Defining and Defending the Open Door Policy : Theodore Roosevelt and China, 1901-1909 9780739199961, 9780739199954

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Defining and Defending the Open Door Policy

Defining and Defending the Open Door Policy Theodore Roosevelt and China, 1901–1909 Gregory Moore

LEXINGTON BOOKS Lanham • Boulder • New York • London

Published by Lexington Books An imprint of The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc. 4501 Forbes Boulevard, Suite 200, Lanham, Maryland 20706 www.rowman.com Unit A, Whitacre Mews, 26-34 Stannary Street, London SE11 4AB Copyright © 2015 by Lexington Books All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form or by any electronic or mechanical means, including information storage and retrieval systems, without written permission from the publisher, except by a reviewer who may quote passages in a review. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Information Available Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Moore, Gregory (A. Gregory) Defining and defending the open door policy : Theodore Roosevelt and China, 1901–1909 / Gregory Moore. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-7391-9995-4 (cloth : alkaline paper) – ISBN 978-0-7391-9996-1 (ebook) 1. United States–Foreign relations–China. 2. China–Foreign relations–United States. 3. Roosevelt, Theodore, 1858–1919–Political and social views. 4. United States–Foreign relations–1901–1909. 5. Eastern question (Far East) 6. China–Foreign public opinion, American. 7. Public opinion–United States–History–20th century. I. Title. E183.8.C5M546 2015 327.73051–dc23 2015010211 TM The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI/NISO Z39.48-1992.

Printed in the United States of America

Dedicated to my wife, Kimberly, my children, Sean and Taylor, and the memory of my parents

Contents

Acknowledgments

ix

Introduction

xi

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

The Setting Attitudes and Perceptions The Open Door in Manchuria: The Russian Challenge The Russo-Japanese War and the Question of Chinese Neutrality Exclusion, Railroads, and the Anti-American Boycott of 1905 “A quiet, firm maintenance of our position is our true policy . . .” Closing the Door?: The Taft-Katsura Memorandum and the Root-Takahira Agreement

1 33 53 87 111 141 165

Conclusion

199

Bibliography

215

Index

225

About the Author

233

vii

Acknowledgments

My interest in Theodore Roosevelt dates back to my days in graduate school when I was student in Lawrence S. Kaplan’s class in American Diplomatic History at Kent State University. I wrote a term paper about the Root-Takahira Agreement, and became fascinated with Roosevelt’s personality, views on international relations, and his approach to the conduct of foreign policy. I quickly discovered that an inherent part of Roosevelt’s viewpoint on international relations in regard to East Asia was his perception of the various actors involved in the competition for influence, trade, and special privileges in China. This was especially true in regard to his views about China and its people. One lesson I took from all of this was that American foreign policy often appears to be conducted with little understanding of other peoples and cultures, especially non-Western ones. Indeed, we as a people are all too ignorant of those cultures that are unlike our own. This point of view has influenced my teaching over the years, during which I have emphasized the importance of learning about non-Western cultures, especially in the present day, and avoiding the dangers of stereotyping. Throughout my career, Lawrence S. Kaplan has served as an inspiration, both as a scholar and teacher. I still remember the times we discussed whether or not Roosevelt feared Japan (I preferred the term “respect”). I was fortunate to have the opportunity to study with one of the premier historians of American foreign policy. Any success I have had in my career I owe to him. I would especially like to thank Dr. Eric Dahl, Dr. Matthew Phillips, Dr. William Spracher, and Dr. Timothy Walton, who read all or parts of the manuscript and offered valuable comments and suggestions. Thanks also to Erin Walpole, Brian Hill, Brighid Klick, and Megan DeLancey at Lexington Books for their support and assistance throughout.

ix

Introduction

The history of Sino-American relations has included a number of complex and intriguing problems. This was certainly the case when Theodore Roosevelt became president in 1901. Relations with China were made complex by the rivalries of the other major world powers involved in the Far East. The weak and decaying Chinese Empire lay prostrate before the imperialistic demands of those nations which sought to exploit China’s weakness for their own gain. Following the Sino-Japanese War and the “scramble for concessions” immediately afterward, the European powers and Japan divided China into a number of economic spheres of influence. Particularly worrisome for the United States, when Theodore Roosevelt assumed the presidency, was Russia, whose designs on Manchuria threatened American trading interests there. Following its defeat of Russia in the Russo-Japanese War, Japan became the major threat to the Open Door in Manchuria. Roosevelt would have to find a way to manage the problem so that hostilities with either power over Manchuria could be avoided. In addition, American interests in Manchuria and other parts of China would have to be defended in such a way as to avoid outright conflict with other potential rivals, while still maintaining an “open door” in China. The Open Door in China and Manchuria was merely one concern. A growing sense of nationalism in China was reflected in increasing resentment over the American policy of excluding Chinese laborers from entering the United States. Entrance to America was restricted to a few students, businessmen, and tourists. Even those few Chinese who were permitted to enter the United States were often harassed and humiliated by overzealous, prejudiced, or ignorant customs officials charged with the duty of preventing mass Chinese immigration to the United States. Chinese resentment over this policy of exclusion and over the ill-treatment of those who did manage to enter xi

xii

Introduction

the United States would ultimately cause difficulties in revising the American-Chinese Treaty of 1894, and would reach full expression in the Anti-American Boycott of 1905. Other problems revolved around the settlement of the Boxer Uprising indemnity, American investments in China, protection of missionaries and travelers in the Chinese interior, and treaty port regulations. China policy did involve complicated issues and could not be taken lightly. In whatever manner the Roosevelt administration would choose to deal with China, American policymakers had to keep in mind China was a focal point for great power rivalry. United States diplomacy had to accept and deal with that reality. Adding to the difficulty of formulating an effective China policy was a limited economic stake there and American public opinion. American trade with China represented a small portion of the nation’s overall commerce and, in general, the American public was relatively apathetic about and lacking in knowledge about the Far East. These factors would contribute to the challenge of maintaining the Open Door and resolving the issues that arose between the United States and China. Among those interested in China there were varying opinions. Trading interests saw in China an enormous potential market for American manufactured goods. Merchants involved in the China trade and others who believed in this potential market argued for greater American involvement in China to protect and develop the market. Others saw in China the opportunity to save a large segment of mankind from degeneracy, immorality, and spiritual drought. These persons viewed China as a corrupt, decadent civilization that was rotting internally because it lacked the virtues and values of Western civilization—particularly American civilization. Missionaries, teachers, and others made the pilgrimage to the Orient seeking to save that which was China from itself. Their voices, and those of their supporters back home, were added to those who called for increased American involvement in China. They added the corollary that the United States should lead the way in aiding China to adopt the ways of the modern world, thus saving her from further collapse and bestowing upon her all the benefits and blessings of the American way of life. On the other hand, there were elements that doubted the potential of the China market, others who believed China was beyond redemption, and still others who feared some vague, ill-defined “yellow peril” should China adopt the ways of the more modern nations, and still others who hated Asians out of simple racial prejudice. These groups opposed any deep involvement in China on the part of the United States. Many cared little, if at all, for the feelings of the Chinese and how those feelings might affect Sino-American relations. Many workingmen, for example, feared and opposed the immigration of Chinese laborers to the United States. The willingness of these laborers to work for wages lower than American workers would accept made

Introduction

xiii

American labor afraid that a massive influx of Chinese labor would take away jobs and lower the standard of living. These people vehemently fought any attempt to liberalize the laws restricting Asian immigration, called for tighter, more stringent legislation, and appeared little concerned that their stand created a great deal of resentment and anger in China that would deeply affect relations with the United States. Finally, there was the problem of reconciling new perceptions of the United States as a growing world power with greater international responsibilities, with older, more traditional foreign policy concepts such as isolationism. For example, in relations with China, the Open Door Policy would have to take into account both the old and the new, and would have to be shaped in such a way as to accommodate both. Scholars who have examined the Roosevelt administration’s relations with China have done so essentially in one of two ways. The approach taken has been either one with a narrow focus, looking at one or two specific problems in China–United States relations, or one with a broader emphasis, relegating the administration to a chapter or two in more general studies. The object of this work is to try a third approach, concentrating not on a specific issue in Sino-American relations, nor on the Roosevelt administration’s impact on the general trend of their relationship, but on the administration as a whole, under the leadership of Roosevelt, as it conducted relations with China. An effort will be made to assess the overall success or failure of the administration’s China policy, rather than an evaluation of the American response to any one problem or crisis. More attention will be paid to the perceptions and attitudes of Roosevelt and his administrators toward China, and the subsequent effect on policy. This is an area that needs to be emphasized. This book will place much of the primary focus on Theodore Roosevelt himself as an influencing factor and contributing element in the shaping of American diplomacy toward China. While others in the administration made significant contributions or played important roles, it is Roosevelt as president who must accept responsibility for China policy. Roosevelt brought strong views on foreign policy to the White House, and they would shape his response to the issues that arose as his administration struggled to define and then defend the Open Door Policy, a policy he had inherited and would now have to implement. Roosevelt had been an ardent expansionist and had done much to help create the American empire that he would now have to administer and protect. Handicapped by a general lack of public interest in the Far East and a limited economic and naval presence in the region, Roosevelt would rely on balance of power politics to maintain the Open Door. The decisions he made reflected his pragmatism and understanding of the limits of American power in the Far East.

xiv

Introduction

Roosevelt’s personal views, along with those of his advisers, affected the way he chose to deal with not only the Chinese, but with the rivalries taking place at China’s expense. The president’s views about China, which were in line with the prevailing thoughts of the time, affected his approach to SinoAmerican relations. China, in Roosevelt’s mind, was a weak, decaying empire that had lost the qualities that had once made it great. Now surpassed by the Western world, the modernization of China would require the guidance of the Western powers and Japan in order for China to play a significant role on the international stage. Although Roosevelt harbored racist views, his ideas regarding the Chinese tended to reflect more of a cultural viewpoint than a biological one. While on more than one occasion he expressed his intentions to treat China justly, he also made it clear that when China was perceived as doing wrong he would insist on taking a firm tone with Beijing. The defense of the Open Door, on the other hand, was conducted in careful, measured steps as both Russia and then Japan conducted activities in Manchuria that threatened the policy Secretary of State John Hay had announced in 1899 and 1900. As stated, the Open Door was contradictory in the sense that on the one hand it accepted the presence of the spheres of influence held by the Western powers and Japan in China, yet also called for the maintenance of China’s territorial integrity. The competition between Russia and Japan in Manchuria posed the greatest threat to the Open Door principles of equal opportunity for trade in China as well as the issue of maintaining China’s territorial integrity. In an effort to create and maintain a balance of power between the Japanese and Russians in Manchuria, the Roosevelt administration chose to pursue a policy of diplomatic pressure on Moscow and reliance on Japan as a counterweight to Russian ambitions. Following the Japanese victory over Russia in the Russo-Japanese War, Roosevelt and his diplomatic team engaged in a series of exchanges of views regarding the interests of both nations in East Asia. These exchanges resulted in the Root-Takahira Agreement of 1908, which contained ambiguous language supporting the principle of maintaining the Open Door in China. These actions finalized a process of emphasizing the Open Door principle of equal opportunity for commerce in China, while depending on a Westphalian approach for the preservation of Chinese territorial integrity. Throughout these efforts to uphold the Open Door, Roosevelt’s diplomacy was conducted almost as if China did not exist, as that country’s government was not consulted even though it was Chinese territory that was threatened by the ambitions of Russia and Japan. The issues of commercial opportunity, protection of American travelers and missionaries in China, the restrictions on the immigration of Chinese laborers to America, discrimination against those Chinese in the United States, and the remission of the Boxer Indemnity were dealt with in a manner that showed little regard for China’s self-respect. The American approach

Introduction

xv

was often arrogant and insulting, and demonstrated little sensitivity to the growing feelings of nationalism that had begun to express itself in China. While the problems were dealt with, they weren’t always resolved. The failure or inability to address their causes resulted in Chinese dissatisfaction and resentment toward the administration’s handling of its relationship with them. In this, Roosevelt may have missed the opportunity to build a more amicable relationship with China. For many Chinese today, the ruling class in particular, the period between the First Opium War and the victory of the Chinese Communist Party (1839–1949) has been labeled as the “Century of Humiliation.” This narrative provides the basis by which China’s leaders view their nation’s approach to international relations in the present. These views reflect the idea that the current international system has not changed since the nineteenth century. Made up of strong and weak nation-states, this system is one of competition for supremacy. There is disagreement over whether or not this is a permanent situation, or if it will change over time. Some Chinese argue that China’s experiences during the “Century of Humiliation” should serve as a warning, since the system is still focused on the humiliation and domination of weaker states by Western interests. Another interpretation holds that the current system is satisfactory because China can now compete with the other major powers. China has emerged from the period of humiliation and can now work toward a stable international system and demonstrate its commitment to doing so. Finally, there is the argument that China’s past experiences give it a unique point of view that can be used to remake the current international order. No matter which view is subscribed to, this version of China’s national history has driven Chinese foreign policy. 1 Kaufman argues “. . . that the discourses China’s elites developed during the 1839–1949 period in order to understand China’s weakness at the time continue to shape China’s outlook on how it should engage the international system today. 2 The author of the book Never Forget National Humiliation: Historical Memory in Chinese Politics and Foreign Relations, Zheng Wang, in a 2014 interview, emphasized the importance of historical memory for the Chinese. Wang notes that “. . . historical memory is the most useful key to unlocking the inner mystery of the Chinese, as it is the prime raw material for constructing China’s national identity.” Although he was referring to the tensions between China and Japan, this statement may be considered relevant to any nation conducting relations with China: “I think it is extremely important for the people of both countries to be aware of other side’s perceptions and understandings of history. As long as both sides remain ignorant of the other country’s perspective and the reasons behind it, finding a solution will remain impossible.” 3 This statement is applicable to Sino-American relations during Theodore Roosevelt’s time as president. Although Roosevelt and his advisers pursued a pragmatic policy in regard to China, especially in regard

xvi

Introduction

to the Open Door Policy, American perceptions of China as a weak and decaying country whose best hope was modernization along American lines resulted in an approach that often took advantage of China’s weakness for the benefit of American interests. In that manner, Roosevelt and his administration contributed to some extent to the narrative that the Chinese now use to define their current conduct of international relations. The rise of China since the death of Mao Zedong and the “Four Modernizations” program launched by Deng Xiaoping in 1978 has made that country the object of national and international fascination. For Americans, China’s awakening has led to concerns about the nature of the Sino-American relationship, its future, and whether or not China may surpass the United States economically and, perhaps, as the dominant world power. 4 In some ways the issues of the present mirror those of the past. There are concerns about trade and commerce, for example, and elements of a “yellow peril” paranoia as Chinese economic growth and military buildup appear to threaten America’s position as the world’s dominant power. But, unlike the China of Theodore Roosevelt’s time, today’s China has joined the ranks of the world’s major powers. The United States is now dealing with a stronger, more confident China. Alarmists fear that China’s rise presages the decline of the United States. But, just as certain beliefs and perceptions of China in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries contributed to the manner in which the great powers of the day, including a rising United States, dealt with China, the same dangers of misunderstanding and misperception can color American policies toward that nation at the present time. The same is true for China as it determines how best to conduct its international relations in the twentyfirst century. 5 NOTES 1. Allison A. Kaufman, “‘The Century of Humiliation,’” Then and Now: Chinese Perceptions of the International Order,” Pacific Focus, 25, no.1 (2010): 1–33. See also, David Scott, China and the International System, 1840–1949: Power, Presence and Perception in a Century of Humiliation (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2008); William A. Callahan, “National Insecurities: Humiliation, Salvation and Chinese Nationalism,” Alternatives 29, no. 2 (2004): 199–218; Matt Schiavenza, “How Humiliation Drove Chinese History,” The Atlantic, http://www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/10/how-humiliation-drove-modern-chinesehistory/280878/ (Retrieved January 30, 2015); Harry W.S. Lee, “The Danger of China’s ‘Chosen Trauma,’” ChinaFile, September 2, 2014; http://www.chinafile.com/reporting-opinion/ viewpoint/danger-chinas-chosen-trauma (Retrieved January 30, 2015); China Research Center, “The Clash of Historical Memory: The ‘Century of Humiliation’ vs. The ‘Post WWII Liberal World Order,’” http://www.chinacenter.net/2014/china_currents/12-2/the-clash-of-historicalmemory-the-century-of-humiliation-vs-the-post-wwii-liberal-world-order/ (Retrieved January 30, 2015); Orville Schell and John Delury, “A Rising China Needs a New National Story,” The Wall Street Journal, July 12, 2013, http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142412788732442 5204578599633633456090 (Retrieved January 30, 2015). 2. Kaufman, “‘The Century of Humiliation,’” p. 4.

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3. Zheng Wang, “In China, History is a Religion,” The Diplomat, http://thediplomat.com/ 2014/06/in-china-history-is-a-religion/ (Retrieved, January 30, 2015). 4. Books about the topic include, but are not limited to, Martin Jaques, When China Rules the World: The End of the Western World and Birth of a New Global Order (New York: PenguinBooks, Revised Edition, 2012); Henry Kissinger, On China (New York: Penguin Press, 2011); David Shambaugh, China Goes Global: The Partial Power (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013); Andrew J. Nathan and Andrew Scobell, China’s Search for Security (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012); Aaron L. Friedberg, A Contest for Supremacy: China, America and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 2011); Elizabeth C. Economy and Michael Levi, By All Means Necessary: How China’s Resource Quest is Changing the World (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014); James Steinberg and Michael E. O’Hanlon, Strategic Reassurance and Resolve: U.S.-China Relations in the TwentyFirst Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014); Evan Osnos, Age of Ambition: Chasing Fortune, Truth and Faith in the New China (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2014); Orville Schnell and John Delury, Wealth and Power: China’s Long March to the Twenty-First Century (New York: Random House, 2013); Kerry Brown, The New Emperors: Power and the Princelings in China (London: I.B. Tauris Ltd., 2014); Robert Haddick, Fire on the Water: China, America and the Future of the Pacific (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2014). A Google or Google Scholar search will produce a large number of articles and citations about the Sino-American relationship and its future. One source of websites dedicated to China can be found here: http://www.china-un.org/eng/xglj/t419904.htm. 5. See Douglas G. Spellman, editor, The United States and China: Mutual Public Misperceptions, (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2011) http:// www.wilsoncenter.org/program/kissinger-institute-china-and-the-united-states (Retrieved December 6, 2014)

Chapter One

The Setting

When Theodore Roosevelt came to the presidency following the assassination of William McKinley, he inherited a policy toward China that was centered around two diplomatic notes that had been sent to the great powers competing for influence, commerce, and territory there. The first note, issued in 1899, asked the nations involved in China to uphold the right of all nations to trade freely in that country. The following note, circulated in 1900 during the Boxer Uprising, stated that it was American policy to preserve China’s territorial and administrative integrity. Taken collectively, the two notes became known as the Open Door notes, and the policy of upholding them the Open Door Policy. The Roosevelt administration would have to determine how best to to apply the Open Door Policy effectively in the face of the international competition taking place in China. Confronted with the reality of a limited commercial interest in China, a weak military presence in the region, and a general lack of public interest in China, Roosevelt settled on a pragmatic strategy focused on maintaining a balance of power in East Asia. Ultimately, the actions of Roosevelt and his administration would suggest that the United States was more concerned about the first note’s call for equal commercial opportunities than the second note’s appeal for the preservation of Chinese territorial integrity, at least along China’s frontier. Contact between the United States and China dates back to the winning of American independence. As soon as the peace conference in Paris confirmed that status, American traders were outfitting and dispatching ships to the Far East. No longer restricted by the British East India Company’s monopoly on Asian trade, Yankee merchants eagerly sought their share of the fabled riches of that far off region. One of these early traders was Amasa Delano, a great grandfather of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, who dealt in furs and sandalwood, both items that were in some demand by the Chinese. In Delano’s opinion, 1

2

Chapter 1

China was “the first for greatness, riches, and grandeur, of any country ever known.” 1 Americans actually were latecomers among Western traders and missionaries in China. The pioneers had been the Portuguese, who reached the southeastern coast of China as early as 1515. It was not until 1567 that the Portuguese were allowed a permanent trading post at what would become the city of Macau, south of Guangzhou (Canton). Macau prospered for a time as the Portuguese dominated an extensive carrying trade between China and Japan. Japanese fear of foreign proselytizing brought an end to that trade in 1639 with the expulsion of all Christians. Macau slowly faded in glory, although it remained an important Western enclave and shipping off point for missionaries. 2 The Dutch followed the Portuguese in the early 1600s. The Dutch East India Company was able to continue trading with the Japanese after the expulsion of Christians from the islands, and from there the Dutch established trade relations with the Chinese. But the Dutch were not as successful in Asia as were the English. The British East India Company had been involved in an irregular trade relationship with China up to 1685. In that year the Chinese emperor authorized foreign commerce and the British were permitted to visit Chinese ports along the southern coast. Over time trade with the Westerners was limited to the port of Canton (Guangzhou), partly due to limited capital on the part of Chinese merchants elsewhere and partly to limit contact with the Western barbarians to as small an area as possible. The latter motive added the advantage of easier management of the outsiders. 3 The Chinese were ill prepared to deal with the Westerners and designated those merchants who came to trade as “eastern barbarians.” The customary Chinese ideas regarding “barbarians” were applied to the Westerners, who were described to the court in Beijing in terms traditionally used to characterize the nomadic tribes found on China’s northern borders. Westerners appear to have been as indistinguishable to the Chinese as the Chinese were to Western observers. 4 China’s slow response to the West was due to its worldview and manner of dealing with outsiders. Critical to this worldview and the processes created to deal with outsiders was the manner in which the Chinese distinguished themselves from others. China’s geographical isolation had served to limit its contacts with the outside world, precluding much in the way of cultural exchanges or borrowing. This geographic isolation was a fundamental reality for the Chinese whose name for their land was not only Zhonguo, or “middle country/kingdom,” but also Tianxia, or, literally, “all under heaven.” China’s growth throughout its history was a progression by which surrounding lands and peoples were absorbed into the empire. Gradually, China’s smaller neighbors were overshadowed by its culture and civilization, which served to reinforce the Chinese view of the superiority of their civilization. In turn, this

The Setting

3

led to the idea of an all-embracing culture governed by an emperor, designated as the “Son of Heaven” (Tianzi) who was the rightful ruler over all human affairs. 5 Those outsiders who accepted Chinese ways, adopted its ideas, and submitted to Chinese rule were capable of becoming civilized and were recognized as “new” Chinese. 6 This meant that the classification of outsiders as “barbarians” was based upon the distinction between culture and barbarism, rather than race, religion, language, or nationality. In other words, a barbarian was one who did not accept the refinements of Chinese civilization. Cultural, rather than political accomplishments, were the standards by which barbarianism was determined. For the Chinese, barbarians were those who did not adhere to the Chinese way of life. They were ignorant of or too unsophisticated to appreciate the superiority of Chinese culture and civilization, and, therefore, required assimilation into the Chinese way of life. Barbarians who advanced to the Chinese level of civilization could themselves become Chinese; those who did not remained barbarians. 7 The way to attract and assimilate barbarians was for the emperor to gain their admiration for the Chinese way of life by demonstrating his concern for them in a virtuous and benevolent manner, as proscribed by Chinese classical philosophies. His treatment of outsiders in a compassionate and generous manner would, it was believed, entice barbarians to China where they would be transformed and able to partake in the benefits of the Chinese way of life. 8 Convinced of their place as the center of the known civilized world, the Chinese designed a system by which any kingdom or country that desired relations with China must accept an inferior status as tributaries. Based on their cultural, economic, military, and political dominance in the region, the Chinese had established a hierarchical system of foreign relations in Eastern and Southern Asia that placed China in a position of leadership and its smaller neighbors in positions of inferiority. China assumed the duty of maintaining order in East Asia while recognizing the legitimacy of neighboring kingdoms. Aid was given in times of foreign invasion or natural disaster and in return these states recognized Chinese superiority by sending tribute. This process of “managing barbarians” reflected the Chinese view that only they had the right to govern the military and economic affairs of those living along its borders, but also that intelligent barbarians would seek to adopt Chinese ways and so become Sinified. In this manner, potential threats to Chinese security could theoretically be alleviated and military expenditures kept to a minimum. Over time, the tributary system would become the means by which China could keep its neighbors divided and less likely to join forces against the empire. 9 Those Sinified tributaries included the Koreans, Mongols, Tibetans, Burmese, Thais, Vietnamese, Taiwanese, and the inhabitants of Okinawa. Japan, however, had begun refusing to recognize Chinese superiority during the Ming Dynasty and would continue to do so from that point

4

Chapter 1

on. The Sinified states shared aspects of Chinese culture such as the Chinese calendar, writing systems based on the Chinese ideographic style, similarities in food and dress, the practice of Confucian and Buddhist norms and some form of comparable bureaucratic organization. 10 As practiced, the tributary system was highly ritualized and symbolic. Diplomatic correspondence between tributary states and China was expected to be written in subservient language, while appearances before the emperor included performing the ritual kowtow of three kneelings and nine knockings of the head on the ground. The reward for properly expressed subservience was permission to conduct a carefully supervised trade relationship with China, which was usually carried out by tributary delegations who appeared in the imperial capital on a schedule fixed by the Chinese. The closeness of each country’s relationship to China determined the frequency of these missions. Once the proper rituals had been performed, the merchants accompanying the envoys were permitted to open a market for a certain number of days in order to sell their goods in what were usually very profitable transactions. Moreover, the tributary system served to reinforce the legitimacy of those kings who sent these missions to China, while the emperor enjoyed the satisfaction of seeing the concept of his superiority sustained. He could also draw comfort from the assurance that these border states constituted a buffer between China and potential enemies. Finally, the tributary system existed to support the traditional belief in China’s superiority within its hierarchical world order. 11 Therefore, China had become used to dealing with outsiders by treating them as inferiors, and these standards were applied to Western traders and others who came to the Middle Kingdom. The tributary system that governed China’s relations with its neighbors would not work when it was applied to the Westerners, but it was the established mode by which China had become used to dealing with outsiders. 12 China was eventually forced to face the problem of finding a new way to deal with the Westerners after centuries of foreign contacts in Asia that had institutionalized one system of response. Adding to China’s limitations in dealing with the West was the dual nature of the Chinese ruling class after the Manchu conquest in 1644. The response to the Western nations was the product of a hybrid institution, the Chinese-Manchu Confucian hierarchy. The Qing Dynasty as a whole, because of its duality (Manchu rulers, Chinese scholars, landlords, and official class), could not respond to the West in a purely Chinese or purely Manchu fashion. 13 The dynasty did not have a single Ministry of Foreign Relations, but managed barbarians through a number of offices and bureaus which served to emphasize the inferiority of these aliens and to defend the empire against them. The Office of Border Affairs (Lifan Yuan) had been founded in 1638 and dealt with the inhabitants along the north and northwestern borders, the Mongols and Russians in particular. Manchus and Mongols made up the

The Setting

5

workforce whose job it was to keep peace along these dangerous borders, the source of numerous invasions as well as China’s Mongol and Manchurian conquerers. This office performed a variety of tasks and its staff tended to be very experienced in terms of conducting policies critical to China’s defense of its northern frontier. 14 Contacts with European missionaries were supervised primarily by the imperial household in Beijing. This was a largely independent unit that performed a variety of tasks from management of salt and porcelain production and the maintenance of the imperial estates to the stockpiling of food and resources and collection of duties on internal and foreign trade. Lower level, but still wealthy and powerful officials normally dealt with the missionaries and represented the view that these relations were less about national policy in foreign affairs and more about the prestige of the imperial court. 15 Relations with Korea as well as the peripheral states to the south such as Burma, Vietnam, and Thailand, as well as the Ryukyu Islands were the responsibility of the Ministry of Rituals. These states were expected to conform to the rituals and expectations of the tributary system, as they shared many of the basic values and norms of Chinese culture and civilization. 16 Despite the division of responsibility for managing relations with its neighbors, each office operated on the premise of China’s innate superiority and its place as the “central kingdom” of Asia. By definition, all other countries were inferior, peripheral, and therefore outside the cultural center of the universe. As a result, the Chinese exhibited a lack of interest in obtaining detailed information about or serious study of foreign countries. It was not uncommon for Chinese accounts of foreign lands to blend myth with fantasy. Foreigners were described in patronizing or demeaning terms and often likened to animals or birds. 17 The early European arrivals in China, the Portuguese and Dutch, were accorded the status of tributary states. They were registered with the Ministry of Rituals and permitted to trade only at specified times. Interestingly, between 1655 and 1795, of the seventeen offical European missions to China, sixteen of them performed, undoubtedly with reluctance, the ceremonial kowtow. 18 These factors seem to have created an intellectual and institutional inability on the part of the Chinese to face the potential crisis presented by contact with the West. This, added to the fact that China was an agrarian, preindustrial, bureaucratic society, made it very difficult for the Chinese to adapt to the commercial, industrial, and nationalistic revolutions brought about by free trade and free contact resulting from the treaties signed with the Western powers. 19 British East India Company ships began to appear off the coast of eastern China as early as 1635, and, perhaps because formal relations were not sought with China, began trading in the cities of Zhoushan, Xiamen, and Canton (Guangzhou). Coastal trading restrictions came to an end in the

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1680s, and the categorization of the Europeans as tributary states was quietly dropped. In 1720, merchants in Canton formed a monopolistic guild commonly known as the Cohong (from the Western pronunciation of gonghang), in order to regulate prices in order to increase their profits as well as to manage foreign trade. In 1754, they were made responsible for the good behavior of the foreign sailors and merchants, as well as collection of transit duties. 20 Although private traders were treated with greater flexibility, by Western standards Chinese rules and regulations regarding trade were considered to be unduly restrictive. Western trade was restricted to Guangzhou by 1760, and its regulation was typically Chinese. The Cohong merchants were under the direction of an official who became known as the Hoppo (another Western mispronunciation of a Chinese word, hubu). 21 This official was usually a Manchu appointed from the imperial household department of the inner court who supervised the collection of import and export duties by the Cohong. The Westerners could communicate any grievances to a member of the Cohong, who would then relay them to the Hoppo. The Hoppo was free to pass the complaints or concerns on to the provincial governor or even Beijing if he wished or he could ignore the issue altogether. Used to diplomatic and commercial equality, Western merchants were soon frustrated by what appeared to be an arcane system and began to express their increasing displeasure with the system. By the early nineteenth century, they were beginning to demand that China conduct international relations according to European principles of international law and diplomacy. The Chinese naturally refused, arguing that the Europeans had arrived uninvited and if they wished to stay they would have to accept Chinese rules and regulations. The Western nations took this as a challenge and, in essence, made it clear that they intended to continue to trade in China and would do so on their terms. 22 Legal issues added to the growing discord between China and the Western nations. Lord George Macartney, who had been dispatched by Britain’s King George III to establish formal relations with China, returned from his failed mission bearing a number of interesting acquisitions including a copy of the Qing Dynasty’s law code. The document clearly demonstrated that China and Europe took a very different approach to interpreting and enforcing the law and that any recourse to legal measures could intensify rather than alleviate the tensions between them. Chinese law under the Qing was codifed and based on past precedents and practices and was interpreted by the state. As there was no independent judiciary, justice at the local level was administered by county magistrates. These officials served as investigators, jury, and judge, accumulating evidence and passing sentences. There was no profession of law, nor were there any lawyers. Suspects were treated harshly and confessions were often coerced, which made trials essentially pro forma. What was missing, however, was a place in the Chinese legal system for the

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special treatment of foreigners. Routine matters were handled by those offices or officials assigned to barbarian management; the expectation was that criminal matters would be handled by Chinese courts in the usual manner. 23 At first, Chinese authorities were willing to accept cash payments to resolve cases involving the deaths of Chinese citizens, but this practice began to change in the 1750s. A French sailor was sentenced to death for killing an English sailor in 1754, however the sentence was never carried out as the sailor was freed as part of a general amnesty declared by the Qianlong emperor. Although the matter involved the death of a European and not a Chinese, the Qing authorities were determined to assert their jurisdiction in the matter. When an English sailor was found innocent by Portuguese authorities in Macau for allegedly killing a Chinese in 1773, Qing officials intervened and retried him. The sailor was found guilty and put to death. In 1780 the authorities reasserted their jurisdiction in a case where one foreigner had killed another. A Frenchman accused of killing a Portuguese was publicly executed after having been found guilty of the crime. Two cases, one in 1784 and the other in 1821, involved sailors whose actions had led to the accidental deaths of Chinese subjects. Both were handed over to Qing authorities and put to death. The incident in 1821 involved an American sailor from the trading ship Emily, and was the first episode to involve American interests in China directly. The Emily had been anchored in Canton for about four months, selling its cargo of opium. The sailor, ironically named Terranova, had dropped or thrown a clay pitcher onto the head of a Chinese fruit seller in a boat below the ship, causing her to fall overboard and drown. When the authorities demanded that Terranova be handed over to them, the Emily’s captain tried to get them to agree to hold a trial on board the ship, having refused to pay a bribe to the woman’s family in order to avoid problems with the local authorities. An agreement to conduct the trial on board the Emily was reached after the American community joined forces to negotiate with local officals. However, the trial, which was a definite departure from tradition on the part of the Chinese, failed to produce a satisfactory verdict, at least from the American perspective. Things remained at an impasse until the Chinese authorities threatened to cut off American trade. Responsible for investments of hundred of thousands of dollars in opium and other commodities, the Americans could not afford to have their trade interrupted. The Emily’s captain surrendered Terranova to the Chinese. The sailor was swiftly tried again, this time in secret, found guilty, and executed by strangling. 24 The combination of disputes, trials, and executions convinced Western observers that the Chinese could not be permitted to have jurisdiction in cases that involved foreign nationals. Of course, the Chinese held firm to their position that jurisdiction in these matters was rightfully theirs. The clash was based to some extent on a misunderstanding since the Chinse law codes

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were complex and needed more than a simple perusal of them to facilitate comprehension. Few, if any Westerners, were knowledgeable enough about the Chinese language and law to give the Qing law code careful study and interpretation. Moreover, when the Qing authorities gave in to Western demands for special treatment or exceptions, as they did from time to time, the Chinese people were angered and protested what appeared to be sell-outs to the “foreign devils.” 25 By the 1830s opium had become a critical problem for China. The earliest records of opium use in China dates back to the Han Dynasty (206 BC–AD 220), with cultivation of it first recorded in the Tang Dynasty (AD 618–907), while some tributary states appear to have included the drug in their tribute. Up to the time of the Qing Dynasty, opium appears to have been used primarily for medicinal purposes including the treatment of a variety of ailments ranging from diarrhea to malaria, as well as other illnesses. The European introduction of tobacco to China led to the practice of smoking a combination of opium and tobacco. Eventually, the tobacco was eliminated and opium was smoked by itself. Smoking opium made it a highly addictive narcotic, although addicts were not likely to become as bellicose as drunkards might. While opium smoking was originally reserved for the elite, over time it spread to the lower classes. In 1729, the problem of addiction had become so widespread that the emperor banned the selling of opium and ordered the closing of opium dens. However, the use of opium for medicinal purposes was permitted to continue. Nonetheless, opium smoking continued and the demand for the drug spread throughout the empire. By the nineteenth century the drug was associated with brothels and gambling houses, as well as merchants, the military, government officals at all levels, and even members of the imperial family. Chinese who performed hard physical labor relied on opium to relieve their exhaustion and muscular pain. Trading in opium became a lucrative and highly profitable enterprise, eventually attracting European merchants with Britain eventually dominating the commerce. Later edicts reiterated and increased the bans on opium importation, but the inability to curtail the trade in and domestic cultivation of opium on the part of the Qing made the decrees essentially worthless, as enterprising Westerners and Chinese developed a lucrative process for smuggling the drug into the empire. The business of selling opium in China was successful because a market for the narcotic existed, there was an effective method of consumption, and the Chinese authorities lacked a competent navy capable of interdicting the smuggling of the drug once its importation and sale were made illegal. Opium would prove to be the answer to offsetting the problem of an increasing trade deficit with China due to the escalating demand for tea in Britain and its colonies. Of course, by entering the opium trade England, and the other Western nations that joined in, including the United States, would contribute to the issue of opium addiction in China.

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In addition to the problem of drug addiction, opium sales had swung the balance of trade in favor of the West, so that China was slowly being drained of its hard currency. In the eighteenth century Britain’s purchase of Chinese commodities, particularly silk, spices, and especially tea, led to a growing trade deficit. Since trading in China was conducted in silver, a good deal of British silver was flowing into China. It was an effort to redress this issue that led to the Macartney mission in the 1790s. When that failed, the British sought a commodity that was in high demand in China, which led to the opium trade. As a result the flow of silver into China was reversed, and the Chinese economy began to experience a silver drain in the nineteenth century. 26 As taxes and the military were paid in silver, the drain impacted the exchange ration between silver and copper coins, which increased the burden of paying taxes on the lower classes, especially the peasants. Crop prices fell, taxes remained high, and these factors contributed to increasing social unrest. Opium was blamed for this economic crisis, although a decline in the world’s silver production may also have contributed to the situation in China, along with hoarding or hiding silver earned through the tea or opium trade or other activities, especially in times of social upheaval. 27 China’s attitude about trade also created an issue with the West. Although the Qianlong emperor dismissed the Macartney mission with the proclamation that China had no need of British manufactures, 28 trade did provide a significant source of revenue. Despite the Qianlong emperor’s confident assertion, Qing China was not a self sufficient state. The empire had become dependent on imports of critcal supplies, among them rice, pepper, sugar, copper, and wood from its neighbors, and silver from Latin America. 29 Trade relations had been formalized with Russia in 1727, granting that country trading privileges in a pair of towns along the northern Chinese border. Two Chinese diplomatic missions traveled to Moscow in 1731 and 1732. Russians were also permitted to live in Beijing and maintain an ecclesiastical mission in China. These were privileges the other European nations who traded with China would not receive for more than a century, and it would take two wars to gain them. 30 Meanwhile, the tributary system governed trade relations with the other Asian states as well as the Europeans who had arrived by sea. The tributary system had come to reflect a Chinese attitude developed in the Ming Dynasty and continued in the Qing, that viewed foreign trade with suspicion. Trade, it was believed, could lead to unrest and disorder. Foreign powers might gain vital intelligence about China’s border defenses, silver would flow out of the Chinese economy, and piracy and crime might increase. And, as a conquering power, the Qing naturally worried about their own security and any potential threats to their rule. 31 Since the Sino-centric view held that the world revolved around China, the tributary system reflected the Confucian concept of hierarchical submission into a foreign relations paradigm. Acceptance of Britain or any other

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Western state as an equal would undermine the superiority of the emperor. This view was confusing and infuriating to the Western merchants who could not understand this attitude, nor could they fathom why China might want to place legal restrictions on them. What the Western nations sought was free trade, diplomatic representation, and equality. 32 Once the Chinese decided to deal with the problems caused by the drug with a ban on the opium trade, war with Great Britain became likely. The search for a peaceful solution to the problems resulting from the Chinese desire to manage the Europeans as they did the neighboring Asian states and the growing Western demands for free trade and recognition of state sovereignty failed, and London elected to resolve the issues militarily. Although efforts to ban the opium trade sparked the First Anglo-Chinese War (the Opium War) of 1839–1842, fundamental differences in viewpoints helped precipitate the conflict. 33 Those Americans coming to China quickly discovered that other Western nations had become more established in the commerce of the region, and they also found a society at a loss as to how to overcome its conditioned response to foreigners. Until the 1830s there was no attempt at contact between the governments of the United States and China, as the only Americans in China were private individuals. This, of course, was not unusual as none of the Western nations involved with the China trade had managed to establish formal relations with the Chinese, despite numerous efforts to do so. The British alone had failed on three separate occasions to expand their relations with China in the eighteenth century, most notably with the Macartney mission. King George III had charged Lord Macartney with the responsibility of establishing a free trading relationship with China as well as a permanent embassy in Beijing. Macartney’s mission failed, and his bitter account of his experiences in China, along with those of others in his entourage, may have contributed to nineteenth-century attitudes that the Chinese would have to be forced to accept the modern world’s ideas regarding free trade, as well as international relations. 34 In 1832 the Jackson administration, in an effort to broaden formal trading relations around the world, tried to negotiate a commercial treaty with Beijing. The effort was a failure. Edmund Roberts, the American representative sent to obtain the agreement, was no more able to establish contact with the Chinese authorities than those Europeans who came before him had been. 35 Notably, the Terranova case described above had not involved the U.S. government, but was handled by the captain of the Emily. Trade was not the only lure for Americans in China. The religious revival of the early nineteenth century found expression in an overseas missionary movement that saw Americans arrive in China to spread the gospel and convert a heathen population to Christianity. Usually from rural areas and educated in New England or New York colleges, they tended to be humorless, uncompromising, and saw themselves as instruments of God’s will.

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Their resources were limited and they were further restricted in their efforts by Chinese regulations that prohibited open proselytizing. Frustrated in their efforts to bring China to Christ through preaching alone, missionaries turned to humanitarian efforts to win converts. 36 Strategic considerations also came into play. Reflecting the growing interest in China, the United States dispatched a naval group to patrol the China coast. Designated originally as the Asiatic Squadron, and later as the Asiatic Fleet, the number of ships increased from two or three vessels to more than thirty by about 1860. Recalled to the United States during the Civil War, the fleet returned to Chinese waters afterward. The number of ships in the fleet varied over the years, but was sufficient for the protection of American lives and property, and it delivered the decisive victory over the Spanish fleet in the Philippines during the Spanish-American War. 37 The Chinese had become aware of America and were struggling to understand the land they would eventually refer to as Meiguo (“beautiful country”). The United States would come to have a special appeal for some Chinese, just as their country would appear to offer unlimited opportunity to various groups of Americans. Chinese officials were the first to try to make sense of the Western powers as they imposed themselves upon their land, and the United States naturally came under their scrutiny. As the United States and the other powers tried to formalize their relationship with the Chinese after the 1830s, learning more about the Americans became a practical consideration. However, China was too weak to confront the growing demands being made by the Western powers and the Qing Dynasty was distracted by growing internal upheavals. Although Chinese officials attempted to draw the United States into actions that would help them resist the demands of more aggressive nations, the American government opted for a policy entailing as little risk as possible in terms of supporting China. 38 The discoveries of gold in the United States in the mid-nineteenth century drew swarms of Chinese to America and made Americans aware of the Chinese in a new way. Drawn to American shores by economic opportunity, these immigrants had no intention of assimilating. In time, the presence of Chinese laborers on the Pacific Coast would lead to hostilities that would create a serious problem in Sino-American relations in the last decades of the 1800s. 39 While their government made an effort to formalize trade relations, American merchants, like other Western merchants, were far more concerned with finding an item to sell to the Chinese. Although some Americans refused to traffic in the drug, the Yankee vendor, like his English counterpart, often had to fall back on the sale of opium in order to turn a profit. 40 Americans entered the opium trade in the early nineteenth century, relying on Turkish sources for the drug. The trade grew rapidly, and by 1825, Perkins and Company, one of the leading American firms involved in the opium

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trade, reported shipping more than 1,200 cases of opium to China. Besides opium, Americans tried to sell cotton, kerosene, ginseng, sealskins, and sandalwood in China, but opium was by far the most profitable. 41 In return, Americans received not only tea and silk, but a diverse number of products including cinnamon, coffee, furniture, candy, shoes, and even knockoffs of popular European products, particularly French items. 42 Americans in China were divided over the importation of opium. Most missionaries condemned the trade, since the Chinese would be unable to respond to the gospel if they were corrupted by opium. However, if Chinese arrogance was undermined and their relations with the West were restructured in a way in which the missionaries might benefit, then some good might come out of the trade. Missionaries such as E. C. Bridgman and S. Wells Williams publicly expressed their concerns about the evils of the opium trade, while also offering Americans some of the earliest insights into the attitudes and views of Chinese officals about this issue and others. They explained how opium was being cultivated in India and exported to China, although they avoided attacking major participants in the opium trade such as Willam Jardine, James Matheson, and Lancelot Dent, all of whom were major contributors to the philanthropic organizations that Bridgman and Williams had founded. They did, however, support the efforts of the offical sent by the Qing, Lin Zexu, to bring an end to the opium trade. 43 Merchants generally lacked any scruples about selling opium in China, and were prepared to justify their actions. The cultivation and use of opium was legal in Turkey, India, and Persia, and its use was legal in many Western countries as well. 44 Opium sales were justified on the basis that the drug was harmless, or no worse than consuming alcohol in the West; or by asserting that the Chinese wanted the drug; or, simply, that it was not the business of merchants to question Chinese tastes. Some argued that selling the drug in coastal waters, thought to be outside China’s jurisdiction, made the transactions legitimate business, rather than smuggling. Warren Delano II, grandfather of Franklin D. Roosevelt, argued that the opium trade was fair, honorable, and legitimate, no different than importing liquor into the United States. 45 However, following Lin Zexu’s confiscation of British stocks of opium in Canton, a group of American merchants indicated their support for the commisioner’s actions and their opposition to the opium trade. 46 They also asked Congress to send a naval expedition to China in the expectation that such a presence would coerce the Chinese to negotiate mutually beneficial trade agreements that would eliminate the animosity that China’s trade restrictions had brought about. In general, American merchants were divided on the question of the war, with many expressing the belief that the Chinese needed to be taught a lesson, while others argued that the Chinese were justified in their resistance to the British. 47 However, some of that opposition, especially

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among those American merchants involved in the opium trade, might have reflected the fear of being shut out of the China trade. And some undoubtedly saw this as an opportunity to emphasize American self-righteousness in comparison to the shamelessness of the British. 48 While on an extended trip back home, Dr. Peter Parker, the first American Proetestant medical missionary to China, went so far as to suggest in a letter to President Martin Van Buren that the United States mediate the conflict between the British and Chinese. The suggestion prompted no action on the part of Van Buren, however. Nonetheless, Parker tirelessly promoted his concerns in speeches, sermons, and articles and his efforts helped make Americans more aware of China and events taking place there. 49 But there were those missionaries who viewed the war as a necessary and, perhaps, providential event. A British victory might force China to permit missionaries to travel freely and spread Christianity through China. Even Bridgman and Williams, despite their opposition to the opium trade, expressed the hope that the conflict would bring about the desired result. 50 Despite the efforts of missionaries to educate the American government and public, not everyone was agreed regarding the war. Former president John Quincy Adams, for example, supported Great Britain for defending free trade and condemned the Chinese for trying to impose their traditional tributary system upon the Western nations. Most Americans, though, undoubtedly influenced by missionary opposition to the opium trade and, perhaps, still mindful of two previous wars with the British, defended the Chinese efforts to end opium smuggling and attributed the war to the low state of morality in the West. Public response to Adams’ position on the war was generally negative. 51 Pressure from American missionaries such as Parker and Bridgman, and some traders led newly inaugurated President John Tyler to order Commodore Lawrence Kearny to China to protect American lives and property as well as to put a stop to opium smuggling by Americans or others operating under the American flag. Arriving in China in April 1842, with two ships, the Constitution and the Boston, Kearny immediately proclaimed American opposition to the opium trade, making it clear that he would not support any efforts to recover vessels or cargo seized by the Chinese that were suspected of smuggling opium. A year later, Kearny’s squadron seized the Ariel, a ship known to smuggle opium under the American flag and confiscated its cargo and papers. The incident and Kearny’s earlier statements angered many British who saw his attitude as representative of the hypocrisy of the American government, whose recently appointed consul to Canton, Paul S. Forbes, had some connections to the opium trade. Even so, it was clear that there were clear differences between the British and American governments regarding opium smuggling. 52

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The British victory in the Opium War served to open up new Chinese seaports to Western merchants. The Treaties of Nanjing and the Bogue opened five seaports to British merchants, abolished the Cohong system of trade, established a tariff structure, regulated the opium trade by prohibiting smuggling, granted Britain most favored nation status and extraterritoriality, and ceded the island of Hong Kong. Besides the cession of Hong Kong, China also paid Great Britain an indemnity. 53 The opening of the treaty ports set in motion a process by which a total of thirty-four of these seaports would be opened to Western and Russian merchants between 1843 and 1894. 54 Following on the heels of the British, the United States sent Caleb Cushing to negotiate a commercial treaty. After some delays, and with assistance from Peter Parker and E. C. Bridgman, both regarded as experts on China, Cushing’s efforts resulted in the Treaty of Wangxia in 1844. Already, and with British approval, China had admitted Americans to trade on equal terms with Great Britain. The Cushing treaty simply formalized that action, giving the Americans the same privileges as given the British in the Treaty of Nanjing, with the exception of Hong Kong, but there were important differences as well. Americans residing in the newly opened treaty ports could build houses, hospitals, and cemetaries, in fact laying the groundwork for an expansion of American medical and missionary activities in China. Americans could learn Chinese and the principle of extraterritoriality was extended to civil as well as criminal cases. The most significant article stated that Americans who violated Chinese laws by trading in opium would be subject to Chinese laws and justice, without any protection from the U.S. government. Additionally, the United States would take steps to prevent other nations from using the American flag as a cover for illicit activities in China. However, the United States was never able to mobilize the resources necessary to enforce these provisions, and the opium trade would continue to expand. Finally, the treaty would be reviewed and revised if necessary in twenty years. In fact, the Chinese had begun to apply, on their own, the idea of treating the other Western barbarians equally with the British. The goal was to keep Britain from admitting the United States to trade in China on equal terms, thereby winning American gratitude that should rightfully be directed toward the emperor. So the Chinese acted before the British could, and, by doing so, China, not the United States, implemented what would later become known as the Open Door Policy. 55 The treaty concessions did little, if anything, to improve the situation for the missionary movement, however. The Chinese still did not respond to either evangelical or humanitarian approaches, and some missionaries would become involved in American diplomacy in order to advance the missionary cause. These efforts would also fail to bear fruit. 56 For example, Parker’s assistance to Cushing would bring him a diplomatic appointment several years later. The missionary had become a supporter of

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a firm approach in advancing American interests in China, including the use of force if necessary. Named U.S. Commissioner to China in 1856, Parker supported the destruction of Chinese forts that had fired on American warships. Parker had also been instructed to seek an American diplomatic residence in Beijing, but his own views went beyond that. He dreamed of an alliance with the British and French that would enable the three nations to place more pressure on the Qing to grant their demands, but his efforts were sabotaged by the Governor of Hong Kong, Sir John Bowring. Parker’s goals also included a greater American naval presence in China and the occupation of Taiwan as a counterweight to the British bases in Hong Kong and Singapore. He also hoped to convince the Qing court to carry out reforms that would bring China’s government more in line with the modern governments of the day. Alarmed by Parker’s views, President Pierce recalled him in 1857. 57 The approaches of Great Britain and the United States toward China were different. The British dealt with China on the basis of their experiences in India and in other Asian countries, and this determined their policy toward the Chinese. The United States, however, dealt with China as one independent nation to another. American policy emphasized diplomacy rather than military force. The expectation that commerce with China would one day be enormous, with Americans dominating that market, produced two effects. First, the United States remained alert that no power should take steps to jeopardize American interests. Second, the United States entered the Pacific in search of ways to protect this anticipated growth in the American share of the China market. In the Pacific and the Far East, Americans looked for harbors, to Japan for more open ports, and to Taiwan for coal. 58 The opening of China as a result of the Opium War and the resulting peace treaty raised expectations that the demand for American goods in China would substantially increase. However, the anticipated trade boom did not materialize. While trade did increase somewhat, between 1844–1869, it did not grow as dramatically as expected. Averaging about $13 million a year in this period, or about 2.5 percent of American foreign trade, commerce did grow but was not the boom many had anticipated. Part of the reason for this was a lack of interest on the part of the Chinese for American products. The variety of American goods being sold to the Chinese had become more diversified, including cotton goods, wheat, flour, and coal as leading commodities, along with smaller amounts of items such as guns, iron, whale oil, leather, and lumber, among others. Americans continued to buy tea and silk, primarily, running a trade deficit as a result. In some years imports were twice the total of exports to China. Contributing further to the limited growth of American trade with China was the fact that China simply wasn’t as rich as American merchants thought it was. There was an enormous gap between the wealthy, who represented a

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small percentage of the Chinese population, and the vast majority of the Chinese people who were mired in poverty. The decades that followed the Opium War would see China suffer through rebellions and destructive natural disasters in the form of flooding, drought, and famine, all of which undermined China’s economic condition further. The only commodity that continued to be in demand in China was opium. What capital the Chinese had was largely spent on opium, which may also have acted as an obstacle to the sale of other American products. While individual Americans grew rich in the China trade, the nation as a whole did not experience the expected economic windfall. 59 Americans also participated in the shipment of Chinese laborers to meet the growing demand for workers in Latin America as the end of the slave trade and slavery created the need for new sources of labor. This activity was outlawed by Congress in 1862, making the United States the first nation to prohibit the trade in Chinese laborers. 60 The growth of international competition in China during the late 1850s and the 1860s led the United States to reconsider its China policy. It was becoming increasingly clear that America must play a greater role in international politics or lose its share of the China trade. The United States supported Britain and France in a second opium war (1856–1860) as they chastised China, although Washington refused to take any formal part in the clash. However, an American naval unit accompanying the American Minister, John Ward, did support, with Ward’s approval, British forces in a battle against the Chinese in 1859. 61 The Treaty of Tianjin in 1860 found the United States beginning to compromise its earlier policy in order to keep pace with international competition. Again following the lead of the British and French, along with Russia, America joined those powers in forcing open eleven new seaports, securing rights to navigate the Yangzi River, obtaining permission for foreigners to travel freely throughout China, gaining tolerance for missionaries and their converts, imposing a low 5 percent tariff on imports, and legalizing the opium trade. This treaty left China almost completely exposed to Western exploitation. The United States briefly acquired a concession area in Tianjin, although it was returned to China in 1880. 62 In 1868 the Burlingame Treaty, which included a pledge not to interfere in the internal development of China by the United States, served to officially express American intentions of upholding what would later be called the Open Door and recognizing Chinese sovereignty. 63 Interestingly, American involvement in the opium trade dropped off after legalization. Making the opium trade legal brought an increase in competition from foreign merchants who benefitted from lower operating costs now that it was no longer necessary to smuggle the drug into China. By 1880, Americans were no longer involved in the business of trading in opium. 64

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Throughout the period leading up to the first Opium War and afterward, the Qing Dynasty was having trouble controlling its internal affairs, which limited its ability to respond to Western encroachment. More than two dozen internal uprisings took place throughout China in the nineteenth century, 65 but the worst was the Taiping Rebellion (1850–1864), in which twenty million or more persons may have died. The uprising grew out of the conversion of a young Chinese Confucian scholar, Hong Xiuquan, by an American Baptist missionary, Reverend I. J. Roberts. Hong’s zeal for the creation of an all-Baptist China (with Confucian features as well) soon became uncontrollable. Hong proclaimed himself the younger brother of Christ and gathered together an army to overthrow the Qing Dynasty. Hong was able to gain control of all of China south of the Yangzi River, but efforts to penetrate north toward Beijing failed and Hong turned toward Shanghai in the early 1860s. The merchants of that city financed a private militia, which was optimistically named the Ever-Victorious Army. Commanded by an American named Frederick T. Ward, the army enlisted British deserters, Chinese bandits, and a motley assortment of waterfront toughs. Preferring to be paid in whiskey, the army was defeated in its first encounter with the Taipings, apparently because of massive drunkenness. The Ever-Victorious Army soon began to live up to its name, however, by winning fourteen straight engagements in 1862. Ward’s death placed the command in the hands of another American, H. A. Burgevine, who was sacked after assaulting a Shanghai merchant. Burgevine’s replacement was a British officer on leave, Charles G. Gordon. Gordon easily smashed the Taiping forces he encountered, contributing to the eventual victory over Hong, who committed suicide. Although Gordon became a hero in Britain, the exploits of the Americans went largely unnoticed at home, due to the impact of the Civil War. 66 Official American policy during the Taiping Rebellion was to strengthen or maintain the Chinese government against internal disorder or foreign aggression. As the United States preferred to rely on the Chinese to fulfill their treaty obligations, there was little interest in establishing military bases in China. The United States also wanted to prevent the dismemberment of China, a likely possibility should the rebellion succeed. American policy was twofold in nature, combining support of the Qing Dynasty with recognition of Chinese sovereignty in order to help China retain its integrity so as to prevent dismemberment. 67 The combination of the Civil War and Reconstruction led to a minimizing of American interests in Asia. It took time to heal the wounds that had divided the nation so that the United States could reenter the world stage as a unified state. Also, Americans were occupied with numerous domestic tasks, including completion of the settlement of the west, linking the country by railroad, and transforming the nation into a great industrial state. It was not

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until the end of the century that the Spanish-American War elevated the United States to the status of a world power, while the acquisition of the Philippines became symbolic of a revived America that was now ready to take its place among the great powers. Like the United States, China was confronted with the immense task of recovery and rebuilding after nearly three decades of rebellion. Unlike the United States, China had not fought one civil war but several. Between 1850 and 1878, the Qing Dynasty was forced to put down nine separate rebellions and uprisings, of which the Taiping Rebellion was the worst. Eight other rebellions flared up, three of which—the Nian Rebellion, Heaven-Earth Society Uprising, and the Small Knife Society uprising—had the overthrow of the Qing as their objective. The others were seccessionist movements involving minority groups, including three Muslim rebellions. 68 As many as 60 million may have perished in all of these conflicts. 69 The suppression of rebellion and the settlement of the second Opium War ended two threats to the Qing Dynasty, at least for the time being. The Qing now focused on restoring order to the country, finding a more effective means of dealing with the West and modernizing China’s military. At the same time, the dynasty placed great importance on the restoration of the traditional Confucian order internally. The resulting Tongzhi Restoration worked to restore the traditional order through an affirmation of the old morality, while applying traditional knowledge to finding practical solutions to the chaallenges facing China. The Qing attacked the problem of enhancing China’s military through a self-strengthening movement. Beginning with the importation of Western armaments, the Chinese then began trying to learn to produce them domestically. The creation of a foreign ministry, the Zongli Yamen, led to the adoption of Western diplomatic practices. Agricultural taxes were lowered and aid was provided to the peasantry in order to help with eocnomic recovery. Governmental reforms attacked the causes of bureaucratic corruption, while the civil service exams, which were based on mastery of the classical Confucian literature, began to stress the practical problems confronting China. 70 The major problem with the restoration and reform movement centered around the question of introducing Western practices, methods, and education to China. The approach was piecemeal, as the Chinese made little or no effort to understand the sources of Western strength by learning about the social, economic, and governmental institutions that produced it. 71 The focus was on the application of Western learning for practical use, while Chinese learning was for “essential matters.” Threfore, this idea committed the Chinese to a policy of halfway Westernization. 72 As a result, the Chinese failed to recognize that fundamental social reforms might be necessary in order to utilize the modern industrial systems they were borrowing from the West. 73 As Fairbank and Goldman put it, “the generation of 1860–1900 clung to the

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shibboleth that China could leap halfway into modern times, like leaping halfway across a river in a flood.” 74 This fragmented approach, along with conservative opposition to Westernization, the challenges of overcoming the problems of technical backwardness, and China’s shortage of capital, would leave China ill-prepared to fight a rising Japan in 1894. 75 China’s humiliating defeat in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895 and the resulting “scramble for concessions” led to fears that the foreign powers would dismember China. Clearly, the self-strengthing endeavor had failed and more extensive reforms were called for. The Chinese were divided as to how reform should be carried out. Some advocated limited administrative reforms along with the adoption of Western methods as a supplement to the basic Chinese structure. More aggressive reforms were called for by the scholar Kang Youwei, whose ideas would influence the ruling Guangxu ruler and lead to the Hundred Days’ Reform. In 1895, Kang and other supporters of a vigorous reform, petitioned the emperor to implement wide-ranging reforms. Utilizing the press and study groups, Kang and his followers eventually gained the ear of the idealistic young emperor and his support. Beginning on June 11, 1898, the Guangxu emperor issued a series of decrees directed at modernizing the Chinese state. The comprehensive program was directed at implementing reforms in administration, education, economy, laws, technology, military, and the police. Conservative opposition to the reforms coalesced swiftly, reaching its peak in September. Alarmed by the reforms, which she viewed as a threat to Manchu power, the Dowager Empress Cixi engineered a palace coup on September 21, placing her nephew, the emperor, under house arrest. The dominant power at the imperial court for more than three decades, the shrewd dowager empress could count on support from the conservative elements opposing the reform, and easily overturned the reform effort. Kang Youwei and others fled to Japan before they could be arrested, although six reformers were captured and executed. For many Chinese, the only answer left was to overthrow the Qing. 76 American impressions of China changed radically in this period. Now able to move freely through China, travelers wrote of appalling conditions. Americans complained of Chinese laziness. Missionaries were disappointed and angered at their failure to convert more Chinese to Christianity. The appearance of a large Chinese population in California added to a negative image that was growing in the United States. The Chinese were welcomed at first by the Californians, and they worked long, hard hours in the mines or as cooks in the mining camps. However, the Chinese were discriminated against, and racial prejudice toward them was evident in local laws. As production in the mines slackened, the Chinese became a cheap source of labor for railroad construction. The Central Pacific Railroad employed over 10,000 workers between 1860–1870, and 90 percent of them were Chinese. With the completion of

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the transcontinental railroad, the Chinese were left to scramble for whatever jobs they could find. The labor market was crowded, and Chinese laborers were in competition with Europeans and Americans for work. Thought of as unfair competition because they worked for and survived on lower wages, the Chinese soon found themselves targets of the American labor movement, which began to agitate for an end to Chinese immigration. The problem was primarily a sectional one, as most Chinese were located on the West Coast, and the Panic of 1873 intensified anti-Chinese sentiments there. Growing unemployment, which led to mob violence, fueled the hostility and a social and economic issue quickly became a political and diplomatic problem. Following negotiation of the Angell Treaties with China in 1880, Congress passed the first in a series of Exclusion Acts (1882), beginning a process that would continue until 1943. Those Chinese already in America now tended to cluster together in urban ghettoes that became known as “Chinatowns.” 77 The presence of Chinese in America launched “yellow peril” fears that reflected concerns about their threat to the white population. Chinese immigrants were portrayed as menacing in a number of ways. They were viewed as “permanently alien, threatening, and inferior on the basis of their race, culture, labor, and aberrant gender relations.” 78 They were believed to be the source of evil and immoral practices such as opium dens and sexual slavery, 79 and popular literature publicized these views. Moreover, the large population size of Asia sparked fears that Asian migration might lead to the overpowering of the white race. Ultimately, Americans viewed Chinese and Asian migration in general as a political, economic, and cultural threat, and the Boxer Uprising of 1900 intensified the “yellow peril” viewpoint. 80 The rise of Japan in the last third of the nineteenth century added a potential military component to these fears. As David Scott has noted, in something of a precursor to Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations thesis, Alfred Mahan, the advocate of naval power, expressed concerns that the time would come when the question of which civilization, East or West, would dominate the world would have to be settled. 81 These observations were not just limited to Americans, as other observers of conditions in China expressed similar fears. 82 Additionally, these viewpoints may have represented Americans’ own anxieties and ambivalence, and, perhaps paranoia, about contacts with nonWestern cultures, Asians in particular, especially as the nation moved toward great power status in the latter part of the nineteenth century. 83 Therefore, prevention of Chinese immigration was deemed to be essential, as the American Federation of Labor argued in its campaign for the continued exclusion of Chinese and a renewal of the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1902. 84 The policy of exclusion in general and the renewal of the Exclusion Act brought about protests in China and eventually led to a boycott of American goods. 85

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The tension between China and the United States was further exacerbated by missionary activities in China, which were causing an increase in antiforeign feelings throughout the empire. As Chinese Christians and missionaries came under increasing attack in the last decades of the nineteenth century, the Western governments increased the pressure on the Qing to protect the endangered missionaries and their converts. Moreover, Western diplomats were encouraged to take steps to protect their citizens and the interests of their respective governments, including the use of gunboats, if necessary, to do so. China’s leaders found themselves caught between the demands of the foreign powers to protect their people, property, and Chinese Christians, and the growing animosity toward foreigners on the part of the Chinese gentry class, which provided the majority of local leaders. Viewing the missionaries as a social, political and ideological threat, the gentry often encouraged antiforeign sentiments among the general population. 86 Religious interest revived with the growth of the social gospel movement and the wave of reform and Westernization in Asia. American Protestant

“The Anti-Chinese Wall–the American wall goes up as the Chinese original goes down.” This cartoon, printed in Puck (1871–1918), the first humor magazine published in the United States, in 1882, shows a group of laborers, among them an Irishman, an African-American, Civil War veteran, Italian, Jew, and Frenchman building a wall to keep out Chinese laborers. The wall is being built with bricks labeled “Competition,” “Jealousy,” “Non-reciprocity,” “Law Against Race,” “Fear,” “Prejudice,” “Anti-Low Wages,” and “Un-American.” “Congressional Mortar” is holding the bricks in place. Across the way, a ship flying an American flag is taking advantage of the removal of the Chinese trade wall, and is loading a cargo of tea, silks, and rice. Source: Puck, March 29, 1882, Library of Congress.

