Decisions and Consequences in Japan’s Foreign Policy 0862383447, 9780862383442

Table of contents :
Theoretical Background ..............7
The Framework for Analysis ..............49

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Images, Decisions and Consequences in Japan’s Foreign Policy Kazuki Iwanaga

Lund University Press

Lund University Press Box 141 S-221 00 Lund Sweden © 1993 Kazuki Iwanaga Art nr 20300 ISBN 91-7966-249-8 Lund University Press ISBN 0-86238-344-7 Chartwell-Bratt Ltd Printed in Sweden Studentlitteratur Lund 1993

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements........................................................................... i 0. Introduction.....................................................................................................1 0.1 Purpose............................................................................................................ 1 0. 2 Outline......................................................................................................4 P art I: Theoretical Background................................................................... 7 The Interplay between Externaland Internal Determinants........................ 7 1. The State of the Art — Review and Critique..................................................9 1.1 External determinants: The dominance of the realist “paradigm”........ 9 1.2 The Neglect of Regional subsystems..................................................... 14 1.3 Internal Determinants: The National Level of Analysis....................... 17 1.3.1 The bureaucratic politics model............................................... 18 1.3.2 Foreign policy decision-making............................................... 23 1.3.3 Comparative foreign policy................................................- ..... 27 1.4 Individual level of analysis.................................................................... 34 1.4.1 Cognitive approach...................................................................... 34 1.4.2 Linkage between beliefs and foreign policy behavior................47 2. The Framework for Analysis......................................................................49 2.1 The need for multilevel explanations....................................................49 2.2 Research design............................................. r...................................... 50 2.3 Foreign Policy Restructuring................................................................ 60 3. Methodological Considerations...................................................................... 63 3.1 Data problems.........................................................................................63 3.2 Inference problems................................................................................ 64 3.3 Case studies: a research strategy............................................................68 P art II. Em pirical Analysis......................................................................... 74 4. Mutual Security Assistance (MSA) Aid........................................................ 74 4.1 Operational Environment...................................................................... 74 4.2 Decision Makers and Their Images....................................................... 80 4.3 The Decision Process............................................................................. 96 4.4 Implementation.....................................................................................108 4.5 Feedback............................................................................................... 124 5. The Soviet Union.......................................................................................... 132 5.1 Operational Environment...................................................................132

5.2 Decision-Makers and Their Images...................................................139 5.3 The Decision Process and Implementation...........................................151 5.4 Feedback................................................................................................ 176 5.5 Foreign Policy Restructuring................................................................180 6. The U.S.-Japan Security Treaty.................................................................... 183 6.1 Operational Environment......................................................................184 Tactical Decision 1 and Strategic Decision..........................................184 Tactical Decision 2................................................................................190 6.2 Decision-Makers and Their Images.................................................. 192 Tactical Decision 1 and Strategic Decision..........................................192 Tactical Decision 2................................................................................202 6.3 Decision Process and Implementation..................................................207 Tactical Decision 1 and Strategic Decision......................................... 207 Tactical Decision 2................................................................................234 6.4 Feedback................................................................................................241 7. China...............................................................................................................252 7.1 Operational Environment..................................................................... 252 Tactical Decision................................................................................ 252 Strategic Decision.................................................................................255 7.2 Decision-Makers and Their Images.................................................. 258 Tactical Decision................................................................................ 258 Strategic Decision.................................................................................263 7.3 Decision Process and Implementation..................................................275 Tactical Decision................................................................................ 277 Strategic Decision.................................................................................287 7.4. Feedback...............................................................................................306 8. Hypothesis Testing and Generation ofNew Hypotheses........................... 315 8.1 Japan’s Foreign Policy Behavior..........................................................315 8.2 General Foreign Policy Behavior........................................................ 316 8.2.1 Flexibility and Intensity of Images.............................................316 8.2.2 Information and Images...........................................................320 8.2.3 Images and Behavior Patterns.................. 322 9. Concluding Remarks...................................................................................337 Appendix.............................................................................................................341 Bibliography...................................... 342 Index....................................................................................................................367

Acknowledgements

Although responsibility for this study’s ultimate accuracy rests completely with the author, it could not have been written without the interest and the helpful and critical suggestions of many people. First of all I should like to thank Professor Christer Jonsson for his guidance, suggestions for improvement and encouragement. His supreme, expert knowledge of international relations and methodology has been a source of invaluable advice. Words alone cannot express my deep gratitude to him. I should also like to thank Associate Professor Anders Sannerstedt and Mr. Jakob Gustafsson at the Department of Political Science, Lund University, for reading my manuscripts thoroughly and making many useful suggestions. I have greatly benefitted from stimulating discussions with them. Mr."Dennis Westlind also at the Department of Political Science, Lund University, not only checked my English with great sensitivity but he also helped me with the formatting of the final manuscript. I owe a special debt of gratitude to Professor lino Yasushi of Keio University, a friend of long standing, for countless hours of discussion and for his encouragement. He has been invaluable to me for drawing my attention to relevant Japanese materials. Special thanks also go to Professor Bjorn Thalberg who read the initial draft of the chapters on theoretical backgrounds. He has also encouraged my work in various ways. Dr. Bertil Lundahl has deeply inspired me in the course of writing this study. He has also helped me with practical matters regarding formatting. My heartfelt thanks go to him. Last but not least, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my wife, Birgitta Ekholm, for her patience, assistance and encouragement without which I could not have completed the study. She had to live with it during the many arduous years of work on this project. By critically reading drafts of the dissertation at several critical periods, she also brought to the manuscript her clarity of perspective. This work is specially dedicated to her. The readers should note that in citing Japanese names, I have used Japanese style throughout, that is, the family name followed by the given name.

r

0. Introduction

0.1 Purpose

The present study has two main objectives. The first is to provide an adequate systematic explanation of Japan’s foreign policy behavior in the post-World War II era by analyzing specific foreign policy decision clusters. Besides the empirical rationale for this work there is also a theoretical motive. The ambition is to test and generate hypotheses and thereby contribute to theory development. The study combines the assets of theory orientation and empirical inquiry.1 The existing literature reveals that many studies of foreign policy have been concerned with surveying the bilateral or multilateral relations of the United States or the Soviet Union with other states as well as superpower relations. Such a decidedly superpower focus is not surprising, considering the importance of these two countries on the world scene. As Japan’s role in the world has expanded as a result of its economic power, its foreign policy has received increased scholarly attention. Japanese foreign policy is, however, typically studied in terms of idiosyncratic factors. It is often treated as something extraordinary with emphasis on unique cultural and historical circumstances. Unique as Japan may be, its foreign policy can only be compared to others within the conceptual categories of some theoretical framework. The emphasis in many studies of Japan’s foreign policy by Japanese scholars has traditionally been on descriptive detail, perhaps reflecting the strong Staatslehre tradition in the study of international relations in Japan. As Inoguchi writes, "In this tradition, top priority is given to supplying rich historical-institutional backgrounds and describing events and their

1 Brecher calls this synthesis structured empiricism. "It denotes the amassing o f empirical data on a foreign policy issue and their integration into a structured analytic framework." Brecher, 1974a, p. 4.

2

Introduction

consequences in detail."2 Only occasionally are these studies linked in some, way to social scientific models or theories. The emphasis on descriptive detail and the neglect of theories is due also in part to the historicist tradition in Japan which "renders the bulk of scholarship in International Relations akin to historical studies rather than that of social science."3 However, during the 1970s and 1980s, the “scientific” development of foreign policy analysis in the United States was to some extent mirrored in Japan. Scholarly endeavor in this field is still very much characterized as being essentially descriptive, narrative, and noncumulative in a theoretical sense.4 In any case, the objectives have not commonly been the testing and generation of hypotheses or the effort to develop a cumulative body of generalizations about state behavior. Without an explicit conceptual framework identifying concepts and the relationships of these concepts to the observed world, an empirical analysis, however insightful, can be little more than an unsystematic mass of insights and facts. To achieve the objectives of the present work, it is necessary to utilize an explanatory framework for analyzing foreign policy in both its theoretical content and its operational aspects. An explicit attempt will, therefore, be made to use a research design developed by Michael Brecher and his colleagues to shed light upon the clusters of important non-crisis foreign policy decisions in the postwar period and to test its utility in the Japanese context. The choice of this model is motivated by my conviction that it can add significantly to an understanding of Japan’s foreign policy behavior and by a desire to test hypotheses. The basic premise of this work is that a full understanding of foreign policy phenomena requires a multilevel approach linking within one framework different levels of analysis. Brecher’s systems framework uses variables on the level of the global system, the regional system level, the dyadic relationship with other nations, domestic politics, and individual decision-makers’ cognitive processes. It is, in my view, the only comprehensive approach that explicitly uses variables and categories from all these levels, with a capacity to ascertain the dynamic dimension of foreign policy decision-making applicable to both crisis and non-crisis decisions.

2 Inoguchi, 1989, pp. 252-253. 3 Ibid., p. 253. 4 For an excellent overview o f the study o f international relations in Japan, see Nihon kokusai seiji gakkai(ed.), "Sengo Nihon no kokusai seijigaku," Relations), Nos. 1-2, 1979. See also Inoguchi, 1989.

Kokusai Seiji (International

-

Introduction

I

3

The four cases I have selected span a twenty-year period and offer significant indicators of Japan’s foreign policy behavior. In each case, as my study demonstrates, political leaders (prime and foreign ministers) rather than bureaucrats played dominant roles in the processes of making decisions. Ever since Japan regained her independence in 1952, Japanese foreign policy has been oriented toward an alliance with the United States. The backbone of this alliance has been the U.S.-Japanese security treaty. Two cases focus particularly on this military alliance relationship and two cases deal with Japan’s relations with the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China. The country’s relations with the two powerful neighbors have often been seen in Japan as involving the question of “independence” or alignment with the United States. The empirical cases to be studied are all, to use Fukui’s term, “critical” ones. They were all “perceived to be watersheds in the foreign policy of postwar Japan involving ‘critical’ decisions.”5 According to Fukui, apart from a “crisis” situation, there are two types of decision-making situations: “critical” and “routine”. Critical cases share, more or less, two of three criteria of a foreign policy crisis as defined by Charles F. Hermann - restricted decision time and a perceived threat to important values, but not surprise. Only one case, Japan’s Soviet decisions, represents an instance of “foreign policy restructuring,” a particular type of foreign policy behavior where authoritative policy makers seek to change the total patterns of their country’s external relations.6 Thus the study is also concerned with understanding this neglected, although interesting, foreign policy phenomenon in the Japanese context. Studies have been done on various aspects of the empirical cases in question, but no empirical research has appeared in print that analyzes them in terms of a comprehensive framework combining variables at different levels of analysis with a view to test and generate hypotheses. This work represents a first effort at applying Brecher’s systems framework to the analysis of Japan’s foreign policy behavior. The present study has been undertaken with dual audiences in mind. This work’s main audience is fellow political scientists in general and students of foreign policy in particular. But the work is also intended for area specialists

5 Fukui, 1977, p. 61. For the detailed description of Fukui’s "critical case" decision making model, see Fukui, 1975, pp. 97-127. 6 Holsti (K. J.), 1982.

4

Introduction

and diplomat*c historians who are interested in infusing into their analyses political science methodologies and theories.

0.2 Outline

Before proceeding with the analysis of foreign policy decision-making in Japan, it is appropriate to say a few words about the organization of this study. It is divided into two parts. Part 1 deals with the theoretical and methodological aspects which provide the readers with a conceptual frame of reference. Part 1 is subdivided into three chapters. Chapter 1 takes a more selective look at various approaches and perspectives in the field of foreign policy and international politics which are necessary for understanding some of the theoretical and conceptual premises of the dissertation. Chapter 2 offers the framework for analysis in terms of which four clusters of foreign policy decisions relating to Japan are analyzed. Chapter 3 discusses methodological problems. My purpose in reviewing the field is less to offer the state of the art for its own sake than to provide a foundation for the chapters that follow. Nevertheless, there are good reasons for presenting the state of the art in the field of international relations and foreign policy relevant to this study. For one thing, since the publication of the model developed by Brecher and his colleagues in 1969, we have witnessed a proliferation of approaches and perspectives that may aid in developing explanations of state behavior. Their model should be examined in the light of the development of international politics in the intervening years. Accordingly, prior to presenting the framework used in this work, it is appropriate to review and assess relevant studies which are necessary for the understanding of underlying explanatory mechanisms in this study. The review is brief and selective since the scope of this chapter does not permit a detailed presentation of the field. It links Brecher’s framework to some of the most important work done on various aspects of that framework and shows how it builds on, or differs from, other models and theories. In short, it will explain why I have chosen to work with Brecher’s framework in this study.

Introduction

5

I believe that examining one level of analysis at a time, as will be done in the following chapter, is necessary for understanding why we cannot fully comprehend the complex forces determining foreign policy behavior by only using variables and perspectives from one level of analysis. This chapter is meant to point out both the merits and limitations involved in using the assumptions and concepts associated with each level of analysis ranging from international systemic to individual factors. I then argue for the need to combine international and domestic levels of analysis to understand more fully foreign policy phenomena. Moreover, since this study has been undertaken with a wide audience in mind - political scientists, diplomatic historians, and area studies specialists the theoretical section of my work provides an overview of the perspectives and approaches that political scientists have used in their studies on international relations and foreign policy. Area specialists and diplomatic historians have often been accused of putting too much emphasis on unique historical circumstances of a particular country. “Area specialists,” in Jonsson’s words, “tend to emphasize the unique and idiosyncratic features of their country or region at the expense of generic theories and hypotheses.”7 There has been only a small amount of cross-fertilization between the various disciplines.8 Diplomatic historians and area studies specialists who want to bring more scientific rigor to their research could fruitfully benefit from the methodology of political science. As Lauren once wrote: “Diplomatic history could become much more sophisticated and enriched by drawing upon theory, methodological experimentation, systematic analysis of phenomena, sharper identification of variables, and explicit definition of problems and concepts.”9 It is hoped that this section will make a contribution to such cross-fertilization. Part 2 is concerned with empirical analysis and hypothesis-testing. It consists of five chapters: Chapter 4, the MSA (Mutual Security Assistance) aid (agreed in 1954); Chapter 5, the normalization of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union 7 Jonsson, 1993, p. 156. 8 Ole R. Holsti wrote: "Universities and professional associations are usually organized in ways that tend to separate scholars in adjoining disciplines and perhaps even to promote stereotypes of each other and their scholarly endeavors. The seemingly natural areas of scholarly convergence between diplomatic historians and political scientists who focus on international relations have been underexploited....." Holsti, 1989, p. 15. See also Walker (W. O.), 1991, pp. 31-32. 9 Lauren, 1979, p. 14.

6

Introduction

(concluded in 1956); Chapter 6, the revision and extension of the U.S.-Japan security treaty (completed in 1960 and 1970 respectively); and Chapter 7, the China decisions (1971 and 1972). In each case, the perceptions, values and objectives of key policy-makers assume critical importance. To facilitate comparison, each of the four cases follows a common format. In each chapter, the various components of the operational environment are first analyzed, and an analysis of the perceptions of relevant decision-makers is undertaken. Analysis of the psychological environment is followed by an inquiry into the policy-making process leading to the formulation of decisions. The feedback effects and decision consequences resulting from the implementation of the decisions are then explored. In Chapter 8, some of the hypotheses which Brecher had drawn from the international relations literature are tested against the findings of the study. Chapter 9 summarizes the findings of the present work and assesses the implications of this study for future research and ongoing debates in the international relations literature.

Part I: Theoretical Background

The Interplay Determinants

between

External

and

Internal

Foreign policy analysts have been pondering the question as to the relative emphasis to be given external versus internal sources of foreign policy. It seems to me that this debate has recently been intensified in connection with the dramatic changes in Soviet foreign policy in the late 1980s, leading to the end of the Cold War: whether the changes in Soviet foreign policy were due to the “pacific” nature of the international environment, or whether they were primarily the result of domestic politics.1 The recognition that the state’s foreign policy is conditioned by both internal and external environments has been unevenly recognized in the international relations literature. The so-called “realist” school of thought emphasizes the external determinants. In this approach, the actions of other states are seen as the primary impetus for making foreign policy. Others focus attention primarily on internal sources of foreign policy. These include public opinion and organizational and bureaucratic influences on decision making. Still others focus on individual policy-makers’ perceptions and beliefs. Despite the recognition of the inability of each level of analysis alone to explain the state’s foreign policy, external and domestic sources of foreign policy have largely been treated as separate fields of inquiry with no or at best only a small amount of cross-fertilization between them. A number of scholars have recently emphasized the need for integrating international and domestic levels of analysis to provide a more satisfactory explanation of foreign policy behavior, security policy, or international trade p o licy .2 They have argued for the need for integrative explanatory See, for example, Deudney and Ikenberry, 1991-1992, pp. 74-118; Mendelson, 1993, pp. 327-360; Checkel, 1993, pp. 271-300. 2 See, for instance, Checkel, 1993; Putnam, 1988; Mckeown, 1991.

8

Theoretical Background

frameworks that deal with the interplay between international and domestic factors. In his attempt at uncovering the complex and dynamic interplay between external and internal determinants of foreign policy, Goldmann argues: “Ignoring the so-called domestic sources may lead to poor theories about international relations; ignoring the foreign sources may lead to erroneous theories about foreign policy... There may be something to gain from combining, in a more systematic fashion than is usual, theories about international systems with the study of domestic political processes, when attempts are made to find the sources of foreign policy.”3 Goldmann presents three models of the interplay between external and internal sources of foreign policy that offer analysts useful ways of thinking about and dealing with the complexities of the explanatory mechanisms. The models are analytically rendered as the additive, requisite, or information models depending upon the ways in which external and internal factors separately or jointly affect external policy. The additive model implies that external and internal variables contribute separately to explaining foreign policy and that the contribution of one variable cluster is added to the contribution of the other cluster. In contrast to the additive model, the requisite and information models (both are called “multiplicative model”) focus on the interconnectedness of explanatory variables. In the requisite model, the “sources” of foreign policy are internal, but it implies that their role cannot be understood without a consideration of external factors. In the information model, inputs from the external environment are the “sources” of foreign policy while the internal processes, which are the means by which the policymaking system produces outputs, are important in understanding the resulting policies.4 “The difference between them,” according to Goldmann, “is that in the requisite model the internal factors are treated as independent and the external factors as intervening, whereas in the information model it is the other way around.”5

3 Goldmann, 1976, p. 307. 4 Ibid., 1976, pp. 291-309. See also Jonsson, 1984, p. 30. 5 Goldmann, 1976, p. 302. Goldmann sets forth the foreign policy decision-m aking frameworks developed by Snyder and Brecher as well as the cognitive process approach along the information model lines. Ibid., p. 303.

1. The State of the Art — Review and Critique

In the analysis of foreign policy behavior, explanatory variables have been posited on several levels of analysis, each with distinct concepts and methodologies. Before fully explicating the explanatory framework I have used in this study, it is necessary to examine each level’s explanatory mechanism and its limitations separately. For purposes of this study, the following four levels of analysis can be advanced: (1) the international system as level of analysis; (2) the regional subsystem as level of analysis; (3) the national level of analysis; and (4) the individual decision-maker as level of analysis. The main theoretical assumption of this study is that, considered in isolation, each level is inadequate for fully understanding foreign policy behavior of states.

1.1 External determinants: The dominance of the realist “paradigm”

The international or global system level is the most comprehensive of the four.6 Systemic variables relate to the processes and structures of the global system such as the amount of conflict in the system, the distribution of power, and the interactive patterns. At this level of analysis, the focus is on the context of foreign policy making: the imperatives and constraints of the external environment. David Singer once argued:

Besides the items cited in the footnotes in this chapter, works at this level of analysis are presented or summarized in Morgan, 1987, pp. 241-276; Viotti & Kauppi, 1990, pp. 32-191; Brecher & James, 1986, pp. 3-18.

10

Theoretical Background By focusing on the system, we are able to study the patterns o f interaction which the system reveals, and to generalize about such phenomena as the creation and dissolution o f coalitions, the frequency and duration o f specific power configurations, modifications in its stability, its responsiveness to changes in formal political institutions... In other words, the systemic level o f analysis, and only this level, permits us to examine international relations in the whole, with a comprehensiveness that is o f necessity lost when our focus is shifted to a lower, and more partial, level.7

Realism has dominated the study of international relations for some 50 years. It tries to explain the behavior of states and the features of the international system as a whole. Although its proponents disagree on a number of issues, including conceptions of the nation-state, a few key elements seem to define its characteristics.8 Sovereign states represent the key units of analysis and are viewed essentially as unified rational actors. Realist theory is based on the premise of the anarchic nature of the international system: there is no higher authority that can constrain the behavior of individual states. Realist theory puts competition between or the conflicting interests of nation-states at the center of international relations. Realist writers therefore focus on military security and strategic issues.9 For realists who have stressed anarchy and the distribution of power among states as essential components of the international system, system-level variables are crucial because they act as constraints on decision-makers. In the late 1970s there was a resurgence of attempts to conceptualize and systematize the development of international systems on the basis of the postulates of the traditional realist approach in a rigorous “scientific” manner, particularly in the works of structural realists or neorealists.10 Structural realism is the currently dominant form of realism and its proponents are concerned with the international sources of international outcomes. The internal characteristics of nation-states, according to the structural realist

7 Singer, 1961, p. 80. 8 Differences among realists are particularly notable between classical realism and structural realism. For a useful summary of the differences within the realist tradition, see Mastanduno, Lake & Ikenberry, 1989, pp. 459-461. 9 Grieco, 1988, p. 488. 10 Most prominent exponents o f "structural realism" are Kenneth Waltz, Stephen Krasner, Robert Gilpin and Robert J. Lieber. Waltz, 1979; Krasner, 1978; Gilpin, 1981; Lieber, 1988. Gilpin questions the use o f the label "scientific." Gilpin, 1986.

The State of the Art

11

approach, are treated as given. The structural realists focus their analysis on the patterns of power relations among the great powers. The most influential structural theorist is Kenneth Waltz. Waltz, using the analogy of the market (the oligopoly structure), explains the structure of international politics by the interactions of the great powers. Waltz emphasizes the balance of power, international conditions and the crucial role of international context in determining what is feasible in foreign-policy making. Many theorists of international relations maintain that the global system determines state behavior. Some realists even contend that an explanatory theory of international relations is possible without a theory of foreign policy. They assume that the behavior of nation-states is constrained by the structure of the international system. Waltz, like other structural realists, is very sensitive to the level-of-analysis issue and asserts that systemic and nationallevel explanations are not merely incommensurable, but that only systemic explanations lie within the province of the study of international politics: An international political theory does not imply or require a theory of foreign policy any more than a market theory implies or requires a theory of the firm. Systemic theories, whether political or economic, are theories that explain how the organization of a realm acts as a constraining and disposing force on the interacting units within it.11

Waltz has criticized a number of system-level analysts for adopting a reductionist approach12; that is, “the whole is understood by knowing the attributes and the interactions of its parts.”13 For him theories of international politics that concentrate causes at national or lower levels are reductionist. He is critical of those who fail to make the distinction between a theory of international politics and a theory of foreign policy: “A theory at one level of generality cannot answer questions about matters at a different level of generality.”14 Research in the realist tradition assumes that domestic politics is unimportant or plays at best a minor role in influencing state behavior. Waltz, for example, argues: “It is not possible to understand world politics simply by looking inside of states... Each state arrives at policies and decides on actions 11 Waltz, 1979, p. 72. For Waltz s critiques of some systems-level analysts, see ibid., pp. 41-50. 13 Ibid., 1979, p. 18. 14 Ibid., p. 121.

12

Theoretical Background

according to its own internal processes, but its decisions are shaped by the very presence of other states as well as by interactions with them.”15 Arnold Wolfers provides another example. He asserts that foreign policy decision makers are little more than “automatons lacking all freedom of choice.”16 In other words, it matters little who makes the decisions. Those responsible for the conduct of a nation’s foreign policy behave as policy-makers in any other nation, in the same circumstances, would have behaved. Many analysts view the nation-state as a unitary rational actor whose external behavior can adequately be explained by reference to the systemic structure. Consequently, foreign policy is largely independent of domestic politics. Singer argued that overemphasis on the system as a whole, however, “tends to lead the observer into a position which exaggerates the impact of the system upon the national actors and, conversely, discounts the impact of the actors on the system.”17 Recently, a number of studies has questioned Waltz’s heavy emphasis on one level for understanding state’s behavior and realists’ assumptions regarding the separability of foreign policy and domestic politics and the motives of states.18 In their study The President and the Political Use of Force, Ostrom and Job, found that domestic politics, particularly the president’s standing in opinion polls, is more influential on the president’s decision to use military force than characteristics of the international environment.19 In reexamining Ostrom and Job’s arguments, James and Oneal note: The challenge to realism is evident. If they are correct, foreign policy cannot be disentangled from domestic politics, even at the heart o f realists’ concern - the realm o f national security affairs. If, as their research indicates, the desire to divert attention from a troubled economy is a greater influence on the decision to use force than the level o f international tension, assumptions regarding the importance of objective national interests are clearly undermined. Despite W altz’s denials.., a theory built on manifestly false premises would be of little interest to most political scientists...20

15 Ibid., p. 65. 16 Wolfers, 1962, p. 13. 17 Singer, 1961, p. 80. 18 For a critique of Waltz’s theory of structural realism, see Keohane, 1986. 19 Ostrom and Job, 1986. 20 James and Oneal, 1991, p. 308.

The State of the Art

13

Lagon, in his recent case study of the Reagan doctrine, examined the utility of structural realist theory, focusing on the international systemic level of analysis and found its explanatory power limited: Structural realism failed to explain fully the choice of action over inaction and failed almost completely to explain the choice o f an overt declaration o f assistance to the Mujahideen, the Contras, UNITA and the CGDK forces as opposed to covert aid programmes. While explaining the realm of the possible in terms o f parameters for choice set by the international system, structural realism does not explain the realm

of the desirable. How do states determine the outcome they desire? States are not purposeful. People are.21

Similarly, Sarah E. Mendelson, in her analysis of the dramatic changes in Soviet foreign policy in the late 1980s and the withdrawal from Afghanistan, argues that systems-level explanations based on structural realism cannot satisfactorily account for change in Soviet foreign policy.22 This level of analysis, in her view, ignores the domestic politics in the Soviet Union and results in treating the Soviet leadership as a unitary actor. A research strategy which concentrates on the international system level of analysis can provide descriptions of general contours of relevant systemic factors and processes, but cannot explain how foreign policies are made. Consequently, a focus on the international system arrives at a mechanical, billiard ball conception of international interactions. The actor in interaction then becomes a billiard ball whose behavior is totally accounted for by the action of other balls upon it. Such an explanation is too deterministic. Lagon contends: The state is not in fact a unitary rational actor responding mechanically to an international equilibrium or to some clearly definable objective interests. Real, live human leaders must answer these questions. The national interest is the product of the subjective beliefs of elites, not of objective realist theory.22

Systemic theories are criticized for their inability to explain specific outcomes or events in international politics. Structural realism, primarily concerned with the recurrence of a workable balance of power and the 1 Lagon, 1992, p. 68 (emphasis in original). 22 Mendelson, 1993, pp. 327-360. 23 Lagon, 1992, p. 65.

14

Theoretical Background

stability of bipolarity, cannot provide a satisfactory account for system change as, for example, the radical transformation of the international system in recent years has shown. Nor does it explain changes within states. As Christer Jonsson notes: The theories that seem to have fared worst as a result o f recent upheavals are the ’’grand” theories aiming at predicting global developments. For instance, Kenneth W altz’s (1979) theory o f bipolar stability foresaw the continuation o f the superpower confrontation. Robert Gilpin’s (1981) theory o f global change pointed to war as the principle vehicle o f restructuring o f the international system and predicted instability as a result of a Soviet challenge to US preponderance. And a whole body o f literature maintained that arms races most likely lead to war and emphatically denied that they might lead to disarmament and withdrawal from confrontations.24

If the international systems approach is to account fully for the causal link between action and reaction, it is essential to open the black box of decision­ making processes. Larson states: “International systems theory describes the range of outcomes of interactions between states that is possible within a given system, but it cannot explain how particular states will react to the pressures and possibilities inherent within the structure of the system. To increase the determinancy of the explanation, then, we must move to lower levels of analysis-the domestic political context and the individual policymakers.”25

1.2 The Neglect of Regional subsystems

Literature in the field of international politics has been dominated by grand theorists who focus on the “center” of the international system. A number of political scientists, feeling the need to fill the gap between the state and international systems levels of analysis, have attempted to devise frameworks for regional subsystems. Foreign policy analysis has tended to polarize 24 Jonsson, 1993, p. 152.

Jonsson, in his article, refers to W alt’s work Theory o f

International Politics and Gilpin’s War and Change in World Politics. 25 Larson, 1985, p. 20.

The State of the Art

15

between an over-emphasis on the role of global systemic factors and an over­ emphasis on the domestic political context. Since Leonard Binder directed our attention to the concept of regional subsystem in the late 1950s, a number of analysts have dealt with this concept. The regional subsystem approach has developed in reaction to a great or superpower focus which characterized the works of international relations specialists. Binder, referring to Morton Kaplan’s analysis of the international system, argued that his model “contained a ‘great power’ bias which could not effectively be used to explain the behavior of less-than-great powers.”26 Similarly, Brecher stated that analysts have been preoccupied with superpower relations or bloc relations: “There is an array of interstate problems, conflicts, and relationships among actors outside the blocs that have nothing or little to do with the bloc system.”27 More recently, Brecher wrote: “The initial attempts to integrate system concepts into international relations theory resulted in exclusive or predominant attention to the great powers in world politics: Kaplan, Hoffmann, Rosecrance, Aron, Haas, McClelland, Young, Waltz, and others meant by the concept of international system either the global system or, more often, the dominant system...”28 What is a regional subsystem? The regionalist literature reveals that there is little agreement among scholars regarding what constitutes a regional subsystem. Thompson, for example, listed 21 different attributes in his systematic review of the literature in the field and stated that consensus on the definition of a regional subsystem does not exist.29 Similarly, Russett argued: “There is no region or aggregate of-national units that can in the very strict sense of boundary congruence be identified as a subsystem of the international system .”30 A panoply of competing concepts has also been employed: subordinate international system, subordinate state system, subordinate system, regional system, regional subsystem and international subsystem.31 According to Cantori and Spiegel, the concept of subordinate system refers to “two or more proximate and interacting states which have some common ethnic, linguistic, cultural, social and historic bonds, and whose sense of identity is sometimes increased by the actions and attitudes of states external to 26 Thompson, p. 90. Brecher, 1963, p. 217. See also Morgan, 1987, p. 218. 28 Brecher and James, 1986, p. 6. 29 Thompson, 1973. 30 Russet, 1967, p. 168.

31 Thompson, 1973: Lampert, 1980, pp. 448-453.

16

Theoretical Background

the system.”32 Brecher listed six characteristics of a subordinate system: (1) limited geographical scope; (2) at least three actors; (3) recognition by others as a region; (4) internal recognition as such; (5) units of power inferior to the dominant system; and (6) greater effect on the subordinate system by penetration from the dominant system than vice-versa.33 He argued that there were at least five subordinate systems: the Middle East, the Americas, Southern Asia, Western Europe and West Africa. Haas defined an international subsystem as any subset of the international system and, revising a set of criteria developed by Brecher, specified three conditions for its existence: (1) delimited scope, “with primary stress on a geographic region”; (2) at least two actors; and (3) “a relatively self-contained network of political interactions between the members, involving such activities as goal attainment, adaptation, pattern maintenance, and integration, and dealing with power relations and military interactions.”34 Vayrynen specified the elements of regional subsystems and states that they should be geographical proximate, regular, display intensity of interaction, be externally and internally recognizable as a region, have a minimum size of three states, belong to a common regional organization and be subordinate to a global system or its core powers.35 Hellmann was less precise in defining a regional subsystem as “ ‘a pattern of relations among basic units in world politics which exhibits a particular degree of regularity and intensity’ plus an awareness of this pattern among the participating units.”36 Thompson, after examining 21 different attributes in the regional subsystem literature, suggests the following four criteria as necessary and sufficient conditions for a.regional subsystem: (1) The actors’ pattern of relations or interactions exhibit a particular degree of regularity and intensity to the extent that a change at one point in the subsystem affects other points. (2) The actors are generally proximate. (3) Internal and external observers and actors recognize the subsystem as a distinctive area or “theatre of operation.” 32 Cantori and Spiegel, 1970, p. 22. 33 Brecher, 1969, p. 117. 34 Haas, 1970, p. 10. Haas revised a set o f conditions developed by Michael Brecher. 35 See Vayrynen, 1984, pp. 337-359. 36 Hellmann, 1969, pp. 421-422.

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(4) The subsystem logically consists of at least two and quite probably more actors.37 None of the regional approaches have resulted in any widely accepted definion of what constitutes a region. Thompson made an inventory of 72 propositions concerning regional subsystem behavior and found that the study of regional subsystems exhibited immaturity and lacked a theory capable of explaining and relating the existing generalizations.38 Morgan also notes the lack of progress towards development of any theory on regional subsystems or even a widely accepted definition of region: ...theory on international regions or subsystems is still at a very primitive level, which is saying something in view o f the state o f theory in the field as a whole. Analysts have reached no agreement about how to detect or define a region and how to describe one when we find it. The larger question remains: Are regions each unique or can we generalize about all of them? Is a region a microcosm o f the entire world, so concepts and theories from one apply to the other? A s o f now, who knows?39

The global and regional systemic levels of analysis describe the processes and structures of a given system, but cannot explain how particular states will react to the opportunities and constraints inherent in the external environment. At these levels of analysis, little room is provided for consideration of “domestic sources” of foreign policy and the decision-making processes by which goals and decisions are selected. To go beyond the so-called ‘billiard ball’ model of international politics and provide a more adequate explanation, we must move to lower levels of analysis: domestic political contexts and individual policymakers’ cognitive processes.40

1.3 Internal Determinants: The National Level of Analysis The third, or national, level of analysis looks at international politics from the perspective of individual nation states rather than from the system of 37 Thompson, 1973, p. 38 Ibid., p. n s .

101 .

39 Morgan, 1987, pp. 218-219. 40 Larson, 1985, p. 20.

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Theoretical Background

international states in which they exist. Research at this level of analysis includes domestic determinants of foreign policy, that is, pressures and demands for decisions arising internally within the state under analysis. Included within the analysis are also organizational and bureaucratic politics models of foreign policy behavior, and systems approaches at the national level of analysis such as decision-making schemes.

1.3.1 The bureaucratic politics model

In an important study, Allison has demonstrated how three different conceptual models of foreign policy making, representing essentially three different levels of analysis (the international, the organizational, and the individual), when applied to the same decision produce quite different explanations of the outcome. The traditional approach to the analysis of state action has been to use what Allison has called a “rational actor paradigm” where “happenings in foreign affairs are conceived as actions chosen by the nation or national government” in order to “maximize strategic goals and objectives.”41 The focus of Allison’s rational actor model is in the international arena. In its ideal form the rational actor “is simply a value-maximizing mechanism for getting from the strategic problem to the logical solution.”4243 Allison asserts that most analysts of foreign policy explain and predict the behavior of national governments primarily in terms of variants of the ‘pure’ model. He also finds the rational actor model which emphasize a unified rational actor with a coherent set of goals of limited explanatory value. “Allison’s critique of the rational actor model,” in the words of Zagare, “has had a profound impact on the study of international politics, and rightfully so.”42 In order to comprehend the complexities of the decision-making process, the addition of something more than a rational actor model is imperative. Simon’s notion of “bounded rationality”, Lindblom’s “science of muddling through”, or the “garbage can” model of decision making developed by Cohen, March and Olsen are useful conceptualizations of the policy process that go

41 Allison, 1971, p. 32. 42 Ibid., p. 36. 43 Zagare, 1990, p. 239.

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beyond the assertion of the economic model of man that decision-makers choose courses of action that maximize their policy objectives.44 Decision-making theories quite often emphasize organizational and bureaucratic factors in explaining why a state acts as it does. In an important explication of decision units involved in foreign policy, Allison presents organizational processes and bureaucratic politics as alternatives to the unitary actor perspective. The focus of Allison’s second model, the organizational process model, is on the output of organizations functioning along the lines of standard patterns of organizational behavior. Foreign policy decisions in this model are determined chiefly from standard operating procedures of organizations. The explanatory power is thus “achieved by uncovering the organizational routines and repertoires that produced the outputs that comprise the puzzling occurrence.”45 In contrast to the organizational explanation, the main thrust of Allison’s third model, the bureaucratic politics model, lies in political resultants of complex bargaining games among players with competing interests. In other words, governmental action is viewed as the result of pluralistic conflict and consensus-building between individuals in positions in the bureaucracy: “The decisions and actions of governments are intranational political resultants: resultants in the sense that what happens is not chosen as a solution to a problem but rather results from compromise, conflict, and confusion of officials with diverse interests and unequal influence; political in the sense that the activity from which decisions and actions emerge is best characterized as bargaining along regularized channels among individual members of the government.”46 In order to understand the bargaining “games”, it is important to understand the positions, power and preferences of the players who are individuals viewing the political reality from particular positions in the organization. Central to Allison’s third model is an offical’s specific position in the bureaucracy, thus the much-cited aphorism “where you stand depends on where you sit.” George, in his book Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy, picks up on the theme present in the Allison work and identifies various sources of possible impediments to information processing in foreign policy decision making emerging from the bureaucratic politics model. Each bureaucratic Simon, 1957; Simon, 1985; Lindblom, 1959; Cohen, March and Olsen, 1972. See also Lundquist, 1987. 45 Allison, 1971, p. 88. 46 ^ id ., p. 162.

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Theoretical Background

actor acquires information about an issue that advances his own interests, evaluates policy alternatives according to his own parochial perspectives, resorts to oversimplification and rhetorical exaggeration in policy debates, employs his bargaining advantages to manipulate the flow of advice, restricts competition among bureaucratic actors in order to protect each other’s important interests, relies on policy routines and standard operating procedures developed earlier, and accordingly is unable to deal more decisively with foreign policy issues.47 Allison’s study of the United States’ decision making in the 1962 Cuban missile crisis initiated the conceptual reorientation of foreign policy research and was, indeed, the pathbreaking work on bureaucracy’s role in foreign policy making. Many of the ideas in his work have had a great impact on the study of foreign policy making and bureaucracy and the book still has wide currency in political science and related disciplines.48 In a recent article, Bendor and Hammond remarked: Prior to A llison’s work, most studies o f bureaucracy and foreign policy, though rich and informative, were largely descriptive and rather unfocused theoretically... Allison’s work demonstrated that a more selfconsciously theoretical approach to the study o f bureaucracy and foreign policy was both feasible and desirable. The earlier literature had rarely developed alternative explanations for events and decisions. But in formulating his three models - the rational actor, organizational process, and

governmental politics models, labeled I, II, and III, respectively - Allison showed how to make explicit the explanations o f events that had only been implicit in many o f these earlier studies. In so doing, Allison helped to place the study o f bureaucracy’s influence on foreign policy on a more scientific foundation 49

In spite of the enthusiasm and discussion sparked by Allison’s work50, this bureaucratic model of decision-making has suffered from a variety of critiques.51 Some of the criticisms directed toward the model concern the

47 George, 1980, pp. 112-113. See also Mandel, 1986, p. 260. 48 Bendor and Hammond, 1992, p. 319. 49 Ibid, p. 301. 50 For the bureaucratic politics model, in addition to Graham A llison’s Essence o f Decisions, see also Allison & Halperin, 1972. 51 Examples of critiques of the bureaucratic politics model include: Krasner, 1972; Art, 1973; Ball, 1974; Yanarella, 1975; Caldwell, 1977; Hermann, 1978; Rosati, 1981; Holsti, 1982;

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notion of the player’s power: it underestimates presidential power. Foreign policy is viewed as the result of bureaucratic bargaining between more or less equal bureaucratic players. Lindsay and his colleagues wrote: “Presidents set the tone of foreign policy. They select the senior officials in the bureaucracy, they determine who participates in decision making, and, most important, they make the final decision.”” Referring to the American system, Inouye argues: “It would be misleading to deal with a president as only one of the players just because he is conditioned in exercising his power in various ways. It must be clearly recognized that presidential power is qualitatively different. The President has the final word in most cases. Therefore, in analyzing the foreign policy-making process in the United States, we should focus upon the process in which the president gets involved in an issue and is influenced by other players, and how he exerts his power and persuades others to finally arrive at a decision.”5253 Closely related is the criticism that the pluralistic conception of actors presented by the bureaucratic process model is based on American experiences and case studies. American society and government are highly differentiated, complex structures which are composed of a vast variety of groups and interests.54 Inouye, however, argues that, “due to structural differences in the political system and the way it is operated, Japanese politics is more amenable than American politics to the application of the concept of actors presented by the bureaucratic politics model.”55 Inouye is too quick to conclude that the model is more applicable to Japanese policy making. The model is not suitable for important “critical” issues in Japan’s foreign policy as a number of case studies including this one clearly shows.56 I am inclined to agree with Jervis when he points out that the applicability of the bureaucratic politics model depends upon the importance of the issues at stake:

Inouye, 1987; Lindsay et al., 1992. A llison’s work also received high praise. See Rourke, 1972: Holsti, 1972; Bendor and Hammond, 1992. 52 Lindsay et al., 1992, pp. 6-7. 53 Inouye, 1987, p. 71. 54 See, for example, Wagner, 1974, p. 451. 55 Inouye, 1987, p. 58. Inouye argues that the bureaucratic politics model is particularly suitable to the Japanese setting. "This is mainly because Japanese leaders in politics and society have not been institutionally and culturally expected to assume such strong leadership as is usually displayed by American presidents." Ibid., p. 71. 56 See, for example, Heilman, 1968 and Fukui (H), 1974.

22

Theoretical Background Organizational perspectives and loyalties are less important when issues are unusual rather than routine, necessitate relatively quick decisions, and involve important and generally shared values. Beliefs about the most important issues o f foreign policy those involving war and peace - are usually unrelated to roles. When we look at the major decisions o f American foreign policy - those that set the terms for future debates and established the general framework within which policy was then conducted - it does not seem to be true, at least for the top decision-makers, that "where you sit determines where you stand."57

These criticisms suggest that the bureaucratic politics model omits the important role of psychological factors or individual perceptions to be entirely useful as explanatory theory. In looking at how foreign policy is made in the United States, Inouye asserts that: ...the core concept o f organizational position excludes or downgrades the important role o f individuals’ perceptions..., which are not so uniform as to be easily replaced by the concept o f position. The concept o f position applies only to career bureaucrats and to certain issues. It is bread-and-butter issues that make these career bureaucrats active players. And only for such issues which affect organizational stakes, the organizational position determines the stance o f each player. Even in these cases, it requires a president’s inattention or a low degree o f his involvement for the nature o f bureaucratic politics to be highly conspicuous. These conditions are very severe, and rarely met. Therefore, the spheres in which the model is operative are limited...the bureaucratic politics model lacks the psychological viewpoint, which is indispensable if we attempt to analyze and explain governmental behavior.58

Bendor and Hammond argue that, while Allison’s study has received considerable critical attention, there has been little systematic examination of the internal logic of his three models. They conclude that “a close examination of these models shows that they are much less rigorously formulated than is generally recognized, that the derivations are in some cases wrong and in others do not follow from the models, and that the meaning of the empirical tests is often quite ambiguous.”59

57 Jervis, 1976, p. 26. 58 Inouye, 1987, pp. 71-72. 59 Bendor and Hammond, 1992, p. 318.

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Hermann and Hermann explore the effects of policy-making in the individual as well as the small group and organizational context on foreign policy behavior.60 Actors with the ability to commit the resources of the government and the power to prevent other entities within the government from reversing their position are referred to as “ultimate decision units.” The Hermanns identify three types of decision units: predominant leaders, single groups, and multiple autonomous actors. The unit may change depending on the issue under consideration and across time. They suggest that the decision­ making process in each type of unit “channels and molds the impact of the wider domestic and international environment on foreign policy behavior.”61 By determining which of the three types is the ultimate decision unit for a specific foreign policy issue, we can also say something about the conditions under which bureaucratic politics are more powerful as sources of explanation than psychological variables. For example, to the extent that multiple autonomous actors are the ultimate decision unit, the less potent will be the psychological variables in explaining outcomes and more relevant will be a bureaucratic perspective. Likewise, if the ultimate decision unit is a predominant leader, then all the more potent will be psychological variables in explaining foreign policy behavior. When the ultimate decision unit is a single group, information on the promptness with which the group can achieve consensus is essential. Prompt consensus is more likely if the group members are cohesive, sharing similar values and perceptions of reality.

1.3.2 Foreign policy decision-making

Although systems approaches in international politics have primarily worked at the international system level of analysis, they have also been employed to study national-level foreign policy. The real break-through in foreign policy research came only when Snyder, Bruck and Sapin published a monograph in 1954 (1962 in book form) setting forth a decision-making framework along systems line. It incorporated explanatory variables at different levels of analysis and was intended to link in their decision making framework individual policymakers, states, and the international system. This was

60 Hermann and Hermann, 1989: Hermann, Hermann and Hagan, 1987. 61 Hermann, Hermann and Hagan, 1987, p. 335.

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Theoretical Background

achieved by indicating that only human beings, not nation-states, make political decisions and that national interests and purposes had no position apart from what authoritative decision makers said they were.62 The question of why a state behaves as it does is answered by analyzing both how the decision-makers define the situation as well as the factors that influence the decision-makers’ perception of reality. The definition of the situation is built around the projected action as well as the reasons for the action. Snyder and his associates contended that “the key to the explanation of why the state behaves as it does lies in the way its decision-makers as actors define their situations.”63 Decision-making was conceived as a cognitive and evaluative process which occurs within an organizational setting and is affected by various components of the external and internal setting. Snyder and his associates define decision­ making as “a process which results in the selection from a socially defined, limited number of problematical, alternative projects of one project intend to bring about the particular future state of affairs envisaged by the decision­ makers.”64 The intellectual origins of Snyder’s decision-making scheme are, in the words of Holsti, “partly to be found in a fundamental dissatisfaction with the unitary rational actor premises of the ‘realist’ approach that had been dominant since roughly the late 1930s or early 1940s.”65 By incorporating insights and concepts from other disciplines into a scheme for foreign policy analysis, they made a great impact on the study of foreign policy. The introduction of the decision-making approach was, as Rosenau once described, a breath of fresh air into the field of international relations.66 By focusing on foreign policy decision-making at the micro level, it also represented both a reaction and a challenge to the institutional modes of analysis which had previously dominated foreign policy studies.67

62 Snyder et al., 1962, pp. 14-185. See also Steiner, 1977, pp. 389-422. 63 Richard C. Snyder et al., "Decision-making as an Approach to the Study o f International Politics," in Foreign Policy Decision Making, 1962, p. 65. 64 Ibid., p. 90. 65 Holsti (Ole R.), 1982, p. 80. 66 Rosenau, "The Premises and Promises o f Decision-M aking Analysis," in James C. Charlesworth (ed.), Contemporary Political Analysis, New York: The Free Press, 1967, pp. 189-211. 67 Cohen, 1975, p. 389.

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In rejecting the rational model, Snyder adopted a “phenomenological approach.”68 Such an approach assumes that explanations of foreign policy decisions can only be made when the analyst ignores his own perspective and adopts the perspective of the decision-maker instead. Thus Paige, who employed Snyder’s scheme, argues that the foreign policy analyst “should attempt to reconstruct decision-making events as far as possible from the point of view of decision makers themselves.”69 The work of the Sprouts provide the most useful cutting edge with which to analyze the interplay between environmental and psychological factors. In their ecological approach to the study of foreign policy, Harold and Margaret Sprout have pointed to the distinction between the psychological environment and the operational environment of foreign policy makers. How policy makers perceive the environment is the central matter of importance in defining choices and making decisions. The operational environment has an impact only after decisions are made and implemented. In trying to explain the outcome of a decision, the analyst must also take into consideration the environmental factors that affect the results of any decision, regardless of whether these factors are perceived by policy makers.70 Snyder, Brack and Sapin have made a similar contrast, but their foreign policy framework has restricted its attention to the psychological environment. The emphasis of this framework is, therefore, to observe the situation as the decision makers perceive it, not as the researchers see it objectively. Snyder claims that the operational environment will eventually force itself to the decision-maker’s attention: We make a basic choice to take as our prime analytical objective the recreation of the “social world” o f the decision-makers as they view it. Our task is to devise a conceptual scheme which will help us to reconstruct the situation as defined by the decision-makers.71

In their decision-making framework, Snyder and his associates asserted that foreign policy can be explained by indicating how features of three sets of stimuli - the “external setting”, the “internal setting”, and the “decision-making process” - can be related to the cognitive and evaluative activities of decision­ makers. Furthermore, they maintained that three categories of variables of the 68 Snyder, 1958, p. 11. 69 Paige, 1968, p. 7. 70 Harold and Margaret Sprout, 1969, pp. 41-56. 71 Snyder, 1958, p. 17.

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Theoretical Background

decision-making process influence the choices made by those capable of making binding decisions for the state. These are spheres of competence, communication and information, and motivation. This conceptual framework has been subjected to a series of critiques.72 Much of the criticism directed toward this decision-making approach concerned its comprehensiveness. The initial formulation was the most comprehensive as it tapped aspects of all conceivable variables that may be presumed to have a causal role in determining foreign policy decisions.73 This is probably one of the key shortcomings of the framework. The data requirements of their scheme are excessive. Brecher writes: The most serious difficulty relates to the application o f this model. The number o f variables is overwhelming - actors, perceptions, values, motivation, spheres o f competence, the structure o f the international system, etc., and many o f these are not researchable. The quantity o f data that must be processed is enormous. Not by chance, perhaps, only one significant case study has appeared in more than a decade... The extraordinary complexity o f this model has made research difficult; the burdens o f an imaginative enterprise have been excessive.74

Other critics of the Snyder, Bruck and Sapin scheme have dwelled on the extent to which the framework ignored the relevance of the operational environment. Michael Brecher, for example, spoke of the scheme: “Snyder et al...accept the Sprouts’ distinction between operational and psychological environments but...they ignore the former as irrelevant. This is a grave weakness of their model, for, while the operational environment cannot influence choice except as decision-makers define their situation, it can and does affect the outcome of decisions, with feedback consequences for subsequent choices.”75 In other words, there is no way of “measuring the degree of congruence between elite perceptions and reality.”76 The framework

72 The decision-making framework was applied by Glenn D. Paige, The Korea Decision (New York: Free Press 1968). 73 See, for example, Brecher et al., 1969, p. 78; Inouye, 1986a, p. 152. Andriole and his colleagues, however, question the comprehensiveness o f the framework developed by the Snyder team: "The framework identified a fairly large number o f internal process variables, to the neglect o f external ones." Andriole et al., 1975, p. 170. 74 Brecher et al., 1969, p. 78. 75 Ibid., p. 77. 76 Ibid., pp. 77-78.

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was also criticized because of its “indifference to feedback and ongoing process”, its failure to suggest “if-then” hypotheses, its lack of attention to the interrelationships among variables, and its exclusively phenomenological focus.77 Nonetheless, Snyder’s framework initiated a shift in analytic focus away from the abstract state by suggesting that our analyses be built on the decisions and the policymakers’ perceptions. The scheme seems most appropriate to instances in which the time covered by the decision-making process is very short and where there are a small number of easily identifiable decisions. Snyder’s research scheme thus seems most suitable for the analysis of single-case, crisis-like decisions. But much of foreign policy does not meet these requirements. Whereas the Snyder scheme is probably applicable to crisis decisions where the empirical materials are limited, its comprehensiveness makes it inapplicable to non-crisis protracted policymaking processes. The decision making approach as developed by Snyder, which does not assign relative weights to the variables of the model ask the researcher to collect data for every category, frequently a difficult task, if at all possible. Theorizing about any phenomenon requires simplification. Conceptual frameworks, if they are to be useful in research, must limit, not increase the burden. As Kaplan states: Science always simplifies; its aim is not to reproduce reality in all its complexity, but only to formulate what is essential for understanding, prediction, or control. That a model is simpler than the subject-matter being enquired into is as much a virtue as a fault, and is in any case inevitable.78

1.3.3 Comparative foreign policy (CFP) While the decision-making scheme developed by Snyder and his associates ignores the relevance of the operational environment and focuses exclusively on the psychological environment, the research orientation of the comparative foreign policy ’’paradigm” typically ignores the latter as irrelevant. This section first presents the major assumptions and premises of the CFP research

77 Rosenau, 1971, pp. 270-271; Cohen, 1975, p. 389; Andriole et al., 1975, p. 170; Inouye, 1986a, pp. 150-155. 78 Kaplan (A), 1964, p. 280.

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Theoretical Background

movement and then shows why it can not adequately account for foreign policy behavior. Decision-making models have been oriented to explaining particular decisions, not to permitting us to characterize policy making in general. Dissatisfied with the limitations inherent in idiographically oriented decision­ making studies, especially their inability to discern patterns of behavior which are dependent upon the observation of a class of events, and aspiring to “scientific” rigor in their studies of foreign policy, an increasing number of political scientists had turned to the comparative foreign policy approach. In an effort to make broad generalizations about various types of foreign policy behavior, the comparative study of foreign policy (CFP) as a field of inquiry opted for the nomothetic orientation. “The main thrust of the new comparative foreign policy analysis,” Hansen wrote, “has been to move the study of foreign policy from idiographically oriented analysis to the nomothetically oriented theory construction and testing already embarked upon by all the other social science subdisciplines.”79 The comparative foreign policy approach has established wide currency in the late 1960s and early 1970s among scholars of foreign policy. It has treated the society-as-actor and attempted to explain variations in the foreign policies produced by societies. Despite initial excitement among foreign policy analysts over the potential of the comparative study of foreign policy, it has not carried our understanding of foreign policy very far. The goal of CFR research was to discover common patterns and processes in the foreign policies of states and, ultimately, to achieve a nomothetic and causal theory of foreign policy. The way to this goal was through cross-national comparisons, quantification, and events data. Since the common methodological strategy of CFP was comparison, single-case studies were denounced as scientifically useless.80 To an extent the reliance on a particular type of data, events and national attribute data reduces the need to gather information on decision-makers’ perceptions, attitudes and values. In an effort to create a parsimonious model they rejected the phenomenological approach and instead opted for a strategy where the 79 Hansen, 1974, p. 144. 80 Patrick McGowan, for example, wrote: "One does not have to use numbers to generate scientific findings, but one has to be comparative to make such findings. Many excellent scholars have failed to appreciate this and they have continued to do single country case studies, although it is easy to demonstrate the scientific uselessness o f such research." Cited in Mouritzen, 1988, p. 410.

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variables should be as few as possible.81 As Rosenau, who can be regarded as having pioneered the CFP approach, states, “it seems both inappropriate and misleading to place the perceptual world of decision-makers at the core of the comparative study of foreign policy.”82 By assuming away cognitive variables, they hoped to create a parsimonious model of comparative foreign policy. The comparativists reasoned that the gain in explanatory power generated by the inclusion of cognitive and decision-making variables do not compensate for the increased complexity of the model. Therefore, the comparativists accepted a loss of detail in an effort to achieve their nomothetic generalizations. Rosenau has influenced much of analytical thinking about the comparative study of foreign policy: “it is beyond question that Rosenau’s pre-theories essay and subsequent writing and organizing activity resulted in the selfconscious emergence of CFP as an area of inquiry.”83 Rosenau argued that the most fruitful approach to a cumulative science of foreign policy is the one in which the phenomena of foreign policy behavior can be treated in terms of testable, “if-then” hypotheses. He also argued that foreign policy can be fruitfully considered as a form of adaptive behavior.84 Rosenau, in his “pre-theory” of foreign policy, outlined the basic variable clusters that can be thought to cause foreign policy behavior: idiosyncratic (later called individual), role, governmental, societal, and systemic.85 The process by which policies are selected, however, is conceptualized as a black box within the actor. It is influenced by all five variable cluster. Foreign policy making as a process remains an unexamined sequence of events acted upon by the five variable clusters. • In his framework for the comparative analysis of foreign policy, Rosenau ranked the potency of these variable clusters for different types of societies and issue areas.86 Rosenau’s framework posits the type of society and issueareas as intervening variables between a cluster of independent variables and the dependent variable. It explicitly deals with such ‘genotypic’ variables as size, economic development, and political system. Rosenau introduced the 81 The literature on comparative foreign policy is fairly extensive. Some works include Rosenau, 1968; McGowan and Shapiro, 1973; Rosenau, 1974; East, Salmore, and Hermann, 1978; Wilkenfeld, Hopple, Rossa, and Andriole, 1980. 8/ Rosenau, 1974, p. 19. See also Jonsson, 1982, p. 1. 83 Hermann and Peacock, 1987, p. 23. 84 A s to the research history o f the adaptive politics field, see Mouritzen, 1988. 85 Rosenau, 1966. 86 Ibid..

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Theoretical Background

concept of issue area into comparative foreign policy studies. The concept suggests that foreign policy behavior and decision making structures vary from one issue area to another. The concept of a “penetrated” system, according to Rosenau, is necessary to understand the fusion that occurs as the rigid distinction between national and international systems breaks down. A penetrated political system is defined by Rosenau as one in which “nonmembers of a national society participate directly and authoritatively, through actions taken jointly with the society’s members, in either the allocation of its values or the mobilization of support on behalf of its goals.”87 He suggested shortage of capabilities on the part of the penetrated society within its economy, military, or society and that an effort to take advantage of this shortage underlies the participation of non­ members in its politics. Rosenau in his later work restricted penetrative processes to those where “members of one polity participate in the political processes of another. That is, they share with those in the penetrated polity the authority to allocate its values.”88 Hanrieder finds Rosenau’s definition unnecessarily restrictive: “Its stress on authoritative participation of nonmembers renders it strongly institutional, and it cannot accommodate the penetration of national systems by external events and trends that takes place without the direct and authoritative participation of nonmembers.” Hanrieder redefines a penetrated system as the one in which “its decision-making process regarding the allocation of values or the mobilization of support on behalf of its goals is strongly affected by external events, and...it can command wide consensus among the relevant elements of the decision­ making process in accommodating to these events.”89 The debate between Rosenau and Hanrieder over whether a penetrated system requires the physical presence of nonmembers has continued. More recently, DeHaven, like Hanrieder, questions the usefulness of Rosenau’s definition of a penetrated system that requires the physical presence of nonmembers: Because o f this restrictive definition, penetration has primarily been used to explain the structural position o f underdeveloped economies in the world capitalist system. This was especially true o f the radical approaches to dependency theory o f the late 1960s and early 1970s. Consequently, use o f the penetration concept has assumed

87 Ibid., p. 65. Emphasis deleted. 88 Rosenau, 1969, p. 46. 89 Hanrieder, 1967, p. 979.

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a decidedly Third World focus that concentrates more on the effects o f economic variables at the expense o f traditional political concerns.90

It seems ill-suited to an understanding of the linkage between domestic and international political forces in developed countries since the political systems of the Western industrialized world “generally possess the capabilities at home and abroad to thwart the most obvious and pernicious manifestations of external influences that Third World nations experience.”91 DeHaven maintains that Hanrieder’s broad definition of penetration makes it possible to analyze the interactions of foreign policies in developed countries.92 In this context, a work by K. J. Holsti on a particular type of foreign policy change, “foreign policy restructuring”, should be noted. He presents interesting and useful ways of dealing with the complexities of the restructuring process - how some countries adopt a new foreign policy orientation in response to extensive external penetration.93 Since its heyday in the early 1970s, the comparative foreign policy research movement has declined greatly. The reasons for the decline of the movement have been summarized by Jonsson : Whereas the early calls for nomothetic rather than idiographic orientation, scientific rigour and statistical treatment o f data met with considerable enthusiasm, the subdiscipline is now accused o f using deterministic logic for indeterminate phenomena, o f confusing correlation with causation, o f selecting variables in terms o f their quantifiability, and o f using simple indicators o f multidimensional concepts. Comparative foreign policy studies have come to rely heavily on ‘events data’ o f debatable validity as indicators o f the dependent variable ‘foreign policy’. And in order to facilitate across-the-board comparisons and statistical methods, remote ecological factors have typically been chosen as explanatory variables. In such research designs there is no place for cognitive variables.94

90 DeHaven, 1990, p. 90. 91 Wittkopf and DeHaven, 1987, p. 435. See also DeHaven, 1990, p. 90. DeHaven’s recent study offers a framework for testing Soviet political penetration o f West Germany and Great Britain. 92 Dehaven, 1990. 93 Holsti (K. J.), 1982. 94 Jonsson, 1982, p. 1.

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Theoretical Background

Several scholars have modified Rosenau’s pre-theory framework, stimulating a number of empirical studies.95 There have been a series of critiques of Rosenau’s approach. Stephens, Petersen, and Smith have pointed out that it is vague in conceptualization.96 Brecher finds the variable categories suggested by Rosenau ambiguous. Moreover, “there is no notion of an inputoutput system nor of feedback; the concern is primarily with policy outputs,” he continues.97 Rosenau himself, later, characterized his “pre-theory” as deficient because it is “time-bound”: “It was overly simple in its reliance on the natural sciences and the aspiration to a cumulative theory that can be applied to any actor at any time.”98 He also admitted that it was a static model: “At the core of the Pre-Theory’s failure was a static conception of authority structures, both within and between societies...it treated the world as frozen into a structure comprised of nation-states which had governments that interacted through an activity called foreign policy.”99 “The Pre-Theory," he continued, "suffered from an imprecise formulation of what constitutes foreign policy.”100 As noted earlier, an important shortcoming of Rosenau’s model, however, is that the foreign policy decision-making process by which goals and policies are chosen is conceptualized as a black box within the state. This represents perhaps the most serious weakness of the comparative foreign policy approach in general. Its quest for parsimony seems to undercut the usefulness of CFP approach. As Smith has pointed out “...the most serious problem with the approach, and one which appears to limit its utility, is that it omits the area of decision-making.”101 A growing number of comparativists have called for the need to open up the black box of decision making.102 As Powell, Purkitt and Dyson have described: ...the effort to develop a comparative theory o f foreign policy at the micro level has been slowed by a lack o f systematic research on how decision makers achieve an understanding o f a problem, make choices, and justify those decisions to relevant

95 See, for example, Hansen, 1974, and Petersen, 1977. 96 Stephens, 1972; Petersen, 1977; Smith, 1981. 97 Brecher et al., 1969, p. 79. 98 Rosenau, 1984, pp. 251. 99 Ibid. 100 Ibid., p. 252. 101 Smith, 1981, p. 121. 102 See, for example, Powell, Dyson and Purkitt, 1987; Kegley, 1987; Anderson, 1987.

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client groups. Without such research, significant progress toward a general theory o f foreign decision making is unlikely. More needs to be known about how individual decision makers use cognitions...to process information. Comparative foreign policy knows more about situational, organizational and systemic factors having the potential to influence decision output than about how policy makers gain problem understanding and select problem responses in specific decisionmaking situations.103

Inouye, a Japanese political scientist, has pointed out that Rosenau’s pre­ theory model contains a serious weakness itself, the omission of cognitive variables. Inouye observes: It must be pointed out that this type o f framework cannot accommodate the psychological dimensions o f individual decision-makers even though the model contains a cluster o f individual variables that distinguish individual policy choices or behavior from those o f other decision-makers.104

Similarly, Kegley, more recently, has characterized the CFP research movement as deficient because it “has become imprisoned ...by its overwhelming reliance on a particular kind of data, events and national attribute data,” and it has not paid “systematic attention to the foreign policy­ making process: to the decisions and the policy makers who make them.”105 “Only by incorporating decision-making-level phenomena,” he continues, “can domestic and international factors be causally linked to foreign policy behavior.”106 Smith is even more pessimistic. He concludes that “the approach presents such serious problems as to make any hope of successfully reformulating the approach a vain one.”107 Voicing dissatisfaction with the development of CFP research, a number of comparativists are calling for a return to the cognitive research tradition in foreign policy analysis initiated first by Snyder, Buck and Sapin in 1954. Mefford observes: 103 Powell, Dyson and Purkitt, 1987, p. 203. 104 Inouye, 1986, p. 162. 105 Kegley, 1987, p. 247. 106 Ibid., p. 249. Kegley, in his earlier work The Comparative Study o f Foreign Policy: Paradigm Lost?, extensively discusses deficiencies o f the CFP approach. See Kegley, 1980. 107 Smith, 1981, p. 123.

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Theoretical Background

Comparative foreign policy (CFP) is undergoing a most remarkable change. The earlier preoccupation with observable attributes and behavior is giving way to a new-found interest in cognitive mechanisms... Discarding the atomism and behavioralist insistence that concepts correspond in some immediate way to objects that can be counted, researchers in the field are now freely experimenting with increasingly complex notions o f how perception and preference interact in real contexts to shape behavior. Evidence o f this thrust is apparent in the new direction the CREON project is taking, in particular the efforts to revitalize the notion of the decision maker’s “definition o f the situation.”108

1.4 Individual level of analysis

1.4.1 Cognitive approaches

Finally, we turn to the fourth, or individual, level of analysis. A number of analysts in the field of international politics have questioned the relevance and explanatory power of the cognitive, psychological perspective that tries to “get into the heads” of decision makers.109 In an oft-cited passage, Arnold Wolfers argues: “Imagine a number of individuals, varying widely in their predispositions, who find themselves inside a house on fire. It would be perfectly realistic to expect that these individuals, with rare exceptions, would feel compelled to run toward the exits... Surely, therefore, for an explanation of the rush for the exits, there is no need to analyze the individual decisions that produce it.”110 Similarly, Singer wrote about the role of personality, perceptions, and cognitive processes in the study of international politics: I suspect that they often will account for very little o f the variance in any given outcome. My theoretical view - and there is little evidence for or against it - is that there w ill be considerable uniformity in the politically relevant attitudes o f those 108 Mefford, 1987, p. 221. 109 See, for example, Wolfers, 1962, p. 13; Pettman, 1975, p. 202. no Wolfers, 1962, p. 13. See also Inouye, 1986, p. 62.

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involved in foreign policy roles...for policy-relevant predictions (but not for explanatory purposes), we can afford to “black box” the cognitive and affective elem ents.111

At this level of analysis, the primary emphasis is put on individual policymakers and their cognitive processes. A host of scholars have emphasized the role of images, perceptions, and beliefs in the analysis of foreign policy since Snyder and the Sprouts stressed the importance of the entity-environment relationship and Kenneth Boulding directed our attention to the role of image.112 The psychological approaches to the study of international politics have developed mainly in reaction to the traditional “billiard ball” rational actor model.113 Since the main objects of the approach are individuals and decision-making processes rather than nation states, it underlines “a humanist perspective to a depersonalized international politics.”114

111 Quoted in Morgan, 1987, p. 77-78. 112 Some o f the important works dealing with the decision maker’s psychological factors and foreign policy decision making are: Herbert C. Kelman, ed., International Behavior: A Social Psychological Analysis (Princeton, 1965); J. De Rivera: The Psychological Dimension o f Foreign Policy (Westerville, 1968); Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York, 1974); Robert Jervis, Perceptions and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, 1976); Robert Axelrod, ed., Structure o f Decision: The Cognitive Maps of Political-Elites (Princeton, 1976); Irving L. Janis and Leon Mann, Decision Making: A Psychological Analysis o f Conflict, Choice, and Commitment (New York, 1977); Lawrence S. Falkowski, Psychological M odels in International Politics (Boulder, 1979); Alexander L. George, Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The Effective U se o f Information and Advice (Boulder, 1980); Christer Jonsson, ed., Cognitive Dynamics and International Politics (New York, 1982); Deborah Welch Larson, Origins of Containment: A Psychological Explanation (Princeton, 1985); Donald Sylvan and Steve Chan, Foreign Policy Decision Making: Perception, Cognition, and Artificial Intelligence (New York, 1984); Martha Cottam, Foreign Policy Decision Making: The Influence o f Cognition (Boulder, 1986); Yaacov Y. I. Vertzberger, The World in Their Minds: Information Processing, Cognition, and Perception in Foreign Policy Decisionmaking (Stanford, 1990); Betty Glad, ed-, Psychological Dimensions o f War (Beverly Hills, 1991). 113 Inouye, "The Psychological Approach to Foreign Policy Decision Making", Kitami Daigaku Ronshu, Vol. 19 (November 1986), p. 61. See also Robert Mandel, "Psychological Approaches to International Relations", in Margaret G. Hermann, ed, Political Psychology: Contemporary Problems and Issues, San Francisco & London , 1986, p. 251. 114 Janice Gross Stein, "Freud and Descartes: The Paradoxes o f Psychological L ogic,” International Journal 32:3 (Summer 1977), p. 429. Quoted by Inouye, "The Psychological

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Theoretical Background

Studies of decision making entail consideration of information processing, such as gathering and evaluating information or establishing alternative courses of action. The notion that individuals have limited capacities to process information is widely accepted. George writes: “Knowledge of cognitive psychology is indispensable for understanding one of the fundamental constraints on processing information in foreign-policy making.”115 The image of foreign policy decision-makers and the reality are not necessarily congruent. The discrepancy between image and reality may be dependent upon the decision-makers’ values, personality traits and other psychological factors as well as the amount and type of information available to them. In this regard, the psychological approach poses a challenge to what Herbert Simon calls procedual rationality that attributes a omniscient-like capability to the actors.116 Human behavior entails complex processes, certainly more complex than the assumption of procedural rationality advanced by theorists of the rational actor model. George notes: In contrast to models o f ‘pure’ rationality in statistical decision theory and formal econom ics, efforts at rational decision-making in political life are subject to constraints o f the follow ing kind: (1) The political actor’s information about situations with which he must deal is usually incomplete; (2) his knowledge o f ends-m eans relationships is generally inadequate to predict reliably the consequences o f choosing one or another course o f action; and (3) it is often difficult for him to formulate a single criterion by means o f which to choose which alternative course o f action is "best."117

An increasing number of empirical studies in social science show, in the words of Mark P. Petracca, “the explanatory limits of the rational choice approach to human nature.”118 Many analysts subscribe to the explanatory power of psychological analyses of decision making that are not bounded by

Approach to Foreign Policy Decision Making", Kitami Daigaku Ronshu, Vol. 19 (November 1986), p. 61. 115 George, 1980, p. 57. 116 Simon, 1976. 117 George, 1969, p. 197-198. 118 Petracca, 1991, p. 300.

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the limits of rational actor model.119 It is important to analyze why decision makers believe and perceive what they do. As Jervis has argued, it is impossible to explain crucial foreign policy decisions without reference to decision-makers’ beliefs about the world, organized as “images.”120 It is through these images that decision-makers respond to stimuli. Recent evidence for the importance of the perceptions and values of decision-makers come from the empirical studies of Holsti and Spiegel.121 Holsti, in his eight case studies of foreign policy “restructuring” in six nations, found that the perceptions and preferences of key leaders are the most important explanatory variables in all cases except one. In his detailed study of U.S. policy toward Middle East, Spiegel found the perceptions and philosophy of key policy makers as a major source of foreign policy: “The international system, the bureaucracy, Congress, and interest groups account for constant picture, but they limit policy; they do not define it. Only by examining the attitude of the presidential elite do we understand why and how policy changes.”122 Although there has long been a recognition of the importance of research on how decision-makers use cognitions to process information since the appearance of Snyder’s decision-making scheme in the 1950s, research efforts at the micro level have been slowed for various reasons. Since the 1970s, especially the second half of the 1970s, cognitive approaches have emerged as one of the most influential subfields in the discipline of political science generally and international politics in particular. Mandel asserts: Recently there has been a revolution in the analysis o f the human element in international relations. Most scholars of the field no longer believe that states always use the “billiard ball” rational actor approach; no longer treat psychological influences as random accidents or idiosyncratic deviations; and no longer assume that the most subjective aspects o f international behavior are inherently unanalyzable.123

119 In the present study, only cognitive approaches to international politics are examined. Some analysts assert that limits to rational decision making are other than merely cognitive. Irving Janis and Leon Mann, for example, made use o f motivational psychology to explicate decision­ making. See Janis and Mann, 1977. 120 Jervis, 1976, p. 28. 121 Holsti, K. J„ 1982: Spiegel, 1985. 122 Spiegel, 1985, p. 393. 123 Mandel, 1986, p. 251.

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Theoretical Background

A growing interest in what psychological analysis could offer in the foreign policy field, as Jonsson points out, seems in part to be associated with the increasing disillusionment with the comparative foreign policy approach in the late 1960s and early 1970s: “The mounting criticism of the prevalent deterministic and mechanistic modes of analysis has, however, entailed renewed calls for the need to ‘bring men back in’.”124 What are the circumstances under which individual cognition becomes an important source of explanation? Graber asserts: “Elite views are particularly significant for major, nonroutine decisions. In routine decisions, institutional values and procedures tend to prevail.”125 Holsti suggests that a cognitive approach may become relevant and prove rewarding when one or more of the following situations exist: decisions under highly ambiguous and uncertain situations; non-routine decision-making situations; decisions made by leaders at the top of an organization’s hierarchy; decisions under stress; and long-range policy planning situations.126 Under these conditions, Holsti claims that a decision-maker’s cognition may greatly influence his diagnosis of the situation, his analysis of different action alternatives, and his choices that lead to a foreign policy decision. The literature on the cognitive dimension of foreign policy is extensive. Much of this literature is concerned with images, belief systems, cognitive maps and/or the operational codes of individuals.127 Following Boulding, the Sprouts ana Snyder, it was commonly assumed that decision-makers act on their image of the situation rather than on the objective facts of the situation. How decision-makers perceive the environment is crucial to choice. Central to them is the principle of cognitive behaviorism. This is “the simple and familiar principle that a person reacts to his milieu as he perceives it-that is as he perceives and interprets it in light of past experience.” 128 This principle assumes that decision-making elites have “cognitive maps” or conceptual frameworks that condition their foreign policy behavior. These “cognitive maps” are used to impose a certain meaning and structure on the decision-makers’ operational environment. Through these “cognitive maps” they view the world. 124 Jonsson, 1982, p. 2. 125 Graber, 1974, p. 197. 126 H olsti, 1976, p. 30. See also George, 1979, pp. 109-110; Jonsson, 1982, p. 6; Vertzberger, 1990, p. 114. 127 For an overview o f this literature, see footnote 121. 128 Sprouts, 1969, p. 45.

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There is little agreement among the analysts who have utilized the term “image” as to its precise meaning. Image can be defined as “an individual’s perceptions of an object, fact, or condition, his evaluation of that object, fact, or condition in terms of its goodness or badness, friendliness or hostility, or value, and the meaning ascribed to, or deduced from, that object, fact, or condition.”129 Kelman refers to an image as “the organized representation of an object in an individual’s cognitive system.”130 According to Brecher, images consists in the recognition of incoming information, definition of the situation, and response to inputs in terms of stating actor goals.131 Images serve as organizing mechanisms allowing decision makers to simplify and comprehend a environment. Images act as a kind of mental filter, which mediates and orders incoming information for decision makers and facilitate the process of deciding which of the pieces of information received are relevant for impending decisions.132 In addition to filtering information, an image also “provides summary perceptions of the power, sophistication, threat, or opportunity posed by a particular type of state.” These summary perceptions affect the perceiver’s expectations about the behavior of that state, the perceiver’s selection of goals vis a vis that country, and the choice of tactics used in the pursuit of goals.133 The other component of the psychological environment which is closely related to the images of the decision-makers is the belief system of the decision-makers. There is not a great deal of definitional agreement on what exactly constitutes a belief system. Several terms are used to identify the focus of concern.134135Burgess focuses on elite images and strategic images in his book, Elite Images and Foreign Policy Outcomes: A Study o f Norway . m The decision maker’s “view of the world” is the term Brecher uses to designate what Holsti refers to as “belief system.” Image refers to some subpart of the belief system.136 “Operational code” is the term George uses to designate what

129 Holsti, 1972, p. 360. 130 Kelman, 1965, p. 24. 131 Brecher, 1974, p. 524. 132 Cottam, 1992, p. 126. See also Jonsson, 1977, p. 130. 133 Cottam, 1992, p. 126. 134 Hopple, 1979, p. 213. 135 Burgess, 1968. 136 See Holsti, "The B elief System and National Images", p. 244. Boulding’s broader use o f the term ‘im age’ is equivalent to Holsti’s term,‘belief system’. Brecher, Decisions in Israel’s

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Theoretical Background

constitutes a belief system.137 The belief system serves as a filter that affects the decision-maker’s perception. Cognitive process theories concerning the perceptions, the images, and the beliefs of the individuals deal with distorted perceptions that occur when people assimilate incoming information. As Goldmann asserts, “there is a tendency for the cognitive analysis of foreign policy to assume beliefs to be stable.”138 One of the most well-known cognitive mechanisms which facilitate such stability is cognitive consistency.139 This means that individuals interpret incoming information in such a way that it fits into pre-existing views. Thus, the perception and interpretation of incoming information is filtered through established frames of reference. Cognitive consistency is maintained through such processes as “selective attention” and “cognitive bolstering”.140 In other words, the decision-makers tend to ignore inconsistent information and focus on evidence that supports their pre-existing views. A well-known study of Holsti on the belief system of U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles in his dealings with the Soviet Union is an excellent illustration.141 Although cognitive process theory is often used to explain stability in beliefs, it is also being used to account for alterations in belief systems or changes in attitudes. At great length, Jervis deals with the problem of attitude change.142 It is often suggested that core beliefs are more resistant to change than peripheral beliefs. Despite the contention that some attitudes can change more readily than others, the concept of attitude remains static. Changes in attitude are generally explained by the theory of cognitive dissonance that postulates a quest for cognitive consistency. Given a human need for consistency, discrepant information is avoided, so that change in attitude is unlikely or slow to occur. During the 1970s and in the early 1980s, new research from cognitive psychology began to challenge some of the earlier assumptions of attitude

Foreign Policy, 1974, p. 524. For Boulding's treatment of the concept, see Boulding, 1963; Boulding, 1969. 137 George, 1969. 138 Goldmann, 1988, p. 23. 139The literature about the need of individuals to maintain a consistent cognitive system is extensive. For a survey, see Vertzberger, 1990, pp. 137-143. 140 See Mandel, 1986, pp. 254-255. 141 Holsti, "The B elief System and National Images: A Case Study," The Journal o f Conflict Resolution 6, 1962, pp. 244-252. 142 Jervis, 1976, Chapter 7.

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consistency theories. Increasingly, ‘man the consistency-seeker’ gave way to a new model of ‘man the naive scientist’ which sees a human being as a problemsolver and as information-processor. Larson, in her Origins o f Containment, discounts the theory of cognitive dissonance. She writes: From the mid-1950s to the mid-1960s, the dominant theoretical school in social psychology viewed man as a “consistent seeker,” driven to avoid the discomfort caused by cognitive contradictions... During the seventies, social psychologists gradually drifted away from motivational models to information-processing approaches in what has been called a "paradigm shift." In attribution theory, there are no internal pressures to achieve cognitive consistency, no motivational constructs o f any kind. From this perspective, people are “naive scientists” or problem solvers, not “rationalizers” or “ego-defenders.” ...people are engaged in a quest for meaning, not cognitive harmony; for validity, not consistency.143

Larson assumes that decision-makers are active agents rather than passive recipients of information. Thus, she views decision-makers as problem solvers whose behavior is to a great extent determined by the way in which they select, code, store, and retrieve information from their environment.144 Larson, in her detailed examination of the origins of American Cold War policies, finds that attribution theory, self-perception theory, and schema theory are most useful in explaining changes in attitudes and belief systems of four leaders who played crucial roles in shaping postwar American policy toward the Soviet Union: Averell Harriman, Harry S. Truman, James F. Byrnes, and Dean Acheson. She writes, “Truman and Brynes pose major difficulties for cognitive dissonance and other consistency theories. These practical politicians maintained incompatible cognitions without discomfort; 143 Larson, 1985, pp. 34-35. For this paradigm shift, see also George, 1980, pp. 55-56: George, 1979, pp. 98-99. George argues that the convergence o f many subfields o f psychology (cognitive balance and dissonance theories, attribution theory, attitude theory, social learning theory, and personality theory) into a common information-processing framework offers the promise o f a synthesis of psychological and cognitive theories relevant for the studies o f political decision-making. Cottam questions Georges’assertion that the ascendancy of the common information-processing framework entails a major paradigm shift in the fundamental "model o f man" assumptions: "...the ‘common information-processing framework’ is elusive. Psychology has no common information processing network nor has it had a resultant paradigmatic shift. Attribution theory, for example, has little relationship to attitude theory’and even less to ‘personality theory’." Cottam, 1986, p. 6. 144 Larson, 1985, pp. 22, 35.

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Theoretical Background

they did not have a stable, coherent system of beliefs on foreign policy or the Soviet Union.”145 Larson’s study suggests such narrow cognitive concepts like schemata or scripts are more strongly associated with policy choices in concrete settings than broader belief systems and allow for the inconsistencies within a decision-maker’s cognitions. Richard Herrmann, in his study of the relationship between perception and policy choice in American foreign policy, tends to support Larson’s finding that it is difficult to predict policy choices from general beliefs alone and that it is useful to disaggregate such concepts as belief systems and ideologies into such variables as schemata and scripts.146 Attribution theory suggests how people infer the motives and personality characteristics of others, and attribtution theorists “seek to discover the principles of ‘naive epistemology,’ the rules and procedures laymen use in gathering and interpreting data, as opposed to those associated with the model of scientific epistemology.”147 Self-perception theory has to do with how people know their own attitudes and beliefs. People derive their views from observing their choices.148 According to schema theory, it is through schemas that individuals make sense of the world. Schemas are the mental “theories” by whose light people perceive, construe, and remember the flow of experience.149 The two major cognitive approaches to decision making studies - cognitive mapping and operational code - focus on the thought process of the individual and systematically try to reconstruct the belief systems of individual decision makers.150 The cognitive map notion refers to the specific rationale that an individual constructs for a particular set of actions.151 More specifically, cognitive maps display a decision maker’s images of causal linkages among three types of concepts in the policy domain. “‘Affective’ concepts refer to the policy objectives or interests of the actors in the international system; ‘cognitive’ concepts denote beliefs about actions that occur in the international system; and ‘conative’ concepts indicate possible alternatives from which the

145 Ibid., p. 354. 146 Herrmann, R., 1986. 147 Larson, 1985, 35. 148 Ibid., pp. 42-50. 149 Ibid., pp. 50-57. For a recent debate on schema theory, See APSR, Vol. 85, No. 4 (Dec 1991), pp. 1341-1356. 150 For a general discussion o f the operational code and the cognitive mapping approaches, see Heradstveit and Narvesen, 1978 and Cottam, 1986. 151 Axelrod, 1976; Shapiro and Bonham, 1973.

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decision maker selects policy recommendations.”152 Axelrod, a creator of the cognitive mapping approach, has outlined its principles using the theory of graphs as follows: The concepts a person uses are represented as points, and the causal links between these concepts are represented as arrows between these points. This gives a pictorial representation o f the causal assertions as a graph o f points and arrows. This kind o f representation o f assertions as a graph will be called a cognitive map. The policy alternatives, all o f the various causes and effects, the goals, and the ultimate utility o f the decision maker call all be thought o f as concept variables and represented as points in the cognitive map.153

The approach has been applied to various cases such as the British Eastern Committee decisions concerning Persia in 1918, Syrian intervention in Jordan, Norwegian oil policy, and the Arab-Israeli conflict in connection with the Yom Kippur War.154 It is interesting to note one of the conclusions Axelrod arrived at from his study of cognitive mapping, when he asserts: “The picture of a decision maker that emerges from the analysis of cognitive maps is of one who has more beliefs than he can handle, who employs a simplified image of the policy environment that is structurally easy to operate with, and who acts rationally within the context of his simplified image.”155 The cognitive mapping approach has been criticized for its analytical shortcomings. Cottam questions the quality of this approach as a model of decision making: “it is a codebook for the analyst specifying how he or she should diagram beliefs and concepts. The map itself is not associated with generalizations or hypotheses about political decision making.”156 Other 152 Shapiro and Bonham, 1973, p. 161. 153 Axelrod, 1976, p. 5. 154 R. Axelrod, "Decision for Neoimperialism: The Deliberations o f the British Eastern Committee in 1918," In R. Axelrod (ed.), The Structure o f Decision, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976; G. M. Bonham, "Explanation o f the Unexpected: The Syrian Intervention in Jordan in 1970," in R. Axelrod (ed.), The Structure o f Decision, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976; G. M. Bonham, D. Heradsveit, O. Narvesen, and M. J. Shapiro, "A Cognitive Model o f Decision-Making: Application to Norwegian Oil Policy," Cooperation and Conflict 2, 1978; and G. M. Bonham, M. J. Shapiro, and T. L. Trumble, The October War: Changes in Cognitive Orientation Towards the Middle East Conflict," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 23, N o .l, 1979, pp. 3-44. 155 Axelrod, 1976, pp. 243-244. 156 Cottam, 1986, p. 20.

