Demystifying Myanmar’s Transition and Political Crisis 9811666741, 9789811666742

Table of contents :
Foreword
Acknowledgements
Contents
Notes on Contributors
List of Figures
List of Tables
Part I Transition and the Periphery
1 Myanmar’s Path to Democracy from 2016–2021: Progress, Limitations and Disruptions
Deepening Crises: An Overview
Reflections from the Periphery: The Kyainseikgyi Flood
Reflections from the Pandemic, Election, and Coup: Chapter Highlights
References
2 The Role of Aung San Suu Kyi in Myanmar’s Transition (2011–2021)
Introduction
The Asymmetry of Power
Tatmadaw’s Planned Political System
The 2011 Reforms
Aung San Suu Kyi’s Dilemma
Navigating the Disciplined Democracy
The Uneasy but Manageable Cohabitation
The Second Plebiscite and the Fourth Coup
Conclusion
References
3 Human Security and the Roles of Ethnic Women’s Organisations in Transitional Myanmar
Introduction
Human Security
Security, Development, and Peace
Human Security Challenges in Myanmar
A Case of Mon Women’s Organization (MWO)
Promotion of Human Security by MWO
Conclusion
References
4 Evaluation of the Equality of Education on Basic Education Standard in Chin State, Burma/Myanmar
Introduction
Brief Background of Chin State
Overview of Basic Education in Burma/Myanmar
Evaluation on Basic Education System in Chin State
State Government's Weak Decision-Making Power
Teacher Insufficiency and Incompetency
Promotion of School Level
Insecurity
Poor School Infrastructure
The Border Areas and Ethnic National Races Youth Development Schools (Na Ta La)
Evaluation of the Situation on Basic Education Standard in Chin State
References
5 Non-State Actors on the IDPs in Kachin: Provision of Humanitarian Assistance and Protection of Justice
Background of the Kachin Conflict
Understanding the Context of Non-State Actors’ Major Role in Kachin State
Churches: Shelters for IDPs and Their Protection
The Role of Churches in Protecting IDPs for Justice
The Effort of Churches for IDPs Returns and Resettlement
Conclusion
6 Public Health Reform and Transition in Burma/Myanmar
Background
References
7 Redrawing or Blurring the Boundary? Observations of Naga People’s Political Struggles and Local Cross-Border Trade Practices
Introduction
History of the Naga
Political Struggle of the Naga People
Indo-Myanmar Border Trade
Grihang Village and Border Trade
Conclusion
Postscript: Possible Transition in the Border Area
References
8 Myanmar on the Road Towards the 2020 Elections: A Pre-electoral Assessment
Introduction
Legal Framework in Brief
Election Administration
Institutional Organisation and Composition
Voter Registration
Political Parties and Electoral Campaign
Political Party Landscape
Political Party and Candidate Registration
Campaign Regulation
Campaign Finance
Elections and Conflict
The Potential Cancellation of Elections
Conflict in Rakhine State
Social Media and Elections
Election Observation
Towards Election Day
Post-Scriptum
Selected Sources and Further Readings
Part II From Challenges to Unity
9 The Politics of Space: Naypyidaw and the Ghosts of Yangon
The Ghosts of Yangon
The Insurgent City and a Host of Green Nats
Yangon Landscapes: The Visible and Invisible City
From Yangon to Naypyidaw
Sacred Spaces and Identity: The Upattasanti Pagoda
Conclusion: Placelessness
References
10 Myanmar’s Peace Process and Ceasefire Monitoring Mechanism: A Post-mortem
Background
Stalemate and Suspicion
Ceasefire Monitoring in Divided Societies: An Overview
Recent Ceasefire Monitoring Experiences: Sudan, Indonesia, Sri Lanka
Aceh, Indonesia
Sri Lanka
Myanmar’s JMC
The JMC’s Co-option
Non-Tatmadaw Experiences in the JMC
The End of the Process
Looking into the Future
References
11 A Paradise Lost in the Indo-Pacific? Great Power Politics and International Relations of the Myanmar Tragedy
A Coup from Within? Three Images and the Myanmar Coup
International Society and the Myanmar Crisis: The Three Paradigms
A Tragic Coda: Myanmar as Asia’s Next Failed State?
References
12 Difficult Development Trade-Offs Amidst ‘Transition’: Exploring Power and Politics in Post-2010 Myanmar
Introduction
Development Theory and Practice Since 1945: A Brief Overview
Engaging with the Difficult Trade-Offs That Surround Processes of Development: Four Starting Points
Development as a Disruptive Process
Incorporating Power Relations into Analysis of Development Processes
Engaging with the ‘Distributive Impacts’ of Development
A Relational Framework for Analysing Poverty, Inequality and Economic Growth
Rural Development Strategies in Myanmar: A Political Economy Approach
Conclusion
Funding Statement
References
13 The World Is Not “Flat”: Limits to Development and Control on a Burmese Periphery
Background
An Ecology of Conflict and Control
AA’s Arrival in Paletwa
The Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army
ARSA and AA: A Major Difference
ARSA’s Future
Conclusion
References
14 Patterns of Japanese Development Assistance for Social Transformation in Reform-Era Myanmar
Background
Japanese Interest in Myanmar
Japanese Aid to Myanmar, 2005–2019
Methodology
Aid Amounts
Sectoral Allocations
Sectoral Distribution of ODA-Subsidized NGO Projects
Assistance to Myanmar Civil Society
Regional Allocations
Regional Distribution of ODA-Subsidized NGO Projects and Grassroots/Human Security Projects
Parallel Dual-Track Civil Society Initiatives
Discussion
Conclusion
References
15 Restoring the Culture of Peace in Locals: Agent of Change from Myanmar’s Periphery
Introduction
Women and Culture of Peace
Proactive and Responsive Activities by Ethnic Women’s Organisations in Myanmar
Agents of Grassroots Social Transformation: A Case Study of EWOs
Commonality in Diversity
Ensuring Coherence from Vision to Action to Campaign
Transferring a Culture of Peace to the Grassroots Community
Conclusion
References
16 Myanmar at a “Point of No Return”: Unity Reborn Despite Junta’s Terrorization
Outside Perceptions and Inside Reality
Coups in Myanmar: Similarities and Differences
The Military Terrorizes, the People Defend
Path Towards the Death of Tyranny and Birth of a New Nation
References
Index

Citation preview

Demystifying Myanmar’s Transition and Political Crisis Edited by Chosein Yamahata Bobby Anderson

Demystifying Myanmar’s Transition and Political Crisis

Chosein Yamahata · Bobby Anderson Editors

Demystifying Myanmar’s Transition and Political Crisis

Editors Chosein Yamahata Aichi Gakuin University Nisshin, Japan

Bobby Anderson Chiang Mai University Chiang Mai, Thailand

ISBN 978-981-16-6674-2 ISBN 978-981-16-6675-9 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-6675-9 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore

To those who are working on social transformations of all kinds to make societies freer, communities more prosperous and individuals more empowered— May your pursuit of just rights and good opportunities towards building an equal, stable and peaceful environment in societies struggling for democracy, justice and freedom, prevail and may it never cease. Especially to the fallen heroes—children, women and men—of Burma/Myanmar and all ethnic nationalities across all walks of life who have been fighting for freedom. You have bravely taught the world about peaceful resistance and powerful unity against the 2021 coup and the subsequent brutal militarization to date— Our deepest appreciation, admiration and continued thoughtfulness to all the heroes. We treasure their sacrifices, courage, determination and unity towards building a new federal democratic Myanmar.

Foreword

Myanmar is not and cannot be a failed state for one simple reason. It is not a state. It may be a member of the United Nations (UN) and of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and it may have diplomatic recognition as a state but in fact it does not constitute a state. The Burma nation-building project begun at independence in 1947 was soon corrupted into a Bamar ethnic project under the thumb of the Bamar ethnic armed organization, called the Tatmadaw. Now, even that project has been derailed as the Bamar people too turn their backs on it. The Tatmadaw’s Bamar project could never succeed. For most of its history, the project was led by one of the most incompetent organizations in the world. The Tatmadaw has been at war continually for seventy years, but it has never fought a foreign foe, only the people it was pledged to protect. And it has never won any of its many wars in all that time. Rather, it has been forced to accept ceasefires that have effectively ceded large swathes of Myanmar territory to its armed opponents. The Tatmadaw’s incompetence extends well beyond the battlefield. It took one of the richest countries in Asia and turned it into one of the poorest countries in the world. It overthrew a fledgling democracy and, 50 years later, the political system it crafted all on its own was far less developed, far less successful and far less democratic than the one it had crushed. The ethnic minorities resisted the Tatmadaw from the beginning. Many of them have professional armies that have been far more effective than the Tatmadaw. They have carved out their own self-governed

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FOREWORD

territories where for decades they have delivered ordinary governmental services, as they do today. They have operated as isolated but successful mini-states. Does any military anywhere have such a record of unalleviated failure? The failure is due to the incompetence of the military leadership. Dictator after dictator, all of them from Ne Win on, have been notable for their inability to fight a successful war, to run a government, to manage an economy, to have vision and to inspire confidence and loyalty. They have been superstitious men who have relied on soothsayers as they have changed the currency, moved the capital city, banned motorcycles, decreed that cars drive on the other side of the road and made all the other irrational decisions. No doubt a soothsayer’s auguries guided the coup of 1 February 2021. If so, the soothsayer got it badly wrong. Like most things in Myanmar’s post-independence history the coup has not gone according to the Tatmadaw’s plans. It was not intended to be like this. The Commander in Chief, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, has admitted that in a rare moment of honesty on Chinese television. He clearly thought that, after a short initial period of protest, people would simply acquiesce without too much opposition. He did not think that protests from the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) would continue on a daily basis for month after month, with tactics adapted cleverly to reflect changes in military responses. He clearly did not anticipate the general strike that, after almost a year, continues to paralyse governmental services in the Bamar heartland and to plunge the economy into freefall. He did not expect that armed resistance in Myanmar’s largest cities and towns, including Yangon and Mandalay, would be increasing rather than being crushed, with a mounting toll of military deaths, injuries and defections on top of the thousands of civilians killed, injured and displaced. Min Aung Hlaing no doubt expected too that the international reaction would be short-lived and weak. For a long time, that at least seemed like a correct calculation. The international system is divided and indecisive and the Tatmadaw has some powerful international protectors. However, as the national uprising has grown, so too has the international response. ASEAN’s decision in October 2021 to refuse to permit Min Aung Hlaing to attend the ASEAN Summit was an unprecedented insult from the normally quiescent regional association. Myanmar is not failing. Rather, as time goes on, it is the coup that is failing. The events of 2021 are a true beginning for Myanmar, not an

FOREWORD

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end. The 70 years of arrested development may be coming to an end. Young people have had enough. They will not accept a return to the dictatorial past under corrupt military control. Bamar and ethnic nationalities peoples are collaborating as never before, working together in a new National Unity Government, the most pluralistic, inclusive and representative government Myanmar has ever had. And the National Unity Government has recognized the grave injustices done to the Rohingya people and promised them a place in Myanmar as full citizens on an equal basis. The sixteen papers in this important collection chart the dimensions of Myanmar’s new beginning, both from the ethnic nationalities and from the centre. They analyse the status of the nation-building project immediately before and immediately after the 2021 coup. They also provide directions for the future, based on expert knowledge and experience. This collection could not be more timely. As Myanmar’s future is being contested and determined, the insights of experts offer critical insights. I am pleased to see this collection appear at this time. Why? Because in spite of the coup, I have never felt more optimistic about Myanmar’s future. Myanmar’s national story is just beginning. Sydney, Australia October 2021

Chris Sidoti

Chris Sidoti is an international human rights lawyer and advocate. His work has included a strong focus on Myanmar for 25 years. He is a founding member of the Special Advisory Council for Myanmar. He was an Expert Member of the United Nations Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar (2017–2019).

Acknowledgements

On behalf of the colleagues, co-workers and students who believe in the activities of academic diplomacy’s noble missions, we would like to extend our sincere gratitude and appreciation for those who contributed their works to this book for information dissemination and knowledge impact to cross boundaries of all kinds. We would like to thank the counterpart institutes and individuals working together in promoting the Academic Diplomacy Project (ADP) by the means of various engaged research projects and dialogues through different networks, including the Burma Review and Challenges International Forum (BRACIF), Asian University Network for Advances in Research (AUNFAIR), Thailand-India-Japan Conclave (TIJC) and EuroAunfair Roundtable (EAR). We express our deepest appreciation for Aichi Gakuin University (AGU) in particular, which has enabled us to launch the missions of these networks and forums. Beyond this, we have worked on the Academic Diplomacy Project’s publications as a key mission based on an overarching theme per volume. The mission to write this book emerged from organizing the BRACIF, where a community of scholars, practitioners and civilians devoted to Myanmar gathered to discuss the challenges and prospects of its democratization. Therefore, it is an invaluable privilege for us to convey our gratitude to those who kindly facilitated the 1st BRACIF (2009): the late Professor Dr. Tadataka Koide, Professor Dr. Takashi Matsugi, Professor Dr. Sean Turnell, Professor Dr. Yoshitsugu Hayashi, Professor Dr. Donald

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

M. Seekins, Professor Dr. Kei Nemoto, Professor Hideyuki Shinkai, Associate Professor Yuka Sasaki, Narita-san, Tomita-san, Isobe-san, Kozaki-san and Takeuchi-san. Similarly, we are thankful for Professor Dr. Mandy Sadan, Professor Dr. Catherine Renshaw, Dr. Helene Maria Kyed, Dr. Axel Harneit-Sievers, Mr. Okkar Phyo and Associate Professor Dr. Makiko Takeda for their instrumental contribution and sponsorship in many ways to convene the 2nd BRACIF (2018). Although there are too many to list, we would like to express our deepest gratitude to all individuals, including the speakers and participants of the above events, and those who have helped bring to life many of these collaborative activities, without whom they would not have been possible. On top of this, we are indebted and grateful to have had the privilege of working within such a wonderful, dynamic and generous communities at large. Without these missions of the past and the subsequent activities being pursued till date, this book may not be a reality at this timing. July 2021

Chosein Yamahata Bobby Anderson

Contents

Part I Transition and the Periphery 1

2

3

4

5

6

Myanmar’s Path to Democracy from 2016–2021: Progress, Limitations and Disruptions Chosein Yamahata and Bobby Anderson

3

The Role of Aung San Suu Kyi in Myanmar’s Transition (2011–2021) Michał Lubina

25

Human Security and the Roles of Ethnic Women’s Organisations in Transitional Myanmar Makiko Takeda and Chosein Yamahata

45

Evaluation of the Equality of Education on Basic Education Standard in Chin State, Burma/Myanmar Khen Suan Khai

67

Non-State Actors on the IDPs in Kachin: Provision of Humanitarian Assistance and Protection of Justice D. Moon Awng

85

Public Health Reform and Transition in Burma/Myanmar Voravit Suwanvanichkij and Saw Nay Htoo

101

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CONTENTS

7

Redrawing or Blurring the Boundary? Observations of Naga People’s Political Struggles and Local Cross-Border Trade Practices Satoshi Ota

8

Myanmar on the Road Towards the 2020 Elections: A Pre-electoral Assessment Michael Lidauer

Part II 9

10

11

12

13

14

15

115

135

From Challenges to Unity

The Politics of Space: Naypyidaw and the Ghosts of Yangon Donald M. Seekins Myanmar’s Peace Process and Ceasefire Monitoring Mechanism: A Post-mortem Saw Chit Thet Tun, Bobby Anderson, and Chosein Yamahata A Paradise Lost in the Indo-Pacific? Great Power Politics and International Relations of the Myanmar Tragedy Jittipat Poonkham Difficult Development Trade-Offs Amidst ‘Transition’: Exploring Power and Politics in Post-2010 Myanmar Patrick Meehan

161

181

209

231

The World Is Not “Flat”: Limits to Development and Control on a Burmese Periphery Bobby Anderson

255

Patterns of Japanese Development Assistance for Social Transformation in Reform-Era Myanmar David M. Potter

271

Restoring the Culture of Peace in Locals: Agent of Change from Myanmar’s Periphery Makiko Takeda

293

CONTENTS

16

Myanmar at a “Point of No Return”: Unity Reborn Despite Junta’s Terrorization Chosein Yamahata

Index

xv

321

345

Notes on Contributors

Bobby Anderson is a Research Fellow at the Chiang Mai University School of Public Policy and specializes in political economy, governance, conflict, fragility, community-driven development, ex-combatant reintegration, conflict resolution, livelihoods, frontline service delivery and M&E system design. D. Moon Awng is a Director of Research and Development at Naushawng Development Institute (NDI), Kachin State, Myanmar, which contributes to democratic transition, peacebuilding and sustainable development through training, education, advocacy, research, policy development analysis, civic engagement and networking. Saw Nay Htoo is a Program Director at Burma Medical Association (BMA), a Thailand-based independent non-profit organization founded since 1991 by a group of health professionals as the leading body for health policy development and capacity building to provide quality health care services in ethnic areas of Burma. Dr. Khen Suan Khai is a Lecturer at the School of Social Innovation Mae Fah Luang University, Thailand, and Current Chair of the Mekong Program under the Asian Research Center for International Development.

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NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Michael Lidauer is an Independent Researcher and Expert on democracy support, evaluation assessment, elections, conflict and peacebuilding with respect to Myanmar and beyond. Dr. Michał Lubina is an Associate Professor at Jagiellonian University, Poland and the author of A Political Biography of Aung San Suu Kyi: A Hybrid Politician (Routledge, 2020), and other books including The Bear Overshadowed by Dragon. Russia-China 1991–2014, as well as Russia and China: A Political Marriage of Convenience—Stable and Successful. Dr. Patrick Meehan is a Senior Teaching Fellow at the Department of Development Studies, SOAS University of London, and explores research projects covering the political economy of violence, conflict and development, and engages specifically with the relationship between illicit economies and processes of state-building and peacebuilding in borderland and frontier regions with a primary focus on Myanmar’s borderlands with China. Dr. Satoshi Ota is a Professor at Tama University, School of Global Studies, Japan and specializes in social anthropology focusing on the areas such as popular culture, consumption and consumerism, youth culture, identity construction, globalization, nationalism, Japan, Taiwan, Northeast India, and the Naga in Myanmar. Dr. Jittipat Poonkham is an Associate Professor of international relations at the Faculty of Policy Science, Thammasat University, as well as a Director of International Studies Program, who co-edited International Relations as a Discipline in Thailand: Theory and Sub-Fields (Routledge, 2019). Dr. David M. Potter is a Professor at the Faculty of Policy Studies at Nanzan University, who contributed a chapter on “Japanese Development Assistance, Geopolitics, and ‘Connectivity’ in the Mekong Region: Implications for Aid to Myanmar” in C. Yamahata, S. Sudo and T. Matsugi (eds.), Rights and Security in India, Myanmar, and Thailand (Palgrave, 2020). Dr. Donald M. Seekins is an Emeritus Professor of Southeast Asian Studies at Meio University, Nago, Okinawa, Japan, who co-edited a book entitled Social Transformations in India, Myanmar, and Thailand: Volume I (Palgrave Macmillan, 2021), and also wrote other major publications including a second edition of The Historical Dictionary of

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Burma (Myanmar) (Rowman & Littlefield, 2017) and State and Society in Modern Rangoon (Routledge, 2011). Dr. Voravit Suwanvanichkij is an Advisor of Mae Tao Clinic, Thailand, and also a member at the Center for Public Health and Human Rights of Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, United States. Dr. Makiko Takeda is an Associate Professor at the Faculty of Policy Studies, Aichi Gakuin University, Japan, who co-edited a book entitled Social Transformations in India, Myanmar, and Thailand: Volume I (Palgrave Macmillan, 2021), and is the author of Women, Children and Social Transformation in Myanmar (Palgrave Pivot, 2020). Saw Chit Thet Tun is a Director of Karen Institute of Strategic Studies, founded in 2019 as a non-profit policy research think tank dedicated to providing strategic insights and policy alternatives, and specializes in technical advisory services related to ceasefire monitoring, conflict resolutions and peace process. Dr. Chosein Yamahata is a Professor of Global and Area Studies at the Graduate School of Policy Studies, Aichi Gakuin University, Japan, who recently co-edited Social Transformations in India, Myanmar, and Thailand: Volume I (Palgrave Macmillan, 2021), and Rights and Security in India, Myanmar, and Thailand (Palgrave Macmillan, 2020).

List of Figures

Fig. 3.1 Fig. 4.1 Fig. 4.2 Fig. 4.3 Fig. 4.4 Fig. 4.5 Fig. 4.6 Fig. 6.1

Fig. 7.1 Fig. 7.2 Fig. 10.1

Seven main dimensions of human security and the possible root causes Basic education school student list in Chin State (2019–2020 academic year) (Source CEI 2020) Matriculation pass rate in Chin State Comparison chart of matriculation pass rate in Chin State and the whole country Japan G.G.P. in Chin State (2005–2020) (Source Embassy of Japan in Burma/Myanmar) Na Ta La schools across Burma/Myanmar (Source MoBA, Burma/Myanmar) Na Ta La residential basic education schools in Burma/Myanmar Primary Health Care Convergence Model (Burma/Myanmar) (Source Prepared by authors based on the draft of the Health Convergence Core Group [HCCG]) Location of Grihang Village (Source Google Maps) A grocery store in Grihang Village (Source Photo taken by the author) Actors, stakeholders and mechanisms of peace process up to 2010 (Source: Fisas, V. (2012). 2011 Yearbook on Peace Processes (p. 138). Barcelona: Icaria Editorial : Escola de Cultura de Pau.)

49 71 74 75 78 79 80

110 126 127

193

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LIST OF FIGURES

Fig. 10.2 Fig. 10.3 Fig. 10.4 Fig. 10.5 Fig. 15.1 Fig. 15.2 Fig. 15.3

Actors, stakeholders and mechanisms of peace process between 2011 and 2015 Actors, stakeholders and mechanisms of peace process between 2016 and 2021 Conceptual flow of peace process under a hybrid democracy JMC, reduction of violence and promotion of peace: Missing components towards a durable peace Commonality in the diversity of the EWO’s projects Common features of the projects from identification to documentation to campaigns A conceptual framework of EWO’s social transformation by bridging diplomacy

194 195 196 200 306 309 317

List of Tables

Table 1.1 Table 1.2 Table 3.1 Table 3.2 Table 3.3 Table 4.1 Table 4.2 Table 6.1 Table 10.1 Table Table Table Table

10.2 10.3 14.1 14.2

Table 14.3 Table 14.4 Table 14.5

Comparative outlook: criteria of democratization satisfied under different governments Determinants for success and failure of democratization The root causes and effects of tensions and concerns in Myanmar Main human security challenges in Myanmar MWO’s major activities and approaches promoting human security List of basic education schools in Chin State Japan ODA to eight townships in Chin State (2015–2020) Comparative health indicators of Burma with Thailand Military strength of the EAOs: NCA signatories and non-signatories Approaches in comparison Function of JMC Top ten recipients of Japan’s ODA Japanese ODA to Myanmar by modality, 2005–2019 (unit: 100 million yen) Japanese ODA projects to Myanmar by modality, 2005–2019 Sectoral allocations of loan aid projects to Myanmar, 2010–2019 (number of projects) Sectoral allocations of grant aid projects to Myanmar, 2005–2019 (number of projects)

5 9 52 54 61 73 77 103 183 189 197 274 276 277 278 279

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LIST OF TABLES

Table 14.6 Table 14.7 Table 14.8 Table 14.9 Table 14.10 Table 14.11 Table 14.12

Table 15.1 Table 15.2 Table 15.3

Sectoral allocations of Japanese NGO subsidized projects to Myanmar, 2005–2019 (number of projects) Sectoral allocations of Grassroots/Human Security projects in Myanmar, 2005–2019 (number of projects) Regional allocations of loan aid projects in Myanmar, 2010–2019 (number of projects) Regional allocations of technical assistance projects to Myanmar, 2012–2017 (number of projects) Regional allocations of grant aid projects in Myanmar, 2005–2019 (number of projects) Regional allocations of Japanese NGO subsidized projects to Myanmar, 2005–2019 (number of projects) Regional allocations of Grassroots-human security NGO subsidized projects to Myanmar, 2005–2019 (number of projects) Eight action areas towards a CoP and summary of the expected actions Gender cultures Analysis of the impacts of EWO’s activities and approaches on culture of peace

280 281 282 283 284 285

286 297 302 313

PART I

Transition and the Periphery

CHAPTER 1

Myanmar’s Path to Democracy from 2016–2021: Progress, Limitations and Disruptions Chosein Yamahata and Bobby Anderson

Deepening Crises: An Overview Myanmar’s February 1, 2021 coup d’état, and the subsequent war waged by the military or Tatmadaw to repress opposition to it have transformed the Union from a budding democracy into a killing field with more than 1,200 fatalities as of November 2021. The promising chapter of Myanmar’s democratic and economic transition, albeit limited in duration and reach, has come to an end, as has the Union’s ongoing reintegration into the international order after roughly sixty years of isolation.

C. Yamahata (B) Graduate School of Policy Studies, Aichi Gakuin University, Nisshin, Japan B. Anderson School of Public Policy, Chiang Mai University, Chiang Mai, Thailand

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 C. Yamahata and B. Anderson (eds.), Demystifying Myanmar’s Transition and Political Crisis, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-6675-9_1

3

4

C. YAMAHATA AND B. ANDERSON

Although the National League for Democracy (NLD) government had much to improve with regard to fulfilling its promises of peace, constitutional reform, strengthening of the rule of law, and reaching out to ethnic parties, people from all walks of life, including those in most ethnic regions bar two states—Rakhine and Shan—voted mainly for the NLD to lead Union and Regional parliaments. The NLD was trusted by people across diverse regions in comparison to the military-affiliated parties and some major ethnic parties, as the most viable and accountable political party to consolidate the ongoing but unfinished political transition and prevent potential democratic backsliding by the military. Table 1.1 illustrates the overview of Myanmar’s democratization or lack thereof since independence. It shows that people generally enjoyed more civic freedoms, political rights, and stable democratic institutions under the NLD administration, although it still fell short of the parliamentary democracy of the 1950s. However, the NLD-led civilian government after decades of military rule gave the general public confidence that they were on the right track towards a freer, more open and inclusive society. This was not only demonstrated by the people of Myanmar in the 2020 elections, but also in their collective defense against the 2021 coup. While the NLD’s landslide election victory in November 2020 had strengthened the hopes of the people of Myanmar and the international community that the process of democratization would continue, yet another majority bagged by the NLD in the 2020 election (earlier in 1990 and 2015) was a threat to the military institution and its affiliates, many of whom mistakenly believed that the NLD had lost popularity since their 2015 victory. This was similar to the miscalculation the Tatmadaw made in 1990 and 2015. Undoubtedly, the progress of Myanmar’s democratization facilitated by the NLD intimidated the military. The NLD administration showed that even under a hybrid democracy with a military largely in control, limited civilian rule continued to widen a democratic path while restoring international confidence and generating domestic approval. Their accomplishments include the smooth provision of infrastructure and lifeline services even to most remote ethnic rural areas, educational and healthcare support to people, the promotion of anti-corruption campaigns across the bureaucracy, the removal of unpopular laws and some repressive regulations, the application of people-centered management, and a competent response to the first waves of the Covid-19 pandemic that also offered relief flights to citizens living abroad.

Elections to office are open to participation by all citizens Each vote is of equal value Voters have real and free choices Citizens have open access to information Guaranteeing freedom Civilian control of the military and police

Checklist

Table 1.1

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

• •

•

•

•

•

•

•

1958–1960 1960–1962

Burmese Way to Socialism

Coup 3

Military-initiated transition (pseudo-democracy)

•

•

•

•

•

•

1962–1974 1974–1988 1988–2010 2010–2015

Parliamentary Coup 2 democracy

1948–1958

Parliamentary Coup 1 democracy

•

•

•

•

•

NLD civilian government (hybrid democracy) 2016–2021

Comparative outlook: criteria of democratization satisfied under different governments

(continued)

2021–present

Coup 4

1 MYANMAR’S PATH TO DEMOCRACY FROM 2016–2021 …

5

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

Source Checklist criteria selected from Wood (2004)

Democratic political culture Absence of intervention by foreign powers Market economy Rule of law Peace

Burmese Way to Socialism

Coup 3

Military-initiated transition (pseudo-democracy)

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

1962–1974 1974–1988 1988–2010 2010–2015

Parliamentary Coup 2 democracy

1958–1960 1960–1962

Parliamentary Coup 1 democracy

Checklist

1948–1958

(continued)

Table 1.1

•

•

•

•

NLD civilian government (hybrid democracy) 2016–2021

•

2021–present

Coup 4

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It should be acknowledged that much of the NLD’s popularity depends on Aung San Suu Kyi’s leadership. She is a singularly popular politician in the Union, enjoying respect, trust, and high expectations across political, ethnic, and religious boundaries since 1988. However, she is equal parts powerful and isolated, and she is emblematic of a flawed belief, found across Myanmar’s colonial and post-colonial history, that one person—one messiah—may be the key to change. The unquestioning faith and commitment accorded Aung San Suu Kyi by the civilian majority, as well as NLD cadres, is also indicative of a messianic understanding of politics, and surely is an impediment to the democratic transition as it is envisaged by western donors, governments, and development agencies. Criticisms can also be made. Dissatisfaction and disapproval have followed regarding NLD performance as well as Aung San Suu Kyi’s leadership in handling select issues. The post-election NLD rapidly found itself out of its depth, with many new cadres sure that they would be judged by their fealty to Aung San Suu Kyi rather than their services to the people who elected them. In non-Bamar areas, this disappointment has been most pronounced, and many an NLD cadre in Kayah, Mon, Shan, Kachin, and elsewhere, are mainly successes if measured by the number of things they have named after, and statues they have built to honor, Aung San Suu Kyi’s father, Aung San (Lin 2021). The case study on Kyainseikgyi in the chapter further reveals the limitations of the transition in the peripheries. Although national reconciliation has been cited as a top priority of Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD, they have failed to include important non-signatories to the National Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) in ongoing political dialogue (Paode 2017, 147). The NLD declared the Arakan Army (AA)—which, like other ethnic armed organizations (EAOs), has been fighting for self-determination—as a terrorist organization, and excluded it from peace talks (Hlaing 2021). Although the extent of the military’s influence over the NLD’s decision remains unclear, a military spokesperson confirmed the military’s support by stating that the AA had “very little chance of participating in the peace process” (Radio Free Asia 2020; Broome 2021). Although the NLD does not have the political authority of the military, its stance toward AA has shown that it has a less flexible attitude toward non-Bamar peoples (Lynn 2020). Despite several rounds of discussion under the “21st Century Panglong” Conference,

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key elements of the NCA were not implemented, and led to communitylevel distrust in the process. Aung San Suu Kyi had also defended the Tatmadaw’s mass expulsions of, and violence against, Rohingya at the International Court of Justice (ICJ), “amid accusations of mass killings, rape and expulsion of the mostly Muslim Rohingya minority” (Aljazeera 2019). However, it must be noted that, despite the NLD having held a parliamentary majority, the Union had for all intents and purposes remained in the hands of the military. In January 2020, the NLD submitted 114 proposed amendments to the 2008 constitution that aimed to reduce the military’s role in the government. The military was able to block these amendments as they occupy 25% of the parliament and thus have the ability to veto constitutional amendments; Article 436 of the constitution requires 75% approval for changes to pass (Aung, 2020). Myanmar’s transition had thus been a struggle in the rising and ebbing floodwaters of politics, security, the economy, and the successive waves of a global pandemic, on a path that might have led to, and may yet lead to, a democracy not beholden to a military that remains in power, its control and influence institutionalized within a shallow democratic system, across political, economic, and social aspects of power. In addition to the military retaining significant influence over politics, Yamahata et al. (2020) identifies two other barriers to Myanmar’s democratic transition prior to the coup: a hybrid/incomplete democratic system and an accumulated negligence to fulfil international norms since 1962. Table 1.2 lists other factors that limited democratization in transitional countries, including Myanmar, making it susceptible to a coup. Moreover, Yamahata et al. (2021) also compared Myanmar with its neighbors, Thailand and India, demonstrating that its transition process suffers from deep divisions caused by continued armed conflicts in the Union’s nonBamar borderlands as well as a lack of political and social integration. Myanmar also has a minimal adherence to the rule of law, while also facing challenges in building democratic institutions. Beyond democratization, Myanmar’s situation also demands multidimensional transitions from conflict to peace, poverty to development, divisions to equality and diversity, and resource extraction to sustainability. The initial process was briefly possible through the institutional transition following the NLD’s landslide victory in the 2015 election. However, the NLD-led transition was not only short-lived—lasting from 2016-2021— but also fell short of laying down a stronger foundation for cementing a

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Table 1.2 Determinants for success and failure of democratization Determinants for success

Determinants for failure

• Nonviolent mass mobilizations

• Nonviolent mass mobilizations that was not properly done • Failure to establish a fair and impartial legal system • The presence of bad neighbourhood influence to influence internal reformers • Economic and social policies benefitted outsiders and domestic elites only • Lawlessness

• Establishment of a fair and impartial legal system • Decentralization of power

• The presence of positive neighbourhood influence to pressure internal reformers • Utilizing economic crises to their advantage • Power of elections • Socially inclusive growth: increasing spending on poor and middle class on conditions of keeping kids in school, etc • Utilizing universal provision of social and economic rights • Building capacity of the judiciary, parliaments and civil society • The utilization of information technology and social media by citizens in combating corruption and bolstering the law

• Need to address regional needs • Need to deliver better for the disadvantaged • Repressive legal system

Source Yamahata et al. (2020)

genuine democratization that can be widely felt by the peripheries due to the roadblocks created, directly and indirectly, by the military. Therefore, the democratic consolidation process was much needed and hoped for by the general public to be accomplished during its second term. Despite the NLD’s shortcomings, this collective hope is the reason behind its landslide victory in 2020 as well as the driving force of the people’s nationwide resistance to the latest coup. Undoubtedly, the 2021 coup has abruptly disrupted Myanmar’s ongoing transition led by the NLD before its second term scheduled to commence from April of the same year. Before February 1, 2021, the military was vocal in questioning the legitimacy of the election and warned that it would “take action” if irregularities, which were groundless one-sided accusations by the military and its affiliated political parties that

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lost in the election, were not investigated. The Union Election Commission (UEC) reported that there was no fraud and rejected the military’s allegations about the election, in which the NLD won 396 of the 498 contested parliamentary seats; domestic and international election monitoring agencies also endorsed the election (Lwin 2020; Naing 2021). It is plausible that the Tatmadaw had anticipated that the coup could be the last and only “chance” to stop Myanmar’s democratic transition toward further consolidation, set to be picked up where it left off after the NLD had been re-elected for its second term. The coup occurred in the early morning on the day parliament was to swear in members elected in November 2020. Since then, resistance to a return to military rule has been both ferocious and widespread, through the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) and other outlets. However, the Tatmadaw’s response toward dissent has been nothing short of terror. According to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners, 1,244 peaceful civilians have been killed, with 9,907 arrested, as of November 8, 2021, on the oneyear anniversary of Myanmar’s latest free and fair election. A closed-door meeting of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) was held on the same day to announce that the 2020 election was free and fair by domestic and international observers and reiterated the Council’s continued call on the military to respect the will of Myanmar people (Nichols 2021). The coup poses a major setback towards any progress in these transitions thus far, worsening pre-existing crises and exacerbating violence. However, coups and subsequent crackdowns on peaceful civilians are nothing new in Myanmar’s modern history, especially the ethnic and religious minorities in its peripheries; the military has established itself as a violent institution long before February 2021, serving as a constant threat to the very country it preaches to serve and protect. Moreover, Myanmar’s political decay started not long after independence in 1948: the first coup was in 1958 (known as the Windermere or constitutional coup), followed by the second and third coups in 1962 and 1988, respectively. Such prolonged military involvement in politics by unconstitutional means and use of violent force against unarmed citizens have derailed the nation’s economic, social, and political stability, ultimately pushing Myanmar and her population into a downward spiral over the past six decades from the “Rice Bowl of Asia” to one of the LDCs. Crises are expected to deepen as the junta continues to ignore and suppress the will of the people. In the summer of 2021, Myanmar also faced an

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indirect, although severe, form of violence through “the junta’s capitalization of Covid-19 to silence the dissident citizens protesting the military by depriving the people’s rights to oxygen, medical and emergency aid services” (Yamahata 2021). The pandemic has claimed 18,869 lives while more than 500,000 cases have been reported till date (Reuters 2021). Despite the coup, this chapter argues that the democratic transition much lauded in 2015 had yet to fully occur; the future of it happening remains distant, although not impossible. This chapter also highlights reflections from the periphery and the challenges faced, especially, the Covid-19 pandemic and the 2020 election.

Reflections from the Periphery: The Kyainseikgyi Flood Although Myanmar’s significant yet short-lived transition was a milestone in the country’s move toward democracy, its limitations are especially evident in non-Bamar peripheries, where the fragility of the Union and the resiliency of the communities that constitute it are seen. There is no better place to illustrate this than with a flood in a township in Karen (Kayin) State. In August of 2019, eastern Myanmar’s annual floods arrived. This was no unusual occurrence and in previous years passed with nary a glance: nutrient-rich waters flooded fields, men rolled their longyi further up to work said fields, while families retreated to their homes. But the compounding effects of climate change have made the floods, and the monsoon, more unpredictable and volatile. In 2019 the Thanlwin (Nee Salween) River and hundreds of other rivers and tributaries overflowed. The waters flooded Mawlamyine’s waterfront, cut off sections of the Yangon—Mawlamyine road, and turned vast swathes of Karen and Mon States into a brown-water sea punctuated by small islands of habitation—hamlets and villages and occasional small towns, many reduced to shelters swaying slightly on stilts above a world of moving water. At that time, Bobby Anderson, co-author of this reflection, was stranded on higher ground, in the capital of Karen State’s Kyainseikgyi Township, for a week. Kyainseikgyi is 1.5 hours by car southeast of Mudon: one leaves that town, drives east up a set of switchbacks over low hills, and then down into a landscape of palm and rubber tree plantations which make way to rice fields soon interspersed by the classic geography of rural Karen—massive Karst formations which increase in

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density the further east one travels.1 In the floods, those rock outcroppings took on the appearance of scattered islands. Kyainseikgyi town lies at the juncture where paddy and plain end and hills soon begin. It historically represents the edge of Union control that has steadily expanded into and transformed ethnic Karen and Mon areas in the past half century of state consolidation. Urban media portrayed the 2019 floods as an unmitigated disaster. But in Kyainseikgyi township, those rising waters were noticed with barely a shrug. Life went on. Markets continued: people kept their own livestock, grew their own vegetables, pickled their own tea leaves, and hunted game: the animals so rare on the other side of the Thai border that they can only be seen in zoos there remain plentiful here. People knew how to forage if it came to that: hard lessons from tougher times when the relationship with the Union was only sanguinary. Families in the town still had family in the villages who could take care of them. Only packaged noodles and other products manufactured beyond the floodwaters might run low. If bottled beer ran out, rice wine would replace it. Most families in the plains had a narrow wooden longtail boat, and the richer ones had replaced bamboo poles and paddles with recycled automotive engines that powered drive shaft—mounted propellers. If fuel became scarce, those paddles remained, as did bullock carts and oxen for transport on the higher ground, and charcoal to cook. One of the briefer nods to modernity in the villages beyond Kyainseikgyi town were the ubiquitous solar panels mounted upon thatch roofs to power lone bulbs and charge the Huawei phones which were now as much a part of the rural assemblage as amulets and religious tattoos, tucked seamlessly into Longyi or in traditional hand-woven bags. But other than that, the pattern of daily life in the township, as in much of rural Myanmar, had not changed much since the British Raj. Much of the disintegrating infrastructure in the Union’s countryside was built by them. The threat of the floods only arrived when one tried to cross those waters to the wider world. Each day I headed outside of Kyainseikgyi town in a pickup truck, chasing rumors of open secondary roads to Kawkareik and points beyond. We would ask at police checkpoints, check with civil servants, and no one was sure what was open. So we drove until we hit the water, and then we drove until the water crept 1 These karsts, cultural heritage in themselves, are now being scraped away by backhoes to provide the foundations for the Union’s “post-junta” construction boom.

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above the wheels, and then we would turn back. On that same road to Kawkareik, we watched a bolder truck, a shiny new Hilux, pioneer a route through the water which none else dared follow, and soon that truck rose, bobbed, and was carried south spinning in fast-flowing water that looked deceptively calm. The truck slipped below the brown water. After a week, I left on a longtail boat, the first of three, punctuated by short walks on higher ground before we hired yet another; I even crab-walked across the bent ruins of a bridge before reaching the higher ground near Mudon—the Union, proper, it felt—again. Over the course of this journey, it dawned upon me that a landscape which I thought had learned intimately across three years of work in the township was now unrecognizable but for the Karst pillars. Kyainseikgyi, like this collection, reflects the deeper experience of the union. Firstly, both illustrate Myanmar’s state-building conundrum: the township reflects both the evanescence of the Union, and the strength and resiliency of the communities herein. Kyainseikgyi is an example of the self-reliance of rural families, communities, and the civil society they constitute across the Union. The township reflects the Union’s diversity as well: Kyainseikgyi hosts a plethora of languages and ethnicities, and the Bamar language is not widely spoken outside the few small towns in the township. Bamar is, indeed, the minority language: Sgaw and Pwo Karen are much more widely used. Kyainseikgyi also reflects the ephemera of the Union beyond its Bamar heartlands. Government, here, is found in the General Administrative Department (GAD), and in teachers and medical workers in the formal state systems, but it is mainly found in the Tatmadaw, followed by police. And even then, this is a façade: the military keep to their concrete and sandbag checkpoints and hilltop bases surrounded by bamboo stakes which are not all that different from the fixed fortifications of millennia past, if one discounts the weapons-grade metal, dry powder, and so on. Roadblocks and tolls on the paved roads abound, but this is only in the flatlands of the west, on the border with Mon. Informal and non-Bamar teachers and medical workers outnumber the formal ones. And while the village tract administrators are GAD representatives, they are not chosen by that monolith; they are selected by village heads, who are in turn elected by the heads of groups of ten households. This starkly patriarchal system still demonstrates a historical and contemporary interplay of authoritarianism and consensus: a foundation to build on.

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The GAD appointees themselves are non-Bamar locals with many loyalties, of which loyalty to the Union is not the first priority. Many are also members of Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs); a Village Tract administrator for the union may be the same village tract administrator appointed by the Karen National Union (see below). This can be seen as Union weakness, but it is better seen as resilience born of pragmatism: a series of decentralized, flexible, and overlapping nodes of governance, described elsewhere as the Rhizome state.2 That’s not to say that fragmentation is not there. Kyainseikgyi abounds with it: the Union here pushes up against those who contest it. The township may host the largest number of EAOs of any township outside of Northern or Eastern Shan: the Karen National Union (KNU)/Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) is the largest, and still controls vast areas of the township’s East, the border with Thailand in particular. They are followed by the New Mon State Party (NMSP); the Democratic Karen Benevolent Army (DKBA); their breakaway, the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA); the miniscule Karen Peace Force, and numerous Border Guard Forces (BGF)—factions of insurgents which joined the Tatmadaw and are under their command. Even the Tatmadaw, then, are often found by proxy here. The KNU, for their part, is the longest-running insurgency in modern history; they were founded in 1947 and launched an armed revolt upon Burma’s independence two years later. Unlike in other areas of Karen and Bago East, the local KNU in Kyainseikgyi has accommodated itself to the Union and the Tatmadaw, although they still control, and defend, if need be, their territory. And it is within Kyainseikgyi that we may also discern the civil interplay between this armed non-state actor and the state: many of the village tract administrators and village heads who serve as GAD, and therefore, Union, representatives, are also members of EAOs, the KNU in particular. A better example of Joel Migdal’s State in Society3 could not be imagined. And while these contending groups are a recipe for volatility, the overlapping civilian administrations described above point to a future where the same blurring of armed groups might occur beyond

2 Baker, Jacqui. 2015. “The Rhizome State: Democratizing Indonesia’s Off-Budget Economy”, Critical Asian Studies, June, Vol. 47, No. 2, pp. 309–336. 3 Migdal, Joel S. 2004. State in Society: Studying How States and Societies Transform and Constitute One Another. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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BGFs allowed to engage in illicit economic activities in exchange for their service to the coercive elements of the Union. As elsewhere in the Union, even these groups are fragmented. The KNU’s cellular structure does not start at Kawthoolei and end at the Brigade level. It continues right down to the Village Tract level, with local KNU administrators given wide leeway in decision-making. This is a lesson the KNU learned when the aforementioned DKBA broke away from the KNU in 1994, and when a DKBA faction broke away from the DKBA when they became a BGF. Strength is found in cellular structure and locality. This plethora of armed groups, and the Union’s manner of dealing with them, also results in paranoia about outsiders within the civilian administration of the state. Across my time working on development projects in the township, my own ability to travel was curtailed to the point where I was eventually banned from moving outside the township capital, and even there I was followed by plainclothes police. It got to the point where I would recognize them and wave; they would wave back. My local counterparts had to file written daily reports on my movement in triplicate, to GAD, Police, and Immigration. This does not reflect any importance on my part—I was the least important person there. Rather, it reflects something found throughout the Union as well, beyond the tourist areas where foreigners can ride balloons above Bagan or take pictures of fishers on Inle lake. Those areas are Potemkin villages. The rest of the Union is bound within a web of authoritarian control, not only military, but civilian, where the Immigration authorities regulate all movement of all people, not only foreigners: if you are from a different township than your ID states, you are an immigrant too, and you represent volatility. The recently curtailed democratic transition had yet to embrace freedom of movement or freedom from surveillance as principles. There is no guarantee that Kyainseikgyi, or the Union around it, will remain at peace. The township is peaceful in comparison to other KNU Brigade Areas, Hpapun4 in particular; here the local KNU seems to have resolved itself to the encroachment of the Union, but this can change. 4 “Karen People Angry over Tatmadaw Incursions into KNU Territory in Post-Election Period”, BNI International, January 8, 2021, https://www.bnionline.net/en/news/ karen-people-angry-over-tatmadaw-incursions-knu-territory-post-election-period, accessed January 15, 2021.

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One lesson Myanmar teaches is that things always fall apart. The foraging that the township’s people know was learned and relearned over the course of the state’s violence toward communities here; unlike Europeans foraging for mushrooms, it is no Sunday pastime. It is as important as knowing how to hide. That all these elements exist in the township, again, points to the resiliency of communities—it is the same lesson found in the myriad contributions to this book.

Reflections from the Pandemic, Election, and Coup: Chapter Highlights The 2020 election and the Covid-19 pandemic are also worth reflecting upon. They also demonstrate equal and paradoxical qualities, fragility, and resilience, which both support and impede the democratic transition. As we write, in early 2021, Myanmar recently held only the second democratic election in the Union’s history, colonial, post-colonial, or otherwise. The 2020 election occurred in the midst of the global Novel Coronavirus (Covid-19) pandemic and associated states of emergency that have brought many aspects of the world economy to a halt. Myanmar was spared the first worldwide wave of Covid-19 infections but an outbreak in Rohingya camps in Rakhine in the summer of 2020 rapidly moved beyond the control of public health workers and other authorities there. Simultaneous outbreaks in other parts of the country may stem from those camps. This consideration, however, is immaterial: Covid-19 has always been here, and the borders by which it can enter the Union are porous ones. The significance of the outbreak in the Rohingya camp, like the flood mentioned above, can also be taken as illustrative of the state of the Union before the coup at its grassroots: isolated yet connected, fragile yet resilient. The pandemic also reminds us that, no matter how distant parts of the Union may be, it remains part of a greater whole, of whom China may be the most pertinent; the dangers, as in the Kyainseikgyi flood described above, may be found in the crossing. The relative truths revealed by the outbreak and its impact, on bodies, communities, markets, elections, and borders, are open to constant interpretation depending on what side of what myriad cornucopia of issues one may find oneself on: fragile or resilient, depending on one’s ideological vantage point leads one to look for strengths or weaknesses.

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Just like Kyainseikgyi, Myanmar’s 2020 election also reflected paradoxes and entry points. That the election occurred in the pandemic is a logistical feat; that voter turnout was so high is illustrative of a robust civil society and an embracing of a new and participatory democratic practice. However, in Kyainseikgyi in 2020, many village tracts in wholly insurgent areas did not get to vote; they lacked the GAD structure by which to do so. In other areas of the township, the elections were cancelled outright, as well as in many parts of Rakhine and Shan, ostensibly due to insecurity. This, and the recent coup, remind us that conflict is not yet settled at the ballot box: nor will it be for the foreseeable future. That cancellation also reminds us that Myanmar, despite a feted and recently curtailed democratic transition, was not yet democratic and that its nascent democracy was easier for Bamar communities to participate in than non-Bamar. The previous election demonstrates this. The Union’s widely feted first democratic election was in 2015: Aung San Suu Kyi’s NLD found itself pitted once again against the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP). Then, and now, the NLD won by a landslide. That first election was hailed as a “triumph of democracy”, but this democracy was not found in Kyainseikgyi, where the elections were cancelled in nearly every village tract in the township. It was safe enough in 2015 for Union development projects to prepare to enter nearly every village in Kyainseikgyi, recruit project workers fresh out of school, and even send in young engineers who did not speak local languages to work with communities to build community-selected infrastructure, but not, it seems, to vote. During the NLD’s first term, the Union’s democratic transition progressed in some places while it reversed in others. The Tatmadaw has since reversed it all. On the one-year anniversary of the NLD’s landslide election victory, the U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken has called for the military junta to restore Myanmar’s path towards “a genuine and inclusive democracy” while honoring the people of Myanmar, including more than 1,300 civilians who lost their lives in the anti-coup struggle to reclaim democracy, respect for human rights, and rule of law (VOA 2021). Myanmar is distinguished by violence, where the options to end it may seem limited and at times “impossible” from the outside. Some political commentators and analysts expect that the perpetrator of violence—the military—is the only capable actor of stopping it. A deeper question remains: how can a country and its people ruled by a singular and dominant military institution overcome yet another coup? After all, the

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transition was compromised from the beginning: not only was it orchestrated by the military, but it also occupied the parliament and other positions of power. However, this is the very reason why Myanmar’s people, including the diaspora, are struggling to rid the Union of such authoritarianism. In light of the challenges faced and the hope for change, the original scope of this volume has widened where relevant to cover both the current crisis, and the possibilities to overcome it. Moreover, there remains a need to demystify the complexities of the derailed transition, the coup, and what both could inform about the future of Myanmar. The book project, then, set out to assess Myanmar’s societal changes and development prospects over the course of a now-disrupted democratic transition. A multitude of authors of diverse interests and specialties undertook extensive research in order to both broaden and deepen understandings of the Union, as well as provide a foundation for effective international cooperation beyond the center and into the peripheries. The diversity of works contained in this volume serve to highlight the possibility of working with change from the bottom-up, involving the grassroots of Myanmar’s diverse peoples as key drivers of change to engage with, and learn from. That such people are described as marginalized is not reflective of either (a) how they see themselves or (b) what they have to contribute. It is only reflective that they have not been engaged to contribute. This volume offers entry points to do so. In the second chapter, Lubina discusses Myanmar’s transition by focusing on Aung San Suu Kyi’s critical role in political transformation. He argues that she adjusted to an inherited “disciplined democracy” and managed to change the system from within to move Myanmar forward, secure reforms, and make progress from 2011 until the 2021 coup d’état. The author analyzes the concessions and compromises Suu Kyi made on the way, but eventually, she emerged victorious both in 2015 and 2020, leading ultimately to the Tatmadaw’s unconstitutional intervention. Takeda and Yamahata argue that even at the height of Myanmar’s political and economic reforms, Myanmar’s citizens continue to encounter considerable human insecurity challenges due, in part, to the excess emphasis on traditional security in the peace process by male-dominated institutions. The authors explain how ethnic women’s organizations (EWOs) are filling in such gaps to promote human security at grassroots levels by bridging stakeholders in order to generate social cohesion. Khai examines Myanmar’s democratic transition through the prism of service delivery and its attendant challenges, with particular attention to

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basic education standards in Chin State, which exemplifies the inequalities found in the peripheries. He emphasizes limitations in equality and quality in education services at all levels there, describing a poor learning environment comprised of inadequate human resources, school infrastructure, outdated teaching methods, language barriers, armed conflict, and even involuntary cultural assimilations such as forced religious conversion. Awng describes the critical role of churches and other non-state actors in providing humanitarian assistance, protection, and justice to Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) taking refuge at both government- and non-government-controlled areas, and in their efforts to attain long-term solutions to the IDP crisis. He reiterates the essential humanitarian roles of such non-state actor groups in ensuring minimum levels of human security and argues that increased collaboration with, as well as support to, these groups, is crucial in the now-paused democratic transition. Suwanvanichkij and Htoo discusses the important role of communitybased ethnic organizations in Myanmar’s transition by presenting how, in the absence of the state, such groups have mobilized to provide essential health and other social services to communities, IDPs, and refugees fleeing armed conflicts. The authors argue that the model for health reform and convergence by ethnic community-based health organizations can progress only in conjunction with real efforts to achieve sustainable peace and a federal democratic state. Ota tackles Myanmar’s transition by explaining the Naga people’s political struggle and their everyday interactions with people on the Indian side of the border. Due to historical reasons, some Nagas in India are trying to create an independent state with Naga from Myanmar. The author argues the political struggle to re-draw the national border is a difficult issue to solve while economic exchange occurs across this border and investigates the tactics of Naga people on the Indian side to circumvent political obstacles daily. Lidauer notes that the 2015 elections were akin to a referendum against military rule, which led to the NLD’s Aung San Suu Kyi as State Counsellor. He analyzes the progress of Myanmar’s transition through the 2020 pre-electoral situation, legal framework for elections, election administration, voter registration, political party landscape, campaign finance framework, the impacts of the local cancellation of elections in Rakhine State in particular, and social media and election observation, while taking Covid-19 into account.

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Seekins introduces new ways of understanding twenty-first-century Myanmar. Politics needs to be understood as a battle over the control of space and as a fundamental human activity; this brings us to the heart of politics in Myanmar and Southeast Asian countries. He analyzes the conflict over space in Myanmar more clearly by focusing on urban areas during previous (1988–2011) military rule, and reflects on Myanmar’s now-stalled transition, including discussions of the old capital of Yangon (Rangoon) vis a vis the new (2005–present) capital of Naypyidaw. Tun, Anderson and Yamahata discuss the role of the Joint Ceasefire Monitoring Committee (JMC), a key mechanism of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) which is increasingly a tool capitalized by the Tatmadaw in all processes. The authors analyze the JMC’s misuse from the perspective of Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) and describe how to transform the JMC into the independent and trust-building entity it was intended to be. Poonkham analyzes the 2021 coup through Kenneth Waltz’s threeimages theory of individuals, domestic politics, and international society. The author argues that international society has thus far failed to act and the military intervention for humanitarian purposes is unlikely to occur due to three key paradigms: the anarchical society, the clash of international orders, and weakened norms of humanitarian intervention. The chapter warns that without prudential ethics and restraints, the prospect of civil war and failed statehood is likely to occur in Myanmar. Meehan argues that all post-2010 engagements rush to focus on “doing development”, which out-paced the ability or willingness to engage with development scholarship or to acknowledge how this scholarship challenges the “win-win” development narratives that have been espoused by policymakers and practitioners working in Myanmar. He highlights that any meaningful development engagement to tackle poverty and inequality in transitional Myanmar must address the difficult trade-off in engaging contentious politics, power relations, unequal distribution of costs, and the benefits of the development processes to filter rural development strategies. Anderson approaches the transition by analyzing the parameters imposed by terrain upon the Union of Myanmar’s nearly century-long attempt to consolidate control within its theoretical borders, using the extreme example of Paletwa to illustrate what problems the Union’s authorities and security actors face when it comes to asserting their control over remote and geographically complex townships. In the

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chapter, the author highlights the factors such as ethnolinguistic diversity, geographical terrain, the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army, and the Arakan Army before outlining possible development futures there and in other peripheries. Potter interprets Myanmar’s progress in the democratic transition by analyzing Japan’s democratization assistance to Myanmar in the context of the post-2010 political liberalization. The author highlights that Japanese aid reinforces state institutions, even as Japan professes support for ethnic minorities; domestic and international political and organizational issues hamper the development of more robust Japanese participation in the democratization processes of Myanmar even during such an important transitional period. Takeda notes that, despite their exclusion from the formal peace process, women under ethnic women’s organizations (EWOs) actively employ alternative strategies to influence these processes, and promote women’s rights, by working together across ethnic and religious boundaries. She highlights the potential of EWOs as agents in restoring a culture of peace from Myanmar’s peripheries by discussing their approaches and representative projects in grassroots social transformation. In the final chapter, Yamahata analyzes the Tatmadaw’s reasons behind the recent coup, its execution, and the atrocities which have followed, concluding that Myanmar is no longer functioning like a state. Instead, the military junta is an illegitimate state or army-state, waging war and committing acts of terror against civilians. Meanwhile, the members of society, including but not limited to the four “sons” or thas of Myanmar—taiyin-tha (ethnic minorities), phaya-tha (Sangha and members of other religious communities), kyaung-tha (students), and pyithupyi-tha (the general public)—are saving the nation from the danger of state failure. Myanmar is at a “point of no return” in which its people will not accept anything less than a federal democracy, even at the cost of continued violence. The people’s unity and determination are key to defending and rebuilding the state as well as completing the unfinished democratic transition; such solidarity has become a driving force of Myanmar’s ‘second’ independence struggle, this time from military authoritarianism, instead of British rule in 1948. In conclusion, this volume, compiled by Myanmar and non-Myanmar scholars working on democratic transition and development, can serve in some small way as a stock-taking. Demystifying Myanmar’s Transition and Political Crisis illustrates that the deepening challenges to a genuine

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democratic transition results in communities taking initiatives on their own. Taken as a whole, these myriad chapters represent the state of the Union, not in her halls of power, but on her edges—on the margins and at the grassroots where nearly all of Myanmar’s putative citizens live. And again, while Covid-19 may have revealed certain fragilities in the prepandemic political economy, at the Union’s grassroots, the resilience of civil society is most evident, as communities and local religious and other organizations mobilize to provide the services that states usually provide, in health, education, social protection, and so on. The myriad groups, initiatives, and other actions found in self-mobilizing communities as described in this book provide a foundation for effective international cooperation beyond the center and into the peripheries—places like Kyainseikgyi. At last, the editors would like to acknowledge that the views represented in each chapter of the volume are those of the contributors and theirs alone. We thank the contributors for sharing their hard work in this fifth book of the Academic Diplomacy Project, aimed to facilitate dialogue on social issues beyond academia. As Myanmar enters a dark period in its history, it becomes incredibly important to stay informed and engaged in the complexities of the country’s transition.

References Aung, S. (2020). Myanmar Military Still Wields Veto on Charter Change as NLD Reform Attempt Fails. The Irrawaddy. Retrieved 4 July 2021, from https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/myanmar-militarystill-wields-veto-charter-change-nld-reform-attempt-fails.html. Baker, J. (2015). The Rhizome State: Democratizing Indonesia’s Off-Budget Economy. Critical Asian Studies, 47 (2), 309–336. https://doi.org/10. 1080/14672715.2015.1041282. Broome, J. (2021). The Arakan Dream: The Search for Peace in Myanmar’s Rakhine State. Jamestown. Retrieved 4 July 2021, from https://jamestown. org/program/the-arakan-dream-the-search-for-peace-in-myanmars-rakhinestate-on-the-verge-of-civil-war/. Hlaing, K. (2021). After Myanmar’s Military Coup, Arakan Army Accelerates Implementation of the ‘Way of Rakhita’. The Diplomat. Retrieved 4 July 2021, from https://thediplomat.com/2021/04/after-myanmars-mil itary-coup-arakan-army-accelerates-implementation-of-the-way-of-rakhita/.

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Lin, S. (2021). Karen People Angry over Tatmadaw Incursions into KNU Territory in Post-Election Period. Retrieved 10 July 2021, from https:// www.bnionline.net/en/news/karen-people-angry-over-tatmadaw-incursionsknu-territory-post-election-period. Lwin, N. (2020). No Major Irregularities in Myanmar Election: Carter Center. The Irrawaddy. Retrieved 19 June 2021, from https://www.irrawaddy.com/ elections/no-major-irregularities-myanmar-election-carter-center.html. Lynn, K. (2020). The National League for Democracy: A Party for Democracy or Federalism? Transnational Institute. Retrieved 4 July 2021, from https:// www.tni.org/es/node/25165. Migdal, J. (2004). State in Society: Studying How States and Societies Transform and Constitute One Another. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Myanmar Says ‘Terrorist’ Arakan Army Is Losing Chance to Join Peace Process. Radio Free Asia. (2020). Retrieved 4 July 2021, from https://www.rfa.org/ english/news/myanmar/terrorist-aa-03262020172528.html. Myanmar: The Latest Coronavirus Counts, Charts and Maps. Reuters. (2021). Retrieved 11 November 2021, from https://graphics.reuters.com/world-cor onavirus-tracker-and-maps/countries-and-territories/myanmar/. Naing, S. (2021). Myanmar Poll Body Says No Election Fraud After Army Warns of ‘Action’. Reuters. Retrieved 4 July 2021, from https://www.reuters.com/ article/us-myanmar-politics-idUSKBN29X1NS. Nichols, M. (2021). U.N. Aid Chief Says Myanmar Deteriorating, Security Council Meets. Retrieved 11 November 2021, from https://www.reuters. com/world/asia-pacific/un-aid-chief-says-myanmar-deteriorating-securitycouncil-meets-2021-11-08/. Paode, A. (2017). National Reconciliation In Myanmar: The National League for Democracy Way. World Affairs: The Journal of International Issues, 21(1), 136–151. Top US Diplomat Calls for Return to ’Genuine and Inclusive Democracy’ in Myanmar. VOA. (2021). Retrieved 11 November 2021, from https://www. voanews.com/a/top-us-diplomat-calls-for-return-to-genuine-and-inclusivedemocracy-in-myanmar-/6304144.html. Transcript: Aung San Suu Kyi’s Speech at the ICJ in Full. Aljazeera. (2019). Retrieved 4 July 2021, from https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/12/ 12/transcript-aung-san-suu-kyis-speech-at-the-icj-in-full. Wood, A. (2004). Asian Democracy in World History (pp. 7, 1–18). Oxon: Routledge. Yamahata, C. (2021). The Spirit of Revolution Lives On Despite Deepening Crises under Myanmar Junta’s Caretaker Government. Taiwan Center for Security Studies. Retrieved 11 November 2021, from https://taiwancss.org/mya nmar-juntas-caretaker-government/.

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Yamahata, C., Seekins, D.M., and Takeda, M. (2021). Social Transformations in India, Myanmar and Thailand: Volume I: Social, Political and Ecological Perspectives. Palgrave Macmillan. Yamahata, C., Sudo, S., and Matsugi, T. (2020). Rights and Security in India, Myanmar, and Thailand. Palgrave Macmillan.

CHAPTER 2

The Role of Aung San Suu Kyi in Myanmar’s Transition (2011–2021) Michał Lubina

Introduction Well before 2010s political changes in Myanmar, it had been said that Aung San Suu Kyi played “a critical role” in Burmese politics (Kyaw Yin Hlaing 2007). This statement holds even truer for 2011–2021 period; the rest of this quote is still valid: “those who want to understand Myanmar politics will have to understand her personality, her political philosophy and her role in the political life of the country” (Kyaw Yin Hlaing 2007). While leaving the issues of her personality and her political philosophy aside here (I have dealt with these topics on other occasions, Lubina 2018, 2020), in this article I will concentrate on the role she played in Myanmar’s 2010s political transformation. To understand the logic of it, however, one must present the background first.

M. Lubina (B) Jagiellonian University, Kraków, Poland e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 C. Yamahata and B. Anderson (eds.), Demystifying Myanmar’s Transition and Political Crisis, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-6675-9_2

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The Asymmetry of Power Since Aung San Suu Kyi entered Burmese politics in 1988 she has been , the Burmese army). politically weaker than the Tatmadaw ( This is an obvious observation, though it is worth repeating due to the fact that overwhelming popular support in Myanmar and significant (before 2010s) foreign backing both created an impression of Suu Kyi’s strength, if not of an “alternative power centre” (Zöllner 2011). But it was an illusion: despite personal charisma, persistence (if not stubbornness) and costly sacrifices, Suu Kyi was politically disadvantageous from the start. In a way, the political struggle in Myanmar since 1988 until 2011 had been a competition between the strong (army) and the weak (Suu Kyi) over who sets the rules. In this over two-decade-long political struggle, the regime was politically winning, but it could not defeat Suu Kyi fully. She was losing, but never lost. Suu Kyi remained in the game which—judging by the asymmetry of power—was a big achievement. Being unable to win and being too strong to lose, she had to believe that time was on her side. The generals followed the same logic, but à rebours: that time was on their side. As a result, the political stalemate in Myanmar prolonged. Nothing helped: neither domestic and international mediations nor behind-the-scenes negotiations. Two sides entrenched on their positions and it was Myanmar that paid the price. The people were caught in the trap of politics and its consequences: poverty, oblivion, exclusion. Cut from the global world, Myanmar—which has a long heritage of inward-looking, a tendency to close itself—became once again a hermit country. This situation strengthened the nationalist, xenophobic forces (Tatmadaw, radical monkhood) while weakening the open-minded groups, inclusive groups (Thant Myint-U 2007). It was, in short, a dark period, a lost two decades, a lose–lose situation for all (generals and cronies excluding).

Tatmadaw’s Planned Political System Politically speaking, the time was on the generals’ side. In 2000s they masterminded (Ye Htut 2019) “a very specific transition”, without Suu Kyi, but a one “to a more diffused and popularly acceptable structure” (Thant Myint-U 2020) than the SLORC/SPDC scheme allowed. It went in accordance with Khin Nyunt’s 7-points “roadmap to democracy” (NLM 2003), though Khin Nyunt himself would not reap the fruits of

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this scenario as he was toppled in 2004 and ceased to matter politically afterwards. First, National Convention resumed (2003) and concluded by drafting a constitution (2007/2008). Then it was put to a (rigged) referendum (2008). Based on it, parliamentary elections (neither free nor fair) were held in 2010; Hluttaw (the two-house parliament) was conveyed (2011) and the civilian, or rather quasi-civilian government was formed (2011). Tatmadaw controlled this political process from the very beginning till the end and—thanks to the constitution—established the military-supervised political system, named the “disciplined democracy”. This charming name has a dual meaning; externally it is a typical “democracies with adjectives” (Collier and Levitsky 1997) or autocracies in disguise of democracy, where the adjective nullifies the noun (when a democracy is “people’s”, “sovereign”, etc. it is no longer a democracy). In Myanmar, in this the most military-dominated constitution in the world (Patel et al. 2014), discipline indicates clearly that it was the army’s invention. But there is , si kan) also another meaning: in Burmese culture, discipline ( is a moral value (Walton 2015). Within 2008 constitution there are numerous clauses that ensure Tatmadaw’s political interests are protected. The military has been allocated 25% seats in both houses of the Hluttaw (166 in total: 110 in Pyithu Hluttaw, or the lower house and 56 in Amyotha Hluttaw, respectively)—these MPs are not elected, but they enjoy the full privileges of the deputies (Constitution of Union of Myanmar 2008). Consequently, elections designate only 75% of all seats, that is 498 seats (out of 664). As it is easy to count, any Tatmadaw-opposed government needs to win 334 seats in total (113 in Amyotha Hluttaw and 221 in Pyithu Hluttaw), or 67% of contested seats in order to outvote the military (the numbers needed to outvote the military deputies change when elections are postponed in some areas—which is a norm—so, in 2015 it was 329 seats, while in 2020 it was 322 seats, but the logic remains the same: an opposing party needs to score a huge majority of mandates). Tatmadaw, however, cannot be outvoted in constitutional matters. To amend the constitution it is required to have over 75% of votes in favour of it (Constitution 2008). In other words, the elected deputies would have to vote unanimously in favour and convince at least one military MP to do the same. In Burmese political circumstances, it is a political fiction scenario.

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Furthermore, the constitution grants Tatmadaw three ministries (home, defence and border affairs) in every government; one vice presidential post, administrative autonomy and judicial impunity, preventing any legal possibility for judging Tatmadaw’s past atrocities (Constitution 2008). Finally, the constitution gives the Tatmadaw the majority (5 out of 9 members) in the NDSC (National Defence and Security Council). The president, in consultation with the NDSC, has the power to declare emergency should the Three National Causes (non-disintegration of the Union, non-disintegration of national solidarity and perpetuation of sovereignty) be endangered; in that case, all powers would transfer to the commander-in-chief of the Tatmadaw (Constitution 2008). And, the constitution, just in case, ensures Aung San Suu Kyi cannot be the president as the charter prohibits any formal foreign liaisons of family members and her two sons hold British and American passports, respectively (their Burmese passports were revoked by the junta in late 1980s). In short, the constitution established the Tatmadaw-supervised political system of Myanmar regardless of the type of the government (quasicivilian: compromised of former military men or genuinely civilian). At best it legitimises a cover-up of factual military rule; at worst scenario, it limits any opposition government, forcing it to cohabitate with the army. The constitution also allows Tatmadaw to move to the back seat: to have power, influence and privilege without responsibility. After legitimizing the constitution, the generals pushed through next steps on the roadmap: elections (November 2010), conveying of the Hluttaw (February–March 2010) and establishment of a (quasi)civilian government in March 2011. It was not the direction that surprised most commentators, but personalities. Instead of Senior General Than Shwe, the paramount Tatmadaw leader, it was Thein Sein (previously no. 4 in the junta) who emerged as president, followed by thura Shwe Mann as lower house speaker and Min Aung Hlaing as the commander-inchief of the armed forces. Than Shwe retired for good from everyday policymaking.

The 2011 Reforms Quite unexpectedly, Thein Sein’s administration introduced sweeping reforms. Although the first signs came already in Spring 2011, what convinced the observers that it was different (than 1995 or 2002) this time, was regime’s rapprochement with Aung San Suu Kyi in the summer

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of 2011 (softened approach towards her, meetings with her “liason officer” Aung Kyi in July and August and the breakthrough Thein Sein-Suu Kyi meeting in Naypyidaw on 19 August 2011, Kyaw Yin Hlaing 2014). Coupled with a brave (yet costly in terms of political consequences, Ye Htut 2019) decision to suspend Myitsone dam this indicated the reforms were for real. And indeed, by 2012 the changes accelerated and produced the politically breakthrough transformation of Myanmar. In just a couple of years, Myanmar changed from being a poor and semi-isolated “hermit country” into a darling of the global world. The contrast between the dynamics of 2010s and the lost two decades (1990s and 2000s) could not have been greater. There is no one explanation why the generals initiated reforms, despite a general consensus that the reforms were elite-made: introduced from above by the military regime (Maung Aung Myoe 2014; Taylor 2013; Egreteau 2014; Aung-Thwin 2013). Some say it was what the Tatmadaw commanders wanted from late 1980s or early 1990s: to withdraw into a comfortable back seat. They couldn’t have done that before, the argument goes, due to various domestic and international challenges; in early 2010s, however, the situation improved enough for them to withdraw into the position of protectors of the political system they created (Egreteau 2016; Maung Aung Myoe 2014; Taylor 2015; Kyaw Yin Hlaing 2014; Slater 2014; Jones 2014; Pedersen 2014). Other analysts present Tatmadaw’s move to the back seat as regime’s “survival strategy” (Bünthe 2014; Croissant and Kamerling 2013; Chambers 2014) and/or as a way to restore legitimacy (Ganesan 2013). Whatever reason, internal dynamics within regime must have been important, too (Egreteau 2016). Although the popular talk about “moderates” and “pragmatists” within Tatmadaw received considerable amount of academic criticism (Kyaw Yin Hlaing 2011), there was nevertheless a generational change within the armed forces in 2000s and 2010s: people more receptive to the outside stimuluses (Zöllner 2011) replaced the old “war fighters” (Callahan 2003) which helped to start (and later: to continue) the reforms; it is debatable, though, to which extent the reforms moved beyond the original plan or followed it consciously (Egreteau 2016; Lall 2016). These Tatmadaw-centred dynamics were complimented by other actions: the ones outside Tatmadaw’s realm. Some Myanmar-watchers say there begun a process of outside-of-the-NLD changes within the Burmese society, started by engaged civil society builders and Myanmar foreign

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returnees, which accelerated after 2008 cyclone; this influenced, this way or another, the regime behaviour’s modification (Lall 2016; Ganesan 2014). And there is a certain popularity of arguments about external reasons: Western sanctions and China (e.g. Min Zin and Brian 2012). For some it was the sanctions that forced the generals to open the country, but this argument is as popular as shallow (Early, 2016 shows well why). The evidence points out to the contrary (international image has never been an important factor in Tatmadaw’s policy considerations). If the sanctions played any constructive role, then it was in the symbolic sphere. Isolation and low international status humiliated Myanmar people; a will to rebuild it must have been one of psychological motivations behind reforms (Thant Myint-U 2020; Taylor 2013; Egreteau 2016). And there is “the China argument”: that the dependence on Beijing proved too much for the generals who wanted to balance Chinese influence by reaching out to the West and restore their traditional neutral foreign policy (Min Zin and Brian 2012; Strangio 2020). All these interpretations are valuable (excluding, perhaps, the “benevolent sanctions” narrative) to some extent (some are more convincing though: the ones pointing out towards domestic variables). They point out and explain several aspects of Myanmar’s political transformation and the reality surrounding it. As such, they must be taken into consideration. One thing, however, is certain. Myanmar political transformation of 2010s would not have been possible without Aung San Suu Kyi.

Aung San Suu Kyi’s Dilemma The new political realities of opening up Myanmar produced a serious political dilemma for Aung San Suu Kyi. For 23 years, with endeavour, stubbornness, personal sacrifices, Suu Kyi attempted to force Tatmadaw to transfer power to the NLD. Since May 1990 it meant forcing the generals to transfer the power in accordance with the result of the elections.1 Throughout 1990s and 2000s, Suu Kyi demanded the Tatmadaw

1 The issue of 1990 elections is more complicated as it wasn’t clear to most of the people what kind of elections these were: to a parliament or to a constitutional assembly, with the NLD and the people favouring the former and Tatmadaw the latter interpretation, Tonkin (2007); but leaving this fascinating discussion aside, what matters is that the generals effectively nullified the results.