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missionary activities in China, begun in the 1830s, increased in the 1890s reflecting the belief that Christianity at home would avoid stagnation by spreading the Gospel abroad. 87 These missionaries worked to promote modernization and reform in China, published works of Christian literature in Chinese, as well as books about the United States and other Western countries and established hospitals, orphanages, and schools. Notable among the education efforts conducted by these missionaries was the increase in the number of educated Chinese women. 88 However, the missionaries were also constant reminders of the humilations China had suffered at Western hands. While there can be no doubting the idealism and good works of many of these missionaries, they were in China solely because of the treaty system. The Chinese had been forced to make concessions allowing missionaries to go and function in places where they were not wanted. In terms of converts, the success of the missionaries was limited, but their conscious or unconscious attacks on traditional Chinese ways anatgonized many Chinese, which fostered increasing unrest. 89 One critic of the encroachment of the West and the undermining of Chinese sovereignty was Sarah Pike Conger, the wife of Edwin H. Conger, the American Minister to China from 1898 to 1905. During her time in China, Mrs. Conger developed a friendly relationship with the Dowager Empress Cixi, and, after her husband’s death in 1907, published a book of her letters written while she was Beijing. In a letter to a nephew penned in February 1899, she said: As I am here and watch, I do not wonder that the Chinese hate the foreigner. The foreigner is frequently severe and exacting in this Empire which is not his own. He often treats the Chinese as if they were dogs and have no rights whatever—no wonder that they growl and sometimes bite. Would that more of the Christ-spirit could be shown them by these people coming from Christian lands! Neither the “young West” nor “young America” has all in its store of knowledge. Might it not be well to watch and search? Even in the “dark” nations unknown lights might be discovered. 90

Some missionaries, however, refuted the idea that they, somehow, were responsible for these anti-foreign viewpoints. Writing in The Atlantic Monthly, five years after the conclusion of the anti-foreign, anti-Christian Boxer Uprising, the missionary Chester Holcombe offered a spirited defense of the American missionary movement, asserting the right of missionaries, as with merchants and diplomats in China, to the protection of their own government. Holcombe went on to assert that the Chinese “ . . . are an intellectual people, and possessed of fully the average amount of shrewd common sense, intermingled with some ancient and crude superstitions, which serve as a variant.” Holcombe added:

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In China the people are, in fact, masters of the situation, and a spirit of sturdy democracy is everywhere evident. They judge men or nations, much as we do, by what they do rather than what they say. Hence in any given conditions or circumstances, if we infer Chinese feelings or conduct from what our own would be in the same situation, we shall not go far wrong, always, however, bearing the fact in mind that they are more patient than we.

Holcombe insisted that, “it must be most emphatically declared that, not Christian propagandism, but most unchristian policies and practices of aggression, dominance, and spoliation upon the part of certain governments of Europe brought about the horrors of the Boxer uprising.” He concluded: When the government and people of the United States are ready, and determined, to return to a dignified and decent, policy in the treatment of the Chinese who are within our borders or may seek to come here; when we realize that now is always the time to apologize for an insult or to right a wrong; when, in short, we resume our earlier attitude and practice of fair play and genuine, helpful friendliness toward the Chinese race and nation, we shall easily secure a renewal of their confidence in us and win back all and more than all that now, thanks to our own folly, appears to have been lost. And the American missionary enterprise in China will play a part in our relations with that great Empire of even greater value in years to come than it has in the past. 91

Meanwhile, efforts on the part of Chinese officials to use the United States to offset the demands being made upon China by the other powers proved to be frustrating. Certain that the United States represented a minimal threat, at best, to China, officals such as Li Hongzhang sought to win American support against more aggressive nations. The expectation that the United States’ commitment to commerce in Asia would provide the common ground that would win American support for China was too optimistic, and, perhaps, unrealistic. Eventually, as the American response to his initiatives proved lukewarm, Li gave up. Friction over the immigration issue and cautious diplomacy proved too much for the Chinese to overcome. 92 The 1890s saw an intensified interest in China among others besides American missionaries. The potential of Asia as a dumping ground for surplus goods attracted many Americans who believed the economy would stagnate due to overproduction and the closing of the frontier. The emergence of the United States as a colonial power after the Spanish-American War reoriented military thinkers in that direction. European and, now, Japanese competition made American businessmen more apprehensive about the China market and they pressed for a more vigorous China policy, often with the support of other elements interested in the Far East. 93 Albert J. Beveridge summarized the sentiments of those who supported a more vigorous pursuit

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of the opportunities the China market seemed to offer. “We will not abandon our opportunity in the Orient,” he proclaimed. Our largest trade henceforth must be with Asia. The Pacific is our ocean. More and more Europe will manufacture the most it needs, secure from its colonies the most it consumes. Where shall we turn for consumers of our surplus? Geography answers the question. China is our natural customer. She is nearer to us than to England, Germany, or Russia, the commercial powers of the present and the future. 94

The views of Charles Denby, Minister to China from 1885 to 1898, reflected these growing concerns. Originally favoring a moderate position in America’s dealings with China, Denby eventually concluded that the weakness and incompetence of the Chinese government would keep it from being able to protect American missionaries and interests. He also thought that China had become vulnerable to the more aggressive ambitions of powers such as Russia and Japan. He concluded that the United States would have to take a more forceful stance in dealing with the Chinese. 95 However, American policymakers would opt for a different approach. The result was the Open Door Policy. To some extent, as noted earlier, the Open Door was already a part of the American relationship with China. Moreover, it reflected the American commitment to equal commercial opportunity dating back to the American Revolution. The notes issued by John Hay in 1899 and 1900 were responses to the possibility of Chinese dismemberment as an aftermath of the Boxer Uprising, and to cries of American merchants that the China trade be protected. The Hay notes were designed to guarantee an already existent policy without having the United States resort to force or alliances. The old principles were now openly advocated and supported by the government of the United States. 96 The location of American commercial interests primarily along the Yangzi River and in Shanghai placed the United States in a strategic position in China since those interests were between the Russian, Japanese, and German spheres of interest in the north and the French and British concessions in the south. America was well situated to try and prevent the dismemberment of China. 97 However the scramble for concessions had altered the situation. In proclaiming the Open Door Policy the United States conceded that the situation in China had changed, for the first note expressly recognized the spheres of influence that Germany, France, Russia, Great Britain, and Japan had established in China following the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895. That war had gone so badly for China that the Qing Dynasty ultimately found itself forced to settle the conflict on Japanese terms in order to avoid the possiblility of a rebellion against the throne. Efforts to negotiate a peace treaty even led the Qing to hire former Secretary of State John Watson Foster, who had served briefly in the Benjamin Harrison adminstration, as an

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adviser. Foster’s efforts, however, could not prevent Japan from forcing the disastrous Treaty of Shimoseki upon China. Intervention by Russia, supported by France and Germany, kept the Japanese from acquiring southern Manchuria, which had been one of the original treaty demands. China was then made to pay a higher indemnity, while Russia gained the territory for itself in the resulting “scarmble for concessions.” The three powers quickly followed up with demands for additional economic concessions from Beijing that established “spheres of influence” in China. Great Britain and Japan swiftly followed suit. The United States was not an a active participant in the scramble for concessions, but the acqusition of the Philippine Islands and Guam as a result of the Spanish-American War gave the United States an Asian presence. Even so, the scramble threatened American access to China, but there was little the McKinley Administration could do about the fait accompli on the part of the other great powers who were competing for trade and other privileges there. The United States could either join the scramble or choose another course of action. The choice was to issue a diplomatic appeal for “perfect equality of treatment for . . . commerce and navigation within such ‘spheres.’” This, of course, was the first of the two Open Door notes. 98 The full text of the note sent to Germany, as an example, was as follows: Earnestly desirous to remove any cause of irritation and to insure at the same time to the commerce of all nations in China the undoubted benefits which should accrue from a formal recognition by the various powers claiming “spheres of interest” that they shall enjoy perfect equality of treatment for their commerce and navigation within such “spheres,” the Government of the United States would be pleased to see His German Majesty’s Government give formal assurances, and lend its cooperation in securing like assurances from the other interested powers, that each within its respective sphere of whatever influence. First. Will in no way interfere with any treaty port or any vested interest within any so-called “sphere of interest” or leased territory they may have in China. Second. That the Chinese treaty tariff . . . shall apply to all merchandise landed or shipped to all such ports as are within said “sphere of interest” (unless they be “free ports”), no matter to what nationality it may belong, and that duties so leviable shall be collected by the Chinese Government. Third. That it will levy no higher harbor dues on vessels of another nationality frequenting any port in such “sphere” than shall be levied on vessels of their own nationality, and no higher railroad charges over lines built, controlled, or operated within such “sphere” on merchandise belonging to citizens or subjects of other nationalities transported through such “sphere” than shall be levied on similar merchandise belonging to their own nationals transported over equal distances. The policy pursued by His Imperial German Majesty in declaring Kiaochao [sic] a free port and in aiding the Chinese Government in establishing there a custom-house, and the ukase of His Imperial Russian Majesty of Au-

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Chapter 1 gust 11 last in erecting a free port at Ta-lien-wa [sic] coupled with the categorical assurances made to this Government by His Majesty’s Imperial representative at this capital at the time and since repeated . . . by the present Russian ambassador, seem to insure the support of the Emperor to the proposed measure . . . The commercial interests of Great Britain and Japan will be so clearly served by the desired declaration of intentions, and the views of the Governments of these countries as the desirability of the adoption of measures insuring the benefits of the equality of treatment of all foreign trade throughout China are so similar to those entertained by the United States, that their acceptance of the propositions herein outlined and their cooperation in advocating their adoption by the other powers can be confidently expected. 99

The reponse to Hay’s declaration was qualified. As an example, Japan stated its willingness to abide by the American proposal “provided that all the other powers concerned shall accept the same.” 100 The second note was the result of the chaos emanating from the Boxer Uprising. This outbreak of violence in China was directed at Chinese Christians and Westerners and was the result of a combination of natural disasters in northern China and growing anti-foreign attitudes. Violence against missionaries was reported as early as 1897 with the murder of a pair of German missionaries, an attack on a Catholic church and the killing of a Chinese Christian, all in Shandong Province. Violence continued to spread and by 1900 the Boxer Movement had attracted support from the Qing Dynasty and had attracted thousands of poor peasants to its ranks. Symbols of the Western presence in China, such as railroads and telegraph lines were destroyed and Chinese Christians were attacked. In the spring of 1900, Boxers began to infiltrate Tianjin and Beijing. In Beijing a number of foreigners were killed, including the German ambassador, and the foreign legations were subjected to a siege that lasted for fifty-five days, before they were rescued by an international force of 20,000, including 3,500 Americans. In September, 1901, the Boxer Protocol imposed an indemnity of $333 million to pay for damages and loss of life on China, along with other provisions including monuments to the memory of the 200 Westerners who had been killed and an agreement on China’s part to carry out domestic reforms, including its legal codes. 101 The American share of the indemnity was just under $24.5 million, or 7 percent of the total. 102 Viewing the situation in China as anarchical, Hay circulated the following directive on July 3, 1900: In this critical posture of affairs in China it is deemed appropriate to define the attitude of the United States as far as present circumstances permit this to be done. We adhere to the policy initiated by us in 1857, of peace with the Chinese nation, of furtherance of lawful commerce, and of promotion of lives and property of our citizens by all means guaranteed under extraterritorial

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treaty rights and by the law of nations. If wrong be done to our citizens we propose to hold the responsible authors to the uttermost accountability. We regard the condition at Pekin [sic] as one of virtual anarchy, whereby power and responsibility are practically devolved upon the local provincial authorities. So long as they are not in overt collusion with rebellion and use their power to protect foreign life and property we regard them as representing the Chinese people, with whom we seek to remain in peace and friendship. The purpose of the President is, as it has been heretofore, to act concurrently with the other powers, first in opening up communication with Pekin and rescuing the American officials, missionaries, and other Americans who are in danger; secondly, in affording all possible protection everywhere in China to American life and property; thirdly, in guarding and protecting all legitimate American interests; and fourthly, in aiding to prevent a spread of the disorders to the other provinces of the Empire and a recurrence of such disasters. It is, of course, too early to forecast the means of attaining this last result; but the policy of the Government of the United States is to seek a solution which may bring about permanent safety and peace to China, preserve Chinese territorial and administrative entity, protect all rights guaranteed to friendly powers by treaty and international law, and safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire. 103

This note was received in much the same vein as the first one was, 104 however, the sentence stating “the policy of the Government of the United States to seek a solution 105 to . . . preserve Chinese territorial and adminsitrative entity” suggests that Hay was issuing a unilateral statement of policy as much as a call for the other powers to respect China’s territorial integrity. By stating that his government was committed to finding a solution to the problem of keeping China whole, Hay provided the other powers with a statement that they could agree to without any definite obligation to actually follow through. The Open Door notes may have been the ideal solution for the McKinley administration’s search for a new Asian policy, 106 a hybrid of anti-colonialism and economic imperialism, or even a rejection of the division of China into spheres of influence. 107 It may also have been simply a means of satisfying a vague demand for action without going too far. 108 It has even been called irrelevant. 109 The Open Door Policy has also been characterized, perhaps most accurately, as an exercise of “soft power” in China. 110 Hsu contends that the “Open Door was a declaration of principles rather than a formal policy of the United States, which had neither the will nor the power to enforce it militarily.” Hsu notes that the process of partitioning China diminished after the declaration less out of respect for the Open Door notes than the fear of rivalry and conflict among the other powers and that the “resulting equilibrium saved the Ch’ing (Qing) empire 111 from an immediate collapse.” Whatever the interpretation, the death of McKinley in 1901 made

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“Putting His Foot Down.” Published in August 1899, this illustration shows Uncle Sam, holding a trade treaty, standing on a map of China, which is in the process of being cut up by Germany, Italy, Great Britain, Russia, and France, while Austria, in the background, is sharpening a pair of shears. Uncle Sam tells the other nations: “Gentleman, you may cut up this map as much as you like, but remember, I’m here to stay, and you can’t divide Me up into spheres of influence.” Source: Puck, August 23, 1899, Library of Congress.

the implementation and definition of the Open Door Policy a policy problem for his successor, Theodore Roosevelt. NOTES 1. Warren I. Cohen, America’s Response to China (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1971), p. 2; Richard Van Alstyne, The United States and East Asia (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1973), p. 18. The quote is from Van Alstyne. 2. Frederick Wakeman, Jr., The Fall of Imperial China (New York: The Free Press, 1975), pp. 113–16. 3. Wakeman, Fall of Imperial China, pp. 116–23; Cohen, America’s Response, p. 3. 4. John King Fairbank, Trade and Diplomacy on the China Coast: The Opening of the Treaty Ports, 1842–1854 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953), pp. 8–10. A broader discussion of the early encounters between the West and China can found in D.E. Mungello, The Great Encounter of China and the West, 1500–1800, 4th Edition (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2012). 5. Li Zhaojie, “Traditional Chinese World Order,” Chinese Journal of International Law 1, no. 1 (2002): 20–58. http://chinesejil.oxfordjournals.org/content/1/1/20.full.pdf (accessed 12/ 30/2014) 6. Ibid., p. 29. 7. Ibid., pp. 29–30. 8. Ibid., pp. 30–31.

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9. Bruce Elleman and S. C. M. Paine, Modern China: Continuity and Change, 1644 to the Present (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2010), p. 8; Immanuel C. Y. Hsu, The Rise of Modern China. 6th Edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 131–32; Jonathan D. Spence, The Search for Modern China, 2nd Edition (New York: W. W. Norton, 1999), p. 118. 10. Elleman and Paine, Modern China, p. 8; Hsu, Rise of Modern China, pp. 130–31; Spence, Search for Modern China, p. 118. 11. Hsu, Rise of Modern China, pp. 130–31; Spence, Search for Modern China, p. 118. 12. Fairbank, Trade and Diplomacy, p. 25. 13. Fairbank, Trade and Diplomacy, p. 45. 14. Spence, Search for Modern China, p. 117; John King Fairbank and Merle Goldman. China: A New History. 2nd Enlarged Edition (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006), p. 117. 15. Spence, Search for Modern China, p. 118. 16. Ibid. 17. Ibid., p. 119. 18. Hsu, Rise of Modern China, p. 133; Spence, Search for Modern China, pp. 120–21. 19. Fairbank, Trade and Diplomacy, p. 22; Fairbank and Goldman, China: A New History, pp. 140–42. 20. Spence, Search for Modern China, p. 120; Fairbank and Goldman, China: A New History, p. 195; Elleman and Paine, Modern China, pp. 89–90. 21. Crossley, Pamela, The Wobbling Pivot: China since 1800, (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), p. 42. 22. Spence, Search for Modern China, pp. 120–21; Fairbank and Goldman, China: A New History, p. 195; Hsu, Rise of Modern China, pp. 133–34, 139–66. 23. Spence, Search for Modern China, pp. 125–26. 24. Ibid., pp. 126–27; Eric Jay Dolin, When America First Met China:An Exotic History of Tea, Drugs and Money in the Age of Sail (New York: W. W. Norton, 2012), pp. 144–47; Jacques M. Downs, “American Merchants and the China Opium Trade, 1800–1840,” The Business History Review 42, no. 4 (1968), p. 427. 25. Spence, Search for Modern China, pp. 127–28. 26. Elleman and Paine, Modern China, pp. 117–18; Hsu, Rise of Modern China, p. 172; Crossley, The Wobbling Pivot, pp. 62–64. 27. Julia Lovell, The Opium War: Drugs, Dreams and the Making of Modern China (New York: The Overlook Press, 2011), pp. 37–38; Elleman and Paine, Modern China, p. 119; Harry G. Gelber, “China as ‘Victim’?: The Opium War That Wasn’t,” Harvard University, Center for European Studies Working Paper #136, p. 3. http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~ces/ publications/docs/pdfs/Gelber136.pdf (accessed January 2, 2015). 28. Elleman and Paine, Modern China, p. 118. 29. Lovell, The Opium War, p. 85. 30. Elleman and Paine, p. 42. 31. Spence, Search for Modern China, p. 57; Lovell, The Opium War, p. 89. 32. Lovell, The Opium War, pp. 86–87; Cohen, America’s Response, pp. 5–6; Fairbank, Trade and Diplomacy, p.94. 33. Lovell, The Opium War, pp. 17–94; Spence, Search for Modern China, pp. 145–54; Hsu, The Rise of Modern China, pp. 169–84; Gelber, “China as ‘Victim’?”, pp. 4–9; Crossley, The Wobbling Pivot, pp. 71–77. See also W. Travis Hanes and Frank Sanello, The Opium Wars: The Addiction of One Empire and the Corruption of Another (Naperville: Sourcebooks, Inc., 2002); Peter Ward Fay, The Opium War, 1840–42 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998). 34. Lovell, The Opium War, p. 87; Spence, Search for Modern China, pp. 122–23; Fairbank and Goldman, China: A New History, p. 196; Elleman and Paine, Modern China, pp. 117–18. 35. Cohen, America’s Response, pp. 4–5. 36. Michael H. Hunt, The Making of a Special Relationship: The United States and China to 1914 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), pp. 24–27. See also Jonathan Spence, To Change China (New York: Little, Brown and Co., 1969).

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37. Robert G. Sutter, U.S.-Chinese Relations: Perilous Past, Pragmatic Present (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2010), p. 17. 38. Sutter, U.S.-Chinese Relations, p. 19. 39. Hunt, Special Relationship, pp. 41–79. 40. Ibid., p. 7; Cohen, America’s Response, pp. 4-5. 41. Dolin, When America First Met China, pp. 136–44; Downs, “American Merchants and the China Opium Trade,” p. 422; Hunt, Special Relationship, p. 148. 42. Dolin, When America First Met China, pp. 155–56. 43. Michael C. Lazich, “American Missionaries and the Opium Trade in Nineteenth-Century China,” Journal of World History 17, no. 2 (June 2006): 198–202. 44. Gelber, “China as ‘Victim’?”, p. 4. 45. Dolin, When America First Met China, pp. 191–92. 46. Hunt, Special Relationship, p. 39; Downs, “American Merchants and the China Opium Trade,” p. 441; Lazich, “American Missionaries,” p. 204. 47. Dolin, When America First Met China, pp 224–28. 48. Lazich, “American Missionaries,” p. 207. 49. Ibid., p. 209. 50. Dolin, When America First Met China, pp. 226–27. 51. Ibid., pp. 227–28; Dong Wang, The United States and China; A History from the Eighteenth Century to the Present (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2013), pp. 50–52. 52. Ibid., 52. 53. Lovell, The Opium War, pp. 223–40; Elleman and Paine, Modern China, pp. 124–26; Fairbank and Goldman, China: A New History, pp. 201–5; Hsu, The Rise of Modern Cbina, pp. 189–93; Crossley, The Wobbling Pivot, pp. 79–82; Spence, Search for Modern China, pp. 160–62; Dolin, When America First Met China, pp. 218–21. 54. A list of the treaty ports opened between 1843 and 1894 can be found on page 126 of Elleman and Paine, Modern China. 55. Dolin, When America First Met China, pp. 232–33; Lazich, “American Missionaries,” pp. 212–14; Robert S. Hart, The Eccentric Tradition: American Diplomacy in the Far East (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1976), p.12; Fairbank, Trade and Diplomacy, p. 196. This citation reflects the material presented in this paragraph and the one preceding it. 56. Hunt, Special Relationship, pp. 29–32. 57. Spence, To Change China, pp. 52–56; Sutter, U.S.-Chinese Relations, p. 22. 58. Tyler Dennett, Americans in Eastern Asia (New York: Barnes and Noble, Inc., 1922), pp. 182–83 59. Dolin, When America First Met China, pp. 252–56. 60. Ibid., pp. 257–68. 61. Sutter, U.S.-Chinese Relations, p. 23. 62. Elleman and Paine, Modern China, p. 229. 63. Dennett, Americans, pp. 345; Hart Eccentric Tradition, pp. 12–13. 64. Dolin, When America First Met China, p. 256. 65. See the list of civil wars that occurred during the Qing Dynasty in Elleman and Paine, Modern China, p. 151. 66. Hart, Eccentric Tradition, pp. 13–14; Franz Michael, The Taiping Rebellion (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1972); Jonathan Spence, God’s Chinese Son: The Taiping Heavenly Kingdom of Hong Xiuquan (New York: W. W. Norton, 1996); Spence, To Change China, pp. 57–92. 67. Dennett, Americans, p. 20 68. Elleman and Paine, Modern China, pp. 151, 153–60; Spence, Search for Modern China, pp. 183–91; Fairbank and Goldman, China: A New History, pp. 214–16. 69. Fairbank and Goldman, China: A New History, p. 216. 70. Hsu, The Rise of Modern China, pp. 261–91; Elleman and Paine, Modern China, pp. 165–77; Fairbank and Goldman, China: A New History, p. 221; Spence, Search for Modern China, pp. 192–202, 215–22. 71. Elleman and Paine, Modern China, p. 176. 72. Ibid., Fairbank and Goldman, China: A New History, p. 217.

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73. Elleman and Paine, Modern China, p. 176. 74. Fairbank and Goldman, China: A New History, p. 217. 75. Ibid., pp. 218–20; Hsu. The Rise of Modern China, pp. 287–91; Elleman and Paine, Modern China, pp. 175–78. 76. Hsu, The Rise of Modern China, pp. 355–84; Fairbank and Goldman, China: A New History, pp. 224–30; Elleman and Paine, Modern China, pp. 210–11. 77. Scott, China and the International System, pp. 58–63; Hart, Eccentric Tradition, pp. 15–16; Akira Iriye, Across the Pacific: An Inner History of American-East Asian Relations (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1967), pp. 30–31; Wang, The United States and China, pp. 73–90; Dolin, When America First Met China, p. 269. 78. Erika Lee, “The Chinese Exclusion Example: Race, Immigration and American Gatekeeping, 1882–1924,” Journal of American Ethnic History 21, no. 3 (Spring 2002): 38. 79. While most Chinese came to the United States voluntarily seeking work, there was an exception. Some young Chinese women were tricked or coerced into going to California (some were sold by their families) where they were forced into prostitution. Dolin, When America First Met China, p. 269. 80. Diana Preston, The Boxer Rebellion: The Dramatic Story of China’s War on Foreigners That Shook the World in the Summer of 1900 (New York: Berkley Books, 1999), pp. 350–51. 81. Scott, China and the International System, p. 139. 82. Preston, The Boxer Rebellion, pp. 350–51. 83. Lee, “The Chinese Exclusion Example,” pp. 38–62; John Kuo Wei Tchen, “Notes for a History of Paranoia, ‘Yellow Peril’ and the Long Twentieth Century,” Psychoanalytic Review 97, no. 2 (2010): 263–83; Karen A. Keely, “Sexual Slavery in San Francisco’s Chinatown, ‘Yellow Peril’ and ‘White Slavery’ in Frank Norris’ Early Fiction,” Studies in American Naturalism 2, no. 2 (Winter 2007): 129–49; Yuko Kawai, “Streotyping Asian-Americans: The Dialectic of the Model Minority and the Yellow Peril,” Howard Journal of Communications 16, no. 2 (April 2005): 109–30; Stanford M. Lyman, “The ‘Yellow Peril’ Mystique: Origins and Vicissitudes of a Racist Discourse,” International Journal of Politics, Culture & Society 13, no. 4 (June 2000): 683–747; Diana L. Ahmad, “Opium Smoking, Anti-Chinese Attitudes, and the American Medical Community, 1850–1890,” American Nineteenth Century History 1, no. 2 (Summer 2000): 53–68; Floyd Cheung, “Anxious and Ambivalent Represenetations: Nineteenth Century Images of Chinese-American Men,” Journal of American Culture 30, no. 3 (2007): 293–309. 84. American Federation of Labor, Some Reasons for Chinese Exclusion: Meat vs. Rice; American Manhood vs. Asiatic Coolieism, Which Shall Survive? (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1902) https://archive.org/stream/somereasonsforc00labogoog#page/n36/ mode/2up (last retrieved, January 4, 2015). 85. Scott, China and the International System, p. 179. 86. Sutter, U.S.-Chinese Relations, pp. 24–25; Wang, The United States and China, pp. 97–115; David J. Silbey, The Boxer Rebellion and the Great Game in China (New York: Hill & Wang, 2012), pp. 40–47. 87. Cohen, America’s Response, pp. 52–53. 88. Wang, The United States and China, pp. 110–14 89. Cohen, America’s Response, p. 53. 90. Sarah Pike Conger, Letters from China: With Particular Reference to the Empress Dowager and the Women of China (Chicago: A.C. McClurg and Company, 1909), pp. 45–46. 91. Chester Holcombe, “The Missionary Enterprise in China,” The Atlantic Monthly, September 1, 1906, http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1906/09/the-missionaryenterprise-in-china/306000/ . (last retrieved, May 20, 2014) 92. Sutter, U.S.-Chinese Relations, pp. 25–26. 93. Iriye, Across the Pacific, pp. 77–79; Cohen, America’s Response, pp. 45–46. 94. Albert J. Beveridge, “In Support of an American Empire,” Congressional Record, 56 Congress, I Session, pp. 704–12. http://mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/ajb72.htm . 95. Sutter, U.S.-Chinese Relations, p. 25. 96. Dennett, Americans, p. 645; Lawrence Battistini, The Rise of American Influence in Asia and the Pacific (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1960), p. 213.

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97. Elleman and Paine, Modern China, p. 229 98. Ibid., pp. 195–207; Spence, The Search for Modern China, pp. 220–22, 230; Jung Chang, Empress Dowager Cixi: The Concubine who Launched Modern China (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2013), pp. 181–216; The Open Door Note, September 6, 1899. https:// www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/opendoor.htm. (Last retrieved May 19, 2014); Gregg Jones, Honor in the Dust: Theodore Roosevelt, War in the Phillipines, and the Rise and Fall of America’s Imperial Dream (New York: New American Library, 2012), p. 178. 99. Hay to White, September 6, 1899. U.S. Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1899 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1899), pp. 129–30. Hereafter cited as Foreign Relations. 100. “The Open Door, 1900,” http://courses.knox.edu/hist245/opendoortext.html. (Last retrieved May 19, 2014). 101. For a complete disussion of the Boxer Uprising, see Preston, The Boxer Rebellion, and Silbey, The Boxer Rebellion and the Great Game in China; Wang, The United States and China, pp. 108–10; Cohen, America’s Response, pp. 54–55; Sutter, U.S.-Chinese Relations, pp. 26–29; Hsu, Rise of Modern China, pp. 387–406; Fairbank and Goldman, China: A New History, 230–32; Spence, Search for Modern China, pp. 230–36; Crossley, The Wobbling Pivot, pp. 138–40; Elleman and Paine, Modern China, pp. 213–17. 102. Elleman and Paine, Modern China, p. 217. A chart showing the amounts China was to pay to the Western powers appears on this page. 103. Hay to Herdliska, July 3, 1900. Foreign Relations, 1900, p. 299. 104. “The Open Door, 1900,” http://courses.knox.edu/hist245/opendoortext.html. (Last retrieved May 19, 2014). 105. Author’s italics. 106. Cohen, America’s Response, p. 45. 107. Thomas J. McCormick, China Market: America’s Quest for Informal Empire, 1893–1901 (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1967), p. 128; Elleman and Paine, Modern China, p. 203. 108. Marilyn B. Young, The Rhetoric of Empire: American China Policy, 1895–1901 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), p. 123. 109. Scott, China and the International System, p. 139. 110. Wang, The United States and China, pp. 59–65. 111. Hsu, The Rise of Modern China, p. 350.

Chapter Two

Attitudes and Perceptions

China was, when Theodore Roosevelt took office, many things to many people. To some, China represented a potentially golden commercial opportunity, a place where good works could be performed and souls saved. As a focal point of international rivalry, China represented a challenge for the United States. China was likewise seen as a potentially fearsome entity, and concerns were expressed about China’s future and what its potential might mean for the United States and the world in general. Of greater concern was the fact that China was a source of cheap labor that, if unchecked, could lead to a flood of alien immigrants who would threaten the American standard of living and bring undesirable habits and activities with them. While Americans were curious about China, their first impressions were largely shaped by European literary sources and the arts, and those impressions were highly idealized. Early American intellectuals, such as Benjamin Franklin, James Madison, and Thomas Jefferson, all admired China as a source of new ideas, methods, and even for its isolation from the world. But there was also an element of disdain for the Chinese, and Americans who traveled to China quickly expressed it. Americans in China soon looked down upon the Chinese, who were perceived as lacking in morality and little better than children. Some of that contempt was the result of China’s refusal to conduct international relations according to Western precepts, and this often led to calls for the use of force to compel Chinese acquiescence to Western demands. Any show of weakness was to be avoided in order to keep the Chinese from taking advantage of it. Even missionaries felt that harsh measures were required to lift China out of its backward and heathen state. 1 The American image of China was also shaped by contact with those Chinese who had come to the United States. A contemporary writer noted: “The average American has less respect for the Chinese as a race than have 33

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most of the European peoples. This is probably owing to the greater acquaintance on the part of Americans with Chinese laborers than with the better class Chinese, and to American legislation on the Chinese question.” 2 A strong anti-Chinese sentiment had developed as a result of that contact, and these feelings helped shape a national attitude toward China. Much of the hostility was modified after 1895 as China’s inability to fend off the thrusts of the Western powers and Japan became apparent. The issuance of the Open Door notes at the turn of the century suggested that a more sympathetic attitude was developing, but American attitudes toward China would be marked by inconsistency in the first part of the twentieth century. Nevertheless, newer views were beginning to develop what, in time, might come to replace the general feelings of hostility that had been dominant. 3 As the Spanish-American War and its aftermath fired American imperialistic ambitions, China loomed as a natural target. The writings of Brooks Adams and Alfred Thayer Mahan, among others, provided an intellectual foundation for American expansion into the Pacific and the Orient. 4 Businessmen who noted a slight growth in the China trade during the 1890s called for greater involvement in Asia. Fear of spiritual stagnation led to a revitalization of the missionary movement. Business and reform would be viewed as partners in the opening of China. Both would serve for the benefit of China with the advantage of providing business opportunities for American merchants and investors. 5 China was also perceived as the focal point of two interrelated struggles. On the one hand was China’s resistance to the guidance offered by the powers of the Western world, of which the United States perceived itself as the superior representative. The other contest was between the American drive for a long-term, benevolent presence in China, and the more insidious imperialism of the European powers. Any hope China had of defending itself against these forces of imperialism was through reform, while the immediate affirmation of American interests was critical to helping this reform process take hold. Additionally, the United States would have to assert itself in China in order to guarantee American access to the enormous potential of the China market. In the eyes of some, China was where the crucial struggles for the control of world civilization would take place. The reasoning that called for an Open Door in China, which was founded in the economic downturn of the 1890s and the need for markets to absorb excess production, inherent ideas of westward expansion, and the opportunity to bring the benefits of American civilization to China, made it easy for those who wanted to increase the nation’s involvement in that ancient empire to dramatize China’s potential and point to it as “a stage for national action.” 6 Writing in the North American Review in January 1898, Charles Denby, the American Minister to China, noted how that country had become a focal

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point of great power rivalry and expressed concern about what he perceived as an apathetic American response to the situation. Our country cannot shut its eyes to this condition. The people of America, with a rapidly increasing population producing more than they can consume, with an aggressive character that brooks no opposition, with a coast line greater than that of any power in Europe, dotted with flourishing cities, constitutes a factor in the Orient that no apathy, no neglect, can belittle . . . The markets of the Orient are the heritage of her merchants, and the time will inevitably come when the voice of the Republic will be heard in Oriental courts with the same voice of authority as in the commonwealths of South America. It would be well if the certainty of this destiny could be recognized before European statesmanship had barred the way with ‘vested interests.’” 7

Denby’s concerns were echoed a month later by General James H. Wilson, who wrote that conditions in China “cannot be regarded with indifference.” The United States, he added, Being as they are, China’s nearest neighbor across the sea, and the only one of the great powers which has absolutely no plans hostile to the peace, integrity, and general welfare of the Chinese people, they must look with the deepest apprehension upon the events taking place in that quarter. They cannot afford to be mistaken as to the plans of the other powers, nor to depend upon even the most benevolent of them for their proper share of the commerce now in existence, and which is sure to increase rapidly hereafter if China is permitted to work out her salvation with her possessions intact and her autonomy unimpaired. 8

Brooks Adams would call China “the great problem of the future, a problem from which there is no escape.” 9 Americans were torn between two images of China when Theodore Roosevelt became president. On one hand, there was a general dissatisfaction with the Chinese as people, based primarily on contacts with Chinese in the United States that led to attitudes that ranged from contempt to paternalism. Some of the harsher edges of this feeling had been blunted by a growing sympathy for the plight of China in its relations with the various world powers. At the same time, there was an increasing optimism in some quarters that China could overcome its weakness and would, one day, take its place with the modern nations of the world. The persons who held this viewpoint thought, in general, that the various powers would have to lead China into the twentieth century, and they wanted the United States to play a principal role in the China reclamation project. 10 For some American missionaries, China’s condition was easily explained. Writing on the eve of the Boxer Uprising, in which she and her husband, the missionary Charles Price, would perish, Eva Jane Price put it simply and

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“In the Chinese Labyrinth.” This illustration shows Uncle Sam leading Great Britain, Austria, France, and Germany through a series of traps labeled “Casus Belli” in China, during the Boxer Uprising. Uncle Sam lights the way with a lantern marked “Prudence.” Source: Puck, February 6, 1901, Library of Congress.

starkly. “China is the result of heathenism and is a fair specimen of what a country’s development will be without the civilization that grows out of a Christian gospel.” 11 D. Z. Sheffield, missionary and educator, who spent more than forty years in China, noted: The presence of powerful Western nations in the soil or at the door of China, with their naval and military equipments, already marking out their “spheres of influence” in Chinese territory, and the ignorance, jealousy, selfishness, and corruption among the rulers who have blindly allowed their country to drift into its present danger, unite in emphasizing the fact that there is a sick man in the Far East whose recovery is doubtful. China cannot continue to exist as a nation without the thorough renovation of her national life. 12

Furthermore, Sheffield added, “China needs protection and guidance . . . at the hands of such Christian nations as are truly interested in her welfare, that she may be preserved in her integrity, and enter in earnest upon her career of reform.” 13 The implication was clear. The United States would have to be one of those “Christian nations” that would assume the responsibility of guidance so that “China will be delivered from its effete civilization, will enjoy a stable and well-ordered government, will enter upon a period of material prosperity, and will come under the power of those mo-

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tives which have their source in the vital truths of the Christian revelation.” 14 Or, as the new American Minister to China, Edwin H. Conger put it, “Orientalism must effectively give way to Occidentalism . . . and the sooner it comes, the better for China.” The debate over China’s future, however, was often marked by uncertainty as a variety of future scenarios were predicted by observers of conditions there. 15 Roosevelt himself was highly representative of these viewpoints. He had read the works of Mahan and Adams and was deeply influenced by them. He corresponded with both and discussed China with each of them, and he shared their points of view. In regard to Hawaii in 1897, Roosevelt told Mahan, “I take your views absolutely, as indeed I do on foreign policy generally.” Roosevelt also expressed his interest in “seeing American commercial interests prosper in the Orient.” He supported the work of missionaries in China and American efforts to reform the educational system there. 16 Roosevelt took a less sympathetic view of China itself. To him, China was the perfect example of what would happen if a nation lost the spiritual and military qualities he so admired, however, he was capable of moderating these views. 17 Although he represented divergent views on China, Roosevelt was definitely interested in that part of the world, although exactly how extensive that interest was may be open to interpretation. What is clear is that he seems to have known a good bit about China 18 and could rely on several friends to keep him conversant about conditions there. 19 As American intelligence efforts, such as they were, focused primarily on military and naval concerns, especially in regard to having a large battleship flotilla, 20 Roosevelt relied on a network made up of diplomatic personnel, journalists, and friends as sources of information. One important source of information was diplomat and China scholar, William W. Rockhill. Coauthor of the Open Door notes, intimate with other China hands such as Alfred E. Hippisley, an Englishman with a long record of service in China, Rockhill shared similar views with Roosevelt on international relations and was an invaluable mine of information, ideas, and suggestions on policy. 21 Roosevelt also relied on two close friends who happened to be foreign diplomats. Cecil Arthur Spring-Rice of Great Britain and Hermann Speck von Sternburg of Germany could be counted on to keep Roosevelt abreast of international affairs. There were several others with whom Roosevelt was comfortable in discussing foreign relations, among them Henry Cabot Lodge, Leonard Wood, William Howard Taft, Henry White, the aforementioned Adams and Mahan, Elihu Root, and John Hay. All of these men could and did provide Roosevelt with insights, news, and viewpoints about international relations in general and the China scene in particular. 22 For all of his interest in China, Roosevelt often displayed a contemptuous attitude toward both the Chinese people and the Chinese empire. In his mind,

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the Chinese lacked the qualities that made for a strong and enduring civilization. China had also failed to display the fighting spirit that had sparked Roosevelt’s admiration for the Japanese. Various social scientists and theorists in general influenced Roosevelt’s views on China and race, but he seems to have relied most heavily on Edward Alsworth Ross, a sociologist at the University of Wisconsin, and the director of the Museum of Natural History in New York, Henry Fairfield Osborn. Ross, in particular, argued for severe restrictions on Oriental immigration, asserting the “yellow peril” viewpoint that if Asian immigrants continued to come to the Pacific shores a clash with white Americans would surely come about. Roosevelt agreed with this point of view, and had taken a position against Chinese immigration as early as 1882. 23 Thomas G. Dyer has argued that Roosevelt held a broad sense of race, based on a series of general assumptions, concepts, and theories that filled his thoughts. It permitted a simplistic view of the past that relied upon racial differences, movements, and competition between the races. “In addition, race functioned as a unifying theme for a social philosophy that rewarded superior pedigrees and penalized inferior ones.” 24 Max J. Skidmore has taken this idea further, however, pointing out that Roosevelt’s definition of race “tended to be based on group identity rather than genetics . . . in many circumstances he qualified his own racial views.” 25 Skidmore concludes that Roosevelt’s ideas on race were based more on culture than genetics. 26 The emphasis on group identity rather than genetics is evident in a statement Roosevelt made to Secretary of State John Hay in 1904. Reflective of his admiration of the Japanese and disdain for China, he stated, “What nonsense it is to speak of the Chinese and Japanese as of the same race! They are of the same race only in the sense that a Levantine Greek is of the same race as Lord Milner.” 27 Roosevelt’s lack of regard for the Chinese may best be summed up in the fact that he used the term “Chinese” as a soubriquet for contempt. 28 Chinese backwardness meant stern measures should be taken in dealing with them, if necessary. During the Boxer Rebellion, Roosevelt commented to Spring-Rice that the situation in China seemed to be very bad. “I earnestly hope that the great powers will be able to act in concert and once for all put China in a position where she has to behave.” 29 A few weeks before he became president, Roosevelt offered these thoughts about the Boxer crisis: “The Chinese outrages had to be stopped and the Chinese bandits punished. . . .” 30 Writing to Speck von Sternburg soon after becoming president, Roosevelt lamented, “. . . if the Chinese could be forced to behave themselves—not permitted to do anything atrocious, but not partitioned, and with the ports kept open to all comers, as well as having the vexatious trade restrictions, which prevent inter-Chinese trade in the interior, abolished.” 31

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The outlines of Roosevelt’s China policy are evident here; how to achieve these goals would be the problem. During the Chinese boycott of American goods in 1905, which was a protest against American immigration policies regarding the Chinese, Roosevelt instructed Rockhill, who had recently assumed the duties of Minister to China, “. . . to take a stiff tone with the Chinese where they are clearly doing wrong. Unless I misread them entirely they despise weakness even more than they prize justice, and we must make it evident that we intend to do what is right and that we do not intend for a moment to suffer what is wrong.” 32 Implicit in the instruction was the idea that the U.S. government would make the decision about what was right and what was wrong. Roosevelt was prone to blame China’s troubles on its weakness and inability to fight. He compared the position of China in the world to that of a wealthy man who has allowed lawless elements to see not only that he was helpless, but also would not defend himself. At the present day China is in exactly the position I speak of and has suffered accordingly. China has lost Mongolia, Manchuria, Tonkin, Hong Kong, and Kiaochow. Peking is still Chinese but even in Peking and the interior of China people still have to do pretty much as foreigners say. This is purely and simply because China has not been able to fight and willing to fight for her own rights. [sic] This attitude has not saved her from war. It has merely saved her from successful war.

Roosevelt noted that the inability of China to conduct a war successfully meant that it had to fight again and again, unlike Japan, which had quickly demonstrated its military prowess. Roosevelt saw in all of this a warning for the United States. Although he argued for the fair and equitable treatment of all nations by the United States, Roosevelt also believed the nation must make it clear that it was ready and capable of defending itself. 33 While Roosevelt undoubtedly harbored prejudicial feelings toward the Chinese, his scorn was based on far more than bigotry. The real reason for his contempt lay in how the Chinese measured up to his own philosophical values regarding the factors that made a nation strong. In Roosevelt’s view, the Chinese were found wanting. China had given in to those forces that could weaken a nation and its people, no matter how rich their cultural background might be. China was held up as an object lesson for the American people. The United States had to continue its growth, had to assume a more active role in world affairs, and had to be prepared to fight for its rights and ideals if necessary. Failure to do so would, in time, reduce the United States to the state China was in. 34 We of this generation . . . have our tasks, and woe to us if we fail to perform them! We cannot, if we would, play the part of China, and be content to rot by

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“The First Duty.” The illustration shows a female figure representing “Civilization” standing before the Chinese emperor, while in the background, a dragon labeled “Boxer” with billowing clouds of smoke labeled “Anarchy,” “Murder,” and “Riot” is coming over the city wall into the international Legation Quarter. Civilization tells the emperor that the Boxer dragon must be killed, stating that if China does not do it, “Civilization” will. Source: Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division Washington, D.C., 1900.

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inches in ignoble ease within our borders, taking no interest in what goes on beyond them, sunk in a scrambling commercialism; heedless of the higher life, the life of aspiration, of toil and risk, busying ourselves only with the wants of our bodies for the day, until suddenly we should find, beyond a shadow of question, what China has already found, that in this world the nation that has trained itself to a career of unwarlike and isolated ease is bound, in the end, to go down before other nations that have not lost the manly and adventurous qualities. If we are to be a really great people, we must strive in good faith to play a great part in the world. 35

This attitude stayed with Roosevelt long after he had left the presidency. A few months after the outbreak of World War I, he declared: “If Germany smashes England, I should regard it as certain that this country either had to fight or admit it was an occidental China.” 36 Preparedness also meant the possibility of a more effective policy in China. As Henry Miller, United States Consul in Niuzhuang (Newchwang) Manchuria, put it, “if we are to expect that our ambitions of an ‘Open Door’ in China are ever to be realized, we must rely upon our activity of a wise and just diplomacy sustained by a first class Navy.” 37 Roosevelt agreed and maintained this viewpoint throughout his life. In 1916, he wrote that asserting American interests in China “would be ample folly until we take up the question of ample preparedness.” 38 Experience had no doubt reinforced Roosevelt’s feelings in regard to the efficacy of the American presence in the Far East when he penned those words, and later events would prove him correct. Many others shared Roosevelt’s disdain for the Chinese. General James Wilson, who had served in China during the Boxer Uprising, declared that “so far as history shows, the Chinese race are about as much of a menace to the rest of the world as the lamb in the fable was to the wolf.” 39 Henry Miller called for the stationing of a gunboat in Niuzhuang because, the American Consul argued, the Chinese had more respect for nations represented by their navy. 40 General Leonard Wood, the military governor of Moro Province in the Philippines, a friend and former commanding officer of Roosevelt’s Rough Riders, violently opposed Chinese immigration to the United States. Writing to the president in 1905, Wood expressed his fervent hope that no law would ever permit Chinese laborers to come to America. “Anyone who had ever seen the Chinese in the coast cities of China would rather see the Pacific Coast, or any other portion of the United States sunk in the ocean than covered with these people.” Wood characterized the Chinese as having “neither patriotism nor morals.” The United States had enough “national weakness and humiliation from the Negro to avoid further trouble by the introduction of races with which we can never mingle.” 41 Roosevelt, himself adverse to racial intermingling, 42 replied that he entirely agreed “with you in what you say about the Chinese situation.” He would never, he assured Wood,

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approve legislation admitting Chinese laborers to the United States. 43 However, by this point, Roosevelt had concluded that allowing members of China’s upper and middle class into the United States was acceptable. 44 Another opponent to the admission of Chinese laborers was Samuel L. Gracey, United States Consul in Fuzhou (Foochow). Gracey did favor permitting Chinese house servants to enter the United States, believing that they would solve a difficult problem in American domestic life. “They [the Chinese] make the best domestic servants to be found on earth.” 45 Secretary of State John Hay was not immune to expressions of scorn in regard to China and its people. Hay told Rockhill at one point, “We have done the Chinks a great service, which they don’t seem inclined to recognize. It would never do to let them imagine they can treat us as they please, and that the only nation they need fear is Russia.” 46 On another occasion, Hay referred to the Chinese as “those poor, trembling rabbits” in a letter to Roosevelt, and during the Russo-Japanese War he spoke of “China’s pathetic helplessness.” 47 Hay seems to have mingled disparagement with a trace of pity in these references to the Chinese. Dealing with the Chinese could and did evoke expressions of frustration from those in the field. Edwin H. Conger, Minister to China when Roosevelt assumed the presidency, called the Chinese “slow moving and procrastinating.” He added that it was “impossible to do anything here, involving the Palace, in a hurry.” 48 Rockhill, who succeeded Conger, experienced similar aggravations. During the anti-American boycott, Rockhill complained, “The Chinese are absolutely impossible to deal with at present—their heads are so swollen—why the Lord only knows! that I prefer to not attempt even discussing matters with them.” The Chinese would become more sensible, Rockhill concluded, “when the money pinch comes.” 49 Unflattering remarks about Chinese diplomats and officials were not uncommon. Alvey A. Adee, Assistant Secretary of State, referred to the Chinese Minister, Sir Chiantung Liang Cheng, as “Poor Sir Chink-tongue.” 50 When Wu Tingfang was named as the new American Minister in 1907, Roosevelt referred to him as “a bad old Chink.” 51 Officials who were influential at court, such as Zhang Zhidong (Chang Chih-tung), governor-general of Hunan and Hupei provinces, and Li Hongzhang, the commissioner of northern ports, were regarded with suspicion and contempt. Hay thought of Li as a corrupt and treacherous scoundrel. 52 Interestingly, after Hay’s death in 1905, “Sir Chink-tongue” expressed admiration for the late Secretary of State in a dispatch to his Foreign Office. The Minister encouraged the empress dowager and emperor to send an imperial edict expressing China’s condolences at Hay’s passing. Liang added that “Everyone regarded John Hay as an exceptional person, unique in his humanity and pacifism. In his seven years in office, in problems of foreign relations, he placed great emphasis on Eastern Asia.” 53 Liang would also

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comment favorably on Hay’s successor, Elihu Root, praising his “loyalty and patriotism” for giving up a lucrative law practice to serve in the government, although his remarks lacked the feelings he expressed for Hay. 54 Ignorance or misunderstanding undoubtedly colored American perceptions of China, official or otherwise. The average citizen had a stereotyped image of “John Chinaman,” and the official viewpoint was often no clearer. For example, William Howard Taft, during his tenure as governor of the Philippines, justified a proposed law permitting the sale of opium to Chinese, while banning its sale to Filipinos and Americans. Taft’s decision was based on his view that opium was not harmful to Chinese, “but it is most pernicious in its effects on Filipino and Americans.” 55 Conger, in a report on the status of Chinese and Japanese women married to Americans, referred to them collectively as “women of the Mongolian race.” Such a remark would have been considered highly insulting both by Japanese or Chinese persons. Roosevelt himself was also guilty of lumping Chinese and Japanese together as members of the “Mongol” race. 56 Roosevelt, his friends, and advisers were not merely contemptuous of the Chinese. Hay, as noted earlier, expressed what might be viewed as pity for them. Elihu Root, Hay’s successor as Secretary of State, appears to have taken a more paternalistic attitude. Root appreciated the cultural heritage of the Chinese and individual abilities of many Chinese statesmen. Preferring to treat the Chinese kindly, Root was often annoyed at what he perceived as childish behavior. 57 Roosevelt admitted that he could not “object to any Chinaman showing a feeling that he would like to retaliate now and then for our insolence to the Chinese.” 58 While Roosevelt might be credited for admitting that the Chinese had been treated badly, it is likely that he and others would have changed both their behavior and perceptions of the Chinese and treated them more respectfully only if more Chinese had demonstrated their willingness to strike back at the Western nations and Japan. However, Roosevelt’s sense of fair play did come across from time to time when dealing with China. He supported a remission of the Boxer Indemnity and the establishment of a scholarship program for Chinese students, for example, and gave strict instructions regarding the treatment of Chinese by consular officials. Discourtesy or mistreatment would result in immediate dismissal from the Foreign Service. Ultimately, Roosevelt would even admit that the United States had treated China badly. 59 Rockhill called for caution in regard to the indiscriminate use of gunboat diplomacy in China. American consuls, he noted, should not be encouraged to request naval support unless it was absolutely necessary. Otherwise, he noted, “we will see the old ‘gunboat policy’ of twenty years ago advocated in the most trivial cases as the only argument suitable to the Chinese.” Rockhill did not object to keeping firearms at the consulates in the event of another Boxer-like uprising, though. 60

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Positive signs could be discerned in China as well. It was Rockhill who recognized in the anti-American boycott of 1905 the first evidence of “a spirit of solidarity” in China. This spirit, Rockhill cautioned, could be dangerous if not directed to lawful ends, but it was “a hopeful one for China if properly guided and developed.” Although he was best equipped to view the situation in China objectively, Rockhill remained unable or unwilling to shake off the view that the Western nations would have to lead China into the modern era. 61 He was also frustrated by the lack of interest China showed in accepting American direction. The only answer, to him, was that China’s upper class lacked the energy and strength to effect change. 62 Rockhill did become more aware of and sympathetic to the rising nationalist tide in China after 1905, and argued for a more responsive American policy toward the empire, but Roosevelt rejected his entreaties. 63 From a geopolitical standpoint, Roosevelt believed that if China could become civilized in the Western sense, and the backward areas of Africa and Asia could be brought under control by the great powers, mankind would benefit as a whole. If this dream could be realized, the time might come when armaments could be reduced to “meet merely the needs of internal and international police work.” 64 Civilizing the so-called backward areas of the world might ultimately serve to eliminate or reduce international rivalries to the point where greater worldwide cooperation might be possible. A civilized China, by Roosevelt’s standards, would be essential in transforming this dream to reality. The international competition for commercial and other privileges in China prompted some debate about whether or not partitioning the Chinese empire might be in the best interests of not only China, but also the world community. One observer held that the dissolution of China “was inevitable and not remote.” Moreover, he held that any partition of China “is not as formidable a contingency as has been imagined, provided that America agrees to take her legitimate share in it.” 65 Others disagreed. The former Minister to Siam and a “China hand” as well, John Barrett, argued that the United States “should oppose, with all its moral, political, and diplomatic influence, any partition of China among the foreign Powers [sic], or any delineation of acknowledged spheres of influence.” Additionally, America needed to insist upon the “permanent maintenance of the Open Door” as a fundamental principle of its foreign policy in regard to China. 66 Barrett also called for a “McKinley Doctrine” in Asia that would stand for the “permanent maintenance of the Open Door in China,” and which would commit the United States to oppose “with all its legitimate moral influence” the acquisition by any power of sovereignty in China so that “vast markets and material opportunities” in Asia would remain open to America. 67 The Reverend Gilbert Reid, president of the International Institute of China, noted that the United States would find it unnecessary to interfere in China affairs if that

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state was not in danger of dismemberment, “but if dismemberment is to be undertaken, the very existence of American interests, commercial and military . . . will require that the United States not only be consulted, but given an equal share in the distribution of new opportunities.” 68 However, Reid went on to note that few persons “realize the danger to American interests of allowing the dismemberment of China.” A scramble for conquest, possessions, sovereignty, in China would endanger the peace of the world. Even a struggle for established spheres of influence, with Chinese authority weakened more and more, would not only be treacherous to China but provoke such discord, animosities, riots, and resentments as to make the loss and trouble of the participants greater than the gain and honor. Each nation, while anxious for more influence, is opposed to the increased influence of any other nation. The whole territory of China presents so many opportunities for foreign enterprise that all prefer competition to exclusiveness and dismemberment. 69

Roosevelt had a keen awareness of the international rivalries in China and the importance of China to the interrelationships of the world community. He was adamantly opposed to any dismemberment of the Chinese Empire. “I do earnestly hope there will be no slicing up of China,” he told Speck von Sternburg during the Boxer Rebellion. “It will be bad for everybody in the end.” 70 Following the signing of the Boxer Protocol, the new president expressed his feeling that there was a link between the Monroe Doctrine and the Open Door that made them equivalent to each other. He did not want any European power acquiring territory in the Western Hemisphere, and hoped the same policy could be applied to China. 71 Roosevelt’s view remained consistent. Three years after leaving office, Roosevelt noted that “all over the world nations are so interrelated at present that a catastrophe for China cannot help affecting everyone.” 72 Before assuming the presidency, Roosevelt had concluded, as had others, 73 that Russia was the major power to contend with in the Far East. Two months before McKinley’s assassination, Roosevelt expressed his belief that “no other European power can in the long run contest with Russia the control of the destiny of Asia.” 74 While Roosevelt had no qualms about “civilized” powers gaining “at the expense of the barbarians,” he was apprehensive about Russian ambitions in China. “Exactly as Turkestan has been benefited by Russia’s advances so I think China would be. But then I look at the matter from a rather visionary standpoint, and it may be that if I knew more of the trade needs between China or Asia generally and our Pacific slope, I might alter my views.” 75 Along with his recognition of Russia as the primary concern in Asia, Roosevelt had also seized upon Japan as the probable counterweight. As early as 1898, he observed that Japan could act as “a formidable counterpoise

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to Russia in the Far East.” 76 During the Boxer troubles, Roosevelt mentioned his desire to see Japan take control of Korea, because “She will be a check upon Russia. . . .” 77 Roosevelt’s disdain for China also reflected his belief that the troubled empire had allowed itself to be controlled and manipulated by stronger nations. His admiration of the Japanese had been sparked by their victory over China in 1895. He respected military skill, and reports that the Japanese troops involved in the International Relief Force that had liberated Beijing from the Boxers in 1900 was one of the best disciplined and most effective of the national forces involved only furthered his respect for Japan. Roosevelt was suspicious of Russia, viewing it as a semi-barbaric country whose leaders were not to be trusted, while his admiration for Japan would make it clear to anyone who knew him where his sympathies were. 78 Roosevelt preferred a policy of international cooperation with the other powers in China, and he especially favored Britain and Germany as the nations to work with in the Far East. “I cordially sympathize with England’s attitude in China,” Roosevelt wrote in 1898, “and I am glad to say that there seems to be a gradual coming together of the two peoples. They certainly ought to come together.” 79 Three years later, he told Mahan: “I feel that the United States and England should so far as possible work together in China.” 80 There were similar calls for German-American cooperation as well. Sternburg was informed that “I am exceedingly anxious that in China there should be the most thorough agreement between the two nations.” 81 Working together could benefit Germany and the United States, not only in China, but also in South America, Roosevelt informed “Specky” after becoming president. 82 Roosevelt’s goal seems to have been an Anglo-American-German effort in Asia. “As you know,” he wrote Sternburg, “I have a strong hope that Germany, England, and the United States will be more and more able to act together. They surely ought to.” 83 While Roosevelt might have welcomed international cooperation, he was not interested in an alliance with either nation. “I do not believe in any entangling alliance, but neither do I believe in any entangling antipathies,” Roosevelt declared. He also indicated a willingness to take a pragmatic approach to China and the rivalries there. “If our trade interests with China are valuable, I should most unquestioningly side with or against any European power out there purely with regards to our own interests.” 84 The qualifying element, of course, was the value of American interests, particularly in regard to trade and commerce, in any American response to events in China. Roosevelt came to the presidency with strongly developed views on China, the Far East and foreign policy in general. While Roosevelt’s views regarding imperialism and immigration undoubtedly harbored racial overtones, 85 his views regarding China involved more than just race. For Roose-

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velt China was the perfect example of what would happen when a nation lost the vigorous qualities he prized so much. More than that, China was an object lesson for the United States, and the other great powers, to keep in mind. Roosevelt did not take the dominance of the white world for granted, 86 but a loss of the virtues that had led to that supremacy could result in the same fate that the Chinese had suffered, and this was a genuine concern of Roosevelt’s. As George Sinkler has correctly noted, the real key to history and civilization in Roosevelt’s mind “was not race but power.” 87 Roosevelt’s contempt for China and its people certainly had racial overtones, but his disdain was primarily the result of his values. And there were times when a hint of sympathy seemed to peek through the veil of scorn. Roosevelt’s friends and advisers shared similar attitudes. The significant element is that Roosevelt was not unmindful of affairs in China, no matter what his attitudes were. He was aware of the major international problems in Asia and had worked out definite ideas, at least in general terms, as to what the United States should try to accomplish there. These included the possible development of Japan as a counter to Russian interests in the Far East, and cooperation with Great Britain and Germany in Asia. Finally, Roosevelt thought of China as an important cog in the increasingly interconnected affairs of the world, and he saw events there as having a significant influence on them. Roosevelt was quite capable of taking a full part in the formation of China policy if he so desired. And, of course, he would. However, the attitudes and perceptions of China that Roosevelt brought with him to the White House served as both a strength and weakness. Because he was knowledgeable about China and Asia, and since he had considered methods of dealing with problems there, Roosevelt was in a position to make a positive contribution to the formation of American policy toward China. Just as important was the fact that he already knew or had corresponded with many of the people who would now be working for or advising him, so that he and his subordinates were familiar with each other and they shared, in general, similar outlooks and viewpoints. Roosevelt could step in for his assassinated predecessor and the machinery of state, especially in regard to making foreign policy, would continue to function fairly smoothly. Had he entered the presidency poorly informed and without having considered guidelines for the conduct of international relations, Roosevelt might have taken a less active role in American diplomacy, especially early on. Certainly he would have been less capable of providing effective leadership and direction, no matter how much he might have chosen to rely on the capabilities of his advisers and diplomats. Negatively, the attitudes and perceptions Roosevelt and so many others shared about China limited American policy initiatives. What this meant was

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that China policy had been and would continue to be based on certain formulaic assumptions. American policymakers could not see beyond the image of a weak China suffering from the lack of Western values and ideals. “John Chinaman” was a stereotype that could not be overcome, especially in comparison with a rising Japan. Americans, Roosevelt among them, saw in China what they wanted to see, not necessarily what really was there to see. The conviction that the Westernization of China would cure all of that struggling country’s ills was, at best, naïve, and, at worst, a justification for the continued exploitation of a weak and defenseless state. There was little or no understanding of how China truly viewed the world or of the tremendous, even traumatic, cultural shock that some sixty years of prolonged Western encroachment had caused, along with the many external and internal tribulations that were the results of that intrusion. China remained a mystery to outsiders no matter how “knowledgeable” one might be. Sarah Pike Conger understood this when she wrote, “Our ignorance and extreme prejudices make us appear in a bad and untrue light. . . . If we strive with patience and good will to understand Chinese life and its expression, many of our prejudices will pass away and we will be able to see more clearly.” 88 The conception Roosevelt had of global interrelationships and the impact the dismemberment of China might have upon them was brilliant. His recognition of Japan as a future threat to American interests in Asia and the Pacific was somewhat prophetic. But his view that the “civilized’ nations of the world must take the “backward” nations of the world by the hand and lead them into the modern world was too simplistic, although the idea that the more advanced nations might offer assistance was basically sound. What Roosevelt and others failed to comprehend was that these nations, whether emerging or struggling to survive, would have to learn to deal with the twentieth century on their own terms. China would have to adapt to the modern world in a way that was compatible with its own past as well as its visions of the future. This was what China was struggling to do, but there was little or no recognition of this fact. The assumption that everything the West, especially the United States, had to offer China would be beneficial was unsound. Only the Chinese could decide what, if anything, the West had to offer was worth fitting into their culture and tradition. It must also be emphasized that Roosevelt and his followers were truly men of their time, and the views they subscribed to were quite representative of their era, and of the great powers in general. 89 Roosevelt maintained a consistent viewpoint and attitude about China before, during, and after his presidency, and his own preconceived notions regarding how nations and peoples should conduct themselves colored his views. Nearly eight years as president did little, if anything, to modify them. If anything, his feelings were reinforced and they would help determine the formulation of China policy during his administration.

