Deliver Us from Dictators! 9781512814835

Table of contents :
Contents
Introduction
I. Dictators, Old Style
II. Dictators, New Style, and the Sort of Government They Set Up
III. Dictators, New Style, and Their Epoch- Making Invention—the One-Party System
IV. Propaganda, Education and Science; Youth Organizations and Women Under Dictatorships
V. Dictators on Democracy, Haughty Disdain and Fraudulent Imitation
VI. Do Dictators Dictate ?
VII. Characteristics of Dictators; Are They Statesmen?
VIII. Ten Points of Dictatorship; Franklin D. Roosevelt Fails to Qualify
IX. What Are the Prospects of a Dictatorship in the United States ?
Index

Citation preview

DELIVER US FROM DICTATORS Ϊ

PRECEPT AND PRACTICE. H m H i r u B . "THE WORLD PERSECUTES US. WE WANT PEACE. . . . YOU WILL NEVER ERADICATE THE DEMAND FOR EQUAL RIGHTS IN OUR PEOPLE. . . . WE WANT TO STRIVE. TO WORK, TO LIVE IN BROTHERHOOD." [Extract from the Osns/AK

CBAXCBLLOU'S

May-Jay tpueh.]

R O B E R T

C.

B R O O K S

Deliver Us From Dictators f

UNIVERSITY

OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Philadelphia 1935

PRESS

Copyright

19S5

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA PRESS Manufactured

in the United

State»

of

America

LONDON HUMPHREY MILFORD OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

the OMNISCIENT, OMNIPOTENT, & OMNICOMPETENT

FIRST DICTATOR OF THE UNITED STATES

this book is dedicated with the fervent hope t h a t a t John's accession t h e author may have passed to a future state of rewards or punishments since it is his sincere conviction t h a t even in the latter case he will be better off

Contents CHAPTER

PAGE

INTRODUCTION I. D I C T A T O R S , OLD S T Y L E

1 7

First Aid from the Dictionary Absolute Monarchies Provide for Heirs Apparent; Dictatorships, Alas, Do Not Absolute Monarchs Ruled by Right Divine; Dictators Do Not, but They Know How to Deal With the Church Ancient Dictators Served Only During Emergencies; Contemporary Dictators Intend to Become Permanent Fixtures What, Then, Is an Emergency, if Any; and How to Make One, if Not S u m m a r y of Our Original D e f i n i t i o n W i t h Amendments and Reservations (Interpretative Only, of Course) to D a t e

23

II. DICTATORS, N E W STYLE, A N D T H E S O R T O F G O V E R N M E N T T H E Y SET U P . . .

25

What They Do to the Governments They Have Overthrown What They Do to Local Government A Dictator Acts Executively Which Means a Type of Government Distinct from the Parliamentary or the Presidential Type It also Means that " t h e Primary Vice of Dictatorship.. .is Action Without Prior Criticism" . For Example, the Dictator, solus, May Start a War vii

7 8

13

16 18

25 27

28 30 31

CONTENTS CHAPTEB

Dictators Cripple or Crush Legislative Bodies As With Legislatures so With Courts Under Dictatorship Political Justice and Class Justice (Is Either Properly called "Justice"?) Under Dictators and Under Democracies Dictatorship Is the Paradise of Political Corruptionists III. DICTATORS, NEW STYLE, AND T H E I R EPOCH-MAKING INVENTION—THE ONE-PARTY SYSTEM Why Dictators "Economize" on Political Parties, Preferring to Get Along with One Only . . . The Dictator's One Party Is, in Truth, a Bossridden Machine, but It Is Much Superior to the Old American Model of that Type . . . Deserving Fascists and Deserving Communists Want Political Jobs—and Get Them . . . . Mustafa Kemal Tries Out a Two-party System under His Dictatorship in Turkey; Result, It Explodes In a Dictatorship the One-party Machine Becomes Superior Even to the State What Happens to Opposition Parties under a Dictatorship? They Are "Absorbed," "Suppressed," "Dissolved," "Liquidated" . . . . And Their Members Are Exiled, Deprived of Citizenship and of Property, or Sent to Concentration Camps Where, Even If the Food Is a Bit Scanty, the Discipline Leaves Nothing to Be Desired Why Dictators Commit More Atrocities than Even Machiavelli Advised, and Nevertheless Manage to Escape the Consequences He Predicted viii

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36 41

47 52

59 59 64 70

73 75 77

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CONTENTS CHAPTEH

PAGE

IV. PROPAGANDA, E D U C A T I O N AND S C I E N C E ; Y O U T H ORGANIZATIONS AND W O M E N UNDER DICTATORSHIPS Democracies and Dictatorships Both Use Propaganda, but in the Latter I t Is an Intensive One-way Affair Youth Organizations, or "Suffer Little Children to Come unto M e " for of Such Is the Cannon Fodder of Dictatorships Population and Wealth Depend Largely upon Technological Progress; the Latter Depends upon the Advance of Pure Science. Dictatorships Are Parasitic Borrowers of the Achievements of Democratic Nations Both in Pure Science and Technology Dictatorships Differ on the Woman Question: Russia Is Radical; Turkey, Mirabile Dictu, Progressive; as to Italy and Germany, Judge for Yourself

90

90

91

101

105

V. DICTATORS ON DEMOCRACY, HAUGHTY D I S D A I N AND TION

FRAUDULENT

IMITA-

Why Dictators Who Profess in Public Their Contempt for Democracy Hold Elections— and How! Apologists Maintain that Dictatorships Are More Democratic than Democracies—a Clever Argument but Not Convincing Dictatorship Is Also Said to Educate the People for Self-government, but in What Ways? . . Dictatorships Have Been Short-lived; Moreover They Were Sickly Affairs During Their Later Years The Spirit of Democracy Is Political Virtue; of ix

115

115

123 125

130

CONTENTS CHAPTEB

PAGE

Aristocracy, Moderation; of Monarchy, Honor; of Despotism, F e a r — T h u s Far Montesquieu. We M a y Add t h a t the Spirit of Dictatorship Is Mass Terror VI. D O D I C T A T O R S D I C T A T E ? All Dictators Pose as Absolute but They Must Serve the Interests of the One-party System and of the Selfish Groups Behind Them . . . Moreover They Must Pursue Narrower and More One-Sided Aims than Democracies Dictators have a Longer Rope with Which to Hang Themselves in Foreign Relations than in Domestic Affairs

138 149

150 154

161

VII. CHARACTERISTICS OF DICTATORS; ARE T H E Y STATESMEN? Mussolini, Barbarian Grown Cautious Hitler, Aristocrat (?) and Fanatic Stalin, Boorish but Crafty Do They Meet Charles Beard's Test of the Statesman? VIII. T E N P O I N T S O F D I C T A T O R S H I P ; F R A N K L I N D . ROOSEVELT FAILS T O QUALIFY Summary of the Ten Points of Dictatorship . . Whether Fascist or Communist All Dictatorships Are Very Much Alike Politically Russia Compared with Italy and Germany . . Does Capitalism Stand to Gain or Lose by Shifting from a Democratic to a Fascist Basis? . . Tested by the Ten Points Stated above Franklin D. Roosevelt Is F a r from Being a Dictator How an American Mussolini Would Manipulate the Depression to Gain Absolute Power . . .

169 169 178 194 202

204 204 208 209 213 215 217

CONTENTS CHAPTER

PAGE

"Kingfish" Huey Long and Others as Candidates for the Dictatorship IX. WHAT ARE T H E PROSPECTS OF A DICTAT O R S H I P I N T H E U N I T E D STATES? . Democracies Often Rise to Meet Emergencies; Our Federal Constitution Designed with t h a t E n d in View Prophets of Revolution in the United States: Lenin and the Hon. James M. Beck . . . . Attorney-General Homer S. Cummings to the Rescue Dualistic Forecast by the Committee on Recent Social Trends From Dictatorship—Red, Black or Brown—Good Lord Deliver Us

xi

221

227

227 230 233 234 241

Illustrations HITLER'S PRECEPT AND PRACTICE . . . Courtesy of the Proprietors of Punch

frontispiece

ITALY AND ITALIANS UNDER MUSSOLINI. . . Courtesy of Americana

page 97

PLEBISCITE AND REICHSTAG BALLOTS . . . . German Election, November 12, 1933

118

GERMANY VOTES YES, OR YES An American View of the German Election of November 12, 1933. Courtesy of the Chicago Daily News

121

HITLER AS STAGE MANAGER, JUNE 30, 1934 . . Courtesy of the London Daily Express

192

COMRADE STALIN INTRODUCES THE MACHINE AGE Courtesy of Americana

xii

RUSSIA TO

201

Introduction of popular government is the order of the day. Of the making of many books dealing with Democracy in Crisis, the Revolt of the Masses, the Coming Struggle for Power, and the like, there is indeed no end. Even the erudite, not to say pedantic, report of President Hoover's Committee on Recent Social Trends hints repeatedly, albeit discreetly, at the possibility of a dictatorship in the United States. Magazines and newspapers of wide circulation present innumerable articles on the subject: for one example, witness the immense amount of space now being given to Hitler's Germany, poor example as it unquestionably is of dictatorship. Nor can one dispose of the matter by treating it as a mere tempest in the teapot of the intelligentsia. Current conversation in all circles seldom fails to touch upon the sins of democracy and the merits of Fascism or Communism. Recent studies conducted by the Engineering and Personnel Research Foundations develop the fact that twenty-three per cent of the unemployed who replied to questionnaires thought that a revolution might be a very good thing for the country. Thirty-four per cent of them were in favor of a strong dictator. Considering the duration and the severity of the depression one may well be surprised that the proportion of the chief sufferers who hold such opinions is not larger. Considering further that nine or ten millions are still out of work it is, however, quite large enough to be impressive, even ominous. CRITICISM

1

DELIVER US FROM DICTATORS! Nor is the inclination toward revolution confined to those who are unemployed. For several months recently the author has put the question: "Does the United States need a dictator?" to friends and acquaintances of all classes. The answers proved somewhat amazing, still more so the motivation accompanying them. T o many business men struggling desperately to keep their noses above water, any political device whatsoever, no matter how divergent from American constitutional ideals, is acceptable, provided only that it seems likely to restore prosperity. And, of course, not a few large employers look upon dictatorship as the only form of government strong enough to put labor in its place. Conversely, many small tradesmen and workers see in it a means of putting capital in i t s place. Even more than their brothers of the business and working classes, professional men are inclined to welcome sweeping innovations in government. Almost universally there is sharp condemnation of politicians in general, often however with reservations favorable to Franklin D. Roosevelt. A few of my informants believe that he is, or at least soon will be, a dictator. It is somewhat surprising to learn how many Americans have come to look upon certain contemporary dictators as men of genius. Chief among the virtues attributed to them is that, having put an end to the knavish tricks of peanut politicians and to the windy, futile disputations of parliamentarians, they act promptly—always, it is assumed, for the benefit of the whole people. Bagehot's famous observation about the simplicity of the rule of one man and the ease with which that kind of government can be grasped by all and sundry, was illustrated over and over again in the replies made to the writer. On the other hand there was almost no comprehension of the destruction or crippling of long existing institutions 2

INTRODUCTION

by dictators nor of the hasty jerry-built nature of the structures improvised to take their place. Little was said about the loss of liberty; evidently scant attention had been paid to the operation of secret police and spy systems or to the remorseless suppression of opposition groups. Often my informants, still rugged individualists even if no longer good democrats, were full of admiration at the rise from small beginnings to Napoleonic power of our Stalins, Mussolinis, Hitlers, et al. Apparently they were unconscious of the innumerable competing ambitions relentlessly snuffed out as a result of the accession of a dictator. Social and economic benefits of every conceivable sort —many of them sharply incompatible—are being anticipated by a large number of Americans as the result of revolutionary change. One sober but evidently longsuffering pater familias even expressed the conviction that the younger generation has gotten completely out of hand in the United States; in his opinion what we need is a Mussolini to restore parental discipline! Of course he was quite unaware of the fact that youth is encouraged by dictators to put a finger in every pie to an extent unknown in democratic countries. In short, dictatorship is being conceived pretty generally as a means to the realization of individual or group panaceas. Obviously it cannot serve this purpose for all individuals, all groups: amid the wide diversity of existing social ends any actual dictatorship must frustrate many of them, often in the most brutal fashion. Granting the evil of the times, granting further the many shortcomings of democracies and the need of far-reaching changes of policy, still it is by no means certain that absolutism in government is the way out. Conceding such achievements as may fairly be put down to the credit of 3

DELIVER US FROM DICTATORS!