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Theoretical Background

problems with the approach, according to Cottam, include undefined terms such as “beliefs” and “concepts” and its simplistic view of causality.157 In his view, the greatest shortcoming of the approach is that "its stated purpose is much larger than the questions it asks in the end."158 He argues: The general goal o f the approach is to understand how policy makers see the world and how this affects their decisions. This is a goal that demands the use o f cognitive psychology. However, when cognitive mappers finally get down to asking the question upon which the model is built, the question is the old one: “What beliefs were important?” They begin with the assumption that decision makers bring an "interpretive framework" to their political experiences but they never develop a model o f this political world view .159

At a more basic level, a number of foreign policy analysts have focused on decision makers’ operational codes, based on Alexander George’s reformulation of Nathan Leites’s operational code construct.160 The operational code approach has been used to study individual policy makers and how their belief systems influence their decision-making. Examples of empirical studies applying the George framework to the study of political leaders include the operational codes of John Foster Dulles (Holsti, 1970), Dean Acheson (McLellan, 1971), Pierre Trudeau (Thordarson, 1972), Henry Kissinger (Walker, 1977), and Machiavelli (Bryder, 1990).161 The operational code construct tries to deal with the most politically relevant aspects of an individual decision maker’s cognitive map. It refers to a political leader’s “beliefs about the nature of politics and political conflict, his view regarding the extent to which historical developments can be shaped, and his notions of correct strategy and tactics.”162 The operational code is made up of the decision maker’s philosophical and instrumental beliefs about political reality. For his construct of a operational code, George draws more on the distinction between “epistomological” and “instrumental” beliefs made by three

157 For a detailed critique see Ibid., pp. 19-20. See also Kinder and Weiss, 1978, p. 713. 158 Cottam, 1986, p. 20. 159 Ibid. 160 Leites 1951&1953; George 1969; George 1979. 161 For the operational code o f Chinese policymakers, see Davis Bobrow et al., 1979. 162 George, 1969, p. 197.

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experimental social psychologists - Brim, Glass, Lavin, and Goodman -than on Leites.163 Philosophical beliefs of a decision maker refer to “assumptions and premises he makes regarding the fundamental nature of politics, the nature of political conflict, the role of the individual in history, etc.”164 Instrumental beliefs represent the decision maker’s beliefs about correct strategies and tactics appropriate to political action as defined by philosophical beliefs. George’s reformulation of Leites’ themes took the form of a series of questions to guide inventories of the operational codes of decision makers. Operational codes serve as filters for analyzing the political world and as norms and standards to guide choices. Thus George has described the relationship between belief systems and external behavior: ...beliefs o f this kind serve as a prism or filter that influences the actor’s perception and diagnosis of political situations and that provides norms and standards to guide and channel his choices o f action in specific situations. The function o f an operational code belief system in decisionmaking, then, is to provide the actor with “diagnostic propensities” and “choice propensities.” Neither his diagnosis o f situations nor his choice of action for dealing with them is rigidly prescribed and determined by these beliefs. Rather, their function is to simplify and channel the task of processing information, inventing and appraising options, and choosing the action that seems best in the circumstances.165

A number of political scientists have discussed some of the problems and difficulties the operational code approach poses.166 One critic of George’s construct of operational code has questioned its focus on individual actors as units of analysis. Gunnar Sjoblom claims that it is unnecessary to concentrate on analysis of individual decision makers and “in most cases probably not useful.”167 He suggests that collective rather than individual political actors should instead be units of analysis. Another problem of the approach is that no clear definition of the term “belief’ is offered.168 Sjoblom has argued that the operational code is confined 163 Bryder, 1982, p. 52: Bryder, 1990, p. 74: George, 1969, 199. See also Brim et al, 1962. 164 George, 1969, p. 199. 165 George, 1980, p. 45. 166 Cottam, 1986: 11-17. Sjoblom, 1982. 167 Sjoblom, 1982, p. 46. 168 Cottam, 1986, p. 11.

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Theoretical Background

to cognitive beliefs, “in other words, beliefs that may be true or false, probable or improbable.” Beside operational code beliefs, “there are not only other cognitive beliefs but also ethical beliefs, ideologies, etc.,” but these are excluded.169 Next the approach does not offer any explanation with regard to the selection of these particular beliefs rather than others. Moreover, the questions to be asked to delineate policy makers’ philosophical and instrumental beliefs “reveal very little about the subject’s assessment of other international actors.”170 There is also a problem of establishing a link between the beliefs and behavior. The beliefs revealed by the questions are “vague and abstract which makes a connection between the beliefs and behavior difficult to achieve.”171 Other critiques have characterized the operational code construct and cognitive maps as deficient because these are too static, incapable of dealing effectively with such important cognitive processes as learning and reasoning.172 Taber, in his recent article, claims that “many analysts of foreign policy decision making have moved away from static representations of cognitive structure toward models or descriptions of the p rocesses involved.”173 Despite the number of criticisms directed at them, both the cognitive mapping and the operational code approaches have contributed to our understanding of cognition and political decision making. For example, Cottam, in a recent review and summary of these approaches, argues: The theorists in both areas have been crucial in advancing the general understanding o f the limits in policy makers’ abilities to process information perfectly... They have also been responsible for making the study of psychological characteristics of decision makers respectable in political science... Finally, both the Operational Code and the cognitive map approach...have pointed to the need for careful definition of terms; a comprehensive use o f psychology; a firm link between psychology, political thinking and political behavior; and a willingness to suggest and test hypotheses derived from the psychological arguments.174

169 Sjoblom, 1982, p. 47. 170 Cottam, 1986, p. 11. 171 Ibid. 172 See, for example, Taber, 1992, p. 889. 173 Ibid., p. 889. 174 Cottam, 1986, pp. 20-21.

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1.4.2 Linkage between beliefs and foreign policy behavior

Although a growing number of studies in the past two decades or so have dealt with the description of decision makers’ belief systems and perceptions, there are only a few systematic studies demonstrating the linkage between beliefs and foreign policy behavior. Much of the work on belief systems in international relations, as described by Rosati, “has been based on one fundamental assumption: that beliefs are major causal forces of behavior and, therefore, explain and predict human action. This basic assumption has become so firmly embedded in the attitude research literature that the relationship between beliefs and behavior has not received adequate study.”175 Rosati lists several studies which have shown a high degree of correspondence between an actor’s foreign policy beliefs and behavior: Studies on the 1914 War and Cuban missile crisis by Holsti, Brody and North; Sullivan’s study on the U.S. escalation and de-escalation behavior concerning Vietnam; and Walker’s work on the relations between Kissinger’s operational code and his bargaining behavior.176 Rosati, in his study of the Carter administration’s foreign policy beliefs and behavior, found that the level of congruency between beliefs and behavior tended to fluctuate in tandem with the degree of consensus among President Carter, Secretary of State Vance, and National Security Advisor Brzezinski. He pointed out that such factors as the degree of image stability and the degree of shared images among the principal decision-makers appear to be fundamental for determining the degree of congruency that exists between beliefs and behavior. As described by Rosati: It appears that when an image is most stable, its impact on behavior will be greatest. When an image is in the process o f undergoing change, a great degree of inconsistency between beliefs and behavior is much more likely. Likewise, it appears that when individuals in a group share similar images, the impact o f the group’s aggregate image on its external behavior will be greatest. However, when

175 Rosati, 1984, p. 158. 176 Ibid., pp. 160-161. See also Holsti, Brody, and North 1965; Holsti, North, and Brody 1968; Sullivan 1979; Walker 1977.

48

Theoretical Background individuals have major differences in images, the behavior o f the group is not likely to be consistent with its beliefs.177

He concluded that the Carter Administration’s foreign policy behavior cannot be explained or understood adequately without its image of the international environment.178

177 Rosati, 1984, pp. 184-185. 178 Ibid., p. 185.

2. The Framework for Analysis

2.1 The need for multilevel explanations

Whereas in the previous chapter I was concerned with examining each level of analysis, here I am interested in showing how the theoretical perspectives and approaches at each analytical level described in the previous chapter could be combined to explain foreign policy behavior. Among the four levels of analysis discussed so far, the question as to which one provides the most useful level of analysis for the understanding and explanation of foreign policy behavior cannot be answered in a straightforward fashion. Each offers its unique advantages to analysts, depending upon the nature of their studies, but none of the four levels of analysis encompasses exclusively all the variables which determine the complex phenomenon of foreign policy behavior. My review of the relevant literature suggests that what is needed is the linking within one framework of the traditional levels of the individuals, state, the regional subsystem, and the international system. The perceptions and images of policymakers are an important area of inquiry. Foreign policy behavior, however, is influenced by other than cognitive variables. Analyses of the nature of the external and internal environments are also necessary and essential for understanding foreign policy. The individual-level cognitive variables need to be placed within a broader framework in order to increase their explanatory and analytical power. Research at every level of analysis “is capable of illuminating a segment of knowledge within a discipline but no more.”1 A multilevel explanation of foreign policy - using variables at different levels of analysis - would, to borrow the words of Brecher and James, “enable us to move beyond the position of blind men attempting to grasp the elephant.’ 2 Or to put it more specifically, “the virtue of multilevel strategy is that it enriches the

1 Brecher and James, 1986, p. 25. 2 Ibid., p. 26.

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Theoretical Background

explanatory power of analysis.”3 A number of models of foreign policy decision making accommodate this multilevel perspective. The choice of any model is a matter of great importance, because it influences the collection and presentation of data and the inferences and conclusions that are drawn from them. A research strategy or conceptual model determines not only what we see, but how we see it, as Graham Allison amply demonstrated in the context of the Cuban missile crisis: “Each conceptual framework consists of a cluster of assumptions and categories that influence what the analyst finds puzzling, how he formulates his question, where he looks for evidence, and what he produces as an answer.”4

2.2 Research design

The framework suggested by Brecher and his associates is one of the few approaches that explicitly uses variables from each of the four levels as well as an additional level of analysis: the dyadic relationship with another nation. The variables of the framework are also general enough to be applied to any type of foreign policy system. By drawing upon the distinction between the operational and psychological environments set forth by Boulding and Sprouts, and supplementing it with insights from general systems theory and inputoutput analysis, Brecher and his associates have developed an elaborate research design for the study of foreign policy behavior. It seeks to pull together otherwise disparate strands into a coherent, conceptual whole. One of the major advantages of this research design, like other ecological or environmental models based on general systems theory, is its applicability to any number of levels of analysis. The framework is summarized in Figure 1 and the accompanying list of terms.

3 Eulau, 1977, p. 47-48. See also Larson, 1985, p. 23. 4 Allison, 1971, p. 245.

The Framework for Analysis

51

Figure 1. The framework of the study.

(Adapted from Brecher 1972 p. 4 and Brecher 1974 p. 7.) G= Global System; S= Subordinate System; SO= Other Subordinate System; DB= Dominant Bilateral Relations; B= Bilateral Relations; M= Military Capability; E= Economic Capability; PS= Political Structure; IG= Interest Groups; CE= Competing Elites. Issue Areas: M-S= Military-Security; P-D= PoliticalDiplomatic; E-D= Economic-Developmental; C-S= Cultural-Status.

52

Theoretical Background

Their framework has a number of advantages over other schemes. For example, it provides a more manageable and researchable approach than the framework of Snyder. It has a specific set of conceptual categories with a reasonable number of variables and the concepts are well defined. Far more than Snyder’s or other decision-making schemes, the external setting contains differentiated conceptual categories comparable to the internal source variables. It is generally agreed that the framework is both comprehensive and operational.5 The utility of the Brecher, Steinberg and Stein research design also “lies in its schematic provision for observable, and even more significantly, researchable factors and categories which allow a rigorous and systematic study of a state’s foreign policy.”6 Brecher’s variable clusters are compared to Snyder’s major categories and the variable clusters of CFP research, especially of Rosenau’s outlined in Chapter 4 in the following Table 1.

Table 1: Major Variable Categories in Three Comprehensive Models o f Foreign Policy Behavior Brecher framework variable clusters

Global system Subordinate system Other subordinate system Dominant bilateral re­ lations Bilateral relations Military Capability Economic capability Political structure Interest groups Competing elites Decision-making process Output

Snyder, Bruck & Sapin framework categories

Comparative foreign policy variable clusters

External setting

Systemic

Internal setting

Governmental Societal Role Individual

Decision-making process Action

Output

Feedback

Another great advantage of this research design is that it enables the analyst to capture the dynamic quality of foreign policy decision-making in a way that 5 Andriole, Wilkenfeld and Hopple, 1975, pp. 172-173. 6 Dawisha, 1976, p. 67.

The Framework for Analysis

53

a more static model may not. This is accomplished by incorporating the concept of feedback which forms an important analytical component of the framework. Information about the operational environment enters a foreign policy system as an input and feeds into the psychological environment of the decision-makers. This is processed and transformed into a decision, which leads to feedback effects upon environmental components which serve as inputs for future decisions. Naturally, the feedback from the operational environment must be perceived in order to be learned and to influence future decisions. It enables analysts to study the ways in which high policy makers “learn,” that is, adapt to their past decisions and outcomes. Thus, by incorporating the notion of feedback, a dynamic dimension is added to the model. Brecher and his associates are not the first to propose the concept of feedback as a relevant dimension in analyzing the policy process. Deutsch, Easton, and Holsti incorporate feedback loops in their models.7 However, in writings on foreign policy, there have been few systematic attempts to study feedback. The basic premise of the framework is that “the concept of system is no less valid in foreign policy analysis than in the study of domestic politics.”8 It views the foreign policy of a country as a system made up of the operational and psychological environments of the decision-makers, and the process through which decisions are formulated and implemented. Brecher and his associates posit that the boundaries of the foreign policy system are “vertical, that is, they encompass all inputs and outputs which affect decisions whose content and scope lie essentially in the realm of inter-state relations. As such the boundaries fluctuate from one issue to another.”9 The foreign policy system in this framework is likened to a flow into and out of structures or institutions and processes which produce decisions. The decisions, in turn, give rise to feedback effects upon the various components of the framework, thus achieving a dynamic circular flow. Foreign policy inputs are broken down into operational and psychological environments. The operational environment consists of an external and internal variable cluster and defines the setting in which foreign policy decisions are made. The external environment comprises three distinct levels at which its influences on decision-making should be considered: Global, 7 Deutsch, 1963; Easton, 1965; Holsti, North, & Brody, 1968. 8 Brecher et al„ 1969, p. 79. 9 Ibid., p. 80.

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Theoretical Background

Subordinate and Subordinate Other, and Bilateral, which includes Dominant Bilateral. The “global system” is the “total web of relationships among all actors within the international system.”10 The “subordinate system” refers to the regional group of states which the government mostly deals with. “Subordinate other” is Brecher’s term for the regional system which is not included in the term “subordinate system.” “Dominant bilateral relations” pertain to a government’s relations with a superpower in the global system, and “bilateral relations” refer to its interactions with any other state. The internal environment is made up of five variables: military capability, economic capability, political structure, interest groups, and competing elites. The psychological environment comprises both the “attitudinal prism” and “elite images”. The attitudinal prism includes the product of social factors ideology, tradition, and historical legacy - and personality dispositions of decision makers. These components “constitute the screen or prism through which elite perceptions of the operational environment are filtered.”11 The elite image is made up of three interrelated aspects: "recognition, that is, notice of incoming information; accurate or inaccurate absorption of messages, i.e. definition of the situation; and response to inputs in terms of stating actor goals.”12 It consists of the perceptions of the external and internal environments. “From these perceptions,” write Brecher and his associates, “flow the elites’ definition of their state’s desirable role in foreign policy.” They add that “these images taken together constitute a world view; and this, in turn, creates a general psychological framework for decision-making.”13 Images are continually subject to redefinition as a result of the operation of interactive and feedback processes. As noted before, Brecher et al consider both the operational and psychological environments important because, according to their framework, a “successful” decision depends upon how closely the two environments overlap with each other: this depends upon the correct perception of decision makers of the external and internal constraints in the operational environment. As Brecher puts it,

10 Ibid., p. 82. 11 Ibid., p. 86. 12 Brecher, 1974a, p. 524. In this study, image and perception have been used synonymously as Brecher has done in his studies. 13 Brecher et al, 1969, p. 87.

The Framework for Analysis

55

To the extent that decision-makers perceive the operational environment accurately their acts may be said to be rooted in reality and are thus likely to be "successful." To the extent that their images are inaccurate policy choices will be "unsuccessful," that is, there will be a gap between elite-defined objectives and policy outcomes.14

The processes of foreign policy decision-making refers to the formulation of decisions and their implementation. Brecher defines a foreign policy decision “as the selection, among perceived alternatives, of one option leading to a course of action in the International System,” and adds that it is researchable since “a decision is an explicit act of choice, which can be located precisely in time and space.” Brecher also states that “a decision is made by identifiable persons authorized by a state’s political system to act within a prescribed sphere of external behavior.”15 Decisions are classified along a continuum of ‘significance’ for a foreign policy system. “Strategic decisions are irrevocable policy choices, measured by significance for a foreign policy system as a whole.” The concept of ‘significance’, Brecher writes, “refers to the number of environmental components which receive feedback from the decision, the intensity of those consequences, and the length of time in which the ‘fall out’ from the decision affects the behavior of decision makers or institutions; that is, the scope and duration of impact.”16 The second type of decisions, tactical decisions are “indissolubly linked to strategic (high-policy) decisions. They may precede, and serve as predecisional stages for, a strategic decision; or they may follow strategic decisions, from which they logically derive.” Implementing decisions are those day-to-day policy choices to execute the above two types of decisions.17 Brecher’s framework incorporates the useful notion of issue area. A number of political scientists have attempted to create foreign policy issue area schemes. Generally there are two different approaches to classify issue areas: a procedural classification scheme based on “the characteristics of the process and the nature of the participants associated with a given issue area,” and an alternative scheme based on substantive characteristics.18 The political scientists who have focused on the procedural issue area approach include Lowi and Zimmerman. In one of the first explications of 14 Ibid., p, 81. 15 Brecher, 1974a, p. 1-2. 16 Ibid., p. 2. 17 Ibid., pp. 2-3. 18 Hermann and Coate, 1982, p. 78.

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Theoretical Background

Lowi’s thought on the concept of issue areas he stated that an issue area “tends to develop its own characteristic political structure, political process, elites, and group relations.”19 He identifies three issue areas based on resource allocation - distribution, regulation, and redistribution - and relates them to theories of who is governing domestic politics, but leaves the task of defining foreign policy as an issue area to another time. In another formalization, Lowi’s central concern is with foreign policy as an issue area.20 Within the foreign policy area, he finds three types of foreign policy “subsystems”: 1) an elitist subsystem “...that prevails (a) in crisis and (b) in any noncrisis situations in which in the short run no internal resources are involved at all”21; 2) a logrolling pattern is decentralized and nonconflictive, and is similar to the distributive subsystem in domestic politics; and 3) a pluralistic regulatory system.22 Zimmerman, by incorporating Lowi’s issue area classification scheme and Wolfers’s idea of a continuum between the poles of power and indifference, suggested an interesting and useful typology.23 An example of a substantive issue area approach was offered by Rosenau, who introduced the concept of issue area into comparative foreign policy studies.24 He defined an issue area as: (1) a cluster o f values, the allocation or potential allocation o f which (2) leads the affected or potentially affected actors to differ so greatly over (a) the way in which the values should be allocated or (b) the horizontal levels at which the allocations should be authorized that (3) they engage in distinctive behavior designed to mobilize support for the attainment of their particular values.25

For Brecher, the criterion for classifying issues is “substantive content, not motivations of decision-makers.”26 All foreign policy issues are classified into four issue areas. First, there is the military-security issue area which comprises “all issues which focus on questions pertaining to violence, including alliances and weaponry.” Second, there exists a political-diplomatic 19 Lowi, 1964, p. 689-690. 20 Lowi, 1967, pp. 295-351. 21 Ibid., p. 324. 22 Ibid., pp. 324-325. 23 Zimmerman, 1974, pp. 1204-1212. 24 The conception o f an issue-area was first developed by Robert A. Dahl in his book Who

governs? Democracy and power in an American city, published in 1961. 25 Rosenau, 1966, p. 81. 26 Brecher, Steinberg, and Stein, 1969, p. 87.

The Framework for Analysis

57

issue area which is something of a residual category, everything not contained in the other three areas, and “covers the spectrum of foreign policy interaction at each of the three levels of the external environment-global, subordinate, and bilateral-except for those dealing violence, material resources, and cultural and status relations.” Third, the economic-developmental issue area consists of “all those issues which involve the acquisition and allocation of resources, such as trade, aid, and investment.” Finally, there is the cultural-status issue area covering not only those issues which involve “cultural, educational, and scientific exchanges” but also “status issues which relate primarily to selfimage, namely, the decision-makers’ perception of their legitimate place in the global and/or subordinate system.” Brecher classifies status-issues in this category, but I feel that status-issues seem to fit better in the political diplomatic issue-area. Analysts have been pondering the question as to the importance of actor conditions (more commonly known as national attributes) for the study of foreign policy behavior for the last three decades. Are there any distinct foreign policy patterns for superpowers, great powers, or small powers? Do national attributes have any significance at all? Holsti claims that the research “has uncovered either contradictory findings, or significant findings.”27 Various criteria have been used to delineate actor conditions. Holsti, for example, lists the following characteristics of nation-states: territorial size, population, economic system and performance, and level of economic development.28 Brecher, in his research design, specifies types of actor conditions according to the following criteria: level of power, level of development, cultural differentiation, and age. Brecher argues that these typologies of actor conditions are important for the analysis of foreign policy behavior because “they serve as constraints on the attainment of goals and/or stimuli to the direction of policy.”29 Regarding “level of power”, Brecher uses a less differentiated categorization than that of Spiegel: superpowers, great powers, middle powers, and small powers.30 The place of a state in the power stratification scale depends, according to Brecher, upon a combination of such components 27 Holsti, K.J., 1992, p. 276. 28 Ibid. 29 Brecher, 1974b, p. 62. 30 Spiegel distinguishes seven categories: superpowers, secondary powers, middle powers, minor powers, regional states, microstates, and dependent states. See Spiegel, 1972.

58

Theoretical Background

as size, population, military capability, and economic capability.31 As for “level of development”, an actor’s place in the scale is measured by the indices of economic capability. There are two broad categories with respect to “cultural differentiation”: Western and non-Westem backgrounds. The last type of actor conditions, “age,” refers to “ ‘new states’- those emerging from the anticolonial revolution since World War II - and ‘old states’ - those in existence prior to 1945.”32 There are two general types of foreign policy situations: The conflict situation “may be brief or protracted; of low- or high-level intensity; and it is manifested in a wide range of activity from diplomatic nonrecognition (passive) to physical hostility (active);” and the non-conflict interaction “ranges from acquiescence or passive coexistence to cooperation, alliance, and, ultimately, integration.”33 The stages or phases of decision-making have been conceptualized variously in the literature of political science.34 Brecher distinguishs three phases of the decision process: (1) the pre-decisional phase; (2) the decisional phase; and (3) the implementation phase. The pre-decisional phase “comprises the cumulative events which, by their gestation over time, create the need, opportunity, or occasion for (foreign policy) choice.” The decisional phase “begins with the (formal or informal) consideration of known alternative options and terminates with a formal choice (decision).” The implementation phase “refers to actions by which a decision is effected.”35 The framework has been applied to cases in Israel, India and Egypt to test both hypotheses about foreign policy decision-making and generate new ones.36 Thordarson used the framework to identify the important variables for

31 Brecher, 1974a, p. 523. 32 Brecher, 1974b, p. 63. 33 Ibid., p. 64. 34 See, for example, Brzezinski and Huntington, 1963; Mintzberg, Raisinghani and Theoret, 1976; Lundquist, 1987; Hermann, Charles F., 1990. 35 Brecher, 1974b, pp. 63-64. 36 Michael Brecher, The Foreign Policy System o f Israel: Settings, Images, Processes (1972); Brecher, "Images, process and feedback in foreign policy: Israel’s decisions on German reparations," American Political Science review 67, 1 (March 1973); Brecher, Decisions in Israel’s Foreign Policy (1974); Brecher, "Inputs and decisions for war and peace: the Israel experience," International Studies Quarterly 18 (1974); Brecher, "India’s decision to remain in the Commonwealth," Journal o f Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 13 (March 1974); Brecher, "India’s decision on the VOA: a study in irresolution," Asian Survey 14, 7 (July

The Framework for Analysis

59

analysis in his study of Canadian foreign policy under Prime Minister Trudeau.37 In applying Brecher’s research design for foreign policy analysis to specific foreign-policy decisions in Japan, two of the external and internal variables will be elaborated here: subordinate system and competing elites. For the purposes of this study the term “East Asia” refers to what is commonly known as Northeast Asia, i.e. Japan, China, Taiwan, the two Koreas and Hong Kong; and Southeast Asia, namely, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, Indonesia, Burma and the nations of Indochina. The term “East Asia” is used primarily to denote a region in a geographic sense. Yet geographical proximity is only one of several essential characteristics of Brecher’s concept of subordinate systems. Although East Asia lacks the cohesion of Western Europe, in my judgement it fulfills criteria suggested by Brecher for identifying a subordinate system.38 East Asia has been one of the most important regions for superpower penetration and competition. Interactions between its core members, China and Japan, and the two major “intrusive powers” in the region, the Soviet Union and the United States, had dominated East Asian international politics. The patterns of interaction within the region during the period of this study have largely tended to be dyadic, and they have not been highly institutionalized with the exception of subregional cooperation within the Association of Southast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Since the 1970s there have been increasing interactions, mainly economic but also political and cultural, among the nations of East Asia. The concept of competing elites used in the present study refers not only to opposition parties but also to competing factions within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). As in any parliamentary system, election results in Japan only determine the structural framework within which political parties must work. In the first decade following the end of the war, a true multi-party system seemed to be emerging. Governments were formed by the conservative parties, but the socialists on occasion did enter into coalitions with a segment of the conservatives to install conservative governments. It was necessary for 1974); A. I. Dawisha, "Perceptions, decisions and consequences in foreign policy: the Egyptian intervention in the Yemen," Political Studies 25, 2 (June 1977). Bruce Thordarson, Trudeau and Foreign Policy: A Study in Decision-making, Toronto 1972.

3g

Other efforts to define East Asia in subordinate-system and regional system terms include Haas, 1970; Cantori and Spiegel, 1970; Hellmann, 1972; Boyd, 1980.

60

Theoretical Background

the party in power to adjust its policy preferences in the interests of interparty cooperation. But events in 1955 put an end to these developments. In that year the hitherto divided conservative parties merged to form the LDP, while the socialist parties united to form the Japan Socialist Party (JSP). From 1955 until the late 1960s, these two parties dominated the parliamentary elections. However, since the JSP was incapable of obtaining more than one-third of the seats in the Diet, the period of one-party rule began. Although several smaller parties such as the Komeito, the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) and the Japan Communist Party (JCP) began to gain some ground in the late 1960s, the LDP continued to control the central government and to hold clear majorities in both houses of the Diet. This structural feature reduced the importance of demands advocated by opposition parties. One of the most important structural characteristics of the Liberal Democratic Party has been the centrality of factional politics. Despite its efforts to create a unified party, the Liberal Democratic Party has remained a coalition of factions. In a sense, it is appropriate to state that Japan has had intra-LDP “coalition governments.” Since no single faction controlled a majority of the party’s Diet members, coalitions between factions were necessary. The role of opposition has been played at different times by various LDP factions. The ruling coalition of factions is commonly called the “mainstream.” Failure to get its members into cabinet and top party posts will drive a faction into opposition. Of course the factions of the LDP are not the only segments of opposition. Other opposition parties have played an important role in influencing government policy. With regard to choosing cabinets during the period of the LDP’s dominance, however, the factions have been the only significant actors of opposition.

2.3 Foreign Policy Restructuring

In recent years, the phenomenon of foreign policy change has received some attention in the relevant literature.39 Holsti, for example, is concerned with a particular type of foreign policy change where governments seek fundamentally to alter their relationships with other nations, foreign policy “restructuring” or “reorientation.” The term refers to the intentions of 39 See Holsti (K. J.), 1982; Hermann (C. F.), 1990; Checkel, 1993; Mendelson, 1993.

The Framework for Analysis

61

authoritative decision-makers "to restructure their nation’s relationships with other countries."40 In Holsti’s view, the phenomenon of foreign policy restructuring has not achieved much attention in the foreign policy literature. Examples of foreign policy restructuring are numerous. Some of the most recent cases are the former socialist countries in Eastern Europe attempting to eliminate old patterns and structures of foreign relations and create new relationships in the post-Cold War world. Foreign policy realignments usually take place both in the geographical sector (for example, Poland’s foreign policy reorientation from the earlier Soviet and East European foreign policy focus to Western Europe) and the functional sector (the type of activity, i.e., Poland’s withdrawal from the COMECON). This type of change is distinguished from incremental forms of foreign policy change: “We...distinguish normal foreign policy change, which is usually slow, incremental and typified by low linkages between sectors... Foreign policy restructuring, which usually takes place more quickly, expresses an intent for fundamental change, is non-incremental and usually involves the conscious linking of different sectors.”41 Hermann’s classification of foreign policy changes is more differentiated: (1) Adjustment changes; (2) Program changes; (3) Problem/Goal changes; and (4) International orientation changes.42 Only the last of Hermann’s categories - international orientation change - corresponds to Holsti’s foreign policy restructuring. Governments that undertake to restructure their foreign relations often destroy traditional patterns of relationships, conceptualized as “disengagement.” Disengagement is-thus a prelude to restructuring. It usually takes place in response to extensive external penetration and to perceptions of dependence.43 Holsti claims that foreign policy restructuring is often a response to threats of various kinds, military and non-military. The operational steps in the method used in delineating how and why restructuring takes place is, according to Holsti, as follows: “It describes each nation’s pattern of foreign relations at tl and the actions taken to establish new patterns. A second ‘photograph’ at t2 indicates the degree of change.”44 In his scheme, the distinction between the policy-makers’ intent to restructure foreign policy and actual repatteming is important. Intent is indicated by 40 Holsti (K. J.), 1982, p. 2. 41 Ibid. 42 Hermann (C. F.), 1990, pp. 5-6. 43 Holsti (K. J.), 1982, pp. 7-8. 44 Ibid., p. 2.

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Theoretical Background

government documents and policy speeches of decision-makers. To the extent that intent has been followed by creation of essentially different patterns of relations, one can say that successful foreign policy restructuring has taken place. The degree of congruence between the two environments (operational and psychological) suggested by Brecher may provide a useful technique for measuring “success” in foreign policy restructuring.45 The phenomenon of foreign policy restructuring in different countries can be systematically studied by using the research design developed by Brecher. The case of Japanese policy decisions regarding the Soviet Union is an attempt to provide evidence about key decision-makers’ perceptions of the external and internal environments which give rise to dissatisfaction with the existing foreign policy orientation and the intent to restructure external relations. As the study of Japanese relations with the Soviet Union illustrates, foreign policy restructuring can be attempted without fundamentally altering or cutting ties to the mentor power.

45 See Brecher et al., 1969, p. 81.

3. Methodological Considerations

3.1 Data problems

Various methodological problems have inhibited the use of existing decision­ making schemes in systematic research on foreign policy. As noted earlier, with the decision making approach suggested by Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin, the vast amounts of information required made its use a rather difficult enterprise. Brecher’s framework also imposes heavy data burdens on the analyst, although the demands are much less with his model than with the decision-making framework developed by Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin. Morgan notes: The Paige study illustrated the very detailed work that may be necessary to apply systems analysis to just one case. The same is true for the studies by North et. al. o f the 1914 crisis. The need for such great quantities o f information brings with it various limitations. As has often been noted, this makes it likely that a truly detailed analysis can ever be anything but retrospective in nature. And there are formidable barriers to crossnational research as a result. The vast Brecher work just to describe and analyze foreign policy in Israel will not be easily imitated.1

The issue of access to data is not an easy matter in the field of foreign policy studies. States often behave in secret. Thus, in the study of foreign policy the analyst is forced to use documentary evidence that is quite often incomplete. Analysis of primary documents prevents studies of recent behavior because of governmental restrictions on the release of secret and confidential documents. The process of declassification in Japan is relatively slow and primary sources of information about decision making in Japan are not as readily available as is information about US decision making.2 The primary written documents are used as they become available within the confines of official secrets acts. Where possible, I have drawn on evidence only recently made available to the public. 1 Morgan, 1987, p. 165. 2 Inoguchi, 1989, p. 257.

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Theoretical Background

While the systems framework developed by Brecher seems most suited for the systematic analysis of specific decisions, it is not appropriate for the study of “the whole series of decisions, interactions and processes which cumulatively constitute a foreign policy.”3 Thus, when the scheme is applied to a state’s foreign policy over time, as Brecher did in his award-winning macro study of Israel’s foreign policy over a twenty-year time period (1948-68),4 it fails to ascertain the dynamic dimension of foreign policy decision-making. Dawisha, for example, argued that Brecher’s work “produced a static study of structures, institutions and processes which failed to incorporate the notion of feedback in terms of responses to decisions and actions.”5 By focusing on the macro concept of foreign policy rather than on any specific decision, the framework asks the researcher to collect and analyze data for the whole series of decisions and their feedback effects on various environmental components in order to account for their cumulative impact on the dynamic character of a state’s foreign policy. The utility of the framework is, however, fully demonstrated when Brecher works at a micro level with case study data derived from seven clusters of decisions relating to Israel.6 Dawisha argues that the main problem with using the macro concept of “policy” as the unit of analysis has proved to be one of the main impediments to the development of general empirically oriented theories of foreign policy behavior: “It is probably this inability which has spurred some theorists to question the utility of ‘policy’ as a dependent variable and to suggest alternatives such as ‘decision’ or ‘undertaking’.”7 The concept of “decision” does not necessarily suffer from this problem, and which could take the place of “policy” as our unit of analysis.8

3.2 Inference problems

3 Dawisha, 1977, p. 203. 4 See Brecher, 1972. 5 Dawisha, 1976, p. 67. 6 Brecher, 1974a. 7 Dawisha, 1976, p. 67. 8 Carlsnaes rejects the concept o f decision and proposes ’’action” as the unit o f analysis in foreign policy research because ”it is often vexingly difficult to get at these decision makers and their decisions, and to do so for comparative purposes.” Carlsnaes, 1987, p. 58.

Methodological Considerations

65

Methodological problems beset the study of cognitive beliefs or processes of decision makers: access to data and inference. It is often difficult to analyze the impact of environmental factors upon foreign policy decisions because of the problems involved in reconstructing decision-makers’ evaluation of them. Key policy makers seldom articulate their assessment of the relative importance of various environmental factors which influence any particular decision at a time. They do not even comment publicly on foreign policy issues. Thus, analysts have to make inferences from scattered comments and published anecdotes. The problems of access and inference exist that complicate the utilization of content analysis. There are generally three categories of data on the cognitive beliefs of decision makers available to researchers: official public statements, interviews, and transcripts of discussions or internal memoranda. Where available, public statements by policy-makers are used as a basis for inferring their images in this study. Speeches, Diet interpellations and press conferences serve as the basic sources of information. Several reasons can be offered to support the use of official public statements as valid indicators of the beliefs of decision makers. As suggested by Brodin, “the credibility of the holders of power, upon which the legitimacy of power ultimately rests, is contingent upon a certain measure of consonance between word and deed, doctrine and decision.”9 Public statements can also act as a constraint on decision makers through their impact on other actors within the environm ent.10 Moreover, an actor may influence himself by his own statements, in accordance with cognitive dissonance theory and Bern’s theory of self-perception.11 In determining the credibility of a government leader’s public statement, some maintain that the political actor’s position in the decision making structure may be an indicator of credibility: “The higher the authority and the greater the reputation for credibility of his office, the more dangerous it would be for the speaker to be caught in a lie.”12 Where relevant, public statements and other hard data from the decision­ making moment are not available, I have relied upon memoirs and other secondary sources to reconstmct the decision-makers’ perceptions.

9 Brodin, 1972, p. 105. For the use o f official statements as valid indicators o f perceptions of high policy-makers, see also Liden, 1979, pp. 27-29. 10 Rosati, 1984, p. 163; Hopple, 1979, 243. 11 Rosati, 1984, p. 163. 12 Graber, 1976, p. 196.

the

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Theoretical Background

It is commonly recognized that content analysis is a useful tool for analyzing documentary evidence, and various techniques have been developed to extract information from the various types of sources available. In approaching the task of interpreting verbal material, the investigator may choose to work with either the qualitative or quantitative methods, or with the combination of both. Larson asserts: “In the past, content analysists have often used quantitative approaches to scale content characteristics... But more qualitative procedures may also yield a reliable and valid assessment of intensity or salience.”13 Several definitions of qualitative content analysis are available. One important perspective in the area is represented in Graber’s definition: Qualitative content analysis involves the systematic, directed search o f selected documents for presence or absence o f a limited amount o f presumably significant information. It differs from quantitative research by deemphasizing the potentially equal importance o f all content elements, focusing instead on preselected key elements. Key elements are determined on the basis o f a general psychological, sociological, and political analysis o f the communication situation.14

Each technique offers its unique advantages to the researchers, depending upon their purposes and the nature of their studies. Quantitative content analysis is often inadequate because it makes inferences directly from the manifest content of communications without taking into account latent meanings. George, in his Propaganda Analysis, concluded that qualitative analysis of selected verbal communications “may often yield better clues to the particular intentions of a particular speaker at one moment in time than more standardized quantitative methods.”15 Similarly, Graber asserts: “For certain types of problems, quantitative analysis is the only suitable method. For instance, if one wishes to analyze long-term changes of mass perceptions as mirrored in the press, or in expressions by significant political figures, one should use quantitative methods. Repetition as such becomes an important factor, for whatever is repeated is more likely to affect a mass audience, through time, than what is mentioned rarely. By contrast, if one wants to trace

13 Larson, p. 248. 14 Graber, 1976, p. 129. 15 George, 1959, p. 7; Graber, 1976, p. 126; Stenelo, 1984, p. 21.

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particular decisions or the interaction of two speakers with respect to a particular topic, a qualitative, sharply focused approach may be preferable.”16 Important problems of inference are encountered in studies that use verbal content to make inferences about cognitive beliefs of decision-makers. Content analysis of political leaders assumes their verbal behavior reflects with fair accuracy their inner thoughts. Whatever data an analyst utilizes, the derivation of images from the content of the communication must be inferred. Larson, like de Sola Pool before her, has drawn a distinction between the representational and instrumental models of communication. The former assumes that verbal communication reflects accurately an actor’s beliefs and images, so that the investigator can make inferences directly from it without taking into consideration its situational and behavioral context. In other words, the representational model accepts articulations at face value. The instrumental model, on the other hand, is based upon the assumption that consideration of contextual factors is highly important in assessing a verbal content since communications are “instrumental” for the purpose of persuading a specific audience.17 As Larson points out: “The representational model is often inadequate for making inferences about an individual’s beliefs and perceptions because words serve functions other than expressing the communicator’s beliefs or emotional states.”18 Most communications are likely to contain both representational and instrumental elements. One obvious problem with the use of interpretive methods implied by the instrumental communication concerns validity.19 How can one make valid inferences- about decision-makers’ beliefs from instrumental communication? There are no easy answers to this question. Larson suggests that “the representational model may be used when the investigator chooses content indicators that the communicator exercises no 16 Graber, 1976, p. 127. 17 Larson, 1988, p. 248. See also Edstrom, 1988, pp. 123-126; Hadenius, 1983, p. 137. 18 Ibid. 19 Jonsson addresses the issue o f validity in general terms: "Whether written sources or interviews are used to reconstruct the perceptions o f political actors, the fundamental issue of validity has to be faced. Does the actor express what he perceives, and does he perceive what he expresses?... The analyst...runs the double risk of either overlooking significant nuances o f a message (under-interpretation), or finding hidden meanings where there is none (overinterpretation). Whereas quantitative content analyses seem more prone to under-interpretation, the temptation of over-interpretation looms large in non-quantitative, contextual analysis." Jonsson, 1982, p. 9. Hadenius discusses specific validity problems in his interesting article The Verification of Motives, 1983.

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conscious control over or has no reason to manipulate.”20 The representational model is useful, but that does not diminish the usefulness of instrumental model. In order to compensate for the deficiencies of each, the combined use of the two models may produce the best results. In this study, qualitative content analysis will be applied because it “permits greater flexibility for considering latent as well as manifest meanings of messages.”21 Moreover, the statements made by Japan’s key decision-makers are often vague and diffuse. Edstrom, for example, wrote that “vague and ambiguous formulations are inherent in the Japanese diplomatic approach and that the Japanese approach to settling international problems precludes clear proclamations by the Japanese government.”22 Under such conditions, consideration of contextual factors is important in making inferences about a top politician’s image.23 It is quite often assumed that the beliefs which one can deduce from the statements of individual policy makers are shared by other members of their decision-making group. On this point, Graber writes: “This happens partly as a result of interactions of decision-makers within political organizations, partly as a consequence of the fact that like-minded people attract each other in the formation of decision-making groups, and partly because decision-makers in the same cultural setting are exposed to the same values and constraints.”24

3.3 Case studies: a research strategy

Let us turn to some methodological problems associated with the use of case studies as a research strategy. Decision-making processes have quite often been subjected to case study research. Its merits and limitations have long been debated among political scientists. One obvious limitation inherent in the use of case studies is the inability of discerning patterns of behavior which are dependent upon the observation of a class of events. The case study approach 20 Larson, 1988, p. 249. 21 Graber, 1976, p.129. 22 Edstrom, 1988, p. 259. See also Pickert, 1974, pp. 84-85. 23 For a discussion o f the problems associated with vague official statements, see, for example, Edstrom, 1988, pp. 127-129. 24 Graber, 1976, p. 198.

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“runs the risk of failing to distinguish between what is unique to the case and what is common to the class of events as a whole. As a result, generalizations based on a single case or even a small sample run the risk of being incorrect and misleading.”25 The crux of the problem is that in-depth understanding of the phenomenon is only obtained at the expense of capacity for generalization or vice versa. In recent years there has been a renewed interest in the use of case studies as a strategy in foreign policy research. It seems to me that the disillusionment with the CFP movement provided the impetus for a resurgence of interest in the approach. Case studies have been criticized by comparativists as noncumulative and atheoretical. These deficiencies are not inherent and can be avoided. In their commitment to the use of event data and “scientific” inquiry, comparativists have held the view that the case study approach cannot be regarded as a rational, much less scientific, undertaking. Now even comparativists themselves admit the utility of case studies as an important research strategy. As Rosenau notes, “the specific case can be used for theory development if care is exercised in the identification of its wider relevance and the specification of its key variables.”26 Similarly, Kegley, in his prescription of the productive direction for future CFP research, calls for the use of case studies for theory testing: ...the comparative case-study approach that is recently emerging is exemplary of the kind o f departure that is being recommended for investigation o f contextuallybounded generalizations. So too, is reconsideration prescribed o f how case-studies might be treated rigorously for middle-range hypothesis-testing... To pursue generalizations that are meaningful and falsifiable at this level requires that controlled comparisons be made.27

George, in his article on the utility of case studies as building blocks for theory, states that “the single case study and the method of ‘controlled comparison’ of a few cases has become a respectable, legitimate research strategy that can contribute to theory development.”28 The comparative case study strategy that is a cross between statistical analysis of many cases and in25 Lebow, 1981, p. 6. 26 Rosenau, 1987, p. 55. 27 Kegley, 1980, p. 20. 28 George, 1979, p. 49. For a futher commentary on the utility o f case study approach, see Persson, 1992, pp. 39-41.

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depth study of single cases has certain advantages over the statistical method: “...given the inevitable scarcity of time, energy, and financial resources, the intensive comparative analysis of a few cases may be more promising than a more superficial statistical analysis of many cases.”29 Brecher demonstrated through his use of comparative case studies how one might discover investigatable propositions. My research strategy closely parallels that of Brecher’s foreign policy studies. I rely on a controlled comparison of few cases as the primary methodology of testing and generating hypotheses. The most important criterion for determining the inclusion of a case was theoretical relevance. It is my theoretical ambition to test and generate hypotheses about foreign policy decision-making. As noted in my introduction, the cases selected in this study have shaped the course of Japan’s foreign policy since the World War II in important ways and offer significant indicators of the nation’s behavior. By including four cases (two cases in the militarysecurity issue-area and two cases in the political-diplomatic issue-area) I have increased the capacity for generalization, although I use caution in drawing sweeping generalizations from these few cases. The other criterion for selecting a case was availability of evidence. A case that could be analyzed in sufficient detail in terms of the categories of Brecher’s explanatory framework was deemed worthy of inclusion. This criterion excluded cases in recent years where the lack of sources is acute. Japan represents an interesting and useful case for comparative and theoretical reasons. In one sense, Japan exhibits many political and economic structural characteristics similar to those of the other advanced industrialized democracies of the West. Thus there is no question as to the comparability of the Japanese case. But, on occasion, Japan’s foreign policy behavior does not resemble the other developed states. Many analysts, for example, have pointed that Japan, despite its vast economic power, has remained politically and militarily withdrawn. To the extent that Japan’s behavior is unique, it is fruitful to examine it in the context of an exceptional case. Lijphart cites a “deviant case strategy,” in which the case is selected in order to reveal why it is deviant.30 Without an explicitly defined conceptual scheme that identifies concepts and the relationships of these concepts to the reality, case study research can be little more than an unprocessed mass of insights and stylized facts. Yin asserts: “The typical case study report is a narrative that follows no predictable 29 Lijphart, 1971, p. 685. 30 Ibid., p. 692.

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structure and is hard to write and hard to read. This pitfall may be avoided if a study is built on a clear conceptual framework.”31 Similarly, Pattakos points out that the lack of a common framework of analysis has proved to be one of the major obstacles to performing rigorous and systematic case studies on foreign policy behavior: “To be of true value in the development of generalizations, hypotheses and hence theory, much detail is required. Such detail must be placed in a rigorous format that is the same or at least very similar among case studies to permit ready comparisons.”32 Unfortunately, many case studies have quite often been noncumulative. They have concentrated primarily on the unique features of events rather than observable patterns of foreign policy behavior. As Richardson puts it, “Indeed, methodological treatments of case study design typically label it ‘prescientific’,” or exploratory.33 Science is cumulative. It advances by building on previous works and ideas. One can distinguish among several types of case studies according to their different uses and various research purposes. Lijphart suggests six ideal types of case study: A) Atheoretical; B) Interpretative; C) Hypothesis-generating; D) Theory-confirming; E ) Theory-infirming; and F ) Deviant. The first two types of case studies are, according to Lijphart, the ones in which cases are selected for analysis because of an interest in the case rather than an interest in theory­ building.34 Lijphart’s first category, the “atheoretical case study,” seems to be nonexistent, because even the purest forms of description still depend upon some theoretical notions. Descriptive case studies can be useful in generating data which are then grist for the analyst’s mill. Such data generating research is indispensable, especially if the analysts carry out case studies in accordance with an explicit common framework of analysis. Perhaps such basic datagathering operations are valuable if it is recognized that “this depends on a theoretically oriented secondary analysis of the data collected in atheoretical case studies.”35 The second category on Lijphart’s list, the “interpretive case study,” is a study in applied science: “a generalization is applied to a specific

31 Yin, 1981, p. 64. 32 Pattakos, 1977, p. 3. 33 Richardson, 1987, pp. 168-169. 34 Lijphart, 1971. 35 Ibid., p. 691.

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I case with the aim of throwing light on the case rather than of improving the generalization in any way.”36 The remaining four types of case studies in Lijphart’s list are selected for the purpose of theory-building. His third category, “hypothesis-generating case studies,” which, together with “deviant case studies,” are said to be most conducive to theory-building. They begin “with a more or less vague notion of possible hypotheses, and attempt to formulate definite hypotheses to be tested subsequently among a large number of cases. Their objective is to develop theoretical generalizations in areas where no theory exists yet.”37 Lijphart’s fourth and fifth categories, “theory-confirming case studies” and “theory-infirming case studies,” are, according to him, “analyses of single cases within the framework of established generalizations.”38 Lijphart claims that they have less theoretical import than hypothesis-generating and deviant case studies: “The case study is a test of the proposition, which may turn out to be confirmed or infirmed by it. If the case study is of the theory-confirming type, it strengthens the proposition in question. But, assuming that the proposition is solidly based on a large number of cases, the demonstration that one more case fits does not strengthen it a great deal. Likewise, theoryinfirming case studies merely weaken the generalizations marginally.”39 I do not follow Lijphart’s contention that these case studies have low theoretical import as he seems to underestimate the value of such research. On this point, I agree with Chalmers Johnson’s statement: These case studies are comparable to “normal science” in the puzzle-solving sense described by Thomas Kuhn in his Structure o f Scientific Revolutions. Puzzle­ solving is omitted in Lijphart’s division of the work o f science into “theorizing” and “applied science,” thereby overlooking the fact that it is usually in the interstices between the two where theory actually becomes operational and anomalies are discovered.40

A good example of the work that belongs in this category is Brecher’s microdimensional analysis of Israel’s foreign policy behavior.41 My work

36 Ibid., p. 692. 37 Ibid. 38 Ibid. 39 Ibid. 40 Johnson, 1974, p. 566. 41 Brecher, 1974a.

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contains elements of Lijphart’s five ideal types: interpretive, theory­ confirming, theory-infirming, hypothesis generating, and deviant case studies. While Lijphart discusses the method of “controlled comparison” of a few cases, Eckstein focuses on the different uses of single case studies.42 Yin distinguishes three types of case studies: exploratory, descriptive, and explanatory.43 As data-collecting operations, exploratory and descriptive studies are indispensable for theory-building. They can also generate concepts and useful insights. According to him, explanatory case studies consist of: “(a) an accurate rendition of the facts of the case, (b) some consideration of alternative explanations of these facts, and (c) a conclusion based on the single explanation that appears most congruent with the facts.”44 A good example of work that belongs in the explanatory category is, according to Yin, Graham Allison’s classic study of the Cuban missile crisis. Brecher’s model will now be applied to several of Japan’s most important and consequential foreign policy decisions in postwar Japan. In terms of the framework used in this study, the case studies relate to two issue-areas: military-security (MSA, the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty) and politicaldiplomatic (the Soviet Union and China).

42 Eckstein lists five types of case studies: configurative-ideographic; disciplined-configurative; heuristic; plausibility probes; and crucial. See Eckstein, 1975. 43 Yin, 1981, p. 59. 44 Ibid., p. 61. The so called "expository" method is another type o f case studies which combines description with explanation. See Stenelo, 1972, p. 10; Bryder, 1975, p. 30; Stenelo, 1984, p. 20.

Part II. Empirical Analysis 4. Mutual Security Assistance (MSA) Aid

In 1953, Japan’s decision-makers were confronted with a major challenge in the form of the American offer to extend Mutual Security Assistance (MSA) aid to Japan. The result was a decision cluster, with three interrelated decisions - one strategic decision and two derivative tactical decisions: On June 30, 1953, the Government of Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru decided to seek MSA aid. (Strategic decision) On March 2, 1954, the Japanese Government approved two defense laws: the Defense Agency Law and the Self-Defense Forces Law at a cabinet meeting. (Tactical decision 1) On March 19, 1954, the Government approved the Defense Secrets Protection Law. (Tactical decision 2) The strategic decision of 1953 was so designated in terms of its scale and duration and because it was to provide the foundation for all subsequent U.S. military aid to Japan and the development of the Self-Defense Forces. The tactical decisions to approve the two defense laws and the Defense Secrets Protection Law were closely linked with and inseparable from the strategic decision to seek MSA aid from the United States.

4.1 Operational Environment

The main feature of the global system which existed in 1953 was the bipolarity between the “eastern camp” led by Moscow and the “western camp” led by

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Washington. The early 1950s saw the penetration of global rivalry into the East Asian system as a result of the triumph of the Communists in China in 1949, the Sino-Soviet alliance of 1950 and the Korean War of 1950-1953. The world was still tightly bipolarized during the months preceding Japan’s strategic decision on MSA. The bipolarity and the antagonism between the two superpowers induced them to allocate much of their resources to intra-bloc activity designed to strengthen their respective camps militarily and economically. As a result of the Korean War, the United States saw China as a serious threat to its security interests, especially regarding the security of its allies in East Asia. Accordingly, Washington decided to increase its military commitments in East Asia by extending sizable military and economic aid to its Asian allies in order to strengthen their defense capabilities. The MSA aid came to occupy an important place in the U.S. Cold War strategy for containing Communism. Washington’s approach to Japan followed logically from the Eisenhower administration’s goal of stopping the Chinese and the Soviets in East Asia. After the Korean armistice in July 1953, the United States sought to make Japan a reliable bulwark against a perceived Soviet and Chinese threat to the stability of East Asia. Thus, the inter-bloc struggle catalyzed an important United States act - to offer the MSA aid to Japan to increase her defense capability. That, in turn, was a decisive input into the processes leading to Japan’s decision. The United States exerted pressures on Japan to assume increasing responsibility for her own defense. When Japan began to put out feelers to the Americans to indicate Tokyo’s desire to receive MSA aid, the Korean War stalemated and the negotiations on an armistice finally ended with the signing of a truce at Panmunjom in June 1953. Japanese relations with the United States were a vital part of the setting for the decisions. One important aspect of the most significant component in the external environment was the dominant position of the United States in Japan’s foreign trade and the role of US as a source of technology and capital. The Japanese economy was structurally dependent on and economically vulnerable to the United States whose decisions had significant implications for Japan’s economic fortunes. A number of figures reveal the extent of Japan’s dependence on the United States. Almost one third of Japanese imports came from the United States whereas about one-sixth of Japanese exports went to the United States. Moreover, during 1952 and 1953 when Japan was running a heavy deficit in its balance of payments, the United States directed offshore Procurement toward Japan.

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The other aspect of this dominant bilateral component was Japan’s total dependence on the United States for its national defense. Knowing that for constitutional, political and economic reasons it could not build a credible deterrent of its own against its potential enemies, Japan put itself under the aegis of the stronger of the two superpowers through the U. S.-Japanese Security Treaty. Following the succession of Eisenhower to the presidency and John Foster Dulles to the post of Secretary of State in 1952, the new Republican administration embarked on a far more active policy of containment designed to meet the perceived threats posed by both the Soviet Union and China. Under Dulles, men with strong anticommunist views came to dominate the State Department.1 The Eisenhower administration considered Japan vital to American security. Under John Foster Dulles, American foreign policy, even after the cease-fire in Korea, tended to be viewed in black and white terms as a worldwide struggle against communism. The United States continued to provide military and economic assistance to its Asian allies to strengthen their defense capabilities. It pressed Japan to rearm rapidly and be counted in its anticommunist policy. During the period of the policy process leading to Japan’s strategic decision on MSA, the Soviet Union was still pursuing a hard line policy toward Japan in terms of Stalin’s concept of the Cold War.2 Moscow viewed Japan as a semisatellite of the United States, bound to Washington by close security, political, and economic ties. It was not until mid-1954 that a shift in the Soviet Union’s policy toward Japan occurred. The People’s Republic of China continued to pursue a hard line toward Tokyo as part of a revolutionary posture in the worldwide struggle against the "imperialist camp." After the armistice agreement in Korea, however, Beijing gradually softened its hard line posture and began to evolve a new policy toward Japan. Lacking official

1 Under the leadership o f Dulles, important posts in the State Department were held by strong anticommunists such as Assistant Secretary o f State for Far Eastern Affairs Walter S. Robertson. Nancy Bernkopf Tucker argues that "Walter S. Robertson's appointment as Assistant Secretary...served to protect D u lles’ flanks from harassment by Republican conservatives." Tucker, 1990, p. 37. Tucker also discusses the role o f the U.S. State Department in the formulation of American policy toward East Asia. 2 Few gestures were made to improve relations with Japan. In early 1953, the Soviets declared that they were ready to reopen negotiations on Japanese fishing rights in the coastal waters off Kamchatka Peninsula. In August 1953 the Soviet Premier declared that the time had come for the restoration o f diplomatic relations with Japan. See Jain, 1981, p. 23: Vishwanathan, 1973, p. 66.

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diplomatic ties with Tokyo, Beijing attempted to develop trade and other links with Japan. Japan’s trade with Communist China was severely restricted. After the start of the Korean War, the United States imposed a complete embargo on trade with the People’s Republic, which it continued as part of its overall policy of containment and pressure against China. The United States also tried to induce other countries to maintain severe restrictions on Chinese trade. Japan was thus compelled to adhere to the U.S. containment of China: the bilateral agreement between Japan and the United States concerning the control of exports to the People’s Republic of China was secretly signed in Washington on September 5, 1952.3 As a result, China’s share in Japan’s overall trade was of marginal importance to Japan. In 1952, less than 0.05 percent of Japan’s export was with the People’s Republic of China and less than one percent of Japan’s imports came from that country.4 The internal dimension of the operational environment was much more significant in the decision to seek MSA aid than the external one. In 1953 the Japanese economy was in a precarious state. The economic boom caused by the Korean War began to subside in 1952. Throughout 1952 and into 1953, consumption and investment were on an upward spiral. But the danger lay in the field of international trade. Imports of industrial machines and consumer goods increased greatly. Japanese industry was unable to compete on world markets because of the comparatively high prices of Japanese products. The West’s embargo policy toward the People’s Republic of China had obliged Japan to import essential raw materials from such distant areas as the United States and South America. Since the relatively high cost of purchasing raw materials made it difficult to bring the price of Japanese products to a competitive level, Japan was running a heavy deficit in its balance of payments. The adverse trade balance grew from $150 million in 1950 to $600 million in 1951, and $759 million in 1952. The trade deficit for the first five months of 1953 amounted to 478 million dollars and it was estimated to be more than 1 billion dollars in 1953, by far larger than any previous year. The prospects for 1954 looked even worse.5 Thus the economic component was a crucial catalyst to the strategic decision. The enormous deficit during the first half of 1953 was a grave situation, particularly as the downward trend in foreign currency receipts now appeared 3 FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. 14, pp. 1332-1333. 4 Ibid.,1480. 5 Borden, 1984, p. 168; Kimura, 1955, p. 265-266; Allison (John M.), 1953, p. 37.

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to be accelerating with the impending termination of U.S. procurement of Korean war-related goods and services. Japan’s trade accounts were balanced with dollar earnings from American military procurements in Japan. It was these special procurements during the Korean War that put the Japanese economy on its feet. A change in U.S. policy on offshore procurements could have had a disproportionately large effect on Japan’s balance of payments and economic growth. With the end of the Korean hostilities in sight, fear began to arise in Japan that a deep recession in Japan’s economy might well follow. Special procurement receipts amounted to $800 million in 1952 which accounted for 64 percent of Japan’s exports and 37 percent of foreign exchange receipts. They fell to $760 million in 1953.6 In the absence of these outlays Japan would have had a substantial deficit. It was under these circumstances that the Japanese Government began to consider Japan’s participation in the MSA program. As for the military component of the environment, the characteristics most relevant to the decision process were the heavy dependence on the United States for Japan’s security and the weaknesses in the defense forces. To be sure, Japan’s military capability during the gestation period for the MSA decisions was weak: the National Safety Force numbered approximately 100,000 men (authorized strength of 110,000); the Maritime Safety Force had 40 World War II minesweepers, and 68 U.S. Coast Guard-type vessels (18 frigates and 50 landing craft) were in the process of being transferred to the Japanese Maritime Safety Force in accordance with the Lend-Lease Agreement concluded on November 12, 1952; Japan had no air force.7 The United States had equipped Japan’s defense forces with both heavy and light equipment. Japan’s almost total reliance on the United States for its security was a salient factor in the setting for decision. Regarding political structure, the characteristic most relevant to the decision process was the precarious position of the Yoshida government. The ruling Liberal Party alone did not command a majority in the Diet for its MSA policy. Until the October 1952 general elections, Yoshida was able to maintain virtually undisputed power by virtue of the electoral successes of the Liberals. In that election, the Liberal Party suffered heavy losses, reducing its strength in the lower house from 285 to 240 seats. The Democratic Party, the exponent of large scale rearmament, increased its representation from 64 to 85 seats. In the Lower House elections of April 1953, Prime Minister Yoshida’s Liberal 6 Borden, 1984, p 168. 7 FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. 14, pp. 1392-1393; Asagumo Shimbunsha, 1973, pp. 143-144.

[

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Party lost further ground, winning only 199 of 466 seats. Until December 1954 Yoshida had to rely on a precarious alliance with the various conservative groups to remain in power. The support of its conservative rivals, the ">ogressive Party (76 seats) and Hatoyama’s Liberal Party (35 seats) was essential to parliamentary approval. In short, as the strength of the Liberal Party decreased, the support of the various conservative groups - the Progressives and splinter Liberals - had become a political necessity if Yoshida’s party was to maintain control of the government. Among competing elites, the Progressives and Hatoyama’s Liberals, representing the conservative opponents of Prime Minister Yoshida’s Liberal Party, were the most forceful advocates of a more rapid rearmament. They had taken a position in favor of receiving MSA aid in so far as it contributed to the development of an autonomous defense capability. But they criticized the Yoshida government’s approach to rearmament, viewing it as one of creeping rearmament. In their eyes, the Yoshida policy conceded that Japan, on constitutional grounds, could not develop an independent military capability. Viewing large-scale rearmament as a step toward true independence for Japan, Yoshida’s conservative opponents advocated redefinition of the mission of the Safety Forces and eventually a revision of the constitution.8 From the other two extremes of the competing elites spectrum, both the Left- and Right-Wing Socialists advocated precisely the contrary. As advocates of disarmed neutrality, they had always opposed the Japan-U.S. alliance as a pillar of Japan’s foreign policy. These competing elite advocacies from the Socialists were not an important environmental component impinging upon the decision on the issue of MSA aid. Internal pressures were present throughout the decision process. Keidanren (the Federation of Economic Organizations), representing Japan’s leading corporations and industrial organizations, was the principal interest group in the setting for decision on MSA aid.9 When Secretary of State Dulles announced to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the administration planned to include Japan in future MSA aid programs, the federation took the lead in calling for Japan’s acceptance of MSA aid. It believed that MSA aid would have a great effect on the reconstruction of Japan’s economy in general and the defense industry in particular. Keidanren stated its view: 8 For the view s o f Yoshida's critics on the right on MSA aid and rearmament, see, for example, Shugiin, Shugiin kaigiroku, No. 17, 16th Diet, 1953, pp. 2-4. 9 For the role o f Keidanren in the policy making process of MSA aid, see, for example, Yanaga, 1968; "MSA enjo to gaishi donyu," Keizai Orai, July 1953, pp. 6-20.

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It is undeniable that with properly planned procurements in Japan as the basis of MSA aid, the foundations can be laid for an industrial structure which, in the future, would contribute in no little way to augmentation o f Japan’s competitive capacity in international markets.10

Keidanren, perceiving benefits in the form of economic aid and military orders, acted as a supportive interest group, pressing its views through the ministries and the Cabinet. In short, interest group advocacy created a setting conducive to the acceptance of MSA aid by the Yoshida government.11

4.2 Decision Makers and Their Images

The strategic decision to seek MSA aid was formally taken by the Japanese government at a cabinet meeting on June 30, 1953. Yoshida’s dominance over foreign and security policy was unchallenged within the Government. He was anything but a “team man,” and he was often referred to as “one man Yoshida.” As Hellmann asserts, “Prime Minister Yoshida took firm and full control over all aspects of Japan’s foreign affairs. In reconstructing the Foreign Office, the veteran diplomat built up a staff which was personally loyal and shared his policy sympathies. All international problems of any consequence were resolved by the prime minister himself...”12 The Foreign Ministry, Hellmann continues, “worked smoothly with the government as a clearing-house for Yoshida’s policies.”13 Ultimate authority on the MSA issue thus rested with Prime Minister Yoshida, as on all major foreign policy decisions. It was his desire to establish centralized political leadership that led him to take such an active personal part in policy formulation. Yoshida was

10 Cited in Borden, 1984, p. 172. 11 Opinion polls taken at the time o f the strategic decision to seek MSA aid showed that the public remained divided. One substantial minority (40 %) opposed Japan's acceptance o f the MSA aid, another minority (27 %) supported it. See Asahi Shimbun, June 22, 1953. 12 Hellmann, 1969, p. 135. 13 Ibid.

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quite often indifferent to the opinion of others and preferred to organize around him a group of advisors who agreed with him.14 There were cabinet ministers with substantial advisory influence in foreign policy, notably Foreign Minister Okazaki Katsuo who was a close friend of Yoshida. His special status derived in part from his role as one of Yoshida’s closest confidants on foreign policy matters. There is little hard evidence about Yoshida’s perceptions at the time of the strategic decision. He seldom commented publicly on the issue of MSA aid and his occasional remarks were evasive. Yet it is possible to infer Yoshida’s image from his general view of the world and from speeches and statements of his Foreign Minister Okazaki, for he had been the spokesman of Prime Minister Yoshida in the matter of foreign policies. There was substantive discussion of the MSA aid in the Diet before and after the strategic decision in which the Foreign Minister took part. For the rest, we have to make inferences from Yoshida’s scattered comments, memoirs, and biographies as well as from the various pronouncements and statements of the Foreign Ministry. Because of the centrality of Yoshida in Japan’s decision-making process, Yoshida’s attitudes were generally reflected in the value-orientations of the other decision-makers. Yoshida, a man of strong convictions, brought with him to the post of Prime Minister certain assets and qualities that enabled him to carry out a vigorous foreign policy in difficult times. Since Yoshida left a legacy of ideas which continue to exert great influence in the sphere of Japan’s foreign policy orientation, the nature of the attitudinal prism governing his image will be explored in detail. Prime Minister Yoshida had a coherent, elaborated belief system. Central to Yoshida’s political philosophy was his emphasis on “realism” as opposed to “idealism.” His ealism was based on the use of a historical frame of reference and the principle of nagai mono ni makareyo (“move with the powerful”) - the two being inextricably intertwined. Yoshida sometimes used historical analogies to understand events in the world and choose among alternative policies. He held a cyclical view of history - every event had a parallel sometime in the past. He seemed to believe that, by studying past events, one could draw useful lessons that could be applied to analogous situations in the present. Yoshida, according to one of his biographers, John W. Dower, was convinced that “history could be rolled back, the pendulum returned to an

14

Kosaka, 1972, p. 116.

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approximation of earlier times.”15 During the occupation period, he remarked to a colleague that “history provides examples of winning by diplomacy after losing in war.”16 There can be little doubt that Yoshida thought of the post-World War II international situation in terms of the lessons of the post-World War I era. He argued that Japan’s diplomacy lost its firm footing when the Anglo-Japanese alliance was terminated in the early 1920s: “Without the stabilizing influence of the Alliance, our military men saw fit to overrun Manchuria and China; the Second World War started, which was a blow to Britain and reduced China to chaos; and everyone knows what happened to us.”17 Having played a small part in negotiating the Versailles settlement and having experienced personally the abrogation of the Anglo-American alliance as a diplomat in London, Yoshida was determined not to repeat these errors. From this sprang his fear of the reemergence of Japanese militarism and his insistence on the need for an alliance. This lesson prompted Yoshida to enter into an alliance relationship with the United States in the early 1950s, the natural successor to the AngloJapanese relationship. Yoshida rejected neutralism since it would force the Japanese to consider the alternative of autonomous self defense and the burden of extensive rearmament he saw as implicit in it. Another important strand of his “realism” was reliance on the old principle of nagai mono ni makareyo, shrewdly observing the changing power relations among principal actors in world politics, taking advantage of their mutual rivalries and seeking to advance the national interest by aligning with the strongest of the great powers.18 Yoshida regarded the alliance with Great Britain, the greatest of the Powers, as one of the most important bases of the nation’s foreign policy in prewar Japan. The termination of the alliance in the early 1920s was, in Yoshida’s views, a severe blow to Japan’s traditional diplomacy, and led the country eventually to the disastrous course in the 1930s. Yoshida opposed ties with Nazi Germany partly on the ground that it was the weaker of the powerful states. He believed in the 1930s that if war came about in Europe, Germany would lose such a war.19 The idea of aligning

15 Dower, 1979, pp. 311-312. 16 Ibid., p. 312. 17 Ibid., p. 36. See also Yoshida, 1962, p. 48. 18 Welfield, 1988, p. 2; Packard, 1966, p. 14. For a discussion o f this concept, see Edstrom, 1992, pp. 15-17. 19 For Yoshida's opposition to rapprochement with Germany, see Dower, 1979, pp. 119-121.

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with the weaker of the great powers was not in line with the Japanese diplomatic tradition based on the principle of nagai mono ni makareyo. According to his line of reasoning, nation states in the international system were confronted with constraints and opportunities, the effects of which tend to vary with their positions within the power structure of the international system. Yoshida recognized the inherent disparity in power between the superpowers and the lesser states and that there were severe limitations in the extent to which a weak and defeated nation like Japan can alter the international system. The Prime Minister stated in his policy speech to the Diet on January 23, 1950: "For some time people have desired ‘over-all’ peace; this, however, is a question that depends on international circumstances, and is not, given the situation our country is in, something we can decide on our own."20 He seemed to believe that the international environment, especially the patterns of power relations between the superpowers, shaped the realm of the possible in Japan’s foreign policy. At most Japan could make skilful use of such factors as disputes between powerful actors in the international system to its advantage. In Yoshida’s view, the defeat of World War II left Japan with no choice but to adjust its policies to the behavior of powerful states. In the selection of its ally, Yoshida relied on the principle of nagai mono ni makareyo. It was natural for Japan to choose the United States, the most powerful western nation, as an alliance partner to advance the country’s interests. It was on the basis of this realism that the Prime Minister committed Japan to a “separate peace,” the bilateral security pact with the United States, and integration into the global capitalist economy. Yoshida, a pragmatic exponent of realpolitik, thus viewed the world in terms of complex and shifting relations between the major powers, and he argued that Japan should fully use such shifting relations to her own advantage. He learned from his study of history that victor nations often disagree among themselves in regard to a postwar settlement and believed that Japan could make use of the complex power relationship among the victors to secure advantageous terms. For Yoshida, the Cold War, the ideological and strategic conflict between the two blocs enhanced Japan’s value and offered such a moment. “It made Japan strategically important to the Americans and therefore gave Yoshida bargaining leverage. He reasoned that Japan could make minimal concessions of passive cooperation with the Americans in return for an early end to the Occupation, a long-term guarantee of its national 20 Yoshida, Kaiso Junen, Vol. 4, 1958, p. 226.

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security, and the opportunity to concentrate on all-out economic recovery.”21 In other words, Yoshida seized the opportunity to practice what Nagai calls jakusha no kyokatsu (“blackmail by the weak”), the strategy to turn military defeat into economic victory by exploiting the Cold War and Japan’s strategic importance, exploiting Japan’s weakness to the hilt.22 Similarly, Yoshida and his government were confident in 1953 that, because of Japan’s strategic value to the United States, the United States would bail it out of any economic crisis “through special procurement, Korean rehabilitation, or new loans.”23 Yoshida, a former high-ranking bureaucrat of the Foreign Ministry and ambassador to Great Britain, brought to his office a particular concept of the relationship between government and people. While Yoshida, an advocate of liberalism, was a firm believer in constitutional and parliamentary government, he was not an advocate of popular democracy in the sense of letting the desires of the people determine government policy. Yoshida believed that as a leader he should be free to exercise his judgement in the common interest whether it agreed with the wishes of the people or not. Yoshida’s concept of the relationship between the government and the people seems to be based on his philosophy of liberalism rather than on participatory democracy.24 Yoshida, a career diplomat before the war, considered party politics to be vulgar, and disliked party politicians who were receptive to the sentiments of the people to solicit popular support. Kosaka described him as a man who set out his own point of view and “refused to take into consideration the ambitions of other politicians, the opinions of opposition parties, or the sentiments of the people at large.” “He would,” Kosaka continues, “neither seek to earn their support for his own point of view nor compromise in an attempt to bring his point of view nearer to theirs.”25 His view of the role of public opinion in foreign policy is similar to that of the realist school of thought. Indeed, Yoshida seemed skeptical of the general public’s contribution to the pursuit of effective diplomacy. He was convinced that the conduct of diplomacy requires secrecy, expert knowledge, experience, and other qualities that would be 21 Pyle, 1987, pp. 245-246. 22 For the concept o f “jakusha no kyokatsu,” see Nagai, 1985, p. 64. 23 "The Ambassador in Japan (Allison) to the Department o f State, September 7, 1953," FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. 14, p. 1499. 24 For Yoshida's conception o f liberalism, see Kosaka, 1968, pp. 238-242. See also Kosaka, 1981, pp. 145-146. 25 Kosaka, 1972, p. 130.

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jeopardized were the public opinion permitted to have a strong voice in foreign policy. Yoshida’s approach to governing was entirely in keeping with his admiration of the diplomacy of the British empire. As an “old liberal,” Yoshida admired the British political system which combines an ultimate democratic control by the electorate with a freedom of governmental action without parallels in other democracies. This was particularly true about the pragmatic British diplomacy in the prewar era which was unhindered by wilful interference by opposition in the parliament or by public opinion. His personality traits seemed to reinforce his style of decision-making: “A man of strong likes and dislikes, he preferred to have around him people who agreed with him, and he actually went so far as to refuse to listen to those whose opinions ran counter to his own.”26 Other important strands of Yoshida’s attitudinal prism were his profound pro-western orientation and mercantilistic approach to international relations. His pro-western orientation was rooted in a deep conviction that the nation’s future lay in close association with the West, especially with the United States. He held the view that the main current of modem Japanese diplomacy was internationalist with Anglo-American orientation. He was convinced that Japan’s security and prosperity above all else depended on its close military, political, and economic ties with the United States. Yoshida wrote in his memoirs: The grand concept of basing Japanese diplomacy principally on friendship with the United States will in all probability not be changed in the future-nor should it be changed. It arises not from the temporary postwar situation in which Japan found herself but rather from the road she has followed ever since the Meiji Restoration. A maritime nation, Japan has no choice but to engage in overseas trade if she is to support her ninety million inhabitants. This being the case, her chief partners should be the United States and Great Britain, countries whose relations with Japan, in trade as w ell as in history, have been closest, countries that are economically prosperous and technologically advanced. This is not essentially a question o f either dogma or philosophy, nor need it lead to a subservient

26 Ibid., p. 116. Inoki Masamichi, one o f Yoshida's biographers, confirms this personality trait. See Inoki, 1981,4: 313.

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Empirical Analysis relationship; it is merely the quickest and most effective way - indeed the only way - to promote the prosperity of the Japanese people.27

Yoshida did not perceive the world in military, strategic terms. Instead he adopted an economic definition of international relations and viewed the world stage as primarily an economic area where Japan could engage in trade. In his view, “the conduct of a country’s international affairs must have its basis in mutual trust above everything else” and “the essence of international diplomacy and international finance are identical - both are based on credit [trust].”28 Kosaka characterized Yoshida’s m ercantilists approach to international relations in the following way: He did not see international relations from the point o f view o f a military man but from that o f a businessman. In a sense, this was the result o f his deep faith in the British diplomatic tradition, and it lends added weight to Yoshida’s reputation as a pro-British and pro-American politician. Certainly, Yoshida never denied that international diplomacy was sometimes a fierce struggle and that at times this struggle degenerated into armed conflict. But he remained convinced that even when a shooting war seemed to be extremely important or even decisive, it would always, if looked at from a long-range point o f view, turn out to be o f secondary importance. He was very firm in his opinion that the nature o f international relations was chiefly determined by trade resulting in mutual benefit, as well as by spiritual and material "credit" among sovereign states.29

It was primarily these values that formed the lens through which he perceived the operational environment. Yoshida perceived the reality of super-power and bloc conflict and the friendship of the United States for Japan. He wrote in his memoirs, “Since the United States and the Soviet Union, the two major Powers, are in opposition to each other, one supported by a group of free countries, the other by satellite Communist nations, the only logical policy for both West Germany and Japan to adopt in foreign affairs is co-operation with the United States as members of the group of free nations.”30 This is also illuminated by another passage in

27 Quoted in Kosaka, 1972, pp. 106-107. See also Yoshida, Kaiso junen, Vol. 4, 1958, pp. 24-25. 28 See Yoshida, Kaiso junen, Vol. 1, 1957, p. 31. See also Kosaka, 1972, p. 110. 29 Kosaka, 1972, p. 110. 30 Yoshida, 1961, p. 111.

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his memoirs: “it has always been my firm belief that Japan should associate and co-operate closely with the free nations in planning her future course. I do not deny the eventual possibility of friendly intercourse with the Communist countries, but a recognition of facts as they now stand, and my abiding faith in liberalism, made me welcome the peace treaty as it emerged as a result of the San Francisco Conference.”31 There is evidence that the question of MSA aid was perceived in terms of Japan’s prevailing global policy of alignment: to accept MSA would be in line with, and strengthen Japan’s posture of alignment with the West, especially the United States. Replying to a question about Japan’s participation in the MSA program in the Diet on June 30, the Foreign Minister stated: “We decided to receive it [MSA] in order to strengthen cooperation with the Western community of nations...to the best of our ability.”32 Deputy Prime Minister Ogata Taketora articulated a perception of the global component and Japan’s relations with the United States as relevant to the strategic decision during the MSA debate in the Diet: “Since the conclusion of the peace treaty, the strengthening of cooperation with the United States and other free world nations and the materialization of the idea of collective security form a part of the government’s foreign policy principles. And we decided to act as we did because we believed that the conclusion of the MSA agreements would be in line with this policy.”33 The need to go along with the United States, the vital source of economic assistance and arms for Japan, was one important strand in Yoshida’s perception. Yoshida’s posture on relations with the United States reflected his deeper belief that the road to economic recovery and international reacceptance of Japan ran through Washington. Yoshida had often portrayed the United States as Japan’s natural ally, a benevolent society sharing common values. He considered the alliance with the United States the cornerstone of Japan’s foreign policy and the foundation of its policies toward other nations: “the great principle that the keynote of Japanese diplomacy is friendship with the United States will not and must not be changed in the future.”34 He allowed no foreign policy action to undermine the Japan-U.S. alliance policy. Yoshida 31 Ibid., p. 274. 32 Sangiin, Sangiin kaigiroku, No. 16, June 30, 1953, p. 9. The Foreign Ministry's paper also emphasized this image component. See Gaimusho Joho Bunka kyoku, "MSA enjo to Nihon," in Sekai no ugoki tokushugo: MSA to wa nani ka, July 1953. 33 Shugiin, Shugiin kaigiroku, No. 18, March 11, 1954, p. 6. 34 Yoshida, Kaiso Junen, Vol. 1, 1957, p. 32. Cited in Dower, p. 446.

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apparently felt that refusal to accept MSA aid would have created unnecessary friction with the United States, which would have been detrimental to Japan’s national interests.35 In his foreign policy speech to the Diet on June 16 1953, Foreign Minister Okazaki, stressed the importance of strengthening cooperation with the United States and other free nations under the concept of collective security.36 The key decision-makers also believed that Japan’s acceptance of MSA aid would promote her economic cooperation with Southeast Asian countries. In his policy speech to the Diet on June 16, 1953, Prime Minister Yoshida stressed the economic importance of the region to Japan: “Today, when we cannot expect much from trade with China, it is not necessary to dwell upon the importance of our relations with Southeast Asia. The government desires to extend every possible cooperation for the prosperity of the countries in Southeast Asia, in the form of capital, technology, and services, in order to deepen our mutually beneficiary relations.”37 Yoshida and his key associates, viewing the situation basically from the perspective of the national economy, believed that Japan, for the foreseeable future, remained dependent not merely upon the economic cooperation with the United States, but upon Washington’s economic contribution in the way of MSA to the non-communist states of Asia.38 They argued for MSA aid geared to the needs of Japanese industry and coordinated aid to Southeast Asia. A paper prepared by the Foreign Ministry, which closely reflected the Yoshida government’s views, elaborated this image component:39 “...if machinery equipment and industrial chemicals that are 35 Dickinson, 1987, p.l 13. 36 Sangiin, Sangiin kaigiroku, No. 16, June 16, 1953, p. 7. 37 Yoshida, Kaiso Junen, Vol. 4, 1958, p. 255. 38 In the Ikeda-Robertson talks in October 1953, Yoshida's key associates endeavoured to persuade the United States that Japan should be given full consideration in matters o f supply and procurement for southeast Asia under the MSA program: "i) That the U.S. assistance to the free nations in the Southeast Asian area, either in the way of MSA or otherwise, be tied with the reparation payment, both in its planning and administration, ii) That if and when the U.S. plans a development program for one o f these nations, full consideration be taken to call supply o f capital goods and technical know-how from Japan, iii) That an assistance, both financially and otherwise, be considered by the United States if and when an agreement is to be made between Japan and one of these nations on a joint undertaking o f developing such a nation." Cited in Dower, 1979, p. 457. 39 The paper was made it public on June 20, 1953 and outlined the Yoshida government's views on the merits o f the MSA aid. Asahi shimbun, June 21, 1953.

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necessary for the development of Asian countries are purchased from our country with the MSA aid funds, it contributes not only to the growth of the industries concerned in our country and to the improvement of foreign currency receipts but also to the deepening of our economic ties and friendly relations with the countries in Asia.”40 None of Japan’s key decision-makers articulated a perception of relations with the Soviet Union and China as relevant to their decisions. Yoshida’s views on communism and the Soviet Union were well-known. He held a harsh antiSoviet view in foreign policy. In part this is a residue of his ideological antipathy to communism and in part to his understanding of historical rivalry between the two countries. His view of the Soviet Union did not change. “Let me say boldly and in all sincerity that, with the Cold War still on, this is no time for us to flirt with Moscow while making pious protestations of friendship for America...”41 In another context, he remarked: “Speaking frankly, the Soviet Union is not a country to make friends with.”42 Yet Yoshida did not view international politics in black and white terms as a struggle against communism and particularly against the threats posed by both the Soviet Union and China. Yoshida saw neither the Soviet Union nor China as imminent, direct military threats to Japan. He apparently reasoned that the Soviets were preoccupied with their mounting domestic problems and that the Chinese simply lacked the capacity to invade Japan. Moreover, he was convinced that Japan’s alliance with the world’s greatest military power was adequate in protecting her security against foreign aggression. “Under these circumstances,” wrote colonel Frank. Kowalski, who was intimately involved in the question of Japan’s rearmament, “he [Yoshida] concluded that neither the Soviet Union nor Red China nor a combination of both would dare to confront the United States in direct combat. Under the protective American umbrella, therefore, there was no need for any hurried rearmament in Japan.”43 Even at the height of the Korean War, Yoshida repeatedly rejected the argument that Japan was in imminent danger of being attacked by the communist countries. On January 27, 1951, for example, he elaborated his view in the following manner: 40 Ibid., pp. 39. 41 Yoshida's speech before the American-Japan Society in Tokyo. Cited in Dower, p. 447. 42 Yoshida's remark in a 1966 interview. Cited in Dower, p. 448. See also Axelbank, 1972, p. 191. 43 Cited in Dower, 1979, p. 393.

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W e do not have the slightest expectation that the communist countries will invade Japan. Therefore, I believe that in addressing the security problem it is necessary to first consider the concrete questions o f from which direction the danger comes and how imminent the danger is to Japan. Insofar as the threat o f communism within the country is concerned, I think that at the present time even the members o f the Communist Party do not believe that such a threat exists. Where the concrete problem o f Japan’s security is concerned, one must first grasp the concrete realities o f the threat to Japan and then discuss this, but there can be no discussion, as if for the sport o f it, on imaginary themes along the lines o f a threat being imminent.44

Moreover, unlike Dulles in his public views, Yoshida, an “old China hand,” did not regard the People’s Republic of China as part of a monolithic, Sovietcontrolled Communist bloc, emphasizing the likelihood that, given the very different national and cultural traditions of the Soviet Union and China, Chinese nationalism and the Soviet desire for domination would eventually come into conflict.45 Yoshida wrote later: “...there seemed to be something basically incompatible in the relationship between mainland China and Russia. There was a prospect that, given the different cultural backgrounds and the differences in national character and political conditions in the two countries, the interests of Communist China and the Soviet Union were ultimately bound to come into conflict.”46 Yoshida believed that the Chinese were pragmatic, materialistic and down to earth, while the Russians were messianic and expansive. He was convinced that the Chinese people would ultimately reject Communism. Yoshida held a basically positive image of China. He believed that Japan and China had more in common with each other than China had with the Soviet Union, in spite of communist ideology: “Red or white, China remains our next-door neighbor. Geography and economic laws will, I believe, prevail in 44 Yoshida's statement in response to an interpellation on the question o f Japan's security in the lower house. Cited in Dower, 1979, p. 390. 45 Contrary to Dulles's public view o f the monolithic nature o f the Communist threat, Dulles, according to Gaddis's recent study, recognized the tensions between the Soviet Union and China. He believed that communism would suffer from problems of "indigestion," considering the different national traditions o f the areas that fell under Communist control. See Gaddis, 1990, pp. 59-60. In December 1953, at a top secret briefing he gave to Churchill, Eden, Eisenhower, and Bidault at their Bermuda summit meeting, Dulles talked about the strain in the Sino-Soviet relations. See FRUS, 1952-1954, 3: 711. 46 Yoshida, 1967, p. 85.