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to honour the result and transfer the power to her party. The generals had other plans. Since Than Shwe’s coming to power in SLORC in 1992, they envisioned their vision of a Tatmadaw’s dominated system (Ye Htut 2019), concretized by the “roadmap” in 2004. They steamrolled their plan by drafting the 2008 constitution and organizing 2010 elections (this politically nullified the discussion about 1990 elections as by then it became irrelevant whether these had been parliamentary or constitutional assembly elections—by 2010 both new constitution and new parliamentary elections came into being). NLD boycotted both, but it did not stop the process of legitimizing the “roadmap”. When the generals approached Suu Kyi in mid-2011 (by sending “liaison officer” Aung Kyi again to her) the political situation was disadvantageous to her. The generals, or post-generals: (quasi) civilians now, enforced their vision and would carry on with her or without her (some of them preferred the former, others the latter, see: Ye Htut 2019; Soe Thane 2017; but they agreed that any deal must be done on Tatmadaw’s conditions). These new political circumstances presented Suu Kyi with roughly two alternative options. First one would be the continuation of the moral high ground approach. Suu Kyi would have rejected then the regime’s reforms (as fake and dishonest ones) and would have carried on along the NLD’s “Shwegondine declaration” (2009) lines. The result would have been predictable. She would keep her iconic position both within and outside , the country: as a highly respected figure of the Amae Suu ( Mother Suu) in Myanmar and as the Peace Nobel Laureate and the “heroine of humanity” (BBC 2012) outside it. But politically, she would have been sidelined. The reforms would have gone on without her and the time would do its part, too: sooner or later she would have been marginalized. She would have ended up being a political celebrity, widely esteemed figure, but too weak to achieve her political goals (finishing her father’s task). In other words, if she had chosen the “moral victory” scenario, she would have achieved the same as in 1990s and 2000s: universal acclamation from home and abroad and effective political failure. It would have been a political capitulation on honourable terms. The alternative would be the following. She could have fought on, despite everything. She would have to nolens voles finally accepted the Tatmadaw’s rules of the game by making a political U-turn. She would have then resumed the political game with a much weaker political position and with no guarantee that the generals would have not changed the rules anytime, as they have pleased. She knew the risk: in 1995 and 2002

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they did not offer much more to her—although we do not know what was on the table during their negotiations, the current sources reveal (Ye Htut 2019) the generals were unwilling to share the power and were negotiating in bad faith. If she had accepted their offer in 2011, she would have risked her iconic status to an unknown result and possibly would have ended up with nothing: neither power nor prestige. Aung San Suu Kyi, who keeps saying “there is no hope without endeavour” (Beech 2012) chose the latter option. In doing so, she behaved as if following Pittacus of Mytilene’s aphorism “know thine opportunity”. For this time (differently than in 1995 and 2002) the generals were willing to (at least partially) share power. Consequently, Suu Kyi-Tatmadaw’s rapprochement of 2011/2012 paved way to ground-breaking changes in Myanmar. It allowed the end of the over twenty years’ political stalemate that had cost Myanmar dearly. Without this unwritten Suu Kyi-Thein Sein deal, Myanmar would have not achieved a splendid decade of 2011–2021. It was, simply put, the key moment in Myanmar’s transformation.

Navigating the Disciplined Democracy Suu Kyi’s acceptance of the road map politically meant that she yielded and accepted the Tatmadaw’s “more equal” status. She consented to function within rules determined by the regime: changed her tactics from confrontation to cooperation with the military-dominated system and tried to convince generals to her person. But it was not Suu Kyi’s surrender. She just switched her tactics from an attempt to overthrow the system into an attempt to change it from within. It was a modification of means, not a change of objectives (Zöllner and Ebbighausen 2018). The plan was to become an elected member of the Hluttaw, then to win 2015 elections, to gain majority and convince the generals to amend the constitution to allow her to become the president (Khin Maung Soe and Thiha Tun 2015). In other words, her consent to become a part of the military-dominated system was meant “as an expedient, not an endgame”: she believed the reforms would not stop at economics but would include amending the constitution as well (Thant Myint-U 2020). She made a concession and she expected concessions from the generals in return. They thought otherwise. The generals since late 1980s considered her a troublemaker and wanted to appease her with formal platitudes about “a respect for Aung San’s daughter”. When they released her in 2002, for

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example, they wanted her to endorse their line in return for public recognition of her special status (she rejected it, which led to their overreaction: the bloody Depayin massacre and another 8 years of house arrest). During the early stages of “roadmap”, everything went the old way: she rejected both constitution and 2010 elections while the generals hoped they were finally able to marginalize her. And then she suddenly agreed to accept the “roadmap” and become part of the system. From their perspective, after many years, she finally saw the writing on the wall and accepted the inevitable limitations. These two standpoints were at odds with one another. Initially Suu Kyi compromised a lot: she took part in the by-elections (thus endorsing the 2008 constitution); after losing battle to amend the oath, she vowed to protect it; she praised Thein Sein for initiating the reforms (thus helping him to gain much needed international recognition). Furthermore, she accepted donations from army cronies, publicly proclaimed “love” for the army (it needs to be admitted, though, that she praised the army for the first already during her Shwedagon speech in 1988; but after 2011 such statements had different political meaning), participated in military parades and did not back social fight for the land grabbed by the military in collusion with Chinese company (Letpadaung mine case). These and other concessions were not reciprocated by the regime. When she realized the generals were unwilling to amend the constitution, she moved to pressurize them. She hoped to find at least one military MP (out of 166) to back her constitutional amendment attempt in the parliament (Peel and Pilling 2015). So, she courted the major factions within regime, starting from Thein Sein (their good relations lasted from mid-2011 until roughly late 2012; deteriorated afterwards), then moved to Shwe Mann (the peak of their cooperation came for years 2012–2015, until Shwe Mann’s ousting from USDP) and Min Aung Hlaing (her courting attempts were rejected from the very beginning) simultaneously. When internal policymaking failed, she reverted to external ones, returning to using her two trump cards: popular support and foreign backing (she used these cards in vain throughout 1990s and 2000s; back then, these were the only cards she had) to force the generals to amend the constitution. Domestically, Suu Kyi, backed by 8888 revolution veterans, started collecting signatures in favour of amending the constitution, organized rallies and openly criticized the regime for not willing to amend the charter. The pressure was noticeable, but failed to impress the generals. The same has to be said about foreign backing.

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Throughout 2013 and 2014 Suu Kyi toured various parts of the world (including my country—Poland) politically preaching in public, while requesting world leaders to back her amendment attempt (I was present during some of her talks with Polish national leaders in 2013 and on her agenda the topic number one was her urge to Polish politicians pressurize the generals). What the international community has done (or hasn’t done) in favour of Suu Kyi behind the scenes is difficult to assess, but the changed international reality (Myanmar’s reengagement with the global world) worked against Suu Kyi’s interests. The prevailing intellectual and political mood in the years between 2012 and 2015 was optimistic: that things in Myanmar, despite problems, were going in the right direction. Suu Kyi’s ambitions for presidency were not seen as worthy of jeopardizing the generals and risking a reverse of reforms. The regime, on its part, used stick and carrot tactics. It threatened Suu Kyi not to rock the boat and it made some spurious concessions, like establishing parliamentary commission to amend the constitution (in the best bureaucratic fashion, the commission worked long enough for everybody to forget what it was set for) or organizing roundtable talks with the NLD and ethnic parties (14 groups altogether, much too much to achieve anything) and between Suu Kyi and Tatmadaw/USDP leaders (the talks were grotesque in both form and style as the participants sat in giant chairs far away from one another). Frustrated Suu Kyi at one point warned that she would boycott 2015 elections (Marshall A.R.C. and Webb 2015), but it was an obvious empty threat. When in June 2015 Hluttaw rejected NLD’s proposal to amend the constitution, it became clear Suu Kyi lost her bid for presidency. It doesn’t mean, however, that she gave up. Throughout all these political struggles she never lost sight of the 2015 general elections, her only way to power. She might have pressurized the generals to amend the constitution, but she never crossed the invisible red lines which would threaten elections. The generals organized the elections and hoped for a good result, or at least a divided parliament. The USDP was betting that the NLD wouldn’t get the 67% of contested seats needed to have the majority (in 2015 elections it was 329 contested seats). But Suu Kyi made sure the elections became a plebiscite on the military rule and on her. In a thundering victory, she secured a landslide, winning 390 seats (or 79% of the contested seats) and politically knocked out her opponents. She then followed up by securing her victory in series of meetings with top Tatmadaw/USDP leaders (November–December). The outcomes of

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these talks were not disclosed to the public, but most probably they consented on a basic framework of cohabitation based on spoken assurances that the NLD would not try to enact retaliation for the past crimes of the generals while they would not overthrow the civilian government. What they did not agree on was the constitution: in early 2016 Suu Kyi tried to force the generals to amend the charter once again—and yet again failed (from the armed forces’ perspective a Suu Kyi presidency was too much to swallow). Hence, she nominated her loyalist Htin Kyaw (in 2018 replaced by another loyalist, Win Myint) for the post while at the same time establishing a post of State Counsellor for herself, with more effective power than the president. Her State Counsellor bill effectively bypassed the constitutional limitations, much to the shock of the Tatmadaw (they protested, but eventually nolens volens accepted it).

The Uneasy but Manageable Cohabitation Although NLD’s first term of governance is a fascinating topic per se (Selth 2017b), this article will focus on the relationship with the Tatmadaw only. The reason is one. Politically speaking, without a cohabitation with the armed forces the political transformation of Myanmar would have been halted or even over. Mending fences with the Tatmadaw was the precondition for any civilian government to rule at all. Suu Kyi learned this political truth—that Tatmadaw must be appeased at all cost—the hard way in 1990s and 2000s and in 2015/2016 did not make the same mistake of antagonizing the army (as she did in 1990s and 2000s, Kyaw Yin Hlaing 2011). Once coming to power in 2016 she declared the national reconciliation (which meant the NLDTatmadaw reconciliation, not necessary ethnic reconciliation) and made sure the armed forces were rest assured by keeping the defence budget high, not touching the Tatmadaw’s privileges, keeping the military-men dominated bureaucracy intact (despite infusing some new members into it), temporarily mending personal fences with Min Aung Hlaing and blocking criticism directed at the Tatmadaw from both the party and the society (including nullifying bottom-to-top attempts to achieve accountability for the past crimes). This policy of “letting the sleeping dogs lie” (Jagan 2017) was later accompanied by aligning with Tatmadaw’s position on the ethnic issue, and especially by taking the Tatmadaw side during the Rohingya crisis and then defending Myanmar at the International Court of Justice in the Hague. There were political costs of these

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actions, certainly (failed 21th Century Panglong and external criticism, Kyaw Sein and Farelly 2016, the latter is of a lesser importance here), yet overall, even if the NLD has been over caution in terms of appeasing the Tatmadaw (Selth 2017b)—this was the price worth paying for the political transformation to continue. Otherwise the NLD government might have not survived. Finding a modus operandi with the armed forces (read: appeasing it, soothing its anxieties) remains the political necessity of any civilian government in Myanmar. It doesn’t mean that Suu Kyi and the NLD surrendered politically and became Tatmadaw’s puppets. On the contrary. While not provoking the army, Suu Kyi was limiting its influence behind the scenes. It was a Burmese “crab tactic”, with steps forward, backward, and to the side, depending on the situation. In a shadow boxing style, Suu Kyi was trying to limit the influence of the army and to increase her position. She has had some minor successes, like taking over the GAD (General Administrative Department), the core of Myanmar’s civil service (she transferred it from home ministry, supervised by the military to Cabinet office, supervised by civilians); or enforcing soldiers to vote in the town (not in garrisons); or “taming” Tatmadaw’s influence many aspects of everyday life. The armed forces accepted these changes because the NLD did not cross the red lines. For the Burmese generals, the political situation was not ideal—a USDP government would have been much more desired— but was tolerable. As long as the NLD was not seen as too confrontational towards the Tatmadaw and its core interests, they could have lived with it (Selth 2017a). Although Suu Kyi-Tatmadaw relationship was dominated by distance and distrust, it was manageable still: both sides considered one another as much less threatening than just a few years prior (Thant Myint-U 2020). This is thanks to the part that both knew their limits: the NLD did not try to deconstruct the “disciplined democracy” political system (it has just adjusted itself to it), while the Tatmadaw did not stage another coup d’état in 2016–2020. Before 2021 neither Suu Kyi nor the generals crossed the red lines: they did not start a new round of political confrontation that could have halted the reforms. This restraint, so rare in Burmese politics, was worth praising, it stands in stark contrast to 1990s and 2000s—and to what happened in 2021.

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The Second Plebiscite and the Fourth Coup Before the 2020 elections the NLD was disadvantaged structurally. The “disciplined democracy” system forces any civilian not aligned with Tatmadaw to win a decisive majority in the parliament in every elections. Indeed, since the generals’ privileged position is enshrined in the constitution and cannot be changed without Tatmadaw’s consent, a civilian opposing Tatmadaw must confirm their mandate every five years. The logic of this system made every election in Myanmar a critical one for Suu Kyi (or any other civilian opposed to the military). In terms of 2020 electoral logic, Suu Kyi needed another landslide to retain the progress (she needed 322 mandates in the Hluttaw). And that was far from straightforward given her record in government to defend. Under NLD’s rule, Myanmar has witnessed limited policy success, coupled with political turbulence. Her administration has successfully retained the support of a plurality of Bamar voters (though she disappointed many ethnic minorities) despite suffering more setbacks than gains. Myanmar’s growth had already started slowing down (GDP 2019) even before the pandemic, foreign direct investment confidence has fallen (FDI 2019), and the cost of doing business has not improved under Suu Kyi’s administration. Tourism levels were also stagnating well before COVID-19, and her government has failed to undertake structural reforms. Her rule, in short, was average: neither successful nor disastrous (at least from external perspective; the domestic optic yet again proved to be different). Despite unfavourable circumstances (Covid pandemic sweeping through the country) and some controversies (Union Electoral Commission’s decision to cancel elections in some ethnic areas, particularly in Rakhine; the total number of cancelled mandates was 22), the elections were held successfully. The Burmese voted—as usual—in a peaceful and disciplined manner, the turnout was high and the result unanimous. NLD secured a landslide well beyond 322 mandates, scoring 396 mandates and shocking international observers (who had expected Suu Kyi’s party to win, but to a lesser margin, e.g. Irrawaddy 2020) and domestic rivals (USDP) alike. There are four major reasons for the NLD’s victory. First, and most importantly, although some Burmese may have been disappointed with Suu Kyi, the people have not forgotten the dreaded rule of the Tatmadaw. The last thing the nation wanted was to see the generals coming back

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to power, either directly or in a civilian cover-up. Second, combined with the first one is that even though Suu Kyi hasn’t implemented any breakthrough reforms, she has continued the process of Myanmar’s reopening to the world and withdrawing the Tatmadaw from direct control, initiated during the tenure of Thein Sein. The army was being slowly removed from public life and civil administration, an internet revolution was underway, NGOs and CSOs have strengthened, and the quality of life has improved. There was a visible development, too: better connectivity and infrastructure, increased budget spending on education and healthcare, and electricity access to over 70% of the population. Fear of the Tatmadaw, so overwhelming a decade ago, had significantly waned before 2021: the people no longer lived in fear. A commonly shared belief that although there were problems, things were going the right way helped to unite the Burmese people and indicated that Suu Kyi still personified societal hopes and dreams. Third, Suu Kyi was and still is politically Amae Suu, the mother Suu, or the mother of the nation. The symbolic bond between Suu Kyi and the Burmese people—which shelters her from the necessity to deliver successes in order to remain popular—is difficult to understand for foreigners. Yet it is something more than just political PR: in times of pandemic people needed reassurance and Suu Kyi provided that. Finally, forth, deep-seated Burmese Buddhist cultural patterns, or Mah¯a-Sammata’s style of democracy, where the people unanimously elect the most moral candidate (as in Aggañña-sutta 2001), help to transform the elections into continuous plebiscites. If the 2015 elections were a dual plebiscite on the rule of the Tatmadaw and on Suu Kyi (these elections politically coronated Suu Kyi as the informal ruler of Myanmar), now 2020 elections reconsecrated Suu Kyi to this position of political “mother of the nation”. The dislike towards the Tatmadaw, the unwillingness to see the generals coming back to power and the continuous reverence of Suu Kyi, all proved much more important to electoral results than a sober balance sheet of the NLD’s governance. Unfortunately, the generals—or maybe, the general Min Aung Hlaing—overreacted: being unable to accept the electoral results, they staged the coup on 1st February 2021. By doing so they switched the comfortable back seat position of partial power, economic influence and socio-legal unaccountability for a rough terrain of ruling without domestic legitimacy.

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Although the Tatmadaw is to blame, Aung San Suu Kyi could have been more cautious. Contrary to 2015, this time in 2020, she didn’t make a political pilgrimage to the generals, soothing their fears and telling them the things would remain the old way. Consequently, they, by expecting a tougher stance from the NLD (attempts to amend the constitution and further limit their role), the generals decided to make a sort of conservative correction, by removing NLD and restoring the pre-2015 “disciplined democracy”. Unfortunately for the country, they miscalculated, causing turmoil and a political and economic catastrophe. What followed the coup: arrest of Suu Kyi, mass protests and bloody pacification akin to 1988, was just the tragic consequence. The post-coup reality is a national tragedy, as the coup nullifies the achievements of Myanmar’s best decade since 1950s. It is also the end of the political transition in the form known in 2010s.

Conclusion Aung San Suu Kyi’s role in Myanmar’s transformation was crucial. Having learned the hard way the experience of dealing with Tatmadaw in 1990s and 2000s, Suu Kyi made a concession in 2011 by accepting the unjust “disciplined democracy” system. This allowed Myanmar to move forward, secure the reforms enacted by Thein Sein’s administration, re-engage with the global world and, consequently, to lead Myanmar to a splendid decade of 2011–2021. In short, Suu Kyi’s flexibility in 2011 allowed Myanmar to break the two decades’ deadlock which cost Myanmar dearly. Suu Kyi’s decision was, however, by no means a capitulation. In the best pragmatic fashion worthy of her father, she simply changed the means of the political struggle in accordance with the circumstances. If before 2011 she had tried to break the Tatmadaw’s dominance (and failed), from 2011 onwards, she embarked on a long campaign to transform the system from within. She made many concessions and compromises on the way (for some of these concessions, she has been mercilessly criticized in the West, where she lost the iconic status for good) but eventually she emerged victorious both in 2015 and 2020. Unfortunately, she was unable to find a common ground with Min Aung Hlaing after her second landslide victory in 2020; not being able to strike a compromise with Suu Kyi, the generals overreacted and staged another (fourth) coup on 1st February 2021, throwing Myanmar into turmoil and effectively ending the political transition of 2010s.

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In terms of political transformation of Myanmar, we may see a certain sinusoid. If in 1990s and 2000s the uncompromising stance of both sides (Tatmadaw and Suu Kyi) led to the deadlock (“lost decades”), then in 2010s the trend was reversed. Both Suu Kyi and (ex)generals compromised (she more than them, but they still a bit), were able to keep mutual distrust and dislike in the controllable levels and exercised restraint. Unfortunately, the fruits of this hard-won compromise proved to be fragile: after the 2021 coup, these have been easily and quickly lost. What happened after the last coup is not only a national tragedy and a humanitarian catastrophe; in political terms, it is another deadlock which terminated the 2010s political transition. If indeed the Burmese history comes in cycles, we are now back to 1988 or at best to around 2003, after the Depayin massacre.

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Egreteau R. (2014). The Continuing Political Salience of the Military in PostSPDC Myanmar. In: Cheesman N., Farrelly N., Wilson T. (Eds.), Debating Democratization (pp. 259–284). Singapore: ISEAS. Egreteau R. (2016). Caretaking Democratization. The Military and Political Change in Myanmar (pp. 3–36). London: Hurst. Foreign direct investment (2019). The World Bank. https://data.worldbank. org/indicator/BX.KLT.DINV.WD.GD.ZS?locations=MM. Ganesan N. (2013). Interpreting Recent Developments in Myanmar as an Attempt to Establish Political Legitimacy. Asian Journal of Peacebuilding, 1, 2, p. 254. Ganesan N. (2014). The Myanmar Peace Center: Its origins, activities, and aspirations. Asian Journal of Peacebuilding, 2, 1, pp. 130–131. GDP Growth (2019). The World Bank. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=MM. Irrawaddy (2020, October 30). Pundits Take on Myanmar’s 2020 Elections. https://www.irrawaddy.com/in-person/interview/pundits-takes-myanmars2020-election.html. Jagan L. (2017, May 1). Patience tested. The Bangkok Post. https://www.ban gkokpost.com/world/1241758/patience-tested. Jones L. (2014). Explaining Myanmar’s Regime Transition: The Periphery Is Central. Democratization, 21, 5, p. 784. Khin Maung Soe, Thiha Tun (2015, November 5). Aung San Suu Kyi eyes leading in Myanmar despite constitutional ban. RFA. https://www.rfa.org/ english/news/myanmar/aung-san-suu-kyi-eyes-leading-in-myanmar-despiteconstitutional-ban-11052015161407.html. Kyaw Sein, Farrelly N. (2016). Myanmar’s Evolving Relations. The NLD in government. Asia Paper (62–63). Stockholm: ISDP. Kyaw Yin Hlaing (2007). Aung San Suu Kyi of Myanmar: A Review of the Lady’s Biographies. Contemporary Southeast Asia, 29, 2, p. 374. Kyaw Yin Hlaing (2011). Political impasse in Myanmar. SEARC Working Paper 111 (27–29). Kyaw Yin Hlaing (2014). The Unexpected Arrival of a New Political Era in Myanmar. In Kyaw Yin Hlaing (Ed.), Prisms on the Golden Pagoda. Perspectives on National Reconciliation in Myanmar (pp. 218–220). Singapore: NUS Press. Lall M. (2016). Understanding Reform in Myanmar. People and Society in the Wake of Military Rule. London: Hurst. Lubina M. (2018). The Moral Democracy. The Political Thought of Aung San Suu Kyi. Warsaw: Scholar. Lubina M. (2020). The Political Biography of Aung San Suu Kyi. A Hybrid Politician. Abington & New York: Routledge.

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Maitrii Aung-Thwin (2013). Reassessing Myanmar’s “Glasnost”. Kyoto Review of Southeast Asia no. 14. Marco Bünthe (2014). Burma’s Transition to Quasi-military Rule: From Rulers to Guardians? Armed Forces & Society, 40, 4, pp. 757–758. Marshall A.R.C., Webb S. (2015, April 3). Suu Kyi Says Boycott of Myanmar Election an Option. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmarsuukyi-idUSKBN0MU19R20150403. Maung Aung Myoe (2014). The Soldier and the State: The Tatmadaw and Political Liberalization in Myanmar since 2011. South East Asia Research, 22, 2, pp. 233–249. Min Zin, Brian J. (2012). The Democrats’ Opportunity. Journal of Democracy, 23, 4, pp. 107–108. NLM (2003, August 31). Prime Minister General Khin Nyunt clarifies future policies and programmes of state. New Light of Myanmar. Patel N., Goodman A., Snider N. (2014). Constitutional Reform in Myanmar: Priorities and Prospects for Amendment. Bingham Centre Working Paper No 2014/01 (p. 8). London: Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law. Pedersen M. (2014). Myanmar’s Democratic Opening: The Process and Prospects for Reform. In: Cheesman N., Farrelly N., Wilson T. (Eds.), Debating Democratization (pp. 23–25). Singapore: ISEAS. Peel M., Pilling D. (2015, February 8). Myanmar: Suu Kyi’s Search for ‘One Brave Soldier’. Financial Times. https://www.ft.com/content/b1e f73fe-ad35-11e4-bfcf-00144feab7de. Selth A. (2017a). Why Myanmar’s Military Is Not Planning a Coup. Nikkei Asia Review. http://asia.nikkei.com/Politics-Economy/Policy-Politics/WhyMyanmar-s-military-is-not-planning-a-coup?page=1. Selth A. (2017b). Be Careful What You Wish for: The National League for Democracy and Government in Myanmar. Griffith Asia Institute Regional Outlook Paper 56 (11–15). Shwegondine Declaration (2009, April 29). National League for Democracy. Slater D. (2014). The Elements of Surprise: Assessing Burma’s Double-Edged Détente. South East Asia Research, 22, 2, p. 177. Soe Thane (2017). Myanmar’s Transformation & U Thein Sein. An Insider’s Account. Yangon: Tun. Strangio on Southeast Asia (2020, July 1). 9Dashline. https://www.9dashl ine.com/article/in-conversation-sebastian-strangio-on-southeast-asia?rq=mya nmar. Taylor R.H. (2013). Myanmar’s ‘Pivot’ Toward the Shibboleth of ‘Democracy. Asian Affairs, 44, 3, pp. 392–400. Taylor R.H. (2015). The Armed Forces in Myanmar’s Politics: A Terminating Role? ISEAS Trends, 2, pp. 5–33.

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Thant Myint-U (2007). The River of Lost Footsteps. A Personal History of Burma (342–346). New York: FSG. Thant Myint-U (2020). The Hidden History of Burma. Race, Capitalism, and the Crisis of Democracy in the 21th Century (pp. 107–110, 148, 253). New York: Norton. Tonkin D. (2007). The 1990 Elections in Myanmar: Broken Promises or a Failure of Communication? Contemporary Southeast Asia, 29, 1, pp. 33–54. Walton M. (2015). The Disciplining Discourse of Unity in Burmese Politics. Journal of Burma Studies, 19, 1, 1–26. Ye Htut (2019). Myanmar’s Political Transition and Lost Opportunities (2010– 2016) (pp. 3, 154–160, 217). Singapore: ISEAS. Zöllner H.-B. (2011). The Beast and the Beauty, The History of the Conflict Between the Military and Aung San Suu Kyi in Myanmar, 1988–2011, Set in a Global Context (pp. 245–246). Berlin: Regiospectra. Zöllner H.-B., Ebbighausen R. (2018). The Daughter. A Political Biography of Aung San Suu Kyi. Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books.

CHAPTER 3

Human Security and the Roles of Ethnic Women’s Organisations in Transitional Myanmar Makiko Takeda and Chosein Yamahata

Introduction The military coup d’état on 1 February 2021 undermined the efforts made by Myanmar over the past decade towards achieving democracy and peace, substantially transforming the political landscape of the country. Although the government encountered multiple challenges, due primarily to the political structure imposed by the 2008 constitution in which power was shared with the military, Myanmar gradually worked towards democracy and development. For the last ten years, numerous economic

M. Takeda (B) Faculty of Policy Studies, Aichi Gakuin University, Nisshin, Japan C. Yamahata Graduate School of Policy Studies, Aichi Gakuin University, Nisshin, Japan

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 C. Yamahata and B. Anderson (eds.), Demystifying Myanmar’s Transition and Political Crisis, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-6675-9_3

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and political reforms were undertaken, including the relaxation of censorship and the formation of associations as well as the release of substantial numbers of prisoners, including political prisoners. Both the European Union and the US lifted sanctions on the country, which is rich with untapped natural and human resources that attracted foreign investment. However, although partial ceasefire agreements were signed between the military, the government, and 10 out of 21 major EAOs, there was no sign of an end to the world’s longest civil war. Indeed, renewed conflicts intensified in Rakhine, Kachin, and Northern Shan states. Aung San Suu Kyi, a Nobel laureate in peace, came under fierce criticism for refusing to acknowledge the military massacres of Rohingya and defended the government’s prosecution of journalists investigating the persecution of Rohingya. International communities and donors expressed concern about the stagnation of the peace process and the human-rights situation. Such confusion cast a shadow on the country’s development and transition towards peace. The fundamental reason why Myanmar has made little progress in achieving peace are the multiple divisions deliberately created over history and during the democratisation process, and the 2008 constitution which allows the military to retain a substantial portion of power. Current divisions exist not only between the ethnic majority and the minorities but also among the majority and the minorities. Fear, distrust, and grievances based on these divisions presented a significant obstacle to the transition process. Therefore, although ordinary citizens have longed for peace and security, these multiple divisions have been exploited to create inequalities among citizens, which impeded them from travelling in the same direction towards peace. It is fair to state that Myanmar is currently facing a situation of “a bridge too far” to cross regarding a genuine transition towards a peaceful, modern, and developed state with human rights, freedoms, and democracy. Therefore, due to the weak economy, political unwillingness, and lack of rule of law, the government failed to provide sufficient and appropriate support for all the nations to guarantee a minimum level of living through social security. As a result, people face multiple human security challenges without freedom from fear and freedom from want. To make matters worse, the coup even eradicated the small progress made during the fragile democratisation process. Against this backdrop of the controlled democratisation, a multitude of women who share the same pain are standing in solidarity to protect

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their rights, promote human security, and build grassroots peace, irrespective of their ethnic and religious differences. Ethnic women have formed an inter-ethnic alliance to work for a shared goal, which reflects their ability to overcome these divisions (Takeda 2020; Takeda and Yamahata 2020a). However, despite their potential and capacity to promote human security and grassroots peace, women, including EWOs, were largely excluded from the formal peace process (Takeda and Yamahata 2020b). Having witnessed the stagnation of formal peace negotiations conducted by male-dominated institutions—the military, government, and ethnic armed organisations (EAOs)—it is important to conduct research on the roles of EWOs in promoting human security at the grassroots level. This research, therefore, investigates the roles EWOs play in promoting human security, which is the foundation of peace and development. First, the concept of human security, with respect to peace and development, is reviewed to highlight the links between the three elements. Second, the research analyses the causes and consequences of human insecurity in Myanmar based on seven dimensions of human security. Third, a case study is conducted on the work of the Mon Women’s Organisation (MWO), one of the major EWOs, to gain an overall understanding of their activities. Finally, the research explores how their approaches and activities are related to the promotion of human security at the grassroots level to highlight the important role that EWOs play in transitional Myanmar.

Human Security Until the end of the twentieth century, security was understood to be a matter for states; therefore, the central concern of security policy was to maintain and facilitate the core values of states based on their sovereignty and territoriality. Consequently, the primary means employed by states to ensure their security was that of military power (MacFarlane and Khong 2006). Ogata (2001), the former United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, explained that “traditionally, security threats were assumed to emanate from external sources. Security issues were therefore examined in the context of ‘state security,’ i.e., the protection of the state, its boundaries, people, institutions, and values from external attacks” (pp. 8–9). Heyzer (2005) points out that the Cold-War concept of weapon-based security was used as the rationale for allocating large military budgets

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that emphasised defence over human well-being. This meant that military expenditure worldwide was more than four times what it would cost for all nations to provide housing, health service, and education for their people. Moreover, although inter-state conflicts and tension have since been reduced, the nature of conflict has largely shifted to internal struggles rooted in colonial history and inequalities created along the lines of ethnicity, religion, and social class. Heyzer (2005) states that whereas only 14% of the casualties of war in World War I were civilians, this number has now increased, according to one estimate, to over 75%. Consequently, even though there are few external attacks against countries, a considerable number of people worldwide are left feeling insecure and face potential challenges to their survival. Ogata (2001) describes the situation thus: “without external aggression or threat to territorial integrity or state sovereignty, people were caught by eruptions of violence within countries” (p. 9). Against this backdrop, the insecurity caused by non-military threats such as poverty, infectious diseases, and environmental degradation as well as the growth of intra-state conflicts and terrorism has given rise to disputes over the meaning and content of security. This has led to a redefinition of subjects ranging from the “state” to the “individual”. As such, the focus in terms of security has expanded from managing inter-state relations to include the economy, environment, health, gender, and culture, all within the context of the development of core values to encompass welfare and identity (Richmond and Franks 2005; MacFarlane and Khong 2006). This has given rise to the concept of human security, which differs from the previous concept of security in two ways. First, it focuses on the individual as the fundamental subject of security. Second, it recognises that the security of individuals includes not only physical survival from violence but also access to basic needs and the exercise of basic rights that allow people to lead their lives in dignity (MacFarlane and Khong 2006). It therefore combines both human rights and human development (Kaldor 2007). Ogata (2001) explains that human security represents a paradigm shift in the notion of security, which traditionally viewed states as the primary providers of security. The concept of human security was first introduced in the 1994 Human Development Report, which explains it as involving the guarantee of propriety freedoms so that “people can exercise choices safely and freely” (UNDP 1994, p. 23). The Report describes two major components of human security, “freedom from fear” and “freedom from

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Fig. 3.1 Seven main dimensions of human security and the possible root causes

want”, which have been recognised since the initial establishment of the United Nations. It states that unless both freedoms are achieved, an enduring peace cannot be assured. It also calls for a change from the narrow concept of national security to the all-inclusive concept of human security (UNDP 1994). The necessity for this conceptual change was discussed earlier in the 1993 Human Development Report which stated that “the concept of security must change from exclusive focus on national security to a much greater stress on people’s security, from security through armaments to security through human development, from territorial security to food, employment, and environmental security” (UNDP 1993). Accordingly, the focus of human security has shifted to the eradication of the root causes of threats. Figure 3.1 presents the seven main categories of human security: economic, health, personal, political, food, environmental, and community, along with the possible root causes.

Security, Development, and Peace The human development concept was developed by economist Dr. Mahbub ul Haq who argued that a country’s success or individual’s well-being cannot be simply measured by national economic growth or individual income growth. He defined human development as a process

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of “enlarging people’s choices” with special emphasis on three dimensions; the freedom to have long and healthy life, to be educated, and to enjoy a decent standard of living (UNDP 1990). Human Development Index (HDI) is a summary measure of average achievement in the three key dimensions, which was first introduced in the Human Development Report 1990 (UNDP 1990). The health dimension is measured by life expectancy at birth and the education dimension is measured by the mean of years of schooling for adults aged 25 years and more and the expected years of schooling for children of school entering age. The living standard dimension is assessed by Gross National Income (GNI) per capita. This composite index has been extensively used as indices of country’s wellbeing around the world (UNDP, n.d.). Depending on the values of HDI, countries are divided into four different levels of Human Development; Very high human development, High human development, Medium human development, and Low human development. As discussed previously, the concept of security was redefined to align with human development. Howe and Jang (2013, cited in Thuzar 2019) found that human security and development tend to mutually reinforce each other, positing that conflict impedes development and underdevelopment can engender conflict. Stewart (2004) also revealed an effect of security/insecurity on well-being and subsequent developmental achievement. In a report published by the Commission on Human Security, Amartya Sen explained human security in relation to human development and human rights. Sen (2003) argues that human security and human development as well as human security and human rights mutually supplement each other in fruitful ways. While human security requires paying serious attention to “downsides risks” that “threaten human survival or safety of daily life, or imperil the natural dignity of men and women, or expose human beings to uncertainty of disease and pestilence, or subject vulnerable people to abrupt penury”, human development extends beyond rear-guard actions against insecurities and concentrates on “growth with equity”, which is more concerned with progress and augmentation. In relation to human rights, Sen views human security as a “class of human rights” that requires “freedom from basic insecurities” (pp. 8–9). Therefore, it can be argued that human security is conceptualised as incorporating minimum core aspects of both human development and human rights. Consequently, a human security approach can have positive impacts on development as it aims to provide the conditions that are essential for such development (Kaldor 2007).

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With regard to the relationship with peace, MacFarlane and Khong (2006) assert that both human security and human development have an instrumental value in the pursuit of peace. The 1994 Human Development Report argues that, given the considerable increase in the number of intra-state conflicts caused by growing socio-economic deprivations and disparities, world peace rests on whether individuals can be assured of security in their daily lives. In the search for individual security in such a milieu, what is required is development rather than arms. Therefore, the path to peace is sustainable development that leads to human security (UNDP 1994). Speth (1994) expresses the interrelationship between peace and development as one where “without peace, there may be no development. But without development, peace maybe threatened” (p. iii). MacFarlane and Khong (2006) elaborated on this relationship by claiming that “human development and human security were mutually constitutive; the two together were the basis for peace” (p. 146). Therefore, it can be argued that prevention based on the provision of human security and human development is the best course of action towards peace. Another important point to note concerns women’s participation in providing human security as well as the instruments that underpin their contribution. Heyzer (2005) argues that it is evident from the history of Afghanistan over the last three decades that intricate internal and external conflicts as well as social and gender injustice subvert the capacity of countries to pursue sustainable peace and development and threaten world peace and security. To develop a just and equitable response to these complex problems and strengthen all forms of human security, it is vital to include those who are most affected by insecurities and injustice when finding solutions. Heyzer takes this point further by arguing that “without women’s equal participation and full involvement in peacebuilding, neither justice nor development will be possible in a war-torn society’s transition to peace” (p. 58). In the democratic transition in Myanmar, the focus has been mainly on hard security, which can be achieved by freedom from military-related threats, dangers, and risks. However, human security has been largely neglected, thus impacting peace and development. Consequently, not only physical violence caused by intra-state conflicts but also insecurity caused by non-military threats are pervasive in the country. In addition, women have been mostly excluded from the formal peace process, which impedes them from making a significant contribution towards peace and security (Upreti et al. 2019). In the next section, the root

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causes and effects of the tensions and concerns based on the multiple divisions in Myanmar are summarised. A discussion follows of the types of human security challenges resulting from these tensions and concerns, according to seven dimensions of human security, together with their causes and consequences, in order to understand how human insecurity is undermining Myanmar’s transition to peace and development.

Human Security Challenges in Myanmar The advent of the civilian administration certainly changed Myanmar’s political and economic landscape, and the country took important steps towards democracy. However, the government faced many problems, including the continued political dominance of the military, repressive legislation, weak rule of law, and a corrupt judiciary. Violent conflicts and natural disasters led to stunted economic growth and poverty, which are spreading throughout the country. Therefore, there were still a great number of challenges to be tackled in order to provide human security to the people equally. Table 3.1 shows a summary of the root causes and the effects of the tensions and concerns that hindered bringing about positive changes. Table 3.1 The root causes and effects of tensions and concerns in Myanmar Tensions Effects 1. Religion 2. Ethnicity 3. Race

Root causes • Bad governance • Lack of rule of law • Lack of constitutional guarantee and enforcement mechanisms

• Exploitation • Discrimination • Communal violence

• Armed conflict Concerns 1. Income/social disparities 2. Locality 3. Rights/access 4. Disability 5. Gender inequality 6. Resources (monetary/non-monetary) Source Takeda (2020, p. 59)

• • • •

Laws and regulations Wrong policies Wrong priorities Prejudice/value judgments • Social/cultural norms

• • • •

Deprivation of rights Inequality in accessibility Low social development Limited technical support • Poor infrastructure • Gender based violence

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Owing to the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) and other bilateral ceasefire agreements between the Burmese military and some EAOs in some ethnic states, some regions did not suffer from armed conflict; however, not all tensions were alleviated among groups in terms of religion, ethnicity, and race. Owing to bad governance and the weak rule of law, compounded by a lack of constitutional guarantees and enforcement mechanisms, severe and persistent economic, social and cultural inequalities between culturally defined groups continued. Ethnic and religious minorities were discriminated against and exploited due, in part, to the abundant natural resources in their ethnic lands. These perpetuated inequalities caused the divided social structures and polarisation that resulted in the deprivation of rights of the minorities, underdevelopment, and gender-based violence and were, therefore, major concerns in Myanmar. They are the result of not only incorrect policies and priorities but also embedded prejudice and social norms (Takeda 2020; Takeda and Yamahata 2020a). It could be argued that the country was still volatile. Thus, when or if a triggering event occured, there was a high possibility of a sudden eruption of violence. Due to such tensions and concerns that exist in Myanmar, people, especially those in rural areas and conflict-affected regions, continue to face considerable human security challenges. Table 3.2 presents the main security challenges in Myanmar based on seven dimensions of human security. As shown, all seven dimensions of human security present serious issues. They have been created on the basis of the tensions and concerns, as discussed in the previous section. These security challenges have negative impacts on the country’s development, reconciliation, and peace process. However, due to the political environment and deep mistrust between the majority and minority ethnic groups, the government could not easily address these issues. In addition, while CSOs have been working to bridge the enormous gap left by the state and can reach out to the most vulnerable populations in many developing countries, they have been divided and thus were unable to actualise a collective movement for positive change in Myanmar. The deep divisions among these male-dominated CSOs are usually attributable to differences in ideological positions, the relative degree of intimacy with the government, and scope of operation, as well as fierce competition over resources, personal recognition, funding, and status. Consequently, CSOs and individuals were often occupied with power struggles (Takeda and Yamahata 2020b). However,

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Table 3.2 Main human security challenges in Myanmar Dimensions of human security

Security challenges

Causes

Consequences

Political security

• Ethnic conflict • Religious conflict

• IDPs, refugees • All dimensions of human security threats

Economic security

• Inflation • Stagnant wages • Lack of job opportunities

Health security

• Inadequate health services and facilities • Communicable diseases

• Political repression • Lack of rule of law and justice • Human rights violations • Incorrect monetary policy • Inequitable distribution of wealth • Weak border controls • Land grabbing • Inter-ethnic and religious tension • Low government expenditure on health • Poverty • Lack of health knowledge • Poor sanitation

Food security

• Food shortages • Food and drink containing dyes • Counterfeit food

• Ethnic conflicts • Lack of awareness around food safety • Weak consumer protection • Poverty

• Poverty • Income disparities • Cross-border labour migration

• Gap between public and private health services • Occurrence of drug resistant malaria and tuberculosis • High prevalence of HIV • Low life expectancy • Outbreaks of disease in remote areas • Ill health (health insecurity) • Life-threatening conditions after prolonged consumption, such as liver and kidney damage

(continued)

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Table 3.2 (continued) Dimensions of human security

Security challenges

Causes

Consequences

Environment security

• Disasters (cyclones, floods)

• Commercial logging • Human encroachment for cultivation and firewood • Mega projects for hydro-power generation

Personal security

• Cross border migration • Forced labour • Child labour • Child soldiers • Rape • Land mines • IDPs, refugees, stateless persons • Human trafficking

Community security

• Ethnic conflict • Religious conflict • Land confiscation

• Poverty • Lack of job opportunities and low wages • Lack of law enforcement • Lack of rule of law • Military impunity • Corruption • Inter-ethnic and religious tension • Inter-ethnic and religious tension • Development projects

• Environmental deterioration • Loss of life, property, and livelihoods • Food shortages and contamination of water • Deterioration of health • Human rights violations • Labour exploitation, sex exploitation and prostitution • Physical and mental illness

• IDPs, refugees • Deterioration of physical and mental health • Arbitrary arrest and imprisonment of local people and activists for protest

CSOs in small towns were disadvantaged when it came to competing as it was easier for foreign donors to access Yangon-based organisations that generally employs English-speaking staff (Fink and Simpson 2018). Prasse-Freeman (2012) differentiates between two kinds of civil society: “grassroots CS” and “elite CS”. Grassroots CS generally takes part in non-political activities providing social welfare and educational services,

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whereas elite CS articulates technical administrative policy solutions. He argues that these two types of civil society together with political opposition need to work as part of a political cycle in asserting, voicing, and articulating social needs and values. However, new opportunities and challenges in the process of transition, ironically have widened division among CSOs and cooperation among them, and with the political opposition, was still far from being a reality. Lidauer et al. (2018) conducted comprehensive research on civil society and revealed that international aid has in fact increased competition and jealousy among CSOs. In such a critical situation, ethnic women’s organisations (EWOs) have overcome the ethnic and religious differences and cooperated with each other for a shared goal of gender equality and peace. At the same time, they are also actively engaging in social issues to promote the well-being of the population by providing human security to the people and playing an important role in filling the enormous gap left by the government at the grassroots level.

A Case of Mon Women’s Organization (MWO) The MWO was founded in 1984 as a women’s unit on the Thai-Burma border, primarily to serve the impoverished women in refugee camps. The 8888 Uprising, a nationwide pro-democracy movement led by students, resulted in the security and economic situation deteriorating even further. Consequently, an enormous number of people were forced to flee to the Thai-Burma border. Even though the MWO’s activities initially focused on social welfare and the environmental sphere to support women in crisis situations, it has gradually expanded its operation to include other critical areas such as rights advocacy, political participation, gender equality, and peace and reconciliation. The MWO opened its main office in Nyisar in 1994, along with two branch offices in Sangkhlaburi in Thailand and Mawlamyine, the capital of Mon State. It conducts various programmes to meet women’s needs in more than 30 Mon villages and works in collaboration with local women’s groups. Most of the donors are European or US-based public bodies, INGOs, and development agencies (MWO, n.d. 2019). The MWO is a member of GEN (Gender Equality Network in Myanmar), an umbrella organisation that comprises more than 130 CSOs, national and international NGOs, and technical resource personnel devoted to realising gender equality and the fulfilment of women’s rights

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in Myanmar (GEN, n.d.). MWO is also a member of the Mon Women’s Network (MWN), which includes seven Mon women’s CSOs as well as the Mon CSOs Network, Women’s Organisation Network (WON), and Alliance for Gender Inclusion in the peace process (AGIPP) through MWN. MWN was established in 2011 to facilitate gender equality and promote women’s participation in decision-making through the support of women in Mon State (AGIPP, n.d.). Furthermore, the MWO is partnered with a number of international and local non-state actors. It forms coalitions regardless of ethnicity and religion inside and outside of Myanmar to create louder voices with which to tackle their common issues. In contrast to CSOs in western countries, which build autonomy from the State and market, MWO also works with the government, the Department of Social Welfare at a national level, and the Mon State Parliament and State Police Department at a regional level to pursue their mission (MWO, personal communication, July 17, 2019). MWO’s mission is to empower women to be able to play a leadership role through building capacity and sharing knowledge for better livelihood, and to combat discrimination against women in Mon areas until the rights of women are fully guaranteed. Accordingly, MWO’s objectives are as follows (MWO 2019): • To empower women and to promote equal participation in decisionmaking as well as taking the leadership roles; • To protect women’s rights, eliminate discrimination against women, and ensure fair access to justice; • To teach Mon literature and culture to unite Mon women and develop Mon nationalities; • To cooperate with other international and local organisations for women’s activities. In line with the mission and objectives, MWO designs and implements various capacity building programmes such as vocational training (dressmaking, computer, sustainable agriculture, handy craft), microcredit, leadership skills, critical thinking, facilitation skills, language and literacy skills (Mon and English), management, health education, voter education, as well as internship programmes (MWO, n.d.). MWO receives about 15–20 interns regularly who were engaged with MWO’s activities.

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MWO also promotes women’s participation by organising events and workshops for raising awareness such as women’s issues, peace, and politics. MWO creates a platform for women to have interactions with others in and outside of Mon states through those events as well as networking meetings with local and international organisations. Moreover, the above-mentioned women’s empowerment programmes themselves create a platform for women’s social interaction and function to promote women’s participation in decision-making (MWO, n.d.). Through women’s alliance, women from diverse backgrounds have worked together cooperatively to construct grassroots peace at the community level and inspire a bigger women’s peace movement at the national level by sharing their expertise and mobilising their limited resources with the help of international organisations. Since women’s organisations are generally excluded from the formal peace process (Upreti et al. 2019), they needed to find a way of implementing societal changes for long-term sustainable peace, which are based on gender equality. Cardenas (2019) termed this alternative strategy of unofficial peacebuilding “women-to-women diplomacy”, which was conceived from the notion of people-to-people diplomacy. It signifies “efforts to create platforms for dialogue and cooperation that challenge the existing conflict narratives” (p. 47). A fundamental strategy underpinning women-to-women diplomacy has been to facilitate social interaction between women, share their experiences of struggles in conflicts, and set a collective goal of gender equality. Through dialogue and cooperation, women can achieve a comprehensive understanding of how gender inequality impacts peacebuilding regardless of ethnic, religious, ideological, and other social differences. Shared pain and struggles arising from their common experience as women also inspire a sense of friendship, which bridges various divisions and serves as a platform for grassroots cooperation (Cardenas 2019). Furthermore, MWO protects and promotes women’s rights. MWO researches and documents human-rights violations including rape cases and domestic violence, and holds workshops to increase the locals’ awareness about human rights, women’s rights, human-rights law, legal means, and procedures as well as giving support to them. In addition, to disseminate that information and calls on not only individuals and the government but also, to encourage the international community to pay serious consideration to the issues, MWO publishes journals, has a website in English, and presents at local and international conferences. They also

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produced a documentary video on GBV entitled “Damaged flowers” with the help of the Swiss Development Cooperation in 2018 (MWO 2018). In order to promote democratic transition, MWO provided voter education to the community and monitored the last 2015 election. Moreover, as an important component of the women’s leadership training programme, MWO also nurtures women to be potential candidates in an election in order to promote women’s rights and gender equality. MWO assists women’s candidates in terms of funding and human resources in an election campaign including promotion on social media, local media, fundraising, election education, and public consultation. MWO also strongly recommended Mon and other ethnic political parties to have a gender policy in place such as gender budgeting and promotion of plans and activities from the perspective of “gender responsive and transformative approach” instead of a “gender blind and negative approach”. MWO advocated the political parties installing a quota system within the parties by having 30 per cent of women’s participation in politics and the peace process. In addition, MWO lobbies for reform regarding gender issues together with MWN, GEN, Mon CSO Network, Women Organization Network (WON), and AGIPP (MWO, personal communication, July 17, 2019). It is evident from the activities that MWO not only promotes human security at the community level but also works for gender equality and peace with purposive efforts at the national level. The MWO women’s alliance strategically connects not only different ethnic and religious groups but also different sectors, including the government, EAOs, and other CSOs, through women-to-women diplomacy. The continuous approach based on equality by MWO could change the relationships among different groups and facilitate grassroots peacebuilding. According to Takeda and Yamahata (2020b), the attitudes, behaviours, and values of the MWO are based on a culture of peace, which was explained by Galtung (2000) as a culture to “promote peace as a value, respect and celebrate differences and protect/promote the political, civil, social, economic, and cultural rights of all individuals, communities, and groups, and are inclusive (by choice and dialogue rather than by force), rather than exclusive in vision” (p. 19). Therefore, the MWO transfers their culture of peace to respective communities and beyond, which can also establish community security by changing the relationships among people. The MWO has been extremely active and effective, which has resulted in their operations being legitimised by local communities and other

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CSOs. However, they still face ongoing challenges in terms of human resources, a lack of awareness among local populations, and patriarchal norms and practices embedded into society. The changing environments of women mean that the MWO has experienced difficulty in retaining skilled and qualified human resources. The low number of skilled staff has in turn made it hard for the MWO to balance the project work supported by donors with the administrative work of the organisation. In addition, many rural women are busy with day-to-day struggles and cannot afford to engage in additional activities. Therefore, although MWO strives to empower women and promote their participation, its activities feature low on women’s list of priorities. Participation in the national peace process and political arena constitutes another challenge. MWO has played a vital role in ensuring women’s participation in the Mon National Political Dialogue organised by the New Mon State Party at a regional level. For instance, the director of MWO attended the 1st and 2nd Union Peace Conference as an observer. Nevertheless, women’s meaningful engagement in the peace process and politics remains extremely limited (MWO, personal communication, July 17, 2019). Thus, on Mon Women’s Day in 2017, MWO urged the government and all state and non-state armed groups to take responsibility for “the lack of women actively participating” in the peace process, helping to establish a federal state, and developing the rule of law in the country (Nyein Nyein, 2017). Promotion of Human Security by MWO Table 3.3 presents MWO’s major activities and approaches employed to work for the target beneficiary groups (TBGs) at the grassroots level in relation to the seven dimensions of human security. Therefore, the activities conducted by the MWO through alliance organisation in support of wider societal issues such as producing joint statements against the coup and lobbying for inclusion of women in the peace process, are not included in the table. Many major activities are connected with promotion of political, personal and community security whereas other dimensions, economic, health, food and environmental security are enhanced through specific projects targeting to address food shortage, health issues and job security. Due to the bilateral ceasefire agreement signed in 1995, there were not many extreme human rights violation committed by the military

• Protecting victims of human rights violation (humanitarian assistance, safety measures, legal, economic and medical support) • Documenting and producing reports on human rights violation and lobbying for rights protection and social justice • Capacity building and internship programs (political empowerment and leadership, voter education, women’s issues etc.) • Supporting female candidates through advocacy and election campaign • Vocational training (dress-making, computer, sustainable agriculture, handy craft, Organic farming, English) and job matching • Microcredit, pig-bank (community animal raising) • Community clinic and clean water supplies and management • Grassroots survey for disease prevention (HIV and malaria etc.) • General health and reproductive health education, early child care development and mental health programmes • Sustainable and nutrition sensitive agriculture and organic farming • Food supplies to the marginalised population • Renewable energy production • Providing humanitarian assistance and emergency relief supplies to the disaster victims • Training on constitution, human trafficking, active citizenship etc. and organizing events and workshops for awareness raising • Providing legal, social and economic support and tackling issues including child abuse, street children, child soldiers and rape • Public education, nursery school and literacy program • Disseminating the information of human rights violation in and outside of the country for awareness raising • Bridging different generation/ethnic/religious/ identity groups, and across sectors • Building mutual understanding and respect to achieve common goals for community goods • Organizing regular grassroots dialogue and meetings through project activities and developing women’s platform • Forming women’s coalitions to utilise the limited resources and exchanging staff • Ethnic language and culture support program

Political security

Community security

Personal security

Environmental security

Food security

Health security

Economic security

MWO’s major activities and approaches promoting human security

MWO’s major activities and approaches promoting human security

Human Security Dimensions

Table 3.3

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such as disappearance and systematic torture as is the case in the other conflict-affected areas in this region. Nevertheless, human rights especially women’s and children’s rights have been affected, mainly due to poverty and disasters, while social injustice is deeply ingrained in society as a result of bad governance and corruption. Therefore, many activities and projects are intended to protect those basic rights, which is reflected in the dimension of political and personal security. With regard to the approaches, which are applied to any projects and activities, they are all contributing to promote community security. By strategy of women-to-women diplomacy through various activities, the MWO invented a mechanism to create a platform for women’s social interaction, which helps to promote mutual understanding and tolerance and build trust among diverse groups. The MWO bridges not only all the different groups across ethnic, religious and generation lines, but also different sectors including EAOs, other CSOs, the government bodies and the security sector to pursue their goals. Their approach is based on equality, which respects diversity, and focuses particularly on the protection and promotion of people’s fundamental rights. Thus, the MWO enhances these forms of security when carrying out any activities and projects. Consequently, it has transformed social division and created social cohesion by building grassroots peace through bridging diplomacy. This was effectively achieved by transferring their own peace culture, which provided the communities with a sense of security.

Conclusion The formation of a democratic government after the prolonged military dictatorship created new opportunities and challenges in Myanmar. The civilian government launched economic and political reforms and there were an influx of foreign investments as well as aid and support from external actors. However, the high expectations at the beginning of the new era regarding peace and development have not been met. The hybrid structure of the regime imposed by the 2008 constitution enabled the military to remain as a dominant player, negatively affecting the dissemination of the rule of law and the promotion of ethnic equality. Moreover, the formal peace process negotiated by three male-dominated institutions—the government, the military, and EAOs—focused heavily on traditional security-related issues such as disarmament and demobilisation, rather than human security. This precarious situation fostered more

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social division, rather than alleviated the pre-existing divisions based on Myanmar’s colonial history and which were exacerbated by the military oppression. Although the inclusion of women in peacebuilding is essential to strengthening all forms of human security, women in Myanmar were largely excluded from the formal peace process, which impeded the realisation of security, justice and development. Against this backdrop, the tensions and concerns based on the divided structures have not been defused, posing considerable challenges for ordinary citizens. In particular, ethnic minorities are challenged in all of the seven dimensions of human security (Table 3.2), which causes serious human-rights violations and deprivations. While numerous CSOs have been established to tackle the social, cultural, environmental, and political problems that governments, owing to a lack of political will or financial resources, were unable to solve, they were involved in a power struggle. Therefore, a collective movement towards positive change was impossible. However, EWOs promote human security through their activities and projects. The MWO has created platforms for dialogue and cooperation among the different stakeholders, which has resulted in the finding of shared goals and priorities regardless of their differences. The MWO has formed coalition across the ethnic and religious boundaries to pursue the shared goal of gender equality at a national level and works with different sectors, including the government, EAOs, and other CSOs, through women-to-women diplomacy. Most notably, their approach is based on equality, which has a positive impact on the building of mutual understanding and overcoming differences. By connecting groups and protecting their rights through women-to-women diplomacy and the transfer of their culture of peace, the MWO has promoted community and political security. Human security is the foundation of peace and development. Although women’s participation in peace processes does not resolve all issues, it is important, because otherwise the capacity of countries to pursue sustainable peace and development is undermined. The case of the MWO indicates that women have the potential and capacity to bridge diverse groups and engender social cohesion. Considering the past failure of peace process in Myanmar, women’s participation becomes even more important than before to improve human security, peace, and development.

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References AGIPP. (n.d.). Mon Women’s Network. Alliance for Gender Inclusion in the Peace Process. Retrieved July 21, 2019, from https://www.agipp.org/en/member profiles/mon-womens-network. Cardenas, M. L. (2019). Women-to-Women Diplomacy and the Women’s League of Burma. In A. Kolas (Ed.), Women, Peace and Security in Myanmar between Feminism and Ethnopolitics (pp. 33–43). Routledge: Oxon and New York. Fink, C., and Simpson, A. (2018). Civil Society. In A. Simpson, N. Farrelly, and I. Holiday (Eds.), Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Myanmar (pp. 257– 267). Oxon and New York: Routledge. Galtung, J. (2000). Searching for Peace: The road to transcend. London: Pluto Press. GEN. (n.d.). Existing Members. Gender Equality Network. Retrieved July 21, 2019, from https://www.genmyanmar.org/existing_members. Heyzer, N. (2005). Women, War and Peace: Mobilizing for Security and Justice in the 21st Century. In F. Dodds and T. Pippard (Eds.), Human and Environmental Security: An Agenda for Change (pp. 50–67). Oxon and New York: Routledge. Kaldor, M. (2007). Human Security. Cambridge: Polity Press. Lidauer, M., Tun, S.C.T., Aung, L.S., and Tun, S.S. (2018). Unlocking Civil Society and Peace in Myanmar: Opportunities, Obstacles and Undercurrents. Yangon: Paung Sie Facility. MacFarlane, N., and Khong, Y. F. (2006). Human Security and the UN: A Critical History. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. MWO. (2018, May 11). Documentary Video on GBV and Legal Resources. Mon Women’s Organization. Retrieved July 21, 2019, from https://www.fac ebook.com/MonWomenOrganization/videos/986238301543202/. MWO. (2019, March 13). Mon Women’s Organization. Retrieved July 27, 2019, from https://www.facebook.com/pg/MonWomenOrganization/rev iews/?ref=page_internal. MWO. (n.d.). Mon Women’s Organization. Retrieved July 26, 2019, from http://monwomenorganization.blogspot.com. Nyein Nyein. (2017). Mon Women Urge Strong and United Voice for Equality. The Irrawaddy. Retrieved July 25, 2019, from https://www.irrawaddy.com/ news/burma/mon-women-urge-strong-and-united-voice-for-equality.html. Ogata, S. (2001). State Security—Human Security. Fridtjof Nansen Memorial Lecture 2001. Tokyo: United Nations University. Retrieved November 23, 2019, from https://archive.unu.edu/hq/library/Collection/PDF_files/ UNU/publ-ogata.pdf. Prasse-Freeman, E. (2012). Civil society, and an inchoate politics of the daily in Burma/Myanmar. The Journal of Asian Studies, 71(2), 371–397.

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CHAPTER 4

Evaluation of the Equality of Education on Basic Education Standard in Chin State, Burma/Myanmar Khen Suan Khai

Introduction Providing quality education and healthcare has been a challenge for successive authorities in Burma/Myanmar. This fact is mainly in the case of basic education standards in Chin State, Burma/Myanmar. The poor education standard in Chin state is one instance of the challenge from the periphery in Burma/Myanmar. While there has been improvement in education, such as ethnic language learning, the primary prerequisites are inadequate. This chapter is an appraisal of the challenges driving the law education situation of Chin State. The causal challenges range from limitations in the equal rights and quality in education services at all levels

K. S. Khai (B) School of Social Innovation, Mae Fah Luang University, Chiang Rai, Thailand e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 C. Yamahata and B. Anderson (eds.), Demystifying Myanmar’s Transition and Political Crisis, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-6675-9_4

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of education to the number of qualified teachers, poor learning environment such as school infrastructure, outdated teaching methods, language barriers, armed conflict, and even cultural assimilation forced religious conversion.

Brief Background of Chin State With an estimated population of over 500,000, Chin State is in remote mountain ranges of northwestern Myanmar, sharing borders with Bangladesh and India in the west, Rakhine State in the south, and Magway and Sagaing Divisions in the east (UNFPA [Myanmar] 2015). The Chin ethnic group is one of the eight “major national ethnic races” in Burma/Myanmar, such as Bamar (Myanmar or Burmese), Kachin, Kayah (Karenni), Kayin (Karen) Mon, Rakhine (Arakan), and Shan. The six main Chin tribes of Asho, Cho (Sho), Khumi (M’ro), Laimi, Mizo (Lushai), and Zomi (Kuki) can be further distinguished by at least 60 different sub-tribal categories (Sakhong 2003). Chin State is predominantly rural, with much of the population living in approximately 1500 villages. There are nine major townships: Tedim, Tonzang, Falam, Hakha, Thantlang, Matupi, Mindat, Kanpetlet, and Paletwa. Another estimated 250,000 Chin live in other parts of Burma (CHRO 2012). Chin State is one of the most ethnically diverse, the most underdeveloped, and isolated areas; the poorest state with inadequate road infrastructure, communication systems, healthcare and education facilities, electricity, and running water. Chin State has the highest poverty rate of 73%, as per the released figures from the World Bank. When it comes to health care and education, which are the fundamental necessity of the people, the level of Chin State is execrable.

Overview of Basic Education in Burma/Myanmar In the four periods of education in Burma/Myanmar, in the first two periods (the pre and early years after independence), Burma/Myanmar had outstanding schools and an extensive missionary school network. During the dark age of Burma/Myanmar from the 1960s to 2000s, the utter junta has dragged the country’s standard, including the education level, into the deep dark pit of a failed state. Now is the period of reform. With its National Education Law (2014) and N.E.L. Amendment (2015), the government in post-2015 has launched several new

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initiatives and national programs to expand access to quality education across the education sector by a wide range of complementary reforms across the national education system such as recognition of the right of all citizens to free, compulsory education at the primary level; establishment of a standards-based education quality assurance system; expansion of the basic education system to 13 years; support for the learning of nationalities’ languages and culture; and greater decentralization within the education system (MOE 2014). There are five levels of education in Burma/Myanmar: Early childhood care and development (ECCD), Basic education, Alternative education (A.E.),1 Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET), and Higher education. According to the National Educational Law (2014), the basic education system has been reformed from the 5+4+2 system to the KG+5+4+3 system. National Education Strategic Plan (NESP) for the 2016–2021 period has emphasized that the new basic education curriculum should focus on learning concepts, problem-solving processes, and understanding basic principles and reasons. There are approximately 50,000 basic education schools in Burma/Myanmar, with approximately 9.26 million students. Most of these schools are managed by the Department of Basic Education under the Ministry of Education (M.O.E.). The 2019/2020 Budget Estimates (B.E.) for the Ministry of Education accounted for MMK 2685 billion, or $1.85 billion, which is even lower than the military’s shares of the union budget, MMK 3.385 trillion. This amount represented 8.41 percent of the total Union budget. Within this budget, nearly 75% goes to Basic education. Nevertheless, the budget is far from enough to support the construction and renovation of schools and teaching and learning tools (MOE 2020). Education assessment is the indispensable prerequisite for development. “Access” is defined by UNICEF as “living within one hour’s walk from school” (UNICEF 2010). In a remote State like Chin, education assessment has been a challenge for the lack of development. For the whole country, enrolment rates are high, but retention rates are low. Only 54% of children in the country completed primary school, which means nearly half of the children’s education is not adequate for basic literacy and numeracy skills. 1 Non-formal Primary Education Equivalency Program (NFPEEP) for out of school children and a Summer Basic Literacy Program (SBLP) for adults.

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The enrollment rate in basic education has also dramatically increased from 88% in 2009–2010 to 97.0% in 2019–2020. It is one of the primary outcomes of the government’s free education program, including free of charge for textbooks and uniforms, registration fee, free stationery, and parent-teacher association fee. The program was initiated with primary education in 2011–2012, middle school education in 2012–2013, and high school education in 2015–2016 (MOE 2016).

Evaluation on Basic Education System in Chin State Factors are resulting in the low basic education system in Chin State range from the poor learning environment, teachers in competencies and insufficiency, poor school infrastructure and learning tools, and insecurity. In the following, the overview and evaluation of basic education in Chin State are elaborated. State Government’s Weak Decision-Making Power There has been widespread interest in the reforms in the education sector. The government comes out with National Education Law and NEPS (2016–2021). However, there is weak decision-making power at lower levels of administration. Apart from State Education Department, there is no organ working respectively on education. The state government should help, guide, and cooperate with government ministries, government organizations, community organizations, local and international organizations, and scholars for education matters. However, the State governments have very limited decision-making power regarding any area related to education administration, such as teacher recruitment, replacement, transferring of teachers to curriculum development. The administrative works being carried by different departmental offices in Chin State are still under the vicious cycle of the red-tape system, which is nothing much different from the military government. Even for staff recruitment, the State government has little to say that to recruit Primary Assistant Teachers (PAT), Junior Assistant Teachers (J.A.T.), Senior Assistant Teachers (S.A.T.), the Union education department makes a final decision. Ministry of Education should be set up in

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each State and Region government in Burma/Myanmar so that in the matter directly relating to the State or Region, they should have a certain degree of decision-making power. Teacher Insufficiency and Incompetency According to 2019–2020 figures from the Chin State Education Office, there are 134,981 basic education students in Chin State, making up more than a fifth of the total population of approximately 500,000 in the State (Fig. 4.1). The student enrollment rate has also increased from 79% in the 2015–2016 academic year to 98.45% in the 2018–2019 academic year. However, only 33.75% of students completed matriculation in 2018– 2019. This factor has indicated that most students cannot pass matriculation for they lack the basic skills. There are 738 Basic Education Primary Schools (BEPS), and there are 4702 teachers all over the state to teach 78,844 students in total. This fact indicates that the student–teacher ratio is 20:1. Each BEPS has only

Fig. 4.1 Basic education school student list in Chin State (2019–2020 academic year) (Source CEI 2020)

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six teachers on average to teach K.G. to Grade-5, which means there is only one teacher per grade. Besides, each level of the class has multiple subjects. This is one of the main reasons that the basic education standard in Chin State is low for teacher insufficiency, and the teachers are not trained and expert in the respective subjects they are teaching. Since students are not taught each subject efficiently and systematically at the basic level in primary schools, the school drop-out rate is high when they reach the middle school level for, they could not catch up with the lessons. The Department of Education should emphasize upgrading teachers’ quality, especially on mastering their respective subjects. Students need to be taught systematically and accurately from their basic classes by qualified teachers in every grade. There are 541 Basic Education Middle Schools (BEMS) all over Chin State with 3979 teachers to teach 44,116 students. This indicates that the student–teacher ratio is 11:1. Each BEMS has only eight teachers on average. There are 174 Basic Education High Schools (BEMS) all over Chin State with 822 teachers to teach 12,707 students. This indicates that the student–teacher ratio is 15:1. Each BEHS has fewer than five teachers on average to teach high school in each school (CEI 2020: 48). This is generally not the case, especially in rural areas where up to 200 students share a single teacher. Many of these teachers are not specialized in the subjects they have been teaching and rarely get training on pedagogy. The shortage of teachers has been a chronic issue in the state. Though schools in towns have no difficulty receiving adequate teachers, it is a major issue for villages. There are 230 vacant positions in the 2020 academic year. Understaffing is a major impediment to access to quality education in the rural areas, which comprise the larger portion of Chin State. In many areas, one school is shared by up to four to five villages in the area. There are 1498 primary education schools all across the state (Table 4.1). One primary reason for the shortage of teachers is a low wage which is insufficient for a monthly living in a rural area where prices are doubled. For NESP (2016–2021), many teachers in the Chin State schools are not well-informed. It is because many of the teachers are not officially appointed but self-hired staff. Besides, the state government also has no resource person working respectively on NESP. It is also because

7 10 15 16 8 8 8 8 15 95

Hakha Thantlang Falam Tedim Tonzang Mindat Matupi Kanpetlet Paletwa Summary

3 6 9 11 3 11 9 6 20 78

BEHS(B)

1

1

BEHS(A) 21 28 27 32 16 20 25 12 42 223

BEMS 10 11 7 11 5 9 22 7 23 105

BEMS(B)

Note A = Affiliated, B = Branch, H = High, M = Middle, P = Primary Source C.E.I.

BEHS

List of basic education schools in Chin State

Township

Table 4.1

15 34 21 33 12 21 30 18 29 213

Post-BEPS 36 23 99 46 47 106 68 62 198 685

BEPS

5 7 2 9 9 57 97

2 6

BEPS(B)

1

1

BEPS (A)

94 119 178 154 98 177 171 123 384 1498

Total

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many of the teachers are in remote areas where communication is difficult. However, an education office mentioned that many teachers are weak in empowering and updating themselves with issues relating to their profession. Promotion of School Level Promotion of school level through thorough evaluation has positive impacts such as the student drop-rate decrease. Many children in the rural village have ceased to study in basic education middle school and high school because there is no school in their village. In recent years, the government has promoted schools from Primary to Middle and then to High School without sufficient teaching staff. This is one of the primary reasons that the educational standard of the state is getting lower and poorer years after years. Language Barriers The Chin State education system is both underfunded and, due to Myanmar/Burmese language policy as the medium of instruction, difficult to follow to Chin indigenous children whose mother tongue language is not Burmese. In the 2020–2021 academic year, Chin State’s national matriculation pass rate was the lowest in the country as always, at 21.2%. This percentage is even the highest matriculation pass rate in a decade. Pass rates have remained well below the national average of 32% each year (Figs. 4.2 and 4.3). The average 20% pass rate of only 40% of the population of matriculation-age students indicates that less than 10% of the population could take matriculation pass successfully. This

Fig. 4.2 Matriculation pass rate in Chin State

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Fig. 4.3 Comparison chart of matriculation pass rate in Chin State and the whole country

factor suggests that approximately 90% of 16-year-old in Chin State are either out of school or failed their matriculation exams or both (South et al. 2021). Those who passed the matriculation are not only from the basic education high school, but many of them are also from private high schools. Local Curriculum Development introduced in 2016 for ethnic language teaching may help achieve literacy in mother-tongues for Chin ethnic nationality. Many students in villages in their middle grades cannot even spell Burmese letters correctly. This has a causal effect on school dropping among students from villages as they move up higher grades. Besides, the subject students failed the most in the Matriculation examination every year in English for the students have no adequate knowledge of the subject. The Chin Education Initiative has contemplated that many teachers who teach English are not good at English. Insecurity One significant alarm recently is in Paletwa township. Paletwa is the most remote town in Chin State. There is no land-road access to Paletwa, except through Kaladan river by boat from Kyaukdaw town of Rakhine state. To visit from one of the towns in Chin State to Paletwa, one must pass the Magway Division, Sagaing Division, and Rakhine state.

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The education system in the township continues to suffer because of the conflict between Tatmadaw and the Arakan Army. According to the Chin State government, more than 200 teachers applied for transfers to other locations due to security concerns associated with the conflict in January 2020. In February, the escalating conflict in Paletwa forced school closures before exams were scheduled to take place. Out of 384 schools in the township, 191 were closed before Covid-19 closed all schools in the country. There were 347 schools in Paletwa, 25% of all the primary education schools in Chin State. For the outbreak of conflict between the Myanmar Army and Arakan Army since 2015, Paletwa township has experienced a shortage of teachers, and schools were closed. Within the 347, 118 schools (35%) have no teachers, and 94 schools (27%) have only one teacher. Hence, 360 non-permanent schoolteachers were appointed to fill up the vacancy that students would pursue their study. However, 306 numbers of subject skilled teachers were still required. By 2020, only half of the schools were re-opened, but the Covid-19 pandemic and the coup d’etat in February 2021 have caused the schools to close again. Poor School Infrastructure A decent learning environment is one of the push factors for a better education standard. Most of the school building is old, unsafe, and lacks proper partition. One can well conceive that how teachers would manage all the same time inside a hall-like school building. While the number of schools is increasing every year, budgets relating to building and housing the existing schools have been rarely allocated. The officials from the respective schools have primary responsibilities to raise funds from other organizations and students’ parents to maintain and renovate the existing infrastructures. Setting aside the school’s hard infrastructure, many of the schools in Chin State have struggled with teaching tools and stationery. It comes as no surprise that Chin State has the lowest matriculation pass rate every year when the schools struggle to have proper housing and desks and chairs for class. The Ministry of Education has evaluated that the poor-quality learning environment in many basic education schools and the out-of-date curriculum and teacher-centered strategies have caused a lack of interest in basic education among children (MOE 2016). Many students in poor primary school buildings have been hindering the practice of child-centered approaches (C.C.A.) in the teaching process (Pyae 2020).