Fascism or Communism, is it not also desirable to look closely to the debit side of their ledgers? Democracy is in crisis to be sure, but so are all the governments of the world today no matter what their basic principles. P a r ticularly is it true t h a t dictatorships develop difficulties after their own kind, many of them of the most threatening character. Before risking a leap from the frying pan it is worth while to ascertain the hotness of the fire; also to inquire whether there are not other possible and less torrid exits. T o that end the author has set for himself first the task of answering the question: " W h a t is dictatorship ?" His approach is that of one trained in political science. H e admits frankly his lack of adequate preparation in economics. Since contemporary dictatorships are likely to stand or fall even more by their economic than by their political activities, it is greatly to be hoped that the former may be subjected to careful investigation by specialists. As a political scientist the author should perhaps be wholly neutral; as a man, however, he admits a p r e j u dice against dictatorship not unlike that felt by Montesquieu against despotism. In any event, advocates of that type of government have poured out freely the vials of their wrath and scorn upon democracy. They are, therefore, in no position to object to a thoroughly critical investigation of the alleged achievements of their Duces and Fuehrers. Once in possession of an answer to the question " W h a t is dictatorship?" we shall be able to state definitely whether the United States now has a government of that type. Absurd as it is—from the author's viewpoint—to think so, he has been appalled to discover how many persons there are who either hold t h a t opinion or who believe we are so close to, and are driving so fast toward, dic4

INTRODUCTION tatorship that its early advent is inevitable. Perhaps they are right; nevertheless the die has not yet been cast. For that reason it seems supremely worth while to examine contemporary dictatorships broadly in all their political implications before we answer affirmatively the final question: "Do we need a dictator?" Once such an answer is given there are certain to be profound political and economic dislocations and considerable violence; neither can it be recalled for a long time nor, in all likelihood, without bloodshed. It would be a pleasure to name here with grateful acknowledgment all who have given material assistance to the author in the writing of Deliver Us from, Dictators! Unfortunately this is impossible: for one thing they are too numerous; for another, several of them are, or were, citizens of Russia, Italy, or Germany, and have given hostages to fortune in the form of relatives who still live under dictatorship. T o a very large extent the author is indebted to Swarthmore honors students of his seminars in Democracies and Dictatorships from 1928 to the present year, especially to those who, as often happened, took issue with his opinions, presenting papers which criticized them keenly. He wishes to thank particularly Professor James T . Young of the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, and Professor J . Roland Pennock of the Department of Political Science, Swarthmore College, each of whom read the manuscript as a whole and offered many helpful suggestions. He is most heavily indebted to his assistant, Frances L. Reinhold, also of the Department of Political Science, Swarthmore College, who aided him without stint or limit at every stage in its preparation—a service all the more appreciated because her views on the subject differed sharply from his own. It is scarcely necessary to add that these generous helpers are not re5

DELIVER US FROM DICTATORS!

sponsible for such errors of fact as may have crept in; on the contrary they saved the writer from many a slip he would have regretted greatly. As to matters of opinion he will hear at length, no doubt, from both Fascist and Communist critics, not to mention democrats of the more conservative tradition. To all the latter the author wishes to present the assurances of his most distinguished consideration and, pending the retort courteous should it prove necessary, to remark: Qui vivra verra. ROBERT C.

Swartlimore College Swarthmore, Pennsylvania January 1st, 1935

G

BROOKS.

I

Dictators, Old Style A D I C T A T O R , according to the New Century, is "one who dictates; one who authoritatively prescribes conduct, usage, etc.; a person exercising absolute authority, especially in government, as a chief magistrate appointed in ancient Rome in times of emergency, or a similar magistrate in some other state." So f a r the dictionary, which we may thank casually for giving us a start. Let us see if the concept may be made more clear and comprehensive, first by construing it, and then by a careful consideration of various contemporary dictatorships, more particularly those of Russia, Italy, and Germany. With dictators who "authoritatively prescribe conduct, usage, etc.," we shall not linger long lest we be obliged to consider such familiar American exemplars as "Czar" Kenesaw Mountain Landis of baseball, "Czar" Will H . Hays of the movies, or even "Czarina" Dorothy Dix whose pontifical advice is followed by all the lovelorn of our innumerable Middletowns. No; clearly our business is not with dictators of conduct, usage, and a vague et cetera, but with dictators in the field of government, with Messrs. Stalin, Mussolini, and Hitler, for example. Each of these latter, it is commonly alleged, exercises absolute authority within his bailiwick. W h a t , then, distinguishes them from the absolute monarchs of continental Europe prior to the French Revolution? First, obviously, the absence of the hereditary principle according to the 7

DELIVER US FROM DICTATORS! Salic law, or otherwise, by which the crown descended witho u t the necessity of a civil war a t t h e d e a t h of each k i n g . T h e dictator achieves power, he does not inherit it. O f t e n he tries to make it p e r m a n e n t in his family, b u t seldom is he successful in so doing. U n q u e s t i o n a b l y this is a serious defect in c o n t e m p o r a r y d i c t a t o r s h i p s . B o t h the Napoleons tried to s a f e g u a r d the succession ; both failed in t h a t u n d e r t a k i n g . A f t e r twelve years of power, Mussolini's statement still stands t h a t his successor is n o t yet b o r n ; his latest u t t e r a n c e on the s u b j e c t indicates t h a t the Fascist regime m a y end with him. 1 Moreover, like all other dictators he is manifestly jealous and a f r a i d of a n y u n d e r s t u d y , since no one of sufficient ability f o r t h a t j o b would have a n y scruples about seizing power himself. I n general, therefore, the DiLce is doing his u t m o s t to bequeath a civil war to I t a l y a t the moment of his t a k i n g off, whether providentially or by an assassin's bullet. H i t l e r ' s accession is too recent, a n d f o r the time being he is too much engrossed with the r e a d j u s t m e n t s a t t e n d a n t thereupon to have provided f o r a successor. W o r s e still, he is not even married, a l t h o u g h to be sure t h a t leaves him free for a royal alliance, ä la Napoleon B o n a p a r t e , should a n y princess of the blood be willing to r u n the risk. Of course if no d a u g h t e r of a r e i g n i n g house has sufficient 1 Emil Ludwig, Talks with Mutsolini, Boston, 1933, p. 133, reports him as saying in 1932: "I think, however, that there will not be a second D u c e ; or that, if he appeared upon the scene, Italy would not put up with him." Taking the sentence in connection with its context, however, the meaning may be merely that no younger man of his own incomparable genius has as yet been found. According to a quite recent magazine article (see Fortune, Vol. x, p. 51, July, 1934), the Grand Council of the Fascist party is to designate three persons, one of whom is to be chosen by the King to succeed Mussolini in case of his resignation, incapacity, or death. Obviously, however, this does not preclude civil war between the one finally chosen and his rivals, nor an effort to restore royal power sans any Duce, nor—most likely of all—a revolution designed to establish an Italian republic.

8

DICTATORS, OLD STYLE

courage there are the innumerable mediatized former reigning families of Germany which are still ebenbürtig, not to speak of the more recently dethroned Hohenzollerns, Wittelsbachs, Wettins, Zähringens, Guelfs, Lippes, et id genus omne, any one of which might be glad to attach itself in the bonds of holy matrimony to the handsome Adolph. As things stand there would seem to be a strong likelihood of civil war in Germany directed against the dictatorship at his death, again whether providentially or by an assassin's bullet; indeed the civil war may not wait for that event; therefore let eligible princesses beware. On the other hand the Russian dictatorship has already survived the demise of Lenin. Stalin succeeded him in spite of the brilliant rival claimant, Trotzky, who failed "to get his blow in fust," and was quickly sent into exile by the Communist analogue of a palace revolution. No civil war resulted; there was no disturbance anywhere in Russia except in the upper circles of the Communist party, and even that was more verbal than violent. With this precedent in its favor, therefore, the Soviet dictatorship has a much better expectation of life than its Fascist contemporaries in Italy and Germany. In dealing with matters of succession two things should be distinguished, first the succession of persons as in hereditary monarchies; and, second that of systems—monarchic, democratic, or what not—regardless of the incumbents at any given time. In the case of Fascist Italy, as we have j u s t seen, no formal provision has been made for a successor to the Duce; on the other hand a stupendous amount of rather gaseous theory has been emitted from that political Vesuvius regarding the incomparable merits of his "corporative" state. Perhaps the expectation is that if the system can be made to appear good enough to survive the death of its founder, an9

DELIVER US FROM DICTATORS! other strong man will appear to wear his shoes, wield his bludgeon, and direct the administration of sufficiently large doses of castor oil. If so, it is a very weak and haphazard method of providing for the succession. No doubt Hitler's publicity men—assuming that he survives for any length of time—will be ordered to cook up a similar dish of theories, bearing, however, some genuinely German and strictly Aryan title on the Carte du Jour of contemporar}' dictatorships. Thus Nazism may hope to live on even after the death of the Fuehrer. Unsatisfactory, dangerous even, as is any method which seeks to perpetuate a system without providing for a definite method of succession of rulers, it is characteristic both in logic and practice of dictatorship. On the one hand dictatorship cannot provide for the popular election of a new chief of state—that would be sailing too close to the Scylla of democracy. On the other hand it cannot set up the hereditary principle—that would run the risk of shipwreck on the Charybdis of absolute monarchy. Both Napoleon Bonaparte and Louis Napoleon steered the latter course and came to grief; in other words, they sought to transform their dictatorships into d} T nastic thrones. In the contemporary world such transformations are even less likely to succeed. Monarchy is too badly discredited; it is going rather than coming. Moreover the Fascist dictatorships both in Italy and in Germany, while vociferously proclaiming death to Marxism, nevertheless have a large following of former Socialists who are still republican at heart and not in the least inclined to prostrate themselves before a throne. Finally, it is the principle of dictatorship that the ruler shall be—or be made to seem—a man of genius, a "peerless leader"; witness the everlasting repetition, as monotonous as it is vociferous, of the title "II Duce" in 10

