Democracy and Public Policy in the Post-COVID-19 World: Choices and Outcomes 2020040192, 2020040193, 9780367679781, 9781003142003

Table of contents :
Cover
Half Title
Series Page
Title Page
Copyright Page
Dedication Page
Contents
List of figures
List of tables
List of contributors
Preface
Introduction
Section I Public policy frameworks, theories and approaches
1 Theoretical framework and dynamics of public policy trajectory
2 Policy making: challenges to multidisciplinary approaches
3 Public policy communication: reclaiming a ‘nearly lost’ theme
4 Connecting the dots, locating the linkages: conceptual perspectives on human rights, human security and public policy
5 Ethics and public policy: how ‘just’ can public policy be?
6 Changing paradigms of strategic political process in public policy formulation and governance: comparative study of GST in India and NAFTA in the US
Section II Policy making in India: choices and outcomes
7 Promoting quality policy research in India: need for an evidence-based approach
8 State and public policies in India: a symbiotic relationship
9 ICT applications in land records administration in India: a study on the implementation of DILRMP
10 Policy and practices of decentralisation of elementary education in India
11 Recent transition in India’s public health policy: layering patterns and inherent bottlenecks
12 Emotive policy in a political democracy: case study of Kanyashree in West Bengal
13 Efficacy of MGNREGS in achieving SDGs
14 The Indian state, democracy and the citizen: public policy challenges in the post-COVID-19 era
Index

Citation preview

DEMOCRACY AND PUBLIC POLICY IN THE POST-COVID-19 WORLD After the COVID-19 disaster, ‘old’ frailties and inadequacies in agriculture and industrial productive capacities in public health and transport systems have evinced sharply in the open, reopening the debates over public policy reforms as never before. This volume: • • • •

Studies the likely impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on future policy making in India and other democracies. Critically looks at the available theoretical frameworks, models and approaches used in the policy making process and studies their contemporary relevance. Balances theoretical approaches with concrete case studies. Examines India’s policies on education, health, e-governance, and gender and work, and also provides recommendations for the future.

An important and timely contribution, this book will be of great interest to scholars and researches of public administration, public policy, political theory, globalization and global democracy. Rumki Basu is Professor of Public Administration and former Head of the Department of Political Science, Jamia Millia Islamia, India. She was also the Director of the Sarojini Naidu Centre for Women’s Studies, Jamia Millia Islamia. She has published 12 books and 40 articles on issues of public policy and governance, international organization and the political economy of development in India. She has presented papers at the World Congress of Political Science in Berlin (1994), Seoul (1997), Santiago (2009), Madrid (2012) and Poznan (2016), and has participated in international workshops in South Asia and the Pacifc Region. She has received the Indian Council of Social Science Research Teacher Fellowship Award. Her published works include: Economic Liberalization and Poverty Alleviation: Social Sector Expenditures and Centre State Relations (2000), Public Administration: Concepts and Theories New Edition 2007, Globalization and the Changing Role of the State (edited, 2008), Governance & Human Capital: The 21st Century Agenda (co-edited, 2011), Democracy and Good Governance: Reinventing the Public Service Delivery System in India (co-edited, 2014), Governance in South Asia (2016), Indian Administration Structure, Performance and Reform (2019) and Public Administration in the 21st Century (2019).

ROUTLEDGE SERIES ON THE HUMANITIES AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES IN A POST-COVID-19 WORLD

The COVID-19 pandemic has not only impacted the world in terms of health and well-being but is reshaping our lives economically, politically, socially and emotionally. It has brought into sharp focus fault lines and continuities which are likely to outlive the pandemic. The humanities and the social sciences will have a crucial role to play in the way we reimagine and reshape our lives in the post-pandemic era. This Routledge series aims to bring cutting edge and interdisciplinary research on various facets of politics, society, economy, environment, culture, psychology and well-being in the post-COVID-19 world. The books in this series engage with a range of topical and critical issues that have emerged in the wake of the pandemic and how these are likely to impact the way in which humanities and social sciences are taught, researched and understood in the years to come. Books in this series DEMOCRACY AND PUBLIC POLICY IN THE POST-COVID-19 WORLD: CHOICES AND OUTCOMES Edited by Rumki Basu

DEMOCRACY AND PUBLIC POLICY IN THE POST-COVID-19 WORLD Choices and Outcomes

Edited by Rumki Basu

First published 2021 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2021 selection and editorial matter, Rumki Basu; individual chapters, the contributors The right of Rumki Basu to be identifed as the author of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identifcation and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Basu, Rumki, editor. Title: Democracy and public policy in the post-covid-19 world : choices and outcomes / edited by Rumki Basu. Description: Abingdon, Oxon ; New York : Routledge, 2021. | Includes bibliographical references and index. | Subjects: LCSH: Democracy—India. | India—Politics and government—21st century. | COVID-19 (Disease)—India. Classifcation: LCC JQ281 .D45 2020 (print) | LCC JQ281 (ebook) | DDC 320.60954—dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020040192 LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020040193 ISBN: 978-0-367-67978-1 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-003-14200-3 (ebk) Typeset in Sabon by Apex CoVantage, LLC

D E D I C AT E D T O T H E S P E C I A L A S S I S TA N C E P RO G R A M M E ( SA P ) G R A N T O F T H E UNIVERSITY GRANTS COMMISSION G I V E N TO T H E P O L I T I CA L S C I E N C E D E PA R T M E N T, J A M I A M I L L I A I S L A M I A (2016–2021) WHICH MADE THE PLANNING P E N N I N G A N D P R E PA R AT I O N O F T H E TEXT OF THIS BOOK A REAL POSSIBILITY I N T H E C OV I D 1 9 Y E A R 2 0 2 0

CONTENTS

ix x xi xiii

List of fgures List of tables List of contributors Preface Introduction

1

RU M K I B A S U

SECTION I

Public policy frameworks, theories and approaches 1 Theoretical framework and dynamics of public policy trajectory

23 25

C . S H E E L A R E DDY

2 Policy making: challenges to multidisciplinary approaches

40

A . V E N K ATR A MAN

3 Public policy communication: reclaiming a ‘nearly lost’ theme

47

D I PA N K A R S I NH A

4 Connecting the dots, locating the linkages: conceptual perspectives on human rights, human security and public policy

60

K A D L O O R SAVITRI

5 Ethics and public policy: how ‘just’ can public policy be? N I L E S H K U M A R JO SH I

vii

74

CONTENTS

6 Changing paradigms of strategic political process in public policy formulation and governance: comparative study of GST in India and NAFTA in the US

83

D E B A S I S B HATTACH A RYA

SECTION II

Policy making in India: choices and outcomes 7 Promoting quality policy research in India: need for an evidence-based approach

99 101

R A M A B R A H MA M IVATURI A N D RAMYA CH IT R APU

8 State and public policies in India: a symbiotic relationship

116

B A L J I T S I N GH MA N N

9 ICT applications in land records administration in India: a study on the implementation of DILRMP

128

R AV I N D E R K AUR AN D VE N KATAMA L L U TH ADABOINA

10 Policy and practices of decentralisation of elementary education in India

140

M A D H U M I TA B A N DYO PADH YAY

11 Recent transition in India’s public health policy: layering patterns and inherent bottlenecks

158

S I D D H A RTHA MUKE RJI

12 Emotive policy in a political democracy: case study of Kanyashree in West Bengal

176

P R ATI P C H ATTO PA DH YAY

13 Effcacy of MGNREGS in achieving SDGs

188

M O I TR I D E Y

14 The Indian state, democracy and the citizen: public policy challenges in the post-COVID-19 era

200

RU M K I B A S U

212

Index

viii

FIGURES

10.1

Percentage distribution of primary (I-V) and upper primary (VI-VIII) elementary schools (I-VIII) with SMCs 10.2 Percentage of schools having constituted SMCs and prepared SDPs (government and aided managements), all of India 10.3 Percentage of schools having constituted SMCs and percentage of schools having constituted SMCs and also prepared SDPs 10.4 Proportion of schools with more than one communitybased organisation 10.5 Proportion of parents who visited schools to meet the teachers 10.6 Status of visit by any teacher to parents (2008) 10.7 Action taken by SMC members 10.8 Percentage of schools with SMC/VEC and percentage of schools which conducted SMC meetings 10.9 Frequency of meetings conducted in schools 10.10 Percentage of distribution of issues discussed in SMC/ VEC meetings 10.11 Proportion of SMCs which provided support to schools in 2008 and 2012 10.12 Head teacher’s opinions regarding contribution and support of SMCs in sample schools (23)

ix

144 145 146 147 149 149 150 151 152 152 153 154

TABLES

7.1

7.2

9.1 9.2 9.3 9.4 10.1 10.2 13.1

Budget allocations and actual expenditure of the Department of School Education and Literacy (DSEL), Ministry of Education (erstwhile MHRD), GoI between 2010–11 and 2018–19 Budget allocations and actual expenditure of the Department of Higher Education (DHE), Ministry of Education (erstwhile MHRD), GoI between 2010–11 and 2018–19 Components and activities of DILRMP Funding pattern under NLRMP Physical progress of DILRMP Component-wise national-level progress under DILRMP Head teachers’ opinions regarding contribution and support of SMCs or PTAs, 2008 Head teachers’ opinions regarding contribution and support of SMCs or PTAs, 2016 and 2018 MGNREGS performance in the past fve years

x

109

110 133 134 135 136 148 155 193

CONTRIBUTORS

Madhumita Bandyopadhyay is professor in the Department of School and Non-formal Education at the National Institute of Educational Planning, New Delhi, India. She has worked extensively in the area of decentralization of school education. She has published many articles and chapters in books and journals of international repute. Debasis Bhattacharya is professor at the Amity Business School, Amity University, Gurugram, India. He is also an author and managing editor for the Centre for the BRICS Studies Newsletter Series. His co-authored book, GST and Its Aftermath: Is Consumer Really the King, was published in 2018. Pratip Chattopadhyay is assistant professor of political science at the University of Kalyani, West Bengal, India. He was previously an associate at IUC-UGC and at IIAS, Shimla (2014–16), and has been an Executive Committee member of the West Bengal Political Science Association since 2013. Ramya Chitrapu is presently a doctoral research scholar in the Department of Political Science, University of Hyderabad, India. She was formerly junior research fellow, Administrative Staff College of India (ASCI), Hyderabad. Her research interests include public service delivery, democratic governance, election studies and innovations in governance and policy making. Moitri Dey is assistant professor in the Department of Political Science, Mata Sundri College for Women, Delhi University, India. She has a PhD in political science from Jamia Millia Islamia and has published various research papers and articles in reputed journals. Ramabrahmam Ivaturi is vice-chancellor, Central University of Odisha, Koraput, India. He was formerly professor and head, Department of Political Science, University of Hyderabad, with more than 30 years of teaching experience. His areas of specialization are higher education, public policy and e-governance. Nilesh Kumar Joshi is associate professor, Department of Public Administration, V.N. South Gujrat University, Surat, India. His areas of specialization xi

CONTRIBUTORS

are local government, comparative public administration and Indian administration. He has also taught in the Ethiopian Civil Services College, Addis Ababa, for two years. Ravinder Kaur is professor of public administration at Osmania University (OU), and director, Regional Centre for Urban and Environmental Studies (RCUES), OU, Hyderabad, India. Baljit Singh Mann is professor and head, Department of Political Science, University of Jammu, India. His areas of specialization are international politics, comparative politics, politics in South Asia and India’s foreign policy. He has co-edited two books, South Asia: Dynamics of Politics, Economy and Society (2006) and Politics of Identities in Jammu and Kashmir: A Contested Terrain (2008), and is the editor of Revisiting Nehru in Contemporary India (2015). Siddhartha Mukerji is assistant professor in the Department of Political Science, Babasaheb Bhimrao Ambedkar University, Lucknow, India. He has been a Baden-Wurttemberg fellow at the South Asia Institute, Heidelberg University, Germany. He has published research papers and book chapters with various renowned publishers/journals. C. Sheela Reddy joined the Indian Institute of Public Administration (IIPA) in 2011. Her teaching and areas of research include public administration, governance, public policy, Ambedkar’s thought and international relations. Presently, she is the chair professor, Dr. Ambedkar Chair in Social Justice, IIPA, India. Kadloor Savitri is professor of political science at Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi, India. She is the recipient of the Chevening Scholarship (2002–2003) and the UGC Research Award (2012–2014); she is also the ICCR’s India Studies chair (2016–2017). Her academic interests mainly involve studying the intersection of politics, international institutions, processes and human rights. Dipankar Sinha is professor of political science and director, Centre for Social Sciences and Humanities, University of Calcutta, India. His area of research and publications primarily focus on the communicative dialectic of governance and development in the post-globalization era. His most recent book, The Information Game in Democracy, was published in 2018. Venkatamallu Thadaboina is assistant professor at the Regional Centre for Urban and Environmental Studies (RCUES), Osmania University, Hyderabad, India. A. Venkatraman is professor of public administration at V.N. South Gujarat University, India. He has been teaching public administration since 1982. He has been associated with various academic bodies at different universities and, as a UGC Visiting Fellow, delivered lectures at different universities. xii

PREFACE

This book was planned after the Jamia Political Science Department International Seminar on Democracy and Public Policy held 26– 27 February 2020 was organized under the banner of UGC-SAP-DRS-I. The whole book was planned, penned and programmed in 2020 against the backdrop of COVID-19, and therefore the pandemic comes up as a point of reference off and on throughout the book. The last chapter was written to study the likely impact of the pandemic with regard to future policy making in India. As the editor of the book, I extend my sincere gratitude to all the authors of the chapters selected for this book. I acknowledge their painstaking research and support, making this joint academic endeavor a truly meaningful contribution to the discipline of public policy. The edited book with 14 chapters re-examines the two worlds – the normative and the empirical – of public policy making today. For the next generation of policy makers, the debate about ends and means will continue in all democracies; therefore a discussion on values is as essential as techniques of public policy. Section I critically looks at the available theoretical frameworks, models and approaches in the subdiscipline of public policy and their contemporary relevance. The normative impacts of policy choices at all stages nudges a rethinking of our premises particularly in the post COVID-19 era, an exercise that is undertaken in the book. Section II is India specifc, and some sectoral policies are examined in detail to understand the complex policy processes in large democracies such as India. Policies are studied through the prism of ‘choices’ and ‘outcomes’. The ‘public’ in democracies needs to be a ‘participant’ in the policy process not only in theory but also in practice. In recent years, there has been a growing demand to unpack the fuzzy domain of public policy and make it more open to citizens. This book is an attempt to do the same. I am deeply grateful to Aakash Chakrabarty, the senior commissioning editor at Routledge, for his constant inspiration, interest and guidance for a book he believed would be of contemporary interest and relevance. I urge readers to read each of the chapters for the thoughtful ideas they generate for debate and discussion on democracy and public policy in today’s world. Rumki Basu xiii

INTRODUCTION Rumki Basu

The post-COVID-19 era The year 2020 will be a turning point in world history. It was a witness to the best and the worst in human ingenuity, governance capacities (irrespective of the nature of the political regime) and what public policies could or could not do in crisis situations in a global order fraught with uncertainty, inequality, violence and disasters, all of which were exacerbated during the period of the COVID-19 pandemic. The Unique Selling Point of the Corona crisis1 was that the entire world was caught in a once-a-century ‘act’ of sailing in the same boat at the same time. As happens in times of crisis, the fragilities and the strengths of governance capacity systems were exposed. In the post-COVID-19 era, rethinking regimes, governance capacities and public policies of states has become imperative, because despite globalization, every problem is essentially a national problem which states have to solve or address, keeping its citizens in mind, at least in democracies. To give an example from India, the Corona crisis was consistently looked at as a ‘lives versus livelihoods’ issue, where the government had to impose ‘lockdowns’ to save lives frst and ease them out later to save livelihoods. Both these decisions were serious public policy issues left in the hands of the central government. Revamping the public health care system was another necessity which the ruling regime had to address. If migrant workers lost their jobs in the informal sector during the lockdown and wanted to go back home from their places of work in different parts of India, providing them with food and transport facilities was considered the government’s job. Ensuring food security to the poor during times of distress or otherwise had traditionally been thought to be the government’s mandate. Providing incentives to the private unorganized sector (the largest employers in India) so that they could keep their businesses going was also considered the government’s business. The foregoing provides a brief idea of what the people in the world’s largest democracy (800 million electorate) thought the government should be doing in times of crisis. Perhaps this is what is expected of the public sector, in all underdeveloped or developing countries anywhere in the world. Such is the dependence of the public on the state that it would 1

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not be wrong to suggest that developing governance capacities to absorb this demand (not only for extraordinary times but for normal times as well) may be absolutely necessary in both new and old democracies. The routine mandated tasks for India’s development administrators in any case is heavy, but the extra efforts they had to put in for the Corona period did seem overwhelming, but not entirely unexpected in the context of crisis situations that India has faced before. In fact, one should ponder why the Sustainable Development Goals2 (SDGs) were ‘imposed’ on all signatory countries as an Agenda of Good Governance by the UN in 2015. Of the 193 members of the UN, barring 50 countries, the rest are all developing or underdeveloped, where, not surprisingly, only governments can deliver these mandates for their citizens. Needless to say, what comes in the way of their performance is not lack of public participation but lack of adequate or enhanced ‘state capacity’ to fulfll these goals by the next decade. After the COVID-19 disaster, ‘old’ frailties and inadequacies in agriculture or industrial productive capacities in public health or transport systems have evinced sharply in the open, reopening the debates over public policy reforms as never before. This book is not about COVID-19, though we shall examine the experiential lessons that were generated from this pandemic; the book is essentially about democracy and public policy. The following are a few interlinked statements which I will present to the reader to ponder upon: • • •

• •

•

Democracy is normatively the best form of government for espousing the twin values of liberty and equality, and empirically to empower citizens with public goods as rights or entitlements. Democracy should always be looked at as a work in progress, a means towards human security through good governance. The progress of democratization has been catalytic (after the 1990s) at times, but slow, painful and regressive at others. It is not a linear movement; ideally the movement should proceed from a ‘procedural’ state of progress to a ‘substantivist’ one in all democracies. Democracy can only be consolidated specially in newer areas through enhanced state capacity, by making democratic governance work for its citizens. Democracy should build public sector institutions for public safety, law and order frst and then strengthen them for public service delivery, so that democratic governments execute welfare schemes with a consolidated measure of effectiveness. Some authoritarian governments in the world today (e.g. China, Russia, Singapore, Vietnam) are essentially ‘hard’ states, having built up state institutions to deliver economic development effciently and effectively. Democratic regimes have to compete with them through proven public policy outcomes. 2

INTRODUCTION

• • •

Moving new developing countries towards democracy without building up their institutional capacities and public service delivery systems will not lead to prosperity, human development or peace dividends. Democracy enhances citizen choices in every aspect of their lives but policy outcome defcits will lead to democratic defcits which lie at the root of unsustainable, weak or failed democracies everywhere. Democracies can backslide anytime – moving from left to right in ideological content and liberal to illiberal in nature (and vice versa) in a wide-ranging spectrum.

India and China – the two models From the 1990s, world politics had started to experience dramatic transformations: the end of the Cold War, the fall of communism in the Soviet Union, the gradual democratization of ex-communist states in Europe and the birth of newly independent countries which had earlier been a part of the Soviet Union. From the 1970s to the frst decade of the 21st century, the number of electoral democracies increased from about 35 to more than 110. This was also the period of the ‘Rising South’, the world’s output of goods and services had quadrupled, largely due to a handful of countries in the developed South. By the time the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGS) were laid down by the UN in 2015, it was amply clear that if the SDGs were to be fulflled by 2030, India, China (constituting one third of mankind) and sub-Saharan Africa would have to deliver on the mandates or else SDGs would founder badly. India and China are comparable Asian powers, except that China has executed developmental policies with greater vigour and success. India lags behind China, which has had 10% growth rates for three decades (a world record), with a human development ranking in the UNDP HDI Index, much higher than India’s.3 China’s biggest success lies in reducing poverty rates. Today China’s GDP has touched $13.6 trillion to India’s $2.7 trillion. China underwent some very bold reforms which made them the manufacturing power house they are today, enabling them to grow at 10% for almost three decades. But today their Special Economic Zone–led growth model has been globally rejected as environmentally depletive and labour exploitative. Coupled with the complete lack of transparency (e.g. its COVID-19–related responses in global fora or its expansionist foreign policy [its incursions into Indian territory in 2020, e.g.]), the authoritarian developmental model of China is far less attractive to the world than it used to be at one time. I think India needs no lessons from their growth model; India can demonstrate that fairly high rates of growth, 7% or more, is possible in a democracy, growth which can be eco-friendly, labour friendly, humane and sustainable. However, we can certainly learn a few lessons from China’s human development record. Just 40 years ago, China was at par with India in terms of income 3

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and life expectancy. By 2018, China’s per capita rate was $9770 compared with India’s $2010. China’s biggest success lies in taming poverty. In 1987, more than 66% of its population was poor as against 49% of ours. Now only 0.5% of Chinese are poor, while India’s poverty head count ratio is 21.2%. Both these countries nurtured domestic industry, focusing on cost competitiveness, quality, size, scale and adoption of cutting-edge technologies to enable global expansion. Therefore the basic model of growth has been similar, emphasizing import substitution, and self-reliance. China and India are the only two countries which can survive import substitution even today. Their domestic markets are large enough to sustain their domestic production. Today China and India are important icons of development through two different models – China is an authoritarian one-party state and India is a multiparty democracy. Francis Fukuyama, the great American political scientist, has clearly stated that despite China’s impressive economic and military strengths, apparently superior to India’s, its model is not exportable as a sustainable model to the rest of the world (Fukuyama, 2018). Both China and India will reach their goals, but India will go slower. I state with conviction that democracy is the only sustainable model in the 21st century. Let us not forget that the tortoise in our children’s fables did win the race at the end and not the hare! The India/China comparison is signifcant for several reasons today. China has aspirations of becoming a super power, and its domestic and foreign policies are completely geared towards this goal. Interestingly, China’s public policies are made and executed by one centralized authority, the Communist Party of China, which also runs the government. Today China is the most populated one-party state in the world. As in other communist countries, the legacy of a single-party state and a centrally planned economy creates huge hurdles for democracy to take overt root. Besides, China has had a long historical tradition of authoritarianism – the old imperial tradition and the philosophy of Confucianism have now been identifed as largely antithetical to liberal democratic values.4 China has allowed marketization of its economy (since the 1980s), raising the human development levels of its people through steady economic growth, but refuses to build or institutionalize political democracy. On the other hand, India is the only developing country in the world which constitutionally adopted procedural democracy, in 1950, and has been working through to eventually becoming a ‘substantivist democracy’ in its 70-year journey as an independent nation. China is a classic case of a state that is hard on implementation whereas India is ‘soft’,5 thereby reinforcing the argument that democracies cannot use coercion to implement public policies. India was doing better after 2001 (averaging a 7% growth rate till COVID-19 happened) and is improving its credentials to forward its claim as a major global power.6 4

INTRODUCTION

Global transformations and democracy Any observer of world politics will not fail to notice that democratization in some form or another has been a global trend in the past 30 years. The trend markers are: sustained attempts to subject governments to popular control and public accountability and building up ‘state-citizen contracts’ by extending citizen rights. Through the SDGs the UN has popularized the notion of a minimum agenda of ‘good governance’ globally defned as citizen entitlements. The SDGs have been signed by all members of the UN. Therefore goals such as ‘abolition of extreme hunger’, ‘gender parity’ or ‘sustainable development’ are global values to be promoted by all states irrespective of the nature of their political regimes. ‘Literacy and good health’ and ‘drinking water and electricity for all’ are public goods which need to be guaranteed as rights to all citizens, making poverty, for example, a human rights violation. This is the agenda around which all signatory governments will be judged by 2030. Public goods and services that governments gave to their citizens in advanced Western welfare states and ex-socialist systems need to be extended to all citizens living in the developing world. This is only possible if it is a part of the public policy agendas of all underdeveloped/developing states in the years to come. Just adopting welfarist policies will not do; these states need the institutional capacity to translate public policies into implementable actions. The ‘third wave’ of democratization7 (Huntington, 1991) which began in Southern Europe in the 1970s before sweeping through Latin America and Central and Eastern Europe after the collapse of the Soviet Union was generally taken as an indication of the triumph of the West. Fukuyama8 (1992) interpreted these events to signify the ‘end of history’ or the end of competing ideologies. The market economies ushered in with the collapse of communism remain largely intact, despite repeated fnancial crises in the US and Europe after 2008 as well as in the Global South sporadically between 1994 and 2002. There were attempts in Africa and Latin America to revive the state as an engine of development. By the frst decade of the 21st century, important developments have occurred in both the theory and practice of democratization, with the reassertion of authoritarianism in some areas as well as the failure of new democracies to build capacities and institutions to process the ‘demand overload’ that democratic systems must inevitably face. Therefore today we have come to realize that true (substantive) democracy is one of the most diffcult systems to operationalize; structural factors frequently impede its ‘deepening’, and it will only succeed with concurrent efforts at institution building to actualize the growing entitlements which democracies promise to their people.

Democracy, state capacity and public policy As the story of democracy unfolds in the 21st century, the older democracies (e.g. in Europe, the US or India) are likely to survive, while newer ones will struggle and remain in the category of ‘problematic’ democracies. 5

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The reasons for the latter are many. Most of them are still struggling with nation-building processes, (e.g. maintaining law and order, territorial integrity or ethnic harmony), while others are struggling to create or sustain institutions which help them operationalize welfarist policies or new demands on the system. We are living in a globalized world and all states, large and small, will have access to knowledge and information leading to an explosion of rising citizen demands and expectations. This is expected to lead to a near-universal yearning for the democratic idea among younger generations everywhere in the world. But if we look at parts of Europe, Latin America, Africa and Asia, given the enormous variations in structure and functions from the old consolidated democracies of the West to these new ‘learning’ democracies, we have to distinguish between ‘procedural’ (formal citizen rights) and ‘substantivist’ (effective citizen entitlements) democracies where formal rights are translated into broad citizen entitlements through effective implementation of laws and public policies. Inevitably, deepening of democracy implies to some degree the redistribution of power and resources in a state. Political democracy guarantees political rights, which become meaningless without a certain amount of economic leveling, ensuring the enjoyment of some economic power and level playing feld for all. Even in developed democracies such as the US and Britain, for example, sharp inequalities and entrenched poverty have meant reduced access and infuence in the public sphere for minorities, Blacks, women and the poor. The recent antiracism protests in the US during the Corona period is a serious testimony to the fact that underlying issues of discrimination and inequalities will weaken democracies, even apparently stable ones like the US. Does democracy necessarily lead to good government and higher levels of economic prosperity compared with authoritarian regimes? Despite a vague global consensus that both ‘democracy’ and ‘human security’ are desirable goals, it is diffcult to establish a logical connection between the two. This brings us to the question of ‘development’ and its relation to regime types. It is generally considered a truism that higher levels of development help to sustain democracy, but there are examples of stable democracies with moderate levels of economic development such as those in the Caribbean or South Asia. Other electoral democracies like Singapore are well-governed states but are run like autocracies; conversely, some rapidly developing countries are one-party states like China. There are other ‘hard’ states in the Middle East that necessarily prioritize human development objectives as their goals. There are fragile democracies in Africa or South Asia that are yet to consolidate their nation-building efforts, let alone achieve peace or broader development objectives for the larger mass of their citizens. Besides, democracies do not necessarily guarantee good governance. Democratic political regimes sometimes do things right, sometimes make policy blunders and are incapable sometimes of correctly comprehending the ‘public 6

INTRODUCTION

interest’ at a given point in time. Democratic governance, like any governance, is at best a ‘fawed’ art. In Europe, democratization seems to have fnally taken root, notably in South and Central Europe which started late (trendsetters of the ‘third wave’). Russia is still struggling and in Latin America the practices are encouraging though not entirely unproblematic, because of political volatility in many states. Although many Latin American democracies remain elitist, some have experimented with welfarist programmes (like Brazil) which have extended citizen entitlements substantively in recent years. In Asia, India remains the oldest and largest democracy in the developing world, gradually transiting from a procedural to a substantivist model, with growing economic capacity to give more economic entitlements to its citizens. Other examples are Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Israel. After the ‘Arab Spring’, the road to democratization looks to be thorny and defnitely not linear. China, of course, stubbornly resists democratization and remains politically a one-party state, having marketized and globalized its economy. In Africa, democratization has taken a bumpy road, and authoritarian resistance is strong, leading to the failure of many democratic experiments. The only notable exceptions are South Africa, Ghana, Kenya, Botswana and Mauritius. The need for democracies to continually justify themselves in economic terms is no longer required in stable democracies but becomes mandatory in the context of a developing country. Even with the procedures and practices of democracy put in place, economic failures can derail democracy. Globalization presumes a rollback of the state, especially in the welfare sectors. A minimalist state would only show a bias in favour of the status quo by cutting back public investments in the social sectors. Narrowing social disparities to enable economic leveling and bringing in more benefciaries of development within its fold is a continuing requirement of electoral democracies everywhere. Wherever the state tried to roll back its welfare benefts or cut down its subsidies for the poor, the state faced election reversals, mainly in developing democracies.

Why do we choose democracy? A democratic regime derives legitimacy from the process by which it comes to power, before what it does while in power. It is elected to offce by citizens, under the principle of universal adult franchise. Elections are fought by contesting political parties with their respective political manifestoes which spell out their future public policies. However, the opposition parties are also a part of the legislative process, since they are legitimately elected members of the legislature. In a democracy, the majority of voters vote for a party’s political agenda, empowering the majority party to make policies during their tenure. In electoral democracies, especially in developing 7

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countries, political manifestoes always make pledges for development. This may include, among other things, raising people’s standards of living, employment opportunities and provision for human security for citizens. A developmental agenda or a welfarist agenda is considered a useful instrument for winning elections and legitimizing democratic governance. Today the normative value of democracy is premised on the assumption that it is the only form of government which derives its legitimacy on universal suffrage, but empirically speaking S. M. Lipset’s thesis (1959) has also been widely proven to be true. Therefore in the 21st century, democracy is irreversible in certain states (which have Lipset’s preconditions)9 but may not be sustainable in others. It is often argued that even if the procedures of a minimalist democracy are put in place, it will founder if ‘nation building’ efforts do not move concurrently with ‘institution building’. This perspective emphasizes that deepening and consolidating the principles and procedures of liberal democracy will have intrinsic benefts such as accelerating human development besides reducing conficts, reinforcing human rights and generating peace dividends by improving human security. The term ‘state capacity’ refers to the capacity of the state to maintain security and rule of law; to provide basic services, such as schools, health care or emergency relief; to formulate and administer the budget and to collect revenues. To strengthen democracies, public sector reforms designed to strengthen core executive agencies, the civil services, the courts, security services and local government have to be introduced. In weak and fragile states democracy also becomes weak and fragile. Therefore it is naïve to believe that electoral democracy per se can generate immediate economic payoffs or reductions in poverty, which will transform the lives of people. What it can do is to strengthen electoral accountability so that politicians have strong incentives to deliver public goods and services according to citizen needs (Norris, 2012). Democracies can limit the abuse of power but are often slow, deliberative and procedure oriented, unable to always deliver electoral promises effciently or effectively. It is also true that many authoritarian regimes in the world today (China, Russia, Vietnam, Singapore or Saudi Arabia) have also demonstrated high rates of growth with high levels of human development through enhanced institutional capacity to deliver public goods to citizens. Therefore desirable developmental outcomes happen in autocracies as well. Why then should citizens opt for democracy, is the big question. Democracies allow citizens to choose their rulers, express their demands overtly in the public domain, hold public offcials to account, punish the incompetent or corrupt and reward the competent through peaceful means of incentivization. Democracies enable the public to participate in the policy cycle (making, implementation and review) in more ways than one through the political process which allows for freedom of speech, the right to criticize, to dissent, to vote or to be voted to public offce. Therefore democracy, 8

INTRODUCTION

state capacity and public policy are interlinked, and there is a need to reinforce and strengthen one another even more if democracy is to become the leitmotif of the 21st century. ‘Democratic defcit’ happens when people’s expectations of democracy are far ahead of its performance. Unless specifc democratic regimes are able to deliver effective public goods and services, especially in developing countries or new and relatively fragile democracies, then democracy’s legitimacy itself will be called into question.

The India story I truly believe that the Indian democratic experiment can provide valuable inputs to the theoretical paradigm of political democracy in the 21st century. Firstly, India is the only example of a post-colonial state where a democratic political machinery, institutions and practices were superimposed by the Constitution, despite the absence of some essential prerequisites: mass literacy, economic levelling or a full-fedged capitalist economic transformation. Indian democracy was not a grassroots or liberal response to an absolutist state, not even the result of a pan-Indian movement. Yet, the Constitution, adopted by Independent India after a long nationalist struggle for political independence, created a liberal, democratic political order in accordance with the political elite’s understanding of the modern liberal, democratic experience of the West. India’s Constitution which happens to be the world’s longest, survives to this day and is the fundamental law of the land. India has the largest electorate in the world today and survives a ‘demand overload’ and varied forms of dissent among an extremely heterogeneous population, making India’s tryst with democracy a truly unparalleled political experiment in 20th-century history. The Indian economy has transited from socialism (1950–1990) to capitalist transformations and adjustments with the market as India gradually globalized after 1990. Public policies refecting these changes have been implemented at times, or derailed by others because of bureaucratic corruption, apathy or pressure of class interests. It is true that democratic politics and policies have essentially been pragmatic and incremental; for example, the radical agenda of socialism adopted as a policy of the state by the Industrial Policy Resolution of 1956 was formally abandoned in 1991 in favour of Structural Adjustment and market policies peacefully, through the legislative process. In the current debate about democracy and markets, it is important to remember that democracy brings about slow, rarely radical change. If the majority is poor in developing countries, they can compel political regimes to implement redistributive/welfare policies. The state has to mediate by trying to reach a compromise among the economic directions which the market sets on the basis of purchasing power, and the priorities which a democratic system sets on the basis of the perceived needs of the electorate. 9

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Even though there is no serious challenge to democracy as a ‘regime type’ in India, what needs to be highlighted is the transformative capacity of democratic public power and the limits and possibilities of a non-coercive model of development, like India. In terms of citizen entitlements, the question often asked is: has India done as much as any democracy could have done with its human skills and knowledge to distribute to its citizens the package of public goods and services which it could have with its resource constraints? Contrary to popular belief, allocations on development in India have been ‘substantive’, therefore the question of accountability arises: why is it that accountability for public resources sanctioned is so rarely debated in the public domain? It is well known that between allocation and implementation much goes wrong. It would be interesting to surmise what would have been the state of development in India if allocated public resources were properly targeted and spent the way they were intended to be, through legislators, politicians and bureaucrats, down from the village to the district, state and right up to the Centre! Public accountability of public resources spent should be the most serious issue in all democracies. This is in contrast to the coercive model of policy implementation followed in China in a comparable period which no doubt ‘delivered’ better! In all ‘outcome’ parameters of public policy, China has a better record. In recent years, improving accountability mechanisms has been one of the most signifcant targets of administrative reform in India; for example, NITI Aayog, an apex think tank of the government of India, prepares an annual implementation of SDGs index to promote competition and cooperative federalism among states and union territories. The SDG India Index rates governance through surveys in the 28 sub-national (federal) units of India through these parameters – education, health, social security, welfare of women and children, gender equality, law and order, environment, transparency and accountability, infrastructure facilities and all core SDG goals. This index is highly rated for its ‘authentic’ governance ratings and has greatly increased public awareness about the parameters of good governance. The 28 states and union territories of India are now competing with one another not only for public and market resources for development, but also in terms of their ‘performance’ measured by actual ‘policy outcomes’.

Democracy and public policy in India The greatest bane of the Indian state has been its underperformance despite its vibrant democracy, and trained civil service. Democracy has survived despite a low-income economy, widespread poverty, illiteracy and ethnic diversity. Judged by developing-country standards, India’s greatest asset has been that it has been ruled by civilian elected governments throughout its post-independent history (since 1950), with a competent civil service which 10

INTRODUCTION

has always underperformed and has never been answerable to the public directly. Unlocking India’s potential and enabling it to take its position in the global arena will require, above all, a strong visionary political leadership and a world-class civil service to manage a country of such continental proportions. These are some of the public policy challenges India faces in the 21st century. Climate change: Unless India cleans up its rivers and forests and switches to alternative sources of energy, millions of its citizens will be at risk. India, like all other developing countries, is still groping for an ideal environment development trade-off. Human development: India is one of the fastest-growing economies in the world, with a human development ranking (129 out of 189 countries) which is poorer than some of its South Asian neighbours, and even subSaharan Africa. Infrastructure: India’s health infrastructure and spending, public transport, waste management, and power and communication systems remain erratic and poor, compared with other developing countries. There is a need to rebuild a relationship of faith and trust between the state and the citizen. Given India’s practice of democracy over the past 70 years, this can best be realized through institutionalized statutory citizen entitlements, enabling a demand for reasoned answers from the ruling regimes and bureaucracy (Basu, 2019). China, India and East Asia’s experiences demonstrate how growth is stimulated and sustained within the policy framework that exploits the opportunities provided by integration into the world economy and relies on a sophisticated use of market incentives in guiding production and investment. From 2001 to 2011, the poverty rate in China fell from 41% to 12%, and the poverty rate in India dropped from 35% to 20%, moving 356 million Chinese and 270 million Indians out of poverty. When China reduced the number of people in poverty by 220 million between 1978 and 2004, it was hailed as the greatest poverty reduction in history. India reduced its number of poor from 407 million to 269 million, a fall of 138 million in the seven years between 2004–05 and 2011–12. India had the highest reduction in the number of multidimensionally poor, estimated at 273 million during the 2005–15 period also. This is faster than China’s poverty reduction rate at a comparable state of development. This is no small achievement for a democracy.

The COVID-19 challenge: policy choices and outcomes Let us now come to the COVID-19 challenge, the most signifcant challenge which emerged in 2020 to public policies across the globe. China imposed a severe lockdown in Wuhan (epicenter of the pandemic) for 70 days, successfully managing to restrict its spread to a few cities only and went back 11

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to business as usual by April 2020. There was a recurrence of infections in China throughout 2020 after it eased out the lockdown in a few cities, but its ‘containment’ measures were largely successful. The disease seems to have magically disappeared from its origin, all in a span of six months: schools and colleges reopened, as did offces and factories, and the Chinese economy, though hurt, came back to recover fast, and everything seemed to be ‘back to normal’ in China by the end of 2020. However, China’s activities in the post-COVID-19 period, has given enough reasons for its critics to claim that a new cold war has started with China’s efforts to undermine and destabilize the pr- COVID-19 international order. Other countries at the time, especially the US, Europe, Latin America and India, were still limping, having suffered huge losses in terms of lives and livelihoods. One economy after another lay battered and bruised, and the World Bank declared the beginning of a Corona-related global recession, recommending a battery of public policy measures needed to meet this challenge. States declared ‘lockdowns’, sealing borders, closing offces, educational institutions and industrial establishments, and health professionals were in the frontline fghting the disease with some ‘hit-and-run’ medicines. People were dying in large numbers, and governments were trying to learn from one another. The US continued to be the worst hit, though being a democracy there was no attempt to hide information or ‘fudge’ fgures about deaths or job losses. Everyone knew what was happening in the US or India (fellow democracies) and what policy measures were being taken to cope with the medical emergency either in terms of health sector preparedness, medical research in developing a vaccine, declaring a stimulus for the economy or relief for those who had suffered job losses. In India, the national media was constantly feeding information to the public while the bureaucracy and the police were kept busy monitoring and policing the pandemic, for example, keeping essential service supply chains running and protecting vulnerable groups through food security while ramping up the medical infrastructure for screening, quarantining and treating patients. The bureaucracy and the police ran the administration with orders from their political heads. Old laws and disaster management experiences were revoked and used. It was ‘public’ administration at its best and at its worst sometimes. As it happens in crisis situations, the state tends to assume more discretionary powers than it should in the name of ‘emergency’. Corona management seemed like managing a war, no less. Because India is a democracy, the opposition raised voices. The suddenness and severity of the ‘lockdown’ measures were questioned. The poor had to wind up their small businesses or jobs and leave for home miles away since all public transport had been suspended. There was a public outcry against the plight of the migrant labour force who had lost jobs and savings and seemed stranded, with no means to go home. The government had to arrange for trains and buses when the opposition and the media raised a hue and cry. Later, the 12

INTRODUCTION

government declared a huge stimulus package (10% of India’s GDP) to revive the economy and minimize job losses. Everything (the Corona crisis and public policy responses) was happening under a media blaze, and the public had access to information. Governments in the US and India were both subject to public scrutiny – for what they seemed to be doing, right or wrong. Immediately in the wake of the Corona crisis the largest civil rights protest erupted in the US, triggered by the killing of a Black US citizen, George Floyd, while in police custody. This anti-racism movement, the largest in more than 50 years in the US, became a catalyst to the most sweeping proposed legislations to combat police violence and racial injustice in democratic America. This is an amazing display of the power of the people to change law and public policy – a clamour for state ‘action’ for social and legal change against injustice and discrimination. That this can even happen in ‘old’, evolved democracies like the US which are normally change resistant, is one of the best things to happen in the post-COVID-19 world! Compare the situation in these two democracies with that of China. China handled the Corona crisis frmly and competently and went back to business as usual within three months of the outbreak of the disease. How exactly it handled the crisis, only the Chinese people can tell; the world outside was kept guessing. How China ‘makes’ policy and how it executes, we know the formal procedures, and we see the outcomes. We are kept in the dark about China’s policy making, implementation and monitoring processes; its ‘hard’ methods or its human rights violations. That is entirely in sync with the nature of an authoritarian state. Information fows are asymmetrical from state to citizen; freedom of speech and information are not a citizen right, and everything we get to know about China is ‘offcial’ information – the ‘informal channels’ are neither legitimized nor authenticated. A discussion about the Corona crisis was not allowed by China in any world fora (WHO or the UN Security Council); the country simply boycotted or refused to discuss. Therefore how China has handled the Corona crisis ‘within’ will not be known to the rest of the world. Transparency and accountability are the most important causalities in non-democracies, and China is no exception. In the ongoing COVID-19 crisis, citizens of India learnt one big lesson: for all the real and impressive strength of India’s private sector today in augmenting India’s growth, given the scale at which India’s problems have to be tackled and that solutions must deliver a certain uniformity or universalism of outcomes, private action cannot be a substitute for government action. During this dark hour of crisis, India rediscovered the necessity of state and public action. COVID-19–related decisions of the central and state governments were the focal point of scrutiny as the crisis rolled on, with the public and civil society agencies insisting that all facts and policies be placed in the public domain. Poverty, marginalization and exclusion lead to a sense of powerlessness and loss of self-esteem and dignity. Interestingly, since the worldwide decline 13

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of the Left, the issues of new marginalized groups (in terms of new classes, gender, identity or race) have gradually been adopted by the agenda of the radicalized Right, leading to an ascendance of Right Wing ruling regimes across the globe. These political groups use the democratic electoral machinery to come to power but shed the trappings of liberalism and its procedures soon after, to espouse ‘identity’ or ‘majoritarian’ politics targeted against perceived ‘enemies’. This has resulted in a sharp rise in illiberal and authoritarian trends in democracies in the past decade. To counter these trends, only economic entitlements for citizens will not be enough; consolidation of a progressive ‘civic culture’ will be needed.

The emerging global scenario From assaults on Hong Kong’s autonomy, threats to Taiwan and Australia and incursions into Indian territory, there are signs that long-simmering discontents with China are coalescing into an incipient, global anti-Beijing coalition. Parallel naval exercises in the South China Sea and Indian Ocean by the US and its allies are the most recent examples of the changing global dynamics. China too has been mobilizing its Belt and Road partners and developing-country friends as demonstrated by 53 countries lining up to support imposition of China’s national security law on Hong Kong. The future will tell whether this is a passing phenomenon or whether we are witnessing the emergence of a new Cold War divide over trade, technology and security issues. Senior US offcials have been explaining why their government believes it is no longer possible to do business as usual with China. US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has called for other democracies to recognize the nature of the threat, suggesting that perhaps an ‘alliance of democracies’ was the need of the hour, particularly in the Indo-Pacifc. Earlier, the US’s national security adviser, attorney general and head of the Federal Bureau of Investigation gave expositions on elements of Beijing’s ‘designs for hegemony’. The statements portrayed present-day China as a powerful state, controlled by an overambitious leader, Xi Jinping, and a communist party whose ideology of control and conquest was being offered as a template for global governance. China, they argued, seeks to extend its technology-enhanced hard power beyond its borders. Mr Pompeo pointed to Beijing’s overseas postures – treating treaties as ‘suggestions’, violating every possible economic and territorial norm – as predatory and destabilizing. It is an irony that China has become a major global player by working within an international order of which it is a primary benefciary! China is perhaps the only non-democratic system that has really adopted and adapted capitalism and technology, indigenizing it with an element of modernity, producing rapid economic growth which gives its political regime a kind of legitimacy as a result of its track record. 14

INTRODUCTION

China is not at all interested in exporting cultural and political values; it is fundamentally different from the totalitarian regimes of the 20th century. Chinese rulers are basically driven by commercial motives, determined to raise their GDP and per capita incomes, and through this legitimize the Communist elite’s domination internally and externally. I do not think that anyone can duplicate their model anywhere else, but that does not mean that it is not a challenge for the world today because its hegemonistic ambitions are potentially destabilizing, making China probably the most important challenge that the international system faces right now. The Chinese system represents a competent and authoritarian government without checks and balances, sometimes demonstrating that a system under a ruthless and driven leadership can actually outperform a democracy in the short run, because they can make decisions quickly. If they are competent, with good technocrats in charge, they can really push forward investment, which a democracy cannot do so easily. It is a challenge to democracies such as the United States and India where decision making is diffused, polarized, slow and deliberative. The transformation of China has been a near-miracle in terms of raising living standards for the largest population in the world who naturally will be wary of change for some time more. If there is an unexpected economic slowdown or growth becomes stagnant, there will be a churning in China, which may then simmer inwards for political change, and in today’s world younger generations everywhere yearn only for democracy. So in the 21st century in the new international world order to come, the Indian model of democracy, growth and development seems more aspirational and sustainable in the long run. The Chinese model may truly remain one of a kind, certainly not an exportable or a sustainable model for the 21st century.

Why policy studies have become important Public policy can be broadly defned as an offcially enacted and ready-toimplement course of action by a government to achieve specifc objectives or goals of a ruling political regime in a state. In the making of policy a variety of actors come into play who may act as pressure groups for enacting preferred legislation. Policies are designed to respond to ‘identifed’ problems, refect the compromises among competing interests and in reality underline theories, both normative and empirical. Perhaps it needs to be stated that policy can never be totally apolitical and emerge from a noncontested domain. There are competing groups in society, based on their different interests with regard to allocation of resources and their authority over the policy making process. These infuences (constituting the political) affect each stage of the process, from agenda setting to the identifcation of alternatives, assessment of the options and fnally to the choice of the most favourable one for legislation. As far as the feld of policy studies 15

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(enquiry and research) is concerned, theories are of crucial importance. They are needed to diagnose problems, project future impacts of new regulations and evaluate the effectiveness of past policy interventions. Section I of this edited book comprises six chapters which integrate these varied perspectives rooted in different schools and disciplines – to explore how actors and institutions shape policy narratives and outcomes while being constrained by them at the same time. Section II of the book comprises eight chapters which are refections on specifc sectoral policies in India. India is going through a time of signifcant change. Economic growth, technological advancements, rapid urbanization, a growing youth population, a closing gender gap and escalating impacts of climate are coming together to redefne India’s role and mandates as a major world power. While these developments bring new opportunities, times of transition can be both creative and challenging. We need to revisit all our existing policies in every sector to determine whether they will meet the requirements of our changed demography, fuctuating economy, rapid urbanization and jobless growth, resulting in differentiated citizen access to good education, housing, health care and jobs. These eight chapters revisit India’s policies on education, health, e-governance, gender and work, with recommendations for the future. The fnal chapter looks at the federal Indian, democratic state and the citizen in the post-COVID-19 era and challenges to public policy making. The book re-examines the two worlds – the normative and the empirical – of public policy making today. The debate about ends and means continues in all democracies, therefore a discussion on values is as essential as techniques of public policy. Section I critically looks at the available theoretical frameworks, models and approaches in the sub-discipline of public policy and their contemporary relevance. The normative impacts on policy choices at all stages, therefore, nudges a rethinking of our premises, especially in the post-COVID-19 era, an exercise that is undertaken in the book. Section II is India specifc, and some sectoral policies are examined in detail to understand the complex policy process in large democracies like India. Policies are studied through the prism of ‘choices’ and ‘outcomes’. The ‘public’ in democracies needs to be a ‘participant’ in the policy process, not only in theory but also in practice. In recent years, there has been a growing demand to unpack the fuzzy domain of public policy and make it more open to citizens. This book is an attempt to do the same.

Chapter context and content The frst chapter by C. Sheela Reddy should be read for an overview of the major frameworks, theories and models used in policy studies today. Her study makes it amply clear that the processes of public policy are interlinked and in co-existence with the perceptions of various stakeholders, knowledge portals and opinionated masses. The study of public policies assumes 16

INTRODUCTION

signifcance in the wake of global challenges such as economic turbulence, climate degradation, terrorism, health emergencies, inequitable allocation of resources and rapid digitization. The theories and approaches of public policy need to be understood in the light of a paradigm shift from administration to governance globally and locally in the context of a country’s citizen needs. A. Venkatraman in his chapter argues that one of the major challenges to public policy formulation is the inability sometimes to correlate the multiplicity of factors that impact a policy arena or sector, leading to lack of a comprehensive approach to understand how a policy (sectoral or otherwise) can infuence these factors. Public policy making is multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary by its nature, adding value to the policy process. Public policy has three realms of focus, namely politics, processes and programmes. The need to reconcile the rational approach of the specialists with that of the intuitive approach of the political, many a time based on inadequate and inaccurate information by both actors, remains a formidable hurdle in the development of policy sciences as a discipline. The chapter endeavors to present the issues and ramifcations of a multidisciplinary approach to policy sciences. Dipankar Sinha, in his chapter, helps to throw light on an understated theme, the role of public policy communication in public policy dynamics. The analysis of public policy communication in India is scarce and much scattered in the mainstream academic domain of social science in general and public administration in particular. This is despite communication being an integral part of public policy dynamics, both as a product and as a process of governance. Public policy–related communication also involves normative issues of justice, access, equity and the complicated question of democracy as well. The essay reveals the importance of initiating academic exploration of a vital question: how ‘public’ is public policy? Against the backdrop of the paradigmatic transition in the mode of governance and in the development trajectories since the 1990s, the chapter blends theoretics with empirics by considering India, supposedly the world’s largest democracy, as its core locale of enquiry. Chapter 4, by Kadloor Savitri, attempts to look at the conceptual and policy infuences that shaped the idea of human security from a human rights perspective to underscore the argument that most studies on human security have sidestepped the evolution of the concept of human security from human rights while focusing exclusively on the content of the concept itself. This paper seeks to illustrate that any understanding of human security is likely to be incomplete if it does not factor in the invaluable discourses afforded by three concepts, namely, human rights, rights-based approach and right to development, in its nascent stages. The linkage among these trajectories would be the cusp on which human security and public policy alternatives will be located and discussed by the author. 17

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In his chapter on ethics and public policy, Nilesh Kumar Joshi opines that no public policy has been labeled as ‘just’ policy, irrespective of all conditions observed by the state. Thus the approach to policy making can be said to be pre-paradigmatic even now despite the availability of multiple models. Perhaps this brings before us the fact that each one of the models lacks the component/s that fail the policy, as the output/outcomes do not get recognition from the stakeholders, and so the policy is either right or wrong. This ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ policy is viewed in terms of ethical parameters depending on who the stakeholders are. Though different policy making models do address this challenge by accommodating numerous facets, the question of ethical policy making remains unresolved, according to the author. Public policy processes have become a contentious exercise in the contemporary political environment worldwide, especially in terms of their effcacy and impact, opines Debasis Bhattacharya in Chapter 6. The paradigms of strategic political processes towards formulation and governance of major public policy reforms have witnessed signifcant metamorphoses in recent years. The formation of divided and/or unifed governments and their associated attributes marked by political gridlock and polarized politics have been increasingly responsible for shaping the contours that entail the process of policy formulation. Bhattacharya’s chapter makes a comparative analysis of the heightened political brinkmanship in the negotiation during the policy processes of two of the most monumental public policy reforms – The Goods and Services Tax (GST) in India and NAFTA in the US. The study deciphers signifcant political convergences and affnity in the policy processes in these two democracies. In their chapter, Ramabrahmam Ivaturi and Ramya Chitrapu argue that evidence-based policymaking (EBPM) has today emerged as a sine qua non for policy making across the world, including India. Its role in shaping effective public policies is also being acknowledged in the domain of policy studies globally. However, EBPM in India, still in its nascent stages, needs indepth studies in terms of the evidences and their implications. This approach can be signifcant for policy making in the social sector in addition to playing a critical role for the achievement of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). This chapter examines the crucial importance of evidence-based policymaking in the context of India. The frst part deals with the evolution and various facets of EBPM. The second part deals with the identifcation of feasible solutions for enhancing the effcacy of EBPM in the context of people, processes and technology in India. In his chapter, Baljit Singh Mann attempts to look at public policies as a mirror image of the state framed to realize its constitutional mandate. The Indian public policy regime has witnessed a paradigm shift with the advent of liberalization, privatization and globalization (LPG) which changed the nature of the Indian state from liberal to neo-liberal since the 1990s. The neo-liberal Indian state formulated populist, neo-liberal and right-based 18

INTRODUCTION

policies which substantially undermined and partially consolidated its welfare credentials. Many neo-liberal policies have also outlived their utility as they failed to deliver and resulted in policy defcits, thereby compounding the legitimacy defcit of the Indian state. Ravinder Kaur and Venkatamallu Thadaboina in their chapter argue that the focus of governments in the digital age is to provide good governance to citizens by adopting information and communication technology (ICT) tools in public sector management and public service delivery. In India, many initiatives have begun under their e-governance strategy. The Indian government launched the National Land Records Modernization Programme (NLRMP) in 2008, which was revamped in 2014 as the Digital India Land Records Modernization Programme (DILRMP), with the aim of establishing a system of titles to ensure conclusive proof of land ownership. The chapter concludes with the policy changes required for effective implementation of the programme that ensure real-time updation of land records with the integration of all the concerned institutions, including the departments involved in land registration, records management, fnancial institutions and the judiciary. In Chapter 10, Madhumita Bandyopadhyay opines that in recent years, various policy initiatives have been taken by the union as well as state governments to improve access of children to elementary education which has affected their enrolment at the primary and upper primary levels. Many studies have already indicated that effective implementation of decentralized planning and management involving school management committees (SMCs) leads to improvement in the quality of education services which in turn infuences the participation and learning outcomes of children. This chapter discusses the process of decentralized planning and management of elementary education involving local authority as well as SMCs and the way all functionaries and SMCs can collaborate to improve the situation within the specifc context of the state/district/local areas. Siddhartha Mukerji in his chapter emphasizes that the development of a nation largely depends on the health and well-being of its citizens. India has a large ailing population that stands at greater fnancial risk to meet their heavy medical expenditures. Mortality rates among women and children have remained signifcantly high. The infant mortality rate for children under 5 years of age was recorded at 39.4 deaths per 1000 live births in 2017. The burden of disease has pushed people to the brink of poverty in many cases. The Indian government has initiated schemes to insure service seekers among the poor and deprived such as Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana (RSBY) and Pradhan Mantri Jan Arogya Yojana (PMJAY) under Ayushman Bharat. The chapter explains the pattern of policy transition in the health sector, with a special focus on public health policies in the post-COVID-19 era. In the Indian context, democracy is utterly ‘political’ (conficting interest of stakeholders) and at times ‘electoral’ (vote bank attraction), leading 19

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to a wide gap between ‘policy-promise’ and ‘policy-formulation’. In Pratip Chattopadhyay’s chapter, a programme for girl children named Kanyashree Prakalpa undertaken by the government of West Bengal in 2013 is taken up as a case study. The chapter argues the following: (a) the pull of ‘politics’ blurs the distinction between policy and programme, (b) the push of ‘emotion’ leads to innovation in policy by identifying crucial public needs issues and (c) Kanyashree is a mix of 3E’s – e-governance, economy and enterprise in public policy. Chattopadhyay concludes that the degree of inclusiveness of Kanyashree dodges initial politicization and recurring criticism and translates ‘development as freedom’ in practice in the highly politicized India of our times. India is among the 193 countries signed for achieving SDGs by 2030, writes Moitri Dey in Chapter 13. The National Institute for Transforming India (NITI Aayog) is the national coordinating agency for SDGs. The SDG targets have been mapped to various nodal ministries and fagship programmes by the NITI Aayog. The Ministry of Rural Development (MoRD) is the designated nodal agency for achieving SDG 1, that is, poverty alleviation. The Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (MGNREGS) has been recognized as a ‘core of the core’ policy to achieve SDGs. MGNREGS was reported in the VNR 2017 by the Indian government for its contribution to achieving SDG 1, while the scheme’s contributions to SDG 5 – gender equality, SDG 8 – decent work and economic growth and SDG 10 – reduce inequalities, were also acknowledged. The chapter explores the effcacy of the policy to achieve the targets of the SDGs. The fnal chapter, written by Rumki Basu, examines the impact of the Corona crisis on the way the democratic Indian government, the 28 Indian states, the private sector and citizens behaved, seminally changing public life in the world’s largest democracy as we know it today. India till recently was one of the world’s fastest-growing economies and was supposed to lead the world in meeting the targets of most of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) despite a hitherto modest ranking in the UNDP Human Development Index (129/189). COVID-19 will test India’s political system, particularly its two constitutional features – democracy and federalism. The post-COVID-19 era will require both the Centre and the states to work in coordination for major policy reforms in every sector. Civil servants (at the federal and state levels) close to 2.15 crore are managing or overseeing all that matters to an Indian citizen today – education, health care, policing, communication, urban planning, transport, banking and parts of industry. It is they who will manage the demands of a young and changing India in the future – a fact generally taken for granted in normal times, but certainly worthy of acknowledgement now, in the post-COVID-19 era, concludes the author.

