Demi-Democracy: The Evolution of the Thai Political System 9812100180

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The Evolution of the Thai Political System

LIKHIT DHIRAVEGIN

TIMES ACADEMIC PRESS

(8 1992 Times Academic Press

First Published 1992 by Times Academic Press Au imprint of Federal Publications (S) Pre Ltd (A member of the Times Publishing Group) Times Centre l New Industrial Road

Singapore 1953 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior

permission of the publishers. ISBN 981 210 018 0 Printed by Ludwinia Printer Pte Ltd

CONTENTS

TABLES AND CHARTS. .. .. . .. . ........ .. . ........... .. . .. .. ....... .. .. . .. .... .. .. . .. .. . ..... . .. .. . .. ... .. .... .. ... ........ .. . .......... . vii

THE AUTHOR. . .. ... .. .. . .. . .... . . .. .. . ..... .. . .. . .. .. .... .. .. .. .. .. ...... .. .. . ...... .... . .. ......... .. . .. . ........ .. .. . .. ..... . .. .. . .. .... .. . viii INTRODUCTION. ...... . .. .. . .. . ... .. .. . .. . .. .. . .... .. ....... .... .. ... ........... .. .. . ...... .... . .. .... .... . .. . ... ..... .. .. . ........ .. . .. . ..... . xi PART

I: THE BACKGROUND

The Legacy of the Past .. . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . ...... . . . . . . ...... . . ........ 1 Chapter II The Sukhothai Kingdom ......... .. ....... . .. ........ . . . . . . . ... . . 12 Chapter III The Ayuthaya Kingdom (1350-1767) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Chapter IV The Thonburi Kingdom (1767-1782) and Ratanakosin Era (1782) . ......... . ........... . . . . . . 63 Chapter I

PART

II:

DEM1-DEMOCRACY

The Politics of Reform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . ..... . . . . . . . 91 Chapter VI Thai Politics from June 24, 1932 to the Coup of 1957: A Struggle between Bureaucracy and Democracy . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...... . ........ . 121 Chapter V

Chapter VH The Despotic Paternalism of Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat . .. . . . . . .. . . . . . . . ......... ... ..

¢ U

155

Chapter VIII The October 14, 1973 Uprising and the ................. .. . .......... .... 173 October 6, 1976 Coup d'erar..... Chapter IX

CONCLUSION.

General Prem Tinasulanonda and the Halfway Democracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..... . .. . .. . . . . . . . .. .. . ... . ... .. . . 209

.. .............. . ............................................................................................................. 225

In

TABLES AND CHARTS

TABLES

I

Prime Ministers in the Constitutional Period . ..... . . ...................... 127

H

U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants Net Obligations and Loan Autllo risations . . . . . .. . .. . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134-135 Degree of Urbanisation and Literacy Rate in Thailand ........... ... 183 Economically Active Population Aged I I and over Classified by Occupation . .. . . .. . .. . . . . . .. . . ............. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184 Production of Rice and Other Agricultural Crops in Thailand (in thousands of metric tons) . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185 Thailand's Exports (in millions of baht) ................... . . . . . . . . . ... ....... 185

III IV V

VI VH

U

Agricultural and Non-Agricultural Labour Force,

Gross Domestic Product, and Productivity, 1960 and 1970 .. . 186 VIII Social Background of Members of the House of Representatives 222 IX Cabinet Members with Business Background . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 223 CHARTS

I

The Capital, the Outer Cities and the Vassal States .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

II

A11 Idealised Sketch of Governmental Organisation

under the Khmerised System of King Ttailok of Ayuthaya and Later Periods ....... .... ................. ................ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

THE AUTHOR

Licit Dhiravegin received his Bachelor of Law (Honoursl degree from Thammasat University in 1964. After studying at the Fletcher School of Diplomacy (Tufts University) for two years, he went on to Brown University to obtain his Ph.D. in Political Science in 1972. Since finishing his education, he has written prolifically on topics such as Thai politics, focal government in Thailand, political development and social change, and Thailand's foreign relations. He has published five books and forty scholarly articles in English, and seven books and hundreds of articles in Thai. He has received many fellowships, awards and research grants from foundations all over the world, including the Ford Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation, the Harvard-Yenching Institute, the _leper Foundation

and the Thai Khadi Research Institute. In 1988, he was presented with the "Nationally Acclaimed Most Distinguished Researcher" award by the National Research Council. Likhit Dhiravegin served as the Dean of the Faculty of Political Science at Tharnmasat University between 1983 and 1985 and was the Vice President of the Thai University Research Association from 1982 to 1984. He was also a. Member of the Constitution Drafting Committee, National Legislative Assembly. At present, he is a Professor of Political Science at Thamrnasat University.

INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION r

Like many other nations, Thailand has been struggling for political survival

since the nationhood took shape centuries ago. The ups and downs of the people and their kingdoms were marked by numerous wars in which heroes and heroines emerged. The Thai people as a nation witnessed both the slow of their ldngdoms and the decline of their polities. This corresponds to the dictum of transience of things endowed in the Buddha's teaching. Yet as empires waxed and waned, kingdoms prospered and crumbled and nations

thrived and perished, the Thai nation continued to endure the hardship and weather the storm. The existence of this diehard culture and the persistence of this race both bear witness to the nation's resilience. While ecstasy and agony are a common phenomenon for humanbeings, as a nation the Thai have also undergone this duality of existence. The sacking of the mighty Ayuthaya kingdom was a shock to the nation. Yet, as the Thai often put it, "Ayuthaya will never run dry of able people". The nation again gathered its strength and continued to struggle against the ill fate bestowed upon it by the traditional national enemy who sought to destroy the

nation once and fO1' all. Then through a painful process of national reconstruction, the nation braved through all sorts of crises, ranging from the menacing traditional national enemy to later Western imperialism. It called for adjustment of a grand scale and thanks to the enlightened leaders, the nation and the kingdom were transformed into a modern nation-state under

the great leadership of King Chulalongkorn the Great. The modern era of Thai politics is no less painful and its experiences no

less turbulent than those of the previous periods. The implantation of the democratic system on the Thai soil after the revolution of June 24, 1932 only led to the resurgence of the traditional forces who were repulsed by the introduction of things alien to the Thai culture. Yet, change was introduced;

this led to a struggle between bureaucracy and democracy, and to political turbulence for two and a half decades between 1932 and 1957. However, in 1958, the traditional element in the form of a military regime staged a comeback with the use of force. But probably due to the law of transience, the strong grip upon

political power by the military was challenged in October 1973 by a mass uprising, unprecedented in the modern history of

the Thai nation. The one

and a half decades of strong rule under men of uniform was put to an end by the politically conscious middle class ironically born out of the national development policy embraced by the ruling elite, who had used it to boost their waning legitimacy. The good deed had thus boomeranged-

xii Demi-Democracy : The Evolution of the Thai Political System

Henceforth, what the Thai nation has witnessed is what can be best

described as a halfway democracy characterised by an elected House of Representatives and an appointed Senate and prime minister. The process, appropriately given the name of deni-democracy in this study, is an attempt to bring about a fusion of the old element, the bureaucrats, and the new element, the newly emerged middle class. The new political set-up is in many senses a compromise and an attempt to work out a feasible political model to accommodate both elements existing in the Thai society. But the halfway democracy cannot be taken as the final outcome of a

political system operating permanently in the Thai society. It is taller as a temporary process in which the arrangement is to accommodate to the changing situation and the political reality. It is a transitional period in which a full democracy is expected to take shape as time progresses. But then one is cautioned against the linear concept of development. Any ascending trajectory can arc in a circle and turn cyclical if the pushing force has lost out in the process of gaining a momentum. A pessimistic view also should be entertained if one is to remain a realist. Thus the transition means either that the demi-democracy will proceed

along the path of linear development to full democracy or if the resistance forces happen to be too strong for the painful process of democratic development, that the situation will be forced back to the better known dictatorial type regime experienced by the Thai people for centuries. It is at this particular juncture in time that a careful study of the evolution of the Thai political system becomes a worthwhile and challenging undertaking. But to achieve a thorough understanding of the Thai political system and process, most notably the present demi-democracy, it is imperative to have a survey of the process of evolution and the way that the Thai people have

operated in these circumstances. Thus, a study of the legacy of the past, which is given in the four chapters as the background in Part I, is imperative. With Part I serving as the foundation, an analysis of the genesis of the demidemocracy can then take place, and this is done in the five chapters which constitute Part II. Because of Thailand's long history and its complicated political process discussions of the subject cannot be too detailed. This is especially true for this study because it is a study of the evolution of the demi-democracy and not a detailed analysis of a specific political event. Thus, those who expect to find information on a particular aspect of Thai politics, are advised to look

elsewhere. This will be the wrong- merchandise. But those who would like to build a background for further study or want a better understanding of Thai politics, this present study should be helpiiil. For a book of this length and scope, assistance has been imperative. First, for funding of the project, the Volkswagen Foundation's financial

Introduction xiii

support was greatly instrumental for the outcome of the present volume. Thamrnasat University, which provides office facilities and an atmosphere conducive to this type of research, was also a great help. Research assistents who helped with data collection also deserve credit for their due contribution.

If this study is useiiil in any way at all, credit should he due to those personalities in Thai history who have brought this nation forward until today. It is this group of people to whom gratitude is due. Likhit Dhiravegin

Facufzy ofPoZirzlca[ Science Waammas/zr Univ/ersiiy

Bangkok, Tfmihnd March 1992

I

I: THE BACKGROUND -

m

_

v

Chapter I

The Legacy of the Past

Chapter II

The Sukhothai Kingdom

Chapter HI The Ayuthaya Kingdom (1350-1767) Chapter IV

The Thonburi Kingdom (1767-1782)

and Ratanakosin Era (I782-

)

I THE LEGACY OF THE PAST

Unlike the study of the history of other countries for which there is more or less a consensus in the interpretation and accuracy of the data, the study of Thai history has a number of problems.' THE PROBLEM OF THE "%1A1" KJNGDOM

The conventional view is that Thai history has had a Linilinear development in terms 0/ its kingdoms; following the migration from South China, -they started Elie iirstkingiom at Sukhothai, then Ayuthaya, Thonburi, and Bangkok. Some present-day scholars reject this unilinear argument. They argue that Sukhothai, considered the first Thai kingdom as a result of the discovery of the stone-inscription by King Rama IV {la/longkut) and it alone has been propagated as a highly glorious ldngdorn, especially during the reign of King Ramkhamhaeng was not the only ldngdom in early Thai history. Their research has revealed that Supanburi, Lopburi, Chiangmai (Lanna), and Nakorn Sri Thammarat of the contemporary period were just as "glorious", or, in the case of Nakorn Sri Thammarat, even "more glorious" than Sukhothai. 2 Sukhothai cannot even be classified as the first among equals among these kingdoms. The question is: Were those kingdoms, other than Sukhothai, also

ruled by the Thai' If the answer is yes, why then should Sukhothai be considered the kingdom of the Thai and not the others such as Chiangmai, Supanburi, Lopburi and Nakorn Sri Thamrnarati This leads to the second

problem. TH18 PROBLEM OF THE "THA1" PEOPLE

Who were the Thai? Were the Thai people only those in Sukhothai, Ayuthaya, Thonburi, and Bangkok or do they include people of Thai ethnicity in other

1. I have learned about these problems in a special lecture of the Thai Studies Programme

by Professor David Wyatt, Director of Southeast Asian Programme, Cornell University and from discussions with scholars in the Southeast Asian Programme where I was a research fellow from 1978-1980 with a grant from die Harvard-Yenching Institute. 2. Discussion with Professor Srisalt Vallibhotama and Professor Thamsuk Numnonda, Southeast Asian Programme, Cornell University 1979-1980.

