Democracy: World Survey 1987 9781685858728

Table of contents :
Contents
Maps
Preface
Introduction
1 Western Europe
2 North America
3 Latin America and the Caribbean
4 Sub-Saharan Africa
5 North Africa and the Near East
6 South Asia
7 East Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific Area
8 The Soviet Sphere and Eastern Europe
Conclusion
Bibliography
About the Book and Authors
Index

Citation preview

DEMOCRACY 1987

DEMOCRACY WORLD SURVEY 1987 Robert Wesson, editor

Lynne Rienner Publishers • Boulder & London

Published in the United States of America in 1988 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 948 North Street, Boulder, Colorado 80302 and in the United Kingdom by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 3 Henrietta Street, Coven t Garden, London WC2E 8LU ©1988 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Democracy: a worldwide survey. Bibliography: p. Includes index. 1. Democracy — History — 20th century. 2. Authoritarianism — History — 20th century. I. Wesson, Robert G. JC421.D46 1987 321.8'09'04 86-30443 ISBN 0-275-92440-8 (alk. paper) 1-55587-034-1

Printed and bound in the United States of America The paper used in this publication meets the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1984. ©

Contents

List of Maps

vi

Preface Introduction

vii Robert Wesson

1 Western Europe 2 North America

1

Dennis Kavanagh

11

John Marini

25

3 Latin America and the Caribbean

John D. Martz

45

4 Sub-Saharan Africa Larry Diamond and Dennis Galvan 5 North Africa and the Near East 6 South Asia

Douglas

Glenn E. Perry

C. Makeig

63 105 137

7 East Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific Area Larry Niksch

155

8 The Soviet Sphere and Eastern Europe David E. Powell

185

Conclusion

Robert Wesson

219

Bibliography

231

About the Book and the Authors

233

Index

235

v

Maps

Western Europe

12

Central America and the Caribbean

46

South America

47

Sub-Saharan Africa

62

North Africa and the Near East

106

South Asia

136

East Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific Area

156

The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe

184

vi

Preface

The purpose of this volume is to examine the condition of democratic institutions and practices throughout the world. This includes not only the health of existing full and partial democracies, but also any movement in more authoritarian states toward or away from liberal-democratic values and practices. We are concerned not only with changes of regime type, which are few (the Philippines and Haiti being the only clear-cut cases in 1986-early 1987), but also with signs of strengthening or solidification of democratic institutions, efforts to establish more representative government, indications of loosening of authoritarian or absolutist claims to c o m p l e t e control, and their o p p o s i t e s — t h e w e a k e n i n g or degradation of democratic institutions, hardening of repression, or tightening of authoritarian regimes. This survey covers all countries except a few ministates and nonself-governing territories during the year 1986 and the first two months of 1987. For descriptive purposes, the world is divided into eight more or less coherent regions, each treated by a specializing scholar: Western Europe, North America, Latin America and the Caribbean, sub-Saharan Africa, North Africa and the Near East, South Asia, East and Southeast Asia and the Pacific, and the Soviet-East European sphere. In part these divisions represent simple geography, but they also correspond for the most part to cultural and political groupings. Western Europe is marked more by democratic, as distinguished from Marxist-Leninist or Communist, institutions than by longitude; it includes Greece but not Yugoslavia. North America is separated from Latin America both by politics and by the difference between

vii

viii

Preface

the dominantly English-speaking countries, settled mostly from northern Europe, and the Spanish- (or Portuguese-) speaking countries, settled from Iberia, with a large proportion of Amerindian blood in most places. Africa begins with the Sahara less because of p o l i t i c s than b e c a u s e N o r t h A f r i c a b e l o n g s c u l t u r a l l y , linguistically, and religiously to the Near Eastern world. South Asia, between Iran and Burma, is a fairly coherent geographic and cultural area. This cannot be said, however, of East and Southeast Asia and the Pacific, which is the most heterogeneous of our regions. It includes absolutist governments, both Marxist (China and Vietnam) and non-Marxist (Burma and Brunei), democracies (Japan and Australia), and many shades between. It is also racially and culturally diverse, from Korea to New Zealand. The Soviet sphere, on the other hand, is politically bound (except for one-time members of the bloc Yugoslavia and Albania) and racially and culturally not very diverse (except for Asiatic parts of the Soviet Union and Mongolia). This raises important questions about the relationship of political institutions to ethnic-cultural, economic, and geographic conditions. It is clearly not accidental that in each region a majority of states are of the same type (except in the grab-bag Asia-Pacific region). Political forms go to some extent with cultural similarity, and neighbors obviously influence one another.

Introduction ROBERT WESSON We do not have anything like a scientific understanding of democracy, although its content is intuitively fairly clear and it is not difficult to give a formal definition. It is usually defined in terms of its institutions—equal political rights, freedom of political expression and organization, governmental authority based on free and fair election with universal adult franchise, independent courts, and rule of law. More broadly, it is characterized by respect for political opposition, among both parties and factions. It is decent, nonbrutal, nonpersonalistic government based on the wishes of the majority with consideration for the rights of minorities. Ethically, it may be defined as government without irrational discriminations or prerogatives, and with equality of persons basically respected. In practice, it is marked by variety of opinions and maximum freedom of choice consistent with the needs of the community. In the democratic order, different sectors of the population necessarily share basic values and are prepared to accept political decisions reached through recognized procedures. Authority is allocated by rules conforming to the prevalent philosophy of individual autonomy. This permits the peaceful coexistence of various more or less independent groups outside the state; pluralism is almost synonymous with democracy. The economy is predominantly in private ownership and subject to market forces. Democratic systems have different nuances and emphases, but their general outlook and spirit are the same everywhere. Africans or Chinese easily understand the basic ideas of choice, freedom, and respect for accepted procedures. There is no "socialist democracy" as opposed to "capitalist" or "bourgeois democracy," and a society that

1

2

Robert Wesson

has some of the chief characteristics of democracy will have all of them. Some regimes claim to promote social or economic rights in preference to political rights, but this is misleading. Social and economic rights are best protected by the states most dedicated to political rights. Such generalizations tell something about democracy, but they do not answer many questions. For example, should India be called democratic despite the fact that the same party and the same family have been in power almost all the years since independence in 1947? Or, if we agree with the universal opinion that India is really democratic, why should it be the most democratic country of the huge Afro-Asian sphere (except Japan and possibly the Philippines)? Its conditions w o u l d seem intuitively quite unfavorable: the grossest inequality, indifference to suffering, and deep divisions between virtually noncommunicating ethnic and communal groups. Equally, it is not easy to understand the almost total absence of democracy in the Arab world (except formerly Lebanon when Christian-dominated); one must have recourse to vague notions of cultural receptivity. From the point of view of modernization, background, homogeneity, and other indicators ordinarily (and properly) associated with democracy, one would expect Colombia to be much more subject to military rule than Argentina; yet in the past half-century the reverse has been the case. Possibly one should accept that political causation may be inscrutable. We would then lay the responsibility on history. Although the values of democracy are universal, in practice it might be defined as the general political mode developed in the past few centuries by the Western European state system and spread by it overseas, by settlement (as in English-speaking countries), by colonial rule (as in Jamaica and India), by victorious imposition (as in Japan), or by the influence of a dominant democratic power (as in several countries of Latin America). Democracy in this view is the product of a unique historical experience of what we call "the West"; countries outside this sphere may be democratic, but nonWestern nations do not become thoroughly democratic unless they are more or less pressed into the mold. Yet, the peoples of Europe, especially northern Europe, do not simply have democracy in their blood. Nor is democracy the result of some undefinable elements of European culture, for there is diversity of ways and national character f r o m Ireland to Scandinavia to Italy; and Japan, with a very different social makeup, has been as successful as any other nation in democratic

Introduction

3

practice. We should also remember that European democracy might well have been terminated, or at least set very far back, if the authoritarian powers had not been defeated in two hard-fought world wars with the help of a very strong democratic power across the Atlantic. Until 1945, indeed, Central Europe knew more dictatorship than democracy. In this sense, it is something of an accident that democracy is the dominant political mode of the modern world. Conceivably, some different values might prevail, but no others seem equally suited to the technological economy and the industrialized society. There is no room in the modern way of life for mystic claims to authority, such as the Nazis' "leadership principle" and their exaltation of racial egoism, or for the Leninist doctrine of supremacy of the party apparatus in fulfillment of a mythical "class" role. We may assume that if such doctrines became generally dominant, intellectual and economic progress would be stifled for a long time. The effort of any authority to control the flow of information, the supremacy of a will over regular rules, and discrimination of persons are not harmonious with an advanced technological culture. The felt need for material progress is the chief reason for movement of authoritarian states in the direction of democratic, or at least less rigid and more open and responsive, structures. It is too much, however, to assume that industrialization is quite dependent on democratic forms. Before 1914, the authoritarian but legalistic German state was the world's leader in science and technology; and Japan was as successful in modernization with little democracy before World War II as it has been under the new democratic order. South Korea, Singapore, and a few other small countries have prospered mightily without much democracy. Yet this is contrary to the general rule in the contemporary world: unless there are certain cultural factors that we do not understand, economies seem to flourish better under political institutions approximating those of the richest nations. For the most part, authoritarian regimes are signal failures economically. The idea, widespread a few decades ago, that the Marxist-Leninist states had an effective recipe for industrial progress has faded as these have slowed greatly and evidenced technological dependence on freer societies. Democracy is certainly successful among the advanced industrial states. It is virtually unquestioned in principle; the complaint is only that it is incomplete or mismanaged. It is phenomenal that no state of the Western world has even seen a real threat to its

4

Robert Wesson

democratic institutions since World War II; and where democracy has spread on the fringes, to Spain, Portugal, and Greece, it seems to have affirmed itself. The European democratic sphere is also remarkably united, with no serious international division and very extensive economic interchanges, even a high degree of integration in the C o m m o n Market. This is in marked contrast to the quarrelsomeness of the nondemocratic nations, among whom there are numerous bitter antagonisms and a number of wars or near-wars. In view of such facts, the desirability of democratic institutions for any state that wishes to become richer and stronger seems quite obvious. It then must be asked why the spread of democratic institutions has been so limited and so often reversed. A modern— that is, constitutional and democratic—political system is clearly associated with prosperity. It makes for better relations with the leading wealthy powers; it gives prestige and nourishes selfrespect, whereas dictatorship is in bad repute. Democratic institutions are the only real means of legitimation of authority in the postwar world, fascism being totally discredited, MarxismLeninism exhausted, and traditional monarchy belonging obviously to a simpler age. Dictators usually feel they have to pretend that they are in power to serve the people, but the only obvious reason for their supremacy is that they managed to put themselves on top. Why then do nations hesitate or, having adopted more or less democratic institutions, often reverse themselves and revert to arbitrary authoritarian modes? The answer is clear in principle. Elites are usually more concerned with maintaining their satisfying position than with obtaining broad and perhaps distant benefits from improved political institutions. For example, the monarch of Kuwait, having permitted the election of a parliament for the obvious reasons, finds it interfering in the conduct of affairs; never having surrendered real power, he expresses his annoyance with parliament by dissolving it. The Chinese rulership carried out major reforms, permitting a considerable amount of private enterprise, opening contacts with the West, and permitting considerable latitude to the intelligentsia for a very good purpose, pulling China out of backwardness and into the modern age. This rational policy was quite successful, and both industry and agriculture prospered as never before. But some people drew the inconvenient conclusion that there should really be some sharing of power, and the party leadership pulled back and made clear that no such thing was to be considered. Such a pattern has been repeated countless times in many lands and will doubtless be repeated many more.

Introduction

5

Democratic institutions have been adopted in sundry countries of the Third World essentially through the preference of the elite—which wants modern, progressive government—not through pressure from the masses or ordinarily even from the usually weak and subservient middle classes. But if the elite has good reason to favor democracy, it does not desire thereby to sacrifice its own position, and democracy remains more procedure than substance. Under pressure, or if the democracy seems to be getting out of hand and bringing not progress but disorder and a threat to the social structure, the procedure can be sacrificed. The reality of democracy depends on a considerable degree of equality, or at least a spirit of equality, whereby elites are prepared to respect the verdict of the majority and do not feel endangered by the sentiments of the masses. Behind the sundry characteristics of democracy mentioned above lies one fundamental: one person is to stand over and command others only for very good reasons and by general consent, and all are to be taken into account. Depending on the balance of forces, however, democracy can be fairly stable in very unequal societies. Thus, India continues to be democratic because the British colonialists put in place a strong legal-bureaucratic-commercial elite which has found the political system satisfactory and has retained it without sharing power with the masses to any important extent. But when, in 1975, Indira Gandhi made herself briefly dictator, there was little protest. In Venezuela since the overthrow of an unpleasant dictatorship in 1958, the political elite has in effect compacted to maintain an orderly system; the military stays behind the scenes with material privileges; and the people receive sufficient concessions to assuage discontent. This democracy of inequality might be called "quasidemocracy," as it has appearances and form but not much of the substance of democracy in terms of acting according to popular wishes. It has two chief weaknesses. One is that disagreement among different elite groups may, for various reasons, lead to disorders and perhaps to violence or a military coup. The other is that people begin taking democracy seriously; then, to win the votes of the masses, politicians will propose effectively populist programs, implying more or less redistribution of wealth. This has occurred particularly in Latin America, the region of the Third World in which democracy is taken most seriously. The effort to reorder the society and economy by political process is for various reasons not likely to be succesful. It probably leads to more or less disorder, economic decline because of overspending and lack of

6

Robert Wesson

confidence, and conditions respectable people find threatening. The result is likely to be a move to restrict or reverse the democratic institutions. Democracy cannot work against very influential groups, cannot rapidly alter deep-lying differences, and cannot readily resolve economic and social inequality. The equalization of unequal societies is very difficult. Shattering defeat in war accomplished this for Japan and established a sound basis for the democratic institutions imposed on it, but nothing like this can be expected elsewhere. Even revolutions do not usually equalize. The revolution may proclaim economic egalitarianism, but it probably gives total power to a small elite, and political power becomes economic domination. Privilege is self-perpetuating in many ways. Consequently, democracy lacks depth, insofar as it exists at all, in most of the world. Yet movement toward democracy should be encouraged. It is certainly preferable that governments allow substantial freedom, treat their c i t i z e n s d e c e n t l y , and permit some political participation even if it is inegalitarian. Partially or even very superficially democratic societies are easier for the United States and other nations to deal with: they are more pacific and will probably administer their economies more rationally for the general benefit. In time their democratic elements may progress, with the growth of middle and professional classes and the loss of habits of military intervention. If the democratic world manages to solve its problems, its attractiveness will grow and with it the conviction that democratic institutions are indispensable for the modern society. Historically, democracy has matured in the course of modernization of once very class-differentiated societies, such as Britain and Sweden. Nowadays, time presses, and we are not prepared to wait for generations to learn new ways. But real change is slow; there is sure to be much stumbling on the way, and even with better efforts than we have seen recently, it will be a very long time before all nations can be called even insecurely democratic. It is nonetheless interesting to examine the state of the world and its progress, or lack of it, toward a more civilized politics. The following chapters seek to do this for the eight regions into which we have divided the world. There is no fully satisfactory way, of course, to rate something as complex and multifaceted as political institutions; and comparativists disagree considerably in their judgments, whether because of differing values or different information. One can easily say that there are the free and the

Introduction

7

unfree, but those who have said that freedom is like pregnancy, there being no condition of partial pregnancy, were entirely wrong. Freedom is nowhere perfect: there are all shades and degrees of democracy and tyranny, all governments have to some degree almost all the vices of the worst, and no absolutism is completely master of its subjects' lives. We have ventured, nonetheless, to categorize the states herein described in five groups: stable democracies, insecure democracies, partial democracies, limited authoritarianisms, and absolutist or totalitarian regimes. These categories are at best efforts to mark off parts of a continuous spectrum, and they become less clear-cut as one proceeds from the democratic end. The first is the least doubtful. To it belong governments strongly attached to rule of law, based on elections accepted by a large majority of the people as free and fair in an openly competitive political arena. The ordinarily recognized freedoms and civil liberties of expression and organization necessary for free political activity are taken for granted, and a coup overturning the constitution would be unthinkable. This category is also the most stable; there have been no defections from it for forty years. The United States is the prime example. In all we list twenty-seven stable democracies. The category of "insecure democracy" is much less solid, as many of its members seem subject to a political pendulum swinging between democracy and militocracy. A coup for an insecure democracy would hardly be surprising. In many of them, rumors of military intervention are frequent gossip, because the people know that the soldiers can take charge if they desire. Insecure democracies have regular and reasonably fair elections, the rule of law prevails generally, rights are respected except for occasional deviations, there is reasonable security for persons and property, and there is some pride in the democratic order. But if times are bad and the politicians are discredited by incompetence and corruption, a good many people might welcome a military intervention. Argentina is a good example. We count twenty-nine states in this group. In the "partial democracy," democratic institutions have some reality, but they c o m p r o m i s e with an authoritarian reality. C o m m o n l y , power is shared between a civilian administration, assisted by a parliament coming out of elections of some sort, and a m i l i t a r y e s t a b l i s h m e n t , as in Guatemala. Alternatively, an authoritarian ruling group goes to some pains to observe democratic forms, as in Mexico. Freedoms exist, but they are apt to be somewhat limited; one may criticize the government, but it is hazardous to exceed the bounds established by it. Political opposition is allowed,

8

Robert Wesson

even encouraged, as long as it does not really menace the allocation of power in society. A partial democracy may graduate to the category above if authoritarian forces become demoralized, as occurred in the Philippines in February 1986. Or it may drop down if the authorities, feeling menaced but retaining adequate means of action, decide that their subjects need more discipline, as in Singapore. W e find seventeen states that can reasonably be called partial democracies. The "limited authoritarianism" is a dictatorship that accepts more or less restriction of its freedom of arbitrary action. Limited authoritarian governments ordinarily permit people to emigrate, and they censor the press but do not attempt to dictate what papers must write. The rather forceful rule of Pinochet in Chile is so classified l a r g e l y b e c a u s e the courts retain c o n s i d e r a b l e independence and the government feels compelled to pledge an eventual return to democracy. The Soviet-bloc states of Poland and Hungary are also placed in this group, although they would surely act arbitrarily without hesitation if they felt t h e m s e l v e s threatened, because they seem to have accepted the right of the people to a modicum of personal autonomy. Yugoslavia likewise maintains the political monopoly of the Communist League but does not claim totality for it, and all powers are qualified by the rights of the semiautonomous republics composing the state. Largely because of the many African states in this group, it is the largest, with forty-nine listed. The category of "absolutist/totalitarian" is least satisfactory. It includes traditional autocracies, such as several Arab states; oldfashioned tyrannies, such as several African dictatorships; independently revolutionary regimes, such as Libya; and revolutionary or ostensibly revolutionary Marxist-Leninist states, from Cuba to the Soviet Union. It is somewhat incongruous to lump these together, but they have in common the complete or nearly complete absence of political rights for those outside the power structure. They generally tend to be xenophobic and inhospitable to Western values, although perhaps fairly agreeable, out of necessity, to trade with the Western world. On the average, they display more brutality than the preceding categories; some of them, such as Idi Amin's Uganda and Pol Pot's Kampuchea in the past and the Sovietsponsored Afghan government more recently, have been very murderous. Yet even of these states, most have made some concessions to democratic forms, such as the Soviet "parliament" elected without choice by the electors or the "Democracy Wall" briefly tolerated by the Beijing g o v e r n m e n t . T h e y have

Introduction

9

constitutions, although in none is the law effective in political questions. This is also a large category, including thirty-seven states. A majority of the classifications made here seem fairly clear and would probably be accepted by most observers. There are, however, many difficult, ambiguous, or borderline cases, regimes that might be placed in two or perhaps three categories according to differing criteria, even if the judges had the same information. For example, is violence-ridden Colombia really to be called a "stable democracy" because of its longevity since 1958? Is South Africa a "partial d e m o c r a c y " because it has regular parliamentary government and free elections for a rather small minority of the population? O r is it, as here c l a s s i f i e d , a " l i m i t e d authoritarianism" because of racial discrimination, police powers, and severe censorship? If Papua New Guinea has formally functioning democratic elections under Australian patronage, while most of the population has very little to do with modern institutions, is it an "insecure democracy," as here indicated? Undoubtedly we have committed errors, if not injustices, meriting the protests of readers; as received, these will be taken into consideration for subsequent editions.

CLASSIFICATION OF

STATES

Stable Democracies Western Europe: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, the Federal R e p u b l i c of G e r m a n y , Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom North America: Canada, the United States Latin America: Barbados, Colombia, Costa Rica, Trinidad and Tobago, Venezuela East Asia-Pacific: Australia, Japan, New Zealand Insecure Democracies Western Europe: Greece, Malta Latin America: Antigua, Argentina, the Bahamas, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Honduras, Jamaica, Peru, St. Christopher and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Uruguay

10

Robert Wesson

Africa: Botswana, Mauritius North Africa-Near East: Cyprus, Israel South Asia: India East Asia-Pacific: Fiji, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, the Solomon Islands, Vanuatu Partial Democracies Latin America: Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Panama Africa: the Gambia, Senegal, Zimbabwe North Africa-Near East: Lebanon, Turkey South Asia: Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka East Asia-Pacific: Malaysia, Thailand, Western Samoa Limited Authoritarianisms Latin America: Chile, Guyana, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Suriname Africa: Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chad, the Comoros, Djibouti, Ghana, Guinea, the Ivory Coast, Kenya, L e s o t h o , Liberia, M a d a g a s c a r , Mali, N i g e r i a , R w a n d a , Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Upper Volta, Zambia North Africa-Near East: Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Mauritania, Morocco, North Yemen, the Sudan, Syria, Tunisia South Asia: Bangladesh, Bhutan East Asia-Pacific: Brunei, Indonesia, Korea (South), Singapore, Taiwan, Tonga Soviet Union-Eastern Europe: Hungary, Poland, Yugoslavia Absolutisms Latin America: Cuba Africa: Angola, Benin, the Central African Republic, the Congo (Brazzaville), Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, GuineaBissau, Malawi, Mozambique, Niger, Sao Tome and Principe, Somalia, Tongo, Zaire North Africa-Near East: Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, South Yemen, the United Arab Emirates East Asia-Pacific: Burma, China, Kampuchea, Korea (North), Laos, Vietnam Soviet-Eastern Europe: A l b a n i a , Bulgaria, C z e c h o s l o v a k i a , Germany (East), Mongolia, Romania, the Soviet Union

Western Europe DENNIS KAVANAGH The outstanding fact about West European states is that they are all liberal democracies, despite great differences in their national histories, party systems, and political institutions. A large majority of the West European states have been secure democracies through the postwar period. The notable exceptions have been Greece, Spain, Portugal, and—on account of the strength and aggressiveness of their Communist parties—France and Italy in the late 1940s and early 1950s. The spread of late industrialism—bringing higher levels of education, affluence, and material goods for more of the population—and the easing of the cold war between the United States and the USSR have been associated with the strengthening of liberal democracy in Western Europe. To date, the sharp increase in unemployment (particularly high in Spain, Portugal, Ireland, the Netherlands, and Belgium) has not led to political instability or marked social disturbances. One might hazard the generalization that democracy in Western Europe is likely to continue strong in the near future because, all states now being democratic, the growing economic, social, and political links between them make it unlikely that any one state can reject liberal democratic institutions. The bulk of the population and twelve of the eighteen states are now linked in the European Economic Community (EEC). Moreover, the longer democratic institutions are established, the more likely they are to survive. The main distinction one might show between the states is to classify Spain, Portugal, and Greece as borderline maturing, and the rest as mature democracies. In the absence of major challenges to the democratic order, the 11

C^

ICELAND

^

/ j F A E R O E ISLANDS

FINLAND SHETLAND I S L A N D S . NORWAY SWEDEN

DENMARK

, UNITED KINGDOM

WEST ( iF.RMANY LUXEMBOURG

Atlantic Ocean

LIECHTENSTEIN FRANCE

AUSTRIA

SWITZERLAND

ITALY CORSICA SPAIN BALEARIC ISLANDS SARDINIA

J3ICLYJ

MALTA 4

Stable Democracy

Insecure Democracy

Western Europe

13

principal annoyance has been the spread of urban terrorism in many West European states. As governments have tried to cope with this they have had to coordinate intergovernmental measures, for example to deal with hijackings. Inevitably, increases in police power and surveillance over citizens have involved limitations of civil liberties. G o v e r n m e n t s are increasingly engaging in intercepting mail and tapping telephones, imposing controls and licenses on the use of fire arms, and conducting identity checks and screening of groups in the population. Understandably, civil libertarians fear for the rights of political dissenters and immigrants. The human rights group Amnesty International has condemned Spain's antiterrorist laws, which, it alleges, allow suspects to be held up to ten days incommunicado. Terrorism has become extensive. In Spain the ETA group has regularly used bombings to further its campaign for Basque independence, and in recent years violence has also been engaged in by pro-Arab groups and anti-ETA factions. The Anti-terrorist Liberation Group has taken measures against Basque groups in France. It is worth noting, however, that assassinations in Spain have fallen two-thirds from the 120 deaths averaged during the years between 1978 and 1980. In Belgium there were bomb outrages by anti-NATO groups and in Austria by anti-Jewish groups. In France also there were bombings by pro-Arab and anti-Jewish groups. In November 1986 the chief of the Renault auto firm was shot dead by the terrorist group Action Directe. In Germany the Red Army Faction continued to cause damage. In Italy, although there was a decline in activity by the once-feared Red Brigade, groups associated with Middle East politics were linked to bombings; and the government's crackdown on the Mafia was faced with that organization's ruthless elimination of key witnesses or their relatives. Bombings and killings continued in Northern Ireland. Perhaps the most dramatic incident in 1986 was the assassination of Prime Minister Olaf Palme in peaceful Sweden. It was an indication of the normal tranquility in Sweden that Palme was walking unguarded with his wife in the street. Terrorism was mostly linked to groups supporting different factions in the complex politics of the Middle East. There was also evidence of linkage between anti-NATO groups in Belgium (Cellules Communistes Combatantes), France (Action Directe), and West G e r m a n y (Red A r m y Faction). Individual targets included prominent industrialists, civil servants, politicians, and military police chiefs. In late 1986 Britain attempted to persuade its EEC partners to

14

Dennis Kavanagh

condemn Syria and impose sanctions on that state on the grounds that it had been involved in the attempt to smuggle a bomb onto an Israeli plane departing from London with over 300 passengers. Britain gained reluctant cooperation from some of the other countries and an outright refusal from Greece. The coordination of measures to halt terrorism fell foul of different state interests. Breaches of civil liberties (or even allegations of breaches) in Western Europe are far fewer than those for most other regions of the World. However, some trends have concerned civil libertarians and Amnesty International. 1 There have been growing concerns over the imprisonment of conscientious objcctors to military service. France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Finland, Greece, Norway, and Switzerland have imprisoned conscientious objectors in the course of 1986. Some states, including Spain, are developing schemes of alternative, nonpunitive work outside of the military branch for such objectors. In Northern Ireland civil libertarians complain about the socalled Diplock courts (in which trials are conducted and convictions can be made on the basis of evidence from former accomplices, who in turn are treated leniently). In Italy there were criticisms that the judicial process was moving much too slowly. Particular objections included the long periods of detention in which defendants were held before being produced for trial (in some cases the delay has lasted up to five years). In Italian trials of terrorists, evidence from witnesses who have left the country has been used by the prosecution, although there was no opportunity for the court to examine the witnesses. In Germany also there is a growing public debate about terrorism and the most suitable measures the state can take against it. The concern over terrorists (a particularly dramatic case was the October murder in Bonn of the political director of the Foreign Ministry) is balanced by the historical memory of the abuses of German civil liberties under Hitler. Pending legislation proposes to treat leniently terrorists (including murderers) who turn state's evidence against former accomplices. It also proposes to extend the range of terrorists' offenses to include attacks on energy and transport installations. The measure is bitterly opposed by the Social Democratic opposition and has split the FDP, one of the coalition government parties. Because it is difficult to clarify the politically similar states of Western Europe, we will survey them approximately from west to east.

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ICELAND had a rare hour of prominence as it hosted the U.S.Soviet summit conference of October 1986. Relations with the United States, soured by the refusal to use Icelandic ships and by a threat of reprisal for export of whale products, were smoothed over with compromises. Perhaps the most democratic nation of the world, Iceland enjoyed a tranquil and prosperous year under the presidency of Vigdis Finnbogadottir, one of the world's few female heads of state. An intergovernmental council for NORTHERN IRELAND was set up by an Anglo-Irish accord signed in November 1985. On the council sat representatives of the Irish and British governments. There had been no consultation with representatives of the Northern Ireland Protestant community, and Unionists and Protestants in Northern Ireland were furious at this granting of a role to the Irish government ("a foreign power") in their domestic affairs. The aim of the British government remains to transfer all powers, save that retained for security, to a devolved government in Northern Ireland as soon as the Unionists and Nationalists can agree on one. Successive British governments have grown increasingly impatient of the failure of Protestants to come to any power-sharing arrangements with representatives of Nationalists and minority Catholics in the province. The fifteen Unionist MPs at Westminster all resigned their seats and called on voters in Northern Ireland to regard the subsequent byelections as a referendum on the accord. In the event, although the opposition parties boycotted most of the elections, they lost two seats. In the four seats which were contested by the pro-Catholic and pro-Irish Nationalist SDLP and Sinn Fein (the political wing of the Irish Republican Army), the former increased its share of the vote by 6 percent and the latter was down by 5 percent. In February the Protestants, or self-proclimed Loyalists, organized strikes that paralyzed the province. Because of powerful paramilitary groups, killings, and the lack of consent to the British government by many in both communities, the province appeared ungovernable. Soldiers, police, and "informers" had long been regarded as legitimate targets by the IRA. In 1986 the IRA extended the targets to include those who supplied goods or services to the armed forces and police (including even milkmen and painters). In turn, Protestant military groups threatened to kill those who refused to cooperate. In 1985 there had been fifty-five murders due to sectarian violence. The politics of IRELAND was dominated by austerity economy measures and the struggle for survival by Garret Fitzgerald's Fianna

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Gael-led coalition, which had a tiny majority over Fianna Fail. The most notable event was the government-held referendum on a proposal to end the constitutional ban on divorce. The ban reflected the dominant position of Catholicism at the time of the foundation of the state in 1921. In the event, modern values of secularism and permissiveness were decisively rejected by voters by a two-to-one majority. If passed, the measure could have been interpreted as a modest reduction in the power of the Catholic Church in Ireland and as a conciliatory gesture to Protestants in Northern Ireland. Although Protestants in Northern Ireland did not take a kindly view of divorce, critics of the Irish government could point to the ban on divorce as an infringement of civil liberties. At an annual conference, Sinn Fein decided to take seats in the Dublin Parliament, so ending a sixty-five-year boycott of the legislature. In BRITAIN, the row within the Conservative government over the attitude to adopt toward rival West European and American bids to rescue the Westland Helicopter Company raised interesting constitutional questions. It provoked the resignation of Michael Heseltine, the minister of defense, who complained that the prime minister would not let him present his case to the full cabinet, and of the industry secretary, Leon Brittan, who was associated with the deliberate leak of a letter from the solicitor-general intended to damage Mr. Heseltine. In the summer the all-party House of Commons Select Committee on Defense released a report that was highly critical of the government and the prime minister. Senior civil servants were named and criticized, in spite of the British political c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c o n v e n t i o n that civil s e r v a n t s are anonymous and only ministers are answerable to Parliament for the conduct of their departments. The government at first argued that civil servants in the future should not appear before the parliamentary committees and that it was for ministers to answer questions. In the face of criticism that this would weaken the ability of the House of C o m m o n s to hold the administration responsible, the government backed down. Civil libertarians also expressed concern at the vigorous attacks by government spokesmen on the British Broadcasting Corporation. It w a s a l l e g e d that the B B C c o n s i s t e n t l y d i s p l a y e d an antigovernment and anti-American bias. Of course, previous administrations had regularly complained of their treatment by the media; but this reached a new level with the attacks from the Conservative party chairman, Norman Tebbit. Groups continued to call for the introduction of a guarantee of

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individual rights for British citizens, perhaps a Bill of Rights. At present the sovereignty of Parliament precludes the courts from playing an active role in the protection of individual liberties. One step forward might be the formal incorporation of the European Convention on Human Rights, which Britain ratified in 1951 but has not yet enacted into law. This would have excluded, for example, detention without trial (under the Prevention of Terrorism Act) of suspected Irish Republican Army terrorists since 1971. The major objection, as to all such measures, is that it would limit the sovereignty of Parliament, something which no British government has an incentive to do. It is interesting that more complaints have been brought against Britain under the Convention than against any other signatory state. In PORTUGAL there was an election in two rounds to elect a president in January and February. To widespread surprise, a figure from the past, Mario Soares, of the Socialist PSP, was narrowly elected to succeed outgoing President Eanes. He now had to coexist with a minority Social Democratic government. This was Portugal's fourth election for president a n d / o r parliament since 1975. In spite of the appalling economic problems, the patience of the people did not waver and 78 percent voted. The new democracy of SPAIN looked more assured than ever. In June it held its fourth general election since the death of Franco in 1975. Mr. Gonzalez' socialist government retained its overall majority in the Cortes, though there was some reduction in its size compared to 1982. The government was helped by the fragmentation of the opposition, but this was a remarkable achievement, bearing in mind the tough austerity economic measures the government had taken and the unemployment of more than a fifth of the work force. The election registered growing support for regional autonomous parties. In Catalonia there was an increase in support for the Batanesa party, which was sympathetic to the claims of the Basque terrorists of ETA. In March a referendum was held to decide on Spanish membership of NATO. Since the time of Franco, the Left had long opposed this. Gonzalez had already dispensed with many left-wing foreign and economic policies and announced a change from his former opposition to Spain's membership of NATO. In December 1985 Parliament had voted to continue membership. Having originally stated that the referendum vote would not be binding on the government, Gonzalez, in the face of opinion polls showing

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public hostility to membership, warned that a negative vote would lead to Spain's withdrawal. Defeat appeared likely because the Socialists were divided and the main pro-NATO party, the Popular Alliance, asked its supporters to abstain from voting. Contrary to the forecasts of the opinion polls, the public voted by 52 percent to 40 percent to continue Spain's membership of NATO, 8 percent of the ballots being spoiled. Only 60 percent of voters cast a ballot. Together with Portugal, Spain became a member of the European Economic Community on January 1,1986. Another landmark was the fiftieth anniversary of the start of the Civil War. The tone of many of the celebrators was remarkably conciliatory. In the parliamentary elections in FRANCE in March 1986, the socialist government was clearly rejected by the electorate, although in the new parliament the Socialists remained the single largest party (with 32 percent of the vote and 215 seats). The two center-right parties, the Rassemblement pour la République (RPR) and the Union pour la Démocratie Française (UDF), dominated the new assembly; and Jacques Chirac, leader of the larger RPR, was invited by Mitterrand to become prime minister. But since 1958 the president had always had a parliamentary majority and a government that was politically sympathetic to him. On what terms, then, would a right-wing prime minister and socialist president coexist? For all the fear of the president's and cabinet's being controlled by different political parties, cohabitation or power sharing appeared to work well and was popular according to the opinion polls. In contrast to the British system of power concentration, i.e., the executive and the legislature being in the same party hands, France experienced something akin to the American practice of the president's having to work with a Congress controlled by another party. Although Mitterrand had two years of his presidency remaining, Chirac quickly emerged as a dominant figure, even in hitherto exclusively presidential domains like foreign policy. The new government proceeded with a program to undo socialism and began the privatization of industries that had been nationalized since 1981. This was coupled with tax cuts, increased spending on law and order and defense, and measures to "free" the labor market (e.g., reducing job security). The government also promised to repeal the proportional representation electoral system which Mitterrand had introduced on the eve of the parliamentary elections. By the end of 1986, however, the government faced severe problems. Mass demonstrations by university students against

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government proposals to reform higher education (notably by stiffer entrance and degree examinations and a restriction on student choice of university) forced a humiliating retreat by the government. This was particulary galling for Chirac, who took pride in his image as a strong leader (demonstrations by Spanish students in February 1987 also forced a withdrawal of proposed economies in higher education). But there was no repeat of May 1968. The students were appeased by the government's retreat, and there was no student connection with the rash of public service strikes in France in early January 1987. BELGIUM suffered a recrudescence of the quarrel of Walloons and Flemings, brought on by the refusal of the mayor of a town in Flanders to speak Flemish, an incident leading to the resignation of the minister of the interior. Other controversies raged over the effort to prune the deficit, the emplacement of American missiles, and the extension to Belgium of the French ultrafast railway. But Belgian politics continued its very civilized course. In THE NETHERLANDS, the religious coalition party, the Christian Democratic Appeal, gained nine seats in the general election. However, its partner in the coalition government, the right-wing People's Party, lost nine seats, so its position was not altered. Yet the outcome of the election was a surprise for the prime minister, Ruud Lubbers. It had been anticipated that the 17 percent rate of unemployment and the strong opposition to the deployment of cruise missiles would favor the return of the Socialists. At the end of 1985, a state commission reported in favor of the introduction of popular initiatives and greater use of referenda as a means of extending democracy. LUXEMBOURG continued, as since 1984, to be governed by the Social Christian-Socialist Coalition headed by Jacques Santer. The principal controversy concerned the bank secrecy laws and the effort to enable Luxembourg to rival Switzerland as a financial center. In WEST GERMANY the federal elections in January turned out as expected. The CDU/CSU and FDP coalition were returned with a workable majority. But the CDU share fell from the 1983 figure of 48.8 percent to 44.3 percent, while the FDP share rose from 7.0 percent to 9.1 percent. Some commentators claimed that CDU support had weakened in the last days of the campaign because voters expected an easy victory. The Socialists fell back again (from 38.2

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percent to 37.0 percent), losing to the Greens, who moved from 5.6 percent to 8.3 percent. The German party system appears to be m o v i n g into two groups: The Christian-Democratic Union ( C D U ) / C h r i s t i a n Social Union (CSU) and the Free Democratic Party (FDP) on one side and the German Socialist Party and Greens on the other. The SPD lost most heavily in areas where the Greens increased their level of support. The Greens are now clearly established as an electoral force—no doubt helped by concern over the environmental and health damage caused by C h e r n o b y l — p a r t i c u l a r l y a m o n g the y o u n g and well-educated voters. Increasingly, the best electoral prospect for the SDP appeared to involve an alliance with the Greens. Some observers were disappointed at the "poor" turnout of 84.4 percent (turnout expectations are high in Germany). In the four federal elections of 1972, 1976, 1980, and 1983, the average was 89.8 percent; the 1987 figure was the second lowest in the postwar period. AUSTRIA gained some unwelcome attention from the world's mass media during the runoff to its presidential election in May and June 1986. The main rivals were Dr. Kurt Sterer, of the Socialist Party, and Dr. Kurt Waldheim, who stood as an independent with the support of the People's Party. Waldheim was, of course, well known from his previous position as United Nations secretarygeneral between 1972 and 1981. The World Jewish Congress alleged that Waldheim had lied about his wartime activities, particularly when serving as an officer in the German army in Yugoslavia between 1942 and 1945. It was alleged that he had cooperated in the Nazi elimination of Jews and that this had escaped the attention of the security measures before he became secretary-general. But the attacks appeared to have little negative effect on Austrian public opinion and may have sparked some displays of anti-Semitism. In the event, Waldheim easily won the runoff election in June by 54 percent to 46 percent. The Socialist-led coalition government was dissolved in September, and a general election was held in November. The election outcome was, as usual, close. The Socialists won eighty seats and the conservative People's Party seventy-seven. There were increases in support for the Greens and the extreme right Freedom Party, which gained twenty-five seats between them. The two large parties agreed to form a coalition, as they had in the period 19451966. It will be interesting to see if the absence of an effective official opposition party in Parliament encourages disillusioned socialist and conservative voters to turn to other parties. The two

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major Austrian parties have promised to increase opportunities for popular political participation: greater use of initiatives, referenda, and less party control of nominations for elections. Referendums were important in SWITZERLAND, the world's most famous direct democracy. The Swiss maintained their centuries-old neutrality by voting by a margin of three to one not to join the United Nations, with a majority in each of the eight cantons against membership. The reputation of Switzerland was blemished by a major chemical spill, polluting the Rhine for weeks. The people also were led to question the banking policies that facilitated the hiding of huge stolen amounts by such dictators as Haiti's Duvalier and the Philippines' Marcos. In DENMARK the governing coalition—Conservatives, Liberal Democrats, and the Christian People's Party—has traditionally enjoyed the support of the opposition Social Democrats in questions of security. The latter, however, following the lead of the British Labour Party and the West German Social Democratic Party, questioned NATO doctrine and proceeded to make a new defense agreement difficult. On the other hand, a referendum approved continued Danish membership in the EEC by 56 percent. Political normality returned to SWEDEN after the shock of the assassination of Palme. (The motive of the assassination remained mysterious.) He was replaced by his colleague, Ingvar Carlsson, a less dynamic but perhaps more pragmatic character. The most important controversy was the effort of public-sector unions to achieve parity of pay with the private sector. This was rejected, possibly representing a significant turn for Sweden's welfare state. In NORWAY, the nonsocialist coalition government of Conservatives, Centrists, and Christian Democrats led by Mr. Kdre Willoch had been returned without an overall majority in September 1985. It resigned after a one-vote defeat in the Storting on its proposal for an oil-tax increase. It was replaced by a minority socialist government, which proceeded to implement an austerity program. Between lockouts and strikes, the country suffered the worst labor disputes in fifty-five years. FINLAND was most concerned with preparation for the general election of March 1987. The Finnish Communist party split, the proSoviet minority calling itself the "Democratic Alternative." The

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government continued to be very careful of Soviet feelings, going so far as to banning books and motion pictures with anti-Soviet undertones—an element of authoritarianism spilling over into Finland's democracy. ITALY was still governed by a five-party coalition dominated by the Christian Democratic Party, which has always been in office in postwar Italy. It shared government with such minor lay parties as the Socialists, Liberals and Republicans. Bettino Craxi, a Socialist, remained prime minister, even though his party gained only 11 percent of the vote in 1983 elections. His continuous hold on office since August 1983 was an Italian record. The Christian Democrats (32.6 percent of the vote) chafed at not having the top position. In MALTA there appeared to be some easing of the sharp polarization between the two main parties and between the Catholic Church and the government. Dom Mintoff's successor as Socialist premier, Mifsud Bonnici, at last reached an agreement with the Catholic Church over schooling, by which the Church agreed to phase out the charging of fees for school pupils over a three-year period and in return gained autonomy in other school matters. As education minister under Mintoff, Bonnici had led the campaign against the Church. The most tense political arena was in GREECE, the last country in the region to oust military rule and restore free elections. In 1985 Andreas Papandreou's PASOK (socialist) party had retained power over the New Democracy party after a bitter election campaign. The government's control of the mass media and its use of patronage provoked opposition complaints that the government was intent on imposing one-party authoritarian rule. In March the Socialists and their allies voted a revision of the constitution. This removed the president's power to appoint a prime minister, limited his right to dissolve Parliament, and ended his rights to call a referendum on what he regarded as a major issue and to proclaim a state of emergency. More power was given to Parliament (i.e., the majority of government). Critics complained that the measures weakened the constitutional checks and balances. The Socialist government pursued anti-NATO policies and was often the odd man out in European Economic Community foreign policy matters. Other West European states complained about its feeble security precautions at airports and its less than wholehearted support for antiterrorist measures. The government

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was critical of the U.S. attacks on Libya and of Britain's breaking diplomatic relations with Syria. It was hostile to the maintenance of the U.S. bases in Greece and suspended the joint N A T O maneuvers w i t h the U n i t e d S t a t e s , c l a i m i n g that T u r k e y r a t h e r than communist states was the main threat to Greece. The EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY is an important part of the democratic framework of Western Europe except for some small c o u n t r i e s on the fringes, N o r w a y , S w e d e n , Austria, and Switzerland in particular. Founded with exalted hopes in 1957, the C o m m u n i t y has virtually given up dreams of becoming a United States of Europe, and it is not even close to full economic integration, with a c o m m o n currency and economic policies. The powers of the European parliament at Strasbourg are largely advisory, and there remain m a n y hindrances to the free movement of goods and people. But barriers are slowly being chipped away, thanks partly to the rulings of the Community court; and laws of member states are being made m o r e uniform, while the need for unanimity is being reduced. T h e C o m m u n i t y is e x t e n d i n g its p u r v i e w to q u e s t i o n s of technological cooperation, environmental protection, and monetary stability. T h e problems of the EEC are those of a thoroughly democratic institution. Agricultural price support takes 70 percent of the b u d g e t , a n d it has b r o u g h t the C o m m u n i t y near b a n k r u p t c y . Decision-making is excessively slow and laborious. But the EEC, h o w e v e r i m p e r f e c t , is the w o r l d ' s best m o d e l for the close cooperation of diverse sovereign states.

SUMMARY OF TRENDS Socialist election successes in Spain and Labor's return as a minority government in N o r w a y were matched by the return of the right in France and the center-right coalition in the Netherlands. In West G e r m a n y a n d Britain the Christian Democrats and Conservatives were widely expected to win again in 1987. For much of the 1960s a n d 1 9 7 0 s , Social D e m o c r a t i c g o v e r n m e n t s h a v e prevailed in n o r t h e r n E u r o p e while southern countries (Greece, Spain, and Portugal) were bastions of the reactionary right. 2 It was pointed out that n o w the Socialists are strong in the periphery as well as N o r w a y and S w e d e n , while the m o d e r a t e right prevails in the center of Western Europe. The four major states—France, Britain, Italy, a n d West G e r m a n y — h a v e right or center-right governments.

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Iri terms of policies, they follow the same regime of tax cuts, control of money supply, privatization of state industries and services, and curbs on public spending. These policies are pursued even by socialist governments in Spain and Greece. As West European states move into postindustrial development, different pressures operate on the political systems. In particular, the shift to a more service-based economy, the decline of the manufacturing base and the blue-collar workforce, and the rise of a more educated population with more liberal values encourage the spread of new issues and threaten the established social bases of support for political parties. Among the new issues and issue groups that have developed in Western Europe in recent years are the peace movement (broadly antinuclear weapons and anti-American missiles in Western Europe), the women's movement, environmentalists (hostile in particular to nuclear power), consumers, and right-to-life and profamily groups. These new divisions and issues related only weakly to traditional patterns of party division based upon lines of economic class. One reflection of this change has been the growth in electoral support for Green political parties. It is also seen in the "greening" response of other political parties. It is, of course, easier for new political parties to b e c o m e established in states that have proportional electoral systems than in majoritarian systems, as in the United States and Britain. In their most recent work, Inglehart and Rabier uncovered a massive potential electoral support for environmentalist parties. 3 Nearly half of West European electorates were prepared to vote for such a party, compared to only 16 percent for Communists. West European politics show signs of dividing increasingly on quality of life issues (or materialist versus postmaterialist values rather than on social class or religious lines). Because of this, high educational attainments, participatory skills, and political concerns, such people are likely to be found disproportionately among the opinionformers and decision-makers in West European states in the future.

NOTES 1. Amnesty International Report, 1986. 2. The Economist, June 28, 1986, p. 12. 3. Ronald Inglehart and Jacques-René Rabier, "Political Realignment in Advanced Industrial Society: From Class-Based Politics to Quality-of-Life Politics," Government and Opposition, 1986.

CHAPTER 2

North America JOHN MARINI The democratic governments of North America have been among the most stable and free in the world. Although their health remains generally sound, the years 1986-1987 presented some disturbing signs of political unrest, though not instability. In Canada the Progressive Conservative Party of Brian Mulroney has been plagued by numerous problems which have compounded the traditional difficulty of all recent Canadian governments, that of maintaining national unity in the face of language differences, provincial schisms, and the economic and political pull of the United States. Ronald Reagan, too, has experienced the most serious crisis of his presidency in the Iran-Contra affair. It remains to be seen whether he can effectively conduct his office, now that the opposition party has gained complete control of the legislature. Perhaps both governments have experienced at least a slight fever in the body politic, which may bode ill for their ongoing vitality, at least in the near future. It also remains to be seen whether either leader can stabilize political circumstances and create the framework for effective government in the respective political system. For Reagan, continued preoccupation with the Iran-Contra affair will undermine his ability to press forward with initiatives of importance, such as SDI and continued support for the Contras. Furthermore, it may become much more difficult to resist measures designed to combat the trade deficit and perhaps even tax increases to bring budget deficits under control. In Canada Mulroney must hold elections by 1989. The Progressive Conservative Party must once again establish its credibility with the voters and retain the support of the western

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provinces, judged in terms of historical precedent, the obstacles facing Reagan and Mulroney are formidable, making it highly unlikely that either of their parties can recover sufficiently to control, let alone dominate, the political agenda of the future.

THE UNITED STATES

Politics in the United States proved to be unusually volatile in 1986. The smoothness of the Reagan presidency in the first two years of his second term and the high level of his personal popularity appeared to convince many observers that the institutions of American government, which had been sorely tested in various crises from Vietnam through Watergate, are fundamentally sound. But it is unclear whether events of the year, particularly those which occurred in the last month, are a temporary aberration or a reflection of fundamental instability. Although no president since Eisenhower has completed two full terms in office, a good deal of blame has been laid at the doorstep of the various men who have held the office, from Johnson to Carter, for the inability to provide sound, effective, or decisive leadership. If we are to follow the logic of this complaint, American institutions are not the problem, but rather the absence of leadership. Reagan appeared to be able to provide this; the "awesome responsibility" of the office seemed to pose little difficulty for him. His style of management, which included delegating ample authority to subordinates, and his winning personality enabled him to handle the presidency with considerable success. The old refrain, "the office is too big for one man," has not been much heard in recent years. Yet events in late 1986, including the elections of that year, may have made such a judgment premature. Although public confidence in the Reagan administration was high throughout most of the year, public perceptions of events are often manipulated by other elite groups in the government, the press, and the bureaucracy. In such circumstances, public opinion is highly volatile, and the president is not dominant in its formation. Going into the midterm elections of 1986, President Reagan's overall approval rating stood at 67 percent, one point below the high of his presidency. Within a few weeks, after the Iran arms sale and Nicaraguan Contra connection were made public, his approval rating dropped to 57 percent, the sharpest drop since the recession of 1981-1982.

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The election of 1986 made it clear that Reagan and the Republican party had not been able to achieve a political realignment. Not only did the Democrats regain control of the Senate, they continued to dominate in state legislative races, improving on their 1984 showing. The electorate, consciously or not, appeared to be unwilling to give the president the kind of legislative support necessary to control issues of the greatest importance in the remainder of his term. If the Reagan agenda dominated policy-making in the last six years, other elected officials in the political system, particularly Democrats in the legislature, have chafed at their inability to upset the Reagan agenda. The Democrats have held the House so long that they are convinced that they too have a mandate to rule. With the decline of parties and the reluctance of incumbent congressmen to run partisan campaigns, the people remain a decisive force only in presidential elections. Public policy issues in our time seem to lack the broad and deep public support that results from a critical or realigning election in which partisan issues are legitimized by public vote. Public policy-making is now primarily a function of interested elite groups and concerned issue-networks throughout the society. Although there has been dissatisfaction among other powerful elite groups with the Reagan presidency, Reagan's skill in appealing to the electorate and his ability to compromise at crucial times have disarmed any united opposition that could undermine his administration. Nonetheless, there has been a profound uneasiness with the direction in which Reagan has moved the political spectrum. This is true in regard to economic issues and social spending, as well as the conduct of foreign policy. House Democrats in particular have long been resentful of Reagan's reordering of priorities in regard to social vis-à-vis defense spending, his militant antiCommunist rhetoric, and especially his attempt to defend against nuclear war through the Strategic Defense Inititative rather than negotiated nuclear disarmament. Moreover, his willingness to violate (unratified) Salt II, his reluctance to impose sanctions on South Africa, and his policy of opposition to the Sandinista government in Nicaragua have been bitterly contested. In addition, there has been considerable discomfort caused by Reagan's policy in the area of civil rights. Democrats in the Senate, led by Senators Kennedy, Biden, and Metzenbaum, have opposed a number of Reagan nominees to the federal judiciary, insisting that they have not been fully committed to vigorous enforcement of civil

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rights. The Justice Department also has been criticized for its opposition to affirmative action quotas and timetables. William Bradford Reynolds was rejected by the Senate for the post of associate attorney general largely because of his outspoken opposition to affirmative action. Furthermore, Attorney General Edwin Meese angered many, including several sitting justices of the Supreme Court, by initiating a public debate concerning the proper standard for judicial interpretation. Meese has insisted that judges ought to be guided by the "original intention" of the Founding Fathers or the express language of the Constitution. In effect, he argued for a "strict construction" of the Constitution. In June of 1986, President Reagan announced the resignation of Supreme Court Chief Justice Warren Burger, who retired so that he might devote full time to the coming celebration of the bicentennial of the Constitution. The issue of judicial philosophy was raised when Reagan appointed William H. Rehnquist to the post of chief justice and Judge Antonin Scalia to that of associate justice. A chorus of criticism was leveled at the chief justice-designate primarily for his alleged opposition to civil rights or affirmative action. The Rehnquist confirmation hearing in the Senate was acrimonious; thirty-three Senators voted in opposition. Scalia sailed through unopposed; but the Democrats served notice, even before they recaptured the Senate, that they would oppose any Reagan attempt to move the Court too far to the right. This controversy is reflective of a profound debate which has occurred in American politics in the last two decades, concerning nothing less than the meaning of equality itself. If Reagan's public luster remained untarnished through the election campaign of 1986, a number of events—including the Daniloff case, the summit meeting with Gorbachev in Iceland, and the alleged Libyan disinformation campaign—provided opportunities to criticize his conduct of foreign affairs. Although these things were bothersome to the administration, they appeared to pose no long-term threat. Another event, made public in late November, did much more to undermine the credibility of the President. This was the arms sale to Iran, allegedly in exchange for hostages, with the further revelation that profits from the sale were funneled secretly into Swiss bank accounts supposedly for the benefit of the Nicaraguan "Contras." Political and Economic Trends. Throughout most of 1986, democracy in America appeared to be quite healthy; President Reagan broke a recent historical pattern by continuing to maintain

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extraordinarily high levels of popularity in his sixth year in office. Reaganomics had ceased to be controversial. Measures such as the tax reform bill were made possible because the underlying terms of economic debate and had been transformed by the success of Reagan's policy and its perceived public ratification in the election of 1984. Even the Democrats in Congress, led by House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Dan Rostenkowski, pushed for a lowering of tax rates. Although Reagan had attempted to reduce federal expenditures as well as tax rates in his first term, his success was limited to a modest reduction in income tax rates. He succeeded in reordering priorities, however, by increasing defense spending and decreasing rates of growth of social spending. The federal budget, nonetheless, has grown significantly in every year of his presidency. When Reagan took office in 1980, the federal budget stood at about 20 percent of GNP. At the end of his first term, the proportion of GNP consumed in the public sector had grown to nearly 24 percent. Moreover, the growth of the federal expenditures was not financed by higher taxes, despite the fact that there had been a significant tax increase in 1982, which blunted the effects of the large tax cuts of the previous year. The inability to cut expenditures, coupled with the effects of the recession and the necessary increase of entitlements, led to a massive rise in the federal deficit. Even the vigorous growth of the economy in the last years of Reagan's first term could not offset the increase in expenditures. Reagan's huge electoral victory in 1984 and the continuing improvement in the economy made tax increases politically difficult. Nearly everyone seemed to favor a balanced budget, but no one could succeed in cutting the size of the government. The constant battles over spending cuts and tax increases that characterized the first years of the Reagan administration had become mere skirmishes or had taken on the character of guerilla warfare within the bureaucracy by the beginning of his second term. There was, however, constant and considerable worry in Washington over the inability to control the federal deficit and the growing national debt, which led to the passage of the Balanced Budget Act and Emergency Deficit Control Act in December 1985. This act, authored by Senators Gramm, Rudman, and Hollings, resulted in substantial changes in the congressional budget process, which mandated fixed deficit targets and required the comptroller general — t h e head of the General Accounting Office—to determine automatic spending cuts (sequestration) if Congress and the President could not come to an agreement on specific budget cuts.

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The federal budget continued to be a main focus of attention in July 1986, particularly in light of the Supreme Court's ruling that month. In the case of Bowsher v. Synar, the Court invalidated a significant aspect of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985. Although Congress has all the necessary constitutional authority to make spending cuts, it has become politically almost impossible to make such cuts. However, the Congress did not want the president's priorities to prevail in public spending. Hence, it was not the president, the director of the Office of Management and Budget, or anyone else in the executive branch that was to oversee the automatic spending cuts needed under provisions of the act, but the comptroller general. It was the sequestration provision of the act, which delegated executive authority to the head of the GAO, an agency the Court viewed as an arm of Congress, that led to the invalidation of such a delegation of authority. It remains to be seen if Congress has the will to comply with Gramm-Rudman-Hollings in the absence of the sequestration provision. The economy moved along at a steady pace, without strong growth in the GNP but also with no significant inflation, which fell to the lowest level in twenty-five years, 1.1 percent for the year. There was little movement in the rate of unemployment, which remained around 7 percent, dropping to 6.7 percent in late 1986 and early 1987. The confidence of consumers and business remained high, and the stock market continued its upward trend, moving sharply higher in January and February 1987. Wall Street was shaken by the biggest insider trading scandals in its history. It remains to be seen if any legislation will be forthcoming in an attempt to deal with hostile takeovers and insider trading. The strength of the U.S. dollar abroad heightened the trade imbalance. The United States imported far more than it exported in every month of the year, and the trade deficit resulted in the U.S. becoming a debtor nation for the first time since World War I. The trade deficit for 1986 was in the neighborhood of $170 billion. The economic consequences of a trade imbalance are often disputed; but it seems certain, if the trade deficit persists at historically high levels, that it will increasingly figure in American politics in 1987. In the 1986 elections, many Democrats sought to make an issue of the loss of jobs to foreign competition, and there will be renewed pressure on the party leadership to support legislation to protect the domestic economy and reduce the balance-of-trade deficit. The Republican party, once the party of protectionism, is now in the position of defending open markets and free trade.

