Debt and Indebtedness at Emar 9781501515309, 9781501521805

Table of contents :
Acknowledgments
Summary of Content
List of Figures
List of Tables
Abbreviations
1 Introduction
Part I: Textual Analysis
2 Credit Transactions
3 Default and Dependency
Part II: Synthesis
4 The Emar Credit System
5 Forms of Dependency at Emar
6 Conclusions
7 Appendix
8 Bibliography
Personal Name Index
Source Index

Citation preview

Maurizio Viano Debt and Indebtedness at Emar

Studies in Ancient Near Eastern Records

General Editor: Gonzalo Rubio Editors: Nicole Brisch, Eva Cancik-Kirschbaum, Petra Goedegebuure, Amélie Kuhrt†, Peter Machinist, Piotr Michalowski, Cécile Michel, Beate Pongratz-Leisten, D.T. Potts, and Kim Ryholt

Volume 28

Maurizio Viano

Debt and Indebtedness at Emar

ISBN 978-1-5015-2180-5 e-ISBN (PDF) 978-1-5015-1530-9 e-ISBN (EPUB) 978-1-5015-1531-6 ISSN 2161-4415 Library of Congress Control Number: 2022942079 Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available on the internet at http://dnb.dnb.de. © 2023 Walter de Gruyter Inc., Boston/Berlin Typesetting: Integra Software Services Pvt. Ltd. Printing and binding: CPI books GmbH, Leck www.degruyter.com

if you’re going to try, go all the way. otherwise, don’t even start. if you’re going to try, go all the way. this could mean losing girlfriends, wives, relatives, jobs and maybe your mind. Charles Bukowski – Roll the Dice

Acknowledgments The research for this volume began in Paris where I worked at Labex Hastec and the PROCLAC laboratory – UMR 7192 (Collège de France) as a Fernand Braudel IFER Incoming postdoctoral fellow. This fellowship was awarded by the Fondation Maison des Sciences de l’Homme. I would like to thank Dominique Charpin for kindly welcoming me to the Collège de France. The research then continued at the Department of Historical Studies of the University of Torino, where I worked as a postdoctoral fellow within the PRIN project “L’Anatolia antica: politiche imperiali e culture locali tra XV e VII secolo a.C. Problemi di etnicità, assetti urbani e territoriali, tradizione e innovazione,” under the supervision of Stefano de Martino. Stefano de Martino deserves my deepest gratitude for his continuous support all these years, since the years of my doctorate. My warmest thanks and gratitude go to Clelia Mora who, as my first teacher, introduced me to the study of the ancient Near East, and to Emar in particular, about twenty years ago. I am greatly indebted to Sophie Démare-Lafont for reading the entire manuscript and for her many suggestions. Her advice was crucial in shaping the volume and prevented me from making numerous mistakes. I want to express my gratitude to Yoram Cohen for his comments and suggestions, and especially for his friendship and support over the years. I thank Jean-Marie Durand and David Owen for giving me access to the photos of Emar tablets of the Jonathan and Jeannette Rosen Cuneiform Tablet Collection. My sincere gratitude is offered to SANER’s editor Gonzalo Rubio for accepting my manuscript and for his suggestions. I am also grateful to the anonymous reviewers for their essential comments, suggestions, and remarks. I thank my friend and colleague Francesca Nebiolo for her remarks and for over ten years of friendship and support. My sincere gratitude goes to Anne-Isabelle Langlois for checking the transliterations in the Appendix and for preparing the indexes to this volume. I would also like to thank Valentina Casella for interesting discussions on the legal aspects of my work. I also want to express my gratitude to Enrico Foietta, Eduardo Torrecilla-Gimenez, Salvatore Gaspa, Gene McGarry, and Adam Anderson. Finally, I thank my family for putting up with me.

https://doi.org/10.1515/9781501515309-202

Summary of Content 1

Introduction 

 1

Part I: Textual Analysis 2 2.1 2.2

Credit Transactions   39 Creation of the Obligation   41 Fulfillment of the Obligation   81

3 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5

 133 Default and Dependency  General Remarks and Terminology   133 Dependency caused by Default   147 Dependency Related to Hardship   197 Chattel Slavery   216 Release   227

Part II: Synthesis 4 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.8 4.9 4.10

The Emar Credit System   239 The Corpus of Texts   239 Purpose and Types of Documents   240 Lent Commodities   247 Interest   250 Security for Debt   252 Private-sector Debts and State Debts   271 Principals and Moneylenders   273 Credit in Business and Commercial Activities   284 Debt Settlement   294 The Economic Context of Credit Transactions at Emar 

5 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4

 307 Forms of Dependency at Emar  Consequences of Default and Hardship   311 The Slave Market   323 Redemption and Manumission   337 Final Considerations on Dependency at Emar   348

 300

X 

 Summary of Content

6

Conclusions 

7

Appendix 

8

Bibliography 

 575

Personal Name Index 

 599

Source Index 

 617

 361  381

Contents Acknowledgments  List of Figures  List of Tables  Abbreviations  1 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.3.3 1.3.4 1.3.5 1.3.6 1.3.7 1.3.8 1.4 1.5

 VII

 XVII  XIX  XXI

 1 Introduction  The City of Emar: History, Chronology, and Society   1 Purpose and Goals of the Study   9 Family Archives and Dossiers   17 The Family of Zū-Baʿla   19 The Family of Ḫima   22 The Family of Milki-Dagan   23 The Family of Kutbe   24 The Family of Awiru   25 The Family of Apilu   26 Minor Dossiers and Other Notable Individuals   27 The Merchants from House 5   31 Excursus 1: Real Properties   32 Excursus 2: Legal Clauses   33

Part I: Textual Analysis 2 Credit Transactions   39 2.1 Creation of the Obligation   41 2.1.1 Syrian Documents   50 2.1.1.1 Hirayama 33   50 2.1.1.2 Hirayama 34   52 2.1.1.3 RE 96   53 2.1.1.4 RE 84   54 2.1.2 Syro-Hittite Documents   55 2.1.2.1 E 278, E 277, E 209, E 319 and E 279  2.1.2.2 E 75, E 87 and E 88   61 2.1.2.3 Hirayama 40   64 2.1.2.4 TBR 49   65

 55

XII 

 Contents

2.1.2.5 2.1.2.6 2.1.2.7 2.1.2.8 2.1.2.9 2.1.2.10 2.1.2.11 2.1.3 2.1.4 2.1.5 2.2 2.2.1 2.2.1.1 2.2.1.1.1 2.2.1.1.2 2.2.1.2 2.2.1.2.1 2.2.1.2.2 2.2.1.2.3 2.2.1.2.4 2.2.1.2.5 2.2.1.2.6 2.2.1.2.7 2.2.1.2.8 2.2.1.2.9 2.2.1.2.10 2.2.1.2.11 2.2.1.2.12 2.2.1.2.13 2.2.1.2.14 2.2.1.3 2.2.1.3.1 2.2.1.3.2 2.2.2 2.2.2.1 2.2.2.1.1 2.2.2.1.2 2.2.2.1.3 2.2.2.1.4 2.2.2.1.5

TBR 27   67 RE 72 and RE 75   69 TBR 34   70 RE 18   72 JCS40 3   72 RE 60   73 PdA 68   74 A Middle Babylonian Document (E 24)   76 A Middle Assyrian Document (RE 19)   77 A Tablet in an Unknown Script (GsK 5)   79 Fulfillment of the Obligation   81 Repayment of Debts   82 Syrian Documents   87 TBR 82   87 E 109   88 Syro-Hittite Documents   90 E 200   90 E 119, E 115 and E 116   91 E 85   95 E 21   96 TBR 28 and TBR 29   97 RE 65   98 Anatolica 16   99 TBR 33   100 TBR 65   100 E 123   101 Hirayama 39   102 BLMJ 12   102 ASJ13 A   104 RE 58   105 Babylonian Documents   106 E 23   106 E 26   106 Family Law Contracts   109 Adoptions   114 E 213   114 TBR 78   117 TBR 74   118 RE 25   119 RE 88   121

Contents 

2.2.2.2 2.2.2.2.1 2.2.2.2.2 2.2.3 2.2.3.1 2.2.3.2 2.2.3.3 2.2.3.4 2.2.3.5

 121 palāḫu Contracts  RE 10 and RE 13   121 SMEA30 9   124 Lawsuits Concerning the Fulfillment of Obligations  MFA 1977.114   127 E 127   127 E 28   129 TBR 36   129 TBR 84   131

 125

 133 Default and Dependency  General Remarks and Terminology   133 Legal Clauses in Documents pertaining to Debt and Famine Slavery   138 3.1.2 The Boundaries of Slavery at Emar   142 3.2 Dependency caused by Default   147 3.2.1 Indentured Labor   148 3.2.1.1 amēlūtu Documents   160 3.2.1.1.1 amēlūtu Contracts without the palāḫu Formula   160 3.2.1.1.1.1 E 77   160 3.2.1.1.1.2 RA77 5   161 3.2.1.1.1.3 ASJ10 A   162 3.2.1.1.2 amēlūtu Contracts with the palāḫu Formula   163 3.2.1.1.2.1 E 117   164 3.2.1.1.2.2 TBR 39 and TBR 40   165 3.2.1.1.2.3 E 16   166 3.2.1.1.2.4 QVO5 2   168 3.2.1.1.2.5 Hirayama 38   169 3.2.1.1.3 A Testament concerning Two amēlūtus (RE 39)   169 3.2.1.2 Non-amēlūtu Contracts Regulating Indentured Labor   171 3.2.1.2.1 RE 63   171 3.2.1.2.2 E 86   173 3.2.2 Dependency Deriving from Pledge Law   174 3.2.2.1 E 77, RA77 5 and ASJ10 A   174 3.2.2.2 AOAT 265.1   176 3.2.3 Debt Slavery   178 3.2.3.1 Sales into Debt Slavery   182 3.2.3.1.1 TBR 44   182 3.2.3.1.2 TBR 26   182 3.2.3.2 Enslavement for Debt   184

3 3.1 3.1.1

 XIII

XIV 

 Contents

Enslavement Contracts   184 GsK 1 and Hirayama 36   184 E 121   185 E 215   186 Lawsuits Establishing Enslavement for Debt   187 E 205   187 E 252   188 E 33   190 Unclear Types of Dependency for Debt   191 Contracts Regulating Unclear Types of Dependency for Debt  Hirayama 37   192 TBR 25   193 A Lawsuit Ruling on an Unclear Type of Dependency for Debt (Subartu 17)   195 3.3 Dependency Related to Hardship   197 3.3.1 Sales into Famine Slavery   197 3.3.1.1 E 217   199 3.3.1.2 E 79, E 83 and E 84   201 3.3.1.3 E 118   202 3.3.1.4 AuOr5 12   203 3.3.1.5 E 7   205 3.3.1.6 TBR 52   205 3.3.1.7 ASJ10 E   206 3.3.1.8 AuOr5 11   206 3.3.1.9 Hirayama 18   207 3.3.1.10 Hirayama 17   208 3.3.2 Various Forms of Dependency Related to Hardship   208 3.3.2.1 Adoptions due to Hardship   209 3.3.2.1.1 Syrian Documents   209 3.3.2.1.1.1 E 256   209 3.3.2.1.1.2 TBR 48   211 3.3.2.1.2 Syro-Hittite Documents   212 3.3.2.1.2.1 E 216   212 3.3.2.1.2.2 TBR 77   212 3.3.2.2 palāḫu Contracts for Hardship   213 3.3.2.2.1 GsK 2   213 3.3.2.2.2 RE 26   215 3.4 Chattel Slavery   216 3.4.1 Sale-related Documents   218 3.4.1.1 A Syrian Sale of Slaves (Iraq54 5)   218

3.2.3.2.1 3.2.3.2.1.1 3.2.3.2.1.2 3.2.3.2.1.3 3.2.3.2.2 3.2.3.2.2.1 3.2.3.2.2.2 3.2.3.2.2.3 3.2.4 3.2.4.1 3.2.4.1.1 3.2.4.1.2 3.2.4.2

 192

Contents 

3.4.1.2 3.4.1.2.1 3.4.1.2.2 3.4.1.2.3 3.4.1.2.4 3.4.1.3 3.4.2 3.4.2.1 3.4.2.2 3.4.3 3.4.3.1 3.4.3.2 3.4.3.2.1 3.4.3.2.2 3.4.3.2.3 3.4.3.2.4 3.5 3.5.1 3.5.1.1 3.5.1.2 3.5.1.3 3.5.2 3.5.2.1 3.5.2.2 3.5.2.3 3.5.2.4 3.5.2.5 3.5.2.6

 218 Syro-Hittite Documents  E 211, E 214 and E 224   218 E 35   220 Hirayama 40   221 E 127   221 A Babylonian Letter (E 25)   222 Slave Transactions of Uncertain Nature   222 A Letter of Unknown Provenance (JA 303)   222 A Syro-Hittite Document (Hirayama 41)   223 Slaves in Documents of Various Content   223 Donations of Slaves   223 Slaves in Various Transactions   224 TBR 79   225 E 91   225 TBR 75   226 E 257   226 Release   227 Redemption   230 E 221   230 BLMJ 2   230 RE 25   231 Manumission   231 RE 27   232 RE 66   233 TBR 32   234 E 177   234 TBR 41   235 RE 26   235

Part II: Synthesis 4 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.5.1 4.5.2

The Emar Credit System   239 The Corpus of Texts   239 Purpose and Types of Documents   240 Lent Commodities   247 Interest   250 Security for Debt   252 Securities in Productive Debts   258 Securities in Consumptive Debts   259

 XV

XVI  4.5.3 4.5.4 4.5.5 4.6 4.7 4.7.1 4.7.2 4.8 4.9 4.9.1 4.9.2 4.9.3 4.10

 Contents

The Nature of the Pledge: Possessory, Hypothecary, and Antichretic Pledges   262 Redemption of Pledges   266 The Value Relation between Debts and Pledges   267 Private-sector Debts and State Debts   271 Principals and Moneylenders   273 Archives and Dossiers   273 The Social Position of the Principals   279 Credit in Business and Commercial Activities   284 Debt Settlement   294 Repayment of Debts   294 Alienated Properties and Redemption   296 Debt Settlement in Family Law Contracts   298 The Economic Context of Credit Transactions at Emar   300

5.1.2 5.1.3 5.2 5.2.1 5.2.2 5.3 5.4

 307 Forms of Dependency at Emar  Consequences of Default and Hardship   311 Temporary Forms of Dependency for Debt: Indentured Labor and Pledge   311 Debt Slavery and Other Forms of Dependency for Debt   319 Dependency related to Hardship   322 The Slave Market   323 Prices of Slaves   323 Masters and Slaves   333 Redemption and Manumission   337 Final Considerations on Dependency at Emar   348

6

Conclusions 

7

Appendix 

8

Bibliography 

 575

Personal Name Index 

 599

5 5.1 5.1.1

Source Index 

 617

 361  381

List of Figures Figure 1 Figure 2 Figure 3 Figure 4 Figure 5 Figure 6 Figure 7 Figure 8 Figure 9 Figure 10

Excavation Areas (Margueron 1982b: 244)   2 Family of Zū-Baʿla   20 Family of Ḫima   22 Family of Milki-Dagan   23  24 Family of Kutbe  Family of Awiru   25 Family of Apilu   26 Distribution of Clauses in Documents pertaining to Debt and Famine Slavery   345 Forms of Dependency   349 Principals in Documents related to Dependency   352

https://doi.org/10.1515/9781501515309-205

List of Tables Table 1 Table 2 Table 3 Table 4 Table 5 Table 6 Table 7 Table 8 Table 9 Table 10 Table 11 Table 12 Table 13 Table 14 Table 15 Table 16 Table 17 Table 18 Table 19 Table 20 Table 21 Table 22 Table 23 Table 24 Table 25 Table 26 Table 27 Table 28 Table 29 Table 30 Table 31 Table 32 Table 33 Table 34 Table 35 Table 36 Table 37 Table 38 Table 39 Table 40 Table 41 Table 42 Table 43

The Archive of Zū-Baʿla   21 The Archive of Ḫima   22 The Archive of Milki-Dagan   24 The Archive of Kutbe   25  26 The Archivie of Awiru  The Archive of Apilu   27 Minor Family Dossiers   27 Other Notable Persons   30 The Archive of House 5   31 House Prices   33 Documents Creating an Obligation   44 Repayments of Debts   83 Family Law Contracts   112 Lawsuits Concerning the Fulfillment of Obligations   126 Legal Clauses in Documents Pertaining to Debt and Famine Slavery   139 Indentured Labor   158 Seizure of the Debtor in the amēlūtu Contracts without the palāḫu Formula   160 Pledged Persons   175 Sales into Debt Slavery   179 Enslavement for Debt   180 Unclear Types of Dependency for Debt   192 Sales into Famine Slavery   198 Various Forms of Dependency Related to Hardship   209 Documents Related to the Sale of Chattel Slaves   217 Slave Transactions of Uncertain Nature   222 Slaves in Various Transactions   224 Redemption   228 Manumission   229 Types of Credit-related Documents   241 Productive Debts   243 Consumptive Debts   245 Commodities Other Than Silver   247 Interest   250 Proportion of Documents Mentioning Securities, by Type and Phase   253 Securities in Productive Debts   254 Securities in Consumptive Debts   256 Amount of Debt in Secured Consumptive Debts   260 Antichretic Pledges   263 Redemption of Pledges   266 Credit-related Documents Belonging to Private Archives and Dossiers   274 Original Moneylenders from the Notable Families and Private Dossiers   280 Business Activities   285 Alienated Properties in Repayments of Debts   296

https://doi.org/10.1515/9781501515309-206

XX  Table 44 Table 45 Table 46 Table 47 Table 48 Table 49 Table 50 Table 51 Table 52 Table 53 Table 54 Table 55 Table 56 Table 57 Table 58 Table 59 Table 60 Table 61

 List of Tables

 299 Penalties in Family Law Contracts  Debts from Ekalte   305 Forms of Dependency   308 The ḫulluqu Clause   312 Penalties in Contracts of Indentured Labor   316 Documents of Debt Enslavement   319 Notable Families as Masters in Documents of Debt Slavery   321 Slave Prices   324 Sales of Slaves with the Year of Hardship Formula   330 Summary of Slave Prices   332 Notable Families in Slavery-related Sales   335 Redemption in Slavery-related Documents   338 Clauses in Debt and Famine Slavery Documents from the Dossiers of the Notable Families and Minor Dossiers   344 Features of Manumission   347 Documents in Which Notable Families Appear as Masters   349 Years of Hardship   362 Notable Families: A Summary   364 Properties Obtained by Notable Families and Other Individuals   366

Abbreviations The abbreviations in the present volume conform to standard Assyriological conventions in the Assyrian Dictionary of the University of Chicago (CAD). Specific abbreviations used in this work are listed here.

Emar Sources AOAT 265.1 ASJ10 ASJ13 AuOr5 BLMJ E GsK Hallo Hirayama

JCS40 Msk PdA QVO5 RA77 RE Semitica55 SMEA30 Subartu 17 TBR

Faist (2001: 251–54) Tsukimoto (1988) Tsukimoto (1991b) Arnaud (1987) Goodnick Westenholz (2000) Arnaud (1985–1987) Sigrist (1993) Hallo (2002) Tsukimoto (1990) = Texts no. 1–16 Tsukimoto (1991a) = Texts no. 17–42 Tsukimoto (1992) = Texts no. 43–50 Tsukimoto (1994) = Text no. 51 Beckman (1988) Siglum of the tablets excavated at Emar by the French mission Fales (1989) Di Filippo (2010) Huehnergard (1983) Beckman (1996a) Durand (2013b) Arnaud (1991c) Cavigneaux and Beyer (2006) Arnaud (1991a)

Alternative Editions Some Emar sources have been re-edited; the following list provides the concordances between the abbreviations used in this volume (on the left) and the alternative editions (on the right). Hirayama 15 Hirayama 18 Hirayama 39 RA77 5 RE 8 RE 39

AuOr5 6 JCS40 1 SMEA30 12 Hirayama 35 Semitica55 2 Semitica55 1

https://doi.org/10.1515/9781501515309-207

XXII 

 Abbreviations

Other Cuneiform Sources BATSH 4 BE 14 BE 15 Bi Ek HS KAJ KTU3 MARV PRU V PRU VI RS RSO 14 RSO 23 RSO 7 T TR

Cancik-Kirschbaum (1996) Clay (1906a) Clay (1906b) Siglum of the tablets excavated at Tell Billa Mayer (2001) Tablet siglum of the Hilprect Collection in Jena Ebeling (1927) Dietrich, Loretz et al. (2013) Freydank (1976) Virolleaud (1965) Nougayrol (1970) Siglum of the tablets excavated at Ras Shamra/Ugarit Yon and Arnaud (2001) Lackenbacher and Malbran-Labat (2016) Bordreuil (1991) Siglum of the tablets excavated at Tell Sabi Abyad Siglum of the tablets excavated at Tell Rimāh

Ugaritica 5

Nougayrol, Laroche et al. (1968)

Other Abbreviations AMA (C) CDLN (D) F M (M) MA MB NG OMA S SH sh. sq. c. Unk

Saporetti and Matini (2016-) Creditor Cuneiform Digital Library Notes Debtor Female Male Master Middle Assyrian Middle Babylonian Not given (referring to information expected in textual sources) Saporetti (1970) Syrian tablets from Emar Syro-Hittite tablets from Emar Shekels of silver Squared cubits Unknown (referring to tablet script)

1 Introduction 1.1 The City of Emar: History, Chronology, and Society The ancient city of Emar, modern Tell Meskene, lies on the West bank of the Euphrates along the middle course of the river, south of Karkemiš and about 90 km east of Aleppo. In the 1970s, following the construction of the Tabqa Dam, the city was the target of a salvage campaign by a French team led by Jean-Claude Margueron. The site was identified in 1972 when, on the fifth day of excavations, in what would later be named Area A, archaeologists found a jar containing thirteen tablets, some of which recorded the toponym Emar.1 The levels investigated by the French mission date back to the Late Bronze Age, but the site, located at the top of a promontory and today partially submerged by the waters of Lake Assad, was reoccupied during the Roman-Byzantine and Islamic periods. The city of Emar was already known from the archives of Ebla, where under the name Imar it appears as an important commercial center connecting the Mediterranean coast and the Euphrates. Textual sources from the first half of the second millennium B.C., especially from Mari, refer to Emar as a river port perhaps in the orbit of Yamkhad. During the Late Bronze Age, the city of Emar was initially under the rule of Mittani and was later conquered by the Hittites. During the campaigns conducted from 1972 to 1976, the French mission opened trenches in 24 excavation areas (labeled A–Y; Fig. 1). Epigraphic finds unearthed in several areas of the site yielded one of the largest and most interesting text corpora from Late Bronze Age Syria.2 According to Margueron,3 the Late Bronze Age town was newly founded by the Hittites, likely under Muršili II,4 who moved the settlement up to the promontory from the Euphrates valley, where it had been located during the third and early second millennium. This process would have led to the terracing of the hill, which, in Margueron’s view, could not have been achieved without Hittite resources. In the 1990s, the new Syrian-German excavations brought to light archaeological levels beneath the Late Bronze Age layers that dated to the third and early second millennium B.C., disproving Margueron’s hypothesis that the settlement had been relocated after the Hittite conquest.5

1 Margueron 1975a, Pitard 1996: 14, Rutz 2013: 57, 63–64. 2 For an overview of findspots see Rutz 2013. 3 Margueron 1980. 4 See Laroche 1980. 5 Faist and Finkbeiner 2002. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781501515309-001

2 

 1 Introduction

Figure 1: Excavation Areas (Margueron 1982b: 244).

Tablets from Emar are mostly written in Akkadian. They include ephemeral documents of various text types: legal documents, especially sale contracts and testaments; administrative texts; letters; and lawsuits. The largest group of tablets, however, consists of religious and scholarly texts in Sumerian and Akkadian found in Building M₁ in Area M. Sumerian and Akkadian texts found during the French excavations were published by the epigrapher of the mission, Daniel Arnaud (1985–1987), in four volumes containing copies, transliterations, and translations. The French mission also discovered some Hittite documents published by Mirjo Salvini and Marie-Claude Trémouille (2003), as well as a large number of Hurrian tablets published in two volumes by Salvini (2015). Subsequent to the French mission, Emar has been targeted by numerous illegal excavations that have fueled the black market in cuneiform tablets. Illicitly obtained texts have entered many collections in Europe, the United States, and Japan. The Emar tablets from the largest of these collections were published by Arnaud (1991a), Beckman (1996a), Tsukimoto (1990, 1991a, 1992, 1994), and Goodnick Westenholz (2000). Additionally, small lots of tablets have been published by various scholars.6

6 See the Middle Euphrates Digital Archives of the Progetto Sinleqiunnini website, http://virgo. unive.it/emaronline/cgi-bin/index.cgi.

1.1 The City of Emar: History, Chronology, and Society 

 3

Since the earliest epigraphic finds, it has been clear that legal texts could be assigned to one of two different traditions (or scribal schools) on the basis of their tablet format. These traditions were termed by Arnaud (1975a) Syrian (S) and Siro-Hittite (SH). Syrian tablets have the typical oblong format with text lines parallel to the short side. Syro-Hittite tablets have a landscape format, with text lines parallel to the long side. The two traditions also exhibit differences in language, script, legal formularies, and seal impressions.7 The Syrian tradition presents archaic features, linguistic and paleographic, that mark a continuity with the Old Babylonian tradition. The Syro-Hittite tradition, by contrast, exhibits characteristics attested in the Middle Babylonian tradition. The most striking fact about the two traditions is that they are almost entirely isolated from each other: apart from a handful of documents, individuals and institutions mentioned in tablets of one tradition are never attested in the other. The royal family and certain local institutions, such as the temple authority Ninurta, only appear in the Syrian tablets.8 The Hittite institutions are attested only in the Syro-Hittite documents. In addition to tablets written by local scribes, the Emar archives yielded tablets in foreign scripts such as Middle Babylonian and Middle Assyrian. These tablets were mostly produced by foreign merchants trading in Emar. Although the chronological details are still disputed, Skaist (1998a) demonstrated that two royal dynasties are attested in the Syrian-type documents. The First Dynasty is dated to the first half of the 14th century, when the city was under Mittanian rule. The so-called arana documents9 attest to a tribute paid by Emar to the Mittanian king at the time of the First Dynasty. The nature of the power of the First Dynasty, however, is unclear because none of its members bears the title of king (LUGAL).10 Probably in the second half of the 14th century, Emar fell under Hittite control, which perhaps triggered a change of dynasty. The so-called Second Dynasty, which is much better documented, began in the last quarter of the 14th century and lasted for five generations.11 Before the demise of Emar, the Second Dynasty came to an end around 1250–1240 B.C., as argued by Cohen 7 For a paleographic analysis of the two traditions see Wilcke 1992, Cohen 2012b. 8 In a few SH documents, Ninurta and the Emarite royal line are referred to as institutions no longer extant. 9 For these documents see Yamada 1993, Beckman 1996c. Skaist (1998b) convincedly argued that arana is the Hurrian word for “gift, tribute”; his reading is now widely accepted, although Yamada (2017) still maintains that Arana is the name of an Emar king. 10 Rulers of the First Dynasty: Irʾib-Baʿal, Igmil-Dagan, Liʾmi-šarru, Išbi-Dagan, Zū-Baʿla. Only Liʾmi-šarru is indirectly referred to as LUGAL in GsK 6, see Cohen and Viano 2016. On the First Dynasty see also Pruzsinszky 2008. 11 Kings of the Second Dynasty: Baʿal-kabar I, Abbanu (?), Pilsu-Dagan, Elli, Zū-Aštarti; Baʿal-kabar II was not a king, see Fleming 2008, Yamada 2013b: 129–31, Cohen 2013: 287. Perhaps

4 

 1 Introduction

and D’Alfonso (2008). Démare-Lafont and Fleming (2015) accept this conclusion but place the end of the Second Dynasty around 1230–1210 B.C. With the end of the monarchy, the Hittites established direct control over the city. In this period the family of Zū-Baʿla became the most influential at Emar and held the office of “diviners of the gods of Emar.”12 This family resided in Building M₁, which yielded the largest archive of the city. Members of the Zū-Baʿla family recorded their business on Syro-Hittite tablets only. The relationship between the Syrian and the Syro-Hittite traditions has given rise to a heated debate among scholars. The universally acknowledged terminus post quem for the destruction of Emar is given by a Babylonian tablet (E 26) found in Area A13 and dated to the second year of the Kassite king Meli-Šipak, probably corresponding in absolute chronology to 1185 or 1175 B.C.14 Early studies considered the texts of both traditions as contemporary corpora, dating to approximately the 13th century. This view was abandoned in the studies of Cohen and d’Alfonso (2008) and Di Filippo (2004, 2008a) in favor of a sequential distribution of the two traditions, with the older Syrian school gradually replaced by the Syro-Hittite one. According to Cohen and D’Alfonso, the Emar documentation dates from the beginning of the 14th century until the first quarter of the 12th century: the Syrian texts were produced for about 175 years, from the first decades of the 14th century until the mid-13th century, while the Syro-Hittite texts were produced for about 100 years, between 1275 and the destruction of the city around 1175. Di Filippo made the substantial point that Syrian tablets were kept as titles to properties and were not contemporary with the Syro-Hittite documents, although they were found together (sometimes even in the same jars).15 Recently, the sequential distribution of the two traditions has been challenged by the studies of Démare-Lafont and Fleming (2009, 2015, 2018). They have proposed a different terminology for the two traditions, referring to the Syrian tradition as the “conventional format” and the Syro-Hittite as the “free format.” While accepting that the conventional format is older, they argue that the two traditions overlapped for a substantial period during which they were practiced by different socio-economic groups: the conventional format was used

Démare-Lafont and Fleming (2015: 65–68) and Endesfelder (2017: 44–46) rightly place Zū-Aštarti as the last king. 12 For this family see § 1.3.1. 13 See § 1.3.7. 14 Arnaud 1975b: 88–89; for the chronology see Brinkman 2017: 36; for the alternative date see Cohen and d’Alfonso 2008: 14–15 and 4 n. 5. 15 Di Filippo 2008a; Di Filippo drew on an early suggestion by Durand 1989d: 170–71.

1.1 The City of Emar: History, Chronology, and Society 

 5

exclusively by local townsmen, while foreigners, although resident in Emar, used the free format, which also served as a shared law for all inhabitants of Emar.16 Following Di Filippo’s insight, Endesfelder17 has argued that the two traditions were not used by different socio-economic groups. Rather, after the SyroHittite format was introduced by the Hittite overlord, the use of the Syrian tradition was limited to documents in which the local authorities, i.e., the Elders and the royal family, had a prominent role.18 Documents not associated with the local authorities were written according to the Syro-Hittite tradition, which overlapped with the Syrian tradition only for about 20 to 30 years and then completely replaced it after the demise of the monarchy. Therefore, the two formats were never used for the same types of documents. Most recently, I strengthened Di Filippo’s argument by arguing that all the preserved Syrian tablets regularly excavated (testaments included) mention real properties and were kept as titles to properties.19 As a consequence, a number of Syrian and Syro-Hittite tablets found in Building M₁ should be ascribed to the private archive of the family of diviners and are evidence of their acquisition of real properties.20 For these reasons, in the present work, the premise that the Syrian tradition was succeeded by the Syro-Hittite tradition is retained.21 16 While keeping the traditional terminology, Fijałkowska (2015b) also believes that the two formats were used by different social groups. 17 Endesfelder 2017: 36–37, 62–64, 68–72. 18 For changes brought about by the Hittite domination see also van Exel 2010. 19 Viano 2020a, Viano 2020b. 20 In an earlier study (Viano 2020b), I concluded that all the Syrian and Syro-Hittite tablets found in Building M₁ belonged to the private archive of the Zū-Baʿla family. But we should consider the possibility that some Syro-Hittite tablets were part of small living dossiers that were deposited by their owners in Building M₁ in virtue of the institutional role of the Zū-Baʿla family. That people owning only a few tablets could store their dossiers outside their houses has been suggested as an explanation for the presence of private dossiers within the Ištar and Teššub temples at Nuzi, Lion and Stein 2016: 21. Given the function of Building M₁ as a scribal school, we could suppose that tablets were written and stored there on behalf of people unrelated to the Zū-Baʿla family. Nevertheless, I am still of the opinion that the majority of tablets from Building M₁ belonged to the private dossier of the Zū-Baʿla family. 21 The chronological difference between the two tablet-writing practices is further suggested by the distribution of the term ḫazannu (mayor). This official served as an intermediary between the king and the local collective powers and is predominantly attested in Syrian tablets; the few Syro-Hittite sources mentioning the ḫazannu can be approximately dated to the very beginning of the Syro-Hittite documentation, suggesting that this office survived for a short time after the demise of the monarchy and was later eliminated by the Hittites, Viano 2018b. Personally, I believe that there was no overlap between the two traditions or, at most, the overlap was shorter than Endesfelder’s chronology allows. I do not share his dating of Ipqi-Dagan of the Apilu family, see ch. 1 fn. 109.

6 

 1 Introduction

The earliest attestations of Hittites in the Emar texts date to approximately 1275–1265 B.C.22 Two kings of Karkemiš, who served as viceroy of the great king of Ḫatti in Syria, are mentioned in the Emar documentation, namely Šaḫurunuwa and his son Ini-Teššub, but certainly many documents were also written during the reign of Talmi-Teššub, son and successor of Ini-Teššub. Below the king of Karkemiš were the Sons of the King. This title was borne by certain high officials of the Hittite empire, who were not necessarily the sons of the sovereign but agents who carried out various functions.23 The Sons of the King mentioned in the Emar texts have a judicial function.24 At the local level, Hittite authority was exercised by the Overseer of the Land (LÚ.UGULA KALAM.MA), who is the Hittite official most frequently attested in the Emar sources.25 Other Hittite officials mentioned in Emar sources are the tartannu and the “Great one of the chariots.” Cohen (2012a) suggested that towards the end of the history of Emar, the Overseer of the Land became the city’s main authority, perhaps acting independently of Hittite control. Emar and the whole Middle Euphrates region are characterized by strong collective governance limiting the power of the king.26 Specific bodies named in the Emar texts – the Elders, Ninurta, the City, the Great Ones, and the “Brothers,” – provide evidence for collective governance.27 These forms of collective governance mostly appear in Syrian tablets but occasionally are also attested in Syro-Hittite documents. Because the present work mainly focuses on Syro-Hittite tablets, these bodies will rarely be encountered in the sources. Nevertheless, they deserve a brief introduction. The Elders of the City (šibut ālī), as the City’s council, were the representatives of the community and, together with the king, formed the highest civil authority. Ninurta, regularly written dNIN.URTA, was likely a temple authority, although both the location of the temple and the identity of the god behind the logogram remain unknown.28 Ninurta appears in Syrian sales contracts as the owner of

22 Cohen and d’Alfonso 2008: 12–14, Démare-Lafont and Fleming 2015: 49–51. 23 Imparati 1975, Bilgin 2018: 423–36. 24 d’Alfonso 2005a: 65–72. 25 For this office see Beckman 1992: 47–48. 26 Fleming 1992. An entire monographic study has been dedicated to collective governance in Late Bronze Age Syria by Solans (2014); see also Fleming 2004. 27 Similar collective bodies are known from Ekalte and neighboring towns. 28 Durand (2005) suggested that dNIN.URTA was an ideogram for the god Rašap. For Ninurta as a temple authority see Leemans 1988: 216–18; contra Solans (2014: 153–56), who identifies Ninurta with the City: “En suma, parece probable que la presencia de NIN.URTA y Baʿlaka, en las ventas mesoeufráticas del Bronce Final sea el resultado de una concepción piadosa de comunidad ciudadana y sus bienes y no de una situación institucional marcada por la presencia de una administración templaria: la ciudad, que desde el punto de vista ideológico es idéntica a NIN.

1.1 The City of Emar: History, Chronology, and Society 

 7

real properties jointly sold with the Elders, who acted as managers of Ninurta’s properties.29 In these sales the king always leads the list of witnesses. The City is usually listed as the owner of properties adjoining those that have been sold, but in two sale contracts (AuOr5 3 and TBR 14) it acts as seller along with Ninurta or the Elders.30 In documents dated to the First Dynasty, the City together with the king is responsible for granting prebends and for collecting money for the tribute to be paid to the Hurrian king. In the Syro-Hittite tablets, the Elders serve as witnesses and preside over courts together with the Hittite authorities. A judicial function is also attributed to the Great Ones, although it remains unclear whether they constituted a different body from the Elders.31 The “Brothers” deserve specific attention because they appear more often in the documents treated in the present work. The group called “Brothers,” usually written as LÚ.MEŠ.AḪ.ḪI.A/aḫ-ḫu and thus to be distinguished from biological brothers,32 has been predominantly interpreted in relation to households: as “members of the (nuclear or extended) family,”33 as “an extended body of kin,”34 as “un groupe de parents ou de membre du même clan ou de la même tribu,”35 or as “representatives of the clan.”36 Another view, namely that the “Brothers” may be a civic institution, has been put forward by Bellotto and most recently by Solans, who stressed the official and public function of the “Brothers.”37 However, Solans’s argument that the “Brothers” could be a non-familial institution, which is based on the observation that in a few texts the word “Brothers” is not followed by a pronominal suffix referring to the testator(s),38 does not seem to rest on solid ground: first, the pronominal suffix is lacking in only three texts (E 197, RE 61, and Ek 19); second, Middle Euphrates texts are well known for their idiosyncrasies. Solans also claims that the “Brothers” cannot be members of an extended family

URTA / Baʿlaka, es el ente jurídico propietario de los bienes enajenados, mientras que los ancianos son el colectivo que actúa como apoderado suyo” (p. 156). Fleming (2012: 108) proposed to identify the temple M₂ in Area E as Ninurta’s temple. 29 For the origin of the property rights of the estate sold by Ninurta and the Elders see Fijałkowska 2014a: 185–95. 30 Solans 2014: 144–49, 327; on the role of the City see Faist 2012. 31 For different views see d’Alfonso (2005a: 72–75, 85–86), who maintains that the two groups were distinct, and Solans (2014: 237–40, 244–46, 271), who believes they were the same body. 32 On the writings see Wilcke 1992 and Bellotto 1995: 211–14. 33 Zaccagnini 1992: 37; see also Arnaud 1981: 7–8 and Arnaud 1991a: 16–17. 34 Beckman 1996b: 58–59. 35 Leemans 1992: 19–20. 36 van der Toorn 1995: 41–42; see also Di Filippo 2008b. 37 Bellotto 1995, Solans 2014: 286–319; this interpretation was already hinted at in Arnaud 1981: 7 n. 4. 38 Solans 2014: 301, 15.

8 

 1 Introduction

because in RE 35 buyer and seller are biological brothers.39 However, biological brothers were themselves members of extended families. A different interpretation has been offered by Démare-Lafont (2012) who, opposing the interpretation of the Brothers as an institution, stressed their private nature: “les « Frères » n’y ont pas de pouvoir de décision au niveau de la Ville, ils n’interviennent pas dans les affaires extérieures et leurs attributions au plan intérieur se limitent essentiellement à un rôle passif de témoins. Les « Frères » sont d’abord un groupe social, une élite économique et culturelle représentative de la tradition dite « syrienne ».”40 Indeed, Démare-Lafont interprets the “Brothers” as landowners forming a group of equals. On the basis of the Mari evidence, she also showed that the “Brothers” in the sale contracts (in which they each receive a shekel of silver) can be interpreted as witnesses and not as members of the seller’s family who relinquished their rights to the property sold.41 Some evidence does suggest that the “Brothers” served an institutional role: namely, their identification in legal documents as recipients of penalties alongside two Emar institutions, the City and Ninurta; the attestations of heralds and heads of the “Brothers”; the attestations of “the gods of the Brothers”; and the use of a seal of the “Brothers.”42 Nevertheless, I regard the “Brothers” as a heterogeneous private body summoned to testify or settle family issues and affairs. For example, the tablet E 14, which proclaims the winner of a legal dispute between two brothers, was written by order of the “Brothers.”43 Regardless of the composition of the “Brothers,” whether members of an extended family or an elite body, I would tend to stress their appearance in documents related to family affairs.44 Admittedly, the number of sale contracts attesting the presence of the “Brothers” that clearly demonstrate kinship between parties is small (5 out of 24), but the fact that the “Brothers” appear in testaments and in other documents pertaining

39 Solans 2014: 306. 40 Démare-Lafont 2012: 131. 41 Démare-Lafont 2012: 135. 42 Bellotto 1995: 219–28, Démare-Lafont 2012: 137–40, Solans 2014: 305–15. 43 See Démare-Lafont 2012: 135, who speaks of private judges. 44 Solans (2014: 305 n. 1533) argues that my assertion (Viano 2010a: 134–40) that the presence of the “Brothers” is a probable indication of kinship between parties cannot be verified because two documents, RE 35 and E 156, should be discarded from a list of sale contracts from Emar in which the parties were related. Solans, following Mayer (2001), regards RE 35 as belonging to the Ekalte corpus, but Torrecilla (2014: XXI ) doubts that the tablet should be ascribed to the Ekalte corpus rather than to the Emar corpus; at any rate, even if the tablet stemmed from Ekalte, the broader picture would not be affected. Solans (2014: 311 n. 1558 and Table 13) also excludes E 156 from the list of texts mentioning “Brothers” for reasons unclear to me, although it is normally included, see Démare-Lafont 2012, 135 n. 31.

1.2 Purpose and Goals of the Study 

 9

to family affairs invites us to explore the possibility that parties in the rest of the documents involving the “Brothers” were tied by a type of kinship. This kind of kinship was not necessarily biological but could have been fictive, or simply a complex of social, political, clientelist, or spatial relationships.45 The involvement of the “Brothers” is not an outright indication of kinship between the parties (see, for instance, RE 84 below, in which the creditor is a temple authority), but this possibility will be taken into account in this study.

