Decade of Death: Secret Wars and Genocide in Africa, 1993-2003 9781300123118, 1300123117

701 37 97MB

English Pages [737] Year 2012

Report DMCA / Copyright


Polecaj historie

Decade of Death: Secret Wars and Genocide in Africa, 1993-2003
 9781300123118, 1300123117

Citation preview



Decade of Death: Secret Wars and Genocide in Africa 1993-2003 Wayne Madsen

DECADE OF DEATH: Secret Wars and Genocide in Africa 1993-2003

Wayne Madsen


First edition published as Genocide and Covert Operations in Africa 1993-1999, Edwin Mellen Press. © 1999 Wayne Madsen. Second edition published as Decade of Death: Secret Wars and Genocide in Africa 1993-2003, © 2012 Wayne Madsen.

ISBN: 978 1 300 12311-8 - -





For my parents who helped me prepare for my worldwide treks in search of these and other answers and to T.M., my lighthouse.


Table of Contents Foreword to First Edition Foreword to Second Edition Preface to First Edition Acknowledgment to First Edition Acknowledgment to Second Edition Introduction

6 11 17 25 26 27

1 The Somali Syndrome 2 America's African Beachhead: Uganda 3 The Death of "Monsieur Afrique" 4. U.S. Target # 1: Jonas Savimbi 5 The Africa Arkansas Indonesia Connection 6 Destabilizing Rwanda 7 Ambassador "Nero" 8 The Road from Kigali to Zaire 9 Kabila's Kiosk 10 Human "Collateral Damage" 11 Pax Americana in Africa 12 The Fall of Kinshasa 13 The Gucci Mercenaries 14 Fashoda II 15 Diamond Wars on the Western Front 16 The French American Spy Wars 17 Qinton's Victory Tour 18 Aftermath 19 Retrospect Afterword Appendix A: Documents

37 49 63 79 91 133 185 211 247 261 309 379 431 477 517 557 577 623 661 720 725


About the Author


' i,

" |i ,

Foreword to First Edition (Genocide and Covert Operations in Africa 1999-1993) In March 1998, President Bill Clinton embarked on a much heralded trip to six African nations. Amid the photo opportunities and speeches, the president's trip had another, much more controversial, aspect. After a four year covert war for control of the riches and political destiny of Africa, Clinton's visit sent a stark message to the major combatants; United States was claiming victory, particularly over France. The national security and military entourage traveling with Clinton were among the architects of America's secret conflict, The covert war itself had dramatic consequences between 800,000 and one million Tutsis slaughtered; between 200,000 and 250,000 Hutus killed in counter genocide; two assassinated African presidents; the overthrow of democratic governments in favor of one party or non party military backed regimes; many suspicious deaths; incessant ethnic rebellions; and financial windfalls for a select group of international financial hucksters. America's attention was not again rigidly fixed on Africa until August 7, 1998 when, during a bustling Friday morning, two powerful bombs exploded at the U.S. embassies in downtown Nairobi and Dar es Salaam. From 1994 to 1998, little was written in the American press about what happened in the killing fields of central Africa. The media treated Americans to carefully edited television scenes of dead and starving refugees and human waves of people moving on foot through jungles. They intended the images to gamer



popular support for selective American peac^ekeeping and humanitarian missions in the region. The virtual open warfare between the American and French military and intelligence services was glossed over by the "responsible press." The fact that major American military involvement in one of the deadliest conflicts since the war in Southeast Asia went unreported is not sinpiising considering the current state of news reporting. Before Clinton's victory lap through Africa, Time magazine ran a vapid nine page piece heralding the self reliance in some of America's newly established client states. These include Mozambique, Eritrea, Mali, and Ghana aU cormtries having less than stellar democratic and human rights records. My goal in this book is to present the events that occurred in the Great Lakes region in the context of how outside players - notably the United States and France used their considerable military and intelligence to tip the balance of economic power in Africa. The first two chapters describe the backgrotmd of American involvement in Somalia and Uganda. Whereas the presence of U.S. troops in Somalia was very public with confusing goals, the Pentagon's program of providing military assistance and training to the Ugandan army (and the Rwandan Patriotic Front) was covert and the goals clear. Washington's use of local surrogates directly benefited its long-range economic plans for the region. Chapter 3 traces the rise of Jacques Foccart, one of France's most influential twentieth century politicians. It was the death of Foccart in 1994 that augured the decline of French influence in Africa.


Chapter 4 analyzes the dramatic shift in U.S. policy toward Africa that began with the coming to power of the Clinton administration. The first casualty of this new policy was the longtime U.S. ally, Jonas Savimbi of Angola's UNTTA movement. American withdrawal of support for Savimbi was in sharp contrast to Washington's new found respect for some of Africa's most noted former Marxist leaders, including the leaders of Angola's government. Chapter 5 introduces the reader to the world of international mining and the dubious nature of an international network of investors and agents of influence. The unlikely confluence of African, American, Southeast Asian and even Arkansas politics had tremendous consequences for many disparate players, including the Clinton administration, the Habyarimana regime in Rwanda, Marshal Mobutu of Zaire, and the boards of directors of companies from Toronto and New York and Singapore to Vancouver. I suggest that the tmstoppable htmger for diamonds, gold, and oil contributed directly to the horrors of the destabilization of Africa, particularly the hideous genocide in Rwanda and Zaire. Chapter 6 describes the Rwandan genocide of 1994 and suggests that the United States was not merely an innocent bystander to the events that led to one of the most systematic mass killing of humans since World War II. Chapters 7 through 12 take the reader through the advance of pro-U.S. guerrilla forces through Rwanda, Burundi, and finally Zaire. Machiavellian pragmatism and selfishness, not altruism and genuine social concerns were at the center of the Clinton administration's policy toward Africa. 8

The role of corporate conglomerates in protecting their substantial assets in Africa is explained in Chapter 13. They highlight the immense influence of what I call the "Gucci mercenaries" and their connections to mercenary companies. The name Fashoda represented a critical tummg point in the nineteenth century British French scramble for Africa. The French never forgot their defeat at Fashoda in 1898. In Chapter 14 I suggest that a "Fashoda II" complex grew out of the contemporary U.S. French rivalry for influence in Africa. That rivalry extended from central Africa to the Horn and Sudan. Chapter 15 focuses on the events in West Africa and suggests the destabilization of Sierra Leone, Liberia, Gambia, and Senegal was not much different from what was occurring in the Great Lakes region. Chapter 16 presents the reader with the backgrotmd of U.S. French economic rivalry as it relates to the intelligence and counterintelligence context. In this regard, I suggest that economic intelligence gathering has become the number one priority for the American and French intelligence establishments, especially in relation to activities in Africa. The book concludes with a description of the political nuances regarding the American declaration of a silent victory in the new scramble for Africa. While flying from London's Gatwick Airport to Entebbe, Uganda in May 1998, I was treated to front page headlines in the British press that dealt with the cozy relationship between Britain's defense and intelligence establishments, mercenary firms, and unscrupulous diamond mining companies. Emerging from the newspaper articles were revelations of a ~9

shadowy network of spies, ex spies, and corporate con men that was actually directing British foreign policy in the West African nation of Sierra Leone. The Clinton administration must have felt some relief that it was Prime Minister Tony Blair and his Foreign Secretary who were on the hot seat. However, the United States government was also engaging the services of mercenaries that were acting in the interests of American and Canadian mining and oil companies. Furthermore, some of these same elements were tightly connected to the very same network that was shaking Britain's government. Innocent Africans died to ensure, among other things, a steady flow of diamonds to the famous jewelry retailers of New York, Paris, and London and lesser known diamond discount houses aroxmd the world. As British Airways Flight 2067 touched down at Entebbe, I was convinced that this book must reveal the sordid tale of genocide, greed, espionage, trickeiy, and political chicanery at the highest levels of power. For the peoples of Africa, Asia, and Latin America, the stakes will remain entirely too high if unscrupulous miners, in cooperation with unregulated mercenaries, are permitted to scavenge the lands of others. Moreover, the United States military must not be used as a praetorian guard for unscrupulous international mining and oil magnates. Politicians must not be lulled into the belief that the bank accotmts of multinational corporations are, in any way, tied to the national security or economic well-being of the United States. WAYNE MADSEN March 1999 10

Foreword to Second Edition (Decade of Death: Secret Wars and Genocide in Africa 1993-2003) Some three and one-half years after completion of the first edition of this book, the outlook for Africa was not promising. From mid-1999 to 2003, the situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and other war-tom nations cotinued to grow rapidly worse. Western intrigue, once again, appeared to be behind two more political assassinations: those of Congolese President Laurent Kabila and one-time U.S. ally Jonas Savimbi of Angola's UNITA rebel movement. The demise of the latter was virtually predicted in Chapter 4 of the first edition (Target No. 1: Jonas Savimbi). Just as many Africans thought America's African policy under the Clinton administration could not get worse, the policies of the Bush administration proved them wrong. Africa was merely viewed through a lens of market potential. Susan Rice's successor as Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Walter Kansteiner HI, set out to make Afica safe for U.S. oil compames that had pumped millions of dollars of contributions into the Bush presidential campaign. According to the Los Angeles Times, he told oil executives in Houston that Africa was "truly the last emerging continent." The Bush administration's myopic view of Africa as a place to drill for oil resulted in private militaty compames like MPRI increasing their military training profiles in Nigeria and Equatorial


Guinea. Sao Tome and Principe, a nation where oil was discovered off shore, offered the United States a naval base and Pentagon officials began visiting the country. U.S. covert activity increased throughout Africa from 1999 to 2003. Liberia's Charles Taylor, who is a joint investor with televangelist Pat Robertson in the Cayman Islands-based Freedom Gold Limited Liberian gold mining venture, remained in power with the help of powerful politicians in Washington, including Reverend Jesse Jackson and Representative Donald Payne. Fresh from lining his pockets with the proceeds from smuggling Sierra Leone conflict diamonds, Taylor began infiltrating guerrillas into neighboring Guinea and Ivory Coast to foment the same kind of turmoil that he helped spark in Sierra Leone. The turmoil in the Ivory Coast best exemplified France's declining power in Africa. The Ivory Coast had always been Paris's shining star: a stable albeit autocratic government that had a standard of living higher than other countries of West Africa. All that changed in 1999 when Henri Konan Bedie was ousted in a coup led by General Robert Guei. Based on other military coups in Africa whereby generals shot their way into office but then scrapped their uniforms in favor of business suits, many Ivorians and others in Africa suspected U.S. intelligence involvement. The pattern had previously been seen in Rwanda, Uganda, DRC, Nigeria, Guinea-Bissau, Gambia, Sierra Leone, Equatorial Guinea, Liberia, and Burundi. Many precariously came close to joining the ranks of other failed states. In January 2001, Guei held and election where only he and Laurent Gbagbo ~ a Socialist — were




candidates. A fourth candidate, former Prime Minister Alassane Ouattara, was declared by Guei to be a citizen of Burkina Faso and therefore ineligible to nm for President. The seeds were sown for civil war. Eventually, Gbagbo won the election but his supporters later suspected that incessant rebellions in the predominantly Muslim north and along the border with Liberia, were being aided by Charles Taylor, Burkina Faso, and the United States. In fact, the United States called for Gbagbo to hold new elections. Instead, Gbagbo appealed to members of HouphouetBoigny/Bedie ruling party, the Democratic Party, to join his government. Dming 2001 and 2002, pro-Ouattara forces launched an anti-govemment rebellion in the north while rebels, said to include, Liberians and RUF guerrillas, fomented problems along the IvorianLiberian border. It seemed like a replay of the situation in the Great Lakes in 1994 when French forces began arriving in the Ivory Coast to mediate a truce. In fact, they were supporting Gbagbo's forces against the rebels. France's former policy of disengagement from its former African colonies began to reverse. On September 19, 2002, General Guei attempted to overthrow Gbagbo while he was on a state visit to Italy. Loyalist forces captured and killed Guei. However, Gbagbo's powerful Interior Minister, Emile Boga Doudou, was killed during the revolt. Whether the CIA or DIA was involved in the Ivory Coast coup on behalf of Guei was uncertain. What was certain was that in the wake of September 11, CIA Director George Tenet had given wide latitude to CIA operatives to engage in all sorts of clandestine activities 13

in the name of the "war against terror." The CIA had also called back into service several retired clandestine service officers whose careers included covert operations in Africa and other developing nations. The same month as Guei's attempted coup, rebels seized several important towns in the north, then moved south and captured the important city of Bouake. As U.S. C-130 transports arrived at Yamoussoukro, French troops arrived in Bouake to give safe passage to foreign citizens trapped there by the rebels. Increasingly, the French troops numbers grew and there clashes with rebels in the north and west increased in frequency and intensity. At the time this edition went to press, the Ivory Coast government reported Liberian troops to be among the rebels in the north and west of the country. Once France's showplace former colony in Africa, the Ivory Coast descended into chaos and the chances of it becoming yet another "failed state" increased in likelihood. On January 24, 2003, the various Ivorian warring parties agreed to a peace agreement in Paris. The northern and western rebels were to be granted representation in a new government of national concilitation. However, many observers drew parallels between the Paris Agreement and the Lome Agreement that rewarded the RUF's banditry and genocide with a role in Sierra Leone's government. Once again, Charles Taylor's mischief making paid lucrative dividends. Another potential "failed state" situation wracked the Central African Republic, where refugee veterans of the Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR) became involved in a series of rebellions against President

14 ~

Patasse. In May 2001, former President Andre Kolingba -r a southerner -- attempted to overthrow Patasse -- a northerner — allegedly with the help of two former FAR generals and other Rwandan refugees who fled their country in 1994. Libyan troops were dispatched to protect Patasse's government. Bemba's MLC forces also crossed into the CAR to help Patasse. The MLC forces were apparently interested in seizing control of the CAR's vast gold and diamond resources, something they had already done, with great success, in the DRC. At the beginning of 1993, the situation in Africa was bleak. The controls put in place on the CIA in the 1970s were loosened after the September 11 attacks. The rise to power in 2002 of a conservative government in France meant that much of the introspection conducted by the previous Socialist government was superseded by business and new strategic concerns. The Bush administration merely viewed Africa through the lens of profit-making. U.S. Africa policy was dominated by former multinational corporation officials who saw Africa as a source of inexpensive labor and a market for manufactured consumer items. The issues of the AIDS pandemic, poor labor conditions, and debt relief barely registered in the power making structures of the White House, the State Department, K Street, and corporate board rooms. The estbalishment of the African Union in 2002, far from giving a stronger voice to African nations, merely ensured Africa's seamless transition into yet another component of the Bush family's and their accomplices' "new world order" of greed, exploitation, constant war, and strong-armed internal and international security.



WAYNE MADSEN January 2003

Preface to First Edition {Genocide and Covert Operations in Africa 1993-1999) Africa has always held a special fascination for Western writers, even if many of them have often been way off the mark when dealing with it. While they approached the "inscrutable East" with a mixture of awe and irritation due to what they realized was the limitation of their insights, they usually had few doubts about the "knowability" of the African continent, and even fewer about their capacity to diagnose, exhort, educate, or "modernize" its peoples. Aside from the vast output of fiction that saw Africa as a white man's playgrotmd where the Francis Macombers of the First World could get in touch with their own manhood in a never-never land of safaris and sundowners, countless travelers, missionaries, administrators, journalists, consultants and assorted scholars combined their efforts to de-code the continent and, with the rallying cry that "the darkest thing about Africa is our ignorance," to make it transparent, safe for Western system builders-in a word, "penetrable." Over the years, the focalization of this corpus has changed somewhat - though less, on the whole, than one might expect - but its emphasis remains descriptive and prescriptive. Ethnographic writing and travelogues have given way to reports and policy papers. In recent years, instant analysis of the "clash of cultures" and "catastrophic" schools (variations on the old 'Heart of Darkness' genre) has enjoyed public attention, while academic scholarship (as if to avoid


coming to grips with the impleasantness of failure, corruption and conflict), increasingly specialized in small-gauge historical or enviromnental micro-studies. My own clan - that of the political scientists are no exception. Their particular effort to make Africa "transparent" has successively taken them from the study of "decolonization" and "African nationalism" to a fascination with "nation-building" and modernization" - a good deal of this informed by Cold War externalities and by a frequent resort to the skeleton key of "tribalism" (or its politically correct cousin, "ethnicity"). The end of the Cold War has brought fresh luster to the "brave new Africa" genre which had first flourished in the 1960s with the "realist" justification of "modernizing militaiy" rule, one-party or no-party systems, and has now re-siu:faced with a brand-new set of accessories variously known as "liberalization" (economic and/or political), "democratization," multipart3dsm, and of course "civil society." In all fairness to "Africanists" (a cohort in which I include myself), it should be noted that, unlike Sovietologists or Sinologists, whose approach was often shaped by the reputed "enmity" of their chosen terrain, they genuinely liked Africa and wished -at times naively or unwisely-to make it "a better place." This meliorative (if partly Western-centric) missionary attitude partly explains why, throughout these five decades, serious literature on Africa has often been reluctant to tackle the seamy rmderside of "African pohtics" - i.e., the degree to which Africa has been (or has remained) penetrated by outside actors. The continued influence of these non-African actors has of


course been recognized, even if there is much more to it than the all-too-real issue of "neo-colonialism." Usually, such outside influence was duly noted when it was manifest and, in a sense, institutionalized (e.g., through the Franc Zone. Or through the many Franco-African cooperation agreements). France, in that perspective, was often seen as the single most significant outside actor "pulling the strings" of client states and puppet regimes. The more subdued (or more insidious) forms of British influence, on the other hand, were often ignored -to the degree that it became fashionable to consider that the UK no longer had an "African policy." Throughout the post-independence period, U.S. influence was often minimized, or treated as an extension of Cold War policies. Within those parameters, the substantial (and often decisive) degree to which US influence was, at various times, projected in countries such as Congo/Zaire, Angola, Kenya, Ethiopia, Sudan, Morocco, Tunisia, Ghana, Nigeria, Xiberia, Guinea, Somalia - and, of coiurse. Southern Africa - could be read as part of a larger pattern of reaction (or over-reaction) to the actual or imagined threats of "Communist" infiltration (mostly Soviet, but for a while Chinese also), a posture that had already been outlined in the 1950's with the recognition of emerging Africa's "challenge to America." The end of the Cold War - some of the early signs of which appeared in Africa- has led to a reconsideration of priorities, but it has not (any more than it has yielded the much-heralded "peace dividend") signaled the end of outside intervention in Africa. In a way, just as the opening of the Suez Canal, though voiding (at least for nearly a century) the


strategic importance of the Cape Route to Asia and of the coastal holdings that British or French naval interests had maintained along its course, actually comcided with the beginning of a more systematic European penetration of the African hinterland, the end of the Cold War, and of its bi-polarized conditioned reflexes, simply opened the door to a new set of considerations, and to a new "scramble" of competing economic ambitions, which the new ideologies of "globalization," "liberalization" and "privatization" now project over the entire planet. Within this "global" perspective, Africa has often seemed marginal," or inconsequential. With a record of mediocre productivity, political instability, biireaucratic corruption, limited consumer incomes, and minimal technological absorption, Africa (particularly its middle portion) was seen as an unpromising target for serious, long-term investments. Indeed, over the past 25 years, what with the crushing burden of debt servicing and repayments, the net balance of capital flows to Africa has consistently been negative. In other words, Africa has been a "high-risk" area attracting speculative capital in search of quick, easily realizable profits, or simply jockeying for position and trading futures in a constantly changing market. There is little doubt that Africa's resources -and particularly its petroleum and mining resourcesremain highly attractive. Not all of them, however, are equally exploitable. Oil (thus far mostly offshore) has long been accessed by all major (as well as some minor) corporate actors in the form of enclaved, highly mechanized operations which (except for environmental "collateral damage") have had only a



limited impact on the indigenous population - but a huge "rentier" effect for the benefit of local oligarchs. Conventional mining for base metals (copper, bauxite, nickel etc.), and even for "rare earth" metals has suffered from erratic world prices, recurrent gluts, and a decaying infrastructure that have combined to reduce its profitability. Diamonds, on the other hand - and, to a lesser extent, gold - have increasingly been mined in far more loosely structured, anarchic and adventurist ways, which is largely due to the high-value, low-bulk nature of these two commodities, accounting for the prevalence of wildcat prospecting, extensive smuggling, theft. Coercion and political collusion which have turned these two sectors into the free-for-all, Raubwirtschaft scene that attracts adventurers and shady operators like over-ripe fruit attracts flies. The chief merit of Wayne Madsen's book is not only to lift the rock under which such swarming characters proliferate, but also to explore the myriad ways m wliich their activities may influence the more formal avenues through which policies are shaped and implemented. Much of the information he gathers is in the public domain, and while the evidence he marshals is, of necessity, fragmentary and partly speculative, its sheer volume and convergence are more than sufficient for the reader to discover patterns in this continent wide puzzle. France, the United States, Britain - but also the not-so-new "new South Africa" - are understandably the main state actors on this regional scene, full of soxmd and fury, but where the condescending Western public sees only the numbing reiteration of its own "heart of darkness" stereotypes, Madsen shows us a different reality behind the I of


Africa s failed states." Without glossing over the faults of African "elites," he reminds us that behind every corrupted, every manipulated indigenous Big Man" lurks a corrupter and a manipulator more often than not non-African.

The complexity and intricacy of our Western political systems, the revolving-door linkages between the public and private sectors, the ambiguities of notions such as "aid" or "development," the sycophancy of "sponsored" research or media coverage, the empire-building rivalries of competing btureaucracies, the selective appeals to "humanitarian" or "politically correct" responses all combine to befuddle even the most perceptive analysts. What this book offers is an extensive thesaurus of data, clues and pointers that encourages us to look beyond platitudes and ready made formulas. The questions it raises are at least as important as those it attempts to answer, and what it makes transparent is not so much Africa itself as the spider web of noxious influences in which it has been, and remains ensnared. This is what investigative journalism, in the tradition of I.F. Stone, Seymour Hersh or Bob Woodward, is all about - and that which it does better than any other form of research. By sniffing out new trails, by inviting further inquiry, by submitting facts that others may chew on, by bridging the gap between the mindlessly repetitive stereotypes of the popular press and the intellectualized speculations of academic writing, Madsen's book is a challenge to all those (Africans or not) who have the travails and the promise of Africa at heart. After 250 years, too many Africans could paraphrase the bitter words addressed to Voltaire's Candide by the


i^utilat6cl slave and remind usr ^^This is the price we pay for you to wear diamonds." EDOUARD BUSTIN



Acknowledgment to First Edition There are many people who supported me with material, information, advice, and, most of all, encouragement. I would especially like to thank James Bamford, Maurice Botbol, Professor Edouard Bustin, Larry Collins, Adrian du Plesssis, Roger Faligot, George Fowler, Antoine Glaser, Professor Christopher Gray, Jean Guisnel, John Hamlet, Remigius Kintu, Stephen Peacock, Francis Soler, Juhani Saari, and Doug Thompson. Thanks also to David Sobel, one of Washington's foremost Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) specialists, in helping me deal with the obstinate bureaucrats of the State Department. Also, thanks go to Marc Rotenberg, David Banisar, and the other Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) staff who provided critical information resource support. I would also like to thank former U.N. Secretary General Dr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali who gave generously of his time and thoughts. Also thanks go to Ugandan Member of Parliament and Opposition Leader Ken Lukyamuzi and William Pike, the editor of New Vision. To the two American military men in Rwanda, thanks for your candor and insights. Although you will remain anonymous, you restored my belief that there endures in the U.S. military a cadre of decent and professional people. Thanks also to Eugene Ka)dhm'a of the Rwandan Embassy and Colonel John Mateeka of the Ugandan Embassy for their help before my trek to central Africa. Amnesty International's Military, Security, Police Transfers Working Group was also helpful in


providing its unique insights, particularly Erin O'Brien.

Acknowledgment to Second Edition ^er the publication of the first edition. Genocide and Cmert OperaUons in Africa 1993-1999, published by wm Mellen Press, so many people from around the world came forward with additional information, concerning the events in Rwanda ih 1994. For this I forever remain grateful. r I like to thank tor their insights, sharing of documents and reference matoial, and advice. I wish I could acknowledge them all by name, but confidentiality agreements and space restraints prevents doing so. Congresswoman Cynthia McKinney of Georgia deserves special mention for her dauntless and consistent stance on U.S. policy in Africa. She was mstrumental in gathering together in impromptu and imormal settings people who know the truth about Africa. Mere words cannot begin to convey mv appreciation. ^ Two former Prime Ministers of Rwanda, Faustin Twagmmungu and Pierre-Celeste Rwigyema, who both served under Kagame and who are now in exile, confirmed my worst suspicions about the corrupt Weptocracy that controls Rwanda and vast portions of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. I appreciate the confidence of Charles Onana, the publisher of this new edition, for his confidence in me and his tolerance for my constantly moving


26 —

Introduction A former Hope, Arkansas land surveyor; an expatriate diamond baron from Mauritius; an aging veteran of the Erench m^quis; a group of U.S. intelligence operatives, and the collegiate alumni of former Marxist African rebel leaders would, at first glance, seem to have little in common. However, the ties that boimd these disparate players throughout the 1990s revolve around American and French economic-driven plans for Africa. The main expediters of the policy include shadowy intelligence operatives, multinational soldiers of forttme, and a coterie of exploitative U.S., Canadian, French, and other corporate conglomerates hoping to cash in on mineral we^th. By 1996, some ninety mercenary companies were operating in Africa with the eyes of their secretive clients set on Africa's immense natural riches. These firms - American, South African, British, French, Israeli, and Dutch - became intimately involved in Africa's many civil wars. Not coincidentally, they concentrated their attention on wars raging in areas rich in diamonds, gold, copper, and oil. Ever smce Rwanda exploded in the horrendous Tutsi-Hutu genocide of 1994, American business and military interests have directly benefited from central Africa's turmoil. This primarily resulted from the breakdown of the region's historic economic ties to France and Belgium. American businessmen swarming into civil war wracked Africa seemed encouraged by the advice once offered by a white Zimbabwean


businessman commenting on Mozambique's bloody civil war, "the investor who gets in while the bullets are still flying is the man who makes a bundle/'^ The Western businessmen crisscrossing Africa during the 1990s were firmly backed by their respective governments. They all sought to gain new economic footholds in the virtually rediscovered continent. One is reminded that some one hundred years earlier, European powers, backed by local entrepreneurs, the most famous being the British magnate Cecil Rhodes, engaged in a similar helter-skelter "scramble for Africa." Then, the continent was divided into British, French, Portuguese, German, Italian, Belgian, Spanish, and Arab spheres of influence. Belgium's King Leopold even claimed the entire Belgian Congo as his personal fiefdom. In that era, the United States had to be content with the small Republic of Liberia, foimded by freed American slaves who still owed allegiance to their former slavers in America. By 1998, the United States foimd itself in the driver^s seat on the continent. Britain, Russia, Germany, and China - the Cold War's other chief contestants for influence in Africa - were largely reduced to minor players. Fiurthermore, in a major coup, Washington's only significant competitor, France, was relegated to the political and economic sidelines in most of the continent. By insisting on militarily backing proFrench despots, Paris had come up short in its battle with Washington for dominance of Africa. The Pentagon's "Newspeak" military jargon refers to civil wars, such as those that took place in Africa in the mid-1990s, as "low intensity conflicts." However, what occurred in Africa was far from low intensity. From 1994 to 1997, the covert de facto French-


American proxy war cost an estimated one million lives. By the middle of 1998, the blood continued to flow. Pentagon phraseology best sums up the Pentagon's failure to react to acts of genocide in central Afrida: "Flexible and Selective Engagement." General Henry Shelton, appointed Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1997, defined the phrase when he served as Commander of the U. S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) (which, interestingly, is the same abbreviation used for mercenaries - SOF - soldier of fortune). The "flexibility" of SOF involvement in foreign military action, according to Shelton, entails the use of "language skills, cross-cultural training, regional orientation, and an tmderstanding of the political context of their [SOF] missions." The general suggested that the use of force to quell conflicts would not be always necessary. America's senior military commander also said that the SOF's non-lethal strategy would "involve working with civilian populations ... to influence situations favorable toward U.S. national interests."^ Therefore, when and where U.S. national security equated to economic advantage, covert SOF operators would assist in furthering U.S. interests. Herein is the root of the new American foreign policy goals in Africa and elsewhere. Instead of making the world "safe for democracy" (an old Cold War rubric), the U.S. military would make the world safe for American economic investment. Thus, democracy and human rights in Africa fell to a lesser priority in the plans of the Clinton foreign policy team. According to Roger Moody, the director of NostRoMo Research, a mining development consultancy that serves indigenous communities around the world, there is a


common factor in the emergent corporate-mercenarymilitary troika that now seeks to dominate much of the world's developing nations and territories. Moody writes that the virtual raping of lands in impoverished countries "is a symptom of the New World Trade Order, as Southern states [developing nations in the southern hemisphere] abandon long standing protectionist investment rules, ^ow the dismemberment of state-owned mining companies and connive in the abandonment of any global standards for how and where resources can be mined."3 In Africa, former state-owned mining companies have fallen into the hands of tmscrupulous international mining barons who work hand-in-hand with mercenary armies and American, British, French, and Israeli special operations forces. As for genocide, any reasonable person would ask for what pmpose could a million lives be sacrificed. According to Antoine Glaser, a leading French specialist on Africa, the answer is "oil, minerals, and intelligence advantage." French and American intelligence encouraged much of the central African turmoil, the latter mostly involving the Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). The goals of France and the United States were clear: either Paris or Washington would win the economic spoils of the African proxy war. When the United States ultimately won the war, some of President Bill Clinton's closest business friends reaped the benefits of lucrative contracts in the resulting mining and oil sweepstakes. In June 1994, Qinton's chief foreign policy supporter in the House of Representatives, the influential Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Lee Hamilton, explained why



Africa was of renewed interest to the United States. "Africa has the most economic potential of any region in the world/' Hamilton declared. He added: "it has powerful rivers. It is rich in minerals and natural resources. It has the most arable land for farming in the world . . . In turn, there were a number of African leaders eager to offer up their mineral riches in return for investment. Namibia's Mining Mimster Andimba Toivo ya Toivo beckoned American investment in his diamond-rich nation, "the cotmtry is bestowed with treasure . . . You just bring your tools.''^

Notes 1. Carole J. L. Collins, "Reconstructing the Congo," Review of African Political Economy, 24: 74,591-600. 2. Prepared Statement by General Henry H. Shelton, Commander-in-Chief, United States Special Operations Command, before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Federal News Service, 11 March 1997. 3. ^oger Moody, "The mercenary miner: Robert Friedland goes to Asia," Multinational Monitor, 18: 6,1 June 1997. 4. "U.S. - Africa: QA Ready to Qose 15 Stations," Inter Press Service, 23 June 1994. 5. Kate Dunn, "The Loded Continent," Christian Science Monitor, 25 March 1998,10.



i ¥



1 The Somalia Syndrome Nothing is easy in war. Mistakes are always paid for in casudties and troops are quick to sense any blunder made by their commanders. General Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953

When President Clinton signed Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25), titled "U.S. Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations/' on May 3, 1994, many observers thought that its purpose was merely an attempt to forestall another U.S. military peacekeeping debacle like the one that had recently occurred in Somalia. Then, in May 1997, Clinton signed PDD-56, titled "Managing Complex Contingency Operations," which was thought to further limit conditions for U.S. participation in peacekeeping operations. In fact, both directives represented a significant change in American peacekeeping duties. Far from avoiding future situations like Somalia, the United States chose involvement in peacekeeping operations only when American national security interests - especially those of an economic nature - were at stake. Moreover, PDD56 states only when a predetermination of what U.S. interests - including economic interests - are at risk in a foreign crisis can a decision to deploy U.S. troops be made. Although the United States claimed it was going


to avoid military activity in Africa, the record speaks for itseh. From 1992 to 1997, the United States was involved m sixteen military operations in Africa. Although these usually involved U.S. Marines being deployed to evacuate its citizens from threat areas, they all had ulterior motives. Etched in the minds of many Americans were the homble October 1993 scenes of dead and naked bodies dragged through the streets of Mogadishu by followers of Somali clan leader Mohammed Farah Aideed. On October 7,1993, eighteen American Army Rangers, under the command of U S Special Operations Command in Tampa, Florida, were killed in Mogadishu. The Clinton administration later cited this as a reason for avoiding future situations mvolvmg U.S. military forces in U.N. peacekeeping operations. It was also the excuse cited by the administration for not doing anything to prevent the massive genocide of Tutsis in Rwanda in 1994 and Hutus and others in Zaire in 1997. Qinton said at the time of deaths of the Rangers, "it was my low point However, PDDs-25 and 56, and Clinton's earlier mistakes in Somalia, did not forestall the use of US troops in civil conflicts. PDD-25 merely set new ground rules for military engagement in more covert operations. These new rules would prevent future politically explosive television scenes such as those in Mogadishu. For example, future covert operations would entail adopting a clever form of censorship called perception management" by the Pentagon information warfare" planners. They would carefully craft the reporting of military operations to ensure the filtenng out of news detrimental to Pentagon policies



and administration popularity. Later, perception management *vas foimd to be at the heart of America's ill-fated Somalia ventirre. Mark Bowden of the Philadelphia Inquirer revealed in late 1997 that the killing of the Army Rangers came after a terrible massacre of many innocent Somalis by American "peacekeeping" troops. According to Bowden's report, several respected elders and diplomats of Aideed's Habr Gidr clan and others were killed on July 12,1993 when U.S. Cobra and Blackhawk helicopters fired sixteen armored-piercing TOW missiles at Abdi House in the K4 suburb Mogadishu. Inside the building, the elders were seriously conferring about a negotiated and durable peace agreement with the U.N. and a peace feeler being discussed between Aideed and former President Jimmy Carter. - an approach fully supported by President Clinton. Some seventy of the ninety officials present were killed in the air assault.^ The Americans decided to attack Abdi House to arrest Aideed. In part, this was a reaction to a June 5 attack by Aideed's forces on a Pakistani peacekeeping unit in which twenty-seven Pakistanis were killed. On August 22,1993, while Clinton was playing a round of golf on Martha's Vineyard, he was informed that six American troops had been wounded in Mpgadishu by a remote-controlled land mine. A few weeks earlier, four U.S. troops were killed in a similar attack. In response, Clinton unwisely decided to heed the advice of the QA and the U.S. Special Operations Command. He authorized the elite Delta Force from Fort Bragg, Army Rangers from Fort Benning, a helicopter assault unit from Fort Campbell, Kentucky, and an in-cormtry CIA team to capture Aideed and fly


1 t

him to a U.S. Navy ship off the coast of Kenya. Once on board, a team of African judges cobbled together by the CIA would hastily try Aideed.^ The U.S. covert action team tried six times to capture Aideed, failing on each occasion. The team tried again on October 3, 1993. U.S. Rangers arrested a few dozen Somalis, including two who were believed to be Aideed's lieutenants, while they were meeting at the Olympic Hotel.^ This time the Somalis retaliated, killing the eighteen Americans in the worst firefight experienced by U.S. troops since the Vietnam War.4 In the clash between the Rangers and Somali irregulars that followed, some 500 Somalis were killed, including many women and children. According to Bowden, besides those Somalis quickly dispatched, many wounded Somalis, too afraid of the Americans to go to a hospital, died later in their homes from wounds suffered in the attack. All told, some one thousand Somalis died in the fighting, five times as many as the U.S. military's official dead coimt of 200. The demonization of Aideed's forces resulted in American atrocities being ignored and tmpunished. For example, one Ranger who took a family hostage, shot one woman as she screamed and another as he prayed to Allah. Retired U.S. Navy Admiral Jonathan Howe, the U.N. special representative to Somalia, was especially anxious for Delta Force to capture Aideed. Howe's rancor was raised after Aideed's forces killed the Pakistani peacekeepers on Jrme 5. The admiral had the support of Secretary of State Warren Christopher, U.S. ambassador to the U.N. Madeleine Albright, National Security adviser Anthony Lake, his deputy Samuel "Sandy" Berger U.S. special envoy to the Somalia

36 ~





! I

i | | j i


t 1 '



* •

Robert Gosende, Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Peter Tamoff, and the CIA. Only Defense Secretary Les Aspin; Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman General Colin Powell; and Marine Major General Joseph Hoar, the Commander in Chief of the U.S. Central Command based in Tampa, Florida; opposed any attempt to "get Aideed." Powell was later convinced to go along with the majority.^ The United. States soon adopted a policy of changing the political situation of Somalia rather than merely providing humanitarian relief. Contrary to the Clinton administration's rhetoric Somalia was not a lesson for the LTnited States - it was a prelude. A few years later, some of the same players propelled the United States into a covert genocidal battle htmdreds of miles to the southwest of Somalia. In Rwanda, Zaire, and other countries, Christopher, Albright, Berger, the CIA, a newly-assertive DIA, the U.S. Special Operations Command, and American mercenaries, would have their bloodied fingerprints on yet more massacres, official lies, and clandestine military operations. Somalia showed that there were new vistas for Angelica's high-technology intelligence web of surveillance, especially in low intensity conflict areas as the Horn of Africa. According to a former Marine Corps intelligence officer assigned to the U.S. military command in Somalia, the National Security Agency (NSA) played a significant role in tracking down Aideed. U.S. forces distributed satellite phones to the Somali clan leaders with the proviso that they be used only to communicate with U.S. military commanders. The Somalis, having a free and high-tech means of communications, decided to disobey the American


stricture and use the phones to talk with one another. The NSA's eavesdropping net over the country quickly snagged their conversations.^ Although it was reported that Aideed, himself, did not use these automatic eavesdropping and tracking satellite phones, opting instead to use low-power walkie-talkies and mobile radios,^ his lieutenants jabbered away on the American "gifts." Exiled Prime Minister Omer Arteh Ghalib was in daily contact with President Ali Mahdi Mohammed in Mogadishu via a satellite phone from his hotel m Riyadh. As a result, he gave NSA valuable intelligence on Aideed's main Somali rival.® Somalia represented the largest dispatch of U.S. military forces since the Gulf War. One would think that after the horrific October scenes from Mogadishu, Qinton would have ordered the hasty withdrawal of American forces. To the contrary, he ordered an increased U.S. military presence in northeast Africa. By the end of October, the U.S. military complement in and around Somalia was as follows: 1. An increase of 5,300 combat troops that brought the total number of U.S. Army and Marine Corps personnel in cormtry and offshore to 10,400. 2. Included among the newly-deployed forces were 1,000 troops from the 24* mechanized infantry division at Ft. Stewart, Georgia; 700 additional troops from the 10* Mountain Division at Ft. Drum, New York; and some 3,600 Marines from Camp Pendleton, California and Camp Lejeime, North Carolina. 3. The new armored forces included 18 Ml tanks, 44 M2 Bradley fighting vehicles, complete with combat service support units from Fort Stewart, and 29 amphibious assardt vehicles and 13 light armored vehicles for the



Marines. (Six months later. Secretary General BoutrosGhali requested armored personnel carriers for Rwanda but his request was denied). 4. Naval forces included the USS Abraham Lincoln, a nuclear aircraft carrier, along with numerous escort ships; the amphibious assault ships USS New Orleans and XISS Guadalcanal in addition to five supporting transports and landing-ships. 5. Available aircraft included 58 strike aircraft based on the carriers; 103 Army and Marine helicopters and four Air Force AC130H gimships, carrying precision-guided 105- millimeter howitzers and machine guns and can be used fot grotmd support. 6. - A total of 20,715 military personnel in the Somalia operating theater, not including a number of ex military civilian contractors from compames like Dyncorp who were working for the Pentagon.^ The Somali campaign ushered into place a "Pax Americana" for Africa, the charter of which was primarily represented by PDD-25. The directive states that "properly conceived and well-executed peace Operations can be a useful element in serving America's interests."^° According to Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Adhms, a senior U.S. Army officer who was involved in peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and Haiti, American interests include "some combination of political, diplomatic, humanitarian and/or intelligence activities, economic development, and securityIn effect, PDD25 laid down additional conditions for U.S. involvement beyond the traditional reasons for providing humanitarian assistance and reducing the risk of greater conflict. The key U.S. interest areas in Africa are


economics and intelligence-gathering. Adams contends that new breeds of U.S. special operations military personnel operating in places like Africa are required to be "warrior-diplomats" having adequate knowledge about politics.^2 Clinton's new foreign policy course also paved the way for the use of mercenaries, something that would have been quite abhorrent to past administrations. London International Institute for Strategic Studies Research Fellow David Shearer describes the use of mercenaries as less controversial than the use of active duty military personnel. Referring to the "body bag factor," Shearer claims that by using mercenaries, governments are not beset with complaints of: "Why did you send our boys there?" Governments can respond, according to Shearer, by claiming: "We didn't - it was a private company that sent them."i3 Although Somalia was touted by the Bush administration as an inherent military-led "Meals on Wheels" program to aid two million starving innocent civilians, there are other, less altruistic, reasons for the U.S. intervention. It turns out that just before Somalia's pro-American president, Mohammed Siad Barre, was overthrown in a 1991 coup, U.S. oil companies discovered vast reserves of oil in the north-central part of the impoverished nation. Numerous Somalis, African experts, and international aid officials claim it was oil, not htimanitarian relief, which prompted Bush, an old Texas oil wildcatter, to intervene in the hapless nation. According to oil industry documents obtained by the Los Angeles Times during the Bush - Clinton transition pqriod in early January 1993, Conoco, Amoco, Chevron, and Phillips Petroleum negotiated lucrative

drilling rights in Somalia. Conoco managed to maintain a functioning office in Mogadishu after the U.S. embassy was forced to close after it was attacked and looted. In fact, the Conoco office became a de facto U.S. embassy in the days before the first U.S. Marines landed in operation "Restore Hope." U.S. envoy to Somalia Robert Oakley even took up residence at the Conoco compound along with other U.S. military and intelligence personnel. At a time when the United States suspended diplomatic relations with Somalia because there was no longer a functioning government, Conoco maintained a close relationship with Ali Mahdi Mohammed, one of Somalia's two major warring clan leaders.15 The lessons learned in Somalia contributed to the formulation of America's new policy toward Africa. In addition, the close relationship between U.S. oil companies and the military intelligence community in Somalia expanded to other areas in Africa. In late 1993, Oakley resiuned his special Somalia envoy mission, this time for President Clinton. From December 1992 to May 1993, Oakley was in daily contact with Aideed, the man the United States consistently called a "warlord." During this time, the United States also cultivated close relations with Prime Minister Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia, President Isaias Afewerki of Eritrea, and President Hassan Gouled of Djibouti.!® The Meles and Isaias connection would help form the core of America's new military alliance in the region. Ethiopia and Eritrea, which later added Uganda, Rwanda, Congo (Kinshasa), and southern Sudan's rebel forces to their ranks would help frame a new U.S. military policy for Africa, one that would involve training African military forces to serve in special units.