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NOTES 1. Hunt, Special Relationship, pp. 32–34. 2. Gilbert Reid, “The Powers and the Partition of China,” North American Review 170, no. 522 (May 1900): 640. 3. Robert McClellan, The Heathen Chinee: A Study of American Attitudes toward China, 1890–1905 (Columbus: The Ohio State University Press, 1971), pp. 249–50. 4. Brooks Adams, American Economic Supremacy (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1900); Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1895); and Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Problem of Asia (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1900). 5. Cohen, America’s Response to China, pp. 42–52; Jerry Israel, Progressivism and the Open Door: America and China, 1905–1921 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1972), pp. 3–22. Good studies of the American interest in the Far East are McCormick, China Market; and Young, The Rhetoric of Empire. 6. Hunt, Special Relationship, p. 177. 7. Charles Denby, “America’s Opportunity in Asia,” North American Review 166, no. 494 (January 1898): 35–36 8. James H. Wilson, “America’s Interests in China,” North American Review 166, no. 495 (February 1989): 140. 9. Brooks Adams, “Russia’s Interest in China,” The Atlantic Monthly 86, no. 515 (September 1900): 317. 10. McClellan, Heathen Chinee, pp. 249–54; Israel, Progressivism and the Open Door, pp. 22–23. 11. Eva Jane Price, China Journal, 1889–1900: An American Missionary Family during the Boxer Rebellion, with Letters and Diaries of Eva Jane Price and her Family (New York: Charles Scribner, 1989), p. 22; Preston, The Boxer Rebellion, pp. 276–79. 12. D. Z. Sheffield, “The Future of the Chinese People,” Atlantic Monthly 85, no. 507 (January 1900): 76. 13. Ibid., p. 84. 14. Ibid. 15. Quoted in Scott, China and the International System, pp. 139–42. 16. Howard K. Beale, Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of America to World Power (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1956), p. 77; Roosevelt to Mahan, May 3, 1897, Elting E. Morison, ed., The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952), vol. 1, p. 607, vol. 4, pp. 1278–79, hereafter cited as Roosevelt Letters; Theodore Roosevelt, “The Awakening of China,” The Outlook, December 28, 1908, pp. 665–67. 17. Israel, Progressivism and the Open Door, p. 23; George Sinkler, The Racial Attitudes of American Presidents (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1971), p. 311; Frank Ninkovich, “Theodore Roosevelt: Civilization as Ideology,” Diplomatic History 10, no. 3 (July 1986): 221–45; Frederick W. Marks, “Morality as a Drive Wheel in the Diplomacy of Theodore Roosevelt,” Diplomatic History 2, no. 1 (January 1978): 46–47. 18. That knowledge could be somewhat esoteric. According to Kathleen Dalton, TR was aware of the impact of erosion on both agriculture and the human environment in China. Kathleen Dalton, Theodore Roosevelt: A Strenuous Life (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2002), p. 247. 19. Beale, Roosevelt and the Rise of America, pp. 180–81. 20. Christopher Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush (New York: Harper Perennial, 1996), p. 29. 21. Rockhill’s influence and career are detailed in Paul Varg, Open Door Diplomat: The Life of W. W. Rockhill (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1952). 22. Beale, Roosevelt and the Rise of America, p. 181. 23. Thomas G. Dyer, Theodore Roosevelt and the Idea of Race (Baton Rouge: The University of Louisiana Press, 1980), pp. 14–15, 140. 24. Dyer, Roosevelt and the Idea of Race, pp. 168–69.

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25. Max J. Skidmore, “Theodore Roosevelt on Race and Gender,” Journal of American Culture (Summer 1998): 36. 26. Ibid., p. 44. 27. Roosevelt to Hay, September 2, 1904, Roosevelt Letters, vol. 4, p. 917. 28. Dyer, Roosevelt and the Idea of Race, p. 140; Sinkler, The Racial Attitudes of American Presidents, p. 314. 29. Roosevelt to Spring-Rice, July 20, 1900, Roosevelt Letters, vol. 2, p. 1359. 30. Roosevelt to Becker, July 8, 1901, Ibid., vol. 3, p.112 (italicized in text). 31. Roosevelt to Sternberg, October 11, 1901. H.W. Brands, The Selected Letters of Theodore Roosevelt (New York: Cooper Square Press, 2001), pp. 271–72, hereafter cited as Brands, Selected Letters. 32. Roosevelt to Rockhill, August 22, 1905, Roosevelt Letters., vol. 4, p. 1310. 33. Roosevelt to Perkins, April 6, 1916, Ibid., vol. 8, p.1029. 34. Beale, Roosevelt and the Rise of America, p. 181; Dyer, Roosevelt and the Idea of Race, p. 140; Sinkler, Racial Attitudes, pp. 311–15. 35. Theodore Roosevelt, The Strenuous Life: Essays and Addresses (New York: The Century Company, 1901), p. 6. 36. Roosevelt to Foulkes, December 12, 1914, Roosevelt Letters, vol. 8, p. 866. 37. Miller to State Department, July 2, 1904, United States, Department of State, Despatches from United States Consuls (Newchwang) (Washington, D.C.: National Archives, 1946), hereafter cited as CD, Newchwang. 38. Roosevelt to Forbes, May 23, 1916, Roosevelt Letters, vol. 8, p. 1044. 39. Wilson, “America’s Interests in China,” p. 130. 40. Miller to Conger, September 21, 1901, CD, Newchwang. 41. Wood to Roosevelt, December 13, 1905, Leonard Wood Papers (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress), hereafter cited as Wood MSS. 42. Sinkler, Racial Attitudes, pp. 331–34; Skidmore’s analysis of Dyer’s work on TR’s racial views suggests that Roosevelt’s views may have been qualified to some degree. Skidmore, “Roosevelt on Race and Gender,” p. 40. 43. Roosevelt to Wood, January 22, 1906, Roosevelt Letters, vol. 5, p. 135. 44. Dyer, Roosevelt and the Idea of Race, p. 140. 45. Gracey to Pierce, March 24, 1902, CD, Foochow. 46. Hay to Rockhill, July 24, 1903, William W. Rockhill Papers (Harvard University: Houghton Library), hereafter cited as Rockhill MSS. 47. Hay to Roosevelt, August 2, 1903, August 27, 1904, John Hay Papers (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress), hereafter cited as Hay MSS. 48. Conger to Hay, December 26, 1903, United States, Department of State, Despatches from United States Ministers to China (Washington, D.C.: National Archives, 1946), hereafter cited as Despatches: China. 49. Rockhill to Hippisley, July 6, 1906, Rockhill MSS. 50. Adee to Hay, August 21, 1903, Hay MSS. 51. Roosevelt to Root, September 26, 1907, Roosevelt Letters, vol. 5, p. 809. 52. Hunt, Special Relationship, p. 198. 53. Quoted in Kenneth W. Rea (ed.), Early Sino-American Relations, 1841–1912: The Collected Articles of Earl Swisher (Boulder: Westview Press, Inc., 1977), p. 199. 54. Ibid. 55. Israel, Progressivism and the Open Door, pp. 23–24; Taft to Root, May 13, 1903, Elihu Root Papers (Washington, D.C.: The Library of Congress), hereafter cited as Root MSS. 56. Conger to Hay, December 11, 1902, Despatches: China; Roosevelt to Trevelyan, October 1, 1911, Roosevelt Letters, vol. 7, p. 399. 57. Philip Jessup, Elihu Root, vol. 2 (New York: Dood, Mean, and Company, 1983), p. 44. 58. Roosevelt to Root, September 26, 1907, Roosevelt Letters, vol. 5, p. 809. 59. Marks, “Morality as a Drive Wheel in the Diplomacy of Theodore Roosevelt,” pp. 46–47. 60. Rockhill to Root, September 18, 1905, Despatches: China; Rockhill memo., March 3, 1902, CD, Chefoo.

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61. Rockhill to State Department, August 26, 1905, Despatches China. 62. Robert E. Hannigan, The New World Power: American Foreign Policy, 1898–1917 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2002), p. 103. 63. Hunt, Special Relationship, pp. 268–69. 64. Roosevelt to White, August 14, 1906, Roosevelt Letters, vol. 5, p. 359. 65. Demetrius C. Boulger, “America’s Share in a Partition of China,” North American Review 171, no. 525 (March 1899): 171, 181. 66. John Barrett, “America’s Duty in China,” North American Review 171, no. 525 (August 1900): 147. 67. Ibid., pp. 153–54. 68. Gilbert, “The Powers and the Partition of China,” p. 640. 69. Ibid., pp. 640–41. 70. Roosevelt to Sternburg, August 28, 1900, Roosevelt Letters, vol. 2, p. 394. 71. Hannigan, New World Power, p. 103. 72. Roosevelt to Takahira, December 29, 1911, Roosevelt Letters, vol. 7, p. 470. 73. Adams, “Russia’s Interest in China,” pp. 309–17; Boulger, “America’s Share,” pp. 173–74; Richard Olney, “Growth of Our Foreign Policy,” The Atlantic Monthly. 85, no. 509 (March 1900): 294. 74. Roosevelt to Sternburg, July 12, 1901, Roosevelt Letters, vol. 3, p. 117. 75. Roosevelt to Becker, July 8, 1901, Ibid., p. 112. 76. Roosevelt to Sternburg, July 17, 1898, Ibid., vol. 1, p. 764. 77. Roosevelt to Sternburg, August 28, 1900, Ibid., vol. 2, p. 894 78. Kenneth Wimmel, Theodore Roosevelt and the Great White Fleet (Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s Inc., 1998), pp. 203–5. 79. Roosevelt to Bryce, March 31, 1898, Roosevelt Letters, vol. 2, p. 807. 80. Roosevelt to Mahan, March 18, 1901, Ibid., vol. 4, p. 23. 81. Roosevelt to Sternburg, July 20, 1900, Ibid., vol. 2, p. 1358. 82. Roosevelt to Sternburg, March 6, 1902, Ibid., vol. 3, pp. 293–40. 83. Roosevelt to Sternburg, November 19, 1900, Ibid., vol. 2, p. 1428. 84. Roosevelt to Moore, February 14, 1898, Ibid., vol. 1, p. 772. 85. Dyer, Roosevelt and the Idea of Race, p. 142. 86. Sinkler, Racial Attitudes, p. 313. 87. Ibid.; Gail Bederman holds, however, that Roosevelt’s notion represented an effort to “remake male power by linking it to racial dominance using the discourse of civilization,” and that this was not an unusual view for the times. Gail Bederman, Manliness & Civilization: A Cultural History of Gender and Race in the United States, 1880–1917 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1995), pp. 170–215. 88. Sarah Pike Conger, Letters from China: With Particular Reference to the Empress Dowager and the Women of China (Chicago: A. C. McClurg and Company, 1909), p. 49. 89. See Scott, China and the International System, pp. 49–182.

Chapter Three

The Open Door in Manchuria The Russian Challenge

On September 8, 1901, William W. Rockhill and his wife left Beijing to journey by boat to Shanghai, from there they would return to the United States. Arriving a week later, they were shocked to find the American and other flags flying at half-mast. The couple soon learned the reason: President William McKinley had been assassinated. McKinley’s passing had elevated Rockhill’s friend, Theodore Roosevelt, to the presidency. As an old friend of both Roosevelt and Secretary of State John Hay, who would remain in the cabinet in that capacity, Rockhill could count on continuing as an important cog in the diplomatic machinery of the United States. It was precisely in that role that Rockhill had been serving for the past year in China. He had been assigned to Beijing as commissioner for the United States as the Boxer Rebellion was beginning to die down. Rockhill filed reports on conditions throughout China through October, when he was instructed to report to Beijing. There the powers involved in putting down the uprising were gathering to discuss the future of China and methods of punishing the Chinese for the insurrection. The ministers of the various powers attended the conference, and as each nation was permitted only one representative, Rockhill was at first on the outside looking in. The situation presented serious difficulties, for the American delegate, Edwin H. Conger, spoke no French, the language used in the meetings. The one representative rule prevented Rockhill from attending and translating for Conger. Rockhill literally had to keep himself informed about what had transpired at each day’s session by meeting and questioning the other delegates outside the conference room. Finally, in frustration, Conger asked the State Department for a leave of absence, which was granted. 53

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The American minister’s action cleared the way for Rockhill to assume the responsibility of representing the United States at the Beijing Conference, and he took his seat there beginning in February 1901. Both Conger and Rockhill were under orders to defend the Open Door Policy, which had been enunciated by Hay during the Boxer troubles, and to work for a stronger China. The other powers were more interested in territorial concessions and a large indemnity, however, and the conference was further hampered by the rivalries of the European powers and the desire of each to put the others at a disadvantage. Japan, meanwhile, seemed willing to side with any of the powers that would support its desire for Chinese territory. Even before Conger left, the conference had become bogged down in diplomatic ineptitude, jealousy, and suspicion. Rockhill would soon discover that he could do little to overcome the situation. Nevertheless, Rockhill was instrumental in the solution of the major question before the conference. This was the issue of an indemnity to be paid by China for the losses caused by Boxer violence. France, Germany, and Russia appeared determined to impose a substantial indemnity that would certainly threaten what was left of China’s independence. Rockhill and Conger had proposed that the reparations not exceed $200 million, 1 and Rockhill had further recommended that the sum be divided among the powers according to a percentage determined by each nation’s losses. The question was finally resolved when China expressed a willingness to pay compensation in the sum of $333 million. Although he felt the amount was probably too high, it was still less than what Russia and some of the other powers had demanded, and certainly lower than what the total would have been if each nation had submitted a bill for damages individually. Ultimately, Russia received the lion’s share of the indemnity, at 29 percent. Germany was next with 20 percent, France received nearly 16 percent of the money, Great Britain 11 percent, Japan just under 8 percent and the United States 7 percent. The remaining money was divided between several other European nations or went toward miscellaneous expenses. 2 The American position may have saved China a good bit of money, although the amount China agreed to pay was excessive, and may have contributed to the continuation of Chinese independence as well. Rockhill’s stance had been based on his desire to maintain Chinese sovereignty, in line with the Open Door notes, and its ability to fulfill its obligations. In this way, American interests there could be guaranteed. 3 Rockhill had helped to ease a serious problem regarding the American position in China when Roosevelt became president. However, the Beijing Conference had failed to resolve or even deal with the greatest threat to Chinese sovereignty. This threat was posed by Russian ambitions in Manchuria.

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W. W. Rockhill. Source: Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division Washington, D.C., created between 1890 and 1910.

Russia had been interested in penetrating Manchuria and northern China with an eye to controlling as much of the region as possible some day. Russians began to appear along the Amur River in the 1660s, and diplomatic

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contacts between Russia and China soon followed. At the same time, some Russians had established settlements in the region. In 1680, the Kangxi emperor demanded the abandonment of these settlements or their submission to Chinese sovereignty. While some Russians did submit, many refused and fighting broke out in the mid-1680s. The Russians were forced to withdraw and the Treaty of Nerchinsk in 1689, China’s first treaty with a European nation, confirmed this. Russian interest in the region had not subsided, however. Exploration of Siberia had revealed that the Amur River was the only river that flowed from west to east, which made it critical for access to Siberia. Additionally, the only land suitable for farming was located on the banks of the Amur as well as on the area located between the Ussuri River and the sea. Taking advantage of the chaos in China caused by the Taiping Rebellion and ignoring China’s objections, Russia annexed the territory between the Amur and Ussuri rivers in 1856. This action was followed by the creation of a Siberian Pacific Fleet to defend it. These steps resulted in the acquisition of more than 600,000 square miles of territory, which was confirmed in the Treaties of Aigun (1858), Beijing (1860) and Tarbagatai (1864). The Russians also received valuable trade rights. The lands Russia took in the mid-nineteenth century remain in their possession today. 4 The Boxer Rebellion presented Russia with the opportunity to push further south. By October 1900, using the destruction of Russian property by Boxers as a rationale, Russia had extended its position in Manchuria well beyond the railway zone that had been acquired through an earlier treaty with China. Operations were expanded until Russia had taken possession of the cities of Mukden and Niuzhuang, and the railroad as far south as Tianjian. It appeared likely that Russia intended to add Manchuria permanently to its possessions. The Chinese officials who returned to the region once the Boxers were under control found that the Russian military was the real authority there. Chinese troops were permitted into Manchuria in such limited numbers that Chinese officials could not even deal with bandit activity in the region. These officials had no more than the appearance of power, and unless the Chinese Foreign Office could find a way to remove the Russians, Chinese administrators in Manchuria would remain helpless. 5 Throughout the quarrels over Manchuria the United States, like China, had dealt from a position of weakness. China, caught in the middle between Russian ambitions and the insistence of the other powers that their rights in Manchuria be upheld, was forced into a waiting and delaying game as it tried to play each side off against the other. The United States was likewise trapped between a Russian threat to its interests and Chinese hopes that America could act in some manner to help keep Manchuria in the empire. China’s hopes were fated to be dashed, however.

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There were limits as to what the United States could do. The lack of a strong military and naval presence in Asia hampered American capabilities to challenge Russia. Even if the United States had had the military capability to do so, the general apathy of the American public toward East Asian affairs would have prevented action. Public opinion in the United States would not support a war over American commercial opportunities in Manchuria and the Russians understood this as well as Roosevelt and Hay. Therefore, the Roosevelt administration did nothing more than issue notes protesting Russian activities that challenged American trade in Manchuria, while pressuring China to observe its treaty and other obligations. Hay summarized the American position best: The Chinese, as well as the Russians, seem to know that the strength of our position is entirely moral . . . and if the Russians are convinced that we will not fight for Manchuria—as I suppose we will not—and the Chinese are convinced that they have nothing but good to expect from us and nothing but a beating from Russia, the open hand will not be so convincing to the poor devils of chinks as the raised club. Still we must do the best we can with the means at our disposition. 6

In January 1901, St. Petersburg sent the Chinese a set of thirteen points, which conditioned any evacuation of Manchuria. Russia would be given veto power over the appointment of Manchurian military governors, China would not grant concessions in Manchuria, Mongolia, or northern China to other powers without Russian consent, and Russia would administer the Chinese customhouses in Manchuria. Beijing’s objections led to withdrawal of the demands by St. Petersburg and Russian consent to cancel the Alexiev-Tsing Agreement. The demands were resubmitted in February, but in modified form. The provision about the Manchurian customhouses was dropped and a demand for economic concessions substituted. China was given until the end of the month to accept them. 7 China, hoping the other powers could provide the leverage to force the Russians to back down, leaked the demands. Prompt warnings and protests were fired off, including a protest from the United States. St. Petersburg appeared unconcerned, insisting that Russia was merely seeking adequate safeguards before withdrawing from Manchuria, but if the powers chose not to heed its assurances, then Russia would look after its own interests. When China decided in late March to reject the ultimatum, Russia withdrew it and sat back to await developments. 8 Relying on reports from both Rockhill and Conger, Secretary of State John Hay was content to merely keep an eye on events during this phase while keeping President McKinley informed. Rockhill expressed doubt that China would be able to hold on to Manchuria. 9 Conger held similar views and suggested an accommodation with Russia as the means of protecting

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American commerce. 10 Hay chose to keep American involvement minimal, opting only to protest the Russian demands while warning China not to agree to them without consulting the other powers. 11 The Chinese rejection of the Russian ultimatum brought a respite in the Manchurian situation. Although the situation in Manchuria was to remain quiet for several months, Hay kept a wary eye out for potential new developments. The secretary of state’s goal was to open up more of China to outside merchants. His efforts were directed toward both reinforcing the Open Door and bringing about a more responsible and forceful Chinese government. Hay also wanted to see reforms in China’s finances and monetary system, as well as an end to the collection of duties on the internal movement of goods within the empire. He also hoped to establish more treaty ports in Manchuria and to get a revision of China’s tariff structure in order to offset its unfavorable balance of trade as well as to further develop the empire’s market potential. 12 At the end of August, Hay instructed Conger to report fully on developments in Manchuria. Conger was to note specifically any damage to American trade and to get the opinions of his colleagues about the situation, “as far as obtainable.” 13 Hay’s telegram indicates what concerned the American government most—the threat a Russian occupation of Manchuria posed to U.S. trade interests there. When he came to the White House, Roosevelt was content to let Hay continue to manage the situation. Conger replied to Hay’s instructions on September 7. He pointed out the enormity of Russia’s railroad and other interests in Manchuria: [I]t is to be presumed that she will negotiate to adequately and permanently conserve them, and that in doing so she will undoubtedly finally acquire sovereign control thereof. It is not a pleasant prospect for us to contemplate, for, judging by the past she will probably so discriminate against foreign products at the ports or differentiate against them during their movement to the interior so as to hamper, if not destroy, foreign trade.

Believing that Russia would rather share than wrangle over the spoils of Manchuria, Conger advised that the United States join with the other powers to get a Russian guarantee of the status quo ante in trade. 14 The American consul in the Manchurian port of Niuzhuang, Henry B. Miller, disagreed. In a dispatch written to Conger on September 2, and forwarded to the State Department in the minister’s September 7th communiqué, Miller expressed his concerns about Russian encroachment in Manchuria. The consul warned that the methods used by the Russians were so “varied, devious and uncertain” that the United States would be unable “to maintain an open door in Manchuria by any agreement with Russia.” Miller called Niuzhuang and the “River Liao” the “true key” to Manchurian trade. He urged that both be kept out of Russian hands in an effort to keep Manchurian

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E. H. Conger and Staff. Source: Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division Washington, D.C., 1901.

trade open to the rest of the world and as a “check to the absolute domination of Russia.” 15 About three weeks later, Miller submitted a request for a gunboat and one hundred marines for Niuzhuang in order to show the Chinese the United States intended to protect its trade interests. Again Miller expressed his fear of Russian domination of Manchuria and the potential effect it would have on American trade there and in the rest of China. “The present trade and future possibilities of commerce between the United States and Manchuria are of too much value to be neglected,” he declared. Miller called for an American effort to open Manchuria to world trade, and suggested that Japan might prove to be a likely partner against the Russians. He noted that Japanese dependence upon American raw materials would give the United States a lever to use in soliciting aid if it so desired. 16 Conger supported Miller’s

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request for a gunboat, and the U.S.S. Vicksburg was sent to spend the winter at Niuzhuang. 17 In late 1901, Sino-Russian talks resumed. The powers kept a close watch on the negotiations, waiting to see what would become of them. Conger was fearful that any Russian-Chinese agreement would place Russia in control of Manchuria and possibly all of China as well. American trade in Manchuria would be destroyed if this eventuality came to pass. The minister recommended that the United States join England and Japan in pressuring Russia to maintain the open door. 18 Hay’s reply was an instruction to continue to watch events closely. Hay also surmised that the Japanese minister would probably be well informed of the progress of the talks. 19 On December 3, Conger reported that China and Russia had come to terms. The proposed agreement called for the return of Manchuria to Chinese jurisdiction and for the evacuation of Russian troops, who were to have completed their withdrawal by 1903. The number and places Chinese troops could occupy would be fixed in concert with Russian authorities, and no other nation could send armed forces to protect railroads in the region. Finally, there could be no construction of railways or bridges without Russian consent. Conger noted that England and Japan had already cautioned China against signing the agreement, and concluded with a request for instructions about the actions he should take. 20 Three days later, Hay instructed his minister to take “an early opportunity” to tell the Chinese “the President of the United States trusts and expects no arrangement will be made with any single power which will permanently impair the territorial integrity of China or injure the legitimate interests of the United States, or impair the ability of China to meet her international obligations.” 21 Roosevelt did not initiate, but did approve Hay’s warning to China. The American message was delivered by Conger to the Chinese government a few days later. Prince Qing, the Chinese foreign minister, reassured the American diplomat that China would not enter into an agreement that would imperil its sovereignty, and that its international obligations would be honored. China would also seek a faster evacuation time and greater control over the placement of its troops in Manchuria. What disturbed Conger, however, was the foreign minister’s admission that China would renew an earlier agreement with the Russo-Chinese Bank that would give Russia first right to build railroads or open mines in Manchuria. 22 In effect, Russia would be granted a monopoly over the economic development of Manchuria. Miller echoed Conger’s concern. The consul felt that Russian management of the Russo-Chinese Bank was detrimental to American interests. The bank, he asserted, was actually an institution of the Russian government. In other words, the Russian government had a hand in Manchurian trade. This, along with the maintenance of twenty thousand railroad guards would easily

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assure Russia’s domination of commerce in Manchuria. “No rights should be allowed Russians in Manchuria that are not allowed to our Country.” 23 Hay and Rockhill were now convinced of the danger. When Conger reported at the end of January that China would sign a modified agreement with Russia in regard to Manchuria, and a separate agreement granting a Russian monopoly there, they took action. 24 Rockhill drafted a protest based on the Sino-French Treaty of 1858, which prohibited any organization from having a commercial monopoly in China. 25 Hay altered the wording somewhat, but kept the substance of Rockhill’s draft, although he dropped his adviser’s use of the phrase “emphatic and categorical protest” against the Russo-Chinese agreement. Instead, Hay informed both parties that the United States viewed the forthcoming agreement “with concern.” The proposed Russian monopoly to open mines, build railroads, and other privileges in China affected American trading rights and threatened Chinese sovereignty. The agreement would encourage other nations to seek similar advantages, thereby undermining the policy of “absolute, equal treatment of all nations in regard to navigation and commercial privileges in the Chinese Empire.” The pact also conflicted with Russian assurances to “follow the policy of the Open Door in China as advocated by the United States and accepted by all the powers having commercial interests in China.” The United States, Hay concluded, was submitting these considerations with confidence due weight would be given them and measures adopted that would relieve American anxiety. 26 The Russian Ministry for Foreign Affairs replied that it was fully disposed to relieve American anxiety over Manchuria, but also declared that negotiations between two nations were not subject to approval by others. This was an interesting assertion, to say the least, as Russia, along with France and Germany, in the “triple intervention,” had interfered in the peace negotiations between Japan and China at Shimonoseki in 1895 over the issue of Manchuria. Russia assured the American government that there was no thought of attacking the principles of the Open Door as Russia understood them. In fact, the Russians thought it was strange that a door that was open to others might be closed to them. Reassurances were given that Manchuria would be restored to China and that any concessions granted the RussoChinese Bank would be in line with those granted to other nations. In sum, there was no need to fear that Russia would contradict the principles of the Open Door. 27 The key to the Russian reply, of course, was the phrase “principles of the Open Door as understood by Russia.” 28 Not only was St. Petersburg politely informing Washington that it would be best to stay out of talks between two other nations, but that American interpretations of the Open Door and the Russian understanding of them were not necessarily the same. Clearly, what constituted an “open door” in Russian eyes was different from the American definition.

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Meanwhile, Japan and Great Britain had been having discussions of their own, and the result was a treaty of alliance. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902 recognized the special interests of each party in China, and of Japan in Korea. Both the United States and Germany expressed their approval of the alliance, while the Russians and their French allies were disturbed by it. The latter pair stated that they considered the Anglo-Japanese accord “a declaration for their special interests in the Far East.” Bolstered by the support of the other powers, especially Britain, Japan, and the United States, China refused to sign the agreement with Russia, and negotiations resumed. St. Petersburg finally agreed to drop the Russo-Chinese Bank convention, promised to evacuate Manchuria in eighteen months, and to restore Chinese sovereignty, contingent on order in the region and non-interference by the other powers. The new agreement was signed on April 8, 1902, and the Manchurian issue quieted once again. 29 American diplomacy may have contributed to the final result, but the Anglo-Japanese Alliance might well have been the key factor that led to a settlement. 30 The question of Manchuria’s evacuation and a Russian monopoly of trade were not the only sources of friction between Washington and St. Petersburg in that region. Minor, but irritating, problems arose at the end of 1901 to add to the larger problems. At the end of December, Count Cassini, the Russian ambassador to the United States, forwarded a complaint to Hay about the activities of Henry Miller, the American consul in Niuzhuang. According to Cassini, Miller had been a constant irritant, refusing to recognize the authority of Russian officials and protecting Chinese subjects “of a more than doubtful reputation.” The Russian ambassador expressed hope the State Department would furnish Miller with explicit instructions so that incidents could be avoided in the future. 31 Hay informed Cassini that Miller had been complaining about Russian interference that was keeping him from carrying out his responsibilities. Hay had not mentioned them before because of the “abnormal character” of the situation at Niuzhuang. Miller, Hay admitted, might not fully comprehend the degree of latitude he could exercise, but errors of judgment should not be construed as an unfriendly attitude on the part of the United States. The American government sought to leave Russia “unembarrassed” while it carried out the provisional execution of its duty, of which the temporary occupation of Niuzhuang was a part, to aid in the restoration of order and good government in China. Miller, Hay assured Cassini, would be instructed to be more circumspect and to avoid friction with Russian officials. Hay did not doubt that “similar motives would inspire the course of the Russian” agents. 32 The careful enunciation by Hay of the American point of view regarding the Russian presence in Manchuria is noteworthy. Meanwhile, violence between Russians and Americans had broken out in Niuzhuang. Three incidents took place between December 23, 1901, and

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Henry B. Miller. Source: Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division Washington, D.C.

January 1, 1902. American sailors from the Vicksburg, which was wintering at Niuzhuang, were reported to have beaten up a pair of Russian sailors on December 23. Three sailors were said to have assaulted a Russian sentinel on Christmas night, and, on the evening of January 1, two American sailors apparently fired a pistol at a Russian soldier, wounding him in the arm. Conger reported that relations were very strained between Russians and Americans in Niuzhuang as a result. The original cause of tension appeared to be the fact that the Vicksburg had been sent to Niuzhuang with no prior warning, and this annoyed the Russians. Responding to Russian complaints that Miller had refused to cooperate in dealing with the incidents of violence, Conger had wired the consul and had instructed him to meet with his Russian counterparts to settle the issue “quietly, quickly, and satisfactorily.” Miller was to help devise stricter means of discipline and control of the Vicksburg’s

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crew so that further incidents could be avoided. The prompt action of the American Minister mollified the Russian government, which expressed the view that affair was a purely local one that would have no effect on American-Russian cordiality. 33 Other irritants stemmed from Russian efforts to appropriate property belonging to an American named James McCaslin in order to extend docking facilities, and from the closing of the Chinese Eastern Railway telegraph office in Niuzhuang. Shutting the telegraph office meant that all communications from the Manchurian port would have to go through Russia. The action brought complaints from American merchants in China as well as from the American Asiatic Association. The State Department requested that Russia take steps to remedy the situation. By April 1902, the Russians had complied, using the excuse of installing a new field telegraph as the reason for the interruption of the regular flow of communications. 34 The McCaslin affair was representative of the strain in relations between Miller and the Russian authorities in Niuzhuang. McCaslin owned some buildings near the waterfront, which he rented to Chinese. The Russians regarded McCaslin’s Chinese tenants as being of dubious character, and suspected them of forging railroad tickets and sheltering fugitives. Additionally, the area was in an extremely unsanitary condition. The Russian authorities wanted to remove any criminal elements and restore proper sanitary conditions. Miller refused to allow this to happen without his permission, claiming any unauthorized action was a violation of American treaty rights. Following this incident, a dispute arose over the location of a dock the Russians were building in the same area. McCaslin claimed the dock was on his property, and demanded compensation for its use. Miller supported McCaslin’s claim, and immediately found himself in another imbroglio with the Russians. Once again, it was Conger who had to step in to ease the situation. The American minister told his consul to try and settle cases such as this amicably. As for the Chinese on McCaslin’s property, Miller could not claim American jurisdiction over them. Conger also chided Miller for not being certain that he was acting within the scope of his authority and for not behaving in such a way as to be sure that he carried out his duties without giving unnecessary offense to Russia. Miller was directed to confer with the Russians in a friendly manner and to reach a satisfactory resolution of McCaslin’s claims. If he could not do this, Miller was to forward all pertinent materials to Conger so the minister could take whatever steps were necessary. 35 Miller’s activities were a source of discomfiture for the State Department. Third Assistant Secretary Herbert H. D. Pierce felt Miller might be right in his position.

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But he has managed to get himself into such personal relations with the Russian Administration that he is quite unable to take advantage of a sound position and he is so possessed with a belief in Russia’s deliberatively aggressive policy toward us as well as with his personal feelings toward the [Russian] Administrator that there seems to be no hope of his being able to come to any sort of agreement with him about anything. I fear that matters will go from bad to worse and that in place of smoothing out difficulties he may involve us in real trouble. 36

Assistant Secretary Alvey A. Adee shared Pierce’s concerns. “He [Miller] is so far right and the Russians so far wrong that we cannot remove him without prejudice to our interests.” Adee recommended that Miller be brought to Washington for a “personal conference.” This action would have the benefit of keeping the troublesome consul out of mischief for three or four months, and might even scare the Russians a bit. 37 Hay must have disagreed with Adee’s plan, for Miller remained in Niuzhuang. However, Miller’s repeated warnings of Russian plans to wreck American trade went unheeded in Washington. 38 An example of the lack of American concern about Russian trade discrimination appears in the complaint of the American Trading Company that goods entering the Russian port of Dalian [Dalny] and Lushun (Port Arthur) were duty free. Those entering at Niuzhuang paid a 5 percent duty. Conger’s report of the complaint noted the necessity of the duty for China’s Boxer Indemnity payment. Conger proposed that the duty free goods pay a customs tax when crossing the border between Russian-leased territory and Manchuria. Otherwise, Conger recommended that the State Department not take up the matter. Miller, on the other hand, argued that trade would be diverted from Niuzhuang and a large portion of the richest part of Manchuria would escape taxation, thus avoiding their share of the indemnity payment. Conger replied that the only ground for complaint was that Chinese revenues would be impaired by the failure to collect duties. Conger called the problem delicate, but was certain it would receive “due consideration.” Rockhill supported Conger’s position. 39 That was enough for Hay, who sent Conger official approval of his stance. The United States could not demand a duty on goods entering Manchuria through Manchurian ports, or an exemption for goods coming through Niuzhuang. The matter was one for the Chinese to handle. 40 The State Department may have buried its head in the sand over this question, but it seems likely that it chose to avoid raising an issue with Russia that might somehow jeopardize the Russian evacuation of Manchuria. American officials undoubtedly expected that occurrence would suffice to eliminate any problems American commerce might encounter. Nevertheless, Miller continued to warn of the Russian threat in Manchuria and of the harm that would befall American trade. He called for a stronger

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American initiative in Manchuria. “To my mind Manchuria is the most natural sphere of our commercial supremacy in China; but we will not be able to hold and develop it without a strenuous effort and a proper organization of Government representatives.” 41 Although Miller supported the opening of Manchuria to international trade, he evidently anticipated that the United States would dominate the commerce there. Miller clearly wanted the administration to take a stronger tone in upholding the Open Door and to assure the opportunity to develop the Manchurian marketplace. His use of the word “sphere” raises the question of whether or not Miller might have been arguing, at least implicitly, for an American sphere of influence in Manchuria to counter the Russian area of interest there, but if he was doing so it was unlikely that Hay or Rockhill would have agreed with him. Both men, as well as Roosevelt, would have opposed an American sphere in Manchuria for numerous reasons, not the least of which would have been Russian and Japanese hostility. The American consul also warned of Russian duplicity and feared his superiors underestimated the Russian danger. Miller reiterated his view that opening Manchuria to world trade would block Russian ambitions in the region and assure American control of the market there. 42 Conger, however, argued that Miller’s assertions might have been reasonable, but his proposed solution was not feasible. Throwing Manchuria open to indiscriminate trade was impossible as long as extraterritoriality was considered necessary. That element could not yet be given up. The minister concluded that Russian domination could only be prevented by the other powers placing arms, officials, and capital in Manchuria. The United States, Conger said, could not and would not do this. So, it was a question of American businessmen invading the area, along with their money, rather than establishing an American presence through political policy and pressure. 43 Conger’s response summarized American policy accurately, and dismissed any idea Miller might have had regarding the creation of an “area of interest” for the United States in Manchuria. Conger’s statements fitted in perfectly with Hay’s view of American policy. The secretary of state had defined that policy to Roosevelt in the following terms: We are not in any attitude of hostility towards Russia in Manchuria. On the contrary, we recognize her exceptional position in northern China. What we have worked to accomplish, and what we have at last accomplished, if assurances are to count for anything, is that no matter what happens eventually in China and Manchuria, the United States shall not be placed in any worse position than while the country was under the unquestioned domination of China. 44

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This statement points out the contradictions and ambiguities inherent in American policy toward China, and the difficulty of defining exactly what the Open Door in China meant. American efforts in Manchuria had been directed toward getting a restoration of Chinese sovereignty there and preventing the creation of a commercial monopoly that would exclude American commercial interests. The Open Door notes Hay had circulated had first called for equal commercial opportunity for all nations in China, although the 1899 note did recognize the presence of spheres of influence in China. However, it did not accept the idea that special privileges within those spheres applied to trade. Hay had then gone a step further in the succeeding note of 1900 by calling for the preservation of China’s territorial integrity. Granted, the second note did not call for an end to the existence of these spheres of influence, but it did imply that they endangered Chinese sovereignty. Now, three years later, Hay was saying that the United States recognized the “exceptional position” of Russia in Manchuria. The United States not only seems to have been in the position of retreating from the position taken in Hay’s second Open Door note, but also of giving informal recognition to a Russian sphere of interest in Manchuria. If Hay was accepting the predominant influence or interest of Russia in Manchuria, then the secretary of state was compromising his own Open Door Policy. However, Hay may have had a more pragmatic view of the Open Door in mind. He might have come to believe that, despite the efforts of the other powers, Russia would attain complete control of Manchuria. In that case, he was saying, the assurances of Russia meant the United States would not suffer assuming Russian assurances could be trusted. Hay understood perfectly well that the Russians knew the United States would not fight over Manchuria and he may have been making the best of a bad situation. Either way, Hay’s view was flawed, although the ambiguities inherent in the Open Door Policy contributed to that flaw. Limited interests in China and American military weakness in general also came into play. However, recognition of a Russian sphere of influence undermined the Open Door concepts of territorial integrity and equal commercial opportunity, making the policy even more ambiguous and confusing than it already was. If Hay seriously meant to redefine the Open Door, he was going about it in the wrong way. To rely on Russian assurances that American merchants would have equal access to a Russian sphere of influence was unwise, to say the least. If Hay intended to concede Manchuria to Russia he should have sought stronger guarantees. A more realistic approach might have been to seek a formal agreement with Russia that would guarantee and protect American commerce in Manchuria should Russia come to control that region. In this manner, the United States could more legitimately expect that its trading interests would be secured, whether or not Russia came to dominate Manchuria. Hay seems never to have considered that option.

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The secretary of state’s point of view remained unaltered. Hay stated that the United States had always recognized the “exceptional position” of Russia. Nothing had been done to interfere with Russian “progress and legitimate aspirations.” The United States had only insisted “upon that freedom of access and opportunity which has been guaranteed to us by the agreement of the whole civilized world including Russia and confirmed to us repeatedly by the voluntary and unsolicited assurances of the Russian Government.” 45 All of this points out the difficulty of dealing with the ambitions of the various powers as they scrambled for slices of the Chinese pie in regard to the basic concepts of the Open Door Policy. Clearly, Hay had come to the conclusion that spheres of influence were acceptable in China as long as other nations had access to trade and China retained at least nominal sovereignty in each sphere. Hay could therefore recognize Russia’s exceptional position in Manchuria while demanding that American trading rights be respected and insisting that sovereignty over the region be restored to China. But the secretary of state never really clarified this concept, so that the definition of the Open Door became not only ambiguous, but confused and contradictory as well, which was reflective of the limited national interest in the region. Even so, to simply rely on the assurances of those nations with “exceptional positions” in China that commercial privileges would be extended to those without such positions was to increase the risk that the door could be slammed shut at any time, leaving the United States with little or no recourse except to fight or acquiesce. The Manchurian issue appeared finally to be resolved when Russia commenced evacuation. Conger reported at the end of October 1902 that the Russian withdrawal was well under way. Meanwhile, the United States had opened negotiations with Beijing for a revision of the Sino-American commercial treaty. Here was a perfect opportunity to further safeguard American interests in Manchuria by providing for the opening of consular posts in the interior. The State Department failed to seize the initiative, however, and waited until early 1903 to put forth such demands. 46 Nevertheless, the treaty revision would prove to be the method of opposing new Russian thrusts in Manchuria when another crisis erupted in April 1903. On April 23, Conger wired the State Department that Russia had placed new conditions on any further evacuation of Manchuria. St. Petersburg now insisted on seven additional requirements, including no new treaty ports or consuls, no foreigners to be employed in the Chinese public service, no change in Manchuria’s administrative status, deposits of Niuzhuang customs revenue in the Russo-Chinese Bank, Russian control of the Sanitary Commission, the privilege of attaching wires to all telegraph poles, and no territory “ever to be alienated to any power.” China had refused to yield so far, Conger reported, but would “unless assured of more than moral support.” 47

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The Russian demands were publicized the next day. The first secretary of the Russian embassy called on Hay to express the assurances of his government of the past “are still absolutely in force, and that there is no intention . . . to interfere with American trade and commerce in Manchuria.” Russia merely sought to protect its “political influence.” Russian objections to new treaty ports and consulates were directed at England, which dominated the foreign members there. All of this was put before Hay after the first secretary had told him the Russian ambassador had no “direct information” regarding the Russian demands. Hay replied that the clauses regarding ports and consulates and foreigners would produce an adverse public opinion in the United States. He then expressed his thanks for Russian assurances regarding the United States and its commerce. 48 The next day Hay instructed Robert McCormick, the American ambassador to Russia, to discreetly ascertain the meaning of the Russian demands. The first two clauses, Hay added, seemed “injurious to our legitimate interests.” 49 At the same time, Conger was ordered to insist on an American request for treaty ports and consulates in Manchuria, and to object to the second clause of the proposed convention. 50 Hay then reported his actions to Roosevelt. The secretary called the situation “delicate and difficult to deal with” but he believed his activities would suffice for a little while. England might be the target, Hay noted, but the first two clauses were harmful to American interests. The secretary of state was also angered at Russian discourtesy in opposing the opening of treaty ports without having first notified the United States, even though the State Department had informed St. Petersburg a month before of American intentions to seek the further opening of ports and establishment of consulates. Hay obviously thought England was not the only target of the Russian initiative. However, he continued, I am sure you will think it is out of the question that we should adopt any scheme of concerted action with England and Japan which would seem openly hostile to Russia. Public opinion in this country would not support such a course, nor do I think it would be to our permanent advantage. Russia is trying to impress us by the most fervent protestations that, whatever happens in Manchuria, our national interests shall not suffer. This is an object which I have been striving for for four years, and if worst comes to worst, I think we can gain it; but there is something due to self-respect also, and it is pretty hard to stand by and see an act of spoliation accomplished under our eyes. 51

Hay touched upon the main reason why the United States had to act independently in dealing with Russia. American tradition would not permit any alliance with England and Japan; therefore, the United States must act alone although American policy might conform to that of the British and Japanese. Nor could the United States adopt an overly hostile attitude toward Russia. American interests in Manchuria might have been important, but they were

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not so much so that American public opinion would countenance hostilities with Russia. While the Russian assertion that its diplomatic actions were directed at England might have contained some truth, it was evident that St. Petersburg was also reacting to American efforts to secure more treaty ports and consulates. The American demands were apparently the result of a scheme of Rockhill’s to further weaken the Russian hold on Manchuria. 52 While waiting for replies from Conger and McCormick, Hay kept in touch with the Russian embassy and continued to keep the president informed. He advised Roosevelt in April 28 of a meeting with the Russian ambassador, Cassini. Cassini claimed to know nothing of the proposed convention, “but discussed it point by point in a manner as clear and minute as if he had written it himself,” Hay said. The secretary was certain that Russia knew just how far American opposition to the proposals would go. “I take it for granted that Russia knows as well as we do that we will not fight over Manchuria for the simple reason that we cannot.” Nor was an alliance against Russia in the cards. “If our rights and our interests in opposition to Russia in the Far East were as clear as noonday, we could never get a treaty through the Senate the object of which was to check the Russian aggression.” 53 Later that day, Hay told Roosevelt that Russia had reiterated its assurances that American trade and commerce in Manchuria would not suffer. Privately, however, Cassini had been less reassuring. “He still thinks that Russia has the right to impose any conditions it pleases, and the rest of the world still has no right to object.” But, the attitude of the United States and the other powers had made Russia less determined to push its demands through. A firm stand by the powers might stiffen backbones in Beijing and affect a compromise on the worst features of the situation. Hay found a “hopeful” sign in Russian fears of Japan, noting that Cassini had suggested that the United States use its influence to warn Japan of the dangers of opposing Russian interests in Manchuria. The ambassador also hinted that the United States might be part of, or thinking of becoming part of, a triple alliance with Japan and England. This Hay, of course, denied. 54 Britain fully supported the American position. The Foreign Office instructed its ambassador to the United States on April 28 of England’s desire to act in accordance with “what we conceive to be the policy of the United States, namely to open China impartially to the commerce of the whole world, to maintain her independence and integrity, and to insist upon the fulfillment of treaty and other obligations by the Chinese Government which they have contracted toward us.” 55 The following day, McCormick reported from St. Petersburg that Russia denied knowledge of and disclaimed the proposed Sino-Russian convention. The United States was to be assured that nothing would be done to close the

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Open Door in Manchuria. Indeed, Russia especially desired to attract American commerce and capital to that region. 56 By May 4, Hay had reason to believe that the crisis was easing and a solution was at hand. The night before, the British ambassador had sent word that the Chinese had refused to accept the Russian conditions. Russia had then asked the Chinese if they intended to extend their administration to Mongolia, if there was any intention to cede territory on the Liao River to a foreign power, and if more ports and consulates would be opened in Manchuria. The Chinese responded negatively to the first inquiries. In regard to the third, they informed Russia that further opening of treaty ports would depend on the necessities of trade. Hay was jubilant. It appeared the United States “had, for the present, checked the designs of Russia upon Manchuria,” he told Roosevelt. “It would seem from this that they are not at this moment persisting in crowding their convention on China, but have invented this means of retiring from an untenable position by putting a series of interrogatories at China of which they were sure of the answers in advance.” The secretary thought there would be no difficulty in getting Chinese acquiescence to opening more ports and consulates, and the State Department would continue to press for them. 57 Hay was premature in his optimism. Within two weeks he was telling Roosevelt that Russia appeared to have embarked on two courses. On the one hand, the United States had the assurances of St. Petersburg that the “convention of seven points” had not been proposed to China, and there was no opposition to American demands for treaty ports and consulates. On the other hand, information from Conger, as well as from Japan and England, made it clear Russia was still trying to impose its will on the Chinese. “Dealing with a government with whom mendacity is a science, is an extremely difficult and delicate matter,” Hay concluded, echoing his remarks of April 25. He felt it was best to wait and see what Russia would do. Both England and Japan would support the United States, although Japan “if we gave them a wink, would fly at the throat of Russia in a moment.” The British appreciated the American need to act independently, but Japan had to be constantly reminded of its Open Door assurances and restrained. Russia, Hay added, considered China dismembered and was merely seeking its share, according to Cassini. When Hay told the Russian that viewpoint was counter to Russian assurances, Cassini replied that he was expressing his own opinion. Nevertheless, Hay felt he had done all he could to “clinch” Russian assurances. He needed no definite instructions from Roosevelt in this matter, he added, although he would be happy to carry out any the president thought fit to give him. 58 Confident in Hay’s abilities, Roosevelt remained content to leave management of the crisis to his secretary of state. Two days later, Conger informed Hay that China was perfectly willing to open Manchurian ports, but Russia was objecting. Prince Qing told the

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American minister that ports would be opened when the Russian evacuation was completed. The Russian chargé d’affaires was preventing any port openings despite assurances from his government that there was no objection to them. Conger suggested a test of those assurances by proposing that Russia make the same declaration to China that it had made to the United States. 59 The American demand for treaty ports and consulates had placed China in a difficult position. The Chinese could not give in to the United States without alienating Russia, but refusing might cause the loss of whatever support the United States could give China in its opposition to the Russian demands. The Chinese delayed, hoping time and better luck would ease the situation. The other features of the treaty had been substantially worked out, with the port issue the one stumbling block to completion. 60 Russia was also in a difficult position. Factionalism within the government had hampered the formation of a coherent Manchurian policy. The War Ministry argued for an aggressive posture, while the Ministry of Finance preferred peaceful economic penetration of the region. The czar, meanwhile, was likely to act as he saw fit in the matter. Russian diplomacy was uncertain, tentative, confused, evasive, and unfriendly. St. Petersburg denied Russian objections to new treaty ports on April 29, yet after that date the Russian chargé d’affaires in Beijing prevented China from agreeing to open them. Cassini wavered between both positions. Naturally, the United States found it hard to accurately gauge Russian intentions, and logically regarded the Russians as mendacious. 61 Pressure was placed on both Russia and China as the United States continued to obtain consulates and ports in Manchuria. Hay first instructed Conger to obtain from the Chinese government a written statement of its objections to complying with the American request for opening ports, and what it intended to do instead. 62 A few days later, Conger was told to see the Russian minister to China, Pavel Lessar, to inform him the Russian government had assured the United States that it did not oppose the opening of new ports. The American was to seek the cooperation of his counterpart in getting Chinese compliance. 63 The Chinese response was evasive. In a note to Conger, Prince Qing repeated the earlier reply that Russia insisted on being consulted before anything was done, but China had refused to discuss the matter. China would decide when to open its ports, but it was not convenient to mention the matter in the commercial treaty. “This is not by any means an absolute refusal of the request of your country,” the minister concluded. 64 Hay fired back a reply arguing that the reasonable American request, beneficial to China as well as to the rest of the world, should not be brushed aside so lightly. If China preferred not to include the subject in a treaty, its government should issue an imperial edict opening the ports. Conger was instructed to impress upon the Chinese the “painful surprise” their unwillingness to comply had caused in the United States. 65

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Conger telegraphed back to Hay the reply of the Russian minister, Lessar. He had told Conger he understood his government did not oppose opening ports and consulates in Manchuria, but he could not cooperate without instructions for which he had telegraphed. A few days later, Conger advised the State Department that Lessar was still awaiting instructions. The minister thought a telegram regarding cooperation had been sent from St. Petersburg. 66 Hay’s response was to tell his minister to take no action until he received further instructions, as the matter was being discussed in Washington with the Russian ambassador. 67 This instruction apparently caused some confusion in Beijing. When they learned of Hay’s orders, both the Japanese and British ministers thought Conger had been told to cease negotiations on the subject of port openings entirely. Conger was able to rectify the impression, which appears to have been the result of an erroneous assumption on the part of both representatives. Hay was satisfied that Conger was acting in accordance with his instructions, and told him so in a letter dated June 13. Hay summarized the situation as it currently stood and noted that Cassini had been a constant thorn in his side. “I think he is fairly hostile to our programme of the ‘open door’ and always has been,” Hay said of the Russian ambassador. “All we have been able to accomplish with Russia has been against her opposition.” The secretary then stated his view that the treaty negotiations had been “remarkably successful” with only the open ports question standing in the way of “a great diplomatic success.” 68 The American effort now focused on Russia. A memorandum was drawn up for presentation to the Russians calling for their assistance in securing Chinese acquiescence to the American demands. The statement asked Russia to instruct its minister in China to tell the Chinese what his government had told the State Department in April; that there was no objection to opening ports in Manchuria, and to support Conger in his efforts to get an agreement on the issue. 69 McCormick, in St. Petersburg, was then informed that the treaty was near completion with the ports issue the only roadblock to finalization. China’s claim of Russian objections was repeated along with American assurances to Beijing that this was not true. McCormick was instructed to find out if the American request that the Russian minister assure China that there were no objections to the American demand had been complied with. 70 The American ambassador wired Hay two days later. The Russians wanted Conger to inform Lessar of the demands of the United States regarding the ports to be opened. The Russian minister would then be authorized to reply frankly what the Russian attitude was. 71 Conger was duly instructed. After carrying out his instructions, the minister reported that the Russian minister had told him he had no instructions and could say nothing to China, as he was to await discussion of the question at Washington. 72

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Britain, meanwhile, had thrown its weight behind the American demands. Walter Townley, the British minister, told the Chinese that the “opening of treaty ports is so greatly to the interest of all nations, and also of China . . . that I am instructed by His Majesty’s Government to express . . . their hope that the request of the United States will be complied with.” 73 Conger reported that Japan was demanding the opening of the same ports as the United States was. He noted that the Japanese and British were the only powers who appeared interested in the problem; therefore he had not conferred with any of his other colleagues on the question. 74 Back in Washington, Hay had another interview with Cassini. Again, the Russian ambassador assured Hay that Russia saw no conflict of interest between the two powers and that all would be settled according to the wishes of the United States. The American government merely needed to have a little patience and the matter would be taken care of “sooner than you think.” 75 Meanwhile, China had continued to delay taking action on the issue. Conger sent word that Prince Qing was still expressing Chinese willingness to open the ports, but not until after the Russian evacuation. Nor would he put any promises in writing, as such an act would only provoke Russia. Hay found the Chinese rationale for inaction unsatisfactory and instructed Conger to continue to urge China to comply. 76 Cassini’s hint that a settlement might be near proved to be correct. On July 14, St. Petersburg issued a formal declaration that the Russian government had no objection to the opening of the Manchurian ports “as long as foreign settlements are not established.” The Russians apparently feared a possible Anglo-Japanese entente against them if they failed to agree to the repeated demands of the United States. Rather than face a united front of the powers, the Russians gave in, and a circular note was sent out. Conger was immediately ordered to press the Chinese for agreement on the ports to be opened. 77 The fear of a possible anti-Russian coalition in the Far East had worked to the advantage of the United States. But the Chinese still refused to act. Again, Prince Qing stated that China was willing to open the ports, but Russia must evacuate Manchuria first. He did give Conger a written assurance that the ports would be opened when the withdrawal was complete. Conger was now convinced that this was the best that could be done and recommended signing the treaty without the provision regarding the ports. 78 Hay showed Conger’s telegram to Rockhill who found it to be “just about as unsatisfactory as it well could be.” Rockhill believed that Conger misunderstood the intention of opening the ports by treaty and thought that they had to be opened immediately. Additionally, the minister had placed too much value on a promise, which, if accepted, would allow China to open ports of its own free will but would allow for them to be closed as well. “Provision should be made in the treaty . . . for the opening of these

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“As to China.” On this cover illustration from Puck, Uncle Sam, John Bull and “Japan” are represented as dogs standing in an open door marked “China Trade.” Source: Puck, March 12, 1902. Library of Congress.

localities to foreign trade,” Rockhill insisted. 79 Conger was told that the Chinese promise had been deemed unsatisfactory and that provision to open the ports must be made in the treaty. 80 Concerned that Conger’s action might have “hopelessly weakened our position at Peking,” Rockhill drafted an instruction that he hoped would “ginger him up.” Rockhill also suggested that Hay remind the minister of the Department’s telegram of May 29. 81 Conger was informed that China was to be given until October 8 to sign a treaty including port openings. The ports

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would not have to be opened until three months after ratifications had been exchanged, so that China would have sufficient time to reestablish administration of the region. Hay recalled the earlier promises of China to provide by treaty for the ports, and noted that the Russian circular of July 14 removed all obstacles to such a provision. The United States would insist on such a treaty article even if China opened the ports immediately. Conger was then reminded of Hay’s May 29 telegram and instructed to use the arguments therein. 82 Rockhill visited the Chinese minister to the United States, Chentung Liang Cheng, and made it clear the State Department would not yield its position. 83 Hay was optimistic that the Chinese would give in. “I think that we shall get our treaty with China in good shape in time to lay it before the Senate,” he wrote Roosevelt in August 2. He had refrained from telling “those poor trembling rabbits” who hardly dared to do as the United States asked because of their fear of Russia, that if they kept their promises America would see to it that “the Bear” did not punish them for something it had declared there was no objection to. “We have accomplished a good deal in the East, but thus far without the expense of a single commitment or promise.” 84 The secretary of state was justified in his view. China accepted the American ultimatum and promised to sign the treaty with an article agreeing to open two seaports. October 8, the date the Russian evacuation of China was to be completed, was agreed to as the time to sign the pact. 85 Hay was delighted. “You have doubtless seen Conger’s despatch of this day’s date,” he penned to Roosevelt on August 21. “I congratulate you with all my heart. We now have the formal written promise of the China Gov’t [sic] that they will sign the entire treaty, open ports and all, Oct. 8 and we had a month ago the written pledge of Russia that they would not oppose it. I think that this is perfectly satisfactory.” 86 That satisfaction proved to be short-lived. In September, Russia presented China with new conditions for the evacuation of Manchuria. The new demands included Chinese assurances that the three Manchurian provinces would never be ceded or leased to a foreign power, Russia was to be permitted to build wharves on the Shanghai River to facilitate access of goods to the Chinese Eastern Railway, and to have troops there to guard them. An exemption was to be granted from special duties on goods entering Manchuria by rail, the offices of the Russo-Chinese Bank were to be guarded by Chinese soldiers after Russia withdrew, and permission would be given Russia to take measures to prevent any outbreak of plague in Manchuria. In return, the region would be evacuated within a year’s time. 87 The State Department was placed in an awkward position by the new Russian initiative. The Japanese had informed the Americans of the latest Russian maneuver, and now were waiting to see how the United States would react. Hay was anxious not to jeopardize the agreed upon treaty with China.

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Referring to the Japanese ambassador, Takahira, as “Take + hire her” [sic], Hay stated that if he insisted in knowing the American attitude he should be told there was no ground for protest. The United States was not called upon to approve or disapprove. “I am particularly desirous not to say anything which may have the effect of delaying the signing of our treaty . . . of the evacuation of Niu Chwang [sic].” 88 Rockhill shared the Japanese concern that the Russian demands were dangerous to the interests of both parties. Like Hay, however, Rockhill felt that there was no need to express official opinion about them at this point. 89 The Japanese were especially disturbed over the Russian demand that the three Manchurian provinces would not be leased or ceded to any other foreign power, while Hay was more worried about their desire for an exemption from duties. “Russia simply asks that there be no cession of Manchurian territory,” he noted. “She includes herself as well as others.” 90 “The demands of Russia for exemption from the surtax is in shameless violation of her open door engagements.” Everyone else would refuse to pay as well, and the result would be disastrous for China’s finances. Even so, Hay wrote, the United States did not want to “begin a controversy with Russia and China which could not be closed before Oct. 8 and which might prevent the conclusion of our treaty.” 91 Rockhill was in agreement with Hay. I still think we had better get our treaty signed and then, if necessary, fight out the various questions with Russia, as circumstances may require . . . In twenty days our treaty will be signed. I do not believe that any definite agreement will be made by Russia with China before that time; even if it should be, our position after the signing of our Treaty would be much stronger than it now is. 92

Rockhill also suggested a delaying action in regard to Japanese inquiries about the American response and attitude toward the newest set of demands. He believed the Japanese were not anxious to take a stand on questions regarding international trade in Manchuria because of their dispute with Russia in regard to Korea. “The Japs are very anxious, of course, that we should fight ourselves, and make ourselves as disagreeable as we possibly can to the Russians . . . I think we should say and do as little as we can until the famous treaty is signed.” 93 Rockhill and Hay might have been correct in their belief that the United States should get the “famous treaty” signed before doing anything about the latest Russian proposals. It is surprising, however, to note the singular lack of concern about the obvious delaying tactics of Russia. It should have been apparent to both men that Russia had little, if any, intention of leaving Manchuria unless it was forced to do so. The Russians were able to keep postponing the completion of their evacuation, and by doing so they gained addition-

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al opportunities to tighten their grasp on Manchuria—and each delay might further imperil the Open Door. Yet, in the State Department, there was little concern expressed over this possibility. The American reluctance to act may have had an additional effect. The Japanese, who were nervous about the Russian presence in Manchuria and its potential threat to their position in Korea, as well as to their interests in Manchuria itself, might have become convinced that they would have to carry the burden of opposing further Russian encroachment in northern Asia alone. While American officials were primarily concerned with the Russian threat to trade in Manchuria, Japan was worried about the territorial interests of Russia. The Japanese seem to have been willing to support the United States as long as the State Department took steps to pressure the Russians to keep the Open Door in Manchuria unlocked. But now that the Americans were expressing reluctance to act in the face of this new threat, Japan may have chosen to bear the brunt of contesting the latest Russian initiative and, if necessary, to fight to protect its interests in the region. The alliance with Britain undoubtedly made such a decision easier to take as well, for Japan could be relatively certain that France and Germany would not join Russia should war become necessary. Faced with demands they could not consent to, the Chinese looked for support against the new menace. Prince Qing called on Conger and expressed his fear that a Chinese rejection of their demands would result in a Russian refusal to complete its evacuation. Qing asked if the United States would, in this case, use its good offices with St. Petersburg to effect a satisfactory settlement. Conger could give no assurances, and sought instructions. 94 The State Department replied quickly. Conger was directed to remind Qing of China’s agreement to sign the treaty. Once the treaty was signed the United States would be in a better position to “discuss questions which may affect its treaty rights and interests in China.” 95 While the Chinese foreign minister was making his request, the Chinese minister in the United States was making a similar query, which was likewise rebuffed. The treaty was signed as scheduled on October 8. Article Twelve provided for the opening of Dandong (Mukden) and Shenyang (Antung) as treaty ports, while Article Two arranged for the appointment of consuls. Hay was able to present the treaty to the Senate with “much satisfaction,” noting trade relations were placed on a “more satisfactory footing then they have heretofore enjoyed.” 96 However, the Russians remained in Manchuria. China now put American policy to the test. A formal request that the United States use its good offices to bring about a settlement with Russia was relayed to Washington through Conger. Hay sent the request to Roosevelt, who gave it serious consideration. Led to believe Russia would fight, recognizing America’s weakness militarily in the region, and knowing that public opinion would not support a war over Manchuria, the president ordered a

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negative reply to the Chinese appeal. 97 As both Roosevelt and Hay were certain Japan was willing to confront Russia, they may well have found it easier to refuse China’s plea. 98 The American position was undoubtedly disappointing to Chinese policymakers, who had determined to use the lure of Manchuria’s commercial potential as the means of attracting American, British, and Japanese support against the Russian assault. 99 The Japanese, meanwhile, had been negotiating with Russia over their mutual interests and relations in the Far East since late July 1903. Japanese efforts to come to some form of agreement were futile, as Russia, sure of its military superiority, refused to grant more than minor concessions. Tokyo’s patience was exhausted by February 1904, and war broke out with the surprise Japanese attack on the Russian naval base at Lushun. Throughout the disputes with Russia and China, Roosevelt had left their management to Hay and Rockhill, confident in their abilities to oversee the situation. The president was kept fully informed through dispatches and cabinet meetings, but he relied largely on the expertise and experience of his two principal advisers on China affairs. There were occasional expressions of opinion from others, but Roosevelt undoubtedly had the most confidence in Rockhill and Hay. 100 Roosevelt had a decidedly anti-Russian bias regarding the Manchurian affair. He blamed the “incredible mendacity” of St. Petersburg for the problems in Manchuria, and accused the Russian government of “persistent lying.” 101 The United States did not desire political control of the region, not did it seek to prevent Russian political control, but only the “rights for which we have fought in connection with the open-door policy.” We wish for our people commercial privileges which Russia again and again had said we shall have—which all the powers of the world have said we shall have, but which China refuses to give because Russia threatens her with dire consequences if she gives them.