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Table 4.2 Japan ODA to eight townships in Chin State (2015–2020) Tonzang Tedim Building 189.05 (School, Staff Housing, Toilet) Water 2 Unit School 2 Furniture (Desks and Chairs)

Falam

Paletwa Matupi Mindat Thantlang

296.56 59.501 310

324.02 184.94 148.05

2

1

2

4

1

1

3.44

0.768

1.04

11.7

0.8

1.88

Hakha 1349.714

7.6 26.56

Source Chin State Government

According to the Chin State government’s data, Chin State has received 2930.623 million Kyats from Japan for building (school, staff housing, and toilet), water unit, and desk and chairs from 2015–2020 (Table 4.2). Since 2015, Japan G.G.P. in Chin State reached $6,192,106 in total. $5,130,404 is for the school building, and the rest is for healthcare (health center and medical equipment). It is difficult to show the direct effect of aids for school buildings, desks and chairs, water, and healthcare. Nevertheless, it is highly effective for the local people, students, and teachers who enjoy the direct impact of having a formal classroom, restroom, staff housing, water unit in schools, and healthcare center with proper desks, tables, and chairs. Teachers and students state that the learning environment directly impacts the education assessment process. They can concentrate more with better class settings and equipment while enjoying daily basic needs such as water systems and toilets (Fig. 4.4). The Border Areas and Ethnic National Races Youth Development Schools (Na Ta La) Due to prevailing low socio-economic conditions in Chin State, rural communities remain vulnerable to state-sponsored cultural assimilation programs. The Border Areas and National Races Youth Development Training (Na Ta La) schools, operating under the military-dominated

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Fig. 4.4 Japan G.G.P. in Chin State (2005–2020) (Source Embassy of Japan in Burma/Myanmar)

Ministry for Border Affairs (MoBA) and Ministry of Religion and Culture Affair (MoRC), continue to target impoverished children and offer the chance to undertake education at residential schools. There are three Na Ta La Schools levels: Residential schools for basic education, Vocational Training, and Technical Training (Fig. 4.5). For technical training and vocational training, the students have gained skills for their profession as they cooperate with international organizations such as Bridge Asia Japan (B.A.J.) and Japan Myanmar Association (J.M.A.). The training is for fashion design, handicraft, cooking, mechanical repairs and maintenance training, electrical and welding, and basic electrical courses (JICA 2016). Many poor children who cannot afford to study in basic education schools go to Na Ta La residential schools as they are free of charge. There are 44 schools across Burma/Myanmar (Fig. 4.6). There are reports that in these residential schools, there are educational incentives to promote Buddhism. Students at Na Ta La schools at Chin State have faced coercion with converting to Buddhism (CHRO 2012). Students in Na Ta La

4

Fig. 4.5 Na Ta Burma/Myanmar)

La

EVALUATION OF THE EQUALITY OF EDUCATION …

schools

across

Burma/Myanmar

(Source

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MoBA,

school have been converted to Buddhism. The Department of Promotion and Propagation of Sasana has been sending this Buddhism mission report to the Ministry of Religion and Culture Affairs every year.

Evaluation of the Situation on Basic Education Standard in Chin State There are certain requirements to learn that the factors leading the basic education standard in Chin State are hierarchical. The education system in the state should have been motivated through the basic but primary levels.

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Fig. 4.6 Na Ta La residential basic education schools in Burma/Myanmar

The genuine endeavor of the government since 2015 to promote the education standard is substantial. With National Education Law and NESP (2016–2021), the output within the first term of the government is obvious. Nevertheless, the State and Region level government has no decision-making power to rely on everything on the management of the Union government, from staff recruiting to promotion. Many school teachers in Chin State are not well-informed of the NESP, that the Union government was unable to implement the NESP effectively. The government’s free education program has a certain impact on the enrolment rate. Nevertheless, the government was incompetent in providing sufficient funding for the proper learning environment, and educational tools, especially in remote States like Chin State. For instance, the Chin State government has benefited from official development assistance from developed countries, such as Japan grant assistance for grassroots development (GGP). However, school buildings and other infrastructure are just one primary requirement among the many other factors. No wonder the education standard is low in the country where the military budget is much higher than the budget for education and health. It is worsening since February 2021, not to mention the Covid-19, that the newly semi-democratic country has fallen into political chaos again that hundred of educators, students, government staff, and the majority of the population in Burma/Myanmar have gone through active non-violence movement against the military junta. Closing the school

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doors is creating a generation uninformed. The ethnic nationalities along Burma/Myanmar’s peripheries have spent more than half a century fighting the regime for autonomy and equal treatment. The result has been uncountable damage to national development, generations of citizens, especially the youth raised in an atmosphere of fear, distrust, and above all, uninformed. The urge to depend more on intellectual consideration and exercise one’s intelligence and compassion becomes less when lethal weapons are still in one’s hands. Factors are impeding the development of quality education in Chin State. For a better education standard, there are primary causes needed to be solved prior. Many children in the remote area in Chin State struggle even for physiological needs, which is the most basic level needed to learn. School teachers in rural villages in Chin State also face a shortage of food and supplies. This challenge has resulted in many schoolteachers being reluctant to stay in or return to the area. This has caused there to be many vacancies to fill in schoolteachers’ posts in Chin State. Besides, many students lack a secure place to learn. The school infrastructures are poor, and many schools in the southern town of Paletwa are closed for armed conflict. The state education office also is incapable of securing enough teachers in schools. There is not even one Senior Assistant Teacher in sixty-two BEHS (Branch) and four BEHS in Chin State. This results from a lack of physical needs and security in the area, barriers impeding schoolteachers to have attachment and sense of belongings and concern toward the locals, especially the students. Besides, there is a low level of trust in the education system and the teachers. Many schools in the rural village filled the vacant by selfhired staff who are not trained in pedagogy—teaching staff who got a B.A. (History) by distance learning are hired to teach science, English, and mathematic subjects. Since the two factors people put their trust in, people and systems, are insufficient, the standard of education in the state is low. School-level promotion without proper evaluation has also resulted in a huge shortage of teachers in these schools. The inadequacy of schoolteachers has been a major challenge for schools in Chin State. Appointment of non-native Chin teachers and lack of local resource personnel have been big challenges in educational administration, too. When the non-native teachers are transferred, it is difficult to fill up the vacant by local teachers, but the local resource cannot cover the requirement of teachers in Chin State. Under the current teacher recruitment law, one must attend teacher training to be appointed

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as a teacher. This also contributes to the insufficiency of teachers in Chin State. There is a hope that more local teachers could be recruited soon as Hakha Education Degree College was established in 2016 in Hakha, Chin State. Hence, it is indispensable to grant the state government a certain degree of decision-making power indirectly relating to education matters, improve teachers’ capacity, and improve the school infrastructure. The state government should have a specific organ working respectively on the development of quality education. It is the prime duty of the state government to enhance cooperation in central government, N.G.O.s, and institutions that can benefit the development of quality education in Chin State, as education is the key to development. Since teachers are also the key to education, the capacity of teachers should be evaluated, appraised, and empowered. Every basic education school in Chin State should have enough teaching staff with expertise in the subject they are teaching. All the stakeholders create a proper learning environment to apply an effective learning approach such as C.C.A. The State government and the schools should rely on the Union budget and search for financial support from international governments such as Japan, an international organization such as UNICEF, and other institutions. Grant aid such as Japan G.G.P. has huge effectiveness in Chin State.

References CEI. (2020). A Study of Basic Education Situation in Chin State. Kanpetlet, Chin State. CHRO. (2012). Threats to Our Existence: Persecution of Ethnic Chin Christians in Burma. Retrieved from http://www.chro.ca/images/stories/files/PDF/ EC_Threats_to_Our_Existence.pdf JICA. (2016). Myanmar Data Collection Survey on Technical and Vocational Education and Training Final Report. Tokyo: JICA. MOE. (2014). National Education Law. MOE. (2016). National Education Strategic Plan 2016–2021 (Summary). In Ministry of Education. Retrieved from http://www.moe-st.gov.mm/ wp-content/uploads/2018/01/NESP_20Summary_20-_20English_20-_ 20Final_20-_20Feb_2023.pdf%0Ahttps://proxy.library.upenn.edu/login? url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=bth&AN=101 480953&site=ehost-live MOE. (2020). Myanmar 2019–2020 Education Budget Brief. Nay Pyi Daw.

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Pyae, S. S. (2020). The Relationship between Primary Teachers’ Mathematics Beliefs and Practices and Influencing Factors: Cases of Yenangyaung, Myanmar. Hiroshima University. Sakhong, L. H. (2003). In Search of Chin Identity: A Study in Religion, Politics and Ethnic Identity in Burma. Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, København. South, A., Edwards, N., Davis, T., Lian, C. K., Dim, R. N., Thang, M. N., & Stenning, E. (2021). Language and Education in Chin State Myanmar Education Partnerships Project. Yangon. UNFPA (Myanmar). (2015). The Republic of The Union of Myanmar: The 2014 Myanmar Population and Housing Census—The Union Report (Vol. 3). Naypyidaw. UNICEF. (2010). Myanmar Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey: Selected Indicators. Yangon.

CHAPTER 5

Non-State Actors on the IDPs in Kachin: Provision of Humanitarian Assistance and Protection of Justice D. Moon Awng

Background of the Kachin Conflict The resumption of armed conflict in Kachin State in 2011 and the subsequent mass displacement is different from the internal migration between the 1960s and 1990s. Thousands of people who are displaced need humanitarian assistance and protection. Without the provision of protection, they are vulnerable to become victims of human rights abuses such as forced disappearances, detention, torture, and sexual violence. In 1994, the Kachin Independence Army and Burmese military government signed a ceasefire agreement after the armed conflict started in 1962 in Kachin and northern Shan States. After 17 years of ceasefire

D. Moon Awng (B) Research and Development Department, Naushawng Development Institute, Myitkyina, Kachin, Myanmar

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 C. Yamahata and B. Anderson (eds.), Demystifying Myanmar’s Transition and Political Crisis, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-6675-9_5

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(1994–2011), the 1994 ceasefire agreement between Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and the military government was breached on June 9, 2011. It was the time when the Thein Sein government came to power after the first general elections in 2010 under the new 2008 constitution. Many scholars argue that the root cause of the resumption of armed conflict is due to the lack of concrete political agenda and political dialogues between both parties during the ceasefire period and the new 2008 constitution. Chapter 7 of the 2008 constitution on “Defence Services”, clause 338 states that “all the armed forces in the Union shall be under the command of the defense services”. In April 2009, the Myanmar government announced the scheme of all armed groups to be transformed into Border Guard Forces (BGF). The formation of the Border Guard Forces scheme is that all ethnic armed groups are to be integrated into the Tatmadaw. There are 326 soldiers in each BGF unit in which 30 are from the Tatmadaw and take charge of the position of the unit. All the BGF army salaries are from the Tatmadaw from the time of military recruitment, and they must retire when they reach the age of fifty.1 If Kachin Independence Organization (KIO)/KIA does not accept the BGF scheme, the government will announce them as an armed insurgent group and the government may begin military operations against KIO/KIA. This was a one-sided political agenda of the Myanmar government; the ethnic revolution armed groups did not participate in any discussion of the whole process. The government gave just three months (April–June 2009) to implement the BGF scheme for all armed groups in Myanmar. Although the deadline for accepting the scheme was set in June 2009, it was postponed until September 2010. KIO/KIA had noticed this kind of enforcing scheme based on their experiences even before the referendum of the 2008 constitution. The KIO was invited to attend the National Convention in which the 2008 constitution emerged. The KIO proposed the 19 points which cover political agenda of “democratic rights for all citizens, political equality for all ethnic nationalities, and the rights of internal self-determination for all member states of the Union” at the National Convention. The SPDC government rejected to discuss the KIO’s proposal. They were threatened by the Commander of the

1 John Buchanan, Militias in Myanmar (Asia Foundation, July 2016).

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Northern Regional Command as the condition of the 1994 ceasefire could be reverted.2 After the 1994 ceasefire agreement, the KIO initiated regional development, infrastructure building, and the provision of basic public services such as education and health in the KIO’s control areas and government control areas. Meanwhile, the public communication and relations of the KIO have improved through community development projects, such as a training program for Kachin young people entitled, “Education and Economic Development for Youth” (EEDY) organized in Laiza since 2008. Thousands of Kachin young people joined there and it got popular for years among Kachin young people. Since KIO has had public relations with Kachin, before making the decision on accepting the BGF scheme, KIO called Kachin community leaders for explaining the scheme and receiving public opinions on transforming KIA into BGF under the Tatmadaw. After that consultation meeting, KIO officially denied accepting the government’s BGF scheme and the KIO’s liaison offices in government control areas closed. Government media started calling the armed groups that rejected the scheme as “insurgents”. After that, the military tensions between the government and KIO/KIA were increased until the 1994 ceasefire ended on June 9, 2011.

Understanding the Context of Non-State Actors’ Major Role in Kachin State Myanmar had been under an authoritarian military regime from 1962 to 2011. The Kachin people like other ethnic groups have been suffering from the negative social and political impacts of armed conflicts from the 1960s until 1994. The Christian Churches in Kachin State took the facilitation role to have the ceasefire agreement between the KIO/KIA and the Myanmar Government in 1994.3 Before the 1994 ceasefire agreement, the civil conflict in Kachin State caused a huge negative impact on the Kachin people’s living conditions, welfare, infrastructure, assets and livelihoods, education and economic growth. According to data published by the KIO, the Tatmadaw destroyed 658 villages during the Kachin 2 Lian H. Sakhong and Paul Keenan, Ending Ethnic Armed Conflict in Burma: A Complicated Peace Process (Chiang Mai: The Burma Centre for Ethnic Studies, 2014), 128. 3 Robert H. Taylor, The State in Myanmar (Singapore: NUS Press, 2009).

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State conflict between 1961 and 1993.4 The local churches played a prominent role in organizing war-torn communities and leading reconstruction, rehabilitation, and initiating the community development in those destroyed villages. Even after signing the 1994 ceasefire agreement between the Tatmadaw and KIA, the military government could not ensure providing basic public services to have social security and quality of life. At that time, the military government could not facilitate genuine economic growth and development because they just focused on the exploitation of resource wealth.5 As an authoritarian regime, the military government hardly accepted the foreign development aid for political factors such as taking the risk of the stability of the regime and threats to their survival.6 The civil society actors such as local religious institutions are to fulfill the welfare needs of the respective communities in the weak welfare state and ceasefire areas.7 The conflict before the 1994 ceasefire prompted around 67,000 Kachin civilians to be internally displaced.8 At that time, the pattern of displacement was like internal migration and took a certain time. People who left their hometown often moved to their relatives’ homes in other villages. There was no mass displacement and no IDP camps that provide humanitarian assistance at that time. As a result of having the freedom of movement, many people internally migrated gradually within and across the State to seek better public services and economic development. Therefore, the church leaders have never experienced hosting and taking care of such displaced people on a massive scale. Although they may have had expected that armed conflict would resume in the Kachin State since KIO rejected the BGF scheme, they would not have calculated for there to be a severe and long conflict and that they would take charge 4 Ibid. 5 Sean Turnell. “Myanmar’s Fifty-Year Authoritarian Trap,” Journal of International

Affairs, 65, 1 (2011): 79–92. 6 Wooyeal Paik. “Authoritarianism and Humanitarian Aid: Regime Stability and External

Relief in China and Myanmar,” The Pacific Review, 24, 4 (2011): 439–462. 7 Jasmin Lorch. “Civil Society Under Authoritarian Rule: The Case of Myanmar,” Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, Institute of Asian Studies, GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Hamburg, 25, 2 (2006): 3–38. 8 Ashlay South, Ethnic Politics in Burma: States of Conflict (Abingdon: Routledge, 2008), 152.

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of humanitarian assistance of mass displacement. It is believed that the resumption of civil war in Kachin in 2011 caused around 100,000 people (over 19,000 households) to leave their homes. The role of the local church becomes very important in accepting IDPs and initially providing shelters and emergency humanitarian assistance since 2011. The lack of the government’s emergency responses to IDPs and the situation of the government’s poor public services have pushed the churches to act as the government that takes accountability for its citizens.

Churches: Shelters for IDPs and Their Protection Almost all the conflict-affected civilians are Kachin Christian. As the Kachin Baptist Convention and Roman Catholic Church are major denominations in Kachin State, their roles in protecting their church members have been very critical and significantly different from community development projects since 2011, the resumption of civil war in Kachin State. For the Kachin Christian civilians, the churches are the only place to have shelter and protection from the armed conflict. The very first mass displaced populations were headed to the Waimaw Catholic Church in 2011. According to UNOCHA, there are 138 IDP sites in both government control areas and non-government control areas as of July 2019.9 The common displacement scheme from the conflict areas was arranged through the communication of respective community or religious leaders. Local NGOs helped transport new IDPs to camps in non-government control areas. The Metta Development Foundation, BRIDGE, and Wunpawng Ninghtoi (WPN) were helping IDPs to be transported to safe places quickly through the connections within the communities. The local churches were usually the hosts for receiving IDPs to give emergency humanitarian assistance such as providing space for temporary shelters, food, and clothes much faster than any other actors such as individual charities, NGOs, and aid agencies. At the beginning of hosting IDPs, for instance, in the Htingnai Baptist Zonal Association of KBC, a local church had to collect funds every Sunday so that they can provide humanitarian assistance to the IDPs. Moreover, the daily cost 9 OCHA, “Myanmar IDP Sites in Kachin State,” ReliefWeb, July 31, 2019, https:// reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/MMR_Kachin_IDP_Site_A0_Jul2019.pdf (accessed January 25, 2020).

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of food for IDPs was allocated to different groups of church members weekly until donor agencies, humanitarian NGOs, and individual donations came to aid. The religious leaders from the Zonal Baptist Association and local churches visited IDP sites and led worship service to give spiritual support. In terms of the schooling process for IDPs, the host local churches like Mogaung Baptist Church tried to contact a local school to get admission in the middle of the academic year. Also, they arranged volunteer teachers who guided and taught school lessons to IDP students at the campsite in the evening. In 2012, armed conflict had intensified and mass displacement increased; the situation showed no signs that IDPs could return to their home shortly and thus, they would need more humanitarian aid and support with international standards. In order to fill this gap, the Joint Strategy Team, initially led by the Metta Development Foundation, Shalom Foundation, Development Department of KBC and KMSS from Catholic Churches, was formed in 2013. The Joint initiative of the Joint Strategy Team comprised nine organizations: Bridging Rural Integrated Development and Grassroot Empowerment (BRIDGE), Kachin Baptist Convention (KBC), Kachin Relief and Development Committee (KRDC), Kachin Women Association (KWA), Kachin Development Group (KDG), Karuna Mission Social Solidarity (KMSS), Metta Development Foundation (Metta), Nyein (Shalom) Foundation and Wunpawng Ninghtoi (WPN) working for IDPs in Kachin State ensuring to improve aid coordination and effectiveness and technical support in fulfilling the international standard of humanitarian assistance.10 The Joint Strategy Team (JST) took a major role of advocacy to the international community through updating the information of the humanitarian situation on the ground on time. For instance, one was entitled “Key messages to world leaders, international governments and the UN Concerns and Requests related to Humanitarian situation in Kachin State and Northern Shan State, Myanmar” to make the international community understand the situation of conflict-affected Kachin communities.11 The JST received funding from a huge international donor, for 10 Ashlay South, Protecting Civilians in the Kachin Borderlands, Myanmar: Key Threats and Local Responses (London: Humanitarian Policy Group Overseas Development Institute, 2018). 11 Joint Strategy Team, “The Humanitarian Crisis Update and Key Messages for Kachin State and Northern Shan State,” Burma Partnership. November 20,

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example, the European Union and could distribute the funds with technical support to not only IDPs from government control areas but also IDPs living in non-government control areas.

The Role of Churches in Protecting IDPs for Justice According to the report of Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar conducted by the United Nations Human Rights Council, there were consistent patterns of serious human rights violations and abuses against the international humanitarian law to Kachin civilians mainly from conflict-affected areas. The Tatmadaw primarily committed violations of human rights in its military operations in Kachin State.12 The common patterns of violations by the Tatmadaw are a conduct of hostilities in flagrant disregard of civilian life and property, unlawful killings, torture, sexual and gender-based violence, arbitrary deprivation of liberty and enforced disappearance, forced labor and forced recruitment of adults and children, forced displacement, confiscation and destruction of property and denial of humanitarian assistance13 . During the armed conflict in Kachin, civilians have been facing a huge humanitarian crisis and human rights abuses due to the lack of immediate humanitarian assistance and protection for human security. Although Myanmar IDPs should have protection under international law, the legal and institutional structure is still weak to ensure justice.14 Civilians from conflict-affected areas, before they become IDPs, are more vulnerable to become victims of human rights violations. Their homes were frequently and arbitrarily fired by mortar, exposed to indiscriminate shelling. Amnesty International reported that such kind of

2015, https://www.burmapartnership.org/2015/11/the-humanitarian-crisis-update-andkey-messages-for-kachin-state-and-northern-shan-state/ (accessed January 20, 2020). 12 Human Rights Council, United Nations, Report of the Detailed Findings of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar, September 2018, A/HRC/39/CRP.2. 13 The Network for Human Rights Documentation, Report on the Human Rights Situation in Burma, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/hrsituationfinal-eng1.pdf (accessed January 26, 2020). 14 Sara Brooks, “What Protection for the Internally Displaced in Burma/Myanmar?” Australian Journal of Human Rights, 36 (2007): 27–62.

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regular incidents harm local civilians—often kill and injure them—and damage their homes since the Tatmadaw neglected to distinguish between civilian and military targets with insufficient measures to minimize civilian harm.15 Even though the conflict-affected civilians displaced to IDP sites, they were under unsecured conditions in terms of protection of justice and humanitarian assistance. Thus, the conflict-affected civilians displaced to non-conflict areas to secure their lives and receive humanitarian assistance. Even in the same village, some of those moved to IDPs sites in the government control areas while others were displaced to non-government control areas based on their respective local network. Although the armed conflict-affected civilians were successfully displaced to IDP camps or sites, their human dignity was violated and there were lacking aspects in the protection of justice and humanitarian assistance. The IDPs from the government control areas were more exposed to human rights abuses, losing human dignity while IDPs at the non-government control areas could not access enough humanitarian assistance. To ensure the protection of IDPs from both areas, the role of churches played a very critical role. In the earlier period of displacement into government control areas, there were frequent visits of the Tatmadaw and local police forces to interrogate as a ploy to suspend the Kachin rebellion. The IDP sites at the government areas were mainly hosted by local churches. In those incidents, the local church and religious leaders were standing for IDPs to protect their rights and dignity. To give a significant example, in 2012, the religious leaders from Jan Mai Kawng Baptist Church and Kachin Baptist Convention led the protest to demand justice for Lahtaw Brang Shawng who was an IDP from Jan Mai Kawng IDP camp.16 Lahtaw Brang Shawng was arrested at the IDP camp accused of being a KIA soldier and setting a bomb. He was forced to confess by

15 Amnesty International, All the Civilians Suffer: Conflict, Displacement, and Abuse in Northern Myanmar, https://www.amnestyusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Mya nmar-report-FINAL-VERSION.pdf (accessed February 1, 2020). 16 Saw Yan Naing and Kyaw Kha, “Kachin Protest for Refugee’s Release,” Irrawaddy, July 6, 2012, https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/kachin-protest-for-refugees-rel ease.html (accessed February 1, 2020).

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being severely tortured17 and charged under the Unlawful Association Act and imprisoned for two years. By the initiatives of local churches, other non-state actors, peacemakers, and international communities with the intention of seeking justice and protection of IDPs, he was released after being detained for one and a half years.18 Moreover, in 2014, after a bomb blast near Man Wing Gyi, three high school students were arrested by the Tatmadaw. Catholic Priest in Man Wing Gyi tried to release those civilians detained by the Tatmadaw.19 There are 140 IDP sites in the Kachin State. Almost half of the total IDPs were displaced to non-government control areas or territories administered by the KIO.20 The significant challenges of IDPs in the non-government control areas were the blockage of access to humanitarian assistance. The report from Fortify Rights (2018) stated that the Myanmar government and the Tatmadaw authorities restricted international humanitarian aid to Kachin State since 2011.21 It mentioned that the restrictions of humanitarian aid to Kachin civilians from the Thein Sein government (2011–2016) to Aung San Su Kyi-led NLD government (2016–2020) have demonstrated that there were policies to prevent or limit international humanitarian aid by imposing travel restrictions and not providing travel authorizations on international humanitarian agencies. According to the Fortify Rights report (2018) on humanitarian aid to Kachin civilians, the government unconditionally approved

17 Seamus Martov, “Torture Persists in Kachin State,” Irrawaddy, September 2, 2013,

https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/torture-persists-in-kachin-state.html (accessed February 1, 2020). 18 Nyein Nyein, “Kachin Detainees Set for Release after Peace Talks,” Irrawaddy,

May 31, 2013, https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/kachin-detainees-set-for-rel ease-after-peace-talks.html (accessed February 1, 2020). 19 Burma Link, “Seven IDPs in Kachin State Arbitrarily Arrested and Intimidated-Four Still Detained in Burma Army Camp,” April 28, 2014, https://www.burmalink.org/ seven-idps-kachin-state-arbitrarily-arrested-intimidated-four-still-detained-burma-armycamp/ (accessed February 1, 2020). 20 OCHA, “Myanmar IDP Sites in Kachin State,” ReliefWeb, July 31, 2019, https:// reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/MMR_Kachin_IDP_Site_A0_Jul2019.pdf (accessed January 25, 2020). 21 Fortify Rights, “They Block Everything,” August 2018, https://www.fortifyrights. org/downloads/They_Block_Everything_EN_Fortify_Rights_August_2018.pdf (accessed February 2, 2020).

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around five percent out of 562 humanitarian aid applications requested by international humanitarian aid agencies to government control areas.22 The government very strictly banned UN and humanitarian agencies that provide aid to IDPs in the non-government control areas since April 2016.23 Also, journalists were deterred from accessing the nongovernment control areas.24 The Myanmar government does not want to recognize IDPs in the non-government control areas because the KIO denied signing the National Ceasefire Agreement (NCA), making Kachin IDPs victims or part of the political game at the expense of human security and justice. The Churches like Kachin Baptist Convention and the Catholic Churches mainly facilitated to deliver essential humanitarian aids and assistance such as food, adequate healthcare, essential items, and proper sanitation collaborating with the Joint Strategy Team. In 2018, the Kachin Baptist Convention discussed with Nippon Foundation to give aid, particularly food to IDPs (approximately 70,000 IDPs) in the nongovernment control areas. However, the Nippon Foundation clearly said that they could not support IDPs in the non-government control areas and reportedly urged KIA to sign the NCS to receive humanitarian aids.25 The churches continued supporting humanitarian aid to IDPs in the non-government control areas with the support of local and church communities’ contributions. Therefore, the Myanmar Border Affairs Ministry issued a warning letter to the Kachin Baptist Convention (KBC) not to deliver humanitarian aid to IDPs in the non-government control areas; otherwise, they would take legal actions against the leaders of

22 Ibid. 23 Amnesty International, “Myanmar: Lift Restrictions Immediately on Humanitarian

Aid,” October 20, 2020, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/10/myanmarlift-restrictions-immediately-on-humanitarian-aid/ (accessed February 2, 2020). 24 Refugees International, “Suffering in Shadows: Aid Restrictions and Reductions Endanger Displaced Persons in Northern Myanmar,” December 2017, https://themimu. info/sites/themimu.info/files/documents/Report_Aid_Restrictions_Reductions_Enda nger_Displaced_Persons_Dec2017.pdf (accessed February 2, 2020). 25 BNI, “KBC: Nippon Foundation Will Not Assist IDPs in KIA-Controlled Areas,” BNI Multimedia Group, December 19, 2018, https://www.bnionline.net/en/news/kbcnippon-foundation-will-not-assist-idps-kia-controlled-areas (accessed February 3, 2020).

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the KBC.26 In brief, the churches and religious leaders are the protectors and those who have been defending human rights, human security, and human dignity for the conflict-affected Kachin civilians in both government control areas and non-government control areas.

The Effort of Churches for IDPs Returns and Resettlement In 2017, after 8 years of mass displacement of Kachin civilians, it has been a great tiring burden for the churches and the church communities’ hosting and taking care of the conflict-affected Kachin civilians and delivering humanitarian aid since the government has no policy agenda for Kachin IDPs but only restrictions to international humanitarian agencies. It seemed that the religious leaders thought that the period of conflict would not take a long time because the Thein Sein government initiated the peace process in 2011 and created the Myanmar Peace Centre for state and union level ceasefire and peace talks. They expected that Kachin IDPs would return to their homes after the ceasefire in the near future. As the period of displacement and living at IDP camps were longer than anticipated, the amount of humanitarian aid is decreasing and hence worsening preexisting hardship. Thousands of children and young people are losing opportunities to shape their future. Therefore, the churches and religious leaders who take care of the Kachin IDPs determined the IDP returns and resettlement plan to the secured areas that should be guaranteed by both armed groups, the Tatmadaw and the KIA. In October 2017, the religious leaders from the Myanmar Council of Churches (MCC)—Myitkyina gave the presentation to the KIO in Laiza about current ground situations of Kachin IDPs and discussed ideas of IDP returns and resettlement plan. Soon after that, a committee named the “Kachin Humanitarian Concern Committee (KHCC)” was formed with leaders from MCC-Myitkyina, leaders from KBC and Roman Catholic Churches, over twenty representatives of churches that host IDPs, and representatives of KIO’s IDP care committee.27 The “Kachin 26 Lawi Weng, “Main Kachin Aid Group Ordered to Halt Humanitarian Work in RebelHeld Areas,” Irrawaddy, June 14, 2018, https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/main-kac hin-aid-group-ordered-halt-humanitarian-work-rebel-held-areas.html (accessed February 3, 2020). 27 Interview with Rev. Maji Bawk La, November 16, 2019.

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Humanitarian Concern Committee (KHCC)” is to negotiate with the government, Tatmadaw and KIO/KIA to facilitate IDP returns and to take care of the IDP return scheme. The major return policies of the committee only apply under the condition that the villages concerned are no longer a battlefield and hence selected to have IDPs returned from both government control areas and non-government control areas at the same time. Before initiating the Kachin IDP return scheme, as of April 2018, over 6000 civilians from Tanai, Kamaing, Namti, Waing Maw, Chi Howe, and N-Jang Yang were displaced to the shelters of safe local churches since the conflict occurred between the Tatmadaw and KIA. More than 3000 people were trapped in war zones because Tatmadaw restricted the civilians to flee from their villages.28 Kachin Humanitarian Concern Committee and local churches tried to rescue the battle-trapped civilians requesting the government. The following year in April, the KHCC had a meeting with the National Reconciliation and Peace Centre (NRPC) in Nay Pyi Taw to discuss the Kachin IDPs return and resettlement. There were five points agreed at the meeting29 : IDPs are to return their homes safely and with dignity in line with international humanitarian policies; the relevant government departments will support the implementation process of IDP return and resettlement; KHCC will take care of providing food, clothes and helping returned IDPs to take up their livelihoods; KHCC will select IDP camps that have more tendency to return in the pilot programs; and finally, KHCC will negotiate with KIO/KIA if necessary for their return.30 As a result of the April meeting in Nay Pyi Taw, the Working Group on Resettling IDPs in Kachin State was formed with the order of the President’s Office to facilitate and help Kachin IDPs for returning with dignity

28 Nan Lwin Hnin Pwint, “More than 3000 People Now Trapped by Fighting in

Kachin State,” ReliefWeb, May 3, 2018, https://reliefweb.int/report/myanmar/more3000-people-now-trapped-fighting-kachin-state (accessed February 3, 2020). 29 NRPC, “NRPC, Kachin Humanitarian Groupp Agree on Five Points for Resettling IDPs,” National Reconciliation and Peace Centre, http://www.nrpc.gov.mm/en/ node/295 (accessed February 3, 2020). 30 Ibid.

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and safety with humanitarian assistance provided by the government.31 The KHCC had a meeting with the Working Group on Resettling IDPs and discussed conducting an Initial Need Assessment for IDP return, drafting the action plan and designating focal persons for the Working Group and KHCC.32 In late 2018, the Tatmadaw announced a unilateral ceasefire for four months from December 2018 to April 2019 to improve peace negotiations with the ethnic armed group.33 It was not a nation-wide unilateral ceasefire announcement that all ethnic armed groups keep demanding. The Tatmadaw’s ceasefire commands just covered four areas in the Northern Kachin State and in the Shan State. Then, the Tatmadaw extended the ceasefire period from May to July 2019.34 As the peace initiatives of the Tatmadaw were during the period of a unilateral ceasefire, the Tatmadaw arranged the IDPs’ return to their places that were covered in the ceasefire announcement areas. In January 2019, the Tatmadaw organized and accompanied 17 families of IDPs returning to Nam San Yang village as a first round. It was one of the conflict-affected villages and situated on highway road that goes from Myitkyina to Bhamo. However, this IDP return arrangement was just the Tatmadaw’s own agenda to happen within the four-month ceasefire announcement. There was no support or participation of KHCC and KIO for the Nam San Yang IDPs’ return. The Nam San Yang IDP return scheme was initiated without the knowledge of the government but later agreed because the Tatmadaw made it happen.35 The KHCC responded that their return was not in good timing since it is still under discussion with both the government and KIO so that all IDPs from government 31 Ministry of Information, “Meeting for Kachin IDPs Agree on Need for Initial Need Assessment,” https://www.moi.gov.mm/moi:eng/?q=news/25/05/2019/ id-17800 (accessed February 4, 2020). 32 Ibid. 33 Nyein Nyein, “Tatmadaw Announces Four-month Ceasefire in North, Northeast,”

Irrawaddy, December 21, 2018, https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/tatmadaw-announ ces-four-month-ceasefire-north-northeast.html (accessed February 4, 2020). 34 Swe Lei Mon, “Tatmadaw Extends Ceasefire Again Despite Ongoing Clashes in Shan,” Myanmar Times, September 2, 2019, https://www.mmtimes.com/news/ tatmadaw-extends-ceasefire-again-despite-ongoing-clashes-shan.html (accessed February 4, 2020). 35 Interview with Rev. Dr. Hkalam Samson, “IDP Return Must Not Be Rushed or Militarized,” https://www.mmpeacemonitor.org/1219 (accessed February 3, 2020).

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control areas and non-government control areas would be able to safely return to their places of origin.36 The churches have already experienced that some of their returns were not safe nor sustainable. Significantly, the hundreds of Kachin civilians from the Pan Sau Yang were displaced to Namti on August 12, 2017, and they returned within two weeks after there was no conflict. However, the people from that village had to leave and displace to Namti on April 21, 2018, since the conflict resumed.37 Thus, the returning IDPs should have a guarantee from both parties of armed conflict in the respective areas or villages. Although the Nam San Yang IDP returnees could achieve their strong desire to return home, they were facing many difficulties to resettle in their villages.38 Before the return, the Tatmadaw had landmine clearance around the villages. However, large areas are still restricted due to the landmines and there are no specific boundaries as restricted danger zones. The landmine clearance operation services were provided by the Tatmadaw only to the households that have household registration certificates. According to the IDP intention survey, 97% of all IDPs have never owned any legal documents of land ownership and only 2% of them ever owned land ownership documents only to later lose them.39 Thus, the percentage of landmine clearance coverage would be very limited in accordance with their landmine operation policy. The freedom of movement even in the village is restricted for daily security, making farming and other livelihoods difficult.40 To have a condition of return with safety and dignity, the Nam San Yang IDP returnees still need a lot of support in many sectors such as reconstruction, food and water security, education,

36 Statement on Return and Resettlement of IDPs in Kachin Region by Kachin Humanitarian Concern Committee, September 26, 2019. 37 Interview with Rev. Yaw Htung, Lambraw Yang Baptist Church, January 28, 2020. 38 Ye Mon, “An Unhappy Return for IDPs in Kachin State,” Frontier Myanmar,

August 22, 2019, https://frontiermyanmar.net/en/an-unhappy-return-for-idps-in-kachinstate (accessed February 4, 2020). 39 UNHCR, KBC, KMSS and Shalom, Kachin State IDP Intention Survey, Myanmar, June 2019. 40 Dan Seng Lawn, Safe and Dignified Returns? A Rapid Assessment of the Experiences of Returned Internally Displaced Persons in Nam San Yang Village, Kachin State, Myanmar (Myitkyina: Kachinland Research Centre, 2019).

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health, land right security, issues of landmines, and sustainable livelihoods41 Therefore, it would not be the long-term solution of IDP return if there is only effort and support from the Tatmadaw and the government. The role of churches, KHCC, and other non-state actors KIO, international humanitarian aid agencies and their participation, collaboration, and support are very crucial for sustainable solutions to IDPs’ return. After eight years of displacement, to understand the situation of Kachin IDPs, their intention about sustainable solutions, barriers, and challenges to achieve durable solutions and to support IDPs’ returns and resettlement with safety and dignity, the Kachin State IDP research was conducted within January and February 2019 by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) collaborating with KBC, KMSS and Shalom Foundation. This survey research covers 100 IDP sites from both government control areas and non-government control areas. According to the survey research report,42 65% of IDPs want to return to their home village if they leave IDP camps. Almost all IDPs (94%) mentioned that they are unable to return to their places of origin because there is still a lack of sustainable physical security and freedom of movement. In terms of the condition of local integration, 48% of IDPs responded that they can integrate locally while 31% can resettle elsewhere under certain conditions, such as newly acquired housing and land. As a result of displacement, the IDPs lost their houses, land, and there is a great negative impact on their livelihoods. The survey research finds out that 65% of IDPs’ household income is less than 20,000 Kyats per month.43 In the effort of the IDP return and resettlement program, the role of churches is facilitating the discussion with the government and KIO to ensure their return with much-needed safety and dignity toward sustainable solutions. Also, the IDPs’ fundamental rights still need to be protected in the whole process of return and resettlement.

41 Ibid. 42 UNHCR, KBC, KMSS and Shalom, Kachin State IDP Intention Survey, Myanmar,

June 2019. 43 Ibid.

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Conclusion The role of churches as non-state actors in providing humanitarian assistance and protecting justice for the Kachin IDPs still remains significantly important, ranging from rescuing the civilians from the battlefield, providing spaces for shelters, foods, humanitarian assistance in both government control areas and non-government control areas to IDP return and resettlement after eight years of mass displacement. There are key determining factors to solve the Kachin IDP issues such as landmine clearance, securing their lands, access to basic services, resettlement elsewhere or local integration, rebuilding their homes, access to livelihoods, social cohesion, and community development to live in safety and dignity. Especially, in the context of setting policy agenda and implementing sustainable solutions of Kachin IDP issues, it is worth considering the role of churches as non-state actors.

CHAPTER 6

Public Health Reform and Transition in Burma/Myanmar Voravit Suwanvanichkij and Saw Nay Htoo

Background Since independence in 1948, Burma, one of the world’s most ethnically diverse countries, has never been at peace. Although the ethnic Burmans, for whom the country was named after, constitute the largest ethnic group, the frontiers of the country, beyond the central plains and the Irrawaddy River Valley, are dominated by other ethnic groups, speaking over 100 different languages and dialects. In many of these areas, ethnic calls for increased autonomy in a federal union were met with a military response, particularly following General Ne Win’s coup d’etat in 1962, which would usher in almost five decades of military rule. With key decisions made by a small cabal of generals, insulated from accountability to the needs of the people, social spending was given low

V. Suwanvanichkij (B) Mae Tao Clinic, Mae Sot, Thailand S. N. Htoo Health Convergence Core Group (HCCG), Mae Sot, Thailand

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 C. Yamahata and B. Anderson (eds.), Demystifying Myanmar’s Transition and Political Crisis, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-6675-9_6

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priority. As a result, decades of military rule in Burma was characterized by severe disinvestments in social services, including health and education, along with extreme centralization and Burmanization of governance, with ethnic concerns and aspirations dismissed or marginalized, including in health (Lintner 2017). Under rule of the last military junta, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), Burma’s health system earned the dubious honor of being among the least funded in the world, the lion’s share of the government budget going to defense, despite a lack of external military threats. In 2000, the Burmese health system was ranked by the WHO second to the bottom in overall performance, only outperforming Sierra Leone, its basic health indices, particularly for infants, children, and women, among the worst in the region (WHO 2000). Yet these official figures obscure the realities facing many ethnic communities living in the conflict zones of the country. Here, not only is severe disinvestment in health problematic but, in addition, for decades the tatmadaw or Burmese military, employed a counterinsurgency policy known as the Four Cuts policy, aimed at disrupting the flow of supplies, information, funds, and recruits to ethnic armies. The cornerstone of this policy was the destruction of villages in contested zones or their forced relocation to areas controlled by the government, coupled with widespread human rights abuses against civilians (particularly forced labor, forced relocation, arbitrary taxation, and confiscation of food and property). Since 1996, an estimated 3700 villages have been destroyed, relocated, or abandoned, leaving at least 400,000 internally displaced in southeastern Burma (TBC 2012). The end result has been a health catastrophe, one which has been described as a “Chronic Emergency” (Back Pack Health Worker Team 2006). In eastern Burma, basic health indices in internally displaced populations (IDPs) are far worse than Burma’s official figures. Multiple population-based analyses collected by networks of ethnic community based health organizations (ECBHOs), some working now for over three decades with displaced communities of eastern Burma, have consistently demonstrated infant, child, and maternal mortality rates that are far higher than Burma’s official figures, already among the highest in ASEAN. In these communities, these figures bear closer resemblance to other settings hosting coincident, complex humanitarian disasters, such as Somalia (Table 6.1) (BMA et al. 2010; HISWG 2015). Morbidity and mortality remains often from preventable entities such as diarrheal disease, respiratory infections, malaria, and malnutrition.

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Table 6.1 Comparative health indicators of Burma with Thailand

General gov’t spending on health/capita (2012) General gov’t spending on health/capita (2012), PPP Total health expenditure, % of GDP (2012) Infant Mortality Rate, per 1000 LB, 2013 Under-5 Mortality Rate, per 1000 LB, 2013 Maternal Mortality ratio, per 100,000 LB, 2013

Thailand

Burma

Eastern Burma*

$164 $385

$5 $6

N/A N/A

4 11 13 20

2 40 51 178

N/A 73 138 721

Yet as has been frequently the case elsewhere in Burma, in the face of official neglect, marginalization, and abuse by agents of the central state, all policies that have widened health disparities in the country between ethnic communities and more Burman and urban areas, local community organizations have mobilized to respond to these failures in order to provide essential social services. Without access to official health services from the Burmese government and with international humanitarian assistance to many IDP communities in eastern Burma blocked or curtailed by the Burmese military, ECBHOs have responded by developing their own local health systems. These initiatives are rooted in their communities and designed to quickly and appropriately respond to local health priorities and needs, which often vary greatly among and even within different communities. In over three decades in operation, these programs have come together to form a coalition of health providers in eastern Burma and network even beyond. Today, a trained cadre of over 2600 health staff cover a population of almost half a million individuals, treating almost 200,000 patients a year through a large network of village health volunteers, mobile medical staff, and clinics. Together, in addition to providing basic preventive and curative services for the most common communicable diseases (particularly diarrhea, malaria, and respiratory infections), this health system also operates basic reproductive health care (working in conjunction with trained traditional birth attendants), child health services, health education campaigns, control of disease outbreaks, relief during acute emergencies (such as storms and flooding), and water and sanitation programs. A referral system is also in place whereby secondary and tertiary level care can be obtained by patients across the Thai border through the Mae Tao (Dr. Cynthia’s) Clinic in Mae Sot. For patients

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requiring even more specialized care, the Mae Tao Clinic is able to refer patients directly into the Thai public hospital system. In 2013, even following the ceasefires that allowed for increased freedom of movement for many IDP communities of eastern Burma, for almost 70%, including for among the most vulnerable populations of Burma, this parallel system was the sole source of health care; only about 8% of those who sought care for an illness did so from Burmese governmental sources. In addition to physical accessibility and financial barriers to accessing official Burmese health services, there exists widespread distrust of the Burmese health system and the low perceived availability of health care personnel (HISWG 2015). The operation of a large and varied workforce, with members performing a variety of roles, including as medics and health administrators, has meant that ECBHOs have had to develop their own training curricula and standardized medical protocols to address the diverse health priorities and needs in their own locales. The development and review of all training packages is done through extensive and longstanding collaborations with local Burmese, Thai, and other international partners, providing experience and building capacity locally to respond to new and emerging local and international priorities. Similar collaborations between ECBHOs have addressed the absence of reliable population-level health data, essential for cost-effective and evidence-based programming, leading to the development of joint information collection and analysis efforts between multiple ethnic and community health organizations, under the rubric of the Health Information System Working Group (HISWG). Altogether, these components of the health programs operated by ECBHOs constitute a separate health system for Burma, one covering ethnic and displaced populations, among the most vulnerable communities of eastern Burma, one operating through a devolved, participatory manner, a paradigm diametrically opposed to that of the Burmandominated central state. In 2011, the last military junta of Burma, the SPDC, was officially dissolved, replaced by a quasi-civilian administration headed by a former General, President Thein Sein. Under this administration, local ceasefires were brokered with most major ethnic armed organizations operating in eastern Burma which, along with the limited political space afforded by Burma’s recent reforms, have afforded more mobility and security for many IDP communities. This includes for ethnic and community health workers, facilitating their ability to perform their duties providing health

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services to IDPs, even as official international humanitarian assistance continues to be controlled or blocked by the government. For the first time in decades, ECBHOs providing health services in eastern Burma and the Thai border have been able to engage in meetings and limited collaborations with the Burmese Ministry of Health and Sports (MoHS), particularly in the fields of nationally and internationally recognized priority diseases (such as malaria, reproductive health, and childhood vaccinations), spurring optimism about the possibility of a “convergence” between these two disparate, parallel systems providing health services in eastern Burma. This optimism must be, however, tempered by an examination of the deep structural barriers that renders any such possibility in the near future unlikely. As opposed to the primary, participatory health system operating at the grass-roots level which is the modus operandi of ECBHOs of eastern Burma, the governance structure of the official Burmese health system is the polar opposite. In Burma, health governance remains highly centralized, with the military-drafted 2008 Constitution of Burma providing the central government in Naypyidaw exclusive legislative power over all aspects of health policy-making (2008 Constitution, Article 96) (ENAC 2016). Although the Constitution also brought into being the existence of state and regional parliaments, their roles are very limited, including in health, where they are only entitled to enact legislature covering traditional medicine and, even then, only on matters “not contrary to traditional medicine policies prescribed by the Union [government]” (2008 Constitution, Article 188) (ENAC 2016). Although state and regional level health departments also exist, these bodies exist in an ambiguous position, bereft of a clear relationship with the central government Ministry of Health and Sports and Sports. In addition, state and regional level governments do not have jurisdiction over these health departments, only an informal coordination role, rendering them largely legally unaccountable to local communities (HCCG, n.d.; Nixon H et al. 2013). Local health departments also do not administer, nor do they have purview over, healthcare facilities (including hospitals and clinics) in the state, which are run entirely by and are thus solely accountable to the Ministry of Health and Sports in Naypyidaw. Although efforts have been made recently to try and deconcentrate power from the union level to the state and regional level authorities, the bulk of key decision-making, including on issues that have significant impacts on the local community, remains at the central level (ENAC 2016).

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It is also significant that the administrative backbone of the Burmese government, including state and regional governments, all their departments, as well as union ministries, is an agency known as the General Administration Department (GAD), an agency formed during the military dictatorship to centralize control over the county. The presence of the GAD throughout governance structures at the state and regional level means that all correspondence and administration, including funding, of the executive and legislative branches of local government are operated through this department (Nixon H et al. 2013). The GAD falls under the Union Ministry of Home Affairs, one of three ministries headed by a minister directly appointed by the Burmese military commanderin-chief, independent of any elected government. This constitutionally derived power gives the tatmadaw yet another means to control or interfere with the administration of states and regions centrally (HCCG, n.d.). This problem is exacerbated by the decades-long pattern of “militarization” of ministries in Burma, including in the Ministry of Health and Sports, whereby high-ranking military officials are transferred to highranking positions (including health officers and director-generals) in the ministry, individuals often with limited experience but whose decisions and opinions prevail over those of experienced civilian staff, and have the power to promote, transfer, demote, or dismiss civilian personnel (Zarni Mann 2015). Meanwhile, the filling of senior positions with military personnel also results in limiting opportunities for advancement of more experienced, civilian personnel, further contributing to low morale and inefficiency in the work of the ministry (Shwe Yee Saw Myint 2015). Thus, despite recent changes in Burma, public health governance remains highly centralized, resulting frequently in a top-down, ineffective, disjointed approach to local health priorities and needs and an ongoing, disproportionate focus on urban, tertiary care facilities despite the often greater needs in more remote areas (3MDG, n.d.; ENAC 2016; MoHS 2016). This disparity is exacerbated by the inequitable distribution of skilled healthcare staff, which heavily concentrated in urban areas, particularly Rangoon and Mandalay, with few willing to work in more rural areas, particularly in longterm in government-operated facilities (MoHS 2016; UNICEF 2017; Thomson Reuters Foundation 2017). These problems result in and are further compounded by a bottleneck in decisions in Naypyidaw, decisions often made by individuals who have little or no accountability to or knowledge of local populations, who

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largely remain shut out of decision-making processes aimed at strengthening or improving public health in their own communities. With little actual power given to local health authorities and a health administration structure that disincentivizes improvement, the end result is that for many rural, ethnic communities in Burma, there remains little tangible change in access to vital health services (HCCG, n.d.). The current, official Burmese government health framework leaves little formal space for local health departments and organizations such as the ECBHOs of eastern Burma to participate in the health of their communities. Indeed, they remain operating illegally: as organizations not officially registered in Burma, they are “illegal organizations,” their members and contact with their members liable to prosecution under statutes such as the British-era Unlawful Associations Act, originally drafted as the India Act XIV of 1908 (Stella Naw 2017). Although currently selectively unenforced, the continued existence of this and other repressive laws serve to hinder wider, official collaborations between ECBHOs of eastern Burma and official bodies. Furthermore, for the cadre of health personnel trained and certified through locally developed curricula and treatment protocols, formulated based on the specific needs of the communities in which they work, such individuals operate now in Burma without official accreditation from the Burmese government and the vital services they have and continue to provide are illegal under Burmese law, and such individuals do so at the risk of arrest (HISWG 2015). Burma has set an ambitious goal of achieving universal health coverage by 2030. The government’s most recent National Health Plan includes the extension of a Basic Essential Package of Health Services (EPHS) to be “guaranteed for everyone by 2020,” “…through the engagement of Ethnic Health Organizations (EHOs), Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), private-for-profit providers, etc.” (MoHS 2016). Yet significant hurdles exist to realize this goal, not the least of which remains the existing health governance political structure, reform of which is needed in order to more efficiently and equitably deliver vital healthrelated services, which must be locally rooted and decentralized, given the extreme diversities and disparities that exist in Burma, particularly for the most vulnerable communities in the country (Phyu Phyu Thinn Zaw et al. 2015; 3MDG, n.d.; EHOF 2017). This reality is also noted in the country’s latest NHP, which recognizes the need for the participation

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of health actors such as ECBHOs and further decentralization (MoHS 2016). Structural reform would also be essential if Burma is to meet its Sustainable Development Goals, particularly in reducing maternal and child mortality and combating HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other infectious diseases, health issues that often disproportionately affect marginalized and ethnic communities of the country (HISWG 2015). The country could address these disparities relatively quickly by leveraging the existing health system built up over decades by ECBHOs of eastern Burma, who must be legally empowered and engaged with, including through their existing administrative structures and in concert with other local actors, in key decisions and programs affecting their communities, a model which has been able to design programs to respond effectively and appropriately to specific health priorities in ethnic communities (EHOF 2017). Yet while recognizing the importance of ECBHOs and the urgent need for decentralization, the current government, also continues to advocate for the need to strengthen the management and leadership role of the central government in Naypyidaw on health policies, counter to the more decentralized model promoted by ECBHOs of eastern Burma whereby ECBHOs themselves manage and operate primary health programs in more remote ethnic communities of Burma. This stands in contrast to the calls of ECBHOs for their operations to be maintained and expanded and central health authorities in Naypyidaw assuming greater technical and coordination roles and focus more on setting national-level policies and priorities (ENAC 2016; MoHS 2016). Concurrently, more resources should be devoted to support access to local health services and local health authorities should be given more responsibility and made more accountable for health of their communities, particularly given the severely limited human resources and capacity of the Ministry of Health and Sports in Burma, a problem especially acute in rural and conflictaffected areas (EHOF 2017). These measures, in addition to helping to enhance health performance and ensure more equitable distribution of health services, will also engage communities, increase civic participation and, ultimately, aid the democratization process. However, such reforms can only occur with extensive structural reform, starting from the country’s many outdated laws as well as Burma’s military-drafted Constitution. Finally, it must be recognized that decentralization and a true convergence between Burma’s official health system and the devolved, inclusive, primary care system that has been operating in eastern Burma for

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decades is intimately and inextricably tied to longstanding discrimination and ethnic conflict, and progress toward such will be inseparable from prospects of achieving a lasting peace in the country, given the diametrically opposed health governance structures and operating models of these two systems. ECBHOs in eastern Burma have proposed a model for health reform and convergence, the Rocketship Model, which highlights the reality that health reform and convergence can only progress in tandem with efforts toward achieving sustainable peace and a federal union in Burma (See Fig. 6.1). The current situation is that ceasefires have largely stopped significant, overt conflict between major ethnic armed organizations and the tatmadaw in eastern Burma, affording more security and mobility for IDPs of eastern Burma and enabling limited collaborative efforts between ECBHOs and official health bodies in the country. However, ceasefires are not guarantees of a durable peace and, in the absence of further, significant decentralization of political power and more equitable and inclusive involvement of ethnic peoples in the future of their own communities, there can be little meaningful integration of the work of ECBHOs into a coherent, equitable national health system of Burma, particularly when periodic skirmishes, ongoing militarization of ethnic homelands, and ongoing human rights abuses continue, all of which further heightens mistrust of the central government (HCCG 2014; KHRG 2016). Today prospects of this remain distant: while the current Burmese government and tatmadaw road map to peace involve ethnic armed organizations formally joining the political process under the rubric of Burma’s highly centralized 2008 Constitution, many ethnic organizations, including ECBHOs of eastern Burma, are pushing for a more fundamental renegotiation of the relationship with the central authorities. For many, the constraints of the 2008 Constitution remain unacceptable, in peace and in health governance (Nixon H et al. 2013). During this critical transition period, international support for the work of ECBHOs, which are the health system for an estimated 500,000 members of the most vulnerable communities of Burma, must be continued, and agencies supporting initiatives in the country, particularly in more rural and ethnic areas, should be cognizant of the implicit conflict-sensitivities this entails. Given the extreme diversities in the country and long history of discriminatory policies by the central government, along with the highly centralized, Burman-dominated system currently in place, it must be recognized that the efforts of ECBHOs in

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Convergence Phases

Political Phases

Decentralized, Integrated Primary Health Care (Programs, systems policies)

Sustainable Peace and Federal Union

Complementary Primary Health Care (Programs & Policies)

Nationwide Peace Agreement

Collaborative Primary Health Care (Programs)

Nationwide Cease re Agreement

Temporary Cease re Agreement National Centralized Primary Health Care System (Government of the Union of Myanmar and MyanmarBased INGOs and LNGOs) Unitary Primary, secondary and tertiary health care Hospitals, xed-position clinics, and mobile outreach Large cities and towns Private out-of-pocket monies Union revenue funded

Localized CommunityBased Primary Health Care System

Pre-Ceasefire Situation

(Ethnic Health Organizations and Community-based Organizations) Devolved Primary health care Fixed clinics and mobile outreach Generally rural-based Mainly donor funded

Fig. 6.1 Primary Health Care Convergence Model (Burma/Myanmar) (Source Prepared by authors based on the draft of the Health Convergence Core Group [HCCG])

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eastern Burma cannot be seen solely as technical health service providers. They are also a longstanding expression of community agency: communities mobilizing themselves to realize their right to health, providing services to peoples long-neglected, marginalized, and abused by successive military administrations who have abrogated their responsibilities, particularly in the social spheres. Being locally owned, ethnic-run, and responding most quickly to local priorities, ECBHOs are perceived by local peoples as being more trustworthy and legitimate than the health bodies of the state and are the de facto health system for large communities living in conflict-affected areas of eastern Burma (South 2014; Shwe Yee Saw Myint 2014; Joliffe 2013). As such, there is an inherent, overt political dimension to health delivery in Burma, one which donors and others wishing to work in Burma should not overlook. Encouraging further support for the work of ECBHOs and not solely supporting organizations and projects approved by the central government can foster the building of a participatory, public health system, increasing trust within and between communities, and the prospects of a long-awaited, genuine peace. This potentially critical role of health systems as a catalyst for peace and a promoter of reconciliation has been recognized by the WHO and has contributed to such in diverse settings including Angola, Croatia, Mozambique, and Bosnia/Herzegovina (WHO, n.d.). Yet in Burma, the converse is also equally true: without an adequate understanding of the country’s complex history and ongoing ethnic and political dynamics, supporting health initiatives in ethnic homelands solely from the perspective of or in cooperation with the central, Burmandominated government not only risks problems such as lack of absorptive capacity at the central level and structural constraints that limit the ability to provide timely, accessible services to among the most vulnerable populations but, to many communities, it can also implicitly discount local initiatives as “inferior” (Joliffe 2013). This risks being counterproductive for the peace process, exacerbating ethnic mistrust and jeopardizing the prospects of durable, equitable improvements of the health of all of the peoples of Burma.

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References Back Pack Health Worker Team (BPHWT) (2006) Chronic Emergency: Health and Human Rights in Eastern Burma. Wanida Press, Chiang Mai. Burma Medical Association (BMA), National Health and Education Committee (NHEC), Back Pack Health Worker Team (BPHWT) and Ethnic Health Organizations (EHOs) (2010) Diagnosis Critical: Health and Human Rights in Eastern Burma. EHOF (2017 May 22) Ethnic Health Organizations Forum: Better Health Together. Ngwe Saung, Myanmar. Ethnic Nationalities Affairs Center (ENAC) (2016) Sectoral Policy Recommendations for Building Future Federal Democratic Union (draft). HCCG (2014) Primary Health Care Convergence Model for Burma/Myanmar. Health Convergence Core Group. HCCG (n.d.) A Federal, Devolved Health System for Burma/Myanmar: A Policy Paper. Health Information System Working Group (HISWG) (2015) The Long Road to Recovery: Ethnic and Community-Based Health Organizations Leading the Way to Better Health in Eastern Burma. Joliffe K (2013 December 18) Do No Harm: Promote ‘Ethnic’ Service Structures. US Institute of Peace (Blog) http://research.kim/works/do-no-harmpromote-ethnic-service-structures Accessed 10 Jan 2018. KHRG (2016) Ongoing Militarisation in Southeast Myanmar. Karen Human Rights Group. Lintner B (2017 June 3) A Question of Race in Myanmar. Asia Times June. http://www.atimes.com/article/question-race-myanmar/ Accessed 7 Feb 2018. 3MDG (n.d.) Collective Voices: Exploring Barriers to Healthcare Access in Myanmar. The Three Millennium Development Goal Fund, Yangon. MoHS (2016) Myanmar National Health Plan 2017–2021. Ministry of Health and Sports, The Republic of the Union of Myanmar. Nixon H et al (2013) State and Region Governments in Myanmar. Asia Foundation. Phyu Phyu Thin Zaw (2015 August 20) Myanmar’s ‘Black Ribbon Movement 2015’: The Tip of the Iceberg, the Diplomat. https://thediplomat.com/ 2015/08/myanmars-black-ribbon-movement-2015-the-tip-of-the-iceberg/ Accessed 25 May 2017. Phyu Phyu Thinn Zaw et al. (2015) Disparities in Health and Health Care in Myanmar. Lancet 386 (10008): 2053. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-673 6(15)00987-3. Shwe Yee Saw Myint (2014 May 5) Health Budget Up But Challenges Remain. Myanmar Times. http://www.mmtimes.com/index.php/home-page/142-

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in-depth/10271-health-budget-up-but-challenges-remain-2.html Accessed 20 May 2017. Shwe Yee Saw Myint (2015 August 31) Black Ribbons Fail to Deter Militarisation of Health Ministry. The Myanmar Times. https://www.mmtimes.com/ national-news/16219-black-ribbons-fail-to-deter-militarisation-of-health-min istry.html Accessed 25 May 2017. South A (2014 March 28) The Myanmar Context. Open Democracy. http:// www.opendemocracy.net/ashley-south/myanmar-context Accessed 20 May 2017. Stella Naw (2017 March 8) They Call it a Crime: Being Born Non-Bamar in a Conflict Zone. The Irrawaddy. https://www.irrawaddy.com/opinion/callcrime-born-non-bamar-conflict-zone.html Accessed 8 March 2017. TBC (2012) Changing Realities, Poverty and Displacement in South East Burma/Myanmar, The Border Consortium, Bangkok. Thomson Reuters Foundation (2017 May 23) Myanmar Children in Conflict-hit Areas Left Behind- UN. Bangkok Post. http://www.bangkokpost.com/ news/asean/1254946/myanmar-children-in-conflict-hit-areas-left-behind-un Accessed 24 May 2017. UNICEF (2017) Lives on Hold: Making Sure No Child Left Behind in Myanmar. United Nations (n.d.) Millennium Development Goals Indicators. United Nations Statistics Division. http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/ Accessed 10 Jan 2019. WHO (2000) The World Health Report 2000, Health Systems: Improving Performance. World Health Organization, Geneva. WHO (n.d.) Health as a Potential Contribution to Peace. Realities from the Field: What WHO Has Learned in the 1990s. http://www.who.int/hac/tec hguidance/hbp/HBP_WHO_learned_1990s.pdf Accessed 10 Jan 2019. WHO (n.d.) Global Health Expenditure Debate. http://apps.who.int/nha/dat abase/Select/Indicators/en Accessed 10 Jan 2019. Zarni Mann (2015 August 12) Movement Against Army Appointees in Burma’s Health Ministry Vows to Continue Advocacy. The Irrawaddy. https://www. irrawaddy.com/news/burma/movement-against-army-appointees-in-burmashealth-ministry-vows-to-continue-advocacy.html Accessed 24 May 2017.

CHAPTER 7

Redrawing or Blurring the Boundary? Observations of Naga People’s Political Struggles and Local Cross-Border Trade Practices Satoshi Ota

Introduction The Indo-Myanmar border stretches 1643 km long, and most of the area is mountainous. Various ethnic minorities reside throughout this mountain area. This chapter takes up the discussion of one of these ethnic minorities, the Naga, and explores their imagined borderline by looking at the local border trade practices among the people in a Naga village of the Indian side of the border. As Horam (2014) claimed, Naga is the amalgamate name of the people who live mostly in the northeastern hill area of India and the northwestern hill area of Myanmar, respectively. He also postulated that there

S. Ota (B) School of Global Studies, Tama University, Fujisawa, Japan e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 C. Yamahata and B. Anderson (eds.), Demystifying Myanmar’s Transition and Political Crisis, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-6675-9_7

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are more than 40 Naga tribes in total. These Naga tribes do not make up a large kingdom, as their polity does not go beyond their village and their identity is attached to their village. Before the national border between Myanmar and India was drawn, those villagers performed trades with other villages. Even after the national border was drawn, people who live in the villages near the border could cross the border relatively easily. Furthermore, some of the Naga people claim autonomy or independence of the Naga-inhabited hill area as Nagalim, which includes part of Myanmar. The chapter investigates their imagined borderline by looking at their local trade practices. The chapter starts by exploring the history of the Naga to elucidate their origins. The history of the Naga people was written by others until they received modern education, leading to a lack in the production of written scripts containing first-hand accounts. The present chapter then looks at their political struggles and the formation of their Naga identity in the modern period. This report also mentions about their claim of the existence of Nagalim and then examines the nature of the border trade occurring between Manipur and Myanmar. Importantly, the point of this paper is not to investigate the border trade between Myanmar and India from an economic point of view but instead to examine people’s perceptions of the border by looking at their local trade practices. The paper also investigates how the ‘border’ had shifted over a period of time and claims that the concept of fixed borderlines is relatively new. The final section presents the findings of fieldwork at Grihang Village in the Ukhrul District of Manipur and describes the local trade practices there to examine the gap between the national border and the imagined boundary.

History of the Naga Because the Naga people have not consistently had writing system, their history was not recorded until recently. There is no exact record about where the Naga people came from, but according to Singh (2008: 26), ‘they migrated to the present place, sometime in [the] B.C. era when other tribes like [the] Caren, Shan, Chin, Singpho, and Koyan of Indonesia, Myanmar, and [the] Philippines, who bear [similarities] in physique with the Naga [people], migrated from the same place (Central Asia) and settled where they found unoccupied lands’. Some others claim that the Naga originated from Mongolia (Horam 2014). According to Horam (2014), there were four major migration waves of Naga people

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to the area in question. The first one was from the direction of Tibet and Nepal through Arunachal Pradesh, while the second wave occurred from the Indo-China Peninsula involving the Mon-Khmer (Horam 2014). Next, the third came from the Yunnan Province of Southern China through the valley of Irrawaddy, followed by the fourth wave originating from Burma and involving people who belong to the Chin Kuki group (Horam 2014). Ahom, a medieval-period kingdom in Assam, had been in contact with the Naga. According to J. P. Mills, the Ao Naga maintained friendly relations with the Ahom Rajas, and several villages historically received grants of land in the plains in exchange for presents and promises to refrain from raiding (cited in Kumar 2005). The Ahom was previously obstructed near Dimapur by the Naga warriors during their march along the Doyang River to invade the kingdom of Kachari at Maibong in the sixteenth century (Kumar 2005). The people of Brahmaputra Valley including many of the royal and noble families were forced to seek shelter in the hills around during the Burmese war. The Ao Naga and Konyak Naga helped both these people, along with the Manipuri as well (Kumar 2005). After the first Anglo-Burmese war, the British annexed Ahom’s territory in 1838 and Cachar’s territory later. The British did not extend their power to the Naga’s hills immediately mainly due to economic reasons: specifically, the area had no prospect of gainful trade and commerce for the British. However, because of frequent raids by the Naga, the British gradually began to change their policy towards. Beginning in 1832, the British took out several surveys in the Naga Hills. The Angami Naga opposed the expeditions but were defeated by the firearms used by the British, with some of the villages becoming occupied by the latter. In 1841, there was an agreement established between the British and Angami chiefs regarding the border that recognised the Dhansiri River as the boundary (Kumar 2005). However, the Naga did not stop raiding the British and, because of this, the British sent 10 military expeditions in the hills between 1835 and 1851. The British progressively extended their influence to the Naga’s hills and Mokokchung was subsequently incorporated within the British jurisdiction in 1889. Prior to this, Kohima was made into an administrative headquarters in 1878 loosely overseen by the Naga Hills District in the Bengal Presidency (Aier 2006). According to Kumar (2005), the annexation of Naga-inhabited areas by the British was done slowly, haltingly, and hesitatingly, but with a gradual move eastward.

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One of the British officers mentioned that there would be no peace until the British absorbed the whole area between Assam and the Chindwin (Kumar 2005). After the Third Anglo-Burmese War, the British annexed Upper Burma in 1886. Subsequently, in 1891, the Anglo-Manipur War broke out and, as a result, Manipur came under the direct control of Britain (Kamei 2015b). After the war, a Scottish Missionary came to Manipur in 1894 and went to the eastern hills area where the Tangkhul Naga lived to promote Christianity. He established the first school in this area in 1897 (Raikhan 2016). After the British conquest of Manipur in 1891, the hill areas came under the rule of British political agents, who acted on behalf of Maharaja Churachand Singh, reported Kamei (2015b). Even after the annexation of Manipur, the British introduced a system of indirect rule over the hill tribes, who were divided into two major ethnic groups: the Naga and the Kuki. The British introduced the hill house tax, which required payment of 3 rupees per household per year, and the chiefs or headmen of the villages were designated to collect said funds. In addition, hill people were made to render forced labour to the colonial authority for the construction and maintenance of bridle paths, roads, and bridges (Kamei 2015b). The British played a role in looking after the interests of the hill tribes and protecting them from the oppression of the administrators of the valley or the Raja. They separated the administration of hill tribes from the Meitei people, who live in the valley area of Manipur. In 1907, the administration of Manipur was handed over to Maharaja Churachand Singh. However, the Raja’s jurisdiction did not cover the hill tribes. According to Kamei (2015b), the objective of the British policy was to prevent the traditional oppression and exploitation of the hill tribes by the Raja. During the period of the First World War (WWI), about 2000 Naga individuals were sent to France to participate in the war as labour corps. It was the first time that Naga people were forced to go to Western Europe, which influenced them in constructing a Naga identity (Horam 2014). In Zeliangrong Naga-inhabited areas, North Cachar Hills, and the Naga Hills, uprisings occurred. The rebellion of the Zeliangron Naga people was led by Haipou Jadonang and his disciple, Gaidinliu (Kumar 2005). Jadonang was arrested in 1931 and hanged that same year. His movement was succeeded by his cousin Gaidinliu, who formed a rebellion (Kamei 2015b). She was eventually captured by the British and sentenced to life imprisonment in 1933, but was released in 1946 (Kumar 2005).

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Naga-inhabited areas became battlegrounds between Allied forces and the Japanese in World War II (WWII). Japan occupied Burma in 1942 and tried to advance its force to Imphal in 1944. The first move was made by the 33rd Division of Japanese Imperial Army on 8 March 1944, who was stationed around Kalewa, Kalay, and Mawlaik and which headed first towards Tedim and Tonzang and then towards Imphal from the south. On 15 March, the 15th Division joined the operation, moving from Leu and Homalin to cross the Chindwin River towards Ukhrul and Shangshak, India. On the same day, the 31st Division began heading towards Kohima from north of Homalin (Senshishitsu 1968). The battle of Imphal and Kohima was ended by the severe defeat of the Japanese. The subsequent effect of WWII on the Naga in general, according to Raikhan (2016), was the realisation of how far behind they were in the scale of human civilisation and development. The Naga realised that the modern world would not be attained, possessed, or reached through their old ways of life, polity, or culture but rather instead through modern education alone (Raikhan 2016).

Political Struggle of the Naga People As Horam (2014) mentioned, Naga people’s identities have been traditionally attached to their own villages, and the people were not conscious about larger units. Naga villages were basically self-sufficient, and contacts with other groups were very scarce. It is said that the first contact with an outsider was with the Ahom sometime in 1228, when the Ahom entered Assam through the Naga Hills from Burma (Vashum 2005). It can be imagined that the Naga resisted the advance of the Ahom, and some fierce battles might have occurred; however, the contact was limited to a section of a few Naga tribes, so the majority of the Naga remained in their respective age-old, isolated village states. It can be expected that there was some additional contact with other tribes in Assam and Manipur for trading purposes, but it was really the British with who the first major contact was. Because of this significant contact with the British, the Naga consciousness gradually emerged during that period. As Hall (1996) argued, identities are constructed through the recognition of differences and it is through the relation to the ‘other’ that one’s identity is constructed. The Naga had been relatively isolated from other ethnic groups and so their chance to meet ‘others’ was thus limited. For many Naga, the British

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were the first ‘other’ individuals with which they found a difference in comparison with themselves. As mentioned above, the British government recruited about 2000 Naga during WWI and sent them to France as labour corps, which gave the Naga another opportunity to meet others. Ao (2002) argued that, after the war, the Naga realised the importance of protecting their sociopolitical identities and realised the need to live together under one banner to achieve their common goal, subsequently forming the Naga Club in 1918 at Kohima. In 1929, the Naga Club submitted a memorandum to the Simon Commission, who visited the Naga territory. The Naga representatives under the guidance of the Naga Club demanded adequate safeguards from any possible rule by the Indians or Burmese (Ao 2002). In 1941, the Deputy Commissioner of the Naga Hills and Governor of Assam at the time suggested a scheme to carve out a trust territory called Crown Colony which would include the Naga Hills, the Northeast Frontier areas in upper Assam, and the hill areas in upper Burma. After WWII, according to Horam (2014), the Naga openly discussed the concept of federalisation, which would encompass all of the Naga people living in Assam, Manipur, the Northeast Frontier Agency (Arunachal Pradesh), and Burma. In 1946, the Naga National Council (NNC) was formed in Kohima and Mokukchung, whose birth represents a landmark in the history of Naga political mobilisation (Bhaumik 2009). Initially, the NNC did not speak about the separation from British India, but later on demanded autonomy of the Naga Hills under Assam by way of separation from Bengal (Vashum 2005). In 1947, the NNC sent a memorandum to the Viceroy of India about setting up an interim government for the Naga for a period of 10 years, with the Naga people left to choose any form of government they liked at the end of this time. The NNC declared Naga National Independence on 14 August 1947, which was one day before the independence of India. British India did not recognise the declaration of Naga National Independence and the first prime minister of India, Jawaharlal Nehru, was against the independence of the Naga. A. Z. Phizo of the Angami Naga was the leader who shaped the Naga nation during this Naga independent movement. Ultimately, there were several battles that occurred between India and the Naga during the 1950s and 60s. The Chinese began supporting the Naga rebels in 1962, and the first group of Naga guerrillas went to China in 1966 (Bhaumik 2009). The NNC eventually separated into several groups because of disagreements among the members. Isak Swu and Th.

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Muivah, who established their base in Burma-Naga territory in March 1975, along with the Naga armies who returned from China, formed a new group called the National Socialist Council for Nagaland (NSCN) in 1980 (Vashum 2005). Later on, the NSCN also separated into a few different groups, while several more groups other than the NSCN began fighting for the freedom of the Naga people. The NSCN-IM group led by Isak and Muivah claimed the area called Greater Nagalim, which consisted of Naga-inhabited areas including some parts of Burma. These armed groups are as not active as they used to be because of ceasefire talks with the Government of India in 2015; however, ongoing disputes between the Naga and India still remain (Gokhale 2015).

Indo-Myanmar Border Trade Although Myanmar and India are neighbouring counties, the trade between the two countries has remained limited, partly due to Myanmar’s political situation. According to Das (2016), India–Myanmar bilateral trade amounted to about 2 billion United States dollars (USD) in 2014. Out of this amount, USD 1.2 billion was from India’s imports from Myanmar, and USD 0.77 billion were India’s exports to Myanmar. From 1962 to 2011, Myanmar was under different military regimes and politically as well as economically isolated from the international societies. In 2010, Myanmar held general elections and implemented political reforms, transitioning into the more modern country that exists today. In India, Gandhi’s rejection of materialism was influential at the time of independence, and Nehru implemented a policy of economic selfsufficiency (Jaffrelot and van der Veer 2008). In 1991, India conducted economic reform and liberalised its economy. In addition, influenced by international political changes, India implemented a ‘Look East Policy’ in 1992 to establish proactive political and economic cooperation with Southeast Asia (Khundrakpam 2016). The policy was also put into place to counter the strategic influence of China on Southeast Asia. In 1994, according to Khundrakpam (2016), India initiated a Memorandum of Understanding on border trade with Myanmar, and Moreh–Tamu border trade took off in 1995. Moreh is the border town in the state of Manipur in India and Tamu is in the Sagaing Division in Myanmar, respectively. Tamu is a town on Asian Highway 1, which goes through Myanmar to Thailand. From Moreh, Asian Highway 1 extends to meet National Highway 102 in India, which goes to Imphal.