2 Deni-Democracy : The Evolution of the Thai Political System

kingdoms' Also, who were the ethnic Thai' The area of the golden peninsula, especially where present-day Thailand is situated, consisted of people of various and mixed ethnicities: Thai, Chinese, Laotian, Mon, Khmer, Vietnamese, Burmese and Malay. The population is so mixed now that one can hardly identify a single individual who can as far as ethnicity is concerned claim to be a pure Thai. Thus, it can be argued that if the word Thai means a people with a Thai culture, broadly speaking, then it is tenable, but if the word Thai means a Thai ethnic group, then the concrete evidence would contradict this assertion, unless the meaning of ethnic is modified to mean people of mixed ethnicities but subscribing to a similar culture. Even in the kingdom of Ayuthaya, there were people of many ethnicities including Thais, Chinese, Mons, Laotians, Vietnamese, Persians, Burmese, Japanese and Portuguese. Many of these were assimilated into a Thai culture, i.e., the Thai language, Theravada Buddhism, and a Thai way of life? It is thus no easy task for an historian to argue that Sulehothai and Ayuthaya were Thai kingdoms while the others were not for one cannot help wondering whether this specification has been made arbitrarily by historians. It is not my interest to discuss this point further. Suffice it to say that the conventional assertion of a unilinear development of Thai history is problematic. SOURCES OF DATA

The Thai people (culturally defined in a broad sense) did not usually keep records. The few records there were talked about the ruling elites and religion . The king, or the polity, was the pillar of society. The history of the king was the history of the nation. Thus, one source of historical data is pongrawadan

or the history of the long (court). Another source is the ramnatz, legend, which is a stoner told from generation to generation about certain phenomena or events, especially concerning religion. Written documents of the early period, if any, are rare. Stone-inscriptions and written accounts of foreign travelers or traders who resided in Ayuthaya

or Bangkok in the early period are examples of written documents. Again these documents have to be used with care. They are good for cross-checking with other evidence. However, there is the problem of accuracy, especially with stone»inscriptions, because stone-inscriptions were state or public documents. Like any other public documents, there is usually a purpose for producing them. Thus, one has to analyse the meanings very carefully. As for written accounts of foreigners, biases are to be expected. They were written by people with an alien culture who probably had a different frame of reference-

3. This view is held by Protcssor S1-isak Vallibhotalna, Silpakom U11ivr:rsiry_

The Legacy of the Past 5

More importantly, much of what was written might have come from hearsay. It is thus clear that this limitation of data makes the analysis of history extremely difficult. Consequently, one would be advised to take any assertion with a grain of salt for many controversies have arisen on particular issues of Thai history. With the advent of modern techniques such as aerial photography and Carbon-14 testing, some scholars have used these new scientific techniques to support their arguments." Since it is not the purpose of this study to probe in detail the problems of the study of Thai history, l will leave it to scholars that are keen on this subject to undertake such a study. I only want to point out the weaknesses and the limitations which one has to keep in mind when one analyses Thai history. Also, the conventional view of Thai history as proceeding from Sukhothai to Ayuthaya, Thonburi, and Bangkok, although controversial, will be retained in this study because, regardless of the arguments against it, interest lies in the impact of the historical legacy on the socio-politicoeconomic structures of the Bangkok period especially prior to the Chakkri Reformation. Again, whether Thai history is unilinear as some scholars have claimed is beside the point- As I shall seek to point out, the Ayuthaya period has had great impact upon Bangkok for the founder of the Chalk24 The above passage, however, can also be interpreted as an inducement for people from outside

the kingdom

to

come to trade. Whatever the argument, one may safely say

that social classes

- i.e., people

of different economic wealth, political power

22. For a discussion of the porcelain trade of Sukhorhai, sec Kasetsiri, op. cir.

23. See Saraya, op. cit. 24. The stone-inscription of Sukhothai is a much quoted piece. It is a well-known historical evidence. For a discussion, see Ha1'1'}f Bends and Cohn A. Larkin, 'Use World

0f Sout/beazst Asia, New York: Harper and Row, 1967.

The Sukhothai Kingdom

15

and social status - did exist in the Sukhothai ldngdom, 25 although the whole male population could be mobilised in critical times, such as during wars.

Political Ideology In any society, certain sets of values and beliefs exist for a number of reasons. These values and beliefs have the function of integrating the society and serving as guidelines for the "accepted" behavior of the individual members. They also explain the secret of life, especially the differential social status and economic well~being. Answers to the question of why misfortunes have

befallen certain individuals can also be sought in these values and beliefs. In most cases, such values and beliefs are derived from religion. In the realm of politics, the most crucial thing is the question of

legitimacy, i.e., the acceptability of the ruler by the ruled. in the new jargon in systems theoryfl legitimacy means support given by the populace to the political regime and political authorities- In early Sukhothai, we have seen the ruler, child that the concept ofpho khan or patriarchal king (father

_

the ruled) served as the legitimacy for the political system. But as time went and the kingdom grew bigger and society became more complex, a more sophisticated concept had to be developed to justify the "right to rule". Thus came the concept of Dharma-raja, a ruler who possessed Dharma, or the moral virtue, the image of a Buddha.

It was King Lithai who espoused this concept. He also, it is believed, authored the Trazpoompramang, the book of the three "lands": heaven, earth, and hell. lt explains how the universe came into being. The Tramp/yum of Lithai served to explain the cosmology to the Thai of later generations. indeed, the beliefs concerning hell and heaven have been handed down from generation to generation giving rise to various kinds of superstitions. But of significance is the laying down

of 3. belief system

for the society, which some

scholars have interpreted as a political ideology based on religious belief, to serve as a mechanism for political. control. lt should be observed that King Lithai was not dissimilar to Prince Shotoku of Japan who, as a devout

'J K/Jo" 25. For a discussion of the social ciasscs of Sukhothai, see Davida Saraya, Kro1i5.g CZvonc/Jan

Num

Saagkonz Sukhotluzi (The Class Srruéle

of the

Sum/not/ani Society),

Bangkok: The Social Science Association of Thaifand (undated), The Social Histoijv of the Sukhothai kingdom. paper presented at the Seventh Conference, International Association of Historians of Asia, Bangkok, 22-26, August 1977.

26. See David Easton, A Framework

far Politica[Ana@sis, N.].: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965.

27. See Cholthira Kladyoo, Traipaompraruang.~

Rattan Khorzg Udomfearn

of

Thai Political] Ideology) Tafngletzrnmuang:/wtf (Trfnpoompranzang: The Foundation Won tarn I/aammdsat (T/oammasat UnifJ'erszlty]o-urrzaf), Vol. 4, No. 1 (June-Septcrnber

1974). CE Chanto rnwong and Samudavanija, op. aft, Chapter IV.

16 Domi-Democracy : The Evolution of the Thai Political System

Buddhist, edited a series of Buddhist sutras and initiated the construction of several Buddhist temples during the seventh century.

Relations with Other States Relations between states in those days were of four types: first, relations between equals in trade; second, relations between equals as friends, e.g., Sukhothai's King Rarnkhamhaeng and Lanna's Mengrai; third, wars between states for the solution of disputes or expansion of territory or power; fourth, relations with China as a tributary state. The last had a two-fold purpose: to seek recognition as a legitimate kingdom by the Chinese empire and to trade disguised as a tributary mission." The Suldiothai kingdom had all four types of relations. In fact, it has been argued that through good relations and marriage or kinship ties, Sukhothai managed to expand its influence. Conventional historians have argued that King Ramkhamhaeng himself went to China. This argument has now been refuted and discarded. Despite the lack of convenient means of transportation and communication, it is surprising to note that transactions between the various small city-states were considerable. Apart from the tributary missions to the court of the Chinese empire, Buddhist monks from Nakorn Sri Thammarat and as far as Ceylon travelled to Sukhothai at the king's invitation. In fact, one high-ranking Ceylonese monk even assumed the position of the equivalent of the Supreme Patriarch of the ldngdom of Sukhothai. Such concepts as the Dharma-raja and the Traipoompmrzrang were certainly not indigene us wisdom. Such abstract and sophisticated treatises must have owed their origin to a higher civilisation. And this was a result of the free flow of information and learning through relations between Sukhothai and the outside world.

Sukhothaj: Was It a Great Kingdom? By an account, the Sukhothai ldngdom was great in its own right. The kingdom had a kingship system first based on the patriarchal ruler, or p/90 khan, concept and later on the Dharma aia, or the Buddhist, moral king who came to govern the earthly kingdom. It produced a belief system For the

28.Lild1it Dhiravegin, Siam and Colonxizlzkm (1855-1909): A?2 Analyszh" coD 10lom/ztifc Relations, Bmuglok: Thai Watarua Panich Co., Ltd., 1975. Their the tributary mission was used for lucrative trade purposes was probably more of the case of Ayuthaya and

later periods, see, Suebsang Promboon, Sine-Siamese TribuMrjf Reltztions, 1282-1853, Ph.D. dissertation, Department of History, University of Wisconsin, 1971. It has been translated into Thai and published by the Social Science and Human Textbook Foundation, 1982.

The Sukhothai Kingdom 17

society which also served as an ideology for the state. It provided a cosmology for the general populace. In the economy, some degree of technological know-how and irrigation systems had been developed. Production was sufficient at least for Sukhothai proper, if not the kingdom. In social structure, the people were stratified although not as rigidly and in as an institutionalised way as in the Ayuthaya system. The ldngdom had its written language. The script was created by King Ramkhamhaeng. In fact, it had been adapted from the Khmer script. In legal terms, there were laws governing the land. Appeals

could also be made by ringing the bell hung at the palace gate when justice failed. According to the stone-inscription, Sukhothai was a prosperous and "free" kingdom. Its glory became the pride of later Thai generations. Some have gone as far as to argue that the clauses on freedom of trade and the related issues found in the stone-inscription can be interpreted as the first

constitution of the Thais. The question which present-day historians have started to ask is: Was Sukhothai a. great kingdom claimed by the "conventional" historians' Since

or

there have been many schools history writing in Thailand, the nationalistic school of "glorification the past" school would assert that Sukhothai was a

or

great kingdom of the Thais. The "objective" school, however would argue that Sukhothai was only one of the many city»states in the region and even at

the height of its glory, the influence it achieved was only through marriage and ldnship ties. Given the geography and the amount of rainfall, it can be argued that Sulchothai could not have produced great quantities of rice, especially when compared to Ayuthaya with its fertile land and the abundance of water from rivers and rainfall, a fact which helped boost Ayuthaya°s paper." The irrigation system was a co-operative project among the people and not a state-controlled project as in the Chinese empire- The porcelain

kilns which can still be traced were not as big as those of Ayuthaya. All in all, scholars of Thai history have argued that while the Sulchothai kingdom was certainly sign ficant, it was by no means the great and powerful ldngdorn once postulated by the conventional historians- At best, it was at times and within a limited geographic space, the first among equals.

29. Charlwit Kasetsiri, Ruarzg K/vang Song relearn (The Story of Twr1 .Kingdoms), Bangkok: Chao Phraya Publishing House, 1980.

50. See Saraya, Sepal Seméit, op. sit.

18 Deni-Demouacy : The Evolution of the Thai Political System

The heritage from history or myth of the Sulchothai period is as follows: I.

The who khan or patriarchal ruler concept. He was considered a benevolent ruler, which justified dictatorship in the form benevolent father and submissive child relationship. Indeed, Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat thought of himself as the .Z0,60-k/9un-

2.

The concept of Dharma-raja or a moral and righteous Buddha Monarch. This concept was mixed with the Devaraja cult in Ayuthaya.

3.

The belief or myth about a peaceful and happy Sukhothai. It was

or

believed to be an ideal society which the Thais of today could emulate. The interpretation of the stone-inscription as the first constitution. and the term mea-Sukhothai or neo-Sukhothai, as some scholars have tried to propose as an alternative political model, testify to the significance of Sukhothai and its inthience on Thai thinls son.

Krom-muen Chesada Bod if worked closely with Dit Bur nag, the minister of Kiang, who through the Krom Chao Ta dealt in trade. It will be remembered that Krorn Chao Ta had jurisdiction over the eastern coastal trading prov rices.