Roosevelt grumbled about Russian “vague and inconclusive answers” to American protestations. He accused them of duplicity, noting Russian assurances regarding the American position regarding Manchuria, while the minister in Beijing, at the same time, “emphatically forbids the Chinese Government to act as China desires.” 102 Roosevelt could be even more blunt, telling Cecil Spring Rice, “. . . the Russians have for the last three years been following out a career of stupendous mendacity, not only with Japan, but ourselves, as regards Manchuria.” 103 Ultimately, the president would declare that Russia’s “. . . conduct in Manchuria was such as to wholly to alienate American sympathy, and to make it clear that they intended to organize China as a step toward domination of the rest of the world.” 104 Possibly recalling the Triple Intervention of 1895, the president was willing to go to “extremes” with Russia over Manchuria if he could be sure

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France and Germany would not “join in.” 105 Roosevelt insisted that Russia had endeavored to force China to “join in breaking the plighted faith of all the powers as to the open door in Manchuria . . . and to bar our own people from access to the Manchurian trade.” 106 Interestingly, the President did not mention Russia’s area of interest there. Hay’s influence on Roosevelt in this matter is quite evident. In a letter to Albert Shaw, Roosevelt made a statement that was very close in context to wording that the secretary of state had used earlier. “We have always recognized the exceptional position of Russia in Manchuria.” Furthermore, the president declared: We have done nothing to interfere with her progress and her legitimate aspirations. We have only insisted upon that freedom of access and of opportunity for our commerce that has been guaranteed to us by an agreement of the whole civilized world including Russia, and confirmed to us repeatedly by the voluntary and unsolicited assurances of the Russian government. 107

Roosevelt clearly agreed with or accepted the viewpoint of Hay. 108 An additional limitation was the Open Door itself. The two notes Hay had issued regarding the concept had called for (1) equal commercial opportunity for all nations in China, and (2) the maintenance of the territorial integrity of China. Taken together, they seemed to state an Open Door Policy based on equal opportunity to trade based upon the maintenance of China as a unified territorial entity. The policy had been enunciated only after the great powers had carved out their respective spheres of influence in China, and Hay’s first note had asked the powers for formal assurances that the commerce of all nations should be given equal opportunity within their spheres of interest. In response, the secretary of state had received evasive replies from the governments that had been solicited. In effect, the United States had expressed its recognition of their spheres of influence, and was requesting equality of treatment within. Hay’s second Open Door note did not require a reply. Instead, the American government reiterated its resolve to protect its legitimate interests in China and the equality of opportunity for trade, but also declared that it was now American policy to preserve the territorial integrity of China. This note indicated that the United States had taken a stand, in principle, against actions that might lead to China’s dismemberment. And spheres of influence certainly had to be considered as a threat that could lead to eventual partition. The disputes with Russia over Manchuria would suggest that St. Petersburg’s conception of the Open Door was based on the 1899 note, while Hay and Roosevelt were acting on the basis of the 1900 circular. Yet Roosevelt, Hay, and Rockhill were willing to recognize the “exceptional positions,” a euphemism for spheres of influence, of other nations in

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China. It was acceptable, in other words, for the powers to carve out areas they might dominate in terms of receiving special privileges in China as long as they did not carve up China. But if the United States insisted upon equal trading opportunities in all of China, while also supporting the preservation of China’s territorial integrity, how could it also recognize a sphere of influence under the control of one nation or another? Naturally, if a nation held an exceptional position in some region of China, it would want to exercise as much control over the area as possible in order to protect its interests there. Therefore equal trading opportunities were likely to be prohibited sooner or later, assuming they were permitted to exist at all, and, in the long run, it was probable that the territorial integrity of China would be jeopardized as nations sought to further consolidate their areas of influence. And the competition for spheres of interest could lead to conflicts among the powers that would not only endanger American commercial interests in China, but would also further destabilize a Chinese empire that was desperately struggling to survive not only foreign encroachment but internal dissensions as well. Under Roosevelt and Hay the American policy of recognizing (tacitly or otherwise) spheres of influence while insisting on Open Door rights was both contradictory and unclear, since their actions could be seen as negating the second Open Door note’s insistence upon the preservation of China’s territorial integrity. Moreover, if such spheres were to be accepted by the United States, the idea of an Open Door, even in regard to commercial opportunities, would ultimately become meaningless. In fact, the second note essentially negated the first note’s implicit recognition of the other powers’ spheres of interest. Wracked by growing internal problems, and unable to defend itself against the encroachment of the Western powers and Japan, the Chinese could not resist the demands of any of the powers on its own. Only by seeking assistance from those powers that opposed the demands of their rivals for concessions could China hope to remain in one piece. To make even a token show of resistance to the demands of any one power, China had to be propped up by some or all of the others. If the Open Door was meant to defend China from the predatory interests of the other powers, it was also meant to defend American trading interests in China. In the case of Russia’s presence in Manchuria, the United States clearly demonstrated that it was willing to go only so far, and that it was more interested in protecting its own trade interests there than in returning control of the region to China. Indeed, American resistance to Russia’s initiatives in Manchuria was most effective when it was clear the other powers opposed Russian ambitions there as well. Roosevelt and his advisers may well have developed this approach out of what they considered to be a realistic appraisal of the situation in China. It is likely that they concluded that Russia would get what it wanted eventually, and they acted to obtain Russian assurances that equal opportunities for

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American traders to conduct their business in Manchuria would be preserved. If that is what they were trying to do, their method was poorly conceived. Assurances alone, especially in international relations, count for little. In his criticism of the American acquisition of the Philippines, Richard Olney had raised this very point three years earlier. Appeals in regard to acceptance of the Open Door Policy had been said, Olney noted, “to have brought satisfactory ‘assurances.’ But such ‘assurances’ can hardly be regarded as definite obligations, nor as being more unchangeable than the views and intentions themselves.” 109 And, despite the declaration of the United States to the contrary, the equivocal replies of the other nations to the first Open Door note could hardly have been termed “satisfactory.” A written agreement regarding equal commercial opportunity and containing a guarantee that the special privileges acquired in Manchuria by Russia would not lead to the separation of Manchuria from China would have been worth much more in terms of preserving the Open Door from Russian assaults. If Russia chose to ignore or break a formal agreement regarding American trade in Manchuria, the United States would have had a more substantial position upon which to fall back, and a more effective instrument for stirring up public opinion against Russia and for protection of America’s interests in East Asia, and a stronger case to present to the rest of the international community in regard to the Open Door. Since confrontation was not an option, the most pragmatic approach might have been to follow the recommendation Conger had made in early 1901 to try and negotiate a deal with Russia. An accord with St. Petersburg whereby that nation’s “special interests” in Manchuria were recognized in return for a Russian guarantee preserving equal opportunity for American traders in the region could have been sought. The idea was not just Conger’s. Although he did not specifically mention Russia, John Barrett, the former minister to Siam, had called for just such an agreement with all the powers in 1900. “Let this agreement not be confined to a diplomatic note, nor to an exchange of intentions with happy felicitation, but let it be a binding convention, formally signed and sealed.” 110 Russia most likely would have rebuffed an offer of this sort since there was nothing to gain by accepting it, but it is interesting that Hay and Roosevelt, already having committed themselves at least informally to the reality of a Russian sphere of interest in Manchuria, did not try to find a more effective method of protecting American commercial interests in that part of China. There would have been risks involved, of course, especially in regard to relations with Great Britain and Japan, but such a course of action would have been perfectly in line with the independent course the United States had followed to this point. Almost certainly Russia (and probably Japan, if asked) would refuse the American proposal, preferring the ambiguities inherent in a policy that was not supported by formal treaty to a situation that would have

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bound St. Petersburg to the Open Door in more than just conceptual terms. That does not mean, however, that the effort should not have been made. The Chinese, naturally, might have viewed such an attempt as an abandonment of American support for their efforts to maintain the territorial integrity of their empire. But a formal agreement upholding the principles of the Open Door, entered into either as a bilateral, or multilateral agreement, might have been in China’s best interests in the long run. Following up the Open Door notes with a series of treaties with the individual powers, or a single accord to which they all were signatories, might have clarified the American position in regard to the Open Door and committed the other nations to its principles. Given the evasive responses to the first Open Door note, this hypothetical attempt most likely would have failed, but it might have been worth trying. Roosevelt and Hay may simply have ignored the inherent contradiction in the Open Door Policy. Faced with a situation in which they could react in only a limited fashion, they chose to be satisfied with a course of notewriting, protest, and insistence upon the preservation of American rights in China, while conceding, at least informally, their acceptance of Russia’s “exceptional position” in Manchuria. Overall, their policy was marked more by failure than success. Russia gave no more than general assurances that American interests in Manchuria were in no danger. Given the complaints by Roosevelt and Hay about Russian mendacity, it is remarkable that the administration made no effort to get a more specific commitment from Russia on this issue. Although a new commercial treaty with China was completed that provided for the opening of additional ports in Manchuria to American merchants, Russia was able to delay their opening, so that the treaty was nearly worthless. If Russia made no real gains in Manchuria, the United States was unable to force the Russians to evacuate the region. In fact, Russia was hardly any worse off than it had been at the end of the Boxer Rebellion. Russia had been able to delay its withdrawal from southern Manchuria by utilizing the strategy of continuing to make demands of China that, if fulfilled, would reduce Manchuria to the status of a Russian satellite. Nothing that Hay and Roosevelt had attempted had been able to halt this process, and, realistically, they could do only so much, although they may not have pursued, or even recognized, all the alternatives possible. It was clear to both men that Manchuria was going to come under the domination of one of the powers encroaching upon China, and the United States, even with Hay’s “famous treaty,” could not halt the process. Indeed, it was likely that the best that could be done was to accommodate American interests to the realities in Manchuria. Ultimately only force would check the Russian schemes, and the United States was neither prepared nor willing to act in that regard. It was Japan, with patience exhausted, buttressed by its alliance with Great Britain, and with dreams and ambitions of its own in Manchuria, which chose to fight.

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NOTES 1. Hay wanted to hold the cost for reparations down, and as part of his strategy for doing do he doubled the American claim for damages. He apparently hoped that by driving up the total, he could get the other powers to agree to a downward revision of their claims. The gambit failed, and the American effort to reduce the total was voted down by the other powers. Hay could then have reduced the American claim but chose not to. The surplus payments were later used to attract Chinese students to study in the United States. Hunt, Special Relationship, p. 200; Hannigan, New World Power, pp. 102–3. 2. Elleman and Paine, Modern China, p. 217. 3. Rockhill’s role in the Beijing Conference is detailed in Varg, Open Door Diplomat, pp. 50–58. 4. Elleman and Paine, Modern China, pp. 92, 143–45. 5. Edward H. Zabriskie, American-Russian Rivalry in the Far East (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1946), pp. 65–67; Hunt, Frontier Defense, pp. 53–54; Hannigan, New World Power, pp. 103–4 and Varg, Open Door Diplomat, p. 51. 6. Hay to White, May 22, 1903, Spring-Rice to Hay, June 1904, Hay Mss. Quote is from Hay to White. 7. Hunt, Frontier Defense, pp. 56–57; Zabriskie, American-Russian Rivalry, pp. 67–68. 8. Hunt, Frontier Defense, pp. 56–57; Zabriskie, American-Russian Rivalry, pp. 67–70. 9. Rockhill to Hay, January 19, 1901, Despatches: China. 10. Conger to Hay, January 19, 1901, Despatches: China. 11. Hunt, Frontier Defense, pp. 59–61; Zabriskie, American-Russian Rivalry, pp. 68–71. 12. Hannigan, New World Power, p. 105. 13. Hay to Conger, August 29, 1901, U.S. Department of State, Diplomatic Instructions from the Department of State: China (Washington, D.C.: National Archives, 1946), hereafter cited as Instructions: China. 14. Conger to Hay, September 7, 1901, Despatches, China. 15. Miller to Conger, September 2, 1901, forwarded to Hay on September 7, 1901 in Conger to Hay, Ibid. 16. Miller to Conger, September 21, 1901, Ibid. 17. Conger to Hay, November 14, 1901, Ibid. 18. Conger to Hay, November 9, 1901, Ibid. 19. Hay to Conger, November 14, 1901, Instructions: China. 20. Conger to Hay, December 3, 1901, Foreign Relations, 1902, p. 271. 21. Hay to Conger, December 6, 1901, Instructions: China; Despatches:China. 22. Conger to Hay, December 12, 1901, Foreign Relations, 1902, p. 272. 23. Miller to Conger, January 2, 1902, Despatches:China. 24. Conger to Hay, January 29, 1902, Foreign Relations, 1902, p. 273. 25. Rockhill to Hay, January 31, 1902, Hay Mss. 26. Hay to Conger, February 9, 1902, Despatches: China. 27. Lamsdorff to Tower, February 9, 1902, Foreign Relations, 1902, p. 929. 28. My italics. 29. Hay to Roosevelt, March 29, 1902, Theodore Roosevelt Papers (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress), hereafter cited as Roosevelt Mss.; Foreign Relations, 1902, pp. 279–81; Zabriskie, American-Russian Rivalry, pp. 80–82. 30. Hunt, Special Relationship, p. 201. 31. Cassini to Hay, December 28, 1901, Foreign Relations, 1902, p. 916. 32. Hay to Cassini, December 30, 1901, Ibid., pp. 917–18. 33. Conger to Hay, January 8, 1902; Tower to Hay, January 13, 1902, Ibid., pp. 146–48, 918–19. 34. Ibid., pp. 148–49, 919–26. 35. Ibid., pp. 149–55. 36. Pierce to Adee, undated, CD: Newchwang. 37. Adee to Hay, March 30, 1902, Ibid. 38. Hunt, Frontier Defense, p. 83.

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39. Conger to Hay, January 8, 1902; Miller to Conger, December 27, 1901; Conger to Miller, January 7, 1902; Rockhill to Adee, February 20, 1902, Despatches: China. 40. Hay to Conger, February 25, 1902, Instructions: China. 41. Miller to Conger, Despatches: China. 42. Miller to Conger, May 7, 1902, February 16, 1903, March 5, 1903, CD: Newchwang; Conger to Miller, February 16, 1903, March 5, 1903, Despatches, China. 43. Conger to Miller, March 10, 1903, Ibid. 44. Hay to Roosevelt, May 1, 1903, Roosevelt Mss; Hay Mss. 45. Writings of John Hay, April 1903, Hay Mss. 46. Hunt, Frontier Defense, p. 69; Varg, Open Door Diplomat, p. 52. 47. Conger to Hay, April 23, 1903, Hay Mss. 48. Hay memorandum, April 24, 1903, Ibid. 49. Hay to McCormick, April 25, 1903, Ibid. 50. Hay to Conger, April 25, 1903, Ibid. 51. Hay to Roosevelt, April 25, 1903, Ibid. 52. Varg, Open Door Diplomat, p. 52. 53. Hay to Roosevelt, April 28, 1903, Hay Mss. 54. Hay to Roosevelt, April 28, 1903, Ibid. 55. British Parliamentary Paper, February, 1904, Correspondence Respecting the Russian Occupation of Manchuria and Newchwang, Department of the Navy, RG 38, file C-8-A, number 146, Box number 426 (Washington, D.C.: National Archives), p. 58. 56. McCormick to Hay, April 29, 1903, Hay Mss. 57. Hay to Roosevelt, May 4, 1903, Ibid. 58. Hay to Roosevelt, May 12, 1903, Ibid. 59. Conger to Hay, May 14, 2003, Despatches: China. 60. Hunt, Frontier Defense, pp. 69–73. 61. Zabriskie, American-Russian Rivalry, pp. 89–90. 62. Hay to Conger, May 18, 1903, Foreign Relations, 1903, p. 60. 63. Hay to Conger, May 23, 1903, Ibid. 64. Conger to Hay, May 28, 1903, Ibid. 65. Hay to Conger, June 6, 1903, Ibid. p. 61. 66. Conger to Hay, May 30, June 6, 1903, Ibid. p. 63. 67. Hay to Conger, June 6, 1903, Ibid. 68. Conger to Hay, June 13, 1903, Despatches: China; Hay to Conger, June 13, 1903, Hay Mss. 69. Memorandum dated June 6, 1903, Ibid. 70. Hay to Riddle, June 13, 1903, Foreign Relations, 1903, p. 710. 71. Riddle to Hay, June 15, 1903, Ibid. 72. Hay to Conger, June 16, 1903; Conger to Hay, June 18, 1903, Ibid., pp. 64–65. 73. British Parliamentary Paper, RG 38, p. 83. 74. Conger to Hay, June 23, 1903, Foreign Relations, 1903, pp. 65–66. 75. Hay to Roosevelt, June 30, 1903, Hay Mss. 76. Conger to Hay, July 1, 1903, Hay to Conger, July 13, 1903, Foreign Relations, 1903, pp. 66–67. 77. Hay to Roosevelt, July 14, 1903, Choate to Hay, July 18, 1903, Hay Mss; Hay to Conger, July 14, 1903, Russian pro memoria, July 14, 1903, Foreign Relations, 1903, pp. 67, 711; Zabriskie, American-Russian Rivalry, p. 93. 78. Conger to Hay, July 22, 1903, Foreign Relations, 1903, p. 68. 79. Rockhill to Hay, July 22, 1903, Hay Mss. 80. Loomis to Hay, July 22, 1903, Foreign Relations, 1903, p. 68. 81. Rockhill to Hay, July 23, 1903, Hay Mss. 82. Hay to Conger, July 26, 1903, Foreign Relations, 1903, p. 70. 83. Rockhill to Hay, August 3, 1903, Hay Mss. 84. Hay to Roosevelt, August 2, 1903, Ibid. 85. Conger to Hay, August 14, 1903, Foreign Relations, 1903, p. 71; Hay to Roosevelt, August 21, 1903, Roosevelt Mss.

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86. Hay to Roosevelt, August 14, 1903, Ibid. 87. Conger to Hay, September 10, 1903, Despatches: China; Adee to Loeb, September 12, 1903, Roosevelt Mss. 88. Hay to Adee, September 16, 1903, Hay Mss. 89. Adee to Hay, September 16, 1903, Ibid. 90. Rockhill to Hay, Adee to Hay, September 16, 1903, Hay to Adee, September 17, 1903, Ibid. 91. Hay to Adee, September 17, 1903, Ibid. 92. Rockhill to Hay, September 18, 1903, Ibid. 93. Rockhill to Hay, September 19, 1903, Ibid. 94. Conger to Secretary of State, September 23, 1903, Conger to Hay, September 24, 1903, Despatches: China. 95. Adee to Conger, September 23, 1903, Hay Mss. 96. Conger to Hay, October 25, 1903, October 29, 1903, Despatches: China; Hunt, Frontier Defense, pp. 80–81. 97. Ibid. 98. See Hay to Roosevelt, April 28, 1903, May 12, 1903, Hay Mss.; and Roosevelt to Hay, July 26, 1904, Roosevelt Mss. 99. Hunt, Special Relationship, p. 200. 100. Lodge to Roosevelt, May 21, 1903, Hollis to Roosevelt, July 6, 1903, Adams to Roosevelt, July 17, 1903, Roosevelt Mss. 101. Roosevelt to Shaw, June 13, 1903, Roosevelt Letters, vol. 4, pp. 497–98. 102. Roosevelt to Abbot, June 22, 1903, Ibid., pp. 500–501. 103. Roosevelt to Spring Rice, June 13, 1904, Brands, Selected Letters, p. 358. 104. Roosevelt to George Otto Trevelyan, March 9, 1905, Ibid., p. 380. 105. Roosevelt to Hay, July 29, 1903, Hay Mss. 106. Roosevelt to Loomis, July 1, 1903, Roosevelt Letters, vol. 4, p. 508. 107. Roosevelt to Shaw, June 22, 1903, Ibid., pp. 497–98. 108. Roosevelt to Hay, May 22, 1903, Ibid., p. 478. 109. Olney. “Growth of Foreign Policy,” p. 294. 110. Barrett, “America’s Duty in China,” pp. 147, 151.

Chapter Four

The Russo-Japanese War and the Question of Chinese Neutrality

The Russo-Japanese War began on February 8, 1904, when Japan carried out a surprise attack on the Russian naval base at Lushun (Port Arthur). Neither the Japanese nor the Russians wanted Chinese participation in the war, even though it was fought on Chinese territory. Although the Qing Dyansty and many Chinese were sympathetic to Japan, and despite the effective use of Chinese spies by Japan, the dynasty proclaimed Chinese neutrality. An alliance with China was not favored by Tokyo as it might raise “yellow peril” fears in the West and might draw other European powers into the conflict on the side of Russia. The declaration of neutrality in a war being fought on its soil placed China in an unusual, if not unique, position in warfare. 1 The outbreak of the war between Japan and Russia placed the Chinese in a dangerous position. From the standpoint of the United States it would be best if China remained neutral in the conflict. It was clear that Manchuria would be the battleground, but there was the possibility that China might, somehow, stumble into the war. A month before hostilities had begun, Conger had warned Hay that China had been purchasing a few arms and was quietly reorganizing and increasing its army. The Chinese had stressed they were doing this with no thought to taking part in the war that seemed inevitably to be coming. The wiser officials, however, “very much fear China will be drawn into it.” 2 A few days later, China gave an affirmative reply to Japan’s request that it remain neutral in the event of war. The pledge came nearly a month before the Japanese attack on Lushun. 3 Beijing had come to the conclusion that neutrality was the best course to follow. Yuan Shikai, commissioner for northern ports, was particularly instrumental in convincing the imperial court that such a decision would be the wisest one to take. 4 China had even taken steps to head off the impending 87

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test of arms. The ministers of the United States, Britain, and France were asked to mediate the dispute between Russia and Japan in a final effort to avoid war. The French had expressed a willingness to do so, but Conger and his British colleague were less receptive. Conger advised the Chinese that he believed mediation was useless especially as Japan had made it clear that it did not desire such interference. The Chinese were encouraged to take up the matter through their representatives in Washington, London, and Paris. 5 Interestingly, on the eve of the conflict, there were indications that Russia blamed the United States for the crisis with Japan. A few days before the Japanese attack on Lushun, the New York Sun cited an article published in the Russian periodical Novoe Vremya. The item accused the United States of seeking hegemony of “the entire globe.” Journalist George Kennan, an intimate of Roosevelt’s who had recently toured Siberia, was said to have been sent there to discredit the Russian government and people. The United States sought to transform China into an American India in order to exploit cheap labor and flood the Far East with its manufactures. “If there is war, its instigators will be the Yankees,” insisted the Novoe Vremya. Kennan, who sent a clipping of the article to Roosevelt, was more amused than anything else by the accusations. The journalist hoped that when the United States went on to “devour” Russia that Roosevelt would still be president “and that you’ll reward me for my ‘campaign’ service by making me Civil Governor of Siberia!” 6 Roosevelt expressed surprise at the “. . . unexpectedly hysterical side of the Russian nature, which the Japanese success, and the supposed hostility of this country, seems to have brought in evidence.” Roosevelt noted that the American nation sympathized, with the exception of American Jews, with Russia, but insisted that he was “. . . entirely sincere in my purpose to keep this Government neutral in the war. And I am no less sincere in my hope that the area of the war will be as limited as possible, and that it will be brought to a close with as little loss to either combatant as is possible.” 7 Once the fighting began, the other powers looked to the United States to lead the way in proclaiming neutrality in China. Kaiser Wilhelm of Germany asked Roosevelt to send a circular note to the other powers, including the belligerents, calling on them to respect Chinese neutrality outside the sphere of military operations. The president showed the German note to Rockhill, who found several objections to the scheme. Rockhill warned that the Russians might interpret the Kaiser’s proposal as a tacit agreement to their continued occupation of Manchuria. Additionally, the German plan to secure Chinese neutrality by occupying the rest of China with foreign troops might cause unrest among the Chinese people. The pro-Japanese Rockhill had another objection as well. “I should have mentioned that if the German suggestion were carried out, it might prove highly prejudicial to Japan’s interests, for by the neutralization of China that country would be precluded from

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joining forces with Japan at some time during the coming struggle, when her aid might bring about the final defeat of Russia.” 8 Roosevelt did approve the release of a circular note, however. Hay drafted an instruction, which he showed to Rockhill, Adee, and Speck von Sternburg, the German ambassador, before its release. The instruction was then cabled to Ambassadors Choate in London, Porter in Paris, and Tower in Berlin. Each was required to consult with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of that nation regarding the desirability of using the good offices of the neutral powers to induce the belligerents to respect Chinese neutrality “and in all practicable ways her administrative entity.” Hay’s instruction was a substantial change from the wording of the Kaiser’s note. The secretary of state also sought to localize and limit the area of hostilities as much as possible in order to avoid disturbance of the Chinese people and the least possible damage to commerce. 9 Notably, Hay’s directive called for maintaining China’s administrative entity rather than its territorial integrity, a distinction that might indicate that Hay, at least, had conceded Manchuria’s fate to the winner of the clash between Russia and Japan. The standard American concern about retaining commercial opportunities in China was reiterated as well. Meanwhile, efforts at mediation had fallen through. Japan notified Washington that any such attempt would be regarded as unfriendly as such an effort would be viewed as a delaying tactic on the part of Russia in order to gain time to strengthen its position. Russia insisted that any proposals must be made to Japan alone. Commenting on the efforts to arbitrate the conflict, Roosevelt wrote, “At present, we have been endeavoring to secure the guaranty of China’s neutrality. I think to try to secure what we know to be impossible at this time would only do damage. Secretary Hay thinks so too.” 10 Hay’s telegram had brought a satisfactory response from Germany, but the British wanted a more concrete definition of what Washington meant by neutral limits. Hay replied that there was no definition contemplated. The United States wanted to secure the possible area of hostilities and the largest possible sphere of neutrality compatible with the military necessities of Japan and Russia. He then informed Choate that Germany had agreed to the American proposal probably in the expectation that the American ambassador could use the information to solicit a satisfactory reply. 11 Later, Hay told Choate that it was all right for the powers to express their desires in any form they chose, reminding him of the desirability of keeping China neutral and limiting the area of hostilities as far as possible. “We certainly wish Chinese administrative entity to suffer as little violation as possible, but if we attempt the specification of meters and bounds we should never get the powers to agree.” 12 German adherence was enough for Hay to issue a circular note embodying the principles put forth in his cable of February 8. The circular was sent

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two days later to China, Russia, and Japan as well as to the other powers, requesting them to make similar representations. Germany, France, Britain, and Italy sent an identical telegram to the belligerents asking them to limit the sphere of their military operations. 13 Japan replied favorably on February 13 and the Russian response arrived on February 19. The Russian answer was likewise favorable, with the exception of Manchuria which “by the force of events, will serve as the field of military operations.” Hay accepted the Russian response without reservation. 14 Roosevelt had proclaimed American neutrality on February 11. 15 China followed the lead of the United States and announced its neutrality a day later. Noting that Manchuria was Chinese frontier territory, Beijing expressed the expectation that the warring powers would not harm the cities, lives, and property of the people there. Russia and Japan were reminded that they must not invade Chinese territory, a declaration that was essentially meaningless since the land war was fought in Manchuria. 16 Finally, China reaffirmed its claim to the three eastern provinces, insisting that “the sovereignty of the frontier territory of Manchuria will still revert to China” no matter who won the war. 17 Roosevelt was quite pleased with the results of the American diplomatic effort. The president was particularly satisfied that the German plan had been circumvented with no difficulties. “Yes, it was at the suggestion of ‘Bill the Kaiser,’ that we sent out the note on the neutrality of China,” Roosevelt told Elihu Root. But the insertion of the word ‘entity’ was ours. His suggestion originally was in intolerable form; that is, he wanted us to guarantee the integrity of China south of the latitude of the Great Wall, which would have left Russia free to gobble up what she really wanted. We changed the proposal by striking out the limitations, and Germany cheerfully acceded!

Roosevelt went on to give credit to the Germans for behaving “better than any other power” in the situation. Landsdowne, the British foreign minister, “drove us half-crazy with thick headed inquiries and requests about our making more specific exactly what it was highly inexpedient to make specific at all.” 18 Hay felt everything “seems to have come out exactly right.” The whole world was in favor of preserving Chinese neutrality as far as was practical in a war being fought on her territory. He had not mentioned Korea or Manchuria in his note because it was impossible “to delimit the neutral territory from that occupied by the armies.” The note was purposely vague, otherwise the assent of all the powers would have been unlikely. 19 Within two weeks of the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War, American diplomacy had secured agreement on the part of the belligerents, as well as

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“The Eastern Kilkennies—may the knot hold.” Russia and Japan are portrayed as two cats fighting while tied by a knot marked “Neutrality” to a rope labeled Manchuria. Source: Puck, March 16, 1904. Library of Congress.

from the other powers interested, respecting the neutrality of China. Washington once again had relied on tactics that had seemingly proved successful in the past. Roosevelt, Rockhill, and Hay sought assurances on the part of all concerned in China that its neutrality would not be violated. In this way pressure could be brought to bear on those countries that might prove reluctant to conform. While there had been no specific mention of the Open Door, the idea of tying the protection of commercial interests to Chinese territorial and administrative integrity was reiterated. The neutrality issues gave the

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United States an opportunity to reaffirm, in general, the principles of the Open Door and to secure international concurrence to them once again. Russia was doubtful, and perhaps suspicious, of China’s ability or willingness to remain neutral in the conflict. On March 1, Conger sent Hay a copy of a Russian proclamation posted in Manchuria shortly after the war had begun. The edict listed six regulations that the people of the “three eastern provinces” were expected to follow. Denouncing the surprise attack on Lushun, Russia insisted on the right to take a firm stand in Manchuria in order to prevent a Japanese invasion of Chinese and Russian territory. The Chinese in Manchuria were urged to assist the Russian army in procuring grain and forage. Russian soldiers were to be met with “sincerity and good feeling.” The Chinese people would be held responsible for the Chinese Eastern Railway as well as for telegraph and telephone poles in their districts. Chinese aid in exterminating banditry was expected, and anyone who looked upon Russian troops “with enmity” faced the possibility of “extermination.” 20 China, meanwhile, was trying to secure the areas of Manchuria that Russia had returned and planned to move some eighteen thousand troops into the region. The Russian minister immediately protested, insisting all of Manchuria must be exempted from the neutrality zone as all of those localities might also be sites of military activities. The Chinese meekly gave in to these objections and the soldiers were stationed on the Manchurian border instead. 21 Hay took this opportunity to remind Beijing of American hopes China would remain neutral and avoid provoking either belligerent. 22 St. Petersburg remained apprehensive that China might be tempted to join forces with Japan. At the end of April, Russia exhorted the State Department to make new representations to Beijing about American desires to see China maintain strict neutrality. 23 American officials in China, however, voiced their own suspicions regarding Russia’s motives. The consul in Tianjian, James W. Ragsdale, reported that early hopes regarding China’s ability to stay neutral in the war were being quickly dispelled. Ragsdale advised Washington that China was preparing to equip and field an army of about eighty thousand men, most of whom apparently would be stationed at the Manchurian border to prevent Russian encroachment. “It is also understood that the Russian authorities are resorting to every method necessary to force China to declare war.” Such action might revive antiforeign sentiments “and serious results [would] follow.” 24 Conger was doubtful of Russian concerns about China’s neutrality. The American minister was satisfied that Beijing was making every effort to observe strict neutrality. But Conger also felt “it will not be strange if the conduct of the Russians does not finally goad them into a violation thereof. This, of course, can the more easily be done if the Japanese army and navy continue to meet with success.” 25

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Hay was uncertain as to whether or not Russia truly feared a Chinese advance against the rear of its forces, or was simply pretending to be afraid. “A long experience of Russian diplomacy has not sufficiently educated me to make me sure when they are in a panic or when they are simulating terror for some diplomatic reason.” It was possible, Hay mused, that the Russians truly “were scared to death.” It was also likely that Russia expected to win the war, and once it had obtained Manchuria and Korea, would find it useful to have a grievance against China. Either way, the secretary of state could find no harm in complying with the Russian requests to remind China of its obligation to remain strictly neutral. 26 Hay did not share the real or feigned fear expressed by St. Petersburg in regard to Chinese neutrality. It was only in deference to the Russian appeals that he reminded Beijing of its obligations as a neutral so that neither side could have cause for complaint. The Chinese had reassured Hay “of their intentions in that regard.” 27 Hay later noted that “every time the Russians get a kick from the Japanese, they turn and swear at us.” 28 An incident in August 1904 undoubtedly caused a good deal of Russian cursing at both China and the United States. On the 13th of that month a Russian cruiser, the Askold, badly damaged and fleeing a pursuing Japanese squadron, steamed into the harbor at Shanghai along with her destroyer escort. The Chinese informed the Russian consul-general that the vessel could only remain in a neutral port for twenty-four hours. This brought forth a protest from the Russian official, who insisted the Askold could remain in Shanghai for “a reasonable time” in order to effect repairs. 29 Repeated Chinese demands that the ship leave the harbor were refused. On August 21, China informed John Goodnow, the American consul-general, that it could not enforce its neutrality and was asking interested neutral powers to take some form of action in the matter. Goodnow convened a meeting of consuls, where it was decided to report the situation to their respective governments and await instructions. By now a Japanese torpedo boat had arrived, China had extended the deadline for the Askold to complete its repairs and depart to August 23, and the Russians had made it evident they intended to remain where they were. Japan was considering sterner measures but had promised not to act without notifying Washington. Additionally, the Standard Oil Company had asked for protection of a plant it owned near where the Russian cruiser was anchored. 30 Goodnow was advised that he could do no more than protest any act endangering neutral interests. Conger was directed to inquire of the Imperial Court what rules of neutrality it intended to apply. The Standard Oil facility could not be guarded by coercing either belligerent, but anyone doing damage to the property of a neutral would be held accountable. 31 Both Hay and Roosevelt were out of Washington at this time, so most of the workload fell onto the shoulders of Alvey A. Adee, who was acting

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secretary of state in Hay’s absence. Roosevelt, as usual, had gone home to Oyster Bay, New York, to escape the summer heat of the capital, while Hay was at his home in Newbury, New Hampshire. The secretary of state undoubtedly was seeking relief from the summer weather as well, but he was also recuperating from one of his frequent bouts with illness. Hay’s physical condition had been failing for several years, and he had been plagued with ill health often since Roosevelt had become president. As a result, Roosevelt had been gradually assuming more and more of the direction of American foreign policy. His increasing role became evident in the Askold affair. Adee had kept both men informed of what was transpiring in China as the Askold situation developed. There were American men of war near Shanghai and Roosevelt immediately called for information regarding any action “done or planned by our vessels in Shanghai. The affair is delicate and of great importance, and I wish full information.” 32 Hay was instructed to keep in touch “with Adee and with me” on the matter. “I do not wish Adee to make any conclusive committal as to our not interfering.” Roosevelt was of the opinion that the Askold should either be forced to leave Shanghai or disarmed, otherwise Japan could not be expected to refrain from taking action. “If necessary, please come down here to see me,” the president told Hay. 33 Roosevelt was clearly taking charge. Most of the American naval vessels were located twelve miles below Shanghai. These included the cruisers Wisconsin and Oregon, five destroyers, and two colliers. Another ship, the U.S.S. Monadnock, was stationed at Shanghai. The squadron was under the command of Admiral Yates Stirling, commander-in-chief of the Pacific Fleet. Acting Naval Secretary Charles H. Darling passed this information along to the president, adding that Stirling had been ordered to file a report on conditions at Shanghai. 34 Adee continued to keep both Roosevelt and Hay up to date, and added recommendations of his own. Adee noted that it might be best if Stirling’s “discretion in case of emergency” should not be hampered by instructions from State. Adee added the suggestion that American consuls should not be committed to any guarantees of Chinese neutrality but should aim to safeguard American neutral interests, if threatened. Additionally, the difficulties of communicating with Hay were pointed out to Roosevelt. The secretary was without a cipher and was three miles from the telegraph, which closed early each day. “I trust you will permit me to consult you in matters of importance,” Adee concluded. 35 Hay, in turn, wrote to Roosevelt assuring him that he was in constant touch with Adee and to implore the president not to worry. Adee could be trusted not to commit the United States to positive action in guaranteeing the neutrality of China. Hay noted that Japan would act to take care of its own interests unless forcibly prevented by the other powers. In that regard, Hay said, there was no sign of interference. 36 Later that day, in a second letter,

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Alvey A. Adee. Source: Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division Washington, D.C., 1908.

Hay told the president he would come and see him at once, “but I am not fit. You would have an invalid on your hands, if I came now.” He reminded Roosevelt that the United States must not seem to be taking sides, “but the object is to help China to insist against Russia making use of her ports as a naval base.” 37

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Two notes were also dispatched to Adee. Hay warned his subordinate of the president’s anxiety about committing the United States to interfering or not interfering in China’s neutrality and expressed his confidence that pitfall could be avoided. Hay repeated to Adee what he had written to Roosevelt about Japan. The secretary could find no real steps for the United States to take. “If Russia persists in making Chinese ports her naval base, and refuses to comply with Chinese rules of neutrality, she cannot complain—though she will—if Japan takes it in herself to enforce those rules.” 38 In his next missive, Hay suggested that the best way out might be for China to tell Japan and Russia that it could not keep the peace between them, damn them both and let them fight it out. “Neither side pays the slightest respect to her wishes or her rules. If all her ports were at once recognized as ‘spheres of hostility’ the Russians would stop running there for shelter and the Japs wd [sic] have no reason to intrude.” 39 The president, meanwhile, had found Adee’s ideas to be satisfactory and sent a telegram of approval. American consuls were to be instructed to avoid commitment to any guarantee of Chinese neutrality. Stirling was to keep a sharp lookout to avoid being taken by surprise by Russian or Japanese initiatives. “He [Stirling] must be given a large liability of action within the lines of preserving American rights against either combatant.” Adee was further directed to communicate “freely” with Roosevelt “from time to time.” 40 Adee promptly cabled the president’s instructions to Shanghai and Beijing. 41 The next day, August 24, Roosevelt instructed Adee to tell the navy not to interfere in any fighting that might occur between the Japanese and Russians in the neutral port. He then wrote Hay to express his agreement with the view that China’s ports should be declared spheres of hostility by Beijing. 42 Adee, meanwhile, was proposing a new idea for solving the problem. He suggested that the neutral powers, using the principle of extraterritoriality as the basis for their action, exercise their “moral duty” and take steps to remove the Askold from Shanghai. Such an act, Adee argued, would not be a guarantee of Chinese neutrality, but “an independent and local step to conserve the neutrality of the foreign settlement.” 43 On August 25, the navy informed Roosevelt that the Askold would not be able to leave Shanghai harbor until the next day. Repair work was still underway and the Japanese were still cruising nearby. Shortly afterward, Adee wrote to Hay to tell him that all the “irritation of the President’s, your and my gray matter has been useless.” Russia had decided to disarm the Askold and its escorts and leave them in Shanghai until the war ended. Adee was unhappy with the solution as it did nothing to protect China’s neutral status. 44 Any hopes that Adee might have had that the issue had been settled were dashed a bit later. Conger wired to report that the Russian minister had informed him of his country’s decision to no longer consider China neutral, adding that the Russians blamed Japan for this turn of events. Adee was

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rightly concerned about what Japan might do next. If the Japanese responded to the Russian challenge by attacking the Askold in Shanghai “the feeble grasp of the neutral powers on the situation” would be weakened and Russia would be free to attempt the conquest of northern China as soon as Japan was worn out. Adee stressed that Japan must be persuaded to respect China’s neutrality until Russia actually invaded. He was also fearful that Russia might try to seize a Chinese port, such as Amoy, and use it as the winter quarters for the Baltic fleet. 45 Roosevelt was informed of the situation the next morning. 46 At the same time, Hay was passing on his impressions to Adee. “I can imagine nothing more silly than for the Russians to press the Chinese neutrality matter.” Once Japan was “authorized” by Russian actions to regard Chinese ports as spheres of hostility, “it would be all up with the Pacific fleet, and with the Baltic if it ever got there.” 47 Hay sent instructions to both Conger and Goodnow to use their influence to support Beijing in insisting on neutrality in Chinese waters. “China had not the power to enforce compliance with her rules and therefore an abuse of neutrality by one combatant will naturally provoke violent action by the other,” Hay pointed out. He thought judicious exertion of the influence of the other neutral nations would prevent abuse of China’s ports by either belligerent. 48 While these events were taking place, the Japanese minister, Takahira Kogoro, had presented Adee with copies of a telegram from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The communication, now academic as Adee noted in passing it along, expressed Tokyo’s desire that the Askold either sail from Shanghai or be disarmed. The Japanese action was the prelude to an official communiqué, which would put their views about the incident on record. As Takahira told Adee, “We wish the powers to know what we think about it.” The Japanese minister then warned Adee that if Russia delayed or the Askold was not effectively disarmed, Japan would take matters into its own hands. 49 Hay had been considering the Russian declaration and summed up his attitude in letters penned to both Roosevelt and Adee. “This latest move,” he wrote Adee, “can have no conceivable purpose but that which we have suspected all along—that in view of the certainty they feel in their superstitious souls that God must give them the victory, they are preparing an attack on China.” The secretary believed the longer Japan delayed in taking up the Russian challenge, the better her moral position would be while it had little to lose tactically. 50 In a longer letter to the president, Hay explained that he had not been unprepared for the latest Russian maneuver. “It has seemed to me ever since the beginning of the war that Russia was itching to declare war on China— and that in spite of all her defeats, she fully expects to crush Japan, annex Manchuria and Korea, and then take as much of North China as she may think she needs.” Hay characterized the Russian position as “the desire of the

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wolf to make a case against the lamb.” Hay suspected Russian plans to send the Baltic fleet to the Far East might have motivated the Russian declaration, with the additional possibility that there might be an effort to seize a Chinese port and turn it into a naval base. “A crazy sort of scheme but they appear of late to think with only one-half their minds.” Hay concluded with a wish that Roosevelt could somehow have an hour alone with the German emperor. If the United States knew for sure the real relationship between Russia and Germany, Hay opined, “we would know what to do. For the moment, the less we do the better, until our cue is spoken loud and clear.” 51 The disarming of the Askold ended the affair, if not to the satisfaction of Russia and Japan, certainly to the relief of the Chinese and American governments. The American role once again had been a cautious one, with Roosevelt and Hay careful to avoid giving any pledge of guaranteeing Chinese neutrality. China was too weak to uphold or defend its neutral position and the United States was not to be placed in the role of guardian. Scornful of China’s weakness, suspicious of Russian motives, and convinced of the rightness of Japan’s position, Roosevelt and Hay took no decisive steps, preferring instead to wait for a “cue” to act. Realistically, there was probably little the United States could do beyond providing moral support to China and insisting that the combatants respect the rights and holdings of the neutral powers. A guarantee of Chinese neutrality could conceivably drag the United States into the war and was certain to involve America in squabbles that would be better to avoid altogether. There is little to show that the American effort, such as it was, convinced Russia to disarm the Askold. More likely, the fact that the cruiser was certain to be sunk or captured by the Japanese the moment she left port was the deciding factor. The Russian declaration that they would no longer consider China neutral was little more than a cry of defiance or spite. There was nothing to gain by expanding a war that was going badly, and there was the risk China would form an alliance with Japan. It would be better to deal with Japan first, if possible, and then turn to China. So Russia gave in and the Askold was disarmed. The incident is significant in illustrating the greater role Roosevelt was assuming in the direction of China policy at this time. Undoubtedly Hay’s failing health was the major cause, and even though the secretary of state retained a grip on the situation, clearly the president was taking charge. Adee, who normally would have reported solely to Hay, was now keeping both men informed of the latest news from China. Roosevelt was taking more of a hand in directing the American personnel abroad as well. Hay had shouldered most of the burden in the past; now that his health was failing, Roosevelt assumed a greater role in the direction of China policy. Hay’s wish that Roosevelt and Kaiser Wilhelm could have an hour alone together, so that the president could ascertain exactly where Germany stood

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vis-à-vis Russia and the Far East was about to be granted, although not in the manner Hay had hoped for. Nevertheless, through Speck von Sternburg, the German ambassador and close friend of the president, the two leaders were able to present their viewpoints on the situation in China to each other. The exchange of views began at the end of 1904. Sternburg, who had returned to Germany, penned a lengthy letter to Roosevelt at the end of December in which he wrote about a “long talk” he had had with the Kaiser. The German ambassador had explained Roosevelt’s position on the question of the Open Door to his master. The kaiser, Sternburg reported, was delighted and “distinctly relieved when I assured him you stood for the policy of the open door and the integrity of China as firmly as ever.” However, the kaiser feared that once peace between Russia and Japan was concluded, the Open Door and Chinese integrity would be gravely imperiled. Wilhelm believed French efforts to create an entente between the British and Russians would lead to a “mighty coalition against the integrity of China and against the open door.” Perhaps recalling the “scramble for concessions” that had followed the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese War, the kaiser thought that the danger might be averted if the neutral powers could be induced to declare that they would not ask for territory or other advantages in China after the conclusion of peace. “In other words that the brokers shall make a pledge not to demand any pay for services rendered in the interests of the belligerents.” In this way it could be determined which of the neutral powers honestly upheld the Open Door and which did not by how quickly they responded to a proposal of this sort. The belligerents, the kaiser felt, however, should not be prevented from seeking compensation in the form of territory. Stipulations should be made regarding the maintenance of the Open Door in any territory ceded to either combatant. Sternburg concluded his letter with the reassurance that Germany adhered to the principles of the Open Door and maintenance of Chinese territorial integrity. He included a suggestion that the proposal regarding the neutral powers would have the best results in the emperor’s opinion, if it came from Roosevelt and the United States. 52 A telegram from the kaiser was sent a week later. In it, he noted that the proposed Anglo-French-Russian combination was designed to convince Russia and Japan that peace in China that did not include compensation for the members of the coalition would be impossible. Wilhelm told Roosevelt he could prevent this by asking all the powers, even the minor ones, to pledge not to demand compensation in China for any services that might be rendered on behalf of either belligerent. As for Russia and Japan “a grant of a certain portion of territory in the north of China” was inevitable, but the Open Door might be retained by treaty. 53 The contradiction in the kaiser’s proposal, of course. was that any concession of territory in northern China, i.e., Manchuria, would immediately negate the Open Door principle regarding Chinese territorial integrity. Wilhelm’s apparent concern about a second scramble for

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concessions appears to have been a cover for his real interest in supporting Russian efforts to gain control of Manchuria. Roosevelt received the cable two or three days before Sternburg’s letter. He immediately replied through Sternburg, asking the ambassador to convey his thanks to the kaiser and his appreciation of the suggestions. “I agree with him fully as to the importance of the matter, and will at once take measures to ascertain the view of various powers in regard to it.” 54 Roosevelt’s response indicated that he did not recognize, or was unconcerned, that China’s territorial integrity would be seriously compromised, if not doomed, if either belligerent was able to carve out of piece of Manchuria for itself. Sternburg’s letter arrived on January 12 and the president again made an immediate reply. Roosevelt confessed he would be astonished if England intended to do what the kaiser suspected to be likely, “but we shall soon see. I am in absolute and complete harmony with the views expressed by his Majesty as set forth in your letter, and acted on his suggestion even before your letter was received.” As to the question of territory Russia might demand, that would have to “depend on the military situation at the time of the peace negotiations.” 55 While the president made a noncommittal reply regarding any cession of territory in Manchuria, he might have asked how any division of Manchuria between Russia and Japan would not imperil the Open Door while any territorial concessions to the alleged “coalition” would. Roosevelt passed the letter on to Hay. “Evidently the Emperor is really alarmed about France and England,” the president wrote. “You notice how he keeps repeating the phrase ‘the integrity of China.’ I am glad I suggested that it be included in your note to the powers.” 56 The president was convinced of the “disinterestedness” of the kaiser, but Hay was suspicious. The secretary of state recognized the significance of the German proposal to, in effect, divide Manchuria between Russia and Japan. Thinking that Germany had designs on northern China as well, and that the kaiser desired an alliance with Russia, Hay removed Wilhelm’s proposals from the circular note he issued on January 13. “It has come to our knowledge that apprehension exists on the part of some of the powers that in the eventual negotiations for peace between Russia and Japan claim may be made for the concession of Chinese territory to neutral powers,” began the American statement. Hay reiterated the American position regarding the Open Door and Chinese integrity, then disavowed any desire for territorial claims in China. The other powers were invited to make similar declarations. Each of the neutral powers, in turn, denied any desire to acquire territory in China. Germany qualified its denial, however, by stating that the AngloGerman Convention of 1900 defined its position. As Germany interpreted this agreement, Manchuria was not considered part of the Chinese Empire. The Kaiser undoubtedly believed he was still free to support Russian ambi-

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tions in Manchuria. 57 There was no objection on the part of the United States to the caveat. Neither Hay nor Roosevelt appears to have fully comprehended the kaiser’s scheme. 58 Roosevelt was certain that “the Emperor rendered a service by what he did.” 59 Hay’s action at least prevented any formal commitment by the powers to support any partitioning of Manchuria between Russia and Japan. It is likely that both men recognized that the war would alter circumstances in Manchuria to some degree, including the possibility that some part of Manchuria might become part of Russia or Japan. But, while foreseeable, that scenario was not a certainty and it would do neither the Open Door nor the American position in China any good to put the United States in the position of appearing to support the transfer of any part of Manchuria to either belligerent, even if such an eventuality was being anticipated. The kaiser made one last abortive effort to manipulate the situation in July 1905, when he tried to convince Roosevelt that the British were seeking to prolong the war in order to weaken both Japan and Russia so as to eventually bring about China’s partition. 60 On the heels of the Hay circular came a Russian protest accusing China of neutrality violations in favor of Japan. Additionally, the Chinese were alleged to be preparing to join Japan in the war. St. Petersburg concluded that the efforts of the powers to assure China’s neutrality had failed and, should the situation continue, Russia would be forced to look to its own interests. 61 Indirectly, Russia was asking the United States to pressure China and Japan to be more scrupulous in enforcing Chinese neutrality. Roosevelt thought that any pressure put on China should be followed by a protest to Russia regarding its violations of Chinese neutrality. “I think we should seize the opportunity when the wolf invites outside interference against the lamb to call the wolf’s attention sharply to his own misdeeds.” Such a course of action might restrain “the wolf” from a course of misconduct that might “cause us trouble hereafter.” 62 Dutifully, the secretary of state reminded China to exercise care in maintaining its neutral status, and expressed his hope to Japan that no nation would ever be guilty of violating Chinese neutrality. Russia was informed of these steps and of the replies of the accused that China’s neutrality had not been violated in any way. Hay once again added his “hope and confidence” that neither belligerent nor any other power would be guilty of any violations. 63 Both China and Japan denied any neutrality violations on their part, but they hurled several counter-accusations at Russia. 64 Russia petulantly responded that “a favorable solution of the question . . . depends much more on China and Japan than on Russia.” 65 Hay finally informed the Russian ambassador that as the question of the neutrality of China affected so many powers, the United States could not offer an isolated judgment or pursue an individu-

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al course of action to conserve that status. The best course would probably be consideration of the issues raised by Russia in a general conference of the powers. 66 Russia quieted down after that, and later protests in the same vein were relatively feeble. 67 Efforts to bring about peace between Russia and Japan had begun almost from the outbreak of hostilities. The efforts to bring about peace have been well chronicled elsewhere and need no repetition here. 68 One of the possibilities for securing peace was American mediation between the two belligerents. Roosevelt, however, was reluctant to get involved. “I wish the Japs and Russians could settle it between themselves, and I should be delighted to have anyone except myself give them a jog to settle it.” 69 China, on the other hand, desired and expected the United States to take “an important part” in the actual negotiations. Beijing hoped America, along with the other powers, would “see to it that China is not unnecessarily despoiled in the terms of settlement,” Conger reported. The American minister had reassured the Chinese that the United States could be relied upon to do whatever, as a friend, it could to secure fair treatment. Conger added that conversations with his colleagues had led them to reveal European expectations that the United States would take an effective part in securing peace. He then offered the suggestion, “for whatever it is worth,” that future struggles in Manchuria be prevented by transferring the Manchurian Railway to China under an international guarantee of payment and protection. In Conger’s opinion, this would put a barrier between the belligerents, secure peace, and assure the Open Door. 70 In dealing with Roosevelt, the Japanese had a card up their diplomatic sleeve. Aware that Roosevelt was the one most likely to offer good offices should the beliigerants desire them, Kaneko Kentaro, a classmate of Roosevelt’s at Harvard, although they met later in their lives, had been sent to the United States early in 1904 in order to begin developing good relations between Japan and the United States. 71 Kaneko met Roosevelt for the first time at the White House and the two quickly became friends. Kaneko returned to the White House in January 1905, and broached the idea of a peace conference. Roosevelt was amenable to the suggestion, but expressed his belief that Manchuria should be returned to China and the great powers should guarantee its neutrality. He also insisted that Japan would have to maintain the Open Door in Manchuria as commercial opportunites there were of importance to the United States. In March, Kaneko was invited to the White House for lunch, shortly after the Japanese victory at the Battle of Mukden. During the conversation, Roosevelt told Kaneko about his upcoming bear hunting trip, which would have him away from Washington for six weeks. However, Roosevelt told Kaneko that he would return to the capital immediately if Kaneko for some reason wished to discuss the war. 72

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April brought a peace overture from Russia, through France, to Japan. Suspicious of the French, who were allied to Russia, and aware that Roosevelt supported the Japanese position, the Japanese turned to Roosevelt, who had already been apprised of Japan’s war goals which were similar to the president’s. The American minister in Japan, Lloyd C. Griscom, advised that the Japanese were anxious both for peace and to have Roosevelt mediate a peace conference. Roosevelt convinced the Japanese that direct negotiations were advisable. It was not until after Japan’s naval victory at Tsushima on May 26, 1905, that the two nations finally agreed to go to the peace table. With Roosevelt acting as intermediary, arrangements were made, albeit slowly, and the conference began in Portsmouth, New Hampshire, August 10, 1905. 73 Prior to commencement of the conference, China expressed a desire to be represented. Rockhill, who had succeeded Conger at Beijing, had attempted to dissuade the Chinese. He stressed the fact that peace negotiations were unlikely to settle terms regarding China’s sovereign rights. Rockhill also stated his belief in Japan’s assurances regarding the Open Door. The new minister thought he had made an impression upon Prince Qing, who was in charge of foreign affairs. Other Chinese officials concurred with Rockhill, while both the British and French had likewise counseled China to wait. 74 Rockhill was successful, for, a few days later, he cabled word that China would not be sending representatives to Portsmouth. The State Department wired back a reassurance that the United States would do whatever it could to prevent China’s sovereignty from injury and protect its territorial integrity. But there was also the caveat that the United States had nothing to do with the actual negotiations. China replied that it would not recognize an agreement by Russia and Japan involving Chinese interests without an arrangement having been reached with Beijing. Rockhill noted Chinese fears of a Japanese takeover of the Russian concessions in Manchuria. He had assured the Imperial Court that Japan would make an agreement with China. 75 The American minister was also striving to reassure Roosevelt. The president had written Rockhill before the negotiations started, pointing out reported Chinese fears of a Japanese victory. Rockhill saw little likelihood in the prospect of the Chinese becoming “mere followers” of Japan. China would find Japanese guidance acceptable because Japan would have to follow a policy identical to that of Britain and America, “to wit: the integrity of China and the ‘open door.’” Japan could not depart from this policy without losing American and English support as well as that “of the business element of all nations which sees in it its only permanent safeguard.” China feared Japanese predominance as much as Russian and would do everything possible to circumvent it. 76 The Treaty of Portsmouth was signed September 5, 1905. Japan secured Port Arthur, Dalien and the South Manchurian Railroad. Language in the

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treaty called for Chinese consent to their transfer and a declaration from Russia that it had no privileges or concessions that impaired Chinese sovereignty or “were inconsistent with the principle of equal oportunity.” Furthermore, in Article Four of the treaty, the two nations pledged not to “obstruct any general measures common to all countries which China may take for the development of the commerce or industry of Manchuria.” 77 Japan would reiterate its commitment to the Open Door in agreements negotiated with France and Russia in 1907. 78 Roosevelt played a significant role in bringing Japan and Russia together, but also in helping to break a deadlock resulting from a Japanese demand for an indemnity. The president was able to convince the Japanese delegation to drop the demand, thereby opening the way to the final settlement. The conclusion of the negotiations and the signing of the treaty represented an apparent victory for Roosevelt’s balance of power diplomacy. Japanese expansion appeared to have been limited and the settlement left the Russians and Japanese facing each other in the hopes that this would have a moderating effect on their respective ambitions in Manchuria. 79 Replying to a telegram of congratulations from the Chinese emperor, Roosevelt expressed satisfaction that the integrity of China was preserved and peace brought to Manchuria, along with “the benefits of commercial intercourse with the world.” 80 Outlining the provision of the treaty to Rockhill in another cable, the president stated his judgment that China “cannot with propriety question the efficacy of this transfer or hesitate to allow Japanese all the rights the Russians were exercising. If China makes any trouble about the transfer in question you will at the proper time state this strongly to the Chinese Government.” Rockhill was further instructed to inform the Japanese minister of the telegram’s contents. China made little fuss over the matter, accepting the Portsmouth treaty in the Sino-Japanese Agreement of December 12, 1905. 81 John Hay did not live to see peace restored in East Asia. A weak heart and other ailments finally took their toll and the secretary of state died July 1, 1905. His death concluded one period of American relations with China and marked the beginning of another. Even before Hay’s demise, as noted earlier, Roosevelt was assuming a greater role in the formulation of China policy and, by the end of his administration, he would have altered the Open Door Policy to some extent. Nevertheless, Hay continued to wield some influence over the president regarding China matters up to the time of his death. Roosevelt, however, was reluctant to admit the influence of Hay. Indeed, within two weeks of Hay’s passing, the president indicated to Henry Cabot Lodge his opinion that the late secretary of state had been a weak man. While praising Hay’s “staunch loyalty” as a “real asset to the administration,” Roosevelt nonetheless found fault with his efforts.

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John Hay. Source: Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division Washington, D.C., 1902.

But in actual work I had to do the big things myself, and the other things I feared would be badly done or not done at all. He had grown to hate the Kaiser so that I could not trust him in dealing with Germany. When, for instance, the Kaiser made the excellent proposition about the integrity of China, Hay wished to refuse and pointed out where the Kaiser’s proposition as originally made contained what was inadvisable. I took hold of it myself, accepted the Kaiser’s offer, but at the same time blandly changed it so as to wholly remove the objectionable feature (that is, I accepted it as applying to all of China,

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Chapter 4 whereas he had proposed it in effect that we should allow Russia to work her sweet will in all northern China) and had Hay publish it in this form. 82

Roosevelt could have been referring to either the circular note of 1904, or of 1905, regarding Chinese neutrality, although it seems most likely that he was thinking of the latter, the most recent and probably the freshest in his mind. In either case, however, there is evidence that Hay was instrumental in having the objectionable features removed. The secretary of state appears to have been responsible for the drafting of the second note, and he seems to have convinced Roosevelt that a statement regarding Chinese integrity was required in the first circular. 83 Roosevelt’s criticisms of Hay were unfair, anyway. Hay had carried the major burden during the Manchurian issues of 1902–1903, along with Rockhill. Roosevelt accepted the advice of his secretary of state and approved his course of action throughout that period. Even when Roosevelt was taking on more of Hay’s duties, Hay, whether out of town or recuperating from illness, remained fully informed of affairs and continued to advise the president, who often agreed with him. In short, although Roosevelt may have been doing more of Hay’s work, he still relied on the infirm secretary of state far more than he indicates in his letter to Lodge. It is unclear as to where Roosevelt picked up the notion he expressed in this letter. It may be that the president was still flushed with his success at bringing Russia and Japan together at Portsmouth and allowed himself to become carried away in his assessment of his and Hay’s roles. Wherever he formed the judgments he expressed, Roosevelt’s criticisms were petty and an unfitting characterization of a man who had served three presidents and his country faithfully and well. Throughout the Russo-Japanese War, the United States appeared to have assumed the lead in working for the maintenance of Chinese neutrality. But that leadership was more chimerical than substantial. As in the earlier troubles in Manchuria, Washington rarely took the initiative or acted without support from one or more of the other major powers involved in China. Usually American actions, such as the circulars regarding Chinese neutrality, were undertaken at the behest of some other nation, most often Germany. Germany, at least, was not loath to use the United States as a pawn to further its ambitions in East Asia, and while the gambit failed, it may be that Roosevelt and Hay did not fully perceive what the kaiser was up to. American leadership in preserving the Open Door, the integrity of China, and the neutrality of that country was almost completely dependent on the support of other major powers. Therefore American actions were cautious and limited and, at times they were confused and uncertain. Roosevelt and Hay relied on soliciting repeated assurances that Chinese neutrality, integrity, and the Open Door would continue to be respected by the other powers. They were careful to avoid any

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commitment or guarantee of Chinese neutrality that might involve the United States in Far Eastern affairs to an extent that the American public would not support. As a result, there was never more than the mildest diplomatic pressure on the belligerents regarding China’s neutrality. The Chinese were pressured a bit harder, but there was no need to do more than admonish or warn them to be careful and avoid provoking either combatant. The basic rule followed by the Roosevelt administration was that if the Chinese could not enforce their neutral status, the United States would not do it for them. As with the earlier Manchurian issues, American policy was pragmatic. The United States could not act alone in China and there were limits as to how far Washington could go in concert with the other nations interested in China affairs. The Open Door Policy had provided a modus vivendi for the powers in China, but it did not serve as a deterrent to their ambitions. The United States had succeeded only in finding a formula for the powers to get along, but just if they wanted to. It was not the Open Door that kept China intact so much as the rivalries of the European nations and Japan, and the realization that China could be exploited in other ways besides dismemberment. But the Russo-Japanese War had made it clear once again that ambitious nations might still seek the latter alternative. It was in this regard that the United States again had an opportunity to take the initiative in finding a solution to this problem. The Russo-Japanese conflict was fought by two nations at odds over territory and rights that supposedly belonged to a third. China had to remain neutral, watching as two powers contended for its property. Largely through American, particularly Roosevelt’s efforts, peace was restored, but little else. American leadership may have been instrumental in making peace, but there was the chance to do more. The conflict between Japan and Russia should have made the necessity for an international conference to discuss the problem of China clear. Roosevelt might have established the United States as a more effective spokesman on the China question by proposing an international conference on China after the Portsmouth peace. He certainly had the chance to lobby for one during the Portsmouth talks. A word in the ears of his friends in Washington’s diplomatic corps about the possibility of a conference of this nature would have allowed Roosevelt to assess its feasibility. It is possible that an agreement could have been negotiated that would have made the Open Door a more viable and effective instrument. Realistically, from the perspective of the other powers, vague assurances regarding the principles of the Open Door were preferable to a formal commitment to them. But, from the American standpoint, there was little to lose and much to gain if the effort proved successful. By failing to perceive and take advantage of the opportunity and opting instead for a solution that left Russia and Japan facing each other in Manchuria, the question of whether or not China would remain an individual entity was not resolved but left in abeyance.