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The Tamu–Moreh road is the major route for the border trade between Myanmar and India, which officially opened in 1995, but the relationship between Myanmar and its neighbours has been existed previously going back centuries. Because of the area’s peripheral location from the point of view of Myanmar as well as India, the area came under the control of several kingdoms throughout history. One of these was Manipur. According to Singh (2015), a Manipur king occupied Kabaw Valley, which is under Myanmar’s control now, in the fifteenth century. According to Khundrakpam (2016), Manipur was an important transit for trade between India and Myanmar as well as the southern part of China and Thailand. It is documented that iron and gold were found in Manipur, and the area was also known for silk production. Burmese traders, according to Khundrakpam (2016), frequented the kingdom of Manipur and bought silk from there. In the eighteenth century, King Bawdawpaya of the Konbaung Dynasty extended his control to Manipur as well as the Arakan Region (Kamei 2015a). The advance of Burmese to British-influenced areas provoked the British, which triggered the First Anglo-Burmese War in 1824. With the help of the British, Manipur drove the Burmese across the Chindwin River and the Meitei, a major ethnic group of Manipur, and the Burmese ceased fighting (Khundrakpam 2016). As the result of the Treaty of Yandaboo in 1826, according to Khundrakpam (2016), Kabaw Valley was handed over to Burma in 1834. However, the British advance on Burma did not stop and they concurred Burma after the Third Anglo-Burmese War. Britain’s rule on India and Burma made it easier to exchange goods between the two areas. During the period of British occupation, Manipur exported silk to Burma and imported tea seeds from Burma to be sent to Assam. In addition, informal trade of household consumption items such as salt, lungis, sewing machines, precious stones, other forest products, buffaloes, and soap was also conducted (Khundrakpam 2016). During the period of WWII, Japan occupied Burma and tried to advance its force to India. The border area became a battleground and new roads were built. After WWII, Burma and India achieved independence from British rule and the free flow of people between India and Burma was curtailed. However, for the tribal people living near the border area, free movement was still allowed for up to 40 km on both sides. This allowed the transborder tribes to go across the border at any point along the boundary line (Khundrakpam 2016). U. Nu visited Manipur in 1952

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and met with Nehru in 1953 to finalise the borderline. Nehru ultimately handed Kabaw Valley to U. Nu (Khundrakpam 2016). As mentioned above, the boundary between Myanmar and India was shifted historically and people living in the area had been allowed to move freely. It was only after the construction of the two nation-states that trade became more controlled. As Khundrakpam (2016) mentioned, trade between India and Myanmar was limited because of politico-economic reasons in the two counties. The post-WWII relationship between Burma and India has evolved in the years since. In 1951, India signed a Treaty of Friendship with Burma. Nehru and U. Nu initially worked closely with each other, but, under Ne Win’s regime, Burma became more isolated. The Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi had meetings with General Ne Win and developed The Land Boundary Agreement in 1967. In 1988 when the democracy uprising broke out in Burma, India supported the movement. India and other six South Asian countries then formed the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) to promote economic and social progress as well as welfare development in South Asian regions. In 1991, as Devi (2016) mentioned, a South Asian Preferential Trading Arrangement among the SAARC member counties was set up with the ultimate goal of achieving a South Asian Free Trade Area. Also, in the mid-1990s, under the influence of the Look East Policy, India tried to tighten its relationship with Myanmar. In August 1992, a Myanmar delegation led by the Director General of the Myanmar Foreign Office visited India and identified concrete areas for bilateral cooperation including border trade. A delegation led by the Foreign Secretary of India visited Myanmar in March 1993, and negotiations on a border trade agreement for cooperation between civilian border authorities were held. A Border Trade Agreement between India and Myanmar was signed in New Delhi in January 1994. The two regions, South Asia and Southeast Asia, tried to seek stronger ties and formed an economic group named BIST-EC on June 1997. Those members were Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka, and Thailand, and, in December 1997, Myanmar joined the member and the group was renamed BIMST-EC.1 Although the relationship between Myanmar and India changed over time, hill tribes, as mentioned above, near the border were allowed free 1 Nepal and Bhutan became full members of the group in 2004 and the group was named the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multisectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC).

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movement of up to 40 km on either side due to the existence of a close affinity and cultural and economic ties among the hill people. However, they began conducting informal border trade including illegal trade in contraband goods such as Chinese consumer items, narcotics, small arms, and precious and semiprecious stones. In 1968, the Indian government introduced a permit system unilaterally to curtail the entry of undesirable elements and insurgents (Khundrakpam 2016). However, because there are many paths known only by local people and there are no checkpoints, people often do not obtain these permits. The border trade between Moreh and Tamu officially started in 1995, with a list of 22 tradable items included that has since increased to 62 (Khundrakpam 2016). These items were bamboo, betel nuts and leaves, chilies, coriander seeds, food items for local consumption, fresh vegetables, fruits, garlic, ginger, katha, minor forest products (excluding teak), mustard seeds, onions, beans, reed brooms, resin, roasted sunflower seeds, sesame seeds, soybeans, spices (excluding nutmeg, mace, cloves, cassia, and cinnamon), tobacco, and tomatoes (Das 2016: 10). According to Khundrakpam (2016), The Imphal market began to be flooded with goods smuggled through the Moreh route by the end of the 1970s. These goods sold well because they were cheaper than legitimate Indian products. In 2001, the 165 km of road between Tamu–Kalemyo to Kalewa opened and made it even easier to move goods (Khundrakpam 2016). In addition to these 22 goods above, electronic goods, blankets, clothes from third countries such as China, Korea, and other Southeast Asian countries were also imported into India. This is because, according to Das (2016), these goods are cheaper than Indian-made products and electronic goods are not available in Northeast India. There are rows of shops in the Paona Bazaar, Imphal selling Chinese and Thai goods that come to India through Moreh. Those items include cheap electronics, plastic items, footwear, baggage, and other amenities (Das 2016). In addition, Khundrakpam (2016) highlighted that other items such as candles, mosquito repellents, soaps, washing liquids and detergents, cigarettes, pickles, slippers, catapult rubber, fishing nets and hooks, folding chairs, and tables are imported from Myanmar. Plastic products, such as chairs, tables, mugs, and plastic-sheeted wardrobes that can be dismantled and set up are also traded all over the state of Manipur (Khundrakpam 2016). Khundrakpam (2016) further argued that these Chinese products are cheap but their quality is low, and she wondered why these low-quality products are so popular among Northeast Indians. One of the reasons

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for this, according to Khundrakpam (2016), could perhaps be that they are attractive for people who want to buy branded items at throwaway prices. She also claims that Chinese goods are attractively packaged, which attracts Northeast Indian people. Indeed, there are many fake items of branded clothes and bags sold in India from China, so, in this sense, Khundrakpam’s analysis is likely correct; however, as far as I understand from talking with people from Northeast India, they additionally mention that Chinese products also are of a higher quality than Indian products (personal communication). Another product that comes from Myanmar that should be noted is media products. Now that the electricity and communication infrastructure has been improved in Northeast India, people can consume media products such as movies and music through the Internet. However, it has only been in the past 10 years that the necessary systems and infrastructure have become stable in the area. Before then, people watched movies by way of DVDs smuggled into India from Myanmar. Those DVDs were of Hollywood movies, but there were also a number of DVDs of Korean movies and dramas that came from Myanmar. Those DVDs were illegally copied. Korean music CDs were also available. Korean media products are very popular in Myanmar and Southeast Asia overall, but are hardly consumed in most parts of India. It is, nevertheless, interesting that Korean media products are very popular among young people in Northeast India. The Moreh–Tamu road is an official border trade route between Myanmar and India. Besides along this road, Champhai (Mizoram) in India and Hri in Myanmar as well as Lungwa (Nagaland) in India and in Myanmar are also officially admitted border trade sectors (Devi 2016). In addition, in Manipur, there are two other routes that go through Myanmar on the eastern border of the Ukhrul District. One route transverses the Kamjong Subdivision of the Ukhrul District and Somrah area of Myanmar, while the other goes through the Chingai Subdivision of the Ukhrul District and connects with the Somrah Tract of Myanmar (Devi 2016). In 2010, India and Myanmar agreed to reduce the permitted zone to 16 km of the international border for those with only permits but without visa, with certain terms and conditions applying. Local nationals on both sides, according to Khundrakpam (2016), can stay in the other country for three days within 16 km of either side. However, many locals do not keep to the regulations of the governments because there are many

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routes by which to cross the border that are kept secret by said local people. The border between Myanmar and India is located on the hill area where Naga people inhabit. In the next section, the chapter explores how the people living in the hill areas cross the border without restrictions and their perceptions of the border by analysing the author’s fieldwork experience.

Grihang Village and Border Trade Grihang Village is in the Ukhrul District of Manipur State, Northeast India and is located near the border of Myanmar (Fig. 7.1). When I first visited Imphal in 2008, foreign-brand clothes were expensive, but clothes made and designed in India did not fit the people from Northeast India because of differences in the body features of mainland Indians and Northeast Indians. Furthermore, the latter people did not like the designs and colours available, although they were of a reasonable price. Clothes from Southeast Asia matched the taste of Northeastern Indian people as well as their size and shape. Blankets sold in Northeast India are mainly brought in from China. In the winter, the region becomes very cold and, according to people from Northeast India that I talked to, Indian blankets are not warm enough. Instead, Chinese blankets are of a better quality and warmer than the Indian ones.

Fig. 7.1 Location of Grihang Village (Source Google Maps)

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Fig. 7.2 A grocery store in Grihang Village (Source Photo taken by the author)

In the past few years, a new road from Myanmar was built, passing next to Grihang Village. ‘Because of the road, people don’t have to go through Moreh to go to Myanmar. The supply of goods to Ukhrul and to Kohima from Myanmar has become faster’, Tom, one of my informants, mentioned.2 I conducted a research trip to Manipur State from 27 December 2017 to 5 January 2018, and visited Grihang Village during the trip. A second visit to Grihang Village was subsequently conducted in December 2018. According to the 2011 census, there are 133 households and 782 people in the village (Census 2011). It is a small village and there were only a few small grocery shops observed to exist there (Fig. 7.2). The goods sold in these shops were mostly Indian products; however, there were also several products from Myanmar. When I asked one of the villagers about where they procure those goods, he mentioned that they are imported through a different town near the border between India and Myanmar. ‘We cross the border and go to the town quite often. We carry motorbikes on a pickup truck and drive near the border, then cross the border using the motorbikes’, Tom mentioned. 2 In this paper, pseudo names are used in order not to disclose personal information.

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According to him, the motorbikes are called Myanmar bikes, because they are imported from Myanmar. They look like scooters but the Naga people mention that they are very powerful and can climb up steep, unpaved mountain roads. ‘Well, if you want, we can take you to the Myanmar side’, Tom suggested. I considered Tom’s offer and decided to take a trip to the Myanmar border with a group of locals. Because there were more people coming along this time than on their usual trips, the group decided not to carry motorbikes with them. We took two Jeep-type vehicles and left Grihang Village in the morning. The first village we passed was Ningchou Village, and then we entered Nampisha Village. Within the area of Nampisha, there are several hamlets, and we dropped into Ramphoi Nampisha to have some rest and then passed through Kangpat Nampisha to reach Tana Hamlet. Tana is a small place with only less than five households. Because Tom and other members of the trip from Grihang Village knew the headman of Tana Hamlet, we were invited into his house and had lunch there. Tana Hamlet is located along a riverbank and, at the other side of the river, there is another village called Phaikoh where Kuki people live. This other village is larger than Tana Hamlet and there exists a community hall, a church, and a playground there. Because it was at the year’s end, Christmas decorations were still everywhere in the village, a sight that was also common in Naga villages. We stayed at Tana village for a few hours, then finally headed to the border. Near the border area, a guerrilla group was active and sometimes harassed passersby, so we had to be careful when we went through the area. We got out of the car and walked along the road. Tom mentioned that we should not talk while walking through the guerrilla-controlled area. After we started walking for 15 minutes or so, one of the members of the group mentioned that we had already entered into Myanmar. ‘We can talk now’, a man said. On the road, no checkpoint and no fence existed, and there was not even a milestone; I did not notice at exactly which point we crossed the border. A three- to four-m wide gravel road stretching through the mountain bush connects straight to Myanmar. After walking for another 40–50 minutes, we reached a village called Yire Mongyang, though the Naga people call it Momo. When we arrived at the village, the villagers noticed an unexpected visit from the India side and came to see us. Because Tom visited the village often, he knew the headman of the village. He talked to him and explained the purpose of the visit, introducing his Japanese guests to

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those on the Myanmar side. The headman welcomed us and showed us his village. The houses in the village were located along the road, and we walked about 1 km before returning because the sun was setting. There was a town a few kilometres away, but we could not reach there because we did not come by motorcycle. People of the village are Kuki or Burmese and do not speak English other than one or two people who served as pastors in Yangon. Because of his frequent visits to Myanmar since a young age, Tom had picked up Burmese and is able to do some communication. He thus interpreted between the local people and us. As Tom mentioned, the border was open and people could come and go very easily, which also makes border trade quite easy. People in Grihang Village can bring products not only from Myanmar but also from Thailand, China, and other Asian countries through Myanmar. As mentioned above, one of these is Korean media products. Unlike mainland India, where Korean music and dramas are hardly seen, Korean media products are very popular among people in Northeast India. These media products came into Northeast India in the form of DVDs or CDs from Myanmar before, but now they are consumed through the Internet or satellite TV. Many people whom I questioned about the reason of their popularity mentioned that they feel familiar because Korean people look similar to Northeastern Indians. ‘We look very similar to Koreans and Japanese [and] very different from [other] Indians, right? In the drama, Koreans are not pushy and they are humble like us. You know [other] Indians are very arrogant and annoying. We are not like them’. I heard this type of comment frequently during my conversations with Naga people. Although they are Indian nationals, they distinguish themselves from mainland Indians and this can be seen in their media consumption choices. In this sense, it can be argued that one of the identities of Naga people reside in what they call the ‘Mongoloid’ race.

Conclusion The chapter has illustrated that the existing national boundary is a modern creation and that the boundary between Burmese kingdoms and Assamese or Manipuri kingdoms kept shifting throughout history. Naga people only have traditionally had their own village identities and did not have an Indian identity or Burmese identity. For some time, they did not have a larger Naga identity either. They had been practicing only small trade with neighbouring villages locate on either the Myanmar side or

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Indian side if we apply knowledge of current borderlines. The practice still can be observed now, as is illustrated in this chapter. Naga people living in the border area cross the border relatively with no hustle. Some groups of Naga claim Nagalim as their demarcated area. In this regard, the trade activities of these people can be a representation of their practicing of Nagalim identity. Separately, their consumption of clothes from China or Thailand selected based on their designs and shapes arouses the familiarity of East Asia and Southeast Asia. In addition, when it comes to their media consumption, it is different from that of mainland Indians. Their preference of Korean media products can extend the boundary of what Chua Ben-Huat (2008) called the ‘East Asia pop culture sphere’ to Northeast India. Chua’s concept of the East Asia pop culture sphere is a cultural area wherein East Asian popular culture, mainly Japanese, Korean, and Chinese popular culture, is consumed, in which he includes Southeast Asia as well. This cultural area makes people feel closer to each other, which also affects their mental boundaries. The border between Myanmar and India is a border between Southeast Asia and South Asia. The border divides people’s mentality, too. India’s Look East Policy also reflects this mental division. If they are mentally connected with Southeast Asia, they do not have to claim to need to ‘look East’ in the first place. On the contrary, although politically as well as economically, Pakistan is not close to India, for the majority of Indian people, Pakistan is mentally closer in comparison with Myanmar. However, for Naga people, by analysing their trade practices as well as their media consumption, Myanmar, including Southeast Asia as well as East Asia, could be included within their range of imagined boundaries in some occasions. Nevertheless, it does not mean that the national boundary does not affect Naga people’s mental boundary. As demonstrated in the section above, the Naga people on the Indian side speak English, while those on the Myanmar side speak Burmese. If they are from the same subtribe, they can speak the common language of their village, even the villages are parted between Myanmar and India, but, when it comes to different tribes, which happens quite often among Naga people, they cannot communicate with each other. Instead, if they are Indian nationals, they can communicate with each other in English, and if they are Myanmar nationals, they use Burmese to talk with each other. According to my observations of people in Grihang Village and conversations with them, it appears therefore that they feel some distance from people living on the other side of the border, although they can access the area relatively

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freely. People in the villages that they frequently visit are Kuki or Burmese; however, judging from my other expeditions to different Naga villages, those people feel some distance away from Burmese Naga when it comes to group to group relations, even if they are both Naga. As we have seen above, Naga people feel some degree of distance from mainland Indian people and instead have some attachment to East and Southeast Asia. Their imagined boundary can be extended to these regions where mainland Indian people feel distant. However, at the same time, Naga people in India feel some distance away from the Naga people in Myanmar, which means that they have imagined a boundary between India and Myanmar as well. For the Naga people that I contacted, imagined boundaries are multilayered and one boundary becomes stronger than the other depending on different situations, which can be influenced by politics.

Postscript: Possible Transition in the Border Area The situation in Myanmar has changed since February 2021, when the military launched a coup d’état. This chapter has explored Naga people living in the border area, between Myanmar and India, and looked at the informal border trade. The amount of border trade is small and people in the north-eastern area of India are the primary consumers of the imported goods. India’s Look East policy has led to the construction of new roads and railways as well as an anticipated increase in the trade between Myanmar and India. However, the recent military coup makes that prospect slightly uncertain. The U.S. and European countries are condemning the military junta and applying economic pressure to oppose it. As a democratic country, India would likely take similar steps, but considering China’s increasing influence on Myanmar, India wants to maintain a fairly good relationship with the military government. Some refugees are crossing the border into India, and the Indian central government is directing their deportation (The Mizoram Post 2021), but the state government of Mizoram is reluctant to comply. The Indo-Myanmar border stretches nearly 1600 km, most of it unfenced. People could cross the border relatively easily, but if the situation became worse, fencing the border would be likely in the future. The social and cultural transition was due to economic exchange in the border area, but the military coup may weaken it. On the other hand, some ethnic minorities in India, especially people of the Chin ethnic groups,

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try to shelter exiles from Myanmar, partly because they share the same ethnicity. The coup incident is enhancing the consciousness of the shared ethnicity across the border, which may lead to rethinking the current boundary. The political turmoil in Myanmar may become a trigger for changing the national consciousness in the border area.

References Aier, Imo Lanutemjen. (2006). Contemporary Naga Social Formations and Ethnic Identity. New Delhi: Akansha Publishing House. Ao, A. Lanunungsang. (2002). From Phizo to Muivarh: The Naga National Question in North East India. New Delhi: Mittal Publication. Bhaumik, Subir. (2009). Troubled Periphery: Crisis of India’s North East. New Delhi: Sage. Census Organisation of India. (2011). Grihang Population—Ukhrul, Manipur. Retrieved February 19, 2020, from http://www.census2011.co.in/data/vil lage/270488-grihang-manipur.html. Chua, Beng Huat. (2008). Transnational and Transcultural Circulation and Consumption of East Asian Television Drama. In C. Jaffrelot and P. van der Veer (Eds.), Patterns of Middle Class Consumption in India and China (pp. 186–206). New Delhi: Sage. Das, Ram Upendra. (2016). Enhancing India–Myanmar Border Trade: Policy and Implementation Measures. Department of Commerce Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of India. Retrieved February 19, 2020, from https://commerce.gov.in/writereaddata/uploadedfile/MOC_ 636045268163813180_Final%20Enhancing_India_Myanmar_Border_Trade_ Report.pdf#search=%27India+Myanmar+trade+dollers%27. Devi, L. Seityabati. (2016). Indo-Myanmar Border Trade. In Utpal Kumar De (Ed.), Look East Policy and North-East India: Achievements and Constrains (pp. 164–173). New Delhi: Concept Publishing Company. Gokhale, Nitin A. (2015 August 4). Peace at Last, Peace at Last: Thank God Almighty, Peace at Last. Rediff.com. Retrieved February 19, 2020, from https://www.rediff.com/news/column/what-the-naga-peace-acc ord-really-means/20150804.htm. Hall, Stuart. (1996). Introduction: Who Needs Identity? In S. Hall and P. du Gay (Eds.), Questions of Cultural Identity (pp. 1–17). London: Sage. Horam, Ringkahao. (2014). Undeclared War: The Naga Political Movement. New Delhi: Sunmarg Publishers.

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Jaffrelot, Christophe, and van der Veer, Peter. (2008). Introduction. In C. Jaffrelot and P. van der Veer (Eds.), Patterns of Middle Class Consumption in India and China (pp. 11–34). New Delhi: Sage. Kamei, Gangmumei. (2015a). A History of Modern Manipur 1826–2000 (A Study of Feudalism, Colonialism and Democracy), Vol. 1. The Feudal Era 1826– 1891. New Delhi: Akansha. ——— . (2015b). A History of Modern Manipur 1826–2000 (A Study of Feudalism, Colonialism and Democracy), Vol. 2. The British Colonial Rule 1891–1947. New Delhi: Akansha. Khundrakpam, Padmabati. (2016). Experiences of Manipur and Indo-Myanmar Border Trade a Relook. New Delhi: Akansha Publishing House. Kumar, B. B. (2005). Naga Identity. New Delhi: Concept Publishing Company. Raikhan, Home. (2016). Naga History: Through a Clan and Tribe. Guwahati: Spectrum Publications. Senshishitsu. (Eds.). (1968). Inp¯ aru Sakusen – Biruma no B¯ oei (Operation Imphal—The Defence of Burma). インパール作戦-ビルマの防衛. In Senshis¯ osho (War History Series), Vol. 15. Tokyo: Asagumoshinbun-sha. Singh, Chandrika. (2008). The Naga Society. New Delhi: Manas Publications. Singh, N. Joykumar. (2015). Emergence of Manipur as a Nation State (From Prehistory to Mid Eighteenth Century). New Delhi: Akansha Publishing House. The Mizoram Post. (2021). Over 1,000 Myanmar Nationals Sneaked into Mizoram After Military Coup: 100 People Sent Back Home Returned to Mizoram Again, 30 March 2021. Retrieved April 6, from http://www.the mizorampost.net/page-view?date=30-03-2121&page_no=1&edition_id=. Vashum, R. (2005). Nagas’ Right to Self-Determination (2nd ed.). New Delhi: Mittal Publications.

CHAPTER 8

Myanmar on the Road Towards the 2020 Elections: A Pre-electoral Assessment Michael Lidauer

Abbreviations AA ANFREL ANP CoC GAD DG DNP EEOP EFM EOM EU MoHS MoIP NLD

Arakan Army Asian Network for Free Elections Arakan National Party Code of Conduct General Administration Department Director General Democratic Party of National Politics Election Education and Observation Partners Election Follow-up Mission Election Observation Mission European Union Ministry of Health and Sports Ministry of Immigration and Population National League for Democracy

M. Lidauer (B) Wiesbaden, Germany

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 C. Yamahata and B. Anderson (eds.), Demystifying Myanmar’s Transition and Political Crisis, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-6675-9_8

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PACE PP SNDP SNLD TCC UBP UEC USDP

People’s Alliance for Credible Elections People’s Party Shan Nationalities Development Party Shan National League for Democracy The Carter Center Union Betterment Party Union Election Commission Union Solidarity and Development Party

Introduction The 2020 general elections in the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, on 8 November 2020, were the third to take place under the 2008 Constitution. The elections of 8 November 2010 had served as a tool for military leaders to steer the country towards a more democratic, and increasingly internationally recognised, form of state. The elections of 7 November 2015 essentially constituted a referendum against military rule, leading to the first government of the National League for Democracy (NLD) under State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. The third general elections within a decade were expected to be more competitive than the previous polls. In addition to the general elections, the Union Election Commission (UEC) also organised by-elections in 2012, 2017, and 2018, the last of which had indicated that support for the NLD might be waning in some areas. The UEC had introduced a number of procedural changes over the years, but with few exceptions the legal framework for holding elections remained essentially unchanged. Authorities implemented few recommendations provided by international election observers to improve the electoral process.1 Expectations for change were very high when the NLD took office in 2016 following a landslide victory. Within the first year of the new government, many people across the country started to feel disappointed by the lack of democratic reforms. Former supporters in civil society felt ignored as civic space, notably the freedom of expression, became more curtailed than before. During the following years, economic reforms and 1 Myanmar has not acceded to the International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the most important international treaty providing prerequisites for the conduct of democratic elections.

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international investments were not achieved as anticipated, and constitutional reforms have not been accomplished. Although the Panglong peace process to end the world’s longest standing civil war was a priority in the beginning of the term, the new administration had shown neither the determination nor the capacity to take it forward.2 Fighting continued and intensified in northern Shan and Kachin States in particular, however, the fiercest atrocities occurred in Rakhine State, with ongoing attacks against civilians. Myanmar was brought before the International Court of Justice for alleged crimes against humanity and genocide. In addition to all these challenges, the country was among the first in Southeast Asia to organise elections under the conditions of the COVID19 pandemic. Myanmar was slow to react to the outbreak. While other countries in the region had already shut down and closed their borders, the first coronavirus case in Yangon was only announced on 23 March. President Win Myint declared precautionary measures and formed a COVID-19 Control and Emergency Response Committee by the end of the month. The Ministry of Health and Sports (MoHS) became the line ministry for governmental responses. Testing for the virus had increased since then, but overall capacities remained low.3 On 9 May, the Tatmadaw (the armed forces) declared a unilateral ceasefire to allow anti-COVID-19 measures in conflict-torn areas with the exception of Rakhine State, and many ethnic armed organisations also declared a unilateral ceasefire on their behalf.4 Before mid-August, the spread of the virus remained reportedly limited and did not cause as many casualties as elsewhere, however, the disease could have been more prevalent as publicly acknowledged. With the release of stay-at-home orders by MoHS for seven townships of Yangon Region on 18 April, the government also started imposing in-country movement restrictions and forbade assemblies of more than five people. Governmental agencies could travel freely, but civil society could not, reminding, in particular, the older generation of conditions under military rule. However, all in all, the measures appeared reasonable, were widely accepted, and began to be lifted during the month of June. Before the declaration of a second wave in mid-August, there was no fear that the

2 ICG (2020a). 3 Hein Thar (2020). 4 ICG (2020c).

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pandemic would overtake the country in uncontrollable ways, and uncertainties regarding the holding of elections remained limited to electoral stakeholders. The COVID-19 pandemic, however, exposed electoral processes worldwide to new risks and challenges. By June 2020, over 100 electoral events had been postponed globally while some countries had decided to go ahead with elections despite the pandemic. In Asia, South Korea, where parliamentary elections were successfully held on 15 April and turnout even increased, was a prominent example.5 Technical assistance providers supporting the Union Elections Commission (UEC) and other electoral stakeholders in Myanmar assembled lessons learned and good practices to support elections under the conditions of COVID-19.6 On 1 June, the UEC announced the third general elections under the 2008 Constitution to take place on 8 November 2020, following the timelines of 2010 and 2015, and continued with election preparations.

Legal Framework in Brief In the general elections, voters in Myanmar elect 330 seats in the Pyithu Hluttaw (Lower House) and 168 seats in the Amyotha Hluttaw (Upper House), which together form the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (the bicameral legislature at Union level) for a five-year term. Concurrently, representatives for 14 State and Region Hluttaws are elected. Following the formation of the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, the President who spearheads the government and appoints a number of executive functions, and two Vice Presidents are elected by an electoral college. The general elections use a majoritarian first-past-the-post electoral system with single-member constituencies based on townships. As a consequence of the electoral system, and taking the presidential powers of appointment into account, the entire governance structure of the country is at stake in a single electoral event.7 The office of State Counsellor is not an elected office and is not foreseen in the Constitution. Based on the 2008 Constitution, which 5 Spinelli (2020). 6 See the websites of IFES and International IDEA for international comparison. Many

international assistance providers left Myanmar before international travel restrictions took effect, but some stayed and worked with the UEC throughout. 7 Compare Lidauer and Saphy (2014), compare Renshaw and Lidauer (2021).

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was promulgated by the military regime, all houses of parliament are composed of elected representatives together with a quarter of all representatives appointed by the Commander-in-Chief. The Myanmar military, the Tatmadaw, also continues to play an important role in the executive government of the country. On the basis of the 2008 Constitution, together with the Union Election Commission Law and the Political Party Registration Law, the election laws extend to the Amyotha Hluttaw, Pyithu Hluttaw, and State and Region Hluttaw laws. All these laws are in force since 2010, and some have been amended since. In addition, the conduct of elections is regulated by a number of UEC rules, regulations, and directives. Since the last general elections in 2015, the regulatory framework remained essentially unchanged, with few exceptions. Amendments introduced with the passing of by-laws in May 2020 resulted in two noticeable changes in the electoral process, among others: Military voters and their families no longer vote inside barracks, but in regular polling stations; and the required timeframe to transfer the right to vote from the permanent to a temporary residence was reduced from 180 to 90 days. These changes were not received without critique. The voting of military personnel and their families, without any civilian oversight inside the barracks, was strongly criticised in the past. Military advance voting was considered in particular opaque, and as a tool to manipulate results. However, voting outside military installations was seen by some stakeholders as potentially exposing the voters concerned to avoidable security risks. Myanmar’s military has an estimated number of 500,000; together with family members, this group amounts to over one million voters. Second, reducing the timeframe to temporarily transfer voters’ residence to vote in a constituency other than their home constituency was met with scepticism by some ethnic political parties. They anticipated this could be to their electoral disadvantage in case Burmese migrant workers temporarily register in their constituencies.

Election Administration Institutional Organisation and Composition The administration of elections in Myanmar lies in the hands of the Union Election Commission (UEC). The 2008 Constitution vests the UEC with the responsibility to organise the general elections and the registration and

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supervision of political parties. The election commission enjoys broad and largely unchecked powers in the implementation of both these competencies. For the conduct of the elections, the UEC inter alia adopts rules and regulations, appoints election sub-commissions at state/region, district, and township levels, designs electoral constituencies, prepares voter lists, certifies results, and decides on election-related complaints and appeals. It can also postpone or cancel elections in areas affected by natural disasters or threats to security (see below).8 Like many other executive functions, the Union Election Commission is appointed by the President. Based on constitutional provisions, the UEC consists of a minimum of five members. Five members of the 2020 commission, including Chairman U Hla Thein, had assumed office in March 2016, replacing the previous UEC who had overseen the 2015 general elections. Since new appointments in March 2019, the commission was again made up of 15 members including the Chairman, as it did in 2015. Most members had a legal background and a background as civil servants, and were also seen as close to the NLD. The composition of the UEC did not reflect the ethnic diversity of the country, did not include young people, and there was no woman among its members. Against this background, political parties at times expressed their lack of confidence in the impartiality of the UEC. However, appointed by the President and under attack from the political opposition, any UEC would have to be proactive in demonstrating its impartiality and independence. In 2020, only one UEC member had been part of the commission overseeing the previous general elections. The Director General (DG)—a role seen as crucial both for the inner organisation of the commission but also for effectively spearheading the electoral administration—was replaced mid-term. However, many Directors within the UEC Secretariat had experience from previous elections. Also, most election officials who were in charge to lead election preparations in the states and regions did not change since 2015. At sub-national level, election commissions are essentially composed of civil servants belonging to the General Administration Department (GAD), the Ministry of Immigration and Population (MoIP), and the Advocate General Office. Consequently, the election administration is, to a large extent, functionally dependent on the executive branch across the country. The GAD was moved under civilian

8 Lidauer and Saphy (2014), compare Renshaw and Lidauer (2021).

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control 2019, but most of its officers had been socialised under the military regime. As set forth in the Constitution and regulated in the electoral laws and by-laws, many crucial aspects of the electoral process are left for the UEC to decide with an unusual margin of discretion. These include the timeframe for candidate registration and for voter registration, access for observers, ballot printing and the transparency of results consolidation, among others. These matters are not mere technical points, but can adversely affect the integrity of the process as well as the rights of voters and candidates. The systems usually in place for dealing with election challenges (campaign regulation, possibility for recounts, and election dispute resolution mechanisms) still appear relatively weak in Myanmar, and have not been tested in more competitive elections before 2020. Importantly, the UEC establishes tribunals for election-related complaints and appeals and is its own judge in electoral matters; there is no possibility to appeal a UEC decision.9 Many electoral stakeholders expected the UEC to publish an electoral calendar to provide details and deadlines for key administrative steps between the announcement of election day and polling day itself. Such a calendar had been provided for the 2017 by-elections, which was much appreciated by all stakeholders, but was missing for the 2018 by-elections. Ahead of the 2020 elections, electoral stakeholders complained that the UEC was reluctant to publicise an electoral calendar for the 2020 general elections, in order to maintain the flexibility to adjust processes and deadlines as needed. However, not having such a calendar creates barriers for the election preparations of political parties, election observers, and others, and might cause avoidable perceptions of arbitrary and potentially partisan UEC decisions. Stakeholder meetings between the UEC and these groups were an important part of the electoral process in 2015. At the time of the 2020 elections, the perceived lack of transparency in the work of the UEC and a lack of regular communication with stakeholders was viewed as a critical shortcoming in its performance. Compounded by restrictions to curb the spread of COVID-19, stakeholders lamented the lack of exchange between the UEC and political parties as well as civil society.

9 Ibid.

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Voter Registration Myanmar uses a passive voter registration system based on existing population data. For the previous general elections, from December 2014 to the end of July 2015, UEC township sub-commissions entered eligible voter data from the GAD and MoIP household lists and logbooks into an electronic database. This was the first time the voter list had been computerised in Myanmar. It was widely acknowledged that these initial lists were not entirely accurate, which created challenges for the registration process. Inaccuracies in voter lists may lead to voters being disenfranchised, political controversies, accusations of manipulation, or attempts to discredit the electoral process—as seen after the 2020 elections. The UEC established mechanisms to allow for inclusions, corrections, and deletions in the voter lists, and provisions were made to facilitate voter transfers between constituencies. Ahead of the 2015 elections, several rounds of public verification exercises had been conducted between March and October 2015, in order to update and correct the list, without this being required by the law. Lists had been displayed for voters to check their names and request corrections or additions. During the display periods, the UEC had organised a nationwide voter education campaign with the distribution of pamphlets and posters throughout Myanmar in some 16 different ethnic languages. Despite remaining uncertainties concerning the quality of the voter register, the final voter lists had been more accurate than expected, resulting in a relatively small number of voters turned away on election day and marking a notable improvement over the lists used in previous elections.10 According to the UEC, over thirty-eight million voters were eligible to vote in the 2020 general elections, including around five million firsttime voters. To prepare the voter register for the 2020 elections, the UEC ordered voter list updates to be conducted already in the second half of 2019. However, unlike in 2015, it appeared that the commission had not been working towards a central, computerised register; the preliminary lists rather existed only as digital spreadsheets of different quality in states and regions or townships. Late in the process, the UEC was looking to identify technical partners and options to centralise the list which were displayed for voter verification from 25 July to 14 August. It was reported that some 6.6 million voters checked their data. As errors 10 EU EOM (2016).

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became apparent, the State Counsellor publicly expressed her dissatisfaction with the list and said that mistakes should have been corrected earlier. A second verification period took place during the first half of October.

Political Parties and Electoral Campaign Political Party Landscape The 2008 Constitution provides, in Article 354, that every citizen may exercise the right to form associations and organisations. Chapter 10 provides for the existence of political parties. It is further stated, in Article 406, that a political party shall have the right to organise freely, and to participate and compete in elections. Article 407 stipulates that parties lose their right to be registered if they receive support from a foreign government or religious association, or if they abuse religion for political purposes. Article 408 requires that, if a political party transgresses the listed prohibitions, their registration “shall be revoked”. Parties can also lose their registration should their members include persons who, for example, contact members of unlawful associations, or who are involved with narcotic drugs. The Political Parties Registration Act 2010 further elaborates upon the constitutional provisions.11 More than 90 political parties were registered with the UEC and expected to contest the elections, fielding thousands of candidates. The National League for Democracy (NLD) was the most prominent group, followed by the former military-proxy Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) as well as a number of so-called ethnic political parties and new so-called Burmese political parties. Since the last general elections in 2015, the political party landscape had changed to some degree. Splinter groups of NLD and USDP as well as other new groups emerged, including the People’s Party (PP), the People’s Pioneer Party (PPP), the Democratic Party of National Politics (DNP), and the Union Betterment Party (UBP). In ethnic states, the NLD was challenged by a number of new ethnic parties which have consolidated to potentially become state-based single-party options for specific ethnic groups. In 2015, ethnic votes had been split between multiple parties in most ethnic states, with the exception of Rakhine which had seen the only (temporarily) unified ethnic party at that time, 11 Ibid.

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the Arakan National Party (ANP). In 2020, the situation had reversed; while the ANP had split, ethnic parties have merged in Chin, Kachin, Kayah, Kayin, and Mon States.12 Reportedly, these new parties were also linked through similar approaches to federalism.13 The two political parties affiliated with Shan ethnicity, the Shan National League for Democracy (SNLD) and the Shan Nationalities Development Party (SNDP), have not merged. Political Party and Candidate Registration The UEC is vested with full power to register, suspend, or deregister political parties. The decision of the UEC is final and conclusive, and the UEC has the sole and exclusive power to review its own actions. For the 2020 elections, candidacies had to be submitted to UEC district sub-commissions between 30 July and 7 August, and were subsequently vetted for requirements at district level between 11 and 17 August. The final list of candidates was published on 28 August. The UEC approved 6969 candidates for the elections. From a total of 7030 nominations, 1934 applications were approved as candidates for the Pyithu Hluttaw, 976 for the Amyotha Hluttaw, 3847 for State/Region Hluttaws, and 212 as candidates for ethnic affairs ministers. Only around 16 per cent of all approved candidates were women. All in all, 35 candidates were initially rejected and 26 revoked their candidature. While candidate registration with the UEC took only place in August, political parties had internally selected candidates internally already earlier in the year. Standing as a candidate for the NLD was widely considered as a likely route to joining parliament. In 2015, the NLD’s choice of candidates had been overshadowed by central executive committee decisions to select future MPs who did not always take local preferences into account, and had left out some prominent figures. In June 2020, the NLD reportedly involved local elders in the decision-making process for candidate selection. Many people associate local elders with respected residents of a township who, since the era of military rule, act as witnesses for official 12 New ethnic political parties were the Chin National League for Democracy (CNLD), the Kachin State People’s Party (KSPP), the Karen National Development Party (KNDP), the Kayah State Democracy Party (KySDP), the Mon Union Party (MUP), and also included the Wa National Party (WNP). 13 Su Mon Thant (2020).

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functions and also play a role in local elections. Opposition candidates criticised the elders’ involvement in the candidate selection process of the NLD as distorting the level playing field for other political actors.14 However, concerns regarding the framework for the registration of political parties and the process for the management of candidate nomination continued to exist. Similar to 2015,15 the predominant reason for candidate rejections was again found in the disputed citizenship status of candidates or of their parents.16 At least one rejection was based on the candidate’s relations with a member of the Arakan Army, a group classified both as unlawful and as terrorist organisation.17 In this case, the Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA) reportedly provided comments to the UEC with reference to the Unlawful Associations Act as well as to the Political Parties Registration Law, while in cases pertaining to citizenship issues the Ministry of Immigration and Population (MoIP) might inform the UEC’s decisions. Five weeks after the UEC had published the approved list of candidates, some registered candidates started to receive notifications that their candidacy was revoked by the UEC. While these cases stemmed from a variety of geographical areas, the predominant pattern was again related to citizenship criteria. Experts opined that candidate rejections, in particular those related to citizenship, were conducted in an arbitrary and discriminatory manner, including cases of candidates who had provided evidence of their parents’ citizenship. In mid-October, the UEC dissolved one political party, the United Democratic Party (UDP), entirely for possessing illegal funds and other reasons in violation of the Political Party Registration Law. Subsequently, the UEC disqualified all 1130 UDP candidates on the basis of Electoral Laws Article 10(h) at a time 14 Ye Mon (2020). 15 For comparison, in 2015, the 75 candidate rejections resulted predominantly from a

stricter interpretation of the citizenship criteria than had been applied in previous elections conducted under identical rules, and had a particularly high impact on Muslim candidates. This, in turn, had significant consequences for Rohingya candidates. Only 28 of over 6000 candidates approved to contest the elections professed the Muslim faith, with none elected, leaving the national parliament without a single Muslim representative for the first time since independence. In 2020, a number of Muslim candidates prepared again to run for election (Ei Ei Toe Lwin 2020b). 16 Other legal grounds were applied as well, such as the timeframe spent abroad prior to the candidacy, or ongoing service in the military. 17 Min Aung Khine (2020).

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when their names were already printed on the ballots. The UDP was the second-largest party after the NLD, contesting nearly all available seats countrywide. Campaign Regulation The 2008 Constitution contains restrictive provisions which undermine the freedoms of association, assembly, and expression—rights which are of particular importance in the context of the elections. Restrictive laws include the Right to Peaceful Assembly and Peaceful Procession Act, the Official Secrets Act, the Unlawful Associations Act, and the Electronic Transactions Act. In 2015, there had been a widespread consensus among civil society that the suppression of human rights had a chilling effect on the election campaign. The UEC had issued Directive No. 1 of 2014, which regulated the campaign. Four forms of campaign activity were provided for, namely campaign events in a fixed place, mobile rallies, use of broadcast media, and the publication of written materials. Within 15 days of the approval of candidature, the candidate must apply to the respective sub-commission for permission to conduct campaign activities. Detailed plans of venues for rallies and itineraries for mobile campaigning must be submitted, and prior approval of all activities must be secured. Electoral authorities, however, had adopted a generally relaxed approach to the notice requirements in 2015. Overall, the absence of monitoring and enforcement powers during the campaign period had been a deficiency in the legal framework.18 In 2020, Myanmar had a number of temporary restrictions in place to prevent the spread of COVID-19.19 These included restrictions for the number of persons allowed to participate in campaign activities, with noticeable local variations, as well as in-country travel restrictions and quarantine regulations. Some stakeholders argued that the longer the freedoms of movement and assembly would be curtailed, the more beneficial the situation could be for the NLD. The ruling party enjoyed increased visibility as respondent to the health crisis. “Mother Suu” became the face of this response, not least through her Facebook

18 EU EOM (2016). 19 Compare Lidauer and Saphy (2021).

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page, but other politicians were also visible in anti-pandemic measures, including through donations. While the formal campaign period extended to two months prior to election day, some political parties appeared to have started campaigning earlier, notably the NLD, the USDP, and the UBP, in particular, online and through increased visibility on Facebook. There was some confusion whether constitutional provisions allow the governmental party to campaign earlier than others.20 Ethnic parties were seen in early campaign mode to a lesser degree, possibly due to different availability of financial means. Similar to 2015, political parties agreed again to sign a Code of Conduct (CoC) for Political Parties ahead of the 2020 elections. Negotiations to agree on a new CoC had started in 2019. The 2015 version of the code was updated in some areas, for example by vesting more importance in the role of the UEC’s mediation committees in resolving pre-electoral disputes at sub-national level, and with regards to online campaigning. It was envisaged to conclude discussions before Thingyan, however, this process became delayed due to COVID-19. The new Code of Conduct (CoC) was signed on 26 June in a ceremony chaired by the UEC. However, some 30 parties led by the USDP did not partake in signing the code, revealing dissonances between the parties regarding some of its provisions, but also indicating an attempt to discredit the credibility of the UEC. The CoC did not have a sanctioning mechanism nor outreach instruments attached to promote it at sub-national level. Such a code can only be effective and have an impact on the fairness of the campaign if it is promoted, actively used, and known to the media. Campaign Finance Myanmar’s electoral framework includes a rudimentary system for campaign finance that requires an overhaul. Candidates’ campaign expenditures are limited to ten million Kyats. This sum is considered to be more than enough, and impossible to reach in some cases, by most parties and candidates, but not by the NLD, USDP, and few other parties who have wealthy donors.

20 Ei Ei Toe Lwin (2020a).

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Candidates should submit detailed records of campaign expenditure within 30 days of the date on which the candidate is declared elected. Inkind-donations are part of the expenses reports of individual candidates. Candidates should declare expenditure by a party on their behalf, but there is no requirement for parties to declare their own campaign expenditure; their legal obligation is to submit annual accounts. Candidates may be disqualified for failure to submit accounts of election expenses, while spending in excess of the limits can also be the basis for an election petition challenging the results. In 2015, while 175 candidates were recommended for disqualification due to campaign finance issues, none of them had been elected, so no seats were in jeopardy.21 Campaign finance rules are generally weak, and without an adequate mechanism to monitor campaign income or expenditure lack real transparency and accountability. Although the UEC Strategic Plan 2019–2022 envisages a stricter monitoring of political party and campaign financing, political decision makers and the UEC did not address this issue, and none of the 2015 recommendations of international election observers suggested for campaign finance have been implemented.22

Elections and Conflict Historically, the government has kept peace negotiations and the electoral process institutionally apart. Electoral and conflict dynamics can collide in various ways, exacerbating already existing risks. Elections per se constitute phases of competition rather than negotiation and compromise.23 In addition, the 2020 elections were expected to be more competitive than previous polls, including in ethnic states. Myanmar has relatively little history of electoral violence, however, the political grievances which lie at the heart of Myanmar’s formal peace process have been far from resolved. Indeed, the Panglong peace process—despite being a priority for the State Counsellor in the beginning of her government—has long-stalled, and new conflicts have escalated during the last term. The NLD administration and the parties to the 2015 Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) held a fourth round of the Twentieth-first-Century Panglong

21 EU EOM (2016), TCC EOM (2016). 22 EU EFM Report (2019). 23 Compare Callahan and Myo Zaw Oo (2019).

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Union Peace Conference in August 2020 before the peace process was expected to hibernate until a new government would be in place. The Potential Cancellation of Elections Prior to the 2020 elections, the cancellation or postponement of elections in areas affected by conflict was little understood by voters, election administrators, and outside observers alike, and was little discussed. The authority to cancel or postpone elections lies with the UEC, based on UEC law section 10f and sections 50 and 51 of the electoral laws. The legal framework provides for cancellation or postponement for security reasons or if natural disasters do not allow the holding of elections. As with other elements of the law, the language of the relevant sections is ambiguous, in particular with regard to the partial cancellation of voting in a given electoral constituency. The law does also not provide a timeframe for when prior to the elections the declaration of cancellations or postponements should occur. In 2015, it was estimated that all in all 500,000 voters were disenfranchised by these cancellations.24 The cancellation or postponement of elections can have different consequences, depending on the size of the administrative units concerned. Vacant seats in the legislature occur only where elections are cancelled for entire constituencies. Conversely, the partial cancellation of elections in a number of wards or village tracts smaller than a constituency does not translate into vacant seats, but leads to the disenfranchisement of the voters residing in the cancelled areas, as the election goes ahead regardless of their participation. Election cancellations or postponement at times appeared ambiguous in the past, or occurred in areas such as the Wa Self-administered Zone where the state administration required to organise elections was absent from the outset. In 2020, however, the security environment in significant parts of Rakhine State did not allow public voter list verification, public campaigns, and other election preparations. In an unprecedented move, the elections were cancelled in a considerable number of Rakhine State constituencies, but also partially cancelled in other parts of the country, causing intense debates.25

24 The exact figure is difficult to ascertain as the 2014 population census was also not carried out in full in many of the areas concerned. Compare Lidauer (2016). 25 Lidauer (2021b). For comparison with 2015 see Lidauer (2021a).

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Conflict in Rakhine State While conflict-prone areas in northern and south-eastern parts of Myanmar have seen less violence in 2020 than previously, Rakhine State was centre stage to some of the most sustained and intense fighting the country had seen in years.26 During the transitional period of the last decade, anti-Muslim sentiments started erupting in 2012 and rising Buddhist nationalism led to Rohingya disenfranchisement in the 2015 elections. The mass exodus of over 700,000 Rohingya to Bangladesh in 2017 following military measures which reportedly involved crimes against humanity brought Myanmar before the International Court of Justice. However, also the Rakhine population became increasingly alienated from the central government. A new frontline emerged between the Tatmadaw and the Arakan Army (AA), a Rakhine ethnic armed organisation, since early 2019, spreading violently across Rakhine State and neighbouring Paletwa township in Chin State. The ongoing armed struggle also followed election-related disappointments of the Rakhine population in the past. Despite winning a majority of seats in an electoral battle against NLD and USDP in 2015, their win at the ballot was ignored by the NLD leadership, most prominently by not leading to the appointment of a state Chief Minister from the successful Arakan National Party, but from the NLD. This has further alienated the ethnic Rakhine from the central government, creating the impression that there is not much to gain from the ballot. Risks of aggravated political grievance became apparent with the unprecedented cancellation of a number of elections in Rakhine State for security reasons. Already prior to these decisions, due to the extension of the armed conflict, it appeared possible that more than half of the state’s townships would see elections cancelled. The cancellations resulted in a number of vacant seats in the Rakhine State Hluttaw and in the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, as well as in a Rakhine State Hluttaw does not represent the majority of its people. Additionally, a re-enfranchisement of the remaining Rohingya population who had lost the right to vote during the period leading to the 2015 elections was out of question.27 According to the International Crisis Group, government leaders were paying little attention to the ongoing conflict. The Tatmadaw’s ceasefire, 26 ICG (2020b). 27 ICG (2020b).

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announced on 9 May to encourage pandemic preparedness and response in other states, did not include the Arakan Army. The AA, in alliance with two other groups, had stated a unilateral ceasefire on their side, but did not follow it through.28 Being labelled as a terrorist organisation since March 2020—a status which criminalises any interaction with the group—they did not have much interest in elections taking place in areas under their influence, or in safeguarding the polls. It was a worst-case scenario that the AA would consider harming the process further through extending attacks to the state’s NLD-dominated south.29 All these factors combined rendered the situation in Rakhine a great risk factor for the 2020 elections.30

Social Media and Elections Myanmar, a country of 53 million people, went from having an internet penetration of 0.22 per cent in 2011 to 39 per cent, with the number of active SIM cards surpassing the number of people by 2017. During this surge, Facebook became nearly synonymous with “the Internet” for many users in the country. Myanmar users did not grow accustomed to technology as it developed. In an information environment which came from day-to-day censorship to next to no quality control, disinformation, fake news, and hate speech were also strategically misused. Such phenomena had already occured around the 2015 elections, with the mobilisation of anti-Muslim sentiments as a core motivation of Buddhistnationalist groups. Reportedly, also the Tatmadaw has specialised social media units.31 On the other extreme, 21 June 2020 marked the oneyear anniversary of the longest Internet shutdown in the world, which reportedly concerned 1.4 million people and was part of warfare in Rakhine. Methodologies for monitoring social media during elections are still experimental. Several groups have been engaged in developing online 28 Interview with an expert on Rakhine State politics on 7 July 2020. 29 On 14 October, three NLD candidates were abducted by armed men in Toungup

township in southern Rakhine State. The AA claimed ownership of the incident several days afterwards (The Irrawaddy, 14 October 2020). 30 For developments in Rakhine State in the immediate aftermath of the elections see e.g. (Kean 2021). 31 Rio (2020).

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monitoring tools to contribute to early warning and to taking inflammatory content down. However, overly regulation of online content might curtail the freedom of speech—a delicate balance to achieve. Online campaign spending was yet monitored to a lesser degree. To take a step towards enhanced transparency, Facebook opened its Ad Library for voluntary reporting in Myanmar, however, this can be seen as a measure among others to reduce reputational damage in an important market. The legal framework pertaining to social media is still rudimentary and needs an overhaul. Any election observation in this field should not only analyse online speech, practices and spending, but also look at this from a regulatory perspective. A number of initiatives that have emerged in Myanmar moved it to the forefront of developments to craft new tools to monitor and shape a responsible and responsive digital sphere. Civic-tech innovators aimed to provide apps and progressive web applications with regards to electoral data and civic and voter education. Social media monitors who had already been focusing on online hate speech and know the digital landscape of Myanmar sought to cover also electoral dynamics. At the same time, election observers with years of experience planned to extend their monitoring efforts to social media, as also the electoral campaign was increasingly taking place online. Not all approaches were synchronised, and some reported a certain saturation of activism in this area. Coordination and knowledge-sharing is certainly important if citizen or international watchdogs and entrepreneurs want to make a positive difference. A certain gap remained with civic and voter education at large, as digital literacy is still low despite tremendous growth rates.

Election Observation The growing integrity of elections in Myanmar over the last decade profited from external scrutiny and engagement. In 2010, international observers had not been invited and election observation at the local level was considered an illicit activity. Nevertheless, citizens provided invaluable reports to inform the international community about the polls.32 The 2012 by-elections, which led to Daw Aung San Suu Kyi joining parliament for the first time, saw limited diplomatic observation and

32 Lidauer (2012).

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provided a testing ground for civic space for emerging citizen election observers. However, it was not before 2015 that elections in Myanmar were observed on a broader scale, contributing to the transparency of the process and providing invaluable testimony, reports, and recommendations. Also, the by-elections of 2017 and 2018 were observed by national and international election observers. Nevertheless, the government of Myanmar and the UEC lacked behind in addressing past observer recommendations, as not many had been translated into legal or regulatory changes in the electoral process.33 Election observation is not foreseen in the law, but the UEC established accreditation mechanisms for election observers. The presence of international observers in 2020 was limited due to international travel restrictions posed by the COVID-19 pandemic. All international groups—notably the Carter Center and the Asian Network for Free Elections (ANFREL)—had to scale down operations, and reverted to mixed teams and local recruitment to some degree. The European Union could only send a small team of election experts, without a strong focus on election day. As the conditions of the pandemic also prevented international journalists from following the elections closely, the level of outside scrutiny was much diminished. In this situation, citizen election observers were all the more important to provide a non-partisan assessment of the elections. International and national election observers employ similar methodologies and play complementary roles. While the assessments of international observers tend to find more resonance among the diplomatic community and with international media, national election observers usually deploy in much larger numbers and provide independent scrutiny in places that cannot be reached by their international counterparts. Although in particular citizen election observers often have a strong focus on election day, they have also developed specialisations in sector-specific observations such as of the media, of women or youth participation, or in monitoring electoral violence. According to the UEC, some 8500 national observers were accredited in 2020.34 However, they faced a variety of challenges which made 33 EU EFM (2019). 34 For comparison, the UEC accredited 11,445 citizen election observers from 52

organisations, some of them coming from very small grassroot organisations, as well as 468 international observers from six organisations in 2015 (EU EOM 2016).

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their deployment uncertain. Five months before election day, observers expressed strong concerns that the UEC might not provide accreditation for citizen observer organisations who are not registered under the Association Registration Law. However, to apply for registration with the Union Registration Board, applicant civil society organisations were required to bring recommendation letters by the President’s Office and their respective line ministries, which in the case of citizen election observers is the UEC. The UEC, however, reportedly expressed reservations to provide such letters. Furthermore, some civil society groups also reported problems with bank transfers put in place by the Central Bank of Myanmar in conjunction with reinforced anti-money laundering provisions, indicating further complications in the preparation of citizen election observation exercises. Eventually, the situation was overcome, but not without considerable uncertainties along the way. The People’s Alliance for Credible Elections (PACE) was the only civil society organisation preparing for a large-scale, country-wide election observation exercise, covering the campaign period, election day, and the consolidation of results. Following the hurdles described above PACE was only accredited in September, thanks to the swift and united support of some 400 other CSOs and additional support from the international community. The delay nevertheless prevented PACE from observing the first phase of the voter list display. PACE deployed 320 long-term observers in 320 townships on 28 September to observe the campaign. For election day, PACE planned to deploy some 2000 short-term observers. The Election Education and Observation Partners (EEOP) network, and some of its member organisations, also undertook efforts to observe elections in significant parts of the country. For the first time, civil society organisations also systematically monitored social media at the national and state level. Towards Election Day Some election preparations were interrupted and slowed down by responses against COVID-19 during the first half of 2020 as outlined above. A group of electoral stakeholders expressed uncertainties regarding the timing of the elections, arguing outspokenly for elections postponement, including at the outset of the campaign period. The election date is not specified in law, but it is contingent on the duration of the legislative term and derives from constitutional provisions. The timeframe within

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which elections were expected to take place was relatively short. However, following a brief period of speculation, on 1 June the UEC declared that the 2020 general elections take place on 8 November, instilling some trust in the process and addressing speculations about any ad infinitum postponement. No COVID-19 election can be compared to another. The declaration of a second pandemic wave and the subsequent stay-at-home orders for 72 townships across the country, including all of Rakhine State and most of Yangon Region, coincided with the beginning of the electoral campaign and cast doubts on the conduct of credible and inclusive elections. Myanmar’s electoral procedures did not foresee early voting days or postal ballots, but advance voting which had been a highly controversial practice in previous pollls and therefore enjoyed little trust among electoral stakeholder. Following the declaration of election day, the completion of candidate registration, voter list displays, and voter list finalisation, and after a 60-day campaign period, the UEC organised polls in around 40,000 polling stations across the country, with speculations that the number might have to increase alongside measures to prevent the spread of COVID-19. Polling procedures and polling station management were adjusted to protect voters and election workers from contagion, contributing to making election day an operational success.35

Post-Scriptum The 2020 election results clearly confirmed the NLD in office. Despite initial acceptance of the election results, the armed forces increasingly contested the electoral outcomes. On 1 February 2021, hours before the new legislature was scheduled to convene and proceed with the election of a new President, the Tatmadaw staged a coup d’état based on a narrative of electoral fraud, referring in particular to faulty voter lists. It is important to state, however, that any intentional tempering with the election results was not apparent. As tensions mounted prior to the coup, a broad coalition of national election observers clearly stated that “the elections were credible and reflected the will of the majority voters”.36

35 Lidauer and Saphy (2021). 36 Joint Statement by Domestic Election Observer Organisations, 29 January 2021.

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Nevertheless, the military argued “It is not the outcome itself of the elections that the Tatmadaw is objecting to in its interaction with the UEC and the NLD-led government (…) rather, the Tatmadaw finds the process of the 2020 election unacceptable”37 and re-iterated historical positions of the armed forces as the guardian of the nation. Alongside other state institutions and dignitaries, the military quickly replaced and detained the leadership of the UEC, announced probing into the electoral proceedings of 2020 as well as revisions of voter registration and the electoral system, and fresh elections within a certain timeframe. Against the unfolding drama in the aftermath of the military takeover, these statements appeared implausible. However, it is possible that the Tatmadaw will again employ narratives of electoral fraud and approaches to change the electoral framework to their benefit in the future.

Selected Sources and Further Readings Callahan, Mary: The 2020 Elections and Prospects for Peace in Myanmar. Background Paper Produced for the Australian Embassy Strategy Testing Workshop, 7 February 2019. Callahan, Mary and Myo Zaw Oo: Myanmar’s 2020 Elections and Conflict Dynamics. Peaceworks No. 146, USIP, April 2019. Democracy Reporting International (DRI): Political Discourse Around Pluralism and Diversity on Facebook: Myanmar Social Media Monitoring Report. Pilot Analysis November 2019–January 2020, June 2020. Ei Ei Toe Lwin: An Old Controversy Returns as Govt Gets the Green Light to Campaign Early. The Frontier, 7 July 2020a. Ei Ei Toe Lwin: ‘We Won’t Retreat’: Muslim Candidates Prepare for Election Battle. The Frontier, 27 July 2020b. EU Election Follow-Up Mission (EFM) Myanmar 2019: Final Report. Brussels, 5 June 2019. EU Election Observation Mission (EOM) Myanmar General Elections: Final Report. Yangon, January 2016. Hein Thar: Swabs, Staff and Supply Chains: How Myanmar Cleared Resource Hurdles to Ramp Up COVID-19 Testing. The Frontier, April 2020. International Crisis Group (ICG): Rebooting Myanmar’s Stalled Peace Process. Asia Report No. 308, 19 June 2020a. ICG: An Avoidable War: Politics and Armed Conflict in Myanmar’s Rakhine State. Asia Report No. 307, 9 June 2020b.

37 Tatmadaw Information Team, 31 January 2021, no longer available online.

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ICG: Conflict, Health Cooperation and Covid-19 in Myanmar. Asia Briefing No. 161, 19 May 2020c. ICG: Myanmar at the International Court of Justice. Asia Q&A, 10 December 2019a. ICG: Peace and Electoral Democracy in Myanmar. Asia Briefing No. 157, August 2019b. Kean, Tom: Myanmar’s Rakhine problem is a domestic and international challenge. Nikkei Asia, 25 January 2021. Lidauer, Michael: Boundary Making in Myanmar’s Electoral Process: Where Elections Do Not Take Place. Modern Asian Studies, 14 January 2021a. Lidauer, Michael: The politics of election cancellations in Myanmar. Oxford Tea Circle, 19 May 2021b. Lidauer, Michael: The 2015 Elections and Conflict Dynamics in Myanmar. In: Nick Cheesman and Nicholas Farrelly (eds.): Conflict in Myanmar: War, Politics, Religion. Singapore: ISEAS Press, 2016. Lidauer, Michael: Democratic Dawn? Civil Society and Elections in Burma/Myanmar 2010/2012. Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, Vol. 31, No. 2, 87–114, 2012. Lidauer, Michael and Gilles Saphy: Elections and the Reform Agenda. In: Melissa Crouch and Tim Lindsey (eds.): Law, Society and Transition in Myanmar. Oxford: Hart, 201–224, 2014. Lidauer, Michael and Gilles Saphy: Running Elections under Stringent Covid-19 Measures in Myanmar. International IDEA, 8 July 2021. Min Aung Khine: Rejected Candidate in Myanmar’s Rakhine State Says He’s Been Bullied Off the Ballot. The Irrawaddy, 3 September 2020. Monney, Tatiana and Jorge Valladares Molleda (eds.): Dialogues on Voluntary Codes of Conduct for Political Parties in Elections: A Facilitator’s Guide. Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs and International IDEA, 2017. Renshaw, Catherine and Michael Lidauer: The Union Election Commission of Myanmar 2010–2020. Asian Journal of Comparative Law, 1–20, 2021. Rio, Victoire: The Role of Social Media in Fomenting Violence: Myanmar. Toda Peace Institute. Policy Brief No. 78, June 2020. Spinelli, Antonio: Managing Elections Under the Covid-19 Pandemic: The Republic of Korea’s Crucial Test. International IDEA Technical Paper 2/2020. Su Mon Thant: Party Mergers in Myanmar: A New Development. ISEAS Trends in Southeast Asia, Issue 8/2020. The Carter Center (TCC): Observing Myanmar’s 2015 General Elections, Final Report. Atlanta, 2016. Ye Mon: NLD Candidate Selection Sparks Controversy Ahead of Election. The Frontier, 27 June 2020.

PART II

From Challenges to Unity

CHAPTER 9

The Politics of Space: Naypyidaw and the Ghosts of Yangon Donald M. Seekins

In this chapter of Demystifying Myanmar’s Transition and Deepening Political Crisis, I wish to introduce an idea that might provide new ways— or at least less conventional ways—of understanding twenty-first century Burma’s society and politics. Fundamentally, I wish to argue that politics cannot be understood without viewing it as a battle over space, or over the control of space, which brings us closer to the heart of politics not only in Myanmar and other Southeast Asian countries, but indeed, politics as a fundamental human activity. In other words, humans are political animals. But our preoccupation with politics has less to do with the “battle over ideas” or “ideals” (communism versus capitalism, authoritarianism versus liberal democracy, cosmopolitanism versus nationalism and isolationism) than it does with the acquisition, control, and defense of territory, meant both literally and metaphorically. Most governments, including the “democratic” governments of the West, are more than

D. M. Seekins (B) Southeast Asian Studies, Meio University, Okinawa, Japan

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 C. Yamahata and B. Anderson (eds.), Demystifying Myanmar’s Transition and Political Crisis, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-6675-9_9

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willing to abandon their ideological principles in order to acquire greater power on a spatial dimension, either inside or outside their borders. In some sense, the connection between politics and space is obvious. During World War II, Prime Minister Winston Churchill called on his people to shed their “blood, sweat and tears” to defend their British homeland from German invasion. Walls are built—by the First Emperor of Qin and his successors in China, the Roman Emperor Hadrian in the British Isles, and former President Trump in his call for a “big, beautiful wall” to keep migrants from Latin America from entering the United States—to protect “our” land from intrusions by “them.” The overheated territorial disputes between East Asian countries (China, Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea), focused on for the most part on tiny islands, shows how the obsession with a little extra space can become almost comical. However, the politics of space is often much subtler, and more pervasive in daily life. It involves contestation not only between republics, empires, and kingdoms, but between people possessing different measures of power in every place where human beings dwell. It also involves an inner, psychological dimension, which is closely connected to the idea of personal autonomy. We develop our autonomy, our personhood, within the physical limits of “our” space. Our memories, unique keys to our personhood, are formed and enclosed by space. Thus, individuals and groups involved in spatial political conflicts often have different memories of the same space. In the Myanmar case, the city of Yangon’s most revered holy space, the Shwedagon Pagoda, is seen by Burma’s military regimes as a place where veneration of Buddhist relics is managed and enabled by themselves as holders of state power, who affirm their superiority in a hierarchical way to an audience of thousands of devout—and docile—Buddhist subjects. To opponents of the regime, however, it is seen as a space for resistance against an unjust, illegitimate state (Seekins 2013: 139–162). After Senior General Min Aung Hlaing declared the establishment of a new military junta, the State Administration Council (SAC), on February 1, 2021, the battle over space in Myanmar emerged with unparalleled intensity as ordinary citizens demonstrated in the streets, demanding restoration of the civilian government elected in November 2020. Some areas of Yangon and Mandalay turned into battlegrounds, or more accurately, killing fields. By November 3, 2021, the police and military units had killed over 1236 people, mostly unarmed and in many cases children

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or bystanders. The brutality of the military response to protest represented only the latest chapter in violent conflict over spatial politics which reaches back to the establishment of the first martial law regime, Ne Win’s Revolutionary Council, in 1962. To understand the conflict over space in Myanmar more clearly, I have focused on urban areas during the State Law and Order Restoration Council/State Peace and Development Council period (SLORC/SPDC 1988–2011): the old capital of Yangon (Rangoon) and the post-2005 capital of Naypyidaw. What has become evident in the new upsurge of popular opposition to the Myanmar Army-State is that its greatest challenge is “pacifying” the urban populations of the country, approximately one-fourth of the total population of 54 million. Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) in the border areas have been largely factionalized and divided against each other by the SLORC/SPDC regime’s policy of cease-fires and “border development.” Buddhist monks, the most respected members of Myanmar society, are tightly controlled at the senior level by the state, and many younger monks have been drawn into the Army-State’s agenda of arousing anti-Muslim sentiment and Burman ultra-nationalism. Militant monks and their lay followers have been involved in very extreme cases of spatial violence, especially the expulsion of over 700,000 Muslim Rohingyas from Myanmar’s western Rakhine (Arakan) State to Bangladesh in 2017. However, for the men in trousers, as the military are often called, the biggest challenge seems to be taking back the streets of the cities from the people who live and work there.

The Ghosts of Yangon In 1998, strange things started to happen in Myeinigone, a Yangon neighborhood north of the Shwedagon Pagoda that had experienced violence between student protestors and government security forces in June 1988. At that time, around 100 students were killed by the Riot Police, and as many as 20 Riot Police slain by students wielding primitive catapults shooting sharpened bicycle spokes. Ten years later, rumors circulated that a ghost was at large in Myeinigone, which advertised its presence by throwing stones through windows, causing light bulbs to explode, and smashing glasses and cups. According to the Bangkok Nation newspaper, other mysterious phenomena included “plates and dishes floating in the air and crashing into the walls; letters and pictures appearing on the

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walls of a teashop; blood coming out from televisions; the sounds of people marching; and unknown (and unseen) voices crying, screaming and moaning in the night” (Seekins 2002: 143). Many curious city people came to Myeinigone to see the ghost, or ghosts, which caused considerable unease among the SLORC/SPDC leadership, who feared that the allegedly supernatural happenings could spark further protests in a city population who still were intent on resisting, both actively and passively, oppressive junta rule. The salience of metaphorical or imagined ghosts inside Yangon, which had been brutally “pacified” by government troops in the summer of 1988, is suggested by a colonial-era writer, James G. Scott, who claimed “there is a theory that persons who are executed or meet a violent death become nats [ghosts, spirits] and haunt the place where they are killed. They are called nat-sein [green nats]” (Scott 1963: 239, 240).

The Insurgent City and a Host of Green Nats This chapter discusses the new capital city of Naypyidaw (in the Myanmar language: “the Abode of the King,” “the Royal Capital”). However, to fully understand the State Peace and Development Council’s decision to move its power-center to an entirely new city 320 km north of Yangon, in what was previously the southern part of Mandalay Region (formerly Mandalay Division), one has to understand that a major motivation of the generals was to flee the crowded and restless old capital’s population, who endangered not only their grip on power but—they feared—their very lives. Hundreds of thousands of Yangon residents expressed their rage against the regime through mass demonstrations, a general strike, and occasional street violence—although most of the violence instigated in the city streets in 1988 was by the Lon Htein (Riot Police) or units of the Tatmadaw, the armed forces. The events of 1988 constituted a war between state and society, the most violent year in Yangon’s history since the two Anglo-Burmese Wars of 1824–1826 and 1852. Even during World War II, which witnessed massive land battles in upcountry Myanmar between Allied and Japanese forces two times, in 1942 and 1945, Yangon was largely spared except for Japanese and Allied air raids. However, the Army-State’s brutal crackdowns during the “Year of Rage” resulted in at least 3000 fatalities in the city as well as many others upcountry, mostly unarmed demonstrators shot point-blank by soldiers. Some of these victims were Buddhist monks,

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as mentioned the most revered group in Myanmar society. In addition, thousands more were arrested, detained, imprisoned and tortured, or fled to neighboring countries, especially Thailand (Seekins 2017: 178).1 Many observers of Democracy Summer described the uprising as spontaneous, the result of popular rage built up over decades and unleashed suddenly against a brutal and incompetent regime. The people had had enough, these observers argue, and in some form virtually the entire population rose up against Ne Win’s socialist state. The vanguard of these protests were university students, and to a lesser extent Buddhist monks.2 According to this perspective, the Myanmar people had a deep and natural yearning for democracy, which Daw Aung San Suu Kyi defined simply as: “we just want to go about our own business freely and peacefully, not doing anybody harm, just earning a decent living without anxiety and fear” (Aung San Suu Kyi 1995: 173). However, spokesmen for the State Law and Order Restoration Council gave their own explanation for the uprising, that it was the consequence of both “leftist” and “rightist” conspiracies involving a wide variety of personalities and assisted by individuals and organizations based outside the country or on its borders, including the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), the Burma Communist Party and some of former Prime Minister U Nu’s associates in exile (Boudreau 2004: 190). Their alleged goal was to destroy Myanmar’s national unity, which the Tatmadaw claimed only it could defend. The English language versions of these theories, reported at press conferences given in late 1988 by Brigadier General Khin Nyunt, head of Military Intelligence (Myanmar’s pervasive secret police network), were titled The Conspiracy of Treasonous Minions within the Myanmar Naingngan and Traitorous Cohorts Abroad and The Burma Communist Party’s Conspiracy to Seize State Power (Khin Nyunt 1988a, b). Most observers thought their contents were ridiculous. However, a veteran activist quoted by Vincent Boudreau claimed that:

1 While the “Year of Rage” is a term used to describe 1988 in its entirety, the high point of the popular uprising, commonly called “Democracy Summer,” occurred during July–September 1988, starting with the appointment pf the hated Sein Lwin as Ne Win’s successor as president in late July, leading to the general strike of 8-8-88 (8 August 1988) and culminating in the power seizure of the SLORC on 18 September 1988. 2 Despite socialist Myanmar’s poverty, the number of university students had increased impressively from 19,855 in 1962 to 97,757 in 1977–1978 (Ono 1981: 127).

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The problem with the SLORC intelligence is not its minor details, but the larger argument that underground cells acted under central [communist] party supervision. Those ties were disrupted in the 1960s, and the party neglected the urban areas thereafter. But you must take claims of UG [underground] involvement seriously. (Boudreau 2004: 191)

Boudreau argues for the existence of a resistance underground during the Ne Win period that may have lost contact with the Communist Party of Burma, which after 1968 was based primarily in a remote corner of Shan State bordering China, but was kept alive by the periodic explosions of protests during the socialist years, especially the student activism of 1974–1976. This underground shared memories of protest with a younger generation of students and other young people through reading circles and extracurricular tutorials, many led by teachers who had been purged from the educational system by the socialist regime. These teachers were motivated to correct the inaccuracies of the stateimposed curriculum, which glorified Ne Win socialism but was silent on its deficiencies (Fink 2009: 200–203). The existence of what Boudreau calls “cells” explains that while earlier protests in 1988, like those of March, were largely spontaneous and unplanned, the later protests, especially those connected to the “Four Eights” general strike of 8 August, were highly organized and connected protesters in Yangon with those upcountry, particularly in Mandalay. These cells were not integrated or organized on a higher level (at least before the summer protests) and espoused different ideologies and perspectives from liberalism to Burma Communist Party ideology. But they had survived decades of surveillance by Military Intelligence and were able to assist in the training of a new generation of dissidents. According to Htun Aung Gyaw, a veteran of the student protests of the mid-1970s: [Students] came to me in June, when things were rolling along. I told them how we started the movement – how to use the media, how to organize people using issues of economic hardship, political freedom. The slogans, I told them, had to be short, precise and to the point so people will understand. I told them to form small and closely-knit groups, with four or five people to a cell, and then each cell member should organize one additional cell. I told them also how to use a cipher. (Boudreau 2004: 197)

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Such dissidents created space inside the city where they kept alive both memories of Myanmar’s past history of revolutionary nationalist resistance to oppressive rulers (the British colonialists, the Japanese “fascists”), including the exploits of Aung San Suu Kyi’s father, Aung San, and hopes that popular resistance could be harnessed to overthrow the military-socialist regime.3 Although the regime isolated Myanmar from the outside world, this “underground” studied not only Myanmar’s past but present-day popular movements around the world that offered examples for their own, a practice hindered by the difficulty of securing foreign publications or (uncensored) domestic ones. A major source of information for the underground were foreign broadcasters like the BBC or the CPB Voice of the People of Burma radio station, which broadcast from the “liberated areas” under the party’s control. According to the Voice of the People of Burma in 1988: A veteran student who was involved in the U Thant crisis said the task that one should always bear in mind is to oppose the military government…. These incidents [the March unrest] show that the link between the old and new generations in the revolutionary tide cannot be broken. The lyrics of a student union songs says: although the older Aung Kyaw [Bo Aung Gyaw] has fallen, the younger Aung Kyaws will take his place. (Seekins 2011: 142)4

Yangon Landscapes: The Visible and Invisible City From the perspective of the military elite, their families, and a number of civilian supporters like Dr. Maung Maung, the only “intellectual” crony of Ne Win who became president of Myanmar after the resignations of Ne Win and Sein Lwin from that post in July and August 1988, the popular demonstrations were deeply disturbing, in their imaginations a replay of the terror of the French Revolution. On 24 August, martial law was unexpectedly lifted from Yangon and military units who had killed and wounded thousands of protesters withdrawn to bases north of the city, 3 A fatal weakness of the Ne Win regime was its failed attempt to co-opt the revolutionary and socialist spirit of Aung San and his fellow Thakins, as reflected in its placing of a commemorative stone memorializing the student boycott of December 1920 on the platform of the Shwedagon Pagoda in 1970 (Seekins, 2011: 56–58). 4 Bo Aung Gyaw (or Aung Kyaw) was a student killed by British colonial police in December 1938, commemorated as a martyr of the struggle for independence.