The Pentagon admired these former Marxist guerrilla leaders for their military achievements and strongwilled leadership qualitiesd^ However, many elements in Africa did not trust America's "soldier princes." One former senior officer of the Rwandan Army General Staff cited the covert activities by the United States in Africa as part of an overall "Plan Evil," designed to install pro-U.S. Tutsis and their allies into key leadership positions in various central African nations. He said the covert plan included Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania, and eastern Zaire (once again called Congo). Lending credence this theory, Richard Cornwall of the Africa Institute of South Africa, said he believed there was an American political "wish list" in which U.S. - based corporations helped shape events in Africa. The Plan Evil proponents have a cheerleader in former U.S. Representative Mervyn Dymally, who had once served as the chairman of the U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on Africa. Dymally wrote in the Christian Science Monitor that the Tutsis were trying to redraw Africa's borders since the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885 divided the continent into different European spheres of influence. D5nnally chided the Clinton administration for supporting Tutsiled or influenced governments in Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi that sent their army units, disguised as Zairian rebels, into Zaire to ostensibly aid ethnic Tutsis against oppression from Hutus and President Mobutu. Dymally also declared that "American foreign policy in Africa has often confused the interests of a regime in power and the interests of the nation. Typically, the United States has identified with a narrowly defined elite, as it


did in. South Africa for decades, and is currently doing in Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Eritrea, and Ethiopia/'i^ France also subscribed to the Plan Evil theory. France saw Museveni as a linchpin in an Anglo-Saxon plot to ^ab control of central Africa. Chief among the French believers in Plan Evil were Army Generals Jean Pierre Huchon and Jannou Lacaze, both attached to the Cooperation Ministry, and President Mitterand's counselors Bruno Delaye and Dominique Pin. It is particularly noteworthy that Pin once served as a counselor in the French embassy in Kinshasa. 20 For France, the U.S. intervention in Somalia marked the beginning of an Anglo-Saxon power play for control of the continent. 21 A U.S. government official corroborated the Rwandan Hutus' charge of a U.S. master plan for Africa. The official said that the United States was fojcusing a disproportionate amount of military assistance on Rwanda to create a "zone of influence" in eastern Africa. Because of the inter-ethmc troubles in Rwanda, the official said the country emerged as' a "target of opportunity" for Pentagon planners.22 Meanwhile, the Clinton administration backed efforts to make Africa "safe" for its American and Canadian business friends by giving them support from the U.S. Special Forces and the intelligence community (primarily the DIA but also the NSA and the CIA. U.S. military and intelligence operatives, acting directly or through mercenary operations, were scattered throughout central and western Africa, ostensibly for purposes of peacekeeping and indigenous peacekeeper training. In reality, they were consolidating the position of the United States as the chief power broker for Africa.


43 )


Additionally, these troops protected regimes that went to bat for U.S. multinational corporations. The involvement of U.S. Special Forces and mercenaries were hardly limited to Africa. Robert Kaplan, a former consultant to the U.S. Army's Special Forces Regiment at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, claimed that "... in 1996 U.S. Special Forces were responsible for 2,325 missions in 167 cotmtries involving 20,642 people - only nine per operation, on average." Kaplan said the Special Forces referred to most of Aeir operations as "low-key" and "discreet."23 One by product of such a low profile was the ability of the United States government and its proxies to maintain a wall of secrecy around their more unsavory and questionable activities. The SOF's General Shelton, while a bit more conservative in his estimate of Special Forces activity in foreign countries, conceded that the number of foreign countries in which his troops were deployed was steadily rising. He testified to Congress that, "In fiscal year '91, SOF were deployed to 92 countries around the world. This increased to 140 countries in fiscal year '96. Deployment figures for first quarter fiscal year '97 indicate that we are on par widi fiscal year '96. On any given week, approximately 4000 plus SOF operators are deployed to 60-70 coimtries."^^ The statistics identifying whom the U.S. military trained under the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program were also alarming. From 1991 to 1995, the U.S. military trained 3400 African officers. Of these, 69 per cent hailed from totalitarian countries while 81 per cent came from nations where the armed forces had effective veto authority over weak


civilian governments. Similar statistics showed that most the African nations where U.S. advisers were providing in-country combat training were dictatorsliips.25 America's policy of "selective engagement" in Africa's turmoil was criticized as generally cotmter productive to the advancement of democracy. Caleb Rossiter, the director of Demilitarization for Democracy, a Washington-based public advocacy group, had special criticism for the activities of the U.S. military and OA in Africa. He said that the Pentagon and Langley (CIA headquarters) were "clearly out of touch with the reality that arming and training repressive armed forces simply creates stronger repressive armed forces, and you have a picture of the most powerful democracy on earth being more of an obstacle than a help to those struggling for freedom and accountability in Africa. Freedom and accormtability clearly were not on the agenda of Pentagon, DIA, and CIA personnel planning covert military operations throughout the continent.

Notes 1.


Patrick J. Sloyan, "The Somalia Endgame; How the Warlord Outwitted Clinton's Spooks," Washington Post, 3 April 3, C3. Mark Bowden, "How a relief mission ended in a firefight," Philadelphia Inquirer, 14 December 1997.

3. Sloyan, op. cit. 4. Keith B. Richburg, "Somalia Battle Killed 12 Americans, Wounded 78," Washington Post, 5 October 1993,


Al. 5. 6. 7.

8. 9. 10.






16. 17. 18. 19.


Sloyan, op. cit. Ibid. Confidential interview with retired U.S. Marine Corps lieutenant colonel who served with the U.S. military task force in Somalia, 10 October 1996. Sloyan, op. cit.; Bowden, op. cit. Caryle Murphy, "Exiled Premier: He Gets No Respect," Washington Post, 7 December 1992, A26. Art Pine, "2 Missions in Clinton's Approach; Force: New Deployment Is Designed to Lay Political Solution Before Guerrillas and to Protect American Troops in Somalia," Los Angeles Times, 8 October 1993, A12; comments of U.S. Army Major General (retired) Andrew Cooley at the Ninth Annual Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC) Symposium, Arlington, VA., 18 February 1998. "President Clinton Signs New Peacekeeping Policy," Statement by the Press Secretary, The White House, 5 May 1994. Lt. Col. Thomas Adams, USAR, "Doctrine for Waging Peace," presentation at the Ninth Annual Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict (SO/LIQ Symposium, Arlington, VA., 18 February 1998. Ibid. Darius Bazargan, "United Nations: Mercenaries go where Blue Berets fear to tread," Inter Press Service, 11 June 1997. Mark Fineman, "The Oil Factor in Somalia; Four American Petroleum Giants had Agreements with the African Nation Before its Civil War Began; They Could Reap Big Rewards if Peace is Restored," Los Angeles Times, 18 January 1993. Ibid. Pine, op. cit. Jim Lobe, "Albright Trip to Bless 'Soldier-Princes'," Inter Press Service, 7 December 1997. Mary Braid, "Zaire's rebels prove a powerful force for change in Africa; the U.S. is implicated in the conflict," The Independent, 5 April 1997,15. Mervyn Dymally,"Don't Redraw Africa's Borders,"



Christian Science Monitor, 29 January 1997,20. "Paris Sees Red," The Indian Ocean Neiusletter, May 14,

1994. Andr6 Dumoulin, La France Militaire et I'Afrique {The French Military and Africa) (Paris: Editions GRIP, 1997), 80. 23. Lynne Duke, "U.S. Military Role in Rwanda Greater Than Disclosed," Washington Post, 16 August 1997, A16. 24. Robert D. Kaplan, "Special Intelligence," The Atlantic Monthly, February 1998,61. 25. Prepared Statement by General Henry H. Shelton, Commander-in-Chief, United States Special Operations Command, before the Senate Armed Services Committee, op. cit. 26. Scott Nathanson, "U.S. should stop boosting Africa's menacing armies," Baltimore Sun, 28 November 1997,27A. 27. "Pro-Democracy Policies Hurt by Military Ties," Inter Press Service, 30 July 1997. 22.




2 America’s AMcan Beachhead: Uganda Uganda is no longer a political pariah internationally, but is coveted by many. President Yoweri Museveni, 1996

Uganda is the most unlikely country for the United States to establish an African beachhead. Idyllically referred to as the "Pearl of Africa" by Winston Churchill and other Britojas, most Americans remembered Uganda as the feared domain of one of the twentieth century's most despotic rulers, Idi Amm. In January 1971, upon ousting President A. Milton Obote in a military coup, Amin's clamped his iron rule on Uganda for eight years. At the time, and with the possible exception of Pol Pot in Cambodia, Amin's brutality became virtually unparalleled in the world. According to Henry Kyemba, Uganda's Minister of Health who later fled into exile out of fear for his life, Amin kept the severed head of one of his cabinet ministers in his refrigerator. This gruesome incident was described in Kyemba's book State of Blood. But Americans best knew the dictator for his role in the hijacking of an Air France passenger jet to Entebbe Airport. Amin was almost universally reviled after it was discovered that one of the ill passengers, Mrs. Dora Bloch, a dual Israeli-British septuagenarian, was dragged from her Kampala


hospital bed by Amin's secret police. She was never seen again. In October 1978, Idi Amin laimched a surprise military attack on neighboring Tanzania. It was not long before Ugandan troops captured some 500 square miles of northwestern Tanzanian territory. Although Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere ordered a cotmterattack, his forces were ill-equipped. However, Amin's atrocities over the years had prompted the formation of an effective anti-Amin Ugandan guerrilla movement based in the Tanzanian savanna coimtry. In April 1979, after the Tanzanians finally got their military act together, they combined their forces with the Ugandan guerrillas and eventually defeated Amin. The self-styled "President for Life" first fled to Libya but was eventually kicked out by Muammar Qaddafi. Amin finally settled in Saudi Arabia as a guest of that nation's government. Unlike many other coxmtries that overthrew despotic leaders, post-dictatorship democracy never came to Uganda. The Tanzanians blessed a succession of Ugandan presidents - Yusef Lule was first. The distinguished jtuist. Dr. Godfrey Binaisa, who attempted to establish some semblance of the rule of law, followed him. However, Binaisa's goals were unpopular with the army. Finally, on May 12, 1980, two of Binaisa's generals, Tito Okello and David C^ok, both of whom were Obote supporters, staged a coup. Binaisa, escaping from house arrest, went into exile in the United States. Amin's predecessor, Obote, who was biding his time in Dar es Salaam, the Tanzanian capital, made his long-awaited comeback. Obote triumphantly returned to Kampala to resume the office from which he was ousted in 1971.


Obote conducted elections, widely considered rigged, that confirmed his reinstatement to power as well as that of his party, the Ugandan People's Congress. However, the Uganda Patriotic Movement party, led by former President Lule and his Defense Minister Yoweri Museveni, was disturbed about Obote's political machinations. Bom in 1944, Museveni, who sports a mustache and shaves his head, is a member of the Ankoli tribe from southwestern Uganda (the proximity to Rwanda would later result in his being declared a non-Ugandan Rwandan Tutsi by his political opponents). Museveni's name actually means "He of Seven." He was named for the 7* Battalion of .the King's African Rifles who fought against the Germans and Italians in World War E.^ Museveni organized a guerrilla resistance to Obote, moving into mountainous westei*h Uganda where he led his National Resistance Army (NRA). Among his NRA ranks were members of the anti-Amin exiles who bravely fought with Tanzanian troops after Uganda's invasion in 1978. Museveni has close ties with various rebel, leaders in Africa. These go back to the late 1960s during his days as a political science student at Dar es Salaam's University of Tanzania. During his Marxist studies, and between fighting for FRELIMO guerrillas in Mozambique, receiving military training in North Korea, and volunteering to help fight against .American troops in Vietnam, Museveni befriended a number of Africa's leading leftists. They included Mozambique's rebel leader Samora Machel; Zimbabwe's Robert Mugabe; and the African National Congress's Thabo Mbeki. He would also become acquainted with three young and relatively unknown students who harbored




political ambitions - Paul Kagame of Rwanda, an unhappy Tutsi expatriate who had grown up in the Nshungerezi refugee camp in western Uganda, Laurent Kabila, a Maoist veteran of leftist rebellions in Zaire, and John Garang, a southern Sudanese Marxist. Back in Kampala, Obote began to emulate some of the practices engaged in by the maniacal Amin. His forces began killing members of opposition ethnic groups. Obote also muzzled dissent. When he threatened to expel Rwandan Tutsi refugees from Uganda, Kagame and his comrades changed their ethnic status to "Ankoli," the tribal grouping from which Museveni hailed.^ In July 1985, finally tired of Obote's excesses. Army chief of staff Tito Okello staged a coup. Once again, Obote was forced into exile. Although Okello called on all guerrilla movements to lay down their arms, Museveni would have nothing of the deal and he and his forces continued their insurrection and began to seize towns. The Ugandan rebel leader demanded unbending discipline from his men. He forbade dissent and court-martialed insubordinate behavior.^ Instilling such strict military qualities in his men would have dramatic consequences for the future. On January 27,1986, Museveni forces drove into Kampala, forcing Okello's government to surrender. Museveni named himself president. He installed his rebel "foreign minister" Samson Kisekka as Prime Minister. However, democracy did not return to Uganda. A new form of "non-party" democracy was in the works. It bore little resemblance to traditional democracies that were beginning to take root in other countries in Africa and elsewhere.


Museveni ignored domestic and international calls for a return to multi-party democracy. In 1994, he annormced plans for non-party elections to a legislative assembly. Many political leaders cried foul. However, this was to no avail since Museveni's allies captured most of the seats in the 214-member constituent assembly. Frpm exile in the United States, former President Binaisa deplored Museveni's tactics, likening them to those of Italian dictator Benito Mussolini. The former president contends that "on the ideological plane President Museveni started off as a socialist, but his socialism quickly deteriorated into Fascism similar to Benito Mussolini, with a little mixture of the Nazi's 'herrenvolk' theory based on birth and looks."^ Binaisa accuses some western nations of recognizing the Tutsis with the same racist favoritism as had been demonstrated by the former German and Belgian colonial masters of the region. Binaisa said, "the Tutsi with their aquiline noses and thin lips and height win the contest over the short, flat-nosed Hutu."s Others accuse Museveni of wanting to be a modern-day Bismarck, because they say he wants to redraw the borders of Africa just as Bismarck had done at the Conference of Berlin. Those Ugandans opposed to Museveni, like Binaisa, had reason to resent the Tutsis. Some of Museveni's most loyal men had been drawn from Rwandan Tutsi refugee camps in Uganda and Tanzania. In fact, when Museveni drove into Kampala some 3,000 of his 14,000 of his NRA troops were Rwandan Tutsis. Among them were men who had fought alongside Museveni since the Tanzanian campaign against Amin.



One of Museveni's most trusted Rwandan colleagues was Kagame, his old friend from his Dar es Salaam campus days. In 1989, Museveni turned over control of the NRA's G-2 (military intelligence) to the selfcontrolled, self-confident, and teetotalling Rwandan expatriate. Museveni would later show his appreciation to Kagame in more concrete and material ways. By 1998, Museveni had become one of America's favorite leaders in Africa. His one-party state earns accolades from numerous U.S. political leaders. U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright calls Museveni a "beacon of hope." "She's a witch," one frustrated leader of the Ugandan political opposition said of Albright in response. Museveni earned more than diplomatic niceties from the United States. He also received military support. In September 1992, some of Museveni's closest aides were charged with attempting to illegally smuggle 400 TOW missiles and 34 launchers from the United States to Uganda. The deal also involved some $15 million worth of Chinook CH-47C helicopter parts. Museveni's personal secretary. Innocent BisangwaMbuguje, and the Ugandan ambassador to the United States, Stephen Kampimpina Katenta-Apuli, were implicated in the smuggling ring. Also fingered were retired Egyptian Air Force General Mounir Fahmy Barsoum and retired Egyptian army colonel Sultan Abou Sharaf; Diane Lewis, an American citizen said to be an "adviser" to the government of Uganda; and Nezih Kent, also an American citizen and a New Yorkbased arms dealer. Additionally, the Justice Department named several co-conspirators including the Ugandan Minister of State for Defense, General David Tinyefuza;



the Permanent Secretary for Defense Ben Mbonye; and two senior Libyan military officers. The Justice Department even considered indicting Museveni along with Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi. Bisangwa-Mbuguje was clearly the key link in the conspiracy. Museveni was so concerned about his secretary's incarceration in a U.S. prison that he put up $Trriillion in bail that was acquired by placing a lien on the $20 million Uganda House, the Ugandan Mission to the U.N. in New York.^ The Justice Department ultimately agreed to drop charges against BisangwaMbuguje in return for his cooperation in providing evidence against Museveni.^ However, those plans were dropped as the government prosecutors began feeling the weight of the State Department and its allies. It is signififcant that during the last year of the Bush administration, the White House asked Congress for a 33 per cent increase in the IMET budget (from the previous fiscal year 92/93 budget of $200,000) to train Museveni's officers. Much of this aid was destined for the Rwandan Tutsis in Museveni's army.^ The U.S. Customs Service originally nabbed the ring by setting up a phony company, the Poseidon Trade Group, in Orlando. For ten months prior to the arrests, Poseidon arranged to meet the principal players at JFK Airport in New York and in Orlando. Colonel Sultan, representing the Ugandans, also set up a phony company, M)nion Holding Ltd. of Geneva, Switzerland, to handle the transactions. The smuggling plan involved disguising the TOW missiles and launchers as construction and refrigeration equipment. The arms would first be shipped from Jacksonville, Florida to Limassol, Cyprus and then on to Entebbe Airport. The



helicopter parts were to be shipped to Uganda via a company in Malta said to be a front for the Libyan government. The Justice Department hoped to use the Libyan connection to prove that the arms were destined for that country in violation of a 1991 U.N. arms embargo. That strategy fell apart when it became clear that the arms were destined for Uganda. A spokesperson for the Customs Service said: "The [Ugandan] brokers said they [the arms] were going for Uganda's own defenses . . They said they were going to use them against smugglers and poachers." Tapes of "sting" meetings between Customs and the arms brokers indicated that the Ugandans intended to install the missiles on recently acquired helicopters.^ Museveni was personally involved in the arms trade in central Africa. For example, he reportedly held a financial stake in Danze,-Ltd., a firm set up in 1990 that was involved in arms trafficking, It is inconceivable that Museveni's arms dealings were imknown to the CIA and DIA. In fact, after the Qinton administration came into office, Museveni became one of the pillars of America's new Africa policy. For that reason, the United States had no interest in punishing their new Ugandan ally. Museveni had his own group of supporters and apologists in the United States. It was ordy a few weeks after Bill Clinton was sworn in as president that the State Department - quite possibly with the prodding of the U.S. intelligence community - began pressuring the Justice Department on its prosecution of the arms smuggling case. They may have also leaned on a Federal judge in Florida to throw out the charges


against all of those involved in the scheme. A "tug of war" broke out between the State and Justice Departments over the case. The Justice Department's case folded when G. Kendall Sharp, the U.S. District judge for the middle district of Florida, ruled: "There was an acquittal of all defendants because the evidence was insufficient to obtain conviction of such offense." Robert Genzman, the U.S. attorney prosecuting the case, was livid over Kendall's decision. "We vigorously disagree with the court's ruling on factual and legal grotmds," Genzman declared. The U.S. attorney then explained how he was prevented from proceeding with the case on appeal: "Unfortunately, because the court did not allow the case to go to the jury, the government cannot appeal." After the exhaustive Customs Service investigation of the arms smuggling ring, one of the defendants' attorneys gloated over the sudden collapse of the government's case. He said, "At the conclusion of the arguments in the case . . . the judge ruled that there was no agreement, no contract, no end-user certificate, no insurance company was brought into the deal and nothing that ever went beyond mere discussions and talk. This is a slap in the face for the U.S. government."^! Particularly slapped hard were the Justice Department and Customs Service for getting involved in an obvious Pentagon-QA arms transfer operation. It was not an tmusual operation. After all, the United States had already supplied Uganda (and the Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF)) with $30 million in annual aid over the past few years.!^ Much of it was military aid provided tmder four U.S. government programs: the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) (bilateral


government sales managed by the Pentagon); the Commercial Sales Program (a Commerce Department program to support private arms sales to foreign nations); the Excess Defense Articles Program (provision of military surplus to foreign governments by the Pentagon); and the International Military Education and Training (IMET) Program (the provision of military training to foreign officers and ratings)^^ It was also reported that the TOWs to be smuggled from Florida were destined for the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) for its war against the Khartoum regime and the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) forces arrayed against the Rwandan government from their base camps in southern Uganda. Also, some TOWs were to be retained by the Ugandan military.Moreover, the SPLA and RPF guerrilla operations were operationally supported by elements of the CIA and DIA. The interference of the Justice Department and Customs Service in the arms transfer naturally led the CIA and DIA to apply intense pressure on the law enforcement bodies. Two years before the massive American military buildup began in Uganda, the British Parliament's upper house's Lord Avebury (the former Liberal Party member of parliament Eric Lubbock), the chairman of Britain's Parliamentary Human Rights Group wrote to Douglas Hurd, the Foreign Secretary. Avebury complained about secretive American military activities and the political situation in Uganda: "We have received disturbing reports of recent developments in Uganda, where President Museveni issued a decree banning political parties on August 6,


1992 against the advice of Parliament, and in contrast to trends in many African countries. It is alleged by the Uganda Democratic Coalition in the U.S. that foreign aid and development loans have been diverted to the purchase of weapons, and these arms have been given to terrorist organizations or used to suppress political opposition. Reference is made to a case in the Florida courts in which Mr. Bisangwa-Mbuguje is alleged to have been caught red-handed trying to ship 400 TOW missiles and 34 launchers from Orlando, Florida to Uganda. The defendants are reported to have admitted that President Museveni sent them to buy these weapons, and the Ugandan Ambassador to the U.N. Mr. Perez Kamunanwire, is said to have mortgaged the Uganda building m New York, worth $20 million, for $1 million, on Museveni's orders, to pay Mr. Mbuguje's bail. If it is true that President Museveni has been trying to purchase missiles clandestinely, breaking the laws of the United States, it would not be appropriate for us to give Uganda aid of any kind, and particularly military aid and training, xmtil die President steps aside and the elections are held." Hurd responded to Avebury in a typical Foreign Office-like fashion. Defending Uganda's uni-party state, Hurd mimicked the Uganda party line by saying, ‘"Political parties have not been banned in Uganda, although their activities have been constrained for some time. An internal debate continues over whether accotmtable government requires a return to full multi party democracy."^^ It would not be the last time that the lord would be subject to diplomatic double-speak


manufactured in London and Washington. One person who was not bu3dng Museveni's one-party state was U.S. Ambassador Michael Southwick. After leaving his Uganda post in July 1997, Southwick blasted Museveni's undemocratic electoral process. Southwick said that Museveni's political system was "the functional equivalent of a one-party state." Furthermore, the ambassador felt that Museveni's dictatorial ways were making him "a bit dangerous" as a regional role model. Museveni responded by calling Southwick's comments "rude." Museveni, in many ways, still adheres to his core Marxist beliefs. He feels political parties are a problem because in many African countries they are based on ethnic lines. Therefore, Museveni prefers to co opt leading members of traditional political parties into a movement. Indeed his political "non-party" is called "The Movement." Museveni threw a sop to the Ugandan traditionalists when he permitted the re establishment of traditional kingdoms having only cultural power without any political party. However, the Bugandans, who owe allegiance to their Kabaka, became increasingly agitated over notions of Bugandan sovereignty and land rights. This put them on a collision course with Museveni and his American benefactors. Museveni also has his eyes set on his neighbors. On July 10 1998, as Ugandan troops were preparing to move into neighboring Congo (Kinshasa), Museveni proposed a union of Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda, and Bunmdi. The proposal was made at the first conference of Museveni's "Movement." Not surprisingly, one of the first steps of Museveni's


proposed "tinion" was to be the creation of a regional military force,i® an idea that clearly met with the approval of Uganda's American military and political benefactors. Whatever his political ambitions in Africa, Museveni was key to America's plans for the region. This prompted French Cooperation Minister Jacques Godfrain called Uganda America's "aircraft carrier" in Africa. He added, "Uncle Sam is looking to seduce" African leaders.^®

Notes 1.

Johanna McGeary, et. Al., "Uganda Has Big Ideas For The Continent," Time, 150: 9,1 September 1997. 2. Newton Kanhema, "Kagame, A Hardened Rwandan Guerrilla Leader Turned Statesman," Panafrican News Agency, 27 October 1997. 3. Lara Santoro, "West Cheers Uganda's One-Man Show," The Christian Science Monitor, 2 March 1998,6. 4. G. Lukongwa Binaisa, "Open Letter to the Youth of Uganda," The Rwanda Crisis: Selected Readings, 8 Jime 1994. Available at:

5. Ibid. 6. Stephen Labaton, "Ugandan Aide Among 5 Indicted From a Sting on Illegal Arms Deal," Neiu York Times, 10 September 1992, AlO; "Private arms trade," The Indian Ocean Neiusletter, 28 February 1998. 7. "Ugandan Libyan leaders may face arms case," Inter Press Service, 6 January 1993; Labaton, op. cit. 8. UDC Newsletter,2:4, October 1992,5. 9. Labaton, op. cit. 10. "Private arms trade," The Indian Ocean Neiusletter, op. cit. 11. Milton G. Allimadi, "Judge Dismisses Missile Smuggling Conspiracy Charges," Journal of Commerce, 4


February 1993,4A. 12.. "Ugandan, Libyan leaders may face arms case," op. cit. 13. Daniel Volman, "Why the U.S. Changed its Congo Policy," Neio African, July/August 1997, 10. 14. Africa Confidential, 33:18,11 September 1992. 15. "The British View of Museveni," UDC Kleiusletter, 2: 5, November/December 1992,1. 16. Ibid. 17. McGeary, et. Al., op. cit. 18. "Museveni Union Idea May be Putto Vote," The East African, 27 July 2 August 1998

19. Tom Masland, Gregory L.Vistica, Karen Breslau, Christopher Dickey, and Marcus Mabry, A Fighting for Africa," Newsweek, 30 March 1998,32.

3 The Death of “Monsieur Afrique” JSfothing great will ever he achieved without great men, and'men are great only if they are determined to be so. President Charles de Gaulle, 1934

After Africa's major decolonization in the 1960s, the French and, to a lesser extent, the Belgians, attempted to maintain the status quo in central Africa. They tried unsuccessfully to keep in power post-colonial friendly (and some would argue subservient) leaders. Chief among them was Zaire's dictator, Mobutu Sese Seko and Rwanda's Hutu strongman, Juvenal Habyarimana. However, the deaths of two French politicians who sought to keep Africa in France's sphere of influence President Frangois Mitterrand and more importantly, France's secretive doyen of African affairs, Jacques Foccart - would hasten the end of the long-term French dominance over the African continent. In many ways, Foccart was a throwback to the era of the French Empire. He was bom in 1913 in Ambrieres, in the Department of Mayenne. The young Foccart moved with his father to Guadeloupe, where the elder Foccart began managing a farm. Foccart's formative years were molded by a colonial lifestyle in the French Antilles. When Foccart was twelve, his father died. A few years later, Foccart returned to France to attend college. Recognizing the lucrative nature of business in the colonies, Foccart decided to carry on the


family business started by his father. This initially involved the export of Renault cars. The business soon expanded to more general import and export commerce with the Antilles. Foccart's early business deals ensured a future life of financial independence. Upon France's 1941 surrender to Germany, Foccart joined Charles de Gaulle's Free French resistance. If France thought that it had the support of the United States in retaining its colonial empire after the war, it was in for a surprise. President Franklin Roosevelt intended to break up European colonialism after the war and put former colonies, particularly those of the French, tmder U.N. trusteeship. Roosevelt's death just prior to the war's end changed American policy. Truman scuttled Roosevelt's plans for decolonization and permitted France to reassert control over its vast domains, including those in Africa. For Foccart, Truman's decision would be a fateful one. In 1946, Foccart took part in the formation of the French Gaullist party, the R.P.F. (Rassemblement du Peuple Frangais).^ De Gaulle increasingly became dependent on the shrewd acumen of the political operative. By the early 1950s, Foccart was organizing private armies of brigands to physically assault French Communist Party members in the streets of Paris and other cities. Foccart facilitated two important trips by General de Gaulle to the African colonies in March and October 1953. Contacts made by Foccart and de Gaulle during this period would later come to serve France in important ways. Indeed, some of the French African leaders with whom the two established a( working rapport during the 1953 trip, would become the future


leaders of independent nations.^ Foccart was known as "Monsieur Afrique" because of his ability to curry favor for Paris in the former African colonies. In 1958, de Gaulle named Foccart as his Secretary General for African Affairs within the Elys4e Palace. Foccart served de Gaulle loyally. When French nationalists in Algeria took up arms against French plans to grant its north African colony independence, Foccart organized the "barbouzes" (bearded ones), secret French agents who launched coimter-attacks against the extremists of the shadowy and anti-de Gaulle Secret Army Organization (Organisation Armee Secrete) (OAS).3 On May 18,1961, Foccart ordered the creation of the Ministry of Cooperation to replace the Secretariat of State for French Relations with the French Community. Not surprisingly, Foccart became the first Cooperation Minister. In 1965, Foccart gave his ministry a military tinge when he created the Military Cooperation Mission (MMQ to oversee French military programs in its Afridan colonies.'* This mission would also identify proFrench political leaders within the ranks of the African armed forces, some of whom would become future presidents of their respective nations. Foccart made and destroyed careers of aspiring politicians in France's former African colorues. When Gabon's president Leon M'Ba was overthrown by opposition forces in 1964, Foccart organized a French military expedition that returned him to power. According to his 1995 memoirs {Foccart Speaks), which many observers thought were purposely annotated awaiting publication of his full memoirs after his death, Foccart claimed to have personally selected Omar



Bongo as M'Ba's successor in Gabon. He was SEiid to have conducted what was essentially a job interview of Bongo over dinner. Foccart boasted that he permitted the 1966 coup in the Central African Republic which brought to power Jean-Bedel Bokassa, who later pronounced himself "emperor" of the nation and participated in rites of cannibalism.^ As despotic and corrupt as Haitian President Francois Duvalier (Papa Doc) across the Atlantic, Bokassa even picked up a variation of the Haitian's nickname. Locals referred to him as "Papa Bok." Elevating Bokassa to the presidential palace in Bangui would be a decision Monsieur Afrique would later come to regret. In his memoirs, Foccart relates a somewhat amusing episode when Bokassa visited de Gaulle in 1966 on the occasion of France's July 14 Bastille Day ceremonies. De Gaulle greeted Bokassa, "Good day, Mr. President." To that Bokassa responded, "Good day, father." De Gaulle, clearly irked by Bokassa's reference to him as "father," replied, "Did you have a good trip?" "Yes, father," replied Bokassa. At that de Gaulle shut the doors to his office. Glaring at Bokassa, de Gaulle said, "Listen - I appreciate your sentiments that you have shown me, but I must ask you not to call me father. You can call me Mr. President like the rest of the world, or better, since you are a former member of the Free French, call me General." To that Bokassa answered, "Yes, father."® Foccart also ensured that the government of Niger followed France's orders on ihe mining of uranium in that country. Although Foccart's firm grip on Niger ensured that the country's high-grade uranium resources did not fall into the hands of the communist bloc, it also ensured France with its own


rich supply, to develop its nuclear weapons. Focpart engaged in similar activities throughout his' career. He was ^so accused of making agreements with sonte African leaders to laimder French aid money through their capitals and back to the coffers of the French Gaullist party. Since these leaders owed their very existence to Foccart, they were more than happy to oblige.7 Foccart also arranged for French intelligence agents to become close security advisers to French allies throughout the continent. These included Colonel JeanClaude Mantion of the DGSE (Direction-Generale de la Securite Exterietire) who became a security aide to President Andre Kolingba of the Central African Republic. Other French intelligence agents and military officers could be foimd in close proximity to the offices of the presidents of the Ivory Coast, Zaire, Rwanda, and Congo.' Another favorite method for Foccart to curry favor with the African heads of state was to offer their sons admission to France's prestigious St. Cyr military academy. Not only would the African leaders be grateful but also France would be grooming a new generation of francophile leaders to continue its dominance over its former colonies.® De Gaulle's successor, Georges Pompidou, wanted to dump Foccart when he became President in .1969 but Foccart had become politically indispensable. It turns out that Monsieur Afrique was still pumping a sizable amount of contributions from African leaders into the coffers of the re-named Gaullist R.P.R. (Rassemblement pour la republique) party.^ Besides, Pompidou understood the influence Foccart had over the French intelligence structure in France and abroad. While Foccart did not command the same type of fear


that American presidents had in FBI director J. Edgar Hoover, he did strike a bit of fear in Pompidou. This was reflected when Pompidou met President Ahmadou Ahidjo on a visit to Cameroon in 1971. Pompidou, in the course of their official discussion, said, "Mr. President, you have a home in France, I believe." Ahidjo responded, "Yes, near Grasse." Pompidou replied, "Ah! Near Grasse. You are a neighbor of Mr. Foccart, who must find you in a good location to spy on you." Pompidou's comment was a backhanded acknowledgment of Foccart's capabilities and a subtle warning to Ahidjo to tow France's party line. But Foccart was actually interested more in spying on Cameroon's English-speaking vice president, Solomon Tadeng Pompidou had no other choice but to retain Foccart. However, de Gaulle apparently did not appreciate Foccart going to work for his sycophantic successor. In a rare television interview, Foccart disclosed that the old general refused to ever meet with him again - a situation that greatly saddened one of France's most durable spymasters.ii The non-Gaullist President, Valery Giscard d'Estaing, finally dumped Foccart in 1974 but he remained a shadowy majordomo in the margins of power. When Jacques Chirac became Prime Minister in 1986, Foccart was essentially given back his old job as a "special adviser" on Africa. As late as August 8, 1994, the bald and eyeglass-wearing Foccart was, at the age of eighty-one, back in Mobutu's quasi-royal white palace in his hometown of Gbadolite, trying to arrange a rapprochement and power-sharing agreement between his old friend and his recalcitrant Prime Minister, Kengo wa Dondo. Foccart accompanied President Chirac on


his first trip as president to Africa. However, Foccart had already witnessed the slow ebbing of French influence ip Rwanda and the nascent anti-Mobutu (and anti-French) rebellion in eastern Zaire. There was no telling what fears were going through the old man's mind when, in the late autumn of his life, he was playing power-broker in Zaire and acting as the chief Africa adviser to the French president.^2 On March 19, 1997, while checking on her charge in the morning, Foccart's nurse discovered that the old man had quietly slipped away during the night. A close friend said death was caused by heart failure. Foccart had already suffered numerous heart attacks and was plagued with Parkinson's disease.^^ Had it been any other official from the de Gaulle era, the event might have just been reported as yet another obituary of a former French bureaucrat. However, Foccart's death was different. It sent shock waves through the Quai d'Orsay (the French Foreign Ministry), the Elys4e Palace, and the few African capitals where French influence still prevailed. At his funeral on March 24, those paying their respects resembled a virtual montage of recent French history. The almost one thousand mourners heard a priest describe Foccart as "General de Gaulle's faithful servant" and GauUism's "Man of Africa." Among the mourners were President Jacques Chirac and his wife Bernadette; former GauUist Prime Ministers Maurice Couve de Murville, Jacques Chaban-Delmas, Pierre Messmer, and Edouard Balladur; Madame Qaude Pompidou; and former cabinet officials Alain Peyrefitte, a Minister of State and Charles Pasqua, an Interior Minister who also served as Foccart's deputy m charge


of African affairs. But Foccart's equal importance to Africa was exemplified by the presence of no less than five African heads of state in the congregation - Abdou Diouf of Senegal, Pascal Lissouba of Congo (Brazzaville), Didier Ratsiraka of Madagascar, Mohammed Taki Abdul Karim of the Comoros, and Obiang Nguema Mbasogo of Equatorial Guinea - as well as ministers and ambassadors of some fifteen other African coxmtries. The ftmeral honors rivaled those extended to deceased Presidents and famous generals. It was capped by a contingent of French marines carrying the French tricolor- draped coffin of the "Great Servant to the Republic and Africa" to the flourishes of the French national anthem and a waiting ftmeral cortege that would carry the "old man" to his home village of Luzarches, north of There were a few symbolic absences at Foccart's funeral. One was Felix Flouphouet-Boigny, the somewhat eccentric President of the Ivory Coast, who had died in December 1993. Houphouet-Boigny had been Foccart's closest friend in Africa. Foccart, at the age of eighty, traveled to Yamoussoukro in the Ivory Coast (which had been officially re-named "Cote d'Ivoire" by the extremely francophile HouphouetBoigny) to attend his old comrade's funeral. Another absentee was Zaire's very ill Marshal Mobutu who was on the verge of being driven from his capital Kinshasa by advancing rebels.^® Two other presidents with whom Foccart had been close chose not to attend because of what they considered to be personal slights. Togo's Gnassingb^ Eyadema was mad at Foccart for publishing in his memoirs the fact that France not only granted Eyadema



lucrative personal loans at the end of the 1960s, but also identified him as the assassin of Togo's President Sylvanus 01)nnpio during a 1963 coup. 01)rmpio, educated in German schools when Togo was a German colony, was outspokenly anti-French. On January 13, 1963>.01)nhpio was shot dead while running for asylum in theU.S. Embassy. Although Olympio ran a one-party state, 'he was popular in Washington because he encouraged foreign investment in his nation's mining industry. However, Foccart preferred someone more subser\nent to Paris. The other significant no-show at Foccart's last rites was Gabon's Omar Bongo, who im'diplomatically cited a previous commitment to visit Morocco as the reason for his absence. Bongo was actually irritated over the seizure of one of his humbered Swiss bank accoxmts by French authorities after the^ discovered the French oil giant ELf-Aquitane used it to pay "commissions" (bribes) to Bongo.^^ As Foccart was being lowered into his grave in Luzarches, much of' France's historical influence in Africa was being buried with him. Elf had played an important part in Foccart's African activities. Loik Le Floch-Prigent was the chairman of Elf from 1989 to 1992 and of the French state 'railway SNCF until August 1993 when he was arrested and imprisoned on embezzlement and other corruption charges. The former Elf chairman had steered $160 million to his friend, Maurice Bidermann, the head of the financially troubled Bidermann textile group, via Elf-Gabon. In a ten-page "confession" publisked in L'Express magazine, Le Floch-Prigent claimed that the oil giant worked hand-in-hand with top French Gaullist politicians, including President