1.2 Purpose and Goals of the Study This work focuses on the socio-economic aspects of access to credit and of indebtedness as well as the motivations behind debts and debt settlement in the city of Emar. Several studies have argued that the major motivation of moneylenders who issued loans for consumption was to acquire the debtor’s labor or his land – primarily Finley (1981) for ancient Greece and Rome, echoed by Steinkeller (2002) for the Ur III period.46 Certainly, the entire system of lending cannot be explained in terms of the creditor’s expectation to acquire labor through default; indeed, lending at interest was an important motivation for entrepreneurs.47 Yet the inability to repay debts remained one of the main causes of dependency in the ancient Near East. Credit-related documents represent one of the richest categories of textual sources in ancient Mesopotamia and have stimulated a wealth of studies on the subject. Nevertheless, scholars have been mostly concerned with the formal and legal features of the documents, while the economic aspect of credit has been little studied and remains obscure in many ways. The socio-economic study of indebtedness is often complicated by the fragmentary nature of the sources and our ever-partial knowledge of archives and prosopography. Familiarity with the principal actors, i.e., creditors and debtors, and their socio-economic relations is essential for understanding the mechanisms of the credit system. Perhaps in no other economic transaction is the knowledge of the relationship between the parties so important. The Late Bronze Age city of Emar offers a prime opportunity for a socio-economic study of credit and indebtedness for several reasons. The textual corpus is rather small, allowing us to investigate all sources related to debt without limiting ourselves to a specific archive or period. Additionally, the whole corpus of legally excavated texts, as well as all of the tablets found in illicit diggings, has been 45 Cf. the discussion of kinship in relation to the Old Babylonian bābtum in Yoffee 1978: 29 and Schloen 2001: 289. 46 See also Van De Mieroop 2002: 70, 77–79. 47 See Garfinkle 2012: 46–48, 64–65, 145–46.

10 

 1 Introduction

published. The archaeological context of the majority of Emar tablets is known, and in several cases dossiers can be reconstructed based on prosopography.48 A fairly well-documented prosopography is indeed a key factor that makes Emar suitable for studying the relations between parties to a transaction. Another reason is that the Late Bronze Age has been the subject of several studies on economic history, including general syntheses as well as historical studies on aspects such as land tenure and prices at specific moments. The aim of this work is to provide a comprehensive investigation of indebtedness at Emar through an analysis of several factors: the purpose of debts, i.e., productive or consumptive; the procedures for granting credit; the strategies put in place to meet an obligation and to cope with economic difficulties; the consequences of non-fulfillment, which may lead to dependency; the different types of dependency; slave prices; and termination of dependency. Despite its potential, the Emar documentation presents considerable difficulties for classification because of the varied nature of the sources. In order to provide a comprehensive study of the socio-economic aspects of debts, all relevant sources have been taken into account. Information on debts is contained in a variety of text types: loan contracts, of course, but also adoptions, wills, court records, real property and slave sale contracts, contracts regulating forms of dependency, and documents of various content. The organization of the material was one of the major tasks of this work, which led to several reconsiderations of the evidence and involved an analysis of its philological and legal-economic aspects. The representativeness of cuneiform sources is one of the main problems in socio-economic studies. In the ancient Near East various types of legal texts were written only for cases that fell outside of custom or were likely to raise judicial problems. Many transactions were undertaken orally and obviously left no trace. This book is divided into two parts. Part I, mainly for specialists in Emar studies, is dedicated to the analysis of textual sources. The content of each source will be summarized and discussed. Part II contains the synthesis of the textual analysis. The reason for this organization is to present in one single place (Part II) the results of this study so that they can be directly accessed by those who might not be interested in the detailed analysis of sources. The introductory sections of each chapter in Part I are, however, useful also for non-specialists in Emar studies who would like to have a better sense of the material under investigation. The book ends with an Appendix containing the discussed Emar sources in transliteration and translation. Part I contains two chapters (§§ 2, 3). In each chapter sources are classified according to their script, namely Syrian, Syro-Hittite, Middle Babylonian,

48 See § 1.3.

1.2 Purpose and Goals of the Study 

 11

or Middle Assyrian. The majority of documents discussed in this work are Syro-Hittite tablets, for only a very small number of Syrian tablets concerning debts are preserved. Middle Babylonian and Middle Assyrian tablets relate to foreigners dealing in or with Emar.49 Chapter 2 is devoted to credit transactions. Since the documents vary in nature, they have been classified according to the first two phases of credit transactions: the creation of the obligation (§ 2.1) and the fulfillment of the obligation (§ 2.2). For each source we will seek to understand the purpose and function of the debt and to determine whether it was contracted to finance commercial and business activities, or to meet necessities due to economic difficulties, especially in times of war and famine. Chapter 3 deals with the consequences of default, which represents the third phase of credit transactions and may lead to forms of dependency. For the sake of completeness, Chapter 3 will focus on forms of dependency derived from debt (§ 3.2) as well as dependency arising from hardship and food shortage but not specifically related to a contracted debt (§ 3.3). In addition, it includes documents pertaining to what is usually referred to as chattel slavery (§ 3.3). Chapter 3 concludes with a discussion of documents related to the termination of slavery, either through redemption or manumission (§ 3.4). Part II consists of two chapters (§§ 4, 5) and final conclusions (§ 6). Chapter 4 offers an overview of the credit system at Emar and seeks to understand the mechanisms of credit practice, such as the types of commodities loaned, the identification of moneylenders, the interest rate, the purpose of the loans, and the ways of fulfilling an obligation. Finally, we will seek to evaluate the economic context of credit transactions (§ 4.10). Chapter 5 deals with forms of dependency at Emar; we will focus on the formation of dependency resulting from indebtedness and hardship (§ 5.1) as well as on prices and contracting parties in transactions on the slave market (§ 5.2). Modalities of the termination of slavery are also discussed (§ 5.3). Section 5.4 compares the socio-economic roles of the different forms of dependency. The concluding chapter (§ 6) discusses the results of the present study in the context of the Syrian economy during the Late Bronze Age. The turn of the 13th century, a period that has been epitomized as the “Crisis Years,”50 saw the collapse of the system of Late Bronze Age regional powers. The

49 The texts discussed in each subsection of §§ 2-3 are Syro-Hittite unless the subheading specifies otherwise. 50 See Klengel 2000; The Crisis Years is also the title of a book edited by Ward and Joukowsky (1992).

12 

 1 Introduction

Hittite capital was abandoned before the fall of the empire51 and Ugarit was destroyed,52 as well as several Levantine cities.53 Many potential causes of the collapse have been put forward.54 There is evidence that climate changes around 1200 B.C. led to crop failure and drought in the Eastern Mediterranean.55 Textual evidence from various sites, including Emar, seems to indicate that populations suffered from famine and food shortage.56 Cuneiform records from Ḫattuša and Amarna speak of a plague affecting Syria, Cyprus, and the Hittite empire.57 Although causes and effects can hardly be distinguished, these factors may have jointly contributed to the migration of peoples and consequent warfare and attacks. Assaults and raids are attributed to pirates, seafarers, and mercenaries of various origin who are collectively called the Sea Peoples.58 These newcomers are described in the account of Ramses III on the wall of his temple at Medinet Habu and in several textual sources from Egypt, Syria, and Anatolia.59 Despite the often obscure nature of these groups, the evidence of destructions in the Eastern Mediterranean at the end of the Bronze Age indicates that the Sea Peoples played a major role in the collapse of costal civilizations.60 In addition to external factors that brought the Late Bronze Age to an end, endogenous causes have been cited as contributing to the collapse. Scholars generally agree that a socio-economic crisis struck the Near East during the Late Bronze Age. This view is tied to theoretical approaches to the Near Eastern economy. Building on the Marxist concept of the Asiatic mode of production, Diakonoff61 elaborated a “two-sector” model entailing a strict separation between state and village socio-economic structures.62 The palace sector was composed of 51 Bryce 2005a: 345, Bryce 2005b; an up-to-date reconstruction of the fall of the Hittite empire is provided in de Martino 2018. 52 Archeological evidence shows signs of an enemy attack, see Yon 1992: 117, Singer 1999: 730. 53 For destructions in northern and southern Syria see Cline 2014: 108–24. 54 For an up-to-date overview see Wiener 2017, see also Núñez 2018. 55 Kaniewski, et al. 2010, Cline 2014: 142–47, with previous bibliography. 56 For Ugarit see Singer 1999: 715–19. 57 Trevisanato 2007, Bryce 2005a: 205–07. 58 For an up-to-date discussion of the migrations of people at the end of the Late Bronze Age see Knapp 2021. The movements of seafarers were associated with the spread of new military technology, Jung 2009. 59 Singer 1999: 719–31, Knapp and Manning 2016: 118–23; most recently see the letter RSO 23 12 (RS 94.2169), which may refer to such episodes, Lackenbacher and Malbran-Labat 2016: 33–35. A survey of these sources is provided in de Martino 2018: 31–33. 60 Wiener 2017: 55–58, see most recently Cohen 2021. 61 Diakonoff 1982. 62 The Asiatic mode of production has been extensively treated by Liverani 1976, Zaccagnini 1981, Liverani 1984, and Zamora 1997, see also Schloen 2001: 189–94 and Liverani 2005b, and

1.2 Purpose and Goals of the Study 

 13

state non-free dependents who performed specialized services but did not own the means of production. The village sector, on the other hand, was characterized by a non-specialized subsistence economy with means of production communally owned by free peasants.63 Zaccagnini64 argued that the village sector had a greater role in the dry-farming areas of northern Mesopotamia, Anatolia, and the Levant. The palace sector depended on the exploitation of villages through taxation and the imposition of corvée. A major contribution to our understanding of the causes of the end of the Late Bronze Age has been made by Liverani, who, building on the two-sector model, in a series of studies attributed the breakdown of the Late Bronze Age regional system to the excessive exploitation of village communities, which led to an increase in indebtedness.65 According to his reconstruction, royal power relied on the support of the class of high functionaries formed by the military aristocracy (maryannu),66 scribes, administrative personnel, and merchants, who in return for their services were rewarded with land grants. Royal land grants are well known from Ugaritic, Kassite, and Assyrian sources.67 According to Liverani, followed by others,68 the periodic measures of debt cancellation typical of the Old Babylonian period were no longer undertaken in the Late Bronze Age as a consequence of the alliance between the king and the class of high-ranking officials and the military aristocracy, who sought to expand their landholdings. Liverani’s assumption that measures of debt cancellation were no longer practiced has now been abandoned in light of evidence from Terqa and Nuzi that attests the issuance of edicts estab-

most recently Liverani 2013: 156–62. For a general overview of theoretical approaches to Late Bronze Age economy (i.e., the feudal model, the two-sector model, the entrepreneurial model, and the patrimonial household model) see Schloen 2001: 187–254, Vidal 2005: 135–52, McGeough 2007: 39–87, Monroe 2009: 3–10 and Pfoh 2016: 108–19; see also for the ancient Near East Snell 1997: 141–58, Garfinkle 2012: 5–17. 63 For communal land ownership see Heltzer 1976: 90–96, Zaccagnini 1981: 25–29, Zaccagnini 1984a: 81. 64 Zaccagnini 1981: 22. 65 Liverani 1975: 159–64, Liverani 1979: 1342–48, Liverani 1982: 256–58, Liverani 1987: 69–70, Liverani 1989: 152–53, see also Liverani 1984: 41–42, Liverani 1995b, Liverani 1995a, Liverani 2001, Vidal 2005: 140, 142–43. 66 For the maryannū see Vita 1999: 464–65. 67 For Ugarit see Heltzer 1969: 38–40, Liverani 1974: 350–52, Heltzer 1988: 10–13, Heltzer 1999, Márquez Rowe 1999: 398, 414–15; for the Kassite period see Paulus 2014: 91–95; for the Middle Assyrian period see Jakob 2017: 154, with previous bibliography. 68 Liverani 1975: 159–60, Zaccagnini 1977: 176–77, Liverani 1979: 1344–47, Zaccagnini 1981: 23, 37–41, 59, Liverani 1987: 69–70, Liverani 1988: 456–58, 629–32, Zaccagnini 1990, Liverani 2005a: 26–29, Van De Mieroop 2007: 247–49, see also Sader 1992, Klengel 2000 Klengel 2013: 342–43.

14 

 1 Introduction

lishing andurāru.69 Nevertheless, no Late Bronze Age andurāru edict has been preserved, and attestations of debt remission are less frequent than in the Old Babylonian period, and in certain areas or periods totally absent. In the Middle Euphrates a single document from Ekalte (Ek 2) mentions andurāru.70 Moreover, although the evidence for andurāru spans from the 16th to the 13th century B.C.,71 most attestations date to the early Late Bronze Age (16th – 14th century B.C.).72 The present study will suggest (§§ 5.1.1, 5.3) that the remission of debts and liberation of people enslaved because of debt was no longer a royal responsibility in Late Bronze Age Emar but was shouldered by private individuals. Perhaps it can be assumed that this was a general process in the ancient Near East during the Late Bronze Age. According to Liverani, the peasantry’s land was pledged and alienated to a growing class of absentee landlords formed by the members of the palace bureaucracy and military aristocracy. The increase of indebtedness forced peasants to enter debt slavery or flee.73 The northern Mesopotamian site of Nuzi offers the well-known case of a restricted number of landowners acquiring vast landholdings belonging to free peasants, who often continued to work the land under a regime of bonded labor as a consequence of the increase of indebtedness caused by economic difficulties.74 In Syria (Ugarit and Alalaḫ) we may observe a parallel situation. The king granted lands – some appropriated from dispossessed villagers – to palace dependents, while merchants and members of the aristocracy purchased land from indebted peasants, resulting in an increase of bonded labor and debt slavery.75 The transfer of property was not limited to single parcels of land but included entire villages, notably at Ugarit.76 Flight was often the only solution for indebted people. The authorities’ concern over the treatment of runaways is witnessed by royal edicts and treaties.77 This crude exploitation led to

69 Lion 1999, see also von Dassow 2018a. 70 Charpin 2002. A MB literary text mentions andurāru established by the Kassite king Kurigalzu II, see Lion 1999: 327. 71 Lion 1999: 313. 72 See Lion 1999: 315, 319. 73 Snell 2001: 58–60. 74 Of the vast literature on the topic, suffice it to mention some references: Zaccagnini 1984a, Zaccagnini 2002, Zaccagnini 2001, Fincke 2010, Maidman 2010: 143–61. For forms of bonded labor caused by indebtedness see in particular Zaccagnini 1984a: 87, Zaccagnini 1984c: 704–05, and Zaccagnini 2002: 176–77. The appropriation of the land by rich magnates often occurred through real estate adoptions; for an overview of this legal instrument with a new explanation of its mechanism see von Dassow 2018a. 75 Liverani 1975: 156–62, Liverani 1983: 150–60, 163–65, 168–72. 76 For the transfer of villages see Zaccagnini 1981: 39–63. 77 Liverani 1974: 352–54, Snell 2001: 63–98.

1.2 Purpose and Goals of the Study 

 15

the depopulation of rural villages, which ultimately caused the failure of the food supply, on which the palace relied. At the same time, there was a progressive disengagement of aristocracy from military obligations; first, through a process of inheritance of land, followed by the replacement of service by annual payments, and finally total exemption. At the moment of the attacks by the Sea Peoples and newcomers, the aristocracy did not provide the military aid needed to protect the palace, which brought about the collapse of the whole system. Although Schloen, the strongest opponent of the two-sector model,78 rejects Liverani’s explanation of the collapse of the village structure, he concedes that Liverani may be correct about the role of indebtedness in this process: “He [Liverani] may even be correct in attributing the eventual collapse of the kingdom [Ugarit] to the chronic and excessive exploitation of the peasantry, who were forced into debt or flight (for which, to be sure, there is some evidence) because of their harsh economic circumstances.”79 The Middle Assyrian evidence shows similar episodes of exploitation of peasant communities.80 There is plenty of information on indebted people who resorted to pledging and selling their properties to wealthy families. Remarkably, the same impoverished families recurrently forfeited their properties as a sign of their progressive economic degradation.81 Scholars have usually underlined the similarity of the socio-economic situation in Emar to that of other political entities towards the end of the Late Bronze Age.82 However, this study will argue that the models of socio-economic relations during the Late Bronze Age proposed by Liverani and others does not account for the Emar evidence. Most texts do not mention the reason why a debt was contracted; this can only be understood through context and prosopographic analysis. Nevertheless, the reconstruction proposed in this study reveals that frequently indebtedness was not linked to economic difficulties. A substantial number of debts were associated with the activities of foreign and local merchants operating at Emar who were financed by local townsmen. These sources show that Emar was an important trade center at the crossroads of various commercial routes. On 78 Criticism of the two-sector model was expressed prior to Schloen by a number of scholars, see, e.g., Postgate 1982: 309–11, Márquez Rowe 1999–2000, Pardee 2001; see also Vidal 2005: 143–45. 79 Schloen 2001: 239; for criticism of Liverani’s understanding of the crisis of the Late Bronze Age see in particular Schloen 2001: 231–41. 80 Postgate 1988: 142–45, Abraham 2001: 190–94, see also Postgate 1982: 311. 81 Evidence is found in Saporetti 1979 and Saporetti 1982, see in particular Saporetti 1979: 44– 47, 77–80, 95–96, Saporetti 1982: 32–39; loan contracts are also documented in Reculeau and Feller 2012, but see the review by Maul 2016. 82 See in particular Zaccagnini 1995: 93, Zaccagnini 2002: 175, 89, Zaccagnini 1999: 338–41, Adamthwaite 2001: 133–54; see also Justel 2013, Bellotto 2014: 41–42.

16 

 1 Introduction

the local level, debts also arose in the course of local business deals and productive activities or were incurred to purchase goods. Even wealthy persons, such as the members of Emar’s family of diviners (§ 1.3.1) or large landowners, became debtors probably to obtain cash. The need for silver appears as one of the major motivations for undertaking debt obligations. Although several documents recording credit transactions belong to the dossiers of wealthy families who probably belonged to the city elite (§ 1.3), moneylending practices were not fully controlled by a few wealthy individuals. There is no evidence of a systematic exploitation of impoverished people to obtain property or labor as in other Late Bronze cities, although comparable phenomena are documented. Comparison of the debt-related documentation from Emar with that from other sites, such as Nuzi,83 shows the peculiar nature of Emar. This is not to say that the inhabitants of Emar experienced no economic difficulties or financial distress; such crises are attested in a substantial number of sources, including cases of servile labor arising from debt or famine. Episodes of hardship are evident in texts that use a date-like formula that mentions the “year of hardship,” and such episodes can be correlated with wars and periods of inflation.84 Nevertheless, Emarites resorted to various strategies for facing indebtedness that were inspired by a principle of solidarity that reached an equitable balance between the debtor’s and creditor’s interests. Sociology and economics have long recognized the role of solidarity in economic behavior. Since the time of Durkheim,85 solidarity has been an essential element of socio-economic analysis and has become central to economic sociology.86 Altruism and non-wealth-maximizing behavior are also acknowledged in New Institutional Economics.87 In the ancient Near East, forms of solidarity and legal devices inspired by principles of social justice are well known, for instance in the edicts of debt remission. Scholars, notably Westbrook and Démare-Lafont,88 have pointed out that forms of solidarity modeled on familial relations and measures of social justice are found in Emar’s sources. These models of solidarity extended outside the family and, as will be discussed in the present study, shaped strategies to help debtors and, at the same time, to secure the rights and interests

83 The cuneiform evidence from Nuzi dates at least one hundred years earlier than the bulk of the Emar documents treated in the present study (see von Dassow 2018a: 236), but is of comparative value nonetheless. 84 For this formula see § 1.5. 85 Durkheim 1893 [2018]. 86 Granovetter 1995, see also Granovetter 1985. 87 North 1990: 20–22. 88 Westbrook 2001a, Démare-Lafont 2014, see also Démare-Lafont 2012, Bellotto 2014.

1.3 Family Archives and Dossiers 

 17

of creditors. The strategies to face indebtedness were more widespread than is usually acknowledged and took different forms. Adoption could oblige a debtor to care for elders in exchange for having his debt repaid. Forms of temporary dependency that usually corresponded in duration to the creditor’s lifetime can be regarded as remedies for indebtedness. Notably, in the so-called amēlūtu contracts (§ 3.2.1.1), the debtor became an amēlūtu (a type of dependent) of his creditor in exchange for the payment or cancellation of his debt. In addition (and perhaps most importantly) the amēlūtu obtained a means of subsistence and was to be released after the creditor’s death. Significantly, the amēlūtu’s duty is expressed by the same verb used for the adoptee’s duty towards the adopter, palāḫu. Some documents pertaining to debt and perhaps famine slavery can be interpreted in a similar manner (§ 5.4). The Emar economy appears to have flourished towards the end of the Late Bronze Age in a way that contrasts with the consensus view of a crisis that led to the collapse of the regional system. The lack of evidence for the accumulation of land tenure by a restricted number of landowners through the exploitation of indebted peasants, the adoption of legal and economic remedies for indebtedness, and the absence of control of the credit system by the wealthiest are some of the peculiar elements of Emar highlighted in the present study. The Emar sources offer a basis for a reconsideration and re-evaluation of the crisis itself.

1.3 Family Archives and Dossiers Discrete family archives and dossiers can be reconstructed from epigraphic finds unearthed in several areas of the site by controlled excavations (Fig. 1), as well as from looted tablets, on the basis of prosopographic links. Six major private dossiers can be reconstructed belonging to families that are named after their patriarchs, i.e., Zū-Baʿla, Ḫima, Milki-Dagan, Kutbe, Awiru, and Apilu. These families will be collectively referred to as the notable families. These dossiers are composed of Syro-Hittite tablets and are contemporary with each other.89 Nevertheless, with the exception of the archive found in Building M₁ and belonging to the family of Zū-Baʿla, the other dossiers only consist of a few tablets. ‘Elite’ is an etic term that often appears in literature in a rather vague way and is loosely defined, but it identifies a concept that, precisely because it can be used in different ways, remains useful for Near Eastern studies. Sallaberger rightly pointed out that ‘elite’ should be defined “according to its specific historical context and to

89 For these dossiers see Skaist 1998a, Viano 2007.

18 

 1 Introduction

the scholar’s analytical perspective.”90 Different criteria can be adopted to define the elite, such as economic, political/military, and religious power. These features can be inferred from several factors, including the number of sources, the type and size of the family’s business concerns, and individuals’ titles. The above-mentioned families were probably part of the city elite, but, with very few exceptions, secure evidence can only be found for the family of Zū-Baʿla. This family of diviners was likely installed in their office by the Hittites,91 and the size of its economic activities leaves no doubt about its status.92 The family residence, Building M₁, stands out as the largest residential unit at Emar.93 Archaeology provides little evidence for the status of the other families because the dossiers of Kutbe, Awiru, and Apilu have been reconstructed from looted tablets, while the houses where the archives of Ḫima and Milki-Dagan were found are the typical Emar front room houses, which do not differ from the other residential units.94 The family of Kutbe perhaps belonged to the military elite (see § 1.3.4), but no information can be gleaned about the political, military, and religious role of the other families. Textual sources allow us to attribute substantial wealth to the families of Milki-Dagan, Ḫima, Kutbe, and probably Awiru, while we have far less data for the family of Apilu because of the smaller number of sources preserved. The families of Zū-Baʿla, Ḫima, Milki-Dagan, Kutbe, and Awiru can also be recognized as a closely related social group since their members served each other as witnesses.95 Apart from the Zū-Baʿla family, whose elite status is undisputed, textual sources do not allow us to infer whether families or individuals had an equal or greater level of wealth compared to the other notable families. Because the notable families yielded the largest preserved dossiers, they are regarded among the most important families at Emar. Other minor dossiers can be reconstructed through prosopographic links or archaeological evidence (§ 1.3.7). Only a few tablets can be attributed to each dossier, and in many cases such attributions are not fully certain. Finally, this section discusses a group of foreign merchants residing at Emar (§ 1.3.8) who, as textual sources make clear, had an important economic role and carried out business at Emar.

90 Sallaberger 2019: 919. 91 For the political role of the Zū-Baʿla family see Cohen 2009: 147–82. 92 For the economic activities of this family see Viano 2020b. 93 For the archaeology of Building M₁ see Rutz 2013: 93–107. 94 For the houses of Ḫima and Milki-Dagan see Margueron 1980: 291–95, Margueron 1982b: 240, see also § 6; for this house type see Margueron 1982a: 35–36, McClellan 1997: 33–34. Note that the house in Area T where the tablets of the family of Ḫima were found is now submerged by Lake Assad, Rutz 2013: 76–77. 95 Skaist 1998a: 51–53.

1.3 Family Archives and Dossiers 

 19

1.3.1 The Family of Zū-Baʿla The most important household documented in the Syro-Hittite tablets is the family of Zū-Baʿla, which held the office of chief diviner, officially known as the “diviner of the gods of Emar.” The family had a privileged relationship with the Hittite courts of Ḫattuša and Karkemiš and is associated with Building M₁, a structure found in Area M located in the center of the tell. Initially identified as a religious building, it does not exhibit the typical features of a temple but rather was an urban elite residence.96 Within Building M₁ the archaeologists found the largest collection of tablets from Emar, which is connected with the private and institutional activities of Zū-Baʿla’s family. Many legal documents that are not directly associated with the family of diviners, some of which are written on Syrian tablets, were also found in Building M₁. As mentioned above, I recently argued that a number of tablets found in Building M₁, both Syrian and Syro-Hittite, were kept as titles to properties or as business records by the Zū-Baʿla family.97 However, when a link with the activity of the family of diviners cannot be established, the documents will be discussed on their own. Building M₁ hosted a scribal school where members of the Zū-Baʿla family served as teachers.98 The family of Zū-Baʿla extended for five generations (Figure 2).99 The office of chief diviner100 was held by Zū-Baʿla, then by his son Baʿal-qarrād, followed by the latter’s eldest son Šaggar-abu, who died shortly thereafter and was replaced by his brother Baʿal-mālik. The last generation is represented by the two sons of Baʿal-mālik, Zūzu and Ipqi-Dagan, and the office was possibly passed down to Ipqi-Dagan.101 A secondary family branch developed from another one of Zū-Baʿla’s sons, Kāpī-Dagan, who bore the title of diviner and had three sons.102

96 McClellan 1997: 30, Otto 2006: 491, Rutz 2013: 303–07. 97 Viano 2020a, Viano 2020b; on the archival practices in Building M₁ see ch. 1 fn. 20. 98 Cohen 2009: 147–82. 99 Previous literature counts four generations starting with Zū-Baʿla, but the first active generation is that of his father Šuršu, who appears as the principal in the Syrian text E 158; for the identification of Šuršu as the father of Zū-Baʿla see d’Alfonso 2000, Cohen 2009: 149–50, Cohen 2013: 291–92. For practical reasons I retain the traditional numbering of generations, treating Zū-Baʿla’s as the first generation. 100 Members of the Zū-Baʿla family bore the title LÚ.ḪAL; only Zū-Baʿla and his father, Šuršu, who is mentioned in E 194 and in the Syrian legal document E 158, bore the title LÚ.MÁŠ.ŠU.GÍD.GÍD, which was an old-fashioned title, see Viano 2020b. 101 Adamthwaite 2001: 32, Cohen and d’Alfonso 2008: 12. 102 For Kāpī-Dagan as the head of a secondary branch of the Zū-Bāʿla family see Cohen 2009: 158–63.

103 Names of chief diviners are enclosed in rectangles; a dashed rectangle indicates that the identification of the individual as chief diviner is uncertain.

Figure 2: Family of Zū-Baʿla.103

20   1 Introduction

1.3 Family Archives and Dossiers 

 21

Seventeen documents pertaining to debts and dependency are distributed over three generations (I to III) of the family of Zū-Baʿla (Table 1).104 The most active member of the family was Baʿal-mālik son of Baʿal-qarrād. Table 1: The Archive of Zū-Baʿla.105 Generation

Principal

Document

Type

I

Zū-Baʿla

E 200

Repayment of debts

E 177 (?)

Manumission

E 209

Document creating an obligation

E 211

Chattel slavery – Sale contract

AOAT 265.1 (?)

Debt slavery – Letter

II

Baʿal-qarrād son of Zū-Baʿla

II

Kāpī-Dagan son of Zū-Baʿla

Subartu 17

Unclear debt dependency – Lawsuit

II

Ibni-Dagan son of Zū-Baʿla

E 205

Debt slavery – Lawsuit

III

Baʿal-mālik son of Baʿal-qarrād

E 213

Family law contract

E 215

Debt slavery – Enslavement

E 217

Famine slavery – Sale contract

E 214

Chattel slavery – Sale contract

E 224

Chattel slavery – Sale contract

E 221

Redemption of slave

E 279

Document creating an obligation

E 319

Document creating an obligation

E 277 (?)

Document creating an obligation

E 278 (?)

Document creating an obligation

III

?

Zū-Aštarti son of Baʿal-qarrād

?

104 Not all documents can be assigned to the Zū-Baʿla family with the same degree of certainty. 105 Due to the large size of the archive of the family of Zū-Baʿla, only documents treated in the present work are listed in this table; another document possibly involving the Zū-Baʿla family is E 210, but the tablet is too fragmentary (cf. ch. 3 fn. 55). Documents indicated in bold in this and in the following tables in § 1.3 are discussed in the present study.

22 

 1 Introduction

1.3.2 The Family of Ḫima The archive of Ḫima’s family was found in Area T, located in the middle of the plateau west of Area N (Figure 1). Archaeologists discovered two domestic structures where a group of thirty-four tablets (E 75 – E 108) was found. The archive of Ḫima comprises fourteen documents distributed over two generations (Figure 3): Dagan-kabar and Dagan-taliʾ, the sons of Ḫima; and Dagan-kabar son of Dagantaliʾ. The nine documents treated in the present study show that the family of Ḫima was deeply involved in moneylending and in the slave market (Table 2).

Figure 3: Family of Ḫima. Table 2: The Archive of Ḫima. Generation

Principal

Document

Type

I

Dagan-kabar son of Ḫima

E 75

Document creating an obligation

E 76

Real property sale contract

E 77

Indentured labor

E 78

Agreement

E 79

Famine slavery – Sale contract

E 87 (?)

Document creating an obligation

E 80

Real property sale contract

E 81

Real property sale contract

E 82

Real property sale contract

E 83

Famine slavery – Sale contract

E 84

Famine slavery – Sale contract

E 85

Repayment of debts – Sale contract

E 86

Indentured labor

E 88 (?)

Document creating an obligation

I

II

Dagan-taliʾ son of Ḫima

Dagan-kabar son of Dagan-taliʾ

Three documents from this archive, E 79, E 87, and E 88, cannot be linked with certainty to either of the two Dagan-kabars because the patronymic is not pre-

1.3 Family Archives and Dossiers 

 23

served. E 79 was assigned by Arnaud to the son of Ḫima; lacking any counterevidence this attribution is followed here. Skaist attributed E 87 and E 88 to Dagan-kabar son  of Dagan-taliʾ, while Zaccagnini regards Dagan-kabar son of Ḫima as the principal.106 Because E 87 involves foreign merchants belonging to the same entourage as those mentioned in E 75, it is more likely that the principal was Dagan-kabar son of Ḫima. Lacking direct links with other documents, E 88 is attributed to Dagan-kabar son of Dagan-taliʾ.

1.3.3 The Family of Milki-Dagan Three domestic structures found in Area V yielded a total of twenty-eight tablets (E 109 – E 136). Ten of these tablets (E 112 – E 121) form the archive of the family of Milki-Dagan (Table 3). This family archive extends over two generations corresponding to Milki-Dagan’s sons Dagan-kabar and Aḫī-Dagan and their respective sons Aḫī-Dagan and Milki-Dagan (Figure 4). Another possible son of Milki-Dagan is a certain Aḫu-qâmu who only appears as a witness in two documents (E 115 and E 117). Six documents from both generations of the archive are relevant for the present study.

Figure 4: Family of Milki-Dagan.

106 Skaist 1998a: 69; Zaccagnini 2018: 57; none of the authors offers an explanation for their attribution.

24 

 1 Introduction

Table 3: The Archive of Milki-Dagan. Generation

Principal

Document

Type

I

Dagan-kabar son of Milki-Dagan

E 112

Testament

I

Aḫī-Dagan son of Milki-Dagan

E 117

Indentured labor

E 118 E 119

II

Aḫī-Dagan son of Dagan-kabar

Real property sale contract

E 114

Real property sale contract

E 116 Milki-Dagan son of Aḫī-Dagan

Repayment of debts

E 113 E 115

II

Famine slavery – Sale contract

Repayment of debts Repayment of debts

E 120

Purchase of inheritance share

E 121

Debt slavery – Enslavement

1.3.4 The Family of Kutbe The archive of the family of Kutbe has been reconstructed on the basis of prosopographic links from tablets found in illegal excavations. Eleven tablets can be assigned to this family archive (Table 4). Although four generations (0-III) are attested, the documents only pertain to two generations, represented by Kutbe’s sons and by his grandsons through Aḫī-mālik (Figure 5).

Figure 5: Family of Kutbe.

Nine documents from this archive are relevant for the present study. Slave trading was probably the core business of Kutbe’s family, as most of the documents relate to forms of dependency. This family likely belonged to the military elite of Emar because GsK 7, a Syro-Hittite tablet that does not belong to the family archive, lists soldiers entrusted to Zū-Aštarti son of Kutbe.

1.3 Family Archives and Dossiers 

 25

Table 4: The Archive of Kutbe. Generation

Principal(s)

Document

Type

I

Zū-Aštarti son of Kutbe

Hirayama 40

Document creating an obligation Chattel slavery – Sale agreement

I

Ḫemia son of Kutbe

TBR 66

Real property sale contract

II

Zū-Aštarti son of Aḫī-mālik Ḫemia son of Aḫī-mālik

Hirayama 22

Testament

Hirayama 36

Debt slavery – Enslavement

Hirayama 37

Unclear debt dependency – Contract

Hirayama 45

Donation of slave

GsK 1

Debt slavery – Enslavement

GsK 2

Uncertain dependency for hardship – Contract

RE 10

Family law contract

RE 13

Family law contract

Hirayama 41

Receipt for a slave transaction

1.3.5 The Family of Awiru The family of Awiru is known from eight tablets found in illegal excavations (Table 5). The family archive lasted two generations, corresponding to Arwu son of Awiru and his son Bulālu (Figure 6). Nevertheless, the archive contains only three documents relevant for the present study.

Figure 6: Family of Awiru.

26 

 1 Introduction

Table 5: The Archivie of Awiru. Generation

Principal

Document

Type

I

Arwu son of Awiru

TBR 20

Real property sale contract

TBR 21

Marriage

TBR 22

Testament

TBR 23

Marriage

Hallo 2

Marriage

TBR 24

Real property sale contract

TBR 25

Unclear debt dependency – Contract

TBR 26

Sale into debt slavery

II

Bulālu son of Arwu

1.3.6 The Family of Apilu Arnaud published texts TBR 43–49 as a discrete dossier belonging to the family of Apilu, but as I previously pointed out, TBR 49 does not belong to this group of documents.107 A further distinction is to be drawn between the Syrian tablets TBR 47–48, on the one hand, and on the other hand the Syro-Hittite sources TBR 43–46 that form the archive of Apilu.108 Therefore the archive covers one generation only, that of Apilu’s sons Itūr-libbu and Ipqi-Dagan (Figure 7), and is dated to the very end of Emar’s history.109 A single document in this archive is relevant for the present study (Table 6).

Figure 7: Family of Apilu.

107 Viano 2007: 255. 108 For TBR 48 see § 3.3.2.1.1.2. 109 TBR 44 mentions the attack of the TAR-WU troops, which is also attested in TBR 25, a document belonging to the last generation of the archive of Awiru (Table 5), Viano 2007: 255–56; for the late date of the TAR-WU troops see also Yamada 2019b. Additionally, TBR 43 is witnessed by Dagan-qarrād, son of the diviner Matkali-Dagan (see Cohen 2009: 39), who is mentioned in a text dated to Aḫī-mālik, the last Overseer of the Land of Emar; for the date of Aḫī-mālik see Cohen 2012a. Based on these observations Endelsfelder’s suggestion (2017: 71) that Ipqi-Dagan son of Apilu could be identified with a witness attested in documents dated to Pilsu-Dagan proves to be unfounded.

1.3 Family Archives and Dossiers 

 27

Table 6: The Archive of Apilu. Generation

Principal

I

Itūr-libbu son of Apilu

I

Ipqi-Dagan son of Apilu

Document

Type

TBR 43

Marriage – Adoption

TBR 44

Debt slavery – Sale contract

TBR 45

Testament

TBR 46

Marriage – Adoption

1.3.7 Minor Dossiers and Other Notable Individuals A few minor dossiers can be reconstructed from excavated and looted tablets based on archaeological evidence as well as prosopography.110 Admittedly, the evidence for the proposed reconstruction of the dossiers is in certain cases rather limited. Given the meager quantity of data, the understanding of the socio-economic status of these people remains highly problematic. Only people who recorded their activities on Syro-Hittite tablets are discussed here (Table 7).111 In addition to these minor dossiers, some notable individuals will be discussed below (Table 8). Table 7: Minor Family Dossiers. Principal(s)

Document

Type

Role

Baʿal-bēlī and Abdi-Šaggar sons of Irʾam-Dagan

E7

Famine slavery – Sale contract

Buyers

Šaggar-abu son of Baʿal-qarrād

E 16

Indentured labor

Creditor – master

Kunaʾe son of Irrike

QVO5 2

Indentured labor

Creditor – master

Family of Laḫma

RE 72

Document creating an obligation

Creditor / Debtor

RE 75

Document creating an obligation

Creditor

TBR 36

Lawsuit concerning the fulfillment of an obligation

Creditor

110 Of the many minor dossiers known from Emar sources, only those containing documents related to the subject of this study will be introduced in this section. 111 Syrian tablets are an older and separate set of data, and only those serving as titles to properties can belong to these dossiers. Dossiers composed exclusively of Syrian tablets are not introduced here, e.g., the dossier of the family of Nunia (E 109, E 110).

28 

 1 Introduction

Table 7 (continued) Principal(s)

Document

Type

Role

Mama son of Ummānu

RE 63

Indentured labor

Creditor – master

Abī-liʾmu son of Abī-liʾmu

TBR 28

Repayment of debts

Third party

TBR 29

Repayment of debts

Third party

TBR 39

Indentured labor

Creditor – master

TBR 40

Indentured labor

Creditor – master

TBR 65

Real property sale contract

Buyers

Family of Udḫa-abu Bēlu-kabar and Dūdu sons of Abdi-ili

Baʿal-bēlī and Abdi-Šaggar, sons of Irʾam-Dagan, appear as buyers of a slave in E 7. I recently proposed to identify these brothers as the owner of an archive of thirteen tablets (E 1 – E 13) stored in the jar Msk 7238. This jar was found in a niche in room 7 of Area A and contained a mix of Syrian and Syro-Hittite tablets.112 The Syrian tablets deal with real properties of the family of Illatu and were kept from the time of the First Dynasty as titles to properties.113 Most likely the Syrian sale contract TBR 5, which records purchases by Irʾam-Dagan son of Illatu, belonged to the same dossier. Baʿal-bēlī and Abdi-Šaggar were perhaps the last members of the family of Illatu. The personal name Abdi-Šaggar occurs elsewhere only in a fragmentary list from the temple of Aštarte (E 67) and lacks a patronymic. Although this archive would be one of the largest private dossiers in Emar, I prefer to keep it separated from those of the notable families because the identification of the sons of Irʾam-Dagan as the owners of the archive is not without problems, and E 7 is the only tablet where they appear. Šaggar-abu son of Baʿal-qarrād – likely not the homonymous member of the Zū-Baʿla family114 – appears as a creditor in E 16. This tablet was stored in the jar Msk 7336, which was found in another room of Area A, Room 15.115 The jar also contained two Syrian-type tablets that were kept as titles to properties by Šaggar-abu.116 Šaggar-abu was likely associated with the notable families

112 Viano 2020a: 415–21. 113 E 12 is the oldest tablet of the archive dating to Liʾmi-šarru; the father of Baʿal-bēlī and Abdi-Šaggar, attested in E 5, was contemporaneous with the third generation of the Zū-Baʿla family because the scribe of E 5, Taʾe son of Abī-kāpī, was the same person who wrote E 215 (§ 3.2.3.2.1.3). 114 For details see § 3.2.1.1.2.3. 115 Arnaud 1975a: 89, Balza 2009: 21. 116 Di Filippo 2008a: 47–48.

1.3 Family Archives and Dossiers 

 29

because some of the sealers of E 16 also sealed documents of the families of Ḫima, Milki-Dagan, and Awiru.117 Kunaʾe son of Irrike appears in two documents, QVO5 1 and QVO5 2. QVO5 1 establishes Kunaʾe’s authority over a woman while QVO5 2 is a contract where Kunaʾe cancels the debt of his debtor and takes him as an indentured person. The family of Laḫma appears in three credit-related documents. ḪinnuDagan son of Laḫma was likely a merchant with certain financial means and appears in two debt notes, RE 72 and RE 75, that document his business with Aḫiu son of Tūbu. RE 72 records in the form of a debt an exchange of goods between the two, and RE 75 records a loan issued by Ḫinnu-Dagan. He is also the principal in the marriage contract RE 76, where he settles matters with the bride’s family: he did not marry the bride as expected but gave her to another man and therefore turned over to her family part of the silver he had received for the woman’s bridewealth.118 His brother Uginu, who appears in the witness list of RE 76, is probably to be identified with the creditor in TBR 36, where he won a lawsuit against his debtors.119 Mama son of Ummānu appears in RE 63 where he repays the debt of his nephew and takes him as a dependent. He probably also appears in RE 56,120 where he regulates the inheritance shares of his three sons. Abī-liʾmu son of Abī-liʾmu is named in TBR 28 and TBR 29, where he repays rather substantial debts and obtains the debtors’ houses. His wife seems to have enjoyed quite a high status.121 The family of Udḫa-abu is attested in two contracts, TBR 39 and TBR 40, where the sons of Udḫa-abu, Dagan-taliʾ and Zimrī-Dagan, repay the debtors’ debt and take them as indentured persons.

117 Amzaḫi son of Eḫlia (seal B1 in Beyer 2001) appears in E 84 (Ḫima) and E 115 (Milki-Dagan); Baʿal-mālik son of Ṣalmu (B2), Ilānu son of Aḫiu (B5), Šaggar-abu son of Dagan-tariʾ (B6), and Dagan-taliʾ son of Ḫuzāmu (B42) appear in TBR 21 (Awiru). 118 Together with Aḫiu, he also appears in a document of unclear nature, RE 74; for the details see p. 70. 119 For details see § 2.2.3.4. Arnaud published TBR 36 together with TBR 35 as part of the same dossier, but TBR 35 is a Syrian tablet dated to Pilsu-Dagan with apparently no relation to TBR 36. TBR 35 mentions a certain Laḫma who is granted all the possessions of another individual, but it is unknown whether he was Uginu’s father; since TBR 36 is dated to one of the oldest Overseers of the Land mentioned in the Emar sources, Mutri-Teššub, the chronological gap between TBR 35 and TBR 36 makes it perhaps not impossible that we are dealing with the same person, especially if we consider that in TBR 36 Laḫma was probably already dead. 120 For the identification see p. 173 and ch. 3 fn. 142. 121 See ch. 2 fns. 140 and 265, and § 2.2.1.2.5.