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top officers bringing their families with them from bogyoke ywa (“generals’ villages”), exclusive areas located inside Yangon reserved for elite military residents (Seekins 2017: 113, 114). Between that date and the SLORC takeover, the city fell into anarchy, punctuated by the lynching of suspected pro-government sympathizers and agents provocateurs by street mobs and the formation of neighborhood self-defense committees to ensure a measure of public safety. There was plenty of evidence that the regime itself created incidents to intensify the anarchy, like the looting of warehouses and the escape of over 1000 prisoners from Insein Jail, Yangon’s largest prison (Seekins 2011: 152–154). It seems clear that the military elite was fearful that one day they would be punished for the violence they had unleashed against protesters both in Yangon and upcountry, a fear that persisted and was reflected in an article of the 2008 Constitution, which formally exempted them from prosecution for any actions performed in the line of duty.5 After the SLORC junta seized power on 18 September, the time of protest was not over, but there would not be a demonstration comparable in scale to those of 1988 until the “Saffron Revolution” movement in September 2007, organized and led by Buddhist monks and supported by tens of thousands of lay people in the old capital. Inside Yangon, however, there developed two types of landscapes during the 1988–2007 period: visible and invisible. Visible landscapes were those that were promoted by the SLORC/SPDC, including foreign-funded projects such as new luxury hotels ready to receive visitors for “Visit Myanmar Year” in 1996–1997, office buildings, and a handful of upscale shopping centers, restaurants and other amenities designed for rich tourists or locals; infrastructure projects such as widening and constructing new highways and bridges to make movement around the city easier (for troops as well as civilians); construction of monuments to the Tatmadaw such as the ugly new Defense Services Museum; and the tearing down of old neighborhoods, both along major streets and in back alleys, to deprive urban insurgents of shelter and make way for profitable new construction (ibid., 161–176).

5 Article 445 of the Constitution: “... No proceeding shall be instituted against the said [SLORC and SPDC] Councils or any member thereof or any member of the Government, in respect to any act done in the execution of their respective duties” (Constitution 2008: 178).

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In many parts of the city, such as the City Hall in the center of town, troops were concealed and could appear at any time to stifle unrest. One of the most visible results of SLORC/SPDC policy was the forced relocation of as many as half a million city residents from Yangon’s center to ten new townships that were established after 1988 and significantly increased the city’s land total area.6 These people included squatters but also more prosperous people living in permanent dwellings whose neighborhoods had supported demonstrators during 1988. Although land grabbing was practiced throughout the junta period (and after) in order to make land available for projects favored by the crony capitalists and their foreign partners, these initial forced evacuations in 1989–1990 were far larger than those motivated by profit or those of the 1958–1960 Caretaker Government period, the first and shortest period of military rule. Focusing on students, the regime relocated most universities to peripheral areas, building expensive new campuses that could be reached by students only after a two-hour commute from downtown by bus or truck. These new campuses lacked dormitories, so the students couldn’t live together on campus. The historic old campus of Yangon (Rangoon) University on the shore of Inya Lake was largely shut down except for a few academic programs that did not involve ordinary undergraduates. To further separate students from each other and townspeople, the junta directed the universities to establish “distance education” courses so that students could stay home and learn by computer (ibid., 169–171). Apart from closing down the Rangoon University Main Campus, the authorities shut down other places in the city that could connect visitors to Myanmar’s revolutionary nationalist past such as the Martyrs’ Mausoleum, which commemorates the death of Aung San and his government at the hands of assassins in July 1947, and Aung San’s old residence, which had been turned into a museum.7 For much of the period of SLORC/SPDC rule, Aung San Suu Kyi’s home at 54 University Avenue and the headquarters of the National League for Democracy party on Shwegondine Road were blockaded by security forces, and important 6 Due to the establishment of new townships in the peri-urban area, between 1983 and 1994, the area of Yangon City increased from 346.1 square kilometers (133.64 square miles) to 612.1 square kilometers (236.3 square miles) (Seekins 2011: 164). 7 Both the Martyrs’ Mausoleum and the Bogyoke Museum were annually opened to the public only for a brief period around 19 July, the date of Aung San’s assassination.

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places in the 1988 uprising such as the White Bridge and Myeinigone were redeveloped in accordance with a globalized and money-making agenda, including construction of the Myanmar International Business Center that overshadows the place where 300 students were killed by Riot Police in the March 1988 White Bridge Incident (ibid., 170). Perhaps the most visible and distinct manner in which the SLORC/SPDC reshaped and refashioned the old capital was through sponsorship of an unprecedented number of Buddhist building projects, especially although not entirely confined to pagodas. In summer 1990, monks in Mandalay, followed by those in Yangon, initiated an “overturning the offering bowl” movement in order to deny the military and their families the opportunity to earn merit through dana (giving) to the much-revered members of the Sangha. The authorities crushed the movement by invading monasteries and arresting monks. More than student and townspeople’s protests, the monk protests worried the junta deeply since members of the Tatmadaw tended to be more devoutly Buddhist than the general Myanmar population. Thus, they undertook to carry out numerous “merit projects” inside Yangon to solidify their legitimacy as uniquely “Buddhist” rulers. Probably the most important was the 1999 installation of a new hti or finial on the summit of the Shwedagon Pagoda, in which SLORC/SPDC Lieutenant General Khin Nyunt played a central and very visible role (Aung Zaw 1999: 12–14; Shwedagon Zedi All-Round Perpetual Renovation Committee 1999). Khin Nyunt was also the major sponsor of the White Stone Buddha Image complex built in northern Yangon, near Mingaladon international airport. Other Buddhist projects included the Buddha Tooth Relic Pagoda (one each were constructed in Yangon and Mandalay), the International Theravada Buddhist University, and a large number of local pagodas, especially those built in the new townships which had little sense of identity or community (Seekins 2011: 179–197). This “Buddhist building boom” was an exercise in overkill, since a huge amount of cash and other resources were diverted to these projects that could have been better spent on practical projects such as improved healthcare, drainage, and electricity generation. Although people flocked to festivals at the new Buddhist sites, many if not most of them were skeptical about the SLORC/SPDC’s motivations. As one Yangon resident told me: “the junta’s spirituality is very materialistic. It boils down to ‘my Buddha is bigger than yours.’”

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Invisible landscapes, the commemoration of which brought heavy regime-imposed penalties to Yangon residents, were located within the collective memory of the people who had either experienced the revolutionary nationalist past or had learned about it from their elders. Most Yangon residents had experienced directly or indirectly the tumult of 1988, and many sought to resist junta rule, passively if not actively. It was not an accident that the “new” post-1988 Yangon looked increasingly like other commercialized cities in Southeast Asia, its history either bulldozed, or converted to profitable uses in the tourist sector (like the remodeled and high-priced Strand Hotel). But the run-down old city proved largely resistant to fundamental change. The move to Naypyidaw constituted not only an attempt by the regime to avoid a restless population, but also to express their vision of a Myanmar that was both “modern” and “traditional,” but above all thinly connected.

From Yangon to Naypyidaw After the State Peace and Development Council announced on 6 November 2005 the capital relocation from Yangon to the site in southern Mandalay Region later given the name Naypyidaw, there was considerable speculation as to its motives. Rumors circulated that the SPDC’s most powerful figure, Senior General Than Shwe, had been advised to move the capital by his personal astrologer, who warned him that if he stayed in Yangon, his regime could fall; or that the generals feared an Iraq-style invasion by sea by the United States that left Yangon vulnerable; or that the Senior General had ample precedent for changing the capital, since it was a common practice of his monarchical predecessors wishing to wipe the slate clean. Or escape hordes of green nats (Lubeigt 2012: 81–82).8 Other, possibly more plausibly grounded geopolitical or geostrategic explanations for the capital shift include: (1) the junta’s desire to project military power more effectively into restive and unstable border regions where ethnic minorities live (the new capital is closer to most border regions than Yangon and includes an extensive Military Zone); and (2) the opportunity to benefit from the integration of East-South-Southeast

8 See Dulyapak Preechrushh (2009: Table 1, 42–46), for a list of capital relocations in Myanmar from 1486 to 2005.

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Asia’s hitherto isolated hinterland regions into a larger Asian and EuroAsian economy through infrastructure projects such as the Asian Highway and the Greater Mekong Subregion development plan, to which China’s President Xi Jinping in 2013 added a more ambitious scheme called the “One Belt, One Road” Initiative (Maung Aung Myoe 2006; Dulyapak Preechrushh 2009). However, in this writer’s opinion, the Army-State’s most important motive was to flee the restless and politicized population of Yangon and establish a safer, more secure power center that would not leave them and their families vulnerable to urban insurrection.9 As described above, the military-backed transformation of the old capital to make it “insurrectionproof” during 1989–2004 apparently was viewed as a failure, causing the SPDC to take the drastic step of building an entirely new capital despite the huge costs and disruption incurred, especially to local people who were forcibly evicted from construction sites and civil servants who were separated from their families and trucked upcountry beginning in November 2005.10 The Saffron Revolution of September 2007 could only have convinced the generals that they had made the correct move. The following year, when Cyclone Nargis devastated the Ayeyarwady Delta and damaged parts of Yangon, causing 140,000 estimated dead or missing, the SPDC sponsored a kadaw-bwe, or ceremony of thanksgiving, in honor of Than Shwe for his insight in moving the capital out of the cyclone’s reach (Seekins 2017: 287). Naypyidaw is situated in the Sittoung (Sittang) River valley, hedged in by the Bago (Pegu) Yoma range of hills to the southwest and the Shan plateau to the east. With the capital relocation, a new regional subdivision, the Naypyidaw Union Territory, was formed from the three townships of Pyinmana, Lewe, and Tatkon and encompasses 7045.37 square kilometers (between nine and ten times the area of Yangon City). The population figure includes the residents of older settlements such as Pyinmana (population: 200,000), so the census of 2014 counted a 9 Local residents of the new capital joked that the SPDC elite and their cronies were kyet pyay, “runaway chickens,” a word play on the name of the old district where the Military Zone is now located (Seekins 2009: 63, 69). 10 According to one Yangon expatriate speaking in March 2007, civil servants relocated to Naypyidaw lacked equipment to work, and just killed time: “the women cook and the men play cards”!

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population of 1,067,682 inside the Union Territory, making Naypyidaw Myanmar’s third-largest city (Myanmar Ministry of Immigration and Population 2016: 164). Although Myanmar monarchs such as Mindon established new capitals, they did so following traditional designs that borrowed heavily from Hindu and Buddhist cosmology, especially the layout of the royal palace (Heine-Geldern 1956). The design of Naypyidaw’s buildings and its layout, however, are modernist, or post-modernist, radically different not only from old royal capitals but the colonial-era layout of Yangon. As mentioned above, Naypyidaw is “thinly connected.” By this, I mean that it lacks a single center, or a small group of alternative centers, where the city population can easily gather for work, recreation, or cultural (or religious) activities. Unlike older cities found in Europe or Asia, it has no well-defined “downtown” serving as the business, community, and spiritual heart of the city, like the area in Yangon bounded by the City Hall, Sule Pagoda and the Maha Bandula Garden with its independence monument. It also lacks the means of moving easily from one part of the city to another: in other words, a well-developed system of public transportation. Instead, Naypyidaw is spread out over a large territory and displays a kind of centerless structure of subcenters according to function: the Military Zone, located east of the new capital and the old town of Pyinmana and largely off-limits to non-military personnel, which contains not only armed forces installations but also the residences of top Tatmadaw commanders (its most striking monument is a parade ground looked over by huge statues of Myanmar’s old conqueror kings: Anawrahta, Bayinnaung and Alaungpaya, which can be seen in the distance); the Administrative Zone where government ministries are located, using an identical plan for each of some 37 ministry or agency buildings, along with the President’s residence and a vast, 31-building complex where the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, or Union Parliament, convenes; a Residential Zone where civil servants live, consisting of some 1200 identically designed, four-storey apartment buildings color-coded for the ministry where the residents work (green, for example, for the Ministry of Agriculture); a Hotel Zone where visitors from Yangon or overseas can stay while meeting with government officials; and an International Zone, set aside for foreign embassies and United Nations agencies, which remains empty since embassies, including those of the United States, Britain, and China, remain in Yangon and only Bangladesh has begun construction of

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a new embassy in the new capital (Seekins 2017: 393–396; Lubeigt 2012: 115–148). These subcenters are linked to each other by wide, multilane, and largely empty highways, which intersect at roundabouts that have been decorated with huge artificial flowers. Recreational facilities have been built in different places to amuse Naypyidaw residents and visitors, including a National Zoological Garden, a Safari Park, a National Herbal Park, numerous golf courses and the National Landscape Garden, located on the shores of Yezin Dam to the northeast of the capital, an area that has been shaped into the configuration of a huge map of Myanmar, containing small-scale replicas of the country’s most famous sites, such as the Gokteik Viaduct in Shan State, Zwegabin Hill in Karen State and the “Golden Rock,” the Kyaiktiyo Pagoda in Mon State. Though shoddily built, the replicas assert Myanmar’s national unity, which the Tatmadaw has dedicated itself to preserving (ibid.). Due to the lack of public transport and accessible urban centers, the residents of Naypyidaw find themselves marooned in different parts of the city and only with great difficulty can get from one part of it to another if they do not own cars.11 The city’s design obliges them to shuttle between home life and work-life with few opportunities to gather in public spaces where citizens can socialize and perhaps form bottom-up movements of their own. Walking is discouraged by the tropical heat and the vast, anonymous distances between one part of the city and another. While a large variety of tea shops in Yangon provide places for people to hang out and converse (even if they are often infiltrated by agents of the secret police), the most public places in the new capital are shopping plazas such as the Junction Centre Shopping Mall, where Starbucks-style cafés offer tea, coffee and cakes consumed quickly by shoppers going in and out of the mall, which sells a large if not dazzling array of mostly made-in-China goods. Although markets in Southeast Asia are important social as well as commercial sites, the blandness and impersonality of these malls do not induce a desire to linger or talk.12 The geographer Guy Lubeigt describes Naypyidaw as a “post-modern city”: “Nay Pyi Taw represents the emergence of a new form of urban 11 Shuttles carry civil servants from their ministry-specific apartments to the relevant ministry building. 12 However, there are traditional markets in Naypyidaw, the largest being the Myoma Market.

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living associated with a new concept of the city, that of the postmodern city... postmodern urbanization is more fragmentary in its form, more chaotic in its structure and operates according to a different process than that which accompanied the emergence of ancient cities. These new urban forms are defined as ‘galactic metropolitan areas,’ in the sense that they are like stars floating in space and are unlike unitary cities that have welldefined centers and peripheries” (Lubeigt 2012: 15). Unlike the 14 other regional subdivisions of Myanmar under the Constitution of 2008, including Yangon Region, the Naypyidaw Union Territory is not governed by an elected or partially elected Hluttaw or legislative body: instead, the civilian members of the Naypyidaw Council are nominated by the president of Myanmar and the military members by the commander-in-chief of the Tatmadaw, who at present is Senior General Min Aung Hlaing (Seekins 2017: 396). It seems that in Myanmar’s new capital region, administration is too important to be left in the hands of politicians or the people who elect them. The abundance of “dead space” in Naypyidaw and the large scale of many of its buildings seem designed to overawe and intimidate, what the geographer Guy Lubeigt calls gigantism (Lubeigt 2012: 29). This is especially true of the Union Parliament compound, which with its hybrid Myanmar and (post-) modernist design looks like a set from a Cecil B. DeMille historical blockbuster like The Ten Commandments. Seated inside the chambers of the People’s Assembly or the Nationalities Assembly, individual legislators look small and insignificant, much like their counterparts in the vast, rubber-stamp legislatures of the People’s Republic of China or North Korea.

Sacred Spaces and Identity: The Upattasanti Pagoda Without history and burdened with much “dead space,” Naypyidaw nonetheless possesses one important space intended to be sacred and central: the Upattasanti Pagoda, a project of state Buddhism constructed by order of Senior General Than Shwe between November 2006 and March 2009. Although the countryside inside and surrounding Naypyidaw is dotted with stupas old and new, this impressive structure asserts its primacy through its position and size, although it is a hollow center, both literally and figuratively. Unlike most pagodas in Myanmar, including the Shwedagon in Yangon, the Upattasanti Pagoda contains a lavishly decorated, gilded interior chamber displaying the Four Holy

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Truths in both Myanmar language and English on the high ceiling above and four jade Buddha images at the four cardinal points of the compass, as well as many other gaudy embellishments. However, again unlike the Shwedagon, which is perpetually crowded with devotees and visitors, making it Yangon’s most important sacred (and public) space, the interior cell and exterior platform of the Upattasanti Pagoda are almost always deserted. Apart from the pagoda, the platform surrounding it and administrative buildings, the precincts of the Upattasanti also include a large shed where six sacred white elephants are kept, traditional symbols of the authority and legitimacy of kings in precolonial India and Southeast Asia. Although comparatively unpopular with visitors, the Upattasanti Pagoda is the one place in Naypyidaw that is unmistakably “Myanmar” in design and purpose, connecting the site to the country’s Buddhist past. Externally, the pagoda closely resembles the Shwedagon, but is 30 centimeters (one foot) shorter. It is unclear why it is shorter: perhaps Than Shwe feared that making it equal or taller in height than the original would alienate people who see the “four relic pagoda” as the premier Buddhist site in Myanmar. However, there is a further paradox: the Shwedagon in its history and design is a Mon pagoda (known as the Kyaik Lagun in the Mon language). Despite its association with the historical enemies of the Burman kings, it is clear that Than Shwe like earlier Buddhist kings wanted to appropriate the Mon pagoda to shore up his own legitimacy. Not only is the Upattasanti a replica, but the most important relic enshrined within it is a replica as well. In November 2011, Than Shwe’s constitutional successor President Thein Sein received with great pomp and circumstance the “authentic” Buddha Tooth Relic from China, originally enshrined near Beijing, and it was temporarily placed inside the hollow stupa. Reportedly, a piece of elephant ivory was put in close proximity, becoming itself a sacred Buddha relic that serves as its substitute after the original was returned to China (Lubeigt 2012: 124, note 246).13 The Upattasanti Pagoda is located on a hill halfway between the new capital and the old town of Pyinmana, a situation that is paradoxical for a fervently Buddhist country. Boasting a fine view of the Shan Hills, it

13 According to Guy Lubeigt, the act of placing a replica next to an authentic relic confers on the replica a value equal to that of the original object.

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nonetheless is suspended in dead space, miles from surrounding settlements, which in part may explain its unpopularity. One could interpret that it expresses a transition from one conception of the old saying—“to be Burmese is to be Buddhist”—to another. In the first, most Myanmar people inhabited a world conforming to Buddhist concepts of cosmology, history, and ethics, which conveyed meaning to lives that were often poor, difficult, and harsh. But the new national capital is a modern or “post-modern” space, which through architecture and design imposes a globalized, twenty-first century worldview that can be summarized by the assertion: “all space is real estate”—its purchase and sale determined by market forces. As a result, Buddhism becomes less a way of life than an identity marker, largely devoid of meaning except for the consciousness that We are Buddhist and They are not. Thus, it is not surprising that the local consensus on the state of Buddhism inside Myanmar relies less on spiritual or mental cultivation and more on drawing uncrossable borders between Self and Other, as the anti-Muslim campaign carried out by Ashin Wirathu and other militant monks have shown since 2012 (Seekins 2017: 569–571).

Conclusion: Placelessness Naypyidaw was and is an expensive project, requiring the participation of most of Myanmar’s crony capitalists in a manner that is still not entirely clear to outside observers even today. However, it is also a monument to placelessness. Its modern buildings, though lacking the individuality of western and Asian masterpieces of “starchitecture,” are adaptations to the twenty-first century globalized values of efficiency, top-down control, and information technology. By making it centerless, the designers of the new capital have created an environment that empowers the state and central planners but leaves the local individual and community largely powerless. Thus, Naypyidaw places distance between itself and older cities, which were based on some concept of active city life—including even colonial Yangon. In its anonymity, it erases history and memory, trapping its residents in an eternal Now. Imagination is discouraged, if not prevented, from thinking about a present other than the one that “inevitably” exists. As one Indian journalist reports, Naypyidaw is a prime example of the “dictatorship by cartography, geometry” (Varadarajan 2007). Despite its being designed to be “insurrection-proof,” the new Myanmar capital witnessed its share of popular demonstrations directed

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against the SAC after the coup d’état. On February 10, police shot Ma Mya Thwet Thwet Khine, a 20-year-old high school student, in the head; she was declared brain dead after being taken to a hospital, and died on February 19 after being taken off life-support (The Irrawaddy 2021a). On February 22, thousands of people in the capital took part in the nationwide “22222” general strike, causing the security forces to close access to the city (The Irrawaddy 2021b). I would like to dedicate this essay to the demonstrators in all parts of Myanmar, young and old, who wish to create spaces reflecting their own values and identity rather than passively allowing them to become yet another organ of the homogeneous and oppressive unity of the Myanmar Army-State (March 30, 2021).

References Aung San Suu Kyi. 1995. Freedom from Fear and Other Writings, Michael Aris, ed. New Edition. London: Penguin Books. Aung Zaw. 1999. “Shwedagon and the Generals.” The Irrawaddy Magazine, 7, 4 (May), 12–14. Boudreau, Vincent. 2004. Resisting Dictatorship: Repression and Resistance in Southeast Asia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar. 2008. Naypyidaw: Ministry of Information, Printing and Publishing Enterprise. Dulyapak Preechrushh. 2009. Naypyidaw: The New Capital of Burma. Bangkok: White Lotus. Fink, Christina. 2009. Living Silence in Burma: Surviving under Military Rule. Second Edition. London/Chiang Mai: Zed Books/Silkworm. Heine-Geldern, Robert. 1956. “Conceptions of State and Kingship in Southeast Asia.” Data Paper No. 18. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Southeast Asia Program. Irrawaddy, The. 2021a. “Myanmar Military Regime Denies Responsibility for Death of Woman Shot at Naypyidaw.” February 21 at www.irrawaddy.com, accessed 03.30.2021. Irrawaddy, The. 2021b. “More Than 20 People Arrested as Security Forces Break Up ‘22222’ Protest in Myanmar’s Capital.” February 22 at www.irrawaddy. com, accessed 03.30.2021. Khin Nyunt. 1988a. Burma Communist Party’s Conspiracy to Take Over State Power. Yangon: Guardian Press. Khin Nyunt. 1988b. The Conspiracy of Treasonous Minions within the Myanmar Naignngan and Traitorous Cohorts Abroad. Yangon: Guardian Press.

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Lubeigt, Guy. 2012. Nay Pyi Taw: une résidence royale pour l’armée birmane. Paris/Bangkok: Les Indes Savantes/IRASEC. Maung Aung Myoe. 2006. “The Road to Naypyidaw: Making Sense of the Myanmar Government’s Decision to Move the Capital.” Working Paper Series, No. 79, November. Singapore: Asian Research Centre, National University of Singapore. Myanmar. Ministry of Labour, Immigration and Population. 2016. The 2014 Myanmar Population and Housing Census: Thematic Report on Migration and Urbanization. Naypyidaw: Ministry of Labour, Immigration and Population. Ono Toru. 1981. “The Development of Education in Burma.” East Asian Cultural Studies, 20, 1–4 (March), 107–134. Scott, James G. (“Shwe Yoh”). 1963. The Burman: His Life and Notions. New York: Norton. Seekins, Donald M. 2002. The Disorder in Order: The Army-State in Burma Since 1962. Bangkok: White Lotus Press. Seekins, Donald M. 2009. “‘Runaway Chickens’ and Myanmar Identity: Relocating Burma’s Capital.” City, 13, 1 (March), 63–70. Seekins, Donald M. 2011. State and Society in Modern Rangoon. Abingdon, UK: Routledge. Seekins, Donald M. 2013. “Sacred Site or Public Space? The Shwedagon Pagoda in Colonial Rangoon.” Pp. 139–162 in John Whalen-Bridge and Pattana Kitiarsa, eds. Buddhism, Modernity and the State in Asia: Forms of Engagement. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Seekins, Donald M. 2017. Historical Dictionary of Burma (Myanmar). Second Edition. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Shwedagon Zedi All-Round Perpetual Renovation Committee. 1999. Historic Record of the Hoisting of the Gold Umbrella on the Shwedagon Pagoda. Yangon: Office of the Trustees of the Shwedagon Pagoda. Varadarajan, Siddharth. 2007. “Dictatorship by Cartography, Geometry.” Himal Southasian, February. Online at http://svaradarajan.blogspot.com/2007/ 02/dictatorship-by-cartography-geometry, assessed 08.05.2007.

CHAPTER 10

Myanmar’s Peace Process and Ceasefire Monitoring Mechanism: A Post-mortem Saw Chit Thet Tun, Bobby Anderson, and Chosein Yamahata

Background The Myanmar military or Tatmadaw overthrew the elected civilian government of Aung San Suu Kyi on February 1, 2021. At the very least this can be said to illustrate fundamental differences in perception between military and civilian authorities which may be insurmountable in the near term. This difference in perception hamstrung the reining in of the Union’s myriad of insurgencies as well. Former President U Thein Sein (2011– 2016) initiated a peace process in 2012 following the shift from direct military rule to a quasi-civilian government. And now, nearly six years

S. C. T. Tun Karen Institute of Strategic Studies, Yangon, Myanmar B. Anderson School of Public Policy, Chiang Mai University, Chiang Mai, Thailand C. Yamahata (B) Graduate School of Policy Studies, Aichi Gakuin University, Nisshin, Japan

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 C. Yamahata and B. Anderson (eds.), Demystifying Myanmar’s Transition and Political Crisis, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-6675-9_10

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after Myanmar’s first Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) signed the National Ceasefire Agreement (NCA), the “21st Century Panglong” peace process which followed the 2015 electoral victory of the National League for Democracy (NLD) is both deadlocked and contested. The coup has implicitly ended this process. Eight EAOs, including the Karen National Union (KNU) and the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS/SSA), initially signed the NCA in October 2015. Additional groups signed in 2018. The Joint Ceasefire Monitoring Committee (JMC) was officially formed in November 2015 by agreement between both Union and EAO signatories. The JMC was intended to implement and monitor the NCA, ensure that all parties adhere to the code of conduct, investigate alleged violations of the ceasefire, and undertake problem-solving functions (JMC-TSC 2017). This chapter discusses the shortcomings of the peace process as well as the JMC and draws out lessons that the authors hope might inform some future processes in a future democratic Myanmar.

Stalemate and Suspicion Prior to the 2021 coup d’etat, the peace process foundered for three key reasons: 1. The most powerful non-state groups were excluded. The majority of experienced fighters were represented by EAO nonsignatories; with some exceptions, the majority of signatory groups posed no threat to the state and held no significant territory. In order to grasp the actual military strength of EAOs, it was misleading to only measure NCA participation by the number of groups, which produces unexpectedly rosy results, with eleven signatories and nine non-signatories. When counting the number of fighters within groups, a less sanguine picture emerges. Of a total of 84,660 fighters across twenty groups, represented in the Table 10.1, NCA signatories contained 21,560 fighters, while non-signatories contained 63,100 fighters, or 75% of fighters. If we included credible reserves, the total number of fighters increased to 116,660–23,560 signatory fighters and 93,100 non-signatory fighters; signatory fighters dropped to 20%. If we include estimated increases in non-signatory numbers through recruitment—such as found within the Ta’ang National Liberation Army or TNLA, for example—the numbers

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Table 10.1 Military strength of the EAOs: NCA signatories and nonsignatories NCA signatory Strength Remarks EAOs in number Arakan Liberation Party (ALP)

60

All Burma Students Democratic Front (ABSDF) Chin National Front (CNF)

400

Estimated Arakan Army as max can (AA)—Kachin be more branch only than 100 Kachin Independence Army (KIA)

200

Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) Democratic Kayin Benevolent Army (DKBA) Karen National Union (KNU)

1500

Karen National Liberation Army Peace Council (KNLA—PC) Lahu Democratic Union (LDU)

200

BGF under the military command

5000

5000

0

NCA non-signatory EAOs

Strength Remarks in number 3000

10,000

Estimated as max can be more than 15,000

Karenni National 600 Progressive Party (KNPP) National Democratic 3000 Alliance Army (NDAA)—Mongla National Socialist 500 Council of Nagaland—Khaplang

Estimated as max can be more than 8000

Myanmar National 2000 Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA)—Kokang Shan State Progress 8000 Party/Shan State Army—North (SSPP/SSA-N)

Estimated as max can be more than 3000

6000

Estimated as max can be more than 10,000

Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA)

(continued)

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Table 10.1 (continued) NCA signatory Strength Remarks EAOs in number

NCA non-signatory EAOs

Strength Remarks in number

New Mon State Party (NMSP) Pao National Liberation Organisation (PNLO) Restoration Council of Shan State/Shan State Army South (RCSS/SSA-S) Total military strength of NCA Signatories

United Wa State Army (UWSA)

30,000

800

2000 reserves

30,000 reserves

400

8000

21,560

weighed even more heavily toward non-signatories. The current number of EAO fighters is now far greater than this. These numbers pre-date the 2021 coup, and recruitment has drastically increased since then. Not many of the signatory groups actually possessed recent combat experience. The non-signatories had it in spades. The Karen National Union (KNU) and the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS)—the main actors that legitimized the NCA—have it. The New Mon State Party (NMSP), the Democratic Kayin Benevolent Army (DKBA), which is now a Border Guard Force under Tatmadaw command, and the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (also DKBA) also merit mention. The other NCA groups are no longer significant, and a few are historical relics; a few have been described as NGOs rather than EAOs. Of the non-signatories, the military refused to acknowledge the legitimacy of many of the groups it was (and is) most actively attempting to destroy—namely, three of the four entities that constitute the Northern Alliance (NA), which launched an offensive against the Tatmadaw in late 2016 in Shan State North. The NA comprises the Arakan Army (AA), the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), the TNLA, and two brigades from the Kachin Independence Army (KIA). Even if

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the former three had wished to sign the NCA, the Tatmadaw would not let them. The three contain a minimum of 11,000 experienced fighters: adding the KIA to the total brings it to a pre-coup minimum of 21,000. The NA, for its part, soon fell under the Federal Political Negotiation and Consultation Committee (FPNCC), a negotiating bloc created and led by the United Wa State Party (UWSP), the strongest EAO in Myanmar. The FPNCC is composed of seven members, namely the AA, KIA, MNDAA, TNLA, National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA), Shan State Progress Party (SSPP), and last but not least, the UWSA. Despite the strength of the FPNCC, it was not recognized by either the late civilian government or the Tatmadaw as it was seen as an attempt to bypass the NCA (CDES 2019). However, unlike previous EAO alliances, the FPNCC proved more durable, and contained the absolute majority of EAO fighters countrywide. Among the members of FPNCC, the UWSA and NDAA did not want to sign the NCA as it was, because they did not participate in the negotiation of NCA content. The position of the FPNCC was to develop new proposals because they perceived the NCA as non-inclusive and failed to recognize the political rights of all ethnicities/nationalities. They also regarded the NCA as “window-dressing,” unlikely to lead to any meaningful political transformations in Myanmar. The NCA lacked substance because it lacked these groups and lacked the means by which to include them. Unable to recognize the elephant in the room, both the military and the civilian government refused to negotiate with the FPNCC as a bloc. This was an inelegant attempt at “divide and rule”: the continued use of a playbook that has failed the Union across the last half-century. Frustrated EAOs might still embrace a new peace process put forth by the FPNCC. 2. Key issues were avoided. The first meeting between the Union and EAO signatories, in August 2016, bore few results but was significant in that it actually happened. The second meeting, in June 2017, resulted in agreement on 37 basic principles, but not key principles including federalism, equality, autonomy, and the drafting of state constitutions. A month after the 2017 meeting, eight out of ten signatories formed a “Peace Process Steering Team” to evaluate the NCA, referring to it as a “deviation from the path they had envisioned” (Irrawaddy 2017). Despite two further meetings during the tenure of the former civilian authorities, no meaningful discussion of key differences of federalism, autonomy, etc., occurred. What agreements were reached were often

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already found in the 2008 constitution. Some observers point out that 80% of Union Accords were actually different descriptive versions of the 2008 constitution (Thawnghmung 2017). As a precondition to discussions around autonomy and federalism, the Tatmadaw demanded that signatories acknowledge the 2008 constitution, which formalized Tatmadaw embeddedness in the civilian government through control of the Ministries of Defense, Border Affairs, and Home Affairs; an allotted 25% of Tatmadaw seats in the parliament that ensured veto power; and a defined right to seize control of, and disband, an elected civilian government. This obviously discouraged EAO engagement. The few powerful NCA signatories, namely the KNU and RCSS, engaged with the NCA with the implicit belief that the process might lead to constitutional reform, but now such belief has been diminished, especially since the political assassination of NLD constitutional reform expert Ko Ni in January of 2017. Sequencing was also an issue. EAOs wanted a political dialogue about the parameters of a federal state followed by security sector reform (SSR) and constitutional change, after which disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of EAOs might occur. The Tatmadaw, fantastically, wanted EAO disarmament prior to political negotiations. This could also be described as “surrender.” The Tatmadaw made the same DDR demand for the non-signatories it waged war against in the north. The former civilian government supported their position. This was a complete non-starter, and reflective of a lack of sincerity, as well as a page from the aforementioned Tatmadaw playbook. In 1981, talks between the KIA and the Tatmadaw fell apart when limited autonomy was rejected. Forty years on, the word federalism is used as a lure, but it is, so far, without substance. That a discussion around it has not even occurred since 2015 reflects an incompatibility of positions. Frustration over these issues led the KNU and RCSS to suspend their participation in the peace process in October 2018. These were the very groups that gave the NCA legitimacy in the first place. 3. The civilian government lacked authority. What was supposed to be a negotiation between the Union and those who contest it was instead a negotiation between the Tatmadaw and EAOs, facilitated by a civilian government which neither side trusted. The EAOs knew government interlocutors lacked authority; they did not speak for the military, which continued to follow its own policies while maintaining a Potemkin village for the international community.

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In summary, then, the “Panglong 21” process, prior to its likely demise as a result of the coup, could not lead to any meaningful conflict nor political transformation in Myanmar. As part of the peace process’ postmortem, and in order to inform a future process, the Joint Monitoring Committee (JMC) is worth examination.

Ceasefire Monitoring in Divided Societies: An Overview A ceasefire can mark the first step in the transition from war to peace in that it halts physical violence and provides short-term stability which Galtung (1969) referred to as “negative” peace. Unlike a peace agreement, ceasefires are concerned with monitoring violence, rather than addressing underlying issues of conflict (Clayton et al. 2021). As tensions are high, and issues and incompatibilities remain, ceasefires have been historically monitored by third parties in order to maintain neutrality (Findlay 2001). Therefore, the international experience of ceasefire monitoring in conflict-affected countries is an essential element for preventing armed clashes between conflicting parties and abiding with a given agreement. Generally, ceasefire monitoring (the technical process of collecting information on the basis of which a verification judgment is to be made) and verification (the process of using monitoring information to evaluate compliance with an agreement [Ross 2017, p. 4]) is conducted by a group or network of groups on the ground level. They investigate reported violations, measure compliance, and resolve disputes between parties. What is measured includes troop numbers, movement and deployment, weapons stockpiles and demobilization/disarmament schedules, incidences of conflict, treatment of civilians, and land and natural resources use, when agreed. When effective, such activities increase the durability of ceasefire agreements by addressing commitment problems inherent in peace processes. Different ceasefire monitoring arrangements include (1) internal commissions; (2) international commissions; and (3) joint commissions (The Public International Law & Policy Group 2013): (1) Internal commissions allow parties to the conflict to manage ceasefire agreement implementation while an external group provides monitoring and verification. This is often ineffective; the absence of thirdparty management is linked to an unaddressed violation, and ultimately,

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unsuccessful implementation. If there is no third-party involvement, or if there is any process that undermines the inclusion of third parties in the commission, there is a high tendency to resume conflict. (2) International commissions allow direct monitoring by international organizations such as the United Nations, regional organizations, or non-government organizations. This type of monitoring excludes the involvement of parties in the conflict. (3) Joint Commissions include parties to the conflict and third parties from international organizations or impartial states. In this system, the third party usually takes the chairperson position to make decisions and act as a mediator to solve disputes between conflict parties. Before analyzing Myanmar’s JMC, it is worth exploring the experiences of ceasefire monitoring mechanisms in other contexts (Table 10.2). Recent Ceasefire Monitoring Experiences: Sudan, Indonesia, Sri Lanka Sudan’s model of ceasefire monitoring is too recent to be called a success, but it is functioning well in the near term. On 19 January 2020, the government of Sudan and the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement/Army reached the Nuba Mountains Ceasefire Agreement (CFA). This contract allowed the creation of the Joint Monitoring Commission (JMC)/Joint Military Mission (JMM) to observe the ceasefire in contested areas in order to promote a just, peaceful and comprehensive settlement of the conflict. The JMM was created by the participation of the JMC, the International Monitoring Mission (IMM), and local JMCs. The IMM brought advanced technology and technical expertise and played roles across all levels of monitoring—tactical, operational, and strategic. As a result, there were several significant outcomes from the JMC, including no hostilities nor clashes between the Parties; no attempts to occupy new ground; no laying of mines; no supply of ammunition or weaponry; no arming of civilians/creation of militias; no killing/bombing of civilians, and very limited instances of hostile propaganda (Wilhelmsen 2005). According to the parties monitoring the ceasefire, third-party exchanges of credible information between former fighters of opposing sides were unable to reduce uncertainty, and the IMM became a trusted intermediary (Verjee 2019, p. 4). The Sudan JMC demonstrated a successful combination of conflict parties and international presence (ibid., p. 5).

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Table 10.2 Approaches in comparison Items

Previous approach New approach

Features

• Required to give up arms to transform into BGF → now allowing ethnic armed groups to keep their arms • Forced to accept 2008 constitution • Asked to set up political party • Asked to contest in elections

Failures

• Accepted from • Bring ceasefire at state level small groups/splinter • Start talking groups, major to make EAOs rejected Nationwide the gov’s Ceasefire proposal and Agreement resumed fighting

• Offered political dialogue • Dropped key preconditions for talks • Allowed EAOs to hold arms while the talk is convening

Ongoing status

Unmet demands by EAOs

• 10 groups had signed NCA • 51 points of Union Accord have made but limited result of what EAOs want • EAOs continued to hold the arms in their area • Decreased tension but still fighting in some area • Formal process has restated on December 2019 • Bi-lateral meeting between the government and NCA non-signatory groups continuing • Preparation for next UPC and Union Accord—Part 3

• Political talks • Union accord— agreement on power sharing and resource sharing • Approval from parliament • No DDR/SSR until political settlement has reached

(continued)

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Table 10.2 (continued) Items

Previous approach New approach

Ongoing status

Unmet demands by EAOs

• Though NCA • 10 groups had • Due to the Feedbacks • The attempt has agreed, poor signed NCA of the military stacking at the relationship regime for • Tatmadaw implementation between the peace and rejected level particularly Government political MNDAA, demarcation and reintegration TNLA and and interim Tatmadaw, it failed due to AA to sign arrangement has a great lack of the NCA impact on the meaningful • KIA refused ongoing peace political to sign process and solution because NCA • Armed Tatmadaw’s implementation conflict policy on resumed in discrimination northern parts and not of the country accepting alland prolonged inclusiveness conflict principles remained unsolved

Aceh, Indonesia The Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka or GAM) fought the Government of Indonesia (GoI), in numerous discrete phases of conflict and retreat, from 1976 until the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding between the GoI and GAM in Helsinki on 15 August 2005 (Anderson 2013). This insurgency was fuelled by the Suharto dictatorship’s exploitation of Aceh’s natural resources as well as by the human rights abuses perpetrated by the Indonesian military (ibid.). Although there were past negotiations to end the conflict, including the Humanitarian Pause in 2000 and the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (COHA) in 2002. All were unsuccessful, with COHA ended by a military offensive in 2003 (Aspinall 2005). On December 26, 2004, a tsunami brought the conflict in Aceh to international attention and served as a catalyst for a new peace agreement. After the Helsinki agreement, the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) was created to assist the implementation of the terms of the MoU. At its height, the AMM consisted of 227 persons seconded from the EU, Norway, Switzerland, and five ASEAN member

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states (Quigley 2006, p. 68). Aceh’s peace process remains successful, and for multiple reasons, including the emergence of pragmatic representatives of opposing parties as a result of the unprecedented scale of the tsunami; the design of peace negotiations that detailed a future action plan (e.g., GAM amnesties, outlining concrete economic programs), and other key elements and actions, and so on—assisted, in part, by an international presence in ceasefire monitoring that served to defuse tensions and build trust between parties. Sri Lanka The Government of Sri Lanka (GOSL) and the separatist Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) fought a protracted conflict from 1983 until the LTTE’s destruction in 2009. The peace process initiated in 2002 was led by Norway and backed by Japan, the United States, and India as co-chairs (Goodhand and Walton 2009, p. 303), while the ceasefire was monitored by secondees from the Scandinavian countries (Shastri 2009, p. 82). Prospects for building peace in Sri Lanka were positive, as the peace process included “the application of security guarantees and peace conditionalities, the establishment of an international monitoring mission to monitor the ceasefire, and funding for reconstruction in conflict-affected regions” (Goodhand and Walton 2009, p. 304). However, similar to other ethnic conflicts, “discriminatory, racial policies and systematic abdication of negotiated compacts (which) served as the primary ingredient fuelling militancy and armed struggle by the Tamils” (Podder 2006, p. 593) persisted, and fighting broke out four years later. The peace process did not adequately address unreconciled tensions between the two parties, leading to numerous ceasefire violations. Sri Lanka’s case shows that although international involvement in monitoring the ceasefire is a crucial element in the process, it can still fail. Efforts to build trust take precedence.

Myanmar’s JMC Myanmar’s NCA explicitly established the JMC as an internal commission and outlined its main tasks as a monitoring mechanism. The strength of the NCA in its inception was that it provided an institutionalized peace process, guarantee of political dialogue, and other broader issues including demarcation, interim arrangements, ceasefire monitoring,

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allowing other stakeholders to participate, and acknowledge existing state institutions, such as parliamentary institutions. UNDP described the JMC ceasefire monitoring arrangement as “exceptional in that it does not rely on an external 3rd party to act as the principal monitoring party, but rather utilizes a hybrid formulation of the parties themselves, together with civilians and civil society actors, carrying out many of the main functions. Typically, ceasefire support is led by 3rd parties (such as in UN mission settings), yet this project uses a development mechanism, with challenges and opportunities in this approach” (UNDP Myanmar 2018) (Figs. 10.1, 10.2, 10.3, and 10.4; Table 10.3). Institutionally, the JMC was set up to perform its tasks. Over a hundred staff members were appointed at different levels. Standard Operating Procedures were developed; Monitoring, Verification, and Reporting (MVR) missions began, and the Twenty-first Century Panglong Conference and Political Dialogue was organized in 2016 and subsequent years. The NCA established JMC as the main body to implement its provisions, namely: to monitor the code of conduct agreed by all parties, to investigate armed clashes, and to find a resolution to these and other disagreements (Joint Ceasefire Committee 2015). The JMC was intended to abide by NCA principles of equality, non-discrimination, transparency, and accountability in implementation, based on shared promises and commitments. The JMC was designed to operate at Union, State, and local levels, with the involvement of the military, EAOs and civilian representatives. However, there were no official JMC representatives from the civilian government, thus diminishing the elected executive organ of the Union. This exclusion strengthened the military as the de facto decision influencer of the mechanism. The JMC’s mandate also covered activities such as the provision of humanitarian assistance, early recovery support for Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), returnees, and host-communities, protection of highrisk groups including women and children, and enabling conditions for sustainable development. The JMC’s community-level public consultation meetings were to provide a space where civilians could directly raise ceasefire related questions and complaints to both Tatmadaw and EAOs. This activity initially helped increase public confidence, transparency among stakeholders, and encouraged dialogue.

Minister Aung Kyi

Thailand

Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar

Indonesia

Group of Friends of the UN Secretary General (14 countries)

Rev. Lahtaw Saboi Jum (Kachin Baptist Convention)

UN

Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (Switzerland)

USA

KIO-KIA

SSA

KNU-KNLAPC (H. Maung)

KNU-KNLA (Naw Zipporah Sein)

National Democratic Force

NLD Aung San Suu Kyi

BB Generation Students Group

Fig. 10.1 Actors, stakeholders and mechanisms of peace process up to 2010 (Source: Fisas, V. (2012). 2011 Yearbook on Peace Processes (p. 138). Barcelona: Icaria Editorial : Escola de Cultura de Pau.)

DKBA

Military junta of Myanmar

India China

Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA)

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EBO, FLD/EPRP, ENAC, PI, CPCS, HD, NPF, Shalom

National Ceasefire Coordination Team (NCCT) (16 EAOs)

Myanmar Peace Center

National Ceasefire Agreement (NCA)

State/Regional Peace Committee

UPWC

Signatory EAOs KNU RCSS ALP ABSDF KNU/KNLA PC DKBA PLNO CNF

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

Non-Signatory EAOs KIO SSPP KNPP NMSP LDU WNO ANC

AA, PSLF/TNLA, MNDAA (Not allowed to sign/Tatmadaw rejection)

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

Fig. 10.2 Actors, stakeholders and mechanisms of peace process between 2011 and 2015

USA EU China Japan MPSI PSDG IPSG NF JPF PSF

National Defence and Security Council (NDSC)

Government

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NCA-S EAO Office

PPST (10 EAOs)

NPRC

Peace Commission

NLD Government

Shalom, ENAC, PI, EBO, IDEA, HD

Joint Implementing Coordination Meeting (JICM)

KNU Technical Team

Bilateral/informal KNU + RCSS

JMC

Tatmadaw

3rd UPC (21 Century Panglong Third Session)

2nd UPC (21 Century Panglong Second Session)

1st UPC (21 Century Panglong First Session)

Unity Peace Dialogue Joint Committee (UPDJC)

KNU Bilateral and Military-to-Military Meeting with Tatmadaw

India

South Korea

Joint Implementing Coordination Meeting (JICM)

Unity Peace Dialogue Joint Committee (UPDJC)

Bilateral with AA

Fig. 10.3 Actors, stakeholders and mechanisms of peace process between 2016 and 2021

Task Force for Federalism (PPST + KIO +KNPP)

CDNH

CPR

FPNCC

China

JPF

4th UPC (21 Century Panglong Fourth Session)

Resuming of JMC-U Meeting

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FPNCC*** United Nationalities Federal Council

Peace Process Steering Team (PPST)

Joint Monitoring Committee (JMC)

New basis for NCA

National Ceasefire Agreement (NCA)

National dialogue

UPC (21 Century Panglong Conference)

Process

Fig. 10.4 Conceptual flow of peace process under a hybrid democracy

NCA-NS-EAOs**

NCA-S-EAOs*

Military

Invited specialists

Ethnic nationalities

Political parties

Union Political Dialogue Joint Committee (UPDJC)

Peace commission

Government

Parliament

Facilitating Platform

Actors

Union Accords

Union Parliament

Ultimate Goal

Constitution

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Table 10.3 Function of JMC Given military situation

Goal Mode Principle

Main tasks

• Both troops are located in mixed areas and some Tatmadaw outposts and camps exist in EAOs’ controlled area • Demarcation as per NCA provision has not been discussed yet • Political dialogue • Joint Implementation Coordination Meeting without independent third-party involvement • Equality and non-discrimination • Transparency • Accountable implementation with the shared promises and commitments • Ceasefire Monitoring • Verification • Conflict resolution

The JMC’s Co-option The JMC was soon co-opted by the Tatmadaw in stages which allowed the military to reframe its purpose. The absence of a third party aided this. This obfuscation included the Tatmadaw’s inclusion of preconditions to dialogue not found in the NCA, the Tatmadaw’s changing interpretations of NCA articles to serve its own interests, their neglect in implementing NCA provisions such as Demarcation and Interim Arrangements, and their insistence upon DDR at the earliest stages of political dialogue. All the above factors led to deadlocks and shallow achievements, at best, in the Union Peace Conferences. The Tatmadaw preconditions, or “package deal,” were exceptionally important. They insisted that EAOs commit to (1) a principle of non-succession, and (2) a commitment to a single army. Only after those principles were agreed, and DDR occurred, would the Tatmadaw then negotiate self-determination and the issue of state constitutions. As described previously, this was a non-starter. The EAOs noted that such preconditions were far beyond the NCA’s mandates and provisions, starting from the beginning, namely, NCA Chapter (1), Article 1(a) which stated the intention to “Establish a union based on the principles of democracy and federalism in accordance with the outcomes of political dialogue and in the spirit of Panglong…” (NCA 2015, p. 1).

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Another flaw in the JMC was that Union-level JMC representation was not structured to account for the strength of EAOs. Territorial control, troop size, and the potential for armed clashes should have been taken into account. JMC authority was centralized, and some authority should have been devolved in part to the state level, in order to address ceasefire violations and other issues in real-time. Following the November 2018 JMC Central Executive Committee meeting, the RCSS noted that JMC “is not respecting the procedure” of the NCA. They and the KNU then suspended formal participation in the peace process. The RCSS explained the rationale and stated their position as follows: 1. The RCSS finds that the RCSS and Tatmadaw have a different understanding and definition of bilateral ceasefire agreements at both the state and union levels. In the past meetings, at all levels of the Joint Monitoring Committee (JMC), the Tatmadaw blamed all the faults on the RCSS more than coming together and solving problems. 2. JMC must reform its structure, responsibilities and ToR at all levels. Moreover, in order to proceed with the NCA, the role of mediations from the international community is needed at all levels of the JMC. 3. For the non-secession issue, it is not part of the NCA. Thus, the RCSS will merely abide by the NCA. 4. For the One Single Army issue, the RCSS will discuss it with the Tatmadaw at the informal meeting. (RCSS 2018) In addition, the RCSS and KNU noted a widening gap between the military and EAOs on the understanding of NCA provisions, creating contradictions in negotiation, and resulting in dialogues with no solutions, ending in deadlock (Wah 2018).1 The recommended JMC reform may not have been important for smaller EAOs, but it was critical for the larger ones which actually hold territory. However, any of such JMC reform proposals should be formulated by integrating a set of comprehensive considerations that tackle structural violence in promoting positive 1 Despite suspending involvement in the process, the, KNU initiated bilateral meetings with the government and military, including meetings between KNLA Brigade Brigadier Generals and Tatmadaw regional commanders, and KNU meetings with the Tatmadaw Commander in Chief, leading to an agreement to resume formal peace talks.

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peace; this needs an introduction (or restoration) of transitional justice as an essential practical element in the process of building lasting peace (Fig. 10.5).

Non-Tatmadaw Experiences in the JMC Interviews2 (JMC-U/S 2019) with EAO representatives including nonsignatory groups, JMC-U and JMC-S members, EAO signatory liaison officers, and members of ethnic civil society organizations, concluded the following: The existing JMC structure and practice had both positive and negative impacts. The JMC was seen as an important mechanism in NCA and the peace process as a whole. The JMC structure was initially promising in that something of its type had not existed before, namely an institution to decrease tensions/fighting and protect civilians, with strong financial and technical support from the international community. The JMC could serve as a space to report ceasefire violations and find resolution through coordination, while ensuring communication channels between the Tatmadaw, EAOs, and communities remained open. Community inclusion was especially highly regarded. Interviewees identified considerable weaknesses and challenges in the JMC, namely that, despite the inclusion of “joint” in the name, the Tatmadaw controlled the structure at the operational level, and always assumed the chairperson seats at Union and State levels. The Tatmadaw used the mechanism to weaken and blame EAOs instead of collaborating. Complaint collection was also a problem, as it was undertaken by the then-Tatmadaw controlled General Administration Department,3 village/ward, and township administrators in particular, as well as police, intelligence, and Tatmadaw ground troops/regional commands. Complaints directed at the Tatmadaw would not feasibly be made to their very representatives, and few made their way up the JMC

2 Interviews with RCSS liaison officers, and members of JMC-U and JMC-S conducted at the Taunggyi RCSS Liasion Office, Shan State in January 2019. Interviews with KNU JMC-U members, and DKBA JMC-U members at Yangon, February 2018. 3 The GAD was under the military-controlled Ministry of Home Affairs but was separated from them in 2018 to come under civilian control. However GAD was transferred back to Home Affairs in May 2021.

reduce

reduce

Structural violence (Poverty, hungry, inequality, discrimination, apartheid, social injustice)

Personal violence (Riots, sexual violence, terrorism, war)

promote

promote

Positive peace Absence of structural violence Presence of social justice

Negative Peace Absence of personal violence

Transitional justice (lacking)

Durable Peace

Fig. 10.5 JMC, reduction of violence and promotion of peace: Missing components towards a durable peace

Civilian cooperation (controlled)

Providing humanitarian aid Protection of risk groups (IDPs, women, children) Enabling conditions for sustainable development Holding public consultation meetings

Implementation and monitoring of NCA Verification Conflict resolution

(Internal commission)

International involvement (limited)

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chain. The lack of third-party involvement was seen as a major obstacle in solving problems at the implementation level. Interviewees noted that the Tatmadaw discarded the NCA and used the 2008 Constitution and the Tatmadaw Commander-in-Chief’s “Six principles for peace” (BNI 2020) as the basis of all discussions. Other divide-and-rule tactics included manipulating EAO representative composition in the JMC; constantly raising non-NCA related issues to put political pressure on EAOs, and intimidating EAO representatives by showing up armed at every meeting, particularly in Shan State. They often insulted and threatened EAO and civilian representatives. One Tatmadaw regional commander bluntly told EAO representatives that autonomy and federalism was impossible. The use of Burmese as the official JMC language put EAO representatives at a distinct disadvantage. State-level JMC boundaries were also split across different Tatmadaw and EAO territories, giving rise to jurisdictional issues. The myriad issues described by interviewees eliminated what little trust existed in the structure and led the RCSS and KNU to leave the process in general and the JMC in particular prior to the coup. All of these issues served to turn the JMC into an instrument other than was intended in the NCA.

The End of the Process Despite this, EAO representatives soldiered on. According to the Fourth meeting of the Union Peace Process (August 12–16, 2020), the following achievements between the Union and EAO signatories had so far been reached: 1. Commitment to NCA implementation provisions, 2. Adherence to the guiding principles for building the democratic federal union, and 3. Abidance to a framework for step-by-step and phase-by-phase NCA implementation. In other words: the parties would keep talking. The framework existed, in spite of the manipulation. This was no mean feat for the Union and EAO signatories.

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In early January 2020 the 8th Joint Implementation Coordination Meeting—the highest mechanism of the NCA (Ministry of Information 2020)—agreed to resume the formal peace process, including discussing implementation of NCA Chapter 3 on ceasefire related matters, Chapter 4 on maintaining and strengthening the ceasefire, and Chapter 6 on tasks to be implemented during the interim period. JMC meetings would resume within a few months. While this may have reflected the Union’s commitment to the NCA process, EAOs were reluctant to return to the JMC, suspecting a repetition of Tatmadaw practices. In order to address these concerns, and reform the JMC, the KNU proposed the following to the Union and Tatmadaw (Karen National Union 2020): 1. Convening military-to-military (Tatmadaw to EAO) meetings to identify issues and define terms in the NCA, including “Ceasefire Area,” “troop deployment,” and so on. 2. Revising the Terms of Reference for JMC and Technical Secretariat Center. 3. Nominating trusted local community members to the JMC for monitoring roles. These would be better alternatives to those nominated by parties to the conflict for the same function. 4. Establishing a local ceasefire monitoring system in order to observe adherence to outcomes of the military-to-military meeting process. These recommendations, if acted upon, would have created a more relevant JMC. They were not actioned and then the coup happened. The JMC may be on hold for now, in addition to the peace process, and indeed democracy, but that does not mean such a mechanism will not be necessary for the future. A future JMC design would wisely consider the KNU’s recommendations, and the experience of the JMC as a whole.

Looking into the Future A resilient FPNCC or future bloc could be the trigger for an entirely new process in place of the moribund NCA. Regardless, such a process would hopefully be governed by the recent experience of the NCA and JMC. At its best, among larger EAOs, the process served as breathing space. The NCA also served as breathing space for the Tatmadaw: such ceasefires in the past have allowed it to concentrate force elsewhere. In 1994 the

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Tatmadaw signed a ceasefire with the KIA, in order for the former to attempt to destroy the Mong Tai Army (MTA) and the KNU. The MTA ended at that time; the KNU was severely weakened. In recent years, the KNU had the ceasefire while force was concentrated on the KIA. For many EAOs, this surely appears cyclical. The breakdown of the 1994– 2011 KIA ceasefire due to that group’s refusal to convert itself into a BGF under Tatmadaw command was also the pre-planned end of a ceasefire whose utility, to the military, had ended. Military businesses, for their part, remain deeply involved in natural resource extraction in contested areas, which cast a shadow across the NCA process as well. Myanmar’s latest peace process was homegrown. During Thein Sein’s administration, the level of perceived trust between the Union/Tatmadaw and EAOs reached its peak. They shared a belief that ending armed conflict and achieving peace was an internal affair. When the NLD came to power, the relationship between the Union and Tatmadaw, as well as between Tatmadaw and EAOs, dramatically changed. The NLD had no influence over the Tatmadaw, formal or informal. EAOs noted that, unlike the previous USDP administration, the Union no longer spoke with one voice. And key elements of the NCA were not implemented, leading to community-level distrust in the process. The Tatmadaw never surrendered either administrative or economic control of the Union, nor did they plan to. The political reforms they adapted were not accompanied by structural/institutional reforms that would allow transfers of actual power from the military to the civilian government. Similarly, the JMC, NCA and the wider peace process had also been limited from the start. Control, codified in the constitution, was always the Tatmadaw’s. The only determinant for the continuity of this façade of reform was their mood. The Union’s civilians, through the leaders they democratically elected, acted as the stress test for those reforms. They pulled the curtain back, and on February 1, 2021, the frail edifice of reform came crashing down. A future peace process, supported by an NCA and JMC, will need to demonstrate its worth through substantive discussions on the shape of federalism and autonomy. These discussions should lead to actions, all of this prior to the pipe dream of disarmament as a prerequisite for discussions. The process needs to be rigid only insofar as it defines how all parties adhere to the terms of a signed agreement, and not peripheral

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subjects used to manipulate the process, or preconditions such as the “six principles of peace” inserted into the process unilaterally. The Tatmadaw in particular remains greatly suspicious of international or third-party involvement in the peace process. However, in the international experience of ceasefire monitoring, such involvement, with the transparency and impartiality it brings, can be an element of success—so long as a principle of building trust between the parties is adhered to by all sides. A future and reformed JMC will be successful based on the following principles: shared political will and determination to build a federal Myanmar; a balance in civil–military relations within the JMC; thirdparty/international participation and technical assistance; democratic practice; and a process that builds rather than erodes trust.

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CHAPTER 11

A Paradise Lost in the Indo-Pacific? Great Power Politics and International Relations of the Myanmar Tragedy Jittipat Poonkham

Situating in international relations theory (IRT), this chapter examines an international dimension, dilemma, and dynamic of the Myanmar tragedy at the outset of the coup d’état. On February 1, 2021, the armed forces known as Tatmadaw, led by Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, ousted the elected civilian government under the leadership of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, whose National League for Democracy (NLD) party won a landslide victory. Suu Kyi and her party leaders such as President Win Myint are being held in custody indefinitely and charged with dubious allegations. The coup has instigated a so-called “spring revolution” since many people-cum-protesters have launched the civil disobedience movement, which spreads throughout the country. The lethal crackdown shortly followed when the Tatmadaw open fire on unarmed demonstrators. On

J. Poonkham (B) Faculty of Political Science, Thammasat University, Bangkok, Thailand e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 C. Yamahata and B. Anderson (eds.), Demystifying Myanmar’s Transition and Political Crisis, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-6675-9_11

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March 27, when the military junta celebrated Armed Forces Day with the military parade in Naypyidaw, it killed more than 100 people across Myanmar, which was one of the bloodiest days of protest. The military regime principally failed the responsibility to protect its own citizens. The current crisis in Myanmar is tragic not only to the Burmese but also to international and regional society. The chapter addresses three key puzzles, as follows: How can we make sense of the outbreak of the coup in Myanmar? How and why has international society failed to do anything? And what are the impacts and repercussions of the Myanmar tragedy upon international and regional society? Given the ongoing situations in Myanmar, the chapter specifically focuses on the nascent origins of the current crisis. It proceeds in three sections. Following Kenneth Waltz’s three-image theory, the first part examines the causes of the Myanmar coup, by analyzing the perceptive images of individuals, domestic politics, and international system/society. The second part argues that international society has thus far failed to act and the military intervention for humanitarian purposes is unlikely to occur due to three key paradigms: the anarchical characteristic of international society, clash of international orders, and weaker norms of humanitarian intervention. These three paradigms explicate the normative divergence between liberal and neo-Westphalian states at both levels of great power politics and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states. International and regional society has been divided along the different international orders. At the international society, the liberal rule-based international order, led by the US, has used “smart” sanctions against the military leaders and their family. In contrast, the illiberal powers such as China and Russia, have defended the neo-Westphalian international order and refrained from criticism of the Myanmar situation, claiming that it was an internal affair of sovereign state. Both powers could (threaten to) use their veto powers at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to block the internationalization of the Myanmar crisis. Similarly, ASEAN Community has also divided between two groups, comprising active states (such as Indonesia and Singapore) and cautious states (such as Thailand). So-called “ASEAN Way” of consensus-building and non-interference principle also renders this regional grouping institutionally weak, incoherent, and even irrelevant in the Myanmar crisis. The chapter concludes with and calls for a tragic vision of international

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relations, which critically interrogates the triple tragedy of Myanmar, by zooming in to its detrimental effects upon international and regional society. It warns that without prudential ethics and restraints, the prospect of civil war and failed statehood is likely to happen in Myanmar.

A Coup from Within? Three Images and the Myanmar Coup The February coup began when the Tatmadaw seized power on February 1, 2021, following a general election which Aung San Suu Kyi’s NLD party won by a landslide last November. While the military-backed opposition claimed that the election was marred by voter fraud and demanded a rerun of the vote, the election commission announced that there was no evidence to support that unsubstantiated allegation. Declaring martial law in the country’s two biggest cities, namely Yangon and Mandalay, the military junta shut down all mobile-internet services and imposed restrictions, such as curfews and limits to gatherings. Since then, the civil disobedience movement has expanded across the society (The Economist, 17 April 2021). The protests have been the largest since the Saffron Revolution in 2007, when tens of thousands of monks took to the streets. In an effort to curb a civil resistance movement, the Tatmadaw has shot dead more than 737 unarmed civilians (as of early April 2021) (Aljazeera, 19 April 2021). Civil disobedience even occurred within bureaucracy, including the diplomatic corps. Myanmar’s U.N. Ambassador Kyaw Moe Tun, speaking for the country’s elected civilian government, had appealed to the United Nations “to use any means necessary to take action against the Myanmar military” to restore democracy to the country (Reuters, 26 February 2021). Burmese Ambassador to London, Kyaw Zwar Minn, also criticized the military coup and called for ousted leader Aung San Suu Kyi to be released. Both democratic ambassadors were abruptly removed from their posts (BBC News, 8 April 2021). Nevertheless, it does not entirely halt civil disobedience within bureaucracy and beyond. The military takeover can be explained through three different levels of analysis or “images” in international relations, ranging from the individuals to domestic politics and international system. In his Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis, Kenneth Waltz (1959 [2001]: xiii) prefers the term “images” since they illustrate that “one forms a picture in the mind” and “one views the world in certain way.” Waltz’s three images

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suggest where to find the answers regarding the major causes of war, rather than what really causes war. These three images, mentally or theoretically formed, can be applicable to the understanding of the Myanmar coup. In the first image, the origins of the Myanmar coup derive from the microfoundational and psychological agents, especially leaders. It believes that human nature, such as those of the military, cannot be easily changed. Therefore, from the first-image theorizing, individuals, coupled with their personalities, beliefs, temperament, and rhetoric, play quintessential roles in precipitating the crisis. Robert Jervis (1976: 28) argued, “it is often impossible to explain crucial decisions and policies without reference to the decision-makers’ beliefs.” In the case of Myanmar, two key political figures are outstanding: Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and Senior General Min Aung Hlaing. On the one hand, Aung San Suu Kyi, the State Counsellor and foreign minister, was the de facto leader of democratic Myanmar since March 2016. The coup was denounced as a double failure of Suu Kyi herself. First, despite her iconic and popular leadership, Suu Kyi has a highly stubborn personality. She did not usually listen to the advice of esteemed colleagues within and outside the NLD and made all decisions in Myanmar’s government. Cartalucci (2016) even called her a “democratic dictator,” who micro-managed all minute details. Second, Suu Kyi sought to appease and compromise with the military. Since the historic 2015 election, she tried to work with the Tatmadaw and even implicitly supported the military’s massacre of the Rohingya minority. In 2019, Suu Kyi appeared before the International Court of Justice in The Hague, where she denied allegations that the military had committed so-called “genocide.” Since then, her international reputation has suffered greatly as her international prizes, such as the 1991 Nobel Peace Prize, were revoked. After the coup, she is charged with the violation of the country’s official secret acts, possessing illegal walkie-talkies, and publishing information that may “cause fear or alarm.” On the other hand, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, the commanderin-chief of the arm forces, is a conservative leader and “an obstacle to improving human rights, democratic reform, peace, modernization, and ameliorating health and education in Myanmar” (Peng 2021: 141– 142). A former law student at Yangon University, Aung Hlaing entered the premier and elitist Defence Services Academy (DSA) on his third

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attempt in 1974. Although the army’s motivations behind the coupmaking remained unclear, Aung Hlaing, who was about to retire from the position of military commander-in-chief this year, may be anxious about his own future and wealth in a more vibrant and democratic country. According to Peng (2021: 142), Aung Hlaing was “a hardliner” who “defended the military’s continued role in national politics,” “refused to make compromises with the government on the constitutional amendment,” and was “the main barrier to NLD’s engagement with the West.” Most international actors focus on the drama surrounding Min Aung Hlaing’s attempt to cling to power. It recently revealed that shortly after the coup, the junta issued a directive abolishing age limits on commanderin-chief. This effectively allows Aung Hlaing to remain the country’s de facto military leader for life.1 His obsession with holding onto power was obvious even before the coup since he began to appoint relatively younger protégés to senior military posts, sidelining any prospective rivals and peers. Many of the military’s most powerful commanders are now men in their fifties or even forties to make sure that they are absolutely loyal to Aung Hlaing. His closest confidante is Lieutenant-General Moe Myint Tun, the current army chief of staff. He graduated from the 30th intake of the DSA, 11 years behind Min Aung Hlaing (DSA 19). Since the coup, Myint Tun is also appointed the new chair of the Myanmar Investment Commission. Aung Hlaing also appointed General Maung Maung Kyaw (DSA 26) as Air Force chief and General Moe Aung (DSA 28) Navy chief. Lieutenant-General Than Hlaing, the newly appointed police chief, is at least 10 years younger than Aung Hlaing (Myanmar Now, 22 May 2021). The generation-skipping promotions aimed at ensuring that Aung Hlaing retains his supreme power in the military politics. In this sense, the first image demonstrates how individuals are key forces and factors behind the military takeover in Myanmar. In the second image, the Myanmar crisis can be analyzed through domestic politics, including political regimes, power structure, intragovernmental/ intra-societal balance of power, and so forth. The coup was determined by internal developments at the national and ethnic 1 Under constitutional age limits, commander-in-chief would have to retire once he reaches the age of 65. Five years ago (June 2016), when Min Aun Hlaing turned 60 years old, he told reporters that “The duty of commander-in-chief is not unlimited. There is an age limit that cannot be extended” (Quoted in Myanmar Now, 22 May 2021).

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levels. The coup represents a crisis of fragile democracy in Myanmar in triple ways. First, the constitutional crisis. A failure to manage the “fragile balance” of civil–military relations (Nakanishi 2021) turned out to be a rife between the civilians and the military. It consisted of many disputes ranging from the 2008 Constitution, national reconciliation, ethnic conflicts, and the Rohingya refugee crisis. Initially, the NLD Party was reluctant and cautious in reviewing the Constitution until January 2019, when it proposed a formation of a joint committee on constitutional amendment in parliament. In March 2020, the Tatmadaw rejected all substantive changes in the constitutional amendments proposed by the NLD. As Yoshihiro Nakanishi (2021: 55) put it nicely, “while the NLD can dominate the game of politics, the Tatmadaw can control the rules of the game.” The constitutional amendments increasingly provoked rumors of military coup since the landslide victory of NLD in the parliamentary elections in November 2020. Second, the ethnic and religious internecine conflicts erupted in Rakhine State between the Burmese Buddhists and Rohingya Muslims since October 2016 until 2017, globally known as the Rohingya crisis. The Tatmadaw allegedly launched a campaign of brutal and bloody suppression of Rohingya Muslims. The civilian government led by Suu Kyi refrained from publicly criticizing the military, which led to Western criticism of human rights abuse in Myanmar (see Galache 2020; PrasseFreeman and Mausert 2021). Meanwhile, the Rohingya insurgent groups named Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army also launched the terrorist attacks in northern Rakhine State, which rendered the Myanmar tragedy complicated. In addition, there is a major dispute between both civilian and military factions over the indigenous groups along the borderland area. On the one hand, the Suu Kyi government renewed the national reconciliation and peace process with ethnic groups through the 21st Century Panglong Conferences after 2016 in order to rebuild trust between central government and different ethnic groups. However, the military, on the other hand, seasonally open fire and attacked the ethnic armed groups, especially the Shan State Army in the northern Myanmar (see Han 2019, Chapter 8). This exacerbated a long historical cycle of distrust/mistrust between the military and ethnic armed groups. After the coup, their delicate distrust unsurprisingly complicated the recent Myanmar conflict since a number of ethnic armed groups, such as the Karen National Union (KNU), which have fought for autonomy for

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decades, started to refuse the authority of the Tatmadaw and sided with the people. For example, General Yawd Serk, the head of the Restoration Council of Shan State, told a Sky News reporter, “If they continue to kill peaceful protesters, we will not stand by.” He added, “If the Burmese army is going to continue to use their weapons and kill peaceful protesters, the ethnic groups are not going to sit back and do nothing. There could be big fighting” (Strangio 2021). Recently, a coalition of three ethnic armed groups, or the so-called “Three Brotherhood Alliance”—including the Arakan Army (AA), the Ta’ang National Liberation Army, and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army—has pledged to support the protesters in what they call a “spring revolution” against the military (Strangio 2021). This raises the possibility that the country might soon slip into full-fledged civil war. Despite an unlikely alliance, this intra-state coalition has shared a common enemy, namely, the Tatmadaw. Third, the role of sangha, or the Buddhist monkhood, which was politically engaged in the anti-military movements in the past, was downplayed in the current Myanmar crisis. Unlike the famous Saffron Revolution of 2007—when a number of Burmese monks marched against the dictatorship and the subsequent use of violence against the monks “awakened the political sentiments of the public and greatly damaged the regime’s claims to moral legitimacy” (Fink 2009: 354)—the role of Burmese monks this time remains ambiguous. Fewer monks, particularly in Mandalay, joined civil resistance. This was partly because, first, the Tatmadaw has divided and ruled the monkhood, seeking to put down a rebellion within the sangha. Like other Burmese rulers, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, himself a superstitious man, has courted senior clerics, including Bhaddanta Kumara Bhivamsa, the head of the Sangha Maha Nayaka (Mahana), which was the supreme council of Burmese monkhood. Following the military parade on the Armed Forces Day on 27 March, Aung Hlaing made a merit at the pagoda in Naypyitaw, where Bhaddanta Kumara Bhivamsa also attended, and bestowed religious titles on some of Myanmar’s most prominent monks (The Economist, 3 April 2021). In addition, there were fewer monks in the cities joining the demonstration partly due to the fact that a number of monks had been dispatched to village monasteries to help manage the COVID19 pandemic crisis. Lastly, some extremist monks and monastic bodies strongly supported the military because they share its anti-Muslim,

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anti-Rohingya xenophobia and spread the propaganda that Buddhism is threatened by Islam. One of the leading xenophobic monks, Ashin Wirathu, infamously said: “You can be full of kindness and love, but you cannot sleep next to a mad dog. If we are weak, our land will become Muslim” (Quoted in Lehr 2019: 158). During the military crackdown of the civil resistance movement, another religious fundamentalist monk, Wisetkhana, even asserted that the violence was initiated by the demonstrators and not the army: “Military officials and soldiers were taught to be patriots and to be ready to defend the country’s race and religions” (The Economist, 3 April 2021). Looking through the second image perspective, Myanmar’s democratic transition was delicately fragile and daunting as the constitutional crisis, ethnic conflict, and intra-Buddhist rivalry set the scene for the coup. In the third image, the international system as a structure of opportunity and constraints shaped and shoved how the Myanmar crisis occurred in the first place. It can be argued that the Myanmar crisis has a great power politics dimension, especially the geopolitical rivalry and competition between the US and China in the Indo-Pacific region. That said, the Myanmar tragedy is happening within the nascent bipolar international system, where the US and China have been competing for the regional, if not global, supremacy (Xuetong 2019; Tunsjø 2018). The emerging bipolar international system becomes a permissive structure of low opportunity (such as Sino–US geopolitical competition and Donald Trump’s negligence of Myanmar) and high constraints (such as the rising tensions in the South China Sea and the Rohingya refugee crisis). Thus, Myanmar faced with the difficulty in maintaining balance or hedging between China and the US. The Rohingya tragedy increasingly deteriorated Myanmar’s relations with the West. Cutting financial aids and assistance, the Trump administration revivified sanctions on Myanmar’s officials and suspended military cooperation (Peng 2021: 137). In turn, US criticism pushed Myanmar to rely more on China and Russia. Despite an ongoing Sinophobia and dissatisfaction with Chinese investment in Burmese society (Nyi Kyaw 2020; Chen 2019), Myanmar increasingly depends on Chinese support for diplomatic protection and economic development under the tutelage of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) (Htet Aung 2020). During the Suu Kyi government, a number of BRI projects—which were previously suspended under Thein Sein’s rule—were revived and accelerated. With the exception of the Myitsone

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hydropower dam, the newly mega-infrastructure projects included ChinaMyanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), New Yangon City development, oil pipeline, the Kyaukphyu Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in Rakhine State, and the Letpadaung mining project. A key turning point was when Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Myanmar in January 2020, the first by a top Chinese leader in nearly two decades. Elevating their relationship to a status of “Sino-Myanmar Community of Common Destiny,” Myanmar signed 33 agreements with China. Xi also described the Kyaukphyu Deep-Sea Port and SEZ, Myanmar–China border economic zones, and New Yangon City development as the three key pillars of the CMEC. The Kunming-Kyaukphyu high-speed railway, which linked the southern China with the Indian Ocean, was being negotiated (Chan 2021; San 2021). Equally important is Russia, which has step up and strengthened a military-to-military cooperation with Myanmar in recent years. It has increased arms sales and military equipment while training the Burmese army. According to Stockholm International Peace Research Institute in 2019, Myanmar was a big importer of Russian arms, totaled $807 million for the decade (The Moscow Times, 26 March 2021). In January 2021, Russia agreed to supply Myanmar with Pantsir-S1 surface-to-air missile systems, Orlan-10E surveillance drones, and radar equipment. A week before the coup, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu visited Naypyidaw and met with Min Aung Hlaing. Concluding a deal on the supply of surface-to-air missile systems, surveillance drones, and radar equipment, Shoigu signed a flight safety agreement with Aung Hlaing, who has reportedly visited Russia six times in the past decade (The Moscow Times, 17 February 2021). In other words, rather than pursuing a neutral strategy (Thuzar and Chachavalpongpun 2021), Myanmar under Suu Kyi was bandwagoning with China and Russia. The bipolar world order has rendered the balancing act between US and China difficult to sustain. With the outbreak of COVID-19 pandemic, Myanmar increased its dependence on China’s economy and vaccine diplomacy, and risked the prospect of debt-trap diplomacy (San 2021). China’s growing influence is a societal concern in Myanmar, exacerbating the anti-Chinese sentiment. Some even claim that the 2021 army’s coup in Myanmar was orchestrated by the Chinese government. Protesters themselves accused Beijing of supporting the military coup. They protested in front of Chinese Embassy in Rangon. Nevertheless,

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the Chinese government has denied those allegations. On the first day of the coup, Beijing refused to characterize the state of emergency declared by the military as a coup, but instead described it as a “cabinet reshuffle.” Although China urged all parties in Myanmar to “properly handle their differences under the constitutional and legal framework and maintain political and social stability,” it disregarded that was “unconstitutional” (Chan 2021). Similar to China, Moscow called the coup “purely a domestic affair of the sovereign state.” Both powers blocked the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to pass a joint statement condemning the Myanmar coup. A few days after the coup, Myanmar became the twenty-first country to approve Russia’s Sputnik-V vaccine (The Moscow Times, 17 February 2021). To sum up, although the third image for Waltz (1959, 1979) provides the most insightful explanation, all three images are equally significant in analyzing a complex international phenomenon. “No single image,” said Waltz (1959: 225), “is ever adequate”: “the third image describes the framework of world politics, but without the first and second images there can be no knowledge of forces that determine policy; the first and second images describe the forces in the world, but without the third image it is impossible to assess their importance or predict their results” (Waltz 1959: 238). From the three-image theory, the Myanmar coup in February 2021 can be envisioned as the complex, multilayered and multidimensional situation.