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the long run over any ideological differences and artificial trade barriers.”47 Yoshida continued to view China in much the same way he had since before World War II, recognizing China’s importance for Japanese trade. He never subscribed to the concept of economic containment pursued by the United States. Nor did he believe in the necessity of rapid and extensive rearmament, considering his perception of the direct external threats to Japan. The discrepancy between Yoshida’s evaluation of the strategic situation and that of Washington became even clearer in mid-1953. When Japan’s strategic decision on MSA aid was approaching a climax, Yoshida, although he still held a bipolar view of the global system, saw a relaxation of tension in the world. In a policy speech before the Diet on June 16 1953, Yoshida declared: “The recent international situation seems to indicate a trend toward some relaxation of antagonism between the Eastern and Western blocs, as witnessed by the cease-fire in Korea. The world policy of the Communist camp may not undergo any fundamental change, but a truce in Korea can be considered as the first step toward the restoration of peace in Asia...”48 Under the new circumstances, the possibility of immediate Soviet and Chinese threats seemed, in Yoshida’s view, increasingly remote. The two pivotal components of the key decision-makers’ image were the concern with Japan’s economic future and the enhancement of Japan’s military capability. These components, as stimuli to the MSA decision, were expressed by Foreign Minister Okazaki in his foreign policy speech to the Diet just before the strategic decision: “I think it would be desirable to receive (MSA) if it would contribute to the strengthening of our country’s self-defense power and to the economy...”49 A closer examination of Foreign Minister Okazaki’s speeches and statements and Prime Minister Yoshida’s writings shows that there is a ranking of these two components: Japan’s key decision-makers were not impervious to the military component, but it was less important than the compelling need of Japan’s economy. Yoshida, like all the other decision-makers, perceived the MSA aid as necessary for Japan’s economy in a period of the economic peril facing the country. Dower wrote: “By early 1951, the Yoshida government was already anticipating an armistice in Korea and again viewing Japan’s economic future with apprehension and great uncertainty. They looked for a

47 Yoshida, 1951, p. 179. 48 Yoshida, Kaiso Junen, Vol. 4, 1958, p. 254. 49 Sangiin kaigiroku, No. 10, June 16, 1953, p. 8.

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bold solution from Washington...”50 Yoshida’s overriding concern was thus with economic recovery in line with the constant core of his world-view. Miyasato maintains that “Yoshida never wavered from the conviction that Japan’s economic growth should be the prime national goal.”51 Foreign Minister Okazaki stated in a Diet interpellation on June 30, 1953 that the economic stability of Japan should be given the primary consideration before undertaking the development of its defense strength.52 Japan’s behavior during the MSA negotiations also confirmed the pre-eminent role of that economic component in the decision-making elite’s image of the MSA issue. Three illustrations point up its intensity. Foreign Minister Okazaki stated in the Diet on June 30 1953 that the Japanese economy was in a grave situation, with the adverse trade balance of approximately 800 million dollars annually and that it had been sustained thus far only by U.S. special expenditures in connection with the Korean War and the stationing of American forces in Japan.53 Okazaki, like other key decision-makers, was persuaded that MSA aid was imperative to cover the mounting trade deficit. He acknowledged this with candor two years after the signing of the MSA agreement: Since income sources other than ordinary trade were in the red, the only way left, aside from expending all her scanty holdings of foreign currencies, was for Japan to rely upon income from the United States special procurements. These included the purchase o f munitions and food supplies needed in the Korean war, materials for Korean rehabilitation, dollars spent in Japan by American military personnel, purchases o f supplies for the American Security Forces stationed in Japan, and offshore procurement. But Japan could not rely indefinitely upon such an unstable source o f income, for there was no telling how long it would continue. It was urgent, therefore, to balance imports and exports.54

The predominant role of the economic component was also evident in the most elaborate articulation of the Foreign Ministry at the time - its paper in July 1953, explaining the merits of receiving MSA aid:

...at present, our country is indirectly receiving economic benefits in the form of the off-shore procurement o f the MSA aid given to various countries. If our country is to receive MSA, we expect such benefits to increase considerably. The United States will, in order to strengthen our country’s defense capabilities and to nurture the basis of such capabilities, namely, the defense industry, use a greater part o f the MSA fund in Japan... Currently there are many companies in Japan which are dependent upon the special procurement of the UN forces in connection with the Korean hostilities. However, such special procurement will disappear in the event of the end of the war. In such an event, the future o f these companies will become uncertain. In contrast, the US Mutual Security Assistance program is a long-term one, because there is at present no expectation that the U .S.-Soviet relations will rapidly improve and the Cold War end. Accordingly, the MSA aid w ill continue for quite a long period and...offshore purchases from our country by the MSA aid fund will last longer than the present special procurements and this is expected to give a sense of stability to the companies concerned.55

Yoshida viewed Japan’s rearmament primarily through an economic lens. He resisted rearmament to the extent urged by the United States on the ground that a rapid increase in military expenditure would have an adverse effect on the economy. Convinced that Japan’s economic recovery should be the prime national goal, Yoshida believed that, until economic conditions permitted, Japan should not rearm extensively. Yoshida also had qualms about rearmament on other grounds: Its constitutionality was debatable, it would not be permitted by popular sentiment, it would breed the kind of social unrest that the communists wanted and it could give rise to the reemergence of militarism. He was determined to avoid the kind of rearmament that would revive the influence of the old officer corps. Yoshida expressed his views on the question of Japan’s security and rearmament in a meeting with John Foster Dulles on January 29, 1951. He spoke of the necessity to go slowly with regard to any possible rearmament of the country as he foresaw two major obstacles:

55 50 Dower, 1979, p. 424. 51 Miyasato, 1990, p. 189. 52 Sangiin, Gaimu iinkai giroku, No. 5, June 30, 1953, p. 6. 53 Sangiin, Gaimu iinkai giroku, No. 5, June 30, 1953, pp. 7-8. 54 Okazaki, 1956, p. 158.

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1953, p. 38. The view that the economic factor was the pre-eminent image component was also evident in the memorandum prepared by Yoshida's close associates for the Dulles visit in August 1953, which closely reflected the Prime Minister's views. It revealed the Japanese government's pessimistic appraisal of Japan's economic future. It stated that Japan could not cut down the imbalance in her balance o f payments by normal foreign trade in the near future. See Dower, 1979, p. 458.

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Empirical Analysis The first was the danger that any precipitate rearmament would bring back the Japanese militarists who had now gone ‘underground’ and might expose the State to the danger o f again being dominated by the military... The other obstacle which confronted Japan in rearmament was the economic one. Japan was a proud country and did not want to receive charity from anyone but the creation o f a military force just at the time when Japan was beginning to get on its feet financially would be a severe strain and probably result in a lower standard o f living. Here again, time would be necessary in order to lay a sound foundation for the economic support o f any rearmament.56

The views that Yoshida expressed in January 1951 did not change. Yoshida consistently rejected American pressures for extensive rearmament, resorting to his bargaining strategy “blackmail by the weak” by using the above arguments. He believed that rearmament should not take precedence over economic recovery. Recalling the problem of the nation’s security problem of the early 1950s, Yoshida wrote: To have invested vast sums o f money in armaments would seriously have retarded hopes of completing our recovery and o f creating a civilized standard o f life for our people through peaceful trade. Modern armaments...are very costly. To equip the nation with an effective means o f defense would have been tantamount to crippling Japan’s convalescent economy. Merely to settle for a less expensive defense setup would have been useless. Moreover, the psychological foundation for rearmament did not exist. The Japanese people, who had been the victims o f a meaningless war, still bore in their hearts and minds the scars o f defeat. Furthermore, should Japan rearm, that fact might w ell rekindle suspicions and antagonisms in neighboring Asian nations. For all these reasons, I resolutely opposed the rearming o f Japan.57

This conviction was also expressed in his memoirs as in the following passage: ...rearmament for Japan would have the opposite effect to that desired - that it was obviously necessary and desirable to possess a certain amount of armed strength, but to go beyond that point, on a scale that warranted the name o f rearmament,

56 "Memorandum o f conversation January 29, 1951," FRUS 1951, 6: 829. 57 Yoshida, 1967, pp. 76-77.

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would place too great a burden upon our people, would provoke national unrest and only serve to aid Communist propaganda and infiltration.58

Yoshida was essentially satisfied with the U.S.-Japanese security arrangement as a guarantee of Japan’s national security. He viewed rearmament more as a political necessity than as an urgent military need. He did not see any contradiction between Japan’s alliance relationship with the United States and its refusal to rearm. From Yoshida’s perspective, the most immediate threat to Japan was not an invasion by the Soviet Union, but the desperate economic situation and the social radicalism that would prevail in the event of economic depression. Yoshida believed that only through rearmament could Japan gain the U.S. economic assistance it desperately needed. He was thus willing to make minimal concessions by beginning a limited, gradual rearmament program as economic and political conditions in Japan permitted in return for the U.S. economic favor. Yoshida, however, declined to rearm on the scale and in the manner considered appropriate by Washington. The Prime Minister was in favor of Japan’s participation in the MSA program so long as it would contribute to the enhancement of the country’s military capability and military hardware was supplied by the United States without any costs to Japan. Yoshida, however, had misgivings about the reemergence of a Japanese militarism and the expense of rearmament he saw as implicit in accepting MSA aid: “Since Prime Minister Yoshida’s idea was that [Japan’s] defense capability should be increased gradually without heavily burdening the country’s economy, it seemed, at a first glance, wise to accept new weapons as gifts from the United States. However, on the other hand, there was a great risk that this, depending upon the types of weapons, would unintentionally result in a huge military organization which might get out of control... There was also a fear that even if the weapons were given free of charge, the repairs might cost a great deal of money, leading to a huge financial burden within a year or two.”59 The demand by the business community for the MSA aid provided an additional stimulus to the decision. According to Miyazawa Kiichi, an intimate participant in the decision process, the business community perceived the immediate economic value of the MSA aid and linked Japan’s economic growth to U.S.-Japan economic cooperation through MSA aid. In anticipation of the end of the Korean war, they counted on the aid to promote the defense 58 Yoshida, 1961, p. 112. 59 Miyazawa, 1956, pp. 175-176.

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industry and ultimately industry in general. The attitude of the business community was known and absorbed by the decision-makers and it provided a stimulus for the strategic decision.60 Although neither Yoshida nor other decision-makers articulated a perception of political structure as relevant to the strategic decision to seek MSA aid, it was perceived as important in the implementation of that decision. In view of the impending MSA aid from the United States, Yoshida was very much concerned with having found himself at the head of a minority government as a result of his Liberal Party’s losses in the April 1953 House of Representatives election. This is evident from the following passage in his memoirs: The outcome [of that election] was that, though we were still called upon to form a Cabinet, we would not be in a position to command a majority in the House unless a coalition was effected with one o f the other parties or groups. I m yself felt more than ever the urgent need for the establishment o f a stable conservative Government.... With the materialization of a project to obtain arms from the United States under the Mutual Security Act, it became necessary to expand Japan’s Police Reserve into a Defence Force, and to add to its allotted duties the defence o f the country against external aggression. To enact this measure it was necessary to...secure the support o f conservatives outside the Liberal Party.61

The vocal opposition of left-wing parties was perceived and absorbed but it was rejected by the decision-makers as the basis for making the strategic decision to accept MSA aid. Miyazawa noted: “Refusing MSA would be praised by the Socialist Party, but it would depart from the course for Japan that we believe in.”62

4.3 The Decision Process

60 For example, see Minister o f International Trade and Industry Okano Kiyohide's remark before the Budget Committee o f the House of Representatives. Shugiin, Yosan iinkai giroku, No. 8, June 23, 1953, p. 14. 61 Yoshida, 1961, pp. 94-96. 62 Miyazawa, 1956, p. 190.

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Under the Mutual Security Assistance (MSA) act, passed by Congress in October 1951, U.S. Security Assistance and Defense aid was coordinated into the Mutual Security Program, which was the military counterpart of the Marshall Plan, aimed at rebuilding the military capabilities of its Asian and European allies to counter the threats posed by the Soviet Union and Communist China. The decision to seek MSA aid can be traced directly and primarily to both the grave economic situation and to the U. S. offer to extend MSA aid to Japan. With the end of the Korean War in sight, the Japanese government foresaw serious difficulties in store for the Japanese economy. Despite the huge American military spending program in Japan, her economic situation did not improve in 1952. In 1953, the balance of payments worsened critically with a reduction in special dollar receipts from US expenditures in Japan. These procurements had provided the economy with valuable foreign currency with which critical raw materials and machinery could be purchased. The prospects for the economy were gloomy. The decline in the special procurements boom of 1952 pointed out weaknesses in the Japanese economy, which had been deeply dependent on the United States. As Korean peace talks neared their conclusion, the Yoshida government was counting on the idea of close U.S.-Japan economic cooperation as the only road to the nation’s economic recovery, especially an access to the huge American market and the open worldwide trading system the United States was sponsoring aided by continued off-shore procurement and economic aid. In August 1952, the Japanese Ambassador to the United States called on the Secretary of Defense and outlined to him the Japanese economic situation. The Ambassador expressed his government’s concern with Japan’s trade deficit “because the US military procurement in Japan and expenditures of US troops is of a temporary nature.”63 On September 5, Foreign Minister Okazaki, at Prime Minister Yoshida’s urging, met U.S. Ambassador to Japan Robert Murphy and requested that the U.S. government make a public statement guaranteeing continued economic assistance to Japan. The statement was to be used by Yoshida’s Liberals in the October 1952 general elections. The plea failed to impress policy makers in Washington. The Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, for example, was not convinced that “an announcement of the sort suggested by

63 FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. 14: 1314.

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the Ambassador would not boomerang against the Prime Minister in view of charges that he was a puppet of the United States” and argued that “at present or in the immediate future there was no economic justification for a loan or for grant aid to Japan.”64 Nevertheless, the State Department authorized the embassy to assure Japan that procurement would continue at a substantial level.65 That the U.S. government was prepared to give mutual security aid to Japan became evident in early September 1952. Ikeda Hayato, then Minister of Finance and a confidant of Yoshida, met the American Secretary of the Treasury John W. Snyder and Joseph M. Dodge, the architect of the so-called Dodge Line, in Mexico City. They attempted to secure a commitment from Ikeda that Japan would substantially increase her defense capabilities from 110.000 to 180,000 men by the end of 1952, with the ultimate force level of 325.000 men by 1954-1955, in return for U.S. military aid.66 Yoshida did not respond positively to such overtures. This was understandable considering his attitude towards Japanese rearmament. Within the American government, the idea of rendering military assistance to Japan under the Mutual Security Assistance (MSA) Act, passed by Congress in October 1951, was probed in late 1952 and early 1953. In the memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs to the Secretary of State on January 27 1953, it was stated that the Departments of State and Defense jointly discussed the proposed recommendation contained in the letter of former Secretary of Defense Lovett to Dean Acheson regarding Japan’s eligibility of receiving MSA aid.67 The issue of Japanese participation in the MSA program brought into focus the question of Japan’s rearmament. The condition underlying aid under the MSA program was that a nation accepting it be prepared also to defend itself against outside, or direct, aggression (the so-called Vandenberg Resolution). In January 1953, Prime Minister Yoshida sent Iseki Yujiro, Director of the

64 Ibid. p. 1329 65 "The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Japan, Washington, September 19 1951," Ibid., pp. 1331-1332. 66 Miyazawa, 1956, pp. 150-151; Miyazawa, 1957, p. 49. 67 In his letter to Acheson of December 5 1952, Lovett referred to a recommendation o f the Joint Chiefs o f Staff that "Japan be considered eligible for grant and reimbursable military assistance in accordance with the provisions of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act o f 1949, as amended, and of the Mutual Security Act of 1951, as amended." FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. 14, pp.1380-1381.

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International Cooperation Bureau at the Foreign Ministry, to Washington to probe American intentions regarding the scale and nature of Japan’s rearmament and their willingness to render military assistance. In his conversations with the State and Defense Departments, Iseki pointed out that the obstacles to the development of Japan’s defense power expansion program were the lack of information in the Japanese government regarding the longrange United States military objectives in Japan and a lack of genuine mutuality in the approach to the Japanese rearmament problem.68 The Japanese government then took the first concrete step towards some form of bilateral military assistance agreements. The memorandum (dated March 12, 1953) prepared by the State Department showed that the representatives of the Japanese Foreign Ministry, “in a recent conversation with” the American embassy in Tokyo, “expressed a desire to begin discussions of a bilateral military assistance agreement.”69 During the first half of 1953, the possibility of U.S. economic assistance was being seriously probed in anticipation of the end of the Korean War. To Yoshida and his advisors, the overriding concern was the plight of the Japanese economy. Yoshida was convinced that, without a continuation of the U.S. procurement program, it would be difficult to ride out the impending economic crisis. In April, Prime Minister Yoshida, in a confidential aidememoire, requested the United States to make a policy declaration regarding American willingness to help support Japan’s economic viability and dampen Japan’s fears of a sudden drop in military procurement in the event of an armistice in Korea.70 A deteriorating economic situation in Japan associated with the end of American war-related procurement programs prompted the Prime Minister to ask his key aide, Ikeda Hayato, Chairman of the Liberal Party’s Policy Committee, to go to Washington in February as his personal envoy to discuss possible economic assistance to Japan. Remembering what the Americans told him in Mexico City the previous year, that rearmament was a precondition for acceptance of military and economic aid from the United States, Ikeda 68 "The Secretary o f State to the Embassy in Tokyo, March 12, 1953," FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. 14, pp. 1394-1395. 69 FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. 14, p.1393. 70 It was handed to the US ambassador in Japan by Prime Minister Yoshida at the latter's residence in Oiso on April 2. A copy of the same aide-memoire was presented to Assistant Secretary o f State for Far Eastern Affairs Robertson by Japanese Ambassador in the United States Araki Eikichi on April 9. See FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. 14, pp. 1409-1410.

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approached this issue cautiously. He sensed that the time was not right for such a visit because he believed that the United States would almost certainly bring up the question of Japan’s remilitarization, a matter that the government was not at all prepared to discuss. He was convinced that the Japanese government would have to formulate a detailed defense plan before he could visit the United States.71 The Yoshida government’s view of the bleak prospects for the Japanese economy was shared by the United States. President Eisenhower at the meeting of the National Security Council on April 8 1953 stated in a pessimistic tone that it would take a considerable time to create a viable Japanese economy. He even expressed his conviction that “there was no future for Japan unless access was provided for it to the markets and raw materials of Manchuria and North C hina.”72 The National Security Council, in its report “United States Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to Japan,” on April 28 1953, stated: Foreign trade remains far below pre-war levels. Imports, in real terms, are only about one-half and exports about one-third o f the 1938 volume... For at least the next two years earnings related to United States military activities in Japan and Korea will probably be sufficient to offset Japan’s trade deficit and to obviate the need for economic assistance... In the long term, Japanese economic viability is of critical importance to the security o f the United States. This viability will be extremely difficult to achieve. Unrestricted trade with Communist China would not o f itself solve Japan’s economic problem. Although Japan may achieve substantial gains in foreign trade, those gains will not, for the foreseeable future, be so great as to remove the necessity for substantial direct or indirect assistance, part o f which could come from expenditures in Japan for U.S. forces.73

During the sounding-out process, the Japanese tried to secure informally and, in advance, assurances from the United States that procurements from Japan and economic aid would continue even after an armistice in Korea. Mixed signals from Washington during the first half of 1953, however, left the Yoshida government puzzled over what the Eisenhower administration actually was prepared to give. Indeed, the U.S. response to a plea for 71 Omori, 1981, p. 74. 72 "Memorandum o f Discussion at the 139th Meeting o f the National Security Council, Washington, April, 1953," FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. 1, p.1407. 73 NSC 125/5, Ibid., p. 1413.

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economic aid to Japan, conveyed in various meetings in April and May, was confusing. Thus, when Minister of International Trade and Industry Ogasawara Sankuro met U. S. Ambassador to Japan Robert Murphy in April, the latter hinted at possible economic assistance to Japan under the MSA program.74 The State Department stated on April 15 that procurement would continue “at relatively high level for at least next two years.”75 The Yoshida government interpreted this as a commitment on the part of Washington. When Allison, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, succeeded Robert Murphy as U.S. Ambassador to Japan in May 1953, the role of the Ambassador in promoting MSA agreement changed considerably. His appointment as Ambassador came to have a great effect on the progress toward a MSA decision and conclusion of an agreement. There can be little question that the continuous personal attention of Allison over the next eleven months was crucial to the solution of the MSA problem. Allison was well acquainted with the nature of decision-making in Washington. He had a great deal of expertise in dealing with the Japanese and was able to present the Japanese point of view to the Americans, as he was convinced was necessary for a better understanding between the two countries. The decision process of MSA began on May 5, 1953, when Dulles stated in congressional testimony that the American mutual security program “provides funds for weapons for Japanese internal security and home defense.”76 That was a decisive input into the process leading to the strategic decision. News of the Secretary of State’s statement reached Tokyo on the following day and, according to Ambassador Allison, “took the Japanese public by surprise.” “They could not understand why the United States was going to give Japan money if their Government had not asked for it, and if there had been no request they could not understand why the United States was going to give them the money,” the Ambassador continued.77 Prime Minister Yoshida immediately instructed the Japanese ambassador to the United States to clarify Washington’s intent: the underlying reasons for Dulles’s statement, the extent and nature of the MSA program for Japan, and the conditions for receiving such mutual security aid. More specifically Yoshida wanted to know: whether MSA aid would be limited to military assistance; whether the requirements for the fulfillment of the “military obligations” provided for in the Mutual 74 Yasuhara, 1988, p. 158. 75 FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. 14, p. 141 land p. 1486. 76 Department o f State Bulletin, May 25, 1953. p. 738. 77 FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. 14, p. 1455.

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Security Act would be met only by the fulfillment of those which Japan had already assumed under the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty; and whether Japanese participation in the MSA program would require a long-term commitment to Japan’s military build-up.78 The Japanese government was unsure whether or not the United States was willing to give economic assistance to Japan because the signals sent by the Americans were contradictory and ambiguous. Toward the end of May, in response to the inquiry made by Minister Takeuchi of the Japanese Embassy in Washington with respect to the Mutual Security Program, the State Department stated that the U.S. was not considering any U.S. economic assistance to Japan separate from offshore procurements.79 Japan apparently misunderstood U.S. motives. In fact, the Japanese never fully realized that Washington was not prepared to provide direct economic aid to Japan within the framework of the MSA program.80 Until Dulles’s announcement at the beginning of May, the issue of MSA aid did not attract any significant public attention and the decision process was confined to a limited number of people within the government. Prime Minister Yoshida and his government were anxious that it would not become a subject of open debate, considering the Japanese sensitivity to the military relationship with the United States and anticipating opposition from the left-wing parties to Japanese participation in the MSA aid program. Therefore, it was important for Prime Minister Yoshida that the matter be kept away from public debate until the government’s thinking on the matter had been crystallized. The Japanese press seldom reported on the question of MSA and apparently had no sense whatsoever of the internal movement toward a MSA decision, until the very last stages. Thus, Dulles’ announcement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on May 5 that the Administration planned to include Japan in MSA aid programs took the Japanese by surprise. As the informal talks on Japanese participation in the mutual security aid program advanced to the decision-making stage, the issue of MSA began to attract significant attention in Japan. 78 Miyazawa, 1956, p. 178. See also Omori, 1981, p. 93. 79 “From Ambassador Araki to Foreign Minister Okazaki,” Gaimusho: Dai 11 kai kokai Gaiko Bunsho, 0003. See also Yasuhara, 1988, pp. 158-159. 80 For example, Iseki Yujiro, Director o f the International Cooperation Bureau at the Foreign Ministry, was talking about the possibility o f U.S. econom ic assistance to Japan in an interview shortly before the start o f MSA negotiations in Tokyo. See "MSA enjo to gaishi donyu," Keizai orai, July 1953, p. 20.

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On June 11, Foreign Minister Okazaki met with Ambassador Allison and explained the Japanese point of view regarding MSA. As Allison recalled: He told me o f the great concern o f the Japanese people over the possible creation o f another military caste and their fear that any participation in an American security program would mean Japanese forces would be sent abroad to fight America’s battles. Even if this was not so, the people feared that the dire economic straits in which Japan then found itself would not permit the building up o f a defense force. The people were also concerned that Japan, as a defeated former enemy, would be placed in an inferior position to other countries with which the United States had security arrangements.81

To ease Japan’s concern about possibly unreasonable U.S. demands, Allison explained the position of the United States on the MSA program regarding Japan in an address before the Japan-American Society in Tokyo on June 12. It was designed to influence the outcome of the tense debate on Japan’s participation in the program: Aid under the Mutual Security Program is not something which the U.S. either would or could force upon Japan. It constitutes an offer only and it is for the Japanese government and people to decide whether they wish to participate in this program. If they do so decide, the aid will apply to Japan in the same way that it applies to all the other nations... None of these nations has been compelled to accept arms - none o f them has been asked to contribute more than her economic circumstances would permit.82

The period from Dulles’ statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on May 5 to Japan’s strategic decision to seek MSA aid witnessed an intense political debate over the merits and demerits of Japan’s participation in the Mutual Security Program. Ranged on one side were the Socialists, and on the other were Yoshida’s conservatives. The question of Japanese participation in the MSA scheme was closely linked to the rearmament issue. The Right-Wing and Left-Wing Socialist Parties, who strongly opposed rearmament, were also opposed to accepting the MSA aid. They argued that Japan’s acceptance of MSA aid would violate the war renunciation clause of the Constitution. Moreover, they argued that 81 Allison (J.M.), 1975, p. 232. 82 Ibid., p. 230.

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Empirical Analysis

Japan’s acceptance of the MSA aid would invite U.S. interference in domestic affairs and that Japan would be forced to dispatch its forces overseas to fight American conflicts. The debate also centered on whether or not there had been secret negotiations between Japan and the United States on MSA aid. The occasion was the public revelation of a testimony by General George Olmstead, Director of Military Assistance, before the House Foreign Relations Committee. The Olmstead testimony of March 11 1953, as reported by the Japanese press in June, left its readers with the impression that negotiations on Japan’s participation in the MSA aid program were already progressing.83 Olmstead’s remarks were contrary to statements Prime Minister Yoshida and Foreign Minister Okazaki had repeatedly made in the Diet that there had been no negotiations. The opposition parties and the Socialists in particular accused the Prime Minister of carrying out “secret diplomacy” and were quick to advance this incident as proof of repeated allegations of a secret deal between the Japanese government and the United States. The Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister categorically denied any secret negotiations on MSA. As late as June 17, Yoshida told the lower house that since there had been no official communication from the American government on the question he could not speculate about the possibility of Japanese acceptance of MSA aid.84 Of greater concern to the Yoshida government were the views of the Prime Minister’s conservative opponents. The issues within the conservative camp were concentrated more on the pace of rearmament and whether or not there had been secret negotiations than on Japan’s participation in the MSA program. The conservatives were by no means united on the question of Japanese rearmament. Yoshida and his followers, who stood for gradual rearmament, had qualms about it. Its constitutionality was questionable, it would be costly and it touched deep-seated fears about the role professional military men might play in Japanese politics. Yoshida’s conservative opponents were deeply dissatisfied with his policy of creeping rearmament because it reaffirmed that Japan could not constitutionally develop a military capability. They called for more rapid rearmament through constitutional revision. Within the conservative camp, the debate concerning expansion of Japan’s defense capability could be viewed as a matter of disagreements over the pace 83 Olmstead's testimony was made public on June 17,1953. For the contents of his testimony before the House Foreign Relations Committee, see Saito et al., 1970, pp. 55-56. See also Yoshida naikaku kankokai, 1956, p. 600. 84 Shugiin kaigiroku, 16th Diet, No. 8, June 17, 1953, p. 9.

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and tactics of rearmament reflecting differing interpretations of nationalism and independence. The Progressives and Hatoyama’s splinter Liberals, who favored MSA aid, voiced strong criticism of the “secret diplomacy” of the Yoshida government. They charged that the government had conducted preliminary negotiations with the United States on MSA aid despite repeated denials by both Prime Minister Yoshida and Foreign Minister Okazaki. Ambassador Allison, in an attempt to salvage the situation for the Yoshida government, requested the State Department on June 18 to issue some clarifying statements to the effect that no negotiations had yet taken place. The State Department agreed to issue such a statement: “Since Japan has not previously been included in this (foreign aid) legislation, we have endeavored to keep the Japanese Government informed about the general nature of the Mutual Security Program. However, there have been no formal exchanges and nothing which could be described as negotiations.”85 From the perspective of the Japanese government, as noted earlier, the rationale behind Japan’s participation in the MSA program was more economic than military. Prime Minister Yoshida and Foreign Minister Okazaki were convinced that economic recovery, industrial expansion, and prosperity were inseparably linked to the mutual security program of the United States. The government’s approach to MSA aid was supported by business leaders who viewed MSA aid largely in terms of stimulation of Japanese industry. They argued that Japan could not afford not to accept MSA aid. Pressure was exerted by the business community, through Keidanren, representing large corporations in Japan. In particular, Uemura Kogoro, then Vice President of Keidanren, strongly advocated Japan’s acceptance of mutual security aid. He argued that refusal to accept MSA aid would not only seriously damage Japan’s vital relations with the United States but might also negatively affect Japan’s trade with southeast Asia.86 Many in the business community believed that the acceptance of mutual security aid would help the Japanese economy to ride out the impending economic crisis by stimulating the defense industry. As the Director of Keidanren, Uchiyama Tokuju, expressed: “It is extremely doubtful whether there is any way for Japan to recover economic independence without accepting the call for defense production. The shortest and quickest way to

85 Nippon Times, June 25, 1953. See also Allison (J.M.), 1975, pp. 234-235. 86 Uemura, 1953, p. 47; Yanaga, 1968, p. 258.

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Empirical Analysis

economic self-support lies in the acceptance of the new procurements to replace the Emergency Korean War Orders.”87 In a cable to the State Department, the American Ambassador in Japan noted: “Business groups have for some time been favorable to the idea of MSA. They have put considerable pressure on the Government to take a receptive position. One important influence on popular thinking is the fear that the Korean procurement will shortly end and, therefore, Japan must find a substitute, which they see in United States procurement under MSA.”88 On May 9, the representatives of Keidanren met Deputy Prime Minister Ogata Taketora and National Security Agency Director Kimura and pressed their case for MSA.89 On June 24 the Japanese government decided to go beyond the informal soundings and to put its views on the MSA question into a more official, written form. Ambassador Allison wrote in his memoirs: “Before we could get started on real negotiations, it was necessary for me to have several conversations with Okazaki to answer questions about MSA which had been posed by the Prime Minister and other Cabinet members. Finally, I suggested that the Japanese Government write the Embassy a letter setting forth the matters on which it required elucidation and which I could send to Washington for an official reply. The reply could then, if satisfactory to the Japanese Government, be made public.”90 Accordingly, at Allison’s suggestion, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs wrote the American Embassy a letter on June 24 to be forwarded to Washington for an official reply: (1) The fundamental objective o f the United States’ assistance to foreign countries under the Mutual Security Program is understood to maintain and promote security o f the free world; and in case when the assistance to Japan under the same program is given, the Japanese Government understands that the afore-mentioned fundamental objective is to be fully accomplished by enabling Japan, through the assistance to be received, to ensure its internal security and its home defense. Is this understanding correct? (2) In so far as the assistance to Japan contemplated by the U.S. Government under the Mutual Security Program is intended to assist Japan’s defense effort, the

87 Cited in Borden, 1984, p. 172. 88 "The Ambassador in Japan [Allison] to the Department o f State, Tokyo, July 6, 1953," FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. 14, p. 1456. 89 Dickinson, 1987, p. 114. 90 Allison (J.M.), 1975, p. 233.

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Japanese Government will deem that, in the consideration o f the defense capacities o f Japan, the economic stability and development of Japan shall be its prerequisite. Is this understanding correct? (3) It is the understanding o f the Government o f Japan that, in receiving the assistance referred to above, it is bound by the applicable provisions o f paragraph (a) o f Section 511 o f the Mutual Security Act. In this connection, is it correct to understand: (a) that the requirements for the fulfillment o f the "military obligations"..., will be met, in the case o f Japan, by the fulfillment o f the obligations which Japan has already assumed under the Security Treaty between the United States o f America and Japan? (b) that...the requirements for Japan for the "development and maintenance o f its own defense strength" will be sufficiently met if it is carried out to such extent as permitted by Japan’s general economic condition and consistent with Japan’s political and economic stability?91

Japan’s queries were followed at once by a U.S. reply. Its contents were made public on June 26, following a cabinet meeting. According to that note, Japan received assurance that the US government regarded the economic stability of Japan as “an essential element for consideration in the development of Japan’s self-defense capacities”92 and her defensive power was to be achieved within the limits imposed by economic conditions, and that mutual security aid was for the objective of safeguarding Japan’s defense and internal security. It was also stated that the military obligations that Japan would assume would be met by the fulfillment of the obligations already assumed under the existing Security Treaty between Japan and the United States. “There is nothing in the Mutual Security Program or any existing treaty obligation between the United States and Japan which requires Japan to use its security forces except in self-defense.”93 The note indicated that US procurement in Japan would be increased if Japan decided to participate in the Program. Following the note exchange of June 26, Prime Minister Yoshida told the Budget Committee of the House of Representatives: “In light of the American reply to the Japanese Government’s inquiry, I think there should be no objection to accepting the MSA aid.”94 Until then Yoshida did not publicly 91 FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. 14, pp. 1445-1446. 92 Ibid., p. 1447. 93 Ibid. 94 Shugiin, Shugiin yosan iinkai giroku, 16th Diet, No. 11, 1953, p. 3.

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commit himself to support of Japan’s participation in the MSA program. Miyazawa Kiichi, who was closely involved in the MSA negotiations, gave three reasons why Yoshida hesitated to make a commitment: “There was a great danger that, depending upon the kinds of military equipment to be received [from the United States], people would lose control over the development, and, as a result, a large military structure which was not intended, would be established. And, on the other hand, it was fully possible that, even if we received [military equipment] without cost, repairs would cost a great deal of money. As a consequence, we feared that there would be a great financial burden within a year or two.” Secondly, the fear that the United States, under mutual security aid, might require Japan to fulfil military obligations beyond those already assumed under the existing Security Treaty. Finally, there was the fear that military assistance rendered by the United States under the mutual security program would obligate Japan to have a long­ term defense plan.95 Following a public exchange of notes on the subject between the two governments, the stage had been set for the strategic decision to be made on MSA aid. On June 30 the Government decided to seek MSA aid and formally requested the US government for the initiation of talks. Japan’s request was followed at once by a positive US response in the form of a notice delivered to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs by the American embassy on the following day. The U.S.-Japan exchange of notes prompted renewed speculation that prior negotiations had obviously been held, and the anti-Yoshida conservatives and the Socialists stepped up their criticisms of Yoshida’s secret diplomacy. In their view, it was inconceivable that an understanding could be reached on such a complicated issue as MSA between the two countries within the space of a day or two without some prior consultations.

4.4 Implementation

The complex negotiations for the MSA aid covered a relatively long period of time, from July 1953 to March 1954, and involved a series of negotiating 95 Miyazawa, 1956, pp. 175-176.

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sessions in Tokyo and Washington.96 Although the Japanese side entered the negotiations with optimism, the issues of Japan’s rearmament and U.S. economic assistance hung in abeyance over the proceedings until April 1954 and created a heightened sense of tension about the outcome of the negotiations.97 The U.S. was most concerned with expansion of Japan’s military capability. As such, it hoped to reach an understanding with the Japanese on the level of Japan’s military build-up prior to the impending MSA negotiations. Ambassador Allison, in a telegram to the State Department on July 1, stated that it would be “extremely difficult to obtain official confidential agreement by Japanese Government to force goals approved by JCS [Joint Chiefs of Staff].” “Japanese Government agreement,” he continued, “either formal or verbal, to meet limited force goals over five-year period or to increase defense forces as political and economic situation permits, is in my opinion best US can expect from approaching negotiations.”98 Formal negotiations began on July 15, 1953 at the Foreign Ministry. Japan’s opening statement reiterated the points as set out in an exchange of notes between the two governments in late June. Ambassador Allison explained the basis and purpose of the MSA aid and concentrated much of his opening statement on the clarification and amplication of the American note. The U.S. side determined the format for the talks by submitting a draft of the proposed Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement, to which the Japanese negotiators responded. The draft followed “closely the standard type agreement, with minor deviations to take into consideration Japanese sensitivities with respect to rearmament.”99 Some of the principal disputes which the Japanese side had with the American negotiators during the first round of talks in Tokyo concerned: Japan’s military obligation under Section 511, Part (a) of the Mutual Security Act, the strengthening of Japan’s defense capabilities, the status and size of the 96 The following account o f the MSA negotiations, including the Ikeda-Robertson talks in Washington, is based upon the diplomatic documents o f the Japanese Foreign Ministry which were made public in October 1991; FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. 14; Miyazawa, 1956; Dower, 1979, pp. 449-463; Yasuhara, 1988, pp. 152-169; and Dickinson, 1987, pp. 103-131. 97 Both the Japanese and American sides expected the negotiations to be short ones. In a cable to the State Department, Allison stated that Japanese Foreign Ministry officials hoped the MSA agreement to be concluded by July 15. See "The Ambassador in Japan (Allison) to the Department o f State, Tokyo, July 2, 1953," FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. 14, pp. 1452-1453. 98 Ibid., p. 1452. 99 Ibid., p. 1458.

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Empirical Analysis

American Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), and U.S. economic assistance to Japan. The Japanese government resisted the inclusion of a provision concerning Japan’s military obligation under Section 511, Part (a) of the Mutual Security Act in the main text of the projected agreements, which had been proposed by the United States. Point four of Part (a) of the MSA Act obliged the country receiving the aid to “make, consistent with its political and economic stability, the full contribution permitted by its manpower, resources, facilities and general economic condition to the development and maintenance of its own defensive strength and the defensive strength of the free world.”100 The inclusion of such a provision would, in the view of the Japanese government, have been inconsistent with the constitution, and was therefore totally unacceptable. The Americans wanted to include the wording “collective defense” in the projected treaty. The insertion of such a concept was strenuously opposed by the Yoshida government which wanted to avoid any point that might violate the Japanese constitution.101 Ambassador Allison, in a cable to the State Department, pointed out that the Japanese are “particularly sensitive” to the question of collective security since any participation in collective security arrangements would imply the use of Japanese troops abroad.102 The question of the MAAG in Japan was one of the major issues that became a matter of contention not only between the United States and Japan but also among American authorities. In similar MSA agreements signed by other nations with the United States, the advisory group had been placed under embassy control and had been small in size. But the Pentagon decided to depart from the standard agreements by insisting that the Japan MAAG should be placed under military rather than embassy control and that its size should be 1489 men, which would have made it the largest MAAG in the world. Allison recalled: “The Japanese made it clear early in the negotiations that they would not accept any MAAG that was not under the Embassy... I was convinced from my talks with the Japanese that the Pentagon would have to back down on this point or there would be no MSA agreement... Eventually, reluctant agreement was received from Washington. Before this happened, however, we had a long drawn out fight over the size of MAAG.”103 100 W elfield, 1988, p. 100. 101 Yasuhara, 1988, p. 159. 102 FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. 14, p. 1486. 103 Allison (John M ), 1975, p. 237.

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Japan’s concern with economic issues rather than with military and strategic ones in the MSA negotiations continued to present difficulties because of the major differences in the positions of the two countries. Japan’s chief concern in negotiations with the U.S. was to secure American assistance in forms that were not so exclusively militarily oriented. This was evident in the memorandum Prime Minister Yoshida handed to Secretary of State Dulles on August 11, where it was requested that “MSA aid would not be limited to the military assistance but be carried out with a view of strengthening.. Japan’s national strength in whole by such measures as defense support financing and the off-shore procurement in Japan.”104 Tokyo viewed the MSA largely in economic terms. Washington gave priority to military-security considerations over economic ones.105 The Americans complained that the Japanese side played down the defense issue and played up the question of U.S. economic aid to Japan. This is evident in a memorandum outlining the negotiating history of the MSA aid, in which the State Department wrote: Early in the [August] negotiations the Japanese proposed a number of changes in the United States draft which would give an economic window dressing to the military assistance agreement. The purpose of this approach was to make the agreement more palatable to the Diet and also to insert a wedge in the United States position that no direct economic assistance was to be given to Japan.106

The United States hoped to reach an understanding with the Japanese on the level of Japan’s military forces prior to MSA negotiations. To the American policymakers, the military relationship as it stood was far from wholly satisfactory. As of July 1953, it was known to the United States that the Japanese government was contemplating an increase in ground forces of between 25,000 to 40,000 men for 1954, that is, from 110,000 to as much as 150,000.107 The United States, according to Dulles’ testimony before Senate

104 Cited in Dower, 1979, p. 458. 105 Ambassador Allison, just before the start o f negotiations on MSA aid in Tokyo, reported to the State Department that "Japanese negotiators will emphasize Japan's economic needs rather than its defense requirements in the hope of expanding procurement rather than emphasizing the need for military end items produced in the United States." "The Ambassador in Japan (Allison) to the Department o f State," July 6, 1953, FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. 14, p. 1456. 106 FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. 14, p. 1613. 107 FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. 14, p. 1459. See also Allison, 1975, p. 239.

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Appropriations Committee on MSA on July 9, hoped Japan would eventually have ground forces of 350, 000 men in ten divisions.108 As was to be expected, Prime Minister Yoshida refused to consider rearmament on this scale. He believed that rearmament should not take priority over economic recovery. Even though Yoshida’s attitude to largescale rearmament was hostile, he correctly perceived that Japan’s military build-up was a precondition for economic favors from the United States. Recently declassified archival sources confirm that there was considerable tension in U.S.-Japanese relations during the MSA negotiation period, in particular over the question of Japanese rearmament. In early August, while the MSA talks were in progress in Tokyo, Secretary Dulles visited Japan. In his conversation with the Japanese Prime Minister, Dulles said that Japan was not doing enough to develop its own defenses or to contribute to the security of Asia, and urged Yoshida “to accomplish a greater Japanese military effort.”109 He drew an unfavorable analogy between Japan’s and Korea’s defense efforts and felt that Japan was not doing its share to rearm and contribute to the common defense in Asia. The Secretary reiterated the U.S. demand for Japanese rearmament on August 13, when the Japanese Ambassador in Washington called on him. Dulles complained that “the Japanese were content to let the United States bear the burden for Japan’s protection.” He found the explanations conveyed by Prime Minister Yoshida in their Tokyo meeting for the unpopularity of increased defense measures in the Diet “quite unsatisfactory.” Dulles said that “no government could expect to establish a position of prestige and respect if it allowed considerations of popularity to determine its national policy.”110 Moreover, he asserted that the Yoshida government was not doing its best to strengthen the Japanese economy in order to meet defense needs: “Japan was squandering its dollars on luxuries at a time when it could ill afford to waste the benefits derived from special procurement.” He suggested that the Japanese government “limit the imports of luxuries in order to channel its dollars into essential uses.”111 Dulles also told the British in August that the Japanese were

108 FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. 14, p. 1460. 109 For the contents o f Dulles's conversation with Yoshida, see FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. 14, pp. 1478-1484 (the quotation is from p. 1478). 110 Ibid., p. 1482. 111 Ibid.

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neither willing to make an effort to defend themselves nor to put their economic house in order."2 In response to American dissatisfaction with the lack of Japanese plans for future military expansion, Japan’s Foreign Ministry, in mid-September, presented the National Safety Agency’s tentative five year defense plan (195458) to the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo. According to the plan, the goals were ground forces of 210,000 men, 140,400 tons for the Navy, and 1418 planes for the Air Force."3 At that time, the ground forces numbered approximately 110.000 men. Shortly afterwards, on September 24, an important meeting took place. Foreign Minister Okazaki and Director Kimura Tokutaro of the National Safety Agency met General Clark and Ambassador Allison to discuss the issue of Japan’s rearmament. At the meeting, the Japanese side produced an outline of the defense plan which was similar to that released by the Safety Agency a week earlier. The Japanese argued that, although their government was committed to increasing Japan’s defense capability, more rapid rearmament would require constitutional revision. Constitutional revision, they added, requires educational campaigns bringing home to Japanese people the facts of life in present world and the necessity for an adequate defense system. Kimura added that a merger or coalition of the conservative parties was the prerequisite to Japan’s defense build-up and to the conduct of an education campaign."4 A Japanese troop level of 210,000 seemed inadequate to Washington and General Clark suggested that the Japanese should build up an armed force of 300.000 men."5 Allison emphasized that Japan’s economy would permit the immediate expenditure of 3.5 percent of the national income on defense, as contrasted to the present 2 percent, and that this amount should gradually increase to a maximum of 5 percent. Allison also told the Japanese that it would be difficult to persuade the American Government and Congress that “Japan was serious unless it made a contribution to its own defense of approximately this magnitude.”" 6 While these problems were being worked out, Yoshida and his advisors felt the need to promote, or at least create the appearance of a unified position on123456 112 Buckley, 1988, p. 373. 113 FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. 14, pp. 1511-1512. 114 Ibid., pp. 1511-1512 115 Ibid., pp. 1513. 116 Ibid., pp. 1512-1513.

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rearmament within the conservative camp in face of the impending MSA talks in Washington. Yoshida and other decision-makers were fully aware of the fact that rearmament was the price Japan would have to pay to secure American cooperation in meeting the impending economic crisis. According to Miyazawa’s subsequent revelation, they reasoned that the forthcoming talks in Washington would center on questions of Japan’s defense build-up and that the precarious position of the Yoshida government in the domestic political arena proscribed the support of his conservative opponents in order to strengthen Japan’s bargaining position.117 This was achieved through a meeting between Prime Minister Yoshida and Shigemitsu Mamoru, leader of the opposition Progressive Party at the latter’s private residence. Yoshida recalled in his memoirs: In order to benefit from the provisions o f MSA, Japan had to undertake to fulfil the obligations set forth in the law. And this had been primarily designed to apply to countries possessing an army and navy, to which Japan alone happened to be an exception. Something needed to be done to bring Japan into line with the law’s requirements if my country was to be granted full MSA status, and, as the situation also, both in Japan and abroad, required some such step to be taken, it was decided to include among the duties o f the new Security Forces that o f repelling foreign invasion, and to frame a new law for that purpose. To enact such a law, it was necessary for me to obtain the support o f the conservative opposition in the Diet the Progressive Party and certain Liberals who had seceded from my own party.118

On September 27, Prime Minister Yoshida and Shigemitsu agreed in a joint statement “to establish a long-term defense plan which accords with our national capabilities and the gradual reduction of foreign forces.” They also agreed “to quickly revise the Safety Forces into Self-Defense Forces, and add defense against direct aggression to their mission.”119 The joint statement permitted the temporary quelling of rivalries between Yoshida’s ruling Liberals and the Progressives, the largest opposition party. The American reception of the Yoshida-Shigemitsu agreement was positive. Ambassador Allison commented: “It is probably difficult from Washington to realize what

117 Miyazawa, 1956, pp. 195-196. 118 Yoshida, 1961, p. 188. 119 Miyazawa, 1956, p. 200. An English translation of the text will be found in Dower, 1979, p. 450.

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great step forward this is but to one sitting in Tokyo it is extremely significant.”120 Two days later, Prime Minister Yoshida also approached his old rival Hatoyama Ichiro, the leader of the splinter Liberals, in his efforts to further prepare the ground for a truce among the conservatives and form a unified conservative position on the rearmament issue. Ando Masazumi (Minister in the Yoshida Cabinet), acting on behalf of the Prime Minister, met Hatoyama and sought his cooperation on this matter. Yoshida was also interested in bringing Hatoyama and his followers back to the fold of the Liberal Party. Two months later, on November 17, the Yoshida-Hatoyama meeting was held. As one important condition for his return, Hatoyama demanded the creation of the Constitution Research Council within the Liberal Party as a step toward revision of Article Nine of the Constitution to allow Japanese remilitarization.121 Yoshida wrote in his memoirs: Mr Hatoyama favoured revising Japan’s new Constitution to permit the nation to rearm; to this step... I could not agree... Something had to be done about these differences o f opinion, and so the Constitution Research C ouncil and the Diplomatic Council were set up within the party, resulting in the return to the Liberal ranks o f most o f the dissident group, including Mr Hatoyama him self.122

But before this happened, the Prime Minister, on September 29, with the assurance of Shigemitsu’s support in the Diet, dispatched Ikeda Hayato, a protege of Yoshida’s and former Finance Minister, as his personal envoy to Washington to negotiate with Assistant Secretary of state for Far Eastern affairs Walter S. Robertson. Ikeda was assisted by Vice Minister of Finance Aichi Kiichi and Miyazawa Kiichi, a member of the House of Councillors, and officials from the Ministry of Finance and the Japanese embassy in Washington. The talks began on October 3. There were seven formal sessions between that date and October 30 when they were ended with the “IkedaRobertson communique.” The talks in Washington encountered major difficulties right from the start over substantive issues. There was a clear difference of approach in the stands "The Ambassador in Japan (Allison) to the Department o f State," FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. 14, p. 1522.

120

121 Hara, 1988, pp. 75-76. On November 29, Hatoyama led his followers to rejoin the Liberal Party. 122 Yoshida, 1961, p. 97.

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Empirical Analysis

taken by Japan and the United States, reflecting inevitable differences of perspectives. The Japanese side felt that the first step must be the discussions of the plight of the Japanese economy; defense matters could be discussed thereafter. The Japanese negotiators sought to broaden the scope of the talks by including economic as well as defense matters. By doing so, it undermined the approach of the American administration, which sought to focus primarily on military aspects of Japan’s participation in the MSA program. The Japanese approach to the negotiations in Washington was also reflected in the composition of the negotiating team sent to Washington: it contained only politicians and specialists in economic and financial affairs and no military experts. The Japanese had carefully planned their negotiation strategy. They usually determined the format for the negotiations by presenting their position papers to which the American negotiators responded.123 The first session was devoted primarily to Ikeda’s exposition of the Japanese position. To anchor this position, Ikeda first presented two position papers which, to the disappointment of the American side, dealt only briefly with the issue of defense. It was purposely left dangling over the negotiations as a question to be dealt with later. Instead Ikeda’s exposition dwelt upon Japan’s economic crisis: export slump, insufficient capital, and inflation. He then listed various areas in which American support was desired: guarantees of continued military procurement orders for American forces in Asia, help in easing import restrictions in the Sterling area, settlement of reparation problems and relaxation of restrictions on trade with China.124 The Japanese argued that the country’s economic problems had led to a nationwide desire that Japan be allowed to follow the British in observing an embargo list of exportable items to China: “As export competition becomes severe Japanese traders are inclined to look for trade with Red China.”125 They also indicated their great concern over the future of overseas procurements, and requested non-direct military aid to Japan similar to that granted to Europe under the Marshall Plan. As expected, the talks in Washington revealed that the United States wanted Japan to proceed much faster in building up its defense forces than the Japanese government felt was either financially or politically possible. This divergence in Japanese and American perspectives was attributable in part to the different assessments of external threats. The U.S. position was based upon 123 Dower, 1979, p. 452. 124 Ibid. 125 Quoted in Borden, 1984, p. 174.

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its assessment of the urgency of the Sino-Soviet threat. Assistant Secretary of Defense Frank C. Nash told the Japanese in a meeting on October 8 that the danger posed by the Soviet and Chinese military threat to Japan was “extremely serious” and that Japan was the “most important prize” in the Far East for the Soviets.126The Japanese found the thrust of his argument far from persuasive. On October 12, at the third session of the Ikeda-Robertson talks, the American delegation presented a draft of its own tentative target figures for the scale of the planned expansion of the Japanese forces. It considered Japanese ground forces of 10-divisions, 325,000 men essential to protect Japan - 6 divisions by July 1, 1954, 8 divisions by July 1, 1955 and 10 divisions by July 1, 1956; a navy of 108 vessels and 13,500 men; and an air force, consisting of about 800 aircraft and approximately 30,000 men.127 The Japanese group refused to consider rearmament on this scale. In response to the American proposal, Ikeda submitted on October 13 what amounted to a “private” draft of the Japanese five-year defense plan in which Japan would maintain a 10 division army of 180,000 men, a navy of 31,300 men with 210 vessels (156,550 tons), and an air force of 518 airplanes and 20,600 men. Ikeda’s plan was more modest than that produced by the National Safety Agency previously. Expansion of the ground forces was to be completed within three years while those of the maritime and air forces within five years. According to this draft, nearly 70 percent of the total cost estimated at some 2.5 billion dollars would be borne by the Japanese and 30 percent by the U.S.128 These figures suggest that the Japanese were far from proposing the kind of forces the United States had insisted was necessary. The American negotiators dismissed Ikeda’s defense plan as totally inadequate.129 Although the Yoshida government stated its commitment to a policy of limited rearmament, a policy that was to be in line with the economic and political reality of Japan, the Japanese refused to budge on the rearmament question. In his seventh meeting with Robertson on October 19, Ikeda submitted a position paper in which he elaborated at length on the various economic, constitutional, political, social, and physical factors that would prevent Japan from increasing her defense forces to the extent desired by the 126 FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. 14, pp. 1523-1526. 127 "United States Minutes o f the Third Session o f the Ikeda-Robertson Talks, October 12, 1953," Ibid., pp. 1527-1528. 128 "The Secretary o f State to the Embassy in Japan," Ibid., pp. 1530-1531. 129 Ibid., p. 1531.

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United States. The compelling argument employed by the Japanese to support their case was an economic one: that rapid defense increases would endanger Japan’s economic recovery. Ikeda also countered American efforts to prod Japan into accepting the higher ceiling by warning that the Japanese people had adopted strong pacifist feelings following the Occupation and spelled out in Article IX of the Constitution, which prohibited Japan from establishing military forces.130 The force levels suggested by the United States would, Ikeda continued, constitute war potential and thus require constitutional revision. Such revision, in turn, required re-education and propaganda to instill a spirit of patriotism and self defense: “Unless the people are firmly held in conviction that nobody but themselves will defend them, which is a matter of education or rather of re-orientation in the case of Japan, and which accordingly will take a considerable time to accomplish...”131 Ikeda pursued this line of reasoning with the American negotiators in Washington whenever the opportunity arose. In a memorandum dated October 21, the American negotiators suggested that both sides tentatively agree upon the goal of the Japanese ground forces of 325,000 to 350,000 men, and argued that U.S. military assistance to Japan "cannot be defended" before Congress unless Japan’s defense expenditures for the fiscal years 1954 and 1955 be greatly raised above present projections. Ikeda’s target figure of 180,000 for ground forces was accepted for the time being, but it was urged that this was to be accomplished within two years increases of 24,000 during fiscal 1953 and 46,000 during fiscal 1954, thus reaching 180,000 by the end of fiscal 1954.132 As was to be expected, the Japanese responded unenthusiastically to such an accelerated timetable. Although the primary source of contention - the scope and level of Japan’s military build-up - remained unresolved in the Ikeda-Robertson talks, Ikeda’s arguments had, as was intended, an effect on Washington. The United States eventually accepted a moderate expansion of Japan’s defense forces along the line suggested the Japanese. Other salient issues in the Ikeda-Robertson talks concerned settlement for U.S. economic aid during the occupation, Japan’s repayment of the GARIOA (Government and Relief in Occupied Areas) funds incurred during the 130 Ikeda's memorandum dated October 19, 1953. Gaimusho: Dai 11 kai kokai gaiko bunsho, 0300-0315. 131 Cited in Dower, 1979, p. 462. 132 ’T he Secretary of State to the Embassay in Japan, Washington, October 22, 1953,” FRUS 1952-54, Vol. 14, p. 1538.

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occupation, U.S. economic assistance, questions of continued U.S. offshore procurements in Japan, the reparation payment of Japan, and trade with the People’s Republic of China. One of the major objectives of the Ikeda mission was to obtain from the United States explicit, formal commitments to economic aid for Japan along the lines of the non-military assistance given to NATO countries. At the seventh meeting, on October 19, Ikeda brought up the question of non-military assistance to Japan. There was no stipulation on economic assistance to Japan in the American draft, whereas specific agreements on economic aid were found in the documents of U.S.-NATO countries. He pointed out this fact to Robertson, citing the case of U.S.-Spain MSA where such an agreement was incorporated in the MSA aid program. He pleaded strongly for U.S. economic and technical assistance to Japan similar to the ones given to NATO countries, only to be rebuffed - a comparison the Americans dismissed as inappropriate on the grounds that Japan had received the off-shore procurements and was consequently in a better economic position than Spain.133 Ikeda argued that Japan’s current situation was similar to those European nations in an early phase of ECA and that the effect accomplished in Europe could be repeated in Japan if such an aid was given her.134 He even indicated his willingness to discuss a Japanese ground force level above 180,000 men as a quid pro quo for such assistance.135 The Americans were not at all prepared to discuss purely economic aid with Yoshida’s personal emissary. The American negotiators pointed out that offshore procurements were more beneficial than economic aid: “Off-shore procurement in fact stimulates the rebuilding and modernization of industry and is preferred by most countries to aid of other kinds.”136 They also maintained that Japan’s large earnings from procurement precluded economic aid. Robertson told Ikeda that the U.S. was disappointed with Japan’s economic performance and the pace of rearmament and that the U.S. Congress would not respond positively to Japan’s requests unless the Japanese government enforced strict austerity measures and increased its effort to rearm. Japan, like Europe, had to meet these terms in order to receive MSA aid, he added.137 133 Yasuhara, 1988, pp. 161-162. 134 Ikeda's memoradum dated October 19, 1953. Gaimusho: Dai 11 kai kokai gaiko bunsho, 0308. 135 FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. 14, p. 1535. 136 Cited in Borden, 1984, p. 174. 137 Ibid.

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Empirical Analysis

What the United States was prepared to offer became clear on October 22 when the Americans submitted their proposals in the form of a memorandum dated October 21. The proposals were to be “conceived as a whole and do not stand independently of one another.”138 As for Japan’s request for aid along the lines of the non-military assistance given European countries under the Marshall Plan, it stated that, although Japan was eligible for economic assistance, there was no justification for such assistance. The United States, however, was prepared to guarantee continued offshore procurements: The actual amount o f offshore procurement in Japan under the Mutual Security Program for the current United States fiscal year depends upon the scope and rate o f the Japanese defense buildup, upon the military assistance program for Japan which may be agreed upon, and upon the ability to procure the desired end-items upon proper terms. The United States agencies involved have a tentative target figure o f $100 million in mind.139

Offshore procurements amounting to $100 million for the coming fiscal year included $50 million in American agricultural commodities to be supplied to Japan under the surplus agricultural commodities program of the MSA, “Section 550” of the Mutual Security Act. In addition to guaranteed offshore procurements, the United States was also prepared to: supply military equipments for the land, sea and air forces of Japan under the MSA program; promote Japanese defense industry by providing technological information and training; and provide information services concerning investment opportunities in the U.S. and abroad which were available under one of the features of the MSA program, the Contact Clearing House Service and Investment Guaranty Program.140 Clearly the results of the Ikeda-Robertson talks were far from wholly satisfactory from the Japanese point of view. The talks failed to resolve any of the fundamental questions between the two countries. Yet they did provide a useful forum in which both sides could clarify their positions and intentions. The United States did not recognize Japan’s request for economic assistance, and Tokyo did not commit itself to rapid rearmament. As one analyst put it,

138 FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. 14, p. 1538. 139 Ibid. 140 Dower, 1979, pp. 458-459. For the details of the U.S. memorandum, see the declassified diplomatic documents o f the Foreign Ministry, Gaimusho: Dai 11 kai kokai gaiko bunsho, 0316-0328; FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. 14, pp. 1538-1539.

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Ikeda “received no more than America intended to offer from the start, and this all wrapped in military bunting.”141 It was agreed that the unresolved issues would be addressed in subsequent negotiations in Tokyo. The communique announcing the results of the IkedaRobertson talks made no mention of the target figure of Japanese defense forces, which had been the most important issue in dispute between Tokyo and Washington. Japan, in essence, promised remilitarization, but gave no definite timetable or final target date and linked its pace to legal, economic, social, and political considerations. The two sides “agreed on the necessity of increasing Japan’s Self-Defense Forces in order to protect her from possible aggression, and to reduce the United States’ burden related to the defense of Japan.”142 It recognized that the Japanese assumption of more defense duties should not impair the country’s economic basis and not violate the Japanese Constitution. Both sides also recognized that certain crucial issues - above all the questions relating to Japan’s military build-up and U.S. economic assistance - could not be solved immediately and that it was necessary to continue discussions further in Tokyo. As for the communique’s treatment of U.S. economic assistance, which was admitted to be the most urgent issue for the Japanese, it simply stated that “$50 million is a reasonable target amount for commodities to be supplied to Japan under Section 550 of the Mutual Security Act” and that “the local currency proceeds of the sale of such agricultural products will be used to help develop the defense production and the industrial potential of Japan through offshore procurement and investment.”143 As for settlement of the GARIOA debt, it stated that the United States “attached great importance to an early settlement for GARIOAaid.” After the Ikeda group’s return from Washington, no negotiations took place until the arrival of Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern affairs, and Admiral Radford, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in Tokyo in December. Even after the Ikeda-Robertson talks in October, the Japanese still hoped that they could nudge the United States toward rendering economic aid to Japan. The Japanese leaders overestimated American willingness to give economic aid. Because of the imperatives of Japanese economy and the commitment of Prime Minister Yoshida and his government to the policy of giving priority to the economy over rearmament, 141 Dower, 1979, p. 459. 142 Department o f State Bulletin, November 9, 1953, p. 637. 143 Ibid., p. 638.

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Empirical Analysis

Japan’s decision-makers felt strong psychological pressures to perceive that the problems they faced could be overcome. Thus Japanese leaders came to believe that “the United States would bail it out of any economic troubles.”144 The Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement and three other related agreements were signed on March 8, 1954. Other supplementary agreements included: an agreement for the purchase by Japan in yen of surplus agricultural goods, an Investment Guaranty Agreement, and an Economic Arrangements Agreement. These were collectively known as the Mutual Security Agreements, since they were based on the Mutual Security Act of 1954. The Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement was a skillfully drafted document that laid the basis for a new Japan-U.S. military relationship. The settlement provoked debate in Japan as to whether the Americans or the Japanese made the greatest concessions. Actually, both sides made important compromises in order to overcome various obstacles to an agreement. The most important achievement from Japan’s viewpoint was that the Americans agreed to Japan’s demands for a limited rearmament program. Thus in the preamble, it expressed that “...in the planning of a defense assistance program for Japan, economic stability will be an essential element for consideration in the development of its defense capacities, and that Japan can contribute only to the extent permitted by its general economic condition and capacities.”145 Under the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement, four major points were emphasized: first, the U.S. was to supply Japan with military equipment, materials, and services; second, Japan would in turn provide the U.S. with the necessary raw materials for defense purposes, and would not disclose any confidential equipment and information supplied to it; third, it was agreed that the defense agreement should be carried out within the framework of the respective countries’ constitutions; and, finally, the agreement bound the U.S. to obtain, as far as possible, arms and equipment in Japan, and to help Japanese firms with information and technical training.146 In the meantime, the government was paving the way for its rearmament program in face of the impending U.S. military aid. In line with the YoshidaShigemitsu agreement on September 27, the leaders of the ruling Liberal Party had a series of talks with the Democrats and Hatoyama’s group from December 3 to March 8, 1954 to discuss the framing of new laws on defense matters. It was in the course of these discussions that the various provisions of 144 Allison (J.M.), 1975, p. 244. 145 Contemporary Japan, vol. 22, nos. 10-12, 1954, p. 736. 146 For the text o f the 1954 agreement, see Ibid., pp. 735-745.

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the Self- Defense Forces Bill and the Defense Agency Establishment Bill were agreed upon. The task of converting the promises in the Yoshida-Shigemitsu agreement into reality proved to be more difficult than some had expected. There was tough bargaining on a number of points, reflecting the essential differences of their approaches to security and defense policy. The major points of contention during the defense talks concerned the role of the defense forces to be created by the new laws, the status of the Defense Agency, the establishment of a Joint Staff Council and a National Defense Council, and the principle of civilian control.147 While the Yoshida government preferred piecemeal amendments of existing legislation to radical change, the Democratic Party advocated the enactment of two new laws, one creating a National Defense Force and the other a Ministry of Defense. The Democratic Party also demanded that a National Defense Council and a Joint Staff Council, made up of the three Chiefs of Staff, were to be established. Yoshida, who feared the role professional military men might play in Japanese politics, was negative to such a demand. But both sides were prepared to compromise because both felt their broader interests required this action, and by doing so they initiated a process of adjustment that opened the door to further conservative collaboration. By the end of 1953, both parties had reached basic agreements on a number of important points. The Liberals agreed to settle for two new defense laws advocated by the Democrats, and the latter in turn gave up its demand for the establishment of a Defense Ministry. The Liberals were also prepared to establish a National Defense Council and a Joint Staff Council provided that the principle of civilian control was firmly established in the new laws establishing these organs. Both sides agreed that the mission of the new Self-Defense Forces was to defend Japan against direct and indirect aggression. By early March, the process of drafting the Defense Agency Establishment Law and the Self-Defense Forces Law was completed almost simultaneously with the signing of the MSA agreement. On March 9, the Cabinet officially approved the two defense laws. These two laws created the Defense Agency and the Ground, Maritime, and Air Self-Defense Forces. The major responsibilities of the newly created Self-Defense Forces included defense “against direct and indirect aggression and, when necessary, to maintain public order.”14* 147 Welfield, 1988, p. 85. 148 Weinstein, 1971, pp. 75-76.

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Empirical Analysis

Since the two defense laws were inseparable from the MSA agreement, the Yoshida government submitted them to the Diet on the same day, March 11. The MSA agreement was approved by the House of Representatives on March 31 and by the House of Councillors on April 18. In favor were the Liberals, the Progressives, and Hatoyama’s Liberals. Opposed were the Right-Wing and Left-Wing Socialists and the Communists. After a long and heated debate, the two defense laws were finally approved by the lower house by 277 to 138 on May 7 and the upper house on June 2. In accordance with one of the obligations incurred in receiving MSA aid, the Defense Secrets Protection Law, which is an integral part of the “MSA system,” was approved by the government at a cabinet meeting on March 19 and was then submitted to the Diet for ratification on March 23.149 On May 14, Japan concluded still another agreement with the United States for the lease of two 1600 ton destroyers, two 1400 ton destroyer-escort vessels, plus some additional small craft. On January 18, 1955, the United States further loaned to Japan five submarines and sixty-three minesweepers.

4.5 Feedback

Most components of the environment were affected by Japan’s strategic decision to seek MSA aid. In the external sphere the global and regional systems were recipients of feedback from the decision, as well as Japan’s relationship with the United States. In the internal setting Japan’s economic capability, her defense capability, and the political structure, along with advocacy of competing elites were affected. The MSA agreement contributed an added stimulus to Japan’s pro-Western orientation. With the government’s MSA decisions, Japan became formally locked into the Western bloc led by the United States in both operational and 149 Asagumo shimbunsha, 1973, p. 156: Hara, 1988, pp. 71-72. Article III, paragraph 1 of the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement states: "Each Government will take such security measures as may be agreed upon between the two Governments in order to prevent the disclosure or compromise o f classified articles, services or information furnished by the other Government pursuant to the present Agreement." For the full text o f the Agreement, See Contemporary Japan, Vol. XXII, No. 10-12, 1954, pp. 736-741.

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psychological terms. As Deputy Under Secretary of State Murphy stated, “In effect, this agreement makes Japan a full member of the free world team.”150 Foreign Minister Okazaki acknowledged that the agreement was “a step forward in the realization of our country’s efforts to contribute to the maintenance of the security of the free world.”151 The MSA agreement was the logical end-product of the process of Japan’s alignment with the United States which began with the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty which was signed simultaneously with the San Francisco Peace Treaty in September 1951. The strategic decision to seek MSA aid and its implementation did have a profound continuing effect on one aspect of Japan’s external environment. The relationship with the United States, the principal source of foreign aid for Japan and her sole patron, was further strengthened by MSA aid. In fact, the decisions consolidated the alliance relationship. The MSA agreement together with the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty “laid the foundations of both Japan’s security arrangements with Washington and the rebirth of Japan’s own m ilitary.”152 The effect of Japan’s MSA decisions on the psychological environment of her decision-makers was also notable. Yoshida’s perception of the United States as patron became increasingly accentuated. Concrete policy effect was to enhance Japan’s virtually total dependence upon the United States for arms and military technology. As Dower puts it, it confirmed “Japan’s indefinite dependency upon U.S. grand strategy, U.S. military technology, and major end products of U.S. defense industry.”153 By 1962, nearly 100 percent of ammunition and weapons held by the Self-Defense Forces, 70 percent of their military aircraft and 60 percent of their naval vessels had been obtained from the U.S. under the scheme of the MSA aid. The naval vessels transferred to Japan under the terms of the MSA agreement had remained American property. Between 1954 and 1961, nearly 3,000 Japanese military personnel were trained in the United States.154 The agreement initiated a close relationship between the Japanese and American military establishments. It laid the basis for the furnishing of U.S. military equipment and technology to Japan. The agreement provided the basis for U.S. grant aids under the Military Assistance Program (terminated in 1967), Foreign Military Sales (FMS), and the domestic production (since the 150 Department o f State Bulletin, Vol. 30, April 5, 1954, p. 515. 151 Shugiin, Shugiin Kaigiroku, no. 18, March 11, p. 247. 152 Buckley, 1988, p. 1231. 153 Dower, 1979, p. 469. 154 W elfield, 1988, p. 111.

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Empirical Analysis

mid-1950s) of U.S.-developed weapon systems under licensing arrangements. FMS is a form of U.S. military assistance to foreign countries. Under this program, Japan has procured equipment such as E-2C, C-130H, “Herpoon” anti-ship missiles and “Tartar” anti-air missiles. F-15 fighter interceptors, P3C anti-submarine aircraft, 203-mm self-propelled Howitzers and Patriot surface-to-air guided missiles have been produced domestically under license arrangements with the United States.155 MSA also laid the legal basis for the transfer of Japanese military technologies to the United States. Until the early 1980s, arms technology transfer had been one-sided from the United States to Japan. In 1983, Japan decided to exempt the United States from its 1967 and 1976 guidelines prohibiting the export of arms and military technology.156 The Japanese Government, led by Prime Minister Nakasone, concluded the transfer of Japanese military technology to the United States in November 1983. By 1988 Tokyo had approved the transfer to the United States of SAM-related technology, technology related to the construction of naval vessels, and technology related to the modification of US naval vessels. MSA stimulated the growth of the defense and defense-related industries in Japan. MSA also laid the basis for Japan’s collaboration with the United States in military research and development. Thus the 1987 Japanese decision to join the United States research effort on the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) and the co­ development of the FS-X were based on the MSA agreement from 1954.157 The decisions confirmed Japan’s commitment to support U.S. policy of containment and counterrevolution in East Asia.158 Based on the premise that the Beijing regime was an integral part of a monolithic, Soviet-led bloc, was fundamentally aggressive and expansionist, and posed great military as well as political dangers to other nations in Asia, Washington’s Asian policy was designed to counter the “China threat” as it was then perceived. The aim, most 155 Nishijima, 1983, pp. 19-20: Defense Agency, Defense o f Japan 1983, p. 210. 156 In April 1967, then Prime Minister Sato declared the Three Principles on Arms Exports which provided that Japan would not allow arms export to countries in the communist bloc, to countries subjected to embargoes on the export of arms under the United Nations resolutions, and to countries involved or likely to be involved in armed conflicts. In its Policy Guideline on Arms Export o f 1976, the Miki government extended this ban on arms exports to all countries and defined "arms" to include not only military equipment but also the parts used in this equipment. 157 Defense Agency, Defense o f Japan 1988, pp. 180-182 and Defense o f Japan 1990, pp. 182-183. 158 Dower, 1979, p. 467.

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127

clearly articulated by Secretary of State Dulles, was to contain China, isolate it, and reduce its influence abroad. To isolate China, the United States continued, even after the cease-fire in Korea, to enforce a trade embargo on China, and it pressed other nations, including Japan, to maintain restrictive trade policies toward Beijing. The effects of the strategic and tactical decisions on Japan’s relations with the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China were short-lived and insignificant. Japan’s MSA decisions reinforced Beijing’s and Moscow’s assessment that she was closely allied with, and subordinate to, the United States.159 But it did not prevent them to show an active interest in establishing official diplomatic ties with Japan starting in 1954-1955. The impact of MSA decisions on Japan’s military capability was profound. They marked the transformation of Japanese forces into a full-fledged army. Up to that point, responsibility for defense against direct outside aggression remained entirely with U.S. forces. The 1954 Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement obliged Japan to commit herself to a gradual expansion of its military capability. It was to form the framework for the Japanese defense capability expansion program. MSA aid was extended to Japan on the basis of the defense plan Ikeda showed Robertson at the October 1953 talks. This plan was, after modifications, adopted as the First Defense Plan in June 1957 (approved by the National Defense Council and the Cabinet).160 The equipment of the Self-Defense Forces was greatly improved under the agreement. During the period of thirteen years from 1954 to 1966 the infusion of military supplies and equipment from the U.S. to the value of approximately 576 billion yen in grants helped to enhance Japan’s defense capability: 227 billion yen for the Self-Defense Ground Force, including 235 airplanes; 180 billion yen for the Self-Defense Maritime Force, including 159

159 For Beijing’s view on this point, see Gaimusho: Ni-Chu kankei kihon shiryoshu 19491969 (Japan-China Relations: Basic Documentary Collection, 1949-1969), 1970, pp. 52-56. The People's Republic o f China and the Soviet Union, in their joint declaration on October 12 1954, characterized Japan's relationship with the United States in the following way: “Nine years after the end of the war, Japan has still not received independence and remains in the position o f a semi-colonial country. Its territory is covered with numerous American military bases, which have been set up for purposes having nothing in common with the task of maintaining peace and securing the peaceful and independent development o f Japan. The industry and finances o f Japan are made dependent on American war contracts. Japan suffers restrictions in its foreign trade." Jain, 1981, p. 222. 150 Welfield, 1988, p. 107.

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Empirical Analysis

ships and 217 airplanes; and 170 billion yen for the Self-Defense Air Force including 595 airplanes.161 The MSA agreement was to play an important role in the reemergence of Japan’s arms production capability by regularizing and expanding U.S. technical assistance to Japan’s defense production industry. Drifte wrote: “Under this agreement the United States granted Japan licenses for the production, or joint development, of U.S. arms, which are essential to the present Japanese arms-production capability. It has been estimated that the Japanese received some $ 10 billion worth of advanced technology from the United States between 1950 and 1983.”162 Japan’s Defense Agency acknowledged that the infusion of U.S. military equipment and technology based on the MSA agreement has contributed “a great deal not only to the completeness and improvement of the Japanese defense capability but also to the establishment of foundations for Japan’s defense industry.”163 The benefits to Japan’s economic capability were undeniable. In Annex A to the 1954 MSA agreement, it was stipulated that the United States “will give every consideration...to procurement in Japan of supplies and equipment to be made available to Japan...and to providing information to and facilitating the training of technicians from Japan’s defense-production industries.”164 Japan’s decisions on MSA aid, according to Welfield, “activated Japan’s militaryrelated industries and had a far-reaching impact on the Japanese economy as a whole, helping overcome the stagnation brought on by the end of the Korean War.”165 In fact, American economic assistance under the agreement began in 1954, a critical time in Japan’s struggle for economic viability. The MSA agreement “played a positive role in helping Japan’s industrial rehabilitation through the transfer of US defense technology.”166 During the years when Japanese industry was not able to compete on world markets and Japan was running a heavy deficit in its balance of payments, the United States placed substantial orders in Japan, largely for goods and services 161 Yoshioka, 1979, pp. 248-249. According to the Congressional Record, the United States had given Japan about 738 million dollars in grants for military supplies and equipment from 1954 through 1962. This represented 18.5 percent o f the total cost to the Japanese government for maintaining her defense forces. Congressional Record, Part 8, Vol. 109, June 17 1963, p. 10981. 162 Drifte, 1986, p. 11. 163 Defense Agency, Defense o f Japan 1990, p. 182. 164 “Documentary Material,” Contemporary Japan, Vol. XXII, Nos. 10-12, 1954, p. 739. 165 W elfield, 1988, pp. 107-108. 166 Drifte, 1990, p. 41.

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consumed in war or required for the support of U.S. forces in East Asia. For the next 10 years after the signing of a Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement in March, about 15 % of Japan’s defense expenditures had been financed by U.S. military assistance under the MSA agreements.167 From 1954 to 1962, the U.S. had given Japan 738 million dollars in grants for military supplies and equipment, representing approximately 17 % of the defense expenditures during the period.168 The total of U.S. military procurement, purchases of yen by U.S. personnel stationed in Japan, and purchases in Japan by third countries with funds provided by U.S. aid programs from 1950 to 1962 was well over 6 billion dollars, enough to cover the trade deficit with the United States and supply over 1.2 billion dollars which could be spent for imports from other countries. This unusual market was critically important to the Japanese as a source of hard currency and as an outlet for an industrial plant still in the process of construction and relatively inefficient. The MSA decisions “paved the way for long-term American interest in financing Japan’s arms industry.”169 The feedbacks from the MSA decisions to the competing elites were extensive. The decisions heightened domestic polarization. The government’s strategic and tactical decisions caused sharp and persistent criticism from the Socialists who perceived them as a step toward Japan’s remilitarization and intensified the polarization between the ruling Conservatives and Socialists over foreign and security policy. The Self-Defense Forces had been the focus for great controversies well into the 1970s. This was a clear issue that divided the ruling conservatives from the opposition parties. The party in power stood firmly for the maintenance of the Self-Defense Forces while the other parties opposed it in varying degrees. The opposition parties bitterly opposed the creation of Self-Defense Forces from the start, fearing a revival of prewar militarism and pointing out that they were in violation of the constitution. Public opinion also ran against them at first. Opposition to the Self-Defense Forces has prevented the upgrading of the Defense Agency to the status of a ministry. The most important effect of the MSA decisions on Japan’s political structure was the hastening of the formal and actual unification of the two conservative parties into the Liberal Democratic Party. MSA and the two defense laws initiated a process of realignment within the conservative camp: 167 Kamiya, 1989, p. 93. 168 Congressional Record, Part 8, Vol. 109, June 17, 1963, p. 10981. 169 Borden, 1984, p. 176.

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Empirical Analysis

“The MSA negotiations and the imminent necessity of framing new defence laws made agreement on defence policy a convenient starting-point on the long and difficult road to Conservative merger, which was finally achieved in November 1955 with the formation of the Liberal Democratic Party.”170 Table 4.1: Feedback flow of Japan’s MSA decisions Operational Environment__________

Psychological Derivatives

Environment

and

Policy

External: G Locked Japan into the

Perception o f Japan as part o f “free world”

Western bloc (S) Japan’s

Perception o f East A sia ’s importance to Japan;

com m itm ent to support

S

C onfirm ed

policy derivative was Japan’s advocacy o f Asian

U.S. policy o f containment

development fund to strengthen non-communist

in East Asia (S)

states in Asia

DB Strengthened Japan’s

Perception o f U.S. as Japan’s sole patron; policy

relations with the U.S. (S)

derivative was increasing dependence on U.S. for military and econom ic support— various arms agreements and economic agreements

B Strengthened C hina’s im age

of

Japan

as

a

“subordinate” state (S)

Internal:

M Strengthened defense

Awareness o f military dependence upon U.S.;

capability and stimulated

policy derivatives were various arms agreements

defense industry (S, T i ,T2)

and defense build-up plans

E Contributed to economic

Awareness o f effects o f econom ic development

recovery (S)

upon

co n tin u ed

U .S .

aid

and

o ffsh o re

procurements; policy derivatives were PL 480 agreements and reliance on offshore procurements PS

Contributed to the

unification

o f the

two

conservative parties into the LDP (S, T i ,T 2)

170 W elfield, 1988, pp. 83-84.

Perception o f need for conservative merger; policy derivative was the establishment o f the LDP

Mutual Security Assistance (MSA) Aid CE Heightened polarization

Policy consequence o f perceived increase in

between the incumbent and

polarization was less readiness for compromise and

competing elites (S, T j,

concessions with respect to foreign and security

T2) IG Influence o f business

policy

interest groups increased

(S)

131

5. The Soviet Union

In the mid-1950s the Japanese government, in its effort to lessen Japan’s hitherto heavy dependence on the United States in international politics, made important decisions concerning the Soviet Union. Although Japan’s decision­ makers did not intend to weaken their ties with the United States, they desired to put U.S.-Japanese relations on a more equal level and change the course of Japan’s diplomacy by assuming a more assertive and independent approach. The Soviet decisions should be seen as part of the Hatoyama government’s attempts to restructure the country’s foreign policy in the sense that they represented a series of decisions and actions deliberately taken to alter the previous policy in a fundamental manner.1 On February 5, 1955, the Government of Japan made the strategic decision at a cabinet meeting to enter into direct negotiations with the Soviet Union with a view to conclude a bilateral peace treaty. (S) After negotiations for a peace treaty were deadlocked, the Japanese government at a cabinet meeting on October 2, 1956, formally approved Prime Minister Hatoyama’s visit to Moscow to reach a settlement with the Soviets. (T)

5.1 Operational Environment

When Hatoyama assumed the post of Prime Minister in December 1954, the global system was less hostile to the establishment of diplomatic ties with the Soviet Union. Although East-West tensions remained, the Cold War had become less menacing than in the early 1950s, and the global system was 1 K. J. Holsti has termed this particular type o f foreign policy change foreign policy “restructuring”. Holsti (K. J.), 1982.