Chirac and Interior Minister Pasqua. In addition, Le Floch-Prigent claimed that the company provided diplomatic and intelligence support to the French government, including appointing and then controlling Bongo in Gabon and President Paul Biya in Cameroon. Le Floch-Prigent also revealed that Elf garnered African support for French positions in the U.N. in order to maintain France's superpower status.^^ Le Floch Prigent said Gaullist Prime Minister Edouard Balladur had tried to curtail Elf's African intelligence operations by appointing two alleged "independent" officials during his term of office, Philippe Jaffre to head Elf after Le Floch-Prigent's resignation and Michel Roussin to the post of Cooperation Minister. Bahadur's plan was to end Elf's network of influence in Africa Aat Le Floch-Prigent claimed included Foccart, Chirac, Pasqua, and Mitterand. The former chairman also admitted that he, too, tried to straighten things out between Elf and the French intelligence services. He said, "When I took over, I tried to put things straight with the help of the heads of the DGSE intelligence and the DST counter espionage services but I failed because the DGSE is a mess where no one knows who is doing what." Actually, Elf's close connection to French intelligence followed the 1962 Algerian independence war. De Gaulle, fearful of losing his major energy supplies, created the firm in 1965. He put in charge of Elf his former chief of intelligence and friend Pierre Guillaumat. Guillaumat headed the Free French secret service in Africa and was very experienced in African affairs. A former head of French intelligence's African division. Colonel Maurice Robert, became ambassador


to Gabon, where he represented the interests of Elf in the oil-rich country. Guillaumat and Robert were not the only French spies to go to Elf. Under Guillaumat's reign, many retired agents ended up in Elf's "protection, security, and administration service" - the oil company's own intelligence branch.20 By April 1997, Elf and its officials were imder investigation by France's fraud squad. The fraud investigators had compiled a number of files dealing with Elf's various illegal activities, especially those relating to Africa. During the night of Saturday, April 19, burglars managed to enter a locked office on the ninth floor of the fraud squad's Paris headquarters. The burglars were said to have detailed knowledge of the building and the location of the sensitive files. The files stolen included those related to the activities of Andre Tarallq, Elf's chief in Gabon and his financial dealings with President Omar Bongo and a Corsican network having links to African countries. Also stolen were files related to the investigation of Andrd GueLfi, Elf's representative in Venezuela, Russia, and Uzbekistan. Guelfi owned a company registered in Liechtenstein called Noblepac which was accused of funneling campaign donations to the 1994 re-election campaign of Germany's Chancellor Helmut Kohl and his fellow Christian Democrats. French investigators also reported that the fraud office's computers had been tampered with and there was speculation that the intrusion and burglary were carried out by the German Federal Intelligence Service (Bxmdesnacrichtendiesnt - BND).2i Elf's primary task was to ensure an uninterrupted flow of oil and gas to France, regardless of what actions were necessary. By controlling, mostly


through bribes, the policies of African leaders. Elf also ensured that their countries would vote with France on crucial votes in the United Nations. Upon visiting France, some pro-French African leaders would actually make a courtesy call on the chairman of Elf before meeting Foccart and other French government officials.22 Working with Foccart, Elf was also to prevent inroads by the "Anglo-Saxon" oil companies of British Petroleum and Shell. Later, American oil firms would be added to the list. France was not alone in using its intelligence service to protect its oil companies. It was known that the CIA and Britain's MI-6 rendered similar assistance to American and British oil companies, respectively.23 Foccart would not be outdone by the Anglo-Saxon competitors. Even in. his old age, Foccart was certainly more than a match for his American competitors - the unsophisticated and bureaucratic African "experts" in Washington. Foccart had tangled with American intelligence for many years. When President de Gaulle pulled France out of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1967, Foccart associates said the CIA, believing Foccart was somehow responsible, targeted him in a smear campaign.24 In 1968, Foccart once again tangled with the CIA when France provided covert' military support to Nigeria's secessionist Republic of Biafra against the Nigerian military government of General Yakubu Gowon, which was supported by the Americans, Soviets, and British. Foccart lined up the support of the Ivory Coast and Gabon for Biafra and also facilitated the arrival of pilots from the Rhodesian air force.^s Oil would play a part in

France's backing of secessionist Biafra in its civil war with Nigeria. France coveted Biafra's rich petroleum reserves and since Nigeria had opened exploration to the British and Americans, Foccart saw a chance to compete in the Anglo-Saxon backyard. Soon, France's most famed mercenary. Bob Denard (whose real name is Gilbert Bourgeaud) would be fighting alongside Biafran troops.^® In his memoirs. Pirate of the Republic, Denard maintained that all of his actions were for the good of his country and that: "France has always been behind jne, or at least, has always given me free rein." It is apparent that Foccart was behind all of Denard s exploits, including the killing of "terrorists in Morocco, running guns to Biafra's army, and mounting four coups in the Comoro Islands, one of which propelled him to co-head of state. Their escapades earned Denard and his mercenary colleagues a less than complementary sobriquet: "les affreux" ("the horrible ones"). Notably, former French spy chief Michel Roussin confirmed all of Denard's allegations concerning mercenary links with the French government. Roussin added that Denard "was tmder the control of his SDECE service,"^^ a link which ultimately led to Foccart's office. Denard's allegations would forever stain Foccart's legacy as a post-war French leader. But the final smear against Foccart came from his old Elf colleague Le Floch-Prigent. The disgraced oil executive said that Foccart fed "disinformation' to the government during the last few years of the Mitterand administration. 28


Notes 1.

Stephen Smith and Antoine Glaser, Ces messieurs Afrique 2

Des reseaux of lobbies, (Paris:


Calmann- Levy, 1997). Extracts on Foccart available at: annexes/bfeuilles/ cmafr2.foccart.htm 2. Ibid. 3. Bernard Edinger, "Veteran French Africa kingmaker Foccart dies at 83," Reuters, 19 March 1997. 4. Dumoulin, op. cit., 51-52. 5. Edinger, op. cit. 6. Philippe Gaillard, Foccart Parle {Foccart Speaks), (SainteMaxime, France: Fayard/Jeune Afrique, 1995), 219-220. 7. Edinger, op. cit. 8. Dumoulin, op. cit., 71. 9. Gerard Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide (London: Hurst & Co., 1996), 316. 10. Gaillard, op. cit., 457-458. 11. Edinger, op. cit. 12. Smith and Glaser, op. cit. 13. Edinger, op. cit. 14. Ibid. 15. Ibid. 16. Ibid. 17. Ibid. 18. "Former Elf head says Elf 'appointed' Gabonese, Cameroonian leaders," Radio France Internationale, Paris, in French 1230 GMT, 12 December 1996, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 14 December 1996. 19. "Elf was 'secular arm' of France Gaullist regime, former chairman says," Agence France Presse, 12 December 1996. 20. Joseph Fitchett, "Ex-Head Tells Of Elf's Work As Paris Agent," International Herald Tribune, 14 December 1996; Roger Faligot, "Elf's shadowy world of bribes and intelligence," The European, 16 March 1998,12. 21. Charles Masters, "Oil plot thickens as Elf files are stolen," The European, 8 May 1997,21. 22. FitchetL op. cit. 23. Faligot, "Elf's shadowy world of bribes and intelligence," op.


cit. 24. Edinger, op. cit. 25. Philippe Chapleau and Francois Misser, Mercenaires S.A. ("Mercenaries S.A."), (Paris: Descl6e de Brouwer, 1998), 41-42. 26. Ibid., 339,345. 27. Susannah Herbert, "Bloody past was my duty to France, says mercenary," Daily Telegraph, 1 May 1998,16. 28. "Elf was 'secular arm' of France Gaullist regime, former chairman says," Agence France Presse, op. cit.





4 U.S. Target #1: Jonas Savimbi I have always taken care to put an idea or emotion behind my jvords. I have made it a habit to be suspicious of the mere music of words. With the Trench grip on Africa beginning to slip, the United States was poised to fill the lucrative vacuum that would soon be exploited by U.S. businesses. However, for the Clinton administration to accommodate the avaricious plans of U.S. mining and oil interests in central Africa, some housekeeping was necessary. Throughout the 1980s, the United States intelligence community supported the pro-Westem rebel leader of Angola, Jonas Savimbi, against his Marxist rivals in Luanda. Clinton changed that by recogrlizing the Luanda government. However, Savimbi remained a force to be reckoned with, not only in Angola, but in neighboring coimtries like Zaire. This was because Savimbi's Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola - National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNTTA) - guerrillas freely operated across the Angolan borders with Zaire and Congo (Brazzaville). Therefore, the nettlesome Savimbi became the first target of Clinton's new Africa



Ever since the Reagan years, the Voice of America ' (VOA) secretly provided short-wave frequencies for use by UNITA's rebel radio station, the Voice of the Resistance of the Black Cockerel (abbreviated "Vorgan"). One of the first concrete actions of the Clinton administration was to throw Vorgan off the 11.070-kilohertz frequency provided by the VOA.^ In 1992, the United States signed an agreement with the island nation of Sao Tome and Principe in the Gulf of Guinea to construct a VOA transmitter site at Pinheira on the main island of Sao Tome. The jamming of Vorgan's signal increased as Sao Tome's operations expanded. A November 1997 article in the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) publication Foreign Affairs, a journal often seen as being in lockstep with various U.S. foreign policy initiatives, suggested that the U.S. support jamming in various crisis zones around the world. Ihe authors of the article suggested that the United States establish "information intervention units" around the world. These would rely on special U.S. jamming and propaganda broadcasting aircraft. The United States maintains a special EC-130 aircraft called Commando Solo designed for such a purpose. Even though the anti-communist broadcasts of the VOA and Radio Free Europe and the anti-Castro broadcasts of Radio Marti and Radio Swan were all jammed by the communists (an action that was condemned by eight successive U.S. administrations), the United States considered adopting jamming as an approach to dealing with trouble spots like Africa.^ During 1996 and 1997, Washington began decrying the operations of so-called "hate radio"



stations springing up in Hutu-controlled territories of Burundi, Rwanda, and eastern Zaire. One of these. Radio Rutomorangingo, operated by an opposition Burundi political party, was accused of broadcasting hate messages, such as encoxiraging Hutus to "rise up against the Tutsi oppressors." However, Article 19, the international anti-censorship group, maintains that the radio station did not directly incite genocide against the Tutsi-controlled government of Burundi. Another station, called Voice of the Patriot, was broadcasting from a mobile transmitter in the Bukavu region exhorting Hutu refugees to be wary of Tutsi killers. In fact, Tutsi military forces had killed a number of Hutu refugees in the region so it is arguable whether such broadcasts were inflammatory or merely genuine public service warnings for civilians to be wary.3 This is not to say that incitive hate radio stations did not exist in central Africa. Other radio stations in the area had, in fact, incited genocidal activities. For example, the Rwandan Hutu radio station. Radio Television Libre des Milles Collines, was responsible for broadcasting messages that encouraged Hutus to kill as many Tutsis as possible during the 1994 government-sanctioned genocide campaign. Information intervention is one of the tasks assigned to the U.S. Special Forces civil affairs units. These units are extremely active in central Africa and elsewhere. Military-run censorship is normally an activity sanctioned only in wartime. The fact that the Pentagon was arguing for such expanded responsibilities m peacetime sent dangerous signals to media outlets around the world, including the flourishing press in Africa. Jamming and other intelligence activities are not


in the congressional charter of the VOA - these are functions normally reserved for the military and intelligence agencies. However, the VOA has made exceptions in cooperating with the QA and NSA. Although VGA's charter mandates that it report the news in an imbiased and accurate manner, this has not stopped it from transmitting secret codes to American undercover agents in countries arotmd the world.^ In the case of Sao Tome, it was rumored that the Pinheira station actually had a dual fimction: VOA transmitter and signals intelligence (SIGINT)-gatheiing station. In this regard, it is noteworthy that the Pentagon's Fuel Supply Center in Fort Belvoir, Virginia supplies the station's fueLThe VOA responded to allegations about the Sao Tome station by claiming it was replacement for its station in Monrovia, Liberia, forced to close due to the civil war in that country. The installation is currently the largest foreign employer on the island.^ The increased satellite traffic beamed to and from Africa was one reason behind American interest in establishing a communications monitoring presence on Sao Tome. The VOA station, itself, comprised various antennae (including four 100 kilowatt short wave and one 600 kilowatt medium wave transmitters)^ a twostory operations building, a huge satellite dish, and an independent power plant.^ The VOA personnel were housed in an armed-guarded compound operated by Christian Hellinger, a shadowy South African businessman whose company, Transafrik, was known for everything from diamond mining to arms trafficking.8 Hellinger also reportedly provided various support "services" to the American oil company



fr !lv

Chevron, which maintains significant operations in the Angolan enclave of Cabinda. These services apparently included providing Angola with mercenaries to combat secessionist forces that operate in the small but resource-rich enclave.^ The importance of Sao Tome to U.S. plans for the region was highlighted when President Miguel Trovoada announced that he had asked the United States to train his 400-man security force. This came after a July 1994 constitutional crisis in which Trovoada was almost thrown out of power.^*' With American security guarantees, Sao Tome continues to be a safe haven from where America's anti-Savimbi SIGINT, jamming, and propaganda operations can flourish without interference. For Washington, it would take more than just throwing Savimbi off the radio airwaves to stifle his movement. Shortly after Clinton took office in 1993, it was reported that the CIA was involved in an attempt by a group of 100 South African mercenaries to assassinate the Angolan rebel leader. The men were mostly black South African veterans of 32 Battalion, the so-called 'Buffalo Battalion," one of the country's elite cotmter-terrorism units. Many battalion veterans worked for the shadowy and secretive South African mercenary company Executive Outcomes, which used a black chess knight for its logo and whose name sounded more like a group of professional management training consultants than a bunch of hired guns. However, the group was not quite a cluster of Brooks Brothers suit-clad consultants with MBAs. And Executive Outcomes certainly had some close links with military and intelligence circles. For example, according




to a "UK Eyes Alpha" (an "above top secret" category) British intelligence report: "Executive Outcomes was registered on September 1993 in the United Kingdom by Anthony (Tony) Buckingham and Simon Mann, a former British officer." Also involved in the new start up were two ex-South African commandos, Eeben Barlow and Lafras Luitingh.” Mann was a commander of the 22"d Special Air Service Regiment, where he saw action in Central America, C3^rus, Saudi Arabia, and Nigeria. Buckingham's background is described later. According to another "UK Eyes Alpha" document, obtained by London's Observer newspaper. Executive Outcomes made a good impression on Britain's intelligence community. Sounding as if it could have come from an Executive Outcome marketing brochure, the highly-classified document stated the mercenary firm "is acquiring a wide reputation in subSaharan Africa for reliability and efficiency . . . [especially among] smaller countries desperate for rapid assistance." The report also described the U.N. as "slow and unwieldy" and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) as nothing more than a "talking shop.''^^ Executive Outcomes maintained that it only provided security to legitimate governments, a claim that would later be proven otherwise. Some thirty "legitimate" governments had, however, approached Executive Outcomes. These included Turkey, which was fighting ethnic Kurds in the western part of the cotmtry; Algeria, which was waging a bloody civil war against Islamist fundamentalists; Nigeria, a nation battling pro-democracy forces and ethnic Quistian minority groups in its southeastern and southern regions; and Sri Lanka, locked in a fight-to-the-death


struggle with the Tamils in the north of the island.i^ The firm also has extensive dealings in Botswana, Ethiopia, Namibia, Lesotho, Bahrain, Qatar, and Yemen-^s In 1992, Executive Outcomes was contracted by Gulf Chevron and Angola's Sonangol oil company to provide security for their facilities in the country. The deal was worth $ 30 million. Interestingly, the CIA plan to kill Savimbi reportedly had the backing of U.S. oil interests. The latter wanted to block UNITA's attempt to spread its conflict to oil-rich Cabinda, possibly linking up with the Cabindan secessionist movement, ELEC (Front for the Liberation of the Cabinda Enclave) (Frente de Liberta^ao do Enclave de Cabinda). FLEC was established in the 1980s during a more harmonious relationship between the CIA and the French external intelligence service, the SDECE (the forerunner of the DGSE). The SDECE man in charge of supporting FLEC was Jean da Costa. Both the CIA and SDECE had a shared interest in ensuring that Angola's Marxist influence in the region was not only stemmed but also defeated. Although French and American oil companies both had installations in Cabinda and paid large sums of royalties to Luanda, some of the oil revenue generated from Cabindan wells also wound up in the hands of the Cabindan secessionists. Andre Tarallo, Elf-Gabon's deputy chief, provided much of the money to the rebels. Moreover, the joint CIA/NSA station at the U.S. embassy on Avenue des Aviateurs in Kinshasa provided FLEC and its mercenary advisers with intelligence support via its vast undercover network in the region.!^ By 1993, with FLEC still a burden to Angola's control of Cabinda and UNITA entrenched in the


1 diamond fields of the Cuango valley in northeast Angola's Lunda Norte province, Clinton's mining friends in Arkansas and elsewhere decided the status quo would change. The UNTTA-controlled diamond fields were also an irritant to the Luanda government. The $1 billion in annual revenue generated from the sale of diamonds was helping to finance UNITA and keep the guerrilla movement afloat. Savimbi sold his diamonds through the giant and influential De Beers conglomerate of South Africa. After he decided to eliminate the middleman, he began selling diamonds from the lucrative Cuango site on the open market. Consequently, Savimbi's prices undercut those of De Beers. Although South Africa had, at one time, provided massive military aid to Savimbi, his diamond dealing caused Pretoria to re-examine its policy. That is when Executive Outcomes was hired by De Beers to put pressure on Savimbi.i^ Luanda, once South Africa's enemy, now became its friend. The American-Canadian mining firm, American Mineral Fields (AMF), also wanted the UNITA guerrillas out of the diamond fields so it could reap the profits. Also, the company wanted to beat De Beers to the punch in northeast Angola. The owner of AMF is Jean Raymond Boulle. A British citizen, he is a softspoken, charming, but somewhat elusive and wily Mauritian emigre, who is, most interestingly, an ex-De Beers executive. At the age of twenty-nine, Boulle was De Beers youngest ever general manager. He was assigned to look after the company's operations in Zaire.18 He lives in Monaco, once lived in San Pedro Town, Belize; conducts business in Dallas; maintains a holding company in Luxembourg; and banks in the



Cayman Islands. His three brothers, Maximillian, Francb, and Bertrand, assist him in his worldwide business operations.i^ The Mauritians have financial interests throughout Africa. With his cousin, Marcel Boulle and. another relative, lawyer Marc Hein of Port Louis,’Mauritius, Boulle acquired majority ownership of Madagascar Resotnces. That company has successfully negotiated gold, copper, and coal mining concessions on &e island.2o His brother Max, also a British citizen, has close ties with Malagasy President Didier Ratsiraka, Prime Minister Pascal Rakotomavo, and Energy and Mines Minister Charles Rasoza. Max's ties with the senior Malagasy leadership were facilitated by Gerard Ecorcheville, a Frenchman who has close links to the Gaullist RPR and who advised Ratsiraka on his successful presidential election campaign. 21 JeanRaymond has his own important contacts - he enjoys the status as an adviser to Guinea's mining minister.22 Additionally, beating out his old employer De Beers, he won a lucrative concession from Angola's government to exploit the diamond deposits along the Luremo River in Lunda Norte. There was one problem - Savimbi's guerrillas were occupying the diamond rich area and mining the diamonds to sustain their power.

Notes 1. 2.


Reuters, "Angola rebel radio beats broadcast blockade," 2 October 1993. Jamie F. Metzl and Fareed Zakaria, "Information Intervention; When Switching Channels Isn't Enough: The Rise of Illiberal Democracy," Foreign Affairs, November/December 1997. Steve Herrmann, "The voice of hatred," BBC Summary of


World Broadcasts, 3 April 1998. Alvin A. Snyder, Warriors of Disinformation (New York: Arcade Publishing, 1995), 186. 5. "Invitation to tender - U.S. - Ft. Belvoir: fuels, lubricants, oils, and waxes," Tenders Electronic Daily, Commission of the European Communities, 4 June 1996; Statement of James Ledesma, Ambassador-designate to Gabon and Sao Tome and Principe, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Federal Document Clearing House Congressional Testimony, 23 July 1998.. 6. Reuter Textline - African Economic Digest, "Sao Tome and Principe: Agreement to install Voice of America transmitters signed," 15 June 1992. 7. Transmitter developments at VOA and Radio Liberty, World Broadcasting Information News, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 14 December 1995. 8. Jon Bowermaster, "End of Innocence?" Condi Nast Traveler (December 1994), 158. 9. Author interview with Antoine Glaser, Paris, 26 September 1997. 10. Reuters, "Trovoada says he never sought foreign intervention," 14 July 1994. 11. Werner Menges, "Government looks into mercenary link," The Namibian (Windhoek), Africa News, 24 July 1998. 12. Khareen Pech and David Beresford, "Africa's New-Look Dogs Of War," Mail and Guardian 0ohannesburg), Africa News, 24 January 1997. 13. Kirsten Sellars, "Old dogs of war learn new tricks," Neio Statesman, 26:4331,25 April 1997. 14. Chapleau and Misser, op. cit., 146. 15. David Isenberg, Soldiers of Fortune, Ltd., Center for Defense Information Monograph, November 1997,10. 16. Christian Tavernier, "Droit de response: M. Tavernier nous 6crit" ("Right of response, Mr. Tavernier writes us"), Le Soir lllustre, 10 December 1997, 48; Faligot, "Elf's shadowy world of bribes and intelligence," op. cit. 17. Dunn, op. cit. 18. Kenneth Gooding, "Voisey's Bay man aims to repeat success with Zairian zinc project," Financial Times (London), 26 September 1996,35. 4.


Jennifer Wells, "Canada's Next Billionaire," Maclean's, 3 June 1996, 44; Jonathan Derrick, "Qui est Jean-Raymond Boulle" ("Who is Jean-Raymond Boulle?") Africa International, November 1997,17. 20. "JRB Disembarks," The Indian Ocean Nezosletter, 17 May 1997. 21. "Not Chaplin's Gold Rush," The Indian Ocean Newsletter, 21 Jime 1997. 22. "Aredor Soon to Resume Work," Africa Energy & Mining, 16 July 1997. 19.


5 The Africa-Arkansas-Indonesia Connection I do not have a 'close association' with people involved with the Sandline mercenary company. I connection, directly or indirectly, intellectually or financially, with Executive Outcomes. I support neither its business nor its credo. And I do not maintain any form of ongoing business association with those who do assist Executive Outcomes on military service contracts. Robert Friedland, letter to the Sydney Morning Herald, April 24, 1997

Diamonds would soon be cotmted as some of the Clinton administration's best friends. In particular, AMF had a great deal of clout with the Clinton administration. In 1995, the company relocated its actual headquarters from Vancouver, British Columbia to Clinton's hometown of Hope, Arkansas. The firm continued to maintain a Vancouver business address while it listed its shares on the Toronto Stock Exchange. Vancouver's Howe Street stock exchange also lists numerous mining companies with similar nondescript addresses, many in off-shore tax havens. Michael McMurrough, AMF's first Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, a former land surveyor and diamond entrepreneur in Hope, meteorically rose to the top job


after Boulle re-located the headquarters to Clinton's birthplace. An AMF spokesman said that although McMurrough "probably knew" Qinton, neither the President nor First Lady Hillary Clinton owned stock or had any financial interests in the company. i It seems that Clinton has more than a casual acquaintance with McMtuxough. Some accotmts actually described Clinton as a friend of the Hope mining baron.2 One of AMF's business partners was Jackson Stephens, an important "friend of Bill" and perennially mentioned in regard to various financial scandals that rocked Arkansas during Qinton's first term as president. For example, Stephens' business partner in Little Rock's Worthen Bank was Indonesian business tycoon Mochtar Riady, the head of the Lippo Group, which gave millions of illegal dollars to Clinton's 1996 presidential re-election campaign. Boulle, McMurrough, and Stephens joined forces in 1987 to mine Arkansas' Crater of Diamonds State Park located on the banks of the Little Missouri River. Boulle had earlier met with then-Govemor Clinton at a luncheon in the summer of 1984. That meeting was set up by Arkansas attorney James Blair, the financial adviser to Hillary Qinton who later helped her make $100,000 on a $1000 investment in commodities trading.3 Boulle later said, "I spent a little time with Governor Clinton explaining to him that this could be important to his state and to the nation." The Arkansas mining partnership, known as the Arkansas Diamond Development Company, included Boulle; Jim Maloney, Boulle's attorney with Baker & Botts of Houston (Baker & Botts was the family law firm of former U.S. Secretary of State James Baker); and Diamond Fields Resources


Inc. of Vancouver, Canada (a firm controlled by Boulle and his brash late foilyish Canadian partner Robert Friedland, and in which McMurrough held stock at the time of the Arkansas deal). The partnership also included the very wealthy Farid Al-Awadi family of Kuwait and Rhombus, Inc. of Little Rock, a firm owned by trust funds of Jackson and Witt Stephens, the founders of Stephens, Inc.^ According to Doug Thompson, the business editor for the Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, Diamond Fields, which xmtil 1993 was known as the Boulle Group, was the real money behind AMF.s In August 1997, Diamond Fields was acquired by Inco, Inc., the world's largest nickel producer, for some $4.3 billion after the Friedland-Boulle combine struck it rich in 1994 when their firm discovered, while exploring for diamonds, the largest nickel deposit in Labrador's Voise/s Bay. The merger represented the largest in Canadian history. Immediately, Labrador's hmu minority began to feel the pressure from both Friedland's company and the Newfoundland government. The Innu, who have lived in the Voisey's Bay region for generations, felt they were not being fairly compensated for their resources. Soon, Innu activists were battling Newfoundland police who were acting on behalf of the mining interests. Plans for a smelter at a former secret U.S. Navy submarine tracking base at Argentia, Newformdland were hung up by environmental concerns. Diamond Field's acquisition by Inco was originally blocked by Exdiam, Inc., a Dallas-based diamond-mining firm, in which Boulle previously held a sizable financial stake and for whom he had served as president. Boulle, Dallas investors, and


associates of the Anaconda Mining Company originally formed Exdiam. Exdiam investors, including Farid alAwadi of Kuwait, subsequently sued Diamond Field's co-chairmen Boulle and Friedland for allegedly breaching their fiduciary duties by diverting Exdiam assets to help finance Diamond Fields. Exdiam leases in Arkansas and Minnesota were diverted to Friedland and Maria Investments, a Cayman Islands firm controlled by Boulle's family, which was later used to form Exdiam. Inco was also named in Exdiam's suit. The Inco takeover was put on hold until Boulle's Diamond Fields agreed to pay Exdiam's investors $25 million in an out-of-court settlement.® The first phase of the plan to mine Arkansas' Crater of Diamonds park, the only known viable diamond deposit in North America, was scuttled after it was discovered that the only diamonds to be found were on the earth's surface and no kimberlite veins existed deep under the groimd.^ Boulle earlier said he believed the mine had the "potential to rival any in South Africa" and perhaps contained $5 billion worth of diamonds.^ However, there were some diamonds in the park because a 4.25 carat diamond from the park managed to find its way onto the ring finger of Hillary Clinton at President Clinton's first inaugural ball in 1993.5 In attendance at the gala were Boulle and his Not knowing how large the diamond deposit at the park could be, and much to the chagrin of conservationists like the Friends of the Crater of Diamonds, Governor Clinton allowed commercial diamond exploration to proceed in 1987 after Boulle complained about delays. It just so happened that



. ainton had placed his friend Karen Lackey in the post of commissioner for parks and tourism. Lackey was appointed by Clinton to head a "Blue Ribbon Task Force" to come up with recommendations concerning mining in the park. The approval was merely a formality. A one-time attorney for Boulle and Arkansas Diamond Development was Clinton White House aid Bruce Lindsey, who did the legal footwork for Boulle on getting Clinton's final approval to mine the park.ii The environmentalists claimed Clinton was the only candidate for governor in 1990 who favored the mining project. In 1996, U.S. District Judge Henry Woods, another "friend of Bill," ruled that a second phase exploration at the park could proceed after Interior Secretary Bruce Babbitt gave his approval. Babbitt's decision was controversial, to say the least. Because Arkansas received federal funds to develop the state park in the early 1970s, any decision to mine it required an Environmental Impact Statement and approval from the National Park Service, an agency of the Department of Interior. In 1996, the Park Service's division chief, Sam Hall, and his boss. Associate Director Denis Galvin, recommended that the request to mine the park be denied. They cited documents from the park service's regional office in Omaha, which was responsible for the park. The papers stated that the local park service officials "could not approve this request now or in the future, even with additional data [from the Arkansas govemment]."^^ Suddenly, in May 1996, Galvin reversed himself and instructed Hall to notify the Omaha office that the earlier decision had been changed and the mining could proceed. Hall, covering his back side, noted in writing his disapproval: "Please


be aware that I cannot support this approval of [further mining activity] at the Crater of Diamonds State Park."i3 An official of the Omaha office stated: "The final decision [to permit the mining] was basically made in Washington." Galvin was later named the Park Service's acting director. It was believed the decision to reverse the earlier mining prohibition was made following pressure from a phalanx of Clinton's business friends who had a stake in the two companies permitted to mine the park. These individuals, in particular, had interests in Continental Diamonds and the Arkansas Diamond Development Company. The former was partly owned by Robert Friedland and the latter included, in addition to the family of Jackson Stephens, Boulle and Friedland, Sanford Robertson of Robertson Stephens and Company of San Francisco.^^ Robertson is an important Clinton fund-raiser and contributor. His business associate is Paul Stephens, an old colleague of Friedland and no relation to the Stephens family of Little Rock. 15 Stephens was the manager of the Robertson Stephens Contrarian Ftmd, a significant investor in shares of Friedland-controlled companies, including Diamond Fields Resources.i^ Moreover, another Stephens fund, the Robertson Stephens Orphan Fund, was among AMF's largest shareholders when the mining firm was first listed on Toronto's Stock Exchange in 1996. Boulle and Stephens were close associates, the former having introduced Stephens to Namibia's President Sam Nujoma in 1994 while on a trip through Africa. Another controversial stockholder in Diamond Fields was Jim Bob Hodge, a Texas diamond merchant


who was convicted in August 1986 of trying to smuggle $20 million in cash to Panama from the United States in concert with a former Chilean diplomat named Benjamin Rencoret. Hodge became involved with Diamond Fields when, in 1992, he sold to the firm his underwater diamond concession off the coast of Namibia. Hodge fancied himself as a professional bag man boasting that he once used a trash compactor to squeeze $1 million into a briefcase.^® The complexities of AMF's business deals did not end with Ae Arkansas state park. Add to the Arkansas mix AMF's mining partner, Barrick Gold Corporation of Canada. The company had formerly been called American Barrick. The gold mining corporate giant was selected as AMF's partner in a grand design to replace French and Belgian mining companies in Congo. Counted among the members of Barrick's prestigious International Advisory Board were former Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney; bona fide "friend of Bill" Vernon Jordan; and, most surprisingly, Qinton's White House predecessor, George Bush. The former President was involved in a number of mining ventures, including serving on the board of a pension fund with gold mining interests in Senegal.i^ Other important advisers to Barrick include ex-U.S. Senator Howard Baker Jr., who served as White House chief of staff under President Reagan, and the influential ex-chief of the German Central Bank, Karl Otto Pohl. Peter Munk, Barrick's multimillionaire Hungarian-bom chairman, spelled out Barrick's mission for Bush and Mulroney. He pronoimced, "They will be providing strategic advice on geopolitical issues


affecting Barrick/'^o Mtink earned the reputation of being a ruthless corporate competitor. His role model was Chile's dictator Augusto Pinochet. Of the Chilean Munk opined, "that man, albeit you may not approve of the methodology, had the courage to single-handedly change the whole direction of a whole continent." Pinochet was also friendly with the numerous foreign mining companies that had billions of dollars of investments in his country. Reflecting on his own business tactics, Munk was quoted as saying, "life is about meeting objectives. Sometimes your objectives cross other peoples'. Then you have to fight - and you fight to win." He could also count the Saudi international arms merchant Adnan Khoshoggi among his circle of friends. 21 Although Munk's business ethics were, indeed, rivaled in the world of international mining and exploration, many innocent people would come to feel the sting of his words. Munk had other important political connections through his friend Boulle. In 1996, rich Republicans attended a swank dinner at a five-star Buckhead, Atlanta hotel with Boulle and the super-rich Friedland at center stage. Buzzing through the wealthy ranks was the speculation that an investor could possibly reap $100 in profit for every dollar invested in Diamond Fields stock. This was a common sales pitch in seeking investors for penny stocks. Rubbing shoulders with Boulle and Friedland was the not so insignificant Newt Gingrich, Speaker of the House of Representatives.22 Boulle, Munk, and Friedland had something else in common: connections to one of the largest financial collapses in North American history. AMF's strategic partner, Barrick, teamed with Indomin, another


company with ties to the elusive Boulle, to mine the supposedly gold-rich Busang gold mine field in Indonesian Borneo (called Kalimantan by the Indonesians). The name Kalimantan, according to local lore, means "rivers of gold and diamonds." The subsequent failure of various mining teams to find gold at Busang led to the financial collapse of Bre-X Minerals, Ltd. Of Alberta, a principal member of one of the exploration consortiums. This resulted in a scandal that rocked Canadian business circles throughout 1997. The chief geologist for Bre-X, forty-one year old Michael de Guzman, supposedly threw himself out of a French-made Alouette III helicopter over the jimgle while flying to Busang from Samarinda, the capital of Indonesian Borneo. Indonesian authorities and Bre-X insisted that de Guzman committed suicide. The Filipino geologist must have been desperate to kill himself before his fateful helicopter trip.23 It was later reported that he tried to kill himself the night before his flight to Busang by drinking a bottle of cough syrup and immersing himself in a water-filled bathtub.Four days after his helicopter suicide dive, De Guzman's bloated body was discovered in a jungle swamp.^ However, a Manila medical examiner reported a second autopsy on the body believed to be that of de Guzman failed to produce a positive identification. The pathologist. Dr. Albert Reyes, said he was not able to compare dental or fingerprint records.2« Bre-X's corporate partner in the seemingly ill-fated venture involving de Guzman was Barrick Gold. Boulle's other partner, the enigmatic Friedland, a dual U.S.- Canadian citizen, also maintained a huge financial stake in Indonesia. Friedland, a native of



Qiicago, experienced a meteoric career progression. In 1970, while a student at Bowdoin College in Maine, he was arrested for selling 8,000 LSD tablets to a federal narcotics agent. Judge Edward T. Gignoux, who sentenced Friedland, prophetically told the convicted drug dealer, "You gave no thought to the consequences for others that could have resulted from this transaction, but only to the large sum of money that you could have obtained."27 Friedland's conviction was later expxmged from court records. After his release from federal prison, Friedland enrolled at Reed College in Portland, Oregon where he studied yoga under an Indian guru and coincidentally became friends with fellow student Stephen Jobs, who later co-founded Apple Computer and provided financial support to Clinton's presidential campaigns. The self-styled hippie drifted through the Oregon Feeling Center, where primal scream therapy was the recommended cure-all; India, where he studied under gurus and sadhus; and to a tree farm in Oregon. He finally found his calling in the mining industry in Vancouver. Mastering the technique of heap leaching, the bathing of ore in cyanide to extract gold,2s Friedland's first company. Galactic Resources, bought the Summitville Gold Mine in the San Juan Mountains of Colorado. Although Summitville's previous owner. Anaconda Minerals, thought heap leaching was a much too dangerous and expensive method for extracting gold,27 Friedland decided to use the process anyway, although only a few ounces spilling into the environment can be lethal. It was also at Galactic where Friedland began rubbing shoulders with influential members of the Democratic Party who were also gold mine investors.