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Notes 1 The term ‘Corona crisis’ refers to the multiple crises generated worldwide from 2020 by the COVID-19 pandemic, triggering a huge loss of lives and livelihoods in different parts of the world. 2 Sustainable Development Goals were initiated by the United Nations in 2015 to address key development challenges, including climate change, economic inequality, sustainable consumption, peace and justice. The 17 goals, to be achieved by 2030, are comprehensive and focus on the fve P’s – people, planet, prosperity, peace and partnership. 3 In the Annual Human Development Index published by UNDP, China holds a rank of 85 (high), while India’s rank is 129 (medium) out of 189 countries. 4 ‘Submission to authority who know best’ has been the cardinal principle of the Imperial tradition and the Confucianism of ancient China. Many scholars believe these are the philosophical roots of a long tradition of authoritarian rule in China. 5 The ‘soft state’ is a term introduced by the Swedish economist Gunnar Myrdal in his book Asian Drama (1968) to describe societal discipline in South Asia and by extension to much of the developing world. He observed that these states were defcient in law enforcement; there is widespread disobedience and corruption among public offcials who are often in collusion with powerful elite groups to derail redistributive public policies. 6 Most of the data given in this section have been curated from the World Bank and other UN reports. 7 The catchphrase ‘the third wave’ frst referred to by Samuel Huntington has been widely used among scholars studying what is considered by some to be democratic transitions and democratization throughout much of the developing world. It began in 1974 with Portugal and included the historical democratic transitions in Latin America in the 1980s, Asia Pacifc countries from 1986 to 1988, Eastern Europe after the collapse of the Soviet Union and sub-Saharan Africa beginning in 1989. 8 In his book, The End of History and The Last Man, Francis Fukuyama argued that the worldwide spread of liberal democracies may signal the end point of humanity’s socio-cultural evolution and become the fnal form of human government. 9 Lipset had argued that democracies and by extension, electoral integrity, fourish best in industrialized and post-industrial societies, with widespread literacy and education, an affuent professional middle class and a pluralistic range of civil associations serving as a buffer between citizens and the state.

References Basu, Rumki, 2019, Public Administration in the 21st Century: A Global South Perspective, London and New York, Routledge. Fukuyama, Francis, 1992, The End of History and the Last Man, New York, Free Press. Fukuyama, Francis, 2018, Identity: The Demand for Dignity and the Politics of Resentment, Profle Books Limited. Huntington, Samuel P., 1991, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, Norman, OK, University of Oklahoma Press. Lipset, S. M., 1959,“Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy”, American Political Science Review, Vol. 53, No. 1, pp. 69–105. Norris, Pippa, 2012, Making Democratic Governance Work, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

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Section I PUBLIC POLICY FRAMEWORKS, THEORIES AND APPROACHES

1 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND DYNAMICS OF PUBLIC POLICY TRAJECTORY C. Sheela Reddy

Introduction Public policy is the principal instrument of the state through which authoritative interventions are possible in the lives of citizens. Policies are actions which contain goal(s) and the means to achieve them. They regulate societies and attempt to channelise human behaviour in acceptable directions. They are decisions characterised by certain behavioural consistency and repetitiveness on the part of those who make public policy and those who abide by it. Hence, public policy is a designated behaviour of some actor or set of actors in dealing with a problem or a matter of concern and not mere declaration of intentions, wishes, principles or expression of desires. Public policies refect not only society’s most important values, but also conficts among and within values. They represent many values which are given the highest priority in any given decision. David Easton (1965) captured this view in his observation that politics is ‘the authoritative allocation of values for a society’. The action of policy makers can determine defnitively which of society’s different and sometimes conficting values will prevail. Public policy is not made in a vacuum. It is affected by social and economic conditions, prevailing political values and the public mood at any given time, the structure of government, and national and local cultural norms, among other variables (Kraft and Furlong, 2013). It is actual resource allocation on programmes designed to respond to perceived public problems and challenges, requiring government action. The range of public policies is usually very broad and almost unlimited. As public aspirations keep on changing and upgrading, public policies exist in a constant rotation of alteration and innovation and are always under the lens of scrutiny (Anyebe, 2018). Public policy is ubiquitous in every sphere of life. It is put into practice in a manner consistent with the formal and stated legislative sanctions. It gets three distinctive characteristics from the government – legitimacy (legal 25

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authority), universality (covering all citizens) and power to exercise coercion (imposing penalties on violators) in society (Dye, 2002). Though formally developed and implemented by government and its offcials, the role of non-state actors and other factors is signifcant, impacting the direction and reach of a policy. There is need to foster critical thinking about public policy and possible alternative courses of action. Harold Laswell (Laswell, 1958) defnes public policy as ‘who gets what, when and how’. It is pertinent to raise some questions: how do policies actually get made? Who are the key players/institutions involved and what role do they play? What is the timeline of a policy change? How do the checks and balances of a modern democracy operate? Is the process context specifc, linear or iterative? What makes a policy successful? The study of public policy is informed by different theoretical models which guide and suggest possible explanation for policy action. The models are indicative of a trajectory shift of a discipline and have contextual relevance. Each has a distinct focus and advocates specifc things about public policy. ‘There is no such thing as a fxed policy, because policy like all organic entities is always in the making’ Lord Salisbury (cited in Chakrabarti and Sanyal, 2017: 29). Harold D. Lasswell (Laswell, 1971) in his book, A Pre-View of Policy Sciences, advocated that policy sciences must strive for three principal attributes: • • •

Context – decisions should be a part of a larger social process. Problem orientation – policy scientists are at home with the intellectual activities involved in clarifying goals, trends, conditions, projections and alternatives. Diversity – the methods employed are not limited to a narrow range.

Charles E. Lindblom (Lindblom, 1980) in his book, The Policy Making Process, outlined the obstacles to intelligent and democratic policy making. Human cognitive limits do not allow actual and potential participants in policy making to trace all the causes of complex problems or to foresee all the consequences of policy options. The high level of factual uncertainty, complex social life, limited human understanding and complicated and problem-ridden organisational life often lead to public policies which may turn out to be disappointing.

Public policy paradigms Public policy analysis can best be understood in terms of its two paradigms (Henry, 2018): 1

Incrementalist paradigm (favoured by political scientists): The political scientist approach to public policy is substantive, processual, descriptive 26

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2

and objective. It is more concerned with how governmental policies are made and implemented and related to the substance of some specifc issue such as the environment, crime, etc. Rational paradigm (favoured by public administrationists): The rationalist paradigm relates to the application of available knowledge to government policies to improve their formulation and implementation. The approach is theoretical, effectual, prescriptive and normative, and the focus is on the development of theories of public policy making and the outputs and effects of those theories.

Incrementalist paradigm Public policy is an incremental process of ‘muddling through’ to a better situation. Charles E. Lindblom, the leading advocate of this paradigm, explained this in terms of ‘disjointed incrementalism’, which refers to the disconnect between the assessment of conditions and the development of responses to them: Making policy is at best a rough process. Neither social scientists, nor politicians, nor public administrators yet know enough about the social world to avoid repeated error in predicting the consequences of policy moves. A wise policy-maker consequently expects that his policies will achieve only part of what he hopes and at the same time will produce unanticipated consequences he would have preferred to avoid. If he proceeds through a succession of incremental changes, he avoids serious lasting mistakes in several ways. (Lindblom, 1959) Incrementalist policies are more politically expedient than necessitating redistribution of social values. This entails consideration of only a few policy alternatives by policy makers and hence, ‘what is feasible is incremental’. The various models and approaches provide a better understanding of the public policy process, though there is no one ‘best’ or ‘most’ satisfactory model. The incremental models can be categorised into: 1

The Elite/Mass theory: This regards public policy as refecting the values and preferences of a governing elite. The essential argument is that public policy is not determined by the demands and actions of the people or the masses, but rather by ruling elites, whose preferences are carried into effect by political offcials and agencies. The elite believe that they alone are able to determine the policies to promote the welfare of the masses and implement them. Thus policies fow downward from the elite to the masses (considered to be apathetic and ill-informed). The policies made by the elites, refecting elite values, prefer status quo to radical changes. Elites share a consensus on the basic values of the social system and the 27

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2

3

4

preservation of the system. Changes in public policy will be incremental rather than revolutionary, with a minimum alteration or dislocation of the system. The elites and non-elites are not stable; they are subject to change. New elites arise and take the place of old elites. Pareto referred to this as the ‘law of circulation of elites’ (Anyebe, 2018). The Group Model: Politics, in general, is a struggle between and among groups. The interaction among groups is a critical ingredient in politics. Many public policies do refect the activities of groups (Anderson, 1997). Each of the various groups in society tries to infuence public policy to its advantage at the policy formulation level. It is this type of competition among groups that determines the pattern of allocation of societal resources. The locus of power in society changes from time to time, depending upon the group that succeeds in exerting its supremacy over the others. Accordingly, the power to regulate policy direction changes with the changes in the fortunes of each or a combination of these groups. The dynamics of the policy process is expected to be more vibrant and ferce in plural societies than in homogenous ones. Public policy at any point of time refects the equilibrium reached in the group struggle. The Systems Model: This model applies systems theory to the policymaking process. The political system receives inputs from its environment and converts them into outputs. This environment consists of all phenomena – social system, economic system, biological setting – that are external to the boundaries of the political system. The inputs are in the form of demands from groups or individuals for specifc policy outcomes. The policy outcomes take the form of determination of societal values and allocation of resources. A feedback loop exists by which the outputs alter future inputs. This model thus relies on concepts of information theory (feedback, input and output) and conceives the policy process as being cyclical and unending. Policy is originated, implemented, adjusted, re-implemented, ad infnitum. David Easton in his famous work, The Political System, analysed the system of interactions in any society through which authoritative allocations are made and implemented in the form of policies and decisions. Public policy, thus, may be seen as a political system’s response to demands arising from its environment. The political system comprises those identifable and interrelated institutions and activities (government institutions and political processes) in a society that make authoritative allocations of values (decisions) that are binding on society (Anderson, 1997). The Institutionalist Model: The institutional structures, arrangements and procedures often have important consequences for the adoption and content of public policies. They provide part of the context for policy making, which must be considered along with the more dynamic aspects of politics, such as political parties, groups, and public opinion in policy study. This model studies the offcial structures and functions 28

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5

of government departments and institutions in an attempt to learn how public policy takes shape. It focuses on the organisation chart of government and emphasises on the formal and legal aspects of government structure. However, this model has shown little concern about the connections between a department and the public policy emanating from it. While the systems approach is dynamic and process oriented, the institutionalist approach is more static and formalistic. The institutional theory can provide only partial explanations of policy, as it is a structure-ridden approach with less emphasis on functional or the operational part. The Neo-Institutionalist Model: This categorises public policies according to policy-making subsystems and predicts institutional behaviour accordingly. Theodore Lowi in 1964 classifed policies by four arenas of power (Henry, 2018): Policy type

Implication

Redistributive

Redistribution of social and economic rewards for equitable society; for example: progressive taxation policy. Distributes policy benefts to specifc interest groups though costs are not given priority; for example: agricultural subsidies. Serves particular interests rather than public interest. Policies deal with the regulation of trade, quality of education and safety measures. This type of regulation is conducted by autonomous institutions that work on behalf of the government. For example, in India, Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI), Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI), the Bureau of Indian Standards (BIS) and Reserve Bank of India (RBI). It directly affects people or political actors, but in whole units; for example, reapportionment of legislature.

Distributive Regulative

Constituent

6

The Organised Anarchy Model: This seems to be a very satisfying explanation of how public policy is made. Basic to the model is the presence of three ‘streams’ – problems, politics and policies that constitute the policy-making process (Henry, 2018). Stream

Basic aim

Implication

Problems

Focuses the public and policy makers’ attention on a particular problem.

Problem is defned according to values (conservative/liberal), comparisons (US vs. Iran) and categories (whether public transit for disabled persons is a transportation problem or a civil rights problem) of policies. (Continued)

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(Continued) Stream

Basic aim

Implication

Politics

Governmental agenda issues are resolved by involvement of policy actors and interest groups through consensus building. Decision agenda (alternative specifcation) is formulated by devising alternate policy solutions to the issues.

Formulation of agenda is by involving forces such as national mood, organised interests, changes in government, etc.

Policy

Ideas and involvement of persons who hold a commitment to a policy change are paramount. The ideas which are technically feasible, socially acceptable and perceived to be free of future constraints such as budget limitations survive.

Rationalist paradigm Rationalism tries to learn all the value preferences extant in a society, assign each value a relative weight, discover all the policy alternatives available, know all the consequences of each alternative, calculate how the selection of any one policy will affect the remaining alternatives in terms of opportunity costs and ultimately select the policy alternative that is the most effcient in terms of the costs and benefts of social values (Mandal and Rawat, 1998). The rationalist paradigm deals with the devising of public policies that ensure better public policies for issues confronting society. Yehezkel Dror calls this concern ‘Metapolicy’ (policy making on policy making). The paradigm conceives public policy formation as a linear fow chart (Dror, 1989). The rational choice theory (social choice, public choice, and political economy) which refers to the identifcation of the optimal mix of social values as the basis for selecting a public policy is a part of this paradigm. Rational choice is associated with Pareto optimality, a concept developed by the economist Vilfredo Pareto, which is a change in economic policy that makes people as better off as they can be without making anyone worse off (Cudd, 1996). Thomas Dye equates rationality with effciency. A policy is rational when it is most effcient. Maximisation of ‘net value achievement’ (sacrifces of some values must be more than compensated by the attainment of some other values) is the hallmark of a rational policy. Herbert Simon defnes rationality as selection of preferred behaviour alternatives in terms of some system of values, whereby the consequences of behaviour can be evaluated (Bhattacharya, 2013). Yehezkel Dror presents a modifed form of the rational model – that is, ‘normative optimalism’ – which combines the core elements of the rational 30

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model (measurement of costs and benefts) with extra-rational factors. Dror envisages a radical reform of the public policy-making process. There is a need to bring about changes in the personnel (politicians, bureaucrats and experts), structures and processes (systematic thinking and integrating experts into policy making) as well as in the general environment of policy making. The public choice approach, which gained increasing popularity in the 1970s and the 1980s, has its base in rational choice theory. Vincent Ostrom, one of the infuential protagonists of the public-choice theory, demands public agencies and organisations give people what they want. The ideal of popular choice implies that the actions/policies of government should be consistent with the values and interests of citizens. As a rational utility maximiser, an individual actor is always in search of increasing net benefts. The approach is oriented towards the understanding of the realm of public choice, that is, politics and bureaucracy. The methodology of public choice is that of economics. Politicians in their supply of public policy are guided by private concerns to the extent that when in government, they attempt to manipulate and stimulate the economy before the election (vote bank politics) to maximise their chances of winning but defate the economy later. This results in the selection of those policies that minimise policy distance between citizens’ expectations and government. The motivation for bureaucracy is serving itself rather than the public interest. Hence, the advocates of the publicchoice approach recommend the introduction of competition into bureaucracy through contracting out, privatisation and increasing competition among government departments by rewarding performance (Sapru, 2004). According to Vincent Ostrom, ‘bureaucratic structures are necessary but not suffcient structures for a productive and responsive public service economy’. The outcomes of interactions based on rational choices by decision units (individual, group or a nation) can also be explained by game theory. The theory is applicable to policy making where the choice and outcomes depend upon what others do. Game theory is an abstract and deductive model of policy making. It does not describe how people actually make decisions, but rather how they would go about making decisions in competitive situations, if they were completely rational. The decision makers are involved in a situation of interdependence. Though they make independent choices, the outcome would be conditioned by the choices made by each participant. The theory has been in use as a method of study of decision making in situations of confict, especially in international relations (Bhattacharya, 2013).

The strategic planning paradigm – third approach The strategic planning paradigm is also known as ‘strategic decision making’ or ‘strategic management’ and considered the third approach, which is not as utopian as rationalism, and not as conservative as incrementalism. 31

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Strategic planning combines the strongest features of incrementalism and rationalism. Strategic planning includes strategies at all stages, be it federal, state or local (Henry, 2018). This paradigm is a linkage with present-day citizen-driven societies, where strategies are drawn, keeping citizens in prime focus while devising policies. Governments experience constant pulls and pressures, calling for wellconsidered decisions/policies acceptable to various groups of stakeholders. Strategic policy is a mega policy that involves multiple organisations and stakeholders, a bold vision for the future and planned and meticulous management of issues to produce desired results. Such policy making needs toplevel attention and drive to generate ideas and vision (e.g., actions towards realization of Sustainable Development Goals) to work out performance achievement road maps and build suitable organisational capabilities to achieve strategic outcomes. In recent times, many countries also have taken recourse to ‘policy transfer’. This is a process by which knowledge of ideas, institutions, policies and programmes in a particular time and place is fed into the policymaking arena, in the development of policies and programmes in another time and place. The policy transfers can be both ‘voluntary’ and ‘coercive’. The Grameen Bank idea from Bangladesh as a model of micro-credit policy which found wide acceptance signifes voluntary transfer. The Japanese economic miracle in East Asia proved inspirational to neighbouring countries such as Singapore, South Korea and Malaysia. The ‘structural adjustment policy’ of the World Bank in the 1990s falls in the category of coercive policy transfer. A major policy in any feld such as pollution control or family welfare has to take into account important and powerful societal forces and factors. Policy is about politics, which is an arena of contestation, bargaining and negotiation. The policy-making exercise has to go beyond facts and draw on wisdom, values and beliefs of participating actors (Bhattacharya, 2013). Though the study of public policy is informed by different theoretical models, no model is adequate enough to explain policy formulation and implementation totally, since policy formulation is a complex and dynamic process. Policy formulation is largely conditioned by socio-political and economic factors. Policy formulation and implementation is not always a rational activity. In fact, no public policy, whether in the sphere of education or elsewhere, can be a value-free inductive exercise, exclusively based on empirical observations. The different models represent attempts to understand the reality in policy formulation. They are explanatory devices to fnd out the causes and consequences of a policy. Each new theory builds on and complements other existing theories. The objective explanation of political behaviour rather than the validation of preferred theoretical approaches should be the goal of political enquiry. 32

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Public policy trajectory The theoretical framework does not affect the discourse of public policies. Theories are the standard framework of public policies, while application of the theories depends upon the requisite context. There may be multifaceted opinions on the kind of shifts society has undergone. In a larger perspective, there are notable shifts from administration to governance, conservative society to behaviourally informed society, knowledge deprived to knowledgeably enlightened society. Globalisation has not only affected the state but also infuenced public policy to a great extent. The worldwide spread of neo-liberal policies has been dictated by many donor agencies in the form of shrinkage or downsizing of the state/government, privatisation policies and the involvement of civil society organisations in many societal problem-solving situations. The good governance paradigm foated and espoused by the World Bank in the 1990s has been instrumental in providing the broad context in which policy choices are being made. It has been fundamental in altering the balance of power among the state, markets and civil society as actors in governance. Concepts such as e-governance, good governance, minimal government, reinventing government and public-private partnerships have raised a new discussion on state and public policy. These advocate fexible, regulated and good governance working processes, which are democratic, accountable and competitive. This is less a decline of the state and more a process of state transformation (Narain, 2018). With a continuance of globalisation and of the information age, there is an increasing degree of interdependence among states to handle a host of issues such as climate change, terrorism, etc. The common issues and problems within a global context may be increasingly identifed in international terms, but policy making and implementation largely remains with nation-states. The global socio-economic framework interacts with the political processes and policies pursued by governments of nation-states, but their success in policy performance will diverge notwithstanding the convergence of global policy concerns (Gupta, 2018). There has been a paradigm shift in the link between government and citizens. Because of the shift from government to governance, the growing role of governments as partners is conspicuous, and interplay among the three critical players/actors – state, market, civil society will infuence public policy making. The concept of network governance (Mathur, 2008) perceives governance as networks of relationships among the key actors and strong partnerships across different sectors to fll governance defcits.

Public policy shifts and dilemmas In the contemporary context, in view of directing suitable action towards realisation of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), fulflling the mandate of global health organisations, economic and climatic forums and tackling 33

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the ongoing pandemic – coronavirus (COVID-19) –it is imperative that nations orient policies to address the following multifarious issues and concerns: • • • • • • • • • • •

Poverty and unemployment Social inclusion and social justice Equitable development Knowledge and resource sharing among nations Threats of dangerous defence technologies – for example, nuclear power Unconventional biological health hazards – for example, coronavirus Safety issues arising out of terrorism and communal problems of nations Effective ways to control population explosion Climate preservation and global participation Strategies to raise education cover or scope to deprived sections Financial turbulence faced by nations

Public policy, unlike in older regimes, is a perplexed feld in present times, both at the national and international levels, with new challenges. There are multiple stakeholders to policy issues, with a qualitative deliberation upon policy matters. The policy issues are largely global and not isolated, thus requiring common platforms of policy deliberations at several levels. There is no standard structure of public policy, but relevance and contextual application is the focus. The neediest recipient of policy benefts is to be taken into consideration to make a policy with holistic coverage Countries which are largely witnessing local problems and have a greater impact of global issues upon them are experiencing a lack of effective policies in place. Human life is losing its value as a majority of people lose their lives in road accidents and health complications and are victims to natural hazards, because of many policy loopholes. This implies that public policies lack focus to raise quantum and quality of human life, as there is a gap between a policy objective and its achievement. Policy challenges must be overcome by smart and economic ways. Ethical dilemmas in public policy arise because resources are inadequate to meet all demands, and people are committed to different values and ideas about ‘doing the right thing’. Elected offcials and expert advisors need to work together to co-produce a policy in ways that engage citizens, address ethical dilemmas and facilitate inclusive participatory decision making. This requires an understanding of clarity of purpose (what and why of problem), nature of particular interest, the values at stake, relevant evidence (certainty of facts and knowledge of what works), factoring in emotions and moral intuitions into practical public reasoning about the right thing to do, democratic mandate regarding implementable options and protecting the dignity and rights of individuals and minorities, while promoting the public good (Bromell, 2012). 34

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Governance in the 21st century: key drivers The convergence of several factors – demographic, socio-economic and technological – will infuence governments in meeting citizens’ changing needs. Demographic change is a major challenge and global population growth, with growth imbalances, has important implications. Increased global migration leads to mingling of cultural identities and the rise of the truly global citizen. Governments are faced with a balancing act, using the latest technologies to meet the rising expectations of hyper-connected citizens. The citizen consumers, empowered by information and technology, play a bigger role in problem solving and fghting corruption. Unprecedented advances in health care, neuroscience, technology computing, nanotechnology and learning allow human beings to expand their physical and mental faculties. Economically, governments grapple with fscal stress, infrastructure bottlenecks and rising income inequality among citizens. Despite the disparities between rich and poor, the scarcity of basic requirements such as food, water, energy, health care, housing and education are being addressed, as technology helps in raising the basic standards of living. Digital technologies allow mass collaboration around huge data sets, infuencing decision making by governments, corporations and individuals alike. With exponential technologies, robots paired with artifcial intelligence (AI), the centuries’long quest to develop machines and software with human-like intelligence, move closer to reality. The cyber-physical systems technologies, unmanned aerial vehicles or drones contribute to domestic policing, geographical surveys and maritime patrol and delivery of goods, among multiple other commercial and military applications. Despite all the advances, trust in governments is generally at an all-time low. The gap between citizens’ expectations and government’s ability to meet them throws up many challenges. What are the main features of a government better suited for our times? Which forces have the greatest potential to make a positive difference and which represent the biggest threats? This necessitates a comprehension of the mega shifts in administration and governance for better policy making. The shifts pertain to the following: • •

•

Government not the sole solution provider: Successful governments focus on nurturing societal solutions from outside government, rather than on trying to solve every problem themselves. Made-for-me service delivery: Large centralized offces do not make sense when different groups of people have different needs, or when many traditional functions can be handled remotely through digital services. Distributed governance: Government functions are being ‘co-created’ with citizens, on their own or working with others. 35

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•

•

•

•

Data-smart government: Data analysis allows the public sector to focus more on prevention. Analytics give policy makers the ability to test potential solutions in advance. This helps in anticipating complex situations which otherwise would not be possible. Alternative forms of government funding: Technology opens up many unique alternatives to fund services and infrastructure. The payment-forresults models such as social impact bonds and tax increment fnancing (TIF) to fnance costly development projects and services is noticeable. Just-in-time civil service: ‘Public workforce’ will be redefned as there is a shift in administration from a closed model to an open and more inclusive one. Employees will not stick to departments, but instead will move from project to project. A new basis of national prosperity: The measure of social good will be determined by holistic measures of progress and well-being such as personal safety, ecosystem sustainability, health and wellness, shelter, sanitation, inclusion and personal freedom. Taken together, they will change how governments assess their progress internally and function externally (Eggers and Macmillan, 2015).

It is necessary that government and public sector organisations respond to these shifts proactively and pre-emptively, to progress in the desired direction. They need to re-evaluate their purpose and role to ensure that their current vision and mission, and ways of operating to achieve them, are relevant enough to ride the waves of these shifts. The changes or shifts in the way government operates as a whole will have implications for the various sectors within government. It is prudent to raise some questions. How can we keep people at the heart of public policy? Which stakeholder groups are more successful in bringing policy changes, through what methods and in what contexts? In the wake of globalisation, how successful have been the strategies of public policies? Why should remaking public policy in the 21st century be less technical and more humane? In his book Future Politics, Jamie Susskind writes: Politics in the twentieth century was dominated by a central question: how much of our collective life should be determined by the state, and what should be left to the market and civil society? For the generation now approaching political maturity, the debate will be different: to what extent should our lives be directed and controlled by powerful digital systems – and on what terms? (cited in Schneier, 2019) Policy makers need to realize that they need technologists on their policy teams and accept well-established scientifc fndings as facts. The evolution 36

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of public health policy serves as an instructive model. Health policy is a feld that includes both policy experts who know a lot about the science and keep abreast of health research and biologists and medical researchers, who work closely with policy makers. The importance of vaccines is widely accepted and well understood by policy makers and is written into policy, especially in the wake of COVID-19. The policies on global pandemics are informed by medical experts. This serves society well, though it was not always this way. Health policy was not always part of public policy (Schneier, 2019). Public policy is a realm which is most relevant in present times. Insight into theoretical perspectives is not accomplished until it is not synchronised with present-day politics and social setup. Unlike the past, when rigid structures and rules were suffcient to govern, now fexible, comprehensive, meaningful policies are successful which can serve citizens’ interests in a substantial manner. The policies framed are also assessed across various knowledge forums, both formal and informal. Citizens are no longer mere benefciaries but part of the policy-making process as digitisation has made feedback mechanisms more strong and secure. The multiple and multifaceted actors or institutions, including not only stakeholders, but also academicians, educated classes, businesspeople, service classes, government offcials, NGOs, corporations and many more social segments, contribute towards the process of public policy. The 21st century brings new challenges for policy makers because reducing poverty and inequality requires a better understanding of the psychological repercussions and narratives associated with poverty. Policy makers have a responsibility to gain a deeper understanding of the human factors underlying poverty and integrate them at the core of policy design. They could start by recognising distorting narratives about poverty and devising ways to counteract them. In an era of turbulence and growing inequality, policy narratives need reframing. There is a shared responsibility for all to engage with policy issues on a deeper level, question ingrained assumptions and rethink governance structures. Policies that give greater weight to the human side of poverty are likely to be more effective in achieving their objectives. A behaviourally informed perspective instead would suggest an approach focused on programmes that are easy to manage, foster stability and give people the fnancial and mental steadiness needed to build more robust economic lives. Changing behaviour across populations is key to meeting many of the global public policy goals for this century. Generally, the policy in force at a particular time and place is infuenced by technological developments, population increase and urbanisation of the population, natural disasters, war and depression, international relations and economic and industrial development. The aim of policy is ‘to make things better’. The key question that follows is ‘what does “better” mean, and for whom?’ Policy is not static and hence should be reformulated and adapted continually on the basis of 37

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experience, research in the relative feld of operation and changing circumstances and needs. The basic requirement of policy is adaptability and regular reviewing to ensure that it is relevant and applicable to a specifc area (Bennett Institute Conference Report, 2018).

Conclusion Policy making generally evokes an image of rational decision making and technical optimality. However, the arena of policy making is characterised by confict and contestation resolved through processes of bargains and compromises. The process of policy making is inherently political and complex. A public policy analyst should constantly be in a process of fnding foundational ideas about policy studies and analysis in the contemporary context. Public policies often seem to be the result of politics and power play for resources and entitlements. Governance is not only about where to go, but also about who should be involved in deciding, and in what capacity. The role/infuence of stakeholders is relative and differs from society to society. Public policy is an endless process, as changing times keep throwing up new choices and challenges. The citizen is the kingpin of administration, and public policies must aim at upholding citizen interests. Rather than a specifc model, a trend or policy inclination is visible in contemporary policies. Preparedness, resilience, coordination and collaboration among different layers, sectors and containment are key aspects which need to be factored into policies to face unexpected and unprecedented challenges deftly and successfully. This necessitates shaping of public policies backed by research and a scientifc outlook.

References Anderson, J. E., 1997, Public Policy Making: An Introduction, Third Edition, Boston, Houghton Miffin Company. Anyebe, Adam A., 2018, “An Overview of Approaches to The Study of Public Policy”, International Journal of Political Science (IJPS), Vol. 4, No. 1, January, pp. 08–17. Bennett Institute for Public Policy, 2018, Conference Report Remaking Public Policy in the 21st Century, University of Cambridge, https://bit.ly/3aGfYYh. Bhattacharya, Mohit, 2013, New Horizons of Public Administration, New Delhi, Jawahar Publishers. Bromell, John David, 2012, “Doing the Right Thing: Ethical Dilemmas in Public Policy Making”, www.researchgate.net/publication/289129763. Chakrabarti, Rajesh and Sanyal, Kaushiki, 2017, Shaping Policy in India; Alliance, Advocacy, Activism, New Delhi, Oxford University Press. Cudd, Ann E., 1996, “Is Pareto Optimality a Criterion of Justice?” Social Theory and Practice, Vol. 22, No. 1, Spring, pp. 1–34, accessed on 25/04/2020.

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Dror, Yehezkel, 1989, Public Policymaking Reexamined, New Brunswick, NJ, Transaction Publishers. Dye, T. R., 2002, Understanding Public Policy, Tenth Edition, New Delhi, Pearson Education. Easton, David, 1965, A Systems Analysis of Political Life, New York, Wiley. Eggers, William D. and Paul Macmillan, 2015, Deloitte Gov2020: A Journey into the Future of Government, https://bit.ly/352KlHe. Gupta, Kamlesh, 2018, State and Public Policy, New Delhi, Pentagon Press. Henry, Nicholas, 2018, Public Administration and Public Affairs, Thirteenth Edition, New York and London, Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group. Kraft, Michael E. and Furlong, Scott R., 2013, Politics, Analysis, and Alternatives, Washington, DC, Sage, CQ Press, Washington DC, USA. Laswell, Harold D., 1958, Politics: Who Gets What, When, How, New York, Meridian Books. Laswell, Harold D., 1971, A Pre-View of Policy Science, New York, American Elsevier Publishing Co. Lindblom, Charles E., 1959, “The Science of Muddling Through”, Public Administration Review, Vol. XIX, No. 2, Spring, pp. 79–88, accessed on 25/04/2020. Lindblom, Charles E., 1980, The Policy Making Process, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, Prentice-Hall. Mandal, U. C. and Rawat, J., 1998, Public Administration: Principles and Practice, New Delhi, Sarup & Son. Mathur, Kuldeep, 2008, From Government to Governance: A Brief Survey of the Indian Experience, New Delhi, National Book Trust. Narain, Vishal, 2018, Public Policy, A View from the South, New Delhi, Cambridge University Press. Sapru, R. K., 2004, Public Policy: Formulation, Implementation and Evaluation, New Delhi, Sterling Publishers. Schneier, Bruce, 2019,“We Must Bridge the Gap Between Technology and Policymaking. Our Future Depends on It”, World Economic Forum, https://bit.ly/2VTKqJb.

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2 POLICY MAKING Challenges to multidisciplinary approaches A. Venkatraman

Introduction All policy issues are outcomes of the political agenda of the ruling party, and the issues involve accumulation of data about problems and possible solutions in the social context. Based on these data, policy actors (political leadership, policy experts, administrators and non-state actors) acquire and translate information and knowledge towards achieving political goals and also to revisit the earlier-held policy beliefs. This process of “policy learning”, which is both cognitive and socially dynamic, is the foundation on which the policy-making processes rest. The policy process is characterized by complexity and uncertainty, sometimes going on indefnitely without a probable solution. In fact, implementation of solutions tends to change the very nature of a problem, leading to diffculties in evaluation. Politics is everywhere in policies and instead of politics preceding policy implementation, one observes that politics commences after policy decisions are made! Public policies, as Charles Lindblom observes, “are made via a complex political system .  .  . and can be better seen as a product of dominant social forces in democracies” (Lindblom, 1993). In democracies, where multiple political actors and pressure groups are involved, public policies are often a result of compromises arrived through competitive conficts. The rational approach of the policy scientist – from agenda setting to policy formulation, implementation, impact, analysis and evaluation – invariably does not ft into the scheme of the actual policy process! This is defnitely not to demean the role of the policy scientist, but only to reaffrm the challenges the policy scientist has had to encounter while dealing with the complex process of policy making. This chapter attempts to identify the parameters of the policy-making process, the multidisciplinary nature of policy issues and the challenges in evolving comprehensive and holistic perspectives on sectoral policies. 40

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Parameters of policy The parameters of the policy process can be explained in terms of scope, content and relevance; they are all interrelated. The scope of a policy delineates the boundaries of a policy problem, which is multidisciplinary, and within which the policy agenda can be identifed. The policy agenda will have not only to address all the relevant areas, but also consider the important “political” aspect of the policy. However much we attempt to anticipate and rationalize the politics of a policy, invariably it turns out to be an ex post facto rationalization. The only predictable thing in explaining the politics of policy is its unpredictability – in terms of time, place and content. For example, a policy on environment will necessarily have to be multidisciplinary in the sense that it is related to various areas such as agriculture, forest, water resources, wetlands, air, emissions caused by industrial activity, science and technology, transport, cost-beneft analysis of all such activities, law and fnally, institutions and governance. It is possible that some more areas too can be identifed and included. But that is not the focus here. It is about the scope that includes the immediate factors that impact the policy issue. Thus a policy scientist will not only have to consider the “politics” of the policy, but also the related substantive factors that impact the policy issue. Broadly speaking, the content of a policy identifes the objectives or goals to be aimed at over a time period – long term as well as short term – in short, the policy goals. The starting point of identifying policy goals is the political agenda, the basis of political governance by the party in power. The political agenda need not translate into policy issues or goals, and policy issues need not be necessarily refected in the political agenda. Political agenda evolves in the socio-political context of governments and invariably refects the popular sentiment of the electorate. Policy parameters and agenda lead to issues of relevance (temporal and spatial) of the policy. How relevant is the policy agenda at a given point of time and for a given geographical area (politics of time and area)? This is a question that is addressed to and determined by politics, but the policy scientist will have to examine relevance (of policy agenda) in the context of political priorities, socio-economic necessities and constraints, and the governability of policy decisions. Yehezkel Dror calls this as “political feasibility – probability that a particular policy will receive suffcient political push and support to be approved and politically implemented” (Dror, 1971). An important component in the policy process that has been inadequately examined is the political communication and support mobilization for policy. Governability of policy decisions depends to a very large extent on the support it elicits from different stakeholders for whom it is meant. An evaluation of the (relative) success or failure of a policy in the context of governance is already in place (through various techniques and methods), but 41

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negligible work has been done to assess the effectiveness of communication for mobilizing support for policy decisions. Politics of policy includes the ability to convince and demand support and cooperation from stakeholders for governability of policy decisions. The signifcance of the communication process is “how intimate the relation is between communication, control and authority”. This process involves effective political communication and in the present digital era, an ability to utilize the masses and social media for direct reach to stakeholders, a necessity for democratic governance. The approaches and methods in policy sciences necessarily involve an amalgam of various disciplines in natural and social sciences. The diffculty is that policy has multiple dimensions often succeeding in some respects but not in others. The task for the policy scientist is to recognize and understand the multidisciplinary nature of policy issues and evolve an interdisciplinary approach to resolve policy problems.

Multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary nature Any theory on the public policy process, particularly the way policies are made and implemented, as well as its impacts requires an understanding of the behaviour of governmental institutions, various actors including interest or pressure groups, the benefciaries for whom the policy is intended, the public at large and the media. Understanding media in the contemporary digital era assumes importance because they make and unmake governments and their agendas. Hence, the role of the media in political communication of the policy issue becomes integral to the policy-making process. Such theory requires an integration of knowledge of social scientists as well as knowledge of experts in substantive areas of policy. So far, political scientists have been preoccupied with a single type of political institution (or with the triangle of institutions – legislature, judiciary and executive – and their related agencies and processes). A policy study that focuses on governmental institutions has demonstrated the limited usefulness of such an approach. However, policy issues cover a wide span of areas and subfelds such as substantive knowledge (and information) of the issue, differences in perception on policy issues between policy-making elites and the public (or benefciaries), and studies on long-term behavioural changes, role of public, private and non-state actors, etc. The need to synthesize different approaches can help in better policy advocacy. In this context, examining the multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary nature of policy issues becomes relevant. The term “multidisciplinary” can be explained as experts of different disciplines working together based on the expertise of their respective disciplines or areas, whereas the term “interdisciplinary” may refer to a synthesis of knowledge and methods of different disciplines. In the context of policy process, policy problems and issues are invariably multidisciplinary in nature, but their resolutions require an interdisciplinary approach. If 42

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multidisciplinarity brings experts of different domains on a single platform to look into policy issues, interdisciplinarity poses greater challenges because it will require an expert (in a particular domain or area) to be familiar with other related areas. Such an expert will normally have a better understanding of the issues from varied perspectives, not confned to his/her own feld of expertise. An interdisciplinary person can offer a more holistic perspective of the policy process – in terms of its impact and consequences. For example, the issue of air pollution causing immense harm to the national capital region (NCR) Delhi has been a major policy problem for the governments, both at the Centre and the state of Delhi. Governments, the judiciary, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the public at large have had their views and have attempted solutions ranging from the “Odd/ Even” rule for road transport, to curbing the burning of stubble in the neighbouring states of Haryana and Punjab, to spraying water and various preventive health measures for citizens. One of the major causes of “smog” has been the burning of stubble. In this context, the suggestion of the agriculture scientist Dr. M. S. Swaminathan was a departure from the normal solutionseeking policy experts on air pollution. He says that if stubble burning is a major issue of air pollution in the NCR, then any solution will have to ensure some economic beneft for farmers to prevent them from burning the stubble. He suggests establishing “rice bioparks” wherein the stubble can be purchased from farmers to be made use of in the manufacture of paper and cardboard and also as cattle feed. Instead of causing pollution, the stubble can help farmers earn extra income. It is worth noting that the M. S. Swaminathan Research Foundation has established bioparks in Myanmar, funded by the Ministry of External Affairs of the Government of India, and recently inaugurated by the president of India (The Hindu, 2019). The foregoing example points to the value of policy knowledge (interdisciplinary in nature) in addressing the issue of air pollution. A straight-jacketed approach to smog and air pollution may not consider the economic benefts the farmers would accrue by not burning the stubble, the benefts of biopark activity, etc. The challenge to the policy process is to identify and co-opt experts who can provide a substantive interdisciplinary input to policy issues, apart from being an expert in their own domains. A couple of such experts would add value to the policy-making process. A comprehensive policy-making process would involve availability and use of up-to-date subject knowledge and information along with relevant analytical tools. A sectoral policy would necessarily have signifcant impact on other related sectors (such as automobile policy on the energy and road sector; agriculture on the environment; foreign policy on trade relations, the energy sector, etc.). Therefore the policy-making process inevitably would result in trade-offs. Policy-making processes and structures should ensure the gathering of such inter-sectoral impacts, the analysis of trade-offs, and fully informed choices among alternatives after a proper consideration of effects on different sectors. 43

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The Indian government’s policy to open up the automobile and consumer goods sector in the mid-1980s did not consider its impact on other related sectors such as energy (oil import) and roads. With more four and two wheelers being manufactured and made available, the consumer goods sector witnessed rapid expansion. However, cars and two wheelers need petrol to run. India’s oil import was around 25% of its total requirement in the 1980s. This was based on the estimated reserves of mineral oil projected by geological experts (The technical terms for estimating mineral reserves – proved, unproved, probable and possible reserves – often create confusion to those outside the domain of geology.) The government, based on the estimates, believed that enough reserves of mineral oil were available and went ahead with its policy to open up the automobile and consumer goods sectors. But limited oil reserves and increased demand resulted in heavy oil imports. Further road capacity to carry vehicles was extremely limited. Thus the inter-sectoral impact was never suffciently analyzed. Coupled with this, the demand for electricity increased because of the easy availability of consumer goods products (such as washing machines, vacuum cleaners, refrigerators, air conditioners, etc., all needing electricity). The impact of importing energy (oil and coal) resulted in balance of payments and the debt crisis in the early 1990s. The effect of the policy decision (of the mid1980s) was the culmination in the form of liberalization, privatization and globalization (LPG). An analysis of the inter-sectoral impact of the policy process is invariably multidisciplinary in nature, requiring domain experts from varied areas. A major lacuna in many policy decisions of the governments (in India) has been the non-involvement of domain experts at different stages of the policy process. Further, if an interdisciplinary outlook of the experts is not available, then the policy process suffers from the inadequacies of the holistic approach. To illustrate, health and education were the twin goals of introducing the Noon Meal Scheme in the state of Madras (now Tamil Nadu) in 1953 by then-Chief Minister, Sri K. Kamaraj. It was originally introduced in 1925 in the city of Madras (now Chennai). At that time, the feld of policy sciences was in its infancy and nothing much was known about the policy process, yet when the Noon Meal Scheme was introduced by the government in 1953, the objective of the policy was to attract students to primary schools with the promise of food, thereby taking care of both health and education. In the present context, this decision may not look that signifcant from the perspective of policy making, but the thought process that resulted in the scheme was reasonably comprehensive in nature. Policy-making structures and processes are as important as the policy itself. In the Indian context, policy making and implementation has been the monopoly of the government, with its huge civil services machinery. Attempts have been made to involve research institutions and think tanks in the process, the recent one being the NITI Aayog. However, the decision 44

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making rests with the Cabinet and its implementation with the civil service. The career-oriented civil services have developed an inherent resistance to accept “outside” interference in the policy process and believe they are the ones who can “rightly” guide and suggest policy interventions to the political executive. Though attempts are being made to overcome this resistance (in the form of lateral entry), their effectiveness remains unclear. Further, the civil services, to continue their dominance, have acquired an “adaptable” approach, wherein they tailor their suggestions to suit political needs. Thus, in a majority of policy issues, politically acceptable policy inputs are provided to the political executive at the cost of substantive policy information and knowledge. In the process, risk aversion becomes a salient feature of policy making. The role of think tanks, research institutions, public opinion and other technical and methodological issues become secondary to the political objectives. This often gets refected in many changes and course corrections to policies that are made (to the original policy decisions). Political factors have a major role to play in the policy-making process, but they alone cannot be the basis of any policy (Bavelas, 1951). The role of the policy scientist is not only to analyze substantive policy issues, but also to evaluate the political feasibility of policy choices. Though there exist disagreements over defning the parameters of the feld, some characteristics (of the policy process) can be agreed upon. The frst is the multi and interdisciplinary nature and its applied areas. Policy studies take elements from political science, economics, public administration, sociology, philosophy (ethical dimensions) and other natural and physical sciences, depending on the policy issue. The interdisciplinary nature (of policy studies) can be an asset as well as a liability. It transcends the narrow limits of a single discipline and brings in a range of perspectives and knowledge. However, it can also be a source of confusion and lack of clarity in developing a perspective on policy issues. But such confusion can be set aside through discussion and critical analysis, which can be a value-added input to policy knowledge. As Yehezkel Dror, the well-known policy scientist, points out, the linear model of policy making fails “to take into consideration the need for creativity, the tacit knowledge and adventurous thinking and may even repress them through subjection to inappropriate criteria and they fail to face the complexities of value judgments” (Dror, 1969). Though public policy includes numerous areas and expressions, the only common denominator is “public”. The term includes public opinion, public interest, public sector, public fnance, public law and so on. Each of the terms is a knowledge domain, and they all overlap with one another and at times are in confict with one another. But all contribute to policy knowledge. The interdisciplinary approach, apart from offering ways to explain existing dilemmas on policy issues, also provides narratives that are signifcant to policy scientists. Such narration can depict the policy issues in a comprehensive and holistic manner. If technical analysis of policies (in 45

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terms of economy, fnance, administration, cost benefts, implementation, etc.) is undertaken on the basis of such narratives, desirable outcomes can be ensured along with forecasting unintended consequences.

Conclusion Approaches to public policy are wide ranging, borrowing theories, models and techniques from various disciplines. The main problem of public policy is the desire for scientifc knowledge to address contemporary issues on the one hand and the political nature of policy decisions on the other. The “value judgment” (perhaps through tacit knowing) of the policy maker and the policy scientists to delineate the ulterior and ultimate political objective (of policies) goes a long way in ensuring the success (or failure) of policies.

References Bavelas, Alex, 1951, “Communication Patterns in Task-Oriented Groups”, in Lerner Daniel and Harold D. Lasswell (eds.), The Policy Sciences, Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press. Dror, Yehezkel, 1969, “Some Normative Implications of a Systems View of Policy Making”, The RAND Corporation. Dror, Yehezkel, 1971, Ventures in Policy Sciences, New York, American Elsevier. Jesudasan, Dennis S., 2019, “Stubble Burning Menace: M. S. Swaminathan Suggests Rice Bioparks as a Solution” The Hindu, November 4. Lindblom, Charles and Woodhouse, Edward, 1993, The Policy Making Process, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, Prentice-Hall.

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3 PUBLIC POLICY COMMUNICATION Reclaiming a ‘nearly lost’ theme Dipankar Sinha

Introduction It may be appropriate to start with an observation, which inscribes a signifcant paradox in the realm of governance in India. It is that while public policy has drawn the prime attention of scholars of public administration as a core issue, and also as a critical factor from allied disciplines of social sciences, in so far as the theme of public policy communication in India is concerned there seems to be a near-total silence in the scholarly pursuit. The chapter at the very outset would initiate a critique of the scholarly world of public policy analysis in India by referring to this blind spot, or to put it in a more nuanced way, to the zone of silence. Subsequently it would advocate the case for public policy communication by highlighting its importance in understanding the highly complex and dynamic public policy arena in particular and governance in general. A clarifcation is also warranted before the discussion goes deeper: I prefer to describe public policy communication as a ‘nearly lost’ theme, with a tinge of optimism, as such description leaves scope for reclaiming it. Such scope will certainly not be there if it is described as ‘lost’.

Theoretical backdrop If one seeks to explore the ‘rationale’ behind such a blind spot or the zone of silence, it is not that concerned scholars have any evident antipathy towards the task of investigating and theorizing the communicative dynamics of public policy formulation and implementation. It may rather be a simple case of indifference, arising out of the entrenched but self-defeating assumption that public policies are made by ‘experts at the top’, and that being pronounced and proclaimed by the highest echelons of government, it is in any case being ‘communicated’ to the people ‘down below’. Such assumption rests on the fundamental faw of making information synonymous 47

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with communication. Information can afford to be based on one directional fow of messages, but communication has to rest on at least a two-way and preferably multi-way fow of messages. In other words, communication has information as its ‘raw material’. Communication and information are not synonymous. Passingly I may refer to the fact that the detachment between public administration and communication studies has also aggravated the marginalization of the study of public policy communication in India. This, however, is not exactly the case in the Western academe. Using information in the broader sense and stressing (Dunn, 2004: 3–6) the importance of policy-relevant information and policy-informational transformation in policy analysis, William Dunn highlights the vital role of public action in solving policy problems, which he defnes (p. 4) as the unrealized value or opportunity for improvement. One can, however, go further back to refer to Harold Lasswell’s bridge-building exercise (Lasswell, 1972: 301–310) in this context. He was advocating a closer bond between public opinion research/ communication research and the policy arena, to the extent of acknowledging the need of the former to become a member of policy science, in these words: Public opinion/communication research, if it is to become fully professionalized, should exert itself more to probe and report on the adequacy of the fows of information that enter into policymaking, as well as on the functioning of the policy process at all stages. (p. 301) In a much later observation on the importance of public policy communication, Young (2007: 179) stresses that public organizing and engagement can be thought of as processes by which society communicates to itself about its needs, problems and creative ideas for how to solve them. For him, the democratic legitimacy of public policy, moreover, depends partly on state institutions being sensitive to that communication process. Western scholarship in public policy communication has evidently acquired a more mature form with the passing years. Thus, in The Argumentative Turn Revisited: Public Policy as Communicative Practice, Fischer and Gotweis (2012) draw heavily from Habermas’s critical theory to expose the constraints and defciencies of ‘value-free’, technical policy analysis. In the process, they reveal (p.  1) how domains as different as discourse analysis, deliberation, deliberative democracy, citizen juries, governance, expertise, participatory inquiry, local and tacit knowledge, collaborative planning, the uses and role of media and interpretive methods, among others, have offered a creative plate of public policy studies constituted and mediated through communicative practices – moving back and forth vis-à-vis argumentation and discourse – with impressively varied methods and techniques. 48

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If, on the other hand, one scans the mainstream literature of public policy in India, one fnds a distinct trend in studies concerning the important question of public policies gone right or wrong. In both cases, though with differential outcomes, the analyses overwhelmingly identify the ‘structural factors’ contributing to the success or failure of the policies. A scrutiny of important journals, such as the Indian Journal of Public Administration, would illustrate the point. Thus more often, one tends to fnd some special stress on ‘obstacles’, ‘hindrances’, ‘constraints’ and ‘limitations’ in the process of policy implementation. The discussions revolve around the ways and means through which, as the case may be, they could or could not be overcome. There is hardly any doubt that structural issues form an integral part of the success and failure of policies, and they are to be an inalienable part of policy analysis. However, such analyses run the risk of being reductionist and partial in the absence of any reference to the mode/s of (non)communication with regard to specifc policies. The issue here is not that the Indian scholars of public administration have to emulate their Western counterparts. What is the most important point to consider is that, by noticing such emphasis on public policy communication, Indian scholars can devise their way for making a more effective contribution to the study of public policy. Public policy is widely recognized as the lifeblood of administration, but administration is inconceivable without the process of communication, formal and informal. This raises the question whether public policy can be appropriately analyzed without being informed by communication theory. In exploring the possible justifcation of utilizing Jurgen Habermas’s normative principles of communicative rationality, John Dryzek (2006: 196) makes the observation that when it comes to the content of understandings, critical policy analysis deploying principles of communicative rationality is in a position to unmask ideological claims – ideology here being understood in the pejorative sense – as the specifcation of false necessities. In the discipline of public administration, while the adjective ‘public’ refers to governmental/public authorities, the same prefx also connotes people for whom the policies are supposed to be formulated. The latter calls for civic engagement through citizen participation. Then again, the awkward but inevitable question is, how public is public policy in the latter sense. In the specifc context of India, which is taken up in detail in the next section, it is common knowledge that the country formally entered into the market economy in the early 1990s, making it necessary to intensely scrutinize the communicative matrix of the Indian public policy domain. How much feedback is being sought and received from those for whom policies are supposed to be formulated and implemented? The question in politicoadministrative terms involves the twin issues of transparency and accountability, supposedly two major pillars of ‘good governance’. The question is of immense importance in the days of LPG – an era in which the state is on the back foot and the market on the front foot. It is not just a question of 49

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‘taking people into account’ or ‘protecting the interest of the people’ – the usual claims of the policymakers, indicating the adoption of the so-called people-centric public policy. The moot issue is whether public policy is people-driven. There is, as I see it, a fundamental distinction between the two categories – people-centric and people-driven. The former is induced by a ‘top down’ taken-for-grantedness about people (perceived mainly as amorphous and silent masses), who are supposed to have little say in policies. It is also induced by an implicit idea, ‘not to be made public’ in a democracy, that public policies are essentially choices or actions backed up by the coercive power of the state – with people having little role as actors. One may refer to a classic but now largely discredited theory, often associated with dictatorial regimes, in communication studies – the bullet theory. Its basic methodological premise is that the messages from the powerful ‘senders’ to the passive ‘receivers’ penetrate the latter in a linear way – with huge pace, without any hitch. It is noteworthy that in such theory ‘communication’ is perceived in a monochromatic way – with the denial of possibility of any ‘noise’ in the form of alternative ideas and possibility of debates. Such a monochromatic view seeks to present communication as the generation of one-way information, thereby subverting the very constitutive logic of communication itself. On the other hand, in the case of policies being peopledriven, it is acknowledged that responses of people, at least of the informed section, are important in the multilayered policy process and that people are not just passive recipients of policies formulated from above. This stance does not advocate any egalitarian utopia by visualizing a popular response by one and all. It rather calls for creating opportunity for all to participate, which may eventually result in responses from a section of the people. In this stance, the proposed policies are to be disclosed to people at large to estimate their responses, and accordingly the policies are to be given shape. In this case, the popular response is regarded as an essential requirement. The underlying assumption in this case is that public policies, even when formulated by experts, may remain defcient, vague and ambiguous, and on occasions they may even be contradictory to public interest. At this stage of the discussion, another important dimension of public policy communication is worth noting. While both the processes of policy formulation and policy implementation leave much to be desired in terms of communication so far as the process of policy implementation is concerned, a reasonable degree of communication takes place when people, having experienced a policy, provide some sort of spontaneous response – positive or negative. If the policymakers come to understand that a particular public policy has really met with success, such a popular response may be engineered by them. This would, however, not be the case when the policymakers come to realize that a particular policy has failed. Both ways, whether intended or not intended by those in the power corridor, some degree of communication is inevitable after policy implementation. But this cannot 50

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be said about the overwhelmingly ‘closed door’ policy formulation process. In a country like India, notwithstanding the fact that it is supposedly the world’s largest democracy, the incommunicado policymakers adopt a highly condescending and patrimonial “we know what is best for them” approach. The vital issue that confronts us in the arena of public administration is whether governance is being ‘distributed’ appropriately in an inequitable society like ours. This issue begs attention to the decisional dimensions of policy formulation – beyond the conventional focus on ‘publicity’ of public policies. To refer more specifcally to the mechanics of public policy communication, communication is the essence of public policy both as a process and as a product. Ingrained in it are key items such as problem identifcation and policy formulation, adoption, implementation and evaluation. The Indian scenario, which is discussed in the next section, is no exception in this regard. The primary pre-condition to administering public policy is dissemination of relevant data and information. But taking cue from the distinction made earlier between information and communication, I shall subsequently argue that data and information are a necessary but not a suffcient condition. The suffcient condition is attained when communication – which in the context of the discussion here means soliciting response of the people who, at least theoretically, are to be the benefciaries, and not ‘targets’ of policies – is taken into account. Communication is vital for all societies, especially in a multicultural and inequitable society like India. The communicative exercise is also important because of the conceptual and practical complexities associated with public policy. To put the matter in a more straightforward way, public policies are not conducted in a linear fashion. Take, for example, the defnition of policy provided by Thomas Dye, one of the foremost scholars in policy studies. According to him (2013: 3), policy is ‘whatever governments choose to do or not to do’. Policies are often defned as the actions, objectives and pronouncements of governments on particular matters, the steps they take (or fail to take) to implement them and the explanations they give for what happens (or does not happen). A closer reading of the apparently general statement would reveal that it is pregnant with a lot of crucial cues. Let me elaborate the point. Policy is most often described as a purposive course of action or inaction undertaken by an actor or set of actors in dealing with a problem or matter of concern. It implies that policies have a set of characteristics. First, public policies are conceptualized by public authorities. Even in the days of ascendance of the market, the state is at the forefront, at least formally, in proclaiming public policies. Second, public policies are not randomly conceptualized as they are to be ‘purposive and goal oriented’. Third, policies consist of patterned actions conducted within a specifc time. Fourth, policies in many cases are an outcome of demand from the people for a government-directed course of action on specifc issues. In a number of cases, such demand can also gain 51

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enough momentum to transform itself into ‘pressure’. Last but not the least, as revealed in Dye’s defnition, public policy can be deliberately purposive action or deliberately purposive non-action.