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NOTES 1. Elleman and Paine, Modern China, p. 218. 2. Conger to Hay, January 2, 1904, Despatches: China. 3. Conger to Hay, January 12, 1904, Ibid. 4. Hunt, Frontier Defense, pp. 85–87. 5. Conger to Hay, January 30, 1906, Despatches: China. 6. Kennan to Roosevelt, February 4, 1904, includes clipping from the New York Sun of February 3, 1904, Roosevelt Mss. 7. Roosevelt to Spring Rice, March 19, 1904, Brands, Selected Letters, p.358. 8. Rockhill to Roosevelt, February 6, 1904, Ibid., Varg, Open Door Diplomat, pp. 57–58. 9. Hay to Roosevelt, February 8, 1904, Roosevelt Mss. 10. Roosevelt to Strauss, February 9, 1904, Roosevelt Letters, vol. 4, p. 271. 11. Hay to Choate, Hay to Tower, February 10, 1904, Roosevelt Mss. 12. Hay to Choate, February 13, 1904, Ibid. 13. Hay to Conger, February 10, 1904, Conger to Hay, February 10, 1904, Foreign Relations, 1904, pp. 118–19. 14. Hay circular instruction, February 20, 1904, Ibid., pp. 2–3. 15. Neutrality Proclamation, General Order number 152, Navy Department, February 15, 1904, Roosevelt Mss. 16. For example, the Battle of Mukden fought in March 1905 involved Japanese forces numbering 300,000 against a Russian army of 310,000 men. Mikaso Hane and Louis G. Perez, Modern Japan: A Historical Survey, 4th Edition (Boulder: Westview Press, 2009), p. 184. 17. Conger to Hay, February 13, 1904, Foreign Relations, 1904, pp. 120–22. 18. Roosevelt to Root, February 16, 1904, Roosevelt Letters, vol. 4. p. 731. 19. Hay to Choate, February 27, 1904, Hay Mss. 20. Conger to Hay, March 1, 1904, Foreign Relations, 1904, pp. 127–28. 21. Conger to Hay, March 4, 1904, Ibid., p. 128. 22. Hay to Conger, March 12, 1904, Ibid., p. 130. 23. Hay to Conger, April 29, 1904, Ibid., p. 132. 24. Ragsdale to Loomis, May 3, 1904, CD Tientsin. 25. Conger to Hay, May 4, 1904, Despatches, China. 26. Hay to White, May 5, 1904, Hay Mss. 27. Hay to Tower, May 11, 1904, Ibid. 28. Hay to Eddy, June 7, 1904, Ibid. 29. Goodnow to Hay, August 22, 1904, Adee to Conger, August 24, 1904, Ibid. 30. Goodnow to Hay, August 13, 1904, Foreign Relations, 1904, p. 136. 31. Adee to Goodnow, August 22, 1904, Adee to Conger, August 22, 1904, Ibid. 32. Roosevelt to Morton, August 22, 1904, Roosevelt Letters, vol. 4, p. 901. 33. Roosevelt to Hay, August 22, 1904, Ibid. 34. Darling to Roosevelt, August 23, 1904, Roosevelt Mss. 35. Adee to Roosevelt, August 23, 1904, Ibid.; Adee to Hay, August 23, 1904, Hay Mss. 36. Hay to Roosevelt, August 23, 1904, Roosevelt, Mss. 37. Hay to Roosevelt, August 23, 1904, Hay Mss. 38. Hay to Adee, August 23, 1904, Ibid. 39. Hay to Adee, August 23, 1904, Ibid. 40. Roosevelt to Adee, August 23, 1904, Ibid.; Roosevelt Letters, vol. 4, p. 902. 41. Adee to Conger, August 23, 1904, Hay Mss.; Foreign Relations, 1904, p. 137. 42. Roosevelt to Hay, August 24, 1904, Hay Mss. 43. Adee to Hay, August 24, 1904, Ibid. 44. Adee to Hay, August 25, 1904, Ibid.; Darling to Roosevelt, August 26, 1904, Roosevelt Mss. 45. Adee to Hay, August 25, 1904, Hay Mss. 46. Forester to Loeb, August 26, 1904, Adee to Roosevelt, August 26, 1904, Roosevelt Mss. 47. Hay to Adee, August 26, 1904, Ibid. 48. Hay to Conger and Goodnow, August 26, 1904, Ibid.

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49. Adee to Hay, August 26, 1904, Ibid.; Adee to Roosevelt, August 26, 1904, Roosevelt Mss. 50. Hay to Adee, August 27, 1904, Hay Mss. Hay’s emphasis. 51. Hay to Roosevelt, August 27, 1904, Ibid. 52. Sternberg to Roosevelt, December 29, 1904, Roosevelt Mss. 53. Busske to Roosevelt, January 5, 1905, Ibid. 54. Roosevelt to Sternburg, January 10, 1905, Roosevelt Letters, vol. 4, p. 1099. 55. Roosevelt to Sternburg, January 12, 1905, Ibid., pp. 1100–1101. 56. Roosevelt to Hay, January 12, 1905, Ibid., p. 1100. 57. Tyler Dennett, Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War (New York: Doubleday, 1925), pp. 70–83; Zabriskie, Russian-American Rivalry, p. 111; Foreign Relations, 1905, pp. 1–5; Roosevelt to Sternberg, January 18, 1905, Roosevelt Letters, vol. 4, p. 1099; see also the note, same page, Busske to Roosevelt, January 17, 1905; Meyer to Roosevelt, January 20, 1905, Roosevelt Mss.; Choate to Hay, January 20, 1905, January 31, 1905, Hay Mss. 58. Dennett, Russo-Japanese War, pp. 81–83. 59. Roosevelt to Tower, February 16, 1905, Roosevelt Letters, vol. 4, p. 1122. 60. Edmund Morris, Theodore Rex (New York: Random House, 2001), p. 395. 61. Cassini to Hay, January 13, 1905, Foreign Relations, 1905, pp. 757–58. 62. Roosevelt to Hay, January 16, 1905, Roosevelt Letters, vol. 4, pp. 1102–3. 63. Foreign Relations, 1905, pp. 135–36, 581–82, 758. 64. Ibid., pp. 136–37, 582–85. 65. Ibid., p. 759. 66. Ibid., p. 760. 67. Ibid., p. 761; all of the above (notes 56-63) can be found in the Roosevelt Mss., dated January 23, 1905. 68. Dennett, Russo-Japanese War, pp. 170–277. 69. Roosevelt to Hay, March 30, 1905, Roosevelt Letters, vol. 4, p. 1150. 70. Conger to Hay, March 31, 1905, Despatches: China; Roosevelt Mss. 71. The choice of Kaneko as Japan’s envoy to Roosevelt reflected Japanese concerns about the war from the beginning. As such, they were making plans for an end to the conflict even as preparations to begin it were being made. Shumpei Okamoto, The Japanese Oligarchy and the Russo-Japanese War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), pp. 101–2. 72. Donald Keene, Emperor of Japan: Meiji and His World, 1852–1912 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), pp. 612, 618. 73. Ibid., p. 618; Zabriskie, Russian-American Rivalry, pp. 113–21; Barnes to Loeb, April 25, 1905, Roosevelt Mss. 74. Rockhill to Hay, July 1, 1905, Despatches: China. 75. Rockhill to Hay, July 6, 1905, July 8, 1905, Ibid. 76. Roosevelt to Rockhill, May 18, 1905, Rockhill to Roosevelt, July 7, 1905, Roosevelt Mss. 77. Text of the Treaty of Portsmouth in Raymond A. Esthus, Double Eagle and Rising Sun, The Russians and Japanese at Portsmouth in 1905 (Durham: Duke University Press, 1988), pp. 207–12. 78. Ibid., p. 197. 79. Henry Kissinger, World Order (New York: Penguin Press, 2014), p. 252. 80. Roosevelt to the Emperor of China, September 10, 1905, Roosevelt Letters, vol. 5, p. 18. TR’s role in the peace talks is best described in Esthus, Double Eagle and Rising Sun. See also Dennett, Russo-Japanese War, pp. 236–77. 81. Roosevelt to Rockhill, September 10, 1905, Roosevelt Letters, vol. 5, p. 18. 82. Roosevelt to Lodge, July 11, 1905, Ibid., vol. 4, p. 1271. 83. Tyler Dennett, John Hay: From Poetry to Politics (New York: Dodd, Mead, and Company, 1934), p. 409.

Chapter Five

Exclusion, Railroads, and the AntiAmerican Boycott of 1905

The Manchurian issue affected not only Sino-American relations, but United States policy toward other nations as well. Manchuria had been a troublesome issue in U.S.-Chinese relations, but it was also a matter of international importance. There were other problems regarding China that faced the Roosevelt administration, however. Significant among them were the questions of excluding Chinese coolie immigrants from the American mainland, the Chinese boycott of American goods in 1905–1906, an attack on an American mission in Lianzhou, and the Chinese purchase of the American China Development Company contract. During this period, in China, following the Boxer Uprising, the Qing Dynasty had embarked on a final effort to implement reforms meant to bring about radical changes to China’s traditional way of life. The focus at first was on education, culminating with the abolishing of the civil service examination system, which emphasized expertise in Chinese classical literature. Other reforms included the creation of a new Ministry of Foreign Relations, replacing the former Zongli Yamen, modernization of the army, establishment of other government ministries, and a variety of economic reforms including the promotion of railroad construction and the opening of a central bank. However, those placed in charge of administering the reforms did not fully commit themselves to the reform process. At the same time a movement toward revolution against the Qing was growing in strength, particularly under the direction of Sun Yat-sen (Sun Zhongshan), who founded the Tongminghui, a revolutionary party in 1905. 1 1905 had begun with an expression of Sino-American amity. Dowager Empress Cixi had presented a portrait of herself to the United States in a gesture that was intended to represent her goodwill and appreciation for 111

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America’s friendship to China as well as her continued good wishes for the well-being of the American people. Roosevelt accepted the gift and expressed his view that the relationship should continue and be strengthened in all practicable ways. Cixi’s portrait would be placed in the National Museum as a lasting symbol of the goodwill that united the two countries. 2 It wouldn’t be long however, before tensions between the two countries returned. The question of excluding Chinese laborers has been effectively dealt with in several studies, and needs only to be summarized here. 3 By the time Roosevelt became president American policy toward China was based upon a contradiction. While working for an Open Door for American merchants and investors in China, the United States had developed a closed door policy as far as permitting Chinese entry into America was concerned. Granted, the Open Door was about the protection of American commerce in China, but the restrictive immigration policies of the United States in regard to Chinese laborers and the effort to keep them out of the country was viewed as humiliating by the Chinese. Moreover, the restriction of Chinese immigration might, in the long run, prove harmful to American commercial interests in China. The Burlingame Treaty of 1868 with China had contained an invitation for Chinese to come to the United States, although they would not be eligible for naturalization. More than a hundred thousand Chinese were already in the United States, having fled conditions that resulted in the Taiping Rebellion and its aftermath, as well as having been attracted by the discovery of gold in California and labor opportunities on the Pacific railroads. However, completion of the railroads, mass emigration from the eastern United States, and the effects of the Panic of 1873 soon had the Chinese drifting to California. There they settled primarily in and around San Francisco, and were desperate for any kind of a job. Economic pressure and racial prejudice soon resulted in strong anti-Chinese feelings in California and agitation for an end to Chinese immigration. Pressure from California eventually led to the negotiation of the Angell Treaty with China in 1880 that gave the United States the right to regulate but not completely prohibit the entrance of Chinese laborers. Exclusionists were soon clamoring for restrictive legislation under the terms of the new treaty. 4 The Chinese Exclusion Act was passed in 1882. Additional exclusion legislation was passed in 1888 and in 1892. The Scott Act, passed in 1888, limited the entry of Chinese laborers and prohibited their re-entry into the United States Chinese teachers, students, officials, merchants, and tourists were exempted. In 1892, the Geary Act required all Chinese, citizens or otherwise, in the United States to carry documentation at all times that confirmed their right to reside in America. 5 However, in 1898, these policies changed as a result of the appointment of Terence V. Powderly, the former head of the Knights of Labor, to the post of commissioner general of immigration, a position he would hold until 1902. Powderly in-

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itiated a “subtle and silent administrative revolution” designed to completely exclude all Chinese immigrants, with the exception of diplomats. Additionally, Powderly aimed to drive the Chinese minority out of the United States through a deliberate policy of harassment. The immigration chief likewise sought to extend this policy to Hawaii and the Philippines. Passage of the Exclusion Act of 1902 gave Powderly and his successor, Frank B. Sargent, another labor leader, the authority to cut off immigration of upper-class Chinese through arbitrary rulings, along with the power to harass Chinese residents into leaving. A new act in 1904 eliminated past references to treaties with China, thereby placing immigration policy in the hands of domestic legislation. By 1904, “a class-based policy of restriction had evolved into a restrictive policy of a national and racist type.” 6 There was a national security aspect to the clamor for exclusion. In its polemic against the immigration of Chinese laborers, entitled Some Reasons for Chinese Exclusion: Meat vs. Rice; American Manhood vs. Asiatic Coolieism, Which Shall Survive?, the American Federation of Laborers concluded its argument against their immigration with these words: Therefore every consideration of public duty, the nation's safety and the peoples' rights, the preservation of our civilization, and the perpetuity of our institutions, impel your memorialists to ask for the reenactment of the exclusion laws, which have for twenty years protected us against the gravest dangers, and which were they relaxed would imperil every interest which the American people hold sacred for themselves and their posterity. 7

Tchen notes that this paragraph “. . . but for the swapping of a few words here and there reads almost like a post 9/11 national security statement.” 8 The Chinese were not without supporters in the United States. Merchants, missionaries, educators, diplomats and others opposed the exclusion policy, fearful that it might harm the Open Door Policy and American trading interests. “As you know we have a large trade in New England with China especially in cottons,” wrote Charles S. Hamlin to President Roosevelt. Hamlin was writing on behalf of several New England merchants opposed to the Exclusion Act of 1902. Passage of the bill “would be productive of disastrous results to said trade.” 9 Roosevelt forwarded the letter to Powderly, who confessed his ignorance of the amount of trade between New England and China. “From my point of view it seems incredible that such an arrangement would affect any legitimate trade between New England and China, any more than the Chinese exclusion laws affect the general trade between China and the United States,” Powderly replied. 10 Another opponent of exclusion was Samuel L. Gracey, United States consul in Fuzhou (Foochow). Gracey doubted that the United States would be overrun with Chinese laborers should the immigration restrictions be lifted. The consul based his conclusion on the assumption that Chinese did

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not like to travel far from home. He also supported the admission of artisans to the American mainland. But the real reason Gracey supported the easing of restrictions was expressed in his concluding remarks, noted earlier: “If house servants could be admitted, it would go far toward solving one of the most perplexing questions of difficulties in our home life. They [the Chinese] make the best domestic servants to be found on earth.” 11 A more serious rationale for easing exclusion was forwarded by members of the Educational Association of China. Protesting the harassment and humiliation suffered by Chinese students at the hands of American customs officials, they warned of the harm such treatment was doing to American interests in China. More and more Chinese were going to Europe, rather than the United States to study, they argued. As a result, they pointed out, American commercial interests probably suffered and the influence of American educators in China was being seriously undermined. The delays in admission, uncertainty, and personal indignities suffered by their students caused resentment among the Chinese to the detriment of Americans and American interests in China. The association urged that students be given the fullest opportunity of admission to the United States in order to win back Chinese goodwill and improve the American position in China. 12 Another correspondent to Roosevelt suggested the best solution to the question from the American point of view. “Our trade may be immensely improved if Congress, without modifying our attitude towards Chinese labor, will permit a Chinese gentleman to be treated as we insist that American gentlemen be treated in China.” 13 John Callan O’Laughlin, the newspaperman who often acted as an unofficial agent 14 for Roosevelt, added his support. What was needed was “legislation which will enable the better classes freely to enter the United States and to transact their business here without molestation. Under the strained interpretation of the Immigration Laws [sic] . . . a banker is refused admission because he is neither an official, a teacher, a student, a merchant, or a traveler.” O’Laughlin added a report of an incident suffered by the first secretary of the Chinese legation, relating how a “Chinese Inspector” tried to arrest the diplomat for failing to carry his registration papers. The inspector refused to take the word of witnesses who identified the official, or to believe his card, which showed him to be a member of the Chinese legation. Only when the secretary prepared a telegram to be sent to the State Department was he released. An official complaint resulted in an investigation that showed only that in the opinion of the Immigration Bureau the inspector had done his duty. 15 In an article published in The Atlantic Monthly in January 1906, John W. Foster noted similar instances of mistreatment. 16 The Chinese government fought the policy as best it could. Lobbying of congressmen, public addresses, and direct audiences with the president were all tried, but with little success. Wu Tingfang, the Chinese minister in 1901,

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was directed to lay the case before Roosevelt in November. In December the minister sent the president a list of specific cases of hardship and injustice suffered by Chinese due to rigid enforcement of the exclusion laws. Wu pointed out that the rights of the exempt classes of Chinese had been constantly ignored and denied by customs officials. Some specific instances of abuse were cited and blamed on “harsh enforcement” of the laws. These certainly do not seek the American shores for the purpose of wresting the daily bread from the mouths of American wage-earners but for the purpose of promoting a friendly understanding and improving the commercial relations between the two countries. It is true that instances of fraudulent attempts to enter the country are not wanting. But innocent Chinese who have every right to come to the United States should not be treated as suspicious characters and sent back . . . on the least pretext. 17

Wu then asked the State Department to consider an adjustment of the question, as the Exclusion Act of 1892 was about to expire. It was hoped an accord “more in harmony with the interests of our respective peoples” might be reached. 18 Any hopes the Chinese had for a more harmonious accord were dashed with passage of the Exclusion Act of 1902. While the legislation did not go as far exclusionists would have liked, it did not repudiate the Immigration Bureau’s actions. 19 Continued harsh enforcement of the law led the Chinese to adopt more drastic measures. The Sino-American Treaty of 1894, which dealt with immigration, was scheduled to expire after ten years had passed. In January 1904, the Chinese announced their intention to terminate the treaty. Efforts to get the Chinese to revoke the decision were in vain. American arguments that China was unlikely to get a more favorable treaty and that Congress was likely to pass harsher legislation were rebuffed. China was willing to keep the agreement in force for a short period of time, but not the stipulated tenyear renewal period, in order to negotiate a new pact. If this could not be done, it was best to let the present treaty run out and start over. The present harsh regulations were too annoying to Chinese at home as well as abroad. The oppression of Chinese in the United States could not, in Beijing’s view, get much worse, so it was best to let the treaty lapse and begin again. 20 The effort failed. By the end of April Congress had passed a new exclusion bill, while attempts to renegotiate the 1894 treaty stalled in the spring of 1905. Chinese opposition to the immigration policy now took a new tack, turning to commercial warfare. The result was a boycott of American products and trade that began in the summer of 1905. The supporters of the Open Door had vigorously opposed passage of the Exclusion Acts of 1902 and 1904, but their efforts had failed to prevent passage of these pieces of legislation. One powerful source of backing against exclusion resided in the White House, but Roosevelt was adamantly

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Wu Tingfang. Source: Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division Washington, D.C., originally created by Frances Benjamin Johnston, 1900.

opposed to the immigration of Chinese laborers as has been noted earlier. Upon passage of the 1902 bill he wrote, “. . . my position . . . has been that we want to make more stringent the exclusion of Chinese laborers (not Chinese students or merchants). Without looking into the details, I have understood that the Senate bill was satisfactory as passed.” 21 Roosevelt’s first annual message to Congress in December 1901 had advocated tightening the restrictions in part to halt the influx of cheap labor. 22 Explaining the exclusion policy in 1904, the president insisted that restrictions were aimed at laborers and not Chinese students or merchants.

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“How John may dodge the Exclusion Act.” This illustration shows a Chinese laborer being kicked off a dock by Uncle Sam’s boot. The surrounding vignettes suggest ways in which “John Chinaman” might get around the exclusion law, by entering the United States as a challenger in a yacht race, “as an industrious anarchist,” “disguised as a humble Irishman,” “as an English ‘wife-hunter,’” or as a knife and gun bearing “peaceful, law-abiding Sicilian.” Source: Puck, July 12, 1905. Library of Congress.

Roosevelt professed unease at the “obstacles” thrown in the way of businessmen and students coming in from China. I think it is a serious damage to our people when this is the case. We wish to enlarge our trade with China. We wish to make ever firmer our intellectual hold upon China. It is for our interests that Chinese merchants [and] students should come here. It is very much against our interests that Chinese laborers should come here and compete with our own workers. 23

Although he expressed unease over the treatment of Chinese other than laborers seeking admission to the United States, Roosevelt did little to check the excesses of the Immigration Bureau. He did intervene in the case of a Chinese he knew personally on one occasion, and suggested that his act serve as an example for better treatment of upper-class Chinese. The Immigration Bureau would agree with the president’s sentiments in principle, but ignore them in practice. 24 Roosevelt’s apprehension was also evident when discussing the Republican Party’s platform for the 1904 election. The president suggested that no

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mention of immigration was needed. However, the platform expressed approval of the attitude of the executive and congressional branches in excluding Chinese labor and promised a continuation of the policy. Roosevelt’s exact feelings about the plank are unclear for he seems to have paid little attention to it. “I do not know what the Chinese exclusion plank amounts to,” he admitted to Lodge. 25 Only when the threat of a Chinese boycott emerged was Roosevelt stirred to action. The danger led powerful groups, including the Harriman, Rockefeller, Hill-Morgan, and other New York business and financial leaders, along with church and educational organizations to urge a shift away from an exclusionist policy. On June 16, Roosevelt instructed Victor H. Metcalf, secretary of commerce and labor, to issue “rigid instructions” to immigration officials to treat Chinese with more courtesy. Three days later, he informed Metcalf of plans to develop a set of instructions drastic enough to end the oppression of upper-class Chinese visitors. Metcalf, a Californian, balked at first, fearing political losses in his home state. Unable to openly defy Roosevelt, he gave in on June 24 and issued the necessary directives. Freedom of movement of the exempt class of Chinese was not to be restricted and the law was to be enforced without harshness. Any severity in enforcement would not be tolerated and, furthermore, would be grounds for dismissal from the bureau. In an additional effort to ease the exclusion policy a special commission to investigate and revise the departmental regulations was created. These acts were clearly designed to convince the Chinese to call off the boycott, which was scheduled to begin on August 1. 26 Although Roosevelt finally acted to soften the policy that had so angered the Chinese, he never changed his stance regarding the immigration of Chinese laborers. Early in 1906 he wrote General Leonard Wood that under no circumstances “would I ever approve any legislation admitting any form of Chinese labor into the United States.” During the election of 1912, Roosevelt spoke out against Asian immigrants, noting that the United States “can’t afford to put our labor in competition with theirs.” In 1913, Roosevelt wrote, “The vital thing is to exclude all mass contact.” 27 Sympathetic to the value of allowing Asian merchants, officials, students, and tourists to travel and reside in the United States, Roosevelt doggedly opposed the immigration of Asian laborers. Undoubtedly some of Roosevelt’s pronouncements were politically motivated, gauged to draw votes from American workingmen. Yet his statements have the ring of sincerity about them. The fact that they remained unchanged throughout his life adds credence to the idea that Roosevelt’s feelings were genuine. It is quite evident that Roosevelt was prejudiced, mostly on the basis of cultural differences and group identity, and that he drew the line at admitting foreign elements that he believed would be difficult to assimilate into the American social fabric. And he undoubtedly was

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sensitive to the economic issues involved, particularly in terms of competition for jobs. The crackdown on the Immigration Bureau proved to be too little, too late, as the Chinese boycott was not averted. Warnings that failure to provide more liberal immigration laws would bring action by the Chinese had been pouring in for some time. On June 8, a report out of Fuzhou stated that false and inflammatory rumors of mistreatment of Chinese in America were being circulated in order to stir up anti-American feelings. According to one rumor, two thousand Chinese had been beheaded in the United States. Such inflammatory falsehoods could spark “a wild mob to break forth in retaliation.” A week later, the vice-consul at Fuzhou, Wilbur T. Gracey, was again alerting Washington about the possibility of mob violence. The local viceroy, one “Ting-Shan,” had been asked to halt the posting of anti-American placards. The viceroy had responded that vigorous action was being taken. Gracey advised that the proposed boycott “will seriously damage trade in American flour, cotton cloths, kerosene, etc.” 28 John Barrett, who had served at diplomatic posts in Siam and China, encouraged Roosevelt to press for more lenient immigration laws. A pair of Chinese viceroys, Zhang Zhidong, and Yuan Shikai, had asked Barrett to use his influence with Roosevelt. “These statesmen emphasize in strong terms that great harm to American interests, both commercial and political, in China is sure to result unless there is a change for the better.” 29 Early in July, Rockhill reported on attempts by native merchant guilds to incite an anti-American boycott in order to force amendment of the immigration laws. The Chinese were being told the United States was trying to make China sign a treaty detrimental to its interests and American demands were to be resisted by boycott. Telegrams had been sent to twenty cities naming August 1 as the date to begin. Rockhill said he had tried to explain the truth, but the movement was spreading “to Foochow, Amoy, Canton, and Hankow, Tientsin and to several interior towns of this province. . . .” Possibly recalling the Boxer Uprising, Rockhill was concerned that violence against foreigners might result from the agitation. The minister had pressured the Foreign Office to halt the proposed boycott. On July 6, Rockhill advised Washington that, “After repeated and urgent representations from this Legation the Foreign Office had issued orders to stop [the] anti-American agitation and attempted boycott [of] American goods.” 30 However, Prince Qing reminded Rockhill that American immigration laws and mistreatment of Chinese “has thus led to this movement, but if the restrictions can be lightened by your Government and a treaty drawn up in a friendly manner then this agitation will of its own accord die out.” 31 American citizens in Guangzhou (Canton) petitioned the president directly to implore him to take action. They, too, urged a more lenient exclusion treaty in order to protect American business interests, to enable the United

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John Barrett. Source: Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division Washington, D.C.

States to take the lead in bringing China into the “modern world,” to encourage Chinese students to come to America, and to further encourage SinoAmerican friendship. 32 The consul in Guangzhou, Julius G. Lay, warned of the growing seriousness of the situation and noted the formation of the “Opposing Exclusion Society.” Lay doubted a boycott would be lengthy but speculated that some damage would be done to American trade. Violence to

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foreigners was also to be feared. Lay was more concerned that should a more favorable treaty be agreed to, China would claim that the boycott had won a victory and would use that tactic as a weapon again in the future, “whenever a question arises with any Western nation.” 33 Some areas appeared to be relatively unaffected. At Niuzhuang (Newchwang), Thomas Sammons, the new consul-general there, found the situation to be relatively quiet. The merchant guild had received a telegram from Shanghai stating that the merchants there would not order American goods. The Niuzhuang merchants, however, were still friendly to the United States. Only if influence from Shanghai led to supplies being cut off would some merchants be unable to handle American items. Some anti-American posters had appeared, but the Chinese merchants seemed unwilling to support the movement. 34 On the other hand, George Anderson, the consul at Xiamen (Amoy), found the opposite to be true. “The Chinese officials here are not only in sympathy with the movement but they have not the physical or moral stamina to oppose it were they not in sympathy with it.” 35 At Shanghai, conditions were similar to those in Xiamen. Consul-general James L. Rodgers reported a high degree of effectiveness against Americans. Rodgers noted the great amount of participation by students and literati, and added that the movement had almost the full support of the merchants, with only a few showing any reluctance to join. 36 Writing after the boycott was well under way, John W. Foster felt “the boycott movement owes its initiative, not to the Chinese government, but to individual and popular influence, and is almost entirely the outgrowth of the ill-feeling of the people who have been the victims of the harsh exclusion laws and the sufferers by the race hatred existing in certain localities and classes in the United States.” 37 The boycott was to officially begin on August 1, 1905, but actually was underway by late July. 38 Lay, in Guangzhou, felt an “early collapse” of the movement was indicated. He admitted, though, that the boycott had not “sufficiently developed to enable even the oldest residents of the district to predict what may transpire. . . .” 39 There was a brief incident in Niuzhuang, where a number of Chinese tried to obstruct the unloading of a Standard Oil shipment. Trouble was avoided when some Japanese took charge of the work. 40 The boycott spread rapidly to cities and towns along the coast and did penetrate the interior in a limited fashion. Resentment toward the United States was fueled through the reporting of American transgressions in newspapers, posters, novels, and songs, while agents of the movement spread literature on behalf of the boycott societies. Persons with firsthand experiences of mistreatment stirred up local agitators as well. In one extreme case, a Cantonese who had been denied entrance into the United States to study, committed suicide on the steps of the American consulate in Shanghai. The

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protesters now vented long-standing feelings of resentment that were the result of American immigration policy abuses, the sale of the American China Development Company to Belgian interests, and the murder of a Chinese by American sailors that the United States had refused to acknowledge. Additional support came from overseas Chinese, including the 90,000 Chinese in the United States, in the form of monetary donations. And, while Americans on the scene blamed Chinese officials for having a hand in the movement, most of them kept their distance from the protests although they were often sympathetic to the boycott. Officials at the Chinese Foreign Office did their best to shield the boycott from American diplomatic pressure through the rest of the summer. 41 By August 4, Rockhill was requesting instructions from Washington. The minister wanted to know if he could inform the Chinese that they would be held responsible for any losses sustained by American trade due to their government’s inability to prevent the boycott. Rockhill described the Chinese foreign office as “supine” thus far, adding that the boycott gave that agency a means to coerce the United States. 42 Rockhill was told to notify China that under Article Fifteen of the Treaty of 1858, it could be held responsible for any American trade losses. 43 Negative reports continued to pour in from the consulates. Lay blamed Chinese officials, rather than the merchants, for the boycott, and felt the movement was approaching a critical juncture. If the Chinese did not crush the boycott soon it would get out of control, he said. “This is the critical time. The Movement will either assume a political character under the control of the anti-foreign and reform element or die a natural death.” 44 Rodgers, at Shanghai, wrote that the situation “has gone from bad to worse.” The Chinese Chamber of Commerce was ready to settle the matter but students and “irresponsible agitators” were blocking such a move. Rodgers also blamed Chinese officials for inactivity that allowed the boycott to spread. “The whole situation is now of some menace despite the fact that no trouble or violence has been reported.” The consul also reported a growing belief that the boycott had a broad political motive and was anti-dynastic in nature. 45 Rockhill, who had been ordered to investigate and report on the general situation and to take as strong a stand as necessary, cabled his first report on August 15. “Reports of consuls show Shanghai and Canton only localities seriously affected by boycott; in all others, conditions normal or only agitation,” he said in the telegram. Shanghai was reporting heavy trade losses and it was expected that it would take a long time to regain the lost ground. All foreign interests were affected and the movement was taking on anti-foreign characteristics. According to Rockhill, most Chinese merchants wanted to abandon the boycott, but the Foreign Office was apathetic and the measures of provincial officials were proving inadequate. Overall, Rockhill concluded,

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the apprehension for the future was greater than the losses sustained so far, and the minister summed the boycott up as a dangerous precedent if it could not be broken. 46 About ten days later, Rockhill repeated his warning about the inherent peril in the movement. “The danger to China which lurks in this movement, a danger that grows greater every day the Government shows its inability to deal with it, is realized by all foreigners and little by little it is dawning on the officials, too late I fear to hide from the people the weakness of the Government in the face of an organized movement on their part.” Yet Rockhill also saw in the boycott the first evidence of “a spirit of solidarity” in China. Dangerous it was, if not directed to lawful ends, “but a hopeful one for China if properly guided and developed.” 47 Others also noted a new spirit in China. “The Chinese boycott of American goods is striking evidence of an awakening spirit of resentment in the great Empire against the injustice and aggression of foreign countries.” 48 However, despite his apparent recognition of a growing spirit of nationalism in China, Rockhill could not help but express the prevalent attitude that Chinese nationalism or “solidarity” required “guidance,” and that direction, he was implying, would all too obviously have to come from the great powers, including the United States. Although he was becoming more sympathetic to the growing nationalist feelings in China, Rockhill disliked the boycott because he feared the new nationalism in China might get out of hand and threaten efforts to reform. 49 Roosevelt, meanwhile, was unhappy with the situation. He instructed Rockhill to continue his investigation of the boycott and to report directly to him. “I intend to do the Chinese justice,” the president told his minister. It was necessary, however, Roosevelt added, for Rockhill to take a “stiff tone” with the Chinese “where they are clearly doing wrong.” Firmly convinced the Chinese despised weakness more than they prized justice, Roosevelt insisted that “ we must make it evident . . . that we intend to do what is right and . . . we do not intend . . . to suffer what is wrong.” Commenting a week later on the boycott, the president stated, “I am very much dissatisfied with the Chinese attitude.” 50 Others were just as dissatisfied. Requests began to arrive for the president to send Secretary of War William Howard Taft, already on a goodwill tour of the Far East, to Guangzhou to do what he could to end the boycott. Among those asking Roosevelt to take action were Senator George C. Perkins of California, representatives of Standard Oil and the British-American Tobacco Company. 51 Taft was duly dispatched to Guangzhou with orders to avoid definite promises while assuring the Chinese that the United States would do what was right, although there was no intention of submitting to the present activities that were taking place. Taft met with a group of Chinese officials on September 4 and delivered the president’s message. The president’s daughter, Alice, who was a member of Taft’s party on the Pacific voyage,

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recalled seeing Chinese shaking their fists at her while they were in Guangzhou. 52 Taft then offered, reluctantly, to go to Beijing if the president wished him to, in order to further pressure the Chinese government. Roosevelt and Rockhill felt there was no need for him to do so, and by September 16 Taft was on his way home. The one benefit of the Taft detour was that he could report personally on conditions in China directly to Roosevelt. Taft’s impressions were delivered before the cabinet in October, and his report led to a decision to further liberalize immigration policy. 53 Meanwhile, some reassuring accounts were now beginning to arrive from the American diplomats in China. The boycott seemed to be ending and it might not have been too damaging to American trade. But there were also warnings that it could resume in intensity if the immigration problems were not resolved satisfactorily. 54 Ominous signs remained as well. There were indications that the merchants were losing control of the boycott to more extreme elements. Patriotic groups in China were demanding an end to all forms of discrimination and anti-foreign feelings were intensifying; perhaps a new Boxer Uprising was in the offing. Success of the boycott meant that such coercive tactics would be used again, and the Chinese government seemed to be stiffening. The Chinese legation warned that it would seek damages for undue deportations, and expressed its willingness to pursue any such cases to the Hague Tribunal if necessary. 55 The violence that was feared broke out in the province of Guangdong in late October when the American Presbyterian mission station in Lianzhou was attacked by a mob on the 28th. Five missionaries were killed, two escaped, and the station was destroyed. Rockhill was not notified of the event until November 3. The cause of the riot, according to the Chinese Foreign Office, was the refusal of the missionaries to allow the village people to fire a cannon during a festival. The Chinese government expressed its humiliation and distress, and promised prompt and vigorous action. 56 Under instructions from the new secretary of state, Elihu Root, Rockhill pressed the Chinese to stamp out the anti-American feelings in the region, to arrest and punish those responsible for the deaths, and to punish those officials who had allowed anti-American sentiments to fester. Rockhill directed his accusations at the viceroy of Guangzhou, who, the American minister contended, had ignored imperial edicts to prevent disorder or hostile demonstrations against Americans. Investigation of the incident and subsequent arrests were completed by December 29. The viceroy at Guangzhou was not dismissed, but the State Department was considering a demand for a reduction in his rank. 57 In addition, the Chinese government agreed to pay an indemnity for the loss of life and destruction of property. 58 Roosevelt acted in what one scholar has described as “his usual twofold manner.” 59 Alarmed by the events at Lianzhou, the president directed Naval

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Secretary Charles J. Bonaparte to take steps to have “as strong a naval force as possible concentrated on the Chinese shore, and as speedily as possible.” The Chinese were not “showing a good spirit,” in Roosevelt’s view, and he was determined to prepare for any contingencies. 60 In November, five destroyers were sent to Guangzhou to support the monitor Monadnock and the gunboat Callao, two cruisers steamed to Shanghai, a battleship squadron was ordered to Hong Kong, and a warship was dispatched to Yentai (Chefoo). Rear Admiral Charles J. Train was ordered to quietly gather information for a possible attack on Guangzhou in cooperation with the army. 61 A military expedition to China was being given serious consideration. But the president was taking other steps as well. These actions were directed at easing the restrictive immigration policy that was the source of the troubles between the two countries. In a letter to T. C. Friedlander, secretary of the San Francisco Merchant’s Exchange, Roosevelt responded to a request that he take strong measures to bring the boycott to an end. Root drafted the significant passage of the letter. Friedlander was told that Congress had to amend the immigration laws to eliminate the source of China’s complaints. “If you and all the other American merchants who are injured by the boycott will urge your representatives in Congress to do away with the cause of the boycott, you will probably succeed.” 62 Roosevelt’s emphasis on the need for congressional action echoed a speech he had given while touring the South in October. In that address, Roosevelt had expressed the need to treat China justly if fair treatment from that country was to be expected by the United States. Our laws and treaties should be so framed as to as to guarantee to all Chinamen, save of the excepted coolie class, the same right of entry to this country, and the same treatment while here, as is guaranteed to citizens of any other nation. By executive action I am as rapidly as possible putting a stop to the abuses which have grown up during many years in the administration of this [exclusion] law. I can do a great deal and will do a great deal even without the action of Congress, but I cannot do all that should be done unless some action is taken. 63

Of greater significance was the president’s message to Congress in December. Roosevelt stuck to his belief that laborers were undesirable immigrants, but he proclaimed that the laws keeping them out of the United States were sufficient. Chinese students, professionals, and businessmen should be allowed to enter the country, however. The law, he said, should be framed so as to state that all Chinese, other than laborers, would be admitted. The boycott was blamed on China’s resentment of the treatment received by those Chinese who came to the United States. Roosevelt reaffirmed the right of each nation to limit immigration by treaty, and then expressed friendship for China along with a desire for its well-being. 64 The public call for an end

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to the mistreatment of those Chinese in the United States, or trying to enter the country was clearly intended to mollify the agitation in China. Efforts at reform continued into 1906 with the appointment of a commission to investigate the Chinese service of the Immigration Bureau, and Roosevelt’s appointment of James B. Reynolds, a Chicago businessman, who had been highly critical of the excesses of the bureau and the harm done to American influence in China, indicated the seriousness of the inquiry. 65 Eventually some modifications were made to some of the more objectionable policies. The American Asiatic Association responded to the president’s call for legislative change by getting a bill introduced that would have broadened the definition of laborer while removing the more offensive restrictions placed on Chinese by the Immigration Bureau. 66 More violence, this time in Shanghai, followed when a riot occurred on December 18. Twenty Chinese were killed and several Westerners were injured before calm was restored. Some of the powers, including the United States, rushed naval vessels to Shanghai to help quell the rioting. As in the case of the Lianzhou incident, the boycott was blamed for the violence. This event apparently convinced Roosevelt that the time had come for a show of force. A week after the riot, newspapers were reporting that additional troops were being sent to the Philippines to be prepared for possible trouble in China. Troops actually were shipped out on January 2. 67 Roosevelt was now considering an expedition to seize Guangzhou, the source of the most vigorous boycott sentiment. The use of troops, the president suggested to Taft, might be required to gain equal rights for those Americans in China. 68 The president ordered the War Department to look into the possibility of conducting military operations against Guangzhou. By January 11 a report had been forwarded to Roosevelt’s desk. In his acknowledgement of receipt of the document, Roosevelt expressed his concern that any expeditionary force would have to be large enough to prevent failure. The president thought that 15,000 men, with 5,000 more in reserve, would be about right. “The Chinese army is far more formidable than it was five years ago,” he wrote. “We ought not to take any chances. We cannot afford a disaster.” 69 Army Chief of Staff Major General J. Franklin Bell was directed to study the Chinese army carefully so that all risk of mishap could be avoided. 70 Throughout the United States, rumors were spreading that a second Boxer Uprising was about to take place. Sentiment for a greater military and naval presence in China began to appear. Both Taft and Root went before the Senate Appropriations Committee to ask for $100,000 to bivouac the additional troops in the Philippines, while the men themselves were being outfitted for a potentially lengthy campaign. 71 By February 15, Major General Leonard Wood, commander of the Philippines Division, informed Roosevelt that he had 5,000 men ready to move “whenever called upon.” Wood was

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eager to lead the expedition, should it be ordered to China, viewing it as “the opportunity of a lifetime, and everything has been prepared to do it thoroughly.” 72 True to his twofold approach, Roosevelt added more diplomatic pressure to the threat of military intervention. On February 26, the president issued a strong set of demands. He called for stern measures to prevent a possible Boxer-style upheaval, punishment of those guilty of crimes, strong action against sympathizers with anti-foreign movements and punishment of provincials, many of whom had been lenient or friendly to the boycott, who failed to protect Americans. Additionally, the boycott had to be suppressed because it unlawfully repressed trade. Rockhill pressed the demands vigorously, and by March 6 an imperial edict had been issued that appeared to mollify Washington. Rockhill, though, continued to urge Beijing to back its words up with action. 73 Events in China now began to quiet down. April brought with it a sense that the boycott was beginning to die out. On April 2, Roosevelt advised Wood that an expedition to China was unlikely, “but I wanted to be sure that if it was needed we would not be unprepared.” 74 On April 21, Rockhill was able to express his view “that the Washington government is rapidly getting over its excitement.” 75 Beijing made a strong effort through March, April, and May to signal its desire to appease the Roosevelt administration. 76 By the summer of 1906, the boycott was, for all intents and purposes, over. The end of the boycott also ended the commitment to reform the excesses of the Immigration Bureau. The American Asiatic Association’s bill was blocked from the House floor by exclusionists, efforts to reach a diplomatic solution to the problem stalled, and, eventually, by Roosevelt’s final year in office, the Bureau of Immigration had returned to its old ways. 77 A less serious, but irritating nonetheless, difficulty centered on the American China Development Company, among whose stockholders were J. P. Morgan and E. H. Harriman. The company had acquired the right to construct a railroad between Hankou and Guangzhou in 1898. A contract revision was signed in 1900, which stipulated that the railroad would be supervised by a mixed board of Chinese and foreigners, additional economic advantages were agreed to for the company’s ownership, and some forty million dollars worth of bonds were to be floated to cover the increased costs for the construction of more than 900 miles of main lines, branch lines, and siding. Article Seventeen of the new contract prohibited the Americans from transferring their rights to other nations or nationals. This clause was designed to keep the concession from falling into Russian or French hands, as both nations were building railways in the north and south of China. By utilizing this method, the Chinese hoped to prevent any one power from controlling the bulk of their railroad system. 78 Once again, China was using its own version of the Open Door to protect its interests.

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In fact, Article Seventeen had been violated even before the agreement had been signed. Shares in the company had passed to Belgian interests, among other non-Americans. Even the Belgian King, Leopold II, was said to have purchased stock in the company, and, in fact, by 1904 he controlled a majority interest. 79 In addition, mismanagement, bickering between the Chinese and non-Chinese directors, and local hostility kept the company from accomplishing much of anything. By November 1903 only ten-and-a-half miles of railroad had been completed and were usable. 80 While the sale of the company’s assets had been concealed from Washington, the Belgian takeover of the company was generally known within the foreign community, China, and both Rockhill and Conger had alerted the State Department. Hay, however, chose to take company assurances at face value, and only when China moved to act in regard to the violation of the contract did he begin to take action. 81 An example of local hostility to the building of the railroad took place in late April 1903. American engineers working on the line were attacked by a mob about a hundred miles west of Guangzhou. The American gunboat Callao had been sent to rescue the engineers and returned safely with them on April 30. According to Chinese accounts a mob had gathered, not understanding that the engineers were simply surveying the route. Fearing that the railroad would disturb the feng-shui of a nearby mountain, they had begun to demonstrate by pounding gongs and raising “a row.” Guards from a local outpost had suppressed the demonstration and dispersed the crowd, and the engineers were able to return to Guangzhou unharmed. 82 Meanwhile the Chinese had become aware that company stock was passing into Belgian hands. Conger informed the State Department in late January 1904 of China’s concerns over this matter. China, the minister warned, would be responsible for the consequences. Conger had done all he could on the company’s behalf, but if the reports were true, he said, the company was no longer deserving of American support. The Chinese would insist that the stock transfers not take place since they were in violation of Article Seventeen of the contract. If the transfers were to take place, or had already taken place, Beijing would void the contract. “It is difficult for the Chinese to separate the United States Government from the enterprises of American citizens, hence the failure of the latter to keep their promises discredits the Government as well, and this action of the American China Development Company will make very difficult in the future to receive favorable consideration from the Chinese Government,” Conger concluded. 83 Hay dropped his defense of the company until May, when he received assurances from a wealthy Bostonian, Charles A. Whittier, whom Leopold had placed in charge of the company. Hay was now determined to prevent an “act of spoliation,” as he termed it, on the part of China. 84

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In June, Conger learned that the imperial throne had been petitioned to cancel the contract. 85 It took the monarchy several months to reach a decision, however, and it was not until November that Conger was officially notified of China’s decision to annul the agreement due to the company’s contract violations. Conger entered a protest and warned that Beijing would be held responsible for any losses or damages. 86 Hay sent instructions to his minister to ask China to postpone the action until all the interested parties could be heard from. 87 The stalling tactic proved to be of no use. On December 22, 1904, Liang Cheng, the Chinese minister, informed Hay that the contract would be voided. 88 Despite the company’s violation of the contract, the State Department remained supportive of the firm. Pressure was placed on the Belgians to sell their stock back to the Americans. In January 1905, Hay learned that King Leopold had sold twelve hundred of his shares to J. P. Morgan, a transaction that restored majority control of the corporation to American hands and made Morgan the leading shareholder. With the completion of the sale, the United States could now officially support the company. 89 Hay then asked Liang Cheng to urge his government to delay the cancellation of the contract, and he instructed Conger to make similar representations in Beijing. 90 On January 6, Hay informed the Chinese minister “the proprietors of the Canton and Hankau [sic] railway have regained control of the complete ownership of a clear bona fide majority of the entire stock of that Company. . . .” In a second note, the State Department insisted “this government cannot admit that the action contemplated by the Chinese Government can be taken in regard to a company which this government considers to be in good faith American. . . .” 91 The only reply offered by the Chinese minister was to say that he had forwarded Hay’s notes to Beijing for the consideration of his government. 92 The American diplomats in Beijing continued to urge the imperial government to postpone its proposed action until the parties involved had a chance to make their case. 93 Roosevelt seems to have first learned of the problem in late January. “You spoke to me the other day about the Chinese railroad,” the president wrote Hay on the 26th. “I should be very sorry to abandon the project of building that road. Sometime go over the matter with me.” 94 Undoubtedly Hay did review the issue with Roosevelt, but the president paid little attention to the affair until later in the year, although he received regular reports about the situation. In China, meanwhile, things were at a standstill. John Gardner Coolidge, chargé d’affaires at the legation in Beijing, reported in March that communication with the Foreign Office about voiding the contract had come to a halt. However, an informal conversation with one official indicated, “that they were in a very uncomfortable position, realizing the attitude of our Government in the matter, but at the same time much in fear of the almost unani-

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Chentung Liang Cheng. Source: Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division Washington, D.C., 1903.

mous sentiment of hostility to this Company in the provinces through which this line passes.” 95 Efforts to resolve the problem were also being undertaken in the United States. Talks between Liang Cheng and John W. Foster, attorney for the Chinese government, and Elihu Root and G.W. Ingraham, representing the company, were held between January and June. The Chinese offered to pay a reasonable sum in compensation for the company’s efforts thus far. Ingraham at first suggested a figure of $18,000,000, but later dropped the number to $13,540,000. Reasonable compensation, Ingraham argued in a letter to Foster on May 29, “would naturally be the profits that the American Company would receive if it were allowed by the Chinese Government to complete its

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contract.” Finally, a compromise was agreed to in June. China settled on a payment of $6,750,000 for the stock and property of the company. The company’s directors accepted the offer, and all that was left to do was to get the approval of the shareholders at a stockholders meeting in August to finalize the settlement. 96 Roosevelt’s interest in the affair was captured that June as well, when King Leopold wrote him, asking for help. The Belgian king blamed the Chinese desire to exclude white people from their enterprises as the source of the dispute. Leopold urged the president to tell the Chinese the American government had consented to the stock transfer to Morgan in order to get them to back down. Leopold also persuaded Henry Cabot Lodge to come to Belgium in order to discuss the matter further. Lodge went, and, after discussions with the king, wrote to Roosevelt. Lodge supported the Belgian monarch’s view that the United States should hold on to the concession. 97 Also opposed to the transaction was Rockhill. He argued that the State Department should straighten out the matter, not for the sake of the company, but for the good name of the Americans who had suffered as a result of the company’s errors, and who would suffer if the sale went through. Rockhill was also afraid the sale would lead to a granting of the concession to some “combination of European interests” which would eventually threaten American commercial and political interests in China. 98 Of the president’s major advisers, only Root favored the sale, and he, of course, had been the company’s lawyer. 99 With Hay only recently deceased, Roosevelt took charge of the affair. He first wrote to Morgan, passing on the details of Lodge’s visit with King Leopold. “I think it would be a real misfortune to let go this great line of railway—a blow to our prestige and to our commerce in China which we want to foster in every way,” Roosevelt added. The president went on to reveal Root’s support for the sale, noting that Hay had opposed it, as did Rockhill and Lodge. “[P]erhaps you can make Root see the economical and political importance of our holding that R. R. [railroad]” Roosevelt then concluded: Now, my dear Mr. Morgan, it is not my business to advise you what to do. From the standpoint of our national interests, I take entirely Lodge’s view. I cannot expect you or any of our big businessmen to go into what they think will be to their disadvantage. But if you are giving up this concession . . . because you think that the Government will not back you up, I wish to assure you that in every honorable way the Government will stand by you and will do all that is in its power to see that you suffer no wrong whatsoever from the Chinese or any other Power in this matter . . . My interest of course is simply the interest of seeing American commercial interests prosper in the Orient. 100

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Morgan met with Roosevelt at Oyster Bay on August 7. The press was told, after the two men met, that Morgan would hold on to the concession and American interests in general would benefit. The following day, the Chinese minister met with the president and reaffirmed his country’s desire to purchase the railroad. And Rockhill alerted Roosevelt at the same time that China would leave the railroad in foreign hands if certain revisions in the lease were made. 101 Roosevelt was, at the least, annoyed by the discrepancy. He swiftly ordered Rockhill to clear up the confusion, charging angrily that either Liang Cheng or the Chinese Foreign Office was guilty of a “gross prevarication of truth.” 102 On August 14, Rockhill reported that the Foreign Office “disclaimed any knowledge of facts about canceling [the] Hankow-Canton concession.” But the Chinese had admitted that the viceroy in Guangzhou had been given approval to regain control of the railway and had been instructed to cooperate with the Chinese minister in this regard. On the 15th, word came that the throne had agreed to the proposed sale. That information prompted a reply from Adee saying that the president was “puzzled” about the matter. “He is inclined to think this Government must take a stand but he would like to hear from you in full as to what you deem advisable in the matter.” 103 In his reply on August 17, Rockhill defended his dispatches, pointing out he knew practically nothing about the company’s side of the case. Regarding the overall situation, the minister felt “removal of this very valuable concession is a serious blow to our interests out here.” Annulment of the contract would be “a great loss to our future trade and industry, but if the American China Development Company is willing to cancel its concessions, I fail to see, without instructions from you, what the Legation can do.” Rockhill was of the opinion that the Chinese were motivated not by hostility toward the United States, but by local antagonism to the company. “It must be remembered . . . that throughout the whole of China at the present time there is a very strong feeling in favor of the Chinese regaining possession at the earliest possible date of the railways . . . and determination not to make concessions of any kind to foreign countries.” Rockhill downplayed the seriousness of the situation, emphasizing that China was not in an attitude of hostility toward the United States. 104 Roosevelt’s efforts to save the concession were in vain. Four days later, Liang Cheng notified the State Department that the Chinese imperial court had approved the proposed transaction. About a week later, Francis B. Loomis, the acting secretary of state, replied that the American China Development Company had accepted the Chinese offer and the United States would not impose any obstacles in the way of the sale’s completion. The Chinese had made it clear that they would not yield on the issue and Morgan, despite Roosevelt’s appeals, had decided not to hold on to the concession any longer. 105

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Roosevelt accepted the decision with distaste. Writing to Rockhill, the president complained that the concession had been surrendered because Morgan and his fellows were convinced that “the Chinese Government . . . have been acting with such duplicity and evidently intend to take away their franchise, the risk is too great for them to go on.” Roosevelt could not find fault with their choice, “for I do not know enough about the situation to be able to guarantee to hold them harmless in case trouble comes with China.” 106 Roosevelt also grumbled about the transaction to Speck von Sternburg, stating, “I did my best to get Pierpoint Morgan and the Hankow concession people to stick to their guns but they would not do it. . . .” Roosevelt admitted that the businessmen had to consider the interests of their stockholders. “They said the price offered was large—probably much larger than they could get in the way of damages before any arbitral body. . . .” So, if the Chinese would not allow the railway to be built, Roosevelt supposed, the company had no choice but to accept compensation. 107 In a lengthy letter to Whitlaw Reid, the American ambassador to Great Britain, the president repeated his disapproval of the deal. He did blame the American management, which had sold out to the Belgians, for part of the problem, but he also condemned the Chinese who “behaved in their usual manner, the local viceroy insisting the Americans must sell, while the central government made tearful complaints about the Americans trying to extort so much money from them.” Roosevelt also blamed himself for failing to get involved sooner. If he had been “in closer touch with the workings of the State Department . . . I should have taken drastic action long ago, both against the American members . . . who had sold out to the Belgians, and against the Chinese government, and I am sure I could have put the thing through.” 108 This was typical Roosevelt blustering. He may well have gotten involved in the affair late in the game, but, given the clear violation of the contractual clause regarding foreign participation in the American China Development Company and the lack of progress made in constructing the Hankou-Guangzhou rail line, it probably would have been best if he had stayed out of it altogether. Both episodes were irritating not only to Roosevelt, but also to his advisers and diplomats, although, of the two, the boycott was the more serious incident. The president should not have become involved in the concession dispute at all. Both parties had already worked out a settlement, and it is likely that the stockholders of the American company would have given final approval to the sale. The minimal amount of construction that had been completed and the willingness of the principals to sell the company’s stock to other interests indicate a lack of commitment to completing the railroad project. It would have been best to let the Chinese buy out the concession to begin with and do with it as they wished. By intervening in the affair and turning it into a question of American prestige, Roosevelt, who had con-

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fessed his lack of knowledge about the project, muddied the waters unnecessarily. Admittedly, Roosevelt’s principal advisers opposed the sale (with the exception of Root, of course), but American prestige in China probably suffered more from the company’s lack of effort than from the abandonment of the concession. Roosevelt had showed little interest in the affair until the Belgian king appealed to him for assistance. Obviously, Leopold was acting on behalf of the Belgians who had bought into the company in an effort to save their investments. The president either failed to realize this, or simply ignored it, and when the majority of his advisers expressed the concern that losing the concession would harm American interests, he acted. Roosevelt turned the dispute into one of American prestige, ignoring the company’s poor record in China and the obvious fact that its investors wanted out. As Beale rightly asserted, Roosevelt practiced dollar diplomacy in reverse by practically “begging business to help maintain the nation’s prestige.” 109 By trying to hang on to the concession, Roosevelt was indicating to the Chinese that the United States was condoning the excesses and violations of the American China Development Company. Instead of protecting American prestige, Roosevelt did it more harm. It does not seem to have occurred to the president and the others that it might be better to have no concessions in China than to have one that failed to live up to its promises and, as a result, damaged the American image in China. Stiff-necked pride, arrogance, some level of ignorance, and an inability or refusal to recognize the growing national spirit in China determined Roosevelt’s decision to get involved in the dispute and the actions he took. As Emily Rosenberg has pointed out, Roosevelt was willing to support economic interests when he felt that there were larger issues of national honor at stake. 110 Much the same can be said for his reaction to the boycott. Little was done to soothe injured Chinese feelings, no serious effort at a diplomatic solution was sought, but continual pressure was brought on Beijing to bring the movement to a halt. It finally took the threat of military intervention to bring China to heel. The stiff American response may have been due in part to Roosevelt’s growing ire over the railway concession affair, but it also reflected the views of Roosevelt and others around him that China had consistently to be bullied into doing the right thing (by the standards of the United States), as a show of force was always preferable to appearing weak. McKee has argued that Roosevelt’s military preparations were primarily defensive in nature, as they were designed to protect Americans against the possibility of a second Boxer uprising. 111 There is some substance to this view. One of the real fears shared by Roosevelt and others was that the boycott agitation could erupt into a general anti-foreign crusade that might result in violence. The deaths at Lianzhou and other incidents certainly had to

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reinforce that concern. Therefore it was only natural for Roosevelt to prepare for the worst in China, and in that regard he was right to do so. However, the above assessment fails to note that the president’s action was perfectly typical for him. A pragmatic man who commonly prepared more than one response to a situation of this kind, Roosevelt ordered military preparations in order to have the option available should diplomacy fail to curb the boycott. In this way, Roosevelt was merely being true to his favorite, if now clichéd, proverb, about speaking softly while keeping a big stick handy. He would take similar action when the immigration issue sparked a crisis with Japan by ordering an increased naval buildup and, finally, by sending the American battleship fleet on its famous world cruise. Roosevelt was not content to simply have the big stick on hand; he brandished it menacingly when he felt it was necessary and when he was certain the other side was not likely to wave one back at him. In this case, he did so without regard to Chinese feelings, and he may have stirred up more resentment than anything else by doing so. Beale’s interpretation of Roosevelt’s response to these events may be closest to the mark. 112 The president confused the new mood in China with that which had brought about the Boxer Uprising and reacted by trying to prop up the tottering establishment while insisting that it maintain order internally. This was combined with a formula of cooperation with the other powers to keep order and to support the Chinese government. Because Roosevelt could not overcome his view of the Chinese as backward and inferior, he could not deal effectively with them. More importantly, perhaps, he could not comprehend that the Chinese might resent his attitude. Chinese patriotism, in Roosevelt’s eyes, was simply misbehavior that required correction. When the boycott began, Roosevelt sought to have it suppressed rather than try to resolve the problems that created antipathy toward the United States in the first place. Continued pressure on the imperial court served only to highlight its increasing impotence. American policy failed because there was no real understanding of what was taking place internally in China and so there was no means of effectively dealing with the situation there. Because it was Roosevelt who was in charge, and who made the major decisions, it is he who must bear the responsibility. Finally, there is the question of damage to American trade caused by the boycott. Did it severely harm American commerce? The answer would seem to be no. Trade increased by over 250 percent in 1904 and 1905, and the American share of the market doubled. There was, however, a decline late in 1905 and through 1906. The boycott was a factor, but other elements played a role as well, such as the problem of overproduction of coins in China, end of a speculative boom in Shanghai, a flood late that same year, and the end of the Russo-Japanese War. 113 The real significance of the boycott lies in the

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fact that it was a meaningful step toward the time when China would become a modern nation. And Roosevelt himself was beginning to recognize this. When Secretary of State Root expressed reservations about the appointment of Wu Tingfang, who had been heavily involved in the boycott activities, Roosevelt agreed that Wu was a “bad old Chink,” but allowed that he “could not object to any Chinaman showing a feeling that he would like to retaliate now and then for our insolence to the Chinese.” 114 In late November 1908, Roosevelt wrote an article for The Outlook, entitled “The Awakening of China.” In the article, the president referred to a pair of sermons he had heard delivered by an Episcopalian and Presbyterian missionary appealing for a greater interest in Christian education in China. Praising the humanitarian efforts of Protestant and Catholic missionaries in China, Roosevelt also noted their observations in regard to a growing “interest in Occidental thought and work among the people of China.” 115 The president then proclaimed that “China is awakening.” There is increasing contact with foreigners, increasing foreign trade, and a growing adoption of modern methods of communication and transportation, while some progress is being made in the introduction of labor-saving devices, with consequent industrial evolution. . . . Much admirable evangelistic, educational, and medical missionary work is being done by the missionaries. . . . The American schools stimulate and aid the best Chinese in an earnest fight against opium and kindred vices, and against political corruption, and encourage them bravely to strive for a high standard of domestic morality. 116

Roosevelt then went on to say: The awakening of China is one of the great events of our age, and the remedy for the “yellow peril,” whatever that may be, is not the repression of life but the cultivation and direction of life. Here at home we believe that the remedy for popular discontent is not repression but justice and education. Similarly, the best way to avoid possible peril, commercial or military, from the great Chinese people, is by behaving righteously toward them and by striving to inspire a righteous life among them. . . . It seems to me that there is no place where there is better opportunity to-day to do this work than in China, and I earnestly hope that we can attract the attention of the great public outside of the so-called missionary circles to the possibility and practicability, no less than to the importance of this work . . . now is the time for the West to implant its ideal in the Orient in such fashion as to minimize the chance of a dreadful future clash between two radically different and hostile civilizations; if we wait until tomorrow, we may find that we have waited too long. 117

Note that Roosevelt’s appeal for the planting of Western ideals in China in order to avoid a “future clash” between East and West is both reflective of Western “yellow peril” paranoia and later “clash of civilizations” theory.

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Despite Roosevelt’s applause for an awakening China, it was clear that he still believed that a modern China would have to be the result of Western guidance and direction, with the United States, if not leading the way, at least playing its part. And, as Cohen has noted, Roosevelt was not prepared to challenge Japanese interests in the Far East, even in support of China’s national aspirations. While he felt that a strong China would be beneficial for the international community, and for the balance of power in East Asia as well as globally, he was not prepared to “strain the limits of American power by attempting to take on that burden. For all of his rhetoric about America’s mission, he suffered no illusions of a Pax Americana; no messianic impulse drove him to risk the security and interests of the United States on behalf of China.” 118 Roosevelt’s dealings with Japanese ambitions in China following the Russo-Japanese War would serve to demonstrate his understanding of the limits of American power and interests in that part of the world. NOTES 1. Elleman and Paine, Modern China, pp. 223–27; Hsu, The Rise of Modern China, pp. 408–12; Fairbank and Goldman, China: A New History, pp. 241–44. 2. Chang, Empress Dowager Cixi, pp. 321–22. 3. Among them are: Andrew Gyory, Closing the Gate: Race, Politics, and the Chinese Exclusion Act (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998); Delber L. McKee, Chinese Exclusion versus the Open Door Policy, 1900–1906 (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1977); Stuart Miller, The Unwelcome Immigrant: The American Image of the Chinese, 1785–1882 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969); Erika Lee, At America’s Gates: Chinese Immigration during the Exclusion Era, 1882–1943 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2007); Guanhua Wang, In Search of Justice: The 1905–1906 Chinese Anti-American Boycott, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001); John Soennichsen, The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 (Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2011); also, Hunt, Special Relationship. See also Adam McKeown, “Ritualization of Regulation: The Enforcement of Chinese Exclusion in the United States and China,” The American Historical Review 108, no. 2 (April 2003): 377–404. 4. McKee, Chinese Exclusion, pp. 22–23. 5. Sutter, U.S.-Chinese Relations, p. 24. 6. McKee, Chinese Exclusion, pp. 28–29, 216–17; quotes from pp. 29, 217. 7. American Federation of Labor, Some Reasons for Chinese Exclusion, p. 30. 8. Tchen, “Notes for a History of Paranoia,” Psychoanalytic Review, p. 271. 9. Hamlin to Roosevelt, November 24, 1901, Roosevelt Mss. 10. Powderly to Roosevelt, December 11, 1901, Ibid. 11. Gracey to Pierce, March 24, 1902, CD: Foochow. 12. Rockhill to Hay, June 25, 1905, Despatches: China. 13. Reynolds to Roosevelt, May 16, 1905, Roosevelt Mss. 14. Liang-Cheng to O’Laughlin, August 11, 1905, O’Laughlin to Roosevelt, undated 1905, John C. O’Laughlin Papers (Washington D.C.: Library of Congress). Hereafter cited as O’Laughlin Mss. 15. O’Laughlin to Roosevelt, undated, 1905, O’Laughlin Mss. 16. John W. Foster, “The Chinese Boycott,” Atlantic Monthly 97, no. 1 (January 1906): 118–27.