In the mid-1980s, these Democratic doyens were investing in Yuba Natural Resources, a gold mining firm that hoped to excavate a mother lode in the Sierra Nevada Moimtains. Among the investors were Richard Silberman, who was a California Democratic party ftmd-raiser who had been Sargent Shriver's 1976 presidential campaign manager and who had served in high-level posts in Governor Jerry Brown's administration; Marvin Kratter, a California huckster who had once owned a dude ranch in Arizona; and exDemocratic National Committee Chairman Charles Manatt. The investors also included another major Democratic Party fund-raiser, M. Larry Lawrence, the owner of the posh San Diego Hotel Del Coronado. As the major stockholder, Silberman became Yuba's chairman. The Bank of America tmderwrote Yuba's gold ventures on the advice of Bechtel, the shadowy San Francisco construction firm which had close links with the U.S. intelligence community. It was when Friedland sought financing for Galactic at the Bank of America he became acquainted with Silberman. The two mining entrepreneurs apparently agreed to turn part of the assets of Yuba Natural Resources over to Yuba American Gold Ltd., a penny stock company which would be traded on the Toronto Stock Exchange. This is how other xmsuspecting investors were roped into the scheme.28

In April 1989, Silberman was charged by the FBI with money laundering. The Democratic Party stalwart thought he was laundering Colombian cocaine proceeds but he was actually stung in a Federal undercover operation. The Silberman/Friedland deal subsequently collapsed, even after Lawrence lent Yuba Natural


Resources a sum of money to settle claims against it. 29 In fact, along with Silberman, Lawrence was a major promoter of the investment potential in Yuba. 3° Later, Lawrence became a major ftmd-raiser for and contributor to President Clinton's 1992 presidential campaign, for which he was rewarded with the ambassadorship to Switzerland. When Lawrence died in 1996, a scandal raged when he was buried in Arlington National Cemetery. This was based on his World War II war "record," which erroneously claimed he was a war-injured U.S. Merchant Marine man. When it was later discovered that Lawrence lied about his record (he was too young to have even been in the service during the war), his body was unceremoniously disinterred from Arlington and reburied in California. Ironically, for part of the time Lawrence claimed to have been in the North Atlantic ferrying arms and supplies to Russia, he worked on KrattePs Arizona dude ranch. Silberman certainly had a commonality with Friedland's business ethics. Although Galactic later went bankrupt and its investors were left holding the bag, Friedland was well on his way to success in other mining ventures, especially one in Venezuela. However, he left one little problem at Summitville. His mining operation leaked cyanide and heavy metals into the Alamosa River, which empties into the Colorado. The Environmental Protection Agency was left with a $148 million cleanup tab.32 The incident conferred upon Friedland an unshakable nickname - "Toxic Bob."33 The local people in Summitville were left to deal with the disastrous aftermath. Ignacio Rodriguez, a local farmer, said: "You know, Mr. Friedland came here, made some money, abandoned the place, and then went bankrupt.


So Mr. Friedland made money, his stockholders and some of his partners didn't make money. The community didn't make money. And you know the government has spent over $120 million tr5dng to clean his mess up. I think that is disgraceful. The man has no conscience. A man with a conscience would not do that, number one to the environment, but number two, to a poverty stricken area like ours."^^ In addition to the local people of Summitville, Friedland's former associates at Summitville Consolidated Mining Company - a wholly-owned subsidiary of Galactic - faced the consequences of Friedland's cyanide-enhanced mining. In May 1996, Summitville Mining's trustees pled guilty to forty felony coimts, most of which involved the pollution of the Alamosa River. They were forced to ante up with a $20 million fine, which amounted to only one-sixth of the cost to the government to clean up the mess which the Mineral Policy Center in Washington called the "Jurassic Park" of U.S. mining.3^ On December 18,1998, a U.S. District judge in Denver sentenced Tom Chisholm, Summitville's environmental manager and Samye Buckner, the general manager, to five years' probation and a $20,000 fine each for polluting navigable rivers and providing false statements to the Environmental Protection Agency. The U.S. Attorney handling the case said the two defendants had cooperated with the government's investigation.36 Based on that cooperation, the presiding judge indicated their sentence could be reduced to two years. However, the U.S. Attome/s office in Denver still had a civil suit pending against Friedland, who, unlike his tinfortunate former Colorado employees, was safely



ensconced in his office in Singapore. Possibly with Friedland in mind/ Assistant U.S. Attorney Bernard Hobson told Judge Daniel Sparr: "the government's disappointed, frankly, judge, that it is only these two defendants that are here and that will be brought before this court on criminal charges."^^ After Summitville, Friedland skipped off to Canada along with his assets. He soon became the multimillionaire head of a Singapore-based p)n:amidal holding company called Ivanhoe Capital Corporation. With gold mine holdings in Kazakhstan, Fiji, Java, and Papua New Guinea, oil fields in Kalimantan (Borneo), plastic housing factories in Shanghai, copper mines in Myanmar (Burma), and other interests in Honduras, Mongolia, the Yukon, Saskatchewan, and the Northwest Territories, Ivanhoe was a true multinational mercenary entity. It had influence with many countries and loyalty to none. Even where Friedland hoped to make a good impression, there was a taint of hypocrisy. His Chinese plastic houses joint venture was to donate 10 per cent of its assets to the China Disabled Persons Federation, run by Deng Pufang, the son of Deng Xiao-ping, chief sanctioner of the 1989 Tiananmien Square massacre. But Friedland was far from an international humanitarian. His Shanghai Land Holdings partner. Bill Zheng, a Taiwanese criminal, supposedly made off with $10 million earmarked for wheelchair-botmd Chinese. All Friedland could say was that Zheng has left me with ".. . smoking embers. Thiat's all I've got. There was a partnership with a Chinese fund for the handicapped that was supposed to deliver all kinds of wonderful shit, and all they did was screw us. So today I'm here


talking with my partner. Royal Plastics, and we're trying to explain where the $10 million went and why everything is a total disaster .. Beyond plastic houses for the poor, Friedland had more important interests in China. He had an interest in two gold mining companies, China Diamond Corporation, of which a majority of shares were controlled by Madras Holdings Ltd.,^^ another Friedland-controlled firm, and Yunnan Mining. China Diamond and Yiinnan were both based in the British Virgin Islands.^o Friedland even snubbed his former homeland, the United States. In August 1996, after "Toxic Bob" made his fortune from the Inco deal in Labrador, the U.S. government and Colorado managed to persuade Canadian and U.S. judges to issue secret court orders that froze $152 million worth of the one half billion dollars in shares that Friedland realized from the Voisey^s Bay deal. An incensed Friedland called the American action "legal stealth" and said that Washington was engaging in "surreptitious and high handed tactics." It was the first time that the United States managed to freeze assets abroad in order to finance an environmental clean up. Soon, however, Friedland would have the last laugh when a Canadian court ordered his shares unfrozen and immediately returned to the enigmatic multi-millionaire.^i Friedland's mining operations also adversely affected mafiy native indigenous peoples. In Suriname, one of his companies. Golden Star, occupied the land of the Maroon people, an Amerindian tribe. Another Friedland company, Vengold, bought gold concessions in rain forest lands belonging to other indigenous tribes.


Native people had reason to worry about Friedland. In August 1995, Golden Sta/s Guyana gold mining operations in Omai, Guyana caused a deadly contamination of the environment. An earthen dam at the site collapsed, sending torrents of bright-red cyanide-tainted water into the Essequibo River. Floating in the 40-mile long red watery cloud were hrmdreds of dead animals, including fish and water fowl. It was a tropical replay of Summitville. Guyana's president, Cheddi Jagan, was forced to declare an environmental disaster.42 phe cleanup costs were estimated at $130 million.43 Other indigenous peoples arormd the world from Papua New Guinea, Lappland in northern Norway, and Java - have become irritants to mineral exploiters. However, the mining companies have an ace card to play in the event of trouble with the local people - highly trained and well-armed mercenaries contracted to keep order. One of Ivanhoe's many holdings was Indochina Goldfields, Ltd., headquartered in Vancouver and traded on both the Toronto and Sydney stock exchanges (Friedland maintained a residence in Sydney). Indochina Goldfields became a major player in the big league rush for Indonesian gold, especially in Borneo. In yet another example of the circuitous relationships in Friedland's business empire, Gordon Toll, the Australian chairman of Australia Bulk Minerals, also served as the vice president of Indochina Goldfields. Toll had, tmtil November 1995, been a chief mining executive of Rio Tinto Zinc (RTZ), a huge AustralianBritish mining firm and a business partner of Friedland. RTZ owned Kennecott Copper,44 a firm with infamous ties to the CIA in its involvement in Chile's 1973


military coup against President Salvador AUende. Indochina Goldfields, in violation of international sanctions, also developed a business relationship with the Burmese state mining company. Number One Mining, which is said to be close to Burma's ruling military jtmta.45 In fact, Reggie Tun Maung, a Burmese businessman who was married to the daughter of Maung Maung Khin, the deputy prime minister of the Burmese jrmta - the SLORC (State Law and Order Restoration Council) - served as a member of the board of Indochina Goldfieldsd^ A SLORCFriedland joint venture, called Ivanhoe Myanmar Holdings, Ltd., is based in Singapore. Friedland's spokesman Ray Torresan refused to comment to the press about Canadian calls for sanctions and a boycott of companies doing business in Burma.^^ Moreover, Ivanhoe's mining operations take place in areas in central Burma populated by repressed ethnic minorities, a familiar pattern in Friedland's exploits. Friedland's dealings with some of the world's most venal tyrants prompted the following comment about the globetrotting mining baron from John Woods of Canada Stock Watch: "[he] seems to thrive in countries that have dodgy governments, that are reputed to be corrupt." This apt description would follow Friedland to the African continent. Woods also supported the claim that Friedland's business partners in his Burmese venture were none other than members of the SLORC itself.^® Toxic Bob's alleged dealings with the SLORC would make his later relationships with various juntas in Africa seem reprehensibly understandable. Friedland was also involved with the Suharto


regime and Indonesian mining endeavors. Indochina Goldfield's Internet web page reports "Indochina believes that the northeast Kalimantan [Borneo] property" demonstrates the presence of "associated gold mineralization" previously noted at the Busang deposit.49 Friedland said, "I would be astonished if there wasn't a significant deposit there."5° Indochina's and Friedland's claim that gold was present at Busang was surprising considering that BreX's chief geologist had supposedly committed harikari after he was accused of faking the discovery of gold at the site. Commenting on de Guzman's alleged fraud at Busang, Friedland opined that a gold salting fraud at Busang would be "an exquisitely difficult thing to achieve - an amazing accomplishment."5i However, after an investigation involving Canadian and Indonesian authorities, it was determined that de Guzman's samples were, in fact, foreign gold used to "salt" rock samples from the Busang mining site. The seamy nature of the mining business in Borneo is germane to the events that were transpiring halfway around the world in Africa. When the world began to believe that Bre-X had, in fact, discovered the "mother lode" in Borneo, big political players began to exert pressure on various corporate and government officials. In Jakarta, Barrick Gold, eager to wrest the Busang windfall for itself, brought out its corporate big guns - George Bush and Brian Mulroney. Both former leaders apparently brought pressure on the Indonesian government to dump Bre-X and sign on with Barrick. Bush and Mulroney got results. President Suharto's daughter, Dharma, and one of his sons, Tutut, began to peddle


Barrick's interests to the Indonesian political machine.s^ There was also talk of big payoffs to Indonesian Mines and Energy Minister I. B. Sudjana.53 In response to Barrick's move, Bre-X struck its own partnership with the New Orleans-based Freeport McMoRan, a mining conglomerate that was accused of enlisting the support of Indonesian military forces and foreign mercenaries in combating West Papuan separatists. In fact, Freeport and Rio Tinto obligingly built barracks for Indonesian military units to have them close by to defend West Papuan mines from the separatists.54 Bre-X also rounded up its own set of powerful Indonesian allies, including President Suharto's oldest son, Sigit, and one of Suharto's closest friends, the multimillionaire timber baron and Freeport partner Bob Hasan.^^ Freeport McMoRan particularly exemplified the exploitative nature of international gold seekers. The Free Papua Movement (OPM) was disturbing the company's environmentally-destructive operations in the western half of New Guinea which was controlled by Indonesia. Ever since 1977, Freeport's mining installations - sites that encroached on some of the most revered lands of the local Amunigme people - were jointly attacked by OPM and Amungme activists. The Indonesian armed forces, with the urging of Freeport, responded cruelly to these attacks. Indonesian air force planes bombed and strafed villages and killed thousands of innocent civilians. However, when the rebels retreated to their hidden jungle lairs, the Indonesian military was xmable to track them. As a result, the Indonesians engaged in random reprisals. Entire villages were attacked and suspected subversives


were summarily executed.s^ Interestingly, one of the members of Freeport McMorRan's board of directors is former U.S. Secretary of State Dr. Henry Kissinger. Friedland was also heavily involved in West Papua. Another of his many firms. First Dynasty, held 90 per cent of Setdco Mining Corporation, owned by Johannes Kotjo, one of Indonesia's most notorious mining magnates. First D5masty owned 81 per cent of West Papua's Montagu Minika site, said to be rich in gold and copper. The site adjoined a massive joint concession owned by Freeport McMoRan and Australia's RTZ. Not coincidentally. First D)masty's president, Marcus Randolph, once served as an executive of RTZ with Friedland's colleague Toll.58 Friedland also hoped to cash in on the dubious sweepstakes in Russia. His First D}masty Company was involved in a troubled gold mining project in Armenia.59 More importantly, Friedland was also involved in Russia's oil business. Black Sea Energy, Ltd., a Calgary-based company co-founded by Friedland, invested some $50 million in a joint venture with Russia's Tyumen Oil Company to exploit the Tura oilfield in the Xyumen Region of western Siberia. In early 1998, Russia sold 50 per cent of T)nimen Oil to a syndicate controlled by Moscow's Alfa Bank. Friedland's company wanted to renegotiate the joint venture deal with the syndicate but a dispute ensued. Black Sea took the issue before the Arbitration Court of Tyumen Region. This situation prompted Friedland to comment: "Stiffice it to say that it's not clear what it takes to buy a judge in remote areas of Siberia."^ When Russia's economy plummeted in 1998, Black Sea decided to look for other lucrative oil




prospects. Hiese included Peru's Amazon rain forest, where Black Sea teamed up with another Friedland company called Pangaea Energy International and California's San Joaquin Valley, where Black Sea teamed with Diatom Petroleum Inc. of Bakersfield. Friedland indicated Black Sea would change its name to reflect its widened international scope.® The human rights violations by the mining companies in Indonesia served as an ominous prelude to future events in central Africa. In addition, there is another important connection between events in Indonesia and Africa. The involvement of U.S. and British Special Forces with the Indonesian military would serve as a blueprint for their later activities in Africa. In January 1996, an OPM band led by Kelik (Kelly) Kwalik, took eleven hostages, including six Exxropeans.® Later, Indonesian commandos of the elite KOPASSUS, the feared "Red Berets" who were trained by U.S. Green Berets, were aided in the hostage-freeing operation by British Special Air Services (SAS) commandos.® Although the U.S. Congress cut off IMET assistance to Indonesia in 1992, the U.S. Army, Air Force, and Marines continued to provide such training under a larger program called the Joint Combined Exchange Training program (JCET). The ultimate targets for the training were the various guerrilla movements in Indonesia that were threatening foreign mineral and oil operations. These included the East Timorese, West Papuans, and an Islamic group in an area known as Acheh in northwestern Sumatra. Pentagon documents released in 1998 describe the t)rpe of training the U.S. was providing to Indonesia. It includes "Advanced Sniper Techniques," "Demolitions


and Air Operations/' PSYOPS (psychological operations) Training, and "Operations, Small Boat Operations, Raids."^^ In October 1997, twelve U.S. Special Forces troops participated with the KOPASSUS in urban assault training at a Jakarta housing project being built by the Lippo Group, the company closely identified with pumping campaign contributions to Clinton's 1996 presidential campaign.® The Special Forces training provided to Indonesia is frighteningly similar to what was given to Ugandan, Rwandan, and other forces in central Africa and it has had the same deadly results. The complex nature of business relationships and overlapping ownership witnessed in the gold rush for Borneo is also strikingly similar to the Byzantine relationships between private companies, mercenaries, and intelligence agencies vying for supremacy over Africa's natural resources. Like his partner Boulle, Friedland is also heavily involved in African mining operations. Diamond Works, another one of Friedland's companies, has extensive interests in both Angola and Sierra Leone. As with Boulle, Friedland discovered the financial benefits of the world of mercenaries. In 1996, Robert's brother, Eric, a graduate of the Colorado School of Mines, merged two Ivanhoe-owned companies, Carson Gold and an Isle of Man-based company called Branch Energy, into Diamond Works. The new company began to issue penny stocks, a sly Ponzi-like scheme designed to reward controllers of the stock at the expense of later public investors. This is done by issuing and purchasing very low cost stocks, then inflating the stock value in exchange for mineral


prospects, then selling more shares at a higher price to the inside investors. When the stock goes public, the shares are valued much higher than their real worth. Branch Energy, a company with diamond mining interests in Sierra Leone and oil interests in Angola, had some interesting principals. One was Michael Grunberg, who was the financial officer for the Bahamas-registered British mercenary firm. Sandline Internationa, Ltd. He became a director of Diamond Works. Joining Diamond Works as its southern Africa manager was Executive Outcomes' Simon Mann.®^ Other Branch Energy owners of Diamond Works shares included retired British Army Scots Guards Colonel and holder of the Order of the British Empire (OBE) Tim Spicer, the head of Sandline, and Executive Outcomes' Buckingham, who also headed Branch Energy.In addition to Sandline and Diamond Works, Buckingham had interests in Heritage Oil and Gas, a company registered in 1992 in die Bahamas. Heritage owns concessions on Angola's Atlantic coast fields in Soyo, at the mouth of the Congo River. Heritage was keen on exploring for oil around Uganda's Lake Albert. Heritage also has interests in Malawi, Congo (Kinshasa), Kenya, Namibia, Oman, and Russia. The firm could also boast of having former British Liberal party leader David Steel (now Lord Steel) on its board of directors tmtil he resigned in late 1996 after he was informed about the firm's relationship with Executive Outcomes.^^ Andrew Gifford, Steel's former personal assistant, also served on Heritage's board and is reportedly a close friend of Buckingham. It was Gifford who introduced Steel to Buckingham.70 In addition. Heritage has links to Ranger Oil, a Canadian-registered firm with interests in




Africa.^ In fact, Buckingham and Ranger's owner. Jack Pierce, have been engaged in NortiK Sea oil joint business deals since 1990.72 Oil certainly brought Gifford to Libya in 1996 to conclude a deal with Colonel Qaddafi. Gifford's consulting firm GJW had been contracted by the BritishLibyan Business Group to patch up relations with Qaddafi's government. All this, at a time when Britain was demanding that two Libyan intelligence agents, believed to be responsible for the bombing of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland in 1988, be handed over by Qaddafi to British authorities. GJW was a lobbying company set up by Gifford (the "G'); Jenney Jeger, a former Number 10 Downing Street aid to Labor Prime Minister James Callaghan (the "J'), and Wilf Weeks, the former private secretary of Tory Prime Minister Edward Heath (the "W"). Other GJW consultants included Tony Hutt, formerly with the Conservative Party's Central Office and, most interestingly Karl Milner, an adviser to Labor Chancellor of the Exchequer Gordon Brown and an adviser to Hillary Clinton in the 1996 U.S. presidential campaign. GJW clients have included Goldman Sachs (the company formerly headed by U.S. Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin), British Telecom, and Vodaphone.73 Buckingham's Branch Energy also has interests in Uganda. Kampala Branch Energy, which owns Branch Mining (a company in which Executive Outcomes owned 40 per cent), was involved in a joint venture with Uganda's government to mine gold at Kidepo National Park. Major General Caleb Akandwanaho, alias "Salim Saleh," a half brother of

Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni and one of his closest defense advisers, reportedly owned 25 per cent of the shares in the joint venture, as well as stock in an Executive Outcomes spin-off security firm called Saracen Uganda. It was thought that Saleh was involved with running arms to Rwandan and Burundian Tutsi forces.74 Saleh also owns a combination arms dealing and mining company called Caleb International that apparently handled arms transfers from Russia and South Africa. Caleb International also obtained mining concessions in Congo after the fall of Mobutu.75 One deal with South Africa's Denel arms firm involved the delivery of South African armored personnel carriers to the Ugandan People's Defense Forces and the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) of Colonel Garang.^e Reportedly, many deals involving the supply of weapons via Uganda to rebels in Rwanda, Sudan, and eastern Zaire were coordinated between Saleh, the Ugandan Defense Ministry, and Buckingham's operations in the cotmtry.^ In addition. Executive Outcomes furnished material and "specialists."78 Kampala Branch Energy was also accused of smuggling gold out of Uganda.^ Buckingham had made a considerable fortune in his post-military ventures. With a spacious apartment in London and a large estate on Guernsey, he is more at home racing his Isle of Wight-based yacht Easy Oars in England's prestigious international Admiral's Cup regatta than in fighting guerrillas in distant African jungles. Buckingham's interest in boats had some relationship with his previous military service: he is a former Special Boat Squadron officer. Buckingham's post-military business was well-known to his fellow



yachtsmen. When asked by a reporter about Buckingham, one of them replied; "Tony Buckingham? He has the biggest private army in the world."so In addition to being a gold prospector, Buckingham was an experienced oil explorer. In a sweetheart deal, the Angolan government arranged for South Africa's Executive Outcomes to provide protection for its oil interests.^! Funded with $30 million from Ranger Oil, an armed force of fifty Executive Outcomes mercenaries liberated Soyo from UNITA occupation in March 1993.82 The installation was later re-captured by UNITA.83 UNTTA's moves on the battlefield were increasingly becoming a bothersome thorn in the side of South Africa and the United States. Executive Outcomes, Branch Energy, Heritage, and Sandline were all, at one time, imder the direction of Strategic Resources Corporation.Jeffrey Moag of the U.S. National Security News Service commented on the incestuous relationsliip between Executive Outcomes and Branch Energy: "Everywhere EO goes. Branch Energy is picking up a diamond concession." Sandline's Spicer, nicknamed "Tumbledown Tim" by his colleagues, was a "perfect" British officer and veteran of the Falklands (the source of his nickname: the islands' Mount Tumbledown), Desert Storm (where he was an aide to General Sir Peter de la Billiere), Northern Ireland (where he earned the OBE knighthood), Bosnia (where he was U.N. General Michael Rose's aide), and the 11* Armoured Brigade in Germany (where he was in charge of intelligence).®^ However, Spicer denied that his firm was merely a European front operation for Executive Outcomes.86 He declared: "We are completely separate organizations


who operate our own business. We have introduced EO to some places and sub-contracted work out to them. We don't have a corporate relationship, but a working one."87

One source close to the mercenary industry scoffed at Spicer's contention: "Sandline is just an offshoot of EO. If those two companies got any closer the)^d be arrested for public indecency."®® Buckingham was similarly coy about his relationship with Executive Outcomes. He admitted: "It is a fact that I did introduce Executive Outcomes into African coxmtries that needed help . . . These were elected governments, they've always been invited in by them, and they've never acted against HMG's (Her Majesty's Government's) interests." He added: "The/ve always acted as a stabilizing force."®^ While Buckingham insisted that Executive Outcomes never acted against Britain, it can be presumed that the firm always acted in support of British interests with London's encouragement and tacit support. If it seems that the relationships between the mercenary firms and between them and resource-based companies are complicated, this mty be more by design than by accident. Many of Buckingham's activities were headquartered at a company called Plaza 107, located at 535 King's Road, Suite 107, Chelsea, west London. Within the second floor offices of the modem office building, one lone receptionist handled telephone queries for more than eighteen different companies. From behind the receptionist area, Buckingham and his colleagues ran their worldwide business empire that includes Executive Outcomes Limited, Ibis Air International, Heritage Oil & Gas, Branch International


Ltd., Branch Mining Ltd., and Capricorn Systems Ltd. The latter company was said to be a follow-on to the Capricorn Africa Society, founded by Sir David Stirling, who launched the SAS in 1940 with the blessing of Winston Churchill. Stirling was involved for many years in mercenary activities, most notably in providing protective services for Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan ^ Nahayan of Abu Dhabi and in helping the Sultan of Muscat and Oman battle leftist guerrillas in the province of Dhofar in 1968.90 His activities had the full blessing and support of Britain's MI-6. Stirling died in 1990 at the age of seventy-four.oi Executive Outcomes business tentacles seemed to stretch forever. The company had a 40 per cent stake in Angola's Afro Mineiro, an Angolan diamond mining company; a joint operation with a South African concern called Wrangal Medical, a company that provided mobile field hospitals; an association with Stuart Mills, a mine removal company; a partnership with Mechchem, the Denel mine removal subsidiary; and Shibata, a joint security services firm linked to Portuguese investors.92 Perhaps most surprising were Buckingham's media interests. In 1994, Buckingham, through another one of his firms. Quest Developments of the Bahamas, invested in the leftist publisher Fourth Estate. Thereafter, he and his former parliamentaiy assistant Gifford, became directors of Fourth Estate whose half owner was Guardian Newspapers, the publisher of Britain's influential Guardian and Observer.^ Such a relationship could benefit, through perception management campaigns, the PSYOPS element of numerous mercenary ventures around the world.


The coterie of companies at Plaza 107 was mirrored in Pretoria at Buckingham's South African sister operation. Strategic Resources Corporation. The Pretoria-based corporation was a holding company for another network of firms that included Saracen, a security company specializing in "VIP protection, strategic point protection and business security protection;" Falconer Systems, a front operation for Executive Outcomes support services for "United Nations - related organizations," Bridge International, a construction and civil engineering outfit; and Saracen Uganda.^4 Another company with significant Executive Outcomes/Strategic Resomce investments is Teleservices of Angola, a Luanda-based joint venture that provided security services to Diamond Works mining sites in the country. Among the members of Telservices board of directors were General Antonio dos Santos Franca "Nda," a former chief of staff and later Angolan ambassador in Washington, and Joao Baptista de Matos, the Angolan chief of staff. According to Elizabeth Rubin, an expert on mercenary activities in Africa: "The directors of the Heritage-Branch group and E.O. [Executive Outcomes] have managed to cloud the exact nature of their relationship behind a web of interlocking companies whose ownership is difficult to trace. Even Heritage-Branch officials have a hard time keeping the story straight: they claim that there's no corporate link but constantly refer to E.O. in conversations as 'we.'"^® Rubin's description of the convoluted links of Executive



Outcomes could easily apply to the mining consortia of Boulle and Friedland, which, in their own right, used murky networks of mercenaries to protect their mining sites and other interests around the world. The link between the mercenary firms and industrial exploiters is highlighted in a U.N. report on mercenaries written by Special Rapporteur Enrique Bemales Ballesteros. Describing the typical mercenary company, Ballesteros wrote, "the firm apparently begins to exploit the concessions it has received by setting up a number of associates and affiliates ... thereby acquiring a significant, if not hegemonic, presence in the economic life of the country in which it is operating."97 When the United States decided to leverage its economic interests in Angola through the use of mercenaries, the Clinton administration forced the Luanda government to cancel its contracts with Executive Outcomes and hire a U.S.- based mercenary firm. Boulle, considered an adversary of his old South African friends, obviously did not want South Africans protecting what he felt was his - the diamond fields to be vacated by UNITA. For the Clinton administration, such a strategy would also benefit a company conveniently headquartered in Hope, Arkansas. Incredibly, the Clinton administration's support for the African ventures of its mining friends marafested itself into military assistance for the Marxist government of Angola, at the expense of America's old Jonas Savimbi. This dramatic foreign policy shift certainly expedited AMF's plans for northeastern Angola. However, AMF was not the only beneficiary of the sudden alteration in America's policy. A wealthy Belgian Jewish immigrant to America named Maurice


Tempelsman, who, after following his father Leon into the diamond business, became a significant donor to Democratic causes and was the last romantically-linked friend of Jacqueline Kennedy Onassis. Tempelsman also had vested interests in Angola.^® Throughout his life, Tempelsman maintained close ties with Democratic Party big shots. During the hiatus between his 1950s presidential bids, Adlai Stevenson served as Tempelsman's attorney. Stevenson was an ardent supporter of African independence movements. Through Stevenson's connections with nationalist movements in Congo and elsewhere, Tempelsman developed close connections with post-colonial Africa's future leaders in a manner not unlike that of Foccart.^® Tempelsman's two companies, Lazare Kaplan, Inc., which supplied diamonds to Tiffany and Cartier, and Leon Tempelsman & Son, wanted an end to the Angolan civil war in order to gain unfettered access to the diamonds in the UNITA-controlled northeast of the coxmtry. Of course, Tempelsman would emerge as the main broker between Angola and the Tiffanys and Cartiers of the world. Fortunately for Tempelsman, he had three lines of access to President Clinton. One was a social link. Tempelsman and Mrs. Onassis had entertained Bill and Hillary Clinton on board Tempelsman's giant yacht, the Relemar, in Martha's Vineyard in 1993. Ironically, it was during that visit that Qinton decided to mount the secret operation to kidnap Mohammed Farah Aideed in Somalia. But the old diamond baron had two other, more effective, entrees into the White House. He had a close relationship with National Security Adviser Anthony Lake. Lake agreed that Tempelsman's argument for a quick end to the


UNTTA rebellion was merited. Lake even instructed a senior member of the National Security Council staff to phone the U.S. Export-Import Bank to help Tempelsman get financial backing for an embryonic Angola diamond brokerage business. Tempelsman also developed a reported romantic relationship with Secretary of State Albright in mid 1998.1°° In particular. Lake was no stranger to African national security matters. Lake, a former Peace Corps voltmteer in Ethiopia, once served on the national security staff of Henry Kissinger during the Nixon administration. However, he resigned to protest the 1970 invasion of Cambodia. Lake wrote his PhD dissertation at Princeton on the Nixon administration's Africa policy. He titled his dissertation The Tar-Baby Option. Lake returned to the government in the Carter administration, where he helped shape U.S. Africa policy.i°i Lake imdoubtedly had Clinton's ear on Africa policy. It was a special relationship that earned him a derisive title from some of Clinton's senior staffers, "national-security adviser for Africa." Lake also heaped praise on America's new military-tumed-civilian African leaders; "There is a neVv geopolitics of Africa, or a significant belt of Africa running from northeast to southwest... A new generation of leaders took power and began to work together. They have transformed much of the continent. They are the best example of Africans taking responsibility for African affairs since the first wave of independence in the early 1960s."i°2 As National Security adviser to Clinton, Lake had a strong degree of authority over the activities of the NSA. The secretive intelligence agency began to shift its primary focus to gathering economic


intelligence after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union. According to Dan Morrison, a former data* processor for the Communications Security Establishment (CSE), an agency considered by a former director of NSA to be "just another branch of NSA," the American SIGINT agency has a keen interest in the internal communications of mining companies, particularly those in Canada.^*® Morrison, who was once based at CSE headquarters and a CSE "outstation" at Masset on British Columbia's Queen Charlotte Island^o^^ claims the CSE (and ultimately, the NSA) monitored the internal communications of selected Canadian resourcebased companies. Morrison said he was not sure what his superiors wanted with the information. However, given the interest of Lake and the National Security Council (NSC) in Tempelsman's diamond business, it can be argued that the Vancouver-based operations of Friedland and Boulle are high on the CSE and NSA "watch lists" for key words of interest. In addition to minerals, the White House had other interests in Africa. At the same time the CIA announced that it was closing down fifteen stations in sub-Saharan Africa, the administration announced that it was convening the first ever "Conference on Africa" on Jtme 27,1994, a few months after genocide engulfed Rwanda. The conference was to cover development, conflict resolution, democratization, and trade and investment. Strangely, the forty-member Congressional Black Caucus was not consulted before the conference's annoimcement, leaving many to wonder about the true nahire of the meeting. In protest, the caucus considered a boycott of the conference, while Randall Robinson, the



director of TransAfrica, withdrew from participation to protest Clinton's "insincerity of spirit" in his policies toward both Africa and Haitido^ Professor George Ayittey, a noted Africa expert, said the following about the V\^te House conclave, "It turned out to be a public relations fluff with little substance. In attendance was a preponderance of apologists and representatives of failed African governments. Ten years earlier, a White House conference on the Soviet Union would have drawn its speakers and guests from the exiled Russian dissident community. There were no exiled African dissidents at [the] 27 Jime 1994 White House Conference on Africa."io7

With the full backing of the Clinton administration and seeing full access to Angola's diamonds as just a matter of time, AMP and its partners stood ready to expand their plans. Also, diamond exploration teams had discovered significant deposits on the Zaire side of the Angolan border. But something would first have to done with Zaire's pro-French leader. Marshal Mobutu Sese Seko. Mobutu continued to favor French, Belgian, and South African companies over those from the United States and Canada. A safe platform was needed from which an attack could be launched on Mobutu and his French and Belgian mining benefactors. That platform would be one of the poorest and most densely-populated ethnic tinderboxes in Africa - Rwanda.

Notes 1. James Ring Adams, "Citizen Kennedy's Energy," The



American Spectator, December 1997,45. "Zairian rebels sign mining deals," Metals Week, 68: 16, 21

April 1997,11. Richard Morais, "Friends in high places," Forbes, 10 August 1998,50. 4. Wells, op. cit. 44. 5. Interview with Doug Thompson. 6. Wells, op. cit., 44-45. 7. Ibid., 39. 8. Morais, op. cit. 9. Dan Noyes, "Babbitt's Diamond Bit," The Nation, 23 February 1998,4. 10. Morais, op. cit. 11. Ibid. 12. Noyes, op. cit., 5. 13. Ibid. 14. Ibid. 15. Ibid., 5-6. 16. Diana B. Henriques, "Questions of Conflict Sting Mutual Funds," Nezu York Times, 7 August 1994,1. 17. Morais, op. cit. 18. "With friends like these," Canadian Business, Jime 1997,110. 19. "La Source Quits Sabodala," Africa Energy & Mining, 16 July 1997. 20. "Bush to head Barrick special panel," United Press International, 3 May 1995. 21. Doug Smith, "Bre-X: the saga continues: fool's gold," Canadian Dimension, 19 September 1997,35. 22. Wells, op. cit., 38. 23. Paul Farrelly and John Aglionby, "An El Dorado made of fool's gold," The Observer, 11 May 1997,7. 24. Mark Heinel, "Bre-X Hid Roc Sampling Ways, Touted Nonexistent Gold, Probe Report Finds," Wall Street Journal, 19 February 1998, A8.. 25. Farrelly and Aglionby, op. cit., 7. 26. Sandra Rubin, "Busang has gold," The Financial Post, 17 April 1997.



27. William Green, "Mining the suckers," Forbes 1997 World's Richest People,

28. The actual process involves crushing the ore containing the gold. The crushed ore is piled on to plastic sheets and sprayed with a diluted compound of sodium cyanide. The cyanide eats away at the ore, ultimately dissolving the gold. The gold is then extracted by precipitating it from the remaining solution. 29. Green, op. cit. 30. Chris Kraul, "Yuba Investor Considers Suit Over Failure To Shift Assets," Los Angeles Times, Part 4,1,20 April 1989,1. 31. Ann Perry, "Yuba has talks to renegotiate $6 million loan," San Diego Union-Tribune, 20 April 1989, AA-1. 32. Donald C. Bauder, "Silberman salary was $150,000; Financier paid despite losses at Yuba Natural: The Richard Silberman Case," San Diego Union-Tribune, 14 April 1989, A-6. 33. Edward F. Cone, "Lodes of trouble," Forbes, 29 May 1989,10; Richard Behar, "Fear and loding on the Yuba River," Forbes, 7 October 1985,48. 34. William Green, op. cit. 35. Pratap Chatterjee, "Environment: Search for Gold Takes "Toxic Bob" Around the World," Inter Press Service, 5 December 1996. 36. "Brennpunkt," Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation broadcast, 6 January 1998. 37. Moody, op. cit,; Stephen H. Daniels, "Summitville Site Is Cleaner, But Court Fight Continues," Engineering Nexus Record, 240:15,13 April 1998,21. 38. Mike McPhee and Mark Eddy, "Ex-mine managers sentenced; Pair given 5 years probation, fines," Denver Post, 19 December 1998, B-04. 39. Karen Abbott, "2 Summitville Gold Mine Officials Sentenced," Rocky Mountain Nexus (Denver), 19 December 1998,7A. 40. This and other tales about the enigmatic Robert Friedland are found on the web page of veteran Canadian financial fraud investigator Adrian du Plessis. See:

41. David Baines, "Your risk, his reward," Canadian Business, Jime


1997,108. 42. Adrian du Plessis, "Carson Gold - Diamond Works PR mines diamonds out of a lump of

43. Ibid. 44. Fred Pearce, "Caught in the gold rush," New Scientist, 11 May 1996,14. 45. "Brennpunkt," op. cit. 46. Moody, op. cit. 47. Ibid. 48. Ibid.; Pratap Chatterjee, "Mercenary Armies & Mineral Wealth," Covert Action Quarterly, Fall 1997,30. 49. Paul Watson, "How Burma's junta defies world; Ruthless regime wins quiet war for foreigners" hearts," The Toronto Star, 16 March 1997, A12. 50. Moody, op. cit. 51. 52. Ibid. 53. Ibid. 54. Doug Smith, op. cit. 55. Maggie Ford, "Shaking the family tree," Asian Business, February 1997, 28-32. 56. Roger Moody, "Diamond dogs of war," Neiu Internationalist, March 1998,

57. Farrelly and Aglioby, op. cit. 58. Human Rights and the Resistance Movement, West Papua Information Kit. Available at:

59. Freeport McMoRan Annual Report for 1997. Freeport McMoRan was bought in 1997 by IMC Global Inc. of Northbrook, Illinois. Other high-power Freeport associates include former Louisiana Senator J. Bennett Johnston, former House Speakerdesignate Robert Livingston, and former CIA director James Woolsey. See: Andrew Hsiao and Jason Vest, "Press Clips, The Village Voice, 1 December 1998,24. 60. Moody, op. cit. 61. John Schreiner, "East Indian tycoon comes to aid of Robert Friedland: $15M investment," National Post, 24 November


1998, C04. 62. Caudia Cattaneo, "Friedland's Siberian Adventure: Russia was so full of promise and petroleum. Black Sea Energy expected to end up in the money - not the courts," The Financial Post, 5 September 1998,6. 63. Ibid. 64. "Irian leaders in Indonesia asked to keep the peace," Reuters, 21 March 1996. 65. Yves Goulet, "Executive Outcomes: Mixing Business with Bullets," Jane's Intelligence Review, 9: 9,1 September 1997, 426. 66. Department of Defense documents released February 12,1998 by Deputy Secretary of Defense John J. Hamre, "Listing of training and exchanges through the Joint Combined Exchange Training gCET) Program 1992-1997" and "Listing of training of Indonesian military personnel by the United States Marine Corps 1993-1997." 67. Dana Priest, "Free of Oversight, U.S. Military Trains Foreign Troops," Washington Post, 12 July 1998, A22. 68. Baines, op. cit. 69. Abrams and Lashmar, op. cit. 70. Tony Wright, "Man with the Mida^ touch linked to mercenary bosses," Sydney Morning Herald, 7 April 1997. 71. Alex Renton, "T am not a mercenary. People love a fantasy'," The Evening Standard (London), 8 August 1997, 21; "Executive Outcomes Profiled," Periscope Daily Defense Neivs Capsules, 20 January 1997. 72. Phillip Van Niekerk and Michael Gillard, "Steel Associate's Mercenary Links," The Observer (London), 10 September 1995, 5; Paul Lashmar, "Urbane operator at head of controversial deals," The Independent, 7 July 1998,6. 73. Pech and Beresford, op. cit. 74. Pascal Catuogno, "Le Businessman et les 'chiens de guerre'" ("The businessman and the 'dogs of war'"), Jeune Afrique, 1-7 December 1998,44. 75. Lashmar, op. cit. 76. "Executive Outcomes Profiled," Periscope Daily Defense Neivs Capsules, 20 January 1997. 77. Jean Claude Willame, "La 'Nouvelle' politique americaine en Afrique centrale" ("The new American policy in central




79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87.