Both Krom-muen Chesada Bod if and Dir Bunny, the Pro Kiang; had engaged in trade. This brought the two men closer together and it was not unrelated to the Kroner-rrzzren S rise of fortune and power. As already mentioned, while the royal trade during King Rama II continued to suffer losses, the part that belonged to the Krone-muen and the

Parr Kfrrng made huge gains. The king, who devoted himself to the affairs of the state and poetry could do very little but was impressed with the success of his son, who became so wealthy that he jokingly called his son Chao Sun a title

referring to a Chinese who made fortunes in business. The alliance of Krom~ rnuen Chesada Bod if and the Pro [rang and the wealth derived from trade and the control of its sources were important factors which helped the Kronanauen to gain the throne of Siam. Another piece of evidence of the dynamism of trade before 1855 was that in the general regulations under which British trade was to be conducted in Siam regarding tariff on exports and inland duties to be levied on articles of trade, there were altogether 64 items of goods including rice, pepper, salt, tobacco, silk, cotton, etc. This shows that over sixty kinds of produce were

12.AeL1srivongse, Watanabe/:am Kradoompee, 96-98; Chai Ruangsilp. Prawatsart Thai

Sandi Po/-* So/:r 2352-2453 Dan Setakir (That History 8.151 2352-2455, Economic

Aspect, Bangkok: Social Science and Humanity Textbook Foundation, 1979.

74

Demi-Democracy : The Evolution of the Thai Political System

exportable before 1855. To be sure, some of these items came from may (through the pmt surrey), but some of them must have come from domestic trade based on the market mechanisrn.'3' Two further developments which were indicative of the growth of trade and the changes it brought about in society occurred in the reign of Rama IH. Rama HI, the former Krom-rnuen Chesada Bod if, who was himself well-versed in business matters, avoided what happened during his father's reign, i.e., losses in the royal trade. 'What he did was to abolish the royal trade as a source of state revenue and revenue was collected by the introduction of 58 lands of taxes. This was a clever policy because revenue collected from taxes would avoid the risks of trade. Also, royal trade, due to the loose control of it, could not be expected to make a profit anyway. Thus, levying taxes on the products would guarantee income. A point to be noted is that some of the new taxes were levied on processed goods which means that the exports which formerly were primary products were now processed somewhat. lt also means that the number of products which were taxable increased, making it feasible for the introduction of new kinds of taxes to be levied on the semi-processed or processed products.14 This suggests that the pattern of trade had advanced another step, indicative of the development in the economy of the country. Another development was that since the revenue of the state shifted from trade to tax collecting, it needed a bureaucracy to do the collecting, an area in which the Thai officials were not noted for their efficiency. Further, there was no effective way to check for leakage or irregularities. This led to a policy of tax farming. Tax collection was farmed out by bidding. The person who won the bidding, normally a Chinese, paid the government a promised amount. He was then appointed Khan or Liang; a title of noble, and absorbed

into the salediiza structure. He was authorised to collect taxes especially on the sale of opium, on gambling houses, on spirits, etc. Tax collecting stations would be set up at certain spots both on land and in the river for tax collecting purposes. Sometimes, there were difficulties. Fortunately, the idea of sovereignty and Thai nationalism had not yet developed. Otherwise, the situation in which the Chinese, who were aliens, going about collecting taxes and sometimes rough-handling those who refused to pay would probably have provoked riots. This practice of allowing tax collecting to be carried out by aliens reminds one of the practice of King farad who employed "specialists" to

13. Dhiravegin, Siam and Calonshlism, op. c.i»t, 96-97. 14.Ruangsilp, Prawatxarr Thai Sinai Po/9 Son 2552-2453 Dan Setakir op. cit., Aeusrivongse, Wyatan/ztham Kradoampee,

op. air.

The Thouburi Kingdom and Ratanakosin Era 75

counterbalance the "administrative officials But in the case of tax farming, the main reason was that the Chinese, who had some experience, were the most efficient in doing the job. After all, tax farming was a system practised in China. It was thus an ideal policy to get the Chinese to collect tax. THE ASCENDANCY OF THE BUNNAG FAMILY

When Rama II died, the throne, if law and tradition were strictly adhered to, should have been given to Chao Fa Mongkut, who was supposed to succeed his father because of his higher princely status (Chao Hz princes or princesses born of the queen). But because of the change of power base and Lhe influence of Dir Bur nag who was in his ascendancy the throne was given to Kroner-muen Chesada Bod if, a Prix One Chao (princes or princesses born -..--

of a consort). The main reason was that in the council of the members of the royal families and the nobles, it was agreed that Krorn-muen Chesada Bod if was a capable administrator with ample experience in the affairs of the stare. or was agreed that at that critical moment of broader contact with the outside

world, he should ascend the throne. Dir Bur nag, the Pm Kiang, Kroner-muen Chesada Bodin's ally also exerted influence on the council. \Y/ith the positions they were holding and with the economic wealth and power both the Krorn-

muen and Dir Bunny had in their possession, Krom-muen Chesada Bod if was thus a natural choice for the throne. Chao Fa Mongkut, who entered the monkhood as a sign of gratitude to his august father upon his death, then remained in the order from 182. to 1851, a total of 27' years. One should not for a moment doubt the strong faith the prince had in Buddhism. However, one should also remember that monldaood provided a sanctuary to the Chao Fa, heir to the throne, and saved him from the embarrassment of having to live like a layman.

'

Dir Bur nag, the kingmaker retained his position of Pm Iflang. The Bur nag family, one of the four powerful families since the late Ayuthaya period, originally came from Persia." Dir Bunny was a descendant of the Kala/Join, Chao Phraya Mahasena (Pli), during the reign of King Rama 1. Through his economic base and the position of the minister of P/am Kfaxlg, and as a close ally of the new king, Dir Bur nag became one of the most powerful men in Siam. His power was further increased when he was asked by Rama ill to take the job of minister of Kalahom in place of the P/are Kiang. He revised the offer. Given the new situation of economic wealth as the

l. 5. `Wyair, "Family Politics in Nineteenth Century", op. bit. This family of Persian origin was converted from Islam to Buddhism in the reign of King Baromakoiz ofIAyurhaya.

76 Demo-Democracy : The Evolution of the Thai Political System

power base instead of the traditional control of manpower, his refusal is understandable. As a result, the king allowed him to hold both positions, becoming Chao P/arazya Pro Kiaizgand acting Kaka/Jam, which helped reinforce his power. If there was anyone to counterbalance the powerful Bur nag, there was one noble whose ascendancy was attributable to his capacity as a warrior. This man with a good fighting record was Chao Phraya Bad if Decha, a member of the Singhaseni family of Brahman origin. But after the demise of

Chao Phraya Bad if Decha, Dit Bur nag became the only powerful noble official in the realm. This eventually led to the growth of one-family dominance in Thai politics and administration.

\Y*'hen Raina IH died in 1851, Chao Fa Mongkut, who was still a monk, was asked to take the throne. This would not have happened if there had been no support from Bur nag family- The Bur nag family meanwhile continued to hold powerful positions in the bureaucracy- Rama IV appointed Dit Bur nag and his brother, That Bunny (Phraya Si Phip fat), Somdcj Chao Phraya (viceroys). Two ofDit Bunnag's sons succeeded their father as Kala/Join and P/are Kfmzg. Of the new king's first twenty-one appointments made immediately on his accession, eight went to the Bur nag family, and another two to their sons-in-law." The peak of the Bunny family came when, upon the death of Rama IV and the throne was occupied by Prince Chulalongkorn, who was still a minor, Chao Phraya Si Siriyawong (Chuang, Dit's son) became the regent. As David Wyatt writes: The period of the Regency (1868-1873) marked the high-point in the fortunes of the Bur nag family. V(/'itli Chao Phraya Si Siriyawong (Chuang) (since raised to the rank of somdej chaophraya) as Regent, his son

Chaophraya Surawong Waiyawat (Won) as lealahom, his brother Clraophraya Phanuwong Mahakosathibodi (Th ram) as phrafehfrzng, affinal

relatives as arelarztrhai and Minister of Lands, and numerous relatives in

important positions in the Royal Pages' Department and at Court, the family as a political grouping was able effectively to challenge the power of

the throne, until they

began to pass from the scene in the mideighties.

King Chulalongkorn at least once came to consider abdication in his frustration at the checks they put upon bis powers."

]ust as the Fujiwara family had close marriage ties with the emperor, the Bur nag family was also related to King Rama V by marrying one family

16. Chao Prayer Bad if Decha, the Founder of the Singhaseni Family had distinguished himself in battle. I--Ie Fought a number of wars against the Vietnamese and against the

Laotians, for example. 17. Wyatt, "Family Politics in Nineteenth Century*", op. is., Aeusrivtmgse, Wfztanarluzm Kmdoox-spc'e, up. co'»'., 93. I8.Wyatt, "l'7an1ily Politics in Nineteenth Ccntuty", op. sift., 221.

19. Ibid., 222.

The Thonburi Kingdom and Ratanakosin, Era 77

member to the king. (/-hile the Fujiwara family exerted Control over the throne through the regency, the Somdej Chao Phraya (Chuang) as the regent, also did likewise. In fact, the Somdej Chao Phraya or Somdej Ongyai was so powerful that for a time he was in every aspect a king except in name. Oral tradition has it that when he was asked by one of his granddaughters why he did not become king, he is said to have made this reply, "Vi/'hy should. I bother? I have everything a man could desire". I-Iis answer reminds us of the poem of Michinaga I*` Lrjiwara, the most powerful regent of the emperor of

Japan, which expresses the feeling of a man who has reached the peak of his fortunes. It reads: "\Y/henl reflect, this world is indeed my world., nor is there any flaw in the full moon. One can thus very well argue that the Bur nag J?

family was in some way comparable to the Fujiwara of the Heian period. EXTERNAL RELATIONS OF EARLY BANGKOK

As in the case of Ayuthaya, the external relations of Bangkok consisted of trade and war, and the tributary relationship with China, a practice which. continued until towards the end of Rama IV's reign. Wars with. neighboring states, such as Burma and. Vietnam, were sporadic but, nevertheless, part of the affairs of the state. Western people came for trade and for missionary activities. In fact, trade was the main objective for the visits of the W/estern ships. During the early Bangkok period, Western powers attempted to negotiate a treaty of comntcrce with the monarchs but were disappointed by Siam's aversion. The principal difficulties encountered by the \lI7esterners in attempting to open relations with Siam. stemmed from the fact that the Siamese felt no need for trade with the West - in Fact, did not desire and were reluctant to sign treaties competition from 'Western merchants with the West because of the possible political dangers involved.*"" The French image and Phaulkon's treason were still fresh in their minds.

-

20. Walter F. Vella, Siren under Rama III (1824-1851), New York: ].]. Augustin Incorporated Publisllcr, 1957, 115. The Thai preferred. to trade with the Chinese and other Asian nationals rather than with the British, whom they (the Thai) considered a dangerous people: "The English were dangerous people to have any connexion with, for they were not only the ablest, but the most ambitious of the European nations that

frequented the Rast", 116. W/ith rho Portuguese, the Thai had a somewhat different attitude. In 1818, a commercial agreement between

:1

Portuguese envoy a n d Bangkok was concluded.

However, it should be noted that this was not a treaty but only an agreement which permitted the Portuguese Lo trade with Siam in return for their display of goodwill and for the guns that Siam wan red to purchase For defense of the country. Sec Songsri As-a-roon, Sizrbi Sdjrab N o dbnakrt (Extrrr-£e:~rito:"hllizj1), Bangkok: The Soul;-Ll Science Association of Thailand, 1965, 2/9-30.