Locating India Insofar as the mechanics and dynamics of public policy in the Indian context is concerned, frst and foremost, it is important to come to terms with the fact that India is not a monolithic entity. The Indian society is a society divided. The Constitution of India, adopted in the year 1950 after prolonged and intense deliberations by distinguished personalities, begins with the following observation of prime signifcance: “India, that is Bharat. . .”. It had also unleashed waves of optimism regarding the construction of a just, equal and participative society, that too after long and repressive colonial rule and a devastatingly divisive partition. Since then the country has traversed more than seven decades of its existence and witnessed a multilevel churning in its polity and economy. The arduous journey of the ‘nation-state’ has been marked by a number of continuities and change – in fact, too many to be mentioned here. During this period, India has attracted the attention of the world as a pro-active Third World country striving for ‘developed’ status with reasonable political and economic leverage in world affairs. Along the way, India has effected a huge paradigm shift in the governance-development interface by leaving the long and arduous path of ‘Nehruvian consensus’ and formally adopting neo-liberal market reforms in mid-1991, in the name of development. Yet, beneath and beyond these achievements there is a lurking question: is there a growing divide between ‘India’ and ‘Bharat’? The question has a lot of policy implications. The aforementioned question confronts us despite efforts to relegate it to the background either by dismissing it as a fgment of imagination or by overwhelmingly packaging it with shrill rhetoric. Leaving aside their historical antecedents and terminological specifcities, both ‘India’ and ‘Bharat’ are being used here metaphorically. ‘Bharat’ is the other of ‘India’. Both are intimate, yet detached. The moot point is, whether the categories, far from being synonymous, are attaining a ‘binary status’. ‘India’ is supposed to belong to the upper echelon of the society – from the super-rich down to their uppermiddle class counterparts. ‘Bharat’, on the other hand, is perceived to be associated with the much less privileged strata – from the lower middle to those at the bottom – the pulverized and marginalized sections. ‘India’ supposedly shines in the light of modernity, while ‘Bharat’ is supposed to be pre-modern, steeped in primordial and anachronistic norms and traditions. At the foundation of such a divide, there is the perennial rich-poor gap, but the contrasting scenarios have an exceptionally wide range: in the degree of access to education and public health care and employment, in modes of housing and transport, in terms of access to institutions of governance, food 52

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security and so on. The unoffcial and often unrecognized vertical split is sourced from differing life worlds of the people of the same country. What is most striking about this divide is that it has been able to perpetuate and intensify itself in two competing paradigms of governancedevelopment: the state-led one which was being followed since independence in the late 1940s, and the market-sourced one which is being followed since the 1990s. In both cases, the commonality has been that ‘India’ is slowly but steadily transgressing the entitlements of ‘Bharat’. ‘India Inc.’ is even more aggressively corporate-led, while ‘Bharat’ is awkwardly statedependent. This is so even if, in terms of the number of inhabitants, the latter is much larger than the former. My purpose is not to make a case for some kind of homogeneity in what is basically an organically multicultural society. Nor is it to reductively attribute the divide to some conspiratorial acts on the part of those who beneft from such a divide. The matter is much more complex than what simplistic explanations reveal. What is important is to draw attention to the increasingly evident superordinatesubordinate relations that lie behind such a perceived divide, a relationship in which ‘India’ is in a much more privileged position than ‘Bharat’. The extent to which amenities and privileges are being monopolized by ‘India’, there emerges a yawning gap between those who belong to it and those involved in an exceedingly diffcult struggle for day-to-day survival in ‘Bharat’. It is often an inequitable show of ‘excess versus defcit’ in political economic terms, which undermines justice and fair play, and in the process negates the promises of democratic governance and inclusive development. Ironically, those who inhabit the supposedly contending spaces are ‘co-citizens’ themselves, who are supposed to be equal in terms of availing rights, freedoms and opportunities. While citizens of various shades come under the fold of public policy, it may be noted that Indian policymakers have a fairly wide clientele who need special attention, especially in ‘Bharat’: poor, indigenous people, minorities, ethnic groups, Dalits, women, elderly, children, disabled, refugees, migrants and so on. Ironically, with the onset of a market-oriented economy and the call by neo-liberal advocates for a ‘social safety net’ as a replacement of social welfare measures, several exclusionary trends are intensifying in society. Such trends involve a lack or denial of resources, rights, goods and services, and an inability of many people to participate in normal relationships and activities in economic, social, cultural or political arenas. The trends affect both the quality of life of individuals and equity and cohesion of the society because they intensify the inability to access goods and services which the more privileged ones take for granted. A retrospective look at public policies in India in education, health, employment, poverty eradication, and even in the much publicized sector of information and communication technology, does not yet show an encouraging picture. The show is overwhelmingly marked verbally by infated rhetoric and actually by a tinkering syndrome. 53

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The economic logic guiding the policymaking process emphasizes more on the supply side and little on the demand side. In critical communicative terms, it is ‘therapeutic’ in spirit – in the sense that some ‘qualifed’ experts unilaterally decide the ‘appropriate’ doses of policies for eradicating the ills of the ‘unqualifed’ masses. The complexity does not end there. Yet another moot question emerges from within the governance-society interface in such a scenario. Even when an attempt is made to address social exclusion, the question is whether Indian policymakers are ready to go beyond the surface level to promote social inclusion. When the Indian state was the prime actor in development while a number of policies were adopted periodically by the rulers, people’s participation could not be totally wished away. Such acts of invoking ‘people’ need not be attributed to a great sense of accountability of the rulers. It was more due to the compulsion of the patron, that is, the state, to regularly address the clients. The clients needed a periodic appraisal of the actions of the patron, and the state being the chief patron of development was performing the ritual of rationalizing its actions. In the process, it also included various explanations and excuses of defcient and/or failed instances of policy implementation. The interventionist, paternalistic Indian state, as the dominant agent of people’s welfare, was problematic in itself. As pointed out by Nirja Gopal Jayal (Jayal, 1994: 18–26), it was more of an interventionist state than a welfare state because its welfarist initiatives fell short of the classical notion of welfare in which rights are accorded the centrality. Yet the Indian state, with all its limitations, provided people with at least one advantage – that of looking up to it and also targeting it when it came to the purgation of frustrations vis-à-vis development policies and programmes. In slogans in the wall or in processions, in strikes and even in violent acts of destruction, the direct target was the state. Even the most consistent critics of the Indian state did not demand the ‘withering away of the Indian state’ as such; the clamour basically was for a better, more effcient and more effective state, responsive to the needs, aspirations and interests of ordinary people. An illustrative case is that of Rajni Kothari’s State Against Democracy (1989), published two years before India’s formal transition to liberalization. The volume contains a severe critique of the role performance of the Indian state vis-à-vis democracy, but it does not in any way advocate the coming of the market as an alternative. At the other end, the response from the rulers to the clients varied from being defensive to offensive, but such responses overwhelmingly revolved around the state itself, with little attempt to shift the responsibility to any other entity. A convenient strategy for rulers at that time could have been to shift the blame on the market for any gap between promise and performance but in the then-prevalent power equations the market was only a secondary actor – not even worthy of ‘passing the buck’. If one has to identify a single factor behind such a people-oriented dispensation of the state, it was what I prefer to call the compulsive visibility of the 54

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state – an attribute ingrained in its constitutive logic, modus operandi and survival strategy as the chief patron of development. With the market acquiring the centre stage of development, such visibility is considerably blurred. Epistemologically speaking, the market, resting on the ‘invisible hand’ thesis, does not want to divulge its operational logic in great detail. It rather prefers to operate from behind, keeping the state at the forefront. Thus, contrary to the earlier apprehension of analysts that the market-led development would hasten the dissolution of the state, it is found that the market functions in tandem with the state, often showing examples of splendid collaboration, beyond instances of mere mechanical cohabitation. It is interesting that the state now acts in tandem with the dictates of the New Public Management, in which politicians and bureaucrats are supposed to act like business entrepreneurs as governance is more of a ‘business’. This also has a direct bearing on the spirit and functioning of public institutions, which has led to the call for “rethinking” the institutional setup (Kapur et al., 2017). On a broader scale, it has a direct connection with the rising phenomenon of ‘nation-branding’, in which the nation is promoted as a product to be showcased in the global marketplace (Aronczyk, 2008: 41–65). There is little doubt that such ventures are marked by highly inequitable power equations – with the state this time relegated to a secondary position. Yet, the state is accorded some responsibilities, especially the maintenance of law and order and legislating and executing the market-friendly laws, by which the market forces take advantage of its visibility and familiarity among the people. In such ambience, the state, though being on backfoot, continues to occupy the frontstage in rationalizing and justifying the policies adopted, and also in facing brickbats. The less visible market operates from the backstage. It is worth recollecting that the Open Door policy in India was adopted in 1991 without any debate by a ‘minority’ government in the Parliament. It was perhaps destined to be so as the development discourse of ‘India Inc.’ had to be cleansed of politics. In such a discourse, people are at best described as the ‘possible benefciaries’ of development, with little substantive role earmarked for them as major stakeholders in development. Development is to be framed and codifed from the top and in a steeply hierarchical way it is to be percolated, with mostly vague timeframes, to people ‘down below’ who also have to undergo the ‘teething trouble’. One major instance of such a mode of development is the unilateral announcement of demonetization on 8 November 2016. While the basic logic of such an act was that its prior announcement would have nullifed the twin goals of tackling counterfeit currency and terror funding, that justifcation does not in any way neutralize the criticism that it was a typical case of one-way information to people about the measure without any communication whatsoever. There was no clue as to how to offset the hardships that ordinary people would go through, with more than 70% of the currency going out of circulation overnight. 55

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Indian democracy’s encounter with the market mode of development has also made the issue of regime change far more inconsequential insofar as ordinary people are concerned. Governing regimes, irrespective of their ideological affnities, have been sucked straight into the market-led path of development. The point can be substantiated by analyzing the narratives and counter-narratives of development of the harbingers of the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) and the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) governments – the Congress Party and the Bharatiya Janata Party, respectively. In the post-reforms era, one can note, there is hardly any fundamental difference in their narratives of development policy. In the policy debates between the two largest parties of India, the inviolable boundary lines are strictly delineated. Accordingly, macro-economic policy issues dominate the debates. The growth-obsessed policies revolve around issues such as gross domestic product (GDP), goods and service tax (GST), tax net, credit index, investors’ confdence level, current account defcit, rate of capital formation and so forth. In the process, the policy debates scrupulously avoid the intrinsically ‘political’ question whether an economy can surge ahead by leaving people behind and by indulging in welfare genocide. These policy debates scrupulously avoid ‘sensitive’ topics, such as plummeting rate of employment, casualization of work, diminishing nutritional value, abysmal conditions of public health and degeneration of the agricultural sector and the vulnerability of the unorganized sector. The reason is that these issues cannot be discussed threadbare without referring to the politics of policymaking in which people are being progressively secluded. The populist rhetoric of ‘people’s welfare’ only seeks to hide such processes without any substantive change. These debates also scrupulously circumvent the ‘economic’ point of view that in the 21st century the return on capital is much less and the rate of economic growth is bound to slow down – the central argument, with huge data, in the French economist Thomas Picketty’s widely discussed book, Capital in the Twenty-First Century (2014). It may also be mentioned in passing that the orchestrated debates in market-friendly, proft-driven mainstream media, the ‘fourth pillar of democracy’, reinforce such exclusionary policy processes by restricting media audiences to the transition from the clients to consumers, and not contributing to their transition to citizens with critical faculty (Sinha, 2014: 104–128). Incidentally, the role of the mainstream mass media and also that of the social media vis-à-vis public policy remains an unexplored area in India. In post-liberalization India, for reasons not much diffcult to identify, information and communication technology is being publicized as the backbone of networked governance. Such publicity comes with the claim that there has been a revolutionary change for the better in governance communication. There is no denying the fact that networking vis-à-vis both governance and technology is inevitable nowadays as development is more and more being determined by the informational mode and its constitutive networks 56

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as space of fows. But at the same time, as an inevitable consequence of such a trend, the organizations and institutions of governance are supposed to acquire ‘inward’ fexibility for the good of the people. Such fexibility should be of particular concern to social scientists in general and public administration scholars in particular because such networks are potentially exclusionary in nature and to make them inclusionary would require effcient and effective management and regulation. The question, however, is whether governance in India, in terms of initiating such inward fexibility for effcient management and regulation, is keeping pace with technology. This very question leads us to yet another vital, and perhaps more fundamental question: to what extent is the Indian state ready for such transformation? The piggy-back ride on the information and technology (ICT) policy by policymakers may be dangerous if one considers the point made by none other than Manuel Castells, the pioneering analyst of the network society. Despite having expressed preference for the network society, Castells warns (Castells, 2004: 23) that the networks, notwithstanding their huge promise, are potentially exclusionary, if not adequately managed and regulated. Elsewhere I have shown (Sinha, 2010: 1–25) vis-à-vis the ICT policy how it was adopted without public consultation, and with disengaging impact. There are, on the contrary, instances of developing countries like Brazil in which the ICT policy has been formulated with broad-based public consultation (Sinha, 2004: 301–313). In contemporary times the proponents of ‘good governance’ continue to advocate open, transparent, responsible and accountable policymaking through economic deregulation and political decentralization. But the Indian experience reveals that while the former is implemented with exceptional zeal, the latter lags behind. What exactly does it entail for policy communication? Bang and Esmark (2009: 14–18) provide an interesting key when they argue that network governance ensures a shift from politics-policy to policy-politics. In the former, politics used to subsume policy, while in the latter it is the other way around. They hasten to add that in the latter case ‘good governance’ (which itself is a buzzword with a fair share of criticism) is prioritized over democracy, an observation which is provocative enough to make India a ‘test case’ in these times. In this backdrop and context, to reclaim public policy communication from its ‘nearly lost’ state, public policy analysts may perform better if they pay heed to a recent theorization of ‘voice’. ‘Voice’ has found an important place in the discussion of Dreze and Sen (2002: 28–32) on the interface of public policy, development and participation in the Indian context, and in their call for reorienting democratic institutions from the practice of exclusion of the underprivileged. Dreze and Senintegrate ‘voice’ with ‘(self)-assertion of the underprivileged through political organization and “solidarity” based on cooperation between the underprivileged sections of the society and their privileged counterparts’. This, they contend, would facilitate recovery of the quality of democracy from the pitfalls of economic and social inequality 57

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caused by policies minimizing social opportunities. In the more specifc context of the people’s voice as a collective locus of agency in the neo-liberal times, it might also be useful to refer briefy to some key points from the formulations of communication theorist, Nick Couldry (2010: 1–20). The voice of the people, according to him, has two functions: (a) it challenges any unilateral and patrimonial claim of doing good for ‘them’ as the disadvantaged people, and (b) it promotes alternative ideas, perspectives, actions, policies – based on people’s own actions. Couldry identifes two major analytical categories: (a) voice as a value and (b) voice as a process. The frst category refers to ‘the act of valuing, and choosing to value, those frameworks for organizing human life and resources that themselves value voice as a process. The second relates to giving account of one’s life and its conditions. Valuing voice involves close attention to the conditions under which voice as a process becomes effective. It also reveals how broader forms of organization may subtly undermine or devalue voice as a process. Couldry’s reading of the scenarios in the UK and US leads him to assert that there is a sort of built-in mechanism in neo-liberalism, which makes offers of voice ‘unsustainable’. This blockade is effected either by outright denying the voice or by making it illusory. It may be added that contracting the people’s voice has a direct link to possibly increasing the number of people who will be sucked into the trope of intolerance of alternative and/or counter-opinions. At another level, with greater twists, it makes militant protests and violence a part of the struggle for attainment of democracy. Both in their respective ways may be linked to public policy communication.

Concluding remarks To formulate inclusive public policies is not an easy task by any means. The basic task is to treat the concerned problems or issues by imparting everyday orientation to policy and at the same time to do it in a theoretical framework. In a more specifc vein, it is important to explore the trends and patterns in policies and gaps – with special reference to the interplay of past interventions and future courses of action – for strategizing public policy communication in particular and policy architecture in general. It must be clear by now that in trying to bring to the fore a ‘nearly lost’ theme, the chapter has presented a two-tiered critique: frst, it critiques the thinking and act of policymakers, and second, in a self-critical vein it points a fnger to the scholars of public administration in India for keeping communication out of their ontological, epistemological and methodological orbits. Let us agree that when we fail to develop adequate analytical tools to analyze the policy process, we willingly or unwillingly become party to the exclusionary politics of the powers that be. In disciplinary terms it also leads to ‘transplanted’ ideas and techniques. Shedding autonomy may not be a pleasing proposition for a creative discipline like public administration. The choice 58

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and the outcome of courses lie with the thinkers and practitioners of the discipline themselves.

References Aronczyk, Melissa, 2008, “‘Living the Brand’: Nationality, Globality and the Identity Strategies of Nation Branding Consultants”, International Journal of Communication, Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 41–65. Bang, Henrik and Esmark, Anders, 2009, “Good Governance in Network Society: Reconfguring the Political from Politics to Policy”, Administrative Theory & Praxis, Vol. 31, No. 1, pp. 7–37. Castells, Manuel (ed.), 2004, The Network Society: A Cross-cultural Perspective, Northampton, MA, Edward Elgar. Couldry, Nick, 2010, Why Voice Matters: Culture and Politics after Neoliberalism, London, Sage Publications. Dreze, Jean and Sen, Amartya, 2002, India: Development and Participation, Oxford, Oxford University Press. Dryzek, John S., 2006, “Policy Analysis as Critique”, in Michael Moran et al. (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Public Policy, Oxford, Oxford University Press. Dunn, William N., 2004, Public Policy Analysis: An Introduction, Upper Saddle River, NJ, Pearson. Dye, Thomas R., 2013, Understanding Public Policy, Fourteenth edition, New York, Longman Press. Fischer, Frank and Herbert Gotweis (eds.), 2012, The Argumentative Turn Revisited: Public Policy as Communicative Practice, Durham and London, Duke University Press. Jayal, Nirja Gopal, 1994, “The Gentle Leviathan: Welfare and the Indian State”, Social Scientist, Vol. 22, No. 256–259, pp. 18–26. Kapur, Devesh, Bhanu Mehta, Pratap and Vaishnav, Milan, 2017, Rethinking Public Institutions in India, New Delhi, Oxford University Press. Kothari, Rajni, 1989, State Against Democracy – Politics and People: In Search of a Humane India, New York, New Horizons Press. Lasswell, Harold D., 1972, “Communications Research and Public Policy”, The Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 3, pp. 301–310. Picketty, Thomas, 2014, Capital in the Twenty-First Century, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press. Sinha, Dipankar, 2004, “The Politics of Information Society: A Comparative Analysis of India and Brazil”, in Michel Sauquet et al. (eds.), L’idiot du Village Mondial (in French), Brussels and Paris, Alliance-Luc Pire-Charles Leopold Mayer. Sinha, Dipankar, 2010, “(De)Politicizing Information Technology: Towards an Inclusionary Perspective”, MEDIA@LSE Electronic Working Papers, No. 19, London, London School of Economics and Political Science, pp.  1–25, www.lse.ac.uk/ media-and communications/assets/documents/research/working-paper-series/ EWP19.pdf, accessed on 3/01/2019. Sinha, Dipankar, 2014, “From Clients to Consumers: The Missing Citizens Among the Indian Television Audience”, in B. Sen and A. Roy (eds.), Channeling Cultures: Television Studies from India, New Delhi, Oxford University Press, pp. 104–128. Young, I. M., 2007, Inclusion and Democracy, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

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4 CONNECTING THE DOTS, LOCATING THE LINKAGES Conceptual perspectives on human rights, human security and public policy Kadloor Savitri

The development of the concept of human rights, and its understanding thereof, has been aided by an eclectic feld of sources, disciplines and cultures. In essence, the sources, development and impact of human rights have been pluralistic in nature; it helps to countenance the fact that a holistic understanding of human rights cannot be achieved from a particular discipline or a singular understanding of a society. It is neither subject specifc nor one-dimensional in nature. Likewise, its impact has been varied too and widespread ranging from ideas, to concepts to policy and planning. One of the most important developments of the 20th century has been the interweaving of human rights in every conceivable intellectual and socio-political discussion, with attendant impact that has been a phenomenal game changer. Human rights standards and obligations have been applied to such concepts as development, security and public policy, with varying degrees of success and relevance. In other words, human rights have permeated the lexicon of every conceivable concept to endow them with an emancipatory sense and agency. This chapter looks at the conceptual and policy infuences that shaped the idea of human security and development policy from the perspective of human rights. It attempts to illustrate that any understanding of human security is likely to be incomplete if it does not factor in the invaluable moorings afforded by three concepts – namely, human rights, rights-based approach (hereafter RBA) and right to development – in nascent stages of its development. This chapter also seeks to trace the trajectory of linkages between human rights and human security on the one hand and the mutual infuence between the two concepts infuencing public policy on the other – one conceptual and the other operational in nature. Two important trajectories can be located in the study of public policy and human 60

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security interface; frst, the conceptual footprints that lead to the emergence of human security as an idea began with human rights, later fortifed by the rights based approach to development, culminating in the individual-centric approach to security. Second, notwithstanding the conceptual origin, it is equally pertinent to critically assess the nature of interaction and mutual infuence between human rights and human security and its consequent impact on the shaping of public policy choices and their implementation. It is posited here that the linkage between the two trajectories would be the cusp on which human security and public policy alternatives are located. Among all categories of rights, it is individual rights that have assumed salience and moved to the centre stage of security dialogue in a way that has signifcantly altered the kernel of discussion on the subject. In fact, it is this shift in the understanding of security from state to a non-state dimension – that is, from national security to human security – that has enabled the non-state actors to proactively campaign for the social dimension of the security dialogue and act as a check on the unilateral actions of the state. Human security has made an indelible impact on our lives and quality of our social existence in the past quarter of a century. The frst argument of this chapter is that the idea of human security could not have evolved if we had not already experienced the conceptual and operational dimensions of human rights in their complete radiance. The germination of the concept of human security can be traced to the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948, wherein, though the term “human security” was not used, it affrmed every individual’s entitlement to a social and international order in which rights and freedoms could be fully realized, thereby extending support to “a human-centred defnition of security. . . it recognizes that respect for rights is intimately connected to the creation of a just social and international framework. It anticipate[d] a human-centred approach to security based on the independence of peoples” (Vietti, 2013: 19). Human rights and human security represent the two ends of the same chronological-conceptual spectrum that is interspersed with right to development, RBA and human development as the intermediary concepts. Or, in other words, the concepts of human rights and right to development are the progenitors of human security. Evidently, there exists at every stage of this evolution a distinct cross-pollination of concepts and ideas, which, in themselves, have found assertion in human rights discourse.

From human rights to right to development: an assertion and a reorientation It is now a well-known and widely acknowledged fact that development discourse was slow in warming up to human rights. Human rights and development followed different trajectories in terms of goals and processes 61

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for long before their paths came together to give rise to the idea of right to development which, in essence, went beyond the terminological conjunction. Right to development as a third-generation right or a collective right – having a strong accent on its social dimension – received impetus in two ways; let us term these as assertion and reorientation. Right to development strengthened the claim of the impoverished Global South to their legitimate demand for development; hence it was an assertion that no longer remained a welfare measure. Conversely, it also intrinsically weakened the hitherto held notion of development as measured through economic indicators alone. Therefore, right to development axiomatically exposed the fault lines in the traditional approach to development. Such amplifcation of the fawed and myopic lens of development enabled a fresh look at the concept and its indicators; hence it was a reorientation, which encouraged the UN Independent Expert on Right to Development to rightly recast the dice by the time the drafting of the Declaration on Right to Development got under way during the mid-1980s. Eventually, the declaration combined in itself both a reorientation of the idea of development as also its assertion as a right, and as a claim, against those forces and political interests that had denied this right even as the economic dimension was repeatedly overemphasized. The assertion and reorientation embedded in right to development is attributed to the conceptual and moral force of human rights. Looking back in hindsight, several sources have acknowledged the unmistakable linkage between human rights–based approach and right to development: The advancement of a human rights-based approach to development is among the greatest achievements of the 1986 UN Declaration on the Right to Development. Since then, this approach has guided the integration of norms, standards and principles of the international human rights system into the plans, policies and processes of development, including the 2030 Agenda and the Sustainable Development Goals. (Piovesan, 2017) The concept of human rights became visible within the development discourse – from right to development to ‘rights-based approach’ to development – in 1990s although it can be fairly established that the human rights concept acted as the very fountainhead of right to development (Tomasevski in Uvin, 2007: 597). Some contend that the vocabulary and discourse on development before the 1990s had remained insulated from the strides made in the feld of human rights despite the conceptual cross-pollination between human rights and right to development because of the political and ideological chasms witnessed during the Cold War that furthered continued relevance of the state security paradigm. This insulation began to wane after the end of the Cold War with the call for good governance 62

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and democracy following the realization that the absence of governmental accountability resulted in manifest failure of policies of structural adjustment programmes. It coincided with the need for development scholars to look beyond economic indices “to redefne development as being about more than economic growth: talking about human rights is one way to construct a more holistic defnition” (Uvin, 2007: 597; Vietti, 2013). It must be emphasized here that the process of infuence between human rights and development was a two-way process – which has been referred to as “crosspollination” earlier. Development too entered the human rights construct through a debate on right to development wherein the term “right” helped to shift the focus away from pure economic connotations. This prefx (of the term “right”) also lent moral justifcation to the demand coming from the developing and less developed countries in global forums. It was necessary to dilute exclusive focus on economic factors to demand the reordering of international economic relations as refected in international trade, balance of payments, aid and fnance. There was a realization that policy goals and demands wrapped in human rights fabric earned greater political acceptability and legitimacy as the ill effects of structural adjustment programmes and policies became increasingly evident during the decade of the 1980s as also the frustrations surrounding the demand for the recognition of right to development. Many a time, reordering of phrases might be required to score a rhetorical, moral victory at the high table of diplomatic deliberations even though it does not change much in real terms. Right to development largely remained a rhetoric given the fact that it was nonbinding, lacking in precise defnition, and was declaratory in nature, with no specifc action plan woven into the document. For this reason among others, many scholars have been less optimistic, even sceptical, in their appraisal of the linkage between human rights and right to development and other ever-evolving concepts to be anything beyond the rhetoric (Donnelly’s view supported by Uvin, 2007; Howard-Hassman, 2012). However, amidst the rhetoric, one cannot afford to miss the point that it signalled the key role played by human rights in turning around the argument in favour of those less dominant states that were up against a formidable position whose demand for development would never have received its recognition as a “right” – however feeble – had it not been for the derivative moorings of human rights. Some do acknowledge that human rights carry within them a steady, undying, continuing agency: Human rights, once set down on paper, never die, even though no one may care much about their survival. Rather, they mutate into working groups, commissions, and expert panels, each of which produces reports . . . [s]ometimes, however, out of this patient work contested or marginal rights obtain a second lease of life. (Uvin, 2007: 598) 63

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Rights-based approach: building bridges between trajectories The rights-based approach (RBA) signifes a signifcant shift in the social science discourse in general and human rights discourse in particular. It was developed in the context of development and human security to denote a human rights–centric approach wherein every individual could claim services as a matter of right before the public authorities and not as a mere passive recipient. It is this insistence on right which alters the notion of RBA from other approaches that seek to achieve development and human security. RBA alters the position of individual in one swift stroke, almost spectacularly, from being a passive, derivative self to an active bearer of rights; from being an object of international efforts and national planning to a subject of international and national law. RBA does not merely change the position of the individual. It lends legal, political and social capital that enables an individual to become a bearer of rights while simultaneously making the state a bearer of duty towards its citizens. RBA in the context of human security is important as an approach because it incorporates the international human rights standards, principles and norms into planning and policy initiatives undertaken at home. In recent years, RBA has been used to analyze the various policy initiatives undertaken by the state to deliver public goods and services and thereby to alleviate the position of the poor and marginalized in the developing world. From the standpoint of the state, RBA imposes certain principles as responsibility, accountability, transparency, non-discrimination and rule of law. It lays emphasis on an undeniable link between human rights and issues of human development and security, that is, it looks at human security beyond the traditional framework of physical, infrastructural security as refected in the defence paraphernalia of a state. RBA does not create any new services or actions, but it is useful in redefning development in terms of claims and processes – or, goals and means. As for claims and goals, RBA facilitated the reorientation of development policy agenda from one of welfare and charity in favour of claims and duties – claims by the individuals and duties for the state or policy makers. Additionally, these duties and responsibilities could be adjudicated for violation of rights. Not all remedial measures of adjudicating violations offered by RBA are legal in nature which might ordinarily entail long, winding litigation processes; some measures are ingrained in spheres other than legal such as administrative mechanisms. Once development goals get articulated in terms of claims and accountability, they will inevitably encounter constraints and limits of their own – not just legal limits alone – which makes their violation diffcult: [M]any forms of social counter-power, administrative mechanisms, open discussion, and shared ideological constraints can act as 64

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mechanisms of accountability as well. At the end of the day .  .  . the nature of the claims and the duties created by human-rights claims is a deeply political and constantly shifting matter; for what is socially and legally feasible today is never fxed, but a matter of political struggle. (Uvin, 2007: 603) In terms of processes and means, RBA with an accent on core human rights makes it imperative for development processes to comply with human rights standards by pursuing and promoting such values as participation, transparency, accountability, equitable distribution of benefts and so on. This aspect of the rights-based approach makes discrimination and exclusion of marginalized groups untenable. Whether these goals lodged in the cusp of the processes are realized or not is a matter of policy implementation and its challenges; RBA provides an essential conceptual framework on which the policy choices for implementation must be located. In other words, questions might be raised about instances of less than optimal realization of developmental goals in terms of desirable processes (means) of accountability in certain sectors and societies, but the test and credit of RBA lie in altering the contours of processes and the kernel of discussion about developmental choices rather than in guaranteeing a visible empirical footprint of claims and processes in a particular context. To illustrate further, the rights-based approach would make necessary the participation of all stakeholders in determining policy inputs towards implementing Sustainable Development Goals (hereafter SDGs); however, poor implementation of the policy choices thus made (in accordance with SDGs) to reduce poverty and the infant and child mortality rate in a less developed country cannot be held as a proof of failure of the rights-based approach itself. The rights-based approach provided the proverbial meeting ground between development and human rights practitioners to create a compact between human rights and human development. Boutros-Ghali’s Agenda for Development and Amartya Sen’s work highlighted the inseparability of human rights and development, while Sen’s work has particularly infuenced “the understanding of the link between poverty and human rights at conceptual level [and] it has strongly infuenced the work of the bodies” (Dominguez-Redondo, 2009: 39) and development agencies within the UN such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) or OHCHR (Offce of the High Commissioner for Human Rights). In the same vein, although the debate surrounding right to development was a slow starter in the realm of social-economic rights and their implementation, it did something remarkable to take the idea of development forward by contributing to envisioning the idea of human development. In conjunction with human rights and the right-based approach, it reoriented an essentially economiccentric right (right to development) in favour of a more holistic concoction 65

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imbued with an unmistakable favour of a social right. This is the mutation that must most defnitely concern those looking at the human rights/human development/human security continuum.

Human rights and human development Once we have located the linkage between human rights and the right to development, it is plausible to extend the argument that the concept of human development is an offering that naturally and logically came from someone belonging to the Global South, one who combined in himself academic training in the economic dimension of development and also frsthand experience of the detrimental impact of underdevelopment. It helped human development personnel in absolving some of the blame that they did not integrate human rights concerns in their area of core competency. Thereafter, development agencies, UN bodies and independent human rights researchers and activists have progressively adopted this approach in their respective work. Amartya Sen’s Development as Freedom exemplifes the social rights–based approach to economic development, and it remains a forerunner to the common ground between human rights and human development. The human rights and human development linkage became possible also because the UN was there, anchoring formalization and standardization of various human rights via conventions and treaties, reordering the very lexicon of development. Ever since the concept of human development arrived on the intellectual frmament, it has made a signifcant impact on everybody’s everyday lives. That is a good testimony to the operational dimension of a concept. Hence, human rights has not merely remained a capacious term or idea but has led to widespread operational footprints as well.  It enabled a paradigmatic shift that put people at the centre of the development process, “that benefts everyone and not a select few, that looks to the economy as a means and not as an end in itself, and that takes seriously the well-being of future generations” (the UNDP’s defnition of human development in Vietti, 2013: 21). A further cross-pollination of ideas propelled human development to culminate into human security, the defnition of which involved freedom from fear as much as, and as well as, freedom from want. Although many commissions and task forces had contributed to the emerging idea of human security, its clearest pronouncement was not witnessed before the 1994 Human Development Report. “Building on conceptual developments related to security that occurred in the 1980s, the Report emphasized that social and economic insecurity threatened international stability” (Vietti, 2013: 20). The concept of human security thus combines with consummate ease the concerns of the state and the individual, the market and the masses, and, fnally, the global and the local. 66

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Despite the linkages detailed earlier, human rights and human development too followed separate paths until the year 2000 – both in concept and action. As with the right to development a decade earlier, human development was dominated by economists, policy makers and social scientists, while the human rights arena was mostly dotted with political activists, lawyers and philosophers. Besides the composition of the personnel involved, both groups followed different strategies of analysis and action (Robinson, 2005: 27). Human development groups promoted policies of economic and social progress, while those placing their faith in human rights persisted with political pressure, legal reforms and ethical questioning of those policies. In a telling comment (it has been widely cited) on the challenges encountered in integrating human rights and development resulting from the different set of actors and approaches, Mary Robinson states that “[l]awyers should not be the only voice in human rights and, equally, economists should not be the only voice in development”. For that matter, inclusive and holistic development is made feasible by human rights because the “great merit of the human rights approach is that it draws attention to discrimination and exclusion. It permits policy makers and observers to identify those who do not beneft from development” (Robinson cited in Piovesan, 2017). The rights-based approach changed this divergent trajectory to create a common ground to tread on.

Human rights, human security, public policy interface The question to bring up at this point is what is the nature and level of interface between human rights and human security in the past two decades. Firstly, international human rights activism has helped human security to fnd a foothold in both the conceptual and implementational realms. The scepticism associated with human security found a remedy in human rights discourse by establishing linkages between “freedom from want” on the one hand and basic, undeniable individual rights on the other that was the hallmark of post–Second World War development of international human rights norms. Secondly, human rights have also retrieved human security from the core of development paradigm to make it intellectually and practically appealing to interpret human rights standards. If this justifcation sounds tilted in favour of human rights augmenting human security, one needs only to look at the linkage between human security and SDGs to be convinced of it. Thirdly, in the realm of public policy implementation, SDGs appear to be the meeting point between human rights and human security. Human rights and SDGs require human security to bring them within the development fold that alone can ensure resource allocation and policy attention in the immediate and long-term planning. More critically, human security has legitimized the demand of the international human rights movement to look beyond the state to make individual the subject and not merely the object of 67

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“global” policy initiatives for human welfare; it gives “political voice to the otherwise politically marginalized” (Osler Hampson’s idea summarized in Owen, 2004b: 377). Lastly, human rights abuses and violations are recognized as one of the main sources of threats to human security. The concept of human security stands at an intersection of interdependence among security, development and human rights. This interrelationship has been well illustrated by Manfred Nowak who says that protection or safeguarding of human security requires a paradigm shift in the implementation of human rights (Nowak cited in Dominguez-Redondo, 2009: 29). In the human security paradigm, the threats are not external, to be managed by the military forces. Rather, threats are internal, manifested in gross violation of human rights (sometimes induced by the state itself), economic failure refected in problems of underdevelopment or lopsided development, discrimination at various levels and on many counts, mass migration, hunger, infectious diseases and so on. While human security broadly alludes to all the foregoing parameters, there is no single defnition of human security (Tadjbakhsh, 2005: 5) that crisply encapsulates all that has been mentioned earlier. Hence one has to take a long detour to make sense of the term for our analysis here. One of the things the term “human security” indicates is a broad policy framework that makes human life secure in the public domain, a referral point for looking at the orientation of public policies. Public policies are formulated by the state, but the state is not the only actor in its implementation or, sometimes, even in its formulation. Nor are there any short and sudden measures to fx the problems of human security in the sense in which the realists emphasize military solutions. “Interventions” do and should involve longer-term engagements (Tadjbakhsh, 2005: 8) revolving around development and reform. It is in this sense of a crisscross between policy orientation and promotion of human rights that the term “human security” is used here. A sound, normative, institutional and yet policy-oriented convergence between human rights and human security is imperative for the success of both. An alternative view suggests that the linkages between human rights and human security are not always benefcial and that it scuttles the focus away from human rights and dilutes their effcacy. Howard-Hassmann points to the dangers of overemphasizing the human security concept that can undermine the cause of human rights. Insofar as identifying threats to human security and victims of those threats, “or new mechanisms to deal with those threats at the inter-state level, it adds to the established human rights regime”. But an attempt by human security supporters to rephrase state obligations towards its citizens into policy initiatives of human security turns the two into competing discourses (Howard-Hassmann, 2012: 89). She conclusively argues that indivisibility (of various categories of rights) and interconnectedness of human rights encompass common solutions for human insecurity. In fact, a human rights regime requires states to be the 68

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primary duty bearers if rights can be claimed as entitlements that are given, not those that have to be earned (2012: 94–95). Critics of human security point out that it is too broad and obscure a concept, and that there is no single unifed approach which presents diffculties in its application. Its scepticism about international organizations and state systems has also come in for criticism, although the concept itself is a child of “post-Cold War scepticism toward the dominant traditional security paradigm” (Owen, 2004a: 16). Hence its scepticism towards Westphalian institutions such as international organizations is only an extension of its intellectual roots. The human security concept can be interventionist in that it looks into the domestic affairs of the state to assess and assist, question and even intervene (militarily, e.g., call for humanitarian intervention in Darfur to stem starvation deaths and the international policy response in the form of the “responsibility to protect”). Asian countries do not accept such justifcation for intervention or other sovereignty-eroding, interferenceinducing characteristics of human security. That makes generalized critical policy analysis within a state extremely diffcult even though some of these countries might be committed to human rights. Despite such reservations, there is overwhelming support for a human rights–human security interface more because of the evident crumbling pie of the traditional security paradigm and its inability to discharge its primary responsibility to protect its people from death and disaster (Owen, 2004b: 374). It is now a commonly held idea based on competing evidence that policy initiatives and governance models that did not pay adequate attention to human rights have not been able to deliver long-term improvements in the well-being of target groups, be it in the area of forest management, poverty alleviation, food security, education or housing. Since these sectors constitute important components of the SDGs, it can be said that international public policy initiatives like SDGs could not have been conceived, planned or achieved “without giving enough attention to rights” (Colchester, 2007: 3). For instance, the food security legislation enacted in India in 2013 was expected to alter the nature of the hitherto existing notion of the public distribution system (PDS). For one, the Food Security Act was a centrally sponsored scheme that aimed to achieve uniformity at the level of human security of freedom from want while taking into account regional and economic disparities within the population. Also, all the existing nutrition and select social security schemes were to be brought within its fold as an entitlement. While PDS was a state welfare scheme, the Food Security Act was couched in terms of the human right to livelihood in line with Article 11 of the International Covenant of Economic Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) to which India is a signatory. The Food Security Act, with universalization of food security as its goal, protects the poor from “sudden disruption of patterns of life” as defned in the human security paradigm and provides a “zero deprivation” band for the poor which is crucial to ensuring justice 69

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in identifying families for subsidies. This would reconcile the demands of social justice in Rawlsian terms for the least advantaged with the obligation of the state to provide socio-economic rights to meet the individual’s and community’s need for human security. In an interesting take on interdependence between democracy and social rights and between participation and policy outcomes, Jean Drèze suggests that the absence of popular democratic participation – beyond exercising the right to vote periodically – is the reason why the aspirations and priorities of the poor do not get refected in public policy planning which perpetuates poverty and deprivation. The divergence between the elitist orientation of policy framers and the needs of the excluded, impoverished masses creates a vicious circle of disempowerment (Drèze, 2005). In other words, a dysfunctional democracy can devalue basic civil political rights while simultaneously invalidating the goals of development and human security. Over the years, in the realm of governance and judicial interpretation too, the linkage between human rights and human security has been reinforced by judicial pronouncements. A signifcant judgement in this context was pronounced by the Supreme Court of India in the Olga Tellis & Ors vs Bombay Municipal Corporation case wherein, taking note of the plight of hundreds of thousands of pavement and slum dwellers in the city of Bombay (now Mumbai), it stayed their eviction by the local municipal authorities. In the process, it also expanded the ambit of Article 21 of the Constitution on right to life to include the right to livelihood and right to shelter. To quote a paragraph from the judgement: Two conclusions emerge from this discussion: one, that the right to life which is conferred by Art. 21 includes the right to livelihood and two, that it is established that if the petitioners are evicted from their dwellings, they will be deprived of their livelihood. But the Constitution does not put an absolute embargo on the deprivation of life or personal liberty. By Art. 21, such deprivation has to be according to procedure established by law. (A.I.R, 1986) In a similar fashion, public interest litigation in India has led to creative interpretation by the judiciary to encompass the right to food, security of livelihood and scores of other amenities within the fold of fundamental rights. The PUCL litigation on right to food succeeded in extracting a cluster of interim orders from the Supreme Court of India (PUCL vs Union of India & Others), recognizing the right to food as a constitutional right. It set off policy directives and action for Mid Day Meal Scheme and the National Food Security Act, 2013. The linking of the right to work and the right to minimum wages and subsistence with the right to life through such statutory provisions as MGNREGS made it doubly important as an individual 70

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right and as a collective right to human security and durable asset creation (Savitri, 2013: 331). Thus, the foregoing discussion reveals that over a period of two decades, a web of interdependencies and linkages has been created among human rights, development, rights-based approach, human security and SDGs that appear deeply enmeshed in policy analysis, planning and its implementation. While the linkages are deep and enmeshed, they are by no means linear and uncomplicated. Intense activity in the feld of human rights has made international NGOs and human rights institutions shift their main focus from traditional civil-political rights to socio-economic rights and bring the latter standards into sharper relief in the form of corporate social responsibility and insistence on state activity in social sectors.

Conclusion Human rights and human security concepts have found common ground in more ways than one. The development of the concept of human rights and its widespread acceptance as an international standard has encouraged the supporters of human security to moor their demand in terms of human rights. There are several areas of convergence between human rights and human security, but three of those are important to recapitulate here. Firstly, both human rights and human security seek to prioritize the individual over the state and have thus revolutionized the way in which the individual is juxtaposed vis-a-vis the state. Secondly, both human security and human rights recognize that the threats to security are not external but internal in nature, often rooted in violations of core human rights. Thirdly, RBA appears to be the common link between human rights and human security. While these linkages are accepted and lauded, it is important to take cognizance of the challenges ahead and the dangers of overemphasizing the interrelationship between the two concepts. There is palpable concern over human security discourse usurping the political and policy space hitherto enjoyed by human rights. It can seriously scuttle the balance between civilpolitical rights and socio-economic rights and might undo the gains harnessed thus far from interweaving the trajectories. In the institutional and policy realm, the Japanese government pioneered greater elucidation and crystallization of the human security concept when it formed the Commission on Human Security in the year 2000 in response to the challenges to the realization of human security highlighted by UN Secretary-General Kof Annan in his Millennium address. The Commission brought into its fold academics and policy makers to devise global strategies; it maintained close ties with international institutions such as the United Nations and has led deliberations and studies on the subject. An important symposium organized by the Commission signalled academic engagement with the concept 71

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(e.g., Sen, 2000). Since then, a large body of work on conceptual, operational and leadership dimensions of human security and its interface with human rights has brought into view two main trajectories of intellectual engagement. While the Japanese-led trajectory has primarily (but not exclusively) focussed on the “freedom from want” aspect, the Canadian approach is inclined more towards addressing “freedom from fear” concerns of human security and protection of core human rights (Axworthy, 1997; Ross, 2001). A middle ground highlighting regional concerns, post-colonial realities and anxieties amidst globalization is found in perspectives on understanding and implementing human security in Asia wherein human security resonates with “concerns about how globalization [has] rendered traditional notions of sovereignty and security less relevant” and predicting the trajectory of human security in an Eastphalian order (Asian perspective on international law and governance and an increased accent on Asian infuence on international systems) presents diffculty even as the Asian region might prove to be an “interesting laboratory for the human security project” (Kim, 2010: 85; generally see Acharya and Acharya, 2000; Acharya, 2001). The SDGs are in a way a manifestation of human rights, development and human security linkage that is already more than apparent in the conceptual, operational and policy arena, but it has somehow not been able to penetrate the institutional structures within international organizations. Institutions working in the feld of development and human rights have lacked the necessary complementarity and interaction, resulting in the prevalence of divergent discourses on human rights and development (Dominguez-Redondo, 2009; Uvin, 2007). If the conceptual linkages have to fructify the operational feld, institutional cohesion and coordinated action is inevitable. This is why it is essential to highlight the linkages and trajectories, identify the gaps and work towards remedial measures. For none other than UN Secretary-General Kof Annan had declared in a widely cited statement that “[W]e will not enjoy development without security, we will not enjoy security without development, and we will not enjoy either without respect for human rights” [Report of the UN Secretary-General, 2005].

References Acharya, Amitav, 2001, “Human Security: East Versus West”, International Journal, Vol. 56, No. 3, pp. 442–460. Acharya, Arabinda and Acharya, Amitav, 2000, “Human Security in Asia: Conceptual Ambiguities and Common Understandings”, www.robarts.yorku.ca/pdf/ acharya_delhi.pdf, accessed on 6/03/2020. Axworthy, Lloyd, 1997, “Canada and Human Security: The Need for Leadership”, International Journal, Vol. 52, No. 2, pp. 183–196. Bajpai, Kanti, 2000, Human Security: Concept and Measurement, Kroc Institute Occasional Paper No. 19, www.humansecurity-chs.org/activities/outreach/Sen2000.pdf.

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Colchester, Marcus, 2007, “Beyond Tenure: Rights-Based Approaches to Peoples and Forests”, Paper for RECOFTC, Bangkok, 3–7 September. Dominguez-Redondo, Elvira, 2009,“The Millennium Development Goals and the Human Rights Based Approach: Refecting on Structural Chasms with the United Nations System”, The International Journal of Human Rights, Vol. 13, No. 1, pp. 29–43. Drèze, Jean, 2005, “Democracy and the Right to Food”, in Philip Alston and Mary Robinson (eds.), Human Rights and Development: Towards Mutual Reinforcement, Oxford and New York, Oxford University Press. Howard-Hassmann, Rhoda E., 2012, “Human Security: Undermining Human Rights?” Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 34, pp. 88–112. Kim, Sung Won, 2010, “Human Security with an Asian Face?” Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, Vol. 17, No. 1, pp. 83–103. Owen, Taylor, 2004a, “Challenges and Opportunities for Defning and Measuring Human Security”, Disarmament Forum, www.unidir.org/pdf/articles/pdf-art2138.pdf. Owen, Taylor, 2004b, “Human Security – Confict, Critique and Consensus: Colloquium Remarks and a Proposal for a Threshold-Based Defnition”, Security Dialogue, Vol. 35, No. 3, pp. 373–387. Piovesan, Flavia, 2017, “The Right to Development: Promoting and Protecting a human Right in the Contemporary Context”, Address to the Eighteenth Session of the Working Group on the Right to Development Speaking on a Right to Development Perspective to the Attainment of the Sustainable Development Goals, Geneva, OHCHR. Report of the UN Secretary-General, 2005, “In Larger Freedom: Development, Security and Human Rights for All”, UN Doc. A/59/2005. Robinson, Mary, 2005, “What Rights Can Add to Good Development Practice”, in Philip Alston and Mary Robinson (eds.), Human Rights and Development: Towards Mutual Reinforcement, Oxford and New York, Oxford University Press, pp. 25–43. Ross, Jennifer, 2001, “Is Canada’s Human Security Policy Really the ‘Axworthy’ Doctrine?” Canadian Foreign Policy, Vol. 8, pp. 75–93. Savitri, Kadloor, 2013, “Human Rights and Human Security: Refections on India’s Policy Initiatives”, in Mohanan Pillai (ed.), India’s National Security: Concerns and Strategies, New Delhi, New Century Publications, pp. 317–337. Sen, Amartya, 2000, “Why Human Security?” International Symposium on Human Security, Tokyo, Commission on Human Security. Supreme Court of India, 1986, “Olga Tellis vs Bombay Municipal Corporation [1985] 1986 AIR 180”, 1985 SCR Suppl. (2) 51. Tadjbakhsh, Shahrbanou, 2005, “Human Security: Concepts and Implications with an Application to Post-Intervention Challenges in Afghanistan”, Les Etudes du CERI – n° 117–118, September. UNDP, 1994, Human Development Report, 1994: New Dimensions of Human Security, New York, UNDP. Uvin, Peter, 2007, “From the Right to Development to the Rights-Based Approach: How ‘Human Rights’ Entered Development”, Development in Practice, Vol. 17, No. 4–5, pp. 597–606. Vietti, Francesca, 2013, “Human Insecurity: Understanding International Migration form a Human Security Perspective”, Journal on Migration and Human Security, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 17–31.