30 

 1 Introduction

Table 8: Other Notable Persons. Person

Document

Type

Role

Ibni-Dagan son of Zū-Aštarti

AuOr5 12

Famine slavery – Sale contract

Buyer

Wašti wife of Piḫa-Tarḫunta

E 35

Chattel slavery – Sale contract

Seller

Aḫlamû son of Abbanu

Hirayama 36

Debt slavery – Enslavement

Creditor

Šeʾi-Dagan son of Šaggar-abu

RE 10

Family law contract

Creditor

Baʿal-bēlī son of Šeʾi-Dagan

RA77 5

Indentured labor

Creditor

Tūri son of Ilī-bāni

GsK 1

Debt slavery – Enslavement

Creditor

Bēlu-kabar and Dūdu, sons of Abdi-ili, appear in TBR 65 as buyers of a property whose owner was compelled to sell by the threat of debt. The two brothers also appear in TBR 64 as buyers of another real property but do not seem to be particularly close with other Emarites.122 A few other individuals will be introduced here. Although they cannot be associated with archives or dossiers, they were likely notable persons. These individuals are often mentioned as moneylenders, and sometimes as principals, in documents belonging to the dossiers of other families. Ibni-Dagan son of Zū-Aštarti appears as the purchaser of a slave in AuOr5 12. This person is qualified as a son of a diviner and appears as a sealer in RE 11 and in TBR 44, which belongs to the family of Apilu.123 Wašti, who is the seller of a slave in E 35, was the wife of Piḫa-Tarḫunta, who bears the title Son of the King and was the grandson of the king of Karkemiš, IniTeššub.124 Aḫlamû son of Abbanu is listed in Hirayama 36 as a creditor of a woman enslaved by the family of Kutbe. Aḫlamû was the grandson of the Overseer of the Land Mutri-Teššub.125 Šeʾi-Dagan son of Šaggar-abu is the creditor in RE 10, where the debtor is a member of the family of Ḫima. His father is a Hittite official who bears the title of tartannu and “Great one of the chariots.”126 122 Note that virtually all witnesses in TBR 65 appear elsewhere only in TBR 64. An exception is the chief scribe Madi-Dagan, who is the first sealer in TBR 64 and had a prominent position at Emar, Cohen 2009: 189–94. 123 For the identification of this person see § 3.3.1.4. 124 For this official see § 3.4.1.2.2. 125 For this Hittite official see d’Alfonso 2005a: 73–75. 126 Šaggar-abu bears the title tartannu in RE 10 and E 128 while in E 117 he bears the title “Great one of the chariots”; in E 221 and perhaps E 118 he is attested as son of the tartannu and in E 16 and RE 25 simply as son of Dagan-tariʾ, for this official see Balza 2007.

1.3 Family Archives and Dossiers 

 31

Baʿal-bēlī son of Šeʾi-Dagan bears the title of diviner and is among the creditors in an amēlūtu contract (RA77 5), but he is otherwise unknown.127 Tūri son of Ilī-bāni is the creditor in GsK 1, an enslavement contract in which a member of the family of Kutbe repays the debt. According to the list of personnel RE 73, Tūri was likely a military official because he serves as the commander of guards at the Emar gates; Dagan-kabar son of Ḫima was recruited as one of these guards. He was also associated with the notable families, having sealed documents belonging to the families of Kutbe (Hirayama 41) and Awiru (TBR 24). His seal also appears in E 7.128

1.3.8  The Merchants from House 5 Located at the northwestern end of the site on the promontory overlooking the Euphrates valley, Area A was the first area to be excavated. Two sectors were investigated. In the northern part of Area A, the French mission discovered a large structure that was first identified with the palace, but which later turned out to show no traces of palatial architecture.129 Southeast of the so-called palace, five domestic structures were unearthed.130 Within room 18 of House 5 was found a group of six tablets (E 23 – E 28) related to the affairs of foreign merchants residing at Emar (Table 9).131 The tablets E 23 – E 27 stand apart from the mass of epigraphic finds from Emar, as they exhibit Middle Babylonian sign shapes and language. Five documents are relevant for the present study. Table 9: The Archive of House 5. Document

Script

Type

Principal(s)

E 23

MB

Repayment of debts

Tatašše/Raʾīndu – Ali-Nani

E 24

MB

Document creating an obligation

Tatašše/Raʾīndu

E 25

MB

Chattel slavery – Letter

Tatašše/Raʾīndu – Alazaia – Kidin-Gula

E 26

MB

Repayment of debts

Kidin-Gula – Nabunni

E 27

MB

Memorandum

Erība-Marduk

E 28

SH

Repayment of debts – Lawsuit

Aḫlamû son of Abī-Bēlu – Inbuia

127 For this individual see Cohen 2009: 39. 128 For his seal see Beyer 2001: 128, Ishida 2017–2018: 48. 129 See McClellan 1997: 30–31, d’Alfonso 2008, Rutz 2013: 61. 130 These domestic structures are other examples of the typical front-room houses, Margueron 1982b: 234. 131 Arnaud 1975a: 90–91, Margueron 1982b: 234.

32 

 1 Introduction

As noted by several commentators, the foreign names of the merchants from House 5 could be evidence of their origin:132 Tatašše/Raʾīndu was likely Hurrian, and her husband Alazaia probably came from Alašia/Cyprus;133 Nabunni was perhaps from the city of Anat on the Middle Euphrates;134 Ali-Nani came from the city of Salḫu in Northern Syria; Kidin-Gula has been identified by Cohen135 as a master at the scribal school in Building M₁ and likely came from Northern Mesopotamia; and Erība-Marduk was likely a Babylonian. Merchants from House 5 had established commercial relations with Ugarit and with Urtenu in particular.136

1.4 Excursus 1: Real Properties Real properties are frequently attested in debt documents as forms of security for debt, or as means for fulfilling an obligation either through the sale of the asset in order to obtain money for repaying the debt, or as an asset transferred to the creditor in lieu of the debt (datio in solutum). These properties are the object of a large number of sale contracts providing much information on prices and price fluctuation, which I dealt with in a few articles.137 The relation between the value of debts and the value of these properties, based on prices in sale contracts, is often discussed in the present work. Therefore, the reader may find it useful to have a short summary of the prices of real properties at Emar. Houses are the most frequently attested properties in debt documents. House sale contracts are documented on both Syrian and Syro-Hittite tablets. The following table further corrects my previous studies. Fields are only attested in a few Syro-Hittite debt documents (E 115, E 116, E 215, MFA 1977.114, and TBR 36). A very limited number of Syro-Hittite sales of fields are known and only three documents (Hirayama 13, TBR 38, and TBR 68) preserve the purchase price, which is 10 shekels in each contract. The prices per square ikû are 10 shekels in Hirayama 13, 1 shekel in TBR 38, and 5 shekels in TBR 68.

132 Arnaud 1980: 256, Adamthwaite 2001: 76–83, and chiefly Cohen and Singer 2006: 129–31. 133 For the personal name Tatašše/Raʾīndu and the origin of the couple see Durand 1989c: c); for her role see also Arnaud 1980: 256, Dietrich 1990: 31–32. 134 The patronymic is Ulamburiaš according to Arnaud but Ulam-ti[. . .] according to Durand. As argued by Cohen 2015, Nabunni of E 26 cannot be identified with the addressee of a letter sent by Talmi-Šarruma; for this letter see § 3.4.2.1. 135 Cohen 2004, Cohen 2009: 183–89. 136 Cohen and Singer 2006, Pruzsinszky and Solans 2015: 327–29, see also Singer 1999: 658–59. 137 Viano 2010b, Viano 2012, Viano 2016.

1.5 Excursus 2: Legal Clauses 

 33

Additionally, in a lawsuit concerning a debt, MFA 1977.114, a field of 2 square ikû is valued at 45 shekels of silver.138 Table 10: House Prices. Script

Avg. Area

Number of Purchased Houses

Avg. Purchase Price

Avg. Price per sq. cubit

S SH

316.48 sq. c.

34

173.29 sh.

0.489 sh.

318.90 sq. c.

22

58.15 sh.

S&SH

0.189 sh.

317.32 sq. c.

56

128.06 sh.

0.367 sh.

A type of real property identified in Emar sources as kierṣetu, likely an unbuilt plot of land,139 is mentioned in two debt documents, one Syrian (E 109) and one Syro-Hittite tablet (E 209). Data related to kierṣetu sales will be provided in the analysis of the pertinent documents.

1.5 Excursus 2: Legal Clauses As an aid to the reader, the most important legal clauses and formulas found in Syro-Hittite texts will be briefly discussed here. Since Syrian texts represent only a small portion of the documentation discussed in this study, legal clauses from those sources will be introduced when encountered. The redemption clause grants the right of redeeming alienated properties. The right of redemption is usually granted to previous owners or rightholders, but sometimes it seems to be extended to anyone (mamma/mannummê).140 The redemption clause is usually associated with properties forcibly alienated on account of debt or distress, as a form of social justice.141 Various expressions are used for writing the redemption clause, mostly with the verbs baqāru and paṭāru.142 The price of redemption is usually set at twice the debt or purchase

138 See § 2.2.3.1 and Viano 2016: 173. 139 See Wilcke 1990, Huehnergard 1991; differently Seminara 1995. I here maintain Wilcke’s interpretation of kierṣetu as a plot of land expressed in Viano 2012: 151; there I argued that unbuilt plots of land are more likely to be found in the peripheral areas of the city, where kierṣetu were usually located (see Mori 2003a: 57–58), than in the city center. 140 See § 5.3. 141 See Westbrook 2001a. 142 For attestations and formulation see Zaccagnini 1996, Fijałkowska 2014a: 152–60.

34 

 1 Introduction

price through the formula TÉŠ.BI/mitḫāriš, which, as established by Zaccagnini, corresponds to the original sum plus its equivalent (i.e., double).143 The non-vindication clause is utilized in various legal documents, mostly sales, where it serves to bar future claims on properties such as real estate and slaves.144 In the Syro-Hittite texts this clause stipulates that if someone raises a claim, the tablet bearing the clause will serve as the primary title to property against any vindication or older tablets.145 Henceforth we will refer to ṭuppu annû ilāʾēšu, “this tablet will prevail over him,” as the non-vindication clause, although it only represents the second part of the clause in the Syro-Hittite documents; the first part is variously formulated, usually with the phrase lā iraggum. For the sake of simplicity and because the second part of the clause is the most consistent, ṭuppu annû ilāʾēšu is here used to refer to the whole non-vindication clause. Another clause protecting the buyer/owner is the zakû clause.146 This clause is mainly found in sale contracts and, pertinent to the subject of this work, in sales of persons (§ 3). The verb zakû, “to be pure, free,” does not bar redemption but protects the buyer from rightholders’ claims: it implies that any controversy will be settled between the seller and the claimants. The clause is usually structured according to the following pattern, with some variants: šumma urram šēram mamma ana bēl dīni ellâ PN₁ ittanapalšu PN₂ zakû, “If, in the future, someone should come up as an adversary in court, PN₁ (seller) will reimburse him; PN₂ (buyer) is free (of claims). The label “year of hardship” is used for various formulas indicating that the transaction took place during a time of distress (ina MU KALA.GA/dannati) or war and hostilities (ina MU nukurti).147 In a few cases, the enemy attacking Emar is identified as TAR-WU troops; the term has not yet been defined, although various hypotheses have been put forth.148 Some texts specify that hardship caused a great inflation in the price of barley.

143 Zaccagnini 1996; see also the remarks in Westbrook 2001a: 28 n. 11. 144 For this clause see also § 3.1.1 and Fijałkowska 2014a: 141–45. 145 The Syrian documents present a penalty clause that imposed high fines to discourage future claims, see Fijałkowska 2014a: 126–41; among the documents studied in the present work only TBR 82 reports this clause. 146 For this clause, see Fijałkowska 2014a: 146–52, cf. Zaccagnini 1996: 97, Westbrook 2001a: 35–36. 147 For this formula and variants see Zaccagnini 1995, Divon 2008, Adamthwaite 2001: 133–75 and Fijałkowska 2014a: 167–69 with previous bibliography; see also § 6 and Table 59. 148 For these troops see Arnaud 1991a: 11, 14–15, Zaccagnini 1995: 96–97 n. 21, Adamthwaite 1996: 104–06, Pentiuc 2001: 180, Vita 2002: 121–22, Durand and Marti 2003: 158, Mora 2007: 517–19, Yamada 2019b: 200–03.

1.5 Excursus 2: Legal Clauses 

 35

The dissolution clause of some contracts regulating forms of dependency contains a formula henceforth termed the “leaving the house” formula; it underlines the asymmetrical relation between parties and indicates that the dependent was obliged to reside in his master’s house.149 This formula could be spoken by either side in breach of contract according to the following patterns: ištu bīti-ya atlak-mi, “Leave my house,” and ištu bīti-ka attallak, “I want to leave your house.” This formula is found in other documents regulating asymmetrical relations, such as E 5. In this fragmentary testament a father gives a certain Aḫia to his biological son Irʾam-Dagan as an adoptive son. The contract stipulates that Aḫia will share the inheritance with Irʾam-Dagan’s biological sons. Yet the adoption clause is formulated with the verb nadānu: (11) ù a-nu-ma mA-ḫi-ia a-n[a DUMU-ut-ti-šu a-na m Ir-am-dKUR] (12) DUMU-ia GAL at-ta-din, “And now, I have given Aḫia as a son to Irʾam-Dagan my eldest son.” This suggests that Aḫia’s adoption was imposed on him regardless of his will, likely because he was a minor, as advocated by Durand.150 The adoption clause, when constructed with the verb nadānu using the pattern “PN₁ gave PN₂ (the adoptee) to PN₃ (the adopter) as son,” reveals the social, juridical, or economic inferiority of the adoptee, or the relative age of the adoptee, with respect to the adopter151 (E 91,152 E 216-217,153 Hirayama 29,154 RE 61,155 RE 82,156 TBR 21,157

149 This formula is found in some contracts of indentured labor (§ 3.2.1), in one contract regulating an unclear form of dependency for debt (TBR 25, § 3.2.4.1), and in one contract regulating a form of dependency for hardship (GsK 2, § 3.3.2.2). 150 Durand 1989d: 169. 151 Note that the verb nadānu is used in the majority of marriages: there the bride is always the object of the contract and does not have an active role, Justel 2007: 21–27, Démare-Lafont 2010: 63. 152 The adoptees were likely servants, see Bellotto 2009: 70–71. 153 For these documents see § 3.3.1.1. 154 In Hirayama 29, the testator gave his daughter into adoption to his wife; the adoptee was perhaps a child (Bellotto 2009: 78) and is not mentioned among the heirs. In adoptions of the spouse’s sons, the adoption formula with the verb nadānu is not employed when the adoptee has no submissive role, i.e., if the adoptee is a male and is entitled to share in the inheritance of the adopter or the testator (E 30, Hirayama 51), see Bellotto 2009: 79–81. 155 RE 61 records a marriage agreement between two families that exchanged two brides, one of whom was adopted, see Durand 2013b: 48–52; on this text see also Yamada 2016a: 115–20. It is clear that the two girls had no decision-making power. It is also likely that the adoptee was a child, see Bellotto 2009: 125. 156 RE 82 records two adoptions: Šaggar-duši, a widow, adopted Amzaḫi and gave him her two children as adoptees; the different clauses employed for the two adoptions – ana maruttīya ētepuš in the first and ana maruttīya ša mAmzaḫi attadin in the second – further underscore the difference between adopting a free adult male and adopting a child. 157 The daughters given into adoption by their mother, a widow, were minors, see Bellotto 2009: 125.

36 

 1 Introduction

TBR  41,158 and TBR 77159).160 Therefore, the dissolution clause in E 5 includes the “leaving the house” formula to stress the asymmetrical relation between the parties: “If Aḫia tells Irʾam-Dagan: ‘You are not my father; [I want to leave your house]’ . . . and if Irʾam-Dagan tells his son Aḫia: ‘You are not my son; leave my house!’”

158 It is significant that different formularies are used in the texts TBR 41 and TBR 42, which both record adoptions within the same household: in TBR 41 the testator, Ikmu-Dagan, gave (attadin) a servant as a son to his wife, Naʿmī-šada, and his son Baʿal-gamil; in TBR 42 Baʿal-gamil adopted his father’s wife, Naʿmī-šada, as his mother (a-na AMA-ia e-te-púš-ši-mi) and his two brothers as his sons (a-na DUMU-ut-ti-ia e-te-púš-šu-nu-ti-mi). 159 In TBR 77, a woman, likely a widow, gave her children into adoption to her sister in order to keep herself and her children alive. The two children were likely servants of the adoptive mother, as they could be redeemed in exchange for two slaves, see § 3.3.2.1.2.2. 160 GsK 2 (§ 3.3.2.2.1) also includes the formula with the verb nadānu because the adoptee was a child, although of a higher social rank than the adopter, cf. Bellotto 2009: 167–69.

Part I: Textual Analysis

2 Credit Transactions Credit is the foundation of modern economies, and although it is granted for very different purposes in both the modern world and the ancient Near East, these purposes can nevertheless be categorized under two headings, namely production (i.e., investment to generate income) and consumption.1 Credit as a tool of income generation was issued to fund economic ventures in which the debtors sought to generate additional income for their households. So-called productive debts were mostly utilized by merchants who sought to earn a profit from business and trade activities. The term is applied here also to credit sought for the purpose of purchase (of, e.g., valuable goods or real properties), because such credit generated business activities. Credit for productive purposes was granted to both well-to-do merchants and to people at the bottom of the commercial hierarchy.2 The second category consists of consumptive debts incurred by people in need as a consequence of financial distress. In agricultural societies, such debts were most commonly issued during times of shortage immediately before the harvest in order to guarantee the debtor’s survival. Consumptive debts could also be granted to people who were not under duress but were simply short of cash. In greater Mesopotamia, consumptive debts were usually interest-bearing and consisted mostly of barley and other agricultural products. Within the category of consumptive debts, we may also include the so-called soft loans that in small communities were given to aid friends or relatives in times of distress. Most of these loans probably left no traces in cuneiform records. Despite the easily defined difference between productive and consumptive debts, the economic background of debt obligations is frequently not clearly discernable in ancient cuneiform records. As will be seen (§ 4.3), a straightforward distinction between the two types of debts based on the lent commodity – metals (specifically silver) in productive debts and staples (notably barley) in consumptive debts – fails.3 In addition, one should consider the possibility that debts that seem to be consumptive in fact derive from failed business and trade activities. Following Moses Finley’s analysis of debts and slavery in ancient Greece, Steinkeller,4 focusing on the Ur III period, proposed that the major motivation of private moneylending in primitive economies and particularly in the ancient Near East

1 Garfinkle 2012: 41–42, see also Stol 1983: 3–4, Renger 1994: 190, 95–99, Van De Mieroop 2002: 70–71. 2 Veenhof 1999a: 57. 3 On this point see for Nuzi Zaccagnini 2002: 179. 4 Steinkeller 2002: 110–13; see also Van De Mieroop 2002: 70, 77–79. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781501515309-002

40 

 2 Credit Transactions

was to obtain either the debtor’s labor or his real property. Debtors pledged that they or their relatives would provide manpower for the duration of the debt, which often remained unpaid and led to forms of dependency. Bonded labor and dispossession of the debtor’s real property, rather than the collection of interest, were usually the true objectives of loans. Recently Garfinkle proposed a more nuanced stance, arguing for the existence of entrepreneurs and investors who lent money for productive activities with the hope of earning a return through interest.5 Debt obligations derive not only from straight loans but also from other transactions, such as the Lieferungskauf and the credit sale. The Lieferungskauf is an advance payment for a good that is not yet available or that will be delivered at a later date.6 In cuneiform records an advance sale was formulated as a loan issued by the buyer to the seller.7 In credit sales the full or balance payment for a good is made at a later date.8 Credit sales were formulated as loans in which one commodity was evaluated in terms of another commodity in order to calculate the price that the debtor was to repay at a future date.9 This practice was common among merchants.10 Two main phases can be distinguished in credit transactions. The first phase corresponds to the formation of the obligation, namely the taking out of the loan. The second phase is concerned with the repayment of the debt. A third phase occurs if the obligation is not fulfilled because of default, and in the ancient Near East default usually led to a form of dependency (§ 3). The contractual stipulations inserted in loans, namely the terms of repayment, the rate of interest, and the demand for securities, often depended on the social relationship between creditor and debtor.11 Two different types of security for loans were employed, pledge and surety. Security was demanded to a greater extent in impersonal credit transactions rather than in loans issued by friends or relatives.12 Pledge in Mesopotamia was mostly possessory and in particular antichretic.13 The other form of security, suretyship, was undertaken by a third party, a guarantor, who assumed liability for the debt. Two main responsibili-

5 Garfinkle 2012: 46–48, 64–65, 145–46. 6 For the Lieferungskauf see with previous bibliography Démare-Lafont 2008: 549–50. 7 For the Old Babylonian period see Skaist 1994: 63–72. 8 For the credit sale see with previous bibliography Démare-Lafont 2008: 550–54. 9 Skaist 1994: 72–77. 10 See Charpin 1982a, Veenhof 1999a: 58–59. 11 Van De Mieroop 2002: 71. 12 Renger 1994: 194. 13 Westbrook 2001c: 328–29.

2.1 Creation of the Obligation 

 41

ties were shouldered by the guarantor: to secure the appearance of the debtor at a given place and time (Gestellungbürgschaft)14 and to repay the creditor if the debtor defaulted. In commercial contexts, in which loans were normally repaid, pledges of land or persons play a less important role, as clearly shown by the Old Assyrian and Old Babylonian records.15 Surety and special arrangements associated with ongoing business activities were the preferred means of security in commercial loans. As argued by Hoftijzer and van Soldt (1991), the Emar and Alalaḫ sources offer no terminological distinction between pledge and surety; the Sumerian and Akkadian terms for surety (ŠU.DU₈.A = qātātu) are indiscriminately used for both surety and pledge. Practically, real and personal securities are subsumed in a single term. The Emar archives yielded various types of documents conveying direct or indirect information on credit transactions. Documents conveying direct information on credit specify the type and quantity of the lent commodity and the names of both creditor and debtor. This group includes loan contracts, debt notes, records of debts, receipts, and lawsuits. Indirect information on credit can be gleaned from other types of legal documents, including adoptions, marriages, testaments, lawsuits, and sale contracts, that mention credit transactions. The context of these documents is the repayment of debts or the provision of remedies for economic difficulties. This chapter presents textual sources dealing with the first two phases of credit transactions. The first section (§ 2.1) is dedicated to documents variously recording the formation of the obligation or its renewal. The second section (§ 2.2) reviews different types of documents that treat the fulfillment of the obligation. Documents related to default are treated in Chapter 3, as the inability to fulfill the obligation resulted in forms of dependency.16 As far as possible we will try to clarify the productive or consumptive nature of debt obligations. Debts that provide no clear evidence for a productive context will be regarded as consumptive.

2.1 Creation of the Obligation The first phase of a credit transaction is recorded in twenty-five documents, varying in format and purpose (Table 11). The obligations stipulated were created by loans 14 See Koschaker 1911: 50–55, San Nicolò 1938. 15 Veenhof 1999a: 76–77, Veenhof 2001: 100–01, Westbrook 2001b: 82–83. 16 To be sure, no single credit transaction can be traced through all three phases, not even through two of them; all sources refer to a single phase of a unique credit transaction.

42 

 2 Credit Transactions

as well as by Lieferungskaufen and credit sales. Documents creating an obligation are known from both Syrian and Syro-Hittite tablets, but only four Syrian documents creating an obligation are preserved,17 against eighteen Syro-Hittite tablets. In addition, one Middle Babylonian tablet, one Middle Assyrian, and one tablet of unknown provenance are preserved. Of the four Syrian tablets, two are dated to the First Dynasty of Emar (Hirayama 33 and Hirayama 34), as shown by the use of the eponym dating system.18 Another document (RE 96) also likely stems from the First Dynasty, while the remaining tablet (RE 84) cannot be precisely dated. True loans (Darhlehensurkunden) formulated as a real contract (Realvertrag) describe the onset of an obligation between two parties, the creditor and the debtor. The basic formula, derived from the Old Babylonian tradition, is formulated from the standpoint of the borrower:19 the borrower received (ŠU BA.AN.TI) the quantity loaned from (KI) the creditor. Specific clauses concerning the term of repayment, pledges, and guarantors are usually included in true loans. Only five true loans are attested at Emar (see Table 11), and only two Syrian-type documents (Hirayama 33 and Hirayama 34) adopt the Old Babylonian formulary. In the Babylonian-script tablet E 24 the Old Babylonian form ŠU BA.AN.TI is replaced by the verb maḫāru, as is typical in late Middle Babylonian texts,20 while the unprovenanced tablet GsK 5 and the only Syro-Hittite true loan, E 87, are formulated from the lender’s standpoint using the verb nadānu.21 A business agreement, Hirayama 40, records a loan for a credit sale. The most frequently used credit instrument at Emar is the debt note or promissory note (Verpflichtungsschein), a short text mentioning the lent commodity, the lender’s name (ša PN), and the borrower’s name, which is introduced by the formula ana/ina muḫḫi (UGU), “incumbent on.”22 The debt note is known from earlier periods, notably the Old Assyrian period, when it was the most commonly used format, but is rarely attested in the Middle Babylonian period.23 Debt notes

17 The tablet published by Cooper, CDLN 2012: 5, should be ascribed to the Ekalte corpus: the scribe, Ikūn-Dagan, is only known from Ekalte, Cohen 2009: 95. 18 The eponym system was in use only in early times at Emar, see Fleming 2000: 203–05. 19 On the Old Babylonian loan contract formulas see Skaist 1994: 22–26, Westbrook 2003a: 403, Skaist 2020: 8–12. 20 Sassmannshausen 2001: 196–97; note that the verb maḫāru never occurs in the loans from Alalaḫ, where only ŠU BA.AN.TI or ilqe are attested, Niedorf 2008: 203. 21 Loan contracts formulated with the verb nadānu occur already in the Old Babylonian period, Skaist 1994: 145–47. 22 For the formulas of the debt note see Skaist 2020: 12–17. 23 A MB example is BE 14 115. The debt note was widely used in the Middle Assyrian period (Postgate 2013: 77–79) and became the regular format for loans in the Neo Babylonian period.

2.1 Creation of the Obligation 

 43

are typically used for renewal of a debt or for converting into a loan an obligation that originated in another type of document (a fictive loan); in the case of sale contracts, for instance, the balance of the purchase price is converted into a debt.24 In other words, debt notes simply describe a state or situation that occurred before the document was drafted. Nevertheless, debt notes are occasionally used to record loans from their onset. Debt notes from Emar are only written on Syro-Hittite tablets (E 75, E 88, JCS40 3, RE 72, RE 75, TBR 27, and TBR 34) and are mainly used for recording the renewal of outstanding debts, but also for documenting true loans.25 A particular type of debt note, the record of debts, includes lists of debtors and creditors (S: RE 96; SH: PdA 68, RE 60, and TBR 49). These documents share with the regular debt notes the use of UGU/ana muḫḫi before the debtor’s name. In the same category we can include the Syro-Hittite administrative texts E 277, E 278, E 279, and E 319, which, however, utilize a different formulary compared to the other records of debts. Additionally, debts are recorded in the testament RE 18 (SH). Three documents formulated as real contracts, RE 84 (S), E 209 (SH), and RE 19 (MA), regulate securities on outstanding debts. Fourteen documents can be classified as recording productive debts (Table 30): the two Syrian true loans (Hirayama 33 and Hirayama 34), nine Syro-Hittite documents (E 75, E 87, E 277, E 278, Hirayama 40, RE 72, RE 75, TBR 27, and TBR 49), a Middle Babylonian tablet (E 24), a Middle Assyrian document (RE 19), and an unprovenanced tablet (GsK 5). Eleven documents can be described as related to consumptive debts (Table 31), including two Syrian-type tablets (RE 84 and RE 96) and nine Syro-Hittite tablets (E 88, E 209, E 279, E 319, JCS40 3, RE 18, RE 60, PdA 68, and TBR 34).

24 See Abraham 2001: 163–66. 25 I regard the fragmentary text E 208 as a sale contract rather than a debt note (cf. Cohen 2009: 156 n. 35) because it includes the redemption clause that is typical of sales.

MB

SH

SH

SH

SH

SH

SH

SH

E 24

E 75

E 87

E 88

E 209

E 277

E 278

E 279

debts

Record of

Loan (?)

debts (?)

Record of

Security

Debt note

Loan

Debt note

Loan

Script Type

Document

Consumptive

Productive

Productive

Consumptive

Consumptive

Productive

Productive

Productive

Purpose

Table 11: Documents Creating an Obligation.

NO

?

YES NO NO

NO

?

272 sh. 150 sh. 60 sh.

14 sh.

Wife of Ḫimaši-[. . .]

brother of Abdi-Bēli;

260

of barley

> 433 parīsu NO

bronze

shekels of NO

?

Baba

?

Kāpī-Dagan; Šaggar-abu son of

of silver

(see E 319)

Zū-Baʿla’s family (?) 50 people

Baṣṣu

Zū-Baʿla’s family (?) Dagan-abu son of

Kamma

Ibni-Dagan son of

Baššu;

Talmi-Kušuḫ;

Unclear

Kāpī-Dagan;

Zū-Baʿla Rībi-Dagan;

Karbu son of Abī-tēri

Laqraʾu son of

Buzēzu son of Ḫabitu

Ṭābat-māliktu (F)

of Dagan-taliʾ)

Ḫimaši-[. . .]

Abdi-Bēli son of

Dagan-kabar (son

Ṭābat-māliktu;

of Ḫima)

Puḫrila[. . .] (?)

Ḫazannu

Dagan-kabar (son

Marduk son of

of Ḫima

wife of Alazaia

Tatašše/Raʾīndu

Debtor

Dagan-kabar son

Kāpī-Dagan

Creditor

Sons of

Rība-[. . .]

Surety

1 erṣetu-plot Lū-Adda son of Nūru; Baʿal-qarrād son of

ki

alum

5 talents of

Pledge

quantities

NO

?

NO

Kislim

Month of

20%

100 sh.

Terms

Interest

Debt

44   2 Credit Transactions

E 319

SH

debts

Record of

Consumptive

138 parīsu of barley

NO

NO

(continued)

Rībi-Dagan (18 sh.)

Ibni-Dagan son of

Aia-aḫu (4 sh.);

Bēlu-kabar son of

Išḫara-ilī (F) (4 sh.);

tēri (2 sh.);

Baʿal-bēlī son Abī-

(10 sh.);

Ḫimanu son of Nukra

Ḫizili (10 sh.);

Kattu (10 sh.);

Ipḫur-Dagan son of

Kamma (5 sh.);

Kappupu son of

priest (10 sh.);

Ilī-iamūt slave of the

(10 sh.);

Aḫu son of Kundalu

Kamma (5 sh.);

Al-ummī daughter of

of Kamma (5 sh.);

Baʿla-kīmī daughter

Dagan (5 sh.);

Aḫī-ḫāmī priest of

(20 sh.);

Amzaḫi son of Uriu

Baʿal-qarrād (20 sh.);

Zū-Baʿla’s Family (?) Zū-Aštarti son of

2.1 Creation of the Obligation   45

Unk

GsK 5

SH

SH

PdA 68

Sale

Hirayama 40 SH

JCS40 3

Loan

Hirayama 34 S

debts

Record of

Debt note

agreement

Loan

Hirayama 33 S

Loan

Script Type

Document

Table 11 (continued)

Consumptive

Consumptive (?)

Productive

Productive

Productive

Productive

Purpose

Default

Custom

200 sh.

20 sh.

NO

Guanni

Amzaḫi son of

NO

30 parīsu of barley

Aīḫ-Dagan

Ea-bāni son of Ḫalāqu;

Adda son of Qabbāru;

Kunānu;

Irʾib-Baʿal son of

Lawi;

Madi-Dagan son of

Zū-Baʿla son of Kisu;

Pazuri-Dagan;

Tūra-Dagan son of

Sara[. . .]

Zimrī-Dagan man of

of Šallaeia

Qalāl-addin sons

Irbi-ilu and

Milki-Dagan

Zū-Aštarti son of

Šamaš-abu son of

Imliku

Baʿal-abu

Iddiʿ-Dagan son of

?

Debtor

Iḫaṣi-bēlu son of

YES (?)

30 days (?)

Bēlu-kabar; Ilī-Dagan

Šeʾi-Baʿali;

House

Abu-kīn

Creditor

Sons

Surety

? sh.

1 month

Pledge

Kutbe

city

NO

8 years

trip

business

End of

Terms

70 sheep

4 slaves =

NO

? sh.

of the

Interest

Debt

46   2 Credit Transactions

SH

MA

SH

SH

RE 18

RE 19

RE 60

RE 72

Debt note

debts

Record of

Security

Testament

Productive

Consumptive

Productive

Consumptive

1) Zū-Aštarti son of

of Ḫabʾu

Matkal-Dagal son

of Aḫī-raḫīqu;

Apḫama-Adad son

garments

2) 4 aribû-

(continued)

of Laḫma

fine oil

2) Ḫinnu-Dagan son

1) Aḫiu son of Tūbu

2) Ilānu son of Baṣṣu

2) Aḫiu son of Tūbu

1) Ḫinnu-Dagan

vessels of

NO

son of Laḫma

NO

7 satu-

1) 12 (?);

(1 sh.);

Aḫī-Bašar son of Titia

(2 sh.);

Puʾa son of Ilī-abī

Ḫaraqqu (1 sh.);

Dagan-taliʾ son of

?

Kušuḫ-atkal

Kāzanu son of

Ḫannanu son of Gūru

Zizi

Mama (2 sh.);

NO

Malia

Mattia

Šaggar-taliʾ son of

of work

NO

1) 6 sh.

(?)

2 months

NO

2) 4 months

?

NO

NG

35 sh.

Ṭāb-Dagan;

Aḫia son of

Gabarni;

Šuṭur-Dagan son of

Irʾibu;

Zadamma son of

2.1 Creation of the Obligation   47

SH

S

S

RE 75

RE 84

RE 96

debts

Record of

Security

Debt note

Script Type

Document

Table 11 (continued)

Consumptive

Consumptive (?)

Productive

Purpose

town of Buzqa Iš-Dagan (6 sh. (?);

Itūr-[. . .] son of

Sons of Adabili

(40 parīsu of barley);

Dagan-kabar

Ḫemi son of

(43 parīsu of barley);

Igmulu son of [. . .]

x parīsu of barley);

Iaḫṣi-Dagan (24.5 sh.;

Rašap-kabar son of

42 parīsu of barley);

Iš-Dagan (2 sh. (?);

Zikra-Aštar son of

parīsu of barley);

Nūri-Dagan (6 sh.; 11

x-x-x-nu son of

parīsu of barley (?));

Dagan (26 sh.;. 44

Amzaḫi son of Nūri-

Ilī-ianil

Abī-liʾmu son of

the God Bēlu of the

Dagan-bēlu

Laḫma

x parīsu of barley);

NO

YES

Debtor

Ḫinnu-Dagan son of Aḫiu son of Tūbu

Creditor

Ikki-Dagan son of

Surety

(?) of barley

NO

House

Pledge

221 parīsu

sh. (?);

64.5

? sh.

fine oil

vessels of

NO

Terms

NO

NO

30 sh.; 40 satu-

Interest

Debt

48   2 Credit Transactions

SH

SH

SH

TBR 27

TBR 34

TBR 49

debts

Record of

Debt note

Debt note

Productive

Consumptive

Productive

2) Tūra-Dagan son of the scribe scribe

Ninurta

tin;

3) Muttatti son of Rībatu 4) Nūra-līmur 5) Šaggar-napšir 6) Abu-ṭāb and Ḫattû

of blue wool 2) 9 sh. 3) 8 sh. 4) 5 sh. 5) 6 sh. 6) 30 sh.

Imlik-Dagan

500 shekels

200 shekels

Mamma-ka

1–5) Abu-ṭāb and

Month of

3 sons

Zuqadu; 1) Ḫattû son of

Zū-Aštarti

Kulabu

Ṣalmu, daughter of

Ṣalmu son of

Abdi-ili son of

Iaʾšu

Aḫī-raḫaq son of

Wife of

Abunnu

Aḫī-raḫaq

(31 parīsu of barley)

6) Abbanu the

NO

1) 23 sh.;

NO

Ḫudatu wife of

Baʿla-kīmī wife of

of purified

NO

115 sh.

NO

Ḫattû

NO

Unclear

Abī-kāpī son of Daʿu

parīsu of barley);

of Tūra-Dagan (10

Abda-mālik son

2.1 Creation of the Obligation   49

50 

 2 Credit Transactions

2.1.1 Syrian Documents 2.1.1.1 Hirayama 33 The document Hirayama 33 records a loan of 200 shekels of refined silver, measured by the weight-standard of Emar (NA₄ uruE-marki). This silver was borrowed by a certain Iddiʿ-Dagan son of Baʿal-abu from three people: Šeʾi-Baʿli, Bēlu-kabar, and Ilī-Dagan. The type of weight used to measure out the silver is usually specified when payments are to be made to other places or foreigners. This suggests that the context of the loan was commercial, although it is not explicitly stated.26 The size of the sum lent – one of the largest loans in Emar records – increases the likelihood that the document describes a productive loan issued for a business venture. The number of lenders, who are not explicitly identified as brothers (although this cannot be excluded), further suggests that they were forming a business partnership among themselves.27 Nevertheless, the text presents several difficulties: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.

2 me-ti KÙ.BABBAR ṣur-pu NA₄ uruE-marki KI Še?-i?-ba-aḫ-li md EN-ka-bar ù Ì-lí-dDa-gan m I-[d]í-dDa-gan DUMU d[IŠ]KUR-a-bu É-šu ù DUMU.MEŠ-šu ŠU BA.AN.TI.MEŠ

Skaist argued that the house and sons in line 8 were taken as a possessory pledge,28 but possessory antichretic pledges are mainly stipulated for consumptive loans.29 Therefore, two different interpretations of lines 8–9 may be suggested. On the one hand, the house and the sons could be pledges, as suggested by Skaist, but 26 See the trade-related documents E 24, AOAT 265.1, and in particular E 75, which uses the same weight-standard; see also Hirayama 34. For the use of different weight standards see Zaccagnini 2018: 55–61; see also Chambon and Faist 2014: 20–21 and n. 8. 27 Note, however, that the indication of brotherhood does not rule out the possibility of a business partnership, because the lexicon of brotherhood was used in commercial contexts, particularly in the Old Assyrian period, see Démare-Lafont 2012: 131; for the Middle Euphrates see remarks in Solans 2014: 294–97. 28 Skaist 2001: 239–40. 29 See §§ 4.5.1, 4.5.2; see also discussion in TBR 27 (§ 2.1.2.5). Note that pledges are infrequently included in commercial loans granted to Old Assyrian merchants, Veenhof 1999a: 76–77; for large amounts as evidence of commercial credit in the Old Assyrian period see Veenhof 1999a: 59.

2.1 Creation of the Obligation 

 51

perhaps hypothecary rather than possessory due to the commercial nature of the loan.30 On the other hand, because the verbal form is plural (ŠU BA.AN.TI.MEŠ), Iddiʿ-Dagan, the house, and his sons should be regarded as the subject. Therefore, the household and the sons can be regarded as participating in the business venture as co-obligors, likely as guarantors. The latter hypothesis seems more likely to me because it does not require the assumption that the scribe has made a mistake. The term of the loan was eight years (MU 8 KÁM KÙ.BABBAR Ì.LÁ.E). Tsukimoto31 argued that MU is an error for ITU because eight years is too long a term for a loan. However, Old Assyrian partnership contracts could run for several years.32 The loan bears no interest, but it is protected by default interest: (11) ú-še-ette-eq-ma (12) MÁŠ li-ṣa-ab, “If he let (the term) pass, he shall pay the interest.” This arrangement may be compared with Old Assyrian commercial loans recording that a sum of silver was to be repaid by a given date on penalty of default interest,33 and with the Old Babylonian partnership loans (NAM.TAB.BA), where interest was usually not charged.34 The rate of default interest, however, is not specified.35 The document can be therefore regarded as a long-term investment whereby an interest-free loan was granted to a business associate who would have used the silver for trade and other business ventures. Both the lenders and the borrowers would have shared in the profits from the business activities. The document is dated to the First Dynasty, as shown by the eponym dating system and the presence of the scribe Rašap-ilī, who worked under Igmil-Dagan (Hirayama 2 and TBR 15).36 Another witness is Baʿal-kabar son of Liʾmi-šarru, the brother of Igmil-Dagan. The presence of a royal scribe and a member of the First Dynasty, although neither is involved as a moneylender, is probably indicative of the importance of the trade financed with this loan. This document cannot

30 Note that in the commercial debts AOAT 265.1 (§ 3.2.2.2) and E 21 (§ 2.2.1.2.4), personal pledges seem to be handed over upon default. 31 Tsukimoto 1991a: 298: 10. 32 Trolle Larsen 1977: 130–31. Note that several long-term loans between two and eight years in duration are known from the Middle Assyrian records, Abraham 2001: Appendix A. 33 Veenhof 1999a: 59. 34 Dole 1965: 40–47. 35 Note that the rate of interest is lacking also in the Middle Assyrian loans, Faist 2001: 151. 36 Cohen 2009: 69; Cohen also wonders if the scribe Rašap-ilī was the same person as the son of Irʾib-Baʿal, brother of Igmil-Dagan; for the rulers of the First Dyanasty see ch. 1 fn. 10. According to Ishida (2017–2018: 66), the tablet is sealed with the seal F 13 (Beyer 2001: 260) that appears in Hirayama 2, TBR 15 and E 153; while Rašap-ilī is certainly mentioned in Hirayama 2 and TBR 15 his name can be perhaps restored in E 153: 31, [IGI Ra-ša₁₀-ap-ì-lí D]UB.SAR. Therefore, it is likely that this seal belonged to Rašap-ilī.