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Politics in America in 1986 has brought into clearer focus some of the contradictions that had already become apparent in recent years. Seymour Martin Lipset noted, just after the election of 1984 and in anticipation of the next presidential election, that "efforts to anticipate electoral politics in 1988 must deal with a number of a n o m a l i e s a n d p a r a d o x e s . R o n a l d R e a g a n w a s reelected overwhelmingly and as of the first quarter of 1986 has the highest approval of any president at a comparable point in office, since polling began." Yet Lipset observed that "on issue after issue, sizeable majorities of Americans voice opposition to his specific policy positions." Furthermore, the Republicans have been the majority party on a presidential level in most postwar elections, but the Democrats have retained control of most state political offices and, as of early 1986, regained a large lead in party identification. 1 In the 1986 elections, the Democrats regained control of the Senate, and Reagan did not achieve a realignment. These facts portend a volatile atmosphere in the last two years of Reagan's presidency, because the elite opposed to the Reagan agenda will now have the means to influence or even do away with presidential policies they oppose. Elections. The elections of 1986 followed the usual historical pattern. The party in control of the White House traditionally loses a significant number of seats, more in a midterm election following reelection of the president. In the postwar elections six years after a shift in control of the White House, the president's party has lost an average of seven Senate seats and forty-eight House seats, as well as six governorships. In 1982, Reagan's first midterm election, despite a rather severe recession and a high level of unemployment, Republicans lost only two Senate seats and twenty-six House seats. In the 1986 election, the Republicans were vulnerable in the Senate, as twenty-two of the thirty-four i n c u m b e n t s were Republicans. They lost a total of eight Senate seats and five House seats, while gaining eight governorships. The statistics indicate that, in comparison with past performance, the electorate was not particularly harsh on the Republican party. The results were significant, nonetheless, as Reagan faces a Congress united in opposition in his last two years. The election itself was symptomatic of contradictory tendencies in the political system and the electorate that have prevented the electoral realignment the Reagan Republican party has been seeking. Although Reagan was a very popular president and sought to m a k e the election a referendum on his presidency, the

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administration was unable to make a coherent or principled appeal on national issues. The Republican party lacked a compelling campaign theme. Reagan simply sought to persuade the electorate, in his many campaign stops for Republican Senate candidates, to cast one last vote "for the Gipper." The Democrats, however, were careful not to take on the President directly, and the election lacked clarity in regard to national issues. As one observer noted, "Democratic congressmen and senators campaigned as if there were 'no great national issues.' Doing so has served them well. But they have found strange bedfellows in Republican politicians, who approach recent elections like inter-conference football games—not as serious partisan contests." 2 The campaign was noteworthy for its lack of focus on issues. It was characterized by so-called negative campaign advertising on television, designed to show the opponent in the worst possible personal light. It is widely believed that many of the Republican candidates for the Senate, including a number of the incumbents of the class of 1980, were weak and ineffective campaigners, particularly when deprived of national partisan issues. The Republican party, some observers have suggested, had too much money in this election, and it was overly dependent on professional campaigners and television time while it neglected the hard work of meeting and animating voters. The so-called gender gap appeared to play an important role in the election. The Republicans would have hung onto Senate seats in Georgia, North Carolina, North Dakota, and Nevada and would likely have won seats in Colorado, Louisiana, and possibly California if the women's vote had not deviated significantly from that of men. John Dillon reports, "Women gave Democrats 5 to 10 percentage points more of their votes than men did in Tuesday's election for the Senate. In U.S. House races, women gave Democrats 6% more of their votes than men did." 3 When the election results became known, the retiring Speaker of the House, Democrat Thomas P. "Tip" O'Neill, declared that "if there ever was a Reagan revolution, it's over." A less partisan political scientist, Walter Dean Burnham, noted that "as 1986 recedes into history, the Reagan era is much closer to its end than its beginning. . . . Electoral realignments in the past," he says, pivoted around collective national issues and ideological differences that penetrated unusually deeply into the citizenry. Crucial electoral minorities stopped doing what they had been doing, began doing something else, and then kept on doing it for

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years or decades to come. These changes in behavior were channeled through political parties, then the sole organizers of the electoral market. This produced change in the identity of the majority and minority parties. Moreover, such change was usually manifest not just at the presidential top, but at most or all significant levels of election in our complicated constitutional scheme. Republican or Democratic "eras" following realignment were marked as a rule by the national majority party's control of the White House, both houses of Congress and most important state governments. 4

Nonetheless, Burnham agrees that Reagan's public policies involved a significant break with the past, but he notes that public policy-making is different from public realignment of the electorate. He contends: "Practically no one doubts that there has been a major realignment in public policy since 1980. But policy is the domain of activist elite groups. Historically, major realignments of policy have usually followed realignments within the public at large. T o d a y , this relationship is practically dissolved. Electoral realignment has not happened." 5 There was little active involvement by the general public and little mass demand for the tax reform legislation of this year. This disjunction between policy-active elite groups and the mass electorate concerning influence in politics has always existed, but the relationship between rulers and ruled has become more problematic. 6 Governing "in accordance with the principles of democracy in a mass, heterogeneous society," a recent observer has insisted, "requires a foundation of active consent by the governed. And the political party is conceived as supplying that systematized communication of governors and governed which is productive of such consent." 7 If the parties no longer provide the means by which policy is legitimized in the electorate, through partisan involvement of the people in the electoral process, what has taken the place of parties? What has replaced the partisan campaign, with its emphasis on controversial issues of great importance or even principles of a high order? In a media age, the relevance of party as a channel for voting decisions has greatly declined among a very large fraction of those adult citizens who still bother to vote—as many citizens do not. The 1986 participation rate of about 38 percent was the lowest on record, except for 1926 and 1942. 8 The decline of partisanship was nowhere more evident than in the races for the House of Representatives. Bureaucratic patronage has largely taken the place of party patronage in the contemporary

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Congress. Members of Congress are increasingly able, as a result of the establishment of a bureaucratic and regulatory apparatus, to make nonpartisan appeals to electorally decisive minorities in their districts who can virtually assure their election. With numerous perquisites at their disposal and campaign finance limits placed upon their opponents, congressmen rarely run partisan campaigns. They rely instead on campaign professionals, the mass media, and personal followings. Politicians seem to operate as individuals pursuing personal careers.9 Modern campaigns are expensive, for they rely on technology and professional management. Not only are incumbents in a strong position to raise money, challengers are seriously disadvantaged in the competition for funds. Members emphasize personal qualities and services to the district, avoiding responsibility for the collective performance of their party. So clear is the advantage of incumbency that the former chairman of the Democratic National Committee, Michael Kirwin, remarked, "No congressman who gets elected and minds his business should ever get beaten. Everything is there for him to use if he'll only keep his nose to the grindstone and use what is offered." 10 Nearly 98 percent of incumbents running for election in 1986 were reelected. Only one Democrat and five Republican incumbents lost. Furthermore, incumbents appear to be running in increasingly safe districts; and as the marginal districts have vanished, the only competitive elections are those for open seats.11 The public financing of presidential elections has led to an increase of private spending in congressional elections. The primary beneficiaries of private spending have been incumbent members of Congress, whose power and influence over particular areas of national policy have made such spending very profitable. It has also become clear that members of both parties have benefited from a centralized bureaucracy and regulatory apparatus, which is responsive to congressional intervention. Congress as a body has an interest in preventing effective political or presidential control of the executive branch. Campaign finance reform legislation has also heightened the tension between the president and Congress and made it more difficult to reconcile the demands of the interests and constituencies that elect the respective branches. Perhaps we have reached the point where "the rules of campaign finance seem to encourage a situation in which Presidents and members of Congress come to office with systematically different interest-group electoral bases. Legislative-executive relations might be improved . . . if the

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branches' electoral bases were made similar." Campaign finance reform has done the opposite, exacerbating those differences. 12 The ongoing regulation of special interests becomes the essence of liberal democratic politics and presupposes the existence of a centralized administration. It has transformed the principal function of Congress from one of legislation on behalf of a general or national interest to detailed administration and regulation of particular interests. Furthermore, members of Congress seek to avoid partisanship in the ordinary sense, ignoring parties and principles while emphasizing service. If the partisan divisions have been obscured, it may be that "in a good many ways the interesting division in congressional politics is not between Democrats and Republicans but between politicians in and out of office." 13 The Republican party took some comfort in the fact that they realized a net gain of eight governorships in the elections in 1986. But only two Democratic incumbents seeking reelection were defeated. In nineteen gubernatorial contests where no incumbent was running for reelection, twelve of these changed parties, Republicans gaining nine and Democrats picking up three. Furthermore, throughout the nation Democrats continued in 1986 to win a substantial majority of the thousands of state legislative races—61 percent of state senators, 60.2 percent of state representatives. 14 In fact, the Democrats improved upon their showing in 1984. The interesting aspect of a period of dealignment is that neither party seems to have undivided control of state governments, which is also reflective of a similar division in national politics. In earlier "alignment eras," the norm was undivided partisan control of most state governments. But today, the norm is the opposite: one party controlling part, the other controlling another part. This is a recent development, which reinforces Burnham's theory of dealignment. He observes that "with dealignment and split partisan outcomes at all levels of government, there is and can be no majority party." 15 Reagan's failure to achieve a new consensus through a critical realignment is not merely a failure of the Republican party. It may indicate a profound problem that threatens to undermine the stability of American democratic institutions. Historically, parties have organized the complicated American government and, in the process, have given the whole enterprise legitimacy. It is not clear how democracy is to function without them.16 Congressional-Executive Relations. When the 100th Congress convened on January 6, 1987, it was clear that the new Speaker, Rep. James C. Wright, Jr., of Texas, had a different agenda than his

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predecessor, Tip O'Neill. Shortly after he was chosen unanimously by the House Democratic Caucus, Wright advocated a revision of the deficit targets laid down in the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings balanced budget act and suggested that scheduled tax cuts for the wealthiest taxpayers be delayed. In doing so, he placed himself in opposition not only to President Reagan but to many powerful Democrats, including House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Dan Rostenkowski of Illinois. Wright's proposals confirmed a widespread view on Capitol Hill that the new Speaker would be pushing his own agenda with a legislative style much different from that of his predecessor, as his colleagues acknowledged. 1 7 In pursuing his objectives, Wright is willing to antagonize powerful House colleagues. Unlike Tip O'Neill, who was known as a coalition builder who listened to his colleagues and helped create coalitions around a consensus that had already emerged, Wright appears willing to act on his own. In the view of one House Democrat, "He's going to lead as opposed to letting it percolate." 1 8 If this is so, it appears that Wright's agenda is likely to place him on a collision course with the administration. Wright has placed trade legislation at the top of his agenda, as well as tax increases and welfare and agricultural policies that are not likely to please the administration. In foreign policy, Wright has indicated he will pursue policies directly in opposition to those of the President. Indeed, as Speakerdesignate, his first key appointment as chief deputy whip was Rep. David E. Bonior of Michigan, who is not only a liberal Democrat but also a leader in the House opposition for aid to the Contras. He also persuaded the Democratic caucus to adopt a resolution pledging to reverse Reagan's decision to exceed the limits on nuclear weapons laid down in the unratified Salt II treaty. "If there is any question about Jim Wright, it's his effectiveness in forging a consensus within his own party," insists a House Republican aide. 19 Another source of likely confrontation between the Democrats in Congress and Reagan involves priorities laid down in Reagan's proposed budget, and his insistence that the budget must remain within the deficit limitations imposed by the Gramm-RudmanHollings act. The administration's fiscal 1988 budget called for a deficit of $107.8 billion, with a $42.4 billion deficit reduction program. Although Reagan proposed the lowest defense increase of his administration, he called for large cuts in other areas, such as education, housing and urban programs, and agriculture. The Democrats insisted that meeting the Gramm-RudmanHollings target would trigger a recession. To cope with the deficit,

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Speaker Wright met with Democratic members of the House Budget Committee to begin building support for making a tax increase part of the fiscal 1988 budget package. Reagan's ability to prevent Democratic domination of the budget priorities will likely depend upon the damage done his presidency by the Iran scandal. The Iran-Contra affair continued to dominate attention in Washington, and the White House seemed unable to divert media attention from this problem. Reagan tried to bolster support for his agenda in his State of the Union message on January 27,1987. Facing a Democratic-controlled Congress for the first time, Reagan refused to compromise on his priorities. He insisted on pressing forward with SDI, and he renewed his support for aid to the Contras in Nicaragua. Many Democrats, expecting a more conciliatory tone, complained bitterly that Reagan's tone was excessively partisan. In an attempt to show that he was still a force to be reckoned with, Reagan vetoed his first piece of legislation in the 100th Congress. He refused to sign the Clean Water Act, which he argued was pure pork-barrel legislation. Congress easily overrode his veto. The Iran-Contra Affair. On February 26, 1987, the president's Special Review Board, chaired by former Senator John Tower, issued a report. The board concluded that Reagan had lost control of his staff. "I believe that the president was poorly advised and poorly served," Tower noted. The report was highly critical of Chief of Staff Donald Regan, who was said to have "asserted personal control over the White House staff" in his two-year tenure. Regan should have "insisted that an orderly process be observed" in carrying out policy; furthermore, he should have developed plans for handling the inevitable public disclosure of the arms sale. "He must bear primary responsibility for the chaos that descended upon the White House when such a disclosure did occur," the report noted. 20 The report further insisted that the "Iran-Contra arms dealings represented a failure of people to use the foreign policy-making system properly, not a failure of the system itself." Although the administration intended to improve political and diplomatic relations with Iran, "the Iran initiative almost from the beginning became an arms-for-hostages deal." The report was also critical of Secretary of State George Shultz and Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, who, though they opposed the Iran arms deal, "should have done more than distance themselves from decisions." The panel criticized the unprofessional way in which decisions were made without review. Reagan apparently knew little of his aides'

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actions and did almost nothing to find out. "The arms transfers to Iran and the activities of the [National Security Council] staff in support of the contras are case studies in the perils of policy pursued outside the constraints of orderly processes." The report, however, concluded that Reagan "did not seem to know that money from the Iran arms sale was secretly being diverted to the Nicaraguan contras." 2 1 Although the commission was critical of the individual behavior of the participants involved, it did not recommend a wholesale revision of the NSC. The Tower Report recommended that the N S C "continue to have flexibility to provide each president with independent advice: Congress should not mandate changes in the NSC's structure and operation." In particular, the board insisted that the national security advisor should not be made to subject to Senate confirmation. However, it suggested that "every administration should carefully follow existing procedures for making, implementing, and reviewing foreign policy, especially for covert actions." The report also suggested that "Congress should consider merging the House and Senate Intelligence committees into a joint panel with a small staff." 2 2 The CIA has advocated this change for many years, arguing that large numbers of staff and members on the two committees have led to difficulty in preventing leaks of secret information. Nonetheless, this proposal has already encountered opposition in Congress, where many members believe that such r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s are merely cover for reducing congressional oversight capability. On February 27, the day after the Tower Report was made public, it was reported that Reagan was angry at the mismanagement described in this report and he intended to make changes as soon as possible. As a first step, he selected former Senate Majority Leader Howard H. Baker, Jr., of Tennessee as his new chief of staff, replacing Donald Regan, the subject of severe censure by the Tower panel. Four top Republican leaders had urged Reagan to select a new chief of staff who would be familiar with Capitol Hill and able to work with Congress. Robert Dole quickly praised Reagan's choice. "Howard Baker has instant credibility," Dole remarked. "He understands the Congress. He also understands the White House. He knows how the president works, what his style may be." 2 3 Even before Baker's appointment, Reagan had gained some support in Congress by appointing Frank Carlucci as national security advisor. As a result of congressional discontent, the nomination of Robert M. Gates to replace William Casey at the CIA was withdrawn. It appeared that Gates was too closely connected to Iran-Contra

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principals. Reagan than named William Webster, the current director of the FBI, to head the CIA. If Reagan did much to placate Congress in this matter, he still faced problems of credibility with the public. His approval rating in opinion polls had dropped twenty-one points in a little over a month. In an attempt to raise his standing with the public, Reagan delivered a nationally televised address to the nation on March 4. Reagan said: "I've studied the Board's report. Its findings are honest, convincing and highly critical, and I accept them." 24 Further, he admitted his policy of selling arms to Iran had gone wrong, and he promised to set his administration right. It is difficult to determine what the impact of the Iran-Contra affair will be, not only in the remaining months of the Reagan presidency, but for the long-term stability of American institutions. Although Reagan's popularity recovered somewhat in the wake of his televison address and his news conference, it is not at all clear that this event can be put behind him. Many have suggested that a fundamental shift in power has occurred in Washington. Former Defense Secretary James R. Schlesinger has observed that we are witnessing a massive shift of power from the president to Congress. If this is indeed the case, it may only confirm the fact, despite the temporary respite of the first years of the Reagan presidency, that American institutions have yet to recover fully from the trauma of Vietnam and Watergate. CANADA

The government of Canada has always had some difficulty maintaining its national unity, not to mention its national identity. Its economics, politics, and defense policies are very much influenced by its common border with the United States. Consequently, it is difficult to view the Canadian democracy without considering its relation to the United States; and numerous problems or disputes over trade or defense policies, acid rain, and trade restrictions are bound to arise. Political and Economic Trends. Since assuming office in 1984, after leading his party to the largest electoral majority in Canadian history, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, leader of the Progressive Conservatives, has sought to improve relations with the United States in both economic and foreign policy matters. Mulroney appears to have a good personal relationship with Ronald Reagan;

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they have met annually. Mulroney, like Reagan, has been plagued by political problems, and he has pressed the United States to help him with a number of thorny problems, such as trade restrictions and acid rain, in the attempt to bolster his popularity. Mulroney has needed help. Charges of corruption and influencepeddling, bribery and favoritism in government contracting have resulted in the resignation of a number of cabinet members and have reduced the ruling Progressive Conservative party's standing in the polls to the lowest level for a government in power in Canadian history. Indeed, the party of Mulroney runs last in the polls, behind the Liberal and the New Democratic parties. A recent Gallup poll showed the Conservatives with the support of only 22 percent of the electorate; 66 percent of Canadians disapproved of Mr. Mulroney's performance as prime minister. In foreign policy Mulroney is much closer to his liberal predecessor, Pierre Trudeau, than to Ronald Reagan. Although Mulroney has increased defense spending, reinforced Canada's commitment to NATO, and agreed to modernization of the United States military radar network in northern Canada, he has declined to participate formally in SDI and has opposed the United States policy in Central America. Moreover, he has placed new emphasis on disarmament rather than defense and promotion of what has been called " p r o g r e s s i v e internationalism." Thus, the " T r u d e a u Mulroney governments have attempted to perform a balancing act between defense alliances and new allies in disarmament." 2 5 They have sought to make a distinction between "constructive internationalism" and "destructive internationalism"; and the Mulroney government, following Trudeau, has considered aid for the Contras in Nicaragua or the United States action in Grenada as "destructive internationalism." In a speech to the Inter-American Press Association on September 15, 1986, Mulroney condemned "third party intervention anywhere in Central America, whoever the third party may be and regardless of its legitimate interests in the area." Mulroney welcomed a Nicaraguan trade office to Toronto, and he and the Conservative party led the Commonwealth's imposition of sanctions against South Africa. Mulroney has threatened to break all diplomatic relations with South Africa "if there is no progress on the dismantling of apartheid." 2 6 Similarly, Mulroney has followed the strategy of the Trudeau government in an attempt to help shape a new international economic order. Trudeau sought to "direct and manage trade," so as "to develop broad and stable and sophisticated trading ties with centrally planned economies." The Progressive Conservatives have

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followed suit. Indeed, the title of the Progressive Conservative's trade paper, How to Secure and Enhance Canadian Access to Export Markets, was taken from a policy speech by Trudeau. In following Trudeau's lead, it is apparent that "the Progressive Conservative government promotes a new international trade policy, not a national free trade policy with the United States." 27 In seeking new allies in disarmament and a new international economic order, the Mulroney government, following Trudeau, is much more sympathetic to left-wing regimes than is the Reagan administration. Canadian conservatism cannot be judged by American standards. Separatism and Elections. A number of difficulties face every government in the attempt to hold the Canadian federation together. In the coming election, Mulroney is likely to meet the alienation of the western provinces. On the other hand, Quebec now poses less danger to national unity than a few years ago. In the provincial election of December 1985, the probusiness Liberal government of Robert Bourassa dealt a severe blow to the separatist Parti Quebecois (PQ). Moreover, Canada's biggest province appears to be prospering as a result of the reinvigoration of the private sector and the reining in of the size of provincial government. As a result, Quebec's real growth rate of 3.7 percent exceeded the Canadian national average. Quebec appears to be reconciled with the Canadian confederation. Nonetheless, because its political influence in Ottawa is so extraordinary, Quebec itself has become a cause of resentment in English Canada. The province accounts for a quarter of all seats in the House of Commons, and it cannot be ignored by any government. But Mulroney is himself from Quebec, and part of his problem stems from the perception that Quebec has been the recipient of all kinds of political favors, from federal contracts to important government posts. For example, in the so-called CF-18 affair, the Mulroney government was accused of diverting the maintenance contract for the F-18 fighter to Montreal and away from a firm from Western Canada that had submitted the lowest bid. Mr. Mulroney tried to justify his intervention on nationalistic grounds: The Western bidder was technically British-owned. Needless to say, it was viewed in Western Canada as "outrageous pork-barreling." 28 Mulroney's bad fortune has brightened the electoral prospects of the New Democratic party. Though members of the party like to consider themselves Social Democrats, the party is clearly socialist. The preamble of the party constitution states: "The production and distribution of goods and services shall be directed to meeting the

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social and individual needs of people and not to the making of profit." In its policy manual, the party has advocated government ownership of transportation and communications industries and nationalization of one of the country's "Big Five" private banks. It has advocated pulling out of N A T O and NORAD, declaring Canada a nuclear-free zone, and working to "reorder the world's economic institutions to transfer a share of power to the poorer nations." T h e NDP's electoral prospects appear brightest in the West. The party began there as an agrarian socialist movement, and it currently governs Manitoba. Moreover, "the West's commoditybased industries are in a slump, and many Westerners who used to blame the Liberals are now disenchanted with the Conservatives." The chief pollster for the Conservatives notes: "Western alienation is real. There is no precedent for such partisan uprooting, and the Conservatives aren't recognizing the problem there." 2 9 Although the N D P is a long way from forming a government, it could play a big role in Canadian affairs after the next general election. It now has only 30 seats in Canada's 282 seat Parliament, but recent polls show it favored by 32 percent of the voters. That is more than favor Mulroney's government in the latest poll and more than double the historical average of the NDP's showing. It could mean up to seventy to eighty seats in an election. If neither the Conservatives nor Liberals win an outright majority in the next Parliament, the NDP could become kingmaker. There have not been two consecutive majority governments since the 1950s, and a minority government is a possibility after the next election. In any case, it is conceivable that Mulroney's election may turn out to be "a historical freak like John Diefenbaker's similar 1958 sweep, and will prove equally evanescent." 3 0

CONCLUSION Both of the d e m o c r a c i e s of North America have experienced considerable stress in their political institutions in the past year. It remains to be seen whether that instability is indicative of a deeper problem, one that m a y threaten the fundamental health of the regimes themselves. It is becoming increasingly common, among the elite, to criticize the constitutional or institutional basis of each of the regimes for their failure to address contemporary problems. In the U n i t e d S t a t e s there has been g r o w i n g criticism of the constitutional separation of powers, which is seen as responsible for the persistent deadlock between the president and Congress. Many

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have called for reform that would lead to something akin to a party government or a parliamentary system. Ironically, much of the criticism of governmental failure in contemporary Canada can be made on the grounds that it is precisely the parliamentary system itself that has failed to provide protection for the diversity of a country so large and heterogeneous. One critic has suggested that "Canada's ten provinces have considerable individual powers, but they lack direct influence over the federal government. It lacks protection for distinct but outvoted regional communities that in the U.S. is furnished by the Senate." It is for this reason the Western Canada has been "treated by Ottawa as a colony in a pure mercantilist sense." For example, "its windfall energy profits from the OPEC price hikes were confiscated under royalty provisions of the National Energy Program. . . ." Perhaps it can be argued that it is the absence of constitutional checks and balances in Canada that made possible the governing elite's prolonged effort to bribe and co-opt the French-speaking quarter of the population, virtually all concentrated in Quebec, by offering it more power and perquisites than its size would warrant. 31 The consequences of such policies have become increasingly apparent, as those minorities outside the governing coalition become more critical of the regime itself. And legislators and party leaders see themselves first and foremost as spokesmen for the organized interests and constituencies that are primarily responsible for their election. Although it seems unlikely that fundamental change in the constitution of either country is forthcoming, public cynicism will grow if the current generation of leaders cannot summon up the courage to do what is necessary to preserve the framework of democratic government. The first step requires recognition of the necessity to pursue a common good rather than a policy of expediency. It remains to be seen whether the contemporary crises in the democracies of North America will lead to renewed health and vigor or merely hasten what some consider to have been a slow but steady decline in the vitality of liberal democratic government. NOTES 1. S e y m o u r Martin Lipset, "Beyond 1984: The Anomalies of A m e r i c a n Politics," PS 19(Spring 1986), p.222. 2. W a l t e r D e a n B u r n h a m , " E l e c t i o n s D a s h G O P D r e a m s of Realignment," Wall Street Journal, N o v e m b e r 26, 1986, p.20. 3. J o h n Dillon, " G O P Stumbles o v e r the G e n d e r Gap," Christian Science Monitor, N o v e m b e r 7, 1986, p . l .

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4. Burnham, p.20. 5. Ibid. 6. Ibid. 7. Harry V. Jaffa, "Equality and Liberty," The Nature and Origin of the American Party Sysfem(New York: Oxford University Press, 1965), pp.4-5. 8. Burnham, p.20. 9. Gary J a c o b s o n , "Congressional C a m p a i g n Finance and the Revival of the Republican Party," in Dennis Hale, ed., The United States Congress, T h o m a s P. O'Neill S y m p o s i u m on Congress(Boston: Boston College, 1982), pp.313-314. 10. Ibid., p.316. 11. Burnham, p.20. 12. Michael D. Malbin, ed., Money and Politics in the United States (New Jersey: Chatham House, 1984), pp.255-256. 13. Cited in G a r y J a c o b s o n , Money in Congressional Elections (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), p.6. 14. Burnham, p.20. 15. Ibid. 16. Ibid. 17. E d w a r d Walsh, "Jim Wright's Agenda for Congress," Washington Post National Weekly Edition, D e c e m b e r 29, 1986, p.6. 18. Cited in Ibid. 19. Cited in Ibid. 20. " E x c e r p t s from T o w e r R e p o r t on I n q u i r y into I r a n - C o n t r a , " Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 45(February 28, 1987), p.389; also John Felton, "Tower Panel Lays out Reagan Policy Failures," ibid., p.339. 21. "Excerpts from Tower Report," p.389. 22. Ibid., p.396. 23. Cited in Felton, p.340. 24. Cited in Congressional Quarterly Weekly Review 45(March 7, 1987), p.440. 25. For an elaboration of this issue, see Philip C. Bom, "The Canadian Pursuit of a N e w International Order," The World and I, December 1986, pp .96-102. 26. Cited in Bom, p.100. 27. Bom, p.99. 28. Peter Brimelow, "Mulroney Faced Anew with Provincial Schisms," Wall Street Journal, J a n u a r y 30, 1987, p.15. 29. The facts and quotes are from Jan Boucek, "Canada's Socialists Gaining Ground," Wall Street Journal, March 13, 1987, p.19. 30. Brimelow, p.15. 31. Brimelow, p.15.

Latin America and the Caribbean JOHN D. MARTZ Although 1986 was marked by continuing economic malaise and concomitant social unrest in the region, democratic institutions p r e v a i l e d in a l a r g e majority of countries; and recently reestablished constitutional governments endured in the face of serious economic problems in such countries as Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay. Stable democracies were maintained in Costa Rica, Colombia, and Venezuela, but a number of countries continued to experience political insecurity, particularly Peru, Ecuador, and Bolivia. In Central A m e r i c a subregional strife threatened the flawed democracy of Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras. The ministates of the eastern Caribbean sought further to build upon the traditions inherited from Great Britain. Latin America and the Caribbean in 1986 also saw the continuation of authoritarian regimes. Chile, Paraguay, and Cuba largely ignored civil rights and individual freedoms, as before. Weak but equally authoritarian systems were found in Suriname and Guyana, while the Nicaraguan regime continued as the most controversial and embattled in the region. The most dramatic change occurred in Haiti, where the Duvalier dynasty was overthrown after nearly three decades of repression. While this event in no sense signified a rapid or certain transition to democracy, it had symbolic importance throughout the hemisphere. The very fact that an era of ruthlessness had come to an end i m p r o v e d the prospects for democratic government throughout the hemisphere. None would deny that many of the present democracies are

45

SURINAM FRENCH GUIANA

Atlantic Ocean

j

Stable D e m o c r a c y

Insecure D e m o c r a c y

Limited Authoritarianism

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John D. Martz

seriously flawed, and the shakiness of institutions in many instances is undeniable. The gravity of contemporary economic problems further suggests the possibility of renewed authoritarianism, but there is room for optimism. In order to review conditions in nearly three dozen countries, we organize them in the following fashion: South America (12 countries), Mexico and Central America (8), and the Caribbean Islands (13).

SOUTH AMERICA

Of the twelve countries in South America, two stand out as especially stable: Colombia and Venezuela. Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, and Uruguay are to varying degrees insecurely democratic, facing greater challenges. Elections were held in four countries. Authoritarian rule has continued in another four states, although none exercises sufficient state control to qualify as absolutist. Since 1957, COLOMBIA has enjoyed a democratic system, although one in which the dominant Liberal and Conservative parties have shared a monopoly of power. On March 9, 1986, Colombians went to the polls to choose their congressmen. The major competitors were Conservatives, Liberals, a reformist faction of the latter known as Nuevo Liberalismo, and Marxists campaigning as the Unidad Popular (UP). The traditional Liberals polled 3.2 million votes in crushing Nuevo Liberalismo, with 0.4 million. The Conservatives received 2.4 million votes and the UP a scant 90,000. The Liberals gained an outright majority in both houses, winning 60 of 114 Senate seats and 100 of 199 in the lower chamber. The Conservative representation was 45 and 82 respectively. For the first time in years, Marxists won a presence in the legislature. Two months later, Colombians returned to the polls to select their next president to replace Belisario Betancourt. With Nuevo Liberalismo having withdrawn its own candidate, the Liberals united behind Virgilio Barco Vivas. Alvaro Gómez Hurtado carried the Conservative banner, while the UP presented the candidacy of Jaime Pardo Leal. On May 25, 1986, Barco won a sweeping victory, with a margin of 1.6 million votes over Gómez. With some 58 percent of the vote, Barco outdistanced Gómez (36 percent) and Pardo Leal (4 percent). 1 When Barco was inaugurated in August, he organized the first

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49

single-party government in more than a quarter-century. The Conservatives f o u n d themselves totally removed from the customary levers of influence and patronage. Colombia thereby entered a situation of more genuinely competitive politics. Colombia remained threatened, however, by guerrilla attacks and the growing power of wealthy drug dealers. The August 1984 truce with several guerrilla groups had been denounced by all but the Communist party's Fuerzas Armadas Revolutionarias de Colombia (FARC). By early 1987, a growing number of elected UP officials had been assassinated, either by right-wing death squads or by dissident leftists. The Barco government, hard pressed by an impatient military, was further plagued by the emergence of new guerrilla o r g a n i z a t i o n s . The level of violence increased dramatically late in 1986, leaving President Barco no less frustrated than had been his predecessor. The February 1987 arrest of drug boss Carlos Lehder did not diminish the peril from that industry. While Colombian democracy was buffeted by guerrilla insurgency and the corroding influence of a wealthy drug industry, VENEZUELA to the east confronted less violent challenges. It remained the most vigorous democracy on the continent, with an excellent record for human rights and individual liberties. Problems were largely economic, reflecting a severe decline in oil prices. In December 1986 the government of Jaime Lusinchi belatedly undertook a form of devaluation, which promptly aroused a drumbeat of criticism from both businessmen and labor. After eight years of recession and stagnation, public opinion was decidedly pessimistic about the nation's future. Although national elections were not scheduled until December 1988, maneuvering for position began in both parties. Former president Carlos Andrés Pérez moved toward nomination by the government party Acción Democrática (AD), while competition inside the Christian Democratic COPEI centered on ex-President Rafael Caldera and party Secretary General Eduardo Fernández. 2 In BRAZIL, the prospects were mixed. President José Sarney, who took office in April 1985 upon the death of President-elect Tancredo N e v e s , g r a d u a l l y s t r e n g t h e n e d the l e g i t i m a c y of h i s administration. The Plan Cruzado introduced (by decree) a host of economic measures that produced a temporary economic boom. The relative euphoria brought by low inflation and high consumption lasted long enough to bring, in the election of November 15, a landslide victory for the dominant government party, the

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Partido Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (PMDB). Capturing twenty of twenty-three state governorships, the PMDB also secured a majority in the February 1987 constituent assembly which would draft new regulations and provisions. However, Sarney's own small Frente Liberal did not fare well, complicating the president's political tasks. After the election, controls crumbled and prices began rising rapidly. Inflation mounted toward a four-digit level in the first months of 1987, many shortages developed, Sarney's popularity plummeted, and the government seemed incapable of movement in the political and economic confusion. President Raul Alfonsin of ARGENTINA retained substantial popularity despite the harshness of his economic program, the Plan Austral. The year was dominated by the implementation of its many and complex provisions. With a breathing space before legislative elections planned for late 1987, the government sought to solidify an apparent economic recovery through new arrangements with the World Bank and the IMF. Alfonsin also sought far-reaching reforms of the state. On November 28,1986, he set forth plans to render the government more efficient and more responsive. He also managed to retain reasonable ties with labor, notwithstanding Peronist influence in the labor federation, CGT. Alfonsin proved skillful in the handling of problems associated with military officers accused of human rights violations during the authoritarian years. In February 1987 a "punto final" was placed on charges against officers. In URUGUAY, across the Rio de la Plata from Argentina, the civilian government of Julio Maria Sanguinetti managed to keep the economy reasonably stabilized. On the h u m a n rights front, however, there were strong pressures to discard the exculpation of the military. In 1984, to facilitate the transition to democracy, the military was assured of reasonable immunity from prosecution for h u m a n rights violations. 3 By November 1986, however, the military itself was on record as having committed excesses in combating the Tupamaro guerrillas. Some political elements were questioning the validity of the guarantees given to the soldiers. President Sanguinetti treated the convening of legislative elections as a kind of national plebiscite on the issue, but others looked ahead to the 1989 presidential elections. Thus, Uruguayan democracy remained fragile, although retaining popular support as an alternative to the military excesses of the 1970s and early 1980s.

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In PERU, the government benefited from the exceptional popularity of President Alan Garcia, but both political and economic pressures were severe. After his inauguration in July 1985, the youthful leader of the Aprista party breathed new vigor into national politics. But the guerrilla activities of the Sendero Luminoso proved intractable. Furthermore, in June of 1986 the uprising of prison inmates in Lima, carried out by guerrilla forces, led to physical annihilation of hundreds by the troops storming the institutions. Although Garcia sought and received key resignations in the wake of this human rights tragedy, his own independence and that of civilian rule were brought into question. This also helped to induce Garcia's active intervention in the elections of November 20. His APRA recorded a major victory, capturing eight major cities, three of which had been controlled by the opposition. The municipal elections most importantly included the victory of Aprista candidate Jorge del Castillo as mayor of Lima, replacing the Marxist mayor Alfonso Barrantes. With the APRA recording victories throughout Peru, including several strongholds of the Marxist coalition Izquierda Unida (1U), García entered 1987 with a strong standing and a well-organized party. The disarray of opposition parties meant that critics were most likely to come from nondemocratic groups. Garcia's defiance of the International Monetary Fund and Peru's foreign private creditors, in the form of a virtual moratorium, was very popular; but Peruvian democracy seemed at the mercy of uncertain economic conditions. Something of the same was true in ECUADOR, although the bitter dispute between conservative President León Febres Cordero and his liberal congressional antagonists imperiled the entire system. With public opinion and organized parties bitterly divided, the combative character of the president contributed to the near breakdown of civilized dialogue. The political uncertainty was aggravated by the public rejection of Febres. In June elections for congressional, provincial, and municipal officials, government forces were soundly defeated. Thirty-five congressmen were elected by the left and center-left, while the president's Social Christian party won seventeen, with the remaining seven going to small centrist parties. In addition, a plebiscite concerning electoral reforms, designed by the government to produce a vote of confidence, resulted in a resounding defeat. The administration's "yes" drew 24.9 percent of the vote,

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to a "no" total of 56.9 percent (the remainder were null or blank votes). 4 Febres' loss of popular support resulted from two major problems. First was the sharp decline in petroleum prices, which virtually shattered the government's economic program and led by mid-year to extreme austerity measures and currency devaluation. Second was a threat to constitutional government posed by the Air Force commander, General Frank Vargas Pazzos. Protesting alleged graft and malfeasance within the military, Vargas was arrested in early March after several days of highly publicized confrontation. By the close of 1986 he remained in jail; Febres and the military insisted he be tried by military courts; the congress had issued an amnesty, which was rejected. Determined to maintain his authority despite the opposition of congress and an increasingly polarized public, Febres insisted upon exercising power without concern for constitutional niceties. On January 16, 1987, Febres was captured by Air Force supporters of Vargas. He yielded to their demands as the price of freedom. Thereafter his loss of face and the factionalism of the military underlined the weakness of Ecuadorian democracy. 5 A devastating earthquake in March 1987 disrupted petroleum production and plunged the nation deeper into economic depression. There were also serious reservations about prospects in BOLIVIA. To be sure, President Victor Paz Estenssoro has demonstrated uncommon skill since his July 1985 election as a minority president. Having negotiated an accord between his Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR) and the rightist Acción Democrática Nacionalista (ADN), he secured the backing of the military as well in imposing rigorous economic controls. Outmaneuvering the powerful miners' union, he achieved a greater degree of legitimacy for the central government than customary for Bolivia. At the same time, the fabric of democracy continues to be threatened by the impact of the drug industry. In July 1986 a highly publicized crackdown involving U.S. military personnel was launched. The Americans were withdrawn in November, having had minimal impact on the narcotics trade; and the government was attacked for having invited or permitted the foreign presence. The fate of the government rested on political controversies that sorely tested the nation's weak institutional structure. It was heavily dependent upon the personal leadership of the septuagenarian Paz Estenssoro.

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In CHILE the dictatorship of General Augusto Pinochet passed through another year of travail. An assassination attempt against Pinochet in September produced a period of greater repression. Meanwhile, the fragmented and disunited democratic opposition was unable to agree on a clear strategy, and the Communist party declared its unwillingness to be restricted to nonviolent actions. One change in the situation was the gradual distancing of Washington from Santiago after years of cordial relations. Ranking U.S. officials called for a relaxation of government controls and an improvement in human rights. While General Pinochet continued to be defiant, his prospects for continuation in power after 1989 dimmed somewhat. Then he will need to win a national plebiscite, in which it appears a majority will approve the government, though military leaders are leaning away from extending his mandate into a new decade. However, his dictatorship was not immediately threatened as 1987 unfolded. In PARAGUAY the Alfredo Stroessner dictatorship seemed even less disposed to move toward a political transition. Only the question of the 74-year-old president's health cast any doubt over the durability of the regime. Rivals for the eventual inheritance of power continued to maneuver behind the scenes, but activities of opponents were little more than minor annoyances to the regime. Efforts by the U.S. ambassador to encourage liberalization merely worsened relations. On the northern shore of the continent, the two most recently independent nations remained under authoritarian rule. GUYANA, in its first year under Desmond Hoyte, appeared only cosmetically different from the previous personalistic rule of the late Forbes Burnham. Hoyte, having won December 1985 elections that were termed fraudulent, exercised control through the dominant People's National Congress (PNC). In November 1986, the PNC was declared the winner of municipal elections in the absence of opposition. The Patriotic Coalition for Democracy (PCD), an alliance of five parties, denounced the process while demanding electoral reforms. If the Hoyte government attempted to maintain the garb of legality, the same could hardly be said of SURINAME. However, Colonel Desi Bouterse, who had suspended the constitution in 1980, reluctantly convened a national assembly to draft rules under which new elections would be held. Installing a new cabinet in August 1986,

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Bouterse promised a return to democracy in 1987. The more immediate challenge to his rule was the guerrilla band of Ronny Brunswijk, which, by the close of the year, controlled much of eastern Suriname; and there was considerable disorder in the whole country. It was questionable whether either Bouterse or Brunswijk genuinely was interested in the reestablishment of democracy.

MEXICO A N D C E N T R A L A M E R I C A

In 1986, as in 1985, Central America was wracked by conflict and turmoil that rendered democracy uncertain. Only in COSTA RICA was there systematic observance of political and electoral freedom. The long-established electoral tradition was maintained when the nation went to the polls on February 2, 1986. With Luis Alberto Monge ineligible for a second term, the government party chose as its candidate Oscar Arias Sánchez, a 44-year-old political scientist. Opposing Arias and the Partido Liberación Nacional (PLN) was Rafael Angel Calderón, son of a very controversial former president. At age thirty-six a candidate for the second time, he headed the Partido de Unidad Social Cristiano (PUSC). Following a heated campaign in which Calderón appeared a favorite, Arias recorded an unexpectedly strong victory, with a margin of 52.3 percent to 45.8 percent over his opponent. Four minor parties drew the remaining votes, while absenteeism was slightly above 20 percent. The PLN won twenty-nine of fifty-seven seats in the legislative assembly, with twenty-five going to the Social Christian forces. A notable fact was the election of a woman as second vice-president for the first time in national history. 6 During the campaign Arias was something of a peace candidate, rejecting Calderón's strong attacks on Nicaragua and the latter's agreement with the policies of Ronald Reagan in the region. For Arias, jobs and inflation, along with the handling of the foreign debt, held the highest priority. Following his inauguration, Arias nonetheless confronted the same difficulties as his predecessor in dealing with U.S. pressures, the presence of assorted antiSandinistas, and public opinion strongly critical of the Nicaraguan regime. He also found economic problems more intractable than expected. By early 1987 Arias' early popularity had waned, opposition attacks were on the rise, and the government was widely charged with inaction and a lack of leadership. Combined with the continuing conflict centered on Nicaragua, the President found his

Latin America & the Caribbean

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situation further complicated by divisions inside his party. All of this, however, occurred within the accepted boundaries of the democratic process, which Costa Ricans continue to value highly. In MEXICO the 70-year-old domination of the official Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) continued despite growing popular discontent. In a series of state elections held from July to December 1986, the PRI continued its uninterrupted string of victories. To do so, however, required extensive fraud, much of which was evident to outside observers. The preference of President Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado for a renovation and renewal of the PRI organization was rejected by traditionalist politicos, who insisted on arranging further victories whatever the price. In hopes of improving its tainted image, the PRI in November passed electoral reform legislation. Seats in the chamber of deputies were increased from 400 to 500 as a means of enlarging opposition participation. The officialist majority nonetheless was retained, while its position in the senate was beyond challenge. With the nation's economic situation worsening throughout the year and the corruption of the political system unchecked, the prospects for a strengthening of democracy were not good. Maneuvering for position by presidential precandidates in early 1987 further destabilized the political process. 7 In PANAMA, democracy continued to be limited by the military. President Eric Arturo del Valle was placed in the presidency by the commander of the National Defense Force, General Manuel Antonio Noriega. While proving more skillful politically than his ousted predecessor, del Valle was fully dependent upon Noriega's approval. Rising criticism of Noriega in the United States, led by Senator Jesse Helms, produced a nationalistic response in Panama. Although there were mixed opinions concerning Noriega and his senior colleagues, few doubted that the degree of democracy in the country was dependent upon their indulgence. Conditions were marginally better in HONDURAS, although the constitutional government was solid. President José Azcona Hoyo, who took office at the close of 1985, proved more independent and politically sensitive than his predecessor. The interplay of democratic politics prevailed, notwithstanding the level of opportunism that influenced a number of ambitious leaders. The overwhelming role of the United States, linked to its support of the Nicaraguan Contras, was basic to the state of domestic affairs.

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With well over 10,000 Contra troops on Honduran soil and periodic Sandinista incursions across the border, the country grew increasingly restive over the dangers inherent in the situation. Although Azcona and most other leaders feared the Nicaraguan government and desired continuing aid and assistance from Washington, there w a s a preoccupation with the lasting repercussions of the foreign presence. EL SAVADOR was also caught up in the Central American maelstrom, entangled with the anti-Sandinista efforts of the United States while still faced with its own civil strife. Efforts by President José Napoleón Duarte to reopen negotiations with the rebel Frente Democratico Revolucionario/Farabundo Martí Liberación Nacional (FDR/FMLN) forces late in 1986 were unsuccessful. Amid the usual charges and countercharges, it was not certain that either side was truly interested in negotiation. The military situation, despite occasional shifts in tactics, remained stalemated. Duarte experienced a difficult year. Support from organized labor was progressively reduced, while opposition from students broke out in November when the president was stoned while visiting the National University. Popular support was also diluted by government mishandling of relief funds and emergency aid following the devastating San Salvador earthquake on October 10. An estimated 1,000 were left dead and upwards of 250,000 homeless by the catastrophe, which was economically more damaging than the civil war itself. Both the Catholic church and labor unions were vocal in criticizing the inadequacy and fumbling of government relief efforts. By the close of 1986 it was estimated that damage was at least $2 billion, three times the 1987 budget or nearly as much as all U.S. aid to El Salvador from 1980 to 1986.8 With the economy in shambles, the government unable to resolve civil strife, President Duarte only marginally successful in exercising authority over the military, and the opposition boycotting the National Assembly, the practice of democracy was superficial. In GUATEMALA the new civilian government of Vinicio Cerezo struggled to build legitimacy and establish its credentials both domestically and internationally. The Christian Democratic leader demonstrated an effective leadership style, while treating the armed forces with necessary prudence. The level of violence diminished somewhat, but its recurrence in both city and countryside testified to the limits of Cerezo's authority.

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It was not clear how far Cerezo might be able to control the military, subdue the perpetrators of violence, and redirect national energies toward socioeconomic priorities. Internationally he pursued a personally active but essentially u n c o m m i t t e d a p p r o a c h to regional conflicts. One striking initiative was his announcement late in the year that Guatemala was prepared to accept the existence of Belize as an independent state. As the Central American country most distinctive from its neighbors in history and tradition, BELIZE continued to seek its own course. Prime Minister Manuel Esquivel, who had defeated the longd o m i n a n t l e a d e r G e o r g e Price in D e c e m b e r 1984 e l e c t i o n s , demonstrated the ability of the opposition to a s s u m e power and direct national affairs. On J u n e 9, 1986, Esquivel reshuffled the cabinet, but his United Democratic Party (UDP) retained control. Price and the People's United Party (PUP) also contributed to the f l e d g l i n g d e m o c r a c y t h r o u g h its w i l l i n g n e s s to p l a y the parliamentary game in accordance with existing rules. For NICARAGUA, the year was again dominated principally by i n t e r n a t i o n a l and r e g i o n a l e v e n t s . D i p l o m a t i c d e a l i n g s w i t h C e n t r a l A m e r i c a n n e i g h b o r s , i n t e r m i t t e n t f i g h t i n g with the Contras, and the continuous hostility with the United States—all were central to the concern of the government. At the same time, Sandinista domination of politics fell far short of absolute control. 9 T h e ninety-member National Assembly worked through the year on a n e w constitution. The opposition, a distinct minority, participated in the proceedings, although denouncing the plans and practices of the government. The Assembly adopted the new charter on N o v e m b e r 29. The opposition, after the threat of boycott, joined in the final debate and the vote. The new document became effective in J a n u a r y 1987, Peru's Alan Garcia b e i n g the o n l y p r o m i n e n t foreigner in attendance. But it was immediately suspended b y the reimposition of the state of siege in effect since 1982 o n grounds of the Contra war. H u m a n rights violations and denials of civil rights continued, whether or not justified by the military situation.

THE CARIBBEAN ISLANDS T h e historical, linguistic, ethnic, and political experience of these thirteen states is v a r i e d . At the s a m e time, there a r e s o m e similarities. W h i l e the state of d e m o c r a c y in the former Spanish

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colonies r u n s from one extreme to another, there is greater commonality among the more recently independent countries formerly ruled by the British. Of these, two have achieved notable institutional solidity over the past quarter century. In BARBADOS the sense of civility has grown with perodic changes of government. Grantley Adams and his Barbados Labour Party (BLP), which led the country to independence, were soon replaced by Errol Barrow and the opposition Democratic Labour Party (DLP). After a decade, the BLP regained power under Grantley's son Tom, who was prime minister until his death in February 1985. This led to the ascent of the BLP's H. Bernard St. John. In general elections on May 28, 1986, Barrow and the DLP recorded the greatest electoral victory in national history. The BLP margin of seventeen to ten was wiped out, with the DLP taking an unprecedented twenty-four of twenty-seven seats. St. John and all but one of his cabinet ministers lost their seats in the process. Barrow declared that the creation of jobs and a reduction of public expenditures would have top priority for the new government. He also enjoyed influence with other leaders in the eastern Caribbean. His victory and the transmission of power underlined the growing maturity of democracy in Barbados. Stability in TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO was based not on periodic renewal through elections, but on thirty years' uninterrupted control by the Peoples' National Movement (PNM). Long dominated by Eric Williams, the PNM became less personalistic under George Chambers following Williams' death in March 1981. Elections were called for December 15, 1986, in which a group of small opposition parties united as the National Alliance for Reconstruction (NAR) won a landslide victory. PNM dropped from twenty-six to three parliamentary seats. A. N. R. Robinson became the new prime minister. Of the former Spanish colonies, the DOMINICAN REPUBLIC currently presents the most positive picture for democracy. It has maintained constitutional regularity since 1966 and, with some difficulty, has twice transferred political power from one party to another. The fragility of the process was undeniable, as was the case in the presidential election of May 1986. With the Partido Revolucionario Dominicano (PRD) of outgoing President Salvador Jorge Blanco presenting Jacobo Majluta as its

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candidate, the opposition turned to Joaquin Balaguer, who had served three consecutive terms from 1966 to 1978. While Majluta had prevailed only after a divisive fight within his party, the Partido Reformista Social Cristiano (PRSC) was solidly behind the septuagenarian Balaguer, who was virtually blind. Clashes between the parties' supporters in April left more than one hundred wounded, and before the closing of voting both candidates were claiming victory. The Central Election Council suspended votecounting, and not until ten days after the election was there agreement between the two candidates. Balaguer received 41 percent of the vote to 39 percent for Majluta (while former president Juan Bosch trailed with 18 percent). Joaquin Balaguer benefited from the discontent of farmers and many in the middle class who recalled better times of earlier years. In his mid-August inaugural address Balaguer pledged a government of national conciliation. PRSC leaders worked for informal agreement with the PRD, without which the government's legislative plurality could not guarantee passage of important reforms. The government functioned reasonably well, but in difficult economic conditions. In JAMAICA, Prime Minister Edward Seaga and his Jamaica Labour Party, who had won the general election in 1980, retained power without further electoral competition. Former Prime Minister Michael Manley and the People's National Party refused to participate in 1983 general elections in the absence of reforms. This resulted in the JLP taking all seats in the House of Representatives. Local elections were twice postponed, with the vote finally being held on July 30,1986. When Jamaicans finally went to the polls, their dissatisfaction over economic policy and governmental submission to the IMF and World Bank contributed to a major defeat. The PNP won eleven of the thirteen municipal elections, with a margin of 57 percent to 43 percent. Michael Manley promptly called for general elections in the wake of this evident repudiation of the government. Edward Seaga responded that elections were not required for two years, and that he would choose the time. The degree of popular polarization promised to test once again the strength of democratic beliefs in Jamaica. In the island ministates, democratic practices were generally observed, although it was too soon to make assumptions about systemic stability. There were few elections during 1986. In

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D O M I N I C A , a by-election on May 5 was held to fill a parliamentary seat vacated by the imprisonment of a former prime minister charged with conspiracy. The governing Dominica Freedom Party (DFP) of Prime Minister Eugenia Charles won easily. In both ST. LUCIA and ST. VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES, as well as in the BAHAMAS, general elections are due in 1987. In ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA, GRENADA, and ST. CHRISTOPHER AND NEVIS, the existing elected governments did not anticipate such tests of their popular support. The political highlight of the year was the unanticipated ouster of the Duvalier dynasty after twenty-nine years of exploitative dictatorship rule in HAITI. The beginning of the end came about when in November 1985 protesting demonstrators in Gonaives were brutally dispersed by authorities. By December the protests had spread, more Haitians had been killed, and a year-end cabinet shuffle could not curb the dissent. In January there were more protests. On the 26th, the army command was purged and Presidentfor-Life Jean-Claude Duvalier imposed a state of siege. On February 7, Duvalier and his family flew to exile in a plane provided by the United States. With this flight, Haiti came under a military-civilian junta headed by General Henri Namphy, the armed forces chief. During the following months the general demonstrated good intentions but limited political skills. The election of delegates to a constituent body that would draft Haiti's twenty-third constitution since its independence in 1804 was carried out on October 19. The first competitive race since the 1950s, it was rife with confusion, uncertainty, and a lack of popular response. The transition to constitutional government would be difficult, and the anniversary of the revolution, February 7, 1987, was marked by more concern than celebration. C U B A remained under a Marxist regime committed and inextricably linked to the Soviet Union, but it maintained a degree of independence from world Marxism. At the same time, its political performance reflected a greater degree of systemic penetration and authority than in any other hemispheric country. This was reflected both institutionally and in the immense personal authority of Fidel Castro. There were extensive changes of personnel. Ten of twenty-four politburo members were replaced, as were one-third of the 146 Central Committee members. When the Third Congress of the

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C o m m u n i s t P a r t y o f C u b a ( P C C ) c o n v e n e d f r o m N o v e m b e r 3 0 to December

2,

1986,

Castro

sharply

denounced

problems

of

p e r f o r m a n c e a n d a c h i e v e m e n t . H e c h a r g e d that i n d i s c i p l i n e , c h a o s , a n d w a s t e w e r e obstacles to achieving the objective of the p a r t y a n d of t h e s t a t e . W h i l e h i s S o v i e t p a t r o n s w e r e m o v i n g t o w a r d f u r t h e r f o r e i g n c o n t r a c t s a n d t r a d e a n d s o m e f r e e d o m for s m a l l - s c a l e p r i v a t e e n t e r p r i s e , C a s t r o e m p h a s i z e d socialist v i r t u e s , r e d u c e d t r a d e w i t h the W e s t ,

and

abolished

the

limited

free

markets

previously

allowed. *

In

Latin

America

and

*

*

the Caribbean,

the

complexities

of

d e m o c r a c y w e r e v e r y e v i d e n t in 1 9 8 7 . C o n d i t i o n s v a r i e d r a d i c a l l y . A l a r g e m a j o r i t y o f c o u n t r i e s w e r e at l e a s t f o r m a l l y d e m o c r a t i c ; a n d if d e m o c r a c y w a s s e v e r e l y c h a l l e n g e d b y a h o s t of s o c i o e c o n o m i c a n d p o l i t i c a l p r o b l e m s , t h e s e w e r e i s s u e s for w h i c h

authoritarianism

had no better answers.

NOTES 1. R e g i s t r a d u r í a N a c i o n a l del Estado Civil, Estadísticas Electorales (Bogotá: Registraduría Nacional, 1986). An excellent survey is Robert H. Dix, The Politics of Colombia ( N e w York: Praeger, 1987). 2. For the most extensive and updated political survey, see J o h n D. M a r t z and David J. Meyers, eds., Venezuela: The Democratic Experience, 2nd ed. (New York: Praeger, 1986). 3. A perceptive o v e r v i e w is Juan Rial, "The U r u g u a y a n Elections of 1984: A Triumph of the Center," in Paul W. Drake and Eduardo Silva, eds., Elections and Democratization in Latin America, 1980-85, (San D i e g o : Center for Iberian and Latin American Studies, 1986), pp. 245-273. 4. T h e most recent extended review of recent and contemporary electoral politics is J o h n D. Martz, Regime, Politics, and Petroleum: Ecuador's Nationalistic Struggle ( N e w Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1987). 5. A detailed review of the military upheaval in 1986 is Gonzalo Ortiz C r e s p o , La hora del General (Quito: Editorial El Conejo, 1986). 6. Tico Times, F e b r u a r y 7 and F e b r u a r y 14, 1986, contains data and discussion. 7. See the three chapters on recent Mexican electoral politics b y Kevin J. M i d d l e b r o o k , J u a n M o l i n a r Horcasitas, and W a y n e A. C o r n e l i u s in Drake and Silva, Elections, pp. 73-143. 8. Central American Report, N o v e m b e r 21, 1986, p. 358. 9. An excellent discussion is J o h n A. Booth, "Election amid W a r and Revolution: T o w a r d Evaluating the 1984 Nicaraguan National Elections," in Drake and Silva, Elections, pp. 37-61.

ERRATUM The following states, depicted in error below as Limited Authoritarianisms, should be shown as Absolutisms: Angola, Benin, Central African Republic, People's Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Guinea-Bissau, Malawi, Mozambique, Niger, Somalia, Togo, and Zaire.