DICTATORS, O L D STYLE I t a l y , of " D e r Fuehrer" in Germany. Of course claptrap of a somewhat similar character is frequently published regarding candidates for high office in democratic countries, but it is always subject to criticism by the opposition and, if overdone, may prove a boomerang. I n contemporary dictatorships, on the other hand, it is, like all other forms of political propaganda, a strictly one-way affair. T o dissent or criticize means a prison t e r m ; even to smile may lead to a denunciation. I n all propagandist literature of the above character the sublime capacity of the dictator is proved by his rise to power, which, as in our typical "success stories," is attributed almost entirely to his own efforts. A d r o i t publicity men pass with brief mention over the sacrifices of his followers: to feature them would obscure somewhat the effulgence of the incomparable one. Europe has recently gone f a r beyond America in the art of creating by ballyhoo misleading portraits of its leading statesmen designed f o r consumption by a gullible public. Thus Baldur von Schirach, one of the principal journalistic acolytes of Hitler, presents that transcendent personage to the world in the following sentence among others: "Es gibt niemanden in Deutschland, auf den der amerikanische Ausdruck ' Selfmademan' so gut passt wie auf ihn, der alles, was er wurde, aus sich selbst wurde."2 Assuming all dictators to be men of genius, it follows that, if the dictatorship with its highly concentrated power is t o continue, their successors should be g i f t e d to ' F r o m a pamphlet entitled Der Triumph des Willens: Kampf und Aufstieg Adolf Hitlers und seiner Bewegung, Berlin, 1983, p. 3. T h e above sentence was quoted as it stood to preserve von Schirach's delicious rendition into agglutinative German of the hackneyed A m e r i can expression which Nazis so much admire. Translated it is as f o l l o w s : " T h e r e is no one in G e r m a n y to whom the A m e r i c a n phrase ' s e l f made man' applies so well as t o him [ H i t l e r ] , who became all that he is b y himself and through himself."

11

D E L I V E R US FROM DICTATORS! an equal degree. Unfortunately, however, sons of great men are almost never g r e a t ; hence the principle of heredity is not applicable to this form of government. Absolute monarchies by divine right may with God's help and a truly religious people make shift to tolerate an occasional degenerate royal heir. Owing to the strenuous competition of democratic politics, presidents and premiers, while seldom g r e a t men, are never complete fools. Moreover the succession to such offices is provided for by methods which, as a rule, preclude the possibility of civil war or even of any serious controversy. In a dictatorship, on the other hand, the death of the ruler may have very serious consequences; in this respect therefore it is at a marked disadvantage as compared with other forms of government. While extremely difficult, the problem of regularizing succession in a dictatorship may nevertheless prove possible of solution. I t implies, of course, sufficient permanence on the p a r t of such a regime to make the problem a practical one. Since dictators usually arrive at power while still comparatively young, a certain breathing space is likely to be accorded them—if assassins can be kept at bay—before a solution is necessary. Russia's success in meeting the situation caused by the death of Lenin indicates a possible way out. Its wide suffrage based essentially upon a labor qualification—hence not primarily democratic in character—a suffrage moreover refined from lower to higher Soviets by "successive filtrations of popular power," might easily be made to eventuate in a council of elder Communist statesmen—elder in the sense that they themselves would not be in the running—this council being empowered to choose a successor to Stalin. Possibly the Politbureaw, as the highest authority in the Communist party, might serve the purpose. T h u s the like12

DICTATORS, OLD STYLE

lihood of civil war would be greatly reduced; on the other hand neither this nor any other conceivable method of choice could insure a succession of great men as dictators. In the last analysis the problem is closely similar to that of elective monarchy. And history, especially the history of Poland, shows that elective monarchies are likely to come to a bad end. Contemporary dictatorships differ from most absolute monarchies in a second particular of major importance, namely that they do not claim divine right. By logic how can the omnipotent dictator afford to admit dependence upon an omnipotent deity? Soviet Russia, indeed, is frankly atheistic; by intensive propaganda it has destroyed religious belief among large masses of the people and has even succeeded in erecting Communist dogma into a bastard sort of materialistic faith. In Italy, on the other hand, Mussolini turned his back on the blatant atheism of his callow youth,3 and made peace with the Church, June 11, 1929, by a political treaty, a financial convention, and a concordat.4 Plunging along in the wake of the Duce, Hitler, who is himself a Roman Catholic, also made a concordat with the Vatican, but it has been so badly observed in Germany that a breach seems likely, especially now that the Fuehrer has begun to send priests to concentration camps for purely political offenses. Also he sought somewhat too a A t Lausanne in 1904 he delivered a speech at the People's House vociferating that "God does not exist. I f he does exist, I d e f y him to chastise me here before you. Compared with science, religion is an a l s u r d i t y ; in action it is immoral; it is only a malady among men." A s late as 1919 Mussolini professed his preference for a pagan fighting people, which would refuse to believe in dogmas and would have only contempt for miracles. Cf. S. Trentin, L'aventure italienne, Paris, 1928, p. 235. 4 For English translations of the texts see Italy Today, No. 5 ( M a y 1929).

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D E L I V E R US FROM D I C T A T O R S !

strenuously to reorganize German Protestantism under the control of the Nazis. The latter, however, are almost as fanatical on the subject of religion as on that of race: some of them even wish to substitute the mythical gods of Walhalla, particularly the warlike Wotan, for the Christian deity; others would be content with a GermanicNordic faith which, of course, would exclude all nonNordics utterly; still others who call themselves German Christians wish to abolish the Old Testament in toto, also to revise the New Testament by cutting out the ''superstitious portions" and inserting a "heroic, fighting Christ." As if all this were not enough, in November 1934, a number of "neo-Heathen," led by such prominent Nazis as Rosenberg, Hess, Ley, and von Schirach, formed a corporate body with the avowed intent of setting up Adolf Hitler and the State as new divinities to be worshipped by the German people. No wonder that active revolt has broken out for the first time in Hitler's Germany, participated in by so large a number of Evangelical clergymen that it is not now convenient to settle the matter by packing them off to concentration camps. I t may be concluded, therefore, that, while contemporary dictators do not care (or dare) to assume the divine right trappings of absolutist monarchs—ecclesiastical gents' furnishings of that style no longer being so impressive as in the earlier Age of Faith—they are very much concerned either, as in Russia, to destroy the Church, or, as in Germany, to bring it under control, or finally, as in Italy, to secure its support under definite contract. Moreover the success of Mussolini or of Hitler in "solving" the religious problem remains to be proved; let it be remembered that for all his genius Napoleon I badly boggled the matter. Of the three dictatorships under consideration the Italic

DICTATORS, OLD STYLE ian has proved itself by far the most considerate of churchly authority. At the time of the concordat the stability of Mussolini's regime seemed unquestionable; on the other hand it is important to note that he was dealing with by far the most powerful sacerdotal organization in the Christian world, an organization with nearly three hundred million communicants living outside the Duce's domain and likely to be very unfavorably impressed should he indulge in harsh treatment of the Holy Father. Within Italy Mussolini removed the possibility of open opposition on the part of an organization he dared not attack. On his side the Pope achieved a triumph—moral rather than territorial—in the recognition of his sovereignty over the miniature State of the Vatican City; also he secured a privileged position for the Church in Italy and a considerable financial indemnity. Whether Premier or Pope got the better of the bargain, over which, by the way, there has subsequently been a good deal of squabbling, remains to be seen; probably the final answer must wait until Mussolini's downfall. 5 I t is a curious fact that the Roman Catholic Church, which is itself not devoid of absolutist proclivities, has always been able to get along more or less successfully with absolutist governments whether monarchical or dictatorial. T h e Pope scuttled the Italian Catholic party (Popolari) after Mussolini was fairly established in power; he has recently (July, 1933) abandoned the German Centrum in spite of its strong organization and long record of parliamentary service. Vatican policy • For a pro-Fascist view see A. Giannini, "The Conciliation between Italy and the Vatican," pp. 40-52 in What is Fascism?, New York, 1931, edited by T. Sillani. C. Sforza, European Dictatorships, New York, 1931, p. 66, criticizes the Lateran Treaties briefly, regarding them, certain to lead to an unprecedented anti-clerical reaction when the however, as "one of the heaviest blunders of Vatican diplomacy" and Fascist scaffolding collapses. 1.5

DELIVER US FROM DICTATORS! seems therefore to be the disbanding of its own clerical parties whenever it can get what it wants by direct contact with dictators. In the long run that may prove a very unsuccessful p o l i c y ; certainly it does not encourage clerical politicians in other countries to organize f o r the defense of Church interests. So f a r as Protestant churches are concerned they are obviously better off under nondictatorial governments. I n some cases they m a y be established, e.g., the Church of E n g l a n d ; even if not established, they are permitted a large field of independent action as in the United States and other democratic countries. B u t , a dictatorship which, according to definition, seeks " t o exercise absolute authority," is compelled b y the logic of its being to destroy or to control ecclesiastical power. Hobbes was quite convincing on that p o i n t : " I t belongeth therefore to him that hath the Soveraign Power, to be J u d g e , or constitute all J u d g e s of Opinions and Doctrines, as a thing necessary to P e a c e ; therby to prevent Discord and Civill W a r r e . " 6 Recalling the dictionary definition, it should be noted that Roman dictatorships were originally appointed "in times of emergency." T h e argument ran that under the stress of some threatening crisis citizens voluntarily surrendered their liberties to a strong man in order that he might, as soon as the state had been saved, return these liberties to them not less, perhaps greater than, before. 7 • Leviathan, P a r t n, Ch. x v n i . * F o r an excellent statement of the classical theory see Rousseau's Social Contract, B k . iv, Ch. vi. The great French p r o p h e t of democracy conceded the necessity of dictatorship, limiting its duration " t o a very brief period, incapable of ever being prolonged." H e mentions with a p p r o v a l the f a c t that R o m a n dictators held office f o r six months only, most of them resigning before their time was up. M o r e o v e r he expressly stipulates that the dictator, while empowered to do e v e r y t h i n g else, shall not be permitted to make laws. A n d , in f a c t , "of the eightyeight dictatorships between SOI B.C. and the decline of the institution three centuries later, most were f o r a very short period, six months

16

DICTATORS, OLD STYLE Whatever might be said for this rather naive argument in ancient times, clearly it forms no part of the case for contemporary dictators. From their point of view Cincinnatus was a fool to return to his small farm on the T i b e r ; for themselves they intend to continue the furrow to the utmost limits of the political field. With simulated modesty Hitler originally asked for time to complete a "Four-Year Plan," thus intimating that he is twenty per cent swifter than the Bolsheviks. What is to happen afterwards? Again by Bolshevik analogy, a second Hitlerian Four-Year Plan, and so on, and so on, ad infinitum. Not until the summer of 1934 was it revealed by high Nazi oracles that further revolutions were verboten in Germany for a thousand years. I t would have been equally easy, and quite as plausible, to have said a million or a billion years. Soviet Russia not only regards the dictatorship as a permanency, it looks forward to a world of Communist states, each a member of the U.S.S.R. Even according to John Strachey that will not be achieved tomorrow. As for Mussolini, he soon abandoned his initial pretense of desiring a temporary lease of power. Apparently supermen also need time as they move, in a mysterious way, their wonders to perform. Commenting upon this point Professor Spencer holds that the Fascist regime in Italy has forfeited the title of dictatorship; that now, because of its intended permanence, it should be called a despotism.8 In the ancient sense of the former term the distinction would have been well taken. Considering the theory and practice of contemporary dictatorships it is quite obsolete. Unfortunate moderns that we at the longest." See article on "Dictatorship" by Professor H . R . Spencer, Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Vol. v, p. 133. " H . R . Spencer, Government and Politics of Italy, New York, 1932, p. 107.