'78 Demi-Democracy : The Evolution of the Thai Political System

In 1821, during the reign of King Rama II, the East India Company appointed Mr John Crawford as the envoy to the Court of Siam with a view to making a treaty, but nothing resulted from the mission. Disappointed as he was, he admired the Thai for their relatively modern society. As he described after his failure to secure a treaty in 1822: "The Siamese are one of the most considerate and civilised of' the groups of nations inhabiting the tropical regions, lying between Hindustan and China.as2' In 1826, Captain Henry Burney, the second British envoy to be sent by the East India Company, succeeded in concluding the first modern treaty of friendship and commerce between a Western nation and Siam. The treaty provided for settling petty disputes, mutually surrendering criminals, defining spheres of influence in the Malay peninsula, and securing freedom of trade." One outstanding fact about the treaty was its absolute reciprocity on every point. As in article one - "The Siamese must not meditate or commit evil, so as to molest the English in any manner. The English must not meditate or commit evil, so as to molest the Siamese in any manner" -- so in the other thirteen articles: item by item, the pledges were mutual, the responsibilities equal, the advantages the same for both parties." In 1853, the United States of America sent Edmund Roberts as an American envoy to Bangkok to negotiate for a treaty. A treaty similar to that with the British was concluded between Siam and the United States within a

short time. Both Henry Burney and Edmund Roberts tried to persuade the king to agree on the establishment of consuls, but to no avail. The British were disappointed with the results of the Burney treaty; they complained of royal monopolies, especially in sugar and the prohibition of the teak trade. The British were also faced with Chinese competitors who were not bound by any obligations such as those which were imposed upon them by the 1826 treaty.

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19. Mid., 16 and Table I and II. 20. Ibid., 16. 21..Chomchai, op. cit., 151-159.

22. See Chaloemtia Rana, Thailand, op. ii;

The 1975 Uprising and the 1.976 Coup etazr 187

The Despotic Paternalism

of Sarit

and Successors

and the October 14, 1973 Uprising To understand contemporary Thai politics, one has to analyses first the nature

of the Sarit political system which came into existence when he took power in 1958, and secondly, to investigate the causes underlying the October 14, 1973 political upheaval which were closely related with the former. The logic of the argument is the October 14, 1973 uprising was a natural outcome spinning off from the final phase of the Sarit political system. This argument will be expounded in our discussion belowSatit, unlike the relatively more urbane leaders such as Pibul and his cohorts, was a product of the Thai environment and the military academy. Indeed, Sarit represented a traditional Thai leader par excellence. His idea of leadership, as mentioned before, was a combination of the idealised paternal pro khan of Sukhothai and the absolute power of the Khmerised Ayuthayan divine kingship. The former was the basis of his izofalesse okizge, his feeling of duty to promote the people's welfare and happiness." He made national economic development and social improvement the basic overriding national policy. At the same time, the absolute power vested in him by Article 17 of the Provisional Constitution turned him into a despot whose power was never questioned during his tenure in office as the prime minster. This is indeed an intrinsically Thai concept of leadership which emphasises the roles of both

pm Kan (carrot) and pm Dec/J (stick). While Sarit could display his char' rear/e/aeng (sportsmanship, broadmindedness, and fairness), he could also turn /ehaemk/Jaerzg dedkhard (austere, strict, and decisive). Thus, summary executions for arsonists, Communist suspects, and drug~traffickers were meted out. The executions were prompt and conspicuously done, usually on the spot where the alleged crime had taken place, such as in the case of arson as a means to

"kill the

chicken

in order

to teach the monkey to learn to danceas 24 ¢

23. Sombul Worapong, Charta! Sari: T/Qanamt (Fz°e!dMars/vaESarz'r T/Janarczr), Bangkok: Kasem Surf pan Karnpirn, B.E. 2507 (1964), 309. See also Licit Dhiravegin, Political Attitudes, op. cit. 24. This is a Chinese metaphor- Ir is said that a monkey is usually stubborn and refuses to obey orders. In order to teach the monkey how to dance, a gimmick is necessary.

This is done by ordering a chicken in front of the monkey to dance. Naturally the chicken will not understand. The trainer will then chop off the head of

the chicken.

Thereupon, he turns to the monkey and orders him to imitate the dancing gesture.

Sure enough, the monkey will obey.

188 Demi-Democracy' : The Evolution of the Thai Political System

Basic to Sarit's political system was the existence of strong paternalistic leader, 1D/:J0 khan, who was committed toward national development for the promotion of the public welfare and the people's happiness. This is the basic, somewhat simplistic, traditional Thai value." The people were to carry on their livelihood while leaving the affairs of the state to the rulers. As long as they were well-fed and well-clothed, free from undue disturbances such as banditry, they would (and should) be satisfied. Pofitical participation and the notion of an opposition party were taken as irrelevant and serving no positive function. in fact, Sarit did not even pretend that he was for democracy. One recalls that he scarcely paid even lip-sewice to a democratic form of government. in terms of political institutions, the bureaucracy served as an intermediary between the government and the people. Thus, as mentioned before, a threetiered structure of government under the p/ao in/sun, the bureaucracy, and the people characterised the Sarit political system. We have seen how the national economic development programme and social improvement policy* of Sarit led to or reinforced socio-economic changes- Amid these changes, a crisis in the political realm began to simmer, With the death of Sarit in' 1963, political power was passed on to Field Marshal Thanorn and Field Marshal Prapass with very little substantial change of policy. Unfortunately, Thanom-Prapass had inherited not only political power but also political problems which had fermented under Sarit and in the decade after his death. This culminated in the October 14, 1973 upheaval in which the Sarit-Thanorn»Prapass regime or the Sarit political system was overthrown." The October 14, 1973 uprising was unprecedented in Thai history- It involved half a million people who took to the streets. The episode brought about the end of the Sarit system but at the cost of a heavy loss of life - about 80 people dead and hundreds injured- The uprising involved the urban intellectuals students with the support of university academicians - factory workers, white collar workers, some businessmen and the anti-Thanorn-Prapass military faction(s) with tacit support from the traditionalists."

25. See Dhiravegin, l'o/zlrica[>4n'itua'e;, op. fait, 56. 26.Yano, op. ii; 27. Throughout this chapter the Sprit regime, the Thant-Prapass regime, the SaritThanom-Prapass regime, the Tiuanom-Prapass-Narong clique, etc., will be used loosely depending on the context. It is held that all of these are part of the broad political system characterised by the Hyun concept of Sarit or the Sprit system or the Sarit political system. 28. The word traditionalists includes the conservative bureaucrats, royalists, etc., who preferred the maintenance of the status quo especially traditional social institutions.

pro

The 1975 Uprising and the 1976 Coup dim: 189

While the significant role played by the students in overthrowing the military regime of Thanorn-Prapass on October 14, 1973 was a matter of fact, it should be cautioned that too much emphasis has been placed on their heroic role. While there is no denying the gallant fight the students put up against the armed policemen and the military tanks with almost bare hands, one should not allow heroism and emotion to cloud one's analysis. Academic honesty and intellectual integrity demand an objective analysis of the event. A close examination of the event would reveal other important factors which combined to bring about the collapse of the Sarit political system. The factors which accounted for the October 14, 1975 uprising," include, for example,

the inherent weaknesses of the plea Le/am? system, the

high-handed behaviour

of Narong Kittikachorn, Thanom°s son, which threatened the interests of other factions, the legitimacy question, the protest movements headed by the students, etc. These factors were closely intertwined but for analytical purposes, they will be examined separately. First, the .0/Jo Mann regime or the Sarit political system came into being with a strong personality who commanded respect, awe, and fear from other members of the ruling elites. A strong towering figure is a sine qua non of such a political system. Closely intertwined with the strong personality was the control of political power. In the Thai context, such political power necessarily means military power. Sarit fit very well into this model, He was cornmanden in»chief of" the army, a key position which controls the most powerful branch of the Thai armed forces. Sarit was also the supreme commander of the armed forces, a position in theory higher than the commander-in-chief of the army, but in actuality was supreme only in name. In addition, Sarit was also the director-general of the police department, an important position which was formerly occupied by General Phao Sriyanont, whom Saris overthrew in the

1957 coup." The position of prime minister was thus only an off-shoot of the military positions he was holding. Another important element of the who it/Jun regime was control of financial resources. The I'/90 lehwz system, dependent on a strong personality and political power, is in essence a patron-client

29. I was a faculty member at Thammasat University during the October 14, 1975 upheaval and after the uprising was appointed a member of the Constitution Drafting Subconlnuttee and a menlber of the National Convention. I was also a founding

member of the New Force Party. The analysis discussed here comes from my research, discussions with a number of prominent figures, personal observations, and experiences. 50. Phao was one of the three strong men before Sprit staged a soup in 1957. The period

was called the triumvirate period (1948-1957). See Chaloemtiarana, op. fit., Chapter II and Chapter VI of this study.

190 Demi-Democracy : The Evolution of the Thai Political System

relationship. Thus p/10 k/Jun cannot rule alone. Despite his commanding figure and political power, the 1D/90 or/aan needs supporters - clients. As a result, the patron, p/oo /than, has to be able to grant financial rewards (pm Kan), inter alia. Many Thai leaders were able to acquire financial resources to serve as the foundation for political power through their alliance with the business elite, by serving as board members, co~investors, share-holders, etc., and through United States military aid, the secret military budget, as well as through illicit activities such as opium trade. The plan lc'lnun system is thus dependent upon a strong personality, political power and wealth. However, it must be pointed out that while Sarit was the pfoo khan who commanded respect, awe, and fear, it does not follow that he was the only powerful man in the realm. To be sure, there were other military generals who were collaborating with Sarit or who were held at bay by Sarit's power or were just oversh adowed by Sarit°s strong personality and temporarily kept a low profile. As the prima; itzrerpares among his military peers, Sarit was able to keep factional struggles to a minimum and was successful in getting his enemies, the Rachaleru military clique of Pibul and Police General Phao and their followers, out of the way. But the p/no lelazzn system has a very obvious inherent weakness: it depends on the individual more than on political institutions. Thus, when a strong figure passes from the scene, trouble becomes inevitable. This was exactly what happened when Sarit passed away in 1963, a point related to our discussion below. Second, with the death of Sarit, the top of the political pyramid was filled by the Thanorn-Prapass clique. For a while, things seemed to be functioning smoothly. But in actuality the Sarit political system was faced with the undercurrent of crisis which soon would surface.

31. Corruption is thus built into the political system. In is said that among the police, the subordinates have to take graft in order to furnish the superordinate with Firianeial beneliir while among the military the superiors, as the patrons, have to give positions to their suborder rates or clients. Sarir even offered to build a house for Dr Puey Ungphakorn, then the governor of the Bank of Thailand, but Dr Phew, well-known for his integrity and clean record, refused to rake the offer. 32.'llhe obvious faction was that of Pibul's followers or the Soi Rachalcru group. There

and financial assistance

were also such personalities as General Kris Srivara, who during Sprit's heyday was sent our to Koran.

The 1973 Uprising and the 1976 Coup alkwfai 191

The Sarit political system, $S already mentioned, was in essence a revival of the traditional patron-client system, albeit in a new form. It was a patrons, notably military generals around whom system with a number younger officers, politicians and businessmen rallied. Thus, certain individuals

or

or groups - be they civil and military officials, politicians, or businessmen were Linder the protection of generals. \X"hile the patron provided protection -

»

and rewards to the client, the client rendered support to the patron and, in the

case of the business elite, economic wealth. for the patron in exchange for protection and business privileges and at times legal evasion. There was thus a network of corruption built into the social system as part of the political structure. While Sarit still held absolute power, the equilibrium of the who kfaurz patron-client system was maintained with Sarit as the dominant figure exerting his power "radiuses" to check the various patrons from struggling against one another. In order to ensure their political power and economic interests, the Thanom-Prapass clique attempted to emulate the strong shogunal leader, Sarit. This was a herculean task for two reasons. One was that neither

Thanom nor Prapass had the kind of éanzmee, a Thai version of charisma, 33 Sarit did.54 The second reason, which was antithetical to the who khan system, was that socio~economic changes had taken place turning the society into a complex environment for the P/5:0 khan political system. As a result, crisis was imminent. Meanwhile,

factional struggles and internal conflicts were

camouflaged by the deceptive calmness on the surface. Pressured to put into

53. Barrzmee can be viewed

ELS 8

Thai version of charisma. lt is believed that a leader has

to accumulate or build his barbee by having a large number of followers or clients, by being able to command respect and obedience and certainly by having economic resources. Age is also an important factor. A young man is not likely to have Zraramec. It is not uncommon to hear a Thai who says something to the effect: "He cannot be the leader. He does not have enough f9gy1g7?3L'£'". 54. Sarit had one major advantage, his masculine voice. In the context of Thai politics, a strong personality befitting a great leader includes a well-built physique, tall and dignified (sung Ra-nag), and a loud and masculine voice. It was often said that Thanom never measured up to Sarit for a number of reasons, but one obvious reason

was his softer voice. After the October 6, l9F'6 coup, Admiral Sa-ngad Chaloiyoo seemingly attempted to imitate the "powerful voice" (Jiang see amnardl of Sarit when he announced the National Reform

COUDCll1$

Proclamation.