Sub-Saharan Africa

LARRY DIAMOND DENNIS GALVAN

There was little progress toward democracy in sub-Saharan Africa during 1986. Although democracy persisted in Botswana and Mauritius, and (at least partially) in Senegal, Gambia, and Zimbabwe, most African countries were governed by authoritarian regimes that allowed little or no scope for popular participation, opposition, and dissent. There was a historic change of regimes in Uganda that opened the way for the reconstruction of democracy and political order in that troubled country. But in Guinea and Liberia, hopes that regime change would bring democratic progress receded. In countries as diverse as Kenya and South Africa, repression deepened significantly in reaction to new movements of resistance to authoritarian domination and abuse. Although there were incremental improvements in the human rights climate in some African countries, none became significantly more democratic during the year. INSECURE AND

PARTIAL DEMOCRACIES

The small Indian Ocean island of MAURITIUS preserved its standing in 1986 as Africa's freest and most democratic nation. Since its independence in 1968, Mauritius has maintained a highly competitive, and in recent years increasingly volatile, multiparty system. The country is governed by a prime minister, Council of Ministers, and unicameral Legislative Assembly, which is elected for a five-year term (in free and fair contests supervised by an

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independent commission). Extensive civil and political liberty is reflected in its vigorous and pluralistic press (which boasts some sixteen private daily, weekly, and monthly newspapers for a population of about one million), a widespread and active trade union movement, and a multitude of other private associations. Together with an independent judicial system (modeled on that of Great Britain) and frequent commissions of inquiry, the freedom and pluralism of the press and associational life serve to ensure public accountability and the rule of law. Since independence, "there have been no reports of political killings, disappearance, torture or degrading treatment of prisoners." 1 During 1986, democracy in Mauritius showed signs of both vigor and strain. In the continuing ferment that has seen executive power change hands twice in the past five years, the governing threeparty alliance of Prime Minister Aneerood Jugnauth suffered a stunning setback in midterm municipal elections in December 1985. The leading opposition party (MMM) of Paul Bérenger, a former coalition partner of the prime minister, swept 118 of 126 local council seats in the island's five major cities with 57 percent of the vote. The result was a sharp rebuff to Jugnauth, who had asked for a popular vote of confidence. Shortly thereafter, on December 31, the worst political scandal in the country's history erupted with the news that four MPs had been arrested in Amsterdam when twenty kilos of heroin (worth about $1 million) were found in the luggage of one of them (the other three were soon released). The arrest of the four (all members of the governing alliance) lent credence to opposition charges that Jugnauth's government was "corrupt and dirty." His shaky coalition was further rocked in early January 1986 when four of his ministers resigned, denouncing his "unwarranted" six-month suspension from parliament of five opposition members, as well as other arrogant and undemocratic practices. One resigned minister criticized the prime minister for polarizing the country and declared, "The democratic system cannot function if the opposition is not allowed to play its role fully." 2 The climate deteriorated further in March when riot police dispersed a demonstration outside the Legislative Assembly led by the suspended Berenger. Although Jugnauth survived a parliamentary censure motion brought by Berenger in May, his authority was weakened by the succession of controversies, and political tension and invective promised to increase as parliamentary elections approached in 1988.3 A less vigorous and volatile but still substantial democracy persisted as well during 1986 in BOTSWANA, another former British

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colony. Although the ruling Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) has dominated the political arena and controlled the national government continuously since independence in 1966, elections have been freely and fairly contested, and the four opposition parties are able to criticize and challenge the government without fear of reprisal. While the BDP controls thirty of thirty-four elective seats in the National Assembly, opposition parties control three important city councils (including that in the capital, Gaborone). In 1986, the BDP candidate was handily defeated in a hard-fought byelection for a National Assembly seat. Democracy in Botswana is buttressed by a tolerant, participatory political culture, vigorous local government, relatively high standards of bureaucratic probity and performance, and a strong legal system that effectively sustains the rule of lav/. The judiciary is independent of the executive and the military, and the constitution offers strong protections against arbitrary arrest and for freedom of expression. While pluralism in the mass media is quite limited, in that the sole daily newspaper and the broadcast media are government-owned, opposition party activity is reported, and three independent weekly newspapers provide a forum for publication of a wider range of views. "Reporting on several sensitive political issues during 1986 demonstrated that the independent press has continued to evolve." 4 Botswana also boasts one of the best human rights records in Africa. Preventive detention is illegal and habeas corpus exists in both law and practice. Unions have the right to organize, although financial contributions from outside the country are prohibited. There were no reports of political prisoners or other human rights violations in Botswana in 1986. Despite this positive record, democracy in Botswana has continued to face serious long-term problems. For one, the political system remains highly paternalistic and elite-centered. Social mobilization remains low, political parties do not penetrate very well down to the grassroots, eligibility for public office is limited to the few who are literate in English, and organized interest group activity is still very limited. 5 Moreover, the depth of the ruling elite's commitment to democratic competition has never been seriously tested, and there is reason to suspect that the BDP might take a considerably less democratic and tolerant posture if its electoral dominance were genuinely threatened. 6 By the end of the year, there seemed little prospect that such a challenge would emerge in the next national election, due in 1989. The influence of the leading opposition party, the Botswana National Front (BNF)

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is limited, although it does enjoy substantial support in the rapidly growing urban areas and also among many traditional chiefs. In the near term, the key challenge to democracy in Botswana derives from the widening regional war in Southern Africa. Increasing pressure from neighboring South Africa in 1986—both in infiltration by antiapartheid guerrilla forces and cross-border raids by the South Africa military—led the government of Botswana to adopt a tough National Security Act, granting it the authority to hold detainees incommunicado on security grounds and prescribing heavy sentences for sabotage of public services. While the BDP government has initially taken care not to apply these broad new powers undemocratically, the BNF has charged that the BDP is using the South African threat to arm itself for a possible political crackdown, and many observers worry that the new powers could gradually undermine Botswana's democratic traditions. 7 Like Botswana, the GAMBIA is a small, relatively homogeneous country in which significant (though somewhat less) political freedom is b a l a n c e d by low levels of political and social mobilization, limited public political awareness, and the continuing dominance of the ruling People's Progressive Party (PPP). Since independence in 1965, the PPP has dominated the House of Representatives, and the first president, Sir Dawda Jawara, has been continually reelected. Hence, as in Botswana, democracy can hardly be regarded as deeply institutionalized. However, the Gambia did continue to recover in 1986 from the bloody and traumatic coup attempt of July 1981 (the first serious challenge to political stability). Particularly significant was the lifting in 1985 of the state of emergency imposed after the abortive coup. In April 1986, the president commuted the death sentences of thirteen more persons convicted of treason and other crimes associated with the coup attempt. There was no evidence of political prisoners or other serious human rights violations in 1986. Perhaps the most significant democratic development in the Gambia in 1986 was the founding of two new opposition parties in anticipation of the next election, scheduled for May 1987. Both parties were formed by defectors from the ruling party, and the most significant of the two new parties, the Gambia People's Party (GPP), was launched by three former cabinet ministers (one a former vice-president). Both parties claimed a socialist orientation (two Marxist parties have been banned). The ruling PPP is unlikely to replicate the success it had in the 1982 general elections, when it captured twenty-seven of thirty-five elective House seats (while

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also controlling all the appointive seats). But the fragmentation of the opposition makes the defeat of the PPP unlikely, even in a free and fair election. In neighboring SENEGAL, a similar pattern prevails. Multiparty electoral competition exists, but the sole ruling party since independence remains overwhelmingly dominant. Grave violations of human rights (political killings, disappearances, torture) do not occur, and there is considerable freedom of expression. However, civil liberties are constrained (preventive detention is permitted indefinitely when there is a threat to public order), and those detained for separatist activities in the southern Casamance region might be considered prisoners of conscience. In January 1986, thirtyone people were sentenced for between two to fifteen years (and one for life) for taking part in separatist demonstrations in Casamance late in 1983. However, seventy-three were acquitted and released, and the government can claim that the sentences were for violent behavior (about thirty people died in the demonstrations) rather than for separatist beliefs. Indeed, one of the major democratic forces in Senegal is "an active, independent, and well trained judiciary," which combines with a tolerant and accommodating political culture at the elite level to provide a relatively liberal climate for dissent. 8 There were no major developments in Senegalese politics in 1986, as the five-year terms for the president and parliament do not expire until February 1988. However, opposition parties have registered sharp concern about biases in electoral laws and administration that favor President Abdou Diouf's Socialist Party. These led the largest opposition party, the PDS, to boycott the 1984 rural and municipal elections, and, in 1986, several of the opposition parties announced their intention to boycott the 1988 general elections unless the electoral law is modified. The most serious problem facing the opposition is tremendous fragmentation (into fifteen different parties). This is institutionalized, in part, by an electoral provision that forbids coalitions between parties. But it is also perpetuated by the opposition's own divisive and sectarian tendencies, which were accentuated in late October when the PDS expelled three members of its political bureau who had publicly criticized and challenged the party leader, Abdoulaye Wade. Nevertheless, the major challenges to democracy in Senegal lie beneath the surface of party politics. In fact, one of the weaknesses of the democratic system in Senegal is precisely its narrowness, elitism, and lack of relevance for the bulk of the population, whose

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impoverished circumstances of life have improved little since independence, and whose participation continues to be manipulated in clientelistic fashion from above. 9 Related to this is the problem of a stagnant economy, long suffering under the weight of a swollen, ponderous, and corrupt state bureaucracy. The government has embarked upon a path of structural change, selling off some stateowned enterprises, reducing state regulation, and encouraging private initiative. "However, with wages frozen and prices rising for agricultural products and consumer goods, there was increased concern in 1986 about the political impact of the economic reform p r o g r a m . " 1 0 Increasingly, frustration is being channeled into fundamentalist Islamic mobilization, which morally rejects the current system and advances a kind of extremist, totalitarian vision of society. 11 The alienation of the Casamance region is yet another challenge that underscores the need for political decentralization, both to deepen and invigorate popular participation and to give important subgroups some autonomy. In Z I M B A B W E , the year saw divergent trends with respect to democracy and human rights. Zimbabwe remains ambivalent in its commitment to democracy. On the one hand, it retains the structures of a multiparty, parliamentary democracy, and Prime Minister Robert Mugabe has continued to respect the provisions of the independence constitution, to which all parties agreed in the Lancaster House negotiations in 1980. On the other hand, Mugabe and his ruling Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU) have repeatedly made clear their ultimate intention of revising the constitution to declare a one-party state. Mugabe announced that he would seek to eliminate in 1987 the twenty seats reserved specially for whites (who constitute just one percent of the population) in the 100-seat House of Assembly. Beginning in April 1987, such fundamental portions of the constitution can be revised by a 70 percent vote in the House of Assembly. The most recent parliamentary election, in 1985, gave ZANU a commanding sixtythree seats, and it has since won support from three more House members (including one white). But the amending power it seeks will require at least some of fifteen votes controlled by the major black opposition party, the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU). Should this support come through a merger of ZANU and ZAPU, as the two parties have been negotiating unsucessfully for years, it would herald the creation, in fact if not in law, of a oneparty state. Although it would essentially eliminate formal party

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opposition, a merger of ZANU and ZAPU has come to be seen by many as the sine qua non for political stability, the only way of resolving the debilitating struggle between the Shona majority, which supports ZANU, and the Ndebele minority, which remains loyal to ZAPU. It is this bitter ethnic and political conflict, with deep historical roots, that has spawned most of the violence and human rights violations since i n d e p e n d e n c e . 1 2 The pace of negotiations between the two parties did accelerate in 1986, generating fresh hopes of an accord. With this came some significant human rights progress. "After more than 3 years of often severe repression of opposition political leaders and the civilian population in Matebeleland, reports of political killings and disappearances declined dramatically in 1986." 13 Church groups and lawyers also reported major improvements in the human rights situation in Matebeleland, as government security forces became more disciplined. 1 4 Significant numbers of political detainees were released, including (in August) ten opposition politicians and military figures charged with treason for allegedly plotting to overthrow Mugabe. Particularly important was the release in December from several years' imprisonment of the former ZAPU military commander, Dumiso Dabengwa, whose detention under the Emergency Powers Act (since being acquitted of treason charges in 1983) had been a major obstacle to an accord. However, these efforts at reconciliation failed to produce an accord between the two parties, and civil conflict festered. In particular, political killings by armed dissidents continued. The dissidents, "an amorphous amalgamation of disaffected former guerrilla fighters, political radicals, and common criminals," pressed on with their "campaign of terror and economic sabotage" in the region, apparently hoping to destabilize the country. 15 Evidence that they have received support from South Africa has accentuated the government's anger and alarm over their activities. Perhaps partly as a consequence, government violations of human rights have not c o m p l e t e l y ceased. "Reliable reports indicate that the authorities continued to apply torture in many security-related cases." 1 6 The government has started prosecuting security personnel charged with violence, and Home Affairs Minister Enos Nkala told police officers that "if there has been torture it must stop." 1 7 But g o v e r n m e n t officials have publicly denounced and privately frustrated the investigative work of human rights groups like A m n e s t y I n t e r n a t i o n a l , and N k a l a s u b s e q u e n t l y w a r n e d Zimbabweans of severe penalties for passing critical information to such groups. Prime Minister Mugabe personally intervened in June to

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free two top officials of the respected Catholic Justice and Peace Commission who had been arrested by police. Zimbabwe's political ambivalence extends to much of social and p o l i t i c a l life. T h e r e is still real p o l i t i c a l p l u r a l i s m a n d competition, but it is waning, as informal pressure is brought to bear on those who do not openly identify with the ruling party. Previous intimidation of opposition by government forces and ruling party thugs has left a "legacy of fear." 1 8 Legally, there is freedom of speech, but it is often harassed and discouraged by the government. There is no formal censorship of the press, but the major print media are g o v e r n m e n t - c o n t r o l l e d , the b r o a d c a s t m e d i a are w h o l l y government-owned, and the major dailies do not seriously challenge or criticize the g o v e r n m e n t . An independent judiciary remains perhaps the most forceful line of defense against arbitrary arrest, abuse of power, and political h e g e m o n y ; the courts h a v e not hesitated to rule against the government and acquit its most bitter e n e m i e s , while the g o v e r n m e n t has g e n e r a l l y accepted these unpalatable decisions. But the judicial system is constrained by a s h o r t a g e of l a w y e r s (only 4 0 0 n a t i o n w i d e ) and e x p e r i e n c e d magistrates, and also by the continuing renewal by parliament every six m o n t h s of the state of e m e r g e n c y that has been in effect continuously since 1965. By permitting indefinite detention without trial of persons (like the acquitted Dabengwa) who are deemed a threat to security, these emergency powers have not only given the government a potent means for repression of opposition, they have also undermined the professionalism of the police, who need not obtain evidence of criminal activity to justify an arrest. 1 9 In short, the search for stable democracy continued in Zimbabwe in 1986, but as the hopes of stability appeared to brighten slightly, the o d d s of Z i m b a b w e b e c o m i n g fully democratic continued to narrow.

REGIMES IN TRANSITION For U G A N D A , 1986 was a year of political upheaval, attempted consolidation, and potential transition to democracy. In January, the National Resistance A r m y ( N R A ) of Yoweri Museveni drove the six-month-old military regime of General Tito Okello from power. After years of struggle against oppressive, authoritarian rule, Museveni's National Resistance M o v e m e n t ( N R M ) finally seized Kampala, promising renewed respect for h u m a n rights and the construction of a popular democracy in a country that has suffered

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some of the most horrendous and widespread human rights violations in all of Africa. However, Museveni and the NRM spent much of the year simply trying to enforce their rule in remote areas, where banditry and anarchy have become commonplace. Despite its rhetoric, by the end of the year, the new government had yet to prove that it could reestablish respect for personal liberty and the rule of law, much less consolidate a democratic form of government. Much of the difficulty facing the new government stems from the long legacy of state violence and decentralized, anarchic violence under previous regimes, beginning with the first civilian government of Milton Obote but reaching grave proportions under Idi Amin (1971-1979) and Obote's second regime (1980-1985). This dual legacy of tyranny and anarchy is, in turn, the product of multiple, intense ethnic divisions, which have polarized into a struggle for dominance between the more developed and much more populous Bantu tribes of the south (probably about 80 percent of the population) and the smaller, poorer Nilotic tribes of the north, which have controlled military and political power since independence in 1962. 2 0 As a northerner, like Obote and Amin, General Okello was ill-equipped to resolve this historic struggle. Indeed, during the last days of his rule, when the government claimed to be honoring a cease-fire agreement it had reached with the NRM in December 1985, there were numerous reports of politically inspired violence. Upon taking power as president on January 29, Museveni formed a transitional government of national unity, which he promised would remain in power for no more than four years. During this time, national elections would be prepared and a new constitution drafted, but traditional political party activity would not be allowed. Although the new government was dominated by Museveni's NRM, it did include representatives of all of Uganda's major political parties, including the Democratic Party, the Uganda People's Congress (of former President Milton Obote), the Conservative Party, the Uganda Patriotic Movement, and the Federal Democratic Party. Five members of the Okello government even reappeared in the new cabinet. The cornerstone of the NRM government's effort to transform Uganda into a democratic society is the tiered system of "resistance councils." The basic building blocks of this system are the villagelevel resistance councils, populist local government structures designed both to "politicize" common people in the ideology of the new regime and to give them practical experience in democratic government. The resistance councils represent Museveni's attempt to

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remove control over the mechanisms of democracy in Uganda from wealthy urban elites, and to mobilize the rural masses into active, self-motivated democratic participation by raising their political consciousness. The local-level resistance councils are run by elected officers who form the resistance committee. Significantly, these elected officers can be removed from office by a vote of no confidence by the resistance council. Eventually, the local councils, of which there were 40,000 by late 1986, will feed into a six-level system of similar administrative structures. The highest of these, the National Resistance Council, is expected to be chosen by direct election. The resistance council system has already come under criticism. Some of the elected resistance committee members have been accused of corruption. In addition, old political party bosses have won election to some committees by virtue of their ability to instill fear in the local populace. Despite the proliferation of the councils, the NRM government has been unable to meet its pledge to establish resistance councils throughout the nation, a failure that threatens the credibility of the entire system. Some sources, citing the left-ofcenter tilt of the system and the NRM's plan to use the resistance councils as a means of keeping tabs on potential dissidents, also question the democratic intent of the resistance council system.21 Early in the year, Museveni and the NRM launched a major rhetorical campaign to make human rights an important element in Ugandan political life. In his July address to the Organization of African Unity, Museveni lashed out at the organization's policy of nonintervention in the internal affairs of member states, a policy he claimed had been used to "shield genocide from censure" in Uganda. The new government announced plans to prosecute key human rights violators of the previous three regimes, including Idi Amin and Milton Obote, but made little tangible progress in this effort during its first year in power. 22 In deed as well as word, the Museveni government clearly improved the human rights situation in Uganda in 1986. This was especially true in the south, the NRM's base, which was freed of the longstanding oppression of a northern-dominated military. A key foundation of this progress has been Museveni's effort to discipline his armed forces by "politically reeducating" his troops (as he seeks to do with the civilian population) and establishing strict lines of control. However, as the new regime consolidated its control and restored order in the south, the military situation in the north disintegrated, and the new military discipline began to break down. By late summer, the NRA was pressed into combat again to

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defend the north against invasion by the well-armed forces of the previous regimes, from their bases in southern Sudan. With the renewed fighting came reports of human rights abuses by the NRA, "possibly including on-the-spot executions of suspected dissidents." 23 The new regime has also had to contend with a political challenge from its own southern base, as the Baganda, Uganda's largest ethnic group, resumed their campaign to restore their monarchy (abolished by Obote in 1966). Museveni, aware that there are a number of potential restoration movements among various Ugandan ethnic groups, tried quietly to reject the Baganda request. However, the royalist ambitions of the Baganda allegedly formed the basis for a coup attempt in September. Upon uncovering the alleged plot, the government arrested twenty-five Baganda monarchists for treason. 24 The Baganda affair apparently weakened the authority of the NRM government, for, just a few weeks later, another coup effort was uncovered, this time involving important cabinet officials from the political parties that Museveni attempted to incorporate into his government. Key officials of several of these parties were arrested in October on charges of attempting to overthrow the NRM government. The arrests came as a significant blow to Museveni's efforts to build a broadly based coalition in support of his reform efforts. 25 Marked improvement in press freedom was also dampened by the instability. The roundup of alleged coup plotters included the editor of Uganda's independent daily The Citizen, Anthony Sekweyama. It was not clear whether his arrest reflected real suspicion of complicity in the coup or government displeasure with the paper's editorial line. Subsequent issues of The Citizen continued to criticize the government, as did many of the dozen or so other regular news publications that were launched or reinvigorated after the NRM takeover. But, in June, a local newspaper was banned and its two editors charged with treason for publishing a story suggesting Kenyan guerrillas were operating out of Uganda 2 6 The military situation in the north, as well as the rising political tension in Kampala, indicated that the Museveni regime's effort to transform Ugandan politics will not come easily. In its first year, the regime failed to make clear progress in resolving any of the challenges that stand in the way of establishing a democratic political order. These include: the military pacification of the north; the institutionalization of military discipline and civilian control over the military; the establishment of a political framework for ethnic reconciliation between north and south; resolution of the appeals for restoration of the former southern

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kingdoms; and reinvigoration of a once-promising economy that has been decimated by a quarter-century of corruption and misrule. By early 1987, political order was still not secure, and the government "was in a severe financial crisis due to poor NRM economic policies which have discouraged trade, spurred inflation, and deepened already large budget deficits." 2 7 It is not yet clear whether Yoweri Museveni's government will, like its predecessors, succumb to the anarchy or fall back in desperation upon the tryanny that has cursed Uganda's political life. But Museveni has brought a concern for human rights and a sense of democratic purpose, and that is at least a beginning. Despite the continuation of military rule, some progress toward democracy was also made in NIGERIA in 1986. Since it seized power in a military coup in August 1985, the military government of President Ibrahim Babangida has sought to emphasize its commitment to human rights while preparing the country for a return to civilian, democratic government. The most repressive features of the harshly authoritarian rule of General Muhammadu Buhari were quickly dismantled in 1985. At the beginning of 1986, Babangida took another important step along the path of transition. He announced that the military would hand over power to a democratically elected civilian government by October 1990, and appointed a seventeen-member political bureau to coordinate a national dialogue on how to negotiate that transition and structure the new government. The bureau was given until the end of the year to solicit p r o p o s a l s from the public and offer its own recommendations. The debate over the structure and ideology of a new democratic system dominated news and editorial commentary for much of the year. While joined with enthusiasm and intensity, the debate reflected considerable cynicism with party politics. This was the residue of popular disgust with the massive corruption, violence, and fraud of politics under Nigeria's Second Republic (1979-1983). Numerous proposals grappled with how to avoid these problems in the future. Many recommended some form of military-civilian power sharing, or "dyarchy," as a way of stabilizing civilian rule, others a no-party system. But these forms were rejected as naive by some past military and political leaders, including the respected former chief of army staff, General Danjuma, who called for more rigorous mechanisms to prevent corruption and electoral fraud. 28 Also high on President Babangida's agenda was the fate of former politicians of the Second Republic. Although widely viewed

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as corrupt and culpable for the democratic breakdown, their trials in secret by military tribunals under Buhari had discredited the heavy prison sentences given to them. In response to recommendations of two judicial panels appointed late in 1985 to review the various cases, the Babangida government reduced the sentences of more than fifty persons convicted of corruption and acquitted twelve others completely. Forty-nine (including twelve former civilian governors) were banned for life from seeking elective office. In July, former President Shagari and Vice-President Ekwueme were released from detention but also banned for life from electoral politics. At the same time, 100 other politicians were cleared of all charges (some to the dismay of a skeptical press and public) and 800 were ordered to be tried for corruption by a special judicial tribunal. But, by the end of the year, nothing had come of these trials, and it was increasingly doubtful that they would ever be held. The need to balance fairness and accountability was a difficult and controversial challenge for the regime, which it tended to resolve in a liberal (some charged lax) spirit. But as progress toward a democratic transition slowly unfolded, and the regime won credit for implementation of courageous and far-reaching economic adjustment policies to deal with a grave depression, other developments began to dent Babangida's liberal image. In March, ten officers convicted by a military tribunal of plotting to overthow the regime were executed. More disturbing to many groups, however, was the blanket ban announced in June, excluding all former politicians of the Second Republic from participation in partisan politics for a period of ten years from the resumption of political activity. Still more controversial was the decision to extend from three months to six the length of time a person could be detained without trial for reasons of "state security" under Decree Number 2 (which, unlike the restrictive press decree, remained from the Buhari period). The extension provoked so much protest from the bar and the press that it was rescinded by the military. This rescision reflected the Babangida government's sensitivity to questions of human rights, in contrast to the unprecedented repression and climate of fear that developed under the twentymonth rule of General Buhari. Under Babangida, Nigeria has permitted domestic human rights groups (such as the Human Rights Committee of the Nigerian Bar Association) and international ones (such as Amnesty International) to operate freely. In August, it hosted an important Pan-African Conference on Human Rights, which called for more vigorous monitoring and reporting of human rights conditions throughout the continent. 2 9 But there were also

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disturbing signs of a reassertion of the repressive mentality of the previous regime. On May 23, police went on a rampage at Ahmadu Bello University in Zaria, killing several students (perhaps twenty) and injuring many more. This provoked widespread outrage and sympathy demonstrations on other campuses, leading to further confrontation and violence. 3 0 The government's response over subsequent months was to quash a planned sympathy demonstration by the Nigerian Labour Congress and detain its leaders, to dissolve all student unions for the remainder of the year, and to reject its commission's recommendation that police not be sent to campuses in the future with lethal weapons. Still more shocking was the assassination by parcel bomb in October of one of Nigeria's most talented, admired, and fearlessly independent journalists, Dele Giwa. Editor-in-chief of Newswatch, the country's leading news weekly (known for its biting commentaries and aggressive investigative reporting), Giwa had been questioned intensely just before his death by state security officials, who accused him of trying to foment revolution. These preposterous charges combined with a wealth of circumstantial evidence to fix public suspicion for the murder on the state security services, and to cast a chilling shadow over Nigeria's historically vibrant and free press. 3 1 Thus, as Nigeria made democratic progress in 1986, it also showed signs of deepening authoritarianism. Some incremental progress toward the government's stated goal of democratization was also made in CAMEROON during President Paul Biya's fourth year in office. Certainly, times have changed since the authoritarian rule of Biya's predecessor, President Ahmadou Ahidjo, when respect for human rights and open discussion of political issues were virtually unheard of. Biya has cautiously stressed the need to open up discussion and competition, at least within the sole ruling party, the Cameroon People's Democratic Movement (CPDM). Early in 1986, the party held open elections for a number of local and provincial positions, in which for the first time multiple candidates were allowed to compete for the same office and voters to cast secret ballots. At the local level, 70 percent of the incumbent officials were removed from office. At the provincial level, almost 50 percent of the offices went to first-time candidates. 3 2 In addition, Biya's government extended clemency during the year to a number of political prisoners. However, there were unconfirmed reports that two of the fourteen members of the outlawed opposition party (the UPC) who were freed in August had been tortured while in detention. 33

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Despite the fact that freedom of expression has expanded widely since the days of President Ahidjo, the Biya regime still regularly practices censorship and occasionally arrests journalists. An issue of the prestigious independent daily Le Messager was not distributed after the government censor insisted that half ot its sixteen pages be removed. In addition, two Cameroon Times reporters were arrested at the Nigerian border and charged with carrying subversive material (an edition of the Times that was critical of the government). Later in the year, three broadcasters for the government-owned Cameroon radio were detained for several months after they allegedly made "derogatory remarks" about members of government.34 President Biya has liberalized the climate of Cameroonian politics: there was more political competition and press freedom and a better human rights environment in Cameroon in 1986 than there had been since the early years of independence. But this is still a far cry even from the semidemocracy of Senegal. Cameroon remains a one-party state by law; the Supreme Court rejected in June (for the second time) the UPC's bid to become a legal opposition party. In addition, the political system continues to be highly centralized, with the president (last elected in 1984 with 99.98 percent of the vote) appointing all governors, prefects, and cabinet ministers. Hence, it remains to be seen whether the modest democratic progress of 1986 represents the early stage of a transition to democracy or merely the limited opening of an enduring authoritarian regime. Still more disappointing has been the absence of democratic progress in two countries where regime change appeared to augur possible transitions to democracy: Liberia and Guinea. LIBERIA could be seen either as having aborted its transition to democracy or as merely caught in the temporary grip of a chaotic and unsustainable authoritarianism. Political developments in 1986 continued to reverberate with the echoes of two traumatic events late in 1985: the massive rigging of the October general elections, which returned President Samuel Doe and his NDPL to power despite the widespread and intense opposition of what was almost surely a sizeable majority of the electorate; and the narrow failure in November of a popular coup attempt, which brought brutal government reprisals. As the regime struggled to legitimate a democratic facade for its rule, which is narrowly based on support from the army and Doe's small Krahn tribe, opposition parties and organizations pressed on with their embattled struggle for democracy.

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Throughout the year, the mercurial Doe zigzagged between repression and halfhearted efforts at conciliation, torn between the need to assert control over a society disgusted with his rule and the need to broaden his political base and mollify persistent U.S. pressure for liberalization. With his opposition in jail and demoralized by the failed coup, Doe was inaugurated as president of the Second Liberian Republic on January 6 after five years of oppressive military rule under his leadership. His campaign for legitimacy began with an appeal for reconciliation, calling on the opposition to assume the few seats (about one-fifth of the total) in the new House and Senate they had "won" in the election, and to participate in his cabinet in junior positions. Although most opposition leaders rebuffed his appeal, reconciliation talks were held in May and June under the auspices of the Liberian Council of Churches. Amid these discussions, Doe announced a presidential pardon of political leaders imprisoned after the November coup attempt. Among them was the highly regarded former finance minister, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, a prominent member of the leading opposition party, the LAP, which is believed to have really won the presidential election. (A few m o n t h s earlier, the LAP presidential candidate, Jackson Doe, had been released from detention). However, the talks broke down over opposition demands for new general elections. 35 The breakdown of negotiations cleared the way for a new round of repression. In March, Doe had suppressed a massive rally called by a new "Grand Coalition" of the three leading opposition parties (the LAP, LUP, and UP) to support the demand of striking teachers for back pay and other popular grievances relating to the collapsing economic situation. In August, the leaders of the three parties were arrested for contempt of court for continuing to call their grouping the Grand Coalition. At the same time, a fourth opposition party, the UPP, denounced the Grand Coalition and declared its readiness to work with Doe and to participate in by-elections for six legislative seats in December. But, three days before the by-elections, which had already been boycotted by the Grand Coalition, the UPP withdrew, charging that the president's Elections Commission was planning to use improper methods in counting the ballots. 36 While some political pluralism and freedom survived, due in part to the stubbornness and courage of opposition parties and the press, the Doe regime's human rights performance remained poor. International human rights groups expressed "serious concern about attempts in Liberia to undermine the independence of the judicial process and the constitution," including routine denial of habeas

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corpus and other rights of due process. The response of Liberia's justice minister was to deride due process as "foreign to Africa." 3 7 Press freedom was under recurrent assault. When the Daily Observer, considered Liberia's best produced and most independent newspaper before it was banned in 1985, announced in March that it would resume publication, its offices were damaged in a suspicious fire. Shortly thereafter, the publisher of two other independent newspapers, the Suntimes and Footprints, refused to print them in apparent protest against government pressure. Doe himself repeatedly clashed with the Suntimes, warning its editor, "God gave you long life, but you are careless with it." 38 Doe has failed to cow the opposition with such tactics, much less to establish the legitimacy of his rule. However, he has been able to summon enough coercion to contain dissent, while also f e i g n i n g just e n o u g h conciliation to placate the R e a g a n administration, which resumed aid after holding it up earlier in the year. Thus, Liberia remained stuck with an inept dictatorship that could not consolidate itself but would not be moved to democracy. During 1986, GUINEA began to show signs of the entrenchment of a new authoritarian regime, albeit one considerably less bloody and monolithic than that of the totalitarian dictator Sékou Touré, who died unexpectedly in 1984 after twenty-six years of rule. By the close of its third year in power, the military regime of General Lansana Conté had made only limited progress toward broadening civil liberties and democratic political participation. On the positive side, civilian participation in government was expanded to nineteen of the thirty-five cabinet-level positions. The Conté government continued the process of developing a modern and independent judicial system. It also added a new emphasis on professionalism, as opposed to ideology, in the appointment of judges and lawyers, marked by the creation of an "independent" Guinea Bar Association to assist in the reform process. Despite restrictions on labor action, the Guinean National Labor Confederation (CNTG) completed its second year as a (somewhat) autonomous entity, and other voluntary associations proliferated in the human services and professional fields as well. Unprecedented concern was focused on the need for political decentralization, to manage ethnic tensions and promote democratic participation. This was advanced with a major national conference in September and a new system of locally elected governing bodies at the village and city neighborhood levels. (The latter, however, would not replace the more powerful prefects, still appointed by the president.) Also, the ruling Military Committee

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for National Recovery (CMRN) continued to show a concern for human rights previously unseen in Guinea, as it criticized publicly some of its own lapses, permitted the free functioning of an Amnesty International local affiliate (one of the few in Africa), and so "raised public consciousness on human rights issues." All of this was a far cry from the "paralyzing fear" with which Guineans lived under Sékou Touré.39 However, the regime's performance was not without numerous antidemocratic features. The CMRN continued to rule by decree, and no progress was made toward any comprehensive plan for national elections and military withdrawal. The media remained tightly controlled and censored by the government, although "local news media were given greater latitude during 1986 to report on the progress or lack of progress in the Government's reform programs." 40 The most serious mark against the government's human rights record was its treatment of political prisoners arrested in connection with the July 1985 attempted coup by supporters and ethnic kinsmen of the late president (including Conté's former prime minister, Diarra Traore). Although difficult to confirm, several reports in 1986 indicated that Traore and a number of close associates and relatives of Touré's (all from his Malinké ethnic group) were executed without trial shortly after the attempted coup. 41 The detention of others implicated in the coup or the Touré regime remains shrouded in secrecy. Disenchantment has also developed over Conté's harsh economic adjustment measures, his dependence on French investment and security assistance, and his favoritism to his own Soussou ethnic group. These concerns notwithstanding, the speed with which Conté has trained and equipped a personal presidential guard is one of several indications that he intends to stay in power for some time. 42 ONE-PARTY, PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE REGIMES

Of the several African regimes that permit limited competition within the framework of a one-party system, the most important political developments in 1986 occurred in KENYA. There, the scope for political contestation and dissent narrowed significantly during the year as President Daniel arap Moi struggled to combat a dramatically growing popular opposition to his nine-year rule. The cutting edge of this opposition is an underground movement that calls itself Mwakenya, a Swahili acronym for the Patriotic Front for the Liberation of Kenya. Dedicated to exposing corruption and tribalism in the Moi regime, if not to actually overthrowing it,

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Mwakenya first came to widespread public attention in March 1986, when the government announced the arrests of several lecturers and dissidents. Mwakenya's principal activity to date has been the distribution of what the government terms a "seditious and subversive" publication, the pamphlet Mpatanishsi (Swahili for "arbiter"). However, members have also been arrested for sabotaging rail lines and telephone wires in what some defendants openly termed "guerrilla warfare" against the government. 43 Initially, the Moi government tried to deal with Mwakenya by rallying public support against it. Moi attempted to play on popular sentiments against intellectuals by labeling Mwakenya's leaders as educated malcontents of a particular ethnic group (the Kikuyu) "who were out to disrupt the peace and stability of the country." There followed a series of well-publicized arrests, running into the hundreds by the end of the year. But the strategy backfired. The publicity testified to the breadth of the movement (with significant support among farmers and the country's influential middle class) rather than the strength of the government. And "the scope of the movement caused the government to place large amounts of discretionary power in the hands of the secret police, known as the Special Branch, which served only to alienate Kenyans and rally support for the dissidents." 44 As public sympathy for Mwakenya grew, the government changed course and ordered an immediate end to public discussion of the movement in early June. By then, however, the movement was already estimated to have hundreds of thousands of sympathizers by a Western diplomat who labeled it "the first truly national resistance movement" since independence. 45 With the crackdown on political opposition came a deterioration in the human rights situation. Amnesty International reported that prisoners of conscience had been tortured and detained indefinitely without charge or trial, and that those tried in court had no lawyer to defend them. It further found that senior government and law officers condoned the abuse of crucial legal and constitutional safeguards for political prisoners, undermining the rule of law in Kenya. 46 Apart from (but perhaps not unrelated to) the Mwakenya challenge, Moi precipitated another controversy in mid-August when his ruling Kenya African National Union (KANU) announced the elimination of the secret ballot for upcoming regional primary elections, with the further provision that candidates receiving 70 percent of the vote would stand unopposed in the general elections. The move assured complete top-down control over electoral competition, since "no Kenyan would dare to publicly contravene the

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stated will of the party." 4 7 It was sharply condemned by Kenya's religious leaders, and by such secular groups as the Law Society of Kenya. But Moi was undeterred, and proceeded to further entrench his personal dominance over the government. In November, he officially declared that the party, already firmly under his control, superseded the parliament in authority, and transformed the crucial positions of attorney-general and controller-general from tenured offices to political appointments under direct presidential control. By this means, two of the most important institutional checks against corruption and abuse of power (weak as they had become in practice) were dispensed with. 48 As he has deepened his authoritarian control of political life, Moi has continued his conspicuous acquisition of personal wealth, building an economic empire of vast fortune. His business interests are reported to include $100 million worth of prime real estate in Nairobi, a transport corporation, the oil company (Kobil) that bought out Mobil's interests in Kenya, and a cinema chain with monopoly control over movie distribution in Kenya. Moi's friends and clients have also amassed fortunes from their political jobs and connections. This escalating greed—along with the increasingly arbitrary and oppressive character of Moi's rule and the growing economic p r o b l e m s of unemployment and rural and urban landlessness— threaten "Kenya's tradition of stability . . . as never before." 4 9 As the decay and repression deepen, so does the prospect that change will come not through gradual political liberalization, but rather through abrupt and violent military intervention. None of the other partially competitive, one-party regimes experienced the kind of political crisis and authoritarian regress that Kenya did in 1986, but neither did they register significant democratic progress. In the IVORY C O A S T , the octogenarian President Félix Houphouët-Boigny continued to dominate political life as he has in the previous twenty-five years. Despite recent moves to widen political participation, particularly in choosing members of the National Assembly, Houphouët-Boigny's personal control over the government continues supreme. In recent years, questions of political liberalization have become intertwined with the effort to establish a clear line of succession to the presidency. In late 1985, Houphouët-Boigny further complicated these issues by eliminating the never-occupied post of vice-president, leaving a number of lesser political figures to maneuver for position in the eventual succession. As long as Houphouët-Boigny lives, it seems clear that the

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country's human rights record will remain generally positive. The worst violations of human rights in the Ivory Coast in the past twenty-five years have involved the use of force to break up demonstrations. There are no known cases of political prisoners, political executions, or disappearances. The government generally does not tolerate direct criticism from the state-run media, nor does it permit the existence of political party's beyond HouphouëtBoigny's Parti démocratique de la Côte d'Ivoire (PDCI). However, there is a limited range of free expression, and—in keeping with the laissez-faire economic system—there is not the kind of ideological conformity or climate of fear that prevails in many other one-party states. Despite the National Assembly's constitutional role as a policy-making body, political control remains firmly in the hands of the president, since the Assembly has yet to oppose any of his initiatives. 5 0 Although there is little organized opposition to the president within the country, a number of potential political leaders remain in self-imposed exile outside the country. These figures are critical of the government's "economic miracle" and demand the creation of a multiparty system. 5 1 However, Houphouët-Boigny's seemingly unshakable political preeminence figures to ensure the stability of the system for the remainder of his life. Only after the struggle for succession is settled will it be clear whether a transition to a multiparty system, or even the maintenance of the current limited authoritarianism, will be possible. In TANZANIA, the voluntary resignation of President Julius Nyerere in 1985 has so far done little to reduce the monopoly over political life exercised by the sole political party, Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), of which Nyrere remains chairman. President Ali Hassan Mwinyi made some effort in 1986 to encourage reform by calling for increased public scrutiny of corrupt government officials. To that end, he gave the state-run media increased latitude in criticizing the government on issues that were officially slated for public examination and reform. But restrictions on independent reporting, and on public speech and association, remain substantial. Most of the news media are organs of the one-party state, as is the sole labor union, Juwata, which effectively lacks the right to s t r i k e . 5 2 This centralized political control was manifested in stunning fashion in the July sugar riots at Kilombero. In response to an illegal strike by sugar workers, government troops opened fire on a crowd of 500 people, killing three and wounding twenty. The attack was the first of its kind in Tanzanian labor history and drew widespread criticism in Tanzania and abroad. 5 3

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At the level of official politics, voters were able to choose from among a number of CCM candidates in the 1985 parliamentary elections, but candidates are selected from above by the party hierarchy, issues are not to be discussed, and a quarter of the MPs are appointed. During 1986, a record number of misconduct allegations were filed for those elections. While the government has tolerated open distribution of leaflets calling for a multiparty system, the CCM retains tight control over political expression and, through its intricate system of local control and surveillance, has the capacity to interfere with the personal lives of Tanzanians. Although ZAMBIA remains an authoritarian one-party state under the continuing personal dominance of its first president, Kenneth Kaunda, it does manifest somewhat greater political freedom. Candidates for political office at any level must be members of the sole political party, the United National Independence Party (UNIP), but there is strong competition for parliamentary seats every five years (most recently in 1983), and many incumbents are defeated. Under the state of emergency in effect since independence in 1964, the president has broad power to detain or restrict the movement of persons, and security officials have broad powers of search and arrest. In addition, there have been credible reports of torture of detainees during interrogation. But the judiciary remains substantially independent of executive branch influence, and while the president can incarcerate detainees indefinitely irrespective of judicial rulings, "in practice, . . . detainees are almost always released if the court finds in their favor." 54 The major news media are state controlled, and criticism of the president, the one-party state, and the national philosophy are prohibited. However, the press regularly reports criticism of government activities, and academic freedom continues to be highly respected. In the future, pressure for more rigid authoritarian control may be generated by popular protest against the austerity measures arising from the country's grave economic circumstances, by the alarming incidence of violent urban crime, or by South African military pressure on antiapartheid groups based in Zambia. (A South African air strike against Zambia on May 19 was followed by widespread detentions of suspected spies.) As in the Ivory Coast and elsewhere, any significant democratic progress will probably have to await the aging dictator's departure from the scene. Like Tanzania, SIERRA LEONE has so far failed to realize the opportunity for democratic progress presented by the voluntary

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resignation in 1985 of its long-time president, Siaka Stevens. But like Zambia, and perhaps even more so, Sierra Leone has managed to preserve some modest degree of personal and political freedom, owing in part to the general independence of the judiciary. Although the military plays a major role in the structure of power, there were no reports of major human rights abuses during 1986. In practice, there is considerable press and academic freedom, despite some selfcensorship. While rights of assembly and association are not permitted to challenge in any way the sole political party, the All Peoples' Congress (APC), trade unions are normally permitted to organize, negotiate, strike, and confederate. Although the 1978 constitution explicitly establishes the APC as the sole legal party, there is e l e c t o r a l c o m p e t i t i o n w i t h i n it. Competitive parliamentary elections were conducted in May 1986, with as many as five candidates (all sanctioned by the party) permitted to run in each constituency. 55 The 1986 parliamentary elections were to have enabled Stevens's handpicked successor, Major General Joseph Saidu Momoh, to purge old guard officials and launch the post-Stevens era of Sierra Leonian politics. The elections were remarkably free of violence, and Momoh took the unprecedented step of disqualifying a number of incumbent candidates, including a close personal friend of his, on grounds of unfair campaigning. 5 6 Still more significantly, over half of the incumbent members of Parliament were defeated, including a number of cabinet officers. 5 7 But Stevens's heavy involvement tainted the contest. The former president chaired the APC committee that reviewed the candidates, and he packed it with his close associates. This cast the legitimacy of the entire election, as well as the authority of President Momoh, in doubt. 5 8 More generally, Momoh's efforts to restore confidence in government and unburden the economy from the well-entrenched graft and mismanagment of the Stevens era are greatly complicated by Stevens's continuing influence over day-to-day affairs as party chairman. 5 9 If Sierra Leone is to develop beyond Stevens's legacy of corrupt mismanagement and centralized political control by a small elite, Momoh must free himself from the influence of the former president. That in itself, however, will be no guarantee of democratization. A sixth country that may be classified among the African authoritarian regimes with limited competition is the strategic island nation of M A D A G A S C A R . Unlike the previous five, Madagascar permits multiple political parties, seven in all, to

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contest actively for power in local, regional, and national elections. Four parties won seats in the most recent (1983) elections for the National P o p u l a r A s s e m b l y , with President Didier Ratsiraka's ruling A R E M A party taking the dominant share (85 percent). However, all seven parties are members of the National Front for the Defense of the Revolution, and no other parties are allowed to operate. This gives M a d a g a s c a r , in practice, about the level of political freedom to be found in Zambia or Sierra Leone. 6 0 Within the political boundaries of the National Front, there exists a range of ideological and policy views, from moderate and pro-Western to p r o - S o v i e t . (Such left-right ideological c l e a v a g e also exists, perhaps m o r e significantly, within the ruling party). Moreover, " v i g o r o u s d e b a t e in the 1 9 8 5 - 8 6 National P o p u l a r A s s e m b l y sessions, negative votes by opposition parties, and an unprecedented vote against a presidential p r o p o s a l . . . provide evidence that the Assembly is becoming less of a 'rubber stamp' organization." 6 1 The judiciary seems to function independently of the executive. There is limited freedom to criticize government officials and policies, but direct criticism of the president or the "socialist revolution" is not tolerated, the press is formally censored, and rights of assembly and association are substantially restricted. There is some evidence of human rights violations by the state secret police, and also suspicion of deliberate sabotage in a M a y 1986 plane crash that killed the d e f e n s e m i n i s t e r and other high military officials who were identified with the p r o - W e s t e r n A R E M A faction o p p o s e d to President Ratsiraka's pro-Soviet tilt. An i n d e p e n d e n t analysis suggests that the only coherent opposition in the country comes from the various Christian congregations, which have criticized the government on several occasions and have also been the target of apparent political killings. 6 2

APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA T h e prospects for a peaceful and democratic transition to black majority rule in S O U T H A F R I C A receded sharply in 1986, as polarization deepened both between and within racial communities, and new forms of popular mobilization against apartheid withered under the crushing repression of an increasingly militarized South African state. South Africa retained a limited authoritarianism. W i t h i n the minority white c o m m u n i t y in particular, opposition parties and human rights organizations continued (within limits) to challenge the apartheid system, and the press continued to criticize

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racist policies and call for reform. A system of electoral competition remained in place for whites, along with some very limited legal and constitutional checks on executive powers. In a few significant cases, the courts released some political detainees, and, in Natal Province, overturned repressive press curbs. 6 3 But these pockets of pluralism and dissent came under intense pressure in 1986, and legal protections were neutralized by sweeping emergency provisions. The process of limited reform continued in 1986. In April, Parliament repealed the "influx control" or "pass" laws, which severely restricted black rights from living in urban areas and moving freely about the country. Still, a network of other laws and sanctions, as well as acute shortages of urban housing, promised continuing formidable obstacles to black freedom of movement and settlement. Parliament also passed a law allowing, for the first time, freehold land ownership by South African blacks. But the Group Areas Act remained in place as a cornerstone of the apartheid system, setting aside separate areas of residence for the different races, with grossly unequal access to education, health care, electricity, water, sewage, paved roads, and other services and amenities. T h e framework of "petty apartheid" continued to crumble as the evolution of greater local autonomy and choice opened a wider and wider range of public facilities and private establishments to all races. Even so, the ruling National Party reiterated again its longstanding commitment to explicitly segregated housing and schools. The recently established tricameral Parliament continued to function, with separate (but much weaker) houses for the nation's 2.8 million "coloured" (or mixed race) and 9 0 0 , 0 0 0 Asian South Africans. National p o w e r r e m a i n e d concentrated in the hands of the five million whites (some 16 percent of the population), while blacks—who constitute 72 percent of the population—were entirely excluded. 64 In short, new installments in the strategy of piecemeal reform did little to alter South Africa's unique status as the only authoritarian regime in the world that is predicated on the institutionalization of racial domination and discrimination. Since the 1960s, roughly a third of South Africa's 24 million blacks have been legally alienated from their own country by virtue of what the government characterizes as their "citizenship" in one of four socalled independent homelands (Transkei, Ciskei, Bophuthatswana, and Venda). In 1986, the newly adopted Restoration of Citizenship Act was proclaimed by the minister of home affairs as inapplicable to m o s t of t h e s e d e n a t i o n a l i z e d citizens. Black political participation remains confined to the tightly controlled urban

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councils of the segregated black "townships" and the heavily manipulated governments of the ten tribal "homelands." As black mobilization for political freedom has escalated, South Africa's human rights situation has continued to deteriorate. During 1986, the numbers of political prisoners and deaths from political violence and state repression reached unprecedented levels. The year began with a state of emergency that had been in effect in certain specified "unrest areas" since July 1985, giving the police and military extraordinary powers of arrest and detention. The emergency had been declared to deal with a new wave of black mobilization that began in September 1984. Several issues had converged then to ignite the most serious episode of racial unrest since World W a r II: black student unrest over educational grievances, discontent in the townships over rent increases and other social and economic hardships, and black opposition to the new c o n s t i t u t i o n with its t r i c a m e r a l P a r l i a m e n t . 6 5 This new mobilization was fostered and organized by the United Democratic Front (UDF), a broad umbrella association of over 800 affiliated community groups, church and civic organizations, and labor unions, founded in August 1983 to oppose the new constitution. Although the UDF shares the basic objectives of the banned African National Congress (ANC), which advocates the violent overthrow of the apartheid regime, most of its member organizations and leaders advocate nonviolent change. The lifting of the partial state of emergency in March 1986 unleashed an outpouring of new protest activity by the UDF, its affiliates, and various other black groups, especially youth groups. "They turned funerals into political theater, claimed the townships as theirs, and openly set up people's parks, people's courts and 'liberated zones' in the townships." 6 6 As the government effectively lost control of many of the townships, the UDF affiliates grew stronger, deepening their organization of the black community down to street committees, while militant students were enforcing boycotts of classes and white-owned stores. However, this brief flowering of black protest and local control was destined to be no more than "a kind of Prague Spring." 67 On June 12, the South African government imposed a new and much more devastating state of emergency, which was to remain in effect across the entire country throughout the rest of the year. This second emergency was declared just four days before the tenth anniversary of the Soweto uprising to preempt plans by apartheid opponents for widespread protests (including a three-day general strike by the main black trade union confederations) to commemorate that event. 68

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The emergency again gave security officials sweeping powers of arbitrary detention. Within a matter of days, thousands of antiapartheid activists and black community leaders were detained, including several entire church congregations numbering in the hundreds. By the end of the year, an estimated 20,000 persons had been detained, more than half without any criminal charge; 10,000 of these were believed to still be in detention at the end of the year. The detained were primarily black but included people of all races. Among them were prominent political figures, community activists, lawyers, churchmen, trade union officials, and journalists. They also included many children, as young as eleven and twelve, and grassroots activists in their seventies. The U D F was a particular target. Human rights groups estimated that some 70 percent of those detained were UDF sympathizers, and virtually the entire top national and regional leadership of the Front was cither imprisoned or forced into hiding. 69 Two new provisions enacted in June (amendments to the Public Safety and Internal Security Acts) conferred on the security police new powers to hold detainees for up to 180 days without charge, and empowered the minister of law and order to invoke emergency powers in places he designates as "unrest areas." Although it had yet to be used since the emergency remained in effect, this provision appeared to institutionalize a virtually permanent state of emergency. 70 The new emergency also brought an escalation in grave human rights abuses. Human rights groups declared the number of "disappeared" persons at 12,000 or more in the weeks following the declaration of the emergency because the government would not release the names of detained persons for more than two months. Even by the end of the year, not all the missing persons had been accounted for. There was substantial evidence that many of the detainees were subjected to torture, "including applications of electric shocks to hands, feet, and genitals." 7 1 Medical evidence gathered by the Detainee Parents' Support Committee indicated that 83 percent showed signs of physical abuse. Although most instances appeared to occur in police hands during and immediately following arrest, there was growing evidence of direct involvement of military personnel in the interrogation and abuse of political detainees. Torture has been an intractable and growing problem in South Africa for some time now, especially as emergency regulations confer on the police and military effective immunity against civil or criminal prosecution for their actions. 72 The wave of repression was extended in December to the foreign

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and domestic media. Freedom of speech and press had long been seriously circumscribed by several acts of Parliament, which make "subversive statements" (encouraging strikes, boycotts, disinvestment, etc.) a criminal offense. Still, the largely white-owned press continued to report on political protest and to criticize the government, at times vigorously, for its policies and principles. The December press restrictions were unprecedented. They made it a criminal offense to publish material on political unrest, detention cases, boycotts, protest meetings, and other political activities without prior government clearance. These restrictions greatly hampered domestic and foreign reporting (already constrained by the emergency provisions). Over the course of the year, the government also retaliated against specific publications and journalists. In June, it confiscated an entire edition of the independent Weekly Mail and twice seized copies of the Sowetan, the country's largest black daily. Several foreign journalists were expelled during the year. "In this atmosphere, self-censorship is rife, and m a n y newspaper editors . . . have had to surrender ultimate editing responsibility to their lawyers." 7 3 The second state of emergency did succeed in reducing the anomic street violence of young black militants, who had become renowned for placing the deadly "necklace" of burning tires around suspected government collaborators in the townships, but it did not restore peace in any real sense. Violence by the regime continued, not only through the medium of military and police action, but through covert support of black vigilante groups, which appeared to supersede an earlier growing reliance on clandestine death squads in some areas. The right-wing vigilante groups were able to operate where white security patrols could not, and often with devastating effect. Mobilizing latent community resentment of the militant youths, and benefiting from active and passive police complicity, the vigilantes targeted their violence on the U D F and other opponents of apartheid and homeland rule. Many of the latter were assassinated and others forced to flee in a climate of vigilante terror and fear. 7 4 At the same time, the ANC also escalated its campaign of revolutionary, terrorist violence against the apartheid state. By the end of November, 1,263 people had died in various incidents of political violence and unrest during 1986, according to the respected South African Institute of Race Relations. This was three times the number of the previous year. 7 5 The violent suppression of black protest did not bring any lessening of black resistance. Rather, it appeared to increase the legitimacy among blacks of the ANC's revolutionary struggle for

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majority rule. As Kenneth Grundy has written, "Moderation and tolerance are in retreat. When people expect violence to 'settle' conflicts, then they prepare for violence." 76 Among whites, the process of reaction and polarization also deepened. Two new rightwing parties, the Conservative Party (CP) and the Herstigte Nasionale Party (HNP) performed well in by-elections on a militant platform of resistance to any dismantling of the structures of apartheid. Some neo-Nazi mobilization among whites was also evident outside the party system. At the same time, military influence in national decision-making appeared to be increasing s i g n i f i c a n t l y . 7 7 This was reflected, in part, in the increasing incidence of cross-border raids on guerrilla bases in front-line states. All of these trends augured poorly for the prospect of peaceful and democratic accommodation of South Airica's tragic divisions. LIMITED AUTHORITARIAN

REGIMES

Although they vary considerably in their level of repression, thirteen states are classified as "limited authoritarian regimes" because they dominate their societies less thoroughly and brutally than absolutist regimes. While some of these regimes repress political opposition quite harshly, most display some degree of pluralism in associational life and tolerance for the expression of critical views. A number of these regimes also tolerate limited judicial autonomy and due process. RWANDA and BURUNDI have, in recent years, been examples of such limited judicial independence, partial toleration of dissent, and very limited electoral contestation. However, in the past year both regimes ignored legal safeguards in persecuting religious groups deemed to threaten state authority. Burundi continued its practice of expelling missionaries, arresting priests, and persecuting church officials, while the Rwandan government sentenced 295 members of religious sects to harsh prison terms for alleged "disobedience to legal authority." 78 The one-party regimes of MALI and CHAD lack a tradition of even limited dissent or pluralism. The Malian regime in 1986 took advantage of the wave of patriotism stemming from its late-1985 border conflict with Burkina Faso to arrest leaders from both the teachers union and resurgent student groups, both of which have opposed the government's IMF-sponsored economic reforms. 79 The

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government of Chad, long fragmented by protracted civil war, was able to incorporate some elements of the opposition into its national reconciliation campaign, but the continued occupation of northern Chad by Libyan forces provided a convenient excuse for authoritarian constraints. The single-party state of GABON continued to be dominated by President Omar Bongo, who has ruled for twenty years, recently with somewhat greater tolerance and restraint. The ministates of CAPE VERDE, the COMOROS, DJIBOUTI, and the SEYCHELLES are also one-party regimes that ban political opposition and restrict civil liberties. However, political competition a n d personal freedom are somewhat greater in Djibouti and Cape Verde than in the Seychelles and the Comoros. The kingdom of SWAZILAND, which has long enjoyed some limitations on monarchical authority through a complex system of traditional obligations and rights, passed through a tense period of political uncertainty and infighting with the coronation of a new king early in the year. In reshuffling the government and arresting some officials, the new monarch appears to have taken steps to improve protections for due process.80 A partial resurrection of monarchical authority occurred in LESOTHO during 1986, following the military coup of January 20 that ended the 20-year-old authoritarian regime of Chief Leabua Jonathan. The coup was precipitated not only by growing discontent with Chief Jonathan's authoritarian one-party system, but also by escalating eco-nomic and military pressure from South Africa, which sought to force Lesotho to drive ANC guerrillas from its territory. The new military regime of General J. M. Lekhanya formally i n v e s t e d executive and legislative a u t h o r i t y in Moshoeshoe II, the previously powerless King of Lesotho. A Military Council led by General Lekhanya rules with the King by decree. The new government pledged itself to national reconciliation after the sometimes divisive and brutal rule of Chief Jonathan. It declared a general amnesty for all those driven out of the country by the former regime and was generally lenient in its treatment of former government officials, although there were a few executions. The new government imposes de facto restrictions on political expression, which have yet to be tested. Apart from the e s t a b l i s h m e n t of "Village D e v e l o p m e n t Committees," embryonic local government structures, it has made no statement

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about a return to civilian rule or a timetable for elections of any kind. 8 1 Despite its recent success in restoring order to GHANA, the populist regime of Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings tightened its control over the nation in 1986. In the first half of the year, the government uncovered three separate coup attempts, some of which involved members of the armed forces. A number of alleged coup plotters were arrested and held without charge, and at least seven were executed. 8 2 Rawlings also faced mounting opposition to his IMF-sponsored economic austerity program. The 50 percent devaluation of the national currency nearly precipitated a nationwide strike in April. Four leftist leaders were arrested for stirring up labor unrest in connection v/ith the strike. As a result of considerable government pressure, the last independent newspaper in Ghana, the Free Press, closed its doors in late April. The government had reportedly made it extremely difficult for the paper to purchase newsprint and arrested its research editor without charge a week before the shutdown. The voluntary closing of the Free Press came several months after the government banned the Catholic Standard, an independent religious weekly that had been critical of Rawlings's human rights record. 83 The government's rcspect for an independent judiciary continued to deteriorate in 1986, as Rawlings summarily dismissed sixteen judges in April for committing "various forms of malfeasance." 8 4 Although he has made some progress recently in restructuring Ghana's economy, which had been devastated by twenty-five years of plunder and misrule, Rawlings had yet to make signficant progress toward redemocratization as his fifth year in power drew to a close. For a third year, his government-appointed National Committee for Democracy deliberated. But the regime failed to produce any workable ideas in its search for a democratic alternative to the multiparty system that has failed three times previously. Moreover, Rawlings's own legitimacy was eroding among diverse elements of the political spectrum fed up with his regime's continuing authoritarianism, " e s p e c i a l l y the military's intermittent brutalization of civilians and the use of detention to silence political foes." 8 5 Consciously modeled on the Rawlings experiment in Ghana, the populist regime of Captain Thomas Sankara in BURKINA FASO also maintained its authoritarian character. However, it did take minor steps toward reconciliation with opposition groups. In August,

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Sankara announced the release of almost all of the nation's political prisoners, some of whom had been held without charge for almost a year in connection with a 1985 act of sabotage against the military. In October, the government released several more political prisoners, including a key labor leader with whom Sankara had clashed in 1985. Political control remains firmly in the hands of President Sankara and his network of Committees for the Defense of the Revolution, which have been accused of serving as surveillance mechanisms for the government. Sankara has given no hint of plans to hold elections or broaden civilian rule. 86 ABSOLUTIST DICTATORSHIPS

Although the dividing line is not a neat one, ten authoritarian regimes in Africa (in addition to the four Marxist dictatorships discussed later in this chapter) may be designated "absolutist" because of the extreme degree to which they concentrate and abuse political power in the absence of effective constitutional checks. A common feature of these regimes is the complete domination of political life by a repressive, personalistic and self-glorifying dictator: Mobutu Sese Seko in Zaire; Gnassingbe Eyadema in Togo; H. Kamuzu Banda in Malawi; Mathieu Kerekou in Benin; General Seyni Kountché in Niger; Mohammed Siad Barre in Somalia; General André Kolingba in the Central African Republic; Teodoro Obiang Nguema in Equatorial Guinea; and Joâo Bernardo Vieira in Guinea-Bissau. (The tiny island nation of Sâo Tomé and Principe may also be classed in this group, as its Marxist emphasis has recently diminished.) In all of these regimes, the absolute ruler controls executive, legislative, and, in effect, judicial power. Representative institutions are absent or meaningless. Freedom of assembly and political organization is denied. Opposition to the military or one-party government is forbidden and may be brutally repressed. Prominent opponents may be assassinated, executed, or (as in the case of Malawi) abducted from exile and imprisoned for life. Criticism of the absolute ruler or his regime is punished with harassment, imprisonment, and torture. The judiciary is more or less thoroughly lacking in autonomy, and the rule of law is very weak or nil. Security services have unlimited powers of search, arrest, and detention. All media are government-owned or closely controlled, and typically they are rigidly censored. Independent labor unions and other associations with potential political weight are barred. Strikes are illegal. Widespread corruption, especially at the top

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levels of government, aggravates tremendous social inequality. Security assistance from countries such as France, Israel, and South Africa helps to protect some absolute dictators from violent overthrow. The quintessential—and (because of its size) most important— case of such absolutist dictatorship remains ZAIRE. Despite transparent efforts to shield himself from responsibility for the extraordinary brutality, corruption, and abusiveness of his rule, President Mobutu continued in 1986 to run the country as his personal fiefdom, much as he has for the past twenty-one years. Indeed, during the year the shrewd dictator may have even further strengthened his stranglehold on political and economic power in Zaire. The political and military opposition remains enfeebled and coopted. Despite the frequent efforts of international human rights organizations to expose the extent and regularity of political killings, torture, arbitrary arrests, and detention without trial in Zaire, Mobutu continued to ignore his own rhetorical proclamations as he ruthlessly silenced dissent. During 1986, Amnesty International again attempted to raise international consciousness about the excesses of the Mobutu regime. In scorching and extensively documented reports, the international human rights organization presented evidence of widespread and horrendous violations of human rights. The Amnesty reports contend, as have many others previously, that arbitrary arrests and extrajudicial executions are commonplace in Zaire, prison conditions inhumane, and torture "endemic." Not all political detainees are tortured; former government ministers and legislators who now constitute the leadership of the outlawed UDPS (Union pour la démocratie et le progrès social) have so far enjoyed apparent immunity from torture because of their international prominence. But "most suspected government opponents who are detained are subjected to routine beatings and often to torture," including severe beatings, whippings, electric shocks, starvation, and rape. 87 The UDPS has published a list of political prisoners who have allegedly been killed while under detention. 88 Much of the recent repression has been directed at the UDPS. Late in 1985, government troops rounded up nearly 100 UDPS supporters in the party's home province of Kasai Oriental; by the end of 1986, most continued to be held without trial. In January 1986, Mobutu sentenced two UDPS officials to eighteen months in prison for "insulting the president." In June, he launched a new wave of repression against the UDPS leadership after it reportedly refused

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to accept his call for unification with his Mouvement populaire de la révolution (MPR), the country's sole legal party. Mobutu sentenced seven leading UDPS officials to internal exile in remote villages throughout the country when, in the wake of a student protest, he accused them of inciting at the University of Kinshasa, government civil servants criticized the personality cult around Mobutu and called for legalization of the UDPS. Numerous other UDPS officials remain in detention around the country. 89 Some improvement in the human rights situation came in eastern Zaire with the waning of the twenty-year-old insurgency and the negotiation in February of a peaceful surrender of 1,500 rebel soldiers and their families. But this occurred only after a scorched earth policy against the rebels in Kivu Province, which included arbitrary arrest of suspected guerrillas, seizure of homes and hospitals, torture of prisoners, and summary executions. The surrender dealt a crucial blow to the morale of the military opposition. 9 0 Other outspoken elements of society, including the press and the church, also came under attack. Activities by the Jehovah's Witnesses and several other small religious groups were banned, and a Catholic press in Kinshasa was temporarily closed when publications on liberation theology were discovered in its offices. Although Mobutu publicly acknowledged the truth of some Amnesty International findings and appointed a commission to investigate, he sought mainly to depict them as military abuses and showed no real sign of altering the repressive and absolutist nature of his rule. Little change was evident during 1986 in the other non-Marxist absolutist regimes. In TOGO, despite some sensitivity to international concerns, the Eyadema regime continued to abuse human rights. In a detailed report in May 1986, Amnesty International questioned the sincerity of Eyadema's National Commission of Inquiry to investigate torture and criticized the government for failing to release the commission's full report. The Amnesty report also noted evidence it had received during 1986 "suggesting that political arrests are still being made in Togo, that prisoners continue to be tortured, including by electric shocks, and that all prisoners risk ill-treatment or torture." 91 With the violent suppression of yet another attempted coup in September and the capture and sentencing of those allegedly responsible for bomb explosions and attempts in late 1985 and July 1986, Eyadema's grip on power appeared stronger than ever as he prepared to celebrate the twentieth anniversary of his seizure of power.

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N e w h u m a n rights abuses were evident elsewhere as well. In B E N I N , President M a t h i e u Kerekou c o n t i n u e d to present an apprehensive posture to potential opposition in the wake of his brutal suppression of student demonstrations in April and May 1985, his ongoing implementation of an IMF-inspired austerity program, and his steady conversion from Marxist leanings toward the United States and France. Attempting to prevent southern-based opposition from organizing, Kerekou detained a number of student radicals and young army officers while placing many m o r e under surveillance. Dozens of political prisoners were held without charge or trial and new reports of torture surfaced. 9 2 In EQUATORIAL GUINEA, a failed coup attempt in July brought the arrest of over one hundred people, fifteen of w h o m were tried by military tribunal and at least three of w h o m were tortured. 9 3 In GUINEA-BISSAU, six of the fifty people arrested in October 1985 for plotting to oust President Vieira were tried for treason and executed in July, while five others mysteriously died in prison. Incidents of religious persecution and suppression of the press also marked the continuing repressive nature of the regime. 9 4 Some continued improvement in the human rights situation in the CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC was apparent in 1986, following the release in December 1985 of eighty-nine political prisoners. In addition, the process of civilianization of government continued with the endorsement of a new constitution establishing a single political party and the election of General Kolingba as president in a November referendum. But Kolingba made it clear that he has "no intention of returning his country to the turbulent multiparty e x p e r i e n c e of the pre-1981 r e g i m e . " 9 5 Similarly, in N I G E R the h u m a n rights situation i m p r o v e d marginally in 1986 and the g o v e r n m e n t p r o c e e d e d with a c a u t i o u s e x p a n s i o n of civilian authority, but President Kountche stressed that the armed forces w o u l d continue to play the preponderant role in the country's political life.