17

DELIVER US FROM DICTATORS! are, it is necessary to resign ourselves to the view t h a t , in intent a t least, dictatorships are quite permanent state forms. N o r need this conclusion rest alone upon the n a t u r a l human love for power common to statesmen not only under dictatorships but under all other forms of governments as well. Dictators accede to power d u r i n g a crisis of some s o r t ; in consequence they must propose very elaborate programs. Such p r o g r a m s are not to be achieved on the basis of the two- or four-year terms familiar in the United States; still less on the basis of the indeterminate sentences meted out to parliamentary cabinets. T h e modern dictator is therefore clearly not worth his salt unless he declares his intent to take all the time needed to complete his job, t h a t is, all the time there is. F u r t h e r , since he achieves power as a result of his own unaided efforts—at least so the story goes—he is clearly a genius whose services should be at the disposal of his fellow countrymen world without end, amen. All definitions of dictatorship presuppose a condition of emergency prior to its establishment. Historically this seems to have been the case; on the other hand, advocates of dictatorship are notoriously given to m a g n i f y i n g the perils which made it necessary for them to step in to save the state. T h e word "emergency" itself is of loose meaning, "crisis" is no b e t t e r ; both have been blurred hopelessly by too frequent usage. Rousseau's formula, "when the existence of the country is at stake," 9 was intended to narrow the concept, but there are always politicians of the view-with-alarm type who maintain t h a t destruction lies immediately ahead. Certainly no sane a n d disinterested person would assert t h a t every emergency, regardless of its extent or duration, justifies resort to • Social Contract,

Bk. rv, Ch. vi.

18

DICTATORS, O L D S T Y L E dictatorship. Desperate remedies are f o r desperate occasions only. Moreover an emergency may be of the most serious character and yet be met successfully in other ways. Thus the American Revolutionary W a r , while menacing enough t o the colonies, was fought on their side by a conspicuously weak and diffuse confederate government. Possibly a dictatorship—if

such a thing be thinkable,

given the time and the people—would have brought the war with the mother country to a successful conclusion much earlier. I n that case, however, it would have been necessary to deal with the dictator himself

eventually,

which would have meant another revolution instead of the peaceful settling down in due time under the federal constitution. F o r no matter to what extent the seizure of power by a dictator may be explained on the basis of emergency conditions, one thing is certain, namely that at his overthrow a second period of crisis must be experienced. I t is possible, moreover, to cite various other periods of emergency which have not been followed by dictatorships, e.g., the invasion of France by the armies of the Sixth Coalition in 1814, which overthrew the dictatorship of Napoleon Bonaparte; the Sonderbund W a r in Switzerland in

1847; the

Civil

War

in

the

United

States,

1861-65; the Franco-Prussian W a r which ushered out the dictatorship of Louis Napoleon and brought in the T h i r d French Republic. Since therefore all emergencies do not lead to the establishment of dictatorships, it is necessary to inquire why certain emergencies have that effect while others do not. Much seems to depend upon the extent of the political training of the people concerned and their attachment t o self-government. T h u s the first English revolution

in 1649 ushered in the dictator

Cromwell,

whereas the glorious and never-to-be-forgotten revolution 19

DELIVER US FROM DICTATORS! of 1688 overthrew absolutist government and established constitutional monarchy. A s for the peoples of the three principal dictatorships in Europe at present, it is significant that none had had extended training in popular government. I n particular the Russians had been habituated for more than four hundred years to the exercise of direct personal rule by their Czars. In this connection it is worth noting that just as a burnt child fears the fire, so also experience with dictators breeds avoidance. Thus two Napoleons taught the French people their lesson.10 There was a threatened recurrence of the malady between 1885 and 1889, in the person of the dashing and handsome General Boulanger, but Marianne, grown wise by suffering military defeat and national humiliation, deftly eluded his embrace. A s to the riots of February 1934 over the Stavisky affair, they may be attributed more to Gallic effervescence than to any serious revolutionary intent. Immediately prior to the seizure of power, would-be dictators grossly exaggerate the extent of the alleged emergency facing the country. A l l their orators and publicity men shriek blue ruin deafeningly and incessantly in speech, print, and over the radio. Nevertheless a calm survey of the situation usually reveals nothing more than ( 1 ) a large over-accumulation of government work which needs to be done, particularly the regulation of business and of social conditions generally; and ( 2 ) a stoppage of the parliamentary process due to the formation of party blocs. T h e consequences may be very annoying, even serious and more or less threatening; however, it would be absurd to class them with the sequelae of any firstclass emergency such as a military debacle, a famine or 10 F o r brief and caustic but quite judicial summaries of the effects upon France of the dictatorships of Napoleon the Great and Napoleon the Little, see C. Guignebert, Short Hiitory of the French People, N e w York, 1930, V o l . n, pp. 484, 608.

20

DICTATORS, O L D S T Y L E pestilence. T h e latter may or may not require drastic concentration of power f o r the time being. A s f o r large accumulations of government work, however, that condition has been chronic ever since governments, including dictatorships, were set up in the world. Further, while parliamentary blocs may make nuisances of themselves in the way of obstruction, they are notoriously unstable compounds, always dissolving and recombining

under

the

stress of public opinion and general elections. N o country in the world has had a longer experience with the above conditions than F r a n c e ; nevertheless enormous gains in freedom, stability, education, and wealth have been made by the T h i r d Republic since 1875. Accumulation of g o v ernment business and obstruction by blocs do not, therefore, constitute a g r a v e emergency; certainly they have been known to yield to treatment other than iron suppression by a dictator. I t may be said, of course, that minor emergencies call f o r minor readjustments only, whereas a m a j o r crisis demands the strong man clothed with absolute power. T h e trouble with this attempted distinction—always

rather

sketchy because it is not accompanied by tests to differentiate m a j o r f r o m minor—is obvious. A n y

considerable

trouble in the navigation of the ship of state is certain to be represented as immediate overwhelming disaster by "Gawdsakers" who demand that something

drastic

be

done forthwith. W o r s e still, at all such times subversive elements do not hesitate to rock the boat. Conceding the seriousness of the conditions in the Russia of 1917 and t o a much less extent in the I t a l y of 1922 and the Germany of 1933, nothing is more evident than that the adherents of dictatorship in all three cases did their utmost t o cripple the existing government, to increase the misery o f the people, to foment violence and disorder. A n y t h i n g 21

DELIVER US FROM DICTATORS! to win was their theory, softened by the reflection that salvation—Communist or Fascist—would bind up all incidental wounds. A people possessed of the barest modicum of political knowledge would have seen through tactics and theories of such crudity. Nevertheless in Russia, Italy, and Germany they were completely successful. Incidentally the evils extant before the revolution, greatly magnified as they were by dictatorial plotters, served two purposes: first, they emphasized the need for the strong man; second, they made it possible for him, once power had been seized, to achieve a "brilliant" initial success in "restoring order." Not that there was anything brilliant about i t ; in reality more than half the battle was won by a simple command from the new dictator to his own followers that they must cease hostilities forthwith. One interesting corollary may be drawn from the discussion of emergencies, namely that, strictly speaking, dictatorship is a disease of democracy and of other limited governments. If an absolute monarch is overtaken by a serious crisis he cannot excuse himself on the ground of lack of power. Neither can the government be attacked on that ground. The crisis may be represented as inevitable, as an Act of God which would have occurred in any event, for which therefore the monarch is not to be blamed. If on the other hand he is held responsible, the fault cannot be attributed to his lack of power since he is absolute, but must be charged to the weakness of his character. And the remedy is to be found in his abdication, leaving his successor, whether legitimate heir or usurper, in full possession of absolute authority. The situation is manifestly different when a democracy or any other government of limited power falls upon evil times. Presidents and premiers may then be accused of personal incapacity, but in addition the government itself may be attacked as not 22

DICTATORS, OLD S T Y L E

possessing sufficient authority to deal with the emergency. If criticism takes the latter form, talk of dictatorship is certain to be heard. The only practical precept to be drawn from the above corollary is that presidents and premiers confronted by a crisis should exert their constitutional powers to the limit. Any other course paves the way for gentlemen who are not in the least troubled by considerations of mere legality—i.e., for would-be dictators. Of course the strongest of presidents, willing to go to the verge of his constitutional powers and as far beyond as Congress and the Supreme Court permit, may nevertheless find a crisis too much for him—a situation which raises the question whether a dictator could do any better. According to a story now going the rounds someone recently remarked to a "high personage," who of course remains nameless: "Franklin D. Roosevelt will be either the best-loved or the worst-hated president in history." T o which the high personage responded: " H e will be either the most successful President of the United States or he will be the last President of the United States." It is not necessary to accept one or the other alternative without qualification ; history is seldom written in stark blacks and whites. President Roosevelt may partly succeed, partly fail, leaving the constitution of the Fathers substantially unchanged. The possibility of such utter ruin within two or six years that he will be followed by a dictator is extremely remote. Even in the latter event the President could not be criticized on the ground that he had not exercised all the powers at his command. Rather the Constitution of the United States itself would have to be held responsible. T o sum up our original definition, with additions and amendments, we find that a contemporary dictator is a 23

DELIVER US FROM DICTATORS! secular person who, without pretense of divine right and without benefit of a definite line of succession, exercises absolute authority in government, an authority which he has not inherited but has achieved in time of crisis—or alleged crisis—by great deeds or by great promises, and who because of the brilliance of his genius or the magnitude of his program, disdains a temporary lease of power, his purpose being to continue the exercise of absolute authority permanently.

24

II

Dictators, New Style, and the Sort of Government They Set Up of the salient traits exhibited by the governments of Russia, Italy, and Germany will enable us to extend the above rather ponderous formula in a number of ways. It centers about the concept of absolute personal authority. Such authority may be exercised, however, through a variety of organs. With the achievement of power by a dictator some disposition must be made of the government he has overthrown. In this respect Russia, Italy, and Germany represent widely different choices. The Bolsheviks tore up Czarism, root and branch, installing instead an entirely new and elaborate system, from factory and village soviets at the bottom to Comrade Stalin at the top. On the other hand Mussolini preserved Crown, Senate, Chamber, Judiciary, and local government—subjecting each of them, however, to his own control. In addition he has made the Grand Council of Fascism—formerly a purely party organ—into a sort of privy council of state; further he has established, largely on paper, various organs of that "elaborate imposture," the corporative state, 1 all of which he dominates. According to a speech delivered November 14, 1933, the Duce intends to substitute one of these organs, the National CONSIDERATION

1 See article entitled "An Elaborate Imposture," The Nation, Vol. 137, p. 448 (October 18, 1933), in which John Strachey reviews Fausto Pitigliani's The Italian Corporative State.

25

DELIVER US FROM DICTATORS!

