Democratic Recession, Autocratization, and Democratic Backlash in Southeast Asia (Contestations in Contemporary Southeast Asia) 9811998108, 9789811998102

Table of contents :
Acknowledgments
Contents
Notes on Contributors
List of Figures
List of Tables
1 Democratic Decline and Rising Autocratization in Southeast Asia: An Organizing Framework
Democratic Reversals
Autocratization
The Inherency of Authoritarian Tendencies
Democratic Backlash
An Organizing Framework for Understanding Democratic Recession
Democratic Recession in Southeast Asia
Contextual Factor One: External Influence
Contextual Factor Two: Political Institutions
Contextual Factor Three: Societal Support and Norms of Accountability and Participation
Process Factor One: Governance, Corruption, and Democratic Recession in Southeast Asia
Process Factor Two: Authoritarian Innovations, Populism, and Democratic Decline
Process Factor Three: Democratic Backlash
Democratic Recession and Autocratization in Southeast Asia
References
2 At the Sharp Edge of Power: Philippines–China Relations and Democratic Erosion Under Duterte
Introduction
Endogenous and Exogenous Drivers of Democratic Erosion
Original Sin? China’s Economic Overtures Under Arroyo
Confrontation Under Aquino, 2010–2016
Conciliation Under Duterte, 2016–2022
Toward Influence Operations?
Conclusion
References
3 Anies Baswedan and Substate Populism in Jakarta, Indonesia
Introduction
Populism, Polarization, and Democratic Decline
Democratization and the Rise of Conservatism in Indonesia
Divisive Gubernatorial Election, Islamist Populism, and Polarization
Three Factors of Substate Populism in Jakarta, Indonesia
Decentralization
Pre-existing Resentment/Anxiety
Capacity to Dominate Local Narratives
Anies Baswedan’s Rhetoric and Policies: Islamist or Technocratic Populist Leader?
Zero Down Payment Housing Scheme
Environmental Policy
COVID-19 Policies
Does Substate Populism in Jakarta Endanger Democracy in Indonesia?
Conclusion
References
4 In Limbo: Islamist Populism and Democratic Stagnation in Malaysia
Introduction
Populism and Democratic Stagnation
Islamization and Authoritarianism in Malaysia
Islamist Populism in Malaysia
The Future of Democracy in Malaysia
Conclusion
References
5 Democratic Backsliding in Malaysia: Executive Aggrandizement Under Muhyiddin Yassin’s Government
Introduction
Malaysian Politics: An Overview
Democratic Backsliding and Executive Aggrandizement
Executive Aggrandizement Under Muhyiddin Yassin
Role of the Malaysian King
COVID-19 and Emergency Powers
Silencing Media and Civil Society
Conclusion
References
6 Propagating and Resisting Authoritarian Innovation Online: Thailand’s ‘ROTC Cyber’ Activity
Introduction
Authoritarian Innovations, Social Media, and Democratic Recession
Thailand, the Military, and Authoritarianism
Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC)
ROTC Cyber
Content of Indoctrination
Dissemination of Pro-military Information
Reshaping the Image of Military Training and ROTC Program
Promotion of the Military’s Political Role Discourses
Promotion or Normalization of Military Characteristics
Effectiveness of ROTC Cyber
Strategy in Publishing
Production Quality
Engagement and Feedback
Impacts of ROTC Cyber
Conclusion
References
7 Rural Grassroots Governance-Building in Myanmar
Introduction
Background
Study Approach
Analytic Framework
Building Grassroots Governance Through Hybrid Organisation
Proto Governance
Pockets of Effectiveness (POE)
The Cases
Cases 1 and 2: Kayin and Chin States
Case 3: Kayah State
Findings and Analysis
Chin State
Findings and Analysis
Kayah State
Findings and Analysis
Kayin State
Findings and Analysis
Synthesising the Evidence
Are These Pockets of Effectiveness?
Conclusions, Discussion, and Implications
References
8 Returned Migrants and Democratization in Village Head Elections in Indonesia: A Glimpse of Hope from Indramayu
Introduction
Authoritarian Enclaves, Democratization, and Economic Transformation
Indramayu Regency
The Shifting Village Economic Structure
Investing New Wealth of Returned Migrants
The Emergence of New Village Elites
Democratization and New Elites: Returned Migrants in the Village Head Elections
The Fall of the Old Elites
The Village’s Democratization
Conclusion
References
9 Regimes, Repression, Repertoires: Student Protest Movements and the Repertoires of Contention in the Philippines and Indonesia
Introduction
Repression and Repertoires: An Overview
Brief History of Student Protest Movements in the Philippines and Indonesia
Student Protest and State Response in Post-1986 Philippines
Student Protest and State Response in Post-Reformasi Indonesia
State Agents, Repression, and Impacts on Repertoires
Conclusions
References
10 Myanmar: From Hybrid Democracy to Violent Autocracy
Myanmar’s Autocratic Innovation
Reversal into Complete Military Control
Democratic Backlash and the Future of the Country
The Formation of a Democratic Backlash
Sustaining the Democratic Backlash
Some Successes of the Democratic Backlash: Redefining an Inclusive Federal Agenda
Conclusion
References
Index

Citation preview

CONTESTATIONS IN CONTEMPORARY SOUTHEAST ASIA

Democratic Recession, Autocratization, and Democratic Backlash in Southeast Asia Edited by James Ockey · Naimah S. Talib

Contestations in Contemporary Southeast Asia

Series Editors Vedi Hadiz, Asia Institute, University of Melbourne, Parkville, VIC, Australia Jamie S. Davidson, Department of Political Science, National University of Singapore, Singapore, Singapore Caroline Hughes, Kroc Institute for Int’l Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, IN, USA

This Palgrave Macmillan book series publishes research that displays strong interdisciplinary concerns to examine links between political conflict and broader socio-economic development and change. While the emphasis is on contemporary Southeast Asia, works included within the Series demonstrate an appreciation of how historical contexts help to shape present-day contested issues in political, economic, social and cultural spheres. The Series will be of interest to authors undertaking single country studies, multi-country comparisons in Southeast Asia or tackling political and socio-economic contestations that pertain to the region as a whole. Rather uniquely, the series welcomes works that seek to illuminate prominent issues in contemporary Southeast Asia by comparing experiences in the region to those in other parts of the world as well. Volumes in the series engage closely with the relevant academic literature on specific debates, and include a comparative dimension within even single country studies such that the work contributes insights to a broader literature. Researchers based in Southeast Asian focused institutions are encouraged to submit their work for consideration.

James Ockey · Naimah S. Talib Editors

Democratic Recession, Autocratization, and Democratic Backlash in Southeast Asia

Editors James Ockey Department of Political Science and International Relations University of Canterbury Christchurch, New Zealand

Naimah S. Talib Department of Political Science and International Relations University of Canterbury Christchurch, New Zealand

ISSN 2661-8354 ISSN 2661-8362 (electronic) Contestations in Contemporary Southeast Asia ISBN 978-981-19-9810-2 ISBN 978-981-19-9811-9 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-9811-9 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover illustration: © Planet Observer getty images This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore

Acknowledgments

This book began at a seminar organized by the Southeast Asia Research Initiative (SEARI) at the University of Canterbury. SEARI organizes regular “Southeast Asia Update” seminars, where country experts give a brief presentation on a topic of interest for their respective countries. As each expert presented in turn, we discovered that all the presentations involved threats to democracy and increased autocratization. And so SEARI decided to organize a workshop, sending out a general call for papers, while encouraging SEARI members and affiliates to participate. We were gratified with the response, and the high quality of the subsequent presentations, and decided to proceed to a symposium and then to this book. The initial workshop was sponsored by SEARI and supported by the University of Canterbury. For the symposium, we were able to secure additional funding and support from the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in New Zealand through a grant received by Professor Alex Tan, co-director of SEARI. We are particularly grateful to Representative Bill K. M. Chen for his support for the project. The Research Initiative on Taiwan Studies at the University of Canterbury together with the Taiwan Institute of Governance and Communication Research at National Chengchi University, organized an additional panel of speakers at the symposium, which enhanced our understanding of the impact of the COVID 19 crisis on governance.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

We would also like to acknowledge the helpful comments at the symposium from Associate Professor Nicholas Khoo and Dr. Lena Tan of the University of Otago, who reviewed chapters and presentations and helped us to strengthen our arguments. The symposium would not have been possible without the organizational abilities of Orson Tan and Neel Vanvari. Our thinking on democratic recession has also been sharpened through our discussions with Dr. Iati Iati of the University of Victoria, Wellington, Dr. Aim Sinpeng of the University of Sydney, and Dr. James To of the Asia–New Zealand Foundation. In addition, Dr. Sinpeng kindly presented some of her research and ideas to our authors at the symposium. Along the way, we have been assisted by many individuals and institutions. SEARI members and affiliates, both here in Christchurch and by Zoom, diligently attended each event, contributed comments, and offered encouragement to writers both individually and as a group. Among those SEARI members and affiliates who contributed are Dennis Quilala, Selver Sahin, Stepan Verkhovets, Pinsuda Wonganan, Orson Tan, Neel Vanvari, Minh Tran, and Tayyaba Latif. As we proceeded to the final preparation of the manuscript, we were assisted with copyediting by A. Ockey, who also provided moral support. We would also like to thank the editors and reviewers at Palgrave Macmillan for their helpful advice and their patience as we worked to make the manuscript presentable. We have had the pleasure of working with a highly enthusiastic and cooperative group of contributors. This book would not be what it is without their support and thoughtful suggestions. Last, we would like to thank those whose past work helped shape our own, and those who take the time to read this book and take up the challenge to critique, refine, and advance our knowledge of democratic recession and autocratization in the future.

Contents

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Democratic Decline and Rising Autocratization in Southeast Asia: An Organizing Framework James Ockey

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At the Sharp Edge of Power: Philippines–China Relations and Democratic Erosion Under Duterte Aries A. Arugay and Justin Keith A. Baquisal

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Anies Baswedan and Substate Populism in Jakarta, Indonesia Amalia Sustikarini

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In Limbo: Islamist Populism and Democratic Stagnation in Malaysia Syaza Shukri

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Democratic Backsliding in Malaysia: Executive Aggrandizement Under Muhyiddin Yassin’s Government Naimah S. Talib Propagating and Resisting Authoritarian Innovation Online: Thailand’s ‘ROTC Cyber’ Activity Pasit Wongngamdee

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CONTENTS

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Rural Grassroots Governance-Building in Myanmar Charles David Crumpton, Mariana Cifuentes, and Julia Roche

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Returned Migrants and Democratization in Village Head Elections in Indonesia: A Glimpse of Hope from Indramayu Khairu Roojiqien Sobandi

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Regimes, Repression, Repertoires: Student Protest Movements and the Repertoires of Contention in the Philippines and Indonesia Juhn Chris P. Espia Myanmar: From Hybrid Democracy to Violent Autocracy Mariana Cifuentes

Index

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Notes on Contributors

Aries A. Arugay is Professor of Political Science at the University of the Philippines-Diliman and Editor-in-Chief of Asian Politics & Policy. He has conducted research on comparative democratization, electoral politics, civil–military relations, contentious politics, security sector reform, and international relations of the Asia-Pacific. He obtained his Ph.D. in Political Science from Georgia State University as a Fulbright Scholar and his M.A. and B.A. (cum laude) in Political Science from the University of the Philippines-Diliman. Justin Keith A. Baquisal is a graduate student at the Department of Political Science at the University of the Philippines-Diliman. He is an editorial review board member at the Philippine Strategic Forum and a strategic intelligence analyst in the private sector, focusing on security and geopolitics in the Asia-Pacific. He obtained his Bachelor’s degree in political science (magna cum laude) from the University of the Philippines-Diliman. Mariana Cifuentes is a governance researcher and development practitioner with 16 years of international experience working on social justice programs in Latin America, East Africa, Asia and Melanesia. Mariana has worked in Myanmar since 2015. During this time, her research focused on the role played by civil society in the provision and delivery of social services. Currently, Mariana is an international consultant for Strategic Engagements and Communication for a program managed by the British

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Council. Mariana’s latest research focuses on how communications and technologies are used to generate discussion and advocate for change, especially among young people. Mariana holds an M.Phil. from the Institute of Development Studies (UK) and a Ph.D. from the International Institute of Social Studies (NL). Charles David Crumpton is a Senior Research Associate at the Institute for Governmental Service and Research, University of Maryland, College Park, and a visiting professor at Chiang Mai University. His most recent democratic governance work in Southeast Asia includes directing a seminar at Chiang Mai University on the future of governance in Myanmar and the formation of the Myanmar Advocacy Research Group which focuses on grassroots governance-building and transitional justice. Juhn Chris P. Espia is an Assistant Professor at the Division of Social Sciences, College of Arts and Sciences, University of the Philippines Visayas. He is currently a Ph.D. candidate at the Department of Political Science and International Relations, University of Canterbury, and a recipient of the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade scholarship. His research interests include state–civil society relations, disaster risk management, foreign policy, local governance, policymaking, and elections. James Ockey is an Associate Professor at the Department of Political Science and International Relations at the University of Canterbury. He is an expert on Thai politics, and on Southeast Asia more generally, with a particular interest in democratization. He has published extensively on civil–military relations, political parties and elections, and local politics in Thailand. He is a co-founder of the Southeast Asia Research Initiative (SEARI) at the University of Canterbury. Julia Roche is a researcher at the Federal University of Goiás in Goiânia, Brazil, where she works on health systems strengthening research. She also works as a Monitoring and Evaluation specialist, contributing to programming at a nonprofit organization focused on gender-based violence. She holds a Master’s in Public Health from the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, and a Master’s in Social Work from the University of Maryland School of Social Work.

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Syaza Shukri is an Assistant Professor at the Department of Political Science, International Islamic University Malaysia. Her area of specialization is in comparative politics, specifically in democratization and politics in the Middle East and Southeast Asia. Her current research interests include populism, identity politics, inter-ethnic relations, and political Islam, specifically in Muslim-majority contexts. She has degrees from the University of Pittsburgh, the London School of Economics and Political Science, and International Islamic University Malaysia. Khairu Roojiqien Sobandi is an Assistant Professor at the Department of Political Science, University of Jenderal Soedirman (UNSOED), Purwokerto, Central Java, Indonesia. He received his Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand. His research interests focus on democratization, local politics, identity and nationalism. Amalia Sustikarini is a Research Associate at CBDS, Department of International Relations, Bina Nusantara University, Indonesia. She obtained her Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Canterbury New Zealand in 2020. Her research interests coalesce around conflict and peace, Southeast Asian Studies, democratization, and identity. She is now based in Sydney, Australia and expanding her research focus on diversity, equity, and inclusion. Naimah S. Talib is an Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Department of Political Science and International Relations at the University of Canterbury. Her research focuses on democratization, Islam and minority Muslim communities, and the role of Islam in politics in Southeast Asia. She has done extensive research on the political development of Malaysia and Brunei. She is a co-founder of the Southeast Asia Research Initiative (SEARI) at the University of Canterbury. Pasit Wongngamdee is a researcher in social science. He obtained a Bachelor’s degree in economics from Thammasat University and a Master’s degree in governance and development from the Institute of Development Studies (IDS), University of Sussex. Currently, he is pursuing a Ph.D. in Political Science at the University of Canterbury. His research interests are various, but largely focus on the roles of morality and ideologies in politics, and on conflict, and violence, especially in Thailand and Southeast Asia. Other areas of interest include political culture, democratization, nationalism, civic education, and good governance.

List of Figures

Fig. 1.1 Fig. 1.2 Fig. 1.3 Fig. 1.4 Fig. 7.1 Fig. 7.2 Fig. 9.1 Fig. 9.2

Polyarchy scores. Nations that have experienced democracy Polyarchy scores. Nations that have not experienced democracy Civil society participation Corruption perceptions index Relationships among components of the analytic model for analysing grassroots governance-building Proto governance progress to date and alternative futures Philippines political terror scores and protest repertoires (1976–2020) Indonesia political terror scores and repertoires (1976–2020)

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List of Tables

Table 1.1 Table 1.2 Table 1.3 Table 1.4 Table 1.5 Table 2.1 Table Table Table Table Table

2.2 2.3 3.1 3.2 3.3

Table 3.4 Table 3.5 Table 4.1 Table 6.1 Table 6.2 Table 7.1 Table 7.2 Table 7.3

Organizing framework for democratic recession Major autocratization events in Southeast Asia ASEAN trade in goods and FDI, China and the United States (million USD) Institutions and autocratization in Southeast Asia Popular perceptions of corruption in Southeast Asia Comparison of project funding sources under Aquino III and Duterte Top three national concerns of Filipinos China-funded projects under Duterte’s BBB program Candidates in the 2017 Jakarta Gubernatorial Election Results of the first round of Jakarta Gubernatorial Election Results of the second round of Jakarta Gubernatorial Election Gini coefficient, Jakarta, 2012–2017 Factors affecting substate populism in Jakarta during Anies Baswedan’s Governorship Democracy in Malaysia ROTC Cyber clips on YouTube ranked by views ROTC Cyber Facebook pages and groups ranked by the last update An analytic model for analysing grassroots governance-building Hybridising roles of grassroots governance stakeholders Hybrid organisation analysis

11 15 16 17 22 45 47 50 69 70 71 74 77 105 154 157 173 175 186

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LIST OF TABLES

Table 7.4 Table 8.1 Table 8.2 Table 8.3 Table 9.1

Proto governance analysis Village headmen in the studied village of indramayu, indonesia Results of the Village Head Election in 2014 Village officials with returned migrant-related background Typology of repression

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CHAPTER 1

Democratic Decline and Rising Autocratization in Southeast Asia: An Organizing Framework James Ockey

On February 1, 2021, soldiers took to the streets of Yangon and other major cities, declaring an emergency, arresting politicians, and bringing an end to Myanmar’s newly elected parliamentary government. Democracy has proven fragile in Myanmar, as it has in neighboring Thailand, and much of the rest of Southeast Asia. Ironically, in overturning the civilian government, Myanmar’s generals echoed the rhetoric of former US president Donald Trump, claiming widespread voter fraud in the election. The generals were more successful than Trump, who failed to overturn the results of the US election. Yet through Trump’s claims of widespread

J. Ockey (B) Department of Political Science and International Relations, University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 J. Ockey and N. S. Talib (eds.), Democratic Recession, Autocratization, and Democratic Backlash in Southeast Asia, Contestations in Contemporary Southeast Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-9811-9_1

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voter fraud, he has undermined confidence in American democracy. Thus neither new nor established democracies have been immune to recent trends. According to Freedom House data, democracy around the world has been in decline since 2006, both in new and established democracies, with the countries where democracy declined outnumbering the countries where democracy improved in each year. Furthermore, 2020 marked the largest cumulative deterioration in democracy during that period, with nearly three-quarters of the global population seeing their freedom decline (Freedom House 2021, p. 1). Other major indices of democracy and autocracy demonstrated the same trend, with V-dem noting that globally, the average citizen has seen democracy decline to levels not seen since 1990, while the percentage of the population living under autocracy rose to 68%, from just 48% in 2010. Southeast Asia was among the regions experiencing a large decline (V-Dem 2021, pp. 7–8). Mounk and Foa (2018) attributed the democratic recession to widespread dissatisfaction with democracy, due to the declining economic hegemony of western democracies, as they become less effective at meeting the economic demands of their citizens, and less convincing as a model of success for other nations. They argue that ultimately the decline in economic hegemony and the associated dissatisfaction with democratic governance will lead to “the end of the democratic century” (Foa et al. 2020, p. 17). And yet, ironically, data collated in the Cambridge Global Satisfaction with Democracy Report (Foa et al. 2020) indicates that satisfaction with democracy is considerably higher in the rapidly developing economies of Southeast Asia than in any other part of the world—indeed, uniquely, in Southeast Asia satisfaction with democracy is growing. Thus Southeast Asia, with its wide range of levels of democratization, its patterns of recession, and its unusual support for democracy, comprises a valuable set of case studies for understanding democratic decline.

Democratic Reversals Early studies of democratization sought to set out the conditions of reversals in new democracies. Lipset (1959), in his highly influential study on the co-requisites of democracy, noted that effectiveness and legitimacy were necessary for the maintenance of democracy. Similarly, Huntington (1991) wrote of democratization occurring in waves and reverse waves.

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On careful reading we can infer from his work that low levels of legitimacy, poor performance, and declining external support may be related to democratic reversals in new democracies, particularly during and after the Third Wave (c. 1974–1999). Larry Diamond (2015), see also Diamond et al. (2016) set out these arguments in more detail, dividing the causes of democratic reversals into internal and external factors. In setting out internal factors, Diamond focused on performance, and in particular on bad governance. Newly democratic regimes, he argued, are often ineffective and are corrupt. Corruption undermines economic development, undermines the rule of law, and ultimately undermines faith in the democratic political system. This in turn opens up opportunities for the return of authoritarian styles of government. In short, the deficiencies are not in the democratic system itself, but in the poor performance of those managing it. Externally, Diamond focused on factors that have made democratization more difficult, rather than on the survival of new democracies. First, he argued that a new “authoritarian axis” had developed, led by Russia and China, bolstered by regional actors such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela, that provides support to struggling authoritarian regimes. The authoritarian axis provides an alternative model of legitimate government, and may provide financial support when struggling regimes face economic pressure, such as sanctions, from democratic states. Second, authoritarian regimes have learned to undermine civil society through taking greater control of NGOs, often by replacing them with government organized NGOs. Third, authoritarian regimes have taken greater control over social media, undermining the ability of democrats to communicate and to recruit support. Last, he noted that declining support for democracy in the hegemon, the United States, also has had a powerful effect (Diamond 2015). Diamond did not address the impact of his authoritarian axis on newly democratic states; however, providing an alternative model of legitimacy and providing—or not providing—financial support may also be crucial in the erosion of new democracies, at least in some cases. We also note a lack of evidence of any coordination by members of Diamond’s authoritarian axis in undermining democracies in Southeast Asia. Nancy Bermeo (2016) has argued that studies of democratic recession have often treated it in an undifferentiated fashion, as if all democratic recession is the same. Yet democratic recession takes many different paths. Bermeo thus sought to investigate the ways that democracies reverse, focusing on coups, executive takeovers, and election day fraud. She argues

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that each of these types has changed in nature and in relative frequency since the end of the Cold War. Classic open-ended military coups, where the military took power and intended to retain power, have been replaced by “promissory coups,” where the military claims it is intervening to defend and improve democracy. The executive coup, or autogolpe, has largely been replaced by “executive aggrandizement,” where executives slowly expand their role and power while undermining mechanisms to hold them accountable. Similarly, election day fraud has largely been replaced by more subtle techniques of ensuring electoral success such as gerrymandering. As to frequency, military coups have declined since the Cold War period, while executive aggrandizement—often linked to populism and to electoral techniques such as disqualification and harassment of political opposition—has increased. Lührmann and Lindberg (2019, pp. 1104–05), employing V-dem data, put more concrete numbers to this shift in frequency. Before the Third Wave (1900–1993), 39% of reversals were comprised of military coups, 32% by autogolpe, and another 29% by foreign invasion. Between 1994 and 2017, military coups remained important, although somewhat diminished, at 30%, while the other 70% of instances of democratic recession were comprised of slow gradual erosion. Bermeo (2016) argued that the shift in the types of democratic recession is a rational response to changing international conditions. Thus the shift in the claims of military coup-makers to promissory coups are a response to the sanctions that coup-makers often face. The shift away from election day fraud is a response to more effective monitoring, including international monitoring. And the slow, often technically legal nature of executive aggrandizement better evades international and domestic outcry. Indeed Bermeo argues that the tendency in democratic recession is to a slow gradual backsliding, rather than sudden dramatic change. On the positive side, she found that authoritarian replacement regimes tend to be less harsh, and less enduring. We might also note that, ironically, the shift in the nature of democratic recession indicates the increasing legitimacy of democracy: it has become necessary to disguise the rise of authoritarianism in ways never needed in the past. Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018) have provided a set of four key indicators for this process of slow gradual erosion. Their first indicator is the rejection of the democratic rules of politics. This includes, for example,

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expressing a willingness to violate the constitution, to declare emergencies to avoid it, or to undermine the integrity of elections. Second, the denial of the legitimacy of political rivals, by describing them as corrupt, treasonous, or criminal. Third, the toleration or encouragement of violence by supporters against the now demonized rivals. And fourth, a willingness to curtail civil liberties and the independent media. This may include threats of lawsuits, praise of censorship in other nations, or suggestions that libel laws be strengthened. Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018, p. 22) noted that the politicians most likely to follow this process are populist outsiders, “antiestablishment politicians” who claim to represent the common citizen against a corrupt established elite. They argue further (2018, p. 56) that the success of such populist outsiders has been enabled by the weakening of party gatekeepers and, perhaps more importantly for understanding the wave of populists in recent years, by the rise of alternative media, including cable and later satellite news, and social media. Writing more specifically on populism in Southeast Asia, Kenny (2019) broadened the focus from party gatekeepers to weak political parties more generally. He argued that weak ties between voters and political parties, generally clientelistic in nature, leave voters susceptible to mobilization by charismatic politicians, often outsiders. Social media enables direct communication between politicians and voters, without the intermediary role normally played by parties or clientelism, further exacerbating the weakness of political parties in the region, in a kind of vicious circle. Consequently, populism has become a powerful force in Southeast Asia. Hadiz (2014) pointed out that in Muslim majority countries in the region, Islamic populism, in both old and new forms, emerges when the regime is secular. As we see further below, social media have played a powerful role in the rise of populism in recent years in Southeast Asia.

Autocratization Where many scholars of democratization tend to see democratic recession in terms of the failings of new democracies and adverse international conditions, other scholars have focused on the autocrats. Such scholars examine increasing autocratization in terms of the successful attempts by authoritarian leaders to prevent, erode, and overturn democracy. Lührmann and Lindberg (2019), using the V-dem database, have examined waves of autocratization, which, naturally, align with the waves of

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democratic recession. Thus, for our purposes here, we will consider democratic recession and autocratization to be different ways of examining the same phenomenon. The world entered a third wave of autocratization in 2006. This third wave of autocratization has been broad-based, with two-thirds of cases occurring in authoritarian states, which became more autocratic, while the other third occurred in states with at least some level of democracy, with some eighty percent of the latter cases ending, not in weak democracies, but in full autocracy (Lührmann and Lindberg 2019, p. 1102). While shifting the analysis to types of democratic recession and autocratization allowed for considerable progress, it retained the focus on broad patterns and on the nature of the regime. In an attempt to move beyond the wider patterns of autocratization, Curato and Fosatti (2020) have advocated the study of “authoritarian innovations,” new techniques and tactics employed by would-be autocrats to undermine democracy. Such innovations, they argue, may be shifts in regulations or institutions, or they may be more subtle, as in a shift in rhetoric intended to undermine the legitimacy of democracy or of the notion of loyal opposition, new applications of a technology to stifle debate, opposition or accountability, or new uses of data to undermine the electoral system or weaken civil society. Curato and Fosatti focus not only on such innovations, but on the questions of how these new authoritarian innovations get added to authoritarian repertoires, how they become normalized, and how they spread within and across political systems. They seek to shift the focus to “everyday” forms of autocratization. As Pepinsky (2020) noted, the focus of Curato and Fossati on the process of authoritarian innovation lends itself methodologically to detailed case studies, rather than a quantitative approach. Detailed case studies are also necessary due to Curato and Fossati’s open-ended approach: the focus on innovation defies the constraints of narrow specification and categorization. Yet the open-ended approach also makes comparison difficult. Morgenbesser (2020) has attempted to bring more structure to the study of authoritarian innovations by introducing a “menu.” His menu categorizes innovation into informational, legal, political, reputational, and technological innovations. Informational techniques are aimed at gathering, shaping, and distributing information. Legal innovations are techniques that rely on the authority of the law to narrow participation of rivals and citizens more generally. Political

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techniques aim to provide a façade of legitimacy, while shrinking and marginalizing the role of the opposition. Reputational techniques rely on the tools of public relations to manage the image of the regime, especially internationally. Technological techniques rely on new technologies to surveil, to misinform, and to manage citizens. By seeking to place innovations not yet created into a fixed menu, Morgenbesser (2020) places some constraints on the open-ended approach that Curato and Fossati (2020) found so advantageous, but by providing a clear structure, his menu allows more effective cross-national comparison.

The Inherency of Authoritarian Tendencies Where literature on democratic recession tends to treat reversals as the result of flawed implementation and literature on autocratization tends to treat reversals as the result of shrewd autocrats, a much older strand of the literature going back to Madison et al. (1981, o.d. 1788) in the Federalist Papers treats authoritarian encroachments as an inherent risk in democratic systems. For the writers of the world’s oldest constitution, the actors and institutions in a democratic system would always seek to erode controls on their power, and so it was necessary to build in mechanisms to check and balance authoritarian impulses. The writers of the American constitution thus established two distinct types of constitutional mechanisms: institutional checks and balances, and societal, constituency-based checks and balances. Thus in the US constitution, at the institutional level, they set the interests of the legislature against the interests of the executive and of the judiciary, while seeking to roughly balance the roles and powers of each. At the societal level, they sought to ensure that each institution would be linked to different groups in society, and in different ways: the House was linked directly to (then a small group of) voters, the Senate was linked to elected state legislatures, the President linked to electors in the electoral college, the judiciary was jointly selected by the president and the senate, and held lifetime appointments. Thus each body was linked to a different constituency, ensuring both accountability and a balancing of the interests of society. More recent work has also focused on the role of institutions and societal structures, beyond the United States. As Diamond (2021, p. 32) put it:

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it is reasonable to conjecture that the innate tendency to enlarge and abuse power is randomly distributed across people in the world. Within countries, then, it is culture and institutions that determine whether potential autocrats are elected to office, and if they are, whether they are effectively constrained from realizing their ambitions. (Diamond 2021, p. 32)

Where the writers of the constitution focused on constituencies, Diamond looked instead to organized civil society to restrain authoritarian tendencies, with the same purpose in mind. He also highlighted the importance of support for the basic norms of democracy. While scholars such as Diamond who examine inherent authoritarian tendencies share much in common with those who study autocratization, this approach is distinct in that, rather than focus on the actions of the would-be autocrats, it focuses on the political institutions and diverse structures of societal commitment to democracy that might act as a bulwark against any and all potential authoritarian innovations. It turns attention to developing and maintaining strong institutional structures and ensuring that norms of political participation and accountability remain strong. Paul Howe (2017) has examined the decline in public support for both institutional structures and democratic norms, focusing on the United States, again noteworthy due to its status as global hegemon and, perhaps, as a model of democracy for many. Using data from the World Values Survey, Howe noted that in the first iteration of the survey in 1981, 47% of respondents indicated they had little confidence in the Congress; by 2011, that had risen to 59%, with another 20% responding that they had no confidence at all in the Congress. Confidence in political parties was even lower, with 66% having not much confidence, and another 21% none at all (Howe, 2017, p. 17). Yet Howe believed that declining confidence in government is likely to lead to greater participation in politics, citing the examples of the Tea Party movement and the Occupy movement. More concerning, he argued (2017, p. 28), is an “erosion of basic norms and values that connect people to their society and the common good.” Rising individualism and a decline in support for the common good, he argued, have eroded the fundamental norms necessary to democracy. Laebens and Lührmann (2021), relying on V-dem data, have carefully examined three cases where democratic erosion occurred, but democracy was preserved. In each case, executives had substantially eroded democracy through some combination of weakening institutional checks and

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balances, violating democratic norms in undermining rivals, or reducing individual, press, or civil society freedoms. In their analysis of these cases, Laebens and Lührmann focused on the importance of accountability, dividing it into three types: vertical accountability, designated as accountability within the political party system; horizontal accountability, designated as accountability to other institutions, such as the judiciary; and diagonal accountability, accountability to journalists and civil society actors. Laebens and Lührmann argue that where executives were eroding the democratic rules of the game, accountability actors sought to resist. Particularly crucial to the resistance, they argue, are the diagonal accountability actors, civil society actors, whose resistance—at least based on their small number of cases—appears to be a necessary but not sufficient condition for success. Popular support from civil society actors enabled horizontal and vertical accountability actors to push back against rule changes, or in some cases, successfully enact rules to help preserve democracy. Thus strong institutions played a key role in stopping democratic recession. Finally, Smith (2009, 2011) has encouraged the development of “democratic innovations,” a proposal which inspired Curato and Fossati’s focus on “authoritarian innovations.” For Smith, democratic innovations are institutions designed to increase citizen participation in the democratic process, with an aim of increasing “inclusiveness, popular control, considered judgement and transparency” (Smith 2011, p. 899). Democratic innovations include such things as participation in budgeting, the use of polling to determine citizens’ desires in shaping policy, citizen assemblies, expansion of referenda focused on legislation, and online forums designed to allow citizens to debate and participate in policy. Democratic innovations, by strengthening participation in political institutions, may slow democratic recession. Innovations have also been employed by protest movements in Southeast Asia; for example, Thai protesters employed an online referendum to make decisions on whether to continue or halt protests on some occasions. Finally, it is worth noting that democratic innovations tend to be decentralized, and can be initiated and controlled by the government, so that even authoritarian regimes may employ them to enhance their legitimacy by allowing some very limited, often localized participation.

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Democratic Backlash Considering democratization and autocratization in terms of waves has enabled comparison within specific international contexts and historical eras. But the focus on waves also introduces a blind spot: reverse waves and attempts to undermine democracy often provoke a democratic backlash which may be overlooked in the focus on democratic recession. As Howe (2017) noted, declining faith in institutions may lead to an increase in political participation, and indeed, the rapid decline in democracy in the United States led to the highest voter turnout in decades. Or, as Laebans and Lührmann (2021) pointed out, accountability mechanisms, including those in the political system, in the electoral process, or in civil society, may strongly resist autocratization. Or democratic innovations, initiated by civil society or the state, may occur alongside democratic recession. And, of course military coups or other forceful seizures of power may provoke a powerful backlash as well. We thus define democratic backlash as a direct reaction to an autocratic event. Democratic backlash need not be a democratic innovation; indeed, it is more likely to be a well-established method of resistance. Furthermore, while it is a direct reaction, it need not be a direct response; rather than target the specific autocratic event, it may target the autocrat or autocratization more generally. Provoking democratic backlash can have both short and long-term impacts. In the short term, it can slow or block autocratic events, as we see with the delay of a new criminal code in Indonesia in Chapter 9. Over the longer term, it can broaden support for democracy, and create a new generation of pro-democracy leaders. We see this quite clearly in Chapter 10, where Cifuentes outlines the responses to the recent coup in Myanmar, as, in the short term, widespread protests erupted, while over the longer term, she argues, a new generation of grassroots democracy leaders has emerged. Democratic backlash helps explain the growing support for democracy in Southeast Asia at a time of widespread recession. It also suggests that an effective approach to understanding democratization and autocratization should be event-focused, as each autocratic event, gradual or sudden, oft-used or innovative, may both undermine democracy and create backlash. If we are to fully understand waves of autocratization and democratic recession, we must also understand the froth generated by each event and the reverse tides of democratic backlash.

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An Organizing Framework for Understanding Democratic Recession Based on the literature and the gaps in the literature, a comprehensive organizing framework for the study of democratic recession and autocratization would include consideration of external influence, with a particular focus on the hegemon and on powerful authoritarian states. It would need to consider problems of governance, particularly corruption and government actions that undermine the rule of law. It would need to look at the innovations of would-be autocrats, at their attempts to gradually erode democracy. One particular focus here would be populism, at least in the current wave, but as Curato and Fossati (2020) indicated, we need to be flexible enough to identify truly innovative techniques as well. A comprehensive framework would also need to consider the institutions of government, including their stability and their ability to provide checks and balances on autocratic innovations. We also need to carefully consider societal support for the basic norms of democracy, both in terms of their embeddedness in political culture, and the willingness to defend those norms by civil society actors and citizens more generally. And finally, we would need to examine closely the events and interactions that erode democracy, both to discover the autocratic innovations, but also to examine whether the innovations are creating a democratic backlash that may slow or even reverse autocratization, either in the short term or over the longer term. This backlash may manifest itself in protest activities, in the development of new generations of pro-democracy leaders, or in more innovative ways, for pro-democracy forces are as likely to be innovative as are would-be autocrats. Our organizing framework thus begins with contextual factors, which change more slowly, before focusing closely on processes, events, and interactions. We can conceptualize it as in Table 1.1. Table 1.1 Organizing framework for democratic recession

Contextual factors

Process factors

External influence Institutions

Governance Autocratic and democratic innovations Democratic backlash

Societal support for democratic norms

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This provides a reasonably comprehensive yet still parsimonious organizing framework for the study of democratization and autocratization. Of course we need to further keep in mind that the contextual factors are also dynamic; however, with the possible exception of external influence, any change in the contextual factors should grow out of the process factors, out of the events and interactions at the core of the analysis. Last, we should note that it would not be desirable to expect all studies of democratic recession and autocratization to include all of these factors, nor have we tried to do so here. Studies that focus on subsets of one or more of these factors will be needed to provide the detailed analysis necessary to develop our understanding of democratic recession.

Democratic Recession in Southeast Asia Following Pepinsky (2020), but for somewhat different reasons, I have argued above that careful case studies are crucial to understanding democratic recession and autocratization, which we attempt in the chapters that follow. In this chapter, I will establish some context by setting out some of the broader patterns of autocratization in Southeast Asia, then briefly considering each category of the organizing framework, using a combination of existing data and specific examples. As in much of the rest of the world, democratic recession and autocratization are on the rise in democratic Southeast Asia. Of the nations in Southeast Asia that have experienced some level of democracy since World War II (defined here as above 0.50 on the V-dem polyarchy score), only Timor Leste has a higher polyarchy score in 2020 than in 2006, and even Timor Leste shows a slight decline in 2020 (see Fig. 1.1). Surprisingly, several of the authoritarian states have rising polyarchy scores (see Fig. 1.2), although Myanmar and Malaysia will take large steps backward in 2021. Singapore is essentially unchanged. Taken together, the three wave pattern first identified by Huntington can be clearly seen in the more democratic countries, and, to a degree, with the less democratic countries, particularly in Myanmar, Malaysia, and Cambodia. Thailand, Cambodia, and (2021) Myanmar, all show steep declines in democracy in the current wave of autocratization, with the Philippines and Indonesia also showing a substantial decline. Thus Southeast Asia in general, but in particular Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, and Thailand are good case studies to examine the patterns identified in the literature.

1

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0.8

0.7

0.6

V-Dem Polyarchy Score

0.5

0.4

0.3

0.2

0.1

Indonesia

Philippines

Thailand

2019

2017

2015

2013

2011

2009

2007

2005

2003

2001

1999

1997

1995

1993

1991

1989

1987

1985

1983

1981

1979

1977

1975

1973

1971

1969

1967

1965

1963

1961

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1955

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1945

0

Timor Leste

Fig. 1.1 Polyarchy scores. Nations that have experienced democracy (Source V-dem database)

If we turn to the data on specific events leading to strong increases in autocratization, V-dem identifies this set of events in Table 1.2. I have added some of the details on type of autocratization, but have left their list of events unchanged. The first thing to note here is that the dates will not always match up with the event, as the decline is only assessed in the next update. Thus the wars in Indochina ended in 1975, but the democratic recession is dated 1976. Similarly, the Thai coup of 1976 appears to be listed as 1977. However, there are a surprising number of omissions, most obviously the 1965 coup in Indonesia, which set in place a dictatorship that would last for 33 years. Also noteworthy is the context lost when the democratization events are omitted. Without the democratization events,

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0.8

0.7

V-Dem Polyarchy Score

0.6

0.5

0.4

0.3

0.2

0.1

0

Myanmar

Cambodia

Laos

Malaysia

Singapore

Vietnam

Fig. 1.2 Polyarchy scores. Nations that have not experienced democracy (Source V-dem database)

the autocratization events could not occur. The advantages of the case study approach become clear when we examine the table of events that have had the largest impact on autocratic changes in the V-dem data, and consider the many gaps in the historical narrative of events. Based on the data that is presented, we see that, as with the global pattern identified by Bermeo (2016) and Lührmann and Lindberg (2019), war is no longer an important cause of autocratization in the region. However, the military coup remains the most common cause of autocratization in Southeast Asia, with the 2020 coup in Myanmar too recent to be in the list. We note further that gradual erosion of democracy has only reached the relatively high threshold for rapid autocratization identified by V-dem on two occasions, one during the second autocratization wave, in Malaysia, and one in the current autocratization wave, in Cambodia. The slow gradual erosion that we see in Figs. 1.1 and 1.2 has

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Table 1.2 Major autocratization events in Southeast Asia Country

Begin

End

Type of autocratization

Philippines Myanmar Indonesia Laos Myanmar Vietnam Malaysia Philippines Cambodia Laos Thailand Thailand Philippines Thailand Cambodia Thailand

1941 1942 1958 1959 1962 1963 1964 1969 1970 1976 1977 1991 2001 2005 2010 2013

1942 1943 1961 1962 1963 1964 1970 1973 1976 1976 1978 1991 2005 2007 2017 2016

War War Autogolpe War Military Coup Military Coup Gradual Erosion, culminating in emergency law Autogolpe Military Coup, War War Military Coup Military Coup Military Coup Military Coup Gradual Erosion Military Coup

Source Adapted from Appendix A, V-dem database

not reached the V-dem threshold point, which, if we consider it a tipping point, may suggest that it is not too late to halt or even reverse it.

Contextual Factor One: External Influence Since World War II, Southeast Asia has been most heavily influenced by the United States—the hegemon—and more recently, by China, a regional rising hegemon. In recent years, many of the nations of Southeast Asia have drifted closer to China, driven in part by the increasing reluctance of the United States to engage in free trade agreements, by the shift to an America First policy under President Donald Trump, and by increased two-way trade between ASEAN and China (see Table 1.3). While China has long been the dominant trade partner for ASEAN, in 2019, ASEAN became the largest trade partner for China, perhaps signaling increasing interdependence (Harada, 2020).This increase in China’s trade influence is somewhat balanced by much higher foreign direct investment from the United States, which may be at least partly, informally conditional on human rights concerns.For some countries, the

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Table 1.3 ASEAN trade in goods and FDI, China and the United States (million USD) Year

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019

United States

China

Trade

FDI

Trade

FDI

181,241 198,110 199,803 205,313 211,508 210,582 211,810 233,834 263,001 294,793

15,431 8197 18,911 11,458 21,143 22,913 15,691 26,775 23,462 24,080

235,514 294,989 319,390 351,583 366,711 363,497 368,567 440,973 482,494 507,963

3631 7194 7975 6165 6812 6572 11,272 15,495 12,241 8896

Source ASEAN Secretariat (2020), compiled from tables 5.9, 7.2

drift toward greater trade and influence for China has also been countered by concerns with increasingly aggressive Chinese diplomatic and military activities, particularly in the South China Sea.Myanmar’s partial democratization may have been, in part, an attempt to counter Chinese influence by normalizing relations with western nations (Myoe, 2015). In addition, Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines have longstanding security relationships with the United States. Yet, both the populist Duterte government and the Thai military regime have sought to counter US pressure on human rights and democratization by soliciting support from China, with Thailand in particular developing closer military ties. As Diamond posited, the trend in external influence has provided some support to autocrats in Southeast Asia, although the level of US foreign direct investment, concerns about Chinese military expansion, and longstanding security arrangements between the United States and some ASEAN countries has provided a counterbalancing force. Furthermore, for the most part, China does not appear to have actively sought to undermine democracy in Southeast Asia; rather it has pursued its own interests in its relationships with ASEAN nations. The relationship between China and the Philippines is considered in more detail in Chapter 2.

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Contextual Factor Two: Political Institutions The effectiveness of political institutions requires more in-depth analysis than can be undertaken in this brief introduction. We have noted already the weakness of political parties in those Southeast Asian nations that have had relatively democratic systems, along with Malaysia, which has considerable democratic potential. As political parties consolidate public opinion, mediate between the state and citizens, and play a role in choosing political leaders, when strong, they are a key institutional structure that can resist autocratization. As for the institutions of government, we can examine briefly two key aspects, the type of political system, in particular whether it is a parliamentary system or a presidential system, and the duration of the constitution, which will give us an idea of how firmly embedded the current institutions might be. This data is set out in Table 1.4. In principle, parliamentary systems tend to have fewer institutional checks and balances than presidential systems. In practice, populist leaders have generally been associated with presidential systems, where the nationwide presidential elections tend to enable populist rhetoric and techniques. The weak party systems across much of Southeast Asia have in some cases exacerbated and in others alleviated these tendencies. A weak party system led to weak coalition governments in Thailand that constrained executive power, until the 1997 constitution strengthened the executive and the parties, enabling the rise of the populist Thai Rak Thai party in 2001. Malaysia, on the other hand, has until recently had a single dominant ruling coalition, with few formal checks on executive power. Its federal system and its strong professional ethic in the public Table 1.4 Institutions and autocratization in Southeast Asia

Country

Type of system

Constitution established

Indonesia Malaysia Myanmar Philippines Thailand Timor Leste

Presidential Parliamentary Mixed Presidential Parliamentary Mixed

2002* 1957 2008 1987 2017 2002

* The Indonesian constitution was originally promulgated in 1945, but was broadly amended, including changes to the basic institutions, after democratization in 1998

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service, particularly in the military, have partly counterbalanced that executive power, providing some constraints on autocratization. Myanmar’s mixed system was designed to allow military control; however, Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy party grew strong enough that she was able to wield more power than the military intended, which proved one of the leading causes of the coup. Timor Leste has had strong presidents, but has also had some power sharing between president and prime minister, due in large part to a need to balance regional differences. Both presidential systems, in Indonesia and the Philippines, have strong presidents with considerable institutional power independent of the legislature. Weak party systems in both countries have further shifted power to presidents, so that populism has begun to spread, more rapidly in the Philippines, but also in Indonesia. Perhaps a stronger indication of the weakness of institutions in much of Southeast Asia is the relative newness of institutional structures. While the Malaysian constitution was promulgated at the time of independence, making it the oldest of the democratic constitutions, it has been extensively amended over the years; perhaps most troubling have been amendments undermining the independence of the judiciary (Malaysian Bar, 2007). The Philippines constitution, promulgated in 1987 after the people power uprising, is also well-established. Other democratic constitutions are less than two decades old, with the Thai constitution less than five years old. The impermanence of Thai constitutions is particularly noteworthy, with about 20 constitutions promulgated since 1932, depending on whether transitory constitutions are counted. Such short-lived constitutions and their institutions often have shallow roots in society, and lack the generations of former leaders that can provide support for the constitution in times of need. For example, former prime ministers may speak out with some authority about the importance of a particular constitutional provision, galvanizing support. Weak institutions have facilitated the attempts of populist leaders to undermine checks and balances on their power, and to gradually erode democratic accountability.

Contextual Factor Three: Societal Support and Norms of Accountability and Participation The degree of societal support for democracy and its associated norms in Southeast Asia has been a point of dispute among scholars and politicians

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(e.g. Huntington 1984, pp. 254–55; Jones 1998; Zakaria and Lee 1994; Kim 1994). Historically, decision-making was participatory in nature at the village level, throughout much of the region. As Steinberg et al. (1987, pp. 27–29; cf. Ockey 1997) noted, across much of Southeast Asia, including Thailand, Myanmar, and Vietnam, village headmen were elected, although participation was limited to elderly men, and even in Malaysia, where positions were hereditary, other village notables played a role in village leadership. At the time, villagers—comprising most of the population—had little contact with the nobility, so that participation was their lived experience. In the contemporary era, V-dem’s civil society index also indicates high levels of participation across most of the region, with Laos and Singapore as exceptions (see Fig. 1.3). Diverse civil society organizations are present even in some countries with tight controls, such as Vietnam and Cambodia, indicating the presence of a group of activists, despite limited participation. Thus, while there may be some traditions of hierarchy and imposed consensus, norms of participation are also quite strong across the region. These norms have been exploited during the current autocratization wave by shifting participation into loyalty to populist leaders, particularly in the Philippines and Malaysia. Yet the strongest sign of the existence of norms of participation and accountability come in the large number of protests, demonstrations, and democratic uprisings over the years. Democratic uprisings in Myanmar can be traced back at least to the period after the coup of 1962, when students demonstrated for the restoration of democracy. There were further demonstrations in the mid-1970s before the large-scale partially successful uprisings in 1988. After the military re-organized itself and retook control, further democratic uprisings occurred, frequently, most notably in 2002 and in 2007. In Thailand, the first student demonstrations came in 1957, contributing to a change in government. In the 1970s, student-led demonstrators overthrew a military government. In 1992, another military government was overthrown. And since 2005, demonstrations for and against different regimes have been frequent, culminating in the large student movement seeking to force a transition to democracy over the last two years. In the Philippines, the people power uprising of 1986 removed the Marcos dictatorship and inspired uprisings in other parts of the region. In Indonesia demonstrations grew through the late 1990s, culminating in the overthrow of the Suharto dictatorship. And in Malaysia, a long-running slowly developing movement in support

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2.5

Civil Society Participation

2

1.5

1

0.5

0 2005 Cambodia

2006

2007

Indonesia

2008 Laos

2009

2010

Malaysia

2011 Myanmar

2012

2013 Philippines

2014

2015

Singapore

2016

2017

Thailand

2018

2019

Timor Leste

2020 Vietnam

Fig. 1.3 Civil society participation (Source V-dem database; Scale ranges from 0 to 3, where 0 indicates state sponsored civil society, 3 = diverse civil society with most people participating at least occasionally)

of Anwar Ibrahim eventually led to the end of the dominant coalition. Across much of Southeast Asia people have been willing to risk their lives in support of norms of participation. While more detailed study of support and erosion of the fundamental norms of democracy is certainly warranted, this general overview, in line with the Cambridge report (Foa et al. 2020), finds some evidence for widespread support of those norms, particularly in countries that have had experience with democracy. That widespread support contributes to the democratic backlash sparked by autocratization in the region, as we see further below.

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Process Factor One: Governance, Corruption, and Democratic Recession in Southeast Asia Corruption has long been perceived as a problem in Southeast Asia, under both authoritarian and civilian governments. Figure 1.4 provides recent comparative data on corruption from Transparency International, based on assessments of entrepreneurs and experts. First, we note that the increase in democratization in Myanmar and, more recently, in Malaysia, improved the perceptions of the level of corruption in those countries. Second, none of the countries where democracy has declined during the period suffered from a perception of increased corruption during the period, as assessed by entrepreneurs and experts. In short, for this group, neither democratization nor democratic recession is associated with increased corruption in Southeast Asia. Of course, popular perceptions of corruption would seem to be more significant, and may diverge from expert opinion. Table 1.5 provides 60

Corruption Index score (0 -100)

50

40

30

20

10

0 2012 Malaysia

2014 Timor-Leste

2016 Indonesia

2018 Thailand

Philippines

2020 Myanmar

Fig. 1.4 Corruption perceptions index (Source Corruption perceptions index, Transparency International 0 = highly corrupt, 100 = very clean)

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Table 1.5 Popular perceptions of corruption in Southeast Asia Q1A. Trust and confidence in the Government (including politicians, public servants, or any kind of government agency) 2020

Malaysia Indonesia Thailand Philippines Myanmar Cambodia

No trust at all (%)

Not a lot of trust (%)

A fair amount of trust (%)

7 2 23 3 4 2

18 29 48 14 7 15

49 63 25 58 58 63

A great deal of trust (%)

Don’t know (%)

24 5 4 24 31 15

2 1 * * * 5

Q2. Now a question about corruption in government—by that I mean corruption involving politicians, public servants, or any kind of government agency in the country. How much of a problem, if at all, is corruption in the government in this country? Is it…? 2020

Malaysia Indonesia Thailand Philippines Myanmar Cambodia

No problem at all (%)

Fairly small (%)

7 2 3 1 13 4

20 5 9 13 36 59

Quite big (%) A very big problem (%) 32 41 39 64 19 22

40 51 49 22 31 11

Don’t know (%) 2 1 * * 1 4

Source Transparency International, Global Corruption Barometer 10th edition

responses to two questions that assess trust in government and perceptions of corruption of ordinary citizens in a smaller set of countries, compiled from Transparency International data. When it comes to trust and confidence in the government (Q1A above), a majority of respondents from all the countries in the dataset except Thailand express confidence in the government. We should note here that in the cases of Myanmar and Malaysia, this survey was taken before the coup, and before the use of the Covid-19 crisis to close parliament and prevent a vote of no-confidence, respectively. Only in Thailand, under a military regime that had manipulated an election to hold on to power do we find a majority—72% of respondents—does not trust the

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government. Perhaps surprisingly, despite the slow erosion of democracy, expressions of trust in government are high, although we should not ignore the possibility that respondents might dissemble in less democratic countries. As for corruption, we find again that respondents from Cambodia perceived it as a small problem, along with Myanmar, which, at the time of the survey, was near its peak level of democracy. Malaysians were more mixed, with two-thirds of citizens seeing corruption as a big problem, and in Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines, nearly 90% of respondents see corruption as quite big, or a very big problem. Those latter three countries have all had populist leaders in recent years, and all have seen a democratic recession, although one year of data cannot tell us whether those perceptions are a cause or a consequence of the populism and democratic decline. Based on this limited data, we can tentatively conclude that there may be a correlation between popular perceptions of corruption and populism, even when expert perceptions remain unchanged.

Process Factor Two: Authoritarian Innovations, Populism, and Democratic Decline While authoritarian innovations may be specific to each polity, they also spread, so that some, particularly populism and its techniques, have manifested throughout the region. Populism has emerged in virtually every democracy in Southeast Asia, to varying degrees. As we saw above, Kenny (2019) has argued that populism is enabled by weak political party systems, and access to social media. In the last decade, even relatively stable political party systems in Southeast Asian democracies have been in turmoil. In Thailand, for example, after the election of 2019, the second largest party, a new military-supported party, formed the government. The third largest party after the election, Future Forward, was also a new party. Meanwhile, the largest party, Pheu Thai, winner of every election since 2001, although it remains dominant, has broken up. The oldest Thai political party, the Democrat party, was decimated in the election, losing all its seats in Bangkok and holding on only in parts of the South, its traditional base. It, too, has since broken up. In Malaysia, the UMNO-led coalition that dominated politics since independence broke up in 2018, as its former leader, Mahathir Mohammed, took power at the head of a coalition of largely new parties. UMNO managed to return to power in 2020, as part of a fragile coalition of parties with a bare

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majority (see Chapter 5). In Indonesia, the governing party, the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle, was founded in 2001. However, the current president was something of an outsider, serving as a mayor and, briefly, as a provincial governor, before becoming the party nominee for President. He has never served in the legislature, and was governor of Jakarta for just two years. Similarly, Roderigo Duterte in the Philippines, whose Philippine Democratic Party-People’s Power was founded in 1986, was also a long-time city mayor, serving only one term in the legislature from 1998 to 2001, before becoming president in 2016. Thus with some exceptions, particularly in authoritarian regimes, in Southeast Asia, political parties have generally been weak, unstable, and subject to takeover by outsiders in recent years. As for social media, which allows populist leaders direct access to voters, Southeast Asia has some of the highest levels of social media usage in the world. According to one source, in late 2019, on average, Filipinos spent just under four hours on social media each day, more than citizens of any other nation, and well above the world average of 2 hours and 24 minutes. Indonesia, at 3 hours and 26 minutes, Thailand, at 2 hours and 55 minutes, and Malaysia, at 2 hours and 45 minutes were all above the global average (Global Web Index, we are social, Hootsuite 2020). The Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand have all elected populist leaders, while Malaysia has been prone to populism as well. And the prominence of social media may well have exacerbated the weakness of party systems in each case, as Kenney (2019) argued.

Process Factor Three: Democratic Backlash As noted under contextual factor three above, despite weak institutions, there is considerable support for democratic norms in much of Southeast Asia. It is this support that enables democratic backlash—indeed many of the uprisings mentioned above were short-term responses to autocratization. But the long-term impact is also clear, particularly in the ways that autocratization can create new generations of pro-democracy leaders. For example, the return of a military-led government in Thailand after the elections of 1992 led to large-scale demonstrations, violence, the overthrow of the military regime, and a return to democracy. Those demonstrations were mainly led by the same generation of students who led the uprisings in the mid-1970s, who then fanned out into civil society, academe, the media, and politics; they continued to play a powerful role

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after 1992, including in the later Red-Yellow conflicts that began in 2005 (see Kanokrat 2016). The mistreatment of Anwar Ibrahim in Malaysia created a movement that has proved lasting, culminating in a victory at the ballot box. And the leaders of the people power uprising in the Philippines, although not young, went on to dominate the newly democratic political scene for some two decades. In Myanmar, Aung San Suu Kyi came to prominence during the 1988 uprising. She continues to dominate democratic politics to the present. Of course some of these individuals and movements have proven flawed at times, even joining the forces of autocratization, as did some in the coups against elected governments in the Philippines, or others who supported a coup in Thailand in 2005. Support for democratic norms may waiver, or at times democrats may choose different political sides. Nevertheless, autocratization in Southeast Asia at least since the beginning of the third wave has promoted both an immediate backlash and has inspired the long-term political forces that seek democratization, across the region. Thus autocratization in Southeast Asia has often proven a temporary setback, while creating the seeds of its own future defeat.

Democratic Recession and Autocratization in Southeast Asia In this brief introduction, I have sought to summarize the disparate literature on democratic recession and autocratization, taking the position that both describe the same phenomenon, from different perspectives. I have then sought to create a comprehensive organizing framework by drawing on existing literature, while attempting to fill in some areas that have not received attention, particularly the importance of democratic backlash. I then set out to apply the framework in very broad and general terms to those parts of Southeast Asia that have had experience with democratization and democratic recession. In doing so, I have tried to show how employing a range of data, using existing databases and concrete examples, can identify some patterns. However, I have also argued that we cannot fully understand democratic recession and autocratization without detailed case studies that can explore the complex norms, the unique innovative patterns of autocratization, and the interactions created by those autocratic innovations. In the chapters that follow, each author takes up a particular case study, and seeks to address some aspects of the framework.