Africa"), Marc Schmitz and Sophie Nolet, editors, Kabila prend le pouvoir ("Kabila Takes Power) (Paris: Editions GRIP, 1998), 143. The huge Denel business empire included numerous subsidiaries, including cargo transportation (TFM), road and bridge construction (OMC Engineering), commtmications (Grind), land mine removal (Mechchem Consultants), land mine manufacturing (Naschem), Kentron (electronics), Lyttleton Ingenieurwerke (artillery), Asmera (cluster bombs), Auitronic (cluster bombs), Routech (radar), Grinaker Avitronics (retro-fitting attack (helicopters), Aerotek (avionics), and Airconcor (avionics). Source: William Reno, "African weak states and commercial alliances," African Affairs, 96: 383,1 April 1997. "Private arms trade," The Indian Ocean Neivsletter, op. cit. Catuogno, op. cit., 45. "Mining Company Under Gold Smuggling Probe," The Statesman (Freetown), 12 December 1996. Renton, op. cit.-, Fran Abrams and Paul Lashmar, "MI6 'backed Africa coup,'" The Independent, 5 October 1998, 2; Catuogno, op. cit, 44. Elizabeth Rubin, "An Army of One's Own," Harper's Magazine, February 1997,46. Pech and Beresford, op. cit Goulet, "Executive Outcomes: Mixing Business with Bullets," op. cit. E. Rubin, op. cit., 46. Michael Ashworth, "The King's Road irregulars versus the jxmgle rebels; 'Security firm' hired to end guerrilla war," The Independent (London), 25 February 1997, 1; Sellars, op. cit.; Abrams and Lashmar, op. cit A common thread that runs through the mercenary firms and their mining colleagues is that they abhor rmdue press attention. Robert Friedland has frequently sued or threatened to sue media organizations like the Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation for reporting on his companies' activities. Likewise, Michael Grimberg, wearing the hat of a Diamond Works Director, pressured the internationally-respected Jane’s Intelligence Reviexv to print what amoimted to a clarification/retraction of an article in its September 1997


89. 90.

issue titled "Executive Outcomes" mixing business with bullets." What is surprising about the Jane's retraction is that it is not often that its publications get stories wrong. The Sandline clarification states: "1) No company or person at Plaza 107's offices in London had anything to do with the registration of Executive Outcomes in the UK; 2) Sandline is not a subsidiary of Heritage Oil and Gas and has no business relationship with this company. Further, Heritage Oil and Gas has never had either a contractual or other formof business relationship with Executive Outcomes; 3) Branch International, Heritage Oil and Gas, Plaza 107, and Sandline International are not associated companies of Executive Outcomes or any of its related entities. Neither is there a financial operational/business link as was suggested in the article; 4) At no time has Branch Energy Ltd. Bought, or otherwise obtained, mining concessions in Sierra Leone or elsewhere from Executive Outcomes or any of its related companies; 5) Neither Executive Outcomes, nor any of its related companies, is a shareholder of Diamond Works, or of its 100% owned subsidiary. Branch Energy Ltd.; 6) Diamond Works and Branch Energy Ltd. Are not "associated comparaes" of Executive Outcomes and there are no direct "operational/business, financial, or administrative" links between Diamond Works and Executive Outcomes; 7) There are no such corporate entities as Branch Energy Sierra Leone or Branch Energy Angola; 8) Shares in Diamond Works Ltd. Trade publicly on the Toronto and Vancouver stock exchanges and the company's shareholders include prominent institutional investors. Former principals of Branch Energy Ltd. Do not control the business affairs of Diamond Works; 9) The Government of Sierra Leone holds a 30% interest in the Koidu mining lease and not in all Branch Energy's mineral concessions in Sierra Leone; 10) Branch Energy is not searching for oil in Uganda. However, a separate, unrelated company. Branch Energy (Uganda) Ltd., is prospecting for gold in that coimtry; 11) Teleservices, of Angola, is not a subsidiary of Executive Outcomes." Darius Bazargan, "High-Risk Business," The Guardian (London), 8 September 1997, T2. Ibid.


91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97.

98. 99. 100. 101. 102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108. 109.

Renton, op. cit. Chapleau and Misser, op. cit., 35,44. Pech and Beresford, op. cit. Reno, "African weak states and commercial alliances," op. cit. Ibid. Ibid. Inigo Gilmore and Chris Dignan, "Diamond fever. British victims of Africa's billion-dollar war," Sunday Times (London), 15 November 1998. E. Rubin, op. cit., 55. Sellars, op. cit. James Ring Adams, op. cit. J. Jennings Moss; et. AL, "The Mother Jones 400; top 1996 campaign donors," Mother Jones, 22:3, May 1997,40. James Ring Adams, op. cit., 45; Nigel Dempster, "Maurice unearths his own flinty gem," Daily Mail (London), 30 July 1998,37. "Washington's Africa Policy: Who's Making It?" Africa Neius, 8 February 1993. Tom Masland, Gregory L. Vistica, Karen Breslau, Christopher Dickey, and Marcus Mabry, op. cit. Mike Frost and Michel Gratton, Spyworld: Inside the Canadian and American Intelligence Establishments (Toronto: Doubleday Canada, Ltd., 1994), 36. Frost is a former official of the CSE. Since 1 April 1997, the Masset station has been remote-linked to the Canadian Forces Station at Leitrim, south of Ottawa. Bruce Livesey, "Trolling for Secrets: Economic espionage is the new niche for government spies," The Financial Post (Toronto), 28 February 1998, Rl. "U.S.-Africa: CIA Ready to Close 15 Stations," Inter Press Service, op. cit. Prepared Statement of George B.N. Ayittey Ph.D. before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee African Affairs Subcommittee, "The New Generation of African Leaders and Prospects for Democracy in Africa," Federal News Service, 12 March 1998.


~ 132 ~

6 Destabilizing Rwanda I don't believe there was any racial element in our slow response ... Keep in mind, I don't think anybody on the outside was prepared for somewhere between 800,000 and one million people to die in 90 days. President Bill Clinton, March 27,1998 The Clinton administration's destabilization of central Africa and, in particular, Rwanda, began in earnest in 1994. Rwanda's pro-French Hutu-dominated government was a troublesome obstacle to Washington's plans. However, American intelligence involvement in Rwanda's internal squabbles pre-dated the Clinton administration — the actual meddling began during the tenure of George Bush. Rwanda and neighboring Burtmdi are home to three ethnic groups. Ironically, the original inhabitants are also the smallest in number and size. These are the forest-dwelling Twa people (also known as "pygmies" but this term is now recognized as a deprecatory). Aroimd 1000 AD, the Bantu Hutus migrated to the lush, green, and mountainous lands of Rwanda and Burundi. They were agrarian hunter-gatherers. The women mainly gathered yams, coconuts, and bananas. The men continuously hunted because they did not yet understand animal domestication or transportation techniques. Because they lived on the equator, the



Hutus developed no calendars or numbering systems. As the migrating Bantu tribes fanned out into Congo, they organized themselves into clans that eventu^y merged into forest kingdoms. The two most important kingdoms were Kongo, located around the mouth of the River Congo and Luba, in southern Congo, in what is now Katanga.1 In 1483, the first Portuguese explorers set foot at the mouth of the Congo. The Kongo King was delighted to meet these new arrivals. Shortly thereafter, the Portuguese established a trading post. The King, anxious to please his new-fotmd trading partners, raided nearby tribes and supplied the Portuguese with human commodities - slaves. He also provided the Europeans with ivory and ornaments that contained a metal that would contribute to the misery faced by the region to this day - gold. The Portuguese, in turn, provided Kongo with textiles, glass goods, knives, tools, and a faith. In the early 1500s, the King of Kongo declared Roman Catholicism his realm's state religion.^ At the same time the Portuguese established contact with the Bantus of the Congo, the Hutus of Rwanda and Btirundi faced a different colonizer. Tutsis, a tall and lighter-skinned Nilotic people from the north, arrived in the Great Lakes region of central Africa. Quickly establishing domination over the agrarian Hutus, the Tutsis established a feudal society. The more numerous Hutus became peasants, while the minority Tutsis established warrior kingdoms in Rwanda and Burundi headed by mwamis (kings). Rwanda's more recent ethnic problems are rooted in the German and Belgian colonial administration of the coimtry. Germany ruled Rwanda,


as well as neighboring Burundi and Tangan)dka, as German East Africa from 1889 to 1916. The Germans liked dealing with the Tutsis. Both reveled in notions of racial superiority. The Germans actually attempted to explain away the negro origins of the Tutsis. Early twentieth-cenhiry German racial theorists were determined to prove that the Tutsis and the related Masai of Kenya were a "primordial red race" that had "an absolutely distinct origin from the negroes." The German racial ideologists considered the Bantu Hutus and all negroes as "belonging to an absolutely inferior order." Some German, French, and Belgian theoreticians even contended that the noble-looking Tutsis had originated in places as diverse as the Garden of Eden, the lost continent of Atlantis, and TibetP In fact, the Tutsis had most likely migrated from an area in southern Ethiopia, now dominated by the Oromo, a people to whom they are related. German)Ks support for the Tutsi mwamis re enforced their royal positions in both Rwanda and Burundi. Belgium gained control of the territories after German)r's surrender in World War I. Brussels governed Rwanda and Burundi as the combined territory of Ruanda-Urundi tmder a League of Nations mandate. The Belgians continued to deal with the Rwandan mwamis with one notable exception. In 1931, they forced Mwami Yuhi V from the throne. A bisexual and non-Christian, he had made the mistake of fighting against the Belgians with the German army in the First World War. He was replaced by Mwami Mutara III, a strong Catholic, who, like General Francisco Franco of Spain, consecrated his coxmtry to Christ the King in 1946.4 In 1939, in a bizarre twist of history, Neville


Chamberlain almost offered up the Belgian Congo (and quite possibly the lost German territory of RuandaUrundi, as well) to Adolf Hitler at the Munich "peace" conference in order to whet the appetite of German colonial re-expansion. Chamberlain never discussed this option with Belgium, the colonial master, but he also never made the offer. Instead, the British Prime Minister put the more coveted Czechoslovakia on the auction block.5 In the late 1930s, many of the Belgian Walloon (French-speaking) Catholic clerics in Rwanda who had supported the Tutsi aristocracy, began to be replaced by Flemish priests. The Flemish Catholics, who were from middle and lower class families in Flanders, more closely identified with the downtrodden Hutus. The Catholic Church in Rwanda soon began providing support to lay Catholic Hutu nationalists like Gregoire Kayibanda, a Hutu school teacher-tumed-joumalist. The Hutu cause was also taken up by a liberal Tutsi chief named Prosper Bwanakweri. In response to his troublesome utterings, Mwami Mutara convinced the Belgians to banish the wayward Tutsi chief to a remote part of Rwanda. However, the Hutus began to make their voices increasingly heard. Some went so far as to suggest to the Catholic hierarchy that Belgium ban the Kalinga, the honored royal Tutsi drum. The Hutus were upset about the drum because it was adorned with the testicles of Hutu princes killed in past battles with the Tutsis.6 In the face of rising Hutu nationalism and, as neighboring African cotmtries began to shed their colonial ties to Europe, the Tutsi oligarchy began to get nervous. In 1957, Kapbanda formed Rwanda's first



political party, the Hutu Social Movement (Mouvement Social Muhutu). It advocated equal treatment for the long-suppressed Hutu people. Belgium began to talk about independence, and much to the chagrin of the Mwami, the Hutus were to be part of that political process. In response, the Tutsis formed their own political party, the royalist and anti-Belgian Rwandan National Union (Union Nationale Rwandaise [UNAR]). Royalist UNAR politicians, fearful that Belgium would grant independence to a Hutu-dominated government, ironically began accepting financial assistance and diplomatic backing from Communist countries like the Soviet Union and China.^ In 1959, Kayibanda consolidated Hutu political forces tmder the Rwandan Democratic Movement/Party of the Movement of Hutu Emancipation (MDR-PARMEHUTU). By this time, the Rwandan tinder box was extremely fire-prone. In November 1959, the first major tribal warfare broke out between supporters of UNAR and PARMEHUTU. Some three hundred people died in the violence, which became known as the "Muyaga" Massacres. The Belgians wanted to cut and run from what they knew would develop into an even more explosive situation. Copying their practice in Congo, they prepared for quick elections and a rash hand over of power to an independent government. Commxmal elections were held in the summer of 1960 and PARMEHUTU and allied Hutu parties swept the seats. However, the Tutsi's non-aligned and Communist allies on the U.N. Trusteeship Council, to which Belgium had to answer, squawked about the election results. Their allies, the Tutsi UNAR party, won the fewest seats, yet, they and



Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold favored handing over power to a Rwandan government dominated by the anti-Belgian and anti-Western Tutsi party.s Hammarskjold's anti-Belgian stance would not be forgotten and would ultimately lead to his own demise. The Belgians and Kayibanda's PARMEHUTU would have nothing to do with the U.N.'s interference. On January 28, 1961, Belgium's representative. Colonel Guy Logiest, and elected mayors and legislative councilors, largely made up of PARMEHUTU members, declared the "sovereign democratic Republic of Rwanda." In a single stroke of the pen, the Tutsi monarch. King Kigeli V (who had succeeded his older brother Mutara upon his death in 1959), was deposed. The Tutsi monarchy, which had ruled over the hapless Hutus for hundreds of years, was gone. Kayibanda became president of the new republic. Fearing the actions of a retaliatory Hutu government, the first wave of Tutsi refugees began to trickle over the border into Uganda where they received the personal support of the King of Buganda, Mutesa II (the rival of then-Prime Minister Obote). Some of the Tutsis quickly formed guerrilla groups, pejoratively called Inyenzi (cockroaches) by the Hutus.^ President Kayibanda soon began ruling Rwanda as a benevolent dictator who took orders from Brussels, Paris, and Washington. A staunch anti-communist, he also received support from the Christian Democratic parties of Belgium and Germany. Kayibanda relied on his friend in the Congo, President Mobutu, to stamp out Tutsi rebel camps established in eastern Congo. Kayibanda soon became a reclusive leader who was fearful of the numerous Tutsi exiles and provocateurs


who woxild have loved to assassinate him. The Hutu army generals became so apprehensive about Kayibanda's political lethargy they deposed him in a bloodless palace coup on July 5,1973. The army chief of staff. Major General Juvenal Habyarimana became President, and like his predecessor, he became a de facto Mwami of the Hutus. Habyarimana garnered the support of the more militant anti-Tutsi Hutu elements in Rwanda. In addition, he, like his predecessor, maintained the Hutu status quo - a strong Hutu government with minimal Tutsi Habyarimana established close ties with Foccart in Paris - a valuable insurance policy for any francophone leader in Africa. Foccart's support was partly instrumental in President Mitterand's continuation of aid to Rwanda after he replaced the conservatives. But this assistance had strings attached. As a result of the 1988 worldwide collapse of coffee prices - which dealt a sharp blow to Rwanda's economy - the country was even more dependent on French assistance. While attending a 1990 Franco-African summit in France, Mitterand quietly leaned on Habyarimana to pave the way for multi-party elections. Habyarimana quickly agreed but his actions were slower than his words. Sensing weakness, Tutsi exiles across the border in Uganda prepared for action. In the early 1980s, when Ugandan guerrilla leader Museveni began challenging the post-Idi Amin government of Obote, two leftist Rwandan exiles became active in his movement. One was Fred Rwigyema, who later became Uganda's commander-inchief and minister of defense. The other, ironically, became America's chief surrogate in the "Great Lakes"


region. He was Paul Kagame, Museveni's Chief of Intelligence for the NRA. In 1979, Kagame, Rwigyema, and other Rwandan Tutsi exiles formed the Rwandan Patriotic Front, a successor to the guerrilla Inyenzi, in Uganda.” In 1986, after the NRA seized power, the RPF operated openly and legally in Uganda. From November 1989 to Jime 1990, Kagame served as Uganda's head of military intelligence. In this capacity, he received training in military tactics and intelligence methods at the U.S. Army's Fort Leavenworth Command and General Staff College in Kansas.” Kagame's presence in the United States, albeit short, earned him the title "America's Man in the Great Lakes." ” Other important RPF leaders received similar American training.” While in Kansas, Kagame ordered his RPF forces to launch their first major cross-border invasion of Rwanda from Uganda.” The invasion began on October 1, 1990. It was a classic "Bay of Pigs" style operation, with the Tutsi exiles acting in the same capacity as the Cuban exiles in Florida. And as with the Cuban exiles, the Tutsi exiles had no real base of support in their home coimtry, except for the few 1959 refugees who had returned home. Many African analysts believe that the order for the RPF invasion could not have been given without the knowledge, approval, and active assistance of the Pentagon's DIA and Britain's MI-6. Both agencies were heavily engaged in Uganda. As RPF units (called Inkotyani or "those who fight courageously")” began detaching from the NRA in preparation for the invasion of Rwanda, Kagame's mentor, Museveni, was in the United States. Undoubtedly, the Ugandan's plan for an RPF invasion of his neighbor was given a green light by the Bush




administration. Ironically, Museveni was attending the UN's World Summit on Children, along with Habyarimana. During the summit, RPF cadres were transporting their land mines, rocket-propelled grenade launchers, mortars, cannon, Katyusha rocket launchers, and Kalashnikov rifles to a soccer stadium in Kabale, just north of the Ugandan border.i^ Earlier, U.S. military advisers encouraged the NRA to organize separate RPF battalions for future action inside Rwanda. These cadres of Rwandan exiles also received military training from British forces at a base in Jinja, Uganda.In 1992, Museveni was soliciting military assistance for the RPF from a wide assortment of cotmtries, including the United States, Eritrea, the Somali warlord faction of Mohammed Farah Aideed, India, and North Korea.^^ The United States, through the World Bank, also pressured Rwanda on the economic front. When international coffee prices slumped and Rwanda's economy went into a tailspin, the World Bank forced the country to adopt rigorous structural adjustments to its financial system. One result of this action was the return of famine to Rwanda, a scourge not seen in the country for some twenty years. The starvation of Rwandans had the consequence of increasing the mutual hostility between Hutus and Tutsis that led to later acts of genocide.20 United States support for Kagame put the Americans at odds with France, which supported Flabyarimana. When the RPF invaded Rwanda, France invoked a 1975 defense pact signed between Flabyarimana and then-President Valery Giscard d'Estaing. Through his close relationship with President


Mitterand's son, Jean-Christophe, Habyarimana got the military results he wanted.21 One thousand French paratroopers were dispatched to Rwanda along with troops from Belgium and Zaire in Operation Noroit. On October 27,1990, when the French began to repulse the RPF forces, a cease-fire was negotiated. However, the RPF could chalk up one victory. It now controlled Rwandan territory for the first time - the strategic border region with Uganda.22 But the RPF attack exacted a severe price for Kagame - his long time friend and comrade Fred Rwigyema was killed in the fighting. Kagame would never forget that loss and vowed that Habyarimana and France would pay dearly for the death of his comrade. Habyarimana also did not forget easily. He retaliated with a vengeance against the Tutsi invaders. In early 1991, Rwandan army forces massacred more than 1200 Bagogwe people, a group akin to the Tutsi who lived in northwest Rwanda. The bloodletting did not stop there. Throughout 1992 and early 1993, Hutu irregulars slaughtered Tutsis in the south and north of the coimtry. In the summer of 1993, when an international commission condemned these acts of genocide. President Mitterand confided to a colleague, "In countries like that, a genocide is not very important." Those words would come back to haunt Mitterand's successor, Chirac.23 On August 4, 1993, the Rwandan government and the RPF hammered out a peace agreement at the foot of Mount Kilimanjaro in the town of Arusha, Tanzania. A transitional government, one that would include the RPF, was approved. All parties concurred that a U.N. force, known as the U.N. Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), would supervise a combined



cease-fire and election process. Part of the deal would include moving a 600-man RPF garrison into Kigali where it would be protected by the U.N. troops. Attending the Arusha conference were Habyarimana; Museveni; President Melchior Ndadaye of Burundi; President Ali Hassan Mwinyi of Tanzania; and Prime Minister Faustin Birindwa, representing Mobutu. Daniel arap Moi of Kenya, who despised Museveni, was a notable no-show. Museveni, the only substantial ally of the RPF, knew that the agreement would give the Tutsis a psychological advantage over the Hutus. The Hutus were unhappy about accommodating the hated Tutsis. Consequently, rampant mutual suspicions delayed implementation of the Arusha Accords into 1994. French support for the Hutu government included providing the Rwandan president with a pilot and crew for his Dassault Mystere-Falcon 50 executive jet. The plane, itself, was a personal gift from Mitterrand's son, Jean-Christophe, to Habyarimana.24 The yotmger Mitterrand was a sort of personal representative for his father to Africa. His role as a special envoy was so obvious, he acquired the nickname of "Papamadit" or "Daddy Told Me" throughout the continent.25 Rwanda also began a major arms buildup. Military armaments came from Russia, Egypt, and South Africa's then-apartheid government. The Egyptians were contracted to provide mortars, mortar shells, howitzers, land mines, and small arms ammunition to Kigali. From South Africa came rifles, machine guns, mortars, and grenade laimchers. Of major importance, the arms shipments to the Rwandan government did not include surface-to-air missiles


(SAMs) or their launchers.^^ On April 6, 1994, Habyarimana and his colleague. President Cyprien Ntaryamira of Burundi, were traveling on the Falcon back to Rwanda after attending a follow-up one-day regional peace conference in Dar es Salaam, hastily called by Tanzanian President Hassan Ali Mwinyi. The summit was convened to try to break a deadlock in the power sharing arrangement between Habyarimana and the RPF. There was also an interest in curbing the increasing violence between Tutsis and Hutus in both Rwanda and Burundi. Also attending the Dar es Salaam conference were OAU Secretary General Salim A. Salim and Burundi's Army Chief of Staff Colonel Jean Bikomagu. The latter attended because there was an interest in reforming the Burundi army, long dominated by Tutsis like Bikomagu. Consequently, there was a call for more Hutus to be incorporated into the army. Following the conference, the Burundian president, deciding his own plane was too slow, took Habyarimana's offer of a lift to Burundi's capital, Bujumbura after it landed in Kigali. At 8:22 PM Rwanda time, as the presidential aircraft was preparing to land at Kigali's Kayibanda International Airport, two SAMs were fired at the aircraft. The resulting explosion pierced the darkening sky over Kigali. The plane spun out of control and crashed into the garden of President Habyarimana's home. The Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi, their aides, Rwanda's military chief of staff General Deogratias Nsabimana, two Burundian cabinet ministers (Bernard Ciza et C5niaque Simbizi), and the French crew of Jacques Heraud, Jean-Pierre Minaberry, and Jean-Michel Penine, were killed. In March 1998,

France's covert relationship with Habyarimana was highlighted by the French newspaper Le Figaro, which printed a copy of a telegram sent to Perrine's widow, Annick, from Cooperation Minister Roussin, a former official of the DGSE. The telegram stated that JeanMichel Perrine died "in official service" to France. ^7 Local and regional suspicion as to the identities of the perpetrators of the attack immediately centered on Tutsi leader Kagame and his U.S. backed ^F forces. The irate Hutus, in retaliation, launched against the Tutsis, one of the worst genocides of the twentieth century. According to French intelligence sources, American disinformation conduits, hoping to divert attention away from the RPF, began putting out the story that militant Hutus, upset with Habyarimana's peace negotiations with the RPF, fired on the plane killing their fellow Hutu leader, The fact that some of the Rwandan ministers on board the flight were Hutu militants did nothing to quell the American-instigated rumor. These included Major Thaddee Bagaragaza, the radical chief of Habyarimana's Presidential Guard, and Colonel Elie Sagatwa, the private secretary to Habyarimana.29 The Hutu militants were brought into Habyarimana's negotiation team precisely because the Rwandan leader feared they might turn against him if they were left out of the peace talks with Ae RPF. The theory of Hutu involvement, therefore, begs an important question. Why did the Hutu radicals want to kill their own militant leaders? That question was neither asked nor answered by the major media in the United States and Britain. At first, the two attack missiles were reported to be Russian-made SAM-7s.3o They were first reported

to have been obtained by the Zairian embassy in Brussels and sent to Rwanda via Ostend, Belgium; Kinshasa; Goma; and eventually Gisenyi.3i The RPF supporters claimed this was proof that Mobutu and his militant Hutu allies must have been behind the assassination. French sources, however, indicate that Zaire had been a major transshipment corridor for arms sent to both the Hutus and the Tutsis in the Rwandan conflict. Their belief was credible. Although Mobutu supported the Hutus, his country was one of the most corrupt in Africa. Zairian businessmen, dealing with Belgian arms suppliers, developed a lucrative business in supplying all the armed factions in central Africa, including Hutu and Tutsi, with weapons. These arms included Russian SAMs and US-made Stingers.32 In addition, the RPF possessed SAMs procured from Uganda. The RPF also did not hesitate to use them. They attacked a Rwandan reconnaissance plane in Marimba on October 3, 1990; a Rwandan Gazelle helicopter in Nyakayaga on October 23, 1990; and a Rwandan helicopter in Cyeru in February 1993. In the first two attacks, Soviet-made SAM-16s were used.^^ In addition, a Zairian Fokker 27 flying between Kigali and Beni in Zaire was attacked at the point where the Rwandan, Zairian, and Ugandan borders meet. RPF involvement in that attack was also suspected.^4 As with many assassinations, there were, and continue to be, many rumors circulating about whom actually shot down the presidential aircraft. Some of the more wild rumors suggested that French military advisers attacked the plane. Another blamed Belgian U.N. peacekeepers for the atrocity. The latter theory was offered by Etienne Sengegera, the Habyarimana



government's ambassador to Zaire. He told Voix du Zaire radio: Sengegera: "We have all the evidence now to declare this without any conjecture, as Belgian soldiers shot down the Rwandan presidential plane on that fatal night of 6* April. Belgian soldiers supposedly on a peace mission in Rwandan - they belonged to the United Nations Assistance Mission to Rwanda [UNAMIR] - three Belgian soldiers supposedly on a peace mission shot down the Rwandan presidential plane with missiles. First they shot a missile which missed the target; the second missile slightly touched the aircraft and the third, unfortunately, hit its target. The aircraft exploded, and this resulted in an incredible catastrophe which nobody could have imagined. Therefore, certain Belgian elements were involved."35 Ntumba Matulu, the Zaire radio correspondent, pressed Sengegera on his fantastic charge of Belgian involvement: Matulu: "Mr. Ambassador, this is a very serious accusation. What reasons could have prompted the Belgians to support the RPF?" Sengegera: "The motives of the Belgians or, to be more precise, of certain Belgians? You will have to ask these people themselves. But the fact is that I am not leveling an accusation -1 am only making an observation. This is because it was Belgians - three UNAMIR Belgian soldiers - who shot down the Rwandan presidential plane with missiles. We do not know their motives or


interests - you would have to ask those persons themselves - but we are now convinced that behind the war which the RPF is imposing on Rwanda to seize power by force, are certain Belgian circles which are involved for reasons unknown to us. We might also make a geostrategic analysis of the war, saying that Rwanda is probably not the only cotmtty that has been targeted. So, you might as well question the Belgians as to what the rebels' motives are. Everybody knows that the rebels are not interested in the democratization of Rwanda. They are interested in taking power by force." Matulu: "What prompts you to think that it is the Belgians and the Ugandans who are behind the rebels? Sengegera: "The case of Uganda has been proven, because the attack on Rwanda on October 1990 was perpetrated by elements who illegally came from the army of President Museveni. They attacked us with full logistical support from the Ugandan army. Subsequent attacks were supported by Uganda, sometimes with the direct intervention of Ugandan soldiers, which seems to be the present case in this current phase of the war. Concerning the Belgians, we note the shift in their policy towards Rwanda, to the point of undertaking this shameful and ignominious plot against the heads of state - against President Habyarimana and his Burundian counterpart. There may be other interested parties in the plot who we have not discovered, but certain Belgians -1 repeat certain Belgians - are involved in the current war imposed on Rwanda. I would also like to stress that in the current clashes in Kigali there have been fotmd in certain localities the dead bodies of



some white foreign nationals who were killed as they fought alongside the RPF." Matulu: "Yes, but tell me, why do you maintain that it is the Belgians who shot down the plane, especially three Belgian soldiers? And what evidence have you to substantiate this?" Sengegera: "The evidence? First there is the place from which the missiles were shot." Matulu: "From where were the missiles shot? Sengegera: "They were shot from near the Kanombe Airport, from a place called Masaka, near Kanombe Airport. So, we spotted where the shots came from, and I can even confirm that the three were immediately arrested by UNAMIR police and collected by the Rwandan army. Another fact: security at Kanombe International Airport in Kigali was ensured by the Belgian contingent, in line with the UNAMIR peace mission. So, you see, at this level there was a lot of complicity. I am also telling you that at the landing strip the pilot of the presidential plane was told to fly around twice because - I don't know - the plot was probably still being prepared, but the pilot thought that this was for technical reasons, whereas it was for other sinister designs." 3^ Segengera's contention concerning Masaka, a farm less than one mile from Kayibanda Airport, is interesting. Although it has been stated that Masaka was in an area dominated by the Rwandan Armed



Forces, others claim that the area could have been easily infiltrated by members of the RPF and moderate Hutu military members. Segengera's claim concerning Masaka was certainly bom out later when, on April 25, 1994, the Rwandan Armed Forces recovered the SAM16 missile latmchers at the Masaka farm.^^ One common thread that ran through all the mmors was that the assassins were white. A U.S.-based Ugandan opposition group, the Uganda Democratic Coalition (UDC), accused the United States of complicity in the assassination. The UDC claimed that the RPF brought down the plane with U.S. military assistance as part of a larger American conspiracy to "destabilize Burundi, Uganda, Zaire, Angola, Kenya, Ghana, Ethiopia and other African states.''^® In addition, the UDC accused three Clinton administration officials Pmdence Bushnell, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs; Arlene Render, State Department Central African Bureau director; and Patricia Irvin, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Humanitarian and Refugee Affairs - of being "conspirators with dictator Museveni and RPF leaders in the assassination plot."^^ The UDC said that the plot was concocted in March 1994, when the three American diplomats were in Kampala. There, they allegedly planned the assassination with RPF officials and Belgians assigned to the UNAMER peacekeeping force.^o Hutu suspicions about the role of UNAMIR stemmed from its responsibility to maintain a "Kigali weapons secure area." The Hutus reasoned that the U.N. peacekeepers in Kigali must have known about the movement of SAM-16s into a zone they were to keep free of such weaponry.« The Hutus, as cited above in


the statements of Segengera, particularly suspected Belgian Blue Helmet involvement in the missile attack. They cited the knowledge the Belgian troops had of the Soviet-made Strela (SAM-14) series of missiles. In addition, they reasoned that the Belgians were the only troops in the area capable of firing shoulder-launched missiles at the aircraft. All this suspicion was couched in the belief of the Hutus that the Belgians favored the RPF over Habyarimana's government.^ There was still plenty of suspicion centered on the Americans and their role in the events in Rwanda. Later, Bushnell claimed that her desire for the U.S. to act proactively to prevent the resulting Rwandan slaughter was "thwarted by others' obstruction." One of the obstructionists to whom Bushnell may have been referring was Richard Clarke of the NSC. As the director of peacekeeping operations for the NSC, Clarke urged no American action in Rwanda.^3 Indeed, there was no one at the NSC actually spearheading a response to the central African mess. When the conflagration erupted in Rwanda, the Africa desk at the NSC was vacant. The number two man, MacArthur Deshazer, was acting NSC director for African affairs tmtil the administration appointed the full time Donald Steinberg at the end of April. On the State Department side. Assistant Secretary for African Affairs George Moose, a career diplomat, allowed Bushnell, his principal assistant, to coordinate policy and responses.^ France said little to counter the UDC's contention that the U.S. played a role in the aerial assassination. Lending credence to the Plan Evil conspiracy were some of France's top African policy makers who saw Uganda's Museveni as the linchpin in


an Anglo-Saxon plot to seize control of central Africa. Chief among the believers in this contrivance were Army Generals Huchon and Lacaze, top Africa experts assigned to the Cooperation Ministry, and Bruno Delaye and Dominique Pin, counselors on Africa to President Mitterrand. Pin was a former attache at the French embassy in Kinshasa.^^ jqg colleagues considered themselves guardians of France's chasse gardee (private turf) in Africa. The theory that the Americans were involved in the aerial assassination is supported by former French Captain Paul Barril who at one time headed France's crack counter-terrorism unit, the National Gendarme Intervention Group (GIGN). Barril started a security company called Secrets in 1992. Its first contract was to train Cameroon President Paul Biya's security guard force.46 Barril also had close links to President Mitterrand. He headed a political "dirty tricks" operation in the Elysee Palace during part of Mitterrand's tenure. In 1994, Barril quit government service and became an adviser to Habyarimana. He claimed the missiles that shot down the Falcon were Soviet-made SAM-16s with Iraqi numerical markings. Barril suggested that after Operation Desert Storm, the CIA transferred the missiles to the RPF from seized Iraqi arms caches.^7 In 1997, Barril allegedly became involved in some post-Elysee chicanery. In June, he was arrested for questioning by Paris vice squad officers. They wanted to know about his involvement in a huge international prostitution ring said to involve Saudi and other Gulf princes, the deposed Emir of Qatar (for whom Barril also worked), a former Swedish model, international


arms dealers, French politicians, and top businessmen from the United States, Great Britain, Indonesia, and the Middle East. In February 1998, the investigation of the ring extended to several film stars, including Robert De Niro, who was questioned for several hours by Paris police.48 The use of prostitutes was a hallmark of the Cold War espionage game. Top politicians were often blackmailed after being lured into intelligencesponsored "honey traps." Barril's involvement in France's Rwanda affairs was no less controversial than his Paris business connections. On March 30, 1998, shortly after President Clinton visited Rwanda, Le Figaro contradicted Barril's contention that the missiles that brought down the presidential aircraft were from QA sources. While the paper did not refute Barril's declaration that the missiles were Soviet-made SAM-16s (code-named Gimlet by NATO), it stated the missiles were captured by the French from Iraqi arms caches during the Gulf War. Allegedly, French operatives subsequently transferred the missiles to the Rwandan Hutus. Two anonymous French army officers revealed later, people close to Barril requested two SAMs from the seized caches. The missiles were supposedly sent to Rwanda between November 1993 and February 1994. In addition, Le Figaro said that a Rwandan Army officer of the Habyarimana regime had jotted down a list of the missiles' serial numbers.^? It is important to note that many countries possessed SAM-16s. These include Angola, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Finland, Himgary, Iraq, Nicaragua, North Korea, Poland, Slovakia, and the ex-Soviet Union. Soviet supplied SAM-16s had also been captured by


UNITA and South African forces in Angola. There are two theories that the missiles were not from Iraq. One theory postulates that UNITA provided captured SAM16s to Rwandan Hutu extremists via Zaire. Another theory is that anti-Habyarimana moderate Hutus bought the missiles from their friends in South Africa, where moderate Rwandan Colonel Anselme Nshizurungu maintained close contacts with arms industry Still, many continued to harbor suspicions about the United States. From his self-imposed exile in the United States, former Ugandan President Binaisa supported the claim that America's RPF allies were behind the downing of the presidential plane. He wrote: "To turn to the deaths of the two Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi. I believe they died by Rwanda Patriotic Front fire, because the RPF had concluded that President Habyarimana of Rwanda, a Hutu, had become a nuisance. He was accused of reneging on the agreement to form an interim government by playing delaying tactics. It is highly unlikely that his own national army killed him because they had nothing to gain and everything to lose by his death. The President of Burundi was killed because he, too, was a Hutu and, as such, a dormant, if not active, nuisance."5i Binaisa's claims are dismissed by some Rwandan Tutsis as conspiratorially-tinged rantings. For example, they allegedly cite Binaisa's close ties with and financing by the right-wing American "king of conspiracy" L5mdon One of the most intriguing theories was


m postulated in the respected Jane's International Defence Review. It was thought that the SAMs may have, in fact, been supplied to Hutus by the United States through Uganda!53 The goal of such an operation would have undoubtedly been the destabilization of the Great Lakes region. According to this line of thinking, certain Hutu moderates allied with the RPF wanted to eliminate Habyarimana and what they considered his dictatorship. A group of Hutu moderates centered around Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana; Major General Augustin Ndindiliyimana, the head of the Gendarmerie; Colonel NshizinmgU/ military adviser to the Prime Minister, who was affiliated with the moderate wing of the MDR and close to the RPF; and a group of supporters in the southern town of Butare, wanted to rid Rwanda of Habyarimana at any cost, including assassination. Later summarizing the situation in Rwanda, Nshizirungu sent a letter to a Belgian friend that stated: "The wicked Rwandans could not bring about the physical elimination of the dictator, I would like you to realize that the good people, for once, got rid of this monster. The controversy surroimding the attack on the Falcon reared its head again in the spring of 1998. Amid a French parliamentary inquiry of Paris's role in the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, former Cooperation Minister Bernard Debre confidently declared the SAMs used to shoot down the executive jet were supplied by the United States via Uganda. Speaking on French radio, Debre said, "There were two SAM-16 [s], which is a modified version of the SAM 7 . . . We pieced together the registration numbers on the tails. There was just one number missing."55 French military intelligence later



photographed the missile launchers and connected their reference number (9M322) with the Soviet Igla series (SAM-16) nomenclature 9L38. The French contended that this series was found in Ugandan military stocks. In addition. General Jean Heinrich of the DRM stated that there was proof that the RPF had acquired SAM16S.56