Council of Corporations, for the "anachronistic" Chamber of Deputies; probably he will next dispose of the Senate in similar fashion. 2 It is too early to forecast Hitler's constitutional program, assuming that he will be spared long enough to carry it into effect. As to the old Reichstag, it was at first sent home, presumably for four years, then dissolved to make way for a new one, 100 per cent Nazi. Apparently the rights of the separate states have been suppressed completely. The old Reichsrat seems to have been spurlos versenkt; of course with the destruction of federalism it lost all reason for existence. Upon the death of Hindenburg the Fuehrer promptly assumed the powers, although not the title, of the presidency. Hitler considers himself Chief Executive for life, that is German Emperor in all but name; moreover cabinet members are now responsible only to him, not to the Reichstag. If the magic phrase "Third Reich" has any definite meaning, all this should be but a beginning; ultimately it will be necessary to create—or seem to create—some wholly "new" structure which can be publicized to the world as worthy of the dictator's sublime genius and as a panacea for all political and economic evils. Something of that sort was announced to be in preparation, December 6, 1933 ;3 quite recently, however, the wild-eyed Hans Lammers, Secretary of State to the Fuehrer, declared rather incoherently that "the Leader does not want Germany to have a docu• "The Chamber," he remarked, "does not please me, nor has it ever pleased me. . . . It is an institution which we found to be extraneous to our mentality and to our feelings as Fascists. The Chamber presupposes a world which we have demolished; it presupposes a plurality of parties." Lengthy excerpts from this highly characteristic speech by Mussolini may be found in the New York Times of December 3, 1933. ' Cf. Dr. Helmuth Nicolai's brochure issued shortly before that date under the title, "The Foundations of the Coming Constitution." 26

DICTATORS, NEW S T Y L E mentary constitution. . . . T h e present laws regulating the life of the German and his personal liberty [ s i c ] are only a beginning. . . . No constitution is needed since all responsibility rests with the Leader, Adolf H i t l e r . " 4 Absolute control of all local government organs would seem to be essential to any dictatorship. Hitler had to go further in this direction than Mussolini because the former took over a federal system, whereas the latter, who succeeded to a highly centralized local administration, merely had to kick out socialist officials and put in reliable Fascist podestas and prefects, incidentally s c r a p p i n g popular "electionism." 5 S o clearly is concentration of power over local governments indicated as a policy of dictatorships t h a t Russia's apparently contradictory course may occasion surprise. F o r the centralized despotism of Czarism it has substituted the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, even guaranteeing to each member the constitutional right of secession! However, no withdrawals have occurred nor are any likely to o c c u r ; on the cont r a r y the T h i r d International still professes to look forward to further accessions. And the five central commissariats of foreign affairs, defense ( a r m y and n a v y ) , foreign trade, transport, and posts and telegraphs, which have no counterparts in the separate republics, are quite strong enough to quell insurrectionary movements originating in the latter. W h a t the central Soviet government has done, t h e n — a n d very shrewdly done—is to make only minor concessions to its members, thus laying the ghosts of racial, language, and geographic difficulties against which the Czarist regime long and vainly battled. No real 4 See Time, Vol. xxiv, p. 16 (October 29, 1934). Similarly Mussolini referred to the Italian constitution of 1848 as an "empty sepulcher." Cf. H. R . Spencer, Government and Politics of Italy, New York, 1932, p. 174. •H. R . Spencer, op. ext., p. 202.

27

DELIVER US FROM DICTATORS! surrender of central power has occurred, on the contrary it is stronger than ever before. In reality, therefore, Soviet Russia has followed the principle of dictatorships in dealing with local governments—namely so to handle them that they may contribute to, and at the same time are quite unable to stand against, absolute central power. Whether or not more tolerant at heart, the Soviets have been more Machiavellian in this field than Italy or Germany. Considering the strength of separatist sentiment in the latter country, Hitler may find that in attempting to stamp it out he has made a major mistake; that, in fact, he has increased rather than diminished the number of centers which may ultimately offer opposition to his regime. Meanwhile, of course, he enjoys the fame of having accomplished more in this field than Bismarck. However, Bismarck's solution of the federal problem lasted for fifty years; it may well be doubted that Hitler's abolition of states' rights will endure for fifty months. As "a person exercising absolute authority" the dictator acts executively. Other organs of government, i.e., legislative or judicial, if permitted to exist, are subject to his power. On these grounds how does a dictatorship differ from ( 1 ) a government of the parliamentary t y p e ; and ( 2 ) from a government of the presidential type? Under the former the legislative dominates the executive in theory at least; in any event an adverse parliamentary vote on any measure of importance forces a change of ministry. Under the presidential type the executive enjoys a definite tenure and acts within its sphere of power ordinarily without encroachment by the legislative; each of the three great organs of government—legislative, executive and judicial—is supreme in its own field, subject to certain checks and balances; jointly they are referred to as concurrent powers. Both in the parliamentary 28

DICTATORS, NEW STYLE and in the presidential type, ultimate power rests with the people acting through elections. In contrast with these two kinds of government, therefore, dictatorship is clearly a tertium quid: under it executive power is exalted above all else; the legislature is either abolished or sent home— if not, both the legislature and the judiciary are kept subject to control. Dictators may or may not make a pretense of democracy. In the former case they represent themselves as realizing the true will or the deepest interests of the people ; in fact, however, they must and do see to it that the electorate always overwhelmingly supports their authority." More commonly contemporary dictators frankly scorn the democratic idea; representative institutions based upon it they declare to be utter failures. If one were to diagram parliamentary and presidential types of government each would rest upon a broad foundation— the electorate; the former would rise to one peak—the legislative—and the latter to three peaks—executive, legislative and judicial. By way of contrast the dictatorship is an inverted pyramid, the point of which—the executive —supports in unstable equilibrium the whole structure of government; the electorate, if any, being represented by a zero without a rim. Or, if a biological analogy be preferred, the executive head becomes hydrocephalic and the rest of the body politic a mere vermiform appendix. I t is, of course, easy to pick flaws in the legislative and judicial processes. All apologists for dictatorship do so, pointing out profusely the floods of parliamentary ora• As in the case of the two Napoleons, each of whom acted on the "theory of Caesarism," namely that "the people is supreme but delegates its powers to the emperor who represents it, incarnates it, acts in its name and in its place and is responsible solely to it." Of course the catch in the foregoing comes in the clause "responsible solely to it." Cf. Charles Guignebert, A Short History of the French People, New York, 1930, Vol. n, p. 603. 29

DELIVER US FROM DICTATORS! t o r y in the one case, t h e countless volumes of c o u r t decisions in t h e o t h e r , the r e s o r t to delay and evasion in both cases, e n d i n g of course with f e r v e n t a p p e a l s f o r a g e n i u s who is a t the same time a consummate man of a c tion. U n f o r t u n a t e l y f o r this r a t h e r h a c k n e y e d line of a r g u m e n t , an even s t r o n g e r case m a y be made o u t a g a i n s t p u r e l y executive methods in g o v e r n m e n t . N o one has g i v e n a more a d m i r a b l e s u m m a r y of the l a t t e r than P r o fessor H a r o l d J . L a s k i , as follows: " T h e p r i m a r y vice of d i c t a t o r s h i p . . . is action without p r i o r criticism of the proposals i n v o l v e d . " 7 I t m i g h t be added t h a t , so l o n g as their power lasts, d i c t a t o r s h i p s h a b i t u a l l y suppress criticism after as well as before t a k i n g action. N o r m a l l y the e f f e c t of such a p o l i c y should be an accumulation of errors r e s u l t i n g finally in revolution. T h i s is not t o s a y t h a t v i g o r o u s action is a l w a y s a m i s f o r t u n e ; on the c o n t r a r y , g i v e n c e r t a i n circumstances, it m a y be l a r g e l y beneficent. F o r e x a m p l e , T o m J o h n s o n , while m a y o r of C l e v e l a n d , provoked wide comment b y the r a t h e r d a r i n g r e m a r k t h a t " t h e secret of a g o o d executive is this — o n e who a l w a y s acts q u i c k l y and is sometimes r i g h t " 8 — a m a x i m which he exemplified a d m i r a b l y t h r o u g h o u t f o u r terms of office. U p o n a n a l y s i s , however, his success p r e sents n o t h i n g r e m a r k a b l e . In the first p l a c e , the powers of a m a y o r u n d e r the Ohio municipal code a t t h a t time were f a r f r o m e x t e n s i v e — J o h n s o n was t h e r e f o r e in no position to commit i r r e p a r a b l e e r r o r s ; in the second p l a c e , a n y mistakes which he made in " a c t i n g q u i c k l y " were certain to evoke criticism f r o m the Council a n d the public p r e s s ; in the t h i r d p l a c e t h e y were s u b j e c t to c o u r t review. F i n a l l y it is to be noted t h a t Johnson was a man of e x cellent j u d g m e n t , somewhat ahead of p u b l i c opinion beDemocracy in Crisie, Chapel Hill, N . C., 1933, p. 81. 'My Story, N e w Y o r k , 1913, p. 122. 7

30

DICTATORS, NEW STYLE cause of his single-tax ideas, b u t only sufficiently so t o a p p e a l to t h e electorate of a progressive middle-western city. Of course Stalin, Mussolini, a n d H i t l e r claim a m u c h higher b a t t i n g average t h a n the above q u o t a t i o n r e q u i r e s ; indeed their too enthusiastic p a r t y followers ascribe t o them something little short of infallibility. M o r e i m p o r t a n t t h a n a n y analysis of such ridiculous assertions is a comparison of the actual f a c t o r s of s a f e t y in the two cases. I n " a c t i n g q u i c k l y " a d i c t a t o r exercises absolute, n o t limited, power—power t h a t extends over a n a t i o n of tens of millions r a t h e r t h a n merely over a city of five h u n d r e d thousand. H i s mistakes m a y be destructive to t h e u t m o s t degree, even involving a S e d a n debacle in the course of a foolish w a r . H e acts, as we have seen, without benefit of f r a n k criticism either by legislature or b y t h e press, also without c o u r t restraint. H e does n o t have to w o r r y a b o u t a hostile p o p u l a r vote. F i n a l l y , he m a y be a m a n of sound j u d g m e n t or the reverse. Lenin certainly qualified in the f o r m e r c a t e g o r y , p e r h a p s Stalin does; Mussolini seems to have acquired caution with a d v a n c i n g y e a r s ; H i t l e r has yet t o be proved, b u t his beginnings s u g g e s t o r a t o r i cal megalomania, incurable f a n a t i c i s m , logical a n a r c h y , a d a r k basic strain of sadistic cruelty. 9 A p a r t f r o m t h e p e r sonal f a c t o r — s u r e l y a slender r e e d — d i c t a t o r s h i p s therefore offer maximum o p p o r t u n i t y f o r h a s t y , uncritical, a n d possibly ruinous "executive" action. B y f a r t h e most conspicuous a n d d a n g e r o u s o p p o r t u n i t y of this sort is the power to declare war. U n d e r d i c t a t o r s h i p one man now possesses t h a t power f o r each of t h r e e g r e a t c o u n t r i e s — S t a l i n f o r R u s s i a , Mussolini •Similarly of Napoleon I it was said that "his one disproportionate quality was his imagination, which was of an enormity approaching insanity." Napoleon III shared the same trait in lesser degree. Cf. C. Guignebert, op. cit., Vol. 11, p. 446. 31