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5 ETHICS AND PUBLIC POLICY How ‘just’ can public policy be? Nilesh Kumar Joshi

Public policy making is a complex process as it involves dynamics which are cyclical in nature. While factoring in these dynamics, one comes across numerous models of policy making, through which the state/government strives to achieve desired development goals. Policy making is a state’s prerogative; it cannot have a public policy without factoring in the perceptions of many stakeholders. The perception varies considerably across various stakeholders, since each stakeholder has different objectives to achieve through the public policy. This is why we often witness discrepancies in public policy objectives, its functioning and the fnal outcomes, as competing dynamics often hijack the whole process of policy making to implementation and there is always a justifcation for the same. Competing stakeholders challenge the very foundation of public policy inclusiveness; besides the ethical and moral considerations of the state action itself. A chaotic condition thus prevails, which requires correction. However, the state’s predominance as a principal actor/stakeholder remains unchallenged. The argument generally forwarded by the state includes the idea of optimum inclusiveness, cost-beneft yields at a macro level to percolate down farther, wherein the highest degree of inclusion can be realized. In a democratic society, this exercise is a far more complex and challenging one. The rational approach to policy making is preferable, as it helps in overriding a number of challenges through its pragmatic line of thinking and perhaps may have some degree of concurrence with the different perceptions of stakeholders. However, this may not result in the desired outcomes, as each perception has its own rationale and therefore may not be compatible for positive outcomes. This poses a major challenge to policy analysis and policy evaluation. Then we are left with a few more approaches such as the incremental model /approach wherein policy modifcation takes place frequently, leaving room for accommodation of different perceptions of stakeholders. Its major drawback is that it is a hindrance to innovation and lacks the capacity to move on during a crisis. Similarly, the Elite Theory ignores the ‘general interest’ and values; 74

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elites as representatives of the interests of the ruling class are different from the masses. The Group Theory of public policy making is the result of group struggle, wherein some equilibrium is reached; however, it ignores the role of the individual and society in general. The System Theory is highly general and does not spell out the procedure and process through which perceptions are translated into policy. The Institutional Approach examines the structure and functions of government departments and institutions to fnd out how public policy evolves. This approach, however, fails to identify the variables that are catalytic to public policy formulation and narrowly focuses on the structural insights required for the same. The Rational Choice Theory is based on economic principles like cost-beneft analysis. Though one is able to identify the correct course of action in policy making, it appears to be rigid, with narrow assumptions, making it more of a utopian approach when seen in the context of reality. In the foregoing discussion, an attempt has been made to see how different approaches, though having strength in evolving policies, lack the fundamental virtue that is considered critical in policy formulation: inclusiveness. This is the most challenging part of policy making. While different models/ approaches appear to bring in inclusiveness through certain methods viz. cost-beneft analysis, rational choice, price discovery, etc., it rarely addresses the larger issue of ethics and morality in the policy making process. Even if the attempts mentioned earlier are referred to as ethical and moral to the extent of addressing certain issues, they are found to be far less convincing as ultimately we have not come across any policy that is devoid of shortcomings, requiring a constant search for newer approaches to policy making for the achievement of desired objectives. No public policy so far has been labeled as a ‘just’ policy, irrespective of whether it has met all the conditions needed to be perceived as ‘just’. Thus, the approach to policy making can be said to be pre-paradigmatic even now despite the availability of multiple models. In other words, there is always policy paralysis as output/outcome does not get recognition from the stakeholders, and so the policy is either perceived as ‘right’ or ‘wrong’. The right or wrong policy is viewed in terms of ethical parameters depending on who the stakeholders are. Though different policy making models do address this challenge by accommodating numerous facets, the question of ethical policy making remains unresolved. As the state views public policies as ‘just’ policy, so also different perceptions of ethics, refected in many schools of thought – often contradictory – make the state’s view contentious to stakeholders. Thus, it is imperative to search for the place of ethics in policy formulation irrespective of the policy making approach. To search for the place of ethics in policy formulation is not easy as the term ‘ethics’ has different connotations ranging from ‘good’ or ‘bad’, ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ and therefore the idea of ‘ethics’ remains very vague. The ethical approach, however, signifes impartiality and universality and priority over other approaches (Cohen, 75

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2004: 14–34). However, this itself does not address the issue of ethics in policy formulation. Policy formulation involves many variables, and we fnd that all these variables are central to policy formulation, leaving aside the ethical component. The most important issue about public policy is what it is, and we have many answers which are often contradictory or competing with one another (Hogwood and Gunn, 1984). But most of us agree that we are looking at public policy from the output/outcome perspective. Now, output or outcome depends largely on the way the resources are being allocated, the decision making process, etc. The most critical aspect is the decision itself. In contemporary times, decision making involves participation by the stakeholders and as stated elsewhere in this chapter, stakeholders are in competition with one another to derive maximum output. Some stakeholders may derive the beneft at the cost of others, but can this really be labeled as government output/outcome? No, because every stakeholder tries to maximize benefts at the cost of others despite their having a legitimate claim. Thus, at this stage we are concerned about ethical and moral dimensions of policy making which is all about justice, through resource allocation. Policy decisions are arrived at in order to derive optimum output/outcome from the economic perspective, but the social cost often remains unattended. It is at this juncture the role of ethics/morality becomes important in the policy making exercise. Now, ideas of ethics/morality are subjective to some extent; the challenge is how to incorporate ethics into policy decision making. This, in other words, can be said to be examining the normative dimension/perspective of policy issues. An argument is also forwarded that policy formulation and analysis thereof by themselves are normative activities, through which one is able to conclude that the policy is right or wrong. However, it is also important to note that many policy decisions are bereft of an ethical or moral dimension as the policy decisions have been arrived at through certain approaches that focus on optimum beneft. Irrespective of the approach, all policy making exercises will make a cost-beneft analysis, and that is where the normative components are missing. Why does this happen? The most common stand taken is that moral and value judgements are subjective and do not ft into the rational framework. This is nothing but value relativism. Policy formulation is based on facts, and one must distinguish between facts and values. While facts can be examined and evaluated empirically, questions about value/morality cannot be evaluated from a rational perspective despite having consensus on the interpretation of a particular set of values. The argument here is that the value or moral stand for particular decisions may not be rationally tested as good or bad, but it may be merely strong or weak. Based on this, it may be possible to confgure the question of ethics/morality in policy making. Gene Outka (Outka, 1974) argues that the strongest and most convincing notion of justice with reference to resource distribution is ‘to each according to his 76

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need’. Thus, we can always think in terms of which ethical/moral stand is ‘just’, appropriate and strong. This provides some clue that value relativism perhaps may not have relevance. There is a second position that ethics as a tool to arrive at policy decisions is not required because democratic societies have an inbuilt capacity to resolve confict. Because stakeholders have opportunities to contribute to the policy making process, any issue that concerns the ethical or moral dimension of the policy can be accommodated and to that extent policy may be labeled as an ethical one. While the argument is appropriate to marshal the stand, the fact is that perceptional difference is overlooked in this approach. Further, this argument ignores the very fact that different stakeholders have varying degrees of infuence in the democratic dialogue, and few stakeholders may have their way into policy making to their advantage. Thus, a level playing feld disappears even through the democratic process. The inclusion of the ethical or moral dimension of policy in the policy making process is not an end in itself but a tool that is catalytic to improve the policy making processes. An ethical or moral dimension in evolving policy does not mean that political or democratic processes should be replaced. It is also argued that a full spectrum of ethics/values is not possible because of methodological issues, while the policy making approaches are well endowed with methods that help address some of the ethical issues. In public policy, analysis fnally boils down to effciency, effectiveness and economy, which are not the only ways to ascertain whether the policy is ethically correct. For example, when we focus on cost-beneft analysis, it fails to capture many value concerns such as inclusiveness, fairness and equity. Do we have tools to address these normative concerns in policy making? This leads to another challenge as to our capacity as human beings to be above bias or prejudices. This is about being ‘value free’ insofar as not being carried away by one’s own preferences for a set of values in the policy analysis and also not allowing the subject of values into policy analysis. This involves a major exercise of critically examining all the dimensions of ethics from the perspective of holistic ethics, from the teleological approach to the deontology approach, which is a daunting task. This takes us to another challenge: the feasibility of ethical analysis of a policy proposal. While nobody would like to dismiss ethical considerations for policy formulation, the major challenge is that the subject matter of ethics/morality is too abstract and has philosophical underpinnings and therefore may not be helpful in policy choices. Ethical analysis involves a huge number of probabilities, and confguring the same with the cost-beneft analysis is likely to be a highly complex task requiring a long time to juxtapose the probabilities with feld-level realities. The policy making process cannot wait until that exercise is over, and by the time a ‘just’ policy evolves, feld-level realities may have undergone a great metamorphosis. However, this does not mean that a focus on ethics should be avoided, since policy 77

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formulation through any of the various approaches by itself is as complex and at times as impractical as a purely ethical approach. The foregoing discussion gives us an understanding that, despite the challenges in policy making and analysis, there is scope for an ethical approach to policy formulation and analysis. While we may overcome these challenges, through methodological fne tuning, we are still left with one major concern that is actually involved in policy making. While the ethical analysis may be intellectually coherent, it nevertheless comes in confict with politics and political systems. Ethical analysis may lead to undermining the efforts of the policy making process and may even question the motives of policy making institutions – mainly the government and more precisely the bureaucracy to begin with and enveloping such stakeholders who are powerful, such as business organizations which have an altogether different connotation with regard to ethics. Their primary focus is on economic development, and they believe that some compromise on ethics eventually may result in development. The state also is ready to buy the argument, as in competitive politics in a democratic society, that the desire to cling to power matters most. Because bureaucracy is deeply involved in policy making, it will not be in a position to be diluted by ethical considerations. Bureaucracies are not designed to debate ethical components as long as they are able to prove the optimum yield through approaches to policy making of their liking; the ethical component in fact can be a major threat to their functioning. The threat posed to bureaucracy is twofold: frstly, the competing political force and dynamics which they may try to neutralize through such policy prescriptions that suits the ruling establishment and secondly, through overriding inputs that may come from different stakeholders having ethical components. At the same time, the bureaucracy poses a challenge from within in the form of whistleblowers. Thus, bureaucracy along with the political masters make the policy making and analysis task a complicated web, which is diffcult to break by various stakeholders. Ethical analysis thus involves the clash between the normative perspective and organizational values and goals (Anthony Downs, 1967). The preference obviously is for maintaining organizational preferences and therefore bureaucrats have little interest or orientation to consider policy alignments (Charles Lindblom, 1959). The ethical approach seeks to distinguish between normative issues and challenges and ethics as practiced by the members of the society. Thus, bureaucracy may ignore bringing in value premises in their decision making process, as they may be accused of bringing in value premises in decision making, thereby exceeding their brief as non-elected functionaries of the state. Bureaucracy may be reluctant to push for ethical investigation as this may be contradictory to the goals arrived at through consultation with the stakeholders. Thus, bureaucracy insists that they are more concerned about effciency and effectiveness which by themselves are basic values for any policy to succeed. Thus, bureaucracy is more comfortable 78

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with the status quo, emphasizing general value premises such as effciency/ effectiveness as enshrined into policy. This approach gives bureaucracy legitimacy to their action and gels well with the political legitimacy for which the state is looking. This gives the political masters an opportunity to build their legitimacy and emerge as anchors to the various stakeholders seeking consensus on policy dimensions. In this context, the relationship between the political system and ethics becomes complex. Politicians are too happy to acknowledge the ethical approach to development and policy making and declare a high moral stand for their actions, but their commitment is limited to broad value premises such as freedom, democracy, participation, etc., which are vague; nobody would ever question a bureaucracy’s effcient and effective operationalization as these values are non-negotiable and every society always strives to achieve the same. The normative value platforms are avoided as far as possible, while justifying the technicalities associated with policy formulation and what is projected as good, in terms of quantitative dimensions. The political system along with the bureaucracy often avoids ethical analysis with reference to generally accepted ideology, as ethical analysis of the policy proposals or programmes may undermine the ideological orientation and so tend to be masked by a pragmatic approach. Ethical analysis generally focuses on the moral underpinnings of the policy dimension, which may create confict with ideological orientations. Thus, there is a tendency to avoid ideological discussion (e.g. population policy in India is a sensitive issue from the ideological perspective, encompassing traditions, belief structure, and religion). It is observed that, when ideological dimensions appear in policy studies, they are ‘introduced in to analysis as though settled facts’ (Lindblom Charles, 1980). Ethics and morality are closely connected to social, economic and political ecology. Ethical analysis may lead to overriding the belief structure, traditions and practices of ecology and may therefore be challenging to reorient the ecology and policy that is ‘just’ in the light of the ecology. It is evident from the foregoing that by bringing in ethical issues for policy formulation or analysis, the policy outcome may be unpredictable. To use Hogwood and Gun’s term, if an issue is ‘ethical’, it may well also be ‘sensitive’; leaders are likely to fear that opening it to analysis and discussion ‘may expose them to criticism or exacerbate relations between contending groups’ (Hogwood and Gunn, 1984). In other words, stakeholders, including the state openly or covertly, suppress an issue because they fear that, if public attention is focused on it, something will be done and what is done will not be in their interest (Dye, 1998). Thus, it is all about the predictability and safety of the outcome through the quantifcation, empirical analysis, comparison, etc., having an objective analysis (Hogwood and Gunn, 1984). Thus, bringing in ethical analysis might make policy making and policy analysis more costly as ethical dimension forces one to search for the ‘just’ policy and may require many more resources than anticipated and even after this 79

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exercise the outcome may be less predictable (Provis, Chris, 2007). There is another challenge as to how to identify the ethical dimension of an issue. If the issue is identifed as ‘political’ rather than ‘ethical’, that may take away attention from issues of moral responsibility and blame (Provis, Chris, 2007). Thus, it is a very complex exercise to integrate ethics and public policy making. The challenges associated with the normative interpretation of values and ethics and confguring them with ecological facts are not easy for any policy matter. This diffculty arises because the ethical standardization goes against the cost-beneft analysis or rational considerations which are deeply enmeshed in the optimum utilization of resources. Further, it threatens professional and political interests – that is, the state itself and powerful stakeholders. The ethical dimension in policy making and analysis may have far-reaching consequences in terms of the outcome of the policy as how the state conducts itself in operationalizing the policy, if the ethical dimension of policy issues is to be the focus of policy making. In view of this, ethics and policy making and analysis are running parallel to each other insofar as they are to take place in an institutional setup. However, policy making and analysis through normative prescription as an option can still be exercised through independent analyst-academicians without being infuenced by the state apparatus and many of its concurring agencies. As noted earlier, policy making in a democratic society is highly challenging, more so in a country like India where federalism as a constitutional prescription matters in order to bring congruence to development challenges, that vary across regions. Development goals also differ substantially from region to region, and therefore any unitary approach to policy making may jeopardize the development process. Further, the structural adjustment policies (SAP) that brought about mesmerizing changes in the development trajectory of India, despite its positive cascading effect, have not remained above criticism. This criticism is not confned to economic imperatives but has raised questions of ethics and morality. The most visible issue is of the development trajectory which now defnes citizens as customers under the New Public Management – an approach without which barely any public policy could be operationalized. The gradual withdrawal of the state as a provider to that of a facilitator has raised a major issue of accessibility to services which not only brings ethical dilemmas to policy making, but also raises questions of constitutional morality. The idea of ethics and constitutional morality has always been fraught with a question as to which one overrides the other. While ethics in general is a well-accepted way of ordering society, constitutional morality is all about codifcation of ethics and moral standards generally accepted by society. Constitutional morality defnes equality before the law irrespective of the general standards of ethics and morality and often contradicts the belief and assumption structures. However, in a democratic society and polity, constitutional morality has an edge over the belief and assumption structures. In this context, an important 80

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policy issue which generated a lot of debate during the past 20 years is related to India’s telecom sector which has a very long history and remained a government monopoly till the late 1990s. The SAP paved the way for a gradual paradigm shift in public policy making that sought a very active role of the private sector to bring in positive changes and build capacities so as to augment technological advances in the sector and facilitate the development process. The telecom sector has emerged as a basic infrastructure. The most important telecom reform in India is the New Telecom Policy 1999 (NTP 99) which laid down a clear road map for future reforms, contemplating the opening up of all the segments of the telecom sector for private sector participation. This called for the regulatory approach in order to distinguish the operational monopoly of the telecom service and the licensing authority. The entry of the private sector in the telecom sector called for an independent regulator and accordingly the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India was created in 1997 by an act of Parliament. Subsequently, several modifcations came with regard to telecom policy and, more importantly, issues revolved around the spectrum allocation to service providers. Technology was not very advanced, though it generated quite an interest among service providers and people at large as the new 2G technology was to become a precursor to more advanced technology, providing huge revenue earnings for service providers and the government on which future telecom capacity was expected to grow. However, the process of 2G spectrum allocation mired in a lot of controversy. The 2G spectrum allocation led to the fling of Public Interest Litigation in the Supreme Court, and several ethical issues emerged as the result of a long trial, which involved multiple stakeholders, each having their own interpretation from the utilitarian perspective and fnally resulting in cancellation of the licenses of more than 100 operators/ ancillary agencies. This litigation resulted in a huge revenue loss to the government, service providers and consumers, causing large-scale unemployment and acquisitions and mergers that led to a monopolistic telecom sector in India. This raises the question: would it have been possible for the government of India to address the ethical issues while allocating spectrum? From a pure normative perspective the answer may be ‘yes’. But what would have been the implications? Perhaps, the larger public good might not have been served – this being just a conjecture – and India would not have been in a position to march towards a true telecom revolution. From the utilitarian perspective, the 2G spectrum allocation just fulflled the aspirations of millions of consumers, and a larger public good was served. From the experience of many other policies which include basic infrastructure policies to sectoral policies in a democratic country like India, with considerable regional disparity on all fronts (social, political and economic) and a diversity of value premises, to evolve ‘just’ policies having a high degree of congruence between ethical components and development imperatives is indeed wishful thinking. 81

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References Cohen, S., 2004, The Nature of Moral Reasoning, Melbourne, VIC, Oxford University Press. Downs, Anthony, 1967, Inside Bureaucracy, Boston, Little Brown Ch. XIX. Dye, T. R., 1998, Understanding Public Policy, Ninth Edition, Upper Saddle River, NJ, Prentice-Hall, p. 322. Hogwood, B. W. and Gunn, L. A., 1984, Policy Analysis for Real World, Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 93, 95. Lindblom, Charles, 1959, “The Science of Muddling Through”, Public Administration Review, Vol. 19, No. 2, Spring, pp. 79–88. Lindblom, Charles, 1980, The Policy Making Process, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, Prentice-Hall. Outka, Gene, 1974, “Social Justice and Equal Access to Health Care”, Journal of Religious Ethics, Vol. 2, Spring pp. 11–32. Provis, Chris, 2007, “Ethics and Issues in Public Policy”, Policy and Society, Vol. 26, No. 3, pp. 24–25.

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6 CHANGING PARADIGMS OF STRATEGIC POLITICAL PROCESS IN PUBLIC POLICY FORMULATION AND GOVERNANCE Comparative study of GST in India and NAFTA in the US Debasis Bhattacharya

Introduction Public policy making worldwide has become a contentious exercise, especially in terms of its effcacy and impacts. The paradigms of strategic political processes at the time of formulation and governance of major public policy interventions have signifcantly metamorphosed in recent years. The dimensions of political gridlock and polarized politics defned by the confguration of divided and/or unifed governments have been increasingly responsible in shaping the contours of the public policy process. The critical nature of coalition and consensus building amidst signifcant partisan and ideological dissensions infuence the political process in public policy formulation and its governance. Of the various contingency factors that impact the strategic political process in public policy formulation and governance, whether in a parliamentary democratic polity or a separated system of democratic polity, perhaps the most determining one is the political nomenclature in which the government has been formed. Divided government exists when there is split-party control of the legislative and executive branches. In contrast, unifed government is formed when the legislative and executive branches are controlled by the same majority party or majority alliance.1 Split-party or majority alliance control of one or both chambers of the legislature represents divided government.2 The policy decision process is signifcantly infuenced by the partisan and ideological disposition and priorities of the ruling party/alliance that forms the government. Other major factors that impact public 83

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policy decisions relate to the nature of debate, electoral incentives, public opinion, media salience and interest group pressures. This chapter attempts to map convergences in strategic political processes during policy making of major public policy decisions of monumental importance. As examples, the Goods and Services Tax (GST) in India and NAFTA in the US have been analyzed as each one of these policies has impacted the entire socio-politico-economic landscape of these two democracies. The chapter argues that there are tangible convergences in the public policy processes of a multiparty parliamentary democracy such as India and a separated system of democracy prevalent in the United States.

Theoretical foundations Formation of divided and/or unifed government is a critical factor affecting legislative-executive relations and the policy decision process, especially at the national level. Divided government exists when there is split-party control of the legislative and executive branches. In contrast, unifed government is formed when the legislative and executive branches are controlled by the same party (Clarke, 1998). Split-party control of one or both chambers of the legislative branch and the executive branch also represents divided government (Auerswald and Campbell, 2012). Conventional scholarship suggests that divided government results in gridlock or dissension, and unifed government causes cooperation or consensus (Krutz and Peake, 2009).3 On the other hand, revisionist theory suggests that the presence of divided or unifed government does not matter in delineating legislative success and legislative-executive consensus (Krehbiel, 1998).4 In the strategic policy process, when there is a divided government, with the opposition party in control of one chamber of parliament or congress, there is generally confrontational politics between the legislative and the executive branches. Based on conventional understanding of the effects of partisanship on major policies during divided government, it is generally observed that the opposition in legislature tends to block and frustrate the executive branch’s policy making efforts (McCormick and Wittkopf, 1990). Legislative oversight of the policy process also increases during the presence of divided government. There is evidence that divided government diminishes its ability in the deliberations and negotiations during the policy process (Milner, 1997). Partisan differences signifcantly infuence political dynamics, with variations in decisional outcomes. As legislators play a strategic role in setting policy priorities, their partisan preferences become critically important in the overall policy process.5 Legislative procedures and priorities, delay tactics, imposition of reservations and amendments in the legislative chamber in which opposition has the majority are greatly infuenced by partisan fault lines (Lindsay, 1994; Auerswald, 2006). Coupled with partisan behaviour, 84

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ideological distance across party spectrum has also become a dominant factor in the policy process. In their study, DaLaet and Scott argue that ideology has been in a statistically signifcant relationship with the legislative voting mechanism in the policy process (DeLaet and Scott, 2006). Procedural delays in policy approval are because of the confict in the ideological policy preferences of pivotal legislators and can be signifcantly connected to electoral prospects in their respective states. Electoral pressures raise ruling party/alliance-opposition competition to resolve strategic policy issues (Conley, 2000). For instance, in the GST approval process when public opinion and the electorate became impatient about political bickering in the Rajya Sabha of the Indian Parliament, the bill was approved unanimously in that chamber. What happened in August 2016 in the wake of what Prime Minister Narendra Modi and the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) had been emphasizing, and the confrontational dynamics shown earlier by the opposition – United Provincial Alliance (UPA) – was a complete reversal of the proceedings of previous sessions. Likewise for the US congressional approval process for NAFTA, the dynamics of stiff opposition and an unconventional cross-party coalition in the US Congress backing President Clinton’s efforts can be largely connected to electoral incentives in states and districts (Mayhew, 2005).

Goods and Services Tax (GST) – transformational structural economic reform in India Coming into existence With the momentous approval of the GST Bill (122nd Constitutional Amendment Act) by the Parliament in 2016, a new beginning in India’s indirect tax system happened. Thereafter, the grand ceremonial launch of the Goods and Services Tax (GST) as a policy at the historic Central Hall of Parliament at midnight on June 30 – July 1, 2017, marked a historic milestone of monumental magnitude in India’s politico-economic landscape since independence. With the inception of GST the country entered into a new era of structural economic reforms in the ambit of an indirect tax system. It was indeed a giant leap forward towards unifcation of the hitherto existing fragmented indirect tax structure that was existent so far. A unique feature of GST is that its architecture is designed to ensure governance and compliance through an inbuilt self-policing automated mechanism that is based on a sophisticated software-driven portal – the GST Network. In fact, GST has the right kind of capability for getting rid of the menace of tax terrorism and black money. Having said that, any new policy intervention, particularly of the nature and size of GST, is bound to have hiccups and glitches during the initial years of governance. GST has been no exception. However, the promising sign is that GST has an inbuilt robustness and 85

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adequate safeguards in place, with credible checks and balances to address such issues. Political contestation on GST road map The ideation towards formulation and inception of a comprehensive and uniform indirect tax system in India originated not much later after the implementation of economic reforms in 1991; its actual coming into force in 2017 in the form we see today is the result of a long, arduous journey of heated debate, brainstorming, analyses and discussions in which all parties and/or stakeholders participated. The terrain, many times bumpy and at times smooth, was a natural process as India inched towards the world’s largest structural economic intervention which would impact more than a billion people in many ways. The run-off to the formulation and passage of GST in the Indian Parliament had witnessed years of contentious debate in the legislature and discussions in the public domain. Formulation of a gigantic policy of such magnitude as GST is in reality a witness to the changing paradigms of policy making in the ambit of multiparty parliamentary democracy such as in India and experiencing alliance government architecture at the centre for most of the period during which the long, drawn-out debate occurred. The existence of alliance government of like-minded political parties, yet with different priorities aligned with differential political ideological shifts, in conjunction with variable power balances in the two chambers of Parliament, refects the dynamics of divided government in a parliamentary setting. Such kind of political alignment existent in India for the majority span of the GST debate did profoundly affect shaping the dynamics of the course of legislative maneuvering during the passage of this momentous bill in the Parliament. A lot of fip-fopping and delay tactics by mainstream political parties in the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) and the United Provincial Alliance (UPA) based on ruling and opposition power positions were signifcantly infuenced by partisan-ideological divergences, electoral contingencies, public and other stakeholder opinions, keeping central and state-level elections in perspective. Interestingly, similar political dispositions as narrated earlier were also observed even after the formation of the Narendra Modi government in the aftermath of the 2014 general elections where, despite the presence of an absolute majority government in the Lok Sabha (House of People), the delay tactics towards approval of the GST Bill was observed in the Rajya Sabha (Council of States) where the central government did not have a majority. The trajectory of political debate in a parliamentary setting became as contentious as possible largely as a refection of the presence of divided government architecture at the centre and in conjunction with most of the states. 86

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GST formulation – the great debate – unconventional consensus building In 2000, the Atal Bihari Vajpayee government at the centre set up an empowered committee tasked with designing a GST model and overseeing the information technology back-end, very similar in nature to the currently existing GST network, as a serious effort to achieve a signifcant breakthrough in the new proposed tax regime as well as making structural reforms in the fragmented indirect tax structure.6 Following that endeavor, the Kelkar Task Force on “Implementation of the Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management Act, 2003”, under the supervision of Vijay Kelkar, identifed that the existing indirect tax system suffered from many problems and had suggested a comprehensive Goods and Services Tax (GST).7 In 2004, the task force recommended that GST replace the hitherto existing indirect tax structure by introducing a comprehensive tax regime on all goods and services encompassing all stages of the value chain, thereby replacing the central-level and state-level VATs.8 In 2006–7, a proposal was mooted, allowing for reforming and/or restructuring of not only indirect taxes levied by the centre but also the states. Consequently, the responsibility of preparing a design and road map for the implementation of GST was assigned to the Empowered Committee of State Finance Ministers (EC).9 The crystallization of the concept continued after the 2009 Lok Sabha elections, when Mr. Pranab Mukherjee became the fnance minister in the UPA II government. In the budget speech for 2009–10, Mukherjee announced that the broad contour of the GST Model is that it will be a dual GST comprising of a Central GST and a State GST. The Centre and the States will each legislate, levy and administer the Central GST and State GST, respectively.10 Simultaneously, the ambit of recommendations of the Thirteenth Finance Commission Report 2010–15 was extended to accommodate the probable road map of dual GST that was coming. Thereafter, the Thirteenth Finance Commission Report outlined the foundations of the future GST model in a format that would imbibe the principle of cooperative federalism in conformity with constitutional provisions. Dubbing the whole structure of the GST regime as the “Grand Bargain”, the commission recommended that both the centre and the states implement a dual-model GST at a single positive rate on all goods and services. Subsequently, the stage was set for the grand debate to take place on the foundations of the “Grand Bargain”, which in turn metamorphosed into the fnal shape of GST. As the Thirteenth Finance Commission was compiling its report on GST, the political terrain that was about to come was also crystallizing as multiple 87

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political parties and their affliations were providing diverse signals. The battleground for contentious debate was already frmly laid out. Simultaneously, in 2010–11, various state governments also started giving mixed responses as the Finance Commission was operating on the modus operandi of the implementation aspects. Parallel to discourses in various political and institutional circles about forming a cohesive concept that would transpire into consensus, keeping in mind diverse ideological and partisan perspectives, then-Union Finance Minister Pranab Mukherjee introduced the Constitution (115th Amendment) Bill in Parliament to give concurrent taxing powers to the union and the states for instituting the GST framework, including creation of a GST Council to recommend harmonized tax rates and a GST Dispute Settlement Authority. The bill was thereafter referred to as the Standing Committee on Finance and was headed by Mr Yashwant Sinha; the committee submitted its report in 2013. However, because of partisan dissension, the UPA government failed to get the proposed law passed by Parliament until the dissolution of the 15th Lok Sabha, and the bill automatically lapsed in 2014 (Bhattacharjee and Bhattacharya, 2018). The bill was reintroduced as the Constitution (122nd Amendment) Bill, 2014, in the 16th Lok Sabha11 by the NDA government led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi in December 2014. The majority strength of NDA in the Lok Sabha ensured smooth passage of the bill in May 2015, but it was a completely different story in the Rajya Sabha,12 where the UPA led by the Congress enjoyed the majority. The Congress Party tried to disrupt the proceedings and block passage of the bill, so that the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) could not run away with the credit for having fnally launched the GST. But the opposition spearheaded by the Congress did not succeed because of the prevailing political situation. Meanwhile, West Bengal Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee of the Trinamool Congress had extended full support to the GST. Simultaneously, the NDA was able to split the opposition on Congress and non-Congress lines. The prime minister used every opportunity to engage and convince non-Congress opposition chief ministers on the necessity of a GST regime. Even the chief ministers of Congressruled states tacitly supported the idea of the GST and believed the Congress had crossed limits in playing the number game politics in the Rajya Sabha.13 Thus NDA was also able to signifcantly isolate the Congress in the Rajya Sabha. A string of losses in assembly elections after 2014 resulted in the dwindling strength of the UPA led by the Congress in the Rajya Sabha, which diminished to 71 and for the frst time ever, behind the BJP-led NDA’s strength of 74. Additionally, extensive media coverage, especially various TV channels,14 highlighted in a big way the delay tactics by the opposition led by the Congress Party in the Rajya Sabha. Media salience and strong favorable public opinion put tremendous pressure on opposition parties to support GST bill passage in the Upper House.15 When all that happened, 88

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BJP started seeking the support of the regional parties aggressively – from Trinamool Congress, JD(U), BJD, Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD), SP, Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP), Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK), Telangana Rashtra Samithi (TRS) and about a dozen nominated members. Congress was thus becoming isolated in the House, and its opposition to GST was becoming irrelevant. In these circumstances, the Congress had no option but to relent to the pressure. The NDA government was fnally able to bring the Congress and the Left on board, who were opposing the bill. On August 3, 2016, the Rajya Sabha passed the GST bill with all 197 members present and voting in its favor.16 The highlight of the great debate is that it transpired into a rare and unique unconventional show of consensus among diverse political parties in the history of the Parliament of India on the issue of establishing a common market for the entire country under a single unifed tax regime. The amended GST bill was approved by the Lok Sabha on August 8, 2016, by a two-thirds majority, with all 443 members present in the House voting in favor.17 After ratifcation by the states, the GST bill received presidential assent on 8 September 2016 and became the law of the land, ushering in a new beginning of a uniform tax system.18 Governance of GST – trajectory of continued reforms While the launching of GST on July 1, 2017, was momentous and ceremonial in the history of India’s tax reforms, there was much speculation about the effcacy of its governance, especially in the context of a policy intervention of such monumental magnitude. Even as the debate regarding governance of the GST was considerably driven by a partisan and ideological divide, there were also intense discussions regarding the enforcement and compliance mechanism. The GST regime is robust in its structural architecture, with adoption of a highly sophisticated, software-driven GST network that enables an inbuilt self-automated policing mechanism, thereby enhancing the effcacy of indirect tax administration. Currently, new changes in terms of tax rationalization, simplifcation of the delivery process and formalization of tax administration and collection are happening in compliance with the provisions of the GST Act. The Goods and Services Tax Council – GST governance epicentre One of the seminal institutional milestones in our country’s history allowing for effcient governance of the GST in conformity with the constitutional principle of fscal federalism has been the creation of the high-powered Goods and Services Tax Council (GST Council) as the frst constitutional federal body empowered with making all decisions with regard to the 89

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GST.19 The GST Council inculcates the spirit of cooperative federalism that remains the backbone of the dual GST model prevalent in India. The GST Council enables the transformation of the centre and the states from being good fscal neighbors to equal fscal partners in sharing a common indirect tax base (Kelkar, 2019). The strategic signifcance of the GST Council is to establish the highest standards of cooperative federalism and allow for a process of comprehensive consultation and consensus building irrespective of partisan politics and ideological dimensions, thereby ensuring that the centre and the states are operating on a level playing feld in the decision process and governance of the new indirect tax regime. With the bold and momentous decisions made from time to time in the GST Council meetings regarding rationalization of GST slabs and tax simplifcation procedures, there is an effort to increase the tax base while lowering the burden on individual taxpayers. In fact, the very essence of rationalization of GST slabs is to confgure a structured indirect tax regime that is responsive to the needs and requirements of end consumers in our country. GST governance – changing paradigms and policy parameters Ensuring greater effciency in implementation, administration, enforcement and compliance of the various provisions is at the forefront of GST governance. The policy parameters can be perceptible by the following outcomes. Elimination of tax terrorism and inspector raj: Under GST the scope of tax terrorism and the inspector raj system is eliminated because of the existence of an integrated process driven by a software-enabled self-automated production–distribution accounting network. In the new system, the benefts of input tax credit are carried forward from one trader to another trader down the value chain electronically. This is a big step forward in eliminating the occurrence of multiple taxes that was existent under the previous system. Moreover, with the installation of the dual-monitoring structure as embedded in GST – one by the states and one by the centre – there is higher probability to detect incidents of tax evasion. Here, even if one set of tax authorities overlooks and/or fails to detect tax evasion, it will be detected by the other overseeing authority.20 Additionally, too many verifcations and seeking permissions from lower-level tax offcials are no longer needed by honest taxpayers in tax assessment. Incidents of sudden raids, retrospective changes of tax provisions and reopening of old returns is also greatly reduced and eliminated. Tax offcials under the GST regime can no longer extort money from taxpayers (Bhattacharjee and Bhattacharya, 2018). The cumulative effects of all these safeguards under the GST regime collectively ensure elimination of tax terrorism and inspector raj. Reduction of black money and corruption coupled with enhancement of transparency and accountability in tax administration: On the issue of 90

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reducing black money and corruption, a fully automated system with a robust self-policing mechanism brought in by the GST regime has enhanced transparency and accountability of tax administration. With online reporting of every transaction and an inbuilt computerized invoice matching system, the tendency/scope of people to sell without an invoice is reduced signifcantly. Under the new tax regime, every supplier needs to upload an invoice in order to reap the benefts of the input tax credit. In case the supplier does not want to sell with a software-generated invoice, no registered buyer will buy such a seller’s products. In this way, the GST has plugged the holes in the system in such a manner that there is lesser scope for unaccounted cash transactions, which is the root cause of generating black money. With the GST thus establishing a tight hold over black money, the level of corruption is simultaneously brought down and ultimately going to be eliminated. Another factor that would reduce black money is the reverse charge mechanism where there is systemic pressure for bringing unregistered traders under the tax network. All these measures under the GST have the power and capability to curtail black money and corruption signifcantly. Self-automated policing – GST network: The GST regime adopted a software-driven GST network, enabling self-automated policing that is a foolproof mechanism ensuring that every transaction is tracked and accounted for from the source till the last stage of consumption. Now it is mandatory to register under GST when sellers, traders and dealers cross a threshold limit of Rs 20 lakhs yearly turnover. Sellers are to upload all transactions based on their raised invoices to the GST portal. Once the seller uploads details of the organization’s sales to another buyer who is also now registered, the system automatically generates a purchase register for the buyer. A system-generated input tax credit is approved for the purchaser. If a vendor fails to upload his or her sales, it would be at the cost of the purchaser losing the input tax credit. The purchaser will eventually stop buying from a vendor who does not declare his or her sales.21 Thus the new system with the GST Network automatically drives tax evaders out of business as no one is willing to do business with him or her. It is in this inbuilt manner that a robust architecture of the GST Network formalizes every transaction in the value chain and enhances effcacy of tax administration.

North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) – classic foreign policy intervention Coming into existence President George H. W. Bush signed The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) on December 17, 1992.22 In 1991, the US Congress granted “fast track” authority to President Bush to negotiate NAFTA with Canada and Mexico. Such a congressional measure helped in negotiating and 91

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ultimately signing NAFTA by the Bush administration. NAFTA was later supported by President Bill Clinton who in turn submitted the agreement to Congress for approval on November 3, 1993. Although the agreement was a bipartisan initiative from the White House’s point of view, it witnessed one of the most contentious political contestations to ever happen in the legislative-executive history in the US. Despite NAFTA being submitted to Congress by President Clinton under the political structure of unifed government, it created an insurmountable political dissension inside his own Democratic Party. Interestingly, the ratifcation of the agreement in Congress was fnally possible with the support of the Republican Party. The US House of Representatives passed the NAFTA bill on November 17, 1993, after a contentious debate and much political maneuvering from the White House.23 That was followed by the US Senate on November 20, 1993.24 Interestingly, NAFTA had the unique distinction of acquiring an unconventional and somewhat convoluted alliance at the inter-branch level – (1) between Capitol Hill and the White House and (2) between like-minded Democrats and Republicans in Congress – despite the presence of a unifed governmental political architecture. NAFTA formulation – the great debate – unconventional alliance With regard to congressional approval during the NAFTA debate, the agreement was ratifed by a 234–200 margin in its favor in the US House of Representatives, and a 61–38 margin in its favor in the US Senate.25 Hence from the macro political perspective, a unifed government in 1993–1994 can be claimed as the causal factor for approval of NAFTA. But the dynamics of political contestation depict a very different story of the political process in which an unusual political alliance had to be built and political maneuvering needed to be pursued primarily by the White House to win congressional approval of NAFTA. President Clinton had to use a wealth of political capital to help build such an unconventional bipartisan alliance in which like-minded Democrats and Republicans came together to reach a viable consensus for the safe passage of NAFTA. In the end, the House approved NAFTA by a comfortable margin of 234 to 200 votes, providing President Clinton with an unpredictable victory after a spell of lengthy contentious debates that “crisscrossed party and ideological lines. . . . A bipartisan coalition of 132 Republicans and 102 Democrats prevailed over the opposition of 156 Democrats and 43 Republicans, and one independent”.26 At every step of the political process, there was consensus and dissension in both the intra-branch and inter-branch arenas in Congress. Such political dynamics spilled over to the congressional-presidential consensus effort too. There was also a regional dimension in the build-up of such a rare political alliance. For that purpose, President Clinton had to fnd support in the 92

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centrist and Sun Belt House districts.27 The Senate also witnessed a political alliance on similar regional lines that ultimately resulted in the safe passage of NAFTA by a comfortable margin of 61–38.28 Here too the bipartisan coalition of 34 Republicans and 27 Democrats prevailed over the opposition of 28 Democrats and 10 Republicans to facilitate the safe passage of NAFTA. Importantly, from an analytical point of view, the safe passage of NAFTA in Congress was a unique case where the mere presence of unifed government was not a causal factor. Partisan and ideological dimensions were seriously at play in mapping out the contours of the changing paradigms of the political process. Such unusual political consensus crisscrossing party and ideological lines was facilitated by the innovative political process initiated not only by President Clinton under the political confguration of unifed government, but also by senior leaders in Congress at their own level. Even the political dynamic of the defection of a group of Democrats was not strong enough to block the passage of NAFTA. Moreover, and most importantly, Clinton was able to garner support from 132 House Republican Party members of Congress. The presence of unifed government played a suboptimal role in gaining support from 102 House Democrats. Despite the presence of unifed government, the conundrum of events during the NAFTA approval refected the underpinnings of a divided political nomenclature throughout the process. Additionally, the extensiveness of the debates in Congress enabled the proponents and opponents of NAFTA in deliberating their respective political positions, thereby portraying vividly the dynamics of the contentious debate in the NAFTA policy process. Simultaneously, powerful interest groups belonging to the labor force, environment and clean technology put enormous pressure on legislators to take favorable positions during the NAFTA deliberations or risk huge fnancial cuts to their electoral campaigns. Concurrently, extensive media coverage, especially the Gore-Perot debate on CNN’s “Larry King Live”, was a game changer in generating favourable public opinion, providing electoral incentives that had implications for the dynamics of the debate and ultimately forcing legislators to attain rare bipartisan support in Congress.

Conclusion The dynamics of the strategic political process in approval of major public policies such as the GST in India and NAFTA in the US refected tangible convergences on issues related to the nature and extent of political contestation with the presence of unifed and/or divided government arrangement, irrespective of parliamentary and separated systems of democratic polity. The unconventional bipartisan support garnered at the end of the contentious process to get the respective policy bills approved, whether in the Indian Parliament or US Congress, can be considerably mapped out on similar political 93

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contingencies that shaped the contours of political decision processes. In both policy trajectories, the criteria of partisan and ideological dispositions had an impeccable imprint on the dynamics of the political process, often overshadowing the existing government’s structural nomenclature. Having said that, the formation of the BJP-led NDA government at the centre under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, garnering an absolute majority in the Lok Sabha of the Indian Parliament, signifcantly empowered the prime minister to maneuver unconventional multiparty political support in the Rajya Sabha during the fnal phase of the contentious debate while getting the GST bill passed in the Parliament. Likewise, the presence of a unifed government under Democratic Party leadership empowered US President Bill Clinton with considerable political capital to obtain unusual bipartisan support and build consensus crisscrossing ideological and partisan lines during the NAFTA approval debate in the US Congress. Tangible convergences are discernible both in the Indian Parliament and the US Congress during the contentious political process regarding the policy formulation and policy approval debates, especially in portraying the consensus-dissension continuum, while ultimately garnering rare unconventional bipartisan and multiparty consensus that was unprecedented. Simultaneously, signifcant convergences can be deciphered on the nature and extent of political pressure on lawmakers based on electoral incentives, interest group dynamics and media salience. Comparative analysis of these two policy processes enable us to conclude that changing paradigms of monumental policy decisions can often display insightful convergences and affnity in the strategic political process both in parliamentary and separated systems of democratic governance.

Notes 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13

Clarke, 1998. Auerswald and Campbell, 2012. Sundquist, 1980, 1988; Cox and Kernell, 1991; Binder, 1999; Coleman, 1999. Peterson, 1990; Jones, 1999. Cox and McCubbins, 1993. PHD Chamber of Commerce and Industry Report, 2016. State Finances: A Study of Budgets of 2016–17, RBI Report, “Goods and Services Tax – A Game Changer,” https://rbidocs.rbi.org.in. Goods and Services Tax Council, www.gstcouncil.gov.in/brief-history-gst. PHD Chamber of Commerce and Industry Report, 2016. Speech of Pranab Mukherjee, Union Budget 2009–10. July 06, 2009, http:// content.indiainfoline.com/wc/budget/FY-2009-10/Union-Budget/Union_Budget_Speech_2009-10.pdf. Lower House of the Parliament of India. Upper House of the Parliament of India. Livemint, “How the Political Battle on GST Was Won”, August 05, 2016.

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14 Doordarshan News, CNN News 18, India Today Group, Aaj Tak, Zee News, India TV, ABP News. 15 The Economic Times, “Public Opinion on GST Played Crucial Role, Says Arun Jaitley”, August 05, 2016. 16 Business Standard, “Rajya Sabha Passes GST Bill’, August 03, 2016. 17 The Times of India, “Parliament Passes GST Bill”, August 08, 2016. 18 The Economic Times, “GST Bill Gets Nod from President Pranab Mukherjee”, September 09, 2016. 19 Goods and Services Tax Council, www.gstcouncil.gov.in/brief-history-gst. 20 Report on the Revenue Neutral Rate and Structure of Rates for the Goods and Services Tax (GST), Government of India, December 04, 2015, p. 4. 21 The Economic Times, “GST: Not Just a Tax Reform, but Real Black Money Law”, August 16, 2016. 22 Congressional Research Service Issue Brief Number IB 93049. 23 Congressional Record – House, November 17, 1993. 24 Congressional Record – Senate, November 20, 1993. 25 Congressional Record – House, November 17, 1993; Congressional Record – Senate, November 20, 1993. 26 The Washington Post, “House Approves U.S.-Canada-Mexico Trade Pact on 234–200 Vote, Giving Clinton Big Victory”, November 18, 1993. 27 Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, November 20, 1993. 28 The New York Times, “Senate Approves Brady Legislation and Trade Accord”, November 21, 1993.

References Auerswald, David, 2006, “Senate Reservations to Security Treaties”, Foreign Policy Analysis, Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 83–100. Auerswald, David and Campbell, Colton, 2012, Congress and the Politics of National Security, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Bhattacharjee, Govind and Bhattacharya, Debasis, 2018, GST and Its Aftermath: Is Consumer Really the King, New Delhi, Sage. Binder, Sarah A., 1999, “The Dynamics of Legislative Gridlock, 1947–96”, American Political Science Review, Vol. 93, No. 3, September, pp. 519–533. Business Standard, 2016, “Rajya Sabha Passes GST Bill”, August 03. Clarke, Wes, 1998, “Divided Government and Budget Confict in the U. S. States”, Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol. 23, No. 1, February, pp. 5–22. Coleman, John J., 1999, “Unifed Government, Divided Government, and Party Responsiveness”, American Political Science Review, Vol. 93, No. 4, December, pp. 821–835. Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, November 20, 1993. Congressional Record – House, November 17, 1993. Congressional Record – Senate, November 20, 1993. Congressional Research Service Issue Brief Number IB 93049, North American Free Trade Agreement: Environmental Issues, September 24, 1993. Conley, Richard S., 2000, “The Electoral and Policy Context of Divided Government and Presidential Support in Congress: Nixon and Bush Compared”, Polity, Vol. 32, No. 4, Summer, pp. 595–621. Cox, Gary and McCubbins, Mathew, 1993, Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House, Berkeley, University of California Press.

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Cox, Gary and Kernell, Samuel (eds.), 1991, The Politics of Divided Government, Boulder, CO, Westview Press. DeLaet, C. James and Scott, James M., 2006, “Treaty-Making and Partisan Politics: Arms Control and the U.S. Senate, 1960–2001”, Foreign Policy Analysis, Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 177–200. The Economic Times, 2016a, “Public Opinion on GST Played Crucial Role, Says Arun Jaitley”, August 05. The Economic Times, 2016b, “GST: Not Just a Tax Reform, But Real Black Money Law”, August 16. The Economic Times, 2016c, “GST Bill Gets Nod from President Pranab Mukherjee”, September 09. Goods and Services Tax Council, www.gstcouncil.gov.in/brief-history-gst. Jones, Charles O., 1999, Separate but Equal Branches: Congress and the Presidency, New York, Chatham House. Kelkar, Vijay, 2019, “Towards India’s New Fiscal Federalism”, NIPFP Working Paper Series, No. 252, January, pp. 2–16. Krehbiel, Keith, 1998, Pivotal Politics: A Theory of U.S. Lawmaking, Chicago, University of Chicago Press. Krutz, Glen S. and Peake, Jeffrey S., 2009, Treaty Politics and the Rise of Executive Agreements: International Commitments in a System of Shared Powers, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press. Lindsay, James, 1994, Congress and the Politics of U.S. Foreign Policy, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press. Livemint, 2016, “How the Political Battle on GST Was Won”, August 05. Mayhew, David R., 2005, Divided We Govern: Party Control, Lawmaking and Investigations, 1946–2002, New Haven, Yale University Press. McCormick, James M. and Wittkopf, Eugene R., 1990, “Bipartisanship, Partisanship, and Ideology in Congressional-Executive Foreign Policy Relations, 1947– 1988”, Journal of Politics, Vol. 52, No. 4, November, pp. 1077–1100. Milner, Helen, 1997, Interests, Institutions, and Information: Domestic Politics and International Relations, Princeton, Princeton University Press. The New York Times, 1993, “Senate Approves Brady Legislation and Trade Accord”, November 21. Peterson, Mark, 1990, Legislating Together: The White House and Capitol Hill from Eisenhower to Reagan, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press. PHD Chamber of Commerce and Industry Report, 2016, PHD House, 4/2 Siri Institutional Area, August. Report on the Revenue Neutral Rate and Structure of Rates for the Goods and Services Tax (GST), Government of India, December 04, 2015. Report of the Thirteenth Finance Commission, 2010–15, Finance Commission India, https://fncomindia.nic.in/ShowContentOne.aspx?id=28&Section=1. Speech of Pranab Mukherjee, Union Budget 2009–10, July 06, 2009, http://content. Indiainfoline.com/wc/budget/FY-2009-10/Union-Budget/Union_Budget_ Speech_2009-10.pdf. State Finances: A Study of Budgets of 2016–17, RBI Report, “Goods and Services Tax – A Game Changer”, https://rbidocs.rbi.org.in. Sundquist, James L., 1980, “The Crisis of Competence in Our National Government”, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 95, No. 2, Summer, pp. 183–208.

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Sundquist, James L., 1988, “Needed: A Political Theory for the New Era of Coalition Government in the United States”, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 103, No. 4, Winter, pp. 613–635. The Times of India, 2016, “Parliament Passes GST Bill”, August 08. The Washington Post, 1993, “House Approves U.S.-Canada-Mexico Trade Pact on 234–200 Vote, Giving Clinton Big Victory”, November 18.

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Section II POLICY MAKING IN INDIA Choices and outcomes

7 PROMOTING QUALITY POLICY RESEARCH IN INDIA Need for an evidence-based approach Ramabrahmam Ivaturi and Ramya Chitrapu

Introduction Evidence-based policymaking (EBPM) has been emerging as a sine qua non for policymaking across the world, including India. Its role in shaping effective public policies is also being acknowledged in the domain of policy studies and other disciplines globally; the data-driven measures to control the COVID-19 pandemic the world over being a classic example. The feld of policy studies is gradually gaining momentum in India too. With increased interest in public policy and its related aspects in the domain of higher education, many public policy schools are being established, and courses on public policy have increased in the past few years. Think tanks and research organisations on public policy with a specifc focus on policy research are in a boom in India. However, evidence-based policy research in India is still in its nascent stages and needs in-depth studies, in terms of evidences and their implications. This becomes especially signifcant for the social sector, which encompasses many policies and programmes for welfare and development while also playing a critical role in the achievement of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). In this context, this chapter examines the centrality of EBPM in the context of Indian policy studies. The frst part of the chapter deals with the evolution of the concept of EBPM and its various facets. In the second part, it traces the growth and trajectory of EBPM in India using secondary resources. Further, it explores the issues and challenges that exist for EBPM through a case study of the Indian education sector. The last part deals with the identifcation of plausible solutions for enhancing the effcacy of EBPM in the context of people, processes and technology.

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Evidence-based policymaking (EBPM) as an approach to policymaking Policymaking is a vital function of the government, which has been evolving and transforming with shifts in governments and governance. This process, also called a “policy cycle,” is a complex and continuous process involving many actors and infuenced by many factors. With roots in the West, the academic interest in policymaking and policy research began after the 1930s. As a result, prominent theories of policymaking evolved that include the four-stage model of policy formulation, incremental approach and recent theories such as advocacy coalition framework (ACF) and punctuated-equilibrium. In addition to these, EBPM is another concept that has gained momentum in the 1990s and continues to be theorised. Drawing from the feld of medicine, evidence-based medicine in particular, EBPM is conceptually an extension of the scientifc method. As in evidence-based medicine, which relies on the most effective interventions based on randomised controlled trials (RCTs), EBPM focuses on a variety of evidences for effective policymaking. The Nobel Prize in economic sciences in 2019 to Abhijit Banerjee, Esther Dufo and Michael Kremer “for their experimental approach to alleviating global poverty” is a case in point. If one looks at policymaking, choices based on information/data from various sources have been a driving force. In this context, EBPM ushered in the need for a systematic use of evidences at various stages of policymaking – from agenda setting to policy evaluation. Although various nations have been basing their policies directly or indirectly on different kinds of data, the frst reference to the use of evidence in policymaking can be traced to the United Kingdom (UK) in the pre-millennium era. The UK government, headed by Tony Blair, in 1999, as part of its endeavour to modernise the government for the new millennium, emphasised on effective policymaking. It focused on “[policies] that are forward-looking and shaped by evidence rather a response to short-term pressures; that tackle causes not symptoms; that are measured by results than activity” and calls for “better use of evidence and research in policymaking and better focus on policies that will deliver long-term goals” (Cabinet Offce, 1999). Defning evidence-based policymaking When it comes to defning the concept of evidence-based policymaking (EBPM), not many defnitions are available in the literature as most studies use it as a self-explanatory term. One direct reference to the defnition of EBPM is as follows: “an approach that helps people make well-informed decisions about policies, programmes and projects by putting the best available evidence from research at the heart of policy development and implementation” (Davies, 1999 as cited in Davies, 2004). According to Shaxson (2005), “Evidence for policymaking is any information that helps to turn a 102

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department’s strategic priorities and other objectives into something concrete, manageable and achievable.” Further, many scholars also looked closely at the nomenclature of this approach. They argue whether EBPM is evidence-based or evidence-infuenced or evidence-aware policymaking (Nutley et al., 2003; Head, 2013). However, the term “evidence-based policymaking” continues to be widely used by scholars and governments worldwide. A critical question in the discourse of EBPM is what counts as evidence. Many times, it is argued that all policymaking happens either based on evidence or using evidence, which in turn poses the question of how EBPM is a novel approach. The UK Cabinet Offce (1999) described evidence as “Expert knowledge; published research; existing research; stakeholder consultations; Previous policy evaluations; the Internet; Outcomes from consultations; costings of policy options; and Output from economic and statistical modelling.” Further, Marston and Watts (2003) classifed the evidence as “hard” and “soft,” which implies objective and subjective connotations, respectively. The hard evidence, which is valued as objective, includes “Primary quantitative data collected by researchers from experiments; secondary quantitative social and epidemiological data collected by government agencies; clinical trials; and interview or questionnaire-based social surveys.” The soft evidence, which is the subjective data, includes “qualitative data such as ethnographic accounts and autobiographical materials.” Thus, it becomes clear that the concept of evidence includes both objective and subjective elements, which add a “scientifc” character to the policymaking process. Building on earlier works of researchers, Shaxson (2005) provided a framework for improving robustness of evidence, which included fve characteristics: credibility, generalability, reliability, objectivity and rootedness. Signifcance of EBPM In terms of the signifcance of EBPM, policymaking based on evidence makes decision-making more effective, which in turn is expected to have positive outputs and outcomes. With governments across the world allocating and expending huge sums of money on policies and programmes for the welfare of its citizens, it certainly calls for better-informed and better outcome-based decision-making. Various researchers have been emphasising the potential of EBPM in solving policy problems. As early as 2005, Shaxson suggested the need for evidence as “a necessary, but not a suffcient condition for decision-making.” Kay (2011) asserted, “The ambition for evidence-based policy-making should be seen in terms of the transition from a single, unique and universal rationality towards multiple rationalities that vary according to different policymaking contexts.” Davies (2012) argued that evidence-based policy made a worldwide impact “at least at the 103

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rhetorical, and institutional levels, and in terms of analytical activity.” He adds that “the role of evaluation evidence in policymaking can be instrumental (direct), conceptual (indirect) or symbolic (i.e. using research results to legitimate and sustain pre-determined positions).” Head (2013), in his article, grouped various articles on the subject of EBPM under four themes, thus emphasising that evidence plays a critical role in each of the stages of policymaking. These themes include foundational issues: value, politics and governance; knowledge and skills for policymaking; policy capacity and policy contestability; policy evaluation and accountability. Many nations across the world embraced EBPM, including the United States, Canada, South Africa, Australia and recently, India, which eventually garnered scholarly attention. A recent example of the use of evidences for deciding the course of policymaking was experimented with in Finland (Box 7.1). Over a period, bureaucracy through political leadership has been taking EBPM forward. Further, some nations that introduced EBPM constituted machinery-like commissions and other bodies, for increased capacities in the domain of EBPM: the Commission on Evidence-Based Policymaking (under the Evidence-Based Policymaking Commission Act of 2016) and Evidence Based Policy Analysis Project (Australia), to name a few. The major objective of most of these has been similar – to take forward the use of evidences in policymaking.

Box 7.1 The experience of Finland in evidence-based policymaking (EBPM) Finland, a Nordic country with a population of 5.52 million (as of July 2019), experimented with a policy for two years. Drawing from the fndings of the experiment – the evidences – the government made a decision on the future course of the policy. In other words, an experiment or a scientifc method (evidence) was used for decision-making (policymaking). The Finnish government introduced a social welfare policy, a variant of the Universal Basic Income (UBI), for unemployed citizens in January 2017. The government introduced the policy as an experiment for a period of two years. Through the experiment, the government attempted to study the effects of basic income on employment and income. Accordingly, the government gave a tax-exempt stipend of €560 to a random sample of 2,000 unemployed citizens in the 25–58 age group. If the trial was successful, it was proposed to be extended to all adults in Finland. However, the experiment of the Finnish government ended in December 2018. According to the preliminary fndings released by the

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Finnish government, “the universal income did not have any effect on employment status during the frst year of the experiment.” It did not improve the employment of the individuals although the well-being of the basic-income recipients improved (Kangas et al., 2019). Based on the evidences from the experiment, the Finnish government withdrew the idea of converting the trial into a full-fedged policy.

A few international organisations also have been carrying out studies and experiments, and the fndings from them are being utilised as inputs for policymaking. The Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab (J-PAL), founded by Abhijit Banerjee, Esther Dufo and Sendhil Mullainathan, for example, is a policy think tank, which works “to reduce poverty by ensuring that policy is informed by scientifc evidence.” It carries out randomised impact evaluations to fnd solutions to fght poverty. However, the new interest in EBPM should not be lost sight of. Despite many nations introducing EBPM in their policymaking processes, the role of evidence in policy formation and policy analysis is widely debated in the domains of policy studies and policy analysis. There is equally compelling literature that draws our attention to the invincibility of this approach. Notable among them are recent works, which attempt to bring forth perspectives on the use, prospects and challenges of EBPM (French, 2019; Cairney, 2019; Gamoran, 2018). Drawing from the evolution and signifcance of the concept of EBPM, the following section brings forth the policy environment and the potential for EBPM in India.