52 

 2 Credit Transactions

be considered an institutional loan, but probably the transaction was somehow subject to central (royal) supervision. In light of the presence of Rašap-ilī and Baʿal-kabar and the personal names of both the lenders and the borrower, it is likely that both parties were Emarites, although these individuals are not attested elsewhere. Nevertheless, the specification of a weight-standard suggests that the trade was carried out outside Emar. The reason for the preservation of this tablet is unknown. If the house had actually been pledged and the debt was never repaid, such an old tablet could have been preserved as a title to property. Otherwise, as with Hirayama 34 (see below), the preservation of old loan contracts that did not serve as titles to properties may be accidental.37 2.1.1.2 Hirayama 34 In Hirayama 34, Iaḫṣi-bēlu son of Imliku lent 20 shekels of refined silver measured by the weight-standard of Emar (NA₄ uruE-marki) to Šamaš-abu son of Milki-Dagan. This was an interest-bearing loan, as indicated by the clause ki-ma ⌜URU MÁŠ?⌝ ⌜ú⌝-ṣa-ab, “He shall add the interest corresponding to the custom of the city.” This provision presupposes the existence of customary laws.38 The only clue to the purpose of the loan is the mention of the weight-standard of Emar, which, as discussed above, appears in commercial contexts. As with Hirayama 33, the parties were most probably Emarite traders, but in Hirayama 34 the amount of the loan suggests that the silver was used for a small business venture, although it was probably conducted outside Emar. Although the document is formulated as a loan contract, it does not contain a repayment clause. Because we lack information on customary practices at Emar, it is unclear when the loan was due. A number of loans from the Ur III and Old Babylonian periods also lack a repayment clause.39 Loans formulated without a repayment clause had no fixed duration and were repaid upon request or according to an agreement between creditor and debtor that was not formally stipulated. The absence of security for the loan may reflect the borrower’s financial reliability or his personal relation to the lender, but neither the borrower nor the

37 See § 4.1. 38 For the “interest of the city” in the Old Babylonian period and more on interest rates in general see Skaist 1994: 123–27; for customary laws at Emar see also Yamada 2016a: 112–14. 39 Skaist 1994: 148, Garfinkle 2012: 46–47.

2.1 Creation of the Obligation 

 53

lender is otherwise known. Should a problem arise, securities, notably sureties, could be demanded at a later stage, as documented at Emar and elsewhere.40 The tablet was written at the time of the First Dynasty, as shown by the use of the eponym system.41 Because the loan contains no reference to pledged properties, it is difficult to understand why this tablet was preserved. Perhaps the business venture was unsuccessful, and the tablet was preserved as a title to credit in the hope of a future repayment. However, as with Hirayama 33, the preservation of this tablet for the whole duration of the Emar archives is probably accidental, because it is unlikely that a debt was expected to be repaid after decades had passed. 2.1.1.3 RE 96 A single Syrian-type record of debts is preserved. RE 96 lists accounts of silver and barley owed to Abī-liʾmu son of Ilī-ianil by nine different debtors. Lines 22–24 report that the “Brothers” assembled and swore an oath. According to Beckman’s reading, the “Brothers” swore concerning Abī-liʾmu’s financial distress (aš-šum ⌜dan!⌝-nu-ti-šu).42 Nevertheless, only four wedges were impressed on the tablet – two horizontals and two verticals, with no double upright at the end of the sign as expected for dan; thus, the line can be read as aš-šum ⌜ú✶-nu⌝-te-šu. The term unūtu, “utensils,” may also denote “belongings, possessions,” especially in connection with debts and inheritance.43 This very meaning is attested at Emar in E 127: 9, where unūtu collectively refers to several goods including gold and copper,44 and in BLMJ 15: 21, where the word is used for an inheritance share that included gold.45 It may be suggested that in RE 96 unūtu is employed as a collective for the total amount of silver and barley lent to the nine debtors by Abī-liʾmu: (22) lú.meš aḫ-ḫu ip-ḫu-ru-ma (23) ù aš-šum ⌜ú*-nu⌝-te-šu (24) ni-iš DINGIR.MEŠ iz!-ku-ru, “The Brothers assembled and swore by the gods concerning his possessions.” The list of debtors includes two pairs of brothers, Itūr-[. . .] and Zikra-Aštar, sons of Iš-Dagan, as well as Amzaḫi and x-x-x-nu, sons of Nūri-Dagan. Zikra-Aštar is likely to be identified with the grandfather of the owners of a property adjoining 40 See E 209 below; for Ugarit see Hoftijzer and van Soldt 1991: 197; for the Old Assyrian period see Veenhof 1999a: 76–78, Veenhof 2001: 101, 103. 41 For the scribe of this tablet see Cohen 2009: 70–71. 42 For the “Brothers” see discussion in § 1.1. 43 CAD U: 174–176. Note that unūtu is a general term for goods in Old and Middle Assyrian records of trade, Faist 2001: 38 and n. 102; the same term is used in the context of trade in the letter RSO 23 19: 8, 12 (RS 94.2443). 44 See § 2.2.3.2. 45 For this text see ch. 3 fn. 320.

54 

 2 Credit Transactions

the field sold in TBR 19, a Syrian sale contract dated to Zū-Baʿla son of Išbi-Dagan, the last ruler of the First Dynasty.46 Therefore, RE 96 could be dated two or three generations prior to TBR 19, at the very beginning of the Emar documentation. The other debtors47 as well as the creditor are otherwise unknown. The total debt amounts to approximately 64.5 shekels48 and at least 221 measures of barley.49 The unit of measurement of barley is not reported,50 but the allotments were most likely counted in parīsu, which is almost the only unit of capacity used at Emar.51 The amounts received by each person are considerable, exceeding 40 parīsu of barley (see Table 11). Since 30 parīsu of barley was the annual allotment for the storm god’s priestess (15 parīsu in bad years),52 the document records consumptive loans or advances intended to provide sustenance to whole families for long periods or to pay taxes. The silver (apparently not the barley) was lent at interest, KÙ.BABBAR-pu an-nu-ú ša ṣi-bu-ti (RE 96: 18), but the rate is not indicated. The summoning of the “Brothers” may simply be due to the presence of biological brothers among the debtors (who perhaps were related to each other), but it should not be excluded that the debtors (at least some of them) and the creditor were tied by some sort of kinship. 2.1.1.4 RE 84 RE 84 is an atypical legal document whereby the sons of Adabili state in the presence of the “Brothers” that they are no longer liable for the debt they owed to the temple authority Bēlu of the town of Buzqa:53 (6) i-na KÙ.BABBAR ša dEN uruBuuz-qaki (7) ša UGU DUMU.MEŠ A-da-bi-li (8) i-šu-ú (9) DUMU.MEŠ A-da-bi-li (10) za-ku-⌜u⌝, “Concerning the silver belonging to the god Bēlu of Buzqa which is owed by the sons of Adabili, the sons of Adabili are free (of claim).” The amount of the debt and the reason why Adabili’s sons are clear of it are not reported. The 46 Although the patronymic in TBR 19: 8 is not reported and the name in RE 96 is restored (Zikra[Aštar]), these are the only occurrences in the Emar corpus of names formed with the element Zikra-, see Beckman 1996a: 120, Pruzsinszky 2003: Index, 819. 47 One of the debtors, Abī-kāpī son of Daʿu, must be distinguished from the creditor listed in the house sale TBR 33 (see below), as the latter is a Syro-Hittite tablet; even if we assume an overlap of the two traditions, the Syro-Hittite tradition was introduced much later than the First Dynasty. 48 Several quantities are badly preserved; in contrast to Beckmnan’s edition, I read ⌜6? GÍN⌝ instead of ⌜8? GÍN⌝ in RE 96: 1, and 6 shekels of silver instead of 5 in RE 96: 3, 5. 49 The quantity of barley incumbent on Itūr-[. . .] in RE 96: 1 is unpreserved. 50 The amounts of barley are recorded as x še-im. 51 See Goodnick Westenholz 2000: xiv, Chambon 2011: 74–78. 52 Fleming 2000: 37. 53 This city was in the vicinity of Emar, Belmonte Marín 2001: 61–62, see also Solans 2014: 305 n. 1529; the god Bēlu of Buzqa is mentioned in the ritual texts from Emar, Fleming 1992: 68.

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 55

debt is cautiously treated as consumptive in this study, mainly because the tone of the document suggests that it concerns domestic affairs.54 This interpretation is supported by a comparison with the Old Babylonian documentation, in which temples issue credit mostly in cases of necessity in the form of charitable loans.55 The debt, however, was not extinguished because a member of the same family, Ikki-Dagan son of Dagan-bēlu, assumed the liability on it:56 (11) mIk-kid Da!-gan (12) DUMU dDa-gan-EN (13) KÙ.BABBAR i-pa-al, “Ikki-Dagan son of Dagan-bēlu will pay the silver.” The use of the durative form indicates that the loan has not been repaid yet. That this tablet comes from Emar is uncertain in light of the mention of the town of Buzqa. The parties are unattested in the rest of the Emar documentation.57

2.1.2 Syro-Hittite Documents 2.1.2.1 E 278, E 277, E 209, E 319 and E 279 Five documents stemming from Building M₁ record the creation of obligations. Two tablets published as administrative texts (E 277, E 278) can be very tentatively regarded as recording business activities, but it is unclear whether the family of Zū-Baʿla was involved. Three other documents (E 209, E 279, and E 319) record consumptive debts. E 278 is a very fragmentary text that is discussed here because of the word ḫu-bu-la-ti in line 3. The document records a debt of 260 shekels of bronze to Dagan-abu son of Baṣṣu:58 (1) 2 me-at! 60 ZABAR (2) a-na mdKUR-a-bu DUMU Bá-aṣ-ṣa (3) [. . .] x ḫu-bu-la-ti. It is likely that the document records a credit

54 See § 4.2 (Table 31). Note the testament-like formulation and the presence of the “Brothers” as witnesses. 55 Charpin 2005: 25–27. 56 Despite the fact that Ikki-Dagan has a different patronym, the sons of Adabili are referred to as his brothers (ŠEŠ.MEŠ-šu), who are here regarded as relatives or members of an extended family. Conversely, Solans (2014: 294–97, 304–05), regards the brotherhood as a fictive relationship. However, I would not treat the distinction between ŠEŠ.MEŠ-šu (RE 84:13) and LÚ.MEŠ.AḪ.ḪI.A (RE 84: 16) as meaningless: thus I am inclined to regard ŠEŠ as referring to a relative (by blood or adoption) of the same (extended) family, and LÚ.MEŠ.AḪ.ḪI.A as a reference to the “Brothers” serving as witnesses (see § 1.1). Démare-Lafont (2012: 140) also highlights the private function of the “Brothers” in this document. 57 Di Filippo (2008a: 55 n. 35) suggested that the document may come from Ekalte, but see Torrecilla 2014: XXI, who argued that the tablet could have come either from Emar or from Ekalte or from another place. 58 Dagan-abu son of Baṣṣu appears as a sealer in TBR 71.

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sale of bronze that was possibly used for some small business or manufacturing activity.59 The formulary of the document resembles that of TBR 27 (see below), with the lent commodity mentioned in the first line of the text. No member of the Zū-Baʿla family is mentioned on the preserved part of the tablet, but due to its find spot it is not excluded that the family of diviner was the lender. Compared to E 278, the assignment of the second administrative record from Building M₁, E 277, to the documents creating an obligation is even more uncertain because no specific reference to debt is preserved on the fragmentary tablet. The text lists quantities of silver belonging to several persons (x GÍN ša PN) as well as people receiving silver (x GÍN ana PN). A ruling separates the list of donors from the list of recipients, but there is no way to determine whether the quantities in the two sections correspond because the tablet is badly damaged. Because E 277 refers to other cities besides Emar, Démare-Lafont and Fleming60 regard this text as a record of debts or expenses arising from private transactions that are perhaps related to merchants. Indeed, the first line of the column listing recipients records silver for the land of Qadeš ([x GÍ]N a-na KUR Ki-in-za, E 277: 5), and one of the borrowers was stationed in a town that can be perhaps identified with Salḫu: (6) [x G]ÍN a-na mGAL-d30 i-na uruSà-a[l!-ḫi], “x shekels to Talmi-Kušuḫ in the town of Salḫu.”61 Worthy of mention is a certain Kāpī-Dagan, who appears once in the list of donors (E 277: 2) and twice in the list of recipients (E 277: 7, 9). Although Kāpī-Dagan lacks a patronymic, all three references likely relate to the same individual. According to line 7, 4 shekels of silver were for the clothes of Kāpī-Dagan, while in line 9 Kāpī-Dagan appears as the recipient of 20 shekels of silver. We can posit that Kāpī-Dagan participated in a commercial venture as both financier and trader, and that part of the investment was intended to purchase some clothes. The mention of clothes is in itself further evidence of the commercial context of the document. Because the tablet was found in Building M₁ one may be tempted to identify Kāpī-Dagan with a member of Emar’s family of diviners who shares the same name. However, Kāpī-Dagan son of Zū-Baʿla almost always bears the title LÚ.ḪAL or DUMU LÚ.ḪAL, and furthermore he is clearly identifiable by his seal(s) or by

59 Note that at Ugarit, 1 shekel of silver corresponded to 200 shekels of bronze, Heltzer 1978: 88, Nasgowitz 1976: 65, 78–86, Vargyas 1986: 108. A connection with cult activities is perhaps not excluded as well, because the letter E 261, written by two members of the Zū-Baʿla family, mentions a quantity of 1000 shekels of bronze to be supplied by or to a Hittite official, see Cohen 2011: 147. 60 Démare-Lafont and Fleming 2018: 38. 61 The land of Salḫu is mentioned in the Babylonian tablet E 23 as the origin of the merchant Ali-Nani, see § 2.2.1.3.

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 57

the context.62 Another possible identification is with a Kāpī-Dagan who also bears no patronymic and is attested as the creditor in the Babylonian tablet E 24, which records a commercial debt.63 The other persons mentioned in the text either lack patronymics or are unknown elsewhere. Our interpretation must remain a hypothesis due to the fragmentary nature of the tablet, which makes it difficult to specify the context of the document. In E 209, the Zū-Baʿla family was certainly involved.64 This document concerns the security for an outstanding loan.65 The opening clause states that an ki erṣetu plot was given as a pledge to the diviner Baʿal-qarrād by Buzēzu son of Ḫabitu in lieu of 14 shekels of silver. Pledges of immovable properties were mostly possessory and antichretic, but in this case the characteristics of the pledged property raise doubts about its nature. The kierṣetu is understood as an unbuilt plot of land66 that could hardly have been exploited by the lender.67 Thus, because non-antichretic possessory pledges are extremely rare,68 it is likely that the kierṣetu was given as a hypothecary pledge. A frequent concern of moneylenders in ancient Near Eastern sources was securing protection against the debtor’s flight and the consequent risk of losing money.69 However, E 209 is the only Emar source concerned with this issue.70 To protect the lender, two additional guarantors are mentioned. The guarantor Lū-Adda son of Nūru will be liable for paying the loan if Buzēzu flees: (3) šum-ma m Bu-zé-zu DUMU Ḫa-bi-ti (4) in-[n]a-ab-ba-at mL[u]-a-da DUMU Nu-ú-ri [š]a PA₅ Ta-am-ni-ti (5) iṣ-ṣa-ab-ba-tu₄ mLu-A-da DUMU Nu-ú-ri PA₅ Ta-am-ni-tu₄ (6) qa-[t] a-ti-šu il-qì, “If Buzēzu son of Ḫabitu should flee, L[ū]-Adda son of Nūru [fr]om the water district of Tamnitu will be seized. Lū-Adda son of Nūru from the water district of Tamnitu will take his su[r]ety.” In turn, a second person, Laqraʾu son of

62 See Cohen 2009: 158–63. If Kāpī-Dagan in E 277 was indeed the son of Zū-Baʿla, the interpretation of the document would have to be modified; the second list could be regarded as an account of profit from a trade venture, because Kāpī-Dagan would certainly not have carried out the trade himself. 63 Kāpī-Dagan in E 24 is unlikely to be the homonymous son of Zū-Baʿla because the text is later, as shown by the fact that one of the sons of Ḫima appears in the witness list, see § 2.1.3. 64 For this text see Skaist 2001: 241, but correct E 205 to E 209. 65 For similar examples from the Old Babylonian period see Westbrook 2001b: 65. 66 See § 1.4. 67 It is likely that this kierṣetu was partially built because it is described as having foundations, ki e[r-ṣ]e-tu₄ q[á-du] NA₄meš-šu (E 209: 1). 68 For this type of pledge see Petschow 1956: 57 and n. 162. 69 Snell 2001. 70 The Middle Assyrian tablet RE 19 is concerned with the flight of the pledged person, see § 2.1.4.

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Karbu son of Abī-tēri, served as a guarantor for Lū-Adda: (9) mLa-aq-ra-ʾu DUMU Kàr-bi DUMU A-bi-te-ri (10) ša mLu-A-da DUMU Nu-ú-ri (11) qa-ta-ti il-qì, “Laqraʾu son of Karbu son of Abī-tēri will take the surety for Lū-Adda son of Nūru.” The text offers a typical example of Stillesitzbürgschaft, where the surety is liable if the debtor runs away,71 which is well known from Ugarit and Alalaḫ.72 However, although multiple guarantors are attested at Emar and elsewhere,73 a “guarantor of a guarantor” is to my knowledge uncommon. Perhaps Baʿal-qarrād was unable to exploit the pledge until default and therefore demanded two guarantors. It is likely that the various instruments of security documented in this text were arranged at different times:74 Lū-Adda assumed the surety before the debtor provided the pledge, likely at the onset of the loan, and only during a later phase was the credit secured by the second guarantor. It remains unclear whether the proviso of the second guarantor was contemporary with the draft of E 209 or occurred between the delivery of the other two securities (i.e., the first guarantor and the pledge). Because the debtor’s financial situation worsened over time, it is likely that the creditor required additional securities but none of the guarantors was considered reliable enough. Arnaud’s interpretation of the clause in E 209: 6–7, that it establishes debt slavery for Buzēzu should he borrow further silver, can be understood against the debtor’s worsening condition: (6) ur-ra-am še-ra-am (7) mBu-zé-e-zu KÙ.BABBAR iš-tu qa!-ti mdIŠKUR-UR.SAG i-ra-aš-ši (8) ARAD-ma ša mdIŠKUR-UR.SAG šu-ú-ut, “If, in the future, Buzēzu obtains (additional) silver from Baʿal-qarrād, he will be Baʿal-qarrād’s slave.”75 It follows that debt slavery was the consequence of default if the debtor was forced to take out another loan. This clause appears to stipulate slavery as a contractual penalty,76 a form of hypothecary personal antichretic pledge.77

71 The term was coined by Koschaker (1911: 50), to refer to this particular type of Gestellungsbürgschaft. 72 For Ugarit see Hoftijzer and van Soldt 1991: 196–99; for Alalaḫ see Niedorf 2008: 212–17. 73 See § 4.5; for the Syro-Palestine area see, for instance, the surety texts from Ugarit in Hoftijzer and van Soldt 1991. It is to be recalled that in the ancient Near East the guarantor was not a co-debtor against whom the creditor could proceed first, as in Roman law, but a form of suretyship in case of default, see Westbrook 2001c: 329. 74 This was suggested by Seminara (1998: 368), because the perfect tense is used for the transfer of the kierṣetu while the preterite is used for the assumption of the surety, which therefore occurred prior to the transfer of the kierṣetu. 75 -ma is not clearly understood, Seminara 1998: 525. These lines have been differently read by Hoftijzer and van Soldt 1991: 200, and Skaist 2001: 241 n. 15. 76 For similar cases see Westbrook 1995: 1647. 77 For this form of pledge see Petschow 1956: 108–10, Kienast 1978: Vol. I, 91–92.

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The borrower as well as the two guarantors are otherwise unknown and the relationship between them remains unclear. Most probably, the debt was never repaid because the tablet belongs to the second generation of Zū-Baʿla’s family and was presumably kept as the title to Buzēzu’s kierṣetu plot during the succeeding generations. Two other administrative documents found in Building M₁, E 319 and E 279, possibly refer to the creation of obligations. E 319 and E 279 record barley loans seemingly issued for consumption. Nevertheless, their interpretation as loans is disputed. According to Arnaud, followed by Pentiuc,78 the word ḫu-ub-te-ti in the heading (E 319: 1), ŠE.MEŠ ša i-na ḫu-ub-te-ti na-ad-na, is to be explained as a local variant of the Akkadian ḫubuttatu, a type of loan.79 The nature and use of ḫubuttatu loans is not entirely clear, but it is agreed that in the post-Old Babylonian period they were interest-free loans.80 Conversely, Démare-Lafont and Fleming,81 following Durand’s reading of the term as related to ḫabātu, “to plunder,”82 interpret the text as recording the sending of barley to hostages. With all due caution, it is maintained here that E 319 is a record of debts. E 279 mentions neither the word ḫubuttatu nor any reference to debts, but it is included here because it lists the same recipients and allotments as E 319. E 319 lists quantities of barley received by people according to the formula x giš pa ŠE.(MEŠ) PN.83 The document does not mention the lender, but on the basis of Middle Babylonian and Alalaḫ parallels84 it may be inferred that the lender was the authority in charge of Building M₁, where the tablet was found. However, it cannot be stated with full confidence whether the family of Zū-Baʿla represented an institution in this transaction or acted privately.85 Private and institutional contexts in the archive of Building M₁ are hardly distinguishable. The fact that E 319, unlike private loan documents, does not identify members of Zū-Baʿla’s family as lenders may point to an institutional loan.

78 Pentiuc 2001: 77. 79 The same type of loan is attested in TBR 49 (§ 2.1.2.4), where it is spelled ḫu-bu-te-tu₄. 80 See Skaist 1994: 52–56, Oelsner 2001: 295. 81 Démare-Lafont and Fleming 2018: 41. 82 Durand 1990: 83. 83 Similar documents are the Middle Babylonian lists of barley loans from the temple archives of Nippur (Sassmannshausen 2001: 198), notably BE 15 19, which records a ḫubuttatu loan; see also the barley lists from Alalaḫ, Niedorf 2008: 89–95. 84 The Nippur texts are silent on the name of the lender, who was obviously the temple authority; occasionally the official liable for the distribution of barley (ŠU PN) is mentioned, see BE 15 90. For Alalaḫ see Niedorf 2008: 198–99. 85 Note, however, that the seal on E 279 cannot be attributed to the Zū-Baʿla family, Beyer 2001: 242.

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The document records a loan of 138 parīsu of barley to fifteen people who each receive between 2 and 20 parīsu of barley (see Table 11). The list is headed by Zū-Aštarti son of Baʿal-qarrād, who can be identified with one of the sons of the diviner mentioned in his testament (SMEA30 7).86 All of the borrowers but one, Išḫara-ilī (E 319: 14), are also mentioned in E 279.87 The quantities of barley allotted to each individual in the two lists are almost entirely identical.88 Thus, E 319 seems to be an abbreviated version of E 279, which lists fifty people receiving more than 433 parīsu of barley.89 Some allotments are considerably large amounts intended to be consumed over a long period.90 The two documents list several people who presumably had important roles in Emar society. Besides the son of Zū-Baʿla, a certain Aḫī-ḫāmī bears the title of priest of Dagan (LÚ.SANGA ša dKUR, E 319: 5, E 279: 21), and Ibni-Dagan is the son of the diviner Rībi-Dagan (E 319: 16; E 279: 16). This Ibni-Dagan was definitely not a member of Zū-Baʿla’s family but may possibly be identified with the individual who, jointly with his brother Tūra-Dagan, inherited several properties from his father in BLMJ 15. The title “priest of Šaggar” (LÚ.SANGA d30), only mentioned in E 279: 48, is borne by a person whose name is not preserved. A certain Kaška son of Anini mentioned in E 279: 18 likely had some connection with the Zū-Baʿla family because he appears as a witness in two of their documents: the aforementioned E 209 and more importantly Baʿal-qarrād’s testament, SMEA30 7. Other people mentioned in the lists appear as witnesses in several documents.91 It is therefore clear that these distributions of barley were not (or not only?) intended for 86 For this person see Cohen 2009: 157–58, 164. 87 In E 279: 5, Zū-Aštarti bears the title of DUMU LÚ.ḪAL but has no patronymic; Ilī-iamūt, “servant of the priest” (ARAD LÚ.SANGA) in E 319: 8, can be identified with the son of Ḫeba in E 279: 25; and Ḫizili, who in E 319: 11 bears no patronymic, is doubtless the wife of Arma-ziti in E 279: 27 as this personal name only appears in these two texts. E 319 lists four women who are also mentioned in E 279; two of them are sisters, Baʿla-kīmī and Al-ummī, daughters of Kamma (E 319: 5–6, E 279: 22–23). Another son of Kamma, Kappupu, is mentioned in E 279: 26 and E 319: 9. Ibni-Dagan son of Rībi-Dagan in E 319: 16 can be identified with the son of the diviner mentioned in E 279: 16 because the same quantity of barley is allotted to both. 88 The only differences concern Amzaḫi son of Uriu, who receives 20 parīsu in E 319: 3 and 25 parīsu in E 279: 6, and Aḫī-ḫāmī priest of Dagan, who receives 5 parīsu in E 319: 4 and 4 parīsu in E 279: 21. 89 Some allotments are not preserved. 90 As mentioned with regard to RE 96 (§ 2.1.1.3), the annual allotment for the storm god’s priestess was 30 parīsu in good years, Fleming 2000: 37. 91 Amzaḫi son of Uriu (E 319: 20, E 279: 6) and Ḫimanu son of Nukra (E 319: 12, E 279: 28) witnessed RE 76 and TBR 28 respectively. Another son of Uriu, Ibni-Dagan, only mentioned in E 279: 15, appears as a witness or sealer in E 255 and E 214 (pp. 219f.) while his son served as witness in TBR 29 (§ 2.2.1.2.5).

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the subsistence of impoverished people. Curiously, with the few exceptions discussed so far, the borrowers of E 319 are attested only in E 279. It seems plausible that the drafting of the two documents was coterminous with the disbursement. The similarities between E 279 and E 319 clearly raise questions about the nature of the several distributions of barley found in Building M₁, but that topic lies beyond the scope of the present work. 2.1.2.2 E 75, E 87 and E 88 Three documents stemming from the archive of Ḫima (Area T) record the creation of debt obligations. Two documents (E 75 and E 87) were issued for commercial purposes, while the other (E 88) seems to record a consumptive debt. The debt note E 75 records the renewal of an outstanding loan of 272 shekels of silver, measured according to the weight-standard of Emar (NA₄.MEŠ uruE-mar), granted by Dagan-kabar son of Ḫima to a certain Marduk son of Ḫazannu. The loan was interest-bearing, and according to the use of the stative at Emar to indicate a completed action,92 the interest had already been paid: (9) MÁŠ-šú na-d[in], “Its interest has been given” (E 75: 9). The interest rate was perhaps 20% or 30%.93 Cohen and Singer (2006) proposed to identify Marduk with an individual mentioned in the letter RSO 7 40 (RS 34.152)94 found at Ugarit in the Maison d’Urtenu. According to their interpretation, the letter was sent from a trading post in Emar that can likely be identified with House 5 in Area A in light of similarities in script, orthography, and grammatical features between RSO 7 40 and documents from House 5 (E 23–27).95 Cohen and Singer further suggested that the sender of the letter, Bannia, may have been Marduk’s son.96 Marduk would therefore have belonged to the entourage of merchants from House 5. The letter, addressing some commercial issues, contains Bannia’s desperate pleas to his lord for food in the face of devastating famine.97 Unfortunately, the fragmentary state of the tablet hampers any understanding of Marduk’s role in the letter.

92 Seminara 1998: 362–65. 93 Zaccagnini 2018: 57–59. 94 Lackenbacher 1991: 84–86. 95 For these documents see § 1.3.8. 96 Cohen and Singer 2006: 123–25, read the name of the sender of RSO 7 40 as [Ba]n-ni-ia and restore mB[a]-ni-ia as Marduk’s son in E 75: 11. 97 “There is famine in your (pl.) house, we will die of hunger. If you do not quickly arrive here, we ourselves will die of hunger. You will not see a living soul from your land,” Cohen and Singer 2006: 135. For an analysis of the historical background of the letter see Singer 1999: 719, 26–28.

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Marduk was a Babylonian merchant, as shown by his name and by his Kassite seal impressed on the tablet.98 Despite the dramatic tone of the letter RSO 7 40, there is nothing in E 75 to suggest famine as a motive for the transaction. The loan was taken out for a commercial purpose and not out of dire need.99 Indeed, as discussed above,100 the specification of the weight-standard indicates that the transaction was carried out between people accustomed to different weight systems, likely for a commercial purpose. Moreover, the exceptional quantity of silver – the largest sum named in the documents creating an obligation – clearly indicates that the background of the loan was commercial. According to our understanding of the text, the document was written after the payment of interest at the renewal of the loan, and it is unlikely that a hunger-stricken individual would have been able to pay the interest that had accumulated on a consumptive loan. The absence of measures to compel Marduk to repay his debt or to punish him further attests to his reliability. The document therefore shows that the family of Ḫima invested a substantial amount of capital in international trade. Another document witnessing the entrepreneurial activity of Ḫima’s family in trade ventures is the loan contract E 87. Notwithstanding its fragmentary nature, it appears to record that a sum of 150 shekels of silver was lent by Dagan-kabar. Although no patronymic is reported in the document, the lender was likely the son of Ḫima because the document concerns international trade and involves the same entourage of merchants as E 75. The borrower’s name is not preserved, but he may possibly be identified with Puḫrila[. . .], who appears as the first sealer.101 Cohen and Singer102 restored the guarantor’s name as m‹E›-ri-ba-d[AMAR.UTU] (E 87: 5). They further identified him with an individual of the same name mentioned in E 27, a document regarding his donkey caravan, and in the aforementioned letter from Ugarit RSO 7 40, where Erība-Marduk was among the merchants sent to the addressee. It follows that Puḫrila[. . .] and Erība-Marduk were members of the same commercial partnership as Marduk. The borrower in E 87 was required to provide further security, 5 talents (= 141 kg.) of alum measured with the weight-standard of the kāru (NA₄. MEŠ ka-[a-ri]), which represents a possessory pledge (Besitzpfand) handed over to the creditor. 98 Beyer 2001: 271, 79–80. 99 The contrasting evidence provided by the letter and the documents from Emar are discussed below, § 6. 100 § 2.1.1. 101 The name of another sealer is unpreserved. 102 Cohen and Singer 2006: 125 n. 8.

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The commercial context of the loan highlights the international horizon of Ḫima’s family business. Indeed, alum was imported from Egypt to Ugarit and from there exported to north-eastern Syria, Anatolia, and Assyria.103 His personal name, atypical for Emar (it appears only in this document),104 might suggest that Puḫrila[. . .] was a foreigner even though he used a Syro-Hittite seal.105 This is not an isolated practice; another foreign merchant from House 5, Ali-Nani, sealed the Babylonian tablet E 23 with a Syro-Hittite seal.106 Unlike E 75, there is no mention of interest. Ḫima’s family presumably enjoyed a share of the profits on the trade. According to the debt note E 88, Dagan-kabar107 lent 60 shekels to Abdibēli son of Ṭābat-māliktu.108 Members of Abdi-Bēli’s family served as security: (5) EN.ŠU.MEŠ-šú DUM[U.M]EŠ (6) fDU₁₀.GA-ma-li[k]-ti (7) DAM ŠEŠ-šú (8) ù mḪima-ši-ᵈ[. . .] (9) ŠEŠ-šú KÙ.[BABBAR.M]EŠ (10) ú-šal-la-mu a-n[u-ma] (11) ṭup-pa i-ḫap-pu-ú, “His securities are the so[n]s of Ṭābat-māli[k]tu, his brother’s wife, and Ḫimaši-[. . .], his brother. (When) they pay the s[ilv]er, t[hen] they will break the tablet.”109 According to Skaist110 these persons were taken as pledges, but the verbal form ušallamū suggests that they probably acted as sureties. The lent sum is rather high for a consumptive loan, but in the absence of any clear evidence of commercial purpose the loan is provisionally assigned to the group of consumptive debts (Table 31).111 Nevertheless, the context of the loan as well as the economic situation of the borrower remains unclear. Unfortunately, prosopography provides no help because the borrower is unattested elsewhere.

103 Zaccagnini 1991: 377, Zaccagnini 2018: 60–61, see also Pruzsinszky and Solans 2015: 327; note that in two letters Dagan-bēlu, an Ugaritic merchant residing at Emar (RSO 7 31, RSO 7 33), asks for shipments of alum. According to Zaccagnini (2018: 61) the specification of the weight of the kāru “certifies the correctness of the weighing operations [that were undertaken at the market office] beyond any possible doubt”; it was not intended to indicate the weight-standard, because the alum was measured according to the talent, which was the same in all the Western systems. 104 See the attestations in Pruzsinszky 2003: Index, 680. 105 Beyer 2001: 136. 106 See § 2.2.1.3.1. According to Zaccagnini (2018: 59), the merchant was certainly a foreigner because the weight of the kāru was specified. 107 The patronymic is not preserved; because none of the persons mentioned in this document is attested elsewhere, I follow Skaist (1998a: 69) and Arnaud’s numbering in assuming that he was the son of Dagan-taliʾ. 108 Note that Abdi-Bēli is identified by his mother’s name. 109 Note the problems in identifying the persons serving as security described by Durand 1990: 49; according to him the sons of Ṭābat-māliktu are Ḫimaši-[. . .] and his wife. 110 Skaist 2001: 240. 111 No weight-standard is specified because both parties are Emarites, see Zaccagnini 2018: 59.

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Surprisingly, the tablet is sealed by the lender but not by the borrower, although it was stored in the creditor’s archive.112 It is not precluded that E 88 refers to an outstanding debt and was drafted in order to demand additional securities. 2.1.2.3 Hirayama 40 Hirayama 40, belonging to the Kutbe archive, relates to a sale of slaves. It is treated here because, as rightly pointed out by Zaccagnini, the document is not an outright sale but rather a business agreement concerning a credit sale for the delivery of four slaves.113 Irbi-ilu and Qalāl-addin, sons of Šallaeia, two individuals from the district of the Abalḫumi-canal,114 were traders entrusted with the sale of slaves owned by Zū-Aštarti son of Kutbe. The price was fixed at 70 sheep in rams and ewes due within one month: (3) 4 ZI.MEŠ ša ᵐZu-‹Aš›-tar-ti DUMU Ku-ut-be (4) a-na 70 uduṣe-ni ŠÁM.TIL.LA (5) uduzi-qi-ti ù udugu-ra-ti (6) i[t]-ta-ás-ḫu u₄-um ša 70 ṣe-ni (7) udu[z]i-qi-ti ù udugu-ra-ti (8) a-na 1 ITU U₄.MEŠ a-na e-da-ni-šu-nu (9) a-na m Zu-‹Aš›-tar-ti ú-šal-la-mu (10) ṭup-pa-šu-nu i-ḫa-pí-ú, “They have t[ra]nsferred 4 persons belonging to Zū-Aštarti son of Kutbe for the full price of 70 sheep in rams and ewes. On the day they pay 70 sheep in [r]ams and ewes, to Zū-Aštarti within one month, the term established for them, they will break their tablet.” A penalty was established for non-payment before the agreed time: (11) šúm-ma a-na ITU U₄.MEŠ (12) a-na e-da-ni-šu-nu uduṣe-ni (13) la ub-ba-lu-ni ka-ás-pu (14) a-na UGU ṣe-ni TÉŠ.BI, “If within one month, the term that was established for them, they do not deliver the sheep, silver (must be paid) for the ‘equivalent’ (quantity) of sheep.” After a dividing ruling the text continues: (15) 12[+ x GÍN K]Ù.SIG₁₇ ša mZu-Ba-la ù mZu-‹Aš›-tar-ti (16) a-[na] UGU mIr-bi-li-ma, “12[+ 1? shekels of go]ld belonging to Zū-Baʿla115 and Zū-Aštarti are upon Irbi-ilu.” Zaccagnini correctly pointed out that the penalty to be paid in silver corresponded to twice the value of the sheep (Hirayama 40: 11–14). He also inferred that lines 15–16 report the equivalent in gold of the quantity of silver to be paid as a penalty. Indeed, Zaccagnini calculated that the full price of 70 sheep would have ranged between 70 and 100 shekels of silver, while the value of 12[+1?] shekels of gold was

112 For the seal impression see Beyer 2001: 142. 113 Zaccagnini 1996: 95–96. This document is also discussed below under sales of slaves, § 3.4.1.2. 114 This place name does not appear in Belmonte Marín 2001 but was likely in the vicinity of Emar. 115 Zū-Baʿla is Zū-Aštarti’s brother.

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equivalent to 160/170 shekels of silver – more or less double the original sum. It remains unclear why only Irbi-ilu is mentioned in the penalty clause. We may therefore conclude that the sons of Kutbe, Zū-Aštarti and Zū-Baʿla, entrusted two merchants with a slave sale, securing their credit sale with a penalty. The two merchants are unattested in other sources. 2.1.2.4 TBR 49 TBR 49 is a unique document assigned by Arnaud to the archive of the family of Apilu but, as I previously argued, the attribution is unfounded.116 The Ikmu-Dagan son of Apilu mentioned in TBR 49 is not found in other documents of Apilu’s family, and both Apilu and Ikmu-Dagan are rather common personal names at Emar. The tablet records several loans and is divided into two sections by a double ruling. The first section (TBR 49: 1–11) records five loans granted by Abu-ṭāb and Ḫattû. It is not excluded that Abu-ṭāb can be identified with the individual mentioned in E 254: 1 because this personal name only occurs in these two texts in the Emar corpus.117 Nothing is known about Ḫattû, but his personal name may suggest an Anatolian origin. Each loan is contained in a paragraph set off by a single ruling. The first loan includes 23 shekels of silver, 200 shekels of purified tin, and 500 shekels of blue wool. The borrower, Ḫattû son of Mamma-ka, is known from a fragmentary inventory from Building M₁ (E 309: 2). The second loan consists of 9 shekels of silver granted to Tūra-Dagan son of the scribe Imlik-Dagan. Tūra-Dagan’s father was possibly a scribe working under the king Zū-Aštarti.118 Because Imlik-Dagan was a scribe of the Syrian tradition, TBR 49 can likely be dated to the transitional period between the Syrian and the Syro-Hittite traditions. The other three loans were granted to individuals bearing personal names that only occur in this text, namely Muttatti, son of Rībatu (8 sh.), Nūra-līmur (5 sh.), and Šaggar-napšir (6 sh.). The second section (TBR 49: 12–19), following the double ruling, records an interest-free loan (ḫubuttetu)119 of 30 shekels of silver owed by the same Abu-ṭāb and Ḫattû to the otherwise unknown Abbanu, who bears the title of scribe.120 The document stipulates that should Abu-ṭāb and Ḫattû delay their repayment, Ikmu-Dagan son of Apilu, clearly acting as guarantor, will reimburse Ab-

116 Viano 2007: 255. TBR 49 is discussed in Viano 2018a: 18–19. 117 On the alleged Eblaite origin of Abu-ṭāb see Durand 2018: 354–55. 118 Cohen 2009: 86. 119 This must be another variant of ḫubuttatu; see E 319, pp. 59ff. 120 For this scribe see Cohen 2009: 99.

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banu within the month of Ninurta.121 Arnaud reads lines 14–19 as follows: (14) šum-ma mA-bu-DU₁₀.GA ù mḪa-at-ta-ú uḫ-ḫa-ru-ni (15) mIk-mu-dKUR DUMU A-pí-li (16) ḫu-bu-la-ti ša mA-bu-DU₁₀.GA (17) ù ša mḪa-at-ta-ú mIk-mu-dKUR i-ṣa-bat-ma (18) 30 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR ša mAb-ba-nu LÚ.DUB.SAR (19) i-na ITI.KÁM dNIN.URTA ú-šal-lam. In line 16 he regards ḫu-bu-la-ti as an interest-bearing loan, translating “le prêt, avec interêt . . . Ikmu-Dagan prendra.” Nevertheless, as stated in lines 18–19 the loan bears no interest because Ikmu-Dagan is liable for only 30 shekels of silver. Therefore, two hypotheses can be put forth: (1) ḫubullu122 in line 16 is used with the same meaning as ḫubuttetu in line 12; (2) the sign LA in ḫu-bula-ti is suspect in light of ḫu-bu-te-tu₄ and should be corrected to ḫu-bu-te!?-ti. In any case, it cannot be inferred from this single unclear attestation that at Emar ḫubullu had the specific meaning of “interest-bearing loan,” rather than a general “debt” or “obligation.”123 The relation between the two sections can be explained by regarding the list of loans in TBR 49: 1–11 as security for the loan issued by Abbanu in the second part of the text.124 It seems plausible that Abu-ṭāb and Ḫattû were merchants who found in Abbanu a financier for their business venture, securing a loan of 30 shekels with the credit they had received from other persons. This is supported by the presence among the witnesses of two of Abu-ṭāb and Ḫattû’s debtors, Ḫattû son of Mamma-ka and Tūra-Dagan son of the scribe Imlik-Dagan. The guarantor, Ikmu-Dagan, was most likely a business partner. The document was held by Abbanu because Ḫattû sealed the tablet. The loan itself was probably written on another tablet, while TBR 49 was a document of security.125 The type of commodities lent in the first loan, and the fact that most of the persons mentioned in the document are unknown elsewhere and bear personal names uncommon at Emar, strengthens the likelihood of the commercial nature of the document, which was likely generated in the context of international trade. Because no interest was charged on the lent capital, it is likely that the moneylenders expected to receive a share of the profits from the trade.

121 Note that this is the only occurrence of Ikmu-Dagan son of Apilu in the text. 122 Note that at Emar ḫubullu forms the plural with feminine endings, Seminara 1998: 292 n. 26. 123 On the ḫubullu loans see Skaist 1994: 40–41; cf. ch. 5 fn. 6. Note that at Nuzi the term ḫubullu applies to loans with or without interest, Zaccagnini 2002: 179. 124 This hypothesis has been suggested to me by Sophie Démare-Lafont. 125 TBR 49 was perhaps copied from another source, as suggested by a possible copying mistake in line 17 that is syntactically incorrect: mIk-mu-dKUR is possibly to be placed after i-ṣa-batma as the subject of the verb in line 19.