DELIVER US FROM DICTATORS! for Italy, Hitler for Germany. However, in spite of the Red Army of over half a million men there is at present little likelihood of aggression initiated by Russia. T h e Soviet government has kept peace with other nations ever since its establishment in 1917 1 0 ; moreover it is too much engrossed with industrialization and the socialization of agriculture to seek military adventure. I f , however, these Marxist experiments should fail, the dictator would be strongly tempted to divert attention from economic ruin and at the same time to re-create devotion to his power by starting a foreign war. Even without these incentives the Soviets engage in ceaseless propaganda to the effect that capitalist nations are meditating assault upon Russia, a propaganda which keeps the people of that country psychologically prepared for a "holy war" in defense of Communism. W i t h regard to Italy there is considerably greater cause for alarm at present. T o be sure Mussolini has kept the peace for twelve years; moreover his earlier extremely truculent attitude, as shown by the bombardment of Corfu and to a less degree by his mordant sarcasm regarding the Protocol of Geneva and the Kellogg-Briand pact, 1 1 10 E x c e p t for the invasion of Poland in 1920, which however may be regarded as an incident of the civil wars then raging in Russia. In any event the Red A r m y was defeated before Warsaw, thus ending for the time being any hope of military conquest by the Soviets. 11 Next to his incorruptibility, omniscience and omnicompetence, Mussolini is most impressed, as the Autobiography ( N e w York, 1928), makes clear in numerous passages, with his own superb courage, both military and political; see pp. 44, 104, 113, 125, 137, 143, 179, 223, 228, and 237. Desiring to praise the Italian arditi for their gallantry during the World War, his fervor misleads him into the following wholly lyric but somewhat ludicrous utterance: "They threw themselves into the battle with bombs in hands, with daggers in the teeth, with a supreme contempt for death, singing their magnificent war hymns." According to Margherita G. Sarfatti, The Life of Benito Mvstolini ( N e w York, 1926), p. 327, Mussolini was accustomed to say, "For my part I prefer fifty thousand rifles to five million votes." Emil

32

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was followed by a somewhat more pacific and cooperative attitude. Curiously enough the latter attitude became notably stronger for a time following January, 1933, as a result of the fire-eating and death-defying heroics staged by the newly installed Herr Hitler. Although these ululations emanating from the Fuehrer were precisely similar to the earlier warlike utterances of the Duce, the latter quite obviously found them distasteful. Then came the assassination of Dolfuss, July 26, 1934, following which Mussolini has reverted to his earlier attitude, accompanying his menaces, which although general in character are clearly addressed to Germany, by troop movements on a large scale. In Germany by the so-called Enabling Act of March 23, 1933, decision over war and peace is placed entirely in the hands of the dictator.12 I t is not necessary to conclude with Philip Scheidemann, who as a former Chancellor of the German Republic naturally sees the Third Empire through intensely hostile eyes, that "Hitler's Berlin is an incendiary torch with which criminals and a group of mentally deranged are playing around a Ludwig, however, in his Talks with Mussolini ( N e w York, 1933), paints a much less bellicose portrait of the Italian dictator; cf. especially pp. 141 et seq. For a well-balanced summing up of the Duce'» attitude toward the League of Nations, see H . R . Spencer, op. ext., p. 280. uSee interview with Philip Scheidemann, first Chancellor of the German Republic, in the New York Times, Section 4, page 23, July 9, 1933. Among other things Scheidemann calls attention to the demand made by President Wilson in his telegram to the German Imperial Government of Oct. 16, 1918, f o r the "destruction everywhere of arbitrary government which has it in its power alone, secretly and in accordance with its own decision, to threaten world peace," a demand to which the then German government acceded almost immediately. Today Dictator Hitler holds exactly the sort of power over Germany that Wilson condemned, and that to a degree indeed which Emperor William I I might have envied. N o t that it did the Hohenzollern W a r L o r d or his people any good in the end, a fact the present Chancellor might well ponder. 33

DELIVER US FROM DICTATORS! powder keg." Nevertheless the purge by murder of the Nazi party on June 3 0 , 1 9 8 4 , indicates a temporary lapse into lunacy on the part of its high command. On the other hand it must be remembered that dictators are determined to rule permanently. They are not likely to risk war, which if unsuccessful spells certain downfall, unless they think themselves assured of victory. In time of crisis they may be forced into it by the highly explosive jingoistic nationalism which they foster, or again they may resort to it as a counter-irritant against domestic insurrection. Of contemporary dictators Hitler seems closest to these contingencies; on the other hand he faces a world largely united in opposition to his preposterous claims and bombastic threats. With actual responsibility resting upon him he may afford the German people an opportunity to vent their spleen and to recover from their inferiority complex, finally leading them away from a policy of revenge to one of gradual revision not unlike that pursued under the Weimar constitution. So far as war is concerned, the impending economic breakdown of the Reich due to the incoherence of Nazi policies in this field, to the exile or imprisonment of the best business men of the country, and to the boycott led by foreign trade-unionists and Jews, may work in one of two ways. Either it will cripple Germany so quickly and so irremediably that military adventure is rendered hopeless, or, assuming that collapse does not come at once, the Fuehrer may be spurred on to the prompt execution of one of his pet plans—the conquest of territory and with it of prosperity—by the sword. Meanwhile the fact remains that Hitler holds within his hands sole power of declaring war, a power the exercise of which may involve the whole of Europe and preface the destruction of Western civilization as we 34

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know it. 13 He has his camarilla of one-party advisers, to be sure, but they appear vastly more violent and vindictive than the Fuehrer himself. As for Hitler's own ideals, they were expressed frankly enough some years ago in Mein Kampf, as follows: W h e n we speak of the resurrection of Germany's power, we do not ask " H o w are we to manufacture a r m s ? " but " H o w are we to arouse the spirit that will make the nation fit to bear arms ? " Once that is done, a thousand ways will be found to get the weapons of war. . . . All education must be so planned as to give the boy the conviction that he is unquestionably superior to the youth of other nations. His physical training must give him the feeling that his nation is unconquerable. T h e army is the last and highest school of training, not only for military duty but for all the tasks of life. 1 4

And so on, and so on, with the same old insipid militarist mush to the end of the chapter. Sane men who saw active service in the World War came out of it for the most part convinced of the truth of General Sherman's famous aphorism. Adolf Hitler saw such service; he may " I t is argued, of course, that while Congress has power to declare war under the constitution of the United States, a president might involve the country in complications which would make war inevitable. True, yet safeguards, whether sufficient or not, are present in our case to a degree which reveals the power of a dictator all the more glaringly in its stark absolutism. While maneuvering the United States toward hostilities a president would have to face criticism in Congress from opposition party leaders, from the press, from innumerable peace societies, and from public opinion generally. In the end he would have to secure an affirmative vote from both Houses. No checks of this character exist under dictatorship. In democratic countries existing checks are currently recognized as insufficient, and stress is laid upon peace pacts of every sort, upon the League of Nations and the World Court, even upon constitutional amendment requiring approval of a declaration of War by popular referendum unless national territory has been invaded. Dictatorships, therefore, move to the opposite extreme from democracies by entrusting sole power over war and peace to one man. "Munich, 50th ed., 1933, Vol. i, p. 365; Vol. n, p. 459. 35

DELIVER US FROM DICTATORS! conceivably be sane, yet he has devoted much of his best oratorical energies subsequently to inciting a new a r m e d conflict in the h e a r t of E u r o p e . E n t r u s t i n g to a man of this t y p e sole power to declare war, the G e r m a n people a t their own deadly peril emphasize to t h e 71th degree " t h e p r i m a r y vice of a dictatorship which is action without p r i o r criticism of the proposals involved." A m o n g the m a n y institutions which, as we have seen, are crippled or crushed by dictatorships must be listed t h e legislative a n d judicial institutions common to civilized countries. Methods differ f r o m c o u n t r y to c o u n t r y : the end is always the same. I n I t a l y the two legislative bodies were p e r m i t t e d to remain, b u t both were shorn of power. A s to the Senate it had never counted f o r much, being a t best a useful revising body. Mussolini paid the senators a back-handed compliment by delivering his earlier pronunciamentos before them, thus expressing his contempt f o r the Chamber. 1 8 H e h a r a n g u e d the l a t t e r body before the end of the year which witnessed the M a r c h on Rome in the following typically egotistic and t r u c u l e n t lang u a g e : " I could have made of this dull and g r a y hall a bivouac f o r corpses. I could have nailed u p the doors of p a r l i a m e n t a n d have established an exclusively Fascist government. I could have done those things, but-—at least f o r a t i m e — I did not do them." 1 6 L a t e r by the electoral law of 1923 he assured himself a two-thirds control, and by the law7 of 1928, a one hundred per cent control of the Chamber. Since the election of 1929 t h a t body serves simply as a sounding board a n d r u b b e r s t a m p f o r the dictator. Such advice on legislative or other m a t t e r s as Mussolini wishes to receive comes f r o m the G r a n d Council of the Fascist P a r t y , all the members of which a r e di15 M

H. R. Spencer, op. cit., p. 153. My Autobiography, p. 197. 36

DICTATORS, NEW STYLE rectly or indirectly his appointees. 1 7 As to his other new c r e a t i o n s — t h e N a t i o n a l Fascist F e d e r a t i o n a n d the N a tional Council of C o r p o r a t i o n s — b o t h are completely under the control of the dictator. 1 8 I n short, Senate, Chamber, M i n i s t r y , G r a n d Council, N a t i o n a l Fascist F e d e r a tion, a n d N a t i o n a l Council of C o r p o r a t i o n s are all merely stage accessories f o r Mussolini; they s u p p l y audience a n d Greek chorus f o r his public t h e a t r i c a l a p p e a r a n c e s , a p p l a u d to t h e echo the least of his oratorical effusions— a n d do as he says. Communist Russia makes a much better, b u t still largely deceptive, showing of legislative institutions. F r o m meetings of workers in factories a n d of peasants in villages the hierarchy rises: soviets of cities a n d volosts, of uyezds, of gubernias and, as capsheaf, the All-Union Soviet Congress. T h a n k s t o the indirect system of election, however, all except the lowest soviets are under complete control by the Communist p a r t y , a n d it, of course, is wholly obedient to D i c t a t o r Stalin, its Secretary. T o a very slight degree may the t e r m "legislative" be a p p l i e d to t h e Union Congress or, f o r t h a t m a t t e r , to any minor o r g a n s of t h e Soviet hierarchy. I t is understood t h a t , while they m a y debate questions of policy r e f e r r e d t o t h e m by t h e p a r t y , a n d even pass resolutions thereon, t h e y a r e never to call in question the existing o r d e r or a n y of its p r i m a r y purposes. T h e i r m a j o r problems a r e essentially a d m i n i s t r a t i v e ; in other words, they a r e n o t asked what the D i c t a t o r shall do b u t how he may get done w h a t he has a l r e a d y decided to do. I t is Stalin who decides, a f t e r consultation if he wishes with the inner circle of Communist p a r t y leaders. T h e rule prevails, as T r o t z k y discovered, t h a t when a decision is once reached it must 17

H . R . Spencer, op. cit., p . 120.

"Ibid., p. 250.