MARXIST DICTATORSHIPS Like the nonideological absolutist regimes, the Marxist dictatorships tolerate no opposition, dissent, or autonomous participation and brutally repress any resistance or independent organization. But their ideological mission also motivates them to d o m i n a t e the media, labor, education, production, and all other realms of social

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and economic life more thoroughly than other absolutisms. However, the three major Afro-Marxist regimes—Ethiopia, Angola, and Mozambique—all continue to face armed insurgencies or separatist movements that have frustrated the consolidation of totalitarian control throughout their territories. During 1986, their struggles against these armed opposition movements aggravated their notoriously poor human rights records. ETHIOPIA in 1986 remained the most rigidly absolutist and repressive of the Marxist regimes in Africa. Despite the promulgation of a new constitution in September, Chairman Mengistu Haile Mariam maintained his efforts to suppress separatist liberation movements and to consolidate the control of the Workers Party of Ethiopia over the nation as a whole. The military conflict between the government and a number of regional guerrilla movements precipitated more accounts of arbitrary detention, torture, and political killings by both the rebels and the government. In a grim, painstakingly researched report in June, Amnesty International expressed concern "about the imprisonment of several thousand suspected opponents of the government in Ethiopia, many of whom are believed to be prisoners of conscience," punished solely for their political opinions or religious beliefs. Some have been held since Mariam's military coordinating committee, known as the Derg, seized power in 1974. Most political prisoners have been detained without charge or trial, and many have been subjected to vicious torture and extrajudicial execution. Further evidence of abuse came in February, when prisoners released in a raid by rebels from the Tigre region related numerous tales of beatings and other forms of torture.96 Late in 1985, in response to widespread international protest, the Ethiopian government abandoned its policy of forced relocation of civilians in several rebel regions. However, the regime continued its controversial "villagization" program, designed to consolidate rural peasants into discrete centers of communal agriculture. The program has generated a number of unconfirmed reports of military abuses against peasants during the relocation process. 97 As in the past, the Mengistu regime used its local governmental units, the kebeles, to control the urban population, squelch dissent, and promulgate official policies. In September, the regime put forward a new constitution, which was hailed in official circles as providing extensive new regional autonomy. 98 The move seemed designed to undercut support for the separatist movements by establishing (at least superficially) a kind of federal structure.

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In both Angola and Mozambique, Marxist regimes struggled to maintain power in the face of growing and well-supplied insurgencies that have significantly destabilized both countries. As in Ethiopia, both the governments and the guerrillas have committed numerous excesses against combatants and civilians alike. In ANGOLA, President Eduardo dos Santos and the ruling Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) continued their struggle against Jonas Savimbi's National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) forces. As the insurgency wore on in 1986, reports indicated that the government continued to arbitrarily arrest suspected supporters of UNITA, and that both sides have, at times, wantonly killed both prisoners and civilians. At least in part as a result of the civil strife, political power in Angola continues to be heavily concentrated in the hands of MPLA leadership. Dissent and public expressions of opposition to the government remain firmly suppressed." In M O Z A M B I Q U E , the struggle against the South Africanbacked Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) continued to distract the FRELIMO government from the consolidation of its political system and the moderation of its brand of African Marxism. Amnesty International reported numerous accounts of brutality, torture, and arbitrary killings by both the government and the opposition. The R E N A M O forces, which appeared to enjoy tactical successes in 1986, were alleged to be especially brutal, maiming and disfiguring numerous suspected government sympathizers in the regions under rebel control. 1 0 0 Despite the need to devote most of its energies to the insurgency, the government continued to make incremental progress toward loosening the reigns of political control in 1986. During the past five years, the late President Samora Machel (who was killed in a still unexplained airplane crash in South Africa in October) had pursued an "offensive for legality," a campaign to promote legal due process for detainees and remove abusive government officials. In 1986, the government continued in this vein, permitting more widespread criticism of the government in the state-run press. However, the regime tended to limit discussion to policies that were already officially slated for reform. 1 0 1 The FRELIMO regime also took a marginal step toward opening the political structure when it held the first elections in ten years for local, district, and provincial party officers. Although the electoral process was tightly controlled by the party leadership, voters were given some degree of choice, since by law there were 20 percent more candidates than seats. 1 0 2

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In the CONGO, a more moderate Marxist regime under President Denis Sassou-Ngouesso was shaken by domestic opposition during the past year. Although many military units disobeyed the president, S a s s o u - N g u e s s o responded brutally to dissident movements, especially outlawed religious sects. Later in the year, he unexpectedly arrested a rival political leader from the south of the Congo, a region that has been politically underrepresented for almost two decades. 1 0 3 In general, the Congolese state continues to suppress the political rights and civil liberties of its people, but usually does not interfere in the personal affairs of those who refrain from expressing opposition to the government.

CONCLUSION

The year ended with little hope for immediate democratic progress in most of the continent. The near-term prospect for a transition to even partial democracy in any of the authoritarian regimes was slim, with the possiule exception of Uganda. Eventually, the death or retirement of long-time personal dictators might present an opportunity for a political opening. In the short run, however, the most that can be hoped for is a reduction or cessation of grave human rights abuses, an improvement in the climate for political dissent and criticism, and an expansion of the space for autonomous associations of all kinds. If the rule of law can be strengthened and democratic infrastructure fostered outside the narrow boundaries of the formal political arena, an important basis for future democratization can be laid. Subjecting arbitrary and absolute powers to judicial and constitutional checks may be a long way from achieving democratic control. But it can be a first step.

NOTES 1. U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1986 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1987), pp .203-206. 2. Africa Now (February 1986), p.24; Africa (February 1986), p.23. 3. New African (July 1986), pp.18-19; Africa News, June 2, 1986, p.14, Africa Report (September-October 1986), p.49. 4. Department of State, Country Reports, p.20. 5. John Holm, "Botswana: A Paternalistic Democracy," in Larry Diamond, Juan Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset, eds., Democracy in Developing Countries: Africa (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers,

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1988). 6. Ibid. 7. Africa News, May 19,1986, p.13. 8. Department of State, Country Reports, p.249. 9. Christian Coulon, "Senegal: The Development of the State and Democracy," in Diamond, Linz, and Lipset, eds., Democracy in Developing Countries: Africa. 10. Department of State, Country Reports, p.248. 11. Coulon, "Senegal," and Africa Confidential, April 9, 1986, p.5. 12. Masipula Sithole, "Zimbabwe in Search of a Stable Democracy," in Diamond, Linz, and Lipset, Democracy in Developing Countries: Africa. 13. Department of State, Country Reports, p.371. 14. Africa News, June 16, 1986, p.5, and September 1, 1986, p.13. 15. Bill Berkeley, "Zimbabwe's Tortured Path," The New Republic, February 16, 1987, p.22. (The author has written c n Zimbabwe for the Lawyers' Committee for Human Rights.) 16. Department of State, Country Reports, p.372. 17. Africa News, September 1, 1986, p.14. 18. Department of State, Country Reports, p.377. 19. Ibid., p.373. 20. Omari Kokole and Ali Mazrui, "Uganda: The Dual Polity and the Plural Society," in D i a m o n d , Linz, and Lipset, eds., Democracy in Developing Countries: Africa. 21. Department of State, Country Reports, p.347; Africa, July 1986, p.35, and September 1986, p.27; New African (November 1986), p . l l . 22. D e p a r t m e n t of State, Country Reports, p.344, 350; Africa Confidential, February 12, 1986, p.l. 23. Department of State, Country Reports, p. 344; Africa Confidential, (September 3,1986), p.8. 24. Department of State, Country Reports, p. 346; Africa Now (October 1986), p.14. 25. Africa (November 1986), p.19. 26. Department of State, Country Reports, p.348; New African (December 1986), p.21. 27. Department of State, Country Reports, p.344. 28. West Africa, April 14,1986, pp.768-769. 29. Department of State, Country Reports, pp.233-234. 30. West Africa, June 2, 1986, pp.1144-1146, June 9, 1986, pp.1196-1197, and June 16,1986, pp.1247,1250-1251. 31. Newswatch (Lagos), November 3 , 1 9 8 6 , pp.13-25, and November 10, 1986, pp.15-22; New African (February 1987), pp.13-15. 32. Tikum Mbah Azonga, "Cameroon in 1986: Four Years of Biya," West Africa, January 5, 1987, p. 13; Department of State, Country Reports, p.40. 33. Ibid., p.41. 34. Ibid., pp.42-43; West Africa, October 27,1986, p.2281. 35. Africa Now (June 1986), p. 28; Africa (June 1986), p.26; West Africa,

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June 23,1986, p. 1341, and July 14,1986, p.1458. 36. Eddie Momoh, "Liberia in 1986: What Democracy?" West Africa, January 5,1987, p.15. 37. West Africa, April 7, 1986, p.719, and November 17, 1986, p.2394; Africa News, April 7, 1986, p.5. 38. West Africa, May 26, 1986, p.1132; Africa Report (May-June 1986), p.47; Africa Now (June 1986), p.28. 39. Department of State, Country Reports, pp.133-137. 40. Ibid., p.135. 41. Africa Confidential, July 30, 1986, pp.5-6; Africa Report (JanuaryFebruary 1986), p.33; Department of State, Country Reports, p.133. 42. Africa Confidential, July 30, 1986, pp. 4-6. 43. Michael Maren, "Kenya: Hear No Evil," Africa Report (NovemberDecember 1986), p.68; Africa (August 1986), p. 35; Africa Now (September 1986), p.14. 44. Michael Maren, "Kenya: The Dissolution of Democracy," Current History 86, no. 520 (May 1987), p.211. 45. Maren, "Hear No Evil," p.68. 46. Amnesty International, Kenya: Torture, Political Detention and Unfair Trials (London: Amnesty International, 1987). 47. Maren, "Hear No Evil," p.71. 48. Maren, "The Dissolution of Democracy," p.212. 49. Ibid.; Africa Confidential, April 9, 1986, pp.2-3. 50. Department of State, Country Reports, pp.83-87. 51. "Ivory Coast: Cabinet Minuet," Africa Confidential, August 20, 1986, p.3. 52. Department of State, Country Reports, pp.329-330; New African (December 1986), p.43. 53. Ibid., pp.330-331. 54. Department of State, Country Reports, p.365. 55. Department of State, Country Reports, pp.261-264. 56. Africa Confidential, June 18, 1986, p.3; Africa Report (July-August 1986), p. 32; Africa News, June 16, 1986, p.12. 57. Department of State, Country Reports, p.264; Africa Confidential, June 18,1986, p.3. 58. Africa Confidential, June 18, 1986, p.3. 59. Larry James, "Sierra Leone: Momoh's New Order," Africa Report (July-August 1986), pp.32-33; Africa Confidential, June 18, 1986, p.3. 60. In his annual survey, Freedom in the World 1986-1987 (New York: Greenwood Press, 1987), Raymond D. Gastil rates all three countries a five on political rights and a five as well on civil liberties, on his twin seven-point scales. By contrast, the Marxist countries and absolutist dictatorships (see below) generally rate six or seven on each scale, while Botswana rates a two and three and Senegal a three and four. 61. Department of State, Country Reports, p.174. 62. Africa Confidential, November 26, 1986, p.7. 63. Department of State, Country Reports, pp.280, 282-283, 287.

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64. Ibid., pp.284, 289-292. 65. For further background, see Larry Diamond, "Sub-Saharan Africa," in Robert W e s s o n , ed., Democracy: A Worldwide Survey ( N e w Y o r k : Praeger Publishers, 1987), p.96. 66. K e n n e t h G r u n d y , "South Africa: C o e r c i o n and D e m a n d s for Change," Current History (May 1987), p.198. 67. Steven M u f s o n , "The Fall of the Front: End of the Beginning in South Africa," The New Republic, March 23, 1987, p.17. 68. A m n e s t y International, "South Africa: H u m a n Rights Violations Under the National State of Emergency," London, J u n e 27, 1986, p . l . 69. D e p a r t m e n t o f S t a t e , Country Reports, pp.280-281; Amnesty International, "Statement on the International Day of Solidarity with South African Political Prisoners, 10 October 1986," London, October 17, 1986, p p . l 2; Grundy, "South Africa," p.199; Africa Confidential, November 26, 1986, p.3. 70. Amnesty International, "Statement, October 10, 1986," pp.3-4. 71. Department of State, Country Reports, p.279. 72. Ibid., p. 279; Amnesty International, "Statement," p.3. 73. D e p a r t m e n t o f State, Country Reports, p.286; G r u n d y , "South Africa," pp.198-199; Africa Now (August 1986). 74. G r u n d y , "South Africa," p. 200; Africa Confidential, N o v e m b e r 26, 1986, p.3; Department of State, Country Reports, pp.276-277. 75. Department of State, Country Reports, p.276. 76. Grundy, "South Africa," p.l 97. 77. G r u n d y , "South Africa," p.224-225; Africa Confidential, November 26,1986, pp.1-2. 78. Department of State, Country Reports, pp.32, 35-36, 236, 238; Africa Confidential, August 20, 1986, p.8. 79. Africa Confidential, October 29, 1986, p.2. 80. D e p a r t m e n t o f State, Country Reports, p.318; Africa Confidential, November 1 2 , 1 9 8 6 , p. 7; Africa Now (June 1986), p.13. 81. D e p a r t m e n t of State, Country Reports, pp.154-159; New African (April 1986), p.19; Africa Now (October 1986), p.19. 82. Africa Confidential, May 21, 1986, p.8; Africa Report ( J u l y - A u g u s t 1986), pp.45-46. Reports, pp.128-129; Africa Now 83. D e p a r t m e n t o f State, Country (June 1986), p.29; New African (July 1986), p.17. 84. Department o f State, Country Reports, p.127. 85. Jon Kraus, "Ghana's Shift from Radical Populism," Current History (May 1987), p.228. 86. D e p a r t m e n t o f State, Country Reports, pp.26-29; Africa News, October 27, 1986, p.29. 87. A m n e s t y I n t e r n a t i o n a l , " T o r t u r e in Z a i r e : T h e P a t t e r n a n d Individual Cases," London, October 1986, pp.2-3. 88. D e p a r t m e n t o f State, Country Reports, p. 354; Africa Report ( M a y J u n e 1986), p.55. 89. D e p a r t m e n t o f State, Country Reports, p.360; Africa News, M a r c h 10, 1986, p.15; New African (May 1986), p.50, and (August 1986), pp.25-26;

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Africa p.16.

Confidential,

September 17, 1986, p.7; West Africa, January 5, 1987,

90. New African (May 1986), p.50; Department of State, Country Reports, p. 353; Africa Confidential, July 2, 1986, p.8. 91. Amnesty International, Togo: Political Imprisonment and Torture (London: Amnesty International Publications, 1986), p.2. 92. Africa Confidential, June 4, 1986, p.4; Africa Now (April 1986), p.46. 93. Department of State, Country Reports, p.96. 94. Ibid., p.140. 95. Ibid., p.59. 96. Amnesty International, "Ethiopia: Political Imprisonment and Torture," London, June 1986; Department of State, Country Reports, p.103; "Ethiopia: Hard Left in Tigray," Africa Confidential, April 7,1986, p.8. 97. Department of State, Country Reports, pp.105-106. 98. Ibid., p.109; Africa (June 1986), p.27. 99. Department of State, Country Reports, pp.6-9. 100. Ibid., pp.210-211; Africa (April 1986), p.35. 101. Department of State, Country Reports, pp.211-213. 102. Ibid., p.215; Africa (September 1986), p. 35. 103. Africa Confidential, January 15, 1986, p.5; Department of State, Country Reports, pp.77-78.

North Africa and the Near East GLENN E. PERRY There was not much change in the political complexion of North Africa and the Near East during 1986 and the first months of 1987. On the one hand, the Sudan held elections and formally joined the ranks of democratic nations, although a large part of the country was in revolt. On the other hand, Kuwait's experiment with a more or less freely elected parliament was terminated because of royal annoyance with its interference. Otherwise, not much was different. Israel remained dynamically democratic, at least for Israelis, although not for Arabs under Israeli rule. Turkish institutions seemed to evolve modestly. Iran, under the legally omnipotent Ayatullah Khomeini, had an active although undemocratic political life. Several states, including Jordan, Morocco, Algeria, Egypt, and Tunisia, have parliaments that restrict the power of respective rulers little or not at all. Many, from Mauritania to the monarchies of the Arabian peninsula, lack any semblance of democratic institutions. Except on paper, Lebanon lacks a government altogether. We begin our survey with the Arab countries, moving generally from west to east in northern Africa, then to the Fertile Crescent (again from west to east), and south to the Arabian peninsula. Finally, the non-Arab states are covered, starting with Israel (and the occupied Arab territories) and Cyprus, then moving from west to east along the northern tier (Turkey to Afghanistan). MAURITANIA, a country that seems to be virtually disappearing as the desert advances and brings continuing deterioration in the already horrible living conditions, remains under the military

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dictatorship of President Maouya Oud Sid Ahmad Taya. Prospects for democracy seem remote, but plans were announced in 1986 for holding popular elections for urban councils, described as a "first experiment in democracy." 1 Taya promised that this would be extended to all administrative units in 1987 but gave an ambiguous answer to a question about the possibility of a multiparty state. 2 Taya included representatives of various regional and ethnic groups in the regime and to an unusual degree seemingly won—at least temporarily—the backing of the non-Moorish south. But ethnic tension was the basis of antiregime activity that led to the arrest of thirty people on charges of "undermining national unity"; most of them were subsequently convicted. Some of them were Moors ("Whites"), but most belonged to the southern ("Black") minorities. 3 Riots and further arrests created fears that the ethnic division was creating a severe crisis, threatening an end to Taya's relative liberalization. Real power in MOROCCO is in the hands of King Hasan II. However, there is a wide range of political parties that sometimes engage in vigorous debate in the mainly elective Chamber of Representatives, although criticism of the monarchy or the main lines of foreign policy is taboo. In March 1986, the king warned the Chamber of the possibility that he would dissolve it again, as he had done twice in earlier years, but also expressed hope that it eventually would "become one of the natural realities of our society." 4 The opposition parties represented in the C h a m b e r — including the leftist Union Socialiste des Forces Populaires, the conservative Istiqqlal, and the communist Parti du Progrès et du S o c i a l i s m e (with two seats)—were in effect tamed by the knowledge that they would be in danger if they criticized the king. The legitimacy granted to the leftist parties was widely considered to be a bribe to keep them quiet. The clandestine leftist, fundamentalist, and Berber opposition was apparently crushed. But severe economic problems, aggravated by the unending war against the Polisario Liberation Front in the Western Sahara, which tied down 120,000 Moroccan troops and cost at least a million dollars a day, could constitute long-range dangers to the monarchy. Concern for human rights did not stand in the way of the regime's determination to root out opposition. Twenty-six leftists were given prison terms of up to twenty years in February 1986 for "distributing leaflets challenging the legitimate struggle . . . to defend and protect the Saharan province." Several members of

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students' and teachers' unions were later sentenced for their roles in the 1984 protests. 5 Various h u m a n rights organizations m a d e accusations of maltreatment of political prisoners. An Amnesty International report charged that the regime engaged in systematic torture and denial of access to families, lawyers, and medical treatment for political prisoners, and that periods of detention exceed the provisions of the country's Code of Criminal Procedure. 6 The Spanish enclaves of CEUTA and MELILLA on the Moroccan coast witnessed demands for democratic rights for the Muslim minority during 1986. In Melilla Muslims engaged in a general strike in response to legislation that defines most of them as noncitizens (on the ground that they are illegal immigrants) and subjects them to expulsion, which in fact had recently been demanded by Christian demonstrators. 7 Subsequently, there have been several episodes of violent rioting with demands for unity with Morocco. Despite the later enactment of more liberal legislation, few applications by Muslims for Spanish nationality were approved. 8 ALGERIA is ruled by a highly authoritarian military bureaucratic elite. The National Assembly is usually a rubber stamp. However, in July 1986 it rejected proposed legislation that would have allowed foreign companies to have a controlling interest in joint ventures. Otherwise, the shift toward economic liberalism continued, despite the opposition of more dogmatic socialistic elements in the military. The new National Charter—the "supreme source of Algerian policies and laws," which was drawn up by the National Liberation Front (FLN) Congress in December 1985 and approved by 98 percent of the voters on January 16—legitimized this trend by enlarging the role of private enterprise. In addition, the charter emphasized the role of Islam, an apparent bow to renewed religious sentiment and also a shift away from Marxism. The reshuffle of several ministers and other top officials early in the year may have been related to the ideological shift. In an effort to dry u p the black market in foreign currency, the government announced a new policy of allowing Algerians to establish foreign currency accounts. However, a drastic fall in oil and gas revenues forced the adoption of austerity measures in April. These included tight currency controls and limits on amounts of hard currency available to those who go abroad. Basic goods were often scarce. Opposition to the regime by members of the Berber minority,

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Muslim fundamentalists, rioting students, supporters of former President Ahmed Ben Bella, and members of the Algerian League for Human Rights continued to provoke arrests and prison sentences on c h a r g e s of distributing leaflets and b e l o n g i n g to illegal organizations. 9 Ben Bella and Ait-Ahmed Hocine, who announced the beginning of a new opposition movement in 1985, continued to oppose the regime. Ben Bella called for "democratic pluralism" and an end to the single-party system, arguing that the FLN under his leadership was not monolithic and that all views could be expressed. President-for-Life Habib Bourguiba of TUNISIA took on an increasingly autocratic style during 1986. Habib Achour, former secretary-general of the powerful Union Général des Travailleurs Tunisiens (UGTT)—once closely associated with the ruling Destourian Socialist Party (DSP)—was put under house arrest in 1985 and finally convicted on apparently trumped-up charges of breaking into a fishing cooperative. He began a one-year prison sentence in January 1986. Other labor leaders were also imprisoned. N u m e r o u s people, including presidential adviser Habib Bourguiba, Jr., fell from grace as the months passed. With the president's niece coming to occupy a key unofficial place in the power structure, Bourguiba became estranged from his previously influential wife Wassila, who was then divorced and left the country. Some of her relatives were arrested and charged with corruption. A h m e d Mestiri, head of the opposition Mouvement des Democrats Socialistes (MDS), faced charges of unlawful assembly after participating in a demonstration against the U.S. bombing of Libya in April. There were accusations that this was done to prevent him from running in the parliamentary elections scheduled for November. He subsequently was sentenced to four months in prison, which made him legally ineligible for public office in the future. Several newspapers were closed during the following months. According to the president of the Tunisian League for the Defence of Human Rights, Khemain Chamari, about 100 people were being held as political prisoners in November. When the Twelfth DSP Congress met in June, the president personally chose all members of the political bureau and the central committee rather than following the normal practice of allowing the congress to vote on his nominees. While confirming his confidence in his designated successor, Muhammad Mzali, at the congress, the president proceeded shortly afterward to dismiss him from his

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positions as prime minister and secretary-general of the DSP. Prevented from leaving the country legally, Mzali fled soon afterward. With several opposition parties permitted d u r i n g the early 1980s, there was hope that the general elections of November 2, 1986, would be the most open ever. But all opposition parties decided to boycott the elections because of repressive measures or inability to register their candidates. Left without opposition, the DSP predictably won all seats. Stability was severely threatened by a drop in the standard of living resulting from decreasing phosphate exports and tourism, as well as from drought. High unemployment was intensified by the return of workers from the oil countries. Islamic fundamentalism, as represented by both the Islamic Tendency Movement and more extreme groups, had a strong following a m o n g the poor and predominated among university students. LIBYA r e m a i n e d a f u n d a m e n t a l l y personalistic r e g i m e dominated by Colonel Muammar al-Qaddafi, together with four other members of the Revolutionary Command Council that carried out the 1969 coup. Each of these had a following within his own tribal group, and a disproportionate number of the members of Qaddafi's own tribe occupied middle-level positions. 10 There was an increase in the extent of collective leadership following the U.S. raid in April. The popular congresses—including basic (local) congresses and the General People's Congress (the Eleventh), which met in February 1986—that are supposed to represent direct d e m o c r a c y w e r e s o m e t i m e s lively but d o m i n a t e d b y the revolutionary committees under Qaddafi's control. The country was hard pressed by a drastic drop in oil revenues. There were signs of popular dissatisfaction at times because of shortages of consumer goods. One response of the government during the year was to allow some renewed private business activity to meet the d e m a n d for food. Some elements of the military were resentful of the people's militia, with which Qaddafi allegedly wanted to replace the regular forces altogether. Army officers also disliked Qaddafi's attempts to limit their access to luxury goods. Many observers believe that the U.S. air raid weakened the opposition and possibly saved Qaddafi. Censorship was increased after the raid. The opposition was described as "fragmented, poorly institutionalized, and . . . ideologically divided." 1 1 THE SUDAN'S Transitional Military Council (TMC) lived up to its promise to hold general elections within a year after coming to

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power. The elections for a 301-member constituent assembly were conducted during April 1-12, 1986, with delays extending the period up to a week in some places. These were the first competitive elections since 1968 (the year before the establishment of the Numayri dictatorship). However, rebellion in the non-Arab, nonMuslim southern third of the country dictated indefinite postponement of the elections in thirty-seven—about half—of the southern districts. In other southern areas, the balloting was restricted mainly to the towns. Out of a total of 8 million eligible voters, 6 million—but including only 560,000 in the s o u t h — registered, a seemingly impressive proportion that may, however, be explained by substantial fake and multiple registration. 12 There were many reports of corruption. About 5 million votes were cast, with forty-eight parties in the running. An unusual feature of the election was the designation of twenty-eight seats for "graduate constituencies," to reward the members of professional associations who played a key role in the demonstrations against the Numayri regime. Graduates of the universities and polytechnic schools thus were given double representation. The two main parties, which together won over 75 percent of the seats, were the Ummah Party (UP) and the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), each of which largely represented its own "sectarian" constituency. The UP, led by Sadiq al-Mahdi, the Oxford-educated great-grandson of the famous Mahdi of the nineteenth century, had its base in the Mahdiyyah religious order. Despite its zealot roots, the UP took a basically pragmatic approach and called for the end of the application of Islamic law in the form introduced by Numayri. It won ninety-nine seats, by far the largest bloc in the assembly (and 48 percent of the vote). The UP is centrist, advocating nonalignment and a mixed e c o n o m y — i t s links with Libya notwithstanding. The probusiness DUP, headed by Muhammad Osman alMirghani, has its main base in the Khatmiyyah religious order. The traditional rival of the UP, it has historically favored union with Egypt. It won sixty-three seats in the assembly. The fundamentalist Muslim Brotherhood was organized as the National Islamic Front (NIF). Closely associated with the Numayri regime until its last days, this group was intimately involved in the introduction of Islamic law and strongly advocated its continuation. Led by Hasan al-Turabi, the well-organized NIF won over fifty seats, including twenty-three of those elected by graduate constituencies. Turabi himself was defeated because other

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parties joined together to support one candidate in his district. Several minor parties also won a few seats. 13 The new, broadly based civilian government that took office May 6 was headed by al-Mahdi as prime minister, with his party getting eight other ministries. The DUP was assigned six ministries, with the SNF and various southern parties getting four. The fivemember "sovereignty council" was made up of two members of each of the two leading parties, with one seat reserved for southerners. The NIF was the largest party left outside the government. The prime minister explained that its rigid Islamic views "would weaken the government" and that "its attitude to the non-Muslim Sudanese might unify them in opposition to the new Sudanese government." 14 Conditions in the Sudan were highly unpropitious for democracy. Hundreds of thousands of people in the south were on the verge of starvation. The $10 billion foreign debt was more than the country could handle, and al-Mahdi announced in October that payments would be restricted to a percentage of earnings from exports. The IMF had already declared it ineligible for further loans. Compounding all other difficulties was the civil war in the south, as John Garang's Ethiopian-backed Southern People's Liberation Movement (SPLA) rejected offers to join the government and continued to fight against it. The SPLA called for the liberation of the whole country and had some support in the north, but it was essentially a southern movement. It controlled perhaps 90 percent of the south, excluding mainly the large towns. The prime minister met with Garang in July and August in Addis Ababa but failed to reach any agreement. The SPLA's main demand was the repeal of Islamic law; while the prime minister was committed to abolishing Numayri's harsh version, he refused to do away with it altogether. In July, thirty-eight southern deputies walked out of the assembly to protest the prime minister's stand on this issue. The SPLA also called for an end to the state of emergency. In EGYPT, power is centered in the office of the president, and no president has been freely elected. The emergency laws give the government wide leeway to restrict freedom, to arrest people without charges, and to carry out various kinds of searches and c e n s o r s h i p . 1 5 Opposition parties are permitted, four of which competed with the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) in the parliamentary elections of 1984. One of these, the New VVafd Party, won fifty-seven seats, while the ruling party got 391. No objective observer would say that the election was completely free, although

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it provided an opportunity for diverse views to be expressed. Much real public debate continued to take place in parliament (the People's Assembly) and in the press. Responding to continuing arguments that the election law in effect at the time of the 1984 People's Assembly elections (and now replaced) violated the constitution by b a n n i n g independent candidates, a question on which a Supreme Consitutional Court ruling was expected, President Husni Mubarak announced on February 4, 1987, that a referendum to be held eight days later would determine whether the legislative body would be dissolved and new elections held. In so doing, he outmaneuvered plans of opposition parties to hold a rally to demand further democratization. The president's move was also intended to remove doubt about the parliament's legitimacy and about the legitimacy of his own renomination by that body scheduled for the following October. This was seen as an effort to strengthen the parliament, as well as to indicate a respect for legality not evinced by previous Egyptian presidents. 1 6 With the president's proposal approved, as expected, by an overwhelming majority, the new elections were scheduled for the following month. Elections on October 1, 1986, for half of the members of the Consultative Council, the advisory upper house (the other half of the members are appointive), were boycotted by all the opposition parties. They protested against new election laws, particularly against provisions that a candidate could not be elected with less than 20 percent of the vote and that a party with an absolute majority in a province would get all the seats. 1 7 Still, the government claimed that 11.2 million of the 13.7 million registered voters participated in the election. President Mubarak's regime was increasingly beleaguered by economic problems as Egypt's modest earnings from oil shrank, tourism declined, and thousands of Egyptian workers returned home from the oil countries. The foreign debt reached $38 billion, and payments fell into arrears. IMF and World Bank calls for unpopular measures, like cutting subsidies for electricity and basic foods as conditions for further loans and rescheduling of existing ones, threatened to enrage the poor and to bring the regime down if implemented (as nearly happened in 1977 when President Anwar alSadat raised the price of bread). But the appointment of a new prime minister, Dr. Atif Sidqi, in November 1986 seemed to indicate that the medicine prescribed by these organizations would be taken. Signs of unrest included sporadic bombings and arson. Strikes proliferated and sometimes provoked large-scale arrests. In two

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instances, police ended worker occupation of factories. A one-day strike by lawyers on May 28, the first since 1954, protested the government's announcement that the state of emergency and other "antidemocratic laws" would be extended for two more years. Referring to the way in which professional associations helped to bring down the Numayri regime in the Sudan the previous year, an Egyptian judge asked his colleagues to do the same. 18 Islamic fundamentalism was on the rise and continued to gain control of labor unions and student associations. Several stores selling pork or liquor were burned. Hundreds of religious militants were arrested on charges of committing such acts or plotting an Islamic revolution. In February, thousands of conscripts in the 300,000-man security forces—who earn about $4 a month and are allegedly regularly beaten by their officers—engaged in a three-day orgy of riots, looting, and killing, directed particularly at hotels, nightclubs, and other symbols of luxury. A few others joined them, but the destructive nature of the riots helped to limit potential sympathy and thus may have aborted a wider revolt. The army suppressed the rioters and virtually ran the country for several days. Leaders of all the legal opposition parties were briefed by the president and declared their support for his actions. The possibility of a military coup was on many minds, 19 as people said that there was too much democracy. Mubarak warned his critics of "frightening alternatives" to his regime. 20 Although JORDAN still had an elected parliament in which some opposition was permitted, it became more repressive in 1986. Discontent was exacerbated by renewed divisions between King Husayn and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and by high unemployment brought on by the loss of jobs in and remittances from the oil countries; and there was increasing criticism of the regime from liberals, fundamentalists, and others. Sensitive stories were banned from publication, and some journalists were not allowed to write. Foreign correspondents whose reports displeased the regime were kept out of the country, temporarily detained, or otherwise pressured. Numerous arrests of Palestinians for political reasons occurred in January 1986. Student demonstrations at Yarmuk University in May brought intervention by security forces, with at least three students killed and sixty wounded. A by-election in Irbid in the same month brought allegations of official high-handedness. There were reports of police harassment

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of those who backed the fundamentalist candidate. The regimebacked candidate was declared winner by a large majority, but the defeated fundamentalist was widely hailed as the true victor. In March, the parliament voted to increase the size of the elective lower house from 60 to 142 following the general elections scheduled for 1988. One purpose was to increase Jordanian influence in the West Bank. Although representatives of the latter were increased from thirty to sixty, this was a reduction of the proportion of seats assigned to the area (previously half the total). As long as the West Bank remains occupied, its deputies are to be picked by the parliament. President Hafiz al-Asad of SYRIA continued his dictatorial rule. Elections for the People's Assembly (parliament) were held in February 1986, with 3,068 candidates vying for the 195 seats. There is no indication that the voters were allowed any real choice among political tendencies, even among the candidates approved by the Ba'thist-dominated Popular Democratic Front, and in any case the Assembly is a tame adjunct to the regime. The Ba'th party and the secret police tightly control political activities. In 1986, Amnesty International adopted as "prisoners of conscience" two Syrians who had been imprisoned for six years for membership in a banned communist organization. Opposition to the regime—which disproportionately represents the minority Alawite sect—was manifested in several terrorist bombings during the year, apparently carried out by the fundamentalist Muslim Brethren, allegedly with Iraqi help. In LEBANON the year 1986 began with high hopes that the pact concluded in Damascus on December 28 of the previous year by leaders of the (largely Druse) Progressive Socialist Party (PSP), the Shi'ite Amal, and the (Maronite) Lebanese Forces (under Elie Hobeika's command) for a more equitable distribution of governmental power among the various sects (and the eventual end of sectarian representation altogether) would finally permit the effective reestablishment of the state. But many Maronites— including President Amin Gemayel and major elements of his Phalangist Party and of the Lebanese armed forces associated with it—opposed any plan that would undermine their longtime predominance. In mid-January, Lebanese Forces Chief of Staff Samir Gaegea joined Gemayel's own Phalangist troops to take control from Hobeika and his loyalists, thus bringing about the pact's collapse. Anarchy then intensified, with mainly Muslim leaders calling

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unsuccessfully for Gemayel's resignation. It was quite an achievement for the Christian and Muslim members of the National Unity Cabinet to meet in September for the first time in eight months. The cabinet members' subsequent announcement that they had agreed on a new formula for a political order based on Christian-Muslim parity 21 seemed to offer little hope for success. Power rested with various militias, which collected their own taxes and provided services to their own territories and were increasingly transformed into regular armies with heavy weapons. Syrian forces remained in the east and the north, and 200 Syrian soldiers tried to restore some order in West Beirut in July. Facing escalating conflict that pitted Amal against the PSP and the Lebanese Communist Party, Damascus heeded the appeals of Lebanese Premier Rashid Karami to intervene there on a larger scale, now with 7,000 men, in February 1987. Syrian forces clashed with local Sunni fundamentalist forces in Tripoli in December. Sunni militias also controlled such areas as Sidon in the south, while the Druse ruled an area to the south and east of Beirut. The Israelibacked South Lebanese Army (SLA) in the "security zone" near the country's southern border was hard pressed by Shi'ite and Palestinian guerrillas. The Israeli forces in the same zone increased to nearly 3,000 in February 1987. Partly as a result of tactical help f r o m their longtime Phalangist enemy, Palestinian guerrillas returned to West Beirut and the south despite the war waged on Palestinian refugee camps by the Syrian-backed Amal—itself more and more overshadowed by the pro-Iranian fundamentalist Party of God, which also supported the Palestinians against its more moderate cosectarians. The Phalangists continued to dominate East Beirut and the area to the east and north, but forces loyal to Gemayel and to Gaegea fought against each other in August. From his base in eastern Lebanon, Hobeika attacked East Beirut in September in an unsuccessful attempt to restore his leadership of the predominantly Maronite area. Violations of human rights were rampant, apparently on all sides. Searching for two captured soldiers, Israeli and SLA troops occupied the town of Shakra in February 1986 and subjected its population to brutal interrogation and torture for several days. 22 Also apparently in reaction to guerrilla activity, Israeli and SLA forces attacked the Shi'ite village of Kunin in December, arrested numerous young men, and expelled the remainder of its 2,000 p e o p l e . 2 3 The Phalangists conducted summary executions of Hobeika's followers, allegedly burying some of them in a mass grave. 2 4 Palestinians in the refugee camps besieged by Amal were

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starved to the point of asking religious authorities for permission to eat human flesh. The susceptibility of Western residents of Beirut to being taken hostage by Shi'ite zealot factions became well known. Spokesmen for the Party of God accused Syrian forces of carrying out a massacre of their militiamen in February 1987. The country's economy was in a state of collapse. The value of the Lebanese pound dropped precipitously, and inflation shot up. As Iranian forces threatened to close in on IRAQ, President Saddam Husayn ruled in an increasingly despotic manner without any representative institutions. Changes in top positions made by a special Ba'th Party Congress in July strengthened Husayn's position. 25 Fear of saying anything that should be construed as criticism of the regime gripped the population. Hundreds of Kurds in the north were executed or shot down in the student demonstrations in late 1985 and early 1986, and there were reports of the arrest and torture of 300 children in retaliation against their parents' opposition to the regime. 26 The press was tightly controlled, and possession of works by authors like Tolstoy or Walt Whitman was said to put one's life in danger. 27 KUWAIT felt increasingly insecure during 1986. This was less because of the economic slowdown, the country's economy being buffered by income from massive investments, than because of Iranian advances in the Gulf War and continuing sabotage and attempted assassinations by pro-Iranian groups. The arrest of eleven Kuwaiti Shi'ites at the end of January 1987 on charges of sabotage accentuated fears of sectarian conflict. Several leftist-nationalist and fundamentalist members having been elected during the previous year, the National Assembly demonstrated increasing vitality during the first part of 1986. Divisions in the royal family and the independent position of some merchants made the government's majority insecure on certain issues. The Assembly, in forcing the resignation of a member of the royal family from his ministry in 1985, seemed only to have sharpened its teeth. Some new deputies whose constituencies included relatively poor people strongly opposed proposals to increase the price of electricity and other services when, as one member put it, the government had spent over $13 billion "bailing out speculators." 28 In May, twenty-eight deputies walked out in protest against the government's insistence on a secret session to debate legislation to reorganize the judicial system. Finally, on June 24, the cabinet—

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headed by a member of the royal family—resigned rather than succumb to the National Assembly's demand to question four of its members (all of whom were members of the royal family) in connection with the way their ministries had been run. The narrow suffrage—men over twenty-one years of age whose families had been Kuwaitis since 1920, estimated at 3 percent of the population—was expanded by 30 percent in 1986 as several thousand people who got Kuwaiti nationality as late as 1965 were added to the list. This step toward democracy proved to be a prelude to the apparent end of democracy for the foreseeable future. Alluding to threats to state security emanating from a "foreign conspiracy," the emir dissolved the National Assembly on July 3 and suspended the parts of the constitution requiring that new elections be held within sixty days. He blamed deputies for "transforming freedom into anarchy and reducing patriotism to sectarianism" and spoke of parallels with the anarchy of Lebanon. 2 9 Few supporters of the recent democratic trend were reassured by his pledge that "we will not abandon our parliamentary course." 3 0 With the regime concentrating on repressing criticism, there was silence on the question of reviving the parliament. Kuwait's press, previously the freest in the Arab world and a source of real information about the country and the region, was subjected to severe censorship. OTHER GULF MONARCHIES. With the suspension of Kuwait's parliament, none of the Arab monarchies in the Gulf region has any sort of elective institutions. Oman continued to have an advisory appointive State Consultative Council. The United Arab Emirates had a Federal National Council whose forty members were appointed by the rulers of the member emirates. Nothing more was heard of earlier talk by King Fahd of Saudi Arabia about establishing an appointive Consultative Council that would ultimately be elective. In fact, Saudi Arabia seemed to be afraid of the potentially contagious effects of representative institutions anywhere in the Gulf region. It is widely believed that Saudi pressure not only was a factor in the dissolution of the Kuwaiti parliament but also stood in the way of any desire to democratize other monarchies, particularly to revive Bahrayn's parliament, suspended in 1976. 31 A recent study concluded that the "popular yearning for participatory institutions is strong" in all these countries. 3 2 Especially in light of the precipitous drop in oil revenues (whose effects are particularly threatening in Bahrayn and might

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constitute a danger for Oman, which has minimal financial reserves), representative institutions might provide a safety valve; but the rulers seem to fear that they could get out of hand. There were reports of dissatisfaction among the merchant class and new university graduates who were facing reduced employment opportunities. Large Shi'ite minorities—and in Bahrayn, a Shi'ite m a j o r i t y — c o n t i n u e d to be a l i e n a t e d from r e g i m e s that discriminated against them. There were reports of human rights abuses. It was estimated that Bahrayn held 3,000 political prisoners, who were subjected to torture. 3 3 There were similar reports about Saudi Arabia—even allegations by some Americans that they had been arbitrarily arrested and tortured because of disputes over business matters; the U.S. State Department agreed only that some businessmen had been prevented from leaving the country until business disputes were resolved. 3 4 Events in January 1986 demonstrated how far SOUTH YEMEN, or the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY), was from democracy or from any kind of legality within the framework of the single-party regime. In an apparent attempt to preempt a move against him in the Yemen Socialist Party (Y'SP) by elements— including the more doctrinaire former president, Abd al-Fatah Isma'il, who had recently returned from exile—opposed to the more pragmatic policies that had developed during the early 1980s, President Ali Nasir Muhammad al-Hasani's bodyguards attempted a "gangland style" massacre of the members of the politburo on January 13, 1986. With other bodyguards returning fire, the army and the YSP militia split, and tribesmen joined in a short full-scale civil war. As al-Hasani's opponents prevailed, he fled to Ethiopia, while Isma'il was killed in the fighting, which, according to later official reports, left 4,230 party members dead among a total of 10,000 casualties. 3 5 The Soviets, with bases in Aden and on the island of Socotra and bound to the PDRY by a treaty of friendship, were seemingly caught by surprise and were unable to exercise any influence. The new leadership included Haydar Abu Bakr al-Attas as interim president and Ali Salim al-Beedh as the YSP's secretarygeneral. The new prime minister, Yasin Sa'id Nu'man, indicated that the drastic changes in the regime "will change nothing" of the country's domestic or foreign policies. 3 6 Indeed, all indications pointed to the continuation of both a pragmatic attitude toward conservative Arab states and the close relationship with Moscow,

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and the struggle seemed clearly to have been rooted in personal and tribal feuds rather than in ideology. There were reports of numerous political prisoners and of at least one leading journalist's death from torture. 37 Elections for members of local councils occurred in October and for the Supreme People's Council the following month, but there was no indication that they were in any sense meaningful. By no contrast, the internal politics of NORTH YEMEN, or the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR), was uneventful. The YAR continued to proclaim its revolutionary credentials going back to 1962, but reconciliation with former royalists in the 1970s and heavy dependence on Saudi aid belie this. Particularly since the mid1970s, the regime, under the presidency of Colonel Ali Abdullah Salih since 1977, has been centered on the military. There is an appointive People's Constituent Assembly (parliament) and a partly elective General People's Congress that meets every two years and seems to be in effect the national congress of a weak single party. 3 8 To the surprise of many, ISRAEL'S government of national unity survived its first twenty-five months under the prime ministership of Labor Alignment leader Shimon Peres and allowed Yitzhak Shamir of the Likud Bloc to take charge in October 1986. With polls showing Peres to be highly popular, many suspected that he wanted the coalition to break u p in order to permit new elections in which Labor could hope for gains. But he was committed to the arrangement even in the face of a move in his party's Central Committee in favor of dissolving the Knesset (parliament) and calling new elections. Eagerly looking forward to the "rotation," Likud leaders refused to permit their Labor colleagues to disrupt the arrangement. Many observers were beginning to see the National Unity government as a more or less permanent arrangement. There were comparisons between this and a one-party regime and warnings that democracy was being undermined since it meant that "effective or noteworthy opposition" was now missing. 39 A prominent Israeli sociologist warned that growing "Jewish intolerance of political dissent" was the main threat to democracy. 40 Others perceived a proclivity of the country's leaders to arbitrary actions as increasingly endangering the rule of law. 41 A case in point was the controversial decision of the Justice Minister in December 1986, in violation of an extradition treaty, to release a French Jewish fugitive (now an Israeli citizen) convicted of murdering an Arab in

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Paris. The government survived several crises during the year. One occurred in April when Finance Minister Yitzhak Modai (Likud) made remarks about Peres that the latter considered insulting and also opposed the transfer of government funds to a construction company and sick fund connected to the Labor Party-dominated Histadrut Labor Federation. With Peres initially calling for Modai to resign, a breakup of the government was avoided by an agreement to shift Modai to another cabinet post. Another crisis was averted in July when Modai agreed to resign as minister of justice rather than be dismissed for his criticism of the prime minister. Still another crisis, which was seen as testing the government's resolve to apply the law equally when Arabs were victims of a crime, related to the incident in 1984—and the subsequent coverup—in which two Arab teenagers who hijacked a bus were beaten to death by officials of Shin Bet (the domestic security service) after their arrest. An investigation in 1985 cleared the name of a general who was accused of the beating, but evidence of a coverup appeared during 1986. This threatened to be particularly explosive since Shin Bet director Avraham Shalom claimed to have been acting on orders "from above," understood to mean Shamir, who had been prime minister at the time. Justice Minister Yitzhak Zamir was dismissed in June because of his insistence on investigating Shin Bet and firing Shalom, who later resigned and was pardoned, along with three other Shin Bet employees. Following the Supreme Court's ruling that such pardons were permissible even before trial and conviction, President Chaim Herzog granted pardons to seven others. At least one of those who were pardoned was appointed to another top position in Shin Bet. 42 Abba Eban, chairman of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee, sarcastically proposed that a list be drawn up showing which people were "above the law." 43 Also related to the unevenness of the rule of law, President Herzog pardoned two Jewish terrorists in February 1986 (others were pardoned the year before) who had been sentenced to forty months and three months, respectively. Their crimes included an attack on West Bank mayors (in which one had his leg blown off), attempting manslaughter, and planting bombs on an Arab bus. 44 Another crisis was caused by Minister of Trade and Industry Ariel Sharon's accusation that Peres's policies were responsible for the massacre of Jews in an Istanbul synagogue in September. The government of national unity was saved when Sharon retracted the statement.

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Prime Minister Peres's austerity measures initiated in 1985 helped put the economy—and the political system—on a more even keel. The annual rate of inflation, which reached 1,200 percent in October 1984, fell dramatically—to zero during some months, otherwise to the 25 percent range. Lower oil prices helped. Austerity also brought reduced incomes and unemployment, increased rates of emigration, and drastic declines in immigration. Signs of the growth of antidemocratic attitudes continued. At least one observer argued that the "polarization" between supporters and opponents of democracy provided Israeli society with its greatest peril. 45 A public opinion poll showed a dramatic drop in support for the Kach Party and its leader, Rabbi Meir Kahane, who was known for his rejection of democracy and particularly for his demand that all Arabs be expelled from Israel and the occupied territories. According to this poll, Kach would have won only two of the Knesset's 120 seats if elections had been held at the time, as opposed to the nine to ten seats indicated in an August 1985 poll (and its one seat at present). Nevertheless, Kahane's ideas were shown to have become more widespread than before, with 38 percent (as opposed to 22 percent three years earlier) now indicating that they would support someone who advocated expelling the Arabs from the occupied territories. 4 6 Another poll showed that 47 percent of Israel's Jews wanted Arabs to be encouraged to leave the country. 47 The Israeli school system responded to Kahane's extreme ideas by introducing a program called "Education for Democracy" in 1985. While this was said to p u t antidemocratic students on the defensive, 4 8 both parents and teachers felt so threatened by the program's emphasis on curbing anti-Arab racism that at the beginning of 1986 only sixteen schools were using the program in the eighth and ninth grades. 49 Rightist and religious opposition to the program, particularly to its promotion of joint activities for Jewish and Arab children, ultimately resulted in its suspension. 5 0 But Education Minister Yitzhak Navon pledged in December 1986 that, despite objections, democratic values would continue to be taught in the schools. 51 Another reaction to Kahane's ideas was to push legislation in the Knesset outlawing racial incitement. This in turn evoked outcries from orthodox Jewish circles that it would interfere with Jewish religious practices. Minister of the Interior Yitzhak Peretz of the orthodox Shas Party, protested that the proposal would make "Religious Jews in Israel. . . more oppressed than the Jews in Russia." 52 As it was ultimately amended, the bill was so watered down by provisions specifying "intent" and excluding anything of a

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religious nature that Kahane himself, against whom it originally was directed, voted for it. 5 3 A Jerusalem Post editorial of August 7, 1986, proclaimed it to be "a bill for the promotion of racism." However, a secret Knesset vote in February 1987 deprived Kahane of his franking privilege after he used it to send letters to Arabs demanding that they leave the country. At a symposium on democracy sponsored by an organization called Response (and established to oppose racist trends), a Likud member of the Knesset, Eliahu Ben-Elissar, opined that a bigger threat to democracy than Kahane was the proportional representation system. He argued that this allows small parties to have too much influence—"more power than big ones in many decisions" (an apparent reference to the bargaining power wielded by small religious parties). 5 4 Others pointed to the way proportional representation strengthens the power of party leaders and leads to a proliferation of parties. Tension between orthodox and secular Jews seemed to intensify. Opinion polls showed that 67 percent of the Jewish population considered the ultra-Orthodox "unacceptable" and that 25 percent labeled them "opportunists, liars, and charlatans." 5 5 An official in the Ministry of Education complained that it was easier to get groups of Arab and Jewish children together than orthodox and secular J e w s . 5 6 There were widespread complaints about the orthodox minority's influence in the Knesset, and many felt that the informal "compact" between these two sectors was breaking down. 57 Several incidents intensified tension during 1986. A decision of the Ministry of the Interior, overturned by the Supreme Court later in the year, to stamp the word "Converted" on the identity cards of immigrants who are converts to Judaism raised a furor because this would alert the Orthodox to look into whether a conversion had been conducted by non-Orthodox rabbis—a matter of some importance since the Orthodox rabbinate controls such matters as marriage and divorce and since other branches of Judaism are not officially recognized. The perennial "Who's a Jew" bill, proposing to reject the right of those converted by non-Orthodox rabbis to qualify for citizenship under the Law of Return, was defeated by a 61-to-41 vote in February. The most explosive incident of the year related to the burning or defacing of over 100 bus shelters by Orthodox Jews to protest advertisements posted there that included pictures of women in bathing suits. Some secularist Jews retaliated by setting fire to an Orthodox synagogue, smashing a holy ark containing the Torah, and

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ransacking two religious schools. 5 8 Amid talk of "pogroms" and a "culture war," President Herzog branded this vandalism "domestic anti-Semitism." 5 9 Also inauspicious for democracy was the convention of the Herut Party (core of the Likud Alignment) in March. The rivalry between supporters of Shamir and David Levy was so intense that virtually nothing was accomplished. Speakers were shouted down, and one was knocked to the floor by pro-Levy delegates. 60 Complaints by the Arab minority during 1986 concentrated on discrimination against them in government funding. An Arab member of the Knesset affiliated with the Mapam Party claimed that Arab towns get only one-fiftieth of the amount spent on Jewish towns on a per-capita basis. 6 1 Acknowledging that Arab local authorities get only 30 percent (per capita) of what similar Jewish institutions receive, Peres said that this should be corrected. And over Modai's objections, the cabinet granted Arab local authorities $6 million to cover most of their debts. 62 T h e nearly 1.5 million people of I S R A E L I - O C C U P I E D TERRITORIES, that is, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (and a few thousand who remain in the Golan Heights), have a quite different status from those in Israel proper. Few Israelis are willing to give up all of these territories, and the Likud in particular rejects withdrawal from any part of them. Yet the idea of giving political equality to the inhabitants is also unthinkable to almost all Israelis because that would mean that their state was no longer a Jewish one, and present demographic trends would give it an Arab majority within a generation. Only the Jewish settlers are governed by Israeli law, while the Arabs are under military law. The Arabs are virtually prevented from engaging in economic activities that would compete with those of Israel or even from drilling wells that would take water from the settlers. 6 3 Thousands of Arabs work at menial jobs in Israel, where they are not allowed to spend the night. An Israeli expert on the occupied territories (and former deputy mayor of Jerusalem) maintained that "the Second Israeli Republic"—described as a "Herrenvolk Democracy," that is, "a bi-national entity with a rigid hierarchical social structure based on ethnicity"—had been in existence since 1967. 64 After the dismissal of nearly all mayors elected in 1976 and the substitution of Israeli military governors, even local self-government was nonexistent. However, statements by Prime Minister Peres and Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin emphasized that residents of the

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territories should have a greater role in local administration. Coordinating its action with Jordan, the Israeli government appointed Palestinian mayors for Hebron, El Bireh, and Ramallah in September, with authority limited to routine matters like garbage and sewage. This was part of an overall political offensive by Amman to undercut the influence of the PLO in these territories. Public opinion polls showed overwhelming support for the PLO and particularly for Yasir Arafat. There seemed to be no prospect of elections, local or otherwise. In May, Rabin adamantly rejected suggestions by Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher of Great Britain that such elections should be conducted, arguing that to do so would be strange since no Arab country had elected mayors. Palestinians continued to be subjected to renewable six-month detention, expulsion, and house or town arrest, as well as demolition of their homes—all without trial. Trade unionists were a major target of these actions. Several actions were directed against the press, including the detention without charges of correspondents for three leading newspapers. Two of these newspapers were closed down in August despite the protest of Israeli civil rights groups. Another journalist was deported in November. In 1986 there were frequent closings of Palestinian universities for long periods, and detentions and other punishments for individual students were stepped up. 65 The U.N. Human Rights Commission condemned Israel for human rights violations in February. The U.S. State Department report pointed to abuse of Arab prisoners but concluded that "there is no evidence that torture is condoned by the Israeli authorities." It also criticized the destruction of homes without trial and other abuses. Amnesty International published allegations of torturing prisoners. 66 Growing unemployment fed by decreasing opportunities for workers in the oil countries and by Israeli restrictions on economic activities intensified the problem. Israelis increasingly referred to Gaza as their "Soweto," and some were expecting "rebellion or mass civil disobedience." 67 Both the ethnically Turkish Republic of NORTHERN CYPRUS and the REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS, whose control was restricted to the ethnically Greek 60 percent of the island, were functioning democracies, although in the former case dependence on the Turkish forces was an important qualification. The problem was how to integrate the two into one state that would give the Greek majority a satisfactory share in the government while providing adequate

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guarantees to the Turkish minority. United Nations Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar presented a new plan in 1986 that was endorsed by Turkish Cypriot President Rauf Denktash but, like earlier proposals, was rebuffed by Greek Cypriot President Spyros Kyprianou in June. This "draft framework agreement," designed to provide the basis for further negotiations between representatives of the two communities, included provisions for a federal system, a Greek president and a Turkish vice-president, and a reduction of the Turkish-controlled area from 40 percent to 29 percent. Kyprianou objected to the plan's failure to provide for the withdrawal of Turkish troops, for guarantees by outside powers, and for freedom of movement from one part of the island to another. 6 8 The lines between the two states threatened to gain permanence. Prime Minister Turgot Ozal of Turkey visited Turkish Cyprus at the beginning of July and promised the local people "their own country. God willing, . . . for eternity." 69 And Denktash temporarily closed the crossing points used by United Nations peacekeepers to demonstrate that his regime was a reality deserving recognition. TURKEY, whose president was still the general who led the 1980 coup and was designated by the 1982 constitution to fill the office for six years, evolved further toward democracy during 1986. The military-sponsored National Democracy Party, which had done poorly at the polls, finally disbanded in May. Political parties proliferated, with some under the barely disguised leadership of precoup politicians who were officially banned from public life and represented tendencies similar to those of the proscribed parties. On the democratic left, the Social Democratic People's Party (SDPP) of Erdal Inonu, which resulted from the merger of the People's Party and the Social Democratic Party the year before, showed signs of vigor by winning a local election in Izmir early in 1986. One poll in March showed that the SDPP had the support of 41.4 percent of the voters, compared with 32.2 percent for Prime Minister Turgut Ozal's conservative Motherland Party (MP). 7 0 Indistinguishable from the SDPP except for its different leadership was the new Democratic Left Party (DLP), headed by Rahsan Ecevit, wife of former Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit. Since Ecevit was one of the people banned from party politics, he was prosecuted after speaking at a rally but was acquitted. The parties on the right competed with each other for the deputies elected on the ticket of the now-defunct NDP. At one time during the year nine such parties were in existence, including those

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led by proxies of the fascist Alparslan Turks and the fundamentalist Necmettin Erbakan. But the moderate rightist True Path Party (TPP), led by a proxy for the former Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel, continued to make gains. In by-elections in September in which twelve parties participated, the TPP got 24 percent of the vote and four of the eleven seats, while the MP got 32 percent of the vote and six seats. The SDPP met a severe setback, by winning only one seat. Despite coming in first by the by-elections, the confidence of the MP was undermined. Before the election, Ozal declared that his party must get at least 35 percent of the vote (it got 45 percent in the 1983 general elections) in order to maintain its "claim to be r e p r e s e n t a t i v e . " 7 1 For the time being, the MP kept its absolute majority—237 out of 400—in the parliament, but Demirel called for an early election on the ground that a government that had shown such minimal support should not remain in office. Many people believed that the TPP was only beginning to grow. A new electoral law was expected to cut down the number of parties by requiring a full-fledged organization in most constituencies and by denying representation to parties that get less than 15 percent of the vote nationwide. It will also allow parties to buy radio and television time, thus handicapping those with inadequate funds. Aside from the way the politicians flouted limitations on their activity, Turks enjoyed increasing doses of freedom during the year. Martial law was progressively removed and, after mid-1986, was limited to nine of the sixty-seven provinces, that is, eastern regions that saw sporadic Kurdish guerrilla activity. But the "state of emergency" continued and involved some of the same restrictions as martial law. Universities and trade unions were still highly restricted, but the Turk-Is trade union federation was allowed to hold a rally in Izmir in February, where provocative antiregime banners were tolerated and where a top SDPP leader was able to condemn the government as "fascistic." Some newspapers were able to protest continuing human rights violations. There was greater freedom of expression than before, but no guarantee that it would continue. Some newspapers were still banned. Thousands of political prisoners were still held, including some for merely participating in student demonstrations. Torture and other kinds of abuse of political prisoners were reportedly still common. A Helsinki Watch report in November put Turkey in a list of nine countries with the worst human rights records among those that signed the 1975 Helsinki Accords and in fact in the top category of oppressiveness (along with the USSR and Rumania). 7 2

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A Turkish government spokesman opined that "democracy is the dessert course in economically sound societies," 73 and economic soundness could not be claimed. Inflation rose to over 25 percent, average incomes had drastically declined in recent years, and the gap between rich and poor widened. This was intensified by reduced opportunities for contractors and workers in the oil countries. 74 During 1986 and early 1987, IRAN won some victories in its war with Iraq as the world waited for a "final offensive." This was in spite of a severe shortage of arms and an economy suffering from a drastic fall in oil revenues. Although not a subject for public debate, disagreement was said to have occurred behind the scenes concerning the call by the Jurist, Ayatullah Khomeini, to continue the war at all costs. Iran was not only under the "guardianship" of the Jurist (and with parliamentary majorities subject to being overruled by a predominantly conservative Council of Guardians in the name of Islamic law), but elections for the Islamic Consultative Council (parliament), although highly competitive, were not open to political tendencies rejected by the regime. The country continued to experience turbulent and sometimes violent politics within the framework of what otherwise might be described as a single-party system. The press was not free, but widely divergent positions, including statements highly critical of the government (not the revolutionary Islamic regime), were permitted, especially on economic issues. Hojatoleslam Hashimi Rafsanjani, speaker of the parliament and one of the most important members of the ruling elite, argued that in effect a two-party system existed. In his view the proprivate enterprise faction on the one hand and the pro-statist and pro-land redistribution faction on the other, both of which agreed on the necessity of bowing to the majority within institutions, were analogous to political parties in Western countries. 75 Actually there were many shades of opinion, and division on diverse issues made it difficult to talk in terms of simply two factions. The economically conservative trend in the regime was represented by President Ali Khamanei, Rafsanjani, and apparently by Husayn Ali Montazeri, who had been elected to succeed Khomeini as Jurist (although some reports d i s p u t e this characterization of Montazeri). On the other hand, Prime Minister Mir Husayn Musavi and almost his whole cabinet—except for one of President Khamanei's associates, Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Vellayati—were on the opposing side. Some property belonging to

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wealthy Iranians in north Tehran was confiscated and turned over to poor families in the first part of 1986. Also, the radical chief public prosecutor, Hojatoleslam Musavi Khoeiniha, confiscated some agricultural land during the year. 76 The parliament was dominated by the radical faction. Former Prime Minister Mahdi Bazargan headed a group that was officially called the Alliance for the Defence of Freedom and Sovereignty of the Iranian Nation, which opposed forced imposition of religious practices and the radical trend in economic matters and called for a negotiated end to the war. This group also opposed some key provisions in the constitution and hoped to form a legal opposition party. Montazeri successfully urged the minister of the interior to allow Bazargan's group to hold meetings, apparently believing that such openness was crucial to the survival of the regime. But militant elements sometimes interfered with these meetings and on one occasion kidnapped Bazargan and other leaders of the movement. This action was interpreted as being directed at Musavi and Montazeri as well. A letter from Bazargan to Khomeini that harshly criticized the latter's policy regarding the war and also his "dictatorial" rule was widely circulated. Khoeiniha attacked Montazeri and Musavi over their attitude toward Bazargan. Khoeiniha's strong criticism aborted an attempt by Musavi to allow some exiles to return with assurances of not being prosecuted.77 Montazeri's and Musavi's support for political liberalization earned them the enmity of some elements. The rightist newspaper Risalat was adamant in demanding Musavi's resignation, calling him "incompetent." In what was interpreted as an indirect attack on both Montazeri and Musavi, rightists in the government demanded the arrest of Behzad Nabavi, the radical minister of heavy industry, who was saved by the intervention of Khomeini. Khomeini's call to the press in July to "hold your pens" was interpreted as a signal that Montazeri's liberalization should be slowed down. 78 In what appeared to be related to secret contacts with the United States that were revealed in November, Iranian leaders were divided on issues of foreign policy into pragmatists and militant advocates of exporting the revolution. Rafsanjani and Musavi apparently represented the former position. This also involved negotiations with some of the monarchies of the Gulf region, particularly Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, which was strongly criticized by militants. Another manifestation of the pragmatists' influence was the arrest in late October of Mahdi Hashimi, who

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headed an organization encouraging the spread of the Islamic Revolution in Lebanon and elsewhere. Montazeri, Hashimi's relative and apparent opponent of the pragmatists on this issue, tried to get him released, but Khomeini backed the action against h i m . 7 9 Revelations of secret U.S.-Iranian dealings apparently stopped Iran's pragmatists in their tracks as Khomeini rejected any normalization of relations with the U.S. before the latter changed its policies. Eight members of the parliament asked for information on the matter, and this request was published in a Tehran newspaper but was withdrawn following harsh words from Khomeini about the legislators. 80 The vitality of Iran's parliament appeared in its treatment of the budget. This was fiercely debated for over two months, resulting in about 100 modifications opposed by the government, including major increases in spending. 81 By-elections were held in ten cities on August 1,1986. Seats were hotly contested by as many as thirteen rival candidates. Runoff elections were necessary to produce a majority in some instances. The defeat of a candidate backed by Montazeri in Tehran was seen as a setback for liberalization. Although accusations by the leftist People's Mujahidin were presumably exaggerated, the human rights picture was not good. Amnesty International pointed to "continuing, large scale executions . . . following s u m m a r y trials." 82 A United Nations report issued in February 1987 estimated that 7,000 people had been executed since the overthrow of the shah in 1979, mostly during the first few years, and that the number had dropped to 500 during 1974 and was continuing to drop slightly during 1985 and 1986.83 A November 1986 United Nations report on the matter was widely criticized for its failure to document allegations of torture and executions. A resulting General Assembly resolution expressed "deep concern over summary and arbitrary executions, the right to freedom f r o m torture or cruel, i n h u m a n or degrading treatment or punishment." 84 AFGHANISTAN remained under a regime imposed by the USSR and backed u p by about 120,000 Soviet troops. The withdrawal of about 6 percent of these troops in late 1986 seemed not to portend any basic change, and there were reports that even these would be replaced. The various resistance groups that controlled most of the countryside repeatedly engaged in bloody clashes with the Soviet and Soviet-backed forces. Talks in Geneva between Pakistani and Afghan representatives aiming at a formula for Soviet withdrawal

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and n o n i n t e r f e r e n c e in Afghanistan's internal affairs were suspended in August but resumed the following February. The guerrillas rejected the government's attempt to institute a unilateral ceasefire at the beginning of 1987. Presumably reflecting Soviet wishes, Babrak Karmal resigned as general secretary of the ruling People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) in May and was replaced by Najib Allah, former head of the secret police and, like his predecessor, a member of the Parcham faction of the party. In November, Karmal resigned from the ceremonial presidency, and Najib Allah took over this role the following month. Karmal also resigned from the politburo. Except for pointing to growing factionalism in the Parcham faction, this apparently represented no basic change in the nature of the regime. There were, however, continuing efforts to broaden the regime. Non-Communists—businessmen, tribal leaders, and ulama—have been brought into top party and government organs. Private business has been allowed a major role, and the government distributes large amounts of money for building mosques and supporting other Islamic activities in an effort to reassure the overwhelmingly religious population. There were several attempts to establish representative bodies, however tame. Local elections were held early in 1986, with government-approved nonparty members elected to 60 percent of the offices. 8 5 There is a handpicked National Assembly and a tribal assembly. Najib Allah also announced that political leaders now outside the country would be welcomed into the government if they r e t u r n e d . 8 6 A commission described as representing the various classes, nationalities, and tribes was set up to draft a constitution. The resistance groups indicated that they also planned to hold elections for a deliberative council in areas under their control and in refugee camps in Pakistan. In October 1986, Najib Allah denied that a Soviet-style system is his goal and ridiculed claims that Moscow brought him to power. He proclaimed that he was working for reconciliation with the guerrillas and expects his country to develop a multiparty system. Previous statements by Karmal specified that such parties would have to "agree with the goals of the revolution." 8 7 Najib Allah's emphasis in December on the strengthening of the PDPA was more to the point, and no one believed it contemplated any real sharing of power. He refused to answer a question about whether the PDPA would contemplate sharing control over the military and security forces with opposition groups. 88

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In N o v e m b e r 1 9 8 6 , t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s i s s u e d a b l e a k r e p o r t o n t h e s t a t e o f h u m a n r i g h t s in t h e c o u n t r y . W i d e s p r e a d against

civilians

and

torture

and

killing

of

atrocities

prisoners

were

r e p o r t e d — c o m m i t t e d mostly b y Soviet troops. The resistance forces w e r e a l s o b l a m e d f o r s o m e a t r o c i t i e s . It w a s e s t i m a t e d t h a t a t h i r d of t h e p o p u l a t i o n h a d fled t h e c o u n t r y — 2 . 8 m i l l i o n t o P a k i s t a n a n d 1.9 million planning

to Iran. T h e r e p o r t

to m o v e

said

300,000 people

that the g o v e r n m e n t

from the provinces near

was the

Pakistani b o r d e r . 8 9 A General A s s e m b l y resolution expressed the members' "grave concern."90

NOTES 1. Africa News, ed. 27 (September 1, 1986), p.16. 2. West Africa, no. 3585 (May 2 6 , 1 9 8 6 ) , p.1134. 3. West Africa, no. 3604 ( October 6, 1986), pp.2093-2094. 4. Africa Confidential, ed. 27 (March 26, 1986), p.4. 5. African Report, ed. 31 (May-June 1986), p.57. 6. New York Times, February 6, 1986, p.5. 7. African Report, ed. 31 (March-April, 1986), pp.48-49. 8. Ibid., September-October 1986, p.52. 9. See Index on Censorship 15 (January 1986), p.33; (February 1986), p.38; and (March 1986), p.38. 10. Africa Confidential, ed. 27 (September 3, 1986), p.6. 11. Lisa A n d e r s o n , " Q a d h d h a f i and His O p p o s i t i o n , " Middle East Journal 40 (Spring 1986), p.237. 12. The Middle East, no. 138 (April 1986), p.52. 13. See Africa Confidential, ed. 27 (March 12, 1986), pp.1-4. 14. Arabia 6 (July 1986), p.30. 15. Index on Censorship 15 (August 1986), p.37. 16. S e e M a r y C u r t i u s , " M u b a r a k M o v e s to S h o r e U p E g y p t D e m o c r a c y , " Christian Science Monitor, February 6, 1987, p. 9-10. 17. New York Times, October 2, 1986, p.5. 18. The Middle East, no. 142 (August 1986), p.41. 19. See Paul J a b b a r , "Egypt's Crisis, A m e r i c a ' s D i l e m m a , " Foreign Affairs 64 (Summer 1986), pp.960-980. 20. Africa Confidential, ed. 27 (March 2 6 , 1 9 8 6 ) , p.2. 21. Ihsan A. Hijazi, "Cabinet Pact Gives Lebanon a Respite," New York Times, September 4, 1986. 22. Julie Flint, " T o w n Tells of a D a y of Torture," Manchester Guardian Weekly, March 2, 1986. 23. Ihsan A. Hijazi, " L e b a n e s e Assert T o w n W a s Raided," New York Times, J a n u a r y 1 , 1 9 8 7 . 24. Ihsan A. Hijazi, "Beirut Christians P u r g e Opponents," New York Times, October, 1 2 , 1 9 8 6 .