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2.1.2.5 TBR 27 The document TBR 27, which records a loan issued by Ḫudatu, wife of Abunnu, to a certain Aḫī-raḫaq, son of Iaʾšu, presents problems of interpretation. The quantity of the lent commodity is stated in the first line, 1 GÚ.UN 1 li-im 6 ME KI.LÁ. BI, but as underlined by Arnaud’s translation, “un talent pesant 1600 (sicles),” several problems remain in the understanding of the line. Some poorly written signs are in need of collation, but more importantly it is evident that the lent commodity is not indicated, probably because of a scribal mistake.126 Since the talent is regularly used for measuring metals and other commodities, it is very unlikely that the document recorded a debt of barley or staples. Indeed, the identification of Aḫī-raḫaq with one of the merchants carrying out international trade between Assyria and Emar in the letter AOAT 265.1 (§ 3.2.2) suggests a commercial context for TBR 27. The interpretation of TBR 27 as a productive debt does not elucidate the second part of the line, however, because a talent corresponds to 3600 shekels.127 Alternatively, one might read 1 GÚ «UN», interpreting GÚ as kišādu, “necklace,” but 1600 shekels appears to be an excessive weight for a necklace.128 Further evidence of the scribe’s inadequacy is documented in lines 4–6, ù f NIN-ki-mi DAM-šú EN.MEŠ ŠU-ti-ši ša fḪu-da-ti i-na ITI ša A-bi-e la-qì, which Skaist129 regards as referring to a pledge transaction and translates “and Baʿla-kīmī his wife (of the debtor) is en-šu of Ḫudatu, in the month of Abu130 (she) was taken.” However, this sentence seems to haphazardly string together various clauses of suretyship, none of which relate qātātu to the creditor: in the Old Babylonian formula qātāti leqû, “to assume the surety,” qātāti is always followed

126 Cf. E 127: 8, 1 GÚ.UN URUDU ša 4 li-im KI.LÁ.BI. 127 For the weight standards at Emar see Zaccagnini 2018: 49–51. 128 The weight is ca. 12.5 kg. according to the shekel of Emar (7.83 g.), see Parise 1984: 127–31, Chambon and Faist 2014: 20–21, Zaccagnini 2018, 49–51; CAD K: 448–449, cites examples of kīšadātu weighing a few shekels. 129 Skaist 2001: 240. 130 Arnaud’s translation, “jusqu’au mois d’Ab,” is not supported by the regular meaning of ina. Fleming (2000: 201) suggests that the line contains no reference to a date and transliterates i-na KAL.LI a-bi-x(e?); a reading LI rather than ŠA seems to be closer to the copy, but both KAL and ITI in the Emar sources have shapes quite different from the sign written on TBR 27. A possible alternative reading is DAG!, which, however, also shows a different shape in the Emar texts; a reading i-na ták!-li a-bi-x(e?), “in trust of the father (?),” could loosely refer to some sort of liability but I am unable to place it in the context of the clause. As a collation of the tablet is currently impossible it is maintained here that the line refers to the moment when the security was assumed.

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by the debtor’s name or by a pronominal suffix referring to the debtor;131 the Assyrian term for surety, bēl qātāte, relates to the debtor132 or, in the Neo Assyrian period, to the lent sum.133 Although at Emar the term qātātu can be indifferently used for surety or pledge, it is never found in a genitive construction with the creditor’s name.134 Despite the text’s inaccuracies,135 I agree with Skaist that Baʿla-kīmī acted as security for her husband, but I regard her role differently. Possessory pledges of persons, especially of free people, are less frequent in commercial loans at Emar and elsewhere.136 In two commercial debts secured by personal pledges, AOAT 265.1 and E 21, the pledges seem to be handed over upon default. Additionally, in both cases the pledged person were dependents working as middlemen, not relatives of the borrower. In the commercial debt in which a personal pledge is consigned before default, RE 19, the pledged person served as a replacement of a professional worker to be delivered to the creditor. For these reasons, it seems more likely that Baʿla-kīmī acted as surety.137 Indeed, the expression bēl qātāti138 points to the function of guarantor rather than pledge. This interpretation leads us to regard TBR 27 as a debt note written at the onset of the loan. Because the document contains no other clauses, it seems unlikely that it was written just to stipulate that Baʿla-kīmī assumed the surety.139

131 See examples in CAD Q: 168–169 and CAD L: 145. 132 Veenhof 2001: 104–05. 133 Radner 2001: 267–68. 134 See in particular E 77, where the suffix -šu unambiguously refers to the debtor, and ASJ13 A, where qātātu, meaning surety, is followed by ša and the debtors. 135 Note also the redundant presence of the pronominal suffix as well as the creditor’s name after EN.MEŠ ŠU. Perhaps the lent object was supposed to be inserted before ša fḪu-da-ti, but -ši remains unclear. 136 See § 4.5.1. Note that in the Old Assyrian sources, personal pledges do not occur in commercial debts unless the borrower was considered unreliable, see Veenhof 2001: 131–37; most of the loans secured by pledge were likely domestic and consumptive. 137 Compare, for instance, the debt note TBR 34 (§ 2.1.2.7), where the personal antichretic pledge is indicated by the clause PN(C) PLEDGE kīmū kaspīšu ukāl, “PN detains PLEDGE in lieu of his silver”; see also RE 58 (§ 2.2.1.2.14). 138 EN.MEŠ ŠU-ti-ši might be a mistake for EN ŠU.MEŠ-ti-ši. 139 On the contrary, if she was pledged, the document could have been written as the transfer of the pledge.

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A hint regarding the economic condition of Aḫī-raḫaq’s family is offered by RE 68, where Baʿla-kīmī140 sold a kierṣetu belonging to her (probably late) husband141 for one of the lowest prices per square cubit recorded at Emar.142 This sale contract is illuminating for two reasons: on the one hand, it tells us that Baʿla-kīmī was likely an impoverished widow who was forced to sell off her properties after her husband’s death in order to deal with financial problems; on the other hand, we are informed that Aḫī-raḫaq owned properties he could have pledged in TBR 27 in place of his wife, which supports our interpretation of Baʿla-kīmī’s role as surety. Another hint that Baʿla-kīmī served as surety is her free status at the time when RE 68 was drafted. Instead of assuming that Baʿla-kīmī was redeemed before she sold her husband’s house because of financial distress, it seems more likely that she acted as surety in TBR 27 and that her economic condition subsequently deteriorated. Most likely Baʿla-kīmī participated in her husband’s trade activity.143 A collation of the tablet would be required to better understand the document. The creditor, Ḫudatu, wife of Abuni, is nowhere else mentioned, and it is unknown whether she was a widow or was acting on behalf of her husband, as commonly attested in trade at Emar.144 2.1.2.6 RE 72 and RE 75 The debt notes RE 72 and RE 75, which belong to the dossier of the family of Laḫma,145 record business exchanges between Ḫinnu-Dagan son of Laḫma and Aḫiu son of Tūbu. The first document lists commodities exchanged by the two men in the form of debts. Lines 1–5 record twelve measures of an unclear com-

140 This Baʿla-kīmī should be distinguished from those appearing in TBR 28, TBR 29, and TBR 30. In my opinion three different persons appear in these documents: in TBR 27 Baʿla-kīmī is the wife of Aḫī-raḫaq; in TBR 28 and TBR 29 another Baʿla-kīmī divorces Milki-Dagan to marry Abīliʾmu son of Abī-liʾmu, a rich man who settles the debts of two persons (see § 2.2.1.2.5); and finally in TBR 30 a Baʿla-kīmī is the wife of Matkali-Dagan. It seems to me very unlikely that the same woman married and divorced three or four times; moreover, in RE 68 Baʿla-kīmī is still identified as Aḫī-raḫaq’s wife. 141 Following Tsukimoto 1998: 189, I regard Baʿla-kīmī as the only seller; indeed the verb is singular, ittadin (l. 13). Therefore, I suggest that her husband was dead. 142 See Viano 2012: 148 Figure 6, 150. 143 Similarly, a couple of foreign merchants from House 5 jointly conducted trade, see §§ 1.3.8, 2.1.3. 144 See § 4.8. 145 For this family see § 1.3.7.

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modity, perhaps bread, and seven satu-vessels of fine oil146 owed by Aḫiu to Ḫinnu-Dagan. Lines 6–9 record four aribû-garments (4 TÚG.ḪI.A a-ri-bu) owed by Ḫinnu-Dagan to Aḫiu. The aribû is a poorly known garment attested so far only in Late Bronze Age sources.147 Due to the kind of commodities lent and the fact that the tablet is sealed by both men, the debt note was plausibly drafted at the onset of the loan.148 In RE 75, Aḫiu borrows 30 shekels and 40 satu-vessels of fine oil from Ḫinnu-Dagan. The contract states that Ḫinnu-Dagan will seize Aḫiu’s house should he die: (4) šum-ma A-hi-ú DUMU Tù-ú-bi BA.UG₇ (5) mḪi-nu-dKUR DUMU La-aḫ-ma É-šú (6) i-ṣa-bat, “If Aḫiu son of Tūbu should die, Ḫinnu-Dagan son of Laḫma will seize his house.” The house is to be understood as security against the debtor’s death.149 It is unclear whether RE 75 was drafted as a debt renewal that included an additional security or whether it was written at the onset of the loan. The types of commodities lent and the way they are exchanged suggest that we are not dealing with large-scale international trade. The two men are also mentioned in RE 74, a text that can perhaps be interpreted as an administrative bill recording quantities of silver disbursed to several individuals and totaling 235.5 shekels of silver.150 In this document Ḫinnu-Dagan receives one half-shekel of silver while Aḫiu receives 40 shekels of silver. Because the archival context of the tablet is unknown, it cannot be decided whether the document recorded debts or (perhaps more likely) payments. The only other individual listed in RE 74 who is known from other Emar sources is Matkali-Dagan son of Papaḫa, who is mentioned as the grandfather of a sealer in AuOr5 9. 2.1.2.7 TBR 34 The document TBR 34 deals with a change in the security provided for an outstanding debt of 115 shekels of silver incurred by Ṣalmu son of Zū-Aštarti.151 The lender Abdi-ili son of Kulabu, bearing the title of herald (lúna-gi-ru), had taken

146 Beckman transliterates 12 NINDA?.ḪI.A 7 dugsà-tu₄ Ì.DU₁₀.GA (line 1), while Tsukimoto (1998: 189), arguing that bread does not fit the context, suggests that silver was the commodity exchanged; the sign transliterated as NINDA presents only three upright wedges. 147 See CAD A/2: 265 and Durand 2009: 29 (I thank Salvatore Gaspa for the reference). 148 Since RE 75 was certainly stored in the archive of Ḫinnu-Dagan, RE 72 likely belonged to the same dossier. 149 It is not excluded that É-šu refers to the debtor’s household rather than the building. 150 Only Ḫinnu-Dagan’s patronymic is indicated in RE 74, but his very presence makes it more than probable that the Aḫiu in line 3 is the same individual as in RE 72 and RE 75. 151 According to Arnaud, TBR 33 and TBR 34 constitute the dossier of the sons of Zū-Aštarti, son of Qabbāru, but there is no evidence that the two documents are related.

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the debtor’s wife and three children as an antichretic pledge,152 but now Ṣalmu offered himself as a substitute for his family: (5) a-na ŠU.MEŠ-ti ša DAM.MEŠ-šu DUMU.MEŠ-‹šu› i-te-ru-ub (6) DAM-šu DUMU.MEŠ-šu ul-te-ṣi, “He entered as pledge for his wife and his children and released his wife and ‹his› children.” None of the parties is known from other sources. Although the amount of silver he lent is high, the nāgiru does not seem to be a high-ranking military official.153 TBR 34 is treated among the documents concerning the creation of an obligation because it is a renewal of an outstanding debt that at least formally was expected to be repaid: (7) ki-i-me-e mṢa-al-mu KÙ.BABBAR an-na-am ú-šal-lam (8) ṭup-pa an-na-am i-hé-pí, “When Ṣalmu will pay this silver, he shall break this tablet.” Some contracts of indentured labor154 specify that they are to be terminated upon the repayment of a loan, but in TBR 34 there is no clear evidence that the debt has matured or that Ṣalmu was a defaulting debtor. Therefore, Ṣalmu’s condition differs from indentured labor only in legal terms: the terminology indicates that he served as a pledge (qātātu), not as an indentured person.155 The non-vindication clause156 bans Zū-Aštarti, Ṣalmu’s father, from raising claims on his daughter-in-law and his grandsons: (9) šum-ma mṢa-al-mu BA.UG₇ ba-li-iṭ (10) mZu-Aš-tar-ti a-bu-šu aš-šum (11) DAM-šu DUMU.MEŠ-šu a-na muhhi-ša (12) la-a i-ra-gu₅-um, “Be Ṣalmu dead or alive,157 Zū-Aštarti, his father, shall not raise a claim concerning his wife and his sons.” Because this clause operated during Ṣalmu’s life and after his death, one may speculate that it was added to protect Ṣalmu’s family from being pledged or enslaved by Zū-Aštarti in the future. Regardless whether the debt was repaid, the protection granted to Ṣalmu’s family by this clause could be the reason why this tablet was preserved. Due to the difficulty of interpretation, this document is very provisionally classified among the documents recording the creation of an obligation, mainly on the basis of its formal aspects. Despite the high amount of the debt, TBR 34 is regarded as a consumptive debt because there is no hint of a commercial context. 152 The clause ki-i-mu-ú KÙ.BABBAR-šu ú-ka-al, “He holds (the pledge) instead of his silver” (TBR 34: 3–4), does not mean that the pledged properties were substitute payments for the loan, because the pledge will be released upon repayment, see § 4.5. 153 Only the overseer of the heralds can be considered as a high-ranking official, Bilgin 2018: 292, 98–99. 154 § 3.2.1. 155 Note that E 77 and RA77 5 distinguish between qātātu and amēlūtu for pledge and indentured person respectively, see § 3.2.1.1.1. 156 For this clause see § 1.5. 157 This clause closely resembles the “dead or alive” clause that is found in documents related to slavery (see § 3.1.1); although both clauses serve to prevent claims, the context appears to be different.

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2.1.2.8 RE 18 The testament RE 18 records the transfer of a credit (35 shekels) from Šaggar-taliʾ son of Mattia to his heirs;158 the sum was lent to Ḫannanu son of Gūru perhaps without interest: (3) 35 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ-ia a-na UGU-ḫi! mḪa-an-na-nu DUMU Gu-ur-a (4) i-na MU-ti ša mu-ta-ni (5) a-na pu-u-hi él-qè, “My 35 shekels of silver are upon Ḫannanu son of Gūru; in the year of plague he borrowed (them).”159 The text states that the credit may be collected by any of the testator’s descendants (his sons Milki-Dagan and Aštartu-līt and his daughters Ummu and Sēbû) who should survive the plague that was currently afflicting Emar, which probably hampered the repayment of the loan to Šaggar-taliʾ: (8) i-na ŠÀ 4 DUMU. MEŠ-ia šum-ma mMil-ki-ᵈKUR (9) mAš-tar-tu-li-it ù šum-[m]a fUm-mi (10) ù šum-ma f Si-i-bi a-ú-me-e (11) i-na ŠÀ-šu-nu TI.LA 35 KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ-ia (12) iš-tu UGU-ḫi m Ḫa-an-na-nu DUMU Gu-ur-a (13) li-il-qè, “Whoever among my four children, be it Milki-Dagan, be it Aštartu-līt, be it Ummu, be it Sēbû, whoever among them should survive, shall take my 35 (shekels) of silver from Ḫannanu son of Gūru.” As this is not the original loan, the terms of the contract are unknown. Nevertheless, although none of the parties is elsewhere attested,160 it is evident that the document records a consumptive debt contracted out of necessity. 2.1.2.9 JCS40 3 The debt note JCS40 3 is a very fragmentary tablet possibly recording a loan: (2) [ . . . ša?] mA-ḫi dKUR (3) [ . . . UGU? Z]i-im-ri-dKUR LÚ uruSa-r[a?]. It seems that Zimrī-Dagan, from the otherwise unknown city of Sara[. . .], borrowed an unpreserved quantity of silver from a certain Aḫī-Dagan. Beckman restored [ . . . uṣ-ṣa-a]b? in line 5, which can be interpreted as referring to the charging of interest.161 However, the same line can also be restored as [ú-ul uṣ-ṣa-a]b?, “(the silver) bears no interest,” which is used in Ekalte (Ek 68) and in the Old Babylonian texts from Alalaḫ as an antichretic formula.162 Both hypotheses are worthy of consideration, but because the tablet is written according to the Syro-Hittite tradition, it seems more likely to me that interest was charged because the antichretic formula is only attested in earlier scribal traditions. The Syro-Hittite tablets from 158 For a similar situation see RE 39, § 3.2.1.1.3. 159 According to Durand (1990, 56–57) the expression ana pūḫi leqû could indicate an interest-free loan. 160 The tablet likely dates to the time of the diviner Baʿal-qarrād, Cohen 2009: 102. 161 For the interest clause see Skaist 1994: 98–101. 162 The full formula reads (KÙ.BABBAR) ul uṣṣab ul iddarar, “The silver bears no interest nor is it affected by a decree of remission of debts,” see Ek 68, Eichler 1973: 73. This formula is unknown in Alalaḫ IV, Niedorf 2008: 210–11.

2.1 Creation of the Obligation 

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Emar exhibit later characteristics than those appearing in the scribal traditions in which the antichretic formula is found.163 The line [ . . . š]a? 30 UD.MEŠ can tentatively be interpreted as referring to the term of the loan. If this interpretation and Beckman’s restoration of [ . . . uṣ-ṣa-a] b? in line 5 are correct, JCS40 3 was drafted as a true loan at the onset of the obligation. The tablet is sealed by the otherwise unknown Itūr-Dagan son of Abunnu. The interpretation of the document relies on the reading of line 5: if the loan was interest-bearing, its context was possibly productive because interest-bearing loans from Emar mostly relate to business activities;164 on the contrary, if the loan included the antichretic formula it was obviously consumptive. The fragmentary nature of the manuscript hampers a full understanding of the background of the loan.165 2.1.2.10 RE 60 RE 60 is a rather obscure text recording debts of four people and a labor obligation. The tablet is divided into four paragraphs, two on each side, set off by rulings. The first paragraph (RE 60: 1–6) includes a list of six people whose relation to the remainder of the text is unclear: Ilānu son of Baṣṣu, Nabuzu, Abdi-ili son of Eʾe, Itūr-Dagan son of Lamma-rāpiʾ, Bēlu-taliʾ son of Uznu, and Ḫussa son of Kutbe.166 The second paragraph (RE 60: 7–10) contains a list of four debtors owing a total of 6 shekels of silver: Zū-Aštarti son of Mama (2 sh.), Dagan-taliʾ son of Ḫaraqqu (1 sh.), Puʾa son of Ilī-abī (2 sh.), and Aḫī-Bašar son of Titia (1 sh.). The list is followed by the sealing of one debtor, Dagan-taliʾ son of Ḫaraqqu, impressed on the lower edge and accompanied by its label.167 The reverse contains the reaffirmation of a labor obligation concerning Ilānu son of Baṣṣu, the same individual heading the list of people in the first paragraph. It is acknowledged that he has performed a service, likely corvée, for two months but still has four months of work left:168 (13) 2 ITI u₄-mimeš mI!-la-nu DUMU

163 Note that the Ekalte tablets are written according to the Syrian tradition. 164 See § 4.4; note, however, the consumptive debt RE 96. 165 As is the case for all the documents of uncertain nature, JCS40 3 is included among the consumptive debts in Table 31 (§ 4.2). 166 Besides Ilānu, who is mentioned later on the tablet, the other persons are unknown elsewhere in the Emar documentation. 167 Perhaps a ruling was drawn at the end of the obverse after the first part of the sealing label, RE 60: 11, NA₄.KIŠIB mdKUR-ta-li-iʾ; however, no ruling is traced between lines 10 and 11, contrary to Beckman’s edition. 168 For a similar situation see ASJ10 A, § 3.2.1.1.1.

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Ba-ṣa (14) il*-lik 4 ITI u₄-mimeš (15) a-na UGU-ḫi-šú ir-ti-iḫ, “Two full months (of work) Ilānu son of Baṣṣu has performed; 4 full months remain upon him.” The last paragraph includes the seal of another debtor, Zū-Aštarti son of Mama, as well as that of Dagan-kabar son of Kukubati, who is not mentioned elsewhere in the text and is unknown from other Emar sources. It is unclear whether one of the debtors, Zū-Aštarti son of Mama, can be identified with the member of a wealthy family documented in RE 56 and RE 63.169 Another debtor, Aḫī-Bašar son of Titia, is mentioned as a witness in E 224, which records the purchase of a slave by the diviner Baʿal-mālik.170 The creditor’s name is apparently unrecorded. The presence of Ilānu son of Baṣṣu in the list of people in the first paragraph of RE 60 rules out the possibility that the list identifies the moneylenders. On the other hand, in light of Ilānu’s presence in the first paragraph and the absence of his sealing – a fact that may indicate that he was the tablet holder – one may suggest that the text records the balance owed for work service performed by Ilānu for the four people listed in the second paragraph. Accordingly, the six shekels of silver would be the payment for four months of work.171 If this holds true, the document should be regarded as a renewal of a labor contract rather than a record of debts. The understanding of the text remains, however, unclear, notably with respect to the role of the people listed after Ilānu in the first paragraph. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the text is provisionally included among the consumptive debts. 2.1.2.11 PdA 68 The document PdA 68 contains, according to Durand,172 a record of debts, although problems of interpretations remain. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

ša mAm-za-ḫi DUMU G[u!]-a-an-ni 3 GIŠ ŠÀ ŠE.MEŠ mTu-ra-dKUR DUMU Pa-[zu-ri]-dKUR 3 GIŠ ŠÀ ŠE.MEŠ mZu-⌜ba-la⌝ DUMU Ki-is-i 3 GIŠ ŠÀ ŠE.MEŠ mMa-⌜dì⌝-dKUR DUMU La-wi 3 GIŠ ŠÀ ŠE.MEŠ mIr-ib-dIŠKUR DUMU Ku-na-na 3 GIŠ ŠÀ ŠE.MEŠ mAd-da DUMU Qa-ba-ri

169 See p. 173; Zū-Aštarti appears as witness also in RA77 3. For Mama in RE 56 and RE 63 see § 1.3.7. 170 See p. 220. 171 The role of the other people listed in the first paragraph remains obscure. Perhaps they were somehow related to Ilānu, or they gave him as a worker to the four people listed in the second paragraph. In the latter case they would be the recipients of the silver for the work duty. 172 For the identification of this text as a record of debts see Durand and Marti 2003: 144.

2.1 Creation of the Obligation 

8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14.

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3 GIŠ ŠÀ ŠE.MEŠ mdÉ-a-ba-ni DUMU Ḫa-la-qi 3 GIŠ ŠÀ ŠE.MEŠ Za-dam-ma DUMU Ir-ib 3 GIŠ ŠÀ ŠE.MEŠ mŠu-ṭur-dKUR DUMU Ga-bar-ni 3 GIŠ ŠÀ ŠE.MEŠ mA-ḫi-ia DUMU DU₁₀-dKUR 3 GIŠ ŠÀ ŠE.MEŠ mZi-i-zi 30 GIŠ ŠÀ ŠE.MEŠ KÚR.MEŠ a-na muḫ-ḫi mdÉ-a-ba-ni

In Durand’s view, the text lists ten creditors who lent 3 parīsu of barley each (3 GIŠ ŠÀ ŠE.MEŠ) to a certain Ea-bāni (PdA 68: 14). As underscored by Durand, the first line of the tablet, written on the left-hand edge and not reported here, requires collation.173 However, there is reason to suggest a different interpretation. First, it is unlikely that the Ea-bāni son of Ḫalāqu mentioned in line 8 is different from the individual liable for the debt reported at the end of the document, because this personal name only occurs in this source at Emar.174 Second, the formula ša PN in line 2 is typically used in debt notes to indicate the creditor. Accordingly, the text would record a debt of 30 parīsu of barley owed to Amzaḫi son of Guanni by ten people, including Ea-bāni, for which Ea-bāni himself assumed the liability. It is worth noting that, as in the case of Ea-bāni, several personal names in this text are otherwise unattested175 or rarely attested176 at Emar. In this context, one may perhaps understand KÚR.MEŠ in line 13 as referring to the debtors’ foreign origin. Because the allotment of barley for each person is the smallest found in debt documents from Emar,177 it is plausible that the loan was issued for consumption to impoverished peasants. Alternatively, in light of the uniformity of the amounts, one may suggest that the purpose of the loan was to record a tax payment owed by a group of people. Ea-bāni would then be the representative of these people, perhaps the residents of a district, who was responsible for collecting and delivering the total amount.178

173 The first line is not visible in the photographs published in Fales 1989: 207–08. 174 For the attestations of this personal name see Pruzsinszky 2003: Index, 302. 175 Guanni, Kisu, Lawi, Šutur-Dagan, Ṭāb-Dagan. 176 Kunānu, Ḫalāqu, Zizi. 177 See § 4.3. 178 This hypothesis has been suggested to me by Sophie Démare-Lafont.

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2.1.3 A Middle Babylonian Document (E 24) The Babylonian tablet E 24 found in House 5 (Area A)179 is a loan contract recording 100 shekels of silver borrowed by Tatašše/Raʾīndu, wife of the merchant Alazaia, from Kāpī-Dagan. The silver was measured by the weight-standard of the city (NA₄ URU) and Tatašše/Raʾīndu agreed to pay 120 shekels, corresponding to the capital and its interest, within the month of Kislim. The tablet is not dated but the duration of the loan may have been quite short, in keeping with the narrow chronological window represented by the other documents in the cache.180 The purpose of the loan was obviously to finance a trade venture, while the gain expected by the lender was the interest, rather than a share of the profits. Tatašše/Raʾīndu operated a trading bureau in Emar, likely to be identified with House 5, while her husband was stationed outside the city.181 The absence of securities perhaps reflects Tatašše/Raʾīndu’s reputation for fulfilling her obligations.182 Several witnesses bearing Babylonian personal names were in some way associated with the pair of merchants. The creditor, Kāpī-Dagan, cannot be identified because he bears no patronymic, but he is unlikely to be identified with the son of Zū-Baʿla and younger brother of Baʿal-qarrād because E 24 belongs to a cache of documents dated to the very end of Emar and can be synchronized with the latter part of Baʿal-mālik’s life and with the Ḫima family.183 Nevertheless, this Kāpī-Dagan was likely a wealthy person on account of the high amount of the loan. He was also probably close to the family of Ḫima because the last witness is one of Ḫima’s sons,184 who certainly served on his side. We speculated above about a possible identification of Kāpī-Dagan with one of the individuals mentioned in E 277, a document related to commercial activities.185

179 For the tablets from House 5 see § 1.3.8. 180 For the chronological span of the tablets from House 5 see Cohen and Singer 2006: 134. 181 Alazaia sent a letter to his wife (E 25) concerning the trade of slaves and fabrics, see § 3.4.1.3. 182 Similar examples are E 75 (§ 2.1.2.2) and Hirayama 34 (§ 2.1.1.2). 183 See § 1.3.8; see also Cohen 2004, Cohen and d’Alfonso 2008: 14–15. 184 E 24: 24–25, IGI ᵐᵈDa-gan-[GAL/ta-li-iʾ] // DUMU ᵐḪé-ma. The name is broken, but given the relation of the Ḫima family with the entourage of foreign merchants at Emar (E 75, E 87) and the fact that virtually all names with Ḫima as patronymic and beginning with Dagan- can be associated with the family of Ḫima (cf. Pruzsinszky 2003: Index, 375–76), there is little doubt that we are dealing with one of the sons of Ḫima. 185 See pp. 56f.

2.1 Creation of the Obligation 

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This tablet offers another example of a trade venture carried out by foreign merchants financed by Emarites.186 Because the tablet was found in the debtor’s archive and it is not sealed, it is likely a copy of the original document.

2.1.4 A Middle Assyrian Document (RE 19) The Middle Assyrian tablet RE 19 is a unique document of security dated to the time of the king Ninurta-apil-Ekur (1181–1169).187 After Beckman’s initial publication, the text was reedited by Deller,188 according to whom the tablet records the replacement of a pledged person by a better, professional worker. My interpretation differs from Deller’s, as I understand that the document records the pledge of a person as security for the delivery of a professional plowman in the context of the trade in workers or slaves. Two individuals, Apḫama-Adad son of Aḫī-raḫīqu and Matkal-Dagal son of Ḫabʾu,189 pledged a certain Malia (ki-i ša-pár-ti ú-še-ši-bu-ú-ni) to an Assyrian from the city of Kailu, Kāzanu son of Kušuḫ-atkal.190 This document is discussed in the present work because Matkal-Dagal is identified as an Emarite.191 The key lines for the understanding of the document are the following: (12) ki-i-mu? 1? LÚ.ENGAR SAG₁₀ (13) ᵐMa-li-ia (14) a-na É ᵐKa-za-a-ni (15) e-rib. Deller argues that these lines can be understood only if the two substantives following the preposition kīmū, “instead of,” are interchanged; therefore he translates: “Anstelle des Malija werden sie dem Haushalt des Kazanu einen qualifizierten Pflüger übergeben.”192 This is, however, unnecessary if we understand that Malia is given as security for the future delivery of a professional worker. This interpretation is supported by the tablet envelope, which bears the following label: (1) ṭup-pu ša-pár!-te (2) [š]a Ma-li-ia, “Tablet of the pledge of Malia.”193 This label makes clear that the pledge concerns Malia and not the plowman; this label would make little sense if Malia 186 See the loans issued by the family of Ḫima (E 75, E 87) and TBR 49; see also § 4.8. 187 For the date of this tablet see Cohen and d’Alfonso 2008: 14–15. According to Durand 2003 the tablet perhaps stems from Tell Šēḫ Ḥamad. 188 Deller 1999. 189 For this personal name see Tsukimoto 1998: 186. 190 For the town of Kailu see Cancik-Kirschbaum 2017: 73. 191 I would tend to associate i-ma-ra-ia ša uruI-mar! (RE 19: 7) with Matkal-Dagal alone, mainly because the personal name Apḫama-Adad is unknown from Emar; for Matkal-Dagal as an alternative spelling for Matkali-Dagan see Pruzsinszky 2003: 125–26 n. 570. 192 Deller (1999: 34) reads e-dan as a form of nadānu; I retain Beckman’s transliteration e-rib, but both readings are problematic. 193 For the reading of the envelope see Tsukimoto 1998: 186.

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was replaced by the plowman as a pledge. Lines 12–15 can be therefore translated as “In place of a good plowman Malia entered into the house of Kāzanu.” This interpretation allows us to see the plowman as the object of the transaction that otherwise would remain unexpressed, in which case the tablet would record no debt for the pledge. The document contains two clauses. The first relieves Kāzanu of responsibility for the death or flight of the pledged person: (16) me-et ḫa-la-qa (17) i-na muḫ-ḫi-šu-nu, “Should he die or flee, (the responsibility) is upon them (i.e., Apḫama-Adad and Matkal-Dagal).”194 The second sets a penalty for the late delivery of the plowman and can be understood as the term of the pledge: (18) šúm-ma a-di 2 ITI U₄.MEŠ (19) LÚ.ENGAR SAG₁₀ la i-tab-lu-ni (20) a-na ᵐKa-za-a-ni (21) la i-ta-nu i-na U₄.MEŠ! ri-qu-te (22) 1/2 MA.NA TA.ÀM ‹i-na› U₄.MEŠ (23) ša ši-ip!-ri 1 MA.NA TA.ÀM (24) ri-qa-a-tu ᵐAp-ḫa-ma-ᵈIŠKUR (25) ᵐMa-at-kal-ᵈDa-gal a-na Ka!-za-a-ni (26) i-ḫi-ṭu, “If within 2 months they have not brought a good plowman and given (him) to Kāzanu, (then) for the idle days 1/2 mina each, and for the working days 1 mina each, as a replacement payment, Apḫama-Adad and Matkal-Dagal will pay to Kāzanu.” The commodity of the penalty is not indicated, but in all likelihood it was paid in tin as is common in Middle Assyrian loans. Although not explicitly stated, it seems plausible that the pledged person was to be released after a term of two months, if the plowman was delivered. At this point we need to understand the role of the people mentioned in the document. Kāzanu was likely a landowner in need of a good plowman and thereby turned to Apḫama-Adad and Matkal-Dagal. Although one or both are defined as leatherworkers,195 these two persons were likely traders who were entrusted with providing a professional plowman to Kāzanu. It is difficult to say who Malia was;196 he could have been a slave of the two merchants or even a business partner given as a pledge to secure the trade.197 Because the nature of the pledge was obviously possessory, it is plausible that he worked as a plowman. His work performance, combined with the penalty, served as securities for Kāzanu. The adjective “good” (SAG₁₀) indicates that the quality of the work performed by the plowman was expected to be superior to that of Malia. The plowman’s status is also difficult to determine because the term “slave” is not employed. Therefore,

194 This clause is unique in Middle Assyrian loans, Deller 1999: 30. 195 RE 19: 3–6: ᵐAp-ḫa-ma-ᵈIŠKUR // DUMU A-ḫi-ra-ḫi-qu // ᵐMa-at-kal-da-gal // DUMU Ḫab-ʾi LÚ.ASGAB; Deller (1999: 33) attributes the title of LÚ.AŠGAB to both men, but I would not exclude the possibility that it refers to Matkal-Dagal’s father. 196 RE 19: 10 can perhaps be read as ᵐMa-li-ia uru✶?x-ri-ta!, “Malia of the town of . . .” 197 Note, however, that slaves were not usually given as pledges in Middle Assyrian loans, Abraham 2001: 175.

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we cannot determine whether the plowman was supposed to be sold to Kāzanu198 or whether Apḫama-Adad and Matkal-Dagal earned a brokerage fee for providing a wage worker. Personally, I would opt for the latter hypothesis. In addition to Kāzanu, other Assyrians are mentioned in the witness list, but none of the parties is otherwise known. To sum up, this document witnesses an agreement concerning a worker or a slave to be provided by two Syrians to an Assyrian. Because RE 19 only records the security given for the transaction, the contract stipulating the purchase or hiring of the worker was written on another tablet.

2.1.5 A Tablet in an Unknown Script (GsK 5) The tablet published by Sigrist in the Kutscher Memorial Volume under number 5 (GsK 5) is not a typical Emar tablet. Although the tablet is very badly preserved and the quality of the photo precludes an accurate evaluation of its paleography, its format and sign shapes clearly differ from both the Syrian and the Syro-Hittite traditions.199 Some features may suggest that the scribe was an Assyrian. The text runs parallel to the short side, but the format of the tablet, with convex upper and lower edges, as well as its layout differ from that of typical Syrian-type tablets, and it recalls the Middle Assyrian tablet RE 19. The text contains some Assyrianisms uncommon in Emar sources: ittidin (GsK 5: 9), tuʾār(u) (GsK 5: 10, 13).200 The expression ana ḫarrāni is found in Middle Assyrian commercial loans and the term tuʾāru is also typical of Middle Assyrian trades.201 Additionally, the title mākisu, tax collector, borne by two witnesses, is known from the Assyrian bureaucracy and in commercial contexts.202 However, on the basis of the photograph, the paleography does not seem to be typical Middle Assyrian, and the Middle Assyrian attestations of mākisu are always written with the sign SU (or SI in genitive) and 198 In case of a sale, the document would record a security provided for a Lieferungskauf of a slave. Malia’s work could be considered as repaying the antichretic interest; repayment of the interest was the most common function of antichretic pledges, see Abraham 2001: 177 and § 4.5.3. The sale contract formulated as a debt note would have been written on a different tablet; note that in the Middle Assyrian period the issuing of the loan and the obligation to provide an antichretic work performance could be written on different tablets, see Saporetti 1978–1979: 59–63. 199 According to Sigrist, the tablet is partially broken and was repaired with clay by the dealer from whom it was purchased. The signs visible on the reverse after the witness list are likely written on the clay used to repair the tablet. 200 See Seminara 1998: 430 and n. 185. 201 Faist 2001: 32, 38. 202 Faist 2001: 184–94, Jakob 2003: 169–72.

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not with ZU as in GsK 5.203 Additionally, the personal names of the moneylender and of the mākisu officials are unattested in Middle Assyrian sources.204 For these reasons this tablet is cautiously regarded as written in an unknown script.205 The tablet is exceptional because it is the only loan contract explicitly stating that the purpose was a business venture, a-na ḫa-ra-a[n].206 The lent commodity is silver but the quantity is unpreserved. The lender, a certain Abu-kīn, entrusted the silver to a merchant (LÚ.DAM.GÀR) whose name is not preserved, with the proviso that he would return the lent capital after the business trip:207 (10’) i-na tu-ar KASKAL-ni (11’) KÙ.BABBAR a-na mA-x-ú208 (12’) ú-sal-la-am, “At the return of the business venture he will pay the silver to Abu-kīn.” Apparently, this was an interest-free loan where the gain for the lender was a share in the profits of the trade. Another clause establishes the penalty for not returning the loan: (13’) šum-ma i-na tu-a-ar (14’) KASKAL-ni-šu (15’) KÙ.BABBAR la ú-sal-la-am (16’) KASKAL LUGAL (17’) i-ṣa-bat. Sigrist reads KASKAL LUGAL as “king’s business venture,” but it is unclear why an insolvent merchant would participate in royal trade.209 This expression, however, does not necessarily imply a commercial context.210 Due to the presence of contrasting linguistic and epigraphic elements, it is possible that the tablet stems from some international environment, either in Assyria or in Syria, where scribes were accustomed to different scribal traditions. If the tablet deals with trade between Syria and Assyria, it may be suggested that the trade concerned textiles and animals, which were the usual commodities taxed by Assyrian mākisus.211 The participants were either Assyrians bearing atypical Assyrian names or Syrians living under Assyrian rule.212 One should not 203 I am indebted for these observations to Jaume Llop Radua; note that the sign LÚ does not seem to be Middle Assyrian. 204 For Abu-kīn see AMA, A; note that this is the sole occurrence of the personal name Abu-kīn at Emar, see Pruzsinszky 2003: Index, 66. The makisus Tūria and Aḫī-Dagan are unknown from the Middle Assyrian onomasticon, see OMA and AMA. 205 I wonder whether the tablet is Assyro-Mittanian. 206 For commercial loans see Koliński 2010: 89–91; see also San Nicolò 1974: 76–87; for Middle Assyrian parallels see Faist 2001: 149–58. 207 For the completion of the journey formula in the Old Babylonian period see Skaist 1994: 183–88. 208 I report here Sigrist’s transliteration, but the name must be Abu-kīn, as he himself translates. 209 One may wonder whether KASKAL LUGAL means “corvée work, royal service” (CAD H: 112– 113), but this meaning is to my knowledge not attested in Middle Assyrian records. 210 A similar expression is found in BATSH 4 10: 36 in a non-commercial context, see also Llop and Shibata 2016: 69. 211 See Jakob 2003: 170. 212 The merchant’s name is unpreserved, but he must have been an Assyrian because, according to Faist 2001: 193, the miksu tax was only imposed on Assyrian merchants.

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exclude that the moneylender was a Syrian, perhaps an Emarite.213 Nevertheless, as long as a direct inspection of the tablet is impossible, we cannot draw any firm conclusion about the content and origin of this tablet.

2.2 Fulfillment of the Obligation The second phase of a credit transaction coincides with the fulfillment of the obligation. Texts recording the repayment of the borrowed capital can be grouped into three categories: repayments of debts, which are documents of various type recording the settlement of a debt (§ 2.2.1); family law contracts, which regulate the repayment of debts by a third party and establish relationships between the debtor and the third party according to family law (§ 2.2.2); and lawsuits, which impose the fulfillment of debt obligations (§ 2.2.3). Obligations are fulfilled either by the debtor himself, by returning the lent sum, or by a third party who repays the debt. Various reasons prompted debtors to resort to a third party. In the case of consumptive debts, debtors might turn to a third party because they were unable to satisfy their creditor(s).214 In business contexts, debts were paid by a third party, usually a business partner, when merchants were trading abroad or because the debtor wanted to reserve cash for investment. Regardless of the debtor’s financial situation, in the documents discussed in this section creditors were satisfied by one means or another without debtors losing their freedom. Therefore, this section also includes renewals of loan contracts in which a third party became the new creditor by satisfying the former lenders (e.g., RE 58).215

213 There is no mention of mākisu officials in Emar sources besides this tablet, but they are attested at Ugarit (Monroe 2009: 164–73), although commercial credit is virtually unknown from Ugarit sources, see Monroe 2009: 122–23. Nevertheless, the possibility that the tablet originated in Ugarit should be taken into account, given that Assyrian scribes were employed in the palace, see van Soldt 2001. 214 Although someone unable to repay a debt is an insolvent debtor, in the documents discussed in § 2.2 the borrowers are not technically in default because they were able to find a way to meet their obligations. Insolvency must be distinguished from default: insolvency refers to an inability to pay the money due, while a debtor in default has not repaid a debt that he or she was required to discharge. Note, however, that this is a formal distinction made in this study for the sake of classifying documents and had little effect in practice. 215 The text Hallo 2 (Hallo 2002: 210–13) is not included here because, in my opinion, there is no evidence of indebtedness: any debt or repayment would have been more clearly stated; for a discussion of the possibility that Hallo 2 reflects indebtedness see Démare-Lafont 2014: 400–06.

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2.2.1 Repayment of Debts This section discusses documents of various content that record the repayment of debts associated with either productive activities (9) or, more frequently, with consumption (12). The majority of documents (17) are written on Syro-Hittite tablets, of which eleven concern the payment of consumptive debts216 while six record debts associated with commercial activities or the purchase of goods.217 Only two Syrian tablets record the repayment of debts (one productive and one consumptive).218 Two Middle Babylonian tablets deal with the repayment of commercial debts.219 The sources include not only receipts that specifically acknowledge the debt settlement, but also documents written with a different purpose, such as sale contracts and other types of documents. Sale contracts usually contain a list of creditors in order to indicate that their money has been returned.220 These documents have the twofold purpose of recording sales and debt repayments, since the silver is directly transferred to the creditors. The sale of real estate was a common strategy employed in the face of economic distress and used to repay debts in Syrian (E 109) and Syro-Hittite documents (E 85, E 115, TBR 33, TBR 65). The institution of datio in solutum, namely the transfer of real properties to the creditor as an alternative repayment of the debt, is attested in two Syro-Hittite documents (E 116 and E 123). A third party who repays a debt may be either a member of the debtor’s family or, as was common in ancient Mesopotamia, a financier who took over loans in order to obtain labor and real properties. Relatives may be recompensed by receiving real properties from the debtor’s share (S: TBR 82, SH: Hirayama 39). In commercial contexts a third party can be an investor or a business partner. It is probably no accident that there are no Syrian-type documents purposely written to record the clearance of debt – i.e., documents that indicate the amount of the debt and the names of the involved parties – most likely because Syrian 216 ASJ13 A, BLMJ 12, E 115, E 116, E 123, Hirayama 39, RE 58, TBR 28, TBR 29, TBR 33, TBR 65, see Table 31. 217 Anatolica 16, E 21, E 85, E 119, E 200, RE 65, see Table 30. 218 E 109 (productive), TBR 82 (consumptive). 219 E 23, E 26. 220 Several other sales possibly resulted from economic distress, but because they contain no clear reference to debts they are not discussed here. The redemption clause was probably appended to sale contracts when the seller was afflicted by economic problems, see Viano 2012: 126–27, 142, 154, and attestations in Fijałkowska 2014a: 152–57. Perhaps other sales with no redemption clause resulted from economic distress: E 20 (S house sale, see ch. 2 fn. 233), TBR 20 (SH sale of tugguru-building and threshing floor), E 114 (SH kierṣetu sale), see Viano 2012: 122, 142, 150.