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beginning to move from rigid bipolarity to a looser form of a bipolar system. Several events highlighted this easing of tensions. The Korean War had ended in 1953, and by 1954 the war in Indo-China had also temporarily ended as a result of the international conference in Geneva. The four-power summit conference at Geneva in July 1955 and the establishment of diplomatic relations between Soviet Union and West Germany in September of that year helped to lessen the intensity of the Cold War and contributed to the creation of a climate favorable to improving Japanese-Soviet ties. Moreover, after the death of Joseph Stalin in March 1953, new Soviet leaders had embarked upon a policy of peaceful coexistence. Another global facet which impinged on the decisions of the Japanese government headed by Prime Minister Hatoyama was Japan’s inability to gain entry into the United Nations due to the Soviet objection. When the Hatoyama government made strategic and tactical decisions on Soviet relations, Japan was still standing on the sidelines of the postwar world order, ten years after the end of World War II. One of the major goals of Japanese foreign policy since the end of the Occupation had been to achieve a respected international status. For the Japanese, admission to the United Nations would symbolize a return to the international community. Since regaining independence Japan had, on several occasions, asked to be admitted to the United Nations, but she was unable to gain entry into the world body because each time the Soviet Union exercised its veto power. The main reason for the Soviet objection was that Japan had not yet concluded peace treaties with the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China. The Japanese government needed an avenue of direct approach to the Soviet government in order to make it abstain from using the veto so that Japan could join the international society. The regional environment was less tranquil than the global setting. This was because of the 1954-55 crisis over the Jinmen-Mazu (Quemoy-Matsu) islands in the Formosa Strait. The Geneva Conference did little to improve SinoAmerican relations. In September 1954, soon after the conference, the People’s Republic called for Taiwan’s “liberation” and began shelling Jinmen, a Nationalist-held island near the mainland. The resulting crisis considerably heightened tensions in Sino-American relations. Secretary of State Dulles described the situation as “we might be said to be living over a volcano.”2 In December 1954, the U.S.-Taiwan Mutual Security Treaty was signed. In Spring 1955, Washington hinted the possible use of nuclear weapons to

2 The Secretary o f State’s remark in private discussions. Quoted in Preussen, 1993, p. 62.

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Empirical Analysis

guarantee the security of the offshore islands. By the summer-fall of 1955, however, the Taiwan Straits crisis had largely subsided.3 With the general improvement in East-West relations, Soviet leaders maintained a flexible posture toward Japan throughout this period, in sharp contrast with Moscow’s rigid and hostile attitude that had marked the period from the end of the Second World War to Stalin’s death in 1953. Indeed, starting about 1954, the Soviet Union began to evolve a new policy toward Japan. Broadly, its aims were to strengthen the Japanese left and to weaken Japan’s alliance with the United States. In short, the Soviet Union’s flexible and moderate posture toward Japan was one of the most important components of the external setting for the decisions. The other dominant bilateral relationship, the ‘American factor’ was present in the Soviet decisions. Following the advent of the first Hatoyama Cabinet, relations between Japan and the United States deteriorated, especially after Prime Minister Hatoyama began to pursue a policy of rapprochement with the Soviet Union. The mutual suspicions underlying U. S.-Japanese relations during the Hatoyama government were deeper than officials from both countries publicly acknowledged or than was commonly assumed. Although the United States did not openly oppose Japan’s quest for normalization of Soviet relations, the Americans were critical of Tokyo’s conciliatory policy toward the Soviet Union. This scepticism was clearly reflected in the guidelines issued by the State Department to the American ambassador to Japan, John M. Allison, on January 10 1955. They stated that the Prime Minister’s statements urging early rapprochement would have a negative effect on public opinion in the United States and that exchanges of propaganda between Japan and the Soviet Union would serve to widen the split within the conservatives and unify the socialist camp in Japan.4 Washington did not have a high regard for the new Prime Minister Hatoyama and was deeply concerned with the political situation in Japan occasioned by Hatoyama’s replacement of Yoshida. CIA Director Allen Dulles reported in the meeting of the National Security Council on December 9, 1954: Hatoyama had solicited Socialist support and had secured it by a commitment to

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135

Hatoyama government to secure the two-thirds majority necessary to amend the constitution in order to permit the rearmament o f Japan. While pro-American, Hatoyama was known to favor increased trade between Japan and Communist China, on the one hand, and between Japan and the Soviet Union on the other.5

Thus, State Department officials viewed the Hatoyama government’s moves to promote Japan’s relations with Communist China and the Soviet Union with considerable misgivings. They argued that Hatoyama’s plan of acting as a gobetween “would be detrimental to U.S. national interests in Asia.”6 Various indicators suggested the essential nature of a dependent relationship between Japan and the United States. Japanese-American military relations were based on dependence, not cooperation: security was provided by the United States in return for base rights. When Hatoyama Ichiro, leader of the Democratic Party, replaced Yoshida as Prime Minister in December 1954, there were 210,000 American military personnel in Japan. The JapaneseAmerican trade relationship continued to be highly asymmetrical. The total trade between the two countries was not extensive from an American point of view, taking 5.6 percent of total United States exports and providing 2.7 percent of United States imports (in 1954), but for Japan it represented a vital factor in her foreign trade, supplying approximately one-third of Japanese imports and taking one-fifth of Japan’s exports.7 As a result of this dependent relationship, Japan was highly vulnerable to political and economic pressure from her mentor. From mid-1953 onwards, the People’s Republic of China gradually assumed a more pragmatic policy of peaceful coexistence toward Japan, especially after the death of Stalin, the armistice agreement in Korea, and the Geneva Conference on Indo-China. Starting in late 1953 and early 1954, the Chinese, like the Soviets, began showing an active interest in establishing official ties with Japan. In late 1954, Chinese and Soviet leaders, in a joint declaration, called for the normalization of diplomatic relations with Japan. When Hatoyama replaced Yoshida as Prime Minister in December 1954, the People’s Republic of China accelerated its peace campaign toward the Japanese government in order to encourage Hatoyama’s conciliatory gestures.

hold general elections in Japan in March 1955. This...was a matter o f anxiety for the United States because in such elections a sufficient number o f Socialist members might be returned to the Diet to make it difficult or impossible for the 3 S e e D i, 1990, pp. 223-231. 4 Asahi Shimbun, February 12, 1991.

5 Memorandum o f D iscussion at the 228th Meeting o f the National Security Council, Washington, December 9, 1954, FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. 14, p. 1796. 6 Simei, 1990, p. 127. 7 Borton et al„ 1957, pp. 128-129.

136

Empirical Analysis

The characteristic of Japan’s political structure most relevant to the decision process was that the ruling Democratic Party alone did not command a Diet majority for its Soviet policy. The Government which made the strategic decision was a caretaker one. The resignation of Prime Minister Yoshida’s fifth Cabinet on December 7, 1954 made necessary the designation of a new Prime Minister by the Diet. Since no party had a majority, an interparty understanding was needed to elect a Prime Minister. Hatoyama Ichiro, leader of the Democratic Party received support from both the Left-Wing and RightWing Socialists on the understanding that he would call for new elections after taking office. When the Democratic government headed by Hatoyama decided to seek the normalization of official diplomatic ties with the Soviet Union, the ruling Democratic Party held the minority position in the Diet occupying only 121 seats in the House of Representatives out of a total of 467 seats. Hatoyama’s Democratic Party did well in the lower house elections, on February 27 1955, as did the Right-Wing and Left-Wing Socialists, while its rival, the Liberals lost further ground. In spite of the increases, however, the ruling party still retained a minority in the lower house. In terms of results, the Democratic Party received 37 per cent of the vote and 185 seats in the lower house, while the Liberals got 27 per cent and 113 seats.8 When the tactical decision was made, Japan’s political structure was different. The unification of the two Socialist parties took place in October 1955. The conservative parties also went through a major political reorganization, culminating in the establishment of the Liberal Democratic Party one month later. These events transformed a multi-party system into a two-party system in Japan. At the time of the merger, the Liberal Democrats had 64 per cent of the seats in the lower house, while the Socialists had 33 per cent.9 Despite the LDP’s stable majority in the Diet, Hatoyama’s own position within the party was precarious. The merger had done little to promote a consensus on Hatoyama’s Soviet policy either within the ruling party or within the political structure as a whole. The normalization issue became ensnared in intraparty factional struggles and was a major arguing point between competing factions.10 Among the competing elites, there were two contrasting advocacies. Both the Left-Wing and Right-Wing Socialist Parties, committed to neutralism, 8 Scalapino and Masumi, 1962, p. 51. 9 Ibid. 10 For the factional alignments at the time o f Japan’s Soviet decisions, see Hellmann, 1969, pp. 50-56

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137

urged the Government to normalize relations with the Soviet Union as a step toward Japan’s greater independence from the United States. The thrust of their case was Japan’s need to gain access to the Soviet Union, the leader of the socialist camp, and to move away from the one-sided, pro-American orientation, in order to insure Japan’s survival against powerful adversaries; and this could be achieved by adherence to neutralism. There was not only dissension within the ruling Democratic Party itself, but opposition from the rival Liberals led by former Prime Minister Yoshida had intensified. Many leading Liberals were also supporters of a hard line toward the Soviet Union. The change in policy toward the Soviet Union initiated by Prime Minister Hatoyama was repugnant to his conservative opponents, especially those concerned about protecting Japan’s special relationships with the United States that his predecessor, Yoshida, had nurtured, and maintaining domestic security against subversive influences. The rival Liberals, seeing international reality through a hard-line, anticommunist and pro-American prism, viewed the Soviet Union as a hostile power and were critical of the Hatoyama government’s efforts to normalize Soviet relations. Distrustful of Soviet actions and intentions, they saw contradiction between government policy toward the Soviet Union and Japan’s alliance with the United States. They held the view that normalization of ties with the Soviet Union would have detrimental effects on close Japanese-American relations. In sum, the opposition was primarily conservative on this issue, rather than left-wing. Interest group pressures were also present in the setting for decisions. Institutional interest groups, such as the Foreign Ministry with its strong “America first” orientation, actively opposed accommodation with Moscow from the outset. It was the Foreign Ministry, acting through Foreign Minister Shigemitsu, that took part in opposing the government’s efforts to promote an early normalization of relations with the Soviet Union, “partly because the Prime Minister dealt directly with the Soviet Union, bypassing the Japanese Foreign Ministry, and partly because Foreign Ministry officials did not wish to initiate negotiations against the wishes of the U. S. Government and former Prime Minister Yoshida.”11 The Foreign Ministry transmitted its case through Foreign Minister Shigemitsu and its alliance with Hatoyama’s conservative rivals. Among associational interest groups, two organizations which performed as supportive interest groups deserve special attention, as they created an atmosphere conducive to the establishment of diplomatic ties with the Soviet

n

Hosoya, 1989, p. 27.

138

Empirical Analysis

Union.12 One was the National Council for the Restoration of Diplomatic Relations with China and the Soviet Union (Ni-Chu, Ni-So Kokko Kaifuku Kokumin Kaigi) which pressed for early normalization of Soviet ties. It played an important role in the early phase of the policy process by providing a liaison between the Japanese decision-making group and the unofficial Soviet mission in Japan. The National Council also “played an instrumental role in bringing about a final settlement” by pressing their views before sympathetic politicians within the ruling party.13 Another organized interest was a group of families of Japanese detainees who urged the government to bring about an early settlement to the repatriation of Japanese still held in the Soviet Union. It acted as a supportive pressure for the government’s conciliatory Soviet policy. It pressed its views by public meetings and petitions. Its access to high-policy decision-makers was assured by Hatoyama’s receptivity to the question of repatriation of Japanese detainees in the Soviet Union. Within the business community, there was considerable diversity of views. The fishery interests, by virtue of their close ties with Prime Minister Hatoyama’s and Agricultural Minister Kono’s mainstream faction in the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, had gained access to the foreign policy formulation process at a crucial time during the lengthy process of implementation, and their actions influenced the direction of government policy. Other business interests were largely divided into two groups with respect to the question of Soviet relations. The leaders of such economic organizations as Keidanren (Federation of Economic Organizations) and Nikkeiren (Japan Federation of Employers Association), known to have strongly anti-Communist orientations, counted on close economic cooperation with the United States. Content with following Washington’s lead on virtually every important foreign policy issue including that of Japan’s Soviet ties, they called for a “go slow” Soviet policy. Other business leaders representing Nissho (Japanese Chamber of Commerce and Industry) and Keizai Doyukai (Japanese Committee for Economic Development) advocated a more independent foreign policy and favored early restoration of Soviet relations. Advocacy and pressures from these employers’ associations, normally the most powerful associational interest groups, were

12 For a detailed description o f various interest groups, see Hellmann, 1969. 13 Ibid., 1969, pp. 98-102.

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139

present during the Soviet negotiations, but their efforts “had no discernible decisive influence on government policy.”14 The growing public demand for a more self-assertive and independent foreign policy was also present in the setting for decisions and acted as a stimulus for decisions.

5.2 Decision-Makers and Their Images

The strategic decision to seek normalization of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union was taken by the government at a cabinet meeting on February 4 1955. Prime Minister Hatoyama was undoubtedly the principal decision-maker on the issue of relations with the Soviet Union. Without Hatoyama’s dynamic personality and his commitment, the normalization issue could have gone unresolved much longer. The pre-eminent role of the Prime Minister was acknowledged by his cabinet colleagues. Foreign Minister Shigemitsu Mamoru, the most forceful critic within the government regarding the issue, admitted the Prime Minister’s decisive influence when, in a conversation with Matsumoto Shunichi, a trusted advisor of Hatoyama, soon after the strategic decision, he told the plenipotentiary that the government’s strategic decision had been caused by Hatoyama’s personal commitment to normalization and that he had only reluctantly agreed.15 Prime Minister Hatoyama was determined to ensure greater political control over the conduct of Japan’s foreign affairs and the government’s bureaucratic apparatus.16 It was Hatoyama’s belief that power had fallen to bureaucrats and was not sufficiently in the hands of the prime minister. In fact, because of his suspicions of the bureaucracy and his desire to inject a greater political input into the policy-making process, Hatoyama tended to conduct foreign policy almost exclusively on the basis of his own views and those of a small circle of advisors at the expense of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

14 Hellmann, 1969, p. 98. For a detailed description o f the role played by the business community, see Hellmann, pp. 94-98 and pp. 121-133. 15 Matsumoto, 1966, p. 19. 16 Hellmann, 1969, p. 136.

140

Empirical Analysis

Agricultural and Forestry Minister Kono Ichiro was a vigorous supporter of Hatoyama’s policy of early normalization of ties with the Soviet Union. Kono, a man of strong personality, was an old follower of Hatoyama in the Seiyukai in the prewar era. As a friend of the Prime Minister, Kono was his closest political advisor throughout the period of the decision process. Having virtually no experience in the field of diplomacy, Kono often attempted to rely on analogies from his career as a skilled politician in Japanese politics in his diplomatic dealings with the Soviets. While he felt the sense of expediency that underlay the friendly relationship with the United States, Kono, like Hatoyama, also was an ardent nationalist. The nationalistic desire to move away from dependence on the United States and to pursue a more independent foreign policy was one of the most potent forces behind his advocacy for diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. He believed that, for strategic and economic as much as political reasons, Japan’s long-term future lay not exclusively with the United States but with balanced relations with the Soviet Union, China, and the United States.17 Foreign Minister Shigemitsu was a member of the high policy elite by virtue of his formal position. There were differences of views between Prime Minister Hatoyama and his Foreign Minister which plagued their relationship from the beginning and subsequently led to widening rifts between them. While the Prime Minister argued for a relatively pragmatic and conciliatory policy toward the Soviet Union, the Foreign Minister, known for his distrust of the Soviet Union, urged a more hard line approach. They interpreted Soviet overtures differently, and made disparate inferences about Soviet foreign policy. Their different personalities, backgrounds, and philosophies also fueled policy disputes. From the start the two had failed to establish more than a formal bond. Shigemitsu, before entering party politics, had a distinguished diplomatic career in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs including a post as Ambassador to the Soviet Union before the War, and had served as Foreign Minister in the wartime Governments even signing the 1945 Instrument of Surrender. Shigemitsu’s views on the best means of dealing with the Soviets placed him at odds with Prime Minister Hatoyama. His diplomatic experience as ambassador to Moscow probably reinforced his conviction that the Soviets should be dealt with firmly and not with an accommodating attitude. Matsumoto Shunichi, then Japan’s plenipotentiary and close foreign policy 17 For Kono’s view s on various issues, see Kono, 1958; 1965a; 1965b. See also Welfield, 1988, pp. 131-133.

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advisor to the Prime Minister wrote: “Foreign Minister Shigemitsu, from his own experience in negotiating with the Soviet Union, seemed to hold the belief that, unless [the Japanese side] took a very tough attitude from the outset, negotiations would not lead to an agreement. Accordingly, from my point of view, he showed an unnecessarily tough attitude at the beginning.”18 Adopting a hawkish policy toward the Soviets, Shigemitsu believed that only through strength in Tokyo and Washington could Japan’s relations with the Soviet Union improve. It was the influence of Hatoyama, more than any other factor, that determined the course of the normalization of Soviet relations. It was primarily his decision, based on his understanding of the internal and external environments, to conduct the normalization in the first place, and it was his views that determined its direction. How did Hatoyama and other key decision­ makers perceive the setting for decisions? The evidence for their images is drawn primarily from the Diet debate at that time, speeches of Prime Minister Hatoyama and Foreign Minister Shigemitsu, memoirs of the Prime Minister, and accounts of participants. Hatoyama had an activist conception of his office especially with respect to foreign affairs. He, having a party politician’s background, seemed to hold the view that a government should be receptive to the desires of the people. Hatoyama’s approach to politics was based on two philosophical and attitudinal paradigms - Yuai seishin (the “spirit of friendship and love”) and nationalism both used to justify the principal goals of his foreign policy: the improvement of relations with the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China, and the pursuit of an independent foreign policy. Hatoyama himself emphasized a “spirit of friendship and love” as the philosophical and spiritual basis of his political actions in the Diet on April 25 1955: I would like to say a few words about the basic principles of my political beliefs. The first principle is about what a democratic government should be. The cardinal principle o f democracy is liberalism, which emphasizes the dignity and the attainment o f the freedom o f the individual and, therefore, as a matter o f course, acknowledges the same freedom and dignity for others. I call this “the spirit of friendship and love.” In short, I believe that the spirit o f concession and tolerance is fundamental principle for the proper operation o f democratic government.19

18 Matsumoto, 1966, p. 106. 19 Shugiin kaigiroku, No. 12, April 25, 1955, pp. 82.

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Hatoyama’s actions in politics, particularly in the context of Japan’s international relations, was consistent with his rhetoric on “spirit of friendship and love.” Thus, he took a positive attitude toward improving Japan’s relations with the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China, arguing that ways should be sought for peaceful coexistence with communist nations. In dealing with the Soviet Union, he stated, “it would be advisable to respect each other’s sovereignty and thereby to open normal diplomatic or economic relations to mutual advantage, without propagandizing or trying to impose one’s ideology on the other.”20 Matsumoto Shunichi, Japan’s plenipotentiary in the negotiations with the Soviet Union, confirmed that Hatoyama’s actions in political life had been guided by the “spirit of friendship and love”: “...Mr. Hatoyama’s earnest desire [for rapprochement with the Soviet Union] lay, firstly, in his tireless quest for peace based on the principle of the so-called spirit of friendship and love that had guided his daily life and political life. In other words, [Hatoyama] seemed to have deeply felt that, although Japan achieved peace with the free nations by virtue of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, it would be undesirable for Japan’s peace and world peace to leave relations with Japan’s strong neighbor, the Soviet Union, in the state of war.”21 Another important theme that emerges from a close examination of Hatoyama’s thought is his espousal of nationalism. Hatoyama’s thoughts and actions were dominated by a single-minded purpose - the creation of a truly independent state. Unlike his predecessor, Yoshida, Hatoyama had little personal contact with westerners. Basically a conservative politician with a strong nationalist flavor and with deep roots in prewar party politics but little in his background to mold an internationalist outlook, Hatoyama saw international problems through a lens quite different from that of Yoshida from a distinctive Japanese perspective. His intense personal ideological commitments, embodied in his particular brand of nationalistic values, seemed to impel him to regard Yoshida’s exclusive identification with the West, especially the United States, as excessive to the point of relegating Japan to subordinate status in the alliance relationship. It was partly nationalism that determined his attitude toward the Soviet Union. Prime Minister Hatoyama saw the improvement of relations with the 20 “Documentary Material: Administrative Speech Delivered by Prime Minister Ichiro Hatoyama at the Re-opening o f the 22nd Extraordinary Session of the Diet, April 25, 1955, Contemporary Japan, Vol. 23, Nos. 7-9, 1955, p. 597. 21 Matsumoto, 1966, pp. 159-160.

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two major communist countries - the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China - in terms of broad foreign policy objectives: as a move for greater independence from the United States, as a means for enhancing Japan’s international stature, and as a step toward restoration of full sovereignty for Japan. The humiliation of defeat, a legacy of World War II, was not without its impact on Hatoyama’s political thought. Indeed, it is probably not an exaggeration to describe his world view as partly shaped by the legacies of defeat and American occupation. The desire to get back what Japan lost in the war - true independence, international position, and national self-confidence supplied the psychological energy for Hatoyama. His desire for greater autonomy from U. S. control was rooted in the belief that Japan had remained under the dominating influence of the United States due in part to her heavy dependence on the U. S. for military protection. Moreover, Hatoyama was irritated by the sight of foreign troops on Japanese soil, a reminder of the country’s dependence on the United States for security. The 1951 U.S.-Japan Security Treaty was seen by Hatoyama as symbolic of that subjugation. He stressed the need to establish a more equal, mutual relationship with the United States by accelerating revision of the treaty, and sought to lessen its importance to Japan. He shared the Socialists’ desire for greater independence from the United States, but he did not share their view of the United States as an imperialist power. His nationalism was not inconsistent with his belief in free trade and free and open exchange of views. Hatoyama’s nationalism can also be exemplified in his approach to the question of Japan’s security and rearmament. He believed that Japan must assume prime responsibility for its own security. To facilitate greater rearmament, he called for constitutional revision to remove all doubt about the legality of Japan’s defense forces. Hatoyama, whose political career was disrupted by the Occupation, did not harbor special affection for the United States.22 It is clear from his memoirs that he even despised the United States: “During and after the [Second World] War, I considered the United States a country which, though paying lip-service to righteousness and liberty, acted in a very reckless way. In this regard, I

22 Hatoyama had been Minister o f Education from 1931 to 1934. While president o f the Liberal Party, Hatoyama was purged in 1946 by the Occupation and turned the presidency o f the party over to Yoshida reportedly on the understanding that when Hatoyama was depurged Yoshida should step down from the party presidency. He was depurged in 1951 and was elected to Parliament in 1952.

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greatly despised the United States...”23 There is evidence in Hatoyama’s general attitude toward the United States and in his philosophical positions that would lead one to predict that a major purpose of his government in foreign policy would be to reduce ties with the United States. Hatoyama felt that, although Japan had formally regained independence in 1952, it was still far from being truly independent from the United States. He had mentioned Japan’s powerful neighbors as a counterweight to the preponderant American relationship: Japan needed ties with the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China in order to protect itself from American political and economic domination. This does not mean that Hatoyama was insensitive to Japan’s important relations with the United States. Indeed, he was very much conscious of the “American factor.” Thus he sought the reaction of the U.S. government throughout. While accepting the sheer necessity of the American alliance, Hatoyama was critical of Japan’s excessive reliance upon it and felt that it limited Japan’s diplomatic independence. He believed that the rapprochement with the Soviet Union would reduce the nation’s dependence on the United States and enable Japan to stand on a more equal footing with her ally. Moreover, Prime Minister Hatoyama saw no danger to Japan’s alliance with the United States from a rapprochement with the Soviet Union. On March 31, 1955, he stated in the Diet: “I see no reason why the United States would oppose Japan’s desire to establish friendly relations with the Soviet Union and Communist China.”24 The desire to establish diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union was one aspect of Hatoyama’s general belief that Japan should diversify its foreign relations and pursue an independent foreign policy. Emphasis was placed on Japan’s need to adjust to the international trends of peaceful coexistence. Hatoyama viewed the events of 1954-5 as providing Japan with an opportunity to break out of the San Francisco system, broaden the base of its diplomacy and play a more creative role in world politics. Accordingly, the normalization of relations with the Soviet Union was part of Hatoyama’s efforts to change the course of Japan’s diplomacy. The changing attitude of the Soviet leadership towards its relationship with Japan was accurately perceived by the Prime Minister and was, of course, one of the most relevant image-components. It is clear from Hatoyama’s statements in the Diet that he was doubtful whether the Soviet Union possessed any aggressive intention against the West. He, as an anti-communist, did not have 23 Hatoyama, 1957, p. 49. 24 Shugiin gaimu iinkai giroku, No. 2, March 31, 1955, p. 5.

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great fondness for the Soviet system of government, but he felt that ideological differences should not be allowed to obscure the reality that the establishment of Soviet-Japanese ties was essential for Japan’s security. Replying to interpellations in the Diet, the Prime Minister, in April 1955, stated: “It seems to me that the Soviet Union has recently moved in the direction of averting World War III as evident in its relations in Europe and Asia...there seems to be no doubt that the Soviet Union wishes to maintain the world peace.” “At a time when the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China are pursuing a peace initiative,” he continued, Japan should adjust its relations with them.25 Hatoyama believed that the Soviet Union harbored no aggressive intentions against the West and Japan unless provoked. In his diary, Foreign Minister Shigemitsu commented on Hatoyama’s view of Japan’s two neighbors in a conversation with Ashida Hitoshi, a faction leader in the ruling Democratic Party: “Prime Minister Hatoyama says that China and the Soviet Union are advocates of peace.”26. The Prime Minister was acutely aware of Japan’s security problem in its global context. He saw in the mid-1950s a bipolar world in which two antagonistic blocs were arrayed against each other. To Hatoyama, SovietJapanese reconciliation was dictated by the division of power between two contending blocs; rivalry between the two superpowers would lead to a new and even more devastating war. He was anxious about Japan being dragged into a conflict as a result of the alliance with the United States. Accordingly, Hatoyama’s concern was the avoidance of dangerous situations which might plunge the nation into war. He believed that the safest course of action was a reconciliation with the Soviet Union. While he considered the balance of power between the Eastern and Western blocs mainly responsible for the maintenance of world peace, he believed no lasting world peace could be established. The creation of a stable international system would require positive measures that went beyond the limitations of the balance of power. In this context, Hatoyama believed Japan could assume a positive role in promoting the peace, stability, and prosperity of the world. Therefore, in his view, Japan must constructively carry out diplomacy for peaceful cooperation, including a diplomatic initiative for ties with Communist countries.27 25 Sangiin gaimu iinkai giroku, No. 1, April 11, 1955. p. 11. 26 Ashida, Ashida Hitoshi Nikki, vol. 5, 1986, p. 411. 27 Shugiin gaimu iinkai giroku, No. 2, March 31, 1954, p. 5. See also Hatoyama’s first press conference as Prime Minister, Asahi Shimbun, December 11, 1955 and his speech before the Foreign Correspondents Club, Asahi Shimbun, December 29. 1954.

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Empirical Analysis

Hatoyama was confident that Japan could serve as an effective bridge between the contending Cold War powers. Efforts towards normalizing Japan’s relations with the Soviet Union were attempts to build one part of that bridge. It was his basic position that Japan should move away from the exclusive reliance upon the alliance with the United States and adopt a more independent policy between the East and the West. The impetus for rapprochement with the Soviet Union was thus linked to the broader problems involved in Japan’s role in the new international order: a desire for Japan to play an active and creative role in world politics. In his statement following the Cabinet meeting on October 2, 1956, in which his trip to Moscow was approved, while explaining the reasons why he strongly advocated normalization of ties with the Soviet Union, the Prime Minister spoke of the proper role Japan should play in world politics - Japan’s serving as a “bridge” between East and West to relax world tension: “I am convinced that Japan, by restoring normal relations with the Soviet Union and by becoming a bridge between the two opposing camps, can play an important role in achieving peace and averting war.”28 Rapprochement with the Soviet Union was considered in terms of national peace and security. The experience of World War II had left a deep imprint on Hatoyama. The horrors of the War, especially the nuclear holocausts of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, affected the way in which he viewed Japan’s security problems. He feared that because of the alliance with the United States, the U. S. military installations in Japan would be prime targets for nuclear strikes. Therefore, in the interest of avoiding total destruction in the event of a war, Japan would be well advised to see that the Soviet ties were established. “If war broke out between the United States and the Soviet Union,” he wrote in his memoirs, “Japan would be a battleground and the Soviet Union would immediately attack Japan. That is why I came to conclusion that relations with the Soviet Union should be normalized as promptly as possible.”29 Prime Minister Hatoyama argued that the trend toward the general improvement of East-West relations should be encouraged by increased contacts with the Soviet Union and China. He strongly questioned the wisdom of the containment policies pursued by the United States and argued that increased contacts with communist nations rather than isolation and 28 An English version o f the Prime Minister’s statement on the eve o f his departure to Moscow is in Jain, 1981, p. 234. For the complete Japanese text of this statement, see Asahi Shimbun, October 3, 1956. 29 Hatoyama, 1957, p. 117.

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containment would help in the promotion of peace and the avoidance of war. This conviction is repeatedly expressed in the statements made by Hatoyama at that time as, for example, in the following passage from the press conference immediately after his first cabinet meeting on February 10, 1955: “What I fear most is World War III, in other words, a war between the United States and the Soviet Union. In order to avoid this, we should expand trade [with communist countries]. If the nations of the Free World regard the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China as their enemies and avoid contacts and trade with these nations, I believe this will give rise to World War III.”30 Another component in Hatoyama’s perceptions concerned China. The Prime Minister took a positive attitude toward improving and expanding Japan’s relations with the PRC. He believed that there was a special affinity between China and Japan rooted in their common cultural and racial backgrounds. In his views, the emergence of the People’s Republic of China constituted the fulfillment of the Chinese nationalist aspiration, socialism notwithstanding. The desire to ease tensions in East Asia by normalizing relations with the Soviet Union and Communist China was a feature of Japan’s high policy makers’ psychological environment.31 Despite the general relaxation of tensions in the global environment, the Hatoyama government saw tensions mount along the Straits of Taiwan. Foreign Minister Shigemitsu articulated this point on several occasions. For example, on February 5, 1955, he stated before the American-Japan Society in Tokyo: “...it gives us a great concern that the tranquility of East Asia is being disturbed by the fighting which is now raging off the Chinese Continent. I need not, I think, stress the fact that we Japanese entertain only most friendly sentiments towards the Chinese people as a whole. It is, therefore, painful to see Communist China at war with Nationalist China. It is my hope, as it must be yours, that a cease-fire will quickly be arranged through the good offices of the United Nations so as to ensure peace in the Formosan Straits.”32 The principle that normalization of diplomatic relations did not connote approval of a political system or its prevailing ideology was one important strand in Hatoyama’s perceptions: “The normalization of diplomatic relations 30 Asahi Shimbun, 10 December 1954. 31 This image-component was articulated by Foreign Minister Shigemitsu before the Budget Committee o f the House o f Representatives. See Shugiin gaimu iinkai giroku, No. 3, April 6, 1955, p. 2. 32 Quoted in Nippon Times, February 6, 1955. See also his administrative speech at the Diet on January 22, 1955: Shugiin kaigiroku, No. 7, January 22, 1955, pp. 62-63.

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with communist countries is one thing and the acceptance of communism is another... It is an undeniable fact that, however strongly opposed we may be to the communist ideology, there now exists in the world certain powers which are adherents of communism. In dealing with such powers, it would be advisable to respect each other’s sovereignty and thereby open normal diplomatic or economic relations to mutual advantage, without propagandizing or trying to impose one’s ideology on the other. I am firmly convinced that this very course should be adopted also as a means of forestalling another world war, the possibility of which is now filling all the peoples of the world with terror.”33 Prime Minister Hatoyama expressed deep concern about Japan’s diplomatic isolation under the San Francisco system and her need to participate in the mainstream of international relations. One of the principal aims of the Hatoyama government was to restore the nation to a position of trust in the eyes of the international community. An intense concern with improving the country’s international status was an important component in his perceptions. Hatoyama viewed the United Nations and normalization with the Soviet Union as a means of ensuring Japanese participation in world affairs and of enhancing Japan’s stature in the world: “My second reason lies in the improvement of Japan’s international position and attainment of complete independence. Despite the fact that we have concluded the San Francisco Peace Treaty, it cannot be denied that Japan’s international position is unsteady inasmuch as she has not yet been admitted to the United Nations. In order that we may join the United Nations and strengthen our status and our voice in the society of nations, and that we may maintain a position of equality with all the other countries as an independent nation, I believe this is time we restored normal relations with the Soviet Union.”34 There was also a sense of obligation to the Japanese nationals detained in the Soviet Union. In a statement issued following the Cabinet meeting on October 2 1956, in which his trip to Moscow was officially decided, Hatoyama stated: “The cardinal aim of government is to protect at all costs the lives and welfare of individual citizens. My heart bleeds when I think of the plight of the many fellow countrymen who are detained in a foreign land now more than ten 33 “Documentary Material: Administrative Speech Delivered by Prime Minister Ichiro Hatoyama at the Re-opening o f the 22nd Extraordinary Session o f the Diet, April 25, 1955,” Contemporary Japan, Vol. 23, Nos. 7-9, 1955, p. 597. 34 An English version o f the statement is in Jain, 1981, p. 234. For the Japanese text, see Asahi Shimbun, October 3, 1956.

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years after the war and the sorrows of their families here. This is the third reason that has moved me to seek the restoration of relations with the Soviet U nion.”35 Hatoyama had frequently stated that the supreme task of the government should be to safeguard the lives and welfare of the country’s citizens. Thus, one of the Prime Minister’s chief advisors on foreign policy, Matsumoto, explained that Hatoyama’s deep concern for safeguarding the interests of Japanese detainees in the Soviet Union and their families in Japan helps to explain why Hatoyama gave priority to the return of Japanese detainees.36 Hatoyama seemed to be the typical party politician: sensitive to public opinion. He paid great attention to the sentiments of the people and sought their approval of his policies. Hatoyama believed it was his duty as a democratic politician to fulfill his pledge: “The normalization of JapaneseSoviet relations has been the most important public pledge of my government ever since its establishment-a pledge which is, I believe, manifestly in complete accord with the fervent aspiration of our people to peace among nations.”37 Foreign Minister Shigemitsu, who argued for a “tougher” policy toward the Soviet Union, perceived the world as divided between two rival armed blocs, between which there could be no genuine peaceful coexistence unless the Western bloc pursued the policy of “peace through strength”: “...the international tension has somewhat decreased with a justifiable hope that peace may ultimately prevail... However, it is still doubtful if diplomacy is equal to the task of ensuring peace in our time. We must yet pluck the flower of safety out of the nettle of danger. For the world is divided with a delicate balance of power and misunderstanding is rife, mistrust profound. In these circumstances, the Free Nations rightly take the position that it is by implementing the established policy of ‘peace through strength’ that the Communist Powers will be brought to a genuine co-existence...”38 As for Shigemitsu’s attitude to the Soviet Union, it is clear from his statements and actions that he was doubtful whether the Soviet Union possessed any genuine interest in pursuing a policy of peaceful coexistence. Shigemitsu 35 ibid.

I

36 Matsumoto, 1966, p. 160. 37 “Documentary Material: Prime Minister Ichiro Hatoyama’s Policy Speech, Delivered before the 25th Extraordinary Session o f the Diet on November 16, 1956,” Contemporary Japan, Vol. 24, Nos. 7-9, 1956, p. 545. 38 Cited in Nippon Tim es, February 6, 1955. For the full text o f Foreign Minister Shigemitsu’s speech before the America-Japan Society in Tokyo, see ibid.

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argued that the current Soviet policy of peaceful coexistence was not based on its love for peace, but arose out of its world strategy. It was obvious, he said, if one looked at “past Soviet policies in reality and the world view of Communism.” “Nevertheless, peaceful co-existence is not a bad thing, whoever proposes. Especially, our country, being located between the two camps, the peaceful co-existence between East and West is important to insure the security of our country.”39 Shigemitsu assigned high priority to good Japan-U.S. relations and was not particularly enthusiastic about the normalization of relations with the Soviet Union. Shigemitsu advocated the policy of “peace through strength” in dealing with Japan’s bilateral relations with the Soviet Union. He believed that a peace settlement with Moscow could not be effectuated unless Japan undertook a large-scale military build-up. It was for this reason, as much as for his concern for the possible U.S. reaction to a settlement with the Soviet Union that Shigemitsu was cool to early Soviet ties.40 Shigemitsu believed that Japan could act “as an instrument of peace and progress designed to promote the security and stability of the Asiatic region.”41 Like his Prime Minister, he did not believe that Japan’s future lay in exclusive association with the United States and the West. Shigemitsu shared Hatoyama’s belief that Japan should contribute to the peace and prosperity of Asia and that Japan should develop a special relationship with China. In his view, the establishment of broader relations with the People’s Republic of China on the part of the Western countries was inevitable, and Japan was well qualified to act as a bridge between China and the United States. In the process of mediating between the United States and China, Japan could reassert its independence and leadership in Asia.42 “Japan is in a unique position as she is the repository of Asiatic culture and yet she has incorporated a good deal of Western civilization. Mirroring as we do the Asiatic consciousness, we can also demonstrate the Western philosophy. In other words, we can interprete the East to the West and vice versa, thus reinforcing the mental bridge, so to speak, that spans the two separate worlds... Anyway, our American friends

39 See Mainichi shimbun, January 1, 1955. 40 For Shigemitsu’s view o f Japan’s rapprochement with the Soviet Union, see, for example, Welfield, 1988, pp. 84-85. 41 Cited in Nippon Times, February 6, 1955. 42 Simei, 1990, p. 127.

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may always count upon us as an instrument of peace and progress designed to promote the security and stability of the Asiatic region.”43 Shigemitsu believed that, through economic assistance, Japan could restore political stability and economic well-being in East Asia. He told the AmericaJapan Society in Tokyo on February 5, 1955: “Let me here refer to the rehabilitation of the Asiatic region. To cope with the subtle infiltration of communism, it is necessary to bring about the peaceful stabilization of the region by raising the standard of living of the indigenous peoples. By common consent, Japan is eminently suited to cater to the growing needs of these peoples and we hope to promote their welfare in cooperation with the Free Nations.”44

5.3 The Decision Process and Implementation

The roots of the normalization issue lie in the fact that the Soviet Union refused to sign the Peace Treaty of San Francisco in September 1951 ending the Allied Occupation of Japan and restoring Japan to the status of an independent state. As a consequence, the question of reestablishing diplomatic relations between the two countries remained unresolved. Hatoyama raised the issue in public as early as 1952. Hatoyama then felt that World War III was an acute possibility and that Japan was obliged to take steps to protect itself. Increasingly concerned about the risks of nuclear conflict, he was trying to evolve a policy of “coexistence” with the Soviet Union. On September 12 1952, just before the first general election after independence, he told a crowd that he wished to terminate the state of war prevailing between Japan and the Soviet Union.45 His perception of Japan’s strategic situation in the early 1950s differed from Yoshida’s, his conservative rival. Yoshida held the belief that there was no threat of another war: “I have no hesitation in declaring that the Korean problem will not suddenly develop into World War Three. This is not an optimistic view; in fact, I am simply stating the actual

43 Cited in Nippon Times, February 6, 1955. 44 Ibid. 45 Hatoyama, 1957, pp. 116-117.

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situation.”46 For Hatoyama, policy toward the Soviet Union also became a nationalist issue, a way of asserting independence from the United States. Starting in August 1953 the Soviet Union began showing an active interest in establishing official diplomatic ties with Japan, and Russian and Chinese leaders in a joint declaration in Beijing in October 1954 called for the normalization of diplomatic relations with Japan: The policy o f the People’s Republic of China and the Union o f the Soviet Socialist Republics in their relations with Japan is based upon the principle that peaceful coexistence is possible between states with different social systems... W e affirm the desirability o f establishing expanded trade and closer cultural relations with Japan on mutually beneficial terms... We declare our wish to normalize relations with Japan, and to move step by step with her in this direction.47

In 1953-54, Moscow continued to hint at possible normalization and to feel out the intentions of the Japanese government. Several signals from Moscow had been transmitted in 1953-54. One came on August 8 1953 when Premier Malenkov announced that the Soviet Union was ready to restore diplomatic relations with Japan. The Soviet Union also offered soon thereafter to negotiate directly with the Japanese government. Another took the form of a reply to a questionnaire from the Japanese newspaper Chubu Nippon Shimbun in which Foreign Minister Molotov on September 11 1954 declared that Moscow “is ready to normalize diplomatic relations with Japan, provided that Japan shows the same readiness.”48 The conciliatory tone of Moscow’s statements was remarkable in light of the tensions and conflicts of the previous years. On October 12, three months after the Geneva agreement on Indochina, China and the Soviet Union expressed in a joint declaration their readiness to take steps to establish relations with Tokyo: The policy o f the Government o f the P eople’s Republic o f China and the Government o f the Soviet Union in their relations with Japan is based on the principle o f the peaceful coexistence o f states with different social systems, and on the conviction that this conforms with the vital interests o f all peoples. They stand

46 Yoshida’s statement in the upper house on January 29, 1951. Quoted in Dower, 1979, p. 392. 47 Gaimusho, Ni-Chu kankei kihon shiryoshu 1949-1969 (Japan-China Relations: Basic Documentary Collection, 1949-1969), 1970, p. 61. 48 Jain, 1981, p. 221.

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for the development, on mutually beneficial terms, o f broad trade relations and the establishment o f close cultural ties with Japan. They all express their readiness to take steps to normalize relations with Japan...49

The Japanese government was unresponsive. Viewing the Soviets’ flexibility and initiatives with deep suspicion, Yoshida did not take Moscow’s signals of possible policy changes seriously. He overemphasized the importance of cooperation with the United States and Great Britain while at the same time, out of his distrust of communism, he was not interested in normalizing Japan’s relations with the Soviet Union. Kosaka, one of his biographers, wrote: In the case o f the Soviet Union, it was Yoshida’s practical-mindedness that prevented him from seeking a solution to the most pressing o f the problems between the two countries. He was not interested in discovering whether it was possible for Japan to normalize her diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, and even if it was possible, he could see no practical benefit to be gained from doing so... With the Cold War continuing, there was little likelihood o f Japanese-Soviet trade increasing substantially... But the practical point o f view was not the only one. An improvement in Soviet-Japanese relations, even if it brought no material benefits, would mean increased freedom o f action and independence for Japan’s international diplomacy. Brilliant diplomat though he was, Yoshida was unable to see this.50

Changes in Japanese domestic politics toward the end of 1954 presented an opportunity for the Soviet Union to take a major diplomatic initiative. In November 1954, Yoshida’s conservative opponents forced a party split, with the Democratic Party emerging as a rival of the Liberal Party which he continued to head. This led to his political demise and the accession of Hatoyama as Prime Minister. Hatoyama, the president of the Democratic Party, formed his cabinet on December 10, 1954. The political transition from Yoshida to Hatoyama in Japan in December 1954 afforded Moscow more latitude to maneuver than was possible in the Yoshida era with its hallmark of strong pro-U.S. orientation, and set in motion forces that promised a peace settlement with Japan. Hatoyama tried to distinguish himself from his predecessor who had been criticized for his “follow-the-United States” foreign policy. As early as 1952 Hatoyama may have considered trying to balance 49 For the text o f the declaration, see Jain, 1981, pp. 221-223. 50 Kosaka, 1972, p. 127.

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relations with Washington by developing ties with Moscow and Beijing.51 He felt that Japan needed closer ties with its two communist neighbors in order to protect itself from American domination. In contrast to Yoshida, Hatoyama was receptive to evidence that the Soviets were pursuing a policy of peaceful co-existence. Hatoyama’s key foreign policy advisors agreed that there were enough signs of moderation in Moscow to warrant careful Japanese attention. The new Prime Minister put the establishment of closer ties with Moscow and Beijing at the top of his priority list. The Hatoyama government, convinced of the necessity of restoring diplomatic relations, publicly gave indications of Japan’s desire for increased contacts with the communist countries, especially with the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China.52 Immediately after the formation of the first Hatoyama Cabinet, the Prime Minister told Minister of Agriculture and Forestry Kono and Miki Bukichi, two long-time friends that "my mission as a politician will be JapanSoviet negotiations and constitutional revision."53 On December 11, the new government declared its policy objectives to be: to achieve complete independence; to pursue an autonomous foreign policy and to help rehabilitate Asia; to build up a defense capability in accordance with Japan’s national power; and to correct the various reforms inaugurated under the Occupation.54 The Soviet Union, responding to Japanese signals, indicated to Tokyo that it was seriously interested in normalization. Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov announced on December 15 that the Soviet Union was ready to normalize relations with Japan.55 Two days later, the Cabinet discussed the statement by Molotov, but no concrete move by Japan followed.56 On December 22, emphasizing that they desired to take further steps to normalize relations, the Soviets indicated clearly for the first time that the San Francisco peace treaty would not pose any obstacle to normalization.

51 Hatoyama, 1957, p. 117. 52 In his early speeches, Hatoyama stressed that Japan must seek closer relations with both Moscow and Peking, but Hatoyama had to give up his efforts to establish formal ties with the People’s Republic o f China because o f vehement opposition from the United States. See Furukawa, 1988, pp. 114-118. 53 Kono, 1958, pp. 5-6. 54 Naikaku Kanbo (ed.), Naikaku seido 90 nen shiryoshu, 1975, p. 806. 55 Yoshizawa, 1973, p. 151. 56 Asahi Shimbun, eve. edit., December 17, 1954.

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In January 1955, Moscow made behind-the-scene overtures toward the Japanese government and finally sent a definitive message through its emissary whose status was unclear. At first, Andrei Domnitsky, deputy head of the former Soviet mission in Japan, tried to approach the Foreign Ministry. But when the latter refused to meet him, the Soviet emissary contacted Sugihara Arita, a close confidant of Hatoyama and a member of the House of Councillors, through Majima Kan, secretary-general of the National Council for the Restoration of Relations with the Soviet Union (Nisso Kokko Kaifuku Kaigi). The meeting took place at Hatoyama’s private residence on January 7 1955, though Shigemitsu and the Foreign Ministry did not approve such private overtures, and lasted approximately 10 minutes. By this time, Hatoyama and his advisors agreed that there were enough signs of Moscow’s genuine interest in a peace settlement with Japan to warrant careful exploration. The Soviet emissary proposed to the Japanese Prime Minister that diplomatic relations be established before the settlement of the various issues pending between the two countries, such as those of territory, trade, repatriation of Japanese detained in Soviet territory and Japan’s admission to the United Nations. “Prime Minister Hatoyama,” Japanese plenipotentiary Matsumoto wrote, “since he, from the very beginning, earnestly desired to normalize Japan-Soviet relations, we agreed in principle to his proposal.”57 On January 22, 1955, the Soviet government instructed Domnitsky to deliver a note to the Japanese government proposing talks for restoration of diplomatic relations between the two countries: ...the Soviet side believes that it would be expedient to exchange view s on the question o f possible steps aimed at the normalization o f the Soviet-Japanese relations. The Soviet side is prepared to nominate representatives for negotiations which could be conducted in M oscow or Tokyo and it would like to know the opinion o f the Japanese side on this matter.58

In spite of the bitter reaction from Shigemitsu and the Foreign Ministry, the Prime Minister met for the second time Domnitsky at his private residence on January 25. It was during this meeting that the Prime Minister received the socalled “Domnitsky note” from the Soviet government requesting that SovietJapanese negotiations be started. In accepting the note, the Prime Minister felt the need to make clear his anti-communist stance at the outset and made a 57 Matsumoto, 1966, p. 24. 58 "Documentary Material," Contemporary Japan, Vol. 23, nos 7-9, 1955, p. 593.

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distinction between communism and normalization. Knowing that the Soviets were attempting to propagate their ideology in other countries, he told the Soviet emissary: “...I dislike communism very much, and if you intend to seize this opportunity to propagate communism, I will not accept it.” Domnitsky replied: “We are very much aware of your dislike for communism. We have absolutely no intention of imposing our ideology |on Japan]...”59 On the same day, Hatoyama handed the Soviet note to his Foreign Minister. The Prime Minister did not neglect to inform the United States of the note. The Japanese government was not sure the offer was genuine since the message was sent through a devious channel, but the signal was clear enough to gain the attention of the Prime Minister. Hatoyama recalled in his memoirs that Domnitsky first sought to contact Foreign Minister Shigemitsu but the latter refused to accept the note on the ground that it did not come from a formal source.60 Shigemitsu and the leading officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who were suspicious of Domnitsky’s mediatory role between Tokyo and Moscow, did not place faith in the Soviet note since it was not dated nor bore any signature, and since the government considered the Soviet delegation defunct after the Peace Treaty of San Francisco. The most important reason, however, appeared to be their suspicion of the intentions behind Moscow’s diplomatic overtures. Foreign Minister Shigemitsu urged the government to not decide at once but, rather, to let his ministry verify the authenticity of the note and clarify Moscow’s true intent. Accordingly, on January 28, Shigemitsu cabled and instructed Japan’s ambassador to the United Nations, Sawada Renzo, to contact the Soviet UN representative A. N. Sobolev. Such clarification came on January 31. It was the Domnitsky note which served as the decisive input into Japan’s strategic decision on the Soviet Union. Hatoyama and his foreign policy advisors concluded that Japan should now seize this opportunity to move rapidly to establish diplomatic relations with Moscow. Although Foreign Minister Shigemitsu was not hostile to the idea of rapprochement, he disagreed with Prime Minister Hatoyama and Agricultural Minister Kono as to the way and pace at which normalization was to be realized. Foreign Minister Shigemitsu, while sharing a strong antipathy toward communism with Hatoyama, was more concerned about the Japan-US relations than about the normalization of ties with the Soviet Union. Shigemitsu, who 59 Hatoyama, 1957, p. 175. 60 Hatoyama, 1957, p. 174.

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found the idea of compromise with the Soviets basically repugnant, argued for a hard-line approach. The Foreign Minister, for example, insisted that the territorial issue and the question of repatriation of the Japanese detained in the Soviet Union be resolved before the establishment of relations.61 He also differed with his Prime Minister on the form of a settlement with Moscow: Shigemitsu’s emphasis was on a treaty rather than a simply provisional agreement normalizing relations as was desired by Hatoyama. Some of the leading bureaucrats in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, having strong American sympathies, also had doubts about the wisdom of Hatoyama’s soft approach. Differences within the government on what tactics to pursue toward the Soviet Union, especially on how tough or conciliatory to be, however, produced tensions between Hatoyama and Shigemitsu. The Prime Minister saw himself as constrained by the Foreign Ministry. He was suspicious of bureaucrats in the ministry. There was an extraordinary gulf between the Prime Minister and the bureaucracy. Communication between Hatoyama and the high officials of the Foreign Ministry was erratic or nonexistent. In his memoirs Hatoyama tells how he unsuccessfully tried to obtain information about the details of the Soviet negotiations in London through the Foreign Ministry. Agricultural and Forestry Minister Kono shared Hatoyama’s distrust of the Ministry. Kono, moreover, did not have a high opinion of policy innovation among the high-ranking bureaucrats of the Foreign Ministry. To be sure, some of these officials were extremely reluctant toward Japan’s early reconciliation with the Soviet Union. Because of his suspicions of the bureaucracy, Hatoyama relied heavily on his advisors. Hatoyama’s close confidants were therefore utilized to prepare the diplomatic groundwork with the Soviets. The strategic decision was formalized at a Cabinet meeting, on February 4, 1955. On the following day, Japan’s decision was communicated to the Soviet UN representative, Sobolev, through Ambassador Sawada, Japan’s permanent observer at the UN. Japan also suggested New York as the place of the talks. The start of peace treaty negotiations was delayed by the difficulties of finding an appropriate location for talks agreeable to both sides. An effort was made during the next two months to determine the site of negotiations. The Soviet Union proposed to start negotiations either in Tokyo or Moscow. Japan did not consider either capital acceptable as a place for the negotiations on the ground that neither country had any official representation 61 See Heilman, 1969, p. 33.

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in each other’s capital. Moreover, Tokyo was rejected as the site of negotiations since the government feared that the negotiations in Tokyo would provide the catalyst through which the Japan Communist Party would intensify its subversive activities.62Japan suggested New York as the most appropriate location “since it is the city where is located the Headquarters of the United Nations, centre of the activities for world peace, and are stationed the official representatives of both Governments.”63 It is dubious that this formal reason was the only basic consideration for Foreign Minister Shigemitsu and his ministry to suggest New York as the site for Soviet-Japanese negotiation. Whatever the real reason, neither Japan nor the Soviet Union wanted the peace treaty process impeded by procedural matters. As a compromise, London was chosen. It was clear to the Japanese government that hard bargaining lay ahead. The desire to establish diplomatic ties with the Soviet Union were not looked upon favorably by the United States, but there had been no outspoken denunciation of Japan’s moves. From the first days of Hatoyama’s premiership, doubts had been raised in Washington about the Japanese government’s commitment to the alliance relations. Washington had been kept informed of Japanese intentions and thinking on the matter, so the decision to enter into talks with the Soviet Union came as no surprise to the U. S. government. Hatoyama wanted to show Washington that his overtures to the Soviet Union were not inconsistent with good alliance relations. The Prime Minister was conscious of relations with the United States. Thus, concern with “the American factor” led him to elicit the U. S. Government’s reaction to the idea of Japan establishing relations with the Soviet Union. In an effort to explain Japan’s new Soviet policy to her suspicious ally, Hatoyama decided to dispatch personal envoys to Washington. When Foreign Minister Shigemitsu suggested at a cabinet meeting on April 1 that he himself would undertake the task, it came as a surprise. “No one,” Hatoyama recalled, “had thought of entrusting the task to Mr. Shigemitsu.”64 In view of Shigemitsu’s stand on the issue of Soviet ties, Hatoyama decided to send Agricultural and Fishery Minister Kono and Kishi Nobusuke, a party leader, to accompany the 62 “Ni-So kosho o meguru kokkai gijiroku,” Chuo koron, October 1956, p. 77. 63 “Documentary Material: Note Verbale Delivered by Ambassador Renzo Sawada, the Permanent Observer o f Japan to the United Nations, to the Ambassador A.A. Sobolev, the Acting Permanent Representative o f the U.S.S.R. to the United Nations, February 5, 1955,’ Contemporary Japan Vol. XXIII Nos. 7-9, 1955, p. 594. 64 Hatoyama, 1957, p. 162.

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Foreign Minister to make sure that he satisfactorily presented Hatoyama’s thinking in the matter of relations with the Soviet Union. According to Kishi, the most important task of the mission was “to seek an understanding from the United States in regard to the improvement of Japanese-Soviet relations and to persuade the United States to the effect that there was to be no misunderstanding and objection to it.”65 Another purpose of the mission was to discuss Japanese-American relations, especially the revision of the Security Treaty. On the same day, soon after the April 1 Cabinet decision to send Shigemitsu to Washington, Foreign Minister Shigemitsu met U.S. ambassador Allison and requested to meet American leaders in April. On April 3, the State department refused Japan’s request, ostensibly for reasons of heavy schedule. Suspicion was cast on the motives of the United States. One of the real reasons for rejecting Japan’s proposal, as Kishi Nobusuke recalled, may have been the U.S. displeasure with the Hatoyama government’s policy toward communist states.66 The Hatoyama government’s efforts to establish more diversified relationships also took the form of the pursuit of a China policy different from that of the Yoshida government. Prime Minister Hatoyama greatly desired pursuing an independent policy toward the People’s Republic of China, one that would not be dictated by Washington. But its foreign policy options in dealing with the People’s Republic of China were fewer than with the Soviet Union, because of the severe constraints in Japan’s external environment - the conflicts in the Taiwan Strait, the Japan-Taiwan peace treaty, and, more importantly, the strong American objections to closer political and economic ties between Beijing and Tokyo. U.S. policy toward China in the post-Korea period was still based on the premise that the PRC was an integral part of a Soviet-led bloc, was expansionist, and posed threats to American allies in East Asia. Washington’s policy was designed to isolate and contain the Beijing government and exerted pressures on other nations not to recognize the legitimacy of the PRC. Nevertheless, Prime Minister Hatoyama took the lead in encouraging trade with China, eased the restrictions on Japan-PRC travel, allowed a trade delegation from Beijing to visit Japan, and endorsed a private Japanese fishery

65 Hara, 1988, p. 81. 66 Kishi, 1983, p. 173.

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delegation’s trip to China.67 Despite Washington’s displeasure, Hatoyama also sent a Japanese delegation led by his close friend, State Minister Takasaki Tatsunosuke of the Economic Planning Agency to the Bandung conference in April 1955. In one of its reactions to Japan’s desire for more trade opportunities with the PRC, the American government reported that “Prime Minister Hatoyama was testing the limits of American patience on the trade issue.”68 From the Japanese perspective, the statement made by State Minister Takasaki Tatsunosuke, in his meeting on April 22 1955 with the Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai in Bandung clearly illustrated the constraints on Japan’s relations with the People’s Republic of China: “Japan at present is under the ‘supervision’ of the United States, and the Japanese Government may not be able to comply with the proposal of your Government. But for the purpose of improving relations between our two countries even a little bit further, the Japanese Government wishes to begin with trade as a first step.”69 On Japan’s relationship with the Soviet Union, the government led by Prime Minister Hatoyama was able to pursue its policy differently from that of the preceding cabinet. The government, at a cabinet meeting on April 1, appointed Matsumoto Shunichi Japanese plenipotentiary at the negotiations in London. Matsumoto was ambassador to Great Britain under the Yoshida government, but resigned to become a politician of the Democratic Party and he was a close friend and foreign policy advisor of Prime Minister Hatoyama. Because he took a positive attitude toward improving Japan’s relations with the Soviet Union and China, his views generally reinforced Hatoyama’s.70 The Japanese plenipotentiary Matsumoto began negotiations aimed at concluding a peace treaty between Japan and the Soviet Union in London with Jacob Malik, Soviet ambassador to England, on June 3. The first stage of negotiations lasted more than three months and ended in deadlock. On June 7, during the second session, Japan submitted its first proposal in the form of a memorandum which included seven points: 1) repatriation of Japanese prisoners of war; 2) respect of Japan’s rights and obligations under the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty; 3) return of not 67 A s a result o f Prime Minister Hatoyama’s encouragement o f trade with China, the volume of two-way trade increased from $ 35 million in 1953 to $ 150 million in 1956. See, Hosoya, 1989, p. 28. 68 Quoted in Cohen (W. I.), 1989, p. 47. 69 Quoted in Hosoya, 1989, p. 28. 70 Togawa, Kishi Nobusuke to hoshu anto: Showa no saisho, dai 5 kan,1982, pp. 107-108.

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only the Habomais and Shikotan but also the Kuriles and Southern Sakhalin to Japan after the conclusion of a peace treaty; 4) respect of Japanese fishing in the northern waters and the return of captured fishermen and boats; 5) an increase in economic relations, to be negotiated in separate talks; 6) mutual respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter; and 7) Soviet support of Japan’s bid for entry into the United Nations.71 Among these points, the Hatoyama government gave high priority to the repatriation of the Japanese detained in the Soviet Union from the outset of negotiations “because of strong demands from the organizations of families of Japanese detainees.”72 The Japanese side contended that the question of repatriation should be negotiated separately from other issues. On their part, the Soviets wished to discuss this question as part of a broad range of issues. On the crucial northern-territory issue, the Japanese Government put forward highly inflated initial demands, but instructed Matsumoto to approach the negotiations with some flexibility: it did not consider its territorial claims as definite. The Japanese Plenipotentiary’s initial instructions were to seek the reversion of the Kuriles and Southern Sakhalin and to press for the islands of Etorofu and Kunashiri, but if these efforts should fail, to accept the return of only the Habomais and Shikotan if that would enable the two countries to reach a general settlement.73 In response to the Japanese memorandum, Malik presented on June 14 what amounted to be the first Soviet draft of a peace treaty. It proposed, among other things, that Japan not be a party to any military alliance and that Japan renounces all her territorial claims to South Sakhalin and the Kuriles. Moreover, Malik refused to separate the repatriation and peace treaty issues, preferring to use the former to extract concessions on the latter. Clearly, Moscow viewed the repatriation as a lever to press Japan to move on to the large issues that were its primary concerns, whereas Tokyo viewed settlement of the repatriation as a prerequisite for serious discussion of other issues and regarded Moscow’s refusal as evidence of bad faith and therefore a block to agreement on other questions. Both the initial Soviet and Japanese drafts were to serve as the basis for negotiations. When the Soviet draft treaty was put forward, Japan’s negotiating team sensed that the path to agreement was strewn with obstacles.74 Both sides 71 Matsumoto, 1966, pp. 29-31. Quoted in Vishwanathan, 1973, p. 72. 72 Matsumoto, 1966, pp. 30-31. 73 Ibid., pp. 29-31. See also Hellmann, 1969, pp. 58-59. 74 Matsumoto, 1966, pp. 32-33.

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asked for much more than they expected to get, for they, in the next series of negotiations, had modified or dropped the more extreme of their initial demands. These concerned the Northern Islands and the question of Japan’s military alliance with the United States. The impasse appeared to be broken on August 5, when the Soviets suddenly took flexible stands on the key issues. The Soviet chief delegate expressed Moscow’s intent to return Habomais and Shikotan and to drop the demands for the military pact clause. Malik made this “offer” known in an informal conversation with Matsumoto at the Japanese embassy in London. At the formal meeting on August 9, he reiterated the flexible posture and pressed for an early settlement. Matsumoto reported to Tokyo that the prospects for the conclusion of a peace treaty seemed bright. Tokyo’s reaction was, however, complicated by political developments in Japan. At this time, the two conservative parties, the Democrats and the Liberals were holding talks to merge into a single party. The unification talks, culminating in the merger, seriously disrupted the policy process in Tokyo. As the unification talks progressed, Hatoyama’s conservative opponents were increasingly harsh and open in their criticism of the government’s efforts to promote normalization with the Soviet Unions. Matsumoto acknowledged that the negotiation process was hindered by the merger, for Foreign Minister Shigemitsu and the Liberals joined forces in opposing an early treaty settlement. “Japan’s internal situation was such that it was very difficult to conclude a peace treaty by receiving only the Habomais and Shikotan from the Soviet Union. It became clear that Hatoyama would face a serious challenge in his quest for early normalization from the right wing of his party; compromise on the territorial issue could make him vulnerable to political attacks from those quarters. At that time, the Liberal Party, which was the other party of the merger with the Democratic Party, opposed such an idea and took the stand that a peace treaty should not be concluded unless the Soviet Union also return Kunashiri and Etorufu, in other words, the southern Kuriles.”75 Consequently, on August 27 1955, Matsumoto had been given revised instructions specifying that he was “to push as far as possible for Etorofu and 75 Matsumoto, 1970, p. 187. In the platform of the newly unified Liberal Democratic Party, a common negotiating posture toward the Soviet Union was adopted. It included: The immediate and complete repatriation o f Japanese citizens still held in the Soviet Union, the unconditional return of the Habomais, Shikotan and the Southern Kuriles, and the future o f the remaining territories should be decided at an international conference.

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Kunashiri as well as the unconditional return of the Habomais and Shikotan” and that the future status of the Northern Kuriles and Southern Sakhalin should be determined at an international conference.76 Thus, domestic political factors in Japan bolstered the arguments of those favoring delay. Angered at this abrupt reversal, the Soviet team reacted sharply, rejecting the claim and demanding now that the reversion of the Habomais and Shikotan was conditional upon Japan’s pledge not to have any military bases on these territories. Shortly thereafter, with the Soviet side hardening its demands, the first stage of the negotiations ended in total deadlock. At this stage, Tokyo favored as much delay as possible to allow Japan’s talks with the United States to take effect. Accordingly, Kono, on his way to Washington, instructed Matsumoto to do everything possible to gain time.77 At the time of the London stalemate in August 1955, serious doubts were expressed, in Washington, about the desirability of Hatoyama’s efforts to promote an early settlement with the Soviets. The American attitude toward the Japanese government’s conciliatory Soviet policy hardened in subtle but important ways. In a memorandum dated August 22, 1955, the State Department argued for a cautious policy approach to the Japan-Soviet problems. In the same memorandum, the State Department expressed the views of the United States on the issue of the northern territories. It supported Japan’s stand that a final disposition of the Kuriles and Southern Sakhalin had not been decided at the San Francisco Peace Conference: their ultimate disposition must be settled by future negotiations. To strengthen the Japanese position in the Soviet negotiations, the memorandum stated that the United States was ready to reiterate on this point. As for the Habomais and Shikotan, it stated that the Americans supported the Japanese position that they were part of Hokkaido. Surprisingly, the State Department did not come out in support of Japanese claims to Kunashiri and Etorofu. It merely stated that it could not comment on these islands since it was not aware of them.78 Japan had also on various occasions consulted with the British government through its ambassador in London since the start of the negotiations with the Soviet Union. Up to this point, the United Kingdom had not taken a stand on the territorial question. When Japan stiffened its original position on the territorial issue at the end of August and demanded the return of not merely the Habomais, Shikotan and the Southern Kuriles but also proposed that the 76 Matsumoto, 1966, p. 49. 77 Ibid., p. 45-46. 78 Asahi Shimbun, February 13, 1991.

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question of the future status of the Northern Kuriles be referred to an international conference, the British ambassador to Japan in his report to the Foreign Office in London called this volte-face “curious and naive” because the Japanese asked for much more than they expected to get through negotiations.79 The United Kingdom did not agree with the Japanese position. It pointed out that there should be no argument as to the Soviet claim to South Sakhalin and Japan did not have any valid legal claim to the Kuriles, even to the islands of Habomai and Shikotan. It stated, however, that the United Kingdom should not raise any objection to Japanese attainment of the restoration of the Habomais and Shikotan.80 Foreign Minister Shigemitsu, joined by Agricultural Minister Kono and Kishi Nobusuke, the Secretary-General of the Democratic Party, held talks with Secretary Dulles in Washington on August 29-31. At their first meeting, on August 29, Dulles received a memorandum from Shigemitsu on the progress of the Soviet-Japanese negotiations. Based on the premise that the Soviet regime was fundamentally aggressive and expansionist, Dulles viewed Moscow’s flexibility and initiatives with deep suspicion and doubts were raised about the meaning of any concession on the part of the Japanese in their dealings with the Soviet regime. Dulles tried to explain Soviet negotiating behavior to the Japanese Foreign Minister. According to information now available, Dulles told Foreign Minister Shigemitsu that Soviet actions were guided by principles and that Soviet leaders would seek to find chances of reaching agreement on basic issues, not by any small Japanese concessions.81 Dulles indirectly urged the Japanese government to be firm and unyielding in the Soviet negotiations. The American Secretary of State argued for a relatively cautious strategy toward early normalization of relations with the Soviet Union. Shigemitsu explained to the American Secretary of State that the efforts to normalize Soviet relations should not be taken as Japan’s neglect of its relations with the United States and that a settlement with Moscow was essential for Japan to obtain Soviet support for Japan’s admission to the United Nations. The meetings did not completely dispel the apprehension felt by the Americans who considered the rapprochement between the Soviet Union and 79 Asahi Shimbun, February 26, 1991. In his report to the British Foreign Office dated September 21, Ambassador Denning recommended that Great Britain should not take a stand on the territorial issue. This attitude was also clear in the Ambassador’s earlier report dated August 18. 80 Ibid. 81 Asahi Shimbun, February 13, 1991.

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Japan harmful to their national interests. There continued to be undercurrents of tension in Washington-Tokyo relations. At the Dulles-Shigemitsu talks, the Japanese Foreign Minister also raised the question of treaty revision and explained that the 1951 security treaty between Japan and the U.S. was an unequal one. Shigemitsu’s plea for revision was bluntly rejected by Dulles on the grounds that it was premature. As part of the Japanese government’s efforts to reduce the extent of American penetration, Hatoyama wanted to remove the presence of the U.S. forces in Japan. Shigemitsu brought up the subject in his meetings with Dulles. He requested the withdrawal of U.S. ground forces from Japan in return for an increase of Japanese ground forces to 180,000 men within three years. In the Secretary’s eyes, this figure was not adequate to protect Japan. According to one of the participants in the Shigemitsu-Dulles talks, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Radford, Dulles told the Japanese Foreign Minister that even if the target of 180,000 would be realized, the United States would have to have its support divisions remain in Japan. He also made the withdrawal of American troops contingent upon the establishment of still larger Self-Defense Forces in Japan.82 The quest for revision of the treaty should be viewed as a part of Hatoyama’s efforts to reorient Japan’s foreign policy, a step toward true independence. During the 1955-1956 Soviet-Japanese negotiations in London, Prime Minister Hatoyama was complaining that he was not getting Matsumoto’s reports on the details of the negotiations through the Foreign Ministry. The relations between Prime Minister Hatoyama on the one hand and Foreign Minister Shigemitsu and the Foreign Ministry’s senior officials on the other were disharmonious from the outset. Shigemitsu publicly expressed views different from those of his own Prime Minister. Shigemitsu made public the details of the Soviet draft treaty, much to the dismay and irritation of Prime Minister Hatoyama and Moscow, and commented that he foresaw the negotiations to be difficult since its contents were the same as the proposals made by the Soviet Union in the San Francisco Peace Treaty Conference in 1951. Further evidence of the continuing friction appeared in March 1955 when Shigemitsu openly criticized Hatoyama and his approach, in newspapers. Despite the contradictory statements and remarks, both the Prime Minister and his Foreign Minister firmly denied the existence of policy differences.83 82 See Hara, 1988, p. 92. 83 In his memoirs, Hatoyama recalled that he did not think he had different view s about the Soviet-Japanese negotiations from Shigemitsu. See Hatoyama, 1957, p. 196.

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A waiting period followed the suspension of the talks, from September 21 until January 17 1956: neither the Soviet Union nor Japan altered its position. In the interim there were two major developments that were to have consequences for the normalization process. One was the conclusion of an agreement in Moscow in September between West Germany’s Chancellor Adenauer and Soviet Premier Bulganin to restore diplomatic relations and to repatriate German detainees in the Soviet Union. This was achieved after both sides agreed to laying aside territorial disputes. Despite important differences in the problems entailed in normalization for Germany and for Japan, the German model or the so-called "Adenauer formula" for dealing with the issues seemed relevant to those urging early normalization in Tokyo in order to break the impasse in the Soviet-Japanese negotiations. It indicated that the German model could be the starting point for working out a basis for diplomatic relations. In December 1955 Moscow once again vetoed Japan’s application for admission to the United Nations. It became obvious that Japan’s admission to the UN depended on normalization of official diplomatic ties with the Soviet Union. The London talks were reopened on January 17, 1956, when the Japanese plenipotentiary met Malik, the first official meeting in four months. The renewal of talks underlined the desire of both sides to avoid total deadlock. It proved to be an abortive resumption of negotiations, however. When the talks started, neither side was willing to compromise its basic position or to be maneuvered into weakening its stand. During the next series of meetings Japan and the Soviet Union again failed to reach an agreement on the territorial issue. Japan maintained a stand-pat position on the issues that had been discussed at Moscow. On March 20, both sides suspended the talks indefinitely. Then the unanticipated occurred: on March 21 the Soviet Union imposed restrictions on fishing by Japanese vessels in the North Pacific for the coming season. This unilateral action by Moscow was to have a significant impact on the negotiation process. The Soviet maneuver had explicitly linked the fishery question with a general settlement of relations. It was clearly designed to influence the course of negotiations. Clearly, Moscow, recognizing Japan’s desperate need for fishing grounds in Soviet waters, viewed the fishery issue as a lever to press Japan to resume negotiations. Japanese leaders were taken aback by the Soviet announcement of fishing restrictions, which created a sense of urgency within the Government because of the economic and political importance of the fishing industry and its special ties with the Hatoyama-Kono

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mainstream faction in the ruling party.84 The fishing industry urged the Japanese government to separate the fishery question from the territorial issue and to arrive at an understanding with Moscow. On April 12, the Government, at an extraordinary cabinet meeting, decided to dispatch Minister of Agriculture and Forestry Kono, who had close and cordial ties with the fishing industry, to Moscow to negotiate a temporary fishery agreement. Thus, at Japan’s suggestion, fishery talks were held in Moscow from April 28 to May 14, 1956. The Soviet negotiating team headed by Fisheries Minister A. A. Ishkov attempted to link the fishery issue to the question of diplomatic relations. But Kono was determined to push for some solution that would satisfy the expectations of his government and the Japanese fishing industry, namely, a temporary fishing agreement for that year. Kono decided to talk directly with Bulganin about the Japanese position on the issue. He asked Ishkov to arrange a meeting with Bulganin so that he could talk man-to-man with the Soviet Premier, as if he were a Japanese politician in need of persuasion. Thus the meeting was hastily improvised on May 9. At this meeting, Kono appealed to Bulganin to conclude a temporary fishery agreement for 1956. The latter insisted on making the fishery settlement contingent upon the normalization of diplomatic ties. Regarding the issue of Soviet-Japanese relations, Bulganin also hinted at a settlement along the lines of the Adenauer formula, which sidestepped the territorial question. Having no experience in diplomacy, Kono, a vigorous supporter of Hatoyama’s policy of Soviet-Japanese normalization, relied on analogies from his experience as a skilled negotiator in domestic politics. He preferred to negotiate without any fixed strategy, using his instincts and intuition to achieve the best agreement possible. Kono’s success as a skilled negotiator was not easily transferred to his diplomatic dealings with the Soviets. Kono applied negotiating scripts derived from his experience negotiating with his conservative opponents in the Japanese domestic context to the task of obtaining the fishery agreements from the Soviets.85 Hellmann wrote: “In Kono’s own portrayal of the Moscow talks, the tactics guiding the meetings strikingly resembled those operative in Japanese conservative habatsu decision-making. To him the negotiations were essentially individual confrontations in which the major considerations were the personal relations of the participants, not the issue. In such a system, indispensable for any agreement is the establishment of shinjitsu (sincerity or 84 For the Hatoyama-Kono mainstream faction’s ties with the fishing industry, see Hellmann, 1969, pp. 130-133. 85 Matsumoto, 1966, PP. 161-163.

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mutual trust) between the parties. Apparently it was in part through a desire to demonstrate his sincerity that Kono attended a crucial conference with Bulganin without an interpreter.”86 After the Kono-Bulganin meeting, the two countries concluded a new 10year fishery convention and a 3-year rescue agreement on May 14. Both agreements were to be effected only after normalization of relations had been agreed upon. Japan was able to obtain those agreements only by consenting to resume peace talks not later than July 31, 1956. It acquiesced to the unilateral Soviet action of controlling fishing in what it considered high seas. Nevertheless, the fishery agreement did force resumption of normalization talks. Throughout the Japanese-Soviet fishery talks, Kono felt that he had received no help from the Foreign Ministry and expressed considerable bitterness at his treatment by the Foreign Ministry.87 The normalization talks were reopened in Moscow on July 31 and continued until August 13 but brought no solution nearer, with both sides unyielding on their respective position on the territorial issue. Foreign Minister Shigemitsu, assisted by Matsumoto, now negotiated directly with his Soviet counterpart, D. Shepilov. Japan continued to demand the return of the Southern Kuriles, and the Soviet Union was willing to cede the Habomais and Shikotan only in return for a peace treaty. In Japan’s case, the problem was exacerbated by Shigemitsu’s independent style. At this moment, the Japanese Foreign Minister had begun to have second thoughts about the “get tough” policy he had been urging on the Prime Minister. Confronted with a rigid and uncompromising stand by the Soviet Union, Foreign Minister Shigemitsu suddenly decided to risk a political storm at home. On August 12, Shigemitsu exceeded his instructions by making unsanctioned concessions: On his own initiative he informed Shepilov that he was willing to make a settlement along the lines of the Soviet proposal to return only the Habomais and Shikotan. The Japanese Foreign Minister apparently felt the situation allowed him to demonstrate his diplomatic skills that might save his place in the cabinet, or even strengthen his position within the LDP. He needed a major foreign policy success. Matsumoto, after a heated discussion, persuaded a reluctant Shigemitsu to seek instructions from the Government on the matter before taking any further step. Accordingly, the Foreign Minister cabled Tokyo: “Putting off the [territorial] question will merely hurt our prestige, put us in a disadvantageous 86 Hellmann, 1969, p. 140. 87 See Kono, 1958, pp. 15-18.

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position, and might even jeopardize prospects for obtaining the Habomais and Shikotan. I believe we can safely compromise at this time...”88 Tokyo’s response was predictably negative: the Japanese Government, after an extra cabinet meeting, cabled him on the following day that it would strongly oppose any concession at this stage, and instructed him to request a recess in the negotiations to attend the Suez conference in London.89 Instead of bolstering his position in the party, Shigemitsu’s unexpected move in Moscow contributed to diminish his prestige among many cabinet colleagues and to undermine his strength within the conservatives. Collapse of the Moscow negotiations strengthened the position of those within the ruling party opposed to early restoration of diplomatic ties. While he was in London, the Japanese Foreign Minister met Secretary Dulles at the American embassy there and explained the progress of the Soviet-Japanese negotiations. Dulles, who was not in favor of a Soviet-Japanese rapprochement, was not interested in doing anything to help the Hatoyama government on this matter. Instead, he resorted to direct pressure by warning Shigemitsu that if Japan recognized Soviet sovereignty over Kunashiri and Etorofu, the United States, under the terms of the San Francisco peace treaty, would be forced to ask Japan to confirm Okinawa to be American territory.90 Dulles’ threat of American claims to Okinawa surprised Shigemitsu and complicated the situation for the Japanese government. Hellmann wrote: “Dulles’gesture was ostensibly designed to strengthen Japan’s position, but since Tokyo was still in the process of formulating its position, it became merely another unsettling element in already confused circumstances.”91 Prime Minister Hatoyama, while giving consideration to Japan’s relationship with the United States, was determined to negotiate an agreement with the Soviet Union. Hatoyama’s response to the stalemate in the negotiations with the Soviets was intense, if not desperate, as his government’s fate was directly involved. For Hatoyama, the deadlock in the negotiations helped to solidify his growing conviction that nothing was to be gained from further waiting. By this time, it became obvious to Hatoyama that the territorial issue was impossible to solve immediately. Under the circumstances, he was ready to postpone a territorial settlement, for this would speedily bring about the normalization of relations. 88 Matsumoto, 1966, p . l l l .

89 Ibid., pp. 112-114. 90 Ibid., p 116. See also Vishwanathan, 1973, p. 79-80. 91 Hellmann, 1969, p. 38.

170

Empirical Analysis

He could do this by following the German precedent and laying aside the northern islands dispute between Tokyo and Moscow. In his view, decisions on the restoration of Soviet relations should now be reached out of consideration for the Japanese detainees still held in the Soviet Union. As Hatoyama later revealed in his memoirs, he branded those Liberal democrats, who were still demanding the retrocession of not merely the Habomais and Shikotan but also Kunashiri and Etorofu as the conditions for a settlement with the Soviet Union, as “unrealistic,” not paying sufficient attention to the plight of the Japanese detainees. “The territory does not disappear over the years, but there is a limit to a man’s life. When there is an opportunity to save [the Japanese detainees], we should work for their earliest possible repatriation. When [Japan] joins the United Nations, there will undoubtedly arise an opportunity to discuss Etorofu and Kunashiri...”92 Unmoved by the opposition from his party’s conservative opponents, the Prime Minister was determined to take personal command of the negotiations, travel to Moscow himself, and reach an agreement: “When Shigemitsu’s negotiations ended, I became increasingly convinced that I would have to go to Moscow and handle the final negotiations myself.”93 In spite of the realization that the previous attempts by Matsumoto and Shigemitsu to reach an agreement with the Soviet Union had ended in failures, Agricultural Minister Kono felt that Hatoyama’s journey to Moscow in order to break the deadlock at the highest level would enable the two countries to reach a settlement: “...I was convinced that an agreement was certain if Prime Minister Hatoyama would go to Moscow.”94 Hatoyama then took what he considered to be one of the most momentous steps in his political career. On August 19 the Prime Minister made up his mind that he would personally go to Moscow to achieve a breakthrough in the negotiations if the government and the Liberal Democratic Party considered it proper, and if his health permitted. As Hatoyama recalled, he came to this conclusion after careful studies by his key foreign policy advisors, including Matsumoto Shunichi and Sugihara Arata.95 Hatoyama felt that he was the most appropriate person for the task since his hard-line, anti-communist stance would dispel the apprehension felt by some conservatives that the restoration of relations might expose the country to subversive ideological and political 92 Hatoyama, 1957, p. 196. 93 Ibid., p. 195. 94 Kono, 1958, p. 191. 95 Hatoyama, 1957, pp. 195-196.

The Soviet Union

171

influences: “It is a matter of common knowledge in the country that I am against communism. Accordingly, as long as I conduct negotiations [with the Soviets], there could not arise any suspicions that the negotiations would bring about the introduction of Communism in Japan...”96 Hatoyama’s record as a hard-line, anti-communist leader gave him protection against right-wing criticism that the restoration of relations might expose Japan to the dangers of Communist subversion. Hatoyama’s decision to visit Moscow set in motion interfactional struggles and feuds among major leaders within the Liberal Democratic Party. The advocates of the normalization of Soviet ties within the ruling party and Agricultural Minister Kono came out in favor of such a trip by the Prime Minister. Hatoyama’s conservative opponents were against the proposed Moscow trip and chose to use this question to challenge his position in the party. The decision to travel to Moscow received their support only when Prime Minister Hatoyama promised to resign, upon the attainment of normalization of relations, to clear the way for a successor. In the meantime, preparations for Hatoyama’s trip and the firming up of the final terms of normalization to be negotiated in Moscow were progressing. A meeting took place at Hatoyama’s residence on September 3. Present were Prime Minister Hatoyama, Minister of Agriculture and Forestry Kono, LDP’s Secretary General Kishi and Plenipotentiary Matsumoto. Matsumoto suggested that the territorial issue be left for further discussion at a later date in order to bring about an early settlement and that the Government should resume negotiations on the basis of five points: (1) terminating the state of war between the two countries; (2) resumption of diplomatic relations; (3) immediate repatriation of Japanese detainees in the Soviet Union; (4) effectuation of the fishery agreement; and (5) Soviet support of Japanese entry into the United Nations.97 All concurred affirmatively with Matsumoto’s suggestion. Consequently, after informal soundings with Soviet representative in Tokyo, Sergei Tichvinsky (who replaced Domnitsky in May 1956), the Japanese Prime Minister sent Soviet Premier Bulganin a note incorporating the above-mentioned five points on September 11, stating that the Japanese government was prepared to enter into negotiations to normalize relations, provided that an agreement was reached on the above-mentioned five points, with the territorial issue being left for further negotiation at a later date.

96 Ibid., p. 195. 97 Matsumoto, 1966, p. 121.

172

Empirical Analysis

Bulganin, in a note dated September 13, replied that the Soviet Union was ready for direct negotiations on the basis of the Japanese proposal.98 At this point, Hatoyama’s visit to the Soviet Union was far from definitive: the question still remained a subject of controversy within the LDP. On September 17, the government and LDP leaders met at the Prime Minister’s residence to discuss the letter from Bulganin and the proposed Moscow trip. Since Bulganin’s reply made no mention of the Japanese condition that the territorial question be left for later consideration, they agreed to send Matsumoto to Moscow to obtain clarification. They also agreed that the government should not make a formal decision to send Hatoyama until it received such a clarification.99 In order to foreclose suspicion from the LDP’s anti-mainstream conservatives, who were still opposed to the Prime Minister’s trip, Matsumoto decided to obtain the Soviet clarification in the form of an exchange of notes.100 In the subsequent exchange of note between Matsumoto and First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei A. Gromyko on September 29, it was agreed that after restoring diplomatic relations, negotiations on the conclusion of a peace treaty, including the territorial question, would be continued.101 At a cabinet meeting on October 2, the Japanese Government formally decided the Prime Minister’s visit to Moscow. The decision was communicated to the Soviet Government by Matsumoto on the following day. Prime Minister Hatoyama was, however, unable to obtain official approval for his mission to Moscow from his own party. He sought the support of the Socialists, hoping to solicit bipartisan support for his mission. On October 4, Chairman Suzuki Mosaburo of the Socialist Party agreed to support his trip.102 Japan’s delegation was headed by Hatoyama and included Kono and Matsumoto. The summit meetings on normalization began on October 15. By this time it was apparent to the Hatoyama government that any agreement would have to include some provision for the territorial issues. This fact made it all the more imperative that a settlement with the Soviet Union be resolved on the basis of what was politically acceptable in Japan. Before Hatoyama’s trip to Moscow, both sides reached an implicit agreement on all substantive issues except the territorial question. Kono seemed to believe that if it could be 98 Ibid., pp. 121-122; Gaimushd, Gaimusho no hyakunen, 1969, pp. 864-865. " Asahi Shimbun, September 18, 1956. 100 Yoshizawa, 1973, pp. 222-223. 101 Ibid., 1973, pp. 222-224. See also Matsumoto, 1966, pp. 203-205. 102 Masumi, 1969, p. 193.

The Soviet Union

173

argued convincingly in the negotiations with the Soviet leaders that the Hatoyama government, committed to an early settlement of Japan-Soviet relations, could not sustain its political majority in the event of a compromise on the territorial issues, this would be a powerful persuader in Moscow. Kono felt that further concessions might be forthcoming if he could have a free and frank exchange of views with Khrushchev. Kono sounded out Khrushchev and other leaders on the key territorial issue to test if their positions were firm and if further concessions might be forthcoming. Thus Kono explained to Khrushchev that even though the Hatoyama government was willing to shelve the territorial issue as agreed in the MatsumotoGromyko correspondence, a number of LDP members had forced passage of a party resolution calling for immediate return of the Habomais and Shikotan. Kono then asked Khrushchev to understand the troublesome situation within the government party in Japan. In response, Khrushchev reminded him that both sides had agreed in the Gromyko-Matsumoto correspondence not to deal with the territorial issue at the present time.103 He also stated that Japan would have to conclude a peace treaty and not a joint declaration if provisions concerning the Habomais and Shikotan were to be inserted. It should be noted here that Japanese negotiating behavior in the Moscow talks provides one illuminating example of how domestic politics and diplomacy can become entangled. It provides strong empirical support for Putnam’s contention that the politics of international negotiations is essentially a two-level game. Putnam argues that when negotiators must win formal or informal ratification from their constituents for an international agreement, they strive to reconcile imperatives of both a domestic political game and an international game simultaneously.104 During the second session, on October 17, Khrushchev told Kono that the Soviet Union would return the Habomais and Shikotan after a peace treaty had been concluded and after Okinawa had been returned to Japan by the United States. However, he indicated a willingness to make a gentlemen’s agreement that they would be returned upon the conclusion of a peace treaty, without reference to Okinawa. During the third Kono-Khrushchev session, the Japanese side presented a draft of the expected joint declaration that both countries would start negotiations for a peace treaty including territorial issues after diplomatic 103 Yoshizawa, 1973, p. 230: Matsumoto, 1966, p. 144. See also Vishwanathan, 1973, pp. 82-83. 104 For his theory o f “two-level games”, see Putnam, 1988, pp. 427-460.