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DELIVER US FROM DICTATORS! be acquiesced in absolutely. " N o opposition p a r t y ; no opposition within t h e p a r t y , " is the slogan c u r r e n t in Russia today. So f a r H i t l e r ' s contribution to the problem of a legislative body has been, first, to expel all Communist members of the R e i c h s t a g ; next to send t h a t body home, p r e sumably f o r f o u r y e a r s ; then to recall it f o r a d a y t o listen to his speech of M a y 17, 1933, on foreign policy. " P a r l i a m e n t has obstructed my r e f o r m s , " he d e c l a r e d ; a d d i n g sententiously, " i t has disappeared." 1 9 L a t e r , however, he changed his mind a g a i n , a n d by the election of November 12, 1933, secured a house all members of which a r e his c r e a t u r e s . T h e only use he has f o u n d so f a r f o r the new R e i c h s t a g was t o call it together to listen t o his speech e x p l a i n i n g t h e m u r d e r of his seventy-seven f o r m e r N a z i p a r t y colleagues. Preeminently the o r a t o r a n d stage m a n a g e r t h a t he is, H i t l e r will, of course, need some sort of official b u t innocuous audience a n d claque f o r his f u t u r e public a p p e a r a n c e s ; whether f o r t h a t p u r p o s e he will convoke the p r e s e n t wholly subservient R e i c h s t a g f r o m time to time or invent another body with some distinctive a n d h i g h - s o u n d i n g title, remains to be seen. N o t t h a t it m a t t e r s in the l e a s t ; if he remains dictator the so-called legislative o r g a n will be completely subservient to his will. Analysis of t h e legislative function in Russia, I t a l y , a n d G e r m a n y , t h u s sustains fully Laski's observations reg a r d i n g the " p r i m a r y vice of d i c t a t o r s h i p . " I n each there is g r a v e d a n g e r of "action without prior criticism of the proposals involved." Criticism is confined within n a r r o w limits a n d is accepted by the All-Highest only f r o m a comparatively small circle of his subservient o n e - p a r t y leaders. u Interview with Anne O'Hare McCormick in the New July 10, 19.33.

38

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DICTATORS, NEW STYLE T o precisely w h a t extent this is t r u e in t h e case of each of the three countries is a question likely to be answered only by detailed historical research a f t e r t h e lapse, say, of half a c e n t u r y . Meanwhile certain s u r f a c e indications throw some light on the subject. I n Russia, L e n i n did n o t p o s t u r e as the sole source of a u t h o r i t y ; a n d a t first Stalin followed his example. Both exemplified Chamberlin's observation t h a t " t h e spirit of Bolshevism is quite opposed to any kind of self-assertive, flamboyant, visible d i c t a t o r on a white horse." 2 0 T h a t sort of nonsense was more in T r o t z k y ' s line, a n d T r o t z k y has been " l i q u i d a t e d . " I n general, supreme leadership over Soviet a f f a i r s seems t o have been exercised by one man, closely associated with an inner circle of advisers, intense M a r x i s t s all, of course. I t would be g o i n g much too f a r t o say t h a t Stalin's relation to his more intimate associates is t h a t of a premier to cabinet members. Nevertheless there is something of t h e cabinet method a t the t o p of the Soviet system, a n d to a considerable extent it affords a s a f e g u a r d a g a i n s t h a s t y , uncritical action. On the other hand Mussolini has never missed an opp o r t u n i t y to tell the world t h a t he alone, omniscient, omnicompetent, and omnipotent, rules in I t a l y : " I h a d t o see, oversee a n d foresee e v e r y t h i n g " ; " I h a d t o decide e v e r y t h i n g " ; " I am sure of my s t r e n g t h a n d my f a i t h ; f o r t h a t reason I do not indulge in a n y concession or a n y c o m p r o m i s e " ; " I never had a n y interval of u n c e r t a i n t y ; f o r t u n a t e l y I never knew those discouragements or those exaltations which often are h a r m f u l to the effectiveness of a s t a t e s m a n " ; " T h e consciousness of my incontestable domination has given me the ability to make the p a r t y W. H. Chamberlin, Soviet Russia, Boston, rev. ed., 1933, p. 94. According to the same author, however, Stalin has recently put on all the absolutism and accepted much the same sort of adulation accorded an eastern despot, cf. Russia's Iron Age, Boston, 1934, p. 178. 39

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live o n " ; " I push on toward better forces of life and progress. I weigh them, I launch them, I guide them." 21 " I — " ; " I — " ; " I — " ; " I — ! ! ! ! " With all due allowance for such egotistic bombast there is reason to believe that Mussolini recognizes no colleagues, only servitors. On every occasion, real or imaginary, he has hastened to nip in the bud the chances of a possible rival. 22 Also it is notorious that Italian statesmen who accomplish some notable service for their country while abroad and are acclaimed for their success by the foreign press receive scant if any personal acknowledgment in Italian newspapers. In conclusion, therefore, Mussolini more closely approximates one-man power, with all the risks thereby involved, than any other contemporary dictator. Hitler is manifestly endeavoring to follow in the footsteps of Mussolini. In some respects, e.g., suppression of opposition parties, attempt to settle the church problem, abolition of states' rights, the German dictator has acted with greater speed, if not with greater wisdom, than his Italian exemplar. Also he poses and is acclaimed as Der Fuehrer, "the Leader." Appearances indicate, however, that he is unable to dominate certain of his more fanatical lieutenants—Goering and Goebbels for example— whose actions and utterances have contributed greatly to the discredit and isolation of the Third Empire. Goebbels in particular, famous for his "Komme was kommen mag" type of oratory, has been suspected of designs to supplant the dictator. Moreover Hitler has failed so far to establish n

B . Mussolini, My Autobiography, pp. 191, 203, 205, 206, 309. As, for example, in the case of Rossoni; cf. H. R. Spencer, op. cit., p. 260. Dino Grandi, hailed during his visit to the United States in 1931 as a possible successor to Mussolini, was promptly packed off to the London legation upon his return to Italy. Nevertheless Mussolini had the effrontery to tell Emil Ludwig, as reported in the Talks with Muttolini, p. 133, that he has been trying to train successors, mentioning Grandi, Balbo, Botai, and Arpinatini in this connection. 22

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DICTATORS, NEW STYLE control over the rank and file of his Brown Shirts, hence many of the atrocities against political opponents and non-Aryans both inside and outside of prison camps. As in Russia, therefore, the dictatorship in Germany appears to be under the control of a group rather than of one man, with the important difference, however, that the German group is composed of antagonistic and refractory personalities. It is obvious that a j u n t a of the latter character cannot provide sound common counsel, also that its activities are likely to be hasty and unwise in an extreme degree. A s with legislatures, so with courts under dictatorship. However, the latter need not be so completely subjected since they are concerned largely with ordinary civil and criminal suits which have no political significance. On the other hand the dictator must be in a position to punish his opponents without court interference, to save the criminals who serve his purposes from legal penalties, and in general to prevent any judicial interference with his policies. Russia has gone beyond these purely political ends by the f r a n k establishment of a system of class justice. In Italy the Fascist regime moved swiftly to protect Black Shirt thugs who had aided in the seizure of power. Its first amnesty decree was issued before the end of the year which witnessed the March on Rome ( 1 9 2 2 ) ; there was a second during the following year, and a third in 1 9 2 6 , affecting persons who had been found, or might be found, guilty of specified offenses, political and otherwise. "But the victims' grievances went unredressed; and it was the victors in the Civil W a r who were the gainers. The traditions of a rule of law suffered." 23 Of course amnesties are inevitable after a revolution, otherwise litigation would be interminable. However, it is " H. R. Spencer, op. cit., p. 228. 41

DELIVER US FROM DICTATORS! n o t necessary, it is n o t even to the p e r m a n e n t interest of the new regime, to advance p e r p e t r a t o r s of t h e worst atrocities t o positions of high honor in t h e state. T o do so is t o serve notice t h a t n o t stabilization b u t a reign of violence a n d intimidation is meditated. L a t e r t h e c o u r t s of I t a l y were "combed o u t in the interest of F a s c i s m , " to quote Mussolini's i l l u m i n a t i n g r e m a r k of J u n e 20, 1925. A c c o r d i n g to the law of t h a t y e a r designed to " p u r g e " the b u r e a u c r a c y , the Minister of G r a c e a n d J u s t i c e was given a spoilsman's power to dismiss p e r sons f o u n d to be "in a position of incompatibility with the general conduct of t h e g o v e r n m e n t . " W h i l e this law was being passed, t h e obedient C h a m b e r r e j e c t e d an amendment which would have exempted the j u d i c i a r y f r o m its provisions. I n the early d a y s of t h e d i c t a t o r s h i p a l a r g e n u m b e r of p r a e t o r s , who correspond to E n g l i s h justices of the peace, h a d been dismissed amid p a e a n s of praise f o r the economies in salaries a n d c o u r t costs thereby achieved. I n 1925, however, a f t e r the b u r e a u c r a c y h a d been b r o u g h t t h o r o u g h l y u n d e r F a s c i s t control, m a n y p r a e t o r s h i p s were reestablished in order to s a t i s f y the demand of local Black S h i r t s f o r political jobs. 2 4 D a n g e r o u s as it was to p r o t e s t , there were still those in I t a l y who d a r e d to speak o u t a g a i n s t the p r o s t i t u t i o n of the courts, the d i s r e g a r d of civil r i g h t s , t h e widespread use of violence, t e r r o r , a n d espionage. R e p l y i n g to his critics in the Chamber on J a n u a r y 3, 1925, Mussolini protested vociferously a g a i n s t t h e accusation t h a t he was setting u p a Cheka on the R u s s i a n model. 25 " A n I t a l i a n C h e k a , " he said, "never has h a d a shadow of existence." Nevertheless " t h e Special T r i b u n a l , consisting of five militia officers of high r a n k , a n d t h e militia itself, both w

Cf. H. R. Spencer, op. cit., Ch. xx on "The Judiciary." * This speech is given in full, pp. 227-233 of his Autobiography. 42

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serve the one purpose of defense of the regime." 29 T h a t is exactly the function of the Gay-Pay-Oo, successor to the Cheka, in Russia, although, of course, the number of buckets of blood shed in the two cases, as Mussolini sought to show, may bear no comparison. 27 As a matter of fact the Italian dictator is not even obligated to act through the Special Tribunal. As Minister of the Interior and Commander of the Militia he can warn persons suspected of anti-Fascist activity; if the warning proves ineffectual, he can segregate them regardless of their ordinary civil rights, and, if they remain obdurate, may deport them secretly and suddenly to the Lipari Islands off the Sicilian coast, which with their volcanoes, lava, sulphur, and torrid climate are veritable pocket editions of the infernal regions. Nor have prisoners thereon confined ever been enthusiastic about the food, discipline, or accommodations generally. 28 If they recant and appeal to the Duce with solemn pledges to cease their anti-Fascist activities, he may graciously release them under close surveillance. Thereafter the least false or suspicious step means penalties of the utmost severity. Notorious above all other political cases which have come u p under the dictatorship in Italy was the trial of De Bono, charged with complicity in the murder of Matteotti, a Socialist deputy who had dared to attack Fascist election frauds and terrorism on the floor of the Chamber. 29 Specifically De Bono was accused of shielding * H. R. Spencer, op. cit., p. 230. " In his speech of January 3, 1925, Mussolini quoted figures regarding the number of executions in Russia. H e did not, of course, quote comparable figures for Italy nor state the number of political prisoners confined in the Lipari Islands or elsewhere. " C f . F . Nitti, Escape, New York, 1930, for details regarding Lipari. Incidentally the political prisoners there confined are thrown together with the vilest of ordinary criminals. " S. Trentin, L'Aventure itnlienne, Paris, 1928, pp. 261-73, prints the speech, interrupted almost at every sentence, which led to his murder. 43