Policy studies using evidence-based instrument With a federal form of government, India comprises a central government and states’/union territories’ governments. As a union of states, the governments at the central and state levels in India formulate and implement various kinds of policies to ensure the well-being of the citizens. These include policies on education, health, industry, social welfare and railways, etc. Various stakeholders in addition to the prevalent socio-cultural contexts characterise policymaking in India at any given time. At the institutional level, the National Institution for Transforming India (NITI) Aayog, a policy think tank that replaced the Planning Commission of India in 2015, has been promoting data-driven EBPM. With NITI Aayog serving as the nodal agency for monitoring the implementation of the SDGs at the central and state levels based on data, one of its major focal areas is EBPM. 105

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Literature on EBPM in India is very limited except for a few research and newspaper articles. Most of these articles point to the signifcance of EBPM and term it as a way forward for India, while many of them also demand EBPM for various sectors such as health (Rao, 2016) and penal policymaking (Prasad et al., 2019). Drawing from her experiences in the health sector, Rao (2016) stated: There is an urgent need to move away from incrementalism and acknowledge the complexity of rebuilding the existing ineffcient health system. The policies and strategies should be evidence-based, embedded within the socio-economic context of the country, and devised on the basis of a close study of the past failures and an uncompromising commitment to equity and fairness. The press too made a positive case for EBPM in recent times. It is termed as the way forward for eradication of poverty and improvement of performance in various sectors, including education, economy, etc. (Pal, 2019). It would not only enhance the quality of policymaking in India, but also would serve as a means to maintain the constitutionally mandated separation of powers (Chatterji, 2016). In terms of the trajectory of EBPM in India, efforts seemed to have begun very recently. EBPM in India was provided a major fllip with the recent announcement of the Indian prime minister on bringing EBPM in India: “We aim to make Evidence Based Policy-Making an integral part of governance by 2022. It will also help in creating a new identity of New India” (ANI, 2019). Further, the Personal Data Protection Bill, 2019,1 introduced in the lower house of the Parliament (Lok Sabha) in December 2019, also touches upon the aspect of EBPM. The inclusion of the aspect of “evidence-based policies” in the bill of 2019, which was not present in the Personal Data Protection Bill, 2018, emphasises the commitment of lawmakers to make policymaking evidence-based. According to clause 91 (2) of the bill: The Central Government may, in consultation with the Authority, direct any data fduciary or data processor to provide any personal data anonymised or other non-personal data to enable better targeting of delivery of services or formulation of evidence-based policies by the Central Government, in such manner as may be prescribed. (The Personal Data Protection Bill, 2019) On the similar lines of the “Modernising Government” White Paper, one of the development reforms of India outlined in “Strategy for New India @ 75” emphasised on data-driven policymaking. According to it, “evidence based policymaking should be made integral to the overall governance structure in 106

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New India, 2022–23” (NITI Aayog, 2018). This was preceded by a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in 2018 between India and the United Kingdom (UK) for utilising big data and analytics capability for evidencebased policymaking (Ministry of External Affairs, 2018). While portraying the backing at the political level, these moves also clearly signal a shift from implementation to an evidence-based way of designing and development of policies in the country. The Indian states at the sub-national level too have been making inroads to EBPM through various initiatives. For instance, states such as Tamil Nadu and Odisha in collaboration with J-PAL are institutionalising evidence in policymaking in different sectors. International organisations such as the World Bank, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF) and the United Nations have been actively promoting evidence-based and datadriven initiatives in the country. For instance, the Evidence-based Policy Infuencing and Advocacy is a branch of UNICEF India working towards evidence-based developmental initiatives. The dashboards introduced by various ministries and departments at the central level and Chief Minister (CM) dashboards introduced by the states are also enabling collection and collation of critical data to monitor the performance and progress of various initiatives. Thus, it is evident that EBPM in India is still in a nascent stage and has a long way to go. However, the political will and the legal backing for the concept seems to promise a large scope for the development of better policymaking and in turn better policy outcomes. Having traced the evolution of EBPM in the Indian context, the following section uses the case of the Indian education sector to highlight some issues and challenges and how EBPM can help in effective policymaking.

The Indian education sector: a case The Indian education sector is the second largest in the world, encompassing school education and higher education. With quality education constituting Goal 4 of the SDGs, various challenges need to be addressed in the education sector. Education in India is included as a subject in the Concurrent List of the Constitution, which means that both the centre and states make legislations in this domain. In other words, both the central and state governments are involved in the policymaking – its formulation, implementation and evaluation. The Ministry of Education (previously known as Human Resource Development (HRD)), Government of India (GoI), is the nodal department for education in the country. The Ministry of Education chiefy functions through two organs – the Department of School Education and Literacy (DSEL) and the Department of Higher Education (DHE). In post-independent India, an array of challenges plagued the education sector, including low enrolment, low literacy rate (18.3% in 1951), poverty; 107

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governance and fnance issues; regional, caste and gender disparities; lack of access; equity and quality of education. Reforms in the education sector were carried out starting with the Charter Act of 1813. This was followed by various commissions appointed in post-independent India for improving the education sector, some of which include Radhakrishnan Commission (1948–49), the Secondary Education Commission (1952–53), Kothari Commission (1964), National Knowledge Commission (2006) and the committee to advice on Renovation and Rejuvenation of Higher Education (2009), to name a few. Policymaking in the education sector can be chiefy seen through the National Policies on Education (NPE) introduced in the country in the post-independent era. The frst NPE was introduced in 1968 followed by NPE 1986, with a focus on adult education; the third NPE, 2005, based on common minimum programme and the National Education Policy (NEP) 2020, focuses on a more equitable education system. Despite the many policies and programmes introduced by the central and state governments, the achievements of the Indian education sector still have a long way to go to meet global standards. In terms of expenditure by the centre and states on the education sector as a proportion of the gross domestic product (GDP), it is between 2.8–3.1 per cent between 2013–14 and 2018–19 (budgeted expenditure) (Ministry of Finance, 2019). The NEP 2020 targets raising the expenditure to 6 per cent of GDP, a goal envisaged since NPE 1968 and reiterated in all the NPEs. The following section outlines the budgetary allocations and utilisation and how EBPM can help enhance the effcacy of policymaking in the education sector. Department of School Education and Literacy The Department of School Education and Literacy (DSEL), as one of the organs of the Ministry of Education, is responsible for the education provided for the age group 6–18 years. The Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education (RTE) Act, 2009, which guarantees elementary education to all, is one of the major focus areas of this department. Table 7.1 indicates the allocations made to the DSEL from 2010–11 to 2018–19, its expenditure and percentage of utilisation for the respective periods. Allocations to the DSEL fuctuated for a few years, but there has been an incremental increase in the past three years. It emerges from the data that utilisation has been in sync with allocations to a large extent in the years under review. This is also evident from the percentage of utilisation in the past four years (between 2015–16 and 2018–19), which has been more than 98 per cent despite a 23 per cent decrease in allocations in 2015–16 over the previous year. 108

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Table 7.1 Budget allocations and actual expenditure of the Department of School Education and Literacy (DSEL), Ministry of Education (erstwhile MHRD), GoI between 2010–11 and 2018–19 Year

Budget estimate (in Rs. crores)

2010–11 33,214 2011–12 41,451 2012–13 48,781 2013–14 52,701 2014–15 55,115 2015–16 42,220 2016–17 43,554 2017–18 46,356 2018–19 50,000 * = Revised estimate

Increase/ decrease over previous year (%)

Actuals (in Rs. crores)

Utilisation (%)

– 25 18 8 5 −23 3 6 8

36,433 40,641 45,631 46,856 45,722 41,800 42,989 46,600 50,114*

110 98 94 89 83 99 99 101 100

Source: Prepared by the authors based on data from Demand for Grants 2019–20 Analysis Human Resource Development (Mann, 2019).

Despite utilisation of more than 80 per cent of allocations over the past ten years, the debate continues on utilisation vs. outputs and outcomes. As pointed out by many studies, the argument on quantity vs. quality has been plaguing the education sector, especially school education. The Annual Status of Education (Rural) Report (ASER) 2019 (ASER Centre, 2019) brought forth insights that continue to raise an alarm for improving the quality of primary education. The ASER survey carried across 26 rural districts in 24 Indian states and consulted a sample of 37,000 children between ages 4 and 8. It tested the children on various cognitive tasks: early language, early numeracy and others. Some of the survey fndings paint a grim picture of the reality of the quality of primary education. For instance, they point out that 49.2 per cent of the children in the primary grades of standards I through III cannot read a text of standard I diffculty level, while 27.8 per cent of the children are unable to recognise numbers. Thus, the strong demands for higher allocations need to take into consideration the growing gap between expectation and achievement in this domain. Department of Higher Education (DHE) The Department of Higher Education (DHE), another organ of the Ministry of Education, GoI, is the nodal agency for higher and technical education in the country. The undergraduate, post-graduate, doctoral degrees and 109

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Table 7.2 Budget allocations and actual expenditure of the Department of Higher Education (DHE), Ministry of Education (erstwhile MHRD), GoI between 2010–11 and 2018–19 Year

Budget Estimate (in Rs. crores)

2010–11 16,690 2011–12 21,912 2012–13 25,275 2013–14 26,750 2014–15 27,656 2015–16 26,855 2016–17 28,840 2017–18 33,330 2018–19 35,010 * = Revised estimate

Increase/decrease over previous year (%)

Actuals (in Rs. crores)

Utilisation (%)

– 31 15 6 3 −3 7 16 5

15,472 19,505 20,423 24,465 23,152 25,439 29,026 33,614 33,512*

93 89 81 91 84 95 101 101 96

Source: Prepared by the authors based on data from Demand for Grants 2019–20 Analysis Human Resource Development (Mann, 2019).

certifcate courses come under the purview of the Department of Higher Education. Table 7.2 indicates the allocations made to the Department of Higher Education from 2010–11 to 2018–19, the increase/decrease in allocations over the previous years and the expenditure and percentage of utilisation for the respective periods. It emerges from the data that there have been major fuctuations in the allocations to the DHE across the nine years under review. However, the utilisation of the budget has been recording more than 80 per cent over the years. It has been 95 per cent or more in the past four years (between 2015–16 and 2018–19). Similar to the DSEL, the DHE has its own issues in terms of outputs and outcomes. The aspirations of many individuals to be employed remain unfulflled. Evidence shows the inability to cope with growing market requirements. Endeavors by the government to offer skill-based education, as a value addition, remains an area of promise. Education cess In addition to the allocations, the government of India (GoI), since 2004, has been levying a cess for education, which is a sum of the Primary Education Cess (PEC) (2 per cent) and the Secondary and Higher Education Cess (SHEC) (1 percent). The GoI is required to create a dedicated fund to spend the proceeds of the cess in the respective areas. Accordingly, the 110

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PEC is spent on two programmes – Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (SSA) and Mid Day Meal (MDM) schemes through the dedicated fund, Prarambhik Shiksha Kosh. In the case of SHEC, the dedicated fund – “Madhyamik and Uchchtar Shiksha Kosh (MUSK)” was created only in 2017, almost a decade after the creation of the SHEC in 2007. As reported by the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) in 2019 and earlier, nearly Rs. 940 billion collected between 2007 and 2018 under SHEC remained unutilised because of the non-creation and operationalisation of the MUSK (Union Government, 2019). While the compliance of payment of cess is adhered to, the policy goal or objective of the collection of cess seemed to be largely neglected. There appears to be a lack of coordination between grant-sanctioning agencies and programme formulators. In other words, the policy is not articulated in a way that ensures sync between the policy and its implementation. The projected revenue from cess in a budget year is more or less known. However, the departments concerned may not have enunciated policies or programmes for utlisation of the cess funds. There is, therefore, a need to formulate appropriate policies followed by programmes in consonance with fund generation. In addition, referring to the Sarkaria Commission’s2 (1988) recommendations and various studies, there is a need to re-examine the rationale and duration of the education cess and similarly other cesses in various sectors. Hence, the conceptual utlisation of funds under a declared cess is another point that strengthens the need for adoption of the prime minister’s call for EBPM in utilising funds in priority areas such as health and education. In this context, if one looks at the education sector as a whole, India has many challenges to deal with, especially in the domain of policymaking. Mathur (2013) points out that policymaking in the education sector is characterised by policy struggles among politicians, bureaucrats and educationists. He adds that educational decisions in India are political decisions and rarely refect technical expertise in education. Ayyar (2017) also emphasised on the various drawbacks of the education policy discourse, while pointing out that “governments cannot address any major policy issue without regard to the possible linkages of that issue with issues of other policy areas, and further cannot disregard competing priorities and demands on limited resources organizational and fnancial.” He illustrates the reason behind the hovering public expenditure of around 4 per cent of GDP even after half a century since the recommendation of the Kothari Commission that the central and state governments should together spend at least 6 percent of GDP on education: The failure to implement the Kothari commission recommendation cannot be attributed to lack of political will . . . one can understand the failure only through an analysis of the fscal capacity of the Central and State Governments and the competing demands and priorities. (Ayyar, 2017) 111

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Thus, it becomes pertinent to use data (evidences) for achieving better outcomes in the education sector, which in turn can scale up the rank of India in various global indicators.

Discussion Drawing from the case of the education sector, data-driven and evidencebased policymaking can have positive results if implemented in other sectors also. With some of the states in India already attempting to institutionalise evidences into policymaking, replicating it in other states and departments/ ministries may provide useful inputs and insights for policymaking. The efforts of the other stakeholders, including international agencies, NGOs and researchers, can also add value to the perspectives of the policymakers. For instance, the “Dalit Human Development Report, Telangana” (Indian Institute of Dalit Studies and the Centre for Dalit Studies, 2018) is a frstof-its-kind report that elaborates the status of Dalits in Telangana. Such reports, if studied in the lens of EBPM, serve as a critical source of inputs for policymaking in various sectors. However, there exist challenges that are context specifc to India. One of the major challenges to make EBPM a reality is the availability and accessibility of data. Mukerji (2019), in his essay focusing on studying the internet in India, noted that the frst challenge is the access and availability of data. In addition, quality of data collection along with effective assimilation and analysis of evidence remains a major challenge (Kattumuri, 2015). Similarly, Mani and Kamath (2014), in their commentary on research and development (R&D) statistics in India, emphasised the need for improvement of the data. Both the articles from two different sectors point at the critical need for having robust data, which is to be made available and accessible. With data being the most signifcant component of EBPM, it is vital for India to make it robust while also addressing important questions such as what evidence to count – qualitative or quantitative, and at what stage of policymaking are the evidences to be utilised and to what extent (Ivaturi, 2019). In addition, the stakeholders of the policymaking processes have a greater responsibility to deploy data effectively in the processes. With technology becoming the enabler, especially in the COVID-19 era, robust platforms on the lines of the dashboards should be created for creation, collation, design and documentation while also enhancing the access and availability of data.

Conclusion EBPM, as an approach to policymaking, has been time tested the world over. It is an interesting trend to observe that the EBPM has been strongly backed by political will, with the heads of various states mentioning its role in effective 112

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policymaking. With India embracing the aspect only recently, it has a long way to go. The issues of standardisation and authenticity of data will persist until robust systems for data collection and data analysis are put in place in the various departments and ministries. Although it is widely debated on the stage at which the evidences are to be used, it is thought that evidence needs to guide policymaking throughout – from agenda setting to the evaluation stage. With EBPM using evidence to inform policy decisions and policymaking, it is expected to enhance the authenticity and credibility for the policies, as they are data driven. This scenario is also expected to lead to better-informed and better outcome-based decision-making while ensuring enhanced accountability and transparency in policymaking and public service delivery. With policies being the lifeblood of any government, there is a need for academicians and policymakers to evolve a comprehensive and robust evidence-based policymaking mechanism based on the experiences of other countries. In addition, there is a need for identifcation of plausible solutions for enhancing the effcacy of EBPM in the context of people, processes and technology. This draws one’s attention to enhancing the capacities in terms of infrastructure and individuals to cater to the demands of the new approach to policymaking. There is a greater need for further research in this area because of its large scope and potential to contribute to the policy ecosystem in the country. Moreover, the use of evidence is also envisaged to open up a pedagogical view and promote quality policy research in the country. Lastly, in the wake of the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, new vistas for research are opening up for policy sciences and especially EBPM.

Notes 1 The bill was introduced in the Lok Sabha in December 2019 and was referred to the Standing Committee for further examination. As of April 2020, the bill had not yet passed. 2 The Sarkaria Commission (headed by Justice R. S. Sarkaria), set up by the central government of India in 1983, made recommendations on the relations between the centre and the states.

References ANI, 2019, “Our Aim Is Make Evidence-Based Policy-Making Integral Part of Governance by 2022: PM Modi”, ANI, November 21, www.aninews.in/news/national/ general-news/our-aim-is-to-make-evidence-based-policy-making-integralpart-of-governance-by-2022-pm-modi20191121180800/. ASER Centre, 2019,“Annual Status of Education Report (Rural) 2019 ‘Early Years’”, http://img.asercentre.org/docs/ASER%202019/ASER2019%20report%20/aser report2019earlyyearsfnal.pdf. Ayyar, R. V. Vaidyanatha, 2017, History of Education Policymaking in India, 1947– 2016, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

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Cabinet Offce, 1999, “Modernising Government”, A White Paper presented to Parliament, March. Cairney, Paul, 2019, “The UK Government’s Imaginative Use of Evidence to Make Policy”, British Politics, Vol. 14, No. 1, pp. 1–22. Chatterji, Sohini, 2016, “Hearsay or Fact: A Case for Evidence-Based Policymaking in India”, The Wire, June 13, https://thewire.in/government/hearsay-or-facta-case-for-evidence-based-policymaking-in-india. Davies, Philip, 2004, “Is Evidence-Based Government Possible”, Jerry Lee Lecture, p. 19. Davies, Philip, 2012, “The State of Evidence-Based Policy Evaluation and Its Role in Policy Formation”, National Institute Economic Review, Vol. 219, No. 1, pp. R41–R52. French, Richard D., 2019, “Is It Time to Give up on Evidence-Based Policy? Four Answers”, Policy & Politics, Vol. 47, No. 1, pp. 151–168. Gamoran, Adam, 2018, “Evidence-Based Policy in the Real World: A Cautionary View”,  The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 678, No. 1, pp. 180–191. Head, Brian W., 2013, “Evidence-Based Policymaking – Speaking Truth to Power?” Australian Journal of Public Administration, Vol. 72, No. 4, pp. 397–403. Indian Institute of Dalit Studies and Centre for Dalit Studies, 2018, Dalit Human Development Report: Telangana, New Delhi, Indian Institute of Dalit Studies. Ivaturi, Ramabrahmam, 2019, “Politics, Populism and Need for Evidence-based Policy Studies”, Bulletin of the Centre for Policy Studies, Vol. 23, No. 4, pp. 12–14. Kangas, Olli, Jauhiainen, Signe, Simanainen, Miska and Ylikännö, Minna, 2019, “The Basic Income Experiment 2017–2018 in Finland: Preliminary Results”, https://julkaisut.valtioneuvosto.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/161361/Report_ The%20Basic%20Income%20Experiment%2020172018%20in%20Finland. pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y. Kattumuri, Ruth, 2015, “Evidence and the Policy Process from an Indian Perspective”, Contemporary Social Science, Vol. 10, No. 2, pp. 191–201. Kay, Adrian, 2011, “Evidence-Based Policy-Making: The Elusive Search for Rational Public Administration”,  Australian Journal of Public Administration,  Vol. 70, No. 3, pp. 236–245. Mani, Sunil and Kamath, Anant, 2014, “What Can We Learn from India’s R&D Statistics”, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 49, No. 10. Mann, Gayatri, 2019. “Demand for Grants 2019–20 Analysis Human Resource Development”, PRS Legislative Research, Institute for Policy Research Studies. Marston, Greg and Watts, Rob, 2003, “Tampering with the Evidence: A Critical Appraisal of Evidence-Based Policy-Making”, The Drawing Board: An Australian Review of Public Affairs, Vol. 3, No. 3, pp. 143–163. Mathur, Kuldeep, 2013, Public Policy and Politics in India: How Institutions Matter, New Delhi, Oxford University Press. Ministry of External Affairs, Govt. of India, 2018, “India-UK List of MOUs/Agreements/ Initiatives during the visit of Prime Minister to London, UK”, April 18, https:// mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/29831/IndiaUK_List_of_MOUs AgreementsInitiatives_during_the_visit_of_Prime_Minister_to_UK_London_ April_18_2018.

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Ministry of Finance, Govt. of India, 2019, “Economic Survey, 2018–19”, www.india budget.gov.in/economicsurvey/doc/vol2chapter/echap10_vol2.pdf. Mukerji, Maitrayee, 2019, “Where Is the Data to Study Internet in India?” EPW Engage,Vol. 54, No. 4, www.epw.in/engage/article/where-data-study-internet-india. NITI Aayog, 2018, Strategy for New India @ 75, https://niti.gov.in/writereaddata/ fles/Strategy_for_New_India.pdf. Nutley, Sandra, Davies, Huw and Walter, Isabel, 2003, “Evidence-Based Policy and Practice: Cross-Sector Lessons from the United Kingdom”, Social Policy Journal of New Zealand, pp. 29–48. Pal, Dipayan, 2019, “Evidence-Based Policy-Making Is the Way Forward”, The Hindu, November 24. The Personal Data Protection Bill, 2018, https://meity.gov.in/writereaddata/fles/ Personal_Data_Protection_Bill,2018.pdf. The Personal Data Protection Bill, 2019, Bill No. 373 of 2019, http://164.100.47.4/ BillsTexts/LSBillTexts/Asintroduced/373_2019_LS_Eng.pdf. Prasad, Pupul Dutta and Vashishtha, Sanjay, 2019, “Neoliberalism and the Rise of Penal Populism in India: Is There a Way Out?” Journal of the Indian Law Institute, Vol. 60, No. 4, pp. 389–405. Rao, K. Sujatha, 2016, Do We Care? India’s Health System, Oxford, Oxford University Press. Sarkaria Commission, 1988, “Chapter X Financial Relations”, Report of the Sarkaria Commission, http://interstatecouncil.nic.in/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/ CHAPTERX.pdf. Shaxson, Louise, 2005, “Is Your Evidence Robust Enough? Questions for Policy Makers and Practitioners”, Evidence & Policy: A Journal of Research, Debate and Practice, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 101–112. Union Government, 2019, “Report of Comptroller and Auditor General of India for the Year 2017–18”, https://cag.gov.in/sites/default/fles/audit_report_fles/Report_ No_2_of_2019_Accounts_of_the_Union_Government_Financial_Audit.pdf.

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8 STATE AND PUBLIC POLICIES IN INDIA A symbiotic relationship Baljit Singh Mann

Introduction State and public policies are intimately related as they have a common professed purpose: to serve the well-being of the public. Neither the nature of the state nor that of public policies can be understood by isolating one from the other, because they have a dialectical relationship and are being shaped by each other. To remain legitimate, both are required to be socially relevant by constantly striving to attain the greater public good. A state that cannot serve the public interest through its policies cannot survive for long; the classic example was that of the colonial state in India. Instead of serving the public interest, the colonial state largely served the interests of the ruling elite that made it socially, economically and politically irrelevant for the masses, thereby enhancing its legitimacy defcit. The Indian National Congress (INC)–led civil society movement argued for public interest–driven policies even before independence. However, the lukewarm and laid-back attitude of the colonial state ultimately culminated in a political transformation from colonial to the post-colonial. Consequent upon that, the process to democratize and socialize public policies to serve the greater public good was set in motion to realize the agenda of the post-independent liberal Indian state. The post-colonial Indian state tried to acquire democratic and liberal credentials by framing public policies to serve the interest of the masses. Being a liberal-democratic state, the welfare of the public was the core concern of its policies. Public interest was the primary concern when the state formulated policies of an over-arching nature such as nonaligned policy and the import substitution policy of growth. The policy of land reforms and nationalization of banks further exhibited the state’s concern for the well-being of the masses. The liberal state also formulated various public policies, including that of reservations to improve the fortunes of underprivileged sections of 116

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the Indian society. Apparently the policy-making process appeared to be democratic, but actually it remained elitist, bureaucratic and top-down in nature. However, the public good remained the core concern of public policies, and the state continued to be their major driver. Non-implementation of certain public policies and policy paralysis at the formulation level in some sectors manifested into a disconnect between the public policies and objective realities as they failed to bring about a meaningful change in the fortunes of the public. Policies to pursue a mixed economy model and import substitution strategy of growth were designed to attain selfsuffciency by promoting the public and the private sector simultaneously. However, weeding-out the loss-making public and private sector undertakings was neither done on merit nor on time. Disconnect between one public policy with that of another also happened at the policy formulation and implementation levels. The policy of economic growth was not connected with that of human development which ultimately culminated in a huge dichotomy between the rate of economic growth and the level of human development and thereby sustained human deprivation at enormous levels. Dichotomy between the economic and environmental policies have not only depleted natural resources but have also incurred huge environmental costs. The top-driven process of public policy formulation and their faulty implementation created a critical mass and a justifcation for the paradigm public policy shift in the shape of new economic policies when India landed in a severe balance-of-payments crisis in the late 1980s. The policy of liberalization, privatization and globalization (LPG) brought a paradigm shift in India’s economic policy which transformed the nature of the Indian state from liberal to neo-liberal and thereby provided the whole context for the formulation and execution of public policies. Neo-liberalism emerged as a philosophical and ideological framework within which the Indian state started framing its public policies. The primary focus of public policies in the LPG era has turned out to be market instead of masses. Formulation of public policies has been largely technocratic in nature, devoid of public participation because of the intellectual process requiring inputs from experts for achieving desired goals. Neither the neo-liberal state nor its public policies have been able to emancipate the masses economically, socially and politically and thereby ensure public well-being. Alleviation of poverty, generation of employment, sustaining high growth rates and ensuring human development have continued to be formidable challenges for the neo-liberal public policies besides ensuring equity and distributive justice. The market has failed to address the ailments of our economy, and its failure has compounded the liabilities of public sector banks and thereby the credibility of the Indian state. Failure of neo-liberal policies elsewhere has already ushered the post–neo-liberal era wherein protectionism is being advocated and promoted particularly through the US policy of America First and the United Kingdom’s policy of Brexit. Disappointment with neo-liberal policies 117

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the world over has created a critical mass wherein the states are required to revise their neo-liberal thinking and agenda to avoid policy defcit and thereby the legitimacy defcit initially for the political regime and ultimately for the state. Such a scenario leads to a series of questions. How has the policy-making process transited from a liberal to a neo-liberal Indian state and to what extent have public policies shaped the nature of state and vice versa? Are the public policy-makers prepared to transcend the neo-liberal agenda to meet the challenges confronting contemporary India?

Public policies in the liberal era The public policy-making process in liberal India was elitist in character, with its focus largely on the masses. Public policies were framed without synchronizing with one another. The policy of economic growth was not synchronized with policies of human development or of the environment. Institutions providing intellectual inputs to the public policy formulation process were mostly funded by the government. The policy-making process was certainly top-down and technocratic which was primarily driven by the minister-bureaucratic relationship. Public policy-making was centralized, largely refecting the vision and ideas of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru in consultation with a team of technocrats from the Planning Commission (Basu, 2019: 226). The public policy-making process got further centralized and personalized, and public policies became more rhetorical and populist, during Indira Gandhi’s regime. Because of that, they failed to bring meaningful change on the ground, and challenges for the Indian state continued to be formidable and compounded with the passage of time. Policies continued to be rhetorical in many sectors during the Rajiv Gandhi era; however, the public policy which turned out to be revolutionary was related to the information technology sector, thereby enabling a transformation of the process of governance. Implementation of public policies continued to be a huge task, given the corrupt state machinery. The major impediment was the permit/licence raj which was exploited by the political elite and bureaucracy to their advantage and the public’s disadvantage. They indulged in corruption while rendering services to the public and issuing licences for setting up various business enterprises by compromising the core objectives of public policies. Still, some public policies in the domain of education and health resulted in the emergence of premier institutions such as Universities, Indian Institutes of Management, Indian Institutes of Technology, All India Institute of Medical Sciences and Post-Graduate Institutes of Medical Sciences. However, the social sector continued to suffer from policy defcits because of a variety of reasons, including that of political apathy which was the most important factor for the deplorable condition of the health and education sectors in liberal India. The increasing size of the population required reasonable investment by the Indian state on education and health. Contrary 118

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to the magnitude of the requirements in the social sector, the investment in it remained negligible. This happened because the priority sectors such as industry, agriculture and infrastructure building had relegated the social sectors such as health and education to the background (Dhal, 2016: 77) which culminated in the emergence of human deprivation as a major challenge to the Indian state.

Public policies in neo-liberal India In neo-liberal India, the public policy-making process continued to be topdown, elitist, corporatist and bureaucratic in character wherein the corporate interests have replaced the public interests on the agenda of public policies. Public policies formulated during the past three decades have witnessed several contradictory tendencies such as populist/rhetorical, neo-liberal and right-based policies. First, to generate political capital in their favour, political regimes have formulated certain populist policies such as free electricity, water and food grains at cheap rates, and have passed some token benefts to the poor masses for electoral gains. However, the corporate agenda has been the core concern of state policies. Apparently, public policies were framed to help the public, but actually they were always intended to serve corporate interests which have converged with that of the political elite as they have been collaborating with one another while formulating and implementing public policies – although the success of business depended largely on managing political regimes in liberal India as well but the state was not a party to corporate interests and played a neutral role in the agenda setting of public policies and processes of policy formulation. This was reversed in the neo-liberal era because the corporate elite has been setting the agenda of public policies wherein the core objective has been to maximize the proft of corporate houses rather than the well-being of the masses. The nexus between the political regimes and a few corporate houses has been well established, and political regimes have been promoting corporate interests in the name of accelerating the economic growth rate and generating employment. Initially, the political regime helped corporations to secure loans from public-sector banks by arguing that it would accelerate economic growth and generate employment. Subsequently, when the corporations failed to pay back their loans to banks, they were declared bad loans and eventually waived off by the political regimes for the beneft of the corporate sector. The rationale of this quid pro quo is not diffcult to understand: elections of the political elite have been fnanced by corporate houses apart from the convergence of their core economic interests for private gains. Further, the political elite has acquired huge stakes in various business enterprises because politics is no more a service but rather a business in this neo-liberal era. Eventually, politics has become a business for the political elite, and the agenda of public policies has been predominantly set by the corporate 119

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sector which led to the privatization of policy-making processes. However, the state makes public policies through legislative acts, but public policy has also been formulated through the ruling of independent regulators that have gained signifcance since India liberalized its economy by allowing the private sector to operate in areas which were earlier government monopolies such as electricity, telecommunication, insurance, securities, market, oil and gas. While regulators have autonomy in performing their roles, they still fall within the broad defnition of the executive branch of the state and are accountable to the legislature (Chakrabarti and Sanyal, 2017: 69). In liberal India, the Planning Commission had initiated the establishment of several research institutes that were later funded under the umbrella of the Indian Council of Social Sciences Research (ICSSR). These institutions were funded mostly by the government and carried out research under its sponsorship. In neo-liberal India, many more research institutes have come up which were fnanced by private sources or international funding agencies. These research institutes usually do not depend on government for fnancial support and have multiple sources of funding. Many of these institutions entered the policy discourse to promote neo-liberal policies and support market-oriented delivery of public goods and services (Mathur, 2018: 10). Globalization has brought into focus a new range of relationship among government institutions and international institutions. Policies are open to global infuences, and government institutions have accepted formulation of policy framed elsewhere particularly in the sectors of environment, climate change and human rights. It has led critics to argue that the policy-making sovereignty of the government has been abdicated. Another change brought about by globalization has been the emergence of global civil society which has had a great infuence on the policy goals and policy-making processes in these sectors (Ibid; 8–9). Globalization has brought transformation in the nature of the state from liberal to neo-liberal, interventionist to regulatory and thereby posed a serious challenge to its welfare credentials. According to the constitutional mandate, the Indian state is still a welfare state but in terms of its policy framework during the past three decades, it has deviated from its welfare agenda and has become by and large a neo-liberal state. It has challenged the nature of public policy by summoning a series of non-negotiable, external and largely economic imperatives that must be appeased in a technically profcient manner if good economic performance is to be maintained, at the cost of democratic accountability (Gupta and Damele, 2018: 18). Globalization necessitates privatization and technicization of public policy, rendering it publicly less accountable. The public character of public policy is potentially seen as a casualty of globalization (Moren et al., 2006). According to F. W. Riggs, the most signifcant challenge to public policy at present is accountability and transparency. These challenges emerged as the effect of globalization (F. W. Riggs, 2012). The process of public 120

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policy-making has therefore remained opaque and lacked accountability in globalized India. India’s liberal policy regime was driven by the Keynesian economic philosophy termed ‘welfare economics’ which enjoyed legitimacy up to the mid-1980s. The economic crisis of the late 1980s was attributed to the failure of liberal policies that created justifcation for the neo-liberal policy regime ushered in from 1991 onward. Neo-liberal policies enjoyed promissory legitimacy for a longtime that was based on the promises that they would eradicate poverty, ensure economic growth, generate employment and ensure the public well-being through corporate social responsibility (CSR). The neo-liberal policy regime also believed that the market is a more effcient and effective economic manager than the state. The basic philosophy of the neo-liberal policy regime has been that free competition and increasing access to markets at a global scale would ensure economic prosperity and public well-being. This policy regime transformed the nature of the Indian state from liberal to neo-liberal which in turn led to the privatization of public policies in terms of their agenda setting, formulation and implementation. By and large, the political elite has reduced politics to crude business and used state policies to pursue that business. Paradoxically, the neo-liberal state has been driving the political mandate from the public but serving the interests of a few corporate houses as there has always been a marriage of convenience among the political elite, top administrators and corporate houses. The major section of the poor masses has always been seduced through populist policies or the passing of some token benefts to them whenever elections came around. The focus of several economic policies of the state apparently appears to be the public; however, their core concern has always been to serve the corporate/private interests. The neo-liberal state has always remained pro-market instead of pro-public as far as its policies have been concerned. Instead of greater common good, the private good has occupied the central place on the agenda of the neo-liberal state. The policy of public-private partnership, an outcome of the neo-liberal policy regime, has been considered successful in a few areas wherein the gestation period for investment was short and the return was prompt. Its success has also relied on the patronage of the state as the economic burden regarding the investment and operational cost of this policy has been transferred to the consumers of these policies. For instance, the roads constructed under the build-operate-transfer (BOT) system under the publicprivate partnership scheme has resulted in double taxation because owners of vehicles pay road tax at the time of the registration of their vehicles and they also pay the hefty toll tax while driving their vehicles on BOT roads. With the patronage of the political regime and the political elites, the tenures to collect toll tax have invariably been extended to feece the public for the beneft of private companies which build and maintain these roads. Private enterprises have failed in several sectors of the economy, including 121

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that of real estate, banking, manufacturing, airlines and information technology. The neo-liberal policy of disinvestment has resulted in the disinvestment of many public sector undertakings doing reasonably well which has also been done at throwaway prices for the beneft of a few corporate houses, political elite and the bureaucracy. The failure of the neo-liberal policy regime has indicated that all has not been well with the private sector and the market. The National Democratic Alliance (NDA) regime continued with some of the public policies formulated by the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) regime. During UPA rule, the Indian state formulated certain public policies by passing legislations such as the Right to Information Act (2005), the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (2005), the Right to Education Act (2009) and the Right to Food Security Act (2013), besides many neoliberal policies. These right-based public policies were implemented through centrally sponsored schemes such as MGNREGS, RTE and the National Rural Health Mission (NRHM). These programmes were launched to realize the welfare agenda of the state besides materializing the millennium development goals (MDGs) prescribed by the United Nations. However, they beneftted millions of people on the margins of Indian society, but social and human development continued to be formidable challenges as the budgetary allocations for these programmes were never suffcient given the magnitude of the problems. The NDA regime also formulated certain public policies either through the executive or legislative mode to fulfl electoral promises made by the BJP during the 2014 general elections, particularly the promise of acche din in the lives of people as promised by Prime Minister Narendra Modi. To achieve this objective, the Modi regime proclaimed a couple of new public policies such as: Make in India, Swachh Bharat Abhiyan, Jan Dhan Yojana, Digital India and Demonetization (Basu, 2019: 226). Proclamation of these public policies indicated that the policy-making process continued to be centralized, personalized and elitist in character which has neither articulated nor refected the views of the public sphere. It was expected that these policies would transform the fortunes of the public but contrary to that they have stifed economic growth and adversely affected the business and employment scenario in India. Hence, the NDA regime strategy to project India as an emerging power bolstering the country’s economic fortunes, and ensuring that the fruits of economic growth are broadly distributed, will not be attainable without sustainable growth at the rate of 10 percent, and an effective, effcient and corruption-free public delivery system (Ibid; 226). The policy of demonetization was an outcome of an executive order, and its evaluation reports indicate that it has slowed down growth to a record low of 5 percent and has cost 2 percent of GDP in 2017 (Ibid; 227). The Parliament passed the goods and services tax in the form of the GST Act which was expected to expand the tax base of the state besides facilitating business ventures. It has also turned out to be counter-productive. Both these policies 122

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created a sense of insecurity for small business ventures and resulted in the decline of demand and loss of jobs. The policy of skill development was launched in 2015 to move away from a supply-driven to a demand-driven skill development approach so that skilled people would get employment of their choice (Rajalakshmi, 2017: 22). The Ministry of Skill Development and Entrepreneurship (MSDE) was established (2016) to consolidate skill development programmes (SDP). The MSDE constituted a committee headed by Sharda Prasad, former directorate general of Employment and Training, for Rationalization and Optimization of the Functioning of the Sector Skill Councils, that analyzed the scheme by having extensive discussions with all state governments, central ministers, the sectoral skill councils (SSCs), employers and vocational training providers (VTPs) which stated: PMKVY, 2016 approved by the Union Cabinet on July 13, 2016 with an outlay of Rs. 12000 crore to impart skills training to one crore over the next four years (2016–2020). However, no evaluation was conducted of PMKVY, 2015 to fnd out what were the outcomes of the scheme and whether it was serving the twin purposes of providing employment to youth and meeting the skill needs of the industry before launching such ambitious scheme. (The Committee Report, Vol. 1, 2016: 21) The committee also pointed out that there was no evaluation of previous skill development schemes before launching the Pradhan Mantri Kaushal Vikas Yojana (PMKVY). After consulting various stakeholders, it observed: All stakeholders in one voice said that the targets allocated to them were high and without regards to any sectoral requirement. Everybody was chasing numbers without providing employment to the youth or meeting sectoral industry needs. Many participants very eloquently said that it benefted VTPs [Vocational Training Providers], ABs [Assessment Bodies] and SSCs [Sectoral Skill Councils] only. Even if the trained youth were able to access placement opportunities, they could get a monthly salary of Rs. 5000/- to Rs. 10000/ while our aim should be to train in a manner and in skill which could command about Rs. 40,000/- to Rs. 50,000/- to make skills aspirational and attract youth towards it. (Ibid; 22) It has become obvious from its report that skill development was neither demand driven nor encouraging because the monthly salary offered to a small fraction of youth trained under this SDP was meagre. Moreover, the SDP in the absence of employment opportunities as a result of declining 123

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growth turned out to be a mirage. India has had more policy with think tanks such as the Centre for Policy Research and the Observer Research Foundation dominating the scene. Their attempts to formulate policy have raised the question of the relation between knowledge and the public sphere. Policy formulation has not really articulated the views of the public sphere. First, the challenge to policy came from social movements, and from civil society which identifed policy and experts as mere extensions of the state (Visvanathan, 2020: 3). India’s parliamentary democracy is based on the legislative model of governance wherein public policies are to be debated on the basis of merit keeping in view the public interest rather than on the basis of party politics. To serve the public interest, policy politics needs to rise above party politics as well as electoral politics; otherwise the public policies are bound to be populist. Whenever a political party has a dominant position in the Indian Parliament, party politics prevails upon policy politics. Electoral domination of one political party has transformed the legislative model into the executive model of governance wherein debating public policies on merit has become a major casualty. Such a phenomenon in Indian politics has reduced the policy-making process to a prerogative of a few elites, and the Iron Law of Oligarchy within the ruling party has further compounded its democratic defcit.

Post-neoliberal era and public policies India’s neo-liberal policy regime gained little legitimacy as it accelerated the economic growth rate, increased per-capita income and also resulted in development of some infrastructure under the BOT scheme. Its legitimacy graph was enhanced as it generated some jobs for skilled labour. The neoliberal policy paradigm has largely driven its legitimacy from the hopes of future payoffs. Promissory legitimacy of this policy framework was driven from the promises of creation of more employment, eradication of poverty, accelerating growth rate, per-capita income and better economic fortunes for people. Another promise of the neo-liberal policy paradigm was to eradicate corruption, and market-oriented policies were meant to enhance effciency, effectiveness and vibrancy in service delivery. This policy regime started unfolding since 1991; however, most of its promises turned out to be a mirage because it was not driven by public interest, and corruption continued unabated irrespective of policy change. The nexus among the political elite, businessmen and bureaucracy has resulted in policy paralysis at the formulation level and corruption at the implementation level. This strange arrangement among the various stakeholders helps to explain why neo-liberalism’s dwindling promissory legitimacy did not lead to profound policy changes. The recently reported economic slowdown, including job losses, crisis of the fnancial sector and also on all other parameters, indicates the hollowness of India’s neo-liberal policy regime. The neo-liberal 124

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policy regime has not only been failing in India, but also in those countries from which it originated in the form of the Washington Consensus, whose ideological thrust was directed towards replacing state with market as a driver of the economy and public policies. However, the failure of the neoliberal policy regime has again brought the state in, to address the fnancial crisis created by the market. The neo-liberal policy regime started facing crisis when the Southeast Asian nations landed in an economic mess in 1997. It was followed by the failure of the neo-liberal policy regime in Argentina (2001) which was touted as the triumph of market fundamentalism in Latin America. However, its statistical indicators looked impressive for a few years, but its economy collapsed because its growth was based on a pile of debt and supported unsustainable levels of consumption (Stiglitz, 2010: xii). Neoliberal policies further suffered a major setback in the United States in October 2008 when its economy was in free-fall because of the fnancial crisis. The banks were not the only frms that had to be bailed out, but also two of the three big auto makers, GM and Chrysler, which were on the edge of collapse. Even well-managed car companies faced problems as a result of the precipitous collapse of sales (Ibid; 43). Political events of 2016 like Brexit and the election of Donald Trump were interpreted as preparing the political ground for institutional reforms that refected the exhaustion of neo-liberal promises. The shift towards more protectionist policies goes against the main mantra of neo-liberal policies which believed in market fundamentalism, free market and global integration of markets. The planned free-trade agreement between the European Union and the US was already exceptionally contested before the American presidential election and was politically dead when the Trump Administration came to power. This indicates an institutional and policy shift that challenges the neo-liberal policy regime which dominated the development discourse over more than 30 years.

Conclusion The paradox of the neo-liberal policy regime in India has been that marginal peasants, tribals, farmers and unskilled workers who have been left behind are not willing to follow the promises of neo-liberalism. However, political regimes are still holding on to the policies of neo-liberalism because they have benefted tremendously from them as they have acquired huge stakes in the corporate sector. In most of the states where the neo-liberal policy paradigm has suffered setbacks, they have initiated course corrections, but the Indian state has still been pushing ahead with neo-liberal policies unmindful of their long-term consequences. The Indian state cannot afford to ignore the failure of the neo-liberal policy regime for long because it is bound to compound its already existing public policy and legitimacy 125

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defcits. India has experimented with liberal and neo-liberal policy regimes for a considerable time. However, both have suffered setbacks, yet the contribution of the liberal public policy regime to improve the fortunes of the public and to build public sector undertakings cannot be ignored, notwithstanding its democratic defcits. Because of top-down, bureaucratic and elitist processes of public policy formulation, public policies could not address the challenges of governance. Defective implementation of public policies compounded the crisis for the liberal policy regime and created the ground for the launch of the neo-liberal policy regime which has compromised the credentials of a welfare state. The neo-liberal policy regime in India attained legitimacy partially because of the defective implementation of liberal policies besides policy paralysis on certain areas and partially from the future payoff of the neo-liberal policy regime. The neo-liberal policy paradigm has exhausted its promissory legitimacy and has also failed to deliver in many sectors. The neo-liberal policy regime resulted in the neoliberal state creating a dichotomy with the liberal welfare state prescribed in the Indian Constitution. The failure of neo-liberal policies has created suffcient ground for substantive policy change for which the Indian state has not prepared itself so far. Ironically, neo-liberal policies are being pursued with even more vigour in combination with some populist policies and certain right-based policies.

References Basu, Rumki, 2019, “Public Policy in India: Transformatory Shifts or Incremental Changes?” Indian Journal of Public Administration, Vol. 65, No. 1 Chakrabarti, Rajesh and Sanyal, Kaushiki, 2017, Public Policy in India, New Delhi, Oxford University Press. Dhal, Sangita, 2016, “Enabling Social Rights Through Proactive Public Policy: An Academic Auditing of Education and Health Sectors in India”, Indian Journal of Public Administration, Vol. 62, No. 1, January–March. Gupta, Kamlesh and Damele, Manjri, 2018, “State and Public Policy: Contemporary Debate”, in Kamlesh Gupta (ed.), State and Public Policy, New Delhi, Pentagon Press. Mathur, Kuldeep, 2018, “Public Policy Processes in Globalized India”, in Kamlesh Gupta (ed.), State and Public Policy, New Delhi, Pentagon Press. Moren, M., Pein, M. and Goodin, R. E., 2006, The Oxford Handbook of Public Policy, New York: Oxford University Press. Rajalakshmi, T. K., 2017, “Chasing a Mirage”, Frontline, Vol. 34, No. 21, October 14–27. Report of the Committee for Rationalization & Optimization of the Functioning of the Sector Skill Councils, Vol. 1, December 2016, Ministry of Skill Development and Entrepreneurship, Government of India, New Delhi, www.msde.gov.in/assets/ images/ssc-reports/SSC%20Vol%20I.pdf, accessed on 12/02/2019. Riggs, F. W., 2012, “Globalization and Public Administration”, www.2huwai.edu/n glop htm cited in Kamlesh Gupta and Manjri Damele on page 19.

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Stiglitz, Joseph E., 2010, Freefall: From Markets and the Sinking of the Global Economy, New York: Allen Lane. Visvanathan, Shiv, 2020, “A New Public Policy for New India”, The Hindu, www. thehindu.com/opinion/lead/a-new-public-policy-for-a-new-India/article70708, accessed on 28/01/2020.

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9 ICT APPLICATIONS IN LAND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION IN INDIA A study on the implementation of DILRMP Ravinder Kaur and Venkatamallu Thadaboina

Introduction In the present digital age, the thrust of governments all over the world is to provide good governance to citizens for inclusive and sustainable development. Many nations, especially India, have been experimenting with numerous initiatives for adoption of information and communication technology (ICT) in public sector management and public service delivery. The increasing use of ICT applications in public service delivery has greatly infuenced the way public services are provided and how citizen engagement processes are delivered (Liu and Yuan, 2015). ICT is seen as a tool to support the work of government institutions and agencies, with the objective of delivering public services and information in a more convenient, citizen-centric and cost-effective manner. ICT adoption in public sector management has often been associated with reform programs aimed at reducing ineffciencies generated by bureaucracy (Clegg, 2007). ICT is used to facilitate and support the basic functions of coordination and control of public organizations, functions defned in “the legal-normative set of rules designed to standardize the administrative procedure and the delivery of public services” (Cordella and Tempini, 2015). ICT in the public sector is deployed to coordinate the execution of activities and enhance organizational effciency and effectiveness which reduces bureaucracy and increases procedural effciency in delivering public services. The adoption of advanced ICT tools in government processes promotes performance measurement, transparency, innovation, cost-effectiveness and quality improvements in the delivery of public services. ICT use in governance is a new paradigm shift in public administration which has brought a revolution in the quality of public service delivery to 128

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citizens. Use of ICT in government agencies helps in effcient, speedy and transparent public service delivery and dissemination of information to the public and other agencies. The concept of e-governance is nothing but the use of ICT at various levels of government and the public sector to enhance the governance mechanism. E-governance is an innovative phenomenon for redeveloping public administration because its objectives are chiefy focused to enhance the quality of government services to citizens, speed up communications through the use of technology, reduce government expenditure, bring in more transparency, reduce corruption and subjectivity, reduce costs for citizens and make government more accessible and accountable. The e-government strategies (called digital government), within a short period, have evolved rapidly from basic uses of ICT as simple tools to facilitate highly structured administrative work to the integration of ICT throughout government operations (Evans, Olaniyi, 2018). ICT-enabled systems offer the potential to eliminate opportunities for corrupt use of discretion by disintermediating services and allowing citizens to conduct transactions themselves (Pathak et al., 2010). In the past two decades, numerous initiatives have been undertaken by various central ministries and state governments in India to usher in the era of e-government. E-governance in India has steadily evolved from computerization of government departments to initiatives that promote good governance with increased transparency, accountability and citizen-centric service delivery. E-governance initiatives have played an important role in shaping the progressive e-governance strategy of the country. The growth of e-governance in India began with the establishment of the National Informatics Centre (NIC) in 1977 which was the frst major step towards e-governance implementation in India. Subsequently, many initiatives were launched to support the growth of e-governance in India. The launch of NICNET in 1987 was one of the driving forces for e-governance. The other signifcant initiatives include the creation of the Union Ministry of Information Technology in 1999, identifcation of a 12-point minimum agenda for e-governance by the Indian government for implementation in all the union government ministries and departments by 2000 and the National e-Governance Plan (NeGP), established in 2006, which set out an impressive agenda for developing e-government services. The NeGP comprises 27 mission mode projects (MMPs) at the central, state and local government levels. The NeGP aims at improving delivery of government services to citizens and businesses, with a vision to make the services accessible to the common person while ensuring effciency, transparency, reliability and effective delivery of services at affordable costs. Under these e-initiatives, governments at the central and state levels are running enormous MMPs which are e-offce, e-district, e-panchayat, UID, common service center, pensions, banking, posts, direct cash transfer, immigration, visa and foreigner’s registration and tracking, etc. 129

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Keeping the foregoing in view, this chapter aims to provide an insight into ICT applications in public service delivery in India, with emphasis on land records administration which ensured transparency and accountability in the public service delivery at reduced cost to the citizen.

Land records administration in India The evolution of the land administration system in India has been a complex process, well recorded in historical chronicles. Broadly, land records are a combination of three types of data records: (a) textual (Record of Rights (RoR)), (b) spatial (maps, boundary limits) and (3) transaction details (registered sale deeds). The maintenance of land records essentially involves recording, processing and dissemination of information about the ownership, value and use of land. In India, land ownership is primarily established through a registered sale deed (a record of the property transaction between the buyer and the seller). Maintenance of land records has gone through a process of evolution as it passed through various administrative systems and socio-economic compulsions from ancient times. The present system of preparing and maintaining land records in a written form originated from the Mughal period. During British rule, the agrarian system of the Mughals was fne tuned by superimposing a new system over the existing pattern in line with prevalent British customs and laws related to land administration. After independence, land became a state subject in the Constitution of India, and the systems of land records management formulated during British rule have undergone a series of local infuences and hence vary from state to state. However, the RoR is almost uniform across the country. According to this system, land record data are kept primarily in the tehsil (township) offce and are to be updated every 30 years through the process of survey and settlement operations. From the beginning of the planning process in India, the government of India has been advocating proper maintenance of land records as the basis of good administration, aiming at social justice through better implementation of various rural development programmes. In India, three different state departments (Registration, Revenue and Survey and Settlement) are responsible for land record management. These three departments work in silos, and updating of records by any one of them makes the records of the others outdated. For this reason, it is diffcult to ensure that survey maps, textual data and registration records match with one another and are updated. In addition, citizens must approach several agencies to get complete information on land records. Non-availability of a comprehensive database and properly updated land records in the manual system hampered implementation of decisions concerning land reforms, and the dearth of databases on land reforms continued. This necessitated creation of a comprehensive

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computerized database on land records, which would help in land tenancy, land ceiling and land consolidation.

Digitization of land records Application of ICT tools in land records management is now a widespread phenomenon all over the world. The World Bank has funded land reform, land administration and land management projects in the Europe and Central Asia (ECA) region since the early 1990s where the digitization of land records has been promoted. The advantages of digitization of land records have proven substantial in reducing the time required to complete transactions, improving access to information by the public, as well as other government agencies, reducing the costs of data acquisition and contributing to standardization of system design (Edward Cook et al., 2008). The Conference of Revenue Ministers of States and Union Territories (UTs), which was organized in 1985, advocated that a computerized land records system is crucial for effective planning, implementation and monitoring of land reforms and related activities in India. In the same year, a study group comprising representatives from the Ministry of Agriculture and the Central Statistical Organization and from the governments of Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu and Uttar Pradesh also recommended computerization of core data of land records to assist developmental planning and to make their records more accessible to the people. Based on the decision at the Conference of the State Revenue Ministers in 1985, the Government of India initiated two centrally sponsored schemes: (a) Strengthening of Revenue Administration & Updating of Land Records (SRA&ULR) and (b) Computerization of Land Records (CLR). The Department of Land Resources (DoLR) under the Ministry of Rural Development was the nodal agency to implement these schemes. The scheme of SRA&ULR was launched in 1987 on a pilot basis in Bihar and Odisha states and the same was extended to all the states and UTs by the end of fnancial year 1989–90. The CLR scheme was launched in 1988–89 and implemented initially on a pilot basis in eight districts of eight states, and subsequently the scheme was extended to cover the rest of the country. The two schemes of SRA & ULR and CLR supported the efforts of the states for updating and computerization of land records and have generated awareness among the masses about the benefts of computerization of land records. However, there were some defciencies in implementation of the schemes which included abnormal delay in executing the scheme, several inconsistencies in the data that were captured, lack of appropriate input and validation controls at the data entry stage and weak monitoring and control mechanisms. It was also observed that the results of these two schemes were very uneven across states because of the absence of a common goal and

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timeframe. Further, both these schemes were not focused on interconnectivity, geographic information system (GIS) mapping, connectivity with banks and treasuries, and registration which is a vital link in updating the land records. To achieve the desired objectives of these initiatives, the Indian government merged these two schemes and formed the National Land Records Modernization Programme (NRLMP) in 2008.

National Land Records Modernization Programme The government of India merged its two existing centrally sponsored schemes (i.e., SRA&ULR and CLR) and renamed it as the National Land Records Modernization Programme (NLRMP) in September 2008 to revolutionize the land records maintenance system. In April 2016, the NLRMP was revamped and became the Digital India Land Records Modernization Programme (DILRMP) and extended the time for completion of activities until the end of fscal year 2019–20. The goal of the integrated programme is to modernize management of land records, minimize the scope of land/ property disputes, enhance transparency in the land records maintenance system and facilitate moving eventually towards guaranteed conclusive titles to immovable properties in the country. The main objective of the DILRMP is to develop a modern, comprehensive and transparent land records management system in the country, with an aim to implement the conclusive land-titling system with title guarantee. The DILRMP has three major components: (a) computerization of all land records – mutations, digitization of maps and integration of textual and spatial data; (b) survey/re-survey – updating of all survey and settlement records, including creation of original cadastral records wherever necessary, and (c) computerization of registration – computerization of sub-registrar offces (SROs) and its integration with the land records maintenance system, development of core GIS and capacity building. Details of all the components and activities of the programme are presented in Table 9.1.