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In Chapter 2, Arugay and Baquisal examine the perceived foreign influence of China on democracy in the Philippines, tracing out the history of the relationship from the Arroyo presidency (2004–2010) through the Aquino presidency (2010–2016), to the Duterte presidency (2016– 2022). They argue that Chinese influence in the Philippines has been a secondary factor, aimed not specifically at eroding democracy, but rather at pursuit of geostrategic advantage. It is the antidemocratic practices of Philippine leaders that have been the primary cause of democratic recession. However, they argue, Philippine political leaders have been emboldened in their efforts at executive aggrandizement by the enticement of Chinese support for development efforts, and have employed promises of the economic advantages of developing closer ties with China to distract from authoritarian measures. In this way, it is not Chinese influence per se that has primarily contributed to democratic recession, but rather employing the “China factor” has become an important tool for political leaders in undermining democratic constraints on their power. In Chapter 3, Sustikarini analyzes the impact of substate populism on democracy in Indonesia, investigating the political career of Anies Baswedan as a case study. She argues that Anies emerged as an Islamist populist candidate in the 2017 Jakarta governor election, by employing “us” vs. “them” rhetoric and supporting nativism. Playing on deeply rooted anxieties over inequality, laden with ethnic connotations, he incited deeper divisions between Muslims and the Sino-Indonesian community in his quest for electoral victory. He did this by campaigning against a flood control policy that resulted in widespread evictions, a program popular with the middle class, but decidedly unpopular among the poor. In seizing on this unpopular policy, he was able to dominate the primary campaign narrative, and engage Jakarta’s poor in the electoral process. Sustikarini sees Anies’ term in office as mixed in its impact on democracy. On the one hand, it created deep divisions and inflamed ethnic tensions, particularly during the campaign. On the other hand, once he came to office, he largely abandoned Islamic populism with its racial connotations as he became more of a technocratic populist, focused on improving the quality of life in Jakarta and on empowering poor, marginalized communities, both positive signs for democracy. Still, the doorway to Islamist populism remains open, and available, to Anies or to others. In Chapter 4, Shukri examines Islamist populism in Malaysia, with a focus on the recent period of stymied democratic transition. She argues

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that in the past, Malaysia has resorted directly to authoritarian measures to maintain control during periods of unrest. However, since the long dominant UMNO-based coalition government lost power for the first time in 2018, it has innovated, relying instead on Islamist populism to reinvigorate a Malay-Muslim coalition, at the expense of Chinese and Indian minorities. Islamist populist rhetoric has further undermined the civil rights of minority populations, and has frozen or reversed any further transition to democracy, leaving Malaysia in limbo, with further recession likely. She notes that, while much of the current UMNO rhetoric has long been in use, it is being applied in new ways, as a form of authoritarian innovation. She concludes that democratic consolidation will not be possible if Islamist populism continues to grow. Where Shukri considered authoritarian innovation in Malaysia in terms of populism, in Chapter 5, Talib considers the stymied transition to democracy in Malaysia and the subsequent autocratization by examining a different form of authoritarian innovation: the executive aggrandizement enabled by the COVID-19 pandemic. With a small, fragile majority in the parliament and a once stable political party system shattered by factionalism, Prime Minister Muhyiddin was able to gradually increase his power by manipulating rules, ignoring parliamentary norms and conventions, and undermining institutional checks and balances. This executive aggrandizement was enabled, for the most part, by imposing COVID-19 restrictions, including on meetings of parliament, and by a new emergency powers ordinance. Thus in Malaysia, she argues, neither institutions nor parliamentary norms prevented executive aggrandizement and the reversal of the fledgling democratic transition. Pasit turns to a more technological form of authoritarian innovation in Chapter 6, as he examines the attempts of the Thai military to use its Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC) to disseminate pro-military authoritarian propaganda. Through a unit called ROTC Cyber, the Thai military has encouraged high school and university students—part time cadets—to create content for YouTube, Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram that promotes militarism or justifies military rule. However, in a close examination of the content of ROTC cyber activity, he finds it lacks coherence, lacks “views,” and is largely ineffective. Thus, he argues, not all authoritarian innovations, no matter how innovative, will succeed. Further, he argues, there appears to be resistance to the propaganda both among internet users who are the targets of the propaganda and among

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those ROTC cadets who are producing it. This resistance to and undermining of the production of effective cyber propaganda may be seen as one everyday type of democratic backlash. The next two chapters of the book focus on the development of democratic norms, at the village level. In Chapter 7, Crumpton, Cifuentes, and Roche turn to grassroots participation in institution-building in Myanmar. Using a novel analytical approach and field research, they argue that, with the support of NGOs, villagers and community leaders took advantage of democratic openings to engage local administration and improve local government processes and structures. Where most successful, they were able to partially, tentatively, institutionalize “pockets of effectiveness” in local governance, despite the rather limited opportunities for participation. While the processes and structures created almost certainly will not survive following the coup, the governance capacity built up among villagers will remain, perhaps to emerge upon the next democratic opening. In Chapter 8, Sobandi examines a different form of international influence, as he looks at the role of returning overseas labor migrants in democratic norm creation at the village level. While a democratic transition began in 1998, Indonesia has faced obstacles in the establishment of authoritarian enclaves at the village level and populism at wider levels. Sobandi finds that in Indramayu, newly returned migrants with their newfound wealth and new experiences abroad have returned to encourage new norms of participation and accountability in village elections and governance. Interestingly, it has not mattered whether the returned labor migrants worked in democratic or non-democratic nations; their desire to consolidate their new class status impels them to seek opportunities to participate in village government, and to hold others accountable. Thus Sobandi, like Sustikarini, paints a complex picture of new obstacles and slow progress in the post transition period in Indonesia, where periods of recession also include renewed hope. The last two chapters of the book look at aspects of democratic backlash. In Chapter 9, Espia argues that student protesters are often the vanguard in opposing autocratization, particularly when institutions fail to protect democratic norms. Espia compares the student movements in Indonesia and the Philippines, focusing on the evolving repertoires of government repression and student protest, which can be seen as authoritarian and democratic innovations, respectively. In both countries,

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students have shown the capacity for innovation and the use of different forms of protest—physical and online—in the face of the state’s own innovative attempts to clamp down on dissent. The ability to utilize existing spaces and the creation of new ones, as well as the use of different methods, allow student protest movements to constantly evolve, and evade or reduce the costs of repression. When democracy is threatened by attempts to undermine it, student protest movements oftentimes play a lead role in the opposition and are manifestations of a particular form of democratic backlash. In the last chapter, Cifuentes argues that the “democratization” in Myanmar in recent years should instead be considered as a complex form of authoritarian innovation, designed to create a democratic façade to provide legitimacy, while leaving the military in power. When military dominance was threatened by voters who took democracy seriously, they ended the experiment and carried out a coup. However, the military had miscalculated, as legitimacy had not transferred to the military, rather it had cohered within the (semi-) democratic system. Thus when the military sought to overturn their own innovation, it created a democratic backlash that rapidly extended to the grassroots level, and to minority areas. The backlash has linked together resistance movements that previously had little in common, a positive change, and while the grassroots backlash will not be able to overturn military rule in the near future, if resistance is sustained, military rule may prove costly and problematic over the longer term. The study of democratic recession and autocratization is in its early stages, yet considerable progress has been made in many directions. The complexity of the topic and the rapidly evolving landscape necessitate careful case studies done within a flexible organizing framework if we are to continue to make progress in a coherent fashion. This book is an attempt to both establish such a framework and expand our knowledge of democratic recession in Southeast Asia.

References ASEAN Secretariat, 2020. ASEAN Statistical Yearbook, 2020. Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat. Bermeo, Nancy, 2016. “On Democratic Backsliding.” Journal of Democracy 27 (January):5–19.

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Curato, Nicole & Fossati, Diego, 2020. “Authoritarian Innovations: Crafting Support for a Less Democratic Southeast Asia.” Democratization 27 (no. 6):1006–1020. Diamond, Larry, 2015. “Facing Up to the Democratic Recession.” In Diamond, Larry, and Plattner, Marc, eds. Democracy in Decline? Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Diamond, Larry, 2021. “Democratic Recession in Comparative Perspective: Scope, Method, and Causes.” Democratization 28 (no. 1):22–42. Diamond, Larry, et al., eds, 2016. Authoritarianism Goes Global: The Challenge to Democracy. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press. Foa, R.S., Klassen, A., Slade, M., Rand, A. and R. Collins, 2020. “The Global Satisfaction with Democracy Report 2020.” Cambridge, United Kingdom: Centre for the Future of Democracy. Freedom House, 2021. “Freedom in the World 2021: Democracy Under Siege.” Online at https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2021/democr acy-under-siege, accessed October 26 2021. Global Web Index, we are social, Hootsuite, 2020. “Daily Time Spent Using Social Media, January 2020.” Online at https://wearesocial.com/au/ blog/2020/01/digital-2020-3-8-billion-people-use-social-media/, accessed 30 June 2022. Hadiz, Vedi R., 2014. “A New Islamic Populism and the Contradictions of Development.” Journal of Contemporary Asia 44 (no. 1):125–143. Hamilton, Alexander, Madison, James, and Jay, John, 1981 [o.d. 1788]. The Federalist papers: a collection of essays written in support of the Constitution of the United States: from the original text of Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, John Jay. Roy P. Fairfield, ed. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Harada, Issaku, 2020. “ASEAN becomes China’s top trade partner as supply chain evolves.” Nikkei Asia 15 July 2020, https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/ International-relations/ASEAN-becomes-China-s-top-trade-partner-as-sup ply-chain-evolves, accessed 26 October 2021. Howe, Paul, 2017. “Eroding Norms and Democratic Deconsolidation.” Journal of Democracy 28 (October):15–29. Huntington, Samuel P., 1984. “Will More Countries Become Democratic?” Political Science Quarterly 99 (Summer):193–218. Huntington, Samuel P., 1991. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Norman: University of Oklahoma. Jones, David Martin, 1998. “Democratization, Civil Society, and Illiberal Middle Class Culture in Pacific Asia.” Comparative Politics 30 (January):147–169. Kanokrat Lertchoosakul, 2016. The Rise of the Octoberists in Contemporary Thailand. New Haven: Yale Southeast Asia Studies.

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Kenny, Paul, 2019. Populism in Southeast Asia. Cambridge Elements: Elements in Politics and Society in Southeast Asia, Cambridge University Press. Kim Dae Jung, 1994. “Is Culture Destiny? The Myth of Asia’s Anti-Democratic Values,” Foreign Affairs 73 (November):189–194. Levitsky, Steven and Ziblatt, Daniel, 2018. How Democracies Die: What History Reveals About Our Future. UK: Viking. Lipset, Seymour Martin, 1959. “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy.” The American Political Science Review 53 (March):69–105. Laebens, Melis G. and Lührmann, Anna, 2021. “What Halts Democratic Erosion? The Changing Role of Accountability.” Democratization 28 (no. 5):908–928 Lührmann, Anna and Lindberg, Staffan I., 2019. “A Third Wave of Autocratization is Here: What is New About It?” Democratization 26 (no. 7):1095–1113. Malaysian Bar, 2007. “Major Changes to the Constitution,” 17 Jul 2007, (excerpted from The Sun) https://www.malaysianbar.org.my/article/news/ legal-and-general-news/general-news/major-changes-to-the-constitution, downloaded 26 October 2021. Morgenbesser, Lee, 2020. “The menu of autocratic innovation.” Democratization 27 (6):1053–1072. Mounk Yascha, and Foa, Roberto Stefan, 2018. “The End of the Democratic Century: Autocracy’s Global Ascendance.” Foreign Affairs 97 (May/June):29–36. Myoe, Maung Aung, 2015. “Myanmar’s China Policy since 2011: Determinants and Directions.” Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, 34 (2): 21–34. Ockey, James, 1997. “Values, Culture, Development and Democracy in Southeast Asia,” Asia Pacific Viewpoint 38 (April): 81–85. Pepinsky, Thomas, 2020. “Authoritarian Innovations: Theoretical Foundations and Practical Implications.” Democratization 27 (6):1092–1101. Smith, Graham, 2009. Democratic Innovations: Designing Institutions for Citizen Participation (Theories of Institutional Design). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Smith, Graham, 2011. “Democratic Innovations: Bringing Theory and Practice into Dialogue.” Philosophy Compass 6 (12):895–901 Steinberg, David Joel, et al., 1987. In Search of Southeast Asia. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. Transparency International, Global Corruption Barometer, 2020. 10th edition. Online at https://www.transparency.org/en/gcb, accessed 26 October 2021, by Transparency International is licensed under CC-BYND 4.0.

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V-Dem Institute, 2021. Autocratization Turns Viral: Democracy Report 2021. University of Gothenberg, online at https://www.v-dem.net/files/25/DR% 202021.pdf, accessed 26 October 2021. Zakaria, Fareed, and Lee Kuan Yew, 1994. “Culture Is Destiny: A Conversation with Lee Kuan Yew.” Foreign Affairs 73 (no. 2):109–126.

Databases Corruption Perceptions Index, Transparency International, online at https:// www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2020/index/nzl, accessed 26 October 2021, by Transparency International is licensed under CC-BYND 4.0. V-Dem Dataset. By Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Jan Teorell, Nazifa Alizada, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Lisa Gastaldi, Haakon Gjerløw, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Garry Hindle, Nina Ilchenko, Joshua Krusell, Anna Lührmann, Seraphine F. Maerz, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Juraj Medzihorsky, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Johannes von Römer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, SvendErik Skaaning, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundström, Ei-tan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, Steven Wilson and Daniel Ziblatt. 2021. “V-Dem Dataset v11.1” Varieties of Democracy Project. https://doi.org/10.23696/ vdemds21, accessed 26 October 2021.

CHAPTER 2

At the Sharp Edge of Power: Philippines–China Relations and Democratic Erosion Under Duterte Aries A. Arugay

and Justin Keith A. Baquisal

Introduction In the span of a decade, the Philippines has experienced remarkable volatility in its democratic regime. In the aftermath of the so-called “lost decade” of its democracy from 2001 to 2010 that is marked by systemic corruption scandals, human rights issues, and social protests, the Philippines re-calibrated to a mainly liberal democratic phase under the Aquino III administration (2010–2016) (Arugay and Slater, 2019). This return to

A. A. Arugay (B) · J. K. A. Baquisal Department of Political Science, University of the Philippines-Diliman, Quezon City, Philippines e-mail: [email protected] J. K. A. Baquisal e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 J. Ockey and N. S. Talib (eds.), Democratic Recession, Autocratization, and Democratic Backlash in Southeast Asia, Contestations in Contemporary Southeast Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-9811-9_2

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democratisation was, however, short-lived given the governance mishaps at the tail-end of Aquino’s government, including the mishandling of natural disasters, security sector debacles, and perceived weak responses to violent crime. The 2016 electoral victory of firebrand leader Rodrigo Duterte put Asia’s oldest republic at the head of the global wave of populism (de la Torre, 2018). The Philippines’ lack of significant progress on democratic quality due to partisan conflict from Presidents Arroyo to Aquino—a process termed as “democratic careening” (Slater, 2013)— changed to overt democratic erosion under Duterte, measured by a host of standards, such as civilian oversight over the security forces, observance of human rights and political freedoms, and executive aggrandisement akin to delegative democracy (O’Donnell, 1994). This chapter focuses on the interaction between perceived foreign influence by the People’s Republic of China and the domestic factors that have enabled the broader process of democratic erosion in the Philippines under Duterte. Specifically, it straddles a middle ground between two discernible strands of literature on endogenous or exogenous drivers of democratic erosion and those that put emphasis on authoritarian influence. As Gerschewski (2021) argued, these drivers have different causes and mechanisms that are often inaccurately portrayed as monolithic processes that undermine democracy. Endogenous factors can include authoritarian political choices often via executive aggrandisement, institutional design tensions between vertical and horizontal elements of democracy, and historical legacies (Boix and Stokes, 2003). Notably, these factors tend to be more enduring and touch on the substance of elite and public choices and dispositions within the otherwise legal bounds of a democratic system. Exogenous factors zoom in on the corrosive effects of actions that are external to democracy per se, such as crises or external pressure by foreign actors that are more explicitly and consciously aimed at chipping away democratic principles (Levitsky and Way, 2010). This chapter argues that as a driver of democratic erosion, China’s influential actions have been largely secondary to antidemocratic practices by local elites (Way, 2016). Except for recorded China-based foreign influence operations in social media, the Chinese state’s linkages to growing authoritarian practices in the Philippines are not explicitly aimed at democratic erosion per se, but rather a geopolitical advantage. However, viewed structurally, Chinese political influence operations as currently practised in economic, political, and diplomatic spheres in the

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Philippines have become increasingly tied to both endogenous and exogenous sources of Philippine democratic erosion under Duterte since 2016 (Arugay, 2020). Rather than explicit interference, the “China factor” appears to embolden, incentivise, promote, and justify autocratising decisions and policies by political elites led by a populist president. Under Duterte, the political environment can be described as a reorientation toward hard state-building objectives such as economic development and social stability rather than “liberal” components of democracy such as transparency, anti-corruption, and participatory governance (Bautista, 2020). There has been great emphasis on fighting crime, modernising the military, expanding its role in politics, i.e. the placement of current and retired military figures in key positions, and fast-tracking the nationwide “Build, Build, Build” infrastructure program to enable economic development (Cabalza et al., 2021; Zambrano, 2021). In lockstep with this is a remarkable change in the Philippine political landscape: the emboldening of elites who actively eschew liberal principles but still enjoy broad-based public support, evidenced by the near-complete victory of pro-administration slates in the 2019 senatorial and 2022 presidential elections. In this environment, openly illiberal elites are the equivalent of a nouveau riche in politics as they tapped into dormant illiberal public preferences while abandoning their contingent support toward democracy (Sinpeng and Arugay, 2015; Borja, 2018). For several years, China has been a viable source of economic and political patronage for these elites who have grown distant from advanced democracies over political conditionalities in aid and general foreign relations as a matter of policy and political values. With its rhetoric of non-interference in domestic affairs and a focus on common interests, part of China’s strategic engagement has been driven by the construction of a “normative constituency” against perceived American unilateralism and values-based foreign policy (Eisenman and Heginbotham, 2019). In the Philippines, Duterte has pursued a conciliatory and accommodationist policy with China, reversing course on his predecessors’ lawfare-based strategy against China’s expanding footprint in the South China Sea. Oppositionist politicians have made the China policy as part of the broader backlash against Duterte’s authoritarianism. This bickering between politicians has not affected the largely negative opinion of the Filipino public toward China in general, indicating that Filipinos have not been swayed by China’s charm offensive in recent years (Cook, 2019). For its part, China’s goal of increasing prominence and influence in a

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historically pro-American country has become a paramount geostrategic objective. Not only has this been shown to be possible, but also proved to be beneficial to China (de Castro, 2019). Given persistent public distrust, China has made better progress on cultivating exclusively elite networks in political and economic spheres and has generally been left no choice but to continue, rather than risk a return to adversarial relations with Manila (Baviera and Arugay, 2021). Much has been written and contested about the direct ways by which authoritarian countries expand influence and undermine democratic regimes in the process of “authoritarian promotion” (Hall and Ambrosio, 2017; Tansey, 2016). In contrast, the Philippine case illustrates how the normal repertoire of authoritarian foreign policy has a challenging path despite a favourable domestic political environment made conducive by an autocratising leader and the support of normative enterprising elites willing to kowtow to China. This seems to indicate the resilience of democratic norms and institutions by members of the country’s political establishment at the outset of authoritarian influence. Though, it remains to be seen to what extent Philippine democracy can endure further authoritarian influence in the post-Duterte period. After a discussion of the scholarly debates regarding the driving factors behind democratic erosion, this chapter discusses the outset of palpable Chinese influence in Philippine politics during the latter part of the Macapagal-Arroyo presidency starting in 2004. This is followed by sections on Philippines–China relations under Aquino starting in 2010, largely defined by the tense territorial and maritime disputes in the South China Sea, as well as the cordial and accommodationist approach instigated by Duterte’s government. The chapter also examines the available empirical evidence of Chinese influence operations in the Philippines that indirectly amplifies the largely domestically-driven democratic erosion. By way of conclusion, it provides some key insights on the external processes that can affect vulnerable democracies such as the Philippines and identifies the prospects of this process of democratic erosion.

Endogenous and Exogenous Drivers of Democratic Erosion As Ding and Slater (2021) argue, “democracy is not a single institution but a complex assemblage of different institutions”, primarily divided between institutions of political competition and of mass participation.

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Studies taking a longue durée view on the quality of Philippine democracy often hold that it is deficient on both counts (Slater and Arugay, 2018). Historically, the country’s electoral integrity is procedurally and substantively infirmed by the significant role of “guns, goons, and gold” and the long shadow cast by major political dynasties that serve as the principal actors in politics (Rocamora, 1998; Kang, 2002; Hutchcroft and Rocamora, 2003; Arugay and Sinpeng, 2018). Despite this, the core idea of elections as the organising principle of political transition has held firm, partly because provincial dynasticism and having multiple centres of power translate to a pluralistic and competitive electoral arena at the national level, consistent with elite theories on the origins of democracies (Schumpeter, 1942). Parallel to this is the aspect of popular participation in political decision-making. On the one hand, the Philippines has long had a vibrant associational life given established social movements such as the famous “People Power” uprising that ended the Marcos dictatorship in 1986, a well-established civil society, and a comparatively free press compared to regional neighbors. On the other hand, due to the exclusionary nature of access to power, popular participation in practice between elections has been more of a veto power in the form of issue-based opposition campaigns rather than genuine participatory empowerment. The two decades of dictatorship under Marcos’ martial law regime have also handed down its trademark, mainly heightening the use and role of coercive state apparatus in political life, and the exacerbated levels of corruption and rent-seeking behaviour (Hernandez, 1985). In this context, the politically moderate 1986 “People Power” democratic uprising that ousted Marcos and restored electoral democracy signalled to elites that civil society has enough willpower to depose naked authoritarianism, but not enough strength to fully resolve structural infirmities such as dynastic politics, corruption, and the difficulty of sending the military back to the barracks (Timberman, 1991). On balance, such democratic deficits are essentially exogenous to democratic politics per se, serving as inhibitors and causes for the stagnation of the country’s democratic quality (Arugay, 2005). This, however, is only part of the story. Democracy is a reconciliation and balancing act of vertical (i.e. popular inclusion) and horizontal (i.e. constraints against excessive concentrations of power) concepts of accountability (Slater and Arugay, 2018). As such, the tension between the two is seen as endogenous to democratic politics. The Philippines is illustrative of the weakening of democratic norms

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and institutions via both executive aggrandisement and backlash that do not emanate from authoritarian practice per se, but rather from valid and compelling contestations about what aspect of democracy to highlight. As Ding and Slater (2021) contend, the seeming disjoint between mass popularity and non-adherence to liberal-democratic policies underscores the distinctness and tension between mass participation and human rights observance, which are distinct components of liberal-democracy. Aspects of democratic politics may regress in one area and improve or remain unchanged in another. An underemphasised feature of Philippine democracy since 1998 has been the persistence of conflicts over the relative importance of mass popularity versus political constraints on the executive. The Estrada administration’s populist brand of governance was a precursor to Duterte’s campaign nearly two decades later. Building on his relatively strong electoral mandate, Estrada threatened liberally-minded elites and citizens by flouting the idea of amending the 1987 Constitution—an idea made more seemingly opportunistic by his strong majoritarian resonance with lower classes who comprised 70 per cent of the country’s population. Rather than return to brazen authoritarian rule, Estrada sought to mobilise the grassroots more deeply but faced increasing democratic backlash amid allegations of involvement in illicit gambling activities and nonmeritocratic appointments (Arugay, 2005). At the same time, the anti-Estrada bloc carried out executive removal via a “civil society coup”, or the extra-constitutional removal from office of a democratically elected leader through social mobilisation by civil society after his constitutional exit was foreclosed by the unravelling of the impeachment process in the divided Senate (Arugay, 2013). However, the historical legacy of “people power revolutions” or civil society coups against non-overt forms of authoritarian rule is a mixed bag given its habituation of non-election-based political succession, while at the same time enabling ordinary people to directly exact political accountability (Hochstetler, 2006; Oxhorn, 1995). Such efforts would again be attempted against his successor, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, and prove politically destabilising once made into a regular rather than extraordinary tool in the repertoire of political contention (Quimpo, 2009). Albeit in a different form, recent experience with the Duterte presidency highlights the orthogonality of vertical versus horizontal dimensions of democracy. Though marked for its illiberal style of governance, poor human rights observance, assault on traditional and independent

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media, and a return to military and police dependency, the incumbent Duterte administration “claims continued democratic legitimacy based on competitive elections and high opinion ratings” (Thompson, 2021). It is worth highlighting that all opposition candidates lost during the midterm senatorial elections which many have interpreted as a mid-term referendum on Duterte’s governance style (Arugay, 2019). Likewise, the overwhelming victory (nearly 60% of the vote) of Ferdinand Marcos Jr—son and namesake of the country’s former dictators—and his vice presidential running mate Sara Duterte-Carpio, daughter of President Duterte in the 2022 national elections, indicates broad popular support for a vote many see as a castigation of traditional liberal governance. The foregoing discussion highlights the analytical importance of not creating an equivalence between the promotion of authoritarianism and democratic erosion. As noted, democracies decay due to endogenous contestations about core precepts of political accountability just as much as they do from openly anti-democratic intentions and actions, such as censorship, physical and economic coercion, and the suppression of popular participation in politics. More importantly, the endogenous conflicts between competing visions of democracy mean that different elements of democracy will have different outcomes. While not promoting authoritarianism per se, China’s influence in the Philippines has generated political risks and externalities by providing economic incentives that enable the agenda of the country’s “illiberal majoritarian” coalition that has taken power since 2016 (Arugay, 2020; Bautista, 2020). In other words, China’s influence on democratic erosion in the Philippines is not via external pressure to autocratise, but through enabling endogenous sources of democratic erosion—illiberalism, polarisation, and corruption-prone, secretive financing. Due to values-based foreign policy and aid practices by traditional Western partners that have criticised the domestic human rights situation, illiberal Philippine elites have increasingly turned to China as an economic and political backer. For its part, China has actively cultivated such illiberal elite foreign influence networks not because they are illiberal elites, but because these elites tend to be the coalition in the Philippines most receptive to friendlier relations with Beijing (Baviera and Arugay, 2021). In this sense, China’s enablement of the restriction of democratic space is arguably a negative externality, rather than an inherent goal of its activities in the Philippines. China-linked operations however have been recently flagged for social media operations that seek to influence the integrity of elections in

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the Philippines, marking a turn toward traditional conceptions of “sharp power” (Nimmo et al., 2020; Walker, 2018). Varieties of Democracy data show that the Philippines is not autocratising or backsliding if based on the Electoral Democracy Index, but it has shown a severe erosion of civil rights using the Liberal Democracy Index, indicating that democracy’s components erode asymmetrically (Thompson, 2021; Ding and Slater, 2021). Electoral quality has remained the same under Duterte, while civil society and rights-based indicators of democratic quality have severely worsened. In its 2018 report, the Bertelsmann Transformation Index showed there was no substantial gain in democratic quality since 2006, as the country declined in some indicators and had little improvement in others.

Original Sin? China’s Economic Overtures Under Arroyo Unlike other Southeast Asian neighbors, the Philippines has not pursued equidistant relations with the United States and China, and its citizens are generally distrustful of diplomatic overtures by China. China had to shed the baggage from ideological fervour during the Cultural Revolution before it began normalising foreign relations in the region in the early 1980-the 90s. However, in 1995 China occupied Mischief Reef close to the Philippines and triggered further geopolitical escalations from 1997 to 1998 that undermined the goodwill initially built during the Corazon Aquino and Fidel Ramos administrations (Baviera, 2012). Significant diplomatic ground-breaking was only made during the Arroyo administration (2001–2010) through her more proactive China policy, under which Beijing focused on economic incentives to gain a geopolitical foothold in the country (Vaughn and Morrison, 2006). The Arroyo administration banked on the growing Chinese investments and significance in import–export markets in Southeast Asia under Hu Jintao in the early 2000s. Major projects meant to charm Philippine political elites such as the national broadband deal with Chinese firm ZhongXing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) Corporation in 2004, the Joint Maritime Seismic Undertaking (JMSU) in 2005, and the three-party consortium’s acquisition of the National Transmission Corporation of the Philippines all faced stern opposition arising from non-transparent negotiations and corruption allegations in collusion with Chinese business interests, resulting in

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the last deal being the only major investment to push through (Landingin, 2010; Santamaria 2018). To make matters worse, these efforts were perceived as elite pacts between Arroyo—the most unpopular post-EDSA president—and China, which has historically had a negative net trust rating by the Philippine public based on national surveys (Social Weather Stations, 2019). Aside from multi-billion dollar deals, there were also joint ventures in economic infrastructure, agriculture, power, and mining. Throughout her presidency, Arroyo’s cabinet was beset with corruption scandals, alleged electoral rigging in 2004, and poor human rights observance—all of which served to reinforce the perception that the President has an illegitimate electoral mandate and the reality of her weak favourability among the public. China’s economic overtures under Arroyo, which were criticised for lack of public transparency, were increasingly entangled as part of the broader laundry list of grievances against the embattled president. Cruz and Juliano (2021) reported that the Arroyo administration also allegedly regularly used shortcuts in the screening process of the National Economic Development Authority’s Investment Coordination Committee by appointing Presidential consultants to undertake project evaluations, which reinforced the reality of heavily politicised rather than organic Chinese ventures in the economy. While there is certainly a compelling economic case for warmer relations with Beijing during this period, Chinese public diplomacy in the Philippines sailed on rocky waters given the country’s domestic political controversies in the early 2000s which attached public perceptions of Chinese influence with shady elite deal-making that corroded Philippine democracy. Throughout her term until 2010, polls indicate that Arroyo’s popularity never recovered and she is the most distrusted post-EDSA president. In 2004, Gloria Arroyo faced her toughest political crisis after perceived irregularities in the election, locally known as the “Hello Garci” controversy. Between 2005 to 2006 when these bilateral deals were made, there was an increased proportion of protests calling for resignation by the President and other public officials, as compared to other types of protest claims, which highlights the hostile political environment for Arroyo’s policies. With the case of the $329 million ZTE deal for the national broadband network in 2007, Philippine state officials became involved in a corruption scandal over their role in ensuring a bid victory by ZTE over a local firm, and their anomalous correspondence from high officials providing the Chinese government with updates on the project. Eventually, the issue

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was among the grievances filed in the impeachment complaint charges levelled against Arroyo, as well as the subsequent plunder case. In 2021, the Philippine Supreme Court affirmed that the then-Director General of National Economic and Development Authority, Mr. Romulo Neri, is administratively liable for grave misconduct in actively brokering the deal, despite being aware of bribery allegations (Torres-Tupas, 2021). What is noteworthy is the “original sin” of Chinese economic overtures to the Philippines: secretive arrangements, reliance on winning over elite actors due to weak or ineffectual public diplomacy, and the instantiation of putting primacy on shady economic deals in the Philippines where corruption is a major political issue. That Benigno Aquino III (“PNoy”) was catapulted to the presidency in 2010 due to a mix of necropolitical nostalgia with the death of his mother, liberal icon former president Corazon Aquino, and a good governance (“Straight Path”/“Daang Matuwid”) platform spoke volumes about the centrality of such issues during the Arroyo years. Because the Arroyo administration was itself beset by low popularity ratings, intense political opposition, and an overall reliance on elite actors such as the military and fair-weather alliances rooted in the distribution of economic largess (Quimpo, 2009), major deals with China were perceived as a form of regime protection and betrayal of national interest. However, China’s links to the backdoor deals and non-transparent governance that hounded the Arroyo years served more as a symptom rather than a source of the democratic erosion in the country. Though not deliberate, the absence of rights-promoting conditionalities on “Chinese foreign aid, unlike its Western counterparts, and its disregard for public transparency in the negotiations dealing with a supposedly democratic regime contributed to the further de-legitimisation of Arroyo’s government” (Arugay, 2020). The veil of secrecy over these projects served the short-term interests of both parties: Arroyo needed a financing lifeline in foreign investments to energise macroeconomic growth which has been the vanguard of her presidency, while China has fared better in dealings with pragmatic local elites than in open public diplomacy in an environment with deeply unfavourable public perceptions of its neighbour. For these reasons, the notion of a Chinese economic footprint being described in recent literature as “corrosive capital” (see Centre for International Private Enterprise, 2020; Kim, 2021) is consistent with Philippine historical experience. However, it must be qualified that the

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general process by which the influx of massive foreign capital that lacks clear accountability standards and transparency can undermine democracy through corruption, overwhelming local regulatory institutions, and even ideational promotion of non-democratic political models is a cautionary tale that is not unique to Chinese economic activity. What bears noting however is that the alignment of China’s aid policy and its domestic political system preventing the mitigation of such policies, given its overriding geopolitical goals all bear down to undermine democratic institutions abroad.

Confrontation Under Aquino, 2010–2016 Benigno Aquino III’s (2010–2016) administration collided with China on two accounts. The first is by way of the cancellation of many allegedly anomalous infrastructure projects by the Arroyo administration and the eventual filing of a plunder case against his predecessor—around the opposition on whom he based his bid for the presidency (Arugay, 2020) This, however, was tempered by an initial move to establish cordial relations with China and so the relationship between his agenda for liberal politics and holding China to account did not become a major issue. The second and more significant collision was over the matter of geopolitical national interest, beginning with the 2012 standoff in Scarborough Shoal and culminating in a lawfare strategy to file a suit at the Permanent Court of Arbitration and further Philippine entrenchment within the US military orbit (de Castro, 2014). Philippine–China relations have been described as openly confrontational under Aquino, although this did not stop the increase in China’s foreign direct investments in the Philippines, which ballooned from 63 billion USD in 1998–2005 to 218 billion USD in 2005–2016 (Central Bank of the Philippines, 2018). The 2012 standoff between China and the Philippines in the disputed Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea was a crucial moment for the diplomatic rapture between the two countries. Aquino leaned heavily on the United States as a geopolitical counterweight and deepened the alliance through measures such as the Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement and diplomatic reciprocation of support for the Philippines’ suit against China at the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) (de Castro, 2014). In seeking to internationalise the dispute, Manila broke from bilateral negotiations, which Beijing preferred. China levied

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economic measures against Philippine export–import markets, as well as travel advisories against travel to the country. Aside from internationalising the dispute, Aquino also sought hard military balance by revitalising the military modernisation program of the Philippines in 2012, which down the line led to major arms acquisitions such as fighter jets and naval vessels in a bid to shift the country’s armed forces from internal security to external defence. Aquino progressively drew a harder stance against Beijing—an approach many characterise as an attempt to make the South China Sea issue the basis of Philippine– China relations. In an interview with the New York Times, he said: “at what point do you say ‘enough is enough?… Well, the world has to say it – remember that the Sudetenland was given in an attempt to appease Hitler to prevent World War II” (Bradsher, 2014). During this period, China kept a low profile in the Philippines, although domestically there had been some circles, especially in business, who disagreed with Aquino’s confrontational lawfare strategy and the attempt to bring the United States into the dispute (Baviera, 2012). Globally, China also had a change toward a more aggressive foreign policy under Xi Jinping, notable for its more proactive cultivation of audiences and political elites who are receptive to China’s geopolitical rise and even support its positions which have become increasingly opposed to or distant from the positions of the United States (Chhabra et al., 2020).

Conciliation Under Duterte, 2016–2022 Duterte’s electoral victory in 2016 was significant for the change in the tenor of the political discourse about how to govern the country, both for its foreign policy and its normative commitment to liberal democracy. Firstly, the Duterte administration’s efforts to go out of its way to improve relations with Beijing were motivated by an alternative foreign policy view that territorial disputes in the South China Sea should not define broader Sino–Filipino relations. Indeed, courting China has been widely documented as delivering strong economic dividends for Philippine foreign investment, sizeable development assistance, tourism, and local employment. Table 2.1 shows the massive jump in Chinese development assistance to the Philippines under Duterte, which coincided with a time when the US and European countries were criticising his controversial drug war and human rights records. Members of the administration

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Table 2.1 Comparison of project funding sources under Aquino III and Duterte Major funding sources

Aquino administration (Cost of projects—PHP millions)

Aquino administration (share of total costs) (%)

Duterte administration (cost of Flagship Projects—PHP millions)a

Duterte administration (share of Flagship Projects) (%)

Total Local Financing PPP ODA Stated Japanese ODA Stated Chinese ODA Stated Korean ODA Stated World Bank ODA

601,509.19 98,112.07

100.0 16.3

4,130,016.47 235,211.00

280,355.28 297,716.58 197,072.93

46.6 49.5 32.8

1,751,120.00b 2,263,490.47 1,472,018.31

42.4 54.8 35.60

Nonea

Nonea

601,433 0.16

14.6

22,704.64

3.8

44,155.00

1.1

67,096.63

11.2

21,772.00

0.52

100.0 5.7

a Figures may not add up to 100% due to hybrid categories (e.g. GAA/PPP, GAA/ODA, etc.) b As of August 2020, unsolicited PPPs accounting for PhP 1.399-trillion or roughly 80 percent of

PPP portfolio Source Cruz and Juliano (2021)

were aware that delivering concrete economic largess to their constituencies is the overarching political rationale for the “Build, Build, Build” flagship infrastructure program of Duterte, and China proved itself as an alternative patron. At the same time, enmeshment with China has its own externalities such as corruption by the bureau of immigration to facilitate bogus Alien Employment Permits (AEP) of Chinese foreign nationals in the Philippines and increased real estate prices in Metro Manila (Rabena, 2019). Nonetheless, over and above the clear economic motive of elites of both countries to sidestep conflictual territorial and exclusive economic zone claims, the sea change in foreign relations from confrontation to conciliation became a strong signal for Beijing that cultivating relations with friendly political elites can work wonders for its near-abroad geopolitical interests. This policy change occurred despite the Filipino public having unfavourable trust ratings of China and a preference for a more

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assertive policy on territorial disputes. Unlike the Arroyo government, Duterte’s popularity has remained stable over time and his massive political capital cushions criticisms against China, which takes advantage of the fact that national surveys consistently show overwhelming public concern and prioritisation for domestic economic issues rather than foreign relations since 2016 (Pulse Asia, 2021). At the same time, this means that China is cornered to contend with seemingly ineffective public diplomacy in the Philippines, and to continue its reliance on relationships with political elites to advance its diplomatic interests (Table 2.2). Secondly, Duterte’s personal rhetoric ensured that focus and normative commitment to values-based liberal reformism (good governance and transparency) were sidelined in favour of state-building fundamentals normally seen as local politics concerns: street crime, vital public infrastructure, and social services (Bautista, 2020). It should be underscored that emphasis on state-building over what was depicted as high-brow values-based liberal reformism need not necessarily be an assault on democracy. However, the populist performance by Duterte specifically utilised an ends-justify-the-means governance method that was decidedly illiberal, having been described as an “order over law” mindset driven by an otherwise genuine concern to make the government credibly deliver on its public functions (Pepinsky, 2017; Thompson, 2017). Riding on the wave of his popularity, the firebrand Duterte became notorious for attacking and fueling public hatred for traditional media, liberal politics, and human rights. For its part, China has proved itself willing to support the Duterte government over international criticism of his war on drugs and has gone so far as to endorse the need to support a firm crackdown on drug users “instead of pointing fingers and casting blames” (Corrales, 2011). Within this context, unlike under Arroyo, Chinese loans and aid to the Philippines has increasingly been an important asset for illiberal elites. During the onset of his administration, the Duterte administration’s unabashed “order over law” rhetoric and controversial war on drugs elicited concerns from Western countries who often have democracy promotion and good governance conditionalities in their aid frameworks. When it failed to comply with the requirement to improve rule of law and democracy in 2016, the Philippines lost funding from the US Millennium Challenge Account that used to fund sanitation, poverty-reduction, and agricultural support programs. Similarly, in 2018 the Canadian government reviewed the sale of helicopters over concerns about its

34 40 36

38 38 34

36 41 33

68 39 37 45

Dec 18

33 42 26

61 46 43 49

Dec 19

29 29 29

74 47 47 45

Sep 20

32 32 30

70 47 46 43

+3 +3 +1

−4 0 1 −2

PR1&2 Change Sep 21 Sep21–Sep 20

Source Pulse Asia (2021). In the September 2021 survey, “defending the integrity of Philippine territory against foreigners” was only identified as one of the top three (3) national concerns by 5% of a nationally representative sample

65 43 39 45

63 44 41 41

To stay healthy and avoid illnesses To have a secure and well-paying job or source of income At least to be able to have enough to eat every day To finish schooling or to be able to provide schooling for our children To be able to have some savings To avoid being a victim of any serious crime To have my own house and lot

Dec 17

Dec 16

Top three national concerns of Filipinos

Personal Concerns

Table 2.2

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usage in internal security operations, and the Philippines responded by cancelling the $235 million contract (The Straits Times, 2019). Duterte also instructed the executive branch to refuse aid with conditionalities related to democracy promotion from the European Union. Likewise, Iceland’s initiation of a resolution in the UN Human Rights Council to investigate human rights violations in the Philippines prompted a vitriolic response from Malacanang Palace, which ordered agencies to reject millions of dollars worth of loans and financial assistance from countries that supported the resolution (Calonzo, 2019). In this light, China’s foreign aid model that emphasises nonintervention in domestic affairs, non-conditionality for political outcomes such as democracy promotion, and a focus on mutual benefit are acceptable to Duterte’s brand of politics. Self-professed to be an “independent foreign policy”, Duterte has sought to distance the country from the United States, although his pronouncements of re-alignment with Russia and China have cast doubt on the label. While in theory, aid that is free from political conditionalities and is more transactional in nature would make the country safer from aid-based diplomatic coercion, China’s aid as “flexible capital” also had less clear legal and regulatory frameworks and weak standards for transparency that ultimately became prone to corruption in the Philippine context (Trinidad, 2013), marking a repeat of Arroyo-era issues. Chinese aid in this context takes on the same anti-democratic or elite-supporting meanings among locals. Critically, many analysts have noted the persistence of the same issues in the Duterte administration’s ambitious Build, Build, Build (BBB) program, which is characterised as the most ambitious post-1986 statedriven infrastructure development program. For one thing, China and the Philippines have not effectively reigned in the corrosive impact of a sudden inpouring of capital investments through integrity mechanisms such as Paris Club provisions (Mangahas and Ilagan, 2017). A recent study of the BBB found that the political calculus of domestic elites in actively seeking China-funded infrastructure projects was motivated by the lack of stringent social and environmental standards by Chinese contractors, which would expedite operational build-time of infrastructure projects in order to reap an electoral advantage (Cruz and Juliano, 2021). This indicates that the problem may be more structural and enduring because both parties are keen on scoring political gains, wherein both Duterte’s illiberal majoritarian efforts and China’s desire for warm relations with Manila exist in symbiotic relationship. Although Japan

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remains the top source of development assistance and loan funding, Cruz and Juliano (2021) have noted China’s growing stake in flagship projects under the Duterte administration (Table 2.3). China has negotiated for the shortlisting of Chinese contractors ahead of the signing of loan agreements, and insisted on Non-Disclosure Agreements. This has caused apprehension at China’s specific financing demands and non-compliance to general OECD standards for Official Development Assistance. Unlike Japan which only allows project engagement with aid recipient countries through its official aid agency, private and state-owned Chinese firms directly maintain contacts with government agencies of partner countries. While legal since the 2003 Government Procurement Reform Act exempts foreign-assisted projects from usual protocols for Philippine government activities, these have the net effect of undermining the integrity of the procurement process in the country. Amelite interviews that claim that rent-seeking has worsened and the level of “kickbacks” nearly doubled as compared to the previous administration (Cruz and Juliano, 2021; Mendoza and Cruz, 2020). However, it would be a mistake to characterise the nature of China’s influence in the Philippines as merely reverting to the Arroyo days which put primacy on economic cooperation to advance diplomatic relations. With rising geopolitical tensions and China’s explicit bid for superpower status, the rather weakly executed but significant partial strategic decoupling of the Philippines from the United States has gained importance as part of a broader effort to break off the “first island chain”— which includes the Philippines. The “first island chain” is a geopolitical legacy of forward-deployment of American troops and alliances in areas that serve to contain China in its near abroad waters (Erickson and Wuthnow, 2016). Under the Duterte administration, Manila dragged its feet on meaningful construction of American military facilities under the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement made by the previous Aquino government. However, Duterte was unable to fully execute its rhetoric of an independent foreign policy due to recalcitrance by the bureaucracy, not least due to the endurance of established mechanisms of cooperation with the United States that have no functional alternative. A study on Philippine strategic elites (military, diplomatic, and academic elites) showed a continued preference for partnership with the United States and distrust of China’s growing regional power (Amador et al., 2020). The Duterte administration ultimately proved unsuccessful in its calls to

Funding

China-funded projects under Duterte’s BBB program

Source Cruz and Juliano (2021)

a Still not officially assigned for China ODA, though state-level discussions ongoing b With initial bilateral agreements and Memoranda of Cooperation signed during visits to China

In NEDA’s April 2019 update in Flagship Projects Subic-Clark Railway Project Loan (PhP 50.031-B) Ambal-Simuay River and Rio Grande de Mindanao Flood Loan (PhP 39.220-B) Control Projects Palanca-Villegas (2nd Ayala) Bridge Loan (PhP 1.595-B) Beata-F.Y. Manalo Bridge Loan (PhP 1.387-B) Blumentritt-Antipolo Bridge Loan (PhP 1.103-B) East–West Bank Bridge 1 Loan (PhP 1.538-B) North and South Harbor Bridge Loan (PhP 8.030-B) Binondo-Intramuros Bridge Grant (PhP 4.607-B) Estrella-Pantaleon Bridge Grant (PhP 1.367-B) Chico River Pump Project Loan (PhP 4.373-B) PNR South Long-haul (Manila-Bicol) Loan (PhP 175.318-B) NCWSP—Kaliwa Dam Project Loan (PhP 12.2-B) Mindanao Railway Project Phase 1a ODA (PhP 81.686-B) Potential Additional China ODA projects in NEDA’s February 2020 Update b Sangley Airport GAA (PhP 1.436-B), but with discussions of China-funded expansion Davao City Expressway ODA (PhP 24.5-B) Panay-Guimaras Negros Bridge ODA (PhP 189.5-B) Potential Additional China ODA projects in NEDA’s August 2020 Update b Marawi Rehabilitation Grant (PhP 999-million) Samal Island-Davao City Connector Bridge ODA (PhP 23.0-B) Safe Philippines Project Phase 1 ODA (PhP 20.3-B)

Project title

Table 2.3

DPWH/DHSUD DPWH DILG

DPWH DPWH

DOTr

DPWH DPWH DPWH DPWH DPWH DPWH DPWH NIA DOTr MWSS DOTr

DOTr/BCDA DPWH

Agency

50 A. A. ARUGAY AND J. K. A. BAQUISAL

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revisit the Mutual Defense Treaty and to terminate the Visting Forces Agreement, the key strategic components of the US–Philippine alliance. Oppositionist politicians have notably railed against Duterte on multiple issues, such as allegations that a former Presidential economic adviser was serving as a front for Chinese business interests, public procurement anomalies facilitated by Chinese capital, and the government’s seemingly defeatist discourse toward China in relation to territorial disputes (Vitug, 2021; Gloria, 2021). In juxtaposition to this, the Philippines’ liberal-minded political elites which form part of the minority opposition to Duterte have been a strong constituency in favour of greater strategic alignment with the United States and take a more hard-line approach toward South China Sea territorial disputes. The concern over Duterte’s ties with Beijing is exacerbated by the President’s own proclamation that Chinese president Xi Jinping swore to protect him from moves that will result in his removal from office (CNN Philippines, 2018). On the one hand, Duterte said so in the context that he was “freely elected leader” and China’s defense of his administration “could be a very justified statement” on such basis, meaning China is serving to uphold a popularly elected government in Manila. On the other hand, the statement also reveals the depth of political motivation of the Chinese Communist Party to maintain Duterte’s new policy and is indicative of the broadening of the goal from just diplomatic overture in the Arroyo years and toward stewardship of geopolitical alignment under Duterte. At the same time, China has publicly signalled punishments toward key figures in the country’s liberal-oppositionist elites when it denied entry to Hong Kong to a former chief anti-graft prosecutor and Supreme court justice for being a “security threat”—a move then seen as retaliation for them filing a case against Xi Jinping for crimes against humanity (Dancel, 2019).

Toward Influence Operations? In recent years, efforts by the Chinese government to punish foreign critics have increased in line with autocratic consolidation under Xi through methods such as visa denial, denial of access to Chinese territory even on a transitory basis, and more aggressive censorship of negative publicity by putting pressure on publishers (Tiffert, 2020). By and large, this chapter has argued that Chinese influence on democratic erosion in

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the Philippines has been largely indirect, serving instead to stoke endogenous factors for democratic erosion, such as by providing alternative sources of political and economic support that are less committed to democratic conditionalities. These serve as lifelines for illiberal majoritarian elites, favouring outreach to state and political elites to get projects done rather than building broad-based public support, and employ overall problematic development aid frameworks that are more prone to corruption than the Philippine’s traditional lenders such as Japan. Indeed, the Philippines is not a typical story for mechanisms described in the literature on the “sharp power” of authoritarian influence whereby an authoritarian power destabilises democracy. Efforts to influence society through cultural exchanges, think-tank engagement, Confucius Institutes, and the use of Chinese-language media programs to foster China’s image have not generated convincing and demonstrable evidence of malign efforts that systematically attack democracy in the Philippines in particular unlike high profile cases of overt corruption in the United States and Latin America, although influence peddling may itself contribute to democratic erosion (Parameswaran, 2019). Admittedly, there is a general lack of enforcement of the Philippines’ Foreign Agents Act of 1979 to address foreign interference. Transmitting foreign propaganda to Philippine government officials is illegal, but the covert nature of influence operations as a form of psychological and public opinion warfare effectively skirts local regulation (Tarun, 2021). Some recent developments are worth highlighting. First, social media giant Meta has twice officially taken down pages and accounts “associated with the Chinese government” in 2019 and China-based disinformation networks again in 2020 the latter of which is specifically about “coordinated inauthentic behavior” (CIB) of fake accounts and manufactured identities that “originated in China and focused primarily on the Philippines” and Southeast Asia: In Southeast Asia where this network focused most of its activity, they posted in Chinese, Filipino and English about global news and current events including Beijing’s interests in the South China Sea; Hong Kong; content supportive of President Rodrigo Duterte and Sarah Duterte’s potential run in the 2022 Presidential election; criticism of Rappler, an independent news organization in the Philippines; issues relevant to the overseas Filipino workers; and praise and some criticism of China. In the US, where this network focused the least and gained almost no following,

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they posted content both in support of and against presidential candidates Pete Buttigieg, Joe Biden and Donald Trump. (Meta, 2020)

Notably, the influence operations campaign dubbed “Operation Naval Gazing” was not a finance-based operation given the low spending on advertisements and instead focused on influencing Filipino audiences through information. The firm Graphika conducted an independent analysis of Facebook’s data and shared that those accounts under the operation secondarily addressed topics on the South China Sea, benefits of trade with China, China’s generosity with COVID-19 vaccine supply, and created polls on cooperating with China on extracting oil and gas in the SCS. However, its focus was more subtle than directly advocating for Chinese interests: The Philippines cluster began in March 2018 and grew through 2019 and into 2020. It was, by a considerable margin, the operation’s most engaged… The majority of its content, both from pages and from individual accounts, praised President Rodrigo Duterte and his family and allies, notably his daughter and the daughter of former president Ferdinand Marcos, Imee Marcos, a senator… Complementing this pro-Duterte and pro-Marcos activity, the operation’s assets attacked critics of the Philippines government and president. The targets of these attacks included opposition senators, the independent Rappler and ABS-CBN news outlets, and Rappler founder and chief executive Maria Ressa, who was celebrated as one of TIME Magazine’s people of the year in 2018”. (Nimmo et al., 2020)

The Philippine focus of the network began picking up after former US Secretary of State Pompeo during the Trump administration affirmed American commitments to the Philippines’ safety in the South China Sea under the Mutual Defense Treaty. One account centred on the Presidential daughter Sara Duterte generated 935,000 or 58% of the 1.6 million social media interactions of the entire operation which targeted audiences in China, Southeast Asia, and the United States. The argument has also been made that the Philippine audience has been singled out specifically because of Filipinos’ top social media usage in the world, using it for roughly 4 hours per day, and that these efforts generally complement the local political landscape where traditional media outlets have been discredited by the President and where alternative news sources are promoted (Winger, 2020). Likewise, the effectiveness of these operations may be

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amplified by the tendency of Duterte supporters to be the most engaged with “non-fans” unlike social media networks of oppositionist politicians (Sinpeng et al., 2020). Left unaddressed, organised disinformation networks linked to China seriously undermine not only the sanctity of electoral choice in the Philippines but also seriously impair civic space by using the tactic of engendering hatred toward unfavourable groups (e.g. anti-China constituencies) using non-China related issues and contributes to Duterte’s attempts to deny legitimacy to political rivals (Levitsky and Ziblatt, 2018). In so doing, China-linked influence operations partake in what Morgenbesser (2020) calls “authoritarian innovation” such as reputational management through social media influence and by championing and manufacturing pro-China ideas and accounts that give the impression of having many supporters in a target country. Incoming president-elect Ferdinand Marcos’ Jr. picked up Duterte’s slogan for an “independent foreign policy”, and social media influencers linked to the Duterte-Marcos coalition have engaged in some discussion on the matter. At the same time, the independent foreign policy rhetoric has appeared to be a staging point to justify the constriction of civil space against unwanted foreign influence. Opposition figures such as Nobel-prize laureate Maria Ressa and Vice President Maria Leonor “Leni” Robredo have been targets of disinformation campaigns linking them to the US Central Intelligence Agency. Supporters of the Marcos Jr. Administration have taken to social media to discredit nongovernmental organisations after Robredo announced her post-election plans to establish a foundation. Another point of controversy symptomatic of the penchant to rush linkages with elite actors was the case of public alarm caused by fears about formal partnerships between the Philippines’ former ruling political party, PDP-Laban of Duterte, and the Chinese Communist Party, which included an agreement in 2016 for “policy training at the CCP’s provincial party school in Fujian”, and the 2017 party-to-party cooperation agreement in 2017 which facilitated high-level meetings (Roxas, 2018; Pazzibugan, 2017). Whether or not these engagements have substantially contributed to democratic erosion via transmission of authoritarian party practices is a subject that deserves furthers study. As Arugay (2020) noted:

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Officially, PDP party officials have made visits to China in order to learn more about party organization, structure, and ideology. This can be interpreted as the attempt to foster organizational and personal relations among the party members of both countries, establish channels of communication, and cooperate at the more informal and even sub-national level given some of the officials are local government executives and parliamentarians. While Filipino politicians have also similar relations and cooperative ventures with other kinds of political parties in the West and Europe, this kind of overture to China is unprecedented. While democratic ideologies and liberal solidarity has become the ties that bind Filipino politicians with their counterparts in Western democracies, non-democratic and illiberal ideas seem to the common thread with the PDP-Laban’s attempt to foster better relations with China’s ruling party.”

Conclusion This chapter has argued that the central goal of China’s diplomatic overtures in the Philippines is to expand influence, not undermine democracy per se. But because the context of the Philippines pits a pro-China illiberal-majoritarian incumbent against an anti-China liberalminded opposition, external influence to promote the former ends up supporting the wilting down of democratic norms, particularly aspects of horizontal accountability, in favour of a populist executive. At the same time, issues on transparency and elite-level political accommodation given economic incentives for Philippines-China engagement run counter to democratic ideas such as consultative planning, market fairness, and public openness that are embedded in the bureaucratic practices of the Philippines, or at least the model it strives to be. In conclusion, this chapter highlights two key takeaways from the Philippine case. First, unlike mainstream literature on authoritarian foreign influence and democratic erosion, we argue that the relationship does not necessarily require malign interests on the part of the foreign power. Within the framework of this volume, democratic recession was argued to be driven by three types of contextual factors: external influence, political institutions, and the degree of societal support for democratic norms. Indeed, the Philippine case highlights that the presumed realpolitik savvy of Chinese aid policy having little values or politics-based conditionalities has historically been a liability in developing countries where political institutions against corruption are weak and elite-driven politics can serve to drive democratic backlash against

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perceived collusion by state officials and Chinese business lobbies. At the same time, the external geopolitical environment has driven Beijing to also be an influence-maximising actor in the region given the demonstrable economic, strategic, and military benefits of friendly counterparts in Manila. However, in the process of influence expansion and in part due to China’s own domestic political structure (e.g. United Front Works), lingering questions remain about the thin line dividing legitimate public diplomacy from influence operations that are more appropriately called “sharp power” that aim not only to win hearts and minds but to also distract and manipulate elites and publics within emerging democracies for its geopolitical benefit (Searight, 2020). This problem not only applies to China, but even to the United States and other great powers. Democracies grappling with polarising conflict such as the Philippines will confront an increasingly hostile environment where foreign sponsorship in domestic electoral processes becomes the norm, not by violence but by the shaping of the information environment that guides decision-making by the public. Secondly, fleshing out exogenous versus endogenous sources of democratic erosion is crucial in assessing the relative gravity and role of foreign influence in facilitating it. Exogenous factors refer to sources of erosion that are external to democratic politics, such as the endemic nature of corruption and elite dominance in electoral politics. This chapter has also pointed to arguments about the institutional contradictions within democracy or “endogenous” sources of erosion between horizontal and vertical conceptions of accountability or those that privilege popular mandate (of which Duterte had plenty) over constitutionalist constraints against concentrations and illiberal use of political power. The Philippines is already undergoing a crisis of its democratic values as it balances populist inclusion and executive overreach, regardless of China’s influence. We have argued that Chinese political influence as currently practised in economic, political, and diplomatic spheres has become increasingly tied to both endogenous and exogenous sources of Philippine democratic erosion post-2016, given the geopolitical primacy that China puts on seemingly supporting Duterte hook, line, and sinker, and what can reasonably be expected as a willingness to engage all takers of a pro-China view among competing political camps. Nonetheless, the superordinate factor that drives democratic erosion remains largely the deliberateness of Duterte’s coalition for illiberal yet still largely majoritarian and constitutionalist governance.