Charging that the Ugandans refitted the missiles, Debr6 denied earlier charges that the missiles were seized from Iraq by French troops during Desert Storm. Debrd said, "With the numbers we are quasi certain that they were Ugandan missiles probably delivered by the Americans . . . from the Gulf war."57 Debre restated that the SAMs came from arms caches provided to Uganda by the United States after they were seized by U.S. troops in Furthermore, he said the CIA, possibly with the assistance of Britain's MI-6, was in on the missile transfer.s^ The United States vigorously rejected Debre's charges. In a double-barreled blast at Paris, the State Department and Pentagon issued seething statements. An anonymous State Department official told the New York Times: "The United States does not have any knowledge about the origin of the missiles which allegedly shot down the plane carrying the presidents of Rwanda and Burundi four years ago . . . We categorically reject any suggestion that we would have delivered any missiles to the perpetrators of this heinous act."6o Pentagon spokesman Kenneth Bacon retorted: "The U.S. has not ever provided anti-aircraft missiles to Uganda ... I think, first, it's a calumnious charge. And second, I think it's wrong." Bacon continued by saying: "Based on everything I know, it is



not possible."® America's allies in Kampala also reacted angrily to the French accusations. An anonymous military source in Uganda told Agence France Presse that Uganda did not have SAM-16 missiles. He rhetorically asked, "If we don't have those missiles ourselves, how could we have managed to buy them for the RPA (Rwandan Patriotic Army)?"® In an editorial, the government-owned Ugandan newspaper New Vision restated the official Ugandan party line on the shooting down of the plane but added another sub-plot. It quoted French academics as saying, "the missiles were fired by French mercenaries commanded by Captain Jacques [sic] (Paul) Barril® and possibly recruited by l^s. Habyarimana." In essence, according to the unnamed French sources, the First Lady of Rwanda engineered the assassination of her husband with the assistance of Barril, the president's own security adviser.® New Vision also stated that Habyarimana's signing of the Arusha Accord was in the interests of both the RPF and Uganda. The RPF would gain power sharing in the Rwandan government and Uganda would achieve regional stability. Therefore, according to the editorial, neither Uganda nor the RPF had any reason to assassinate Habyarimana. The editorial restated another tenet of Uganda's explanation of the missile attack. It declared, "the missiles were fired from an area near Kigali airport which was heavily guarded by the government... It was not possible for the RPF to have infiltrated this area, fired the missiles and escaped undetected."® However, Ugandan opposition sources in Kampala disagreed with their government's stance. One



opposition figure cited the fact that the original U.S. denial that the missiles did not come from American sources was so weak, it seemed as though Washington wanted to leave itself some wiggle room in the event the SAMs were later discovered to have originated from U.S. or U.S.-influenced sources.®^ There were ample avenues for the United States to clandestinely supply the RPF with SAMs from the open international weapons bazaar. For example, it was revealed in 1998 that Vector Microwave Research Corporation of Alexandria, Virginia; Electronic Warfare Associates of Dulles Airport, Virginia; and BDM International of McLean, Virginia^^ were rmder contract to the QA and DIA to procure various weapons from dubious international somces under the covert "foreign materiel acquisition" program. The weapons included Soviet-manufactured SAMs as well as U.S.- made Stingers. In late 1987, Vector's offices were raided by federal agents as part of an investigation of the company's possible illegal activities. The President of Vector was former DIA director retired Air Force Lt. Gen. Leonard Perroots, a personal favorite of the late CIA director William Casey. Vector was a procurement carve-out company for U.S. intelligence that routinely bought weapons and radar systems from China, North Korea, Belarus, Iran, Iraq, Russia, and other countries. After the government's investigation. Vector went out of business and its components were acquired by its main foreign materiel acquisition competitors.^s The secret U.S. program to buy arms from pariah states is but one additional possible channel for the clandestine shipment of arms to the RPF. DIA's involvement in companies like Vector and


other "proprietary" firms was authorized in the Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal year 1991. Congress permitted the DIA to establish private businesses as "covers" for military intelligence gathering operations in the United States and in other countries. These phony companies were permitted to engage in sellmg products and engage in banking services. The companies could either keep any profits for meeting corporate expenses or surrender any money generated to the U.S. Treasury. Although, the intelligence act gave primary responsibility for such operations to DIA, it specified that the military intelligence agency was to coordinate its domestic activities with both the CIA and FBI.®^ The RPF was definitely interested in procuring the best weapons available on the international market to achieve their goals. In this regard, an article in the Ugandan publication Uganda Yearly Review 1997/98, while generally supportive of the policies of Museveni, surprisingly describes the actual goals of the RPF: "It is the persecution of the Tutsi exiles during the Obote II regime on the one hand and their being sidelined in the NRA several years after his overthrow which prompted the formation of the RPF which on 1 October 1990 invaded their mother country, starting a civil war which culminated in the assassination of the Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana on 6 April 1994, followed by unprecedented massacres of Rwandese Tutsi and Hutu Moderates, and the eventual capture of state power by the Tutsi dominated RPF.''^® Considering the view that it was the RPF that triggered


the invasion because they were not content to sit on the sidelines in Uganda is an amazing revelation considering the Ugandan authorship. However, the publication's review of Rwandan events continues by denying Museveni's involvement with the RPF: "There have been accusations that President Museveni is an empire builder and that he masterminded or supported the invasion in order to bring Rwanda tmder his sphere of influence. Given his close historical relationship with the key players of the RPA [Rwandan Patriotic Army], it would have been easy to believe the hypothesis. But it is now common Imowledge that although he had known that some Rwandese elements within the NRA had formed a clandestine exile organization dedicated to the return to Rwanda of all Rwandese refugees at all costs he had in fact advised Habyarimana about it, but the latter had ignored the advice."7i By April 1998, the Socialist-led French parliament was in a quandary over its investigation of France's role in the Rwanda carnage. Senator Paul Quiles, a former Socialist Defense Minister, headed the parliamentary inquiry - the first ever concerning French foreign policy in the forty years of the Fifth Republic. Although the roles played by former Gaullist Prime Minister Balladur, former Defense Minister Francois Leotard, former Foreign Minister Alain Juppe, and Debre's predecessor as Cooperation Minister, Michel Roussin, were tmder investigation, they were joined by noteworthy Socialists, including Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine, who was, at the time of the genocide.



the chief aide to Mitterrand, and Jean-Christophe Mitterrand. Jean-Christope was the head of the Africa cell within the presidency and, ironically, a confidant of the right-wing Gaullist Charles Pasqua.^^ Xhenambassador to Rwanda Georges Martre was also called before the commission. Bipartisan French culpability in the Rwandan genocide was during a period of "co habitation" between the Gaullist prime minister and the Socialist president. Consequently, the co-habitation ultimately led to charges of co-involvement in genocide. Bahadur sharply defended his government's role in Rwanda. He said: "The French Army has no responsibility [in the genocide]. . . France is the only coimtry to have used the word 'genocide,' the only cormtry whose chief of government, myself, went to the United Nations to finally get a humanitarian operation decided on, the only country to have thousands of soldiers intervene and prevent thousands of massacres."73 He also said: "We will make sure that the honor of France and the French army is protected from attacks that are completely unfair."74 Bahadur had a point concerning the use of the term "genocide." The Clinton administration and its envoys to the U.N. and Africa studiously avoided the use of the term while France and Secretary General Boutros-Ghali referred to the massive killings for what they were - genocide. There was a distinct air of indignation over America's policy hanging over the Paris parliamentary hearing room. The lingering resentment of Washington was compounded by selfdeprecating comments made by President Clinton in Rwanda on March 25, 1998. Even though the Clinton administration blocked sending peacekeepers to



Rwanda in 1994, the president issued a nostra culpa, "The international community, together with nations in Africa . . . did not act quickly enough after the killing began."75 Countering Clinton's claim that the international community sat back and did nothing, Balladur and Juppe told the Paris commission that France's humanitarian force saved as many as 20,000 lives, a number supported by many experts who earlier appeared before ihe inquiry 76 Balladur said that the French could "be proud of their country, of a humanitarian operation that it waged alone."77 Vedrine, the new foreign minister in the Jospin government, echoed that sentiment. He told the Quills panel that France acted with "tenacity" to prevent the genocide from taking place.These were sentiments supported by members of a U.S. military training team later sent to Rwanda. One member of the group told the author: "At least France sent people in here to stop the killing . . . that's more than we did." ^9 That sentiment was echoed by Herman Cohen, the former head of the State Department's Africa bureau during the Bush administration. He said the French rescue effort, "was the only effort made to save Tutsi lives."®^ Cohen added: "I believe the operation saved the lives of between 20,000 and 40,000 Tutsis."8i The final Quiles Commission report, issued on December 15,1998, defended France's role in Operation Turquoise. The report stated that France was the only western nation to offer humanitarian assistance to stem the genocide. The reasons given were that the United States was hesitant to get involved following the Somalia "fiasco," Belgium was paralyzed following the massacre of its Blue Helmets, Germany was barred


constitutionally from involving itself militarily in Africa, Britain did not consider Rwanda to be in its "zone of influence," and Italy did not have the capability to deploy troops to the area. Quil&s concluded that French troops, along with contingents from Senegal, Mauritania, Niger, Egypt, Chad, Guinea Bissau, and Congo (Brazzaville), were the only forces capable of providing humanitarian assistance to Rwanda.82

However, the experts criticized subsequent activities of Operation Turquoise that permitted many Hutu genocidaires to escape into neighboring Zaire.83 While refusing to be blamed for militarily assisting the Rwandan Hutus, Balladur concurred with published reports that suggested the possibility of a rogue operation being run by the French government in support of the militant Hutus, possibly the one involving Barril. Balladur said: "As far as I know there were no [arms sales] authorizations but I can't be expected to know everything and I can't remember eveiything."84 Such a ring operating out of Mitterand's office would not be unlike the secret Nicaraguan contra support network established by Oliver North in the basement of the Reagan White House.83 There is one other interesting theory that actually involves Kagame approaching the French to get logistical assistance in assassinating Habyarimana. The periodical Africa International cites two top secret meetings between the RPF leader and French intelligence in Paris in 1992. Two meetings were held in hotel rooms at the Hilton Hotel-Suffren and the SofitelLa Defense. Kagame, according to the report, wanted to obtain remote-controlled equipment capable of


assassinating both Habyarimana and Ntaryamira. This, he revealed, would be carried out with the aid of mercenaries.®^ Appearing before the commission the day after Bahadur's testimony, Jean-Christophe Mitterrand denied that any African affairs cell operating within the Elysee was bypassing the French government. He emphatically declared: "No, I repeat no, the role of the successive advisors in charge of African affairs during Francois Mitterrand's mandate was to inform the president, answer his questions and carry out the missions he thought useful."®^ Rwanda wasted no time in seeking to make political capital out of the hearings in Paris. Emmanuel Gasana, an aide to Kagame thundered: "France has Rwandese blood on its hands." Refusing to absolve the French Socialists he added, "The change of governments does not take away the responsibility of the state." Rwandan Foreign Minister Anastase Gasana said his government was considering seeking reparations from France, the United Nations and "all those who played a role" in the genocide.®® The political war of words between Paris and Washington continued when Philip Re)mtjens, a professor of African Law and Politics at the University of Antwerp, revealed that based on information supplied to him by British intelligence sources, the SAM 16s used in the aerial attack were seized by French troops in Iraq during Desert Storm. British intelligence, however, was known to be a cipher for U.S. intelligence in matters concerning Britain's intelligence relations with its European Union partners. Reyntjens told the French parliamentary inquiry that his British


intelligence sources had been supported by sources within the Belgian military intelligence service, the Service General de Renseignements (SGR), and U.S. military intelligence.s^ Reyntjens did concede that the missiles could have been procured from unscrupulous middlemen,^ a theory supported by many experts in France, Zaire, and elsewhere. Debre charged that Reyn^ens' accusations of French involvement amounted to nothing more than "QA misinformation." The former French minister also insisted that "the SAM 16 missiles used by the RPF for several months before the attack were therefore probably American. As far as I remember the Ugandans did not take part in the Gulf War." He also said it was "probable" the missiles had come from the United States via Uganda.^i Debre claimed that the missile numbers cited by Reyntjens as proof of French complicity were "given to him [Reyntjens] by the CIA."92 Debre was backed by former head of the DGSE Claude Silberzahn. He said that some western intelligence agencies had established an "exchange ['bourse'] of intelligence" geared toward disinformation. Although he did not mention what intelligence agencies he had in mind, it was clear he was referring to the CIA and MI6. Moreover, Silberzahn charged that although Reyn^ens claimed he had received his information from three different sources, he actually received it from one.^3 There was another "bourse" of intelligence - in this case signals intelligence or "SIGINT" that pointed to an RPF role in the downing of the aircraft. The Rwandan military had a listening station in Gisenyi that was scanning the frequencies diuring the evening of


April 6. Its major task was to monitor the frequencies of the RPF. Shortly after the SAM-16s were fired at the presidential plane, the Rwandan SIGINT operator in Gisenyi heard the RPF frequency crackle with the report that "the target is hit." The next day, a Captain Apedo, a Togolese member of the UNAMIR team in Kigali, reported that a "RGF [Rwandan Government Forces] Major said they monitored RPF commtmication which stated 'target is hit.'"94 Marcel Gerin, a white Belgian operator of a tourist ranch at Mpanga some 50 miles from Kigali, reported that he was talking on his radio to his German friend in Kigali at approximately 8:30 PM on the evening of April 6. At the same time the aircraft was attacked, Gerin said he and his friend heard four explosions. Gerin heard them over the radio and the German first hand. Later in the evening, Gerin said he heard several messages concerning the attack on the aircraft. One emanated from a Belgian security company in Kigali named Cobra Unit. One message broadcast by the head of the unit said "We killed Le Grand [President Habyarimana]." In comparison, Gerin said U.N. and Rwandan Armed Forces messages following the attack indicated that their forces were in complete disarray. Gerin's implication that Belgians were involved in the attack certainly corresponds to other reports that whites were responsible. Gerin and his Mexican-bom wife also said that, addition to the atrocities of the Hutu Interhamwe, they witnessed the systematic killing of Hutus, Tutsis, Banyambo, and mixed-race "Hutsis" by members of the RPF. As for the RPF, the Gerins charge that it cleverly manipulated the foreign press to show them massacres supposedly committed by the


Interhamwe and Hutu army when they had actually been carried out by the RPF itself! In fact, the RPF used the Gerins' ranch as a foreign press staging area for guided tours of mutilation fields in eastern Rwanda. Also, according to Gerin, flying over the massacre scene in the Rusomo-Kibungo area was a lone C-130 photo reconnaissance plane.^® The United States was one of the few coimtries having such aircraft in the region. The French contention of RPF involvement was supported during the Quiles inquuy by former Rwandan Defense Minister James Gasana, who served from April 1992 to July 1993. Gasana is a well-known Hutu moderate who was forced to flee Rwanda after death threats from Hutu extremists. He testified that "We never trained people to use anti-air weaponry of this type . . . We never pondered purchasing anti-air missiles because the FPR (RPF) people we were facing had no planes. It would have been a waste of money to purchase equipment we couldn't use in this war. However, Gasana cited examples of RPF use of such surface-to-air weapons. He related two instances: the 1990 downing by the RPF of a Rwandan army reconnaissance plane and a helicopter by Soviet-made SAM-16 missiles. Gasana also revealed that it would have been impossible for Hutu militants to carry out such an assassination since Rwandan military intelligence reported to him as Defense Minister and he would have been informed about such a plot.^^ Also, while the RPF was well-trained in the use of SAMs, Ambassador Martre contended that the same could not be said of the Hutu extremists. He said they even had trouble handling mortars and guns, let alone sophisticated SAMs.^s


Herman Cohen told the Quiles Commission that only the militant Hutus could have been responsible for the attack of Habyarimana's plane. He reasoned: "They [the militants] wanted to get rid of him because they believed he was too soft, and they feared he would make concessions to the [Tutsi-led] Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF)." He also repeated the charge that Habyarimana's own family was responsible for his assassination.^ One unexpected outcome of Senator Quiles' investigation of the French activity in Rwanda was the forwarding by the government of thousands of pages of classified documents, including secret defense agreements between France and eight African coimtries and confidential clauses in agreements with twentythree others.ioo The eight countries having secret defense agreements with France were Cameroon, Central African Republic, Comoros, Djibouti, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Senegal, and^ The confidential clauses were contained in French treaties with Benin, Burkina Faso, Burtmdi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Seychelles, Togo, and Zaire.102 In April 1998, it was revealed during the parliamentary inquiry, that French Foreign Legionnaires played an important role in training Rwanda's Hutu army, its gendarmerie, and the Interhamwe militias between 1990 and 1993. Part of the training was conducted by elite teams from the Foreign Legion's 2"^ Foreign Parachute Regiment (2eme Regiment Etranger de Parachutistes - REP) and the 2"d



REFs Reconnaissance Platoon, also known as Commandos de Renseignement et de I'Action dans la Profondeur - CRAPS. Other training was provided by personnel from the French Arm)^s Special Operations Command Group, (the COS, or Commandement Operations Speciales). Many of the Foreign Legionnaires were not French-bom but were German, Israeli, Canadian, South African, British, and white Rhodesians-io^

America's role in training RPF forces in Uganda was similarly revealed during the Paris inquiry. Balladur, after being urged by a commission member to describe the malevolent role of the Americans in Africa, said that some members of the RPF, while attached to the Ugandan army, had been trained in the United States. Juppe and Leotard also suspected the United States of being involved in the missile attack on Habyarimana's aircraft. They claimed that members of the RPF received specialized missile training near Phoenix, Arizona.i°4 According to the public affairs office at Luke Air Force Base near Phoenix, the Barry M. Goldwater Air Force Range, which is a tenant activity of Luke Air Force Base, is often used by U.S. Army special operations forces for live fire exercises and training. The U.S. Army Intelligence Center at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, apparently coordinates such training. By its own admission, the U.S. Department of Defense provided official military training to the RPF since January 1994, three months before they launched their invasion of Rwanda from Uganda. In a Febmary 1997 letter to Amnesty International, a U.S. diplomatic official outlined U.S. military support to the RPF and its army, the RPA. The letter states that the training:


"includes such things as English language instruction, helping to develop the Rwandan military justice system, encourage effective management of defense resources, and bringing engineering, quartermaster, medical, adjutant general, and ordnance officers to the U.S. to enhance their professionalization. We have also conducted a short course in basic infantry skills for about 30 RPA soldiers. A theme in all our dealings with the RPA has been to professionalize what started as a guerrilla army, and to expose their officers to management of a multiethnic force."io5 Even if one were to believe that U.S. support for the RPF only consisted of "professionalization" training, one could question the impact of such training in light of the human rights abuses conducted by the since the training began. The Clinton administration also continued to be uncomfortable with the charge that it was involved in bringing down the Falcon. While there were charges of U.S. involvement by star witnesses in the Quills inquiry, one of the only media outlets in the United States to even report on Ihe hearings curiously omitted any references to American complicity. National Public Radio (NPR), financed partly with federal government funds, merely reported the accusations that France was responsible for the attack on the aircraft: Jennifer Ludden, NPR Reporter, reporting from Paris: "There were a lot of questions remaining after toda/s hearing. Perhaps the biggest mystery: increasing allegations that French missiles shot down the plane


that killed Rwanda's president and sparked the genocide. A Belgian newspaper today supported the claim, and alleged the missiles were fired by Europeans. France has disclaimed responsibility for the missiles. Ministers today had nothing to add."^^^ Fair reporting on the part of the Ludden would have not included the last sentence in her report: that "ministers had nothing to add." Balladur, Juppe, and Leotard, not to mention Debre, had plenty to add to the controversy: the fact that the United States and its client, Uganda, played a significant role in the attack. There seemed to be no great interest on the part of any American broadcast outlet to mention the spectacular allegations of the former French officials. Moreover, Leotard touched on something particularly interesting in his testimony before the Quills inquiry. He revealed that Zaire's Mobutu was expected to be aboard the ill-fated Rwandan aircraft. However, he changed his mind about attending the Dar es Salaam meeting at the last minute.i^^ Confidential sources in Washington that represent both Hutu and Tutsi interests - two sides that never agree - revealed to the author in April 1998 that there were other last-minute cancellations to go to Dar es Salaam in addition to Mobutu's. Ugandan opposition sources close to the Hutus claim that President Moi of Kenya was also to have attended the summit on April 6. However, Tanzania's director of security intelligence. Major General Imran Kombe, was tipped off about a possible assassination attempt against three leaders who were to have attended the conference. They were Habyarimana, Moi, and Mobutu. It is thought that



Kombe then tipped off Moi, who then relayed the warning to Mobutu. Subsequently, both leaders canceled their plans to go to Dar es Salaam. Moi sent his vice-president instead. However, that left Habyarimana as the sole target. Reportedly, this necessitated changing the assassination plans to firing on his aircraft. According to Hutu sources, there was never any Tutsi plan to take out Burundi's president, an unforhinate casualty of the conspiracy. Also, according to an official RPF source, there was a last minute change of plans by Burundi's Tutsi army chief of staff Colonel Bikomagu after the summit adjourned. Shortly before he was to board the doomed plane, a Tutsi official present in Dar es Salaam warned Bikomagu not to fly on the plane with his president. He wisely decided to heed the advice.^.


38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45.

46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53.

specially-coxifigured P-3s are used for communications intercepts and sending false messages, something known as "spoofing." These planes, called EP-3 Aries, have been active in operations in Libya and Algeria. On board the aircraft is a system manufactured by Raytheon's ESystems that intercepts a message, alters its mearting, and retransmits it using the original radio operator's voice. The Pentagon readily admits that such technology should be used cautiously. See: David A. Fulghum, "Communications Intercepts Pace EP-3s," Aviation Week and Space Technology, 5 May 1997, 53. Interview with Remigius Kintu, Uganda Democratic Coalition. Shoumatoff, op. cit. Jeffrey Goldberg, "Our Africa Problem," Nezo York Times, 2 March 1997,34. Ibid. Lynch, op. cit. Condurier, op. cit. "Priests Speak of Massacres, Destitution," All Africa Press Service, Africa Neios, 24 March 1997. Holly Burkhalter, "Is United States Aiding Abuse by Rwanda?; Physicians' Group Disputes Administration's Version of Role in African Nation," Fulton County Daily Report, 3 October 1997. Georges Berghezan, "Qui a arme Kabila?" ("Who armed Kabila?"), Schmitz and Nolet, editors, op. cit., 76. Lara Marlowe, "Rwandans got combat training from U.S. army, paper claims," The Irish Times, 28 August 1997,11. Connell and Smyth, op. cit. Comment at the African Studies Association Annual Meeting, Chicago, 30 October 1998. Author interview with Antoine Glaser, Paris, 26 September 1997. Willame, op. cit., 141. Condurier, 27. Ibid.


54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72.

73. 74.

Alec Russell, "Troops loyal to Kabila 'massacred Hutu men,"' Electronic Telegraph, 10 October 1997.

William Branigin, "Hutu Chiefs Gearing for War: U.S. Cites Arms Buildup in Refugee Camps," International Herald Tribune, 20 July 1995. Carol Giacomo, "Christopher urges closure of Rwandan camps," Reuters, 11 October 1996. "Zairean rebels intensify offensive, leaders discuss crisis," Deutsche Presse Agentur, 3 December 1996. Nicholas Doughty, "France alone on Zaire, others see Mobutu power over," Reuters, llMarch 1997. Rieff, op. cit. Nicholas Doughty, op. cit. German Catholic Council Censures Western Powers," All Africa Press Service, Africa Nezvs, 7 July 1997. "Priests Speak of Massacres, Destitution," All Africa Press Service, op. cit. William Eagle, "Zaire/Allegations," Voice of America Background Report, 21 March 1997.

"Nobel Prize anticipated," San Diego Union Tribune, 30 April 1988, B 2. William Shawcross , "A Hero Of Our Time," The Independent, 4 February 1996,12. Eagle, op. cit; Chapleau and Misser, op. cit., 107108. Interview with Remigius Kintu. Kevin Whitelaw, "Good works, evil results," U.S. News & World Report, 26 May 1997,34,38. Private information. Donald G. McNeil, Jr., "hr Congo, Forbidding Terrain Hides a Calamity," New York Times, 1 Jime 1997, 4. Edward Mortimer, "The moral maze: The dilemmas of African conflict cannot be avoided by identifying one side as victims and the other as aggressors," Financial Times (London), 12 February 1997, 24. Prepared Statement of Kathi Austin, op. cit. Colum Lynch, "Group alleges armies tied to Zaire atrocity; Calls for probe of role of U.S.," Boston Globe, 9 October 1997, A2.


75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81.

82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87.

88. 89. 90. 91. 92.

Adotei Akwei, "Training killers in Africa," Washington Times, 11 September 1997, A21. Ibid. Human Rights Watch, "Mass Graves Of Refugees Uncovered In Congo," Africa News, 9 October 1997. Discussion with Jean Guisnel, 21 May 1998. Dumoulin, op. cit., 43. Lyime Duke, "U.S. Military Role in Rwanda Greater Than Disclosed," op. cit. Hearing of the International Operations and Human Rights Subcommittee of the House International Relations Committee, Federal News Service, 4 December 1996. Ibid. Statement made at the African Studies Association Meeting, Chicago, 30 October 1998. Hearing of the International Operations and Human Rights Subcommittee of the House International Relations Committee, Federal News Service, 4 December 1996. Reuter, "Zairean rebels tap foreign media to raise money," 17 May 1997. Patrice Mkubwa and James Adams, "Rise of Zaire rebel messiah jolts West," Boston Globe, 23 March 1997. Hearing of the House International Relations Committee; Subject: Situation in Central Africa, Federal News Service, 5 November 1997; Jack Kelley, "Zaire rebels take charge, revenge; Scarred nation hopes for best, fears the worst," USA Today, 19 May 1997, lA. Hearing of the International Operations and Human Rights Subcommittee of the House International Relations Committee, Federal News Service, 4 December 1996. Michael Anders, "International aid for refugees eyed; Zaire numbers vary widely," Agence France Presse, 22 November 1996. Kelley, "Zaire rebels take charge," op. cit. Hearing of the International Operations and Human Rights Subcommittee of the House International Relations Committee, Federal News Service, 4 December 1996. JeanMarcc Veszely, "LTrr6sistible Ascension de Kabila" ("The Unstoppable Rise of Kabila"), Le Soir Illustre, 19 February 1997,25.


93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100.

Hearing Of the House International Relations Committee; Subject: Situation in Central Africa, Federal News Service, 5 November 1997. Nathanson, op. cit. Dana Priest, “Pentagon Slow to Cooperate With Information Requests," op. cit. Francis Curta, "US State Department refuses to answer questions on Rwandan genocide," Agence France Presse, 5 May 1998. Ibid. Jim Anderson, "Rwanda's genocide: Who knew what and when and why no response?" Deutsche Presse Agentur, 5 May 1998. Ibid. Ibid.


11 Pax Americana in Africa Human rights is important, but so is security and so is trade. Secretary ofState Warren Christopher, 1996.

On July 25, 1996, while the world was barely watching what was transpiring in Rwanda and eastern Zaire, the Tutsi juggernaut hit Burundi with massive speed. Pierre Buyoya, a Tutsi, seized power in a coup against the democratically elected Hutu President, Sylvestre Ntibantunganya. Ntibantunganya became president after the assassination of his predecessor, Ntaryamira, in the skies over Kigali, two years earlier. However, the successor of Ntaryamira was regarded by many Tutsis as providing cover for militant Hutus.^ Therefore, they were eager to depose him and carry on with ethnic score settling. Within three weeks of Buyoya's coup, Tutsis throughout Burundi had killed 6,000 Hutu civilians. Some Hutu refugees from Rwanda, seeking refuge in Burundi, which they had considered a safe haven, were forcibly sent home. Once back in Rwanda, they were subjected to torture and worse. While the United States remained quiet. Warren Christopher even


urged the Hutu refugees to accept the political offers of Buyoya. He said, after attending a regional meeting in Arusha that: "The rebel groups [Hutus] must know that we expect them to choose dialogue as well. It is time for all sides to stop the killing and start talking."^ The U.N. was not as sanguine as was Christopher. During the forced repatriation of Hutus, Ray Wilkinson, the London based spokesman for the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, said "this [violence against the Hutus] only confirms our belief that the refugees have not been returning to Rwanda voltmtarily. We find this unacceptable and we are calling for firm international action to prevent the spiral of violence continuing or getting worse. With American inaction, the situation did get worse. Buyoya was certainly no stranger to U.S. intelligence. The CIA knew that when Buyoya was the military dictator of Burundi from 1988 to 1992, he presided over the slaughter of thousands of Hutus. U.S. intelligence also could link Buyoya to an attempted coup in 1993 that led to the assassination of democratically-elected Hutu President Melchior Ndadaye. Some 100,000 Hutus were slain following that coup attempt. Buyoya, however, also fit nicely into the plans of the Clinton administration and its Tutsi allies in Kigali, eastern Zaire, and Uganda. The ousted Hutu government of Burundi had been considered an ally of Mobutu and the former Rwandan Armed Forces in eastern Zaire. It was an inevitable target for the Tutsis. Only Africa's elder statesmen, Nyerere of Tanzania, tmderstood what was happening in Burundi. Although he tried unsuccessfully to mediate a peace agreement, he knew that the treachery of Museveni, Kagame, and


Kabila was at work in Burundi. The new Tutsi led government in Bujumbura wasted no time in coming to the aid of its allies operating across the Zaire border. In August 1996, Buyoya permitted some 3,000 RPF troops to cross his borders with vehicles and equipment. Their destination was Zaire's southeast front. Biirundi jointly participated in attacks on Burtmdi Hutu refugee camps in South Kivu province where the Burundian Hutu Forces de Defense de la Democratie (Forces for the Defense of Democracy - FDD) maintained its headquarters. In September 1996, the Burundi army stepped up its military involvement in the Zaire conflict by ousting Mobutu's troops from the Kiliba sugar factory in South Kivu. The invaders took advantage of the situation by looting the factory's sugar and hauling it back to Burundi. It seems sugar was a r commodity in Burundi as a result of the U.N.'s economic embargo against the military regime. However, that did not stop Rwanda from allowing oil shipments to their embargoed southern compatriots. In December 1996, Burundi showed its appreciation to Rwanda and Kabila by ordering its gunboats on Lake Tanganyika to bomb the Zairian port of Kisima in South Kivu.^ Apparently, the Burundian Tutsi forces did encounter some military opposition from the ubiquitous forces of Executive Outcomes. The company had allegedly sent a force to South Kivu during the summer of 1996 to train FDD forces. The firm subsequently and characteristically denied the allegations.^ Although the United States "officially" condemned Buyoya's coup and provided sanctuary for ousted President Ntibantunganya at its embassy in


Bujumbura, it was later revealed that the American government provided Buyoya with $145,000 in USAID funds while he was out of power. Most of the money was for his Foxmdation for Unity, Peace, and Democracy to organize an intemation^ conference on Burundi that was to include Archbishop Desmond Tutu of South Africa. The conference never took place and, instead, Buyoya used the money to travel to the United States to argue against regional peacekeeping to prevent the type of persecution and killing of Hutus by the Tutsi minority that was taking place in his country.^ There was also evidence that the Clinton administration and the U.S. intelligence community were ignoring the shipment of arms to refugee Burundian and Rwandan Hutus in violation of both U.N. and OAU embargoes. According to a Human Rights Watch report on Arms, the United States was putting pressure on "allied countries" to conceal the vast network of arms deliveries to ex Rwandan FAR personnel and Burundian Hutu Conseil National de Defense de la Democratie (National Council for the Defense of Democracy - CNDD) rebels based in Kenya. The reason for the silence was to cover up the U.S. shipment of arms to the southern Sudanese rebels of the Sudan People's Liberation Army who were arrayed against the Islamist government in Khartoum. The arms sent to the Hutus and the southern Sudanese apparently all moved via the same network that involved Tanzanian ports and railways.^ The secret network was also reported to use Nairobi's Wilson Airport as a major conduit of arms to the Great Lakes region. The air shipments of arms reportedly involved Executive Outcome's Ibis Air in


cooperation with Kenya's Simba Air. The latter airline was primarily owned by Raymond Moi, the son of Kenya's President. Sanjivan Ruprah, a major campaign contributor to Moi's political coffers and the head of Branch Energy Kenya, also seemed to be heavily involved in the air shipments from Nairobi.^ One likely destination for the arms was the Sudan, where Executive Outcomes had a contract to protect Canadian oil interests.^ Many of the smuggled arms destined for Burundi were of Chinese origin and shipped into Dar es Salaam in ships belonging to the Chinese Tanzanian Joint Shipping Company. The Chinese originally supplied Burundi's Hutu led government but continued the shipments to the Tutsis. Although the final destination of the Chinese arms shipped to Tanzania was said to be Uganda, once flown to Entebbe, members of the Ugandan military, working with Chinese representatives of the China North Industries Corporation, delivered the arms by air to Burundi's Tutsi government. In one case, according to Human Rights Watch, one consignment of arms delivered to the Tanzanian port of Mwanza was transported across Tanzania to Uganda by Ugandan army personnel using a Uganda Railways Corporation train. Human Kghts Watch also reported that a Chinese and North Korean manned and South African managed arms factory at Nakasongola in Uganda was providing mines and ammunition to Buyoya.ii The Nakasongola factory was originally built with Libyan funds but had since been turned over to the South Africans. Ironically, the facility also housed a small unit of American military trainers.^^ This was the


first time in history that American and North Korean military personnel worked peacefully and jointly on the same military base. Also violating the arms embargo imposed on Burundi, South Africa's government owned railway, Spoomet, was involved in the arms shipments to the Hutu guerrilla forces in Tanzania. Spoomet employees told Human Rights Watch that South Africans sent weapons to Hutu rebels in Tanzania aboard Spoomet trains. In one case. South African arms were hidden in Spoomet railcars transporting a humanitarian shipment for the U.N. World Food Program.Ironically, while the South Africans were helping to arm the Hutu groups, they were also helping the Rwandan Tutsis. In September 1996, dturing a visit by South African Vice President Mbeki to Rwanda, it was announced that South African arms would be sold to Kigali.^^ Even under a multiracial government. South Africa was abiding by its old Afrikaner tradition of providing arms to anyone willing to pay the price. Washington also had its fingerprints on the illicit arms trade with Bumndi. At a time when the United States was maintaming a tight air and naval blockade of Iraq to enforce a U.N. embargo on that nation, it permitted the embargo on Bumndi to leak like a sieve. Moreover, American government agencies were actively participating in the embargo busting. Ironically, one key U.S. policy maker that was not buying the Clinton administration's official "hands off" policy on the Great Lakes region was the U.S. ambassador to Burxmdi, former Texas Democratic senator Robert Kmeger. In August 1995, almost a year before Buyoya's coup, Kmeger grotesquely described



recent treatment of Burundian Hutus by the minority Tutsis. Warning that ethnic trouble was only a matter of time, Krueger said the two ethnic groups were "moving into a dreadful spiral where the enemy is seen as not being a human being deserving of life, and where torture is justified/'^® Krueger annoimced that the Tutsis had forced 100,000 Hutus to flee Bujumbura and that only 2000 Hutu families dared remain in the city. The ambassador described a particularly gruesome incident in June 1995 in which young Tutsi men had passed out tickets for people to watch them torture and then kill Hutu hostages. Krueger said, "Six were killed then. Seven managed to escape, but five of them were caught and killed at another spot.''^^ Krueger also lamented the fact that on the same day that NATO planes quickly bombed Serbian positions outside of Sarajevo after a Serb missile killed 37 people in the cit/s center, no interest was shown in the massacre of 50 Hutus in the Bujumbura suburb of Kamenge.^7 Krueger's comments about selective enforcement of human rights and the need to send a peacekeeping force to Burundi were similar to those voiced one year earlier by Secretary General Boutros Ghali over the situation in Rwanda. Also, by giving President Ntibantunganya asylum in the U.S. embassy, Krueger behaved in a totally different manner than did his colleague in Kigali, who failed to prevent the butchery of that country's Prime Minister when she sought the protection of the U.S. embassy. Krueger's belief that a military force should be sent to Burundi resulted in an undiplomatic response from Paris. French Cooperation Minister Debr6 said of