Funding of the programme The DILRMP is a demand-driven scheme, and funds are allocated/released to the state governments/UT administrations or their designated implementing agencies for carrying out the activities under the DILRMP. The DILRMP has become a central sector scheme, with 100 percent funding from the centre since 01.04.2016. However, state governments are required to release their corresponding share, if any, to the funds released by the central government up to 31.03.2016. Table 9.2 provides the funding pattern and sharing of costs between the centre and the states under the erstwhile NLRMP up to 31.03.2016. 132

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Table 9.1 Components and activities of DILRMP Components

Activities

Computerization of land records

i)

Survey/re-survey

ii) iii) iv) v) vi) i) ii) a) b) c)

Computerization of registration

Modern record rooms Training and capacity building Core GIS

i) ii) iii) iv) v) i) i) ii) i) ii)

Legal changes

Programme management

i) ii) iii) iv) i) ii) iii) iv) v)

Data entry/re-entry/data conversion of all textual records, including mutation records and other land attributes data Digitization of cadastral maps Integration of textual and spatial data Tehsil, subdivision/district data centers State-level data centers Inter-connectivity among revenue offces Creation of original cadastral records wherever necessary Ground control network and ground truthing should be implemented using modern technology options such as: Pure ground method using total station (TS) and differential global positioning system (DGPS) Hybrid methodology using aerial photography and ground truthing by TS and DGPS High Resolution Satellite Imagery (HRSI) and ground truthing by TS and DGPS Computerization of the SROs Data entry of valuation details Data entry of legacy encumbrance data Scanning and preservation of old documents Connectivity to SROs with revenue offces Setup of modern record rooms/land records management centres at state, district, tehsil, taluk, circle, block levels Conducting training, workshops, etc. Strengthening of survey and revenue-training institutes Village index base maps from satellite imagery for creating the core GIS Integration of three layers of data: a. Spatial data from aerial photographs or highresolution satellite imagery b. Survey of India and Forest Survey of India maps c. Cadastral maps from revenue records Amendments to the Registration Act, 1908 Amendments to the Indian Stamps Acts, 1899 Amendments to land-related legislations of states/UTs Creation of model law for conclusive titling Programme Sanctioning & Monitoring Committee in the DoLR Core Technical Advisory Group in the DoLR and the states/UTs Programme Management Unit (PMU) in the DoLR and the states/UTs Information, Education and Communication (IEC) activities Evaluation

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Table 9.2 Funding pattern under NLRMP Components

Central government share For the states

For the UTs

100%

100%

Survey/resurvey and updating of survey and settlement records (including ground control network and ground truthing)

50%

100%

Computerization of registration

25%

100%

Modern record rooms/land records management centres at tehsil/taluk/block levels

50%

100%

100%

100%

Computerization of land records

Training and capacity building

Progress under DILRMP The programme is currently being implemented in all states and UTs, but the pace of modernization of records and bringing them to an online platform has been slow. Many states/UTs in the country have not yet completed the digitization of basic survey documents, sketches, maps, etc. The physical progress of DILRMP and the present status of activities under DILRMP are presented in Tables 9.3 and 9.4, respectively, with the numerical fgures calculated based on the data retrieved on 06.12.2019 from the DIRLMP dashboard of the DoLR, Ministry of Rural Development. The present status of activities is presented in three categories: (a) Category-I (Completed), where the work has been completed equal to or above 95 percent of work; (b) Category-II (Ongoing), where the work is completed above 0 percent and below 95 percent, and (c) Category-III, where the work has not started yet. The data, pertaining to the physical progress under DILRMP presented in Table 9.3, show that the handwritten documents were discontinued in 25 states/UTs and legal sanctity has been given to computerized RoR in 26 states/UTs. The data reveal that RoR is available on web in 29 states/UTs and maps are available on web in 15 states/UTs. The project management units (PMU) for NLRMP are established in 29 states/UTs. It is seen that data centres are established in only 20 states/UTs. Out of a total 723 districts in the country, data centers at the district level are established in only 13 percent of districts in the country. It is also seen that data centers are established in 9.3 percent of subdivisions (220 out of 2356) and 15.9 percent of tehsils (1073 out of 6742) in the country. The data also reveal that out of a total of 5147 SROs in the country, stamp papers have been abolished in 1663 SROs and land records have been integrated with land registration in 3344 SROs. Table 9.4 presents the data pertaining to the component-wise progress of the programme at the national level. With respect to the computerization of 134

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Table 9.3 Physical progress of DILRMP Sl. Description No. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

11

Total Completed %

No. of states/UTs where handwritten documents 7 25 have been discontinued No. of states/UTs where legal sanctity given to 26 computerized RoR No. of states/UTs where RoR available on web 29 No. of states/UTs where maps available on web 15 No. of states/UTs where PMUs are established 29 No. of states/UTs where the process is integrated 12 with banks No. of states/UTs where state data centres are set up 20 No. of districts where district data centers are set up 723 95 No. of subdivisions where data centres are set up 2356 220 No. of tehsils where data centers are set up 6742 1073 a) No. of tehsils where only RoR services are 3341 available b) No. of tehsils where RoR with map services 629 are available c) No. of tehsils where services are provided 1618 through a modern record room d) No. of tehsils where services are provided 3989 through a tehsil computer center e) No. of tehsils where services are provided 3532 through online f) No. of tehsils where computerized RoR is 3082 obtainable g) No. of tehsils where modern record rooms 1763 (MRR) are set up     Physical progress of SRO a) No. of SROs computerized 5147 4344 b) No. of SROs where internet facility is available 4308 c) No. of SROs where stamp paper is abolished 1663 d) No. of SROs that have been connected with 3394 revenue offce e) No. of SROs that have been integrated with 3344 land registration f) No. of SROs where the deed searchable in web 2912 facility available

67.57 70.27 78.38 40.54 78.38 32.43 54.05 13.14 9.34 15.92 49.56 9.33 24.0 59.17 52.39 45.71 26.15   84.40 83.70 32.31 65.94 64.97 56.58

Note: Figures have been calculated based on the data retrieved from the DIRLMP dashboard of the DoLR, Ministry of Rural Development.

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Category-III (not started)

90.12 13,123 2.00 51,665 7.88 59.16 – – – – 0.09 – – – – 53.33 – – – – 44.65 – – – – 33.83 – – – – 22.09 – – – – 11.51 4673 0.71 5,75,732 87.77 .36 – – – – 5.08 35,649 5.43 5,86,932 89.48

Category-I Category-II (completed) (ongoing) (equal or above 95%) (above 0% and below 95%)

Computerization of land records (in no. of villages) 6,55,922 5,91,138 Mutation computerized (in no. of villages) 6,55,922 3,88,071 Issuance of digitally signed RoR (no. of RoR) 29,02,50,340 2,57,540 Cadastral maps digitized (no. of maps) 1,24,86,995 66,59,112 Spatial data verifed (in no. of villages) 6,55,922 2,92,871 Cadastral maps linked to RoR (in no. of villages) 6,55,922 2,21,908 Real-time updation of RoR and maps (in no. of villages) 6,55,922 1,44,862 Survey/re-survey work completed (in no. of villages) 6,55,922 75,517 Area surveyed (in sq km) 1,87,06,825.85 6,29,116.55 RoR linkage with Aadhaar (in no. of villages) 6,55,922 33,341

Total

Note: Figures have been calculated based on the data retrieved from the DIRLMP dashboard of the DoLR, Ministry of Rural Development.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Sl. No. Components

Table 9.4 Component-wise national-level progress under DILRMP

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land records activity, 19 states/UTs are under Category-I, 16 states/UTs are in Category-II and two states (i.e., Arunachal Pradesh and Meghalaya) are in Category-III where the work has not started. Also observed is that out of the total 6,55,922 villages in the country, the computerization of land record activity is completed in 90 percent of villages. Of the remaining 10 percent, the activity has not yet started in about 8 percent of villages. The digitization of cadastral maps activity has been completed in 14 states/ UTs; of the remainder, 22 states/UTs are in Category-II and one UT (i.e., Daman & Diu) is in Category-III. It is observed that out of the total of 1,24,86,995 cadastral maps in India, only 53.33 percent of the maps have been digitized. In terms of integration of the cadastral map with RoR, only three states (Goa, Odisha and Tripura) have completed the activity of linking cadastral maps with RoR. In the remaining states/UTs, 21 states/UTs are in an ongoing category and 12 states/UTs have not started the activity yet. It is observed that cadastral maps have been linked to RoR in only 33.83 percent of villages in the country. When it comes to the Computerization of Property Registration activity, 18 states/UTs are in Category-I, 12 states/UTs fall under Category-II and in six States/ UTs the activity has not yet started. The data reveal that the mutation process is digitized in 59.16 percent of villages in India. It is also observed that the integration of land records and property registration is completed in 13 states/UTs, and the same is under process in 12 states/UTs. But, the process has not started yet in 11 states/UTs. It is seen that RoR linkage with the Aadhaar activity is not completed in any of the states/UTs, but it is under process in 20 states/ UTs and the remaining 16 states/UTs have not started the activity yet. It is observed that this activity has been completed in only 5 percent of villages but not yet started in almost 90 percent of them. The data show that the issuance of digitally signed RoR has occurred in seven states/UTs, and the issuance of digitally signed RoR is under process in 15 states/UTs. However, the process has not yet started in 14 states/UTs. Of the total of 29,02,50,340 RoRs in the country, only about 1 percent of RoRs, which are digitally signed, have been issued. The data reveal that only 3.36 percent of total area has been surveyed, and the survey/resurvey activity has been completed in only 11.50 percent of villages in the country. It is also observed that state data centres were set up in only 20 states/UTs. In terms of data centre setups at the district, subdivision and tehsil levels, the process has been completed in 95 districts (out of a total of 723 districts in the country), 220 subdivisions (out of 2356 subdivisions) and 1073 tehsils (out of 6742 tehsils), respectively. As per the data available on the DILRMP dashboard, 90 percent of the land records have been computerized and uploaded on the web. However, only 59.16 percent of the mutation records (recording the transfer of ownership) have been automated. The main objective of digitization of land records is to have smooth access to correct data, real-time updation of property records. But, the data show that the real-time updation of RoR 137

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and maps has been fnished for only 22 percent of the land records in the country. The data also reveal that 53.33 percent of the cadastral maps have been automated so far, and only 44.65 percent of the spatial data have been verifed. As a result, only 33 percent of cadastral maps have been linked to RoRs. Finally, survey and re-survey work has been undertaken in only 11.5 percent of the villages.

Conclusion In the past three decades, the government of India and state governments have been attempting to improve the quality of land records management and make land records more accessible through their e-governance initiatives. In the past, most of the land records were maintained manually through village maps, marking boundaries and/or paper records, which included the names of the occupants. Moreover, the land records were maintained by different departments at the village level. Because of a lack of maintenance of streamlined land records and coordination among the concerned departments, there have been litigations, scams and property disputes over land ownership. Hence, the need has arisen for digitization of land records for better land administration. Digitization of the land records programme has had a tremendous social and economic impact in the country by bringing in transparency; reducing corruption, land disputes, court cases and related crimes/violence; and generating revenue for the government. The digitization of land records will enable reduction in manual work, accurate and fast processing, and the automatic generation of necessary Management Information System (MIS) reports such as land usage pattern, revenue-related statistics, etc. The digitized data can be used in land value assessment, preparation of feld-level soil health cards and smart cards for farmers to facilitate e-governance and e-banking; easy settlement of compensation claims related to land acquisition and rehabilitation, crop insurance and grants of agricultural subsidies; establishment of community/village resource centres; precision farming, etc. The digitization of land and property records will also directly boost the government’s Digital India mission. The digitization can speed up the process of land acquisition, thereby making it easier for the government to work on its Smart Cities mission or plan industrialization. The programme will help all the stakeholders of the system which include citizens, farmers, governments, administrators, judicial administration and fnancial institutions. The programme is being implemented across all states with differential progress. The programme was started a decade ago, and the time frame for completion of the activities is also going to end. However, the data reveal that physical progress on some components of the programme has been very slow and some of the activities have not been taken up by many states/UTs. The progress of the programme reveals that the implementation of DILRMP 138

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has been a daunting task since most of the states use their local language and distinct terminologies in their textual and geographical land records. The slow progress could be attributed to the heavy volume of records, most of which used to be stored manually. Besides, there is poor capacity at the district and local levels. The continuous process of data collection and storage with regard to land records takes place at the village or city level. It is also observed that efforts have been made by many states/UTs to digitize land records; however, the records do not match with ground realities. The recent shocking incident of a tehsildar in Telangana who was set ablaze by a farmer because of a land registration dispute reveals the ground reality. This incident illustrates the need for increased responsibility on the part of the governments to ensure real-time updation of records which in turn will ensure accuracy of the land records to avoid legal disputes. Hence, necessary changes must be introduced in existing laws that govern registration and transfer of land for accurate databases for land records. To strengthen land records management, capacity building among offcials at all levels is required. It is also essential that all information about land records management be available through a single window which is possible only through integration of land-related information across departments, including fnancial and judicial institutions and updation of these records.

References Clegg, S., 2007, “Something Is Happening Here, but You Don’t Know What It Is, Do You, Mister Jones?” ICT in the Contemporary World, London, Information Systems and Innovation Group, London School of Economics and Political Science. Cook, Edward, Stanley, Victoria, Adlington, Gavin, Bell, Keith and Törhön, Mika, 2008, “Information and Communications Technology in Land Administration Projects”, Agriculture and Rural Development: The World Bank, Issue No. 38. Cordella, A. and Tempini, N., 2015, “E-Government and Organizational Change: Reappraising the Role of ICT and Bureaucracy in Public Service Delivery”, Government Information Quarterly, Vol. 32, No. 3, pp. 279–286. Digital India Land Records Modernization Programme (DILRMP)-Guidelines, Technical Manuals and MIS, 2018–19, Department of Land Resources, Ministry of Rural Development, Government of India, http://dilrmp.gov.in/. Evans, Olaniyi, 2018, “Digital Government: ICT and Public Sector Management in Africa”, Munich Personal RePEc Archive (MPRA), Paper No. 91628, https:// mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/91628/. Liu, S. M. and Yuan, Q., 2015, “The Evolution of Information and Communication Technology in Public Administration”, Public Administration and Development, Vol. 35, No. 2, pp. 140–151. Pathak, R. D., Naz, R., Singh, G. and Smith, R. F., 2010, “ICT for Improved Public Service Delivery in Papua New Guinea”, Journal of Administration & Governance, Vol. 5, No. 1, pp. 36–44.

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10 POLICY AND PRACTICES OF DECENTRALISATION OF ELEMENTARY EDUCATION IN INDIA Madhumita Bandyopadhyay

Introduction Improved governance of education has been identifed as one way through which levels of access, quality and participation in education can be improved (UNESCO, 2009). Combating educational exclusion is closely associated with the increase in awareness levels of local governing agencies. In recent years, enormous stress is being given on decentralisation of management of educational planning and administration by involving the community in educational programmes not only in India, but also in many other countries across the globe. This chapter discusses the process of decentralisation of elementary education and its impact on participation of children in schools, with a special focus on people’s or community participation in school education. In doing so, the chapter also discusses the issues pertaining to functioning of community-based organisations (CBOs), especially school management committees (SMCs). The motives behind decentralisation involving lower-level and local functionaries as well as community vary according to the context which is specifc to any particular country. It may be for effective administration, utilisation of resources judiciously by spreading the burden of investment of resources. However, decentralisation which encourages local participation is seen as an effective means of promoting elementary education in different ways. It requires effective initiatives, including legal measures to ensure participation of the poor and marginalised people in decision making processes.

Policy perspective In India, local governance of education has been part of policy recommendations during the post-independence period though it has been an important agenda even before independence. Community participation is not a 140

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new concept; rather it has a long history in many countries, including India. In fact, all over the world, responsibility for educating children rested with the community, and historically in India, community and school had a closer link. Distance between the community and school increased mainly with massive nationalisation of education during the post-independence period. Control of the state over education continued in a big way until the 1960s, when the Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRI) were established (GoI, 1978). Some states could use these bodies effectively, while others did not, and considerable variation is found across the states not only in implementation of PRI acts, but also in involvement of PRI in school activities. The early 1970s witnessed a reverse, leading to the large-scale nationalisation of schools, particularly at the primary stage. State governments became the main providers and managers of elementary education. Considerable authority continued to be vested at the district level, resulting in de-concentration of power at the district level. The 1980s saw a revival of interest in panchayati raj in some of the states, with varied consequences (Govinda and Bandyopadhyay, 2006). For example, while West Bengal took up the task of strengthening the three-tier system for local governance and linking education governance with that setup, Gujarat and Maharashtra, with the stronghold of PRI, could decentralise educational management signifcantly to the district level using the structure of PRI (Govinda and Bandyopadhyay, 2010). Major changes took place in the 1990s with the 73rd and 74th constitutional amendments which have been one of the signifcant policy initiatives as far as decentralised governance is concerned in the Indian context. Among others, management of school education has been part of the 11th schedule of PRI, and Panchayat elections became mandatory for all states. This constitutional amendment has obliged states to adopt the structure and transform representative democracy into a participatory democracy through governance at the grassroots level. Decentralisation has also been refected in educational policies as the Kothari Commission in 1964 (NCERT, 1971) recommended bringing schools closer to the community. The National Policy on Education (NPE) 1986 (GoI, 1986) also recommended involvement of the local governing authority, community and parents in school education. It has emphasised giving pre-eminence to people’s involvement, including the association of non-governmental agencies and voluntary efforts in management of the education system. Involving PRI by delegating power and authority to it for managing schools was one of many recommendations made by NPE. The role of community was made clear in NPE, 1986, and it also became part of the Programme of Action (1992). Following policy directives, subsequent programmes such as Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (SSA) (2001) and Rashtriya Madhyamik Shiksha Abhiyan (RMSA) (2009) have put enormous emphasis on local governance of school education. Variations in actual practices are posing tremendous challenges 141

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in school governance, resulting in varying administrative structures and conficts in roles, responsibilities and authorities as revealed by some studies (Govinda and Bandyopadhyay, 2006; Govinda and Bandyopadhyay, 2010). As is evident from an earlier study (Govinda and Bandyopadhyay, 2010: 3),“in India decentralization has a special signifcance because it advocates a shift of decision-making centres closer to the people at the grassroots level. Many initiatives are underway for translating policies of decentralization into action and to facilitate this implementation.” The major change took place in 2010 with enforcement of the Right to Education (RTE) Act, 2009. As per section 21, RTE Act, 2009, formation of School Management Committee (SMC) has been made mandatory for all government and aided schools in which 75% of members need to be parents of children enrolled in the respective school. The Right to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009, has defned children belonging to disadvantaged groups and children belonging to weaker sections, and the act has made the appropriate government and every local authority responsible for ensuring that “the child belonging to weaker sections and the child belonging to a disadvantaged group are not discriminated against and prevented from pursuing and completing elementary education on any ground”. This SMC as recommended by the RTE Act requires a school to prepare a development plan (SDP) [section 21 (2) (b)] that will form the basis for grants to be made to the school [section 22 (2)]. Emphasis on community participation as well as local governance of schools by improving school management committees have continued even after the merging of the SSA and RMSA in a new programme of the Indian government called Samagra Shiksha, initiated in 2018. According to the Framework of Samagra Shiksha (SS), “active participation of the community ensures transparency, accountability and helps in leveraging the cumulative knowledge of the community for better functioning of the school” (pp. 83). So in this context, every school may constitute a SMC/School Management and Development Committee at the school level which will include representatives of local authorities, academicians, subject experts, offcials, representatives of disadvantaged groups, women and parents/guardians of students. This has been further strengthened by the new National Education Policy (NEP) which was introduced in 2020. The recent NEP also talked about similar roles and responsibilities categorised in the Samagra Shiksha framework. However, besides this, NEP, 2020 has introduced a new committee namely the school complex management committee (SCMC) rather than School Management Committee “for more robust and improved governance, monitoring, oversight, innovations, and initiatives by local stakeholders. Building such larger communities of schools, school leaders, teachers, students, supporting staff, parents, and local citizens would energize and empower the schooling system, and in a resource-effcient manner” (GoI, 2020: 29). The policy has envisaged that it would facilitate long-term and 142

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short-term planning for further development of schools. The NEP, 2020 (GoI, 2020: 29–30) further states, schools will develop their plans (SDPs) with the involvement of their SMCs. These plans will then become the basis for the creation of School Complex/Cluster Development Plans (SCDPs). The SCDP will also involve the plans of all other institutions associated with the school complex, such as vocational education institutions, and will be created by the principals and teachers of the school complex with the involvement of the SCMC and will be made available publicly. The plans will include human resources, learning resources, physical resources and infrastructure, improvement initiatives, fnancial resources, school culture initiatives, teacher development plans, and educational outcomes. Much research (Govinda and Bandyopadhyay, 2006, 2010) has highlighted that, under the framework of democratic decentralisation, the community is encouraged to participate in school education for various reasons. It is known to all that education of children is a joint responsibility of parents and schools. Without active parental support it is not possible to get a child enrolled in school, retain her in school and motivate her to complete her education successfully. In recent years, promotion of ‘inclusive’ education to address the right of each child to education irrespective of their social and economic background has been given importance. Community members, parents and caregivers have a larger role to play to ensure that each 6- to 14-year-old child of the village can get an educational opportunity at least at the elementary level, if not at secondary and above. Active involvement of the community and community-based organisations like the SMC can considerably impact on girls’ education because in India, children, particularly girls, are affected by inequalities in the household decision making process. Many children are still engaged in different forms of child labour instead of attending schools. Child marriage is another social evil that affects many girls drastically, particularly in a few states such as Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, Bihar and Uttar Pradesh. These are some of the issues which need to be taken into consideration when developing awareness of community at large. Separate acts and policies have already been introduced to prevent such social evils, but without the help of communities and parents, such acts can hardly be implemented.

Prerequisites for effective community and SMC participation Decentralisation by involving community depends on the extent to which the community is responsive towards school, and it needs to ensure the community’s active participation in the day-to-day functioning of school. Creation 143

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and development of an enabling condition through appropriate strategic interventions is needed to facilitate meaningful participation by community members irrespective of their background. Educational functionaries need to take initiatives to ensure full cooperation of the community. Building trust between government offcials and community members is one important aspect for ensuring the success of any collaborative approach to manage education. The aspirations and demands of the community need immediate attention from the authority, and it is necessary to decide strategies through a consultative process involving the community in the best possible ways. For promoting active participation of people, it is also necessary to provide options to the community to choose how and in which school activities they will participate, and it is essential to build their capacity accordingly. Another essential requirement for ensuring effective community participation is to adopt fexible policies and different approaches to involve communities according to local needs. In a diverse situation, children have different educational needs, and they face various kinds of problems. These problems need to be identifed, and a proper mechanism should be put in place. Much research and feld experiences suggest that it is also required to understand the cultural background of the community not only to identify the barriers that children face to get an education, but also to establish a linkage between the local culture and the educational process in school.

Do SMCs get involved in school functioning? As mentioned earlier, as per the RTE Act, 2009, constitution of SMCs and preparation of SDPs have been made mandatory. However, there are some schools at which SMCs have not been formed yet. In Figure 10.1, 90.00 85.00

86.84 83.30

84.27

87.53

87.49

83.85

80.00

77.05

77.7

76.88

75.00 70.00 (I-V)

(VI-VIII) 2014-15

2015-16

(I-VIII) 2016-17

Figure 10.1 Percentage distribution of primary (I-V) and upper primary (VI-VIII) elementary schools (I-VIII) with SMCs Source: U-DISE Flash Statistics 2016–17, NIEPA

144

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96

93.36

94.03

94 88.94

92 90

85.87

88 86 84 82 80 Schools with SMC

SMC developed SDP 2014-15

2015-16

Figure 10.2 Percentage of schools having constituted SMCs and prepared SDPs (government and aided managements), all of India Source: U-DISE Flash Statistics 2015–16, NIEPA Data for 2016–17 is not available.

the District Information System for Education (DISE) data show that there was a slight increase in the percent of overall proportion of only primary and only upper primary elementary schools having SMCs across the country between 2014–15 and 2015–16, but the proportion declined marginally in the following year. A substantial proportion of these schools have not developed SDPs though there is also a slight increase during one year in the proportion of schools which could form SMC and developed SDPs as well (Figure 10.2).

Statewise distribution of schools having SMCs While almost 90% of schools in most of the states could form SMCs, West Bengal lags behind where even half of the schools could not form SMCs even after three years of enforcement of the RTE Act, 2009. It is also noticeable that the proportion of schools which could form SMCs is comparatively less than other states in Kerala which has been one of the pioneering states initiating people’s participation. It is to be noted that, some states have shown substantial improvement as far as formation of SMCs is concerned. It is worthwhile to see the extent to which these SMCs were active in making schools function in cooperation with teachers and other staff in schools. For example, preparation of SDPs involving SMCs has become mandatory for all schools, but recent DISE data show that, barring a few states, nearly 145

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120.000 100.000 80.000 60.000 40.000 20.000 Tamil Nadu Punjab Gujarat D&N Haveli Haryana Karnataka Nagaland Maharashtra Andhra Pradesh Chattishgarh Telangana Madhya Pradesh Chandigarh Arunachal Pradesh Himachal Pradesh Uttarakhand Manipur Kerala Rajasthan Uttar pradesh Assam A& D Islands Daman & Diu Tripura Puducherry Odisha Goa Delhi Jharkhand Bihar Sikkim Jammu & Kashmir Mizoram Lakshadweep West Bengal Meghalaya

0.000

Schools developed SDP

Schools with SMC

Figure 10.3 Percentage of schools having constituted SMCs and percentage of schools having constituted SMCs and also prepared SDPs Source: U-DISE Flash Statistics 2016–17, NIEPA

30–40% of schools have yet to prepare a school development plan (Figure 10.3). An informal discussion during a workshop with block education offcers from different states has revealed that many schools which have prepared SDP are fnding it diffcult to implement the plan because of a lack of knowledge, skills, manpower and resources in addition to administrative problems and systemic challenges that vary from state to state and from one area to another within the same state.

Evidences from different empirical studies (2008–2018) While the existing policy documents envisaged involvement of local functionaries and parents through SMCs, the situation is not always encouraging in reality as empirical research has shown that parents and community are not always consulted and informed regarding their children’s education and related matters. Many teachers are reluctant to meet and talk with parents; the main reason given for this is illiteracy or the lower educational level of parents and because it is perceived that they would not understand the educational development of their wards or would not value their education. In this section, with the help of fndings from some empirical studies, an effort has been made to discuss the extent and nature of involvement of SMCs in school functioning. A study on school governance at the local level conducted on the basis of primary data collected from 88 schools in Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh in 2008–10 as part of CREATE’s Community and School Survey (ComSS) (Bandyopadhyay, 2009) has made an effort to explore whether 146

D E C E N T R A L I S AT I O N O F E L E M E N TA RY E D U C AT I O N 60 50

50

40 30

27

27

31 23

20

31

28 21

21

17 9

10 0

Rewa

0 Dindori

Schools with VEC & SMC Schools with PTA/MTA & SMC

15

9

0 Rajnandgaon

22

Total

Schools with VEC & PTA/MTA Schools with VEC, PTA/MTA & SMC all

Figure 10.4 Proportion of schools with more than one community-based organisation Source: Field data of CREATE (ComSS), 2008–09

community-based organisations (CBOs) are functioning effectively or not and the extent to which they are involved in the school decision making process. A school-level survey covered three clusters located in three districts: Rajnandgaon in Chaatisgarh and Rewa and Dindoriin, Madhya Pradesh, to collect the data through an interview with CBOs such as Jan Bhagidari Samiti (JBS) in Rajnandgaon and Parents Teacher Association (PTA) in Rewa and Dindori. As per the data collected from the study clusters, barring two schools – one in Rewa and the other in Rajnandgaon – all reported that they have one such CBO, such as Village Education Committees (VECs), PTAs or SMCs, in 2008 when Sarva Siksha Abhiyan was being implemented across the country though all were not functional as observed during school visits. As per the data, out of 30 schools in Rajnandgaon, 27 schools had active JBSs or VECs, while in Rewa, 29 out of 35 schools have reported that their PTAs and VECs were functional. In Dindori, all 23 government-run schools had one such organization which was reportedly functional. Some schools had more than one such committee functioning simultaneously (Figure 10.4). According to many SMC members, meetings were held irregularly in many schools, but school heads reported that these meetings were conducted regularly. Head teachers of 44 schools reported that the meetings were conducted regularly – that is, more than eight times in 2008 (Table 10.1). Most SMC members reported that they mainly discussed the utilisation of funds and the school development grant that is given to each school. Some of the head teachers reported that issues related to quality and school 147

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Table 10.1 Head teachers’ opinions regarding contribution and support of SMCs or PTAs, 2008 Rajnandgaon Rewa

Frequency of 1–5 times meeting in last year 6–8 times more than 8 times Issues discussed in Expenditure-related issues SMC meetings Quality and school activities Infrastructure-relate issues Others Kind of contribution Financial contribution SMC makes in Others school functioning No contribution

Dindori

No. of schools

% No. of % No. of % schools schools

14 3 9 5 13 3 7 4 12 10

16 3 10 6 15 3 8 5 14 11

4 3 12 – 4 2 13 – 5 –

5 3 14 – 5 2 15 – 6 –

– – 23 – 1 – 22 – – 23

– – 26 – 1 – 25 – – 26

Source: Field data of CREATE (ComSS), 2008–09 Note: Total number of head teachers/In-charge is 88 (n=100)

activities have also been discussed at their SMC meetings apart from fund utilisation and infrastructure development (see Table 10.1). It can also be noted that the SMC members were also unaware about the problems of schools that have been part of SMCs (JBS/PTA) in the study area. It came to light that approximately 64% of SMCs reported that there was no case of ‘never enrolment’ in their area. It is noteworthy that, approximately 57% of SMCs reported that there was no problem of dropout in their area. In the opinion of the rest of the SMCs, the highest proportion of children dropout because of economic reasons and household chores, etc. Other reasons mentioned for dropout included lack of awareness about the importance of education (7%), truancy (5%), failure (3%) and non-availability of a middle or high school in the close vicinity (2%). The situation was varied among the clusters under study; for example, although the Rajnandgaon cluster had 106 children drop out, 50 were found to have never enrolled, but out of SMCs at 27 schools, members of 21 responded that no child dropped out in their village. Ironically, a household survey in all 11 villages in this cluster revealed that not a single sample village was free from the dropout problem. The awareness level was almost the same in the other two clusters of Rewa and Dindori. While around one ffth of SMCs reported that they visited houses of children to persuade parents not to withdraw their children from school, about 15% were of the opinion to bring back dropout children through bridge courses and approximately 7% of them reported that they discussed with teachers how to prevent dropouts. 148

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Similarly, some of the SMC members were also not aware about the problem of student and teacher absenteeism. For example, about 74% of SMCs in Rajnandgaon were aware of the problem of student absenteeism, while only 50% of SMCs said that there was no teacher absenteeism, though the data indicate almost all schools in the cluster had both teacher and student absenteeism. In Rewa, SMCs at 11 schools (31%) reported that the problem of teacher absenteeism persists at their schools but that no action had been taken either at a higher level or at the school level to prevent it. Interestingly, PTA members in 11 (51%) of 23 schools in Dindori reported that their schools did not experience teacher absenteeism, although during the school visit it was found that this was an endemic problem in all schools under study. It has also been mentioned by parents that teachers often visited their home to provide feedback, and sometimes parents also visited schools and interacted with teachers to enquire about their children (Figure 10.5). While 62% of parents in all three study clusters reported that no teacher had visited their home to provide feedback for their children, approximately 24% of parents reported that teachers had visited their home more than once (Figure 10.6). 100

79.3

80 60

47.9

46.1

51.8

Rajnandgaon

Total

40 20 0 Rewa

Dindori

Figure 10.5 Proportion of parents who visited schools to meet the teachers Source: Household survey in Rajnandgaon, Rewa and Dindori in 2008

Once, 13.9% Twice, 9.30% More, 14.50%

Never, 62.40%

Figure 10.6 Status of visit by any teacher to parents (2008) Source: Household survey in Rajnandgaon, Rewa and Dindori in 2008

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Opinion of SMCs (VECs and PTAs) regarding school functioning and education of children Data collected through interviewing SMC members revealed that SMCs did not perceive any gender inequality as far as enrolment, participation and learning achievement are concerned in the entire study area, including the tribal villages in Dindori (Bandyopadhyay and Dey, 2011). For example, 78%of SMCs did not see any difference in enrolment of boys and girls. Similarly, SMCs in about 80% of schools mentioned that there was no difference between learning achievement between girls and boys though approximately 12% believed that girls performed better than boys and only 3% considered boys more capable than girls. As the data indicate, approximately 42% of SMC members expressed their dissatisfaction with respect to school functioning, the teaching-learning process and the learning status of children (both boys and girls). About half of the SMCs who were not satisfed cited ‘teacher inadequacy’ as the main reason for their dissatisfaction; 6 percent more reported teacher ineffciency as the reason. While 18% of SMCs were not satisfed because of inadequacy in space and classrooms in the school, 6 percent mentioned lack of interest among children as the reason of their dissatisfaction. A substantial proportion (15%) of SMCs cited multiple reasons for their dissatisfaction. Figure 10.7 highlights the actions taken by SMCs to improve the situation.

21% 8% 6%

65%

Discuss with parents Organise PTA meetings Multiple response Cannot take any action

Figure 10.7 Action taken by SMC members Source: Field data from interview with SMC members (2008)

150

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120% 100% 100% 100% 81% 80%

81% 71%

80% 69%

60%

45%

40% 20% 0% Faridabad

Gurgaon Haryana

Schools with SMC/VEC

Rajasmand

Jaipur

Rajasthan Schools with SMC/VEC which conducted meetings

Figure 10.8 Percentage of schools with SMC/VEC and percentage of schools which conducted SMC meetings Source: Interview with school heads and SMC members

Another study (Bandyopadhyay, 2011) conducted in Rajasthan and Haryana simultaneously in 2008–09 also found that some schools did not have school management committees or village education committees at the time of the school survey data collection. Many of these schools could not conduct SMC meetings despite having an SMC (Figure 10.8). It was found that only 45% of sample schools in the Rajasmand District of Rajasthan could hold SMC meetings, but approximately 44% of these schools conducted a meeting more than twice (Figure 10.9). Although the majority of SMC meetings were devoted to discussing school-related problems and fnancial matters, about 22% discussed academic results (Figure 10.10). The foregoing discussion shows that just before enforcement of the RTE Act, 2009, many schools were reluctant to involve SMCs in the decision making processes though SMCs existed in the majority of sample schools in all four states covered under the two different studies mentioned earlier. Many SMCs were not aware of the actual situation prevailing in their villages and schools, and they could not provide adequate support to their schools (Figure 10.11). Now it is essential to fnd out whether there is any change in participation of SMCs during the post-RTE period. The following section will deal with this question referring fnding of another study (Bandyopadhyay, 2019) conducted in six states i.e. Himachal Pradesh, Haryana, Madhya Pradesh, Odhisha, Karnataka and Mizoram and data have

151

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76

80 70 60

55

53

45

50 40

44 44

33

30 20

18

13

11

10 0

Faridabad

Gurgaon

Rajasmand

Haryana

Once a month

6

0

Once a year

Jaipur

As per need

Rajasthan

Figure 10.9 Frequency of meetings conducted in schools Source: Interview with school heads

Academic results, 22%

Discussion on school, 37%

School maintenance , 15% Money distribution, 13%

Education development, 13%

Figure 10.10 Percentage of distribution of issues discussed in SMC/VEC meetings Source: Interview with school heads

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70 62 58

60 50 50

46 42

40

38

30 20 10 0 Haryana

Rajasthan

Support provided by SMC/VEC (2008)

Total Support provided by SMC (2012)

Figure 10.11 Proportion of SMCs which provided support to schools in 2008 and 2012 Source: Interview with school heads

been collected through two round survey of schools in 2016 (base line) and 2018 (end line). During school visits detailed interview was conducted with school heads to understand their opinion regarding SMC’s involvement in 23 sample schools.

Opinion of school heads regarding participation of SMCs in 2016 and 2018 All schools under study conducted SMC meetings in the previous year of data collection, but the frequency of such meetings varied considerably. For example, two schools in Himachal Pradesh conducted these meetings more than eight times; one held meetings only four times in 2016. At the same time, two schools in Madhya Pradesh and one in Odisha conducted such meetings more than ten times. However, as mentioned earlier, the effectiveness of these meetings also depends on the issues that are discussed. All sample schools in Haryana, Karnataka, Odisha and Mizoram, but only one in Himachal Pradesh and two in Madhya Pradesh, could prepare school development plans. Although all SMCs held meetings and many discussed important topics, including quality issues, only nine schools out of 23 (three schools in Haryana, four in Karnataka and two in Madhya Pradesh) could

153

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25

2120

20

5

21 19

2019

1919 1414

15 10

21 19

10

9 3

3

6

6

9 9 3 4

3 2

Frequency of SMC Meeting in a year

Issues discussed in SMC Meetings

Base Line

Sometimes

Regulare

No Financial/Material Contribution

Financial Contribution

Future action plans (FAPs)

Infrastructure related

Quality & School activities

Expenditure related

>10

8 to 10

6 to 8

1 to 5

0

Kind of Type of Support Contribution SMC made

End Line

Figure 10.12 Head teacher’s opinions regarding contribution and support of SMCs in sample schools (23) Source: Interview with heads of sample schools (2016–2018)

contribute fnancial resources for their schools. It is to be noted that except for Madhya Pradesh, most sample schools in Himachal Pradesh, Haryana, Karnataka, Mizoram and Odisha discussed all the issues related to expenditure, quality of education, activities conducted in schools, infrastructure, etc. Figure 10.12 illustrates a more recent situation regarding participation of the SMCs in sample schools. Although SMCs participated in meetings and discussed important issues as mentioned previously, many of these organizations could not contribute anything as reported by school heads of sample schools. Note that three schools in Haryana, four in Karnataka and two in Madhya Pradesh contributed fnancial resources for schools. Table 10.2 highlights this disparity in involvement of SMCs. This status regarding involvement of SMCs remained almost the same in most states in 2018, indicating more efforts are needed to encourage SMCs to get involved in school functioning on a regular basis. It is also necessary to refect on actions taken so far to make SMCs active partners in school functioning and its development on a regular basis, particularly at this juncture when the new National Education Policy of 2019–20 has envisaged an important role for SMCs in this regard, as mentioned earlier. 154

155 1 4 0

0 4 0 4

4

4 4

3 1 0 0 4 4

0 4 0

4

4 4

1 3 0 0 4 4

Source: Interviews with head teachers in 23 selected schools in 2016 and 2018

1 4 0 4

3

3 4

0 1 3 0 4 3

5 5 0 5

0

5 5

3 0 0 0 5 5

5 5 0

0

5 5

2 1 0 0 5 5

2 2 2 4

2

2 2

0 0 2 2 2 2

2 2 2

2

2 2

0 0 2 2 2 2

3 3 0 3

0

3 3

0 0 2 1 3 3

3 3 0

0

3 3

0 0 3 0 3 3

14 20 3 23

9

21 19

9 3 6 3 21 21

14 19 4

9

19 19

3 6 10 2 20 19

3 1 2

3

4 4

2 2 0 0 4 4

3 2 1 3

1–5 6–8 8–10 >10 Issues discussed Expenditure related in SMC Quality and school meetings activities Infrastructure related Future action plans (FAPs) Kind of Financial contribution contribution SMC made No contribution Type of support Regular Sometimes N=100 0

All states

0

Odisha

2 1

Madhya Pradesh

3 1

Mizoram

0 1 2 0 2 2

Karnataka

1 0 2 0 3 3

Haryana

Frequency of SMC meetings in a year

Himachal Pradesh

Baseline Endline Baseline Endline Baseline Endline Baseline Endline Baseline Endline Baseline Endline Baseline Endline

 

Items

 

Table 10.2 Head teachers’ opinions regarding contribution and support of SMCs or PTAs, 2016 and 2018

D E C E N T R A L I S AT I O N O F E L E M E N TA RY E D U C AT I O N

M A D H U M I T A B A N DY O P A D H Y AY

Conclusion From the foregoing discussion, it is discernible that, although in recent years during implementation of various educational programmes many initiatives have been taken to ensure involvement of SMCs, it is still a challenging task to ensure their full participation and make them aware about their role in improving the school system. The analysis presented in this chapter, which is based on three different studies undertaken before and after enforcement of the RTE Act, 2009, reveal that more serious attention needs to be given to the involvement of SMCs for effective functioning of schools as well as for implementation of the policy of decentralisation of school management which envisaged policy and programmes mentioned earlier. SMC members need to be aware of the actual situation of exclusion of children and their vulnerability to exclusion in their respective schools. More initiatives can be undertaken to involve SMCs as a partner for easier tasks – for example, beautifcation of schools, organising exhibitions, plantation, etc. – gradually developing their capacity for solving more serious and specifc problems related to children’s education. It is not suffcient to have an enabling policy for involvement of SMCs and community and its legitimisation through the RTE Act; more efforts are needed to implement the act, ensuring active and genuine community participation, and its transformation towards community ownership in a real sense. This would then pave the path for making children’s right to education a reality.

References Bandyopadhyay, M., 2009, A Study on School Governance at Local Level in Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh, Under Community and School Studies (ComSS) Conducted for CREATE, New Delhi, Mimeo, NIEPA. Bandyopadhyay, M., 2011, Research Report of a Study on Social Hierarchy of Access to Elementary Education in Haryana and Rajasthan, New Delhi, Mimeo, NIEPA. Bandyopadhyay, M., 2019, Research Report of Participatory Action Research for Improving the Participation of Children in Elementary Schools in India, New Delhi, NIEPA, Mimeo. Bandyopadhyay, M. and Dey, Moitri, 2011, “Effective School Management Committee”, CREATE India Policy Brief 4, NIEPA, New Delhi. GoI, 1978, Report of the Committee of Panchayati Raj Institutions, New Delhi, (Chairman: Asoka Mehta), Department of Rural Development. GoI, 1986, National Policy on Education, New Delhi, Department of Education, Ministry of Human Resource Development. GoI, 1992, Programme of Action 1992, New Delhi, Department of Education, Ministry of Human Resource Development. GoI, 2001, Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan, 2000–01, New Delhi, Department of Education, Ministry of Human Resource Development. GoI, 2009, Rashtriya Madhyamik Shiksha Abhiyan, 2009, New Delhi, Department of Education, Ministry of Human Resource Development.

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GoI, 2010, Right to Education Act, 2009, New Delhi, Department of Education, Ministry of Human Resource Development. GoI, 2018, Samagra Shiksha 2018–19, New Delhi, Department of Education, Ministry of Human Resource Development. GoI, 2020, National Education Policy 2019, New Delhi, Ministry of Education, India. Govinda, R. and Bandyopadhyay, M., 2006, “Decentralisation of Educational Governance in India: Trends and Issues”, in Bjork, C. (ed.), Educational Decentralization: Asian Experiences and Conceptual Contributions, Netherlands, Springer, pp. 159–177. Govinda, R. and Bandyopadhyay, M., 2010,“Changing Framework of Local Governance and Community Participation in Elementary Education in India”, Create Pathways to Access Research Monograph No. 35, p. 47. NCERT, 1971, Report of the Education Commission: Education and National Development (1964–66), New Delhi, NCERT. NIEPA, 2016, Elementary Education in India: Progress Towards UEE, New Delhi, Flash Statistics, DISE, 2015–16, NIEPA. NIEPA, 2018, School Education in India, New Delhi, Flash Statistics: 2016–17, NIEPA and MHRD. UNESCO, 2009, EFA Global Monitoring Report- Overcoming Inequality: Why Governance Matters, Paris, UNESCO Publishing & UK, Oxford University Press.

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11 RECENT TRANSITION IN INDIA’S PUBLIC HEALTH POLICY Layering patterns and inherent bottlenecks Siddhartha Mukerji

Introduction A healthy life is a basic right of all individuals. Any defciency in safeguarding public health will fracture development in a society. So, the prosperity of a society lies in making its people healthy so that they can contribute to its progress and well-being. With this thought, the Indian government since independence has taken necessary measures to augment health facilities to meet the medical needs of a fast-growing population. While universal health care (UHC) was promised several times in the manifestoes of respective governments much in line with the Alma-Ata Declaration 1978 that stipulated UHC along with equity, community participation and inter-sectoral coordination for promotion of healthcare, its realization became diffcult to achieve. Burgeoning of private hospitals since the scaling of market reforms in the new millennium, poor medical infrastructure in government hospitals and health centres, lack of skilled medical staff at primary health centres, paucity of funds and resources and lack of synergy between governing and delivery agencies continue to weaken the health delivery system. Ambitious plans and schemes for health care have fallen short of addressing these fundamental bottlenecks. This is an irony because the country has produced signifcant advances in medical science research and is a leader in the global pharmaceuticals industry. But its own structural problems have overshadowed this comparative advantage that could have been used to draw tangible health benefts, especially for the poor and the marginalized. The millennium development goals (MDG) set a benchmark for countries to take active steps to eradicate disease and secure maternal and child health. While three of its goals directly concern public health, the remaining fve also correlate. As pointed out: The MDGs are interdependent, all the MDGs infuence health, and health infuences all the MDGS. For example, better health enables 158

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children to learn and adults to learn. Gender equality is essential to the achievement of better health. Reducing poverty, hunger and environmental degradation positively infuences, but also depends on, better health.1 Much in line with the stipulated goals, the government decided to follow a multi-pronged approach to improve public health in India. For this, several policies and schemes were introduced primarily to provide medical and fnancial support to different categories of vulnerable people. An important component of the health policy was insurance covering health expenditures. Three major health insurance schemes that were introduced since the commencement of the MDGs were: The Universal Health Insurance Scheme (2003), Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana (2008) and, most recently, Pradhan Mantri Jan Arogya Yojana (PMJAY) under Ayushman Bharat (2018). The sequential introduction of these insurance schemes indicate a layering pattern of incremental institutional change that adds new provisions to the existing ones, producing small changes that may accumulate to bring about a signifcant transformation (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010). Although this change is yet to be seen as PMJAY takes shape, its new stipulations, without disturbing the existing policy frameworks introduced by the United Progressive Alliance (UPA), certainly embodies an institutional advancement to streamline health insurance in India. It adds on to the Swasthya Bima Yojana launched in 2008 by the UPA government and replaces the fragmented system of health insurance with universal health care, embodying fxed insurance coverage for the vast majority of the population. Also, the chapter briefy discusses the global COVID-19 pandemic to account for the government’s strategic intervention in managing the health emergency. This will have larger implications for health policy as we set ourselves for better preparedness and relevant institutional practices for a sustainable future.

Institutional and policy change Institutional and policy change in developing societies has always been a diffcult political exercise. In a democracy like India, this has been an even bigger challenge because policy makers experience conficting social choices while driving such change. Multiple pressures emerge both within society and the state, when parts of the state align with dominant forces in society to resist change. Also, the interests of actors that go into the making of institutions during initial stages are diffcult to resist at later stages when new actors emerge with new ideas and perspectives. As Pierson observes, ‘Political institutions are change resistant. . . . Anticipating that the political rival may take control of the government, political actors frame rules that are hard to reverse’ (Pierson, 2000: 262). Also, political goals are complex and are diffcult to settle with countervailing pressures. Policies still emerge 159

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amidst such pressures. But the pattern in which they emerge varies according to differences in political contexts. There are broadly three lines of theoretical explanations for policy and institutional change: (a) Pierson’s path dependence pattern of change (Pierson, 2000), (b) Mukherji’s tipping point account of institutional change and (c) Mahoney and Theleen (2010) conceptualization of incremental institutional change. Pierson views political institutions as largely change resistant because of increasing returns from existing social norms. This implies that historical continuities are diffcult to break, especially when they are tied with the interests of political actors. In the normal course, actors are seen to count upon a specifc path taken earlier, with little possibility of deviation. The same logic could be used to explain path-dependent policy action. But this is more of an exception than a rule. New ideas that resist such lock-ins may not only appear valid as new policies emerge, but may also get embedded in the near past. Acknowledging the force of such new ideas, the tipping point theory derived from geology to explain the occurrence of an earthquake shows how an endogenous process of ideational change supporting globalization translated into a large-scale irreversible transformation in 1991 triggered by a balance of payments crisis as the external shock. The stage at which the transformation happens is called the ‘tipping point’. Mukherji has aptly subscribed to this model while also explaining the emergence of social policies such as Right to Information (RTI), Right to Education (RTE) and Mahatma Gandhi Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (MNRGES) in India (Mukherji, 2014). However, many critical policy arenas like health have not experienced large-scale transformation at one go, even with leadership changes that have emerged incrementally. Consequently, the pattern of policy change in the health sector is best explained by Theelen and Mahoney’s concept of incremental institutional change. Four mechanisms of such change have been identifed: replacement, drift, layering and conversion. While replacement is identifed as the only mode of complete replacement at one go, layering, drift and conversion are largely build-ons. Drift happens when the impact of the same rules change with a change in external conditions. When the old rules and policies are read and executed in different ways because of their inherent faws, conversion follows. Finally, layering involves superimposition of new policies on the old ones, and change comes through scaling rather than replacement (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010). The recent transition in health insurance policy largely follows layering of the earlier schemes, aligning them signifcantly with the goal of equity in health services, a WHO core objective of universal health coverage.2 This is comparable with structural changes marked by universalization of health services in Brazil in 1988 when the agents of change were able to penetrate the local health administration, research and technical institutions and above all the Ministry of Health at the Centre (Tulia, 2010). Deservedly, 160

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COVID-19 needs a special mention here as it marks a critical juncture in policy and institutional change, necessitating a complete relook at our existing governance practices to secure public health. Given its scale of damage to people’s lives and economic vulnerability of the poor, it may well require the government to ensure universal health care in the future and broaden the scope of PMJAY coupled with active involvement of public health institutions at the delivery end.

Recent policy transition in public health Serious policy thinking on health insurance was given since the initiation of MDGs in the new millennium. Health insurance was a critical component of health policy. Earlier efforts in this regard were half-hearted as there were speculations about scale of government expenditures and the design of implementation. There was absence of a clear mechanism to identify target groups. Similar observations could be made about MNRGES and other welfare programmes where manipulation of benefciary lists because of the absence of an objective criterion for identifcation has led to their limited outreach. A critical step to provide health insurance by the government to poor families was the Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana. It was not just an improvisation of the Universal Health Insurance Scheme, 2003, but a policy change of a transformative nature in the way of abolishing premium requirement and providing broader health coverage. It laid the foundation for streamlining health insurance and driving the shift towards a consolidated health insurance system. The scheme was launched by the Ministry of Labour and Employment, Government of India, on 1 April 2008 for the health insurance of below poverty line (BPL) families with fve members. The stipulated insurance cover was Rs. 30,000 with an addition of Rs. 1,000 for covering transport expenses. It added the provisions of cashless transaction and coverage of all ailments, with few exceptions. Funding was to be shared by the central and state governments in the pattern of 75% and 25%, respectively. The additional administrative costs were to be borne by the latter. The enrolment process was streamlined by maintaining an electronic database of the BPL families at the block level. The enrolment schedule for revision of the list and inclusion of new members was to be decided by the partner insurance company along with district offcials. The concerned company was also required to publicize the date so that those interested could apply for enrolment. State governments had the fnal responsibility to check the list. Innovatively, the programme also created mobile enrolment stations in villages. Biometric information was stored in a smart card provided to the targeted benefciaries. The card had two major functions: to identify the member – and to be used for cashless transaction. 161

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Because health is viewed as a state subject, state governments were assigned a major role in the implementation of the policy. They carry out competitive bidding in selecting the insurance company registered under the Insurance Regulatory Development Authority. Once selected, the insurance company needs to empanel the public and private hospitals for providing the service in designated districts. The hospitals are required to create a help desk with an assistant to register the patient, taking all the details from his/her smart card. The list of empanelled hospitals is provided to the benefciary at the time of enrolment itself. In addition, a pamphlet summarizing the policy coverage and providing a toll-free number is given to the enroller.3 The organization of the scheme was well designed, with fxation of responsibility at various levels of service delivery. However, programme outreach was found to be lower than expected, as shown by many studies. Narayan (2010) showed that only one third of the total districts in India had enrolled the poor in the frst year of the programme. The geographical spread of enrolment was also found to be uneven. Eight states, namely Uttar Pradesh, Punjab, Maharashtra, Haryana, Chhattisgarh, Gujarat, Maharashtra and Kerala, constituted 85% of total enrolments. The study also showed that states with comparably higher poverty such as Uttar Pradesh and Bihar had comparably low rates of enrolment (Narayan, 2010). Other states such as Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka had low enrolment because of parallel schemes called Arogyashri and Yashashvini (Johnson and Krishnaswamy, 2010). Overall, RSBY has been found to be less impactful in terms of low and uneven enrolment, spurious inclusions in the BPL list, actual exclusion of target groups and absence of outpatient expenditure coverage. It was also observed that the monitoring mechanism of state-run health insurance schemes like Arogyashri of Andhra Pradesh was better than that of RSBY (Choudhary and Srinivas, 2011). Awareness and communication are noticeable problems in many states. Even with impressive results in states like Karnataka, levels of communication and accessibility were below expectation (Rajasekhar, 2011). It is evident that schemes for the poor require wider communication for their outreach. Low levels of awareness are what make many such schemes inaccessible. Local administration often lacks the will and capacity to bring awareness among ignorant masses.

Pradhan Mantri Jan Arogya Yojana: a layered transformation Ayushman Bharat was initiated in 2018 as an outcome of the 2017 National Health Policy to provide a comprehensive approach to public health much in line with the prescriptions of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Fortifying health insurance aims to mitigate poverty, seen both as a cause and consequence of rising health expenditures. The fagship programme of 162

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the government entails a holistic approach to health services at primary, secondary and tertiary levels. It has two interlinked components: 1 2

Establishing health and wellness centres Pradhan Mantri Jan Arogya Yojana

As part of its frst initiative, the government decided to establish 1,50,000 health and wellness centres across the country in the frst phase of implementation. These centres have been created to supersede the existing primary health centres, making them more attuned with the overall requirements of health care. Under the present scheme, these centres have emerged as health institutions addressing myriad health disorders from maternal and child health care to the treatment of enlisted non-communicable diseases. Free drug and medicine kits and diagnostic services will also be available in these centres. This could be a respite to the ASHA workers for whom procurement of drug kits is a major challenge. In his study of the National Rural Health Mission (NRHM), Ashtekar observes that ‘Drug kits are either not supplied or not reflled. The drug kit consists of just four medicines (iron tablets, chloroquine, paracetamol and oral rehydration therapy). Ayurveda and homeopathy remedies have not arrived’ (Ashtekar, 2008: 25). The health and wellness centres are not really a replacement for primary health centres or public and private health centres. These are reformed institutions which are reoriented towards upgradation of health services, with a special focus on marginalized communities from all walks of life. The scheme is anchored to the government’s mission of ‘Sabka saath . . . sabka vikas’. It embodies the goal of development of all with the participation of all. The participatory approach is therefore central to the realization of the envisioned goal and success of the scheme. The second and a more vital component of Ayushman Bharat is Pradhan Mantri Jan Arogya Yojana. Keeping in view the implied agenda of poverty elimination, the scheme was expediently launched in Ranchi, Jharkhand. In this event, the prime minister also inaugurated ten health and wellness centres in Chaibasa and Koderma. By September 2018 this number reached 2,300 and is aimed at 1.5 lacs in the coming four years.4 The scheme provides a health insurance of Rs. 5 lacs per family annually covering secondary and tertiary health care. The list of benefciaries of the programmes is drawn from the Socio-Economic Caste Census 2011. It subsumes the earlier Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana, making it more comprehensive, holistic and aligning better with the goal of inclusive development. Moreover, inclusivity itself is defned in a broader sense in terms of the number of people covered, with more than 50 crore benefciaries targeted.5 This includes those who are covered under RSBY and the Socio-Economic Caste Census 2011. Also, 1,300 diseases, including critical ones such as cancer and heart diseases, are covered by the insurance (The Hindu, 2018). 163

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The PMJAY follows the public-private partnership (PPP) model, with active involvement of private hospitals as service providers. By September 2018, a total of 13,000 were empanelled under the scheme. State health departments are charged with the empanelment of private hospitals. Public hospitals and national medical institutes are the fulcrum of the scheme, and they automatically become a part of it. In addition, hospitals coming under the Employee State Insurance Corporation (ESIC) can also be empanelled if they fulfl the stipulated infrastructural requirements such as number of beds available for the patients. Groups entitled to the insurance beneft have been separately identifed in urban and rural areas. As reported, those who can avail the facility in rural areas include scheduled castes and scheduled tribe households, families without an elder member aged between 16–59 years, families with female heads and having no male member aged between 16–59 years, disabled members and families with the absence of any able-bodied adult, homeless families and beggars, manual scavengers, families living in homes with one room having kucha walls and roof, legallyreleased bonded labour and primitive tribal communities. (The Economic Times, 2018) The target groups in urban areas include beggars, domestic workers, rag pickers, street vendors, cobblers, hawkers, construction workers, plumbers, masons, other service providers on the streets. Vendors, security guards, coolies, sweepers, sanitation workers, transport workers, drivers, gardeners, rickshaw pullers, shop workers, delivery assistants, attendants, waiters, electricians, assemblers, repair workers, and washermen. (The Economic Times, 2018) As the list indicates, the occupational groups mainly include low-income categories of people. Other than the economic criterion, natural disability and caste status are also set as criteria for identifying target groups. The composition of the benefciaries is broad based, taking multiple indicators of exclusion into account. PMJAY thus goes beyond the BPL category of RSBY to include many other occupational groups that may either experience relative economic deprivation or social-structural marginalization.