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CHAPTER 3

Anies Baswedan and Substate Populism in Jakarta, Indonesia Amalia Sustikarini

Introduction Since the early 2000s, the international community has witnessed the strengthening of populist forces and movements in various parts of the world. In Europe, since the early 2000s, right-wing populist groups have emerged focusing on ultra-nationalist and anti-immigrant issues. These groups include the Pim Fortuyn List, Freedom Party of Austria, Danish People’s Party, National Front, UK Independence Party, and Alternative for Germany. In the United States, these right-wing populist groups are represented by Donald Trump, who won the United States election through the Republican Party. Benjamin Netanyahu and the Likud Party dominated Israeli politics in the Middle East. In Latin America,

A. Sustikarini (B) Center for Business and Diplomatic Studies (CBDS), Department of International Relations, Bina Nusantara University, West Jakarta, Indonesia e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 J. Ockey and N. S. Talib (eds.), Democratic Recession, Autocratization, and Democratic Backlash in Southeast Asia, Contestations in Contemporary Southeast Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-9811-9_3

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populism takes a different form. Hand in hand with leftist ideology, since the early 2000s, populism has spawned leftist populist figures, such as Hugo Chavez, Evo Morales, and Rafael Correa. Meanwhile, in some other countries, populism is intertwined with religion. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in India is one of the representations of this political power. In Indonesia, populism is also intertwined with religion, giving birth to Islamist populist groups whose influence is strengthening in the domestic political sphere. Based on the framework for democratic recession conceptualized by Ockey (see Chapter 1) of this volume, populism is categorized in terms of an autocratic innovation, as a factor that undermines democracy (Curato and Fossati, 2020). Ockey highlights the prevalence of populism and its technique in Southeast Asian countries, such as Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia. Particularly in Indonesia, Ockey notes the detachment of Joko Widodo, the current President, from political party politics, as one of the important characteristics of populism. Ockey’s view is strengthened by Mietzner (2020), who asserts that Jokowi’s refusal to tie himself organizationally to the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (Partai Democracy Indonesia Perjuangan) is the key to understanding his technocratic populism. He never assumed a party leadership role or used the party as a political vehicle. While Jokowi provides a good example of populism at the national level, it would be worth examining the Governor of Jakarta, Anies Baswedan, a notable populist, as a case study of populism at the substate level. Anies has the same characteristics as Jokowi in terms of his disassociation with party politics. He participated in the 2014 Democratic Party (Partai Demokrat) convention and secured the ticket for the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election from Gerindra and PKS (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, Prosperous and Justice Party). Yet, he is neither a member nor an elite of any of the established political parties in Indonesia. Anies successfully won the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election, one of the most divisive elections in Indonesia. His victory was largely supported by the mass rallies against the incumbent governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok), who was accused of blasphemy. This movement was called Action to Defend Islam (Aksi Bela Islam) or by the more popular name, 212 rally (derived from the date of the largest mass protest, 2 December) led by Muhammad Rizieq Shihab, chairman of

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the Islamic Defenders Front (Front Pembela Islam or FPI). While the primary aim of FPI was to force the government and prosecutor to jail Ahok based on the Indonesian Council of Ulama (Majelis Ulama Indonesia/MUI) fatwa, this movement has expanded to address Muslim grievances, including socioeconomic aspects. Scholarly works (Mietzner, 2020; Nuryanti, 2021) categorize Action to Defend Islam as a form of Islamist populism. However, there is a gap in the literature that explains the leadership of Anies Baswedan as a regional leader whose triumph in the election was in large part due to endorsement by this Islamist populist movement and anti-Chinese sentiment. This chapter contributes to the literature on democratic decline and populism in Southeast Asia by investigating substate populism in Indonesia and its impact on deepening polarization through the mobilization of grievance and identity politics. Referring to Heuer and Hierman (2018), it is argued that substate populism is supported by three factors: decentralization, pre-existing resentment or anxiety, and the capacity to dominate the local narrative. This chapter also argues that the type of populist movement that successfully brings candidates into power does not necessarily determine the type of populist leadership performed by the elected leader. Populist policies carried out by the populist leader are not necessarily harmful to democracy and could be a corrective to this system and beneficial to disadvantaged groups. In analyzing substate populism in Jakarta, Indonesia, and explaining its characteristics and impact on democratic decline, this chapter is structured as follows. The first section will elaborate on the definitions of populism and the case studies of populism in Indonesia, and on the nexus between populism, polarization, and democratic decline. It then discusses the Jakarta gubernatorial election, the discourse of identity politics, and grievance mobilization. The subsequent section will utilize the framework of substate populism from Heuer and Hierman (2018) to analyze the formation of substate populism in Jakarta, Indonesia. The fourth section discusses the rhetoric and populist policies of Anies Baswedan as Governor of Jakarta and the chapter concludes by discussing the impact of substate populism in Jakarta on the future of democratic consolidation in Indonesia, particularly in relation to the upcoming 2024 Indonesia presidential election.

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Populism, Polarization, and Democratic Decline While populism is a highly contested concept, this chapter will use the definition of populism provided by Cass Mudde (2004) as “an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups: ‘the pure people’ and ‘the corrupt elite’ and argues that politics should be an expression of the general will of the people”. Regarding the case of populism in Indonesia, there is a growing literature that is seeking to explain the trend of populism in Indonesia. Ziv (2001) and Aspinall (2015) attempt to explain the rise of nationalist populist groups in Indonesian politics by using the cases of Megawati and Prabowo. Hadiz (2016) analyzes the rise of Islamist populism in Indonesia through comparative studies of similar movements in Egypt and Turkey. There are also some scholarly works on populism that focus on Indonesia after the emergence of Jokowi in national politics, covering the presidential elections in 2014 and 2019 and the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election written by Hamid (2014) and Mietzner (2015, 2020). Hadiz and Robison (2017) investigates the nexus between oligarchy and populism in Indonesia while Fossati and Mietzner (2019), based on a survey and strong quantitative studies, analyze Indonesia’s populist electorate. I will also cite several scholars who focus on the impact of populism on democracy and the linkage between populism and polarization. Mudde and Kaltwasser (2012: 20–25) state that “populism is a double-edged sword for democracy that has positive and negative impacts”. According to Hamid (2014), in a democratic country like Indonesia, populism in the hands of the opposition is a corrective for democracy. Populism provides opportunities to criticize problems that the new democracy faces, such as corruption, inefficiency, and exclusion, which means that populism can push for democratic reform. Populism also opens up opportunities for a “new representation” of the silent majority that the elite had previously abandoned. In contrast, populism can also be a threat to democracy. It can undermine the checks and balances among government institutions and undermine the strength or development of liberal democratic institutions and protections. Large-scale support, directly from the people, can sometimes legitimize any actions by a populist leader, as occurred in Venezuela in 2009 when Hugo Chavez used a referendum to amend the constitution that had limited a leader’s maximum term (Roberts, 2012).

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Ufen (2018) also notes the positive impact of populism on democracy and civil rights. Left-wing populism, for example, has expanded the rights of ethnic minorities in Latin America. In the same vein, Chantal Mouffe (2018) pleads for populist mobilization to activate formerly excluded parts of the population. However, it has to be added that this is possible without constructing the core antagonism between the “pure people” and a “morally corrupt elite”. One can legitimately attack corrupt elites and conjure up the need for fundamental reforms in the name of the people, but one has to make clear, at the same time, who exactly belongs to the elite, that the people are essentially heterogeneous, and that pluralism and liberal democracy are principally not questioned (Ufen, 2018). Among the negative impacts that are brought about by populism is polarization. According to Waburton (2020), one of the drivers of polarization is the rise of populism, which has deepened divisions in Indonesia as it has elsewhere around the world. As Kenny (2017) argues, patronage democracies like Indonesia are particularly vulnerable to populism because “populist mobilization thrives where ties between voters and non-populist parties do not exist or have decayed”. When linkages between voters and parties are weak, charismatic individuals at the national level can make direct, personal appeals to the masses and minimize their use of formal party structures (Waburton, 2020). Roberts (2012) explains that populism is a subset of polarized politics. Populism may be intrinsically polarizing, but not all forms of polarization are constructed along a populist line of sociopolitical demarcation. Polarization along a class cleavage between workers and capitalists, for example, or between rival ethnic or religious groups cohabiting a national political community, need not be articulated in populist forms—although such societal divisions can provide raw material or sociological bases for a populist articulation of the ‘true’ and authentic ‘people’ (Roberts, 2012).

Democratization and the Rise of Conservatism in Indonesia The development of Islamist populism in Indonesia is one of the impacts of the growing conservatism in Indonesia since the fall of President Suharto and the beginning of the democratization process. In his influential book, Bruinessen (2013) describes this trend as “a very different face of Indonesian Islam”. After three decades of featuring modernist Islam, harmonious relations with non-Muslim minorities and rejecting

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the idea of an Islamic state and embracing the secular state ideology of Pancasila, there were violent inter-religious conflicts that occurred in some provinces, increasing sympathy and support for radical groups and the idea of an Islamic state and religiously motivated terrorist attacks. However, Bruinessen (2013) argues that this development is a temporary reaction to a sudden shift in power balance and redistribution of resources in the post-Suharto democratization process. The more permanent development is the competition for influence between transnational Islamic movements represented by the Prosperous and Justice Party, which is perceived as Indonesia’s Muslim Brotherhood movement, Hizbut Tahrir, Jamaah Tabligh, and Salafi groups with the established mass-based Indonesian organizations. To add to this dynamic, there is also competition between progressive and conservative camps within NU (Nahdlatul Ulama) and Muhammadiyah (Bruinessen, 2013). The Indonesia Ulama Council, or Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI), is one of the influential organizations that greatly contributed to this conservative turn in Indonesia’s Islamic landscape. MUI is Indonesia’s leading Islamic body established during President Suharto’s administration in 1975 as a semi-official institution. In the aftermath of the fall of Suharto’s regime in 1998, MUI not only managed to survive but strengthened its role as a source of Islamic authority (Hasyim, 2019). In 2000, the MUI asserted and proclaimed its aspiration to shift its role from being the “khadim al-hukumah” (servant of the government) to serving as the “khadim al-ummah” (servant of the ummah). The MUI has endeavored to reposition itself in Indonesia’s transitional politics by defending more conservative Muslim interests and aspirations (Ichwan, 2013). This can be seen from various fatwas, tausiyahs, and other statements produced by the MUI, and in the way in which it has dealt with social, political, economic, and cultural issues. The MUI demonstrated the clearest expression of this conservative turn by the issuance of a number of controversial fatwa (authoritative opinions), including the fatwa that declared secularism, pluralism, and religious liberalism as incompatible with Islam. This conservatism stance is also shown in the controversy surrounding the election of a non-Muslim leader. While MUI never issued a specific fatwa forbidding Muslims from electing non-Muslim leaders, some MUI officials have repeatedly asserted the obligation of Muslims to elect a leader from the same religion based on a Quranic verse. The MUI’s conservative position is an important driving factor behind the Action to

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Defend Islam, a mass rally that turned to Islamist populism. The mass rally developed into a movement and played a significant part in the victory of Anies Baswedan during the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election.

Divisive Gubernatorial Election, Islamist Populism, and Polarization Jakarta is designated as a special territory (Daerah Khusus Ibukota/DKI), which means that it is administered by a governor and enjoys the same status as a province. The population of over nine million comprises diverse ethnic and cultural groups from different parts of Indonesia, including Chinese, Arab, and Indian minority communities in some areas. As the country’s capital, the election in Jakarta is important and used as a barometer for the landscape of national politics in Indonesia. Therefore, according to Hamid (2014), “in the post-Suharto reformasi era, Jakarta’s electoral landscape has been fiercely contested and has constantly been shifting”. Jakarta’s special status as a special territory also grants it different rules on local elections. In Jakarta, the candidate for governor must gain more than 50% of the votes. If no candidate reaches this threshold, the two candidates with the most votes compete in a second round of elections. Table 3.1 shows the three candidates who competed in the Jakarta Gubernatorial Election in 2017. Table 3.1 Candidates in the 2017 Jakarta Gubernatorial Election No

Candidates

Supporting parties

1

Agus Harimurti Yudhoyono (son of the former President of Indonesia, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono) and Sylviana Murni

2

Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Incumbent) and Djarot Syaiful Hidayat

3

Anies Baswedan and Sandiaga Uno

Democrat Party (Partai Democrat), National Awakening Party (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa/PKB), United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan/PPP) and National Mandate Party (Partai Amanat Nasional/PAN) PDI-P, Golkar, National Democratic Party (Nasdem) Party and Hanura Party Greater Indonesia Party (Gerindra) and Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera/PKS)

Source Kompas (24 October 2016)

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In October 2016, four months before the 2017 gubernatorial election, a Facebook user named Buni Yani uploaded a portion of Ahok’s speech in Pulau Seribu expressing his concern about the manipulation of the Quranic verse, Al-Maidah, 51, in an attempt to undermine Ahok’s nomination in the upcoming election. This verse states that Muslims are obligated to choose leaders who are also Muslims. The video went viral and sparked anger among many Muslims all over Indonesia, not only in Jakarta, and accused Ahok of insulting the Quran and committing blasphemy. MUI responded to this controversy by issuing an edict as well as a religious opinion and its stance regarding Ahok’s blasphemy case. There were a series of rallies held by various Muslim organizations and individuals to protest Ahok’s speech, with the first held on October 14, 2016, followed by the second on November 4, 2016, and third on December 2, 2016. The last rally attracted around 500,000–750,000 people and this was probably the largest religious gathering in Indonesian history (Fealy, 2016). This movement was led by Muhammad Rizieq Shihab, the chairman of Front Pembela Islam. The rally was organized by the National Movement to Guard the MUI Fatwa (GNPF-MUI), a coalition of Islamist groups. The first and second round of the Jakarta Gubernatorial elections were held during a period of heightened sociopolitical tension. The elections were held in two rounds, on 15 February and 19 April 2017, because no candidate could obtain 50% plus one vote during the first round as required to win the election (Tables 3.2 and 3.3). There are two competing arguments to explain the results of the 2017 Jakarta Gubernatorial Election. The first perceives that the cause of Ahok’s defeat was heavily related to identity politics (Setijadi, 2017; Tempo, 2017), while the second, as represented by Wilson, emphasizes Ahok’s communication style and his aggressive campaign and policies on Table 3.2 Results of the first round of Jakarta Gubernatorial Election No

Candidates

Voter

1 2

Agus Harimurti Yudhoyono and Sylviana Murni Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok) as an incumbent and Djarot Syaiful Hidayat Anies Baswedan and Sandiaga Uno

937.950 (17.02%) 2.364.577 (42.99%)

3

Source Detiknews (4 March 2017)

2.197.33 (39.95%)

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Table 3.3 Results of the second round of Jakarta Gubernatorial Election No

Candidates

Voter

1

Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Incumbent) and Djarot Syaiful Hidayat Anies Baswedan and Sandiaga Uno

2.350.366 (42.04%)

2

3.240.987 (57.96%)

Source Kompas (30 April 2017)

forced eviction. Ahok’s policies on slum and squatter areas of relocating residents to vertical housing have triggered grievances among Jakarta’s poor people. To put it another way, Wilson (Tempo, 2017 April 23) prefers to use the perspective of class in analyzing the result of the election. However, Setijadi (2017) argues that class could not solely explain the defeat of Ahok and the growing populism in Jakarta. Setijadi refers to the round two exit polls from Indikator Politik revealing that up until the time of Ahok’s loss, 72% of surveyed voters were happy with his performance. However, 39% of the satisfied segment said that they did not vote for him because of religious reasons. This opinion was strengthened by Mietzner (Tempo, 2017) as he revealed that the politicization of identity had started in the 2012 Jakarta local election when Jokowi and Ahok ran as candidates. The Quranic verse on the obligation to choose a leader from the same religion was already used during the 2012 gubernatorial election; however, the attempt to politicize it was not successful since Ahok only ran as Jokowi’s vice-governor. Mietzner (as cited in Tempo, 2017) also disclosed the survey result that showed a high level of satisfaction with Ahok’s performance. He was surprised that an incumbent who gained such a high satisfaction rate could be defeated. Nuryanti (2021) and Mietzner (2020) consider the series of mass rallies against Ahok as an important occurrence in the rise of Islamist populism in Indonesia. The basic tenets of “us versus them” in populism are presented in the rallies as a revolt against an individual (Ahok) who represents the established structure of power against the people’s will (that is represented by the ummah). The ummah is contrasted against the greedy business elites labeled as the ethnic Chinese minority, who are in turn also backed by corrupt and powerful political figures (Hadiz and Rakhmani, 2017).

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Mietzner also emphasized the presence of Muhammad Rizieq Shihab as a leader of this movement. The various Islamist groups such as Habit Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), Front Pembela Islam (Islamic Defender Movement/FPI), and various Saudi-supported Salafi groups found in Rizieg Shihab a recognized leader. Mietzner (2020) stresses “that Rizieq Shihab’s rise gave the Islamists a mouthpiece for articulating the volonté générale – in this case, the will of the ‘pure’ Indonesian Muslim community”. The mobilization of grievance and identity politics during the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election has created deep-seated polarization in Indonesia. The polarization started in the 2014 Presidential election, but the stronger identity politics with a clear boundary between Anies Baswedan as a Muslim and Ahok as a Chinese-Christian, a double minority in Indonesia, has widened this polarization. Waburton (2020), Setijadi (2017), and Afrimadona (2021) agree that the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election used explicit sectarian campaigns and hence, heightened the polarization. Massive anti-Ahok street protests organized by FPI and other hardline Muslim groups and anti-Ahok, anti-non-Muslim, and anti-Chinese rhetoric preached by hardline leaders and then circulated widely on social media were very influential in polarizing the Jakarta election (Waburton, 2020). These groups spread a sectarian message through online networks, prayer groups, and mosques. This sectarian campaign delivered Anies a resounding victory. Ahok, who had been the favorite going into the election, lost decisively and was prosecuted for blasphemy and sentenced to two years in prison (Setijadi, 2017). Quick count results indicated that religious identity was a central driver of voting behavior. There was a striking divide between Muslim and non-Muslim voters: Muslims were more likely to vote for Anies regardless of their other characteristics, such as income or education while non-Muslims voted for Ahok (Waburton, 2020).

Three Factors of Substate Populism in Jakarta, Indonesia Heuer and Hierman (2018: 41) define substate populism as “a frame in which corrupt national elites’ interference in or neglect of local political dynamics is blamed for harms done to the rightful local people”. They

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further assert the need for the local authority to be reasserted in the name of the ‘local people’. In other words, substate populism is a subtype of populism used by local politicians.

Decentralization Due to Jakarta’s special status as the national capital of Indonesia, it is granted asymmetrical decentralization or “differentiated assignment of competencies across subnational governments, for the same level of administration” (Dupré et al., 2020: 1). These consist of the following arrangements: 1. Single autonomy at the provincial level. Apart from Jakarta, regional autonomy in the entire territory of the Republic of Indonesia is attached to the city/regency. In Jakarta, the city/regency is not an autonomous region but only an administrative work region. 2. In addition to the vice-governor, the governor of Jakarta can appoint four deputies. 3. In other regions, a combined governor/vice-governor ticket must secure the highest number of votes, with a threshold of 30%. In Jakarta, the law also regulates that to become governor, a candidate must gain more than 50% of the votes. If no candidate reaches this threshold, the two candidates with the most votes compete in a second round of elections. 4. The Governor of Jakarta may attend a cabinet meeting on matters relating to the interest of Jakarta as the national capital. 5. The Governor of Jakarta attains the right to accompany the President of the Republic of Indonesia at state events. From the five asymmetrical aspects of decentralization above, it is clear that the leader of Jakarta has more centralized power than other provinces in Indonesia. The requirement of obtaining a 50 plus one percent vote in the election will strengthen the legitimacy of the governor’s leadership. Coupled with special rights to attend cabinet meetings and accompany the President during international and national events, it has put the governor of Jakarta in a strong and strategic political position.

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Pre-existing Resentment/Anxiety Successful entrepreneurs tend to express personal anxieties about their life chances or exacerbate latent feelings of resentment (Heuer and Hierman, 2018). Thus, successful substate populism requires pre-existing grouplevel resentment or anxiety to be tapped into (Heuer and Hierman, 2018). The most prevalent resentment/anxiety in Jakarta is poverty and inequality. While Mietzner (2020) asserts the anomaly of populism in Indonesia, a country with an average economic growth above 5% per year, there has been a steady growth in inequality as reflected in the Gini coefficient level in Jakarta. The Gini coefficient or Gini index is a measure of the distribution of income across a population. It is often used to measure economic inequality, income distribution or wealth distribution among a population. Table 3.4 shows that the range of the Gini index in Jakarta is on the same level as the Gini index at the national level. It indicates a moderate to a high level of inequality. Since the colonial era, Jakarta has been the powerhouse of Indonesia’s economy due to its high concentration of skilled labor and entrepreneurs and Jakarta’s dominance in the financial and business sector (Rukmana and Ramadhani, 2021). Jakarta is also the most attractive area for domestic and foreign investment in Indonesia. Jakarta’s contribution to Indonesia’s GDP increased from 14.9% in 2000 to 16.7% in 2010 and 17.5% in 2016. Despite robust development and economic growth, Jakarta remains a place of poverty. The contrast between rich and poor is highly pronounced in many parts of the city (Rukmana and Ramadhani, 2021). Jakarta is also dubbed as a city of dualistic contrasts (Leaf, 1994) between the new suburban settlements, or the ‘modern’ city, associated with wealth, formality, and globalized standards of urban development, Table 3.4 Gini coefficient, Jakarta, 2012–2017

Year

Gini coefficient

2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

0.42 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.41 0.41

Source Jakarta Statistical Bureau

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and the kampung city, which is associated with poverty informality, and traditional means of living. The existence of new suburban communities and kampungs in Jakarta reflects the socioeconomic dualism which pervades Indonesia’s urban society (Leaf, 1994; Winarso, 2010). The duality of Jakarta’s society also reflects the widening socioeconomic disparities and residential segregation based on income level and lifestyle. Firman (2004) argues that the income inequality and socioeconomic segregation in Jakarta’s suburban development creates enclave settlements that separate middle and upper-income residents from low-income residents. Hadiz and Rakhmani (2017) further highlight the anxiety among some sections of young and educated Muslims about their future and their aspiration for upward social mobility. This anxiety linked with their concerns about social injustice was amplified during the Action to Defend Islam mass rallies. Based on their research of 600 respondents, a slight majority had completed tertiary education (51%), and 47% attained secondary education. Around 44% reported monthly household expenditures of between Rp 4.5 to 7 million a month (U$350–400), which place them in the lower-middle-class bracket or at the borderline middle class. Regarding age, 60% of respondents were in their 20s, 18% were in their 30s, while only 14% were over 40 years old. Most respondents from the mass rallies had attained higher levels of education than their parents but were uncertain about the reality or prospect of employment. The academic debate about the causes of populism has become polarized, with some insisting that economic performance is to blame and others claiming that cultural factors are responsible (Springford and Tilford, 2017). Through economic inequalities and poverty as preresentment and anxiety, these two causes, economic performance and cultural factors create a convergence to drive populism in Jakarta. According to Stoetzer et al. (2021), previous research suggests that increasing income inequality is a major driver of the rise of populist and radical parties in recent years. One possible explanation for the relationship between inequality and support for populism in Jakarta is that the role of relative deprivation in income inequalities will generate economic insecurity and, in the end, will give more support to populist parties or leaders (Stoetzer et al., 2021). Relative deprivation is used in what Mietzner (2020) describes as the “politicization of inequalities”. While Indonesia did not experience a massive influx of immigrants from different cultural backgrounds, the victimization of wealthy ethnic

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Chinese minorities labeled as greedy business elites became a vehicle for populist mobilization.

Capacity to Dominate Local Narratives Among multiple problems experienced by local people in Jakarta, flooding has been a major chronic issue. Ahok chose a program of river normalization for his flood management. This program involves dredging, straightening, and concretizing Jakarta’s rivers (Colven, 2021). Due to this “hard infrastructure” approach, river normalization results in a massive forced evictions of people. This project was popular with the middle class but ultimately was deeply resented by the affected communities. In response to the growing resentment over Ahok’s heavy-handed and unapologetic approach to evictions in executing the river normalization program, Anies has taken a more cautious approach by replacing river normalization with river naturalization (Colven, 2021). In contrast to normalization, the naturalization project replaces concrete piling with river stones and transforms riverbanks into green public spaces (The Jakarta Post, 7 January 2020). This approach is more popular for residents on the riverbank because it avoids them being forcibly evicted. Anies thus attempted to show his support to the slum dwellers that are represented as “us” in his populist rhetoric. The case of the different approach taken by Anies in flood mitigation has provided us with another example of inequalities as the driver of populism in Jakarta. The hard approach of eviction used by Ahok is seen as a lack of sympathy toward the poor people or “us” and just gives advantages to the middle class who are able to buy a house or the representation of “them” in populist rhetoric (the people living on the riverbanks are commonly categorized as illegal dwellers without proper land ownership documentation). Anies positioned himself as an empathetic leader who avoided forced eviction and chose more humane approaches to managing Jakarta’s flood problem. However, it inevitably created tension with the central government, especially with the Ministry of Public Works and Housing, responsible for the flood mitigation program at the national level (Table 3.5).

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Table 3.5 Factors affecting substate populism in Jakarta during Anies Baswedan’s Governorship (Adapted from Heuer and Hierman, 2018) Decentralization

Pre-existing resentment or anxiety

Asymmetric Decentralization: Inequality more legitimate leaders and more significant influence of the governor at the national level Socio-Economic Segregation Anxieties about the future held by young and educated Muslims with aspirations for upward social mobility

Capacity to dominate local narratives Stopping forced eviction as part of the flood mitigation program

Anies Baswedan’s Rhetoric and Policies: Islamist or Technocratic Populist Leader? Another important aspect of analyzing populist leaders is exploring their rhetoric and policies after taking office. The most profound statement from Baswedan about the division between “us” and “them” was delivered during his inaugural speech; In the past, all of us, the pribumi [natives], were oppressed and defeated. Now we are independent. It is time for us to become the hosts in our own country. Do not let Jakarta be like what is written in the Madurese saying: etek se bertelor, ajam se rameh [The duck lays the eggs, but the chicken broods]. (Burhani, 2020: 4)

According to Burhani (2020) the use of the word “pribumi” here can lead to an assumption that Anies supported “nativism”. Anies also differentiate between “duck” and “chicken”, referring to the particular group that had hijacked or disproportionally taken the benefits of independence that should be received more by the natives (Burhani, 2020). This statement could also be translated into a differentiation between “indigenous Indonesians” and Indonesians of Chinese descent. While the election of Anies was largely supported by the Islamist populism movement and his inaugural speech was characterized by the

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division between “native” (as the unfairly disadvantaged group) and nonnatives (as the unfairly advantaged group), we must carefully analyze his subsequent statements, rhetoric, and policies to determine his leadership style. This section attempts to provide an analysis of some policies undertaken by Anies Baswedan in his governorship as well as his populist rhetoric.

Zero Down Payment Housing Scheme One of the key campaign promises of Anies Baswedan was to provide a zero down payment housing scheme for low-income families. This scheme was only available for Jakarta residents with salaries under Rp 7 million (USD 478) per month. This program was launched in 2018 after a groundbreaking ceremony at Pondok Kelapa, East Jakarta. During the launch, Anies emphasized that “This (program) is dedicated to the poor” (The Jakarta Post, 18 January 2018) and “This is so that everyone can have a home. This is important to solve the inequality problem in Jakarta” (Coconuts Jakarta, 18 January 2018). Waldron (2021) and Adler and Ansell (2020) analyze the nexus between housing and support for populist leaders. They assert that existing research adopting either cultural or economic explanations of populism had overlooked the housing aspect as one of the most important determinants of people’s everyday welfare. Housing also contributes to the division of wealth inequalities, economic, and socio-demographic divide. Similarly, Ansell (2019) emphasized that the housing market is both a proxy for and a cause of growing social cleavages that shape how citizens view political issues and populist campaigns. While Waldron (2021), Adler and Ansell (2020), and Ansell (2019) use European housing policy, housing ownership, and voting for a populist leader as their case study, housing as a populist program is also common in Southeast Asian countries. In 2003, Thaksin Shinawatra launched the One Million House Program, an effort to solve Thailand’s low-income urban housing problem (Leeruttanawisut and Fukushima, 2017). In the Philippines, according to the secretary of the Department of Human Settlements and Urban Development (DHSUD), the Duterte administration built more than one thousand housing units from January 2016 to July 2021, focusing on low-income families. In Indonesia, a similar program at the national level was launched in 2015 during President Jokowi’s administration under the One Million Houses Program. This

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program allocated 70% of units to low-income households, with the remaining 30% offered to those with higher incomes (Gapura Jakarta, 10 September 2018). Anies’ housing project is interesting yet problematic because of its zero down payment feature. The entire housing project is dedicated to lowincome families (not divided into low and middle income). The focus on low-income families finally changed when in 2021, Anies amended the requirements for the eligibility of this program and raised the nominal income of applicants applying for this zero down payment homeownership from Rp 7 million to around Rp 14 million per month to increase the target market (VOI, 15 March 2021). This program is also tainted by the corruption scandal committed by PT Sarana Jaya, the zero down payment program developer. The officials responsible for purchasing the land have marked up the price and caused the state to lose Rp 10 billion (The Straits Times, 18 March 2021). While this zero down payment sounds like a catchy campaign program and makes little business sense (The Straits Times, 18 March 2021), it might be a solution to the low share of home ownership in Jakarta. In 2021, Indonesia’s average national home ownership is quite high (80.8%), but Jakarta recorded the lowest share of home ownership with only 48.48% of the population having their own home (Databoks Katadata, 18 April 2022). Limited available land coupled with rapid population growth has immensely increased house prices and inhibited people in Jakarta from having their own homes (Sunindijo et al., 2020). Through this housing policy, Anies is trying to provide affordable housing as an essential aspect of people’s welfare and solve home ownership as one of the most complicated problems in Jakarta. Because housing is also one of the bases of wealth inequalities, Anies could also use this program to highlight the discrepancies between the poor and the rich and how he portrayed himself as a figure to help the disadvantaged groups get their rights to adequate housing.

Environmental Policy Based on his findings from the Global Populism database and executive leaders’ environmental performance information, Böhmelt (2021) argues that populist leadership often undermines environmental quality. The causes are twofold: populist leaders perceive that green policies are usually

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promoted by corrupt elites, and populist leaders tend to erode democratic institutions that are related to better environmental performance. Populist, right-wing leaders and parties also often mobilize against climate and sustainability policies by denying man-made climate change (Trump) or prioritizing economic issues over environmental ones (Buzogány and Mohamad-Klotzbach, 2021). Anies demonstrated an exception to the nexus between a populist leader and environmental issues by his decision not to file an appeal against the Central Jakarta District Court verdict that ruled the Jakarta Provincial government was liable for the air pollution caused by millions of motor vehicles and by coal-fired power plants in the neighboring provinces of Banten and West Java (Mongabay, 21 September 2021). Anies Baswedan, as Governor of Jakarta, together with Jokowi, President of Indonesia, Governor of West Java, and Governor of Banten are the respondents of this lawsuit. Anies also supports the optimization of public transportation by creating Jaklingko, a public transport integration program. Maximizing the utilization of public transport is one method to reduce pollution. He also encouraged the installation of solar panels in the local government building in Jakarta and the construction of bicycle lanes. Anies set a target of zero-emission in Jakarta by 2050 and claimed to successfully reduce the percentage of gas emissions in Jakarta (Sindonews, 17 March 2021). It is also important to consider that due to their pragmatic nature, populist parties and leaders are very responsive to popular moods and could quickly adapt to support environmental issues when it comes to maximizing votes and support (Buzogany and Mohamad-Klotzbach, 2021). During the launch of Jakarta’s Mass Rapid Transportation (MRT) in 2019, a public transport that is designed as an environmentally friendly, effective, and sustainable transportation system, Anies accentuated his populist rhetoric, “You can use the same class in this MRT, whether from the President, office boys, ministers, mayors, governors, CEOs, General Managers. They have equal seats; the entry and queue are the same” (Liputan 6, 17 February 2020), In the environmental realm, Anies strategically positioned himself as a leader with great concern about pollution as an environmental issue closely related to Jakarta people’s daily lives. At the same time, he emphasizes the “us” and “them” and his efforts to narrow or eliminate the gap between these groups of communities in Jakarta to gain support and sympathy.

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COVID-19 Policies Some analysts tend to see the populist leader as a liability for policymaking during the pandemic. Taking examples from the leadership of Donald Trump, Boris Johnson, and Joko Widodo, Lassa and Booth (2020) observed the common qualities between these three leaders in managing the pandemic: optimistic bias, leadership ambiguity, and ignorance of science. Populist leaders have been excessively optimistic during the pandemic while the general expectation is the ability to anticipate events. They also utilize ambiguous messaging as shown by top Indonesian officials who used religious texts and blind faith to calm people, while delaying measures to deal with the epidemic. The most critical characteristic of some populist leaders is their ignorance of science because evidence-based policy is not compatible with their approach to public policy (Lassa and Booth, 2020). Anies provides us with an interesting case of leadership during the pandemic. He was the first government official in Indonesia to close tourist attractions; he urged people to stay at home and partially locked down Jakarta (Burhani, 2020). In September, when hospitals in the country’s capital were almost over capacity, Anies made a crucial decision to reactivate the lockdown policy or known locally as a large-scale social restriction or PSBB (Lassa et al., 2020). He converted a few cityowned hotels into accommodations for medical staff to prevent infecting their family members and called for volunteers to help the medical staff, who were being overwhelmed by the disease (Burhani, 2020). The Jakarta provincial government has been rewarded with the best province in COVID-19 management award by the Ministry of Health (Media Indonesia, 13 November 2021) and is among the top 50 cities in the world with the best response in handling the pandemic, according to an assessment by London-based analytical agency, Deep Knowledge Analytics/DKA (CNN Indonesia 10 November 2021). However, Anies also demonstrated an ambiguous attitude in his leadership. In November 2020, Muhammad Rizieq Shihab, the key figure behind Action to Defend Islam that gave substantial support for Anies’ victory in the Jakarta Gubernatorial Election, returned to Indonesia after his “self-exile” for three years in Saudi Arabia. Rizieq was accused of violating coronavirus protocols after staging several mass gatherings upon his return to Indonesia. Responding to this incident, Anies emphasized that his government seriously enforced the implementation of health

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protocols during the COVID-19 pandemic by the imposition of administrative fines of Rp 50 million to Rizieq for mobilizing a crowd of people (VOI, 16 November 2020). While stressing this public stance on the violation of health protocol, Anies visited Rizieq in his house in Petamburan, Jakarta, hours after the cleric arrived in Jakarta. This created controversy because Rizieq had to comply with a mandatory 14-day selfquarantine, which is part of the country’s pandemic protocol for everyone who had returned from overseas. Anies also persistently employed his populist rhetoric during the management of the pandemic in Jakarta. He inspected Ray White and Equity Insurance (two corporations that could be interpreted as a symbol of ‘them’/capitalism) and reprimanded them for not taking work from home orders for their employees seriously (Bisnis Indonesia, 6 July 2021). It could be seen from the management of COVID-19, Anies adopted an ambiguous approach. On the one hand, he implemented evidencebased policies such as lockdowns and adopted a more assertive policy against corporations that violated health orders, but on the other hand, he showed a softer attitude toward Muhammad Rizieq Shihab, a politically influential cleric who repeatedly violated the pandemic health protocol. The combination of policies and rhetoric of Anies during his tenure as Jakarta’s governor provides us with an interesting case of populist leadership. Based on selected policies that have been elaborated in this section, we can see that Anies is not following the linear prediction that the Islamist populism movement will give birth to Islamist populist leaders. There are two examples of this inconsistency between Islamist populism and the type of populist leadership style in Anies’ case. First, in the first weeks after his inauguration, Anies planned to revise the regulation on the utilization of the National Monument Area in Central Jakarta and overturn the ban on Monas (National Monument) being used for religious and political events (Coconuts Jakarta, 5 December 2017). This historical area was used for the Action to Defend Islam 212 rally and could not be utilized to host art, cultural and religious events and is dedicated as a neutral compound. After taking office in October 2017, Anies emphasized that Monas could be used to support any religious activities in the capital, and the “compound was open for them anytime” (The Jakarta Post, 23 November 2017). Secondly, the Jakarta administration has allocated Rp 1.6 trillion (USD 118.3 million) in grants for 104 non-profit mass organizations, mostly Islamic ones (The Jakarta Post, 22 November 2017). However, some

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funds are also allocated for other religious institutions, such as a Protestant church in Tanjung Priok, North Jakarta, the Bethel Church in Kebon Jeruk, West Jakarta, and Parisada Hindu Dharma Indonesia (The Jakarta Post, 22 November 2017). There is a strong sense that the corrective actions that Anies made to fix his image as an intolerant leader due to strong support from the 212 mass rally for his election as Jakarta governor. Anies understands that he must portray himself as a “leader for all” the diverse communities in Jakarta. We can also see the efforts from Anies to transform himself from a populist leader who is supported by religious sentiment to a rational leader who focuses on solving or addressing the various urban problems, from housing, environment, flood and lately, the pandemic. The type of leadership that is shown by Anies falls into a category of technocratic populism rather than a purely cultural or Islamist populism. Technocracy can generally be understood as governmental rationality and the practice of managerialism, techno-progressivism, and social engineering (Esmark, 2020). The convergence between these concepts, technocracy and populism, has been described as theoretically puzzling because of their contradictory nature(Drapalova and Wegrich, 2021). At first glance, technocracy emphasizing rational solutions and long-term planning administered by experts and professionals seems to clash directly with “emotional” and people-centered populism (Drápalová and Wegrich, 2021). The source of technocratic legitimacy is expertise and output performance, not a direct representation of people. Mudde (2004) described this instrumental symbiosis between populism and technocracy as consisting of populists capturing people’s needs and wishes and technocrats finding solutions and implementing them effectively. In this case, supported by his background as an academic, political science scholar, and experience in a bureaucracy as Minister of Education, Anies has a strong capacity to be a technocratic leader who leads by using rationality, science and data rather than by emotion and following people’s will. Yet, we must pay attention to his persistent populist rhetoric that divides “us” and “them”. Interestingly, rather than stressing or openly referring to ‘us’ as the Muslim community who significantly contributed to his victory in the gubernatorial election, Anies implies “us” as marginalized communities who have been left behind during the massive development in Jakarta. Because disadvantaged groups in Jakarta are predominantly Muslim, Anies maintains the trust of this marginalized

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Muslim group in Jakarta (and middle-upper class Muslims who struggle with wealth inequalities and anxiety toward upward mobility). He then implies that “them” are powerful capitalists and rich people rather than bluntly pointing to wealthy ethnic Chinese minorities. He changes the tone from “right” or cultural Islamist populism to left populism that focuses on “class” rather than on the discourse between native (Indonesian indigenous) and non-natives (Indonesian of Chinese origin) that he highlighted during his controversial inauguration speech. This is seemingly motivated by his pragmatic calculation to retain the substantial support from the disadvantaged lower-class Muslim group and anxious middle-upper class Muslim group but at the same time, he is trying to garner new support from the progressive group and “leftist” civil society activists. The latter groups take a strong stance against the domination of capitalism but are reluctant to be seen as an intolerant or anti-pluralist elements of the society.

Does Substate Populism in Jakarta Endanger Democracy in Indonesia? The last section of this article aims to answer the fundamental question, does populism endanger democracy, or more specifically, does substate populism in Jakarta exacerbate the risk of democratic decline in Indonesia? I will employ arguments from Mudde and Kaltwasser (2014) regarding the populist leadership style to answer this question. Mudde and Kaltwasser (2014) explain that populism is not always constructed from above or by a powerful leader; populism exists with various types of leadership and can even be leaderless. They also assert that the leader is not the creator but rather the vehicle for promoting and establishing a populist set of ideas under certain circumstances. It is also important to stress that populism is not necessarily bad for democracy, or as Mudde and Kaltwasser’s (2012) cautions, populism is a double-edged sword. Substate populism in Jakarta, Indonesia, provides us with a case study of a leader whose victory in the gubernatorial election was greatly influenced by the Islamist populist movement (212 mass rally or Action to Defend Islam). Anies used the religious sentiment from Ahok’s blasphemy case to mobilize support during the 2017 Jakarta election. He allied with the Islamic hardliner group and received an endorsement from the leader of the Islamist populist movement, Muhammad Rizieq Shihab, to build

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more substantial support for his nomination. In the 2017 Jakarta election’s run-up and aftermath, Islamist populism has negatively impacted Indonesia’s consolidated democracy through its destructive polarization, identity politics, and grievance mobilization. However, we must also pay attention to the rhetoric, communication style, and policies of Anies Baswedan after he took office before classifying him as an Islamist populist leader. Anies does persistently employ one of the basic tenets of populism, “us’ versus them”, in some of his speeches and statements. However, he does not refer specifically to the identity of “us” and “them”, although some people can easily associate “us” with Muslim communities that are major supporters of his victory in the gubernatorial election and “them” with the capitalist and wealthy Chinese tycoons and business conglomerates. Anies seems to bridge the stark division of identity between the people in Jakarta that resulted from the 2017 gubernatorial election by switching the reference “us” and “them” from identity to class. Contrary to the divisive impact of Islamist populist policies, Anies has shown his intention to endorse and implement positive and effective public policies. The realization of one of his most popular campaign promises, the zero down payment housing scheme, attempts to resolve low house ownership among the people in Jakarta, even though this program is widely criticized for its slow implementation and frequent changes to its regulations. His support for mass integrated public transportation is beneficial for reducing severe traffic congestion in Jakarta as well as improving air quality and pollution as the most acute environmental problems faced by people in Jakarta. Anies also implemented evidence-based policies in responding to the COVID-19 pandemic. If Anies is categorized as a populist leader, Anies fits more as a technocratic populist leader rather than a cultural (Islamist) populist leader. This type of leadership brings a relatively lower risk to democracy. However, we also must pay attention to the residual impact of the highly polarizing 2017 Jakarta election. The people in Jakarta tend to be trapped in prolonged polarization, including in their response to Anies’ policies. In other words, the response is rather emotional than logical. The second important aspect in analyzing the substate populism in Jakarta is the possibility of Anies running in the upcoming 2024 Presidential Election. Being disappointed with Prabowo, who became Jokowi’s ally, the Islamic political parties such as PKS as well as Islamist organizations

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outside the party system now view Anies as the new leader of the opposition and as the Islamist candidate of choice for the 2024 presidential election. A number of survey institutions have commenced identifying potential candidates for the 2024 Presidential Election. Based on the latest studies conducted by three pollsters, Gerindra Party Chairman Prabowo Subianto, Central Java Governor Ganjar Pranowo, and Jakarta Governor Anies Baswedan are the top three in electability ratings with above 10% each (Tempo, 3 June 2021). With the history of Anies’ engagement with the Islamist populist movement in the 2017 election and his politically pragmatic attitude, there is a possibility of re-engagement of Anies with this Islamist populist movement that would lead to the re-emergence of identity politics and widening polarization in Indonesia society.

Conclusion Anies Baswedan’s triumph in the highly divisive 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election marks the emergence of substate populism in Indonesia. I employ three factors of substate populism from Heuer and Hierman (2018): decentralization, pre-existing resentment/anxiety, and the capacity to dominate the local narrative. I argue that the asymmetric decentralization and the special status of Jakarta as a national capital, preexisting resentment/anxiety felt by people in Jakarta, which consists of inequality, poverty, and insecurity regarding upward social mobility, and the capacity of Anies Baswedan to dominate the local narrative through the flood mitigation project have contributed to the formation of substate populism in Jakarta. Anies detached himself from party politics and effectively used religious sentiment and endorsement from the leader of the Islamist populist movement as the ticket to win the 2017 gubernatorial election. However, Anies seemed to portray himself as a more technocratic populist leader than an Islamist populist leader during his tenure. While persistently employing populist rhetoric in his speeches and statements that emphasized the distinction between “us” and “them”, some of his populist policies, such as the zero down payment housing scheme, public transportation, and pollution reduction, aim to solve urban problems in Jakarta and give greater access to marginalized communities. Anies demonstrates the case of a technocratic populist leader who emerged from the cultural/Islamist populist movement. In other words,

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Anies is a technocratic populist leader who used the Islamist populist movement as his political vehicle. While his leadership and policies do not seem to undermine democracy, the 2017 gubernatorial election has deepened and perpetuated the polarization in Indonesian society. If Anies runs for the 2024 Presidential Election, there is always a possibility of the repetition of identity politics and the re-consolidation of the Islamist populist movement due to its proven impact on voter mobilization for winning elections. Thus, democracy in Indonesia may be in danger and may experience regression.

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CHAPTER 4

In Limbo: Islamist Populism and Democratic Stagnation in Malaysia Syaza Shukri

Introduction Since the turn of the twenty-first century, we have witnessed what has been considered as a period of democratic recession where different countries have experienced increasing democratic breakdowns, democratic destabilization, deepening authoritarianism, and the lack of willpower by major democracies to support democratic promotion abroad (Diamond, 2015). According to Freedom House, democratic recession was exacerbated in 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic, economic and political upheavals, and the spread of violence in fledgling democracies, thus bringing into question the merit of democracy as a resilient political system in the modern world (Repucci & Slipowitz, 2021). The situation

S. Shukri (B) Department of Political Science, International Islamic University Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 J. Ockey and N. S. Talib (eds.), Democratic Recession, Autocratization, and Democratic Backlash in Southeast Asia, Contestations in Contemporary Southeast Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-9811-9_4

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in most countries also seem to have worsened with the rise of right-wing populists and demagogues in recent years, such as Viktor Orban, Donald Trump, and Narendra Modi, ironically through democratic means. These leaders, among others, have been described as (ethno)nationalists for their populist rhetoric to protect ‘the people’ from the minority ‘others’ through any means at their disposal even if they threaten the health of democracy in their respective country. Malaysia is a country in Southeast Asia that appears to be experiencing the same rise in populism in recent years led by Malay ethno-nationalists. This group found themselves in the opposition for a brief twenty-two months following the history-making 2018 elections that replaced the long-ruling Barisan Nasional (BN) coalition which was led by the United Malays National Organization (UMNO). Since Malays are constitutionally bound to be Muslims in the country, there is no mistaking the overlap between ethno-nationalist populism and Islamist populism as a discourse employed by the Malay establishment. The short-lived Pakatan Harapan (PH) government, which was made up of four parties with two of them being multiracial parties, provided an opportunity for Islamist populism to expand. UMNO and the Islamist Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS) used populist rhetoric focused on an imminent danger to the position of Islam and the Malays if PH continues to be in government (Shukri, 2021b). This chapter seeks to show that Islamist populism and autocratic innovation, among other factors such as corruption and a long dominant-party system, are undermining Malaysia’s ability to become a mature democracy because of the lack of respect for civil liberties of non-Muslim Malaysians. After a positive record in 2019, democracy in Malaysia has been held back. One of the reasons for this is the success of Islamist populists returning to power in 2020 through a strategy of emphasizing Malay-Muslim superiority over non-Muslims who are treated as de facto second-class citizens because they are not ‘indigenous’ to Malaysia. While this populist rhetoric of Chinese and Indians being relative newcomers to Malaysia is not a recent innovation, this study argues that as a populist strategy, it has become one of the tools at the disposal of the Malay establishment to stay in power at the expense of democratic transition. Instead of using authoritarian measures as had been done in the 1980s and 1990s, with the rise of political polarization among the Malay-Muslims, Islamist populism is better suited as a strategy in Malaysia’s latest experience with democratization. As Malaysia grows more democratic, autocratic innovations

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continue to endanger democracy as the days of a dominant Malay-based party recede into the past. Islamist populism can be argued to lead to democratic backsliding in Malaysia similar to what is happening in other countries in the region such as Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines (Mietzner, 2021). After a brief period of democratic breakthrough under the PH government, there has been a discernible democratic backsliding after power was seized in a soft coup led by leaders of Malay-based parties in 2020. Although Malaysia has a long way to go before consolidating its democracy, it was at least on the right path for two years. Now, Malaysia has regressed to the pre-Pakatan Harapan period in which democracy is in limbo with little respect for minority rights, despite having relatively higher levels of economic development. As argued by Stasavage (2020), the presence of a strong bureaucracy renders it difficult to establish democracy in the modern world. Taking this idea further, since Malaysia’s Islamization of the bureaucracy in the 1980s, democracy was not seen by the Malay establishment as necessary to ‘protect’ Islam and therefore democratic norms were never really embedded in Malaysia. The way Islamist populist rhetoric is used to evoke negative emotions among the Malay-Muslim population can be examined and contextualized within the broader narrative of Malay-Muslim supremacy (Koschut, 2020). Islamist populist rhetoric is situated within this specific sociocultural context and analyzed as a deliberate attempt to portray non-Muslims as a threat to Malay-Muslims through words such as ‘enemy’ and ‘dangerous.’ Political rivals are reported to lack legitimacy for various reasons, including treason for their supposed attempt to upend Malaysia’s sociocultural system and for ‘manipulating’ social media to spread un-Islamic ideas such as liberalism and feminism. The idea of limiting democracy and civil liberties in the name of protecting the Malays is nothing new; while in government, BN had various institutions and mechanisms at its disposal to prove its commitment to Islam and Malay rights by curtailing civil liberties and the media’s ability to report without fear of repercussion. But when these MalayMuslim leaders were in the opposition, they resorted to populist strategies that challenged the PH government and ended up limiting Malaysia’s ability to consolidate its democracy. The situation did not improve after the Malay establishment succeeded in returning to power in 2020. A state of emergency was declared in January 2021, allegedly to tackle the COVID-19 pandemic, but was widely viewed as political maneuvering

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to prevent parliament from sitting and testing the strength of the newly formed Perikatan Nasional (PN) government (The Straits Times, 2021a). Nevertheless, after a new prime minister was appointed in 2021, the government signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the opposition. This showed a form of political maturity and willingness by the establishment to compromise for the sake of national stability. This move had more to do with the political survival of the former prime minister, Ismail Sabri Yaakob, than genuine democratization as he was seen as politically weak (Chung, 2022). The next section will provide an overview of populism that relates to this study and a brief scholarly debate on the issue of democratic recession. Following that is a section on Islamization and authoritarianism in Malaysia with a brief background on partisan politics of the main Malaybased parties of UMNO and PAS. Next, there will be a discussion of Islamist populism in Malaysia following the historic change in government in 2018. Finally, this paper will consider the democratic trajectory in Malaysia following successive changes in government in 2020 and 2021.

Populism and Democratic Stagnation Cas Mudde (2004) defines populism as a set of ideas or a thin-centered ideology that operates on the separation of ‘the people’ from ‘the others’ who are usually the elites. This ideational form of populism may take different forms or strategies including specific political discourses and styles. More importantly, these strategies are used by populists to create a distinct ‘pure people’ to contrast against the corrupt ‘others’ (Mueller, 2016), which may take on different constructs depending on the society (Canovan, 2005), falling on either a vertical or horizontal axis. On the vertical axis, the ‘others’ are traditionally the corrupt elite establishment, whereas on the horizontal axis, the ‘others’ may include different civilizational groups such as minorities or migrants (Yilmaz et al., 2021a). In a similar fashion, Kyle and Gultchin (2018) divide populism into three categories including cultural populism (right), socioeconomic populism (left), and anti-establishment populism (vertical). As a thin-centered ideology, populism can be easily attached to other established ideologies either on the left or right as they have clearer political and economic objectives. Islamism is one such ideology in which Islam, or its values, should be materialized in public life especially in politics and governance (Hamid & Dar, 2016). This is not unique to

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Islam, as religion in general has taken on a more important role in political discourses over multiple countries, from India to Turkey (Brubaker, 2017; Elçi, 2021; Marzouki et al., 2016). While claiming to represent the general will is not in itself anti-democratic, the preponderance of populists to exclude other groups such as racial and sexual minorities make it a challenge to liberal democracy’s tenet of protecting the rights of every individual in a country. This is witnessed in the Malaysian case where the Muslim majority has attempted to limit the voices of racial minority groups in Malaysia such as the Indians and Chinese by claiming that the land rightfully belongs to the Malays as the so-called indigenous people. As discussed in Chapter 1, democratic backsliding is a phenomenon that can impact various regimes experiencing a reduction in people’s participation in the decision-making process. Democratic backsliding can occur either through outside forces such as a coup, or through the actions of democratically elected leaders, such as among today’s populist leaders (Maeda, 2010). Despite these risks, Gerschewski (2018) observes, similar to Levitsky and Way (2015), that cases of democratic transition actually continue to outnumber those of democratic recession. Similarly, although Malaysia made positive steps toward democratic transition after the electoral victory of PH in 2018, the political uncertainties that resulted from the COVID-19 pandemic have created a setback and have led to a period of democratic recession. As argued by Bermeo (2016), the general quality of democracy has been undermined in the twenty-first century. Populist leaders prefer to operate within these majoritarian democratic systems as they can justify their actions as prioritizing the wants and needs of ‘the people’ who voted for them while having little regard for the minorities. In other words, populists in Southeast Asia and elsewhere undermine liberal democracy by diverting the majority’s discontent and fury onto a specific set of people, whether they are elites, immigrants, or ethnic minorities. This process of stigmatizing the ‘others’ exacerbates societal polarization, erodes institutional independence, political rights, and civil freedoms (Kaufman & Haggard, 2019).

Islamization and Authoritarianism in Malaysia Malaysia is a multiracial country that is made up of a majority MalayMuslim population, followed by the main minority communities of Chinese and Indians. Constitutionally, ethnic Malays in Malaysia are Muslims with apostasy being a criminal offense. Despite the multicultural

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make-up of the country, the constitution also clearly states that Islam is the official religion of the federation, and the special position of Muslims and Malays is protected by law. Therefore, when certain Muslim clerics in the Malay-nationalist UMNO party decided to create another party, PAS, in 1951, it was due to a difference of opinion on the nature and role of Islam within the government, and not about the position of Islam in the country, which is legally secured. For this reason, PAS is the eminent Islamist party in Malaysia which merits a thorough discussion of its background vis-à-vis its relationship with other parties in the country in this section. While UMNO was content with the status quo, PAS wanted a more active and distinct political role for a Muslim organization. Nonetheless, PAS went through multiple stages throughout its history, with the 1960s seeing the party being led by a leftist nationalist and a further pivot toward Malay nationalism in the 1970s. Following the global rise of Islamization after the Iranian Revolution, PAS had another change in ideology under the ulama (Islamic cleric) leadership, shifting from Malay nationalism toward a more conservative brand of Islamism. To counter the rising popularity of Islamism at the time as represented by PAS and the Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia (ABIM), the UMNO government under Mahathir Mohamad resorted to efforts at Islamizing the bureaucracy in the 1980s and 1990s. A major move by Mahathir was to court Anwar Ibrahim who was then a well-known Islamist leader to join UMNO and he was subsequently promoted to various posts within the administration. Among other Islamization projects at the time was the introduction of Islamic banking with the creation of Bank Islam, the founding of an Islamic institute of higher education (International Islamic University Malaysia), and the creation of the Department of Islamic Development (JAKIM) under the Prime Minister’s Office. PAS accused the government’s attempts of creating these Islamic institutions as being nothing more than window dressing and Hadi Awang, a firebrand of the party and its present president, even accused UMNO leaders of being ‘infidels’ under a practice known as takfir (Hamid, 2016). The different interpretations of Islam by these two main Malay parties led to further division among the Malay population between those who agreed with PAS’ Islamist rhetoric and those who felt UMNO was already doing enough to protect Malay and Muslim rights. With both PAS and UMNO competing for the Malay-Muslim heartland, these opposing narratives set the ground for the rise of hegemonic Islamist discourses

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in Malaysian politics. PAS’ overt Islamist ideology was unpopular under the first Mahathir administration (1981–2003), as seen by the party’s poor showing at the 1986 general election, with only one seat gained. For Malay-Muslims, Mahathir Mohamad’s ethno-nationalist foundation was sufficient, whereas PAS’ Islamization goal appeared foreign. Mahathir Mohamad had been branded as an authoritarian populist; his nationalist ideology to establish an inclusive Malay bourgeois class by any means included employing the draconian Internal Security Act against ‘liberal Malays’ and Chinese ‘others’ (Munro-Kua, 1996). Mahathir utilized top-down measures using the bureaucracy and the police, while undermining democratic institutions such as the judiciary and parliament. While these latter institutions have historically served as checks on authoritarian executive power, it is evident that they have been eroded during the Mahathir administration. Political institutions have historically acted as a form of top-down instrument of control especially over potential opposition. Even prior to Mahathir’s transformation of Malaysia into a system of ‘competitive authoritarianism’ in the late 1990s, Malaysia was never regarded a completely democratic state (Slater, 2003). The most prominent institutions in Malaysia have had a delicate and dynamic relationship between democracy and authoritarianism for nearly half a century. Consequently, when Mahathir faced growing opposition to his increasingly personalized and dictatorial rule during the Reformasi period of 1998–1999 after the firing of Anwar Ibrahim as deputy prime minister, he had the full backing of a party-state apparatus that had a long history of eliminating opponents. PAS, on the other hand, went through another shift in the 1990s and early 2000s, in response to Mahathir’s authoritarianism, opting for a more moderate stance under the leadership of Fadzil Noor. The party even cooperated with the new multiracial party, Keadilan, and the secular Chinese-based Democratic Action Party (DAP) through various iterations from 1999 until 2013. A clear division among the Malay electorate emerged as urban Malays voted for this opposition bloc while conservative Malays continued to support UMNO. Since PAS’ main base of support has also been conservative rural Malays, the competition then was clearly between UMNO and PAS. Unfortunately, PAS’ share of seats was reduced following the 2013 elections, and as a result, the party returned to its more conservative Islamist roots to capture the conservative Malay votes, ultimately severing its relationship with other opposition parties in Malaysia. This was a calculated move in some ways, as Chu et al.