SH

SH

MB

MB

SH

BLMJ 12

E 21

E 23

E 26

E 85

Sale contract

Receipt

Repayment of debt

Redemption of pledge

Redemption of pledge

Repayment of debt

SH

ASJ13 A

Type

Receipt (?)

Script

Anatolica 16 SH

Document

Table 12: Repayments of Debts.

Productive (?)

Productive

Productive

Productive

Consumptive

Consumptive

Productive

Purpose

1 house 1 ḫablu

Tatašše/ Raindu (F)

Tatašše/ Raindu (F)

Dagankabar son of Kumri

[. . .] sons of Šimi-dārû

Sons of Laḫma and Zū-Baba

Debtor

NG

Atteu son of Sapu

(continued)

Tēri-Dagan, Zū-Baʿla, and Šaggar-abu, sons of Kāpī-Dagan son of Baṣṣu

Nabunni

Ali-Nani

Imlik-Dagan son of Dagan-bēlu

Ea-damiq son of Zikria Abdi-ili son of Kumri

17 creditors, only a few preserved: Iškur-[. . .] (25 sh.); Šamaš-[. . .] (F) (10 sh.); Kiri-Dagan (50 sh.); Šalim-Dagan (20 sh.)

> 30 sh.

> 60 sh.

292 sh.

60 sh. 14 sh.

60 sh. Textiles

Palace

Creditor

Šeʾi-Dagan Šamaš-iluli son of IpqiDagan

Third Partya

292 sh.

20 sh.

30 sh.

Šeʾi-Dagan son of IpqiDagan

Surety

Kidin-Gula

65 sh.

65 sh.

Sold Properties

3 shekels of gold (?)

2 talents and 2400 shekels of copper

Repaid

Bronze chain

Debt

2.2 Fulfillment of the Obligation   83

SH

SH

SH

E 119

E 123

E 200

Receipt

Transfer of properties

Receipt

Transfer of properties

SH

Consumptive

Productive

Consumptive

Productive

Consumptive

Consumptive

Repayment of Consumptive debt

SH

E 116

Sale contract

Productive (?)

RE 58

SH

E 115

Sale contract

Purpose

Will

S

E 109

Type

Hirayama 39 SH

Script

Document

Table 12 (continued)

Fields Apple wood

5 sh.

1 house

30 sh. 25 sh.

20 sh.

30 sh.

30 sh. 25 sh.

20 sh.

15 parīsu 15 parīsu of barley of barley

1 tugguru Fields

20 sh.

20 sh.

Sold Properties 1 kierṣetu

Repaid

NG

Debt

Šurši-Dagan [. . .]

Baba son of Abdi-ili

Surety

Aḫī-Dagan son of Dagan-kabar son of Milki-Dagan

NG

NG

Creditor

Zadamma son of Ipqi-Dagan

IkmuDagan son of Aḫia

Sons of Ilī-abī son of Kukku

NG

Dagan-kabar son of Bēlu

Pūḫu son of Ummānu (20 sh.); Abī-Šaggar son of Zū-Anna (10 sh.)

Šurši-Dagan City of Kuraraba [. . .]

Baba son of Abdi-ili

Third Partya

Penti son of Itūr-Dagan

Ilī-aḫī son of Aḫia

Zū-Baʿla

Zū-Baʿla son of Iairu

Aḫī-Dagan son of Milki-Dagan; Ipqi-Dagan son of Ḫu-um/un-zi (?); Zū-Baʿla son of Ḫatiu

Baʿal-bēlī son of Bēlu-kabar

Baʿal-bēlī and Ḫuzu, sons of Bēlu-kabar

Ilia son of Aḫī-ḫamiṣ

Debtor

84   2 Credit Transactions

SH

SH

SH

RE 65

TBR 28

TBR 29

Testament

Testament

Consumptive

Consumptive

Repayment of Productive debt

58.5 sh.

50 sh.

60 sh.

58.5 sh.

50 sh.

60 sh.

Abī-liʾmu son of Abī-liʾmu

Abī-liʾmu son of Abī-liʾmu

Alal-abu

NG

NG

(continued)

Naʿma-Dagan son Baʿal-bēlī

Iakmu-Dagan son of Kamma

Aliu son of Zulalu Bura-ziki (10 sh.); Tabili son in law of Ḫania (10 sh.); Itūr-Dagan son of Ḫumāmu (10 sh.); Kamma son of Tuttul (13 sh.); Dagalli son of Šaḫlu (5 sh.); Puʾašu son of Dagan-BE (2 sh.); Šamiḫu son of Bianu (2 sh.); ‹PN› son of Nuʾāru (2 sh.); Aḫu-waqaru son of Enia (1.5 sh.); Walda-aḫī (1 sh.); Aštar-abu son of Adute (1 sh.); Quʾu son of Šazi (1 sh.)

2.2 Fulfillment of the Obligation   85

SH

SH

S

TBR 33

TBR 65

TBR 82

Agreement

Sale contract

Sale contract

Type

Consumptive

Consumptive

Consumptive

Purpose

Repaid 31 sh.

45 sh. 30 sh.

Debt 31 sh.

45 sh. 30 sh.

1 house

1 house

Sold Properties

Surety

Garibu son of Abia

Third Partya

NG

Tūra-Dagan son of Attuwa

Ibnia son of Mādī-Te (20 sh.); Wife of Dagan-abu son of Gani (10 sh.); Abī-kāpī son of Daʿu (1 sh.)

Creditor

Aia son of Abia

Adama-ilī wife of Abī-kāpī son of Gaku

Aḫī-Dagan and Abdi-ili, sons of Ibni-BE/Dagan

Debtor

When the same name appears in the surety and third-party columns, it means that the guarantor repaid the debt. If only the surety column contains a name, the person acted as guarantor but did not repay (or had not yet repaid) the debt.

a

Script

Document

Table 12 (continued)

86   2 Credit Transactions

2.2 Fulfillment of the Obligation 

 87

tablets of this type were broken when the debt was resolved. In the only two preserved Syrian documents dealing with repayment of debts (E 109 and TBR 82), the reference to debts is simply explanatory and part of the background of the contract, whose primary object was to record the transfer of real properties. These documents were therefore preserved as inheritable/transferrable titles to properties. 2.2.1.1 Syrian Documents 2.2.1.1.1 TBR 82 TBR 82 is a sale contract-like document dated to the king Elli recording the transfer of a house from Aia son of Abia to his brother Garibu as recompense for repaying Aia’s debt of 30 shekels of silver. The opening lines, patterned after sale contracts, indicate the dimensions of the house and list the adjoining properties. The absence of the creditor’s name underlines that the purpose of the document was to regulate Garibu’s and Aia’s own rights. The sale contract-like formulary indicates that the ownership of the house was fully alienated as recompense for the repayment of the debt. This is further underscored by the non-vindication clause that is typical of sale contracts. This clause bars future claims by the “Brothers” against Garibu and establishes a penalty of 2000 shekels for the claimants, to be paid to the palace.221 Therefore the house was not taken as a possessory pledge, as might have occurred in the case of a debt note that created a new debt obligation between the debtor and the third party repaying the debt.222 Unlike the “Brothers,” who have to pay a large penalty, the right of redemption for Aia corresponded to the debt, 30 shekels of silver, in the following uncommon formula: (21) šum-ma mA-a (22) iš-tu KÁ-bi URU.DIDLI!.ḪI.A (23) i-li-ia (24) 30 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR Ì.LÁ.E.MEŠ (25) É-ta-šu li-il-qi, “If Aia returns through the city gate and pays 30 shekels of silver, he can take his house back.”223 While the redemption price for alienated assets was generally twice the amount of the debt,224 the one-to-one rate of redemption in TBR 82 is perhaps due to the fact that Garibu and Aia were brothers. This can be inferred by comparing this document with the two other texts stipulating a one-to-one rate of redemption. In both documents, no kinship existed between the parties and the conditions for redemption

221 For the penalty clause in Syrian sale contracts see Fijałkowska 2014a: 126–41. 222 This situation is recorded in RE 58, where the debtor pledged himself to the individual who repaid his debt, see § 2.2.1.2.14. 223 This clause may indicate that Aia had left the city, perhaps for fear of being seized. 224 See § 4.9.2.

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were rather different from TBR 82: in E 123 the one-to-one rate of redemption was limited to one year, while in E 116 the right of redemption was granted to anyone and not only to the debtor. Alternatively, it can be argued that the one-to-one rate of redemption was granted because of the difference between the debt and the value of the house. Based on the amount of the debt, the price per square cubit would fetch an unrealistic 0.08 shekels of silver, which is one of the lowest in sale contracts for houses and the lowest one in the Syrian documents.225 Accordingly, Aia had no other means to pay his brother than to forfeit his house. Thus, because of the low evaluation of the house, the price of redemption was kept equal to the debt. It is also worth noting that one of the adjoining properties in TBR 82 belongs to another brother of Aia, Aḫī-[. . .]. Garibu’s intervention was clearly motivated by family solidarity on behalf of his financially distressed brother. None of the parties is mentioned in other Emar texts. The debt was likely consumptive. 2.2.1.1.2 E 109 A genuine sale contract is E 109, a tablet found in Area V, that together with E 110 forms a small dossier belonging to the family of Nunia.226 Both documents are dated to the time of King Baʿal-kabar I227 and record the purchase of two kierṣetus by Abda son of Nunia, while his brother Milki-Dagan serves as witness in E 110. The relation of this dossier to the archive of Milki-Dagan found in Area V is unknown.228 It is not excluded that these tablets later entered the archive of Milki-Dagan, either because the family of Nunia declined and was forced to sell their properties, or because we are dealing with the same family and the tablets were simply inherited. In this respect, the name of Abda’s brother is suggestive of a relation with the family of Milki-Dagan.229 In E 109 Abda purchased an kierṣetu plot from Ilia son of Aḫī-ḫamiṣ (unknown elsewhere) for 130 shekels of silver. The only reference to debt is the statement in

225 Note that the second-lowest price per square cubit in Syrian sales is twice as much, 0.161 sh. (RE 9). 226 E 111 is a Syrian tablet recording the sale of a house by Baʿal-ma son of Abda; this document cannot be assigned to the family of Nunia because there is no prosopographic link with the other two documents apart from a single common witness, Iddaʿ-Da son of Imliku (E 109: 44 and E 111: 29); the seller cannot confidently be regarded as the son of Abda son of Nunia. 227 One of the witnesses in E 109, Bēlānu son of Lanaša, is mentioned in one of Baʿal-kabar’s documents, E 14; for the date of these tablets see also Viano 2012: 155. 228 The precise find spot of tablets in Area V is unknown, Rutz 2013: 78–79. 229 The chronological gap between Baʿal-kabar I and the archive of Milki-Dagan excludes that Abda’s brother is the same as the patriarch of Milki-Dagan’s family.

2.2 Fulfillment of the Obligation 

 89

lines 10–11 that the “creditors seized Ilia” (be-lu-ú ḫu-bu-ul-li // mÌ-l[í-ia] iṣ-bat!-tu). However, the lenders’ names are unspecified and, contrary to the practice in Syro-Hittite tablets that record sales caused by indebtedness, the list of creditors is not reported in E 109. However, it is not excluded that the long list of witnesses included the creditors. Although the amount of the debt is unrecorded, we may surmise that it approximately corresponded to the sale price, which would represent one of the largest silver loans at Emar.230 The price per square cubit, 0.328 shekels of silver, is one of the highest recorded in kierṣetu sales,231 suggesting that the debtor was able to strike a lucrative deal. We can therefore propose that Ilia borrowed a huge sum of silver to finance business activity and that his decision to sell his kierṣetu was voluntary and not compelled by economic hardship. An alternative hypothesis hinges on the relationship between Ilia and Abda, who may have been kin because the “Brothers” are involved in the transaction.232 Therefore, it is possible that Abda overpaid for Ilia’s house as an act of solidarity with a member of his family who was facing financial difficulties.233 It is possible that the silver was given to Ilia’s son, Aḫī-ḫamiṣ, who appears as the first witness, in order to repay his father’s debt and release him.234 This hypothesis does not rule out the possibility that the debt was contracted for a productive activity, which is therefore provisionally retained. The penalty clause establishes a fine of 200 shekels due to Ninurta and 200 shekels due to the “Brothers” for future claims.235 It is very difficult to determine the socio-economic position of people whose activities were recorded on Syrian tablets because all that has been preserved from their archives are the titles to properties kept by later rightholders, be they

230 Note that only E 85 (292 sh.), E 75 (272 sh.), Hirayama 33 (200 sh.), E 87 (150 sh.), and E 77 (140 sh.) record larger debts; all these debts have been regarded as productive. 231 See Viano 2012: 146–47. 232 On the possibility that the presence of the “Brothers” indicates kinship see § 1.1. 233 This is a possibility that should be explored for all sales involving the “Brothers,” which usually record high prices. The scenario suggested here for E 109 does not conflict with the interpretation of the “Brothers” as members of the local elite advanced by Démare-Lafont 2012, because class solidarity is common among restricted social groups. A similar case is possibly evidenced in E 20, a Syrian sale contract undertaken in a year of hardship that may have been motivated by the threat of famine (see ch. 2 fn. 220): it may be assumed that in this text the purchaser overpaid for the real estate in order to help a member of his family. For this document see Viano 2012: 122. 234 This hypothesis has been suggested to me by Sophie Démare-Lafont. 235 According to Fijałkowska 2014a: 139, the penalty clause protected the buyer from fraudulent claims by the seller or third parties.

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members of the same family or not.236 Nevertheless, the high prices paid for the ki erṣetus suggests that Abda had substantial financial means. 2.2.1.2 Syro-Hittite Documents 2.2.1.2.1 E 200 Only one document dealing with the repayment of debt names a member of Emar’s family of diviners, and surprisingly he is the debtor. In E 200 the diviner Zū-Baʿla returned 30 shekels of silver borrowed from Dagan-kabar son of Bēlu. This tablet is a receipt for the payment because it was found in the debtor’s archive and is sealed by the creditor. The creditor, Dagan-kabar, is mentioned in TBR 22, which bears the same seal impression as E 200.237 Because he lent money to the diviner, we may surmise that he was a wealthy person and probably close to the Zū-Baʿla family. Although wealthy people may have had temporary cash shortages, it is quite surprising that a member of the richest Emar family did not have at his disposal 30 shekels of silver, a relatively small quantity. Since no interest was charged,238 the loan could be understood as an advance between friends who likely shared the same social status. The purpose of the loan remains unknown, but given the status of the lender a consumptive context must be excluded. Most likely the silver was used for purchasing goods, and the transaction is therefore regarded as a productive debt. The Ekalte text Ek 46 may offer a valuable parallel to the Emar document. Although the tablet is very fragmentary, the text records that the ḫazannu Muḫraaḫī, who in other documents acts as a moneylender, returned an unpreserved quantity of silver to Iaḫmu son of Abda.239 Although the latter is attested only in this document, one may suggest that he was one of the “sons of Abda” who recorded several credits in RE 89.240 It follows that Ek 46 seems to provide an additional example of a wealthy person who repays a debt to another important individual.

236 In most cases it is impossible to confirm family ties between people recorded on Syrian tablets and their descendants who lived at the time when the Syro-Hittite format was in use. 237 Beyer 2001: 138; another possible attestation of Dagan-kabar is TBR 52 as the purchaser of a slave girl, see § 3.3.1.6. 238 Note that the text uses the expression ana pūḫi leqû, which seems to indicate an interest-free loan, see ch. 2 fn. 159 and E 119 below; see also Niedorf 2008: 93–95. 239 For the ḫazannu Muḫra-aḫī see Mayer 2001: 4. The find spot supports the claim that the borrower is Muḫra-aḫī because Ek 46 was unearthed in House Z, while all the loans in which Muḫra-aḫī is the lender were found in House P, see Mayer 2001: 4–6. 240 RE 89 is a tablet from Ekalte, Mayer 2001: 7.

2.2 Fulfillment of the Obligation 

 91

Two individuals witnessed the transaction, each one attesting the payment of part of the debt: (6) ša 20 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ ‹IGI› mdU-UR.S[AG] (7) ù ša 10 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ (8) IGI mLa-al-ú DUMU Pu-ḫu-na, “For 20 shekels of silver ‹the witness› is Baʿal-qarrād, and for 10 shekels of silver the witness is Lalû son of Puḫuna.” It might be suggested that these individuals were guarantors for Zū-Baʿla, and according to Cohen, Baʿal-qarrād was Zū-Baʿla’s son.241 Alternatively, given that this tablet is the borrower’s copy acknowledging his payment, it is possible that these two individuals were associated with the lender, perhaps as dependents or business partners. Accordingly, this document could reflect two payments made on separate occasions and later recorded on the same tablet with the names of the corresponding witnesses. The document ends with the non-vindication clause (ṭuppu annû ilāʾēšu) barring future claims by Dagan-kabar against Zū-Baʿla. 2.2.1.2.2 E 119, E 115 and E 116 E 119 is a fragmentary tablet stemming from the archive of Milki-Dagan that records a debt repaid by Aḫī-Dagan son of Milki-Dagan and his business associates: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.

A-ḫi-dKUR DUMU Mil-k[i-d]KUR Ip-qí-dKUR DUMU Ḫu-⌜um⌝/⌜un⌝-zi m Zu-Ba-la DUMU Ḫa-ti-i 15 gišpa ŠE.MEŠ iš-tu uru Ku-ra-ra-ba a-na pu-u-ḫi il-te-qu ‹ . . . › ù mŠur-ši-dKUR EN.MEŠ.ŠU.MEŠ i-na-an-na [Š]E.MEŠ ša-a-ši a-na [md . . . -la]k ù mŠur-ši-dKUR [u]l-tal-li-mu m m

(1) Aḫī-Dagan son of Milk[i]-Dagan, (2) Ipqi-Dagan son of Ḫum/unzi (3) (and) Zū-Baʿla son of Ḫatiu (5–6) borrowed (4) 15 parīsu of barley from (5) the city of Kuraraba. (6–7) ‹ . . . › and Šurši-Dagan are their guarantors. (7–9) Now they have paid this barley to [. . .] and Šurši-Dagan. The document relates to a barley loan, probably without interest, of 15 parīsu issued by the city of Kuraraba to three individuals. Two persons, a certain Šurši-Dagan and another individual whose name is unpreserved, stood as guarantors for the loan. The document acknowledges that the two guarantors were

241 Cohen 2009: 156 n. 35.

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reimbursed for having paid the debt to the lender, and they clearly act as middlemen in the transaction. The tablet is sealed by a member of Kutbe’s family, Zū-Baʿla son of Kutbe, and by a person from Kururaba who probably acted on behalf of the city council. The receipt must have been retained as Aḫī-Dagan’s record of the transaction, given that it was found in his family archive. Unlike Aḫī-Dagan, the two other debtors as well as the guarantor(s) are unknown elsewhere. Obviously, the presence of a member of Milki-Dagan’s family among the borrowers excludes economic hardship as the reason for the loan. Therefore, E 119 can be understood as a payment for a credit sale of barley carried out through middlemen. Additionally, the borrowers seem to act as a partnership, and it is possible that the barley was purchased to issue further loans. For these reasons, E 119 is included among the productive debts. As already mentioned, a quantity of 15 parīsu of barley (approximately 450 liters)242 was the annual allotment for the storm god’s priestess in bad years.243 This amount was divided among three borrowers, yielding a rather small quantity for each. Perhaps the barley was purchased to issue further loans. Because the loan was possibly interest-free, the benefit for the city of Kururaba remains unclear. The family of Milki-Dagan is also involved in two other documents recording the repayment of consumptive debts, E 115 and E 116. In the sale contract E 115, Aḫī-Dagan son of Dagan-kabar son of Milki-Dagan purchased a tugguru-building244 and several fields from Baʿal-bēlī and Ḫuzu, sons of Bēlu-kabar, who belonged to a family called “Sons of Immaru”:245 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

É tu-gu-ru qa-du TÚL-ši «x x x» i-na uruKu-la-ti 5 A.ŠÀ.MEŠ i-di dE-ni [. . .]-ti ù A.ŠÀ.MEŠ DUMU.MEŠ Im-ma-ri i-di si-pa-ḫi [. . .] ša mḪu-za ù mdU.EN DUMU.MEŠ EN.GA[L] [l]ú⌜ṣa!⌝-bi-ḫi iš-tu li-it mḪu-za ù mdU-EN DUMU.MEŠ E[N-GA]L m A-ḫi-dKUR DUMU dKUR-GAL DUMU Mil-ki-dKUR a-na 20 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ ŠÁM.TIL.LA iš!-am

(1) A tugguru-building with its pit (2) in the town of Kullati, 5 fields near the divine spring of [. . .], (3) and the fields of the sons of Immaru near the

242 See Goodnick Westenholz 2000: xiv. 243 Fleming 2000: 37. 244 A tugguru was a type of rural building, Mori 2003a: 65–70. 245 This was likely an extended family, see also E 116 and Durand 1990: 55. Extended families should be distinguished from clans, for which there is no evidence at Emar, see Beckman 1996b: 58–60, Viano 2010a; for the kind of kinship intended here see § 1.1.

2.2 Fulfillment of the Obligation 

 93

area of sipḫu-fields (?)246 [. . .] (4) belonging to Ḫuzu and Baʿal-bēlī, sons of Bēlu-kabar, the zabiḫu, (5) from Ḫuzu and Baʿal-bēlī, sons of Bēlu-kabar, (6) Aḫī-Dagan son of Dagan-kabar son of Milki-Dagan (7) bought for 20 shekels of silver, the full price. The contract states that the silver was received by the creditors but their names are not reported: (12) a-nu-ma KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ ša-a-šu a-na LÚ.MEŠ.EN.MEŠ (13) ḫu-bu-la-ti ša gab-bi-šú-nu-ma (14) e-te-ru-ub, “Now that silver reached the creditors, all of them.” Redemption for the tugguru was granted to Baʿal-qarrād, brother of the sellers, for twice the purchase price (TÉŠ.BI): (8) ur-ra-am še-ra-am šúm-ma md U-NIR ŠEŠ-šú-nu (9) il-la-a i-bá-qar-ši KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ TÉŠ.BI (10) a-na m A-ḫi-dKUR DUMU mdKUR-GAL li-din (11) É tu-gu-ra lil-qi, “In the future, if Baʿal-qarrād, their brother, should come up and claim it (the tugguru), he shall give the equivalent silver to Aḫī-Dagan son of Dagan-kabar (and) take the tugguru.” Unless the mention of the tugguru-building alone in this redemption clause was a mistake, or was understood to refer to all the properties sold,247 it remains unclear why the right of redemption was granted only for the tugguru and exclusively to Baʿal-qarrād. Perhaps Baʿal-qarrād owned the tugguru in common with his brothers, and he agreed to the sale but preserved the right of redemption because he was not a co-debtor. It cannot be excluded that the sellers’ right of redemption was implicit. Although the price per unit area cannot be calculated, the value of a tugguru-building and several fields was doubtless higher than the purchase price. The “Sons of Immaru” were presumably compelled by circumstances to sell their properties at a loss.248 If Aḫī-Dagan himself was one of the creditors, it is plausible that the low purchase price derives from the fact that the 20 shekels would correspond to the value of the forfeited properties minus the amount of the debt. The financial problems of the “Sons of Immaru” are confirmed in E 116. Here, Baba son of Abdi-ili, a member of the same family, acted as guarantor and repaid 5 shekels of silver that the same Aḫī-Dagan had lent to the aforementioned Baʿal-bēlī:

246 For sipḫu fields see Mori 2003a: 131–32. 247 Note that grammar clearly indicates that only the tugguru may be redeemed: note the feminine pronoun -ši appended to the verb baqāru, referring to bītu, cf. TÚL-ši (E 115: 2). 248 As mentioned in § 1.4, only four SH documents provide information on the value of fields. Purchase prices of tugguru-buildings range from 9 to 1000 sh., see Viano 2012: 141–42.

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1. 2.

Ba-ba DUMU ARAD!-DINGIR.MEŠ mdU-EN DUMU EN-GAL ŠEŠ-šú 5 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ ša mA-ḫi-dKUR DUMU dKUR-GAL ŠU.MEŠti-šú ṣa-bít 3. i-na-an-na mBa-ba A.ŠÀ.MEŠ mi-ri-ša ù GIŠ.HAŠḪUR.KUR.RA li-ki-is 4. ša uruKu-la-ti ḪA.LA-šú ša dU-EN ŠEŠ-šú 5. ma-la it-ti ŠEŠ.‹MEŠ›-šú-‹nu›249 DUMU.MEŠ Im-ma-ri i-kaš-ša-ad-šú 6. a-na mA-ḫi-dKUR DUMU dKUR-GAL it-ta-din m

(1) Baba son of Abdi-ili – Baʿal-bēlī son of Bēlu-kabar (is) his brother – (2) was seized as guarantor250 for 5 shekels of silver belonging to Aḫī-Dagan son of Dagan-kabar. (3) Now Baba shall withdraw the cultivated fields and apple wood (4) in Kullati,251 the share of Baʿal-bēlī, his brother, (5) which he will receive together with his brothers, the sons of Immaru – (6) he (Baba) gave it (the share) to Aḫī-Dagan son of Dagan-kabar. The form of debt settlement used by Baba is an example of datio in solutum because he extinguished the debt by transferring properties to Aḫī-Dagan. These properties were the share that Baʿal-bēlī should have received from the properties of the family that had not yet been apportioned, to which Baba apparently had some rights. As with E 115, the redemption clause refers to only a part of the alienated property: (7) ur-ra-am še-ra-am ma-an-nu-me-e (8) A.ŠÀ mi-ri-ša š[a DU]MU.MEŠ Im-ma-ri i-bá-qar (9) 5 GÍN a-na mA-ḫi-dKUR DUMU dKUR-GAL li-din (10) A.ŠÀ. MEŠ lil-qi, “In the future, whoever should claim the cultivated fields o[f the so]ns of Immaru, he shall pay 5 shekels of silver to Aḫī-Dagan son of Dagan-kabar and take the field.” In this case, however, it is likely that the cultivated fields collectively referred to all the alienated properties. The price of redemption was equal to the amount of the debt, but anyone could redeem the properties. Although the area of the agricultural land is unknown, there is little doubt that its value was greater than the 5 shekels of the debt. The family resorted to this form of debt settlement presumably because it had no cash (i.e., silver) to fulfill the obligation. The “Sons of Immaru” may have experienced a sudden or gradual loss of wealth – a riches-to-rags story – because they apparently owned several lands in the city of Kullati. Furthermore, Dagan-kabar, Baʿal-bēlī and Ḫuzu’s father, bore

249 For this restoration see Durand 1990: 55. 250 The formula qātātīšu ṣabit is to be understood not as the physical act of seizing a guarantor but as a coercive demand for the return of the debt, see Skaist 2001: 242. 251 Several cultivated lands were located in this area, see Mori 2003a: 111.

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the title of zābiḫu, “sacrificer,”252 (E 115: 4), and Baba’s father was a diviner (E 116: 20). It is unlikely that persons bearing such titles belonged to a poor family.253 Nevertheless, they contracted these debts out of need. The presence of Aḫī-Dagan in both E 115 and E 116 suggests that some relationship existed between the family of Milki-Dagan and the “Sons of Immaru,” who perhaps became clients of Aḫī-Dagan. 2.2.1.2.3 E 85 The sale contract E 85 dates to the second generation of Ḫima’s family. This document records the sale of a house and a ḫablu building254 to Dagan-kabar son of Dagan-taliʾ son of Ḫima by Tīri-Dagan, Zū-Baʿla, and Šaggar-abu, the sons of Kāpī-Dagan son of Baṣṣu, for 310 shekels of silver. The list of creditors includes seventeen names but only a few are fully preserved.255 The quantity of silver returned to the creditors by the three brothers, 292 shekels of silver, is less than the purchase price, likely because the sellers were able to strike a favorable bargain with the buyer, keeping 18 shekels for themselves. This hypothesis is supported by the price per square cubit, 0.62 shekels of silver, which is the fourth highest overall at Emar and the highest among the Syro-Hittite house sale contracts.256 The lent sum, 292 shekels of silver, is the largest silver credit known from Emar. All these elements indicate that Kāpī-Dagan’s sons, even though they are not attested elsewhere, were not impoverished people who resorted to debt because of economic difficulties. Rather, it may be suggested that Kāpī-Dagan’s sons were partners in some business activity and borrowed money to finance their venture. This hypothesis seems to be supported by the number of moneylenders, who were likely investors. Therefore, the sale resulted from choice and not from economic difficulties.

252 This is a West Semitic word meaning “slaughterer,” a cultic official, see Fleming 2000: 154 n. 45 and Pentiuc 2001: 193–94. 253 The Syrian sale contract TBR 5 mentions the “Sons of Immaru” (TBR 5: 10) and Baba son of Immaru (TBR 5: 14) in the list of adjoining properties as the owners of houses; since the text is dated to Abbanu, Baba son of Immaru might be an ancestor of the Baba attested in E 116, in light of the same personal name. Therefore, Immaru was the patriarch of the family that included Baba’s, Baʿal-bēlī’s, and Baʿal-qarrād’s branches. 254 For this building see Mori 2003b, Mori 2003a: 70–72, Faist 2006. 255 Kiri-Dagan (E 85: 22) and Šalim-Dagan (E 85: 24); no patronymic is preserved. Some creditors were women. 256 The high price per square cubit is perhaps also related to the type of buildings sold, see Viano 2012: 126.

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E 85 is the only Syro-Hittite document recording repayment of a debt and regulating the full alienation of real estate properties in which redemption is not allowed. The document contains the non-vindication clause barring future claims (ṭuppu annû ilāʾēšu). It may be suggested that the absence of the redemption clause was not imposed by the buyer and was deemed unnecessary because it was only stipulated in the case of forced sales.257 Our interpretation is further strengthened by the involvement of the family of Ḫima in commercial enterprises (E 75, E 87). 2.2.1.2.4 E 21 The contract E 21 was the lone tablet archived in a jar found in room 15 of Area A.258 The tablet records the payment of quantities of silver made by a certain Imlik-Dagan son of Dagan-bēlu to Kalbiu, the servant of Atteu son of Sapu. A sum of 60 shekels weighed according to the weight-standard of Amurru (NA₄. MEŠ KUR A-mur-ri) purchased the release (ipṭirū) of Imlik-Dagan. Additionally, 14 shekels of silver, also measured by the weight of Amurru, were paid by Imlik-Dagan for clothing. According to Zaccagnini,259 Imlik-Dagan was a merchant held as a pledge260 by Kalbiu, who was Atteu’s Palmyrene261 representative in Emar. Atteu was an Assyrian merchant living in the Jazirah who financed a trade venture. Imlik-Dagan received in the form of a credit sale from his financier a cargo of Assyrian clothing that was transported via the caravan road to Palmyra and reached Western Syria, as indicated by the use of the weight of Amurru. Zaccagnini rightly pointed out that the original contract between Atteu and Imlik-Dagan was stipulated in the form of a loan secured by a personal pledge that was delivered upon default (hypothecary pledge). Imlik-Dagan (or his representatives) was supposed to sell the clothing in Syrian markets on behalf of Atteu. However, for reasons unknown to us he was unable to pay off his debt and was held by Atteu’s representative

257 This situation can be compared with the Syrian document E 109, which contains the penalty clause for future claims typical of Syrian sales; note that we have suggested a commercial background for E 109 as well, see § 2.2.1.1. Since the responsibility of debt remission had shifted from the institutional to the private sphere in the Late Bronze Age (§ 5.1.1), this situation can be compared to the Old Babylonian period, when commercial debts were not subject to the edicts of debt remission. 258 For the find spot see Margueron 1975b: 77, Arnaud 1975a: 90, Balza 2009: 21. 259 Zaccagnini 2018: 44–47. 260 Imlik-Dagan’s situation is similar to that of Ḫamis-Dagal in AOAT 265.1, § 3.2.2; however, in AOAT 265.1 the debt has not yet been repaid. 261 Two witnesses of the contract are identified as Palmyrene.

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as a pledge. Eventually Imlik-Dagan somehow collected the money to satisfy his creditor. The 60 shekels, the price of the ransom, very likely corresponded to the expected gain, while the sum of 14 shekels corresponded to the value of the clothing, which was apparently lost. None of the individuals mentioned in this text is known from other Emar sources, but one may wonder whether Dagan-bēlu, Imlik-Dagan’s father, can be identified with the Ugaritic merchant who served as a representative of ŠipṭiBaʿal’s commercial firm at Emar and sent letters found in the Maison d’Urtenu at Ugarit (RSO 7 30–33).262 If so, Imlik-Dagan could have been an associate of the merchants of House 5, from which the aforementioned letter found in the Maison d’Urtenu RSO 7 40 was likely sent.263 2.2.1.2.5 TBR 28 and TBR 29 The documents TBR 28 and TBR 29 contain Baʿla-kīmī’s testamentary wills and record two debts settled by her husband, Abī-liʾmu son of Abī-liʾmu. In TBR 28, Abī-liʾmu paid off 50 shekels incurred by Iakmu-Dagan son of Kamma and in TBR 29 he repaid 60 shekels, the debt of Naʿma-Dagan son of Baʿal-bēlī. In exchange, Abī-liʾmu obtained two houses from each debtor.264 Neither document reports the creditor’s name. In TBR 29, the two houses were given by Baʿla-kīmī to her son Rībi-Dagan, whereas TBR 28 does not state who benefited from Iakmu-Dagan’s properties. However, since TBR 28 regulates Baʿla-kīmī’s inheritance and her divorce from her former husband, Milki-Dagan,265 the reference to the repaid debt makes little sense if Abī-liʾmu retained ownership of these houses. Accordingly, Iakmu-Dagan’s houses were likely part of the marriage agreement between Baʿla-kīmī and Abī-liʾmu and were included in Rībi-Dagan’s share of inheritance. Abī-liʾmu’s intent was to obtain real estate properties whose value was likely higher than the debts.266 The document does not specify the legal basis allowing Abī-liʾmu to take the debtors’ properties, but it is likely that they were forfeited by the debtors themselves in exchange for having their debts repaid. It is clear, however, that ownership of the properties, not their mere possession, was 262 Šipṭi-Baʿal was the son-in-law of the king of Ugarit and real estate manager of the queen; for Dagan-bēlu see Arnaud 1991b, Pruzsinszky and Solans 2015: 328, and ch. 2 fn. 103; see also Cohen 2019: 283, 292. 263 See E 75 (pp. 61f.); note that the building where E 21 was found is close to House 5. 264 TBR 28: 5, 2 É ša-šú-nu lil-qì; TBR 29: 4, 2 [É].ḪI.A an-nu-ti il-qì-mi. 265 Baʿla-kīmī was clearly a woman of high status; she divorced and returned several items, likely her dowry, to her husband (TBR 28: 21); on Baʿla-kīmī’s identity see ch. 2 fn. 140. 266 On the basis of the average purchase price in Syro-Hittite sale contracts (§ 1.4), the value of each property transferred was about twice the amount of the debt.

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transferred to Abī-liʾmu. Indeed, both documents grant the right of redemption to anyone (mannummê) at double (mitḫāriš)267 the amount of the debt.268 In TBR 29, the redemption price is due to Rībi-Dagan: (6) [u]r-ra-am še-ra-am (7) ma-annu-me-e [2] É.ḪI.A i-bá-qa-ar (8) KÙ.BABBAR TÉŠ.[B]I a-na mRi-bi-dKUR DUMU-ia (9) li-din 2 É.ḪI.A lil-qì, “In the [f]uture, anyone wishing to redeem the [2] houses shall give the equival[en]t silver to Rībi-Dagan, my son.” This clause shows that the right to collect the redemption price could be transferred to one’s heirs. No personal relation (friendship or kinship) seems to exist between Abī-liʾmu and the two debtors, who are unknown from other Emar texts. Given the context, the debts were likely consumptive. 2.2.1.2.6 RE 65 RE 65 is a peculiar text in that it resembles a record of debts, but unlike that type of document, it contains a list of twelve creditors who have received their money, totaling 58.5 shekels of silver. The debt was incurred by a certain Bura-ziki, but as stated at the end of the text, it was paid by Alal-abu: (15) KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ an-nu-ú ḫu-ba-la-tu₄ (16) ša mBu-ra-zi-gi (17) mA-lál-a-bu i-pu-ul-šu-nu,269 “This silver is the debt of Bura-ziki. Alal-abu paid it.” The relation between Bura-ziki and Alal-abu is unknown as they are not mentioned elsewhere. The personal name Bura-ziki, which is not attested in other Emar sources, may suggest that this person was a foreigner.270 It is therefore likely that Bura-ziki was a merchant or businessman and Alal-abu was his guarantor or business partner on the Middle Euphrates. The long list of creditors bolsters the case for a commercial context because they can be regarded as investors or partners whose invested capital was returned to them or who shared in the profits from the business venture. Curiously this list ends with Bura-ziki as the recipient of 3 shekels of silver: (13) 3 GÍN mBu-razi-g[i-m]a (14) il-qè. The role of Bura-ziki at the end of the list can be interpreted in different ways. On the one hand, the use of the emphatic -ma marking the main focus is perhaps intended to underline that Bura-ziki was still liable for 3 shekels of silver, and thus he borrowed more money. On the other hand, the 3 shekels of silver can be explained as Bura-ziki’s gain in the partnership. None of 267 For mitḫariš see § 1.5. 268 Note that the redemption of pledge is set at the same value as the debt, see § 4.5.4. 269 The photograph of the tablet confirms the reading of RE 65: 17 proposed by Tsukimoto 1998: 189. 270 According to Pruzsinszky 2003: 264–65, Bura-ziki is a Hurro-Kassite personal name. S. de Martino informed me (personal communication) that the elements pura and ziki could derive from the Hurrian verbal roots wur- “to see” and zik-, but the name Bura-ziki is not attested at Nuzi, Alalaḫ, or Ḫatti.

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the creditors is known elsewhere, and several personal names are only attested in this document.271 Moreover, one creditor, Kamma, is said to come from Tuttul. These elements may indicate that the investors too, or some of them, were not from Emar. 2.2.1.2.7 Anatolica 16 Another clearance of debt possibly connected to commercial activity is Anatolica 16. In this very terse and not fully understood text, a bronze chain, likely the debt owed to the palace by the sons of Laḫma and Zū-Baba, is redeemed by means of 2 talents and 2400 shekels of copper that were deposited in the temple of Dagan: (1) ŠÈR.ŠÈR ZABAR.MEŠ ša muḫ-ḫi DUMU.MEŠ La-aḫ-ma ù Zu-ba-ba (2) TA 2 GUN 2 LIM 4 ME URUDU.MEŠ ša É.GAL-lim (3) i-na x x ⌜x mPu⌝-ḫi-ŠEŠ (4) ú-šal-li-mu, “A bronze chain (?) that is upon the sons of Laḫma and Zū-Baba, they paid by means of 2 talents and 2400 (shekels) of copper – (good) of the palace – in the presence of (?) Puḫi-šenni.” This document was drawn up in the presence of Puḫi-šenni, a representative of the Hittite administration who, according to his seal impressed on the tablet, bore the titles of scribe and priest.272 Puḫi-šenni is to be identified with the officer listed as Overseer of the Land in several Syro-Hittite texts from Emar; thus, Anatolica 16 is to be dated to the very beginning of his career, before he was appointed to that position.273 Because Puḫi-šenni is the earliest Overseer of the Land attested in the Emar sources, this document is one of the oldest Syro-Hittite tablets. It is clear that the palace to which the debt was repaid represents the Hittite royal officialdom of Karkemiš. Tentatively, the document can be interpreted as recording a credit sale of a bronze chain entrusted by the palace to a merchant partnership, referred to as the sons of Laḫma and Zū-Baba, in exchange for copper that entered the treasury of the temple of Dagan.274

271 Aliu, Quʾu, Tabili, Walda-aḫī. 272 For the restoration of the name Puḫi-šenni in the cuneiform text see Gonnet and Malbran-Labat 1989–1990: 3–5. 273 Puḫi-šenni bears the title of scribe also in E 201, see Skaist 1998a: 201, Viano 2018b. 274 For royal control over the temple and its function as a repository for valuable materials see Durand and Marti 2003: 161–62; examples of chains stemming from Ugarit, Alalaḫ and Ḫattuša, probably from cultic contexts, are mentioned in Nasgowitz 1976: 58–60.