International Society and the Myanmar Crisis: The Three Paradigms On March 27, when the military junta had celebrated its Armed Forces Day with military parade in Naypyitaw, its security forces killed more than 100 people across the country. It turned out to be one of the bloodiest days of protests since the coup. It is reported that only eight countries— including China, Russia, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand—sent their representatives, most of which were military attaché, to attend the military parade. Only Moscow sent the high-ranking official, which was deputy defense minister, Alexander Fomin. Behind the headlines, there are lingering puzzles: Why are sufficient international and regional pressures lacking? To what extent and how far would international society respond to the Myanmar crisis, especially the military crackdown of the people? Would it employ necessary means,

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including the use of forces, to end the atrocity? And what is to be done? These international puzzles are not going to be easily solved in the near future. A lack of effective action from international society is often explained as either because of its institutional failure of both global and regional security communities, especially ASEAN or due to the fact that China and Russia are not willing to exert any significant pressures on the military junta. Although both factors are important in themselves, the Myanmar incident represents something much bigger. It is a more nuanced and complex picture of international politics, which comprises both enduring and changing characters of international society in the twenty-first century. The latter provides a better understanding of the non-intervention practices at the international and regional levels. I argue that the internationalization of Myanmar crisis and its concomitant prospect of externally humanitarian intervention are unlikely to happen largely due to the structural and ideational underpinnings of international society, including the anarchical, clash-of-international-orders, and weak-norm paradigms. First, the anarchical nature of international society is both enduring and transforming in the twenty-first century. On the one hand, the “anarchical society” (Bull 1977) endures as it connotes an absence of central authority at the global stage, which has persistently hindered the legitimate and effective monopolization of the use of violence internationally. The equilibrium of power is highly unbalanced since the US is relatively declining whereas China is exponentially rising and militarily assertive. It seems that international society is approaching a bipolar world, though China remains a second distant. On the other hand, the anarchical society is increasingly disrupted by new challenges, including climate (apocalyptic) politics, pandemic crisis, and above all the fourth industrial revolution of disruptive technology, such as artificial intelligence, robots, digital technology, and so on. Norms, rules, and principles on these key challenges are not yet fully established and remain essentially contested. An increasingly disruptive international anarchy risks impeding international cooperation and increases the intense international competition between great powers. Order among states, let alone international justice, become uncertain, unsettled, and unpredictable. Second, the clash-of-international-orders paradigm. The twenty-firstcentury international society is ruled by two competing international

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orders and value systems: liberalism and neo-Westphalianism. The former is deeply associated with the liberal principles of democracy, human rights, freedom of navigation, free trade, and market-led capitalism whereas the latter is promoting and protecting the norms of sovereignty, territorial integrity, non-interference in internal affairs, and state-led capitalist system. It is a clash of international orders that renders the current international society difficult to be properly ordered. This interregnum affects a double divergence of values at both international and regional levels. International society is deeply divided in the Myanmar crisis along the clash-of-international-orders paradigm. On the one hand, in the neoWestphalian international order, the bête noire of international relations, the concept of sovereignty, remains intact and even stronger now than before (i.e., the post-Cold War world order). Sovereignty has been spoken and used by Myanmar’s junta and its supporters. This principle is increasingly endorsed by those illiberal powers such as Russia and China. They have supported Myanmar’s sovereignty and protected the military seizure of power as an internal affair, with which any outside powers have no legal rights to interfere. China and Russia have refrained from criticism of the military junta and even supported it at the United Nations level. Since Russia and China are permanent members of the UN Security Council (UNSC) holding veto powers, they can block any potential UN actions and resolutions regarding the Myanmar crisis. The specter of regime change at the UNSC is a shared bond among illiberal powers such as China and Russia. Previously, China and Russia jointly vetoed a drafted UNSC resolution on Myanmar in January 2007 (Fung 2019: 137). Until recently, China blocked a UN Security Council statement condemning the coup, though it has backed calls for the release of Suu Kyi and a return to democracy. Likewise, Russia has been proactive and prominent in the Myanmar crisis. It strongly supports the Tatmadaw. Russia was the only country that sent its own deputy defense minister, Alexander Fomin, to attend the Armed Forces Day military parade in Naypyitaw. As Fomin was receiving a medal from Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, the latter said, “Russia is a true friend.” While there is a long history of Sino–Burmese partnership, defense ties between Russia and Myanmar have recently grown. Promising to increase military cooperation with Myanmar, Moscow provided training to thousands of Burmese soldiers as well as selling arms to the military (Chongkittavorn 2021a).

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On the contrary, the Western powers in the liberal international order have condemned Myanmar’s military takeover and subsequent lethal crackdown of its own people. The US, UK, and EU officials condemned the violence. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken accused the security forces of a “reign of terror.” In addition, the US and UK have imposed “smart” sanctions, directly targeting Myanmar’s military leaders and their family. They also added two main military-controlled corporations, namely, Myanmar Economic Corporations (MEC) and Myanmar Economic Holdings Limited (MEHL) to a blacklist. For the US, the sanctions “are not directed at the people of Burma.” As Blinken announced: “These actions will specifically target those who led the coup, the economic interests of the military, and the funding streams supporting the Burmese military’s brutal repression” (BBC News, 9 April 2021). However, given their relatively weaker and divided positions, the Western powers so far stop short of military intervention. This is because the clash of international orders made the prospect of any forms of intervention quite difficult since there would be a lack of consensus at the United Nations Security Council. In addition, the clash-of-international-orders paradigm can also explicate the divergence of interests and values within regional society, culminated in the division among the member states of ASEAN Community. It is fair to say that, rhetorically, ASEAN members have been pursuing diplomatic efforts to end the crisis in Myanmar. ASEAN as a regional grouping has issued a statement, calling for a peaceful resolution to the crisis and a return to democracy (Chongkittavorn 2021b). Nevertheless, so far, ASEAN is deeply divided and lacks consensus and institutional cohesion on the Myanmar crisis. According to Thitinan Pongsudhirak (2021), “ASEAN is not only ineffectual as a regional organization but is preventing a more effective international response.” There are at least two routes within ASEAN regarding the Myanmar crisis: (a) active route and (b) cautious route. In the former, countries such as Indonesia and Singapore have pursued a more proactive stance on the Myanmar crisis by urging Myanmar’s military junta to immediately end atrocity and return to democracy. In the latter, ASEAN countries such as Thailand, have taken a cautious way of engaging with the military regime and avoiding external interference in Myanmar’s domestic affairs. In general, numerous ASEAN countries prefer so-called “quiet diplomacy” behind the scenes, which for them could accomplish more. Some scholars, such as Kishore Mahbubani, agree with this approach: “It’s the

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southeast Asian way of avoiding confrontation. And frankly, you have to acknowledge that has kept Southeast Asia at peace for 30, 40 years now, finding diplomatic solutions, talking to each other and changing people’s minds” (Quoted in BBC News, 9 April 2021). In this way, ASEAN Community seems to follow its own “ASEAN Way,” which strongly protects sovereign rights and endorses the noninterference norm. Some scholars believe that ASEAN Way is a solution to Myanmar crisis. As one senior veteran journalist puts it, ASEAN accepts the reality that “conflicting parties within Myanmar” cannot “sit down and negotiate,” but informal meetings could “bring together official and non-official representatives of the main stakeholders, from both inside and outside the country,” including the Tatmadaw, NLD, ethnic groups, civil society, and private sector. “The United Nations, ASEAN and key international dialogue partners could be brought in to provide support and mediate” (Chongkittavorn 2021b). That said, a large majority of ASEAN members do not wish to divert from this ASEAN Way and take any necessary steps in the Myanmar situation. In addition, Myanmar’s biggest trade partners in Asia, including ASEAN, have flatly rejected sanctions. Nor is military or humanitarian intervention tabled as a viable option. The third paradigm hindering the internationalization of the Myanmar crisis is a weakened norm of humanitarian intervention. The idea of an international role in promoting a responsibility to protect (R2P) human beings from mass atrocity crimes is essentially contested and challenged around the year 2011 due to two critical junctures. First, the UNauthorized humanitarian intervention in Libya starting in March 2011 instigated the toppling and killing of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi in October, which was criticized by China and Russia as a practice of regime change, rather than the protection of ordinary civilians. This prompted the dividing lines between states and delegitimized intervention as back door “regime change.” The second critical juncture is that the rising powers, especially BRICS—Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa—have adopted a much more non-interventionist stance, at least rhetorically. After Libya, the BRICS states deeply concerned about the permissiveness of regime change, which could set precedent for such actions against themselves. Chinese government, for example, stressed that “China opposes any externally imposed solution aimed at forcing a foreign-imposed regime change” (Quoted in Fung 2019: 1). The rising powers proposed a

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cautious and restrictive approach to humanitarian intervention (such as Brazil’s idea of “responsibility while protecting”) that still allowed for the occasional instance of humanitarian intervention on the case-by-case basis but strictly limited the prospect of regime change (Pattison 2018: 8–9). Undoubtedly, this rendered it harder for international society to intervene militarily. The non-interventionism in Syria in 2013 was an obvious case illustrating a weakened norm paradigm in international relations. With the veto powers of China and Russia, the UN Security Council would not be able to reach consensus and take serious actions, including any military intervention for the humanitarian purposes in the years to come. In so doing, this would cripple the R2P norm in the long run. Furthermore, despite a vague threshold of humanitarian intervention or responsibility to protect principle, the number of death tolls in the recent Myanmar crisis remains relatively lower than other cases of humanitarian (non)intervention in the past. For example, an estimated 800,000 to one million people died during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda but there was no external humanitarian intervention. In Myanmar, according to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP), a local monitoring group (as of 18 April 2021), 737 civilians have been killed (Aljazeera, 19 April 2021). This number is even lower than the Rohingya crisis (2016– 2017) where at least 6700 Rohingya, including at least 730 children under the age of five, were killed in the month after the violence broke out, according to medical charity Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) (BBC News, 23 January 2020). Therefore, the prospect of military/ humanitarian intervention is constrained by a declining norm of humanitarian intervention at the global level and the relatively low number of casualties in Myanmar. All in all, Burmese military junta is playing with fire, taking advantages of the loopholes within international society. The anarchical, clashof-international-orders and weak-norm paradigms could explicate why Myanmar is not a unique case of international non-intervention. Rather, it is, unfortunately and sadly, a rule rather than an exception in international society today.

A Tragic Coda: Myanmar as Asia’s Next Failed State? Whereas a final verdict is not possible at the time of writing, a clash of international orders together with twin normative divergences become

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a key obstacle to the internationalization of the Myanmar crisis. The prospect of externally-oriented humanitarian intervention is limited. However, the current Myanmar crisis is not purely internal affair of Myanmar. Rather, it directly affects international society as well as regional security, economy, and people-to-people connectivity, including the plausibility of refugee influx. We can conclude the chapter by critically reflecting that the current Myanmar saga, which is a specter still haunting us like déjà vu, comprises a triple tragedy. First, it is an international tragedy. A global dilemma is often interrogated as the crisis of leadership or legitimacy at the international stage. Rather, what really happens in the contemporary global politics is the crisis or clash of international orders. To emphasize, it is a clash between liberal, rule-based international order led by the US and neo-Westphalian international order spearheaded by China and Russia. The former endorses liberal principles, such as democracy, free trade, human rights, humanitarianism, and so on. The latter defends the Westphalian principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and non-interference in internal affairs. There is no consensus in the contemporary international order, which renders the maintenance of peace and rights quite difficult. Myanmar is situating in this changing configuration of international orders and the nascent bipolar system with Sino–US geopolitical competition. Under these international environments, humanitarian intervention is not possible whereas sanctions, whether smart or not, would not work because sanctions are not universally applied by all members of international society. They are exclusively selective. Sanctions would hurt Myanmar’s people more than help. If sanctions are aimed at hurting the military without shutting down the economy, the question then remains whether or not foreign businesses, such as Western oil and gas companies, can still operate in Myanmar. Basically, economic pressures and sanctions alone are unlikely to force the military junta to retreat. Democracy promotion from abroad is normally viewed as an important path to build peace. The recent empirical research contests that conventional wisdom and warns that violent conflicts, including ethnic violence, civil war, and genocide, often happen in countries where they are strictly following the interveners’ package deal and undergoing transition from dictatorship to democracy, by holding rapid elections for the first time without taking the necessary conditions (such as power relations, sociocultural cleavages, institutional building, elite mobilization, localized fighting, and so on) into serious consideration. In The Frontlines of Peace,

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Severine Austesserre (2021: 102) holds that “the larger the magnitude of the regime change, the more aggressive states in transition are likely to become … Contrary to the conventional wisdom, [externally oriented] democratization is not an antidote to violence, but rather the opposite: It doubles the risk of civil war resumption.” In other words, election fetishism and trickle-down peace alone could be a destabilizing force. As Austesserre (2021: 149) put it, “only a combination of macro-level and micro-level initiatives can build a sustainable peace. Supporting bottomup work should not take place at the expense of top-down efforts; instead we need both types of approaches, precisely because they complement each other.” Second, the Myanmar incident is also a regional tragedy. ASEAN’s diplomatic approach is neither sufficient nor sustainable. This regional security community is deeply divided along the clash-of-internationalorders paradigm. With the “ASEAN Way” of consensus building and non-interference, there is no exit plan for the Myanmar crisis. Furthermore, the broader Indo-Pacific frameworks are not likely to help since the Indo-Pacific entrepreneurs, especially the Quad states—including the US, Japan, India, and Australia—have a tendency to deepen the contest of values within the international society and sharpen the great power competition. In turn, the US-led Indo-Pacific strategy would and could divide the small countries in the region into different and diverging groups, if not opposing blocs. Last but not least, the Myanmar crisis is of course tragic in and of itself. It is not only about the question of democratization or stability but also the problem of life and death. Violence cannot solve any conflict. It instead renders human lives vulnerable. However, we cannot deny the blunt fact that the Tatmadaw was and will remain a key (f)actor in shaping the upcoming trajectory of Myanmar’s political transition. In other words, rebuilding democracy without the military involvement would be impossible while restoring democracy without popular participation and representation would be meaningless. With the backdrop of triple tragedy, the chapter calls for a tragic vision of international relations, which offers (a) a prudential position and praxis that calls for the restraints and ethical calculation of cost and benefits (see Ned Lebow 2003; Williams 2005). Given the fact that stability cannot be restored without the consent of the people, the military needs to pursue a more restrained and ethical action toward its own people. A tragic vision also necessitates (b) to strike a permanently secure and

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sustained balance of the military–civilian relations, which means a civilian control of the military, the restoration of inclusive society, and the trustbuilding between Burmese and indigenous groups. In foreign affairs, a tragic view recommends that Myanmar should (c) maintain the balancing act of great power politics, especially US–China relations, and reestablish the Burmese tradition of neutralism in the age of bipolar world. With its critical strategic location in the Indian Ocean, sandwiched between China and other major powers, a relatively small state like Myanmar should pursue such a policy (see Steinberg 2018). When Aung San Suu Kyi was released from house arrest on November 13, 2010, she said to the cheering crowd outside her house that “People must work in unison. Only then can we achieve our goal” (Quoted in Myint-U 2020: 129). Without this prudential and peopleoriented approach, Myanmar would become Asia’s next failed state and the prospect of civil war would be highly likely. That situation would cost regional peace and prosperity as well as have negative effects on international society in general. In conclusion, a tragic vision in international relations could be a reasonably effective conceptual tool to make sense of the Myanmar crisis, by zooming in with a critical lens and zooming out with a realistic and praxeological perspective. A Burmese imbroglio is still ongoing in the global and Indo-Pacific labyrinths, where no players can find a proper way forward. The light at the end of the tunnel remains blurred but, as Bull (1977: 320) put it, “it is better to recognize that we are in darkness than to pretend that we can see the light.” With this tragic vision, the audacity of hope is still possible.

References Aljazeera. 2021. Outcry in Myanmar as Military Airs Images of ‘Tortured’ Detainees. 19 April, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/4/19/outcryin-myanmar-as-military-airs-images-of-tortured-detainees. Austesserre, Severine. 2021. The Frontlines of Peace: An Insider’s Guide to Changing the World. Oxford: Oxford University Press. BBC News. 2020. Myanmar Rohingya: What You Need to Know About the Crisis. 23 January, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-41566561. BBC News. 2021. Myanmar’s Ex-UK Envoy Says Military Attaché Has ‘Occupied’ Embassy. 8 April, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-56670524. BBC News. 2021. Myanmar Coup: Could Sanctions on the Military Ever Work? 9 April, https://www.bbc.com/news/business-56248559.

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Bull, Hedley. 1977. The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics. London: Macmillan. Cartalucci. Tony. 2016. Myanmar’s New ‘Democratic Dictator’: Aung San Suu Kyi. Global Research. 21 November, https://www.globalresearch.ca/mya nmars-new-democratic-dictator-aung-san-suu-kyi-2/5558108. Chan, Debby S.W. 2021. Beijing’s Position on the Myanmar Coup. E-IR. 6 March. https://www.e-ir.info/2021/03/06/opinion-beijings-position-onthe-myanmar-coup/. Chen, Ian Tsung-yen. 2019. China’s Economic Offensive and Its Discontent in Southeast Asia: Diminishing Footprints in Myanmar. In China’s Footprints in Southeast Asia, eds. Maria Serena I. Diokna, Hsin-Huang Michael Hsiao, and Alan H. Yang, 63–89. Singapore: NUS Press. Chongkittavorn, Kavi. 2021a. Russia’s Gamble in Post-Coup Myanmar. The Bangkok Post. 30 March. Chongkittavorn, Kavi. 2021b. Myanmar Crisis: ASEAN’s Next Moves. The Bangkok Post. 6 April. The Economist. 2021. The Military Coup Has Riven the Monkhood. 3 April, 22. The Economist. 2021. Burmese Blaze. 17 April, 21. Fink, Christina. 2009. The Moment of the Monks: Burma, 2007. In Civil Resistance and Power Politics, eds. Adam Roberts and Timothy Garton Ash, 354–370. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Fung, Courtney J. 2019. China and Intervention at the UN Security Council. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Galache, Carlos Sardina. 2020. The Burmese Labyrinth: A History of the Rohinya Tragedy. London: Verso. Han, Enze. 2019. Asymmetrical Neighbors: Borderland, Statebuilding between China and Southeast Asia. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Htet Aung, Kyaw. 2020. The Political Economy of China-Myanmar Bilateral Relations under the Framework of Belt and Road Initiative. Journal of Governance and Public Policy, 7 (June): 88–103. Jervis, Robert. 1976. Perception and Misperception in International Politics. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Lehr, Peter. 2019. Militant Buddhism: The Rise of Religious Violence in Sri Lanka, Myanmar and Thailand. London: Palgrave Macmillan. The Moscow Times. 2021. Russia Backs Myanmar Military after China Raises Concerns. 17 February, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2021/02/17/ russia-backs-myanmar-military-after-china-raises-concerns-a72983. The Moscow Times. 2021. Russia to Deepen Ties with Myanmar Military Junta, Top Defense Official Says in First Visit after Coup. 26 March, https://www. themoscowtimes.com/2021/03/26/russia-to-deepen-ties-with-myanmar-mil itary-junta-top-defense-official-says-in-first-visit-after-coup-a73387.

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Myanmar Now. 2021. Min Aung Hlaing Makes Himself Military Supremo for Life. 22 May, https://www.myanmar-now.org/en/news/min-aung-hla ing-makes-himself-military-supremo-for-life. Myint-U, Thant. 2020. The Hidden History of Burma: Race, Capitalism, and the Crisis of Democracy in the 21st Century. New York: W. W. Norton. Nakanishi, Yoshihiro. 2021. Fragile Balance of Civil-Military Relations in Myanmar. In Unraveling Myanmar’s Transition: Progress, Retrenchment, and Ambiguity Amidst Liberalization, eds. Pavin Chachavalpongpun, Elliott Prasse-Freeman, and Patrick Strefford, 39–62. Singapore: NUS Press. Ned Lebow, Richard. 2003. The Tragic Vision of Politics: Ethics, Interests and Orders. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Nyi Kyaw, Nyi. 2020. Sinophobia in Myanmar and the Belt and Road Initiative. Perspective, 9 (13 February). Pattison, James. 2018. The Alternatives to War: From Sanctions to Nonviolence. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Peng, Nian. 2021. International Pressures, Strategic Preference, and Myanmar’s China Policy Since 1988. Singapore: Springer. Prasse-Freeman, Elliott, and Kirt Mausert. 2021. Two Sides of the Same Arakanese Coin. In Unraveling Myanmar’s Transition: Progress, Retrenchment, and Ambiguity Amidst Liberalization, eds. Pavin Chachavalpongpun, Elliott Prasse-Freeman, and Patrick Strefford, 261–289. Singapore: NUS Press. Reuters. 2021. Myanmar’s U.N. Ambassador Appeals for Action to Stop Coup. 26 February, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/myanmarsun-ambassador-appeals-action-stop-coup-2021-02-26/. San, Myant. 2021. Myanmar’s Response to COVID-19 and Its Impacts on China-Myanmar Relations. In The Reshaping of China-Southeast Asia Relations in Light of the COVID-19 Pandemic, ed. Nian Peng, 95–110. Singapore: Springer. Steinberg, David I. 2018. The World. In Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Myanmar, eds. Adam Simpson, Nicholas Farrelly, and Ian Holliday, 291–299. London and New York: Routledge. Strangio, Sebastian. 2021. Alliance of Ethnic Armed Groups Pledge Support for Myanmar’s ‘Spring Revolution’. The Diplomat. 30 March, https://thedip lomat.com/2021/03/alliance-of-ethnic-armed-groups-pledge-support-formyanmars-spring-revolution/. Thitinan Pongsudhirak. 2021. ASEAN’s Myanmar Crisis Out of Control. The Bangkok Post. 26 March. Thuzar, Moe and Pavin Chachavalpongpun. 2021. Myanmar’s Post 2015 Foreign Policy: Prisms of Interpretation. In Unraveling Myanmar’s Transition: Progress, Retrenchment, and Ambiguity Amidst Liberalization, eds. Pavin Chachavalpongpun, Elliott Prasse-Freeman, and Patrick Strefford, 63–83. Singapore: NUS Press.

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Tunsjø, Øystein. 2018. The Return of Bipolarity in World Politics: China, the United States, and Geostructural Realism. New York: Columbia University Press. Waltz, Kenneth N. 1959 [2001]. Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis. New York: Columbia University Press. Waltz, Kenneth N. 1979. Theory of International Politics. MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company. Williams, Michael C. 2005. The Realist Tradition and the Limits of International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Xuetong, Yan. 2019. The Age of Uneasy Peace: Chinese Power in Divided World. Foreign Affairs, 98 (1), 40–49.

CHAPTER 12

Difficult Development Trade-Offs Amidst ‘Transition’: Exploring Power and Politics in Post-2010 Myanmar Patrick Meehan

Introduction Definitions of development and the purpose of development studies as an academic discipline have been the subject of rigorous and ongoing debates. As a relatively new field of study that rose to prominence in the decades after the Second World War, development studies is often defined by its inherently cross-disciplinary nature—drawing upon ‘older’ disciplines such as history, anthropology, economics and geography—and its perceived qualities as a ‘policy science’ able to generate applied knowledge for practical benefit (Bernstein 2005, p. 111). Indeed, many characterise the distinctiveness of development studies by its engagement with policy and practice: its value lies in its ability to shape policies and interventions aimed at economic growth and poverty reduction. For others, however,

P. Meehan (B) SOAS, University of London, London, UK e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 C. Yamahata and B. Anderson (eds.), Demystifying Myanmar’s Transition and Political Crisis, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-6675-9_12

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this rather instrumental approach underplays the real value of development studies, which lies in its engagement with long-term historical processes of social change and its focus on the ‘big’ questions that shape societies—such as the nature of the state and state-society relations, the rise of capitalism, processes of agrarian transformation and industrialisation, integration into global economies‚ and how people have tried to make sense of these transformations. From this perspective, development studies draw upon a rich intellectual heritage within the social sciences and are animated by the same kinds of questions that underpinned the pioneering works of social science by the likes of Adam Smith, Karl Marx and Max Weber. The study of Development thus covers a vast ‘spectrum’ of analysis that ranges from ‘intellectual analysis’ of societal transformation through to a more practical focus on ‘doing development’ (Kothari 2005). For those who see development studies primarily as a ‘policy science’ defined by its engagement with policy and practice, development is essentially the realm of planned and intentional interventions, aimed primarily at promoting economic growth and alleviating poverty. However, for those who emphasise a more expansive intellectual approach, development is defined far more as an ‘immanent’ process of societal transformation that is shaped less by purposeful attempts to enact change, and more by complex social processes—and the conflicts, negotiations and power relations between diverse and competing interests that surround these processes—within which planned interventions play only a small part. Bridging the ‘theory/practice divide’ continues to pose a profound challenge for development studies (Kothari 2005). In many countries— notably the UK—a significant amount of funding has been invested in development studies research and there have been efforts to integrate this scholarship into policy and practice. However, fundamental tensions continue to exist between development studies scholarship that draws attention to the messy reality of processes of development and change—typically underpinned by difficult trade-offs and ‘losers’ as well as ‘winners’—and normative frameworks that seek to promote development as a realm of ‘win–win’ solutions in which interventions—if implemented correctly—can bring benefits to all. For those working in the development sector, the intellectual analysis of development processes can often appear remote and disconnected from the more immediate priorities of efforts to address poverty, inequality, vulnerability and violence. In turn, contemporary development discourses—with their promises of win–win

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solutions through pro-poor and inclusive growth—often appear as naïve, ahistorical or disingenuous, and obstructive to the difficult questions and trade-offs that policymakers and practitioners need to grapple with. The purpose of this chapter is to reflect on these debates surrounding development theory and practice and how they relate to development discourses and interventions in Myanmar in the decade that followed the country’s 2010 General Election up until the February 1st 2021 military coup that brought an end to the country’s democratic transition and reinstated authoritarian military rule. After decades of military rule, Myanmar’s 2010 General Election was seen as a watershed moment in the country’s history. The country’s previous election—in 1990—had been annulled after the main opposition party, the National League for Democracy (NLD) led by Aung San Suu Kyi won a landslide victory. After decades of self-imposed isolation under General Ne Win’s military government (1962–1988), the continuation of an oppressive authoritarian military regime and the repression of political opposition after the 1990 election led many countries to impose sanctions on Myanmar and to limit their engagement with the country. The global aid architecture, which grew considerably in the 1990s and 2000s, thus had a rather limited reach within Myanmar. However, the emergence after 2010 of a series of democratic political reforms, the decision by the country’s new quasi-civilian government to launch a formal peace process in 2011, and Aung San Suu Kyi’s 2015 election victory‚ inspired a rush to engage in Myanmar. A combination of four factors soon led Myanmar to become a new frontier for development interventions. First, multilateral agencies, bilateral donors and NGOs wanted to be a part of the ‘feel-good’ morality tale of a democratic transition in one of the world’s most oppressive states and the rise to power of the iconic Aung San Suu Kyi. Sanctions were lifted, debts were cancelled or rescheduled and inflows of aid soon followed. Second, there seemed to be huge potential to support economic growth and poverty alleviation in a country where more than a quarter of the population lives below the poverty line after decades of military rule, armed conflict‚ and economic mismanagement. Third, since 1990—the period in which Myanmar has been largely isolated from international (or at least western) aid—the development sector had expanded significantly in terms of both the number of donors and NGOs and the issues upon which development agencies have sought to engage. This meant that as Myanmar opened to development aid flows, many donors and

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development agencies looked to roll out programmes that were already well-established in other parts of the world. For example, Myanmar soon became the next destination for many conflict advisors who had worked in other parts of the world and peacebuilding programmes that drew upon conflict resolution models used in other conflict-settings. Fourth, the country’s highly geo-strategic position as a resource-rich country bridging India, China and Southeast Asia ensured that many countries sought to extend their interests and influence within Myanmar, with development aid and programmes providing one such avenue. All of these factors led to a vast expansion in development aid and programmes in Myanmar. In 2011 Myanmar received US$357 million in development aid (Asia Foundation 2018, p. 6). By 2015 this had risen to US$3.4 billion (ibid.). In 2013, Myanmar became the world’s third largest recipient of aid, a meteoric rise from its 79th position in 2010. Aid per capita rose more than tenfold between 2010 and 2015. Development interventions in Myanmar after 2010 were largely framed around supporting what the World Bank dubbed the country’s ‘triple transition’: transition from authoritarian military rule to democratic governance, from a centrally directed economy to a market-oriented economy, and from 60 years of conflict to sustainable peace in the country’s border areas (World Bank 2014). However, while the rhetoric of a ‘triple transition’ offered a vision of development that saw goals of democratisation, market-led economic growth and poverty alleviation‚ and sustainable peace as mutually reinforcing there was scant engagement with the fact that critical development studies scholarship shows that development rarely offers such ‘win–win’ solutions‚ but is instead a disruptive and conflictual process that confronts societies and governments with difficult trade-offs‚ creating winners and losers and new forms of precarity as well as prosperity. This chapter argues that the rush to engage in Myanmar—a country in which it has been difficult to conduct in-depth research for many decades—made it particularly challenging to bridge the divide between development scholarship and development in practice. The focus on ‘doing development’ and designing effective interventions to capitalise on Myanmar’s ‘transition’ far out-paced the ability—or willingness— to reflect critically on how insights from academic scholarship on the country and within the discipline of development studies offered a more cautionary tale surrounding the promises and pitfalls of transition in Myanmar post-2011. Consequently‚ much of the focus on development

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in Myanmar concentrated on technical and managerial issues of how to ensure effectiveness, efficiency, value for money and results, rather than engage with more deep-seated issues of power and politics in shaping development processes and outcomes. Exploring these limitations, this chapter provides some brief and rather schematic reflections on how insights from historical political economy scholarship within the field of development studies offers several starting points for confronting questions of power and politics that are instructive for reflecting on the development challenges that faced Myanmar after 2010. The rest of this chapter is divided into three sections. The first section of this chapter provides a brief overview of the trajectory of mainstream development theory and policy in the period since the Second World War. It aims to set out the lineage of the kinds of ‘win–win’ development narratives that have shaped interventions in Myanmar over the past decade. The second section of this paper offers four ‘starting points’ for how historical political economy scholarship can provide useful ways for engaging with the difficult trade-offs that surround development processes in Myanmar and other contexts. Section three then offers a brief case study of rural development strategies in upland ethnic minority areas of Myanmar. This case study explores how the political economy analysis set out in this paper offers important insights into some of the limitations, blind spots and misleading narratives surrounding agricultural development strategies that have been promoted by the Myanmar government and external donors over the past decade. In doing so, it shows the importance of centring questions of power and politics when assessing the aims, policies‚ and outcomes of rural development in Myanmar’s uplands.

Development Theory and Practice Since 1945: A Brief Overview In the first two decades after the Second World War, doctrines of development were largely framed in terms of supporting ‘developing’ or ‘Third World’ countries to catch up with more advanced western countries through processes of ‘modernisation’. Priority was given to policies aimed at promoting economic growth and efficiency, with the belief that this would provide the foundation for development and poverty alleviation in due course. The UN Measure for the Economic Development of Under-Developed Countries (1951) defined development in terms of per capita income. Much of the focus of western development interventions

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was to provide the components that countries were missing in order to ‘catch-up’ with levels of growth in ‘advanced’ societies. This included capital for investment (through aid, concessional loans‚ and foreign direct investment), technical expertise‚ and technology transfers. Development economics surrounding aid and trade through the 1950s and 1960s was also strongly influenced by social democratic ideas and Keynesianism (Bernstein 2006, p. 53). The interventionist state was seen as the key agent for the development, in part because of its perceived ability to initiate societal and economic transformation and in part out of a desire to break the colonial ties that integrated many countries into the global economy on highly unequal terms. However, the rise of neoliberal ideologies in the west (associated most clearly with Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher) and the relatively poor record of state-led development in many parts of the developing world saw a profound transformation in the dominant paradigm of development economics through the 1980s. In what became known as the ‘Washington Consensus’, free markets were seen as the most important agent for development. State intervention was viewed as an impediment to the allocative efficiency of the market. Reforms were designed to ‘roll back the state’, deregulate markets and open domestic economies to international trade and investment, often enforced through US, IMF and World Bank conditionality attached to development aid and debt relief. These neoliberal approaches to development viewed the costs of state interference and regulation (for example, the protection of key sectors such as agriculture or nascent industries) as higher than the costs of deregulated markets. Neoliberal development discourses argued that the economic growth that would be unleashed by liberalising markets would benefit all—a trickle-down effect often likened to a rising tide that lifts all boats. Inequality was justified as a reflection of the impartial market distribution of benefits that rewarded efficiency and entrepreneurship. The disruptions created through the implementation of these reforms— for example, the end of agricultural subsidies and cuts to state welfare services and employment—were largely disregarded by policymakers who viewed such disruptions as a necessary evil on the pathway to prosperity, and warned that ‘“crossing the desert” (i.e., addressing the transitional or frictional costs of adjustment to the poor) is made more difficult if the desert is artificially widened by failure to act firmly and decisively on badly needed adjustment measures’ (Ribe et al. 1990).

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However, the promised benefits of these reforms rarely materialised. Instead, they created huge social problems that disproportionately impacted the poor. Urban poverty rose steeply as public spending was cut and employment and wages fell. Global malnutrition levels worsened and the 1980s became known as the ‘lost decade’ for development. The clear failures of market-led reform packages to alleviate poverty in many parts of the world, coupled with growing inequality and the worsening marginalisation of the poorest undermined the triumphant claims that had underpinned the market fundamentalism of the Washington Consensus. However, these failures were blamed on the fact that markets were unable to operate in contexts lacking basic institutions (e.g., the rule of law to uphold property rights), services (e.g., basic education and health) and infrastructure (e.g., roads). Thus, the fundamental logic of the market as the key driver for economic development was not challenged. Instead, there emerged what Henry Bernstein and Carlos Oya have defined as a ‘markets-plus’ model, in which market liberalisation was accompanied by limited space for interventions aimed at strengthening institutions and services that could then enable markets to function properly and better serve the poor (Bernstein and Oya 2014). The ‘markets-plus’ model— often known as the ‘post-Washington consensus’—sought to combine the economic dynamism of free markets with a commitment to poverty alleviation through mantras of ‘inclusive growth’ and ‘pro-poor growth’. The fundamental priority has been to promote economic liberalisation alongside investment in basic services and the provision of ‘safety nets’ to enable the poor to manage sudden shocks or economic downturns. Today, dominant development narratives claim that a ‘markets-plus’ model can simultaneously stimulate rapid economic growth and that this growth can, with the right institutional framework, be inclusive and be harnessed to benefit the poor. The focus on ‘inclusive’ and ‘pro-poor’ growth has been underpinned by efforts to widen definitions of development beyond a narrow focus on economic growth (measured by GDP) and to go beyond the assumption that the benefits of growth will trickle down to benefit all. Amartya Sen’s ‘capabilities approach’ had a significant influence on rethinking the meaning of development and contributed to the evolution of the UN’s Human Development Index (HDI), which provided a composite measure of development that went beyond just per capita income to also include life expectancy and level of education (Sen 1985; Stanton 2007). The UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) provided an ambitious set of eight goals measured by 21 targets. These

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have now been expanded into the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which comprise 169 targets across 17 goals, with the aim of providing a ‘blueprint to achieve a better and more sustainable future for all’ and pledges to ‘leave no-one behind’ and to ensure that development can ‘reach the furthest behind first’. This ‘markets-plus’ development narrative has been particularly influential in Myanmar over the past decade. The priority for domestic elites, multilateral development agencies‚ and foreign investors has been to ‘unlock the potential’ of Myanmar’s economy and to stimulate rapid economic growth through the standard neoliberal toolkit of liberalising markets, creating modern market institutions, deepening the financial sector‚ and creating an enabling environment for a thriving private sector (Asian Development Bank 2014). Economic growth has been viewed as providing the fundamental prerequisite to alleviate poverty and overcome the country’s longstanding armed conflicts. The prioritisation given to economic growth and liberalisation as the key to success for Myanmar’s post-2010 reform process is rooted in various factors. For decades, the country has lagged behind its more successful ASEAN neighbours. There has been a strong desire amongst political and business elites within Myanmar to narrow the gap to countries like Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand, with this gap typically measured in terms of GDP. Similarly, China’s meteoric transformation since the 1980s has been rooted in a relentless focus on prioritising economic growth, global competitiveness‚ and macroeconomic stability above all else. Although vast populations have been adversely affected by the societal dislocations unleashed by the unremitting push for sustained economic growth, this has been justified by the huge numbers of people that have been lifted out of poverty. As China’s influence across Southeast Asia continues to grow, the rationale for large-scale development initiatives—whether major infrastructure projects or large-scale agribusinesses—has been predicated on the belief that the net benefits of such projects to improving levels of economic growth far outweigh the adverse impact that they may have on local populations. Myanmar’s post-2010 ‘transition’ also took place in an era where neoliberal economic strategies had become the ‘common-sense’ approach to development (Bernstein 2006, p. 56). In Myanmar’s case, particularly, decades of economic mismanagement and clumsy state intervention in the economy dating back to the era of General Ne Win provided further justification for the importance of market-led reforms in unleashing the

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country’s economic potential. The fact that Myanmar is the largest country in mainland Southeast Asia, is strategically situated as connecting South Asia, Southeast Asia and China, and has vast natural resources have all been cited as evidence that with the ‘correct’ set of economic reforms, the country’s high levels of poverty and internal conflict can be quickly overcome through rapid economic growth. Over the past decade, a powerful narrative also emerged linking Myanmar’s longstanding internal conflicts to the country’s poverty and underdevelopment. Development narratives in Myanmar after 2011 were underpinned by claims that policies aimed at promoting aggregate economic growth would simultaneously alleviate poverty, strengthen democratisation‚ and provide a stronger foundation for peace. However, these claims impeded engagement with the difficult realities surrounding development processes and limited the intellectual space for critical development studies scholarship to engage in any meaningful way with those ‘doing development’ (Bernstein 2006, p. 56). This process reflects what James Ferguson (1990) famously termed the ‘anti-politics machine’, which serves to depoliticise development through the framing as development as a series of ‘technical solutions to technical problems’. As Stefan Bächtold (2015, p. 1971) notes in relation to the ‘rise of an anti-politics machinery’ in post-2010 Myanmar: the consequence is a de-politicisation of development, where debate is restricted to improving technical ‘solutions’ in expert debates without revisiting larger, underlying assumptions, ideologies or world-views. Thus, although development discourse operates with broad, transformative notions of equal development, inclusiveness or even empowerment, it often focuses on narrow problematisations that stifle the broader changes these notions entail.

This has obscured the contentious politics of development, the difficult trade-offs that surround development interventions, the unequal distribution of the benefits of development and the subsequent fact that there are ‘losers’ as well as ‘winners’ of development processes.

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Engaging with the Difficult Trade-Offs That Surround Processes of Development: Four Starting Points Addressing the profound challenges of poverty, inequality and injustice requires a different set of starting points that can overcome the limitations of the ‘win–win’ narratives that surround claims of ‘pro-poor’ and inclusive development, and instead engage directly with development as a political process steeped in power relations. In the limited space available here, this section briefly sets out four starting points for how critically development studies scholarship can provide a way of exploring contemporary development challenges in countries like Myanmar. Development as a Disruptive Process Development is often conceived by policymakers a set of deliberate interventions aimed at achieving specific goals through the implementation of distinct plans and programmes. However, development must also be understood as an immanent process of social and political change that is the result of ongoing processes of state formation and capitalist development and the multiple sets of interests, tensions, conflicts, negotiations and compromises that surround these processes, none of which can be easily controlled through project management. These processes of societal transformation—such as the transition from agrarian to industrial societies, urbanisation, the growth of modern states and globalisation—are invariably disruptive processes that can cause profound social tensions and dislocations. In an important contribution, Michael Cowen and Robert Shenton (1996) argue that the tendency to view ‘development theory’ as a colonial or post-colonial project designed in the aftermath of World War II to address the ‘underdevelopment’ of countries across Asia, Africa and South America is misleading. It overlooks the fact that debates surrounding the meaning of development originated in nineteenth-century Europe and were rooted in philosophical concerns regarding how to manage the social disruption created by the advent of industrial capitalism. This was a time when Western Europe was confronted with the social dislocations unleashed by the French Revolution and the Industrial Revolution. It was a world where ‘progress’ (in terms of transitions to more ‘advanced’ or enlightened political systems and wealthier economies) had become separated from order and stability.

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Cowen and Shenton (1996, p. 4) argue that the philosophical roots of development theory centred on how to ‘compensate for the results of the development of capitalism’—which invariably included violent and hugely unequal social upheaval—rather than viewing capitalist development as means to achieve wider social goals. Development, they argue, was thus designed as a way to provide order and stability to more immanent processes of political and economic change that were inherently restless, disruptive and uneven. Development was needed to overcome the societal problems unleashed by ‘progress’—unemployment, breakdown of social relations and general disorder—rather than as a means through which to facilitate such ‘progress’. Reflecting on the philosophical debates that surrounded the emergence of doctrines of development may seem far removed from the frontline of development work in Myanmar and other areas of the Global South. However, it draws attention to the kinds of tensions that have historically existed—and continue to exist—in societies undergoing rapid political and economic change. In countries like Myanmar, this warns that the kinds of rapid change advocated by policymakers after 2010 to ‘unleash’ the country’s potential—in terms of structural transformations to the economy and the political system—were likely to be disruptive and contested rather than providing universal benefits. It warns that forms of economic growth may not necessarily provide a stronger foundation for ‘pro-poor’ development and declining social conflicts, as is often assumed. For example, claims that rapid economic development and stronger state institutions will necessarily offer an antidote to the country’s decadeslong armed conflicts, need to be assessed against the ways in which the societal disruptions created by forms of rapid economic growth have also served to reinvigorate the drivers of armed conflict in many regions. Difficult trade-offs will continue to exist between the quest for aggregate economic growth and the pursuit of peace and ‘inclusive’ development in contested and impoverished regions of Myanmar, as explored briefly in section three, below. These trade-offs have typically been ignored by the mantra that ‘development and peace come together’, which has been a key part of government and donor rhetoric over the past decade. Incorporating Power Relations into Analysis of Development Processes Tania Li’s (2007) seminal work on development interventions in Indonesia explores how development interventions are often underpinned

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by a tendency to ‘render technical’ the complex and contested challenges facing societies. The process of ‘rendering technical’ has a dual function. First, it frames development challenges—such as poverty, inequality or conservation—as problems that can be solved by ‘technical fixes’ through a series of planned interventions, which in turn empower the ‘development expert’ who has the knowledge to implement such fixes. Second, ‘questions that are rendered technical are simultaneously rendered nonpolitical’: complex development issues are de-politicised and the root causes of the challenges facing development—which typically relate to issues of politics and power rather than technical problems—are ignored. In Myanmar, the process of ‘rendering technical’ is clear in international efforts aimed at supporting the country’s so-called triple transition and the development of a progressive liberal market state. Within this framework, promoting economic growth and tackling poverty has been presented as dependent upon the need to devise and implement the ‘correct’ set of political and economic policies. This has included liberalising the economy, expanding the role of the private sector, encouraging foreign investment, modernising agricultural‚ and implementing sound monetary policies to limit inflation. There is no space here to debate the merits of such policies and their record of intervention; the point to emphasise is that the technical focus on ‘getting the economics right’ and designing the ‘correct’ interventions has often obscured the political interests and power relations that inevitably shape such processes. A political economy approach requires thinking more deeply about who stands to gain and who is likely to lose out from such reforms, and the relative power of these competing forces. This is neatly captured in Mushtaq Khan’s (2010) work on ‘transaction costs’ and ‘transition costs’ surrounding institutional reforms. Broadly, transaction costs refer to the relative efficiency of different types of institutions or models for development. In Myanmar, for example, a liberal market economy may be viewed as a more efficient way to promote growth than the authoritarian state-managed economy that has been in place for much of the period since 1962. However, efforts to implement such reforms must also consider the ‘transition costs’ of change, namely ‘the political costs which potential losers from a proposed institutional change can impose on the proponent’ (Khan 2010, p. 17). In Myanmar’s case, there were winners of the previous system—not least the country’s military and business elites that enjoyed a privileged and protected position within the country’s political and economic structures. Liberalisation,

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democratisation and efforts to promote accountability and transparency inevitably threaten pre-existing power structures in Myanmar. There are thus powerful vested interests that have clear ‘disruptive potential’ to challenge reform processes. Any kind of development intervention is thus likely to be shaped by power relations and political interests and must be resilient to these pressures in Myanmar. Although the example above suggests that taking power relations seriously may require a more cautious approach to the potential of Myanmar’s ongoing reform process, incorporating power relations into analysis of development also offers important opportunities. It suggests that efforts to works towards greater social justice may be possible, but that this requires understanding the political impediments that often prevent justice. This provides a challenging but important reminder that efforts to address poverty and injustice are inherently political and must be treated as so. One of the most important foundations for efforts to address the challenges of poverty, inequality and injustice in Myanmar must be to engage with issues of power and confront the political challenges that often serve to actively silence and marginalise those whose voices need to be heard in debates surrounding development. Engaging with the ‘Distributive Impacts’ of Development A third starting point is to analyse not only the aggregate impacts of economic growth and of development interventions but also their ‘distributive impacts’; in other words how the costs and benefits of growth and development are distributed between different groups in society, and the factors that determine this distribution of costs and benefits. In addressing this point, Mushtaq Khan gives the example of how to manage a common resource such as a fishing lake (Khan 2010, p. 19). For this resource to provide a foundation for sustainable economic growth, it is important that the lake is managed so as to prevent overfishing and to ensure that fishing can provide a foundation for stable income generation over many years. However, the management of this common resource can be implemented in different ways and with very different distributive impacts. The license to fish could be given to one individual or company, or an institutional framework could be established that offers fishing permits to a collective of local fishermen to all use the lake. Both approaches may serve to manage the risk of overfishing and provide fish for the market, but they have very different distributional

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outcomes. Furthermore, as Khan’s work shows, the decisions surrounding which approach to implement are rooted in power relations. Institutional frameworks will only be stable and work effectively if they are consistent with the underlying distribution of power. Development interventions thus need to be attuned to the likely ‘enforcement costs’ of attempted reforms. These relate to the costs required to overcome opposition to a particular policy or reform. Interventions that challenge the interests of powerful groups in society will entail higher enforcement costs and will thus be harder to enforce. Deals that align with the interests of powerful actors will have lower enforcement costs but will have less scope to deliver transformative change. In the example above, if the license is provided to the collective of fishermen, but the private company has greater power to mobilise pressure on the state and to inflict costs on others (for example, violence against the fishermen) then this institutional framework is likely to be inherently unstable. Engaging with the distributive impacts of economic growth—and the power relations that underpin them—requires moving beyond claims that development necessarily offers win–win solutions. It emphasises the need to engage with the tough trade-offs that surround development processes, especially who bears the costs of these processes and the very real challenges that exist between efforts to simultaneously pursue economic growth, social justice, poverty alleviation‚ and conflict reduction. It is these kinds of difficult— and highly political—trade-offs that need to be foregrounded in debates surrounding development interventions and reforms in Myanmar‚ but which were often overlooked in development narratives that promised win-win outcomes. Such an approach also emphasises the need to think about how the distributive impacts of development are spread spatially. This is particularly relevant in a country like Myanmar where many of the country’s most valuable resources are concentrated in regions of the country with histories of longstanding armed conflict, where the legitimacy and authority of the state remain contested, and which are home to ethnic populations who remain marginalised from the country’s political and economic structures. For example, Myanmar’s current electricity shortages, the country’s high hydropower potential‚ and the government’s ambitious plans for 100% electrification by 2030 have led to renewed focus on the potential of hydropower dams to address the country’s electricity needs and promote development. However, the distributive impact of the costs and benefits of such schemes is hugely contested.

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Dam construction has often been accompanied by militarisation, forced dispossession with minimal compensation‚ and the funnelling of energy to the country’s major cities or sale abroad. The costs and benefits of electrification do not merely raise technical challenges in need of technocratic solutions, but relate to longstanding tensions surrounding the uneven distribution of power (in both senses) within the country, deepseated distrust against the central government and the power relations that exist between the Myanmar state, private sector business interests‚ and non-state armed groups. A Relational Framework for Analysing Poverty, Inequality and Economic Growth A fourth analytical starting point for engaging with the tensions and trade-offs surrounding development processes is to take a ‘relational’ framework to analysing poverty and inequality. Poverty is typically framed as resulting from a lack of economic growth and development: the poverty of certain communities or regions is seen to be rooted in their marginalisation and lack of integration into states and markets, the antidote to which is the expansion of states and markets to incorporate ‘lagging regions’. In contrast, a relational framework explores the ways in which persistent poverty and inequality are also rooted in processes of longterm capitalist development, rather than being a result of exclusion or marginalisation from these processes. As David Mosse (2010) argues, this relational framework challenges ‘the habit of thinking of poverty as a “condition” understood by focussing on the characteristics of “the poor” themselves (low income, vulnerability to risk, weak networks and so on) rather than on the wider economic and social systems of which they are a part, and consequently of equating the study of poverty with studying poor people … In this regard, poverty research needs reconnection to knowledge about the way in which socio-economic, political and cultural systems work’. Indeed, as Mosse points out, ‘[b]y defining poverty reduction as the goal of development and economic growth as its means’, contemporary discourses of development obscure and simplify the relationships that may exist between processes of economic growth and enduring poverty. As will be shown in the final section of the paper, a relational framework for understanding the drivers of poverty‚ precarity‚ and inequality in Myanmar is instructive in showing how the challenges and insecurities

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facing many households and communities are not simply rooted in a lack of economic growth or their marginalisation from the state and markets; rather enduring forms of poverty and inequality are also embedded in the particular modalities of capitalism and state formation that were prominent in the decades prior to Myanmar’s ‘opening up’ in 2010‚ and which became more firmly entrenched amidst the reforms launched after 2010.

Rural Development Strategies in Myanmar: A Political Economy Approach The final section of this chapter provides a brief analysis of development discourses that surround rural development strategies in Myanmar’s uplands. It demonstrates how the four starting points, outlined above, offer important insights into the difficult trade-offs that surround agricultural reform‚ but which are rarely acknowledged. Myanmar remains a predominantly agrarian society, with agriculture employing more than 50% of the population. Poverty in rural areas—especially the country’s Dry zone and upland and coastal areas—is significantly higher than in urban areas, with almost 40% of the country’s rural population living below the poverty line compared to under 15% of the country’s urban population (World Bank 2017). Myanmar’s agricultural sector has experienced decades of underinvestment and long been deemed as highly inefficient. A central component of the country’s post-2010 development strategy has been to modernise the agricultural sector through commercial agribusiness-led development, and to instigate a structural transformation away from an agriculturebased economy to an industry and serviced-based economy (see, for example, Raitzer et al. 2015; FAO 2012; GORUM 2018). The Government of Myanmar made the agricultural sector a high priority and set out a vision that ‘by 2030, Myanmar achieves an inclusive, competitive, food and nutrition secure, climate change resilient, and sustainable agricultural system contributing to the socio-economic well-being of farmers and rural people and further development of the national economy’ (GORUM 2018). In order to fulfil this vision, the Myanmar Agricultural Development Strategy and Investment Plan (2018/2019–2022/2023) proposed ‘a sequence of interventions that will pave the way to: commercial expansion of crops and livestock production, increased incomes for farmers

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and better access to international markets, ultimately contributing to the country’s food security and economic development’ (GORUM 2018). In Myanmar’s upland regions, these policies have largely been framed in terms of improving market integration, encouraging commercial agricultural practices, promoting the cultivation of ‘boom crops’, such as rubber, maize and coffee, and encouraging agribusiness models of development. These reforms, it is argued, offer ‘win–win’, ‘pro-poor’ and ‘inclusive’ development solutions in two ways. First, policy documents make the claim that agriculture commercialisation can benefit the entire rural population, including both large-scale agribusinesses and smallholder farmers. Second, the country’s development strategies claim that an expanding industrial and service sector will provide decent jobs for those who move out of agriculture once efficiency gains mean that a smaller proportion of the population is needed in farming. In reality, however, both of these claims are misleading and fail to engage substantively with the difficult trade-offs briefly outlined in the previous section of this paper. In Myanmar, the country’s legal frameworks have sanctioned the granting to agribusinesses of large-scale concessions of ‘wastelands’, defined as land that has no legal title that in reality includes all customary lands regardless of whether or not they were being farmed. The government has announced ambitious plans to develop four million hectares of ‘wasteland’ into permanent agriculture by 2030, much of it in the country’s ethnic minority upland areas (TNI 2012). This has created severe land insecurity for large numbers of smallholders throughout the country. Furthermore, the kinds of agricultural intensification that have been promoted in the country’s development strategies—such as use of high yielding seeds, fertilisers and pesticides— require significant up-front costs and have economies of scale (i.e., cost advantages are maximised from increased levels of production) that benefit better-off farmers or companies which have more land, more capital to invest and more resilience to fluctuating global markets. For smaller farmers, who produce on credit—often borrowing to purchase the inputs they need to farm—increased input costs (seeds, fertilisers, etc.) and the volatility of global markets can make them highly vulnerable to debt and dispossession (Woods 2020). Development strategies emphasise the potential benefits of agricultural modernisation—in terms of higher yields, greater efficiency, cheaper food supplies and increased exports—but fail to engage with the likely distributive impacts of processes of modernisation, which are likely to

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see the country’s poor smallholders bear the adverse impacts of these reforms and concentrate wealth with larger-scale agribusinesses. In a country like Myanmar, where the majority of the population continue to rely on farming for their livelihoods, very real tensions may thus exist in a model of agribusiness-led agricultural development which promises greater production and efficiency, but through a process that benefits large-scale investment, rewards labour-saving technologies‚ and concentrates the means of production. The goals of economic growth and efficiency on the one hand and improved livelihoods for the country’s poorest on the other may therefore be deeply conflicting. This raises important and urgent questions regarding how to determine the priorities of development and how to address the disruptive forces that are likely to be unleashed through the kinds of structural economic transformation advocated in national development strategies and donor policy papers. However, these difficult questions continue to be obscured in development discourses that claim that neoliberal agricultural reforms can benefit global agribusiness and smallholder farmers alike. These underlying tensions are exacerbated by the fact that there is no guarantee that other sectors of the economy—such as industry or services—will necessarily offer viable ‘exit options’ for those unable to compete in the agricultural sector within Myanmar. In today’s globalised economy, areas of industrial growth and expanding service sectors are often located far from areas where people are being pushed out of agriculture. This is especially the case in Myanmar in light of the fact that it is situated next door to the industrial powerhouse that is China. The supply of cheap commodities will make it difficult for small- and mediumsized enterprises, or a larger industrial sector to develop in Myanmar. As Tania Li’s (2010) work has shown, in large parts of rural Asia this has created a situation whereby ‘places (or their resources) are useful, but the people are not, so that dispossession is detached from any prospect of labour absorption’. Narratives surrounding ‘exit options’ from agriculture for rural populations also treat people as rational utility maximisers and ignore the powerful attachments that people have to land and place, which are likely to ensure that the kinds of agricultural reforms being advocated in Myanmar are likely to be very socially disruptive. In place of development narratives that claim to simultaneously offer agribusinessled efficiency gains, opportunities for smallholder farmers, and viable exist options for those that leave farming, there is a need to address the difficult trade-offs that surround development processes and to assess the relative

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importance of different development goals—such as economic growth, reduced inequality and sustainable livelihoods—which are often framed as mutually attainable, but that invariably are not. A further limitation of current rural development strategies espoused by international donors and policymakers in Myanmar is that they largely ignore the experiences of rural populations in the previous two decades since 1988. Myanmar’s relative isolation from western aid and development architecture in the period of military dictatorship between the 1990 General Election and the 2010 General Election created a tendency to view this period as one of economic stagnation and continuity with the previous decades of military rule under General Ne Win (1962– 1988). However, this characterisation overlooks the fact that while there was significant continuity in the political system—continued authoritarian military rule, censorship‚ and opposition crackdowns—this period also saw significant economic shifts. The quasi-socialist policies of the Ne Win era were dismantled and replaced by a series of liberalisation measures, which reflected a wider post-Cold War shift in former socialist countries in Mainland Southeast Asia, notably Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam (Taylor 2016). In the late 1980s, border trade with China and Thailand was liberalised, the country’s land laws and foreign investment laws were reformed, and marginal conflict-affected rural areas were opened up to inflows of capital, increasingly integrated into regional economies and subjected to processes of agricultural commercialisation. Consequently, there has been a failure in the rural development strategies being advocated in Myanmar to analyse how the drivers of poverty, vulnerability and livelihood insecurity work in relation to the processes of agricultural modernisation and market integration that occurred through the 1990s and 2000s. Instead, policy documents implicitly assume that rural poverty in upland areas is a function of the marginalisation of these regions from markets and commercial practices. A brief example of illegal opium production in upland areas of southern Shan State illustrates this point clearly. Illegal opium production is typically blamed on the marginalisation and ‘underdevelopment’ of poppy-producing regions, with agricultural modernisation and market integration deemed to offer effective ways to overcome illegal cultivation. However, this policy narrative ignores the fact that in some areas, poppy cultivation has become the alternative livelihood strategy for farmers who have been negatively impacted by debt, dispossession and land grabs that have accompanied

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the expansion of commercial agriculture and increased inflows of investment into rural Myanmar. The vulnerabilities that have pushed farmers into the illegal opium economy—for example, in regions of Shan State south of Taunggyi—are not simply the result of the region’s marginalisation and lack of integration into markets, but stem from new forms of insecurity facing smallholder farmers as a result of agricultural commercialisation (Meehan 2021). A relational framework thus allows researchers to consider how forms of poverty and vulnerability can become embedded in the kinds of economic development promoted by governments and donors, rather than indicating a failure of development. Importantly, it also reveals the hackneyed nature of much of the debates surrounding rural development in Myanmar after 2010. Although rural development policies are couched in a language of modernisation, innovation, inclusivity and pro-poor development they are, in reality, offering little that is different from the kinds of neoliberal pathways that rural populations have experienced—and struggled to grapple with—over the past two decades.

Conclusion A major challenge for many of those working in the development sector is how to integrate a commitment to the ideals of social justice, inclusivity‚ and pro-poor growth with an awareness of the profound challenges that deep-seated power structures and the inherently uneven nature of development processes can pose to such aspirations. There are no easy answers but, as this chapter has briefly tried to sketch out, an important starting point is to better integrate critical development studies scholarship into development practice. The rush to engage in Myanmar in the years after 2010 often led the pendulum to swing too far towards a preoccupation with ‘doing development’ and a subsequent neglect of—or impatience with—the difficult and inconvenient questions that development studies scholarship poses. However, bridging the ‘theory/policy divide’ is a necessary starting point for addressing pressing societal issues in countries like Myanmar that experience widespread poverty and longstanding armed conflicts. This requires an approach that is willing to confront the difficult tradeoffs that surround questions of development and that acknowledges the importance of understanding entrenched political power structures that are often much slower to change than the kinds of rapid transitions pursued in countries like Myanmar. This emphasises the importance of

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history and the value of deep contextual knowledge. It also highlights the importance of engaging with, and investing, in the development of such knowledge, rather than relying upon the kinds of external models, toolkits‚ and technocratic fixes that often underpin development work. For any such endeavour to be effective, engaging marginalised voices is essential to ensure development narratives do not simply reflect the interests of entrenched power structures. In Myanmar, supporting researchers to pursue academic careers and strengthening research institutes that are able to bring their knowledge of local societies to bear on the difficult and contentious debates on development offers one such starting point. Following the military coup that took place in Myanmar in February 2021, aid flows and large-scale development programs have been scaled back, suspended, or cancelled entirely. Considering the protracted humanitarian crises facing Myanmar, the questions facing many donors now revolve around immediate concerns of how to navigate the new political reality, the vexed issue of sanctions, and whether and how to provide humanitarian aid (Slim 2021; Décobert 2021). Alongside these critical and immediate challenges, in time there will be important lessons to learn from Myanmar’s experience of ‘transition’ and development interventions between 2011 and 2021. An important aspect of these reflections must be to assess how to better address the theory/policy divide within development so as to move beyond ‘win-win’ narratives that underpinned development policies and programs over the past decade, and to instead confront directly the tensions, trade-offs, and power relations that surround efforts to address poverty, inequality, and insecurity in Myanmar and beyond.

Funding Statement Research for this article was supported by the Economic and Social Research Council: Grant number: ES/P009867/1: Building sustainable peacetime economies in the aftermath of war and Grant number: ES/P011543/1: GCRF—Drugs and (dis)order: Building sustainable peacetime economies in the aftermath of war.

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References Asian Development Bank. (2014). Myanmar: Unlocking the Potential. Asian Development Bank. Bächtold, S. (2015). The Rise of an Anti-politics Machinery: Peace, Civil Society and the Focus on Results in Myanmar, Third World Quarterly, 36(10), 1968– 1983. Bernstein, H. (2005). Development Studies and the Marxists. In U. Kothari (ed.), A Radical History of Development Studies: Individuals, Institutions and Ideologies (pp. 111–137). Zed Books. Bernstein, H. (2006). Studying Development/Development Studies, African Studies, 65(1), 45–62. Bernstein, H. & Oya, C. (2014). Rural Futures: How Much Should Markets Rule? IIED Working Paper. London. Cowen, M. & Shenton, R. (1996). Doctrines of Development. Routledge. Décobert, A. (2021). Myanmar’s human rights crisis justifies foregoing neutrality for a solidarity-based approach to humanitarianism. Melbourne Asia Review. FAO. (2012). Country Programming Framework 2012–2016. FAO. Ferguson, J. (1990). The Anti-politics Machine: Development, Depoliticization and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho. Cambridge University Press. GORUM. (2018). Myanmar Agriculture Development Strategy and Investment Plan (2018–19–2022–23). Government of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar. Khan, M. (2010). Political Settlements and the Governance of GrowthEnhancing Institutions. Draft Paper in Research Paper Series on ‘GrowthEnhancing Governance’. http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/9968/1/Political_Settle ments_internet.pdf. Accessed: 15/12/2019. Kothari, U. (2005). A Radical History of Development Studies: Individuals, Institutions and Ideologies. In U. Kothari (ed.), A Radical History of Development Studies: Individuals, Institutions and Ideologies (pp. 111–137). Zed Books. Li, T. (2007). The Will to Improve: Governmentality, Development, and the Practice of Politics. Duke University Press. Li, T. (2010). To Make Live or Let Die? Rural Dispossession and the Protection of Surplus Populations, Antipode, 41(1), 66–93. Meehan, P. (2021). “Ploughing the land five times”: Opium and agrarian change in the ceasefire landscapes of south-western Shan State, Myanmar. Journal of Agrarian Change, 1– 24. Mosse, D. (2010). A Relational Approach to Durable Poverty, Inequality and Power, The Journal of Development Studies, 46(7), 1156–1178. Raitzer, D., Wong, L. & Samson, J.L. (2015). Myanmar’s Agriculture Sector: Unlocking the Potential for Inclusive Growth. ADB Economics Working Paper Series no. 470. Asian Development Bank.

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Ribe, H., Carvalho, S., Liebenthal, R., Nicholas, P. & Zuckerman, E. (1990). How Adjustment Programs Can Help the Poor: The World Bank’s Experience. World Bank Discussion Paper 71. World Bank Sen, A. (1985). Commodities and Capabilities. Oxford University Press. Slim, H. (2021). Humanitarian resistance and military dictatorship. Humanitarian Practice Network. 14 April 2021. Stanton, E. (2007). The Human Development Index: A History. PERI Working Papers 127. Political Economy Research Institute. Taylor, P. (2016). Frontier commoditisation in post-socialist Southeast Asia. Asia Pacific Viewpoint‚ 57 (2)‚ 145–153. The Asia Foundation. (2018). Supporting the Transition: Understanding Aid to Myanmar Since 2011. The Asia Foundation. TNI. (2012). Financing Dispossession China’s Opium Substitution Programme in Northern Burma. Transnational Institute. United Nations. (1951). Measures for the economic development of under-developed countries: Report by a Group of Experts appointed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations. New York: United Nations. Woods, K.M. (2020). Smaller-Scale Land Grabs and Accumulation from Below: Violence, Coercion and Consent in Spatially Uneven Agrarian Change in Shan State, Myanmar. World Development, 127 . World Bank. (2014). Myanmar Overview. http://www.worldbank.org/en/cou ntry/myanmar/overview. Accessed: 02/07/2015. World Bank. (2017). An Analysis of Poverty in Myanmar, Part 02: Poverty Profile. World Bank.

CHAPTER 13

The World Is Not “Flat”: Limits to Development and Control on a Burmese Periphery Bobby Anderson

Background Myanmar’s Chin state is distinguished by mountain, forest, and river, sparse and scattered populations, and a monsoon that cuts access from June to September. The state shares long and unmonitored borders with Bangladesh to the west and India to the north. It is the poorest state in the Union, and Paletwa is its southernmost and poorest township. Paletwa is enormous: as the crow flies, it is roughly 150 km from south to north, and yet villages in Pangrang, on the township’s northeast corner and 88 km on a straight line from the township capital, are five day’s travel away, via boat, motorcycle, and foot. One could drive from California to New York in the same timeframe; James C. Scott’s Friction of Terrain (Scott 2009, 43) is palpable here. While much of Chin may be known for mountains, Paletwa’s primary geographical feature is the Kaladan

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River, which begins in northeast India’s Mizoram State and crosses the entirety of the township before entering Rakhine, where it passes through Kyauktaw and empties into the Bay of Bengal just to the west of Sittwe. The Kaladan is the fifth largest undammed river in the world. It is no tepid and predictable thing: it can fluctuate 40 feet in depth between the dry season and the monsoon, eroding and buckling banks and forcing communities to relocate, sometimes on extremely short notice. The rains wash enormous volumes of hillside into the Kaladan, collapsing homes, felling trees, flattening hills, and raising the river bottom incrementally. To the river’s east and west are forested hills and mountains interspersed with dirt tracks and occasional roads that generally need re-building after every monsoon. The number of all-weather roads in Paletwa can be counted on one hand. In a township lacking roads, the Kaladan is the highway; while the rainy season causes much of rural Myanmar, including eastern Paletwa, to grind to a halt, Paletwa’s river environs seem to awaken, with villages inaccessible in the dry season easily reachable via monsoon tributaries. Paletwa’s population is majority Khumi Chin; roughly 40% are Rakhine. The former is a slew of Christian denominations, or animist, or a combination of the two; the latter are Theravada Buddhists, although in contemporary Myanmar, and the wider world, these religions often serve as markers to distinguish oneself from another rather than religions practiced in the absence of the other. In this, religions are akin to the facial tattoos that previous generations of Chin women wore to mark themselves from lowlanders. There are a few mixed Chin—Rakhine villages, but most villages are either majority Khumi Chin or majority Rakhine, with the Rakhine often living on the Kaladan and its tributaries and the Chin eking out a living in the hills. This is, of course, a generalization, with numerous exceptions. Chin villages lie on the river, but the author has yet to find a Rakhine village far from the river. Rakhine trade, raise livestock, and farm fixed plots near the riversides. Chin practice shifting cultivation, which once entailed the movement of villages every few years, but government efforts to stop this practice by banning the establishment of new villages have resulted in permanent Chin settlements which serve as fulcrums for rotating and communally held plots, cleared, burned, planted, harvested, and abandoned to rejuvenate every few years. Despite evidence to the contrary (Anderson 2018; Asia Indigenous People’s Pact 2012), governments with a dislike of population mobility claim the practice is environmentally harmful. In Chin villages, the detritus of British

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colonialism can be found, in battered bugles playing barely recalled notes, belt buckles, and even occasional officer’s swords, and in parade protocols displayed for visitors by a few ancient men wearing the brick-a-brac of their fathers as they stand to attention. The detritus of Myanmar colonialism in this non-Bamar space, for its part, is hardly residual. The river provides: people wash their bodies and clothes in it, haul it in buckets back to their kitchens to prepare their food with it. Human waste washes down to it and fish feed upon that waste and that fish is then caught, cooked, and consumed. The river provides livelihoods: for boat captains and mechanics, for traders who run gas and cooking oil and salt and sugar and sacks of rice and tobacco and bundles of secondhand clothing and cement bags and ubiquitous Chinese thermoses and cookware up the river, and sacks of beans and corn and sesame and squash and wild elephant foot yam and other herbs down it, as well as occasional rice liquor, which the Chin are (justly) famous for. Paletwa’s people—those in need of goods and cash, anyway—get them via the Kaladan. Some travel far afield for work, not only to Kyauktaw and Sittwe but to Malaysia, India, Bangladesh, and even China. Rakhine is the lingua franca of the river, while Chin dialects are the reserve of the hills: most Chins speak Rakhine, for it is the language of trade, and many Chin who speak no Burmese are fluent in Rakhine. Rakhine, for their part, speaks Burmese—a related language—but generally don’t speak Chin. The word for “us” in many a Chin dialect, Zomi, was adapted by Willem Van Schendel to name Zomia, the upland South— Southeast Asian land massif which stretches from Vietnam to Tibet. In the hills and further up the river, the Burmese language is rarely found, except amongst soldiers, who from the end of the Second World War until recently were a rare sight in Paletwa. Paletwa, and the rest of Chin, has long been on the periphery of the Union, not just in geographic, but in developmental terms: in the 1960s Chin state didn’t possess a single secondary school, and today it has only one tertiary institute, in Hakha, which opened in 2017. In Paletwa, the little development which can be found is on the Kaladan, along with the only foreign investment: the Indian Government’s Kaladan Multi-Modal Transport (KMMT) project, which will connect that country’s Northeast to the Bay of Bengal via Sittwe and the Kaladan, with dredging in Sittwe harbor to accommodate a six-meter draft, a new port facility across from Paletwa town, and a new road connecting Paletwa to Zorinpui, Mizoram state. Other than India, and the Union of Myanmar’s National

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Community Driven Development Project1 which builds small-scale infrastructure across Paletwa, there’s little else to speak of, other than roads in Samee, and small-scale waterworks constructed by the International Rescue Committee. Paletwa town boasts of a new four-story building and a 3G telecommunications signal which disappears 15 minutes north or south of it. The town has electricity from 1800 to 2200 hours daily, with an extra hour both morning and night in the weeks prior to student exams. Earthen roads, passable by 4 × 4 vehicles, connect a mud flat ten minutes southeast of Paletwa town, on the other side of the river, to Samee in the east, and Kyauktaw/Sittwe to the south. The state government, for its part, speaks of the establishment of “special economic zones” in Paletwa, a shibboleth to attract investment. Still others say “ecotourism.” Surely others will soon say “blockchain.” The government is generally restricted to Paletwa town, of which the General Administration Department is the most powerful and extensive node. The township Immigration office is also key to control: it regulates not only foreigners but the internal immigration of Myanmar’s people, from township to township, and the fact that their paper records are eroding from silverfish, rainwater, and mold across the country, does not serve to dilute their power. Beyond Paletwa town, however, the government shrinks to teachers, many of them on daily wages and unqualified, and the GAD village tract appointees. Government neglect of Paletwa, and the rest of Chin, across generations, resulted in nary a response: while the Chins were stereotyped as a “martial” people, and were eagerly recruited by the British, and later Myanmar’s armed forces or Tatmadaw, the Chins did not display this supposed talent in the form of effective insurgency in the same ferocious manner as the Union’s Kachin, Karen, and Shan. The Chin National Front, which formed in the 1960s, never waged enough of an insurgency to trigger a meaningful Tatmadaw response, such as the “four cuts” campaigns the Tatmadaw subjected the civilian “bases” of other insurgent groups too, completely depopulating the Pegu Yoma and other areas, for example. The CNF generally exists on paper now or in the memories of veterans residing abroad. They have been described by Bertil Lintner as less an insurgency and more an NGO. With a few rifles at their disposal, they could be better characterized as a hunting club. With that

1 http://cdd.drdmyanmar.org/mm.