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(2016) show that a considerable majority of Malaysian respondents agreed that the government should consult religious (Islamic) authority when interpreting laws. Because Malaysians hold a high regard for Islamic institutions, Malay politicians can readily co-opt Islamist discourses into their advocacy for a stronger role of religion in government. There is little doubt that Malay political leaders exploit moral and religious feelings, knowing that Muslims tend to be conservative and look up to their religious leaders. The more moderate members of PAS left the party in 2015 to create a so-called progressive Islamist party, Amanah. In the years preceding the 2018 general election, then prime minister, Najib Razak, had been embroiled in the 1MDB scandal in which he was accused, and later convicted in 2022 by the highest court of the land, the Federal Court, of various corruption charges. Nonetheless, he remained popular as his administration introduced the cash handout scheme, Bantuan Rakyat 1Malaysia (BR1M), to the lower income group together with other ‘1Malaysia’ spending to convince the masses that the BN government was a champion of the people, or in other words, this was framed as a populist strategy to win the hearts and minds of working-class Malaysians (Welsh, 2013; Weiss, 2020). During this period, democracy in Malaysia was under siege due to governance and institutional crises. Corruption is a well-known problem in Malaysia that affects the private and public sectors, from the top-most elites to the lowly bureaucrats, leading to the very little trust of the people toward the government and its agencies (Muhamad & Gani, 2020). It was then that Mahathir Mohamad left UMNO to form a new party, Bersatu, with Muhyiddin Yassin in a bid to fight kleptocracy. It must be noted that as a Malay-based party, Bersatu’s main objective was to defeat Najib Razak at the election and not necessarily to align itself with the reformist ideology of Pakatan Harapan. Furthermore, Bersatu must compete with PAS and UMNO for the conservative Malay votes. Before the 2018 general election, the concept of populism was inconsistently defined within the country’s political discourse (Azhari & Halim, 2019). This is because it had been used by different parties as a pejorative word to describe their political opponents. During the campaign period in 2018, PH utilized vertical and horizontal populist sentiments by portraying the BN government as uncaring elites because of widespread corruption scandals culminating with the 1MDB financial scandal, and the need for more inclusive political participation after six decades of

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UMNO-led rule. PH also incorporated the need for inclusive socioeconomic measures such as the abolition of the unpopular Goods and Services Tax (GST), planned subsidies for fuel, and the postponement of student loan repayments. On the other hand, after Pakatan Harapan un-seated the Barisan Nasional administration, UMNO and PAS began to use civilizational populist discourse (Yilmaz et al., 2021b) by stressing the supposed rights of Malay-Muslims to lead the country. This is a recent autocratic innovation in Malaysia because while in government, UMNO did not resort to these populist sentiments, whereas PAS had alternated between nationalist and socioeconomic populism in the opposition before settling on Islamist populism since 2015. Instead of being wiped out as expected by most analysts (Aziz, 2018), PAS was able to win 18 parliamentary seats out of 222 in the 2018 general election, proving that the influence and reach of PAS had been solidified, especially in the Malay heartland in northern Peninsular Malaysia. Finding themselves in the opposition, PAS and UMNO decided to work together and form the Muafakat Nasional which has now been converted to an NGO. With multiple Malay-based parties in parliament vying for support from the same electorate, it has been argued that attempts by populist parties to out-Malay and out-Islam each other were among the most effective strategies to get the Malay votes (Shukri & Smajljaj, 2020). Thus, we saw a rise in populist rhetoric claiming that the non-Muslim ‘others’ have become bolder upon the success of PH thereby threatening the unity of the Malays.

Islamist Populism in Malaysia When the PH government came to power, Islamist populists in Malaysia attempted to use civilizational populism to paint a picture of an Islamic majority versus the non-Muslim minority in Malaysia. The accusation that Muslim rights were under threat was immediate and forceful, supposedly ‘proven’ by the appointment of non-Muslims to important posts in the Pakatan Harapan administration—Lim Guan Eng as the Finance Minister, Tommy Thomas as the Attorney-General, and Richard Malanjum as the Chief Justice of Malaysia. With non-Muslims heading matters relating to finance and law, Islamist populists vigorously argued that Malaysia’s identity as a Muslim country was quickly eroding, even though as previously mentioned, the position of Islam is secured within the constitution. Their

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populist effort was so effective that in July 2018, about 2,000 people gathered in the capital city, Kuala Lumpur, to protest what they viewed as the loss of Malay-Muslim rights (Fuad, 2018). Among the issues that were brought up during this protest were the government’s efforts to recognize the Unified Examination Certificate (UEC) for Chinese private schools, the attempt to ratify the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD), and the appointments of non-Muslims into important posts as described earlier. The fact that thousands of people participated in the protest shows that these Islamist populists were not operating in a vacuum. Another issue that was played up by Islamist populists led by UMNO and PAS was Tabung Haji, an institution that is responsible for managing the wealth of Muslim Malaysians planning to perform the Islamic pilgrimage or Hajj. When the PH government took over, Tabung Haji was underperforming, and thus the new government had to take drastic and unpopular measures to rehabilitate its assets. The transfer of these non-competitive assets was finalized by the Ministry of Finance, Incorporated, a division under the Ministry of Finance and controlled by the minister. As mentioned, during the 22 months of PH rule, the finance minister, Lim Guan Eng, was an ethnic Chinese. Leaders from PAS and UMNO were quick to accuse the PH government, with Mujahid Yusof Rawa from Amanah being the de facto religious minister, of ‘selling’ Muslim assets to non-Muslims, and specifically to the DAP. However, as acknowledged by the auditor-general in 2021, the PH government did a fine job in managing Tabung Haji with no ‘emphasis of matter’ (Media Rania, 2021). In other words, although PH has been proven its ability to render Tabung Haji financially stable, Islamist populists stirred up racial animosity by putting the spotlight on a Chinese-led corporation managing the assets. The pressure on the Malay leadership in PH, especially among Bersatu members, to show its commitment to Malay issues was so strong that in October 2019, government leaders, including Mahathir Mohamad, attended a Malay Dignity Congress alongside other opposition leaders such as the president of PAS, Hadi Awang, to discuss the uplifting of Malays and Islam within the country. After months of uncertainty, the efforts by Islamist populists in Malaysia to convince the Muslim population that PH was not committed to Islam and Malay rights proved fruitful as the PH government was toppled in a soft coup in February 2020 when Bersatu left the governing coalition. Populist rhetoric on Malay

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rights thus appeared to resonate with the public as a study done after the change in government to the PN administration found that more Malays were satisfied with UMNO, PAS, and Bersatu compared to Malays being dissatisfied with Pakatan Harapan (Merdeka Center, 2020). Even though the Pakatan Harapan government was able to improve on certain democratic measures in Malaysia to some extent, there is no doubt that their efforts were limited due to various factors such as political pressure and the eventual desertion of partner members. However, while they were in government, PH also failed to overturn repressive laws that could significantly improve democratic practices in Malaysia such as the Prevention of Crime Act 1959, Security Offences (Special Measures) Act 2012, Prevention of Terrorism Act 2015, the Sedition Act 1948, and the Printing Presses and Publications Act 1984. Instead, a bigger concern was convincing the Malays that PH was on their side as proven by the leadership’s attendance to the earlier mentioned Malay Dignity Congress and on the lack of political will to ratify ICERD. The subsequent PN government was therefore a manifestation of the successful strategy by Islamist populists to wrestle Putrajaya from PH. PH won the 2018 election because of their populist promises to improve the socioeconomic condition of the Malaysian working class. Since Malays make up a considerable percentage of the working class in Malaysia, we can understand that their support for PH was associated with the hope of better livelihood. However, the reforms proposed by PH appeared piecemeal and stopped short of providing a comprehensive framework to lift Malays out of the punishing neoliberal economic practices of the BN government (Benjamin, 2020). At the same time, the overlap between their class and religious identities makes MalayMuslims in Malaysia more likely to be socially conservative, with a greater tendency to be easily influenced by the Islamist populist rhetoric emphasizing a black-and-white view of the world. It is easier to explain to the Malay working class that the non-Muslim ‘others’ are the enemy and the ones who have constrained the ability of Malay-Muslims to improve their socioeconomic conditions and to live a fully dignified life (Shukri, 2021a) rather than introduce unpopular measures for greater economic inclusivity. As such, the civil liberties of non-Muslims have become contentious because they are viewed as jeopardizing the special position of Islam and Malays. Interestingly, even after forming a Malay-centric government, leaders of the PN coalition continued with their populist rhetoric on the position

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of Islam and Malays in the country. This is evident especially following the High Court ruling in March 2021 that decided non-Muslims had the right to use the word ‘Allah’ in their publications with a disclaimer that it did not apply to Muslims. Following that judgment, UMNO announced that it was prepared to go to the streets in protest with its president, Zahid Hamidi, declaring the party’s intention to strengthen Syariah law if they are voted into power (The Straits Times, 2021b). UMNO was in power for 61 years and had previously been against PAS’ politicization of Syariah law. Moreover, PAS, the party that has championed the implementation of Syariah law since the 1990s, declared that it was not the right time to implement Islamic hudud law even though they were recently in government (Habibu, 2020). This shows that the proposition of hudud law as crucial in Malaysia was nothing more than populist rhetoric by an Islamist party with no clear method of achieving it. Apart from the debate on hudud law, the government did propose the introduction and amendment of 11 bills including a law to limit the propagation of non-Islamic religions to Muslims together with the more popular bill, RUU 355, on expanding the jurisdiction of the Syariah courts. This is such a contentious issue that the de facto law minister, who is from the more diverse East Malaysian state of Sarawak, Wan Junaidi Tuanku Jaafar, had to clarify that the bills have not yet been brought to cabinet as of September 2021 (Kow, 2021). Both Muslims and nonMuslims, such as the Chief Minister of the state of Sabah and the Deputy Chief Minister of Penang, have voiced concern over the so-called antipropagation bill and how it will affect the social cohesion of multiracial Malaysia. A discussion on Islamist populism in Malaysia would not be complete without dissecting the words of Hadi Awang, the current president of PAS. Although he is known as a firebrand party leader, he also embodies Islamist populism from his clear description of Muslims as the ‘true people’ in comparison to the non-Muslim ‘others’ who are intent on defeating Islam in Malaysia. This binary view of society makes Hadi Awang a typical populist based on Mudde’s definition. Examples of his rhetoric include a warning that ‘it is forbidden to be together with enemies of the religion and the ummah’ (Malaysiakini, 2021a), thus conflating his political opponents with enemies of Islam. Since Malaydominated parties have been in power since March 2020, what caused Hadi Awang to go on this scathing attack against PH? June 2021 was a time of political uncertainty in Malaysia, with grassroots-led movements

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demanding the resignation of the Muhyiddin Yassin administration. Soon after, in July 2021, Hadi wrote that PH ‘set up a government which was not only liberal but also dared to challenge the position of Islam and the Royalty’ (Free Malaysia Today, 2021a). Again, he used the civilizational discourse of Islam against the liberal ‘others’ in his political effort to stay in power. He accused the opposition of trying to replace the government not to improve the COVID-19 response but to eliminate Islam. The attempts by Islamist populists to bring into question the rights of non-Muslim minorities in Malaysia have led to a minor democratic recession especially in 2021. When declining democratic quality in Malaysia is discussed, it is usually done in comparison to the short-lived PH government. Table 4.1 is a compilation of different indexes that look at different measures of democracy, freedom, and governance in Malaysia. The year 2013 is chosen as the first year for the comparison because it was the year when general elections were held before the historic 2018 general elections. Apart from a few minor reverses, Malaysia has been on an upward trend on most indexes except for the Corruption Perception Index that was highly affected during Najib Razak’s premiership because of the 1MDB scandal, which has been described as ‘one of the world’s greatest financial scandals’ (Chen et al., 2019). What is more interesting, however, is that right after PH was elected to government, Malaysia’s indexes significantly improved in 2019 after a full year of PH rule. After the government was toppled in 2020, also coinciding with the COVID19 pandemic, Malaysia’s indexes went on a downward trend except for the Economist Intelligence Unit Democracy Index which saw a slight improvement in Malaysia’s score. Table 4.1 Democracy in Malaysia

Freedom House EIU Democracy Index V-Dem (Liberal democratic index) Corruption Perception Index (CPI) Ranking on World Press Freedom Index

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

(4) 6.49 0.19

(4) 6.49 0.19

(4) 6.43 0.19

45 6.54 0.19

44 6.54 0.19

45 6.88 0.26

52 7.16 0.32

52 7.19 0.28

51 X X

50

52

50

49

47

47

53

51

X

145

147

147

146

144

145

123

101

119

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The bold numbers in Table 4.1 represent a peak in Malaysia’s standing before the more recent slide. If we were to take out these bold numbers and compare data from 2020 or 2021 with that from 2018, we will see that Malaysia is improving on all measures. This shows that 2019 was a good year for democracy in Malaysia’s history, with PH’s stated commitment to improve governance on different levels of inequality within the country. It is unfortunate that after two positive years, Malaysia’s indexes fell after the political takeover in 2020. One of the main factors for the democratic decline in Malaysia may be the return of the Malay ruling establishment following the success of their Islamist populist campaign. Of course, Islamist populism is not the only reason as the pandemic also led to a clampdown on those critical of the government’s handling of COVID-19. According to Freedom House (2021), the slight drop in Malaysia’s global freedom score is due to multiple crackdowns on freedom of speech in the country with COVID-19 being used as a justification for some of the arrests. Nonetheless, in June 2021, the police disclosed that out of 1,897 investigation papers that were opened between January 2019 and June 2021 involving social media, 465 cases involved either the royal institution, racial matters, or insults against religions (Camoens, 2021). These are the 3Rs that are important to the Malay-Muslim community, and any alleged offense would lead to at least an investigation. With Islamist populists excluding non-Muslim ‘others’ in their civilizational discourse, there is a correlation that increased awareness and sensitivity to the 3R has led to democratic stagnation in Malaysia. It could be argued that investigation papers are opened arbitrarily as a show by the establishment to protect Malay rights. For example, in July 2021, the police were instructed to open an investigation on a veteran opposition member of parliament, Lim Kit Siang, for allegedly disturbing the peace in his rebuttal to Hadi Awang’s claim that PH was challenging the rights of Islam (Carvalho, 2021). At the same time, despite reports made against Hadi Awang for allegedly instilling fear among Malaysians, no strong stand was taken by the government against him. The success of the PN government’s Islamist populist strategy that is based on religion and morality can also be observed from the people’s response on social media regarding Muhyiddin Yassin’s ability to recite prayer, or dua, in Arabic live on national television whenever he was addressing the public (Mukhriz, 2020). The Malay-Muslim public was so touched by his act that he has been called the best prime minister simply based on this ability. This shows, again, how Islamist populism

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works in Malaysia to attract support by conservative Malay-Muslims who are swayed by such action without the need to question the government and its leadership in terms of policymaking and respect for people’s rights during the challenging COVID-19 surge in the country. In a twist of events, UMNO withdrew support from Muhyiddin Yassin in August 2021 at the height of the COVID-19 pandemic; through some sophisticated politicking, UMNO then successfully staged a return with Ismail Sabri Yaakob, a vice-president in UMNO, assuming the office of Malaysia’s ninth prime minister. Right before a state by-election was to be called in 2021, UMNO’s president declared that the party would likely abandon its alliance with PAS under the banner of Muafakat Nasional to focus on competing for the Malay vote on its own with help from its traditional BN coalition (Malaysiakini, 2021b). This shows that the conceptualization of Muafakat Nasional as an attempt to unite MalayMuslims was in the first place a populist strategy with no long-term agenda for the alliance to work together in future elections. UMNO and PAS are set to continue their decades-long competition for the conservative Malay votes in the country at the detriment of non-Muslim minorities. Interestingly, Ismail Sabri Yaakob had also used populist rhetoric when he was the opposition leader, despite presenting the idea of a multiracial ‘Malaysian Family’ during his first televised speech to the nation as prime minister. In a tweet in April 2019 on a so-called Pahang Ummah Unity Gathering, he gave a warning to ‘the DAP and anyone to stop their agenda and actions to challenge the privileges of the Malay Bumiputera [indigenous], the sanctity of Islam and the power of the Malay Rulers’ (Yaakob, 2019b). In September, he wrote about how ‘Malay-Muslims and the Bumiputera are in danger and threatened today because we are faced with a DAP minority administration’ (Yaakob, 2019a), even though the DAP shared power with other parties within the PH coalition. Similarly, as the opposition in August 2019, Ismail Sabri accused Dong Zong, the Federation of Malaysian Chinese school board associations, of being racist, and he challenged the PH government to ban the organization. This religious-tinted populist rhetoric was utilized to portray UMNO as a defender of Malay-Muslims whose rights were allegedly being threatened by increasingly bold non-Muslim associations (Hairom, 2019). However, once Ismail Sabri became prime minister of a new government, the Finance Ministry approved an allocation of RM 15 million to independent Chinese schools (Yap, 2021) which proves that the previous

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populist rhetoric was aimed to further political mileage rather than a strict policy of UMNO. Furthermore, during the height of the ‘Buy Muslim First’ campaign in 2015, which was another Islamist populist effort to get the Malay populace to support Malay businesses at the expense of other minority groups, especially the Chinese establishment, Ismail Sabri defended the boycott to avoid the ‘oppression’ of the Malays by the Chinese (BH Online, 2015). Without a doubt, populist rhetoric steeped in religious and racial discourses was a preferred strategy by Malay leaders. As a strategy against the PH government, it becomes clear that Islamist populist rhetoric could not work when the Malay elites are back in power, as the ‘enemy’ of the people—the Chinese—have been defeated. An example of this would be the controversy over the name of an awardwinning whiskey made in Malaysia. The chosen name of Timah was portrayed as being disrespectful to the Malays for it is a shortened version of the ubiquitous female Malay name of Fatimah. Instead of PAS, it was Amanah, a progressive Islamist party in the opposition, that played the race card and accused PAS of being silent on the matter (Kamarulzaman, 2021). Similarly, a member of parliament from PKR claimed that drinking the whiskey was akin to drinking a Malay lady (Carvalho & Rahim, 2021). Islamist populist rhetoric, therefore, is not unique to PAS, but it is used by any party seeking the support of conservative Malay-Muslims in Malaysia through emotive language that painted the non-Muslim ‘others’ as being in the wrong.

The Future of Democracy in Malaysia Institutionally, as a dominant-party system with few checks on the executive, there used to be very little confidence in the ability of parties, other than UMNO, to lead the country, much less to allow for greater accountability of the government. Reform was on the minds of many Malaysians, including the Malays right before the 2018 general election (Bakar et al., 2021). While Malaysians were initially hopeful and exuberant with PH’s electoral win, the fact that UMNO quickly came back to power, albeit in a vulnerable coalition, shows the intransigence of Malaysia’s dominantparty system and the power of the bureaucracy to block various reforms attempted by PH. Malaysia’s democracy continues to be in a delicate balance today especially when it comes to the politics of the Malays. With multiple parties

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now vying for support from the majority Malay-Muslim population— UMNO, PAS, Bersatu, PKR, Amanah, Pejuang (Mahathir’s latest party), the Sabah-based Warisan, and the youth-based MUDA—it is too soon to predict the trajectory of democracy in Malaysia. Based on recent state elections that were held during the pandemic, the ruling coalition led by UMNO appeared to be gaining momentum not due to its increasing strength, but due to the weakness of the opposition (Lemiere, 2022). However, it is incorrect to claim that the people are again embracing an UMNO-led government. As the state election in Johor shows, only 43.11% of voters chose the UMNO-led BN whereas 24.04% voted for Muhyiddin Yassin’s PN and 20.48% voted for PH (The Star, 2022). There are a few observations here: firstly, a majority of people did not vote for BN, and secondly, a combined 67.15% of voters did vote for conservative Malay parties embodied by BN and PN. Due to Malaysia’s first-pastthe-post system, BN’s 43.11% of votes translated to 71.43% of seats in the assembly, a two-thirds majority. With BN gaining electoral strength, there is fear that Malaysia will see further democratic backsliding to return to the years of BN hegemony. Furthermore, the growing popularity of Najib Razak despite his conviction on corruption charges (Anand, 2022) shows that nostalgic populism, instead of Islamist populism, might also allow his return to national politics, thus further dampening Malaysia’s democratization process. Nonetheless, there is hope. In the Johor election, BN made a promise to field at least 30% of young candidates, showing the willingness of the old guard to share power with the next generation (Bernama, 2022). During the Malacca state election in 2021, PN nominated a female candidate for the position of Menteri Besar (Chief Minister) if the coalition won the election (Radhi, 2021). Even the opposition Chinese-based DAP had seen its former leaders give way to new faces (Malaysiakini, 2022). It seems that the political elites are listening to the people, implying there is hope for democracy in Malaysia’s future. Democratization did not break through in Malaysia in 2018 and even became worse thereafter, but the entrance of new parties and leadership showed that the people’s voices can make a difference. Although there have been periods of democratic decline in 2020 and 2021, we should not forget that Malaysia is more democratic today than it was three decades ago. For example, in 1987, the Mahathir administration detained political activists and opposition politicians without trial under an operation known as Ops Lalang. During the Bersih rally for

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free and fair elections in 2007, the police responded by firing chemically laced water cannons and tear gas at participants. Compare these past events to the recent #Lawan protest in July 2021 where youths were demanding the resignation of Muhyiddin Yassin over perceived failure in handling rising cases of COVID-19. Despite intimidation by the government, the police only stopped protesters from entering the historic Dataran Merdeka (Independence Square), but no physical altercation occurred as protesters were left to sit on the streets chanting their frustrations (Loheswar, 2021).

Conclusion This chapter argues that Malaysia’s democracy has seen a slight decline after two good years during the PH government. This democratic backsliding has put the brakes on Malaysia’s democratic transition, keeping it stuck in limbo. The democratic stagnation in Malaysia is worrying if there is little political will to move the country forward. One of the reasons for this is that Islamist populists in the form of the Malay establishment were able to read the mood of the Malay-Muslim population who are concerned with the supposed erosion of special rights afforded to them when PH came to power. During the BN administration, UMNO was obviously the main party within the coalition, but under PH, the different parties were on an equal footing. The idea of the Chinese-based DAP being an equal partner in government was enough to scare the Malay populace to believe the rhetoric of the ‘others’ threatening the special rights of Malay-Muslims. By analyzing the discourse of Malay political leaders, we see that Islamist populists from UMNO and PAS, who found themselves in the opposition in 2018, played up racial and religious sentiments to justify the need to bring them back to power. In other words, populism was the strategy of choice when they stressed that Malaysia belongs to the Malay-Muslims and the ‘others’ should be grateful to even be allowed to participate in the ‘Malaysian family.’ This ‘us’ versus ‘them’ discourse is the classic definition of populism according to Mudde, and instead of accusing the elite establishment of not being inclusive of the masses, this version of populism encapsulates the ‘true’ people of the country. When they were in the opposition, PAS and UMNO accused PH of ‘selling’ the country to non-Muslims, but when they are in power, the people are told not to ‘overreact’ when the government increased special lottery draws

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even though gambling is sinful in Islam (Free Malaysia Today, 2021b) and the questions raised regarding a Malaysian-made whiskey called Timah are simply a ‘desperate attack’ against PAS (Malaysiakini, 2021c). It seems clear that instead of having a clear policy implementation strategy, civilizational discourse on Islam is used by these Islamist populists to push a Malay-Muslim agenda at the expense of the civil liberties of non-Muslim minority groups, even if democracy becomes collateral damage. Due to this autocratic innovation by the Malay establishment and the parties’ unyielding institutional authority, Malaysia continues on the very shaky ground toward possible democratic consolidation with a higher chance of democratic stagnation in the immediate future as civil liberties for non-Muslim Malaysians are threatened by the demands of Islamist populists.

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Malaysiakini. (2021b, October 13). Zahid: No ‘Muafakat’ for Malacca Polls. Retrieved from https://www.malaysiakini.com/news/595199 Malaysiakini. (2021c, October 19). Timah Whiskey—A Desperate Attack Against PAS, Says Tuan Ibrahim. Retrieved from https://www.malaysiakini.com/ news/595983 Malaysiakini. (2022, May 9). DAP MP Ong Will Not Contest in GE15. https:// www.malaysiakini.com/news/620549 Marzouki, N., McDonnell, D., & Roy, O. (2016). Saving the People: How Populists Hijack Religion. Oxford University Press. Media Rania. (2021, September 23). Ketua Audit Negara Sahkan Kerajaan PH Telah Selamatkan Tabung Haji. Media Rania. Retrieved from https://www. mediarania.com/2021/09/23/ketua-audit-negara-sahkan-kerajaan-ph-telahselamatkan-tabung-haji/ Merdeka Center. (2020, September 2). Survey: Muhyiddin Approval Rating at 69pct, PN Most Popular. Retrieved from https://merdeka.org/v2/surveymuhyiddin-approval-rating-at-69pct-pn-most-popular/ Mietzner, M. (2021). Democratic Deconsolidation in Southeast Asia. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Mudde, Cas. (2004). The Populist Zeitgeist. Government and Opposition, 39(4), 541–563. Mueller, Jan-Werner. (2016). What Is Populism? Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press. Muhamad, N., & Gani, A. (2020). A Decade of Corruption Studies in Malaysia. Journal of Financial Crime, 27 (2), 423–436. Mukhriz, A. (2020, October 21). Twitter. Retrieved from https://twitter.com/ amofficialmy/status/1318876285842567170?s=20 Munro-Kua, A. (1996). Authoritarian Populism in Malaysia. London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan. Radhi, N. A. M. (2021, November 18). PN Names Mas Ermieyati as Melaka CM Candidate. New Straits Times. https://www.nst.com.my/news/nation/ 2021/11/746471/pn-names-mas-ermieyati-melaka-cm-candidate Repucci, S., & Slipowitz, A. (2021). Freedom in the World 2021 Democracy Under Siege. Freedom House. Retrieved from https://freedomhouse.org/rep ort/freedom-world/2021/democracy-under-siege Shukri, S. (2021a, July 5). Malay Political Polarization and Islamic Populism in Malaysia. Stratsea. Retrieved from https://stratsea.com/malay-political-polari zation-and-islamic-populism-in-malaysia/ Shukri, S. F. M. (2021b). Dignity and Political Expectation of the Malay Electorate in Malaysia. Intellectual Discourse, 29(1), 149–174. Shukri, S. F. M., & Smajljaj, A. (2020). Populism and Muslim Democracies. Asian Politics & Policy, 12(4), 575–591.

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Slater, D. (2003). Iron Cage in an Iron Fist: Authoritarian Institutions and the Personalization of Power in Malaysia. Comparative Politics, 36(1), 81–101. Stasavage, D. (2020). The Decline and Rise of Democracy. Princeton University Press. The Star. (2022, March 13). Johor Polls: BN Won 43.11% of the Popular Vote, Perikatan in Second Spot. https://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/ 2022/03/13/johor-polls-bn-won-4311-of-the-popular-vote-perikatan-in-sec ond-spot The Straits Times. (2021a, March 3). No Malaysian Parliament Sitting Until Emergency Ends on Aug 1, Says Minister. Retrieved from https://www.str aitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/no-malaysian-parliament-sitting-until-emergencyends-on-aug-1-says-minister The Straits Times. (2021b, March 28). Zahid Says Umno to ‘Strengthen’ Syariah Law in Malaysia If It Wins Supermajority in Parliament. Retrieved from https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/umno-chief-zahid-says-to-streng then-syariah-in-malaysia-if-it-has-supermajority-in Weiss, M. L. (2020). The Limits of “Populism”: How Malaysia Misses the Mark and Why That Matters. Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, 39(2), 207–226. Welsh, B. (2013). Malaysia’s Elections: A Step Backward. Journal of Democracy, 24(2), 136–150. Yaakob, I. S. (2019a, January 9). Twitter. Retrieved from https://twitter.com/ IsmailSabri60/status/1082810597958242304?s=20 Yaakob, I. S. (2019b, April 26). Twitter. Retrieved from https://twitter.com/ IsmailSabri60/status/1121797983945682946?s=20 Yap, F. (2021, October 1). Govt Approved RM15m for 63 Chinese Independent Schools—Dong Zong. Malaysiakini. Retrieved from https://www.malaysiak ini.com/news/593560 Yilmaz, I., Demir, M., & Morieson, N. (2021a). Religion in Creating Populist Appeal: Islamist Populism and Civilizationism in the Friday Sermons of Turkey’s Diyanet. Religions, 12(5), 359. Yilmaz, I., Morieson, N., & Demir, M. (2021b). Exploring Religions in Relation to Populism: A Tour Around the World. Religions, 12(5), 301.

CHAPTER 5

Democratic Backsliding in Malaysia: Executive Aggrandizement Under Muhyiddin Yassin’s Government Naimah S. Talib

Introduction Malaysia’s fourteenth general election held in May 2018 resulted in the first transfer of power to the opposition since independence (Welsh, 2018; Abdullah, 2019). In a strong repudiation at the polls, the Barisan Nasional (BN) coalition that had held uninterrupted political power in Malaysia for six decades was finally removed from power. The political breakthrough in 2018 surprised many observers especially in an era of encroaching authoritarianism in the region. Many had hoped that the former coalition, Pakatan Harapan (PH, Alliance of Hope) under the leadership of

N. S. Talib (B) Department of Political Science and International Relations, University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 J. Ockey and N. S. Talib (eds.), Democratic Recession, Autocratization, and Democratic Backlash in Southeast Asia, Contestations in Contemporary Southeast Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-9811-9_5

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Mahathir Mohamad, would be able to finally sweep away ethnic politics and other structural flaws in the political system after forming the new government (Hutchinson, 2018; Weiss, 2020; Dettman, 2020). Nevertheless, Mahathir’s government comprised a fragmented coalition of parties, and was mired in political infighting; it was unable to promptly deal with the problems of the previous regime and focus on political reform. Tensions in the coalition government, Pakatan Harapan, formed after the 2018 electoral win, culminated in a full-blown crisis in February 2020 and led to the collapse of the government. The new coalition government, Perikatan Nasional (PN, National Alliance) led by Muhyiddin Yassin and including UMNO and PAS, coincided with the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in Malaysia which spread to the whole of Peninsular Malaysia and the Bornean states of Sabah and Sarawak. The pandemic provided opportunities for the executive to expand its power at the expense of the legislature. The PN government was described by its critics as a “backdoor government,” as many felt that the government was put together without a popular mandate or a vote of confidence in parliament (Head, 2020, March 5; Paddock, 2020, May 22). A faction within Mahathir’s party, Bersatu (Parti Pribumi Bersatu, Malaysian United Indigenous Party), launched an internal coup in February 2020 by forming an alliance with ethnocentric parties that had lost the election in 2018. This prompted the resignation of Mahathir Mohamad as prime minister and a realignment of political parties. PN was beset by a number of problems, chief of which was its slim majority in parliament (Wong, 2020; Paddock, 2020, May 22). Despite its vulnerability, the PN coalition government was determined to stay in power at all costs, and a lack of commitment to democratic norms had resulted in a weak executive that attempted to augment its power in relation to the legislature. By manipulating legislative procedures, the executive aimed to undermine the opposition and stifle debate in parliament. In a further move to limit the role of the legislature and bypass constitutional restraints on its power, the executive used emergency powers in response to the COVID-19 pandemic to erode institutional checks and balances and accountability. This chapter argues that through a process of executive aggrandizement, the executive under the leadership of Muhyiddin Yassin gradually accumulated power, albeit through legal means by manipulating rules and exploiting opportunities to increase its influence at the expense of

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democratic reform (Bermeo, 2016). Since the Malaysian political system is a constitutional monarchy, any discussion on executive aggrandizement must necessarily include a discussion on the role of the Malaysian king who exercises a symbolic role (Faruqi, 2021a). The extent of royal influence as well as the role of the king in the executive accumulation of power also deserves attention. This chapter seeks to explore the nature and ramifications of the executive aggrandizement of power during Muhyiddin’s brief tenure as prime minister from March 2020 to August 2021 under the PN coalition government.

Malaysian Politics: An Overview The Pakatan Harapan (PH) government headed by Mahathir that came to power in May 2018 had at best a mixed record of achieving political reform (Wong, 2020). They were confronted with problems that were endemic in the Malaysian political landscape. In Malaysia, political leadership is seen through the lens of a cultural understanding of leadership that often promotes clientelism and includes opportunities for private material gain through abusing entrusted power utilizing various corrupt practices (Weiss, 2020). The competition for power and authority is therefore intense because leadership positions confer not just political power but moral authority and wealth. These factors do not support the objectives of democratization such as “depersonalized office, policy-based parties, horizontal and vertical accountability and transparency” (Slater and Arugay, 2018; Croissant and Haynes, 2021; Laebans and Lührmann, 2021). In the twenty-two months that the PH government was in power, from May 2018 to February 2020, it was not able to dismantle the structural features of Malaysian politics that had stalled the process of democratic consolidation. In particular, the ethnic nature of politics had become entrenched with the Malay ethnocentric parties exercising dominance. Apart from this, the lack of trust among the component parties in the PH government made it difficult to push through the necessary reforms that would limit corruption. The uneasy alliance between former Prime Minister Mahathir and Anwar Ibrahim, leader of the major party, Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR, People’s Justice Party) in the same coalition, did not bode well for the new and volatile political landscape (Chin, 2020; Wan Jan, 2020). The squabbling within Mahathir’s Pakatan Harapan coalition, including the problematic planned leadership transition from

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Mahathir to Anwar brought the government down in February 2020 (Sarawak Report, 2020, February 24). Key members of the coalition defected to form a new coalition, PN, including Muhyiddin Yassin, who at times, had been an ally of both Mahathir and former Prime Minister Najib Razak (Malaysiakini, 2020a, February 25). As the constitutional head of state, the Malaysian king (Yang di Pertuan Agong) holds discretionary power to appoint the prime minister. Politicians from both UMNO, a major component party of Barisan Nasional (BN, National Front) from the pre-May 2018 governing coalition, joined forces with Muhyiddin together with the Islamist party, Parti Se-Islam Malaysia (PAS, Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party), to form a new government in March 2020 (Head, 2020, March 5). What is significant about this new coalition is that they comprise the main Malay ethnic parties—Bersatu, UMNO, and PAS—and have excluded the parties appealing to nonMalay/indigenous ethnic communities. It is also worth taking note that many in Bersatu were former UMNO members, including Muhyiddin and Mahathir. The internal coup of February 2020, dubbed the “Sheraton Move,” also resulted in major defections by politicians from Anwar’s PKR party to Bersatu to join the new governing coalition (Malaysiakini, 2020d, December 1; Chin, 2020). As previously mentioned, Mahathir resigned as prime minister in protest of the alliance with UMNO, and Muhyiddin was appointed as the new prime minister in March 2020. As a result of the change, Anwar found himself in a new role as leader of the opposition (Malaysiakini, 2020b, March 8). Mahathir then decided to part ways with the party that he founded in 2016 and formed yet another new party. For many, the formation of a new government through political machinations that incorporated parties thrown out of power after the historic 2018 election, created a deficit in legitimacy. The situation was made worse by the fact that Muhyiddin had a razor-thin majority in parliament (Wong, 2020; Teoh, 2020b; Ostwald, 2020). Like many authoritarian leaders around the world, the new government found itself in a situation where in order to survive, it felt a need to take advantage of constitutional loopholes that avoided legislative sittings and debate. The government under Muhyiddin used the COVID-19 pandemic as a pretext to undermine democratic norms, benefiting from policies and restrictions intended to slow the spread of the virus. A state of emergency was declared in January 2021, suspending parliament for more than six months. This was also employed to prevent the opposition from undermining the government.

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Democratic Backsliding and Executive Aggrandizement According to Bermeo (2016, p. 6), democracies today that have experienced problems are more likely to erode over time than “shatter,” declining piecemeal rather than falling in one blow. Bermeo (2016) further explains that the global trend in democratic backsliding reflects the slow progress of democracy and not its total “demise.” Democratic backsliding tends to occur gradually with political leaders slowly undermining competition, freedoms, the rule of law, and the free press (Laebens and Lührmann, 2021). Recent literature on democratic backsliding shows a growing concern with executives becoming more hegemonic, accumulating power at the expense of other institutions (Pérez-Liñán et al., 2019). The erosion of democratic quality is often the result of a weak commitment to the rules of the game denying legitimacy to political opposition and a willingness to restrict civil liberties. Diamond (2021, p. 30) suggests that elected political leaders who are keen to accumulate power and wealth “knock away various types of constraints on their power and enlarge and entrench it in undemocratic ways.” Diamond (2021) points in particular to political leaders honing their skills in the authoritarian aggrandizement of power. The weaker the democratic institutions, and the commitment to norms consistent with a competitive political system, the easier to manipulate and dismantle democracy. In her discussion on different types of democratic backsliding, Bermeo (2016, p. 6) argues that executive coups that took place in the past are now being supplanted by a process of executive aggrandizement—“that blatant election-day vote fraud that characterized elections in many developing countries in the last few decades is being replaced by longer-term strategic harassment and manipulation.” According to Laebens and Lührmann (2021), democratic erosion takes the form of an executive concentrating and expanding its power. Bermeo (2016) explains that executive aggrandizement is a process that involves the incremental erosion of various checks on executive power over a period of time. This process typically includes the dismantling of constitutional constraints that limit executive power or the manipulation of loopholes that allow the executive to avoid or bypass convention. The disassembling of institutions with the ability to challenge the executive may be done piecemeal and usually through legal channels, and may include the use of referenda and newly elected assemblies. Existing courts

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or legislatures may also be used in cases where supporters of the executive gain majority control of such bodies. An important feature of executive aggrandizement is that institutional change is normally legally voted on by freely elected officials—this suggests that the change can be “framed as having resulted from a democratic mandate” (Bermeo, 2016, pp. 10–11). In the shift toward autocratization, the incumbent uses a variety of tools and mechanisms that limit competition and accountability. In his study of growing autocratization in Southeast Asia, Morgenbesser (2020, p. 1054) categorizes autocratic innovations as taking various forms—informational, legal, political, reputational, and technological—and targeting different actors, including civil society activists, political opposition parties, and foreign policymakers. These innovations try to mimic both vertical and horizontal accountability, giving the appearance of accountability but falling short of real accountability in practice. A variety of subtle techniques are used by authoritarian regimes, some of which include how “laws can be bent, not broken; institutions to be managed, not made meaningless; political opponents to be circumscribed, not eliminated” (Morgenbesser, 2020, p. 1055). This chapter will also explore tools used by the executive, namely the postponement of legislative sittings to avoid debate in parliament, thereby undermining the role of the opposition to debate and scrutinize bills. Another mechanism sometimes employed is the use of emergency ordinances to suspend parliament altogether. The use of wide-ranging powers during an emergency privileges the executive over other institutions, especially the legislature. Lührmann and Rooney (2021) suggest that studying states of emergency may provide a better understanding of the processes of autocratization.

Executive Aggrandizement Under Muhyiddin Yassin The federal government of Malaysia is a constitutional democracy with executive power vested in the king, the Yang di Pertuan Agong, as the nominal head of state; executive power is exercised by the prime minister and his cabinet (Harding, 2012). From the time of independence until the 2018 election, Malaysia has had six prime ministers, each of whom stayed in office for at least four years. Under the pre-2018 BN coalition, the prime minister wielded enormous power and influence, not only in the federal parliament but also by indirectly controlling many of the state governments via the BN coalition (Harding, 2012, pp. 55–58). Before

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the 2008 elections, the BN coalition commanded a substantial majority in parliament, generally holding two-thirds of seats as well as controlling the Senate. Thus, successive governments had been able to propose amendments to the constitution without much challenge. Mahathir’s long tenure as prime minister, from 1981 to 2003, saw the expansion of executive power; in 1987–1988, Mahathir challenged the power of the judiciary, and also the state hereditary rulers, the Sultans, in 1983 and 1993 (Milne and Mauzy, 1999). Mahathir’s successors, Abdullah Badawi and Najib Razak, while continuing BN hegemony in government were increasingly challenged by a popular opposition. After his resignation from UMNO, Mahathir and the various opposition leaders campaigned in 2018 on a promise to restore democracy and put in place a clean and transparent government. Persistent bickering between the various component parties in the PH coalition led to an impasse, paving the way for an internal coup led by Mahathir’s deputy, Muhyiddin Yassin. Soon after being sworn-in as the prime minister of Malaysia in March 2020, Muhyiddin unveiled his new cabinet. His choice of cabinet members reveals some of the complexities of forming a government with a very small majority. In order to satisfy other parties in his coalition and maintain his own party’s influence, Muhyiddin opted not to name a deputy prime minister (Case, 2021). This move was a departure from past practice in Malaysia. Although not mandated by the constitution, the appointment of a deputy prime minister was regarded as a convention. However, under pressure from UMNO, Muhyiddin appointed Ismail Sabri Yaakob deputy prime minister the following year, in July 2021. Before Ismail Sabri’s appointment, Muhyiddin’s cabinet included four senior ministers with responsibility for education, works, defense, and international trade and industry, with two of these senior posts going to his own party. In order to avoid a “floor test” and a no-confidence vote in parliament, Muhyiddin needed the full cooperation of all component parties in his coalition. In an attempt to reward his supporters, Muhyiddin decided to enlarge the cabinet, appointing more than 70 members; this historically was Malaysia’s largest cabinet, comprising 32 full ministers and 38 deputy ministers (Paddock, 2020, May 22). Muhyiddin’s inclination toward clientelist politics is also demonstrated in his appointment of 19 lawmakers to key positions in government-linked companies (Hutchinson, 2020, April 17). To strengthen his influence and authority, Muhyiddin allocated a budget of RM11.1 billion (US$2.56 billion) in 2020 to the prime

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minister’s department, which was the sixth largest budget overall. He also expanded the reach of the prime minister’s department; apart from covering the Religious Affairs and Law and Parliamentary Affairs ministries as usual, it also incorporated the Economic Affairs Ministry and the newly created Ministry for Sabah and Sarawak Affairs (Hutchinson, 2020, April 17). The cabinet allocations demonstrated Muhyiddin’s attempt to maintain his power. Most of the senior posts were dominated by Muhyiddin’s party, Bersatu. At the outset of Muhyiddin’s tenure as prime minister, Bersatu had 30 MPs, compared to UMNO’s total of 39 MPs (Malaysiakini, 2020c, March 10). Apart from the education and international trade and industry portfolios, Muhyiddin also secured eight other important portfolios for his party. A number of these ministries had important roles in the development and implementation of projects in Malaysia’s rural heartland, the traditional constituency of Malay Muslims. Thus, while working with his coalition partners, Muhyiddin understood the need to compete with them and mobilize support among the rural MalayMuslim constituency. On the other hand, UMNO did not fare as well as Bersatu; it obtained only three high-profile portfolios: defense, health, and the newly established higher education. In order not to be associated with ongoing court proceedings related to corruption scandals involving UMNO politicians—Najib Razak, the former prime minister, and UMNO party president, Ahmad Zahid Hamidi—were excluded from the cabinet line-up. Evidently, the allocation of senior posts created tension and eventually conflict, precipitating yet another crisis in July and August 2021 (Jaipragas, 2021, July 9). Muhyiddin was under mounting pressure from UMNO party leaders for a more equitable distribution of ministerial portfolios. However, Muhyiddin was not willing to compromise his party’s influence vis-à-vis UMNO in the fragile coalition; this reluctance to accommodate the ambitions of UMNO leaders led to public threats of withdrawal from the governing coalition by the UMNO president, Ahmad Zahid Hamidi. Muhyiddin’s “bloated” cabinet demonstrates an attempt to consolidate his power over his other coalition partners in the executive while at the same time also ensuring that his loyal supporters were rewarded (Wong, 2020). Although UMNO held more seats in parliament than Muhyiddin’s party, Bersatu, they were allocated far fewer senior ministerial posts. Muhyiddin’s earlier decision not to appoint a deputy prime

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minister and name a successor, instead appointing four senior ministers, indicates his willingness to avoid political convention as past cabinets had always included a successor.

Role of the Malaysian King According to the Malaysian constitution, the king, known officially as Yang di Pertuan Agong, is a constitutional monarch vested with the power of a nominal chief executive. The king is elected every five years by the Conference of Rulers representing the nine states in Malaysia with hereditary Malay monarchies. The Malaysian king generally acts on the advice of the cabinet, except where the constitution requires him to act on his own discretion such as the appointment of the prime minister (Welikala, 2020, p. 788; Harding, 2012). Faruqi (2021b) explains that the king under Article 43 (2) has the power to judge who commands confidence in the House without recourse to parliament. The current king is Abdullah Ahmad Shah from the state of Pahang, who was elected by the Conference of Rulers in January 2019. Malaysian royalty is held in high regard in Malaysian society and is seen as a pillar of traditional Malay authority and influence. Additionally, Malaysian kings also play an important role as religious leaders and protectors of Islam in their respective states (Abdul Hamid and Ismail, 2012; Milner, 2012; Neo, 2006). Any action that is seen to have received royal consent is thus perceived as having been conferred royal legitimacy. In the two political crises that precipitated a change of government, the first in February/March 2020 and the second in July/August 2021, the king played an unusually influential role in exercising his discretionary power in determining the next government (Teoh, 2020a, February 28). In the first crisis, which culminated in the withdrawal of Bersatu from the PH coalition government, the king appointed Muhyiddin as the next prime minister, thus confirming that Muhyiddin had secured a majority in parliament. His decision was based on meetings with parliamentarians to determine which party had the majority without recourse to parliament, resulting in a significant political realignment (Case, 2021). Muhyiddin was a respected UMNO politician before resigning prior to the 2018 elections in protest against former Prime Minister Najib Razak’s corruption scandal. In exercising his discretionary power to choose the next prime minister, the king may have taken into account the rift between Mahathir, who was then still the leader of the Bersatu party and Muhyiddin,

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Bersatu’s deputy leader. A factor that may have influenced the king’s choice in choosing Muhyiddin was Mahathir’s history of conflict with Malaysia’s sultans between 1983 and 1994 when Mahathir pushed for constitutional changes that imposed limits on royal power (Milne and Mauzy, 1999; Andaya, 2018). This move on the part of the king is significant because it resulted in a change of government without an election or recourse to parliament and it also led to the formation of a government that brought three Malay ethnocentric parties, UMNO, PAS, and Bersatu, into the governing coalition. In the second crisis, the king, in August 2021, consented to the appointment of yet another prime minister, Ismail Sabri Yaakob from UMNO, who was appointed deputy prime minister by Muhyiddin just one month earlier. The second crisis was the result of months of tension between Bersatu and UMNO over a more equitable distribution of power in the coalition government. One UMNO faction then withdrew support from Muhyiddin as the prime minister. Again, in August 2021, the king exercised his discretionary power in paving the way for the return of an UMNO prime minister, just three years after the party lost overwhelmingly in the 2018 elections (Teoh, 2021, June 17). In contrast to the first crisis, the king advised the newly appointed prime minister to seek a confidence vote in parliament. It is not clear why the king did not insist on a confidence vote in March 2020. The king commands widespread respect and support not just among Malay Muslims but across the various ethnic communities in Malaysia. Thus, the king normally treads warily in exercising his discretionary power so as not to be seen as favoring a particular party or faction. Welikala (2020, p. 792) provides an explanation of why a floor test in the legislature did not occur in the first crisis after the new prime minister’s appointment in March 2020. He points to a pattern of infrequent meetings seen in some Commonwealth legislatures and also long breaks in between sessions and meetings of parliamentary committees. After the appointment of Muhyiddin as prime minister, parliament convened on 18 May 2020 for a royal address at the opening of parliament before meeting again briefly from 13 July 2020 onward. Another factor proposed by Welikala (2020, p. 793) is that there is a tendency in less consolidated Westminster-style democracies for the executive to have a more hegemonic control over parliament. In addition, according to the Malaysian constitution, a “floor test” is not a legal requirement (Harding, 2012; Faruqi, 2021b). This issue was raised by the Attorney General, Idrus

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Harun, who argued that it was not necessary to seek a confidence motion in parliament after the king had appointed a prime minister (Malaysiakini, 2021c, September 4). Perhaps as an attempt to address the anomaly in Malaysia’s constitution, the king himself advised the new UMNO prime minister in August 2021 to seek a motion of confidence (Malay Mail, 2021, September 6). According to Faruqi (2021a, June 17), there have been precedents for newly appointed prime ministers in Malaysia to seek a motion of confidence in parliament as seen in the appointment of Prime Minister Tun Hussein Onn on 16 January 1976 following the death of Tun Razak. Thus, the decision of Muhyiddin not to seek a vote of confidence defied the convention. On the other hand, in exercising his discretion to appoint a prime minister, the king played a significant role in the two political crises, given the moral legitimacy conferred on his selected candidate. In a situation in which the person he appointed had a razor-thin majority, he had the opportunity to express his expectation that the new prime minister would follow the established convention and hold a vote of confidence.

COVID-19 and Emergency Powers Muhyiddin’s appointment as prime minister in March 2020 coincided with the rapid onset of COVID-19 in Malaysia. Due to its nature as a highly contagious disease, the government had to put in place effective measures to reduce its exponential spread. The measures included safe distancing and self-isolation of those infected with the virus. A high level of compliance and trust in the government is important in ensuring the success of these measures. The increase in COVID-19 cases in early March 2020 can be traced to a religious event that took place in Kuala Lumpur from 27 February to 1 March 2020 attended by more than 15,000 people. Muhyiddin’s government then introduced a range of measures and expanded travel restrictions that were already in place. More drastic measures in the form of a partial lockdown ensued with the Movement Control Order (MCO) imposed on 18 March 2020 requiring all non-essential businesses to close. The number of cases steadily surged in the first few months of Muhyiddin’s tenure, despite stiff fines and the mobilization of the military to enforce the restrictions (Tang, 2022). The first phase of the MCO lasted until 31 March 2020, and was extended several times until May 2020 when some of the restrictions were relaxed (Malay Mail, 2020, June 7).

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A new surge began in September 2020 after mandatory in-person voting during a state election in Sabah led to a spike in infections. The timing of the pandemic helped Muhyiddin consolidate power despite holding a small majority in parliament. While it is evident that Muhyiddin’s government put in place measures that would slow the spread of the virus, he also took advantage of the pandemic in minimizing opportunities for his opponents to mobilize against him (Rahman, 2022). Due to movement restrictions and the limits on public gatherings, it was difficult for his opponents to organize street protests against the government. He canceled parliament’s March 2020 session because of the pandemic. After a brief one-day session opening parliament in May 2020, the next session was held in July 2020; however, the July 2020 sitting was only convened briefly citing COVID-19 risks. To ensure control of the legislative agenda, Muhyiddin appointed a new speaker for parliament on 13 July 2020, Azhar Harun. The prime minister also kept the July 2020 session short and the newly appointed speaker did not allow any motions, including an attempt by Mahathir to call for a vote of no-confidence (Hassan, 2020, September 24). Parliament met again albeit briefly in August, November, and December 2020, again without an opportunity for a motion of no-confidence. The COVID-19 pandemic provided a good excuse not to call parliamentary meetings for extended periods to allow Muhyiddin’s government time to increase its majority. On 11 January 2021, the king, on the advice of Muhyiddin, declared a state of nationwide emergency that would be in force for more than six months until 1 August 2021 (Welsh, 2021, March 19). It is important to note that Muhyiddin’s earlier attempt to call for an emergency in October 2020 was refused by the king. In his emergency proclamation in January 2021, the king expressed satisfaction that there was a strong justification for emergency powers to curb the spread of the pandemic (Bernama, 2021, January 12). The Emergency (Essential Powers) Ordinance announced on 14 January 2021 included broad powers and was criticized by activists and civil rights groups calling for immediate revisions to meet international human rights standards (Human Rights Watch, 2021). The ordinance provided Malaysia’s military with wide policing authority, allowing for the forced confiscation of property with no recourse or compensation. It also provided the government with almost total immunity for actions taken under the ordinance (Shamsunahar, 2021, June 11).

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According to the Malaysian constitution, once a state of emergency is declared, the king is given powers under Article 150(2B) to promulgate ordinances that have the force of law (Harding, 2012). A state of emergency is the only instance in which the executive, together with the support of the nominal chief executive, represented by the king, acquires both primary and parallel legislative functions when both houses, the House of Representatives (Dewan Rakyat) and the Senate are not sitting concurrently (Faruqi, 2021b). The federal executive can pass laws with the assent of the king without having to go through the legislature. When an emergency proclamation is in place, the executive takes on a legislative role and bypasses parliament altogether. Under the state of emergency, the Emergency (Essential Powers) Ordinance 2021 was expanded to allow the prime minister, or heads of state governments to pass a supplementary budget or utilize consolidated funds without going through the legislature and suspending parliament’s authority over fiscal matters (Faruqi, 2021b). This is evident in paragraph 4(b) of the Government Funding Act 1983 and paragraph 2(2)(b) of the Treasury Bills (Local) Act 1946, which relates to the Dewan Rakyat’s authority over fiscal matters. Under normal circumstances, a supplementary supply bill would come under scrutiny in parliament. An opposition member of parliament was critical of this attempt to constrain parliament; the then secretary-general of the Democratic Action Party (DAP), Lim Guan Eng, argued that the executive “guillotined parliament and was now allowed to expand the budget without the people’s approval” (Malaysiakini, 2021a, March 31). Additionally, the executive authority of the federal government also extends to the legislative authority of a state. Under Article 150(4), the federal government may provide directions to a state government, thus ignoring the constitutional separation between the federal and state governments (Faruqi, 2021b). While an emergency remains in force, vacancies in the Senate and House of Representatives will also not be filled. The provisions in the federal constitution that relate to the summoning, proroguing, and dissolution of parliament will also not have effect without the consent and approval of the king. During the emergency, parliament was in abeyance until another crisis prompted by UMNO President Ahmad Zahid Hamidi’s public criticism of the government for not convening parliament. The presence of a large cabinet appointed in March 2020 had failed to remove tension within the coalition government and the prolonged use of emergency powers had worsened relations between Muhyiddin and a faction

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of UMNO led by Zahid. Zahid’s UMNO faction threatened to withdraw support of Muhyiddin as prime minister in June 2021. With UMNO holding 39 out of 222 seats in parliament, Muhyiddin was under tremendous pressure to give in to Zahid’s demands. Muhyiddin then attempted to placate UMNO by appointing Ismail Sabri Yaakob, a prominent UMNO member, as deputy prime minister and promoted another UMNO stalwart, Hishammuddin Hussein, as senior cabinet minister. While Muhyiddin’s measures to manage the spread of COVID-19 had resulted in acceptance by the wider public and increased popularity of the government in the short term, inconsistencies in policies and a lack of clear communication contributed to growing frustration with pandemic policies especially during the emergency. The king and the Conference of Rulers also shared their frustrations and concerns regarding the COVID-19 policies, and in June 2021, they called for the emergency not to be extended beyond 1 August and for the reopening of parliament soon after (Chin, 2021, June 15). Zahid also issued an ultimatum in the following week for parliament to be convened. On 30 June, after a series of meetings with heads of both houses of parliament, the king reiterated his call for the opening of parliament, this time, signaling his desire to see parliament convene before the end of the emergency. Finally, on 5 July, Muhyiddin gave in to pressure and called for a special sitting of parliament for just five days beginning on 26 July to discuss the national recovery plan. However, the political compromise did not yield the desired results for Muhyiddin; UMNO then withdrew support from Muhyiddin as prime minister, triggering a political crisis that led to the appointment of Ismail Sabri as the next prime minister of Malaysia. This marked the return of an UMNO prime minister after the party was removed from power in the May 2018 elections. The use of emergency powers to consolidate Muhyiddin’s government and silence the opposition endangered democracy. Malaysia had previously invoked emergency powers only once, in the aftermath of the 1969 ethnic riots that resulted in political turmoil. From the opposition’s perspective, emergency powers and the suspension of parliament undermine the opposition’s role as a check on executive power and prevent it from exercising its legislative function. The declaration of an emergency as a tool to combat the pandemic involves a drastic limitation of fundamental rights. Lührmann and Rooney (2021) argue that states of emergency provide broad sweeping powers and opportunities for executives with the intention to dismantle democracy by exploiting or abusing

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the extraordinary powers that “typically come with it.” While states of emergency in response to a crisis may be seen as a “temporary institutional derogation,” it does not necessarily lead to a long-term decline in electoral democracies and may empower a government to manage an unusual crisis, and allow it to effectively deal with complex challenges (Lührmann and Rooney, 2021). Autocratization as a result of executive empowerment may occur when an executive harbors the intention of expanding its power to exploit opportunities to abuse wide-ranging powers that accompany states of emergency. A common result of declaring a state of emergency is the concentration of extra powers in the hands of the executive, and there is a danger that the executive will use this opportunity to grab power or promote its self-interest rather than seek the common good.