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2.2.1.2.8 TBR 33 In the sale contract TBR 33, two brothers, Aḫī-Dagan and Abdi-ili, sons of Ibni-BE/ Dagan,275 sold their house to Abdu son of Zū-Aštarti son of Qabbāru for 31 shekels of silver. This sum was received by three creditors: Ibnia son of Mādī-Te (20 sh.), the wife of Dagan-abu son of Gani (10 sh.), and Abī-kāpī son of Daʿu (1 sh.). Neither the buyer nor the sellers are known elsewhere in the Emar sources.276 The text mentions that a kiln and one house adjacent to the sold property belonged to the family of one of the creditors, the wife of Dagan-abu son of Gani. Thus Ibni-BE’s sons borrowed money from their neighbors, perhaps a common situation at Emar. Due to the small amount of silver lent and the probable friendship between borrowers and lenders, the context of the debt is likely consumptive. The contract granted the right of redemption to “anyone” for twice the purchase price (TÉŠ.BI). The price per square cubit, 0.054 shekels of silver, is the second-lowest price in the Syro-Hittite house sale contracts and perhaps was influenced by the sellers’ indebtedness. 2.2.1.2.9 TBR 65 Another sale resulting from economic hardship is TBR 65. Adama-ilī wife of Abī-kāpī son of Gaku, likely a widow, jointly with her four children sold her husband’s house to Bēlu-kabar and Dūdu, sons of Abdi-ili, in a year of hardship (a-na MU.1-ti dan-na-ti). Doubtless the debt was contracted for consumption because the sellers are a widow and minors. The sum paid, 45 shekels of silver, was transferred directly to the creditor, Tūra-Dagan son of Attuwa. The right of redemption is limited to Abī-kāpī’s sons and is set as usual at double the purchase price (TÉŠ.BI).277 Although the price per square cubit cannot 275 Although -BE in personal names usually stands for bēlu or Baʿal (Cohen 2010: 37), TBR 33: 23–24 (NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐA-ḫi-ᵈKUR // DUMU Ib-ni-ᵈKUR EN É, “Seal of Aḫī-Dagan son of Ibni-Dagan, owner of the house”) makes clear that the name of the sellers’ father was written either Ibni-BE (TBR 33: 8, 9, 30) or Ibni-Dagan. 276 For the date of these texts see ch. 2 fn. 151. 277 Note that the sold property is defined as a house, É-tu₄, in line 4 and as kier-ṣe-tu₄ in the redemption clause: ur-ra-am še-ra-am šum-ma DUMU.MEŠ mA-bi-ka-pí // kier-ṣi-tu₄ iš-tu ŠU mENGAL // ù mDu-u-du i-li-iq-qu-ú // 90 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ TÉŠ.BI a-na mEN-GAL // ù mDú-ú-du li-id-id-din-ma // kier-ṣi-tu₄-šu-nu lil-qu-ú, “In the future, if the children of Abī-kāpi want to take the kierṣetu from Bēlu-kabar and Dūdu, they shall pay 90 shekels of silver, the equivalent silver, to Bēlu-kabar and Dūdu and take their kierṣetu” (TBR 65: 8–13). According to Seminara (1995), the difference is due to the deterioration of the building over time, so that the kierṣetu is regarded as a ruin. This interpretation is not followed here, but it is difficult to explain the discrepancy. Perhaps É-tu₄ in line 4 is simply a scribal mistake for kier-ṣe-tu₄; nevertheless, due to the uncertainty the real property is here regarded as a house.

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be calculated in TBR 65, it can be suggested on the basis of the low purchase price that the valuation of the property was influenced by the seller’s indebtedness.278 While debtor and creditor are unknown elsewhere, the purchasers are listed as buyers of an kierṣetu plot in TBR 64, a text that includes the redemption clause but does not expressly refer to indebtedness.279 The text includes a rare clause barring reversibility of the sale by the buyer:280 (14) ù šum-ma ‹m›EN-GAL ù mDú-u-du a-na 4 DUMU.MEŠ mA-bi-ka-pí (15) a-kán-na i-qáb-bi ma-a É-ku-nu la-a a-la-qì-mi (16) a-na KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ NU.TUK, “And if Bēlu-kabar and Dūdu should say to the four sons of Abī-kāpi as follows: ‘I do not take your house,’ they have no right to the silver.” According to Westbrook281 such a clause originated in the realm of social justice, and its purpose was to secure the sellers against possible claims by the buyer. Indeed, by claiming that the house was in reality a pledge and the sale price a loan, the buyer could have returned the property, demanding his money back. In this way, he could have minimized or eliminated the risk of investments during years of economic hardship. The presence of the creditor’s seal on the tablet was probably intended to assure the buyer that the property was unencumbered. 2.2.1.2.10 E 123 The document E 123 records another case of datio in solutum.282 Zū-Baʿla son of Iairu transferred his house to his creditors, Pūḫu son of Ummānu and Abī-Šaggar son of Zū-Anna, who had lent him 20 and 10 shekels of silver respectively. As a title to the property, the creditors received an old tablet sealed by Ninurta, from which the house had been purchased. To confirm that the property was forfeited as full compensation for the debt, the document is patterned after sale contracts with an indication that 30 shekels is the full price: (5) i-na-an-na mZu-Ba-la É-šú a-na mPu-uḫ-a (6) ù mA-bi-d30 ki-i-mu-ú 30 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR.ME (7) ša-a-šú ŠÁM. TIL.LA it-ta-din-šu, “Now Zū-Baʿla gave his house to Pūḫu and Abī-Šaggar in exchange for those 30 shekels of silver as full price.”

278 By using the average surface area of houses at Emar (317.32 sq. cubits), the price per square cubit can be estimated as 0.14 sh. 279 One may speculate that the seller in TBR 64, Tūra-Dagan son of Ilī-aḫī son of Attuwa, is the creditor in TBR 65, where he would have been identified by his grandfather’s name, because the personal name Attuwa is poorly attested at Emar, see Pruzsinszky 2003: Index: 165–66; for persons using their grandfather’s name as patronymic see Singer 2000: 86. 280 The clause is also attested in TBR 53. 281 Westbrook 2001a: 25–31. 282 See E 116, pp. 93ff.

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The redemption clause protected the debtor, allowing Zū-Baʿla to redeem his own house for the same amount as the debt within one year; from the second year onward, the right of redemption was extended to everyone but the penalty increased to twice (TÉŠ.BI) the original debt.283 None of the parties involved in this document is otherwise known, but it is clear that the debt resulted from financial distress.284 2.2.1.2.11 Hirayama 39 Hirayama 39 records another debt repaid by a third party who received a real property as recompense. This document presents the same arrangement between brothers found in the Syrian text TBR 82,285 but unlike TBR 82, which is formulated as a sale contract, Hirayama 39 is formulated as a will: Ilī-aḫī son of Aḫia declares that because his brother Ikmu-Dagan paid his debt of 25 shekels of silver, he has transferred to him his house and inheritance share.286 The creditor’s name is not reported, likely because the document regulates the relation between the brothers. The context of the transaction suggests that the debt was contracted for consumption. Despite the presence of the non-vindication clause, redemption was granted to anyone willing to pay twice the original capital: (15) ur-ra-am še-ra-am [ma-am-ma aš-šum É ḪA.LA-ia]287 (16) a-na UGU-ḫi mIk-mu-dKUR ŠEŠ-ia (17) ù DUMU.MEŠ-šu la i-‹ra›-gu-mu (18) ša i-ra-gu-um KÙ.BABBAR mi-it-ha-ri-i[š] (19) li-id-din-šú É ḪA.LA-ia lil-qi, “In the future, [no one] shall raise a claim [concerning my house and my share of inheritance] against my brother Ikmu-Dagan and his children. Whoever should raise a claim, shall pay the equivalent (silver) and take the house and my share of inheritance.” The two brothers are otherwise unattested. 2.2.1.2.12 BLMJ 12 Pledge was a common measure to secure loans, but BLMJ 12 is the only preserved document that was purposely written to record the redemption of a pledged

283 For the redemption clause see Durand 1990: 58. 284 Note that none of the witnesses is attested elsewhere in the Emar documentation. 285 See § 2.2.1.1.1. 286 The text is fragmentary but the redemption clause indicates that Ilī-aḫī’s house and inheritance share were transferred to his brother. Tsukimoto transliterates in Hirayama 39: 19 only ḪA.LA, but the hand copy clearly shows also the sign É, see Appendix; likely É ḪA.LA refers to all the debtor’s properties, which would have included his house. 287 By analogy with Hirayama 39: 19, I restore É.

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property. Dagan-kabar son of Kumri redeemed, as an “outsider,” kima nikari, the house of his brother, Abdi-ili, which Ea-damiq son of Zikria held as a pledge: (1) É-tu₄ ša mARAD-DINGIR-lì DUMU Ku-um-ri (2) mdÉ-a-SAG₁₀ DUMU Zi-ik-ri-ia ki-i 30 KÙ.BABBAR.MÉŠ (3) ú-ka-al-šú, “Ea-damiq son of Zikria held the house of Abdiili son of Kumri in lieu of 30 shekels of silver.” The redemption payment was ten shekels of silver less than the original debt. According to the editors,288 the pledgeholder had the right to alienate the pledged property if the debtor was unable to repay the loan. However, the pledgeholder accepted the offer of the debtor’s family (20 sh.) because he did not expect a better return from a sale to a third party, who might not have been willing to pay the full amount of the loan. The kima nikari clause would have been included to show that Dagan-kabar was paying the full and final price for the property, i.e., the price of a stranger, and not the usual redemption price of the debtor. This was intended to prevent the pledgeholder from later claiming that the debtor still owed 10 shekels. In my opinion, this line of reasoning seems overcomplicated. One should note that the kima nikari formula is employed in sale contracts between relatives. The clause about the full price and the non-vindication clause, which could be used to bar later claims, are not appended to the document. A simpler explanation begins with the assumption that the pledgeholder, Ea-damiq, and the redeemer, Dagan-kabar, were relatives.289 Redemption at a lower price than the debt was acceptable because of the kinship between debtor and creditor. This strengthens the hypothesis that sales including the kima nikari formula were not carried out at market price, as is usually believed, but were influenced by the family ties between the contracting parties, which led to the subsequent reduction of prices.290 An alternative explanation would take into account the nature of the pledge. Although it is unknown whether the pledge was given during the basic term of the loan or upon default, it was clearly possessory and thus antichretic. It might be suggested that the loan was interest-free and that the pledge served to amortize the principal (Kapitalantichrese).291 The exploitation of the pledge for the time it

288 Goodnick Westenholz 2000: 34. 289 Fijałkowska 2014a: 158–60, regards BLMJ 12 and Hirayama 11 as the only two texts with the kima nikari formula in which the parties are not relatives, but “l’acheteur semble avoir quelque droit de rachat” without specifying where the right comes from. In light of the numerous examples of kima nikari texts where the parties are relatives, I think that Fijałkowska’s hypothesis is unconvincing; why should these two texts differ from the others? 290 For kima nikari sales see Viano 2012: 123–24; Westbrook’s (2003b: 686–87) hypothesis that kima nikari transactions were not discounted is not supported by data. 291 For an overview of the different antichretic arrangements see § 3.2.1.

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was held by the lender corresponded to 10 shekels of silver. Thus, the borrower could redeem the pledge for the balance of the debt, namely 20 shekels of silver. The absence of economic gain for the lender may be explained by his kinship with the borrower.292 The creditor, Ea-damiq, was the owner of a property adjoining the vineyard sold in E 90A-B and a sealer in TBR 72; he is also included in the list of personal names E 336.293 In BLMJ 12 and TBR 72, Ea-damiq is mentioned together with members of the Zū-Baʿla family.294 The debtor and his brother, on the other hand, are unknown elsewhere. Because of the kinship relation between creditor and debtor, we may conclude that Abdi-ili’s financial problems were personal and did not affect other relatives, as his brother’s intervention clearly shows. The text is silent on the background of the loan, but the consignment of a pledged real property suggests that the debt was contracted for consumption. It remains unclear whether Dagan-kabar redeemed the house for himself or for his brother. 2.2.1.2.13 ASJ13 A ASJ13 A records the repayment of a debt owed by the sons of Šimi-dārû to Šamaš-iluli. The debt, 65 shekels of silver, was entirely repaid by the guarantor (qātātu), Šeʾi-Dagan son of Ipqi-Dagan, who was “seized” (ṣabit) by the creditors. One may speculate that the guarantor could be identified with the Šeʾi-Dagan who took a debtor as amēlūtu in ASJ10 A, but in the absence of any concrete evidence this identification is not presumed here.295 None of the other individuals is otherwise known, however, and so the relation between debtor and guarantor remains unclear. This document records an agreement between the guarantor and the creditor; the debtors do not participate and are only referred to as the sons of Šimidārû. This is clear from a clause barring reciprocal claims between guarantor and

292 There is no evidence that the sum of 30 sh. refers to capital and interest. 293 The name of Ea-damiq is written dÉ-a-SAG₁₀ DUMU Zi-ik-ri in E 90A and mdA.A.SAG₁₀ DUMU Zi-ik-ri-ia in E 90B, but he was obviously the same individual; thus mdÉ-a-SAG₁₀ DUMU Zi-ik-ri in TBR 72 is to be identified with the same person. 294 Kāpī-Dagan son of Zū-Baʿla seals BLMJ 12, possibly on Ea-damiq’s side (for the seal see Singer 2000: 87), and they appear together as the two first sealers in TBR 72. TBR 72 and E 90A-B are also sealed by Laḫeia, son of the Overseer of the Land Mutri-Teššub, who in E 90A-B has already replaced his father because he bears the title of LÚ.UGULA KALAM.MA. 295 See § 3.2.1.1.1.3; in ASJ10 A Šeʾi-Dagan bears no patronymic.

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creditor: (10) ù EGIR-nu ᵐᵈUTU-i-lu-li a-[na muḫ-ḫi ᵐŠe-i-ᵈKUR] (11) [l]a-a ‹‹1›› i-ragu-um ù ᵐ[Še-i-ᵈKUR] (12) [a-n]a [mu]ḫ-ḫi ᵐᵈUTU-[i-lu-l]í! [la-a i-ra-gu-um], “And, in the future, Šamaš-iluli shall [n]ot raise a claim a[gainst Šeʾi-Dagan], and [Šeʾi-Dagan] [shall not raise a claim agai]nst Šamaš-[ilul]i.” The economic background of the document is difficult to reconstruct. On the one hand, the rather high amount of the debt could point to a credit granted to promote a business endeavor, yet the fragmentary nature of the tablet and the lack of clear evidence of any commercial activity suggest a cautious classification as a consumptive debt. 2.2.1.2.14 RE 58 RE 58 records a new obligation incurred by a debtor whose debt has been repaid by a third party. The document is formulated as a declaration of Zadamma son of Ipqi-Dagan, who, in exchange for paying a debt of 20 shekels owed by Penti son of Itūr-Dagan to the sons of Ilī-abī son of Kukku, took the debtor’s house and wife as pledges: (6) mPé-en-ti DUMU I-túr-dKUR (7) É-šú ù DAM-šú (8) a-na qa-ta-ti ša 20 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ (9) a-na mZa-dam-ma DUMU Ip-qí-dKUR (10) il-ta-kán, “Penti son of Itūr-Dagan has placed his house and his wife as a pledge for 20 shekels of silver to Zadamma son of Ipqi-Dagan.” The nature of the pledge seems to be possessory because it was given at the onset of the new obligation. Zadamma became the new creditor and obtained the usufruct of a property and the labor performed by the debtor’s wife. While the former creditors were satisfied, the document created a new debt obligation that had obviously not matured yet. Needless to say, the debt was contracted for consumption. Although none of these persons is attested elsewhere in the corpus of Emar texts, a certain Itūr-Dagan son of Kukku witnessed several Syrian documents dated to Pilsu-Dagan (E 8, E 10, E 140).296 One may speculate that Kukku was the grandfather of both debtor and creditors, and therefore Penti took out a loan from his family circle.

296 RE 58 is likely to be dated at the beginning of the Syro-Hittite documentation because one of the witnesses, Nuʾbi-Dagan son of Zū-Anna, is attested as the owner of a property assigned to the diviner Zū-Baʿla, see E 194 and Hirayama 43.

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2.2.1.3 Babylonian Documents 2.2.1.3.1 E 23 E 23 is a very fragmentary tablet from House 5297 recording the partial settlement of a debt incurred by Ali-Nani, a merchant from the land of Salḫu, which has been tentatively located in upper Syria.298 The text states that more than 30 shekels of silver299 weighed by the big weight of the land of Subaru (NA₄.GAL KUR Sú-ba-ri-i) was paid by Tatašše/Raʾīndu, who also swore an oath that she would assume the surety for the rest of the debt, an additional 30 shekels of silver. Tatašše/Raʾīndu promised to pay the balance should Ali-Nani not return from his business trip. The creditor’s name is not indicated because the document regulates the agreement between the two merchants. Ali-Nani’s sealing300 shows that the tablet was stored in the archive of Tatašše/Raʾīndu. The use of the Subarian weight to measure out the silver of a debt presumably contracted at Emar indicates that the target of Ali-Nani’s trade was the land of Subaru. This region, likely located in upper Mesopotamia, was outside the area of the Western weight system used at Emar.301 2.2.1.3.2 E 26 E 26 is another document from House 5 published by Arnaud, who regarded it as a record of a loan made to Nabunni by Kidin-Gula. This interpretation was followed by Y. Cohen, who stressed the similarity between its formulation and that of Kassite loans.302 Nevertheless, the nature of the document poses several problems of interpretation. Kidin-Gula was a teacher at the Emar scribal school

297 For the documents and merchants from House 5 see § 1.3.8. 298 The city of Salḫu is also mentioned in E 277, see pp. 56f. 299 The amount paid by Tatašše/Raʾīndu is not fully preserved, but it exceeded 30 shekels, [x +] 30 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR (E 23: 2). 300 Ali-Nani uses a Syro-Hittite seal, Beyer 2001: 126. Note that this is not a unique case, because in E 87 Puḫrila[. . .], likely a foreign merchant, also bears a Syro-Hittite seal, see pp. 62f. 301 The weight system in use at Emar was based on a mina of 470 g; according to Zaccagnini the “big” Subarian weight refers to the Mesopotamian weight system based on a shekel of 8.4 g. and a mina of 60 shekels (500 g.), Zaccagnini 2018: 56; see also Monroe 2009: 50. 302 Cohen 2009: 188 and n. 105; Cohen reads E 26: 2, i-na ⌜ŠU!⌝ mKi-din-d[Gu-la], “from the hand of Kidin-Gula,” instead of i-na ⌜É!⌝ mKi-din-d[Gu-la], “in the house of Kidin-Gula”; according to the typical loan formula, ina qāt or itti, Cohen’s reading would indicate the creditor. For Kassite loans see Sassmannshausen 2001: 195–202, with previous bibliography.

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 107

and is also mentioned in the letter E 25 as the owner of a maidservant,303 while Nabunni is only known from this document.304 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14.

DUB 3 GÍN K[Ù.SIG₁₇?] i-na É mKi-din-d[Gu-la] DUMU md30.NUMUN.M[U] m Na-bu-u[n-ni] DUMU Ú-lam-t[i- . . . DU]B?.SAR ki-i 3 ME 40+2?[/5?/8? . . . ] i-na URUki A[n-a]t im-ḫu-ur ITI KIN 2 K[AM]305 MU 2 KÁM Mé-li-ši-ḪU LUGAL.E NA₄.KIŠIB mNa-bu-un-ni URU An-at

(1) The tablet of 3 shekels of g[old (?)],306 (2) (which was stored) in the house of Kidin-[Gula] (3) son of Sîn-zēra-idd[in], (4) Nabu[nni] son of Ulam-t[i . . . , the sc]ribe, (8) received (6) in exchange for 330+/340+ [. . .], (7) in the city of A[na]t. (9) Month of Elūlu inter[calated], (10–12) second year of the king Meli-Šipak. (13) Seal of Nabunni. (14) City of Anat. The document does not present any clear indication of a credit transaction, and its formulary significantly differs from those of true loans and debt notes.307 The text does not contain the repayment clause, which was seen in the Middle Babylonian text E 24 discussed above and is usually attested in Old Babylonian and Kassite loan contracts. Although the repayment clause can be omitted,308 E 26 further differs from the Kassite debt notes. Line 6 refers to a quantity of goods (fabrics,

303 See § 3.4.1.3. 304 This edition is based on Durand and Marti’s collation, Durand and Marti 2003: 167. 305 Brinkman (2017: 28 n. 243), reads ITI GU₄ UD.1.KAM. 306 Although the commodity is not fully preserved, gold is more plausible because of the high quantity of goods purchased. 307 For instance, ana muḫḫi is absent. 308 See, e.g., BA 15 35; cf. Sassmannshausen 2001: 195 n. 3158, 197. The loan notes published in Kessler 1982 provide little evidence because they are badly preserved. For the Old Babylonian period see Skaist 1994: 148; see also Hirayama 34 above (§ 2.1.1.2).

108 

 2 Credit Transactions

according to Durand) that were given in exchange for 3 shekels of gold.309 E 26 is probably a receipt for a payment for a quantity of goods rather than a loan contract. Indeed, the formulary of our text resembles that of Kassite receipts of payment310 listing the sum paid; the name of the person who paid (ina qāt PN); some occasional details, such as the city where the transaction took place;311 and the exchanged good.312 Moreover, the introductory sentence in E 26, DUB 3 GÍN K[Ù.SIG₁₇], is atypical for loan documents but finds close parallels in the Middle Assyrian receipts313 and in a Babylonian record of payment.314 Therefore E 26 can be understood as a receipt confirming that Nabunni received a tablet of 3 shekels of gold in exchange for more than three hundred items. The tablet received by Nabunni may be explained in two different ways. It could have been a bill of exchange, namely a tablet recording a debt obligation; this payment instrument was frequently used among merchants to avoid carrying large quantities of cash.315 The tablet was drafted by a debtor, likely a merchant, who owed money to Kidin-Gula, who in turn transferred the obligation to Nabunni as a means of payment. Alternatively, it can be suggested that the tablet of 3 shekels of gold recorded a loan issued by Kidin-Gula as an advance on a later payment316 (Lieferungskauf), and that it was recovered by Nabunni upon the delivery of the goods. In turn, Nabunni acknowledged receipt of the payment by

309 A possible interpretation of kī as a reference to security given by Nabunni for the money lent is, to my knowledge, not supported by parallel examples from Emar and elsewhere; kī/kīmū is usually employed in clauses whose subject is the creditor who takes a property as a pledge, as in the following texts: BLMJ 12: 1–3, É-tu₄ ša PN₁ PN₂ ki-i 30 KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ ú-ka-al-šu, “PN₂ retained the house of PN₁ as a pledge in lieu of 30 shekels of silver;” TBR 34: 3–4, PN₁ PN₂ . . . ki-imu KÙ.BABBAR-šu ú-ka-al, “PN₁ retained PN₂ (and her children) as pledge(s) in lieu of his silver.” For pledges in the Old Babylonian period see Skaist 1994: 202–30. In the Middle Assyrian loans the common clause used to refer to the act of charging properties as pledges is kī našlante or kīmū LENT OBJECT kī šaparte PLEDGED OBJECT PN(C) ṣabātu/kullu, “in compensation of/instead of (the lent object) as a pledge PN (the creditor) takes/holds (the pledged object),” see Abraham 2001: 177–79; this clause is always placed after the statement that the debtor has received the loan, see Saporetti 1978–1979: 10–16. 310 E.g., BE 15 11, BE 15 20, BE 15 22, BE 15 24. 311 BE 15 20, BE 15 22. 312 BE 15 11. 313 Bi 9, TR 3016, see Saporetti 1978–1979: 86, 90. 314 Kessler 1982: 88, IM 85014: 1, [I]M ša ŠÁM, “tablet of the payment.” 315 Another example from Emar is TBR 49. For this instrument see Veenhof 1997: 351–64; this interpretation was suggested to me by Sophie Démare-Lafont. 316 Note that in BE 14 36, BE 14 84, and BE 15 24, payments took place inside the house of an individual who is different from the person who actually made the transfer.

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 109

issuing E 26 and sealing the tablet, which remained in the hands of Kidin-Gula.317 Indeed, receipts record the fulfillment of an outstanding obligation.318 By way of comparison with receipts for partial repayment of a debt that do not mention the delivery of the tablet but include further obligations,319 E 26 probably recorded the conclusion of the transaction: the goods had been delivered and the sum had been paid, and there was no additional obligation on either side. The city of Anat, the main center of the land of Suḫu on the Middle Euphrates,320 should simply be considered the location where the transaction took place, as in several receipts of payment,321 rather than Nabunni’s hometown, although the latter cannot be excluded.

2.2.2 Family Law Contracts Eight documents, all written on Syro-Hittite tablets, regulate family matters pertaining to debts. These documents are patterned as adoption contracts, although a real adoption does not always take place, and record debts repaid (šalāmu) by a third party. The new relation established between the parties is defined by the verb palāḫu, “to honor, to support,” which is usually found in adoption contracts to describe the duties of adopted children.322 The verb palāḫu is also employed in a variety of situations to define the duties of indentured persons (§ 3.2.1.1.2), manumitted slaves (§ 3.5.2), and other forms of dependency (§ 3.3.2.2). All debts in family law contracts appear to be consumptive. This seems to be further supported by the presence of barley as part of the debt in several family law contracts (Table 13). The family law contracts can be divided into two groups. In five documents (E 213, RE 25, RE 88, TBR 74, and TBR 78), family ties are established between the debtor and the third party through adoption (§ 2.2.2.1). The adoptee may be either the debtor or the third party and must perform the palāḫu duty towards the adopter. Three of these contracts also stipulate marriages: in RE 25 and RE 88, the 317 Note that records of payments were also stored in the payer’s archive, see for instance Kessler 1982: No. 6. 318 For receipts see Postgate 1986: 16. 319 See the Middle Assyrian receipts for partial repayments of debts in Deller and Saporetti 1970; note that the aforementioned Bi 9 and TR 3016 acknowledge the full repayment of the debt. 320 For the land of Suḫu see Bassetti 1996, Singer 2008: 233–37 and Belmonte Marín 2001: 24–25; Durand and Marti (2003: 167) read the city name as Āl-ilī-abī. 321 E.g., Kessler 1982: No. 6, 7, 18. 322 For the palāḫu formula in adoption at Emar see Bellotto 2009: 27–32. For palāḫu adoptions from Nuzi see Lion 2004: 553.

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 2 Credit Transactions

adoption of the debtors is paired with their marriage to the creditors’ daughters; in E 213 the debtor’s daughter is married off to the person repaying the debt, and the marriage is the principal arrangement of the contract. The second group consists of three documents labeled palāḫu contracts (RE 10, RE 13, and SMEA30 9)323 that, despite the presence of the palāḫu formula, do not stipulate adoptions (§ 2.2.2.2). In these contracts the palāḫu duty is received by an indebted person from a third party who repays the debts. In a single palāḫu contract, SMEA30 9, new family ties between parties are created through marriage. Both groups record a transfer of properties from the recipient of the palāḫu duty to the performer: the latter – who in the first group can be either the debtor or the third party – becomes the heir of the former. We have therefore a distinction between documents where the third party, who repays the debt, becomes the heir (E 213, RE 10, RE 13, SMEA30 9, and TBR 78),324 and those where the debtor is entitled to inherit the third party’s share (RE 25, RE 88, and TBR 74).325 The duration of the palāḫu duty usually corresponds to the recipient’s lifetime. The inheritance, i.e., the reward for having fulfilled the palāḫu duty, mostly consists of the house and all possessions of the recipient of the duty: kīmē ipallaḫanni arkī šimtīya ublanni bitīya gabba mimmuya lilqi, “As he supports me after my fate carries me off, he shall take my household and all my possessions.”326 The family law contracts contain dissolution clauses penalizing premature termination of the agreement. Penalties are only slightly heavier on the debtor, but overall they are equal or very similar on each side in case of breach, usually

323 For the palāḫu contracts see Bellotto 2014. 324 The two adoption contracts E 213 and TBR 78, where a third party performs the palāḫu duty for the debtor receiving his share, can be compared to adoptions from the Old Babylonian period and from Nuzi where the adoptee receives an inheritance of real property in exchange for support (palāḫu), see Stone and Owen 1991: 3–9, Lion 2004: 552–54. 325 GsK 2 shares some features with the palāḫu contracts because it contains the palāḫu formula and lacks the adoption statement; however, it is distinctive because it makes no reference to debt and shares other features with contracts of indentured labor. Notably, the clause of dissolution includes a formula forcing the debtor to “leave the house” that is not attested in the palāḫu contracts but is found in some contracts of indentured labor. Additionally, the debtor does not become the heir in GsK 2; this document will be discussed below, § 3.3.2.1.2. 326 For inheritance shares in family law contracts see Table 44.

2.2 Fulfillment of the Obligation 

 111

consisting of a sum of silver, generally 60 shekels of silver, and the loss of certain rights.327 The family law contracts were strategies for overcoming financial problems. Motivations in the family law contracts depended on the type of established relation. If the debtor was the recipient of the palāḫu duty, the third party was entitled to obtain the debtor’s properties. On the other hand, when the third party received the palāḫu duty from the debtor, he/she obtained the continuation of his/her family line,328 care in old age, and support through work service. The family law contracts show the wide semantic range of the verb palāḫu, which covered the duties of debtors and creditors at the same time. The duty established for the debtor in some contracts of indentured labor (§ 3.2.1) is defined by the same verb (palāḫu) and has the same duration, but the debtor’s status must be distinguished in the two types of contracts. In the contracts of indentured labor, the debtor must always perform the palāḫu duty and never becomes heir. On the contrary, in the family law contracts the debtor either receives the palāḫu duty or is entitled to the third party’s inheritance as the universal heir when he performs the palāḫu duty. Moreover, debtors in the family law contracts appear to have started out in a better economic position than persons compelled to indentured labor, because they owned several properties to bequeath to the individual who repaid their debts.329 Indentured persons usually had no properties to bequeath.330 Debtors in family law contracts are never required to provide securities, unlike persons in the regime of indentured labor, who are attested as pledging their assets.331

327 See § 4.9.3 for penalties. When contracts stipulate adoption, the dissolution clause is patterned according to a formula already known in the Old Babylonian period (Westbrook 2003a: 393), “You are not my son,” “You are not my father,” which is incorporated in all adoptions from Emar, see Bellotto 2009: 33–37. 328 Adoptees are mostly adult males, Bellotto 2008: 187. 329 E 213, RE 10, RE 13, SMEA30 9. 330 Properties fully transferred to the creditors in contracts of indentured labor are only attested in E 117, in which the possessions of the indentured person will be transferred to the master upon his death, see § 3.2.1.1.2.1; see also the enslavement contract E 215, in which the enslaved debtor forfeited his properties to the person who repaid his debt, see § 3.2.3.2.1.3. 331 See E 77 and RA77 5, § 3.2.1.1.1.

SH

SH

SH

SH

SH

E 213

RE 25

RE 88

TBR 74

TBR 78

Adoptions

Marriage

Marriage

Marriage

Repaid

Debtor (Adopter?)

Third Party (Adopter) Debtor (Adopter)

30 sh. (?) ?

9 sh.

9 sh.

Third Party (Adopter)

?

Third Party

Dada daughter of Tūra-Da

NG

?

Third Party Šuška-ziti, servant Zū-Aštarti son of (Adoptee) of the Overseer of Bēlu-mālik the Land

Debtor (Adoptee)

Debtor

Agitu (F) (20 sh.); Ḫudi wife of Abiu Madi (30 parīsu of barley) son of Zikria

Creditor

(continued)

Ilī-abī son of Abī-Dagan

Baʿal-qarrād son of [. . .]

Iati and Irʾib-Dagan

Išmaʾ-Dagan son of Azia son of Tutaliti (52 sh.); Ia son of Gubba Dagan-qarrād son of Matte Ḫimaši-Dagan (50 sh.); son of Tutaliti Ēṭir-Adad (3 sh.); Abī-liʾmu son of Mikku (5 sh.); Biʾšu son of Ipšil-enna (3 sh.; 50 parīsu of barley)

Debtors Aḫiau (Adoptees)

Debtor (Adoptee)

Third Party Baʿal-mālik son of (Adoptee?) Baʿal-qarrād

Recipient of Heir the palāḫu duty

113 sh. 113 sh. Third Party 50 parīsu 50 parīsu (Adopter) of barley of barley

20 sh. 30 parīsu of barley

Document Script Arrangement Debt

Table 13: Family Law Contracts.

112   2 Credit Transactions

Marriage

NG

see RE 10

Abdi-ili son of Šameḫu son of Ia-[. . .]

Ḫemia son of Aḫī-mālik son of Kutbe

Third Party Ḫusiru

RE 13

20 sh. 20 sh. Debtor 20 parīsu 20 parīsu of barley of barley

SH

RE 10

SMEA30 9 SH

Debtor

Third Party Zū-Aštarti son of Aḫī-mālik son of Kutbe

Creditor

51 sh. 51 sh. Debtor 30 parīsu 30 parīsu of barley of barley

Third Party

SH

Recipient of Heir the palāḫu duty Third Party Bēlu-qarrād son of Zu-Baʿla son of Aḫī-mālik Ḫemia son of Tūra-Dagan (10 sh.); Aḫī-mālik son Dagan-taliʾ son of of Kutbe Zikri-Dagan (10 sh.); Šeʾi-Dagan son of the tartannu (10 sh.); Bēlu-qarrād son of Tūra-Dagan (10 sh.; 10 parīsu of barley); Šurši-Dagan son of Bilila (5 sh.); Ibbi-ilu son of Ḫulû (3 sh.); Ikmu-Dagan son of Išbi-Dagan (3 sh.); Baʿal-qarrād son of Ilī-abī (20 parīsu of barley)

Repaid

51 sh. 51 sh. Debtor 30 parīsu 30 parīsu of barley of barley

palāḫu Contracts

Document Script Arrangement Debt

Table 13 (continued)

2.2 Fulfillment of the Obligation   113

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2.2.2.1 Adoptions 2.2.2.1.1 E 213 The Zu-Baʿla family is involved in the testament E 213, which records an agreement between Baʿal-mālik son of Baʿal-qarrād and Ḫudi wife of Abiu son of Zikria. As we learn from BLMJ 14, Abiu had bequeathed to Ḫudi several items for her kubuddāʾu332 on the condition that she would not remarry. He also determined that his five sons were to take care of their mother in exchange for her kubuddāʾu, to be received after her death. E 213 begins with reporting Ḫudi’s will – probably drafted prior to E 213 – in which she designated her daughter Batta as her universal and only heir: (1) iš-tu u₄-mi an-ni-i fḪu-di₁₂ DAM mA-bi-ú (2) DUMU Zi-ik-ri-ia ši-im-ti É-ši i-ši-im (3) a-kán-na iq-bi ma-a a-nu-ma É-ia gišKIRI₆.GEŠTIN (4)  fḪa-zi-ir-tu₄ qa-du DUMU.MUNUS-ši gáb-bá mim-mu-ia (5) a-na fBa-at-ti DUMU.MUNUS-ia at-ta-din (6) lúwa-ra-ša a-bal-li-la NU.TUKU, “From this day, Ḫudi wife of Abiu son of Zikria determined the fate of her household. She spoke as follows: ‘Now I have given my house, the vineyard, Ḫazirtu [i.e., a maidservant] with her daughter, and all my possessions to Batta my daughter. She is heir; there is no (other) sharer.’”333 These properties belonged to the share of Ḫudi’s deceased husband following the division of his father’s estate between him and his brothers, who were barred from making any claims: (6) a-nu-ma ŠEŠ.MEŠ mu-tì-ia (7) zi-i-zu ba-aṣ-ru li-im A.ŠÀ.MEŠ a-na É-ia (8) mim-mu-ia la-a i-ra-gu-mu ša i-ra-gu-um (9) ṭup-pu an-nu-ú i-la-e-šu: “Now my husband’s brothers have shared and divided334 (and) not even from afar335 shall they raise a claim upon my house and my possessions. Whoever should raise a claim, this tablet will prevail over him.” The document recording the division of properties between Abiu and his brothers has survived. E 186 and E 187 are two copies of the same document wherein four brothers – Abiu, Kāpī-Dagan, Dagan-bēlu, and Lada-Dagan – divide their inheritance.336 Despite the fact that no patronymic is reported in E 186–187, there is little doubt that this Abiu is the same individual mentioned in E 213 and BLMJ 14. Among the items received by Ḫudi for her kubuddāʾu in BLMJ 14 was an asallu vessel of 300 shekels in weight, which is also mentioned as part of Abiu’s

332 This word indicates a sort of bequest or gift given to a wife by her husband to secure her livelihood after his death, Beckman 1996b: 72, Pentiuc 2001: 107–08, Yamada 2016b. 333 The clause lúwaraša aballila designates the principal heir and excludes other heirs, Tsukimoto 1991a: 283, Bellotto 2009: 61 and n. 313, Démare-Lafont 2010: 57–58. 334 For this expression see Seminara 1998: 539. 335 For (1) lim A.ŠÀ see Durand 2004. 336 E 186 is a copy of E 187, because the latter bears a seal impression of Ini-Teššub, king of Karkemiš, see Rutz 2013: 294.

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share (E 186: 14). It is clear from these sources that Abiu belonged to a wealthy family. He was likely a merchant or someone involved in trade, as shown by BLMJ 14: (3) 1 ŠEN ZABAR 3 me-at KI.LÁ.BI (4) ša KASKAL-ni-i[a?], “one bronze kettle of 300 (shekels) in weight of my business journey.”337 Despite the marital gift, Ḫudi fell into debt after her husband’s death for reasons that are not reported in E 213: (10) ù a-nu-ma EGIR lúmu-ti-ia muš-kèna-ku (11) uḫ-ta-bíl ù i-na ŠÀ ŠEŠ.MEŠ mu-tì-ia (12) ša i-pal-la-ḫa-an-ni ia-nu, “And now after (the death) of my husband, I became poor and fell into debt, and among my husband’s brothers there was no one to support me.” Ḫudi’s five sons attested in BLMJ 14 are not mentioned in E 213. Perhaps they were all dead or were too young to support their mother.338 Baʿal-mālik, who at the time of E 213 is identified as a son of the diviner, paid Ḫudi’s debt and set out to perform the palāḫu duty for her. In turn Baʿal-mālik – who was perhaps adopted by Ḫudi, although the adoption formula is lacking339 – received Batta as his wife and inherited all of Ḫudi’s possessions: (14) fBa-a-ta DUMU.MUNUS-ia a-na DAM-šu at-ta-din (15) É-ia gáb-bá mim-mu-ia at-ta-na-šu, “I gave Batta, my daughter, as his wife, and I left him my house and all my belongings.” Additionally, he received a house in the irrigation district of Ziʾlu.340 Ḫudi’s debt amounted to 20 shekels of silver owed to Agitu (a woman) and 30 parīsu of barley owed to Madi’s family. Apparently, Ḫudi’s decision to bequeath all her properties to Baʿal-mālik through his marriage with Batta was not motivated by her financial situation, which was by no means desperate because the amount of her debt was considerably lower than the value of her properties. Usually, a woman did not legally own the properties inherited from her husband but only received their usufruct during her lifetime. These properties were later passed down to her children.341 Hence, one may argue that Ḫudi could ensure that her debt would be repaid only by giving her daughter into marriage. Nevertheless, Emar sources offer several examples of women selling properties belonging to

337 Further evidence of Abiu’s high status is Ini-Teššub’s seal impressed on E 187, Beyer 2001: 151. 338 A less likely alternative is that Ḫudi’s sons had refused to support their mother; such a circumstance would have been explicitly stated, and the non-vindication clause would have mentioned them along with Abiu’s brothers; cf. TBR 78 where the debtor broke off his relationship with his sons. 339 In E 213: 20, Ḫudi addresses Baʿal-mālik as DUMU-ia, but the term māru may indicate both son and son-in-law. 340 E 213: 24–25, ù a-nu-ma É-ia ša KÁ Zi-iʾ-li // ša mdU-ma-lik-ma DUMU-ia; for the irrigation districts see Reculeau 2008: 133–35. 341 For women and inheritance see Justel 2008a: 132, 34, 38, 283, 287, 290–291.

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their deceased husbands even if they had children.342 Therefore it is not excluded that Ḫudi could have sold one of her assets to clear her debt.343 Moreover, it seems plausible that the house in the district of Ziʾlu was her own property because it is mentioned separately from her husband’s share, which was bequeathed to Batta. An explanation may perhaps be found in a clause binding Baʿal-mālik to the marriage on penalty of losing his rights to Ḫudi’s share: (21) ur-ra-am še-ra-am šum-ma mdU-ma-lik (22) DUMU.MUNUS-ia ú-maš-šar a-na mim-mu-šu «NU.TUKU» (23) ú-še-li-mu ù a-na! mim-mi-ia NU.TUKU, “In the future, if Baʿal-mālik should abandon my daughter, he will have no (right) to everything he paid and to all my possessions.” Based on her personal experience, Ḫudi sought to secure protection and a stable future for her daughter through a matrimonial agreement that would indissolubly tie Batta to the diviner’s family. Thus, her primary concern was her daughter’s future. Quite oddly, no penalties are imposed on Ḫudi or her daughter for breaking the contract. The text makes no mention of the terḫatu that was perhaps replaced by the repayment of the debt, but if Baʿal-mālik was actually adopted by Ḫudi, no transfer of bridewealth was made at all. The fact that Ḫudi and Batta belonged to a wealthy or important family is probably the reason why Baʿal-mālik agreed to marry the daughter of an indebted woman instead of forcing the debtor into servitude.344 At any rate, the arrangement was a good deal for Baʿal-mālik, who obtained several properties for a relatively small amount of silver and barley.345 Ḫudi’s former husband is mentioned in another document, E 225. In this text Zūzu son of Baʿal-mālik purchased the share of his brother Ipqi-Dagan in a house that once belonged to Abiu. This was perhaps the same real property transferred to Baʿal-mālik in E 213. Nothing is known about the original creditors, but Agitu can perhaps be identified with one of the daughters of Abdi-ili mentioned in SMEA30 9 (see below). It is worth noting that Agitu’s name was written with both male and female determinatives.346

342 Justel 2016: 375–76. Note that both the marital gift and the dowry were made up of movable properties that were passed down to the children. 343 The conclusions stated in Viano 2012: 121 should be dismissed. 344 Cf. E 215. 345 E 186–187 were found in Building M₁ and preserved as titles to properties, see Viano 2020a: 424–25. 346 For women who are granted the status of both male and female, see Fijałkowska 2017: 120– 21, with previous bibliography.

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2.2.2.1.2 TBR 78 In TBR 78 an indebted person adopted someone who paid his debt. Ilī-abī son of Abī-Dagan owed 9 shekels of silver to Zū-Aštarti son of Bēlu-mālik, but he had no one to support him (ša ipallaḫanni yānu) after he broke off relations with his sons, perhaps because they refused to repay the debt. Therefore, Ilī-abī adopted Šuška-ziti, servant of the Overseer of the Land,347 who cleared his debt and performed the palāḫu duty. In turn, he received full rights to Ilī-abī’s house after his death. The non-vindication clause (ṭuppu annû ilāʾēšu) established that Ilī-abī’s wife and sons could not raise claims against Šuška-ziti. In case of dissolution, the contract stipulated equal penalties for each party, namely the payment of 60 shekels of silver and the forfeiture of a house: (11) šúm-ma mDINGIR-lì-a-bi a-na pa-ni mŠu-uš-ka-si-di (12) DUMU-šú [i-q]ab-bi ma-a ul DUMU-ia at-ta-mì (13) mDINGIR-lì-a-bi a-na É-šú NU.TUKU 60 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR a-na mŠu-uš-ka-LÚ (14) DU[MU-šú li-i]d-din-ma a-šar ŠÀ-šu lil-lik (15) [ù šúm-ma ᵐŠu-uš-k]a-si-di (16) [a-n]a pa-n[i mDINGIR-lì-a-bi a-bi-šú] i-iq!-bi (17) ma-a ul a-bu-ia a[t-t]a-mì (18) mŠu-uš-ka-s[i-d]i [a-n]a É NU.TUKU (19) 60 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ a-na mDINGIR-lì-a-bi a-bi-šú (20) li-din-ma a-šar ŠÀ-šú lil-lik, “If Ilī-abī should [s]ay to Šuška-ziti, his son: ‘You are not my son,’ Ilī-abī will have no (right) to his house (and) [shall g]ive 60 shekels of silver to Šuška-ziti, [his] so[n], and go wherever he pleases. [And if Šušk]a-ziti should say [t]o [Ilī-abī, his father]: ‘Y[o]u are not my father,’ Šuška-z[it]i will have no (right) [t]o the house and shall give 60 shekels of silver to Ilī-abī, his father, and go wherever he pleases.” In my opinion, both penalty clauses refer to Ilī-abī’s house.348 Therefore, although the penalties seem equal, the contract imposed a stiffer penalty on the adopter/debtor because he would forfeit his house, while the adoptee/benefactor would only lose the right to the potential ownership of a property. Since the debtor’s house is the only property to be inherited by the adoptee,349 one may tentatively compare the amount of the debt with the average purchase price of houses in the Syro-Hittite sale contracts (ca. 60 sh.),350 although the dimensions of the house are not provided. Therefore it seems plausible that the value of the house was greater than the debt. Going further, an evident contrast

347 The name of the overseer is not reported. 348 Note the use of É-šu in Ilī-abī’s penalty but simply É in Šuška-ziti’s penalty. 349 The mention of the house probably does not refer to all the debtor’s properties, because the expression gabba mimmû-ya, which is attested in several adoptions, is not reported here. However, such an inclusive interpretation cannot be ruled out. 350 See § 1.4.