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in mind, any characterization of the CNF’s signing of the 2015 National Ceasefire Agreement or NCA as removing a “stumbling block” to Chin development is an ignorant one. Over time, however, Union neglect, of Rakhine primarily, but also, Chin, has led to more significant consequences, from amongst elements of the Rakhine community, in the form of the Arakan Army or AA. Beginning in 2015 it began to make its presence felt in the west, firstly in Rakhine, but now more substantially in Chin–Paletwa township in particular. And besides being a highway, the Kaladan River is a great place to ambush soldiers.

An Ecology of Conflict and Control The Arakan Army or AA is the latest incarnation of Rakhine nationalism taken to an extreme conclusion, and taken root in a periphery previously ignored by the state. Its ideological forebears are found in the nearly defunct Arakan Liberation Party (ALP), which like the CNF was relatively inactive in comparison to Myanmar’s tenacious northern and eastern insurgencies. The ALP also signed the 2015 NCA. Its 60–100 claimed fighters may be a hopeful estimate. The AA view the contemporary ALP leadership as traitors to a cause built upon a discourse both rich and misunderstood. Rakhine nationalism is that of a neglected colonial backwater dwelling upon past glories, of which the targeting of Rohingya is not a cause, but a symptom. The AA, paradoxically, was not born in Rakhine or Chin, but in Kachin, midwifed by the Kachin Independence Army or KIA as their proxy after the KIA’s 1994 ceasefire with the Tatmadaw fell apart in 2011. In this they also mirror their predecessor: the ALP was founded by the Karen National Union or KNU in the late 1960s. The 1994 KIA ceasefire ended in part due to the KIA’s refusal to transform itself into a Border Guard Force under the Tatmadaw’s command. AA’s first recruits, David Scott Mathieson (2017) notes, were ethnic Rakhine working in the Hpakant jade mines: a landscape of holes, tents, young men, filth, and dreams that surely erode with every passing rain or landslide, and for which ample supplies of heroin manufactured in neighboring Shan state act as an elixir. With that comes HIV. AA rose to tempt young Rakhine perhaps not so much fueled by nationalist discourse and tales of dead kingdoms as by the squalor and death of Hpakant: the poverty they’d left

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in Rakhine at least had family, and meaning, and the AA may have given that back. The AA soon learned how to fight under the KIA’s tutelage. Until recently the AA, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) were allied along with four other insurgent groups under the umbrella United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC). Despite early involvement in ceasefire negotiations, including inputs to the general National Ceasefire Agreement text, the UNFC declined involvement in Panglong 21 because the AA, MNDAA, and TNLA were not “accepted” by the Tatmadaw as potential individual NCA signatories. The military went so far as to ban from attending the first Panglong 21 conference, although with Chinese Government Special Envoy Sun Guoxiang’s facilitation, they did attend the second. The Tatmadaw’s refusal to even discuss ceasefires with the groups that are it is most actively—other than the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army—trying to destroy, serves as a reminder of the 1989–1994 ceasefires which the Tatmadaw signed with groups it considered less of a threat, providing it with the “breathing space” it required to concentrate force on the Mong Tai Army and the Karen National Union. The MTA died back then, although its remnants grew into the Restoration Council of Shan State. More recently, the KNU had the ceasefire while the KIA’s elimination was sought. The Tatmadaw’s demand that the KIA transform into a BGF under the command of Tatmadaw (Bamar) officers was also known by all to be untenable. The point was to start a fight, not for the preservation of a Union which has only ever existed in theory, but to access natural resource income streams in KIA territories. The breathing room any insurgency has with the Tatmadaw may be temporary, evinced by the refusal of select KNU brigades to let any Union civil servants into their territories. In November 2016 the MNDAA, AA, TNLA, and two KIA brigades, describing themselves as the “Northern Alliance,” launched a joint offensive against the Tatmadaw in Kokang and other areas of Northern Shan State; this offensive continues.

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AA’s Arrival in Paletwa Complementing its activities in Rakhine state, the AA established itself in Paletwa. This was a curveball thrown at the Tatmadaw by the Northern Alliance, a second front for them to address; although uncoordinated, the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army or ARSA, discussed below, represented yet another front. The AA’s Paletwa branch first established bases just across the border, in Bangladesh’s Shangu–Matamuhri wildlife sanctuary (they likely have bases in India, considering that they’ve launched attacks on the Mizoram [DVB 2017] border with Paletwa). The group’s first foray into Paletwa occurred in March 2015. In December 2016, they occupied Chin and Rakhine villages in remote areas to the west of the Kaladan River; given the lack of communications outside of Paletwa town’s environs, the news of the AA came out slowly, via boat crews that transported rumors of occupation south. The AA withdrew, and then returned to occupy more villages in the spring of 2017, “holding” them for a short while before the Tatmadaw seized some and the AA abandoned others preemptively. These occupations served as “socialization” and recruiting drives in ethnic Rakhine areas; some young Rakhine followed them back across the border. With this ebb and flow of occupation and withdrawal came persistent rumors: of landmines, and of other occupations which may or may not have occurred but are likely, given Paletwa’s terrain, communication silence, and sympathy. The AA launched yet another cross-border raid in July 2017—the middle of the monsoon—occupying 70+ villages, establishing defensive positions on the western banks of the Kaladan, and ambushing a Tatmadaw-commandeered boat dispatched to deal with them, killing 11 soldiers and a civilian and wounding others (Irrawaddy 2017). The AA also disarmed a few Arakan Liberation Party predecessors and torched their guard post. The AA withdrew again before troops could be effectively mobilized against them. The government has more robustly arrived in Paletwa, then, in the form of soldiery. They have established new bases, and they patrol the fields of corn and beans on the riversides. New checkpoints have sprung up to the north and south of Paletwa town, with compulsory inspection of IDs; new bases near Paletwa have emerged from hilltops scraped bare of trees. In January 2018 an official ceremony marked the “re-taking” of the township. But that re-taking was ephemeral. The Tatmadaw lacks

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the numbers to control Paletwa consistently, and given Tatmadaw offensives in Kachin and Shan State North, and the surety of future actions in northern Rakhine, they won’t have those numbers any time soon. The Tatmadaw’s troop movements and supply chains are determinate upon the river and a few helicopter landing zones are hacked out of hillsides. They are vulnerable amongst trees and without roads, constrained by a border they cannot cross and by a human geography that AA may dwell within: they can see the army, but the army cannot see them. The appearance of AA, troop movements in response, and then withdrawals, first of one, then the other, will continue, Vietnam or Afghanistan in sluggish microcosm. State actions, not only in Paletwa but elsewhere, may indirectly provide support to AA’s cause. Anger at the state, across Rakhine, is hardly residual and is fueled by contemporary action, most recently through the cancellation of a commemoration of the fall of the Arakan kingdom to the Burmese two centuries previously, in Mrauk U, Rakhine’s historical capital, in mid-January 2018. Authorities opened fire on Rakhine protesters that night, killing seven, wounding 12 (BBC 2018), and later arresting those same wounded in hospital. This violence is only the biggest in a longer line of recent oppressive moves by government, including the detention of civilians for “unlawful association” charges, and the arrest of a monk who organized an “Arakan army cup” football match (Irrawaddy 2017), for example. Tatmadaw rice confiscations from Rakhine civilians in Paletwa based on the possibility that they may be stockpiled by or for AA surely earn them no fans either. The AA have evolved beyond rural insurgency, and are alleged by the Union to be the murderers of former Mrauk U township administrator Bo Bo Min Theik, stabbed to death and dumped on a roadside next to his torched car in February 2018 (Frontier Myanmar 2018). A roadside bombing of the state minister’s convoy on the Gwa–Sittwe road was attempted in late 2017, and an army convoy was targeted with mines in Minbya. AA may have been behind three Sittwe bombings in February 2018, one of which targeted the State Government Secretary. The group was reported by the Union propaganda outlet Global New Light of Myanmar (2016) to traffic drugs, an allegation which it denies. If the allegation is true, then it is a norm: insurgent groups engage in organized criminal activities to raise funds and buy weapons, because they

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are, by their nature, excluded from licit incomes, and smuggling methamphetamine surely pays greater dividends than the Akyab–Chittagong rice smuggling of previous generations. The author has never met a Chin that offers any sympathy toward the AA. The AA, for their part, leaves Chin alone, bypassing their villages; nor do they levy taxes or seek recruits from them. Not yet, anyway. Allegations of forced porterage from 2015 are remembered, as are landmines allegedly laid by AA. An unlikely, but still possible, future scenario in Paletwa might be ethnic conflict between Rakhine and Chin. The Rakhine nationalist discourse claims Paletwa as part of an earlier kingdom of Arakan. Nationalist mythologists as a rule claim a territory at the point of its greatest historical expansion: witness berserk Salafis claiming Spain. This led to shouting matches between CNF and ALP delegates in previous Union Peace Conferences. How this could play out in Paletwa is another matter. One could imagine a Chin with a flintlock rifle2 firing at an AA soldier for any number of alleged acts, whether it be porterage or mines, and one could imagine what the response could be. Chin would then make eager recruits for new pro-government border militias, and the line between combatant and civilians, as it has so often in Myanmar’s history, would dissolve. Even accidental Tatmadaw reprisals against Chin for AA actions—a crucial aspect of “four cuts” campaigns, and still in evidence today—are extremely unlikely, and if they did occur, would result in more Chin anger toward the former. Only extremely unlikely repetitive reprisals over time would lead to Chin sympathy for AA, and a grudging one at that. They’d rekindle their own insurgency rather than join one that makes claims upon their land.

The Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army The emergence of the AA in Paletwa, and Rakhine, was closely followed by the emergence of the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army or ARSA, in an area with only a human geography to hide amongst. The two groups are exclusive to one another. Nor would they likely be linked, despite the shallow logic of such a move. 2 Unlike pervasive gun restrictions in the rest of Myanmar, the Tatmadaw made an exception for Chin civilians, allowing them to possess hunting rifles so long as they registered them.

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ARSA finds its ideological origins in the Mujahid revolts of the early 1950s. It carried out its first actions in October of 2016, attacking three police outposts in Maungdaw and Rathedaung, Northern Rakhine, killing nine police with bamboo spears and machetes, and stealing firearms and ammunition. They touched off a predictably disproportionate Tatmadaw response. Perhaps in recognition of troop numbers too low to control populations through consistent presence, the Tatmadaw and its proxies opted to expel the populations. Entire villages were razed and tens of thousands of Rohingya fled into Bangladesh. Months of steadily increasing instability followed, with movement tightly controlled by Union Immigration and Tatmadaw. ARSA, for their part, assassinated village heads and civil servants. Smaller scale attacks on security forces continued, mostly to obtain additional weapons, including attacks on Bangladeshi security forces in refugee camps there (Daily Star 2016). While Rakhine nationalists targeted Rohingya since the mid-2000s, with riots and killings increasing in 2008 and 2012, it was the emergence of ARSA which provided Rakhine and Bamar Buddhist nationalists with a moment both catalytic and cathartic: they alleged that Rohingya were radical Salafis for years, and at last—through the laboratory of persecution and the creation of conditions which made life nearly untenable for Rohingya communities—something akin to it emerged. ARSA’s next relatively large-scale action, on August 25, 2017, was reported attacks on 30 police and army posts, killing 12 security and other officials (Guardian 2017). That attacks on such a high number of posts resulted in an inexplicably low number of deaths and no reported wounded passed without comment. The Tatmadaw began large-scale expulsions, using Rakhine militias as proxies; so much livestock was stolen that the price of beef and mutton fell in Sittwe. Well over 600,000 Rohingya fled to Bangladesh, where they remain. ARSA attempted to establish bona fides internationally through the declaration of a monthlong humanitarian pause which was dismissed out of hand. ARSA’s knowledge of geography—human, political, and otherwise—was almost hallucinatory. The Tatmadaw, for their part, understood ARSA better than ARSA understood itself.

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ARSA and AA: A Major Difference At this stage, it’s worth dismissing speculation of any partnership between groups with similar goals and targets. If ARSA survives long enough to professionalize, it is unlikely that any coordination between them and AA could occur. AA toes the Union line on Rohingya, referring to them as migrants at best and terrorists at worst. It shares the government’s sentiment, and the government’s sentiment is less extreme than the public sentiment of what AA regards as its Rakhine civilian support base. Neither AA nor the Tatmadaw would ever consider ARSA as an “Ethnic Armed Organization” or EAO—a classification that carried some credibility within the latest peace process—and no EAO would squander the political capital to do so. Whether or not ARSA is linked to foreign Salafis or not—something that the Chinese government recently declared— EAOs applied the terrorist label to ARSA,3 and they would not want that label applied to themselves by association. All, however, are happy to see the Tatmadaw forced to engage another insurgency on its western flank, however short-lived: one that flared in an easily navigable flatland now devoid of a population to hide amongst, and that now licks its wounds amongst much of the shell-shocked population it claimed to protect, in Bangladesh. Surreptitious coordination of mutual benefit cannot be ruled out, but will be dismissed as serendipity rather than planning if and when it occurs. ARSA’s Future ARSA, for now, speaks a language of autonomy and rights. Current actions against it serve to attract funds and expertise, in areas that are beyond the control of states, and in a human geography of misery just across the border that will provide it with a limitless pool of embittered recruits. What it might do with those recruits other than send them to their deaths is another matter entirely. If ARSA evolves, it might one day pose a threat beyond bamboo spears and the occasionally stolen firearm. The group has fallen into fighting to prevent alternatives to its vision from 3 Many Karen the author knows, including in the KNU, dismiss ARSA as terrorists, and take Union-issued threat warnings about potential attacks across Myanmar seriously, increasing vehicle searches at checkpoints. The New Mon State Party did likewise, demonstrating widespread belief in the government narrative amongst groups who usually don’t trust the government at all.

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arising in the camps, and at this stage it has killed far more Rohingya than non-Rohingya. While militancy in the camps grows in sentiment, proficiency in tactics will evolve elsewhere: the Bangladeshi authorities won’t allow it, and civil servant colleagues there also regard Rohingya as a threat. A future and professional movement may one day factionalize, with a one ARSA continuing to speak of rights and dignity in a fruitless effort to engage with an ephemeral international community beyond the occasional peace concert or academic conference, while a radical faction senses the embarrassing flaccidity of such effort and seeks to attack a “far enemy” beyond northern Rakhine. One could imagine an attack on a Yangon shopping mall attributed to ARSA. If that happens, the remainder of Myanmar’s Rohingya will be driven from the country, with Bangladesh, the days of its current coastline already numbered by rising sea levels, adding another 1.2 million to its population, denuding hillsides and dying of the mudslides that follow, or from cholera in half-collapsed tents. And even if no such catalytic bombing occurs, conditions of life could remain unbearable. It may not be unwarranted to suggest that, within our lifetimes, there may eventually be no Rohingya left in Myanmar. With that in mind, it falls to those attempting to cultivate reconciliation, to ask themselves what long-term workable vision they have for Rakhine—Rohingya, and Bamar—Rohingya relations, divorced from theory and explanation, and reflective of the multitude of parameters to such work, from grassroots to national. Those the author is acquainted with struggle with this: there are no clear answers, and it is beyond the scope of this chapter to extrapolate from the current context the multiplicity of policy changes and instruments that could lead to change, and the willingness of civilian authorities to act upon them. Responses now are built around immediate needs. At the very least it falls to donors to be more critical of the work that they are approached to fund. Standalone interventions overly concerned with assumptions about misunderstanding and the need for dialog, and detached from economics, neglect of Rakhine across generations, and palpable things Rakhine communities can understand and articulate in their own words, lack meaning.

Conclusion Which brings us back to Paletwa—50 miles from Northern Rakhine as the crow flies, or six hour’s drive in the dry season. The road goes via Sittwe and Kyauktaw, and during the rainy season, one must stop and board a

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boat from one of that town’s fetid piers, to travel another six hours to the now-submerged Paletwa town dock, ten miles to the west of Bangladesh. On the other side of that border, far to the north of the desolation of Rohingya camps, tourists trek to waterfalls and ride elephants. It’s an alternate universe to Paletwa, just as Paletwa is a different world from Maungdaw. This mosaic of insurgency represents a Hobbesian world in microcosm, surrounding a simmering Bamar core. In this, Paletwa serves as one of many long threads pulled to unravel the inconsistency of the state which emerged from the 1648 treaty of Westphalia in a place such as Myanmar. Union attempts to build a theoretical state in there are spurred on by challenges to its sovereignty in the form of AA, but how far it might go into the countryside, beyond roads and bases and helicopter landing zones, to give rural citizenry a reason why they might remain in such a place beyond the zero-sum calculus of avoiding counterinsurgency, is anyone’s guess. The civilian minority of Myanmar’s already-contested, Tatmadaw-controlled state struggled to establish its own bona fides in pursuit of the development of a state-citizen compact, the Ministry of Education in particular, but these are tentative steps upon a path that will be walked for generations, as the Union develops to accommodate what it contains. While the fool’s gold of a globalized world may be found in Paletwa town in the form of cheap kitchenware and social network access via new mobile phones, one still butts up everywhere against geography as important now as it was in the age of sail. A future in Myanmar devoid of conflict will be found in either totalitarian dictatorship or federalism and decentralization. The former has never and will never work in such a shatter zone. The latter remains to be agreed upon by sides many of which are still trying to kill one another while talking in circles in a peace process where trust is fleeting, and paradoxically decreases, the longer the process continues. In facilitation and peacekeeping as elsewhere, the future in Myanmar may be a Chinese one, with only the PRC having the clout to bring the northern alliance, under the umbrella of the larger Federal Political Negotiation and Consultation Committee or FPNCC, to Naypyidaw. It may also be able to convince the Tatmadaw that its cynical forms of conflict resolution— opportunistic ceasefires with one group in order to attempt to destroy another, the use of proxies and militias, dangling the bait of a federalism without substance—has not worked in 70 years and won’t work now. The Northern Alliance won’t be destroyed, and there is no “Sri Lanka” option available to the Tatmadaw; the true elephant in the room, the United Wa

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State Party—the lead group in the FPNCC—won’t give up what they have for some lesser autonomy. China has the ability to offer incentives to both state and non-state actors to secure the Myanmar aspects of the Belt and Road Initiative that extends from the battlegrounds of Northern Shan to the Rakhine coast. Substantive discussions around revenue sharing, direct elections for state leadership, increased autonomy in additional Self-Administered Zones, and so on, will have to begin, and despite the Tatmadaw’s insistence on disarmament prior to discussion, only after concrete steps toward federalism begins, will disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration be discussed—not just of insurgents but of proxies and militias as well. This may happen within the Panglong process or some other as suggested by numerous EAOs. The longer I spend in Myanmar, the more I wonder if these insurgencies will last beyond my lifetime, and into the next generation to ponder, by some future traveler, one not yet born, in the same manner that those who made forays into Chin in the 1950s and 1960s would have made predictions for the township very different than what we find today.

References Anderson, B. (2013, March 13). Gangster, ideologue, martyr: The posthumous reinvention of Teungku Badruddin and the nature of the Free Aceh Movement. Conflict, Security and Development 13(1), 31–56. Anderson, B. (2017, April). People, land and poppy: The political ecology of opium and the historical impact of alternative development in northwest Thailand. Forest and Society 1(1). http://journal.unhas.ac.id/index.php/fs/ article/view/1495. Anderson, B. (2018, October). Zomia’s vestiges: Illegible peoples and legible crimes in Omkoi, northwest Thailand. South East Asia Research 26(1). Asia Indigenous People’s Pact. (2012). Drivers of deforestation? Facts to be considered regarding the impact of shifting cultivation in Asia. https://unf ccc.int/resource/docs/2012/smsn/ngo/235.pdf. British Broadcasting Corporation. (2018, January 7). Myanmar police kill seven ethnic Rakhine protesters. BBC. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-427 14024. Buchanan, J. (2016). Militias in Myanmar. The Asia Foundation. http://asiafo undation.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Militias-in-Myanmar.pdf.

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Chasie, C., and Hazarika, S. (2009). The state strikes back: India and the Naga insurgency. East West Center Policy Studies 52. http://www.eastwestcenter. org/publications/state-strikes-back-india-and-naga-insurgency. Daily Star. (2016, May 14). Ansar camp attacked. https://www.thedailystar.net/ frontpage/ansar-camp-attacked-1223542. Democratic Voice of Burma. (2017, August 23). Arakan liberation party says its outpost attacked by Arakan Army. http://english.dvb.no/news/arakan-libera tion-party-says-outpost-attacked-arakan-army/77022. Economist. (2020, April 4). Guerillas with attitude. Economist Online. https:// www.economist.com/asia/2020/04/16/an-ethnic-militia-with-daring-tac tics-is-humiliating-myanmars-army. Frontier Myanmar. (2018, February). Police point finger at AA over Mrauku administrator’s death. https://frontiermyanmar.net/en/police-point-fingerat-aa-over-mrauk-u-administrators-death. Ghoshal, D. (2016, November 5). A year after winning power, Aung San Suu Kyi is struggling to transform Myanmar. Quartz India. https://qz.com/825 494/a-year-after-aung-san-suu-kyi-won-power-the-worlds-most-famous-politi cal-prisoner-is-struggling-to-transform-myanmar/. Global New Light of Myanmar. (2016, February). How to fund a war. http://globalnewlightofmyanmar.com/how-to-fund-a-war-arakan-armyofficer-arrested-with-guns-drugs-in-yangon/. Guardian. (2017, August 25). Dozens killed in fighting between Myanmar army and Rohingya militants. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/aug/ 25/rohingya-militants-blamed-as-attack-on-myanmar-border-kills-12. Irrawaddy. (2017, November 9). Tatmadaw troops killed and wounded in Arakan army ambush. https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/tatmadaw-troopskilled-wounded-arakan-army-ambush.html. Kramer, T. (2007). The United Wa State Party: Narco-army or ethnic nationalist party? East West Center Policy Studies 38. http://www.eastwestcenter.org/pub lications/united-wa-state-party-narco-army-or-ethnic-nationalist-party. Levin, D. (2014, December 1). Searching for Burmese jade and finding misery. New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/02/world/searchingfor-burmese-jade-and-finding-misery.html. Mathieson, D. S. (2017, June 11). Shadowy rebels extend Myanmar’s wars. Asia Times. Scott, J. C. (2009). The art of not being governed: An anarchist history of upland Southeast Asia. New Haven: Yale University Press. Unger, J. (1997, July 1). Not quite Han: The ethnic minorities of China’s southwest. Critical Asian Studies 29(3), 67–78. http://psc.bellschool.anu. edu.au/sites/default/files/IPS/PSC/CCC/publications/papers/JU_not_ quite_han.pdf.

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United Nations. (N.D.). Integrated disarmament, demobilization and reintegration operational guidelines. http://www.unddr.org/uploads/documents/Ope rational%20Guide.pdf.

CHAPTER 14

Patterns of Japanese Development Assistance for Social Transformation in Reform-Era Myanmar David M. Potter

Background ODA is a key component of Japan’s economic and diplomatic relationship with ASEAN and Myanmar. Japan has had a long but complicated aid relationship with Burma/Myanmar since its inception in the 1950s, one that has taken on new life as Japanese aid, and investment have flowed

An early draft of this chapter was presented at the Burma Studies Seminar 2017, Center for Asian Legal Exchange, Nagoya University, March 8–9, 2017. The current chapter was completed with support from the Nanzan University Pache 1-A-2 2020 research subsidy and Japan Society for the Promotion of Science general (B) grant 20K01516 (2020–2022). D. M. Potter (B) Nanzan University, Nagoya, Japan e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 C. Yamahata and B. Anderson (eds.), Demystifying Myanmar’s Transition and Political Crisis, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-6675-9_14

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back into Myanmar in the wake of the economic and political liberalization process begun in 2011. Japan’s interests in Myanmar are significant and varied and Myanmar’s development needs are great. Japan’s aid has the potential to help catalyze Myanmar’s economic and social transformation but is frequently criticized for its bias in favor of the pursuit of economic interests and good relations with Naypyidaw over the needs of the rest of society, especially ethnic minorities of the periphery. Khai (2019) has outlined Japanese aid policy toward Myanmar since liberalization, focusing on diplomatic and political issues. To date, however, no study has laid out exactly what Japanese official development assistance (ODA) actually providies to Myanmar and to whom. This chapter provides a spatial analysis of Japanese development assistance to Myanmar since 2005 in three dimensions: over time, by development sector, and by region of the country. It examines government-to-government aid transfers and significant assistance by Japanese nongovernmental organizations. The chapter therefore focuses on the issue of aid allocation understood in terms of the traditional political science question of who gets what, when, and why? It concludes that aid has increased over time, supports more development sectors, and is reaching more areas of the country, but the patterns by which this is done still favor areas of the Burman majority and cushion the Japanese government from the politically delicate task of national reconciliation between the central government and the ethnic periphery.

Japanese Interest in Myanmar Myanmar is an important aid recipient for Japan for a number of reasons. First, Myanmar and Japan have an old aid relationship that has its origins in Japanese war reparations. Prior to 1988 Japan was Myanmar’s preeminent bilateral aid donor (Seekins 2007). Second, although the diplomatic relationship has been difficult at times, especially after 1988, the Japanese government preferred engagement instead of isolation in its diplomatic interactions with the government of Myanmar. Hence, it provided modest amounts of humanitarian assistance throughout the post-1988 period. Third, Myanmar is seen as an economic opportunity for Japanese business, smarting from stagnant growth at home and previously restrained by international sanctions from a more active role in Myanmar. Fourth, Myanmar is a partner in Japan’s efforts to promote ASEAN and Mekong connectivity. Japan has been interested in the development

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of the Mekong River sub-region for many years. JICA (2012: 27) outlines its understanding of Mekong connectivity thus: Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Viet Nam have fallen behind in economic development, and are struggling with high poverty rates. Despite these problems, the region is attractive for investments because of its strong economic growth and political stability. With prospects for significant growth in the future, this region is expected to have a stronger relationship with Japan. JICA is implementing a broad range of projects to narrow the development gap within the region and to develop the region further. These projects are based on the Tokyo Strategy 2012 for MekongJapan Cooperation, which was announced at the April 2012 Mekong-Japan Summit Meeting as well as the Vision of the Vital Artery for East-West and Southern Economic Corridor, which is part of Japan’s support for ASEAN connectivity, and other initiatives.

Bilateral and Asian Development Bank aid has supported projects in the CLMV countries. Geographic contiguity and the integration of the Indochina countries and Myanmar provide an important spatial dimension to Japan’s attempts to foster “connectivity” (both within the region and with Japan), a key goal in the promotion of the Japan-Mekong Regional Partnership Program inaugurated in 2007 (Sudo 2015: 220). Finally, Myanmar is understood as geopolitically important. Japan supports east–west connectivity that links the China Seas to the Indian Ocean and the Mekong countries. Emphasis on mainland Southeast Asia’s east–west connectivity has two potential payoffs. First, it mirrors Japan’s strategic understanding of the importance of Southeast Asian sea lanes. At the same time, the East–West Corridor and the Southern Corridor development projects parallel the sea lanes of the South China Sea and the Malacca Strait. For a country like Japan on the East Asian littoral, this pair of corridors provides an alternative to transport through the Malacca Strait, the geostrategic chokepoint between the Indian Ocean and East Asia. Myanmar is the key link in continental ASEAN connectivity and therefore Mekong sub-region connectivity. Myanmar’s development needs are great. As of this writing it ranks 145th among 189 countries in the Human Development Index (UNDP 2019), second lowest among the ASEAN countries (Cambodia ranks 146th). Its HDI values improved between 2005 and 2017 (ASEAN 2019: 24). It remains among the Least Developed Countries according

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to the Development Assistance Committee’s list of ODA recipients (OECD 2020). Estimates of 2018 show that it has the lowest GDP per capita (US$1326) in ASEAN (Me de miru ASEAN 2019). Myanmar has welcomed renewed Japanese investment and aid since 2012. Scott Morris (2016: 4) argues that “Myanmar’s reforms were partly motivated by its desire to lessen its reliance on China, its largest trading partner and the source of large-scale external financing during a period when foreign flows from other sources were extremely limited.” Myanmar’s opening has provided the opportunity for Japan and the United States to better engage it as a counterweight to China, an opportunity the Japanese government has been quick to grasp (Morris 2016: 5; Seekins 2015). The reform process in Myanmar since 2011 also opened up greater possibilities for ASEAN-India connectivity and implementation of India’s Look East policy (Potter 2020). Japanese aid and investment at Dawei will complete the western end of the East–West Economic Corridor, and Thai-Japanese cooperation in the development of Thilawa extends its northwest. Since the 2011 liberalization Myanmar and Japan have revived ties across a number of policy areas, including diplomatic relations, nascent security cooperation, and active economic cooperation (Haacke 2018: 302–304). From 2011 to 2020 Japan resumed its place as Myanmar’s most generous bilateral ODA donor. Table 14.1 shows that Myanmar has jumped into the top ten of Japan’s bilateral aid recipients worldwide, achieving the status of top recipient in 2013. In turn, Japan has become Myanmar’s largest official development assistance donor. Table 14.1 Top ten recipients of Japan’s ODA

Rank

2013–2014

2014–2015

2017–2018

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Myanmar Vietnam India Indonesia Afghanistan Iraq Thailand Bangladesh Philippines Sri Lanka

Vietnam India Indonesia Philippines Bangladesh Iraq Afghanistan Thailand Myanmar Sri Lanka

India Bangladesh Viet Nam Indonesia Iraq Myanmar Philippines Thailand Mongolia Uzbekistan

Source OECD, Aid at a glance charts, selected years

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Japanese Aid to Myanmar, 2005–2019 Japan’s official aid policy toward Myanmar since 2011 is to support democratization; restoration of peace; reform aimed at rapid and sustainable development; and broad distribution of the benefits of reform. It places emphasis on three sectors: (1) improving living conditions for citizens, including ethnic minorities (emphasis added), through assistance for development in the social sectors; (2) development of human capacity to further economic and social development, including democratization assistance; and (3) sustainable economic growth through assistance for infrastructure development (JMOFA 2015: 28). Critics of Japanese aid to Myanmar have pointed out its lack of understanding of local conditions in ethnic minority regions (Karen Peace Support Network 2014; Khai 2019) and emphasis on economic considerations over political issues such as human rights and ethnic autonomy from central government encroachment (Seekins 2015). This is of course the dilemma for an international donor, official or nongovernmental: does one avoid providing aid because of bad governance or does one provide what assistance one can despite the potential negative impacts on society? As stated above, the Japanese government perceives a variety of interests to be pursued in restoring aid relations with Myanmar and chosen the latter course. This has been facilitated by a predisposition to distribute Japanese through official channels while adopting a superficially neutral and technocratic attitude that focuses on project-specific development outcomes and avoids deeper analysis of power relations between central governments and their citizens. This predisposition is reinforced in the case of recipients like Myanmar where governments are highly unlikely to let aid donors dictate what will be provided and where. Recipient government preferences extend to nongovernmental organizations, which are obliged to sign memoranda of understanding with government agencies if they wish to engage in extended development or humanitarian relief efforts in country. In short, despite its inability to control populations and territory in large swathes of the ethnic periphery of its own country the central government in Naypyidaw acts as a sovereign government in setting conditions on how to assist social transformation in Myanmar. By and large Japanese aid organizations, official and nongovernmental, have been willing to accept that. It is therefore important to examine the ODA Japan actually providies to Myanmar. The following sections provide a spatial analysis of Japan’s

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Table 14.2 Japanese ODA to Myanmar by modality, 2005–2019 (unit: 100 million yen)

Year

Loans

Grants

Technical assistance

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1998.81 510.52 983.14 1257.38 1358.08 1170.40 0 1688.58

17.17 13.54 11.81 41.29 23.03 13.33 45.13 277.30 199.76 181.89 176.05 156.14 135.07 156.34 66.1

16.41 21.11 20.02 22.91 23.31 20.24 21.23 42.00 61.59 70.50 87.63 98.12 92.00 Na Na

actual aid commitments to Myanmar along three dimensions: over time, by development sector, and by region. The author set a beginning date of 2005 and gathered available data on aid through 2019. The choice to start at 2005 is somewhat arbitrary as some Japanese aid, both official and nongovernmental, can be traced with some accuracy back to the 1990s. However, the resulting data set covers 15 years of allocations that occur before and after the onset of liberalization in 2011, 2010, and 2015 national parliamentary elections, and the 2015 ceasefire agreement between the central government and key ethnic armed organizations. Between 2005 and 2019 Japan provided 216 loan and direct grant aid budget allocations, maintained an active technical assistance profile, and funded several hundred more NGO, local government, and community organization projects through its Japanese NGO subsidy, and grassrootshuman security subsidy (see Tables 14.2–14.12). A subsequent section reviews assistance by the Nippon Foundation and Japan Platform.

Methodology The following sections examine that assistance by aid volume, an indicator of donor political commitment; then examines each aid modality (loans, grants, technical assistance, and civil society support) by sector and region within Myanmar. Data were collected from two online sources

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maintained by the Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs: the Kunibetsu ODA Detashuu (data on aid by country) and the List of Exchange of Notes, each updated annually. Each has benefits and drawbacks for data collection. The former provides annual budget and project information for each recipient country, while the latter has more detailed information on projects, including links to project descriptions that proved helpful in specifying regional and sectoral distributions. The latter proved indispensable when collecting data on NGO projects as the Detashuu lists only total budget amounts and number of projects funded. Occasional discrepancies exist between the two databases. Japanese bilateral aid is predominantly project-based, so there can be a significant variation in annual allocations depending on formal agreement on specific projects (see Potter 1996). For example, Myanmar did not receive any new loan aid commitments in 2018, but then received its highest-ever allocation in 2019. Aid Amounts Tables 14.2 and 14.3 present annual data on aid allocations by modality, first by aid amount and then by number of projects. At the time of writing the Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs had not published final statistics Table 14.3 Japanese ODA projects to Myanmar by modality, 2005–2019

Year

Loans

Grants

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 4 6 6 7 4 0 6

6 7 5 13 15 14 8 18 13 14 15 18 20 11 4

Technical assistance na na na na na na na 3 8 5 7 5 4 na na

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for 2018 and 2019, so loan and grant figures in the tables are approximations derived by aggregating Detashuu project data for those years. Official technical assistance figures were not available in either database at the time of writing, and technical assistance data prior to 2012 could not be used as reported in project calculations for Table 14.3. Table 14.3 does not include subsidized NGO projects as they are analyzed separately below. The data make clear the shift in Japanese aid after 2011. New loan aid had been suspended after 1988, although modest levels of grant aid and technical assistance continued to be provided in the 1990s. Technical assistance in particular had been regularly provided throughout the period of Myanmar’s international isolation. That said, after 2011 the increase in aid across loan all three modalities is clear. The increases are multi-dimensional: more aid, more projects, and larger scale projects with larger individual allocations.

Sectoral Allocations Sectoral allocations for loan and grant aid are presented in Tables 14.4 and 14.5. Data are aggregated by five-year periods to clarify patterns across time. Loan aid is remarkably stable across sectors even as projects increased from 2012–2014 to 2015–2019. The most significant change occurred in the debt reduction category: two debt reduction allocations in the first period were prerequisites for restarting loan aid in 2012 and are not repeated thereafter. The economic infrastructure sectors predominate, especially transportation and energy and electrification, a pattern Table 14.4 Sectoral allocations of loan aid projects to Myanmar, 2010–2019 (number of projects)

Sector Transportation Energy/Electricity Communications Waterworks Agriculture/Forestry Industry/Finance Debt reduction EWEC project multisectoral

2010–2014

2015–2019

3 1 1 1 1

9 6 2 2 2

2 1

1 6

14

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Table 14.5 Sectoral allocations of grant aid projects to Myanmar, 2005–2019 (number of projects) Sector Transportation Energy/Electricity Communications Waterworks Agriculture/Forestry Industry/Finance Education/Human Resources Medicine and Health Food aid Disaster relief/reconstruction Peacebuilding Program/nonproject Refugee/IDPs Culture Democracy/governance multisectoral Grants via multilateral institutions

2005–2009

2010–2014

2015–2019

11 7 1 15

8 3 2 4 3 1 7 7 2 5

3 1 1 2 3 1 8 3 2 5 3

1

2 11 1

17

18

4

11 1 2 7 20

typical of Japan’s loan aid and found in other countries as well (see Potter 1996; Potter and Potter Seminar 2019). Grant aid is more broadly distributed, with clustering in the social development sectors and humanitarian assistance. Education/human resources, medicine and health, and disaster relief and reconstruction predominate in the first period but taper in later periods. The refugees/IDPs numbers, in contrast, are prominent after 2010, suggesting a reallocation of grant aid from the former sectors to the latter. Note that there is a broadening of sectoral allocations after 2011. This includes allocations for economic infrastructure development, although on a smaller scale than loan aid projects in those sectors. It also includes limited steps to support political and economic liberalization, as evidenced in allocation for peacebuilding, democracy/governance (election support in 2015 and judicial reform), and industry/finance (financial sector reform). Finally, many projects were supported by allocations through United Nations development agencies. These allocations were in the disaster relief and reconstruction, food aid, and refugees and IDPs categories. This no

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doubt reflects donor best practice, as assistance through multilateral agencies reduces the number of agencies in the field distributing short-term relief aid in highly fluid situations. However, it also allows Myanmar’s most important bilateral donor to distance itself from the political implications of ongoing conflicts that provoke the need for humanitarian assistance in the first place.

Sectoral Distribution of ODA-Subsidized NGO Projects Since 1989 the Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs has provided subsidies to Japanese NGOs and civil society and local organizations conducting development work in recipient countries. Since 2003 the following two subsidies have been the main vehicles for this support. Total budget and project number data are included in annual figures for the grant aid program. Table 14.1 includes those figures in the data presented in the grant aid column, but the author excluded them from the project figures in Table 14.2 as their scale is very small when measured against regular grant aid projects and direct one-to-one comparison by project numbers would be misleading. The subsidy data provide, however, a reliable and comparable dataset that can serve as a window on to the role of civil society organizations in the context of Japan’s development assistance. Table 14.6 presents the sectoral distributions of projects undertaken by Table 14.6 Sectoral allocations of Japanese NGO subsidized projects to Myanmar, 2005–2019 (number of projects) Sector Transportation Energy/Electricity Communications Waterworks Agriculture/Forestry Education/Human Resources Medicine and Health Social Services/livelihood Food aid Disaster relief/reconstruction Peacebuilding/democracy

2005–2009

2010–2014

2015–2019

4

3 1 2 4 5 14 24 3

7

6 4 12 3 1 3

2

1 7 6 15 16 3 8 1

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Japanese NGOs in Myanmar and funded through the grant aid program. Ministry data provides a sectoral nomenclature that is slightly different from that used in the previous tables but is nevertheless close. The author added the peacebuilding/democracy category separately. As found in the broader grant aid program NGO projects span the economic infrastructure and social development sectors but concentrate in education/human resources and medicine and health. This is consistent with what is known about Japanese international NGOs’ sectoral preferences more broadly (see JICA 2008). Prominent among the NGOs receiving subsidies are Bridge Asia Japan (BAJ), the Association of Medical Doctors of Asia (AMDA), and Save the Children Japan, leading NGOs with histories of aid work in Myanmar back to the 1990s and willing to work with both the governments of Japan and Myanmar. All three are affiliated with Japan Platform, discussed below. At the same time, there are a number of economic infrastructure projects in the transportation and energy sectors represented in the table. These projects constructed or refurbished local roads and bridges in rural communities. Assistance to Myanmar Civil Society Grassroots/Human security grants subsidize local civil society organizations directly. As the number of projects listed in Table 14.7 suggests many more local organizations have received subsidies than have Japanese NGOs under the subsidy scheme discussed above. Table 14.7 Sectoral allocations of Grassroots/Human Security projects in Myanmar, 2005–2019 (number of projects) Sector Transportation/Communications Energy/Electricity Waterworks Agriculture/Forestry Industry/Finance Education/Human Resources Medicine and Health Social Services Disaster relief/reconstruction Environment

2015–2019a

2005–2009

2010–2014

12 2 9 4

8

18

7 7

2

70 50 7 1

90 42 3 1

a No projects were funded under this scheme in 2019

1 105 8 1 1

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As with NGO subsidy projects Grassroots/Human security projects run the gamut from economic infrastructure to social development but with a strong concentration in education and human resource development and, secondarily, medicine and health. Project reports show that school construction and rehabilitation (especially after natural disasters) are common, as are construction of clinics and local hospitals. Similarly, and consistent with Japanese NGO projects discussed above, transportation projects involve construction and rebuilding of rural roads and bridges. One is left here with the impression of small-scale physical infrastructure development in the pursuit of local social transformation.

Regional Allocations Where does Japanese aid go in Myanmar? Tables 14.8–14.12 present the distributions of each aid modality by administrative region of the country. The tables are arranged on a north–south axis beginning with the Burman core (Central Region to Ayeyarwady), Thanintharyi Division in the extreme south, then the ethnic states of the west (Chin and Rakhine), Table 14.8 Regional allocations of loan aid projects in Myanmar, 2010–2019 (number of projects)

Region Central Region, regionala Sagaing Mandalay Magway Bago Yangon Ayeyarwady Thanintharyi Chin State Rakhine State Kachin State Shan State Karen State Kayah State Mon State Ethnic states regionala National, unspecified

2010–2014

2015–2019

3

5 1 1

1 4

1 7

1

4

3 5

a Projects specifying three or more states or divisions but not

“nationwide”

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283

and finally the ethnic states of the east (Kachin to Mon). Projects covering three or more administrative regions but identifiable as either Burman core or ethnic periphery were included the “Central region, regional” and “ethnic states, regional” categories, while projects that crossed the core-periphery divide or for which location could not be determined were included in the “National, unspecified” category. Tables 14.8 and 14.9 present data on regional distributions of loan aid and technical assistance. Technical assistance reporting changed after 2011, allowing a limited analysis. The regional concentration of projects is clear: loan aid projects support “nation-building” infrastructure development in the Burman core. In both periods for which loan aid was given Yangon and Bago were favored, especially so because in fact Central Region regional projects were mostly allocated for transportation projects linking the central region’s urban areas from Mandalay to Yangon. Even in the Burman core the peripheries, Sagaing, and Thanintharyi received no direct loan aid. The inclusion of Kayah State on the list is attributable to the refurbishment of the Baluchaung Hydroelectric power plant, a legacy project that goes back to the original war reparations whence Japan’s aid relationship with Myanmar developed. Table 14.9 Regional allocations of technical assistance projects to Myanmar, 2012–2017 (number of projects)

Region Central Region, regional Sagaing Mandalay Magway Naypyidaw Bago Yangon Ayeyarwady Thanintharyi Chin State Rakhine State Kachin State Shan State Karen State Kayah State Mon State Ethnic states regional National, unspecified

Projects 4 1 2 1 2 3 10 2

1 1 1 1

10

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D. M. POTTER

Technical assistance projects are somewhat more evenly spread across the country but still favor the Burman core. Ethnic states in the period represented were still limited to single projects. Moreover, we have to be a bit careful with official statistics here because Japanese aid accounting classifies projects either as specific to a region or “nationwide.” The latter category includes transregional projects but also serves as a catchall for technical assistance and grant projects carried out by national government ministries. Thus, a fair amount of aid budgeted for “nationwide” projects is actually spent in Naypyidaw. As Table 14.10 makes clear, along with the increase in projects following liberalization grant aid has been distributed across the country: the shift from concentration on the Burman core pre-2011 to a more equal distribution between core and periphery post-2011 is striking. This is true not only for specific ethnic states but grant aid among multiple ethnic states as well. Note also, however, the concentration in the periphery on Rakhine State in the final period. This concentration is related to the focus on refugees/IDPS in grant aid seen in Table 14.5. Table 14.10 Regional allocations of grant aid projects in Myanmar, 2005–2019 (number of projects)

Region Central Region, regional Sagaing Mandalay Magway Bago Yangon Ayeyarwady Thanintharyi Chin State Rakhine State Kachin State Shan State Karen State Kayah State Mon State Ethnic states regional National, unspecified

2005–2009

2010–2014

2015–2019

3

6

3

1

1 1

1 1

1 1

5 3

7 2 2 1 11

1 1 1 1 2

19

2

6

5

20

18

14

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PATTERNS OF JAPANESE DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE …

Regional Distribution of ODA-Subsidized NGO Projects and Grassroots/Human Security Projects Tables 14.11 and 14.12 complete the statistical survey, presenting data on regional distributions of Japanese NGO subsidized projects and Grassroots/Human security projects carried out by local civil society organizations. As with grant aid in general civil society organizations are represented across the country. This is true before and after the initiation of liberalization in 2011 with a trend toward broader inclusion over time. Even in the Burman core there is a diversification of projects out of centers like Yangon toward the Ayeyarwady and Sagaing. Unlike grant aid, however, projects are small-scale and correspondingly local in their scope. Regional projects are therefore few in number. Grassroots/ Human security projects are more inclusive than those of their Japanese counterparts. In part, this is due to access, since not all ethnic regions are open to foreign organizations without prior central government approval. Notice the discrepancy in project numbers in Table 14.11 Regional allocations of Japanese NGO subsidized projects to Myanmar, 2005–2019 (number of projects)

Region Central Region, regional Sagaing Mandalay Magway Bago Yangon Ayeyarwady Thanintharyi Chin State Rakhine State Kachin State Shan State Karen State Kayah State Mon State Ethnic states regional National, unspecified

2005–2009

6 3 3 3 2

1 1 5

2010–2014

2015–2019

2

3

5 8 5 10 5

1 7 8 3 7

11 3

2 1 1 10 10

1

2

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D. M. POTTER

Table 14.12 Regional allocations of Grassroots-human security NGO subsidized projects to Myanmar, 2005–2019 (number of projects)

Region Central Region regional Sagaing Mandalay Magway Bago Yangon Ayeyarwady Thanintharyi Chin State Rakhine State Kachin State Shan State Karen State Kayah State Mon State Ethnic states regional National, unspecified

2005–2009

2010–2014

2015–2019

1 15 2 2 50 14 2 3 7 7 13 8 6 6

8 13 15 17 35 18 10 16 7 16 15 12 12 6

17 5 29 23 4 32 3 14 12 12 7 4 9 7

1

5

Kachin State, for example. It may also reflect the tendency of international NGOs to locate where infrastructure and services facilitate their operations, a tendency identified by Koch (2009).

Parallel Dual-Track Civil Society Initiatives Two other significant Japanese assistance programs operate in Myanmar. One is Japan Platform, a consortium of leading Japanese NGOs backed up by financial and other assistance from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Keidanren, the national federation of the country’s largest manufacturers. The other is the Nippon Foundation, a private foundation with close ties to the Japanese government and a continuous presence in Myanmar well back into the period of international isolation. Japan Platform allocations for Myanmar are included in total grant figures presented in Table 14.2 but detailed analysis using the methodology followed in subsequent tables is not possible using available sources. Nippon Foundation projects are carried out separately in what amounts to a dual-track aid diplomacy. Therefore, these two programs are analyzed separately here.

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Japan Platform focuses on humanitarian assistance. In early 2013 it signed a memorandum of understanding with the Myanmar Peace Center in Yangon to carry out a series of humanitarian projects over three years to assist refugees in the Myanmar-Thai border area to return and resettle in Karen State. Fifteen NGOs were involved in various interventions (Japan Platform 2015). Since 2017 the consortium has shifted its attention to the western border with Bangladesh and India, carrying out resettlement and humanitarian assistance projects in support of refugees and IDPs dislocated by ethnic violence in Rakhine State (Japan Platform 2020). The Nippon Foundation occupies a singular position in Japan’s assistance in reforming Myanmar, a private, nonprofit foundation acting as a vehicle of dual-track diplomacy. In addition to an active development and humanitarian assistance profile in country, discussed below, its affiliate foundations have promoted United States-Japan information exchange on Myanmar (Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA 2015) and helped foster emerging security cooperation between Japan’s Self-Defense Forces (notably the Maritime Self-Defense Forces) and the Tatmadaw. Most significantly, Foundation chairman Sasakawa Yohei was appointed Special Envoy of the Government of Japan for National Reconciliation in Myanmar, a quasi-official position in he has since served as Japan’s representative in official ceasefire and peace negotiations between the central government of Myanmar and the country’s numerous ethnic armed organizations. Sasakawa signed the historic ceasefire agreements in 2015 and 2018 between Naypyidaw and most of the major ethnic armies and has continued to offer Japan’s good offices as its representative. The Nippon Foundation, therefore, is most clearly at the center of the highly political processes of national reconciliation and peacebuilding in Myanmar. The Foundation maintains an active assistance program in Myanmar that focuses on six sectors: human resources development (including technical training in cooperation with Japanese companies); health care; school education (its school construction assistance dates back to the mid-1970s); agriculture; support for people with disabilities; and peacebuilding. Peacebuilding includes efforts to “build trust between the government and ethnic armed organizations,” assist people affected by conflict, and promote the concept of civilian control. As of March 2018 the Foundation reported a mix of sectoral activities in every division and state except Mon State and Tanintharyi Division (Nippon Foundation 2018). The only areas where it did not report peacebuilding activities alongside its more traditional development work were the Ayeyarwady

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Division, presumably because it is not needed, and Kachin State, where the Kachin Independence Army remains outside the formal ceasefire negotiation process. Since 2014 the Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs has implemented an assistance program to support the peace process in Myanmar’s ethnic minority areas. This is a program outside the grant and NGO programs discussed above. As of the end of March 2020 the ministry had made 35 allocations for humanitarian assistance, the majority of which were implemented by the Nippon Foundation. The projects cover a variety of types of humanitarian assistance but are all labeled under the rubric of peacebuilding in the ministry database (Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2020c). Projects have ranged across the country’s ethnic minority regions to areas not reached by other NGO subsidies, indicating the Foundation’s unusual position in Japan-Myanmar aid relations. Two geographical points, however, are notable. The first is the concentration of activity in Karen State and eastern Mon State, two states that have not been favored by the regular aid program. The second is the nearly complete absence of assistance in Kachin State until 2020. The distribution of aid to areas with ethnic armed organizations willing to negotiate ceasefires and the Foundation’s central role in its distribution are clear indicators of the Japanese approach of providing aid as an inducement to discuss restoration of peace. It is also indicative of the understanding of Japanese aid agencies that peacebuilding requires social and economic development (see Amakasu and Potter 2016).

Discussion Comparing Japan’s basic aid policy on Myanmar with actual aid allocations reveals the following. First, while support of democratization is a basic policy there is little actual aid directly for it. Restoration of peace and reforms aimed at rapid and sustainable development are better addressed. The separate budget line for humanitarian assistance channeled through the Nippon Foundation is a significant example of this and suggests that the Japanese government sees restoration of peace as a prerequisite of further democratization and with it “broad distribution of the benefits of reform.” Comparison of allocations with the three priority sectors shows some reversal of priorities when measured by funding commitments. Infrastructure development for economic growth outweighs social development.

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Loan and grant aid both reflect the preoccupation with sustainable economic growth through assistance for infrastructure development. Support for the Thilawa Special Economic Zone, future development of Dawei, and ongoing aid for Baluchaung Hydroplant 2 are significant cases. Debt relief also took up a substantial portion of loan aid in 2012 and 2013. Grant aid and technical assistance reflect a mix of economic development and social development concerns, the former focusing on the preparatory phases of long-term transportation and production sector development and the latter focusing on social and community development projects, including in ethnic communities. Subsidized NGO projects have a clearer social development and human security focus. These are typically small-scale projects that approach human security from the freedom from want perspective favored by the Japanese government (see Amakasu and Potter 2016). As mentioned earlier, many of these projects are carried out in ethnic minority regions. Like grant aid partnerships with UNHCR and UNDP in IDP assistance, partnerships with NGOs in the provision of human security assistance afford the Japanese government a certain distance from communities when dealing with politically sensitive policy issues. Regional configurations are also related to aid modalities, that is whether the aid is loan aid, grant aid, technical assistance, and subsidies to NGOs. Simply, loan aid is concentrated in the Burman core. Given the scale of yen loan projects this means that aid resources favor that region. Commitments to the development of Dawei may change this pattern, but, as Catherine Dalpino (2016) wrote recently, “Dawei will be a long-term effort: although some initial construction could begin this year, the entire facility could take as long as four decades to complete.” Limited evidence suggests that technical assistance follows the pattern of loan aid, concentrating around the Yangon-Delta area, Nayphidaw, and other divisions of the Burman core. Grant aid and NGO aid are much more broadly distributed across the country. Within this pattern, however, we find another: grant aid still tends to cluster in the Burman areas of the country, while NGO aid extends to the peripheries. This is a pattern that can be discerned in Japanese aid to Iraq after 2003. Official aid clustered around Baghdad and Al-Muthanah Province, where the Self-Defense Forces were stationed: ODA-subsidized NGO projects concentrated in the Kurdish region of the country where many Japanese NGOs had been working since the 1990s (Potter 2004).

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This pattern of aid modalities is related to sectoral distributions of Japanese aid to Myanmar since 2012. Japan’s basic policy on aid to Myanmar since 2011 highlights the twin issues of democratization and alleviation of ethnic conflict. That said, Japan’s basic aid orientation in general is to support the development of economic productive sectors primarily through assistance for economic infrastructure development. The Japanese commitment to the construction of SEZs at Thilawa and Dawei is consistent with this overall orientation. Conversely, assistance for democratization and alleviation of ethnic conflict in Myanmar are problematic for Japan. “Nation building” in the form of developing an economic base for national development assumes a centralized, competent state with a clear commitment to promoting the national weal and capable of carrying out development in the country’s periphery. These are problematic propositions in the Burmese case. In addition, Japan’s democracy assistance focuses on reforming state institutions, such as the courts and the police, rather than the development of a democratic and independent civil society. Thus, values-based diplomacy and democracy assistance runs the risk of strengthening a still-authoritarian state while ignoring the concerns of ethnic minorities.

Conclusion What do these patterns tell us about the impact of Japanese aid on Myanmar’s transformation? First, values diplomacy, including democratization and economic liberalization, has been an important component of the Japanese government’s approach to partners in Asia since the inauguration of the Abe administration in 2006. However, second, donors have objectives other than the political and economic development in mind when they give aid. Myanmar’s geopolitical position in ASEAN and the Indian Ocean means that Tokyo, within limits, will want to assist any friendly government in Naypyidaw, no matter what its political record might be. Japan’s record of diplomatic engagement from 1988 to 2011 confirms that. Moreover, the business opportunities to Japanese companies that follow the provision of aid will likely give issues of democratization short shrift. Third, Japan’s understanding of democratization begins with the concept of a strong state and not necessarily a strong civil society. Technical assistance in this area focuses on professionalization and improved capacity of state institutions. The overall thrust of Japanese aid in favor of economic and social infrastructure development is not directly

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related to either democratization or settlement of ethnic conflict. This disconnect is ameliorated somewhat by cooperation with UN agencies and NGOs.

References Amakasu, P. and Potter, D. M. (2016) Peacebuilding and the human securitization of Japan’s foreign aid. In S. Brown and J. Grävingholt (eds.) The securitization of foreign aid (85–112). New York: Palgrave. ASEAN Secretariat (2019) ASEAN key figures 2019. Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat. https://www.aseanstats.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/11/ASEAN_ Key_Figures_2019.pdf. Accessed July 3, 2020. Dalpino, C. (2016) Japan-Southeast Asia relations: Incremental, but groundbreaking steps. Comparative Connections 18(1): 139–146. Haacke, J. (2018) Regional. In A. Simpson, N. Ferrelly, and I. Holliday (eds.) Routledge handbook of contemporary Myanmar (300–311). London and New York: Routledge. JICA (2008) Understanding Japanese NGOs through facts and practices. Tokyo: JICA. JICA (2012) Strategic cooperation for sharing prosperity between Japan and Southeast Asia, JICA annual report 2012. Tokyo: Japan International Cooperation Agency. Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2015) Kunibetsu ODA detabukku. Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Japan Platform (2015) Reintegration assistance program for refugees/IDPs of Myanmar, 2013–2015. Tokyo: Japan Platform. https://www.japanplatform. org/info/docs/130325_Release_Myanmar_E.pdf. Accessed July 4, 2020. Japan Platform (2020) Myanma- hinanmin jindou shien. https://www.japanplat form.org/programs/myanmar-refugees2017/. Accessed July 4, 2020. Karen Peace Support Network (2014) Critique of Japan International Cooperation Agency’s blueprint for development in Southeastern Burma/Myanmar. Karen Peace Support Network. Khai, K. S. (2019) Japan’s official development assistance diplomacy toward Myanmar post 2012. MFU Connexion 7(1): 68–92. Koch, D. (2009) Aid from international NGOs: Blind spots on the aid allocation map. New York and London: Routledge. Me de miru ASEAN: ASEAN keizai toukei kiso shiryou (2019) Ajia Taiheiyoushuu-kyoku Seisaku Sanjikanshitsu. https://www.mofa.go.jp/ mofaj/files/000127169.pdf. Accessed July 3, 2020. Morris, S. (2016) Responding to AIIB: U.S. leadership at the multilateral development banks in a new era. CGD Working Paper 091.

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Nippon Foundation (2018) The Nippon Foundation Myanmar support progam. Pdf file. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2020) DAC list of ODA recipients effective for reporting on 2018, 2019, and 2020 flows. http://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/develo pment-finance-standards/daclist.htm. Accessed June 1, 2020. Potter, D. (1996) Japan’s foreign aid to Thailand and the Philippines. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Potter, D. (2004) Japan’s assistance in the Iraq war. Academia: Humanities and Social Sciences 82: 453–471. Potter, D. M. (2020) Japanese official development assistance, geopolitics, and ‘connectivity’ in the Mekong region: Implications for aid to Myanmar. In C. Yamahata, S. Sudo, and T. Matsugi (eds.) Rights and security in India, Myanmar, and Thailand (151–172). Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan. Potter, D. and Potter Seminar (2019) Japan’s official development to Thailand and the Philippines, 1995–2015. Academia: Social Sciences 17: 97–118. Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA (2015) The United States and Japan: Assisting Myanmar’s development. Washington, DC: Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA. Seekins, D. (2007) Burma and Japan since 1940. Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies. Seekins, D. (2015) Japan’s development ambitions for Myanmar: ‘Economics before politics’. Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 34(2): 113–138. Sudo, S. (2015) Japan’s ASEAN policy: In search of proactive multilateralism. Singapore: ISEAS. United Nations Development Programme (2019) 2019 Human Development Index ranking. Hdr.undp.org/en/content/2019-human-development-indexranking. Accessed June 1, 2020.

Databases Consulted Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2020a) List of exchange of notes. https:// www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/note/index.html. Accessed July 3, 2020. Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2020b) Kunibetsu ODA detashuu. https:// www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/data/index.htm. Accessed July 3, 2020. Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2020c) Myanmaa ni okeru shousuu minzoku to no kokumin wakai ni muketa nihon seifu no shien. https://www.mofa.go. jp/mofaj/ic/ngoc/page23_002769.html. Accessed July 3, 2020.

CHAPTER 15

Restoring the Culture of Peace in Locals: Agent of Change from Myanmar’s Periphery Makiko Takeda

Introduction Myanmar experienced a top-down regime transition that shaped the country’s political trajectory. However, contrary to the public’s high expectations in the early days of the Aung San Suu Kyi-led civilian government, Myanmar’s democratic transition came to a deadlock. The reality was far from fulfilling neither domestic expectations nor international standards. Many hurdles and confusion were created by various extreme groups serving the interest and agenda of the military. The nation’s hybrid democracy marked by the military’s continued dominance influenced the legislative, judicial and executive branches, bringing about neither national reconciliation nor the realisation of a full democratic state. Although in pre-colonial Burma, the country was basically unified (Safman 2007), politicisation of ethnicity and religion under the colonial and military rule resulted in diversity becoming an issue, and continued to encourage social division—a major insurmountable obstacle towards a

M. Takeda (B) Faculty of Policy Studies, Aichi Gakuin University, Nissin, Japan

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 C. Yamahata and B. Anderson (eds.), Demystifying Myanmar’s Transition and Political Crisis, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-6675-9_15

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peaceful and genuine transition. Furthermore, civil society organisations (CSOs), which are meant to be the oxygen of democracy (Ban 2015), were also divided in terms of ideological position, the relative degree of intimacy with the government, scope of operation as well as fierce competition over resources and personal recognition. Therefore, Myanmar still has a long way to go to achieve a genuine transition towards a peaceful, modern and developed state with human rights, freedoms and democracy. Owing to the weak economy, political unwillingness and lack of rule of law, the government failed to provide sufficient and appropriate support for all the nations to guarantee a minimum level of living through social security. Moreover, the 2020 election created the new divisions due to political dissent, despite the fact that the National League for Democracy (NLD) won a landslide victory and was therefore re-elected. A culture of violence is rooted in Myanmar’s colonial history and military rule and prevails throughout the country. Consequently, if division causes an event to occur, violent conflict could be the result. In such a treacherous situation, ethnic women’s organisations (EWOs) have been attempting to bridge the massive gap left by the state. They occupy an important role, particularly in the socio-environmental sphere as well as in the armed conflict areas that the government was either unable or unwilling to manage (Takeda 2020; Takeda and Yamahata 2020). Furthermore, EWOs have formed inter-ethnic and inter-religious alliances with the purpose of working towards shared goals of gender equality, promotion of women’s rights and women’s participation in decision-making and gender justice nationally (Cardenas 2019). They also seek to attain effective implementation of the projects that provide support to the marginalised population irrespective of their ethnicity and religion at the grassroots level. Such essential support and cooperation across different ethnic and religious boundaries has not been exclusively undertaken by other institutions and organisations in different sectors, such as local NGOs, faith-based organisations, and ethnic armed organisations (EAOs). Although women were generally excluded from the formal peace process, EWOs adopted an alternative strategy of making alliances, which leads to an attempt to influence this process as well as achieves the optimal outcome by utilising limited resources. Whereas male-dominated institutions and organisations find it difficult to act in harmony because of the deep-seated divisions, EWOs, which share experiences of struggles in

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conflicts, have built a platform for grassroots cooperation for peace and development (Takeda and Yamahata 2021). Cardenas (2019, p.47) terms this alternative strategy ‘women-to-women diplomacy’ which signifies ‘efforts to create platforms for dialogue and cooperation that challenge existing conflict narratives’. EWOs have considerable potential to create a culture of peace (CoP) in which people respect differences, and proactively redress prejudice, discrimination and inequality, which they transfer to their respected community. Durable peace cannot be achieved in this country without the transformation of a deep-rooted culture of violence into CoP. After the coup, an unprecedented unity of diverse groups has been achieved to fight against the military junta, a common enemy of all the citizens. However, an important question of whether people can continue to work for a shared future after once the coup is over emerges. If they cannot due to the deep-seated division, we may have to see history repeat itself. Thus, unity based on CoP could grant a key to move forward to a much-needed genuine transition towards federal democracy. Consequently, this chapter aims to investigate the potential of EWOs as agents of restoring CoP from Myanmar’s periphery. First, it reviews the literature associated with women on CoP. Secondly, it presents a case study in order to explore the means, approaches and projects of two representative EWOs in Myanmar. Furthermore, it reveals how EWOs promote CoP in order to consolidate social cohesion in the community, as well as the relationship between their work and the promotion of CoP. Finally, based on the analysis, the chapter aims to construct a conceptual framework for grassroots peacebuilding through creation of CoP for the purpose of highlighting the importance of the roles of EWOs that could lead to social transformation from periphery in a divided society.

Women and Culture of Peace The United Nations General Assembly adopted the resolution entitled ‘Culture of Peace’ at the 52nd session in 1997 and defined the culture of peace as: a set of values, attitudes and behaviours that reflect and inspire social interaction and sharing based on the principles of freedom, justice and democracy, all human rights, tolerance and solidarity, that reject violence and endeavour to prevent conflicts by tackling their root causes to solve problems through dialogue and negotiation and that guarantee the full

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exercise of all rights and the means to participate fully in the development process of their society. (United Nations 1998a)

It called for a transformation from a culture of war and violence to a culture of peace and non-violence to save future generations from the scourge of war (United Nations 1998a) and the year 2000 was proclaimed as the International Year for the Culture of Peace (United Nations 1998b). At the 53rd session, the General Assembly proclaimed the period 2001–2010 as the International Decade for a Culture of Peace and NonViolence for the Children of the World (United Nations 1998c) and adopted a Declaration and Program of Action on a Culture of Peace, identifying eight action areas to promote culture of peace (CoP). These were: (1) foster a culture of peace through education, (2) promote sustainable economic and social development, (3) promote respect for all human rights, (4) ensure equality between women and men, (5) foster democratic participation, (6) advance understanding, tolerance and solidarity, (7) support participatory communication and the free flow of information and knowledge and (8) promote international peace and security. The Declaration also emphasises full engagement of civil society, contribution of media as well as the stakeholders of all sectors for promotion of CoP (United Nations 1999). Under each action area, expected and target actions to be taken at national, regional and international levels by all actors are stated. Table 15.1 shows the eight action areas of CoP and summary of the expected actions. Galtung (2000) explains that cultures of peace ‘promote peace as a value, respect and celebrate differences and protect/promote the political, civil, social, economic, and cultural rights of all individuals, communities, and groups, and are inclusive (by choice and dialogue rather than by force), rather than exclusive in vision’ (p. 19). Therefore, a culture of peace is far from equating to an absence of war and violence; therefore, a positive, dynamic participatory process is required to resolve conflicts through a dialogue based on tolerance, mutual understanding and cooperation (United Nations 1999). Thus, a transformation from a culture of war and violence to a culture of peace and non-violence requires changes in the values, attitudes and behaviours of people in a way that respects the rights of all and proactively tackles the roots of violence to realise a truly democratic society. A number of feminist and peace researchers argue that women are superior to men in their capacity for decision-making, peace-making and

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Table 15.1 Eight action areas towards a CoP and summary of the expected actions Action areas towards a CoP

Expected actions

1. Foster a culture of peace through education

a. Reinvigorate national efforts and international cooperation to achieve the goal of education for all b. Ensure children develop the values and attitudes needed for human dignity, tolerance and non-discrimination c. Involve children in activities designed to instil the values and goals of a CoP e. Ensure equality of access to education for women, especially girls f. Encourage revision of educational curricula with reference to the 1995 Declaration and Integrated Framework of Action on Education for Peace, Human Rights and Democracy g. Encourage and strengthen efforts by actors as identified in the Declaration h. Strengthen the ongoing efforts of the UN system j. Expand initiatives to promote a CoP undertaken by institutions of higher education a. Undertake comprehensive actions to eradicate poverty b. Strengthen the national capacity for the implementation of policies and programmes c. Promote effective solutions to the external debt and debt-servicing problems of developing countries through, inter alia, debt relief d. Reinforce actions at all levels to implement national strategies for sustainable food security e. Undertake further efforts to ensure that the development process is participatory f. Include a gender perspective and empowerment as an integral part of the development process g. Include special measures within development strategies that focus on the needs of women and children as well as groups with special needs h. Strengthen assistance in post-conflict situations through development i. Incorporate capacity-building in development strategies and projects j. Remove obstacles to realising the right of peoples to self-determination

2. Promote sustainable economic and social development

(continued)

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Table 15.1 (continued) Action areas towards a CoP

Expected actions

3. Promote respect for all human rights

a. Full implementation of the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action b. Encourage the development of national plans of action c. Strengthen national institutions and capacities for human rights d. Realisation and implementation of the right to development e. Achievement of the goals of the United Nations Decade for Human Rights Education f. Dissemination and promotion of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights g. Support for the activities of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights a. Integrate a gender perspective into all relevant international instruments b. Further implementation of international instruments that promote gender equality c. Implementation of the Beijing Platform for Action d. Promotion of equality in economic, social and political decision-making e. Strengthen the UN system for the elimination of discrimination and violence against women f. Support and assist female victims of any forms of violence a. Reinforce the full range of actions to promote democratic principles and practices b. Special emphasis on democratic principles and practices in education c. Establish and strengthen national institutions and processes that promote and sustain democracy through, inter alia, training and capacity-building of public officials d. Strengthen democratic participation through the provision of electoral assistance e. Combat terrorism, organised crime and corruption as well as the production, trafficking and consumption of illicit drugs and money laundering

4. Ensure equality between women and men

5. Foster democratic participation

(continued)

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Table 15.1 (continued) Action areas towards a CoP

Expected actions

6. Advance understanding, tolerance and solidarity

a. Implement the Declaration of Principles on Tolerance and the Follow-up Plan of Action for the United Nations Year for Tolerance b. Support activities in the context of the 2001 UN Year of Dialogue among Civilisations c. Study local/indigenous practices and traditions for settling disputes and promoting tolerance d. Support actions that foster understanding, tolerance and solidarity e. Support the attainment of the goals of the International Decade of the World’s Indigenous People f. Support actions that foster tolerance and solidarity with refugees and displaced persons g. Support actions that foster tolerance and solidarity with migrants h. Promote increased understanding, tolerance and cooperation among all peoples through the appropriate use of new technologies and the dissemination of information i. Support actions that foster understanding, tolerance, solidarity and cooperation among peoples a. Support the important role of the media in the promotion of a CoP b. Ensure freedom of the press and freedom of information and communication c. Make effective use of the media for advocacy and dissemination of information on a CoP d. Promote mass communication that enables communities to express their needs and participate in decision-making e. Take measures to address the issue of violence in the media f. Increase efforts to promote the sharing of information on new information technologies

7. Support participatory communication and the free flow of information and knowledge

(continued)

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Table 15.1 (continued) Action areas towards a CoP

Expected actions

8. Promote international peace and security

a. Promote general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control b. Draw on lessons learned from ‘military conversion’ efforts that are conducive to a CoP c. Emphasise the inadmissibility of acquiring territory by means of war d. Encourage confidence-building measures and efforts for negotiating peaceful settlements e. Take measures to eliminate the illicit production and trafficking of small arms and light weapons f. Support demobilisation; reintegration of former combatants, refugees and IDPs; weapon collection programmes; exchange of information and confidence-building g. Discourage any unilateral measures not in line with international law and the Charter of UN h. Refrain from any coercion not in line with international law and the Charter that threatens the political independence or territorial integrity of any State i. Recommend proper consideration of the humanitarian impact of sanctions j. Promote greater involvement of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts k. Promote initiatives to ensure the delivery of humanitarian supplies in conflict situations l. Encourage training in techniques for the understanding, prevention and resolution of conflict

Source United Nations (1999)

conflict resolution. Women are also less associated with war and more associated with peace than men, often opposing violent means to resolve conflicts. It has recently been argued that the disparate social construction of male and female identities, which differ in terms of history, space and culture, significantly impacts on their roles, behaviours and styles (Stephenson 2009; Eichenberg 2017; Caprioli 2005; Melander 2005). Based on cross-national research on gender differences towards the use of military force in 60 countries, Eichenberg (2017) concluded that women are generally less supportive of the use of military force regardless of their age, ideology and general attitude towards international security and

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gender differences. The adherence to non-violent means by women is even more significantly correlated with the level of economic development and gender equality in society. This was revealed in a CBS News poll conducted at the time of the first Gulf War, where 57 per cent of men responded that the US should take military action if Iraq did not leave Kuwait by the deadline, whereas only 40 per cent of women favoured military action (Clymer 1991). Another survey conducted in 2005 on retroactive support for the bombing of Japan in World War II also supports this phenomenon, as 73 per cent of American men approved of the bombing compared to just 42 per cent of American women (Moore 2005). Caprioli (2005) found that poverty, underdevelopment and diversity alone do not spur people into violence; systemic discrimination and inequality are also required and in fact gender inequality is a good predictor of intrastate and interstate violence. For instance, 14 out of 17 countries categorised as having ‘very-high’ levels of gender discrimination in the OECD’s index experienced conflict over the last two decades (OECD Development centre, 2014, cited in O’Reilly 2016). Although the direction of causality is unclear, gender equality is a stronger predictor of state peacefulness than other factors such as democracy, religion and GDP (Hudson et al. 2012). Melander (2005) found that gender equality, measured as the percentage of females represented in parliament and the ratio of female to male attainment in higher education, is correlated with lower levels of intrastate armed conflicts. Moreover, there is a statistically significant pacifying effect of the ratio of female parliamentary representation with the level of institutional democracy. In a study of sex differences in leadership style, Eagly and Johnson (1990) found that women who adopt leadership positions tend to be more democratic and participative while men adopt a more autocratic and directive style. However, the effectiveness of each style is contingent on the characteristics of the group or environment. Therefore, it cannot be asserted that women’s relatively democratic and participative leadership style is an advantage or disadvantage. Nevertheless, in organisational settings employment will be less alienating if modes of interaction are less hierarchical and involve cooperation and collaboration between collegial groups of colleagues. Stephenson (2005) argues that some gender cultures take into account the significant differences in men’s and women’s observed behaviours and their understanding of such behaviours. He reviewed research from various disciplines and summarised the gender cultures as shown in Table 15.2.