Silencing Media and Civil Society Non-state actors, such as civil society organizations and independent media, make an important contribution to diagonal accountability. These actors provide information and highlight problems with specific government policies so that voters and legislatures can make informed choices (Lührmann et al., 2020). When Malaysia experienced its first-ever transfer of power to the opposition through elections in May 2018, the environment for journalists became much more favorable and the country rose dramatically in the Reporters Without Borders (RSF) Press Freedom Index (IFJ, 2021, April 30). However, the positive trend has reversed since March 2020. Measures taken by Prime Minister Muhyiddin Yassin’s government included reviving the Special Affairs Department (known by the Malay acronym of JASA), which was responsible for political propaganda and was awarded the sum of RM85 million in funding in the 2021 budget. The government relied on various draconian legislation with which to suppress media freedom, an arsenal that includes the Sedition Act 1948, the Official Secrets Act 1972, and the Communications and Multimedia Act 1998 (CMA). Under these laws, the authorities have strict control over publication licenses and journalists can be sentenced to 20 years in prison on sedition charges (CIVICUS, 2021, March 3). For the media, the restoration of more authoritarian rule in 2020 has led to prosecutions, police searches, and flagrant violations of the confidentiality of journalists’ sources. To protect themselves against the government’s offensive, many journalists have had to censor themselves.

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According to political activist, Nalini Elumalai, the PN government under Muhyiddin was extremely secretive about its legislative agenda, having suspended parliament during the emergency. Additionally, the government was focused on using repressive policies to target critics and dissenters. Since March 2020, the government had continuously used various laws to investigate, arrest, charge, and convict individuals who criticized the government or Malaysian royalty and who had shared opinions about sensitive issues such as race and religion. Between March 2020 and February 2021, rights advocacy groups Article 19 and CIVICUS recorded 66 cases involving 77 individuals who were investigated or charged under the two laws. Over this period, at least 12 people were convicted under the CMA (CIVICUS, 2021, March 3). Press freedom also declined during Muhyiddin’s tenure as prime minister. The International Federation of Journalists (IFJ) expressed concern in April 2021 regarding the decline of Malaysia’s press freedom index from 101 in 2020 to 119 in 2021 out of 180 countries (IFJ, 2021, April 30). This trend was highlighted by a prominent opposition online news provider, Malaysiakini, whose CEO was charged in relation to third-party comments submitted by readers to its website. The government also launched an “unprecedented witch-hunt” against Al Jazeera journalists investigating the treatment of migrant workers during the COVID-19 pandemic. The harassment and intimidation of journalists further demonstrate the shrinking space for free and independent media in Malaysia. In addition to journalists, the authorities harassed, investigated, and arbitrarily detained human rights defenders, peaceful protesters, women’s rights activists, and union leaders in an effort to silence civil society voices. The legal framework governing the exercise of freedom of assembly and association remains highly restrictive and excessively burdensome. The Peaceful Assembly Act 2012 falls short of international law and standards and denies the right to protest to children and non-citizens. It also fails to allow for spontaneous assemblies. Peaceful protesters were investigated and arrested, including health workers protesting their lack of access to adequate personal protective equipment during the COVID19 pandemic. The Societies Act 1966 has continued to stand in the way of the right to freedom of association, which is critical in a democracy. Under Muhyiddin’s government, the Registrar of Societies had excessive powers and erected barriers to registration for new opposition political

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parties such as Muda and Pejuang and civil society groups while simultaneously fast-tracking the registration of PN (Malaysiakini, 2021b, May 23). Journalists and civil society activists play a key role in ensuring diagonal accountability. After the May 2018 elections, the environment for independent media reporting improved. Despite this, the Muhyiddin government reversed this policy leading to a decline in media freedom. Similarly, civil society groups found that they had limited ability to mobilize and to constrain the government. By silencing its critics, the Muhyiddin government undermined democratic norms; without the public being provided neutral and unbiased assessments of the executive, it is more difficult to hold the government to account at the ballot box.

Conclusion The gains made after the electoral victory of the PH coalition in May 2018 and the end of BN’s hegemonic hold on power for the first time in more than six decades was welcomed by many observers as a step toward a more liberal democracy. Democratic turnover in politics also brings with it higher expectations of democratic reform and improvement in governance. Infighting among the coalition partners within Mahathir’s PH government, unfortunately, increased the level of distrust between politicians. The lack of cooperation and inability of the government to push for unpopular reforms increased tension within the coalition and eventually led to a full-blown crisis in February 2020. As a result of political maneuverings, the Pakatan Harapan government collapsed when Mahathir’s Bersatu party decided to ally itself with the Malay-Muslim ethnocentric parties, UMNO and PAS, to form a new government in March 2020. Mahathir decided not to associate himself with the coalition government and joined the ranks of the opposition. The executive under Prime Minister Muhyiddin Yassin, in power from March 2020 to August 2021, provides important insights into how an executive accumulates power, ignores democratic conventions, the institutional balance of power and accountability, and consequently manages to remain in power, albeit briefly, with only a small majority in parliament. The experience of the Muhyiddin government illustrates how it was able to incrementally increase its power vis-à-vis the legislature by avoiding parliamentary sittings as much as possible. In its attempt to stay in power at all costs, the government was provided with opportunities

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during a health crisis to further expand its powers. While the regulations on people’s movements, safe distancing, and travel restrictions were all aimed to limit the spread of COVID-19, the executive managed to exploit opportunities to limit its accountability and constrain checks on its power. The pandemic aided the PN government under Muhyiddin Yassin to consolidate its power during its brief tenure of 17 months. The push for executive expansion was motivated by the government’s tenuous position with a small majority in parliament. In its attempt to hang on to power, the executive sought to bypass constraints on its power, avoiding parliamentary sittings to allow for parliament to exercise its legislative function and its role as a check on the executive. Parliament only met a few times in 2020, and the imposition of a state of emergency the following year led to the suspension of parliamentary sittings altogether. The role of the Malaysian king as the nominal chief executive also deserves scrutiny. As a symbolic monarch in a constitutional democracy, the king, under the Malaysian constitution, is given discretionary power to choose a candidate for the office of prime minister, the person whom he deems has the confidence of a parliamentary majority. As we have seen in the two political crises, the first in February/March 2020, and the second in July/August 2021, the king was able to indirectly influence the direction of politics and also provided some level of legitimacy to the appointed prime minister and government. While there is no constitutional requirement to have the prime minister and his government go through a motion of confidence, the king did not insist on a floor test in the appointment of Muhyiddin as prime minister in March 2020 but advised Ismail Sabri to seek a motion of confidence in August 2021. The king also played an influential role during the state of emergency, acting on the advice of the prime minister. The accumulation of executive power and the erosion of democracy was also evident in policies targeting the media and civil society. In an attempt to silence public criticism of the government and thwart any possible challenges, the government used a range of legal instruments to restrict press freedom and harass and investigate members of civil society groups. Muhyiddin’s tenure as prime minister signaled a phase in Malaysian politics in which democracy was put on hold. Muhyiddin stepped down in August 2021 to make way for a new successor, Ismail Sabri Yaakob; his brief tenure as prime minister signaled a return to authoritarianism and a re-autocratization of Malaysian politics.

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Affairs. Retrieved from https://www.ideas.org.my/malaysias-emergency-ord inance-and-the-clampdown-on-public-discourse/ Slater, D. and Arugay, A. A. (2018). Polarizing figures: Executive power and institutional conflict in Asian democracies. American Behavioral Scientist, 62(1), 92–106. Tang, D. K. K. (2022). Movement control as an effective measure against COVID-19 spread in Malaysia: An overview. Journal of Public Health: From Theory to Practice, 30, 583–586. Teoh, S. (2020a, February 28). Malaysian King says he, not parliament, will decide on next PM. The Straits Times. Retrieved from https://www.straitsti mes.com/asia/se-asia/malaysias-agong-affirms-speakers-decision-not-to-con vene-parliament Teoh, S. (2020b, February 28). Muhyiddin emerges as frontrunner to be Malaysia’s next PM, with backing from UMNO and PAS. The Straits Times. Retrieved from https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/muhyiddin-set-tobecome-malaysias-next-pm-with-backing-from-umno-and-pas Teoh, S. (2021, June 17). Malaysia’s King urges govt to reconvene Parliament soon despite PM’s plan. The Straits Times. Retrieved from https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/malaysias-king-urges-govtto-reconvene-parliament-as-soon-as-possible Wan Jan, W. S. (2020). Why did Bersatu leave Pakatan Harapan? Trends in Southeast Asia, no. 10. ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute. Weiss, M. L. (2020). The roots of resilience: Party machines, grassroots resilience in Southeast Asia. Cornell University Press. Welikala, A. (2020). The dismissal of prime ministers in the Asian commonwealth: Comparing democratic deconsolidation in Malaysia and Sri Lanka. Political Quarterly, 91(4), 786–794. Welsh, B. (2018). ‘Saviour’ politics and Malaysia’s 2018 electoral democratic breakthrough: Rethinking explanatory narratives and implications. Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, 3, 85–108. Welsh, B. (2021, March 19). One year of Covid lockdown. Malaysiakini. Retrieved from https://www.malaysiakini.com/columns/567174 Wong, C. (2020). Parliament as prime minister’s electoral college: The defection game in Malaysia’s democratic backsliding. The Round Table, 109(5), 586– 607.

CHAPTER 6

Propagating and Resisting Authoritarian Innovation Online: Thailand’s ‘ROTC Cyber’ Activity Pasit Wongngamdee

Introduction Originally, social media was seen as a tool to empower citizens and boost political participation, thus promoting democratization. Yet there is growing literature suggesting that social media may not necessarily bring about democratic consolidation (Sinpeng 2020). Curato and Fossati

I would not have been able to complete this paper without the warm support of my dear family; Preenapha, Pongsathorn, Rungtip, Piriya, Krishana and Boonchai. My heartfelt thanks. P. Wongngamdee (B) Department of Political Science and International Relations, University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 J. Ockey and N. S. Talib (eds.), Democratic Recession, Autocratization, and Democratic Backlash in Southeast Asia, Contestations in Contemporary Southeast Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-9811-9_6

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(2020) and Morgenbesser (2020) propose that authoritarian governments may invent new techniques to limit the democratizing effects of social media or even to exploit social media for the benefits of the regime. They call such techniques ‘authoritarian innovations’. Authoritarian innovations can take various forms not limited to social media; however, as social media has become increasingly important, more authoritarian innovations have been invented to manipulate social media (Curato and Fossati 2020, p. 1011). One prime example of authoritarian innovation in Thailand is a military activity called ‘ROTC Cyber’. It is an activity where high school students in a military program are mobilized to disseminate military propaganda on social media. This paper examines ROTC Cyber activity as a case study of an authoritarian innovation operating on social media. It aims to provide an in-depth case analysis of how an authoritarian innovation is implemented and the limitations and resistance it may face from society. The paper starts with a discussion of the theoretical literature on authoritarian innovations, social media, and democratic recession. Then it will discuss the political context in Thailand and move on to the development of ROTC Cyber activity. Next, the paper will explore the work of ROTC Cyber on popular social media in Thailand, namely Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, and Instagram. The content used to propagandize and indoctrinate will also be discussed. Finally, the paper will demonstrate the limits of ROTC Cyber by discussing the challenges and resistance that the activity faces in its implementation.

Authoritarian Innovations, Social Media, and Democratic Recession The most recent scholarly debate regarding authoritarian innovations is in the thematic section of the journal, Democratization, published in 2020. In this volume, Curato and Fossati (2020) propose that authoritarian innovations are ‘novel governance practices designed to shrink spaces for meaningful public participation in politics’ (p. 1010). Curato and Fossati note that authoritarian innovations can wear a variety of appearances and ‘.. may take the form of a policy, a directive, an application of a new technology, or shift in rhetorical styles, among others (p. 1010)’. To be considered as ‘novel’, the practice does not need to have been recently invented, but it does mean the practice has newly been adopted by governments to undermine democracy.

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Given the growing importance of social media in politics, especially in Southeast Asia, there have been some innovations created to manipulate the internet community (Curato and Fossati 2020, p. 1011). For instance, ‘flooding’ is a novel technique to overload certain information on social media to distract the public from a government scandal or other particular topics. Another innovation is the ‘troll army’—a group of people who are often hired by the government to intimidate political critics or disseminate pro-regime information. Good examples of the troll army are Singapore’s ‘Internet Brigade’ (Tan 2020), the ‘50 Cent Army’ in China, and ‘Information Operation (IO)’ in Thailand (Morgenbesser 2020, p. 1058). Moreover, governments in different countries may also hire ‘PR firms’ to help them maintain a positive image, or pay social media ‘influencers’ to promote government policies and achievements online (Tan 2020, p. 1082). Despite the important contributions in Democratization, there are still some significant gaps in the existing literature. First, Curato and Fossati (2020) and Morgenbesser (2020) are two pioneers of the authoritarian innovation concept, but their works are cross-national comparative, meaning that their studies may lack in-depth case analysis. Pepinsky (2020) suggests that the nature of ‘authoritarian innovations’ is fluid and context sensitive. He argues that the meaning of democratic or authoritarian practices is highly dependent on contexts; thus, some practices in some societies may escape the attention of international organizations or might be misinterpreted. Pepinsky then implies that Curato and Fossati and Morgenbesser’s works may be flawed, as they are comparisons based on international organizations’ reports. Pepinsky concludes that to fill in the gap, in-depth case analyses and context-sensitive research are required (Pepinsky 2020, p. 1096). In the thematic section of Democratization, there are three studies comprised of case-based analysis, yet there are still gaps that the three works have not covered. The three works are case studies of Malaysia (Dettman 2020), Indonesia (Mietzner 2020), and Singapore (Tan 2020). Among them, only Tan’s work on Singapore is about authoritarian innovations on social media. Although Mietzner’s work discusses the limits of authoritarian innovations on regime change, he does not elaborate on how authoritarian innovations might be resisted. Likewise, Dettman’s work does not pay attention to the resistance that authoritarian innovations might face. Therefore, there is no work as yet focusing on a case

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of an authoritarian innovation on social media that faces resistance and challenges in its implementation. The lack of case studies on resistance and challenges to authoritarian innovations might lead to an assumption that the presence of authoritarian innovations will automatically undermine democracy; however, such an assumption is problematic. For instance, Laebens and Lührmann (2021) use the cases of Benin, Ecuador, and South Korea to demonstrate that democratic erosion can later be halted by mechanisms of accountability. One of the most important mechanisms highlighted is accountability from society, where citizens resisted and protested against authoritarian practices, whether innovative or traditional. Similarly, Lorentzen et al. (2013) discuss the case of the Chinese Communist Party, which attempted to control local governments via an authoritarian innovation—environmental regulations—yet its implementation was challenged by local elites. These works show that authoritarian innovations might be less impactful and less effective than posited in the works in Democratization. Ultimately, considering the shortcomings in the literature, research providing an in-depth case analysis of a digital authoritarian innovation that faces resistance and difficulties in its implementation should be useful to the debate on the relationship between authoritarian innovations, social media, and democratic recession. The case of ROTC Cyber activity in Thailand, therefore, deserves more attention, as it is a new case of an authoritarian innovation on social media which has experienced resistance from society and limitations in its implementation.

Thailand, the Military, and Authoritarianism Since 1932, Thailand has experienced 12 successful coups (Asia Foundation 2017, p. 171), so that Thailand has been a country with regular shifts between direct military rule and semi-democracy under military guidance. The military has created and reproduced a discourse claiming that the most appropriate regime for the country is not liberal democracy—as Thailand is different from the western world—but Thai-style democracy, officially named ‘Democracy with King as Head of State (DKHS)’ (Chalermkiat 1992; Hewison and Kengkij 2008). This regime is centered on royal-nationalism, an ideology that the monarchy, who is the representation of ultimate Buddhist virtue (Hewison and Kengkij 2008), is the key to the survival of the nation (Thongchai 2016). Under this political

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ideology, the king is a moral monarch (Dhammaraja) who supervises Thai politics with Buddhist principles and fights the evil nature of humans by advocating Buddhism (Hewison and Kengkij 2008; Chalermkiat 1992). According to this theory, without guidance from Buddhism and the monarchy, people will be corrupted and divided by politicians or external enemies, causing civil wars and the fall of the nation. Consequently, when the Thai military interferes in politics, they often state that the interventions are to protect the nation, the religion, and the king—the three foundations of DKHS. Furthermore, the military’s interventions are not limited to staging coups, but also include behindthe-scenes interference, such as supporting certain ‘good politicians’ and obstructing particular ‘bad politicians’ whom the military views as a threat to DKHS. In short, the Thai military generally claims that their putsches are not to demolish democracy, but to safeguard ‘appropriate democracy’. Likewise, their other interventions are not to undermine democracy, but to restore, to reform, or to pursue ‘true democracy’. Therefore, the Thai military’s political role can be seen as ‘a protector and a builder of DKHS’. The military has been indoctrinating civilians to accept their political role in the offline world since the 1950s (Chai-Anan et al. 1990), but as social media has become more and more important, especially after a putsch in 2014, they have begun to invent authoritarian innovations to control online social networks too. These innovations include, for example, the creation of the army’s public relations page, the launch of the junta leader’s fan page, and the Thai military’s troll army called ‘Information Operation (IO)’ (Stanford Internet Observatory 2020). However, one of the most crucial channels for social media indoctrination is through the new military activity named ‘ROTC Cyber’. The activity promotes the military’s role as the protector and the builder of DKHS both directly and indirectly on Thailand’s popular social media, such as Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, and Instagram.

Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) ROTC Cyber is a part of a five-year-long military training program called ‘Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC)’. The program is under the authority of an army organization named ‘Territorial Defense Command (TDC)’. Originally, the ROTC program was a channel to recruit military reservists. The primary target of the program is high school students, so to attract more students, the military grants the right to skip conscription

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to those who complete at least the third year of the program. The Thai military is infamous for the violent treatment of draftees; new recruits are often brutally ‘disciplined’ by higher-ranking soldiers. For example, Prachatai (2018) reports that from 2007 to 2018, there were at least 14 cases of draftees killed in military camps. Among those cases, some were allegedly forced to drink 40 liters of water while others were beaten to death. Therefore, the ROTC program is flooded with students who want to avoid conscription rather than those who want to be reservists. The most apparent evidence is that the first three years of the program are crowded with students, while the last two years have very few students, since most quit the program when they receive the right to skip conscription (Worapong 1994; Kampol 1999; Narong 2003; Prommesuan 2007; Drun 2013; Yuthachai 2018). This dropout rate indicates that the majority of students who join the program are those who already have a negative attitude toward the military, or at least are not inclined to serve long term. Although the military failed to achieve its original purpose of recruiting military reservists through the ROTC program, they later found that the program had many elements appropriate for indoctrinating young people. First, the number of ROTC students attending the program is very large. There are roughly 100,000 new students joining the program every year, and in each year the military is responsible for a total of about 300,000 students (Yuthapong 2016, p. 1). Second, ROTC students spend a lot of time being taught by the military. Annually, students must spend 80 hours in the training center plus five to twelve more days in a bootcamp (Prakarn 2017, p. 34). Third, the ROTC program is often conducted as a parttime program, meaning that ROTC students interact with civilians after class. This increases the chances that ROTC students can spread military propaganda to their fellow citizens in daily interaction. Therefore, since the program’s potential for indoctrination was recognized by the military in 2006, the military has tended to focus more on indoctrinating the students rather than trying to recruit them as reservists. In 2019, the military sought to boost the indoctrination power of the ROTC program by introducing a new curriculum called ‘ROTC New Gen’. The new curriculum includes several changes, from trivial rules to teaching techniques, to make the ROTC program look more appealing to the younger generation. It has also reduced the time on military subjects

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and increased the time on political subjects, such as the history of Thailand, the importance of the monarchy, the military’s role in security, and creating a spirit of volunteering. Most importantly, ROTC New Gen has encouraged indoctrinated students to reach out to a wider number of civilians through two new activities. The first activity is ‘ROTC Volunteer’, where ROTC students are urged to visit different communities and impart military values to civilians. The second activity is ‘ROTC Cyber’, where cyber-competent students are mobilized to disseminate military propaganda on social media.

ROTC Cyber ROTC Cyber is a new activity introduced under ROTC New Gen. According to a document published by the military, its goal is to establish cyber-competent units to support the military’s public relations on the internet. Official documents identify that its operations involve (a) disseminating information regarding ROTC training online, (b) educating people about online media literacy, and (c) producing educational media for the ROTC program (The Royal Thai Army 2020; Territorial Defense Command 2020). However, as we see below, ROTC Cyber’s work covers a range of activities including disseminating military propaganda. The ROTC Cyber activity starts with selecting cyber-competent members among ROTC students. Then an ‘ROTC Cyber unit’ will be formed. Members receive special training where they are taught about the mission and purpose of the activity. After the training, each unit creates a variety of content which will later be published online or used in the ROTC program. This entire process is not run by Territorial Defense Command, but by each ROTC training center, which is responsible for training, monitoring, and supervising their own units (The Royal Thai Army 2020; Territorial Defense Command 2020; Reserved Officer Training Unit, Military Circle 26 2019). Therefore, the management of this activity is rather decentralized, meaning the performance of ROTC Cyber units varies across different training centers. This chapter explores the operations of different ROTC Cyber units on social media, namely Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, and Instagram, which are popular among Thai people. Other social media such as Line, despite its popularity, is not practical as the application’s communication is private.

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Regarding Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram, this study examines all accounts that are open to the public and can be proven to be related to ROTC Cyber. The paper considers an account related to ROTC Cyber when it meets any one of these criteria: a. the account itself is named as an ROTC Cyber unit. b. the account itself is named as an ROTC training center or an ROTC affiliated school, and at least once shares content which has an ROTC Cyber credit on it. There are thirteen Facebook pages and groups, three Twitter accounts, and one Instagram account which meet these criteria. The paper investigates the activities of these seventeen accounts over the previous thirty days since their latest update. On YouTube, there are countless clips which can be linked to ROTC Cyber. Therefore, the study randomly examines 47 clips that can be proven to be related to ROTC Cyber. To be considered related, the clips must meet any one of these criteria: a. The video contains ROTC Cyber credits either on the title, description, opening credit or on end credit. b. The video is shared by other ROTC Cyber social media accounts, and the account gives credit to ROTC Cyber activity. The research done for this chapter took place between 1 July 2021 and 10 July 2021.

Content of Indoctrination The content of the indoctrination produced by ROTC Cyber is varied, but it can be categorized into four groups: first, dissemination of promilitary information; second, reshaping the image of military training and the ROTC program; third, promotion of messages claiming that the Thai military’s political involvement is necessary; and fourth, promotion or normalization of military culture.

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Dissemination of Pro-military Information Regarding the dissemination of pro-military information, this type of content includes the publication of any information which encourages civilians to have a better attitude toward the military as an organization. This content is most prevalent on Facebook. An approach that is often used is to depict the military as working hard to look after Thai people, although such work is not a traditional military responsibility. For example, one ROTC Cyber Facebook account published pictures of soldiers delivering food to people during the COVID-19 pandemic. This series of pictures came with the caption ‘Caring Army Arranging Delivery Operation To Send Food To Your House’ and hashtags ‘#TheArmyHelpsThePeople’ and ‘#PeopleCanRelyOnSoldiers’. Another example is a student scholarship project called ‘Soldiers Help You Pursue Your Dream’. This project was promoted on an ROTC Cyber Facebook page and a YouTube clip. Circulating information about the scholarship and army food delivery projects online not only promotes a positive image of the military but it also romanticizes and normalizes the expansion of the military’s role into civilian affairs. This type of content is not only produced to display a positive side of the military but sometimes it can be used to alleviate criticism toward the armed forces and the military government as well. The COVID19 cluster at Lumpinee Boxing Stadium is a good example. In March 2020, the boxing stadium, which is run by the army, organized a major boxing match, despite the concern about COVID-19. The match ended up becoming a big cluster in the 2020 pandemic, and the army was widely criticized (Thai PBS 2020). Possibly because of the criticism, one recurring theme on ROTC Cyber Facebook pages was pictures showing the ROTC program employing several measures to prevent virus transmission during the training to protect the military from further criticism. Similarly, to alleviate criticism of the government’s reliance on the Sinovac vaccine, which is believed to have a low efficacy rate, one ROTC Cyber Facebook page shared a shortened clip of Vox’s video arguing that efficacy rate alone cannot determine the effectiveness of COVID-19 vaccines.

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Reshaping the Image of Military Training and ROTC Program The second type of propaganda content produced by ROTC Cyber is intended to reshape the image of Thai military training and the ROTC program. This content is similar to dissemination of pro-military information, but rather than promoting the military as an organization, it specifically aims to repackage military training and the ROTC program. To help improve the image of military training, many ROTC Cyber accounts publish content demonstrating that ROTC training is ‘safe, fun, and for the new generation’. For example, 10 out of 47 YouTube clips produced by ROTC Cyber units are music videos of two newly produced songs named ‘Young ROTC, New Gen Heart’ and ‘Love the Nation As Your Life’. They are songs that were specially produced to repackage military training and the ROTC program. The former song is a rockcountry song with the rather fast rhythm and tempo, while the latter is primarily composed of rap. Both of them were designed to be attractive for the younger generation. There are several verses portraying the ROTC program as appealing. To illustrate, one verse of ‘Young ROTC, New Gen Heart’ emphasizes that the program now does not force students to have only ‘high and tight’ haircuts, while another verse says that there are also pretty girls studying in the program. Another theme that is often promoted by ROTC Cyber accounts to make the program more appealing to Thai youth is ‘active learning’. Active learning is an educational process that allows students to participate more in class while teachers only play the role of facilitators (Office of the Basic Education Commission 2019, p. 4). TDC believes that implementing active learning in lecture-based classes will make the program look more progressive and make the class more enjoyable. ROTC Cyber accounts then promote this ‘enjoyable and progressive’ image by producing content about active learning. Numerous pictures and clips of students working in a group, giving presentations in front of a classroom, and using online applications are inserted in content published by ROTC Cyber accounts. There are also at least two YouTube clips found in this study that did nothing but showcase active learning. Apart from songs and active learning, ROTC Cyber Facebook pages have employed a variety of jokes and memes to reshape the program’s image as well. The Facebook accounts have posted numerous pictures of good-looking ROTC students in uniforms—both male and female—to

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make the audience feel that the program is for ‘cool’ teenagers. Sometimes they turn these pictures into memes about romance and love. These memes usually come with quotes, such as ‘If you haven’t met true love, that’s coz you haven’t met me yet’, ‘Where is your heart? On your left side or by my side?’, and ‘I’m protecting the land, but I have nobody who protects my heart’. Although these jokes may seem random and non-military, they might help to weaken the association of adversity and danger with military training, and rebrand the program as fun and friendly for the new generation. Promotion of the Military’s Political Role Discourses The third type of indoctrinating content is aimed at promoting the military’s role as the protector and the builder of DKHS, underlining the importance of the special relationship between the military, Buddhism, and the monarchy. Regarding the monarchy, music videos of the newly produced song ‘Love the Nation As Your Life’ is a prominent example. The song is an elaboration of the special relationship between the monarchy, the military, and the public society. One part of the chorus says ‘I’ll protect our father’s land [the king’s land], to return his majesty’s favor, who gives us food to eat. Siam will flourish forever, the golden land’. The song encourages the audience to protect the monarchy—or at least cooperate with the military which has a duty to do so—otherwise, people will not have food to eat, and the nation will decay. Aside from the music videos, there are also a number of clips published by ROTC Cyber accounts discussing contributions that the past kings have made to the country. These contributions range from helping the poor and fighting in wars to ‘civilizing’ the nation. Although these clips do not focus on the military, they highlight the necessity of the monarchy and amplify the importance of the military as a protector of the monarchy as well. As regards Buddhism, a large amount of ROTC Cyber content equates the concept of morality to Buddhist principles, underscoring the cruciality of Buddhism in Thai society. For the ROTC program, the primary sources of moral teachings are from two Buddhist activities called ‘White Mind ROTC’ and ‘ROTC Volunteer’. The former is an activity to develop ROTC students’ mentalities through the practice of Buddhist meditation (Sararn Mangkalayotha 2017; Matichon Online 2016). The latter is an activity to encourage students to do ‘good deeds’, such as cleaning community areas or making a donation. Pictures and clips of ROTC

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students doing good deeds and practicing meditation are common in ROTC Cyber accounts. Although such content does not discuss Buddhist teachings in detail, pictures and clips of students adopting Buddhism as an ultimate principle and practice without reference to other religions or different philosophies may support the idea that Buddhism is essential for Thailand. Reinforcing this concept also implies that the military’s role as a protector of Buddhism is vital for the country. Apart from promoting the military’s role as the protector of the monarchy and Buddhism, some content may support other related topics which underpin DKHS, such as the idea that Thai people are still poor, uneducated, and corruptible, so Thais need guidance from loyal servants of the monarchy—the soldiers. One short film on YouTube about a plastic reduction campaign illustrates this theme very well. The film starts with the main character—an ROTC student—walking back to his school. He is in an ROTC uniform, signaling that the film is depicting him as a representation of the military. The main character then meets with his two friends; both of them are wearing school uniforms, thus representing civilians. The ROTC student starts the conversation by sharing that he just finished his ROTC Volunteer activity. After he is asked how tiring the activity was, the soldier character answers proudly ‘exhausting, but if it helps society, it’s fine’. Later, the three of them begin to talk about their plastic reduction project. They have decided to make an inspiring short film, but they have not yet agreed on the plot. One of the school students proposes a plot for an art symbolism film. The other school student disagrees because he prefers a simple straightforward plot. The two school students then start shouting at each other, derailing the meeting due to their personal conflict. Then the camera begins to zoom out, enabling the audience to see the surrounding areas are filled with plastic waste. It is now revealed that despite having a project on plastic reduction, the two school students themselves created more plastic waste. At the end of the film, the camera focuses on the face of the ROTC student, who expresses extreme disappointment. Finally, a message appears: ‘If we want to reduce the use of plastic, it begins with ourselves. If we act first, others will follow’. On the surface, the film promotes soldiers as visionary leaders who see the real problem and are ready to lead society via ‘actions, not words’; however, the film carries many deeper political meanings. The story of the short film visualizes the Thai military’s justification to intervene in politics, depicting the ROTC student as the military, the two school

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students as factionalized civilians and the plastic reduction project as the nation. The film displays that the civilians are corrupt and divided, so they are blinded by their own hatred toward each other. As a result, civilians cannot see the real problem, and their personal conflict obstructs the development of the nation. On the other hand, the military can see the real problem, as soldiers are not blinded by personal interest, since they are trained to be patriotic and to put the benefit of the community first. Hence, conflict among civilians that hinders the nation’s development inevitably forces the military to intervene in politics to help the country move forward. The film also implies that the military in fact does not want to intervene in politics as it is ‘exhausting’, but they eventually decide to do so because they believe that ‘if it helps society, it’s fine’. Therefore, the film romanticizes the military’s justification to interfere in politics as a builder of DKHS. Promotion or Normalization of Military Characteristics The fourth type of indoctrinating content is the promotion or normalization of military cultural characteristics. This type of content may familiarize the audience with military attributes, leading them to feel positive toward the military. The characteristics that ROTC Cyber accounts often promote are values such as discipline, subordination, and obedience, as well as stories of warrior heroes. One music video on YouTube is a prime example of the content that promotes military values. The song is a rap about the ROTC student motto: ‘Discipline, Duty, Unity, Sacrifice, and Endurance’. There are many verses of the song which aim to promote the benefits of discipline, subordination, and obedience. The verses are as follows: …We study military subjects. We stand in line. We run. We crouch. We get up. We crawl. It’s normal to be tired. We mustn’t disobey. It’s not right to drag our feet, coz it’s our duty to obey orders… …No matter how exhausting ROTC training is, we must endure. Instructors educate us to make us a full man. Disciplined, we must be. Neglecting is not right, coz we are the nation’s hope. No matter how difficult, we’ll succeed… …Obey the rules, don’t flout the rules. Instructors must be cruel, otherwise students will disobey…

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To put it simply, the song teaches the audience to endure every order regardless of how tiring it is, because discipline and obedience are important for children, who are the nation’s hope. If the audience upholds such values, they might not only have a positive attitude toward the military, but they may not question the military’s right to rule either. ROTC Cyber accounts also promote stories of warrior heroes who helped the country during crises. King Naresuan (reign: 1590–1605), who liberated Ayutthaya from the Taungoo Empire, is commonly invoked by the military. As a warrior king, he possessed both the masculinewarrior image and a heroic back story. Thus, the day that King Naresuan emerged victorious in an elephant duel with a Taungoo crown prince is now considered ‘the Royal Thai Army Day’. On YouTube, there is at least one ROTC Cyber clip that specifically focuses on his biography, and there are many more clips in which his stories and pictures are included. On Facebook, his stories were heavily promoted at least twice a year on the Royal Thai Army Day and on the anniversary of his death. Through this content promotion, the military strengthens the narrative of military heroes who emerge in crises to save the nation. This narrative also aligns well with their self-portrait as the protector and the builder of DKHS.

Effectiveness of ROTC Cyber Although the Thai military has vigorously promoted ROTC Cyber, its implementation of authoritarian innovation has not always been successful. There are many variables determining the effectiveness of ROTC Cyber. This section analyses publishing strategies and production quality, which are two important factors determining the effectiveness of the activity. This section will then discuss public engagement with and feedback given to ROTC Cyber content. Strategy in Publishing ROTC Cyber’s publishing strategy is limited in several ways. First, there are few connections across social media platforms. This hinders the military from promoting their content to multiple audiences. For example, there are many times that ROTC Cyber Facebook pages upload clips on Facebook directly instead of sharing them via YouTube. Similarly, there are many ROTC students who upload clips on YouTube without linking to Facebook pages. Therefore, people who view the clips on YouTube will

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miss other content on Facebook and vice versa. This prevents the military from using social media propaganda to its full potential. Second, content is frequently uploaded by accounts with few subscribers. On YouTube, from the survey done in this study, there are only 20 clips out of 47 that were uploaded by official training centers. The majority of the clips were uploaded either by ROTC Cyber units or individuals, such as ROTC students, teachers in affiliated schools, and ROTC officers. Unlike training centers, these ROTC Cyber units and individuals normally have very few subscribers, so publishing content through their channels cannot reach a large audience. Additionally, many of them are ROTC students, meaning that they are likely to stop uploading ROTC Cyber content once they graduate. This further constrains the reach of the content. Third, ROTC Cyber content lacks ‘viral’ or ‘click bait’ elements to attract the audience. Titles of YouTube and Facebook clips are often too serious or too straightforward. Most titles include the words ‘ROTC Cyber’ plus a brief description of an activity, such as ‘ROTC Cyber Social Development Volunteer’, or only the activity description, such as ‘Reduce Plastic Campaign’. More surprisingly, sometimes uninformative titles, such as ‘Training Centre of XXX School’, ‘ROTC Cyber Training Centre XXX’, and ‘Feeling’, can be found as well. These titles may not be interesting enough to attract internet users to click and watch them. Likewise, the content of ROTC Cyber activity is not typical viral fare either. Most of the content comprises repetitive restatements of the Thai state’s propaganda that most Thai civilians are already familiar with. When ROTC Cyber accounts try to create viral hashtags, the created hashtags usually fail to have an impact on the internet due to the lack of collaboration across training centers and across ROTC Cyber units. To illustrate, once an ROTC Cyber Twitter account attempted to promote the hashtag ‘#TeenagersMustStudyROTC’, yet this hashtag was not adopted by any other ROTC Cyber accounts at all. As a result, the hashtag ended up being referred to only in one tweet. Altogether, without click bait and viral elements, the ROTC Cyber’s content will reach only those who are searching for the content: in other words, pro-military civilians. Therefore, ROTC Cyber activity might fail to convert apolitical or anti-military civilians because its content cannot reach them in the first place. Lastly, the majority of ROTC Cyber content is uploaded only in September and October. As shown in Table 6.1, on YouTube, 30 out

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of 47 clips were uploaded in September or October. In the case of Facebook, shown in Table 6.2, 9 out of 13 pages and groups were created in these two months as well. There are four pages that heavily posted content in September and October 2020 and are now no longer active. One of them updated 51 times in 30 days. On the other hand, although other pages are not flooded with content, they are not very active either. There are six pages that publish content only once in a few months, or less frequently than that. Therefore, it is noteworthy that ROTC Cyber accounts are active only a few months in a year, particularly during September and October. Some of the accounts are extremely lively in these two months, and apart from that period, they are very quiet. This is possibly because September and October are the time that ROTC Cyber units’ performances are being assessed. Table 6.1 ROTC Cyber clips on YouTube ranked by views. Clips which were published in September and October are emphasized Rank

Date published

Publishers’ relation with the military

Length

Type

Views

1

19 October 2019 20 October 2019 20 October 2019 11 October 2019 18 October 2019 20 October 2019 18 October 2019 3 January 2020 12 October 2019 14 February 2020 26 December 2019

ROTC officer

3.15

MV

510,756

Training center

4.04

MV

392,319

Training center

4.1

MV

65,665

Training center

4.12

MV

32,097

Unclear

4.09

MV

20,838

ROTC cyber unit

4.1

MV

8,321

Unclear

4.04

MV

4,428

Affiliated school Training center

4.05 3.09

MV MV

4,397 3,109

ROTC student

15.51

Documentary

2,063

Training center

3.22

Documentary

1,527

2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11

(continued)

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Table 6.1 (continued) Rank

Date published

Publishers’ relation with the military

Length

Type

Views

12

26 February 2020 8 December 2020 27 September 2019 16 September 2019 16 August 2019 26 November 2020 8 October 2019 4 March 2020 23 November 2020 28 September 2020 7 October 2020 10 September 2020 15 September 2020 9 November 2020 5 November 2019 1 October 20 20 3 September 2020 4 October 2020 8 September 2020 23 August 2019

ROTC student

20.01

Documentary

1,299

ROTC student

3.53

MV

1,115

ROTC student

3.01

MV

1,079

Training center

2.22

MV

917

ROTC cyber unit Unclear

1.38 6.24

Uncategorizable MV

894 892

Teacher in an affiliated school ROTC student Training center

6.23

Documentary

710

13.24 5.09

Documentary MV

705 584

Training center

0.53

Short film

495

Training center

0.5

Interview

441

Training center

1.37

Uncategorizable

439

Training center

1.59

Uncategorizable

427

Training center

3.02

MV

358

Unclear

86.09

Documentary

356

Training center

2.54

Uncatagorizable

288

Training center

1.19

Interview

281

ROTC cyber unit

2.58

Documentary

261

Training center

9.09

Documentary

253

ROTC cyber unit

4.57

Documentary

196

13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31

(continued)

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Table 6.1 (continued) Rank

Date published

Publishers’ relation with the military

Length

Type

Views

32

19 October 2019 21 October 2020 16 September 2019 18 October 2020 28 November 2020 16 October 2020 24 November 2020 31 October 2019 19 October 2020 13 September 2019 30 August 2020 16 September 2019 4 August 2019 21 April 2021 16 September 2019 17 September 2019

ROTC cyber unit

8.19

Documentary

178

Training center

1.43

Uncategorizable

107

Training center

6.03

Uncategorizable

102

Training center

1.49

Uncategorizable

91

Unclear

9.2

Short film

89

Training center

1.45

Uncategorizable

84

ROTC student

4

uncategorizable

81

ROTC student

3

Short film

79

Training center

1.09

Uncategorizable

77

ROTC cyber unit

2.04

Uncategorizable

74

Unclear ROTC student

2.59 3.13

MV Uncategorizable

38 27

ROTC cyber unit Affiliated school Unclear

1.45 6.05 3.03

Uncategorizable Interview Documentary

26 25 17

Unclear

0.5

Interview

10

33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47

Production Quality Due to the decentralized nature of the ROTC Cyber activity, the production quality of its content depends on the capability of each unit and each training center. While some units’ quality is very high as if it were created by professional teams, some content appears as if it were produced by amateurs. The high-quality content is shot by good photographers with expensive cameras, as the resolution is high. Some pictures and videos are shot at the golden hour to capture the twilight, indicating the expertise of the

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Table 6.2 ROTC Cyber Facebook pages and groups ranked by the last update. Pages and groups which were established and last updated in September and October are emphasized No

Type

Likes

Followers

Members

Established

Last updated

Publication frequency in 30 days

1

Fan page

582

615

–

17 April 2020

3

2

Fan page

584

597

–

Fan page

488

499

–

4

Fan page

602

664

–

5

Fan page

1,015

1,085

–

6

Fan page

1,529

1,583

–

7

Fan page

–

1,300

–

8

Fan page

465

532

–

11 September 2020 13 September 2020 28 September 2020 24 October 2020 1 January 2021 12 Jan uary 2021 6 April 2021

36

3

9

Fan page

552

579

–

29 April 2021

1

10

Fan page

347

356

–

12 May 2021

1

11

Group

–

–

47

26 June 2021

1

12

Fan page

11,568

12,600

–

Fan page

10,265

10,912

–

7 July 2021 7 July 2021

8

13

4 September 2019 6 September 2020 5 September 2020 14 September 2020 26 Septenber 2020 6 July 2019 6 July 2019 17 October 2020 19 September 2019 31 October 2020 10 October 2020 22 August 2017 17 March 2018

51

29

49

1 1 1

25

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photographers. A few of them even have aerial views, meaning that they were taken by drones, which shows how professionally equipped some teams are. Furthermore, the presentation techniques in some of these pieces are also excellent. A few of them employ symbolism to convey subtle messages. For example, the short film about the plastic reduction campaign uses the ROTC uniform and school uniform to represent the military and the civilians. Some videos also use a variety of editing techniques, such as slow motion, lap dissolve, and jump cut, to make the clips more entertaining and impactful. Regarding the low-quality content, many of the short films, music videos, and documentaries have bad storytelling. Their plots are either confusing or have no narrative at all. In some cases, it is quite obvious that the producers did not plan the story well before shooting, so the videos became a collection of random unrelated clips and photos. Moreover, there are a number of clips where the narration and characters’ voices are drowned out by loud background music or noises from the environment. Because the team behind the production are usually amateurs, some content ironically reveals a negative side of the military and the ROTC program, instead of promoting a good image. A prime example is a short film published on an ROTC Cyber Facebook page which aims to portray the dedication of ROTC Cyber members. The clip follows the daily life of two ROTC Cyber members. At the beginning of the clip, the two members were bullied by their fellow ROTC students, who believe that the two members just use ROTC Cyber as an excuse to skip drills and stay in an air-conditioned room. Later, the clip shows that while the two members are busily working in front of computers, an ROTC instructor, who was doing nothing but playing on his mobile phone, asked the two members to go and buy him a coffee. At the end of the clip, the two members stayed at the training center until late at night to finish their cyber activity. The clip depicts hardship in the ROTC Cyber activity and shows fellow students’ bullying and an instructor abusing his power as obstacles that ROTC Cyber members must regularly overcome. Although the clip was designed to praise the dedication and endurance of ROTC Cyber units, it also reveals bullying and abuse problems within the military. Likewise, it also implies that some ROTC Cyber members do not sincerely want to work for the military, and merely want to use ROTC Cyber activity as an excuse to access privileges. This clip was viewed 1,100 times on Facebook.

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Another clip on YouTube, titled ‘Easy Training’, shows an ROTC student talking to the camera, saying that this year’s training is soft. The video then cuts to a series of intense training clips, as if telling the ROTC student ‘if you want it intense, we can make it intense’. After the hard training, the ROTC student faints and one of his friends drags him away to recover. Later, when the student regains consciousness, he walks past an ROTC instructor who suddenly orders him to crawl on the ground without any particular reason. The student has to follow the order, and then the clip ends. This clip refers to the joke among ROTC students that sometimes the drill and the instructors can become unreasonably harsh without warning. However, not all of the audience will laugh at the clip; some viewers, especially non-ROTC, may think that the ROTC program is unreasonable and too difficult to endure. Rather than making the program look fun, the clip might actually re-emphasize the hardship of life in military camps. This clip gained around 400 views on YouTube. Engagement and Feedback Decentralization in the activity’s management not only leads to a lack of standardization in the publishing strategy and the quality of production but it also leaves feedback and engagement with the content varied too. Regarding YouTube clips, as shown in Table 6.1, the most popular clip gained more than 500,000 views, while the least popular clip has merely ten views. Nevertheless, on average, the feedback and engagement on YouTube are fairly limited: there are only two clips which have more than 100,000 views, while 33 clips—or 70 percent of the surveyed clips—have less than 1,000 views. The low views may be the result of publishing strategies that allow low-subscribers accounts to publish the majority of the clips. Interestingly, a number of clips with high-quality production— such as clips which are shot using a drone, clips that employ symbolism, clips which have impactful messages, and clips that have original songs— sometimes have low views as well. This fact indicates that high production quality alone cannot help the clips to reach a wider audience without a good publishing strategy. Although two clips have been viewed more than 100,000 times, which is quite high, it should be noted that the indoctrination power of those clips may be limited. This is because the content of these popular clips is rather repetitive. Considering the top 10 viewed clips, nine of them are music videos of the same two songs: ‘Young ROTC, New Gen Heart’

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and ‘Love the Nation As Your Life’. Although these clips are produced by different training centers and different ROTC Cyber units, the content in the clips is almost the same: photos or videos of daily training that were merged into music videos. Despite the different types of presentation techniques involved (e.g. some use cartoons, some use videos, and some use pictures), the content of these clips is nearly identical to each other. In the case of Facebook, as shown in Table 6.2, out of 13 pages and groups, there are two pages that have more than 10,000 followers/likes, while another five pages and groups have 500–999 followers/likes. In total, there are approximately 30,000 people following these ROTC Cyber pages and groups. Nevertheless, it is likely that some individuals may follow more than one page/group. The numbers of likes, followers, and members of ROTC Cyber Facebook pages and groups are still substantially lower than the ‘Army PR Center’ (100,000 followers), which is the main Facebook page of the military, and ‘Prayut Chan-o-cha’ (one million likes), which is the official fan page of the junta leader. Aside from Facebook and YouTube, there are only three Twitter accounts and one Instagram account related to ROTC Cyber. The most popular Twitter account has 337 followers. The second most popular account has 235 followers, while the last account has only one follower. The only Instagram account has 238 followers.

Impacts of ROTC Cyber To summarize, the impact of the ROTC Cyber activity is likely to be limited for three reasons: (a) issues with the management of the activity, (b) resistance from ROTC students, and (c) resistance from internet users. Regarding issues with the management of the activity, the key problem is largely caused by its decentralized model and the lack of training in content-creating skills. It is noteworthy that although the newly recruited ROTC Cyber units must receive special training from their training center, such training focuses more on the purpose of the activity and the mission of ROTC Cyber units. In other words, the training is to help the unit members understand the importance of indoctrination; it does not teach the unit members how to indoctrinate civilians. The training does not develop the unit members’ skills in content creating, such as filmmaking, marketing, or psychology, which are critical for a successful internet campaign. Consequently, the quality of the content is determined by different levels of each ROTC Cyber units’ preexisting

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skills. As the decentralized model has not provided the training centers with a clear framework on how to supervise and monitor the activity, this allows ROTC Cyber units to produce unstandardized content and employ different publishing strategies. The result of such problems are limited links across social media platforms, publication by low-subscribers accounts, lack of click bait and viral elements, inactive accounts, unattractive content, and content that reveals negative sides of the military. However, low-quality content and poor publishing strategies are not caused by the management problem alone, but also by resistance from ROTC students as well. As discussed above, most ROTC students join the program not because they have a positive attitude toward the military, but because they want to avoid conscription. Therefore, rather than to help the military, it is likely that students volunteer for ROTC Cyber to gain privileges, such as the right to skip drilling, to access computers, and to work in an air-conditioned room. Hence, ROTC Cyber members might not have an incentive to work hard, but rather produce content with minimum effort. The evidence is the fact that the majority of ROTC Cyber content was produced in September and October—the month that the units’ performances are evaluated. Although there are some students who work hard to produce content, such students are often those who have a passion for filmmaking and photography, rather than those who like the military. These students tend to take ROTC Cyber as a hobby or a chance to improve their skills. Sometimes they even personally use their ROTC Cyber Facebook page to advertise their part-time jobs as photographers or filmmakers. These students usually prioritize technical aspects of the content production (e.g. photographing, lighting, and editing) and care less about the image of the military. The result of their work is thus content with high-quality production that reveals a negative side of the military, whether accidentally or intentionally. A prime example is the short film about ROTC Cyber members being bullied and abused by their fellows and instructors. As well as resistance from ROTC students, ROTC Cyber activity faces resistance from the internet community as well. When the activity was first introduced to the public in 2019, it received negative feedback from social media users, especially from Twitter, which is a popular platform for youth in Thailand. Some examples of such Twitter comments are as follows:

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ROTC Cyber is possibly making fake accounts when there is a political scandal… They perhaps created ROTC Cyber to watch cyber society, to see if there is anyone opposing the government. ROTC Cyber is intended to expand the IO base,1 to get a better score [on organizational performance].

This feedback demonstrates that since the very beginning, many social media users have been aware that ROTC Cyber might be used for military propaganda. Given the fact that a large amount of ROTC Cyber content clearly indicates the source of activity in noticeable places—such as titles, descriptions, beginning of the clips, end of the clips, and names of pages or groups—it is often easy for internet users to be aware that such content is aimed at military indoctrination. One of the indications that ROTC Cyber has been spurned by the Thai cyber community is the fact that YouTube clips published by civilians which criticize or ridicule the ROTC program usually get much more engagement than those of ROTC Cyber. One YouTube clip about an ROTC student mocking absurdity in the program is a good example. The clip shows a male ROTC student who just finished his training talking to a videographer. The student is asked by the videographer to express his true feelings after the training ended. The student answers with a sarcastic tone that ‘the training was good, but…’ After the word ‘but’ he mocks several things about the ROTC program, such as the waste of money, bad food, unreasonable orders from instructors, extremely strict rules, and abuse of power. Every time he names an item, he receives a big laugh from the crowd of fellow ROTC students who sit in the background. This clip gained more than 2 million views and 51,000 likes from internet users.

Conclusion The studies of Curato and Fossati (2020) and Morgenbesser (2020) have warned us that authoritarian governments may invent novel practices to control and manipulate social media. Their works show that such authoritarian innovations exist in different countries around the world. In Thailand, the ROTC Cyber activity disseminates pro-military information, portrays a positive image of military programs, justifies the military’s 1 IO or Information Operation is the name of the Thai military’s troll army

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political involvement, and normalizes militarism. It aims to indoctrinate civilians to accept the military’s role in politics both directly and indirectly. However, scholars should not be overly pessimistic that the prevalence and popularity of authoritarian innovations will necessarily allow autocracy to prevail, as the implementation of authoritarian innovations may face resistance and challenges as well. The case of ROTC Cyber in Thailand illustrates that policy design and implementation of authoritarian innovations are no easy tasks, as they might experience unexpected management issues such as lack of training and control over the staff. Moreover, the implementation of these innovations can encounter resistance from the inside too, since those who carry out the innovations might not fully agree with the innovation designers at the top. This problem is likely to hinder authoritarian innovations substantially if the upper management cannot oversee the staff efficiently, because the staff may be foot-dragging or widow-dressing their work. This problem is reflected by ROTC Cyber members who dislike the military but decided to join the activity for privileges, and only when necessary do they lazily flood their accounts with low-quality propaganda. Lastly, the innovations might be opposed by society itself. The case of ROTC Cyber shows that Thai netizens do not obediently adopt authoritarian innovations, instead often ignoring, mocking, or criticizing them. Ultimately, scholars should not jump to the conclusion that the presence of authoritarian innovations will always lead to democratic recession, as the presence of authoritarian innovations merely reflects attempts to use a novel tool to undermine democracy. The effectiveness of the tool also deserves more study. Therefore, more in-depth case analyses in different countries might be useful to help improve scholars’ understanding of the effectiveness of authoritarian innovations.

References Asia Foundation. (2017). The State of Conflict and Violence in Asia. San Francisco: Asia Foundation. Chai-Anan, Samudavanija, Kusuma Snitwongse, Suchit Bunbongkarn. (1990). From Armed Suppression To Political Offensive: Attitudinal Transformation of Thai Military Officers since 1976. Bangkok: Institute of Security and International Studies. Chalermkiat, Phiu-nuan. (1992) Political Thoughts of The Thai military 1976– 1992. Bangkok: Manager Publisher. (in Thai).

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Curato, N., and Fossati, D. (2020). ‘Authoritarian Innovations: Crafting Support for a Less Democratic Southeast Asia’. Democratization, 27(6), pp. 10061020. Dettman, S. (2020). ‘Authoritarian Innovations and Democratic Reform in the “New Malaysia”’. Democratization, 27(6), pp. 1037–1052. Drun, Yuthawongsuk. (2013). ‘Reformation of the Royal Thai Army’s Reserve Forces’. Kasem Bundit Journal, 14(2), pp. 59–75. (in Thai). Hewison, K. and Kengkij Kitirianglarp. (2008). ‘“Thai-Style Democracy”: A Royalist Struggle for Thailand’s Politics’. Paper presented at the Contemporary Thailand Workshop, Global Education Center, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Kampol, Wasuthep. (1999). Problems Obstructing Third Year Reserve Officer Training Crops from Udon Thanee Provice to Further Study in the Fourth Year. Master of Social Work Independent Studies. Bangkok: Thammasat University. (in Thai). Laebens, M. G. and Lührmann, A. (2021). ‘What Halts Democratic Erosion? The Changing Role of Accountability’. Democratization, 28(5), pp. 908–928. Lorentzen, P., Landry, P. and Yasuda, J. (2013). ‘Undermining Authoritarian Innovation: The Power of China’s Industrial Giants’. The Journal of Politics, 76(1), pp. 182–194. Matichon Online. (2016). ‘White Mind ROTC’ Initiated All ROTC Students Pray and Meditate Before Class. Matichon Online. Available from: https:// www.matichon.co.th/politics/news_363375 (Accessed: 7 November 2021). (in Thai). Mietzner, M. (2020). ‘Authoritarian Innovations in Indonesia: Electoral Narrowing, Identity Politics and Executive Illiberalism’. Democratization, 27(6), pp. 1021–1036. Morgenbesser, L. (2020). ‘The Menu of Autocratic Innovation’. Democratization, 27(6), pp. 1053–1072. Narong, Pongpundecha. (2003). An Approach to Improve the Thai Military’s Reserve Force. Master of Political Science Dissertation. Chiangmai: Chiangmai University. (in Thai). Office of the Basic Education Commission. (2019). The Supervision Approach to Develop and Promote Active Learning. Bangkok: Office of the Basic Education Commission. Pepinsky, T. (2020). ‘Authoritarian Innovations: Theoretical Foundations and Practical Implications’. Democratization, 27(6), pp. 1092–1101. Prachatai. (2018). ‘Undeserved Deaths of Young Draftees for 11 Years, While Old Soldiers Never Die’. Prachatai. Available from: https://prachatai.com/ journal/2018/08/78406 (Accessed: 6 February 2021). (in Thai).

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Prakarn, Padavanija. (2017). Reserve Officer Training Corps’ Training to Develop the Youth for the Society. Bangkok: National Defence College of Thailand. (In Thai). Prommesuan, Kasempaisarn. (2007). Decision to Further Study in the Fourth and Fifth Year of Reserve Officer Training Corp programme. Master of Political Science Dissertation. Chonburee: Burapha University. (in Thai). Reserved Officer Training Unit, Military Circle 26. (2019). ROTC Cyber 2nd Generation. Reserved Officer Training Unit, Military Circle 26. Available from: http://www.rdmtb26.org/?name=gallery&op=gallery_d etail&id=24 (Accessed: 7 November 2021). (in Thai). Sararn, Mangkalayotha. (2017). The Approach to Operate ‘White Mind ROTC’ Project, ‘Strategic Mediation’ Curriculum, How to Apply Meditation Subject to Students. Bangkok: Army War College. (in Thai). Sinpeng, A. (2020). ‘Digital Media, Political Authoritarianism, and Internet Controls in Southeast Asia’. Media, Culture & Society, 42(1), pp. 25–39. Stanford Internet Observatory. (2020). Cheerleading Without Fans: A LowImpact Domestic Information Operation by the Royal Thai Army. California: Stanford Internet Observatory Cyber Policy Centre. Tan, N. (2020). ‘Digital Learning and Extending Electoral Authoritarianism in Singapore’. Democratization, 27(6), pp. 1073–1091. Territorial Defence Command. (2020). Guidebook for 3rd Year ROTC Students 2020. Bangkok: Territorial Defence Command. Thai PBS. (2020). Maj. Gen. Rachit Moved—Lumpinee Board Sacked After The Boxing Stadium Became Covid-19 Cluster. Thai PBS. Available from: https://news.thaipbs.or.th/content/293310?read_meta=%7B%22label% 22%3A%22articlepage_number1%22%2C%22group%22%3A%22NA%22%7D (Accessed: 7 November 2021). (in Thai). The Royal Thai Army. (2020). The Army Internal Assessment Report of 2020 Fiscal Year. Thongchai, W. (2016) The Face of Royal-nationalism. Nonthaburee: Same Sky Book. (in Thai). Worapong, Sanganetr. (1994). Determinants of Application Decision for The Fourth Year of Reserve Officer Training Corp Programme: The Case of the Third-year Students of Reserve Officer Training Corps in Bangkok. Master of Political Science Dissertation. Bangkok: Thammasat University. (in Thai). Yuthachai, Tiantong. (2018). Development of Reserve Officer Training Corp to Be Efficient National Reserve Forces. Bangkok: National Defence College of Thailand. (in Thai). Yuthapong, Pinanong. (2016). Reserve Forces Act. The Secretariat of the House of Representatives. (in Thai).