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25. Frederick W. Axelgard, "Iraqi Woes Magnified by Economic Crucnch," Christian Science Monitor, December 12, 1986. 26. Index on Censorship 15 (March 1986), p.39; (April 1986), p.38. 27. See Ibid., February 1986, pp.28-53. 28. The Middle East, no. 136 (February 8, 1986), p.25. 29. The Middle East, no. 142 (August 1986), p.14. 30. Ibid., p.15. 31. Shireen T. Hunter, "The Gulf Economic Crisis and Its Social and Political Consequences," Middle East Journal 40 (Autumn 1986), p.609. 32. Ibid. 33. Index on Censorship 15 (June 1986), p.37; (September 1986), p.47. 34. Judith Miller, "A Saudi Amnesty Frees Half of Jailed Americans," New York Times, November 23, 1986, pp.1, 3. 35. New York Times, December 7, 1986, p.28. 36. New York Times, February 10, 1986. 37. Index on Censorship 15 (October 1986), p.52. 38. For background, see Robert D. Burrowes, "The Yemen Arab Republic and the Ali Abdallah Salih Regime: 1978-1984," Middle East Journal 39 (Summer 1985), pp.287-316. 39. Benny Morris, "The Price of Unity," Jerusalem Post, international ed., December 7-13, 1986, p.10. 40. Sammy Smooha, "Political Intolerance: Threatening Israel's Democracy," New Outlook 29 (July 1986), p.27. 41. See Mary Curtius, "Israel's Self-Made Woes," Christian Science Monitor, January 6, 1987, pp.1,14. 42. New York Times, August 25, 1986, p.8. 43. Benny Morris, "Security Chief Shalom Offered to Quit," Jerusalem Post, international ed., June 1-7,1986, p . l l . 44. Jerusalem Post, international ed., February 15-22, 1986, p.l. 45. Donald S. Will, "The Impending Polarization of Israeli Society," Arab Studies Quarterly 8 (Summer 1986), pp. 231-252. 46. Thomas L. Friedman, "Kahane Is Fading, But Not His Ideas," New York Times, November 13, 1986, p.4. 47. Ya'acov Friedler, "Poll: Most Jews Suspicious of Arabs," Jerusalem Post, international ed., January 19-25,1986, p.10. 48. Friedman, p.4. 49. Friedler, p.10. 50. Sarah Graham-Brown, "Two Systems of Education," Index on Censorship 15 (March 1986), p.41. 51. Jerusalem Post, international ed., December 21-27,1986, p.4. 52. Ibid., February 23-March 1,1986, p.8. 53. Asher Wallfish, "The Knesset's Big Double Fiasco," Jerusalem Post, international ed., August 9-16,1986. 54. Lea Levavi, "Current Electoral System Is Greater Threat to Democracy than Kahane," Jerusalem Post, international ed., August 3-9, 1986, p.ll. 55. Jerusalem Post, international ed., February 16-22, 1986, p.13; and

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June 29-July 5, 1986. 56. Ibid., February 16-22,1986, p.13. 57. See Thomas L. Friedman, "Israel's Uneasy Mix of Religion and State," New York Times, June 22, 1986, p.E3. 58. New York Times, June 16, 1986, p.3. 59. Christian Science Monitor, June 17, 1986, p.2. 60. Jerusalem Post, international ed., March 16-22, 1986, p.2. 61. Ibid., February 8-15,1986, p . l l . 62. Ibid., January 5-11,1986, p.17. 63. See Robert C. Zelnick, "Israeli Democracy Stops at the 'Green Line,'" Christian Science Monitor, June 3, 1986. 64. M e r o n Benvenisti, "The Second Republic," Jerusalem Post, international ed., January 11-17,1987, pp.8-9. 65. For other examples, see "Chronology of Violations of Academic Freedom," Education under Occupation, Summer 1986, p.5. 66. See Journal of Palestine Studies, Fall 1986, pp.199-200. 67. Benny Morris, '"Trouble Ahead in the Territories,'" Jerusalem Post, international ed., March 2-8, 1986, p.6. 68. Mary Anne Weaver, "Patience, Time Running Out as Latest U.N. Cyprus Plan Is Rejected," Christian Science Monitor, June 18, 1986, p.12; and George D. Moffett, 111, "Turkish-Cypriot Chief Seeks Partnership' with Island's Greeks," (interview), Christian Science Monitor, October 3, 1986, p.8. 69. New York Times, July 5, 1986, p.5. 70. The Middle East, no. 140 (June 1986), p.58. 71. Ibid., no.144 (November 1986), p.14. 72. New York Times, November 11, 1986, p.17. 73. Claire Tréan, "'Dessert' of Democracy That Leaves a Bitter Taste,"Manchester Guardian Weekly, August 3, 1986, p.14 (trans, from Le Monde, July 4, 1986). 74. Ibid. 75. Jean Gueyras, "No Holds Barred in Factional Fight behind Khomeini," Manchester Guardian Weekly, October 5, 1986, p.14 (trans, from Le Monde, September 21-22, 1986). 76. The Middle East, no. 141 (March 1986), p.7. 77. Gueyras, p.14. 78. Ibid. 79. Ihsan A. Hijazi, "Hostage's Release Is Linked to Shift in Iranian Policy," New York Times, November 4, 1986, pp.1,10. 80. New York Times, November 27,1986, p . l l . 81. Kayhan International, March 15, 1986. 82. New York Times, November 13, 1986, p . l l . 83. New York Times, February 13,1986, p.4. 84. Ibid., November 13, 1986, p . l l ; and November 29,1986, p.36. 85. Jonathan Steele, "Karmal Not to Seek More Soviet Troops," Manchester Guardian Weekly, March 2, 1986, p.7. 86. Steven R. W e i s m a n , "Afghan War Is Not Just a Matter of

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87. Jonathan Steele, "Moscow's Kabul Campaign," MER1P Middle Reports 16, (July-August 1986), p.8. 88. New York Times, January 19, 1987, p.9. 89. Ibid., November 21, 1986, pp.1,4. 90. Ibid., November 29,1986, p.36.

East

Insecure Democracy Partial Democracy Limited Authoritarianism Absolutisms

South Asia DOUGLAS C. MAKEIG South Asia made strides during 1986 in restoring or maintaining the institutions of representative democracy. With the lifting of martial law in Bangladesh in November 1986, all seven states of the region could claim for the first time in over a decade to have systems of government that are nominally democratic. Although the institutional arrangements and the viability of the democratic experiments vary tremendously from one country to the next, South Asia is currently the only region of the Afro-Asian world where a semblance of democracy prevails. For present purposes the seven states of South Asia are divided into three categories: 1) established democratic systems (India and Sri Lanka); 2) former martial regimes which are in the process of reinstituting democracy (Pakistan and Bangladesh); and 3) nascent democracies headed by constitutional monarchs (Nepal and Bhutan) or a powerful elected president (Maldives). The region boasts a long exposure to democratic traditions, and the democratic ideal enjoys wide popular appeal in each country. The indigenous tradition of village panchayats (elected councils), the parliamentary institutions bequeathed by the British, and the Indian democratic model are powerful sources of inspiration for the peoples of South Asia. Moreover, the regional cooperation organization (the South Asia Association of Regional Cooperation— SAARC) that was launched in December 1985 provides a potential institutional framework for promoting the cause of democracy in the region.

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I N D I A stands out as the only South Asian state that boasts a nearly unbroken democratic record. Because of its enormous population, its ethnic and religious diversity, and its seemingly intractable economic problems, India baffles many foreign observers who have regularly predicted its disintegration. India's survival as a full-fledged democracy is a continuing process, not a settled fact. However, despite its many shortcomings, India under the Congress-I government of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi remains a success in a continent where democratic ideals are more often preached than practiced. With a three-fourths majority in parliament and control over fifteen of India's twenty-four state ministries, Congress-I remains the dominant political force. Moreover, Gandhi commands a strong personal following that cuts across regional and communal lines. During 1986, however, Gandhi struggled to contain a variety of challenges that threatened to unravel the huge electoral mandate he received in December 1985. Dissident Congress-I partymen complained that Gandhi and his inner circle of westernized technocrats were out of touch with the party rank and file, and the opposition sought to exploit intra-Congress bickering. On controversial issues such as a proposed tax increase on fuel and a government-sponsored bill to provide maintenance to Muslim divorcees, Gandhi was forced to make tactical retreats in the face of strong criticism. In August, Congress-I issued a revised twenty-point political program that catered to the interests of rural voters and the poor. This outreach strategy was designed to reestablish the p a r t y ' s populist credentials. However, G a n d h i ' s political honeymoon has ended. India's most vexing problem remained the volatile Punjab state, where a small minority of militant Sikhs have been waging a terrorist campaign since 1981. The militants' objective is an independent Sikh homeland known as "Khalistan." Although most Sikhs reject the secessionists' call for an armed struggle against "Hindu India," the bloodshed of the past five years has created a tense communal situation. The crisis has hardened attitudes on both sides. Moderate Sikhs have begun questioning whether secular democracy and the Indian federal system can provide adequate guarantees of the community's survival, and Hindus have reacted to the spreading violence by arming themselves in self-defense. During his first year in office, Gandhi made considerable progress in addressing Sikh grievances and restoring public confidence in the government's commitment to secularism and communal reconciliation. In July 1985, a faction of the Akali Dal,

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the major Sikh political party, entered into a political agreement with New Delhi. Both parties hoped the Punjab Accord would isolate the radicals, restore elected state government, and protect the Indian Union against the mounting separatist challenge. Three months after the Accord was signed, voters in the Punjab elected a moderate Akali Dal state ministry headed by Surjit Singh Barnala. The new government pledged to carry out the provisions of the Accord and to work with New Delhi in combating terrorism, but Sikh militants vowed to sabotage the settlement. The new political dispensation in the Punjab was hailed by most observers as Gandhi's finest hour. The political momentum of the Accord slowed noticeably in 1986, however. A major sticking point was the status of Chandigarh, a disputed city which has served as the joint capital of the Punjab and neighboring Haryana since the early 1970s. The Accord stipulated that jurisdiction over the city would revert to the Punjab. In exchange, Hindu-majority Haryana would be compensated by the transfer from Punjab of a strip of Hindi-speaking settlements. New Delhi appointed a commission to oversee the transfer and delineate the new state boundaries. On January 26, the day before the transfer was to be finalized, a commission reported that the linguistic census that had been hastily undertaken was flawed. Gandhi then reneged on the Chandigarh understanding and named a new commission to look into the question. To the distress of both state governments, the new commission arrived at the same impasse in June 1986, forcing New Delhi to delay implementation of the transfer again. The tussle over Chandigarh demoralized the Barnala ministry and provided political ammunition to those Sikhs who opposed the reconciliation process. On the other side, Hindus feared that territorial concessions made on a communal/linguistic basis in the Punjab would set a dangerous precedent for minorities in other states. Caught between these conflicting political demands, Gandhi equivocated and lost credibility in both communities. His own Congress-I party was deeply divided over the issue and stood to lose political support, regardless of the final shape of the settlement. If left unresolved, the issue of Chandigarh will continue to fuel communal fires throughout northern India. The security situation in the Punjab remained tense. After the Accord was signed, the Indian army was relieved of domestic peacekeeping duties by federally-controlled paramilitary forces and the local constabulary. Although the army remained poised to resume counterterrorist operations, Gandhi and Barnala indicated

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their determination to keep the army in the barracks. The army resented being called upon by civil authorities to put down domestic violence. Moreover, Sikhs alleged that the army had committed atrocities. In order to deflect public criticism of his handling of the Punjab crisis, Gandhi repeatedly charged that Pakistan armed and trained Sikh terrorists. Pakistan denied any involvement in the Punjab and accused Gandhi of raising the "foreign hand" bogey to mask his government's failure. Local peacekeeping forces have been unable to curb the violence and win public confidence. During the first five months of the Barnala ministry, terrorist killings averaged about two per day. The average subsequently rose to seven murders per day. 1 While some of the terrorists' victims are moderate, progovernment Sikhs, most of the victims are Hindus. By striking randomly against Hindus, the terrorists hope to spread fear and trigger a Hindu exodus from the state. Reports suggest that many Hindu families have heeded the warning, sold their lands, and left the state. Substantial numbers of Sikhs residing outside the Punjab have also fled to their ancestral homes to escape persecution at the hands of militant Hindus. This transfer of population along communal lines is reminiscent of the massive migration of Sikh, Hindu, and Muslim refugees during the 1947 partition of India. Several grisly episodes that occurred during the year point to the serious terrorist threat. In July, Sikh commandos highjacked a bus in Muktsar, a sleepy Punjabi village. After segregating the Sikh passengers, the terrorists gunned down fifteen men, women, and children—all Hindus. The incident created a nationwide outrage and Hindu mobs in Delhi began roaming the streets in search of Sikhs. Although prompt army action defused the situation on that occasion, there is a danger that the riots that claimed over 1,000 Sikh lives in the immediate aftermath of Indira Gandhi's assassination in November 1984 could be repeated. New Delhi responded to the crisis by creating a five-kilometer "no man's land" along the entire length of the Punjab border with Pakistan. Under this scheme, the army was responsible for apprehending suspected terrorists who transit the border. In August the nation was rocked again when Sikh terrorists assassinated General A. S. Vaidya, the retired chief of staff of the Indian army. Vaidya was singled out because of his role in the June 1984 assault on the terrorist stronghold in the Sikh holy temple of Amritsar. Shadowy Sikh terrorist organizations publicized a "hit list" of government officials targeted for the same fate. Heading the list were Rajiv Gandhi and the Sikh president of India, Giani Zail

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Singh. In November terrorists staged another bus hijacking in Hoshiarpur District, and twenty-four Hindu passengers were summarily executed. Once again, the army was put on nationwide alert to prevent a violent Hindu backlash. New Delhi was reluctant to dismiss the Barnala government and reimpose central rule on the state, which would undo the political gains Gandhi made during his first year in office. Akali factionalism, however, threatened to paralyze the administration and force Gandhi's hand. In November, Akali moderates lost political control of the Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee (SGPC), an important Sikh organization that manages temple revenues and provides political guidance to the community. Akali radicals led by Barnala's archrival, G. S. Tohra, won a majority of SGPA seats. Immediately after his election, Tohra ordered security forces to vacate the Golden Temple. New Delhi feared that Sikh terrorists would take control of the Golden Temple again. In the northeastern state of Assam, the political accord that Gandhi finalized in August 1985 fared considerably better than the Punjab Accord. Under the terms of the settlement, New Delhi agreed to expel Bangladeshi immigrants who entered the state illegally after 1971. Those who had arrived earlier were eligible to apply for citizenship after a waiting period of ten years. The Asom Gono Parishad (AGP) state ministry headed by Chief Minister A. K. Mahanta complained, however, that New Delhi was delaying implementation of the accord. The AGP noted that few immigrants had been expelled, that New Delhi was slow to construct a barbedwire fence along the Bangladesh frontier, and that the center was neglecting the state's battered economy. After completing its first year in power, the AGP ministry won respect for providing effective leadership in a state which was wracked by years of violent protests. The AGP's transformation from a protest movement to a ruling government is a testament to the underlying strength of Indian democracy. In June, Indian democracy scored another victory when tribal insurgents in the remote northeastern territory of Mizoram agreed to lay down their arms and participate in the democratic process. The Mizo rebellion is one of several tribal insurgencies that have festered in the region for decades. Operating under the banner of the Mizo National Front (MNF), the rebels sought to secede from the Indian Union and form an independent Mizo state incorporating several related tribal groups in neighboring states. Although the

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Indian army always held the upper hand, security forces were unable to defeat the Mizos, who enjoyed widespread local support and had access to sanctuaries in neighboring Bangladesh and Burma. Negotiations between New Delhi and the MNF had dragged on for years. Both sides tacitly acknowledged the futility of the struggle. It appears that Gandhi's arrival in power facilitated the negotiating process. Within a year after Gandhi took office, the M N F leader, Laldenga (his full name), returned to India from selfimposed exile in London. Shortly thereafter, the MNF declared a unilateral ceascfire. Gandhi responded by ordering a halt to counterinsurgency operations, relaxing draconian security measures, and legalizing the MNF. Under the June accord, Mizoram will be granted full statehood. More importantly, the state will enjoy a special status in the Indian constitution similar to the constitutional privileges extended to Nagaland. Under these provisions, non-Mizo Indians are prevented from owning land, trading, or even entering Mizoram without state government permission. Furthermore, Mizo customary law will take precedence over the Indian civil code and the state bureaucracy will be staffed exclusively by Mizos. 2 Laldenga returned to a hero's welcome in the capital city of Aizawl. In August, he was sworn in as chief minister of a provisional C o n g r e s s - I / M N F coalition government. As stipulated under the peace treaty, the battle-hardened MNF guerrillas abandoned their jungle hideouts and surrendered their weapons. While observers applauded Gandhi for reaching a settlement with the Mizos, the accord also raised questions. Some feared that striking bargains with separatist movements could set an example for other similarly inclined groups. If the process of granting special constitutional privileges to dissident minorities is allowed to continue, India's national unity could be threatened. Critics also argued that a dangerous precedent was set when Gandhi extended political legitimacy to a group that achieved power through violence. Fears that the Mizo settlement would have a demonstration effect were realized in August when the Nepalese minority in the tea districts of West Bengal began agitating for a separate state within the Indian Union. The Nepalese argued that although they were Indian citizens, the West Bengal state government had always treated them as second-class citizens. To safeguard their language and culture, the agitators proposed the formation of a Nepalesemajority state, " G o r k h a l a n d . " The statehood m o v e m e n t is spearheaded by the Gorkha National Liberation Front (GNLF), led

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bv Subash Ghinsingh, a retired army corporal whose fiery oratory draws huge crowds in Darjeeling. The GNLF political strategy calls fcr a civil disobedience campaign in the classic Indian tradition. As the agitation gathered momentum, however, several violent ircidents occurred. There also developed a noticeable anti-Bengali tenor to the movement. The Gorkhaland movement drove a wedge between the Gandhi government and the Communist-led Left Front government in West Bengal. The Left Front labeled the GNLF an "antinational conspiracy" and called on New Delhi to lend support in suppressing the agitation. The Gandhi government obliged by mild criticism of the GNLF. Gandhi, however, was not to be very helpful since Left Front political losses could become Congress-I gains. Both governments were eyeing state elections scheduled for March 1987. West Bengal Chief Minister Jyoti Basu responded by criticizing Gandhi for playing politics with a potentially serious threat to national unity. 3 The Gorkha agitation was a minor affair, however, compared to the nationwide political storm Gandhi created in February when he introduced into parliament the Muslim Women's (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Bill. The legislation allowed Muslim women to petition civil courts to force ex-husbands to provide alimony—a concept that falls outside traditional Islamic jurisprudence. The case grew out of a civil suit filed in 1985 by a Muslim divorcee who asked the court to defend her property rights as an Indian citizen. The court ruled that all women, regardless of community, had equal rights under the law. Taking his cue from the court, Gandhi sought legislative relief by championing the Shah Bano ruling as a women's rights issue. Gandhi, however, miscalculated the level of opposition to the bill. The overwhelming feeling in the Muslim community was that the bill undercut constitutional provisions which guaranteed the legal supremacy of the shar'ia (Muslim personal law) in all internal matters affecting the Muslim community. Government meddling in Muslim personal law was seen as a breach of trust with a religious minority 100 million strong that had consistently supported Congress governments since independence. As India Today magazine noted: "The controversy has cut into the innermost core of the Muslim religious identity. In the wellspring of their minority psyche, it strengthens the community's feelings of persecution at the hands of a majority which, many of them believe, regards [Muslims] as ungrateful, disloyal, and bigoted." 4

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The bill galvanized Muslim public opinion against the government. Rallying behind the cry "Islam in Danger," angry demonstrators marched on parliament, and Islamic organizations across the nation lined up against the bill. Political commentators noted that the liberal, westernized prime minister acted hastily in a sensitive communal matter that had serious political implications for the nation in general and the Congress-I in particular. Muslims suspected that the bill was the first step in a drive to enact a uniform civil code for all communities, an allegation that Gandhi denied vigorously. Several prominent Congress-I Muslims resigned from the party in protest. If allowed to continue, Muslim disaffection with Congress could undo the electoral calculus that has sustained the party in power for all but two years since independence in 1947. Muslims are a critical Congress-I constituency, providing the swing vote in two Congress-ruled states (Uttar Pradesh and Bihar), in two oppositionruled states (Assam and West Bengal), and in the Muslim-majority states of Jammu and Kashmir. Taken aback by the controversy, Gandhi withdrew the bill from consideration, but he refused to intercede in the discretion of civil courts to exercise jurisdiction over divorce cases. The dispute over civil and religious law thus challenges the government's ability to protect minority rights. Although strains in the Indian federal system were clearly evident in 1986, the country's basic commitment to parliamentary democracy remains strong. On balance, India's qualifications as the "world's largest democracy" are well earned. SRI LANKA's pro-Western government under President Junius Jayewardene made little headway in 1986 in the battle to put down or accommodate a Tamil separatist challenge to the territorial integrity of the island state. Although negotiations dragged on, hardliners on both sides of the ethnic divide continued to press for a military solution to the country's communal problem. Since the outbreak of vicious anti-Tamil riots in August 1983, the Tamil separatist cause has escalated from a low-level terrorist menace to a full-scale insurgency. Under the banner of numerous leftwing organizations collectively known as the Tigers, Tamil militants seek to carve out an independent nation of Tamil Eelam from Tamil-majority areas in the north and east of the island. Whether or not they support the successionist cause, most Sri Lankan Tamils believe that Sinhalese chauvinism has forced the minority community to take up arms in self-defense. Tamil grievances center around four issues: 1) the role of Tamil language in the affairs of the

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nation; 2) Sinhalese settlement on traditionally Tamil lands; 3) Tamil representation in government schools and services; and 4) formulas for powersharing or partition. Tamils comprise approximately 18 percent of the country's population of 16 million. Organized along Maoist guerrilla lines, the Tigers have the advantage of havens in the nearby Indian state of Tamil Nadu, where 60 million ethnic coreligionists reside. The Sinhalesedominated government in Colombo charges that India has given arms and training to the guerrillas. New Delhi denies any such involvement. Under Rajiv Gandhi, India has offered its good offices in political negotiations designed to offer the Tamils a constitutional stake in a unified, democratic Sri Lanka. The Tigers, however, have vowed to continue the independence struggle at all costs. Tiger spokesmen based in India have repeatedly called on New Delhi to intervene militarily, taking India's intervention in the 1971 Pakistani civil war as a precedent. Although some Indian Tamils have also called for military intervention, New Delhi has consistently ruled it out. Throughout the year, the armed struggle in Sri Lanka stalemated. Both sides initiated bloody offensives, but none tipped the military scales. The Tigers effectively control the Tamil heartland in the northernmost reaches of the Jaffna peninsula, where they have set up a parallel administration that collects taxes, runs schools, and dispenses justice. Government troops in the region are confined to Jaffna city and a few heavily fortified areas in the countryside. The local population regards these troops as an army of occupation. The army moves through the region only during daylight hours and in mechanized convoys. In the hotly contested eastern region around the port cities of Batticaloa and Trincomallee, the army enjoys a degree of local support from Sinhalese settlers and the local Muslim population. In this region, the army has mounted an aggressive and frequently brutal campaign. The army is attempting to wear down the guerrillas, reassert Colombo's control, and rally the local populace against the Tigers. There were numerous reports that both sides continued to indulge in atrocities. A third area where the Tamil population is concentrated, the capital city of Colombo, was relatively quiet in 1986. Tamil residents feared, however, that the Sinhalese government would be unable or unwilling to contain Sinhalese mobs if another Tiger attack in the north created a panic in the south.

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On the political front, the Jayewardene government pressed its search for a negotiated solution to the communal violence. Over the course of two years, negotiations have been conducted under the auspices of an All-Party Conference (APC). Communal hardliners, however, have refused to participate in the APC process. In some cases, extremist elements have undermined the negotiations by resorting to terrorism and intimidation. On the Sinhalese side, various Buddhist organizations and the opposition Sri Lanka Freedom Party are opposed to any concessions to the Tamils. Sinhalese extremists argue that they are a religious and linguistic minority in a region dominated by Tamil Hindus and that concessions to the Tamils could eventually imperil the existence of Sinhalese Buddhist culture. Tamil extremists have also sabotaged the talks by employing terrorist tactics against Tamil as well as Sinhalese voices of moderation. Jayewardene has adopted a three-pronged strategy. First, he has conducted negotiations with the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF), a moderate Tamil party that has indicated a willingness to accept a political solution that falls short of independence. Second, Jayewardene has pressured India to use its influence to persuade the Tigers to participate in the negotiations. Third, Jayewardene has stepped u p military pressure on the insurgents to force the pace of negotiations. The government unveiled a new series of proposals in June. Under this scheme, Tamil-majority areas in Jaffna would be governed by district councils that would enjoy considerable autonomy within the framework of a united Sri Lanka. TULF leader A. Amirthalingam detected some improvement in the government's offer. Negotiations broke down again, however, when the TULF stuck to its demand to include the eastern region as part of a unified Tamil administration. Colombo was reluctant to concede the demand because the eastern zone is an ethnically diverse region where substantial numbers of Sinhalese reside. Conceding this demand would automatically trigger a Sinhalese backlash that would threaten Jayewardene's grip on p o w e r , d e s p i t e the five-sixths' majority his United National Party holds in parliament. By year's end, the negotiations remained deadlocked. 5 Sri L a n k a p r o v i d e s a tragic example of a functioning, representative democracy gradually succumbing to an escalating cycle of terrorist violence and government repression. The economy is in shambles, voices of moderation have been drowned out by extremists, and the government has resorted to a consistent pattern of human rights violations. These excesses have precipitated an

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exodus of Tamil "boat people" to India and as far away as Canada. Sri Lanka has paid the heaviest price, however, in the gradual unraveling of the democratic fabric of the state. Even though Jayewardene remains personally committed to resolving the civil war through negotiations and communal reconciliation, his government's record suggests that a workable compromise between the Sinhalese majority and the Tamil minority lies far in the future. In PAKISTAN seven years of military rule came formally to an end on December 31, 1985. Although Pakistan's experiment in Islamic democracy remained on track during 1986, the new civilian government of Prime Minister Mohammad Khan Junejo faced a number of serious political challenges. A large section of the democratic opposition dismissed the transfer of power as a fraud. Opposition critics led by the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) argued that Zia-ul Haq, the general who overthrew the democratically elected government in 1977, still controlled the political process in his dual role as president and chief of army staff, and that Junejo lacked a popular mandate since the elections that confirmed him in power were conducted on a nonparty basis and were boycotted by the opposition. During the year, the PPP mounted a crescendo of nonviolent protests, many of which degenerated into street clashes. The PPP called for Zia's resignation, the full restoration of the 1973 constitution, and the holding of fresh elections on a party basis. The Junejo government also contended with various domestic and foreign policy problems. These included a deterioration of law and order in the countryside, a sharp increase in ethnic and sectarian tensions, and an escalating campaign of subversion and cross-border attacks waged by communist forces from neighboring Afghanistan. The restoration of democracy in Pakistan remains in the formative stage. In December 1984, President Zia staged a national referendum that empowered the unelected president to press ahead in the campaign to mold Pakistan into a fundamentalist Islamic state. Zia also interpreted his referendum victory as a mandate to retain the presidency for another five years. The next step in the transfer of power occurred when elections for the National Assembly (NA) were held in February 1985. When the NA held its inaugural session in October 1985, Zia pushed through a constitutional amendment that validated all actions taken by the regime while martial law was in force. Having protected himself and the military from civilian retribution, Zia carried out his long-deferred pledge to the

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nation and formally lifted martial law by the year's end. The military remains the ultimate arbiter of power in a political order run by civilians. Despite the army's informal watchdog role over the political process, the removal of martial law has promoted a democratic trend in a country where democratic institutions are notoriously feeble. The 1973 constitution was partially revived, basic guarantees of individual liberty were restored, and martial law courts were disbanded. The Pakistani press must still operate within the regime's limits of tolerance, and newspapers depend heavily on government advertising and subsidies. Nevertheless, the lifting of censorship has vastly improved the quantity (if not the caliber) of political reporting in Pakistan, and views of every ideological hue now reach the public through the media. Pakistan also made noticeable improvements in regard to human rights. Under martial law, the country was justifiably singled out by Western governments and humanitarian organizations as a chronic violator. Although press reports suggest that Pakistan still holds about 300 political prisoners who were originally convictcd by military tribunals, the Junejo government is committed in principle to freeing political detainees and observing the rule of law. 6 Some critics maintain that traditional Islamic punishments such as stoning, lashing, and amputation are violations of human rights. Pakistan, however, regards these punishments as part of the Islamic legal code that has gradually been introduced in place of the legal system inherited from the British. On the economic front, the Junejo government has managed to satisfy its primary political constituencies: large landholders, industrialists, the military rank and file, and middle-class shopkeepers. Despite the decline in remittances from Pakistani workers in the Middle East and the crushing burden of providing for 3 million Afghan refugees, Pakistan has enjoyed relative prosperity in recent years. Even though the country faces a huge debt service obligation, the private sector is booming and U.S. aid flows are expected to increase. The opposition has thus been unable to exploit economic disatisfaction with the regime. To the surprise of many critics who regarded the NA as a rubberstamp debate society, it began to play a substantive role in formulating legislation and providing political direction for the country. One of Junejo's first decisions after convening parliament in 1986 was to legalize political parties. He reasoned that performance alone could not ensure his government's survival unless he and his supporters could confront the opposition with their own political

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organization. Zia was openly skeptical of the proposal. In his experience, political factionalism was the bane of Pakistani politics that had historically triggered army intervention. Junejo prevailed in this early test of strength, and the NA passed legislation providing for party politicking. In order to placate the military, however, the government retained the power to withhold registration of any party d e e m e d "antinational" or "un-Islamic." There are indications that several small opposition parties will abandon the agitation route to power and register as recognized political parties. The PPP, however, regarded the registration requirement as a ploy to split the opposition and deprive the PPP of legitimacy. Junejo's choice for a government political vehicle was the Muslim League, the party created in the 1930s by Pakistani founding father M o h a m m e d Ali Jinnah. Like most political parties in Pakistan, the Muslim League has a checkered history of political infighting, weak leadership, and backroom skullduggery. Junejo himself belongs to the old guard of the party. Lacking any viable alternative, Junejo resucitated the party, rechristened it the Pakistan Muslim League (PML), and began to build the party organization from the top down. His supporters in the bicameral NA and the four provincial assemblies dutifully signed u p as charter members. Since most opposition parties chose to boycott the 1985 election, the government's only opposition is a small Independent Parliamentary Group led by the conservative Jamiat-i-Islami and a section of kindred fundamentalist parties. At this stage the PML is a king's party that has failed to appeal to the public. While it enjoys the tremendous advantage of official patronage, it has only a rudimentary grassroots structure. The party's main bastion is the Punjab, the country's dominant province. This fact raises suspicions in the three minority provinces, where local resentments against Punjabi domination run deep. In addition, most PML elected officials are political neophytes with no personal base of support within the party or in the countryside. Despite these handicaps, Junejo vowed to complete the formidable task of partybuilding prior to facing the electorate in 1990. Junejo faced a critical test in April when the PPP mounted a direct challenge to the legitimacy of the new order. The campaign to overthrow Zia began when Benazir Bhutto, the PPP head, returned to Pakistan after two years of self-imposed exile in London. The 33year-old Benazir is the daughter of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, the charismatic PPP founder whose government was overthrown by Zia in 1977. Although the regime was clearly unnerved by Benazir's

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triumphant homecoming, Zia and Junejo were careful to point out that Pakistan had rejoined the democratic fold of nations. As long as Benazir and her supporters observed the law, they were free to campaign as they saw fit. The government-controlled media, however, avoided any mention of the PPP campaign. Benazir's arrival in Lahore on April 10 was a momentous public event for a population grown weary of martial law and lackluster politics. Over 1.5 million people converged on the city to greet her. Benazir attacked the military for commandeering the government and condemned Zia for sending her father to the gallows. Buoyed by her mammoth reception in Lahore, Benazir spent the next month barnstorming the country. Huge crowds of devoted followers and curious onlookers greeted her at every stop. After retreating from public view during the holy month of Ramadan in order to regain strength and map out strategy, Benazir returned to the streets in August, determined to translate the outpouring of support into a "people's referendum" against Zia, whipping up popular emotions to the point that the government became immobilized. If Zia opted to call out the army to put down her "doves of democracy," Benazir calculated that the Punjabi-dominated army would refuse to fire on its Punjabi countrymen. Benazir did not attack Junejo directly. Some observers speculated that once Zia was removed, the prime minister might serve as an interim figure until fresh elections returned the PPP to power. Benazir was also careful not to allow the agitation to take an anti-American direction. U.S. support would be crucial if and when the PPP returned to power. Some PPP supporters believed that Washington might even throw its lot with Benazir, much as the United States backed Corazon Aquino in the Philippines. Benazir's scenario proved wildly optimistic. A head-on clash with the government was scheduled for August 14, Pakistan's national day. Junejo, fearing that another massive Bhutto rally would end in violence, banned scheduled PPP and PML rallies. The PPP, determined not to let down its supporters who were itching for a "final" confrontation, vowed to defy the ban. Junejo then ordered the arrest of Benazir, most of the PPP leadership, and the leaders of allied opposition parties. Although the government was aware that mass arrests would tarnish the country's new credentials as a democracy, Junejo applied the full force of the state to prevent the demonstration. The arrests sparked riots in a number of cities. Particularly hard hit was Lahore, where police and army units battled youthful demonstrators. After a week of rioting in the Punjab, the violence shifted to the PPP provincial stronghold in the Sind, where the

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situation deteriorated rapidly. The province also experienced an alarming increase in banditry and street crime. In October and November the capital city of Karachi experienced bloody riots between Pathan immigrants and muhajirs (Muslims who had emigrated from India in 1947). Baluchistan and the Northwest Frontier Province were largely unaffected, however, because the PPP does not command broad support in the two minority provinces. In the pivotal province of Punjab, where 60 percent of Pakistan's population resides, the PPP bid to win power fizzled after the initial bout of violence, and Junejo managed to weather the storm. Zia was on pilgrimage in Mecca throughout the ordeal. After release from prison in early September, Benazir admitted that she had acted prematurely. PPP stalwarts criticized her for reaching for power before the party had laid the necessary political groundwork. T w o of her father's trusted lieutenants, Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi and Ghulam Mustafa Khar, bolted the PPP to form their own People's Party. Benazir's supporters in the Sind were particularly upset by the party's failure to sustain the movement in the Punjab. Sindhi resentment against the Punjab fed the growing separatist movement in the province and threatened to undermine the party's position in the Sind. The nine coalition partners of the P r P that make up the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy also criticized Benazir, complaining that she bypassed them and attempted to catapult the PPP into office without coalition partners. The PML will have its hands full gearing up for the electoral challenge slated for 1990. Some observers speculate that the army will never allow another PPP government to assume office. The PPP enjoys considerable popular appeal, particularly among Pakistani youth, but large sections of the population share bitter memories of the Bhutto years in power (1972-1977). For all the shortcomings of martial law and the current quasidemocratic government, many Pakistanis fear that a PPP regime could not guarantee political stability. The fiasco suffered by the PPP in August suggests that its support is long on emotion and short on organization. A test run of the 1990 elections could occur in 1987, however, when local elections are to take place. To summarize, Pakistan's ongoing political experiment offers hope that the country can achieve a measure of stability within a democratic framework. However, the fragile democratic edifice could crumble rapidly. Although the army does not relish its role of political arbiter, it stands ready to intervene again if the political,

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economic, or security situation deteriorates. BANGLADESH became a civilianized militocracy after staging a bloodless coup in March 1982. Lieutenant-General H. M. Ershad groped for a strategy to restore elected civilian government while simultaneously retaining the army's self-appointed role as the arbiter of power. Ershad cancelled scheduled elections three times after concluding that an opposition boycott would render the polls meaningless. In the absence of a consensus among civilian politicians and army commanders over the ground rules for a return to democracy, he removed his uniform to offer himself as a presidential candidate. Ershad set the stage for his own election when he resigned as chief of army staff in August 1986 and patched together the Jatiyo Party, a personal political vehicle. After engaging in lengthy negotiations with the major opposition parties, Ershad succeeded in persuading the powerful Awami League to participate in a parliamentary election. The AL, led by Hasina Wajed, headed a fifteenparty center-left alliance. A second opposition group headed by the conservative Bangladesh National Party (BNP) rejected Ershad's offer and vowed to boycott any election held under martial law. Hasina's dramatic decision to break with the BNP and participate in the May 7 election allowed Ershad and his supporters to drive a wedge in the opposition ranks. As expected, Ershad scored a convincing victory. His candidates secured 156 of the 300 contested seats. In addition, Ershad controlled thirty appointed seats and had the support of some independents. The AL entered the newly revived parliament as the main opposition party. Press reports noted, h o w e v e r , that E r s h a d ' s victory was tainted by electoral irregularities such as ballot-stuffing and the intimidation of opposition candidates. Undeterred by criticism of his clumsy handling of the election, Ershad scheduled a presidential contest for October 15. All opposition parties refused to participate. In the absence of any credible challenger, Ershad received over 90 percent of the ballots cast. Parliament convened on November 10. Ershad's first order of business was to pass a constitutional amendment validating all actions taken by the regime while martial law was in force. Once again, the combined opposition boycotted the session on the plea that parliament should not be convened prior to the removal of martial law. Ershad barely succeeded in mustering the two-thirds majority required to amend the constitution. Immediately after passing the so-called Indemnification Act, Ershad ended martial

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law, restored the 1972 constitution, and disbanded military tribunals. According to Ershad, the transition to democracy is essentially complete now that the army has returned to the barracks and an elected civilian regime is in place. However, Ershad and his Jatiyo Party lack broad popular appeal, despite their solid majority in parliament. Moreover, Ershad is an uninspiring leader who is widely criticized for corruption and election-rigging. The civilian opposition remains suspicious and regards the regime as a civilian front for the military. The army remains the key political player in a fragile democratic experiment only nominally run by civilians. Thus, while Bangladesh in 1986 made strides in the direction of democracy, success remains in doubt. King Birendra, NEPAL'S constitutional monarch, rules over a landlocked mountain kingdom where political parties have been banned since 1960. The 140-member Rashtriya Panchayat (national parliament) is dominated by the king's supporters, despite factional infighting and palace intrigues. Birendra exercises firm control over the direction and pace of political change in the country. In 1980, voters narrowly rejected a referendum that would have changed the panchayat system to allow for a multiparty system in which the king's powers would have been circumscribed by a more assertive parliament. Since the defeat of the referendum, political pressures to alter the system have been mounting in Nepal. On May 12, Birendra staged the nation's second general election under the partyless panchayat system. In order to promote the palace's image as an impartial overseer of the electoral process, the government of Prime Minister Lokendra Bahadur Chand resigned in March as a prelude to the general election. In its place, Birendra appointed an interim government composed of administrators who were barred from standing as candidates. Over 1,500 candidates filed for election to the 112 seats at stake. The major opposition force, the Nepali Congress Party headed by veteran politician G. P. Koirala, carried out its pledge to boycott the election. Voter turnout was brisk. An estimated 60 percent of the country's 9 million voters cast ballots. Most observers agreed that the election was conducted fairly, with a minimum of violence. Although a number of leftists and outspoken critics of the monarchy managed to win office, Birendra retained an identifiable majority. It remains to be seen, however, whether he can stave off mounting opposition de-

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mands to replace the panchayat system with a conventional, Westminster-style democratic system. The new Nepali ministry that took office in June is headed by Prime Minister Maraich Man Sigh Shresta. 7 King Jigme Singye Wangchuk has led the isolated kingdom of BHUTAN since 1972. The Bhutanese system of government is a pyramidal structure of elected councils extending from the village level to the royal advisory council. Politics in Bhutan reflect the Buddhist and feudal character of the country. Village elections are held every three years with each family unit casting one vote. As in Nepal, opposition parties are illegal. The strategically located, though little known, state of MALDIVES consists of 1,200 sparsely inhabited islands and atolls southwest of India in the Indian Ocean. With a population of about 150,000 and a narrow economic base, the Maldives supports a quasidemocratic system of government. The 1968 constitution provides for a highly centralized form of government in which Islam plays a guiding role. The country has been ably led since 1978 by its Cairo-educated president, Maumoon Abdul Gayoom, who is nominally responsible to a democratically elected tnajlis (council).

NOTES 1. Rahul Singh, "One Year of Barbala Government," Indian Express (Bombay), September 2 9 , 1 9 8 6 , p.7. 2. Hari Haisingh, "Accords and Discord," Indian Express (Bombay), July 9,1986, p.7. 3. Shekhar Gupta et al., "The Muslims: A Community in Turmoil," India Today (New Delhi), January 3 1 , 1 9 8 6 , p.91. 4. For an insightful overview of the controversy, see Ajaj Kumar, "The Muslim W o m a n ' s Bill: The Gathering Storm," India Today ( N e w Delhi), March 3 1 , 1 9 8 6 . 5. See Richard M. Weintraub, "Sri Lankan Lists Reforms to End Violence," Washington Post, June 26, 1986, p.A27. 6. J a m e s R u p e r t , "Pakistan Still H o l d s H u n d r e d s for Politics," Washington Post, May 28, 1986, p.A23. 7. "Nepal: The Partyless Parties," Far Eastern Economic Review (Hong Kong), May 8 , 1 9 8 6 , pp.43-44.

East Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific Area LARRY NIKSCH The Philippine revolution sent shockwaves throughout noncommunist East Asia in 1986, causing authoritarian governments to reexamine their policies toward internal dissent. Opposition groups were emboldened to escalate their criticisms and challenges and they sought to strengthen their own political organizations. Existing governments, too, took a second look at U.S. attitudes towards them in reaction to American behavior against Marcos in the last days of his regime. The result of all this was the broadest region-wide move toward political liberalization and pluralism in at least two decades. The shift was nowhere as dramatic as in the Philippines—sometimes only a modest movement—and the ultimate outcome remained uncertain in most countries at year's end. Nevertheless, pressures for greater democratization were felt to some degree in all the noncommunist countries of Southeast Asia except Brunei, as well as in Taiwan and South Korea. Communist East Asia persisted with one-party dictatorships rationalized with Marxist-Leninist rhetoric. Succession scenarios played on in the Vietnamese and North Korean Communist Party politburos with no public choice or input except for stage-managed mass mobilizations. Thousands of refugees continued to flee the communist regimes of Indochina, and the economies of these states continued to stagnate or decline. Economic conditions in Vietnam in 1986 provoked complaints from the lower and middle levels of the ruling party. China's political structure remained rigid at the extremities, but internal debate and dissent over Deng Xiaoping's economic

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reforms provided a more open political atmosphere than those of China's communist neighbors. At the end of 1986, the Chinese leadership wrestled with the problem of the extent to which the regime could permit the free expression of views. W e survey first the industrial countries of East Asia, then Southeast Asia, followed by the Marxist-Leninist states, and finally the European-populated democracies of Australia and New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, and Fiji and small island states. JAPAN, since the end of the American postwar occupation, has maintained the basic institutions and procedures of Western-style p a r l i a m e n t a r y d e m o c r a c y : an elected p a r l i a m e n t , cabinet government, and constitutionally-guaranteed political and civil liberties. The operation of the system, however, has been distinctly Japanese: hierarchical and factional structures of the political parties; immense power of the government bureaucracy; a decisionmaking process dominated by the drive to achieve the broadest possible consensus among politicians, top bureaucrats, business, and other interests; and domination by a single political party. Yasuhiro Nakasone entered the year campaigning within the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) for a third two-year term starting in November 1986. Opposition from factional leaders within the LDP, including potential successors, made his chances of success appear slim to most observers of the Japanese political scene. Nakasone's ambitions appeared to be weakened further by his failure at the economic summit conference in May to secure the agreement of the Western industrial powers to arrest the sharp appreciation of the Japanese yen in relation to the U.S. dollar. 1 Nakasone, aware that polls had shown him to be one of the most popular prime ministers in the postwar period, dissolved the Diet and called an election for both houses simultaneously in July— a rarity in Japan. The election results exceeded the most optimistic LDP forecasts. The Liberal Democrats boosted their seats in the powerful lower house of the Diet from 250 to 304 and kept their majority in the upper house. The stunning LDP victory turned around Nakasone's fortunes. Many media commentators and political experts attributed the LDP victory to Nakasone and his policies of raising Japan's international profile and educational reform. Nakasone's rivals within the party met shortly afterwards and decided to support an extension of the prime minister's term of office, which was ratified by the parliamentary majority. The LDP victory was matched by the defeats suffered by the

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opposition parties. The leftist Socialist Party emerged with eightyfive seats in the Diet, down from its previous 109 seats. Komeito and the Democratic Socialist party also lost seats. The opposition parties have yet to offer a credible alternative to the LDP. SOUTH KOREA was caught up in a struggle over democratization as nowhere else in East Asia except the Philippines. The conflict originated in the turmoil of 1980, when a military coup ended the political liberalization that had occurred following the assassination of President Park Chung Hee. The leader of the coup, General Chun Doo Hwan, established a government similar to the Park regime, authoritarian but highly competent. Power has been concentrated in the hands of President Chun, whose closest advisors have been his personal assistants, most of whom have also come from the army. The cabinet, the National Assembly, and the progovernment Democratic Justice Party have exercised little independent influence. The Democratic Justice Party is led by retired army commanders. Its organization is concentrated at the top and is much weaker at the local level. This is especially so in the cities. In the countryside, government rural development organizations also provide a base for mobilizing political support.2 Behind the Chun government has stood the powerful army with a history of political intervention and a deep suspicion of civilian politicians. Many key commanders have close ties to Chun going back to their days at the Korean Military Academy. 3 According to many observers, the Chun government has not achieved popularity with the South Korean people despite its outstanding performance in leading the Korean economy to strong growth and increasing South Korea's international prestige through such means as gaining the 1988 Olympics for Seoul.4 The Chun government relaxed political restrictions in 1983 and 1984, permitting the organization of the New Korea Democratic Party (NKDP). The primary opposition leaders have been Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung. The two Kims had been rivals in the past, but they have maintained unity since the NKDP arose to challenge the Chun government. 5 In the parliamentary election of 1984, the Democratic Justice Party won 35 percent of the vote, running well in the rural areas and smaller towns and cities. The NKDP ran a strong second, winning 29 percent of the vote and sixty-eight seats in the 276-member National Assembly. The NKDP did well in the big cities among middle- and working-class residents. It received 43 percent of the vote in Seoul, compared to 27 percent for the DJP. 6 Following a

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merger of the NKDP with another opposition party, the NKDP's seat total in the National Assembly surpassed 100. The DJP held 148 seats. The NKDP took a hard line toward the government, calling on President Chun to step down before his term expires in 1988 and also demanding a revision of the constitution to allow a direct popular election of the president and all members of the National Assembly. The present system provides for selection of the president by an electoral college of about 5,000 elected members and the granting of a majority of unelected seats to the party that wins the most seats in the National Assemby. The government's response initially was conciliatory. President Chun reiterated a pledge to retire from office in 1988, but DJP leaders rejected constitutional revision before 1988. After minor disturbances, the government cracked down, arresting some strikers and raiding university campuses. Tensions peaked in February 1986 when the NKDP began a petition drive for signatures for constitutional revision and the government moved to prevent it. At that juncture, the Marcos government fell in the Philippines, an event that received massive publicity in South Korea. President Chun then indicated a willingness to negotiate constitutional revision before 1988 and proposed to set up a committee in the National Assembly to deal with the issue. The NKDP responded to Chun's proposals by moderating the demand for Chun's resignation and postponing the petition drive. The result was the establishment of a constitutional revision committee in the summer of 1986. Negotiations remained deadlocked, however, and the NKDP threatened to break them off and return to pressure tactics including street demonstrations and a renewal of the petition drive. The government used thousands of police to thwart an NKDP attempt to hold a protest rally in Seoul on November 29,1986. The DJP has proposed a parliamentary system with a prime minister and cabinet chosen from members of parliament. The NKDP continues to advocate a presidential system with the president elected by a direct popular vote. Both sides have self-serving motives. The DJP fears that it could not win a direct popular presidential election but expects that it could retain its position as the strongest party in a future parliamentary election. The NKDP has a similar assessment, and it also has been influenced by the ambition of Kim Dae Jung to be president. The negotiations between the DJP and NKDP have been complicated by escalating, often violent antigovernment protests by university and college students. Student-led disorders reached their

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highest stage yet in 1986, involving many thousands of students. Leftist student organizations increasingly provided leadership, and multicampus protests replaced the individual campus disorders. Better organization also allowed students to challenge the authorities off campus, with heightened student involvement in rallies staged by the NKDP in the larger cities. Waves of violence involved dozens of campuses throughout the country. Extremist political views, including Marxism-Leninism, have become a prominent feature of student activism. Anti-American sentiments are often voiced, including demands for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea and an end to South Korea's "economic dependence" on the United States. Students physically occupied U.S.I.A. centers in Pusan and Kwangju in the spring of 1986. Student radicals also have targeted the N K D P for being too moderate in its views and stance toward the South Korean g o v e r n m e n t . 7 The radicals proclaim a Marxist revolution as their goal. They have attempted to enter the industrial work force secretly and to move into rural areas in order to organize workers and farmers. The government estimated in August 1986 that more than 1,500 students were engaging in such activities during the summer vacation. 8 Many observers fear that if domestic violence escalates, North Korea will establish links with such groups and stage its own terrorist acts inside South Korea. South Korean student groups have not drawn other major elements of South Korean society into their confrontational activities. Several major churches have supported NKDP positions but have not associated themselves with violent tactics, although a smaller group of church activists maintains links with the student movement. The NKDP has viewed the students as allies against the Chun government, but spokesmen have criticized the violent tactics of radical students and their anti-U.S. pronouncements. 9 The student problem has created strains in the NKDP, and at least one faction leader has called for tough measures against the radicals. 1 0 The South Korean army has stayed in the background during the current turmoil. Nevertheless, any political outcome will have to be at least tolerable to the army leadership. If it is not, the army could be expected to take direct political authority as it did in 1961 and 1980. The army leadership appears to accept some degree of democratization, but intervention might be brought by an escalation of violence in the form of urban rioting or terrorism in major cities or a likelihood that Kim Dae Jung, who is said to be unacceptable to the army, would be the future leader of South Korea.