174

Empirical Analysis

relations had been restored and that the Soviet Union, acceding to Japanese demands and taking into consideration the interests of Japan, agreed to return the Habomais and Shikotan upon the conclusion of a peace treaty. Khrushchev responded to the Japanese draft by demanding the omission of the words, “including territorial issues.” Kono felt that he simply could not acquiesce to Khrushchev’s demand and that any agreement would have to include some territorial provision for post-normalization treaty negotiations. Therefore, he emphasized the importance of the inclusion of the words, as the ruling LDP attached high priority to the territorial question. However, the Japanese side eventually softened its position and suggested the following compromise solution: 1) the proposed joint declaration should include a clause specifying that the Habomais and Shikotan be returned to Japan on the conclusion of a peace treaty; 2) The Gromyko-Matsumoto correspondence of September 29 would be published; and 3) the words "including territorial issues" would be deleted.105 The Soviets accepted this compromise. Clearly it was far from wholly satisfactory to the Japanese side. Despite the absence of the provision regarding the South Kurile islands of Etorofu and Kunashiri, the Japanese negotiators accepted it in the expectation that it was a foundation on which others could build. Hatoyama recalled: Even though the words "including territorial issues" were to be deleted [in the Joint Declaration], the use o f the words "to continue...negotiations for the conclusion of a Peace Treaty" meant naturally the inclusion o f territorial questions since the remaining issues to be dealt with were in reality the questions o f Etorofu and Kunashiri. Accordingly, under the circumstances, we were compelled to accept this compromise and came to a decision that all our efforts, first o f all, be directed at repatriation o f [Japanese] detainees and [Japan’s] entry into the U N .106

The Soviet-Japanese negotiations, conducted intermittently over a period of 18 months, were finally brought to a conclusion. The joint declaration between the Soviet Union and Japan signed by Bulganin and Hatoyama in Moscow on October 19, 1956 was an important instrument that laid the basis for a new Soviet-Japanese relationship. It expressed the desire of both sides that the restoration of diplomatic relations would contribute to the development of mutual understanding and cooperation in the interests of peace and security in 105 Matsumoto, 1966, pp. 143-149. 106 Cited in Yoshizawa, 1973, pp. 234-235.

The Soviet Union

175

the Far East. The Joint Declaration provided for a termination of the state of war between the two nations, restoration of diplomatic and consular relations, Soviet support for Japan’s application for membership in the United Nations, repatriation of Japanese detainees, negotiations for the conclusion of treaties on trade and navigation, effectuation of the Fisheries Agreement signed on May 14, 1956, and early negotiations of a peace treaty followed by the return of the Habomais and Shikotan.107 The two sides also agreed on reciprocal most-favored-nation treatment in a separate protocol.108 The Joint Declaration settled all issues outstanding from World War II except for the territorial question. The most difficult issue, of course, was what the Japanese referred to as the question of the northern territories. The Joint Declaration’s treatment of the territorial question was a delicate exercise in deliberate ambiguity, which left room for differing interpretations and misunderstanding. Thus regarding the territorial question, it states: “The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan agree to continue after the restoration of normal diplomatic relations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan, negotiations for the conclusion of a Peace Treaty. In this connection, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, desiring to meet the wishes of Japan and taking into consideration the interests of the Japanese State, agrees to transfer to Japan the Habomai Islands and Island of Shikotan, the actual transfer of these islands to Japan to take place after the conclusion of a Peace Treaty between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan.”109 The issue was simply shelved. It remained to ratify the Japan-Soviet Joint Declaration. The House of Representatives approved the declaration on November 27. The vote was 365 to 0, with 82 abstaining. There was marked dissent in Hatoyama’s own party, the Liberal Democrats. Many of those who abstained from voting came from the old Liberal group in the ruling party. On December 5 the House of Councillors ratified the Joint Declaration by a vote of 224 to 3. Three days later, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet ratified it. The ratification instruments were exchanged in Tokyo on December 12 of that year. Thus ended a two-year process of foreign policy decision-making by Japan on the normalization issue. 107 For an English translation o f the Joint Declaration, See Hellmann, 1969, pp. 161-164. 108 For the Japanese text o f the protocol for the “promotion o f trade and mutual extension o f the most-favored-nation treatment,” see Yoshizawa, 1973, pp. 242-243. For the English text, see Jain, 1981, pp. 238-239. 109 Hellmann, 1969, pp. 163-164.

176

Empirical Analysis

According to Japanese plenipotentiary Matsumoto, there were three obstacles to an early settlement: First, the world was still severely polarized. Under the circumstances, the United States had taken a tough stand on the territorial issue by threatening permanent occupation of Okinawa should Japan accede to Soviet territorial demands in the Soviet-Japanese negotiations. Secondly, the rigidity displayed by the Soviet Union in the negotiations regarding the territorial issue - the Soviet claim that the territorial issue had been settled by the Potsdam Declaration and the Yalta Agreement. Thirdly, in addition to facing the international political factors, Prime Minister Hatoyama had to meet challenges from within his own LDP to his policy toward the Soviet Union.110

5.4 Feedback

Several components of Japan’s foreign policy system were affected by her decisions on normalization. In the external sphere, relations with the Soviet Union; and, as a consequence of that relationship, Japan’s ties with Eastern Europe. Following the normalization of diplomatic relations, Soviet-Japanese relations has undergone a substantial transformation, especially in economic terms. In December 1957 a Treaty of Commerce was concluded for a period of five years, granting most-favored-nation status. Bilateral trade increased from little more than $20 million in 1957 to $822 million in 1970.111 Throughout most of the 1970s, Japan was the largest nonsocialist trading partner for the Soviet Union, but the Soviet share of Japan’s foreign trade accounted for less than 3 percent of the total. Improvements in Soviet-Japanese relations also included the civil aviation agreement (1966); long-term trade agreements; the consular agreement (1966); cultural links (1961 and 1966); and regular ministerial consultations (since 1967). For resource-poor Japan, the joint development of natural resources in Siberia had implications for Japan’s economic capability. Between 1968 and 1981, Japan and the Soviet Union concluded half a dozen agreements 110 Matsumoto, 1966, p. 157. 111 For the development of Soviet-Japanese trade since 1956, see, for example, Vishwanathan, 1973, pp. 94-112.

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to develop Siberian timber, coal, oil, and natural gas. Imports of such raw materials has helped Japan to diversify its suppliers and to attain a degree of flexibility in dealing with the uncertainties of the international market place. Japan’s decisions put an end to a decade of hostile relations and helped to dissipate some of the hostility and mistmst that dominated Japanese and Soviet perceptions of each other. As early as the late 1950s, however, there began to be a “cooling” in the relationship, which became increasingly apparent from 1960 on. The reasons were several. The most difficult issue, of course, was what the Japanese referred to as the “northern territories.” For more than a quarter of a century since the establishment of diplomatic ties between the two countries, the territorial question has been the most important issue in dispute between Tokyo and Moscow, and Japan has insisted its solution was a prerequisite to any substantial improvement of Soviet-Japanese relations. In 1960, at the time of the revision of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, the Soviets added as a new precondition for the return of the Habomai Islands and Shikotan to Japan that foreign military forces withdraw from Japanese territory. Since then, Moscow has more or less taken the position that all territorial issues between the two countries have been settled with the conclusion of World War II, and that there is no territorial issue. The normalization decisions opened the way to Japan’s ties with the countries in Eastern Europe. Diplomatic relations with Poland and Czechoslovakia were established in 1957; Rumania, Hungary and Bulgaria in 1959. Trade agreements followed the establishment of relations. As for Japan’s relations with the other superpower, the United States, there was no discernible lessening of ties, despite Washington’s displeasure. When Japan sought to normalize relations with the Soviet Union, Japan’s relations with the United States became strained. There were some fears expressed in Tokyo that the establishment of ties with the enemy of the mentor would adversely affect the U. S.- Japan relations. The American government expressed misgivings about Tokyo’s rapprochement with Moscow. It did not, however, have any discernible impact on the economic and security dimensions of the dominant bilateral relationship. When Kishi Nobusuke assumed the leadership of the Japanese government in February 1957, he moved to repair the strained relations with the United Sta.es which had been caused by Japan’s rapprochement with the Soviet Union and vigorously to strengthen Japan’s ties with the United States. The Joint Declaration cleared the way for Japan’s entry into the United Nations, thus initiating improvement in Japan’s stature in the global system.

178

Empirical Analysis

The Security Council, with Soviet agreement now assured, voted approval of Japanese admission on December 12,1956. The General Assembly voted to seat the Japanese delegation on December 18, 1956, and Japan took its place among the United Nations. Less than a year later, in October, 1957, Japan was elected to sit as a non-permanent member on the Security Council. The effect of Japan’s Soviet decisions was even greater on the psychological environment of her decision-makers. Prime Minister Kishi perceived the normalization of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and Japan’s membership in the United Nations as a turning point in Japan’s foreign policy after independence.112 The United Nations was to become an increasingly important component in Japan’s foreign policy: The adherence to a diplomatic policy based on support for the United Nations was emphasized as one of the pillars of Japan’s foreign policy.113 The enhancement of Japan’s stature was perceived by Japan’s leaders and created a further inducement to decisions on revision of the security treaty in 1958. Feedback effects from Japan’s normalization decisions upon her regional setting may also be detected. The feelings of distrust that had enveloped relations between the two governments had been a source of instability and tension in the region. The rapprochement between Japan and her powerful neighbor contributed to a relaxation of tensions in East Asia. Feedback from the government’s Soviet decisions to the internal environment had effects on the political structure and competing elites as well. Sharp criticism came from conservative opponents of the normalization process, who perceived them as a departure from post-independence Japanese foreign policy. The effectuation of the strategic and tactical decisions brought with it the resignation of the Prime Minister and a realignment of intraparty factions. Japan’s security was also enhanced by improved relations with the Soviet Union. Table 5.1: Feedback from Japan s Soviet Union decisions:* Operational Environment

Psychological Derivatives

Environment

and

Policy

112 Kishi, 1983, p. 292. 113 Following Japan’s admission as a member o f the U N, three basic principles o f foreign policy were announced by then Foreign Minister Kishi Nobusuke in a statement to the Diet on February 4, 1957: 1) the centrality o f the UN (U.N.-centered diplomacy), 2) cooperation with the other free democratic states, and 3) the observance o f Japan’s position as an Asian nation.

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External: G Enhanced Japan’s stature

Japan’s enhanced stature was perceived; policy

in the global system (S,T)

derivatives were the adoption o f UN-centered foreign policy and upgrading Japan’s status in international society by seeking revision o f the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty

the

Relaxation of tension recognized and perception o f

relaxation o f tension in East

Japan as an Asian nation; policy derivative was

Asia

expansion o f ties with the region

SO Opened Japan’s path to

Benefit to Japan’s relations with Eastern Europe

Eastern Europe

was correctly perceived; policy derivatives were the

S

C ontributed

to

establishment o f diplomatic and commercial ties with Eastern Europe DB Initiated multiple ties

Improved relations with Moscow perceived; policy

with the Soviet Union

derivatives were various trade agreements, the civil aviation agreement (1966), cultural agreements (1961

and

1966),

and regular m inisterial

consultations (since 1967) W ashington ’s

Adverse effects perceived; policy derivative was a

apprehensions about Japan-

strengthened alliance through the revision o f the

U.S. relationship

1951 U.S.-Japan security arrangements

Increased

Internal: P S & C E Aggravated re­

Intensification o f conflict between government and

lations between government

conservative opposition was perceived: policy

and conservative opposition

derivatives were the resignation o f Prime Minister Hatoyama and the formation o f a new government

M

Increased

security

Japan’s

Greater security for Japan was recognized; there was no policy derivative*

* Consequences of the derivative tactical decision to send Prime Minister Hatoyama to Moscow to reach a settlement with the Soviets for Japan’s foreign policy system are subsumed in the feedback from the strategic decision.

5.5 Foreign Policy Restructuring

The intent to reorient Japan’s foreign policy was enunciated in various statements by key decision-makers. Japan represents a case which was fully committed to foreign policy restructuring at the rhetorical level, but in which actual repatteming did not extend as far as the intent indicated. Like Hatoyama, Ishibashi Tanzan (who succeeded him as Prime Minister on December 23, 1956) advocated improvement of Japan’s relations with the People’s Republic of China and the Soviet Union and was ready to continue the foreign policy restructuring process initiated by Hatoyama. But illness forced him to resign after only two months in office. It is conceivable that if the Ishibashi government had stayed in power for several years, the process of foreign policy restructuring would have gone much further. Under the government led by Kishi Nobusuke, who took over on February 25, 1957, Japan moved toward closer association with the United States. The Hatoyama government sought to reduce dependence and vulnerability by diversifying foreign relations, but the evidence indicates only marginal success in this objective. As this chapter demonstrates, efforts to diversify relations have borne few fruits. Foreign policy restructuring was attempted without radically altering Japan’s ties with the mentor power, the United States. While Japanese relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe was established, Japan’s political and economic fortunes remained tied up to theUnited States. The Hatoyama government initiated the process of adjustment to the changing realities of global politics. Yet its efforts to assert a more independent role, while not entirely unsuccessful, were hampered by a combination of international and domestic factors. The constraints in Japan’s external and internal environments constituted a hindrance to the continued pursuit of a major foreign policy reorientation initiated by the Hatoyama government. Holsti indicates that foreign policy restructuring often generates bilateral conflict with the mentor: “Mentors are seldom pleased to see their wards break away, particularly if the break involves significant new relationships with the enemies of the mentor.”114 In the case of Japan, the Soviet decisions were, of course, not met with any enthusiasm in Washington, but were not seen as an anti-U.S. policy to cut Japan’s ties with its patron. Certain aspects of the 114 Holsti (K. J.), 1982, p. 101.

The Soviet Union

181

dominant bilateral relationship with the United States were affected. The Eisenhower administration rejected Japan’s request to revise its security treaty with the United States as evident from the Shigemitsu-Dulles talks in 1955. Despite Japan’s rapprochement with the Soviet Union, the Japanese-American security relationships were not weakened. All this means that the normalization of Japan’s diplomatic relations, an important element in the Hatoyama government’s attempts to restructure Japanese foreign policies, was achieved at virtually no or little cost to Japan. It did not face any form of explicit American retaliation, much less threats by the United States to undertake its own reappraisal of relations with Japan. Japan’s efforts at diversifying its external relations are not the only dimension of foreign policy structuring. The quest for greater equality and a desire to end dependent relationships led Prime Minister Hatoyama and his government to seek revision of the unequal 195,1 security treaty between the United States and Japan. The revision of the 1951 security treaty initiated by the Japanese government in 1955 was a part of Hatoyama’s efforts to change the course of Japanese diplomacy. One step toward the goal of complete independence, in Hatoyama’s view, was to put Japan’s relations with the United States on a more equal basis through revision of the 1951 security treaty. As noted before, a proposal for treaty revision put forward by Foreign Minister Shigemitsu met blunt rejection by Secretary of State Dulles in August 1955. It was left to Kishi to negotiate it when he became Prime Minister in February 1957. A number of other policies employed to counterbalance American penetration are noteworthy. The intent to diminish Japan’s total dependence on the United States for its security is also important. The Hatoyama government’s attempts to establish a substantial, independent military capability through constitutional revision was not successful, since the Socialists occupied more than one-third of the seats of the Diet. An amendment of the Constitution requires the concurrent votes of two-thirds or more of all the members of each house and ratification by the people through the affirmative vote of a majority of the votes cast in a referendum. Kishi, Hatoyama’s successor as premier, also strongly favored revision. The movement to revise the "American-imposed" Constitution was at its height in the 1950s. In his efforts to lessen the treaty’s importance to Japan, Hatoyama rearmed at a much faster pace than his predecessor, Prime Minister Yoshida. Under his administration, the authorized strength of the Self-Defense Forces increased

182

Empirical Analysis

from 152,000 in 1954 to 197,000 in 1956. The United States forces in Japan were reduced from 210,000 men in late 1954 to 117,000 by the end of 1956.115 It was economically difficult for the government to substantially increase the size of the defense budget. The relationship with the Soviet Union was the centerpiece of Hatoyama’s grand design to free Japanese diplomacy from the restraints of the San Francisco system and reduce his country’s excessive dependence on the United States. In certain respects it had, in the short term at least, only limited success. Efforts to restructure foreign policy had borne few fruits. The United States retained its position as Japan’s single most important market throughout the 1960s and 1970s. Holsti contends that governments restructure their foreign policies to cope with military or non-military threats.116 As this study shows, Prime Minister Hatoyama perceived the threat of a possible “World War III.” In order to minimize the direct external threat to Japan, his government embarked on the rapprochement to the Soviet Union. Thus perceived military threat was a source of foreign policy restructuring in this case. But this case study confirms that perceptions of non-military threats and other variables are more important in helping to explain restructuring efforts than are military threats. Prime Minister Hatoyama felt “threatened” by the over-presence of the Americans. The drives to end dependent relationships and the quest for greater equality, for example, were some of the motives behind the Hatoyama government’s efforts to reorient the country’s foreign policy.

115 Weinstein, 1971, p. 111. 116 Holsti (K. J.), 1982, pp. 8-10.

6. The U.S.-Japan Security Treaty

The U.S.-Japan Security Treaty was probably the single most contended issue in postwar Japanese politics. This was the one clear issue that divided the ruling Liberal Democratic Party from the opposition parties. The government’s decision to renegotiate the 1951 treaty provoked the largest mass protest movement since World War II. A number of decisions preceded the 1958 tactical and strategic decisions, but in terms of decision flow all were preparatory in character. Several important decisions were made concerning the security treaty after Japan regained its independence. Two of them may be designated tactical: one preceding and the other following the strategic decision on this issue. The strategic decision of 1958 was so designated because it was significant in terms of its scale and duration of importance and remained the pillar of Japan’s foreign and security policy. Shortly after the general elections on May 22, 1958, Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke and Foreign Minister Fujiyama Aiichiro decided to seek the revision of the Japan-U.S. security treaty. (Ti) After the tactical decision was made, the Prime Minister decided to pursue a new treaty and formally conveyed his decision to the United States on August 25. (S) After a long interval, the derivative tactical decision was made by the Japanese Government. The decision could be made due to the change in status of the Japan-U.S. security treaty in June 1970, marking the expiration of the ten-year fixed term of the treaty and ushering in an indefinite period of “automatic continuation” during which either side could obtain release from its obligation upon one year’s notification to the other. On June 22, 1970, the Government led by Prime Minister Sato Eisaku formally decided to let the treaty continue in effect “automatically.” (Tz) The following exploration of the operational environment, the high-policy decision-makers, and the images which induced their decisions includes a derivative tactical decision of 1970 because of the ten-year gap between the strategic and tactical decisions, and because of its continuing political importance.

184

Empirical Analysis

6.1 Operational Environment

Tactical Decision 1 and Strategic Decision Although the bipolar structure of world power relationships remained, it began to gradually break down in the late 1950s. Many developments contributed to this trend, but the most important was the Sino-Soviet split. The global system was relatively tranquil in 1957-58, but world tensions heightened considerably in the summer of 1958, as witnessed by confrontations over Jordan and Lebanon, over Berlin, and across the Taiwan straits. East Asia became once more an arena of the Cold War when, in August, the Chinese renewed their offensive against the offshore islands held by the Nationalists, Jinmen and Mazu, precipitating a crisis in the Taiwan Strait. The resulting crisis heightened tensions in East Asia. The Taiwan Strait crisis of 1958 proved to be even more dangerous than the one in 1954-1955. The United States massed naval and air forces in the Taiwan Strait area in order to help the Nationalists defend the offshore islands. The escalation of conflict in the region and the U.S. threat to use tactical nuclear weapons against China led Khrushchev to warn President Eisenhower that in the event of a nuclear attack on the People’s Republic, the Soviet Union would back China with nuclear protection.1 However, the renewal of talks between the PRC and the U.S. on September 16, 1958, at the height of the offshore islands crisis, showed the desire of both sides to avoid dangerous confrontation and helped to defuse the crisis. Several weeks later, military tension in the area subsided. This setting provided the background for the debate on the treaty revision issue in Japan. The mounting tension in East Asia increased the fear that, allied with the United States, Japan might be dragged into war as Cold War tensions heated up. Many Japanese came to feel that the United States might use its forces and bases in Japan without any consultation with the Japanese government and that 1 For a discussion o f the Taiwan Strait crisis o f 1958, see D i, 1990, pp. 222-245; Asahi nenkan, 1959, pp. 58-59.

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a new treaty to be negotiated must provide some voice for Japan in the military actions of the United States in East Asia. At the height of the Taiwan Strait crisis, Foreign Minister Fujiyama Aiichiro stated at a news conference that Japan wished to have a voice in the deployment of U.S. forces to other parts of the region.2 It appeared that their fear was not entirely unfounded. During the crisis, the Seventh Fleet, supported by American bases in Japan, was used to convoy supplies to the offshore islands.3 Many Japanese feared that with the Soviet Union entering the picture in the Taiwan Strait crisis, the American bases in Japan might be attacked by the Soviets. Another aspect of the global component that had an important bearing on the revision issue was Japan’s enhanced stature in global system. Since the end of the occupation, Japan had sought to improve its international status. Japan’s quest for greater international recognition was rewarded with its admission to the United Nations in 1956 and its selection to the Security Council for the period 1958-59. Moreover, in 1956, Japan restored diplomatic ties with the Soviet Union. With this new international stature, there was a surge of national self-confidence, in sharp contrast with the situation in 1951 when the original U.S.-Japan Security Treaty was concluded. By 1957-58, it became clear that Japan’s new diplomatic and political influence was being exerted in the form of increased activities in the United Nations and in bilateral relations between Japan and other countries. One keen observer, for example, described the situation in the following way: Japan’s proposals in the Security Council for the withdrawal o f American and British troops from the Middle East during the 1958 troubles is considered by many international observers as the move that led to a solution o f that crisis.4

Another observer wrote: In her relations toward Communist China, Japan showed increasing independence from the United States, and in 1957 she departed from the U.S.-backed Chincom trade controls to follow the British in liberalizing the list o f exportable items to China. When the United States and Great Britain appeared to disagree over the Chincom issue, Japan even offered to mediate between them - an offer that would have amazed both sides several years earlier. On the issue o f nuclear testing, the

2 Packard, 1966, p. 63. 3 Ibid. 4 Kurzman, 1960, p. 325.

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Empirical Analysis Japanese Government spoke against the United States, Great Britain, and the U.S.S.R. with equal vehemence. Japan’s presence on the world stage was coming to be felt again.5

The dominant bilateral component was a vital part of the setting for the tactical and strategic decisions. When Kishi became Prime Minister in February 1957, Japanese-American relations were strained because of Japan’s rapprochement with the Soviet Union and Kishi was determined to upgrade them. The American Secretary of State John Foster Dulles remarked in June 1957 that, with Kishi’s coming to power, “a period of drift” in U.S.-Japanese relations was over.6 Japan’s defense and security continued to be controlled by its relationship with the United States. The 1951 security treaty had been the core of this relationship. Since its independence in 1952, the United States assumed the role of patron and protector while Japan developed as an American client state dependent on Washington for its military security and economic survival. From Japan’s point of view, certain features of the 1951 security treaty were considered to be “unequal” and became an irritant in the relations between the two countries: it placed no limitations on the use of American troops in Japan; it permitted the use of American forces to quell civil disturbances; it had no terminal date. Washington itself recognized the unilateral character of the security treaty. As early as in September 1956, the U.S. government’s own assessment of its relations with Japan for the period 1956-1961 warned that Japan’s ties with the United States and the West would become peripheral unless Washington accepted changes toward greater equality in the relationship. The security treaty of 1951 was referred to as one of the areas in which the American government would have to make concessions.7 Thus the dominant bilateral relationship in 1957-1958, Japan’s relations with the United States, was decidedly more favorable to put the relations between the two countries on a more equal basis by revising the 1951 security arrangements and was an important environmental input for Japan’s treaty decisions. Two bilateral components of Japan’s foreign policy setting also had a bearing on the issue of treaty revision. One was the attitude of the People’s Republic of China. Sino-Japanese relations began to deteriorate towards the summer of 1957 and reached a low point during the period 1958-60. When 5 Packard, 1966, p. 34. 6 Aruga, 1989, p. 64. 7 Cohen, Warren I., 1989, p. 47.

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Kishi moved to strengthen Japan’s ties with the United States and Taiwan in 1957 (he became the first Prime Minister to visit Chiang Kai-shek in Taiwan), the Chinese hardened their antagonistic pose toward the Kishi government. In this worsened political climate the Beijing government seized upon an incident in which a Chinese flag was tom down by Japanese right-wingers from an exhibition in Nagasaki on May 2, 1958 as the pretext for an abrupt severance of trade relations with Japan. On November 19, 1958, one and a half month after the first formal security treaty negotiation began, China’s foreign minister openly called on the Japanese to repudiate Prime Minister Kishi and abrogate the Japan-U.S. security treaty, and in 1959 until the end of Kishi’s premiership in 1960 Beijing kept up its criticism of the Kishi government.8 Chinese policy in this period played a role in exacerbating the conflict in Japan over the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty as the People’s Republic of China urged various Japanese groups to oppose it. The state of Soviet-Japanese relations at the time of the treaty decisions was relatively good. Soviet behavior towards Japan during the period 1958-1960 was aimed at the promotion of “neutralist” trends in Japan. For instance, two months after the formal opening of treaty negotiations, the Soviet Government’s memorandum of December 2, 1958 advised Japan to adopt a policy of neutrality and abandon the security treaty, claiming that neutralism would be the best guarantee of Japan’s security.9 As for military capability, Japan continued to pursue its incremental rearmament program in accordance with the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement of March 8, 1954, which stipulated the Japanese obligation to rearm. The authorized strength of Japan’s defense forces jumped from 110.000 men in late 1952 to 222,000 men by the end of 1957. They were still heavily dependent on American sources for military equipment. Yet Japan was no longer as defenseless as it was in the early 1950s when Japan signed the original security treaty with the U.S. By the end of 1957, all American ground combat forces had been withdrawn from Japan and American military personnel stationed in the country were reduced from 260,000 in 1952 to 77.000 by the end of 1957.10 The American withdrawal made a long-term

8 For samples of the Chinese criticisms o f the Kishi government during the period 1957-1960, see Ni-Chu kankei kihon shiryoshu (Collected Basic Documents on Japan-China Relations), 1970, pp. 118-177. 9 Yoshizawa, 1973, p. 48. 10 Yuhikaku, Nihon no anzen hosho, 1973, p. 418. See also Weinstein, 1971, p . l l l .

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strengthening of Japanese defense capabilities inevitable. Thus the military component of the environment acted as a stimulus to the treaty decisions. As for Japan’s political structure, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party held a comfortable majority in the Diet. In November 1955 the two conservative parties, the Liberal Party and the Democratic Party, merged to form the Liberal Democratic Party in order to build a strong and stable conservative government. Almost simultaneously, the Right-Wing and Left-Wing Socialist Parties also merged to form the Japan Socialist Party (JSP). This marked the beginning of the “1955 system” in Japan. In the first general election after the formation of the LDP in May 1958, the Liberal Democrats polled 58 per cent of the vote and obtained 287 seats in a Diet of 467, while the Socialist Party polled 33 per cent of the vote and won 166 seats. This became one of the environmental conditions for Japan’s decisions on the treaty revision issue. There was no discernible opposition from within the ruling LDP when the tactical and strategic decisions were made in the summer of 1958. The issue of treaty revision, however, aroused intraparty political problems after the start of negotiations between Japan and the United States, such as factional struggles and feuds among political leaders within the LDP prolonging negotiations with the United States. Kishi’s security treaty revision did not arouse strong criticism from the opposition parties at the time the decisions were made. Organized opposition came to exist only after the beginning of the revision negotiations was announced. Although the Japan Socialist Party, an advocate of “unarmed neutrality,” opposed the existing security treaty as a matter of principle, it was not until October 1958, after the start of negotiations was announced, that the party decided to oppose the treaty revision that the Kishi government intended to negotiate with the United States. Until then, JSP opinion on this matter was divided: the Socialists had committed themselves to neither treaty revision nor the policy of outright opposition.11 It is fair to say that the inputs of the opposition parties were not critical in understanding the decisions to seek revision of the security treaty. During the 1950s, Japan’s economic capability was increasing. Between 1952 and 1958 the real gross national product grew at an average rate of 7 percent a year.12 In 1955 the first strong investment boom since the Korean War started. Investments had increased 77 per cent over the previous year and by 1956 the Japanese war-devastated economy was fully recovered. Japan had overtaken the United Kingdom as the world’s leading shipbuilding nation by 11 Hara, 1988, pp. 244-257. 12 Packard, 1966, p. 34.

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1956. After a brief recession in 1957, the second boom began in 1958.13 The recovery of Japan’s economic strength had increased national self-confidence and was an environmental input for the decisions on the security treaty revision issue. Internal pressures for security treaty revision were present. Many Japanese were discontented with the unequal nature of the security treaty of 1951, regarding it as a symbol of Japanese subjugation to the United States and an encroachment on its sovereignty. The major source of dissatisfaction was the belief that the treaty was “one-sided” in favor of the United States: Japan was obliged to provide military bases to the United States, while the United States’ obligation to defend Japan was nowhere explicitly stated. By 1957-1958 there was a widespread desire for some sort of treaty revision. As early as the Spring 1957, some segments of the attentive public articulated a widespread mood in the country for changes in the treaty. As one analyst put it, “Politicians, commentators, scholars, and public figures joined in the public debate, and from February to May 1957 the press was filled with opinions on how and why to adapt the security treaty to the new circumstances.”14 On February 28, more than 500 scholars and “men of culture” (bunkajin) on the left urged the government to reexamine the 1951 security arrangements with the United States.15 During the prolonged implementation of the tactical and strategic decisions, the attentive public in general displayed rigidity in its image and advocacy, demanding the abrogation of the U.S.-Japan security arrangements. Moreover, the presence of American bases and troops in Japan had been a continual source of controversy in Japan. Numerous incidents surrounding U.S. bases in Japan created tensions between the Japanese people and U.S. troops stationed in Japan.16 Such tensions were gradually being transformed into anti-security treaty movements or movements toward treaty revision. Underlying these movements was a growing sense of nationalism among the

13 Hirschmeier & Yui, 1981, p. 292-293. 14 Packard, 1966, p. 46. 15 Hara, 1988, p. 115. 16 The most important o f these incidents was the Girard case in 1957. An elderly Japanese woman who was gathering shell cases on a U.S. firing range in Gumma Prefecture was shot to death by U.S. soldier William S. Girard. Controversy revolved around whether the United States or Japan had legal jurisdiction to try the soldier. For details o f the Girard case, see Packard, 1966, pp. 35-37.

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Japanese due in part to their accomplishments in the economy and world politics.17 The advocacy of associational interest groups was important only in the prolonged implementation stage. In particular, the opposition to the new security treaty was coordinated by the People’s Council for Preventing Revision of the Security Treaty (Anpo Kaitei Soshi Kokumin Kaigi, formed on March 28, 1959) in which the Socialists and the General Council of Trade Unions (Sohyo) were the most important participating organizations.18 Such organizations as the National Federation of Student Self-Government Associations (Zengakuren) and the Japan Communist Party were denied full membership status in the People’s Council but were able to carry out the vigorous anti-treaty struggle.

Tactical Decision 2 The latter half of the 1960s was noteworthy for a swing towards detente, in sharp contrast with the frequent confrontations that had marked the 1950s and early 1960s. Several events highlighted this gradual yet perceptible easing of tensions. In 1967, proposals came from the Soviet Union for a European security conference. This gave rise to hopes that the Soviets were engaged in a quest for world stability. The opening of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) between the two superpowers in late 1969 was another sign of detente, as was the decision announced the same year by the West German government to improve relations with the countries of Eastern Europe. But, although the dominant global conditions throughout most of the period of Japan’s tactical decision process on the Japan-U.S. security issue was in the direction of detente, this trend was disturbed by one notable event: the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968. The regional setting was less tranquil than the global dimension of the operational environment. Although the tactical decision on the Japan-US security issue took place throughout a period of superpower detente, part of it was conducted in the midst of tensions in East Asia. The war in Southeast Asia escalated from a localized conflict in the early 1960s to full-scale stalemated

17 Packard, 1966, pp. 35-47. 18 For the details o f the People's Council and its role in the anti-treaty movement, see Hara, 1988, pp. 195-212, pp. 285-299: Packard, 1966, pp. 105-124.

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war with half a million American troops in the late 1960s. The United States made its first moves toward eventual military disengagement from Vietnam and proclaimed that it would reduce its military involvements in Asia which the President proposed in his so-called Nixon Doctrine in 1969. Sino-Soviet tensions increased greatly in the 1960s, and were transformed from an essentially ideological and political dispute into an open military confrontation by the late 1960s in light of the Soviet military buildup around China’s borders. In 1969 the Sino-Soviet border clashes brought the two countries close to war. Although Beijing and Moscow then moved to defuse the situation, the hostile relationship continued thereafter. The American factor was significant in the setting for Japan’s 1970 tactical decision on the security treaty issue. The United States had, for nearly two decades, assumed the role of patron providing Japan with a military shield behind which Japan could engage in single-minded pursuit of rapid economic growth. The U.S. attitude toward Japan and its contribution to the security treaty began to shift ascertainably, starting at the end of the 1960s. This shift was caused by the decline of the bipolar stability and the war in Vietnam. By the end of the 1960s, as a result of the Soviet military buildup around China, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, and the Sino-Soviet border clashes of 1969, a basic qualitative change had occurred in Sino-Soviet relations. Beijing and Washington began to explore the possibility of new ties with each other in their efforts to impose new restraints on the Soviet Union and achieve greater leverage in dealing with Moscow. The war in Vietnam led the United States to reassess its containment policies. One result of this reassessment was the Nixon Doctrine enunciated in a speech made on Guam in July 1969. In 1957 the Japanese economy was still weak and fragile. By 1960, however, Japan was on the threshold of an extraordinary burst of economic activity that by 1965 was to yield large annual surpluses in the balance of trade and expand the GNP. During the 1960s Japan’s economy began to overtake those of European countries and by the late 1960s it grew into the third largest in the world, the growth that many Japanese admit would have been unthinkable without the military security provided by the United States. Japan’s economic benefit from the limited spending on her defense had been substantial over the years. Japan had spent an average of less than 2 percent of her GNP for defense, which was the lowest among the industrialized nations. The political structure remained stable with the Liberal Democratic Party enjoying a comfortable majority in the two houses of the Diet. Success for the

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LDP and failure of the largest opposition party, the Socialists, at the polls in December 1969 had led the Sato government to claim the election victory as a mandate for continuing the Japan-U.S. security arrangements in effect. Competing elites of the Left - Socialists and Communists - favoring nonalignment, marshalled their forces to advocate outright abrogation of the security treaty in the late 1960s, when tactical decision-making was approaching a climax. The Japan-U.S. security arrangements were regarded by opposition parties as obligations imposed upon Japan by the United States and therefore often regarded as a symbol of Japan’s "subservience" to U.S. policy and as a possible reason for being drawn into a war. The more moderate Democratic Socialist Party and the Komeitd called for gradual dissolution of the security treaty.19 In 1970, as the date approached when the Japan-U.S. security treaty became subject to notice of termination, the Socialist Party, the Communist Party and the labor union movement had promised massive demonstrations and disruptions comparable to those of 1960.

6.2 Decision-Makers and Their Images

Tactical Decision 1 and Strategic Decision There is a consensus that Prime Minister Kishi was the central decision-maker. However, he lacked Hatoyama’s charisma with the Japanese public. In fact, the people tended to mistrust his actions partly because of his wartime record. Kishi was a former bureaucrat and served as Minister of Commerce and Industry, and then Minister without portfolio, in General Tojo’s wartime cabinet. Suspected by the Allied authorities of committing war crimes, he was purged and held in Sugamo prison. Although Kishi was released in 1948, he was not removed from the list of purgees until April 1952, when Japan regained its independence. Known for his extraordinary organizational talent and skill at bureaucratic give-and-take, Kishi helped to organize the merger of the Liberal and Democratic Parties in 1955. Kishi, who had been serving as acting Prime Minister and Foreign Minister under the Cabinet headed by 19 Miyazaki, 1980, pp. 175-176.

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Ishibashi Tanzan, was designated Prime Minister in February 1957. He devoted more time and personal energy to the question of treaty revision than he did to any other single issue. He regarded this as his forte and until July 1957 he himself assumed the post of Foreign Minister concurrently with that of Prime Minister. Foreign Minister Fujiyama Aiichiro was a successful businessman with no experience in politics and diplomacy. It was his long-time friendship with Kishi that eventually brought him to the post of Foreign Minister in July 1957. One of Kishi’s biographers wrote: “In Kishi’s views, Fujiyama has a practical mind, yet a streak of idealism and moralistic sense not too often found in businessmen. Kishi thought this was a healthy combination of qualities for a Foreign Minister to have, particularly one burdened with the difficult job of lifting an outlaw nation to a high level of international prestige and respectability.”20 Like his Prime Minister, Fujiyama regarded the 1951 security treaty as a legacy of occupation that had to be overhauled. He was thus responsive to the idea of treaty revision from the outset. He participated in the tactical decision to seek treaty revision and was a central figure in the negotiations with the United States. His experience as a businessman had taught him the need for compromise and reconciliation as well as hard bargaining. Fujiyama also carried the issue through the ruling Liberal Democratic Party. The views of Fujiyama commanded respect on this issue, but it was primarily the image of the Prime Minister which shaped Japan’s decisions on the treaty revision issue. What was the nature of the attitudinal prism of Prime Minister Kishi? How did he perceive various components of the operational environment on one of the most controversial issues in Japan’s foreign policy? Kishi was preoccupied with power and had an intuitive grasp of the mechanics of power in domestic politics. The belief that politics is based on power was a fundamental article of faith on which Kishi’s entire approach to domestic and foreign policy rested. His conception of power was based on the law of numbers.21 Thus he himself admitted that the basis for Kishi politics was to gather as many supporters as possible in order to carry sufficient weight in policy matters.22 Kosaka Masataka observed that while Kishi was secretary-general of the Liberal Democratic Party, “the party established a close liaison with a number of interest groups, largely because he realized that 20Kurzman, 1960, pp. 323-324. 21 Hara, 1988, p. 104. 22 Ibid.

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their numbers, taken as a whole, would yield a huge number of votes when election time came.”23 He made great efforts to unify the conservatives in order to create a strong government. The unification of the conservatives, in Kishi’s view, was necessary to carry out the various policies needed to achieve the ultimate goal of complete independence.24 After his first visit to the United States in 1955, Kishi argued that “Japan could not improve relations with the United States unless it was able to stabilize its domestic political situation, which meant conservative unification.”25 Soon after the formation of the Liberal Democratic Party, Kishi stated: The birth o f the Liberal-Democratic Party means, on the one hand, the establishment o f a democratic political structure based on the two-party system, and on the other hand, the concentration o f political power sufficient to permit implementation o f uncompromising reconstruction policies. This political structure will permit stable and honest administration o f the Diet, which will be operated in accordance with the sound rules o f democracy... As for our reconstruction policies, one must be the revision o f our Constitution, especially the part that forbids the establishment o f defense forces. We must also promote economic relations with the Asian countries and maintain close friendship with the United States, Great Britain and other free nations. We must build up our economy by means o f planning and raise our moral standards through reform o f our educational system.26

Another component of Kishi’s attitudinal prism was the legacy of occupation. The original Security Treaty, concluded as it was when the country was occupied and without international standing, was regarded as a legacy of occupation that had to be revised in accordance with Japan’s new international stature. This perceptual link was articulated by Kishi in his speech before the National Press Club in Washington on June 21, 1957: ...at the time this security structure was created Japan did not have the Self-Defense Forces which she has today and the United States assumed the major portion o f the responsibility for the defense o f Japan. Since then, Japan has created the SelfDefense Forces and is making efforts to continue to build them up to the limit of her

23 Kosaka, 1972, p. 173. 24 Asahi Shimbun, May 7, 1955. See also Hara, 1988, p. 97. 25 Kurzman, 1960, p. 289. 26 Cited in Kurzman, 1960, p. 290. For a more detailed articulation o f his view on the matter see Kishi, 1983, pp. 221-225.

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national capabilities. Furthermore, Japan has, only a short time ago, been admitted to the United Nations. In the light of this changed situation, I believe it is necessary for the United States and Japan to study the question o f adjusting the existing security structure so that it may conform to the new situation.27

Kishi, an ardent nationalist, was extremely sensitive about Japan’s sovereignty and international status, perhaps because the Japanese so recently came out of the Occupation that seriously compromised their national integrity. One of the overriding concerns of Kishi was to achieve complete independence for Japan. The attainment of that objective was perceived as an instrumental goal to achieve a higher value, the enhancement of Japan’s status in the international community. Kosaka remarked: “His greatest effort was exerted in attempting to raise Japan’s status in international society.”28 To a politician like Kishi who espoused a conservative nationalism, one way of achieving these objectives was to put relations between Japan and the United States on a more equal basis by revising the Security Treaty. The emphasis on independence and status was directly related to his perception of the ignominy of the years of subordination to the United States during the occupation period. In short, Kishi saw treaty revision as an important step towards the restoration of full sovereignty for Japan. Through such a revision, he believed that Japan would enhance its international status by becoming truly independent. The impact of the two intertwined strands of the Prime Minister’s attitudinal prism - the nationalistic orientation and the predominant conservative ideology - is evident in his approach to foreign and security policy. Within that prism the perceptual focus was on Japan’s role in the American alliance. One of the motives behind Kishi’s quest for revision was a desire to assert Japanese equality within the alliance framework. To Kishi, representing the nationalistic outlook, the Japan-U.S. security treaty as it stood was anything but satisfactory. While he regarded the military alliance as a guarantee of American protection under which economic growth could be pursued, certain features of the treaty did not befit a fully independent nation of Japan’s stature. Kishi recalled in a 1981 interview:

27 From the official text, as published in Contemporary Japan, Vol. 25, N o .l, September 1957, p. 164. 28 Kosaka, 1972, p. 172.

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Empirical Analysis In the postwar era, Japan had been occupied by the United States for a long period and even though her political independence was restored by the San Francisco Peace Treaty, the Japanese-U.S. relations had not been equal in various fields. Although the occupation was formally ended, its vestiges...stayed in the minds of the Japanese... In order to build up friendly relations between Japan and the United States, it was necessary to do away with such remnants o f the occupation period and to put Japan-U.S. relations on an equal footing.29

Moreover, to Kishi, the presence of American troops on Japanese soil, a discomforting reminder of the country’s dependence on the United States for defense, constituted a crucial psychological impetus. Kishi’s view of the world changed little over the years. His view was formed partly by his years at Tokyo Imperial University, along with the current of thought prevalent in the nationalistic 1930s.30 Kishi was influenced by the radical nationalist views of such men as Kita Ikki: Kita Ikki was the greatest influence on me in my student days. He was later executed by firing squad as one o f the chief conspirators in the 26 February 1936 Incident. But he died as he had lived, a dedicated revolutionary since the time of Sun Yat Sen’s revolution against the Manchus. The right-wingers who came after him simply could not compare in knowledge and judgement. Kita’s Proposal for

the Reconstruction of Japan , the work o f a socialist converted to nationalism [K okkash u gi], outlined, in a structured, concrete fashion, a project for implementing immense social and political changes within the context of the Sacred National Polity. This was very close to my way o f thinking at that time.31

Kita’s influences were reflected in Kishi’s approach to international politics in prewar Japan. Like Kita, Kishi emphasized the concept of brotherhood and uniqueness of Asians and accepted the doctrine of Japan’s mission to save East Asia from the perils of socialism and Anglo-American influences. In postwar Japan, he came to believe that Japan’s defeat in the pacific war made it necessary for Japan to maintain friendly relations with the United States, the dominant Western power. This belief was in consonance with the strong anti-

29 Hara, 1988, p. 106. 30 For the details o f Kishi's personal background and political ideas in English, see Kurzman, 1960: Packard, 1966, pp. 47-54: Welfied, 1988, pp. 116-122. 31 As cited in Welfield, 1988, p. 118.

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communist biases of Kishi. In his view, Marxism “goes against human nature.”32 Another important component of Kishi’s attitudinal prism that influenced his perceptions of the issue was the lesson of 1955, when the U.S. rejected Japan’s request for revision of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty on grounds of Japan’s insufficient rearmament. Kishi participated with then Foreign Minister Shigemitsu in meetings with Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. Kishi’s analysis of his encounters with Dulles served to confirm the validity of the assumptions he made about American terms for revision. “At the ShigemitsuDulles talks, we were told by Dulles that Japan had no capability to obtain an equal treaty with the United States. It was my intention to make the United States clearly understand that Japan was building up a basic [military] capability to defend herself by making such efforts.”33 This perceptual link was manifested in Kishi’s efforts to make adequate preparations in the form of Japanese rearmament before his visit to the United States in 1957. Kishi revealed an unusual preoccupation with national security. It was his basic position that Japan should develop an indigenous military capability, and the impediments to rearmament were constitutional inhibitions and, ultimately, popular sentiment. Kishi was convinced that the Constitution, especially the provisions forbidding rearmament should be amended so that Japan could attain “true” independence. Kishi had consistently advocated a revision of the Constitution more in line with Japan’s own needs and aspirations: Now that the Occupation has ended, our Constitution will have to be restudied on a new basis and be amended in pursuance o f the will o f the entire people. Since our Constitution is our fundamental law, which should be adhered to by the whole country, it must be a reflection o f the will and wishes o f the Japanese people. It is my belief that our Constitution should be revised as soon as possible.34

On the relationship between rearmament and the goal of Japan’s true independence, he wrote: Personally, I do not like the prefix ‘re’ in the word ‘rearmament’. For it smacks o f a return to militarism. Now that Japan has regained its independence, if nominally, it must eliminate the necessity o f keeping foreign troops here for protection o f the

32 Ibid. 33 Hara's intervew with Kishi conducted on December 26, 1980. See Hara, 1988, p. 110. 34 A s cited in Kurzman, 1960, p. 268.

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Empirical Analysis nation against aggression. Japan should be strong enough to defend herself. This is the right and obligation of an independent nation. That the Japanese nation seems to prefer relying, as long as possible, on the protection of the United States, is proof enough that this country, conditioned by Occupation policies, has lost its sense of self-reliance, and that the spirit of independence she once had has been paralyzed.35

Kishi recognized a bipolar world dominated by a rivalry between the socialist and capitalist camps. He considered the balance of power between the two armed blocs and mutual deterrence mainly responsible for the maintenance of world peace. In his view, the strategic realities of the Cold War demanded alignment with the United States. He, therefore, rejected neutralism as an option for Japan: “In the present international circumstances, I don’t think there is any room for ‘neutralism’ to exist.”36 On another occasion, he stated: “Japan will never go communist, or neutralist. We will always be on the side of the free world. We recognize that our own security as a free nation depends upon the security of the free world.”37 Kishi judged the United Nations incapable of functioning as an effective world collective security system. In the context of East Asian security requirements, he believed that only close military cooperation with the United States could provide some measure of security for Japan. He accepted the Japan-U.S. security arrangements as imperative to the defense of Japan’s core national interests, particularly at a time when there existed constitutional inhibitions upon extensive rearmament and strong popular sentiment even against the modest Self-Defense Forces. Prime Minister Kishi attached special importance to Asia, especially Southeast Asia, because of its economic potential and because it was an area where Japan could potentially reassert its leadership and play a preeminent role in her quest for enhancing her status in international society. On the importance of Japan’s ties with Asia, Kishi stated in the Diet, in May 1957: “Japan, as a nation of Asia, is closely linked to these countries geographically, historically and culturally. Without peace and prosperity in Asia, there is no hope of prosperity for Japan. The establishment of amicable and neighborly

35 Ibid. 36 Ibid., p. 287. 37 Prime Minister Kishi's speech at National Press Club, Washington, June 21, 1957. “Documentary Material,” Contemporary Japan, Vol. XXV, No. 1, Sept. 1957, p. 164.

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relations between Japan and the nations of Asia is the keynote of my Government’s foreign policy.”38 Kishi believed that Japan should help create a prosperous Asia, free from the domination of the Soviet Union and China. He was convinced that an anti­ communist system should be established in East Asia with Japan playing a leading role in it. He even seemed to envision the development of Japan’s military ties with the region in a joint effort to prevent the Communist takeover of Asia.39 Kishi proposed closer relations with the region using American aid to Asia through ties with Japanese industry. His proposal for a Southeast Asian development fund, for example, reflected his desire for Japan to play a leading role in promoting economic development and regional integration. Japan was to provide industrial and technical assistance to the region with funds to be provided by the United States.40 A “special” relationship with Southeast Asia was needed for Japan’s larger role as a regional leader. The regional component of the environment in Kishi’s images was of instrumental relevance: Japan’s leadership role in East Asia was perceived as necessary to the revision of the security treaty. Kishi later recalled: To bring about peace and prosperity in Asia was to contribute to peace in the world, and, as an Asian state... Japan found itself in a position where it had to display positive Asian diplomacy. In order to achieve this [objective], I thought it was necessary to understand the situations of developing countries, to meet leaders of each country, and to find out what their goals are, what wishes they have, and what they disapprove of. I believed that entering into the talks with the United States based on such knowledge and experience would make [my] visit to the United States more fruitful. My consideration was that by building up Japan’s position in Asia, or, in other words, making Japan stand out as the center of Asia, my position in the talks with Eisenhower for more equal Japan-U.S. relations would be strengthened.41

Kishi perceived military capability in instrumental terms: He believed that only through the expansion of an indigenous defense capability could Japan gain the U.S. agreement to the revision of the security treaty it desired - a fact 38 Quoted in Kurzman, 1960, p. 317. 39 Welfield, 1988, p. 121. 40 Kishi, 1983, pp. 319-312. 41 Ibid., p. 312.

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of life confirmed in the talks with American Secretary of State Dulles in 1955.42 Moreover, expansion of the Japanese military was viewed as a means of attaining his goal of true independence. Kishi was also aware of the growing evidence of dissatisfaction with the existing security treaty among the Japanese people. This image component was evident in the following passage from his memoirs: “I deeply sensed that the desire for the revision [of the security treaty] was the opinion of the Japanese people at large including the opposition parties.”43 Kishi knew that the movements against the 1951 security treaty were rapidly gaining strength in the country. As Packard put it, “Kishi, with the unerring political instincts that had taken him to the Prime Ministership, sensed the size and the strength of the public mood.”44 Moreover, he perceived that the maintenance of a huge American garrison in Japan was a source of friction between the American troops and the local population and that only through indigenous remilitarization could such frictions be removed. Thus in his discussions with American Secretary of State Dulles in June 1957, Kishi requested withdrawal of U. S. forces from Japan in return for Japanese rearmament.45 The demand by the Socialists for some form of revision in the 1951 security treaty was perceived by Kishi, but was of marginal importance to him. When the decisions on treaty revision were being made, opinion among the Socialists had not yet crystallized around clear ways to deal with the existing security treaty and administrative agreement. Kishi recalled that the Socialists, at the beginning of his administration, did not voice opposition to the idea of treaty revision.46 Fujiyama later acknowledged that the Socialists did not press for the abrogation of the 1951 agreement: “Until I went [to the United States] to meet Dulles, the Socialist Party advocated the treaty revision.”47 The arguments of the Socialists in the Diet, according to Kishi’s recollection, centered on whether the government had the political courage to seek revisions of the security treaty in face of expected U.S. opposition. It was only at later stages that the Socialists took an unyielding stand against treaty 42 Hara, 1988, p. 110. 43 Kishi, 1983, p. 298. 44 Packard, 1966, p. 45. 45 Documentary Material, “Text of the Japan-United States Joint Communique, Issued on the Occasion o f Prime Minister Kishi's Visit to Washington, June 22, 1957,” Contemporary Japan, Vol. XXV, No. 1, September 1957, pp. 166-168. 46 Kishi, Yatsugi and Ito, 1981, p. 235: Kishi, 1983, pp. 296-298. 47 Hara's interview with Fujiyama on September 1, 1980. See Hara, 1988, p. 245.

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revision.48 In his perception, that shift was a product of Soviet and Chinese influence on the Socialists. Thus in a reply to a question “What were the reasons for the change in the position of the Socialist Party?” Kishi remarked: “I think that shift was due not only to the change in the thinking of the Socialist Party itself but also to the influence of Communist China and the Soviet Union. At that time, Communist China and the Soviet Union opposed treaty revision because they feared that U.S.-Japanese relations would be equal and strengthened.”49 The strategic decision to seek a total revision in the form of a new security treaty was primarily motivated by Kishi’s desire to educate and stimulate public interest in the issue of national defense and security.50 Kishi felt that only by seeking a new treaty could he make the Japanese people aware of the country’s defense and security requirements. The Prime Minister acknowledged in an interview many years later that he was disturbed by the lack of interest on the part of the Japanese people in the issue of national defense.51 Against the background of this lack of security concern, he felt it necessary to stimulate an open debate on the matter. “In the postwar period, the Japanese people had become very indifferent to the question of national defense. Such a phenomenon does probably not exist in any other country of the world. The security treaty revision would give rise to heated debates from various quarters." Kishi hoped that "such debates would heighten public interest in the question of national defense and make the people understand that for Japan, as an independent state, it would be of great significance to have a defense in order to protect its independence.”52 Kishi saw an open debate on defense and security as a means of getting people used to accepting one of his major objectives, constitutional revision. This was consistent with his belief that the constitution, particularly the provisions forbidding rearmament, be revised so that Japan could attain true independence. Kishi believed that Japan’s participation in any collective security arrangements on the basis of true mutuality would be inconsistent with the pacifist constitution. By allowing an open debate, he hoped to steer the public opinion toward acceptance of a constitutional revision, thereby making it possible for Japan to have a true military force. That was, in turn, 48 Kishi, Yatsugi and Ito, 1981, p. 235: Hara, 1988, p. 116. 49 Kishi, Yatsugi and Ito, 1981, pp. 235-236. 50 Hara, 1988, pp. 183-184. 51 Ibid., pp. 229-230. 52 Ibid.

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perceived as vital to the realization of his vision about a new Japan in a true partnership in the alliance relationship within a genuinely equal and mutual security arrangement with the United States.53 Kishi made his own position clear later when he, in an interview, remarked that “if Japan was to strive for an equal, mutual security treaty between Japan and the United States in the true sense of the term, or to put it shortly, a treaty of the mutual assistance type, I thought the existing constitution was unsuitable and should, therefore, be amended... I was prepared to instill through education and propaganda a consciousness among the people that a constitutional revision was necessary and that the constitution should and would have to be revised.”54 Prime Minister Kishi perceived political structure in instrumental terms: the stability of Japan’s political structure was necessary to revise the security treaty making Japan an equal partner in the alliance. He believed that a strong, stable conservative government capable of fending off the challenge of the Socialists and Communists would permit Japan to bargain with the US government from a position of strength. Japan, for the first time since the war, had the basis for a stable government capable of carrying out revision of the U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty. This view is compatible with the constant core of his political philosophy: politics is about power. The perceptual link between the creation of a strong government and the revision of the security treaty was evident in Kishi’s remarks to Secretary Dulles during the meetings on June 20, 1957: The Japanese Prime Minister stated that the unification of the conservatives would make it possible to put Japanese-U.S. relations on a more equal basis by reviewing the security treaty from 1951.55

Tactical Decision 2 The tactical decision was made by the cabinet headed by Prime Minister Sato Eisaku. While all 19 ministers were high-policy decision-makers, pre-eminent influence lay with the Prime Minister. There were also other ministers with substantial influence as regards foreign and security policy, notably Foreign Minister Aichi Kiichi, one of Sato’s most trusted confidants. In foreign policy, the Prime Minister frequently sought assistance and advice from Aichi.56 The 53 Hara, 1988, p. 184. 54 Hara's interview with Kishi conducted on January 30, 1981. See Hara, 1988, p. 184. 55 Ibid., p. 118. 56 Fukui, 1975, p. 120; Destler et al, 1979, p. 42.

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centrality of Prime Minister Sato in the decision-making structure renders his attitudinal prism and perceptions the most relevant. Since all principal decision-makers during the period under study placed primary importance on the maintenance of close and friendly ties with the United States and agreed on how to handle the 1960 security treaty after the expiration of the initial 10year term, the relevant images of the high policy-making elite can be ascertained mainly through an analysis of Sato’s values and images. Sato was the proud continuator of the Yoshida path in foreign and security policy. Sato’s view of world politics, its characteristics and structure, was essentially in a ‘realist’ philosophical tradition. He seemed to believe that the international system had no common authority endowed with means of coercion. Conflicts arise from the contradictions between the irreconcilable aspirations of different states. Sato held the view that the only way to ensure a state of relative peace in a world characterized by the confrontation between the two contending blocs was to maintain a balance of power. The constant threat of conflict and war imposes the need for a credible defense, one that ensures every means of protection. Japan’s decision-makers judged that so long as international tensions exist and the United Nations is incapable of functioning as an effective world collective security system for maintaining peace and stability, Japan will complement its own self-defense efforts with the Japanese-U.S. Security Treaty. This is evident from the following passages in Sato’s policy speech to the Diet in January 1969: ...the basic trends in international politics remain unchanged. The two major camps with different ideologies coexist under their respective collective security systems and world peace is being maintained ultimately by the balance o f power between these two camps although with the passage o f time there arise from time to time dissensions and conflicts o f opinions within each bloc. We should do well not to overlook this stem reality. In order to ensure, in such an international environment, the existence and prosperity o f our country which is poor in natural resources, it is essential that peace and security be maintained not only in our country itself but also in the areas around it. The Government has hitherto succeeded in deterring threats and conflicts in advance by gradually building up and improving its self-defense capability in consonance with the national capacity and also through the JapanUnited States security system. That our country’s security has thus been maintained until today and prosperity has been achieved is an incontrovertible fact that no one can deny. I am confident that the people will not fail to extend their strong support

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Empirical Analysis to the Government’s policy o f continuing to firmly maintain the Japan-United States security system.57

One further example of Sato’s perceptions of the external environment and his conception of Japan’s security in its global context is found in the Prime Minister’s reply to an interpellator from Japan’s Socialist Party in the regular session of the Lower House on January 30, 1969: The Government strongly desires the arrival o f eternal peace which is the ideal of our country’s constitution. However, the current international situation with the events in Czechoslovakia and the Middle East reveal that threats to the security o f a nation might happen any time. Since the United Nations’ security arrangements are not satisfactory, all countries are making appropriate defense efforts. However, under the present international situation, there is almost no country which could assure its security by independent efforts and a large number o f countries in the world depend on collective security systems...our conception o f defense differs fundamentally from that o f the Socialist Party. While we base our position on the premise that we make defense efforts commensurate to our national capability and prevent conflicts by the Japan-U.S. security system, the Socialist Party’s posture is based on the premise that [Japan] would be dragged into a war. In the past 11 years, Japan, under the Japan-U.S. security system, has not been dragged into a war. On the contrary, [Japan] could achieve splendid economic development under this system... On the basis o f this historical fact, the Government, for the time being, intends to maintain the Japan-U.S. security system.58

Sato perceived the maintenance of peace and security in East Asia as vital to Japan’s own security. This regional dimension of the external environment is evident from the following passage in his speech to the Diet on December 1, 1969: As I have repeatedly stated, the security of our country cannot be adequately maintained without international peace and security in the Far East. In particular the security o f our neighbor countries such as Republic o f Korea and Republic of China is a matter of serious concern in connection with our own security.59

57 Gaimusho: Gaimusho Press Releases 1969, p. 2. 58 Shugiin, Shugiin kaigiroku, 61th Diet, No. 4, January 30, 1969, pp. 5-6. 59 Gaimusho, Gaimusho Press Releases, 1969, p. 63.

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Prime Minister Sato attached special importance to security. He frankly acknowledged this five months after he left his office in an interview: “...the keynote of politics is how to maintain the security of a nation state. At least, I think I have conducted my politics with such belief.”60 The goal of government, Sato continued, should be to realize Japan’s “complete security.” In order to safeguard Japan’s security “it is necessary to take measures doubly and trebly.” In his view, the strengthening of the Self-Defense Forces would be one measure and the maintenance of the security treaty with the United States another. He also held the idea that Japan’s security could be enhanced by means of non-aggression pacts with China and the Soviet Union.61 In the same interview, Sato remarked that he was greatly impressed by the political leaders he met, especially Charles de Gaulles, Harold Wilson and John F. Kennedy. In his view, it was their deep concern with the issue of national defense and security that strengthened his beliefs. Important components for Prime Minister Sato were relations with the United States, security and prosperity The three were inextricably intertwined in his perceptions. He believed the national interest of Japan to be predominantly the preservation of stable and amiable ties with the United States, which more than anything else could provide Japan with ultimate military protection and economic prosperity.62That the maintenance of close relations with the United States was the fundamental prerequisite for Japan’s economic prosperity and sense of national security was a view widely held within the Japanese high-policy elite. The Government, immediately after the cabinet decision on June 22, 1970, stated: “That the nation has enjoyed peace in the turbulence of the world today and that it has achieved an unprecedented economic prosperity and improvement in the people’s living bear out the wisdom of the national choice thus made on the course of external policy.”63 One important aspect of this perceptual link between the security treaty and the economy was the recognition that Japan had prospered in the postwar period because of the absence of heavy military spending. Japan’s decision­ makers believed that the nation had been able to sustain a high rate of economic growth because the Japan-U.S. security setup had made it feasible for Japan to expend only a small percentage of its GNP on defense.

60 Sato (Eisaku), 1973, p. 150. 61 Ibid., p. 150. 62 Ibid. 63 For the full English text o f the government statement, see The Japan Times, June 23,1970.

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The existence of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty was seen as an effective measure to protect Japan’s security. Sato and other decision-makers had repeatedly maintained that the treaty and the protection afforded by the American nuclear umbrella had enabled Japan to stay out of wars. In a Diet interpellation on January 30 1969, for example, Prime Minister Sato argued that thanks to the security pact, Japan had not once been dragged into a war.6* One more illustration will suffice. Sato stated in an address to the Diet on January 27, 1969: The Government has hitherto succeeded in deterring threats and conflicts in advance by gradually building up and improving its self-defense capability in consonance with the national capacity and also through the Japan-United States security system. That our country’s security has thus been maintained until today and prosperity has been achieved is an incontrovertible fact that no one can deny.6465

The attitudinal prisms of Prime Minister Sato and other government leaders were pervaded with the “lessons of the 1960 treaty revision crisis.” There can be little doubt that they thought of the decision situation in terms of that legacy. Within that prism, the focus was on the possible impact on Japan’s political structure: Sato and his government feared massive demonstrations, disruptions, and a general strike which would paralyze the country and its political system. They were convinced that Japan must not be wracked by the kind of internal dissidence and turmoil that eventually forced Sato’s brother and predecessor, Kishi, to resign. Having played a part in the decision process of the 1960 security treaty, Sato was determined to avoid a replay of the political crisis. This was one important reason why they shied away from a revision of the security treaty in June 1970 when the treaty became eligible for further negotiations. Hayasaka Shigezo, a secretary to Tanaka Kakuei, then Secretary General of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, wrote: “Prime Minister Sato and Secretary General Tanaka, judging that it would cause great turmoil within the country if the Government submitted a proposal for ‘fixed period of extension’ to the Diet, decided to firmly maintain the Japan-U.S. security system by an ‘automatic continuation’.”66 Japanese public opinion also played a role in shaping the Sato government’s decision. Sato acknowledged in an interview in 1974 that, while he was Prime 64 Shugiin kaigiroku, No. 4, January 30, 1969, p. 6. See also Ibid., p. 32. 65 Gaimusho: Gaimusho Press Releases, 1969, p. 2. 66 Hayasaka, 1987, p. 227.

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Minister, he read and cared about the results of public opinion surveys.67 Hence, Prime Minister Sato could assert that he would count on the Japanese people’s voice, as reflected in his party’s success in the general election of December 1969 as an endorsement of the security treaty. In his address to the Diet on February 14, 1970, Prime Minister Sato stated: I firmly believe that, as is clear from the results o f the recent general election, there is a wide national consensus for the policy o f augmenting our national self-defense capabilities in accordance with our national power and circumstances, and o f complementing our insufficiencies by the United States-Japan Treaty o f Mutual Security based on the fundamental attitude o f preserving liberty and peace.68

6.3 Decision Process and Implementation

Tactical Decision 1 and Strategic Decision The roots of the treaty revision issue lie in the terms of the U.S.-Japanese security treaty concluded during the American Occupation of Japan. Since economic, constitutional, and political considerations placed limits on Japan’s defense capability, the Japanese government favored primary dependence on the United States for security through formal arrangements. The concept was incorporated in the bilateral security treaty with the United States signed in 1951 simultaneously with the San Francisco Peace Treaty that restored Japan’s sovereignty. The administrative agreement, the operative part of the U.S.Japan Security Treaty, was signed two months before the peace and security treaties went into effect.69 The 1951 security arrangements were to become the foundation of Japan’s national security.

67 Sato Eisaku's interview with Endo Shusaku in Shukan Asahi, April 26, 1974, pp. 140-141. Cited in Watanabe, 1977, p. 106. 68 Gaimusho, Gaimusho Press Releases, 1970, p. 4. 69 It was signed on February 28, 1952. For the details o f the negotiations on the Administrative Agreement, see Foreign Relations o f the United States, 1952-1954, Vol. 14, pp. 1095-1208

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The Japanese negotiated the security treaty with the understanding that it was provisional and would be replaced by a treaty with greater mutuality. Prime Minister Yoshida acknowledged the provisional character of the security arrangements with the United States.70 The Japanese dissatisfaction with the 1951 U. S.- Japanese Security Treaty was articulated from its very inception and grew as time went by. It was concluded when Japan was under American occupation and came to be regarded as a legacy of occupation that had to be changed in accordance with Japan’s new national status. The major source of dissatisfaction was that the treaty lacked explicit provisions for mutuality. Prime Minister Yoshida wrote on his notion of mutuality in security: Obviously, since Japan possessed next to nothing in the way o f armament, there could be no equality in that respect: the nation whose security was to be guaranteed was Japan, while that country herself could do nothing to guarantee the security o f the United States. But if the United States, with her immense economic and military power, and Japan, completely at her disposal, were to co-operate in the defence of Japan as part o f the defence o f the free world, it would be for the benefit o f both countries and of the entire free world also.71

As noted earlier, there were a number of provisions in the original security treaty that were seen as unequal. In more specific terms, the first of the important objections to the treaty was that the United States had, under Article I, the right to dispose her forces in Japan, but assumed no explicit obligation to defend Japan. Second, the treaty had not stipulated any expiration date. Third, since the treaty had no provision for prior consultation with the Japanese government for any deployment of American forces outside Japan, Japan could be drawn into a war against its will. Fourth, Article I of the treaty stipulated that the U.S. forces may be used to put down large-scale internal disturbances in Japan if requested by the Japanese government. This the Japanese felt to be humiliating, fearing that it would invite U.S. interference in domestic affairs. Fifth, the treaty contained no provision on the part of the United States to abide by the U.N. Charter in acting under the Security Treaty. Finally, there was no explicit provision in the treaty to prevent Japan-based American forces from being equipped with nuclear weapons. 70 See Y oshida's policy speech in the Diet on October 12 1951, Naikaku Kanbo (ed.), Naikaku soridaijin enzetsu shu, 1965, p. 531. 71 Yoshida, 1961, p. 266.

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The demand for treaty revision was gradually gaining strength in the country. Underlying this demand was a mood of rising nationalist sentiments. The presence of American bases and troops, which, in Japanese eyes, came to represent an extension of the occupation, irritated the nationalists. Treaty revision was tied in the public mind with the search for true independence after the end of the Occupation. The 1951 Security Treaty, they claimed, placed Japan in a position of subservience vis-a-vis the United States. Dissatisfaction with the treaty and the government’s subservient posture toward the United States continued to grow and came under criticism from both the right and left wing forces: the right wing objected to the security treaty of 1951 because of its unilateral character, considering it unbecoming for a sovereign state; the left wing, advocating neutralism, objected to any military relationship with the leading protagonist of the Cold War, feeling that it would result in Japan being involved in a war against its will. In short, the presence of U.S. troops and rising nationalism created pressures against the existing treaty. The idea of a revision of the 1951 security pact as a step toward true independence received one of its earliest articulations in February 1952. It was one of the central items on the conservative Reformist Party’s agenda. In November 1954, this objective was also embodied in the platform of the newly formed Japan Democratic Party.72 When the Democrats first came into power in December 1954, the new Prime Minister, Hatoyama Ichiro, put a treaty revision at the top of his urgent issues. It was desired by the new government as a step toward the attainment of true independence. According to Kishi, the first proposal for revision of the security treaty was initiated by the Japanese government in 1955 under Prime Minister H atoyam a.73 In late August, Foreign Minister Shigemitsu Mamoru, accompanied by Kishi Nobusuke, Secretary-General of the ruling Democratic Party, and Kono Ichiro, Minister of Agriculture and Forestry, was dispatched to Washington to clarify Japan’s new Soviet Policy and to discuss the JapaneseU.S. relations. Since a revision of the 1951 U.S.-Japan security pact was to be one of the central items on the mission’s agenda, Shigemitsu, in advance of the trip to Washington, ordered a study on revision. The central question for the Treaty Bureau of the Foreign Ministry and Shigemitsu was how to develop effective arguments in support of treaty revision. Both Foreign Minister 72 Yuhikaku, Nihon no anzen hosho, 1973, pp. 175-176. 73 Kishi recalled: “I think it was Shigemitsu who first suggested it [revision o f the security treaty] to the American side.” Kishi, Yatsugi and Ito, 1981, p. 233.

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Shigemitsu and Treaty Bureau chief Shimoda acted on the premise that Japan should seek a total revision of the security treaty rather than piecemeal modifications. By late August a position paper was ready to be taken to Washington by the Foreign Minister for the forthcoming meetings with John Foster Dulles.74 The paper was not checked out at home for its soundness or its acceptability. In fact, there had been no discussion within the government about Shigemitsu’s formula for revision. Kono and Kishi were not briefed on the contents of the paper until the day before the Shigemitsu-Dulles meeting. Although both Kishi and Kono were in principle favorable to the idea of treaty revision, they felt that the proper groundwork was not laid with party leaders.75 The Foreign Minister, reading from an English text, stated that the antiAmerican sentiments in Japan were due to the “unequal treaty” and that treaty revision would be necessary for the conservatives to win elections and to control communist influence in Japan.76 Dulles did not agree, and he told the Japanese Foreign Minister, “I don’t think Japan’s anti-American forces would subside by changing the security treaty.” Dulles then criticized the Japanese government indirectly of being “soft” on the left-wing elements in the country by stating that Konrad Adenauer in West Germany and Ramon Magsaysay in Philippines were effective in turning back the revolutionary challenge.77 To support the case for revision, Shigemitsu outlined to the U.S. Secretary of State that his government planned to increase the Self-Defense Ground Forces from 150,000 men to 180,000 men by 1958.78 The American response to the Japanese plea for treaty revision was disappointing. Dulles flatly rejected the idea of treaty revision on the grounds that Japan had no sufficient defense capability. Referring to the Vandenberg resolution, the American Secretary of State pointed out that if Japan wanted to replace the present treaty with one of greater mutuality, it would have to strengthen its defense capability sufficiently to not only defend herself against an enemy invasion, but also to share with the United States the burden of maintaining regional security. Regarding the question of Japanese participation in regional defense, Dulles observed that Japan could not assume responsibility 74 Hara, 1988, pp. 82-87. 75 Kono, 1957, pp. 95-96. 76 Hara, 1988, p. 82; Kono, 1957, p. 96; Kishi, 1983, p. 192. 77 Hara, 1988, p. 82. 78 Ibid., pp. 91-92.

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for regional defense under the present constitution that barred her from sending troops overseas.79 Although Shigemitsu was not successful in his efforts to persuade Dulles on the question of treaty revision, they agreed upon the following joint statement on August 31, 1955: It was agreed that efforts should be made, whenever practicable on a cooperative basis, to establish conditions such that Japan could, as rapidly as possible, assume prime responsibility for the defense o f its homeland and be able to contribute to the preservation o f international peace and security in the Western Pacific. It was also agreed that when such conditions were brought about it would be appropriate to replace the present security treaty with one o f greater mutuality.80

The Shigemitsu-Dulles Joint Communique was an ambiguous document, subject to differing interpretations. Both conservative and socialist opposition politicians reacted strongly against it, and they launched an intense campaign to denounce the Hatoyama government for violating the constitution by agreeing to the “Western Pacific” commitment. From the viewpoint of the opposition parties, the communique hinted that Japan would have to assume a military role in the Western Pacific, in collaboration with the United States, in return for an American promise to renegotiate the terms of the Security Treaty.81 In the face of opposition, Foreign Minister Shigemitsu was forced to retreat from the commitment contained in the communique by explaining in the Diet and to the press that Japan had assumed no military obligations beyond its own territories. Although the 1955 meetings between Foreign Minister Shigemitsu and Secretary of State Dulles did not produce any momentous movement toward treaty revision, the situation was not entirely stagnant. The joint communique at least cleared the way for an understanding between Tokyo and Washington that the main condition for the revision of the security treaty would be an increase of Japan’s defense capability. The revision question lay dormant for the next two years, and there was no discussion between the two governments in regard to the revision of the security treaty. Things had slowly begun to loosen up on the issue with the election of the Kishi government in 1957. In the meantime, pressure in Japan 79 Kishi, 1983, pp. 192-205; Hara, 1988, pp. 82-85. 80 Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 33, No. 846, September 12, 1955, pp. 419-20. 81 Hara,1988, pp. 84-85.

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for changes in the security treaty mounted as the results of growing nationalism and tensions between the Japanese people and U.S. forces stationed in Japan. To many Japanese, the 1951 security treaty represented a symbol of subordination to the United States. The continued presence of American troops on Japanese soil, a discomforting reminder of the occupation period, and many incidents involving U.S. forces stationed in Japan brought about strong feelings of resentment among the Japanese people. Such tensions were slowly being transformed into movements against the existing security arrangement with the United States. The “base problems” helped the opposition parties to sow discontent with the existing treaty. The security treaty became a target for opposition attacks in January and February 1957. The Socialists, in both Diet debates and in public speeches, pointed out that it was the “unequal treaty” which created the base problems and urged the government to seek revisions in the security treaty. For example, Socialist Party Secretary-General Asanuma Inejiro, referring to such incidents, said on February 22, 1957: “How can we call Japan an independent country? The cause of such incidents is the unequal treaty.”82 By Spring 1957, highly vocal publics had made their demand for changes in the treaty known. As noted previously, the treaty was attacked by groups of academics and “men of culture.” They sought to influence the government through public expressions of their views. More than 500 such intellectuals issued a statement on February 28 calling for a fundamental reexamination of the security treaty and administrative agreement.83 Kishi, representing the government, did not publicly commit himself to the treaty revision at this stage, although it was definitely on Kishi’s own agenda. During the Diet debate of February 4 1957, Kishi, who was then acting Prime Minister and Foreign Minister under the government of Ishibashi Tanzan, stated that the time was not right for seeking treaty revision, but the government would consider it when Japan improved its defense situation sufficiently.84 Four days later, Kishi emphasized in the Diet debate that it

82 Ibid., p. 115. 83 Ibid. 84 Ibid., pp. 113-114.

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would be necessary to make adequate preparations before Japan could seek treaty revision.85 The Ishibashi government (December 1956 - February 1957) did not commit itself to support of the treaty revision. It was taken up once more by the Japanese government when Kishi Nobusuke took the office of Prime Minister on February 25, 1957. He declared his foreign policy objectives to be: (1) to move toward close and firm relations with the United States, relations which had previously been strained by Japan’s rapprochement with the Soviet Union and the Peoples Republic of China; and (2) to put U.S.Japanese relations on a more equal basis by revising the 1951 security treaty. Kishi recognized immediately that treaty revision would be the major task of his government and began an examination of possible new moves on the issue, ordering the Foreign Ministry to study how the 1951 security arrangement would be revised. A small working team of three officials was formed in the ministry for the task. With the formation of this special study group, Prime Minister Kishi began to deal in earnest with the question. The group reasoned that a new mutual defense treaty would have difficulty obtaining ratification in the U.S. Senate. In recognition of this problem, Foreign Ministry officials favored tackling the treaty revision issue in the form of side agreements which did not require Senate approval. In other words, instead of amending the treaty itself, they thought of supplementing the treaty with several side agreements. The prior consultation of the Japanese government for the use of U.S. forces in Japan was one of the points emphasized in the study. Concerned with the possibility that the Japanese “antiU.S. bases” sentiments might turn into anti-U.S. feeling, the study recommended the reduction in the number of U.S. bases in Japan and the withdrawal of American ground combat forces from Japan.86 On March 14, the Prime Minister met U.S. ambassador to Japan Douglas MacArthur II, and communicated his intent to visit the U.S. to discuss the revision of the security treaty and other pending problems between Tokyo and Washington. They held at least seven formal meetings before Kishi left for Washington. The American Ambassador kept Secretary of State Dulles informed of his talks with the Japanese Prime Minister and several times put his views on the security questions into memorandum form. The main topic of 85 See Prime Minister Kishi's response at the House o f Representatives Committee on the Budget on February 8, 1957, in Yoshihara and Kubo, 1971, pp. 604-605. See also Hara, 1988, pp. 114-115. 86 Hara, 1988, pp. 107-108.

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the Kishi-MacArthur talks was, according to Kishi, the revision of the security treaty.87 Apparently, Kishi was not at all prepared to discuss with Ambassador MacArthur a new treaty of mutual defense at this early stage of the decision process, because he believed that Washington was not ready for such an alternative and that he had to develop a convincing case for it. The situation that had been laid out in the Foreign Ministry’s study was the basis for his perception of the problem. The study influenced Kishi’s thinking on the alternative ways of revision. Thus, in line with the Foreign Ministry’s view, the Prime Minister outlined his preference for piecemeal modifications of the treaty in the form of supplementary agreements rather than a completely new treaty.88 On April 19, 1957, the Prime Minister raised the issue of treaty revision in public for the first time. He told the Diet: “I believe the time has come to fully examine the security treaty and administrative agreement.”89 In the meantime, Kishi, known for his penchant for meticulous planning, was carefully and diligently preparing the groundwork for his forthcoming trip to Washington. In fact, the Kishi administration had paid far more attention to preparations for treaty revision than did the Hatoyama government. Remembering Secretary of State Dulles’ cold response to Foreign Minister Shigemitsu’s request for revision of the security treaty in August 1955, Kishi approached this issue cautiously in public statements.90 He had not spoken much on the security revision issue before the tactical decision. Moreover, he did not commit himself to a definite course of action before he made certain that it was the safest and most profitable. On the basis of Shigemitsu’s talks with Secretary of State Dulles in August 1955, Kishi knew that the Americans would not agree to treaty revision unless Japan increased its defense capability. On May 20, the Basic Policy of National Defense was approved by the National Defense Council and the cabinet. It formulated the objective of national defence as “to prevent direct and indirect aggression and, once invaded, to repel such aggression, thereby preserving the independence and peace of Japan founded upon democratic principles.” To achieve this objective, the basic policy stated:

87 Ibid., p. 106. 88 Ibid., pp. 106-108. 89 Ibid., p. 117. 90 Kishi, 1983, p. 298.

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1. To support the action o f the United Nations, to promote international cooperation, and to achieve world peace. 2. To firmly establish the necessary basis to stabilize people’s livelihood, increase their patriotism, and guarantee the security o f the state. 3. To gradually build up effective forces to provide the minimum degree o f defense necessary in accord with national strength and national sentiment. 4. Until the United Nations is able to acquire the ability to effectively stop external aggression, to deal with it on the basis o f the security system with the United States.91

In order to implement this policy, the National Defense Council, on June 14, and the Cabinet, on the same day, approved the First Defense Buildup Plan for the three year period 1958-60 after much infighting between the Defense Agency and the Ministry of Finance over budget appropriation. Under the defense plan, the Self-Defense Ground Force would be increased to 180,000, the total tonnage of vessels in the Self-Defense Maritime Force would be 124,000 tons, and the Self-Defense Air Force would have 1,300 planes.92 Both the basic defense policy and the defense plan were intended to convince the U.S. of Japan’s efforts to increase defense capability in view of Kishi’s forthcoming visit to Washington.93 Before the Washington trip, the Prime Minister had expended considerable effort to convince the United States of his own commitment to Japan’s rearmament and a close U.S.-Japanese alliance. In fact, in his talks with MacArthur, Kishi requested that the American Ambassador inform Washington of the scope of Japan’s efforts toward rearmament.94 On April 19, as part of the preparations for revision of the security treaty, Kishi declared his intent to visit several Southeast Asian countries. The primary motive behind his trip was to strengthen Japan’s bargaining position in the forthcoming talks with the American leaders. Thus it was a tactical step toward effecting revision of the security treaty. The Japanese Prime Minister was convinced that, because Japan had the region’s only significantly industrialized economy, she would have to assume the major responsibility for East Asia’s economic development. In the process of assuming this 91 Langdon, 1973, p. 37. 92 Asagumo Shimbunsha, Nihon no Anzen hosho, 1973, pp. 171-172. See also Hara, 1988, p. 110. 93 Hara, 1988, p. 110. 94 Ibid.

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responsibility, Kishi believed, Japan could reassert its leadership in the region. Kishi proposed a Southeast Asian development fund to promote regional integration that would be based on massive American coordinated aid to Asia, “particularly through linkage with Japanese industrial techniques.”95 The underlying purpose of such a fund was also to counteract the SovietChinese Communist thrust into Southeast Asia and thereby contribute to the strengthening of the free world. Kishi states: “If this idea had materialized, Japan’s leadership in Southeast Asia would have been established... Moreover, Communist China’s and the Soviet Union’s influence in Southeast Asia would have diminished and the position of the free world have been strengthened.”96 In July 1957, an emissary of Prime Minister Kishi arrived in Washington to make arrangements for the upcoming visit by the Japanese Prime Minister. He met with Clarence Randall, the chairman of the Council on Foreign Economic Policy and discussed Japan’s plan for the economic integration of Southeast Asia. The Japanese emissary, indicating that neither the United States nor Japan was “well liked in the area,” took up the question of a joint JapaneseAmerican venture in Southeast Asia “to prove [Washington and Tokyo’s] good intentions.”97 Although Kishi strongly promoted the idea, it was premature because Southeast Asia was not eager for Japanese leadership. There were political obstacles to regional economic integration. The countries of nonCommunist Asia feared that Japan would dominate any regional economic scheme. With memories of World War II still fresh in their minds, Southeast Asian countries were reluctant to establish economic ties with Japan. Moreover, they feared that their own interests would be dwarfed by Japan supported by the United States.98 Prime Minister Kishi set out on his visit to Washington (June 19-21) in an effort to secure a positive American response regarding the revision of the treaty. The mood of the talks was cordial. The Eisenhower administration showed a much greater understanding toward Kishi’s ambitions on this matter

95 Ibid., p. 111. For the contents o f Kishi's proposal for a Southeast Asia economic development fund, see “Memorandum from the Japanese Government to the United States Government, Department of State, Washington, June 20, 1957,” FRUS, 1955-1957, Vol. 21, 1990, pp. 356-358. See also Kishi, 1983, pp. 319-320. 96 Kishi, 1983, p. 320. 97 Kaufman, 1990, p. 115. 98 For US reaction to Kishi's plan for Asian economic development fund, see “Circular Telegram from the Department o f State to Certain Diplomatic Missions, Washington, October 11, 1957,” FRUS, 1955-1957, Vol. 21, 1990, pp. 398-399.