CHAPTER 7

Rural Grassroots Governance-Building in Myanmar Charles David Crumpton , Mariana Cifuentes , and Julia Roche

Introduction Although institution-building progress in developing nations is a frequent focus in international literature, it is rarely considered in obscure settings (Soe et al., 2019). However, some scholars have examined how in some

This article was completed after the February 2021 military coup d’etat in Myanmar. However, the research was completed prior to the coup. We believe that regardless of the national governing regime approach Myanmar experiences in the future, the research should be valuable for future local governance-building in Myanmar—and research concerning it. C. D. Crumpton (B) Institute for Governmental Service and Research, University of Maryland, College Park, MD, USA e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 J. Ockey and N. S. Talib (eds.), Democratic Recession, Autocratization, and Democratic Backlash in Southeast Asia, Contestations in Contemporary Southeast Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-9811-9_7

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such settings, new forms of governance have performed well despite contexts of weak institutions. Leonard (2008, 2010) and others (Roll, 2015; Kuwajima, 2016; McCourt, 2018) argue that focusing solely on national-level institution building may hide progress in less visible corners of governance. They suggest that these “pockets of effectiveness” (POE) should be sought out to assess progress in institution building. This study does this by considering sub-township level grassroots governancebuilding in Myanmar. We examine how Myanmar’s 2011–2021 political transition provided spaces for both grassroots governance-building and government institutional reforms. To do this we consider bottom-up and top-down benefits of grassroots governance-building in Chin, Kayah, and Kayin States, using a novel analytic approach that blends concepts and analytic framing from hybrid organisational analysis, proto governance, and POE. We highlight how grassroots governance has offered a voice to historically marginalised groups in rural areas and opportunities for Myanmar’s General Administration Department (GAD) to engage with and understand local needs and identify approaches to address them. Grassroots governance-building is relevant even in the context of democratic recession. Despite countervailing pressures resulting from Myanmar’s non-democratic or anti-democratic past and the continuing authoritarian pressures from its military leadership, we have seen notable democratic innovation occurring in obscure rural corners of the nation. Women, ethnic groups, and other historically marginalised interests have found a democratic voice and material roles to play into identifying their needs and actions to address them through emerging democratic processes at the sub-township level of governance.

M. Cifuentes British Council, Yangon, Myanmar e-mail: [email protected] J. Roche Federal University of Goiás, Goiânia, Brazil e-mail: [email protected]

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Background Since gaining independence in 1948, Myanmar has experienced domestic conflict involving ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) and militarised and centralised institutions dominated by a Buddhist Bamar elite (Jolliffe, 2014)1 that has used a form of “coercive centralism” within the executive, legislature, judiciary, and government ministries (Plunkett, 2021, 253). The 2015 elections resulted in a semi-democratic government, which was forced to work around this “coercive centralism” and produced modest reform with the little meaningful democratic transition. Some progress occurred prior to the 2015 elections when the National League for Democracy (NLD) party elected 100-household leaders. This offered potential for grassroots-level participation in GAD administrative matters (Batcheler, 2018). Further reform occurred in 2018 when the NLD-led government announced it was transferring GAD from the militarycontrolled Ministry of Home Affairs to the civilian Ministry of the Office of the Union Government (UG).2 Reforming GAD was key to Myanmar’s political transformation, particularly in building institutions of subnational governance, including inclusive participatory governance at the lowest levels of governance. Although the military perpetuated conflict, the government and EAOs engaged in a collaboration that acknowledged subnational autonomy to end conflict and bring peace, stability, and economic development to all ethnic groups (Lee, 2014; Kipgen, 2015). Yet, some researchers have characterised Myanmar’s democratisation as the Bamar political elite controlling national governmental institutions, while other ethnic groups are limited in participating in governance at all levels (e.g., South & Lall,

1 The Myanmar government officially recognises 135 ethnic groups. Major groups include the majority Bamar ethnic group, and the Chin, Karen, Kayah, Kachin, Mon, Rakhine, and Shan, each of which gives its name to a state. This study covers three of these ethnic States: Kayin, Kayah, and Chin. 2 Until 2015, GAD was mainly responsible for the system of district administration. In 1988, it was reformed by the State Law and Order Restoration Council to preserve “peace and stability”, which in practical terms meant a bureaucratic structure for military leaders to exert control in the outermost reaches of the country where GAD operated as its surveillance arm. Currently, GAD controls subnational administration in Myanmar. It consists of a bureaucracy of nearly 36,000 staff that includes the UG headquarters every state and region, district, township, ward, and village tract.

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2017; Smith, 2017; Kyed & Gravers, 2017; Thawnhmung & Yadana, 2017).3 Within a context of national conflict, rural village life has reflected a struggle to maintain local identity, access basic services, and survive pervasive violence despite Myanmar’s institutionalised racism (e.g., Cheesman, 2017; Kyaw, 2019; Bünte et al., 2020). Myanmar’s ethnic states continue to experience poverty, inadequate infrastructure, and limited access to basic services, such as electricity and water. Other public services, including health and education, are scarce and of low quality. There is little access to employment outside agriculture, resulting in large numbers of rural residents—especially young adults—migrating to more prosperous neighbouring countries and to Yangon in search of employment opportunities and a better quality of life (Federer et al., 2015). Two opposing forces—slow democratisation at all levels of governance and institutionalised violence against ethnic group identity and autonomy—are at play in Myanmar’s administration of townships. However, among villages and village tracts within townships, space has been created for developing bottom-up governance processes. Developing local governance capacity and capability among villages and village tracts has involved blending efforts by the government, EAOs, national and regional NGOs, international NGOs (INGOs), community service organisations (CSOs), and other groups (Batcheler, 2018). This is the focus of the current study. This study examines evidence from the work of an INGO, ActionAid Myanmar (AAM), in grassroots governance-building in Chin, Kayah, and Kayin states during this period when democratic practices were introduced during the national and subnational political transition toward democracy. These grassroots efforts paralleled nascent institutional transitions in the operations of the Myanmar civil service and GAD, which provides administration for Myanmar’s districts and townships (Saw & Arnold, 2014).4

3 Democratisation of government institutions has been challenged by barriers including the rise of militant Buddhist extremist and Bamar nationalist groups, lingering interethnic group tensions, lack of trust in the government, and mixed government and EAO territorial and public service provision control (Kipgen, 2015). 4 AAM has played an active role in this local governance-building effort in a variety of states and across many villages, townships, and wards.

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The study expands upon the Myanmar contextualised meaning of “hybrid governance,” which involves GoM and EAOs sharing subnational governance responsibility to include new more inclusive decision-making arenas as part of GAD reform (South, 2018). In light of weak institutions and limited resources, local governance problems in developing settings are often addressed through hybridised solutions that blend efforts of multiple actors (Tun et al., 2020a, 2020b). These actors might include government, EAOs, NGOs, CSOs, business groups, and other interests. In linking their separate capabilities and capacities, they may form temporary informal networks, more formal and permanent networks for co-production (Poocharoen & Ting, 2015), or formalise their collaborative relationships in new hybrid organisational forms that depend on their source interests, but also demonstrate autonomy and operational independence (Tun et al., 2020a, 2020b). In response to extensive local public service problems, weak governance institutions, and limited financial and human resources, we assume that the creation of bottom-up structures and processes of community-led participatory planning and grassroots-level governance development in Myanmar requires a blending of capabilities and capacity among various internal and external actors. This assumption is supported by extensive research across national and local settings (Alfonso, 1997; Schild, 1997; Esteves, 2011; Tun et al., 2020a, 2020b; Crumpton, 2020; Crumpton & Cifuentes, 2020). Additionally, in line with the intent of this volume, we see the forms of grassroots governance-building on the sub-township level as important steps in the direction of democratic innovation in a national setting otherwise characterised by weak democratic norms, structures, and processes.

Study Approach Our study assumes that searching for POE in obscure governancebuilding loci deserves support from analytic tools that assist students of developing nation institution-building, leaders in governance-building, and other intra-national and international stakeholders to better understand the dynamics involved in creating inclusive institution-building processes. The study is premised on a need for analytic tools to assess grassroot-level governance-building in developing settings to understand the interaction among identity, traditional power holders, and the democratisation and functional improvement of institutional arrangements.

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We use hybrid organisation analysis (Lowatcharin et al., 2019; Tun et al., 2020a) to examine how emerging forms of local governance are constructed. The study also uses a concept that we refer to as “proto governance” to assess the extent grassroots efforts progress in governance-building (Crumpton & Cifuentes, 2020). Finally, we assess whether proto governance progress in grassroots governance-building through hybrid organisational arrangements in grassroots settings of Myanmar can be considered POEs. We apply this approach to case studies in Chin, Kayah, and Kayin states. This approach is intended to answer two central research questions: ● Is a multi-dimensional analytic approach that includes hybrid organisation variables, proto governance development, and a POE determination useful in describing and assessing progress in grassroots governance-building in rural villages and village tracts of Myanmar? ● What does the application of this analytic approach yield regarding subject cases in Chin, Kayah, and Kayin states? Evidence upon which we apply this novel analytic approach is taken from recent reports produced by AAM (2020a, 2020b), Crumpton (2020), and Crumpton and Cifuentes (2020) concerning AAM’s governancebuilding projects in Chin, Kayah, and Kayin states of Myanmar. We perform a secondary analysis of evidence produced by AAM-associated researchers.

Analytic Framework The study applies a novel multicomponent analytic approach to assess the hybrid organisation, proto governance, and POE characteristics of three cases of grassroots governance in rural Myanmar. Table 7.1 and Fig. 7.1 summarise the approach and its operationalisation. The approach is applied to the case study settings to assess where they fall on a continuum of “proto governance.” Hybridising characteristics of multiple

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Table 7.1 An analytic model for analysing grassroots governance-building Grassroots governance-building characteristics Hybrid organisation

Proto governance

Pockets of effectiveness

Purpose

Provides conceptual and analytic support to assess how multiple governance actors collaborate to form grassroots governance

Assists in identifying situations of organisational effectiveness in weak institution/governance settings

Analytic approach

Identify: ● Which entities collaborate in governancebuilding ● Relative roles of each entity ● Relative influence of collaborating entities

Describes approaches that build governance capacity and capability that might ultimately lead to roles in government decision-making Assesses the extent to which emerging forms of grassroots governance have developed identity, organisation, process, decision-making, and government linkage characteristics

Assesses the performance of emerging forms of grassroots governance on responsiveness, accountability, and transparency indicators through consideration of analytic results on the hybrid organisation, proto governance, and sustainable local governance dimensions

governance stakeholders resulting in grassroots governance in the case study settings will produce assessable evidence on a continuum of “proto governance.” Following Tun et al. (2020a), by “hybridising” characteristics of multiple stakeholders we mean blending their purposes, objectives, structures, processes, and organisational resources. If sufficient progress toward democratic grassroots governance is discerned in the subject cases as compared to the norm in Myanmar, they might be described as POEs in a setting that otherwise has weak institutions of governance.

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Hybrid organisation

Proto governance

Pocket of effectiveness

Fig. 7.1 Relationships among components of the analytic model for analysing grassroots governance-building

Building Grassroots Governance Through Hybrid Organisation We examine roles played by governance actors (e.g., organiser, leader, participant) and the relative influence (low, medium, high) they exert in emerging governance processes and structures.5 This assessment for each case is presented in Table 7.2, which includes a description of the role played by each governance actor and their level of influence in the governance-building process. Applying the above matrix to the subject cases illustrates the inter-actor organisation and processes involved in grassroots governance-building. Of particular interest is the extent to which grassroot actors play substantive roles and demonstrate levels of influence that indicate the emergence of self-governance and linkages to formal decision-making structures government processes.

5 We do not apply other organisational variables identified by Crumpton and Tun et al., including budgetary characteristics, human resources, and executive leadership that do not apply to nascent governance settings such as those of rural villages and village tracts in Myanmar.

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Table 7.2 Hybridising roles of grassroots governance stakeholders

Governance actor

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Dimension Roles

Level of influence

CSO A CSO B NGO A NGO B Other actor Government EAO

Proto Governance “Proto governance” describes approaches that build governance capacity and capability that might ultimately lead to roles in government decisionmaking. The concept of proto governance recognises the slow, incremental, and contingent nature of grassroots governance-building in Myanmar and other developing settings (Crumpton 2020; Crumpton & Cifuentes, 2020; AAM, 2020a, 2020b). In this study, designation of “proto governance” means nascent governance-building at the grassroots level characterised by capability and capacity-building that leads to but falls short of formal linkages to local government. Based upon existing international research and cumulative grassroots empirical evidence from Myanmar, we suggest the following five “dimensions” (or indicators) of proto governance: 1. Identity development Community identity has long been considered important to community empowerment—both as a means for and an objective of community organising (e.g., Schild, 1997; Campos et al., 2019). Development of community identity can involve villager involvement in identifying community needs, sharing ideas for addressing those needs, and promoting their ideas within local government. Assessing progress toward community identity should also consider barriers encountered by communities.

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2. Organisation development Inclusive participatory development of community organisations is necessary for effective grassroots advocacy (e.g., Barinaga, 2017; Campos et al., 2019). Indicators of progress on this might include the formation of CSOs and CBOs to support participatory decision-making regarding community needs and actions to address them. 3. Process development Effective processes are key to the logic of community engagement (Barinaga, 2018). Although organising to identify community needs and actions to address them supports grassroots governance-building, unless the organisation operates as intended, progress will be limited. Therefore, it is important to assess how well new community development planning entities operate to gauge capacity-building progress. 4. Decision-making Communities making decisions regarding their needs and how those needs should be addressed is essential to grassroots governance-building (Kaufman, 1997). In rural communities in Myanmar, evidence of successful grassroots self-governance capacity and capability-building takes the form of CSOs, CBOs, or similar entities deciding on community priorities and actions to address those priorities. 5. Government linkage development Understanding linkages between micro governance action and formal governing structures is essential to frame new forms of social organisation (Canel, 1997). In Myanmar, the effectiveness of grassroots self-governance through inclusive participatory community development planning can be seen in whether community priorities and recommended project actions are presented to local government officials for inclusion in government planning and budgetary decisions. In this study, we consider whether movement on these dimensions across the subject cases has been “low,” “medium,” or “high.” Progress

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can be considered on a continuum that ultimately leads to forms of grassroots governance realising formal linkages to governance. Pockets of Effectiveness (POE) Soe et al. (2019) introduced the concept of POE as a lens for examining institution and governance-building in Myanmar. Their approach was stimulated by the work of Leonard (2008, 2010), Grindle (1997), Roll (2014), and Kuwajima (2016), who considered the value of identifying cases of governance effectiveness in weak institutions and ineffective governance settings. This view asserts that international development literature has tended to judge governance-building in developing nations in simplistic terms regarding whether they represent “good” or “sound” governance. As a result, some situations wherein effectiveness has been realised have been overlooked. Soe et al. (2019) introduced an approach to POE analysis that considers progress on the responsiveness, accountability, and transparency (RAT) dimensions of good governance to assess progress toward POE designation. We consolidate evidence concerning the subject cases on their hybrid organisation and proto governance experience to consider if they demonstrate responsiveness, accountability, and transparency to warrant designation as POEs in Myanmar’s weak local governance context. Our understanding of “weak local governance” is based upon a synthesis of Batcheler’s (2018) analysis of subnational governance in Myanmar with ActionAid’s (2020a), Crumpton’s (2020), and Crumpton and Cifuentes’s (2020) descriptions of pre-grassroots governance-building conditions in the areas considered in the study. We also consider the potential of emerging forms of grassroots governance in the subject settings to support strategies 4 and 5 of the Myanmar Sustainable Development Plan (MSDP). Considering the early-days status of the cases studied, this assessment is limited to a tentative and contingent heuristic assessment. We also see this analytic approach as useful to assessing democratic innovation progress at the grassroots level in Myanmar.

The Cases The cases considered in this study are examples of AAM’s work in rural settings to develop grassroots self-governing capacity and capability

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to address community problems. These rural settings are villages and village tracts in Chin, Kayah, and Kayin states where AAM has worked to introduce democratic innovation in the form of inclusive participatory planning to address community development needs. The following discussion summarises each case. Source material includes programme documentation from AAM, including project reports and evaluations. Cases 1 and 2: Kayin and Chin States Although Myanmar experienced political and economic changes over the decade prior to the February 2021 military coup, the rural villages of Chin and Kayin States continue to face extreme poverty, inadequate infrastructure, limited access to basic public services, and outward migration by young people (Federer et al., 2015; Crumpton, 2020; Crumpton & Cifuentes, 2020). In response to this situation, AAM established a fellowship programme to train young villagers to facilitate community-led development and lead rural communities to adapt to current challenges and plan for a more desirable and sustainable future (Ferretti, 2010, 2015; Löfving, 2011; Crumpton, 2020; Crumpton & Cifuentes, 2020). This programme, which has been central to AAM’s grassroots governance-building efforts across Myanmar, can be assessed as a form of democratic innovation that emphasises community participation and the inclusion of women, young people, and other historically marginalised groups to identify community needs and prioritise actions to address them. This process of self-definition facilitated by village fellows funded by AAM produces a strengthened sense of community, trust across gender, ethnicity and other identities, and self-empowerment for the village as a whole and its component parts. In the AAM model, the participatory planning process is led by fellows and results in the production of “village books,” a tool introduced by AAM to document evidence of villager collaboration. The books identify village needs and project and programme priorities that villagers agree should be introduced to address those needs. Village books also function as concrete advocacy tools that support the efforts of villagers as they seek improvements for their communities with governing authorities (Crumpton, 2020). AAM’s approach assumes that community members can organise to define their needs, identify solutions, and create action plans to address community needs in their village contexts and according to their terms (Crumpton, 2020).

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The current study considers two fellowship projects in Kayin and Chin States: ● The Empowering Communities in Mon and Kayin States (SIRP II) project initiated in 2016 and ending in January 2020, sought to help vulnerable communities and support the voluntary return and settlement of people displaced by conflict. It focused on the development of young leaders and strengthening inclusive participatory community decision-making. It also sought to build village advocacy capabilities to make the government aware of community needs and improve public service delivery (Crumpton, 2020). The current study only considers the Kayin State experience. ● The Changemakers: Empowering communities in Kayin and Chin States project started in 2016 and ended in December 2019. It addressed economic and social needs of vulnerable families and communities by developing young community leaders as AAM fellows. AAM trained fellows and community volunteers to mobilise community members through the establishment of village community-based organisations (VCBOs). Fellows and volunteers helped their communities analyse the causes of their poverty and vulnerability to social, economic, and environmental problems. Fellows helped communities create action plans to overcome these challenges. The project focused on gender equality and empowerment of young female leaders. In Chin State, the project involved collaboration with a local NGO, Hualngo Land Development Organisation (HLDO). Case 3: Kayah State Kayah State has experienced civil unrest for the past 60 years. Despite being the nation’s smallest state, it has ten ethno-linguistic groups. Kayah’s rural villagers tend to live in extreme poverty complicated by the scarcity of arable land, poor infrastructure, and inaccessible markets. Environmental degradation, inadequate healthcare and education, and widespread health problems add to the daily challenges faced by rural villagers (Crumpton & Cifuentes, 2020). AAM proposed that CBOs involving collaboration among villages and ethnic groups could cooperate to identify solutions to common problems,

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negotiate with township authorities for governmental support of community projects, and engender greater inter-ethnic understanding and peace. Thus, AAM collaborated with the Local Development Network (LDN) to introduce the Strengthening Community Led Development (SCLD) project to identify village and inter-village needs, design projects and programmes to address these needs and seek support from the government (Crumpton & Cifuentes, 2020). The project moved beyond the pre-existing individual village focus of the AAM fellowship programme to promote inter-village cooperation. This model engages representatives of villages that comprise village tracts in a collective community-based organisation, the Village Tract Community Based Organisation (VTCBO).

Findings and Analysis This section summarises findings from the source research for each case and synthesises evidence across the cases on the dimensions and indicators identified in this study’s analytic framework. Chin State Our analysis of grassroots governance-building in Chin State relied upon evidence from AAM’s (2020a) report, Strengthening Rural Communities Through Fellow-Led Community Development in Chin State, Myanmar and Crumpton and Cifuentes’s (2020) summary of the study findings. The study was conducted in 80 village tracts of Falam Township to consider how AAM fellows impact community power dynamics and leadership in terms of inclusion of women and youth in community decision-making structures and processes. Using a participatory research approach, it examined what factors strengthen village change processes. Interviews were conducted with 32 respondents including fellows, village members, village volunteers, village heads, community-based organisation members, women’s self-help group members, and HLDO employees.

Findings and Analysis Crumpton and Cifuentes (2020) reported that the community development process led by AAM fellows in Chin State offers potential to change traditional relationships among village stakeholders and facilitate grassroots governance-building. In many villages, participatory processes

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that improve community members’ capabilities and emphasise contributions from the entire community have been successfully introduced. Weak structures and collaborative processes became better organised and exhibited greater self-sufficiency and capability to identify and prioritise village needs and find solutions. In communities where village-level affairs were formerly controlled by village leaders, elders, and household heads, village young people and women increased engagement in community decision-making. Women and other marginalised villagers are participating in village activities and have raised awareness of their ideas regarding village planning. While traditional gendering of roles in village affairs has not been eliminated, progress has been realised in reducing inequality experienced by women and other marginalised groups. The formation of village-level governance structures and processes can be seen in women’s self-help groups (WSHGs) and VCBOs that have contributed to the organisational capability and capacity in the subject villages and offer opportunities for more inclusive ways to identify and act upon common interests. The process of creating village books encouraged participatory community planning, supported organisation of CBOs, and facilitated negotiation for funding of village projects with government authorities. However, while village organisational capabilities are emerging, support provided by AAM and HLDO was essential to villagelevel governance-building progress. Thus, the sustainability of progress is highly contingent on these outside sources of support and expertise. Other barriers remain to broadly inclusive participatory grassroots governance among the villages of Chin State. These include basic facts of daily rural life in low-resource village settings. Villagers struggle to make ends meet and, since they must focus on time-consuming agriculture work, they have little “spare” time to contribute to village affairs. They often lack the technical skills needed to implement projects such as coffee plantation planting or water projects. Traditional norms and power relationships based on patrimony and established hierarchical relationships are also resilient barriers to changing village governance. Religious norms and limited access to education contribute to the entrenchment of power imbalances between men and women. As a result, transforming deep-rooted socio-cultural norms and values will take time. A central barrier to institutionalising grassroots governance change in Chin State involves relationships between villages and the local level of GAD. AAM (2020a) and Crumpton and Cifuentes (2020) found that the negotiation with local government officials is an area wherein many

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villages are limited in their ability to effectively act upon their interests. Villagers’ lack of familiarity with government decision-making, lack of fluency in Burmese, and the government’s unwillingness to recognise local village planning as legitimate decision-making have limited their success with the government. The government recognises traditional leadership forms as more legitimate. Kayah State To analyse grassroots governance-building in Kayah State, we relied upon evidence from AAM’s (2020b) study, Analysis of Community-led Development in Kayah: Challenges and Lessons from Collective Community Leadership and in a summary of the findings produced by Crumpton and Cifuentes (2020). AAM analysed the effectiveness of the SCLD project and the impact of collective agency in strengthening communityled development and shifting power dynamics. The researchers applied four theoretical concepts: community philanthropy, intersectionality, power, and agency. The concept of community philanthropy allowed the researchers “to theorise the process of strengthening community-led development” (Bridge, 2020, 2). The researchers collected data via semistructured key informant interviews, focus group discussions (FGDs), and participant observation. A total of 100 respondents participated in the research.

Findings and Analysis Creating village tract community-based organisations (VTCBOs) was central to grassroots governance-building in Kayah State. This approach was supported by other village-level actions intended to involve women in grassroots governance, including the formation of WSHGs. VTCBOs were intended to identify common needs among villages that comprise village tracts, develop proposals for projects to address those needs, and lobby local government to include project proposals in governmental budgets. Crumpton and Cifuentes (2020) reported that progress was made in proving the value of the VTCBO approach. This was evidenced by growing villager participation in VTCBO planning activities and villager trust in the VTCBO concept. Crumpton and Cifuentes (2020) found that VTCBOs offer potential as grassroots governance tools to serve the efficiency and effectiveness

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interests of villages, village tract administration, and township governance. VTCBO action plans present grassroot priorities to the government and help officials better understand inter-village needs and priorities. VTCBOs can help empower villages in township decision-making. There is evidence that VTCBOs support good governance objectives of responsiveness, accountability, and transparency. Crumpton and Cifuentes (2020) found VTCBOs can help groups of villages “see” the governance structures and processes that frame community development. This results in opportunities for representing village interests in government decision-making and assessing whether government administrators are responsive to their needs and accountable for their actions. VTCBOs can also help the government better understand what communities need, want, and prioritise for action. They offer platforms for feedback for the government to improve its responsiveness, accountability, effectiveness, and efficiency performance. They can be two-way conduits to mobilise village and village tract level support for strategies 1.4 and 1.5 of the MSDP (MPE, 2018). Crumpton and Cifuentes (2020) describe VTCBOs as “twoway accountability bridge[s] between village tracts and government.” (8) This bridging quality offers opportunities for communities to monitor if projects are implemented as intended. VTCBOs can offer checks and balances to assure development work headed by administrators at village and village tract levels is executed in the best interests of the villages affected, while also dovetailing with national government effectiveness and sustainable development. Several barriers have impeded VTCBO effectiveness as carriers of inclusive grassroots self-governance. They often do not possess the technical competence needed to propose and implement projects or financial resources for basic operating expenses. These limitations result in dependence on AAM, LDN, and other NGOs, thus challenging their self-governing capacity. VTCBOs depend on outside expertise in group identification development and organisation, which are essential to their establishment and operation (Crumpton & Cifuentes, 2020). Other barriers have impeded VTCBO functioning. VTCBO inclusiveness has been challenged by the reality of Myanmar rural life. Due to extreme poverty and an urgent need to work, most villagers do not have time to participate in VTCBO and other village activities. This has resulted in frequent villager and volunteer VTCBO participant turnover. Additionally, even though the inclusion of women, young villagers, and other historically marginalised groups has been emphasised

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in WSHGs and VTCBOs, inclusive participatory grassroots governance via the VTCBO approach is challenged by deeply rooted Myanmar values and norms that limit the roles of women through patriarchic patterns including dominance of older men in village decision-making (Crumpton & Cifuentes, 2020). The most basic barrier to the effective operation of VTCBOs may be limited recognition by villagers and the government of their legitimacy, both in terms of representing grassroots interests and as meaningful participants in government planning and budget decision-making. Yet, because some VTCBOs have realised some success on both fronts, the potential for them to play important roles can be visualised. Positive perceptions of VTCBOs might improve as they produce action plans and obtain government approval for them (Crumpton & Cifuentes, 2020). Kayin State To analyse grassroots governance-building in Kayin State, we used evidence produced by AAM (Crumpton, 2020). Its research utilised the experiences of AAM fellows working in rural villages for a picture of grass-roots governance-building in the form of village-level inclusive participation planning for community development. The Kayin research used a participatory approach based on Feminist Participatory Research (FPR). The research was collaboratively conducted by an AAM researcher and twelve AAM fellows. The study included three townships and their 163 village tracts. Data was collected via 57 key informant interviews and 17 FGDs with AAM fellows, AAM headquarter employees in Yangon, AAM field staff in the capital of Kayin State, villagers, and village and village tract community leaders.

Findings and Analysis AAM fellows led processes of village governance-building involving participatory planning for community development. They provided leadership to support grassroots self-governance and creation of VCBOs and WSHGs. These new structures and processes became components of participatory planning to produce village books. This community development process sought to introduce a shift in the traditional role

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definition of women and modify power dynamics experienced by men and women. Women played essential roles in village book development. Formation of WSHGs strengthened the self-identity/empowerment of village women. Although progress was realised, traditional ideas regarding women’s “proper” role in the home and community were a continuing barrier to their realisation of equality in village decision-making (Crumpton, 2020). Fellows also took on representational responsibilities in dealing with village chiefs and administrators, the government, and EAOs. Fellows developed roles in negotiating with government and EAO representatives, jointly or separately, indicating a structural shift in village governance. The voice of villagers represented by fellows as they dealt with these entities indicated that villager-centric participatory planning can potentially influence institutional holders of power over village futures (Crumpton, 2020). A problem is that this approach to community development is having little impact on the structures and processes of local government (Crumpton, 2020). VCBOs and WSHGs have not been incorporated into decision-making processes nor have permanent links been established between village participatory planning to government or EAO decision-making. While the AAM model offers grassroots-level governance-building to Kayin villages that represents proto governance, it has not been institutionalised to become part of the formal decisionmaking. Synthesising the Evidence Table 7.3 translates findings on each case in terms of the study’s hybrid organisation analytic approach. It shows village and village tract interests across the cases exhibit low to moderate influence on grassroots governance, while NGO, government, and EAOs exhibit moderate to high influence. Table 7.4 and Fig. 7.2 interpret the evidence on dimensions of proto governance and progress toward proto governance. Overall, progress on creating formal linkages to government has been moderate to date. As reflected in Fig. 7.2., future progress toward grassroots governance-building will likely depend on what happens in the aftermath of the 2021 coup and levels of support from the government and NGOs.

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Table 7.3 Hybrid organisation analysis State

Chin

Governance actor

Dimension of analysis Roles

Level of influence/Discussion

VCBOs

Participate in village decision-making; lobby government

WSHGs

Participate in village decision-making

Traditional village leaders

Participate in village decision-making; lobby government

Local NGO

Train participants; guide organizational efforts; provide financial support

National NGO

Train participants; guide organizational efforts; provide financial support

Government

Makes decisions on village projects to fund

Medium High on identifying community needs and solutions; low on influencing government decisions Low Medium on identifying community needs and solutions; low on influencing government decisions. Reflects historic barriers to participation of women Medium High on identifying community needs and solutions; low/medium on influencing government decisions—government recognizes traditional leadership forms as more legitimate than new forms Medium High on organizing new village governance forms; low on influencing government Medium/High High on organizing new village governance forms; low/medium on influencing government High In that it alone makes final decisions, it dominates grassroots governance

(continued)

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Table 7.3 (continued) State

Governance actor

Dimension of analysis Roles

Kayah

VTCBOs

WSHGs

Traditional village leaders

LDN

AAM

Level of influence/Discussion

Participate in inter-village decision-making; lobby government

Low Medium on identifying community needs and solutions; low on full engagement with all village tract communities; low on influencing government decisions Participate in village Low decision-making Medium on identifying community needs and solutions; low on influencing government decisions. Low level of influence reflects historic barriers to participation of women Participate in village and Medium inter-village decisionmaking; High on dominating lobby government village level decision-making and connecting across villages; low/medium on influencing government decisions—government recognizes traditional leadership forms as more legitimate than new forms Train participants; guide Medium organizational efforts; High on organizing provide financial support new village governance forms; low on influencing government Train participants; guide Medium organizational efforts; High on organizing provide financial support new village governance forms; low on influencing government

(continued)

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Table 7.3 (continued) State

Kayin

Governance actor

Dimension of analysis Roles

Level of influence/Discussion

Government

Makes decisions on village and village tract projects to fund

VCBOs

Participate in village decision-making; lobby government

WSHGs

Participate in village decision-making

Traditional village leaders

Participate in village decision-making; lobby government

AAM

Train participants; guide organizational efforts; provide financial support

Government

Makes decisions on village projects to fund

High In that it alone makes final decisions, it dominates grassroots governance Medium High on identifying community needs and solutions; low on influencing government decisions Low Medium on identifying community needs and solutions; low on influencing government decisions. Reflects historic barriers to participation of women. Medium High on identifying community needs and solutions; low/medium on influencing government decisions—government recognizes traditional leadership forms as more legitimate than new forms Medium High on organizing new village governance forms; low on influencing government High In that areas that it has control, it alone makes final decisions, it dominates grassroots governance

(continued)

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Table 7.3 (continued) State

Governance actor

EAOs

Dimension of analysis Roles

Level of influence/Discussion

Makes decisions on village projects to fund

High In that areas that they are in control, they alone make final decisions and dominate grassroots governance

Table 7.4 Proto governance analysis Case

Chin Kayah Kayin

Dimension Identity development

Organisation development

Process development

Decision-making

Government linkage development

Medium Medium Medium

Medium Medium Medium

Medium Medium Medium

Medium Medium Medium

Low Moderate Low

Are These Pockets of Effectiveness? Analysis of hybrid organisation and proto governance dimensions of grassroots governance-building in rural villages and village tracts of Chin, Kayah, and Kayin states lead to a tentative assessment that the cases might be POEs. “Tentative” must be emphasised for at least three reasons. First, progress in these cases has been dependent on the support of outside actors—AAM and state-level NGOs. Without this support, it is questionable whether these forms of grassroots governance can survive. Second, the lack of widespread villager engagement and tepid recognition by the government and EAOs of their legitimacy indicate that they are far from institutionalised parts of local governance. If these challenges can be overcome and these forms of grassroots governance demonstrate that they reliably represent community interests as useful governance partners for the government and EAOs, they could be assessed as “POEs.” The third and most troubling qualifier involves what will follow the February 2021

No progress

Moderate Progress

Progress to-date

Fig. 7.2 Proto governance progress to date and alternative futures

Progress on identity, organization & process development, decisionmaking & formal government linkage indicators Formal linkage to government

Low

Moderate

High

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coup. Rather than speculate on what the future will hold, we can only hope for the best. This study offers evidence that the subject nascent forms of grassroots governance could have been useful tools for GAD to strengthen its capacity and capability to support subnational governance on a democratic pathway. These bottom-up forms of governance offer opportunities to better understand grassroots needs and approaches to address them, as well as build trust among grassroots leaders. Had the democratic transition continued, these POEs could have offered new opportunities to build grassroots-level support for and participation in Myanmar’s national sustainable development plan (MSDP). These examples of grassroots governance-building in rural areas historically defined by inter-ethnic tensions and violence could have supported Strategy 1.4, which calls for “[enhancing] good governance, institutional performance and improving the efficiency of administrative decision-making at all levels” and Strategy 1.5, which envisions “[increasing] the ability of all people to engage with government” (MPE, 2018, i). Despite the changes in circumstances, these POEs remain opportunities for historically marginalised ethnic communities to collaborate to improve the odds that they review governmental benefits.

Conclusions, Discussion, and Implications The militarised political context in Myanmar indicates that political reforms, such as semi-democratic engagement with GAD, will not continue. More likely, GAD will revert to its role as a tool for surveillance rather than service delivery improvement and inclusive decision-making at lower administrative levels. Despite the post-coup changes, a better understanding of grassroots governance in historically marginalised ethnic areas of Myanmar offers lessons for the nation’s future, as well as for other fragile countries. The evidence that we offer here also offers hope regarding the potential for introducing democratic innovation at the most basic level of politics and political analysis, despite regime instability and general institutional instability. Even in the event that the military were to eliminate programmes such as AAM’s entirely, the capacity building at the grassroots level has the potential for remaining. This study’s novel analytic approach is useful in describing characteristics of grassroots governance-building efforts. Evidence was produced on whether these grassroots governance-building efforts have made progress

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in terms of hybrid organisation and proto governance, such that they might be designated as “pockets of effectiveness.” The analytic approach contributes to understanding how such grassroots governance-building could have played a role in reforming GAD through development of networks of trust. However, this bottom-up governance approach requires interest and support from government such that citizens are encouraged to participate in local decision-making arenas. A governance picture dominated by military control does not offer hope for this in the foreseeable future. This study has highlighted concerns to be addressed in Myanmar for successful grassroots governance-building. Because of capacity and capability limitations, villages and village tracts depend on NGO actors. Their status as institutionalised parts of local governance is challenged by lack of legitimacy in the eyes of the government. Addressing these matters underlines a central assumption of this study: that development and institutionalisation of forms of grassroots governance will require time and patience among the NGOs that fund them, and that the government must assume an active role in promoting their development. Another barrier to institutionalising grassroots governance-building in Myanmar lies beyond the evidence on the three cases considered. It involves the institutional weakness of the GAD on the local level. Local government in Myanmar reflects challenges on the village level: inadequate capacity and capability, and lack of human and financial resources to effectively engage with, encourage, and support grassroots governance-building (e.g., Batcheler, 2018). The study’s results should be considered in light of its limitations. Aside from the military coup’s impact, perhaps the most important limitation is its novel analytic approach that has not been previously used. It has also relied upon secondary analysis of research that itself includes limitations. There are also notable contextual differences among the study settings. For example, in Kayin State, EAOs were involved in local governance, and the relationships between them, government, and villages had to be considered. This was not true in Chin and Kayah States. Despite these limitations, the study offers much for future study of grassroots governance-building in Myanmar and other developing settings. The international discourse emphasises the importance of effective governance at all levels of governance for realising sustainable development objectives (e.g., Farazmand, 2004; Stojanovi´c et al., 2016; UNESC, 2018; Glass & Newig, 2019; Ramzy et al., 2019). This study’s

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evidence supports the idea that grassroots governance-building involving villages and village tracts can play an important role in the pursuit of Myanmar’s sustainable development objectives as represented in the MSDP. It can also offer a source of democratic innovation that might ultimately contribute to inducing a change in the direction of democratic institution-building at higher levels of the nation’s governance. For Myanmar, the study should be useful for continuing the study of grassroots governance-building cases and comparative inter-contextual studies of such. A specific application might be in evaluation research to determine the need for, and the design, implementation, and evaluation of the performance of interventions to promote governance and democratic institution-building on the sub-township level. Our analytic approach might be valuable in other developing settings for considering individual cases and in inter-contextual comparisons. It also should be useful to international organisations that promote democratic innovation to support sustainable development and governance approaches that facilitate it.

References ActionAid Myanmar (AAM) (2020a). Strengthening Rural Communities Through Fellow-Led Community Development in Chin State, Myanmar. Yangon, MM: ActionAid, retrieved from https://myanmar.actionaid.org/sites/myanmar/ files/publications/Strengthening%20Rural%20Community%20Development% 20in%20Chin%20State%20Myanmar.pdf ActionAid Myanmar (AAM) (2020b). Analysis of Community-led Development in Kayah: Challenges and Lessons from Collective Community Leadership. Ynagon, MM: ActionAid, retrieved from https://myanmar.actionaid.org/ sites/myanmar/files/publications/Community%20Led%20Development% 20in%20Kayah.pdf Alfonso, H.D. (1997). Political Decentralization and Popular Alternatives: A View from the South. In M. Kaufman & H.D. Alfonso (Eds.), Community Power and Grassroots Democracy, pp. 170–188. London: Zed Books Ltd. Barinaga, E. (2017). Tinkering with space: The Organisational Practices of a Nascent Social Venture. Organisation Studies, 38(7): 937–958. Barinaga, E. (2018). Coopted! Mission Drift in a Social Venture Engaged in a Cross-Sectoral Partnership. VOLUNTAS: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organisations, 31: 437–449. Batcheler, R. (2018). State and Region Governments in Myanmar. Yangon, MM: The Asia Foundation.

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Bridge Consultancy (Bridge) (2020). Community Led Development in Kayah: Challenges and Lesssons from Collective Community Leadership. Yangon, MM: ActionAid, retrieved from https://myanmar.actionaid.org/publicati ons/2020/community-led-development-kayah Bünte, M., Köllner, P. & Roewer, R. (2020). Taking Stock of Myanmar’s Political Transformation Since 2011. Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, 38(3): 249–264. Campos, M.J.Z., Barinaga, E., Kain, J-H., Oloko, M. & Zapata, P. (2019). Organising Grassroots Initiatives for a More Inclusive Governance: Constructing the City from Below. Stockholm: Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency—SIDA, retrieved from https://www.local2030.org/library/ 676/Organising-grassroots-initiatives-for-a-more-inclusive-governance-Constr ucting-the-city-from-below.pdf Canel, E. (1997). New Social Movement Theory and Resource Mobilization Theory: The Need for Integration. In M. Kaufman & H.D. Alfonso (Eds.), Community Power and Grassroots Democracy, pp. 189–221. London: Zed Books Ltd. Cheesman, N. (2017). How in Myanmar ‘National Races’ Came to Surpass Citizenship and Exclude Rohingya. Journal of Contemporary Asia, 47(3): 461–483. Crumpton, C.D. (2020). Like Wax of a Candle: Youth-led Community Development in Kayin State, Myanmar, Key Highlights. Yangon, MM: ActionAid. Crumpton, C.D. & Cifuentes, M. (2020). Research Brief: Learning from the Community-led Development Processes in Chin and Kayah States, Myanmar. Yangon, MM: ActionAid. Esteves, A.M. (2011). Grassroots Mobilization, Co-production of Public Policy and the Promotion of Participatory Democracy by the Brazilian Solidarity Economy Movement. Providence, RI: Brown University. Farazmand, A. (2004). Building Partnerships for Sound Governance. In A. Farazmand (Ed.), Sound Governance: Policy and Administrative Innovations, pp. 77–98. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers. Federer, J.P., Hansen, J.M., Khen, S.I. & Waa, N.L.S. (2015). Why Gender Matters in Conflict and Peace: Perspectives from Mon and Kayin States, Myanmar. Bangkok: UN Women, retrieved from https://asiapacific.unw omen.org/en/digital-library/publications/2015/11/why-gender-matters-inconflict-and-peace Ferretti, S. (2010). Fellows and Civil Society. Yangon: ActionAid, retrieved from https://actionaid.org/sites/default/files/fellows_and_civil_society_-_final_ report.pdf Ferretti, S. (2015). Change Makers: Transforming Myanmar from Within: Final Evaluation of SIDA-funded Programme. Yangon: ActionAid Myanmar.

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Glass, L.-M. & Newig, J. (2019). Governance for Achieving the Sustainable Development Goals: How Important Are Participation, Policy Coherence, Reflexivity, Adaptation and Democratic Institutions? Earth System Governance, 2. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.esg.2019.100031 Grindle, M.S. (1997). Divergent Cultures? When Public Organizations Perform Well in Developing Countries. World Development, 25(4), 481–495. Jolliffe, K. (2014). Ethnic Conflict and Social Services in Myanmar’s Contested Regions. Yangon: The Asia Foundation. Kaufman, M. (1997). Community Power, Grassroots Democracy, and the Transformation of Social Life. In M. Kaufman & H.D. Alfonso (Eds.), Community Power and Grassroots Democracy, pp. 1–24. London: Zed Books Ltd. Kipgen, N. (2015). Ethnic Nationalities and the Peace Process in Myanmar. Social Research, 82(2): 399–425. Kuwajima, K. (2016). Deciphering Capacity Development Through the Lenses of “Pockets of Effectiveness”—A Case of Innovative Turnaround of the Phnom Penh Water Supply Authority, Cambodia. Tokyo, Japan: JICA Research Institute. Kyaw, K.K. (2019). Adulteration of Pure Native Blood by Aliens? Mixed Race Kapya in Colonial and post-Colonial Myanmar. Social Identities, 25(3): 345– 359. Kyed, H.M. & Gravers, M. (2017). Representation and Citizenship in the Future Integration of Ethnic Armed Actors in Myanmar/Burma. In A. South & M. Lall (Eds.), Citizenship in Myanmar: Ways of Being in and from Burma, pp. 59–87. Singapore: ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute. Lee, L. (2014). Myanmar’s Transition to Democracy: New Opportunities or Obstacles for India? Contemporary Southeast Asia, 36(2): 290–316. Leonard, D.K. (2008). Where Are ‘Pockets’ of Effective Agencies Likely in Weak Governance States and Why? A Propositional Inventory. Working Paper 306. Brighton, UK: Institute of Development Studies, retrieved from http://www. ntd.co.uk/idsbookshop/details.asp?id=1049 Leonard, D.K. (2010). ‘Pockets’ of Effective Agencies in Weak Governance States: Where Are They Likely and Why Does It Matter? Public Administration and Development, 30: 91–101. Löfving, A. (2011). A Force for Change: Achievements of the Fellowship Programme in Myanmar. Yangon: ActionAid Myanmar. Lowatcharin, G., Crumpton, C.D. & Pacharoen, S. (2019). Intergovernmental Relations in a World of Governance: A Consideration of International Experiences, Challenges, and New Directions. Asia-Pacific Social Science Review, 19(4): 44–55. McCourt, W. (2018). New Directions for Public Service Reform in Developing Countries. Public Administration and Development, 38, 120–129.

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Ministry of Planning and Finance (MPE) (2018). Myanmar Sustainable Development Plan. Naypyidaw, MM: The Government of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, Ministry of Planning and Finance, retrieved from https://the mimu.info/sites/themimu.info/files/documents/Core_Doc_Myanmar_Sust ainable_Development_Plan_2018-_2030_Aug2018.pdf Plunkett, A. (2021). The Constitution of Myanmar: A Contextual Analysis. International Affairs, 97(1): 253–254. Poocharoen, O. & Ting, B. (2015). Collaboration, Coproduction, Networks— Convergence of Theories. Public Management Review, 17(4): 587–614. Ramzy, O., El Bedaway, R., Anwar, M. & Eldahn, O. (2019). Sustainable Development and Good Governance. European Journal of Sustainable Development, 8(2): 125–138. https://doi.org/10.14207/ejsd.2019 Roll, M. (2014). The State That Works: A ‘Pockets Of Effectiveness’ Perspective on Nigeria and Beyond. In T. Bierschenk & J.-P. O. de Sardan (Eds.), States at Work: Dynamics of African Bureaucracies. pp. 365–398. Brill. http://www. jstor.org/stable/10.1163/j.ctv2gjwx4m.20 Roll, M. (2015). Pockets of Effectiveness: Review and Analytic Framework. In M. Roll (Ed.), The Politics of Public Sector Performance: Pockets of Effectiveness, pp. 22–42. New York, NY: Routledge. Saw, K.P.C. & Arnold, M. (2014). Administering the State in Myanmar: An Overview of the General Administration Department. Discussion paper no. 6. Myanmar Development Resource Institute’s Centre for Economic and Social Development and The Asia Foundation, retrieved from https://asiafound ation.org/resources/pdfs/GADEnglish.pdf Schild, V. (1997). The Hidden Politics of Neighborhood Organisations: Women and Local Participation in the Pobaciones of Chile. In M. Kaufman & H.D. Alfonso (Eds.), Community Power and Grassroots Democracy, pp. 126–150. London: Zed Books Ltd. Smith, M. (2017). Ethnic Politics and Citizenship in History. In A. South & M. Lall (Eds.), Citizenship in Myanmar: Ways of Being in and from Burma, pp. 26–58. Singapore: ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute. Soe, P.P., Grichawat, L., Crumpton, C.D. & Draper, J. (2019). Searching for ‘Pockets of Effectiveness’ in Weak Governance States: Preliminary Examination of the Securities and Exchange Commission of Myanmar. Australian Journal of Public Administration. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8500. 12408. South, A. (2018). “Hybrid Governance” and the Politics of Legitimacy in the Myanmar Peace Process. Journal of Contemporary Asia, 48(1): 50–66. https://doi.org/10.1080/00472336.2017.1387280 South, A. & Lall, M. (2017). Introduction. In A. South & M. Lall (Eds.), Citizenship in Myanmar: Ways of Being in and from Burma, pp. 1–25. Singapore: ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute.

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Stojanovi´c, I., Ateljevi´c, J. & Stevi´c, S. (2016). Good Governance as a Tool of Sustainable Development. European Journal of Sustainable Development, 5(4): 558–573. https://doi.org/10.14207/ejsd.2016.v5n4p558 Thawnhmung, A.M. & Yadana (2017). Citizenship and Minority Rights: The Role of “National Race Affairs” Ministers in Myanmar’s 2008 Constitution. In A. South & M. Lall (Eds.), Citizenship in Myanmar: Ways of Being in and from Burma, pp. 113–140. Singapore: ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute. Tun, S.K.T., Lowatcharin, G., Crumpton, C.D. & Kamnaunsilpa, P. (2020a). Responding to Challenges in Local Governance: Comparing Hybrid Organisational Responses in Urban Areas of Thailand and Myanmar. Journal of Mekong Societies, 16(3). Tun, S.K.T., Lowatcharin, G., Kamnaunsilpa, P. & Crumpton, C.D. (2020b). Considering the Responsiveness, Accountability and Transparency Implications of Hybrid Organisation in Local Governance: A Comparison of Public Service Provision Approaches in Myanmar and Thailand. Asia-Pacific Social Science Review, 21(2). UNESC (2018). Principles of Effective for Sustainable Development. New York City: United Nations Economic and Social Council, retrieved from https://publicadministration.un.org/Portals/1/Images/CEPA/Princi ples_of_effective_governance_english.pdf

CHAPTER 8

Returned Migrants and Democratization in Village Head Elections in Indonesia: A Glimpse of Hope from Indramayu Khairu Roojiqien Sobandi

Introduction One major reason new democracies are prone to democratic recession is that they lack norms of participation and accountability, particularly in the countryside. This absence of norms of democratic participation often helps traditional elites at the village to survive politically. In countries like the Philippines and Indonesia, scholars have shown that established elites survive in post-transition politics through open and free elections because they succeed in using their wealth, social status, and resource domination to keep their political power (Buehler & Nataatmadja, 2021; Hadiz,

K. R. Sobandi (B) Department of Political Science, University of Jenderal Soedirman (UNSOED), Purwokerto, Indonesia e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 J. Ockey and N. S. Talib (eds.), Democratic Recession, Autocratization, and Democratic Backlash in Southeast Asia, Contestations in Contemporary Southeast Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-9811-9_8

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2010). In Indonesia, over the last two decades, democratization processes have pushed the process of political transition forward. The authoritarian New Order regime broke down in 1997, and democratic institutions have taken their place. However, democratization processes have not developed at the same pace at the national, local, and village levels. As a result, the post-transition period of the reform era in Indonesia has included a series of authoritarian enclaves in which established political elites have succeeded in operating in their old style. The survival of established political elites challenges the study of democratization, especially in breaking up those authoritarian enclaves and preventing democratic recession. This challenge provides opportunities for new elites with different values, such as returned migrants, who bring democratic norms and accountability to the village. This study focuses on returned migrants as a new elite with new values through a case study of a village head election in Indramayu Regency, West Java Province.1 The studied village represents an atypical case study because the returned migrant community has been deeply involved in the village head election. Before the migrant villagers returned to their home village, their village life was marked by strong social hierarchies like many other villages in Java (White & Wiradi, 1979). The New Order era (1966–1998) showed us how elections for village heads are commonly in favor of those villagers who have more wealth or higher status (Latief, 2000). Since the political transformation began in 1998, the supra-village authorities have not been able to intervene in the candidates’ recruitment for the village head elections. This transformation creates new opportunities for new individuals to compete as candidates for village head elections, including returned migrants. This study explores the democratization process through societal support for democratic norms and how democratization has weakened established leaders in the studied village. A remarkable change that has taken place recently is the emergence of returned migrant workers’ community as new elites supporting democratic norms in village elections. Before these returned migrants began to exercise power, the village was governed by an established upper class

1 Data gathered in this paper was first collected during PhD fieldwork in 2018 and subsequently updated. Material for this paper is mainly extracted from Chapter seven of my Ph.D. thesis at the University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand, titled “Transformative journeys: Temporary Indonesian migrant workers and identity change” (Sobandi, 2021).

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that had control of power. Recently, at least in the last two village head elections, these established leaders have been replaced by villagers linked to returned migrant families with a different leadership style. Through the literature on authoritarian enclaves, this chapter argues that economic transformation at the village level and changes in land ownership have facilitated this shift in leadership. This village leadership transformation is related to controlling village resources and mediating the changing class structure as returned migrant villagers claim new status in their home village. Simultaneously, political transformation in the post-transition era has assisted villagers in re-evaluating their village leaders. As a result, we have more democratic village head elections as voters are better informed and consequently encouraged to transfer power away from established elites in the village.

Authoritarian Enclaves, Democratization, and Economic Transformation Open and free elections are expected to facilitate leadership renewal and change. Societal participation and accountability as key elements of the democratization process through electoral democracy have encouraged more public involvement that weakened the established elites, including political families. However, the process of democratization is not always straightforward. The established elites have managed to adapt by altering their strategies to respond to new opportunities and challenges created by the changing political system. At national and regional levels, the established elites often use their economic power to survive in the changing political system, such as through vote buying and personal networks. Within this context, the economic independence of voters is a key component that can create opportunities to weaken the established elites by creating authoritarian enclaves as experienced by some Southeast Asian countries such as Thailand (Ockey, 1998), the Philippines (Sidel, 2004; 2014), and Indonesia (Buehler & Nataatmadja, 2021; Hadiz, 2010). As shown in these scholarly works, the established elites may still survive and continue to hold their power after the authoritarian regimes collapse in these Southeast Asian countries. Following the observations of scholars for national and regional levels, those scholars who focus on village politics also find that the established elites managed to survive because many voters in the village are very much dependent economically on these elites. As a result, we can see that the

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village headmen elections have limited participation and thus, the village government continues to lack transparency and accountability. They often utilize their economic resources, such as owning land, to pressure tenant farmers who work for them to follow their preferences. It is also common for the elites who intended to be the candidate for village head to use their wealth to help them to secure the election through Operation Dawn (Operasi Fajar), a euphemism for vote buying, and providing drinks and snacks (suguhan) for voters (Kammen, 2003, p. 319). It shows that economic pressure on lower-class villagers and vote buying are important factors that can prevent elite transformation. Similarly, Hadiz (2010, p. 119) also noted that to maintain and secure their position, the elites often turn their economic resources into a patronage to sway voters in their favor. Elites may additionally pressure voters through the use of political violence. In a time of socio-economic transformation, authoritarian enclaves will emerge when a small number of upper-class villagers, who dominate economic resources, compete with one another by locking in voters (Scott, 1969, p. 1146), especially those voters who have less autonomy economically (McMann, 2006, pp. 28–31). The elites will secure their domination on economic resources to keep them in power and to diminish any challenges that threaten them from others. This chapter explores returned migrant communities in villages as they have new economic resources from outside their village, creating economic independence and dispersal of economic power, potentially generating power locally in the village. This study focuses on the migrant villagers who returned to their home village with money earned overseas, new skills, knowledge, and new status joining the ranks of the newly rich people (Orang Kaya Baru, OKB). This is not to say that all returned migrants are successful, as many of them also experienced failure in gaining new wealth, but enough returned migrants are considered successful migrant villagers, at least economically. International migration provides new sources of wealth and creates a more diversified economy as returned migrants bring new wealth that creates economic autonomy in their home village (De Haas, 2010) by creating new economic activities such as establishing micro-businesses (Bachtiar & Prasetyo, 2017). However, it is not clear how returned migrant villagers with their external sources of income can contribute to the process of democratization at the village level. As Indonesia is mainly a rural country where most Indonesians live in villages, a study of democratization processes

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through village elections (pemilihan kepala desa, abbreviated as “pilkades”) with the participation of returned migrant villagers with their new wealth and status, may provide a better understanding of democratization processes in rural Indonesia. This study explores how the candidates in village head elections are linked to returned migrant villagers, the role of returned migrant villagers in rural economic transformation, and how they have become a new elite group that weakens the economic power of traditional elites.

Indramayu Regency Indramayu has long been well-known as a major supplier of overseas migrant workers from Indonesia (BNP2TKI, 2019). The high number of overseas migrant workers is due to widespread poverty in Indramayu as well as low levels of education, and economic conditions. In terms of poverty, Indramayu is the second-ranked in West Java province after Kuningan Regency, at 12.7%, well above the provincial average of 7.88% in 2020 (BPS-Statistics West Java Province, 2021, p. 253). Indramayu has one of the lowest ratings among 28 regencies and municipalities in West Java Province on the Human Development Index (HDI) with an HDI ranking of 24th. Additionally, its rank on the Gender-related Development Index (GDI) is 16th (BPS-Statistics West Java Province, 2021). Indramayu’s economy is predominantly agriculture-based; its villagers are well-known for their productivity in agriculture, relying on the agricultural sector for work. Agriculture involves 228,759 villagers (29.48%) (ibid. p. 69); and contributes 19.67% of GRDP (ibid. p. 233). Indramayu was the largest rice-producing area in 2020, contributing 14.78% of the total production of rice in West Java Province (BPS-Statistics West Java Province, 2021: p. 283). However, there is significant inequality between landowners and landless households where the landless are mostly working as agricultural laborers. These landless villagers have short growing times for the rice due to limited water supplies, and thus must find other jobs other than agriculture to earn a living (White & Wirandi, 1979). As a result, the rice-farm laborers changed occupations by migrating to urban areas, and especially traveling out of the country as overseas migrant workers, right after the 1997 financial crisis. Indramayu is a major source of overseas migrant workers from Indonesia; the district is highly ranked among 514 regencies and municipalities in Indonesia in

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this regard, with 23,360 overseas migrant workers in 2019, right before the COVID-19 pandemic hit the world (BNP2TKI, 2019: p. 5). Perhaps closely related to the class structure, Indramayu has been dominated by family politics. A leading member of a prominent political family, Irianto Mahfudz Sidik Syafiuddin (better-known as Yance), closely linked to the Golkar party and the Suharto authoritarian regime, survived and dominated Indramayu for almost two decades despite democratization starting in 1998 through open and free elections. This shows the concentrated nature of economic power at the local level in Indramayu. A village was chosen as the case study where the returned migrant community is dominant, and where roughly around 40% of the adult population are returned migrants and their families (Field notes, January 2018). This village also gained recognition from the national government for its innovation in creating new economic sources and initiating the process of democratization to create a more transparent and accountable village government and facilitate more public participation (ibid.). As this studied village was established in the early 1980s, it is considered a relatively new village in Indramayu. Separating from the parent village, this newly established village was known as one of the poorer villages in Indramayu, with more than 40% of the inhabitants living in poverty (Interview with village head E, 10 January 2018). The upper-class villagers often dominate village economies, especially in land ownership. Only two in ten families here are landholders that dominate 201 hectares of rice fields out of 293 hectares (ibid.). The poor tenant farmers economically depend on the upper-class villagers, creating a patron–client relationship and a strong traditional social hierarchy. The concentrated nature of wealth demonstrates class relations in the village. As seasonal agricultural work is limited, large numbers of landless villagers have migrated to work overseas as temporary migrant workers since the late 1990s. The first-generation migrants from this village were observed by international migration institutions in the early 1980s; from the late 1980s through the 1990s, their involvement in overseas migration became increasingly evident. Many migrants went to the Middle East and worked as domestic workers, construction workers, and landscaping workers. The later migrant generation, particularly after the 1997/1998 financial crisis hit Indonesia, signed up to work overseas as temporary migrant workers in wealthy Asian countries such as Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Japan.