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TAIWAN, until the spring of 1986, seemed little affected by the pressure for political liberalization and greater democracy that had emerged over the last few years in its neighbors in East Asia. The Kuomintang (KMT), or Nationalist Party, firmly controlled the government. The KMT had established a mass base with a sophisticated grass roots organization and a membership including two million native Taiwanese, but it continued to be dominated by mainland Chinese. The KMT held a monopoly of power through martial law, a ban on opposition political parties, control over the press, and arrest and detention of political opponents. This state of affairs began to change in March 1986 because of the shock of the Philippine revolution and recognition that the time of succession to Premier Chiang Ching-kuo may be close at hand. The government since March has undergone internal reform and made concessions to the political opposition. The opposition has formed a political party in order to prepare for a higher level of competition with the KMT. The government and the KMT have debated political liberalization for the last two years, but many older leaders have resisted it. A continuation of liberalization may require the personal initiative of Premier Chiang, who is 76 and in poor health. The new policies are initatives of Chiang himself. 1 1 They include: 1)

2)

3)

The replacement of four older members of the thirty-onemember KMT Central Committee with younger officials, including two native Taiwanese. This brings the number of Taiwanese up to fourteen. The first-ever talks between the KMT and the Tangwi, the name given to the opposition, and government permission for the Tangwi to set up branch offices. The KMT Central Committee accepted in October 1986 a study committee's recommendations that martial law be lifted and replaced with a national security law and that existing laws regulating civic organizations and elections be revised. 1 2

The first crisis in the liberalization policies came from the Tangwi. The Tangwi has been a loose, factional coalition that opposed the KMT in local and national elections, despite the lack of legal party status. Government-imposed restrictions, disputes between moderate and radical factions, and poor organization and planning have limited the Tangwi's ability to challenge political officials. In previous elections, the Tangwi was not able to muster

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over 30 percent of the vote nationwide. The Tangwi potentially took a major step forward when 135 of its leaders unexpectedly proclaimed a Democratic Progress Party in September 1986. The new party held secret regional and national conventions in November and approved a party constitution. Premier Chiang indicated that the new party could receive legal status if it endorsed anticommunism, refrained from advocating independence for Taiwan from mainland China, and pledged to support the existing constitution. 13 It was reported, however, that a major debate had ensued in the KMT leadership over how to deal with it. 14 The Democratic Progress Party responded initially by declaring opposition to violence and a policy of noncontact with elements at home or abroad that advocated violent revolution, an apparent reference to Taiwan independence groups overseas that have links with the indigenous opposition. Party spokesmen also said, though, that the Democratic Progress Party would accept a genuine decision by the people of Taiwan to declare Taiwan independent of China. 15 They called for a full restoration of the 1946 Chinese Nationalist constitution in order to practice real "constitutional democracy" to distinguish Taiwan politically from mainland China. 16 The fragility of the liberalization process was illustrated in late November and early December 1986 when the government blocked attempts of Taiwanese exiles to return. Followers of the exiles and police clashed several times at the Taipei airport when authorities refused admittance to the exiles and placed them on outbound airplanes. Several exiles represent the more radical elements within the opposition because of their open advocacy of independence for Taiwan and the use of violence against the government. The government allowed DPP candidates to run in elections of December 6, 1986, to Taiwan's two legislative bodies, the Legislative Yuan and the National Assembly, despite the DPP's lack of official status. The election results showed that the DPP could have a political future, but it did not significantly improve its position vis-à-vis the KMT. Its gains came mostly at the expense of independent candidates, who lost heavily. The KMT won fifty-nine of seventy-three seats for election in the Legislative Yuan and sixty-eight of eighty-four open seats in the National Assembly. The KMT vote was over 66 percent of the total. The DPP, with about 23 percent, won twelve seats in the Legislative Yuan, up from six, and eleven seats in the Assembly, up from four.

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Democratization is connected with the Taiwan independence issue. The Democratic Progress Party's statement of support for selfdetermination stops just short of a call for independence. Democratization cannot proceed very far before the independence issue is pushed to the forefront of national politics. BURMA for over two decades has been a political contradiction. On the one hand, it is a military-dominated, one-party state that exercises tight control over the people under its rule. On the other hand, it is a de facto federation of ethnic tribes, many of which are largely independent of the central government. The result is an unending series of conflicts between the government in Rangoon and the tribes. Ne Win, as army commander, seized power in a coup in 1962. Ne Win has structured a state based on one political party, the Burma Socialist Progress Party (BSPP). No other parties are allowed to exist. The BSPP nominates all candidates for elected office. Most are unopposed. Ne Win is the undisputed leader of the party. 17 The government prohibits the exercise of most political and civil liberties. It does not permit criticism of the government in the press or by speech. Members of the BSPP can express limited criticisms within the party organizations. 18 The Ne Win government has proclaimed the goal of a socialist Burma. It has assumed ownership over most economic enterprises. The economy has stagnated for well over a decade under this system, despite an abundance of natural resources and potentially rich agriculture. A common observation by outsiders who visit Burma is that the black market is the key functioning economic institution in the country. 19 Ne Win's centralized, authoritarian state does not extend much beyond the ethnic Burman areas of the central part of the country. Elsewhere, it faces various insurgent groups, the most prominent of which are the Karens, Shans, and Kachins. In addition to these tribal insurgencies, the Burma Communist party has been fighting the government for nearly forty years. The insurgencies do not threaten the Ne Win regime, but they are a severe drain on the government's resources. There is no prospect of negotiated settlements; neither side proposes to negotiate, and the Burmese government rejects the concept of autonomy for the tribal regions. The government launched a more intense antiinsurgency campaign in 1986. It organized large anti-insurgent rallies in the cities and major towns and stepped up military operations against the insurgents. Heavy fighting took place

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throughout the year between Burmese troops and Karen rebels. Government forces captured Karen base camps and drove Karen units o v e r the b o r d e r into Thailand. The offensive, h o w e v e r , w a s inconclusive and had little impact on the other tribal groups. THAILAND'S political system has been dominated by an elite, centralized bureaucratic structure that developed in the early part of the t w e n t i e t h century. Since the a b s o l u t e m o n a r c h y was overthrown in 1932, political and government decisions, as well as contests for power and influence, have been carried out within the army and the civil bureaucracy. Constitutions and parliaments have been intended more to legitimize bureaucratic rule and accommodate newly emerging political forces than to create a genuinely broadbased political structure. A r m y officers, including retired officers, have headed Thai governments for all but twelve years since 1932. Military coups have been the frequent means of changing governments. The monarch who symbolizes the state has not participated in daily g o v e r n m e n t affairs since 1932, but h e has latent power through the prerogatives of c o n s e n t and a p p o i n t m e n t . King B h u m i b o l (Rama IX) h a s influenced politics by indicating his preferences to the military and political leaders. The political parties have, however, staked out a position of influence within the government, which has made it increasingly difficult for the military to change the political structure through extralegal means. Thailand surmounted two obstacles to continued parliamentary rule in 1986. First, General Arthit Kamlangek was forced to retire from his position as commander-in-chief of the army, thus removing the chief threat from the military to the government of P r e m T i n s u l a n o n d . S e c o n d , T h a i l a n d w e n t t h r o u g h a parliamentary election and the formation of a new cabinet under Prem in accord with constitutional procedures. Prem removed Arthit on May 27,1986, in a surprise move several months before his term as army commander expired on August 31. Arthit had challenged key government policy decisions and had opposed constitutional changes to increase the powers of the elected l o w e r h o u s e of the N a t i o n a l A s s e m b l y . H i s a c t i o n s h a d periodically sparked rumors of an impending military coup. Prem appointed as army commander General Chaovalit Youngchaiyuth, w h o advocates a reduced military role in politics, although he no doubt will be politically influential. 2 0 Prem called a new parliamentary election after the government lost a vote in May. The election, held on July 27, saw little violence.

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Vote b u y i n g was reported, but there were no other major irregularities. No party gained anywhere near a majority in the 347-member House of Representatives. The Democrats made the best showing, winning 100 seats, up from fifty-six. Prem formed a new coalition government composed of four parties: the Democrats, Social Action, Chart Thai, and Rassadorn (a newly formed party). He retained control over the finance, defense, and interior ministries, appointing nonpoliticians to those posts. Thailand thus ended the year looking more stable, with some features of democracy more firmly in place. The one negative development was the performance of the political parties during the year. The incidence of party-switching and aisle-crossing was high, money often being the motive. Leadership squabbles within the Democratic Party and Social Action Party threatened both groups. The major parties remained suspicious of each other, and the army will doubtless continue to play a direct role in politics. Like Prem, the next prime minister probably will come from the ranks of the army. Since the independence of MALAYSIA in 1957 and the formation of the Federation in 1963, Malaysia has retained the institutional structure of parliamentary democracy bequeathed to it by the British. M a n y of the procedural aspects of parliamentary democracy also remain intact. The system has evolved, however, toward a mixture of democratic and authoritarian practices. Single-party dominance since the 1960s by the United Malays National Organization (UMNO) has continued as UMNO has adopted opposition parties by bringing them into an UNMO-led National Front, controlling the government. UMNO also enforces a policy of political dominance by the majority Malays (about 50 percent of the population), especially in relation to the large ethnic Chinese minority (about 35 percent of the population). U M N O also has retained and expanded Britishera emergency laws that give the government the power to arrest and imprison subversives. The government has used such powers sparingly, but enough to warn its strongest political critics of the limits on criticism. Under this mixed system, democratic practices often have been compromised; but they have shown an enduring quality. Malaysia in 1986 confounded most of the experts who predicted the emergence of new threats to the country's federal, parliamentary constitutional system. Malaysia entered the year facing a number of serious

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problems. These would pull many voters toward opposition parties whose commitment to parliamentary government was uncertain or might force the government to adopt more authoritarian controls. Islamic elements continued to be an unstable force. Rioting by Muslims occurred in the state of Sabah in March 1986. This was the latest development in an escalating struggle between Muslims and Christians since a predominantly Christian political party won control of the state government in elections of April 1985. The UMNO was threatened with division when Deputy Prime Minister Musa Hitam resigned and indicated that he would challenge Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammed at the party's next general assembly. Moreover, protracted disputes within the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) continued to plague the government. After two years of internal wrangling, the MCA chose a new leader, who soon found himself involved in a financial scandal and indicted for criminal acts by the Singapore government. Malaysia also faced potential political problems from a slowing economy and another major financial scandal. The Sabah crisis escalated first in 1986, as violence threatened basic order in the state and as Muslim political elements pressed the federal government to oust the Christian-led Parti Bersatu Sabah government and impose federal rule over the state. The temptation to adopt such a course was great, given Malaysia's Islamic character and the fact that the Parti Bersatu was not Muslim and was not a member of the National Front. The federal government, nevertheless, decided to permit a new parliamentary election in the state. The ruling party was returned to power in a democratic vote, winning thirty-four of forty-eight seats, and tensions in the state subsided. The next test was the national and state elections held on August 2-3, 1986. Forecasters predicted substantial UMNO losses and major gains by the Islamic fundamentalist Party Islam (PAS). The results were quite the contrary. National Front parties won 147 of the 177 seats in the national parliament. It had held 135 seats out of 154 seats in the old parliament (twenty-three new seats had been created). The Front did equally well in the state assembly races and won clear majorities everywhere. 21 The vote showed that PAS has not made substantial progress in winning Malays away from UMNO by calling for a pure Islamic state. UMNO campaigned on its record of providing service and education to poor rural Malays, and it appeared to pay off. The one negative aspect of the National Front's performance was the setbacks suffered by the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) and Gerakan, the two progovernment parties from Malay-

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sia's large ethnic Chinese minority. The MCA, which had twentyfour parliamentary seats, lost several. Gerakan saw its parliamentary delegation reduced from nine to five. The opposition Democratic Action Party (DAP) was the big winner among the ethnic Chinese. DAP candidates thrashed MCA and Gerakan candidates in numerous races and won twenty-four seats—a gain of fifteen.22 The turning of Chinese voters away from the government probably stemmed from the continuing leadership crisis within the MCA and Chinese dissatisfaction over government economic, educational, and religious policies that favor ethnic Malays and the Muslim religion. Younger Chinese voters noticeably swung to the DAP. Race relations in Malaysia thus may be entering a new period of tensions. There was sharp racial rhetoric in the postelection parliament, as UMNO members of parliament reasserted the party's theme of Malay dominance. In 1969, major opposition electoral gains among the Chinese sparked race riots in Malaysian cities. A repeat does not appear likely, but the DAP will use its stronger position to challenge government policies that have ethnic or religious motivations. More fundamentally, the radical rhetoric reflects the conflict between the growing social and political pluralism in Malaysia and resultant pressures for democratization on the one hand, and Prime Minister Mahithir bin Mohamad's personal preference for authoritarian controls and conformity on the other. Besides UNMO warnings to the Chinese community, the government has since the elections tried to expel correspondents of the Asian Wall Street Journal (Malaysian courts overturned an initial expulsion order, forcing the government to back down) and passed amendments to the Official Secrets Act giving the government powers to classify and restrict a broad range of documents. It has also criticized public interest groups, portraying them as allies of the political opposition and intent on subverting Malaysian society and the political system, and taken steps to establish UMNO as a functioning political party in Sabah (where UMNO never has operated), thus heightening the challenge to the Christian-led state government. In short, the conflict between democracy and authoritarianism has become more intense as a result of the events of 1986. Democracy has won some victories, but one can expect in the near future more counterattacks from the Mahathir government. SINGAPORE represents one of the great successes of the Third World since the end of World War II, comparable to South Korea

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and Taiwan. A modern, prosperous, vibrant city-state has emerged from the poor, backwater colony that became independent in 1965. This success has not included the establishment of democratic government, however. Despite the parliamentary systems left by the British and preserved by the present government, it has been a one-party state where opposition and dissent are barely tolerated. The People's Action Party (PAP) under Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew has combined a progressive statism in economic and social policies with strong political controls. The PAP maintains a presence throughout the society, facilitating the delivery of social services to people, for which it has enjoyed genuine popular support. The symbol of PAP dominance has been the parliament. The PAP went into the elections of December 22, 1984, holding seventyeight out of seventy-nine seats. It lost only one additional seat in the election, but its share of the total vote dropped from 75.5 percent to 62.9 percent, causing consternation in the government. The election results raised questions concerning the continuity of the political system after the departure of Lee Kuan Yew. Within the next decade, key figures of the postindependence leadership will retire, and a new generation of leaders now being groomed will take over. At the same time, a new, postindependence generation of voters soon will become the majority of the electorate. Persons below 40 years of age constituted 40 percent of the electorate in 1984 and will make up well over 60 percent in the next election, probably in the late 1980s. These new voters, well-educated and affluent, have little or no personal memory of Singapore's economic deprivation and the PAP's bitter struggle with the communists in the 1950s and early 1960s; and they are more likely to favor an opposition in parliament. PAP leaders emphasized that Singapore is to remain a system of one major political party and several minor ones to ensure political stability, as compared to the instability of a two-party system. Deputy Prime Minister Goh indicated that Prime Minister Lee likely would remain in office until 1990. He reaffirmed earlier statements that the government intended to change the constitution to include provision for a popularly elected president with veto powers, especially over financial matters. The government moved against the opposition in 1986 by trying and convicting (overturning through appeal an initial acquittal) J.B. Jeyaratnam, one of two opposition members of parliament, for an alleged false declaration of his party's finances. The conviction means that Jeyaratnam cannot return to parliament for at least five years.

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Lee Hsien Loong, son of the prime minister, loomed larger in the future plans of the PAP. He was named minister of state for trade and industry and was appointed to head a special committee to review and make recommendations concerning the economy. Lee was also made head of the newly created youth wing of the PAP and was named to the twelve-member executive committee of the PAP. The government in July put through parliament amendments to the Newspaper and Printing Presses Act, allowing it to restrict sales of foreign publications that are deemed to interfere in local politics. During the debate the Law Society of Singapore criticized the proposed legislation for containing too many ambiguities and giving too broad an authority to the minister of communications. Government spokesmen in turn questioned the Law Society's right to criticize government policies. The political order of I N D O N E S I A imposes a degree of conformity over a vast realm of 13,000 islands stretching 4,800 kilometers from east to west and holding over 160 million people of various ethnic strains. The present government of President Suharto came to power in 1965 following a long period of political instability and economic decline and a communist-led coup attempt. Suharto has established a highly centralized bureaucratic state in which political power rests with Suharto and the leadership of the army, whose organization parallels and mixes with the government bureaucracy at all levels of the society. Political parties and elected legislative bodies are appendages to this bureaucratic apparatus, and mass political participation is meager. The great majority of Indonesians have accepted or supported the system because it brought order and economic improvement over the pre-Suharto period, and because rural society on Java, where the majority of Indonesia's population lives, is traditionally based on a hierarchical structure. Opposition has been found basically among urban elite groups like college students and among fundamentalist Muslims, who are a minority of the 80 percent of Indonesians who profess Islam. When overt opposition has arisen, the government has reacted swiftly and often forcibly to suppress it. Contrary to trends in most other noncommunist states of East Asia, the Indonesian government has opposed any degree of political liberalization. The government initiated a campaign in 1983 to compel social and religious groups to adopt Pancasila, the official state ideology, as their own statement of purpose. The

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regime cracked down hard on dissidents and even on nondissidents who had a "questionable" past. Trials completed in January 1986 handed out tough sentences to individuals involved in the Tangjung Priok rioting by Muslims in Jakarta in September 1984 and the subsequent bombings of banks and other facilities. Prosecutors warned that the government might bring similar charges against other critics, including prominent former members of the regime. The drive for political conformity did not prevent the emergence of new problems for the Suharto government. First, there was the shock of the revolution in the neighboring Philippines, which the Indonesian press covered extensively. Second, the government reacted strongly to Australian press reports that the government had shown favoritism to the relatives of Suharto in their requisition of important business holdings. Third, the Indonesian economy went into a deep slump as the price of oil, Indonesia's main export, plummeted. Suharto found himself confronted with talk in Jakarta of a "Marcos analogy," especially comparisons of Suharto family members' holdings with the President Marcos' "crony capitalism," which the Jakarta press highlighted in its coverage of Marcos' downfall. On July 7, 1986, President Suharto held a three-hour meeting with senior military commanders to discuss the allegations regarding his family. 2 3 His decision to place the issue before his military chiefs showed how seriously he viewed the issue. The armed forces commander, General Benny Murdani, gave Suharto a ringing endorsement after the meeting. Murdani, who probably is the second most powerful man in Indonesia, denounced the Marcos analogy and the press accounts as "not true." He strongly endorsed President Suharto for a fifth term of office, which is scheduled for 1988. He also warned critics against opposing Suharto; a member of parliament had questioned whether Suharto was entitled under the constitution to a fifth term. 24 Nevertheless, other critical voices were raised after July 7. Students at the Bandung Institute of Technology demonstrated in September to protest the government's decision to devalue Indonesia's currency by 31 percent. A leading Jakarta newspaper, Sinar Harapan, ran articles which discussed limitations on the number of terms an individual president could hold office and criticized the d e v a l u a t i o n . The g o v e r n m e n t r e v o k e d the newspaper's license in October, forcing its closure. 25 A small group of affluent Jakarta-based oppositionists called the "Petition of Fifty" issued a statement calling for broader political participation,

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separation of powers in the branches of government, and the withdrawal of the army from politics. 26 None of these events appear to threaten President Suharto's assumption of another term of office in 1988. The longer term situation into the 1990s is more uncertain. The economic slowdown and uncertainties, general change in the army, and a demographic bulge cloud the relatively tranquil political atmosphere. BRUNEI is a small Islamic monarchy on the north coast of the island of Borneo, surrounded by Malaysian territory, and inhabited predominantly by Malays. Great Britain exercised a protectorate over it until 1984, when the country became independent. The sultan of Brunei has considerable powers. His father imposed a state of emergency in 1962 in response to political unrest, and he has maintained it to the present. The elected legislative and ministerial bodies of 1962 have remained suspended. There has recently been little political unrest. Substantial overseas sales of oil and natural gas give the small population of 220,000 a standard of living much higher than that of the people in neighboring countries, with a per capita income over $22,000 and a high level of social services. Signs appeared in 1985 and 1986 that internal politics were becoming more active. Two political parties were formed. One, a National United Party, voiced support for the sultan and his policies. A second, the Brunei National Democratic Party, has called for new elections for a legislature and the installation of a civilian prime minister. It has threatened to take these issues to the U.N. Commission on Human Rights if the sultan does not act. Islamic fundamentalism and ethnic tensions between majority Malays and minority Chinese are other issues that show signs of emerging, as evidenced by increased Chinese emigration from Brunei in 1986. 27 In February 1987, THE PHILIPPINES, under President Corazon Aquino, celebrated the first anniversary of the overthrow of Ferdinand Marcos. The government also celebrated its survival in office in the face of two coup attempts by elements in the military and other reported plots in the armed forces. The Aquino government was reasonably secure, but the coup attempts and the constant rumors created an unsettled political climate that has stifled investor confidence and thus has limited economic recovery. President Aquino continues to have broad support from Filipinos b e c a u s e of her reputation for personal integrity, religious convictions, and commitment to democracy, which the people

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support. The over 76 percent vote of February 2 for a new constitution and the 90 percent voter turnout were only in part a personal endorsement of Aquino. Moreover, the armed forces leadership has remained loyal. General Fidel Ramos, the armed forces chief of staff, and Defense Minister Rafael Ileto have had policy differences with Aquino, but they appear committed to the principle of civilian supremacy. Most other commanders have remained loyal. The United States gives full backing to the Aquino government. The Reagan administration has warned anti-Aquino elements in the armed forces that it will not support a coup or any regime that assumes power via a coup. 28 American opinion has an important place in Filipino perceptions, and noncommunist opponents of Aquino realize that they would have difficulty staying in power without American support. A failed coup attempt by pro-Marcos military elements in late January and the decision by the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) to terminate a sixty-day cease-fire on February 8 bolstered the Aquino government. 29 Pro-Marcos military plotters are either in custody or in hiding. General Ramos and Defense Minister Ileto have started to break u p cliques of officers in the armed forces, which have been the source of instability. This includes the g r o u p of RAM (Reform Armed Forces of the Philippines) officers in the Defense Ministry that played a prominent role in the overthrow of Marcos and supported former Defense Minister Enrile in his unsuccessful political challenge to Aquino last November 1986. The CPP entered the cease-fire believing it could reap a propaganda bonanza. It directed its political message during the truce to urban, middle-class Filipinos. The CPP also tried to press demands on the Aquino government, including admittance into a coalition government, a merger of the communist-led New People's Army (NPA) with the Philippines Armed Forces (AFP), adoption of the CPP version of land reform, and termination of U.S. rights to military bases. The CPP's decision to scrap the cease-fire after only sixty days appears to reflect continued division within the party's leadership over strategy toward the Aquino government and the CPP's conclusion that it was beginning to suffer losses. The losses apparently included a propaganda failure when CPP leaders in Manila faced questions concerning assassinations of civilians, "taxation" of businesses, and an erosion of discipline among rank and file members of the NPA. The CPP now bears the added political onus of having ended the truce, and it admits increasing difficulties in recruiting in the countryside.

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This is not to say that the communist insurgency is on the verge of collapse, but it appears to be on a plateau. NPA regular strength is believed to have increased slightly in 1986 to over 24,000, and the communists succeeded in increasing their political organizations in the barrios to about 20 percent of the total 41,000 barrios in the country. 3 0 This is a slower rate of growth than in the last three years of the Marcos government, but growth nonetheless. Severe erosion is not likely in the near term due to strong discipline in the C P P / N P A ranks, continued poor socioeconomic conditions in the rural areas, and the lack of a comprehensive government strategy against the insurgency. The government faces a number of crucial tasks whose outcome will determine whether it will remain stable and build on the advantages gained since December. One is to make a positive impact on socioeconomic conditions in the rural areas, where government programs have had little impact to date. Another task is to improve conditions and morale in the armed forces. A third challenge is to develop an effective election strategy to minimize gains in upcoming August 1987 congressional elections by the CPP and regional political bosses associated with the Marcos government. President Aquino will have to deal with a new and potentially powerful congress of twenty-four senators and 250 congressmen who will be elected in May. The outlook is that political centrists will have control of the legislature but that vocal rightist and leftist minorities will oppose many of Aquino's policies. Even the centrists likely will include independent-minded individuals who will not follow Aquino's wishes on key issues. Aquino will need considerable skills to deal with this new center of political power when it emerges. At the end of 1986, CHINA faced protests and demands for democracy and political reform. Tens of thousands of students staged demonstrations in cities in central and south China, especially in the politically influential metropolis of Shanghai. Crowds of students and others, numbering up to 50,000, demonstrated in the center of Shanghai and demanded freedom of the press and open political expression and debate. 31 Government officials, nationally and locally, initially took a benevolent stance towards the students. Some local officials agreed to individual student demands, such as greater student role in the Communist party's selection of candidates for local elections. The growth and longevity of the Shanghai protests, however, produced a harsh official reaction.

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T h e C o m m u n i s t party criticized a n d expelled several intellectuals who had advocated greater political freedom and pluralism. Most of them also lost their jobs. Media organs launched a national campaign against those whom they accused of advocating "total westernization" and rejection of the Communist party's leadership. Hu Yao-bang was removed from his post as chairman of the C o m m u n i s t p a r t y . A l e a d i n g a d v o c a t e of political liberalization and less party interference with economic decisionmaking at the local level, Hu had been thought to be the leading candidate to assume Deng's de-facto leader's role when Deng retired. Deng Xiaoping and Premier Zhao Ziyang stressed that supression of political reform would not lessen the commitment to economic liberalization. Nevertheless, antireform elements have asserted themselves within the Communist party. Party media organs now appear to be under the control of the antireformists, and they have issued appeals for support of continued state economic planning with less emphasis on building up consumer purchasing power. Peng Li, a 57-year-old deputy premier who was educated in the Soviet Union, may be emerging as the leading advocate of constraints on the reform program and a narrowing of China's window to the West. This would reinforce the similar sentiment of several elderly members of the party's politburo. The student protests are the latest manifestation of the issue of how much political freedom, if any, China should permit at a time of economic reforms and the growing exposure of Chinese to Westerners and Western values. Deng Xiaoping and his reformist leadership have previously wavered in their attitudes toward political reform. T h e g o v e r n m e n t allowed the " d e m o c r a c y movement" to bloom in the late 1970s and then closed it down, imprisoning key student leaders. It subsequently launched a drive against "spiritual pollution," only to halt the program when excessive actions by local Communist party cadres seemed to threaten the economic reform movement. Overall movement has been toward lessening of controls over individual behavior. The government revived talk of political liberalization in 1986 partly in reaction to the continued obstruction of economic reforms by m i d d l e a n d l o w e r p a r t y cadres, e s p e c i a l l y in industrial workplaces. 3 2 Government officials acknowledged in April 1986 that a "party rectification" campaign begun in 1983 had failed to purge the CPC of hundreds of thousands of antireformist cadres, most of whom entered the CPC during the Cultural Revolution of the late 1960s and early 1970s. In some regions, CPC officials virtually

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ignored instructions to carry out the rectification campaign. The government thus raised the possibility of political reforms with the aim of solidifying popular sentiment behind the economic reform program and isolating recalcitrant elements in the CPC machinery. The government began to encourage intellectuals to speak out on policy issues, though with limits on political content. Officials spoke of political decentralization and a less overt role for the Communist party in the government. A high-ranking official stated in August that political reform would be discussed at meetings throughout the country, culminating in the national congress of the CPC in September 1987.33 Political reform, however, remained an anathema to many CPC officials, including key senior officials who also have questioned the pace and scope of economic reforms. Resistance developed at a meeting of the 199-member Central Committee of the CPC in October 1986, where a resolution reportedly went through several drafts before being approved. It spoke of political reform as applying only to reforming party and government leadership systems, the extension of "socialist democracy," and improving China's legal system. The resolution stated that political reform would "proceed step by step and with proper guidance." The resolution also asserted that China would resist decadent "feudal and bourgeois" ideas and adhere to Marxism-Leninism. Thus the student demands far outdistanced thinking within the CPC leadership. It should be noted that the student protests are not strictly a by-product of government talk of political reform. They reflect broader trends in Chinese life mentioned earlier. Students, probably more than most elements in Chinese society, feel these changes directly in terms of life-styles and individual opportunities. These freedoms are now spilling over into the political views of many students. Students participating in the Shanghai protests eagerly sought out Westerners to explain their actions, and many student protestors acknowledged listening frequently to the Voice of America. 34 Nevertheless, the Communist party's crackdown indicated that China in the immediate future will turn toward orthodoxy in politics. Economic reform undoubtedly will be halted or slowed. The events of early 1987 cast a heavy shadow over China's future after Deng, who is 82, leaves the political scene. NORTH KOREA has shut itself off from the outside world as much as any country. It remains an enigma to Americans and other Westerners. 35

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North Korea today is what it was at the time of its creation in 1948: a highly c e n t r a l i z e d , Soviet-style totalitarian state dominated by a pervasive personality cult of Kim Il-sung, who holds the key posts of head of state and head of the Communist party, officially called the Korean Workers Party. The individual is regarded as merely part of an ideologically motivated and highly organized collective mass striving to achieve the national goals set by Kim Il-sung and the Communist party. The 1972 North Korean constitution makes the national legislature the highest organ of state power; but the government at all levels is not a decision-making body but is officially described as a "transmission belt" for the policy decisions of the highest organs of the Workers Party. The Workers Party has nearly 2 million members out of a population of an estimated 18 million. It has cells located in every enterprise, organization, farm, school, military unit, and governmental organ in the country to insure that party directives are fully carried out at every level by government agencies and other institutions. Policy decisions emanate from the Political Committee of the Central Committee, composed of Kim Ilsung and his leading associates. Throughout the years, Kim Il-sung has eliminated through purges rival leaders and factions. Since the mid-1970s, Kim, now 74, has promoted his son, 44-year-old Kim Chong-il, as his successordesignate. Kim Chong-il has moved up steadily in the Workers Party and the government. He is now believed to exercise authority on a daily basis over the operations of the party and government. The media in North Korea have created a second cult of personality through their constant glorification of Kim Chong-il, whose supporters now occupy top party and government positions. 36 *

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Communist Indochina experienced greater political turmoil in 1987. Democratization, however, was not part of the process. Communist parties in Vietnam, Laos, and Kampuchea (Cambodia) retained the monopoly of political power. Thousands of Vietnamese and Laotians remained in "reeducation" camps—or, more accurately, concentration camps. Several thousand people fled the three countries during the year, continuing the flow of the past ten years. 3 7 Nevertheless, important leadership changes and self-criticism occurred in all three countries. Criticism arose in VIETNAM'S Communist party of incorrect policies of the central government, mismanagement of enterprises,

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and rampant corruption. Reformers within the party reportedly demanded that the aged leadership of the Party step down and that the government lift some socialist controls over individual enterprises and within certain sectors of the economy. 38 At the annual Communist party congress in December 1986, the leadership trio of Truong Chinh, 79, Pham Van Dong, 80, and Le Due Tho, 75, gave up their top positions in the Party. A new leadership group headed by Nguyen Van Linh took over. Many of the new leaders have had experience in South Vietnam during and after the Vietnam War. 3 9 Experts on Vietnam, however, were uncertain whether the old leadership had surrendered much actual power. Chinh and Dong retained their government posts, and all three became senior advisors to the new leaders. Despite the criticism of present economic policies, the new leadership announced no significant policy changes at the congress. Advocates of economic reform appeared to gain more ground in government personnel shifts announced in February 1987. Soviet officials enjoyed a high profile at the Vietnamese Communist party congress. They promised to double Soviet economic aid to nearly $2 billion annually, though stressing that Vietnam had to utilize aid more efficiently. In LAOS, the Communist party went through similar "selfcriticism" over economic failures, but leadership changes were more modest than in Vietnam. Older leaders kept their positions in the Communist party's politburo, that body being enlarged to accommodate new members. 40 In KAMPUCHEA, the Vietnamese party congress adopted a political report that stressed the maintenance of Vietnamese supremacy. General Le Due Anh, the Vietnamese military commander in Kampuchea, received a higher position in the politburo. In February he also became defense minister. 41 If Hanoi gave no signs of altering policies on Kampuchea, the reason did not lie in success in crushing the resistance groups. Ironically, the resistance has become more active and viable since the Vietnamese wiped out their base camps in early 1985. The resistance forces have reorganized with the primary emphasis on infiltrating small units deep into Cambodia. There they have carried out growing numbers of guerrilla operations, ambushes, mortar attacks, and interdiction of roads. They also have received increasing support from villagers, especially food and information. The communist Khmer Rouge has been the most active of the

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resistance groups, but forces loyal to Prince Sihanouk carried out more attacks in 1986 and moved several thousand guerrillas into Kampuchea. 42 The resistance groups cannot defeat the Vietnamese militarily, as Hanoi still has at least 140,000 troops in Kampuchea. Vietnam, however, faces an intractable struggle and no prospect of success. Its puppet regime in Phnom Penh and the army of that regime are weak and demoralized. Vietnamese officials reportedly state in private that the Phnom Penh administration will not be viable for years to come.43 AUSTRALIA and NEW ZEALAND have had stable parliamentary democracies for their entire existence as nation-states, their inheritance from Great Britain. In both countries social and racial tensions have normally been resolved through the regular political processes. Of late in New Zealand, however, the racial problem has worsened. The indigenous Maoris represent about 9 percent of the population, and disputes over Maori land rights, language, and culture are persistent, emotional issues of the 1980s. Some Maoris hold separatist views; and crimes of violence involving Maoris, especially in the Auckland region, have increased in recent years. 44 The Labour Party is currently dominant in Australia, controlling the central government and the governments of four of the six states. It traditionally has had close ties to the trade union movement, and it has a vocal, often radical left wing. However, the government under Prime Minister Robert Hawke has followed centrist economic and foreign policies. Prime Minister Hawke has sided with the United States in its dispute with New Zealand over the latter's ban of nuclear armedpowered ships from its ports. Nevertheless, potential strains in U.S.-Australian relations have arisen because of American refusal to endorse the South Pacific treaty on nuclear weapons and U.S. subsidies of exports of wheat and sugar, which are major Australian exports. They are not subsidized by Australia, and the Australian public reaction to the American subsidies has been quite negative. 45 The New Zealand Labour Party also controls the government. Like its Australian counterpart, it has traditional ties to trade unions, but its constituency in recent years has included large numbers of middle-class professionals. This new element in Labour's constituency has influenced both economic and foreign policies. The government under Prime Minister David Lange has followed pragmatic economic policies, including

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deregulation of controls over private investment. Its foreign policy, however, has veered from New Zealand's traditional commitment to ANZUS alliance with the United States and Australia. Antinuclear sentiment has become a dominant political persuasion among New Zealanders. The Lange government has barred U.S. nuclear armed and nuclear powered ships from its ports. The United States has retaliated by ending defense ties with New Zealand and abrogating its defense commitment to New Zealand under the ANZUS treaty. New Zealand faces new elections in 1987. Australia will follow with elections in 1988. Both Labour parties appear likely to win against conservative opposition parties whose leaders so far have not demonstrated broad political appeal. The Labour Party in Australia, however, faces more uncertain economic conditions. PAPUA NEW GUINEA (PNG) is the largest country of what is today called the South Pacific. Becoming independent in 1973, it inherited a democratic, parliamentary system from Australia, the previous administering power. Since independence, Papua New Guinea has held successful parliamentary elections and has changed governments legally and without violence. The last change of government occurred in November 1985 after a vote of no confidence in the parliament against the government of Prime Minister Michael Somare. A new government headed by Prime Minister Pais Wingti has been in power ever since. The Wingti government has emphasized anticorruption measures and the need to preserve Papuan culture against outside influences. The prime minister has forced several cabinet ministers to resign because of their reported involvement in corruption. He also has banned the installation of a television broadcast network (PNG has no general television station) because program content might be contrary to Papuan values. A major potentially divisive issue is PNG policy toward the Papuan insurgency in the Indonesian-ruled half of the island of New Guinea. The insurgents are ethnic kinsmen of the Papuans of PNG and have the sympathy of many PNG citizens. Some 10,000 refugees have crossed the border into PNG in order to avoid the fighting between the insurgents and Indonesian forces. The government does not support the insurgency and has tried to cooperate with Indonesia to defuse incidents on the border and deal with the refugee problem. 46 This policy is not totally popular, and the government in the future may find it difficult to reconcile with government emphasis on Melanesian nationalism in other issues involving the

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South Pacific region. FIJI, an island state in the South Pacific, has a population of 715,000 divided nearly equally between indigenous Melanesians and ethnic Indians. Fiji gained independence from Great Britain in 1970 and has kept the parliamentary system of government inherited from the colonial period. Fiji has held parliamentary elections on several occasions since independence. Observers have considered them to be free and fair. Citizens currently enjoy a wide range of political and civil liberties. 4 7 Two major internal political issues occupy Fijians today. One is the long-standing ethnic tension between the Melanesians and Indians. The Melanesians are dominant in government through the ruling Alliance Party. They have special rights to land, owning about 85 percent of all land. 48 The Indians dominate business, many of the professions, and the civil service. Indian spokesmen charge that g o v e r n m e n t policies discriminate against the Indian community, while the Melanesians resent the greater wealth of the Indians. A second issue is the emergence of a political party on the left with the formation of a Labor party in 1985. The Labor Party appears to have gained enough support to mount a serious challenge to the ruling Alliance Party in 1987. Its platform stresses nationalization of businesses and more neutral foreign policy between East and West. Fiji currently has defense ties with Australia and N e w Zealand and close relations with the United States. TONGA consists of a number of islands in the South Pacific with a population of 104,000, nearly all Polynesian. The government is a monarchy, and politics is dominated by the king and hereditary nobles. The legislature consists of seven nobles elected by their peers and seven persons elected by the general populace. There are no political parties. VANUATU is a South Pacific island nation with an estimated population of 136,000. Formerly the New Hebrides islands, Vanuatu gained independence in 1980 after more than seventy years of joint British-French rule. Vanuatu has a parliamentary system of government with the parliament chosen through direct elections. The country's only election so far, in 1983, was considered to be fair and democratic. A second election is scheduled for 1987. Vanuatu has had a good record

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with regard to the upholding of political and civil liberties, according to the U.S. State Department. 4 9 Several political parties exist, and the 1983 election was heavily contested. Despite its internal record, the United States, Australia, and New Zealand are concerned over Vanuatu. The government of Prime Minister W a l t e r Lini has adopted a strident M e l a n e s i a n nationalism in its foreign policy. It has established diplomatic relations with Cuba, Libya, and Nicaragua. In early 1987, the government granted the Soviet Union fishing rights in Vanuatu's territorial waters and port facilities for Soviet fishing vessels. 50 WESTERN SAMOA, with 165,000 people, is an island nation of the South Pacific. Having received independence from New Zealand in 1962, it maintains a Westminster parliamentary system. At the local level, some 12,000 village chiefs hold power. The chiefs also select forty-five of the forty-seven members of the parliament in elections every three years. Political parties have begun to emerge in the 1980s, and there is some pressure to extend the vote. Nevertheless, the country appears stable, with no major political shifts in the offing.

NOTES 1. Washington Post, May 8, 1986. 2. "A Flimsy Foundation," Far Eastern Economic Review (Hong Kong), March 13,1986, pp.24-25. 3. For a recent piece on the army, see New York Times, June 29, 1986. 4. Washington Post, August 17, 1986; and December 16-17, 1983. 5. The leadership structure of the NKDP is multifactional. Factions loyal to Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung make up about 80 percent of the NKDP's representation in the National Assembly. Other factions hold the remaining 20 percent. Below this level, the organizational structure weakens, similarly to that of the DJP. 6. Christian Science Monitor, February 25, 1985; Shim Jae Hoon, "Judgement on Chun," Far Eastern Economic Review (Hong Kong), February 28,1985, pp.43-44. 7. Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly, June 23, 1986; Washington Post, August 17,1986. 8. Christian Science Monitor, August 19, 1986. 9. Washington Times, April 30, 1986; New York Times, May 15, 1986. 10. Washington Times, November 4, 1986. 11. Washington Post, May 30, 1986. 12. Radio Taipei, October 15, 1986. 13. Washington Post, October 8, 1986.

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14. Christian Science Monitor, October 28, 1986. 15. Washington Times, November 7, 1986. 16. Tzu Wan Pao (Taipei), October 11, 1986. 17. For a profile of Ne Win, see Asian Wall Street Journal, January 1011.1986. 18. U.S. D e p a r t m e n t of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1986 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1987), pp.663-665. 19. New York Times, March 23, 1987. 20. Christian Science Monitor, October 1, 1986. 21. Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly, August 11, 1986. 22. Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly, August 11, 1985. 23. Agence France Presse (Hong Kong), July 7, 1986. 24. Ibid. 25. Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly, October 13, 1986. 26. Shim Jae Hoon, "Swelling Undercurrent", Far Eastern Economic Review (Hong Kong), September 4, 1986, pp. 36-37. 27. Far Eastern Economic Review 1987 Yearbook, pp.112-113. 28. Washington Post, December 14, 1986; and November 25, 1986. 29. Ibid., February 4, 1987. 30. Statement by Richard L. Armitage, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, before the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, House Foreign Affairs Committee, March 17, 1987. 31. New York Times, December 22, 1986. 32. Robert Delfs, "Anatomy of a Reform," Far Eastern Economic Review (Hong Kong), October 9, 1986, pp.28-32; Asian Wall Street Journal, August 25,1986; and September 8,1986. 33. Asian Wall Street Journal, September 8, 1986. 34. New York Times, December 22, 1986. 35. For overviews of North Korea, see Robert Scalapina and Chong-sik Lee, Communism in Korea (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972); annual surveys of North Korea in January editions of Asian Survey, "North Korea," Far Eastern Economic Review (Hong Kong), June 26, 1986, pp.36-46; annual reports on human rights by the U.S. State Department and Amnesty International. 36. Asian Wall Street Journal, November 21-22, 1986; Kyodo News Service (Tokyo), March 31, 1985. 37. U.S. D e p a r t m e n t of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1986, pp.837-839. 38. Washington Post, November 11, 1986. 39. Bangkok Post, December 19, 1986. 40. M u r r a y Hiebert, "Change at the Top," Far Eastern Economic Review, December 4, 1986, pp.42-43. 41. Nayan Chanda, "Not Soft on Cambodia," Far Eastern Economic Review (Hong Kong), January 1, 1987, pp.11-13; Washington Post, February 18.1987. 42. Rodney Tasker, "Dry-Season Dominance," Far Eastern Economic

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Review (Hong Kong), November 6, 1986, pp.42-44; Ken Guest, "Mission into Cambodia," Asiaweek, July 13, 1986, p.28. 43. Agence France Presse (Hong Kong), June 21, 1986. 44. Frost and Sullivan/Political Risk Services, New Zealand, December 1986, p.3A. 45. Frost and Sullivan/Political Risk Services, New Zealand, December 1986, p.3A. 46. Asian Wall Street Journal, January 2-3, 1987; Hamish McDonald, "A Long Slow Process," Far Eastern Economic Review (Hong Kong), March 27, 1986, pp.26-28. 47. U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1986, pp.711-714. 48. Ibid., p.713. 49. Ibid., pp.833-835. 50. Asian Wall Street Journal, January 23-24, 1987.

Limited Authoritarianism

Absolutisms

U N I O N OF SOVIET S O C I A L I S T REPUBLICS •i t i n i t

O EASTXj GERMANY

POLAND

CZECHOSLOVAKIA*

HUNGARY ROMANIA

Black Sea YUGOSLAVIA BULGARIA

ALBANIA

M O N t ¡OLIA

The Soviet Sphere and Eastern Europe DAVID E. POWELL None of the countries examined in this chapter has a democratic system. While Yugoslavia comes nearest, it might be described more aptly as anarchy clad in an ill-fitting authoritarian cloak. Hungary, Poland, and the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) exhibit some democratic traits; but in all three states, the authorities have been trying to root out nonconformist behavior and isolate institutions not under their control. The new regime in Albania has begun to make contact with the outside world, but the country remains more isolated and less exposed to Western democratic influences than either Bulgaria or Czechoslovakia. Romania has descended into a kind of "Ice Age," even though a few courageous dissidents protest the madness of Ceausescu's dictatorship. Finally, Mongolia is virtually terra incognita, but what is known of the regime in Ulan Bator suggests that the term "democratic" is utterly alien. In all of these countries, government institutions and practices resemble to some degree those found in the USSR. This is especially true of Mongolia, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany. The Albanian leadership is just beginning to experiment with "democratization," while the more westernized elite groups in Hungary have exhibited somewhat greater flexibility. Politics in Romania resembles the system that prevailed in the Soviet Union when Stalin was alive (without the massive killings). Furthermore, Ceausescu and Gorbachev are moving in different directions. Yugoslavia is an anomaly, having declared its independence from Moscow almost forty years ago. Poland is another anomaly, with a population that refuses to accept Soviet control and a government

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that pretends to be pragmatic but often acts as though it were an agent of the USSR. In the following pages, we shall look for elements of democracy, or movement away from it, beginning with the dominant state and considering the others approximately in the order of their conformity to it: the Soviet Union, Mongolia, Bulgaria, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Yugoslavia, and Albania. In the SOVIET U N I O N in 1986, General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev and his colleagues continued to issue calls for glasnost (openness or candor) and perestroika (a restructuring of institutions and attitudes, abandoning the "old way" of doing things), as well as "social justice," "revolutionary changes," and "democratization." Each of these terms is consistent with a populist orientation, a desire to "open up" Soviet society. And, in some ways, life in the USSR did become less harsh, less restrictive, and less secretive during the year. But Gorbachev's language was also used to cloak policies that were far less benign, and his political vocabulary included other expressions reminiscent of the times of Lenin and Stalin. Thus, the general secretary spoke repeatedly of the need for "discipline," "intensification" (more output from a given quantity of input), and "acceleration" (quicker accomplishment of various tasks). Skilled at public relations, Gorbachev has managed to convey to many in the West an image of "an underdog democratizer," a character in a morality play representing the light against the darkness, an enlightened modernizer facing resistance on many fronts—within the Communist party and the bureaucracy, and among the public at large. 1 It would be rash to deny that the general secretary faces resistance; but it would be equally naive to believe that he is contemplating introducing some sort of Western-style democracy. Gorbachev's rhetoric and behavior to date underscore his determination to overcome the inertia of the Brezhnev era—to make the USSR more efficient, more productive, and more "modern." The fact that Soviet spokesmen (along with those from other communist countries) talk about "democratization," rather than "democracy," suggests something very different from a government "of the people, by the people, and for the people." Indeed, unless there is f u n d a m e n t a l political c h a n g e — a highly unlikely e v e n t u a l i t y — a successful perestroika will provide the Soviet leadership with a population that is more disciplined, an economy better suited to innovation and growth, a military structure even

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more powerful than today's, and a political system that still rests on the rule of one person or a small group. Two sets of apparently contradictory programs that seek, on the one hand, to arouse the enthusiasm of the masses and certain elite groups while, on the other, subjecting them to strong central controls, give the Gorbachev administration its distinctive character. In the following pages, we will see how this generalization applies to several spheres of Soviet life. Glasnost. Since Lenin's time, one of the principal responsibilities of the mass media has been to uncover and publicize evidence of illegal or immoral behavior. The press, as Lenin put it, should be a "collective propagandist, a collective agitator, and a collective organizer." In 1986, as in previous years, there were innumerable reports of corruption, falsification of data, illegal monetary transactions, juvenile delinquency, alcohol abuse, shoddy construction practices, shortages of foodstuffs and consumer goods, and so on. Each item praised the Party's overall policy in a particular area, but then criticized low- or middle-level officials for failing to carry out their responsibilities properly or for deliberately circumventing the law. But 1986 also witnessed a dramatic broadening of what is considered newsworthy. Thus, one can now find stories about largescale loss of life from airplane crashes, ship collisions, dams bursting, and similar events that previously were ignored by the media. More interesting and important are reports of drug abuse, draft-dodging, and other antisocial behavior that formerly had been declared nonexistent, even impossible, in socialist society. There were also a number of live televison broadcasts ("telebridges") linking Soviet audiences with their counterparts in the U.S., Western Europe, and Japan. In addition, various high-ranking officials, including members of the USSR Council of Ministers, were put in the awkward position of having to respond to critics calling in their complaints to radio and televison studios. Furthermore, for the first time in many years, the media addressed such delicate political questions as the crimes of the Stalin Era, Soviet unpreparedness on the eve of World War II, and the fact that some peasants welcomed the Nazis as "liberators" in 1941. There were even reports, sometimes veiled and sometimes explicit, of ethnic disturbances and sit-down strikes in certain parts of the country. All of this is quite remarkable, and even though coverage of the Chernobyl disaster was a significant exception—relying heavily on denial, scapegoating and various forms of self-exculpating behavior

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(not to mention efforts to divert attention from the cause of the tragedy by focusing on the "heroism" and "patriotism" of those sent to help out)—discussion of "shortcomings" and "mistakes" at the nuclear power station provided massive evidence of official ineptitude. 2 At the same time, the Soviet press continues to include preposterous, sometimes grotesque allegations about the United States and its allies. Without doubt the most lurid charges are those concerning the disease AIDS. According to Moscow, the virus is the product of bacteriological warfare experiments being conducted by the American military—experiments carried out on two particularly vulnerable groups, homosexuals and drug addicts. The year 1986 also witnessed charges that the United States provided mujaheddin forces in Afghanistan with mines, hand grenades, and shells containing toxic chemicals; that the American military has transformed the Caribbean island of Grenada into "a base of operations for reprisals against national-liberation movements in the area" and has "saturated [Grenadan radio and televison] with the propaganda of anti-communism and violence"; that the U.S., Great Britain, and Canada conspired to bring about violent clashes between Hindus and Sikhs in India, and that the American government has set up large numbers of "concentration camps" for use in the future against political dissidents. One of the major functions of glasnost—its political purpose—comes through only obliquely, if at all, in individual articles or broadcasts. To a significant degree, the campaign for "candor" is an instrument with which Gorbachev and his followers have been engaging in factional politics. "Openness" in criticizing various individuals and practices, is closely linked with an effort to remove from positions of influence those individuals who were elevated by Brezhnev or who are not sufficiently enthusiastic about supporting Gorbachev. The Cultural Realm. "Glasnost is the sister of literature," the poet Andrei Voznesensky declared in mid-1986 at the Eighth Congress of Soviet Writers. "A writer spends 10 percent of his life writing books, and the other 90 percent trying to get them published." 3 His fellow poet, Yevgeny Yevtushenko, made much the same point at the Congress when he observed, "If our literature wants to remain the conscience of our people,... it does not have the right to look at life through one eye, closing the other out of shame. Half-truths . . . are more dangerous than lies." 4 Both men, especially Yevtushenko, have been accused in the past of political

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opportunism, remaining discreetly silent most of the time, and raising their voices in protest only when it was fashionable to do so. While there is much truth in this accusation, the two poets have played a major role in expanding the "cultural thaw" evident since Gorbachev's accession to power. The "thaw" itself consists of several elements. During the year 1986, the most important of these were: a) a public debate, carried out on the pages of the central press, about the right and duty of journalists to criticize, and about continuing attempts "from above" to suppress such material,-5 b) widespread criticism of the censorship system, including objections to the notion of "forbidden themes," such as sexual intimacy, marital infidelity, suicide, pacifism, and alcohol abuse, 6 Stalin's excesses, and editors and publishers who allegedly are too timid; 7 c) the release of some half-dozen films and plays that previously had been withheld from public viewing, and a virtual revolution within the Film Workers' Union; 8 d) the partial or complete rehabilitation of various literary and other cultural figures; e.g., Nikolai Gumilev (a poet who was accused of participating in a "counterrevolutionary" plot and was shot in 1921), Vladislav Khodasevich (a poet and literary critic who emigrated from Russia in 1922), Boris Pasternak, Anna Akhmatova, Mikhail Bulgakov, Yevgeny Zamiatin, Vladimir Nabokov, and Osip Mandelshtam. Even Vladimir Vysotsky, the popular songwriter and singer who was regarded as a quasidissident figure until his death in 1980, suddenly was rehabilitated in 1986. An unofficial cult figure during his life, he is once again receiving great attention—but now from officially approved sources.9 While the significance of these developments should not be underestimated, the full story is complicated. In each case, some of the author's works have been published, while others are the subject of rumor or promises; and if past experience is any guide, only some of the works scheduled to appear in print in 1987, 1988, or thereafter are likely to do so. In addition, other authors, such as Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, definitely will not be published. 10 What we are witnessing is only the first step in a liberalization process that may or may not have a future; as one well-informed Soviet emigre has observed, "It is proceeding timidly and cautiously." 1 1 Furthermore, as a British scholar has pointed out, "The trouble with benign dictatorships is that they do not necessarily remain benign; freedoms granted one day can be clawed back the next." 1 2 In fact, Soviet sources—including the general secretary himself—have already alleged that the "thaw" is encountering resistance "from those who either cannot or will not" change. 13

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The Dissidents. There were spectacular developments in this sphere in 1986, but whether or not they represent a meaningful change in the lives of disaffected citizens still living in the USSR remains to be seen. Early in the year, Elena Bonner, wife of dissident Soviet physicist Andrei Sakharov, was allowed to travel to the West to receive urgently needed medical treatment. In December, the couple was suddenly informed that their period of exile in Gorky was over. (Sakharov had been banished from Moscow in January 1980, although he had not even been charged with committing a crime. Ms. Bonner was free to travel between the capital and Gorky until 1984, when she was accused, tried, convicted, and sent to join her husband in exile, allegedly for having engaged in "anti-Soviet activities.") The end of the couple's travails (or at least this phase of them), while obviously welcome, should not be seen as the product of the general secretary's benevolence. Despite the fact that Sakharov was treated savagely in 1984 and 1985—he was force-fed brutally when he went on hunger strikes in support of his wife's request to seek medical treatment abroad—Gorbachev declared in February 1986 that the physicist "is living in Gorky in normal circumstances. . . . As far as I know, the state of his health is normal." The Soviet leader added, in a statement that was as false as it was cruel, that Sakharov had committed "illegal acts," and that "measures had been taken against him in accordance with our laws." 1 4 Moreover, until he decided to release him from exile, Gorbachev had accepted Sakharov's pain and humiliation, consigning the physicist to the "sinister hospitals and bent doctors" supervised by the security police. 15 Toward the end of 1986, the government released a number of prominent human rights activists who had been serving terms in labor camps or administrative exile. An official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs candidly acknowledged that pressure from Western nations had influenced his government's decision. The review of political cases, he said, had been undertaken because such individuals had created "some discomfort for us in the past, and caused tensions in our relations with other countries." 16 An even greater victory came earlier in the year, when the USSR's most prominent political prisoner, Anatoly Shcharansky, was freed. He had spent nine years in various prisons and labor camps. Until his arrest almost a decade ago, he represented the major bridge linking the "human rights movement" in the Soviet Union with the groups advocating Jewish emigration. According to the National Conference on Soviet Jewry, 914 Jews

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were permitted to leave the Soviet Union in 1986. This figure represents a 20 percent drop from the figure of 1,140 in 1985, and it is far below the 51,320 level reached in 1979, the peak year for Jewish emigration. Another 373,000 Jews still living in the USSR have indicated their desire to leave that country, by "requesting and receiving from relatives in Israel an affidavit (vyzov)" inviting them to come. 17 Their fate may well depend more on the state of Soviet-American relations, especially progress in arms control discussions, than on Moscow's fidelity to the 1975 Helsinki agreement. (This document requires all signatories, including the USSR, to take whatever steps are needed to facilitate "family reunification.") In an open letter to Gorbachev, Elie Wiesel has urged the general secretary to release the 3,000 or so families of "refuseniks." Their only "sin," Wiesel pointed out, is "to wish to live among people they love, instead of dwelling among people they fear." 18 Despite this and similar pleas, the politburo seems to regard its Jewish population in general, and the "refuseniks" in particular, as items to be used in negotiations on arms control and as a possible "bargaining chip" in its quest for Most Favored Nation status, credits, and advanced technology from the West. New regulations, promulgated in November 1986, narrow the definition of "family reunification." As of January 1, 1987, applications to emigrate will be considered only on the invitation of "direct" family members abroad, i.e., husband or wife, father or mother, son or daughter, and brother or sister.19 Those who remain in the camps, whether "prisoners of conscience" or ordinary criminals, live in an extremely harsh environment. Among those who perished in 1986 was Anatoly Marchenko, one of the legendary figures of the Gulag, who spent more than sixteen years in labor camps and prisons and another four in internal exile. The official cause of death was listed as "heart failure," but he had been severely weakened by a three-month-long hunger strike he had undertaken to protest the treatment of political prisoners. Among the observations for which he was best known was the statement that "words from prison are not heard." Marchenko's plea was heard in Moscow but was ignored. Other Developments. The year witnessed a number of other decisions and events that may have far-reaching effects on the prospects for democracy. Shortly after an ethnic Russian, Gennadi Kolbin, was brought in to replace the Kazakh Dinmukhamed Kunaev as first secretary of the Communist party of Kazakhstan,

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nationalist demonstrations took place in the capital city of AlmaAta. They quickly turned into a race riot. While TASS placed most of the blame on "hooligans, parasites, and other anti-social persons," it admitted that "nationalist elements" had at least incited the confrontation. There were also reports of brawls pitting groups of Russians against Yakuts in the Soviet Far East, but too little is known about these events to term them "ethnic riots" or even some sort of political manifestation. 20 Finally, the continued antialcohol campaign, a new law on "unearned income," further restrictions on the number of people who will be able to receive higher education, a renewed emphasis on increasing pay differentials, and incessant demands for "acceleration," "intensification," and "discipline" will make life more difficult for ordinary citizens. For the new system of incentives and rewards may make a reality of the principle "From each according to his ability, to each according to his work." But that will depend on the availability of high-quality consumer goods and foodstuffs, without which the new incentives will be ineffective. Moreover, the rest of the population—the great majority who have acquired sloppy work habits, whose access to the "second economy" will be limited, and who have lived through many previous "reforms"—may wind up experiencing a drop in living standards. Little information comes out of MONGOLIA, the USSR's only true satellite. 21 In June 1986, elections to the People's Great Hural (the nation's nominal legislature) were held. According to official reports, 99.9 percent of the voters—929,393 out of 929,403—cast their ballots for the candidates nominated by the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (MPRP). All the candidates were unopposed. Party and government officials adopted policies and used language that were all but identical to those associated with Mikhail Gorbachev's USSR. Thus, Jambyn Batmonh, general secretary of the MPRP since 1984, declared at the party congress in May that "recently, various shortcomings have been allowed in the implementation of the party's cadre policy." Echoing Gorbachev's criticism of party organizations in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, Batmonh added, "It is necessary to put an end to the unprincipled handling of cadre matters on the basis of departmental or local ties and friendships." He even called for a "restructuring" in the style of party work. What is needed, he said, is "an end to the creation of paperwork and the renunciation of bureaucratic work methods and speechifying." During the year 1986, Mongolia was in the midst of an

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intensified campaign against "negative phenomena." Designed to "put in order all spheres of society," this program involves stern measures against illegal currency transactions, black marketeering, embezzlement, and alcohol abuse. It also permits the leadership to place the blame for current social and economic problems on officials appointed during the reign of Yumjaagiyn Tsedenbal, head of the MPRP, who was removed in August 1984. In keeping with Gorbachev's policy of glasnost, Batmonh acknowledged difficulties in providing adequate supplies of foodstuffs and consumer goods. In addition, he spoke of "serious shortcomings" in the sphere of public health, expressing particular concern at the inadequate care available to infants and other children. Yet another echo of recent Soviet declarations could be heard in a speech given at the Party Congress by Damaagiyn Sodnom, chairman of the Council of Ministers. He talked about the need for more efficient use of "existing production capacity and labor, material and financial resources." He even announced the government's determination to reduce administrative interference in the operation of enterprises—giving them greater decision-making power in order to increase responsibility for success or failure in fulfilling the plan. These remarks and innovations could have been prepared in Moscow, and in all likelihood they were. This suggests that the Mongolian People's Republic is virtually part of the Soviet Union. BULGARIA remains a country whose leaders speak incessantly about democracy but do everything in their power to limit the freedom of their citizens. In fact, the degree of cynicism and disingenuousness among official spokesmen and the disparity between their claims and political reality may well be greater than anywhere else in the Soviet bloc. In virtually all spheres of life, one finds abundant evidence of government intrusiveness, refusal to tolerate individual or group autonomy, and a determination on the part of the authorities to rationalize their intolerance by referring to their "historical duty" to rear "the new socialist man." Ethnic Relations. During the year, there was no let-up in the regime's assault on its Turkish minority. Since 1984, the government has been conducting a campaign to compel the one million or so ethnic Turks in Bulgaria to give up their Turkish-Arabic names and adopt instead Bulgarian-sounding names. Official propaganda agencies assert that these people are not really Turks; instead, it is said, they are descendants of Slavs who had been forcibly converted to Islam during the period of Ottoman rule. 22 This is untrue; in effect,

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the regime has been demanding that these individuals renounce both their religion and their ethnic identity. According to a report issued in April 1986 by Amnesty International, the Bulgarian government sees adherence to Islam as "the key factor inhibiting loyalty to the Communist regime." But the matter of ethnic self-identification probably is at least as important; in fact, one suspects that the authorities' concern is heightened by the mutually reinforcing elements of religious and ethnic distinctiveness. In any event, as the assimilation campaign progressed through 1986, government spokesmen declared repeatedly that these "Slav Bulgarians" were all "spontaneously" and "voluntarily" requesting name changes—as a sign of their "rebirth in the Bulgarian nation." Just how "spontaneous" and "voluntary" this process is can be seen from Amnesty's findings: . . . villages with predominately Turkish inhabitants were s u r r o u n d e d b y police with d o g s and t r o o p s with tanks. . . . Officials with n e w identity c a r d s , or . . . with a list of "official" n a m e s to c h o o s e f r o m , visited e v e r y h o u s e h o l d , and the inhabitants w e r e forced . . . to a c c e p t the n e w identity c a r d s and t o sign " v o l u n t a r y " forms requesting their n e w n a m e s . 2 3

It is not only the Turks who have been made to "disappear" by administrative fiat. Because officials decided that the country's most recent census (December 4-14, 1985) should omit all questions concerning minorities, Bulgaria has been transformed magically into a "one-nation state," i.e., a country comprised of only one ethnic group. The new policy has elicited a barrage of criticism from Bulgaria's neighbors. In addition to Ankara's predictable outrage, Yugoslav analysts observed that Bulgaria's Macedonian minority, which had numbered more than a quarter million persons in 1946, suddenly had vanished. The census also failed to identify any of the country's 300,000-400,000 Gypsies, as well as smaller groups of Jews, Armenians, Tatars, and Greeks. 24 With the program of compulsory name-changing—accompanied by forcible closing of mosques, a prohibition on speaking Turkish in public or wearing traditional Turkish clothes, and similar measures —now complete, the government has taken its policy one step further, trying to prove that the Turkish minority never existed. Despite repeated affirmations over the past forty years that Turkish, Gypsy, Jewish, and other ethnic groups were present in the country, a major Bulgarian newspaper suddenly reported on the results of "a thirty-year-long anthropological and morphological study of exhumed skulls," taken from an area inhabited by "socalled" ethnic Turks. The researchers concluded that, "since the

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Middle Ages, only pure Bulgarians had existed there." 25 Publication of this "finding" has been termed "especially unsavory" by The New York Times, which noted that, "This racist pseudo-science recalls the Nazis' [practice of] measuring skulls to prove the inferiority of Jews and Slavs." 26 Glasnost and "The New Climate." Since the fall of 1985, Bulgaria has been experiencing a well-publicized campaign against "negative phenomena." Precisely what the dimensions of this campaign are, however, has never been made clear: the term is used to describe a wide range of antisocial behaviors (such as excessive drinking, church attendance, and nepotism), as well as conduct that is criminal in nature (e.g., corruption, bribery, embezzlement, and dealing in foreign currency). During 1986, official spokesmen and the press continued to rail against "negative phenomena," but were increasingly apt to accompany their criticism with reminders of the need for glasnost. (The same word is used in Bulgarian and in Russian.) In a speech to the Party Central Committee in January 1986, Todor Zhivkov went further, declaring that, "a new economic, political, and ideological climate is necessary, and we must create it at any cost." While the notion of a "new climate" is no more precise than that of "negative phenomena," it is strikingly similar to one of Gorbachev's favorite terms, perestroika. But the similarity is confined largely to the level of rhetoric. The Soviet general secretary makes frequent reference to the need for a "restructuring" of established practices and institutions, and he has used the expression in order to carry out a far-reaching purge. In contrast, Zhivkov (who has led the Bulgarian party since 1954) has continued, in the main, to rely on the same cadres who have served him for many years. Furthermore, even though the Thirteenth Party Congress in April 1986 gave its approval to the policy of glasnost, in the six months after the Congress the media were less candid about high-level corruption than they had been during the six months preceding the Congress.27 Presumably the party leadership is waiting to see "how far the Soviet reforms will be taken before it considers committing itself to a more radical line. . . ." 28 If Gorbachev proceeds too quickly or goes too far for his colleagues in the politburo, he may well become the former general secretary. Recognizing this possibility, and lacking any reason to make major changes among the country's leading personnel, Zhivkov seems content to call for glasnost and "a new climate," but not to pursue these objectives too energetically.