192 Demi-Democracy : The Evolution of the Thai Political System

effect the new constitution (which took more than ten years to draft).85 Thanorn held an election in 1969. Thant, with the support: of his United Thai People's Party, was appointed the prime minster, despite the fact that he did not even run for election. But opposition to his government proved intolerable. Other cliques sought to undermine the Thanom~Prapass clique's power. Even his own party members started to withdraw their support. Thant and his clique then seized power in 1971 and tried to move back to the previous situation that existed under Sarit. However, events after his 197 l coup confirmed intense conflicts between the Thanom-Prapass clique and other groups. lt took a long time before the coup party could form a Cabinet

which consisted mostly of the members of the Thanoni-Prapass clique. Moreover, each Cabinet member controlled two to three portfolios, indicating that the Thanorn-Prapass clique attempted to monopolise political power. It also suggested that a compromise with other clique faifcd.56 From then on, the Thanom-Prapass clique was riding on the back of" a tiger, unable to control the situation and unable to step down. Third, the ultimate rise to power of Colonel Narong Kittikachorn, Than.otn's son and Prapa.ss's son-in-law, and his high~handed behaviour as

the deputy secretary~general of' the Board for the Inspection. and Follow-up of Government Operations or K/90 The Pro (abbreviation) only added a few more straws to the over-burdened camel's back. \Vhile KlIo T/vo Pro was meant to be a government agency to keep an eye on the operations of government officials, the authority vested in the agency was omnipotent. Narong, out of enthusiasm or audacity, exercised his power with little constraint, arresting businessmen who were carrying on illegal enterprises and ordering investigations of liiglrrankiiig officials who were suspected of being accomplices in these undertaldngs. Run our had it that even some military

generals who were heads of cliques were investigated by Narong's agency. These higlliailded activities, although justifiable in many cases, inevitably led to resentment and anger among members of the injured party. Most

35. The drafting of the constitution was accelerated because a new speaker of the Constituent Assembly was appointed following the death of the former speaker. The new speaker, for some reason, did not abide by the tacit agreement of dragging the drafting process on indefinitely. As a result, the new const tutor was presented as a

fair accompli and became something like a farce majeure for the Thanorn-Prapass regime.

36. Chamarik, op. sir.

The 1975 Uprising and the 1976 Coup d :

195

importantly, the equilibrium of the patron-client system and the network of corruption characterised by the tacitly agreed on spheres of influence of the various "mafias" starred shaking at its core. The implications were obvious. The arrest of businessmen who had been under the protection of a certain patron or a general, was in essence a slap in the face of the patron, a gesture to challenge his power. An investigation of the patron was to humiliate him as a patron and to destroy his barbee. This whole process, if allowed to continue, would result in destroying the power of the other cliques. For if the

clients, in this case businessmen or other followers, were unable to obtain protection from the patrons, the clients would eventually defect and seek a new patron, probably from the Thanom~Prapa

Social (

Forces

Br

ironically, these social forces of change were brought about a political system with traditional values and ideology which had unwittingly committed itself to a development policy. These social forces, which were brought about by socio-economic changes, must be allowed to articulate their demands in the political process through political participation. Unfortunately, the Sarit political system could not accor modate itself to this new reality. In the language of political scientists, there was thus an incongrucncy between political development and socio-economic modernisation. Basic to the argument is that economic development (and social improvement) cannot be sustained if there is no political development, because without political development there cannot be political stability and economic growth cannot be sustained in a situation of political instability. Thus, there is a close

50.James Davies, "Toward a Theory of Revolution", in Davies, ed., Ibo( 135. 51.Anderson, up. it., 17 and pasfM/.

52. Soc Dhiravegin, Politiczzf /ltfituaies,

as. fit., 57-58.

202

Demi-Democracy : The Evolution of the Thai Political System

relationship between social (socio-economic) change and political development. To overlook the latter would inevitably lead to a crisis exemplified by the political upheaval on October 14, 1973 in Thailand, in which the simmering forces reached a boiling point; the fragile political shell of control was broken and the suppressed social forces escaped, scattering into the open. With the analysis of the factors which accounted for the October 14, 1973 uprising and the political events which followed afterward as the background, contemporary Thai politics automatically unfolds itself. October 14, 1975 signified the temporary end of the Sarit political system. It was followed by an interlude of open politics, starting with the two Sanyo governments, which were rather liberal, although technically they were dictatorial governments which had derived power from the provisional constitution of the Thanom-Prapass regime. After the new constitution was promulgated, a general election was held in January 1975. Kukrit became premier, then dissolved the parliament and a new election was held in April 1976. Seni, Kukrit°s elder brother, became premier until the coup of October

6, 1976.55 Most revealing were the political events of the interlude between October

14, 1973 and October 6, 1976. With the analogy of the bursting of the potential shell of control which sent out social forces boiling into the open, one would recall the hundreds of strikes and demonstrations, the proliferation

of political parties and interest groups, and political harassment, terrorism (bomb-throwing) and assassinations- The period also saw the proliferation of leftist literature and the advocacy of an ideology by radical elements which sought to transform Thai society into a socialist system. This was a situation

unimaginable in the "Land of Smiles" and political apathy portrayed in conventional imagery. There was an ideological polarisation and a conflict of

53. It should be pointed out here that technically there were four governments during this period. First Semi, and his Democrat Fatty tried to form a government but did not get vote of confidence from the parliament. Then Kultrit and his Social Action Parry was successful in setting up a government. He then dissolved the parliament. After the election, Semi became premier and a new government was formed, then he

set up another government which lasted only a few days before the October 6, 1976 massacre took place, which was followed by a coup in the evening.

54. For an

account of these events, see William Bradley, et al., "Thailand, Domino by Default?" Ohio University Center for International Studies, Southeast Asian Programme 1978, 4-22.

The 1973 Uprising and the 1976 Coup eta: 203

economic interests which led to a confrontation between two extreme groups, while the voices of the liberal elements who advocated compromises and moderation were ignored These liberal elements were sandwiched by the rightists and the leftists. They were branded by the rightists as leftists and by the leftists as rightists. Before long they were forced to join the "silent

majority". Thus, the political scene was dominated by the two extreme groups whose bickering had at times expressed itself in violent, hysteric verbal and physical expressions with the rightists taking the lead. For a while, even a person with the most optimistic outlook would not have denied that the whole social fabric was tearing at the seams. Political leaders were not able to maintain minimum stability, although they had a mandate from a popular election. The inefficiency of the bureaucratic system and government machinery, either from inherent weakness or deliberate manoeuvres to paralyse the government, helped to discredit the representative form of government. The attack on the prime minster's residence by drunken policemen, the violent attack on the Thammasat University campus, the grenade throwing at a political rally of the New Force Party at Chainart Province and at the New Force Party's office and at a demonstration against U.S. bases all lead one to conclude that the political system was at the point of breaking apart.56 If anything, the situation tempts one to make two interpretations. First, the real power still lay in the hands of the bureaucracy, whose members could deliberately block any efforts of the government to keep law and order. Bureaucracy machinery was not subject to control by extra-bureaucratic institutions. Thus, the bureaucratic polity argument oflred Riggs still holds. Second, the violent and hysteric political expressions and the unregulated articulation ofnurnerous interests and their incessant demands remind one of the l-luntingtonian argument about "political development and political

55.1/Mi C f . David Merell and Chai-anan Samudavanija, "Thailand Since October 1975: Dissolution of Revolution", Pacnqc Commnniy (]ugly 1975), 575-594. 56. Cf. Licit Dhiravegin, "Contcnrporary Politics in Thailand' An Analysis ofll'olitical Trend after October 14, 1973", presented at the 30th International Congress of Oricntalists, Mexico City, August 1976.

57. Fred Riggs, Thailand- The Modewzisarion off Eureaucrnric Polity, Honolulu' EastWest Centre Press, 1967. Riggs°s thesis was confirmed by an empirical study of Likhit Dhiravegin, T/Je Bureaucratic Elite 0f T/oailnnd: A Study of Tlaeir Soc£ologicaZAz'tri&ute.t, Falucnziarznl Background; and Career Advancement Pattern, Bangkok: Thai Khadi

Research Institute, Thammasat University, 1978.

2.4 Demi-Democracy : The Evolution of the Thai Political System

decay",58 which in the final analysis is an argument for the development of political institutions to regulate political participation. Probably the best way to describe this situation of having socio-economic changes while failing to develop political institutions through which political participation could he accommodated is to use a modified term coined by Norman Jacobs, "socioeconomic modernisation without political developrnent".59 If the events between the October 14, 1973 and October 6, 1976 can be characterised as the natural outcome of an incongruency between social change and political development i.e., the lack of political institutions which were capable of accommodating societal demands brought about by social change, the October 6, 1976 coup involving lynch mobs, beating,

hanging, burning people alive, and other atrocities unprecedented in modern Thai politics can be interpreted as an attempt of the old political system to force the return of the old political order by reconfirming the scattering social forces under the shell of political control. Some people in fact see the October 6, 1976 coup as the harbinger of the end of the old order. Whatever the case, it is clear that the October 20, 1977 coup overthrowing the Thanin government was a showdown between the military and the traditionalists, who were on the winning side. The one year "civilian" rule by Thanin Kraivixien with his ultra-conservative policy became a political nightmare to many Thais, including the conservatives. The ultra~conservative policy of the Thanin government represented an overreaction which proved to serve no positive purpose. Thus, the regime lasted less than a year. indeed. it was to be expected that the Thanin government was only a stop»gap before the military came back in hill force." Earlier, an abortive coup had been staged by one military faction in March 1977. This unfortunate event cost the life of Generaf Chalard Hiransiri who was executed for killing General Aron Tawatasin. This event and the

y in Claude E. 58. Samuel Huntington, "Poli nial Development and Political Decay" VlFelch, Cd., Poliziml Zllodernisaziion, Belmont, California: Wordsworth Publishing :r

Company, Inc., 1967, 207-246. 59. See Norman Jacobs, Modernization without Def/e[o_pmen.*: T/aailarm' as an Asian Case Study, New York: Prayer, 1971 .

60. Political development is defined

as

the process of increasing the capacity of the

political system to generate support to meet society's needs and demands. See

as.

Dhiravegin, Political A2fTitudes, cit., GT-68. See also J.A. Ramsay, "The Development of a Bureaucractic Polity: The Case of Northern Siam", Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University, 1971. 61. Kamol Sontvichian, "The Oyster and the Shell: Thai Bureaucrats in Politics°', Asian

Survey Vol. XVIII, No. 8 (August 1978), 829-837.