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than it had shown two years earlier. Kishi had succeeded in portraying himself and his government as the guarantors of a close alignment with the United States. MacArthur had provided Dulles with a favorable assessment of the Japanese Prime Minister. A week before the Japanese Prime Minister was to arrive in Washington, Dulles, in a memorandum to Eisenhower, wrote that “Mr. Kishi gives every indication of being the strongest government leader to emerge in postwar Japan.”99 Regarding Japan’s quest for revision of the security treaty, Dulles wrote in the same memorandum that “the time has come to take the initiative in proposing a readjustment of our relations with Japan and to suggest to Mr. Kishi that we work toward a mutual security arrangement which could, we would hope, replace the present security treaty.”100 He also wrote: “this is not the time to negotiate any of the specific provisions of the present treaty... If, however, Prime Minister Kishi concurs in the proposal that we have discussions looking forward to a common objective of a Mutual Security Treaty or some other mutually satisfactory security arrangement, we should be prepared, subsequent to his visit, to hold discussions with him in Tokyo.”101 On June 19, the Japanese Prime Minister met President Eisenhower to discuss the revision issue. Kishi stated that conditions were far different in 1957 than they had been six years earlier, pointing out the increased capability of the Self-Defense Forces and Japan’s admission to the United Nations. He further insisted that under these changed circumstances, the treaty no longer reflected the actual security arrangements that had evolved since 1951 and needed reviewing. He expressed his view that the prior consultation of the Japanese government on the equipment and deployment of U.S. forces stationed in Japan and the expiration date of the treaty be among the main 99 Cited in Aruga, 1989, p. 64. Dulles' high regard for Kishi was also evident in his statement before the ANZUS Council Meeting in Washington on October 4, 1957: “The Secretary stated that we had had a very useful visit to this country by Kishi, who, in his opinion, is the strongest and most competent Prime Minister the Japanese have had since the war.” “United States Minutes o f the ANZUS Council Meeting, Department o f State, Washington, October 4, 1957,” FRUS, 1955-1957, Vol. 21, 1990, p. 381. On another occasion (on June 25, 1957), Dulles remarked: “We all believe that the important thing is to develop a relationship o f real mutuality and real cooperation and our best chance to do that is under the leadership o f the present Prime Minister...in whom we can have confidence and who has a genuine dedication to the principles o f the free world.” Quoted in Aruga, 1989, p. 64. 100 D ulles's memorandum for President Eisenhower dated June 12, 1957. Quoted in Aruga, 1989, p. 64. See also Hara, 1988, pp. 121-122. 101 Aruga, 1989, pp. 77-78.

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points for review. President Eisenhower, on the other hand, countered by stating that treaty revision was premature at the present stage, but raised no objection to its review.102 The following day Kishi met Secretary of State Dulles. The Prime Minister assured Dulles that treaty revision would strengthen the U.S.-Japanese alliance rather than weaken it. He reiterated the argument that changed conditions - the increased defense capability and entry into the UN - made review of the original treaty desirable. Kishi pointed out to Dulles that the first Defense Build-up Plan (1958-61) was approved by the National Defense Council and the Cabinet. Secretary Dulles was ready to concur with most of what Kishi had to say. Dulles’s response was similar to that of the President the previous day: the U.S. would agree in principle to review the treaty.103 Although Dulles was favorable to the idea of a treaty revision, he felt that the issue should also be approached from a military perspective and that the proper base for a treaty revision would have to be laid with military leaders. Dulles was critical of the slow pace of Japan’s self-defense force build-up and emphasized that the Japanese defense capability should be greatly strengthened. He pointed out that Japan had been spending only 2 percent of its GNP on defense while NATO countries had been expending 8-10 percent and the United States 11 percent. On the question of prior consultation, Dulles agreed to the extent that it would apply except in case of emergency. Dulles however, made an important concession: the U.S. would withdraw its ground combat forces from Japan within the next year.104 Both Secretary Dulles and President Eisenhower came to recognize that the 1951 security arrangement was provisional and needed revising, but they did not want to commit themselves to negotiations for treaty revision. The major reason why the Secretary avoided any commitment at this stage was, according to one analyst, that the military’s response on the matter was lukewarm.105 102 Hara, 1988, pp. 117-118. 103 Ibid., p. 118. 104 Ibid., p. 119. Dulles showed his willingness to reduce the US ground forces in Japan as early as May 1955 as evident in his letter to Secretary o f Defense Wilson: “...it is politically desirable that we reduce our forces in Japan as rapidly as military circumstances permit. This is one of the best ways to induce the Japanese to increase their own defense effort, and it tends to reduce the friction which inevitably arises there from the continued presence o f large United States forces after the termination o f the Occupation.” “Letter from the Secretary o f State to the Secretary o f Defense (W ilson), Washington, May 26, 1955,” FRUS, 1955-1957, Vol. 21, 1990, p. 108. 105 Aruga, 1989, p. 78f.

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Although Kishi failed to secure Washington’s explicit commitment to the treaty revision, he was at least able to get the United States to recognize the unilateral character of the security treaty. Dulles frankly acknowledged this at the ANZUS Council meeting held in Washington in October 1957: The treaty is in effect a unilateral one, since it gives the U.S. the right to stay anywhere in Japan, to have bases anywhere and to remain as long as it desires. The U.S. did not undertake to defend Japan; Japan got nothing out o f it. There has been some talk o f replacing the treaty with a more normal security type treaty. Kishi, however, very wisely did not press for this because it would be very difficult for the United States to accede in view of Japan’s constitutional limitations to acceptance o f any military obligations.106

On June 21 Kishi and Eisenhower announced a joint communique proclaiming a “new era” in U.S.-Japan relations. The main points in the communique were: 1. “It was agreed to establish an intergovernmental committee to study problems arising in relation to the security treaty including consultation, whenever practicable, regarding the disposition and employment in Japan by the United States of its forces. The committee will also consult to assure that any action taken under the treaty conforms to the principles of the United Nations Charter.” 2. “The President and the Prime Minister affirmed their understanding that the Security Treaty of 1951 was designed to be transitional in character and not in that form to remain in perpetuity.” 3. “The United States welcomed Japan’s plans for the buildup of her defense forces and accordingly...will substantially reduce the numbers of United States forces in Japan within the next year, including a prompt withdrawal of all United States ground combat forces.”107 The outcome of the Washington talks fell somewhat short of the Japanese Prime Minister’s expectations. Yet, although the communique contained no provisions of great practical importance, it was to Kishi of symbolic value to his attempts to renegotiate the 1951 security arrangement. Washington’s 106 United States Minutes of the ANZUS Council Meeting, Department o f State, Washington, October 4, 1957, FRUS, 1955-1957, Vol. 21, 1990, p. 381. 107 See the full text in U.S. Department of State, “Joint Communique o f June 21, 1957, Issued by President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Kishi,” Department o f State Bulletin, Vol. 37, July 8, 1957, pp. 51-53.

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flexibility in agreeing to a review of the treaty raised Kishi’s hopes for negotiating its revision still higher, even though it was clear that Japan would have to wait another year for such an opportunity to arise. July 1957 to May 22, 1958, following Kishi’s visit to Washington was a gestation period for the revision of the security treaty within the Japanese government. The Joint Japanese-American committee on Security was created on August 6, 1957, to work out more regular security consultation between the two governments.108 Yet the function of the committee was not to prepare the treaty revision. Instead, according to the State Department, it was to discuss “what actions are to be taken or should be taken under the treaty, thus giving the Japanese a feeling that the Treaty is not entirely unilateral and that they are voluntarily participating in its implementation.”109 In fact, as a former high official of the Foreign Ministry recalled, “...the question of the security treaty revision was not discussed by this committee.”110 The general election in May 22 proved satisfactory for the Liberal Democrats and a personal victory for Prime Minister Kishi. With his position definitely strengthened in the party, Kishi and Foreign Minister Fujiyama decided to seek the treaty revision.111 Fujiyama recalled how he felt about the question of treaty revision at the time of tactical decision: A s Foreign Minister I could not help but think that the treaty was a preposterously unequal one, and that it was most peculiar for Japan, seven years after independence, to be in the same situation as it was under the occupation. That is to say, my intention in proceeding with revision o f the security treaty was, if I may em ploy words we often used at the time, to correct occupation policy and occupation administration.112

Fujiyama contacted Ambassador MacArthur and conveyed his and Kishi’s desire to have secret meetings on the issue.113 He also told the American 108 The joint committee was composed o f the Japanese foreign minister, the director general of the defense agency, the U.S. ambassador to Japan, and the commander in chief, Pacific. 109 United States Minutes o f the ANZUS Council Meeting, Department o f State, Washington, October 4, 1957, FRUS, 1955-1957, Vol. 21, 1990, p. 381. 110 Togo, 1982, p. 47. 111 In his memoirs, Fujiyama recalled that he met Prime Minister soon after the general election (May 22, 1958) at the latter's private residence and decided to seek revision o f the 1951 security treaty. Fujiyama, p. 59. See also Uchida, 1972, p. 126: Asahi nenkan, 1959, p. 152. 112 Cited in W elfield, 1988, p. 147. 113 Hara, 1988, p. 167.

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Ambassador that the Japanese Foreign Ministry had already begun preparations for such meetings. Ambassador MacArthur was to play an important role in persuading Washington to respond positively to Kishi’s request for revision. On June 5, he sent a recommendation to Washington that the Japanese request should be met positively. Soon after the May 1958 general election in Japan, MacArthur, who was named Ambassador in late 1956, undertook a personal commitment to work out a solution to the problem of treaty revision. MacArthur was a career official who was well acquainted with the nature of decision-making in Washington and had a friendly relationship with President Eisenhower.114 Ambassador MacArthur played an active role in influencing Washington’s thinking on the issue. He recognized immediately that treaty revision would be the major task of his term in Tokyo. Because of his efforts to present the Japanese point of view to Washington, the U.S. Ambassador’s role in the decision process was important. There can be little doubt that the continuous personal commitment of MacArthur throughout the decision process was vital to the solution of the treaty problem. He made strenuous efforts to persuade United States civil and military officials of the urgency and seriousness of the issue. At times he seemed to choose to assert his authority beyond his capacity as the U.S. Ambassador to Japan and actively pursued discussion of the problem with those at higher levels of authority to ensure that his view would gain some upward momentum. At the same time, he was carefully watching developments in Japanese politics and seeing that the most effective arguments for revision were fully employed within the decision process in Washington. The U.S. Ambassador maintained a close, cooperative working relationship with Prime Minister Kishi throughout the period of his assignment in Japan.115 It was in part thanks to MacArthur that the Eisenhower administration showed a much higher regard for Prime Minister Kishi than it had shown for Yoshida and Hatoyama.

114 Douglas MacArthur II worked as General Eisenhower's expert on France during World War II. In the early 1950s, he worked as counselor and senior staff officer for the State Department on the National Security Council. He managed to maintain close working relationships with both Eisenhower and Dulles. For Douglas MacArthur II's relationship with Eisenhower and Dulles, see Tucker, 1990, pp. 40-41. 115 For MacArthur’s recollection o f his cooperative relationship with the Japanese premier during the crucial stage o f the treaty revision process, see Komori, “Ima akasu 60 nen anpo joyaku kaitei no shinso,” Chuo Koron, November 1981, pp. 180-200.

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Ambassador MacArthur brought the question of treaty revision to the attention of Secretary of State Dulles in a memorandum on June 5. In the memorandum, MacArthur went at great lengths to explain why the United States should respond positively to revision proposals by the Kishi government. He emphasized that the circumstances were ripe for treaty revision and the need for the United States to constructively demonstrate its commitment to a strong alliance with Japan by agreeing to revision. In MacArthur’s view, the compelling political argument that supported the case for reassessment of the security treaty was that Kishi’s leadership in the Japanese political process was strengthened as a result of the LDP’s victory in the general election. If revision was not expeditiously accomplished, Kishi and his supporters, who were most firmly committed to preserving the alliance relationship, would be embarrassed and discredited in the eyes of their opponents and the general public. If the United States were to deny Japan’s quest for equal partnership at this point, it would seriously disrupt the security relationship with Japan.116 MacArthur criticized the discriminatory treatment of Japan and suggested that the United States, in revising the security treaty, should be prepared to give Japan the same treatment as it had given its allies in NATO and SEATO. He suggested two alternative revisions of the treaty: (1) piecemeal adjustments or (2) a new treaty of mutual defense. He expressed his preference for the second alternative, which he was convinced was necessary for the strengthening of relations between the two countries, considering Japanese sensitivity to the unequal nature of existing security arrangements.117 One of the most compelling cases against the first alternative was based on the argument that it would reinforce Japanese “anti-treaty” sentiments promoted by advocates of neutralism. He stressed the need to make Japan a full and equal partner of the United States. Within the Foreign Ministry, a “task force” of six officials was being formed to prepare a recommendation to be presented to the Foreign Minister. In spirit and content, it was very similar to the one prepared by the Ministry officials a year earlier in connection with Kishi’s visit to Washington. The Foreign Ministry was still operating on the assumption that a revision in the form of a new treaty of mutual defense would not be feasible in view of Japan’s constitutional prohibition on the dispatch of Japanese Self-Defense Forces overseas. Consequently, the bulk of the work of the Foreign Ministry 116 Hara, 1988, pp. 166-171. 117 Ibid.

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team centered on supplementing the treaty with several agreements rather than on revising the treaty itself. For Foreign Ministry officials, such piecemeal adjustments of the existing security arrangement would include an American assurance of military cooperation with Japan’s Self-Defense Forces in case of external aggression and an American promise to consult with the Japanese government before undertaking combat operations initiated from Japanese bases and directed outside Japan. Such supplementary agreements, they felt, would be enough to remove basic Japanese grievances. Foreign Minister Fujiyama and his officials felt that this was the maximum Japan could hope to achieve.118 As Fujiyama recalled, “I considered it difficult to seek a new treaty. Therefore, appending notes to the existing treaty or revising it partially was, I thought, about as far as we could go.”119 In his study of the style of Japanese diplomatic negotiations, Michael K. Blaker maintains that Japan expends a comparatively great deal of diplomatic energy on sounding out the other side and exchanging views with them before negotiations begin.120 In a series of secret meetings with the U.S. Ambassador in Japan in the summer of 1958, the Prime Minister sought to elicit Washington’s opinion on treaty revision and to air his views on the issue. Apparently, it was over the course of these informal talks that Kishi and MacArthur privately managed to reach an understanding on how to change the treaty: Kishi’s preference for a completely new treaty was communicated to the Ambassador.121 It was on the basis of this understanding that MacArthur approached the talks with Foreign Minister Fujiyama. Interestingly, Fujiyama was not fully briefed by the Prime Minister about the contents of the KishiMacArthur meetings. The Japanese Foreign Minister, unaware of the Prime Minister’s secret diplomacy, met MacArthur on July 17. The U.S. Ambassador hinted that a favorable response to Japan’s request for a new, mutual security treaty might be forthcoming if she wanted it. It was the first time the Americans officially suggested the possibility of a mutual treaty. Fujiyama apparently did not absorb the hint. On July 30 Fujiyama again met the U.S. Ambassador. At this meeting the Foreign Minister stated that the time had come to discuss questions of security between the two governments in line with the spirit of the Japan U.S. summit meetings last year. He then told the U.S. ambassador that a new 118 Ibid., pp. 180-181; Togo, 1982, 56-59. 119 Hara, 1988, p. 182. 120 Blaker, 1977, pp. 59-60. 121 Hara, 1988, pp. 184-185.

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treaty of mutual defense needed further study. According to one of the Foreign Ministry’s officials present at the meeting, MacArthur pointed out to Fujiyama the two alternative modes of revision: 1) supplementing the existing treaty by several new agreements on specific issues, or 2) a new treaty of greater mutuality compatible with the Japanese Constitution. MacArthur told the Japanese Foreign Minister that he was very much aware of the constitutional prohibition on the dispatch of Japan’s armed forces overseas. He then asked whether the Kishi government would prefer a new treaty if it was possible to come up with such a treaty compatible with the Constitution.122 When MacArthur suggested the second alternative to the Foreign Minister, it came as a surprise.123 The reason appears to have been the Foreign Ministry’s conviction that the mutual nature of a new security treaty would be incompatible with constitutional prohibitions on sending the Japanese SelfDefense Forces overseas. As mentioned before, Foreign Ministry officials were proceeding on the assumption that it would be difficult to devise a new treaty of greater mutuality. Fujiyama, stunned by MacArthur’s suggestion and realizing its domestic political implication, replied cautiously: it would be desirable to move in the direction of a mutual treaty, but he would have to consult the Prime Minister. MacArthur’s efforts had the support of the Secretary of State to whom he reported in Washington. He would not have made it without an advance positive response from Washington. While the Foreign Ministry officials were debating the merits and demerits of various options for piecemeal adjustments in the existing security arrangement, Prime Minister Kishi was anxious to move in a bold and dramatic step: he was considering a very different kind of option - a new security treaty. He was convinced that only a new treaty could put U.S.Japanese relations on a firm and equal basis. As mentioned previously, he also believed that a new security treaty rather than a partial revision was necessary to make an impact on the Japanese public in order to instill a defense consciousness. Thus the Prime Minister made the strategic decision to this effect.124

122 Ibid., pp. 176-177. 123 Togo, 1982, p. 61. As mentioned before, Foreign Ministry officials were proceeding on the assumption that it would be impossible to devise such a security treaty considering that the constitution prohibited Japan from sending troops overseas. 124 Hara argues that Kishi made his decision to seek a new treaty shortly after the general elections o f May 22, 1958. Hara, 1988, p. 183.

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The meeting between Prime Minister Kishi, Foreign Minister Fujiyama and American Ambassador MacArthur produced a momentous movement toward treaty revision. On August 25, Prime Minister Kishi formally conveyed his decision to seek a new treaty. Kishi’s decision took Fujiyama and the Foreign Ministry by surprise. Kishi’s decision was made without consulting his Foreign Minister. Fujiyama recalled: “Mr. Kishi and I did not have advance consultation about whether we would seek a new treaty or not. Even though I more or less anticipated Mr. Kishi’s preference for a new treaty, I did not clearly know about [Kishi’s "new treaty" decision] until Mr. Kishi replied to M acA rthur.” 125 Similarly, Foreign Ministry’s Treaties Division Head Takahashi Michio remarked: “When I learned of Kishi’s decision to go ahead with a new treaty from the Foreign Minister following the tripartite meeting of Kishi, Fujiyama and MacArthur, I was really surprised.”126 Foreign Minister Fujiyama felt a sense of betrayal in not being consulted before the decision. The incident subsequently led to widening rifts between them. The official American response came on September 11, 1958 when Foreign Minister Fujiyama met Secretary of State Dulles in New York. At this meeting, the Foreign Minister emphasized that a new and mutual security pact would be in the interests of both Japan and the United States and should be promptly negotiated. He then conveyed the Japanese government’s view on treaty revision to the Secretary of State. In essence, its salient points were: 1. The United States should assume the obligation to help defend Japan in case of an act of external aggression upon Japan and Japanese obligations be limited to those compatible with the Constitution; 2. Prior consultation with the Japanese government should be required when the United States makes major changes in the deployment and equipment of its armed forces, or uses bases in Japan for military operations overseas; and 3. The treaty should be effective for a limited period. Fujiyama also outlined for Dulles three ways of reviewing the existing security arrangements: the first way was to replace the treaty by a new treaty, the second was to revise the existing treaty, and the third was to supplement the present treaty by various agreements on specific issues. Fujiyama restated the case for the first alternative, and, made an effort to solicit Dulles’s understanding of the Japanese government’s position that only a new treaty could instill a defense consciousness among the Japanese people

125 Hara, 1988, p. 179. 126 Ibid.

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through a thorough debate on the issue and put U.S.-Japanese relations on a firm and stable basis.127 Dulles responded by saying that he was one of the founding fathers of the 1951 security treaty and it was a good piece of work. But he was not opposed to the idea of treaty revision. He then agreed to treaty negotiations with a view to conclude a new, mutual security pact, stating that, even though it might require the United States to concede much for an insufficient gain, the spirit of friendship between the two countries was more important than legal privileges and obligations.128 Complex negotiations for the revision of the treaty covered a relatively long period of time, from October 1958 to December 1959. The delays in the negotiations were due mainly to domestic political problems in Japan rather than to differences between the two governments. The first formal meeting to negotiate the revision of the treaty began on October 4, 1958 in Tokyo. Present at this meeting were Prime Minister Kishi, Foreign Minister Fujiyama, Ambassador MacArthur, and their respective aids. From the start, the Japanese were defensive in their negotiation approach, letting the initiative fall into the hands of the United States. According to one participant in the negotiations, the Japanese were being forced on the defensive because of the difficulty in devising a new, mutual treaty compatible with their Constitution.129 Thus the American team set the tone by submitting a treaty draft during the first session. In essence, it provided: (1) the treaty would be named the “Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security” and would define mutual cooperation broadly, including political and economic as well as security matters; (2) the parties, individually and in cooperation with each other, by means of self-help and mutual aid, would maintain and develop their capacities to exercise the right of individual and collective defense against armed attack; (3) each party would agree to recognize that an armed attack against either party in the Pacific area would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declare that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes; (4) the existing administrative agreement regarding the use of Japanese bases by U.S. forces would be continued under the new treaty; and (5) after ten years, each party

127 Ibid., p. 185-186. 128 Togo, 1982, p. 70: Hara, p. 187: Aruga, 1989, p. 66. 129 Togo, 1982, pp. 71-72. See also Hara, 1988, pp. 193-194.

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may give notice to the other party of its intention to terminate the treaty one year later.130 The American side also presented two other documents, one of which dealt with “prior consultation” with the Japanese government on the equipment and deployment of the United States forces in Japan. The other concerned the renewal of the 1951 Acheson-Yoshida notes.131 The first formal session defined the parameters of negotiation. The major points of disagreements concerned the use of the term “collective defense” and the area to which the new mutual security pact would apply. The Japanese wanted to delete the term “collective defense” from the text of the American draft, because it violated their own understanding of the Constitution as prohibiting Japan from exercising the right of collective defense. During the discussion of the treaty area, Ambassador MacArthur pointed out to Foreign Minister Fujiyama that, in the text of a new, mutual security agreement, Japan should explicitly recognize the notion that an armed attack against the territories to which the new pact would apply was a matter of common concern and that it was the obligation of both governments to act to meet the common danger in case of such an attack. Ambassador MacArthur insisted that one clause spell out the obligation of both parties to meet the common danger in case of an armed attack against the treaty area. He also indicated that Washington would regard Tokyo’s agreement to such a clause as important for the mutuality envisaged by the Americans.132 The Japanese negotiators were reluctant to include such a provision in the text because of the constitutionality of such an arrangement. Faced with U.S. threats to suspend negotiations, they backed away from their position. Regarding the question of the area of joint responsibility, it was stated in the American draft that the joint defense area be "the Pacific". The American side did not define the scope of "the Pacific" area, but it was understood to include Hawaii and the "Far East".133 Although the provision did not envision the dispatch of Japanese troops overseas, the Japanese side, could not agree to "the Pacific" commitment. To the Americans, this extension of the treaty area was 130 Togo, 1982, pp. 72-73: Aruga, 1989, p. 66. 131 In the Acheson-Yoshida notes from September 8, 1951, the Japanese government agreed that the American bases in Japan would continue to support operations in Korea as long as there were American bases in Japan and a United Nations Unified Command in Korea. See Weinstein, 1971, p. 52. 132 Hara, 1988, pp. 189-190. 133 Ibid., 1988, p. 188.

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important for greater mutuality. Despite a number of problems, both the Americans and the Japanese were strongly committed to the task of concluding a mutual security treaty, and concrete progress was made toward this end. Mac Arthur, showing himself to be extremely sensitive to Japanese opinion, undertook the task of persuading Washington to exclude the entire Pacific region except Okinawa and the Bonins as well as Japan itself from the area of joint military responsibility.134 As a result, the United States government soon offered to drop “the Pacific” as the area of the treaty, but demanded that Japan should accept joint responsibility for the defense of Okinawa and the Bonins. Prime Minister Kishi and Foreign Minister Fujiyama did not at first express their disagreement to this formula, believing that Japan should accept some responsibility for their defense. In fact, the Prime Minister told the Cabinet Committee of the House of Representatives on October 23 that it would be constitutionally feasible to include Okinawa and the Bonins in the treaty area.135 A settlement with the United States on the question of the treaty area seemed within reach. However, complications appeared almost immediately. Within the ruling party, Kishi’s rivals saw the issue as an opportunity to attack the Prime Minister and strengthen their own political positions. They argued that Japan should not accept responsibility for the defense of Okinawa and the Bonins until they were returned to Japan. Even within the government, the minister in charge of the Defense Agency opposed the inclusion of the islands. As the question of treaty area became a focal point for factional contention, the issue became ensnared in the struggle for party control. The intraparty cleavages over this question were to greatly inhibit Kishi’s efforts to foster an early agreement with the United States. To ease Kishi’s concern about this dissension in his party, Ambassador MacArthur proposed that he was willing to persuade Washington to exclude Okinawa and the Bonins from the sphere of joint military responsibility, and that the treaty would apply only to those territories under the administration of Japan, provided that both parties assume the obligation to act to meet the common danger in instances of armed attack in those territories under the administration of Japan.136 The timing and the content of the changes in the Japanese position on the question of the area of joint responsibility came about almost entirely independent of the bargaining at the negotiating table. Foreign Minister 134 Ibid., pp. 188-189. 135 Dai 30 kokkai Shugiin naikaku iinkai giroku, No. 5, October 23, 1958, p. 5. 136 Hara, 1988, p. 190.

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Fujiyama, confronted with a growing opposition in the party, declared on November 23 that Okinawa and the Bonins would not be included in the treaty area. Even Prime Minister Kishi, on December 3, stated that the new treaty would not include these islands.137 In the midst of the negotiations, still another event brought severe censure to the party leadership: on October 8, four days after the first negotiation on the revision of the security treaty had started, the Kishi government presented to the Diet a bill enlarging the powers of the police to control public demonstrations. The police law bill was instrumental in frustrating the attempt by Prime Minister Kishi to bring the Japanese-U.S. Security Treaty before the winter session of the 1959 Diet. The decision to introduce the bill was made by Kishi alone. Fujiyama recalled in his memoirs: “Mr. Kishi...immediately after the formal start of security treaty negotiations, suddenly let the Cabinet decide on the revision of the Police Duties Law revision bill and submitted the bill to the House of Representatives... I was not consulted about the introduction of the police bill in any way beforehand. There were also quite a few Cabinet members who, like me, knew nothing about it.”138 There was one important reason why Kishi presented the Diet with the bill: he was deeply concerned with the possibility that the proposed security treaty might prompt anti-treaty protest movements. The link between the police bill and the security treaty was articulated by Kishi: “I anticipated a great deal of opposition to the Security Treaty, but since I was strongly determined to proceed [with the treaty] in spite of such opposition, and even at the cost of my political life, I had felt it absolutely necessary to amend the police bill in order to insure law and order.”139 Immediately a deluge of criticism descended, from the left-wing parties, labor unions, newspapers, and so on. Opposition Diet members strongly opposed it on the grounds that the proposed new police powers might lead to the prewar type of police control and the Socialists boycotted the Diet. The fight over the police bill had become one of the most divisive issues in Japan, triggering by far the most serious public outburst against the government since independence. Only a week after the government presented to the bill to the Diet, the "People’s Council to Oppose the Revision of the Police Law" was formed. Those most active in the People’s Council were the Socialist Party, Sohyo and other labor federations. The government, in the 137 Asahi Shimbun, December 3, 1958. See also Hara, 1988, p. 209. 138 Fujiyama, 1976, p. 78. 139 Kishi, Yatsugi and Ito, 1981, p. 196.

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face of Socialist opposition to the point of physical obstruction of Diet proceedings, extended the Diet session on November 4 in order to pass it. On November 5, some four million Japanese staged demonstrations and strikes protesting the bill. The introduction of the police bill aggravated the divisions within the ruling LDP. Kishi’s factional opponents in the LDP, for tactical and personal rather than policy reasons, strongly denounced the Prime Minister for his high­ handed approach to the police bill. At the time, there was an anti-Kishi alliance within the party, composed of three factions which hoped to defeat Kishi in his race for re-election as party president a few months later. Kishi, confronted with internal party dissension over whether to press for the passage of this bill and with the public outcry and adamancy of the socialists, became increasingly uncomfortable. He had staked his political future on the revision of the 1951 treaty and was well aware that an unsatisfactory treatment of this legislation could have grave consequences for the attainment of his important objective treaty revision - and for himself personally. The Prime Minister did not want to aggravate the situation and to spoil the opportunity of a new security treaty by introducing yet another controversial issue. He therefore shelved the bill indefinitely after more than two months of heated debate in the Diet. Prime Minister Kishi was deeply concerned with the success of the opposition in this case, because he felt that the opposition forces might gain momentum and block the revision of the security treaty. At Japan’s request, the official negotiations were postponed for four months largely because of the factional struggles within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party and also because of the controversies surrounding the police bill. Although none of Kishi’s rivals came out in direct opposition to treaty revision, several criticized the details of the government’s position. Their criticisms were based less on matters of substance than of factional rivalry. Intraparty opposition placed severe limitations on Kishi’s ability to provide positive leadership and was to delay the process of treaty negotiations considerably since much of Kishi’s time was spent on building consensus and on consolidating his power within the party. The Socialists, soon after the start of the treaty negotiations was announced, decided to oppose the government’s efforts to have the treaty revised. The People’s Republic of China had established relationships with various opposition groups in Japan, and by 1956-57 regarded the Socialist Party as their most important potential ally in Japan. The Chinese encouraged the Socialists to oppose Prime Minister Kishi more strongly and manipulated trade

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policy to weaken his position. China continued its efforts to cement relations with the Japanese Socialists. When a second Socialist Party mission went to Beijing in March 1959, its leaders joined the Chinese in asserting that “American imperialism” is the “common enemy of both the Chinese and Japanese people.”140 This rather dramatic statement played a part in causing one right-wing group in the party to break off in late 1959 and form the Democratic Socialist Party. Once the negotiations were under way, the struggle against the revision of the Japanese-U.S. Security Treaty was stepped up. With the active lead of the Socialist Party and Sohyo, the effort to build up momentum for the struggle resulted in the formation of the People’s Council for Preventing the Revision of the Security Treaty, on March 28, 1959. Its membership consisted of 134 organizations with the Socialist Party, Sohyo, the Japan-China Friendship Association, the People’s Council for the Restoration of Japan-China Diplomatic Relations, the Japan Peace Committee and others as members of a 13 member Board of Directors. In the period following the Cabinet reshuffle in January 1959, Prime Minister Kishi and Foreign Minister Fujiyama had devoted considerable time to building the necessary consensus for the security treaty revision. In February, the Foreign Minister submitted the so-called "Fujiyama Plan" to a meeting of the LDP in an effort to build intraparty consensus around his program of treaty revision. The plan was essentially a summary of what had been agreed so far between the Japanese and American negotiators and outlined the provisions to be written in a new treaty. The contents of the Fujiyama Plan were almost identical with those of the new treaty to be concluded in the following year.141 Responses within the party were without enthusiasm. Many of Kishi’s rivals had misgivings about the terms of revision. Party unity was not achieved on the Fujiyama Plan and intraparty struggle continued. Because of the factional disputes, the ruling LDP was unable to reach a consensus position on the revised security treaty. Only two days before the resumption of the formal negotiations, on April 11, 1959, the LDP approved two documents concerning the revision of the security treaty. One of the documents accepted the principles enumerated in the Fujiyama Plan, while the

140 Mainichi shimbun, March 10, 1959. 141 Hara, 1988, p. 242.

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other called for negotiating for revision of the security treaty and administrative agreement simultaneously.142 The negotiations were reopened on April 23 and basic agreement on the provisions of the new treaty was reached in the fifth meeting held on May 23. Thus the Foreign Minister was able to make public its outline in a speech on May 25. The government’s main points concerning the treaty were: 1) to clarify the relationship of the security treaty to the United Nations Charter; 2) to clarify the cooperative relationship of the United States and Japan in the political and economic fields; 3) to clarify the American obligation to defend Japan, while restricting Japan’s obligations to the limits of the Constitution; 4) to establish the area of the treaty as Japanese territory, and Japanese territory not under Japanese administration would automatically become part of the treaty area when returned to Japanese control; 5) to allow U.S. forces to remain in Japan, but to provide for prior consultations in cases where these troops were to be used in combat outside Japan and on major equipment changes; 6) to eliminate the “internal disturbance” clause; 7) to eliminate the clause requiring U.S. prior consent for the forces of a third country to stay in or pass through Japan; 8) in order to ensure smooth functioning of the treaty, to insert a clause providing for consultations over the execution of the treaty; and 9) to limit the duration of the treaty to ten years, with one year’s notice thereafter to abrogate.143 The negotiations continued, until January 6, 1960, to bring about a new administrative agreement. After the total of twenty-two official and countless unofficial meetings since the negotiations began, an agreement was finally reached on the texts of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan, and an accompanying administrative agreement. The new treaty was signed by Prime Minister Kishi and Secretary of State Christian Herter, who had succeeded John Foster Dulles in April 1959, in the White House on January 19, 1960. Treaty ratification remained.144 Because of mass demonstrations against the treaty and opposition party recalcitrance in Japan, the process took six months. By the time the treaty was introduced in the Diet for ratification in April 1960, Socialists, Communists, labor unions and student organizations had built up a huge mass movement in opposition to the security treaty. Prime Minister Kishi was determined to see the Treaty ratified by the Diet before President 142 Togo, 1982, p. 95: Aruga, 1989, pp. 68-69. 143 Packard, 1966, pp. 76-77. 144 The struggle for ratification is discussed in details in Packard, 1966 and Hara, 1988.

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Eisenhower’s visit to Japan, scheduled for June 19. Deliberation in the Diet got out of hand when the Socialists took the Speaker of the lower house captive; police were called in to remove them. The Socialists boycotted the Diet sessions in protest. Prime Minister Kishi used his party’s Diet majority to ram the treaty through the lower house. It was approved on May 20. The opposition parties denied the validity of the ratification and accused the Kishi government for violating the rules of parliamentary democracy. The antiSecurity Treaty movement was now joined by those who opposed the Kishi government’s open disregard of the spirit of Japanese parliamentary politics. They demanded the resignation of Prime Minister Kishi. Major newspapers scolded the tactics of Kishi and his Liberal Democratic Party. Outside the Diet building, mass anti-government demonstrations took place. In view of the disorder, an emergency cabinet meeting decided to ask President Eisenhower not to come. According to the Japanese Constitution, a treaty approved by the lower house is automatically given the approval of the Diet after one month. Thus, the security treaty with the United States received automatic approval of the Diet on June 19 without any action taken by the House of Councillors. The U.S. Senate ratified it 90 to 2 with 1 abstention and 6 absentees on June 22. Ratification papers were exchanged at the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs the next day, thus completing Japan’s most controversial decision process in the post-independence period. On July 15, Kishi and his cabinet resigned. President Eisenhower’s visit to Japan which had been set for June was cancelled because mass rallies and riots were directed against it and the Kishi government. One prominent politician wrote in 1966 about the treaty crisis: "Before we knew it, these disturbances departed radically from being a dispute over the pros and cons of revising the U.S.Japan Security Treaty and took on the character of a great political struggle between conservatism and progressivism that brought into question the relationship between rulers and the ruled..."145 The new treaty and its accompanying administrative agreement eliminated a few controversial clauses in the 1951 security treaty and added several new provisions. Quite unlike its predecessor, the term of validity of the 1960 treaty was set at ten years and permitted either party, at the end of the ten-year period, to terminate it by giving one year’s advance notice to the other. The United States’s obligation to defend Japan was stated in the treaty. Further, it stipulated the relationship between the United Nations charter and the treaty: the security arrangements were placed within the framework of the U N 145 Ohira Masayoshi quoted in Sato, Koyama and Kumon, 1990, p.172.

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charter. Other important revisions included the removal of a clause permitting the U.S. troops stationed in Japan to serve as police in emergency situations; a “prior consultation” clause; and a clause calling for an explicit promise on the part of the United States to defend Japan from external aggression. It eliminated the “internal disturbance” article. This new treaty extended the basis of Japan-U.S. cooperation from a purely military one to military and economic areas. One of the notable features of the 1960 Mutual Security Treaty, its prescribed “mutual” notwithstanding, was that the U.S. assumed obligation to defend Japan, while Japan had no reciprocal obligation to help defend the United States. It stipulated only that Japan help defend U.S. interests on its premises. In this respect, their security arrangements differed from other pacts, such as the U.S. security treaties with South Korea, the Republic of China and the Philippines. Once the ratification of the new security treaty went into effect, the issue began to lose its edge in Japanese politics and the political situation calmed down temporarily in the early 1960s. The treaty was an issue which once more raised the temperature of politics in the latter half of the 1960s. Notwithstanding the controversies surrounding the treaty, it remained in effect for ten years. A new test for the treaty was to come on June 22, 1970, exactly ten years after the 1960 treaty was established. Both the ruling Liberal Democrats and the opposition parties recognized that 1970 would be an important year for Japan’s foreign and security policy, because the treaty provided that either party may terminate it on one year’s notice after 1970. If a year’s advance notice is not given by either party, the treaty automatically remains in effect. That was the year the Japanese government must decide whether to revise, continue, or terminate the existing security arrangements with the United States. The issue was debated in Japan in terms of the “problem of 1970” or the “options of 1970.”

Tactical Decision 2 The tactical decision process extended over almost five years of intensive deliberations, from mid-1960s to June 1970. During this period, the question of what to do about the 1960 Japanese-U.S. security arrangements beyond its original ten-year period had become an object of intense domestic dispute. In order to have the treaty terminated in 1970, the Socialist Party, together with

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Sohyo, began to mobilize their forces as early as the mid-1960s by linking it with the reversion of Okinawa. To many Japanese, the issue of Okinawa reversion and the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty were inseparable from each other. Well aware of the strength of nationalistic sentiments over Okinawa, the opposition forces planned to use the U.S. occupation of Okinawa in their attempt to terminate the treaty. The Japanese government, knowing the significance of the issue of Okinawa reversion in relation to the coming extension of the treaty, was determined to bring about the return of Okinawa to Japan before 1970.146 From 1965 onwards, there was also an intense debate within the LDP on national defense, prompted by the impending decision regarding extension of the 1960 security treaty in 1970. The intraparty debate centered increasingly on the question of whether the treaty should be automatically extended for an indefinite period, or revised and extended for a fixed term.147 The proponents of the latter view argued that a revised treaty extended for another ten years would be a firmer arrangement and would not be subject to sudden abrogation if, for instance, an anti-treaty government were to assume office in either country. The idea of attaching a fixed period to the treaty when the initial ten-year period expired received one of its earliest expressions on January 28, 1965. During interpellation in the plenary session of the upper house of the Diet, Kajima Morinosuke, a leading LDP politician, expressed his view that, since the 1950 Sino-Soviet pact of alliance in which Japan was regarded as the hypothetical enemy was designed to remain in force until 1980, it would be desirable for Japan to extend the validity of the Japan-United States security treaty to 1980 so as to bring the period of the treaty into line with that of the Sino-Soviet pact of alliance. Prime Minister Sato stated in reply that it was important to maintain the security treaty but that the government was not

146 According to Fukui, Prime Minister Sato became very conscious o f the “problem o f 1970,” which combined the question o f Okinawa reversion and the future of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, during his trip to Okinawa in August 1965. The Prime Minister's tour o f the islands was marred by demonstrations demanding the removal o f U.S. military facilities and return o f Okinawa to Japan. See Fukui, 1975, pp. 106-107. 147 For the intraparty debate on the extension o f the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, see, for example, Asahi Shimbunsha, Jiminto: Hoshu kenryoku no kozo, 1970; Kajima Morinosuke, Kajima Morinosuke gaiko ron senshu 2; Nihon no anzen hosho, 1972.

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considering the option of extending the treaty for a fixed period of ten years.148 Sato raised the issue in the upper house Budget Committee, on March 8, 1966: “Since the nation’s defense system must be built on a long-term basis, it would be necessary to give longevity to the security treaty when its current term expires.”149 Sato’s remarks provoked an immediate public controversy over their meaning. The Chief Cabinet Secretary found it necessary to indicate that the Prime Minister’s statement was not to be interpreted as meaning that the government was in favor of attaching a fixed period for the treaty. Aware of the political significance of the “problem of 1970,” the LDP and the government leaders found it necessary to build at least a general consensus within the ruling party on the future of the security treaty. Such a consensus did not emerge for several years. The principal forums for debate were the LDP’s Security Problems Research and Foreign Affairs Research Committees. In June 1966, the Security Problems Research Committee, which had been deliberating the treaty since December 1965, came up with its interim report on Japan’s security. In the report the committee called for extension of the security treaty for a specific term of ten years after 1970.150 They were anxious to see that the consensus reached in the report was moved to the Foreign Affairs Research Committee for consideration so that it would be reflected in the LDP’s official view. It remained for the Foreign Affairs Research Committee to do their own thinking on the matter. Some influential LDP members - notably, Kosaka Zentaro and Ohira Masayoshi (both were ex-foreign ministers and vicechairmen of the LDP’s Research Committee on Foreign Affairs) - opposed the view expressed in the report, however. Remembering the 1960 treaty crisis, they argued that an attempt to fix a specific period of extension would only cause unnecessary turmoil by evoking a clash between the government and the opposition parties.151 The proponents of “automatic extension” also contended that there would be no crisis in 1970 as the treaty would be automatically continued since no confirmatory action was required in the Diet. Moreover, they believed that it would be problematical whether the United States would accept Japan’s 148 Kajima, 1972, pp. 149-150. 149 Asahi Shimbun-sha, Jiminto: Hoshu kenryoku no kozo, 1970, p. 81. See also Kajima, 1972, p. 201. 150 Asahi Shimbun-sha, Jiminto: Hoshu kenryoku no kozo, 1970, pp. 87-90. 151 Ibid.

I

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proposition to renew the treaty for a further ten years in its present form after 1970. In contrast, Kajima Morinosuke, one of the most articulate advocates of a “fixed period of extension” argued: ...as long as the Socialist Party continues to adhere to its position as a Marxist party, a clash between the government and opposition parties is inevitable over the question o f the security treaty. Thus, unless there is a long-term period affixed to the treaty, there are bound to be disorders on a scale far greater than the turmoil erupting over the revision o f the security treaty. The antisecurity campaign will become such a daily and chronic affair that the nation’s security will be seriously jeopardized.152

Within the government, the Foreign Ministry, which had long been proAmerican, was aware that it would be difficult to obtain U.S. agreement to a ten-year extension of the 1960 security arrangements. The Ministry was, therefore, convinced that the optimum solution to the treaty problem would be automatic extension.153 The Ministry officials then chose to bring their view to the attention of the Prime Minister. They did not, however, succeed in getting any indication of support for their view from the Prime Minister. Sato himself remained undecided, at least publicly, about the question of whether to attach a specific period or to automatically extend the Japanese-American security treaty. From 1967 onwards, the mood within the LDP and the government had shifted in favor of automatic continuation. By June 1968 there seemed to be a clear majority for this position within the party. There were two factors that influenced the evolution of an intraparty and government consensus in Japan to proceed with automatic extension. One was the desire to avoid a repetition of the great turmoil in connection with the revision of the security treaty in 1960. Considering Japanese sensitivity to the security alliance and anticipating renewed efforts by the opposition parties to push for cancellation of the security treaty in 1970, the lesson to be learned from the parliamentary crisis of 1960 was obvious. Another powerful persuader in the creation of momentum toward automatic extension in the LDP may have been the negative reaction of the US government to “fixed period of extension.” A signal that the United States would reply unfavorably was apparent from a conversation that former Prime 152 Kajima, 1969, p. 180. 153 Asahi Shimbunsha, Jiminto: Hoshu kenryoku no kozo, 1970, p. 96.

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Minister Kishi had with American Secretary of State Dean Rusk in Washington in March 1967. Kishi asked the American Secretary if there was any possibility of the term of the treaty being extended by another ten years. Rusk said in reply that it would be difficult to obtain the ratification of the U.S. Senate for a 10 year extension of the security treaty.154 The reason appears to have been the lack of mutuality in the existing Japanese-U.S. security arrangements. It obligated the United States to help defend Japan but did not require a reciprocal obligation on the part of Japan to help defend the United States. Having caught wind of the movement in Washington’s thinking on the question of the security treaty, Kishi became convinced of the treaty’s automatic continuation. Kishi’s change of opinion on the matter bolstered an argument in favor of automatic continuation. In June 1969, Foreign Minister Aichi went to Washington to prepare for the 1969 summit meeting between Prime Minister Sato and President Nixon. At the talks between Aichi and Secretary of State Rogers, the Japanese Foreign Minister was quoted in press reports reaching Tokyo as saying that his government would prefer automatic extension to renegotiation regarding the extension of the treaty when it expires in 1970.155 This was contrary to statements Prime Minister Sato and Aichi himself had made in the Diet that no decision had yet been made regarding whether renewal should be determined for a specific term of years or whether continuation should be automatic. The press reports produced an uproar in Japan. Prime Minister Sato and Foreign Minister Aichi found it necessary to appear before the Diet to make clarifying statements. They explained that the Foreign Minister merely stated his personal view on the trend in party circles - there was a clear majority within the LDP for “automatic extension” of the security treaty.156 The subject of treaty extension was raised at the plenary session of the lower house on June 12 at which Prime Minister Sato had stated, the Government would decide by the time of his visit to Washington, scheduled for November 1969, after having taken public opinion and political current within the ruling LDP into full consideration.157 In the meantime, as general consensus moved forward on the security treaty issue within the LDP, a formal decision on the matter by the party warranted 154 Ibid., pp. 95-96. 155 See, for example, Asahi Shimbun, June 4, 1969. 156 Asahi Shimbun, June 5, 1969: Yoshiwara et al. (eds.), Nichi-Bei anpojoyaku shi 4, 1971, pp. 44-45: Aichi Kiichi ikoshu kanko kai, 1974, p. 124. 157 Yoshihara et al. (eds.), Nichi-Bei anpo joyaku shi 4, 1971, p. 44.

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greater consideration especially in view of the coming summit meeting between Sato and Nixon to be held in November. After a series of discussions, a joint conference between the party organs primarily concerned with the treaty issue - Foreign Affairs Research Committee and Security Problems Research Committee decided on “automatic extension” on October 9, 1969. It was accepted by the party’s Executive Council and became official party policy on October 14.158 The treaty, according to the party’s statement, would be needed “for a considerable period of time” beyond its original ten-year term and would remain in force until satisfactory United Nations arrangements would provide for Japan’s security.159 Now that the intraparty consensus had been achieved within the LDP in favor of automatic extension, the stage had been set for the final decision by the Government. The Prime Minister was still extremely cautious and reluctant to make explicit commitments with regard to the question of the form which the U.S.Japan Security Treaty would take after 1970. Sato’s approach to decisions bore the imprint of his cautious character. Sato characteristically made decisions slowly. Fukui described Sato’s talent of procrastination: “As befitted the successful bureaucrat that he was before entering politics, Sato was an extraordinarily cautious and discreet man. He would ‘tap his way across a stone bridge to be sure it was safe’; he avoided making explicit commitments to one position or another, particularly on controversial issues, until a general consensus emerged among the influential groups concerned.”160 In the meantime, with the question of Okinawa reversion becoming more and more troublesome politically, Sato was determined to obtain a promise of its return to Japan at his summit meeting with President Nixon in November 1969. For the Japanese side, the summit meeting was successful with regard to the reversion of Okinawa: Prime Minister Sato and President Nixon, in their November 21 joint communique, agreed that Okinawa would be returned to Japan in 1972 with application of the 1960 security treaty and related arrangements “without modification” to the island. The communique made no mention of the question of the form which the 1960 security treaty would take after the expiration of the initial 10-year term on June 22, 1970. It simply 158 Okamoto, 1972, p. 231. 159 For the full text o f the LDP statement, see Yoshihara et al. (eds.), Nichi-Bei anpo joyaku taisei-shi 4, 1971, p. 444. 160 Destler, Fukui and Sato, 1979, pp. 39-40. For his talent for procrastination, see also Fukui Haruhiro, “Okinawa henkan kosho: Nihon seifu ni okeru kettei katei (Okinawa Reversion: Decision Making in the Japanese Government,” Kokusai seiji, No. 2, 1974, p. 111.

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“affirmed the intention of the two governments firmly to maintain the Treaty.”161 Sato subsequently explained that the question of whether the treaty should be automatically extended was not discussed at the summit meeting. The Sato-Nixon agreement "defused" the Okinawa problem and significantly reduced the domestic political importance of one of the most divisive issues. The opposition forces in Japan lost an important catalyst for a united struggle against the government’s impending decision regarding extension of the security treaty. In fact, the treaty issue began to lose much of the political passion that had once surrounded it. Prime Minister Sato was eager to translate his diplomatic success into a personal and partisan advantage. Thus, one month later, the Sato government dissolved the Diet and called for a general election in December 1969, hoping to get the Japanese people’s mandate on the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty in the forthcoming year. The successful summit meeting seemed to make an appreciable impact upon the LDP’s election outcome. The vote was a victory for the governing party and a stunning setback for the anti-treaty Japan Socialist Party. Thus, in his policy speech to the Diet, on February 14, 1970, Prime Minister Sato could state: I firmly believe that, as is clear from the results o f the recent general election, there is a w ide national consensus for the policy o f augmenting our self-defense capabilities in accordance with our national power and circumstances, and o f complementing our insufficiencies by the U.S.-Japan Treaty o f Mutual Security based on the fundamental attitude o f preserving liberty and peace.162

Foreign Minister Aichi told the Budget Committee of the lower house on March 11, 1970 that the government would let the treaty continue in its present form “automatically” after the expiration of the initial 10-year term on June 22, 1970.163 But the Prime Minister persisted in denying that the decision had been made on the matter. On May 8, Sato said at the lower house Foreign Affairs Committee, in reply to an interpellator, that the government had not yet discussed “automatic extension” with the United States.164 Finally, the Government of Japan formally decided on the automatic continuation of the

161 For the full text o f the joint communique, see Gaimusho, Gaimusho Press Releases, 1969, pp. 94-98. 162 Gaimusho, Gaimusho Press Releases 1970, p. 4. 163 Yoshihara et al., 1971, p. 43. 164 Shugiin, Shugiin gaimu iinkai giroku, No. 4, 64th Diet, May 8, 1970, p. 13.

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security treaty at a cabinet meeting on June 22, 1970. The Government Statement, issued after a cabinet meeting, declared: At the lapse o f the initial period o f 10 years o f the Treaty o f Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States o f America, the Government confirms its intention to firmly maintain the treaty in the interest of the maintenance o f the security o f Japan. Back in 1952, our country chose resolutely to conclude the Peace Treaty with the majority o f the major powers, and at the same time concluded the Security Treaty with the United States in order to ensure our national security and reconstruction under the precarious situation then prevailing in the Far East. Subsequently, we concluded with the United States in 1960 the present Treaty o f Mutual Cooperation and Security, by revising the former Security Treaty and placing the JapaneseAmerican relationship on the basis o f equal partnership. That the nation has enjoyed peace in the turbulence o f the world today and that it has achieved an unprecedented economic prosperity and improvement in the people’s living bear out the wisdom o f the national choice thus made on the course o f external policy... [N]o nation in today’s world can be expected to maintain its security by itself. The best conceivable way to secure national existence and development, it is believed, is to build up our self-defense power in consonance with national capabilities, and to ensure the peace and security o f the Far East including Japan by the Japanese-American security system...165

All the opposition parties announced their opposition to the government’s decision. On June 23 some 700,000 people took to the streets throughout Japan to demonstrate against the security treaty. In spite of the large numbers who took part in the demonstrations, the expected crisis did not materialize. None of the excessive violence associated with the 1960 treaty crisis occurred. The decision to let the treaty continue in effect automatically did not require any confirmatory action in the Diet and the government was able to avoid a repeat performance of the 1960 political crisis. Thus ended the decision-making process on the tactical decision.

6.4 Feedback

165 The Japan Times, 23 June 1970.

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Empirical Analysis

There were significant consequences of Japan’s treaty policy decisions. No other decision cluster in postwar Japan had such a far-reaching and durable impact on her foreign policy system both in reality and in her image. Almost all environmental components were more or less affected by them. In the external environment the global and subordinate dimensions, and the U.S.Japanese relationship were affected, as were Japan’s relations with the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China. As for the internal setting, Japan’s defense capability, her economy, advocacy of competing elites and interest groups, as well as the political structure, were recipients of feedback from the revision decisions. The American security commitment through the U.S.-Japanese bilateral security arrangements allowed Japan to adopt a low-profile external political posture and to concentrate on pursuing the trade-first policy, a neo­ mercantilist foreign policy, and sheltered Japan to a significant degree from global politics. For the United States, the alliance relationship with Japan was to become “the most important Asian link in its global containment of the Soviet Union.”166 One could argue that it was the United States’ security guarantee for Japan in accordance with the security treaty, including the American “nuclear umbrella,” which enabled Japan to adhere to its “three non-nuclear principles” (the nonproduction, nonpossession, and nonintroduction of nuclear weapons), and to sign (1970) and ratify (1976) the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. All these actions were designed for Japan to play a nonmilitary, nonpolitical, mercantilist role in the world. The government policy of adhering to such a non-nuclear posture enhanced, externally, the image of Japan as a peaceful nation. As Endicott observed, Japan’s ratification of the NPT provided “a positive image of Japan as a peaceful nation to enable it to pursue advocacy of nuclear disarmament worldwide, and remove obstacles in the way of peaceful uses of nuclear power.”167 Had it not been for the U.S. security guarantee, Tokyo would probably have had to make a hard decision on its nuclear security policy with adverse consequences. In a sense, one consequence of the treaty decisions in the late 1950s was that Japan’s foreign policy options were narrowed: “...the total reliance of Japan’s

166 Bosworth, 1992, p. 124. 167 Endicott, 1977, p. 292.

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security and economy on a single country has produced inevitable restraints on her foreign policy - in fact, conformity to United States policy has become the intuitive reflex of foreign policy planners - seriously limiting the scope of diplomatic initiatives.”168 Japan’s security arrangements with the United States have often been viewed as vital to peace and security in East Asia. As a Japanese scholar noted, “the Treaty is now one of the most important stabilizing elements in the international politics of the Asian and Pacific regions.”169 Considering the fears of East Asian nations of revived Japanese militarism, the security treaty contributed to regional security by providing assurance against Japan again embarking on major remilitarization. Johnstone, for example, recently wrote, “Beyond its past effectiveness in providing a check on Soviet aspirations in the area, it has also provided reassurance to the region with respect to Japanese intentions.”170 These consequences were perceived by Japan’s decision-makers for many years after the strategic decision. In his policy speech to the Diet in March 1990, Prime Minister Kaifu Toshiki, for example, stated that the Japan-U.S. alliance relationship based on the bilateral security arrangements had contributed to “the stability of international relations in the Asia-Pacific region and hence the entire world.”171 As Vice Foreign Minister Kuriyama Takakazu said in 1990, the treaty functioned “as the most important framework for stability and development in Asia and the Pacific region.” Kuriyama maintained that the security treaty “is the crucial pillar for the continuation of an active U.S. presence in this region.” “If the security pact were to be dissolved,” he went on, “U.S. presence in the Asia and Pacific region will be greatly curtailed not only militarily, but also politically and economically.” Kuriyama also argued that “the Security Treaty renders international credibility to Japan’s fundamental stance that it will not become a major military power, thus facilitating the acceptance of a larger political and economic role for Japan by its neighbors.”172

168 Muraoka, 1973, p. 1. 169 Satoh, 1982, p. 25. 170 Johnston, 1992, p. 105. 171 “Policy Speech by Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu to the 118th Session o f the National Diet,” Diplomatic Bluebook 1990, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, p. 277. 172 Kuriyama Takakazu, “New Directions for Japanese Foreign Policy in the Changing World o f the 1990s,” Distributed by the Foreign Press Center, 1990, pp. 25-26.

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Empirical Analysis

Of course Japan’s relationship with the United States benefited from the decisions. Japan’s close relations with the United States in the political, economic, cultural and all other fields would not have been possible without the security treaty with the United States, a symbol of a close military alliance and political partnership. As one Japanese analyst points out: The Japan-U.S. Security Treaty has...helped to consolidate the nonstrategic aspects o f the relationship between the two countries and has played an important role in elevating Japan to the status o f a major power - a development that was not foreseen at the time the treaty was signed. Interdependence between Japan and the United States has deepened considerably over the past 30 years and can now be seen in nearly every aspect o f the relationship: trade, investment, finance, transportation, communications, education, research, tourism ... The agreement not only guaranteed Japan’s security but also strengthened its ties with the United States in other ways.173

In the long run, Japan’s dominant bilateral relationship with the United States has grown closer over the years. In the field of national defense and security, Japan has moved toward greater coordination with the United States. Since 1978, joint defence studies and planning have been instituted and are today an important part of security cooperation between the two countries. Joint military training between Japanese and US forces has also become more frequent and extensive over the years. The consequence of Japan’s strategic decision on treaty revision was to make “the American factor” even more important in her foreign policy: “In the 1960s, the relationship between Japan and the United States was one of total reliance, in which Japan identified her interests with those of the United States in the conduct of her foreign policy.”174 The pervasive US influence on Japanese decision-making was not new. It had been demonstrated quite often since Japan’s independence in the early 1950s, but the revision of the security treaty raised it to a new dimension of centrality. The degree to which Japanese policy had become dominated by the “American factor” was evident in Japan’s policy towards China. Japanese high-policy decision-makers allowed no foreign policy action, and certainly not the normalization of relations with China, to jeopardize the close relations with the United States.

173 Nishihara, 1991, p. 28. 174 Muraoka, 1973, p. 2.

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Former Foreign Minister Okita Saburo underscored the primacy of the Japanese-American alliance in a recent article: “Japan’s relations with the entire world have been shaped by being under America’s economic, social, and political wing for more than forty years.”175 The spillover to other decisions can also be discerned. The 1958 security treaty decisions prepared the way for the return of Okinawa from the United States to Japan, an issue of emotional importance to the Japanese and a major irritant in relations between the two countries. In March 1969, Prime Minister Sato announced his intent to negotiate with Washington on the basis of a nuclear-free reversion of Okinawa with application of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty to the bases remaining on the island in March 1969. This Okinawa decision by Prime Minister Sato should be viewed as the logical product of the decisions in 1958 to seek treaty revision. The reversion of Okinawa was announced in a communique issued by Prime Minister Sato and President Nixon in November 1969 and went into effect in May 1972. The decisions on treaty revision worsened the relations between Japan and the Soviet Union. Moscow, in a memorandum to the Japanese government, on January 27, 1960, criticized the new U.S.-Japan Security Treaty as being “the new military treaty...directed against the Soviet Union, as also against the People’s Republic of China.” In the same memorandum, the Soviet Union also demanded the removal of all foreign troops from Japan as a condition for the return of the Habomais and Shikotan: “...the islands of Habomai and Shikotan will be turned over to Japan, as envisaged in the joint declaration of the USSR and Japan of October 19, 1956, only on condition of the withdrawal of all foreign troops from the territory of Japan and the conclusion of a peace treaty between the USSR and Japan.”176 Soon after, there was a hardening of the Soviet position on the issue of the Northern territories, claiming that the issue was already settled “by appropriate international agreements.” The Chinese response to the revised security treaty was prompt. As early as late 1958 and throughout 1959 Beijing kept up its critical campaign against the treaty. The Chinese Foreign Ministry on January 14, 1960, just before the treaty was signed in Washington, characterized the “U.S.-Japanese military alliance treaty” as marking the revival of Japanese militarism and an aggressive expansion in Asia. In 1960, Zhou Enlai also expressed strong

175 Quoted in Bowen, 1992, p. 60; Okita, 1989, p. 131. 176 Jain, 1981, p. 260.

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Empirical Analysis

criticism of the treaty and warned that Japan was on the way to becoming a threat to Southeast Asia.177 The U.S.-Japan Security Treaty had become one of the most serious obstacles to normalizing relations between Beijing and Tokyo. But it did not prevent both countries from expanding their economic relationship. The Chinese reassessed their Japan policy when Kishi was ousted as Prime Minister and was replaced by Ikeda Hayato. On the Japanese side, the new government took steps to improve Japan’s relations with the People’s Republic of China which had sunk to the lowest point since 1952. An important step toward increased bilateral trade was taken in 1962 when a major trade agreement for the period 1963-67 was signed by Takasaki Tatsunosuke, former head of Japan’s Ministry of International Trade and Industry, and Liao Chengzhi, head of the China-Japan Friendship Association. Their “sem i-official” memorandum, which created the basis for what came to be known as “L-T trade” (named after the initials of Liao and Takasaki), called for an average annual two-way trade of about $100 million. The PRC denounced Japan’s tactical decision of 1970 to let the security treaty continue automatically, thereby straining the relations between the two countries. Yet the effects were short-lived: they were erased by the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations in 1972. An important effect of Japan’s treaty decisions is discernible in its security. “For Japan, the treaty has greatly enhanced its security by helping to deter any aggressive intentions by the Soviet Union and reducing the likelihood of political or nuclear blackmail.”178 In its white paper on foreign policy, the Japanese government acknowledged the importance of the Japan-U.S. security arrangements: “Japan has enjoyed peace and prosperity over the past 40 years as these arrangements effectively functioned as a system of deterrence.”179 The decisions of 1958 aggravated the relations between the LDP government and the opposition parties and sparked short-term political crises for Japan. Japan’s political structure was temporarily destabilized by the fallout from her decisions on the security treaty. As previously noted, the implementation of the strategic decision touched off the greatest political crisis in postwar Japan, as opposition parties, trade unions, and peace organizations launched a massive campaign against the security treaty that for a time 177 See Gaimusho, Ni-Chu kankei kihon shiryoshu 1949-1969, 1970, pp. 176-180. 178 The Edwin O. Reischauer Center for East Asian Studies, The United States and Japan in 1990, 1990, p. 65. 179 Diplomatic Bluebook 1990, Tokyo: Ministry o f Foreign Affairs, 1990, p. 179.

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threatened the stability of the Japanese political system itself. The demonstrations against the Japanese-U.S. Security Treaty did not prevent its ratification, but it did succeed in compelling Kishi to resign as party president and prime minister. Interestingly, the general elections of November resulted in a victory for the ruling Liberal Democratic Party with 297 seats in the House of Representatives - 10 seats more than it had obtained in the 1958 general elections.180 There were serious and long-term consequences for the psychological environment of Japan’s high-policy elite. The legacy of the 1960 crisis deeply affected decision-makers’ perceptions. The unprecedented mass movements in opposition to the treaty and Prime Minister Kishi gave an enormous shock to government and LDP leaders. The fact that opposition to the security treaty could mobilize such mass protests made a lasting impression on subsequent governments. The policy effect was that successive governments have attempted to refrain from seriously politicizing the issue of defense and security. For example, for Kishi’s successor Ikeda Hayato, the anti-security treaty movement made an instructive impression. Ikeda’s most important task when he became Prime Minister was to restore stability to the nation which had just suffered its worst political turmoil in the postwar period. Ikeda, therefore, adopted a “low political posture” toward the opposition parties and pledged to work for the restoration of parliamentary democracy.181 As Langdon wrote: The new prime minister played down the divisive policy o f military alignment reaffirmed in the new security treaty... To distract attention from military affairs he emphasized domestic economic growth and the concomitant growth o f foreign trade and other economic relations, particularly with the United States. This policy was aimed at reducing economic discontent and was capable o f attracting support right across the political spectrum.182

Ikeda’s apprehension over possible domestic turmoil similar to that over the forced passage of the Security Treaty in the Diet caused his cabinet to delay its 180 The Socialists won 144 seats, an increase o f 22 over the total in the previous general election, mostly at the expense o f the Democratic Socialist Party. 181 Soon after he became P.M. Ikeda announced: " In order to regain the confidence o f the people, I promised to cooperate with my friends, the members o f the opposition parties, and concentrate all my efforts ton protecting the principles o f parliamentary democracy." Cited in Kosaka, 1972, p. 201. 182 Langdon, 1973, p. 20.

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Empirical Analysis

decisions on the establishment of diplomatic ties with South Korea.183 Similarly, when the initial ten year term of the Security Treaty came to an end in June 1970, the Sato government did not propose its revision because of the legacy of 1960. As divisive defense and security issues lost their primacy to less controversial, crosscutting matters of economic growth and trade, the policymaking process of Japan also underwent substantial changes in the direction of far less confrontation. “Reluctant” cooperation, rather than confrontation, characterized relations between government and opposition. The decisions did have a profound continuing effect on Japan’s economic capability. The American security guarantee under the security treaty had enabled Japan to remain lightly armed and to concentrate on the single-minded pursuit of economic growth. Without the security arrangements with the United States, Japan would have had to spend a far larger share of its annual national budget on its defense which would have cut seriously into its expenditures for social welfare, public works, and, above all, economic development. Miyazawa Kiichi, a prominent Japanese politician, observed in his book that the Japan-U.S. security pact has had effects on Japan’s security and economic capability: “...the first effect is that Japan’s peace and security has been preserved during the last 10 or more years by the [Japan-U.S.] security system. As a consequence of the security treaty, Japan has been able to limit the unproductive military expenditures and concentrate on economic development.”184 A similar view is presented by James E. Dougherty, an analyst of international relations: “For many years, the nation’s defense expenditures have been less than 10 per cent of the budget and less than one percent of GNP. Thus the Mutual Security Treaty has made its contribution to Japan’s economic miracle.”185 One more example of the effects on Japan’s economy will suffice: In calculating the economic benefits o f the American security umbrella to Japan, it is appropriate to refer not merely to current annual expenditures, but to the entire post-occupation era. From this long-term perspective, the benefits to Japan are staggeringly large. According to two leading economists, Hugh Patrick and Henry Rosovsky, if Japan had spent proportionately as much on defense as the average

183 Kosaka, 1968, p. 139. 184 Miyazawa, 1965, pp. 192-193. 185 James E. Dougherty, “Nuclear Proliferation in Asia,” Orbis, Vol. XIX, No. 3, Fall 1975.

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member o f the North Atlantic Treaty Organization through roughly 1974, the Japanese GNP would have been one-third less than it actually was at that time.186

Feedback from the tactical and strategic decisions to competing elites may also be discerned. There are, however, two different views of the feedback effect on this component. One claims that the influence of the opposition parties increased: “As a long-term consequence of the 1960 crisis, the conservative coalition tried to include the opposition parties in major decisions concerning foreign and security policy.”187 The other is that the influence of the leftist parties in the area of national security policy declined. The opposition camp itself became more fragmented. The treaty revision caused a split in the Socialist movement and led to the proliferation of opposition parties. A group of right-wing socialists seceded from the Socialist Party in January 1960 to form the Democratic Socialist Party as a fallout from Japan’s treaty decisions. As a result the Socialist vote was reduced. On this point Aruga writes: “This split of the JSP foretold its gradual decline in the 1960s and 1970s...”188 There was, too, an effect of the tactical and strategic decisions on interest groups. The influence of interest groups advocating against the revision of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty was reduced as attention shifted from polarizing foreign and security policy matters to domestic politics and more concrete economic issues. For example, the influence of the leftist interest groups such as Zengakuren (The National Federation of Student Self-Government Associations), Anpo Kaitei Soshi Kokumin Kaigi (The People’s Council for Preventing Revision of the Security Treaty) and Sohyo (The General Council of Trade Unions) was diminished. After the 1960 treaty revisions, the radical student movement broke up into several militant groups. Although such student groups became increasingly active in the latter half of the 1960s, their political role continued to fade once the 1970 tactical decision to automatically extend the treaty went into effect. The decision-makers perceived the declining concern of interest groups and even competing elites with defense and security matters and they could, therefore, concentrate on trade and industrial development.

186 Donald C. Hellmann, 1987, pp. 177. 187 Thomas Risse-Kappen, 1991, p. 509. 188 Aruga, 1989, p. 70.

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Empirical Analysis

Table 6.1: Feedback from Japan’s decisions on the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty:* Operational Environment__________

Psychological Derivatives

Environment

and

Policy

External: to

Perception o f need for the trade-first policy in

maintain a “low-profile” in

foreign affairs; p o licy consequence w as to

G

A llo w ed

Japan

world politics (S, T 2 )

strengthen Japan’s low-profile, neo-mercantilist role in the world

S Contributed to regional

The treaty’s stabilizing role in East A sia was

security (S, T 2 )

recognized; policy derivative was pursuit o f economic diplomacy in the region

D B j Solidified the alliance

Perception o f strengthened American alliance; policy

with the U.S. (S, T 2 )

effect was to seek even closer relations with Washington

DB2

W orsened Japan’s

Adverse effects perceived; policy effect was to

relations with Moscow (S)

search even closer links with the U.S.

B

Perception o f adverse effects; policy derivative was

D eteriorated

S in o -

Japanese relations (S, T 2 )

to improve ties with Beijing by expanding trade between the two countries

Internal:

M

E nhanced

Japan’s

security (S, T2 )

Greater security achieved by the treaty was perceived; policy consequence was to maintain close military relationship with the U.S.

E Contributed to Japan’s

Awareness o f the treaty’s contribution to economic

economic growth (S, T2)

growth; policy derivative was concentration o f Japan’s resources on industrial development

PS D estabilized political structure (S) CE Increased polarization

P o licy derivative o f perceived increase in

b e tw e e n

LDP

polarization was to avoid confrontation with

government and opposition

opposition parties by adopting a “low political

(S); Increased influence of

posture”

th e

opposition parties (S)

The U.S.-Japan Security Treaty IG Influence o f interest

Policy consequence o f perception with declining

groups

concern with security issue was the pursuit o f a high

again st

r e v is io n

treaty

d e c lin e d

as

economic growth policy

attention shifted to more concrete

economic

problems * The consequences o f tactical decision 1 are subsumed in the feedback flow from the strategic decision since it did not yield autonomous feedback.

251

7. China

The China issue had been one of the most controversial foreign policy issues in postwar Japan. In the early 1970s, important decisions relating to China were made by Japan: On September 22, 1971, Prime Minister Sato Eisaku decided to co-sponsor the resolution calling for the expulsion of Taiwan as an important question requiring a two-thirds majority vote1 and a resolution on dual Chinese representation at the United Nations2 ; (T) In early August 1972, Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei and Foreign Minister Ohira Masayoshi decided on Tanaka’s visit to China for the pursuit of diplomatic relations with Beijing; (S)3 These two decisions are treated and analyzed as a decision cluster because the questions of Chinese representation in the United Nations and diplomatic recognition of the People’s Republic of China were related in the minds of Japan’s key decision-makers, in addition to being closely related structurally.

7.1 Operational Environment

Tactical Decision

1 This resolution was commonly known as the “reverse important question” formula. 2 The resolution on dual representation called for making the People’s Republic a member of the United Nations with a permanent seat in the Security Council while retaining Taiwan in the General Assembly. 3 On 22 September, 1972, the Cabinet formally approved the dispatch o f the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister to China to enter into direct negotiations with the Chinese government. Naikaku kanbo naikaku sanjikan shitsu, Kakugi oyobi jimujikan nado kaigi fugi jiko no kenmei nado mokuroku, 1972, p. 104.

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At the global level, both superpowers continued to pursue the course of detente as evident from the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and continuing restraint on the part of the Soviet Union in the war in Vietnam as well as from the progress of a series of talks including a dialogue between the two German governments and the West Germany-Soviet Union treaty negotiations. The most important facet of the global component which impinged on the tactical decision was that there was a clear trend in favor of bringing the People’s Republic of China into the United Nations. On October 13, 1970, Canada extended diplomatic recognition to the PRC. Soon thereafter, Italy and several major states followed suit. On November 20 the same year, for the first time, those voting for the Albanian resolution calling for the admission of the PRC to, and the expulsion of the Nationalists from, the United Nations were in majority. By the fall of 1971, 63 states had recognized Beijing, while 55 states for Taipei. All these changes in the global setting were salient symptoms for Japan’s decision-makers. Thus the global system in 1971 was decidedly more favorable to ties with the PRC. Japan’s bilateral relationship with the PRC in 1970-71 was characterized by deterioration as Beijing kept up its denunciations of Japanese “remilitarization.” Beijing’s hostility toward the Sato government increased, especially after the Prime Minister’s 1969 visit to the United States, when he and President Nixon issued a joint communique indicating that Korea was “essential” and Taiwan “important” to Japan’s security. In Beijing’s view, the joint communique implied that the Japanese might be moving to play a new role in East Asia in the aftermath of the Nixon doctrine, calling for a reduced American military presence in Asia. Japan’s close relations with the Nationalist government in Taiwan was pervasive in the setting for the tactical decision. The emotional attachments that some leading LDP Diet members felt to Taiwan, and broad political and economic ties with the Nationalists were some of the reasons for Taiwan’s importance in Japan’s policy toward China. Japan’s trade with Taiwan consistently surpassed trade with the People’s Republic of China. In 1970 Japan’s Taiwan trade exceeded $950 million (about $700 in exports to Taiwan and about $250 million in imports), and in 1971 it was more than $1.2 billion.4 Japan’s investment in Taiwan had also grown rapidly. It accounted for a quarter of all investments in Taiwan after 1954 and by the end of September 1972, it was as high as $650 million.5 Through technical and licensing 4 Mendl, 1978, p. 130. 5 Ibid., p. 40.

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Empirical Analysis

agreements, Japan’s role in Taiwan’s industrial development had also become significant. Taiwan’s importance in Japan’s China policy extended beyond economic considerations. Some government and LDP leaders had developed personal ties with Chiang Kai-shek. Many LDP also felt a sense of personal obligation to him for the leniency with which he treated the Japanese at the close of World War n. United States behavior was a vital part of the setting for the decision. When dramatic policy shifts were unveiled in 1971, they created doubt and shock among top leaders in Tokyo. Despite the U.S.-China opening, Washington had taken a tough, demanding posture in the voting of allies in the UN over China’s representation and had strongly requested Japanese cooperation in its attempts to preserve the Nationalist Chinese seat in the General Assembly. The U.S.-Japanese negotiations on the textile issue was moving to a critical stage and the agreement on the return of Okinawa, which was signed in June 17 1971, was to be implemented by the following spring. The "American factor" was a constant in the decision process throughout, ultimately creating the psychological environment for the tactical decision. As for the political structure, the characteristics most relevant to the decision process were the sharp division in the ruling Liberal Democratic Party and the cabinet on the Chinese representation question. The Liberal Democratic Party held a majority in the Diet. So, it could obtain parliamentary approval for any foreign policy proposal. But the intraparty division contributed to the delaying of a tactical decision. It imposed restraints on the Prime Minister’s capacity for leadership. Although Prime Minister Sato enjoyed a strong position in the party, other faction leaders opposed to the Prime Minister used this issue to challenge his position in the party. This internal division became one of the environmental conditions for the tactical decision. Competing elite and interest group pressures were also present in the setting for decision. There was a widespread advocacy of Japan’s positive posture in the Chinese representation issue at the forthcoming UN General Assembly. Besides Sato’s factional opponents in the ruling LDP, the opposition parties urged the government to take positive steps to ensure the PRC’s admission to the UN. Interparty advocacies were also articulated by the Diet-members’ League for Promoting Restoration of Japan-China Diplomatic Relations (NiChu kokko kaifuku sokushin giin renmei), a multiparty organization advocating early normalization of relations with Beijing, established in December 1970. The League’s membership consisted of 379 out of 738 Diet

China

255

members - 95 Liberal Democrats, 154 Socialists, 71 members of the Komeito, 37 Democratic Socialists, 21 Communists, and one independent Diet member.6 It pressed for a revision of Japan’s China policy, with an emphasis on normalization of diplomatic ties with the PRC and a positive posture in the Chinese representation issue. During the Diet session in mid-July 1971, the League introduced a resolution advocating early normalization of diplomatic ties with the PRC and its seat in the United Nations General Assembly. The resolution did not, however, reach the floor in the Diet due to the government’s pressures on the League’s LDP members. The Foreign Ministry, one of the most powerful institutional interest groups in Japan’s foreign policy system, argued forcefully for Japan’s co-sponsorship even though it was not united in its advocacy. Of the Foreign Ministry’s advocacy and the division of views within it one commentator wrote: "In...the bureaucracy there was a sharp division of opinion as to whether Japan should accede to the American request. In the Foreign Ministry, intense and often emotional debates lasted for a full month. It was with a great deal of difficulty that an affirmative decision was finally reached by the top echelon, represented by the staunchly anti-Communist Deputy Vice-Minister Hogen Shinsaku, against the vigorous opposition of several middle-ranking officials, notably China Division Head Hashimoto Hiroshi."7 Almost all of the major newspapers were opposed to Japan’s co-sponsorship. Changes in Japan’s external environment, such as Nixon’s announcement of his planned visit to Beijing, did not have any marked effect on the Japanese public with regard to the Chinese UN representation issue, as reflected in opinion surveys.8

Strategic Decision The global system in 1972 was even more favorable to diplomatic ties with the PRC, when the People’s Republic displaced the Republic of China in the United Nations and when the overwhelming majority of nations severed their ties with the Nationalist regime and established diplomatic relations with 6 Gendai joho kagaku kenkyujo (ed.), Shiryo sengo no Ni-Chu kankei, 1971. See also Hayasaka, 1987, p. 358. 7 Fukui, 1977, p. 69. For the Foreign Ministry’s advocacy o f Japan's co-sponsorship o f the resolution calling for the expulsion of Taiwan as an important question and a twin resolution on dual Chinese representation, see also Tagawa, 1979, pp. 112-115. 8 See, for example, Watanabe, 1977, pp. 124-131.

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Empirical Analysis

Beijing. One important aspect of the global system to impinge upon the normalization issue was the behavior of the United Nations. In October, 1971, the General Assembly had approved the resolution calling for the seating of the People’s Republic of China in place of the Republic of China. Thus, the resolutions to preserve Nationalist China’s seat in the UN General Assembly were defeated. Moreover, by the summer of 1972, 74 states had recognized the People’s Republic of China, while 51 maintained diplomatic relations with the Nationalist government in Taiwan. Another facet of the global system which impinged on the decisions to establish diplomatic ties with Beijing was the Sino-American detente. Washington’s steps toward the Sino-American detente that culminated in President Nixon’s dramatic trip to China and the signing of the Shanghai communique ended the hostile confrontation that had shaped their relations for more than two decades and profoundly affected the nature of relations among the major powers in East Asia in general and Japan’s decision to normalize diplomatic ties with the PRC in particular. The bilateral component had undergone significant change from the coolness of Sato’s last year to the move of reconciliation with the election of the Tanaka government in July 1972. Sino-American rapprochement changed the context for Japan’s bilateral relationship with the PRC. The Chinese began to adopt a more flexible posture toward Japan in early 1972. They dropped both their strong denunciations of Japanese remilitarization and the political conditions they had set for trade. As one quantitative content analysis of the daily Renmin ribao has shown, criticisms of Japan had shown a sharp decline between October 1971 and May 1972 - as the time for Prime Minister Sato’s resignation had drawn nearer.9 The Chinese leaders also started to signal strongly that they wished to move promptly toward normalization of relations as soon as Sato was replaced as prime minister, which appeared imminent. Despite political and economic restrictions, there had been rapid growth of Sino-Japanese trade in the last three years before normalization. Another important environmental input was the United States. Before the opening of U.S.-China relations, "the American factor" had been the principal obstacle to normalizing Tokyo-Beijing ties. Although the actual reversion of Okinawa to Japanese sovereignty in May 1972 removed one of the most controversial issues from Japan-U.S. relations, economic issues continued to cause strains in their relationship. In the issue of Japan’s ties with China, the role of Washington was transformed from effective restraint, before the 9 Eto, 1972, p. 4. See also Okabe, 1976.

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257

opening of U.S.-China relations in 1971-72, to tacit approval for Japan’s normalization of relations with the PRC. The only other state to impinge on Japan’s behavior was the Nationalist government in Taiwan. Its role was a constraining element. For more than a quarter of a century, the Taiwan issue had been the most important bilateral problem in Sino-Japanese relations, and it had been one of the main obstacles to normalizing Tokyo-Beijing diplomatic ties. The Soviet factor was not entirely absent in the setting for a decision on normalization, but did not constitute a vital part of it. In the wake of the SinoAmerican rapprochement, the Soviet Union modified its rigid stance towards Japan. The change was discernible in Soviet interest in concluding a peace treaty with Japan,10 its flexible attitude on the question of Japan’s claim to the disputed northern islands, and the unusual speed with which the annual fisheries agreement was concluded in the spring of 1972.11 The shift to a more conciliatory approach toward Japan reflected the Soviet preoccupation with the military and political containment of the People’s Republic of China. Moscow wished to create a counterweight to the Sino-American rapprochement and to preempt the possibilities of Japan joining China and the U.S. in an anti-Soviet coalition by improving its relations with Tokyo. However, when the strategic decision-making was approaching a climax in August 1972, the Soviet attitude cooled to a certain degree.12*

10 Talks between the two governments on a peace treaty had virtually deadlocked since 1956. 11 In January 1972, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko visited Tokyo. The agreements reached during Gromyko's visit left the impression that a new era in Japanese-Soviet relations had been launched. The two parties agreed that talks on the question of concluding a peace treaty would begin before the end o f 1972. The two sides also agreed to “hold regular consultations at the level o f Foreign Ministers o f both countries at least once a year.” Moreover, both sides agreed to make efforts towards the development of economic cooperation. Gromyko even took a flexible stand on the territorial issue. For details o f Gromyko's visit to Japan and SovietJapanese relations in 1972, see Jain, 1981, pp. 133-137. For the contents o f the joint communique issued at the end o f Gromyko's stay in Japan, see Ibid., pp. 300-302. 12 The Soviet ambassador in Tokyo, Oleg Troyanovsky, who approached the Japanese government to propose preliminary negotiations on a peace treaty betwt en Japan and the Soviet Union soon after Tanaka assumed the office, returned to Moscow when he realized that Tanaka was determined to proceed with the Sino-Japanese rapprochement. “After Troyansky's departure,” Sato, Koyama and Kumon wrote, “which was intended to convey displeasure with Japan, however much the Ministry o f Foreign Affairs might have wished to commence preliminary negotiations with the Soviet Union, these did not get o ff the ground.” Sato, Koyama and Kumon, 1990, p. 308.

258

Empirical Analysis

In the internal sphere, public opinion was an important component in the setting for Japan’s strategic decision on normalization, serving as inducement. The UN decision to seat the PRC and expel Taiwan from the United Nations increased the popular demand for Japanese-Chinese diplomatic normalization.13 Pressures from competing elites and interest groups were also present in the setting for a decision. All opposition parties strongly advocated a positive decision. So did almost all major newspapers. The influential business community was profoundly affected by events such as the U.S.-China opening and the UN vote on Chinese representation. As a result, it came out in favor of normalization of relations with China.14

7.2 Decision-Makers and Their Images

Tactical Decision Japan’s tactical decision to co-sponsor the “reversed important question” resolution was made by Prime Minister Sato Eisaku. Sato was one of former Prime Minister Yoshida’s proteges and was known as an “honor student” of the so-called “Yoshida school,” a group of Yoshida’s political disciples who carried on his ideas. Foreign Minister Fukuda Takeo, a close confidant of Sato and a leading member of his faction in the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, played a decisive role in the decision. In terms of outlook on Japan’s China policy, there was a close resemblance between the outlooks of Sato and Fukuda. In the Diet debate, Sato and Fukuda appeared to be complimentary toward each other’s statements relating to the China issues. The principle of observing “international faith” (kokusai shingi), as espoused by Prime Minister Sato and Foreign Minister Fukuda constituted the dominant strand in their attitudinal prism on the Chinese representation question. This principle was used as a justification for Japan’s tactical decision to co-sponsor the two resolutions drafted by the United States at the 26th General Assembly. The commitment to respect “international faith” as a

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principle derived in part from the historical legacy of the Japan-Taiwan peace treaty of 1952. Its importance and relevance to the decision was articulated by both Prime Minister Sato and the Foreign Minister on several occasions.15 Hori Shigeru, a close confidant of Sato and then Secretary-General of the Liberal Democratic Party, pointed out in his memoirs that the prism of “international faith” was pervasive in Sato’s decision to co-sponsor the United States resolution designed to preserve a seat for Taiwan.16 For a politician like Sato, Japan’s international reputation depended on the reliable observance of its commitments to international treaties. Sato had attached great importance to the principle of keeping one’s word. He believed a national leader should carry out international commitments even when the original premises or interests underlying them had changed. Because Sato observed the “code of the politician,” one would expect him to observe previous agreements with the Nationalist regime even as the changes in Japan’s international and domestic environments caused his rivals within the LDP to question whether policies premised on Cold War strategy were still appropriate. In short, for a politician like Sato, what was most important was Japan’s international reputation for keeping agreements such as the relations established between the Republic of China and Japan by the 1952 bilateral peace treaty.17 Much of Sato’s perception also had its roots in the Japanese experience with World War II - the legacies of defeat. The loss of the war had the effect of isolating Japan from the mainstream of international politics. It became essential to win the trust of the international community in Japan’s faith and sincerity in order to reestablish relations with other states and participate in international organizations. Like Yoshida Shigeru, Sato seemed to believe that the essence of international relations was mainly based on ‘trust’ among states. It was this belief that enabled him to make the decision despite opposition from within the cabinet and the ruling LDP as well as from the competing elites and interest groups.