Krueger, "I have met him several times. He is a warmonger. Debre added, "I am a little wary of the American ambassador because he wants intervention but he does not want to commit American troops." Debre felt that an outside military force would fan the flames of ethnic warfare in Ironically, the French pleaded for such a force in Rwanda when similar warfare broke out there. Krueger particularly irritated Paris because he was seen as close to President Ntibantunganya who was felt by France to be its client. Krueger's vigorous defense of the Hutus almost got him killed in June 1995. While driving with Burundian Foreign Minister Jean Marie Ngendahayo on a factfinding mission in the country's northwest, the ambassador's eight vehicle motorcade came imder Tutsi machine gun fire. Although two people were killed and thurteen seriously injured, Krueger and the foreign minister escaped unhurt. However, Krueger discovered the hard way, the price of stating one's convictions above the "national interests of the United States." Those interests favored Tutsi forces throughout the region. In late 1995, Krueger was transferred to Botswana as ambassador. This was done after pro Tutsi newspapers in Bujumbura began publishing death threats against him. Krueger later said he would have felt "ashamed" had he not denounced the killing of the Hutus in Burundi.2o Someone who was less inclined to denounce the actions of Buyoya's government was President Clinton's special envoy to the region, Harold Wolpe. Although there was a unenforceable "paper" embargo on Burundi, it did not stop Buyoya from visiting America's




close military ally Eritrea in January 1998. Shortly after Buyoya returned to Burundi, it was announced that Wolpe would participate in internal peace talks in the Burundian town of Gitega between the Buyoya regime and hand chosen opposition leaders and special interest groups. Tanzania's Nyerere had urged all party talks to include various Hutu exile groups. However, after the revelations that South Africa's Spoomet was supplying arms to the Hutus via Tanzania, Nyerere's position as mediator became suspect. That is when Wolpe stepped in to seek an internal solution that would favor Buyoya. 21 It is clear that, as with other leaders who shot their way into power and then claimed they were "democrats," the United States was hying to justify Buyoya's legal ascension to power so he could join America's other "soldier princes" in Africa. Other African nations that balked at the Tutsi expansion of power soon found that such a stance exacted a price. Consequently, Nyerere and his country, which provided refugee sanctuaries for fleeing Hutu refugees from Bunmdi, became an eventual target for the Tutsis. Kenya's President Daniel arap Moi also gave sanctuary to Hutus from Rwanda. He would also answer for his actions. An aide to Kagame put it bluntly: "Moi will go. Perhaps not with elections."22 Moi soon began facing protesters in the sheets of Nairobi chanhng "Kabila!" After witnessing Washington's heatment of its old friend Mobutu, Moi took the hint and arrested seven accused Rwandan Hutu war criminals for hansfer to the U.N. war crimes hibimal in Arusha.23 However, the Kenyan leader


would not budge on democracy in his country. In 1997, he staged a rigged election that ensured the continued firm grip of his Kenya African National Union (KANU) over the country. Moi even had the temerity to suggest separate homelands for the Hutus and the Tutsis. If Africa's borders were to be redrawn, it would be up to America's Tutsi alliance, not Moi. Moi's troubles with America did not originate with his support for the Hutus or with the Clinton administration. Many Kenyan exile groups had fotmd bases of support in Scandinavia. In fact, Kenya broke off diplomatic relations with Norway after that nation publicly supported Kenyan democratic opposition forces. Fearing a potential post Moi Kenyan government friendlier to Europe's economic interests over those of the United States, the Bush administration began to chastise Moi. ThenU.S. ambassador to Kenya Smith Hempstone even publicly admonished Moi for his totalitarian and corrupt administration. Hempstone, who bears an amazing resemblance in both looks and demeanor to Ernest Hemingway, had good reason to upbraid Moi, a man who practices thuggery in a fashion reminiscent of Idi Amin. For example, in February 1990, after returning from a trip to Washington with Moi, Foreign Minister Robert Ouko was taken to Kenya's Criminal Investigation Division (CID) headquarters at Nyati House in Nairobi where he was roughly interrogated by Moi's sadistic security agents. From there, Ouko was taken to the State House, where it is said Moi demanded to know what President Bush and Secretary of State Baker told him in Washington. Moi then accused Ouko of treason. After Ouko denied the charges, Moi beat him mercilessly imtil he was


tmconscious. The following day, Ouko was returned to Moi's office. He was so badly injured, Moi was advised that taking him to a hospital for treatment would raise uncomfortable questions. At that, Nicholas Biwott, Moi's brutish Energy Minister, pulled out a pistol and shot Ouko through the head twice. Later, it was announced that Ouko's burned body was fotmd near his home. The government first ruled the death a suicide.24 Hempstone's era of public remonstrations of Moi's government was followed by a cool and detached reception from the Qinton administration. Dming the AWcan visits of Christopher, Albright, and Hillary Qinton, Kenya was bypassed. One could understand this policy if the United States were purely interested in advancing the cause of democracy in Kenya. However, as was the case elsewhere in Africa, democracy had little to do with American policy. To the corporate interests and their African proxies that wanted to open Africa to American trade and resource exploitation, Moi was seen as an uncomfortable impediment. Hempstone's successor as ambassador, Aurelia Brazeal, a career foreign officer, refused to publicly condemn Moi's abuses in the same way that earned Hempstone so much respect throughout Kenya. Brazeal fit more into the mold of Rawson and Gribbin in neighboring Rwanda; say nothing and hope for everything to advance America's economic and political interests at all possible costs. Keith Richburg, writing in the Washington Post, had this observation from his vantage point in Nairobi, "the U.S. Embassy here - once at the forefront of the push for democratic change under outspoken Ambassador Smith Hempstone - has done an


about face under the new ambassador, Aurelia E. Brazeal. Whereas Hempstone was often bombastic in his criticism of the Kenyan government, Brazeal has adopted what appears to be a more conciliatory approach, praising the changes that have occurred in the apparent hope of encouraging more." Long time democratic opposition figure Paul Muite criticized Brazeal's new approach on behalf of the Qinton administration: "I don't think she [Brazeal] imderstands the Kenyan situation whatsoever ... [The U.S. Embassy in Nairobi] is now irrelevant to the democratization struggle here."25 Brazeal was ultimately replaced by the State Department's Prudence Bushnell, suspected by many in East Africa of being complicit, along with Museveni and Kagame, in the assassinations of the Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi. In addition, a number of East Africans suspected that Moi, like Mobutu, was to be eliminated from the scene covertly with the plausible deniability of Washington being the most overriding concern. Tanzania also incurred the wrath of the United States. By November 1997, Tanzania began to worry about the Tutsi refugees along its borders with Rwanda and Burundi. Like Mobutu's Zaire, the Tanzanians feared that the presence of the Tutsis would provide a fifth column, as well as a base for Rwandan and Burundian intelligence operatives. Therefore, it decided to roimd up the Tutsis. According to many refugees expelled to Rwanda, many were placed in a "concentration camp" at Biharamuro, Tanzania. From there, they were dumped across the border into Rwanda. Some reported that family members were indiscriminately separated from one another. The


Bunmdian government said that many of the Tutsis were, in fact, Tanzanian citizens, some having lived there since the 1940s. Bunmdi cited the fact that some 300,000 Hutu refugees in Tanzania had not been expelled. Burundian officials also charged that Hutu camps were used by Hutu guerrillas for raids inside Burundi. Showing the same level of irritation about the Tutsis that was displayed by Mobutu a year before, Tanzanian President Benjamin Mkapa threatened Bunmdi with an invasion to oust its "tmdemocratic regime." Speaking at a November 1997 political party congress in Dodoma, Mkapa fired a broadside at Burundi's Tutsi government. He said: "We cannot keep quiet, or be trampled upon . . . when we are forced to receive waves of refugees that threaten peace along our common border, simply because of the intransigence of the present leaders in Bujumbura." Zambia's President Frederick Chiluba also foimd out what can happen when one is considered a deviationist. On October 28, 1997, a group of drunk army officers led by a "Captain Solo," who said he received his orders from an angel, attempted a coup d'etat. Rather than coming from a heavenly emissary. Solo's actual orders may have instead originated in Angola.27 xhe word was spreading around the African press that in the absence of support from the ousted Mobutu, Jonas Savimbi began receiving military support from Zambia. Neither the Angolan government nor Savimbi said anything to dispel these claims. In fact, it was suspected that since Savimbi lost his diamond export hubs in Kinshasa and Brazzaville, he was shipping the gems via Lusaka to Antwerp.^® Angola was also suspected of wanting to dump Chiluba for his


continued support of UNTTA. It was known that UNITA rear bases had been established in Zambia following the loss of similar bases in Congo (Kinshasa) and Congo (Brazzaville).® UNITA was also suspected of receiving arms stockpiled in Kara, Togo, the home village of President Eyadema. The arms, much of which originated in Romania and Bulgaria, were shipped to Zambia on Russian made Antonov transport planes, then on to two remaining UNITA bases - Cazombo and Maeba - just across the border in Angola.3o In any move to oust Chiluba, Angola would have had the support of the United States, which was also trying to disarm UNITA, its old anti communist ally. One clue was the presence of the ubiquitous Bill Richardson in Africa at the time of the attempted coup against Chiluba.^i Richardson's earlier presence in Africa was later discovered to revolve around the U.S. operations to get rid of Mobutu. Also, another erstwhile American ally, Lissouba, had just been forced from Brazzaville. Chiluba evidently got the message. Originally, Chiluba thought he had made the right public relations moves in permitting 1,000 Katangan gendarmes passage from Angola through Zaire, to join Kabila's front against Mobutu. Apparently, that was not enough. He would have to give imwavering support to the new political alliance in Africa and aid to Savimbi violated the norms of America's new political order. ***

It is amazing that with all the evidence of direct American military and intelligence involvement with Kabila and his foreign allies during the Zairian civil war. State Department spokesman Nicholas Bums


confidently stated, "the United States does not support the rebel groups that are fighting to destabilize the Zairian government." Bums, criticized by some for his school boyish approach to foreign affairs, repeated the denial that the United States backed Kabila. "In no way did we throw our support behind Mr. Kabila," he affirmed.32 Bums was directly contradicted by the secret Belgian SGR report which stated that from March 1996, the United States had covertly contributed $100 million in military and other assistance to Kabila's forces.^s Bums even had the temerity to warn Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi to stay out of the Zaire conflict and urged "mercenary groups" to avoid involvement in Zaire saying that such a development could only "contribute to further civilian deaths."^^ The State Department was involved in a classic foreign policy disinformation campaign. One could only be reminded of Germany's 1939 charge that it invaded Poland as an act of self defense or the Soviet Union's declaration in 1979 that its troops were "invited" into Afghanistan. Everyone on the groimd in the Great Lakes region knew very well that the United States not only knew about, but also supported militarily, the involvement of outside troops in Zaire. Feeding the disinformation pipeline, Ambassador Bogosian told a House of Representatives panel that the Tutsi rebellion in eastern Zaire was supported by native Zairians who wanted to get rid of Mobutu. He contritely told the congressmen, "a couple of weeks ago, many of us have never even heard of these people [the Banyamulenge Tutsis] let alone take them seriously. And yet they seem to win one military victory after another. They've recently taken the town


of Btinia."35 Bogosian failed to mention the fact that Ugandan forces that had captured Bxmia were being militarily supported by the United States. The U.S. power play for Africa should not have been a mystery to either Bums or Bogosian. After all, it was their boss. Secretary of State Christopher, who actually set the stage for a full blown Franco American proxy war in October 1996. On his first trip to Africa, Christopher admonished Paris for treating Africa as its "private domain." Also, the late Commerce Secretary Ron Brown presaged Christopher's comments in May 1995, when, during a visit to Dakar in the heart of francophone Africa, declared, "the United States will no longer concede African markets to traditional colonial powers."36 Brown clearly had France in mind. A French cabinet minister dismissed Christopher's comments as a "cheap stunt" to win black American votes in the upcoming presidential election. Jacques Godfrain, the Minister for Foreign Cooperation, declared: "Since Bill Clinton hasn't been to Africa once, since he didn't even mention Africa in his speech before the U.N. General Assembly and since U.S. foreign development aid has diminished by 15 per cent... I am delighted to see the president showing interest in Africa and making it a priority three weeks before the presidential election.''^® State Department spokesman Bums xmdiplomatically responded by stating Godfrain was "living imder a rock."39 Another target for America's wrath was U.N. Secretary General Boutros Ghali. The United States was never satisfied with the selection of Boutros Ghali as the leader of the world body. When the U.N. had to elect a successor to Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar in


324 ~

1991, the Americans made no secret of their preference for either Canadian Prime Minister Mulroney or the veteran Finnish diplomat Max Jakobson. However, Jakobson was Jewish and, therefore, he faced resolute opposition from Arab and Islamic members. On the other hand, Boutros Ghali enjoyed the full backing of the French. They were supported by their African allies, and also, therefore, by the OAU. Egypt lined up the support of the Arab countries, even though Boutros Ghali was a Coptic Christian who was married to a prominent Egyptian Jew. In addition, Boutros Ghali's work on the Camp David Accords on behalf of President Sadat earned him a measure of respect in Israel. When Russia, China, Germany, Japan, and Canada threw their support behind the urbane and wealthy Egyptian, the United States was forced to reluctantly go along.However, the Americans feared that Boutros Ghali would not be as compliant as had previous secretaries general. They would be proven correct. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Secretary General had to shame the United States into providing humanitarian relief and peacekeeping forces for Somalia at a time the world's "only superpower" was beginning to involve itself in the Bosnian civil war while virtually ignoring the Somali situation. Boutros Ghali also made the mistake of criticizing America's tendency to act as the spokesman for the world. In criticizing the massive media coverage of the Bosnian conflict, he referred to the fighting there as a "rich man's war." Later, the Secretary General lamented that after 18 American soldiers were killed by forces loyal to the Somali warlord Farah Aideed, Washington


considered "SG" not to stand for Secretary General but for "scapegoat."4i Further aggravating the United States, the U.N. leader did not support NATO air attacks against the Serbs and, in April 1996 he severely condemned Israel's artillery shelling of a U.N. peacekeeping camp in Lebanon. However, when Boutros Ghali condemned America's inaction over the genocide in Rwanda and eastern Zaire, that was the last straw for the military, foreign policy, and intelligence policymakers in the Clinton administration. Boutros Ghali's term as Secretary General was up at the end of 1996, and the United States was intent on seeing the recalcitrant Egyptian replaced. In rare and imdiplomatic behavior for a senior diplomat, Madeleine Albright publicly upbraided Boutros Ghali, suggesting that he tend to administrative functions at the United Nations. A few years later, the former Secretary General recalled his demotion by the Clinton administration. He told the author that Washington threw FDD 25 at him when it came to his peacekeeping proposals. In other words, the U.S. smarting from the Somalia debacle - would not be pressed into another peacekeeping operation unless the Clinton administration saw a specific national security reason. Boutros Ghali recalled that during the Bush administration he was expected to be both a "secretary" and general" at the U.N. - an obvious reference to his role in crafting the U.N.'s Desert Storm coalition. After the transition to the Clinton administration, the former U.N. chief said he was merely told to be a "secretary."42 The head of the world body responded to Washington's demands by condemning the "dishonesty of those who


make the U.N. inefficient by depriving it of indispensable funds, while refusing to pay out funds on the grotmds that it is inefficient." The secretary general was referring to the massive American arrears in dues to the world body and charges by Republican politicians like Senators Jesse Helms and Bob Dole that the U.N. was mismanaged. During the 1996 presidential campaign. Dole resorted to derisively calling Boutros Ghali "Bu Bu."« A Qinton administration official, while a bit more diplomatic, was no less blunt, "We need to find a new secretary general."^^ Trying to outdo Dole's ad hominem attack on Boutros Ghali, Albright made it a point of referring to the Secretary General in conversations with her colleagues as "Frenchie."45 Such slurs helped poison future U.S French relations. A few years later, after Boutros Ghali became Secretary General of the Francophone Group of nations, he was asked about Albright's saber rattling against Iraq. He responded: "I am a gentleman, gentlemen don't talk."46 Boutros Ghali's spokesman, Sylvana Foa, said America's policy of demonizing the Secretary General was worthy of "practices that recall the McCarthy era."47 In the midst of the childish name calling by the U.S. politicians, events in central Africa remained out of control and innocent people continued to perish. In December 1996, Albright finally succeeded in ousting Boutros Ghali as Secretary General. She was aided in her effort by a special "anti Boutros" team. Its core members were the NSC's Richard Qarke; James Rubin, Albright's chief assistant; and James Steinberg, the State Department's director of policy planning. The


team devised a plan to dump Boutros Ghali and replace him with the much more docile Kofi Annan from Ghana. They then presented their plan to Secretary of State Christopher and National Security Adviser Lake. Christopher quietly endorsed the plan. A March 6,1996 memo from Clarke, Rubin, and Steinberg to Christopher stated, "our strategy should be to tell [Boutros Ghali] to withdraw and that weTl veto him if he doesn't, and then quietly support Kofi Annan." On March 25, 1996, Clinton approved the final plan drawn up by Albright's cabal. He must have realized the volatility of dumping Boutros Ghali when he said to the team, "Okay, you've persuaded me . . . I'll take the heat." Administration officials, knowing of the bad blood between Albright and the Secretary General, decided not to let her take part in the meeting in which the United States would offer Boutros Ghali what was termed a "dignified exit." Christopher decided to call on former Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and Carnegie Corporation president David Hamburg to lay the groundwork for the Secretary General's departiue from the United Nations. Christopher offered Boutros Ghali an extra year in office that would last until November 1997. On June 18,1996, Christopher met with Boutros Ghali in New York to seek final approval for the deal. The Secretary General, clearly irate at the American maneuvering within the U.N., rejected Christopher's offer. The next day, Christopher told The New York Times that the United States would use its veto to block another term for Boutros Ghali.48 France was beside itself with rage when it learned that the United States intended to use its veto power. One French diplomat chided the American


move, "you shouldn't have begun by announcing that you would use the veto. That's going direct to a nuclear weapon [in international diplomacy]."49 The choice of an African diplomat from an English speaking, instead of a French speaking African country, was yet another impolitic slap at the French. Annan's selection represented another indication that the winds across Africa were strongly blowing in Washington's direction. On November 19, 1996, just two weeks after Clinton's re election, Albright cast the lone veto in the Security Coimcil against a second term for Boutros Ghali. Shortly thereafter, Albright was rewarded with the post of Secretary of State in Qinton's second administration. After witnessing her steamrolling the Secretary General, one of Albright's colleagues described in personal detail the new Secretary of State: "Everyone saw her as someone to fear, to be in awe of . . . Everyone wanted to be able to present themselves as her special friend and not get on her bad side. And that obviously had a big effect on the final selection of the secretary general."5o America's antipathy toward France also ruffled a few feathers in Africa itself. Zaire's Prime Minister Kengo wa Dondo, a pro Mobutu politician whose father was Polish and mother part Rwandan,5i accused the United States and Great Britain of purposefully blocking French plans to intervene in Zaire to stop the civil war. Kengo also decried U.S. and British opposition to a French proposal in the U.N. Security Council to send a multinational peacekeeping force to Zaire to protect Hutu and other refugees fleeing the Tutsi led forces in the eastern part of the coxmtry. Citing


"racist" motives of the Americans and British, Kengo said, "the U.S. and Britain leave the impression that the tragedy which is happening in Zaire does not interest them, maybe because they're dealing with Africans." To the contrary, the Americans and British were dealing with Africans, but these Africans were located in Uganda, Rwanda, and Ethiopia, and they, along with Washington and London, wanted to see the region rid of Mobutu, loyalists like Kengo, and their Hutu compatriots.52 On March 13,1997, citing the divide between the Americans and British on one side and the French on the other, Kengo averred, "France is on our side and all those who want peace in Africa, particularly the Great Lakes region, can only accept the logic of the French government's proposals."53 However, Kengo did not seem to tmderstand that France's power in Africa was steadily waning. Moreover, within four days, Foccart, the great French protector of Paris's friends on the continent, would be dead, and with him, French benevolence and protection. After constantly denying the involvement of U.S. officials in Kabila's offensive, the White House finally admitted on April 10,1997 that its ambassador to Rwanda, Robert Gribbin - the alleged CIA operative met with Kabila between thirty and forty times during the past eighteen months. Gribbin had engineered the funneling of Hutu refugees through "safe corridors" from Zaire to Rwanda during Operation Return. However, Gribbin failed to support military protection for the returning refugees through the war zone.^ It was like leading cattle to slaughter. Instead, some 200 U.S. troops stationed in Kigali, personnel who could


have provided military protection for the Hutus, were tasked with providing direct military support to Kabila's forces and coordinating the activities of U.S. hired mercenaries fighting with them. The Pentagon later admitted that it played a significant role in convincing Rwandan Hutu refugees to return home. It provided something called "public information" training to Rwandan civilian and military personnel. It now seems apparent that the Pentagon was engaged in a classic PSYOPS assignment. Even though Gribbin and the Pentagon could not guarantee the safety of returning refugees, U.S. military personnel trained Rwandans in "operations to assist repatriation of refugees and other displaced civilians, and in planning and conducting public information campaigns supporting refugee repatriation and reintegration." TTie U.S. supplied the Rwandans with leaflets and radio messages. The Pentagon claimed "[these] products encouraged refugees to return to a safe homeland and sought to counter the ex FAR/Interhamwe message that returnees would be killed upon their return to Rwanda." The American PSYOPS program eventually led to the establishment of a "Rwandan Military Information Platoon." Amnesty International criticized the program for "convincing foreign govemmehts and humanitarian organizations that it was safe for Rwandan refugees to return home, where many of them have subsequently been subjected to human rights violations, including extrajudicial executions and 'disappearances.'" When one Pentagon official described Rwanda's human rights record as "surprisingly good," Amnesty International replied that such "uncritical political support of the USA for the




Rwandese Government can only be encouraging the Rwandese authorities to believe that they can carry on violating human rights with little fear of criticism from their most important allies."55 In November 1997, Congressman Smith pointed out the general distrust that humanitarian workers in central Africa had with Gribbin and his embassy staff. Smith said: "Numerous human rights and humanitarian groups have found the U.S. ambassador and his staff to be outspokenly critical of them, that's to say the human rights groups and the humanitarian people and their effort, particularly of the work of the UNHCR." Smith went on to say: "The U.S. Embassy has also publicly defended a Rwandan government human rights record and it's actions, and minimized reports of human rights observers in both Rwanda and Congo.''^^ It should have been readily apparent to Smith and his congressional colleagues that human rights was not the number one priority for the U.S. Embassy in Kigali. Its role, as one of the most important CIA stations in the area, was to nurture Washington's new military alliance in Africa. America's newly appointed U.N. ambassador. Bill Richardson, admitted to the close military cooperation between Uganda, Rwanda, and Kabila - the alliance that the Rwandan Hutus had earlier called part of "Plan Evil." The ambassador said, "to get to Kabila you had to get to Kagame and Museveni." He also said, "I think that Museveni is the front power guy with juice and visibility . . . but I think the real power is Kagame, and he exercises it quietly and skillfully and with little fanfare." Richardson also revealed that Kagame was, "the one who really gets the work done .. . the one who forges the alliance." Towing the DIA line.


Richardson gave a great deal of appropriate credit for the actual organization of the Tutsi alliance to the young former Ugandan intelligence officer who received his military training from the U.S. Army.^^ Richardson was a key player in the American diplomatic team supporting Kabila and his benefactors in central Africa. He arrived at Kabila's Lubumbashi headquarters in early June 1997. Accompanying him was a CIA officer whose special "financial services" were offered to Kabila. The CIA offered to help Kabila recover the millions of dollars Mobutu embezzled from the country during his thirty two years of power.^s The military interest in Kabila's war was highlighted by the fact that Richardson also proposed military training exchanges between U.S. forces and Kabila's rebels. In fact, a Navy admiral, a Marine Corps colonel, and an Army lieutenant colonel were members of Richardson's delegation.59 Although the American officers had no real official military "cotmterparts" on Kabila's side, it is understood that they conducted liaison with the Rwandan and Ugandan military "advisers" to Kabila. On June 24, 1997, many veterans of Africa's paramilitary campaigns met at the Pentagon in a closed conference billed as "The Privatization of National Security Functions in Sub Saharan Africa." Although participation in the conference included college professors and human rights representatives, the DIA insisted that all comments be non attributable.^^ Particularly troubling was the attendance of representatives of such humanitarian organizations as the International Committee of the Red Cross, UNICEF, World Vision, and the U.N. High Commission for

Refugees.61 One participant claimed that there was a consensus among the military, intelligence, and corporate representatives that the use of mercenaries was going to "greatly increase during the next few years." Such an agreement was not surprising considering who was present. Attending was a virtual "Who's Who" of international guns for hire: Harry Ed Soyster of MPRI; Eeben Barlow, then of South Africa's Executive Outcomes; and Tim Spicer, Michael Gnmberg, and Bemie McCabe of Britain's Sandline International. McCabe, a former U.S. Green Beret, was the U.S. agent for Sandline.^^ In fact, a summary provided to the author by the DIA indicated that the U.S. government favored the use of security contractors in stabilizing African crises. The summary states, "basically, these firms provide a service - focused mainly on long term training packages geared to customer needs - long sought by foreign governments." The summary also discusses legitimate reasons for using security companies: "the ending of the Cold War, reluctance of the West to get involved, and the indifference of public opinion." One contentious issue discussed at the conference revolved around the propriety of Western intelligence agencies providing "military and commercial" intelligence about private security firms to their political leadership.^^ Spicer and Gnmberg were significant stakeholders in the Friedland's Diamond Works. A few months later. Diamond Works signed a deal with Rex Diamonds of Antwerp. The agreement provided Diamond Works with the avenues to begin mining diamonds at Angola's Lunda Norte site located in the town of Luo and recently occupied by Luanda's troops.


Moreover, security for Rex's Sierra Leone diamond operations had, at one time, been provided by Barlov/s Executive Outcomes.®^ The international intrigues of the mercenaries gathered on the west bank of the Potomac River in Virginia did not stop with Africa. In January 1997, Prime Minister Julius Chan of Papua New Guinea hired Sandline. The firm's orders were clear: put down a long simmering rebellion on the nickel rich island of Bougainville. In 1988, RTZ was forced out of Bougainville's Panguna mine after the firm had systematically reneged on paying the native islanders compensation and failed to prevent environmental pollution. RTZ's indifference to native claims led to a full scale rebellion against the Papua New Guinea central government and the establishment of a rebel government on the island. Although Papua New Guinea managed to militarily regain control of much of the island, the Panguna mine in the central part of the island was a stronghold of BRA (Bougainville Revolutionary Army) activity. RTZ wanted to reclaim its lost property. The offer by Sandline to retake Panguna was attractive to both Chan and RTZ. However, there was another aspect to RTZ's interest in taking back its Bougainville mine. RTZ's relationship with the ubiquitous Friedland gave the firm initial access to Sandline and Executive Outcomes. Friedland, himself, had partnered with RTZ in the past. His Galactic Resources, before it went bankrupt as a result of the Summitville disaster, sold 30 per cent of its shares in the Philippine Far South East project in Luzon's Cordillera region to RTZ. Cordillera is yet another indigenous area, which seems to be a virtual


pre requisite for Friedland's exploitative intentions. There was also speculation that Friedland was involved in providing some of the financial backing to Sandlines's and RTZ's plan to recapture Panguna from the Bougainville rebels.® Chan hinted that Sandline would have another mission tied directly to the mining companies in the neighboring Indonesian ruled province of Irian Jaya. West Papuan separatists were using sanctuaries just inside the Papua New Guinea border. Chan was tmder pressure from Indonesia and Irian Jaya based mining companies to clear the rebels from the border. Chan, hinting that Sandline would operate against the West Papuan rebels, said: "Bougainville is not the only national security situation we have to contend with. On our western border we have some of the most inhospitable terrain on earth to monitor and patrol." In February 1997, Executive Outcomes mercenaries, directed by British army officers, began arriving in Port Moresby. Their mission was said to entail technical support but their ultimate goal was clear: secure Bougainville.^7 On March 17,1997, after Brigadier General Jerry Singirok, Papua New Guinea's Defense Forces commander (who was woimded in the Bougainville civil war), became disenchanted about the mercenary deal, he launched an abortive military coup. Civilian rioters supported him. Although Chan retaliated by dismissing Singirok, his government eventually coUapsed. Sandline's advance team leader, who was none other than the ubiquitous Spicer, was arrested by the Papua New Guinea military along with some seventy British, South African, and Ethiopian


mercenaries. Except for Spicer, they were expelled from the country. Spicer was held tmder arrest and threatened with execution several times.®^ The loathing felt for the mercenaries by Papua New Guinea's army boiled over when Spicer was led into a Port Moresby coturtroom to answer the legal charges against him. Several of the country's soldiers shouted: "Kill him! Kill him! He's stealing our money!"® Some of Spicer's former military colleagues seemed to take some deHght in the predicament of their comrade. One veteran who served with Spicer said: "He was the most arrogant, pompous bastard I have ever met. . . He was always very pleased with himself, and I'm not sturprised one bit by what's happened."7o Later, Chan's replacement. Bill Skate, took Spicer to court again and a government probe of the entire affair ensued. Much to the dismay of RTZ and Friedland, Skate was willing to negotiate an autonomy agreement with Bougainville, thus sealing the fate of Panguna as far as the mining barons were concerned. Skate said all those involved in the Sandline affair, "must be taken to task over the legitimacy of their actions . . . the Sandline contract was not in the nation's interest, nor within the spirit and letter of the constitution. The crisis was an unfortunate blemish in the history of Papua New Guinea and we must cleanse the ill feeling it created in our nation."7i It was later discovered that the plot to introduce Sandline to Papua New Guinea and Bougainville was hatched a year earlier. On April 7, 1996, a group participating in "Operation Oyster" met, amid throngs of Japanese tourists and honeymooners, in the coffee




shop at the Hilton Hotel in the Queensland resort city of Cairns. Present at the secretive meeting were Tim Spicer, the ubiquitous Tony Buckingham, General Singirok, and Defense Minister Matias Ijape. The resulting deal was partially financed through the Hong Kong financial firm Jardine Fleming, a component of the huge Jardine Matheson Group. Jardine Fleming had a stake in Orogen, a company with significant gold and oil holdings in Papua New Guinea. Jardine was also the same firm that had a partnership with Kroll Associates of the U.K.. Hong Kong's Independent Commission Against Corruption later revealed that $18 million transferred from Hong Kong to Port Moresby to allegedly pay Sandline vanished.^ The money was paid into Sandline Holdings' accotmt number 600774426 at the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank on February 5,1997. According to a Papua New Guinea judicial report, the accotmt holders were listed as Simon Mann, Lafras Luitingh, Eeben Barlow, and Anthony L. R. Buckingham.73 In total. Sandline's contract was valued at some $36 million. ^4 The groundwork for an invasion of Bougainville, an operation Sandline code named "Operation Contravene," was apparently laid when, on October 13, 1996, Bougainville's interim Premier Theodore Miriung, was assassinated. Although Miritmg was accused by the BRA of being a quisling like traitor, the Papua New Guinea Defense Force considered him a BRA spy. Miriung irritated the Papua New Guinea army when, in September 1996, he accused them of executing eight Bougainvilleans in the north of the island. With Miriung out of the way, the invasion of the island would be made easier, or so the mercenaries thought. A later


government inquiry laid the blame for Mirixmg's assassination squarely on Singirok's troops and pro government troops in Bougainvilleas Earlier in 1996, Singirok attempted to negotiate his own mercenary deal with a German firm called International Business Company. All of a sudden, he was told to end those negotiations in favor of Sandline. He said Defense Minister Ijape told him, "Bro, you can become a rich man if you engage this group."76 A few months later. Executive Outcomes' chief executive officer Nick van den Bergh seemed to tip his hand on the compan/s operations in the Pacific. In a radio interview, van den Bergh was asked about Pacific operations by commentator Stan Correy: Correy: "And would companies like Executive Outcomes be interested in getting a contract elsewhere in the world, outside Africa, say somewhere like Bougainville or Freeport in Irian Jaya?" Van den Bergh: "If we look at the specific region that you mention, we haven't worked there, but I'm sure if we get an invitation from, maybe the government or a private company like the mining company that you mentioned, we would surely be glad to go in, have a chat with these guys and would like to consult them. We wouldn't have a problem with A Papua New Guinea Judicial Commission headed by Australian Justice Warwick John Andrew, CBE neatly tied together all of the players in the mercenary invasion plot. In his ruling the judge stated: ^^The controllers of Sandline International are obviously


Mr. Buckingham, Mr. (Michael) Grunberg [of Diamond Works], and at least to some extent Mr. Spicer ... There is a strong inference that Sandline Holdings Limited may be something of a joint venture between the interests of Mr. Buckingham and the interests of Mr. Barlow and Executive Outcomes."78 Justice Andrew also concluded: "The information provided by Sandline Holdings that they are entirely separate from Executive Outcomes cannot be correct, but the exact nature of their relationship seems clouded behind a web of interlocking companies whose ownership is difficult to trace."79

There was also a significant intelligence angle to the operation. Australia's own complicity in the affair was revealed in the fact that the weapons and Russian built helicopter grmships to be used by Sandline's mercenaries were stored at the Tindal Royal Australian Air Force base in the Northern The intrigue in paradise was also well known to the upper echelons of the Qinton administration. The NSA had its massive intelligence gathering ears pointed to the brewing tempest in the southwestern Pacific for quite some time. In February 1998, it was reported that New Zealand's Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB), a virtual antipodean annex of the NSA, was monitoring the satellite phone of Bougainville's Revolutionary Army (BRA) leader Francis Ona. He regularly used the phone to communicate with his supporters in Australia. Ona, a bitter foe of the mining exploitation of his island, had refused to go along with New Zealand sponsored talks for the island. In 1998, those talks resulted- in the Lincoln Agreement, which promised a different status for Bougainville. However,



New Zealand kept its ears pointed at the Bougainville rebels. It was reported that stepped up eavesdropping on Ona and his supporters was being conducted from a massive satellite interception facility at Waihopai, on New Zealand'^s South Island.®^ The facility, which is largely funded by NSA, routinely intercepted telephone calls throughout the region. The NSA had an additional ear pointed toward Bougainville. Australia's Defense Signals Directorate (DSD), NSA's Australian subsidiary, installed a SIGINT "outstation" on the tip of Cape York in northern Queensland at Bamaga. Bamaga has been a remote detachment of DSD's Cabarlah station in Queensland since 1988. One of the station's main purposes is to listen to the radio transmissions of the BRA. Many experts familiar with DSD believe that Australia passes on intercepted phone calls to Papua New Guinea. it was also possible that in the new era of economic warfare, some of the SIGINT may have ended up in the hands of RTZ and other mining companies having an interest in Bougainville. The United States concurrently stepped up arms shipments to the region. In January 1998, the Solomon Islands' Prime Mmister Bartholomew Ulufa'alu asked Australia to seize and destroy a $ 4 million arms shipment to his country from the United States. New Zealand eventually took posession of the arms xmtil a decision was reached on their disposal. The arms deal had been negotiated by Ulufa'alu's predecessor, Solomon Mamaloni, with Centmy Arms International, Inc. of Boca Raton, Florida and St. Albans, Vermont. The State Department rejected Ulufa'alu's request, citing the fact that it had approved the export licenses of the


American arms exporting company. Such export licenses are always granted with the concurrence of the Pentagon and CIA. Ironically, the Pentagon and U.S. Customs Service expressed misgivings over the granting of the export license due to the fact that many Solomon Islanders support the Bougainville rebels against Papua New Guinea. Although it is certain the arms were destined for Bougainville, as the Solomons do not have an army, it is also likely they were going to the BRA. However, the United States supports Papua New Guinea against the secessionists. The shipment of arms to such a sensitive region is eerily similar to the arms embargo busting conducted by the United States in central Africa. A closer examination of Century Arms bolsters this comparison. The company was fotmded in the late 1950s by Canadian businessman William Sucher. After Sucher's death, his son Michael took over. He, along with his mother, two brothers and sister are major stockholders in Century Arms, Inc.; its Montreal branch. Century International Arms Ltd.; and other related companies. The firm's Boca Raton management claims that Century Arms of Montreal and Century Arms of Boca Raton are unrelated. However, when a Miami reporter called the Montreal firm, the receptionist revealed that Century Arms, Ltd.'s parent company was located in Boca Raton. The world of international arms dealing is as interlinked and murky as the world of mining and mercenaries. There is also a reported link between Century Arms and covert activities. The Sucher family has been linked to Emmanuel Weigensberg of Montreal. Weigensberg's company, Trans World, brokered the first arms shipment to Nicaraguan rebels in 1984. Weigensberg




was paid more than $2 million for his involvement in the Iran-contra deal. After the death of the elder Sucher, Weigensberg headed Century Arms Ltd. Moreover, similar to Executive Outcomes and Sandline, Trans World and Century Arms shared the same Montreal address. *3 Following the Papua New Guinea debacle, the DIA, in addition to inviting mercenaries, brought together at its Pentagon conclave U.S. government officials with businessmen having interests in Africa. These included the DIA's "Mr. Africa," William Thom and twenty of his agency colleagues; former Bush State Department official Herman Cohen and former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for African Affairs (under Reagan, Bush, and Clinton) James Woods»4; and Bermy Bray of Sierra Rutile America, the firm that originally introduced Executive Outcomes to Sierra Leone. Also invited were a group of African defense attaches in Washington, Colonel John Mateeka of Uganda, Colonel Francisco Antonio of Angola, Colonel Gilbert Chileshe of Zambia, and Colonel Diallo Mamadou Alidou of Although Colonel Mateeka of Uganda felt the conference had some good intentions, especially regarding private army support for humanitarian operations,®^ privatized U.S. armies were gearing up to work with at least seven U.S. trained African battalions, consisting of between 500 and 800 men.®7 Trained by U.S. military personnel under the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI), the units were designed to rapidly intervene in crises anywhere on the African continent. Assisting in the effort to convince African states to join ACRI and utilize the services of


MPRI were the two former U.S. government Africa hands: Herman Cohen and James Woods.^s By far, the loudest cheerleader for mercenary proliferation was the DIA's Thom. He cited the long usage of mercenaries as beneficial to Africa. He told the Pentagon gathering: "Historically, Africa before and during colonialism, plus after independence, had a long tradition of using foreign troops," adding that mercenary forces have proven to be "efficient and loyal." According to a senior Pentagon military officer, ACRI's major impetus came from MPRI and LOGICON, another top Pentagon contractor.^o The ACRI plan was revealed by the Pentagon earlier in 1997. Testifying on March 12, 1997 before a Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee, Thomas E. McNamara, the Assistant Secretary of State for Political Military Affairs, described nations receiving U.S. military assistance as "focus" coxmtries. What McNamara failed to mention was that some of these nations were among the worst human rights violators in the world. McNamara also announced that U.S. military assistance to Africa would be concentrated on those nations participating in "the African Crisis Response Force (ACRF) initiative."^! McNamara was no stranger to African conflicts. He served in diplomatic posts in Lubumbashi, Bukavu, and as Deputy Chief of Mission in Kinshasa. From 1988 to 1991, he was the U.S. ambassador to another nation ravaged by insurgencies Colombia. McNamara also served several stints on the NSC where he was responsible for various African programs.52 When Charles Snyder, the number two man at the State Department's Africa Desk, was asked at a


conference why ACRI was being extended to totalitarian countries, he defended the decision by saying it was in the interest of "constructive engagement." Ironically, the Reagan administration used the very same term to defend its own ties with the apartheid government of South Africa.^ Actually, Secretary of State Christopher first proposed an African rapid response force during his October 1996 visit to Africa. It was to be mainly targeted against African insurrectionist groups.^^ When some nations (most notably France and South Africa) balked at the idea of a force, the proposal's title was wordsmithed to "initiative."^^ Paris and Johannesburg were deeply suspicious about American intentions. The South Africans in particular saw the United States program as an attempt to dictate to Africa.®^ The South Africans saw themselves as the regional leader for Africa and its saw ACRI as a tool for the Americans to gain influence in Africa at its expense. South Africa's fears were backed by a few other African coimtries that saw American military involvement as the "thin end of an American wedge" to ensure Washington's dominance over the continent's vast natural resources.^^ Other nations agreed with South Africa in not supporting the American military initiatives for Africa. They included Egypt and Zimbabwe. They announced that they were not signing on to ACRI. In Jrme 1996, Niger's military head of state. General Ibrahim Bare Mainassara, convened in his capital Niamey, a conference of fifty traditional chiefs from ten West African nations. The chiefs were not going to stand by while national governments began signing up for American military led conflict resolution programs.




Mainassara summed up the frustrations of the chiefs in saying, "In solving these [ethnic, religious, resource based or territorial conflicts], African states and political classes have adopted the regrettable habit of marginali2dng traditional chiefs." In a clear slap at the American initiatives, the Niger leader declared, "unfortunately, history has shown us that military and political approaches to conflict resolution have many weaknesses."^® France had traditionally maintained close relations with West Africa's traditional rulers. By getting the chiefs to warn against American plans for the continent, Paris was clearly playing a trump card that Washington did not have. Also not buying into Washington's military plans for the region was Tanzania. In November 1997, after it was granted a paltry $225,000 in aid from the United States, the government annoimced that it would not use the money to send its officers to the United States for military training. The Pentagon admitted that while Tanzania had never formally agreed to participate in ACRI, the U.S. Army had already set up a training course for Tanzanian field artillery persormel at Fort Sill, Oklahoma and another coturse for Tanzanian officers at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The Tanzanian government, guided by the hand of former President Nyerere, said it favored an African regional solution. One Foreign Ministry official said: "We don't subscribe to bilateral military assistance, we can only work through a sub regional grouping such as the Southern African Development Coordination area." The Pentagon revealed that America's NATO command in Europe, European Command or "EUCOM" had directed the approach to Tanzania.^?