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Table 15.2 Gender cultures Women

Men

Preference for harmony Be part of group Collectivist Preference for outsider We = we + they Personal relations key Self-demeaning Undervalue own interest Money = autonomy/security Knowledge = experiential Language indirect Speeches as collective talk Interruption = collaboration

Preference for confrontation Run group Individualist Preference for authority We = we vs. they Task key Self-enhancing Overvalue own interest Money = power Knowledge = authority-based Language direct Speech as turn-taking Interruption = domination

Source Stephenson (2005)

The differences in gender cultures indicate that women tend to be more collaborative and collective whereas men focus more on power and authority. Thus in general women are more democratic and inclusive and are better able to achieve collective goals rather than individual goals by putting aside their own interests and gains. All of these imply that women’s participation in decision-making in the peace process and other social issues is important not only to promote gender equality but also to facilitate non-violent means of conflict resolution and peace. The Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, which is a global agenda for the advancement of women, states that women’s ‘full participation in decision-making, conflict prevention, and resolution and all other peace initiatives is essential to the realisation of lasting peace’ (BDPA 1995). More recently, in the speech of UN Women, Deputy Executive Director Lakshmi Puri at the High-Level Forum on the Culture of Peace (CoP) on 9 September 2014 said that ‘women and their empowerment are crucial to advancing the culture of peace in all its vectors’. Therefore, ‘women must not only be protected from war and the violence unleashed thereby, but they must be seen as agents of conflict prevention, of peace-making, and as reconcilers in peacebuilding in post-conflict’ (UN Women 2014). This difference probably derives from their perspectives on society as mothers, wives or daughters, which emphasize inclusiveness and respect

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for diversity. Women are often the nurturers in families and communities, and thereby play crucial roles in peacebuilding (Porter 2007). Qualitative evidence also shows that ‘women shape both the substance and process of reducing and transforming conflict’ (Thornton and Whitman 2013, p. 104). Therefore, if women are empowered politically, economically and socially, women can gain more power and control over their own lives, which can be seen as an important process in not only reducing gender inequality but also consolidating democracy and promoting sustainable peace and development.

Proactive and Responsive Activities by Ethnic Women’s Organisations in Myanmar Women in Myanmar, especially ethnic minority women, have experienced considerable human security challenges due to the prolonged ethnic conflict and poverty. A significant level of sexual violence against women by the military has been reported by ethnic women’s organisations (EWOs); however, the perpetrators have had almost absolute impunity (SHRF and SWAN 2002). Even though their rights were brutally violated, women have been generally voiceless and marginalised in a society affected by social and cultural norms (Takeda 2020). Therefore, at some point, they realised that unless they work together to create a bigger voice, they cannot change this situation (Takeda and Yamahata 2021). Against the backdrop of women’s rights violations and deprivation, an increasing number of women’s organisations have emerged, especially since 2011 when the previous Thein Sein government loosened its restrictions on the formation of civil society. Initially, most women’s organisations began working in socio-economic sectors helping marginalised populations, but later they extended their work to include political activities such as lobbying for gender equality and promoting women’s participation in the peace process. In fact, women have long contributed to community-level or informal conflict prevention, resolution and peacebuilding (Muehlenbeck and Federer 2016). However, their work has been under-recognised and they have been largely excluded from the formal peace process, which constitutes a serious obstacle to the inclusion of women’s perspectives on the agreements reached. Women’s experience of similar struggles across different ethnic and religious groups has therefore

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provided solid ground for cooperation towards a shared goal of gender equality and peace (Takeda and Yamahata 2021). Although CSOs are the only actors who can reach the most vulnerable population, bridging the immense gap left by the state, they have generally taken few initiatives to seriously reach out to other CSOs beyond ethnic and religious boundaries and strengthen social cohesion. According to Lidauer et al. (2018), there has been fierce competition and division among CSOs over resources, funding and personal recognition or status, resulting in a series of power struggles. Divisions are also the result of geographical locations, ideological positions, the relative degree of intimacy with the government and the scope of operation (Fink and Simpson 2018). This pattern of inter-CSO rivalry resembles the pattern of power struggles among the military, the government and EAOs in many respects, and cannot produce any meaningful outcomes in the formal peace process. Nevertheless, under such circumstances, several women’s inter-ethnic and inter-religious alliances have been formed to achieve the shared goals of gender equality, promotion of women’s rights, women’s participation in decision-making and gender justice. Today, a bigger umbrella organisation that comprises different women’s alliance networks has been established to collaborate further on the top-priority issue of national reconciliation and peace and they are supported by a number of international NGOs (Takeda and Yamahata 2021). The trigger for the change in relationships between the majority and minority women dates back to the 1988 democracy uprising. Many student activists, mostly those from Bamar, fled to the border areas to escape aggression by the military. It was the first time that women of both sides learnt they had experienced similar gender-based struggles under the war. This fostered a sense of solidarity as women, generating the power to overcome their differences to achieve a shared goal of peace and development (Fink 2011). Consequently, in 1999, the Women’s League of Burma (WLB) was founded as the first women’s alliance organisation, comprising 12 member organisations that overcame differences such as ethnicity, religion and political positions. Therefore, EWOs reach not only the most marginalised ethnic population as ethnically-based CSOs, but also have the proven capacity to bridge such divisions. As such, EWOs have immense potential to transform distrust and division into trust and harmony given their noteworthy achievement in transcending differences and building trust across ethnic

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and religious boundaries through dialogue and a unified effort to secure a shared future.

Agents of Grassroots Social Transformation: A Case Study of EWOs Commonality in Diversity The next two sections discuss the procedures, approaches and means employed by EWOs to undertake their projects as well as the common features of these projects. The data were collected from interviews with key members of two EWOs and observations of the different stages of their projects. Between 2016 and 2020, the author visited different local communities to cover the EWOs’ past and on-going projects as well as had meetings with the EWOs and CSOs. On the ground, consultation meetings are regularly held to discuss the effectiveness, impacts and emerging problems of the projects. These are generally attended by the members of the EWOs, as well as the following stakeholders: trainees attending the different capacity building and women’s empowerment programmes offered at the EWO’s head office, local women’s representatives from villages/communities who are usually the former trainees, current target beneficiary groups (TBGs) who are generally housewives, and community elders technically supported by local students or local retirees. The author has been given a series of opportunities to join such local meetings during the scheduled visits. Starting from an initial consideration of each project prior to its implementation, the EWOs take every step to ensure that the planning, consultation, operation, management, delivery and monitoring of the project: (1) serve the intended needs of the TBGs and local region; (2) meet the objectives of the EWO and (3) contribute towards the muchneeded agenda of the nation—peace, security and development. The common flow identified in the various projects organised by the EWOs is summarised in Fig. 15.1. The EWOs’ sensitive and transparent way of initiating each project, as the established common flow in the above figure shows, portrays the level of standardised practise each EWO adopts to implement the projects in a highly responsible manner. Based on the interviews conducted regarding the process and procedures, several factors were found to have contributed to the EWOs’ established democratic practise, which

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Geƫng started

Geƫng organised

Taking acƟon

Widening impacts

Fig. 15.1

• Build support group • Understand ideas & root causes • Know the community & plan iniƟal financing for targets • Decide organisaƟon plan • Prepare proposal/project • Get local support & recogniƟon • Form operaƟonal team • Appoint advisors • InvesƟgate/survey environment • Define the scope of the project • Adjust strategy • Build capacity & training skills • Establish transparency & accountability measures • Increase awareness for promoƟng tolerance, diversity & mutual understanding • Advocate women-to-women diplomacy, the principle of peace culture & grassroots alliance • Generate equality & change relaƟons to reject violence/tension • Increase social cohesion & community harmony/peace • Accelerate inter-ethnic/inter-sectorial cooperaƟon & democraƟc dialogue • Promote community parƟcipaƟon & local empowerment • IniƟate local innovaƟon & community strategy • Consolidate local inputs based on the pracƟce of the culture of peace towards community security • Design sustainable policies • Extend local benefits to a wider neighbourhood • Strengthen the “drivers of change” for further applicability • Increase modes of democraƟc communicaƟon • Promote collecƟve & societal prioriƟes • Link project outcomes to the next agenda

Commonality in the diversity of the EWO’s projects

gives them high recognition as well as respect from local multi-ethnic populations in communities, male-dominated EAOs, local legislative and administrative bodies and research and media organisations. The five factors are: (1) organisational commitment to a clear, principle-based and rule-based practise; (2) a clear focus on the benefits of the TBGs and the communities; (3) adherence to international norms and universal values to encourage grassroots innovation for change; (4) pride and responsibility in their work and mutually respectful relationships with international donors and (5) an unshakeable determination and practise to pursue the peace, security and stability of the nation through grassroots activities, which depends on whether the current democratic transition can peacefully embody equality, diversity, justice and participatory development in an expeditious manner.

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Therefore, EWOs are credited with serving as a representative role model in delivering direct and indirect services to all ethnic populations on the ground. At the same time, they also work to offer alternative and consultative views to the EAOs centred on gender perspectives and build constructive voices to be heard by local legislative, executive and judicial bodies through alternative means using bridging diplomacy. It can be argued that the EWOs’ principle-led, rule-based and TBG-focussed standpoint and their constant efforts in concentrating on and prioritising the local benefits of the practise of a CoP have had a demonstrable effect on diverse communities. Specifically, it has enabled them to transform negative values, attitudes and behaviours; promote tolerance; respect diversity and strengthen mutual understanding among different ethnic and religious members, which has changed their relations on the basis of equality. Ensuring Coherence from Vision to Action to Campaign Fowler (1997) emphasises that achieving cohesion within the operation of a non-governmental development organisation (NGDO) depends on promoting consistency through the functioning of three essential stages. The first stage involves the re-examination and confirmation of what the organisation stands for in terms of coherence between vision, mission, identity and role in the community or region. The second stage involves the linkage of these to longer-term strategic choices that give the NGDO an overall direction and maximise its impact on society. The last but the most crucial stage involves translating the choices into tangible actions and tasks to be carried out by staff, volunteers and others in collaboration, even when opposed, with several stakeholders. These stages ensure the consistency of the organisation (p. 45). Fowler stresses the importance of applying sustainable knowledge, the promotion of dialogue and maintaining consistency in his work as follows: … the knowledge that [needs] to be relevant and sustainable, … [the] top-down approach must be matched by a bottom-up process of dialogue and negotiation with the external stakeholders that eventually determines if there are lasting social changes and benefits from the [organisation’s] efforts. Matching these two directions is one of the most difficult problems … is a constant tension which must be managed. Managing the tension is

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made easier if there is a consistency between what it says it wants to be and what it does. (Fowler 1997, p. 45)

The EWOs pay special attention to ensuring the maximum effectiveness of each project regardless of the amount of funding involved and the numbers of staff engaged. The EWOs sensitively and responsibly focus on the targeted beneficiary groups (TBGs) and communities as well as extending their positive impacts to neighbouring local areas and their surroundings. It is therefore important that the path from vision to action coheres in order to achieve the targets for the TBGs and amplify the impacts of the projects. The EWOs thus lead the projects to a successful conclusion in terms of attaining the intended targets, coverage of the TBGs, recognition as well as appreciation by both the TBGs and the neighbouring communities/sub-region, and mutually constructive advisory exchange with other organisations and local bodies. The reason for this lies in the EWOs’ functionally consistent bi-directional approach—top-down and bottom-up. Common features of the consistent flow of the EWOs’ projects are summarised in Fig. 15.2. Every step EWOs take from ‘Vision + mission’ at the top to ‘Activation for policy input, public campaigns, policy reports, press release and workshop/conference’ at the bottom, involves local meetings with various stakeholders as explained previously, many of whom are trainees, local women’s representatives from villages and the TBGs. The observational research shows that those local meetings (consultative/advisory community/village talk circle) are key to the successful implementation and operation of the projects in initiating different kinds of optimum social innovations at different phases. These promote changing relations among the different ethnic members of each community as well as among the connected communities. The meetings are conducted in a consultative form on a weekly or monthly basis depending on the mutual initiatives proposed by the EWOs’ head offices and local women’s representatives. In addition to the TBGs, the discussions also include knowledgeable retirees such as former university staff, lawyers, medical staff, local administrators, youth volunteers comprising current students together with people in the voluntary sector (parahita) and, on occasion, persons belonging to different faithbased organisations, members of EAOs, and other ethnic-based and nonethnic-based CSOs. Such local meetings are openly attended (observed

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Fig. 15.2 Common features of the projects from identification to documentation to campaigns

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or checked in some manner) by staff sent by the local government’s security affairs section. Even under these circumstances, women-led meetings, organised in the name of project meetings, can function to bridge differences and create social cohesion and community peace. Such regular local meetings ensure consistency between the mission, the strategic choices and tangible actions for the TBGs and match a topdown approach with the bottom-up process of dialogue and negotiation with external stakeholders. This has positive effects on inducing lasting social changes and benefits. EWOs also share their knowledge with the attendees and facilitate consensual decision-making through dialogue and negotiation while ensuring TBG’s involvement in decision-making at each stage of the projects. Therefore, local meetings function as venues for sharing the benefits of the process among different parties including the TBGs of different ethnic groups and other stakeholders, as well as observers with different interests. Some of those process-benefits include creating new awareness around diversity and equality, the provision of updated information, promotion of open consultation with both technical and legal bodies prior to consensus building on any community issues and establishing an informal confidence-building link with the local government’s security sector and local youth and student volunteers, which bridges the diverse population across sectors and generations. Moreover, regular open-natured local meetings have become an established platform on which to foresee potential difficulties in the implementation or operation of the remaining steps of the projects as well as the feasibility of extending a similar approach to other connected communities. The functional characteristics of such people-centred (TBGs-centred) projects driven by a community/village consultative discussion circle can be summarised as follows: • Led by local women enabled by EWOs. • Attended and facilitated by male members comprising local educated retirees and community members. • Allows observation by the local security sector to develop the confidence of the regional authority with respect to EWOs’ activities. • Attended by motivated community members, especially TBGs. • Discusses EWOs’ on-going activities and the implementation and operation of projects at every stage

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• Coordinates such activities with those of other women-led ethnic, youth or other organisations and partners through grassroots level women-to-women diplomacy. • Potentially mitigates foreseeable problems. • Identifies community needs and plan future activities. • Strengthens the practise of peaceful dialogue in transforming negative attitudes, behaviours and values held by different ethnic, religious and social members to positive ones, as well as setting a shared goal based on common community and societal priorities. • Establishes the community harmony and security through the practise of a CoP at the grassroots level. In reality, the formal adoption of a policy to reduce horizontal inequalities tends to meet with serious opposition from the privileged. It therefore cannot be implemented without building trust and ensuring a shared future between the privileged and the deprived while enhancing development. Thus, in a divided society, the informal measures taken to promote a shared goal of national unity, stability and initiatives for grassroots development, which disadvantaged groups themselves try to implement to improve their communities, are as important as the implementation of a formal policy for peace-building. In the case of Myanmar, although ceasefires have been agreed with approximately half of the major EAOs, this only ensures a negative peace and does not address structural violence and the culture of violence. Having analysed the means, approaches and procedures used by EWOs to implement the projects, it could be argued that, through project meetings, EWOs create opportunities for the community members regardless of social status, ethnicity, religion and the sectors to which they belong. This enables them to have a shared goal of unity, stability, and grassroots development where EWOs include TBGs so that they are in charge of and feel responsible for the projects. In addition, the EWOs’ projects are designed to address issues of inequality, rights, justice and development, which can have direct and positive impacts on the reduction of structural violence and the culture of violence. In effect, EWOs are transferring their culture of peace to communities through their projects, which gives people the power to transform a culture of violence into a culture of peace.

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Transferring a Culture of Peace to the Grassroots Community This section sheds light on the relationship between the EWO’s work and promotion of CoP. Table 15.3 presents all the projects and activities as well as approaches of one of the EWOs in relation to promotion of a CoP in the grassroots community. Of the 35 items, items 1–29 relate to the activities or projects of the EWO while items 30–35 are concerned with the approaches and means employed to implement and operate the projects. As explained earlier, these means and approaches are applied to all the projects. The 35 items comprise detailed and comprehensive lists of the EWO’s work to the TBGs at the grassroots level; therefore, activities conducted by the EWO through the alliance organisation in support of wider societal issues along with other activities such as producing reports and lobbying trips are not included in the list. Table 15.3 shows how the EWO’s work relates to six out of eight action areas of a CoP, which are presented in Table 15.1. The six target action areas are as follows: education (E), economic and social development (D), human rights (H), gender equality (G), democratic participation (P) and understanding and tolerance and solidarity (U). The other two areas, participatory communication and international peace and security, are excluded from the analysis as they are largely related to media freedom and the promotion of negative peace, respectively, which are beyond the scope of the activities of the EWO. Regarding the relationship with the six action areas of CoP, all the activities and projects are related to two or more action areas. Most cover the actions for sustainable development (D), human rights (H), and gender equality (G), while the other action areas: education (E), democratic participation (P) and understanding, tolerance and solidarity (D) are particularly promoted in some of the special activities or projects. Although the region of this EWO is physically safe and generally stable due to ceasefire agreement, widespread poverty has led to human rights deprivation and related health issues. In addition, it is also one of the disaster-prone areas in Myanmar, with floods every year in the rainy season. Therefore, the activities of the EWO primarily target the protection of human rights and development whereas, as a women’s organisation, one of its main missions is to achieve gender equality and eliminate gender discrimination. With regard to the means and approaches (items 30–35) of the EWO, all are associated with almost all the six action areas. It is evident that the EWO’s practise is itself based on the CoP.

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Table 15.3 Analysis of the impacts of EWO’s activities and approaches on culture of peace EWO’s activities, projects, approaches and means in communities

1. Health education, home healthcare and community clinic 2. Psychological healing and counselling for traumatised women 3. Grassroots survey for disease prevention (HIV, malaria) 4. Reproductive health education 5. Clean water supplies and management 6. Local technology, vocational and skills training 7. Microcredit, leadership training and empowerment 8. Training on gender awareness, HRs, constitution, federalism, human trafficking, human security and active citizenship 9. Internship programmes 10. Organic farming and pig-bank (community animal raising) 11. Legal, medical, social and economic support for the victims of violence/SGBV 12. Provision of shelter and safety measures for victims 13. Tackling child abuse, street children and the prevention of child soldiers 14. Initiatives for literacy, ethnic language and culture support programmes 15. Nursery school programme 16. Early childcare development and maternal health programmes 17. Summer English school 18. Renewable energy production 19. Documentation of SGBV and lobbying for the elimination of violence 20. Awareness promotion, voter education and legislation, election monitoring and technical/information transparency support 21. Supporting female candidates through advocacy and election campaigns 22. Training, job matching and dialogue for migrants/migrant advice centre

Related to culture of peace E

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Table 15.3 (continued) EWO’s activities, projects, approaches and means in communities

23. Advisory services, capacity building and technical and legal assistance to reclaim social justice for groups in need 24. Women’s political empowerment and leadership 25. Disseminating the findings of international meetings on gender equality 26. Seeking the endorsement of women’s issues from political parties, armed organisations and local/regional parliaments/bodies 27. Demanding the national government, legislative bodies and judiciary field more women’s candidates 28. Lobbying for reforms regarding gender equality in all sectors and for national affairs including peace building (peace process) 29. Public education programme on gender issues to be linked with the promotion of human security; social innovation for realisation and peace of SDGs 30. Social innovation measures empowering marginalised households 31. Bridging different generations, different ethnic/religious/identity groups and across sectors to build common priorities for community goods 32. Organising regular grassroots dialogue and meetings through project activities to change attitudes, behaviours and values towards social cohesion 33. Development of women’s platforms, meetings, consultations and workshops 34. Diversifying initiatives for a ‘culture of peace transfer’ to the community to widen the impacts of grassroots peace building 35. Utilising women-to-women diplomacy as an enabling strategy to promote capacity, equality, peace, security and development from the peripheries

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Notes E, D, H, G, P and U stand for the 6 target action areas of CoP: education (E), economic and social development (D), human rights (H), gender equality (G), democratic participation (P) and understanding and tolerance and solidarity (U)

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The analysis of EWOs as agents for restoring CoP clearly shows that the EWOs have great potential and capacity. EWOs have not only built women’s solidarity beyond ethnic, religious and ideological differences but also bridged different sectors, in some cases including the security sector and local government, to support the most marginalised groups in their communities. It can be argued that CoP is created and transferred to the communities by EWOs through a continuous approach based on equality, dialogue and cooperation which has a positive impact on changing the negative attitudes, behaviours and values of people in different groups. This has resulted in changing the relationship among diverse population and facilitating social cohesion, which provides them community security. EWO’s determination towards peace and development with principle-led, rule-based and TBG-focussed standpoint could ultimately change people’s values and build solidarity in communities in realising grassroots peace. In effect, EWOs are transferring their culture of peace to communities through their projects, which gives people the power to transform a culture of violence into a culture of peace.

Conclusion The underlining strategic focus of the EWOs is to transform the powerless (vulnerable) characteristics of local populations into a more proactive attitude by empowering and bridging diverse groups and providing them with opportunities to cooperate and pursue a shared goal. The EWOs also promote social innovation and change by placing marginalised people at the centre of their projects. It can thus be argued that the EWOs have embodied the concept of people-centred development while transferring attitudes, behaviour and values that are based on CoP. In so doing, the EWOs successfully ensures community security which is one of the most important factors that has been omitted from the current transition process. In general, a state of vulnerability and a sense of hopelessness has deeply affected the local populations due to a combination of multiple factors in Myanmar. These include physical violence from armed conflicts and related security issues in conflict-affected areas, land grabbing, human trafficking, grinding poverty and the lack of a rule of law. These have cast a shadow on the quality of their lives, daily justice, basic freedoms and equality. In addition, new challenges and opportunities created in

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the transition process have catalysed the cleavages of an already divided society. Another common feature in numerous local populations is a passive and reserved attitude towards addressing other people’s issues, which is partly rooted in the prolonged military suppression. Under the military rule, people who were involved in politics were subjected to serious human rights abuse such as arbitrary arrest, torture and sexual aggression in the case of women (Takeda and Yamahata 2020). Therefore, people are accustomed to (or subject to) not responding to any individual or community challenges through a culture of ‘not in my backyard (nimby)’. If the problem is one experienced by another ethnic group, detachment becomes more apparent. This fear-driven passive attitude, a lack of awareness caused by insufficient information and education and a culture of negligence are an impediment to grassroots transformation. In sum, a lack of capacity and opportunities for necessary capacity building constitute a major barrier for both women and local communities, preventing them from making their voices heard through participatory community approaches to equality, safety, security, peace and development. Those communities struggling with underdevelopment, inequality, injustice and violence without choices, chances and freedom require empowerment, resources and legal support in building capacities through participatory people-centred community projects. The case study of the EWO’s projects has revealed that the EWOs have promoted a virtuous circle of transferring CoP to the TBGs; this in turn has induced them to transform their attitudes, behaviours and values, resulting in a change in relationship among different ethnic groups at the grassroots level. The EWOs have also empowered marginalised women, who later become representative core members of the communities through internship and capacity-building programmes. Therefore, a new way of promoting community transformation is made possible by ‘connection’ and ‘engagement’ directly with TBGs through projects focussing on the promotion of rights and equality, capacity building and empowerment. Such frequent and transparent communications and cooperation through the dialogue approach through ‘bridging diplomacy’ has been employed by the EWOs as a social innovation or pragmatic grassroots initiative, effectively enhancing community security by building solidarity among diverse groups across ethnic and religious boundaries. Figure 15.3 depicts a conceptual framework of social transformation through the grassroots peace-building by bridging diplomacy.

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Empowerment

Inequality

EWO’s approach based on CoP

InternaƟonal instruments

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Fig. 15.3 A conceptual framework of EWO’s social transformation by bridging diplomacy

Consequently, EWOs are generally evaluated highly by TBGs and respected by EAOs, other CSOs, youth organisations as well as security sectors and regional government and therefore recognised and supported by international NGOs. The EWOs in this study have created the mechanism to make the projects open to many stakeholders through women-to-women diplomacy. At the same time it has placed TBGs at the centre of their projects, which has promoted a sense of ownership of these projects. This shows that the EWO’s transfer of CoP has promoted social cohesion, by protecting human rights and building bridges between diverse groups in the communities. This could constitute one small step towards advancing peace in Myanmar’s stagnated transition as a culture of peace and a sense of security can contribute to creating a solid foundation for peace in the future.

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CHAPTER 16

Myanmar at a “Point of No Return”: Unity Reborn Despite Junta’s Terrorization Chosein Yamahata

Outside Perceptions and Inside Reality A period of transition, prompted by the democratically elected National League for Democracy (NLD), had been abruptly disturbed by the recent military1 coup. Commander in Chief Senior General Min Aung Hlaing (C-in-C) carried out a political hijack through the early hours of February 1, the day scheduled for convening a new union parliament as the outcome of the 2020 election, endorsed by the international, regional and local election monitors and observers (Lwin 2020; Naing 2021). The current reality of what is happening in Myanmar is a sign of the military’s displeasure in losing its political grip on the nation’s future landscape, following the second free and fair general elections in November 1 The term “military” is used interchangeably with “Tatmadaw”, which is the name of Myanmar’s armed forces. Similarly, the terms “junta” and “military regime” are used interchangeably with the State Administration Council (SAC), which is the name of the 2021 coup regime.

C. Yamahata (B) Graduate School of Policy Studies, Aichi Gakuin University, Nisshin, Japan

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 C. Yamahata and B. Anderson (eds.), Demystifying Myanmar’s Transition and Political Crisis, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-6675-9_16

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2020 that served as a litmus test for democracy. There are a set of factors that make the military junta’s seizure of power illegal and groundless that include: (1) the enthusiastic, determined and systematic manner of voting for NLD by citizens across the nation, (2) local and international endorsements issued on the degree of free and fairness of the 2020 elections by observers, (3) the recognition and official responses by the governments around the world with respect to the election results announced by the Union Election Commission (UEC) officializing the NLD’s landslide victory. The NLD’s victories in past general and by-elections held in 1990, 2012, 2015, 2017 on top of the most recent 2020 general election could have motivated the military to use unconstitutional means to “rob” election results to prevent the cementing of democratic civilian governance. The coup undoubtedly destroyed the ongoing democratic progress—sending a clear signal to the world that whenever the military loses the game, it would not hesitate to change the rules to win it. Meanwhile, the people of Myanmar have been using peaceful means to protest the unconstitutional coup, the junta’s illegitimate rules and the subsequent terrorizing tactics used in repression. The international community has been witnessing the daily reality of Myanmar peoples’ struggles for freedom from military brutality amidst the waves of the coronavirus. UN Secretary-General António Guterres expressed his full support for the people in Myanmar and reiterated that “coups have no place in our modern world” (UN News 2021). Myanmar senior adviser Richard Horsey (2021) from the International Crisis Group reports that Myanmar is “at the brink of state failure, of state collapse” and identifies multilayered crises facing the country’s banking system, supply chains, healthcare, natural resources and the peace process. The UNDP (2021) analyzes that the compounded effect of two ongoing crises—COVID-19 and the coup—could push 12 million people into poverty. Meanwhile, a reporter in Yangon as well as Rebecca Ratcliffe (2021) in the Guardian highlights how Myanmar is “on the verge of a new civil war”, where not only ethnic armed groups but also civilians are taking up arms to resist military terrorization. Outside perceptions towards ending the coup and the subsequent wide-scale violence have largely revolved around bringing the military to the negotiation table. Bill Hayton (2021), an associate fellow from the Asia–Pacific Programme at Chatham House, argues that the international community should engage with the military leadership as the alternatives would be worse; he explains that the military would only be

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willing to revert to its previous background role “if it is reassured that its political position is safe”. Similarly, former Singaporean diplomat, Bilahari Kausikan (2021) urges the West to turn away from sanctions and instead “accept a slow transition back to civilian rule and cooperate with the Tatmadaw”. This hope is further echoed by ASEAN which has urged for “constructive dialogue” and invited Min Aung Hlaing to the emergency summit in April (Human Rights Watch 2021). Although these suggestions prioritize a quick return to democracy, we must ask: at what cost and at whose cost? History has proved that similar treatments to Myanmar’s military after coups in the past by China, other regional neighbours including ASEAN, and major donors like Japan had strengthened military dictatorship from 1962 till date, effectively enabling the entrenchment of the iron fist military rule—both directly and indirectly. The rights, destinies, opportunities and futures, especially of ethnic nationalities, and religious minorities, have been continuously trapped into poverty, division, conflict and unfreedom. Therefore, recommendations from external players that neglect the peoples’ grievances, inspirations, struggles and determinations, to deal with the junta are “out of question” to the people of Myanmar. The inside reality in Myanmar could not be further from outside perceptions. Although coups are not necessarily new to Myanmar—as the country has experienced four coups since post-independence—the 2021 coup has pushed Myanmar towards a “point of no return”. What makes this coup different from others? The military’s reasons behind the recent coup, its execution and the atrocities following it confirm that the country is no longer functioning like a state. The chapter discusses that after a limited yet promising period of democratic transition under the 2016–2021 NLD administration, the people simply refuse to have their freedoms and hopes stolen by the military once again. In this vision, there is no place for the military or its “polarizing tactics of Burmanization, Buddhization, and securitization” (Yamahata 2021). Not only do the people share a united goal towards restoring democracy but also for building a federal state that respects the rights of all ethnic people, who have been marginalized for too long. If the outside perceivers neglect Myanmar’s realities by prioritizing dialogue with the military, it gives the very regime the Myanmar people have been trying to oust the

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legitimacy it craves. They should divert their priorities away from the military, an institution of terror that is failing the state, but instead empower the people who are fighting every day to keep it together. Outside perceivers should thus realize that Myanmar is at a “point of no return” in which people will not accept anything less than a federal democracy even at the cost of continued violence. As the late poet Khet Thi had famously penned, “they shoot in the head, but they don’t know the revolution is in the heart”.

Coups in Myanmar: Similarities and Differences Coup d’états are staged by “the military or other elites within the state apparatus to unseat the sitting executive using unconstitutional means” (Powell and Thyne 2011, 252). As the coup regime comes to power through force, it automatically lacks legitimacy and hence must provide justification to rule. Militaries seize power under the pretence that they will return authority to civilians once the internal or external threats to the state are eliminated by them (Kailitz and Stockemer 2017, 338). At the same time, militaries find themselves in a “legitimation dilemma” as the success of removing such threats would exhaust the justification for the military to hold political power (Kailitz 2013, 50). Democratization literature has explored various potential motivations of coups in two broad categories: military’s political interests that “push” them towards a power grab or structural issues that “pull” the military into a position of rule (Croissant 2013, 268–269). A major push factor includes “the personal interests of officers—their desire for promotions, political ambitions, and fear of dismissal” (Nordlinger 1977, 66). Among these interests include economic ventures, which could become so highly institutionalized that “any reverse course of it could only be regarded by them as unacceptable” (Chambers and Waitoolkiat 2017, 2). Other causes of the coup address structural factors, such as domestic instability caused by political and economic crises. For example, severe economic deterioration will “tend to invite military intervention that will have popular approval” (Johnson 1964, 260). Meanwhile, Finer (1976) explains that issues concerning national defence, such as civil wars or power vacuums could provide a justification for a coup. A study by Bueno de Mesquita et al. (1992) explains how a history of coups in the past ten years could also be a predictor of future coups. Taking these explanations

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into account, this section discusses how Myanmar’s recent coup diverges from past coups in the country as well as those of its counterparts. The military’s entry into politics started in 1958 through what “amounted to a coup in all but name” by forming a caretaker government with General Ne Win as the caretaker Prime Minister, in which it took upon themselves to address “many destabilizing factors that had plagued the country since independence” that the newly formed civilian government under Prime Minister U Nu faced (Owen et al. 2005, 334; Huang 2013, 250). According to military sources, the takeover was “a constitutionally-based power transfer by U Nu to Ne Win to allow the establishment of ‘law and order’” (Lynn 2021). Although a general election was held in 1960, the country’s experience of democracy was brief. Ne Win led a coup in 1962 under the Revolutionary Council, which was prompted by “a mix of political infighting, policy gridlock, multiple insurgencies on a massive scale, and a declining economy” (Devi 2014, 46). During his rule, he instituted the Burmese Way to Socialism and promulgated the 1974 constitution. This period in Myanmar’s history was especially devastating as the country once known as the “rice bowl of Asia” quickly plummeted to be included in the list of least developed countries (LDCs) in 1987. The military’s brutality against its own citizens, especially towards the ethnic minorities in the peripheral areas of Myanmar continued (Guan 2007). Civilian discontent culminated into the 8888 Revolution, resulting in mass massacres of more than 3,000 peaceful protesters. Soon after in the same year, the military staged yet another coup, this time, led by General Saw Maung under the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), which was later named State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) led by General Than Shwe. Although SLORC announced it would restore democracy, as a response to nationwide protests, it refused to transfer power following the general elections of 1990 when the NLD won its first landslide victory. Myanmar’s Asian counterparts, namely Thailand and Indonesia, are no strangers to coups and military rule. The past and recent coups in Myanmar differ from Thailand as the military does not have support from strong forces like the monarchy or the urban middle class. Instead, the Myanmar military has made itself the sole dominant force in the country’s political and economic spheres; unlike the Thai military, it does not have an obligation to meet the demands of its supporters or require their blessing to stage a coup. In comparison to Indonesia’s split military, the Myanmar military largely remains united in their common interest to

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maintain its monopoly on the country’s natural resource sector and other business areas. The Myanmar military functions as a tight network made up of military elites, their families and close relatives, and business affiliates or cronies. Its patronage system is not tied to one leader like Suharto (Crouch 1979). According to Croissant (2013), social mobilization in the 1970s, 1990s and 2000s resulted in political disorder and hence provided the Thai military a justification for staging a coup. However, the Thai military had ruling elites and the urban middle class on its side: in both 1976 and 2006, the coup challenged competing political forces in the countryside. Bangkok felt threatened by “a Maoist insurgency, a peasant movement, and a student movement which sympathized with rural demands” in 1976 and by Thaksin Shinawatra and the Thai Rak Thai Party “which had built unprecedented support in the rural areas of the North and the Northeast by delivering a range of populist programmes, and promising more” in 2006 (Phongpaichit 2007, 6). Furthermore, Chambers (2020, 205) explains how the Thai military “depends on the monarchy in terms of ideology, rituals and processes which greatly enhance its legitimacy as a political actor”, while the monarchy “relies upon the guardianship of successive factions within the military, especially the army”. The coup in 2014 once again removed a sitting Prime Minister, Thaksin’s sister, Yingluck Shinawatra. In Indonesia, military dictatorship evolved to become more personalistic during Suharto’s rule. He was able to successfully assert centralized political and social control through “the use of the military promotion system, patronage politics, and divide-andconquer strategies to control the military” (Croissant et al. 2012). In this process, Suharto “enlisted the help of civilian allies”, causing the emergence of “complex structures in which elites would compete both within and across civilian-military institutions for political advancement” (Slater 2010, 146). This very structure that Suharto created caused a problem when the Asian financial crisis hit in 1998 as he was no longer able to maintain his patronage networks. Although the motivations behind coups have usually been studied in authoritarian contexts, recent coups in Myanmar (2021), Thailand (2014), Egypt (2013), Mali (2012) and Honduras (2009) show that the majority of coups over the past decade happened in democratizing countries (Bell 2016, 1168). Following Myanmar’s coup in 2021, there were also similar seizures of power in Chad, Mali, Guinea, and Sudan in the same year; these cases go against the general trend of a decrease in

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coup frequency since the end of the Cold War (Kendall-Taylor and Frantz 2014). What explains the recent coup in Myanmar? Contrary to popular belief, a study by Powell (2012) suggests that democracies are no less likely to suffer from a coup than autocracies. This is due to the reality that in emerging democracies, the military and other autocratic elites are able to retain political influence. This may be in the form of holding parliamentary seats, engaging in economic activities, or in Myanmar’s case, both. The Tatmadaw retained a quarter of the seats in both houses of parliament while military elites also run conglomerates that are involved in a wide range of businesses (Jones 2014). A military that is not under the control of the democratically elected civilian government is thus not “coup-proof”; the looming possibility of a coup lingers. After all, civilian control of the military is an essential requirement for democratic consolidation (Croissant et al. 2010). In fact, military elites could even initiate transitions if societal conditions are favourable, ridding the need for direct rule (Nordlinger 1977; Jones 2014). Military withdrawal could even “contain an element of continuity, and represent the accomplishment of the mission invoked to justify the initial intervention” (Rouquie 1986, 127). The lead up to Myanmar’s coup is a case in point. The country’s democratic transition, after five decades of military dictatorship, was undoubtedly a turning point in its history. At the same time, the process of democratization has neither been linear nor simple as it was orchestrated by the junta itself through the “roadmap to democracy”. Although it seems to follow Samuel Huntington’s “transformation” approach towards political reform, the military’s seven-stage “roadmap to democracy” did the opposite by institutionalizing the military’s political stakes and dominant influence over civilians without sustaining a direct dictatorship. Regardless of the second landslide victory of the NLD in the 2015 elections—that could have pointed towards Myanmar evolving into a “replacement” model of democratic transition—the elections were just a mere institutional transition in the political branch that lacked teeth in taming the military and reforming the security sector to be under civilian control (Huntington 1991). Instead, the NLD’s third consecutive landslide victory in the 2020 elections was crushed by the military’s coup. Moreover, military elites could take it upon themselves to “restore” democracy and use the lack of democratization as a justification to stage a coup. Although coups are illegitimate in nature, Niger’s overthrow of

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President Mamadou Tandja in 2010 was not universally condemned as it came after the President’s decision to “revise the constitution so as to extend his presidency by three years at the end of his second fiveyear term” (Baudais and Chauzal 2011, 295). Following the coup, the junta promised “free and fair elections and a swift return to civilian rule” as well as “staffed many agencies with civilians and initiated a consultative constitution-drafting process”, both of which it delivered (Trithart 2013, 117). Although Niger faces insecurity and instability, neither stems from the coup and the country is still on its path of democratic transition (Freedom House 2012; Ajala 2021). Niger serves as an example for the “democratic coup” argument which posits that coups staged since the end of the Cold War have generally led to free and fair elections (Marinov and Goemans 2014; Varol 2012; Thyne and Powell 2014). A study by Oisín Tansey (2016) however argues otherwise: although there may be post-coup elections, they tend to serve as a facade for authoritarian resilience and regime instability and not as a gateway for genuine democratic transition. The study highlights how nine countries that held post-coup elections between 1991 and 2009 experienced at least one more coup following those elections. These multiple-coup cases were (with coup years in parentheses): Egypt (2011 and 2013), Fiji (2000 and 2006), Guinea-Bissau (1999, 2003, and 2012), Lesotho (1991 and 1994), Mali (1991 and 2012), Mauritania (2005 and 2008), Niger (1996, 1999, and 2010), Sierra Leone (1992, 1996, and 1997), and Thailand (1991, 2006, and 2014).

Myanmar’s neighbour Thailand serves as a case in point. Although Myanmar’s military staged a coup under the pretence to “restore” democracy and with a promise to hold an election within a year, its history of coups and brutal crackdowns against citizens suggest otherwise. After the 1962 coup, the Revolutionary Council led by Ne Win, which later was renamed to Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP), lasted a total of 26 years until the 8888 Revolution for democracy. Another coup in 1988 lasted another 23 years until 2010 when the SPDC held the elections, which the NLD boycotted as its leader Aung San Suu Kyi was still under house arrest along with other members also imprisoned, killed or in hiding. The potential reasons behind Myanmar’s recent coup can be analyzed from four interpretations, which suggest that the military is not going to be giving up its power any time soon.

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Firstly, it was caused by the military’s desperate, unconstitutional move by applying force to grab political power from the winners of the election to derail the nation’s current democratic transition; this sets the stage for the return of military authoritarianism camouflaged as a token election-based pseudo-democracy. It is possible that the coup had been planned around the time of the Union Solidarity and Development Party’s (USDP) devastating loss in the 2015 elections and its even more humiliating loss in 2020 is what pushed it. The military was exposed for its clear intent to stage a coup before and during the election as can be seen by various premeditated efforts such as: the C-in-C’s and the military’s press conferences, its announcements in written and broadcast media that serve as the military’s mouthpiece, and the media interviews on the C-in-C (Asian Network for Free Election 2021, 47). The election losses also show that the military’s attempt to use the USDP as its “front desk” in maneuvering politico-administrative affairs, legislative control, judicial influence as well as security sector expansion for the post-2020 elections political landscape is no longer feasible. Moreover, overwhelming support for the NLD, which has only grown since 2015, is most likely what threatened the military and pushed it to reclaim total superiority over civilian rule while they could. The coup aims to dismantle Aung San Suu Kyi and the coming generations of the NLD and other democratic forces in the country, preventing them from meaningfully standing in Myanmar’s future political landscape. Secondly, staging a coup would strengthen the unity, connectivity and stability among different generations of military leaders and their affiliates for ensuring collective monopolization over natural resource extraction and other business ventures. The members and loyalists of the State Administration Council (SAC) sharing this common interest are categorized into eight groups: • A group of ex-military personnel who had served for Sr. Gen. Than Shwe (former C-in-C) and the Chairman of the SPDC government; • The C-in-C’s current loyalists from the military combined with his deputy, Gen. Soe Win and Than Shwe’s confidante, Gen. Myat Tun Oo; • Some members of the former President Thein Sein’s administration or legislative members; • Ex-presidential advisors as well as their close associates;

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• Some politicians of break-away parties from the NLD before the 2010 elections and before the 2020 elections, along with a couple of ethnic leaders who belong to small ethnic parties which are different from mainstream ethno-territorial parties from their own region; • Politicians and the elected representatives of the Rakhine party; • The C-in-C’s handpicked individuals from the USDP, ex-military breed and business circles to sustain patron-client relations; • Relatives of the important persons belonging to earlier military regimes of Myanmar, including Gen. Ne Win’s BSPP. Additionally, junior comrades-cum-loyalists joined the unconstitutional mission as C-in-C’s partners of alliance in their wealth-building machine. Resource-rich Myanmar is a promising land for the military leaders to continue exploiting as their own private property and to promote many rent-seeking functions in “selling” Myanmar to enrich their business empire. Thirdly, the military sees the danger of being potentially charged by the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for their past and ongoing ethnic and religious atrocities committed across the nation, most notably, the Rohingya genocide. Additionally, the military is aware that the coup was unconstitutional and violated the military-drafted 2008 constitution. The International Commission of Jurists (2021) reported that the coup “violates principles of rule of law, international law, and Myanmar’s constitution”. As the National Unity Government (NUG) prepares to file an international lawsuit against the junta for crimes against humanity, the military feels the pressure to increase its level of impunity and block the formation of a civilian government in the future (Maung 2021). It is possible that the military is amending the 2008 constitution or drafting a new one altogether to ensure its institutionalization in society. Although the 2008 constitution did guarantee that to a large extent, the NLD was able to grant a certain level of civic freedoms to empower people, communities and organizations to enjoy “freedom from fear”. Finally, the coup positions Myanmar as an artificial “swing state” in the regional and global geopolitical landscape: the junta could seek help from China against pressures from major democracies as well as universal norms and treaties, while also appealing to the West in the event of critical political sovereignty and territory challenges. China and the West’s continued inability to find common ground on the issue would thus

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help sustain the junta. Currently, the SAC is leaning towards Chinese support as it is one of the few countries “willing to do business with coup leaders and invest heavily in the country” (Irrawaddy 2021). The junta moves ahead to implement investment and development projects as part of China’s Belt-and-Road Initiative (BRI), including the Kyaukphyu port and special economic zones, both of which would guarantee China’s unfettered access to the Indian Ocean (Tower and Clapp 2021). The SAC’s continued cooperation with China could well transform Myanmar to share the characteristics of a combination of many Asian authoritarian and semi-autocratic states; it could develop into a Vietnam–China-like political model as well as into a Thailand-Cambodia style of militarydominated rule. However, if the military’s violence continues, Myanmar’s fate could be similar to that of North Korea. The SAC’s confidence that China, ASEAN and Japan would continue economic engagement despite the coup could perhaps very well sustain the coup regime. In sum, the analysis is that the coup was triggered by the heavy election loss by the junta’s proxy party, the USDP and its affiliates; this clearly frightened the C-in-C and the military as a whole regarding the uncertainty surrounding their future under the elected government that would have been formed. All driving factors behind the 2021 coup include a selfserving ambition of key military leaders, old and current, represented by the C-in-C as well as the vested business interests by their family members and close affiliates or cronies, and the fear about potential repercussions from the military leadership’s past and present wrong-doings, including ethnic and religious atrocities committed.

The Military Terrorizes, the People Defend The 2021 coup and the violence that followed sparked concerns on how Myanmar is on the verge of becoming a “failed state”, a term synonymous with states undergoing severe crises. The phenomenon of a failed state is “the convergence of conflict, institutional implosion and humanitarian crisis” (Bøås and Jennings 2005, 387; Zartman 1995). This is due to states being either unable or unwilling to “perform the functions required for them to pass as states” (Zartman 1995, 5). Rotberg (2002, 85) further explains that states fail because:

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they can no longer deliver public goods to their people. Their governments lose legitimacy, and in the eyes and hearts of a growing plurality of its citizens, the nation-state itself becomes illegitimate.

A strong state differs from a weak state as they are able to fulfil the capabilities to “penetrate society, regulate social relationships, extract resources, and appropriate or use resources in determined ways” (Migdal 1988, 4). The Fragile States Index by the Fund for Peace (2021) measures the vulnerability of weak states collapsing or becoming failed states. Its assessment framework is categorized into (1) cohesion indicators with sub-indicators that consider the security apparatus, factionalized elites and group grievance; (2) economic indicators with sub-indicators that consider economic decline, uneven economic development and human flight and brain drain; (3) political indicators with sub-indicators that consider state legitimacy, public services and human rights and rule of law; and (4) social indicators with sub-indicators that consider demographic pressures and refugees and internally displaced people; (5) cross-cutting indicators with a sub-indicator that considers the level of external intervention (The Fund for Peace 2021). Other than Myanmar, the Fragile States Index by the Fund for Peace (2021) includes Yemen, Somalia, Syria, Ethiopia, Afghanistan and the Central African Republic among countries that are at high risk of state collapse. By taking this definition into account, Myanmar is indeed a failed state. Although the state has the primary responsibility to guarantee public goods, such as security, economic livelihood, justice, basic freedom and infrastructure development, the coup regime has been committing crimes against humanity and war crimes against its own citizens. According to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners, 1,243 civilians have been killed with more than 7,000 put behind bars as of November 7, 2021. Among the fatalities include more than 72 children, some as young as a five-year-old child who was killed in a bombing (Nikkei Asia 2021; Beer 2021). Children have also been taken into custody as hostages. The recent detention of Su Htet Wine, a daughter of an anti-coup protest leader and striking teacher in Mogok, turned five in custody; she was seen holding an image of Aung San Suu Kyi in a protest (Myanmar Now 2021). However, the military’s atrocities do not end here. Most of the fatalities were due to a deliberate shot to the head and/or chest. The military’s shoot-to-kill style has been a method of brutal oppression over decades. The killing of peaceful protesters in anti-coup

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protests is reminiscent of the 8888 Revolution, when General Ne Win said, “The military never fires into the air. It just shoots straight to hit” (Moe 2021). The security forces have also taken away the bodies of the victims they killed and charged families of the deceased to retrieve them (Hollingsworth and Sharma 2021). When returned, some of the victims’ bodies have been stitched, leading the families of the victims to suspect that the internal organs of their fallen loved ones were removed. Khet Thi, a poet on the frontlines of resistance, died after being detained and his body was returned to his family with organs missing (Reuters 2021). The coup regime has especially been a setback for women’s rights as gender-based sexual violence has been “a hallmark of the military’s operations for decades, and there have been credible reports of sexual assault, rape, and killing of women throughout ethnic minority communities” (Onello and Radhakrishnan 2021). Despite the risks of sexual abuse, Myanmar’s women have been on the frontlines of protests against the junta, resisting authoritarianism and patriarchy. The UN has reported that women in detention, including young women, LGBTQ+ and civil society activists, have been experiencing torture and sexual violence (United Nations in Myanmar 2021). Victims reported the junta’s use of “heavy beatings, sexual abuse during interrogations, misogynistic insults, and death threats” (OMCT 2021). Since 2017, the UN Secretary-General listed the Myanmar military as a party “credibly suspected of committing or being responsible for patterns of rape or other forms of sexual violence in armed conflict on the agenda of the Security Council” along with the Border Guard (United Nations Secretary General 2021). The military has engaged in airstrikes against ethnic forces, displacing thousands. According to the Karen Peace Support Network (KPSN), the airstrikes that started sometime in late March in Mutraw District have killed dozens and displaced over 70,000 people, amounting to around 90% of the rural population. Latest reports by the UN estimate that 230,000 people have been displaced by the continued violence in Myanmar (Reuters 2021). In October, the military indiscriminately shelled and torched Thantlang, a town in Chin State, where nearly 200 homes and buildings were destroyed, including two churches (The Irrawaddy, 2021). Nicholas Koumjian, the head of the UN’s Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar (IIMM) reported that there have been patterns of uptick in violence following the coup in order to suppress the demonstrators and that the widespread and systematic attack

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on civilians amount to crimes against humanity. In addition, the investigators observed that particular groups were targeted for arrests, detentions without due process of law including journalists, medical workers and political opponents (Aljazeera, 2021). Given the scope of the atrocities, the UN Special Rapporteur of Human Rights in Myanmar, Thomas H. Andrews has called for global responsibility to address this severe crisis as the coup regime lacks the will and the capacity to take necessary action to stop it (OHCHR, 2021). Civilians engaged in the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) have also been systematically targeted by the junta. The military has been suppressing coverage of anti-coup protests by banning local news outlets and arresting journalists (Kurtenbach 2021). The military has also been cutting internet connections, destroying properties and looting residents (Nikkei Asia 2021; Irrawaddy 2021). In particular, their attacks on healthcare workers, especially those delivering emergency aid to the wounded, raise alarm as it is in violation of international law. Elmore (2021) writes that: since February 11, at least 109 attacks and threats against health workers, facilities, and transports have reportedly been perpetrated in Myanmar, according to an analysis based on open-source reports conducted by Insecurity Insight, Physicians for Human Rights (PHR) and the Johns Hopkins University Center for Public Health and Human Rights (CPHHR). During this period, at least 97 healthcare workers have been arrested, 32 injured, and 10 killed.

Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict, Pramilla Patten, expressed that the continued violence has greatly impacted public healthcare services: The current crisis is disrupting essential health and social services, including safe pregnancy and childbirth. In the midst of this civilian suffering, and the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, it is essential that appropriate multisectoral services are available to all civilians including non-discriminatory care for survivors of sexual violence, and unimpeded access for humanitarian actors to provide essential lifesaving services. (United Nations Secretary General 2021)

Acts of horror by the Myanmar military diverge from a state government’s and instead take the form of an army-state, serving as an institution of terror. However, its approach to rule at gunpoint is neither new nor specific to the 2021 coup. According to Yamahata (2021) it is

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a method far too familiar for the four thas or “sons” of Myanmar— taiyin-tha (ethnic minorities), phaya-tha (Sangha and members of other religious communities), kyaung-tha (students) and pyithupyi-tha (the general public)—in which the perpetrators of violence are the sit-tha or soldiers of the military. Ethnic minorities or taiyin-tha in the periphery have been disproportionately subjected to the military’s abuse for decades. The military has installed Burmanization, suppressing ethnic language and culture and assimilating ethnic nationalities into the majority-Bamar population. The military has also been engaged in conflict with ethnic armed organizations in what is known as the world’s longest running civil war and committed atrocities against various ethnic groups, in which the genocide against the Rohingyas has caught the attention of the ICJ. The military also has a history of committing violence against kyaung-tha or students that led the 8888 Revolution and phaya-tha or Sangha that led the 2007 Saffron Revolution. Now, the general public at the centre or pyithupyi-tha are added to the picture as they experience the violence on a daily basis under the SAC. The junta’s terrorizing acts to build a political and economic empire are self-serving—beneficial for military elites and their affiliates at the expense of all other actors that constitute the state. Meanwhile, actors of Myanmar society that make up the state, such as those part of the CDM, ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) and ordinary civilians have been putting their lives on the line for the preservation of the nation. Their actions are the complete opposite of the junta: while the military terrorizes, Myanmar’s people defend. The responses by Myanmar people have been very quick, solid and fluid, starting from daily general strikes inclusive of people from all walks of life—organized by students, unions, Gen Zers, civil society organizations to the united ethnic nationalities. The info-tech savvy youth of Gen Z is at the forefront of the protest; they use social media tacitly to keep communication flowing and disclose information outside of the country despite frequent internet blackouts (Fawthrop 2021). The CDM by workers and the politico-legislative leadership by the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH) have been gaining international recognition and garnered strong momentum against the coup regime. Furthermore, the SAC is an illegitimate army-state that forcefully seized power from the NLD: a legitimate civilian government expected to serve its second term. Members of Myanmar society do not recognize

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it and condemn the junta’s daily assault to democracy. Their continued resistance has led to the creation of the NUG, a shadow government that represents the will of Myanmar’s democratic society and hence is legitimate to its members. The people’s defence has also had an effect abroad: until date, no country, with the exception of China, has officially recognized the SAC as the government of Myanmar and UN agencies, especially, ILO, FAO, WHO and UNHRC refused to allow the representative of the SAC to attend their assemblies. Most recently, ASEAN has barred Myanmar from attending the annual leaders’ summit. Despite the imminent threat of detention and even death, the people are not failing the state. From this perspective, it is misleading to label Myanmar as a “failed state”. So what should Myanmar be labelled? Where does the country stand?

Path Towards the Death of Tyranny and Birth of a New Nation The junta remains strong in its continued use of violence, but it has already lost in the eyes of the people. It has lost the country, economy, political standing and international recognition. The military also cannot secure full control over the territories of many ethnic regions to claim as its own. This situation shows that the colliding course between the people and the military has already crossed the “point of no return”—the ongoing situation demonstrates that the nation is rethrown into political turmoil without a clear prospect of it being settled. The bedrock of democratization and the peace process, although they were fragile from the start, has now collapsed. This chapter has highlighted that Myanmar has faced a long history of coups and violence that comes with military rule. However, what makes this coup different from others is the overwhelming civilian resistance that remains united and vigilant to the present day. According to Yamahata (2021), the collective pain shared by the four “sons” of Myanmar—taiyin-tha (ethnic minorities), phaya-tha (Sangha and members of other religious communities), kyaung-tha (students) and pyithupyi-tha (the general public)—has solidified a united front against the military, composed of sit-tha (soldiers), and forged a “new nationalism” that is anti-military and anti-extremist. This show of unity, solidarity, compromise and reconciliation between the “sons” of Myanmar, and in particular, between the Bamar-majority and the ethnic minorities,

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whom the military has spent decades marginalizing, are central to the death of tyranny and towards the birth of a new nation. Although their perspectives on the future of the country may somewhat differ, they all strive towards building a federal democracy. Yamahata (2021) elaborates further: The creation and widespread dissemination of the military’s discourse, in which the prerequisite to be a nationalist is to be Burmese and Buddhist, cannot be ignored in making sense of military influence in Myanmar. However, the nationwide reaction to the recent coup has proved otherwise, marking a turning point in Myanmar’s history. Now more than ever, its people or pyithupyi-tha are united in their determination to establish a fully civilian government founded on the principles of a truly diverse and inclusive federal democracy. Systematically marginalized taiyin-tha, including the Rohingyas, have expressed their solidarity with the majority Bamar ethnic group, while the Bamar have expressed remorse and apologies for not siding with ethnic minorities prior to the coup.

People’s determination, efforts and directions lead towards new settings for building a new nation under the long-awaited federal principles by democratic means, effectively expelling military authoritarianism from Myanmar once and for all. From this perspective, Myanmar is not a failed state because the people refuse to recognize the SAC or allow the military to destroy it; instead, members of society, including but not limited to the four “sons” have been putting their lives on the line to save the nation from the dangers of state failure. What we have is an illegitimate state or army-state, waging war against society. In response, the NUG has called for a “people’s defensive war” against the terrorization of the military junta. Although the international community or regional organizations like ASEAN may prioritize reaching a break in further loss of lives by the SAC’s terrors in order to avert the coming humanitarian crises, the people of Myanmar’s real need and the determined collective aim is the removal of the military. The military and their terrorizing acts have been costing unbearable losses to the people, society and nation as a whole since 1962. Continued authoritarianism is an alarming worry to the public because the military regime could also be functioning as a “front desk” of China’s

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political meddling in Myanmar, as can be seen by its pursuit for geopolitical and strategic advances in the region despite the junta’s violence. In fact, the military would most likely not have moved against the elected NLD government if they were not confident that powerful states like China and Russia would be able to back their endeavours. Undoubtedly, there is a fundamental gap between the outside’s interest-cum-priority and the inside’s need-based struggle. It is therefore worth highlighting that the people of Myanmar and its diaspora, from all walks of life—ethnic and religious minorities, different civil society organizations and EAOs—will not stop their present struggle as it is their second independence battle to free themselves, this time, from internal colonialism by the military’s decades-old brutal oppression. Moreover, any international and regional drives in terms of priority setting, policy emphasis, action planning as well as resource allocation need to be reflected in the course of the people of Myanmar as the choice of all stakeholders represented by the NUG or National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC). Therefore, any external/international facilitation activities, including mediation dialogue, preventive diplomacy, humanitarian intervention, punitive measures, reconstruction and transitional justice mechanisms must sensitively consider the gap that exists between “outside interests” and “inside needs” to avoid enabling the further entrenchment of the deadly military authoritarianism in Myanmar.

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Index

A absorptive capacity, 111 Academic Diplomacy Project, 22 accessible services, 111 accountability, 101, 106 Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM), 190 aid, 82, 88–90, 93, 94, 99, 233, 234, 236, 249, 271–286, 288–290 alternative education, 69 Anglo-Burmese War, 117, 164 Anglo-Manipur War, 118 Arakan, 7, 21 Arakan Army (AA), 7, 145, 150, 151, 184, 185, 259–263, 265, 267 Arakan Liberation Party (ALP), 259, 263 Arakan National Party, 144, 150 Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), 260, 261, 263–266 armed conflict, 85, 88–92, 98 Army-State, 334, 335, 337 ASEAN Way, 210, 222, 225 Assam, 117–120, 122

Association of Medical Doctors of Asia (AMDA), 281 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 210, 219, 221, 222, 225, 271–273, 290, 323, 331, 337 Aung San, 165, 167, 169 Aung San Suu Kyi, 7, 17–19, 25, 26, 28, 30, 32, 39, 46, 136, 152, 165, 167, 169, 209, 211, 212, 226, 233, 329, 332 autonomy, 101, 162, 185, 186, 201, 203 availability, 104 B Bamar, 7, 8, 11, 13, 14, 17, 68, 257, 260, 264, 266, 267 Baptist Convention, 89, 90, 92, 94 basic education, 67, 69, 70, 72, 74–76, 78, 79, 82 Basic Essential Package of Health Services, 107 basic reproductive health care, 103

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 C. Yamahata and B. Anderson (eds.), Demystifying Myanmar’s Transition and Political Crisis, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-6675-9

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346

INDEX

Belt-and-Road Initiative (BRI), 331 Border Guard Forces (BGF), 14, 15, 86–88, 203, 259 border(s), 115–117, 121–131, 162, 165, 177 BRICS, 222 Bridge Asia Japan (BAJ), 281 Buddhism, 78, 175, 177, 264 Buddhist kings, 176 Buddhist monks, 163–165, 168 Buddhization, 323 Burma Communist Party, 165, 166 Burmanization, 102, 323, 335 Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP), 330 Burmese Way to Socialism, 325 C Cambodia, 273 capacity building, 305, 316 capital, 163, 164, 168, 170–177 Ceasefire Agreement (CFA), 188 ceasefire(s), 46, 53, 85, 87, 88, 95, 97, 104, 109, 137, 150, 182, 187, 188, 191, 192, 198, 199, 202–204 centralization, 102 Central Region to Ayeyarwady, 282 Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (COHA), 190 child health services, 103 childhood vaccinations, 105 Chin, 19, 67–72, 74–82, 144, 150, 255–259, 261, 263, 268, 282–286 China, 16, 30, 117, 120–122, 124, 126, 129–131, 162, 166, 172–176, 234, 238, 239, 248, 249, 273, 274, 330, 336, 337 churches, 88, 89, 92, 94–96, 98–100 Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM), 10, 334, 335

civil society, 136, 137, 141, 146, 154 Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), 294, 304, 308, 317 civil war, 46 clash of international orders, 210, 220, 221, 223, 224 CLMV, 273 CNF, 258, 259, 263 colonialism, 257 Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), 335 community, 170, 173, 177 community development, 87–89, 100 conflict, 17, 19, 20 conflict resolution, 300, 302 conflict zones, 102 contextual knowledge, 251 convergence, 105, 108 counterinsurgency policy, 102 COVID-19, 4, 37, 137, 138, 141, 146, 147, 153–155, 215, 217, 322, 334 Culture of Peace (CoP), 295, 296, 302, 307, 311, 312, 315–317 Cyclone Nargis, 172 D dams, 244 debt, 278 Democratic Kayin Benevolent Army (DKBA), 14, 15, 184, 199 democratic participation, 296, 312 Democratic Party of National Politics, 143 democratic transition, 7, 8, 10, 15–19, 21, 321, 323, 327–329 democratization, 4, 8, 9, 21, 275, 288, 290 development, 7, 15, 17, 18, 20, 21, 258 development studies, 231, 232, 234, 239, 240, 250

INDEX

disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, 186 disciplined democracy, 27, 32, 36, 37, 39 discriminatory policies, 109 disenfranchisement, 149, 150 disinvestment, 102 disparity, 106 divided society, 295, 311, 316 donor, 272, 274–276, 280 E Early Childhood Care and Development (ECCD), 69 East-West Economic Corridor, 273, 274 economic growth, 231–239, 241–243, 245, 248, 249 education, 296, 301, 312, 316 education services, 67 8888 Revolution, 33, 325, 333, 335 electoral violence, 148 equality, 294, 296, 301–304, 306, 307, 310, 312, 315, 316 Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs), 7, 14, 20, 46, 47, 53, 59, 62, 63, 163, 182–186, 192, 197–199, 201–203, 265, 268, 335, 338 ethnic communities, 102, 103, 107, 108 ethnic community based health organizations, 102 Ethnic Health Organizations, 107 Ethnic Women’s Organizations (EWOs), 18, 21, 47, 56, 63, 294, 295, 303–305, 307, 308, 310–312, 315, 317 F Facebook, 146, 147, 151, 152 failed state, 331, 332, 336, 337

347

federalism, 185, 186, 197, 201, 203 Federal Political Negotiation and Consultation Committee (FPNCC), 185, 202, 267 financial barriers, 104 First World War, 118 Fomin, Alexander, 218, 220 forced displacement, 91 Four Cuts policy, 102 Four Eights, 166 four ‘sons’, 21 Free Aceh Movement, 190 freedom of movement, 104 G gender, 294, 300–304, 307, 312 gender equality, 56, 58, 59, 63 General Administrative Department (GAD), 13–15, 17, 106 Gen Z, 335 Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM), 190 ghost, 163, 164 Global South, 241 governance, 102, 105–107, 109 Government of Indonesia (GoI), 190 grassroots, 16, 18, 21, 22, 80, 281, 282, 285, 286, 294, 295, 306, 311, 312, 315, 316 grassroots peace, 47, 58 grassroots peacebuilding, 295 great power politics, 210, 216, 226 Grihang Village, 116, 126–130 H healthcare, 67, 68, 77 health education campaigns, 103 Health Information System Working Group, 104 health policies, 108 health services, 103, 105, 107, 108 Helsinki agreement, 190

348

INDEX

higher education, 69 human development, 48–51 Human Development Index (HDI), 237, 273 humanitarian assistance, 85, 88–93, 97, 100 humanitarian intervention, 210, 219, 222–224 human rights, 46, 48, 50, 58, 63, 85, 91, 92, 95, 294–296, 312, 316, 317 human rights abuses, 102, 109 human security, 46–48, 50, 51, 53, 62, 63, 91, 94, 95, 281, 282, 285 hybrid democracy, 4

I India, 8, 19, 115, 116, 119–131, 176, 234 Indian Ocean, 273, 290 Indochina, 273 Indonesia, 325, 326 inequitable distribution, 106 Internal commissions, 187 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), 19, 89–100, 102, 192 International commissions, 188 International Court of Justice (ICJ), 8, 330, 335 International Criminal Court (ICC), 330 international humanitarian assistance, 103, 105 International Monitoring Mission (IMM), 188 international society, 210, 218, 219, 223–226 international support, 109

J Japan, 21, 271–275, 277, 279–281, 283, 286–288, 290 Japan-Mekong Regional Partnership Program, 273 Japan-Myanmar, 288 Japan Platform, 276, 281, 286, 287 JICA, 273, 281 JMC-S, 199 JMC-U, 199 Joint Ceasefire Monitoring Committee (JMC), 20, 182, 187, 188, 191, 192, 197–199, 201–204 Joint Commissions, 188 Joint Military Mission (JMM), 188 jurisdiction, 105 K Kachin, 7, 46, 68, 85, 87–100, 137, 144, 258, 259, 262, 282–286, 288 Kachin Humanitarian Concern Committee (KHCC), 95–97, 99 Kachin Independence Army (KIA), 86, 87, 92, 94–96, 184–186, 203, 259, 260 Kachin Independence Organization (KIO), 86–88, 94–97, 99 Kaladan, 255–257, 259, 261 Kaladan Multi-Modal Transport (KMMT), 257 Karen, 11, 13–15, 174 Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), 14 Karen National Union (KNU), 14, 15, 182, 184, 186, 198, 199, 201–203, 259, 260, 265 Karen Peace Support Network (KPSN), 333 Kayah, 7, 68, 144 Kayin, 68, 144

INDEX

349

Keynesianism, 236 Khin Nyunt, 165, 170 Ko Ni, 186 Kyainseikgyi, 11–17, 22 kyaung-tha, 335, 336

Myanmar coup, 210, 212, 218 Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), 184, 185, 260 Myanmar tragedy, 209, 210, 214, 216

L Laos, 273 liberalization, 272, 274, 276, 279, 284, 285, 290 Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), 191 livelihoods, 87, 99, 100 Look East Policy, 121, 123, 130 Lwin, Sein, 165, 167

N Naga, 19, 115–120, 126, 128–131 Naga Hills, 117–120 Naga National Council, 120 Na Ta La, 77, 78 National Ceasefire Agreement (NCA), 7, 94, 182, 184–186, 191, 192, 197–199, 201–203, 259, 260 National Convention, 86 National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA), 185 National Education Law, 68, 70, 80 National Education Strategic Plan (NESP), 69 National Health Plan, 107 National League for Democracy (NLD), 4, 7, 8, 10, 17, 19, 29–31, 34–39, 93, 136, 140, 143, 144, 146–148, 150, 151, 182, 186, 203, 209, 211–214, 222, 233, 294, 321–323, 325, 327, 329, 330, 335, 338 national reconciliation, 272, 287 National Reconciliation and Peace Centre (NRPC), 96 National Socialist Council for Nagaland (NSCN), 121 National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC), 338 National Unity Government (NUG), 330, 336, 338 Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA), 20, 53, 148, 182–186, 191, 192, 197–199, 201–203 Naypyidaw, 163, 164, 171–177 negative peace, 311, 312

M Mae Tao Clinic, 104 Malacca Strait, 273 malaria, 102, 103, 105, 108 Mandalay, 162, 164, 166, 170, 171 Manipur, 116, 118–122, 124–127 ‘markets-plus’ model, 237 martial law, 163, 167 Mekong-Japan Cooperation, 273 Mekong sub-region connectivity, 273 Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), 237 Min Aung Hlaing, 28, 33, 35, 38, 39, 162, 175, 209, 212, 213, 215, 217, 220, 321, 323 Ministry of Education, 69, 70, 76 Mizoram, 125, 131 mobility, 104, 109 modernization, 235, 247, 249 Mon, 7, 11–14, 68, 144, 145, 174, 176, 282–288 Mongolia, 116 Mong Tai Army (MTA), 203, 260 Monitoring, Verification and Reporting, 192

350

INDEX

neoliberal development, 236 Ne Win, 163, 165–167, 233, 238, 249, 325, 330, 333 New Mon State Party (NMSP), 14, 184 1990 election, 233 Nippon Foundation, 276, 286–288 Non-Governmental Development Organisation (NGDO), 307 Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), 276–278, 280–282, 285, 286, 288, 289 non-state actors, 93, 99, 100 Northeast India, 124–126, 129 Northern Alliance (NA), 184, 185 O Official Development Assistance (ODA), 271, 272, 274–277, 280, 285, 289 P pagoda, 176 Paletwa, 20, 255–259, 261–263, 266 Panglong 21, 187, 260 Panglong peace process, 137, 148 participatory health system, 105 peace, 294–296, 302–306, 310–312, 315–317 peacebuilding, 281, 287, 288 peace process, 7, 18, 21, 46, 47, 51, 53, 58–60, 62, 63, 181, 182, 185–187, 191, 198, 199, 202–204 People’s Party, 143, 144 People’s Pioneer Party, 143 periphery, 295 phaya-tha, 335, 336 physical accessibility, 104 placelessness, 177 political liberalization, 21

political power structures, 250 political transformation, 25, 30, 35, 36, 40 political transition, 39, 40 poverty, 231–235, 237–240, 242–246, 249, 250 poverty reduction, 231, 245 priority diseases, 105 public services, 87–89 pyithupyi-tha, 335–337 R Rakhine, 4, 16, 17, 19, 46, 68, 75, 137, 143, 149–151, 163, 256, 257, 259, 261–266, 268, 282–287 RCSS/SSA, 182 reconstruction, 88, 98 referral system, 103 reform process, 238, 243 rehabilitation, 88 relocation, 102 reproductive health, 103, 105 resettlement, 95, 96, 99, 100 residential schools, 78 responsibility to protect (R2P), 222 Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS), 182, 184, 186, 198, 199, 201 Revolutionary Council, 163, 325 Rohingya, 8, 16, 21, 46, 145, 150, 163, 259–261, 263–267, 335, 337 Rohingya crisis, 223 S Saffron Revolution, 168, 172 sangha, 215 Saw Maung, 325 Second World War, 119, 120, 122, 123, 162, 164, 231, 235, 257

INDEX

security, 46–48, 50–53, 56, 59, 62, 63, 104, 109 security sector reform, 186 sexual violence, 303 Shan, 7, 14, 17, 46, 68, 85, 90, 97, 137, 144, 166, 172, 174, 176, 184, 199, 201, 249, 258–260, 262, 268 Shan Nationalities Development Party, 144 Shan National League for Democracy, 144 Shan State Progress Party (SSPP), 185 SLORC/SPDC, 163, 164, 168–170 social cohesion, 295, 304, 310, 315, 317 social spending, 101 social transformation, 295, 316 South China Sea, 273 Southeast Asia, 121, 123, 125, 126, 130, 131, 171, 172, 174, 176, 234, 238, 239, 249, 273 Southern Corridor, 273 space, 161–163, 167, 175, 177 Sri Lanka, 188, 191 State Administration Council (SAC), 162, 329, 331, 335, 337 State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), 325 State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), 325, 329 structural constraints, 111 structural reform, 108 Sudan, 188 Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement/Army, 188 sustainable development, 288 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), 108, 238 sustainable peace, 109

351

T Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), 182, 184, 185, 260 taiyin-tha, 335–337 Target Beneficiary Groups (TBGs), 305, 306, 308, 310–312, 316, 317 Tatmadaw, 3, 4, 8, 10, 13–15, 18, 20, 21, 26–32, 34–40, 76, 86–88, 91–93, 95–98, 137, 139, 150, 151, 164, 165, 168, 170, 173–175, 181, 184–186, 192, 197–199, 201–204, 209, 211, 212, 214, 215, 220, 222, 225, 258–265, 267, 268, 323, 325, 327, 334, 335 Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET), 69 technical assistance, 276–278, 283, 284, 290 Technical Training, 78 territorial disputes, 162 Thai-Burma border, 56 Thailand, 8, 14, 165, 325, 326, 328, 331 Than Shwe, 171, 172, 175, 176, 329 Thein Sein, 181, 203, 329 theory/practice divide, 232 Tokyo Strategy 2012, 273 tragic vision of international relations, a, 211, 225 transition period, 109 Treaty of Yandaboo, 122 2008 Constitution, 8, 27, 31, 33, 45, 46, 62, 86, 136, 138, 139, 143, 146, 186 2010 General Election, 233, 249 2015 election, 233 2020 election, 16, 17, 136, 141, 142, 155, 294, 321, 322, 327, 329, 330 2021 coup, 3, 4, 9, 18, 20, 40

352

INDEX

21st Century Panglong, 7, 182, 192 U underdevelopment, 239, 240, 249 Union Accords, 186 Union Betterment Party, 143 Union Election Commission (UEC), 10, 136, 138–149, 153, 155 Union Ministry of Home Affairs, 106 Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), 17, 33, 34, 36, 37, 143, 147, 150, 329–331 United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC), 260 United Wa State Party (UWSP), 185 U Nu, 165, 325 UWSA, 185 V Vietnam, 273, 274

Vocational Training, 78 voter list, 142, 149, 154, 155 vulnerable populations, 104, 111

W Waltz, Kenneth, 210, 211 Washington Consensus, 236, 237 water and sanitation programs, 103 Win Myint, 137 Women’s League of Burma (WLB), 304 women’s organisations, 56, 58 women-to-women diplomacy, 58, 59, 63 WWII. See Second World War

Y Yangon, 162–164, 166–175, 177