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17. Wu Tingfang to Hay, December 9, 1901, U.S. Department of State, Notes from the Chinese Legation in the United States to the Department of State (Washington, D.C.: National Archives). Hereafter cited as Legation Notes: China. 18. Wu Tingfang to Hay, December 10, 1901, Ibid. 19. Hunt, Special Relationship, p. 232. 20. Conger to Hay, April 20, 1904, Despatches: China. 21. Roosevelt to Shaw, March 27, 1902, Roosevelt Letters, vol. 3, p. 249. 22. Foreign Relations, 1901, p. xxi. 23. Roosevelt to Cortelyou, January 25, 1904, Roosevelt Letters, vol. 3, pp. 709–10. 24. McKee, Chinese Exclusion, p. 87. 25. Ibid., p. 93, Roosevelt to Lodge, May 24, 1904, June 28, 1904, Roosevelt Letters, vol. 4, pp. 803, 849. 26. McKee, Chinese Exclusion, pp. 126–30; Roosevelt to Metcalf, June 16 and 19, 1905, Roosevelt Letters, vol.4, pp. 1235–36, 1240; Metcalf to Roosevelt, June 24, 1905, Department of Commerce and Labor, General Instructions on the Enforcement of Chinese Exclusion Laws, Roosevelt Mss. 27. Roosevelt to Wood, July 22, 1906, Roosevelt Letters, vol. 5, p. 135; excerpt of Roosevelt speech in Albuquerque, N.M., September 18, 1912, O’Laughlin Mss.; Roosevelt to SpringRice, July 6, 1913, Roosevelt Letters, vol. 7, p. 737. 28. Gracey to Pierce, June 8, June 14, June 21, 1905, CD: Foochow. 29. Bartlett to Roosevelt, June 17, 1905, Roosevelt Mss. 30. Rockhill to State Department, July 6, 1905, Ibid. 31. Prince Qing to Rockhill, July 1, 1901, Ibid. 32. Petition from U.S. citizens residing in Canton, China, July 17, 1905, Ibid. 33. Lay to Loomis, July 22, 1905, July 24, 1905, Ibid. 34. Sammons to Rockhill, July 11, 1905, July 24, 1905, July 28, 1905, CD: Newchwang. 35. Anderson to Loomis, July 25, 1905, Roosevelt Mss. 36. Rodgers to Loomis, July 27, 1905, Ibid. 37. Foster, “The Chinese Boycott,” p. 118. 38. Hunt, Special Relationship, p. 235. 39. Lay to Loomis, August 1, 1905, Ibid. 40. Sammons to Rockhill, August 2, 1905, CD: Newchwang. 41. Hunt, Special Relationship, pp. 235–38. For a discussion of the boycott’s ideology see Wang, In Search of Justice, pp. 134–60. 42. Rockhill to State Department, August 4, 1905, Despatches: China. 43. Adee to Rockhill, August 5, 1905, Foreign Relations, 1905, p. 212. 44. Lay to Loomis, August 9, 1905, August 16, 1905, Roosevelt Mss. 45. Rodgers to Loomis, August 11, 1905, August 21, 1905, Ibid. 46. Rockhill to State Department, August 15, 1905, Foreign Relations, 1905, pp. 212–18. 47. Rockhill to State Department, August 24, 1905, Roosevelt Mss.; Rockhill to State Department, August 26, 1905, Despatches: China. 48. Foster, “The Chinese Boycott,” p. 118. 49. Hunt, Special Relationship, p. 268. 50. Roosevelt to Rockhill, August 22, 1905, August 29, 1905, Roosevelt Letters, vol. 4, pp. 1310, 1326. 51. Perkins to Roosevelt, August 30, 1905, Wheelwright to Roosevelt, August 31, 1905, Loomis to Loeb, September 1, 1905, Piles and Awkenny to Roosevelt, September 1, 1905, Parker to Loomis, September 2, 1905, Roosevelt Mss. 52. Wang, In Search of Justice, p. 190. 53. Taft to Roosevelt, September 4, 1905, September 6, 1905, Ibid.; Rockhill to Root, September 11, 1905, Despatches: China; McKee, Chinese Exclusion, pp. 137–40. 54. Rockhill to Root, September 1, 1905, Adee to Loeb, September 21, 1905, Rockhill to Root, October 4, 1905, Roosevelt Mss.; Gracey to Loomis, September 13, 1905, CD: Foochow; Sammons to State Department, September 14, 1905, CD: Newchwang; Rockhill to Root, October 3, 1905, Despatches: China. 55. McKee, Chinese Exclusion, p. 159.

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56. Foreign Relations, 1906, pp. 308–9. 57. Ibid., pp. 309–15; see also Denby to Root, January 16, 1906, Despatches: China. 58. Foreign Relations, 1906, pp. 315–24. 59. Beale, Rise of America, p. 239. 60. Roosevelt to Bonaparte, November 15, 1905, Roosevelt Letters, vol. 5, p. 77. 61. William R. Braisted, The United States Navy in the Pacific, 1897–1909 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1958), pp. 187–88. 62. Friedlander to Roosevelt, November 6, 1905, Root to Roosevelt, November 24, 1905, Roosevelt Mss.; Roosevelt to Friedlander, November 23, 1905, Roosevelt Letters, vol. 5, pp. 90–91. 63. Quoted by Foster, “The Chinese Boycott,” pp. 126–27. 64. Foreign Relations, 1905, pp. xlviii–xl. 65. Hunt, Special Relationship, p. 245. 66. Hunt, Special Relationship, pp. 245–46. 67. Beale, Rise of America, pp. 241–42. 68. George E. Mowry, Theodore Roosevelt and the Birth of Modern America, 1900–1912 (New York: Harper & Row, 1958), p. 186. 69. Roosevelt to Taft, January 11, 1906, Roosevelt Letters, vol. 5, pp. 132–33. 70. Braisted, U.S. Navy, p. 188. 71. Beale, Rise of America, pp. 243–44. 72. Wood to Roosevelt, February 15, 1905, Wood Mss. Wood’s letters in this period provide a few details on the proposed expedition. See Wood to War Department, February 14, 1906, Wood to Taft, February 21, 1906, Wood to Roosevelt, February 21, 1906, Wood Mss. 73. Beale, Rise of America, pp. 244–45; Varg, Open Door Diplomat, pp. 68–69; McKee, Chinese Exclusion, pp. 186–89; Rockhill to Root, March 5, 1906, Despatches: China. 74. Roosevelt to Wood, April 2, 1906, Roosevelt Letters, vol. 5, p. 205. 75. Rockhill to Hippisley, April 21, 1906, Rockhill Mss. 76. McKee, Chinese Exclusion, pp. 189–90. 77. Hunt, Special Relationship, p. 246. 78. Ibid., p. 193; Beale, Rise of America, pp. 200–201. 79. Hunt, Special Interest, p. 277. 80. Beale, Rise of America, p. 201. 81. Hunt, Special Interest, p. 278. 82. Conger to Hay, May 25, 1903, Despatches: China. 83. Conger to Hay, January 22, 1904, Ibid. 84. Hunt, Special Relationship, p. 278. 85. Conger to Hay, June 10, 1904, Ibid. 86. Conger to Hay, November 14, 1904, November 16, 1904, Ibid. 87. Conger to Hay, December 20, 1904, Ibid. 88. Foreign Relations, 1905, pp. 125–26. 89. Beale, Rise of America, p. 202. 90. Foreign Relations, 1905, p. 127. 91. Ibid., p. 129; Hay to Chentung Liang-cheng, January 6, 1905, Rockhill Mss. 92. Foreign Relations, 1905, pp. 127–28. 93. Coolidge to Prince Ching, January 9, 1905, Coolidge to Hay, January 25, 1905, February 9, 1905, Roosevelt Mss; Foreign Relations, 1905, pp. 129–31. 94. Roosevelt to Hay, January 26, 1905, Roosevelt Letters, vol. 4, p. 1109. 95. Coolidge to Hay, March 8, 1905, Roosevelt Mss. 96. Beale, Rise of America, p. 203; Ingraham to Foster, May 29, 1905, Roosevelt Mss; Foreign Relations, 1905, p. 132. 97. Beale, Rise of America, pp. 204–5. 98. Rockhill to Hay, July 7, 1905, Despatches: China. 99. Beale, Rise of America, p. 205. 100. Roosevelt to Morgan, July 18, 1905, Root Mss. 101. Beale, Rise of America, p. 207. 102. Rockhill to State Department, August 9, 1905, Despatches: China.

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103. Adee to Rockhill, August 16, 1905, Roosevelt Mss; Foreign Relations, 1905, pp. 132–34; Rockhill to State Department, August 14, 1905, Despatches: China; Beale, Rise of America, pp. 207–8. 104. Rockhill to State Department, August 17, 1905, Despatches: China. 105. Foreign Relations, 1905, pp. 134–35; Beale, Rise of America, pp. 209–10. 106. Roosevelt to Rockhill, August 29, 1905, Rockhill Mss. 107. Roosevelt to Sternberg, September 6, 1905, Roosevelt Letters, vol. 5, p. 15. 108. Roosevelt to Reid, September 16, 1905, Ibid., pp. 29–30. 109. Beale, Rise of America, p. 211. 110. Emily Rosenberg, Spreading the American Dream: American Economic and Cultural Expansion, 1890–1945 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1982), p. 58. 111. McKee, Chinese Exclusion, p. 10. 112. Beale, Rise of America, pp. 249–52. 113. C.F. Remer, A Study of Chinese Boycotts (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1933), pp. 35–39. 114. Roosevelt to Root, September 26, 1907, Roosevelt Letters, vol. 5, p. 809. 115. Theodore Roosevelt, “The Awakening of China,” The Outlook 90, no. 13 (November 28, 1908): 665. 116. Ibid., pp. 665–66. 117. Ibid., pp. 666–67. 118. Cohen, America’s Response, pp. 74–75.

Chapter Six

“A quiet, firm maintenance of our position is our true policy . . .” 1

Following the signing of the Treaty of Portsmouth, which brought the RussoJapanese War to a close, China embarked on the final phase of its ill-fated effort to embrace radical change in an effort to transform itself. Japan’s defeat of Russia was taken as an indication that a constitutional monarchy would prove more efficacious in the process of reform. Western style ministries were soon established, efforts to eliminate government corruption were implemented, a national system of education for girls was implemented, and the creation of a modern army was well under way. By 1909, the dynasty was under significant pressure to produce a constitution and permit the election of provincial assemblies. The reforms proved to be expensive, and the resulting tax increases contributed to an increasing Chinese opposition to Manchu rule. Social unrest intensified, and in late 1911 the revolution that would sweep the Qing from power was under way. 2 Meanwhile, one of the most serious diplomatic questions for the United States in East Asia was the future course of Japanese activities in Manchuria. 3 The war had at last secured for Japan what it had been forced to give up after the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–95: a sphere of influence in southern Manchuria. The terms of the treaty, which Roosevelt had mediated, gave Japan the South Manchuria Railway along with the rest of Russia’s concessions in southern Manchuria, particularly the lease of the Liaodong Peninsula where the naval base at Lushun (Port Arthur) and the port of Dalien (Dalny) were located. 4 Japan then secured Chinese acquiescence to the transfer of the Russian rights in a treaty signed December 22, 1905. Along with this approval, China ceded certain timber rights to Japan, permitted Japan to link the Korean railways to the South Manchurian Railway, and promised not to build a competing line with that railroad. 5 The result was the attainment of 141

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interests substantial enough to lead to expectations that Japan would try to dominate capital investment in the area. A “perfect” sphere of influence such as the German sphere in Shandong Peninsula was not acquired by Japan, however. Unlike the Japanese, who had no such rights in southern Manchuria, Germany had the exclusive right to invest capital in Shandong. 6 Although the Treaty of Portsmouth contained wording supportive of the Open Door, the activities of the Japanese military in Manchuria represented a threat to commerce as well as to Chinese sovereignty over the region. The Japanese military treated the commercial ambitions of the other powers in Manchuria with indifference. The military leaders refused to open the interior to foreigners, and made it clear to Tokyo that foreign interests were not wanted in Manchuria. The dispatches of the chargé d’affaires of the American minister in Japan, Francis Huntington-Wilson, illuminate the problem confronting the United States. Wilson reported to the State Department that the Japanese military leaders were unsympathetic to the idea of an “open door” in Manchuria as they feared a “war of revenge” there and wanted a free hand. Foreigners were perceived at the least as intruders, if not spies. No importance was attached to official governmental policy, which included support for the principles of the Open Door. Moreover, Wilson continued, the military did not recognize that the “vested foreign interests” in Manchuria, primarily British and American, “would probably go far as a buffer against aggression from the north.” Wilson also remarked upon the great influence of the military class in Japan. This group was, he said, able to shape the government’s attitude to their will, even though the government as whole recognized Japan’s commitment to the Open Door. 7 In a later report, Wilson declared, “The present conditions are undoubtedly due to obstruction by the military branch of the Government.” 8 The Japanese clearly felt that Manchuria was theirs by right of conquest. Soon after the conclusion of peace, Consul-General Thomas Sammons at Niuzhuang forwarded an editorial from the Manchuria Daily Report, which was, in the American’s words, “ a semi-official Japanese publication.” The editorial concluded “Japan has bought Manchuria for a dear price in blood and money.” It was Japan that was to be credited with restoring the balance of power in Asia and preventing the dismemberment of China. “Manchuria is hers by just rights . . . what just man on earth could dispute Japan’s legitimate ownership?” 9 There were other indications that the Japanese were not adhering to the Open Door Policy as well. Rockhill noted that Japanese merchants were being freely admitted to Manchuria, while others were being kept out. The minister thought that the return of the American consul-general to Mukden might help resolve that problem. 10 In February 1906, the British-American Tobacco Company complained of discrimination in the collection of taxes and duties on their goods arriving in Dalien and Mukden, pointing out that

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Japanese commodities were being admitted without being taxed. There was also dissatisfaction with the fact that only Japanese were allowed in the war zone, while other foreign agents were not permitted in the sphere of Japanese occupation. 11 Japanese reluctance to open Manchuria to foreign commercial interests prompted the United States and Great Britain to express their concern and to urge the opening of Manchuria. Wilson was informed in late February that American traders were not only refused entrance into Manchuria, but were victims of discrimination in favor of Japanese merchants. Wilson was instructed to inform the Japanese of American concerns, and to suggest that the violation of the Open Door might be the work of unauthorized subordinates. He was also instructed to ask the Japanese to look into the matter. Wilson appeared before Prime Minister Saionji, who was also serving as foreign minister, on March 8, and presented the American complaint. 12 Two more protests from the United States followed that month. By March 30, Secretary of State Root was expressing the fear China would find itself merely the nominal sovereign of a territory in which the temporary occupants had appropriated the material advantages. 13 The notes apparently produced the desired result. Wilson informed Root on April 5 that Japan had decided to enforce in principle the Open Door in Manchuria. He also reported that Manchuria would be completely open to foreigners beginning on June 1, 1906. The only exceptions would be in certain military districts and Dalien, where the port’s opening would be delayed although it would be made available as soon as possible. Saionji’s response to Wilson was confirmed in a formal note to Root a week later. 14 The Japanese also declared “nothing is further from the thought of the Imperial Government than to attempt to monopolize the trade of Manchuria in violation of the principles of the Open Door and equal opportunity for which they have pledged their honor.” 15 Despite Saionji’s pledge, Americans in Manchuria remained concerned. 16 Pressure from inside as well as from outside weighed into the Japanese decision. Several statesmen, including Saionji and Kato, favored strict observance of the principle of equal commercial opportunity. 17 Leading newspapers also supported such a policy. The Jiji Shimpo, which Wilson referred to as “perhaps the most important independent newspaper in Japan,” stressed the duty of the Japanese government to carry out the principle of equal commercial opportunity in Manchuria. The paper also called for a united policy on the part of Japan, Great Britain, and the United States for the maintenance of Chinese territorial integrity and the principle of the Open Door. 18 On June 1, Japan announced that the evacuation of troops from Manchuria had been completed and steps were being taken to place most of South Manchuria back under Chinese administration. The Chinese, however, were in no hurry to take over as they were trying to both retain control of Manchu-

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ria while surrendering as few concessions as possible to the Japanese and Russians. Negotiations with these two powers did not begin until the fall of 1906, however, and although the British and Americans stressed the importance of coming to a settlement, the talks dragged. The primary issue with Russia was the insistence, based on an earlier treaty, upon the free entry of goods in a zone one hundred li (about 33 miles) on either side of the border. Japan, meanwhile, refused to surrender large tracts of land taken by its army during the war with Russia. Japan’s administration of South Manchuria did not officially come to an end until April 1907, and a Chinese settlement with Russia was not concluded until July. 19 Official American concern over Manchuria was minimal throughout 1907. Beyond periodic situation reports on the reopening of the region to foreign trade from legations and consulates, there was little attention given to the area. 20 Other dispatches discussed the questions of taxation and duties, customs regulations, Japanese efforts to sell China a railroad line, and continuing fears that Japan was still seeking to dominate the Manchurian market. 21 Japanese efforts to operate mines on either side of the Mukden-Antung (Andong) railway brought an American protest similar to the one made when Russia had tried to secure a mining monopoly in 1902–1903. As before, the United States trusted that China would not enter into any agreement that would endanger its territorial integrity or impair the legitimate interests of other nations in any region of the empire. The mining agreement with Japan was of concern to the United States because it would create a monopoly that would contravene treaty rights and obligations to the other powers. American trade would be restricted and it was feared other nations would make similar demands. Japan’s demands were held to be in violation of assurances given Washington regarding the Open Door. 22 Overall, however, the immigration crisis with Japan was of greater concern for Roosevelt and the American government in 1907. The president left management of the Manchurian issue to Secretary of State Elihu Root. If the United States was giving only minimal attention to Manchuria during 1907, Japan certainly was not. During the year the Japanese concluded agreements with both France and Russia in regard to the region. Each accord upheld the principle of Chinese integrity and independence as well as the principle of equal commercial opportunity, but, more importantly, the special interests of each nation in regard to China were recognized. Both agreements served to strengthen Japan’s position in Manchuria that went beyond any economic rights that nation could claim by treaty with China. At this juncture the United States was content to sit back and watch as the Japanese set the stage for what would become a drawn out conflict between the Chinese and themselves. The Chinese were anxious to preserve as much of their sovereignty and administrative entity as possible in the face of a growing Japanese interest in South Manchuria. 23

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Elihu Root. Source: Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division Washington, D.C., 1902.

In February 1908, the United States found itself involved in a dispute over the question of Russian administration in the railway zone in northern Manchuria. The disagreement, which was to continue into the Taft administration, concerned Russia’s attempt to acquire municipal sovereignty over the city of Harbin. By claiming exclusive administrative rights over the railway zone, Russia aimed a direct blow at Chinese sovereignty in Manchuria. 24 The contretemps began with a Russian complaint that the American consul in Harbin, Fred D. Fisher, was supporting China in its protests against

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Russia’s attempted takeover of the administration of Harbin. The note suggested that the United States did not need “to meddle in this matter.” 25 The American reply was not forthcoming until April. In a lengthy note, Root reasserted the position of the United States in regard to China’s sovereignty and reminded the Russians of their acquiescence to the Open Door principle of Chinese integrity in the Treaty of Portsmouth and other agreements. Root also lent his support to Fisher’s actions and suggested that the United States and Russia work together to preserve Chinese sovereignty and keep it intact. 26 A second Russian note protesting Fisher’s actions arrived in Washington in June. Root responded in July with a promise to investigate the Russian allegations that Fisher’s views and actions did not correspond with those of the State Department. It was not until late December, however, that the secretary of state informed St. Petersburg that a “thorough analysis of the attitude of Mr. Fisher as regards the points in question” had been completed. The inquiry had concluded that the consul’s views and actions “have been entirely in accord with the views of this Government.” Root again urged Russia to uphold China’s sovereignty and the principles of the Open Door. 27 Root was also worried about the possibility that Japan might try to extend a similar claim in South Manchuria. While working to keep Russia from perfecting its claim, Root met with the Japanese ambassador, Baron Takahira Kogoro, several times in order to ascertain what Japan might do. The Japanese government did not establish a claim similar to Russia’s and instead chose to assert vague “police powers” in their railway zone. 28 The “Harbin question” was finally resolved by an agreement between Russia and China in May 1909. 29 The United States also made efforts to demonstrate its friendship to both the Chinese and Japan during 1908. In an attempt to show sincere amity for China, following the strain in their relations due to the boycott, immigration issue, and the American China Development Company episode, a large portion of the Boxer Indemnity was returned to Beijing. The United States was the first of the Boxer Indemnity recipients to remit the indemnity to China. While not a major creditor, having been allocated seven percent of the indemnity, the decision to return the funds set a precedent. Faced with significant financial challenges, China was anxious to have as much of the indemnity returned as possible. W. W. Rockhill led the negotiations in China, and was one of those who favored applying the funds to educating Chinese students in America. However, the negotiations with China proved difficult. Strains from the 1905 boycott, the railroad issue, and immigration made dealing with the indemnity issue problematic and negotiations stalled. Chinese efforts to stir up public opinion in favor of remission of the indemnity only added to the problem of securing American agreement. Finally, in 1907, Wu Tingfang, the new Chinese minister, was able to persuade Roosevelt to

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settle the issue. Root, with Roosevelt’s support, and that of others, including the American missionary and educator, Arthur Smith, and the president of the University of Illinois, Edwin James, recommended that China use the funds to send students to the United States to further their educations. Roosevelt agreed, and asked Congress for the authority to return part of the indemnity in order to help the Chinese adapt to the new conditions they faced. The final arrangement, concluded in 1908 following a heated debate in Congress before passage of the necessary resolution, provided for China to make its payments as scheduled, with the funds to be used for educational purposes. China acknowledged its agreement in July 1908 with the announcement that one hundred Chinese students would be sent to the United States annually up to a total of four hundred. The establishment of a preparatory college, Tshingua College, now Tshingua University, followed in 1911. 30 As Hunt notes, however, the settlement was something of a disappointment to the Chinese, as they would have preferred to utilize the funds as they saw fit. Unable to overcome American preconditions regarding how the remitted funds were to be utilized, China was ultimately forced to give in to the American insistence that the funds be used for educational purposes. Their anxiety to have the funds returned swiftly was in conflict with their desire to use the money in whatever manner they wished. This conflict rendered the Chinese vulnerable to the American preference that it be used for education. Therefore, unless they gave in to American preferences, there was the possibility that the funds might never be returned. The Roosevelt administration was able to utilize its stronger negotiating position in order to achieve its goal. The remission of the American share of the Boxer Indemnity in order to promote educational opportunities in America for Chinese students, therefore, was less an act of generosity than it was the result of American strength and Chinese weakness. 31 The United States also concluded a pair of agreements with Japan. The first was an arbitration treaty; the second has popularly become known as the “Root-Takahira Agreement.” The latter was an exchange of notes by the two governments, which took place on November 30, 1908. Among other things, the duo pledged to respect each other’s territorial possessions in the Pacific region and to support the independence and integrity of China. 32 This agreement, in some aspects, was remarkably similar to the Franco-Japanese and Russo-Japanese pacts concluded the year before. 33 The return of the Boxer Indemnity encouraged some, if not all, of the Chinese officials that it would be possible to work more closely with the United States in turning back the Japanese menace in Manchuria. It was possible to believe that the United States government was demonstrating a real and disinterested friendship for China, and that it might be prevailed upon to give aid that would enable Beijing a real chance to resist further encroachment. 34

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After the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese War, Chinese policy had come to focus on the United States as the primary guardian of Chinese independence. Relying on the commercial interests of the powers had become problematic, as Japan was now seen as a serious threat to the Open Door in Manchuria. That nation’s alliance with Great Britain, furthermore, limited the ability of the British to oppose any Japanese challenge to the Open Door there. Further compromising the situation was the failure of the Americans and British to develop their trade interests in Manchuria sufficiently to offset the influence of Japan and Russia, despite the opportunity to do business in more than a dozen cities in the region and the existence of a highly developed railway network to carry that trade. To offset Japan and Russia in Manchuria, China had begun to implement a program of extending its political administration, encouraging colonization, and promoting commerce and industry, hopefully with funds returned from the Boxer Indemnity. A key component of the policy was the construction of Chinese-controlled railroads so that Manchuria could be more easily defended, the influence of Russia and Japan could be undermined, and the development of commerce and industry could be promoted. To acquire funding for this bold scheme as well as diplomatic support for the assault on the existing spheres of influence in Manchuria, China needed one of the powers for a partner. The United States was to be drawn into that partnership. 35 Under the leadership of Yuan Shikai, who was one of the empress dowager’s grand councilors, a dual approach was taken. The American railroad magnate, E. H. Harriman, was offered the opportunity to build a railroad from southern Manchuria to the Russian border. Initially interested, Harriman had to turn down the opportunity when the United States entered into a recession in 1907. When an approach to British financiers fell through, the Chinese turned back to the United States. The governor of Fengtian Province, Tang Shaoyi, was sent to Beijing to solicit the support of the monarchy and Rockhill. Tang had studied in the United States and was active in efforts to get Roosevelt to support Chinese efforts to block Japanese ambitions in Manchuria. He would work with Yuan and others to try and persuade American government and business interests to invest in railroad construction there as a way to counter Japan’s expansionist goals in the region. 36 The American consul-general in Mukden, Willard Straight, became a conduit by which the latest scheme was pitched to Taft during his tour of the Far East in 1907, as well as to several Wall Street financiers. 37 Taft, however, upon return to his duties as secretary of war after returning from his Asian tour, did not promote the scheme to State or the White House. 38 Meanwhile, the empress and Yuan had begun the process of improving relations with the United States. A Sino-American arbitration treaty was proposed, a cordial welcome was given the battleship fleet when it visited China, and a public campaign for a Sino-American alliance was initiated.

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Willard Straight. Source: The Willard Dickerman Straight Papers, California State Polytechnic University, Pomona, CA.

American businessmen were apprised of the opportunities awaiting them in Manchuria, while the alliance was promoted as a means by which China and American commercial interests could both be safeguarded from Japanese ambitions. Now all that was left was to get a commitment from Washington and American financial interests. 39

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So, Tang Shaoyi left China for Washington, ostensibly to thank the United States for the return of the indemnity. His real purpose, however, was to secure an American loan to finance a bank in Manchuria that would provide capital for projects to strengthen China there. Tang had the backing of Willard Straight, who was vehemently opposed to Japanese expansion in Manchuria, and to Roosevelt’s policies there. Straight viewed the earlier Japanese takeover of Korea as outright aggression (he had been serving in the American legation in Seoul when the Japanese protectorate was established) and had accepted an appointment to Mukden with the idea of building American influence in China in order to prevent the same thing happening in Manchuria. 40 In 1905, while in Korea, Straight had met Harriman, who was traveling through the Far East with an eye toward finding ways to extend American commerce and influence there. Harriman also had in mind the creation of an around-the-world transportation line, which would be under American control, by way of Japan, Siberia, European Russia, and the Atlantic Ocean. Harriman’s goal was to unite four of the world’s most populous nations and to facilitate a commanding position for the United States in the Orient. America would be able to supply the needs and wants and direct, to some extent, the commercial activities of hundreds of millions of people in the least developed parts of Europe and Asia. 41 Harriman’s plans called, first, for the purchase of the Chinese Eastern Railroad from Russia, then to secure transportation or trucking rights over trans-Siberian and Russian government roads from North Manchuria to the coast of the Baltic Sea. The terminals at the Baltic would be connected to the United States across the Atlantic by a fleet of steamships. 42 During his stay in Japan, Harriman had secured an agreement with the Japanese government for the sale of the South Manchurian railroad. The deal fell through, however, when the Japanese delegation returned from Portsmouth with the peace treaty. Baron Komura Jutaro, the deputation’s leader, objected to the sale on the grounds that it violated Article Six of the treaty and because the Japanese would also be foolish to jeopardize what they won in nearly two years of war by opening the commercial field bought with Japanese blood to foreign competition. 43 Unable to carry out his plans, Harriman nevertheless kept an eye on the situation in the Far East in regard to railroad affairs through reports he received from Straight. In the summer of 1908, Harriman persuaded Root to recall Straight in order to allow American businessmen to discuss with him the expediency of loaning funds to China for agricultural development and railroad construction in Manchuria. Straight arrived in Washington with a memorandum of agreement for a $20 million bank loan for the creation of a Manchurian bank, which would cooperate with American and Chinese interests in the construction of a new rail line in Manchuria. 44

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Tang and Straight’s scheme did not come to fruition. The Chinese, much to the astonishment of Rockhill, intended to apply the remission of Boxer Indemnity funds to the project. Rockhill pressed the Chinese for agreement on the application of the money to educate Chinese students in the United States, threatening a delay in the return of the funds if agreement was not reached quickly. His efforts were successful in helping to finalize the agreement. But Rockhill also moved to block any consideration of loaning China money to get the proposed bank started. Rockhill alerted the State Department that Tang was on his way to the United States to negotiate a loan, and that the Chinese should not be allowed to disrupt a plan that was meant for their own good. Tang arrived in Washington on November 30, 1908, and found that State was uninterested in discussing the proposed loan. Unable to secure a meeting with Root, Tang left for Europe in early 1909. 45 Furthermore, the emperor and empress dowager of China died in November 1908, and the death of the dowager seriously weakened the position of Tang’s principal supporter back home, Yuan Shikai. The new Manchu regency removed Yuan from office and the loss of his backing added to Tang’s disillusionment and he let the matter drop. 46 Another blow came from the Root-Takahira accord, which was, ironically, concluded on the day of Tang’s arrival. The exchange of notes helped to further undermine the plan by drawing the United States into the web of treaties Japan had negotiated with France, Russia, and Great Britain, while isolating China. 47 Depending on how the ambiguous clauses of the agreement were interpreted, the United States could be seen as sanctioning Japan’s position in Manchuria. Faced with the dilemma of dealing with Japanese expansion in Manchuria and upholding the principles of the Open Door between 1905 and 1909, the Roosevelt administration continued to react to events and hesitated to take a firm stance. In those notes that reaffirmed America’s position vis-à-vis the Open Door or protested violations of the policy, the administration persistently maintained a friendly posture. It remained safer to try and cajole the other powers to uphold the principle of the Open Door in China, rather than risk the possibility of an open conflict, especially as the United States lacked a substantial commercial interest in Manchuria. The Hay notes of 1899 and 1900 had proclaimed the now familiar principles of the Open Door and the other powers had consented to them, albeit reluctantly at times, although they tended to uphold them mostly when it was convenient to do so. Continued remonstrations when the powers strayed from these tenets made up the bulk of American support for China when its sovereignty was threatened, even though the United States had the opportunity to provide more extensive backing. However, the lack of a strong military presence in China, public apathy, and limitations within the Open Door Policy itself have already been cited as factors in the American inability or unwillingness to respond more fully to China’s plight.

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Another reason for the minimal effort may have been the continuing lack of a sizeable commercial interest in China. Not that the United States lacked a commercial interest in China—American business there simply was not very substantial. American exports to China in 1900 totaled nearly $15.3 million, or 1.1 percent of the total American exports for that year. In 1905 U.S. exports to China jumped to about $53.5 million, but this amount was only 3.5 percent of all American exports. Three years later this figure had declined to $22.3 million, or 1.2 percent of the nation’s export total. Moreover, in 1908, Chinese imports from the United States totaled just 10.5 percent of all the goods imported into the empire. 48 The United States, as a rule, imported more from China than it exported, but incoming Chinese goods amounted to only 3.2 percent of the total imported in 1900, 2.5 percent in 1905, and 2.2 percent in 1908. 49 The large increase in 1905 reflected American expectations that the end of the Russo-Japanese War would bring about the opening of more ports in China. But the war’s end brought a trade slump instead, caused by a lessening of the demand for foreign goods. A civilian population impoverished by war and uncertain about Japan’s withdrawal could not take up the slack. Overoptimistic firms were caught overstocked as a result. Also, trade was disrupted by uncertain financial conditions and transportation as a result of the war. American traders were further pinched by the appearance of Japanese competition. The Japanese had the advantages of government subsidies, cheap labor, familiarity with the Manchurian market, and geographical proximity to that market. These benefits allowed Japanese businessmen to undersell their American competitors. 50 American exports to Manchuria also reflect the lack of American enterprise. Exports to Manchuria reached a peak in 1905, and then declined. American goods accounted for about 10 percent of the goods entering Manchuria through the port of Niuzhuang in 1903, but increased to nearly 50 percent in 1905, a “boom” year in American exports to Asia. Sales to Manchuria declined in 1906 and 1907 until they eventually reached less than 10 percent of the volume of 1905. 51 There was little direct trade activity in Manchuria as well. Only half a dozen American merchants were doing business there in 1906. Four of these were established in Niuzhuang, and the other two were operating in the interior of Liaoning (formerly Fengtian) Province. American firms were usually established further south in Shanghai, and few of these went to Manchuria or branched out there. The Shanghai merchants often bought goods in the United States and shipped them to Manchuria to be marketed by British, German, Chinese, and Japanese agents, thereby causing a loss of identity for American-made products. American investors were also reluctant to commit to an area as uncertain as Manchuria was. Root’s tenure as secretary of state after 1905 may also have discouraged American businessmen from becoming involved there as he was not prone to support close ties between the government and corporations that were operat-

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ing in foreign parts. Root also opposed the use of political power on the part of government officials to assist private investors in obtaining contracts. 52 Lack of commercial enterprise by the United States did not mean there was any shortage of expectation that China one day would become a great market. It was predicted that the complete opening of Manchuria to commerce and industry would result in a “growth of prosperity that would astonish China and the world.” American trade would increase by “ten hundred percent” as a result. 53 Roosevelt was told in June 1905 that the “opportunity for the expansion of the market for American goods is great.” 54 The economic motive for going into China had been based on the popular notion that as nations fall into arrears a great struggle for markets in which commodities could be sold to offset that debt would ensue. East Asia loomed as a great potential market for manufactured goods, and it was in the best interest of the United States to gain control of this market. Failure to do so might result in the eventual disintegration of the country, while domination of the Asian market could make America the greatest seat of wealth and power the world had ever known. Roosevelt believed it was in the best interest of the United States to keep the roads of trade to Asia open and see that they were managed primarily in the national interest. 55 On the whole, however, American investors were generally indifferent to the China market and exhibited little inclination to invest in it. American policies in China were therefore limited and weak due to the lack of a significant economic stake in that part of the world. Paul Varg has pointed out that with “no economic roots in China sufficient to nourish a strong will, the United States found it difficult to rise above the rank of an onlooker.” 56 The actions of the Roosevelt administration amply demonstrate the veracity of that assessment. The lack of a forceful economic effort on the part of the United States in East Asia limited its security concerns there. However, maintenance of a cordial attitude in dealing with the powers in China, especially Japan, does not mean the United States, and Roosevelt in particular, was afraid of them. 57 Roosevelt’s letters during this period indicate a genuine respect and admiration for Japan, particularly its transformation into a Western-style power, but not intimidation. 58 Moreover, a strong position for Japan in China was not necessarily a bad thing. A memorandum to Roosevelt in June 1905 argued: If . . . Japan can develop the buying capacity of China and Korea (the sine qua non of progress!), as she has her own, they will in a few years purchase ten times as much from us as they do now. It is . . . foolish to assume that Japan is going to dominate China completely to the exclusion of the United States and all others . . . there are abundant signs that she means to maintain her own integrity and economic independence through her own efforts. 59

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Rockhill likewise believed that it was unlikely that Japan would try to secure control of China. That Japan will try to get as much of the markets of China and of Russia, as she can supply, I have no doubt, that she can and will help China to become a stronger, richer, and more responsible power is true, but that this will permanently disturb the balance of power in the East seems to me highly improbable. 60

The failure of the Roosevelt administration to give greater support to China in Manchuria after 1905 would suggest that the president and his policymakers may have been persuaded by these arguments. For those powers more deeply entrenched in Asia there were deep and pressing security concerns. Russia and Japan still faced each other in Manchuria, the British were concerned about possible Russian aggressiveness toward India and they had linked with the Japanese in order to forestall that possibility. The French had major holdings in Southeast Asia and heavy investments in Russia. These factors, coupled with a deep fear of Germany, led France to subordinate its China policy to those considerations. These powers were tied together by a network of agreements, which left them free to push their own interests in their respective spheres and formed a bulwark, which kept the United States from “effectively challenging any one of them.” 61 This is not to diminish the legitimate security concerns the United States had in the Pacific and Asia. The acquisition of Hawaii and the Philippines had made the United States a colonial power, and the Philippines in particular were certainly vulnerable to Japan should that nation choose to expand in that direction. For the moment, though, Japan’s focus was on establishing itself as a continental power in Asia and that goal, in the minds of Roosevelt and some of his advisers, made Japan useful as a counterweight to Russian ambitions in Manchuria. With Japan playing the game in that region to America’s apparent benefit, it was wise to tread carefully in pressing for equal opportunity in Manchuria, where American commercial performance so far had been desultory at best. American diplomacy in this period reflected the weakness of both U.S. economic and security concerns in the Far East. Public sentiment regarding China never reached any great height because neither special interest groups nor broad national security interests exhibited any major concern about Asia, and China or Manchuria in particular that would result in a public fervor. 62 The Department of State had little more to do than show occasional reverence for China’s territorial integrity, affirm the principle of equal commercial opportunity, and publicly approve the missionary enterprise. 63 The Open Door may actually have become more limited in nature and might not even have been entirely relevant after the signing of the Treaty of

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Portsmouth. Huntington-Wilson, who left the legation in Japan in order to become third assistant secretary of state during the last three years of Roosevelt’s presidency, noted “. . . a sensitive student of foreign policy could not but lament the appalling lack of realism in our relations with the Far East . . . one could not help feeling that the [open door] was a myth.” 64 The Open Door was probably more relevant when China was in danger of partition, which was becoming a highly unlikely prospect during this period. The nations involved in China were now becoming more interested in practical matters; namely, obtaining railroad contracts, mining rights, and advancing other economic enterprises. 65 European capitalists, supported by their governments, led the drive. Government support, though, was based on political relations with the other powers in China, and no government was eager to offend rivals or allies there. 66 Essentially, each nation had specific treaty rights granted by China in its respective sphere of influence. While publicly affirming the principles of the Open Door, 67 no nation was willing to grant concessions that would allow another to undermine its special interests in its sphere of influence. So, they were prepared to enter into accords that technically upheld the Open Door, but more importantly, pledged respect for each other’s “special interests” in China. The United States could do nothing in the face of these agreements because, in effect, the Open Door remained open. One might have to force one’s way in, as in the case of Manchuria, but the notion remained in effect. American policy therefore boiled down to maintaining China as an independent state capable of holding its position, while developing economic relations that were mutually advantageous to Americans and Chinese. 68 The United States remained unwilling to do anything to challenge the position of any other nation in China as long as American commercial interests were permitted equal opportunity (although not necessarily in Manchuria if Japanese interests were deemed more important), and some semblance of Chinese independence was preserved. In this way, the Open Door did become less of a reality and more of an illusion. The Open Door had become a policy based on moral, rather than political or practical considerations. Essential to the formation of American policy regarding the Far East were the attitudes of Roosevelt and his new secretary of state, Elihu Root. Roosevelt’s attitudes have already been discussed; some attention must now be given Root. “The main object of diplomacy,” Root stated in September 1905, “is to keep the country out of trouble.” 69 Throughout his tenure as secretary of state, Root pursued a policy that would do just that. Root’s policy was simply to recognize the legal rights of Japan and Russia in Manchuria, the avoidance of aggressive attacks on those privileges, while offering resistance to any interpretation of those rights that were unreasonable or which undermined Chinese sovereignty. 70 Root dreaded the possibility that China might be

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partitioned some day, and thought such an occurrence “would be second to no event in its effect upon mankind since the fall of the Roman Empire.” 71 The secretary of state did make the effort to win and maintain Chinese friendship, and his handling of the Boxer Indemnity overpayment stands as firm evidence of his desire to keep Sino-American relations on a friendly basis, at least by American standards. Root felt his predecessor, John Hay, had influenced him to some extent. As a cabinet member and friend of Hay’s, Root came to discuss “most of the question of our diplomacy and most of the great things Mr. Hay did as Secretary and . . . I gained from him some of his points of view and methods of treatment and spirit.” 72 In fact, Root’s first experience with China affairs had come in 1900, when Hay fell ill during the Boxer Uprising. Then secretary of war, Root assumed Hay’s duties. Helping to shape America’s policy toward China gave Root his first exposure to international policymaking and intrigue. The future secretary of state gained some level of familiarity with Asian affairs that would serve him in good stead in the years to come. 73 While committed to defend the principle of the Open Door, Root held views that were divergent in that he was willing to consent to Japan’s ascendancy in Korea, as will be noted in the next chapter. Root had little regard for Russia, although he held high aspirations for Japan. He hoped that nation would become the “England of the Orient,” with a constitutional form of government, freedom from excessive territorial ambitions, and a desire to promote stability and equality for commercial opportunity in a troubled part of the world. For these reasons, Root approved the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1905, and accepted the gradual absorption of Korea as inevitable, and even desirable. 74 As noted above, lack of a strong American commercial interest in China may have weakened the ability of the United States to pursue a stronger policy in regard to Japanese and Russian attempts to usurp Chinese sovereignty in Manchuria. The attitude of Root concerning American commercial interests would certainly add credence to that viewpoint. While maintaining a general policy of promoting American trade, Root showed little interest in promoting individual business interests in Manchuria. He refused to involve the United States in any sort of international consortium loan to China, for example, reasoning that it would be “a great mistake to put our Government in a controversial position for the purpose of helping our bankers and traders.” Our form of government allows enough help of trade to make the government a participant. The result will be that a trade controversy will be a direct cause of war. It is only because of the government’s detachment that they can discuss a business controversy. 75

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On another occasion, Root further stated his views on the matter. “While the State Department is actively engaged in . . . striving to pry open and hold open the doors for the entrance of American commerce . . . I do not believe in too much government.” The “real work,” Root thought, had to be done by American businessmen. “The really great things . . . have been accomplished in the true American fashion, by the association of individual private enterprise.” 76 When Tang Shaoyi, the special emissary from China, arrived in Washington seeking the aforementioned loan, Root drafted a letter to Willard Straight which dashed any hopes of any monetary investments in Manchuria on the part of the U.S. government: As to the negotiation of a loan, whether in the United States or Europe . . . the State Department has no wish or authority to involve the United States in any obligation wither legal or moral with reference to such a loan. 77

It was best, Root felt, to have Straight “acting under express instructions.” 78 Root did not shut off all possibility of financial assistance, however. Straight was instructed to help Tang meet any representatives of American finance and commerce he need to for “the prosecution of the mission.” Straight was also told to show the letter to anyone Tang wished to have informed of the views of the United States. 79 Essentially, Root based his diplomacy on legal interpretations of treaties and agreements, as befitted his background as an attorney. Accordingly, he could defend the positions of Russia and Japan as long as they were within the bounds of their treaty rights. Neither country, however, had the prerogative to usurp in any way the sovereignty of China in Manchuria. Conversely, China had no right to interfere in any way with the treaty privileges granted to Japan and Russia, no matter how fearful it might be of losing Manchuria. Root also preferred to conduct diplomacy in an atmosphere of friendliness and calm moderation. He credited such a policy to the successful conclusion of the Root-Takahira Agreement, noting, “. . . the friendliness which made the agreement possible was due to no one incident but to a line of conduct followed over a period of time.” 80 Root’s role in the Harbin issues may be the best example of his legalist viewpoint. Technically he was only defending the United States and the other commercial powers in Manchuria against an erroneous interpretation of treaty rights by Russia. Although Root based the position of the United States on his interpretation of international law, he found himself in the forefront of the effort to preserve Chinese sovereignty in Manchuria. 81 Root stated the American position thusly:

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Chapter 6 The position of the United States is that it does not propose to surrender treaty rights in China or to concede that its sympathy can be excluded from those rights or subjected to any governmental power on the part of the Chinese railway company. On the other hand, we do not wish to be bumptious or disputatious or unfriendly in the assertion of rights, or to become a protagonist in Manchuria, taking the responsibility of carrying on a vexatious controversy with Russia. A quiet, firm maintenance of our position is our true policy and in that the interests to be preserved are the future interests of the open door and there is no present interest which would justify us in exhibiting undue excitement in this quiet and firm maintenance of our position. 82

Root was able to garner support from London and Berlin in defense of China’s sovereignty, and he was able to keep the Japanese from advancing similar claims. Nevertheless, he was reluctant to become deeply involved in the Manchurian rivalry although he felt it was his duty to uphold American treaty rights and shield China from a severe blow to its sovereignty. 83 While Root wanted to keep relations between the United States and China on a friendly basis, American support for China was to be kept within the bounds of international law. Root had no desire to assume obligations that might involve the nation in a conflict with the European powers or Japan over China. His approach was a policy of moderation, taking care not to needlessly antagonize the other powers while making certain that the United States asserted its views in a firm manner. Whether or not Root might have taken a different tack had another man been president is an open question. It does seem clear, however, that Root’s methods for dealing with China were influenced, if not limited in some respect, by Roosevelt’s perceptions of the Far East and the international competition that was taking place there. Regarding Japan’s special interests in Manchuria, Roosevelt’s views were forcefully evident. The president still believed Russia was the primary threat in Manchuria, even after Japan’s success in the Russo-Japanese War, and he thought Japan would make a useful counterweight there. In that way American interests could be protected and China safeguarded. 84 This viewpoint led Roosevelt to lessen his regard for the Open Door in Manchuria and Chinese sovereignty there, and it allowed the United States to rely on diplomatic protests as its primary defense of the Hay notes. The president showed little concern when Japan disregarded the Open Door as it consolidated its position in southern Manchuria following the signing of the Portsmouth Treaty. The protests that were made were largely the result of Root’s concern, rather than Roosevelt’s. 85 Having secured Japan’s promise to respect the Open Door during the negotiations at Portsmouth, Roosevelt was confident that the Japanese would honor their pledge. 86 Roosevelt’s confidence was borne out when Japan opened most of Manchuria to foreign commerce in the middle of 1906, but the prodding of

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Root and the British in their protestations regarding access to the region may have served to accelerate the Japanese decision to do so. Whether or not Roosevelt would have confronted Japan if it had refused to reopen Manchuria is an open question. He had great respect for Japan’s strategic interests there, he believed the Russo-Japanese conflict was the most fundamental of the many rivalries in Asia, and he certainly was aware of the limitations in regard to what America could do in the Far East. The president was convinced that Japanese interests in Manchuria were more important than those of the United States, or the West in general, because, for Japan, national security was at stake. Japanese economic encroachments, therefore, could be viewed with sympathy as long as Japan was defending its legitimate interests in Asia. As a result, Roosevelt’s respect for Japanese strategic interests overshadowed any feelings he might have in regard to Chinese sovereignty in Manchuria. 87 By 1908, Roosevelt was willing to express to Takahira his willingness to treat Manchuria differently from the rest of China. 88 Further affecting Roosevelt’s views regarding Japan’s interests in Manchuria was the crisis with that nation caused by the mistreatment of Japanese in California, along with the American policy of refusing entrance to the United States to Japanese laborers. Although the problem was resolved in the Gentlemen’s Agreements of 1907–1908, the hostile feelings that arose made Roosevelt wary of antagonizing Japan further or needlessly. While he was positive that Japan had no immediate plans for war with the United States, he was convinced that American opposition to Japan in Manchuria could incur Japanese enmity. I do not think that she wishes war . . . but I am very sure that if sufficiently irritated and humiliated by us she will get to accept us instead of Russia as the national enemy she will have to fight. 89

Specifically, Roosevelt pointed out: It is peculiarly in our interest not to take any steps as regards Manchuria which will give the Japanese cause to feel, with or without reason, that we are hostile to them or a menace—to their interests. 90

Relations with Japan, therefore, necessitated a specific approach: [A] policy of behaving with absolute good faith, courtesy and justice to her on the one hand, and, on the other, of keeping our navy in such a shape as to make it a risky thing for Japan to go to war with us. 91

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The echo of Root’s approach is evident here, as is the standard Rooseveltian methodology of backing up one’s diplomacy with military, or in this case, naval preparedness. Roosevelt later credited this “big stick” policy with improving JapaneseAmerican relations. Noting that affairs were “infinitely better” with Japan by the end of 1908, the president credited the rapprochement to the fact that “we desire to act with fairness and courtesy, and that we carry a big stick.” 92 What was more important, though left unsaid, was that the United States had not antagonized Japan over its position in Manchuria. Also contributing to the milder diplomatic style in dealing with the Japanese was the growing preoccupation of Roosevelt with Europe, in particular the Anglo-German rivalry. The president believed Germany was the greatest threat to world peace, surpassing any of the rivalries in Asia, or friction between the United States and Japan. Europe, in his mind, remained the fulcrum of international diplomacy and any real threat to international harmony came from there, rather than from the Far East. 93 The United States, interestingly enough, had the opportunity to conclude an alliance with Germany and China against Japan toward the end of Roosevelt’s second term. Kaiser Wilhelm was vehemently anti-Japanese and was increasingly concerned about the Japanese arrangements with Britain, France, and Russia. Seeking to escape Germany’s diplomatic isolation in Asia, the kaiser tried to create an entente with the United States and China. The plan fell through partly due to Roosevelt’s distrust of Germany and his desire to avoid offending Japan. The empress dowager, however, was equally distrustful of the kaiser, which made a coalition of any sort between the three nations a near impossibility. 94 Roosevelt also noted another problem with the proposal, which he mentioned in a letter to Taft in 1910. “Alliance with China, in view of China’s absolute military helplessness, means of course not an additional strength to us, but an additional obligation which we assume.” 95 Also problematic, even if Roosevelt had seriously considered an alliance with Germany and China, would have been overcoming traditional isolationist feelings in the United States, a nearly impossible task given the limited American presence in the Far East. And the biggest reason for not joining a Sino-German combination was that it most likely would have been viewed badly by Japan. In conclusion, while the United States might have given greater support to China in the Manchurian question following the Russo-Japanese War, it appeared neither essential nor beneficial to do so. While some American diplomats, notably Willard Straight and Francis Huntington-Wilson, argued for a stronger anti-Japanese policy in Manchuria, Roosevelt and Root overruled them, preferring a policy of moderation and friendliness toward Japan along with a tactful, yet assertive, courtesy in regard to China. Root may have been staunch in his defense of China’s integrity in Manchuria, but his

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recognition of Japanese and Russian treaty rights there limited any actions he might take, as did Roosevelt’s regard for Japan’s strategic interests. Neither man was willing to antagonize Japan or to risk placing the United States in a war to defend the Open Door in an area where the American presence was weak to begin with. Therefore they restricted their efforts to uphold Chinese sovereignty and the Open Door in Manchuria. The lack of substantial commercial interests and limited security interests in Asia, along with the questionable relevance of the Open Door Policy also added to the decision to restrain policy initiatives in China. Traditional American isolationism, reflected in the unwillingness of the American government to assume specific political obligations in regard to China, undoubtedly further hindered the defense of Chinese sovereignty by the United States. These factors taken together made it impossible for the Roosevelt administration to do more than give vocal support to the principle of Chinese integrity and sovereignty in Manchuria in the years following the Russo-Japanese War. The Open Door Policy itself was redefined, consciously or unconsciously, by the limited American approach to the situation in Manchuria once Japan had established itself in southern Manchuria. By elevating Japanese interests in Manchuria over those of the United States, Roosevelt and Root made it clear that the Open Door stood more for equality of opportunity for trade than it did for China’s territorial integrity. The second part of the Open Door was not abandoned completely, however. Instead, it was simply set aside in the expectation that the competition between the various powers in China would serve to keep China intact. Even so, Roosevelt and Root appear to have been prepared to make some concessions to Japan regarding Chinese sovereignty in Manchuria if it would prevent Russia from gaining the upper hand there. This was a shift from the prewar period when the United States more actively opposed Russian encroachment in Manchuria. In effect, Roosevelt seemed to think of the Japanese as a surrogate guardian of the Open Door, trusting to them to uphold the principle of equal commercial opportunity even if some aspects of China’s integrity were compromised as a result. And so, in the waning years of the Roosevelt administration, the emphasis was on the economic aspects of the Open Door Policy, while the question of Chinese integrity, territorial or otherwise, while not abandoned entirely, was played down in order to establish a balance of power between Japan and Russia in Manchuria. In the few months remaining in Roosevelt’s second term, the two nations would further define, albeit ambiguously, that very premise.

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NOTES 1. Quoted in Philip C. Jessup, Elihu Root, 2 volumes (New York: Dodd, Mead and Co., 1938), vol. 2, pp. 52–53. 2. Elleman and Paine, Modern China, pp. 224–34; Hsu, The Rise of Modern China, pp. 412–17. 3. Paul A Varg, The Making of a Myth: The United States and China, 1897–1912 (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1968), p. 139. 4. Jessup, Elihu Root, vol. 2, p. 7; Raymond A. Esthus, Theodore Roosevelt and the International Rivalries (Waltham: Ginn-Blaisdell, 1970), p. 136. 5. Foreign Relations, 1906, vol. 2, pp. 996–99; Rockhill to Root, December 22, 1905, December 28, 1905, Despatches: China. 6. Esthus, International Rivalries, p. 136. 7. Wilson to Root, March 15, 1906, U.S. Department of State, Despatches from United States Ministers to Japan (Washington, D.C.: National Archives), hereafter cited as Despatches: Japan. 8. Wilson to Root, March 28, 1906, Ibid.; Rockhill to Root, January 18, 1906, Despatches: China. 9. Sammons to Rockhill, September 22, 1905, CD: Newchwang. 10. Rockhill to Root, January 18, 1906, Despatches: China. 11. Sammons to Rockhill, February 16, 1906, CD: Newchwang. 12. Foreign Relations, 1906, vol.1, pp. 170–71. 13. Ibid., p. 177. 14. Ibid, pp. 176–80. 15. Ibid., p. 181. 16. Rockhill to Root, May 30, 1906, June 15, 1906, CD: Newchwang. 17. Raymond A. Esthus, Theodore Roosevelt and Japan (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1966), p. 121. 18. Foreign Relations, 1906, vol. 1, pp. 175–76. 19. Varg, Making of a Myth, pp. 142–46; Esthus, Roosevelt and Japan, p. 125; Rockhill to Root, January 10, 1906, January 18, 1906, June 29, 1906; Bacon to Rockhill, August 11, 1906; Rockhill to Root, August 16, 1906; Adee to Rockhill, August 29, 1906, August 31, 1906, September 20, 1906; Root to Rockhill, October 4, 1906; Rockhill to Root, October 6, 1906, December 18, 1906, February 1, 1907, March 29, 1907, May 17, 1907; Root to Rockhill, May 27, 1907, June 5, 1907, June 11, 1907, Despatches: China. 20. Foreign Relations, 1907, vol. 1, pp. 130–40. 21. Rockhill to Root, January 12, 1907; Bacon to Rockhill, February 8, 1907; Rockhill to Root, March 22, 1907; Root to Rockhill, April 5, 1907; Rockhill to Root, April 22, 1907; Root to Rockhill, April 29, 1907; Rockhill to Root, May 31, 1907, June 6, 1907, August 8, 1907, Despatches: China; Sammons to State Department, January 31, 1907; Paddock to State Department, March 21, 1907; Rockhill to Root, May 31, 1907; O’Brien to State Department, December 12, 1907, U.S. Department of State, Numerical Files of the Department of State (Washington D.C.: National Archives), microfilm reels, 311, 501, 571, and 328, hereafter cited as NF. 22. State Department memorandum from the Division of Far Eastern Affairs, December 24, 1907, NF: reel 571. 23. Foreign Relations, 1907, vol. 2, pp. 754–57; C. Walter Young, Japan’s Special Position in Manchuria (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1931), pp. 125–26; O. Edmund Clubb, China and Russia, The “Great Game” (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), p. 145; Esthus, International Rivalries, pp. 136–37. 24. Foreign Relations, 1910, p. 202; Esthus, International Rivalries, p. 142. 25. Foreign Relations, 1910, p. 202. 26. Ibid., pp. 203–5. 27. Ibid., pp. 205–8. 28. Esthus, Roosevelt and Japan, p. 270.

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29. Foreign Relations, 1910, p. 209; Rockhill to Root, January 31, 1908, February 14, 1908; Bacon to Rockhill, April 15, 1908; Root to Rockhill, April 23, 1908; Bacon to Rockhill, July 2, 1908, July 7, 1908; Root to Rockhill, December 29, 1908, Despatches: China. 30. Jenks to Roosevelt, August 10, 1905; Mathews to Roosevelt, September 22, 1905, Roosevelt Mss.; Foreign Relations, 1907, pp. lxvii–lxviii; Michael H. Hunt, “The American Remission of the Boxer Indemnity: A Reappraisal,” The Journal of Asian Studies 31, no. 3 (May 1972): 539–59; Frank H. H. King, “The Boxer Indemnity—‘Nothing but Bad’” Modern Asian Studies 40, no. 3 (July 2006): 678–79; William H. Harbaugh, The Life and Times of Theodore Roosevelt. Revised edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 302; Jessup, Root, vol. 1, pp. 385–88. 31. Hunt, “The American Remission of the Boxer Indemnity,” p. 541. 32. Foreign Relations, 1908, p. 511. 33. Thomas A. Bailey, in “The Root-Takahira Agreement of 1908,” Pacific Historical Review (March 1940): 24–25, has noted the similarity not only of the above two agreements, but also with the preamble of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1905, which renewed the original agreement concluded in 1902. 34. F. M. Huntington-Wilson, Memoirs of an Ex-Diplomat (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1945), p. 168. 35. Hunt, Special Relationship, p. 204. 36. Sutter, U.S.-Chinese Relations, p. 30. 37. Hunt, Special Relationship, p. 205. 38. Hunt, “The American Remission of the Boxer Indemnity,” pp. 552–53. 39. Hunt, Special Relationship, p. 205. 40. Herbert Croly, Willard Straight (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1924), p. 268; Walter LaFeber, The Clash: U.S.-Japanese Relations throughout History (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1997), p.86. 41. George Kennan, E.H. Harriman: A Biography, 2 volumes (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1922), vol. 2, pp. 1–2. 42. Ibid., p. 3. 43. Ibid., pp. 15–19. 44. Ibid., pp. 26–27; Croly, Straight, pp. 269–70; Huntington-Wilson, Memoirs, p. 168. 45. Hunt, “The American Remission of the Boxer Indemnity,” pp. 554–55. 46. Kennan, Harriman, pp. 26-27; Huntington-Wilson, Memoirs, p. 168, Hunt, Special Relationship, pp. 207–8. 47. Bailey, “The Root-Takahira Agreement,” pp. 28–29, 24; Huntington-Wilson, Memoirs, pp. 168–69; Akira Iriye, Pacific Estrangement: Japanese and American Expansion, 1897–1911 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972), p. 206; Hunt, Special Relationship, p. 207. 48. U.S. Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1905 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1905), pp. 216, 154; Ibid., Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1909 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1909), pp. 370, 336, 769, hereafter cited as Statistical Abstract. 49. Ibid. 50. Iriye, Pacific Estrangement, pp. 115, 190–91; Hunt, Frontier Defense, pp. 108–13. 51. Ibid., Sammons to Rockhill, February 21, 1906, CD: Newchwang. 52. Hunt, Frontier Defense, p. 111; George E. Mowry, The Era of Theodore Roosevelt and the Birth of Modern America, 1900–1912 (New York: Harper and Row, 1958), p. 190. 53. Miller to Squiers, March 19, 1903, CD: Newchwang. 54. Barrett to Roosevelt, June 17, 1905, Roosevelt Mss. 55. Beale, Rise of America, pp. 178–79; Shaw to Roosevelt, September 26, 1905, Roosevelt Mss. 56. Varg, Making of a Myth, pp. 126–27. 57. Ibid. 58. Roosevelt Letters, vol. 5, pp. 22, 135, 474–75, 528, 853; vol. 6, p. 1445; vol. 7, pp. 180–81, 189–91, 239. 59. Barrett to Roosevelt, June 17, 1905, Roosevelt Mss. 60. Rockhill to Roosevelt, July 7, 1905, Roosevelt Mss.

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61. Varg, Making of a Myth, p. 128. 62. Ibid. 63. Ibid. 64. Huntington-Wilson, Memoirs, p. 166. 65. Varg, Making of a Myth, p. 130. 66. Ibid. 67. For example, the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1905, and the FrancoJapanese and Russo-Japanese agreements negotiated in 1907 all contained clauses upholding the principles of the Open Door. 68. Varg, Making of a Myth, p. 130. 69. Quoted in Richard W. Leopold, Elihu Root and the Conservative Tradition (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1954.), p. 50. 70. Esthus, International Rivalries, p. 145. 71. Quoted in Jessup, Root, vol. 1, p. 382. 72. Quoted in Ibid., p. 452. 73. Ibid., p. 380, Leopold, Root, p. 60. 74. Ibid. 75. Quoted in Jessup, Root, vol. 2, p. 53. 76. Root to Burnham, November 18, 1907, Root Mss. 77. Jessup, Root, vol. 2, p. 54. 78. Root to Roosevelt, December 18, 1908, Root Mss. 79. Jessup, Root, vol. 2, p. 54. 80. Quoted in Ibid., p. 42. 81. Esthus, International Rivalries, p. 142. 82. Quoted in Jessup, Root, vol. 2, pp. 52–53. 83. Esthus, International Rivalries, p. 144; Root to Reid, May 22, 1908, Root Mss. 84. Paul S. Holbo, United States Policies toward China (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1969), p. 21. 85. Esthus, International Rivalries, p. 137. 86. Ibid., Holbo, United States Policies, pp. 21–22. 87. Roosevelt to Taft, December 8, 1910, December 22, 1910, Roosevelt Letters, vol. 7, pp. 180–81, 189–91; Esthus, International Rivalries, p. 138. 88. Ibid., pp. 139, 144. 89. Roosevelt to Hale, October 27, 1906, Roosevelt Letters, vol. 5, p. 474. 90. Roosevelt to Taft, December 22, 1910, Ibid., vol. 7, pp. 190–91. 91. Roosevelt to Hale, October 27, 1906, Ibid., vol. 5, p. 474. 92. Roosevelt to Brooks, December 28, 1908, Ibid., vol. 6, p. 1445, italicized by Morison. 93. Esthus, International Rivalries, pp. 149–50. 94. See Luella J. Hall, “The Abortive German-American-Chinese Entente of 1907-1908,” Journal of American History (June 1929): 219–35; Oscar King Davis, Released for Publication: Some Inside Political History of Theodore Roosevelt and His Times (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1925), pp. 81–85; Roosevelt to Root, August 8, 1908; Roosevelt to Lee, October 17, 1908; Roosevelt to Theodore Roosevelt Jr., November 20, 1908; Roosevelt to Reid, January 6, 1909, Roosevelt Letters, vol. 6, pp. 1163–64, 1292–94, 1370, 1374, 1465–67; Howard to Roosevelt, May 3, 1908; Fuller to State Department, August 24, 1908; Sieberling to Roosevelt, September 23, 1908; Carr to Sieberling, October 1, 1908; Woodall to New York Evening Post, 11 September 1908, NF reels 847, 931; Chang, Empress Dowager Cixi, pp. 354–55. 95. Roosevelt to Taft, December 22, 1910, Roosevelt Letters, vol. 7, pp. 189–91.