The 1973 Uprising and the 1976 Coup et 205

coup of October 20, 1977 which ousted die Thanin government had two political implications. First, the factional struggle among the military was by no means reduced. Second, the toppling of Thanin suggested that there was a conflict between the military and the traditionalists. Amidst the threat from the leftists, an alliance was formed between the two groups but as soon as imminent danger was thwarted, conflict started to seep in and weakened the alliance. After the coup of Qctober 20, 1977 General Ktiangsak Chomanan became the prime minister for over a. year and promulgated a new constitution, similar to the one Thanom had issued in 1969. A. general election was held in 1979, and Kriangsak again became premier although, like his predecessor, Thant, had not run for election. While Kriangsak should be given credit for his foreign policy of "neutrality" and the domestic policy of creating unity

and some degree of liberalism toward the progressive or radical elements, which was in great contrast to the Thanin regime, he failed abjectly in economic policy. This was partly due to the oil crisis and partly due to other factors out of his control. The society and the political system whose foundation was laid down by Sarit and reinforced by Thanom, Prapass and Narong was becoming an uncontrollable monster. As a result, Kriangsak, despite earlier support from the appointed Senate and the military Reaction called the "Young Turks" lost legitimacy as El leader because of the inefficiency of his government in solving economic problems. Ktiangsak then stepped clown in March 1980 to be succeeded by General Prem Tinsulanonda, who held the post of commandenin-chief of the army. To summarise, while the October 14, 1975 uprising came as the inevitable result of the socio-economic changes and the political problems inherent in the Sarit political system, the October 6, 1976 coup was an

attempt of the ruling elite to pull back the social forces which had been unleashed by the temporary breakdown of the Sarit political system. Others may find satisfaction in different interpretations. For example, some people saw the October 6, l 976 bloodbath coup as the last struggle for survival of the existing system. Whateiter the case, one thing was certain: the old system would persist. The October 6, 1976 atrocities might have struck fear into some people°s hearts and alienated others and might temporarily have helped to keep the situation quiet, but one thing remained unchanged. There existed a real problem of economic disparity, a situation only aggravated by inflation,

62. The population of Thailand is projected to be 70.5 million in the next decade. See Chomchal, op. c.:'Ii, Table 20, 146.

206 Demi-Democracy : The Evolution of the The Political System

the oil crisis, and population growth.62 This was the real threat to the political system.. The ultra-rightist regime of Thanin proved to be no answer either-

Thanks to the sanity of the Thai people, who were well»socialised in the Lord Buddha°s middle path, the Thanin regime was short-lived. The Kriangsak regime, for all its faults in domestic economic policy, is to be praised for its relatively liberal political stand and liberal foreign policy." In conceptual terms, one could probably summarise the political

phenomenon and the prognosis of Thai politics in the following way.64

_r

.r I

H .r

O

C

D

II

II

A

B

OA represents objective conditions for reform, i.e., acceptable to the ruling elite and to the people. OB represents the extent of reforms or change desired by the radical elements. BC represents reactions by the ruling elite while CD represents a turning toward a more liberal policy. While OA here may stand for the optimum point for reforms after October 14, 1975 OB was the extent to which the radical elements made demands." As a result, there BC, represented by the was a showdown and a reaction or an overreaction Thanin government which was toppled and to be followed by the more liberal Kriangsak regime: CD. The hope was that the new and the future -

»

-

63. In many respects, the Kriangsak governments foreign policy followed the traditional diplomatic style of "Bamboo Diplomacy" of balancing the forces of the super powers. Cf. Lildait Dbiravcgin, "Thailand's Foreign Policy Determination", far-na! of the Hisronmzl Society, University of Singapore (December 1971), 54-69.

Nodal Simona, Institute of Oriental Studies, U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, at the Southeast Asia Programme, Cornell University, March 27, 1980.

64. This chart was copied from a lecture given by Professor

65. Examples of such reforms or demands included nationalisation of commercial banks, nation-wide land reform, abolition of the Ministry of the Interior, etc. Some elements

even advocated 8 socialist form of government.

The 1975 Uprising and the 1976 Coup dew 207

governments would astutely

toward the objective conditions of the optimum point A, and as time progressed, would move slowly forward beyond A, even though this process would be frustrating and painful. The constitution of Thailand before the 1991 coup was unacceptable to many people because it allowed only a quasi-democracy or a halfway democracy. It was however representative of an effort to bring about a fusion of the old political system and the new political process to meet the new socio-economic realities. Popular election of the House of Representatives suggested an effort by the political elite to allow limited political participation . This limited participation served as a safety valve for the political system or in the language four analogy, the political shell of control. The new government under General Prom, which consisted of people from various sectors of the elites, signified an attempt to form a coalition government which claimed to be a national government.66 Vlrhile there was no question that the political system was still elitist, there was also some degree of mass participation. There was thus an attempt to blend the old values with the new values and realities. The development efforts of the elites and the policy of improving the economic conditions of the rural areas, apart from following the dictum of the traditional philosophy of promoting public welfare, were, however, also strategies to maintain the system which allowed the elite to survive. Of the three broadly defined political systems - fascism, WesterIi democracy and socialism67 Thailand has been alternating between fascism or more precisely military dictatorship and Western democracy with the scale tipped in great favour of the former.68 This alternating game cannot go on IT1E1I1OCL1VII€

» - -

66. The Prom government includes three major parties, the Democrat, the Thai Nation and the Social Action Party. There are also people from the business sector, the civil bureaucracy, and the military. This so-called national government is Far from being perfect. It does not have people who are representatives of the poorer sector of the society such as the workers and the peasants. One clistinguishing feature of the

government is the presence of a large number of academicians serving as aclvisors on legal, economic, political, and foreign affairs issues.

67.C£ A.7F.K. Organslci, Stages

Political Develapmenig New York: Alfred A.. Knopf

1967.

68. Dhiravegin, The T/Mi .Bureaucr.a.t:lc Elite, op. air., 217-218.

208

Do-:mi-Democracy : The Evolution of the Thai Political System

forever. It can easily slip from these two systems to the third, the socialist system or people's democracy. Fortunately, the decline of Communism has done away with this threat. At any rate, for survival, the elite have to tackle in earnest the economic distribution problems,69 while the "Thai style democracy" of fusion beivrecn the old and the new has to be refined to prepare the ground for a genuine democracy in the future." This is the only path to avoid large scale bloodshed and unwarranted damage which may result from an upheaval. The quest for the appropriate political model for Thailand" will go on if this effort fails. Indeed, Thai politics has arrived at a critical and crucial transition whose turning point will have far-reaching implications for the future.

69. There are a number of problems a society or political system might c11.coL1nter- These are the problems of identity, penetration, participation, legitimacy, and distribution. The most serious problem Thailand is now facing is Lhat of distribution. For a discussion of these problems or crises, see Leonard Binder or al., C`ris.§s and Sequences

m Political Development; New jersey: Princeton University Press, 1971. Dhiravegin,

Polzztz 'al Attitudes, op co; 65 67 70. Although it is true that the success of a democratic form of government depends on the masses, it is also true that the attitudes of the elite toward democracy is equally important. If the elite strongly believe in a democratic form of government and make efforts to make the system work, there is a good chance For success. On the other hand, iF demand for democracy is blocked by the elite, the chance For success is slim and that will leave the masses with no alternative but to turn to an upheaval. 71. One proposal, if democracy failed, was to have a one-party system with political tutelage for a period. of time followed by attempts to transform the one-party system

a la Turkey 1923-45 into a cornpetidvc party system. For details see Dhiravcgin, 9 Poli.tical_/ltizrufzlef, cy. tit, 6?-69; Lilt fit Dhiravegin. Pay/earnmuafag _Lee Rizrnpatrnna Knrnwzuarrgrbaai (Political Przrzy anal Political Development in Tlyrrzilamll, Bangkok: Thai University Research Association, 1982.

IX GENERAL PREM TINASULANONDA AND THE HALFWAY DEMOCRACY General Prey Tinasufanonda can be classified as the premier of the "modern" period of Thai politics (i.e., after the October 14, 1973 uprising) who has had the longest tenure in office. Under his premiership, many interesting political events have taken place. The discussion of this chapter is to present an overview of how General Prem manoeuvred under the halfway democracy. As already mentioned, General Kriangsak Chomanan, with the support of the young military officers who were later known as the "Young Turks", became premier alter the coup of October 2.0, 1. 977. A constitution was later promulgated and a. general election was held: General Kriangsak again became premier.

What is to be noted here is that the new constitution laid down the foundation for what was popularly to be known as "halfway democracy". It is dubbed "halfWwy" because it is a system in which the old elements, i.e. the civil and military bureaucrats, and the the new emerging social forces both have had to be accommodated. The new social forces were accommodated by a process of election while the old elements, by the procedures of the "halfway democracy". The salient features of the halfway democracy constitution are as follows: First, the prime minister does not have to run for election. He can be selected to be premier if he gets enough support from members of the parliament and support from certain powerful elements including the military*

and others. Second, cabinet members can consist of both the elected MPs or anyone who has been approached to become part of the government. This will allow those who did not run for election to become ministers. .

Third, cabinet members can come from permanent military officers or civil servants and they can concurrently hold both positions. Fourth, the senators are appointedThe constitution was to have the third feature for four years. After the expiration of the provisional clause, a "fuller" democracy was to come into existence, i.e. permanent military officers or civil servants could not hold political. positions unless they resigned from their posts. These constitutional technicalities, as we shall seek to point out, were to be the cause for political troubles in a later period.

210 Demi-Democracy : The Evolution of the Thai Political System

The Kriangsak government, despite its poor performance in the economic. realm, was to be praised for its liberal political policy. The more or less open politics led to an atmosphere of relaxation. The liberal policy of inducing the Communist insurgents or Communist syrnpathisers, especially the students who fled into the jungle after the October 6, 1876 bloody coup to return to the fold, were cases in point- But, General Kriangsalis independent political action and at times his adamant political stand, coupled with factional conflicts of the different parties in the coalition government, started to "displease" the army elements which gave him support. The bond between Kriangsak and the young military officers began to wear out.

Reliable sources have it that the group of young officers, who were the Class»7 graduates of the Chulachomldao Royal Military Academy, known as the "Young Turks" after being disillusioned with General Kriangsalt started to look for someone to replace him as premier. The "Young Turks" then proceeded to pressure General Kriangsak to step down in favour of General Prem. General Prem, perhaps out of deference to his senior, was at first reluctant but after his trip with General Kriangsak to Chiangmai, where they both had an audience with His Majesty the King, General Prem decided to take over the premiership. It is thus not surprising that General Kriangsak's statement of resignation came as a great surprise to members of the parliament.

'When addressing the parliament, General Kriangsak started by vehemently attacking the MPs for their unbecoming behavior giving the impression that he was going to dissolve the House of Representative. Then towards the very end, General Kriangsak announced his resignation. In Fact the statement was prepared in order to dissolve the House of Representatives but "new information" led to a change of heart. General Kriangsak then substituted the last sentence from (something to the effect) "I hereby declare the dissolution

of the House of Representatives" to "I hereby resign from the premiership". i n Match 1980, Kriangsalt was replaced by General Prem Tinasulanonda, who was then deputy minister of the interior. This started the era of the From government which continued up until August 1988. General Prem proved to be a shrewd politician, and a master at the game of political survival. It is generally admitted that General Kriangsak displayed

a praiseworthy

political spirit. The democratic process, albeit halfway was maintained. Later, Kriangsali, as head of the National Democratic Party, ran successfully as a

member of the House of Representatives. The Prem government saw a continuation of the liberal policy laid down by General Kriangsak. It also saw the emergence of a number of academicians and technocrats, who hitherto had been meeting with the Young Turks, as advisors to the new premier, some of diem became cabinet members.

General Prim Tinasulanonda and the HalfWay Democracy

211

Then, one major political event took place which turned the relationship between the premier and the Young Turks sour. General Sant Chitpatima, deputy commander-in-chief of the army and chairman of the Advisory Board to the premier, who was expected to succeed General Prem as commander in chief of the army upon the latter's retirement in October 1980, lost his chance. Some months before October 1980, Major General Art fit Kamlang~ ek, who was deputy commander of the second army region (northeast) , started to manoeuvre For the extension of General Prem's tenure for another year as commander-in-chief of the army. This would mean that General Sant who had only one more year left before retiring would lose the chance of being commandenin-chief'of the army and hence also the possibility of being the premier. The move was a political one to prevent General Sant, who was very close to the Young Turks, from assuming supreme power in the army (armed forces). The tenure extension sailed through despite opposition from Me Young Turks and other elements who viewed it as an inapprop r i t e measure. General Prem then continued to hold on to the position of commander-in-chiefof the army and the premiership. The event greatly displeased the Young Turks for it had served as the first sign of a check on their power and offended General Sant. It was apparent now that the power struggle among the military would result in rational conflicts. Then it was r u m o r e d that the Young Turks officers, who had been wielding political power since the October 20, 1977 coup, might be transferred to inactive posts in the coming April 1981 reshuffle. Some analysts interpreted the run our as a gimmick to "induce the tigers to come out from the cave".