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The Shifting Village Economic Structure Many of the villagers, who went overseas to work as Indonesian temporary migrant workers (Pekerja Migran Indonesia, PMI), came from low-income families with low educational levels. A high number were tenant farmers who worked for the upper-class villagers. As only a few of the wealthiest villagers dominated village lands, their extensive and productive lands provided a guarantee for these wealthy villagers to have relatively stable sources of income throughout the years. In contrast, the poor villagers must struggle for their lives by relying on the wealthy villagers economically. This creates a patron–client relationship between the rich villagers who control the rice fields as patrons and the subsistence farmers, as clients, who have no economic autonomy. This traditional village economic structure has allowed the upperclass villagers to dominate economic activities in the village through the concentration of wealth. It has been difficult for lower-class villagers to achieve upward social mobility because this traditional economic structure provided little room for lower-class villagers to have economic autonomy. Within this context, some lower-class villagers started to look for new jobs outside their village not only for their survival but also to change their life. One way to do this was by seeking high-risk employment to gain a high return by working overseas as PMI. It indicates that such villagers who want to work overseas are those who find a strategic way out from the traditional economic structure for upward social mobility. After working overseas, migrants return to their home village with more money, new knowledge, and confidence, and thus they no longer fit into their previous class, status, and the old economic structure in the village. The migrants’ new economic sources from working overseas have created confusion within the established village economic structure. These migrants returned with externally earned income from outside their village, but then it had no base in the village itself. Many returned migrants described their new life after returning to their home village by showing off their permanent and modern houses with new kiosks, shops, motorcycles, cars, cattle, and rice fields (sawah). They also often talked about their new economic activities in the village, such as online selling through social media marketplaces using mobile phones. This indicates that they are now no longer occupying the same class as before migration. Non-migrant villagers often recognize the changes economically on returned migrant villagers’ lives and call them newly rich people (Orang

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Kaya Baru, OKB). This new label for migrant villagers is a result of their newfound economic activities after they returned to their home village. For example, many migrant villagers demonstrate their new economic power by buying land for their houses and rice fields in the village. In an interview with the secretary of Hortikultura Agrimania of Indramayu in the studied village, he stated, When they [returned migrants or their family members] bought land or rice fields, for example, … 60 bata (equal to 14 m2 x 60 m = 840 m2 or equal to 0.084 hectares) … Then I said Rp 35 million (equal to 3,645 NZD with the assumption 1 NZD = 9,600). [They said] ’Ok, that is it [deal] then tomorrow [ they directly] sent [me] the money! (Interview, 6 February 2018).

Consequently, the concentrated wealth in the village started to disperse as some returned migrant villagers now have their own land for their houses and rice fields. Some wealthy villagers could not resist the temptation to get more money by selling some of their lands at a higher price to returned migrant villagers. … How can you resist such an amount of money they offer you? … When I mention a price, they [some returned migrants] did not overthink about the price as they have the money in the bank from their overseas work to buy a half hectare of my rice fields. … I got around Rp 300 million (equal to 31,250 NZD with the assumption of 1 NZD = 9,600) for a half hectare. … That is too good to turn down! … I am happy to sell my lands to ex-PMI. …Before, I had more than 10 hectares of rice fields [in the village], but now, I only have around 4 hectares of rice fields, but that is fine (Interview with former village head D, 1 March 2018).

This demonstrates that migrant villagers returned to their home village with income accumulated from overseas and they were able to purchase land without bargaining. In fact, the two wealthiest villagers in the studied village currently have less than 5 hectares of rice fields as they sold the majority of their land to returned migrants (Interview with village head E, 10 January 2018). The sale of land to returned migrants has decreased land ownership of the wealthiest villagers and give them less control over the village land. Losing control over the land in the village means the richest villagers lose their economic control and influence over the lower-class villagers. As a result, the shift in the village’s

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wealth from being primarily concentrated to increasingly being dispersed is inevitable. These new developments in the village’s economic structure create a new situation where the migrant villagers have control over their lands. With the dispersed nature of wealth in an agricultural community where land ownership is a key factor of social class, this change in the village’s economic structure has also altered the relationships between the established elites and the returned migrant villagers who now have control over their lands in the village. As a result, these changes in the village’s economic structure challenged the dominance of the upper-class villagers by reducing land ownership and transforming the traditional social hierarchies.

Investing New Wealth of Returned Migrants The shift in the village economic structure from concentrated to dispersed wealth shows us an increase in economic autonomy for returned migrant villagers in their home villages in Indramayu Regency. Having more money, returned migrant villagers create new economic activities in the village through farming as well as non-farming sources of income. Owning rice fields and employing some non-migrant villagers as tenant farmers is only a starting point for returned migrants to develop new sources of income. Some migrant villagers also have other economic activities closely related to their rice fields such as cattle farming. Starting a cattle business is not easy because of the high cost involved in setting up the business, with at least Rp 10 million required to start the business. Only relatively wealthy villagers can start such a cattle business in the village. Five returned migrant villagers initiated a cattle business in 2009 as they saw the profit potential through this new business and the market demand during the two annual Muslim festivals, Eid-al-Fitr (to mark the end of the fasting month) and Eid-al-Adha (to mark the end of the religious pilgrimage to Mecca). On regular days, they could sell a cow for Rp 20 million (equal to NZD 2,083 with the assumption of 1 NZD = Rp 9,600). During the two Muslim festivals, the cattle farmers potentially earned at least double the profit of a regular day (Interview with cattle farm leader, 24 January 2018). As the cattle business grew, a few rich non-migrant villagers joined in the business and employed more lower-class villagers as laborers. From the ten cows they had earlier, the number of cows tripled within a year.

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Later, through the Ministry of Agriculture, the national government supported them with a grant by giving them 32 cattle in 2013 (ibid.). The rapid growth of the cattle business has attracted other returned migrants to invest more money into this cattle business. The Indramayu local government also supported them by facilitating veterinary services and checking the cattle regularly (ibid.). In 2017, 32 new farmers, including 21 returned migrants, were involved in the village cattle farm with 165 cows (ibid.). Returned migrants also invested their money in non-farm sectors. Their work in technology includes being retailers for mobile phones, mobile sim card vouchers, and internet broadband by setting up kiosks near their houses; otherwise, it is also common for returned migrants to be motorcycle taxi drivers, or foreign language tutors, teaching Korean and English, to potential overseas migrant workers. Some other returned migrant villagers work as social entrepreneurs of micro, small, and medium enterprises (Usaha Mikro, Kecil, dan Menengah, UMKM) allowing returned migrants who have new ideas and skills in making handmade bags and foods to sell their products through social media marketplaces, something that never would have happened before the migrant villagers returned to their home village. This variety of new economic activities undertaken by returned migrant villagers has increasingly become a new trend in the rural economy of Indramayu. In the early period of the 1980s, when this relatively new village was established, more than 90% of the villagers in the studied village depended on agricultural sources of income where around 70% of them were tenant farmers (Interview with village head E, 10 January 2018). By 2018, the total number had changed to 26%, where only 2.35% of them were tenant farmers (Ibid.). This data reveals an emerging new source of income coming from outside the village through international migration (Bachtiar & Prasetyo, 2017; De Hass, 2010). It also demonstrates new developments in the village economy in Indramayu in which farms are no longer the main source of income as the farmland has been transformed partly into residential areas. This occurred earlier when migrant villagers returned to their home village and bought land from the established upper-class villagers for new houses and rice fields.

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The Emergence of New Village Elites As more and more migrant villagers have returned to their home village since 2004, their presence has changed the structure of their village economy by increasingly dispersing wealth. With more than 40% of families in the village having overseas migration-related background, it brings greater attention to returned migrant villagers as they are now considered the newly rich villagers, who have economic power. With this new economic power and status, returned migrants, started to expand their influence by creating an informal village-based association in early 2009; they formalized it as an organization in 2012. Through this association, returned migrants learned that they are now an emerging elite group, as they succeeded in investing their new wealth in the village in a way that separates them from other non-migrant villagers not only through farm sources of income but also the nonfarm sector. Especially after the association created a community radio, a village library, and a warnet (warung internet or an internet café), they began to consolidate themselves as a new elite group capable of impacting democratization processes by creating a new kind of leadership through the village head elections. It indicates that the creation of the returned migrants’ association allows returned migrants to engage with the community and expand their influence. In doing so, returned migrants, as a new elite, are competing with the established elite. First, they established a community radio station in 2004 that is owned and operated by returned migrants (Field research notes, 20 February 2018). This is one way returned migrants may choose to practice, support, and participate in democratization by creating dialogue for villagers to discuss community development, socio-economic matters, or political issues in the village (ibid.). Returned migrants also use a community radio station to maintain interest and pressure the village government to respond to the issues. The radio station becomes an intermediary institution for ordinary villagers and leaders in the village to meet and have dialogues to solve problems that concern them. As a result, through the radio station, the returned migrant community democratized interactions in the traditional social hierarchy between the public and the leaders of the village. Returned migrants created a village library as their second project in 2010. The village library developed as a place for villagers to learn and

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share with others. Many visitors were attracted to reading books, especially those related to practical knowledge. Young visitors were more keen to read about internet-based technologies, while some other villagers, especially women, were more attracted to reading food recipe books (Field research notes, 20 April 2018). In facilitating the application of their practical knowledge, the organizers of the library collaborate with Karang Taruna and the village-based Family Welfare Organization (Pemberdayaan Kesejahteraan Keluarga, PKK) to organize workshops to upgrade skills related to the participants’ interests for their future work or new businesses (ibid.). As a result, the creation of a library by returned migrants increased their recognition as a new elite group that enabled other villagers to develop their own businesses and potentially create economic autonomy. In 2012, the returned migrant association established a warnet (warung internet ) as their third project. This is a commercial low-cost internet café aimed at middle-lower-class consumers, which has become popular in Indonesia after the authoritarian regime ended in 1998, and during the early years of democratization (Lim, 2005: p. 74). The consumers only pay Rp 2,500 (equal to 0.26 NZD with the assumption of 1 NZD = Rp 9,600) per hour to use the internet (Interview with an ex-warnet organizer A, 20 April 2018). The creation of this warnet in the village by the returned migrant association is not only about their own interests in making money but also about enabling democratization processes by getting lower-class villagers to participate in the village’s community development. Previously, the upper-class often monopolized both access to and sources of information. Consequently, the upper-class villagers typically controlled the perceptions of lower-class villagers to influence and maintain their compliance in legitimizing the interests of the upper-class group. But now, the creation of this warnet has facilitated lower-class villagers to gain access to new information from varied sources. As a result, upper-class villagers have found it increasingly hard to dominate and manipulate information. In the same year, the returned migrants’ association formalized their group as an organization. The formalization was motivated by the fact that their activities through the creation of a community radio station, library, and warnet gained them more popularity in the village. Their vision was to empower returned migrants to be more prosperous and equal through democratization for a better life (Interview with returned

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migrant G, 15 April 2018). It should be noted that migrant villagers returned to their home village and added diversity to the new organization. It does not mean all returned migrants agree on democratization, but enough migrants have agreed to make democratization their vision and prioritize a new way of life. This returned migrants’ organization becomes crucial as they support democratic norms when interacting with others. Right after the returned migrants’ organization was established, they collaborated with the village government in developing the village economically and politically. Economically, returned migrants have facilitated the creation of more dispersed sources of income through the creation of new jobs, including micro-businesses (UMKM). As the returned migrant group stimulates varied and new economic activities, it also creates more job opportunities in the village. Within the context of politics, returned migrants were involved in initiating the creation of a village policy on overseas migrant workers’ protection, which resulted in village regulation, No.3/2012, that is focused on protecting the village’s migrant workers and their families (Interview with organizer B of returned migrants’ organization, 24 March 2018). For the current village head, the returned migrants’ organization became a place for him to engage with his constituents in the lead-up to the 2014 village head election. Such power relations between returned migrants and the village government shows the democratization process through the public participation of returned migrants.

Democratization and New Elites: Returned Migrants in the Village Head Elections From Table 8.1, we can see that the village elites’ transformation is a relatively new and still ongoing process. The established elites, such as village heads C and D, the two richest villagers, did not participate in the village head election after running for the first period. It shows us that the political transformation at the national level of Indonesia that began in 1998 through democratization has subsequently impacted these village head elections as new elites emerged like village head E, who is the husband of a returned migrant, was able to win the village head elections in 2008 and 2014.

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Table 8.1 Village headmen in the studied village of indramayu, indonesia

No

Name of the village headman

1 2 3 4

Village Village Village Village

headman headman headman headman

C D E E

Periods 1989–1999 1999–2009 2009–2015 2015–2021

Source Village government archives, 2017, and Field research notes, January 2018

The Fall of the Old Elites Right before village head C finished his term in 1998 and before the village head election at the end of the year, Indonesia experienced a political transformation in which Suharto’s authoritarian regime ended in May 1998. One of the main demands of protesters that pushed for change was the democratization of the Indonesian political system, especially to have free and open elections. This national emphasis on the democratic process impacted the village level. The villagers’ demand for changes was directed at the village head, like village head C (Interview with the chief of Village Cultural Affairs, 6 February 2018). The villagers’ interest in reform indicates that the political situation in the village was not in favor of village head C. Realizing the villagers’ opposition, village head C decided to not participate in the next election. Knowing that the incumbent, village head C, would not be a candidate for the village head, his cousin, village head D, immediately took the opportunity and declared himself as a candidate for the village head election (Interview with village head D, 19 February 2018). Thus, family politics survived and continued to monopolize power as village head D stepped up to be the only candidate for the village head with new branding. This situation should be seen within the context of the studied village, as it is relatively poor and does not have an unlimited usufruct right to land (tanah bengkok, salary lands) to fund the salary of the village head and their village officers and to pay for the costs of village government. In fact, the studied village only has 18 hectares of tanah bengkok, and if we compare it to the parent village before this studied village was established in the early 1980s, its parent village has more than 70 hectares of tanah bengkok (Interview with village head E, 10 January 2018). As a result, villagers generally were less interested in becoming village heads.

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As a former civil servant in Indramayu with higher education and one of the richest villagers, village head D promoted himself as a person who was not prone to corruption as he was knowledgeable and already wealthy (Interview with village head E, 19 February 2018). The absence of village head candidates was also due to the prohibitive costs of competing in the elections given their worse economic situation, particularly as the financial crisis hit Indonesia in 1997. Dealing with economic hardship, villagers were in a weak position to challenge one of the richest villagers, who branded himself as a “reformist.“ The financial crisis and the political transformation in 1997/1998 resulted in village head D easily winning the election and spending more than Rp 10 million for his campaign (ibid.). An ordinary villager would have struggled to afford such expenditure, and thus, it was hard to compete with one of the richest villagers (Interview with returned migrant G, 5 March 2018). Under village head D’s leadership, there were relatively few changes in terms of the village economy and political life. As he realized that he could not rely on the limited tanah bengkok, he sought other sources of profits by using his position as the village head. There are a wide variety of ways for the village head to use his position for his personal economic gain. One strategy to gain more economic and political benefits was to engage with Yance’s political family, who survived through a Local Legislative Assembly (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah, DPRD) election in 2000. As Yance needed to expand his power and popularity at the grassroots level, village head D managed to convince Yance to support him for his second term through a direct money welfare program in early 2005 to lure potential voters before a local election in September that year (ibid.). For each person receiving money directly, village head D charged a fee to be determined at his discretion (interview with village head E, 10 January 2018). The next strategy by village head D was to build a rice mill. He claimed that the rice mill was built for the benefit of farmers in the village. However, as the rice mill was the nearest and the only one in the village, he used the village head’s position to promote his own rice mill through farmers’ group meetings or village meetings (Interview with non-migrant villager C, 12 February 2018). Some villagers saw this promotion as a kind of “soft” intimidation of farmers. Another way to gain economic advantage by using the village head position was through a wide range of documents that must be signed

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by the village head, such as required documents for prospective overseas migrant workers. Village head D charged a fee for each villager who wanted to be an overseas migrant worker. However, it was not something new for a village head in Suharto’s authoritarian era to charge fees for signing documents (Kammen, 2003: p. 320). Charging fees for signing documents may be a lucrative source of income for the village head, as more and more villagers from the studied village intend to be overseas migrant workers. As returned migrant A stated, she needed to pay Rp 50 thousand to have all the required certified copies of documents signed at the village office in early 2000 (Interview, village office, 9 January 2018). It made her and many other prospective migrants feel greatly unhappy (ibid.). In short, the political transformation at the national level did not impact the village immediately as the established elites, especially those elites who come from the same political families, managed to survive through free and open village head elections. They utilized their status, control over village resources, and their economic power to continue dominating the village. The Village’s Democratization The change in the village economic structure from concentrated wealth to dispersed wealth is a key explanation as the village’s economic development challenges the domination of the established elites by decreasing their land ownership and undermining the established elites’ position at the top of social hierarchy. The village’s economic development has greatly impacted the established upper-class villagers, including village head D, who sold some of his land to returned migrant villagers due to the higher price he gained from selling the land. As he is no longer the richest villager, he has lost significant economic power and this has also impacted on his political power. Village head D can no longer benefit from the economic dependence of tenant farmers and influence their voting preferences. As a result, he could not guarantee his candidacy for a second term as the village head. The presence of the newly rich migrants threatened the position of village head D as they consolidated in an association and through their investments. For example, returned migrants used the community radio station as their tool to influence other villagers. In 2007, a year before the village head election, the community radio station hosted a discussion on

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corruption and public services, especially regarding fees charged to poorer villagers and the signing of certified copies of documents (Interview with community radio station announcer A, 1 April 2018). The discussion did not stop on the radio, and it triggered wider discussions in the community meetings to stop extracting fees from villagers. As more and more villagers became displeased, it fomented distrust of village head D. This situation created an opportunity for migrants to persuade others to challenge village head D in the next village head election by promoting a school teacher, who is also the husband of a returned migrant, as a candidate for the village head (Interview with returned migrant G, 8 January 2018). Coming from different backgrounds, it provided migrants with a perfect combination to challenge village head D in the village election. The chosen candidate was also known for his modest and friendly nature with the youth organization and the village religious leaders’ council (majelis ulama desa). As a result, returned migrants created a campaign team (tim sukses ) to support the candidate in early 2008 (ibid.). Previously, only a few of the wealthiest villagers could afford the village head candidacy costs, but this is no longer the case now. The newly rich villagers now have similar wealth as the established elites. On top of that, as the returned migrants’ association controlled the community radio station, they popularized their candidate through radio programs (Interview with community radio station announcer A, 1 April 2018). In this context, returned migrants successfully organized more effective tim sukses. Seeing this new development, instead of supporting village head D, Yance, the regent and a scion of a major political family in Indramayu, decided to support the migrants’ chosen candidate, as he expected to get more widespread support for his son to be the member of the West Java Province House of Representatives in 2009 and his wife to be the next regent of Indramayu in 2010 (Interview with village head E, 10 January 2018). As a result, village head D decided not to participate in the village head election at the end of 2008 after losing his capacity to influence villagers because he had lost his economic status and influence and also the backing of the local strongman of Indramayu, Yance. As returned migrants emerged as a new elite group, they continued to consolidate their group by creating a village library in 2010 and a warnet in 2012. Returned migrants and village head E continued to collaborate in many ways, including creating a more accountable village government and stimulating societal participation through community development

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Table 8.2 Results of the Village Head Election in 2014

No

The candidates

Votes

Percentage (%)

1 2

Incumbent The wife of incumbent Non-voting

1701 131

89.9 6.9

60 1,892

3.2 100

3 Total

Source Village government archives, 2014 and Fieldwork notes, January 2018

programs. This has made it difficult for the old elites to reclaim their economic and political domination. As a result, village head E easily won the 2014 village election for another six-year term. The national government’s Law No. 6/2014 and Regulation No. 43/2014 dictates that the election for the village head must consist of at least two candidates, village head E, as the incumbent, asked his wife, returned migrant I, to be his “dummy” competitor in the election to fulfill the requirements of the new regulation (Interview with returned migrant G, 6 January 2018). It was no surprise that village head E, as the incumbent, won the 2014 election convincingly with almost 90% of the vote, while his wife received 6.9% and the rest was non-voting with 3.2% (see Table 8.2). This strong win in the village head election gave village head E the opportunity to appoint a number of returned migrants as village officers. In 2015, village head E recruited three migrants among ten village officials, and a year later, in 2016, he replaced a non-migrant village officer with a returned migrant (see Table 8.3). As we can see in Table 8.3, village head E recruited not only returned migrants but also the husbands of returned migrants as village officers. The total number of village officials with returned migrant-related backgrounds was seven villagers. The migrants’ involvement shows that the new elites have become key players in the village. The returned migrants’ participation through their new skills, investments, and status has rewarded the studied village with numerous awards not only at the local or regional level but also at the national level between 2015 and 2018 for their efforts and actions to support democratic norms of participation in their village (Field research notes, 12 April 2018). Their new status, knowledge of democratic norms, and wealth have enabled them to develop societal participation which they

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Table 8.3 Village officials with returned migrant-related background No

Village official backgrounds

Numbers of officials in 2015

Percentage (%)

Numbers of officials in 2016

Percentage (%)

1

Returned migrant Husband of a returned migrant Non-migrant

3

30

4

40

3

30

3

30

4 10

40 100

3 10

30 100

2

3 Total

Source Village government secretariat, 2018

perpetuate through the returned migrants’ organization, the redistribution of the village’s wealth, the formulation of village policies, and their deep involvement in the village head elections. It shows that the participation of returned migrants made their village a “role model” in developing rural areas of Indonesia with a different kind of leadership. The studied village benefited from the experiences of overseas migrants through their support of democratic norms of participation, their promotion of a more diverse village economy and accountable government. Thus, the awards given to the village demonstrated the contribution of returned migrants as new elites who have different values, and who manage to break up authoritarian enclaves and deter democratic recession in rural Indonesia.

Conclusion This chapter highlights the importance of democratic norms to advance and maintain democracy in the face of not only authoritarian enclaves but also other forms of democratic recession. Under Suharto’s authoritarian regime, participation in the village head elections was limited to the upper-class villagers who owned village land, especially rice fields. As village headmen were elected with limited participation, the village head position was inherited within political families. Even after Indonesia experienced a new wave of democratization in 1998, the established village elites managed to survive using their wealth, social status, and resources to maintain their power. These established elites managed to maintain and concentrate control over local economies for their political benefit.

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However, recent economic and political transformations subsequently created opportunities for new individuals to be candidates for the village head elections. Having new wealth, returned migrants gained their newfound status as newly rich villagers. Their new status helped returned migrants expand their investments by buying land for houses and rice fields from the upperclass villagers. Reducing the established elites’ land ownership meant reducing their economic domination in the village, which also weakened their position politically as elites, and their ability to influence other villagers. Returned migrants also invested their money in new economic activities in the village by creating a cattle co-op that highlights their status as newly rich villagers. The new investments from returned migrants not only come from farm-based sources of income but also from nonfarm businesses. This variety of new economic activities from returned migrant villagers created economic diversification in the village. As a result, new economic development emerged in the village where agricultural sources of income were no longer the main source of income. It also indicates they now have economic autonomy for their land and do not depend anymore on the upper-class villagers who previously dominated land ownership. The presence and participation of returned migrants have changed the structure of the village economy from concentrated wealth to one that is more dispersed. Having new economic power and status as newly rich villagers, returned migrant villagers expanded their involvement and influence in the village by creating a village-based organization. The creation of the returned migrants’ organization shows emerging democratic participation from these villagers. They also established a community radio station, village library, and warnet to consolidate themselves as a new elite group different from the non-migrant villagers. This bolstered democratic norms of participation and accountability, thereby contributing to the transformation of the village leadership. The new investments not only show returned migrant villagers’ participation but also encourage more involvement from other villagers. This increased level of participation supports the process of democratization in the village portrayed through the village head elections by promoting a candidate with a more modest background.

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References Bachtiar, Palmira Permata and Prasetyo, Dinar Dewi (2017). Return Migration and Various Reintegration Programs for Low-Skilled Migrant Workers in Indonesia. Jakarta: The SMERU Research Institute. Retrieved from http:// www.smeru.or.id/sites/default/files/publication/returnmigration.pdf BNP2TKI (2019). Data Penempatan dan Perlindungan PMI (Data of Placement and Protection of Indonesian Overseas Migrant Workers). Jakarta. BPS-Statistics West Java Province. (2021). Jawa Barat Province in Figures 2021. Bandung: BPS-Statistics West Java Province. Buehler, Michael, and Ronnie Nataatmadja (2021). Authoritarian Diasporas in Indonesia and the Philippines: Comparative Perspectives on Elite Survival and Defection. Democratization 28(3), 521-538. De Haas, Hein (2010). Migration and Development: A Theoretical Perspective. International Migration Review, 44(1), 227–264. Hadiz, Vedi R. (2010). Localizing Power in Post-Authoritarian Indonesia: A Southeast Asian Perspective. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press. Kammen, Douglas (2003). Pilkades: Democracy, Village Elections, and Protest in Indonesia. In James Siegel and Audrey R. Kahin (Eds.), Southeast Asia over Three Generations, (pp. 303–330). Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Latief, Muhammad Syahbudin. (2000). Persaingan Calon Kepala Desa di Jawa (The Competition of Village Head Candidates in Java) Yogyakarta: Media Pressindo. Lim, M. (2005). @rchipelago Online: The Internet and Political Activism in Indonesia. Enschede: University of Twente. Mcmann, Kelly (2006). Economic Autonomy and Democracy: Hybrid Regimes in Russia and Kyrgyzstan. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ockey, James (1998). Crime, Society, and Politics in Thailand. In Carl A. Trocki (Ed.), Gangsters, Democracy, and the State in Southeast Asia, pp. 39–54. SEAP Publications: Ithaca. Scott, James C. (1969). Corruption, Machine Politics, and Political Change. American Political Science Review 63(4), 1142–1158. Sobandi, Khairu R. (2021). Transformative journeys: Temporary Indonesian migrant workers and identity change. PhD thesis, University of Canterbury. Sidel, John T. (2004). Bossism and Democracy in the Philippines, Thailand and Indonesia: Towards an Alternative Framework for the Study of ‘Local Strongmen’.“ In John Harriss, Kristian Stokke, and Olle Törnquist (Eds.), Politicizing Democracy: The New Local Politics of Democratization, pp. 51–74. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

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Sidel, John T. (2014). Economic Foundations of Subnational Authoritarianism: Insights and Evidence from Qualitative and Quantitative Research. Democratization 21(1), 161–184. White, Ben, and Wiradi, Gunawan (1979). Patterns of Land Tenure in the Cimanuk River Basin: Some Preliminary Notes. Bogor: Agro-Economic Survey.

CHAPTER 9

Regimes, Repression, Repertoires: Student Protest Movements and the Repertoires of Contention in the Philippines and Indonesia Juhn Chris P. Espia

Introduction Student protest movements have been at the forefront of opposition movements in Asia. Several examples demonstrate that students have not only been participants, they are also at the vanguard of these waves of protests: Thailand in 1957 and 1970s, Japan in the 1960s and 1970s, South Korean students protesting against the military dictatorship in the 1980s, Tiananmen Square in 1989, and the toppling of the Suharto

J. C. P. Espia (B) Division of Social Sciences, College of Arts and Sciences, University of the Philippines Visayas, Miagao, Philippines e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 J. Ockey and N. S. Talib (eds.), Democratic Recession, Autocratization, and Democratic Backlash in Southeast Asia, Contestations in Contemporary Southeast Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-9811-9_9

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regime in Indonesia in the late 1990s. In these places, when democracy is threatened by elite attempts to undermine it, student protest movements, along with other forms of civil society action, become manifestations of a particular form of democratic backlash. Despite current framings such as the “youth deficit” model, where the youth cohort’s participation in politics and society is viewed in terms of their disenchantment, frustration, and general apathy, student activist movements continue to defy these expectations. There have been several explanations as to why students continue to be changemakers. First, studentship, or the state of being a student is highly conducive to collective action because of their “free and becoming disposition” (Klemenˇciˇc, 2014). Students are also deemed to be in a relatively privileged status, have the necessary skills and social capital, as well as the militancy lacking in older political actors (Jimenez, 2014; Weiss and Aspinall, 2012). Universities also offer a favorable environment for activism: an active intellectual environment, the promotion of critical thinking, and directly or indirectly challenging established norms. University locations experience more protests, especially in areas where restraints exist on political expression and organization (Dahlum and Wig, 2021). Student movements oftentimes serve as vanguards in societies where political institutions are failing and civil societies are muted (Millora and Karunungan, 2021). In Southeast Asia, democratic recession and autocratization are on the rise (Alizada et al., 2021). However, in the face of this wave of autocratization, the region also saw some sizable pro-democracy protests, a good number of them led by or involving students. These protests highlight some distinct characteristics of student protest movements in the region: (a) students have a constituency among those with a particular standing; (b) there are certain presumptions about their expertise and authority; (c) they have physical centers to conduct mobilization such as campuses; and (d) they are flexible in terms of the issues that they are able to deal with (Weiss et al., 2012). This chapter extends this argument by examining how student protest movements demonstrate a distinct form of democratic participation and societal support for democracy in the face of autocratization. Protest repertoires, I argue, are democratic innovations that allow student protest movements to reduce the costs of repression in the face of equally innovative autocrats. In particular, I will examine how repression and facilitation by state and private agents shape the choice of

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repertoire by student protest movements over cycles of contention and democratic backlash by looking at cases of student protest movements in the Philippines and Indonesia.

Repression and Repertoires: An Overview Repression is traditionally understood as the physical coercion of challengers with the hope of increasing the “costs” of collective action (Tilly, 1978). This may include any action taken by government authorities that impedes mobilization, harasses and intimidates activists, divide organizations, and physically assault, imprison or kill movement participants (Earl, 2003). Repression has several effects on subsequent mobilizations, and the dynamics of opposition, state response, and renewed action can take a variety of pathways. These include: (1) mounting of protest and severe repression by the state, (2) mounting protest with repression leading to greater protests, but is dampened by much greater repression, (3) the classic spiral of revolutionary conflict: repression leading to even greater protests, (4) a spiral of protests, repression, expanding protests, but ending in massive concessions, and lastly (5) protests leading to concessions (Goldstone and Tilly, 2001). As previous chapters in this volume have demonstrated, autocrats have an immense capacity for innovation. In social movement literature, this has translated into a wider understanding of how repression is done and who the repressive agents are. The ability to repress movements is no longer a monopoly of the state as private agents, particularly private organizations, have increasingly demonstrated an immense capacity for repression. Repression also needs to be understood as a three-dimensional phenomenon that includes: (1) the identity of the repressive agent; (2) the character of repressive action; and (3) whether repressive action is observable (Earl, 2003). State agents can be classified into those who are tightly connected with national elites (e.g., military units and military governments) and those who have a loose connection with these elites (e.g., local police departments). Repressive agents can be private groups and organizations, such as vigilantes and counter-movements (Earl, 2003). It is therefore important to characterize repressive action into two forms: coercive repression and channeling. Coercive repression involves the show and use of force, and other forms of standard police and military action, such as intimidation and direct violence (Earl, 2003). The

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coercion of protesters was the major recourse of regimes in the twentieth century, but they began to lose their popularity after WWI when civil liberties were expanded by courts. Because of the growing ineffectiveness of direct controls, states have turned to channeling (Tarrow, 2011). Channeling involves more indirect repression, which is meant to affect the forms of protests available, the timing of protests, and the flows of resources available to movements. For instance, tax restrictions for non-profit groups could restrict the flow of key resources that can be used to mobilize protests (Earl, 2003). Whether repression is observable is also important. While “observable” and “unobservable” categories may be used, the level of visibility could be placed in a continuum of the entirely visible actors, actions, and intentions to the entirely invisible actors, actions, and intentions (Earl, 2003). The relationship between these factors is outlined in Table 9.1. On the other hand, social movement literature broadly classifies the types of collective action repertoires into three: disruption, violence, and contained behavior. Violent actions, while the easiest to initiate, are Table 9.1 Typology of repression Coercion

Channeling

Agents

Observable

Unobservable

Observable

Unobservable

State agents tightly connected with national elites State agents loosely connected with national elites Private agents

Murders, disappearances, political arrests

Counterintelligence programs

Cutting off funding

Tax law for non-profits

Local policing of protests

Local counterintelligence programs

Permit requirement for protests

Financial aid restrictions on students convicted of “crimes”

Violence by counter-movements

Private Threats by counter-movements

Elite patronage limited to specific goals or tactics

Organizational disciplinary codes

Source Adapted from: Earl, J. 2003. Tanks, Tear Gas, and Taxes: Toward a Theory of Movement Repression. Sociological Theory, 21(1), p. 49

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done by smaller groups with fewer resources who are willing to exact damage and face repression. Contained action allows groups to help the public understand by undertaking routine activities, as well as to attract the support of elites. Disruptive action, on the other hand, has several effects: breaking with routine, startling “bystanders”, and causing confusion among elites for a time. Among these, disruption tends to be the most innovative but is highly unstable and could easily turn to either violence or routine action (Tarrow, 2011). Changes in repertoire depend on major changes in interests and organization but more importantly, on opportunities and costs associated with collective action. Repertoires have evolved from the marches, demonstrations, and turnouts of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to the use of electronic communications such as the internet (Bolognani, 2010). Innovation in collective action forms is the result of interactions between challengers and their opponents and has been demonstrated in several cases. For instance, when employers tried to use the tactic of locking their workers out of a factory to defeat a strike, workers added the sitdown strike and factory occupation to their repertoire (Tarrow, 2011). Each time that leaders approached a crisis in participation or opposition, the threshold for collective action was raised to a new level, using tools and repertoire designed to outguess opponents and increase participation (McAdam et al., 2001). In addition, information, including ideas about which repertoires work, is diffused between social movements through the direct interaction between prior and potential sites of action (Hedström et al., 2000), through a mediator or translator (Suh, 2014), or even in the absence of direct communication between social movement actors. In the latter, mass media plays a key role in “non-relational” diffusion through the creation of communication channels. Social media platforms, such as Facebook and Twitter, have been found to “precede and correlate with the emergence of protests” because increased social media activity indicates the presence of energized activists (Vasi and Suh, 2016). Social networks, both online and offline, play an important role in contagion and the spread of social movement innovations (Centola, 2018). The literature on the repression–dissent nexus shows us that: (a) first, autocrats show innovation in terms of how regimes deal specifically with different forms of collective action; (b) one manifestation of this innovation is that repression is no longer a monopoly of the state; and (c) shifts

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and innovations in movement repertoire are a form of democratic innovation in response to state and private agent action. This paper examines how repression and facilitation by state and private agents (a and b) shape the choice of repertoire by movements over cycles of contention in the case of the student protest movements in the Philippines and Indonesia. The Philippines and Indonesia are electoral democracies, are presidential systems with powerful chief executives, but are also considered highly patrimonial states. Both countries also have a recent experience of authoritarianism1 where student protest movements have played important, but very different roles. This study analyzed movement documents and expert studies which include books, journal articles, and pertinent websites. As violence is considered an important component of repression, the study also utilized the Political Terror Scale (PTS) (1976–2019) as a measure to supplement expert studies on the governing authorities’ use of repression against its citizens. The PTS measures levels of political violence and terror that a country experiences in a particular year based on a 5-level “terror scale” developed by Freedom House. This comes from three different sources: the yearly country reports of Amnesty International (AI), Human Rights Watch’s (HRW) World Reports, and the US State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (Gibney et al., 2021). Countries are given an average annual score corresponding to a particular level on a scale of one (1) to five (5). A low score on the scale means lesser levels of political violence and terror while a high score means greater propensity toward it.2

Brief History of Student Protest Movements in the Philippines and Indonesia Historically, student protest movements have played a key role in watershed moments in both countries. These include roles that are at the heart of events that can be considered as democratic backlash. Student protest movements are at the front and center of events that precipitated regime change or when regimes become more repressive, they become

1 In the Philippines, Martial Law (1972–1986). In Indonesia, New Order (1965–1998). 2 For a detailed explanation of the scale, see the Political Terror Scale at: http://www.

politicalterrorscale.org/.

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the primary targets of state repression because of their open and vocal opposition to these regimes. Student activism in the Philippines can be traced back to the Spanish colonial regime when young Filipino students began demanding reforms in the late 1800s (Abinales, 2012). It would make a return in the 1960s with the resurgence of nationalism across campuses over the issues of parity rights, US military bases in the Philippines, and the Philippine involvement in the Vietnam War (Daroy, 1988). Student activism beginning in this period was closely tied up with the Philippine Left, where the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) took a lead role in organizing and mobilizing students (Abinales, 1996).3 As the anti-war movement grew, many students began conducting protest rallies and teach-ins. In 1967, when students protested the arrival of US President Lyndon B. Johnson, they were forcibly dispersed using truncheons, resulting in injuries and multiple arrests, making it the first recorded use of police brutality against student demonstrations (Gleeck, 1993). As a result, subsequent protests beginning in the election year 1969 became more violent (Quezon, 2010). Radical students, already disdainful of the elite-dominated political system, witnessed one of the most violent and fraudulent election campaigns in Philippine history later that year. This would culminate in a three-month-long series of violent confrontations in the streets of Metro Manila in 1970, aptly dubbed the “First Quarter Storm” (FQS). It pitted poorly armed students and other groups against the military (Jones, 1989). This was followed by a student takeover of the University of the Philippines campus in Diliman, Quezon City. The barricade, known as the “Diliman Commune”, was forcibly dismantled by the Philippine Constabulary, resulting in a violent confrontation and the death of three students (Santos, 2010). The declaration of Martial Law in 1972 left the student movement in disarray. More than 30,000 people were detained by state forces, many of the students. Many activists went underground and tried to fight back through lightning protests, political graffiti, and the distribution of antiMarcos material (Jones, 1989). As a result, the CPP resorted to a strategy

3 This identification with the Left has persisted until today, where to be a Tibak (activist) means being identified with the Left despite the relative heterogeneity between student movements.

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of “legal struggle”, which essentially meant the establishment of organizations “authorized” under Martial Law. After the success of protests against tuition fee hikes in the late 1970s and the establishment of the League of Filipino Students (LFS), the CPP’s legal persona on university campuses, student participation in protest activities declined (Abinales, 2012). The CPP’s ties with the student movement had significant implications on the latter’s growth. As the armed revolution grew, the CPP became less reliant on students as a source of cadres and they took a lesser role in the CPP’s overall strategy (Rutten, 2008). Thus, while students took part in the funeral rally for assassinated opposition leader Benigno Aquino in 1983 and the People Power Revolution in 1986, they would do so as unorganized groups. The CPP and student cadres, on the other hand, watched from the sidelines (Abinales, 2012). In Indonesia, students were key in establishing the New Order regime 1965–1966, in destroying it three decades later, and were the most sustained opposition force in the period following it. Several student groups were involved in proto-nationalist movements in the early twentieth century (Frederick, 1989). The pemuda (youth) with their long hair and rough style would become important sources of inspiration for the later generation of aktivis (activist) youth. But owing to their rather small size, students as a group only gained importance as political actors in 1965–1966, when anti-communist students played a key role in bringing down President Sukarno. After the so-called 30 September Movement, students created the Indonesian Student Action Front or KAMI (Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia) which called for a communist purge of the Sukarno government and the eventual removal of Sukarno. They also provided civilian legitimacy for the military takeover of power (Aspinall, 2012). However, this relationship with the New Order regime did not last very long. By 1967, students who were formerly part of KAMI were disillusioned with corruption in the new government. This culminated with two waves of protest in 1973–1974 and 1977–1978 (Aspinall, 2012). The first wave peaked in January of 1974 with the so-called Malari Affair, which resulted in widespread rioting in Jakarta where many of the protesters were violently arrested by the military. The second wave in 1977–1978 involved a series of nationwide protests by student councils. The state responded by conducting campus raids involving tanks and battalions of soldiers to arrest student activists (Budiman, 1978). This was followed by the promulgation of the Normalization of Campus Life Policy, where

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student bodies were placed under the strict control of school administrators. As a result of the repression, in the 1980s, student protest movements went into a hiatus. Student political activity then moved underground. Student organizing work began again with the easing of restrictions over forms of political activity under the Keterbukaan (Openness) Policy in 1989 (Aspinall, 2012). Campuses once again became centers of radical protest action, albeit more dispersed. The 1997 Asian Financial Crisis precipitated a wave of protest over the catastrophic effects of the crisis on Indonesia’s economy. The regime initially tried to placate students, but soldiers shot four students in Jakarta’s Trisakti University, which led to several days of destructive rioting. The subsequent splintering this caused in the New Order regime led to the fall of President Suharto in 1998 (Pepinsky, 2009; Aspinall, 2012).

Student Protest and State Response in Post-1986 Philippines By the 1990s, the LFS had been replaced by the Anakbayan as the CPP’s youth wing. The latter was an urban youth group comprised of former LFS members and other student activists. Anakbayan would eventually form the youth party, ANAK ng BAYAN (Ang Nagkakaisang Kabataan Para sa Sambayanan, The United Youth for the People) with other student groups. ANAK ng BAYAN would eventually rename itself as Kabataan (Youth) Party-list4 and form part of a small leftist coalition of party-list groups in the Lower House of Philippine Congress (Kabataan Partylist, 2020). Student protests continued at the national level, but the CPP’s influence and interests in universities were lessening and so did the number of students participating in these protests (Abinales, 2012). However, the culture of protest would continue in schools such as the University of the Philippines (UP). Students would regularly conduct lightning rallies during commencement exercises and other physical forms of protest such as sit-in demonstrations, room-to-room campaigns, and indoor rallies, among others. When faced with the threat of physical coercion, students have come to include many creative uses of the media such

4 This is to avoid confusion with similar names such as Anakbayan and the political party Akbayan.

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as posters, stickers, leaflets, ribbons, and effigies. More recently, this has also come to include online activism, such as the use of hashtags and websites (Dabu, 2017). After missing out on the first People Power Movement, students were among the key players in the movement to remove President Joseph Estrada in 2001, dubbed EDSA II. While largely made up of the urban middle class, the movement successfully removed Estrada from office with the support of the military (Kasuya, 2003). The Arroyo regime (2001– 2010) which came after was among the most brutal in terms of the magnitude of state repression against activists. While there is no consensus in terms of the numbers, the range is between 400 to 1206 individuals killed by the military and the police (Holden, 2011). Many student activists during this period became political prisoners or have become part of the desaparecido (the disappeared). The most infamous agent of student repression was retired Army General Jovito Palpalaran (nicknamed “The Butcher”), who was found guilty of kidnapping and killing dozens of student activists (Millora and Karunungan, 2021). As internet access improved in the Philippines and younger people started to be active in social media, online protests on social media platforms started to enter the repertoire for protest movements. In early 2008, when a corruption investigation was launched against thenPresident Arroyo over the issue of the alleged overpriced national broadband deal, social networking platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, and Plurk were used by students and other members of the youth sector. Thousands of Facebook groups and posts as well as tweets on the issue were posted online, which encouraged participation in street protests organized by traditional social movements. In May 2009, a campaign against the tax imposition on imported books was launched through Facebook. Within the same month, the initiative had gathered 2,000 signatures and forced President Arroyo to revoke Finance Department Order 17-09. This anti-book tax campaign was the first successful online advocacy and was remarkable because it succeeded despite the absence of street protests (Lim, 2009). Large protests featuring students and the youth sector would make a return in 2016 when President Duterte granted burial in the cemetery for heroes of former President Marcos. Thousands took to social media and the streets. The protests, largely organic and unorganized, were unprecedented in the post-Marcos period. Sporting placards and profane chants mocking President Duterte and the Marcoses, the students and other

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members of the youth sector organized a concert at the People Power Monument (Tejano, 2017). The youth in Metro Manila organized the Millennials Against Dictators, which vowed to fight back against past and future dictators. They staged teach-ins and protests against President Duterte’s anti-drug campaign and were subjected to death threats (Balane, 2017). Not even the COVID-19 pandemic was able to stem the wave of student activism. In 2020, these activities centered around calling-out government officials involved in “red-tagging” or “red-baiting”5 and the government’s inadequate pandemic response (Mendoza, 2020). The passage of the Anti-terror Law in the Philippines in July 2020 resulted in a wave of protests dominated by students. These students raised awareness through online campaigns, colorful graphics, and physical/on-ground rallies under the hashtag #JunkTerrorLaw (Rappler.com, 2020). The law, signed amid large protests, gave the military power to detain suspects without a warrant for nearly a month. This was followed by the abrogation of a 32-year agreement that banned security forces from entering the University of the Philippines (UP), long considered a bastion of free speech but also of communist recruitment. Repertoires for the protest on the anti-terror law and the abrogation of the contract include art installations on the UP campus made up of bamboo and old furniture that was designed to look like a barricade from the 1971 student uprising, as well as sit-in protests and demonstration rallies (Guitierrez, 2021). In response to student protests against the Anti-Terror Law, eight students were arrested in Cebu City, 16 in Iligan City, and 15 in Quezon City (Millora and Karunungan, 2021; Medenilla, 2020). The COVID-19 pandemic saw an increase in the criminalization of dissent and heightened policing. In the Philippines, where stringent community quarantine restrictions were among the most restrictive and the longest in the world, student activists found it increasingly difficult to organize protests due to safety precautions that needed to be considered. These included logistical concerns, securing protest permits, and negotiations with the police (Magsambol, 2020). Despite these restrictions, various forms of online campaigns thrived under the following hashtags: #JunkTerrorLaw, #OustDuterte, #DutertePalpak (Duterte Failure), 5 This draws parallelisms to the period of McCarthyism in the United States in the 1950s. At the height of anti-communist suspicions, politicians used this tactic to publicly attack opponents.

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#DuterteDuwag (Duterte Coward), #NasaanAngPangulo (Where is the President?). Aside from its use in protesting and in organizing protests, social media has been used by students in the Philippines to raise funds. In 2020, the #PisoparasaLaptop (A peso for a laptop) drive was launched. This is a donation drive launched in response to the government’s failed efforts in conducting distance learning efforts during the pandemic, where many students were unable to afford the tools needed for online classes, given that many families lost their sources of income during the lockdown (Mendoza, 2020). Because classes went online, students also did signature campaigns and academic strikes online. Students from several universities, including the Catholic Ateneo de Manila University, launched a signature campaign to hold an academic strike in protest of the government’s COVID-19 response and its failed response to a series of typhoons that rocked the country. Students threatened to withdraw all academic submissions until their demands were met. Within days, students from other universities showed their support, with some calling for the University of the Philippines to implement a “no-fail policy” while students from the oldest university, the University of Santo Tomas, ran a signature campaign to oust President Duterte (Santos, 2020b). Under Duterte’s Presidency, the Philippine government targeted activists through propaganda, crackdowns, and violence. This, however, is not new as it is nothing but an escalation of attacks against activists (Magallona, 2019). Many of the threats against activists in the country have come in the form of “red-tagging” or “red-baiting”. This propaganda tactic involves the labeling or accusation of individuals, groups, or organizations, sans any evidence or basis, as communists or terrorists, thereby making them enemies of the state. One of the most affected sectors of government red-tagging is in academia. In 2018, the Armed Forces of the Philippines revealed a list of schools that were supposed “recruitment beds” for communist rebels. This included the country’s top universities and colleges, including one that did not even exist (Magallona, 2019). In addition, the Senate, through Committee Report No. 10 (sponsored by Duterte ally and former police chief Sen. Dela Rosa), sought to enforce an increased military and police presence on campus as well as the review and investigation of faculty and curricula. This prompted another wave of protests (Cigaral, 2019). Attacks on student activists have also included propaganda posters discouraging students from becoming activists or from protesting in front of the campuses and

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at the entrance of the military’s headquarters in Quezon City as well as threatening text messages (Magallona, 2019). An interesting addition to actions employed in previous state responses to student mobilization is the use of counter-movements. Duterte Youth, a right-wing group represented in Congress, held a rally at the UP campus in support of the anti-terror law and President Duterte in the face of massive student protests (Guitierrez, 2021). In response to the proposed academic strike, academic freeze, and the supposed recruitment of leftist organizations, a group of parents calling themselves the League of Parents of the Philippines staged several indignation rallies in front of different universities (Santos, 2020a). The Anti-Terror Law mentioned above exacerbates an already constrained space for dissent. President Duterte, through a supermajority in Congress, has shut down the television and satellite services of the country’s largest media network, ABS-CBN. In an infamous case, Maria Ressa, the editor of investigative journalism outlet Rappler (which was critical of the President’s “War on Drugs”) was sued and found guilty of cyber libel (she later won the Nobel Peace Prize) by an ally of the president. Under the pretext of preventing the spread of false information, the response to the COVID-19 pandemic in the Philippines has also led to more penalization of online activities. In another form of state repression, thousands of dummy Facebook accounts were found to be impersonating student activists in June 2020. Many of these students were subjected to harassment and death threats from these accounts. While the motive behind the accounts’ creation remained unclear, experts have suggested they were created to intimidate and harass those critical of the government and appeared organized and coordinated (Freedom House, 2021). In the post-1986 Philippines, the culture of protest persisted in national tertiary institutions which have a long history of student activism, such as UP. It is therefore no surprise that these relatively free spaces for dissent would be the primary target for red-tagging by state security forces. While the repertoires employed by students still include physical forms of protest, threats of physical coercion have caused them to innovate and adopt other repertoires, such as the skillful use of different media and different forms of online activism. True to the character of student protests being manifestations of democratic backlash, large student protests saw a return as the state under Duterte took on a more authoritarian character. As arrests occurred in these large protests

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and policing became more heightened during the COVID-19 pandemic, student protesters innovated by moving many activities online. This, in turn, resulted in autocratic innovation: state repression online. However, this failed to quell online dissent.

Student Protest and State Response in Post-Reformasi Indonesia In the transition years following the demise of the New Order, student protests continued to proliferate and involved clashes with the police (Aspinall, 2012). These protests, however, tended to be smaller and to include other actors and issues: religious political parties, land and labor issues, and ethnonationalism in Papua and Aceh. While earlier generations of activists in the 1980s and 1990s aimed to produce meaningful political theater in the streets, activists in the early 2000s tended to be innovative by blending their activist identity and their consumer habits, where the production and wearing of t-shirts and other paraphernalia with leftist symbols became the norm. Many of the demonstrations during this period would also recite the Pemuda (Youth) Oath. The oath, which began in 1928, proclaimed ideas of one motherland, one nation, and one language. Typically done with a fist raised toward the sky, it ties contemporary student protesters with earlier nationalist counterparts (Lee, 2011). While there has been a general weakening of the student movement at the national level, it has thrived in the regions far removed from the national centers of power, such as the smaller university towns of Makassar in South Sulawesi, Lampung in South Sumatra, and Banjarmasin in South Kalimantan (Sastramidjaja, 2019). Similar to the Philippines, Indonesia would see a major democratic backlash in 2019, with some of the biggest national student protests since 1998.6 The key issues include the passage of a new law which was deemed to weaken the country’s anti-graft agency and the passage of a new criminal code. The key to this mobilization is the internet. Internet access has grown exponentially in Indonesia in the past two decades, from 7% in 2009 to 48% in 2019 (Hamid and Hermawan, 2020). Protesters communicated with each other via WhatsApp. The online and physical

6 At its height, there were around 52,000 protesters participating in these protests based on reports by the National Police Intelligence and Security Agency.

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protests were dominated by the hashtag #ReformasiDirorupsi (Reform Corrupted). The protesters were also able to raise money on the crowdfunding platform Kitabisa.com, which collected around Rp 175 million and was used for food and transportation for protesters (Komando cars), and ambulances (Widianto and Potkin, 2019). These student protests were also part of a broad swathe of protesters which included many sectors of Indonesian society. Appearing rattled by the violent protests, authorities have delayed the passage of the criminal code which sought to ban pre-marital sex and penalize insults against the President (Widianto and Suroyo, 2019). By framing the protests as part of the methodical attempt by elites to roll back democratic reforms, the students found a lot of resonance with earlier generations of student activists. The relative success of the 2019 protests under the #ReformasiDikorupsi banner served as a pretext for its use in the second wave of protests in the following year over the passage of the Omnibus Law on Job Creation. The law sought several reforms to make Indonesia more attractive to foreign investors. It modified 79 laws, including 1,200 clauses on employment and business licensing. The law drew a lot of criticism among civil society groups and was seen as favoring oligarchs because it made minimum wage laws unfavorable to workers and diminished the role of local communities in environmental decision-making7 (Hamid and Hermawan, 2020). The ensuing protests over the Omnibus Law proved to be more violent. For example, in Bandung, 3,000 student protesters clashed with police when they tried to reach the parliament building. When police violently dispersed the protesters, the activists set fires to tires near the blocked streets and threw rocks and gasoline bombs at the police. They were eventually successful in breaking one of the parliament compound’s gates. The police responded by using tear gas and water cannons (Marsiela and Karmini, 2020). Because of restrictions brought about by the pandemic, human rights activists in Indonesia also moved some protests online. Kamisan, a weekly silent protest held every Thursday in front of the Presidential Palace complex, has been moved to platforms such as Twitter and Instagram under the hashtag #kamisanonline. This has since generated more engagement, especially from young people, who are very active on social media (Oktavianti, 2020). 7 The law was also passed without adequate consultation as provided in the 2019 law on the legislative process and has fuelled more opposition to the law.

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The Widodo administration responded with repressive measures and has increasingly used security forces to repress dissenters. According to a report by Amnesty International Indonesia, there had been at least 402 victims of police violence during protests. At least 660 people have been imprisoned for participating in these protests. Arson during the protests in Jakarta and other Indonesian cities were also attributed to students, even when there was no clear proof (Hamid and Hermawan, 2020). In the 2019 wave of protests, 5 people died while hundreds were injured in clashes with the police. An officer was arrested over the deaths of two students, one of whom died of gunshot wounds (Widianto and Suroyo, 2019). Data from the Legal Aid Institute indicate that demonstrators were subject to police violence in at least 18 provinces (BBC Indonesia, 2020). Security officials in Indonesia have been seen making “quiet visits” to the homes of protest organizers to “dissuade” them from organizing protest action. Government officials have also been pressuring university officials to rein in “unruly students” (Aspinall, 2020). Beyond this open repression are propaganda tactics straight from the Suharto era. Protesters were discredited by branding them as rioters and as unwitting pawns of anti-government forces. Protesters have been framed as ditunggangi (ridden like a horse, as in being manipulated for political ends) by ambitious political figures aiming to destabilize the government, and it has been alleged that the protesters are kelompok anarko (anarchist groups) (Aspinall, 2020). However, in contrast to the Suharto era, some of this is done in cyberspace. For instance, a few days before the passage of the Omnibus Law, the national police issued a directive to ban political rallies, and instructions for police personnel on how to conduct “cyber patrols”, monitor rallies, “clarify hoaxes”, and “counter anti-government narratives” (Hamid and Hermawan, 2020). The Widodo regime has invested in IT infrastructure, which has since been used to silence political dissent. The Ministry of Communication and Information Technology purchased a USD 13.8 million web crawler in 2017 to supposedly address issues with hoaxes, hate speech, and pornography. Units such as the National Cyber and Encryption Agency were also established while the National Police upgraded its cybercrime agency into a dedicated directorate (Hamid and Hermawan, 2020). Following the large October 2020 protests, the cyber police squad arrested members of an opposition group made up of Islamist and nationalist figures. Seven administrators of a WhatsApp group, a Facebook page, and an Instagram account were also arrested for allegedly using

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the accounts to assemble protests (Hamid and Hermawan, 2020). The detainees were charged under the 2008 Information and Transactions Law, which has been used to silence critics. In Yudhoyono’s second term (2009–2014) 74 cases were tried under the ITE Law. In Widodo’s first term the number went up to 233. In his second term, by the second quarter of 2020, 241 were charged, and 82 of these accusations were about insults directed against the President (Safenet, 2020). The arrests, which received considerable media coverage, had a “chilling effect” on free speech. Recent surveys show that nearly 70% of Indonesians are afraid to express their opinions online (Hamid and Hermawan, 2020). Aside from draconian measures, there has also been a rise in online hacking attacks targeting activists. In connection with the Omnibus Law protests, there have been at least 16 cases of hacked social media accounts targeting labor and student protesters (Safenet, 2020). In contrast to the Philippines, student protest movements in postReformasi Indonesia have generally weakened nationally, until 2019, when students, seeing themselves as guardians against the elite attempt to roll back reforms, lashed back by launching large and violent protests. These protests were met by police violence, arrests, intimidation, and state-sponsored propaganda, some of which were drawn directly from the New Order era while some were innovative in terms of silencing online dissent. Despite Indonesian student protesters becoming quite adept at using social media to protest and raise funds, in contrast to the Philippines, these protests online were met by a far more capable state response and more systematic repression, resulting in a general dampening of the enthusiasm for online dissent.