Chapter Seven

Closing the Door? The Taft-Katsura Memorandum and the Root-Takahira Agreement

As Russia and Japan moved toward ending the war between them and in the aftermath of the Japanese immigration crisis, the Roosevelt administration found itself in conversations and negotiations with Japan that would further define the American commitment to the Open Door and the relationship with China. The United States would strengthen its policy of supporting Japanese endeavors in Manchuria, at first informally and then through a formal agreement. These would form the basis, however ambiguous, for preserving a balance of power in the Far East with Japan serving as the counterweight to Russian ambitions in Manchuria. By the end of this process the Open Door Policy had evolved to the point where the focus was on preserving access to the region for American investment and commerce, no matter how limited it might be, rather than on the preservation of China’s territorial integrity, especially in Manchuria. For the Chinese, these actions, especially the RootTakahira Agreement of 1908, would prove to be a serious blow to their hopes for a Sino-American partnership that could preserve Chinese independence and block Japan’s ambitions in Manchuria. Instead, the Root-Takahira Agreement seemed to indicate that maintaining American-Japanese amity took precedence over maintaining the territorial integrity of China. It may well have seemed that the Open Door was closing. The process began during the summer of 1905, as the world awaited the upcoming peace conference scheduled to take place between Japan and Russia. The secretary of war, William Howard Taft, was preparing to sail for the Far East. Taft’s primary mission was to accompany a group of congressmen on a fact-finding tour of the Philippines. However, Taft had also been in165

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structed by Roosevelt to make a stopover in Japan in order to pay his compliments to the Japanese. 1 The fact that the president had sent Taft to visit Japan at such a sensitive time is a strong indicator of his pro-Japanese sentiments. Roosevelt was aware that Taft’s visit was likely to cause bad feelings among the Russian people and government, who were unlikely to understand the nature of the call. 2 The president did not cancel the scheduled trip, but he did instruct the American minister to Japan, Lloyd C. Griscom, to advise the Japanese emperor that “Secretary Taft’s visit should be as informal a character as possible” due to Russia’s sensitivity over the matter. Taft was permitted to accept the emperor’s invitation and stay at the Imperial Palace, however. 3 It is likely that the Japanese attached more significance to Taft’s visit than either the president or the war secretary anticipated. The Japanese were aware that Taft had added the burdens of the State Department to his other duties while Roosevelt had been away from Washington earlier in the year. The breakdown of John Hay’s health and his subsequent death had led Roosevelt to assume many of the secretary of state’s duties personally, and he passed them on to Taft whenever he was out of town. Departing on a hunting trip in April, the president had left the faithful, rotund Taft “sitting on the lid” as acting secretary of state. 4 The Japanese may well have believed that such a trusted official of the American government might be empowered to conduct some serious bargaining over the ultimate peace terms with Russia, as well as the Philippines, immigration issues, and China. The Japanese greeted Taft warmly when he arrived in late July and quickly drew him into diplomatic conversations in which he attempted to explain U.S. policy. 5 The most significant meeting took place on July 27, 1905, between Taft and Prime Minister Katsura Taro, who also held the portfolio for foreign affairs. Katsura initiated the discussion, and while Taft was reluctant to enter into the conversation because he had no instructions authorizing him to do so it seemed easier to go on with the dialogue than to refuse to do so. 6 The lengthy talk consisted of three major topics. The question of the Philippines was broached first by Taft, who expressed the opinion that Japan’s real interest in the islands was to have a strong, friendly power such as the United States governing them rather than some hostile nation, or to place them under native rule when they were not yet ready for self-government. Katsura assured Taft that Japan had no aggressive designs toward the Philippines. The prime minister then stated that the “maintenance of general peace in the extreme East forms the fundamental principle of Japan’s international policy.” Katsura went on to say that he felt the best way to assure peace was to form a “good understanding” or an alliance “in principle if not in name” between Japan, Great Britain, and the United States. Taft replied that an alliance was impossible for the United States to enter into without the consent of the Senate. While his answer was technically correct, apparently the

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secretary of war either forgot or ignored the traditional American principle of avoiding entangling alliances. Taft went on to say that the interests of the United States were so close to those of the British and Japanese “that without any agreement at all” the United States could be counted upon to support both nations in the maintenance of peace in the Far East. The third issue, which was raised by Katsura, was Korea and Japan’s desire to take some step that would keep it from being dragged into a war over that region. This was a somewhat spurious comment, since it was clear that the war with Russia was as much about Korea as it was Manchuria, although it may have reflected Japanese fears of a repetition of the “triple intervention” of 1895, which had kept Japan from gaining a sphere of influence in southern Manchuria. If Taft took note of the former, he blithely ignored it and expressed “his personal opinion” that the United States would not object to Japanese suzerainty over Korea, but he could give no official assurance of this, as he had no “mandate” to do so from the president. 7 After the discussion had concluded, a memorandum was drawn up and copies were given to each party, both of whom agreed the document was accurate. Neither party signed it and no indication that a formal agreement had been reached as a result of the conversation was given. The text of the memorandum noted only that certain viewpoints had been exchanged in the course of the discussion. 8 Taft’s hesitancy to enter into the conversation and his concern that he might have overstepped his bounds was evident in his report to the new secretary of state, Elihu Root. “If I have spoken too freely or inaccurately or unwittingly,” Taft cabled, “I know you can and will correct it. Do not want to Butt [sic] in, but under the circumstances difficult to avoid statement and so told truth as I believe it.” 9 Still concerned about his actions, Taft also telegraphed the president, informing Roosevelt of his report to Root. Taft’s uncertainty about whether or not he had behaved correctly was again evident: I sent Mr. Root . . . a long cable concerning a conversation I had with Count Katsura. They were anxious that it should be sent and I did not know but it might help you in your conference with Komura [the Japanese delegate to the Portsmouth conference]. They sought the interview. I did not because I did not wish to “butt into” the affairs of the State Department, but they probably thought it important because I had some relation with State Department business. 10

Roosevelt replied promptly reassured his apprehensive cabinet member that he had done well. “Your conversation with Count Katsura absolutely correct in every respect,” wired the president, “wish you would state to Katsura that I confirm every word you have said.” 11 In a later missive to Taft Roosevelt noted, “Our position could not have been stated with greater accuracy.” 12

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Any discussion of the Philippine Islands in Taft’s conversation with the Japanese was only natural. Taft had served as governor-general there, and in his present capacity as secretary of war the islands came under his administration. There was some legitimate concern regarding the territory on the part of both Roosevelt and Taft because pro-Russian elements in American were claiming that Japan’s victory over Russia was just a prelude to Japanese aggression aimed at the Philippines. 13 Katsura’s disclaimer of any aggressive intent undoubtedly was a welcome reassurance to Roosevelt and Taft of Japan’s goodwill. The amicable stance on the part of the Japanese leader may also have had some influence on Roosevelt’s actions at Portsmouth three weeks later, when the president’s mediation broke a deadlock between the Russian and Japanese negotiators and brought about a settlement. It has been suggested that Roosevelt’s course of action might have been different had he not received Katsura’s assurances that Japan had no designs on American territory in the Far East. 14 However, there is no proof that Roosevelt would have acted differently without Japan’s pledge of disinterest in regard to the Philippines. Following the signing of the Portsmouth treaty, in which Russia recognized Japanese interests in Korea, Japan acted swiftly to consolidate its position there. 15 In November the State Department was informed that Japan was sending Marquis Ito Hirobumi “to investigate conditions and develop Japanese policy in Korea.” The report further stated that it was “most probable” that Ito would arrange “that the foreign relations of Korea shall be conducted in future at Tokio [Tokyo].” 16 Ito’s trip resulted in the Japan-Korea Convention of November 17, 1905, in which Korea ceded to Japan the authority to conduct its foreign relations. 17 As Taft had correctly surmised, the Roosevelt administration gave quick approval to the Japanese action. On November 24 the United States agreed to withdraw its legation from Seoul, thereby recognizing Korea’s acquiescence to Japan. 18 The decision to withdraw may have been the result of a telegram two weeks earlier from Rockhill. The American minister reported a conversation he had with a Japanese official who had informed him that Japan would not request the powers to withdraw their legations from the Korean capital. However, the official added, should Roosevelt see fit to withdraw the American legation “the Japanese will consider it proof of great friendship.” 19 The swift response of the American government brought warm expressions of pleasure from Japan. The fact that the United States had been the first nation to remove its diplomatic outpost from Korea led the Japanese to consider the step “a very graceful and friendly act.” One newspaper called the action “another instance of America’s friendship and good will to our country.” 20 Roosevelt had made Taft’s reluctant pronouncements good, but in doing so he indirectly threatened the Open Door in China. Given proof that the United States was willing to accede to a Japanese sphere of influence in

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Korea that amounted at the very least to a protectorate, Japan had every right to think that the Roosevelt administration would not object to a Japanese position in Manchuria that was superior to those of the other nations with interests there. The Taft-Katsura memorandum has been interpreted as a secret agreement in which the United States agreed to Japan’s suzerainty in Korea in exchange for a pledge that the Japanese had no aggressive designs on the Philippines. 21 Given the American propensity for soliciting assurances in regard to the maintenance of the Open Door in China, that view would seem reasonable. While also emphasizing the secrecy involved, particularly the fact the memorandum was only discovered nearly twenty years later in Roosevelt’s papers, Walter LaFeber goes a step further and characterizes the memorandum as an executive agreement, one of the first “made by a president on his own,” which had the advantage of allowing Roosevelt to avoid any potentially embarrassing ratification debates in the Senate. Morris supports this view, arguing that executive privilege made it unnecessary for legislators in either Japan or the United States to ratify or even be informed of it. 22 Another view holds that Roosevelt exchanged Japanese control of Korea for that nation’s recognition of American interests in the Philippines, without consulting the Senate. Doing so was an example of his imperial presidency in the conduct of foreign relations. 23 Since Korea was already in Japan’s possession this seems doubtful as the United States was not likely to take steps to force Japan to surrender what it had won. Moreover, Japan’s humiliation at the hands of Russia, France, and Germany in the “triple intervention” of 1895, would almost certainly mean that Japan would continue fighting rather than give up Korea. American approval of the Japanese conquest of Korea would seem to be irrelevant. Japan was not going to leave Korea under any circumstances, and Roosevelt knew it. Other explanations argue that the memorandum was not a secret deal at all, but they differ in their views as to the real meaning of the document. 24 The record seems to indicate that the principals themselves did not consider the conversation had led to an agreement between the two nations, but it is difficult to place an exact interpretation on the true meaning of the document that was produced. Because the memorandum was never made public and there is an apparent quid pro quo element in the clauses referring to the Philippines and Korea, it is easy to see why the document has the appearance of an agreement of some sort. However there is no indication that Roosevelt interpreted the words of the secretary of war as a bargain with Japan. A few weeks after the conclusion of the Portsmouth conference, Griscom reported from Tokyo that rumors were floating about Japan to the effect that a deal had been struck between Japan and America. According to Griscom it appeared that a newspaper, the Kokumin Shimbun, was responsible for the story. Griscom pointed out that the paper was a government organ, which

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implied that the story might have been leaked, and that it claimed a “Japanese-Anglo-American alliance” had been formed, although the United States was not bound by any treaty obligations. Griscom also reported rumors of a bargain whereby Japan disavowed any designs on the Philippines in return for American approval for a Japanese protectorate in Korea. 25 Roosevelt took a different view in regard to the alleged “bargain.” Griscom’s reports needed no reply, the president told Taft, but if they did, a sufficient answer “would be that we neither ask nor give any favor to anyone as a reward for not meddling with any American territory. We are entirely competent to prevent such meddling, and require no guaranty of assistance to preserve our territorial integrity.” 26 Roosevelt further clarified his interpretation two days later: The statement about the Philippines was merely to clear up Japan’s attitude, which had purposely been misrepresented by pro-Russian sympathizers and is shown to have been entirely apart from your statements—that is, our statements—in reference to Korea and in reference to our having the same interests with Japan and Great Britain in preserving the peace of the Orient. 27

The president then complained to Baron Takahira, the Japanese minister to the United States. A few days later, Katsura telegraphed a denial that the Kokumin article was based on information received from the government. Moreover, Katsura told Roosevelt that the Japanese government appreciated the friendly attitude of the United States regarding its position in Korea and that it realized the American attitude was not the result of a bargain between the two nations. Katsura, in effect, was endorsing Roosevelt’s view. 28 It is entirely possible that the rumors were the result of leaks from the Japanese government. The failure of the Japanese to secure an indemnity from Russia in the Portsmouth talks had angered a large segment of the Japanese populace, and the government was under heavy attack. The Japanese leaders might have leaked the Taft-Katsura memorandum to the press in the hope it would be interpreted as an agreement that could be seen as a diplomatic success offsetting the government’s “failure” in the peace negotiations. The Japanese cabinet might even have viewed the memorandum as a de facto agreement that should be made public. In either case, the rumors that appeared may have been the result of the cabinet’s efforts to deflect public criticism directed at them for their futile attempt to secure an indemnity as part of the peace settlement. If so, the weakness of such a position quickly became evident when Roosevelt protested and Katsura confirmed the American viewpoint. It was not a complete victory for the president, however. Katsura did accede to the American point of view, but he did so privately. Nor was there any official denial of the rumors, although Katsura repudiated the assertion that his government had provided information to the press. 29

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Taft’s reports to Root and Roosevelt indicate he did not travel to Japan with instructions to make any kind of a deal with Tokyo. Moreover, his accounts do not suggest that an agreement had been negotiated as a result of his conversation with Katsura. Taft noted that the Japanese had wanted to talk; he was reluctant to do so but could not find a way to avoid the meeting. Taft was clearly uncertain as to whether he had done the right thing, or that he had stated American policy correctly. He was hopeful that the State Department would correct any errors on his part. There were no written instructions regarding what to say to the Japanese in the event he was pressed for statements regarding American policy in the Far East by Japanese officials, nor are there any records of verbal instructions. While evidence is lacking that Roosevelt had briefed Taft on his viewpoints regarding Asia, Taft’s stint as acting secretary of state would certainly have left him well acquainted with the president’s feelings and thoughts on the subject if he was not already aware of them. Taft undoubtedly left Japan believing that in his talk with Katsura he had done no more than utter frank statements about American policy in the Far East, as he understood it. The secretary of war did not believe he had concluded an agreement of any kind between the two nations. 30 Nor did Taft’s statements in regard to Korea reflect any major shift in United States policy toward that country by any means. He merely reiterated a viewpoint that accurately reflected the sentiments of Roosevelt; feelings the president had held for some time. Roosevelt had long thought that the Koreans were unable to govern themselves properly and it would be best to let Japan take over the country, govern it efficiently, and preserve law and order. 31 At the same time, the president was interested in maintaining a balance in the power relationships in the Far East. The rising power of Japan was meant to act as a counterweight to Russian strength in Asia. A refusal to recognize Japanese suzerainty in Korea would seriously strain JapaneseAmerican relations, which were essentially friendly, and could undermine that cordiality altogether. Even more worrisome was that Japan might move closer to Russia and seek reconciliation should relations with the United States be damaged. This was a possibility that Roosevelt greatly feared. 32 Given Roosevelt’s feelings about Korea and his desire to have Japanese strength balance Russia’s in Asia, United States acquiescence to a Japanese protectorate in Korea was not surprising, and Roosevelt could have done very little about it anyway, even if he had felt differently. Twenty-five years later, Root stated that: “There was nothing we could do except fight Japan; Congress wouldn’t have declared war and the people would have turned out the Congress that had. All we might have done was to make threats which we could not carry out.” 33 Root may have been guilty of rationalizing American policy, however. In 1916, the former secretary of state commented, “. . . it was better for the people of Korea, who were not governing themselves, to be

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Taft leaving Yokohama. Source: Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division Washington, D.C., 1905.

incorporated in the liberal and progressive Empire of Japan than to remain the puppets of the absurd, old opera bouffe emperor.” 34 The United States might not have been able to act in order to preserve Korean independence, but that made little difference as the Roosevelt administration obviously did not care to do anything. “We cannot possibly interfere for the Koreans against Japan,” Roosevelt wrote to Hay late in January of 1905, “they couldn’t strike one blow in their own defense.” 35 In another letter to Hay a few days later, the president added: “Japan ought to have a protectorate over Korea (which has shown an utter inability to stand by itself).” 36 As Japan prepared to place Korea under its suzerainty, the Korean emperor sent a lengthy letter in secret to Roosevelt in which he made an impassioned plea to the president to use his influence with Japan to prevent it from taking over Korea’s foreign affairs. 37 Roosevelt told Root that because the letter had been sent in secret and that the Korean representatives to the United States knew nothing about it, it would not be possible to treat the document as an official communication. Additionally, the United States had been informed that Korea had arranged to allow Japan to secure control over its foreign policy. “All things considered, I do not see that any practical action on the letter is open to us,” Roosevelt concluded. 38 Taft appears to have shared the views of Roosevelt and Root, noting in March 1905 that

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Japan would have its hands full peopling Korea following the war with Russia. 39 Korea’s fate was, most likely, a foregone conclusion by the time Taft and Katsura had their conversation. The dialogue between Taft and Katsura is somewhat similar to points raised in a luncheon conversation that took place in June 1904 between Roosevelt, Baron Takahira Kogoro, Japan’s minister to the United States, and Roosevelt’s Harvard classmate, Baron Kaneko Kantaro. In that discussion the two Japanese told the president that any aspirations their nation might have regarding the Philippines was “nonsense.” In response to Roosevelt’s statement that he hoped Japan would help bring China along the path their nation was presently traveling, although he felt the Japanese would have a difficult time mastering the Chinese character, the two men merely smiled and replied that they were quite aware of the difficulty they would have in Korea alone and were satisfied with that job. 40 Roosevelt had no problem with the Japanese attitude. In April 1905, the president told Takahira that he had no objections to Japan’s acquisition of Korea along with Port Arthur, Dalien (Dalny), and the Harbin-Port Arthur Railroad. 41 The Taft-Katsura discussion merely reiterated the American position regarding Korea. At the same time Katsura repeated what Roosevelt had been told a year before: Japan had no designs on the Philippines. There was no quid pro quo agreement but simply a repetition of positions that had been expressed before. Katsura’s suggestion of an alliance was in agreement with Roosevelt’s personal feelings, but he knew all too well that the Senate would never approve, if for no other reason than the traditional isolationist opposition to alliances. 42 However, Taft’s statement that the United States could be counted upon to help Great Britain and Japan preserve the peace of the Orient was right in line with Roosevelt’s policy of maintaining a posture of friendship to preserve the balance of power in Asia and to prevent a Japanese reconciliation with Russia. If he could not enter into a formal alliance with the British and Japanese, Roosevelt could at least work toward an informal coalition to maintain the Asian balance of power as he thought it should be. Therefore the president readily endorsed Taft’s remarks on the subject as unhesitatingly as he sanctioned the elements of the conversation regarding Korea and the Philippines. Therefore, the Taft-Katsura “agreement” was not a formal agreement but an exchange of viewpoints, which the two sides had stated to each other previously. Neither Roosevelt nor Taft interpreted the conversation as an agreement and the Japanese accepted this view, at least publicly. Moreover, neither side made any statements that would place them under obligation to the other or that would give the other specific legal rights. Thus, under international law, no formal agreement had been made. At best, it was morally binding, but it was unenforceable. 43

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If not a formal agreement, the discussion may have provided the basis for a tacit understanding. Certainly the United States approved the Japanese takeover of Korea’s foreign relations. Japan was aware of this and acted quickly to establish a protectorate over Korea following the signing of the Treaty of Portsmouth. Japan may have felt it could act so quickly because of Taft’s comments to Katsura and Roosevelt’s subsequent endorsement. Roosevelt was assured in return that there was nothing to fear in the way of Japanese aggression in the direction of the Philippines, and presumably, the Hawaiian Islands. Furthermore, there was the understanding that each nation had an interest in preserving peace in the Far East and that they could work together, at least informally, to maintain that state of affairs. No obligations had been made, however, so that each nation remained free to apply its own interpretation to the conversation as it saw fit or to change its policy if it felt compelled to do so. Morris believes that because the memorandum was “agreed on, not agreed to,” and was binding only in a moral sense, it was “plainly an informal declaration of intent regarding the security concerns of Japan in East Asia, and of the United States in the eastern Pacific.” 44 That may be as good an explanation as any of the Taft-Katsura “agreement.” It should be kept in mind, however, that the encounter dealt with topics that had been discussed in an unofficial setting a year before. With the peace talks at hand, it may well be that Katsura sought the opportunity to meet with Taft in order to reassure himself that American views regarding Japan’s role in Asia had not changed over the past year. If that was the case, Katsura was not disappointed. However informal the arrangement, it still threatened the concept of the Open Door in China. Roosevelt had hinted to the Japanese that he would approve, indeed that he expected, a strong Japanese role in China’s development and guidance into the twentieth century. Roosevelt believed Japan should have control over certain parts of Manchuria, and that it should have Korea as well. These feelings worked to undermine the principle of China’s territorial integrity. In order to guard its hold on Korea, Japan would have to secure the portion of Manchuria it had received as a result of the war with Russia and keep a relatively unchallenged position there. Roosevelt had intimated that the United States would not object too strenuously to such an occurrence. After the Russo-Japanese War and the signing of the peace, the only American protests about Japanese actions in Manchuria centered on the protection of commercial rights that were secured by treaty. Although Japan did return the administration of Korea to China, agreements with Russia, Britain, and France solidified recognition of its special position in China and the United States voiced no objection to them. Nor did the Roosevelt administration support plans that might have solidified China’s position, at least financially, in Manchuria. From the Japanese viewpoint it must have seemed that Roosevelt was amenable to a sphere of influence for Japan in Manchuria

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as long as American trading interests, such as they were, were not seriously interfered with. Again the Roosevelt administration failed to distinguish the conflict between the ideals of the Open Door and acquiescence to a sphere of influence in territory China claimed for itself. Chinese territorial integrity was being compromised in order to safeguard American trade in the Orient. At the time of the Taft-Katsura conversation, Japanese-American relations were amicable, but storm clouds were beginning to appear on the horizon. Relations between the two nations would, over the next two years or so, be strained to the point where speculation arose regarding the possibility of war between them both in Europe and among jingoistic elements in each. While the subject of Manchuria contributed to the war scare, the most serious issue centered once again upon the questions of race and labor as the immigration of Japanese laborers to the American west coast sparked a crisis. The problem was finally resolved in the Gentlemen’s Agreements of 1907–1908, and the talk of war soon died down. 45 As war rumors abated in the first part of 1908, both governments began to take steps to reaffirm the amity that had been strained over the past two years. The first step was taken on May 5, with the signing of an arbitration treaty. The terms of the agreement bound the United States and Japan to refer disputes of a legal nature or regarding the interpretation of treaties to the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague. 46 Following the arbitration treaty, two pacts regarding trademark protection for both nations in Korea and China were signed on May 19. 47 Three days later, Congress passed a resolution accepting Japan’s invitation for the American government and people to take part in a national exposition scheduled to be held in Tokyo in 1912. In the resolution, Congress declared it to be the purpose of the United States to participate in the event “by erecting suitable buildings and making an appropriate exhibit of arts, industries, manufactures, and products of the soil and mines” along with whatever else the president might direct to be displayed. The sum of $1.5 million was appropriated to pay for official exhibits. 48 Another signal came in the autumn as the American battleship fleet, on its global voyage, visited Japan. The fleet had been sent on its cruise in December 1907, as the immigration crisis was approaching final resolution. While the voyage ostensibly was described as a goodwill voyage, Roosevelt wanted to demonstrate that the battleships could move easily from the Atlantic to the Pacific in the event of hostilities there. The president also intended the voyage to serve as a display of strength to impress those Japanese who were angry over the immigration issue and who talked of war with America. However, the voyage confirmed an earlier report indicating American ports in the Pacific were inadequate to service the fleet under wartime conditions. The ability of the navy to act unilaterally in Asia, let alone defend the Philip-

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pines was now in doubt. Ultimately, Roosevelt would have to draw the American defense perimeter back to Hawaii. 49 A few months after the journey had begun, the Japanese government extended an invitation for the fleet to call at a Japanese port. Roosevelt accepted and the fleet arrived in Yokohama on October 18, where it was accorded a tumultuous welcome. The warm hospitality of the Japanese was highly appreciated not only by the sailors and officers who were the recipients, but also by Americans at home as well. Roosevelt would later refer to the fleet’s reception by the Japanese as the “most noteworthy incident of the cruise.” 50 Slightly more than a month later, Japan and the United States reaffirmed their traditional friendship through an exchange of notes by the secretary of state and the Japanese minister. The Root-Takahira Agreement, as the exchange became known, was implemented on November 30, 1908. 51 The Root-Takahira Agreement was actually based on a proposal suggested more than a year earlier by Viscount Aoki Shuzo, then Japanese ambassador. Concerned by all the talk of war, Aoki determined to take some sort of step to end the rumors. Acting solely on his own authority, the ambassador approached Roosevelt and outlined three points he believed might serve as the basis for some sort of an agreement. Aoki’s first point called for control of the Pacific as an international highway of commerce, in an effort to negate the presumed fear that Japan or the United States might seek to attain control of that ocean. Secondly, Aoki asked for respect of the territorial rights of each nation and the maintenance of the existing order of things in the Pacific area. Finally, the ambassador’s last proposal called for maintenance of the Open Door in China and its territorial integrity. Roosevelt was highly interested in Aoki’s proposal and suggested that the second point specifically mention Hawaii, the Philippines, and Formosa (Taiwan), but Aoki was reluctant to be that specific. 52 At Roosevelt’s urging, Aoki telegraphed the foreign ministry in Tokyo and described what he had done. Unfortunately for the ambassador, his government did not share his or Roosevelt’s enthusiasm. Foreign Minister Hayashi Tadasu responded negatively to the telegram a few days later. Although the foreign minister admitted that Japan was fully in accord with Aoki’s views, the principle of the Open Door had been repeatedly affirmed in the agreements with Russia and France. Furthermore, the minister reminded Aoki, Japan had repeatedly assured the United States that it had no designs on the Philippines. Hayashi went on to say that an agreement was unnecessary, first because Japan believed in the peaceful nature of the United States, secondly because the agreement would add credence to the rumors of the yellow press and create the impression—by disavowing aggressive intentions that did not exist—that a crisis of some sort was being covered up. Rather than mollify public sentiment, such an agreement might aggravate it.

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The crux of the matter, however, was the immigration issue. This problem could not yet be resolved satisfactorily, but to ignore it completely would be regarded as an attempt to gloss over the issue. This would not prove reassuring, but disappointing, and might be thought of as suspicious. While both governments should do all they could to disperse any belief that ill feelings existed between them, time would serve to rectify the situation. The chagrined Aoki sent three lengthy cables to Tokyo in an attempt to change Hayashi’s mind, but to no avail. Some five weeks later, Aoki was recalled and, in January 1908, Takahira returned to Washington as Japan’s new ambassador. 53 Now, with the fall of 1908 approaching, conditions had changed. The war scare had died out, the immigration issue had been resolved for the time being, the fleet had been invited to visit Japan, three treaties had been negotiated and signed, and the United States had cordially accepted Japan’s invitation to take part in the 1912 exposition. Furthermore, the government led by Prime Minister Saionji, which had included Hayashi, had been swept from office over the summer. Now under the leadership of Katsura, the new cabinet was eager to get American-Japanese relations back on an even keel. On October 14, the journalist John Callan O’Laughlin, who was in Tokyo as secretary of the U.S. commission for the exposition, cabled Roosevelt that Foreign Minister Komura was interested in reviving Aoki’s proposal. 54 In a letter written three days earlier, O’Laughlin explained that the change of heart was due to the “earnest representations of Aoki.” Additionally, Katsura was anxious to give “some striking indication of the friendly relations” between the two nations. 55 Katsura and Komura must have been aware that O’Laughlin was more than just a friend of the president’s, as they gave him other interviews anticipating that their sentiments would be passed on to the White House. Their expectations came to fruition. O’Laughlin wrote to Roosevelt on October 20, relating a two-hour conversation with Katsura. “There is no question in my mind,” O’Laughlin wrote, “that both Marquis Katsura and Minister Komura desire that something . . . be accomplished in order tangibly to demonstrate that there is real ground for the friendship between the two countries and also to remove all shadow of suspicion that Japan has designs on American territory.” Katsura further told O’Laughlin that Japanese interests demanded the integrity of China and the Open Door along with an American interest to counterbalance European interests there. Japan wanted the United States to hold on to the Philippines in order to assure its continued interest in the Far East, although Japan would not allow any other power to have them should America decide to give them up. Katsura then stated that Japan would allow the United States to regulate Japanese immigration if legislation permitting the naturalization of Japanese was enacted. Japan, the prime minister said, wanted its people to emigrate to Manchuria and Korea, and if the United

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Baron Takahira Kogoro. Source: Louisiana Purchase Exposition (1904: Saint Louis, Mo.), St. Louis Public Library.

States would permit the naturalization of Japanese there would be no question regarding their immigration to America. Finally, Katsura assured O’Laughlin that Japan had no plans for war with the United States. 56 O’Laughlin also passed on a memorandum of a conversation with Komura, dated October 21. The major points of this discussion included the statement that Japan did not covet Chinese territory. Japan, Komura said, had no real interest in Mongolia, but did regard south Manchuria as its outer line of

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defense. Moreover, the Japanese were not without fear that a future Russian government might go to war with them. South Manchuria was described as a “sphere of interest” rather than influence, and the Open Door was to be upheld even though Japan did not regard Manchuria as a part of China. Komura also claimed that Japan wanted its population to remain in Asia, but could not permit any affront to its dignity by the restriction of Japanese immigration by any other power. Japan would curb the emigration of its people in order to prove that it could do so, and if Japan could control the flow of its people to America then there would be no need for the United States to consider restrictions. Komura closed the discussion with a statement that the two powers together could control the Pacific. 57 O’Laughlin concluded that Japan would be the real problem in Asia for the United States, but that it desired friendly relations with America. He counseled Roosevelt to keep the fleet strong so that the nation could continue to wield real influence in the Far East. 58 On October 26, the day after the American battleships sailed from Japan, Takahira, on the instructions of Tokyo, opened negotiations by presenting Roosevelt with a draft of a proposed agreement containing the substance of Aoki’s original proposals. Roosevelt favored the idea of an accord but replied to Takahira that any decision would have to be deferred until Root, who was out of town, returned to Washington. Root was back two weeks later, and Takahira immediately arranged to confer with him. Root’s immediate concern was over the form the proposed agreement would take. He preferred an informal agreement that would not require the consent of the Senate; to this view Takahira acquiesced. 59 Root then took up the question of the agreement itself. The first point of the Japanese draft declared that both nations were firmly resolved to preserve their territorial possessions intact. Root explained his objection to the phrase in a note to Takahira: The fact of asserting a firm resolve to preserve intact our own territorial possessions might be regarded as indicating the existence of some question on that subject which, of course, has never existed and there is in our case a possibility of misunderstanding which I am desirous to avoid. Many of our people are desirous that at some time in the future more or less complete autonomy shall be given to the Philippines. A declaration of our firm resolve to preserve intact our possession of the Philippines might be construed as a declaration negativing that contingency. I hardly think that the value of such a declaration would be great enough to counter-balance such a possibility of misunderstanding. 60

Root suggested the phrase “They are accordingly firmly resolved to scrupulously respect the territorial possessions belonging to each other” as a substi-

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tute. Takahira accepted this wording with exchange of “reciprocally” for “scrupulously.” 61 The next point to come under consideration dealt with the integrity and administrative entity of China. Takahira’s draft differed from Aoki’s in that it contained no reference regarding the territorial integrity of China. This omission was pointed out by Willard Straight, who, on his return from Manchuria, had assumed the duties of acting chief of the Far Eastern Division at State. Straight noted that Japan’s three treaties with Britain, France, and Russia all referred to China’s territorial integrity. Subscription to an agreement that did not confirm American support to the principles of the Open Door “would be a severe blow to American prestige in the Orient” and consent to such exclusion would be interpreted as an indication of weakness on the part of the United States. Straight was opposed to any agreement with Japan, anyway, which was hardly surprising given his antipathy toward that nation. He argued that an accord with the Japanese would place both China and Germany further outside the network of agreements, conventions, and ententes regarding the Far East; therefore the United States would be acting in a manner calculated to offend them. China would be especially suspicious of any agreement that appeared to put the United States morally on the side of Japan. 62 Root dismissed Straight’s opposition, other than to suggest that the parties declare their intention to “exercise their influence to maintain the territorial integrity and administrative entity of China, in accordance with the policy frequently declared by both of them.” 63 Root made his recommendation on November 11. Three days later, Takahira informed the Secretary of State of his government’s reaction. Japan was willing to guarantee the territorial integrity of China, but not its administrative entity as such an assurance would be in conflict with Japan’s leased rights in Manchuria and along the South Manchurian Railway. Japan also preferred to avoid the phrase “territorial integrity” as it might be offensive to the Chinese, but would accept the wording if the United States insisted. If such phrasing was to be used, then Japan preferred to modify the statement to read similarly to a clause the Japanese had used in earlier agreements: “. . . and to exercise their influence to maintain the independence and territorial integrity of China.” Ultimately the two nations agreed on language that bound them both “to preserve the common interest of all powers in China by supporting by all pacific means at their disposal the independence and integrity of China and the principle of equal opportunity for commerce and industry of all nations in that Empire.” 64 A potential complication arose when the State Department considered introducing the Harbin dispute into the negotiations. However, it soon became obvious that any attempt to deal with the question within the framework of the proposed agreement would bring about the collapse of the talks, and any attempt to deal face to face with Japan on the Manchurian issues was

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set aside. A few more revisions in the draft of the agreement were made and the pact, in its final form, was implemented through an exchange of notes on November 30, 1908. 65 The final agreement read as follows: 1. It is the wish of the two Governments to encourage the free and peaceful development of their commerce on the Pacific Ocean. 2. The policy of both Governments, uninfluenced by any aggressive tendencies, is directed to the maintenance of the existing status quo in the region above mentioned and to the defense of the principle of equal opportunity of commerce and industry in China. 3. They are equally firmly resolved reciprocally to respect the territorial possessions belonging to each other in said region. 4. They are also determined to preserve the common interest by supporting by all pacific means at their disposal the independence and integrity of China and the principle of equal opportunity for commerce and industry of all nations in that Empire. 5. Should any event occur threatening the status quo as above described or the principle of equal opportunity above defined, it remains for the two Governments to communicate with each other in order to arrive at an understanding as to what measures they may consider it useful to take. 66

The final form of the notes had been completed by November 21. On that date Root telegraphed Rockhill the final draft with word that the exchange of notes would take place “shortly.” The American minister was instructed to inform the Chinese government “immediately” of the agreement. Root then summed up the rationale for the accord. “The Imperial Government of China will appreciate the fact that this action by the United States is the logical fruit of our traditional and frequently enunciated policy of friendly interest in and concern regarding the welfare of the Chinese Empire, and has been prompted by our desire to reaffirm that policy by gaining a renewed definite and particular assurance of adherence thereto.” The State Department considered the declaration should be “peculiarly satisfactory to the Imperial Government at this time.” 67 Rockhill was advised of the exchange of notes on December 3. “A copy of the text was given to Tang Shaoyi, to whom the Secretary explained its signification.” The Chinese Legation was informed at the same time. 68 Root’s expectation that the Chinese would appreciate the American action proved to be incorrect. Although China did accept the agreement, it did so after an initial expression of disappointment and irritation. Rockhill showed the advance copy of the agreement to Yuan Shikai, who became upset and agitated. Yuan asked whether the intended exchange of notes would take place if China objected. Apparently startled at Yuan’s demeanor, and failing to realize China might be suspicious of the agreement, the minister was likewise surprised to discover that the Chinese might have a complaint.

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Nonetheless, he advised Yuan the exchange would probably take place anyway. Yuan was also irritated by the fact Washington had not awaited the arrival of Tang Shaoyi before entering into an accord with Japan. However, after reflecting on the situation overnight, the Chinese official informed Rockhill the next day that the agreement was now regarded as beneficial to China. 69 It appears the Chinese swallowed their distaste for the JapaneseAmerican action and acquiesced to it, having little recourse but to do so. At least one Chinese newspaper expressed indignation, however. A Beijing newspaper wondered how the Japanese would rage if China and some other power agreed to protect the independence and integrity of Japan, adding, “When a country comes to ruin quickly men are easily moved and become excited; but when the decline is gradual men get accustomed to the conditions and do not perceive anything. Many great powers are arrayed against our country; so they keep up an appearance of concord, but it will not stop with three or four treaties.” 70 Reaction elsewhere to the agreement was generally good. The American press received word of the agreement cordially, the view taken that the exchange of notes was a final blow to warmongers and a logical outcome of the voyage of the battleship fleet. A few papers were apprehensive about the agreement, mostly out of concern that the exchange of notes had committed the United States to an entangling alliance with Japan. The Japanese likewise welcomed the exchange, although some dissatisfaction was expressed regarding the failure of the notes to refer to the immigration issue. Ito Hirobumi considered the agreement “relative to the open door as of the greatest importance ‘at this particular moment,’” Thomas Sammons wired to the State Department. A statement from Hayashi that the Root-Takahira notes had nothing new in them and merely formalized what was previously understood drew Ito’s disapproval, and the former prime minister emphasized the importance and desirability of the agreement. 71 In Europe the development was applauded, even in Germany where antiJapanese feelings ran high. For the kaiser and his foreign office the RootTakahira Agreement was the final blow shattering a dream of an entente with the United States and China to offset the understandings between Britain, France, and Russia. Any disappointment that was felt was well concealed, however, and the foreign office declared the agreement to be in complete accord with Germany’s Far Eastern policy. The British, French, and Russians, as could have been expected, greeted the diplomatic exchange with warm satisfaction. 72 Meanwhile, back in Washington two voices rose in protest. Both Straight and Wilson, who was now third assistant secretary of state, remained opposed to the agreement. Straight summed it up as “a terrible diplomatic blunder to be laid at the door of T.R.” 73 In Wilson’s view, “Here was the old policy of unreality and fine words—words insincere on the part of Japan.” 74

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Moreover, both men viewed the arrangement as a Japanese coup directed at forestalling a Chinese-American agreement. Straight, it will be recalled, was deep in his plan to secure a loan for the Manchurian bank project and saw Japanese policy toward Manchuria as an attempt to take over the region just as had been done in Korea. In an attempt to block Japan in Manchuria, Straight was trying to increase American commercial development there. Wilson, who likewise had little regard for the Japanese, was supportive of Straight’s efforts. Therefore it was natural that the duo would perceive the Root-Takahira Agreement as a Japanese effort to thwart their scheme. As Wilson later recalled: The status quo, so slyly alluded to, was, especially in Manchuria, one already painful to China. The object of the Japanese Government was, of course, to try to show the Chinese that Japan and the United States were in friendly accord and that therefore America’s friendship for China could mean nothing. The timing was perfect and the effect was as Japan had planned. Arriving in Washington a few days later, T’ang Shao-yi was profoundly discouraged. 75

However, it must be remembered that the Chinese envoy was already in a position of weakness due to the passing of both the Guangxu emperor and his aunt, the empress dowager. Their deaths had served to weaken the political position of Yuan Shikai, Tang’s chief source of support back home, which added further to and provided greater cause for his discouragement. It also seems unlikely that the Japanese, who must have been aware of the nature of Tang’s mission, 76 entered into the agreement merely to forestall his efforts although that may have contributed in some small degree to their willingness to negotiate the pact. Root, of course, disagreed with the views of Straight and Wilson. My arrangements . . . negatived the special interests of Japan in China. My idea was that both the United States and Japan had rights and interests in China—there was more interest and more occasion for exercise of rights on the part of Japan, but they were the same rights as ours though vastly more important for them than us. 77

Root also believed the agreement was the end result of his policy of treating the Japanese in a friendly and courteous manner. “The friendliness which made the agreement possible was due to no one incident but to a line of conduct over a period of time.” 78 Roosevelt’s impressions of the diplomatic exchange were aired in a letter written three weeks after the event. He was writing in reply to a letter from Arthur Lee, a British friend, who had called the agreement “ a real knock-out for the mischief makers on both sides of the Atlantic.” 79 In his response, Roosevelt said:

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Roosevelt’s correspondence and private papers contain no mention of the negotiations of the Root-Takahira Agreement, so it is impossible to ascertain how much of a part he played in putting the agreement together beyond supporting the original idea. Undoubtedly Root kept the president informed of the progress of the talks, but it is not known if Roosevelt added any suggestions for the wording of the agreement. One thing is abundantly clear. Both Root and Roosevelt were convinced that a policy of friendliness and courtesy toward Japan had led to this preservation of Japanese-American harmony as their nearly identical phrasing suggests. Roosevelt, true to his nature, also, perhaps correctly, credited the cruise of the battleship fleet as having been vital to the process. One author has declared that some scholars have pored over the clauses of the Root-Takahira Agreement “as if they were a Biblical text.” 81 Certainly scholarly examination of the documents has produced a variety of opinions as to the real meaning of and significance of the exchange. Was the agreement “a clever move, because it secured American support for Japanese aggression” in China, 82 or were both governments “motivated primarily by the desire to signalize the Japanese-American rapprochement with a publicity statement that would smooth over the friction of the last two years and silence the war rumors?” 83 Was it simply “little more than a candid acceptance of the facts of life . . .” in the Far East? 84 Much of the controversy centers on the question of Manchuria. Some scholars have taken the position that the Root-Takahira Agreement was a trade in which the Japanese pledged to respect the Philippines in return for a free hand in Manchuria. This interpretation is based on the idea that Japan had granted the United States important concessions by agreeing to restrict the emigration of its people and in the clause of the Root-Takahira notes pledging to respect each other’s territorial possessions in the Pacific, which, from the American standpoint, meant the Philippines and Hawaii. Therefore, the argument goes, it is only natural to assume that the United States granted Japan concessions in return. Pointing out the lack of the qualifying term “territorial” in that section of the notes referring to China’s integrity, and believing that the term “status quo” in the second part refers to the treaty rights of Japan and Manchuria, they have concluded that the American concession to the Japanese was a free hand in Manchuria at the expense of the Open Door principle of maintaining China’s territorial integrity. 85 Another interpretation suggests that the agreement sig-

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naled a lack of American interest regarding any plan on the part of China to challenge the interests of Japan in Manchuria. 86 The notes themselves are sufficiently ambiguous as to allow a broad range of interpretation regarding their exact meaning, particularly as applied to the Japanese presence in Manchuria. The second clause states that both governments were directed to a policy of maintaining the “existing status quo” of the Pacific Ocean region. However, there is no definition of the term “status quo” nor is there any indication of what exactly comprised the boundaries of the region mentioned, or what specific territories are included within. It has been intimated that the mention of China in this clause seems to limit its application to Chinese territory, and that it infers American acquiescence to the status quo as it was at that time in Manchuria. 87 The clause specifically states that both governments have directed their policy “to the defense of the principle of equal opportunity for commerce and industry in China.” If the United States was agreeing to accept the “status quo” in Manchuria, then that condition included the principle of the Open Door, which Japan had pledged itself to defend as well. This could hardly be interpreted as formal consent to a free hand for the Japanese in Manchuria, assuming that the region was even included in the scope of the agreement. The fourth section of the agreement also noted the determination of the two nations to support “by all pacific means” the “independence and integrity” of China along with the standard of equal opportunity for commerce and industry for all nations in China. The failure, if it was such, to include the qualifying term “territorial” in front of “integrity” might be construed as accepting Japan’s desire to control Manchuria and the Japanese view that the area was not a part of China. On the other hand, omission of the term could be viewed as being more favorable to China. 88 Failure to include “territorial,” which Japan had agreed to use in the wording of the notes, would in no way prevent the United States from defending China’s territorial integrity if compelled to do so. Indeed, use of the term “integrity” alone meant that the United States was free to defend the integrity of China along whatever lines it chose, according to how Washington desired to define the word. At the same time, the Japanese could act as they pleased in Manchuria, as long as other businessmen were free to trade there, because nothing had been said about the “territorial integrity” of China. In effect, by wording the notes in an ambiguous manner, both nations had left their options open in regard to Manchuria. Each side was free to interpret the question of China’s integrity as it saw fit, since the area was not specifically mentioned in the text of the agreement. Therefore, Japan could take the position that the agreement sanctioned its policies in Manchuria while the United States was free to agree or not. It all depended on how the two viewed Manchuria and China in regard to those Pacific territories they had vowed to respect.

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American concern for the Open Door, expressed in the efforts of the Roosevelt administration to keep Manchuria from falling completely into the hands of either the Russians or Japanese, suggests the United States was not willing to give Japan, on paper at least, a completely free hand there. The diplomatic pressure placed on both nations by the United States was a reminder that there was also an American interest in both China and Manchuria, minimal as it might be. Roosevelt wanted to retain some semblance of the Open Door in Manchuria, but he was willing to allow Japan to decide just how wide the door should be left open. The treaties and agreements Japan had negotiated with the British, French, and Russians actually left the door little more than slightly ajar, and the president was unwilling to force it open any further in order to avoid antagonizing Japan. Root and Roosevelt’s regard for Japan’s greater interests in Manchuria limited the secretary of state’s protestations regarding the Open Door. Both men formulated American policy in the hope that Japan would not get “the big head,” in Rooseveltian phraseology, and pursue a ruthless and aggressive policy there. Perhaps the best insight into Roosevelt’s thinking can be found in a lengthy letter sent to his friend, the British diplomat Cecil Spring-Rice, in June 1904, more than a year before the Taft-Katsura conversation. Marked “Personal—be very careful that no one gets a chance to see this,” the letter contains a lengthy discussion of the situation in the Far East as well as other matters. Roosevelt opened by stating his immense interest in “the war in the East,” noting “I never anticipated in the least such a rise as this of Japan’s. . . .” The president went on to tell “Springy” about his luncheon (noted earlier in the chapter) with Takahira and Kaneko. 89 Roosevelt said he had warned the two Japanese about the dangers of getting “the big head” and launching “a general career of insolence and aggression.” While doing so might be unpleasant for the rest of the world, “it would in the end be more unpleasant for Japan.” The president went on to say that he hoped Japan would take its place among the great nations. The president remarked that Japan had a “paramount interest in what surrounds the Yellow Sea, just as the United States has a paramount interest in what surrounds the Caribbean.” Roosevelt then noted that both men agreed with him, and then discussed Japan’s own fears of “the Yellow Terror,” referring to the Mongol attempts to invade Japan in the late thirteenth century. Both men assured the president that Japan aspired “to become part of the circle of civilized mankind.” Then the subject of the Philippines and China came up. Of course they earnestly assured me that all talk of the Philippines was nonsense. I told them I was quite sure this was true; that I should certainly do all in my power to avoid giving Japan or any other nation an excuse for aggression; that if aggression came I believed we would be quite competent to defend ourselves. I then said that as far as I was concerned I hoped to see China kept

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Cecil Spring-Rice. Source: Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division Washington, D.C.

together, and would gladly welcome any part played by Japan which would tend to bring China forward along the road which Japan trod, because I thought it for the interest of all the world that each part of the world should be prosperous and well policed; I added that unless everybody was mistaken in the Chinese character I thought they would have their hands full in mastering

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After the Japanese expressed their distrust of the Russians, a feeling Roosevelt shared, the discussion returned to China and Manchuria in particular. It was evident from what the Minister said that their hope is to get the Russians completely out of Manchuria and to turn it over to the Chinese, but he is not sure that the Chinese would be strong enough to support themselves. I said that of course if we could get a Chinese Viceroy able to keep definite order under the guarantee of the Powers in Manchuria, that would be the best outcome; but that I did not know whether this was possible, or whether the powers would even consider such an idea. The Minister was evidently very anxious that there should be a general agreement to guarantee the autonomy of China in Manchuria. 90

This conversation took place just a few months into the Russo-Japanese War, but the outlines of Roosevelt’s thinking about Japan, China, and Manchuria are quite evident. Especially notable is his commentary, in general, about Japan’s interests in the Far East and those of the United States in the Caribbean; a clear reference to the existence of an American sphere of interest in the Western Hemisphere and an allusion that a Japanese sphere of interest in the Far East would be acceptable to the United States.While Kaneko said that Japan’s goal was to remove Russia from Manchuria altogether and then return the region to China, Roosevelt may well have taken that utterance with a grain of salt. Japan had lost access to southern Manchuria when Russia, along with France and Germany, had staged the “triple intervention” during the peace talks at Shimonoseki. Therefore, it would seem reasonable that Japan would want to recover what it had lost in 1895, and Roosevelt might have kept that in mind. In 1906, Roosevelt told his friend and former commanding officer, General Leonard Wood, then serving as governor of Moro Province in the Philippines, “I entirely agree with you that we can retain the Philippines only so long as we have a first-class fighting navy, superior to the navy of any possible opponent.” Roosevelt doubted that the Japanese had any immediate interest in the Philippines because they would be focused on Korea and southern Manchuria for the present. If she attacked us and met disaster, she would lose everything she has gained in the war with Russia; if she attacked us and won, she would make this republic her envenomed and resolute foe for all time, and would, without question speedily lose the alliance with Great Britain and see a coalition between Russia, the United States, and very possibly Germany and France to destroy her in the Far East.

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The Philippines would be safe “for a decade or two, or until the present conditions of international politics change.” 91 Roosevelt had, of course, been among the leading lobbyists for the annexation of the Philippines after the Spanish-American War. His worldview encompassed an expansion of American power into the Pacific Ocean to block the possibility of Germany or Japan gaining control of the Philippines or Hawaii. He certainly felt that the United States should control those islands nearest the American shore, both in the Caribbean and the Pacific. In his defense of American expansion into the Pacific, Roosevelt had argued that the process was simply the continuation of the expansionist impulse that had led Americans across the North American continent. Moreover, the nation could take up the duty and responsibility of bringing civilization and democracy to these lands so as to prepare them for the time when they were fit to govern themselves. Adding his favorite themes of manliness and national honor, Roosevelt succeeded in helping to inspire a national political revival that focused on redefining the rising nation’s destiny as it entered the twentieth century. 92 After becoming president, in the face of the rising power of Japan, Roosevelt eventually began to reconsider the annexation of the Philippines. Perhaps it hadn’t been such a good idea after all. The occupation of the islands had led to a bloody insurrection and serious political scandal. Roosevelt’s letter to Spring-Rice quoted above indicates that he had not anticipated Japan’s emergence to international prominence to take place as quickly as it did. The performance of Japan’s navy, in particular, during the Russo-Japanese War undoubtedly reinforced Roosevelt’s views of the strategic importance of both Hawaii and the Philippine archipelagoes, and the need for a powerful navy to defend them. It is clear that he intended for the latter to be in place. He had made it clear to Takahira and Kaneko that the United States was quite capable of defending its possessions. But having the ability to do so was paramount. A year later, in June 1905, Roosevelt summarized his policy toward Japan. My own policy is perfectly simple, though I have not the slightest idea whether I can get my country to follow it. I wish to see the United States treat the Japanese in the spirit of all possible courtesy, and with generosity and justice. At the same time I wish to see our navy constantly built up and each ship kept at the highest possible point of efficiency as a fighting unit. If we follow this course we shall have no trouble with the Japanese or anyone else. But if we bluster; if we behave rather badly to other nations; if we show that we regard the Japanese as an inferior and alien race, and try to treat them as we have the Chinese; and if at the same time we fail to keep our navy at the highest point of efficiency and size—then we shall invite disaster. 93

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The immigration crisis with Japan, and the resulting war rumors only served to underscore Roosevelt’s thoughts about how best to deal with Japan. The crisis had “caused me more concern that you can imagine,” Roosevelt confessed to Takahira. 94 By the summer of 1907, although the issue had largely been resolved, Roosevelt was still dwelling on the possibility of war with the Japanese, and his attitude showed signs of reconsidering America’s strategic position in the Pacific. “I am more concerned over this Japanese situation than almost any other,” Roosevelt admitted. “Thank heaven we have the navy in good shape.” Sending the battleship fleet on a global cruise “. . . would have a pacific effect to show that it can be done.” 95 Roosevelt even initiated inquiries as to how rapidly battleships could be constructed during wartime. 96 Referring to the Philippines as America’s “heel of Achilles” in a letter to Taft in August, Roosevelt further expressed his concern about the rise of Japan and the potential threat it represented to America’s Pacific possessions. Roosevelt was frustrated that he was unable to make the American people fully understand the nation’s security needs, and he pondered whether or not the Philippines should be granted early independence. However, under no circumstance would the possession be given up as the result of pressure from Japan. It was better that the nation “fight for its life” to keep the islands than surrender them “under duress” to another power. Roosevelt’s vexation is understandable, for it is likely that the nation’s experiences in the international arena to this point had simply not prepared the American people for the role the president envisaged for them. 97 Roosevelt alluded to this in a letter to Spring Rice in 1904, soon after the Russo-Japanese War had begun. “I do not think that the country looks forward to, or concerns itself about, the immense possibilities which the war holds for the future. I suppose democracies will always be shortsighted about anything that is not brought roughly home to them.” 98 The immigration crisis had caused Roosevelt to rethink the possibility of conflict with Japan, and the potential threat that nation posed toward the Philippines. There could be no denying that Japan had joined the ranks of the world’s great powers. Roosevelt continued to believe that his basic approach to American-Japanese relations— treating Japan courteously and justly, as he would the other major powers, while making sure America’s strength was sufficient so as to discourage any potential threat to its possessions in the Pacific—was the best course to follow. He would continue to do so in the remaining years of his administration. He would do all that he could to see that the nation would not have the realities of international relations “brought roughly home.” Roosevelt was also thinking in balance of power terms. Encouraging Japanese interests in Manchuria would keep that nation busy for a while and divert its attention from matters in the Pacific, while offsetting Russian interests in the region. Japan could help maintain stability in Asia and contribute

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to the modernization of China—bringing the Chinese “forward along the road Japan trod.” Maintaining good relations with Japan meant more than protecting the Philippine Islands. It also meant preserving some semblance of the Open Door and, hopefully, encouraging Japan to play a role in developing the prosperity and stability of East Asia. Therefore, the policy of Roosevelt and Root was to maintain the limited American interest in China in such a way as to keep Japan from perceiving the United States as a potential enemy. That Japan had a sphere of influence or interest that infringed to some extent upon the territorial integrity of China was accepted by the United States, for it fit into Roosevelt’s strategy of using Japan, a nation he liked and respected, as a counterweight to the ambitions of Russia, which he disliked, in Asia. Roosevelt thought it was more important to allow the Japanese a little leeway in Manchuria than to actively oppose their policies there and risk destroying the rapport that was essential to his tactic of using Japan as a balancing force in Asia. The concern for the Open Door after the Russo-Japanese War and the Harbin dispute indicate, however, that only so much leeway and infringement would be tolerated. 99 Nevertheless, the United States was not prepared to resort to war to defend the Open Door or China’s integrity, territorial or otherwise. Roosevelt knew that if Japan chose to pursue a line of conduct in Manchuria that the United States opposed, only war would stop it. Discussing the Open Door after he had left the White House, Roosevelt said: The “open-door” policy in China was an excellent thing and will I hope be a good thing in the future, so far as it can be maintained by general diplomatic agreement; but as has been proved by the whole history of Manchuria under Russia and under Japan, the “open-door” policy, as a matter of fact, completely disappears as soon as a powerful nation determines to disregard it. . . . Our interests in Manchuria are really unimportant and not such that the American people would be content to run the slightest risk of collision against them.

The United States, Roosevelt warned, must not take any steps regarding Manchuria that would make Japan feel that its interests there were being threatened. 100 And so the Open Door, at least as it pertained to Manchuria, became little more than mere words. Roosevelt was satisfied as long as American businessmen and merchants could operate there, and the Japanese paid lip service to the notion of Chinese integrity in some form so that the principles of the Open Door appeared to be in force. Furthermore it seems unlikely that Japan needed an agreement with the United States that would sanction its position in Manchuria. In the first place, there had been no serious challenge from the Roosevelt administration regarding the Japanese position there. Secondly, they were very aware of the president’s attitude in regard to both China and Manchuria, for Roosevelt had expressed his views to Takahira and Kaneko earlier and there had been no

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indication of a change in his thinking. The immigration issue had not stiffened Roosevelt’s attitude about the Japanese in Manchuria to the point that he might try to force concessions from them. If anything, the crisis had only made him more cautious about giving offense over Manchuria. The Japanese probably also believed that Taft, now the president-elect and close friend of Roosevelt, would continue to implement Roosevelt’s policies. Finally, it seems likely that if both parties intended to reach an understanding regarding Manchuria, the Harbin dispute would have been included in the negotiations between Root and Takahira. The primary reason for the creation of the Root-Takahira Agreement would seem to be the desire on the part of both governments to demonstrate to the rest of the world that they intended to continue their relationship on an amicable basis, and that the rifts of the past two years had not damaged that fundamental amity. O’ Laughlin’s letter to Roosevelt indicates the desire of the new Japanese government to enter into an agreement in order to publicly demonstrate the friendship of the two rising powers. It is not surprising that Roosevelt and Root were willing to conclude such an agreement as their policy was based on maintaining good relations with Japan. For Japan, however, the desire to continue an amicable relationship may have been based on an additional factor. The Japanese had an excellent reason for wanting to keep their relationship with the United States on a friendly basis: America was a major market for Japanese exports. An article in the Jiji Shimpo in January 1905 noted that 21 percent of Japan’s foreign trade was with the United States. Moreover, the exports sold to the United States were about equal to the total trade with Great Britain, France, and Germany combined. The Jiji further stated that the United States was a leading buyer of raw silk, silk goods, tea, and “fancy mattings,” purchasing about 30 percent of the total exports of these items. 101 By 1908, the percentage of Japanese exports to the United States had grown to almost 32 percent of the total of Japan’s exports. 102 Not only was the United States a major purchaser of Japanese exports, the Japanese also enjoyed a favorable balance of trade with America. For example, in 1900, the United States exported 29.1 million dollars worth of goods to Japan, while importing 32.7 million dollars worth of goods, a difference of 3.6 million. In 1903, the difference had increased in Japan’s favor by 23.2 million dollars. The gap fell to a miniscule $102,000 for Japan in 1905, and then increased in 1906 to a plus of 14.1 million. The balance of trade favored Japan by 30.1 million in 1907, and 26.1 million dollars in 1908. 103 Practical business sense made it worthwhile for Japan to seek rapprochement with the United States, and to signal it in the exchange of notes between Takahira and Root. The real importance of the Root-Takahira Agreement was in confirming the settlement over immigration that had taken place between Japan and the

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United States. What remaining rumors of war between the two taking place were snuffed out, and the world was reassured that the two powers had every intention of remaining friends. This was the primary effect of the notes, and probably the main reason the agreement was made. The vagueness of the document itself hints that it was no more than a public relations statement. Both sides repeated statements they had made to each other previously, especially in regard to the Open Door and each other’s possessions in Asia and the Pacific. This time, however, they said them publicly so that the world could see that there was no enmity between them. The agreement did not mention, most likely on purpose, the two issues that had been the cause of the strain in their relationship: immigration and Manchuria. The immigration issue seemed to have been resolved for the time being with the implementation of the Gentlemen’s Agreement, which had been completed with the exchange of notes in February 1908, while the Harbin dispute remained unsettled. The omission of these concerns further indicates that the agreement was meant to do no more than clear the air. Root may well have summed up the intent of the two nations when he stated the agreement was designed to put an end to “absurd rumors of ill will between American and Japan.” 104 Each side undoubtedly felt it had gained certain advantages from the agreement. Japan had the satisfaction of including the United States in the web of treaties and understandings it had concluded with France, Russia, and Great Britain, thereby forestalling any possibility of an agreement with China. There was the additional benefit of undermining the mission of Tang Shaoyi, by weakening his political support at home, although the passing of the dowager empress had more to do with that. 105 Of course, there was the reassurance of continued peace and a guarantee of Japan’s Asian possessions. For the United States, again the guarantee of peace and the dispelling of war rumors were important gains. America also had a formal guarantee of its Pacific territories, notably Hawaii and the Philippines. Additionally, Japan had declared its adherence to the principles of the Open Door, thereby fulfilling Roosevelt and Root’s policy of maintaining the Open Door in the only way they could—by diplomatic agreement. Finally, Roosevelt and Root each viewed the agreement as a vindication of their method of dealing with the Japanese. In summation, the Root-Takahira Agreement was designed to dispel the last vestiges of war rumors concerning Japan and America and to publicly reaffirm their friendship. There was no trade of the Philippines for Manchuria, but the failure of the United States to accept the inclusion of the word “territorial” in regard to Chinese integrity resulted in an ambiguity that allowed each side to interpret Japan’s position in Manchuria as it wished. The United States appeared to retreat on the Open Door principle about the territorial integrity of China, even if Japan had not been granted a free hand in

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Manchuria. Each side naturally felt it had benefited from the accord, and for Roosevelt the Root-Takahira Agreement was the culmination of his policy of treating Japan courteously and justly while keeping the navy prepared for any eventuality. While Roosevelt and Root’s policy in this regard may have been successful, that success was contingent on the fact Japan was as interested in preserving the peaceful and amicable relationship as they were. Had Japan elected to take a harder line, or to follow a more aggressive policy, the United States would have been faced with the very real possibility of war. Roosevelt might then have been forced to abandon the Open Door entirely and concede to the Japanese a completely free hand in Asia in order to offset the insults resulting from the anti-Japanese agitation on the Pacific Coast, or to lead the United States into a war over the Philippines that the American people did not want to fight, and for which the nation was ill-prepared. Both sides were responsible, therefore, for keeping the peace and preserving their friendship. The preservation of Japanese-American harmony did little for China, however. Japan continued to be a strong presence in Manchuria, and could now argue that the United States agreed with its growing dominion there. For those Chinese who were aware of the Root-Takahira pact, the Open Door must have seemed to be closing rapidly, at least in the north. Certainly the ambiguity of the notes gave China little substantial hope that Manchuria could be kept out of Japanese hands. Most Chinese who were aware of the agreement probably viewed it as a movement away from the Open Door principle of safeguarding China’s territorial integrity. The agreement must also have seemed arrogant in nature to the Chinese. The mutual pledge to defend China’s “independence and integrity” surely galled many Chinese, who must have resented the implication, even if it might have been true, that the independence of their country was secure only as long as it was guarded by other nations. For China, the Root-Takahira Agreement had to appear as an affront on the part of the United States and Japan. No matter how much Americans and Japanese may have been pleased by the agreement, there was little in it to make China happy. It was clear that in Asia, Roosevelt and the American government were more concerned about the feelings of Japan then they were about those of China, particularly in regard to what remained of the Open Door in Manchuria. NOTES 1. Donald F. Anderson, William Howard Taft: A Conservative’s Conception of the Presidency (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1968), p. 22; Henry F. Pringle, The Life and Times of William Howard Taft, 2 volumes (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, Inc., 1939), vol. 1, p. 297; Raymond A. Esthus, “The Taft-Katsura Agreement—Reality or Myth?” Journal of Modern History, (March, 1959): 46–47. 2. O’Laughlin to Roosevelt, April 23, 1905, Roosevelt Mss.

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3. Pierce to Griscom, July 8, 1905, July 12, 1905, U.S. Department of State, Diplomatic Instructions of the Department of State: Japan (Washington, D.C.: National Archives), hereafter cited as Instructions: Japan. 4. Henry F. Pringle, Theodore Roosevelt: A Biography (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1931), p. 268; Pringle, Taft, p. 297; Anderson, Taft: A Conservative’s Conception, p. 22. 5. Ibid., pp. 22–23. 6. Tyler Dennett, “President Roosevelt’s Secret Pact with Japan,” Current History (October 1929): 19. 7. Taft to Root, July 29, 1905, Roosevelt Mss. 8. Esthus, “The Taft-Katsura Agreement,” p. 48. 9. Taft to Root, July 29, 1905, Roosevelt Mss. 10. Taft to Roosevelt, July 31, 1905, Ibid. 11. Roosevelt to Taft, July 31, 1905, Roosevelt Letters, vol. 4, p. 1923. 12. Roosevelt to Taft, October 7, 1905, Ibid., vol. 5, p. 49. 13. Ibid., Esthus, Roosevelt and Japan, p. 102. 14. Dennett, “Roosevelt’s Secret Pact,” p. 19. 15. Esthus, Roosevelt and Japan, p. 107. 16. Griscom to Root, November 6, 1905, November 10, 1905, Despatches: Japan. 17. Wilson to Root, December 1, 1905, Ibid. 18. Root to Takahira, November 24, 1905, Foreign Relations, 1905, p. 613. 19. Rockhill to Root, November 11, 1905, Despatches: China. 20. Wilson to Root, November 30, 1905, Foreign Relations, 1905, pp. 614–15; Wilson to Root, November 30, 1905, dispatch containing a translation of an article from the Jiji Shimpo (Despatches: Japan). 21. Lawrence Battistini, Japan and America (Westport: Greenwood University Press, 1953), p. 58; A. Whitney Griswold, The Far Eastern Policy of the United States (New Haven: Yale Univeristy Press, 1938), pp. 125–26. 22. LaFeber, The Clash, p. 86, Morris, Theodore Rex, p. 399. 23. Dalton, A Strenuous Life, p. 332; A revisionist view is offered by James Bradley in The Imperial Cruise, that the meeting between Taft and Katsura set in motion a chain of events that led to the Japanese attack on the United States that brought America into World War II. James Bradley, The Imperial Cruise: A Secret History of Empire and War (New York: Back Bay Books, 2009). 24. Esthus in the “Taft-Katsura Agreement,” pp. 50–51 and in Roosevelt and Japan, p. 106, calls the memorandum merely “an honest exchange of views.” Treat insists that the memorandum “was in no way a secret agreement,” but fails to elaborate further. Payson J. Treat, Diplomatic Relations between the United States and Japan (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1938), pp. 253–54. Minger finds it difficult to see what the United States gained from the conversation. Ralph E. Minger, “Taft’s Missions to Japan: A Study in Personal Diplomacy,” Pacific Historical Review (August 1961): 283. Chay concludes that the memorandum “was not quite an agreement, but more than an exchange of views,” Jongsuk Chay, “The Taft-Katsura Memorandum Reconsidered,” Pacific Historical Review (August 1968): 326. Edmund Morris points out that the timing of the agreement, weeks before the peace negotiations in Portsmouth were scheduled to begin, is significant. Roosevelt was assured that the Philippines and Hawaii were safe, while Japan was likely to be more amenable to American pleas for magnanimity toward Russia. Morris, Theodore Rex, pp. 399–400. See also Doris Kearns Goodwin, The Bully Pulpit: Theodore Roosevelt, William Howard Taft and the Golden Age of Journalism (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2013), pp. 432–33. 25. Griscom to Root, October 9, 1905, Despatches: Japan; Esthus, Roosevelt and Japan, p. 104. 26. Roosevelt to Taft, October 5, 1905, Roosevelt Letters, vol. 5, p. 46. 27. Roosevelt to Taft, October 7, 1905, Ibid., p. 49. 28. Esthus, Roosevelt and Japan, p. 105. 29. Ibid.; Braisted, The United States Navy, p. 182; Treat, Diplomatic Relations, p. 254.