Implementation pattern Implementation defciencies are a major cause of policy failures in India. Policies embodying a prior design for implementation are more likely to 164

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succeed. On the contrary, even a grand public programme without a well thought-out implementation design may fall short of its desired outcome. The success of implementation depends on the capacity of the institutional network that is created to deliver and monitor the policy. PMJAY is implemented by institutions at three levels: central agency with a nodal body, state health departments, and insurance agencies and the district administration. The apex body of the government to monitor the policy at the central level is the National Health Authority (NHA). Until 23 May 2018 it was called the National Health Agency. It is an attached offce of the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare and has a governing board as its highest body, chaired by the minister of health and family welfare. The chief executive offcer (CEO), an offcer of the secretary rank, heads the NHA and also serves as the ex-offcio member secretary of the governing board. The NHA’s functions include preparing and revising the guidelines and model documents; deciding the premium and capping and revising it periodically based on feld data; devising and monitoring the follow-up of norms related to quality standards, data sharing and security, and treatment requirements; developing mechanisms for purchasing health care services; ensuring relevant convergence with other health insurance schemes; developing relevant technological infrastructure and ecosystem for running the scheme in collaboration with the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology; devising and implementing regulatory norms for health insurance in consultation with the Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority; coordination and capacity building of state health agencies and other stakeholders; conducting periodic policy research and knowledge sharing with strategic partners in public and private banks and insurance companies; collaboration with academic institutions and think tanks; and taking relevant administrative decisions with regard to recruitment and grants to the state governments.6 The functions of the NHA manifest a multipronged approach to run the scheme. The structural layering that follows has three dimensions: institutional, functional and technological. Institutional layering entails creation of an elaborate network of governance at both the horizontal and vertical levels; horizontally between health ministry and other central agencies like the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology and vertically with state health agencies, banks and insurance companies. Functionally, the NHA aligns PMJAY with other insurance and health schemes run at different levels of government. Consolidation of various schemes thus follows from striking the right chord with similar programmes. This does not imply dilution of others but aligning them appropriately with mutual learning and interoperability. However, integration with similar state-run schemes has run into political complications. This has been the case primarily with non–BJP-ruled states. But this is more an exception than the rule. Delhi, Telangana and Odhisha have not adopted the scheme, while others such as 165

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West Bengal, Chhattisgarh and Karnataka that did opted out subsequently. Others like Maharashtra joined later, while Andhra Pradesh runs it simultaneously with its own health insurance scheme. Tamil Nadu, on the other hand, has continued with the merger.7 The third area of layering is of technological infrastructure. Following this, three central portals – namely, the benefciary identifcation system, hospital empanelment management, and the transaction management system and grievance portal – have been created for online management and processing of data. In collaboration with the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (MeIT), NHA has been seeking partner agencies in government and the private sector to build the technological system. Recently, an innovation in this direction has been the engagement with promising startups to provide cutting-edge technological solutions in ‘medical devices, digital health, health communication, hospital services, hospital management, training and capacity building’.8 This is yet another illustration of schematic integration for innovation by NHA. Driven by a federal spirit, PMJAY provides ample fexibility to states in implementing the programme. Also, as health is a state subject, the will of state government is crucial in driving it. At the state level, the scheme is operated by state health agencies (SHA). They may be state health departments or designated societies by the state government. The SHAs are headed by a CEO appointed by the state government. Their tasks include integration of respective state health insurance schemes with that of PMJAY; selection of insurance company for providing the service; empanelment of hospitals; issuance of e-cards to the targeted benefciaries; monitoring of insurance companies and empanelled hospitals to check for any fraudulent practices; establishing grievance redressal committees; undertaking capacity building programmes and provide awareness in society; establishing and monitoring of district offces; managing and sharing data with NHA; preparing periodic reports of development and undertaking programme evaluation with independent agencies.9 It is clear from these functions that the SHAs mainly operationalize the scheme, while the NHA does policy research. While exercising autonomy in designing the operations, the SHAs have to follow the guidelines set by NHA. The NHA-SHA combine is a good illustration of cooperative federalism to promote public health. Cooperative federalism is itself the newly envisioned goal to which the policy and institutional change is directed in the true spirit of the Constitution. But as observed, this has been more of an ideal than practice as political speculations restrain states to adopt the scheme and merge it with theirs. In many cases, the central scheme is seen more as a dilution or subversion of their own schemes started much earlier. 166

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The third tier of operation is done at three subsequent levels: district administration, the insurance company and the empanelled hospitals at the service end. The agencies work parallel to deliver the services on the ground. The implementing agency at the district level is called the district implementation unit (DIU), headed by the deputy commissioner or the district magistrate, as the case may be. The DIU works in coordination with the team of the insurance company and the district chief medical offcer. The insurance company – the service provider – is selected by the state government through an open tendering process. The hospitals are also empanelled by the state government from among public and private sectors.

Challenges and prescriptions Reminiscent of the constitutional assignment of heath governance to states, the centre mainly depends on state governments to operationalize their health schemes. But for different reasons, many states have been disinclined to pursue these schemes. Firstly, they see PMJAY as a dilution of their own health insurance schemes which they fnd more effective than the centre’s. But more than this, even if state programmes are ineffective, political speculation makes them reluctant to adopt the central scheme. Even when the programme is adopted, the process of fund utilization by the states is sluggish. Secondly, a uniform application of the model is lacking across Indian states. Broadly speaking, the states are given the fexibility in opting for one of the following three models: insurance model, trust model and hybrid model. In the frst case, an insurance company selected through an open tendering process is contracted to provide the service and administer the claims. In the trust model, the government runs the scheme through a trust or a society in which the money is pooled. The hybrid model is a combination of the two. In most cases, a minimum threshold of the premium is set to involve insurance companies beyond which the trust handles the fnances. The insurance model often creates uncertainties of fnancial claims by the concerned insurance company. When an insurance company is directly involved in giving the service, they are also required to administer the claims on their own. This often leads to manipulation and underhanded dealings. States with a poor health status such as Uttar Pradesh (UP) and Bihar have also opted for the trust model. Given the logic of adoption of the trust model, the UP health minister said that there were diffculties in managing the claims of insurance companies and therefore the trust model was preferable and more transparent. The insurance companies often make spurious claims which are diffcult to monitor and detect. Unwarranted claims are a strain on the government exchequer. Interestingly, states with poor governance and development records such as UP, Bihar and Assam are opting for the trust model. Coincidently, these are also Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)/ 167

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BJP coalition–governed states. Madhya Pradesh, with a trust model, in this case is an exception. The trust model is certainly apt for states committed to transparency and good governance. This could be the reason for the transition from insurance to the trust mode, as in UP. Prolonged fnancial transfer from the centre is a reason for delay in services in many states. It is reported that paucity of funds for the scheme is a major handicap. The funding is found to be even less than what NHA has demanded (Business Standard, 2019). The challenge is both in terms of shortage of funds and utilization complications at the state level. Also, as RSBY the PMJAY excludes outpatient care expenditures which is a severe strain on service seekers. Unless a health insurance policy covers outpatient care expenditures, the fnancial strain on poor patients will continue. On the present state of the government’s health expenditure, the comptroller and auditor general (CAG) report comments that “There is still a long way to go before the target of public health expenditure is achieved and the central allocation for health for 2019–20 was far short of target” (Comptroller and Auditor General, 2019). The CAG report observes a rise in public health expenditure from 1.12% of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2009–10 to 1.28% in 2017–18. But it notes that it has remained within the narrow bracket of 1.12–1.28% and is certainly much below the target of 2.5% set for 2025 (Comptroller and Auditor General, 2019). Health services for which insurance is sought require scaling much beyond the existing levels. No amount of insurance will help unless the services and the medical infrastructure to support the services are improved. Although, as the CAG report notes, upgradation of sub-centres and primary health centres (PHC) in the form of health and wellness centres is a promising step in the direction of providing comprehensive health care, weak infrastructure and medical services continue to fracture health delivery in rural areas. Unless tangible changes are seen in health services with competent medical staff and doctors, adequate availability of medical equipment and drug kits, the newly transformed structures will only appear as old wine in a new bottle and fall short of the layering undertaken for the envisioned large-scale transformation in times to come. Broadly, the two components of Ayushman Bharat – fnancial support to common people and improved health services – would have to go together to make the policy meaningful. They are mutually reinforcing and therefore the unavailability of one may make the other redundant. If people do not have money, good services will not count. Reciprocally, without good services, money will not matter. The empanelled hospitals are core service providers under PMJAY. So, their role is most critical in making the policy successful. The complicity of many such hospitals with fraudulent insurance companies has bred corruption and fnancial embezzlement. With the help of the Insurance Regulatory Authority of India, the government has identifed several cases of fraud and has taken stern action accordingly against nearly 338 hospitals and 168

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the associated insurance partners (Live Mint, 2019). This may, however, be necessary but not suffcient to monitor the service providers. Because the scheme relates with the most critical area of public welfare, social auditing can be the best way to detect fraud and spurious practices and bring transparency to the implementation process. Until now, public health schemes, unlike other social policies such as MNRGES and Mid Day Meal (MDM), have remained immune from social auditing. As the federal arrangement has given greater responsibility to state governments in the health sector, states need to come forward with innovative mechanisms of social auditing as Andhra Pradesh did to govern MNRGES. Contrarily, because of the many political speculations surrounding social auditing, the states have moved slowly and the centre has also not made much headway in this direction.

COVID-19 and state response The world has been hard hit by the COVID-19 pandemic in recent months, since its emergence in the city of Wuhan in China last December. Subsequently, the virus spread to other parts of the world and following China, Italy became the epicentre of the disease in Europe in February 2020. COVID-19 is transmitted from human to human; science has not yet confrmed its existence in animals, although some traces of it have been remotely found in the cat family. As medical science has not been able to discover the antidote to this virus, precautionary measures are the only remedy to break the human chain. It is reported that the virus causes a mild to moderate respiratory ailment infection, and those who have diabetes, cardiovascular disease, chronic respiratory disease and cancer are most susceptible to succumbing to the infection. It is highly contagious and spreads through droplets of saliva discharged during coughing and sneezing. Prevention rather than cure being the only solution at the moment necessitates minimizing human contact through social distancing, wearing masks and gloves and stopping the transmission of the virus by cleaning exposed body parts with sanitizers and also bleaching surfaces and external objects. The mysterious character of the highly contagious infection that, if led astray, could cause a severe community outbreak, called for direct state intervention in drawing a multi-pronged strategy to break the human chain. The World Health Organization (WHO) has identifed following major public health measures as a prescription to the governments: rapid case identifcation, rapid testing and isolation of cases, comprehensive contact tracing and quarantine of the contacts (WHO, 2020: 3).10 Countries with exponentially high infections have followed strict lockdowns as the basic key to minimize human contact and prevent the spread of the infection. In addition, health care systems were required to be well equipped in providing treatment to COVID-19 patients. 169

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Amidst this global health crisis, India, with a population of 1.3 cr, had to face the biggest challenge of preventing a community outbreak. The frst case of COVID-19 in India was a medical student who had returned to Kerala from Wuhan in January end. The government of Kerala was quick to respond to the crisis, knowing the scale of damage that it could bring to its highly mobile population. In early March, when three of the frst six confrmed cases were detected in Kerala, the government, with its robust health care system, designed a defnite strategy to contain the spread of the coronavirus without endangering the livelihoods of the poor, particularly the daily wage earners. The success story of Kerala is a combination of bureaucratic and political will of the health department under the mentorship of Health Minister K. K. Shailaja and has parallels with the rural development department in Andhra Pradesh (Mukherji and Jha, 2017). The structural capacity of Kerala in dealing with health emergencies was already demonstrated in eradicating the deadly Nipah, a brain-damaging virus in 2018. The Nipah experience came in handy in dealing with COVID-19. The public health measures that are key to the success of Kerala’s success with COVID-19 go back to the modernization programme initiated by K. K. Shailaja in 2016, the year her party came to power. Under this programme, diagnostic and treatment facilities were upgraded in all public hospitals. The robust delivery institutions were all set to address deadly health emergencies such as Nipah and COVID-19. This shows up in its success in fattening the curve of COVID-19 cases by early May. By 5 May 2020 it had only 499 cases, with no new cases reported in the frst three days of the month (The Hindu, 2020). The numbers have almost become stagnant since May 2020. Timely intervention at the highest level of administration was the key to success. When the rest of the world was still ambivalent about how and when to act, Kerala had started preparing itself for the impending struggle. An early trace of the virus in January was enough to bring the entire health machinery into action. The action plan was designed in two stages: the phase of outbreak and then an advanced stage. The outbreak stage is identifed as being between the end of January and early February and is reported to have confrmed three positive cases in the districts of Thrissur, Alappuzha and Kasaragod, in that order. On 20 January 2020, after confrming the intensity of the danger by talking to one of her deputies in the health department, the health minister called a meeting of health offcials to design a strategy for mitigating the spread of the infection.11 A rapid response team was set up to issue guidelines for clinical observation, laboratory observation, treatment, awareness campaign and training for the health offcials in all districts. All district collectors were also instructed to set up a control room for relevant communication and information dissemination regarding COVID-19. Medical colleges and hospitals, both public and private, were mandated to set up isolation wards for COVID patients. In the preventive stage, measures such as rigorous contact tracing, testing facilities, closure 170

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of public gatherings and education institutions, and availability of sanitizers in all offces were undertaken. The innovative side of the containment measures is noteworthy. Pamphlets on precautionary guidelines printed in Malayalam were distributed to the common people. In addition, internet connectivity was quickened by providing greater bandwidth to foster the digital media campaign. Also, the government started an app and an SMS service to provide updates on COVID-19. This was done to foster greater alertness in people.12 The strategy attracted the attention of the central government, and the cabinet secretary insisted that other states follow the standard operating procedures (SoP) of the Kerala government. As cases starting surging in India by the end of March, a call for Janata curfew was given by the prime minister on 22 March 2020 after which four lockdowns beginning on 24 March were announced without any break to prescribe strict social distancing by the people of the country. In the true spirit of federalism, the prime minister held videoconferences with the chief ministers from time to time, seeking their suggestions on subsequent lockdowns. While the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare at the centre (MoHFW) has issued broad guidelines on the containment of the pandemic, the states have been given the autonomy to issue specifc directions and instructions considering the requirements of their respective regions. As a practice of cooperative federalism, states have undertaken rigorous exercise of social distancing, contact tracing, testing and quarantining under the broad framework of central directives. State governments were also given the discretion to demarcate the red, orange and green zones, keeping track on the rise and fall of COVID-19 cases in their respective districts.13 The pandemic control measures have therefore indicated close cooperation and mutuality of governance between the centre and states in crisis management. Locally, the states have instructed the district administration to study the ground situation and provide periodic reports to the government. The district magistrates have also been empowered to work out the modalities of the lockdown like on the possibilities of opening up industries, factories, shops and other work units in their area. Lately, the Agra model has been hailed as the most successful intervention by the district administration. With the reporting of six cases in the city in early March, the district magistrate undertook a holistic approach to contain the spread of the infection. This included door-to-door surveys for case identifcation, quarantining the positive cases, tracking the movement of foreign returns and their contacts, and declaring colonies of high COVID concentration as a ‘hotspot’ (The Hindustan Times, 2020). The pandemic has indeed thrown up multiple issues for debate and discussion in the arena of public policy and governance. Firstly, it has reinstated an integrative approach to governance, especially in such a critical area as public health. Integration embodies collective action between all levels of 171

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administration, from central ministries down to the district magistrates in local administration. In a grave situation, such as with COVID-19, the uncertainties of collective action can be overshadowed by the imperatives of collective survival, leading to mutuality. Secondly, crisis management also indicates the importance of interlocking of strategies developed at different levels of government and administration. For instance, the Kerala model served as a ready solution in many ways to the central government as much as the Agra model did for local administration. COVID-19 is a good indication of how the locus of governance can shift to state- or local-level interventions that may be helpful for society and the nation as a whole. Thirdly, COVID-19 has larger implications for future health policy in India. This may indeed be prioritization of public health in the policy discourse both in terms of fnancial allocation and relevant institutional measures for crisis management. Much of what Kerala achieved in containing COVID-19 is explained by its past institutional practices to manage calamities such as Nipah or the foods of 2019. The robust health care system that the state has developed over the years has not only helped in maintaining a high life expectancy rate, but also provided the strength to manage health emergencies. On similar lines, the wellness centres in the present scheme of Ayushman Bharat have emerged with upgraded medical infrastructure and in the future they must become better equipped to deal with health emergencies like COVID-19. Lastly, integration of programmes and policies with Digital India is the best way of ensuring transparency, accuracy and effciency with which health services could be delivered. Relevant apps could be developed from time to time to seek and disseminate information so that a reciprocity could develop through a government-citizen interface. Arogya Setu developed for this purpose has created a niche of communication for tracing and tracking COVID-19.

Conclusion Recent developments in health policies clearly manifest an ideational change in favour of inclusive development. However, the change is of an incremental nature much in the pattern of structural and policy layering. The policy of the present regime largely builds on the earlier ones with greater resilience and concerted action. Layering entails scaling of the policy package, revision of the structural design and upgrading the technological know-how. With this, PMJAY is distinctly more integrative and all-encompassing. Developed under the PPP model, it embodies a coordinated and networked implementation framework. Yet, certain handicaps that impair it need special attention. Firstly, absence of civil society organizations in the programme for information dissemination, awareness campaigns and monitoring has made its outreach limited. In contrast, their active presence in implementation of other state-run programmes like the Encephalitis Action Plan of Uttar Pradesh has produced encouraging results. As a corollary, co-option of 172

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voluntary organizations for communicating and monitoring the scheme is much needed given its magnitude, scale and operation and its larger implications for public welfare. Secondly, the scaling of network with private hospitals and insurance companies has created new channels of rigging and unwarranted premium claims by the private collaborators. A welcome response to this dilemma is a shift towards the trust mode by states like Uttar Pradesh. Involvement of private organizations may be relevant to the extent that they are reasonably monitored by the state without which the scheme may confront the principal-agent problem with ‘the principal (the state) bearing the residual cost of agent’s (private hospitals and insurance companies) pursuing their interests only’ (Bevir, 2012). Also, given the federal structure of India, in which health is designated as a state subject, it may be imperative for states to exercise their political will in creating a desirable institutional environment for supporting the central scheme. This will be a welcome move to the spirit of cooperative federalism and democratic governance. The collective spirit has been well demonstrated in the COVID-19 containment action. Nevertheless, the global coronavirus pandemic calls for a relook at the health policy as it opens a Pandora’s box for new sets of dilemmas such as universal health care versus insurance model, centralized versus decentralized governance and, above all, public versus private health care in a neo-liberal economy. Above all, it also seeks to put in place a new normative order in which the government prioritizes human development and fosters public education on health, hygiene and environment.

Notes 1 www.who.int/topics/millennium_development_goals/about/en/, accessed on 4/10/2019. 2 https://www.who.int/healthsystems/universal_health_coverage/en/, Offcial website of WHO. 3 Ibid. 4 https://pib.gov.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=183635, accessed on 5/12/2019. 5 https://pmjay.gov.in/about-pmjay, offcial website of Ayushman Bharat, accessed on 5/12/2019. 6 https://pmjay.gov.in/about-nha, offcial website of Ayushman Bharat, accessed on 10/12/2019. 7 www.moneycontrol.com/news/business/economy/ayushman-bharat-states-rush-tomerge-old-schemes-with-new-some-drop-out-3572341.html, accessed on 10/12/2019. 8 www.startupindia.gov.in/content/sih/en/ams-application/challenge.html?applica tionId=5d6fa0f4e4b0fad8ed6ba26c, Offcial website of Start-Up India, accessed on 10/12/2019. 9 https://pmjay.gov.in/about-nha, offcial website of Ayushman Bharat, accessed on 11/12/2020. 10 fle:///C:/Users/MR.%20PROFESSIONAL/Downloads/covid-strategy-update14april2020.pdf, accessed on 18/5/2020. 11 https://timesofndia.indiatimes.com/india/how-keralas-rockstar-health-ministerkilled-coronavirus-in-state/articleshow/75821588.cms, The Times of India, New Delhi, 19 May, 2020, accessed on 20/05/2020.

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12 www.keralacm.gov.in/kerala-fght-against-covid-19/, Kerala’s Fight Against Covid-19, Offcial website of Chief Minister of Kerala, accessed on 20/05/2020. www.livemint.com/politics/policy/govt-to-launch-40-000-health-and-wellnesscentres-by-march-2020-1568714333973.html,Live Mint, 17 September 2019, New Delhi, accessed on 14/11/2019. fle:///C:/Users/MR.%20PROFESSIONAL/Downloads/covid-strategy-update14april2020.pdf,“Covid-19 Strategy Update”, World Health Organization, April14, 2020, accessed on 18/05/2020. 13 Depending on the number of COVID-19 cases, districts across India have been categorized as red, orange and green zones. Areas with an overload of cases are marked as red zones. Areas which in the past have reported a limited number of cases but where no surge in cases has occurred recently are designated as orange zones. Areas with zero confrmed cases to date or no positive cases in the past 21 days are designated as green zones. Times Now, May 17, 2020.

References Ashtekar, Shyam, 2008, “The National Rural Health Mission: A Stocktaking”, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 43, No. 37, September 13–19, p. 25. Bevir, Mark, 2012, Governance: A Short Introduction, Oxford, Oxford University Press. Choudhary, Mita and Srinivasan, R., 2011, A Study on Insurance Schemes of Government of India, New Delhi, National Institute of Public Finance and Policy, March. Douglas, Johnson and Krishnaswamy, Karuna, 2010, “The Impact of RSBY on Hospital Utilization and Out-of-pocket Health Expenditure”, World Bank, December. Felleti, Tulia, 2010,“Evolution of Health Care Reforms in Brazil”, in James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen (eds.), Explaining Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency and Power, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Mahoney, James and Theleen, Kathleen, 2010, Explaining Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency and Power, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Mukherji, Rahul, 2014, Political Economy of Reforms in India, New Delhi, Oxford University Press. Mukherji, Rahul and Jha, Himanshu, 2017, “Bureaucratic Rationality, Political Will and State Capacity: MNRGES in Undivided Andhra Pradesh”, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 52, No. 5, December 9. Narayan, D., 2010, “Review of Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana”, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. xlv, No. 29, July 27, p. 13. Pierson, Paul, 2000, “Increasing Returns, Path Dependence and the Study of Politics”, American Political Science Review, Vol. 94, No. 2, June. Rajasekhar, D. et al., 2011, “Implementing Health Insurance: The Roll Out of Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana in Karnataka”, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. XLVI, No. 20, May 14, p. 59. “Report on the Preparedness for the Implementation of Sustainable Development Goals”, 2019, Comptroller and Auditor General, Government of India, The Hindu, May 6, 2020. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/wealth/insure/ayushman-bharat-how-tocheck-entitlement-and-eligibility/articleshow/65422257.cms,The Economic Times, accessed on 31/12/2018.

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www.business-standard.com/article/economy-policy/the-euphoria-around-pmjayvs-neglect-of-public-health-schemes-119042000583_1.html,Business Standard, April 21, 2019, New Delhi, accessed on 14/12/2019. www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/centre-directs-all-states-to-follow-agramodel/story-s8Lxw6irtNxpDi5l05ACII.html, Hindustan Times, April 13, 2020, Agra, accessed on 22/05/2020. www.thehindubusinessline.com/news/national/pm-modi-to-launch-ayushmanbharat-scheme-from-jkhand-today/article25019730.ece,The Hindu, Ranchi, September 23, 2018, accessed on 5/11/2019. www.timesnownews.com/india/article/coronavirus-zones-and-their-meaningscovid-19-containment-plan-what-are-red-orange-green-zones/580094,Times Now, May 17, 2020, accessed on 27/5/2020. file:///C:/Users/MR.%20PROFESSIONAL/Downloads/covid-strategy-update14april2020.pdf,“Covid-19 Strategy Update”, World Health Organization, April 14, 2020, accessed on 18/05/2020.

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12 EMOTIVE POLICY IN A POLITICAL DEMOCRACY Case study of Kanyashree in West Bengal Pratip Chattopadhyay

Introduction Public policy analysis theoretically has been grounded on bureaucratic determinism, on whims of decision-makers or on the political milieu of the day. The emotive side of public policy is an emerging subfeld which is inspired by the work of Herbert Simon (1983) on bounded rationality; Baumgartner and Jones’s (2005) studies of disproportionate information processing; and Robert Cox and Daniel Béland’s (2013) study of the emotional qualities of policy ideas, and Moshe Maor’s works on policy over-reaction (2012), among others. Democracy in India over the past couple of decades transformed itself into an electoral democracy where winning elections remains the prerequisite for all politics and policies. Therefore, often a gap remains between pre-electoral promises and post-electoral public policies. In an era when innovative public policy design remains few and far between, the Kanyashree programme, a policy of the Department of Women and Child Development and Social Welfare, government of West Bengal (GoWB), has received the appreciation of the United Nations, viz. the frst prize on UN Public Service Day, as a policy successfully implemented to achieve Goal 4 of Agenda 2030 of Sustainable Development, that is, to ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all. The end of an entrenched rule of the Left Front government from 1977 to 2011 created high public expectations for a party politics–free neutral policy domain. In this context, the Kanyashree programme echoed the emotion of the public in the policy domain in West Bengal. Section I of the chapter deals with the theoretical understanding of emotive public policy, while section II gives a historical outline of the Kanyashree programme. The third section evaluates Kanyashree as a public policy, and section IV tries to understand the value of the Kanyashree policy in the democratic political milieu of India, with special reference to the changing theoretical 176

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orientation of management. The chapter concludes by arguing that at times the emotion of the public needs to be taken into account while designing public policies which can be fruitful electorally in the long run.

Section I The policy-making process is a part of politics and political action. According to Gabriel Almond, a political system is a set of interactions having structures, each of which performs its functions in order to keep it an ongoing concern. It is a set of processes that routinely converts inputs into outputs. Public policies are goal oriented. Public policies are formulated and implemented in order to attain the objectives which the government has in view for the ultimate beneft of the masses in general. These policies clearly spell out the programmes of the government. Public policy is the broad direction or perspective that the government lays down in order to take decisions. Each organisation or the individual is enjoined to take a decision within a policy framework. The  Oxford Handbook of Public Policy  aspires to provide a rounded understanding of what it is to make and to suffer, to study and to critique, the programmes and policies by which offcers of the state attempt to rule. Ruling is an assertion of the will, an attempt to exercise control, to shape the world. Public policies are instruments of this assertive ambition, and policy studies in the mode that emerged from operations research during the Second World War were originally envisaged as handmaidens in that ambition. Patrick Miller argues that contrary to the perception that emotion is an outgrowth of low sophistication, high sophisticates are more likely to experience emotion in reaction to politics and that emotion is more infuential on the political behaviour of high sophisticates (Miller, 2011). The value of emotions has also been appreciated by a handful of leading public policy scholars. Characteristically, Simon (1983) noted that thought processes, decisions and everyday behaviors may be signifcantly affected by emotion. The role of emotion has also been addressed by focusing on the emotional quality of an idea, which explains why some ideas are more successful than others (Cox and Béland, 2013). The role of emotion has also been conceptually integrated into the study of policy over- and underreaction (Maor, 2014a), as well as the study of policy bubbles (Maor, 2014b). In public policy scholarship on policy design, emotions are still treated as opposed to goals, and their presence is assumed to signal that things have gone wrong. Anna P Durnová and Eva M Hejzlarová argue, however, that understanding how and for whom emotions matter is vital to the dynamics of policy design because emotions are central to the capacity building of policy intermediaries and, with that, to the success of public policies (Durnová and Hejzlarová, 2017). 177

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Many federal, state and local governments are developing and implementing strategic human-capital plans and programmes with comprehensive knowledge management (KM) systems in their efforts to ensure that the right numbers and skill mix of workers are on hand to carry out their critical missions. Not surprisingly, the success of these programs depends in large part upon the application of ICT capabilities. This theme of human capital and knowledge management in public management is often addressed in efforts to bring about a “transformation of public service”. Since knowledge management (KM) practices focus on the human side of using information, KM was soon considered a critical tool in the management of information and communications technology. For these administrators, KM represents a major paradigm shift in management thinking from the role of caretaker to that of innovator (Mcnabb, 2009).

Section II The Kanyashree Prakalpa (KP) introduced by the government of West Bengal in 2013 is a conditional cash transfer (CCT) scheme aimed at simultaneously reducing underage marriage and adolescent school dropout among girls. This two-tier scheme consists of an annual grant of Rs 750 for unmarried girls between the ages of 13 and 18 years who are enrolled in some educational institution (KP1) and a one-time grant of Rs 25,000 upon the attainment of 18 years, conditional upon her remaining both unmarried and continuing studies till that age (KP2). It has come as a much-needed intervention at a time when the percentage of underage marriage among girls in West Bengal was the highest in India (Census 2011), and the mean years of schooling for women is lower than the national average, according to the District Level Household Survey (DLHS) 2012–13. This scheme has received widespread recognition at both the national and international levels, the latest being awarded the frst prize in the Asia-Pacifc group for the category “reaching the poorest and most vulnerable through inclusive services and participation” by the United Nations in the Netherlands in July 2017. According to the Census 2011, 7.8% of the females in West Bengal were married before 18 years of age compared with the all-India average of 3.7%. However, as West Bengal presents a very different picture in terms of the determinants of early marriage from the rest of India, the policy aimed at tackling this problem needed to be carefully designed. A recent analysis revealed that, while economic factors and welfare schemes in the village played a vital role in determining the probability of a family bringing in an underage bride in the rest of India, it was not so in West Bengal. None of the economic factors affect the probability of a woman marrying before age 18 in this state, suggesting that poverty is defnitely not responsible for this malaise. However, a girl with a higher level of education had a signifcantly lower probability of getting married before age 18 and so, encouraging 178

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higher education would lower underage marriage. Analysing the National Sample Survey Offce (NSSO) 71st Round data, it was found that income plays a very signifcant role in reducing adolescent dropouts among women in West Bengal. Thus, a conditional cash transfer aimed at reducing child marriage would not work unless it included education as a pathway. The very small transfer from the age of 13 supports, at least partially, the education cost of the girls and retains them within the education system, waiting for the ‘big prize’ after they turn 18. This assurance of Rs 25,000 discourages dropping out among girls at the secondary level and prompts them to defer marriage till the legally permissible age (Sen and Dutta, 2018). The Kanyashree Prakalpa is defnitely not the frst CCT scheme to target both dropout at the secondary level and early marriage together. One of the frst CCTs to do so was the Apni Beti Apni Dhan (ABAD) scheme launched in Haryana in 1994 for households belonging to backward social castes and/or lying below the poverty line. In fact, ABAD benefciaries saw the CCT as a way to cover marriage and dowry expenses. More effective are the CCT schemes related to education of girls, such as the Bangaru Thali introduced in Andhra Pradesh, Ladli in Delhi and the Vidyalakshmi in Gujarat. Though these programmes are the closest to KP in design, they differed in two extremely crucial points. First, KP identifes two simultaneous eligibility criteria: continued education and remaining unmarried till the eighteenth birthday, thus internalising the pathway of education for reducing underage marriage, while ABAD left out the condition of continuing girls’ education till age 18 (completing secondary education was enough). Second, in ABAD, the parents had to register at the time of birth of the girl child, whereas in KP the girls had to register themselves at the age of 13. Thus, KP generated a greater inspirational effect among girls. The Majhi Kanya Bhagyashree Scheme initiated by the government of Maharashtra in 2015, two years after the KP, staggered fnancial incentives to the families to educate the girl child and ensure proper nutrition. After the age of 18, the girl receives Rs. 1 lakh per annum for continuing her studies if she is not married till then. However, to receive the substantial amount of Rs. 1 lakh, the girl has to continue education beyond age 18, which might not be feasible in many families. In KP, the term ‘education’ encompasses secondary, higher secondary and higher education, as well as the various vocational, technical and sports courses available for this age group. Girls must be enrolled and regularly attending educational institutions located in West Bengal that is recognized by the government. To ensure an equity focus, the scheme is open only to girls from families below a certain income ceiling. For girls with special needs, orphans and for girls currently residing in registered juvenile justice homes, this criterion is waived. Because of early marriage education, the health of the girl child above all our national development is hindered. Under this circumstance, the government of West Bengal launched Kanyashree Prakalpa to provide relief to 179

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the girl child from extreme conditions of suffering, with a vision to protect and empower all adolescent girls and support their healthy development by creating an enabling environment for their participation and meaningful contribution to society (Samsujjaman and Halder, 2018). No doubt, this is not the only policy in West Bengal or the frst scheme in West Bengal to cope with the problem of dropout, early marriage or empowerment of girl children. Earlier, the government had also made some initiatives for the same issues. Some people are also of the opinion that the scheme is nothing but the continuation of the old scheme, known as the Incentive Scheme for Girl Students of Classes IX to XII, which was enacted in September 2008 by the Left Front government wide GoWB GO No. 1677/SE(S)/IOM-25/08. The fact that the government of West Bengal under the Trinamul Congress has used all its administrative powers to make this scheme available to many girl students is worthy of mention (Mir, 2018). Kanyashree Prakalpa not only minimises the tendency of girl students to dropout of school at an early age, but it will also positively affect the prevention of girl child marriage. A precondition of the Prakalpa is not being married. A girl who receives the beneft of the Prakalpa (K1) will enjoy the beneft till she reaches the age of 17. For obvious reasons, the girl herself and her family would like to receive the beneft, thereby dissuading the family from arranging a marriage for the girl before she turns 18. This obviously reduces the prevalence of child marriage in the state. A new dimension in 2018 has been added to the scheme known as K-3, named “Swami Vivekananda Merit-cum-Means Scholarship Scheme” for providing fnancial assistance to the poor and meritorious students of West Bengal pursuing higher studies. Students at the post-secondary level and onwards in regular courses, who are pursuing their studies and who are domiciled in West Bengal and studying at educational institutions in this state after passing out from the state board/council of Secondary/Higher Secondary and Madrasha education or a university of West Bengal set up by the state act and whose annual family income is Rs 2,50,000.00 or less, may apply for this scholarship. Recipients of Kanyashree with valid and sanctioned K2 ID who are pursuing post-graduate courses in science, humanities and commerce from universities in West Bengal must obtain 45% aggregate marks from recognised institutions of this state to apply from the academic session 2017–18 (Halder, 2018). The scheme is being implemented through 16,000 institutes and schools across West Bengal. As of December 2019, a total of 57,98,307 Kanyashree girls are enrolled. The Kanyashree portal of the West Bengal government reveals that the initial enthusiasm with K1 and K2 has dropped from 2013– 14 to 2018–19 in terms of application, but K1 renewal and upgradation to K2 has shown a steep increase. This proves that girls are going for higher education in the state, and the average household income has increased so that families are now worthy of a certain spending capacity on the education of their girl children. 180

181

Source: https://wbkanyashree.gov.in/kp_dashboard.php accessed on 12.12.2019

7,05185 17,48332 3,319 3,94,772 2,85,1608

7,39,759 16,05,615 25,198 3,29,533 27,00,105

Annual scholarship (K1) Renewal (K1) One-time grant (K2) Upgradation (K2) Total application

7,09,517 15,79,703 23,797 3,21,028 26,34,045

Uploaded

Uploaded

 

Sanctioned

2017–18

2016–17

Scheme type

Yearwise statistics   

7,69,945 12,22,942 49,138 2,56,737 22,98,762

18,89,960 0 1,44,197 0 20,34,157

Annual scholarship (K1) Renewal (K1) One-time grant (K2) Upgradation (K2) Total application

18,44,990 0 1,38,965 0 19,83,955

Uploaded

Uploaded

 

Sanctioned

2014–15

2013–14

Scheme type

Yearwise statistics     

6,87,625 17,36,138 3,270 3,89,392 28,16,425

Sanctioned

 

7,59,061 12,04,921 46,118 2,49,266 22,59,366

Sanctioned

8,08,733 18,42,334 16,738 4,29,577 30,97,382

Uploaded

2018–19

 

6,11,154 15,83,073 34,979 3,01,874 25,31,080

Uploaded

2015–16

8,05,702 18,41,566 16,625 4,26,289 30,90,182

Sanctioned

 

5,95,221 15,76,218 32,379 2,96,969 25,00,787

Sanctioned

 

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P R A T I P C H A T T O P A D H Y AY

The Department of Women and Child Development and Social Welfare of West Bengal government has published a Citizen’s Charter, for the Kanyashree programme in the fnancial year 2019–20, where it has been stated that the Kanyashree scheme confers more than just monetary support; it is a means of fnancial inclusion and a tool of empowerment for adolescent girls. The scheme’s benefts are therefore paid directly to bank accounts in the girls’ names, leaving the decision of utilisation of the money in their hands. To reinforce the positive impact of increased education and delayed marriages, the scheme also works towards enhancing the social power and self-esteem of girls through a targeted behaviour change communication strategy. The communication strategy not only builds awareness of the scheme, but also includes adolescent-friendly approaches such as events, competitions and Kanyashree clubs, and the endorsement of strong women fgures as role models to promote social and psychological empowerment.

Section III In the parlance of public administration and public policy, programmes are short-term interventions that create temporary improvements in the wake of challenges. Policies, on the other hand, are covenants we collectively choose to live by, as articulated in legislation and regulation. They inform our socially accepted mores and ethics. This is where the distinction between programmes and policies comes in. Ultimately, programmes cannot eliminate the systemic injustices that any group faces. They can help people manage  the effects of these injustices, but they do not overcome or cure them. Policies, conversely, actually shift the way communities and their members react and relate to one another, empowering people to improve their own well-being in a systematic way (Goodin et al., 2011). Although initially seen as a programme to manage the palpable situation in the state regarding adolescent girl child school dropout and early marriage, Kanyashree Prakalpa’s success soon transformed itself into a sustained policy of GoWB along with other benefcial programmes such as Sabuj Sathi (bicycles to girl students) and Rupasree (Rs. 25,000/- for marriage after 18 years to all Kanyashree girls). Kanyashree e-learning portal states that the learning process is becoming pervasive, both for individuals and organisations, in formal education, in the professional context and as part of leisure activities. Learning should be accessible to every citizen, independent of age, education, social status and tailored to his/her individual needs. A program called Swapno Bhor (‘dream always’) has been announced through which Kanyashree girls can develop their soft skills under Utkarsha 182

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Bangla with the help of Swapno Bhor and become fnancially independent. The e-portal of Kanyashree Prakalpa and Utkarsha Bangla will be linked through Swapno Bhor; Kanyashree girls will have the opportunity to take their preferred training course free of cost; on successful completion of training, Kanyashree girls will receive employment opportunities. The political impact of Kanyashree Prakalpa is now very deep rooted. Today Kanyashree Prakalpa has touched every Bengali. It has reached into every house, every family. No doubt Mamata Banerjee and her Trinamul Congress also reached every family with this prakalpa. It has given her much popularity and, of course, a huge amount of votes in her wallet. Kanyashree Prakalpa is a sharp weapon of the vote war as Mamata Banerjee checkmates over her political enemies. It has brought her enormous electoral gains. The opposition cannot criticize this prakalpa, because the popularity of this project is unbelievable. Opposing this project would be against their political interest. They know that the criticism of Kanyashree Prakalpa will never be accepted by the people. The recognition of the United Nations gave her an international identity. So, it became a Brahamastra (‘ultimate weapon’) to win elections. Kanyashree Prakalpa is now moving towards becoming a social movement (Bhattacharjee, 2018). The movement, to stop child marriage, encourages the girl child to seek higher education and become selfemployed, and, of course, it empowers adolescent girls and women. The parents of Kanyashree girls are also warriors of this movement.

Section IV An evolutionary perspective refects that state administrations in Bengal (Congress, Left Front) have always tried to focus on participatory management, but ultimately they became politicised to a large extent. The Trinamul Congress (TMC), after four years of rule, seems to toe a similar line. But, that it has successfully created a network with the Ma, Mati, Manush (the commoners of the state), and refected decentralised governance through several symbolic articulations, the TMC continues to be accepted among the people at large as refected through election results. The experience of the TMC administration shows that while less of government/bureaucracy (the logic of good governance) is a welcome initiative, one must rethink in the postcolonial setting of populist politics the extent to which such a ‘governance pattern’ can degenerate into chaotic and highly political management. “Good governance does not always rest with experience of bad governance . . . but on promoting it more vigorously . . . good governance is a continuing ideal” (Hasnat, 2002: 5). This is apt in analysing the Kanyashree programme as it is a continuation of the policy of Left Front government towards the girl child from 2008 onwards by the TMC government but in a more meaningful, economically benefcial and systematically structured way. 183

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It is often argued that elites are important in the policy process, but even during their honeymoon they do operate under some constraints. In the context of the Kanyashree programme, the succession from the Left Front regime to the TMC regime is seen as a succession from decentralisation to empowerment, and despite monetary constraints the programme was innovatively managed by Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee. Managing networks is at the heart of new public governance (NPG). Hands-off steering refers to working with and through networks or webs of organisations that achieve shared policy objectives through continuously negotiated beliefs and the exchange of resources within agreed rules of the game. The distinction between policy and management, and politician and civil servant is meaningless when confronted by the imperative to cope and survive. Political administrators are dependent on one another to carry out their respective roles; each role is one side of the same coin. It is not civil service reform that should be at the top of the reform agenda but ministerial reform to ensure they have the array of skills necessary for high offce. According to R. A. W. Rhodes, the 20th century was an era of thinking small. It is time to think big again and return to the craft – to statecraft (Rhodes, 2014). The Kanyashree programme is a succinct example of this statecraft in which educational institutions, all tiers of government, local political leaders and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have formed a wide network to identify, enroll and provide Kanyashree benefts to girl children. It is like a new-found identity of empowerment to create economically independent and enterprising girl children in the state. The way Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee in all her programmes bridges between bureaucracy and democracy, and between government and political party refects that her balancing act is much needed in NPG. The success of the Kanyashree programme is an example of innovative governance, but this innovation is rooted in personal emotion for the public and native wisdom of politics. The earlier programme of the present chief minister as the central minister of railways to inaugurate ladies’ special trains on the suburban rails in the state is matched with the same care and concern symbolically through the Kanyashree programme. Thus, women are satisfed to an extent. Going back to the parlance of public administration, one can say that the present Bengal state administration has tried to create a co-governing atmosphere by building an emotional contract, something more than an emotional bond, with the masses at large that accounts for the puzzle that, despite repeated highlights of the faults of the TMC governance mode, the party continues to perform well during local and national-level elections in the state. Although the aim of democratic governance is the one signpost for any good governance initiative, it is very hard to achieve simply because of the dual problem of managing and disciplining the free-spirited souls freed from the clutches of an ancient regime of control and suffocation into an 184

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orderly mass of governable citizenry and the capacity of the leader, that too a woman, doing it all by herself – the managing, governing, keeping up the party and the government appeal all at the same time together with responding to critical comments against the government. Thus, while it is essential to have some kind of a governance without government syndrome – a free space of network – one has to think seriously whether post-colonial democracies are able to handle such freedom in a meaningful manner. Even the Rupashree scheme has been scrutinised because many fake applicants claiming the one-time grant for marriage are in the news often. However, Kanyashree is entirely an e-programme, and hence reports of corruption and nepotism on this particular programme are rarely reported.

Conclusion Emotive public policy in a politicised democracy is a form of building networks of trust with the electorate. According to Charles Tilly, in the short term, we are likely to witness more of the same – the partial integration of trust networks into national public politics produced by the 20th-century combination of proletarianisation, expansion of governmental capacity, incomplete democratisation and extension of government-backed social provisions will continue throughout much of the world. In a pessimistic scenario, more of the same means continuation of forms of inequality, injustice and oppression that still exist in the world. In an optimistic scenario, it means incremental democratisation, which should erode inequality, injustice and oppression without eliminating them entirely (Tilly, 2005). The Kanyashree programme policy of the GoWB Department of Women and Child Welfare is a step forward to achieving the positive scenario which Tilly wished to refect. The French philosopher Jacques Rancaire develops a distinction between ‘police’ and ‘politics’. The former refers to the existing social order, that is the set of means, often unconscious or implicit, employed to stabilise and preserve the unequal distribution of status and wealth in a social body. Politics, on the other hand, refers to phases of contestation of ‘police’. Such challenges arise when those with no part – those who are not counted in the social order – burst onto the stage of history. Rancaire named this eruption the ‘part of those with no part’ in his 2010 book titled Dissensus: On Politics and Aesthetics. The ‘part of those with no part’ is in itself empty, since those without a part precisely have no part. It is flled with a political content according to historical circumstances. The principle cited by those ‘with no part’ to assert their presence is equality which they invoke against the wrong of which they are victims. In a Rancarian sense, politics is the opposite of identity. It is what puts existing identities into crisis and by triggering a process of subjectifcation, the formation of the subject opens up a space of possibilities, both individual and collective (Keucheyan, 2014). In a 185

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literal sense, girl children were ‘part of public with no part’ in the electoral democracy in West Bengal. But the way they were subjectifed in the policy domain through the Kanyashree programme has two related effects – frstly, the short-term programme was transformed into a long-term policy for the state government, with infuences on other public service sectoral policies as exemplifed by its recognition at the UN. Secondly, following Rancaire, West Bengal under the TMC government opened up possibilities for the individual and the collective to sanitise the ‘established order’ or the ‘police’ as existed in the Left Front regime and provided equity-based policies like Kanyashree to historicise the girl child in the public policy of West Bengal. Ours is a critical time in which politics is changing its grammar, meaning and behavioural features, having more of ‘everydayness’ than ‘routineness’ in post-colonial democratic societies. West Bengal, as a federal unit of India, has long been devoid of innovations in public policy since the time of the land reform programme by the Left Front government in the late 1970s. The Kanyashree programme was charged with emotional attachment between the politician-turned-administrator Mamata Banerjee and the Ma, Mati, Manush (commoners) of the state. Highly benefcial in real terms over the past six years, GoWB has now launched K3, a next step further in the Kanyashree programme particularly catering to scholarships for higher studies for talented girl students. The everyday necessities of a family includes the rearing of children and Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee intruded the familial space through an emotive public policy named ‘Kanyashree Prakalpa’. Exemplifying a thorough e-governance initiative, the Kanyashree programme ultimately is a strategy to strengthen the attachment between the electorate and the government in the state, reaping electoral benefts for the Trinamul Congress party in the long run. This programme also remains in line with the new direction of public policy, that of emotive public policy and knowledge management through statecraft. This is the new turn in Indian democracy where politics is underpinned and underlined in a low key through various initiatives which are explicitly social but implicitly political. The Kanyashree programme is indeed a social policy, but the web of emotion created transpired into a web of support electorally and socially because it echoed the values of Bengali society – care, commitment and concern.

References Baumgartner, F. R. and Jones, B. D., 2005, The Politics of Attention, Chicago, University of Chicago Press. Bhattacharjee, Somen, 2018, “Kanyashree Prakalpa Impacting The Socio Economic Status of Girls: A Case Study on Gangasagar, West Bengal”, International Journal of Basic and Applied Research, Vol. 8, No. 10, October, pp. 124–132. Cox, R. H. and Béland, D., 2013, “Valence, Policy Ideas, and the Rise of Sustainability”, Governance, Vol. 26, No. 2, pp. 307–328.

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Durnová, Anna P. and Hejzlarová, Eva M., 2017, “Framing Policy Designs Through Contradictory Emotions: The Case of Czech Single Mothers”, https://doi.org/ 10.1177/0952076717709524, accessed on 03/02/2020. Goodin, Robert E., Rein, Martin and Moran, Michael (eds.), 2011, Overview of Public Policy: The Public and its Policies, London, Oxford University Press. Halder, Ujjwal Kumar, 2018, “Kanyashree Prakalpa: Elaboration of The Objectives”, Journal of Education and Development, Vol. 8, No. 15, June, pp. 259–265. Hasnat, Abdul Hye, 2002, Governance in South Asian Perspective, Dhaka, University Press Limited. Keucheyan, Razmig, 2014, The Left Hemisphere: Mapping Critical Theory Today, London, Verso. Maor, M., 2012,“Policy Overreaction”, Journal of Public Policy, Vol. 32, pp. 231–259. Maor, M., 2014a, “Policy Persistence, Risk Estimation and Policy Underreaction”, Policy Sciences, Vol. 47, No. 4, pp. 425–443. Maor, M., 2014b, “Policy Bubbles: Policy Overreaction and Positive Feedback”, Governance, Vol. 27, No. 3, pp. 469–487. Mcnabb, David E., 2009, The New Face of Government: How Public Managers are Forging a New Approach to Governance, New York, CRC Press. Miller, Patrick, 2011, “The Emotional Citizen: Emotion as a Function of Political Sophistication”, Political Psychology, Vol. 32, No. 4, pp. 575–600. Mir, Najrul, 2018, “The Impact of Kanyashree Scheme in West Bengal”, IOSR Journal of Humanities and Social Science (IOSR-JHSS), Vol. 23, No. 3, March, pp. 8–11. Rhodes, R. A. W., 2014, “Recovering the ‘Craft’ of Public Administration”, Plenary Address at 23rd IPSA World Congress, Montreal, 2014. Samsujjaman and Halder, Tarini, 2018, “Awareness of Kanyashree Prakalpa and its Impact on Ongoing Girls Education”, International Journal of Management, Technology and Engineering, Vol. 8, No. 8, August, pp. 479–488. Sen, Anindita and Dutta, Arijita, 2018, “West Bengal’s Successful Kanyashree Prakalpa Programme Needs More Push from State and Benefciaries”, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 54, No. 17, April 28, Engage articles. Simon, H. A., 1983, Reason in Human Affairs, Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press. Tilly, Charles, 2005, Trust and Rule, London, Cambridge University Press. www.governing.com/gov-institute/voices/col-social-equity-crucial-difference-policiesprograms-ferguson.html, accessed on 12/12/2019.

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13 EFFICACY OF MGNREGS IN ACHIEVING SDGS Moitri Dey

Introduction Despite India’s upward trajectory in development over a decade, one third of its population are under the poverty line. India had achieved new heights in terms of economic growth, infrastructure development, urbanization, sanitation for all and technological advancements in the frst two decades of the 21st century. It is now an emerging superpower. It is also home to a number of billionaires in the Forbes or Fortune 500 list. Despite that, India could not achieve many of the millennium development goals by 2015. Development and economic growth are not able to generate a decent and dignifed livelihood to many of the poor in India. Hence, there is a severe crisis of unemployment and decent income for a vast majority of the population. Economic growth has not reached all sections of society. Growth is important for reducing poverty and also for providing a decent livelihood to the people. There is general consensus that poverty reduction is linked to achieving economic development (Dollar and Kraay, 2002). The question which arises is how this growth can be inclusive and reach underprivileged sections of society. Therefore, it is imperative that our policies secure a decent, sustainable livelihood for the 27.1 crore poor people in India (UNDP, 2019). It is also very important to highlight the unemployment crisis which is evidently seen all over India. It is often considered that unemployment is an urban problem like unemployment among educated youth or unemployment in the informal sector. It is equally a rural issue. In fact, the situation in rural areas is more grave and worrisome. In this context, the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (MGNREGS) is a boon not only for the rural economy, but also for the nation’s growth and development. India is among the 193 countries signed on for achieving Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) by 2030 and a universal call for action to end poverty, protect the planet and ensure that all people enjoy peace and prosperity. The National Institute of Transforming India (NITI Aayog) is the 188

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national coordinating agency for SDGs. The SDGs and targets have been mapped to various nodal ministries and fagship programmes by the NITI Aayog. The Ministry of Rural Development (MoRD) is the designated nodal agency for achieving SDG 1, that is, no poverty. MGNREGS has been recognized as a “core of the core” policy to achieve SDGs. The goal is to achieve SDG 1 related to poverty alleviation. MGNREGS was reported in the VNR 2017 by the government of India for its contribution to achieving SDG 1, while the scheme’s contributions to SDG 5, gender equality; SDG 8, decent work and economic growth; and SDG 10, reduced inequalities, were also acknowledged (GoI, 2017). The target is to eradicate extreme poverty for all people everywhere, currently measured as people living on less than $1.25 a day, by 2030. Poverty reduction and providing basic needs to its people have been one of the major aims of independent India. Decades after independence, India is still struggling to address the issue of poverty. This is evident from the fact that India is ranked 129 among 189 countries in the Human Development Index (HDI) (UNDP, 2018). A total of 26.8% of India’s HDI value is lost on account of inequalities – a greater loss of social protection measures, attempted to ensure that the gains of economic development are shared widely and reach the farthest frst. The chapter explores the effcacy of the policy to achieve the SDG targets. MGNREGS has more potential to achieve the targets than most of its South Asian neighbours (the average loss for the region is 26.1%). This confrms that inequality remains a challenge for India as it progresses economically. The Indian central government and numerous state governments have taken various policy initiatives to achieve a variety of SDGs, but it depends on policy implementation. Throughout this chapter, the challenges in implementing MGNREGS are evaluated. The prospective of a policy will enhance when we address the challenges. The purpose of the chapter is to see how the challenges of the policy can be addressed.