15 See, for example, Sato’s reply to a question on Chinese representation in the United Nations in the Budget Committee o f the lower house, Shugiin, Yosaniinkai giroku, No. 6, 67th Diet, October 30, 1971, p. 34. See also Shugiin, Gaimuiinkai giroku, No. 1, 67th Diet, October

13 For the results o f opinion polls conducted by major newspapers, see ”Ni-Chu kokko seijoka

22, 1971, p. 8.

o meguru kokumin yoron no ugoki,” Chosa Geppo, No. 1, January 1973, pp. 24-29.

16 Hori, 1975, p. 133. 17 For Sato's view o f Japan's reputation for keeping international agreements, see, for example, Asahi Shimbunsha, Shiryo: Nihon to Chugoku '45-'71, 1972, p. 117.

14 For an excellent study o f the business community and Japan's normalization o f relations with the People's Republic o f China, see Ogata, 1977, pp. 175-203.

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Empirical Analysis

Takeshita Noboru, one of the closest and most trusted confidants of the Prime Minister, articulated Sato’s motivations underlying his decision: his feeling of indebtness to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek for his generous attitude toward Japan after the war. "Especially in the case of the China problem, [Sato] emphasized ‘oriental virtue’ or ‘faith’.” According to Takeshita, Sato felt obligated in a very personal way by a “debt of gratitude” to the Generalissimo for allowing Japanese soldiers to be evacuated unmolested from China at the end of the war and by having opposed the division of Japan into occupation zones to be administered by the different victorious powers. As an expression of gratitude to the Generalissimo, Sato supported the Nationalist government. The Prime Minister seemed to believe that to change Japan’s China policy was to betray a man who issued a proclamation to “repay enmity with virtue” at the end of the war. Sato also felt that if Japan maintained its commitment to respect faith for the Nationalist government during his tenure, it would be easier for his successors to select new foreign policy lines.18 Within that prism, two components dominated the psychological environment of the Prime Minister: the reality of two governments in China and the obligation to Taiwan. Sato made several references to them in the Diet debates and in his policy speeches.19 In answering questions in the Budget Committee of the upper house on July 22, 1971, Prime Minister Sato stated, “...there still exist two governments in China and one of them is a permanent member of the UN Security Council. If this fact is ignored, how can we enjoy international faith.”20 The most important and elaborate articulation of these image components is found in the explanatory statement made by Aichi Kiichi, chairman of the Japanese delegation, on the question of Chinese representation in the UN at the 26th session of the General Assembly: [T]here are two governments confronting each other across the Taiwan Straits. One o f these is the Government o f the Republic of China, in effective control o f a population o f some fourteen million people who enjoy a high standard o f living in Taiwan. The other is the Government o f the People’s Republic o f China, in effective control o f mainland China with a population over 700 million people. At present 60 countries have diplomatic relations with the Republic o f China and 65

18 Miyazaki, 1980, p. 221. 19 See, for example, Shugiin, Yosaniinkai giroku, No. 2, 67th Diet, October 25, 1971, pp. 20-22: Shugiin, Yosaniinkai giroku, No. 4, 67th Diet, October 30, 1971, p. 34. 20 Asahi Shimbun, evening edition, July, 22, 1971.

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countries have diplomatic ties with the People’s Republic o f China. We believe that the United Nations should reflect the existing factual situation prevailing in the world... W e would welcome and look forward to the active participation o f the Government o f the People’s Republic o f China in the United Nations... On the other hand, the Republic o f China was one o f the principal and original founders o f the United Nations in 1945. Moreover, the Republic o f China has since then faithfully carried out her responsibilities and obligations under the charter... These are well known and indisputable facts that cannot be denied by anyone.21

The Prime Minister was also conscious of the regional environment. In his articulated image, any attempt to unseat the Nationalist government and replace it with the Beijing government in the United Nations would unnecessarily heighten tension in the East Asian region by overturning the existing balance of power on which the peace and security of the region depend.22 This was emphasized by him in explaining the government’s decision to co-sponsor the resolutions: “...the unilateral expulsion from the United Nations of the Republic of China, which is one of the important founding members of the United Nations, by the so-called Albanian resolution certainly is not only unrealistic from the standpoint of the international situation but it may also become the very cause of an intensification of tensions in Asia.”23 Moreover, Sato was concerned about the possible impact on Japan’s relations with the United States. He apparently feared possible U.S. economic and political sanctions in case he refused to comply with the American request. As Fukui wrote, [Sato] was obviously worried about its possible impact on the U.S. position on the textiles problem, which was entering the final and critical phase o f discussions, and, more importantly, on the actual reversion o f Okinawa, which was scheduled for the follow ing spring... Sato...felt that he could not afford to offend President Nixon once again and to suffer further retaliation in connection with such vital issues as trade and, especially, Okinawa reversion. Another Nixon shock would spell the end o f his power in Japanese government at least as surely as an unpopular move on the issue o f Chinese representation in the U .N.24

21 Gaimusho, Gaimusho Press Releases 1971, pp. 74-83. 22 See, for example, Shugiin, Yosan iinkai giroku, No. 6, 67th Diet, October 30, 1971, p. 34. 23 Gaimusho, Gaimusho Press Releases, 1971, p. 63. 24 Fukui, 1977, pp. 69-70.

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Empirical Analysis

The Foreign Minister articulated his image along the same lines pointing out the importance of observing international faith, the obligation to Taiwan, the regional environment and the world opinion. In his foreign policy speech to the Diet on October 19, 1971, Fukuda acknowledged that the international situation had changed: “The objective situation around the Chinese problem has been recently changing as many countries have come to recognize the People’s Republic of China and to establish diplomatic relations with that government, and as President Nixon has announced his plan to visit China.”25 Fukuda, like his Prime Minister, also emphasized the commitment to respect international faith as evident from the following passage from the same speech: I firmly believe that in no way should tensions be increased in Asia by causing a drastic change in the international situation. It is also important to pay careful consideration to not breaking international faith. In case Japan should give the impression that it is unreliable, it will not benefit our country’s future. If we easily fail to keep international faith when solving this problem, we cannot expect to receive any trust from Taiwan with its 14, 000,000 population, from the people of mainland China or from the world as a whole.26

There was one other strand in Fukuda’s perception: the need to continue close cooperation with the United States. In spite of the Sino-American rapprochement, the United States was determined to put forward a “oneChina, one-Taiwan” solution at the United Nations and the Japanese government came under great American pressure to co-sponsor the two resolutions drafted by the United States. In an interview, more than one year after the tactical decision, the Foreign Minister recalled the “American factor”: “...at that time, the United States very stubbornly requested Japan to become a co-sponsoring state of the ‘reverse important question’ and the ‘dual representation’ resolutions. The US maintained that if Japan could not become a co-sponsor, this would bring about grave consequences [for the success of the resolutions].”27

25 Gaimusho, Gaimusho Press Releases 1971, p. 71. 26 Ibid., p. 72. For the importance o f observing “international faith,” see also Fukuda’s statement in the Foreign Affairs Committee o f the lower house on October 22, Shugiin, Gaimu iinkai giroku, No. 1, 67th Diet, October 22, 1971, pp. 7-8. 27 Jiji Tsushinsha seijibu, 1972, p. 156.

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In sum, the reality of two governments representing China and a sense of continuing obligation to the Nationalist regime, a concern about possible destabilizing effects in the region, and the need to go along with the American request all argued for Sato’s tactical decision.

Strategic Decision Among the principal decision-makers at the time of Japan’s decision to normalize relations with China, the duumvirate stood apart, in terms of influence on the decision: Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei and Foreign Minister Ohira Masayoshi. The pre-eminent role of the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister was widely recognized. Without Tanaka’s decisiveness and his personal commitment, the normalization issue could have gone undecided for a while longer. Furui Yoshimi, a Liberal Democratic Diet member who conferred with both the Prime minister and Foreign minister several times before the strategic decision, observed that Tanaka and Ohira were the only Japanese leaders who could have pushed the decision through.28 Ultimate authority on the China issue rested with Tanaka. Of the duumvirate, Ohira, former foreign minister under the Ikeda Cabinet, was more articulate with a reputation for being well versed in foreign policy and spoke more frequently about foreign affairs. In fact, he had welldeveloped views on foreign affairs, while Tanaka’s notions were not wellformulated. Tanaka lacked the formal higher education of his peers and had a limited understanding of foreign affairs when he succeeded Sato as Prime Minister. But this was compensated by many years of experience in political life. Tanaka had another asset that helped him formulate a new China policy: he had keen political instincts, and knew how to sniff out the direction of public sentiment. In personality and character Tanaka was very different from Ohira. Tanaka was decisive and acted on intuition, Ohira was extremely cautious and had a habit of toying with a problem, advancing a step in one direction only to hop three steps to the side. The two men had respect for each other. Tanaka’s impulsive decision-making style was probably due in part to his insecurity about his lack of formal education. On occasions, Tanaka’s talent for making quick decisions did not give him sufficient time to consider various policy 28 Furui, 1972, pp. 143-144. See also Furui, 1978, p. 119.

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Empirical Analysis

alternatives or acquire new information bearing on the problem. Ohira on one occasion advised Tanaka: “Quit coming to hasty conclusions when negotiating with foreign countries. At home I’d like to have you say yes or no only after getting some consensus, first of all among the LDP, and also among the various government ministries, opposition parties, financial and labor circles, and so on. In saying yes or no a lot of responsibility is involved, so I want to hear you say yes or no after making preparations that will leave a clean aftermath at home. Your mind works fast and so you often do things only halfway along, when you think you’ve already understood everything, and that’s why I’m a little worried.”29 The new Prime Minister’s limited experience in foreign affairs led him to rely extensively on Ohira’s counsel. As Furui observed: “Tanaka has long experience in domestic policies but lacks experience in foreign affairs.”30 Tanaka himself was conscious of his limited knowledge of foreign affairs, and did not hesitate to accept the advice of men who he recognized had greater expertise. Consequently Ohira’s judgement, especially on the China issue was highly respected by the Prime Minister. At the same time, Ohira was on close personal terms with Tanaka. The two men developed a close working relationship. In short, Tanaka’s inexperience and inexpertness in foreign affairs enhanced the power of Foreign Minister Ohira. Tanaka also seemed to have had the politician’s ability to shift with prevailing winds. He was able to shift course quickly whenever he received evidence that a particular approach was not working. His beliefs seemed to have been highly transient and contingent on the atmosphere of the moment. He did not have a coherent, elaborated world view and had no strong enduring convictions about foreign affairs. His commitment to Sino-Japanese normalization was not well-grounded in any firm beliefs or principles.31 There were other cabinet ministers with substantial advisory influence, notably Vice-Prime Minister Miki Takeo. Miki was a long time advocate of establishing formal ties with Beijing and met Chinese leaders before the advent of the Tanaka cabinet. He was consulted during the gestation of the normalization decision and played a part in making the new government more acceptable to China’s leaders. He commented his role in the decision: “I had talked to Foreign Minister Ohira and the Prime Minister several times [on the

29 Sato, Koyama, and Kumon, 1990, p. 289. 30 Furui, 1972, p. 144. 31 Hayashi and Tsuji, Nihon naikakushiroku 6, 1981, p. 244.

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normalization issue]... I think my opinion was of some help to them.”32 Of the key decision-makers, three have been selected for image analysis, those persons who shaped the decisions of 1972. Before exploring in depth the images of Japan’s principal decision makers, their attitudinal prism relevant to the decision will be examined. Tanaka was known for his ability to act quickly and decisively, a personality trait which was displayed in his quick decision to normalize relations with Beijing. A major component of that prism was the historical legacy of the San Francisco system. In the early 1950s the whole question of alignment or neutrality was determined when the Japanese government led by Prime Minister Yoshida decided to sign the peace treaty at San Francisco without the participation of the Soviet Union or China, and to parallel the peace treaty with a bilateral Security Treaty between Japan and the United States. By adopting the San Francisco system, Japan aligned herself with the United States and the western bloc. In April 1952 Japan had been forced by the United States to conclude a bilateral peace treaty with the Nationalist government in Taiwan. The treaty became an integral part of the San Francisco system. The legacy of the San Francisco system had profoundly influenced Tanaka’s and Ohira’s approach to the China issue. Ohira acknowledged that the system, which was a product of the bipolar, cold-war era, had been the cornerstone of “Japan’s postwar management.” The major problem for the Japanese government, according to Ohira, had been how the talks on the normalization of relations with the government in Beijing could be conducted within the framework of the San Francisco system which the People’s Republic of China considered as a hostile system. Moreover, the difficulty of establishing formal ties with Beijing had been the existence of a government in Taiwan which was an integral part of the San Francisco system.33 Another significant aspect of the attitudinal prism of Japan’s decision­ makers which is relevant to the normalization issue is historical and emotional attachment to China. The historical heritage of interactions between Japan and China under many centuries had given them a sense of common cultural legacy in values. About this Hellmann wrote in 1964: “The beliefs that there is a special affinity between China and Japan rooted in their common cultural, linguistic, and racial backgrounds is accepted by virtually all conservatives, 32 Jiji Tsushinsha, 1972, p. 114. 33 For the full text of Ohira's speech at Imperial Hotel in Tokyo on October 6, 1972, see Ibid., pp. 188-197. In his speech, Ohira elaborated his thinking on the normalization o f Japan-China diplomatic relations at great length.

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Empirical Analysis

but for the pro-Peking faction, this is a fundamental article of faith on which their entire approach to the issue rests.”34 But feelings of affinity and admiration were mixed with guilt and condescension over Japanese expansionism and aggression during the half-century from 1894 to 1945. Thus Tanaka’s and Ohira’s views of China were ambivalent, with contrasting postures coexisting simultaneously in their analyses. Tanaka, like many other decision-makers, had a pro-American orientation but at the same time acknowledged Japan’s special relation with China, due to their Asian background and recent historical experience. Tanaka acknowledged this strand in the Diet interpellation on March 23 1972: I have always used the expression that Japan’s military aggression caused great inconveniences to mainland China. ...I think my feelings that the first task o f Japan-China normalization would be to express a feeling of profound regret should be a major premise w ill not change now or in the future. The Japan-China relationship has a history o f 2000 years, or even much older. Moreover, the Japanese civilization has been nurtured by the Chinese civilization, and the two peoples are o f a common oriental race. Therefore, we have to promote a normalization of Japan-China relations from a new perspective, position and angle, beyond love and hate.35

Tanaka rarely spoke about the China issue before becoming Prime Minister, reflecting the sensitivity and controversial nature of the China issue in Japanese politics. His occasional remarks to the press, before the Diet and the meetings of the LDP organs were either too abstract or diplomatically evasive. The Prime Minister, like other key decision-makers, clearly perceived the change in the nature of the global international system and stressed the need to adjust Japan’s relationship with the People’s Republic of China to the new international environment. Tanaka articulated this global component on June 27, 1972, just before he became Prime Minister: “International politics has entered into a new, multipolar era. The new turn in Sino-American relations symbolizes the fundamental change in postwar East-West relations characterized by confrontations.”36 Some of the image components of Prime Minister Tanaka are evident in his policy speech on October 28, about a month

34 Hellmann, 1964, p. 1087. 35 Cited in Hayasaka, 1987, p. 362. 36 Jiyu Shinpo, June 27, 1972.

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after his visit to Beijing. He cited the reasons for normalizing Japan-China relations: It is true that numerous factors o f instability still exist in many areas in present international society, but a world-wide trend has begun to ease tensions through negotiations instead o f by confrontation. In such a world situation, Japan has realized the normalization o f diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China... It was due to the strong support o f our people’s opinion reflecting the trend o f the times that enabled us to solve the long-pending Japan-China problem by normalizing diplomatic relations and placing good-neighborly relations on a firm basis. My decision to normalize our relations with China was made only after careful consideration o f the change in the international situation, and o f the unfortunate relations which had existed between Japan and China during the past half-century...37

There is some evidence to suggest that Tanaka was moved to act by an image of the significance that Japan-China normalization would have on East Asian international politics. In his speech to the 71st session of the Diet on January 27, 1973, he spoke: “It was the thought that it would contribute to peace and stability in the Asian area that urged the government to normalize diplomatic relations - a pending issue of long standing.”38 In a Diet debate Tanaka elaborated on this point: “China has 700 or 800 million people. If one adds Japan’s 100 million, there are 800 or 900 million people, or one fourth of the 3.6 billion people on earth. It is needless to say the fact that a quarter of the population on earth in the past half-century have not been able to have relations has been a great unstable factor in Asia.”39 There is little doubt that Ohira’s image was shaped by developments since the summer of 1971. Foreign Minister Ohira’s image of China became clearly positive ever since the changes in the external environment of Japan as symbolized in Nixon’s announcement to visit China. In his speech to the meeting of his faction on September 1, 1971, Ohira stated:

37 "Policy Speech by Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka at the 70th Session o f the National Diet, October 28, 1972," Gaimusho Press Releases, 1972, pp. 38-39. 38 "Policy Speech by Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka at the 71th Session o f the National Diet, January 27, 1973," Gaimusho Press Releases, 1973, p. 2. 39 Shugiin, Yosan iinkai giroku, No. 2, 70th Diet, November 2, 1972, p. 13.

268

Empirical Analysis In the Diet in 1964,1 made a statement to the effect that if Beijing should receive the world’s blessing and become a member o f the United Nations, Japan, too, should work for a normalization o f relations with Beijing.40 After that, discussion o f China’s representation at the United Nations took place on several occasions, and since last autumn the majority opinion at the United Nations has rapidly inclined toward recognizing the right of Beijing to represent China. Since then, not only have the number o f countries with diplomatic relations with Beijing continued to grow, but public opinion in our country has also been moving noticeably in this direction. I judge that the time is now ripe for the government to assess this situation and to make, as it were, an ultimate decision on the China issue. Therefore, I believe that the government, in keeping with the spirit and principle of Japan-China friendship, would be faithful to public opinion at home and abroad by opening, as quickly as possible, negotiations with the government in Beijing. And until such a decision is reached, I should ask the government to refrain from actions, such as supporting the scheme for inverse substantive issue designation in the United Nations, which run counter to the mainstream o f public opinion.41

The issue of normalization was perceived in terms of Japan’s quest for a more independent foreign policy. Ohira saw in the early 1970s a multipolarized world. He perceived greater freedom to follow an independent foreign policy line as long as it did not harm Japan’s alliance with the United States. This was evident from the speech Foreign Minister Ohira gave at the America-Japan Society just before the strategic decision: “...in our efforts to diversify our diplomacy to face the challenges of a rapidly changing world, it will become all the more important for us to secure a firm foundation of the security arrangement with the United States. I am also convinced that such close ties between Japan and the United States can be and must be compatible with the efforts of both countries to pursue peaceful coexistence with the People’s Republic of China and the Soviet Union. One of the immediate tasks

40 On February 20, 1964, then Foreign Minister Ohira, declared his view on normalization of diplomatic relations with the People's Republic in the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House o f Councillors: “when the situation is such, that Communist China is admitted into the UN, we have to duly consider and deal with it.” Shaw, 1968, p. 173. 41 Sato, Koyama, and Kumon, 1990, p. 281. For the Japanese text o f Ohira's speech, see Ohira Masayoshi kaisoroku kankokai, ed., Ohira Masayoshi kaisoroku, shiryohen, 1982, p.

210 .

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in diversifying our diplomacy is to achieve the normalization of our relations with China.”42 Ohira maintained that Japan’s foreign policy during most of the postwar period had been passive and had followed the “safety first” principle. The Japanese government was able to concentrate on economic development without having its own policy deserving the name of “diplomacy” because of its cooperation with and dependence on the United States. Japan could maintain stability in its foreign relations only by automatically pursuing the established foreign policy line of close cooperation with the United States. In Ohira’s view, relations between Japan and the United States should be put on a more equal basis and Japan could pursue a more independent position in foreign policy by ridding itself of excessive American dependence. His concern about Japan’s independent position to be taken in foreign policy grew out of pride in Japanese economic achievements, the nationalistic mood and the international acclaim they had brought. His concern about Japan’s role in international politics was also brought on by a perception of American decline.43 After the “Nixon shocks,” the so-called “absence of diplomacy” era, according to Ohira, had entered the stage of collapse and Japan should formulate its own foreign policy line in order to cope with the rapidly changing environment in and around itself. To Ohira, it was no longer appropriate to adhere to the acquiescent and reactive policies of the past. Japan, in Ohira’s perception, must increasingly set forth its own policies and principles. One step toward the goal of diplomatic independence was the opening of relations with the People’s Republic of China. On this, he remarked: “...in speaking on the China question, the tenet of Japan’s foreign policy is to be dependent on, or acquiescent to, the United States. On the controversial issues such as the question of China, it was considered as advantageous to act in accordance with the US...”44 In his speech on May 8, 1972, Ohira drew attention to another stimulus to the strategic decision: “We, in order to achieve permanent reconciliation between Japan and China which have the responsibility for peace in Asia, have 42 "Address by His Excellency Mr. Masayoshi Ohira, Ministry o f Foreign Affairs, to the America-Japan Society, August 11, 1972," Gaimusho, Gaimusho Press Releases, 1972, p. 24. 43 For Ohira's view o f Japan's postwar foreign policy, see, for example, his speech before Ajia Chosakai (The Asian Research Group) on December 6, 1971, Ajicho Geppo (February 1972), No. 22, pp. 30-41. 44 Ibid., p. 36.

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Empirical Analysis

to hurry the normalization of relations between the two countries.”45 The regional component in Ohira’s image is also evident in his foreign policy speech to the Diet on October 28, 1972 in which he explained the SinoJapanese normalization of relations: “...to normalize the diplomatic relationship between Japan and China and thereby establish good-neighborly and friendly relations between the two nations is most important for consolidating the foundation of stability and prosperity in Asia.”46 In Ohira’s view, the international system in the early 1970s was a world of political multipolarity with military bipolarity. He attached importance to adapting Japan’s China policy to the new international environment. This global change had transformed the character of relations among the major powers in East Asia. Ohira claimed that there was a state of balance in relationships among the four major powers - the United States, the Soviet Union, China, and Japan - in East Asia. It was a type of equilibrium in which four major nations were constantly interacting and adjusting their relationships, each trying not only to maintain and improve its position but also to prevent dangerous new imbalances from emerging. He argued that while relative stability appeared to exist in relations among the four major power themselves, the region as a whole remained unstable. The conflicts on the Korean peninsula and in Vietnam, for instance, could destabilize the existing balance. East Asian nations were far more diverse among themselves in economics, culture, religion, etc. than European nations and, as a consequence, contained many factors of instability. Ohira maintained that two of the major powers in East Asia, China and Japan shared responsibility for the maintenance of the region’s stability.47 Ohira’s image of the external environment is evident in the most elaborate and important articulation of his view at the time - his speech on August 10, 1972: The reasons why the government came to such a judgement are that we perceived the great changes in [Japan’s] internal and external situations on the question of

45 Ohira Masayoshi Kaisoroku Kankokai, ed., Ohira Masayoshi kaisoroku, shiryohen, 1982, p. 219. 46 “Foreign Policy Speech by Foreign Minister Masayoshi Ohira at the 70th Session o f the National Diet, October 2 8 ,1 9 7 2 ,” Gaimusho Press Releases, 1972, p. 32. 47 This summary of Ohira's image of the regional component is based upon his speech on May 8, 1972. See Ohira Masayoshi Kaisoroku Kankokai, ed., Ohira M asayoshi kaisoroku, shiryohen, 1982, pp. 215-219.

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China in the last two or three years. First, ever since Canada recognized the government in Peking, 25 additional states have recognized that government. At present, 77 nations, including 72 member states o f the United Nations, came to recognize the Beijing government as the legitimate government o f China. Moreover, at the 25th General Assembly o f the United Nations last year, the question of Chinese representation resulted in a very dramatic way... It was judged that the Peking government is the rightful representative o f China at the United Nations... I think it is not mistaken to draw the conclusion that China’s foreign policy has become very realistic... The United States and China, after having gone through the processes o f confrontation and struggle, have entered into the phase o f dialogue...48

As is apparent from the above passage, the attitude of Beijing was one of Ohira’s most relevant image-components. He clearly perceived that China’s policy toward Japan had become realistic and flexible and that both countries began to approach the normalization issue with increased honesty and realism.49 There was also a sense of obligation to the Nationalist government in Taiwan. The very existence of the Peace Treaty with Taipei was perceived by Tanaka and Ohira as an obstacle to the rapprochement with Beijing. Recognition of the mainland regime would mean an abrogation of the peace treaty with the ROC, thereby destroying the very foundation of Japan’s prevailing China policy. However, this “Taiwan factor” became less important to the key decision-makers as a result of inputs from both the external and internal environments. Ohira was acutely conscious of the growing desire for normalized relations with China within the public: “The Japanese are very sensitive to changes in the international situation... The public opinion in Japan concerning the China issue has greatly changed, judging from the opinion surveys conducted by various newspapers, and I believe that a great majority of the people have come to favor one side on this issue.”50 In his address to the Diet on October 28, while explaining the strategic decision, the Foreign Minister declared: “The Tanaka Cabinet, from its first formation, considered it necessary to 48 Ohira, 1972, pp. 9-10. 49 See Ohira's speech delivered at Naigai Josei Chosakai (Research Council on Internal and External Situations) on October 6, 1972, in Jiji Tsushinsha, 1972, p. 195. See also Ohira, 1972, p. 9. 50 Ohira, 1972, p. 10.

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Empirical Analysis

respect the desire of the Japanese people for normalization of relations with China, which had quickly gained strength by such international developments as the outcome of the debate on the Chinese representation issue at the United Nations General Assembly last year and the visit to China of United States President Richard M. Nixon.”51 On another occasion Ohira elaborated the links between the increasing public demand for normalization and the political obligation to accommodate that demand in the following manner: “We politicians can not ignore such a situation... and how to realize the desires of the people in general is the responsibility of the sphere of serious politics... It is not healthy for Japan if the demand is left unfulfilled and discontent spreads within the country... It is a condition of political constipation.”52 The Foreign Minister articulated a perception of competing elites or interest groups as relevant to the decision to normalize relations with China. The attitudes of other parties and various interest groups were known and absorbed but they were not significant, perhaps because of the near-total support for the decision among competing elites, as well as the press and the business community. He stated: “...opposition parties have long been opposing [government’s] China policy, and now the majority of the business community, mass media and labor organizations came to advocate the change in policy toward China.”53 Ohira articulated the attitudes of the superpowers and nations in East Asia as relevant for the strategic decision: “the Cabinet gave full consideration to the possible impact of the Sino-Japanese normalization upon our country’s relations with the United States, the Soviet Union and all other nations in the Asia-Pacific region.”54 In Ohira’s perception, Japan’s relations with the United States was an important environmental variable. He regarded the alliance with the US as the cornerstone of Japan’s foreign policy and the foundation of its policies toward all other nations, including the policy toward the People’s Republic of China.

51 "Foreign Policy Speech by Foreign Minister Masayoshi Ohira at the 70th Session o f the National Diet, October 28, 1972," Gaimusho Press Releases, 1972, p. 32. 52 Foreign Minister Ohira’s speech delivered at Naigai Josei Chosakai (Research Counicl on Internal and External Situations) on October 6, 1972, in Jiji Tsushinsha, 1972, pp. 194-195. 53 Jiyu Shinpo, June 6, 1972. These image components are also found in Ohira's speech on August 10, 1972. Ohira, 1972, p. 9. 54 "Foreign Policy Speech by Foreign Minister Masayoshi Ohira at the 70th Session o f the National Diet," Gaimusho, Gaimusho Press Releases 1972, p. 32.

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The normalization of relations between Japan and China “should and can be compatible with the maintenance of close friendly relations between Japan, the United States and all other countries.”55 Tanaka and Ohira explicitly sought Washington’s approval or, at least, acquiescence, in their proposed normalization with China by meeting Nixon in Honolulu in the beginning of September 1972. In his book published six years after the Japan-China normalization, Ohira pointed out the importance of linking Japan’s quest for normalization of relations with PRC with the maintenance of the Japan-U.S. alliance: “At the [Honolulu summit] meeting we promised the United States to maintain the Japan-U.S. security system and...declared our intent to go ahead with the normalization of Japan-China relations. The U.S. wished us success [with our efforts]...” He continued: “But my worry was whether China could be drawn into negotiations on normalization of relations considering the fact that our country firmly maintained the Japan-U.S. security treaty. This is because the Chinese side had constantly reiterated statements critical of the Japan-U.S. security treaty. After the Japan-US summit meeting, I closely watched the Chinese moves. However, China did not show any special response to the Japan-U.S. joint declaration issued after the meeting. Accordingly, I felt that unless China objects to the San Francisco system based on the Japan-US security treaty, we should now resolve the long-pending issue of normalization of Japan-China relations. I perceived the Chinese attitude towards the Japan-US security treaty to be flexible and realistic...”56 Foreign Minister Ohira, at the first meeting of the LDP’s Council for Japan-China Normalization on July 24, 1972, gave five reasons for the government’s judgement as to why the time was right for normalization: 1) 72 states having recognized the government in Beijing; 2) China’s entry into the United Nations; 3) the U.S. rapprochement with China; 4) the changes in Japanese public opinion; and 5) the changes in China’s attitude toward Japan.57 Among the key decision-makers, Deputy Prime Minister Miki Takeo had pressed hardest for normalization of Japan-China relations. Miki was among the most dovish of the key decision-makers. Like Ohira and Tanaka, he was aware of the public demand for the normalization of relations with the

55 Ibid., p. 34. 56 Ohira, 1978, pp. 123-124. 57 Iwami, 1972, pp. 20-21.

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People’s Republic. His psychological setting also included China’s entry into the United Nations and Sino-American rapprochement.58 Miki was also conscious of the regional environment as evident from his speech on May 17, 1972: “...to continue antagonistic relations with our neighboring country, China, would not only allow...the tension in the AsianPacific region to continue, but also cause some apprehensions about Japan’s image in Asian countries.”59 Miki elaborated this point soon after the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations: “Stability in the Pacific area cannot be achieved as long as lasting friendly relations are not established between Japan and China, in the same way that stability cannot be expected in Europe without lasting friendly relations between France and Germany. The responsibility placed upon Japan and China is to build up the foundation for a lasting Japan-China reconciliation, with the restoration of Japan-China diplomatic relations as a starting point, and so to contribute to the stability of the Asian-Pacific area.”60 Miki, like Ohira, perceived the link between the recognition of the Beijing government and the strengthening of the foundation of Japan’s foreign policy. While not challenging the basic premise of the alliance with the United States, he urged Japan to take a much more independent look at its foreign policy. He noted that, in the multipolar world of the early 1970s, Japan should not continue her prior policies of acquiescent diplomacy of the Cold War era that permitted Japan to take shelter behind a strong American military and political stance, avoiding to take her own initiatives in international politics. He felt that Japan should pursue a more independent policy toward other nations, including China, by ridding itself of excessive American influences: “The era of Cold War was already gone. In the era of the Cold War dominated by the poles of the United States and the Soviet Union, Japan’s capability was not strong enough and [Japan] could follow the American line or, as it is called, the acquiescent diplomacy. But in today’s multipolar era, Japan’s diplomacy should have an independent character and she should make her own decision with her own outlook, judgement and responsibility... The restoration of Japan-China relations will not cause the worsening of the Japan-U.S. relations

58 These image-components are evident in one o f the most important articulations o f Miki's image at the time - his speech before Ajiya Chosakai (The Asian Research Group) on May 17, 1972. See Miki, 1972, pp. 2-11. 59 Ibid., p. 3. 60 Miki, 1973, p. 20.

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nor will it lead to the cooling of Japan-Soviet relations... Rather, I believe, it will strengthen the foundation of Japan’s foreign policy.”61 To Miki, the reality of the regime in Beijing as the legitimate government representing China was central to his image: “As it became apparent by the decision of the United Nations, the only legitimate government of China is the People’s Republic of China and Taiwan does not have that qualification... Taiwan is an indissoluble part of the territory of the PRC.”62 In Miki’s perception, there was also a recognition that the state of war still existed between Japan and China since the peace treaty of 1952 was made with the Nationalist government. Accordingly, he continued, Japan should start negotiations with Beijing with a view to concluding a new peace treaty.63

7.3 Decision Process and Implementation

The roots of the “China issue” lay in the existence of two Chinas and Japan’s conclusion of a bilateral peace treaty with the Nationalist Government on Taiwan in 1952. In September 1951, Japan signed a peace treaty with the United States and its Western allies at the San Francisco peace conference, ending the state of war that had technically continued up to that time. The Soviet Union took part, but refused to sign the treaty. Both the People’s Republic of China and the Nationalist government in Taiwan were excluded from the peace conference because of the Anglo-American dispute over the question of Chinese representation. The treaty obligated Japan to conclude peace separately with China, without specifying which Chinese government it should negotiate with. In theory, Japan could make its own decision whether to recognize Beijing or Taipei. In practice, it had no choice, for the Japanese government, as one of the conditions for ratification of the 1951 peace treaty by the U.S. Senate, was required to pledge itself not to recognize the People’s Republic of China. In a letter to the chief of the ROC mission in Tokyo on September 19, 1951, Yoshida made clear his intentions to establish in Taipei an Overseas Agency,

61 Miki, 1972, p. 4. 62 Ibid. 63 Ibid.

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the closest thing to an embassy that Japan was then allowed to establish.64 The Agency was established on November 17. Dulles needed added assurances from the Japanese premier that Japan did not intend to conclude a treaty with the regime in Beijing. Yoshida met Dulles on December 13, and the latter read him a memorandum that the Senate, the Congress, and the American people would want to know prior to ratification proceedings whether the Japanese government intended to pursue its foreign policy in Asia compatible with American foreign policy. Then he suggested that Japanese interests might best be served by negotiating with the Nationalist government. In response to Dulles’ reading of the memorandum, Yoshida stated the following day that he had no objection in principle to the course suggested by Dulles but was reluctant to take this course if the British were strongly opposed. Yoshida, pushed in different directions by Washington and London, was reluctant to offend either power and pleaded for American and British unity in policy with respect to China. But soon Yoshida, mindful of Japan’s dependence on the United States for political and economic recovery as well as for military security, yielded to American pressures. On December 18, Dulles handed a draft of a letter, professing Japan’s intention to conclude a peace treaty with the government in Taipei, which Dulles wanted Yoshida to send to him. Dulles explained that such a letter from the Japanese Prime Minister “would be the minimum without which it would probably be impossible to obtain the ratification of the Treaty.”65 The main points of the letter are these: The Japanese Government desires ultimately to have a full measure o f political peace and commercial intercourse with China which is Japan’s close neighbor. My government is prepared as soon as legally possible to conclude with the Nationalist Government o f China, if that government so desires, a Treaty which w ill reestablish normal relations between the two governments in conformity with the principles set out in the multilateral Treaty o f Peace... I can assure you that the Japanese Government has no intention to conclude a bilateral treaty with the Communist regime o f China.66

64 Gaimusho, Dai 9 kai kokai gaiko bunsho, 1982, Document no. 6 0379-6 0380. 65 "Memorandum o f conversation, by the United States political advisor to SCAP (Sebald) December 18 1951," FRUS 1951, 6: 1444. For the text o f a draft o f the letter, See Ibid., pp. 1445-1446. 66 For the full text o f the "Yoshida letter," see Gaimusho, Dai 9 kai kokai gaiko bunsho, 1982, Document no. 0070-0072.

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Through the “Yoshida letter” dated December 24, 1951, Prime Minister Yoshida committed his government to a bilateral peace treaty with the Nationalist government in Taiwan. The treaty was signed on April 28, 1952, establishing diplomatic relations between Japan and the government in Taiwan and recognizing that government as the legitimate government of China. Yoshida managed to minimize Japan’s obligations by making it clear that the treaty applied only to territory actually under Nationalist control, leaving Japan free to decide later about the rest of China. But the bilateral peace treaty nevertheless locked Japan into the pro-Nationalist, anti-communist posture adopted by the United States. It also left a residue of bitterness on the part of Beijing that was to last for two decades and foreclosed for an indefinite period any official relationship with the People’s Republic of China.

Tactical Decision The question of seating the People’s Republic of China at the United Nations was for the first time submitted to the General Assembly in 1950. When a proposal was then put forward by India, requesting the seating of Beijing, it was defeated by a vote of 16 in favor, 33 opposed, with 10 abstentions.67 From 1951 to 1960 the issue was put to the General Assembly in the form of the procedural motion of whether to include the question of Chinese representation on the agenda. It had always been defeated, with Japan voting for non-inclusion. The majority on the procedural matter of keeping the Chinese representation question off the agenda in the Assembly was, however, threatened when a number of African states declared that they would vote in favor of seating Beijing in 1961.68 From 1961 to 1970, the General Assembly voted in favor of treating the issue of a UN seat for the People’s Republic as an “important question.” Japan had followed the U.S. line in the General Assembly. The initial stimulus to the tactical decision was a considerable increase in pressure at the United Nations towards the seating of the People’s Republic of China as witnessed by the 1970 session of the General Assembly. The American stratagem on China’s representation, faithfully supported by Japan,

67 Ota, 1971, p. 31. 68 Ibid.

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Empirical Analysis

had been eroding each year. This procedural device known as the ’’important question” resolution required that the admission of the Beijing government must be approved by a two-thirds majority of UN members. In 1970, the “important question” resolution received 66 to 52 vote. At the same time, the Albanian resolution, which provided for the seating of the People’s Republic of China and the ouster of the Nationalist government, had for the first time obtained a plurality at the 1970 General Assembly, 51 to 49.69 Faced with the prospect of losing in 1971 and with the fact that several important nations had deserted their ranks, the United States and Japan began to consider a different approach to the issue of Chinese representation. Fully aware of the gravity of this situation, Japan was anxious to coordinate strategy for the forthcoming session of the General Assembly. During Spring 1971, frequent consultations had taken place between officials of the Foreign Ministry and their American counterparts to explore the various options. However, aside from maintaining the standard line about opposing the PRC’s entry at the expense of Taiwan, the United States remained very much silent over strategy and tactics.70 While the Japanese government waited for guidance, a new perspective was given to the China question when Nixon’s forthcoming visit to China was announced on July 15 at 10.30 p.m. (on July 16 at 11.30 a.m. Japan time). This was done without consulting and notifying Prime Minister Sato in advance. For years the U.S. had emphasized the necessity for consultation and coordination with respect to China. The news reached Tokyo only three minutes before Nixon’s official announcement.71 Nixon’s move toward accommodation with China became a decisive input into Japan’s foreign policy system. This “Nixon shock” proved to be the first of several decisive inputs that eventually led to the tactical and strategic decisions in 1971-1972. One month later, on August 15, 1971, President Nixon, in an attempt to cope with an unprecedented trade deficit and pressure against the dollar, devalued the dollar and imposed a 10 percent surcharge on all imports into the United States. No foreign government including Japan was forewarned of the decisions.

69 Nihon Keizai Shimbun, November 21, evening edition, 1970. 70 For Foreign Minister Fukuda's recollection o f the events leading to the tactical decision, see Jiji Tsushinsha seijibu (ed.), Dokyumento Ni-Chu fukko, 1972, pp. 152-159. 71 Secretary Rogers telephoned Ushiba Nobuhiko, Japan's Ambassador in the United States to convey the news and the Ambassador, in turn, telephoned the Foreign Ministry in Tokyo. Furukawa, 1988, p. 333.

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Nixon’s China decision, combined with his economic decisions, led the Japanese decision-makers to realize that Japan could no longer rely on a “special relationship” with the United States. They felt a sense of betrayal in not being consulted before the opening of U.S.-China contacts. As Prime Minister Sato told Gough Whitlam, the Australian Labor leader, “I have done everything they [the American administration] have asked. They let me down.”72 In his memoirs, Kissinger acknowledged the error of not consulting the Japanese prime minister: I believe in retrospect that we could have chosen a more sensitive method o f informing the Japanese...It would have surely been more courteous and thoughtful, for example, to send one of my associates from the Peking trip to Tokyo to brief Sato a few hours before the official announcement. This would have combined secrecy with a demonstration o f special consideration for a good and decent friend.73

Publicly humiliated by the “Nixon shock,” the Sato government began to diversify its foreign relations. Just before Nixon’s visit to China was to take place, the Japanese government dispatched its top officials to Hanoi to discuss affairs despite U.S. protests. About the same time, Prime Minister Sato also decided to establish diplomatic relations with Outer Mongolia. A sudden shift in Washington’s policy toward China caused consternation in Japan and created the atmosphere of crisis in Japan-US relations in the short run. Japan’s posture toward China had for many years been in line with American policy. The primary concern of successive Japanese governments had been to avoid pursuing any China policy that could produce undesirable consequences for Japan’s relations with the United States. Nixon’s announcement of his intended visit to China was a marked departure from the pattern of close consultation and cooperation on matters relating to China policy. The fundamental context for Sino-Japanese relations was changed with the sudden prospect of the U.S.-China opening. Within Japan, the significance of the U.S. move toward rapprochement with the People’s Republic was immediately recognized. Debate in Japan over China policy and political pressure on the government to change its China policy intensified. Competing elites marshalled their forces to advocate the shift in Japan’s China policy. The attentive public responded quickly to changes in 72 Welfield, 1988, p. 295. 73 Kissinger, 1979, p. 760.

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Japan’s external environment by demanding a more positive policy toward the People’s Republic. Secretary-General Imai Akira of the National Congress for the Restoration of Japan-China Diplomatic Relations (Ni-Chu kokko kaifuku kokumin kaigi) articulated a prevailing mood within the attentive public. He urged the government to refrain from co-sponsoring the “reverse important question” resolution designed to preserve a UN seat for Taiwan.74 Even within the ruling LDP, many felt that the government should now move to establish diplomatic relations with the Beijing government. The LDP Policy Board Chairman, Kosaka Zentaro, summed up the impact of Nixon’s announcement on the LDP: “...the view that [Japan] should normalize diplomatic relations with mainland China has increasingly gained strength within the Party, and this is due in large part to Nixon’s decision to visit China.”75 Miki Takeo, one time Foreign Minister (1966-1968), was the first faction leader within the LDP to make his position toward the Nationalist government explicit by stating that relations with the Nationalists would have to be sacrificed for the more important task of normalizing ties with the PRC. Although the Prime Minister began using the term “People’s Republic of China” in referring to the government on the mainland, he was not prepared to abandon the Nationalist government in order to assure Japan’s own future standing in Beijing. In line with its reexamination of its fundamental approach to U.S.-China relations, Washington moved to redefine its position on the Chinese representation issue in the UN. By the beginning of August, the United States made its new posture clear. It suggested that the People’s Republic be seated in the General Assembly and Security Council, but, at the same time, advocated continued representation for the Nationalist regime in the General Assembly. On August 2, for example, American Secretary of State William Rogers declared that the US would welcome the PRC seating in the UN, but at the same time would oppose any moves to expel the nationalists. Thus Washington had become more disposed toward a “two-China” solution in the UN and departed from the previous unequivocal position - opposition against the seating of the People’s Republic in the United Nations. The American’s request for Japan’s co-sponsorship of the “reverse important question” resolution designating the expulsion of the Nationalist 74 Asahi Shimbun, August 25, 1971. The congress was formed in February 1971 and included members from the Socialist Party, Sohyo, the Japan-China Cultural Exchange Association, the Japan Socialist Youth Alliance, and other groups and individuals. For its membership, see, for example, Lee, 1976, p. 94. 75 Mainichi Shimbunsha (ed.), 1971, p. 338.

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government from the UN as an important question requiring a two-thirds majority and the resolution on dual Chinese representation was officially made at the meetings of U.S.-Japan UN representatives held at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Tokyo on August 22 and 23.76 Despite the adverse developments in Japan’s external and internal environments, the Foreign Ministry had been advocating compliance with Washington’s request to become a co-sponsor. However, the division of views within the Liberal Democratic Party and the government disrupted the decision process and made delay seem unavoidable. Many LDP Diet members were now inclined to advocate that Japan abstain from voting on the question of the PRC’s membership at the coming UN General Assembly in the fall, because of their belief that the US resolutions would fail, and because abstention would serve as an indication to Beijing of Japan’s non-hostile posture and a signal to the Japanese people of the government’s desire for the normalization of relations with the PRC.77 One of the first influential LDP Diet members to speak up against the government’s UN policy was former Foreign Minister Miki Takeo. Ever since Nixon’s July announcement, Miki openly criticized the Sato government’s policy toward the question of China’s UN representation right. Ohira Masayoshi, Foreign Minister under the Ikeda cabinet in the early 1960s, had become increasingly critical of Sato’s China policy, which he considered inflexible and unimaginative. But, true to his nature, he remained extremely cautious in taking a definite stand on the question of China’s representation in the UN. It was not until many members of the Ohira faction called for a more positive stance towards the People’s Republic that he finally made up his mind. On September 1 Ohira, at the study meeting of his faction, urged the government not to pursue a China policy, such as supporting the “reverse important question” resolution designed to preserve a seat for the Nationalists in Taiwan, that would counter the international and domestic opinion.78 Miki and Ohira were soon joined by other LDP leaders such as Nakasone Yasuhiro, Chairman of the LDP Executive Board, and Kosaka Zentaro, 76 Asahi Shimbun, August 25, 1971. 77 Pro-Beijing LDP Diet member Furui Yoshimi observed that in the fall of 1971 there were at least five groupings in the ruling LDP with regard to the China issue ranging from die-hard pro-Beijing elements to non-aligned floaters to die-hard pro-Taipei elements. See Mainichi Shimbunsha (ed.), Nihon to Chugoku: seijoka e no michi, 1971, p. 258. See also Fukui, 1975, p. 165. 78 Asahi Shimbun, September 2, 1971.

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Chairman of the LDP’s Policy Board. They all argued that Japan should not simply follow Washington’s policy by co-sponsoring the U.S.-drafted resolutions, but make its own decision on the basis of its own judgement.79 There was also cabinet disunity over the representation issue. At the cabinet meeting on September 3, the Minister of Agriculture and Forestry Akagi Munenori advocated a cautious attitude on the question of co-sponsorship of the “reverse important question” resolution.80 On September 7, a similar advocacy was made by the Minister of Justice, Maeo Shigesaburo. The government’s and the LDP’s examination of Japan’s posture on the question of China’s UN membership was intensified in preparation for the Foreign Minister’s visit to Washington to attend the annual meeting of the United States-Japan Joint Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs on September 6. Before his departure, the government hoped that the LDP would reach an intraparty consensus on Japan’s response to the American request. The issue was debated in the various LDP organs, but all of them failed to reach a decision. When the Special United Nations Subcommittee of the LDP’s China Problem Research Committee, which was set up to consider Japan’s posture on the issue of China’s representation, met on September 3, the committee was sharply divided into two groups: those who advocated Japan’s co-sponsoring of the two resolutions on the basis of Japan’s moral commitment to Taiwan and upholding international faith, and those who opposed co­ sponsorship, maintaining that co-sponsoring was nothing but a two-Chinas plot which neither Taipei nor Beijing would accept, and that such a stance would pose a serious obstacle to the normalization of diplomatic relations with the PRC. The motivation for those who urged the government not to go along with Washington’s request appeared to be not merely a desire to improve Sino-Japanese relations but also intense displeasure with the government’s subservient posture toward the United States. These were the men who now insisted that Japan should not, in her foreign policy, rely mainly on the United States but should seek to broaden the scope of her international relations as widely as possible. In the meantime, the Japanese government informed Washington on September 6 that Japan would support the “reverse important question” resolution and a twin resolution on dual Chinese representation. This step orchestrated by the Sato government, however, provoked those LDP Diet 79 For a discussion of the disunity in the LDP on China policy, see Mainichi Shimbunsha (ed.), Nihon to Chugoku: Seijoka e no michi, 1971, pp. 258-274; Tagawa, 1979. 80 Asahi Shimbun, September 4, 1971.

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members advocating a positive China policy, despite the government’s explanation to the effect that supporting the resolutions was not the same as co­ sponsoring them.81 On the same day, the Japanese Foreign Minister flew to Washington for his conference with the American Secretary of State. At the Fukuda-Rogers conference on September 9 and 10, the question of Chinese representation came up almost immediately. Rogers reiterated that the two countries should press for “dual representation” and “reverse important formula.” The Secretary also stressed that Japanese co-sponsorship would be indispensable if the resolutions were to muster the needed support. While both parties agreed on the importance of preserving Taiwan’s status, Fukuda differed with Secretary Rogers on the strategy concerning the representation issue. While reserving his position, Fukuda explained Japan’s position in general and the question of the PRC’s UN membership in particular.82 As the Foreign Minister later recalled his meetings with the Secretary, he could not promise Japanese co-sponsorship as the issue had become a great divide on the domestic political scene in Japan.83 The LDP Secretary General Hori, revealed in an interview that given the sharp division of views on the issue within the ruling party, he requested the Foreign Minister by telephone not to yield to the American request during his conference with the American Secretary.84 The decision was to be reached after Fukuda returned from Washington. The difficulty of the Chinese representation issue was again demonstrated at various meetings Fukuda had with the leaders of the LDP after returning home from Washington without reaching any final conclusion. The issue was also discussed by the Cabinet on September 4, but no decision was taken.85 The Prime Minister continued to search, however, for a party consensus. On September 18, the Policy Board and the Executive Board of the party held a joint meeting, but they, too, could not reach an agreement. While no one seemed to oppose the PRC’s entry into the United Nations, the participants were equally divided into two groups: the advocates of co-sponsorship of the two U.S. resolutions - designating the expulsion of Taiwan from the UN as an 81 Ibid., September 7, 1971. 82 For Fukuda's recollection o f the meetings with Secretary Rogers, see Jiji Tsuhinsha seijibu, 1972, pp. 156-157. 83 Ibid. 84 Ibid., pp. 88-89. See also Hori, 1975, pp. 132-133. 85 Tagawa, 1979, p. 115.

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important question and calling for retention of Taiwan in the General Assembly while seating the Beijing government in the Assembly and on the Security Council - and those who opposed Japan’s co-sponsorship and favored Japan’s abstaining from voting on the Albanian resolution so as to demonstrate Japan’s non-hostile posture toward the People’s Republic. With these two conflicting views too intense to reach any compromise solution, the meeting ended without reaching any unified conclusion. The joint meeting of the LDP China Committee and the Committee on Foreign Affairs on September 20 was unable to reach an intraparty consensus. At this meeting, Foreign Minister Fukuda stated that the United States would submit two resolutions to the United Nations on September 22 or 23 and that Japan’s posture on the question should be determined before that date.86 The failure of the LDP organs to reach any conclusion on the Chinese representation issue left the final policy decision to Sato’s ultimate political decision. Sato himself was caught in the middle of conflicting arguments within his party and cabinet. On September 21, the highest policy-making organ of the LDP, the Executive Board decided to leave the question to five party leaders the Secretary General of the party Hori Shigeru, Chairman Nakasone Yasuhiro of the Executive Board, Chairman Kosaka Zentaro of the Policy Board, Chairman Noda Takeo of the China Committee and Chairman Kitazawa of the United Nations Problems Subcommittee. They in turn felt that the matter should be decided by the Cabinet. Then, on the same day in a Cabinet meeting, it was decided that Japan’s position on the question of Chinese representation should be left to the Prime Minister. Justice Minister Maeo advocated caution and urged the Prime Minister to give careful thought to the views of the LDP before making any decision. Agricultural Minister Akagi urged Sato to refrain from Japan’s co-sponsorship of the “reversed important question” resolution in the United Nations.87 Secretary of State Rogers showed Washington’s concern by phoning Sato on the morning of September 21 and requesting Japan’s co-sponsorship. He also informed the Prime Minister that the US would delay the submission of resolutions until the next day so that Japan could join in their attempts to preserve the status of Taiwan in the UN.88 Sato found it difficult to make up 86 Asahi Shimbun, September 21, 1971. 87 Furukawa, 1988, p. 348. 88 ” ‘Gyaku juyo’ kyodo teian e no ikari,” Asahi Janaru, Vol. 13, No. 38, October 8, 1971, p.

4.

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his mind. Rather than seek new ideas, he sought information that would reinforce those he already had. On September 22, after he had been given the chance to think through the implications of alternative policies one more day, the Prime Minister finally decided to co-sponsor the two US resolutions and summoned the Foreign Minister, LDP Secretary General Hori and two other LDP leaders to the Prime Minister’s official residence and conveyed his decision. The tactical decision was conveyed to Washington on September 22. The Japanese government, in close coordination with the State Department in Washington, launched a diplomatic offensive in an attempt to gain wider support for the proposal. A major effort was made during October to persuade states that remained indecisive on the Chinese UN issue. Prime Minister Sato appointed Former Foreign Minister Aichi Kiichi to take command of operations at the United Nations. According to Aichi, the Japanese government had contacted and talked to about 40 countries.89 In pondering the prospects, the officials at the Foreign Ministry estimated that the proposal’s fate would hinge on the margin of defeat. On September 27, Aichi, acting as Japan’s chief delegate to the UN, presented the Japanese government’s point of view in the form of a speech, which was delivered at the 26th session of the General Assembly. In his speech Aichi first pointed out: In the 25th session o f the General Assembly, the votes for the so-called Albanian Resolution exceeded those against it. A number of countries have since recognized and established diplomatic relations with the Government o f the People’s Republic o f China. It was announced in July last that President Nixon would visit that country. The international situation involving China is moving rapidly and the People’s Republic o f China is about to emerge from her long isolation and to join the international community as an important member."90

Aichi’s speech reflected the change in Tokyo’s China policy regarding the question of the Chinese representation, from one barring the People’s Republic from entering into the UN, to one welcoming that government in the UN and at the same time defending the status of the Nationalist government in the UN:

89 For A ichi’s account o f Japan's efforts to enlist the support for its proposal at the United Nations, see Aichi Kiichi ikoshu kankokai (ed.), 1974, pp. 247-251. 90 Gaimusho Press Releases 1971, p. 53.

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Empirical Analysis ...the Government o f Japan has decided to co-sponsor the resolution requesting to decide as an important question under Article 18 o f the Charter whatever proposal that may result in depriving the Government o f the Republic o f China o f its representation in the United Nations and also the resolution to affirm the right of representation o f the Government o f the People’s Republic of China, to recommend that it should be seated in the Security Council as a permanent member, and at the same time to affirm the right o f representation of the Government o f the Republic of China."91

Finally, he noted: “The Japanese Government holds the position that China is one, and we sincerely wish that the problem should be solved through peaceful dialogue between the parties concerned.”92 The United States and Japan believed that their attempts to retain Taiwan might succeed if they “could win the initial procedural vote to secure ‘priority’ for a proposal that any expulsion from the United Nations must be considered an ‘important question’ requiring a two-thirds vote, the momentum could carry us through.”93 However, Japan’s chief delegate to the United Nations, Aichi Kiichi, was not optimistic about the prospects for the two resolutions: He foresaw the loss o f the China contest as a body blow to all the principles for which Japan and the United States had stood. He was particularly bitter that America’s European allies failed to understand these implications. Privately, the Japanese felt that the announcement of Dr. Kissinger’s second visit to Peking, which would coincide precisely with the General A ssem bly’s voting on China, dashed our last hopes.94

At the General Assembly session, on October 1971, the issue of Chinese representation was first put to the Assembly in the form of a procedural motion of whether to give priority to the resolution that the expulsion of the Republic of China should be considered an “important question.” This was carried 61 in favor, 53 against, with 15 abstentions. The vote gave some hope to the United States and Japan. However, when the “reverse important question” itself was put to a vote, the voting strength of those in favor began to erode. This resolution was defeated 55 in favor and 59 against, with 15 abstentions. This erosion can be attributed to the last-minute shift of 8 states 91 92 93 94

Ibid., pp. 53-54. Ibid., p. 54. Meyer, 1974, p. 142. Ibid.

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which had earlier indicated to the United States or Japan that they would support the resolution to abstention.95 The Albanian resolution calling for the expulsion of the Republic of China received an overwhelming majority, 76 to 35 with 17 abstentions.96

Strategic Decision As noted, a number of interrelated decisive inputs had flown into Japan’s foreign policy system since the summer of 1971. There was, however, a predecisional stage of thought and deeds lasting for two decades since Japan signed a bilateral peace treaty with the Nationalist government in Taiwan. The first decisive input to Japan’s foreign policy system was Nixon’s announcement of his impending visit to China. The announcement set in motion a chain of events that led to the normalization of Japan-China relations one year later.97 Another decisive input was the convincing victory of the Albanian resolution admitting the PRC at the expense of Taiwan and the defeat of the "reverse important question" resolution. Because of these changes in Japan’s external environment, the position of those who had favored some kind of two-China solution was seriously undercut and voices advocating a more positive posture grew increasingly stronger. These remarkable turnabouts started the process of normalization of JapanChina relations and profoundly altered the context for the decision-making process. Ever since the US-China opening in July 1971, Prime Minister Sato and his lieutenants had been seeking an opening to Beijing. They were acutely aware of the mounting pressure in Japan for establishing diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic and unless they responded quickly and positively it would soon overwhelm them. Sato’s political life now seemed to hang on his immediate reconciliation with the leadership of the PRC government. The process began with cautious probings in the summer and fall of 1971 by the Japanese side. The Prime Minister began to put out feelers to the Chinese to indicate Tokyo’s desire to open a dialogue - first through Kimura Takeo, a member of the Prime Minister’s faction in the LDP, and then 95 Ibid. 96 For a detailed official description of the question o f the Chinese representation at the 26th session o f U N General Assembly, see Gaimusho joho bunka kyoku, Dai 26 kai kokuren sokai ni okeru Chugoku mondai no shingi jokyo, Kokusai mondai shiryo 83, January 15, 1972. 97 Hogen, 1981, p. 44.

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through Tagawa Seiichi, a pro-Beijing LDP Diet member. Beijing was unresponsive and refused to deal with the Sato government. In August, when Wang Guoquan, Vice-President of the China-Japan Friendship Association, visited Japan to attend the funeral services for Matsumura Kenzo, a prominent LDP Diet member and an exponent of relations with Beijing, Sato sent Chief Cabinet Secretary Takeshita Noboru to greet his arrival. In a desperate effort to establish Sino-Japanese contacts, Sato himself approached Wang directly at the funeral service, but Wang declined to accept the Japanese Prime Minister’s personal overtures. Instead, China continued to voice concern over prospective Japanese militarism.98 Despite his failures to establish contacts with the People’s Republic, the Prime Minister was determined to try again. In October 1971, LDP SecretaryGeneral Hori, at Prime Minister Sato’s suggestion, used the Governor of Tokyo Minobe Ryokichi to go to China on his behalf, carrying a secret letter from Hori to Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai. Minobe, who had been elected governor with the support of the Socialist and Communist parties, offered to play a liaison role with the PRC.99 In the letter Hori indicated his desire to initiate talks on normalization of Sino-Japanese relations. The letter also stated the position of the Sato government that there is but one China and that Taiwan is a territory of the Chinese people. These statements, while moving Tokyo closer to Beijing’s view, clearly were far from satisfactory to the Chinese side. The "Hori letter" did not explicitly recognize Beijing’s claim to Taiwan or accept the PRC as the sole legitimate government of China, as B eijing w ish ed .100 Deliberate ambiguity left room for serious misunderstanding. Thus, when the Governor met the Chinese Premier on November 10, the letter was flatly rejected by the latter. At the meeting, Minobe recalled, Premier Zhou emphasized that it was impossible to normalize Japan-China relations under the Sato government. The Chinese Premier also pointed out that the Japan-China friendship would not be achieved " as long as [Japan] does not recognize Zhou’s conditions that the PRC is the sole legitimate government of China, and that Taiwan is a part of China."101

98 See Furukawa, 1988, pp. 338-341. " Hori, 1975, pp. 128-130. 100 For the text o f the “Hori letter”, see ibid., p. 130. For Hori's account o f the letter, see also Jiji Tsushinsha, 1972, pp. 84-95. 101 Jiji Tsushinsha, 1972, p. 76.

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The "Hori letter" is an illustration of the use of ambiguity in diplomacy in protecting an actor's image and reputation as described by Jervis. As Jervis put it, "Many times, especially at the start of negotiations or informal soundings, an actor will wish to put out feelers that can be denied if the response is not appropriate."102 Sato wished to start talks with Beijing, but he was afraid that Chinese leaders would reject overtures from him. In order to minimize the danger of damage to his reputation, Sato therefore sent a signal through a disavowable channel. In early 1972, the Sato government took several concrete steps to dismantle past policies toward China. It authorized Export-Import Bank financing of trade with the People’s Republic and nullified the controversial "Yoshida letter."103 The fact that they were taken unilaterally was further evidence of Sato’s genuine desire to adjust Japan’s China policy. All these efforts at seeking an opening to the PRC failed, however. It was too late. The Chinese became increasingly critical of all signs of overtures from Sato. His credibility had reached a low point and he was not taken seriously by the Chinese leaders. It was his decision to co-sponsor the “reverse important question” resolution that finally made rapprochement with Beijing impossible during his term in office. The Chinese also began to signal that they wished to move toward normalization of relations as soon as Sato was replaced as prime minister. Little changed before Tanaka Kakuei became prime minister. As early as July 1971, after Nixon’s announcement of his scheduled visit to China, Tanaka began to secretly explore the possibilities of establishing diplomatic ties with the People’s Republic. In that month, Tanaka’s secretaries asked the Foreign Ministry’s China Division Chief, Hashimoto Hiroshi, who was an advocate of Japan-China normalization to prepare a basic study of the subject for Tanaka. By January 1972, Hashimoto was ready with a report to Tanaka. In the following month, after having given Hashimoto his reactions to the report, Tanaka met his close confidant and a member of his faction, Aichi Kiichi, and Hashimoto. After the meeting, he was convinced that the normalization of Japan-China relations with severing diplomatic ties with Taiwan, pursued within the framework of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, was

102 Jervis, 1970, p. 123. 103 In 1964, then Prime Minister Ikeda encouraged Yoshida Shigeru to send a letter to Taipei forbidding the use o f Japanese state funds to finance plant exports to China.

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a realistic option.104 No important substantive changes took place, however, until after Tanaka had assumed office in July 1972. As Sato’s resignation became increasingly apparent in the spring of 1972, his International Trade and Industry Minister Tanaka Kakuei, a major contender for the Prime Minister’s post, sensed that the next government’s foremost objective would be normalization of Japan-China relations. Tanaka began to indicate his desire to initiate talks on the normalization of relations with China, and Chinese leaders indicated that they would be prepared to deal with him. Accordingly,on April 21, about two months before the announcement of Sato’s resignation, he conferred with 6hira Masayoshi whom he was in close personal relationship with and Furui Yoshimi, a LDP Diet member with strong sympathies for the People’s Republic of China. According to Furui, Tanaka said: “...If I become Prime Minister, I will choose Ohira as Foreign Minister, and I will do my best for a breakthrough of the Japan-China impasse.”105 During the spring of 1972, a series of signals had been exchanged with Zhou Enlai. The Chinese side hinted at possible policy changes and to feel out the intentions of the next prime minister. Tanaka began secretly to explore the possibility of a high-level visit to Beijing, using politicians from the LDP and the opposition parties as intermediaries. Zhou Enlai had been assured by LDP politicians that Tanaka, if elected, would proceed with normalization of JapanChina relations. Consequently, the Chinese seemed to regard Tanaka as more acceptable than Sato. On May 18, Furui went to Beijing to exchange views with the Chinese concerning the normalization issue. Furui got the impression that “the other [Chinese] side was much more in a hurry [to proceed with normalization of Japan-China relations] than we had expected, and very positive and volitional.”106 He also got the impression that, while maintaining firm stance on matters of principle, China would take a flexible approach to Japanese proposals on details. Furui told the Chinese Premier that he expected Tanaka to become the next prime minister with Ohira as foreign minister. Upon his return to Tokyo, Furui passed on the positive Chinese signal to Ohira.107 104 This account is based on the recollection o f Tanaka's secretary for 23 years, Hayasaka Shigezo, Seijika Tanaka Kakuei, 1987, p. 363. 105 Hayasaka, 1987, p. 364. For the details o f the meeting, see Asahi Shimbun, September 29, evening edition, 1972 and Furukawa, 1988, pp. 363-365. 106 Jiji Tsushinsha, 1972, p. 61. 107 For Furui's account o f his visit to China, see Ibid., pp. 57-74.

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At about the same time, Tanaka and Ohira received a clear signal from Beijing, this time through the Komeito. When the Chinese premier met the Komeito delegation headed by its Vice-Chairman Ninomiya Bunzo in Beijing on May 15, he conveyed a secret message to Takeiri Yoshikatsu, the party’s Chairman, with the understanding that Takeiri would pass on the message to Tanaka. It stated, according to Takeiri, that Zhou would welcome a visit by Tanaka to Beijing for direct negotiations and that China would be flexible regarding their three basic prerequisites for normalized Sino-Japanese relations: (1) recognition that the People’s Republic of China was the only government representing the Chinese people; (2) recognition that Taiwan was a province and an inseparable part of the People’s Republic of China; and (3) abrogation of Japan’s treaty with Taiwan. Zhou also made it clear in the message that he, according to Takeiri, “would not put [Tanaka] in an awkward situation nor would he let [Tanaka] lose face.”108 On the domestic political front, the LDP presidential contest intensified as it was evident that Sato would soon be replaced as prime minister. On June 17, 1972, Prime Minister Sato formally declared his retirement before an LDP meeting of party members of both chambers of the Diet. The major contenders for Sato’s job were Tanaka Kakuei, Fukuda Takeo, Ohira Masayoshi, and Miki Takeo. Varying policies toward the PRC were identified with each individual candidate. Of the China policy stance taken by the four faction leaders, Miki had the most long-standing and forward-looking posture toward the normalization of Japan-China relations. Following a visit to Beijing in April 1972, he began to speak publicly of the necessity for the new government to accept the three basic Chinese principles for normalized SinoJapanese relations. Ohira assumed an increasingly positive posture in calling for the normalization of Japan-China relations after the U.S.-China opening. The increasingly positive posture Fukuda, Sato’s Foreign Minister, assumed in the LDP’s presidential contest in declaring his readiness to visit China for the normalization of relations with Japan’s most important neighbor was in part to enhance his public standing in the wake of the rising public tide against the Sato government and of the increased public demand for normalizing JapanPRC relations. In the LDP presidential election, Tanaka, Ohira and Miki formed an electoral pact to challenge Fukuda. The China policy stance taken by the three faction leaders was an important reason for the formation of their coalition, as 108 Ibid., p. 139.

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was evident from their policy agreement regarding China: “Normalization of Japan-China relations is now the demand of the entire nation. We will enter into negotiations with a view to concluding a peace treaty with the People’s Republic of China through [official] contacts between the two governments.”109 In July 1972, Tanaka emerged victorious from the leadership struggle within the LDP. Tanaka tried to give the impression that he wanted his policy to be different from that of Sato. As expected, he chose Ohira to be his Foreign Minister. Simultaneously, Tanaka and Ohira were moving rapidly toward decisive changes in Japanese policy toward China. When Prime Minister Tanaka assumed office in July 1972 he immediately began to speak publicly of the desire for normalization of Japan-China relations and initiated an examination of possible new moves in policy toward China. The crucial difference between Sato and Tanaka was in their commitment to Taiwan: a key Tanaka priority was normalizing ties with Beijing, even if this meant breaking diplomatic relations with the Nationalists. For the first time since the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, the Japanese government made its aim the diplomatic recognition of the government in Beijing. In his first news conference as Prime Minister, Tanaka declared that “the time is right for normalization of Japan-China relations,” and in a statement issued immediately after his first cabinet meeting on July 7, the Prime Minister declared that “I would like to speed up the normalization of diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China.”110 Two days later, Chinese Premier Zhou responded favorably: “The Tanaka Cabinet was inaugurated on July 7 and with regard to foreign policy it has announced that it will endeavor to realize a normalization of relations between Japan and China. This is certainly to be welcomed.”111 Thereafter events developed rapidly. On July 20, the first contacts between the Japanese Foreign Minister and Chinese officials had been made at a reception given in the honor of Sun Pinghua, the visiting Deputy Secretary-General of the China-Japan Friendship Association, and Xiao Xiangqian, the chief representative of the Chinese Memorandum Trade Office in Tokyo. Two days later, on July 22, they held the first talks to discuss the Japan-China normalization. The meeting was arranged by Fujiyama Aiichiro, a former foreign minister and a chairman of 109 Cited in Furukawa, 1988, p. 362.

110 Asahi Shimbun, July 8, 1972. 111 Cited in Eto, 1972, p. 1.

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the suprapartisan Diet Members’ League for the Normalization of Japan-China Relations. This was the first formal contact at governmental level between the two countries since 1949.112 At this meeting, Sung conveyed to 6hira a message from the Chinese Premier inviting Prime Minister Tanaka to Beijing. They also agreed to establish regular channels of communication between the Japanese Foreign Ministry and China’s Memorandum Trade Office in Japan. Tanaka and Ohira made clear their intentions to secure the reins of foreign policy leadership in their hands. They relied on politicians rather than experienced Gaimusho diplomats as liaison agents in dealing with Beijing. The intermediaries included not only LDP politicians, for example, Furui Yoshimi, a personal friend of Ohira since prewar times who was sympathetic to the People’s Republic, but also leaders of the opposition parties, such as Sasaki Kozo, a former leader of the Socialist Party and Takeiri Yoshikatsu, the Chairman of Komeito, who was close to Prime Minister Tanaka and who won the confidence of the Chinese Premier during a visit to Beijing in the summer of 1971. Thus the emissaries employed by Tanaka and Ohira as part of the ground work in normalizing relations were politicians who were known to be reliable and trusted by the Chinese side. While these emissaries did not completely share the government’s stance on the China issue, their use not only enabled the Tanaka government to know what China really wanted, but also let them communicate with the Chinese in a way that was clear enough to gain the attention of the Chinese leaders. Individual opposition leaders actually came to play important roles in the decision process. On July 11, Sasaki Kozo, former chairman of the Japan Socialist Party, contacted the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister before his departure to Beijing to urge them to restore relations with China. At the meeting, Tanaka and Ohira assured him of the Prime Minister’s determination to proceed with normalization of relations and of his intent to visit China for that purpose. When asked about certain crucial issues such as China’s three principles for normalization of relations and above all the Taiwan problem, Tanaka replied: “...as for handling of the Taiwan problem, I am absolutely confident of it.”113 Sasaki left for Beijing the following day. There were as yet no formal bids from the PRC, though several signals had been transmitted. Sasaki tried to reassure Premier Zhou about Tokyo’s intentions. Sasaki may have convinced 112 On July 20, Sun and Xiao met Foreign Minister Ohira, Minister o f State Miki and Minister o f International Trade and Industry Nakasone at a reception given in the honor o f the two unofficial envoys from the PRC by Fujiyama Aiichiro, a pro-Beijing LDP leader. 113 Ibid., p. 123.

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Beijing that the Tanaka government really intended to proceed with the normalization of relations. At the meeting, Premier Zhou conveyed orally to Sasaki an official message from his government inviting Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka to visit China. Upon his return to Tokyo, Sasaki conveyed this to Tanaka on July 22. Even though Tanaka and Ohira made clear their strong desire for the establishment of diplomatic relations, they were not yet certain what the prerequisites of normalization would ultimately be and the extent and limits of the compromises that the Chinese were willing to make. Ohira felt that he needed to feel out Beijing further. In this context, Chairman Takeiri of the Komeito offered to act as gobetween for Tanaka and Ohira with the Chinese leaders in order to convey their thinking on the normalization issue and to determine China’s stand on a number of key issues. Takeiri played the decisive role in the pre-negotiation preparations. During his visit to China, Takeiri and Premier Zhou managed to reach a backchannel agreement on many issues entailed in normalization. It was mainly on the basis of this understanding that Tanaka and Ohira arrived at the strategic decision. Takeiri, as a private emissary of Prime Minister Tanaka, left for Beijing in late July with a draft proposal of his own that was to form the basis for a new Sino-Japanese relationship. He held long discussions with Premier Zhou in Beijing on July 27, 28, and 29, on a broad range of issues. During the first two days of talks, the Komeito Chairman largely determined the general format for the discussions by explaining his twenty-point proposal to which the Chinese Premier responded. It was during the third meeting, on July 29, that, in an extremely surprising move, Premier Zhou presented the Chinese thinking on the normalization of relations in the form of a ten-point proposal that laid the basis for the forthcoming negotiation on normalization between the two governments. “Since it [the draft] was typewritten," Takeiri recalled, "[the Premier] asked me to write down while he read the text... While taking verbatim notes of their proposition, I felt that the normalization of Japan-China relations was possible if their conditions were such and I was so happy that tears of pleasure gushed from my eyes.”114 The Chinese draft proposed, among other things, that “the Japanese government fully understands the three principles for the restoration of diplomatic relations and recognizes the People’s Republic of China as the sole legal government of China”, and that China renounced any claim for 114 Ibid., p. 143.

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reparations from Japan from World War II damages.115 The Chinese draft made no mention of the Japan-Republic of China Peace Treaty of 1952, which Beijing’s three principles had maintained was illegal, and which Tanaka and Ohira considered to be one of the most difficult issues. For twenty years it had been the most important issue in dispute between Tokyo and Washington, and the Chinese had insisted its solution was a prerequisite to the restoration of relations. Nor did the Chinese proposal make mention of either the Japan-U.S. security treaty or the Sato-Nixon joint statement of 1969. These questions were discussed during the first meeting, on July 27, and were dismissed by Zhou as irrelevant to the restoration of diplomatic relations. During the discussions, the Premier asked about the date of Tanaka’s visit to China, and Takeiri replied: “...I will surely see to it that Prime Minister Tanaka visit [China] in September...”116 China’s flexible approach clearly demonstrated that the Chinese leaders felt a strong desire to maintain momentum in developing the new relationship. The Japanese Prime Minister and Foreign Minister were kept informed about the Chinese proposal and the meetings by Furui, who was in touch with Takeiri in Beijing by telephone.117 In the meantime, the Japanese government took several steps to remove obstacles to the establishment of diplomatic relations. One was the question regarding the severance of Japan’s formal ties with Taiwan. Tanaka and Ohira certainly preferred either not altering its relations with Taipei or simply reducing the level of diplomatic ties with it. However, since the PRC had maintained an uncompromising position on this issue, they had no choice but to make clear Japan’s intent to sever formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan. The government reasoned that normalization of relations with the PRC was sufficiently important in relation to broad Japanese interests to justify downgrading its links with Taipei, on the understanding that Japan continued important nonofficial relations with Taiwan. The desire of the Japanese side to pave the road for the opening of diplomatic relations with the PRC was indicated when Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Aoki Masahisa announced the government’s basic stand on normalization at a meeting of the vice-ministers on August 3:

115 Ibid., p. 145. See also Besshi Y., “Ni-Chu Kokko Seijoka no Seiji Katei,” Kokusai Seiji, vol. 66, no. 3, 1980, p. 7. 116 Jiji Tsushinsha, 1972, p. 147. 117 Besshi, 1980, p. 8.

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Empirical Analysis (1) the first objective o f normalization was to end the unnatural relationship between the two countries and to strengthen Japan’s diplomacy o f peace; a related objective was that normalization should contribute to peace and security in Asia and the world, and not, therefore, be directed against any third party; (2) the Japanese government, as a matter o f fundamental approach, fully understood the People’s Republic o f China’s “three principles” for restoring diplomatic relations and wished to seek concrete points of agreement through talks between the two countries; (3) if diplomatic relations were reestablished, diplomatic relations between Taiwan and Japan could, as a natural consequence, no longer continue; in that event, trade, economic, and all other “practical relationships” between Taiwan and Japan would be solved “in a realistic way.”118

The above positions of the Japanese government were familiar to the Chinese since the contents of this statement had already been conveyed to Premier Zhou by Takeiri. Nevertheless, this was the first time that the Japanese government had officially declared its intent to break off diplomatic relations with the Nationalists. The statement, while not committing the government to any definite position, certainly moved Tokyo closer to Beijing’s views on the Taiwan issue. Upon his return to Tokyo, Takeiri personally transmitted the Chinese proposal on August 4, and the minutes of the meetings on August 5 to Tanaka and Ohira. The minutes of the meetings were brought to Tanaka at a hotel in Tokyo on August 5 and Takeiri urged an immediate decision. After a one and a half hour reading, the Prime Minister told Takeiri that he would go to Beijing.119 As Takeiri recalled, “Having returned to Japan late on the night of August 3, I visited the Prime Finister and the Foreign Minister at the Prime Minister’s official residence the next day and gave him the memo on which I had written down Premier Zhou’s suggestions with regard to drafting a joint communique on normalization. Smiling broadly, Ohira’s famous small eyes...became even smaller, and he put my memo in his pocket. Afterward, he said to me, ‘Takeiri, all that’s left is the prime minister’s decision. Once that’s made, as foreign minister, I ’ll overcome any difficulties, I promise.’ ”120It was one of Takeiri’s major contributions to ease Japan’s path to the highly

118 Sato, Koyama and Kumon, 1990, p. 294. For the detailed Japanese text, see Hayasaka, 1987, pp. 372-374. 119 Besshi, 1980, p. 8. 120 Sato, Koyama and Kumon, 1990, p. 295.

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important strategic decision. It was a decisive input into the strategic decision on China. There could no longer be any doubt about the Chinese intentions. Following the meetings with Takeiri, Prime Minister Tanaka and Foreign Minister Ohira made the strategic decision to go to China for direct negotiations with the Chinese leaders for the establishment of diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China.121 It remained to convey this to the Chinese at the earliest possible date. The Chinese wanted to hear the news. However, Prime Minister Tanaka and Foreign Minister Ohira had to act in a cautious way in order to avoid what both feared might be a backlash of disappointment if diplomatic successes were not forthcoming. They had their reasons for such a stance. Despite the U.S.-China opening, Tanaka and Ohira did not know what Wahington’s reaction would be and they were not yet sure how an intraparty consensus might be reached. Accordingly, during Takeiri’s talks with Zhou, it was agreed that a secret signal was to be communicated to the Chinese if Prime Minister Tanaka would visit China within two or three months: the signal was the postponement of the forthcoming “friendly mission” to Japan of the China-Japan Friendship Association, which was invited by the Japan Socialist Party and other opposition parties as well as several interest organizations, due to take place prior to Tanaka’s visit to China. Just after the Komeito chairman’s talks with Tanaka on August 5, Takeiri met with Xiao Xiangqian, head of the Tokyo Liaison Office for the China-Japan Memorandum Trade to request such a postponement.122 The decision was conveyed orally to Xiao Xiangqian, the Deputy SecretaryGeneral of the China-Japan Friendship Association, by the Foreign Minister when they met for the second time on August l l . 123 Four days later, on August 15, Sun and Xiao told Tanaka that China would welcome the Prime Minister’s visit to China. In the meantime, the issue was heatedly debated at various organs in the Liberal Democratic Party. The period from late July through August 1972

121 According to Furui Yoshimi, Prime Minister Tanaka and Foreign Minister Ohira made their decision to go to Beijing for direct negotiations some time between August 5 and August 10. See Furui, 1972, p. 146. Fukui Haruhiro wrote that their final decision “was made most probably during or immediately following their joint meeting on August 4 with Takeiri, who had returned from Peking the previous day.” Fukui, 1977, p. 87. Kawasaki Hideji, a proBeijing LDP politician, wrote in his book that the decision was made on August 10. See Kawasaki, 1972, p. 69. 122 Furukawa M., 1988, pp. 373-374. 123 Furui, 1972, p. 146.

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witnessed tense political clashes as Tanaka and Ohira tried to reach an intraparty consensus on the normalization issue. Ranged on one side were the hawks, the pro-Taipei groups opposed to normalization of diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic at the expense of Taiwan. On the other were the groups which supported the government’s policy. The principal forum for intraparty debate was the LDP’s Council for the Normalization of Japan-China Relations established soon after the formation of the Tanaka government. The most controversial issue concerned Japan’s relations with Taiwan. Tanaka’s and Ohira’s intent to sever diplomatic relations with Taipei, or downgrade Japan’s political and economic ties with the Nationalists evoked a strong reaction from the pro-Taiwan forces. They made it clear that the government should not force a break in the existing political or economic links between Japan and Taiwan in accommodating Beijing’s desires. They spoke out against further compromise on the Taiwan issue. Despite critical voices from the hawks, there was a clear majority in favor of normalization. The atmosphere within the LDP had undergone a drastic change since Nixon’s move toward accommodation with China and China’s representation in the UN. On August 2, the meeting of the chairman and vice-chairmen of the Council gave de facto approval to the Prime Minister’s trip to China. The trip was formally approved by the Council on August 9.124 That approval was to determine the decision of the LDP’s Executive Board which followed two other heated discussions in the Party’s Council for the Normalization of JapanChina Relations on August 15 and 17. The Executive Board finally approved the Prime Minister’s China visit for direct negotiations. While the issue of normalization was discussed intensely in the LDP, pre­ negotiation preparations were well under way in the Foreign Ministry. In late July, Foreign Minister Ohira directed the establishment of a small working group within the ministry to examine various aspects of the normalization issue: China’s three principles of normalization, the termination of the war question, the 1952 Japan-Taiwan peace treaty and the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. The chairman of this working group was Vice-Minister Hogen Shinsaku. His principal associates in the group were Takashima Masuo (director of the Treaties Bureau), Kuriyama Takakazu (head of the Treaties Section), Yoshida Kenzo (director of the Asian Affairs Bureau), and Hashimoto Hiroshi (head of the China Section).125 A special study group was 124 Nihon Keizai Shimbun, August 10, 1972. 125 Fukui, 1977, p. 86.

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formed essentially to analyze the argument and the issues involved in normalization. By the time this special group was formed, the Foreign Ministry had already given considerable thought to the question of normalization. In his instructions to the working group, Ohira had requested it to proceed on the assumption that Japan would probably have to accept the necessity of ending diplomatic relations with the government of Nationalist China. There was a conscious effort in forming this group to bring some new ideas into the discussion which would not be bound with standard bureaucratic procedures. The Foreign Minister probably felt that the continuous personal attention and commitment of these officials was vital to the solution of the China problem. These officials were inclined to delve fully into the matter of normalization, undeterred by commonly prescribed areas of bureaucratic responsibility. They were able to actively pursue discussion of the problem with those at higher levels of authority, especially with Foreign Minister Ohira, to ensure that the work of the group would gain upward momentum. Not only did they pursue this goal within their own areas of responsibility, but they coordinated their efforts closely between themselves. With the formation of this special working group, the Japanese government intensively sought means by which satisfactory terms for normalization could be obtained. With the Chinese ten-point proposal which Komeito Chairman Takeiri brought back from Beijing in early August as the basis, the group was drawing up the Japanese draft of a forthcoming joint communique. A major effort was made during August and the first half of September to convince friendly states of Japan’s stance on normalization. Foreign Minister Ohira spoke to President Park Chung Hee in Seoul in early September. The government also took steps to inform the United States and Taiwan. Prime Minister Tanaka sought the reaction of the U.S. to the idea of Japan establishing diplomatic relations with China. Soon after Tanaka had assumed office, he instructed Vice-Foreign Minister Hogen to make preparations for talks with Washington.126 On July 24, Tokyo and Washington agreed to hold summit meetings on August 31 and September 1 in Honolulu. On August 31, the Japanese Prime Minister, accompanied by his Foreign Minister flew to Honolulu for talks with President Nixon. At the Honolulu summit, Tanaka explained to Nixon that his government would establish diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic and abrogate the peace treaty with the Nationalist Government in Taiwan. He assured the President that the 126 Ibid., p. 378.