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30. Esthus, “The Taft-Katsura Agreement,” p. 48; Minger, “Taft’s Missions,” p. 279; Pringle, Taft, pp. 297–98. 31. Beale, Roosevelt and the Rise of America, pp.321–22. 32. Ibid.; Dennett, “Roosevelt’s Secret Pact,” p. 21; Esthus, “The Taft-Katsura Agreement,” p. 50; Harbaugh, Theodore Roosevelt, pp. 263–66. 33. Quoted in Ibid., pp. 265–66. 34. Quoted in Jessup, Root, vol. 2, p. 7. 35. Roosevelt to Hay, January 28, 1905, Roosevelt Letters, vol. 4, p. 1112. 36. Roosevelt to Hay, February 6, 1905, Ibid., p. 1116. 37. Korean Emperor to Roosevelt, November 1905, Roosevelt Mss. 38. Roosevelt to Root, November 25, 1905, Roosevelt Letters, vol. 5, p. 96. 39. Pringle, Taft, p. 296. 40. Roosevelt to Spring-Rice, June 13, 1904, Roosevelt Letters, vol. 4, p. 831. 41. Roosevelt to Hay, April 2, 1905, Ibid., p. 1158; Esthus, “The Taft-Katsura Agreement,” pp. 50–51. 42. Roosevelt to Kennan, May 6, 1905, Roosevelt Letters, vol. 5, p. 116. 43. Chay, “Taft-Katsura,” pp. 323–24; Morris, Theodore Rex, p. 399. 44. Ibid. 45. For discussion of the immigration crisis and the resulting war scare between the United States and Japan, see particularly Esthus, Roosevelt and Japan, and Charles E. Neu, An Uncertain Friendship: Theodore Roosevelt and Japan, 1906–1909 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967). 46. Foreign Relations, 1908, pp. 503–4. 47. Ibid., pp. 518–23. 48. Ibid., pp. 515–17. 49. John B. Judis, The Folly of Empire: What George W. Bush Could Learn from Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 66. 50. Theodore Roosevelt, Theodore Roosevelt: An Autobiography (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1913), p. 568; Thomas A. Bailey, Theodore Roosevelt and the JapaneseAmerican Crises (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1934), pp. 285–90; Pringle, Theodore Roosevelt, p. 289. 51. Robert Hart argues the agreement was the direct result of the good reception given the fleet by Japan. He also suggests the reception might not have been that sincere. Robert Hart, The Great White Fleet (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1965), pp. 204–36; see also, Harbaugh, Roosevelt, pp. 287–88. 52. Thomas A. Bailey, “The Root-Takahira Agreement of 1908,” Pacific Historical Review (March 1940), p. 19; Esthus, Roosevelt and Japan, p. 206, Neu, Uncertain Friendship, pp. 155–56. 53. Bailey, “The Root-Takahira Agreement,” pp. 19–20; Esthus, Roosevelt and Japan, pp. 206–9; Neu, Uncertain Friendship, pp. 155–56. 54. O’Laughlin to Roosevelt, October 14, 1908, Roosevelt Mss. 55. O’Laughlin to Roosevelt, October 11, 1908, Ibid. 56. O’Laughlin to Roosevelt, October 20, 1908, Ibid. 57. Ibid. 58. Ibid. 59. Esthus, Roosevelt and Japan, p. 273; Neu, Uncertain Friendship, p. 275; Bailey, “The Root-Takahira Agreement,” p. 21. 60. Quoted in Jessup, Root, vol. 2, p. 36. 61. Ibid. 62. Ibid., pp. 36–37; Bailey, “The Root-Takahira Agreement,” p. 23; Esthus, Roosevelt and Japan, p. 274; Neu, Uncertain Friendship, p. 276. 63. Quoted in Jessup, Root, vol. 2, p. 37. 64. Ibid.; Foreign Relations, 1908, p. 511; Esthus, Roosevelt and Japan, pp. 276–77; Neu, Uncertain Friendship, pp. 276–77. 65. Ibid., p. 277; Esthus, Roosevelt and Japan, pp. 277–79. 66. Foreign Relations, 1908, pp. 510–12.

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67. Root to Rockhill, November 22, 1908, Despatches: China. 68. Adee to Amlegation, December 3, 1908, Instructions: China. 69. Bailey, “The Root-Takahira Agreement,” pp. 26–33; Esthus, Roosevelt and Japan, pp. 282–83; Neu, Uncertain Friendship, pp. 285–87; Jessup, Root, vol. 2, pp. 38–43. 70. Ibid., p. 43; Rockhill to Root, December 16, 1908, Despatches: China. 71. Sammons to State Department, December 10, 1908, NF, Reel 328. 72. Bailey, “The Root-Takahira Agreement,” pp. 26–33; Esthus, Roosevelt and Japan, pp. 282–83; Neu, Uncertain Friendship, pp. 285–87; Jessup, Root, vol.2, pp. 38–43. 73. Croly, Willard Straight, p. 272. 74. Huntington-Wilson, Memoirs, p. 169. 75. Ibid.; Croly, Willard Straight, p. 272. 76. Bailey, “The Root-Takahira Agreement,” p. 29. 77. Quoted in Jessup, Root, vol. 2. pp. 41–42. 78. Ibid., p. 42. 79. Lee to Roosevelt , December 1, 1908, Roosevelt Mss. 80. Roosevelt to Lee, December 20, 1908, Roosevelt Letters, vol. 6, p. 1432. Italicized in Morison. 81. Leopold, Root and the Conservative Tradition, p. 62. 82. John H. Latane, “Our Relations with Japan,” American Political Science Review (November 1914): 593. 83. Esthus, Roosevelt and Japan, p. 285. 84. Foster Rhea Dulles, America’s Rise to World Power, 1898–1954 (New York: Harper and Row, 1954), p. 71. 85. Griswold, Far Eastern Policies, p. 129; Battistini, Japan and America, pp. 62-63; Harbaugh, Theodore Roosevelt, p. 288. 86. Sutter, U.S.-Chinese Relations, p. 30; Wang notes that the subsequent Lansing-Ishii Agreement of 1917 further obscured the “undefined nature of the status quo in the Pacific.” Wang, The United States and China, p. 147. 87. Thomas F. Millard, America and the Far Eastern Question (New York: Moffat, Yard and Company, 1909), pp. 365–66. 88. Jessup, Root, vol. 2, p. 37. 89. In an earlier letter to Kaneko, Roosevelt had asked the Baron to “let me know when you next come to Washington. I should like to talk over with you and with Mr. Takahira, more at length, these matters.” Brands, Selected Letters, p. 360. 90. Roosevelt to Spring-Rice, June 13, 1904, Ibid., pp. 364–65. 91. Roosevelt to Wood, January 22, 1906, Ibid., pp. 408–9. 92. Judis, The Folly of Empire, pp. 60–62; Aida D. Donald, Lion in the White House: A Life of Theodore Roosevelt (New York: Basic Books, 2007), pp. 80–81; Morris, Theodore Rex, p. 24. 93. Roosevelt to Spring Rice, June 16, 1905, Brands, Selected Letters, p. 387. 94. Roosevelt to Takahira, April 28, 1907, Ibid., p. 455. 95. Roosevelt to Root, July 13, 1907, Ibid., p. 458. 96. Roosevelt to Brownson, July 26, 1907, Ibid., p. 460. 97. H. W. Brands, T. R.: The Last Romantic (New York: Basic Books, 1997), p. 615–16; Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995), p. 38. 98. Roosevelt to Spring Rice, March 19, 1904, Brands, Selected Letters, p. 358. 99. Neu, Uncertain Friendship, pp. 281–84; Esthus, Roosevelt and Japan, p. 285. 100. Roosevelt to Taft, December 22, 1910, Roosevelt Letters, vol. 7, pp. 189–92. 101. Translation of article in the Jiji Shimpo, dated January 18, 1905, enclosed in Griscom to Hay, January 24, 1905, Despatches: Japan. 102. Statistical Abstract, 1909, p. 770. 103. Statistical Abstract, 1905, p. 221; Statistical Abstract, 1909, p. 373. 104. Quoted in Esthus, Roosevelt and Japan, p. 285. 105. Croly, Willard Straight, p. 276; Jessie A. Miller, China in American Policy and Opinion (PhD dissertation, Clark University, 1940), pp. 321–22; Hunt, Frontier Defense, pp. 175–76.

Conclusion

When Theodore Roosevelt became president, China had become a land that was both in upheaval and transition. The nineteenth century had seen China suffer through the impact of the opium trade, a massive drain of silver from the economy, humiliating defeats in two opium wars, the devastation caused by numerous internal rebellions, the absorption of Manchuria by Russia, the failure of two reform efforts, and a shocking defeat in the Sino-Japanese War, which was followed by the division of China by the great powers, including Japan, into spheres of influence. The twentieth century began with the anti-foreign Boxer Uprising, which was put down by a coalition of the great powers. The Boxer Protocol that followed was designed to punish China for the destruction and loss of life during the Boxer movement. The imposition of the Boxer Protocol completed sixty years of internal upheaval and national humiliation, all of which had seriously weakened the Qing Dynasty and its ability to govern China successfully. Reform efforts meant to move China toward modernization following the Boxer Uprising concentrated on military, educational, and economic matters, but failed to give enough attention to political restructuring. Meanwhile, the seeds of revolution were being planted as the Qing Dynasty’s inability to institute a successful program of reform became painfully evident. The United States had kept out of the scramble for concessions that carved China into spheres of influence, but had called for equal opportunity for trade in China as well as respect for the empire’s territorial integrity. When he left the White House in March of 1909, Theodore Roosevelt had every right to be proud of his record overall, but he had accomplished little of note in U.S.-Chinese relations. To some degree he could view his China policy as successful. The United States had avoided any real conflict with the various international rivals in Asia and Russian ambitions in Manchuria had 199

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been checked, although not so much by American initiatives as by those of Japan. China’s hold on Manchuria remained tenuous at best, and was certainly no stronger when Roosevelt left office than it had been when he assumed the presidency. The only real difference was that the region was now split between two competing powers rather than being threatened by only one. From Roosevelt’s standpoint, however, this was fine, as he believed Japan made the perfect foil to Russian ambitions in the Far East. But for the Chinese the situation was no better than it had been before the Russo-Japanese War, and probably worse. Roosevelt had the Nobel Peace Prize, Japan and Russia had divided Manchuria between them, Great Britain, France, and Germany retained spheres of influence in other parts of the country, and China was left with nothing more than assurances that its integrity, whose meaning was open to interpretation, would be protected. The establishment of Japanese and Russian spheres of interest in Manchuria was devastating to China. The homeland of the ruling Qing Dynasty, Manchuria was an integral part of the Chinese Empire. China’s hold on the region, originally weakened by Russian encroachment, had now been further compromised. The Open Door remained in effect, but it was apparent that the United States was essentially interested more in the provisions of the first Open Door note regarding equal commercial opportunity and less concerned about the second note, which called for the maintenance of China’s territorial integrity. Roosevelt had clearly retreated somewhat on that issue; at least as far as the frontier regions of China were concerned. Manchuria’s future was now in the hands of the Japanese and Russians. In the direct relations between the United States and China, there was little that was noteworthy. The Roosevelt administration dealt with China from a limited and stereotyped point of view, and this hindered the development of a more supportive and, perhaps, helpful policy. There was no real appreciation of the forces and feelings that were stirring in China, and as a result, nothing concrete was done to alleviate or remove the causes of ill feeling, as expressed in the anti-American boycott, for example, that many Chinese were beginning to develop toward America. All too often, the Roosevelt administration chose to bully the Imperial Government of China rather than cooperate with it, or to try and find solutions to the problems China was complaining about. China was expected to conform to American desires without expecting that the opposite would occur. Even the remission of the Boxer Indemnity was conducted according to American terms. These attitudes were reflective of the assumption that American values and power were superior to China’s. A good deal of effort was made to get the Chinese to see themselves through American eyes. Among others, American missionaries were especially committed to the concept that the Chinese wanted to be like Americans, an understandable viewpoint given the amount of time they had spent in trying to bring the two cultures together.

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Even so, the negative images formed during the nineteenth century carried over into the early twentieth century and served to contribute to the manner in which the United States conducted its relations with China. At the same time, an ongoing theme in American foreign relations—an altruistic impulse to do good—came into play. China became an object of this desire, and, as a result, American educators, missionaries, diplomats, and businessmen had been working to bring China the benefits of democracy, capitalism, science, and Christianity, if, for no other reason, than it was the right thing to do. 1 These attitudes were evident in the policies of the Roosevelt administration toward China. Unlike most Americans, Theodore Roosevelt had some knowledge about that mysterious Oriental entity called China. He was fortunate to have people in and around his administration that were likewise informed or experienced in dealing with China affairs. In general, however, Roosevelt, his advisers, and friends all shared similar viewpoints and attitudes about that part of the world. The picture they had formed of China was not flattering, and reflected American views about China in general. Basically, China was thought of as timid, weak, and corrupt; the perfect example of the fate of a nation that failed to retain the vigorous qualities that led to greatness. Essentially China policy was based on a stereotype; that of a weak nation deficient in Western values and ideals that would have to be “saved” from itself and led into the modern world by a transfusion of those very standards and principles. That naïveté did not hinder the development of or implementation of policy decisions that could be effective, but it did prevent the creation of a more openminded, more understanding approach. While Roosevelt and his circle were not entirely ignorant about affairs in China, they lacked any real appreciation of what was transpiring internally there, and this restricted policy formation and responsiveness. The Chinese were all too often treated like recalcitrant children, not only by the United States, but also by the other world powers. The major problem in China was the situation brought about by the various international rivalries there, especially in Manchuria where the Open Door was threatened by Russian and Japanese ambitions. While Roosevelt wanted to defend the principles of the Hay notes, the American position in Asia was weak largely due to a limited presence resulting from the lack of a strong economic and public interest in the region. The American response to the Russian assault on the Open Door during 1902 and 1903 was limited to putting diplomatic pressure on the Russians to uphold American rights in Manchuria. The Japanese decision for war in 1904 proved, however, to be the only effective check to Russian aspirations in Manchuria. The Japanese decision for war may well have been taken in part because it was becoming obvious that the United States was unwilling to do more than rely on diplomacy to blunt Russian initiatives in the area, initiatives that threated Japanese ambitions in Korea and southern Manchuria. Roosevelt’s actions were sen-

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sible given the limited American presence and interests in China, and if the Japanese expected more they were going to be disappointed. Manchuria was far more important to Russia and Japan than it was to the United States. If anyone was going to fight to block Russian expansion in Manchuria, it was Japan and not America. The Russo-Japanese War served only to divide Manchuria between those two nations. It also pointed out the dangers that international ambitions in China could lead to. Roosevelt could have tried to solidify the Open Door Policy by seeking some sort of international conference in regard to China in which a stronger commitment to and a clearer definition of the Open Door might have been achieved. But it is almost certain that the other powers would have rejected an action of this sort, as they were primarily interested in preserving their own spheres of interest in China. Instead, Japan acted unilaterally to create a network of agreements supporting its position in Manchuria, all of which included commitments to the Hay notes including the principle of Chinese territorial integrity. This presented the Roosevelt administration with the problem of upholding an ambiguously defined Open Door in the face of two powers that were in the process of dividing Manchuria between them. Roosevelt chose to deal with the situation by using Japan as a buffer against Russian ambitions in Manchuria. The Japanese presence there was just as dangerous to the Open Door, but Roosevelt was confident that they could be trusted to keep the door open, at least for a time. When Japan did violate the Open Door, the United States protested, but pressure was not applied as strongly as it could have been. This was due to the fact that Roosevelt trusted Japan more than he did Russia, he needed Japanese friendship to maintain his policy of balancing the rivalries in Manchuria, and he wished to avoid giving further offense to a nation already irritated by American agitation about Japanese immigration. And, of course, he recognized the weakness of the American position in Asia. Throughout the various spats over Manchuria, the Open Door was always the central issue for the United States. The difficulties served to point out a contradiction in that policy. The first Open Door note called for equal opportunity for commerce in China for all nations, while accepting the presence of spheres of influence that had been established in the scramble for concessions following the Sino-Japanese War. The second note stated that American policy stood for the maintenance of China’s territorial integrity. Unstated, but perhaps implied, was the idea that any further actions that compromised Chinese territorial integrity, beyond the existence of those spheres of influence, was unacceptable. Any acquiescence to a situation that tightened an outside power’s hold on a part of China threatened, in the long run, Chinese sovereignty. The Roosevelt administration understood, however, that there was little, if anything, that could be done about it. As long as the

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United States was assured of the opportunity to trade in China, including Manchuria, Roosevelt and the State Department were satisfied. Defense of the Open Door meant insisting on the first principle and compromising, even retreating, on the second. Realistically, the Roosevelt administration could do little else. The limited presence of the United States in the Far East, the stereotypical view of China, and a general lack of public interest in Asia made it difficult to respond to a problem of this nature. War was not an option, even if Roosevelt wanted to fight to uphold the Open Door, and he clearly did not. The president understood that diplomatic appeals to the powers to respect the principles expressed in the Open Door notes was the best he could do. Additionally, the overlying American contempt or sense of paternalism toward China made it easy to dismiss or downplay the commitment to preserve that country’s territorial integrity in favor of the first Open Door note’s recognition of spheres of influence and the appeal for equal commercial opportunity within. Even though the United States continued to publicly support the principle of maintaining China’s territorial integrity, the focal point was on access to the China market. The reality was that Chinese territorial integrity could be maintained only by a coalition of some sort among those powers who opposed the transition of the existing spheres of influence into territorial acquisition. The United States could not uphold China’s territorial integrity by itself, and the sense that China must learn to stand on its own two feet, and would have to adapt to Western ways, meant that the United States was unlikely to go beyond general appeals for assurances regarding China’s preservation. Although the second Open Door note’s commitment to China’s territorial preservation was not abandoned, it was subordinate to the primary concern, which was American access to the China market, especially in those “areas of interest” held by the other powers. Roosevelt and the others understood that China’s dismemberment would have serious international consequences, but their options were limited. What public opinion there was in regard to China tended to focus on the potential of the China market, or the missionary activities taking place, making sure that American businessmen, products, missionaries, and others got their fair share of the opportunities present there while keeping Chinese laborers from competing with American workers for jobs. China had to be held together in order to safeguard those prospects, of course, but American policy regarding the preservation of China’s existence was grounded in the desire not only to access the China market, but also to one day dominate it. Eliot A. Cohen has mentioned the art of imperial understatement, 2 noting that British imperial policy in the nineteenth century included the effort to avoid having “a grand coalition” of powers rise against the empire. To a certain extent Roosevelt was following a similar policy. Though prone to

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bluster at times, Roosevelt’s diplomacy regarding China was pragmatic. Defense of the Open Door was based on a tacit admission that China’s territorial integrity was already compromised and that the United States did not want to see it undermined further. Roosevelt understood the international relations of his time as well as any man, and he was committed to the balance of power system that was the foundation of global politics in his era. To maintain the Open Door, Roosevelt had to rely on an informal combination of those powers with interests in China to help defend the American policy. But, in order to keep that informal arrangement in place, Roosevelt had to accept some limitations to the Open Door, and that meant downplaying, to some extent, the second Open Door note in favor of the first and its call for equal commercial opportunity—which was the greater American concern, anyway. So Roosevelt never threatened any of the other powers over China, especially Manchuria, nor did the United States give any impression that American policy opposed “special interests” or whatever euphemism was selected to describe the spheres of interest in China, in order to avoid the possibility that some of the powers might combine against the Open Door and the American desire to preserve its access to the China market. At the same time, the State Department would gently cajole and remind potential offenders of their commitment to the Open Door, while relying on the greater interests of those powers with a deeper involvement in Asia—commercially or strategically— to back up its statements in order to keep China whole. The big stick was brandished in the direction of China when necessary, since, in the prevailing view of the day, that country was a recalcitrant state that required correction from time to time as it was shown the way into the modern world. But that same big stick was never waved in the direction of Japan or the European powers in regard to their interests in China, perhaps reflecting a basic maxim Roosevelt had learned during his cowboy days in Montana—“never draw unless you mean to shoot.” Interestingly, the Roosevelt administration was willing to settle for assurances from Russia regarding the Open Door, yet chose to conclude an agreement with Japan that committed both to uphold that policy in China. The same issues were at stake with both nations; why not an agreement with Russia? The answer appears to be simple: Roosevelt disliked and distrusted Russia and he liked and trusted Japan, therefore he felt more comfortable about reaching an agreement with the Japanese. More importantly, from a geopolitical standpoint, Japan posed a greater potential threat to American possessions in the Pacific than Russia did, something that became especially evident after the Russo-Japanese War. Even so, given the complaints about Russian mendacity, relying only on assurances was a risky approach at best. Roosevelt and Hay would have been wiser to seek some sort of accord with the Russians over the Open Door in Manchuria. It may be, however, that they were certain that Japan would confront Russia at some point in time, and in the expectation such an event

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would have a positive outcome for the Japanese they concluded that an agreement would be unnecessary. This assumes, of course, that there was ever any consideration given to the possibility of reaching an accord with Russia over the Open Door in Manchuria. Moreover, there were more pressing reasons for coming to an arrangement with Japan. The two nations had been through a rough period in their relationship, and there had even been talk of war. The Root-Takahira Agreement was designed to signal their rapprochement. Since Roosevelt’s policy of balancing the Russo-Japanese rivalry required harmony with the Japanese, he was more willing to come to an agreement with them, one that marked not only rapprochement, but that also committed Japan at least to the first principle of the Open Door. And Japan also had some excellent reasons, economic in particular, for affirming the friendship between the two nations. The Manchurian issues, to some extent, were contested almost as if China itself was unimportant. The United States gave the Chinese some support, particularly against Russia, but that backing was minimal. Often such actions reflected the concerns of the diplomat on the scene more than it did those of the State Department. Rarely did the United States act alone, preferring to work in concert with other nations that were concerned about their rights in China. Britain was usually the chief source of assistance, with the other powers occasionally joining in. In addition, the United States seemed more concerned with its privileges in China than it was with the rights of that country. The central issue in the Manchurian disputes for the Roosevelt administration was, for example, the protection of American interests; Chinese interests seemed secondary. Also, as much pressure was placed on China to guarantee American rights as there was put on the contending powers, if not more. The Chinese were always in the middle of these disputes, threatened on the one hand with encroachment, while facing demands that they protect what they were almost powerless to defend on the other. Ultimately, China was forced to rely on the competition between the powers themselves to balance everything out, while hoping that not too much would be lost in the end. The major issues in the direct dealings with China focused on immigration, American trade and investments, and their relationship to a burgeoning nationalism in that awakening country. A crisis over the immigration of Chinese laborers coupled with American prejudice toward all Chinese led to a boycott of American imports in China. In this regard, the Roosevelt administration was guilty of a cultural racism based on China’s perceived inability, unlike Japan, to adapt to Western ways. Or, as Tchen has put it, the Chinese were “bad” and the Japanese “good.” These views also reflected the situational and selective aspect of the “yellow peril” paranoia, for example, which along with the economic reasons for

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opposing Chinese (and, later, Japanese) immigration, led to the movement to exclude Chinese laborers from entering the United States. 3 Laxness in fulfilling its contract and the violation of some of its clauses led the Chinese to annul the railroad concession granted to the American China Development Company. While Roosevelt was able to coerce an end to the boycott, his efforts to prevent the cancellation of the railroad contract and to affect a compromise that would have resulted in the payment of a huge indemnity to the American firm were unsuccessful. In both instances the president paid little attention to Chinese self-respect or the growing national feeling that was emerging, while he overzealously tried to salvage American prestige. The American response to these events was both arrogant and insulting. Little effort at a diplomatic settlement was attempted in either case, nor was there any real effort to eliminate the causes of Chinese distress. Roosevelt’s perception of China as a backward country prevented him from seeking solutions that would have been more amenable to Chinese feelings. The administration managed to participate in bringing each problem to a conclusion, but failed to eliminate their causes and paid a high price in terms of Chinese dissatisfaction and resentment over the high-handed tactics that were used. The bullying of the Chinese government by the Roosevelt administration, and the insistence that the Qing exercise powers that they were unable to, only served to help highlight Beijing’s increasing weakness. The Imperial throne was tottering, as internal upheaval and its inability to deal effectively with the various powers and their ambitions proved time and again. China exploited the international rivalries as best it could; but it is likely that the jealousies of those nations protected China more effectively than did Chinese efforts to play the barbarians off against each other. It is also possible that most of the powers had come to the conclusion that the further dismemberment of China was unnecessary, as the spheres of influence they had carved out for themselves were sufficient. Instead, they continued to seek concessions for themselves and the Imperial government, both by giving in to their demands and through its inability to recover them, further revealed its declining power. The Roosevelt administration was not alone in pushing the Chinese around, but the attitude and actions taken by the United States and the rest of the powers contributed to the decay of the Qing monarchy and its downfall. When Roosevelt left office, the final collapse of the last Chinese dynasty was just three years away. This lack of sensitivity to the emerging nationalist movement in China might have been a precursor of later American attitudes. The callous arrogance that dismissed the traditional way of life in China as backward and decadent, along with the simplistic or naïve assumption that China’s problems would be resolved once the West “guided” China into the modern world, led to a blind eye being turned toward the ferment that was building in

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that country. Roosevelt and so many others were typical of their time in taking a condescending view of China and thinking that the Chinese would become a useful part of the international community, as well as offering an improved marketplace, only when they modernized along Western lines with the help of the West itself. This view, however, failed to take into account the incredible political, economic, cultural, and social trauma that China had already undergone as the result of more than sixty years of encroachment and bullying on the part of the great powers. As a result, the Chinese had been forced to begin to reexamine their traditional culture at every level. Outsiders did not fully comprehend that Westernization (and, implicit in the American view, democratization) would not come about easily, if it happened at all. China, despite the best and worst intentions of the powers in their efforts to point the way toward modernization, would have to find its own way into the twentieth century and determine on its own how best to amalgamate the modern world into its traditional way of life, or whether to abandon traditional ways altogether. This is something China still struggles with today, despite the remarkable economic, military, and social transformation that has taken place since 1978. The presumption that contemporary (i.e., Western or American) political, economic, cultural, and social value systems alone are the key to a peaceful and prosperous world still ignores the fundamental struggle within traditional societies to find a balance between their longestablished ways of life and modern forms. Change has not come easily to China, nor will it come about readily in today’s other traditional societies. China was struggling with the question of change in Roosevelt’s time, and neither he nor many of his contemporaries grasped fully, if at all, the meaning of the upheaval that was taking hold in that country. By failing to discern that there were internal forces at work in China that hindered the ability of the Qing Dynasty to govern or conduct foreign policy effectively, the United States chose to deal with China in much the same fashion as did the other powers. Despite Roosevelt’s understanding that the dismemberment of China would be undesirable, there was far more interest in assuring a place for America in the Chinese market than there was for the fate of a country struggling to find its place in a world where the imperialist ambitions of the major powers threatened China’s independence. The Sino-American relationship has sometimes been referred to as “special,” but if it was so, it was only in the sense that the United States did not intrude upon, exploit, or bully China to the degree that the other powers did. Nonetheless, the American approach to China relations added another piece to the contemporary Chinese interpretation of its relations with the West and China from the Opium War to the victory of the Chinese Communist Party in 1949 as the “Century of Humiliation.” This undoubtedly was the real failure of the Roosevelt administration in its management of relations with China. The apparent lack of appreciation

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for just how weak the Qing Dynasty had become or the growing strength of Chinese nationalism meant that patriotic displays, such as the boycott, were interpreted as misbehavior on the part of a backward people and, as such, would have to be put down. Basic policy was to support the Imperial throne in these situations and to make sure that American interests were not harmed. This usually meant forcing China to protect those interests, which only highlighted all the more the weakness of the Qing and encouraged rising nationalist feelings, which in turn inspired reformists and revolutionaries in China. American policy, along with those of the other powers, therefore, despite efforts to prop up the dynasty, contributed to the hastening of the overthrow of the Qing. It is also likely that the Western powers and Japan did not fully realize what they were helping to bring about. In the case of the United States, at least, the failure to recognize or make any effort to understand the new spirit in China meant that the Roosevelt administration was out of touch with a significant element there. This does not mean that Roosevelt should have pursued a policy of support for Sun Yat-sen and the other revolutionaries who were building momentum toward the day when the Qing would be toppled, but a better understanding of growing Chinese nationalism and animosity toward the Manchu ruling class might have led to a more informed approach to Sino-American relations. Charles Neu has called Roosevelt “America’s First Strategic Thinker,” and argues that only John Quincy Adams and Richard Nixon rival him as such. Roosevelt, Neu contends, thought “very hard and very deeply about the strategic structure of international relations,” although his focus on strategic thinking led him, at times, “to neglect the niceties that made his policies go down better.” 4 George Herring credits Roosevelt with taking “unprecedented initiatives” while demonstrating that the president could take on the role of world leader. “Recognizing limited U.S. interests in China and Korea and the vulnerability of the Philippines and even Hawaii, he was the consummate pragmatist in East Asia, refusing to take on commitments he could not uphold.” 5 Henry Kissinger believes that Roosevelt “commands a unique historical position in America’s approach to international relations.” While certain of the beneficent role of America in the world, Roosevelt acted on the basis that the nation had foreign policy interests of its own, reflecting his understanding that the United States was a power, like other powers, “and not a singular incarnation of virtue.” He defined America’s role entirely in terms of the national interest and, unlike previous presidents, “identified the national interest so completely with the balance of power.” Roosevelt’s pragmatism, perception of world order, and a global balance of power, in Kissinger’s view, was European-like and is reminiscent of a Disraeli or Palmerston. 6 Defining America’s place in the world from a geographic, political, and cultural background, Roosevelt believed the United States was poised to

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assume an “essential role” in world affairs. In exercising his desire to have the United States play the role he believed Great Britain had played in the nineteenth century, Roosevelt, in an unprecedented approach in American foreign policy, focused primarily on geopolitical considerations. Thus, the goal of his foreign policy was “maintaining peace by guaranteeing equilibrium, hovering offshore of Eurasia and tilting the balance against any power threatening to dominate a strategic region.” As Kissinger notes, this “was an astonishingly ambitious ambition for a country that had heretofore viewed its isolation as its defining characteristic and that had conceived of its navy as an instrument of coastal defense.” Kissinger also speculates that had Roosevelt been succeeded by a disciple or had won the election of 1912, “he might have introduced America into the Westphalian system of world order or an adaptation of it.” 7 But, Kissinger has also noted that, “. . . Roosevelt lived either a century too late or a century too early. His approach to international affairs died with him in 1919; no significant school of American thought on foreign policy has invoked him since.” 8 H. W. Brands points out that “Roosevelt also set the standard for what would become another signature of twentieth-century America: an assumption of responsibility for international order.” Roosevelt was the first American president to understand the potential for exercising national power beyond the Western Hemisphere, and, as he did in his domestic policy, “trampled forms and precedents” in the process of leading the nation to international prominence. 9 Roosevelt, however, unlike many presidents to come after him, also understood that there were limits to American power and that the nation could not dictate solutions to world problems. However, the Roosevelt administration did nothing truly innovative or inventive in its dealings with China as it pursued a reactive rather than a proactive foreign policy in Asia. American interests in Asia were defined essentially as defending access to the China market and protecting the limited American presence there, while making sure that China lived up to its treaty obligations. Reflecting the realities of American interests in China, balance of power politics became the key to keeping the Open Door ajar in order to, hopefully, assure American business interests access to the Chinese market. Holding to a stereotyped viewpoint and recognizing the inherent limitations affecting its China policy, the United States was able to deal with problems that arose, but was unable to anticipate them or find solutions to them. Probably it would have been impossible to completely solve these dilemmas, especially those caused by the international rivalries in the Far East. But in the bilateral relations of the United States and China there might well have been better ways to resolve the causes of the difficulties that came between them. However, the narrow-minded attitudes and viewpoints held by Roosevelt and others in his administration in regard to China and its people created a barrier to doing so, and those who were more sympathetic to

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the plight of China, such as Straight and Wilson, lacked the influence to overcome those perceptions. By failing to see beyond their own stereotyped image of China, Roosevelt and his people missed the opportunity to bring the two lands and cultures closer together and, perhaps, to build a more cordial relationship between the Chinese and the United States. Today, the emergence of China as a power capable of challenging the preeminent position of the United States in the world means American leaders must give careful consideration to its relationship with that nation. Since the end of World War I, the United States has tried to create a world order based almost entirely on its values. “But, Wilsonianism cannot be the sole basis for the post-Cold War era.” 10 Any implication that Sino-American relations are based on American favors which can be cut off at any time, rather than reciprocal interests, will only create resentment in Beijing and make America appear unreliable and intrusive. 11 Hard choices will have to be made and they should be based on contemporary reality rather than what can appear to be self-righteous posturing. 12 Perhaps the time has come to reconsider Roosevelt’s pragmatism when conducting relations with the Chinese, as well as other parts of the world. Of equal importance is the need to consider the implications of rhetoric and its potential impact on each side’s perceptions of the other. Attacks on Chinese policies and their motivations can lead to misperceptions and concerns that they may lead to hostilities at some point in time. Especially galling to the Chinese is the description of China as a “rising” power. The Chinese see themselves as a power returning to prominence after more than a hundred years of colonial exploitation in which the West and Japan took advantage of internal unrest and decline. Thus, China’s desire to exercise influence in East Asia is viewed as a return “to a normal state of affairs.” When outsiders speak about the need for China to mature as a nation, it is only natural for the Chinese, with a history that spans millennia, to feel resentful. 13 China’s neighbors, however, many of whom were one time tributaries of the Chinese, want a continuing American role in the region in order to maintain equilibrium there rather than confrontation. Therefore, the United States will have to find ways to settle the inevitable disagreements that will arise with China without resorting to strategies of confrontation. Otherwise each may be faced with worst-case scenarios that could, potentially, spiral out of control. 14 Combining a balance of power strategy with a diplomacy of partnership may alleviate those disagreements that do arise. 15 Hopefully, the United States can do a better job in the conduct of its relationship with the People’s Republic of China in this century. There can be no doubt that the United States will continue to play a leading role in world affairs in the foreseeable future. Perhaps that role will be better played if the United States approaches its foreign policy with the understanding that there are limits to what it can do in terms of the exercise of power. It may

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also be that the traditional American view of the United States as a singular incarnation of virtue acts as an inhibiting factor on foreign policy decision making. Instead, a greater focus on geopolitics, international rivalries and ambitions while focusing on the construction of a global equilibrium through balance of power politics may serve as a better approach for the conduct of American foreign policy at present and in the future. While Americans will continue to believe in the exceptional nature of their country and their destiny to spread democracy and freedom to the rest of the world, this should not be the only basis by which the nation’s foreign policy is conducted. As Brzezinski has stated, “At the onset of the global era, a dominant power . . . has no choice but to pursue a foreign policy that is truly globalist in spirit, content and scope. Nothing could be worse for America, and eventually the world, than if American policy were universally viewed as arrogantly imperial in a postimperial age, mired in a colonial relapse in a postcolonial time, selfishly indifferent in the face of unprecedented global interdependence, and culturally self-righteous in a religiously diverse world.” 16 Additionally, the increasing number of competing ideologies and worldviews at present makes the understanding of cultural influences, prejudices, and stereotypes essential for dealing effectively with the challenges that have arisen and have yet to appear on the international stage in this century. Oversimplifying or generalizing about cultural differences can lead to false assumptions that can negatively impact policymaking. In order to overcome this challenge, and to bring about a balanced foreign policy, the American public must take a greater responsibility for shaping America’s place in today’s world. Sean Kay argues that successful “citizen engagement requires a deep sense of history, understanding international relations, and effective means of communicating perspectives derived from facts.” He notes several methods of engagement, from attending lectures, community programs, and involvement in local councils on world affairs, to careers in foreign and defense policy and honoring those who have served on behalf of America. He concludes by writing: The kinds of issues that are pertinent to the future of America’s role in the world also require citizens to challenge assumptions, question politically driven narratives, and insist that their leaders use facts to inform policy. It also suggests that the truest idealist vision is the cause of peace. Americans have a special role to play in balancing between idealist and realist policy approaches toward this basic goal. 17

The policies of the Theodore Roosevelt administration in regard to China serve as one example of how a limited understanding of cultures different from ours can affect the implementation of American foreign policy. The failure to develop a better understanding of those cultures and societies that are different from those in the Western world will only impede the imple-

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mentation of a foreign policy suitable for the twenty-first century. This is especially so in regard to Sino-American relations. Both countries must make a better effort to understand each other in order to find a basis by which they can get along. While idealism should remain a part of the American foreign policy vision, it must be balanced by a greater sense of realism in terms of its conduct. If the weakness of Roosevelt’s China policy was a stereotyped vision of China, one that was shared by the great powers in general, its strength was in his understanding of the limits of American power. As a result, Roosevelt conducted a diplomatic strategy designed to avoid involving the United States in an Asian conflict while trying to build a balance of power in Asia. By doing so, he hoped to prevent the dismemberment of the Chinese Empire and divert potential foes from casting a covetous eye toward American possessions in the Pacific, while keeping the door open for American commerce. This pragmatic approach toward the creation of equilibrium in Asia may well serve as a lesson for the present day. American idealism may not always be applicable to the foreign policy challenges of the present. The time has come, therefore, for a new realism to balance the Wilsonian idealism that has been a critical component of American foreign policy for the past century. That realism should be built around the recognition and acceptance that the United States cannot dictate solutions to the problems of the world, and that it may not be possible to achieve all of its foreign policy goals. Compromise, partnerships, careful diplomacy, strategic planning, and a balancing of interests, combined with a greater emphasis on understanding cultural differences, may be the keys to a successful foreign policy in this century. NOTES 1. Terry Lautz, “U.S. Views of China: History, Values and Power,” in The United States and China: Mutual Public Misperceptions, Douglas G. Spellman, editor, pp. 8–16. 2. Eliot A. Cohen, “History and the Hyperpower,” Foreign Affairs 83, no. 4 (July/August 2004): 59. 3. Tchen, “Notes for a History of Paranoia,” Psychoanalytic Review 97, no. 2 (2010): 270. 4. William N. Tilchin and Charles Neu, Artists of Power: Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson and their Enduring Impact on U.S. Foreign Policy (Westport: Praeger, 2005), pp. 42–43. 5. George Herring, From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations since 1776 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 376–77. 6. Kissinger, Diplomacy, pp. 38–43. 7. Kissinger, World Order, pp. 247–56. 8. Kissinger, Diplomacy, p. 54. 9. Brands, TR, The Last Romantic, p. 813 10. Kissinger, Diplomacy, p. 811. 11. Ibid., p. 830. 12. Ibid., p. 834. 13. Kissinger, On China, p. 456. 14. Ibid., pp. 457–58.

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15. Kissinger, World Order, p. 233. 16. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Second Chance: Three American Presidents and the Crisis of American Superpower (New York: Basic Books, 2008), pp. 215–16. 17. Sean Kay, America’s Search for Security: The Triumph of Idealism and the Return of Realism (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014), pp. 292–93.

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Index

Adams, Brooks, 34, 35, 37 Adams, John Quincy, 13, 208 Adee, Alvey A., 42, 65, 89, 93–97, 132 American Asiatic Association, 64, 126, 127 American battleship fleet, 179; world tour of, 148, 182, 184 American China Development Company, 111, 122, 127, 133, 134, 146, 206; Chinese railroad contract violations, 128–129, 133; sale of railroad concession to China, 130–133; violence against, 128; voiding of contract, 129 American-Chinese Treaty of 1894, xi American Federation of Labor, 113 American Trading Company, 65 Amur River, 55–56 Anderson, George, 121 Angell Treaties, 20, 112 Anglo-German Convention of 1900, 100 Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902, 62, 78, 83, 148, 156 anti-American boycott. See Sino-American Relations Aoki, Shuzo, 176, 177, 179, 180 Asiatic Squadron (Asiatic Fleet), 11 Askold, 93, 94, 96, 98 Ariel, 13 Barrett, John, 44, 119 Battle of Mukden, 102

Battle of Tsushima, 103 Beijing Conference, 54 Bell, J. Franklin, 126 Beveridge, Albert J., 23 Bowring, Sir John, 15 Bridgman, E.C., 12, 13, 14 Britain. See Great Britain British American Tobacco Company, 123, 142 British East India Company, 1, 2, 5 Bonaparte, Charles J., 125 Boxer Uprising (Rebellion), 1, 22, 24, 26, 38, 43, 45, 46, 53, 54, 83, 111, 119, 124, 127, 134, 135, 156, 199; Boxer Protocol, 26, 45, 199; Indemnity, xii, 26, 54, 65, 199; Indemnity Remission, xiv, 43, 146–147, 148, 150, 151, 157, 200 Burlingame Treaty, 16, 112 Cassini, Arthur Paul Nicholas. See Count Cassini Chiantung (Chentung) Liang Cheng, Sir,, 42, 76, 129 China, xi, xii–xvi; balance of trade, 9, 58; balance of power in, 165; “century of humiliation”, xv, 207; dismemberment, 17, 19, 24, 44–45, 80, 107, 142, 155; educational reform, 37, 111; economic reform, 58, 111, 148, 199; great power rivalry in, xii, 44–45, 54, 68, 154, 155, 225

226

Index

158, 159, 199, 201–202, 205, 206, 209–210; Hundred Days’ Reform, 19; internal weakness, 17, 24, 39–41, 81, 98, 199, 206–207; Ministry of Foreign Relations, 111; political reform, 111, 141, 148, 199; protection of American missionaries, xii, 21; “scramble for concessions”, xi, 24, 25, 99, 199; selfstrengthening movement, 18; social reform, 18, 111, 199; Tongzhi Restoration, 18; Zhongguo, 2 China-United States relations. See SinoAmerican relations Chinese: attitude about trade, 9–10; attitude toward Westerners, 2, 4, 5, 21, 124; definition of barbarians, 3; effort to offset Russian and Japanese interests in Manchuria, 148–151; law, 6–8; managing barbarians, 2, 3–5, 7, 10; nationalism, xv, 44, 123, 205, 208; worldview, 3 Chinese Eastern Railway, 64, 76, 92, 150 Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, 20, 115 Chinese Exclusion Act of 1902, 20, 113, 115 Chinese Exclusion Act of 1904, 113, 115–116 Chinese Foreign Office. See Ministry of Foreign Affairs Cixi (Dowager Empress), 19, 22, 42, 111–112, 148, 151, 160, 183, 193 Cohong, 6 Conger, Edwin H., 22, 41, 53, 57–58, 59, 60, 64, 65, 66, 68, 69, 71, 73, 74, 76, 78, 87, 88, 92, 93, 97, 102, 103, 128, 129 Conger, Sarah Pike, 22, 48 Coolidge, John Gardner, 129 Count Cassini, 62, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74 Cushing, Caleb, 14

Dutch, 2, 5; Dutch East India Company, 2 Dyer, Thomas G., 38

Dalian (Dalny), 65, 103, 141, 143 Dandong (Mukden), 78 Darling, Charles H., 94 Delano, Amasa, 1 Delano II, Warren, 12 Dent, Lancelot, 12 Denby, Charles, 24, 34–35 dollar diplomacy, 134

Hamlin, Charles S., 113 Han Dynasty, 8 Hankou (Hankow), 119; HankouGuangzhou railway concession. See American China Development Company Harbin, 145, 180, 191, 192, 193; Russian sovereignty over, 145–146, 157

Educational Association of China, 114 Emily incident, 7, 10 Empress Dowager. See Cixi England. See Great Britain Ever-Victorious Army, 17 extraterritoriality, 14, 96 Fisher, Fred D., 145–146 First Anglo-Chinese War. See Opium War Forbes, Paul S., 13 Foster, John Watson, 24, 114, 130 France, 24, 25, 54, 62, 78, 79, 88, 90, 99, 103, 154, 160, 169, 174, 176, 180, 182, 192, 193 Franco-Japanese Treaty of 1907, 144, 147 Friedlander, T. C., 125 Fuzhou (Foochow), 41, 113, 119 Geary Act, 112 Gentleman’s Agreement of 1907, 159, 175, 193 Germany, 24, 25, 37, 54, 62, 78, 79, 88, 90, 98, 99, 100, 154, 160, 169, 182, 192; as threat to world peace, 160 Goodnow, John, 93, 97 Gordon, Charles G., 17 Great Britain, 6, 8–9, 12, 14, 17, 24, 25, 26, 37, 60, 62, 69, 71, 74, 78, 82, 103, 143, 148, 159, 160, 167, 174, 180, 182, 192, 193 Gracey, Samuel L, 41, 113 Gracey, Wilbur T., 119 Griscom, Lloyd C., 103, 166, 169, 170 Guangzhou (Canton), 2, 5, 119, 121, 122, 123, 126, 127, 128; Western trade limited to, 2 Guangxu emperor, 19, 104, 151, 183

Index Harriman, Edward H., 118, 127, 148; world transportation line, 150 Hawaii, 37, 154, 174, 176, 184, 189, 193; vulnerability of, 208 Hay, John, xiv, 24, 26, 37, 38, 42, 53, 57–58, 60, 61, 62, 65, 66, 67–68, 69, 71, 72, 73, 74, 76, 77, 79, 80, 87, 89, 90, 92, 93, 94, 96, 97–98, 100–101, 106, 128, 129, 131, 156, 172, 204; death of, 104; failing health, 94, 96, 98, 166; Roosevelt’s criticisms of, 104–106 Hayashi, Tadasu, 176, 177, 182 Heaven-Earth Society Uprising, 18 Hippisley, Alfred E., 37 Holcombe, Chester, 22–23 Hong Kong, 14 Hong Xiuquan, 17 Hoppo, 6 Hundred Days’ Reform, 19 Huntington-Wilson, Francis, 142, 143, 209; opposition to TR’s China policy, 160; opposition to Root-Takahira Agreement, 182–183 Immigration Bureau, 117, 119, 127; reform efforts, 126 Imperial household, 5 Ingraham, G. W., 130 Italy, 90 Ito, Hirobumi, 168, 182 Jackson Administration, 10 James, Edwin, 147 Japan, xi, xiv, 2, 3, 15, 24, 26, 45, 46, 54, 60, 62, 69, 70, 71, 74, 77–78, 79, 82, 87, 89, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100–102, 103, 104, 121, 135, 156, 160, 165, 184; American-Japanese amity, 165, 192, 205; as civilizing agent in China, 186, 190; as threat to American interests, 48, 141–143, 144, 188–191, 204; counter to Russia, 45, 59, 154, 200, 202; foreign trade with U.S., 192; immigration crisis, 159, 166, 175, 177, 190, 191, 192–193, 206; influence of military class, 142; Japanese-Anglo-American alliance, 69, 170; threat to Chinese interests in South Manchuria, 142, 144; visit of American battleship fleet,

227

175–176, 179, 182. See also Open Door Policy Japan-Korea Convention of 1905, 168 Japanese. See Japan Jardine, William, 12 Jiji Shimpo, 143, 192 Kaiser Wilhelm II, 88, 89, 90, 98, 99, 100, 101, 106, 160, 182 Kaneko, Kentaro, 102, 173, 186, 188, 189, 191 Kang Youwei, 19 Kato Takaaki, 143 Katsura, Taro, 166, 168, 170, 173, 177 Kearny, Lawrence, 13 Kennan, George, 88 King Leopold II, 128, 129, 131, 134 Kokumin Shimbun, 170 Komura, Jutaro, 150, 177, 179 Korea, 45, 62, 77, 90, 93, 97, 150, 156, 167, 168, 177–178, 186, 188, 208; as Japanese protectorate, 168–169, 170, 171–173, 174; withdrawal of American legation from, 168 Landsdowne, 90 Lay, Julius G., 119–121, 122 Lee, Arthur, 183 Lessar, Pavel, 72, 73 Lianzhou, 134; attack on American mission, 111, 124 Liaodong Peninsula, 141 Liaoning (Fengtien) Province, 152 Liao River, 58, 71 Li Hongzhang, 23, 42 Lin Zexu, 12 Loomis, Francis B., 132 Lushun (Port Arthur), 65, 79, 87, 88, 92, 103, 141 Lodge, Henry Cabot, 37, 104, 106, 131 Macau, 2 Macartney, Lord George, 6; mission to China, 9, 10 Mahan, Alfred Thayer, 20, 34, 37 Manchu, 19; Manchu conquest, 4 Manchuria, xi, xiv, 25, 54, 69, 80, 90, 92, 111, 167, 177, 184, 192, 193–194; battleground in Russo-Japanese War,

228

Index

87; in Russo-Japanese war, 90, 97, 99, 100, 102, 104, 106, 107; Japanese acquisitions in, 141–142; Japanese administration of, 142, 143–144; Japanese sphere of influence in, 169; threat to Chinese sovereignty in, 157, 200, 205; lack of American concern, 144, 191; Russian acquisitions in, 56; Russian demands for concessions in, 57, 58, 60; Russian evacuation of, 57, 60, 65, 68, 74, 76; Russian settlements in, 56; Russian trade discrimination in, 65; Russian threat to Chinese sovereignty in, 145–146, 157, 199; Sino-Russian negotiations over, 60, 62; Sino-Japanese treaty of 1905, 141 Manchuria Daily Report, 142 Matheson, James, 12 McCaslin, James, 64 McCormick, Robert, 69, 70, 73 McKinley, William, 25, 27, 45, 53; McKinley Doctrine, 44 Metcalf, Victor H., 118 Miller, Henry B., 41, 58–59, 60, 62, 64, 65 Ming Dynasty, 3–4 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 4, 56, 111, 119, 122, 124, 129, 132 Ministry of Rituals, 5 Monroe Doctrine, 45 Morgan, J. P., 127, 129, 131, 132, 133 Mukden, 56, 78, 142, 148; MukdenAntung Railway, 144 Nian Rebellion, 18 Nixon, Richard M., 208 Niuzhuang (Newchwang), 41, 56, 58–59, 62, 65, 76, 121, 142, 152; Chinese Eastern Railway telegraph office, 64; Violence in, 62 Office of Border Affairs (Lifan Yuan) , 4 O’Laughlin, John Callan, 114, 177, 178, 179 Open Door Notes. See Open Door Policy Open Door Policy, xi, xii, xiii, xiv, xvi, 1, 14, 16, 24, 25, 27, 41, 44, 45, 54, 58, 61, 73, 99, 100–101, 102, 103, 104, 106, 107, 112, 113, 115, 146, 151, 158, 169, 174, 177, 179, 180, 184, 193,

202–205; American willingness for war over, 57, 70, 191; balance of interests, 186; British support for, 70, 74, 148; Chinese application of, 14, 127; contradictions and ambiguities in, xiv, 67–68, 80–83, 175, 202; impact of limited American commerce, 151–153, 161; international rivalries and, 107, 161; Japanese support for, 77–78, 142, 143, 179, 193, 202; Japanese threat to, 71, 142–143, 144, 148, 174, 191; link to Monroe Doctrine, 45; meaning of, 27, 80–81; moral aspect of, 57, 155; threat of Russian concessions to, 58, 60, 61, 65–66, 70, 71, 72, 77, 78; redefinition of, 155, 160–161, 165, 174–175, 191, 193, 200; retreat from, 67, 194, 200 opium: Chinese addiction to, 8 opium trade, 8, 199; American involvement in, 11–13, 16; ban on, 10; effect on balance of trade, 9, 199 Opium War: First, xv, 15, 199; Second, 16, 199 Osborne, Henry Fairfield, 38 The Outlook, 136 Panic of 1873, 112 Parker, Peter, 13, 14–15 Perkins and Company, 11 Perkins, George C., 123 Philippine Islands, 11, 25, 41, 113, 126, 154, 166, 176, 177, 179, 184, 186, 188, 193; reconsideration of annexation, 189; vulnerability of, 154, 166, 168, 169, 173, 190, 208 Pierce, Franklin, 15 Pierce, Herbert H. D., 64 Portuguese, 2, 5 Powderly, Terence V., 112–113 Price, Charles, 35 Price, Eva Jane, 35 Prince Qing, 71, 72, 74, 78, 103, 119 Qianlong Emperor, 9 Qing Dynasty, 4, 6, 9, 17, 18, 26, 27, 87, 111, 141, 199, 200, 206, 207–208 Ragsdale, James W., 92 Reid, Gilbert, 44

Index Reid, Whitlaw, 133 Reynolds, James B., 126 Roberts, Edmund, 10 Roberts, I. J., 17 Rockefeller, John D., 118 Rockhill, W. W., 37, 39, 42, 43, 45, 53–55, 57, 61, 66, 70, 74, 77, 79, 89, 90, 103, 104, 119, 122, 123, 124, 127, 128, 131, 132, 142, 146, 151, 168, 181, 182; proJapanese attitude, 88 Rodgers, James L., 121, 122 Root, Elihu, 37, 42, 43, 90, 130, 131, 143, 144, 146, 167, 179, 180, 181, 193, 194; as Secretary of War, 156; attitude toward China trade, 152–153, 156–157; attitude regarding China policy, 155–156; Korea as Japanese possession, 171–172; legalist viewpoint, 157–158; limited protests in defense of the Open Door, 186 Root-Takahira Agreement, xiv, 147, 157, 165, 176, 183; ambiguity of, 185, 193; Chinese reaction to, 181–182; effect on the Open Door, 186, 193–194; guarantee of American possessions, 193; impact on China, 194; international reaction to, 182; interpretations of, 184–185; isolation of China, 151; maintenance of Open Door, 176, 193; negotiations, 176–181; rationale, 181; significance of, 192–194, 205 Roosevelt, Alice, 123–124 Roosevelt, Theodore, xi, xiii–xiv, xv, 1, 27, 33, 35–37, 53, 58, 66, 70, 71, 76, 88, 89, 90, 93, 94, 96, 98, 99, 100–101, 102, 103, 104, 106, 112, 113, 114, 115–117, 118, 119, 146, 148, 153, 167, 168, 169, 176, 194, 199; and American China Development Company, 129–134, 206; attitude toward China, xiv, 37–41, 43, 46–48, 116, 118, 123, 134, 135, 136–137, 155, 200–201, 205–206; attitude toward Japan, 46, 153–154, 159–160, 166, 186–191, 202, 204; attitude toward Russia, 79–80, 158, 202, 204; awakening of China, 136; cultural racism, 205; failures of China policy, 207–208, 209–210;

229

imperial presidency, 169; importance of navy, 159–160, 179, 188, 189–190, 194; international cooperation in China, 46, 47, 135; Korea as Japanese possession, 172–173; Japan as civilizing force in China, 186–188; Japan as counter to Russia in East Asia, 45, 47, 59, 154, 158, 161, 171, 191, 205; Japanese threat to the Philippines, 186, 188–191; lessening of regard for the Open Door, 158, 186; pragmatism, xiii, xv, 1, 46, 81, 135, 203–204, 208–209, 210; recognition of national interest, 208; reconsideration of Philippines annexation, 189, 190; reaction to anti-American boycott, 124–127, 134–135; reaction to RootTakahira Agreement, 183–184; reaction to Taft-Katsura “agreement”, 167–168, 170; role in negotiations of the RootTakahira Agreement, 184; strategic thinker, 208–209; support for annexation of the Philippines, 189 Ross, Edward Alsworth, 38 Russia, xiv, 4, 9, 24, 25, 54, 58, 76–78, 79, 80, 89, 92, 96, 98, 99, 100–102, 103, 104, 156, 157, 165, 166, 169, 174, 176, 180, 182, 188, 193; threat in Asia, 42, 45, 56, 57, 58–59, 60, 65, 201–202. See also Manchuria Russians. See Russia Russo-Chinese Bank, 60, 62, 68, 76 Russo-Japanese Agreement of 1907, 144, 147 Russo-Japanese War, xi, xiv, 42, 79, 87, 90, 135, 137, 141, 148, 152, 158, 159, 161, 174, 188, 191, 200, 201–202, 204; American neutrality, 88, 90, 94; Chinese neutrality, 87, 89, 90, 92, 93, 96–97, 98, 101, 106, 107; Chinese participation in peace conference, 103; mediation, 88, 102, 103; peace conference, 102, 103, 104 Saionji, Kinmochi, 143, 177 Sammons, Thomas, 121, 142, 182 San Francisco Merchant’s Exchange, 125 Scott Act, 112 Shandong Province, 26, 142

230

Index

Shaw, Albert, 80 Sheffield, D. Z., 36–37 Shanghai, 24, 53, 93, 94, 96, 121, 122, 135, 152; violence in, 126 Shenyang (Antung), 78 Sinkler, George, 47 Sino-American relations, xii–xiii, xv, 11, 16, 17, 23, 24, 58, 71, 78, 111, 137, 147, 156, 191, 199; alliance with Germany and China, 160, 182; alliance with Japan and Great Britain, 70; American attitudes toward, xii, xvi, 19, 33–37, 41–45, 48, 154, 200, 205, 206–207; American exceptionalism as an inhibiting factor, 210–211; American investments in, xii, 127; American military weakness in, 1, 57, 67, 70, 78, 83, 151, 154; American missionaries in, 10–11, 12, 13, 14, 16, 19, 21–23, 33, 37, 136, 154, 200; American commerce with, xii, xiv, 1, 10, 11, 15–16, 23, 24, 33, 38, 46, 58, 59, 61, 65, 70, 79, 80, 102, 113, 114, 115, 135, 148, 151–153, 155, 156, 157, 161, 165, 205; American-Chinese partnership, 148–151; anti-American boycott, 39, 43, 111, 115, 119–127, 134–135, 146, 200; challenges in present-day Sino-American relations, 210–211; balance of power, 45, 47, 104, 137, 161, 165, 171, 173, 190, 205, 208; discrimination against Chinese, xiv–xv, 19–20, 124; immigration and exclusion, xi, xii–xiii, xiv, 11, 20, 23, 38, 39, 41–42, 111, 112, 113, 114–115, 117, 118, 119, 121, 146, 159, 205, 206; importance of understanding different cultures, 211; international cooperation, 46, 135, 167, 205; lack of public support for, xii, 1, 57, 69, 106, 151, 171; limited American security interests, 137, 153, 154, 161; limited response to threats to China, 65, 151–154, 155, 202, 203; limits to American power, 209, 210; maintenance of Chinese independence, 155; pragmatism, 66, 107, 135, 210; Sino-American Commercial Treaty of 1903, 77, 78; Sino-American

partnership, 165; Sino-American Treaty of 1894, 115; weakness of American position, 56, 202 Sino-French Treaty of 1858, 61 Sino-Japanese War, xi, 24, 199 Small Knife Society uprising, 18 Smith, Arthur, 147 Some Reasons for Chinese Exclusion , 113 South Manchurian Railway, 141 Spanish-American War, 23, 25, 34 sphere of influence (interest), xiv, 24–25, 45, 66, 67, 68, 80–81, 82, 141–142, 155, 167, 169, 175, 179, 186, 188, 191, 199, 200, 204, 206 Spring-Rice, Sir Cecil, 37, 38, 79, 186, 189 Standard Oil Company, 93, 121, 123 South Manchurian Railroad, 102, 103, 180 Straight, Willard, 148, 180, 209; and Harriman, 150; loan to China, 150, 151, 157; opposition to TR’s China policy, 150, 160; opposition to Root-Takahira Agreement, 182–183 Sternburg, Hermann Speck von, 37, 38, 45, 89, 98, 99, 133 Stirling, Admiral Yates, 94, 96 Sun Yat-sen (Sun Zhongshan), 111, 208 Taft, William Howard, 37, 43, 123–124, 126, 148, 160, 170, 191–192; as acting Secretary of State, 166, 171; Far Eastern tour, 165–167 Taft-Katsura Memorandum, 167, 175, 186; as executive agreement, 169; as exchange of viewpoints, 173–174; as formal agreement, 169, 171; as secret agreement, 169; as threat to the Open Door, 174; interpretations of, 169; Japanese leaks of, 170 Takahira, Kogoro, 76, 97, 146, 159, 170, 173, 177, 179, 180, 186, 189, 191 Taiping Rebellion, 17, 56, 112 Tang Dynasty, 8 Tang Shaoyi, 148, 157, 181, 182, 183, 193; Manchurian bank scheme, 150, 151, 157 Tianjin, 16, 56, 92 Tianxia, 2 Tianzi, 3 Tongzhi Restoration, 18

Index Townley, Walter, 74 Treaty of Aigun, 56 Treaty of Beijing (1860), 56 Treaty of Nerchinsk, 56 Treaty of Portsmouth, 103, 107, 141, 142, 146, 155, 158, 168 Treaty of Shimonoseki, 24, 61 Treaty of Tarbagatai, 56 Treaty of Tianjin, 16, 122 Treaty of Wangxia, 14 Train, Charles J., 125 tributary system, 3–4, 9–10 “triple intervention”, 25, 61, 79, 167, 169, 188 Tshingua College (University), 147 U.S.S. Boston, 13 U.S.S. Callao, 125, 128 U.S.S. Constitution, 13 U.S.S. Monadnock, 94, 125 U.S.S. Oregon, 94 U.S.S. Wisconsin, 94 U.S.S. Vicksburg, 59, 62–64 Ussuri River, 56

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Van Buren, Martin, 13 Viceroy of Guangzhou, 124, 132 Ward, Frederick T., 17 Ward, John, 16 White, Henry, 37 Whittier, Charles A, 128 Williams, S. Wells, 12, 13 Wilson. See Huntington-Wilson Wood, Leonard, 37, 41, 126, 188 Wu Tingfang, 42, 114, 115, 118, 136, 146 Xiamen (Amoy), 5, 97, 119 Yamen, 18, 111 “yellow peril”, xii, xvi, 20, 38, 87, 136, 186 Yentai (Chefoo), 124 Yuan Shikai, 87, 119, 148, 151, 181–182 Zhang Zhidong (Chang Chih-tung), 42, 119 Zhoushan, 5

About the Author

Dr. Gregory Moore is professor of history, director of the Center for Intelligence Studies, and the chairperson of the Department of History and Political Science at Notre Dame College in Cleveland, Ohio. He holds a doctorate in American Diplomatic History from Kent State University. Dr. Moore has published The War Came to Me: A Story of Hope and Endurance (2009) and numerous articles, including “The History of U.S. Intelligence” in Homeland Security and Intelligence (2010). He is also the editor of the Encyclopedia of U.S. Intelligence (2014). Dr. Moore served as a consultant for the NATO Humint Center of Excellence, in Oradea, Romania, serving as a subject matter expert, contributor, and coordinating editor for the COE’s publication, Human Aspects in NATO Military Operations (2014).

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