At a conference on conflict resolution held in Arusha in January 1998, Nyerere seemed to scoff at American desires to aid in settling African conflicts. Speaking about the secessionist movement on the islands of Zanzibar and Pemba, Nyerere declared: "The Zanzibar problem is a Tanzanian problem." He also indicated he was in a better position than Washington was in solving the conflict in neighboring Burundi. Nyerere said: "I have already told them [the Buyoya government] that if Tm a problem, Tm ready to quit, and if the venue [for the talks] is the problem Tm ready to go even to the moon."if* Even America's closest ally, Canada, was critical of ACRI, albeit in a more "muted way."i°i Canada traditionally supported more conventional approaches to peacekeeping, including operations under the aegis of both the U.N. and OAU. However, given the involvement of Canadian mining companies in African affedrs, the Canadian government was willing to go only so far in opposing Washington's plans for the continent. From 1997 onward, to say that American military personnel were fanning across Africa would have been an understatement in every sense. One might not think that the Comoros, a small chain of tropical volcanic islands in the Mozambique Channel between Madagascar and the African mainland, would become a backdrop to the French US rivalry raging elsewhere on the continent. After all, the islands were only known to the outside world for exporting an exotic aromatic tree product called "ylang ylang," used to make perfume. Nevertheless, the Comoros were drawn into the Paris Washington conflict. Made up of four islands, the Comoros had never fully broken away from France. In


fact, one island, Mayotte, voted to remain an overseas territory of France upon the achievement of independence of the other three islands - Grand Comoro, Anjouan and Moheli - in 1975. France put down a Comorian coup led by the famed mercenary Bob Denard in 1995. Denard ruled the islands as a CO president after he led a previous coup in 1978. Anjouan and Moheli inhabitants, like their compatriots on Mayotte, resented the high handed rule and corruption from the main island of Grand Comoro. Consequently, in September 1997, separatists on Anjouan declared independence. Soon, Comorian troops landed on the island to put down the rebellion. However, they encountered heavy resistance from foreign troops (possibly mercenaries) who were said to have alighted from the French light cruiser La Boudeuse. Some observers claimed the Anjouan troops were, in fact, French.102 It was known that some of the backers of the Anjouan separatist movement had links with the extreme right wing French monarchist group Action Fran^aise, former Lebanese Maronite General Michel Aoim, and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, which, like Anjouan, was an internationally unrecognized secessionist territory. The Comoros also made use of foreign mercenaries. Some twenty Serbs were positioned in northern Madagascar to aid a planned Comorian invasion of the wayward island. Even though the Serbs had fought with the French in Zaire against Kabila, they, like their Russian mercenary colleagues, tended to work for anyone who would pay them.i°4 As far as they were concerned, working for the Comoros was no different than being hired by Mobutu.


The American military interest in the Comoros and tiny Anjouan, as with its pattern throughout Africa, represented larger economic interests. A Providence, Rhode Island based firm was interested in developing Anjouan into a $500 million free trade zone under a 99 year lease. The firm, Forbes & Company, reportedly had connections to Rhode Island Congressman Patrick Kennedy, the son of Senator Edward Kennedy; Republican Lieutenant Governor of Rhode Island Bernard A. Jackvony; and Providence Mayor Vincent Cianci.105 Kennedy and Secretary of State Madeleine Albright interceded on behalf of the company with Comorian President Mohammed Taki. Foccart had originally sponsored Taki as leader of the Comoros. However, after Foccart's death, Taki was clearly looking for other benefactors.^^® Prior to the Comorian assault on Anjouan, the government broadcasting system began transmitting news about rising crime on Anjouan, the use of drugs, rampant looting, and vandalism. In fact, Anjouan was largely peaceful when it declared independence. It was also true that a large majority of Anjouan's population favored independence or re attachment to France in a status similar to Mayotte's. The propaganda barrage from Grand Comoro seemed like a classic PSYOPS campaign designed to justify an impending military action. It was then discovered that from August 25 to 29,1997, there was a U.S. military delegation in Moroni, the Comorian capital on Grand Comoro. The Americans sponsored a conference of military personnel and civilian government officials, titled in the finest example of Pentagon "Newspeak": "Relations between citizens and the security forces."io7 This was the same type of


civil affairs training being offered by U.S. Special Forces and other troops elsewhere in Africa. In the Comoros, the training seems to have been directly tied to the abortive Comorian attempt to invade Anjouan. There was an additional clue to the Comoros having adopted the advice of American military advisers. A private radio station called Tropic FM, owned by a former member of parliament and opposition leader, criticized the "trickery" of American investors, chided the government for its dictatorial ways, and revealed President Taki's lavish life style. On July 5, 1996, forty armed policemen burst into Tropic FM's studio on Grand Comoro island and confiscated the transmitter. Such a move would certainly be in keeping with the U.S. PSYOPS proclivities in silencing impopular radio stations in other countries around the world. American support for the Comoros government was set back on November 6, 1998 when Taki suddenly died of an apparent heart attack. The new president, Tadjiddin Said Ben Massunde, an ethnic Anjouanian, seemed much more agreeable in seeking an accommodation with the breakaway island. The presence of high ranking U.S. military personnel in Africa gave an understandable rise to the fears that there was an American "hidden agenda." Just prior to Christopher's 1996 African visit. General James Jamerson, the deputy commander in chief of the U.S. European Command in Stuttgart, Germany visited the OAU's Conflict Management Center's Addis Ababa headquarters. The center, built with U.S. frmds, is a computerized early warning center that monitors all of Africa's conflicts around the clock, Moreover, ACRI


provides a link between participant armies and the Addis Ababa center. According to the agreement signed by the seven ACRI participants, each member battalion would be assigned American military advisers. Also, every battalion was to be furnished with 500 Motorola UHF VHF walkie talkie sets and two satellite telephones. According to the manufacturer, the ASTRO Spectra Digital radios offer a range of encryption options. Obviously, regardless of what encryption strength the African battalions use, the NSA is certainly able to monitor the encrypted conversations over the radios.^^^ The United States soon sought to expand participation in ACRI beyond the seven original participants. In August 1996, U.S. troops were in the Ivory Coast, a traditional French bastion, training Ivorian troops in reconnaissance operations, intelligence gathering, ambush techniques, rainy season operations, and daytime and nighttime explosives detonation.ii^ In September 1996, George Moose solicited participation from Botswana, Tanzania, Kenya, Zimbabwe, and Mozambique.n^ In February 1996, U.S. Army General J. H. Binford Peay III laid the groundwork for further solicitations when he visited Eritrea, Djibouti, Kenya, and Tanzania. To pick up Madagascar's support, Peay dispatched the Pentagon's Vince Kern to Antananarivo to offer U.S. military training to Malagasy officers. The two countries agreed to resume the training of Malagasy military officers at West Point and the Air Force Academy, gy July 1997^ U.S. Special Forces training was expanded to include officers from Lesotho, South Africa, Zambia, Guinea Bissau, Cameroon, and Rwanda. This training


was conducted at the U.S. Air Force Special Operations School at Fort Hurlburt, Floridad^^ Other U.S. military training, mostly under the JCET program, was provided to enlisted ranks in Benin, Botswana, Cameroon, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Ghana, Guinea Bissau, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Malawi, Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.^i^ In February 1998, Lieutenant Colonel James Smaugh, the chief of an entity attached to the U.S. Embassy in Gaborone known as the "U.S. Office of Defense Cooperation in Botswana," visited Lesotho. Smaugh reportedly offered Lesotho Defense Force members training on civil military relations, a euphemism for the same type of PSYOPs and civil affairs training previously experienced firsthand by the residents of Rwanda, Uganda, Zaire, Angola, and Anjouan. Smaugh's unit in Botswana was said to be responsible for U.S. military assistance programs in Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, and Zambia.i^^ In 1994, Botswana became an additional focal point for U.S. military activity in Africa. In a desert wilderness area at Mapharanangwane near the town of Molepolole, some fifty five miles northwest of Gaborone, construction began on a multi million dollar air base merely called "Contract 15." Also dubbed "Operation Eagle" and "Project Eagle," because of the involvement of the United States, the base was criticized by many as being much too large for Botswana's defense needs.ii^ Critics included Foreign Minister Theo Ben Gutirab of Namibia who said; "We have seen reports which suggest that it is a huge military base which, on the face of it, goes beyond the needs of


Botswana as a country. Some people even suggest it goes beyond the needs of southern Africa as a region. If it is confirmed beyond any doubt that it is a huge military base, that creates suspicion. What is the purpose? Whom is it intended for? Who is going to use it? Then we would be very much concerned, because we want to close the chapter of militarization in southern Africa."ii8 Gurirab had good reason to be concerned. Namibia had, on numerous occasions, complained about Botswanan army border incursions. It successfully lobbied Germany, its pre South Africa colonial master, against their plan to sell Botswana fifty Leopard tanks. Botswana also obtained fighter planes from the United States and Canada and Scorpion tanks from Britain. To counter this military buildup, Namibia began receiving military training and equipment from Russia.ii^ The air base caused a political tremor in the Namibian National Assembly. The leader of the conservative opposition Democratic Tumhalle Alliance, Geoffrey Mwilima, asked what the Namibian Intelligence Service was doing to forestall a military threat from Botswana. He said: "We can only hope they are providing the Government with useful and accurate information about any possible military build up in Botswana, as has been suggested by that countr/s big air base funded by the United States."i2o Botswana's Home Affairs Minister, Bahiti Temare, was also critical of the base. He said that Defense Minister Ian Khama was favoring army expenditures over other departments. Botswana's opposition said the money for the base would have been better spent on unemployment, housing for the poor, and general poverty. Opposition leader Knight



Maripe asked: "Why should we put up such a sophisticated and costly facility when people are starving?" In an editorial, Botswana's independent newspaper Mmegi wondered who Botswana's enemy really was. Botswana did have a minor simmering border feud with Namibia, which involved the disputed and uninhabited Chobe River island of Sedudu in the East Caprivi strip. At first glance the island - a low lying marshy speck dotted by a few trees - would seem inconsequential. The Caprivi Strip, itself, is a geographical oddity - a long and narrow strip of Namibia jutting between the border of Botswana with Angola and Zambia. In 1890, Germany got the Caprivi Strip in return for giving up claims to British-controlled southwest Uganda. The Germans, who originally controlled Namibia as the colony of South West Africa, wanted Caprivi as an access corridor to the Zambezi River, which they mistakenly believed would give them a navigable waterway to the Indian Ocean. Presently, because the Okavango River cuts through the strip, Namibia is in a position to cut off the water supply to Botswana's critical Okavango Delta. In December 1997, Botswanan troops upped the ante when they seized another tminhabited island called Situngu. The stage was being set for a war over water - a contentious issue that was not unique to southern Africa. The feud actually began with a less than earth shattering Botswanan military incursion into Namibia in which Botswana was accused of stealing fifty-two goats.^^i However, Namibia was more concerned about Namibians who were crossing into Botswana seeking political asylum. By November 1998, these political refugees numbered over 1000. These included such


important Namibians as former secretary general of Namibia's long governing South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) Mishake Muyongo; the head of the Mafwe ethnic group, Chief Boniface Mamili; and the Governor of the Caprivi Region John Mabuku. Caprivi is not only a nascent bone of contention for Namibia and Botswana, but for Zambia, as well. The Caprivi inhabitants are ethnic Lozis who want to unite with their tribal brethren in Zambia's western province Barotseland. The transborder Lozis formed two undergrormd secessionist movements to achieve their aims of an independent Barotseland - the Caprivi Liberation Movement in the Caprivi Strip and the Barotse Patriotic Front in Zambia.122 For the United States and its corporate mining interests, such disruption is tmwelcome. Hence, this area, like the Great Lakes Region and West Africa, came into the line of sight of the Pentagon's military planners. The Mapharanangwane base, designed by the British firm Sir Alexander Gibbs and Partners and built by the French construction firm Spie Batignolles, cost around $250 million. South African and Italian companies were also involved in the project. Later reports in the local press claimed the total cost to the United States and Botswana was an astronomical $2 billion. While the real cost was far less, the base impressively consisted of a 1000 foot long runway, a military barracks, small hospital, and a number of empty buildings and warehouses. Botswana's official story was the base was for its air force - which at the time of construction consisted only of six British made Strikemaster ground attack jets and a few transpprt planes and trainers. The runway was designed for


wide bodied planes like C 5s and Boeing 747 jumbo jets.123

It was later discovered that in addition to hosting an American SIGINT listening post - said to involve other American communications and intelligence bases on the British islands of Ascension in the Atlantic and Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean Mapharanangwe was built by the United States and apartheid South Africa as an evacuation staging area. Washington and the government of F.W. de Klerk feared that the evacuation of hundreds of thousands of South African whites might be necessary in the event of a bloodbath following South Africa's transition to majority rule. After such a scenario failed to materialize, the United States decided to turn the base into a staging area for ACRI forces engaged in quelling civil wars and secessionist movements in Africa. The Pentagon was also reported to be planning for the pre positioning of military equipment at the base.^24 Soon, the reasons for the base would become crystal clear to Gurirab and other opponents of Botswana's military buildup. The United States plaimed to stay in Africa for a very long time. Also, neighboring Namibia is rich in diamonds, especially in the area south of Luderitz, a German coastal community that is fiercely independent of the Namibian government and other outsiders. However, Namibia is in the sights of the diamond companies and their mercenary colleagues. In the summer of 1998, two mining companies with interests in Namibia - Indigo Sky Gems and Camelthom Mining - were charged by the Namibian government with having links to both Executive Outcomes and Sandline. In 1996, Nujoma was


assured by Hugh Daniel, a representative of Tony Buckingham and a director of both Camelthom and Indigo Sky Gems, that Branch Energy, the majority shareholder of the companies, had no ties to Executive Outcomes or any other mercenary firms. Nevertheless, the Namibian government decided to launch an investigation of the ties between the various companies. Namibia's Deputy Minister of Mines and Energy Jesaya Nyamu said the links between and Indigo Sky Gems and Buckingham's British based companies were "emerging more clearly." Nyamu also said the Namibian government was aware that, "these companies are actually managerially linked to each other, xmder the control of Mr. Buckingham. This information we did not have at the start."i25 Indigo also began using its hired gtms to repress demonstrations waged by small independent miners who are fearful of being denied access to the mines at Neu Schwaben. The company also brazenly brought legal action against the mayor of the town of Karibib and a member of the Namibian parliament for allegedly fanning the flames of the independent miners' revolt.126 For his part, Nyamu was not buying Buckingham's line. Based on the Papua New Guinea fiasco and documents revealed following the judicial inquiry there, Nyamu said: "The information provided by Sandline Holdings that they are entirely separate from Executive Outcomes cannot be true, but the exact nature of their relationship seems clouded behind a web of interlocking companies whose ownership is difficult to trace." Nyamu said his boss, the Minister of Mines and Energy, thought from the start that there was probably a relationship between Branch Energy and


Executive Outcomes. When the ministry investigated the links. Branch Energy provided "categorical" evidence that Branch Energy and Executive Outcomes were separate companies. Diamond Works Vice President for Corporate Development Bill Trenaman declared: "Branch Energy Ltd. Has never, repeat never, contracted with Executive Outcomes."i27 Nyamu disagreed and said, "a picture is emerging that it seems there is an interlink between all these companies of Buckingham, particular the management level." For example, court documents from Papua New Guinea showed that a London telephone number - + 44 171 351 5555 - was used by Spicer on January 30, 1997 to send faxes to Papua New Guinea's General Stngirok. That same number appears on three Indigo Sky Gems letterhead faxes sent by Buckingham associate Paul Atherton, Diamond Works' Commercial Manager in London, to Namibia between May 9 and September 8, 1997. In accordance with labor regulations, copies of those faxes were filed at the Windhoek Magistrate's Court.128

Diamond Works' Trenaman told a Namibian newspaper that when his company took over 100 per cent of the shares of Branch Energy Ltd. On October 11, 1996, Branch's only assets were diamond mining concessions in Angola and Sierra Leone. However, the share records of Indigo Sky Gems and Camelthom Mining, held by their auditors in Windhoek, indicate that Branch Energy (Namibia) Ltd. Directly held 98 per cent of shares in both companies. Branch Energy (Namibia) relinquished the shares on January 17, 1997 to Branch Africa Holdings. Branch Energy (Namibia) was registered at 15, The Grange, St. Peter Post,


Guernsey, while Branch Africa Holdings, was registered in Douglas, the Isle of Man. Before January 17, 1997, Branch Energy (Namibia) was controlled by Buckingham's Branch Energy, Ltd. And ultimately. Diamond Works. Until August 15, 1995, Pierre Roux, a Windhoek lawyer, held the single share of Branch Energy (Namibia). Furthermore, a February 1997 Diamond Works docmnent involving a European Union mining development loan to Indigo Sky Gems lists Lifeguard Management Ltd. As controlled by Branch Energy, Ltd. The Diamond Works document states that Lifeguard Security Sierra Leone, Ltd. Is "an affiliate of Executive Outcomes." The loan document also states that Branch Energy Ltd. Had a controlling interest in Ibis Aviation, a company linked to Executive Outcomes.129 The same document indicates that Branch Energy and Buckingham were instrumental in introducing Ranger Oil into Namibia. It states: "The Chief Executive Officer and owner of Branch Energy Ltd. Is Mr. A. L. R. Buckingham." The document goes on to state that Branch Energy Ltd. Held 20 per cent of the shares in the Offshore Development Company, in addition to a majority controlling interest in Heritage Oil & Gas, "which owns an exploration interest in Block 4 (Angola) and which promoted Ranger Oil into Block 2213 in Namibia."i30 This is yet a further example of how intricate and confusing ^e relationships are in the murky world of mining and mercenaries. If one were even so inclined to follow the money trail, he or she would be faced with numerous dead ends, endless pass throughs, and thousands of links. The links are frustrating to journalists and researchers around the world who have


tried to get to the bottom of the secret deal making process. In addition to the frustration of running into complicated business deals, they have also been faced with abusive and threatening letters and phone calls from some of the principal companies involved. In addition to Namibia, South Africa became suspicious of U.S. intentions in southern Africa. In an editorial commenting on President Clinton's 1998 Africa trip, Johannesburg's Mail and Guardian described Washington's policy toward Africa: "Before getting swept up in the euphoria surroimding Bill Qinton's visit, it would be wise to keep in mind the bottom line defining it: the United States president is visiting Africa in pursuit of American interests. The Cold War is over. The U.S. has emerged victorious as a global power. The changed context illustrates the agenda of Qinton's visit: the need to reinforce the Pax Americana, through symbolism and through reforms, at home or abroad."i3i Referring to the ACRI force, the paper stated: ". . . an African sectuity force resourced by the U.S. is likely to be pan African in name only, for its core agenda will surely be set by those who provide the resources."i32 Explaining Qinton's choice of Botswana on his itinerary, the Mail and Guardian rhetorically asked, "What explains the choice of Botswana on the itinerary?




Is the reason economic, that this is the continent's main unsung economic success story, with growth rates of more than 10 [per cent] for nearly two decades, or is the reason also strategic? Is there any truth to the stories about the construction of a major U.S. air base in Botswana? If yes, could such a base be aimed anywhere else but at the countries in the region with aspirations to consolidate state sovereignty in spite of the constraints of globalization as defined by a single super power?"^33 America's military training of Botswana facilitated its army's invasion, with the South African National Defense Force, of Lesotho in September 1998. Some 200 Botswana troops, some having just received U.S. military training, took part in the operation. The invasion was prompted after the pro South African ruling political party, the Lesotho Congress for Democracy Party (LCD), faced a Lesotho army mutiny. The revolt was triggered when it was charged that the LCD rigged the vote to gain power. Ethnic Basotho nationalist opposition parties and Lesotho's BCing Letsie III supported the Lesotho army. The army and the opposition feared that the LCD and its leader. Prime Minister Pakalitha Mosisili, were negotiating the annexation of Lesotho to South Africa. They pointed to the fact that Mosisili failed to inform the King of his decision to invite in the South African led military force. The joint South Africa Botswana Operation Boleas sought to quell the revolt. The move came as President Mandela was being lauded as a peacemaker by President Clinton during a state visit to the AATiite House. Lesotho's opposition parties - the Basotholand Congress Party, the Basotho National Party, and the Marematlou Freedom Party - as well as several


opposition South African parties condemned the invasion, which went very badly for South Africa when Lesotho army troops put up fierce resistance. South Africa was forced to withdraw many of its forces when it became apparent that the Lesotho Defense Force would not give up easily. The escapade resulted in Maseru, the nation's capital, being largely destroyed. Washington's Pentagon planners were not only active in southern and central Africa in the late 1990s. In early 1998, General Jamerson was on the African road again. Visiting Mauritania, a one time ally of Iraq's Sadaam Hussein, Jamerson discussed with President Maaouiya Quid Ahmed Taya the "fruitful cooperation between the Mauritanian armed forces and the U.S. armed forces.''^^^ Mauritanian forces had taken part in a U.S. led training exercise in a remote comer of Senegal bordering Mali and Mauritania. The exercise, called "Guidimaka 98," lasted ten days.^^® It seemed certain that the United States convinced Mauritania, a country accused of permitting slavery of thousands of blacks from its southern region, to take part m America's grand military alliance in Africa. The U.S. military was also active in providing military support to the Economic Community of West African States Military Operations Group (ECOMOG), the West African peacekeeping force in Liberia. Recipients of aid included Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Sierra Leone, and most interestingly, Nigeria. The latter was under sharp international criticism for executing political opponents of the military regime of General Sard Abacha. However, it was not imtil July 1997 when the Urdted States belatedly recognized that U.S. military assistance to Nigeria was improper; it announced that


the cotintry was barred from participating in the ACRI.137 Nigeria's shunning by the United States military planners drew a sharp rebuke from Lagos. At an Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) conference in Lom6, Nigeria's Foreign Minister, Tom Ikimi, called ACRI an "imperialist maneuver" designed to "manipulate African armies in a neo colonialist manner." Ddmi said the West's goals entailed a "repartitioning of Africa into spheres of influence and interests."i38 However, Washington's policy toward Nigeria took a sudden and more moderate turn when Qinton embarked on his 1998 African tour. As far as Qinton and his entourage were concerned, human rights would take a back seat to military requirements and economic priorities. In explaining America's new military policy toward Africa, Russell Travers, a senior adviser to the DIA, claimed that multilateral military operations would become more commonplace in the future. While speaking at a biennial Cape Town defense exhibition, Travers candidly reflected on the U.S. experience in central Africa. After describing the central African wars as "small" and "messy," Travers said, "there's lots of very ftmdamental questions that are just unresolved." He candidly added, "the trend over the last several years and the trend in the future will be to defer the hardest decisions, because that is the easiest approach to take, and I suspect it's going to come back and haunt many of us."^39 When it came to preventing genocide and averting the indiscriminate slaughter of refugees, notable members of the Clinton administration, including Warren Christopher and Madeleine Albright,


seemed to be doing exactly what Travers described in Cape Town: deferring the hardest decisions. The DIA's Pentagon seminar confirmed the military intelligence agenc)r's apparent supremacy over other U.S. intelligence services in determining America's policies for Africa. The DIA, by inviting participation in "peacekeeping" duties from mercenary companies, was actively endorsing their activities. Moreover, DIA's policies, as has been described, seem to have a decidedly economic tinge, rather than a strategic or tactical military flavor. ACRI was a convenient vehicle to extend a U.S. military presence throughout Africa. One anonymous U.S. official disputed the belief that ACRI's intentions were malevolent. "We are neither trying to create a standing army nor one in reserve," the official declared. However, another anonymous source involved in ACRI pointed to the fact that in two of the countries where U.S. military forces were training local armies tmder the program, those same forces were involved in military operations beyond their borders. Senegal was fighting a rebellion in Guinea Bissau, while Uganda was engaged in operations in eastern Congo.i^o The Belgian newspaper Le Soir described ACRI as creating "low cost, military contact networks throughout Africa" to benefit Washington.^41 In 1998, the Pentagon annoimced plans to establish a $36 million African Center for Security Studies (ACSS). In 1999, the centeP s name was changed to the African Center for Strateguc Studies because some African officials objected to the term "security." The original decision to establish the ACSS followed an annoimcement by President Clinton to create such a


center during his visit to Senegal in April 1998. The African center is modeled after three other regional centers run by the Defense Department. They are the George C. Marshall Center for Security Studies in Garmisch, Germany; the Asia Pacific Center in Honolulu, Hawaii; and the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies in Washington, DC. These combined centers train military and civilian officials from numerous cotmtries in Western and Eastern Europe, the Pacific Rim, Central Asia, Latin America, and the


According to U.S. Air Force Lt. Col. Andrew H. Cox, an official of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs (Africa Region), the ACSS is designed to supplement other U.S. military training programs in Africa, including ACRI, IMET, Enhanced IMET, and JCET. JCET became a tool of the Pentagon to evade congressional prohibitions against providing IMET assistance to countries with poor human rights records. Timothy Connolly, a former Special Operations officer who supervised JCET related operations and who was fired in a policy dispute, criticized JCET; "Due to feckless leadership in the civilian oversight office, we don't have a handle on how the QNCs [Commanders in Chief] spend that [JCET] money .. . We have no idea what their objectives are, what the units involved are . . . The definition of [the] training is extremely elastic depending upon the wishes of the decision makers."i43 According to Cox, the IMET and E IMET yielded successes for American efforts to groom pro U.S. military leaders in Africa. One such success story he cited was the Botswana Chief of Defense, who attended U.S. Army courses at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas and

Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. The Botswanan "restructured the military based on his U.S. training."i44 In addition to the aforementioned officer military schools, the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey is also playing a role in training Africa's officer corps. For example, Lt. Col. Frank Rusagara, the secretary general of the Rwandan Defense Ministry, attended Ae navy school for three months in early 1998.145 Other African defense ministers attended familiarization sessions at the Marshall Center in Garmisch.146

Cox also said the ACSS "builds on the successes of IMET and EIMET" and reflects "a long term commitment by DoD." It is anticipated that the ACSS tudent population will be a mix of civilian and military officials of African states. Cox said officials of the OAU, Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) were briefed on the ACSS and gave the program their approval. He also said there were future plans to brief the Horn of Africa's Inter Government Authority on Development (IGAD), and the East African Community on the American military program. At the outset, the ACSS was to comprise a free two week mobile course on civil military relations, defense resource management, national decision making, "transnational threats," and possibly environmental security and media relations. French and English were targeted as the preferred languages of instruction with eventual plans to include Portuguese and Arabic. The targeted student population includes civilian officials of Ministries of Defense and Foreign



45. Ibid. 46. Ibid. 47. Ken Silverstein. "Licensed to Kill: Shadowing our government's favorite arms dealer," ^ «nments Harper's Magazine, May 2000.

48. Douglas Farah, "Report Says Africans Harbored AI Qaeda: Terror ^sets Hidden In Gem-Buying Spree," The Washington Post 29 December 2002, p.Al. 49. Confidential interview, Tel Aviv, October 1,2002. 50. Center for Public Integrity, op. cit. 51. Deus Kagiraneza, Testimony, 12 July 2000

52. Marguerite Feitlowitz, "UN War Crimes Court Approved for Sierra Leone," 8 January 2000.

53. Su™ry-Report to Congress on U.S. Military Activities in Rwanda, 1994-August 1997

55. Ibid. 56. National Team Inquiry Internal Memorandum, March 1997 classified "Secret." ' 57. Ibid. 58. Ibid. 59. Ibid. 60. Ibid. 61 &minar: "Covert Action in Africa: A Smoking Gun in Washmgton, D C." Rayburn House Office Building, April 16,2001. S' m information provided by the UN investigator. 63. Lt. Col. Orth, African Studies Association Conference Philadelphia, Session: "Tlie Multiple Dimensions of Conflict in AfricaRwanda s Huta Extremist Genocidal Insurgency: An Eyewitness Perspective, November 12,1999. 64. Confidential information. 65. Interview with Faustin Twagirimungu, 25 May 2001.


66. Shifa Rahman, "Sudan's harvests of suffering," Index on

Censorship, 21 January 2003.

67. Sudan Monthly Report, 18 June 2001 < webgate/africa/msg01300.html> 68. "As Dead as ACRI," New African, May 2000 town/terrace/lf41/na/mayOO/naopOS 02.htm; Dr. Nowa Omoigui, "History of Civil-Military Relations in Nigeria: The Current Transition," <>; "Star Struck," Africa Confidential, Vol. 43, No. 8,19 April 2002 <>; Center for Public Integrity, "Privatizing Combat: The New World Order, Making a Killing: The Business of War," 28 October. 2002 < http: / /> 69. Stratfor, "The Militarization of West Africa," 2 August 2002

70. Bill Gertz, "Pentagon Sought Spy Post off Yemen Coast," Washington Times, 14 October 2000. Philippe Vasset, Africa in Washington: The Permanent Guide, Paris: Indigo Publications, June 2001. 72. "Our People," Cohen and Woods Washington Office < page4a.htm>


aft erword This book covers the ten years of the second “scramble for Africa,” an unprecedented grab by major powers for influence in order to gain access to Africa’s vast wealth of netural resources. Millions of people, primarily in the Democratic Republic of Congo, died from civil war, famine, and disease brought about largely by the competition by Western powers for control over Africa’s resources. Although this second edition covers the decade of 1993 to 2003, the situation in Africa since then has not improved. No one could have predicted in 2003 that five years later the United States would not only elect its first African-yynerican president but someone whose father was a native of Kenya. If anyone had suggested in 2003 that America’s next president would have been a “son of Africa” there would have been hopes that America’s relationship with the continent would no longer be based on covert actions, militaiy engagement, and a sociopathic lust for natural resources. Howveer, Barack H. Obama, Jr. s presidency has been marked by the continued grwoth in the mission of the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) to conduct counter-insurgency operations in nations with some of the worst human rights records. Unmanned drones indiscriminatly target civilians in countries like Somalia ans the U.S. has established a ne^ork of militaiy bases and intelligence installations in Ethiopia, Seychelles, Kenya, Central African Republic, Burundi, Uganda, Burkina Faso (Operations Creek Sand and Aztec Archer), Mauritania, Djibouti, and other


nations. The Franco-American rivahy in Africa described in the previous chapters has been largely replaced by a Sino-American war for control of Africa’s resources, particularly oil, natural gas, and rare earth minerals. The Obama administration oversaw the splitting of Sudan into two nations — the Republic of South Sudan, long a pet project of Susan Rice, who became Obama’s ambassador to the UN, and the Republic of Sudan in the north. After the NATO-supported war on and ouster and assassination of Libya’s Muammar Qaddafi, the eastern and oil-rich province of Cyrenaica has declared autonomy. Further blowback from the Libya intervention in the West has seen Mali’s Tuareg ethnic group declare an independent state of Azawad in the country’s north only to then be overrun by Saudi-backed Wahhabist adherents of A1 Qaeda, Mali’s Ansar Dine, and the Boko Haram sect of Nigeria. The Democratic Republic of Congo remains in the quagmire of civil war with Rwandan-backed rebels effectively taking control of key areas in eastern Congo. The financial institutions of the West, including the World Bank and IMF, continue to impose draconian economic policies on the nation’s of Africa, measures that helped to launch popular rebellions that ousted the govenmments of Tunisia and Egypt and pressured Morocco to institute political reforms. In the latter years of the George W. Bush administration, America’s policy toward Africa began to take on, in earnest, the appearance of neo-colonialist. On January 2, 2008, the author wrote the following about the



neo-colonialist slant of U.S. policy: “The militarism of America's policy on Africa centers on propping up dictators who have bought into the globalization agenda and who have offered up bases for the U.S. military incursion into Africa that seeks to recolonize the continent. This neo-colonization of Africa is evident in the Bush administration's soft policy towards the incumbent President of Kenya, Mwai Kibaki, who has just stolen the presidential election from his progressive opponent Raila Odinga, the son of the first Vice President of Kenya, who later became an opposition leader and was jailed by the government. Raila Odinga heads the opposition Orange Democratic Movement, but this ‘themed’ and ‘color-connected’ popular movement does not buy into the neoconservative line and therefore received no support from the corporate-funded think tanks and the corporate media in the United States and elsewhere. US ambassador to Kenya Michael Ranneberger actually showed his support for Kibaki's ‘Florida-style’ election ‘victory,’ before backing down to a small extent. Ranneberger, a career Foreign Service officer, has been active in various hot spots where U.S. intelligence and the military have also been active, most of the time not for the betterment of the nations involved: Sudan, Cuba, Somalia, Mali, Angola, Namibia,


Mozambique, El Salvador, Haiti, and Paraguay. The militarization of U.S. Africa policy is highlighted by the fact that USAID and State Department officials are to be assigned to the AFRICOM headquarters. AFRICOM commander, US Army General William E. ‘Kip’ Ward, will be assisted by military and State Department Foreign Service deputies. As with the top militaristic foreign policy ‘expert’ in the Bush administration, Frazer, an African American, the selection of Ward, also an African American, is a shameless attempt by the Bush administration to mask the true intent of AFRICOM among Africa's black population. AFRICOM will serve as a major pass through for U.S. covert operations in Africa, mainly because U.S. civilian assistance funds will be fimneled through AFRICOM's budget, and, therefore, be controlled by the Pentagon. The funding mechanisms for AFRICOM will also permit private military contractors like Blackwater USA, Dyncorp, and Triple Canopy to extend their operations in Africa. It is clear that the necons are planning to turn Africa into the next war zone by providing military aid for the crushing of secessionist, tribal, and democracy movements. We see U.S. military- and law enforcement-provided weapons now being used against political protesters in Kenya and Ethiopia.”


Obama continued Bush’s policy of militarizing Africa. For example, NATO, through the AFRICOM, maintains de facto control over the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia via the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), which consists mostly of troops from Uganda and Burundi. In addition, the TFG is supported by Ethiopian military forces and CIA operatives. The CIA operates from a secret base at Mogadishu's Aden Adde International Airport. CIA offieers direct the activities of AMISOM’s Ugandan and Bm^dian forees in Somalia and conduct drone attacks against suspected Islamist guerrillas in the eountry. The CIA base in Mogadishu also coordinates drone attaeks throughout the Horn of Africa and Yemen with other CIA drone facilities in Djibouti, Seychelles, and Oman. When Obama took the oath of office as president of the United States on January 21, 2009, many Africans hoped for a new dawn and a blessing in America’s first African-American president. Instead, Obama has turned out to be a curse. WAYNE MADSEN August 2012

724 ~

About the Author Wayne Madsen is a Washington, DC-based investigative journalist, author and syndicated columnist. He has written for The Village Voice, The Progressive, Counterpunch, Wired, Multinational Monitor, In These Times, and The American Conservative. His columns have appeared in The Miami Herald, Houston Chronicle, Philadelphia Inquirer, Columbus Dispatch, Sacramento Bee, and Atlanta JournalConstitution,

among others.

Madsen is the author of The Handbook of Personal Data Protection (London: Macmillan, 1992), an acclaimed reference book on international data protection law; Genocide and Covert Operations in Africa 1993-1999 (Edwin Mellen Press, 1999); co-author of America's Nightmare: The Presidency of George Bush II (Dandelion, 2003), author ofJaded Tasks: Big Oil, Black Ops & Brass Plates;

Overthrow a Fascist Regime on $15 a Day; and The Manufacturing of a President: the CIA's Insertion of Barack H Obama, Jr. into the White House.

Madsen has been a regular contributor on RT and PressTV. He has been a frequent political and national security commentator on Fox News and has also appeared on ABC, NBC, CBS, PBS, CNN, BBC, A1 Jazeera, and MS-NBC. Madsen has taken on Bill OReilly and Sean Hannity on their television shows. He has been invited to testify as a witness before the US House of Representatives, the UN Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, and a terrorism investigation panel of the French government. Madsen has some twenty years experience in seeurity issues. As a U.S. Naval Officer, he managed one of the first


computer security programs for the U.S. Navy. He subsequently worked for the National Security Agency, the Naval Data Automation Command, Department of State, RCA Corporation, and Computer Sciences Corporation. Madsen was a Senior Fellow for the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC), a privacy public advocacy organization. Madsen is a member of the Society of Professional Journalists (SPJ) and the National Press Club.

APPENDIX A Documents are as follows; Note: Some names have been redacted to protect the privacy of indivduals. Confidential UN OIOS Report, Rwanda Secret UN OIOS Report, Rwanda ICTR invitation to appear as an expert witness ICTR invitation to appear as a defense “non-protected” witness


SECRET oowhiet op«tlon.. on. attKK upon PtMBKit MaP»amMm I" '*«•

«» ««


IX. •.xn. taxi «m»eon ttie Rumndeae Presldenttal alioralt at about 2030 hours on t April 1894. Tha WuhwijFh Sources advlss test the former RPP, now known as the RffiF, has wftein It n ceO of eftoe soldiers who ere sedvatod and deactivated from time to time fa

■NvesnoftTioNs aecnoN / twos >»«WM«PMlTa»niiT

DKo ofRcpan;

1 Ansnit 1S97 ^ 1W a 1 M.Y 1997 -fee US««IOS-,

R^IABHJTy ofInfonartioa »ourco;


—«. .


UK;ATtON;|)nto»,llBtms»«eia«nttMBW/\SloKln,S5i); QIOS

s=^£.?7^^.'^ N«ioial T«m WM%»tiontla«n»eri«d. 3«na«rof emi«l ftaorer-

"*>mwie« wu ooOTboreus) by oihtr B.ini..

Mudi 6f lUs

S=:Srs:£fi2£jsrS.SS?^'^ *aS^'ti.;"r«^;;:,“;^Z^" »» rsi; “ “ ■-~^!£rs5?'^i^ i«io«*



SECRET Aecoraing to ttio «oure««, this grouD uu^ adviMH Mar. «4 aa tha Aruslu talka


. ™



»• *“" «' eoi>cli 0—ool HW tf/WV Bnit___*

' Control Pocto



r ReelwtfIraM m Mw .

fitod B» SA«r« Soi. ■Part. «,d 0«oBl HBIi. Cfc_

n«y !» ««a.W. to «» iCTR ' AltocliPfiui .dll. Itoni eow o»ld«„ !*"• To *rto tho ICTH h» lOtoMtood thM toi. Mt !>• ry*n» iC5^ *x *A

W «v

IK, ^ Jo r ** /• CT Cy I ^ •-W teou. k

•»«/«, O/*,


.nfttetJN and •-—


pi5iwmmo«: |^*1IUI»/*I'«^> ———^

isk^i * •■>


Diw .,t









Qio q z

Ititomaiional Criminal Tribunal tor Rimnda Tribunal P4m I Intamational pour In SSa briamarb^ inMa»«._... .

'--------mCDr.r* —'^a-tr?»tnoivsan7a^ J»04S6Vi^aMS^M^^M *”*• ■**"'* T««7«rJ,

1>i2ns a«sM9

Arusia, 24Juiw20Ci2


Nonficaden of appcannce «^

vHacfs befon the ICTR «the matter of

Ml. Mkdxn. I>rfence Qh iib c I «f the accwcd



lO^ia^KTarnam-.,,. „

pitpaid Annmbo“J'rSS'a'b^^r»Ltt^fflb^™jlS't.S“


Hyou w to t.fe a^il orto“^cTlL’.£^u’??« fayunt fflehri. amount of oxpeuci i‘ncnrre/1 nyni {.