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Empirical Analysis

alliance relationship would not be affected by Japan’s China decisions. Nixon “listened to Tanaka’s explanations in complete silence.”127 Despite the joint statement issued after the talks declaring that the Sino-Japanese rapprochement would “further the trend for the relaxation of tension in Asia,” the Americans, in Foreign Minister Ohira’s view, failed to understand the Japanese position fully.128 A far more difficult task was to explain Japan’s new China policy to the Nationalist regime. Prime Minister Tanaka and Foreign Minister Ohira were conscious of “Taiwan factor.” Thus they, in order to clarify Japan’s position on the matter of future relations with China and to elicit Taipei’s response, decided on August 20 to send a special government emissary to Taiwan. Two days later, former Foreign Minister and LDP Vice-President Shiina Etsusaburo was appointed as the emissary. As noted previously, from August 3 onwards, the government had made it fairly clear that Japan’s relations with the Nationalist regime in all likelihood would be affected by recognition of the Beijing regime. Soon after his appointment, Shiina met with the Foreign Minister to seek some sort of explanation or even apology that Japan could offer the Nationalist government. Ohira, however, was unwilling to do more than alter the government’s posture toward Taiwan in very general and fairly vague terms. In response to Shiina’s inquiry as to future relations with Taiwan following normalization, Ohira said that the nature of Japan’s relations with Taiwan would have to change following normalization, for one cannot maintain diplomatic relations with two regimes: “If we choose one side, we have to give up the other side. In dealing with divided countries, like the Korean Peninsula, Germany, and Vietnam, there is no other alternative.”129 This was interpreted to mean that, if Japan recognized the People’s Republic of China, she would have to break diplomatic relations with the Nationalists. Behind the scenes the Foreign Ministry officials were making necessary preparations for Tanaka’s forthcoming visit to China. By early September, the work on a Japanese draft of the joint communique by the ad hoc working team under Vice-Minister Hogen Shinsaku in the Ministry was completed. Only Chinese concurrence on the draft remained to be obtained. Its contents were similar to those of Zhou’s ten-point proposal that Takeiri brought back from China.

127 Welfield, 1988, p. 318. 128 Ibid. 129 Sato, Koyama and Kumon, 1990, p. 297.

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The draft intentionally made no explicit mention of the crucial questions which at times had appeared to be obstacles to normalizing relations: the “termination of war” question and the Japanese peace treaty with the Nationalist government in Taiwan. On the former, the Japanese government took the stand that the state of war between Japan and China had already been ended through the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty in 1952. As for the latter, the most difficult question concerned the treatment of the three principles in the joint statement. While the Chinese side wanted a clear statement, the Japanese side preferred a vague formula in its attempt to avoid clear commitment over Taiwan and the three principles. In the end, the Japanese draft stated that Japan would recognize the People’s Republic of China as the only lawful government and that it understands and respects the Chinese stand that Taiwan is a part of China. The abrogation of the JapanTaiwan Treaty was not to be included in the joint statement. Instead, the Japanese government was to issue a declaration that the Japan-Republic of China Treaty would cease to be effective.130 Despite PRC leaders’ new flexibility and realistic posture, Ohira needed additional assurances that the Tanaka mission would succeed and therefore wanted Chinese reactions to the Japanese draft before going to Beijing. That concern led to his decision to have Furui carry the Japanese draft of the joint statement to Beijing in advance of the Tanaka-Zhou summit meeting. Armed with Japan’s proposals for the joint agreement, Furui, accompanied by two persons sympathetic to normalization of Japan-China relations - LDP Diet member Tagawa Seiichi and Matsumoto Shunichi, a distinguished diplomat, who had played an important role in Japan’s negotiations to restore diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in 1955-56 - set out on his visit to China on September 9 in an effort to secure Chinese reactions to the proposals and to eliminate the differences which still existed.131 Because of the highly confidential mission of the delegation, they departed for China ostensibly to negotiate memorandum trade.132 The mission’s real purpose was so secret that even Tagawa and Matsumoto, who accompanied Furui, were not briefed on the contents of the Japanese draft for a joint 130 Fukui, 1977, p. 88: Jiji Tsuhinsha seijibu, 1972, pp. 68-70: Tagawa, 1973, pp. 358-359: Furukawa, 1988, p. 385. 131 Furukawa, 1988, pp. 383-385. 132 Before the restoration o f Sino-Japanese diplomatic ties, trade between the two countries were carried out according to two types: “Memorandum trade,” which contained a semi-official elemet, and “friendly-firms trade.”

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Empirical Analysis

statement until they arrived in Beijing.133 On September 12 and 20, Furui met the Chinese Premier. Zhou Enlai gave Chinese consent to most of the points in the Japanese draft, but made several suggestions concerning such points as the termination of the state of war and China’s three principles for restoring diplomatic relations. Regarding the former point, the Japanese side considered that the state of war with China had legally terminated with the Japan-Taiwan peace treaty, while China insisted that it would end only with normalization of diplomatic ties. At first, Zhou stood firm in insisting that both sides must formally terminate the state of war. Eventually the Chinese Premier displayed a willingness to address the problem in a pragmatic spirit. He told Furui: “I have a good idea, you need not worry.” What Zhou Enlai had in mind was the use of the expression “to end the abnormal state of affairs that had hitherto existed between the two countries” in the joint statement. This was to avoid the legal issue as to whether the state of war between Japan and China had already terminated or not. On the question of China’s three principles, Zhou insisted that the Japanese government should clarify its general stand on them in the preamble. The Japanese side, however, preferred to express them “in a more paraphrased and scattered way...”134 Eventually, all the major problems of a joint statement appeared to have been resolved satisfactorily. The Chinese side, highly mindful to keep the contents of the talks secret, requested Furui not to report back to Tokyo by telephone. Instead, Foreign Ministry’s China Division Head Hashimoto, who happened to be in China with an LDP delegation, was entrusted to carry Furui’s personal report from Beijing to Foreign Minister Ohira in Tokyo. Furui waited for further instructions from the Foreign Minister. On the evening of September 22, Ohira instructed Furui by coded cable to the effect that the unresolved issues would be dealt with by the forthcoming top-level meetings between Japan and China.135 The Prime Minister’s visit to China became formalized during intensive preparations for Tanaka’s trip. On September 22, the Cabinet formally approved his forthcoming China visit and wide discretion on authority had been granted to the negotiating team headed by the Prime Minister.136Thus the process of negotiation preparations was completed. 133 Furui, 1978, p. 124. 134 Sato, Koyama and Kumon, 1990, p. 300. See also Furukawa, 1988, pp. 384-386: Jiji Tsushinsha seijibu, 1972, pp. 68-70. 135 Tagawa, 1973, p. 377. 136 Naikaku kanbo naikaku sanjikanshitsu, 1972, p. 105.

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The Japanese negotiation team headed by Prime Minister Tanaka and Foreign Minister Ohira went to Beijing on September 25. The formal negotiations for the establishment of diplomatic relations covered a relatively short period of time from September 25 to 29 and involved a number of toplevel tough negotiating sessions. The talks began on the afternoon of their arrival. The negotiations proved to be more difficult than many had expected, with Taiwan as the crux of the problem. Although both sides entered the negotiations with relatively close positions, the Japanese side having anticipated the likely conditions of the Chinese side through various intermediaries, the Taiwan issue hung in abeyance over the proceedings throughout and created a heightened sense of suspense and tension about the outcome of the negotiations. The Japanese Foreign Minister complained: “It doesn’t help to have soldiers in ambush. Suddenly, things that we had not expected become problems.”137 The gap between Japanese and Chinese positions regarding Taiwan’s legal status posed problems. In the first session of top-level meetings, both sides explained their respective positions regarding normalization of relations. Tanaka frankly explained the divergent conceptions of the Taiwan problem in his LDP and emphasized that the joint statement’s treatment of the Taiwan issue would be a prerequisite to any success in the negotiations. Zhou told the Japanese negotiating team that it was desirable for Japan to maintain ties with the United States. Zhou also made it clear that the Sino-Japanese normalization was not directed against any third country. On the evening of their arrival, tension was created by Tanaka’s speech at a welcoming banquet in honor of the Japanese delegation. The Prime Minister’s apology for Japanese atrocities committed during the war was, from the Chinese point of view, less than sincere.138 This event offers a glimpse into one strand of the legacy of the war that had affected Sino-Japanese relations for more than two decades. The next day Foreign Minister Ohira met his Chinese counterpart, Ji Pengfei for further discussion centering around the unsettled key issues. However, when discussion of the contents of a joint statement began, serious trouble arose. Treaty Bureau chief Takashima Masuo of the Japanese Foreign Ministry argued that the “state of war” question had been settled by the 1952 137 Sato, Koyama and Kumon, 1990, p. 302. 138 In response to Zhou’s welcome speech, Tanaka said: “My country again expresses a feeling o f profound regret \fukai hansei] over the great inconveniences [tadai no gomeiwaku] that it caused the Chinese people.” Ibid. For the Japanese text o f Tanaka's speech, see Jiji Tsushinsha seijibu, 1972, pp. 181-182.

304

Empirical Analysis

Japan-Nationalist China Peace Treaty. In other words, a state of war with China no longer existed. Japan also took up the “three principles” and rejected the Chinese contention regarding the second principle that Taiwan is a part of China’s territory. The Chinese reacted sharply, rejecting both points in the Japanese statements. The gap between Japanese and Chinese positions regarding these issues posed a serious obstacle. This meeting ended in near deadlock. After the meeting, Tanaka, who had been waiting at the State Guest House encouraged his Foreign Minister: “Since we’ve come this far, there’s no need to step back. Even if it turns out to be a failure, we can always go home. We can just pretend we came for sightseeing. I ’ll take responsibility for whatever comes afterward. Once again, stick to your positions.”'39 Following the Foreign Ministers’ session, Tanaka and Zhou held the second of their four summit meetings. At this session, the Chinese Premier harshly criticized the statements made by Takahashi during the Foreign Ministers’ talks as being juridical and stated that the normalization issue should be conceived and dealt with as a political question rather than as a juridical one: “Today, I was really surprised. Indeed I can’t believe that what DirectorGeneral Takashima said conveys Prime Minister Tanaka’s and Foreign Minister Ohira’s real intent. From what he said one can’t tell whether he has come to pick up a fight or to bring about normalization.”139140 Zhou also reacted sharply to Tanaka’s banquet speech, insisting that the Japanese Prime Minister’s apology for his nation’s guilt for the war crimes committed against the Chinese people was not sincere enough. On that evening, the Japanese and Chinese foreign ministers held their second meeting for talks on various outstanding problems. The meeting was followed by negotiations between the officials of the two countries to agree upon a text which satisfied Chinese demands. At Chinese suggestion, Ohira read out and explained a Japanese draft of which Foreign Minister Ji Pengfei took verbatim notes article by article. After each point was translated and written down, a Chinese aide took the note to a separate room. After about 20 minutes, an aide returned to the room where negotiations were conducted. This peculiar negotiating style puzzled the Japanese. Apparently Zhou was present in that room and he preferred to operate behind the scenes for domestic political considerations.141 Eventually 139 Sato, Koyama and Kumon, 1990, pp. 302-303. 140 Ibid., p. 301. 141 Ohira Masayoshi kaisdroku kankokai, Ohira Masayoshi kaisoroku: denkihen (A Memoir o f Ohira Masayoshi: a bibliographical volume), 1982, p. 335.

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the Chinese indicated a willingness to include a statement on the ending of the state of war in the preamble of the joint statement to resolve the impasse. Agreement on all contentious points was reached at two meetings that day. On the evening of their third day in China, Prime Minister Tanaka and Foreign Minister Ohira met with Chairman Mao at his residence in Beijing for an hour. The meeting was hastily improvised. By this time substantial progress had already been made in regard to issues which at times had appeared to be serious obstacles to normalizing relations. To break the ice, Mao remarked to Tanaka and 6hira: “Have the arguments finished? It’s no good if you don’t quarrel.” “To speak about ‘arguments being finished’,” according to Ohira’s memoirs, “was Mao’s way of indicating that the Japan-China negotiations were for the most part wrapped up.” He also commented the Japanese Prime Minister’s usage of “inconveniences” at the banquet on the first evening by saying: “Our young people say the expression about causing inconveniences was not enough and don’t accept it. In China, that’s an expression you use when you spill water on a woman’s skirt.”142 The meeting with Mao produced a momentous movement toward a normalization agreement. Toward the end of the same day, the Japanese and Chinese foreign ministers worked with their staff to hammer out the final terms of the agreement until well past midnight. A de facto agreement on all major points except for the future of Japan’s formal ties with Taiwan following normalization was reached. The Chinese side insisted that Tokyo sever formal diplomatic relations with the Nationalists, but the Japanese side made clear that it would continue de facto political as well as economic, cultural, and other ties with Taiwan, and the Chinese acquiesced to this. The Tanaka-Zhou agreement laid the basis for a new Sino-Japanese relationship. In the first portions of the statement, both sides expressed “a long history of traditional friendship” between the two countries and declared “the abnormal state of affairs” in Japan-China relations to be terminated. The Japanese government apologized for the war by stating that it was “keenly aware of Japan’s responsibility for causing enormous damages in the past to the Chinese people through war and deeply reproaches itself.” The statement’s treatment of the Chinese three principles for the normalization of diplomatic relations was an exceedingly delicate exercise in ambiguity and vagueness. The 142 Sato, Koyama and Kumon, 1990, p. 304. For the Japanese version, see Ohira Masayoshi kaisoroku; denkihen (A Memoir o f Ohira Masayoshi: a bibliographical volum e), Ohira Masayoshi kaisoroku kanko kai, 1982, p. 336.

306

Empirical Analysis

Japanese side declared that “it proceeds from the stand of fully understanding the three principles”, but it explicitly accepted only one of them, namely, recognition of the People’s Republic of China “as the sole legal government of China.” On Beijing’s claim to Taiwan, while not committing Japan to any definite position, the Japanese government said it “fully understands and respects” that claim.143 In the joint communique, both sides agreed to establish formal diplomatic ties “as from September 29, 1972” to be followed by negotiations to conclude “agreements on trade, navigation, aviation, fishery, etc.” as well as “a treaty of peace and friendship.” The Chinese renounced their claim to war reparations from Japan “in the interest of the friendship between the peoples of China and Japan.” The two sides declared that the “normalization of relations between China and Japan is not directed against third countries.” They also pledged that neither should "seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and stated that both “opposed to efforts of any country or group of countries” to do so. The latter part of this statement, which obviously implied the Soviet Union, was of great significance to China since it constituted a Japanese pledge not to collude with Moscow against Beijing, but it could also be interpreted as an assurance to Moscow that it should not fear Japan-China collusion. The statement did not touch upon the Japanese peace treaty with the Nationalist government in Taiwan, which China’s three principles had maintained was illegal. Immediately after the issuance of the statement, however, the Japanese Foreign Minister declared at a press conference that the peace treaty “has lost the basis for existence and is considered to have ceased to be effective.”144

7.4. Feedback

The effects of the tactical decision on global politics and Japan’s relations with the United States were marginal. Japan’s co-sponsorship of the twin resolutions could not prevent the PRC’s admission into the United Nations. The decision was a minor event in the flow of world politics in 1971. Although the decision 143 For the text o f the joint statement, see Jiji Tsushinsha, 1972, pp. 162-165. For its English translation, see Peking Review, October 6, 1972, pp. 12-13. 144 Asahi shimbun, September 29, evening edition, 1972.

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pleased the US government, it did not prevent American-Japanese disputes over the economic issue from continuing. The most noticeable recipient of feedback from the tactical decision was a bilateral component - relations with the People’s Republic. The Sato decision reinforced the already negative image that Chinese leaders had of Prime Minister Sato and his government. The decision, according to the People’s Daily, “has further exposed his reactionary features as a docile accomplice of U.S. imperialism.”145 China had increasingly attempted to isolate Sato in Japan politically by effectively manipulating his opponents in the ruling LDP and exploiting the China mood that had been building up in Japan. In short, Prime Minister Sato’s decision on the Chinese representation issue foreclosed Japan’s path to normal relations with the People’s Republic of China under the remaining period of his tenure. The feedback from the tactical decision had more dramatic effects on the political structure and competing elites. Prime Minister Sato’s decision caused sharp and persistent criticism both within his own party and from the opposition parties which perceived the government as pursuing an acquiescent foreign policy. Strong dissatisfaction with and criticism of the Foreign Ministry’s moves concerning the Chinese representation issue and its recommendation to Prime Minister Sato to become a co-sponsor of the “reverse important question” appeared among political circles including LDP leaders and among mass media circles. The defeat of the “reversed important question” hurt the Sato government and the LDP. Thereafter an early change of the Prime Minister and cabinet was a foregone conclusion. As measured by the scope and intensity of feedback to the environment, the strategic decision to normalize diplomatic relations with the PRC ranks very high along a scale of significance for Japan’s foreign policy decisions. Most of the components, in both the external and internal settings were affected by the decision, with continuing effects on the perceptions and behavior of Japan’s decision-makers. The normalization of relations with the People’s Republic was a watershed in Japan’s foreign policy. While not challenging the basic premise of close alignment with the United States, Japan began to pursue a more independent 145 Quoted in Lee, 1976, p. 102. In the joint statement signed on October 2, 1971 by the China-Japan Friendship Association and a visiting delegation o f the Dietmenbers’ League for Promoting Restoration o f Japan-China Diplomatic Relations, the Chinese strongly criticised the Sato decision. See Asahi Shimbunsha (ed.), Shiryo: Nihon to Chugoku 1945-1971, 1972, p.

221 .

308

Empirical Analysis

behavior on various issues. The conflict in Middle East and resulting OPEC oil embargo forced Japan to break with its traditional Middle East policy, based on coordination with the United States and Israel, and moved closer to the Arab states. In the long run the effect of Japan’s China decisions was even greater on the psychological environment of her decision-makers. The effect of Japan’s recognition of the PRC on international politics was not insignificant. It opened the door to full diplomatic relations between Washington and Beijing by indicating that the so-called Japanese model for dealing with the issues entailed in normalization was clearly relevant.146 For example, in regard to the crucial question of Taiwan, the most important single issue blocking U.S.-China ties, the United States could obtain full normalization of relations while maintaining de facto political and economic as well as other links to Taiwan by following the Japanese precedent and downgrading its diplomatic ties with Taiwan to “nonofficial” status. In the case of Japan, the People’s Republic insisted that Japan sever formal diplomatic relations with the Nationalist regime, but acquiesced to Japan’s demand that it would continue de facto political as well as economic and cultural ties with Taiwan. In regional terms the rapprochement between the two most powerful states in the region signified an important step toward reducing tensions and enhancing the prospects for peace and stability in East Asia. The decisions to normalize ties with the People’s Republic profoundly altered both Japan’s bilateral relations with the PRC and, together with the Sino-American rapprochement, the regional balance. The main effect of Japan’s China decisions on most Southeast Asian nations was to encourage the adjustment of their policies toward China. Most had moved toward broadening relations with Beijing. Even some ASEAN nations such as Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines moved to establish diplomatic relations with China in 1974 and 1975. Among Southeast Asian nations, the slowest to move toward new relationships with China were Singapore and Indonesia, but in 1976 Singapore’s prime minister visited Beijing. With the Sino-American accommodation and the Japan-China normalization, the regional structure that sustained the mechanism of the Cold War in the region - the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), the Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC), and 146 According to Henry Kissinger, the Chinese leaders made clear during President Ford's visit to China in December 1975 that “the general model that they want is something similar to the Japanese model.” Department o f State Bulletin, December 29, 1975, p. 929. Cited in A. Doak Barnett, China Policy, 1977, p. 24.

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the Ministerial Conference for the Economic Development of Southeast Asia was seriously weakened.147 These effects were accompanied by a change in the perceptions of East Asia held by Japan’s decision-makers: The region had become an even more important component in the decision-makers’ image of Japan’s external environment as evident in their speeches. Tanaka, for example, perceived the normalization decisions in historic terms: If we look upon the centennial history o f Japan since the Meiji Restoration, it appears that there have been two trends of thought on diplomacy; one emphasizing the cooperation with the Western countries and the other attaching greater importance to our relations with the Continent o f Asia. I intend to carry out foreign policy, correctly harmonizing these two trends o f thought. The normalization o f our relations with China has an aspect o f orienting Japan’s foreign policy towards the Continent o f A sia.148

One obvious strand of feedback is that the strategic decision of 1972 created a precedent for multiple ties to China: a three-year trade agreement (signed in January, 1974); a civil aviation accord (April, 1974); a merchant service agreement (June, 1975); a three-year fishery agreement (August, 1975); a long-term trade agreement (February, 1978); and a Japan-China Peace and Friendship Treaty (August, 1978). Japan’s decision to normalize its relations with China helped to dissipate some of the hostility and mistrust that dominated Chinese and Japanese perceptions of each other and set in motion a chain of events that led to a peace and friendship treaty six years later. The Japan-China Treaty of Peace and Friendship was consummated by the Fukuda government in 1978. The treaty was the logical end-product of Japan’s strategic decision in 1972 to negotiate the normalization of diplomatic relations. The People’s Republic of China was to become an increasingly valuable bilateral component in Japan’s foreign policy system. The greatest progress between Japan and China has been seen in their growing economic relationship. The volume of trade between the two countries had increased from $1.1 billion in 1972 to some $5 billion in 1978. By the end of the decade

147 Furukawa, 1988, pp. 391-392. 148 Tanaka’s address to the America-Japan Society on October 18, 1972. Gaimusho, Gaimusho Press Releases 1972.

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Empirical Analysis

China had become Japan’s fifth-largest trading partner. By 1985, the value of two-way trade had reached $18.9 billion - seventeen times the 1972 figure.149 Japan’s relationship with Taiwan was adversely affected by the dramatic visit of Prime Minister Tanaka to China. The normalization of relations with the PRC was followed by the severance of formal diplomatic ties with the Nationalist regime in Taipei. Even though Tokyo recognized the People’s Republic of China as the sole legal government of China, Tokyo, with Beijing’s tacit acquiescence, proceeded to expand trade with, and investment in, Taiwan. Japan continued to maintain its extensive relations with Taiwan even though the formal relationship had ended. In effect, the Japanese established quasi-diplomatic, “non-official” ties with the Nationalist regime. The Japanese embassy in Taiwan was converted into a so-called Private Interchange Association and the Nationalist embassy in Japan was transformed into an East Asian Relations Association. Foreign Ministry officers on leave from their official positions staffed these associations. Trade between Japan and Taiwan suffered a brief setback after the severance of diplomatic relations. Taipei had imposed trade restrictions, but they were not kept up for long and by the spring of 1973 restrictions on the import of plants and machinery from Japan had been lifted to a large extent. The volume of the two-way trade in 1973 was approximately $2.5 billion, and in 1976 it was close to $3.5 billion. By 1985, it had increased to over $9 billion.150 There was a lessening of ties with the Soviet Union. The Sino-Japanese diplomatic accommodation was viewed apprehensively by Moscow, which feared that the economically powerful Japan might tilt toward China with its vast natural and military resources. Prime Minister Tanaka, in an effort to allay Soviet misgivings about Japan’s new China policy, sent Foreign Minister Ohira to Moscow in October 1972. This effort did not fully dispel the apprehension felt by the Soviet leaders. Moscow’s displeasure was reflected in the fact that Ohira’s meeting with Brezhnev did not materialize. The Soviet leaders also criticized the “anti-hegemony clause” in the Tanaka-Zhou joint statement because it implied a Sino-Japanese alliance aimed at the Soviet Union.151 Tanaka’s visit to Moscow in September 1973, the second by a Japanese Prime Minister during the postwar period, did little to break the ice. In the aftermath of Japan’s rapprochement with the People’s Republic of China, the Soviet Union hardened its stand on the question of Japan’s claim to 149 Mendl, 1978, p. 127: Kim, 1988, pp. 156, 178, 179. 150 Mendl, 1978, p. 130: Kim, 1988, p. 155. 151 Sato, Koyama and Kumon, 1990, p. 309.

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the disputed northern territories and resumed its charges of a reviving Japanese militarism, after having taken a more conciliatory posture in early 1972. While Japan was anxious to avoid involvement in the Sino-Soviet dispute, Japan’s strategic decision added confirmation to Moscow’s assessment that she was participating in a plot to create an anti-Soviet grand coalition.152 The conclusion of the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship incorporating an anti-hegemony clause in 1978, confirmed Moscow’s fears. An incidental feedback from the normalization decisions to the perceptions of Japan’s decision-makers concerned the relationship with the United States. As Ohira stated, only on the basis of firm relationship with the U.S., can Japan deal with both China and the Soviet Union. The general effect on policy was to reaffirm the commitment to maintain a close alliance with the United States as the cornerstone of Japan’s foreign policy and to pursue a policy of equidistance toward the Soviet Union and China. In normalizing its relations with the People's Republic, Japan had in fact “leapfrogged” the United States, then the world’s only major power not to have officially recognized the government in Beijing. Japan’s decisions to alter fundamentally its China policy did not appear to have met with adverse reaction in Washington. Given the Nixon administration’s own initiatives on this issue, it was hardly in a position to oppose similar attempts by the Japanese government. Thus, there was never any American disparagement of the normalization of Sino-Japanese ties. In short, Japan’s rapprochement with the People’s Republic of China was achieved without generating dominant bilateral frictions with the United States. The negotiations for a Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship proved to be difficult, with the hegemony clause in the proposed treaty the crux of the problem .153 The process had been delayed by Japan’s desire to avoid compromising its “equidistance” posture and antagonizing the Soviet Union. In the long-run, perhaps the most important legacy of the normalization decisions was a definite tilt by the Japanese toward China in the triangular relationship among Tokyo, Beijing, and Moscow. The swing to China was accompanied by an image of Japan’s security interests as linked to those of China. Japan’s perception of the regional and global systems involving China became identical to that of the United States; that is, “keeping China on the side of the Western

152 Chapman, Drifte and Gow, 1983, 112. 153 For a detailed analysis of Japan's policymaking process concerning the Sino-Japanese Treaty o f Peace and Friendship, see Furusawa, 1988. See also Sudo, 1984.

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Empirical Analysis

powers would serve the common interest of the West as a whole.”154 “Maintaining and developing good, stable relations with China is a major pillar of Japan’s diplomacy, and it is a policy to which every Japanese cabinet in recent years has subscribed. The existence of such a relationship is important not only for Japan and China but for the peace and stability of Asia.”155 The legitimacy of Beijing’s claim to represent the sole government of all China has been augmented considerably by the extension of formal recognition from the U.S.’ major ally in Asia and the world’s third largest economic power. As such, the Nationalist government of Taiwan has been further isolated, both from the world community in general and from Asia in particular. The normalization of Sino-Japanese relations generated further pressure for other nations to do likewise, particularly in Asia. And, for example, Australia and New Zealand announced on December 22, 1972 that they would place their relations with Beijing on a normal footing. In the internal sphere, a cumulative impact is evident in two components: political structure and competing elites. The strategic decision removed one important source of interparty conflict between the ruling Liberal Democrats and the opposition parties. The “China question,” however, remained a divisive one within the LDP, as the controversy stimulated by the civil aviation negotiations in 1973-74 and the dispute over the Japan-China Peace and Friendship Treaty had made evident. The influence of the pro-Taiwan groups in the LDP declined. Leftist critics of the Japan-U.S. security treaty found the ground cut from under their feet by the change of Chinese attitude toward it. Japan’s strategic decision on China led the People’s Republic of China to shift its opposition to the security treaty to tacit approval of it, and this “seriously weakened the domestic opposition on defense issues, notably the Japan Socialist Party, which could now no longer rely on support from China.”156 With respect to Japan’s China policy, individual opposition leaders gained policymaking influence. Prime Minister Tanaka and Foreign Minister Ohira used Chairman Takeiri of Komeito and the former JSP Chairman Sasaki in important liaison roles with the People’s Republic of China. Especially, Takeiri played an important behind-the-scenes role in making the strategic decision to negotiate with Beijing. Their crucial role in normalizing relations was clearly recognized by Japan’s decision-makers. Politicians from the opposition parties continued to play liaison roles in the decision-making 154 Asahi Shimbun, November 21, 1983. Quoted in Kim, 1988, p. 153. 155 Tanino, 1990, p. 40. 156 Drifte, 1990, p. 30.

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process of a treaty of peace and friendship between Japan and China. Prime Minister Fukuda, for example, relied on Chairman Takeiri and SecretaryGeneral Yano as intermediaries between Tokyo and Beijing in preparing the diplomatic ground work for the treaty.157 Prime Minister Tanaka, who was confident of a convincing victory for his party, tried to take advantage of the prevailing China mood by dissolving the Diet. Although a causal link to election results cannot be proved, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party was unable to capitalize on its China achievement. It did little to arrest the decline of the LDP. In the first general elections to the House of Representatives after the Japan-China normalization, held on December 11, 1972, LDP seats fell from 288 before the dissolution to 271. Recognizing the defeat in the election, Prime Minister Tanaka moved in the direction of changing Japan’s electoral district system with a view to establishing a single representative district system similar to the BritishAmerican system. But it met determined antagonism from the opposition parties. They feared that they would be disadvantaged if such a system was introduced.158 Spillover benefits to Japan’s security can also be detected. Together with the Sino-American detente, the rapprochement with the PRC has considerably enhanced Japan’s national security by promoting an international environment characterized by negotiations, and by increasing the prospects for stability between East Asia’s two most important and powerful nations. After the opening of relations with Japan, Beijing endorsed the continuation of the U.S.Japanese security treaty and gave its tacit approval to Japan’s maintenance of Self-Defense Forces, hoping that Japan would serve as a counterweight to the Soviet Union, its principal enemy. Table 7.1: Feedback from Japan’s China decisions: Operational Environment

Psychological Environment and Policy Derivatives

External:

157 For the role o f opposition party politicians in the case of the Sino-Japanese friendship treaty, see Furusawa, 1988, pp. 116-123. 158 Ohira Masayoshi kaisoroku kankokai (ed.), Ohira Masayoshi kaisoroku: denkihen, 1982, pp. 340-342.

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Empirical Analysis

G Opened the path to full diplomatic

Japan’s greater role perceived; policy

rela tio n s

derivative was the pursuit o f a more

b etw een

B e ijin g

and

Washingon, expanded Japan’s role in

independent foreign policy

world politics (S) S Contributed to the lessen in g o f

Increased importance o f the regional

tension in the region and to changes in

com ponent in the decision-m aker’s

China policies o f several nations in the

image o f Japan’s external environment;

region (S)

policy derivative was to seek even closer links with the region

Bl

Reinforced China’s negative image

Sato correctly percevied hostile image;

of Prime Minister Sato (T)

policy derivative was desparate attempt

Created precedent for multiple relations

N ew relations with China correctly

with Beijing (S)

percevied; policy derivatives were three-

to improve relations with Beijing

year trade agreement (1974), civil aviation accord (1 9 7 4 ), merchant service agreement (1975), three-year fishery agreement (1975), long-term trade agreement (1978), and JapanChina Peace and Friendship Treaty (1978) B 2 Worsened Japan’s relations with

A dverse effects perceived; policy

Taiwan and initiated “unofficial” ties

derivative was to proceed to expand

with Taipei (S)

trade with, and investment in, Taiwan

Internal: M Increased Japan’s security (S)

G reater

secu rity

a c h e iv e d

by

normalization was perceived; policy derivative was to establish multiple ties with China E Enhanced Japan’s economic capacity

Benefit to its economy was perceived;

(S)

policy consequences were various trade and economic agreements

PS Removed one source o f conflict between government and opposition (S) CE

Influence o f com peting elites

increased in foreign affairs (S)

P olicy

con seq u en ce o f perceived

increase in the influence o f competing elites was government's readiness for cooperation and concessions

8. Hypothesis Testing and Generation of New Hypotheses

8.1 Japan’s Foreign Policy Behavior

The test of hypotheses is the point at which a theory and the observable world it models confront each other. Such a test determines whether the model adequately represents its empirical domain. The validity of a hypothesis lies in its capacity to predict in probabilistic terms the outcome of "decision processes which have been investigated (internal validity) and those not yet investigated (external validity) but which clearly fall within the scope of definition of the given universe of data, i.e. foreign policy decisions."1In his book, Decisions in Israel’s Foreign Policy, Brecher tested the validity of 48 hypotheses on decision making which had been derived from the literature of international relations against the evidence of Israel’s foreign policy behavior in 21 tactical and strategic decisions. Since the bulk of the hypotheses tested by Brecher concerns crisis behavior, only fifteen out of the 48 hypotheses were considered to be relevant to my work. They were tested against the findings of this study. Where a hypothesis was not relevant, this was noted. In addition to the above hypotheses, five more hypotheses have been generated by the data in this study. Despite Japan’s several unique features, many of its political-structural characteristics are similar to those of other developed states. One may very well make generalizations on the basis of Japanese foreign policy behavior. The comparability of the Japanese case is confirmed by other scholars. In terms of Brecher’s classification of states, Japan can be described first as a middle power (until about the mid-1950s) and then as a great power, a developed non-Westem and old state.2

'Brecher, 1974a, p. 518. 2 For an interesting discussion of Japan's place in the power scale, see Edstrom, 1988.

316

Hypothesis Testing

8.2 General Foreign Policy Behavior

8.2.1 Flexibility and Intensity of Images Hypothesis 1: “The flexibility of an image seems to be an inverse function of the level of intensity.”3

MSA Aid Strategic decision: Supported Derivative tactical decisions 1 and 2: Not relevant The bleak prospects for the Japanese economy associated with the end of the U.S. Korean War special procurements prompted Japan’s key high-policy decision-makers to look to MSA aid to cope with the impending economic crisis. The key decision-makers’ image of the MSA aid issue was at a high level of intensity. This was accompanied by rigidity in their image and response. Despite the repeated American signals that purely economic assistance would not be granted, Japan’s high-policy decision-makers often misperceived the signals because they felt very intensely about the issue.

The Soviet Union Strategic decision: Supported Derivative tactical decision: Supported In striking contrast to his predecessor, Yoshida Shigeru, who viewed Moscow’s flexibility and initiatives in 1954 with deep suspicion, Prime Minister Hatoyama did not hold an intensely negative image of the Soviet Union. This was accompanied by flexibility in response. Accordingly, he and his advisors responded quickly and positively to Soviet overtures for improved relations. Even when the negotiations with the Soviet Union were deadlocked, Hatoyama and his key foreign policy advisors were convinced that Moscow and Tokyo would eventually come to an agreement if Japan took a flexible posture on the crucial territorial question. 3 Brecher, 1974a, p. 525.

Hypothesis Testing

317

The U.S.-Japan Security Treaty Tactical decision 1: Not supported Strategic decision: Not supported Derivative tactical decision 2: Supported Tactical decision 1 and strategic decision: Prime Minister Kishi felt intensely about the unequal nature of the 1951 security arrangements. He was deeply convinced that the “unequal” security treaty must be transformed into a full and equal military alliance. He staked his reputation on revision of the security treaty. Yet during the tactical and strategic decision processes, Kishi displayed, for the most part, flexibility in perception and behavior. He sought treaty revision as soon as it was possible for him to do so and adapted quickly to the challenge posed by Washington’s willingness to conclude a new treaty of mutual security. In his dealings with those opposing revision of the treaty, however, Kishi, seemingly accepting hostile confrontation as a given, settled into a posture of rigid inflexibility. Tactical decision 2: The decision-makers’ image of the treaty issue became increasingly intense as the date of June 22, 1970, neared, when the security treaty would complete its first 10-year period and thereafter be open to extension or abrogation. Their experience with the 1960 political crisis narrowed their image of the decision situation significantly. That perception was accompanied by a conviction that the treaty should continue in effect “automatically” rather than become subject to renegotiation - a method that allowed Japan to avoid a repetition of the 1960 parliamentary crisis and debate in the Diet.

China Tactical decision: Supported Strategic decision: Not supported Tactical decision: This hypothesis is supported. Prime Minister Sato felt intensely about the preservation of a seat for Taiwan in view of the increasing support for Beijing’s entry into the United Nations. Sato’s own personal sense of commitment to the Nationalist regime in Taiwan tied his judgement to continued support for the American efforts to preserve the status of Taiwan in

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the world body. Accordingly, the Japanese Prime Minister displayed rigidity and inflexibility on that issue. Strategic decision: The image of the normalization issue held by Japan’s high-policy decision-makers was very intense. But, at the same time, Tanaka and Ohira displayed considerable flexibility on that issue during the decision process. They lost little time in responding to Beijing’s overtures for diplomatic relations.

Hypothesis 2: “The rigidity of the image of the decisionmaking elite and the time lag will be greater than in the case of the attentive and mass publics.”4

MSA Aid Strategic decision: Supported (for attentive public) Derivative tactical decisions 1,2: Not relevant The image and advocacy of some sections of the attentive public were more flexible than those of the decision-makers. Consequently they responded more quickly to the major challenge posed by U.S. offer of MSA aid. The Japanese mass public was not aware of the question of MSA aid until the press in Japan reported that Dulles told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee of a plan to extend MSA aid to Japan. A significant minority of the mass public, according to opinion polls, were opposed to the acceptance of MSA aid.

The Soviet Union Strategic decision: Not supported Derivative tactical decision: Not supported Hatoyama and Kono manifested a marked flexibility in image and responded more decisively to Soviet overtures for improved relations than the attentive and mass publics.

The U. S.-Japan Security Treaty Tactical decision 1: Not supported Strategic decision: Not supported 4 Ibid., p. 527.

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Derivative tactical decision 2: Not supported Tactical decision 1 and strategic decision: Prime Minister Kishi decided to seek revision of the 1951 security arrangements with the United States as soon as the circumstances permitted him to do so. In fact, he responded decisively and quickly to changes in Japan’s external and internal settings. Segments of the attentive and mass public shared the flexibility displayed by Prime Minister Kishi during the decision processes leading to the tactical and strategic decisions: there was no marked difference in flexibility. During the implementation stage of the decisions to seek treaty revision, however, the image and advocacy of the attentive public became increasingly rigid and retained the hostile image of the security treaty and of the United States throughout. Tactical decision 2: Leftist segments of the attentive public held a consistently hostile image of the U.S. and the security treaty throughout. In contrast, the high-policy decision-making elite manifested a flexible standpoint regarding the way in which the treaty was to be extended. Japan's mass public, according to opinion polls, generally supported the government's policy on the issue of the security treaty.

China Tactical decision: Supported (for attentive public) Strategic decision: Supported Tactical decision: The image of the Chinese UN representation issue held by the Japanese mass public, as reflected in opinion polls, was not flexible and did not change appreciably in the aftermath of Nixon’s announcement of his planned visit to China. The images of the key decision-makers were rigid and, accordingly, adapted slowly to changes in the operational environment. The image and advocacy of the attentive publics were, on the other hand, far more flexible and responded more quickly to changes in Japan’s external and internal environments. Strategic decision: Such important international developments as the SinoAmerican rapprochement and the People’s Republic’s admission to the United Nations influenced the image of the Chinese recognition issue held by Japanese attentive and mass publics. Large segments of the attentive public strongly advocated an early normalization of diplomatic relations with Beijing even

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before Tanaka formed a new cabinet in July 1972. Tanaka and Ohira responded to the advocacy of the attentive public and mass publics.

8.2.2 Information and Images H ypothesis 3: “The evidence from both psychology and history overwhelmingly supports the view that decision-makers tend to fit incoming information into their existing theories, and images... In other words, actors tend to perceive what they expect.”5

MSA Aid Strategic decision: Supported Derivative tactical decisions 1 and 2: Not relevant In the strategic decision process, Japan’s decision-making elite interpreted incoming information in such a way that the information supported rather than contradicted their images. Yoshida and other high-policy decision-makers expected the American willingness to render economic assistance to Japan and they incorporated the flow of information about MSA aid into their predispositional images. Positive information about the American willingness to render economic assistance was highlighted and negative information was deemphasized. In short, they perceived the world in terms of their own expectations and from their own vantage points.

The Soviet Union Strategic decision: Supported Derivative tactical decision: Supported Prime Minister Hatoyama absorbed the flow of information about Moscow’s intentions into an image of the Soviet Union as sincerely wanting diplomatic relations with Japan. Hatoyama also fitted the inflow of information about Soviet overtures into his own view of the world. Thus Hatoyama’s expectation of conciliatory behavior by the Soviet Union influenced his interpretation of various Soviet signals transmitted in 1954-1955. In the tactical decision 5 Ibid., p. 529.

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process, Japan’s key decision-makers expected a breakthrough in the deadlocked negotiations if Prime Minister Hatoyama personally visited Moscow and acted accordingly.

The U. S.-Japan Security Treaty Tactical decision 1: Supported Strategic decision: Supported Derivative tactical decision 2: Supported Tactical decision 1 and strategic decision: In the decision process leading to the strategic and tactical decisions, Prime Minister Kishi expected the United States to eventually agree to his demand for treaty revision. Even if his talks with President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles in the summer of 1957 failed to produce any concrete agreement regarding revision of the 1951 security treaty, he perceived the talks as successful. From May to August 1958, Kishi fitted the flow of information about Washington’s intentions regarding revision of the treaty into his image of the United States as friendly and trustworthy. Tactical Decision 2: The decision-making elite expected the United States to prefer “automatic extension” of the 1960 security treaty to renegotiation when its fixed period of ten years expired on June 22 1970 and perceived it as such.

China Tactical decision: Supported Strategic decision: Supported Tactical decision: Prime Minister Sato perceived U.S. pressure on Japan to cooperate in the question of Chinese representation in the UN. Sato absorbed the flow of information about the issue into his images of the existence of two governments representing China, the obligation to the Nationalist regime in Taiwan and the need to go along with the U.S. policy with respect to the issue. These image elements were so central to Sato as to enable f im to submerge his other image components. Strategic decision: Both Prime Minister Tanaka and Foreign Minister Ohira fitted information about Chinese intentions regarding the establishment of diplomatic relations into their images of China’s foreign policy as being

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realistic and flexible. The Tanaka government quickly accorded diplomatic recognition to the People’s Republic of China.

8.2.3 Images and Behavior Patterns Military Security Issue-Area Hypothesis 4: “There is no pre-eminent component in this issue-area. Rather, there are four key variables - military capability, interest groups, subordinate, and bilateral; and for developed states it comprises as well global and dominant-bilateral.”6 MSA Aid Strategic decision: Not supported Derivative tactical decisions 1 and 2: Not relevant Yoshida and other key decision-makers gave highest priority to Japan’s economic recovery. Although there were other variables, the decision to seek MSA aid was primarily the result of Japan’s economic compulsions.

The U.S.-Japan Security Treaty Tactical decision 1: Supported Strategic decision: Not supported Derivative tactical decision 2: Supported Tactical decision 1 and strategic decision: The tactical decision was the result of diverse inputs, all of them within an attitudinal prism dominated by the legacy of defeat in World War II and occupation as well as by the lesson of 1955. The desires to put the Japanese-American relations on a more equal basis and to raise Japan’s international status by putting an end to the unequal alliance relationship were important components. But there were others: the quest for a leadership role in East Asia, the concern with Japan’s security, and public opinion pressure to end the unequal relations with the United States symbolized by the 1951 security arrangements. The strategic decision to seek a

5 Brecher, 1974a, p. 532.

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new security treaty was primarily induced by Kishi’s desire to instill a “defense consciousness” in the Japanese public. Tactical decision 2: The decision to let the security treaty continue automatically was made on several grounds. The perception that the treaty had contributed to Japan’s prosperity was one important factor. The treaty was also seen as an effective measure to protect Japan’s security. There were others: DB - relations with the United States; PS - the possible impact on Japan’s political system; and IG - public opinion support for the treaty. In addition, the tactical decision was influenced by a pervasive attitudinal prism of the “lessons of the 1960 treaty crisis.” Hypothesis 5: “Elites of developed states have a sharp awareness of the global system and of dominant-bilateral relationships.”7 MSA Aid Strategic decision: Supported Tactical decision 1 and 2: Not relevant Prime Minister Yoshida and other high-policy decision-makers were very much aware of the bipolar global system and US pressure on Japan to stand up and be counted in the world-wide struggles to fight communism. The decision­ making elite viewed the MSA aid issue in terms of Japan’s global policy of alignment and Japan’s relations with the United States.

The U.S.-Japan Security Treaty Tactical decision 1: Supported Strategic decision: Supported Derivative tactical decision: Supported Tactical decision 1 and Strategic decision: The global systemic component was present in the psychological environment. The dominant-bilateral relationship with the United States, however, was an even more important image component. The need to transform the 1951 security arrangements into a full and equal military alliance between Japan and the United States weighed heavily in Prime Minister Kishi’s and Foreign Minister Fujiyama's calculations. 7 Ibid., p. 533.

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Tactical Decision 2: The global level was clearly perceived by Japan’s decision-makers, but the tactical decision was not made in terms of global systemic considerations. Prime Minister Sato and other key decision-makers attached great significance to the relationship with the United States. Hypothesis 6: “In most cases, the pre-eminent interest group is the armed forces establishment.”8 MSA Aid Strategic decision: Not supported. Tactical decision 1: Not supported. Tactical decision 2: Not supported. Strategic decision: The interest group whose advocacy was perceived by Japan’s decision-making elite as most relevant was that of the business community. In fact, the business community was the pre-eminent interest group. When the strategic decision was contemplated, business interest groups, notably Keidanren (The Federation of Economic Organizations) put pressure on the government. The defense establishment did not play a significant role in the decision-making process. Tactical decisions 1 and 2: There was no evidence to suggest that the National Safety Agency and the National Safety Force played a pre-eminent role in the formulation of the tactical decisions.

The U.S.-Japan Security Treaty Tactical decision: Not supported Strategic decision 1: Not supported Tactical decision 2: Not supported Tactical Decision 1 and Strategic Decision: The evidence suggests that the influence of the defense establishment was minimal. Public opinion was certainly the most relevant interest in the setting for the tactical and strategic decisions. Tactical Decision 2: The decision to automatically extend the security treaty was taken partly in the anticipation of mass demonstrations organized by various opposition groups, including labor unions, against the government’s 8 Ibid., p. 534.

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decision. The Self-Defense Forces did not play a significant role in the tactical decision process. Hypothesis 7: “Decision-makers perceive their own subordinate system as the level of the international system most directly impinging on vital questions of security.”9 MSA Aid Strategic decision: Not supported Tactical decisions 1 and 2: Not relevant There was no evidence to support this hypothesis. The decision-making elite perceived the regional environment as important for Japan’s economic well­ being rather than for its security.

The U.S.-Japan Security Treaty Tactical decision 1: Supported Strategic decision: Supported Tactical decision 2: supported Tactical decision 1 and strategic decision: Throughout the tactical and strategic decision processes, Prime Minister Kishi and Foreign Minister Fujiyama perceived East Asia as the level of the international system most relevant to Japan’s security. Tactical Decision 2: The subordinate system level was not overtly articulated by the decision-makers as decisive to the tactical decision. Nonetheless, as far as Japan’s security was concerned, East Asia was perceived as the primary level. Hypothesis 8: “Awareness of economic capability and concern with its enhancement do not impinge significantly on elite perceptions in the militarysecurity issue-area.”10 MSA Aid Strategic decision: Not supported 9 Ibid., p. 535. 10 Ibid., p. 535.

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Tactical decision 1: Not relevant Tactical decision 2: Not relevant The perceptions of Prime Minister Yoshida and others throughout the decision process were very much concerned with the enhancement of Japan economic capability. In fact they attached greatest importance to that component.

The U.S.-Japan Security Treaty Tactical decision 1: Not supported Strategic decision: Not supported Tactical decision 2: Not supported Tactical decision 1 and strategic decision: Both the tactical and strategic decisions were induced by an awareness of Japan’s economic capability. Japan’s economic growth had been accompanied by a resurgence of nationalistic sentiment and a consequent demand for a more equal JapaneseAmerican relationship. The role of economic capability in the decision process was essentially catalytic. The insertion of a specific clause on economic cooperation between Japan and the United States in Article 2 of the new security treaty also showed the relevance of the economic component. Tactical decision 2: The perception that the 1960 security treaty contributed to Japan’s prosperity and industrial growth was one of the most salient components of the elite perceptions.

Political-Diplomatic Issue Area Hypothesis 9: “Developed states’ elites have a much sharper awareness of dominant-bilateral relations than of their regional system characteristics and pressures.”11

The Soviet Union Strategic decision: Supported Tactical decision: Supported

11 Ibid., p. 536.

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The strategic and derivative tactical decisions were made by such considerations as: the pursuit of a more independent foreign policy, Japan’s entry into the United Nations, the “Soviet factor,” the repatriation of Japanese detainees, and public opinion. Hatoyama and his key advisors were also very much conscious of the “American factor.” The decisions were not primarily made in terms of regional system characteristics.

China Tactical decision: Supported Strategic decision: Supported Tactical decision: The decision to co-sponsor the US resolutions was primarily induced by the obligation to Taiwan, the reality of two governments representing China and the U.S. pressure on Japan. Sato was concerned about possible destabilizing effects of Taiwan’s explusion from the UN in the region, but it was not central to his image. Strategic decision: Tanaka and Ohira were acutely conscious of the implications of the strategic decision for Japan’s vital relations with the United States. The regional systemic dimension was also present in their calculations but it was not decisive. Hypothesis 10: “To the extent that decision-makers of developed states perceive their internal environment, they attach greatest importance to the advocacy by competing elites and interest groups.”12 The Soviet Union Strategic decision: Supported Tactical decision: Supported In the strategic and tactical decision processes, the advocacy by the families of Japanese detainees calling for the repatriation of Japanese citizens still held in the Soviet Union and other interest groups were clearly perceived by Prime Minister Hatoyama and contributed to the formulation and implementation of the strategic and tactical decisions. The advocacy by the Socialists was also recognized and relevant to the Soviet decisions.

12 Ibid., p. 537.

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China Tactical decision: Supported Strategic decision: Supported Tactical decision: In the case of the People’s Republic of China’s representation in the United Nations, non-organized group advocacy, as well as the advocacy by competing elites, was perceived but IGs (interest groups) and CEs (competing elites) did not greatly shape the decision to cosponsor the US “reverse important question” formula at the UN General Assembly. Advocacy by the Foreign Ministry, the most powerful institutional interest group, weighed heavily in Sato’s decision. Strategic decision: This hypothesis is fully supported in the case of Japan’s decision to negotiate directly with the People’s Republic of China with a view to normalize diplomatic relations. The advocacy by various interest groups, including the mass public, and by competing elites were perceived and formed an important variable in the calculus of Prime Minister Tanaka and Foreign Minister Ohira. Hypothesis 11\ “Foreign policy elites in both developed and developing states attach marginal weight to four variables in this issue-area: other subordinate systems, political structure, economic capability, and military capability.”13 The Soviet Union Strategic decision: Supported Tactical decision: Supported Strategic and tactical decisions: Prime Minister Hatoyama was concerned about the minority position of his party in the Diet (PS), but it did not prevent him from seeking rapprochement with the Soviet Union. Japan’s security (M) was one of the components in the calculus of Hatoyama. The other two components did not shape the strategic and tactical decisions.

China Tactical decision: Supported Strategic decision: Supported 13 Ibid., p. 538.

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329

Tactical decision: Prime Minister Sato was well aware of the possible adverse effect of his decision to cosponsor the resolution requiring a two-thirds majority to expel Taiwan on the stability of his government, because of the strong opposition within his own cabinet and the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, but it was not central to his image. The other three components - other subordinate systems, economic and military capability - were not relevant. Strategic decision: None of these components played a decisive role in the formulation of the strategic decision.

Cross Issue-Area Hypothesis 12: “The distinction between articulation and aggregation is far less meaningful in a foreign policy system than in a domestic policy system. ‘Advocacy’ in a foreign policy system is performed without functional differentiation by interest groups and competing elites.”14

MSA Aid Strategic decision: Supported Tactical decision 1: Not relevant Tactical decision 2: Not relevant Both the business community and the competing elites, notably Yoshida’s conservative opponents, advocated the acceptance of MSA aid offered by the United States without functional differentiation.

The Soviet Union Strategic decision: Supported Tactical decision: Supported The establishment of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union was advocated by the Socialists and the Communists as well as by interest groups without, in most cases, any discernible differentiation in performance of the advocacy function.

14 Ibid., p. 542.

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The U.S.-Japan Security Treaty Tactical decision 1: Supported Strategic decision : Supported Tactical decision 2: Supported Tactical decision 1 and strategic decision: During the lengthy process of implementation, leftist parties, such as the Japan Socialist Party and the Communist Party, and associational interest groups, notably Anpo Kaitei Soshi Kokumin Kaigi (The People’s Council for Preventing Revision of the Security Treaty), Sohyd (The General Council of Trade Unions), and Zengakuren (The National Federation of Student Unions) advocated the immediate abrogation of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. Their demands coalesced on the issue of treaty revision. The distinction between competing elites and interest groups regarding the performance of the advocacy function was blurred in the security treaty case. Tactical decision 2: As the date of June 22, 1970, approached, both opposition parties and labor federations intensified their activities in their efforts to terminate the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty without functional differentiation in performing the advocacy function.

China Tactical decision: Supported Strategic decision: Supported Tactical decision: During the decision making process leading to the tactical decision, there was no notable distinction in the nature of the advocacy function played by those opposing Japan’s cosponsorship of the resolution requiring a two-thirds majority to expel Taiwan. Strategic decision: The normalization of diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China was advocated by all political parties and diverse interest groups, including newspapers and public opinion. Both competing elites and interest groups were engaged in complementary advocacy without marked functional differentiation. The following three hypotheses concerning middle powers are taken from Brecher. The hypotheses are relevant only for the first two clusters of decisions - MSA aid and the Soviet Union.

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Hypothesis 13: “The role of military or economic capability in the image of middle-power foreign policy elites will be marginal except in those decisions that are specifically military or economic in content.”15 The Soviet Union Strategic decision: Not supported Derivative tactical decision: Not relevant Greater security for Japan was one of the important components in Hatoyama’s image. His decision was partly influenced by the prism of the nuclear holocausts of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Hatoyama believed that nuclear war was a possibility and that Japan was obliged to take steps to protect itself. The reconciliation with the Soviet Union was such a step in his mind. The decision clusters relating to MSA aid are irrelevant because they were specifically military in content. Hypothesis 14: “Decision-makers of middle powers will be marginally influenced in their decisional choice by their own political structure.”16 MSA Aid Strategic decision: Supported Derivative tactical decisions 1 and 2: Not supported Strategic decision: The political structure was not decisive in the government’s decision to seek MSA aid, but played an important role in the implementation stage. Since the ruling Liberal Party did not command a majority in the Diet, it needed the support of the opposition Progressive Party in implementing the strategic decision. Tactical decisions 1 and 2: Because of the minority position of Yoshida’s Liberals in the Diet, the support of the conservative Progressive Party was perceived as essential in making and implementing the tactical decisions.

The Soviet Union Strategic decision: Supported 15 Ibid., p. 544. 16 Ibid., p. 544.

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Derivative tactical decision: Supported Strategic and tactical decisions: Japan’s political structure was not decisive in the elite images. Hypothesis 15: “The much publicized view that the maximization of power, defined as military and economic capability, is the chief motivating factor in state behavior is invalid for middle powers.”17

MSA Aid Strategic decision: Not supported Derivative tactical decisions: Not supported Strategic decision: Yoshida and his foreign policy advisors were influenced by economic and military considerations. They perceived continued U.S. aid as vital to the easing of Japan’s serious economic problems. Tactical decisions 1 and 2: The expansion of Japan’s military capability was the primary objective behind the tactical decisions.

The Soviet Union Strategic decision: Not supported Derivative tactical decision: Not relevant Strategic decision: Maximization of Japan’s security by normalizing relations with the Soviet Union was one important factor in the calculations of Hatoyama. The following three hypotheses have been generated by the data of this study. Hypothesis 16: Foreign policy elites in developed states attach greater weight to the external environment than to the internal environment in the politicaldiplomatic issue area.

The Soviet Union

17 Ibid., p. 546.

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The various components of the external environment primarily shaped the images of the incumbent decision-making elite and the consequent strategic and tactical decisions. The principal decision-makers also perceived internal pressures, notably from the Japanese citizens still detained in the Soviet Union and their families and public opinion. However, powerful challenges from the external environment were required to induce the decisions.

China Tactical decision: Regarding the issue of China’s representation in the UN, external pressures, most notably from the United States and Taiwan, were most visibly relevant to the decision to cosponsor the U.S. resolutions. Strategic decision: The strategic decision was, primarily, the outcome of the external environment. Tanaka and Ohira clearly perceived internal pressure, especially from public opinion, but to compel the strategic decision required inputs from the external environment. Hypothesis 17: Decision-makers of developed states perceive interest group advocacy as more relevant than advocacy by competing elites in the militarysecurity and political-diplomatic issue areas.

MSA Aid In the strategic decision process on MSA aid Yoshida and other decision­ makers attached greater importance to the demands made by the business community than competing elite advocacy.

The U.S.-Japan Security Treaty Tactical decision 1 and strategic decision: During the decision-making processes, Kishi was very much conscious of pressure for changes in the treaty from public opinion. As noted earlier, the strategic decision to seek a new treaty was primarily motivated by Kishi’s desire to instill a “defense consciousness” in the Japanese public. Opposition parties, especially the Socialists, criticized the 1951 security arrangements with the United States. This attitude was acknowledged by Kishi, but did not weigh heavily in his calculation.

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Tactical decision 2: Among the interest groups, the government led by Prime Minister Sato attached great weight to the advocacy for “automatic extension” by one institutional interest group, namely, the Foreign Ministry.

The Soviet Union In the case of Japan’s decisions on the Soviet Union, Hatoyama and his key foreign policy advisors were acutely aware of interest group demands. They were conscious of competing elite advocacy, especially those opposing negotiations with Moscow, but the articulated needs of Japanese detainees and their families, and of the fishing industry weighed heavily in their decision calculus.

China Tactical decision: The advocacy of the Foreign Ministry was the only component in the internal environment to which Prime Minister Sato paid special attention in the process of deciding to become a cosponsor on the issue of China’s representation in the UN. Strategic decision: In the strategic decision to negotiate with the People’s Republic, Tanaka and Ohira attached the greatest importance to public opinion pressure among the various components of the internal environment. Hypothesis 18: In developed states, there is no preeminent component in the political-diplomatic issue area. Instead, there is a cluster of six key variables: global, subordinate, dominant-bilateral, bilateral, competing elites and interest groups.

The Soviet Union The decisions on the Soviet Union were the result of several inputs: G - the desire to gain entry into the United Nations and to pursue a more independent foreign policy in world politics; S - the desire to ease tensions in East Asia; DB -Moscow’s flexible and positive attitude towards Japan as well as the American factor; M - the fear of being attacked in the event of a war; and IG internal pressures in the form of the repatriation of Japanese detainees and public opinion. There was no single pre-eminent component.

China

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Tactical Decision: The two image components - the obligation to Taiwan and external pressure from the United States - were the most decisive inputs in Ohira’s decision to become cosponsor of the U.S. resolutions. There were also other variables: G - Intensified pressure in the UN for the seating of the People’s Republic and Sino-American reconciliation; B - the reality of two governments representing China; S - a concern about possible destabilizing effects in East Asia; and IG - advocacy for Japan’s cosponsorship from the Foreign Ministry. Strategic Decision: The decision to negotiate directly with the Peking regime by Tanaka and 6hira was the outcome of various inputs: G - China’s entry into the UN, the U.S. rapprochement with China, and the desire to pursue a more independent foreign policy; S - the desire to ease tensions in East Asia; B - China’s flexible attitude toward Japan; and IG - public opinion pressure. In addition to the above hypotheses, two hypotheses relating to foreign policy restructuring were generated from the study of Japan’s Soviet decisions. Hypothesis 19: The external environment is more relevant to decision-makers’ intent to restructure foreign policy in developed states than internal variables. The decision to normalize relations with the Soviet Union was a part of Hatoyama’s efforts to alter the U.S. centered patterns of Japan’s foreign relations inherited from the Yoshida government and to diversify its external relations in his efforts to achieve complete independence. Foreign policy restructuring was primarily a response to Japan’s external environment, most notably the dependent relationship between Japan and its mentor. Hypothesis 20: In developed states, awareness of non-military threats are more important in the decision-making elite’s intent to alter traditional patterns of relations than perceived military threat.18 The perceived non-military threat was an important source of foreign policy restructuring attempted by the government led by Prime Minister Hatoyama. As a nationalist, he felt “threatened” by the overwhelming American influence. In his efforts to escape from it, he emphasized the following lines of policy: 18 The importance o f non-military threats in foreign policy restructuring was emphasized in K. J. Holsti's study. See Holsti (K. J.), 1982.

-

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w

the achievement of full independence for Japan, the normalization of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic, the establishment of an independent defense capability, the abrogation of occupation reforms, and the revision of the “imposed” Constitution.

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9. Concluding Remarks

The main purpose of this work has been to provide a more complete and systematic explanation of Japan’s foreign policy behavior by conducting case studies of four clusters of important non-crisis decisions. These clusters of decisions relating to two issue areas - military-security (MSA aid, the U.SJapan Security Treaty) and political-diplomatic (the Soviet Union and China) have been analyzed using the framework of analysis advanced by Michael Brecher. My ambition has also been to test and generate hypotheses. Within the limitations of the case study method stated elsewhere, the present work has accomplished its purposes. The present study, with its emphasis on multi-level approach to the analysis of foreign policy behavior, has much in common with Brecher’s penetrating micro-dimensional study of Israel. I have tested some of his hypotheses about foreign policymaking and generated new ones. Less than half of the hypotheses (7 of 15) scored a high degree of support (See Appendix).1 Six manifested total support. Among these, four hypotheses (Hs, H9, H io, H u) relate to the specific issue-areas; three relevant to the politicaldiplomatic and one to the military-security issue-area. Out of the eight hypotheses which scored a low degree of support, four were not supported at all. These invalid hypotheses relate to: H6, Hs. H 13 , and Hi5; half of them (2 of 4) belong to the military-security issue-area type. How shall we account for such a proportionally high frequency of invalid hypotheses for military-security area decisions? In these cases, I evoke Lijphart’s “deviant case strategy” in order to reveal why they are deviant, “that is, to uncover the relevant additional variables that were not considered previously, or to refine the (operational) definitions of some or all of the variables.”2 In other words, the deviance can be explained by the specific dimensions of Japan’s foreign policy system that differentiates Japan from other countries. A part of the answer lies in the legacies of defeat in World 1 The degree o f support (DS) for an hypothesis (Hy) is defined as: DS (Hy) = Number o f Decisions Supporting Hv total Number of Relevant Desicions See, Brecher 1974a, p. 572. 2 Lijphart, 1971, p. 692.

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War II. Defeat gave rise to the “pacifist” Constitution and strong anti-military sentiments. Another important consequence of Japan’s defeat was economic. For a number of years following the war, the most urgent and important issue confronting Japanese governments was how to resolve Japan’s warbom economic problems. Even long after the critical stage had passed, the economy continued to be Japan’s principal preoccupation. As one observer notes: “Even more than in the West German case, the legacy of World War II prevented the rise of a new Japanese militarism. A firm national consensus including all relevant elite factions, the opposition, and society insures that Japanese security policy has been first and foremost a matter of foreign economic policy.”34 As this study illustrates, the Japanese government often put economic considerations first even with respect to military-security issues. Japan’s single-minded commercial pursuit since World War II seemed a virtual proof of its neo-mercantilist use of the economy to further its security interests. Apart from some military-security decisions, the hypotheses relating to specific issue-areas manifest a higher degree of support than those of a more general type in this study. Hence, I am inclined to agree with Brecher’s observation that “narrow-gauge theory-building, deriving from specific situations, is more promising than grand design (general) theory.”* A case study approach, such as this one, has its limitations. It sacrifices breadth for depth and cannot reach definite conclusions about Japan’s foreign policy behavior. More case studies of its foreign policymaking in terms of the theoretical framework used here, including other issue areas such as economic-developmental and cultural issues, should be made. Better generalizations and more definite conclusions can then be made, supplementating the particular and idiosyncratic features of case studies which make sweeping generalizations less valid. It is also highly desirable that the framework be applied to other actors representing diverse types of states and conditions. Brecher’s model is explicitly designed to be used and tested in the comparative study of foreign policy. It contains concepts and categories that can be applied to a variety of different types of foreign policy systems. An accumulation of foreign policy-making case studies of Japan and other countries will lead to broader generalizations and theory building. Case studies of Japan’s crisis decision-making in terms of the multilevel approach used in this work should also be made. Brecher’s framework is designed to be applicable to both crisis and non-crisis decisions. The examples 3 Risse-Kappen, 1991, 492. 4 Brecher, 1974a, p. 579 (Emphasis in original).

Concluding Remarks

339

of post-World War II crisis decisions in Japan are difficult to find, but there are numerous historical cases for the period up to 1945. The historical cases are usually well documented and analysts can shed new light on these by utilizing political science theories and methodologies. As Lebow notes: “...despite all the technological and political changes that have taken place since the end of World War II the older crises have lost little of their analytical relevance. The generic causes of crisis, the principle of strategic bargaining and the problems of crisis decision-making, appears to have changed very little during the last fifty or even seventy-five years.”5 While case studies of crisis decisions, especially of American foreign policy decision-making, have accumulated in recent years, enabling political scientists to engage in theorizing, systematic case studies of Japan’s crisis decisions have yet to be made. This study has also focused on an example of foreign policy realignment. In an effort to explain the Hatoyama government’s attempts to repattem Japan’s foreign policy, I have drawn on the work of Kalevi Holsti. I find the notion of foreign policy restructuring fruitful for explaining how and why it occurred when it did. My study differs from Holsti’s studies in the sense that I have used Brecher’s framework to shed light on this phenomenon. By arguing that the Japanese case is the result of a complex interplay of external and domestic political determinants, I have highlighted the diverse sources of foreign policy restructuring. In Kalevi Holsti’s studies, foreign policy restructuring has primarily been used to describe and explain significant changes in the patterns of external relations of developing nations. Only one out of the eight cases deals with foreign policy realignment in the “First World” - Canada. As a result, the use of the foreign policy restructuring concept has assumed a Third World focus. More empirical case studies on foreign policy change in developed states should be made. In this way, such empirical research can make a contributition to the understanding of the full complexity of why a nation restructures its foreign policy and to the growing body of international relations literature on foreign policy change.6 Recently, empirical illustrations of foreign policy restructuring abound. Since the late 1980s, a large number of nations have been undertaking major reorientations in their foreign policies - the dramatic changes in Soviet foreign policy in the late 1980s and many instances of 5 Lebow, 1981, pp. 14-15. 6 See, for example, Hermann (C.F.), 1990; Checkel, 1993; Deudney and Ikenberry 19911992; Mendelson, 1993.

340

Concluding Remarks

foreign policy restructuring in Eastern Europe, as well as the ongoing efforts by a number of European countries including Sweden and Finland to join the European Community (EC)/ the European Union (EU). These empirical instances provide interesting cases for future research. I conclude with an assessment of the implications of this study for an ongoing debate in the international relations literature over whether external factors or domestic-level variables are the most important determinants of state behavior. As this study has shown, such an either-or approach is not particularly useful in understanding foreign policy decisions. Explanations based on external, internal, or individual factors in isolation are themselves incapable of satisfactorily accounting for the state’s foreign policy. I have argued that a multilevel approach integrating different levels of analysis will add significantly to the explanatory power of analysis. This study joins the growing literature that attempts to link international and domestic levels of analysis.

Appendix Table A1: Hypothesis testing of Japan s Foreign Policy Behavior: Intensity of Images Hypothesis#:

1

Information and Images

2

D e c is io n C lu s te r s :

l.(S/MSA) 2.(Ti/MSA) 3.(T2/MSA) 4.(S/Soviet) 5.(T/Soviet) 6.(Ti/security) 7.(S/Security) 8.(T2/Security) 9.(T/China) 10.(S/China)

S — — S

S — — N N N N N N S N S N S

Images and Behavior Issue-Areas M-S

3____________ 4

5 6

s

s

s s s s s s s

s

s

P-D 7

8

N N N N — — N — — — — N — —

— —

s s s s

N S

N N N

Cross-issue

S N s N

s

N

9 10 11

12 13 14 15

s

— — — — — — S

ss s s s

— — — — — — — — —

s s s s s s

s

— ------ N ------ N S N S S — S S --------------------------

s s s s

N N N

N — — — — — —

S=Supported, N=Not supported, — irrelevan t

Table A2: Support fo r hypotheses applied to Japan’s foreign policy Degree o f Support

Type of Hypothesis

H. No.

No. o f Decisions Supporting H.

Total Number of Relevant Decisions

Intensity o f Images

1 2

5 3

8 8

0.63 0.38

Low Low

3

8

8

1.00

High

4 5 6 7 8

2 4 0 3 0

4 4 6 4 4

0.50 1.00 0.00 0.75 0.00

Low High Low High Low

9 10 11

4 4 4

4 4 4

1.00 1.00 1.00

High High High

Information and Images Military-Security Issue-Area

Political-Diplomatic Issue-Area

Support*

High 1.00 12 8 8 Low 0.00 1 0 13 Low 0.60 14 5 3 Low 0.00 4 0 15 “High” support denotes a degree o f support greater than 0.66, “low ” a degree o f support less than 0.67.

Cross-Issue Area

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Index

Cognitive consistency, 40-41 Cognitive map, 38, 42-44, 46 Cold War, 7, 41, 61, 75, 76, 83-84, 89, 93, 132-133, 146, 153, 184, 198, 209, 259, 274, 308

A Acheson, Dean, 41, 44, 98, 227 Adenauer, Konrad, 166, 210 Adenauer formula, 166-167 A ichi Kiichi, 115, 202, 238, 240, 260, 285, 286, 289 Allison, Graham, 18-20, 22, 50, 73 A llison, John, 101, 103, 105-106, 109110, 113-114, 134, 159 Aron, Raymond, 15

Comparative foreign policy, 27-34, 38, 56 Containment, policy of, 76-77, 91, 126, 130, 146-147, 191, 242, 257 Content analysis, 65-68, 256 Cottam, 43-44, 46 Cuban missile crisis, 20, 47, 50, 73

D Dawisha, 64 Decision-making, 2-4, 14, 17-20, 23-30, 32-38, 44, 52-55, 58, 63-65, 68, 70, 81,

Aruga Tadashi, 249

85, 92, 101-102, 138, 167, 175, 192,

Attribution theory, 41-42

203, 221, 241, 244, 257, 263, 287, 312,

Axelrod, Robert, 43

B Bendor, Jonathan, 20, 22 Binder, Leonard, 15 Blaker, Michael K., 223 Boulding, Kenneth E., 35, 38, 50 Brecher, M ichael, 2-4, 6, 15-16, 26, 32, 39, 49-59, 62-64, 70, 72-73, 315, 330, 337-339 Brodin, Katarina, 65 Bryder, Tom, 44 Bureaucratic politics model, 18-22 Burgess, P. M., 39

c Cantori, Louis J., 15 Case study, 13, 26, 64, 68-72, 182, 337338 Chiang Kai-shek, 187, 254, 260 Cognitive approach, 34, 37, 38, 42

319-321, 323-325, 333, 335, 338-339 Defense Agency, 123, 128, 129, 215, 228 Defense Agency Law, 74, 123 Defense Secrets Protection Law, 74, 124 DeHaven, Mark J., 30, 31 Democratic Party, 78, 122-123, 135-137, 145, 153, 160, 162, 164, 188, 209 Dower, John W„ 81, 91, 125 Drifte, Reinhard, 128 D ulles, John Foster, 40, 44, 76, 79, 90, 93, 101-103, 111-112, 127, 133, 164165, 169, 180-181, 186, 197, 200, 202, 210-211, 213-214, 217-219, 222, 225226, 232, 276, 318, 321 Dyson, James W., 32

E East Asia, 59, 75, 126, 129-130, 147, 151, 159, 178-179, 184-185, 190, 196, 198199, 204, 215, 243, 250, 253, 256, 270, 272, 308-309, 322, 325, 334-335

368

Index

Eckstein, Harry, 73 Edstrom, Bert, 68

H

Eisenhower, Dwight D„ 75-76, 100, 180,

Haas, Michael, 15-16

184, 199, 216-219, 221, 233, 321

Habomais and Shikotan, 161-164, 168170, 173-175, 245

Endicott, John E., 242

Hammond, Thomas H., 20, 22

F

Hanrieder, Wolfram F., 30-31

Feedback, 6, 26-27, 32, 52-55, 64

Hashimoto Hiroshi, 255, 289, 298, 302

from Japan's decisions on MSA aid,

Hatoyama, Ichiro, 79, 105, 115, 122, 124,

124-131

132-163, 165-167, 169-176, 179-182,

from Japan's decisions regarding the

192, 209, 211, 214, 221, 316, 318, 320-

Soviet Union, 176-179 from Japan's decisions on the U.S,-

321, 327-328, 331-332, 334-335, 339 Hellmann, Donald C., 16, 80, 167, 169,

Japan Security Treaty, 241-251 from Japan's decisions on China, 306314 Foreign Ministry, Japanese, 80-81, 84, 88,

265 Hermann, Charles F., 3, 23, 61 Hermann, Margaret G., 23 Hoffmann, Stanley, 15

92, 99, 109, 113, 137, 155, 157, 165,

Hogen Shinsaku, 255, 298-300

168, 209, 213-214, 220-225, 237, 245,

Holsti, K. J., 31, 37, 57, 60-61, 180, 182,

255, 278, 281, 285, 289, 293, 298-300, 302-303, 307, 310, 328, 334-335 Foreign policy restructuring, 3, 31, 60-62, 180-182, 335, 339-340 Fujiyama Aichiro, 183, 185, 193, 200,

339 Holsti, Ole R„ 24, 38-40, 44, 47, 53

I Ikeda Hayato, 98-99, 115-119, 121, 127, 246-247, 263, 281

220, 223-229, 231, 292, 323-325 Fukuda Takeo, 258, 262, 283-284, 291, 313

Ikeda-Robertson talks, 117-118, 120-121 Inoguchi Takashi, 1

Fukui Haruhiro, 3, 239, 261

Inouye Shinzo, 21-22, 33

Furui Yoshim i, 263-264, 290, 293, 295,

Ishibashi Tanzan, 180, 193, 212-213

301-302

Issue-area, 29, 57, 70, 73, 322, 325, 328329, 337-338, 341

G GARIOA (Government and R elief in Occupied Areas) funds, 118, 121 George, Alexander L., 19, 36, 39, 44-45, 66, 69

J James, Patrick, 12, 49 Japan Socialist Party, 60, 188, 240, 293, 297, 312, 330

Goldmann, Kjell, 8, 40

Jervis, Robert, 21, 37, 40, 289

Graber, Doris A., 38, 66, 68

Job, Brian, 12

Gromyko, Andrei, 172-174

Johnson, Chalmers, 72

Index Joint declaration, 135,152, 173, 174 Jonsson, Christer, 5, 14, 31, 38, 67

369

Liberal Party, 78-79, 96-97, 99, 114-115, 122-124, 136-137, 153, 162, 188, 331 Lijphart, Arend, 70-73, 337

K

Lindblom, Charles E., 18

Kaplan, Abraham, 27

Lindsay, James M., 21

Kaplan, Morton, 15

Lowi, Theodore J., 55-56

Kegley, Charles W„ 33, 69 Keidanren

(Federation

o f E conom ic

Organizations), 79, 106, 138, 324 Keizai Doyukai (Japan Committee for Economic Development), 138

M MAAG, 110 MacArthur, D ouglas II, 213-215, 217, 220-228

Khrushchev, Nikita, 173-174, 184

Mandel, Robert, 37

Kishi Nobusuke, 158-159, 164, 171, 177-

Mao Zedong, 305

178, 180-181, 183, 186-187, 192-202,

Matsumoto Shunichi, 139-140, 142, 149,

206, 209-210, 212-226, 228-233, 238,

155, 160-163, 165, 168, 170-174, 176,

246-247, 317, 319, 321, 325, 333

301

Kissinger, Henry, 44, 47, 279

McClelland, Charles A., 15

Kom eito, 60, 192, 255, 291, 293-294,

McLellan, David S., 44

297, 299, 312 Kono Ichiro, 138, 140, 154, 156-158, 163-164, 166-168, 170-174, 209, 210

Mefford, Dwain, 33 Mendelson, Sarah E., 13 Miki Takeo, 264, 273-275, 280-281, 291

Korea, 91, 100, 159, 204, 253

Miki Bukichi, 154

Korean War, 75, 77-78, 92, 97, 106, 133,

M iyazawa Kiichi, 95-96, 108, 114-115,

188, 316 Kosaka Masataka, 84, 86, 153, 193, 195, 236, 280, 281, 284

248 Morgan, Patrick M., 17, 63 Mutual Security Assistance (MSA) Aid, 5, 73-81, 87-89, 91-93, 95-98, 101-112,

L

114, 116, 119-120, 123-130, 316, 318,

Lagon, Mark P., 13 Larson, Deborah W., 14, 41-42, 66-67 Lauren, Paul Gordon, 5

320, 322-325, 329-333, 337, 341, 344345, 347 Murphy, Robert, 97, 101, 125

Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), 59-60, 129-130, 136, 138, 168, 171-176, 183,

N

188, 191-194, 206, 220, 222, 230-231,

Nakasone Yasuhiro, 126, 281, 284

233-240, 246-247, 250, 253-255, 258-

NATO, 119, 218, 222

259, 264, 266, 273, 280- 285, 287-288,

Nikkeiren (Japan Federation o f Employers

290-293, 297-298, 300-303, 307, 312313, 329 Leites, Nathan, 44, 45

Association), 138

370

Index

Nixon, Richard M., 238-240, 245, 253,

275, 277-278, 280-282, 287-295, 297,

255-256, 261-262, 267, 272-273, 278279, 281, 285, 287, 289, 298-300, 319 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 242

300-301, 306-313, 322, 328, 330 Phenomenological approach, 25, 28 Powell, Charles A., 32 Progressive Party, 79, 105, 114, 124, 331

o

Psychological environment, 6, 25, 26, 27,

Ogata Taketora, 87,106

39, 50, 53, 54

Ohira Masayoshi, 236, 252, 263-265, 267-

regarding decisions on MSA aid, 80-96,

274, 281, 290-305, 310-312, 318, 320-

130-131

321, 327-328, 333-335

regarding decisions about the Soviet

Okazaki Katsuo, 81, 88, 91-92, 97, 103-

Union, 139-151, 178-179

106, 113, 125

regarding decisions on the U.S.-Japan

Okinawa, 169, 173, 176, 228-229, 235,

Security Treaty, 192-207, 250-252

239-240, 245, 254, 256, 261

regarding decisions about China, 258-

Olmstead, George, 104 Oneal, John R., 12

275, 313-314 Public opinion, 7, 84-85, 129, 134, 149,

Operational code, 38-39, 42, 44-47

201, 206, 207, 238, 258, 268, 271, 273,

Operational environment, 6, 25, 26, 27, 38, 53, 54, 55 regarding decisions on MSA aid, 74-80,

322-324, 327, 330, 333-335 Purkitt, Helen E., 32 Putnam, Robert D., 173

130-131 regarding decisions about the Soviet Union, 132-139, 178-179 regarding decisions on the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, 184-192, 250-252 regarding decisions about China, 252-

R Reagan doctrine, 13 Realism, 10, 12, 13 Realist theory, 10, 13 Rearmament, 78-79, 82, 89, 91, 93-95,

258, 313-314

98-99, 103-105, 109, 112-115, 117,

Ostrom, Charles W., 12

119-122, 135, 143, 187, 197-198, 200201, 215

P

Rogers, William, 238, 280, 283-284

Packard, George R., 200 Paige, Glen D., 25, 63

Rosati, Jerel A„ 47 Rosenau James N., 24, 29-30, 32-33, 52,

Penetrated system, 30 People’s Republic o f China (PRC), 3, 7677, 90, 119, 127, 133, 135, 141-145,

56, 69 Russett, Bruce M., 15

147, 150, 152, 154, 159, 160, 180, 184,

s

186-187, 230, 242, 245-246, 252-258,

Safety Agency, 113, 117, 324

260, 262, 265-266, 268-269, 272-273,

Safety Forces, 79, 114

Index San Francisco system, 144, 148, 182, 265, 273

Spiegel, Steven L., 15, 37, 57 Sprout, Harold, 25-26, 35, 38, 50

Sasaki, Kozo, 293, 294, 312

Sprout, Margaret, 25-26, 35, 38, 50

Sato, Eisaku, 183, 202-207, 235-240, 245,

Stalin, Joseph, 76, 133, 134, 135

252, 254, 256, 258-261, 263, 278-279, 281, 284-285, 287-292, 307, 317, 321, 324, 327-329, 334 Schema theory, 41-42 SEATO, 222, 308 Self-D efense Forces, 74, 114, 121, 123, 125, 127, 129, 165, 181, 194, 198, 205, 217, 222-224, 313, 325 Self-Defense Forces Law, 74, 123 Self-perception theory, 41-42 Shigemitsu Mamoru, 114-115, 122-123, 137, 139-141, 145, 147, 149-151, 155159, 162, 164-165, 168-170, 180-181, 197, 209-211, 214 Shiina Etsusaburo, 300 Simon, Herbert A., 18, 36 Singer, J. David, 9, 12, 34 Sino-Soviet alliance, 75 Sjoblom, Gunnar, 45 Smith, Steve, 32-33 Snyder, Richard C„ 23-27, 33, 35, 38, 52, 63 Socialist Party, 96, 172, 188, 192, 200, 201, 204, 212, 229, 230, 231, 234, 237, 293 Sohyo (General Council o f Trade Unions), 190, 229, 231, 249, 330 Soviet Union, 1, 3, 5, 13, 40-42, 59, 62, 73, 76, 86, 89-90, 95, 97, 127, 132142, 144-160, 162-166, 168, 170, 172174, 176-178, 180, 182, 184-186, 190191, 201, 205, 213, 242, 245, 257, 265, 268, 270, 275, 306, 310-311, 313, 316, 318, 320, 326-336

371

Subordinate system, 15-16, 54, 57, 59, 325, 328-329

T Taber, Charles S., 46 Tagawa Seiichi, 288, 301 Taiwan, 59, 133, 159, 184, 187, 252-254, 256-260, 262, 265, 271, 275, 277-278, 280-284, 286-289, 291-293, 295-296, 298-306, 308, 312, 314, 317, 321, 327, 329-330, 333, 335 Takeiri Yoshikatsu, 291, 293-297, 299300, 312-313 Tanaka Kakuei, 206, 252, 263-267, 271, 273, 289-300, 303-305, 309-310, 312313, 318, 320-321, 327-328, 333-335 Thompson, William, 15-17 Thordarson, B., 44, 58

u U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, 3, 6, 73, 102, 125, 143, 160, 177, 179, 183, 185, 187, 207, 233, 235, 239-240, 245-250, 289, 298, 322-326, 330, 333 United Nations, 133, 147-148, 155, 158, 161, 164, 166, 170-171, 175, 177-178, 185, 195, 198, 203-204, 215, 217, 219, 232-233, 239, 252-253, 255-256, 258, 261-262, 268, 271-275, 277, 280, 283286, 306, 317, 319, 327-328, 334 United States, 1-3, 20-22, 59, 74-78, 8291, 93, 95-97, 99-112, 116-121, 124129, 132, 134-135, 137-138, 140, 142146, 150, 152-153, 156, 158-160, 162165, 169, 173, 176-177, 180-184, 186-

372

Index

189, 191-196, 198-199, 202-203, 205, 207-212, 215-217, 219, 222, 225-226, 228, 232-234, 236-238, 242-245, 253256, 258, 261-262, 265, 268-270, 272280, 282, 284, 286-287, 299, 303, 306308, 311, 319, 321-324, 326-327, 329, 333, 335

V VSyrynen, Raimo, 16

w Walker, Stephen G., 44, 47 Waltz, Kenneth N„ 11-12, 14 Welfield, John, 128 Wolfers, Arnold, 12, 34, 56

Y Yin, Robert K„ 70, 73 Yoshida Shigeru, 74, 78-105, 107-108, 110-115, 117, 119, 121-123, 124-125, 134-137, 142, 151, 153-154, 159-160, 181, 203, 208, 221, 227, 258-259, 265, 275-277, 289, 298, 316, 320, 322-323, 326, 329, 331-333, 335

z Zagare, Frank C., 18 Zengakuren (National Federation of Student Self-G overnm ent A ssociations), 190, 249, 330 Zhou Enlai, 160, 245, 288, 290-297, 300305, 310 Zimmerman, William, 55-56

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78. Sjolin, Mats: Coalition Politics and Parliamentary Power , Lund: Lund University Press 1993 79. Stenelo, Lars-Goran - Norrving, B e n g t: Lokal Makt, Lund: Lund University Press 1993 80. Iwanaga, Kazuki: Images, Decisions and Consequences in Japan’s Foreign Policy, Lund: Lund University Press 1993