On April 1, 1981 the Young Turks officers led by Colonel Prachalc

Sawangchit and Colonel Manoon Roopkhachorn staged a coup. The coup was officially led by General Salt Chitpatima. The coup seemed at first a success but finally ended up in a fiasco. The country was indeed on the brink of a major civil war, but due to the prudence oi- the Young Turks officers, especially Colonel Manoon Roopkhachorn who exercised respectable constraint, this was averted. Had he decided to fight to the very end, it would have inflicted great damage on the country. lt was, in part, also due to the pragmatic policy of the Prem government which issued an amnesty pardoning the coup leaders. Most of the Young Turks officers were however initially dismissed from service. The presence of the resistance group at Karat who stole back. to

Bangkok and turned the tide against the coup group also had a dramatic effect on the event- Utilising political symbols and having a keen understanding of Thai political culture and psychology, the Koral group was able to emerge as

212 Demi-Democracy ' The Evolution of the Thai Political System

victor. This was a political event with extremely significant political implications with its impact to be felt for years to come. The event was also to catapult General Art fit Kamlang-ek to the status of a "hero" in a very short time. After April 1981, General Art fit became commander of the first army division (Bangkok) and commander of the first army region (central). In 1982, General Art fit was promoted to lieutenant general and became assistant commander of the army as well as commander of the first army region. In 1983, General Art fit was promoted to full General and became commander-in-chief of the army as well as supreme commander.

Indeed General Arr fit was seen as the man who would succeed General Prem as premier in the same manner that General Prom had succeeded

General Kriangsak. It is noticeable that General Arthit's career was in a way synchronised with that of one of his colleagues, General Pichit Kullavanijaya. In 1983, Major General Pichit was promoted to become commander of the first army division (Bangkok). Then, in 1984, General Pichit became lieutenant-general and was appointed commander of the first army region (central). 1r was expected that he would eventually, with the support of General Art fit, become commander-in-chief of the army, when General Arthir had to step down. General Pichit was also instrumental in having General Arthit's tenure extended after the retirement age in 1985. In order to make sure that General Art fit would rise to fulfill the fashion of a successful career military officer, to become commander-in-chief of the army, the supreme commander and then the prime minister, a move to amend the constitution, after the expiration of the four-year provisional clause, was then proposed by General Pichit on a T.V. programme organised the army entitled "Discussions on National Problems". General Pichit called for an amendment to the constitution so that career military officers and civil servants could concurrently hold both political and regular posts, a

Br

situation that existed before the expiration of the provisional clause. Two other demands were related to the power of the Senate and the electoral system but in fact they were of secondary importance and were discussed pro for'/vm. The essential issue was the first one, for it would pave the way for General Art fit to hold a Cabinet post while he was still commander-in-chief of the army and supreme commander and, hopefully, the premier. Opposition to the constitution amendment proposal took place immediately after the T-V. broadcast. l t gained momentum and it soon became apparent that the controversy was becoming too d i i c u l t to handle. The idea was then

dropped although it was subsequently taken up for discussion by both the opposition parties and other elements whenever they hoped to gain from the issue.

General Poem Tinasulanonda and the Halfway Democracy 215

Having tailed in the constitution amendment attempt, General Pichit then switched to the extension of tenure strategy. Following the same pattern

of General Art fit when he moved for the extension of tenure for General Prem, General Pichit solicited enough signatories for General Arthit's second tenure extension. Despite criticism against such a move and despite the efforts

of the progressive MPs in the Democrat Fatty to block such an attempt by proposing as bill through the Cabinet to prevent future tenure extension, it seemed that the extension move could become successtiil. But General Prem, whose political keenness was noted earlier, temporised the issue by stating that the extension had to be carried out in accordance with rules and regul ations

laid down by the law. Then came a political event which tarnished General Arthit's image and damaged his career. In November 1984, when the government announced the devaluation of the Thai currency from 23 baht to one U.S. dollar to 27 baht, General Art fit who was not consulted, immediately attacked the policy on a T.V. broadcast. Tinted with the threat of a coup, his statement drew forth strong reaction. Soon, the devaluation issue became something of secondary importance. The concern was shifted to the coup issue. Voices of disapproval of General Arthit's statement appeared louder. Run our had it that General Art fit would be dismissed. Politically the situation was tense for a while but it gradually subsided. General. Art fit then kept a low profile, spending more time in the border areas where fighting was taking place between the Kampuchean resistance forces and the Vietnamese forces. It was a shrewd tactical retreat, albeit a temporary one. Then in March of 1985, a party was thrown at General Prem's residence in which the top military officials including General Arr fit were present. The party ended in a joyful atmosphere, and there were speculations that General

Art fit might get his tenure extended be General Poem who, in his capacity as

minister of defense, had agreed to go along with the proposal submitted earlier by General Pichit and his colleagues. Reliable sources had it that General Art fit would continue in his present positions for another year. But as it later turned out the tenure extension was rejected. To wrap up the scene of power configuration, one could say that it was characterised as follows: The two most outstanding groups were those of

General Art fit and General Prem. On the side of General Prem were General Chavalit Yongchaiyuth, deputy chief of staff (who is known as a shrewd

military officer»cum»politician and who has been recognised as the brain of the army organisation), and the Class-5 graduates of the Chulaehomklao Royal Army Academy. The most notable officer of the Class-5 graduates is General Suchinda Kraprayun, director of army operation department, General Arthit's supporters included General Pichit, a rival of General Chavalit, and

214 Demi-D emocracy : The Evolution of the Thai Political System

Me Young Turks officers who were dismissed after the abortive April 1, 198 l coup, but ironically chose to join with General Art fit. There was an attempted coup again on September 9, 1985 but in failed just as abjectly as the April l coup. Colonel la/lanoon Roopkhachorn who had been residing abroad allegedly stole back to stage this coup when General Prem was away at an official visit in Indonesia and General Art fit was in Sweden for some other reason. A number of retired military officers including the former Prime Minister General Kriangsak and General Serm na Nakorn were involved in the coup attempt. But the tide was again turned because the

coup bid was turned into another fiasco by the resistance of General Tianchai Sirisamphan, deputy commander-in-chief of the army, who was acting for General Art fit. The coup was a very complex political manoeuvring and it is believed that it failed because of some technical problems. Colonel Manoon was only ordered back apparently to become instrumental in the undertaking.

Who was the real leader behind the coup plot? The perplexing question will

or

go unanswered for some time. has been analysed that as in the case of the April l coup the military faction which successfully blocked the advancement

of the various military units was the Class-5 graduates and General Chavalit, who had the advantage of being on the legitimate side, legally speaking. The two coups experienced by General Prem show that conflict was rife among the military; his survival shows that he knew how to manage the

game. General Prom enjoyed the support and blessing from various political

institutions, bureaucratic and higher. General Art fit who had his eyes on the premiership however had somehow fumbled one time after another by making statements which were not politically shrewd. The bid made by his supporters, as already discussed, to have the constitution amended to allow a permanent government official to hold two political posts concurrently failed to muster much support from the public. His comment on the devaluation decision

made by the government against which he made public statement demanding for a return to the original exchange rate against the U.S. dollar was a political suicide. Hence, his military career and political stature started to wane but he continued manoeuvring. During his seven years tenu.re as premier General Prom dissolved the

House of Representatives twice. There were two general elections. All told, there were five major Cabinets known as Prem One, Prem Two government

and so on. But the dissolution of the House on May l , 1976 displayed a most dramatic political move by the ruling elite. The main cause of the dissolution of the House was the anticipated defeat of the emergency royal decrees of the

government by the House. The apprehension was that if the government failed to have the emergency royal decrees passed, the prime minister would have to resign. The alternative was to dissolve the House of Representatives. The harbinger of the defeat of the emergency royal decrees was that the

General Prim Tinasulanonda and the Halfway Democracy

215

opposition faction was headed by a veteran politician who used to belong to the Social Action Party and served as deputy prime minister but was dropped in a reshuffle before the opening of the House session- The government was tricked into believing that the emergency royal decrees would sail through but then when the first emergency royal decree, one which was as significant as other emergency royal decrees on financial and tax matter, was defeated on the third counting of votes, the government was caught nonplussed and had to declare the House dissolved.

But the political game became complicated. It was said that some military officers who were the adversaries of General Prem's faction were behind the defeat of the decree. The next difficulty encountered by General Prem and his supporters in the army was how to prepare, within 90 days, for the general election of _July 27. General Art fit would still be in power as commander-in-chief of the army and supreme commander until September 1. Prior to the dissolution of the House, attempts to have General Arthit's tenure extended for the second time failed to materialise. General Prem and his supporters had to nip in the bud any political complication that could arise given the fact that General Art fit was still holding power in his position while the election campaign proceeded along.

The July 27, 1986 Election The July 27, 1986 general election was taken by political analysts as a significant event, a political breakthrough, in the Thai democracy. Wliile this observation may he well-taken, one can also argue that, despite its significance, the general election was only a pro formrz to render legitimacy to the existing

power configuration of the military. As such, the trend of Thai politics was arguably set on May 27 when there was a reshuffle of the most important position in the Thai army, the commander-in-chief of the army. lr is a wellknown fact that before the military reshuffle of May 2? there were two parties vying tor political power. One group was headed by General Prom Tinasulanonda, the prime minister and minister of deface and his supporters consisting mainly of Chulachomklao Royal Military Academy Class-5 graduates. The rival group was headed by General Art fit Kamlang-ek, supreme commander and commander-in-chief of the army whose supporters included military faction loyal to him and some member of the ex-Young-Turks officers who were the graduates of Class»7. It was observable that the two key personalities were holding positions which supposedly represented different organisational structures. General Prem's positions were those of the Executive

Branch of power or Cabinet portfolios while those of General Art fit were those of the bureaucracy. It would be tempting for one to argue that there was

216

Demi-Democracy : The Evolution of the Thai Political System

as such a struggle between political appointees and permanent government officials. Some may even go as far to say that it was a struggle between democracy and bureaucracy. While the above argument may sound convincing judging from the theoretical standpoint, what actually happened was that

both General Prem and General Art fit, their different positions notwithstanding, were simply engaged in the game of power struggle with different institutions as their bastions. At a deeper level of analysis, one can also argue that what appeared to be the outward game of power struggle between key personalities with different institutional back-up was, after all, a power struggle in the military organisation. But because power politics in the military bureaucracy

is

so intertwined

with

the democratic structure that

bureaucratic power struggle at times appears to be a power struggle in the democratic process. The dissolution of the House of Representative and the ]uly 27 election was, by any definition, a normal process that one can expect in a democracy. However, it was also pan and parcel of the bureaucratic political struggle in military organisation. The May 27 reshuffle of military positions in fact set the tone for subsequent political drama.