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Evidence for this interpretation can be seen in the Party leader's recommendation, made at the Thirteenth Congress, that competitive elections be held for certain government offices. Although this was not the first time such an idea had been advanced—it has been the subject of considerable discussion for almost a decade—Zhivkov stipulated that the Party would determine which of the many possible candidates has "the political qualifications" needed to get into the ballot. 29 The GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC (East Germany, or the GDR) continues to make significant economic progress, and its population has been provided with living standards above those that prevail elsewhere in the Soviet bloc. But the political system in the GDR remains highly authoritarian, and foreign policy is subordinated to Soviet objectives. Nevertheless, by 1986, the year that marked a quarter century since the Berlin Wall was put up, more and more groups were pressing for some kind of autonomy. Although these democratic stirrings have had only modest success to date, they seem to be growing in scope and intensity. Often, they involve direct confrontations with government officials, whose response is more apt to bring about additional demands than to put an end to conflict. Dissent can be discerned and, more surprisingly, is tolerated in several spheres. One concerns church-state relations; a second has to do with cultural affairs, especially those affecting youth; and a third involves emigration. In addition, there is some (but by no means conclusive) evidence that the regime of Erich Honecker is itself engaged in a form of dissent, i.e., failing to endorse —or even explicitly differing with—Soviet positions on a number of issues. Church-state relations. In September 1986, the country's eleven Catholic bishops issued a letter criticizing the fact that Christians and Party members were not treated equally. 30 In view of this pattern of discrimination, it went on, Catholics could not be expected to cooperate fully with the secular authorities. Clearly troubled by continuing erosion of Church autonomy, even with respect to matters of individual conscience and conduct, the bishops underscored their determination to resist this development. As they declared in their letter: The Church must remain a Church and must not evolve into a secular a r m [of the regime] for the pursuit of the state's and society's i n t e r e s t s . . . . Christians . . . do not wish to be submerged

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under a compulsory worldview that seeks to create a nonreligious, atheistic society under the banner of socialism.

More generally, the statement demanded that the authorities grant "equal rights and respect" to Catholic spokesmen, and allow the Church to express its views publicly "on important questions of the present time." This document constitutes a call for genuine pluralism, at least with respect to religious belief and behavior. If Erich Honecker and his colleagues in the Socialist Unity Party (SED) were to accept such notions, the GDR would cease to be a "socialist" or "communist" country. The Soviets, too, would doubtless find such an arrangement intolerable. The Federation of Evangelical Churches has also spoken out against policies endorsed by the government.31 For a number of years, the Federation has supported an independent peace movement within the country and has also backed the idea of alternative service for young men who are conscientious objectors. (Unlike its Warsaw Pact allies, the GDR does, in fact, permit COs to perform noncombat-related functions within the armed services.) In 1986, the Church Synod went a step further, calling for some sort of "pacifist education" in East German schools. The Synod also expressed concern about the Chernobyl disaster, recommended a moratorium on the development of nuclear energy, and called for a thorough study of the risks associated with "the peaceful atom." Religious authorities are not satisfied with what is actually a rather liberal policy on the part of the regime. Cultural Affairs. The government's attempts to relax its ideological-political controls have not satisfied the new policy's presumed beneficiaries. The period of sharp confrontation between the regime and its critics within the artistic community basically ended in 1976, when the popular songwriter Wolf Biermann was expelled from the GDR. During the past decade, the authorities have come to a modus vivendi with the creative intelligentsia— partly because of a more flexible approach on the part of the former, partly because of a less confrontational posture on the part of the latter. The year 1986 witnessed no significant changes in behavior among those active in the world of culture or in public policy toward this stratum. As one well-informed analyst has observed, the younger generation of writers and poets (i.e., those under age 35) are characterized by estrangement from the East German system: they "largely ignore the state and reject all ideas of political

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commitment." Operating in small groups, whose existence and activities are accepted by the regime, these individuals "have developed something of an autonomous literary 'subculture' in the GDR." Poetry readings, art exhibits, and concerts are permitted, though only for other members of this officially tolerated segment of society. They are even permitted to publish a number of books and journals, but by making greater and greater use of audio and video cassettes, they have managed to reach a larger audience. 32 Emigration. According to West German estimates, some 400,000500,000 citizens of the GDR have applied for permits to emigrate. These individuals apparently see a "window of opportunity" that could be closed at any moment. For reasons that are not altogether clear, the East German regime has been letting substantial numbers leave—approximately 40,000 in 1984, an additional 20,000 in 1985, and yet another 20,000 in 1986. Those who have been granted exit permits are, in the main, men and women of pension age. Presumably the East Berlin authorities regard them as nonproductive and potentially costly to the state, and the regime would prefer to have West Germany assume responsibility for providing pensions, medical care, etc. In addition, an undetermined number of people left because of problems at work or at school, or—in the words of an East German clergyman—because they found it intolerable to continue expressing opinions "that they did not really identify with." During the first eight months of 1986, some 2,773 East Germans fled to West Germany, mostly via third countries. The total was almost 40 percent higher than the number who escaped during the same period in 1985. Foreign Polio/. The evidence is incomplete, but it offers some support for the proposition that Honecker has been trying to pursue a foreign policy differing slightly from Moscow's. Thus, when the USSR began to install short-range missiles in Eastern Europe, official media in the GDR (as well as Czechoslovakia) signaled their d i s p l e a s u r e . S i m i l a r l y , during a period of mutual recriminations between Bonn and Moscow, Honecker continued to speak of his country's "policy of dialogue and cooperation" with the West. Finally, the East Germans have reported only selected aspects of Gorbachev's program for economic reform in the USSR. Instead of publishing the Soviet leaders' speeches verbatim, Neues Deutschland and other newspapers in the GDR have offered summaries, omitting references to "openness," "crises," and other terms that might encourage questioning among East German

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r e a d e r s . 3 3 Still, it is inconceivable that either Honecker or Gorbachev would allow a serious challenge to Soviet hegemony to occur anywhere in Eastern Europe. CZECHOSLOVAKIA has not forgotten the "Prague Spring," although almost twenty years have passed since Soviet and other Warsaw Pact forces put an end to it. Despite—or perhaps because of—its democratic traditions, its highly educated population, and its brief but exhilarating experiment with democracy in 1968, most of the population of Czechoslovakia are dispirited and indifferent, forced to repress rage at their government, those who reign in Moscow, and their own political impotence. If Gorbachev's commitment to "restructuring" and "democratization" in the USSR is ever adopted by those who control the various East European countries, we might see the beginnings of change in Czechoslovakia. To date, however, the Husak regime has been even more insistent than that of Todor Zhivkov in Bulgaria on maintaining the status quo. The Cultural Sphere. The censorship apparatus may well be the only institution in the country that operates efficiently, largely because cultural and ideological functionaries are constantly reminded to be on the alert for "cultural products alien to socialism." 3 4 For example, when Jaroslav Seifert won the Nobel Prize for literature in 1984, the government prevented the text of his speech from being released in Czechoslovakia. When the poet died in early 1986, he was described by an official spokesman as "one of the brightest stars in the constellation of proletarian writing." Not a word was said about his frequent criticism of the regime; the fact that he was one of the original signers of the Dissident Declaration, Charter 77; the fact that most of his works were published in extremely small editions (and even then, only after lengthy delays and in censored form); and the fact that he had once been expelled from the Party. A church service organized to eulogize him was never announced in the newspapers, but the word spread. When several thousand mourners appeared, plainclothes policemen who had been sent to the church took photographs of everyone present. 35 Dissent and Charter 77. Despite continuing efforts to isolate members of the intelligentsia who are not politically malleable, the regime has not eliminated Charter 77. Set up ten years ago, Charter 77 is not an "organization" in the usual sense of this term. It has neither formal membership nor leadership; instead, it describes itself as "an informal and open association of signatories to the

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Charter 77 Declaration [issued on] 1 January 1977." Anyone who signs the original Charter, then, "does not profess adherence to an organization, but [rather] to his own civic awareness." 36 By January 1, 1987, some 1,300 men and women had signed the original manifesto. Over the course of the past decade, Charter 77 has broadened its field of vision beyond its original concern with violations of human rights. Although it embraces Western democratic values, such as tolerance and pluralism, it has never formulated a political program. Instead, its adherents have tried to keep elements of the traditional political culture alive, while also encouraging unofficial or "underground" cultural and intellectual activities. As Jeri Laber, executive director of the human rights organization Helsinki Watch, has remarked, "hundreds of books are published in samizdat, unpublished plays are performed in living rooms by banned actors, seminars on forbidden topics are held by former professors in private homes, and church services for believers are conducted privately by ministers and priests who have lost their state licenses to officiate." 37 On January 1, 1987, the Charter issued a remarkable appeal, "A Word to Fellow Citizens." 38 This document called for basic political change and urged concerned men and women to take action. This advice was explicit, outlining the need to mobilize public opinion and challenge "the system," i.e., precisely the kind of exhortations that are most likely to arouse the Party's instincts for selfpreservation. The letter is very close to a call for sedition. If Gorbachev and his approach continue to guide Soviet policies, if Moscow is able to persuade or compel the various East European elites to move in the same direction, and if none of these developments leads to loss of political control by Soviet or East European rulers in any individual state or in the bloc as a whole, perhaps some of the Charter's new recommendations will bear fruit. But long before any of this happens, the regime in Prague—one of the most, if not the most, unyielding on questions of political change—may decide that the reform group has already gone too far. Other Developments. The authorities in Prague seem uncertain about how to deal with Gorbachev's call for glasnost. Part of their response involves ignoring or reporting selectively on developments in the USSR. Although Husak has shown almost no interest in "restructuring" his country's economy, dealing candidly with its postwar history, or allowing serious public debate over contemporary political, economic, and social issues, he must take

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cognizance of what is happening in the Soviet Union. His dilemma was illustrated with unusual clarity on June 3, 1986, when Rude Pravo published a letter by an anonymous citizen of Czechoslovakia to a Soviet friend. The author's puzzlement merits quoting at some length: Please tell m e the truth about what is going on in your country. I have always thought that I know about life [ t h e r e ] . . . . I never allowed myself to think that the problems discussed at the 27th C P S U C o n g r e s s w e r e so deep and disturbing that it is n o w necessary for you to speak openly about some kind of stagnation in society, bureaucratization, [the need for] urgent measures in the e c o n o m y and management, and mainly about the psychological re-education of the Soviet people. What has happened and why? Is it really all like this? . . . And even if this is true, why discuss your errors and failures in front of the whole world?

The various questions enumerated here indicate that grave doubts exist in Prague about the wisdom of Gorbachev's innovations. So far, the Czechoslovak regime has responded in the same way it has since 1968—e.g., by trying members of the "Jazz Section," closing down a play that allegedly "debauched people's taste and distorted socialist reality," and asserting that "the law guarantees freedom for each citizen to the extent willed by the state." Developments in HUNGARY were largely uncongenial to the prospects for democracy. Whereas much that happened during 1985 offered reason for cautious optimism, the trend during 1986 was in a contrary direction. The change can be seen most clearly in the spheres of culture and economic policy. The Cultural Realm. Two events marked the difficulties for those active in cultural affairs: the government's response to the Budapest Cultural Forum held in October 1985, and its concern about the thirtieth anniversary of the Hungarian Revolution of 1956. A number of Western intellectuals who attended the Forum expressed serious distress at the "increased cultural repression that has been evident in Hungary" since the meeting ended. The regime, they correctly pointed out, is "engaged in a campaign of intimidation and harassment," aimed at curbing illicit publishing and other dissident activities. 39 A prominent Hungarian dissident, Gyórgy Krassó, has confirmed their assessment, contrasting the government's relatively progressive course in 1985 with its attempts a year later "to silence the democratic opposition," primarily by resorting to a "sudden resurgence of police violence."40

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A major literary journal was closed down in mid-1986; according to Gyorgy Vajda, deputy minister of culture, the magazine's editors had permitted "a series of abuses of communications policy." At the same time, Vajda declared that the actions of the playwright Istvan Csurka—who had delivered several lectures while abroad, and who had published a volume of essays while in the United States—"give a distorted picture of our social conditions and our people's [recent] history." As a result, he announced that "until further notice, editors will not publish Istvan Csurka's work. Similar instructions have been issued to book publishers, film studios and theaters." 41 In November, Janos Berecz, the Party official responsible for ideology and culture, addressed the Writers' Union; his attacks on nonconformism were so harsh and alienated the audience to such a degree that the writers proceeded to elect (in a genuine secret ballot) a new executive board, which excluded all but a handful of Party members. (The inevitable crackdown by the authorities began in 1987.) Even the world of painting, where artists had been given considerable freedom in their work and were permitted to display and sell their products without interference by the state, began to change in the latter part of 1986. A new rector was appointed to the Academy of Fine Arts in Budapest, and shortly after assuming his new position, he promised to restore "socialist values" in the school and criticized his predecessor for "trying to convey and represent various currents and impressions uncritically and without value." 42 As indicated earlier, the decision to tighten censorship policies was not simply a response to the "excessive" freedom of 1985 and the Cultural Forum. It also seems to have been linked to official anxiety over the way certain dissidents and even the official media might treat the thirtieth anniversary of the 1956 uprising. Evidence in support of this contention includes the testimony of various Hungarian dissidents, an outpouring of official Party propaganda denouncing the "counterrevolution," reports that at least one individual who spoke out against the government's handling of the anniversary theme was taken to a mental institution, increasing restrictions on foreign travel as the date of the anniversary drew near, and other steps to minimize the risk of contact among dissidents, emigres, and foreign journalists. 43 The anniversary itself was celebrated in Hungary by small groups of nonconformists meeting quietly in friends' apartments, since the police had taken precautions to prevent public manifestations. Security personnel were posted at statues and cemeteries, "preventing people from laying wreaths to mark the anniversary."

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When a well-known dissident, Imre Mecs, tried to place a bouquet at the gravesite where four of his friends are buried, "three men in casual clothes walked out of the woods and identified themselves as police." They told him "a new law" prohibited visits to this section of the cemetery and forced him to leave. Economic Freedom and Controls. Hungary is seen by many in the West as the most prosperous and the most nearly "capitalist" of all the countries of Eastern Europe. Its shops are well provisioned; markets generally have a wide range of fruits, vegetables, and other foodstuffs available; people tend to be fashionably dressed; and the private sector plays a large and growing role in the production and distribution of goods and services. The British magazine The Economist has suggested that the national motto seems to be, "If you can't join capitalism, imitate it." 44 Still, most students of Hungarian affairs recognize that the half measures that have been introduced to date cannot solve the country's economic, social, or political problems. A relevant change is the law on bankruptcy that took effect in September 1986. This legislation, which has already been used to close down certain unprofitable plants, represents an assault on one of the most cherished features of socialist systems: the implicit social contract between citizens and the state, especially the guarantee of job security. The traditional practice in Hungary required each enterprise to hand over most of its profits to the state. In recent years, some 80-83 percent of the profits of efficient production units have had to be delivered to the government, which in turn has used these funds to subsidize enterprises that operated at a loss. With the new law in place, support for what have been termed "lifeless" industries is withdrawn. But there has been far more talk than action with respect to closing down inefficient enterprises and permitting the worst performers to go bankrupt. The state budget for 1987 actually calls for an increase of 3.7 percent in government subsidies to unprofitable enterprises; today, these transfers account for 26.1 percent of government expenditures and comprise the largest item in the entire budget. 4 5 In April 1986, Ferenc Havasi, a member of both the politburo and the Secretariat, warned that unless the authorities were more assertive in rewarding the efficient and punishing the inefficient, "we will gradually exhaust the moral and political capital and assets that we have been able to accumulate since 1981." 46 The Party, like its counterpart in the USSR, seems willing to refine its system of incentives and rewards in order to promote

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productivity and efficiency. While officials are aware of public unease at the idea of increasing income differentials, they emphasize that Marxism requires only the guarantee of equal opportunity, rather than a policy of income-leveling. As a politburo member put it in a September 1986 interview, income should be higher for those who are "smarter, more diligent, and talented." As for workers and managers who perform poorly, they should feel the results "in their pockets." 47 This approach has already widened the gap between those who are well-off financially and those who have difficulty making ends meet. One survey, whose results were made public during the year, concluded that 17-18 percent of the country's population considered themselves "rich," while 21-22 percent described themselves as "poor." The phenomenon of poverty is real; but because it has been ignored, even denied, for years, it has grown more severe. In the words of one Hungarian writer, "certain social injustices [have] continued to regenerate themselves"; too few of the country's citizens are willing to accept the fact that the ideological state of "communism," with its promise of "complete equality," will not appear in the foreseeable future. 48 Both the political system of POLAND and developments during 1986 defy easy categorization. Solidarity and other underground groups continued to receive a respectful hearing, especially among the urban population, and hundreds of different publications were issued outside of official channels. These activities are tolerated by the authorities for domestic, as well as foreign policy, reasons. At the same time, Poland clearly is a nation whose democratic practices are furtive, occasional, and always at risk of being terminated. This odd combination of authoritarianism and a parallel, almost independent political life gives "democracy" its peculiar flavor in Poland. 49 The apparent contradiction can be seen most clearly in the sphere of human rights, especially in the government's policy toward the Catholic Church. Human Rights. The underground press continues to flourish, and new books, journals, and newspapers appear frequently. While these publications often are described as "illegal" or "clandestine," neither term is altogether appropriate. According to the Polish constitution and numerous international agreements to which Poland is a signatory, "freedom of expression" is guaranteed. Thus, as Michal Kolodziej has noted, materials "that do not pass through state censorship are technically not illegal." Furthermore, since the

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individuals who write for unauthorized publications do not always resort to pseudonyms, the underground press is "not completely clandestine . . . [or] illegal." Kolodziej prefers the term "independent publication." 50 Most of the newspapers and magazines that have appeared since the declaration of martial law in December 1981 have ceased to exist, and those that continue to be published are constantly in need of money and supplies, distribution costs, etc. Extraordinarily enough, many of the men and women who work for independent publishers are paid regular wages, and authors often receive a fee for their contributions. Funds to cover expenses come from ordinary citizens who buy the various publications, as well as from gifts—especially from the large community of Poles living in the West and from Western trade unions.51 The most widely read and influential of these underground publications is the weekly Tygodnik Mazowszwa. Its average print run is some 15,000 copies, primarily because it usually is the first (or one of the first) newspapers to print communiques from unofficial groups, criticism of government policies, and reports on arrests, strikes, and other important developments. This paper, along with a few others, manages to continue operating even in the face of raids, arrests, seizure of property, and other forms of intimidation. 52 On the other hand, during the first half of 1986, hundreds of writers, journalists, playwrights, and other intellectuals were in prison, having been found guilty of "crimes against the state and public order." Among the best known of these "politicals" was Adam Michnik, an historian, writer, and long-term political activist. Another prominent dissident who spent the first eight and one-half months of 1986 in prison was Czeslaw Bielecki. An architect and graphic artist who has played a leading role in mobilizing the opposition, he was jailed for his alleged ties with "an alien organization harming Poland's political system." The Paris monthly Kultura has published a number of letters Bielecki wrote to his sons while he still was in Warsaw's Mokotow Prison. They describe in detail "the tortures of forced feeding" (he had undertaken a hunger strike) and what he euphemistically refers to as the "carelessness" of prison officials and various "pseudo-medical experiments" carried out in the prison hospital. 53 The low point for human rights during the year was reached in the weeks leading up to the Tenth Party Congress, held in Warsaw during the period June 29-July 3. Motivated (or prodded) by the fact that Gorbachev was to attend the Polish meeting, "the authorities rounded up a large part of the Solidarity underground movement

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. . . , and [the] official press described the outlawed union as little better than a Western spy-ring." 5 4 Two weeks after the Congress ended, the government approved a limited, and then a general, amnesty; by September 15, all the "politicals" were released from prison. 55 These changes in policy were striking indeed, but whether they were a sign of Jaruzelski's political strength or weakness is less clear. In any event, as The Economist pointed out, "When a general empties his jails of political prisoners, he deserves a pat on the back—even though he is the one who put them behind bars in the first place." 5 6 Still, Jaruzelski emphasized his determination to prevent any extension of autonomy or incipient pluralism in Polish society. In a speech on September 16, he declared, "Our critics regard pluralism as the legalization of activities that are by nature illegal, anti-socialist, and destructive." Anyone trying to "abuse" the amnesty, who tries to "set up anti-state groups or start another round of anarchy," he added, would receive swift punishment. 57 Religion. Church-state relations remained at a low level, but the powerful feelings of distrust manifested by both sides did not turn into violent confrontation. The secular authorities continued to express hostility toward what they termed "political clericalism," periodically denouncing certain priests as "enemies of socialism." Just as often, the Polish primate, Jozef Cardinal Glemp, rejected these accusations, while also reaffirming his determination not to impose restraints on the clergy. Although the cardinal is not as outspoken as his predecessor, Stefan Cardinal Wyszynski, he has managed to preserve the Church's autonomy, despite the government's unremitting efforts to impose greater controls. The issues separating the two sides in 1986 were largely unchanged from the previous year. Perhaps the most significant shift involved the introduction, on September 1, of a course on "Religious Science." For decades, atheistic messages have been included in courses dealing with history, literature, science, and social studies. The new course, being taught on a trial basis in a limited number of schools, focuses on the Marxist conception of religion, church-state relations in comparative perspective, and the situation of the Roman Catholic Church in Poland. Concerned about this and other developments, the Polish episcopate issued a pastoral letter on education and youth, and had it read in all churches. The bishops' remarks were forceful and to the point: they warned that any further escalation of the current "crisis of conscience" in the schools would do "irreversible harm to the rearing

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of [future] generations," threatening the population's "moral and patriotic values, as well as the future of social order." 58 A second church-state issue, centering on the Church's plan to set up an "Agricultural Foundation," was resolved during the year. Since 1981, the Polish episcopate has been trying to establish an organization to channel money and resources to the private sector of agriculture. The idea was to bring in modern machinery, spare parts, and fertilizer, bought with dollars raised abroad. Polish peasants were supposed to pay for the goods in zloty; the money was then to be used by the foundation for projects to improve life in the villages. The government, however, refused to accept any such plan unless the minister of agriculture was put in charge. Government negotiators insisted that he would have to have the final say in case of disagreement about how the money should be spent. They also stipulated that any Church plans had to be "organically coordinated" with those of the state. Obviously, these requirements would have deprived the foundation of any kind of independence, and the bishops abandoned the project. 59 Once again, raison d'état was placed above economic rationality. ROMANIA is a country ruled by a dictator whose hypertrophied ego leads him to destroy precious architectural monuments, subject women of child-bearing age to humiliating physical examinations every month under the auspices of "demographic command units," reduce people's daily caloric intake and deprive them of adequate nutrition, pursue policies that place the most vulnerable elements of the population—new-born babies and the elderly—at risk, and at the same time claim to be one of the most brilliant, talented, benevolent, and beloved leaders ever to appear on earth. Nicolae Ceausescu's megalomania and seeming indifference to the damage he is doing are of long standing. The horrors that he brought about in 1986 were largely an outgrowth of earlier policies. The destruction of churches, synagogues, and masterpieces of secular architecture, begun in 1984, continued at a brisk pace. This program, elevating vandalism to the level of state policy, was described as a "revolutionary urban achievement," whereby "dilapidated yet picturesque . . . [buildings] expressing and generating social inequality" would be replaced by a communist "Acropolis." 60 Out of economic necessity, Bucharest has been expanding its food shipments to the USSR without increasing agricultural output. A sharp fall in farm income, shortages of machinery and fertilizer, and "the coercive control of trade between village and city" have had a devastating effect on morale and productivity in the farm

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sector. 61 There are widespread shortages of basic foodstuffs: sugar and cooking oil are rationed in most areas. Rationed goods often are unavailable in the stores: meat and dairy products have all but disappeared, and thousands of people travel "from district to district on shopping excursions from which they often return emptyhanded." 6 2 An American journalist visiting Romania in early 1987 said that his "dominant impression [was] of a nation perennially standing in line with empty shopping bags and returning home with the bags scarcely fuller." 63 One of his colleagues went even further, speaking of "the institutionalized misery and despair" that have affected everyone—"except the police, who are paid more than university professors to carry submachine guns" and intimidate the population. 6 4 Gasoline supplies were severely limited, and the government again banned the use of private automobiles during the period February 2-March 22. (These restrictions led to absurd or even grotesque results. According to the Romanian press, families and friends of people who died sometimes had to take the body to the cemetery by streetcar.) Civil rights, as they are understood in "bourgeois democracies," are virtually nonexistent. In this respect, as in others, there has been no change. A broad array of written and unwritten restrictions limit religious freedom, and even those who obey the law may find themselves the victims of official arbitrariness. According to a U.S. government analysis, "religious activities are kept under scrutiny by the secret police and are subject to loss of jobs and social benefits, police intimidation, and in some cases beatings." 65 The Romanian Orthodox Church has been a supine institution, although some parish priests have tried to challenge the accommodating stance of their superiors. Seventh-Day Adventists, Baptists, Pentecostals, Jehovah's Witnesses, and a curious Protestant group known as "the Brethren" all experience relentless pressure, especially because of their efforts to distribute religious literature. Physical attacks by state security personnel are commonplace, as are arrests and heavy fines. Ethnic minorities fare no better. Most Hungarians, Turks, Germans, Jews, and Gypsies who are Romanian citizens are treated extremely shabbily, as the regime systematically seeks to integrate and absorb these minorities into one Romanian culture. Once a year—when the U.S. Congress is debating whether or not to offer Bucharest Most Favored Nation (MFN) status—several thousand Jews and Germans are usually permitted to emigrate. 66 (A former advisor to the Romanian president has asserted, perhaps apocryphally, that in 1975 "Mr. Ceausescu decided to maintain

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emigration from Romania . . . at the minimum level but no higher. 'We should make as much money as possible on our vanishing natural resources—oil, Jews and Germans,' he reportedly told the task force.") 67 The authorities have made prodigious efforts to prevent or stifle any form of dissent. According to "Decree No. 408," a document often mentioned but never actually published in the Romanian media, citizens must report all contacts with foreigners within twenty-four hours of their occurrence. Various amendments to the decree make it a criminal offense to offer overnight accommodations to foreign visitors, prohibit writers from having unauthorized conversations with foreign colleagues, and—in the somewhat exaggerated language of The Economist—"make it illegal for any Romanian citizen to have any serious conversation with a foreigner." 6 8 An anonymous Romanian, commenting to a foreign writer, emphasized just how pervasive the control system is. "Repression isn't what you think it is," he remarked. "It's not the Gulag now, and it's not people being thrown in prison: it is the condition of ordinary life" throughout the country. 69 YUGOSLAVIA is the most nearly democratic of all the countries of Eastern Europe. On the surface, at least, it possesses some of the characteristics associated with open societies, e.g., a genuine federal structure that guarantees a significant decentralization of political power, a free press, and an independent judiciary. But reality is complex and, as developments during 1986 made clear, political institutions and processes can be deprived of their democratic essence whenever the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (the Communist party) feels it necessary to do so. Civil Liberties. Although journalists in Yugoslavia enjoy far more freedom than their counterparts anywhere else in Eastern Europe or the USSR, freedom of the press was repeatedly called into question during the year. As is true of almost all spheres of life in this country, there is considerable regional variation: debate in the Slovenian press, for example, is far more robust than in Serbia, not to mention Macedonia or Bosnia-Hercegovina. Some of the material that appears in print is astonishing. Thus, during the year, the journalists' association of Slovenia issued a declaration urging that a 1982 law requiring reporters to be "consciously loyal to the ideas of Marxism-Leninism" (that is, to engage in self-censorship and submit to Party discipline) be removed from the books. Similarly, another Serbian group—identifying

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itself as the Committee for the Defense of Freedom of Thought and Expression—called for the abolition of the one-party system and the introduction of genuinely free elections. "No one should hold power forever and without interruption," its manifesto affirmed, "just because of . . . past victories and merits." 70 One can even find public officials calling for democratic political change, occasionally resorting to Western-style protests to make their point. A particularly striking instance of this involved a group of three Serbian judges. Outraged at what they rightly regarded as excessive Party interference in their deliberations, the judges went on a two-day hunger strike, accusing the Party of having usurped judicial responsibilities. Moved by this courageous act, a prominent law professor offered his support a few days later: he denounced the "devaluation of the law" in Yugoslavia, asserting that the constitutional provision establishing an independent judiciary (Article 219) was "a fiction." The system, he said, "is frequently powerless to protect its own order against the assaults of politically powerful personalities." He placed the responsibility directly in the hands of the Party apparatchiki, for "placing loyalty to the political organization above the existing laws." 71 Even the Party is not immune to criticism. A Croatian Party functionary asserted that Communists had become "great babblers, rather than a group of people trying to bring about revolutionary change." 7 2 A Montenegrin official spoke out in the same vein, declaring that "leaders often consider their job not as imposing greater responsibility on themselves, but rather as a way of securing greater privileges." 73 But these are only occasional voices which the Party ignores. Ethnic Problems. Developments in the realm of nationality relations were, by and large, unfavorable to democracy. Members of the country's various ethnic groups continued to express envy, anxiety, condescension, and/or hostility toward one another. This is not new, but 1986 saw a significant deterioration. There was a sharp increase in ethnically linked acts of violence, primarily in Kosovo, the autonomous province located in Serbia whose population is largely Albanian. Since 1981 nationalist riots have resulted in numerous deaths and widespread destruction; more than 20,000 Serbs and Montenegrins have moved out of the area, and many of those who remain are frightened. These developments, in turn, have intensified nationalist feelings among Serbs, including those who wield power in Belgrade. In the past year, several hundred Albanians living in Kosovo were arrested. They were accused of

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trying to accelerate the exodus of other nationalities from the province, of having in their possession large quantities of weapons, ammunition, and printing presses, and also of operating a number of illegal radio transmitters. The Kosovo Serbs who fear being displaced have not confined their reactions to expressions of outrage. Some have submitted petitions to the federal authorities requesting protection from their neighbors. Others have organized protest demonstrations, while still others have demanded that Kosovo be denied its semiautonomous status, that Albanian no longer be recognized as an official language in Yugoslavia, and that "Albanian national symbols" be prohibited in Kosovo. Religious Issues. For more than forty years, the Yugoslav Communist party has restricted religious organizations. In a country where religious and ethnic self-identification overlap strongly, and where regional rivalries have severely tested the ability of the political elite to hold the federation together, it is important to take note of any relaxation in controls. For the first time since the 1940s, the government permitted two major religious leaders—the Catholic Archbishop of Slovenia and the Patriarch of the Serbian Orthodox Church—to offer Christmas Eve greetings over state televison. While both men studiously avoided political subjects, they offered indirect support for the values of pluralism and tolerance, and it was encouraging to see high-ranking clerics given access to the electronic media. The situation of the country's 4,000,000 or so Muslims is less secure. In part because of their high birthrates, and perhaps because of some uneasiness over the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in the Middle East, the government has been increasingly ready to impose barriers upon members of this faith. For example, municipal authorities in Zagreb have continued to deny the local Muslim community permission to open a mosque that is already completed. The Right to Strike. One of the major indicators of Yugoslav liberalism is official tolerance of strikes, work stoppages, and other forms of worker protest. 74 Technically speaking, strikes are neither legal nor illegal in the country, but they have been an accepted form of behavior for some three decades. In the first half of 1986 (the most recent period for which data are available), 383 strikes took place, a modest increase over the 341 that occurred during the same period a year earlier. Upwards of 90 percent of strikes, according to some estimates, are about wages.

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To date, almost all instances of worker protest have been confined to a single enterprise; the same regionalism, social and cultural diversity, and local autonomy that have impeded the country's economic progress seriously limit the prospects for "workers' solidarity." But in the past year or two, there has been increasing evidence of official unease at the growing number of strikes, at their economic cost, and at the prospect of a challenge to political and social stability. Striking workers are increasingly likely to be reprimanded, fined, or even dismissed. But this approach, in turn, has led to greater alienation among workers. Aware that a formal decision to stage a strike or a work stoppage may result in punishment, workers resort to what are known as "white strikes," a method of protest resembling the "job action" or "sick-out" sometimes practiced in America by public employees who are forbidden by law to strike. Still, groups of workers who take steps to protect or advance their interests remain vulnerable; they must rely on the good will of enterprise managers and local government authorities. The political leadership of ALBANIA continued to take tentative steps toward liberalizing the country's domestic and foreign policies. Citizens remain largely cut off from the rest of the world, have very little control over their own lives, and are permitted no opportunity whatsoever to influence public policy. Still, there has been change since 1985, when Enver Hoxha died and Ramiz Alia succeeded him. This change can be seen in at least four areas: economic policy, cultural policy, policy toward youth, and foreign policy, especially foreign trade. Each of these shifts is quite modest in scope, but together they indicate genuine interest on the part of Alia to pull Albania out of its self-imposed isolation and backwardness. Economic Policy. Unlike his predecessor, Alia seems anxious to raise his countrymen's standard of living. On March 28, an editorial in the nation's principal newspaper condemned as "harmful" the notion that "there is no room for change," 75 and Alia himself has called for an "improvement in the well-being of the masses," a notion that was all but heretical when Hoxha was alive. 76 The new Party leader has put an end to the campaign, carried out in 19811985, to collectivize privately held livestock and to reduce the size of the peasants' private plots. He also suggested a greater measure of economic decentralization, and he has announced that several collective farms will participate in an "experiment" in 1987 to

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permit individual farm managers greater latitude in decisionmaking. Finally, he has intimated that state procurement prices for agricultural products will be raised and that prices on certain other goods might be lowered. 77 All these decisions and recommendations, accompanied by changes in the system of incentives and rewards, a greater emphasis on foreign trade, and the determination to acquire foreign technology, should help to improve the quality of life in Albania. Cultural Policy. Improvements in this sphere are a product of two mutually reinforcing developments. The first involves Alia's overall effort to improve the population's quality of life; he has described the raising of cultural standards as an integral part of this effort. The second concerns his linking of "culture" with the decision to expand relations with the West. In the latter sense, it is a kind of "damage-limiting" operation, an attempt to meet the needs of people who might otherwise be seduced by "foreign enticements." The new approach began in August 1985, when Alia spoke out against what he termed "mediocrity in cultural activity." He asserted that "higher artistic standards are today a very urgent requirement,. . . [even] a necessity." Leading figures in Albanian politics and the arts have echoed these sentiments. 78 Films tend to attract small audiences, plays run for only brief periods of time, readers show little interest in the poetry available to them, and books remain on the shelf because few people want to read them. As the newspaper Rruga e Partise put it in May, "the reader and the spectator are not satisfied with the level of these works." 79 More important, the new Party leader is not satisfied either. This is not to suggest that the Albanian political elite has decided to "let a hundred flowers bloom," much less dismantle the apparatus of censorship. The leadership seems to be divided on this issue. The chairman of the Union of Albanian Writers and Artists has argued in favor of maintaining the traditional approach. Other commentators have expressed dismay at the interest that ordinary citizens have in "vulgar televison programs," "tasteless, distorted, and totally worthless" broadcasts originating in Italy or Yugoslavia, but which can be seen and heard in parts of Albania. There has even been a literary scandal—perhaps the first in the country's history—involving a novelist who overestimated the latitude granted by the Party's new policy. The author, Koco Kosta, criticized most of his fellow citizens as materialistic, ridiculed former partisans for "milking socialism" today, excoriated the chairman of the Union of Writers and Artists as "false, egotistic,

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and a slanderer," and even touched upon the forbidden topic of homosexuality. He was upbraided for having written a novel that adopted an "erroneous" ideological position and for having transgressed the limits of the permissible. Polio/ Toward Youth. In this area, too, the new leadership has rejected Hoxha's approach as outdated and counterproductive. The traditional emphasis on d i s c i p l i n e , c o n s t a n t political indoctrination, and rejection of Western ways appears to have resulted in widespread apathy, cynicism, and curiosity about Western styles and fads. Alia himself criticized those in the Party and the official youth organization who seek "to exert unnecessary control over . . . the activities of the youth." Indeed, he has declared, "We must once and for all get rid of the tutelage and all other methods . . . used to 'discipline' the cultural, artistic, and supporting activities of young people—even their entertainment—because they artificially hinder the drive, skills, and initiative of the young." 8 0 In response to pressure from above, Radio Tirana has expanded its youth-oriented broadcasts, providing folk music, "easy-listening music," and other programs aimed at the younger generation. 8 1 Although the authorities are moving cautiously—there is no hard rock, "heavy metal," or songs with suggestive lyrics, such as one finds in the West—they definitely are trying to repair relations with the country's girls and boys. As the British magazine The Economist has observed, "Young people [in Albania] are fascinated with the world outside." Many, if not most, schoolchildren are aware of prominent Western performers, such as the singer Madonna. Despite the risks involved in relaxing controls, Alia and his colleagues evidently view the change as desirable or even necessary. Foreign Policy. The government has continued its policy, introduced in 1985, of expanding trade links, cultural exchanges, scientific-educational, and other ties with the European capitalist states. Albania has now established diplomatic relations with all the Western European countries, except for the United Kingdom, Ireland, and the Federal Republic of Germany; and it has been holding talks with representatives of these states about the possibility of exchanging ambassadors. Policy toward Yugoslavia, too, is beginning to change, but the available evidence indicates the presence of sharp differences among Albania's leaders. Alia himself seems to belong to the more intransigent faction. Thus, he has written, "The Yugoslav rulers have been guided by a kind of feudal

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mentality . . .; [they believe] that they ought to impose their dictate[s] and tutelage over Albania." 8 2 At the same time, a very different attitude was expressed in the leading paper, Zeri i Popullit. While accusing its communist neighbor of promoting a "savage anti-Albanian campaign," it called for the establishment of cultural exchanges between the two countries as a way of improving relations. "We are ready at any time to send to Yugoslavia an artistic group or a sports team or to open an art exhibition there," the newspaper declared. "Similarly, we are ready to welcome Yugoslav artists, scholars, and sportsmen to our country." 83 As regards the Soviets, Alia remains unyielding, accusing them of "trying to subjugate Albania, to seize its sovereigty. . . . They only wanted to dictate to us, to impose their policy, to turn Albania into a battleground for their imperialist expansion." His attitude towards the U.S. seems equally hostile, at least for the time being. Alia has explicitly rejected the idea of establishing relations with Washington, asserting that the American government had tried on many occasions in the postwar period to overthrow the regime. While opening up his country to many capitalist, Third World, and communist states, the Albanian leader remains adamant in his rejection of the two superpowers.

SUMMARY

While some leaders in the countries surveyed here are willing to go beyond the facade of contested elections, none of them has shown any inclination to do away with the one-party system, the power and privileges of nomenklatura, or the right to employ arbitrary methods when they feel threatened. Thus, even if developments in a particular country suggest the possibility of "democratization," there is at least as much likelihood that the next year will witness retrograde movement. Yet even if no communist regime is willing to transfer governmental rights and duties to "the people," outside influence, especially from the United States, can help to eliminate some injustices and bring about some improvements. Many of their leaders are interested in expanding commercial relations with the United States, Western Europe, and Japan. Credits, the search for Most Favored Nation status, the transfer of technology and managerial skills, and access to capitalist markets are all to some degree contingent on developments within these countries. Aware that they

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are heavily in debt, barely able to produce g o o d s that are competitive in world markets (except for energy and raw materials), and finding it increasingly difficult to generate economic growth, the men who control these nine countries have been increasingly willing to turn to the "evil empire" of "imperialism." And this, in turn, puts them in a position which, given skillful Western diplomacy, can lead to further political change. Nothing like "democracy" is likely to materialize, but some of the harsher elements of authoritarian rule can be curtailed or even eliminated.

NOTES 1. Wall Street Journal, March 17, 1987, p.29. 2. See Ellen Jones and Benjamin L. Woodbury II, "Chernobyl and 'Glasnost'," Problems of Communism, Vol. 35:6 (November-December 1986), pp.28-39. 3. Literaturnaia Gazeta, July 2, 1986, p.6. 4. Ibid., p.7. 5. See, e.g., Sovetskaia Rossiia, March 21, 1986, p.2; Literaturnaia Gazeta, May 7, 1986; Pravda, May 10, 1986, p.3; June 13, 1986, pp. 1-2, and June 14, 1986, p.l; Zhurnalist 4 (1986), p.60. 6. See, e.g., Literaturnaia Gazeta, March 19, 1986, p.6, and June 18, 1986, p.8; Knizhnoe Obozrenie, no. 26(1986), p.8. See also Index on Censorship, no. 4 (1986), pp.28-30. 7. Izvestiia, August 17, 1986; Sovetskaia kul'tura, April 15, 1986, and August 17,1986. 8. See Sovetskaia kul'tura, February 19, 1986, p.4; April 29,1986, p.3; July 15, 1986, p.l; and August 2, 1986, p.5. Also Pravda, July 24, 1986, p.3; and August 9, 1986, p.3; and Komsomol'skaia Pravda, August 3, 1986, p.4. 9. See Trud, May 14, 1986, p.4; Literaturnaia Gazeta, June 18, 1986, p.14; Avrora, no. 6(1986), pp.92-95; Sobesednik, no. 31(1986), p.2. 10. New York Times, March 6, 1987, p.AlO. 11. Index on Censorship, no. 8 (1986), p.13. 12. See Soviet Analyst 16:5 (March 2,1987), p.4. 13. See, e.g., Sovetskaia kul'tura, September 16, 1986, p.3. 14. Pravda, February 2,1986, p.l. 15. Economist, June 7,1986, p.16. 16. New York Times, January 17, 1987, p.3. 17. Ibid., January, 11, 1987, p.8; Midstream 32:9, p.8. 18. New York Times, January 29, 1987, p.A27. 19. Ibid., November 8,1986, p.l; and December 10,1986, p.A3. 20. Radio Liberty Research (hereafter cited as RL) 475/86, p.2. See also Literaturnaia Gazeta, January 1, 1987, p.10. 21. This section relies primarily on information contained in Keesing's Contemporary Arkhives, 33, no.10 (October 1986), pp.34677-34679; and Asia

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1987 Yearbook (Hong Kong: Far Eastern Economic Review, 1987), pp. 197201.

22. There are, in fact, such people in Bulgaria; known as Pomaks, they are ethnic Bulgars whose ancestors were compelled to adopt the Muslim faith in the seventeenth century. Official efforts to assimilate the 150,000 or so Pomaks began in the mid-1960s. 23. Amnesty International, Imprisonment of Ethnic Turks in Bulgaria (London, 1986). 24. See Radio Free Europe (hereafter cited as RFE) Bulgarian Situation Report (hereafter cited as SR) 12, p.27. For a moving description of Bulgaria's 5,000 Jews, see New York Times, April 13, 1986, p.9. I have made slight changes in the translations of several RFE items, putting them into closer conformity with current American usage. 25. New York Times, April 20, 1986, p.8. 26. Ibid., April 23,1986, p.A22. 27. See RFE Bulgarian SRI (February 13, 1987), pp.15-20. 28. Ibid., pp.17,19. 29. Rabotnichesko Delo, April 3, 1986, p.3. 30. RFE RAD Background Report (BR) 172, pp.1-3. 31. The following two paragraphs rely primarily on RFE RAD BR143, pp.1-5. 32. See RAD BR132, p.2. 33. RFE RAD BR19, pp.1-4; New York Times, February 12, 1987, p.A14. 34. Radio Prague, May 2,1986. 35. New York Times, January 22, 1986, p.A7. 36. See RFE Czechoslovakia SR2, p.4. 37. New York Times, January 23, 1987, p.A27. 38. The full text of the document is available in RFE Czechoslovakia SRI, pp.13-19. 39. See letter to the editor, New York Review of Books 33:9 (May 29, 1986), p.56. 40. Index on Censorship, no. 5 (1986), p.14. 41. Magyar Nemzet, August 9, 1986; excerpts reprinted in Index on Censorship, no. 9 (1986), pp.4-5. 42. Economist, October 25,1986, p.106; and February 7, 1987, p.47. 43. See RFE Hungarian SR9, pp.3-7; New Republic, November 17, 1986, pp.7-11; New York Times, October 24, 1986, p.A4; and November 10, 1986, p.A3. 44. Economist, January 3, 1987, p.56. 45. See RFE Hungarian SRI (January 31,1987), p.8. 46. Cited in RFE RAD BR60 (April 24,1986), pp.5-6. 47. Cited in RFE Hungarian SR11 (October 31,1986), p.44. 48. See RFE Hungarian SR3 (February 25,1986), p.10. 49. See Roman Dumas, "Poland's 'Independent Society,'" Poland Watch, no. 3(1986); and New York Times, December 12, 1986, p.A35 50. See RFE RAD BR135, pp.1-5. Also see Economist, June 7, 1986, p.58. 51. RFE Polish SR5, pp.11-12; and SR10, pp.31-32.

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52. New York Times, February 16, 1986, p.7; and December 31, 1986, p.A5. 53. See Kultura (Paris), July-August, 1986. For additional reporting on Polish prisons, see RFE Polish SR7, pp.5-10. 54. Economist, July 5,1986, p.43. 55. See New York Times, July 18, 1986, p.A2. 56. Economist, September 20, 1986, p.15. 57. Radio Warsaw, September 19, 1986. 58. RFE Polish SR10, pp.21-26. See also New York Times, October 16, 1986, p.4. 59. See Economist, September 13, 1986, pp.47-48; and RFE Polish SR14, pp.19-21. 60. RFE Romanian SR3, p.3. 61. See "Birth and Death in Romania," New York Review of Books, 33:16(October 23,1986), p.12. 62. Ibid., p.10. 63. New York Times, January 4, 1987, p.3. 64. David Binder, "The Cult of Ceausescu," New York Times Magazine, November 30,1986, p.40. 65. Twenty-First Semiannual Report by the President to the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Implementation of Helsinki Final Act, April 1, 1986-September 30, 1986 (Washington: U.S. Department of State). 66. See New York Times, June 3, 1986, pp.Al, AIO; and ibid., June 4, 1986, p.A6. 67. Wall Street Journal, January 13, 1986, p.26. 68. Economist, November 15, 1986, p.50. 69. "Birth and Death in Romania," p.18. 70. See RFE Yugoslav SR10 (October 16,1986), p.10. 71. RFE Yugoslav SR3 (March 7,1986), pp.19-21. 72. RFE Yugoslav SR4 (March 27,1986), p.27. 73. Ibid., p.21. 74. The following two paragraphs are derived chiefly from RFE Yugoslav SR/11, pp.3-5 and SR/12, pp.9-14. 75. Cited in RFE RAD 59, p.2. 76. RFE RAD BR17 (November 25,1986), p.2. 77. Ibid., pp.1-4. 78. RFE RAD BR147 (October 17, 1986), pp.1-3. 79. RFE RAD BR95 (July 11,1986), pp.1-2. 80. RFE RAD BR79 (June 5,1986), p.2. 81. RFE RAD BR89 (July 3,1986), pp.2-3. 82. RFE RAD BR162 (November 13,1986), p.3. 83. Quoted in RFE Yugoslav SR5 (May 30,1986), p.8.

Conclusion ROBERT WESSON

It is not easy to summarize the variegated picture sketched in the preceding chapters. Although the desire for democracy, or the dislike of arbitrary government, has probably continued to increase in all parts of the modernizing world, the world has not changed much politically in the past year, perhaps less than one might expect in this dynamic age; and the most important political developments have occurred in quite undemocratic areas, China and the Soviet Union. WESTERN EUROPE continues firmly to adhere to democratic w a y s with little or no change. The chief problems of rights and freedom related to small terrorist movements seeking independence or other concessions, especially in Spain (Basque nationalists) and Northern Ireland, but also in France (among the Arab community), W e s t Germany, and Italy. The respective g o v e r n m e n t s felt compelled to take police measures sometimes contrary to democratic norms, and it was unhappily evident that political freedom and elections do not solve all troubles. But there was no threat to stability in any country, and prospects for liberal democracy seemed improved in the nations where it is of more recent development and might conceivably be in some danger: Portugal, Spain, and Greece. Perhaps the most significant development was the continued trend away from socialistic politics and state enterprise. The idea of privatization was widespread, and the Thatcher government in Britain undertook to sell profitable public corporations to the public on an unprecedented scale. On the other hand, the finances of the E u r o p e a n Economic C o m m u n i t y were endangered by a very

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democratic weakness, inability to cope with a powerful agricultural lobby and the subsidization of overproduction of many products, producing mountains of butter and lakes of wine to be practically given away to such nations as the Soviet Union in order to force Europeans to pay high prices. NORTH AMERICA takes perhaps even more pride in democracy than Western Europe. The United States, even in times of troubles, regards itself as a model for the world and, more realistically, as the leader of democratic forces everywhere. The health, real and apparent, of democracy in the United States is consequently of crucial importance for democracy around the world. But its past year has not been glorious, in either appearance or reality. The American government seemed badly advised, inept, and inconsistent in its dealings with Iran, and this has had serious effects on American influence, not only in the Near East but also elsewhere. Disclosures of secret arms shipments to Iran and related matters showed inadequacy of foreign policy management, whereby secret undertakings were carried out without the approval of the secretary of state or the secretary of defense and with minimal guidance from the president. It seemed that the executive branch lacked means of coordination and Congress lacked means of control. Recurrent confrontation between Congress and the president over the budget and the inability of both to bring it near balance also suggested institutional shortcomings. The image of an ineffective American president seemed even more unfortunate by comparison with the refreshing innovations and disarming disarmament proposals of Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev. The persuasiveness of the message of freedom and the open society could not fail to lose thereby—although the Soviet leader scored points to some extent by adopting positions of his adversaries. The major negative development was the undermining of trust in government that had been a prime achievement of earlier years of the Reagan administration. Despite the fondness of most Americans for their president, or at least a considerable willingness to forgive lapses, belief in the competence a n d / o r h o n e s t y of the administration was badly shaken. Disclosures of irregular foreign policy-making by officials of the National Security Council in relation to Iran a n d to a lesser extent the Nicaraguan antiSandinista movement showed a seamy side of national policy of which most Americans had been unaware. The clandestine weapons sales to the government that most Americans disliked perhaps more

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intensely than any other, whether to free a few hostages in Lebanon or to make overtures to "moderates" in the Iranian government, indicated a considerable disregard for propriety and good administration. C o m p a r i s o n s were inevitably m a d e with the Watergate episode, and it was obvious that the damage would not be easily undone. Questions were raised about the ability of the administration to do more than limp through its last two years, and it was difficult to contemplate a strong presidency in the face of multiple investigations and Democratic control of Congress. However, changes of personnel in the agencies most involved—the National Security Council and the CIA—and in the president's personal staff greatly improved the atmosphere. In a sense, the whole affair, even more than Watergate, was evidence of the strength of American democracy. Perhaps in no other major power is the feeling so firm that the executive is not above the law, even in sensitive matters of foreign policy. To such democratic states as Britain and France, this determination to wash the soiled clothes in public and to tell all to the world was a bit naive. At the «ame time, the investigators handled the matter with responsibility; it may be said that the system of checks and controls worked remarkably well. This inner strength, however, was not so apparent to the world at large as the foreign policy fiasco; and there was certainly a diminution of the American ability to lead in world affairs, including the promotion of democracy that was a prominent goal of the administration. The inability of the United States to handle international trade problems or to offer a remedy for the excessive debt load of the Third World was clearly negative. Support for anticommunist insurgencies in Angola, Nicaragua, and Afghanistan continued, but results seem positive only in the last. Whether the United States itself was becoming basically more democratic (by checking the expansion of government) or less so (by the increase of inequality) under the Reagan administration is a question to be left to the historians. The public did not seem greatly impressed by the "Reagan Revolution," however, as the 1986 election returned the Democrats to control of both houses of Congress. The American system has functioned less than ideally not only in secret foreign policy but also in the broader question of national finances and the apparent incapability of Congress and president to match expenditures to revenues. There were also serious doubts about the evolution of political practice, including the decline of party affiliation, the high cost of professionally managed and media-

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intensive campaigns, and the large advantages to incumbents. Election to the House of Representatives seems almost a tenured position, coming u p for perfunctory review every two years. The long-term significance of such developments is unclear, but they obviously reflect on and qualify the nature of American democracy. In LATIN AMERICA the chief triumph of democracy was the collapse of one of the least edifying dictatorships, the 29-year-old rule of the Duvalier family in Haiti. Although the triumph was much appreciated, the transition proved difficult, and a functioning democratic order seemed to be still far away a year afterward. There was no other regime change. Colombia, Peru, and Ecuador were troubled by increasing violence. The aging dictatorship of Paraguay rather cut d o w n the minimal freedom allowed the opposition, and that of Pinochet in Chile moved in both directions. Nearly all countries of the region were bowed under unpayable debt b u r d e n s , with potentially destabilizing effects. The most remarkable fact was how little radical nationalism surged up, how patient most people seemed to be with miserable conditions. The failure of radical economic measures to bring lasting improvement in Brazil and Argentina lowered the credit of their respective democratic governments. There was no sign of armed forces maneuvering to reassume power in countries where they had retreated, such as Brazil, Uruguay, and Argentina. But the economic problems that contributed to the willingness of the generals to withdraw plagued their civilian successors, mostly because of the inability to cope with the foreign debt. Brazil in particular seemed to flounder as President Sarney, who had won enormous popularity by halting r u n a w a y inflation, lost it entirely when, after the November elections, inflation broke out more wildly than ever. Ecuador, plagued by quarrels of government and opposition, was not far from paralysis. Colombia suffered increasing bloody violence of both left and right severe enough to call into question its political stability. The government of Napoleon Duarte in El Salvador lost authority because of its inability either to end the civil war or to restore the severely depressed economy. One country marking a considerable economic upturn was Peru, which to some extent isolated itself by its virtual repudiation of its foreign debt (so far as owed to private institutions). It has been a less rosy year for Latin American democracy than 1984 or 1985. AFRICA continues to be the Dark Continent, politically as well as economically. For the most part, incomes and standards of living

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have continued to decline; perhaps for this reason, political institutions seemed a shade less promising in 1987 than a year or more before. There were no major changes, but government appeared a little harsher in such countries as Kenya and Liberia. It was decidedly sterner toward the nonwhite majority in South Africa, and the rights of the white minority were also much restricted. In Senegal, a semicoup led to abridgments of the limited freedom previously conceded. The Nigerian militocracy advanced a promise of transition to democracy in 1990, but this was shadowed by increased regime violence. Zimbabwe seemed to progress a little with an agreement between the two chief party-tribal groups, but it moved toward becoming a one-party state like its neighbors. There were intraparty elections in Cameroon, but the Marxist dictatorships were generally static. In nearly all countries, politics was overshadowed by economic problems, food shortages, in some regions starvation, and a foreign debt much less than Latin America's but overwhelming in terms of ability to pay. Almost everywhere, too, progress was held back by the overstaffed, inefficient, corrupt state apparatus controlling the economy—for example, purchasing agencies that required farmers to sell their produce for a fraction of its market value. In t h e NORTH A F R I C A - N E A R E A S T E R N w o r l d , it w o u l d b e

difficult to draw up a balance sheet showing the strengthening or weakening of democratic institutions. There were two opposite regime movements. The Sudan held elections to replace a military regime that came to power by a coup, but the integrity of the newly elected government was qualified by the continuation of civil war in the south. In Kuwait, on the contrary, the elected parliament was summarily dismissed. Continued modernization, close relations with Europe, and desire for legitimate institutions brought some strengthening of constitutionalism and democracy in Turkey, but the broader trend was toward more repression and arbitrary controls in countries from Tunisia to Iraq. Where elected assemblies existed, as in Mauritania, Egypt, and Jordan, they were not given important powers. In many states, especially those of the Arabian peninsula, there was no pretext of popular representation. Iran is a curious case of a one-party, dogmatic revolutionary state with a theoretically absolute governor (the "jurist") but also with a remarkable amount of open political contestation. This is presumably ascribable to the inclination of the aged Ayatollah Khomeini to let others work out ordinary affairs as long as they subscribe to his ideals. Conceivably, on his departure and in the

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absence of a forceful successor, this practice could lead to a relatively democratic state. Israel, on the contrary, is a quite democratic state in structures and practices; but it suffers strains that may prove injurious to its political well-being. Its chief problem—how to handle the large number of Arabs under its rule, who may soon be a majority of the population—has no democratic solution. To permit them equal rights would mean to sacrifice the character of the state for which Jews have striven mightily. Yet to allow the benefits of democracy only to Jews leads to intolerance and negates democratic values. Tensions between Jews and Arabs or Palestinians are only part of the conflictual situation making the political outlook of the Near East problematic. A medley of fierce partisan currents swirls around Lebanon, which has been reduced to chaos except as order is brought by foreign armies. The war between Iraq and Iran, now in its seventh year, is apparently far from resolution. The Sunni-Shi'ite split runs t h r o u g h m u c h of the Islamic world, with Shi'ite-Islamic f u n d a m e n t a l i s m , an anti-Western and basically antimodern movement, advancing to promote Muslim law and traditional practices. Economic problems and the fading of the promise of prosperity lead many to turn away from the liberal trends of recent decades. In nearly all countries of the region, educated elite groups in tune with modern thought are critical of old-style despotic or semidespotic rulership and eager for more participation in public affairs; but the tide is not going their way. In SOUTH ASIA the pluses are at least more definite than the minuses. It was perhaps sufficient credit for India to maintain its democratic system under considerable and probably growing stresses. In the face of communal strife, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi lost a good deal of his magic; he was no longer regarded as a wonderworker but as a somewhat capricious and isolated boss, unable either to settle the differences between Sikhs and Hindus and other perennial quarrels or to carry out the desired reforms of the Indian economy and the bureaucratically choked administration. In Sri Lanka, once perhaps the most democratic country of the Afro-Asian sphere, the fierce communal-civil conflict between Tamils and Sinhalese made representative institutions largely inoperative. One could only guess how fully they might be restored if the violence could be brought to an end. The principal development in Pakistan and Bangladesh was the ongoing effort to regularize and legitimize the government while