State Agents, Repression, and Impacts on Repertoires States deal with student activism through punitive tactics of physical violence, delegitimization, surveillance, and criminalization. This involves the reframing of young people as disengaged, “troubled”, and at risk of being derailed from responsible adulthood (Bessant and Grasso, 2019). This justifies the criminalization and policing of student activities (Power, 2012). As the cases of the Philippines and Indonesia demonstrate above, repression (both channeling and coercion) was present in both authoritarian and post-authoritarian periods in both countries.

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Crackdowns by police and military elements, which oftentimes involve violent dispersals and arrests, is a common theme in both cases. The inherent repressiveness of regimes against their citizens (although not limited exclusively to student protest movements) can also be seen in terms of the Political Terror Scale (1976–2020). There is a positive correlation between the regime’s perception of the level of threat and the amount of repression that it uses against dissenters. The higher the regime’s perception of the threat, the greater its propensity to employ violent means (Gibney et al., 2021). A look at the trend in the Political Terror Scale scores of both countries confirms this relationship. In the case of the Philippines, Duterte’s ascent to power marks one of the most repressive periods in the country’s recent history. A score of “5” means that terror has expanded to the whole population and that leaders of these societies place no limits on the means or thoroughness with which they pursue personal or ideological goals. This accounts for his administration’s “War on Drugs”, which has caused thousands of deaths. Before this, the first Aquino administration declared “total war” against the National Democratic Front of the Philippines (NDFP) which saw massive use of red-tagging and violence against activists. Similarly, the Arroyo regime (2001–2010) exhibited a pattern of continued repression against dissidents through the Oplan Bantay Laya,8 the military’s primary counter-insurgency strategy. This continued well into Aquino II’s administration (2010–2016) through the military’s Oplan Bayanihan 9 (see Fig. 9.1). In the case of Indonesia, the spikes in state repression coincided with periods characterized by heightened student involvement in protests (1977–1978, 1997–1998, 2000–2006). After the fall of the New Order regime in 1998, repression against activists involved in land and labor issues, and ethnonationalism (particularly in West Papua and Aceh) continued. Small protests of ultra-radical students continued at the national level, but the bulk of student activity moved to the regions. The state dealt with activism using continuous surveillance and the arrest of those involved. While student involvement in the Philippines has been

8 Literally (and ironically), “To Guard Freedom”. 9 Literally, “Mutual help”. While these meant an increase in Civil-Military Operations

(CMOs) to “win hearts and mind”, Oplan Bayanihan also continued the repression against activists under Oplan Bantay Laya.

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6 War on Drugs 5 Aquino I “Total War”

Martial Law

Oplan Bantay Laya

Oplan Bayanihan

PT SCORES

4 Start of Online Protests

3

2

Student protest movements “underground”

Return of physical protests and use of different media

Increase in Online Protests

Mix of Physical and Online Protests

1

0

YEAR AI

HRW

US State Dept.

Fig. 9.1 Philippines political terror scores and protest repertoires (1976–2020) (Source Gibney, M., Wood, R., Cornett, L., Hashcke, P., Arnon, D., Pisano, A., Barrett, G. & Park, B. 2021. Political Terror Scale 1976–2020. Political Terror Scale October 2021 ed. http://www.politicalterrorscale.org/. Acronyms in the PTS scores in Figs. 9.1 and 9.2 denote the following: AI [Amnesty International], HRW [Human Rights Watch], and the U.S. State Department. HRW only began publishing the World Reports in 2013)

more sustained, if smaller, at the national level, in Indonesia, protests tend to come about in major explosive waves (see Fig. 9.2). Figures 9.1 and 9.2 and the preceding discussion also point to how state repression of dissent affects the choice of repertoire in both cases. Historically, high levels of repression have driven the student movement underground or into a hiatus, as in the case of the Philippines during the Martial Law period and beginning in 1978 in Indonesia. In both cases, physical repression during protests by state actors has led student protest movements to also resort to violence, but this is more apparent in the case of Indonesia. In the Philippines, the Duterte regime innovated by using private agents in the form of counter-movements such as the Duterte Youth and the League of Parents to play a role in channeling dissent by creating a counter-narrative against student dissent. In Indonesia, repression has become the exclusive remit of the state, with observers seeing

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6 Repression against activists involved in ethnonationalist, land, and labor protests

New Order Regime (1965-1998) 5

PT SCORES

4

3

2

1

Massive protests by student councils

Return to organizing under Keterbukaan policy

General national weakening of student movement

Massive protests to unseat Suharto

Student protest movements “underground”

0

Increase in Online Protests

Mix of Physical and Online Protests

YEAR AI

HRW

US State Dept.

Fig. 9.2 Indonesia political terror scores and repertoires (1976–2020) (Source Gibney, M., Wood, R., Cornett, L., Hashcke, P., Arnon, D., Pisano, A., Barrett, G. & Park, B. 2021. Political Terror Scale 1976–2020. Political Terror Scale October 2021 ed. http://www.politicalterrorscale.org/)

parallelism between current state tactics and those employed during the New Order era. Heightened repression, coupled with technological advances in both cases, have resulted in innovation in terms of repertoires: activists moving toward a less-costly, less-risky yet high-impact form of activism in cyberspace. Young people who would otherwise be disengaged are influenced through things like Facebook status updates and other forms of unsolicited news content. In the Philippines and Indonesia, increases in the use of social media,10 in particular Facebook, Twitter, and WhatsApp11 coupled with the increase in internet accessibility are seen as major 10 On average, Filipinos spend just under four hours on social media each day while Indonesia ranks fifth, at 3 hours and 26 minutes. Source: Global Web Index, Social Media Marketing Trends in 2021, https://www. gwi.co2021m/reports/social. 11 Social media figures for both countries (2019 Figures):

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factors in the perceived shift from traditional forms of political participation to web-based forms of political and civic engagement (David, 2013). Autocratic innovations to control dissent through online tactics have taken the character of policing or the militarization of online spaces. In these scenarios, there is frequently no accountability for state actors while dissidents have very little or no access at all to formal recourse. Oftentimes, in these spaces, the military or police also become the perpetrators of violence (Burke and Lokshin, 2020). But despite attempts by both regimes to control this space, protesters always seem to find ways to skirt government controls. For instance, in the face of government hacking and online surveillance, dissidents have moved toward apps that offer better encryption, such as Telegram and Signal. Finally, both cases demonstrate different degrees of contagion and diffusion. Repertoires, which carry a lot of symbolism because of their ties with earlier movements, were utilized. For example, the repertoire of teach-ins was reminiscent of those done in the United States during the Vietnam War and those done by earlier generations of student activists in the Philippines. Indonesian students in 1998 modeled part of their protests on the 1986 People Power revolt in the Philippines (Weiss et al., 2012). The influence of the Sunflower Movement in Taiwan, the Hong Kong Umbrella Movement, and students in the Bersih Movement in Malaysia are apparent in Indonesian student protests. In Indonesia, the practices of students in Hongkong in dealing with the police were translated into Bahasa Indonesia and were widely disseminated on social media (Widianto and Potkin, 2019). In both cases, the use of technology to organize a protest and broadcast it to a wider audience is reminiscent of the tactics employed by protesters in the Arab Spring.

Facebook: Indonesia: 136.96 million (4th in the world); Philippines: 71.76 million (6th in the world). Twitter: Indonesia: 15.1 million; Philippines; 8.9 million. WhatsApp: Indonesia: 60 million; Philippines: 6 million. Sources: https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/facebook-users-by-cou ntry; https://www.internetworldstats.com/stats3.htm

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Conclusions The cases illustrated above appear to conform to what has been the prevailing pattern of student protests in Asia: the lack of permanence and consistency. From time to time, they emerge as a potent force in national politics, but at other times, they have exhibited political passivity and have been marginalized (Weiss and Aspinall, 2012). The historical moments when the student protest movements mobilized are particularly telling. When there is a perceived threat to democracy and democratic institutions, they lash back in a rather dramatic fashion. This can be attributed to several factors, some of which are well beyond the scope of this paper: changes and expansion in higher education brought about by neoliberalism and the role of collective identity. On the other hand, this paper has focused more on how regimes and available political opportunities shape how student protest movements attempt to align (or not) with prevailing institutional patterns. In particular, I argue that repertoires of student protest and how autocrats repress them share a dynamic relationship across cycles of contention and democratic backlash. Student protest movements and their rise can be seen as a by-product of the growth of the middle class in Southeast Asia. Higher education has ceased to be the privilege of the elite and state policies have enabled poor and lower-middle-class families to gain opportunities for upward mobility. This also meant that student protest movements have had a relatively stable pool from which a critical mass can be drawn. In the case of the Philippines and Indonesia, student protest movements tend to be urban—largely a function of where major higher educational institutions are (and where centers of power that are oftentimes the target of student protests are). While the relationship between repression by regimes and student protest repertoires tends to occur dynamically, student activism in both countries tends to emerge more in cases when regimes are more authoritarian and when other social and political forces are repressed. Despite the ebb and flow of student protest movements, student movements have established a culture of democratic innovation comprised of diverse repertoires of action. Coupled with their militancy, organizational capacity, and technological savvy, students are almost always able to get the attention of regimes in power. Because states can no longer easily ignore popular clamor, they can either respond favorably or respond repressively. In the latter, regimes risk revealing their authoritarian tendencies and thus risk questions of legitimacy. A positive response, on the other

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hand, demonstrates the efficacy of student protests as a means of exerting political pressure. Save for a few cases above, regimes were generally hesitant to overtly repress student protest movements. This, I argue, is due to where most protests happen (urban, with media presence), and the members of the protest movement themselves: young, middle class, and able to pursue different forms of challenging the state in the aftermath of violent state repression. This brings to the fore the important role that repertoires play in student protest movements. State capacity for repression is a major determinant of the choice of repertoires and the level of resonance that protest movements can generate. Indonesian authorities have been more effective in this regard than their Philippine counterparts. But more than just outright authoritarianism, varying levels of repression (even when the two countries are the biggest democracies in Southeast Asia) shape which issues they mobilize over and the strategies they employ. In both countries, students have shown the capacity for innovation in the use of different forms of protest—physical and online—in the face of the state’s attempt to clamp down on dissent. The ability to utilize existing spaces and create new ones, and use different methods, allow student protest movements to constantly evolve, and evade or reduce the costs of state repression. It is worth exploring in future inquiries how available opportunities for youth engagement and the presence of other actors in the mobilization front shape the tendency of students to mobilize. For example, the Philippines, in comparison to its Asian neighbors, provides a diverse set of opportunities for youth engagement. This can range from large-scale institutionalized organizations embedded in government to faith-based and school-based organizations (David, 2013). In Indonesia, on the other hand, research conducted by the Indonesian Ministry of Youth shows a lack of opportunities for youth to participate in governance in some regions of Indonesia. There is currently no specific mechanism to ensure the involvement of youth in development (Junior, 2017). In the case of Indonesia, the student movement is just one of the many pressure groups in the country, with its mobilizing capacities failing in comparison to massive rallies organized by other actors, particularly Islamic groups at certain times (Sastramidjaja, 2019). In the case of the Philippines, the other members of the National Democratic Front have taken a bigger role in the struggle against entrenched elite interests (Abinales, 2012).

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The student protest movements discussed in this chapter played the role of the vanguard in pro-democracy movements and were key members of various opposition coalitions. The Philippines and Indonesia are historical examples of where student-led democracy movements have succeeded. Other cases in Southeast Asia, however, show that these movements may falter (Malaysia) or be silenced by repression (Myanmar). In the face of a democratic recession in Southeast Asia, the return of students to the forefront has taken a double-edged character. On the one hand, student protest movements manifest a level of social support for democracy and are a distinct form of democratic political participation. But given their distinctive place in the history of democratization in the region, the reappearance of massive student protest movements is a sign that democracy is under siege.

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CHAPTER 10

Myanmar: From Hybrid Democracy to Violent Autocracy Mariana Cifuentes

Since independence, the Myanmar army has been the most significant political institution, directly controlling the government for 26 years, and indirectly for 15 years (Taylor, 2020). The authoritarian regime meant that for many years Myanmar was considered a repressive and self-isolated country. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the military-led State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) government seemed to have understood the need to transform itself into a different type of government. The military government labeled this new government system a “disciplined flourishing democracy” as it accomplished the dual objectives of providing Myanmar with free elections and allowing the Myanmar military to remain in power (Bünte, 2021a). From 2005, Myanmar entered a period of deep transformation. In 2015, the

M. Cifuentes (B) British Council, Yangon, Myanmar e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 J. Ockey and N. S. Talib (eds.), Democratic Recession, Autocratization, and Democratic Backlash in Southeast Asia, Contestations in Contemporary Southeast Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-9811-9_10

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National League for Democracy (NLD) party officially won the elections, announcing to the world that Myanmar had successfully transitioned into a democracy. However, the Myanmar democracy was at its core a hybrid governing model that was “neither clearly democratic nor conventionally authoritarian” (Bünte, 2021a, p. 336). This chapter argues that the governance changes in Myanmar that took place during the hybrid political regime (2010–2020) can be framed as a sophisticated example of “autocratic innovation” (Curato & Fossati, 2020, p. 2). Curato and Forsatti (2020) coined the concept “autocratic innovations” to portray a more nuanced picture of authoritarianism by looking into novel tools for authoritarian repression, whether it is through the introduction of governance styles, rhetorical tropes, policies, or technologies. The concept of autocratic innovation is defined here as novel governance practices designed to shrink spaces for meaningful public participation. This chapter explains how, when looked as an autocratic innovation, it is possible to reconceptualize Myanmar’s political trajectory of the last 15 years, not as a democratic process, but instead as a shift in governance practices; although looking like a democracy, military control was retained and the elected government disempowered (Bogaards, 2009). The authoritarian innovations had a profound effect on Myanmar politics and society, drastically transforming the relationship between its citizens and those in power. The innovations allowed citizens to experience some of the benefits of living in a democracy, while also witnessing the democratic deficit. Most importantly, it began a conversation on the need for a federal government system, a multi-ethnic nation and a pan-ethnic national identity. As an innovation, however, the “disciplined flourishing democracy” was short-lived. On 1 February 2021, the day the newly elected parliament was scheduled to meet, the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces declared a state of emergency and overthrew the 2020 democratically elected NLD government. The closing of the political space led to a powerful “democratic backlash” (Ockey 2022, see Chapter 1). Citizens’ widespread resistance to the coup—both armed and unarmed—continues as they reject the military government. Saw Kapi (2021) argues that the social mobilization that happened after the coup has led to a new political vision for the country that aims to remove the military from power. The coup acted as a catalyst for the mobilization of Generation Z, also called Gen Z, which is the generational cohort following millennials, born between the late 1990s

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and early 2010s. It also removed the military from blocking negotiations toward peace and stability in the country, allowing ethnic nationalities to have a more leveled political ground. These developments represent a seismic shift in political views and practices across Myanmar society (Kapi, 2021). This chapter explores the reasons behind the political opening and closing of Myanmar, as well as the responses to them by ordinary people. The chapter asks, why is the democratic backlash so widespread in Myanmar? What might sustain that democratic backlash? Can it grow strong enough to force the military to back down?

Myanmar’s Autocratic Innovation At the beginning of the 1990s, as the military faced demands for a more participatory political system, it started to work on a solution that would guarantee its survival. This process concluded with the announcement of the 2008 Constitution, which reserved 25% of seats in Central, State, and Regional parliaments. In addition, it gave the military control over the Ministries of Defense, Home Affairs, and Border Affairs and the prerogative to “safeguard” the constitution in an emergency (Thawnghmung & Noah, 2021, p. 298). In 2010, a quasi-civilian government started the transition from authoritarianism to a hybrid political regime (Bhattacharya & Raghuvanshil, 2021; Huang, 2013; Taylor, 2020). After decades of popular demands for political change, the military-led government seemed to agree to transition into a limited democratic path. The military-led State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) government put in place several reforms and legal amendments to liberalize the country and put it in the way of a “disciplined flourishing democracy” that gave opportunity for the military to retain control, while allowing for electoral competitiveness and civil liberties (Bünte, 2021b; Oo, 2021). Although the Myanmar military was known for reinventing itself under other guises, this was by far the most daring innovation it had adopted as it allowed not only open political participation but also freedom of information. Media censorship was lifted, private newspapers opened, and a steady flow of political prisoners were released from jail. Other sectors were also liberalized. Reforms were introduced to promote economic growth. These included the modernization of the banking system and the simplification of the exchange system, as well

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as permits for foreign companies to operate in Myanmar.1 Soon, the Myanmar economy became one of the fastest growing in the world. All these reforms took on new meaning once Aung Sang Suu Kyi was persuaded to stand in the 2012 by-elections after the re-instatement of the NLD party. The re-entry of Aung Sang Suu Kyi into political life signaled to the international community that things had changed. Starting in 2013, the European Union and the United States started lifting sanctions and economic restrictions.2 In 2014, Myanmar was appointed to chair the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Following the 2015 NLD victory, foreign investment increased, and more multinationals moved into the country. Telecommunications expanded and Facebook became the most popular communication platform. By 2017, all US sanctions were lifted, allowing Myanmar new options for trading partners. After almost fifty years of isolating from the world, these changes propelled Myanmar into a period of rapid change and economic prosperity (World Bank, 2020).3 For younger people, the newly found access to the internet, social media, and jobs was transformational. For older generations, the political opening, the renewal of the peace process, and Aung Sang Suu Kyi’s leadership meant an opportunity to openly discuss the trauma suffered in the past at the hands of the military. However, the rolling out of the autocratic innovations included elements that obstructed democratic transition. Contrary to what people understood, the innovation was not an exit strategy by the military to

1 The military elite benefited from the economic reforms. The Natural Resource and Governance Institute (NRGI) estimated that between 2011 and 2015 around USD 8.6 billion from natural resource revenue taxes and other payments collected by state-owned enterprises were placed in unknown bank accounts. It is likely that these resources, as many others, were diverted from the government coffers to the military-owned businesses and enterprises as a “bonus” for their support in the political transition (NRGI, 2018, p. 2). 2 In 1997, economic sanctions and broad regime-focused sanctions program against the Myanmar military junta was put in place against Myanmar (or Burma) by the United States. On September 2017, President Obama pledged to lift all the sanctions that had been in place for almost two decades. 3 Myanmar’s economic growth (above 7% per year) led to measurable improvements in social welfare: Poverty almost halved, falling from 48 to 25% between 2005 and 2017 (World Bank, 2020).

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retreat from national politics (Huang, 2013). Rather, it was a sophisticated form of control. The military continued to rule indirectly by taking independent decisions in the fields of security and defense, preferring military solutions to political problems (David & Holliday, 2018, p. 80 quoted by Bünte, 2021a, p. 9). This military approach toward ethnic and religious tensions meant an increase in conflicts in Rakhine, Kachin, and Shan states.4 In 2016–2017, the military put in place a genocidal campaign against the Rohingya (OHCHR, 2016; Human Rights Watch, 2017). In addition, by then the military intelligence network was relying on electronic monitoring and manipulation of the population. The military genocidal campaign in Rakhine was accompanied by an ultra-nationalist Buddhist social media campaign that closely mirrored the military values and xenophobic approach toward the Rohingya community (Selth, 2020). The social media campaign increased solidarity among the Bahmar Buddhist majority, gaining popularity among the population while simultaneously narrowing the newly opened space for civil liberties, freedom of speech, and the press (van Klinken & Aung Su Mon Thazin, 2017). The control of the military over internal affairs revealed two important aspects of the autocratic innovations. First, it pointed to the inability of the NLD government to rule over the military or to restrain the military’s impulses. Second, it showed the influence the military had over any other government body (Huang, 2013, p. 258). Inevitably, this had a terrible impact on the NLD government, revoking Aung San Suu Kyi’s international reputation as a human rights advocate (Bowcott, 2019; Rhodes, 2019).

Reversal into Complete Military Control The reported turnout in the 2020 democratic elections exceeded the 2015 levels (Thawnghmung & Noah, 2021). The NLD candidates won 920 (or 82%) of the total 1,117 elected seats, including seats in both 4 It is possible the military had implemented wide-ranging reforms to make the military more professional and to improve its order of battle. In 2011, the military reforms led to extensive arms acquisition, an expansion and modernization of its forces and various defense arrangements with friendly foreign countries, such as China, India, Russia, and Japan. These reforms ensured that the military had the size, revenue, and hardware necessary to handle any internal challenges that arose during the hybrid government (Selth, 2020, pp. 374–376).

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houses of Myanmar’s bicameral Parliament and the state/regional parliaments, as well as ethnic affairs minister posts, giving the NLD another landslide victory (The Irrawaddy, 2020). The size of their victory put the NLD in a different negotiating position with the military, as it now controlled more than 80% of the government. This fundamentally improved the power of the civilian government. However, the elected NLD government was unable to take office. On 1 February 2021, Myanmar state media broadcast that the elected tenth president of the Republic of the Union, Win Myint, and Aung San Suu Kyi were under arrest. The announcement of the coup took many Myanmar citizens by surprise. In the weeks after the coup, large peaceful civilian demonstrations made it evident that the military government lacked popular support. The military government responded with a combination of legal and military actions against the civilian population (Human Rights Watch, 2021). Thanks to their control of the political and legal systems, the military-led government put in place new legislation and legal amendments to restrict civil liberties. For example, sections of the Law Protecting the Privacy and Security of Citizens (2017) were removed to allow the police and military to conduct searches, seizures, and arrests; to extend detention without judicial oversight; and to carry out broad surveillance and investigation activities that could intrude on individual privacy (Clyde & Co, 2021, p. 1). The Penal Code was amended to create new offenses and expand existing offenses to target those speaking critically of the coup and the military (Centre for Law and Democracy, 2021). Amendments to the Cyber Law Draft and Electronic Transactions Law prevented the free flow of information and criminalized the dissemination of information through cyberspace, including expressions critical of the coup or the acts of the military (IFJ, 2021). As the demonstrations continued, the military coup started undoing all the democratic gains that had taken place since 2012. The military rolled back many of the economic reforms that were responsible for the economic boom of the last decade. Internet services were limited or stopped; the stock market and banking operations were put under tight controls; and controls over the foreign exchange market were imposed. As a result, by September 2021, the economy contracted by 18.4% and inflation was 6.5% above the same time the previous year (Asian Development Bank, 2021). In particular, the long-lasting suspension of private banking activities caused chaos in the daily lives of people due to the

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limited liquidity in market and its impact on reducing cash flow for businesses. By November, the kyat had lost more than 35% of its value against the US Dollar, and more than 48% of its value against the Chinese Yuan. Some people in Myanmar perceived the economic instability as a political maneuver used by the military to make it harder for the democratic movement to continue, especially among the urban middle class (Tan, 2021, p. 680). In addition to the legal and economic campaigns to control the population, the military orchestrated widespread violence and violations of human rights against unarmed civilians to establish its authority across the country and down to the lowest levels of governance (International Crisis Group, 2021). In 2021, the military was reported using torture, forced disappearances, deportations, and forced transfers across Myanmar (Fortify Rights, 2022). The scale of the violation of fundamental rules of international law provided grounds for condemnation by Western countries and from the United Nations. However, very little was done to address the human rights atrocities that were taking place, aside from imposing new sanctions (International Crisis Group, 2021; Human Rights Watch, 2022; Fortify Rights, 2022).5 One of the reasons why foreign interference was ruled out was the close relationship of the Myanmar military with several key countries, including China, Russia, India, and the ASEAN countries. Close diplomatic ties with geopolitical allies was an important reason why Myanmar was shielded from the wrath of the international community. China has been by far the most powerful ally for the military-led government. China’s support of the military-led government has lessened the pressure of external sanctions, both due to its economic and diplomatic support. China remains Myanmar’s paramount interlocutor, diplomatic protector, and economic partner (Passeri, 2021, p. 231). Four months after the coup d’état, the Chinese government announced that its policy toward the country remained unchanged, and that it was ready to resume normal bilateral contacts (The Diplomat, 2021). This economic 5 Shortly after the coup was announced, the United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres strongly condemned the military’s actions, arguing they “represent[ed] a serious blow to democratic reforms in Myanmar.” The United Nations Security Council and G-7 Foreign Ministers issued several statements stressing the need to uphold democratic institutions and processes, refrain from violence, and fully respecting human rights, fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, while also requesting the release of Aung San Suu Kyi and NLD colleagues.

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support has been critical to compensate for the impact of the sanctions put in place by Western countries, such as the European Union and the United States. Most importantly, the Chinese support to the Myanmar military-led government has had a strong influence on other neighboring ASEAN countries.6 Nevertheless, China–Myanmar relations have had a long history of mistrust due to China’s growing influence with ethnic armed groups, and the internal politics of the country. In response, the Myanmar military has tried to reduce its reliance on China by investing time and effort in diversifying and building their foreign relations with other countries. Ties with Russia and India have been carefully built. These relationships seem to have paid off as together, China, Russia, and India have successfully prevented any type of intervention against the military-led government, including blocking attempts by the United Unions Security Council (UNSC) to impose an arms embargo on Myanmar (Abnett, 2021). Since the coup, all three countries have continued working closely with the military-led government. China and Russia have also become the largest suppliers of weapons to Myanmar’s armed forces (Reuters, 2021). Although diplomatic ties have effectively protected the Myanmar military from foreign intervention, they have done little to stabilize the country. As the internal political and economic crises unfold, the civilian rejection of the military has not wavered. The democratic backlash, and the conflict that has emerged in many different parts of the country, is seriously challenging central state control. The military is once again facing the dilemma of how to govern so it can provide enough stability to attract capital, expand trade, and intensify resource extraction (Meehan & Seng Lawn Dan, 2022).

6 The United Nations General Assembly reported on 17 May 2021 that Liechtenstein had introduced a resolution calling for “an immediate suspension” of the transfer of weapons to the military junta of Myanmar. The draft was supported by the European Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The sole Asian country to cosponsor this move was South Korea. In contrast, ASEAN sent a letter to the United Nations General Assembly to drop the call to suspend arms sales to the Myanmar military (Nichols, 2021).

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Democratic Backlash and the Future of the Country Myanmar is a multi-ethnic state that officially recognizes 135 ethnic groups, as subdivisions of eight major national ethnic races (or ethnic nationalities) (Transnational Institute, 2014, p. 13). Since independence, the Myanmar military established successive central governments that were alien, predatory, and violent against ethnic nationalities (South & Lall, 2017). As a result, Myanmar’s national identity is based on the subjugation of several non-Bahmar states, and the Union government has manufactured strong opposition against regional autonomy and federalism (Huang, 2013). After the NLD victory in 2015, there was hope that democracy would translate into a more inclusive and equitable governance structure. While the military’s autocratic innovations failed to meaningfully address decades of ethnic conflict, it did provide space for Bahmar to rethink their political strategy through ethnic parties (Stokke, 2020, p. 23). To some degree, this brought non-Bahmar groups into mainstream politics. The autocratic innovations also provided enough internal wealth to transform the lives and aspirations of young people, especially those living in urban centers and towns across the country. The Formation of a Democratic Backlash After the coup, millions of people felt they had been robbed of their future (Jordt et al., 2021, p. 12). Initially, the protests were peaceful and non-violent. They included acts of civil disobedience, labor strikes, a military boycott campaign, a pot-banging movement, a red ribbon campaign, public protests, and formal recognition of the election results by elected representatives (Walsh & Akanksha, 2021). Organizing through Facebook, young people came out in the streets, severing barriers imposed by military ideology where mostly older Bahmar Buddhist nationalist men were involved in politics (Jordt et al., 2021, p. 14). Young people, self-identifying as Gen Z, became a movement of movements that was leaderless, emphasized horizontal relations (rather than hierarchical ones),

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and accentuated a social justice orientation inclusive of all members of society (Jordt et al., 2021, p. 20).7 The military then responded with a campaign of fear and intense repression, including extrajudicial killings, shooting protesters, torturing prisoners, and raiding homes as security forces were seen looting and plundering food, cash, and property of civilians (Human Rights Watch, 2022; Thawnghmung & Noah, 2021). Through social media, people disseminated pictures of the military terrorizing the population across the country.8 The terror campaign, however, had the opposite effect on the population, encouraging more members of the citizenry to revolt against the military (Drechsler, 2021, p. 579; Beech, 2021). As the repression intensified, more civil servants joined the Civil Disobedience Movement and refused to work for a military-led government that showed disrespect, and at times enjoyment in killing its citizens (Drechsler, 2021, p. 579).9 The anti-coup movement became known locally as the Spring Revolution. Initially, its demands concentrated on reinstating democratic rule and the release of Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD leadership. Slowly, the demands changed as Myanmar citizens realized the NLD leadership was unable to provide a solution for the future (Jordt et al., 2021, p. 20). Not only was the NLD leadership too old for the challenges that lay ahead, they had been unable to review key issues regarding constrained citizenship, the lack of substantive representation of political parties, and the authoritarian political culture, all of which impinged on democratic diversity and pluralism (Bünte, 2021a; Stokke, 2020). The anti-coup movement moved away from the NLD political agenda; instead, it focused on demands for a new governance structure that did

7 Jordt et al. (2021, p. 20) argue that Gen Z aspirations are “directed toward a universalism expressive of ideas promoting the defense of democracy and equality—rather than religious, racial or ethnic particularism.” 8 Using social media, anti-government protesters have made visible the military’s use of propaganda to present a veneer of normalcy. Gen Z has leveraged digital literacy to function as citizen journalists to reveal corruption and extensive violence inflicted across the country, as well as citizens’ refusal to bow down to the terror campaign (Jordt et al., 2021, p. 25). 9 In April 2021, it was estimated that between 30 and 50% civil servants have joined the civil disobedience movement across the Ministries previously managed by the civilian government. Examples of these are the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Culture, the Ministries of Education (ME, including teachers), and of Health and Sports (MHS) (Drechsler, 2021).

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not include the military, as it had lost all legitimacy to govern. In turn, Myanmar’s National Unity Government (NUG) has also adopted the language of inclusion of ethnic and other stakeholder interests, and views itself to be laying the foundation for “a federal union that seeks to address decades of structural violence against all the people of Myanmar regardless of race and religion” (Thuzar & Min Tun, 2022).10 Sustaining the Democratic Backlash What has sustained the democratic backlash since 2021 is the systematic challenging of the pillars that make it possible for the military to govern: a Bahmar Buddhist-centered national political identity, as well as centralized armed forces and civil service (Oo, 2021). First, the democratic backlash revisited Myanmar’s understanding of its national identity. After the shared trauma from the military’s crackdown on protesters, the Bahmar ethnic majority shifted their views toward minority groups long persecuted by the military—and even by the NLD government (Prasse-Freeman & Kabya, 2021).11 It also created the political space for moving away from the singular (Bahmar Buddhist) NLD leadership into a nascent more inclusive political identity that incorporated other ethno-religious identities (Thawnghmung & Noah, 2021). Following the anti-coup movement’s ideology, the NUG adopted a more inclusive federal agenda. This agenda included a mandate to redress past injustices against various communities and ethnic nationality groups across Myanmar, and to establish NUG’ legitimacy domestically and abroad (Thuzar & Min Tun, 2022, p. 6). Second, the evolution of the Gen Z participation into a decentralized armed movement has been a critical element to sustain the democratic backlash. After the military repression reduced the scale of street protests, it forced peaceful anti-coup groups to find new strategies to oppose military rule (Beech, 2021). Gen Z protesters armed themselves to defend

10 The NUG emerged on 16 April 2021 amidst the political crisis following the military coup. The NUG has been striving to gain as much support as it can from Myanmar’s many ethnic armed organizations as well as from the anti-coup movement (Thuzar & Min Tun, 2022, p. 3). 11 It provided the majority group a new perspective into the violence suffered by the many ethnic groups of the country, including the genocidal campaign suffered by the Rohingya as well as other ethnic nationalities.

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their neighborhoods against attacks (International Crisis Group, 2021). After many Gen Z protesters received training from Ethnic Armed Organizations, they returned to the cities and their areas of origin as people’s defense forces to fight back in a dispersed, subterranean manner against the military and their informers (Cheesman, 2021, p. 64).12 These new people’s defense forces are responding to violence unleashed by security forces (ACLED, 2021).13 They are loosely structured and horizontally interrelated and have ties with several ethnic armed forces (Cheesman, 2021, p. 65). In most instances, they have a loose affiliation with the NUG, and their efforts of establishing a “Federal Union Army” that would incorporate the PDF and various EAOs fighting the Myanmar military (Thuzar & Min Tun, 2022, p. 11).14 Third, the battle for the civil service continues as the people’s defense forces target local administrative authorities working for the military (Prasse-Freeman & Kabya, 2021). This response from Gen Z is a counterforce to the crackdown shown by the military toward civil servants participating in the Civil Disobedience Movement (Cheesman, 2021). Therefore, although the Civil Disobedience Movement has lost more than one-third of its active members, those civil servants that have gone back to work are afraid of performing their roles in case they are seen as defenders of the military (Radio Free Asia, 2022). In addition, ward and village tract level administrative associations have emerged across contested areas, where populations are electing their own representatives (Zarni, 2021). These “people’s administrations” are consolidating power in areas, such as Sagaing, Magwe, Chin, and Kayah, where the military has most violently attacked the population (Radio Free Asia, 2022). Throughout the process of challenging the central elements of the military-led government, the anti-coup movement has evolved and grown. Not only has it changed its approach toward social change, for example, by supporting civilian armed forces, but it is also both aligning

12 Gen Z have looked to minority armed organizations for practical help, sanctuary, training, and support for building a force that could protect them from the daily terror under siege by the military (Zarni, 2021). 13 ACLED (2021) data shows that of the people’s defense groups formed since the coup have led to an increase of conflict in Bahmar areas. 14 At the same time, the NUG has tried to incorporate the various people’s defense forces under a central coordinating body to that can organize the resistance against the military (Thuzar & Min Tun, 2022, p. 10 quoting Myanmar Now, 2021).

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with and influencing key consolidated political actors, such as the NUG and ethnic armed organizations. As it has expanded its influence, the movement’s ideology has permeated the ethnic armed organizations and the NUG policies. The increased synergy between the anti-coup movement and other consolidated political actors has continued to sustain the democratic backlash. Some Successes of the Democratic Backlash: Redefining an Inclusive Federal Agenda The Myanmar military has dominated national politics as well as the state apparatus since first coming into power in 1958 (Breen & Décobert, 2021). This is not the first time that a military-led government has been challenged by its citizens (Lall, 2017). The main difference with past social mobilizations is that this democratic backlash is so broad and encompassing that it requires a completely different way for the military to address it; one that brute force might not resolve. The strength of the democratic backlash emanates from its diversity (Cheesman, 2021). To succeed, the diversity and decentralized nature of social mobilization need to be incorporated into the design of the next Myanmar civilian government (Breen & Décobert, 2021). This is what a democratic Myanmar requires: a nation that respects self-determination and is inclusive of diversity. This is hard to do, especially since Myanmar’s various political actors, such as NLD party leadership and ethnic armed organizations, have been unable to include demands for self-determination at the center of the nation-building project (South & Lall, 2017). Nevertheless, there are promising steps toward a more relevant Myanmar governance model. Since May 2021, the group of elected lawmakers, activists, and elected members of parliament (ousted in the 2021 Myanmar coup d’état) that formed the National Unity Government of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar (or NUG) are working together to establish new political structures that make this possible. This process is ongoing and has been full of challenges and biases as representatives of ethnic nationalities are wary of falling back into the trap of mistakenly assuming that national unity will benefit all ethnic groups (Selth, 2020; Sakkong, 2012). Nevertheless, the diversity represented in the NUG is a positive step forward

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(Thuzar & Min Tun, 2022).15 There is also a process to include ethnic armed groups and people’s defense forces into a federal army (Zarni, 2021; ACLED, 2021). Finally, the NUG announced that the military was a terrorist group, and by consequence the root cause of multiple and persistent armed conflicts and human rights violations (Republic of the Union of Myanmar National Unity Government, 2021).16 As Loong (2021) argues, all of this points to the fact that Myanmar is at a critical juncture. The success of the democratic backlash depends on Myanmar’s ability to transform existing center–periphery relations, and to embrace a more decentralized and inclusive political system. This means that the role of Gen Z, ethnic armed organizations, and civil society organizations needs to be recognized rather than side-lined in favor of other country-based actors, such as the National Unity Government.

Conclusion The empirical evidence presented in this chapter suggests that we need to broaden our understanding of how democracies are born, end, or transform. Myanmar has shown how autocratic innovations were able to create an environment where both the army and its civilian opposition were able to benefit from a “democratic” arrangement. By contrast, the military-led government has been unable to secure any legitimacy; instead using its autocratic networks to protect itself from foreign interference. Despite its use of increased violence and repression, the military has been unable to stop civilian demands for a return to democracy. The democratic backlash that emerged after the coup has changed the political space of Myanmar in such a significant manner that the country will never

15 Moe Thuzar and Htet Myet Min Tun (2022) argue that NUG’s diversity is a

concious effort to attract support from Myanmar’s many ethnic armed organizations: As many as 13 of the 26 members of the NUG cabinet are from ethnic nationalities. This includes the acting (Kachin) president and (Karen) prime minister. Also, a third of the cabinet are women, an LGBTQ+ human rights activist is the NUG minister for human rights, and at least two deputy ministers are from political parties that contested for seats against the NLD in 2020. More information on the membership of the NUG can be found here: https://www.nugmyanmar.org/en/. 16 The NUG statement designates “the Tatmadaw and its affiliated organisations as terrorist organisations” and further includes, inter alia, the text: “Generally, five critical components of terrorism include an involvement in an act of violence, an audience, the creation of a mood of fear, innocent victims, and political goals or motives.”

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be the same again. The democratic backlash was formed once there was a unifying rejection for the military’s control of the state. This movement has been sustained by the establishment of new structures, such as citizen solidarity networks, people’s defense forces, and alternative civil administrators, which are more inclusive and decentralized. For the democratic backlash to succeed, there needs to be a Federalist agenda that has a more balanced sharing of resources between the Bahmar majority and other ethnic nationalities; this issue has been subject to superficial solutions up until now. Although it is difficult to know if the anti-coup movement can, at some point, force the military to back down and restore some semblance of democracy, these events open the possibility of creating new governing rules for the future, providing a historical opportunity for long-lasting change for all Myanmar citizens.

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Index

A accountability, 6–10, 18, 19, 28, 37–39, 43, 55, 56, 108, 118, 119, 122, 131, 133, 142, 173, 177, 183, 199–202, 218 ActionAid Myanmar (AAM), 170, 172, 175, 177–185, 189, 191 Action to Defend Islam (Aksi Bela Islam), 64, 65, 69, 75, 81, 82, 84 Ahok (Basuki Tjahaja Purnama), 64, 65, 69–72, 76, 84 Amanah, 100, 102, 108, 109 Amnesty International (AI), 226, 236 Anarchist groups (kelompok anarko), 236 anti-coup movement, 258–261, 263 Anti-Terror Law, 231, 233 Aquino, Benigno III, 42, 43, 45, 228 Arab Spring, 241 Aspinall, E., 66, 222, 228, 229, 234, 236, 242

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 15, 16, 252, 255, 256 Ateneo de Manila University, 232 authoritarian enclaves, 28, 200–202, 217 authoritarian influence, 34, 36, 52 authoritarian innovation, 6, 8, 9, 23, 27, 29, 54, 140–143, 152, 162, 163, 250 autocratization, 5, 6, 8, 10–15, 17, 18, 20, 24, 25, 27, 29, 122, 131, 222 B backdoor government, 118 Bahmar, 253, 257, 259, 260, 263 Barisan Nasional (BN), 94, 101, 117, 120 Baswedan, Anies, 26, 64, 65, 69–72, 77, 78, 80, 85, 86 Bermeo, N., 3, 4, 14, 97, 119, 121, 122

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 J. Ockey and N. S. Talib (eds.), Democratic Recession, Autocratization, and Democratic Backlash in Southeast Asia, Contestations in Contemporary Southeast Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-9811-9

269

270

INDEX

Bersatu, 100, 102, 103, 109, 118, 120, 124–126, 133 bottom-up governance, 170, 192 Buddhist, 142, 143, 149, 150, 169, 170, 253, 257, 259 Bumiputera, 107 C Cambodia, 12, 14, 15, 19, 22, 23 censorship, 5, 39, 51, 251 channeling, 223, 224, 237, 239 charismatic, 5, 67 China, 3, 15, 16, 26, 34–36, 39–46, 48, 49, 51–53, 55, 56, 141, 253, 255, 256 Chinese Communist Party, 51, 54, 142 Chin State, 178–181 citizenship, 258 Civil Disobedience Movement, 258, 260 civil society, 3, 6, 8–11, 19, 20, 24, 37, 38, 40, 84, 122, 131, 133, 134, 222, 235, 262 coercion, 39, 48, 223, 224, 229, 233, 237 Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), 227–229 community-based organisations (CBOs), 176, 179–181 community-led participatory planning, 171 conservatism, 67, 68 contagion, 225, 241 corrosive capital, 42 corruption, 3, 11, 21–23, 33, 37, 39, 41–43, 45, 48, 52, 55, 56, 66, 79, 94, 100, 109, 119, 124, 125, 213, 215, 228, 230, 258 coup, 4, 10, 13, 15, 19, 25, 28, 29, 38, 95, 97, 102, 118, 120, 121, 123, 142, 143, 178, 185, 191,

192, 250, 254–256, 259, 260, 262 COVID-19, 22, 27, 53, 81, 82, 85, 93, 95, 97, 105–107, 110, 118, 120, 127, 128, 130, 132, 134, 147, 204, 231–234 Curato, N., 6, 7, 9, 11, 64, 139–141, 162, 250

D democracy, 1–3, 5, 6, 8, 10–12, 14, 16, 18–21, 23, 26, 27, 29, 33–39, 41, 43, 46, 48, 52, 56, 64–67, 84, 85, 87, 93–95, 97, 99, 100, 105, 108–111, 121–123, 126, 130, 132–134, 140, 142, 143, 163, 170, 199, 217, 222, 226, 242–244, 250, 257, 262, 263 Democracy with King as Head of State (DKHS), 142, 143, 149–152 Democratic Action Party (DAP), 99, 102, 107, 109, 110, 129 democratic backlash, 10, 11, 20, 24, 25, 28, 29, 38, 55, 222, 223, 226, 233, 234, 242, 250, 251, 256, 259, 261–263 democratic backsliding, 95, 97, 109, 110, 121 democratic careening, 34 democratic deficit, 37, 250 democratic erosion, 8, 34–36, 39, 42, 51, 52, 54–56, 121, 142 democratic innovation, 9–11, 28, 168, 171, 177, 178, 191, 193, 222, 226, 242 democratic recession, 2–7, 9–13, 21, 23, 25, 26, 29, 55, 64, 93, 96, 97, 105, 140, 142, 163, 168, 199, 200, 217, 222, 244

INDEX

democratization, 2, 5, 10, 12, 13, 16, 17, 21, 25, 29, 34, 67, 94, 109, 119, 139, 142, 200–202, 204, 209–212, 217, 218, 244 development aid, 52 Diamond, L., 3, 7, 8, 16, 93, 121 diffusion, 225, 241 Diliman Commune, 227 disinformation, 52, 54 distrust, 36, 49, 133, 215 domestic workers, 204 domination, 84, 199, 202, 214, 216, 218 Duterte, Rodrigo, 24, 34, 52, 53

E economic transformation, 201–203 education, 72, 75, 98, 123, 124, 170, 179, 181, 203, 213, 242 election, 1, 3–5, 17, 22–24, 26, 35, 37, 39, 52, 63, 65, 66, 68–72, 77, 83, 85–87, 94, 99–101, 103, 105, 107, 109, 110, 117, 118, 120–122, 125, 126, 128, 130, 133, 169, 199–203, 209, 211–218, 227, 249, 253, 257 electoral democracy, 37, 201 elite, 5, 34–39, 41, 42, 44–46, 48, 49, 51, 52, 54, 56, 64, 66, 67, 72, 76, 80, 96, 100, 108, 110, 142, 169, 199–203, 209–211, 214, 215, 217, 218, 222, 223, 225, 235, 237, 242, 243, 252 emergency, 1, 5, 27, 95, 118, 120, 122, 128–132, 134, 250, 251 emergency law, 15 ethnic armed organisations (EAOs), 169–171, 175, 185, 189, 192, 259, 260, 262 executive aggrandizement, 4, 26, 27, 34, 38, 118, 119, 121, 122

271

executive power, 17, 18, 99, 121–123, 130, 134

F Facebook, 27, 53, 70, 140, 143, 145–148, 152–154, 157, 158, 160, 161, 225, 230, 233, 236, 240, 252, 257 family politics, 204, 212 feminist participatory research (FPR), 184 financial crisis, 203, 204, 213, 229 flood mitigation, 76, 77, 86 Foa, R.S., 2, 20 foreign influence, 26, 34, 39, 54–56 Fosatti, D., 6 Freedom House, 2, 93, 105, 106, 226, 233

G Generation Z (Gen Z), 250, 257–260, 262 Gerschewski, J., 34, 97 Golkar party, 204 governance, 2, 3, 11, 28, 35, 38, 39, 42, 46, 56, 96, 100, 105, 106, 133, 140, 168–177, 181, 183, 185, 189, 191–193, 243, 250, 255, 257, 258, 261 government, 118 grassroots governance, 168, 172, 173, 175, 177, 181, 182, 184, 185, 189, 191, 192 Greater Indonesia Party (Gerindra), 64, 69, 86 grievance, 41, 42, 65, 71, 72, 85

H Hadi Awang, 98, 102, 104, 106

272

INDEX

Hadiz, V.R., 5, 66, 71, 75, 199, 201, 202 Hong Kong, 51, 52, 204, 241 hudud, 104 Human Rights Watch (HRW), 128, 226, 253, 254, 258 Huntington, S.P., 2, 12, 19 hybrid governance, 171 hybrid organisation, 172, 173, 177, 185, 192 hybrid organisation analysis, 168, 172, 186

I Ibrahim, Anwar, 20, 25, 98, 99, 119 illiberal majoritarianism, 39, 48, 52 Indonesia, 10, 12, 13, 18, 19, 23, 24, 26, 28, 64–67, 69–75, 78, 80, 81, 83, 84, 86, 87, 95, 141, 199–204, 210–213, 217, 222, 223, 226, 228, 234–244 Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan), 24, 64 Indonesian Student Action Front (Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa, KAMI), 228 Indonesian Ulama Council (Majelis Ulama Indonesia/MUI), 65, 68 Indramayu, 28, 200, 203, 204, 206–208, 212, 213, 215 inequality, 26, 74–76, 78, 79, 86, 106, 181, 203 Influence operations, 34, 36, 52–54, 56 informal village-based association, 209 Information Operation (IO), 141, 143, 162 Instagram, 27, 140, 143, 145, 146, 160, 235, 236 institutionalised racism, 170

international migration, 202, 204, 208 Islam, 67, 68, 94–98, 101–107, 111, 125 J Jakarta gubernatorial election, 64–66, 69–72, 81, 86 Japan, 48, 49, 52, 204, 221, 253 Jokowi (Joko Widodo), 64, 66, 71, 78, 80, 81, 85 K Kayah State, 179, 182, 192 Kayin State, 168, 170, 172, 178, 179, 184, 189, 192 Kenny, P.D., 67 Keterbukaan (Openness) Policy, 229 king, Malaysia (Yang di Pertuan Agong), 120, 122, 125 Kyi, Aung San Suu, 18, 25, 253–255, 258 L Laebens, M.G., 8, 9, 121, 142 Laos, 15, 19 leadership, 19, 64, 65, 73, 78, 79, 81–84, 87, 98, 99, 102, 103, 107, 109, 117–119, 168, 174, 180, 184, 201, 209, 217, 252, 258, 259, 261 leadership transformation, 201 League of Filipino Students (LFS), 228, 229 Levitsky, S., 4, 5, 34, 54, 97 Lindberg, S.I., 4–6, 14 Lipset, S.M., 2 lower-class, 84, 202, 205–207, 210 low-income, 75, 78, 79, 205 Lührmann, A., 4–6, 8–10, 14, 119, 121, 122, 130, 131, 142

INDEX

M Macapagal-Arroyo, Gloria, 36, 38 Malari Affair, 228 Malaysia, 12, 14, 17, 19, 21–27, 64, 94–101, 103–106, 108–111, 117–119, 122, 123, 127, 131, 132, 141 martial law, 37, 226–228, 239 media, 5, 24, 39, 46, 52, 53, 131–134, 145, 225, 229, 233, 237, 243, 251, 254 Middle East, 63, 204 Mietzner, M., 64–66, 71, 72, 74, 75, 95, 141 migrant community, 200, 202, 204, 209 migrant villagers, 200–203, 205–209, 211, 214, 218 military, 4, 14–16, 18, 19, 23, 27, 29, 35, 37, 42, 44, 49, 56, 127, 140, 142–152, 154–156, 158, 161–163, 168, 169, 191, 221, 227, 230, 233, 238, 249–261, 263 Millennials Against Dictators, 231 Mohamad, Mahathir, 98–100, 102, 118 Morgenbesser, L., 6, 7, 54, 122, 140, 141, 162 Mounk, Y., 2 Muafakat Nasional, 101, 107 Mudde, C., 66, 83, 84, 96, 104, 110 Muhammadiyah, 68 Muhammad Rizieq Shihab, 64, 70, 72, 81, 82, 84 Myanmar, 1, 12, 15, 16, 18, 19, 22, 25, 29, 168–172, 174, 176–178, 184, 192, 193, 244, 249–252, 254–257, 259–262 Myanmar Sustainable Development Plan (MSDP), 177, 183, 191, 193

273

N Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), 68 Najib Razak, 100, 105, 109, 120, 123–125 National Awakening Party (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa/PKB), 69 National Democratic Front, 243 National League for Democracy (NLD), 18, 169, 250, 252–255, 257–259, 261, 262 National Mandate Party (Partai Amanat Nasional/PAN), 69 National Monument (Monumen Nasional), 82 National Unity Government (NUG), 259–262 newly rich, 202, 205, 209, 214, 215, 218 New Order, 200, 226, 228, 229, 234, 237, 238, 240 Non-governmental organizations (NGOs), 3, 28, 54, 170, 179, 185, 189, 192 Normalization of Campus Life Policy, 228 norms, 8, 9, 11, 18–20, 25, 27, 28, 36, 37, 55, 95, 118, 120, 121, 133, 171, 181, 184, 199, 200, 211, 216–218, 222

O Official Development Assistance, 49 Omnibus Law, 235–237 Operation Naval Gazing, 53 overseas migrant worker, 203, 204, 208, 211, 214

P Pakatan Harapan (PH), 94, 95, 100, 101, 103, 117, 119, 133

274

INDEX

participation, 6, 8–10, 19, 20, 28, 36–39, 97, 100, 139, 140, 169, 178, 182, 184, 191, 199, 201–204, 211, 215–218, 222, 225, 228, 230, 244, 250, 251, 259 Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS), 94, 96, 98–104, 107, 108, 110, 111, 118, 120, 126, 133 Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR), 108, 109, 119, 120 patron-client, 204, 205 people power movement, 230 Pepinsky, T., 6, 12, 46, 141 Perikatan Nasional (PN), 96, 103, 106, 109, 118–120, 132–134 Philippines, 12, 15–19, 22, 24–26, 28, 33–37, 39–46, 48–53, 55, 56, 64, 78, 95, 199, 201, 223, 226, 227, 229, 231, 232, 234, 237–240, 242–244 pockets of effectiveness (POE), 28, 168, 171–173, 177, 189, 191, 192 political families, 201, 204, 213–215, 217 political parties, 258 political system, 3, 6, 10, 17, 93, 118, 119, 121, 201, 212, 227, 251, 262 Political Terror Scale (PTS), 226, 238 political transformation, 169, 200, 201, 211–214, 218 political transition, 37, 168, 170, 200, 252 political violence, 202, 226 populism, Islamist, 26, 27, 65–67, 69, 71, 77, 82–85, 94–96, 101, 104, 106, 109 post-transition, 28, 199–201 poverty, 74, 75, 86, 170, 178, 179, 183, 203, 204, 252

power, 4, 7, 10, 18, 19, 23, 25, 27, 37, 39, 41, 49, 65, 71, 80, 93–95, 101, 104, 107, 108, 110, 117–122, 124–126, 128, 131, 133, 134, 144, 158, 171, 180–182, 185, 199–202, 204, 209, 211, 213, 214, 218, 228, 231, 237, 242, 249, 254, 260, 261 Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera/PKS), 69 proto governance, 168, 172, 173, 175, 177, 185, 190, 192 R Rakhine, 169, 253 Rappler, 52, 53, 233 red-tagging, 231–233, 238 reform, 66, 67, 103, 108, 118, 119, 133, 143, 168, 169, 171, 191, 200, 212, 227, 235, 237, 251–255 Reformasi, 69, 99 repertoires, 6, 28, 36, 38, 222–226, 230, 231, 233, 239–243 repression, 28, 29, 222–227, 229, 230, 233, 234, 236–240, 243, 244, 250, 258, 259, 262 returned migrants association, 210 Rohingya, 253, 259 ROTC Cyber, 27, 140, 142, 143, 145–149, 151–158, 160–163 ROTC New Gen, 144, 145 ROTC programme, 143–149, 158, 159, 162 ROTC Volunteer, 145, 149, 150 Royal-nationalism, 142 Russia, 3, 48, 253, 255, 256 S Sharp power, 40, 52, 56

INDEX

275

Siang, Lim Kit, 106 Singapore, 12, 16, 19, 141, 204 Slater, D., 33, 34, 36–38, 40, 99, 119 social class, 207 social entrepreneurs, 208 social hierarchy, 200, 204, 207, 209, 214 social media, 3, 5, 23, 24, 34, 39, 52–54, 72, 95, 106, 139–143, 145, 152, 161, 162, 205, 208, 225, 230, 232, 235, 237, 240, 241, 252, 253, 258 social mobility, 75, 77, 86, 205 social status, 199, 217 South China Sea, 16, 35, 36, 43, 44, 51–53 Southeast Asian, 17, 23, 40, 64, 78, 201 South Korea, 142, 204, 256 Spring Revolution, 258 State Department, 226 State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), 249, 251 students, 19, 24, 28, 29, 140, 143–145, 147–153, 158–162, 171, 221–223, 226–239, 241–244 substate populism, 26, 65, 72–74, 77, 84–86 Suharto, 19, 67, 68, 204, 212, 214, 217, 221, 229, 236 Syariah, 104

tenant farmers, 202, 204, 205, 207, 208, 214 Territorial Defense Command (TDC), 143, 145, 148 Thailand, 1, 12, 15–17, 19, 22–25, 64, 78, 95, 140–142, 145, 150, 161–163, 201, 221 Thai-style democracy, 142 Tilly, C., 223 Timor Leste, 12, 17, 18 Trisakti University, 229 troll army, 141, 143, 162 Twitter, 27, 140, 143, 145, 146, 153, 160, 161, 225, 230, 235, 240

T Tabung Haji, 102 Tarrow, S.G., 224, 225 technocratic populism, 64, 83 Telegram, 241 temporary migrant workers (Pekerja Migran Indonesia, PMI), 204, 205

V V-dem, 2, 4, 5, 8, 12–15, 19, 105 Vietnam, 15, 19 Vietnam War, 227, 241 village community-based organisations (VCBOs), 179, 181, 184, 185 village election, 28, 200, 203, 215, 216

U Ummah, 68, 71, 104, 107 United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan/PPP), 45, 69 United Malays National Organization (UMNO), 23, 27, 94, 96, 98–102, 104, 107–110, 118, 120, 123–127, 129, 130, 133 United States (US), 7, 16, 40, 43, 48, 52, 53, 63, 231, 252, 255, 256 University of the Philippines (UP), 227, 229, 231, 232 upper-class, 200, 202, 204, 205, 207, 208, 210, 214, 218

276

INDEX

village tract community-based organisation (VTCBO), 180, 182–184 vote-buying, 201, 202 voters, 1, 2, 5, 7, 10, 24, 29, 67, 70–72, 87, 109, 131, 201, 202, 213 voting preferences, 214 W warnet (warung internet, internet café), 209, 210, 215, 218 Weiss, M.L., 100, 118, 119, 222, 241, 242 WhatsApp, 234, 236, 240 women’s self-help groups (WSHGs), 180–182, 184, 185

Y Yaakob, Ismail Sabri, 96, 107, 123, 126, 130, 134 Yassin, Muhyiddin, 100, 105–107, 109, 110, 118, 120, 123, 131, 133, 134 Youth (Pemuda), 148, 161, 180, 215, 222, 228–231, 234, 239, 243 Youtube, 27, 140, 143, 145–148, 150–154, 159, 160, 162

Z Zero down payment housing scheme (Rumah DP 0 persen), 78, 85 Ziblatt, D., 4, 5, 54