D E L I V E R U S FROM D I C T A T O R S !

the actual murderers from pursuit, 30 also of having directed illegal espionage and the "removal" of political opponents in the best Bolshevik manner. Acting for the Senate as a high court of justice the committee charged with the inquiry absolved De Bono on the latter charge and found the famous Scotch verdict of "not proven" as to his complicity in the Matteotti affair. Whereupon he was hailed by all loyal Fascists as completely exonerated, and was promptly appointed governor of Libya. Methods of court procedure under Mussolini were also strikingly illustrated in 1925 by the activities of Italo Balbo who, like De Bono, was one of the Quadrumvirate of the March on Rome. Unquestionably Balbo had taken a prominent part in the early widespread violence against enemies of the Fascist regime. A letter sent by him in 1923 to leaders of the party in Bologna is sufficiently explicit on that point, for in it he advised the systematic beating up of Communists, adding: " I t would be well if the prefect were to let the King's prosecutor understand that we do not want any lawsuits as a result of our beatings-up—which must be performed in regular style." Because of his valuable services to the regime of this and other sorts, Balbo's activities at the trial in 1925 of the murderers of Don Minzoni, an anti-Fascist organizer, were regarded as officially inspired. However that may be, he did not hesitate to bring constant pressure to bear on judge and jury, nor to lead demonstrations outside and inside the courtroom in favor of the accused, embracing them daily in public. The verdict, an acquittal of course, was proclaimed a glorious vindication of the regime. Balbo has been heaped with honors and official duties by Mus" The murderers themselves were liberated two months after they had been sentenced. Cf. C. Sforza, European Dictatorship», New York, 1931, pp. 26-37.

DICTATORS, N E W

STYLE

solini; in the course of the summer of 1933 as Minister of Aviation he headed the air squadron which flew to the Chicago W o r l d ' s F a i r — t h u s serving in a sense as unofficial ambassador of I t a l y to the United States. Hitler's Germany has not had time to settle down to a definite legal procedure, although there can be no doubt that the courts will be subjected completely to the D i c tator's will in all political matters. A p a r t f r o m the expulsion of Jewish judges and lawyers no definite action has been taken. H e r e as elsewhere, however, the model supplied by Mussolini—pardon f o r N a z i offenders, savage severity for opponents of the regime—is being followed closely, especially in the infamous so-called People's Courts. Conditions in prison camps where the number confined f a r surpasses all records, will be described later. Recently Captain Goering, the Prussian Premier, who seems to be Hitler's mouthpiece in cases involving violence and terrorism, announced that clemency would be extended to those who have offended against " t h e letter of the l a w " in order to serve the new regime. 31 Considering the number and loathsome character of the crimes charged against Bro\vn Shirts, Goering's use of the words " t h e letter of the l a w " in the above statement deserves to be classed as a masterpiece of euphemism. A t the same time that they were being uttered, the Prussian State Ministry issued a decree amending the Prussian Constitution which conferred upon him the sole authority to g r a n t pardons to offenders against the laws. Thereupon Goering delegated power to Hans K e r r l , minister of justice, to exercise clemency in the cases of all persons charged with offenses f r o m March 21st to J u l y 15th ( 1 9 3 3 ) " d u r i n g the revolution to establish the National Socialistic state." T o date "See

wireless dispatch from Berlin to the New

23, 1933.

45

York

Times,

July

DELIVER US FROM DICTATORS! no general amnesty has been d e c r e e d ; possibly the use of individual p a r d o n s is p r e f e r r e d , since by withholding t h e m offenders a m o n g the Brown S h i r t s — w h o have recently shown themselves inclined to i n s u b o r d i n a t i o n — m a y be kept under better control. Also men with penalties suspended over their heads are likely to prove more willi n g tools in the execution of f u r t h e r crimes needed by the regime. So much f o r clemencj' to Nazi offenders. Now f o r penalties of increased severity a g a i n s t opponents. A t t h e same time t h a t C a p t a i n Goering made the above announcement, he secured the enactment by the P r u s s i a n cabinet of a d r a f t law providing f o r the death p e n a l t y in the case of a n y a t t e m p t upon the life of a member of the Nazi a r m y in which the Stahlhelm is now included, or of the police, or of any government official. C a p i t a l punishment may also be inflicted f o r "subversive a c t i v i t y , " especially f o r disseminating atrocity r e p o r t s or f o r the importation into G e r m a n y of subversive literature. N o t only the offender himself is to suffer in such cases b u t members of his f a m ily as well, since sentence of the f o r m e r automatically c a r ries with it cancellation of the pensions, social welfare s u p p o r t , a n d unemployment insurance of the l a t t e r . I n u r g i n g the passage of his d r a f t law Goering announced t h a t he intended " t o t a k e hold with the mailed fist," a d d ing t h a t "whoever h e r e a f t e r lays h a n d s on s u p p o r t e r s of the Nationalist movement or an o r g a n of the state shall know t h a t he will p a y for it with his life in the shortest time, and the simple establishment of i n t e n t shall be sufficient f o r conviction." Of course this is n o t the l a n g u a g e of courts of law nor even of a decent c o u r t - m a r t i a l ; r a t h e r it suggests an armed bully who has his adversary temp o r a r i l y a t his mercy but who, with nerves shot to pieces 46

DICTATORS, NEW STYLE by memories of his p a s t violences and by morphine, is nevertheless s h a k i n g in his boots at the fear of reprisals. Since G o e r i n g ' s d r a f t law amends the P e n a l Code of the E m p i r e it requires a p p r o v a l by the federal government. N o d o u b t the l a t t e r will be f o r t h c o m i n g p r o m p t l y . Meanwhile the p r a c t i c e common a m o n g savages of making the innocent suffer f o r the g u i l t y has been accepted in other p a r t s of G e r m a n y . On A u g u s t 4, 1933, the S t a t e of H a m b u r g issued a communique s t a t i n g t h a t " f o r every case of the distribution of a subversive p a m p h l e t or of an a t t a c k on a Nazi organization, where no arrests follow, ten Communist leaders in the concentration camps are to be placed u n d e r solitary confinement; f u r t h e r in cases where the p e r p e t r a t o r is known b u t escapes c a p t u r e members of his family will be arrested." 3 2 A distinction m a y be drawn between the class j u s t i c e practised on a g r a n d scale in Russia, and the p u r e l y political j u s t i c e now characteristic of I t a l y and G e r m a n y . F o r t h e f o r m e r some sort of excuse may be f o u n d . T h e Soviets p u t t h r o u g h n o t merely a political revolution, i.e., one involving a f u n d a m e n t a l change in the form of gove r n m e n t , b u t also a social revolution, i.e., one involving the overthrow of a previously dominant class and the rise t o power of a new r u l i n g class. I t would, of course, be quite impossible t o m a i n t a i n the recently established d i c t a t o r ship of the p r o l e t a r i a t in Russia without vigorous a n d long-continued use of the courts administering class, i.e., labor-class, justice. Moreover t h e Soviets have been entirely f r a n k in the m a t t e r a n d have accomplished definite results in systematizing the situation. Communists a r e f o n d of p o i n t i n g o u t t h a t with the extinction of t h e " f o r m e r p e o p l e " — r e m n a n t s of the old Czarist nobility, landlords, clergy, bourgeois, and the like—there will ultiM

A . P. despatch from Berlin, August 4, 1933. 47

DELIVER US FROM DICTATORS! mately be but one class—the workers—whereupon the legal system devised for the benefit of the latter will apply to the whole population of the U . S. S. R . All of which, of course, does not make the sufferings of those now discriminated against any the less. In spite of the ballyhoo accompanying them it is clear that the revolutions of 1922 in Italy and of 1 9 3 3 in Germany were political, not social in character. Hence neither Mussolini nor Hitler had any occasion to resort to class justice, the nearest approach to it being Hitler's use of the courts to further his anti-Semitic persecutions, and that, of course, is racial rather than class discrimination. Like all others of their kind, however, the dictators of Germany and Italy have, as we have j u s t seen, made large use of political justice. N o matter how oppressive it may be, the end pursued by class justice is a broadly social one; on the other hand political justice is tainted by a selfish motive—the maintenance in power of the dictator and the band of politicians and adventurers who follow his fortunes. In kind there is little to distinguish the political justice meted out by Mussolini and Hitler and that administered by corrupt magistrates in bossridden American cities like New York and Philadelphia. Notoriously the latter may be depended upon to free petty offenders who do the dirty work of the machine, and to impose maximum penalties upon citizens who are independent in politics. Of course the machine magistrates of our cities are jackals, not lions. Their sins of omission and commission are petty, indeed, in comparison with the innumerable crooked favors handed out to adherents of the dictator, and the innumerable monstrous sentences meted out to his opponents by the courts of Italy and Germany. Radicals frequently charge that the courts of demo48

DICTATORS, NEW STYLE era tic countries p r a c t i s e class j u s t i c e , p a r t i c u l a r l y in labor cases where the " i n a r t i c u l a t e m a j o r p r e m i s e " of t h e j u d g e inclines him to act as the e x p o n e n t of a c a p i t a l i s t p h i losophy. 3 3 I t m u s t be conceded t h a t n u m e r o u s cases can be cited in s u p p o r t of this c h a r g e . On the o t h e r h a n d , labor has h a d its victories in A m e r i c a n courts, witness favorable decisions in i n j u n c t i o n cases, in cases involving hours of labor, mode of p a y m e n t , c o m p a n y unions, employers' liability a n d workmen's compensation acts. 3 4 I t m a y be said, of course, t h a t the occasional successes of labor in t h e courts of democratic countries a r e of no g r e a t significance, t h a t a t the outside t h e y r e p r e s e n t only the winning of skirmishes a g a i n s t entrenched c a p i t a l i s t positions. M a n y persons believe t h a t , given a n y t h o r o u g h g o i n g radical measure which involved a real menace to wealth, S u p r e m e C o u r t justices m a y be depended u p o n t o find t h e s t r o n g e s t of constitutional reasons a g a i n s t it. Even g r a n t i n g this contention, m a n i f e s t l y there is a g r e a t difference between countries in which constitutional provisions a n d legal t r a d i t i o n s r u n a g a i n s t class j u s t i c e a n d those, like Soviet Russia, in which t h e reverse is the case. L a b o r m a y have its grievances a g a i n s t t h e courts of the f o r m e r , b u t t h e y a r e n o t irremediable. A n u n f a v o r a b l e decision m a y be a p p e a l e d to the legislature or repealed by " S e e H. J. Laski, op. cit., pp. 128 et seq., for a strong argument in support of this contention. also Holden " Cf. Frankfurter and Greene, The Labor Injunction; v. Hardy (1898), 169 U. S. 366; Müller v. Oregon (1908), 208 U. S. 412; Knoxville Iron Co. v. Harbison (1901), 183 U . S. 13; Bunting v. Oregon (1917), 243 U. S. 426; Ν. Y. C. R. R. Co. v. White (1917), 243 U. S. 188; Mt. Timber Lumber Co. v. Washington (1917), 243 U. S. 219; Arizona Employers' Liability Cases (1919), 250 U. S. 400; Ward £ Oow v. Krinsky (1922), 259 U . S. 503; Second Employers' Liability Cases (1912), 223 U. S. 1; Texas