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keeping the substance of power with the military-bureaucratic leadership. In both cases, this meant election of a parliament by doubtful procedures—without the concurrence of opposition parties and with the installation of a civilian administration—in the case of Pakistan, under the presidency of the former military dictator, and in the case of Bangladesh, an administration headed by the military ruler without his uniform. It is difficult to assess the significance of this partial democratization. It clearly does not represent a real transfer of power to politicians representing or elected by the masses. Yet it entails a relaxation of controls and a considerable freedom of political expression and organization, which one assumes may eventually result in a more fundamentally open political system. The situation in Nepal is basically the same, as the traditional monarchy seeks to compromise with modernity. The EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA-PACIFIC region showed mixed

trends corresponding to its inherent diversity. The overthrow of the corrupt Philippine dictatorship by Corazon Aquino's "people power" represented a major victory, although some disillusionment set in, as democratization did not bring any rapid economic improvement and all manner of quarrels immobilized the government. Soldiers long accustomed to sharing power did not enjoy retreating to passivity, and the guerrillas for whom the new freedom was only a beginning resumed the civil war after the failure of a truce. The fall of the Marcos dictatorship echoed through the noncommunist authoritarian regimes of the vicinity, Indonesia, Taiwan, and South Korea. None, however, seemed a year later to have been really shaken, and prospects for liberalization remained distant. China saw the principal setback to the movement toward liberalization, democracy being very far away. Western observers thought or hoped that the extensive economic reforms of Deng Xiaoping and the relative openness to deviant ideas and foreign contacts were so successful in raising the standard of living and pulling China out of backwardness that they were hardly to be reversed, and that China might in due course come to a looser type of regime with more open politics as well as a decentralized economy. Chinese students seem to have thought so also, and a considerable number ventured to shout loudly for democracy in late 1986. But this annoyed or frightened much of the political leadership. The ruling party shifted course back toward standard Marxist-Leninist theory and practice; numerous intellectuals were dismissed, and many

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officials were purged, from Hu Yaobang, formerly party chief, down. The obligatory virtues of socialism were reinstated against the vices of money-making, and relations with the Soviet Union thawed. The leadership in Beijing, as in many capitals, clearly wanted the benefits of a more open order but did not propose to risk letting outsiders into the temples of power. All such changes or trends, however, were of secondary importance compared with developments during 1986-1987 in the SOVIET SPHERE, which saw a general trend toward opening and relaxation and a decrease of repression. There was even, in the Soviet Union itself, talk of elections contested by approved candidates—no doubt far from any idea of permitting an open conflict of parties and ideas, in Western style, but a remarkable change from the obligatory unity and top-down management of "democratic centralism" of the past. The admission that there were serious faults in the system and the opening of the press to more farreaching controversy and criticism than at any time since 1917 signified an important evolution of the Soviet mentality, even on the assumption that the purpose was improvement of party rule, not its weakening. This was obviously not the caprice of a single individual who happened, like a newly crowned prince, to find power in his hands. General Secretary Gorbachev reached his position by filling needs of the party and its bosses; and he could not move without concurrence, presumably of a majority, despite appearances or at least talk of considerable opposition. He spoke more of discipline than of relaxation; but any effort to make the Soviet regime less dogmatic, more open to foreign contacts, less repressive of its intellectuals, and slightly more responsible to people below indicated a wearing out of the old Leninist-Stalinist ideas and practices. Probably every country of the Soviet sphere felt pressures to move in the same direction, although authorities in Albania, East G e r m a n y , Czechoslovakia, a n d Romania resisted visible concessions, perhaps mostly because of the greater insecurity of their regimes. It was difficult to believe that they could indefinitely hold out against continued liberalization. But it remained to be seen how far liberalization would be allowed to progress before Soviet leaders decided that it entailed danger to party authority, as in Poland's Solidarity movement of 1980. The lifting of controls of opinion cannot be carried very far; as soon as people become accustomed to speaking out, they are sure to

Conclusion

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begin questioning the very bases of the state, the role of the party, the need for a monopoly of the press, the economy, and the lack of democracy: Who elected Gorbachev and his politburo? If freedom of speech is extended to Ukrainians, Lithuanians, and Uzbeks, they will certainly start asking the more crucial question, why they should be held in the "prison-house of nationalities," as Lenin characterized the Russian empire. And if East Europeans become convinced that the Soviet forces will not shoot, Soviet dominion over that region will come into question. If Moscow does not know its own mind and has no strong will, how can it command the nations of the bloc, all of which would rather look toward the West than the East? A partial liberalization of a Soviet Union ruled by the Communist party would thus seem highly unstable. Alternatives might be a more personal dictatorship, probably by a more charismatic person than Gorbachev, or more or less of a militocracy. If the soldiers see the politicians unable to keep good order and protect the strength of the state and its world position, they will surely undertake to do so themselves, as they have done in scores of countries. The military is probably the institution in the Soviet state least subject to erosion. Regardless of the way glasnost may turn out in coming years, the Soviet Union has apparently ceased to be a very effective model of totalistic government in the world. The fact that an impressively great and necessarily prestigious power has a strict monopoly of political power, censorship of all media, repressive political police, pseudoelections, and the like gives some respectability to such institutions elsewhere. Without such a model, arbitrary government becomes increasingly the specialty of the less advanced and less prestigious poor nations of the Third World. So far as this comes about, it will represent a turn of world-historical moment, an important part of the maturation of the post-postwar era. The Soviet Union has also been, since its earliest days, the leader of a more or less organized and coherent movement for worldwide revolutionary change, the exponent of class warfare and a broadside attack on "bourgeois" values. This commitment has become rather theoretical in recent decades, as the Soviet state has looked primarily to its direct and concrete interests much more than to any ideological purposes. Nonetheless, the Soviet Union has continued to support a loose coalition of radical movements, both politically and financially. It has thereby injected elements of violence into political life in many countries and made more difficult the progress of democratic moderation and constitutionalism. In

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part, dictatorships and oligarchies have more or less cynically used the supposed menace of communist movements as an excuse for suppression of rights of noncommunists; in part, elite groups have been frightened by the possibility that even rather moderate leftist reform movements might open the doors to revolution, thus threatening their status, property, and lives. The fate of officers of the pre-Castro Cuban army was a powerful argument for Latin American generals to quash any radical threat, whatever the cost in civil liberties. Most revolutionary parties, violent or nonviolent, are decidedly indigenous and little dependent on Soviet support, direct or indirect. However, the existence of the Soviet-led international movement has tended to identify radical parties in general, at least the numerous ones of Marxist inspiration, with an international, that is, foreign evil. So far as the Soviet Union gives up the pretense of leading a world march toward a new era of history, with the destruction of the prevalent economic order, an important rationale of dictatorship will be weakened. » * * Such effects are mostly for the future, however. For the present, the best that can be said is that, broadly speaking, the world sees a c o n t i n u a t i o n of the long-term gradual tide toward legal, constitutional, modern, and (by corollary) democratic government. On the other hand, it has become even more evident that democracy has its limitations and that it suffers from economic and political disorder and setbacks. It lacks an answer to truculent ethnic or other group antagonisms, regardless of cultural level. The inability of British authorities to resolve the strife of Northern Ireland makes it easier to understand the murderous chaos of Lebanon, the communal violence of India, and civil wars in the Sudan and Sri Lanka. It may be that democratic politics exacerbates such problems by inviting people to express their hatreds and to organize to promote them. Antagonisms are intensified by economic distress; and if democracy bespeaks modernization and economic and political maturity, it suffers if the economy works badly. High levels of unemployment and inflation, with stagnant or falling standards of living, tend to discredit the democratic (and other) institutions. In depressed conditions, democracy has failed to continue its advance in Latin America, as in, for example, El Salvador and Ecuador; and in Brazil it has suffered disillusionment. The fact that there has been no move toward restoration of militocracy in such countries is

Conclusion

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probably due mostly to the recency of transition to democratic forms; the soldiers are not likely to move until there is more accumulated discontent. Likewise, the political malaise of Africa and the weakness of pressures for liberalization in that unhappy continent are entirely u n d e r s t a n d a b l e in view of the p r e v a l e n t depression—even in places the retreat—of modern civilization. A major cause of economic illness in Latin America, as well as to a lesser degree in Africa and much of Asia, is a malfunctioning of d e m o c r a t i c a l l y - b a s e d economic i n s t i t u t i o n s ; n a m e l y , the inordinately low prices of most of their exports and the perversion of international lending, placing countries under an excessive load of foreign debt. Not only has the salutary inflow of development capital, which came abundantly in years up to the early 1980s, dried up; the stream has been reversed and the needy countries have paid out varying, often large amounts as interest, despite feeble export earnings. At the same time, confidence has sagged, and not only have foreign investors held back, but native capitalists have sent their funds to apparently more secure foreign havens. The results are grave. Not only is economic regression a cause of political difficulties; the democratic system may also suffer by association, the debts being owed to the major democratic powers. These become financial antagonists; it is much harder to be democratic while resenting the United States and its capitalist associates. Democracy and the free enterprise economy are closely connected in practice, if not so much in theory; and misfortunes arising through capitalistic institutions can only reflect on the politics of freedom. Under conditions of great inequality not only of wealth but of education and social standing, elite groups are understandably reluctant to cede much authority to popular masses or to politicians who can mobilize their votes. When conditions are improving, there may not be much tendency to radicalism; but under conditions of deprivation the masses are not likely to support conservative economic policies. And if there arise serious threats to the economic and social order (widely perceived, not only by the masses but by intellectuals of the middle classes, as unjust if not intolerable), the democracy will be brought to an end by an authoritarian assumption of power—or conceivably by a radical revolution that may be egalitarian in purpose but cannot be democratic. It would seem, consequently, that resumption of the trend toward democratic ways must await progress in reducing major world economic maladjustments, including the return to favor of freer trading instead of protectionism, removal of the debt load of the

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Third World, and renewal of economic growth sufficient to reduce tragic levels of unemployment. In sum, the underlying trends of 1986-1987 were mixed. The principal negative was the difficulty of governments in managing economies; so far as this can be improved, one should be able to look forward to continued, albeit slow, expansion of responsible government and freedom for people to develop and express their capabilities.

Bibliography

Alekseyeva, Liudmilla. Soviet Dissident. Middletown, Ct.: Wesleyan University Press, 1985. Barzun, Jacques. Is Democratic Theory for Export? Sixth Morgenthau Memorial Lecture on Ethics & Foreign Policy. New York: Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs, 1986. Bergquist, Charles. Labor in Latin America: Comparative Essays on Chile, Argentina, Venezuela, and Colombia. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1986. Bill, James A., and Carl Leiden. Politics in the Middle East. 2nd ed. Boston: Little, Brown, 1984. Bresnan, John, ed. Crisis in the Philippines: The Marcos Era and Beyond. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986. Chazan, Naomi. An Anatomy of Ghanaian Politics: Managing Political Recession, 1969-82. Boulder: Westview Press, 1983. Diamond, Larry. Nigeria in Search of Democracy. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, forthcoming. Duignan, Peter, and Robert H. Jackson, eds. Politics and Government in African States 1960-85. London: Croom Helm; Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1986. Fatton, Robert, Jr. The Making of a Liberal Democracy: Senegal's Passive Revolution, 1975-85. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1987. Fleet, Michael. The Rise and Fall of Chilean Democracy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985. Hartlyn, Jonathan, and Samuel A. Morley, eds. Latin American Political Economy: Financial Crisis and Political Change. Boulder: Westview Press, 1986. Helsinki Watch Committee, Violations of the Helsinki Accords. Vols, on Bulgaria, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Romania, USSR, Yugoslavia, and Ten Years Late. New York, 1986. Horowitz, Donald. Ethnic Groups in Conßict. Berkeley: University of

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California Press, 1985. Inglehart, R o n a l d , a n d J a c q u e s - R e n é Rabier. "Political R e a l i g n m e n t in Advanced Industrial Society: From Class-Based Politics to Quality-ofLife Politics."Government and Opposition, 1986. L a w y e r s ' C o m m i t t e e for H u m a n Rights, Repression Disguised as Law: Poland. N e w York, 1986. Long, David E., and Bernard Reich, eds. The Government and Politics of the Middle East and North Africa. 2nd ed. Boulder: Westview Press, 1986. Mayne, R., ed. Modern Europe. London: Muller, Blonde, and White, 1987. Michnik, A d a m . Letters from Prison and Other Essays. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986. M o r g a n , R., a n d C. Bray, eds. Partners and Rivals in Western Europe: Britain, France and Germany. London: Policy Studies Institute; G o w e r Press, 1986. Nathan, A n d r e w J. Chinese Democracy. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985. O'Donnell, G u i l l e r m o , Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, eds. Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Latin America. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986. Payne, Stanley G., ed. The Politics of Democratic Spain. Chicago: Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 1986. Peeler, J o h n A. Latin American Democracies: Colombia, Costa Rica, Venezuela. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1985. The Rise and Fall of Democracies in Third World Societies. Studies in Third W o r l d Societies 27. W i l l i a m s b u r g : D e p a r t m e n t of A n t h r o p o l o g y , College of William and Mary, 1986. R o n e n , D o v , ed. Democracy and Pluralism in Africa. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1986. Rubenstein, Joshua. Soviet Dissidents. 2nd ed. Boston: Beacon Press, 1985. Smith, G. Politics and Western Europe. London: Heinemann, 1986. Tibi, Bassam. "Political Freedom in Arab Societies." Arab Studies Quarterly 6 (Summer 1984): 2 2 2 - 2 2 7 . Wiarda, H o w a r d J., and Harvey F. Kline, eds. Latin American Politics and Development. 2nd ed. Boulder: Westview Press, 1985.

About the Book and Authors

This second v o l u m e of Democracy: World Survey examines developments related to the progress of democracy in the world during 1986 and the first part of 1987. The approach is two-pronged, assessing both the health of democratic institutions and the increase or decrease of repression. The authors place each country into one of five categories along a spectrum ranging from stable democracy to absolutism, and political realities that influence the development of freedom and popular government in each.

LARRY DIAMOND is senior research fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University. He is the author of Class, Ethnicity and Democracy in Nigeria: The Failure of the First Republic and coeditor, with Juan Linz and Seymour Martin Lipset, of Democracy in Developing Countries. DENNIS GALVAN is a recent graduate of Stanford University. His senior honors thesis, "The American Aid Relationship with the Republic of Mali, 1960-86," won the Firestone Award for excellence in research at Stanford. DENNIS A. KAVANAGH is professor of politics at the University of Nottingham in England. His most recent books include British Politics: Continuities and Change (1985); The British General Election of 1983 (1984), with David Butler; Political Science and Political Behavior (1983); and The Politics of the Labour Party (1982). DOUGLAS C. MAKEIG, a senior South Asian specialist with Research Division, Library of Congress, is responsible for political and security issues affecting all seven countries of the is currently conducting research on Indo-Pakistani relations. expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect those of the Library of Congress or the U.S. government.

233

the Federal monitoring region. He The views necessarily

234

Contributors

JOHN MARINI is assistant professor of politics at the University of Dallas. He has served on the faculties of the University of Nevada-Reno and Ohio University in Athens. He has written articles on American politics, c a m p a i g n finance, and bureaucratic politics. He is completing a manuscript on the politics of budget control. JOHN D. MARTZ is professor of political science at Pennsylvania State University. He has published fourteen books on Latin America in general and Venezuela and Colombia specifically, has written many articles for journals, and contributed chapters to multiauthor books. LARRY NIKSCH researches Asian affairs with Congressional Research, specializing in issues affecting U.S. security and foreign policies, East Asia, and the western Pacific. He holds a Ph.D. in history from Georgetown University, is author of many newspaper and journal articles, and has lectured widely on East Asian affairs. He was a member of the U.S. election observer team to the Philippine presidential election in February 1986. GLENN E. PERRY is professor of political university. He is the author of The Middle East: (1983) and the editor of Palestine: Continuing articles on Middle Eastern affairs have appeared has contributed to various multiauthor books.

science at Indiana State Fourteen Islamic Countries Dispossession (1986). His in several journals, and he

DAVID E. POWELL is research associate at the Russian Research Center, Harvard University. He is the author of Antireligious Propaganda in the Soviet Union as well as numerous articles dealing with Soviet and East European affairs. He is currently working on books on alcohol abuse and militarism and pacifism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. ROBERT WESSON is senior research fellow of the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, and professor emeritus of political science of the University of California-Santa Barbara. He is the author of numerous books on Soviet politics, Latin America, international relations, and comparative government, including Modern Government: Democracy and Authoritarianism, and Politics.

Index

Absolutist/totalitarian states, definition of, 8; list of, 10 Acción Democratica Nacionalista (ADN), Bolivia, 52 Acción Democratica (AD), Venezuela, 49 Achour, Habib (Tunisia), 109 Action Directe (France), 13 AD. See Acción Democratica, Venezuela Adams, Grantley (Barbados), 58 Adams, Tom (Barbados), 58 Aden, Russian base in, 119 ADN. See Acción Democratica Nacionalista, Bolivia Advance Guard of the Malagasy Revolution (AREMA), Madagascar, 86 African National Congress (ANC), 90-91 Afghanistan, 8,130-131,132; aid to insurgents in, 130,188,219; Soviets in, 130 AGP. See Ascom Gono Parishad Ahidjo, Ahmadou (Cameroon), 76, 77 Aizawl (Mizoram state, India), 142 Akali Dal Party (India), 139, 141 Akhmatova, Anna (USSR), 189 AL. See Awami League Albania, 185, 186, 212-215; resistance to reform in, 224; and Yugoslavia, 214215 Albanian population, Yugoslavia, 210, 211 Alfonsin Raul (Argentina), 50 Algeria, 105,108-109 Algerian League for Human Rights, 109 Alia, Ramiz (Albania), 212-213, 214, 215 All People's Congress (APC), Sierra

Leone, 85 Alliance for Defence of Freedom and Sovereignity of the Iranian Nation, 129 Alliance Party, Fiji, 180 Alparslan Turks, 127 Amal (Shi'ite, Lebanon), 115, 116 American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA), Peru, 51 Amin, Idi (Uganda), 8, 71 Amirthalingam, A. (Sri Lanka), 146 Amnesty International, 14 Amnesty International reports: Bulgaria, 194; Ethiopia, 98; Iran, 130; Israel, 125; Kenya, 81; Morocco, 108; Mozambique, 99; Nigeria, 75; Spain, 13; Syria, 115; Zaire, 95, 96 ANC. See African National Congress Anglo-Irish Accord, 15 Angola, 99; insurgencies in, 219 Anti-Sandinistas. See Contras, Nicaragua Anti-terrorist Liberation Group, France, 13 ANZUS Treaty, 179 APC. See All People's Congress, Sierra Leone Aquino, Corazon, 150,171-172,223 APRA. See American Popular Revolution Alliance Arafat, Yasir (PLO), 125 AREMA. See Advance Guard of the Malagasy Revolution Argentina, 2 , 7 , 4 5 , 4 8 , 50,220; Plan Austral, 50

235

236

Index

Arias Sánchez, Oscar (Costa Rica), 54 Arms sales, Iran, 218-219 Arthit Kamlangek, General (Thailand) 164 Asom Gono Parishad (AGP) Assam, India, 141 Assad, Hafiz al- (Syria), 167 Assam, 141,144 Attas, Haydar Abu Bakr al- (PDRY), 119 Australia, 178-179; nuclear weapons treaty, 178 Austria, 20-21; terrorist activities in, 13 Awami League (Bangladesh), 152 Azcona Hoyo, José (Nicaragua), 55, 56 Babaginda, Ibrahim (Nigeria), 74, 75 Baganda tribe (Uganda), 73 Bahrayn, 118-119 Baker, Howard (United States), 38 Balaguer, Joaquin (Dominican Republic), 59 Banda, H. Kamuzu (Malawi), 94 Bangladesh, 137, 143,152-153, 222-223; Assam immigrants, 141 Bangladesh National Party, 152 Bantu tribes (Uganda), 71 Barbados, 58; Barbados Labour Party (BLP), 58 Barco Vivas, Virgilio (Colombia), 48-49 Barn ala, Surjit Singh (India), 139, 140, 141 Barrantes, Alfonso (Peru), 51 Barrow, Errol (Barbados), 58 Basque nationalists, 13, 217 Basu, Jyoti (W. Bengal), 143 Batanesa Party, Catalonia, 17 Ba'th Party Congress, Iraq, 117 Batmonh, Jambyn (Mongolia), 192-193 Bazargan, Mahdi (Iran), 129 BDP. See Botswana Democratic Party Beedh (Bayd) Ali Salim al- (PDRY), 119 Belgium, 13, 19; terrorist activities, 13; Walloon-Flemish dispute, 19 Belize, 57 Ben Bella, Ahmed (Algeria), 109 Ben-Elissar, Eliahu (Israel), 123 Benin, 94,97 Berecz, János (Hungary), 202 Bérenger, Paul (Mauritius), 64 Betancourt, Belisario (Colombia), 48 Bhumibol, King (Rama IX, Thailand), 164

Bhutan, 154 Bhutto, Benazir (Pakistan), 149-150, 151 Bhutto, Zulfiqar Ali (Pakistan), 149, 150 Biden, Joseph (United States), 27 Bielicki, Czeslaw (Poland), 205 Bierman, Wolf, 197 Birendra, King (Nepal), 153 Biya, Paul (Cameroon), 76, 77 Blanco, Salvador Jorge (Dominican Republic), 58 BLP. See Barbados Labour Party BNF. See Botswana National Front BNP. See Bangladesh National Party Bolivia, 45, 52 Bonici, Mifsud (Malta), 22 Bonior, Congressman David E. (United States), 36 Bonner, Elena (USSR), in the United States, 190 Bophuthaswana, 87 Botswana, 63, 64-66 Botswana Democratic Party (BDP), 65, 66 Botswana National Front (BNF), 65-66 Bourguiba, Habib (Tunisia), 109-110 Bourgiba, Habib, Jr. (Tunisia), 109 Bourgiba, Wassila (Tunisia), 109 Bourassa, Robert (Canada), 41 Bouterse, Colonel Desi (Suriname), 53-54 Brazil, 45,48, 49-50, 220, 226-227; Plan Cruzado, 49 Brezhnev, Leonid (USSR), 188 Britain, 6,16-17, 217, 219; anti-terrorist efforts, 13-14. See also Great Britain; United Kingdom Brittan, Leon (Great Britain), 16 Brunei, 155,171 Brunei National Democratic Party, 171 Brunswijk, Ronny (Suriname), 54 BSPP. See Burma Socialist Progress Party Buhari, General Muhammadu (Nigeria), 74,75 Bulgakov, Mikhail (USSR), 189 Bulgaria, 185,186,193-196,199; 1986 Party Congress, 195,196; Turkish minority problem, 193,194-195 Burger, Warren (United States), 28 Burkina Faso, 93-94 Burma, 141,163-164 Burma Communist Party, 163 Burma Socialist Progress Party, 163 Burriham Forbes (Guyana), 53 Burnham, Walter D., 32, 33; dealignment

Index

theory of, 35 Burundi, 91 Caldera, Rafael (Venezuela), 49 Calderón Guardia, Rafael Angel (Costa Rica), 54 Cambodia, 177. See also Kampuchea Cameroon, 76-77,221 Cameroon People's Democratic Movement (CPDM), 76 Cameroon People's Union (UPC), 76 Campaign financing, United States, 3 4 35 Canada, 25-26; 39-42, 43,147, 188; unity problems, 39 Cape Verde, 92 Carlsson, Ingvar (Sweden), 21 Carlucci, Frank (United States), 38 Casey, William (United States), 38 Castro, Fidel Ruz, 60, 61 Catholic Church, GDR, 196-197; Poland, 204,206,207 CCM. See Chama Cha Mapinduzi (Tanzania) CDU. See Christian Democratic Union Ceausescu, Nicolae, 185, 206, 207, 208 Cellules Communistes Combatantes, Belgium, 13 Central African Republic, 94, 97 Central Intelligence Agency (United States), 38, 219 Cerezo, Vinicio (Guatemala), 56-57 Ceuta (North Africa), 108 CGT. See Confederación General de Trabajadores (Argentina) Chad, 92 Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), Tanzania, 83, 84 Chamari, Khemain (Tunisia), 109 Chambers, George, (Trinidad and Tobago), 58 Chand, Lokendra Bahadur (Nepal), 153 Chaovalit Youngchaiyuth, General (Thailand), 164 Charles, Eugenia (Dominica), 60 Chart Thai party, 165 Charter 77, nature of, 199-200 Chernobyl disaster, 187-188, 197 Chiang Ching-kuo (Taiwan), 161 Chile, 8 , 4 5 , 53,220 China, 155-157,173-175; communist party dispute over reforms, 174-175;

237

demands for democratic reforms, 173; economic reforms in, 4; political purges in, 223-224 Chinese Communist Party (CPC), Central Committee, 175 Chinese emigration, Brunei, 171 Chirac, Jaques (France), 18-19 Christian-Democratic Appeal, 19 Christian Democratic Party, Colombia, 49 Christian Democratic Party, Italy, 22 Christian Democratic Union (DCU), W. Germany, 19-20 Christian People's Party, Denmark, 21 Christian Social Union (CSU), West Germany, 19-20 Chun Doo Hwan, General (Korea), 158, 159 CIA. See Central Intelligence Agency CMRN. See Military Committee for National Recovery, Guinea Colombia, 2, 9, 45, 48-49; violence in, 49, 220 Committee for the Defense and Freedom of Thought and Expression, Serbia, 210 Common Market, Europe, 4 Comoros, 92 Confederacion General de Trabajadores (CGT), Argentina, 50 Congo, political repression, 100 Congress-I Party (India), dominance of, 138,139; and Muslims, 144 Conservative Party (CP), Colombia, 48; South Africa, 91; Uganda, 71 Conte, General Lansana, Guinea, 79-80 Contras, Nicaragua, 3 7 , 5 5 - 5 7 COPEI. See Christian Democratic Party, Colombia Costa Rica, 45, 54-55 CP. See Conservative Party, South Africa CPC. See Chinese Communist Party CPDM. See Cameroon People's Democratic Movement CPP. See Communist Party of the Philippines Craxi, Bettino (Italy), 22 CSU. See Christian Social Union Csurka, Istvän (Hungary), 202 Cuba, 8 , 6 0 - 6 1 , 2 2 6 Cyprus, 125-126 Czechoslovakia, 185, 186, 199-201;

238

Index

resistance to reforms, 224; and Soviet glasnost, 200 Dabangwa, Dumi so (Zimbabwe), 69, 70 Daniloff, Nicholas, 28 Danjuma, General (Nigeria), 74 DAP. See Democratic Action Party, Malaysia Del Castillo, Jorge (Peru), 51 De la Madrid Hurtado, Miguel (Mexico), 55 Del Valle, Eric Arturo (Panama), 55 Demirel, Suleyman (Turkey), 127 Democracy: advantages, 4, 6; definition of, 1-2; Hast European elements of, 185-186, 215; favorable conditions for, 3, 5; limitation of, 6, 42, 43, 219-220; trend toward, 226-228 Democratic Action Party, Malaysia, 167 Democratic institutions, preference for, 5 Democratic Justice Party, South Korea, 158,159 Democratic Labour Party (BLP), Barbados, 58 Democratic Left Party, Turkey, 126 Democratic Party, Uganda, 71; United States, 27, 28, 31, 32,219 Democratic Progress Party (DPP), Taiwan, 162 Democratic Socialist Party, Japan, 158 Democratic Unionist Party, Sudan, 111 Democrats, Thailand, 165 Deng Xiaoping, 174,175; economic reforms of, 155-157,223 Denktash, Rauf (Cyprus), 126 Denmark, 21 Derg (Military Coordinating Committee, Ethiopia), 98 Destourian Socialist Party (DSP), Tunisia, 109 Diefenbaker, John (Canada), 42 Diouf, Abdou (Senegal), 67 Djibouti, 92 DLP. See Democratic Labour Party, Barbados DLP. See Democratic Left Party, Turkey Doe, Jackson (Liberia), 77, 78 Doe, Samuel (Liberia), 77, 78-79 Dole Robert (United States), 38 Dominica, 60 Dominica Freedom Party (DFP), 60 Dominican Republic, 58-59

DPP. See Democratic Progress Party (Taiwan) DSP. See Destourian Socialist Party (Tunisia) Duarte, José N., 56,220; negotiation attempts by, 54 DUP. See Democratic Unionist Party, Sudan Duvalier family, 45, 60, 222 Duvalier, Jean-Claude, 21 "Dyarchy," (Nigeria), 74 Eanes, Antonio (Portugal), 17 East Germany, 186; resistance to reforms, 224. See also German Democratic Republic (GDR) Eban, Abba (Israel), 121 Ecevit, Bulent (Turkey), 126 Ecevit, Rashan (Turkey), 126 Economic necessity, pressures of, 215-216 Economic reforms, need for, 227-228 Ecuador, 45, 48, 51-52,220 EEC. See European Economic Community Egypt, 105,112-114, 221 El Salvador, 56, 226; civil war in, 220 Enrile, Juan Ponce (Philippines), 172 Equatorial Guinea, 97 Erbakan, Necmettin (Turkey), 127 Ershad, H.M. (Bangladesh), 152, 153 Esquivel, Manuel (Belize), 57 ETA. See Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna, Spain Ethiopia, 98 European Convention on Human Rights, 17 European Economic Community (EEC), 11, 13-14,23; agricultural price supports, 23; membership in, 18, 22; problems of, 23,217-218 Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), Spain, 17 Eyadema, Gnassinghe, 94, 96 Fahd, King (Saudi Arabia) 118 FARC See Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia FDR/FMLN. See Frente Democratico Revolucionario/Farabundo Marti Liberación Nacional Febres Cordero, León, 51,52 Federal Democratic Party, Uganda, 71 Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), 19-21 Federation of Evangelical Churches,

Index

GDR, 197 Fernández, Eduardo (Venezuela), 49 Fianna Fail, Ireland, 16 Fianna Gael, Ireland, 15-16 Fiji, 180 Finland, 21-22 Finnbogadottir, Vidgis (Iceland), 15 Fitzgerald, Garret (Ireland), 15 FLN. See National Liberation Front, Algeria France, 11,13, lft-19, 219; terrorist activities in, 13 Franco, Francisco (Spain), 17 Freedom Party, Austria, 20 FRELIMO. See Frente de Libertado de Mo^mbique Frente de Libertado de Mozambique (FRELIMO), 99 Frente Democratico Revolucionario/Farabundo Marti Liberación Nacional (FDR/FMLN), El Salvadore, 56 Frente Liberal, Brazil, 50 Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), 49 Gabon, 92 Gaegea, Samir (Lebanona), 115,116 The Gambia, 63, 66-67 Gambia People's Party, 66 Gandhi, Indira (India), 5, 140 Gandhi, Rajiv (India), 138-144, passim; problems of, 222; and Sri Lanka, 145 Garang, John (Sudan), 112 Garcia, Alán (Peru), 51, 57 Gates, Robert (United States), 38 Gayoon, Maumoon Abdul (Maldives), 154 Gaza strip, 124,125 Gemayel, Amin (Lebanon), 115,116 General People's Congress, Lybia, 110 Gerakan, Malaysia, 166-167 German Democratic Republic, 185, 196-199; demands for autonomy in, 196; exodus from, 198; see also East Germany Ghana, 92 Ghorkaland, 142 Ghorka National Liberation Front, Nepal, 143 Giwa, Dele (Nigeria), 76 Clasnost, 186; as exposé in the USSR, 187; as political tool, 188-189; prognosis for, 225

239

Glemp, Jozef Cardinal (Poland), 206 GNLF. See Ghorka National Liberation Front, Nepal Goh, Chok Tong (Singapore), 168 Golan Heights, 124 Gómez Hurtado, Alvaro (Colombia), 48 González, Felipe (Spain), 17 Gorbachev, Mikhail (USSR), 185, 191, 192,198,199,200,205,225; disarmament proposals of, 218; and dissidents, 190; reform attempts of, 186,187, 224; "restructuring," 195 Gramm, Senator Phil (United States), 29, 36 Grand Coalition, Liberia, 77 Great Britain, 16-17, 45,125,188; European Convention on Human Rights, 17. See also United Kingdom; Britain Greece, 4,11,14, 22-23; democracy in 217; governmental changes, 22 Greens: Austria, 20; West Germany, 20 Grenada, 188 Grundy, Kenneth (United States), 91 Guatemala, 7, 45, 56-57 Guinea, 63, 79-80 Guinea-Bissau, 94, 97 Guinean National Labor Confederation, 79 Gumilev, Nikolai (USSR), 189 Guyana, 45,53 Haiti, 45, 60, 220 Hasan II, King (Morocco), 107 Hasani, Ali Nassir Muhammad al-, (PDRY), 119 Hashimi, Mahdi (Iran), 129 Havasi, Ferenc (Hungary), 203 Hawke, Robert (Australia), 178 Helms, Senator Jesse (United States), 55 Helsinki Accords, 127,191 Helsinki Watch, 127, 200 Herstigte Nasionale Party (HNP), South Africa, 91 Herut Party, Israel, 121,124 Herzog, Chaim (Israel), 121, 124 Heseltine, Michael (Great Britain), 16 Histadrut Labor Federation, Israel, 121 Hitam, Musa (Malaysia), 166 HNP. See Herstigte Nasionale Party, South Africa Hobeika, Elie (Lebanon), 115-116 Hocine, Ait-Ahmed (Algeria), 109

240

Index

Hollings, Senator Ernest (United States), 29,36 Honduras, 45, 55-56 Honecker, Erich, 196,198,199 Houphouët-Boigny, Félix (Ivory Coast), 82-83 Hoxha, Enver (Albania), 212, 214 Hoyte, Desmond (Guyana), 53 Human Rights Committee of the Nigerian Bar Association, 75 Human rights record: Afghanistan, 132; Argentine military, 50; Bahrayn, 118, 119; Benin, 97; Botswana, 65; Ethiopia, 98; the Gambia, 66; Ghana, 93; Iran, 130; Israel, 124-125; Ivory Coast, 83; Kenya, 81; Lebanon, 117-118; Liberia, 77-78; Madagascar, 86; Mozambique, 99; Nicaragua, 57; Niger, 97; Nigeria, 74; Pakistan, 148; PDRY, 120; Poland, 205-206; Romania, 208-209; Saudi Arabia, 119; Senegal, 67; Sierra Leone, 85; South Africa, 89; Sri Lanka, 146- 147; improvement in Sub-Saharan Africa, 63; Togo, 96; Turkey, 127; Uganda, 70-71,72; Uruguay, 50; Zaire, 96; Zimbabwe, 69 Hungary, 8,185,186, 201-204 Husak, Gustav (Czechoslovakia), 199, 200-201 Husayn, King (Jordan), 114 Husayn, Saddam (Iraq), 117 Hu Yao-bang (China), 174, 224 Iceland, 15; summit, 28 lieto, Rafael (Philippines), 172 IMF. See International Monetary Fund India, 2, 5, 146,147,138-144, 222, 226; civil war in, 226; ethnic and religious problems of, 138-139,140,188,222; Nepalese statehood movement, 142-143 Indochina, 155 Indonesia, 169-171; currency devaluation, 170; dissidents in, 170-171; government of, 169,170, 223; Muslims in, 169; oil in, 170 Inglehart, Ronald, 24 Inonu, Er dal (Turkey), 126 Insecure democracies, definition of, 7; list of, 9-10 International Monetary Fund (IMF), 50, 51, 59,112; IMF-sponsored economic

reforms, 91, 93, 97 Iran, 105,128-130, 222; internal policy divisions, 129-130; and the United States, 129-130 Iran-Contra affair, 25, 28, 37-39 Iran-Iraq war, 128, 222 Iraq, 117, 221 Ireland, 15-16 Islamic fundamentalism, rise in the Middle East, 68, 114, 211 Islamic Tendency Movement, Tunisia, 110 Isma'il, Abd, al-Fatah (PDRY), 119 Israel, 105,116,120-124; ethnic tensions, 122, 123-124, 222; National Unity government of, 120; occupied territories, 124-125 Istiqqlal party, Morocco, 107 Italy, 11, 14, 22, 217 Ivory Coast, 82-83 Jaffna (Sri Lanka), 145 Jamaica, 2, 59 Jamaica Labour Party (JLP), 59 Jamiati-i-Islami (Pakistan), 149 Japan, 2, 6,157-158, 215; exchange rate ooncems, 157 Jaruzelski, Wojciech (Poland), 206 Jatiyo Party (Bangaldesh), 152 Jatoi, Ghulam Mustafa (Pakistan), 151 Jawara, Sir Dawda (the Gambia), 66 Jayewardene, Junius (Sri Lanka), 144,146, 147 Jewish emigration, USSR, 190-191 Jeyaratnam, J.B. (Singapore), 168 Jigme Singye Wangchuk, King (Bhutan), 154 Jinnah, Mohammed Ali (Pakistan), 149 JLP. See Jamaica Labour Party Johnson-Sirleaf, Ellen (Liberia), 78 Jonathan, Chief Leabua (Lesotho), 92 Jordan, 114-115,125; increased parliamentary representation, 115, 223 Jugnauth, Ameerood (Mauritius), 64 Junejo, Mohammed Khan (Pakistan), 147-151, passim Juwata labor union, Tanzania, 83 Kach Party (Israel), 122 Kachins (Burma), 163 Kahane, Meir (Israel), 122, 123 Kampuchea, 8,177-178; puppet government of, 178. See also Cambodia

Index

KANU. See Kenya African National Union Karami, Rashid (Lebanon), 116 Karens (Burma), 163,164 Karmal, Babrak (Afghanistan), 131-132 Kaunda, Kenneth (Zambia), 84 Kennedy, Senator Ted (United States), 27 Kenya, 63,80-82,221 Kenya African National Union (KANU), elimination of secret ballot, 81-82 Kerekou, Mathieu (Benin), 94, 97 "Khalistan," (India), 138 Khameini, Ali (Iran), 128 Khar, Ghulam Mustafa (Pakistan), 151 Khmer Rouge, 178-179 Khodasevich, Vladislav (USSR), 189 Khoeiniha, Hojatoleslam Musavi (Iran), 129 Khomeini, Ayatollah Ruhollah (Iran), 105,128-130 Kikuyu group (Kenya), 81 Kim Chong-il (North Korea), 176 Kim Il-sung (North Korea), 176 Kim Dae Jung (South Korea), 158, 159,160 Kim Young Sam (South Korea), 158 Kirwin, Michael (United States), 34 KMT. See Kuomintang, Taiwan Koirala, G.P. (Nepal), 153 Kolbin, Gennadi (USSR), 191 Kolingba, General André (Central African Republic), 94, 97 Kolodziej, Mich al (Poland), 204, 205 Korean Workers Party, North Korea, 176 Kosta, Koco (Albania), 213-214 Kountché, Brigadier General, Seyni (Niger), 94, 97 Krahn tribe (Nigeria), 77 Krassó, György (Hungary), 201 Kunaev, Dinmukhamed (USSR), 191 Kuomintang (KMT), Taiwan, 161,162 Kuwait, 4 , 1 0 5 , 1 1 7 - 1 1 8 , 1 2 9 ; dissolution of National Assembly, 118, 221 Kyprianou, Spyros (Greek-Cyprus), 126 Laber, Jeri, 200 Labor Party: Fiji, 180; Israel, 120 Labour Party, Australia, 178 Laldenga (India), 142 Lange, David (New Zealand), 178 Laos, 177 LAP. See Liberian Action Party LDP. See Liberal Democratic Party, Japan

241

League of Communists of Yugoslavia, 209 Lebanon, 2,105,115-117,130, 222,226; economic collapse, 117; Lebanese Communist Party, 116 Le Due Anh (Vietnam), 177 Le Due Tho (Vietnam), 177 Lee Hsien Loong (Singapore), 169 Lee Kuan Yew (Singapore), 168 Left Front, West Bengal, 143 Lekhanya, General J.M. (Lesotho), 92 Lenin, V.I., 187, 225, doctrine of, 3 Lesotho, 92-93; coup, 91 Levy, David (Israel), 124 Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), Japan, 157-158 Liberal Party, Canada, 40; Colombia, 48 Liberia, 6, 77-79, 221 Liberian Action Party (LAP), 77 Liberian Unity Party (LUP), 77 Libya, 8, 28,110 Likud Bloc, Israel, 120, 124 Limited authoritarianism, definition, 8; list of states, 10 Lini, Walter (Vanuatu), 181 Lithuanians, 225 Lubbers, Ruud (Netherlands), 19 LUP. See Liberian Unity Party Lusinchi, Jaime (Venezuela), 49 Luxembourg, 19 Madagascar, 85-86 Mahanta, A.K. (India), 141 Mahatir, Muhammed (Malaysia), 166, 167 Mahdi, Sadiq al- (Sudan), 111-112 Mahdiyyah religious order, Sudan, 111 Majlis (Maldives), 154 Majluta, Jacobo (Dominican Republic), 58-59 Malawi, 94 Malaysia, 165-167; Chinese Minority, 165,166-167; Islamic elements in, 166 Maldives, 154 Mali, 91 Malta, 22 Manley, Michael (Jamaica), 59 Malinke ethnic group (Guinea), 80 Mandelshtam, Osip (USSR), 189 Mapam Party, Israel, 124 Marchenko, Anatoly (USSR), 191 Marcos, Ferdinand (Philippines), 21, 159, 170,172,223

242

Index

Maronites (Lebanon), 115 Mauritania, 105-107, 221; ethnic division of, 107 Mauritanian Military Movement (MMM), 64 Mauritius, 63-64 MCA. See Malaysian Chinese Association, 166 MDS. See Mouvement des Democrats Socialistes Mécs, Imre (Hungary), 203 Meese, Edwin (United States), 28 Melanesian nationalism, 179-180 Melilla (North Africa), 108 Mengistu, Haile Mariam (Ethiopia), 98 Mestiri, Ahmed (Tunisia), 109 Metzenbaum, Senator Howard (United States), 27 Mexico, 7, 55 Michnik, Adam (Poland), 205 Military Committee for National Recovery (CMRN), Guinea, 80 Milotocracy, 7 Mintoff, Dom (Malta), 22 Mirghani, Muhammad Osman aleudan), 111 Mitterrand, François (France), 18 Mizo National Front, (MNF), India, 141-142 MMM. See Mauritanian Military Movement MNR. See Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario, Bolivia Mobutu Sese Seko (Zaire), 94, 95, 96 Modai, Yitzhak (Israel), 121, 124 Moi, Daniel arap (Kenya), 80, 81, 82 Momoh, Major General Jospeh Saidu (Sierra Leone), 85 Monge, Luis Alberto (Costa Rica), 53 Mongolia, 185,186,192-193; Soviet influence on, 193 Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (MPRP), 192,193 Montazeri, Husayn Ali (Iran), 128, 129, 130 Morocco, 105,107-108; civil war, 107 Moshoeshoe II, King (Lesotho), 92 Most Favored Nation Status, appeal of, 215; Romania, 208-209 Motherland Party (Turkey), 126 Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution (MPR), Zaire, 96

Mouvement des Democrats Socialises (MDS), Tunisia, 109 Movement for the Restoration of Democracy, Pakistan, 151 Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR), Bolivia, 52 Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO), 99 Mozambique, 99 MP. See Motherland Party, Turkey MPLA. See Popular Movement of the Liberation of Angola MPR. See Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution, Zaire MPRP. See Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party Mubarek, Husni (Egypt), 113,114 Mugabe, Robert (Zimbabwe), 68,69, 70 Muhajirs (Pakistan), 151 Mulroney, Brian (Canada), 4, 25, 39-40, 42; Quebec question, 41 Murdani, Benny (Indonesia), 170 Musavi, Moi Husayn (Iran), 128,129 Museveni, Yoweri (Uganda), 70, 71-72, 74 Muslim Brethren (Syria), 115 Muslim Brotherhood (Sudan), 111 M waken y a (Kenya), 80-81 Mwinyi, Ali Hassan (Tanzania), 83 Mzali, Muhammad (Tunisia), 109-110 NA. See National Assembly (Pakistan) Nabavi, Behzad (Iran), 129 Nabokov, Vladimir (USSR), 189 Najib Allah (Afghanistan), 131-132 Nakasone, Yasuhiro (Japan), 157 Namphy, General Henri (Haiti), 60 National Alliance for Reconstruction (NAR), Trinidad and Tobago, 58 National Commission for Inquiry, Togo, 96 National Conference on Soviet Jewry, United States, 190-191 National Democratic Party (NDP), Egypt, 112; Turkey, 126 National Democratic Party of Liberia (NDPL), 77 National Front, Malaysia, 165 National Front for the Defense of the Revolution Madagascar, 86 National Islamic Front, Sudan, 111, 112 National Liberation Front (FLN), Algeria, 108

Index

National Party, South Africa, 87 National Resistance Army, Uganda, 72-73 National Resistance Movement (NRM), Uganda, 70, 72 National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), 99 National United Party, Indonesia, 171 National Unity Cabinet, Lebanon, 116 Nationalist Party, Taiwan. See Kuomintang Nationalist Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP), N. Ireland, 15 NATO, 13, 42 NDP. See New Democratic Party, Canada NDP. See National Democratic Party, Egypt NDPL. See National Democratic Party of Liberia Nepal, 153-154, 223 Nepali Congress Party, 153 The Netherlands, 19 Neves, Tancredo, death of, 49 New Democratic Party, Canada, 40, 41-42 New Democracy Party, Greece, 22 New Hebrides. See Vanuatu New Korea Democratic Party, S. Korea, 158,159,160 Ne Win (Burma), 163 New People's Army, Philippines, 172 New Wafa Party, Egypt, 112 New Zealand, 178-179 Nguema, Teodoro Obiang (Equatorial Guinea), 94 Nguyen Van Linh (Vietnam), 177 Nicaragua, 45, 54, 57, 218; air to contras in, 219; new charter of, 57 NIF. See National Islamic Front Niger, 94, 97 Nigeria, 74-76, 221; ethnic division in 71 Nigerian Labor Congress, 76 Nkala, Enos (Zimbabwe), 69 NKDP. See New Korea Democratic Party Noriega, General Manuel A. (Panama), 55 North Korea, 155,175-176 Northern Ireland, 13,15,16,217; and Britain, 226 North Yemen. See Yemen Arab Republic Norway, 14, 21

243

NPA. See New People's Army, Philippines NRA. See National Resistance Army, Uganda NRM. See National Resistance Movement, Uganda Nuevo Liberalismo, Colombia, 48 Nu'man, Yasin Sa'id (South Yemen), 119 Numayro, Jafar (Sudan), 111, 112,114 Nyerere, Julius (Tanzania), 83 Obote, Milton (Uganda), 71 Okello, General Tito (Uganda), 70, 71 Oman, 118-119 O'Neil, Tip (United States), 32, 36 Organization of African Unity, 72 Özal, Turgot (Turkey), 126 Pakistan, 140,147-152, 222-223; and Afghanistan, 130-131, 148; martial law, 147-148; and United States, 148 Pakistan Muslim League, 149,150,151 Pakistan People's Party (PPP), 147, 149-151, passim Palestine Liberation Organization, 114, 149 Palme, Olaf (Sweden), 13, 21 Pan-African Conference on Human Rights, Nigeria, 75 Panama, 55 PAP. See People's Action Party Papandreou, Andreas (Greece), 22 Papua-New Guinea, 9,179-180 Paraguay, 53, 220 Pardo Leal, Jaime (Colombia), 48 Park Chung Hee (S. Korea), 158 Parti Bersatu, Malaysia, 166 Parti Démocratique de la Côte d'Ivoire (PDCI), 82 Parti Québécois, 41 Parti du Progrès et du Socialisme, Morocco, 107 Partial democracy, definition 7-8; list of states, 10 Partido de Unidad Social Cristiano (PUSC), Costa Rica, 54 Partido Liberación Nacional (PLN), Costa Rica, 54 Partido Moviemiento Democratico BrasUeiro (PMDB), 49-50 Partido Reformista Social Cristiano (PRSO, Dominican Republic, 59

244

Index

Partido Revolucionario Dominico, 58-59 Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), Mexico, 55 Party Islam (PAS), 166 Party of God, Lebanon, 116,117 PASOK, Greece, 22 Pasternak, Boris (USSR), 189 Patriotic Coalition for Democracy (PCD), Guyana, 53 Patriotic Front for the Liberation of Kenya (MWAKENYA), 80-81 Paz Estenssoro, Victor (Bolivia), 52 PCD. See Patriotic Coalition for Democracy PDPA. See People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan PDRY. See People's Democratic Republic of Yemen PDS. See Senegalese Democratic Party. Peng Li (China), 174 People's Action Party, Singapore, 168, 169 People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, 131-132 People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY), South Yemen, 119-120 People's Mujahidin, Afghanistan, 130 People's National Congress (PNC), Guayana, 53 People's National Movement (PNM), Trinidad and Tobago, 58 People's National Party (PNP), Jamaica, 59 People's Party, Austria, 20; The Netherlands, 19; Pakistan, 151; Turkey, 126 People's Progressive Party (PPP), the Gambia, 66 People's United Party (PUP), Belize, 57 Peres, Shimon (Israel), 120,121,124 Peretz, Yitzhak (Israel), 122 Pérez, Carlos Andres (Venezuela), 49 Perez de Cuellar, Javier, 126 Peru, 45,48,51,220 Phalangist Party, Lebanon, 115 Pham Van Dong (Vietnam), 177 The Philippines, 2, 8, 159,171-173; insurgency, 172-173; new constitution, 172; revolution, 155,161,169 Pinochet, General Augusto (Chile), 8, 53, 220 PLN. See Partido Liberación Nacional, Costa Rica

PLO. See Palestine Liberation Organization PMDB. See Partido Movimento Democrático PML. See Pakistan Muslim League PNC. See People's National Congress, Guyana PNG. See Papua-New Guinea Poland, 8,185, 186, 204-207; Party Congress, 205-206 Polisario Liberation Front, Morocco, 107 Pol Pot (Cambodia), 8 Popular Democratic Front, Syria, 115 Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), 99 Portugal, 4,11,17,217,18 PPP. See Pakistan People's Party PPP. See People's Progressive Party, the Gambia PQ. See Parti Quebecois PRD. See Partido Revolucionario Dominica Prem Tinsulanond (Thailand), 164, 165 PRI. See Partido Revolucionario Institucional, Mexico Price, George (Belize), 57 Privatization, Western Europe, 217 Progressive Conservative Party, Canada, 25,39,40,41 Progressive Socialist Party, Lebanon, 115, 116 PRSC. See Partido Reformista Social Cristiano, Dominican Republic PSP. See Socialist Democratic Party, Portugal PSP. See Progressive Socialist Party, Lebanon Punjab, 138,139,140,149,150,151; Accord, 139,141 PUP. See People's United Party, Belize PUSC. See Partido de Unidad Social Cristiano, Costa Rica Qadaffy, Muammar-al (Libya), 110 Quasidemocracy, weaknesses, 5-6 Rabier, Jacques-René (France), 24 Rabin, Yitzhak (Israel), 124 Radical movements, Soviet support of, 225,226 Rafsanjani, Hajatoleslam Hashimi (Iran), 128,129

Index

Ramos, Fidel (Philippines), 172 Rassadorn Party, Thailand, 165 Rassemblement pour la République (RPR), France, 18 Ratsiraka, Didier (Madagascar), 86 Rawlings, Jerry (Ghana), 93 Reagan, Ronald, 27,36, 37,172, 218; credibility of, 39; and the NSC, 38: popularity of, 26, 29,31,32; problems of, 25; Reagan Revolution, 219 Red Army Faction, W. Germany, 13 Red Brigade, Italy, 13 Regan, Donald (United States), 37, 38 Rehnquist, William H. (United States), 28 Republican Party, United States, 31-32 Reynolds, William B. (United States), 28 Robinson, A.N.R. (Trinidad and Tobago), 57 Romania, 185,186, 206-209; Pentecostals, 208; resistance to reforms, 224; Seventh Day Adventists, 208 Rostenkowski, Congressman Dan, 29,36 RPR. See Rassemblement pour la République, France Rudman, Senator Warren, 29,36 Rwanda, 91 SAARC. See South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation Sadat, Anwar, al-, 113 St. John, H. Bernard (Barbados), 58 Sakharov, Andrei (USSR), 190 Salih, AU Abdullah (PDRY), 120 SALT II, 27,36 Samizdat, Czechoslovakia, 200 Sanguinetti, Julio M. (Uruguay), 50 Sankara, Captain Thomas (Burkina Faso), 93, 94 Santer, Jacques (Luxembourg), 19 Santos, Eduardo dos (Angola), 99 Sâo Tomé and Principe, 94 Samey, José (Brazil), 48, 49, 220 Sassou-Ngouesso, Denis (Congo), 100 Saudi Arabia, 118,119,129 Savimbi, Jonas (Angola), 99 Scalia, Antonin (United States), 28 Schlesinger, James R. (United States), 39 SDI. See Strategic Defense Initiative SDPP. See Social Democratic People's Party, Turkey Seaga, Edward (Jamaica), 59

245

SED. See Socialist Unity Party, GDR Seifert, Jaroslav (Czechoslovakia), 199 Sekweyama, Anthony (Uganda), 73 Sendero Luminoso, Peru, 51 Senegal, 63,67-68 Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS), 67 Seychelles, 92 SGPC. See Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhok Committee, India Shalom, Avraham (Israel), 121 Shamir, Yitzhak (Israel), 120, 121, 124 Shans tribe (Burma), 163 Sharon, Ariel (Israel), 121 Shas Party, Israel, 122 Shcharansky, Anatoly (Israel), 190 Shin Bet, Israel, 121 Shona majority (Zimbabwe), 70 Shresta, Marish Man Sigh (Nepal), 154 Shultz, George (United States), 37 Siad Barre, Mohammed (Somalia), 94 Sidqi, Atij (Egypt), 113 Sierra Leone, 84-85 Sikhs (India), 140, 222 Singapore, 3, 8,167-169 Singh, Giani Zail (India), 141 Sinhalese (Sri Lanka), 222 Sinn Fein, Ireland, 15,16 SLA. See South Lebanese Army SNF. See Sudanese National Front Soares, Mario, (Spain), 17 Socialist Party, Thailand, 165 Social Democratic Party, Denmark, 21; Portugal, 17; Turkey, 126; West Germany, 14 Social Democratic People's Party (SDPP), Turkey, 126 Socialist Party, Austria, 20; Senegal, 67 Socialist Unity Party (SED), GDR, 197 Socotra, South Yemen, Russian base, 119 Sodnom, Damaagiyn (Mongolia), 193 Solidarity movement, 204, 205, 227 Solzhenitsyn, Aleksandr, 189 Somalia, 94 Somare, Michael (Papua-New Guinea), 179 South African, 9, 27, 99; apartheid, 86-91; military influence, 91; sanctions, 40; and Zambia, 84; and Zimbabwe, 69 South America, 48-54 South Asia, degrees of democracy, 137, 222 South Asia Association of Regional

246

Index

Cooperation (SAARC), 137 South Korea, 3, 155,158-160, 223; antigovernment protests, 159-160; elections, 158-159 South Yemen, 119-120. See also People's Democratic Republic of Yemen Southern People's Liberation Movement, Sudan, 112 Soviet Union, 185,186-192; and China, 224; and Cuba, 60; developments in, 201; political reform attempts, 221, 225; and the USA, 191. See also Union of Soviet Socialist Republics South Lebanese Army, 116 Spain, 4,11,13,14,17-19, 57-58; and Basque nationalists, 217; democracy in, 17,217 SPLA. See Southern People's Liberation Movement, Sudan Sri Lanka, 144-147; ethnic strife in, 144-145,146,222, 226 Sri Lanka Freedom Party, 146 Stable democracies, definition, 7; list of states, 9 Stalin, Joseph, 185, 187, 189 Stevens, Siaka (Sierra Leone), 85 Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), 27, 37 Stroessner, Alfredo (Paraguay), 53 Subash Ghinsingh (India), 143 Sudan, 105,110-112,114,221; civil war, 112,226 Sudanese National Front (SNF), 112 Suharto (Indonesia), 169 Sunni fundamentalist forces, 116 Suriname, 45, 53-54 Swaziland, limited monarchy, 91 Sweden, 6,13,21 Switzerland, 14; 21 Syria, 14,115,116 Taiwan, 155,161-163,167-168 Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF), 146 Tamils, Sri Lanka, 222 TANGWI, Taiwan, 161-162 Tanzania, 82-84 Taya, Maoruya Oud Sid Ahmad (Mauritania), 107 Tebbit, Norman (Great Britain), 16 Terrorism, urban 13; in W. Europe, 217 Thailand, 164-165 Thatcher, Margaret (Great Britain), 125

Tigers, Sri Lanka, 144-145 Togo, 94, 96 Tohram, G.S. (India), 141 Tonga, 180 Touré, Sékou (Guinea), 79,80 Tower, Senator John (United States), 37 Tower Report, 37,38 TPP. See True Path Party, Turkey Traore, Diarra (Guinea), 80 Trinidad and Tobago, 58 Trudeau, Pierre (Canada), 40, 41 True Path Party (TPP), Turkey, 127 Truongh Chinh (Vietnam), 177 Tsedenbal, Yumjaagiyn (Mongolia), 193 TULF. See Tamil United Liberation Front Tunisia, 105,109-110, 221 Tunisian League for the Defense of Human Rights, 109 Turabi, Hasan al- (Sudan), 111 Turkey, 105,126-128, 221; and Bulgaria, 193-195; Kurdish guerrillas, 127, TurkIs, 127 Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, 125-126 UDF. See United Democratic Front, South Africa UDF. See Union pour la Démocratie Française UDP. See United Democratic Party, Belize UDPS. See Union pour la Démocratie et Progrès Social, Zaire Uganda, 8, 70-74; political changes, 63, 70-71 Uganda Patriotic Movement, 71 Uganda People's Congress, 71 UGTT. See Union Général des Travailleurs Tunisiens Ukrainians, 225 Ummah Party, Sudan, 111 UMNO. See United Malays National Organization Unidad Popular (UD), Colombia, 48 Union of Albanian Writers and Artists, 213 Union pour la Démocratie et le Progrès Social (UDPS), Zaire, 95-96, 109 Union Général des Travailleurs Tunisiens (UGTT), 109 Union Socialiste des Forces Populaires, Morocco, 107

Index

UNIP. See United National Independence Party, Zambia UNITA. See National Union for the Total Independence of Angola United Arab Emirates, 118 United Democratic Front (UDF), South Africa, 88, 89 United Democratic Party (UDP), Belize, 57 United Kingdom, 214. See also Great Britain; Britain United Malays National Organization (UMNO), 165,166,167 United National Independence Party (UNIP), Zambia, 84 United National Party, Sri Lanka, 146 United Nations, 20, 218, 219 United Nations Human Rights Commission, on Israel, 125 United Nations reports, on Iran, 130; on Afghanistan, 132 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), 8 , 1 1 , 1 3 0 , 1 8 6 - 1 9 2 , 200, 209; arms negotiations, 198; protest demonstraitons, 191-192; reform efforts, 188; summit meeting with USA, 15. See also Soviet Union United States of America, 6, 11, 26-39, 42, 43,125,150,155,160,172,178,188,215; and Bolivia, 52; and Libya, 109; and Chile, 53; and Haiti, 60; and Honduras, 55, 56; leadership of, 219; and Iran, 129-130; as model democracy, 218; and Pakistan, 148; and Panama, 55; and Paraguay, 53; trade deficits, 30; USA-USSR summit, 15 United States Information Agency, 160 Unity Party (UP), Liberia, 77 UP. See Ummah Party, Sudan UP. See Unidad Popular, Colombia UP. See Unity Party, Liberia UPC. See Cameroon People's Union Uruguay, 50, 220; democracy, 45 USSR. See Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Vanuatu, 180-181 Vaidya, General (India) A. S., 140 Vajda, György (Hungary), 202 Vargas Pazzos, General Frank (Ecuador), 52 Vellayati, Ali Akbar (Iran), 128

247

Venezuela, 5 , 4 5 , 4 8 , 4 9 Vieira Joao Bernardo (Guinea-Bissau), 94,97 Vietnam, 155,176-177; Soviet aid, 177 Voznesensky, Andrei (USSR), 188 Vysotsky, Vladimir (USSR), 189 Wade, Abdoulaye (Senegal), 67 Wajed, Hasina (Bangladesh), 152 Waldheim, Kurt (Austrua), 20 Warsaw Treaty Organization, 187; forces of, 199 Watergate episode, 219 Webster William (United States), 39 Weinberger, Caspar (United Sates), 37 West Germany, 13,19-20, 198. See also Federal Republic of Germany Western Samoa, 181 Williams, Eric (Trinidad and Tobago), 58 Willoch, K i r e (Norway), 21 Wingti, Pai (Papua-New Guinea), 179 Workers Party of Ethiopia, 98 World Bank, 50, 59 World Jewish Congress, 20 Wright, Congressman James C. (United States), 35, 37 Wyszynski, Stefan Cardinal (Poland), 206 Yemen Arab Republic (YAR), 120 Yemen Socialist Party, (YSP), 119 Yevtushenko, Yevgeny (USSR), 188 YSP. See Yemen Socialist Party Yugoslavia, 8 , 2 0 , 1 8 5 , 1 8 6 , 209-212; and Albania, 214-215; Bulgarian Macedons, 194; criticism of ruling party, 210; Montenegrin minority, 210; Muslims, 211; strikes, 211-212 Zaire, 94,95-96; religious persecution, 96 Zambia, 84 Zamiatin, Yevgeny (USSR), 189 Zamir, Yitzhak (Israel), 212 ZANU-PF. See Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front ZAPU. See Zimbabwe African People's Union Zhao Ziyang (China), 174 Zhivkov, Todor (Bulgaria), 195, 196, 199 Zia-ul Haq (Pakistan), 147, 149, 150, 151 Zimbabwe, 63,68-70, 221 Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), 68, 69