SDGs and India’s commitment Despite India’s booming economy, which is now the 10th largest in the world, 302 million people (21.8% of the total population) were living below the poverty line in 2004–05 (61st NSSO round) (GoI, 2006).1 The Indian government has been taking various measures to overcome the problem of poverty. A range of poverty alleviation programmes comprising wage employment programmes, rural housing schemes and a public distribution system have been initiated from time to time. Some programmes were successful to some extent in addressing the issue of poverty, whereas others suffered from major faws in implementation. Based on the experiences of previous poverty alleviation and employment generation policies and a long drawn-out struggle by various sections of people, MGNREGS was enacted 189

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in 2005 by the Indian government to fght poverty more effectively. During this period, most of the developing countries were in distress from neoliberal policies. As has been rightly put forward by Hirway et al. (2010), neo-liberal policies have treated employment very indifferently, creating a shortage of decent work opportunities in most developing countries. MGNREGS was enacted to reinforce the commitment towards livelihood security in rural areas. The signifcance of MGNREGS lies in the fact that it creates a rights-based framework for wage employment programmes and makes the government legally accountable for providing employment to those who ask for it. The central government passed the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act in September 2005 and launched the National Rural Employment Guarantee Programme on February 2, 2006. The act guarantees the right to work by providing 100 days of guaranteed wage employment in a fnancial year to every rural household whose adult members are willing to do semi- or un-skilled manual work. In 2009, it was renamed as MGNREGS in honor of Mahatma Gandhi. MGNREGS is the frst-ever law internationally to guarantee wage employment on such an unprecedented scale. The idea was to provide a legal guarantee of employment to anyone who is willing to do casual/unskilled manual labour at the statutory minimum wage. Any adult who applies for work under the act is entitled to being employed on public works without delay. Some of the main objectives of the act are to ensure social protection for the rural poor by providing employment opportunities, ensuring livelihood security for the poor through creation of durable assets, effecting greater transparency and accountability in governance and checking distress migration by providing work within the vicinity of the village. Thus, an employment guarantee act provides a universal and enforceable legal right to the most basic form of employment. Sustainability is defned in a varied manner, but the most frequently used defnition is given by the Brundtland Report, also known as “Our Common Future”. It defnes sustainable development as development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs (UN, 1987). The report further states that widespread poverty is no longer inevitable. Poverty is not only an evil in itself, but also sustainable development requires meeting the basic needs of all and extending to all the opportunity to fulfl their aspirations for a better life. A world in which poverty is endemic will always be prone to ecological and other catastrophes. The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and its goals are the guiding principle for today’s leading global framework for international cooperation. There are 17 sustainable development goals known as SDGs to be achieved by 2030. The 17 goals were adopted by all UN member states in 2015, as part of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development which set out a 15-year plan for fulflment. The 190

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goals and targets are universal which means that they apply to all countries around the world. The SDGs are a universal call of action to end poverty, protect the planet and improve the lives and prospects of everyone, everywhere. Sustainable development calls for concerted efforts towards building an inclusive, sustainable and resilient future for people and the planet. For sustainable development to be achieved, it is crucial to harmonize three core elements: economic growth, social inclusion and environmental protection. These elements are interconnected, and all are crucial for the well-being of individuals and societies. Eradicating poverty in all its forms and dimensions is an indispensable requirement for sustainable development. To this end, there must be promotion of sustainable, inclusive and equitable economic growth, creating greater opportunities for all, reducing inequalities, raising basic standards of living, fostering equitable social development and inclusion, and promoting integrated and sustainable management of natural resources and ecosystems (UNDP, 2017). SDGs are more comprehensive compared with millennium development goals (MDGs), with more detailed and discussed goals on inequality, climate change, environmental sustainability, urbanization, governance and partnerships which include means of implementation. Two important global cornerstones of SDGs missing in the MDGs are evaluation and accountability. To address these, a global High Level Political Forum (HLPF) was established. Following the mandate, India entrusted the task to NITI Aayog for coordinating work on SDGs by adopting a synergistic approach. India also prepared its Voluntary National Review Report at the United Nations High Level Political Forum in 2017 (GoI, 2017). The Global Goal 1 target is to reduce poverty by at least half, the proportion of men, women and children of all ages living in poverty in all its dimensions, according to national defnitions. Further, it emphasizes creating sound policy frameworks, mobilizing resources from a variety of sources and implementing nationally appropriate social protection systems that ensure equal rights; and access to basic services and economic resources. Poverty manifests itself in diminished opportunities for livelihood and quality education, lack of access to resources, social discrimination and exposure and vulnerability to extreme climate events. Goal 1 of the SDGs is one of the most important goals because of its multiple impacts. The goal is linked to others such as Goal 2 (zero hunger), Goal 3 (good health and well-being), Goal 4 (quality education), Goal 5 (gender equality), Goal 6 (clean water and sanitation), Goal 8 (decent work and economic growth) and Goal 10 (reduced inequalities). In contemporary policy making, Sustainable Development Goals are the main framework for making policies not only in India but also across the globe. The concept of sustainability is the core idea which defnes contemporary society. It is a way of strategizing present and future growth and human development that is concerned with a sustainable economy and 191

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environment. MGNREGS not only targets improving the rural economy by providing sustainable employment, but also includes overall sustainability of rural assets. This includes sustainable income, social security, agriculture, forest, health and much more sustainable asset creation. MGNREGS aims at strengthening the rural livelihood resource base through creation of productive and durable assets for sustainable growth. In a study conducted by the Institute of Economic Growth, as many as 76% of rural households reported that the quality of assets created under the rural employment guarantee scheme MGNREGS were “very good”(Institute of Economic Growth, 2017).

MGNREGS performance in achieving SDGs As was discussed in the previous section that MGNREGS has been identifed as the “core of the core” policy by MoRD for achieving SDGs, it is imperative to discuss the performance of MGNREGS so far. Table 13.1 traces the progress made by MGNREGS over the past fve years. It lists the indicators which denote the performance of the programme. The table clearly illustrates the remarkable progress made in generating payment within 15 days, from a low of 36.92% in 2015–16 to 93.98% in 2019–20. The total expenditure of Rs. 69,618 crore in 2018–19 is nearly Rs. 25,000 crore more than what was spent in 2015–16. Likewise, for livelihood security and durable assets, an increase in expenditure for agriculture and allied works can be seen with a rise in percentage from 62.85% in 2015–16 to 66.05% in 2017–18. The Institute of Economic Growth Study (2017) on natural resource management found that benefciaries said that 76% of assets created were good or very good and only 0.5% was unsatisfactory. The thrust to completion will continue. Governance reforms have been the hallmark of MGNREGS over the past three years, with use of Information Technology/Direct Beneft Transfer, and geo-tagging effectively. Verifcation of job cards and efforts to provide a job card to every deprived household as per the Socio Economic Census 2011 has yielded very positive results. According to the study, 96.31% of expenditure is now through the Electronic Fund Management System as against 37.13% in 2013–14 (Institute of Economic Growth, 2018). Critics have argued that MGNREGS works remain incomplete for a long time, leading to poor quality assets and unsatisfactory livelihood security. The push to complete works over the past two fnancial years led to the completion of nearly 1.20 crore assets in 2016–17 and 2017–18 which is nearly equal to what was being completed in four years. The geo-tagging exercise is a national-level initiative involving linking ISRO-Bhuvan with the “NREGA-Soft” interface operated under DoRD by the National Informatics Centre (GoI, 2016). Geo-tagging of MGNREGS assets which started 192

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267.96 50.88 5.48 4,61,880 90.22 63.39 69,618.59 99.01 89.61

6.13 4,62,093 73.33 66.05 68,116.76 99.56 93.98

FY 2018–19

265.3 48.39

FY 2019–20

Source: Ministry of Rural Development (2020) (Accessed on 13.10.2020).

Person-days generated so far (in crore) Average days of employment provided per household Total households worked (in crore) Differently abled persons worked Number of completed works (in lakhs) % of expenditure on agriculture and agriculture-allied works Total expenditures (in crore) % of total expenditures through electronic Fund Management System  % of payments generated within 15 days

Progress

Table 13.1 MGNREGS performance in the past fve years

84.50

63,649.48 95.86

5.12 4,72,218 62.63 66.07

233.74 45.69

FY 2017–18

43.43

58,062.92 92.33

5.1224 4,71,819 65.46 66

235.6458 46

FY 2016–17

36.92

44,002.59 91.19

4.8134 4,59,597 36.18 62.85

235.1465 48.85

FY 2015–16

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on September 1, 2016, is going on, with approximately 80,000 assets being geo-tagged daily. More than 2.84 crore assets out of a total of 3.34 completed assets since inception of the programmes have been geo-tagged and put in the public domain. While reporting about the various facets of the SDGs, the Voluntary Review Report (GoI, 2017) focuses on the progress made towards achieving goals 1, 2, 3, 5, 9, 14 and 17. These goals have been agreed upon in the HLPF as focus areas for this year (2017–18). The nature of SDGs is such that the advancement of one global goal may lead to progress in other goals as well. Indeed, one set of SDGs effectively serves as instruments to achieve another set of SDGs. For instance, SDG 8 (decent work and economic growth) is perhaps the most effective means to achieving SDG 1 (no poverty). Hence, to some degree, the progress in SDGs discussed in this chapter also represents progress in achieving other SDGs. A report published by the Centre for Policy Research (CPR) shows that the average person-days of work generated per household under the MGNREGS remained less than 50 across years in the past fve years. The report also highlights the fact that average person-days of work being generated have been declining over the past fve years. It states that the average person-days of work generated in 2015–16 was just 49. In the following year, it declined to 46 and continued to decline in 2017–18. In 2018–19, only 41 person-days of work per rural household had been generated as of December 31, 2018. The report names better-performing states, including northeastern states of Mizoram, which generated 76 person days of work; Meghalaya, which generated 68 person-days of work, and Nagaland, which generated 57 person-days of work on average. A few other states, such as Rajasthan, West Bengal, Andhra Pradesh and Chhattisgarh, created more than 50 person-days of work per household under the employment guarantee scheme. Against this, worst-performing states include Odisha, which generated 40 average person-days of work; Uttar Pradesh, which generated 37 average person-days; Bihar, which generated 36 average person-days; Punjab, which generated 34 average person-days; and Haryana, which generated 33 average person-days (Kapur and Paul, 2019). The decline began from 2013–14 and is continuing. It’s because there is no money in the programme. At the same time, material costs and daily wage is also increasing. This is the reason for the decline in person days of work generated per household under MGNREGS. Nikhil Dey of Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan, a non-proft organization (Down to Earth, 2019) A study has shown that on average, over a period of fve years, 89% of households that demanded work, received it. This refects approximately 194

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0.5 crore to 0.6 crore households that were not provided work. For instance, in FY 2014–15, while the demand was relatively low at 4.6 crore households, 4.1 crore households, or 89%, were provided work. Similarly, in FY 2017–18, while 5.7 crore households had demanded work, employment was provided to 5.1 crore households. In FY 2018–19, as of January, 17, 2018, of the 5.2 crore households that had demanded employment, 4.5  crore households had been provided work (Kapur and Paul, 2019). A study conducted by Rajendran, Dhorajiwala and Golani in 2017 found that there were signifcant delays between the generation of the fund transfer order and the actual payment of wages to workers. Using Management Information System data, the authors analysed more than nine million transactions across ten states in FY 2016–17 and found that only 21% of payments in FY 2016–17 were made on time. In another study conducted for FY 2017–18, the authors found that only 32% of wage payments made in the frst two quarters of the fnancial year had been made on time (Narayanan et al., 2017). Despite all these indications of varying performance of MGNREGS in recent years, the act has played a vital role in reducing poverty in India by 32% and prevented 14 million people from falling into the poverty trap during 2004–05 to 2011–12 (Desai et al., 2015).

Effcacy and prescription MGNREGS is a self-targeted programme for benefts to the poor. There is no specifc criteria for identifying the poor and needy households under MGNREGS. The demand-driven approach of the programme relies on the benefciaries to select them. This ensures that the targeted population is beneftted. There is a lack of work to gratify the demand for all jobseekers under the scheme. It has been found that there are non-poor households that obstruct the employment of poor households when there is inadequate work. This phenomenon has been described as “Capture” which means the benefts of the poor is blocked by the non-poor. Many studies have also reported that the benefts of the pro-poor policies are often captured by the non-poor. This has been cited as one of the major challenges in the effective implementation of policies like MGNREGS (Jha et al., 2009). Employment should be given on a priority basis to those households that are in need of income for their livelihood. The criteria of providing employment to households need to be redefned. A household with many members is unable to derive beneft from the act. The number of days to receive employment should be increased based on the size of the household. SDG 1 targets an end to poverty. It emphasizes eradicating all kinds of poverty from everywhere. It becomes imperative to remove intra-household disparities such as gender discrimination (male and female) and age discrimination (old and young) regarding poverty. For this, it is essential that 195

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gender-specifc and age-specifc intra-household poverty data be collected and such a database be used for effcient policy making. Currently, in India, there is no such database. However, to achieve the target of 2030, it is important to establish such a database by inventing relevant methodology (RIS, 2016) It is worth mentioning that most of the benefciaries are illiterate, which is one of the primary reasons behind their unawareness of the statutory norms. The participation of benefciaries is needed for successful implementation of MGNREGS. In this regard, we can say that educating MGNREGS workers can facilitate their ability to understand the scheme. The National Literacy Mission programme of the Indian government for spreading adult education can be supportive in this effort. It can help workers become acquainted with their rights and benefts more clearly and voice their demands. This will also increase the accountability factor among the higher-implementing agencies. MGNREGS can be linked with major policies of the central government which are being implemented in the rural areas. This can enhance effective implementation of other governmental policies. Government should encourage the formation of self-help groups (SHG) which will spread information about the act and its nuances. Civil society organizations can also play a prominent role in raising awareness among benefciaries. The act can play a signifcant role in the enrolment of rural children in schools. Because proper facilities are not provided at the worksites and the majority of workers are women, they send their children to nearby government schools. In these schools, children not only are educated, but also receive mid-day meals which help the women of the household to work under MGNREGS. This will also ensure that the children are enrolled in school. Young children (3–5 years) can also be sent to anganwadi centres created under the Integrated Child Development Services (ICDS). Doing this helps children by improving their health and nurturing them for schooling. In the age of the COVID-19 crisis, to protect the rural poor from adverse economic impact, the government had to rely on MGNREGS. The government decided to expedite the transfer of cash under the direct benefts transfer (DBT) scheme while placing emphasis on “individual asset creation” under MGNREGS. After huge demand from various state governments, the Parliament approved a second supplementary demand for grants to the tune of Rs. 5000 crore. This was used to clear the delayed wages of workers to March 31, 2020. MGNREGS has the potential to sustain the rural economy if there is suffcient political will. As the milieu of the rural poor improves because of this act, some positive effects on the rural environment can be expected. Children in rural areas can be expected to acquire better education as their parents’ need to move frequently is reduced and they have more money in their hands. The village environment also improves because most of these works are directed towards projects to counter problems such as drought, soil erosion, 196

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deforestation, etc. The implementation of MGNREGS has been uneven across the country. In some areas, the act has begun to demonstrate its potential. However, in most parts of the country the basic prerequisite of a meaningful legal entitlement for the rural citizen is still lacking. The frst priority of the government must be to ensure that the basic framework is in place across the country and that citizens in all parts of rural India can exercise their right to work on demand and receive minimum wages, timely payments, etc. Thus, MGNREGS needs to be nurtured to bring about socioeconomic changes (Dey, 2016). For effcient and effective implementation of policies, improved coordination among the public sector, private sector, community organizations and civil society organizations at all levels of governance is required. Government agencies like NITI Aayog should provide technical assistance to states for mobilising fnancial resources on their own from domestic and international sources in an innovative manner for capacity building of the stakeholder. It is expected that the synthesis of fnancial support and technical assistance can lead to tremendous strengthening of development policies. In India, the strategic use of development fnance at the national level should be targeted towards low-income, highly vulnerable states with limited fscal capacities such as Bihar, Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh. State GDP could play a vital role in better implementation of SDG 1 across various regions as the states are equipped with better knowledge about opportunities and challenges at the local level. Greater fscal autonomy should be provided to states. Development expenditure should be targeted more towards social security of the young and the elderly and also of women as they comprise the most vulnerable class at the intra-household level which constitutes the depth of poverty.

Conclusion India is a growing nation and going through a transitional phase. It means economic growth, technological advancements, rapid urbanization, a growing youth population, a closing gender gap and escalating impacts of climate change are coming together to redefne India’s role and mandates as a major world power. These developments create opportunities at the same time; it can be challenging particularly in the time of transition. India could not achieve many of the MDGs. So, it is of utmost importance to re-examine all our existing policies in every sector. Policies must be amended according to the country’s changing economy which is fuctuating because of rapid urbanization, changing demography and jobless growth which have resulted in differentiated citizen access to basic amenities. India being a welfare state, it is the responsibility of the state to provide its citizens access to dignifed livelihood, good health care, quality education and social security. Only rejuvenated social policies will help in achieving the SDGs. 197

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Soon it is expected that only such radical acts which aim at inclusive growth through a rights-based approach to development will have a lasting impact on the economy, society and environment of India. This is a kind of growth that India can sustain for generations ahead.

Note 1 The poverty line is Rs. 356 monthly per capita consumption expenditure for rural areas and Rs. 539 for urban areas.

References Desai, S., Vashishtha, P. and Joshi, O., 2015, Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act: A Catalyst for Rural Transformation, New Delhi, National Council of Applied Economic Research. Dey, Moitri, 2016, MGNREGA: Success or Failure, New Delhi, Adroit Publishers. Dollar, David and Kraay, Aart, 2002, “Growth Is Good for the Poor”, Journal of Economic Growth, Vol. 7, September, pp. 195–225. Down to Earth, 2019, MGNREGA Scheme Failed on Many Counts: Report, Down to Earth, 19/3/2019, www.downtoearth.org.in/news/economy/mgnrega-schemefailed-on-many-counts-report-63658, accessed on 20/12/19. Government of India, 2006, 61st Round Report of National Sample Survey Organisation: July 2004-June 2005, New Delhi, Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation, Government of India. Government of India, 2016, MOU Signed Between ISRO and MoRD for Geo-Tagging the Assets of MGNREGA, New Delhi, Department of Space, Indian Space Research Organisation, Government of India. Government of India, 2017, Voluntary National Review Report: On the Implementation of Sustainable Development Goals (United Nations High Level Political Forum), New Delhi, NITI Aayog, Government of India. Hirway, Indira, Saluja, M. R. and Yadav, Bhupesh, 2010, Employment Guarantee Programme and the Pro-Poor Growth: The Study of a Village in Gujarat, New Delhi, Academic Foundation. Institute of Economic Growth, 2017, Rapid Assessment of Natural Resource Management Component Under MGNREGA and Its Impact on Sustainable Livelihoods, New Delhi, Institute of Economic Growth. Institute of Economic Growth, 2018, Natural Resource Management, New Delhi, Institute of Economic Growth. Jha, Raghbendra, Bhattacharyya, Sambit, Gaiha, Raghav and Shankar, Shylashri, 2009, “‘Capture’ of Anti-Poverty Programs: An Analysis of the Nation Rural Employment Guarantee Program in India”, Journal of Asian Economics, Vol. 20, pp. 456–464. Kapur, Avani and Paul, Meghna, 2019, “Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (MGNREGS) (Post-Interim Budget)”, Accountability Initiative, Centre for Policy Research, Budget Briefs, MGNREGS, VOL 11 / ISSUE 9. Narayanan, Rajendran, Dhorajiwala, Sakina and Golani, Rajesh, 2017, Analysis of Payment Delays and Delay Compensation in NREGA: Findings Across Ten

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States for Financial Year 2016–17, Bangalore, Azim Premji University, https:// azimpremjiuniversity.edu.in/SitePages/pdf/PaymentDelayAnalysisWorkingPaper. pdf, accessed on 18/12/2019. Research and Information System for Developing Countries, 2016, India and Sustainable Development Goals: The Way Forward, New Delhi, Research and Information System for Developing Countries. United Nations, 1987, “Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development Our Common Future (Brundtland Report)”, General Assembly Resolution 42/187.1987 December 11 Oslo, United Nation, www.un-documents.net/ our-common-future.pdf, accessed on 20/12/2019. United Nations Development Programme, 2017, The Sustainable Development Agenda, New York, UNDP, www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/developmentagenda/, accessed on 02/12/2019. United Nations Development Programme, 2018, Human Development Indices and Indicators: 2018 Statistical Update, New York, UNDP. United Nations Development Programme, 2019, Global Multidimensional Poverty Index 2019: Illuminating Inequalities, New York, United Nations Development Programme and Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative.

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14 THE INDIAN STATE, DEMOCRACY AND THE CITIZEN Public policy challenges in the postCOVID-19 era Rumki Basu

When India encountered its frst case of COVID-19 on January 30 in Kerala, the coronavirus-caused disease seemed like an unknown infection in a corner of China that appeared to have created a scare of sorts. Six months later, over 7 million Indians had been infected by SARS-CoV-2, and more than 100,000 Indians were dead because of the disease. Since then, India has changed seminally and irreversibly. India’s governance structure has confronted the most serious multidimensional crises in its history. Its political life is on the verge of potential transformation, both in form and substance. Its public health system has emerged as the most critical determinant of the nation’s ability to fght and revive. Its economy has gone through an unprecedented contraction. Its governing economic philosophy is being put to an acid test. Its private companies have been forced to reconfgure their business. The country’s migrant labour force has gone through a humanitarian tragedy, more severe than India has ever experienced, in her recent political history. India’s poor have gotten poorer, the rich have not gotten richer and the middle class has seen opportunities shrink, jobs disappear and incomes depleted. Its salaried professionals have had to reconfgure the very idea of what it means to work from home. Its children have been forced to adapt to a new education system, where going to school itself is an elusive prospect. Its citizens have changed the way they live, eat, travel, interact and work in visible and invisible ways. As the world grappled with the coronavirus pandemic in 2020, India enforced the world’s largest and most stringent1 lockdown, starting March 25 of the same year, for almost three months, taking several other measures to contain the pandemic. It was during this period that the centrality of the Indian state in the world’s largest democracy truly entered the 200

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collective consciousness of its 1.3 billion citizens as never before. COVID19 impacted the way the democratic Indian government, the 28 Indian states, the private sector and the citizens behaved, seminally changing public life as we know it today. Since 1991, with the onset of new economic policies, the state-market divide had been changed irreversibly with state minimalism and market-driven growth and development being espoused as the offcial policy of the Indian state. The days of administrative overreach and the philosophy of the welfare state seemed outdated in a globalized neoliberal era. Then suddenly, or so it seemed with the March 25 lockdown, everything changed in India, and the state came to command the central heights again. COVID-19 was destined to place both the central and the state governments at the forefront of the response to the pandemic. Indian citizens were not looking to the private sector for any service they needed, be it food and essential supplies, medicines, health care, security, transportation, policing in lockdown zones or research for a new vaccine. For all of the real and impressive strength of India’s private initiatives since 1991 in raising India’s growth rates, given the scale at which this pandemic had to be tackled and that solutions had to deliver a certain universalism of outcomes, private action could not substitute for government action. Rarely has the Indian state been put to test for its resilience, integrity, effciency and governance capabilities as it was during the pandemic. The weakness of the State was most acutely refected in the health care system. People do secede time to time from the realm of public health services by turning to private services for basic needs, but the pandemic has shown that no one can truly secede from the larger public health system. It is the web of the health ministry, state governments, government hospitals in each district, government physicians and health care personnel which have provided the frst line of response. The private sector has chipped in – but even the conditions under which it can do so have been determined by public health authorities. This expansive role of the State also required new ways of working. From the prime minister holding video conferences with chief ministers to the cabinet secretary convening a meeting of all chief secretaries digitally, from rolling out the Aarogya Setu app to track infections to the deployment of offcials from a range of departments for contact tracing, the State has had to adapt, embrace technology and divert its resources for the most urgent tasks at hand, and realign priorities. But through all of this, the Indian state’s fssures and weaknesses came to be exposed as never before. Its investment in key areas which are central to its mandate – such as health – was far too limited. Its coercive apparatus tended to go overboard, as during enforcement of the lockdown. It was slow to respond to the immediate needs of the most vulnerable citizens during the pandemic (migrant labour being the most obvious example). 201

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The Indian state: rediscovered strengths First, the Indian state’s coercive arms were found to be extraordinarily strong, effcient and effective. Locking down an entire nation of India’s population, size and diversity was no mean achievement. The lockdown was a testament to the fact that when the state wishes to implement something on a large scale, curtailing the liberty of citizens for any purpose (this time, for preserving public health), then what can emerge is a revelation – with a clear directive from the centre in unison with the states, all departments and ministries, including the police, can deliver! If a democracy can turn into a ‘hard’2 state during a medical emergency, can its state machinery be used in a similar fashion as a tool of policy implementation in normal times? Yes, even this can happen, as it has been proved in some administrative best practices when public policies were very effectively implemented by the politico-administrative machineries in different states of India. Let’s take the case of Sustainable Development Goal3 (SDG) implementation in India. I frmly believe that if the political vision and directives are clear, there can be 100% implementation of our SDG goals by 2030 in one state after another, the centre frmly holding the hands of the states. If we need to be a world-class power, our public service delivery systems need to be world class too. The point I am trying to make is that ‘soft’ democracies like India can be turned ‘hard’ with the requisite political will and purpose, and expected outcomes will follow! This brings me to the second interrelated strength. The lockdown could not have been as successful without the cooperation and support of the citizens. People by and large complied with all state directives, even when it severely hurt their livelihoods. People’s participation is a must for successful policy implementation. Effective political communication is mandatory too, something that Prime Minister Narendra Modi understands very well and was the raison d’etre of his television addresses during the lockdown period. He has been the only Indian prime minister so far who uses this direct mode (i.e. the radio or television) of communication frequently, bypassing other intermediaries. The prime minister has always launched his major welfare programmes through a social movement mode, nudging the public for major behavioural changes in order to make public policies succeed – Jan Dhan Yojana (compulsory opening of bank accounts for universal fnancial inclusion), Swachh Bharat Abhiyan (sanitation campaign) and Beti Padhao Beti Bachao (educate and save the girl child) are apt examples. However, it is naïve to believe that electoral democracy per se can generate immediate economic payoffs or reductions in poverty, which will transform the lives of people. What it can do is to strengthen electoral accountability so that politicians have strong incentives to deliver public goods and services according to citizen needs. Democracies can limit the abuse of power but are often slow, deliberative and procedure oriented, unable to always deliver electoral promises effciently or effectively. 202

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Federalism in practice Post-COVID-19, India’s political system will be tested most particularly in its major constitutional feature – the federal division of powers. It is also important to remember the context in which public policies are made in India. A democratic politico-administrative system means that the fow of information is open and that there is a constant ‘feedback’ system where criticism from the public, political opposition, domain experts and the media can enable mid-course corrections through public opinion and feedback. In other words, democracy allows scope for change with continuity. The government must see this as a strength and be open to inputs from all sources. For example, if the present ruling regime has been criticized for demonetization, lowering the growth momentum, shoddy GST4 implementation, the CAA5 and its role in creating societal fssures, failure to reignite the manufacturing sector and restart the growth momentum, severity of the lockdown measures, etc., it should take these in its stride. Constructive criticism helps to improve public policies in democracies. India has one of the sturdiest Right to Information acts in the world, which is widely used by the public. However, a democratic system also, by its very nature, is slower and more deliberative. Finding quick solutions to structural issues (e.g. a weak health infrastructure) is not going to be easy and quick. The pandemic has amply demonstrated the need and beneft of centrestate coordination in policy making and execution. There is a complex division of powers envisaged in the Constitution, and public health, for example, is under the jurisdiction of states. Broad guidelines to deal with a health emergency like COVID-19 can be framed at the centre, but the power of implementation lies largely with state governments, which therefore will have room to innovate and execute. The era of economic planning and the ‘administrative state’6 which was a hallmark of Indian democracy in the 1950–90 period was too soon declared dead. The broad contours of the Indian state that have emerged after India globalized in the 1990s did lead to high growth rates. India enjoyed rising growth rates, suffcient foreign exchange reserves, food security and high rates of savings and investment till around 2018. Around 300 million ‘exited’ poverty in the past decade; we moved from relative poverty to relative prosperity. In this, the most important initiatives in good governance emerged from the 28 states of India. NITI Aayog’s (a premier government think tank) mandate today is to oversee the implementation of SDGS and promote competitive federalism among states and union territories. It prepares an SDG India Index which has become a good test of how the states are doing in all developmental parameters. The SDG index is an excellent tool which offers possibilities for the states to identify priorities which demand action, facilitate learning from other states, highlight data gaps and promote healthy competition among states. 203

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Kerala model – why states matter Kerala is not among the richest of Indian states, but it has demonstrated by example that citizen centricity is the key to good governance and that maintaining an effcient and effective public service delivery network is the raison d’etre of democratic administration. Kerala spends 6% (public and private combined) of its SDP on health infrastructure; other northern and western Indian states (with more COVID-19 cases in 2020) lacked the decentralized politico-administrative command structures, public health institutions or effective public service delivery networks to handle emergencies like COVID-19 as Kerala did. India’s per capita expenditure on health is 1.8% of our GDP, with a meager $16 per capita, one of the lowest in the world. Despite apparent inequities regarding access to health care (1.03 beds for every 1000 persons), it is known that Indian physicians and its private health care infrastructure are among the best in the world. One of our most signifcant achievements has been keeping the death rate from COVID-19 to one of the lowest in the world. Among states in India, Kerala stands out because of its superior administrative capacities, its long traditions of public education and health care through public action. ‘Social trust’ makes things easier, even when the state has to mastermind logistics in a pandemic situation. The people’s right to information was respected by the government, and the people trusted government information and data. There was no opacity in government functioning, and this helped immensely in community outreach, rigorous contact tracing and mass quarantine measures. The three-tier public health system set up to deal with COVID-19 involving government hospitals is the outcome of a more than 50-year legacy of spending on health care and education. All of these policy measures have shown outstanding outcomes: Kerala’s frst-place ranking on both the Human Development India Index (2019) and the Sustainable Development Goal India Index (2019) among the 28 Indian states is a testimony to this. Kerala is right on track in meeting all SDG targets by 2030.7 In the past three decades, it was our states which were at the forefront of our political and development reforms whether it was public health, right to information, e-governance, right to employment or public service guarantees; all such initiatives have come from the states frst, to be followed up by the centre later. A total of 80% of developmental expenditures are spent by and in states. In the COVID-19 efforts, it was the states which led the fght against the pandemic. By putting treatment protocols in place, ramping up medical infrastructure and humanely treating migrant workers by activating existing laws, Kerala was truly a pioneer followed by others. In the post-COVID-19 era, it is the states which should push for bold structural reforms for growth and implementation of SDGs to pave the way 204

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for a true ‘welfare state’8 in India. There is another reason to explain why states matter. The biggest bane in India today is the phenomenon of differentiated citizen entitlements in different states of India – for example, you might get access to a decent platter of public goods such as food, education and health, if you are a resident of Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Mizoram or Himachal Pradesh, rather than any other state in India. The National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA), is the world’s largest wage employment scheme; the Food Security Act guaranteeing food to 74% of Indians is one of the world’s largest public food distribution networks, and Ayushman Bharat is also the world’s largest public health insurance programme. Put together they do empower large populations in India with substantive welfare benefts; the only problem is that these schemes are not run with uniform effciency or access, leading to a lack of universalism of outcomes in all states of India. A citizen is morally entitled to the same package of rights and basic public goods as another citizen. That rarely happens in India. What divides is the quality and effciency of governance of a particular state of India, where you may happen to reside or in which sector you may choose to work (formal or informal). Today, when we talk of migrant workers’ rights, the debate focuses on the issue that all Indian citizens should receive uniform welfare benefts from the government (e.g. food or medical care) irrespective of the state of residence or sector (formal or informal) of work. This was the logic behind the ‘One Nation, One Ration Card’ scheme enforced after the Corona crisis to ensure the portability of food entitlements to any citizen uniformly across India.

Role of the public servant Time has also come to acknowledge the role of the state and the public servant in a population of 1.3 billion. Civil servants (at the federal and state levels) close to 21.5 million are managing or overseeing all that matters to an Indian citizen today – education, health care, policing, communication, urban planning, transport, banking and parts of industry. They are important because it is they who will manage the demands of a young9 and changing India in the future – a fact generally taken for granted in normal times, but certainly worthy of acknowledgement now, in the post-COVID-19 era. Our bureaucratic structure, contrary to popular thinking, is neither bloated nor too big for our needs. India has only 1.6 governmental personnel for every 100 residents compared with the much higher fgures of 3.3 in South Africa, 3.9 in Mexico, 5.9 in Brazil, 7.2 in Germany and 10.1 in the UK. Increasing bureaucratic capacity to enhance their strength to meet the needs of 1.3 billion citizens is a must, not a luxury. To move from a procedural to a substantive democracy, more public action is required to translate public needs to public entitlements. Better implementation of public policies requires more competent public institutions, not fewer. We must understand, 205

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who needs the Indian state? The hallmark of a well-governed state is what it does for its citizens – by way of public goods, services and utilities provided. In India, for example, it is the marginalized sections of society which primarily rely on citizen entitlements through public service delivery systems.

Welfare architecture A very crucial gap is the way the Indian state deals with its poorest citizens. Interestingly, it was the Narendra Modi government which brought in the debate about how we deal with welfare, through direct cash transfer to the poor, digitization of welfare benefts to plug leakages and the need for movements and campaigns to raise public awareness through public action. Today, 400 schemes come under the Direct Beneft Transfer. The Modi government should use these well through the trinity approach – Jan Dhan (universal fnancial inclusion), Aadhaar (unique identity number) and Mobile (JAM) phone to directly reach benefciaries and plug corruption and leakages. The Modi government’s biggest mandate should now be to weave together a credible welfare architecture and execute it with effciency and effectiveness in tandem with states so that it reaches every Indian citizen who needs it most. The state should not only be fair, it should be perceived to be so. NREGA, the Public Distribution System (PDS), Right to Education and Ayushman Bharat (a public health insurance scheme) have been good initiatives; what is required is making employment generation the centre of our political discourse. In democracies, the poor and the marginalized have one key advantage – the power of the vote. The time has come to extend the right to work to urban areas, with municipal bodies being given the responsibility for providing 100 days of work to all those seeking it. Lastly, COVID-19 has highlighted the need for providing universal free health care. Universal insurance coverage will not be enough. Raising the share of expenditure on health care to 3% of the GDP can ensure the right to health to all. A well-designed social protection architecture should not be seen as charity or fnancial profigacy. The pandemic has further reinforced the need for a welfare state. Identifcation of benefciaries is entirely possible through existing databases. Schemes such as NREGA, PDS and a modest universal income transfer can drive growth by boosting demand, correcting market failures, improving credit access and providing the income needed for people to invest in health and education. Contrary to popular imagination, India is not a poor state; we have enough public fnances to take care of our citizens by devolving these welfare benefts to those who need them most. Let us say, creating a true welfare state in India for a target group (those who need these public goods and services may not be more than 300–400 million at a time) costs about 10% of our GDP in a given year. We were one of the world’s fastest-growing economies before COVID-19 happened. Today we have slowed down, like all other countries after the pandemic. But if we grow back again 206

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(there is no reason why we should not), then in what direction should our public policies go? I am absolutely certain that there is no worthier cause in democracies than moving towards the creation of a ‘welfare architecture’ to ultimately build a viable welfare state for its citizens.

Demographic dividend, skill mapping and education To manage our vast human resources and truly reap the benefts of the projected ‘demographic dividend’,10 we need to plan for our 500 million workforce – 90% of whom are in the informal sector. Skill mapping of this workforce is extremely important. Workers will be needed for agriculture and industry and knowledge workers for the service sectors. Planning, skilling and ftting our young mobile workforce in the economy with full respect to their skills and abilities, taking full care of their health and other workplace benefts, is the moral imperative of the Indian state. The National Education Policy (NEP) 2020 comes 34 years after it was last revised. It marks a historic milestone in the country’s education system. The document is an exemplar of how public policy should be framed – factoring in voices of every single stakeholder at the centre and the states. NEP will drive change in alignment with the system’s need to focus holistically on the most critical tenets of access, equity, infrastructure, governance and learning in education. With an extensive focus on universalizing access from early childhood to higher education, integrating more than 20 million out-of-school children, and concerted efforts for socio-economically disadvantaged groups, the policy ensures last-mile delivery, for the least advantaged underprivileged child. Along with a dedicated national mission for foundational literacy and numeracy, NEP 2020 will bolster the most critical phases of building a strong foundation for the educational system. Revamped curriculum, adult education, lifelong learning and the vision to ensure that half of India’s learners have exposure to at least one vocational skill in the next fve years is characteristic of the shift from rote to applied learning. Through a skill-gap analysis, practice-based curriculum and internships with local vocational experts, NEP 2020 augurs well for social-sector public policy formulation. The creation of an academic credit bank, the impetus to research, graded autonomy, internationalization and the development of special educational zones are vital to rebranding India as a desired higher-education destination. NEP marks an overhaul of the governance architecture from over-regulation and complex norms to a simplifed and workable structure. Outcomefocused accreditation will be critical to leapfrogging India’s journey towards quality education, the fourth goal of sustainable development. NEP 2020 is a welcome step in the right direction, with a desired focus on critical thinking, experiential learning, integrated pedagogy and inclusive 207

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digital education. It is truly a multifaceted policy which will strengthen India’s journey towards the fourth industrial revolution.

Other structural reforms To bring the private sector and the informal sector, which employ 90% of our workforce, in the ambit of labour laws and welfare benefts will be the biggest challenge of the Indian state. The Indian state has been a model employer, but it employs only a miniscule fraction (2.7%) of the labour force; there can be no true human resource planning or management if labour and welfare law compliance is not enforced on the private and informal sector, where it is needed most. This brings me to the promise of bold structural reforms to regain India’s growth momentum. I agree that bold reforms in areas such as land and labour are needed, but let us not think that laws are an answer to every problem in Indian society. Indian statute books are overfowing with more than 600011 laws passed by the central and state governments; only a fraction of them are possibly implemented in their true spirit. Take, for example, the Migrant Labour Crisis12 that emerged as the most signifcant crisis in human migration in India since our independence in 1947. The Inter State Migrant Workmen Act 1979 mandates registration, regulation of employment and conditions of service by employers. During the pandemic, it was found that, except for Kerala, no other state in India voluntarily complied and implemented the welfare provisions of the law. In line with the recommendation of the second National Commission on Labour, the Ministry of Labour has taken steps for formulating four labour codes on wages, industrial relations, social security welfare and occupational safety, health and working conditions by amalgamating, simplifying and rationalizing the relevant provisions of the existing central labour laws. This code has already been introduced in the Lok Sabha in 2019 and when passed will subsume and replace 13 labour laws, including the Inter State Migrant Workmen Act. Land in India is a state subject; of all factors of production, the market for land is most distorted. Therefore all changes have to come from the states. A catalyst for this change is increasing competition among states to attract investment. An essential requirement for a well-functioning land market is clear titling which boosts the credit and sales market for land as well. It has been more than a decade since a national land record modernization project began. The centre should handhold the states and back it with resources to conclusively clear India’s titling mess. If states are taking initiatives in land and labour reforms, and accelerating the reform process in agriculture, this is the best news ever for the agriculture sector. Bold reforms will also call for encouraging local production, build local brands, improve logistics and lower energy costs for domestic companies. This will enable them to achieve economies of scale and technological sophistication for successfully 208

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competing in global markets, with huge impacts on the manufacturing sector. Besides, food and medical supplies are not in shortage. Livelihoods can be restored by initiating a massive public works programme focusing on rural roads and housing, for example, which will provide a huge stimulus to the economy and revive growth. Self-reliance was the leitmotif of policies pursued in India in the 1950s, and the country industrialized quickly with the least foreign aid. In the next decade came the Green Revolution, which set the nation free from food imports. We need to identify sectors – such as the mineral sector, the health and pharma sector, our textiles and agricultural products – which can also be world class. India and China are the two countries which can survive on their domestic markets alone – which is the only secret of true self-reliance.

Democratic public policy making It is imperative that we understand the democratic public policy making and execution process. The point to emphasize is that democratic functioning need not always be ‘soft’, the policy process can go ‘hard’ sometimes without losing the quality and context of the democratic spirit and power. ‘Hard’ democracies are not necessarily illiberal democracies. Prioritization is absolutely necessary to plan a nation’s future. State minimalism is not a virtue in itself; a normative idea like ‘citizen welfare’ can be a moral imperative in a democracy in the developing world where enhancing state capacity to continuously deliver to its citizens may be the only way to transit from being a procedural democracy to a substantivist one. The pandemic has shaped public discourse on key issues of public policy which the Indian state will now be forced to respond. For citizens, livelihoods, public health, jobs with a degree of social security benefts (even in the informal sector), income support to the ordinary citizen in times of distress, are now being considered as part of a ‘welfare state’ agenda that should be prioritized in public policy making and implementation. If these now become the central themes which will govern state-citizen relations in democratic India, then the country will certainly move towards a substantivist democracy in terms of citizen entitlements. The contours of such a welfare state seem to have fnally entered the public consciousness as a by-product of their collective experiences during the COVID-19 period. India has seen and understood the centrality of state power in this time of the pandemic. Citizens have come to realize that the same power can be used to bring seminal changes in our public policies and transform the lives of our citizens. Addressing inequality and reducing differentiated access to public goods and services is the biggest challenge for the Indian state in the post-COVID-19 era. The pandemic has only succeeded in exposing all the fssures and weaknesses of our society, economy and governance structures as never before. Addressing all of them will not be easy! Some can be 209

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redressed through short-term policies, but most of them require a long-term vision. That vision requires a societal consensus that needs to be forged through democratic modes and techniques. In the post-COVID-19 period, all democracies in today’s post-globalized era need to renegotiate the relationship among state, society and the citizen. National resources should be used to revamp public service delivery systems to fulfll citizen needs and entitlements with a sense of fairness and justice. The difference between the magnetic idea of real equality (however utopian) and day-to-day perceived inequalities is the greatest cause of ‘democratic defcits’, in all democracies, old and new, and India is no exception to this rule. It is absolutely necessary for democracies and democratic public power to succeed and deliver if democratization becomes the leitmotif of good governance in the 21st century.

Notes 1 India’s lockdown was imposed on 1.3 billion citizens, the world’s largest target group, in 2020. The Government Response Stringency Index is a score assigned to countries based on seven indicators such as closure of schools and workplaces and restrictions on travel, etc. A higher score means a country has taken stricter measures, like India. 2 ‘Soft’ state is a term frst used by the famous Swedish economist Gunnar Myrdal to refer to countries of the developing world where an ‘implementation’ gap existed between policies and their execution. The reverse was the case in ‘hard’ states. Myrdal identifed India was as an example of a ‘soft’ state. 3 The SDGs are a group of 17 goals for all signatory UN members to follow, designed to be a blueprint to achieve a better and more sustainable future for all humankind. The SDGs, set in 2015 by the UN General Assembly and intended to be achieved by the year 2030, are part of UN Resolution 70/1, the 2030 Agenda. 4 Goods and Services Tax Act passed in 2017 by the Indian Parliament laid the foundation for a complete reform in India’s indirect tax system. 5 The Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2019, was passed by the Indian Parliament in 2019. It amended the Citizenship Act 1955 by providing a path to Indian citizenship for illegal migrants of all religious minorities who had fed persecution from Pakistan, Bangladesh and Afghanistan before December 2014, except Muslims. The act was the frst time religion had been overtly used as a criterion for citizenship under Indian law. 6 This refers to a state that has acquired a huge bureaucratic network for regulating economic and social affairs. Introduced in the early 1940s, this term is usually used in discussions regarding the problems of accountability that arise as a consequence of delegating rulemaking and adjudicative power to administrative agencies. 7 For all statistical data on Kerala, check: www.kerala.gov.in 8 The welfare state (conceptualized after World War II) refers to a state which has a mission of controlling and directing economic forces so as to promote social well-being for its citizens. 9 A total of 62.5% of India’s population is in the age group of 15–59 years which is increasing and will be at its peak around 2030 when it will reach approximately 65%. These population parameters indicate availability of a demographic dividend in India which started in 2005–06 and will last till 2055–56.

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10 Ibid. 11 Hindustan Times, New Delhi, June 10, 2020. 12 After the lockdown was announced, India’s huge migrant labour force faced a terrible crisis – they were stranded in their places of work with no employment. With all modes of public transport closed, no work and no wages, they started returning home, often on foot.

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Note: Italicized pages refer to fgures and bold pages refer to tables. 2G spectrum 81 Aarogya Setu 172, 201 Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab (J-PAL) 105, 107 abuse of power 8 accountability 10 advocacy coalition framework (ACF) 102 Agenda for Sustainable Development (Agenda 2030) 176, 190 air pollution 43 Alma-Ata Declaration 158 Almond, G. 177 Apni Beti Apni Dhan (ABAD) 179 Arab Spring 7 Argumentative Turn Revisited: Public Policy as Communicative Practice, The (Fischer and Gotweis) 48 Arogyashri 162 Article 21 of the Constitution 70 automobile sector 44 Ayushman Bharat 159, 172, 206 Banerjee, Abhijit 105 Banerjee, Mamata 184 Bangladesh 32 below poverty line (BPL) families 161 Beti Padhao Beti Bachao 202 Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF) 107 biometric information 161 black money, GST reducing 90–91

Blair, Tony 102 bureaucracy 78–79 Bush, George H. W. 91–92 Capital in the Twenty-First Century (Picketty) 56 Census 2011 178 Centre for Policy Research (CPR) 194 cess for education 110–112 China 14–15; authoritarian government 15; Confucianism 4; growth rates 3; handling COVID-19 crisis 11–12, 13; human development 3–4; India vs. 3–4; naval exercises 14; non-democratic system 14; post-COVID-19 period 12; poverty rate in 11; totalitarian regimes 15; transformation of 15 Citizen’s Charter 182 civil servants see public servant in post-COVID-19 era civil services 44–45 civil society organizations 196 climate change 11 Clinton, B. 92–93 CLR (Computerization of Land Records) 131 Cold War 3 communication 47–58; administration and 49; information and 47–48; political 42; signifcance of 42 Communist Party of China 4 community-based organisations (CBO) 140

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Dror, Yehezkel 30–31, 41, 45 Dryzek, John 49 Dufo, Esther 105 Dunn, William 48 Durnová, A. P. 177 Dye, Thomas 30

Confucianism 4 constitutional morality 80–81 Constitution of India 9; Article 21 70 consumer goods sector 44 Corona-related global recession 12 corruption, GST reducing 90–91 Couldry, Nick 58 COVID-19 200–201; community outbreak 170; deaths from 200; lockdown 200–201; MGNREGS and 196; multidimensional crises 200; policy choices and outcomes 11–14; response to 169–172; see also postCOVID-19 era Davies, Philip 103–104 decentralisation of elementary education 140–156; policy perspective 140–143; see also school management committees (SMC) demand overload 9 democracy 2, 5–11; electoral 7–8; Europe 7; global transformations and 5; Indian 9–11; limiting abuse of power 8; minimalist 8; normative value of 8; older 5; policy cycle 8; political regimes 6–7; problematic 5–6 democratic defcit 9 Department of Women and Child Development and Social Welfare of West Bengal 176, 182 Dey, Nikhil 194 digital technologies 35 digitization of land records 131–132; DILRMP 132–138; NLRMP 132, 134 DILRMP (Digital India Land Records Modernization Programme) 132–138; central sector scheme 132; components 132, 133; progress under 134–138, 135–136 Direct Beneft Transfer 206 district implementation unit (DIU) 167 District Information System for Education (DISE) 145 District Level Household Survey (DLHS) 178 Drèze, Jean 70

Easton, David 28 economic growth 188 education 107–112; cess for education 110–112; governance of 104 elections/electoral democracy 7–8 elementary education, decentralisation of 140–156; see also school management committees (SMC) Elite/Mass theory 27–28, 74–75 emotive public policy 176–185; Kanyashree programme 176–177, 178–185; overview 176–177; theoretical understanding 177–178 ethical dilemmas 34 ethics/ethical analysis 74–81 Europe 7 Evidence-based Policy Infuencing and Advocacy (UNICEF India) 107 evidence-based policymaking (EBPM) 101–107; defning 102–103; Indian education sector 107–112; policy studies 105–107; signifcance 103–105 feedback loop 28 Finland, EBPM experiment in 104–105 Fischer, Frank 48 Food Security Act 69–70, 205 Future Politic (Susskind) 36 game theory 31 Gandhi, Mahatma 190 geo-tagging of MGNREGS assets 192, 194 girls: early marriage 178, 179; higher education 178–179; school dropout 178, 179, 180; see also Kanyashree programme globalisation 33 Gotweis, Herbert 48

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governance: in the 21st century 35–38; of GST (Goods and Services Tax) 89; policy success and failure 41 Grameen Bank, Bangladesh 32 Green Revolution 209 Group Model/Theory 28, 75 GST (Goods and Services Tax) 84, 85–91; eliminating tax terrorism and inspector raj 90; formulation 87–89; governance of 89; GST Council 89–90; inception of 85–86; political contestation 86; reducing black money and corruption 90–91; self-automated policing 91 GST Council 89–90 GST Network 91 Gunn, L. A. 79 health care: challenges and prescriptions 167–169; institutional and policy change 159–161; insurance schemes 159; millennium development goals 158–159; per capita expenditure 204; policy transition 158–172; response to COVID-19 169–172; universal free care 206 health policy 37 Hejzlarová, E. M. 177 High Level Political Forum (HLPF) 191 Hogwood, B. W. 79 human development 11; China compared with India 3–4; human rights and 66–67 Human Development Index (HDI) 189, 204 human rights 60–71; human development and 66–67; human security and 67–71; rights-based approach (RBA) 64–66; right to development 61–63 ICT (information and communication technology) 128–139; digitization of land records 131–132; DILRMP 132–138; land records administration 130–131; NLRMP 132, 134 incrementalist paradigm 26–30; Elite/ Mass theory 27–28; Group Model 28;

Institutionalist Model 28–29; NeoInstitutionalist Model 29; Organised Anarchy Model 29–30; Systems Model 28 India: China vs. 3–4; COVID-19 crisis management 12–13; democracy and public policy 10–11; economic growth 188; HDI value 189; millennium development goals (MDG) and 188, 191; Open Door policy 55; poverty rate in 11 Indian Journal of Public Administration 49 Indian National Congress (INC) 116 Indian Ocean 14 Industrial Policy Resolution of 1956 9 information 47–48 inspector raj, GST eliminating 90 Institutionalist Model 28–29 Insurance Regulatory Authority of India 168 Insurance Regulatory Development Authority 162 interdisciplinary approach 42–46 International Covenant of Economic Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) 69 Inter State Migrant Workmen Act 1979 208 Jan Dhan Yojana 202 Jayal, Nirja Gopal 54 Kamaraj, K. 44 Kanyashree programme 178–185; Citizen’s Charter 182; conditional cash transfer (CCT) 178, 179; e-learning portal 182, 183; evaluation of 182–183; historical outline of 178–182, 181; implementation 180; overview 176–177; political impact 183; precondition 180; value as public policy 183–185 Kay, Adrian 103 Kerala: administrative capacities 204; as a model state for post-COVID-19 204–205; response to COVID-19 169–172 knowledge management (KM) 177

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land 209 land records: administration system 130–131; digitization 131–138; DILRMP 132–138; NLRMP 132, 134 “Larry King Live” (CNN) 93 Lasswell, Harold 26, 48 Lindblom, Charles E. 26, 40 Lipset, S. M. 8 Lowi, Theodore 29 Ma, Mati, Manush 183 Mathur, Kuldeep 111 MDG (millennium development goals) 158–159, 188, 191 media 42 Metapolicy 30 MGNREGS (Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme) 188–197; critics on 192; demand-driven approach of 195; effcacy and prescription 195–197; geo-tagging of assets 192, 194; objectives of 190; performance 192–195, 193; SDGs and 188–197 micro-credit policy 32 Mid Day Meal (MDM) 169 Migrant Labour Crisis 208 Miller, Patrick 177 minimalist democracy 8 Ministry of Labour 208 Ministry of Rural Development (MoRD) 189 “Modernising Government” White Paper 106–107 Modi, Narendra (Modi government) 202, 206; television addresses 202; welfare programmes 202 M. S. Swaminathan Research Foundation 43 Mukherjee, Pranab 87 Mullainathan, Sendhil 105 multidisciplinary approach 42–46 NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) 91–93 national capital region (NCR) 43 National Commission on Labour 208

National Education Policy (NEP) 2020 207–208 National Policy on Education (NPE) 1986 141 National Sample Survey Offce (NSSO) 179 naval exercises 14 Neo-Institutionalist Model 29 new public governance (NPG) 184 New Public Management 80 New Telecom Policy 1999 (NTP 99) 81 NITI Aayog (National Institute of Transforming India) 44–45, 105, 188–189, 203 NLRMP (National Land Records Modernization Programme) 132; funding pattern and sharing of costs 134 Noon Meal Scheme 44 NREGA (National Rural Employment Guarantee Act) 190, 205 “Odd/Even” rule for road transport 43 older democracy 5 Olga Tellis & Ors vs. Bombay Municipal Corporation 70 ‘One Nation, One Ration Card’ 205 Open Door policy 55 Organised Anarchy Model 29–30 Ostrom, Vincent 31 Outka, G. 75–76 Oxford Handbook of Public Policy, The 177 Panchayat elections 141 Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRI) 141 parameters of policy 41–42 Pareto, Vilfredo 30 Personal Data Protection Bill 106 Picketty, Thomas 56 Pierson, P. 159–160 policy, parameters of 41–42 policy-making process 40–46; civil services 44–45; inter-sectoral impact 44; multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary nature 42–46 Policy Making Process, The (Lindblom) 26 policy scientist 45

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policy studies 15–16; evidence-based instrument 105–107 political communication 42 political contestation on GST 86 political feasibility 41 political regimes, democracy and 6–7 political system: defned 177 Political System, The (Easton) 28 Pompeo, Mike 14 post-COVID-19 era 1–16; democratic public policy making and execution 209–210; federalism 203; free health care 206; Kerala model 204–205; NEP 2020 207–208; public servant and 205–206; structural reforms 208–209; welfare architecture 206–207 poverty 11, 189 Pradhan Mantri Jan Arogya Yojana (PMJAY) 159, 162–169; challenges and prescriptions 167–169; empanelled hospitals 168–169; outpatient care expenditures 168 Pre-View of Policy Sciences, A (Lasswell) 26 problematic democracy 5–6 Public Distribution System (PDS) 206 public policies 116–125, 176; communication 47–58; defned 26; dynamics of trajectory 25–38; ethics and 74–81; evolution 36–37; governance 35–38; in liberal India 118–119; LPG (liberalization, privatization and globalization) 117; in neo-liberal India 119–124; nonimplementation of 117; overview 25–26; post-neoliberal era 124–125; public interest 116; shifts and dilemmas 33–34 public policy paradigms 26–32; incrementalist paradigm 27–30; rationalist paradigm 30–31; strategic planning paradigm 31–32 public sector reforms 8 public servant in post-COVID-19 era 205–206 Rashtriya Madhyamik Shiksha Abhiyan (RMSA) 141

Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana 159 Rational Choice Theory 75 rationalist paradigm 27, 30–31 Rhodes, R. A. W. 184 rice bioparks 43 right to development, human rights to 61–63 Right to Education (RTE) Act 142 Right to Free and Compulsory Education Act 142 Rupasree 182 Sabuj Sathi (bicycles to girl students) 182 SARS-CoV-2 200; see also COVID-19 Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (SSA) 141 school complex management committee (SCMC) 142 school management committees (SMC) 140; evidences from empirical studies 146–153; involvement in school functioning 144–145, 144–145; opinion on school functioning and education 150–151, 150–153, 152–153; school heads on participation of 153–154, 154, 155; statewise distribution of schools having 145–146, 146 SDG (Sustainable Development Goals) 2, 3, 5, 10, 202; as framework for making policies 191–192; India’s commitment to 189–192; MGNREGS and 188–197; NITI Aayog and 188–189 Second World War 177 sectoral policy 43 self-automated policing 90–91 self-help groups (SHG) 196 Shailaja, K. K. 170 Simon, H. 30, 176, 177 Sinha, Yashwant 88 smog 43 South China Sea 14 SRA&ULR (Strengthening of Revenue Administration & Updating of Land Records) 131 State Against Democracy (Kothari) 54 state and public policies 116–125

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state capacity 8 strategic planning paradigm 31–32 structural adjustment policies (SAP) 80–81 stubble burning 43 Susskind, Jamie 36 Sustainable Development Goal India Index 10, 204 Swachh Bharat Abhiyan 202 Swaminathan, M. S. 43 Swami Vivekananda Merit-cum-Means Scholarship Scheme 180 Swapno Bhor (dream always) 182–183 Systems Model/Theory 28, 75 tax terrorism, GST eliminating 90 Telecom Regulatory Authority of India 81 Thirteenth Finance Commission 87–88 Trinamul Congress (TMC) 183–184

United Nations (UN) 107, 176 United Progressive Alliance (UPA) 159 universal health care (UHC) 158; see also health care Universal Health Insurance Scheme 159 Voluntary Review Report (GoI) 194 welfare architecture for post-COVID-19 era 206–207 welfarist policies 5 West Bengal: early marriage 178; Kanyashree programme 176–185 World Bank 12, 107 World Health Organization (WHO) 169 Wuhan, China 11–12, 169 Xi Jinping 14

UNICEF India 107 United Kingdom (UK) 102

Yashashvini 162

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