The Intra-Bureaucratic Politics The May 1 parliamentary session, the opening day of the House of Representatives regular session, in which one of the emergency royal decrees was shot down cannot be interpreted as a normal process. Instead it represents a process of power struggle between the Prem faction and its rival. lt will he

remembered that the faction in the Social Action Party led by Boontheng Thongsawat was instrumental in bringing about the killing of the emergency royal decree which threw the government off balance. The motive was to

force the government to either resign of dissolve the House of Representatives which would change the ball game and lead to a fluid situation in which political manipulations and manoeuvres would be made by those who were skilful in the power politics game. in fact, had it not been for the fact that the government was quick enough to realise that it had to move fast before things got out of hand, the situation would have become entirely different. That evening, when news Of the killing of the emergency royal decree was broken, the government was faced with two options: either to dissolve the House or to face a grim political crisis when other members in the coalition government

pulled out from the government. General Prem made a swift move by cancelling his appearance at the party given in h o n o r of the German Head of Executive and made a trip to have an audience with His Majesty the King to have the royal approval of declaring the House of Representatives dissolved. This move would block the movement which sought to overthrow the government by forcing its resignation. in a sense, at that particular evening,

General Flem Tinasulanonda and the Halfway Democracy

217

there was an attempt From both sides to seize power through the political and institutional processes. The dissolution of the House of Representatives and the call for general election on July 27 might appear constitutional since it specified that a general election was to take place within O0 days the dissolution of the House of Representatives. However, a simmering power struggle was in the making. General Prom and his faction who were forced by political pressure to alter the power hall game was now caught in a delicate situation in which the difference of four weeks or so became extremely significant political time. in other words, the July 27 election day left much to be desired. lt would have been a different kind of game if the general election had been deferred until the 2nd of September. The time element however turned out to be so important that a dramatic reshuffle of the positions in the army was prompted, for the first time in the modern history of Thai politics and military record. The reshuffle stemmed from the fact that despite the failure on the part of General Art fit or to be more precise his loyal supporters to have his tenure extended for another year, the retirement date which fell on September l had very important implications for power politics in the army which in turn would have a great impact upon the new government. iF the new government was not headed by General Prem this would automatically mean that the new minister of' deface would be someone else than General Prem. who through his position as minister of deface had been able to shape the course of power politics in the military bureaucracy. If the new government was headed by someone other than General Prey, General Art fit as commander-in~chief of the army could presumably flex his political muscle which would have a bearing on the formation of the new governm e n , and if the new minister of deface was someone who belonged to General A_rthit's faction, General Art fit would be able to call the shots regarding military res futile in the coming October and pave the way for his ascending to the top post. This would be detrimental to both General Prom and his supporters in the military faction- Most notably the future of General Chavalit Yongchaiyuth who had been opted as the new commander-in-chief of the army and the Class-5 graduates who controlled eleven divisions would encounter the possibility of

a reshuffle which would either atiect their own positions and their careers or those of their loyal subordinates who might be replaced by those who were General Arthit's supporters. ii this happened it would certainly jeopardise the career of General Chavalit and the Glass~5. This delicate situation would lead to a political crisis which would shake the realm or turn the nation into a

suspended nightmare. Thus, the situation, called for a measure to nip in bud this potential crisis. The only way left was to deprive General Art fit of the power of command in the army so that the would-be political manoeuvring would be thwarted.

218 Demi-Democracy : The Evolution of the Thai Political System

Second, as part of the manoeuvring tactic to achieve the objective

discussed above, there was a r u m o r which was confirmed by some reliable sources that an effort was made by General Art fit to have some military officers from the ranks of colonels reshuffled down. This was viewed as a tactic to place men loyal to him at strategic posts while those who were loyal to General Prem and his supporters would be removed to inactive posts. Thus, the military faction which was General Prem's supporters would be stripped of a power base. If the situation was not altered, it would lead to a tip of political power balance resulting probably in the waning of power of General Chavalit and the Class-5. in fact, according to a report in the Bangkok Post, the marching to General Prom's residence by the commander of the Special Wfarfare Centre at Lopburi was to voice their opposition to the transfer of some members of the army which served as a warning about the imminent danger from the political-cum-military move. lt was reported that the transfer or reshuffle would be done in batches totaling altogether 190 members- This transfer would not need the approval of the minister of deface. It was an act which the commander-in-chief of the army was empowered to undertake. If anything, this initial reshuffle move was taken as a harbinger of a political crisis which if allowed to proceed along its full course, would end up in a confrontation with the worst possible outcome imaginable. The situation only buttressed the need to alter the course of politiea.l development by resorting to the risky reshuffle which would dismiss General Art fit from the powerful position of the commander-in-chief of the army.

Third, there were reasons to believe that the killing of the emergency royal decree was made possible by the partial support given by the opponent to General Prern°s government. Dr Trairong Suwankiri, the government

spokesman in his remark about the new commander-in»chief of the army's way of using the military secret budget tended to insinuate that the former commander-in-chief of the army might through the secret budget, have played a part in the toppling of the emergency royal decree in which it was alleged that some members of the House of Representatives were purchased outright for their support against the decree. Moreover, the election centre allegedly set up by the order, if orally, of General Art fit was to make sure that

political parties especially the Democrat Party which supported General Prem as premier did not win enough seats. The suggestion for the military officers and their family members to exercise their voting rights was interpreted as an effort to chart the course of the election and to shape the election outcome. This move was seen as an effort to make sure that General Prem did not again become a premier which in turn would mean that the minister of deface would be someone else who was not be inimical to General Art fit. Or if the situation called for in, General Arthir could seek to resign and become premier

General Poem Tinasulanonda and the Halfway Democracy 219

or deputy premier and minister of deface himself if it could be worked out among political parties to have a civilian, say, M. R. Kukrit Prarnoj, as the new premier. Given the above analysis, one can see that a drastic move to strip General Art fit of political power was inevitable. Indeed, on May 27 this is exactly what happened: General Art fit was given the dismissal order. The whole episode was reflective of intra~bureaucratic power struggle which could be termed a coup deter of a sort. Henceforth, extra-bureaucratic political process such as election was only to complete the overall political process which served as a legitimising role for the semi-open political system for the halfway democracy.

The Formation of the Government and the Premiership The halfway democracy or demi-democracy, as already mentioned, is characterised by the existence of the elected body, the House of Representatives and the appointed Senate and a premier who does not even have to run for office as an MP. A number of the cabinet members is drawn from those who have not been involved in the election process. In other words, cabinet members consist of MPs and non-MPs. The new government formed by the major political parties which win the largest number of seats in the election. To do this parties often have to work out a coalition. Political brokers have to run around negotiating at meetings to sound out the possibility of a coalition.

If an agreement can be reached, on the coalition and the premier, then the person who has been approached to become the premier has to agree with the coalition and state his conditions. The coalition also sects the military organisation's conditions fulfill or modify through negotiation or consultationsThere must also be blessing from the monarchical institution for the new government. After all, the new cabinet to be presented for royal approval. Of all these steps, the distribution of portfolios is the most difficult. There is a lot of bargaining and negotiations and compromises and there may be intervention from some powerful figures to forge out a government if it has reached an impasse. The premier is thus someone who has the support from three elements,

blessing from above, approval of the "green" element and an acceptable coalition of political parties which can agree on the portfolios and the premierThe tripods upon which the premier rests or from which the premier is suspended is a delicate balance which only a skilful politician can manipulate

for survival. However, as analysed earlier, the intra-bureaucratic power configuration

is the roost important factor in Thai politics, for the general election ofluly

27 was only a process already shaped by the May 27 military reshuffle. As

220 Demi-Democracy The Evolution of the Thai Political System

such, the formation of the new government and the assumption of power of the new premier only served to complete the process which had already begun in its major part. This was not political cynicism but a reflection of the

objective political reality of Thai politics. To be sure, the course of development can he altered and in the final analysis no one can really be in full control. But as the structure which has developed over the years has allowed the military organisation to become the somewhat decisive factor in the formation of government, the words or demands from this power centre can certainly become a variable to influence the trend and the course of Thai politics.

General Prom and His Career as

the Premier

General Prom could be classified as a master of the political game. His long tenure in office testifies to the Pact that somehow he possessed certain qualities which allowed him to stay in power. He survived two attempted coups and weathered all kinds of political storm. Needless to say, the support he was given by those who saw in him the advantage for their career and the absence of an alternative turned him into an indispensable person of a sort. It would be tempting to argue that he remained as a premier by default. If one is to summarise his contributions during his years as premier, here are some of the salient points. First, General Prem represents a premier who maintained a clean record. His integrity and honesty are some of the factors for the support and there was no "back door" blessing he received. As he was not married meaning a lady who entered into business deals with those who came to seek no accusation was ever made against him. privilege from the gentleman

And there are reasons to believe that he maintained his self-respect and impeccable record regarding this particular aspect. V(/hen put against some of his predecessors, General Prey could be said to be outstanding on the matter on a par with such former premier as Professor Sanya Dhammasakdi and Thanin Kraivixien. Second, General Prem showed unswerving loyalty to the monarchical institution. His deface and reverence for Their Majesties the King and Queen and the members of the royal Family have gained him trust and admiration. Third, whether ..it was his intention or not, General Prem contributed toward the maintenance of the semi-open political system. He was known to be averse to using force for political objective. He was against power seizure. The fact that he attempted to function within the constitutional framework cannot be interpreted otherwise but as support for the Thai political system, imperfect as it may be.

General Prom Tinasulanonda and the Half ay Democracy

221

Fourth, in economic development, despite the absence of impressive record, one has to admit that he did depend on technocrats and knowledgeable individuals to advise him on the matter. The economic woe taking place was attributable to the global situation. The devaluation policy which was twice adopted was a bold step because it was an unpopular decision. Lowering of interest rates and taxes to induce investment was done in accordance with sound economic theory. If any damage resulted from such action, it can be attributed to innocent mistakes or consequences unanticipated rather than for other reasons. Fifth, rural development programme was given emphasis by General Prom. Needless to say, the policy was suggested by some zealous academiciaris

and technocrats most notably some individuals at the National Economic and Social Development Board who for some time served in the Advisory Board for the prime minister. Last, under the premiership of General Prem, no notorious political persecution was recorded. The fundamental rights of the people, generally spealang, were protected. There were a few cases of political threats such as bombing but rhea .-' served as warning by one political faction against another rather than general breakdown of law and order. But on the other side of the coin, one has to admit that there were also negative impacts upon the society during the tenure of General Prem as premier. First, despite the fact that General Prem himself admirably maintained a clean record, members of his coalition who were involved in scandalous stories were not unknown. In fact, one secretary-general of a certain party even made a flat statement that his party was impoverished by being outside "

"

the government as an opposition for too long. Second, General Prem was alleged to be so preoccupied with staying in power that he was laconic and chose to stay aloof or above conflict. He was

also known for sacrificing his supporters for his survival. indeed, he earned the title, whether justifiable or not is debatable, of "the Killer of the Chao

Phraya River". Third, in certain regard, Generaf Prom was accused of taking no decisive action to thwart negative consequences, especially economic impact. inaction which was in itself an action thus led to some damage. But then no one had really pinned down the exact nature of such a damage apart from making fuse accusation. Fourth, General Prom suffered what was common for leaders in general,

i.e., he had stayed too long in power. Boredom and the desire to see change led to the bid to have a new man on the top of the power pyramid. Despite efforts to unseat him, General Prem continued to hold on to his post. But the

222 Demi-Democracy : The Evolution of the Thai Political System

fact remained that the government under his premiership and he himself suffered sagging popularity, after eight and a half years in power.

Political Change under General Prom's Government In systemic and structural terms, the Thai society has undergone discernable socio-economic changes. We have seen that these changes have resulted in dramatic political events such as the October 14, 1973 uprising. In the case of the halfway democracy starting with General Kriangsak and later under General Prem, what one would witness is the increasing number of people of

business background in the political process- An investigation of the social background of the members of the House of Representatives and cabinet members would reveal the picture. lt will be seen from Table I that since 1979 the number of MPs who were from business background was close to 40% (37% in 1979, 37.9% in 1983, 38.6% in 1986) which was comparatively larger than the previous period.

Table IX. Social Background of Members of the House of Representatives Social

'*--._

Election of

Background

Business Government Official Pensioned Gov 't

Official Practising Lawyers ]ournalists

Physicians Agriculturist

April 83

April 79

July 86

N

%

N

%

112

37.0

123

37.9

N

%

317

51

134 42

18 41 2

12

19

35

45

0 11

3 7

17 20

15 15

5

Tcacl1er»Pro"Ecssor

26 22

Others

30

54

64

8

11

3

Not Specified Total

301

100

324

100

549

38.6

100

Source: Vlsut Tharnviriyavong, C7'90ap:char'z.vzz¢¢n Tang¢z.