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between the penalties emerges when we estimate their amount:351 the penalty for Šuška-ziti fetches 69 shekels of silver,352 while for Ilī-abī it would be about 129 shekels.353 Nevertheless, because the amount of the penalty was far greater than the debt, the parties had no interest in dissolving the contract. The economic background of the document is not entirely clear. The debt could have been covered by selling the house or forfeiting it to the original creditor, but the debtor preferred to keep it, likely because this was his only property. The inability to repay a small debt – as well as the fact that the house was probably the only real estate owned by the debtor, who was thus concerned to prevent its forfeiture – points to financial distress. It also seems plausible that the debtor was concerned with disinheriting his sons and obtaining someone’s support. It is unclear why Ilī-abī preferred to adopt a third party, Šuška-ziti, instead of the original creditor, Zū-Aštarti, but likely this choice was influenced by personal relationships, such as kinship or friendship. This conjecture cannot be verified, however, because none of the parties can be clearly identified in other texts from Emar.354 2.2.2.1.3 TBR 74 The text TBR 74 regulates the adoption of a man by a woman who paid his debt. Dada, daughter of Tūra-Da, was likely a widow who had been granted the status of son to provide her with the right to her family inheritance after her brothers’ death: [ᶠDa-a-da D]UMU.MUNUS GUR-da! a-kán-na iq-bi (2) [ma-a] ᵐGUR-da a-bu-ia a-na DUMU.NITA (3) i-pu-ša-an-ni ù ŠEŠ.MEŠ-ia BA.UG₇ (4) ù É a-[n]a ⌜a⌝-ia-ši ir-te-ḫa, “[Dada d]aughter of Tūra-Da spoke as follows: ‘Tūra-Da, my father, made me as (his) son because my brothers were dead and the house remained to me.’” Dada declared that she had no male child and that no one could take care of her. Thus she adopted Baʿal-qarrād son of Qasuli, who had fallen into debt in a year of hardship and great inflation: (4) i-na-an-na a-na-ku (5) DUMU. NITA NU.TUKU ù ša i-pal-la-ḫa-an-ni i-ia-nu (6) i-na-an-na ᵐᵈU-UR.SAG DUMU Qa?-s[u?-l]i? (7) i-na MU KALA.GA ša 2 SÌLA ŠE.ME a-na 1 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ (8) ḫu-búl-lu ù a-na DUMU-ut-ti-ia (9) e-te-púš-šú, “Now I have no son and there is no one to support me. Now Baʿal-qarrād son of Qas[ul]i, in the year of hardship, 351 The calculation is based on the assumption, derived from other family law contracts (RE 10, RE 13), that the silver paid to clear the debt is not returned to the third party if the latter is in breach. 352 60 sh. of penalty and 9 sh. of the repaid debt. 353 60 sh. of penalty, 9 sh. of the debt, and about 60 sh. for the value of the house. 354 Démare-Lafont and Fleming (2015: 69–70) identify the creditor in TBR 78 and a certain Zū-Aštarti son of Bēlu-mālik who sealed TBR 32 with the king of Emar; this identification is not followed here.

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when 2 qû of barley (corresponded) to 1 shekel of silver, was indebted and I have made him my son.” In exchange for performing the palāḫu duty, Baʿal-qarrād was to become Dada’s universal heir after her death (É-ia gáb-bá mim-mu-ia lil-qì). According to the dissolution clause, the penalties imposed on the adopter/ benefactor seem higher than those on the adoptee/debtor. Moreover, the cash penalty is lower than the usual 60 shekels of silver. The adopter would have to forfeit her house and all her properties, while the adoptee, in addition to the loss of any rights on the adopter’s house, would have to pay a penalty of 30 shekels of silver, which perhaps corresponded to the original debt. The uniqueness of these terms is probably due to the fact that the adopter/benefactor was a woman and a widow. In order to ensure Baʿal-qarrād’s rights, Dada’s grandchildren, Bulālu and Dagan-taliʾ,355 were given a female slave but were forbidden to raise claims on the house: (22) ù a-nu-ma mBu-la-lu ù mdKUR-ta-li-iʾ (23) DUMU.ME DUMU-ia GÉME-šú ša a-bi-šú-nu (24) [i]l-ta-qu-ú ù i-na EGIR u₄-mi aš-šum (25) É a-bi-i[a] a-na muḫ-ḫi mU-UR.SAG DUMU-ia (26) la-a i-ra-gu-mu šum-ma i-ra-gu-mu (27)  [ṭup-pu an-n] u-ú i-la-eʾ-e-[šu-nu]-ti, “And now Bulālu and Dagan-taliʾ, my son’s children, have taken the female slave of their father, and in the future, concerning the house of my father, they will not raise a claim against Baʿal-qarrād, my son. Should they raise a claim, [thi]s [tablet] will prevail over [the]m.” The house is defined as a property of Dada’s father, a clear indication that it did not belong to her (late) husband. The amount of the debt and the creditor are not mentioned. It remains therefore unclear whether Dada was the original creditor. None of the parties is known elsewhere in the Emar documentation. 2.2.2.1.4 RE 25 In RE 25, Išmaʾ-Dagan son of Gubba adopted Ia son of Ḫimaši-Dagan son of Tutaliti and repaid his debt of 113 shekels of silver and 50 parīsu of barley owed to several creditors: 52 shekels were owed to Ia’s uncle, Azia son of Tutaliti, 50 shekels to Dagan-qarrād son of Matte, 3 shekels to Ēṭir-Adad, 5 shekels to Abī-liʾmu son of Mikku, and 3 shekels and 50 parīsu of barley to Biʾšu son of Ipšil-enna. Additionally, Išmaʾ-Dagan gave his daughter Ḫebat-ilī to Ia as a wife.

355 They are regarded as the children of Dada’s late biological son. Bellotto (2009: 65 and n. 330) regards them as Baʿal-qarrād’s sons, because Dada claimed that she had no one to support her, but as shown by TBR 78, RE 25, RE 10, and RE 13 the need for palāḫu duty is not related to the absence of living offspring. Because Baʿal-qarrād became Dada’s heir, barring his sons from her inheritance would make no sense.

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In exchange for performing the palāḫu duty, the adoptee was entitled to share the inheritance with the adopter’s biological sons: (8) É-ia gáb-bá mim-mu-ia it-ti DUMU.ME-ia (9) li-zu-zú GAL ù TUR i-na ŠÀ-šú-‹nu› i-ia-nu, “He shall divide my house and all my possessions with my (other) sons; there is no senior or junior among them.” The dissolution clause imposes the same penalty of 60 shekels of silver on each side, but adds that the debtor will also have to relinquish his wife and sons if he dissolves the contract. By repaying the debt, Išmaʾ-Dagan redeemed Ia’s slave, Ittinu, along with his wife and daughter, who had likely served as a pledge.356 Apparently, the slaves were collectively held by the five lenders, suggesting that they were members of the same extended family. This seems to be supported by the fact that Išmaʾ-Dagan acted “as an outsider,” kima nikari, a clause that indicates that he belonged to the same family as Ia.357 Moreover, if one of the creditors, Azia son of Tutaliti, was the debtor’s uncle, as suggested by his patronymic, it follows that Išmaʾ-Dagan and Ia were also relatives. Indeed, there was no apparent reason, other than kinship, for IšmaʾDagan to repay such a large debt (the largest in the family law contracts) and to grant Ia the same status as his biological sons. With a single exception,358 none of the individuals mentioned in RE 25 crops up in other texts from Emar.359 RE 25 is counted among the consumptive debts (Table 31) in virtue of the family law arrangements between parties and the fact that the debt included barley. However, given the high amount of the debt and the multiple creditors, who may be indicative of a trade partnership, it is not excluded that the debt arose from a business venture.360

356 Although the term for pledge is not used, the verb paṭāru, “release,” suggests that the slaves were taken as a pledge: ù a-nu-ma mIt-ti-na ARAD-šú it-ti // DAM-šú DUMU.MUNUS-šú ki-i lúnika-ri ap-ta-aṭ-ra, “And now, I have released Ittinu, his slave, his wife, and his daughter as an outsider” (RE 25: 20–21). Alternatively, the slaves were seized as distraint. For the value relation between debt and pledge see § 4.5.5. 357 See ch. 2 fn. 290. 358 Azia son of Tutaliti acts as a sealer in RE 25 and TBR 88. 359 The tablet is sealed by Šaggar-abu son of Dagan-tariʾ, who has been identified with the Hittite official bearing the titles of tartannu and “Great one of the chariots,” see § 1.3.7 and ch. 1 fn. 126. 360 Note that the amēlūtu contract E 77 (§ 3.2.1.1.1.1) has been regarded as recording a productive debt because of the high amount of the debt. However, the context of RE 25 seems more domestic, especially because the debt includes barley.

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2.2.2.1.5 RE 88 The contract RE 88 records an adoption with erēbu marriage. Although the tablet is very fragmentary, the content can be reconstructed as follows: two men, Iati and Irʾib-Dagan, were adopted by Aḫiau and married the adopter’s daughters in exchange for performing the palāḫu duty for their father. The plausible absence of male heirs would have entailed the end of the family line and the dissipation of its wealth, which would have been acquired by the husbands of Aḫiau’ daughters. To avoid this, Aḫiau made his daughter’s husbands enter his family, thus securing a future for his daughters, the continuation of his family line, and support for himself in old age. The only preserved reference to the adoptees’ indebtedness is contained in a clause at the end of the text stating that when Iati and Irʾib-Dagan will have married off Baʿla-bītu, very likely another daughter of Aḫiau, they will take her terḫatu in order to pay their debts: (27’) ù fdIŠKUR-É ⌜i-na⌝ É e-mì li-[lik] (28’) NÍG. MUSSA ⌜lil⌝-qu-ú-ma (29’) ù ḫu-bu-ul-la-šú-nu (30’) li-šal-li-mu, “And Baʿla-bītu shall g[o] to the house of a father-in-law. They shall take the bridewealth and pay their debt.” The amount of the debt is not preserved. The fragmentary nature of the tablet, along with the fact that the parties are unknown elsewhere in the Emar documentation, precludes a full understanding of the contractual terms. The dissolution clause possibly imposes equal penalties on unilateral dissolution. Iati and Irʾib-Dagan must pay 60 shekels of silver and forfeit their wives and perhaps their houses and silver. Aḫiau will lose the rights over his daughters and his house (?) and possibly must pay 60 shekels of silver.361 2.2.2.2 palāḫu Contracts 2.2.2.2.1 RE 10 and RE 13 The palāḫu contracts RE 10 and RE 13 belong to the last generation of the archive of the family of Kutbe and concern the debts of Ḫemia son of Aḫī-mālik son of Kutbe. According to RE 10, Ḫemia owed a debt of 51 shekels of silver and 30 parīsu of barley to several creditors. Thus, he took one of his creditors, Bēlu-qarrād son of Tūra-Dagan, to fulfill the palāḫu duty because he had no one to support him (ša ipallaḫanni mamma yānu). In return for paying the debt and serving the palāḫu duty for the lifetime of Ḫemia and his wife, Al-aḫaia, Bēlu-qarrād obtained all Ḫemia’s properties and his entire estate: É-ia gab-ba mim-mu-ia ka-ia-an-zi-ia362 ša URUk[i] // ù ša

361 Perhaps it is possible to restore RE 88: 18’ as follows: [60 GÍN KÙ.BABBA]R mA-ḫi-ia-ú a-na m I-ia-ti ù mIr-[ib-dKUR li-di-in], “Aḫiau [shall pay 60 shekels of silve]r to Iati and Ir[ʾib-Dagan].” For the specific request by Aḫiau to have the terḫatu of his daughters returned see Justel 2008c. 362 For kaianzu/a, “property,” see Pentiuc 2001: 93–94.

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EDIN ḪA.LA-ia ma-la it-ti ŠEŠ.MEŠ-ia // i-kaš-ša-da-an-ni lil-qè, “He (Bēlu-qarrād) shall take my house, all my possessions and property in the city and in the countryside – my inheritance share, as much as it comes to me along with my brothers.” It is also stipulated that Bēlu-qarrād shall raise Ḫemia’s daughters and receive their terḫatu. Additionally, he shall give 50 shekels of silver to Ḫemia’s son, Baʿal-kabar, to let him take a wife: (30) a-nu-ma mdIM-GAL DUMU-ia mEN-UR. SAG 30✶ GÍN K[Ù.BABBAR].M[EŠ] (31) ša DAM-šú li-din-na-šu, “Now Baʿal-kabar is my son. Bēlu-qarrād shall give him 30 shekels of silver for his wife.” The contract bars Baʿal-kabar from raising any claims against Bēlu-qarrād and imposes penalties on each side in case of unilateral dissolution: Bēlu-qarrād would forfeit the silver and barley that he disbursed for clearing the debt and pay 60 shekels of silver to Ḫemia; Ḫemia would pay 60 shekels of silver to Bēlu-qarrād and forfeit any rights to his house, his properties, and the terḫatu of his daughters. The reference to the terḫatu in the dissolution clause implies that the right to cash the bridewealth of Ḫemia’s daughters was retained by Bēlu-qarrād. Although the penalty imposed on the debtor is higher, the one set for the third party is also considerable and includes the same fee of 60 shekels of silver. In addition to Bēlu-qarrād, the document lists eight creditors including Ḫemia’s brother Zū-Baʿla and Šeʾi-Dagan, the son of an important Hittite official, Šaggar-abu the tartannu.363 Two other creditors are mentioned in other texts: Šurši-Dagan son of Bilila acts as a sealer in documents of the families of Kutbe (GsK 1 and Hirayama 37) and Awiru (TBR 22 and TBR 25); Ikmu-Dagan son of Išbi-Dagan is named in a broken context in BLMJ 13, where he is possibly assigned two bridewealths. The remaining creditors – Dagan-taliʾ son of Zikri-Dagan, Ibbiilu son of Ḫulû, Ikmu-Dagan son of Išbi-Dagan, and Baʿal-qarrād son of Ilī-abī – are unknown elsewhere. Although Bēlu-qarrād is only mentioned in this text, it seems reasonable that he was someone wealthy. It is unlikely that a member of an important family such as that of Ḫima resorted to someone of inferior status for such a particular agreement that also included the raising of his children. Similarly, it seems plausible that the other creditors too had a high status, as suggested by the presence of the tartannu’s son. As we are informed from RE 13, the agreement stipulated in RE 10 was rescinded because Bēlu-qarrād failed to fulfill his duties. He was replaced by another brother of Ḫemia, Zū-Aštarti, who received substantially the same benefits and obligations as those specified in RE 10. The main difference is the absence of any reference to the terḫatu in the penalty imposed on Ḫemia, although Zū-Aštarti obtained the right to cash it: (22) šúm-ma mḪe-mi-ia a-na pa-ni mZu-Aš-

363 The document is sealed by the tartannu Šaggar-abu himself; for this person see § 1.3.7.

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tar-t[i] i-qa-bi (23) ma-a la-a ta-pal-la-ḫa-na-ši m⌜Ḫe-mi⌝-i[a a-n]a É-šú (24) gab-ba mim-mu-šu NU.TUK 60 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ a-n[a mZ]u-Aš-tar-ti (25) li-din-ma, “If Ḫemia should say to Zū-Aštart[i]: ‘You shall not support us,’ Ḫemi[a] will have no right [t]o his house (and) all his possessions. He shall pay 60 shekels of silver t[o Z]ū-Aštarti.” Another difference is that there is no specification of the sum to be given to Ḫemia’s son for his marriage: (26) a-nu-ma mdU-GAL DUMU-ia mZuAš-tar-ti DAM-ta₅ (27) li-ša-ḫi-iz-šu, “Now Baʿal-kabar is my son. Zū-Aštarti shall enable him to take a wife.” Although Bēlu-qarrād failed to fulfill the obligations imposed by the palāḫu duty, he paid off Ḫemia’s debts because he was reimbursed by Zū-Aštarti: (12) a-nu-[m]a 51 GÍN ⌜KÙ⌝.BABBAR.MEŠ 30 gišpa ŠE.MEŠ ḫu-[búl-l]i-ia (13) ᵐZu-[Aš]tar-ti a-na ᵐEN-UR.SAG i-din, “Now 51 shekels of silver and 30 parīsu of barley, my d[eb]t, Zū-[Aš]tarti paid to Bēlu-qarrād.” The text does not state whether the penalties of RE 10 were applied to Bēlu-qarrād. In a further document, Hirayama 45, Ḫemia gave his female servant, Ṣuḫmaiatu, to Zū-Aštarti and granted him the right to receive the terḫatu of his daughter Abī-qīrī. The latter and her sister Baʿla-milki are the same daughters of Ḫemia whose terḫātu were to be collected by Bēlu-qarrād in RE 10 and then by Zū-Aštarti in RE 13. The relative chronology of the three texts is unclear. If the agreement recorded in Hirayama 45 took place before RE 10 and RE 13, it may be suggested that Ḫemia dissolved the earlier contract. Later, with RE 10 Ḫemia granted the right of receiving Abī-qīrī’s bridewealth to Bēlu-qarrād and finally reassigned the right to his brother Zū-Aštarti. The consequences for dissolving Hirayama 45 are, however, unknown to us. Conversely, if RE 10 and RE 13 were the earlier documents, Hirayama 45 served as confirmation of Zū-Aštarti’s rights over his brother’s daughter.364 Despite his debts, Ḫemia’s situation was far from desperate, given the socio-economic position of his family towards the end of Emar history and his own properties. No clear-cut explanation can account for Ḫemia’s decision to resort to Bēlu-qarrād in the first place rather than to his brother Zū-Aštarti. It is to be noted that Bēlu-qarrād was Ḫemia’s principal creditor, having lent him 10 shekels of silver and 10 parīsu of barley, but it is dubious whether this played any role in Ḫemia’s decision. It is not excluded that Bēlu-qarrād belonged to Ḫemia’s

364 The relative chronology of the three texts is rather complicated. Perhaps it is more likely that Hirayama 45 preceded RE 10 and RE 13 because it is dated to the Overseer of the Land Tuwariša and can be synchronized with E 117, which is sealed by Šaggar-abu, “Great one of the chariots”; for the chronology of Tuwariša see ch. 3 fn. 252. On the other hand, in RE 10 Šaggar-abu bears the title of tartannu that he plausibly assumed later in his career. However, this chronology is based on indirect prosopographic links and it is not excluded that Šaggar-abu already held the office of tartannu when Tuwariša was Overseer of the Land.

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family circle. Indeed, RE 10 and RE 13 include the same contractual terms. Since written records were often drafted when agreements differed from customary practices, one may wonder what circumstances required written contracts applying the same terms to a relative and to an outsider. Bēlu-qarrād and Zū-Aštarti seemingly had the same legal status in relation to Ḫemia. Another question that cannot be answered within the limits of the present study concerns the enforcement of penalties, because the contract RE 10, and perhaps Hirayama 45, was broken without any apparent consequences. Furthermore, the lack of support claimed by some debtors in the family law contracts may be fictive, because Hemia’s statement in RE 10 is contradicted by the agreement with his brother in RE 13. From an economic point of view, these agreements favor those who assumed the palāḫu duty. Although these documents are regarded as recording consumptive debts, as in the case of RE 25 above the presence of multiple creditors raises doubts about their nature and might suggest a commercial context. 2.2.2.2.2 SMEA30 9 SMEA30 9 is a fragmentary tablet divided into five or six sections separated by rulings. The text is a palāḫu agreement establishing marriages between the debtor’s daughters and the sons of someone who repaid his debts. The first section (SMEA30 9: 1–16) contains the speech of the debtor, Abdi-ili son of Šameḫu son of Ia-[. . .], who declares that he had no male children who could look after him and that he was indebted. The amount of the debt, 20 shekels of silver and 20 parīsu of barley, is mentioned in the fourth section as part of the third party’s declaration (SMEA30 9: 33–35). Quite exceptionally, the benefactor, Ḫusiru, together with his family, entered Abdi-ili’s household to perform the palāḫu duty and paid his debt: (3) i-na-an-na mḪu-si-rù D[UMU . . . ] (4) qa-du DAM-šú 2 DUMU.MEŠ-ši a-na pa-la-[ḫi-(ia)] (5) a-na É-ia e-te-[e]r-ba ù ḫu-[búl-la-ia ú-šal-lim], “Now Ḫusiru s[on of . . . ] with his wife and her two sons, entered my house to suppor[t me], and [he paid my] d[ebt].” We are also informed that in a year of hardship (i-na MU.KÁM KALA.GA) Ḫusiru kept alive (bulluṭu) Abdi-ili’s daughters, who were then married off to his two sons (SMEA30 9: 5–9). In turn, Ḫusiru was made Abdi-ili’s heir,365 and apparently his sons were entitled to share Abdi-ili’s inheritance through their marriages (SMEA30 9: 10–16). The second section (SMEA 30 9: 17–25) establishes the disinheritance of Agitu, another daughter of Abdi-ili, for not having fulfilled the palāḫu duty. The third section (SMEA30 9: 26–32) contains the dissolution clause. Abdi-ili was able to secure the status of main wives for his daughters, and if Ḫusiru’s sons 365 SMEA30 9: 14, lúwa-ra-ša a-bal-‹li›-la NU.T[UKU]; for this clause see ch. 2 fn. 333.

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did not fulfill their duties, they would lose their rights to Abdi-ili’s inheritance. The penalty stipulated for Abdi-ili’s daughters should they divorce Ḫusiru’s sons is the forfeiture of their father’s possessions. At the end of the document, after the witness list and a break in the tablet, a heavily broken clause seems to impose a penalty of 250 shekels of silver upon Ḫusiru. The penalty is imposed if Ḫusiru wants to leave, but from where he might want to leave is not specified; we may presume that the clause refers to Abdi-ili’s house. The clause also refers to a “companionship” (NAM.TAB.BA), but its relation to the rest of the document remains unclear. The economic condition of Abdi-ili’s family does not seem to be desperate. This may be inferred from the mention of several possessions belonging to Abdiili366 and from the conditions imposed on Ḫusiru, particularly his residence in the debtor’s house. Nothing is known about the parties outside of this text,367 but as stated above, a woman called Agitu appears as creditor in E 213.368 Since the properties that Ḫusiru would inherit were of greater value than Abdi-ili’s debt, the main concern of this contract was likely the marriage agreement between the two families. The preserved part of the text does not name any creditors.

2.2.3 Lawsuits Concerning the Fulfillment of Obligations Five documents, all Syro-Hittite tablets, contain lawsuits adjudicating the repayment of debts. Lawsuits were mostly decided by Hittite authorities, namely the Overseer of the Land (TBR 36 and TBR 84), a Son of the King (E 127), or even the king of Karkemiš (MFA 1977.114). Local authorities also presided over courts: the Great Ones are mentioned in E 28, while the Elders are possibly attested along with the Overseer of the Land in TBR 84. Three documents (E 28, E 127, and MFA 1977.114) deal with disputes between foreigners and Emarites over commercial debts.

366 In addition to the house where Ḫusiru and his family went to dwell, another house located near the “central gate” that used to belong to Abdi-ili’s third daughter, Agitu, is possibly mentioned in SMEA30 9: 23, and an item weighing 400 shekels, part of the share of Abdi-ili’s daughters, is cited in SMEA30 9: 15. 367 A certain Ḫusiru son of Rībi-Dagan is mentioned in E 257 (see ch. 3 fn. 335), but it is uncertain whether he is the same individual because other persons with this name are found in Emar texts. 368 Note that SMEA30 9: 17–18 (a-nu-ma fA-gi-tu₄ DUMU.MUNUS-ia [. . .] // ša a-na É-ia e-te-púš [. . .]) may refer to the status of universal heir granted to Agitu, whose name in E 213 bears both male and female determinatives.

10 shekels of gold; Tuwata-ziti, oil for 100 sh.; Son of the King 5 talents of boxwood and 2 good oxes (= the value of a naššartu-woman and a child); 1 talent of copper of 4000 sh. in weigh 1 field

Fields

20 sh. (?)

100 sh. 2 slaves additional silver

45 sh.

Productive

Productive

Consumptive 77 sh.

Consumptive 20 sh.

SH

MFA SH 1977.114

SH

SH

E 127

TBR 36

TBR 84

Third Party

Pazuri-Dagan

Aššur-aḫa-iddina son of Šamaš-abu

Aḫlamû son of Abī-Bēlu

Creditor

Ari-Teššub man of Aššur

Lalû son of Zū-Baʿla

Inbuia (F)

Debtor

Mutri-Teššub, Karbu son of Buzza Overseer of the Abdi-Išḫara son of Land; Buzza Elders

Galalu son of Išḫara-abu; (Aštartu-līt son of Bābu-laʾu)

Buzza

Mutri-Teššub, Abī-Šaggar and Uginu son of Laḫma Apilu Overseer of the Abba, sons of Apilu Land

Ini-Teššub, king (Tarḫunta-azammi of Karkemiš mother of IniTeššub)

Great Ones

15 sh.

30 sh.

Productive

SH

E 28

Court

Repaid

Debt

Document Script Purpose

Table 14: Lawsuits Concerning the Fulfillment of Obligations.

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2.2.3.1 MFA 1977.114 The document MFA 1977.114 records a dispute that involved the royal family of Karkemiš. Pazuri-Dagan son of Akal-enna addressed the court presided over by the king of Karkemiš, Ini-Teššub, to obtain the return of 45 shekels of silver that he had lent to the Assyrian merchant Ari-Teššub.369 At this point the litigation registers the intervention of Ini-Teššub’s mother, Tarḫunta-azammi, who released Ari-Teššub and promised to repay the latter’s debt to Pazuri-Dagan. However, in lieu of silver, Pazuri-Dagan received a field of 2 square ikû located in the village of Kullati in the vicinity of Emar.370 The non-vindication clause (ṭuppu annû ilāʾēšu) bars reciprocal claims by the two opponents. Since one of the properties adjoining this field belongs to the “king,” who is to be identified with the king of Karkemiš,371 it is likely that the field given to Pazuri-Dagan was also a parcel of royal land because landowners tended to concentrate their properties in the same area.372 Although only three other Syro-Hittite field sale contracts record purchase prices, it is worth noting that MFA 1977.114 records the highest value per square ikû (22.5 sh.).373 The context of the debt is clearly commercial. The sum held by Ari-Teššub may have been an advance on goods that he was supposed to deliver to PazuriDagan after his return from Assur (i.e., Lieferungskauf) or capital invested in a trade venture. 2.2.3.2 E 127 The tablet E 127 was found in Area V but cannot be integrated into the archive of the family of Milki-Dagan.374 This document records a dispute between an Emarite and another Assyrian. Aššur-aḫa-iddina son of Šamaš-abu, an Assyrian merchant from the city of Šadikanni,375 addressed the Hittite court presided over by the Son of the King Tuwata-ziti and asserted that a certain Lalû son of Zū-Baʿla was indebted to him. Lalû repaid the debt by handing several commodities over to Aššur-aḫa-iddina: (6) 10 GÍN KÙ.SIG₁₇ za-ku-ú Ì.GIŠ ša 1 me-at KÙ.BABBAR.ḪI.A (7) 5 GÚ.UN gišTAŠKA369 For a reconstruction of the circumstances of the dispute, see Beckman 1996d. 370 This is also the location of the properties mentioned in E 115 and E 116, see pp. 92ff. 371 Note that Ini-Teššub is simply defined as LUGAL in MFA 1977.114: 39. 372 At any rate, because the text mentions no expropriation there is no reason to assume that the field received by Pazuri-Dagan did not belong to the royal family. 373 For the value of the field see Viano 2016: 173. 374 Rutz 2013: 78–79. 375 For the reading of the town see Durand 1989a. The town was under the control of Assur during the Middle Assyrian period, Cancik-Kirschbaum 2006–2008: 485–86.

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RIM.ḪI.A 2 GU₄ SAG₁₀ ša munus!na-aš-šar-ti (8) 1 TUR NÍTA 1 GÚ.UN URUDU ša 4 li-im KI.LÁ.BI, “10 shekels of pure gold, oil for 100 shekels of silver, 5 talents of boxwood, (and?) 2 oxen of good quality (in exchange for?) a naššartu-woman and a child (of her), 1 talent of copper of 4000 shekels in weight.”376 These items should not be understood as a substitute payment but as the goods to be delivered in a Lieferungskauf: Aššur-aḫa-iddina entrusted capital in the form of a loan to Lalû, who acted as an agent for the purchase of goods to be shipped to Šadikanni or Assur. Nonetheless, Lalû had not delivered the items yet, and Aššur-aḫa-iddina took him to court. The capital included 100 shekels of silver for purchasing oil, and, following Durand’s reading, one naššartu-woman and her son as slaves.377 It remains unknown whether Lalû was the final purchaser of these slaves or a middleman. The witness list, which includes Assyrians and Emarites, proves the commercial context of the document. Although Aššur-aḫa-iddina is not specifically referred to as a merchant, two witnesses are identified as LÚ.DAM.GÀR: Ṣilla-Idiglat (E 127: 18) and Mār-Šerūʾa (E 127: 19).378 The latter was both a scribe and a royal merchant (LÚ.DUB.SAR LÚ.DAM.GÀR ša LUGAL). Lalû is unknown elsewhere, but he seems to be a merchant and we can presume that this tablet was stored in his archive as a receipt for the delivery of the goods. The career of the Son of the King Tuwata-ziti lasted from the time of Muršili II down to Muwatalli II and Muršili III/Urḫi-Teššub,379 and thus he can be dated at the very beginning of the Syro-Hittite documentation. The early date of E 127 is further supported by the presence of the ḫazannu Ikki-Dagan among the witnesses.380 This local official is mainly known from Syrian sources, notably from the time of the First Dynasty.381

376 These goods were typically imported to Assyria, see Faist 2001: 170–71 and n. 120–21. 377 According to Durand (1990: 59), one naššartu-woman and her son were exchanged for 5 talents of boxwood and 2 oxen of good quality; this interpretation is followed by Faist 2001: 170–71. Conversely d’Alfonso (2005a: 181) regards the two slaves as part of the list of goods. 378 For the seals of Aššur-aḫa-iddina and Ṣilla-Idiglat see Beyer 2001: 211, 233; on the identity of Mār-Šerūʾa see Pruzsinszky and Solans 2015: 324 n. 63. 379 For this Hittite official mentioned in the Ḫattuša sources see d’Alfonso 2005a: 70–71. 380 Ikki-Dagan also seals the tablet, Beyer 2001: 228–39. 381 For the ḫazannū at Emar see Viano 2018b. Another Syro-Hittite tablet sealed by a ḫazannu is RE 39 (§ 3.2.1.1.3). These tablets were likely drafted before old local institutions had been fully replaced by the Hittite authorities.

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2.2.3.3 E 28 The lawsuit E 28 was found in House 5 in the same cache as the Babylonian-script tablets, but it was written by a local scribe of the Syro-Hittite tradition.382 The Great Ones were invited to judge a case involving about 30 shekels of silver owed by a woman, Inbuia, to Aḫlamû son of Abī-Bēlu. In order to avoid swearing the oath imposed by the Great Ones, the two parties agreed383 to reduce the debt by half so that Aḫlamû received 15 shekels of silver. Unfortunately, the relationship between Inbuia and Aḫlamû is unknown and it is unclear why Aḫlamû agreed to the restoration of only half the amount of the debt. Since the tablet was sealed by Aḫlamû, it is clear that E 28 was the copy held by Inbuia,384 who therefore belonged to the entourage of merchants dwelling in House 5. Although it is not explicitly stated, there is no reason to doubt that the debt originated in a commercial context. The text ends with the statement that the silver was received on the 16th day of the month of Tašritu.385 2.2.3.4 TBR 36 TBR 36 is a lawsuit heard by the Overseer of the Land, Mutri-Teššub. Uginu son of Laḫma386 sued Abba and Abī-Šaggar, sons of Apilu, for 77 shekels of silver owed to him by their father. Meanwhile another controversy broke out between Apilu’s sons. Abba declared that he was not liable for the debt and was sued by his brother, who apparently won the case:387 (5) ù mAb-ba a-kán-na iq-bi (6) ma-a i-na KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ ḫu-búl-li ša-a-šú ú-ul su-um-mu-ḫa-ku-mi (7) ù A-bi-d30 ‹m›Ab-ba iš-tu di-ni (8) a-na pa-ni LÚ.UGULA [KALA]M.MA il-te-ʾ-e-šu, “And Abba spoke as follows: ‘I am not involved in the silver of that debt.’ And Abī-Šaggar defeated Abba in the lawsuit before the Overseer of the Land.” Then the Overseer of the Land ruled that Uginu must take an oath, and he swore that the money was owed to him by Apilu.

382 For the tablets from House 5 see § 1.3.8. 383 E 28: 3–6, um-ma LÚ.MEŠ.GAL // a-na ma-mi-ti it-ta-šú-nu // i-na-an-na la-ma-ma i-na bi-rišú-‹nu› it-ma // im-taḫ-ra, “The Great Ones (spoke as follows): ‘What suits them is an oath.’ Now before they swore between them, they met,” see Durand and Marti 2003: 164–65. 384 Inbuia is an Akkadian name that is only attested in this Emar text, Pruzsinszky 2003: Index, 488. 385 For this month at Emar see Fleming 2000: 201. 386 For the family of Laḫma see § 1.3.7. 387 See Skaist 2001: 245; d’Alfonso (2005a: 179) regards Abba as the winner, but grammar confirms that Abī-Šaggar won the suit, Seminara 1998: 473; to construe Abba as the winner one must invert the order of the subject and object of the sentence, which is very unlikely.

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The outcome of the lawsuit filed by Uginu is rather complicated: 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24.

ù mA-bi-d30 KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ ša-a-šú šu-ul-lu-mi ú-ul i-li-ʾ-e ù A.ŠÀ.ḪI.A ka-ia-an-za388 ša a-bi-šu ša KÁ uruI[z]-bi ki-i-mu-ú KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ ša-a-šú ḫu-búl-li ša a-bi-šu a-na mÚ-gi-ni DUMU Láh-ma it-ta-din 4 aš-lu ša 38 IKU.MEŠ i-na ba!-li-ti 2 aš-lu₄ ša 22 IKU.MEŠ a-na pa-ni dKUR 4 aš-lu₄ ša 45 IKU.MEŠ i-na e-bir₅-ta-a-an i-na K[Á]-bi ka-pí A.ŠÀ.MEŠ an-na-tu₄ ša mA-bi-d30 ù mAb-ba DUMU.MEŠ A-pí-la a-na mÚ-gi-nu DUMU Làh-ma ki-i-mu-ú 77 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ ša ḫu-búl-li ša a-bi!-šu-nu it-ta-an-nu ù 2 aš-lu i-na ŠÀ A.ŠÀ.MEŠ ša mGUR-dKUR DUMU Qí-ri-dKUR DUMU Na-mar-ti

(12–13) And Abī-Šaggar was not able to pay out that silver. So, the fields, property (14) of his father, at the irrigation district of I[z]bu in lieu of that silver, (15–16) the debt of his father, (he) gave to Uginu son of Laḫma: 4 ašlu of 38 ikû (17) in the dead meander of the river; 2 ašlu of 22 ikû (18) in front of Dagan; 4 ašlu of 45 ikû (19) on the opposite bank of the river in the irrigation district of the stone; (20) these fields (belonging) to Abī-Šaggar and Abba (21–23) sons of Apilu, they gave to Uginu son of Laḫma in lieu of 77 shekels of silver of the debt of their father, and (they also gave) 2 ašlu in the fields of Tūra-Dagan (24) son of Kiri-Dagan son of Namartu. As Abī-Šaggar owned no silver (TBR 36: 12–13), he handed over to his creditor parcels of land in the irrigation district of Izbu389 that had belonged to his father (datio in solutum). Although lines 13–16 refer to Abī-Šaggar as the one settling the debt, the properties were jointly inherited with his brother Abba (TBR 36: 20); lines 22–23 make clear that the two brothers jointly paid the debt.390 Additionally, Abba and Abī-Šaggar transferred to Uginu some land belonging to Tūra-Dagan son of Kiri-Dagan son of Namartu. While this person is not mentioned elsewhere in the Emar documentation, his father Kiri-Dagan appears in RE 7 as the seller of

388 For this term see ch. 2 fn. 362. 389 For the irrigation district of Izbu see Reculeau 2008: 134 n. 50; for the irrigation district of the “stone” see p. 135 and n. 72. 390 Differently, d’Alfonso (2005a: 179) suggests that by repaying the debt with properties shared with his brother, Abī-Šaggar became indebted to him.

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a ḫabaʾu-building and a member of the “Brothers.” TBR 36 is silent on the identity of Tūra-Dagan son of Kiri-Dagan; he might be either an old rightholder391 or a member of the same family as Abba and Abī-Šaggar. The fields given to Uginu are disproportionately large in comparison to the amount of the debt. Although the field located near the balītu, “dead meander of the river,” was likely of little value,392 the same cannot be said for the other fields.393 Therefore, it is unclear whether the value of such a large parcel of land was deemed equivalent to the debt because land prices had fallen, or whether this was a harsh punishment imposed by the Overseer of the Land. Uginu is likely to be identified as the brother of Ḫinnu-Dagan, who recorded his business activities in RE 72 and RE 75.394 Uginu acts as a sealer in his brother’s marriage agreement (RE 76) and perhaps in a contract of indentured labor (RA77 5).395 Apilu and his sons are otherwise unknown. The lawsuit seemingly ensued from a cash shortage rather than impoverishment, because the sons of Apilu owned large plots of land. Nevertheless, it is unknown whether the family forfeited all their properties or retained ownership on some other lands after this lawsuit. One may not exclude that the family became seriously impoverished after being deprived of its means of subsistence. The reason why Apilu took out a loan is unknown, but the agrarian setting of the document points to consumption, and perhaps the funds were necessary for cultivation. We can posit that the same cash shortage afflicting Abba and Abī-Šaggar was behind the debt. 2.2.3.5 TBR 84 TBR 84 is a rather obscure text containing a lawsuit before the Overseer of the Land, Mutri-Teššub, and likely the Elders.396 Aštartu-līt son of Bābu-laʾu sued Karbu son of Buzza for 20 shekels of silver that Buzza owed to Galalu son

391 It is not precluded that Tūra-Dagan was indebted to Abba and Abī-Šaggar. 392 For the prices of fields located near the dead meander of the river see Viano 2010b: 263. 393 Irrigation districts (KÁ), where some fields were located, were sought-after areas for agriculture; most orchards, the most expensive type of agricultural lands, were located in irrigation districts, see Viano 2016. 394 For this family see § 1.3.7. 395 There is no direct link between RE 76, RA77 5, and TBR 36 but only in these documents does the name Uginu bear the patronymic Laḫma, Pruzsinszky 2003: Index, 798–99. If Uginu in RA77 5 and RE 76 are the same person, one must conclude that he owned more than one seal, because the sealing impression on RA77 5 (= Hirayama 35, see Ishida 2017–2018: 70) is different from that on RE 76. 396 The Elders are restored in the gap by Arnaud on the basis of E 201.

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of Išḫara-abu, likely Aštartu-līt’s cousin. Two tablets assessing Buzza’s debt were placed in Galalu’s house: ù 2 ṭup-paḫi.a ki-i 20 KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ i-na É mGala-li na-ad-nu (TBR 84: 5–7). Although not explicitly stated, it is plausible that these two tablets recorded some form of security, such as a real pledge.397 Then Abdi-Išḫara, Karbu’s brother, redeemed the tablets by returning the 20 shekels of silver: (7) ù mdARAD- dIš-ha-ra «ki-i» (8) ki-i ni-ka-rì! ṭup-paḫi.a ša a-bi-šu-nu (9) a-na 20 KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ iš-tu É mGa-la-li (10) [i-t]a-aṭ-ra, “And Abdi-Išḫara [has wi]thdrawn as an outsider the tablets of their father for 20 shekels of silver from the house of Galalu.”398 Because Aštartu-līt’s witnesses refused to swear, his claim was rejected. Unfortunately, prosopography offers no help in understanding the document as none of the parties is attested elsewhere. However, the fact that Abdi-Išḫara redeemed the tablets as a stranger, kima nikari, from the house of Galalu indicates that these two individuals were relatives. It is unlikely that the debtor’s family was facing economic difficulties because they were able to repay the debt, although the same cannot be said for the debtor himself, who likely contracted the debt for consumption.

397 Perhaps these tablets were a loan contract and a debt note renewing the outstanding loan. 398 For a different interpretation see d’Alfonso 2005a: 180.

3 Default and Dependency 3.1 General Remarks and Terminology This chapter will discuss the consequences of unpaid debts, i.e., default, which in Emar as in the whole ancient Near East could culminate in the loss of personal freedom. In Emar sources, a variety of forms of dependency result from default. However, the study of the documents pertaining to default would remain incomplete without addressing the conditions of dependency that arose from circumstances other than debt. The term ‘dependency’ covers forms of coerced labor that may originate from different causes. Sources will be organized according to the cause of dependency rather than by types of dependency (e.g., slavery vs. non-slavery), which may cut across different causes. Therefore, documents pertaining to slavery are presented here in different sections according to the cause of slavery. This organization is justified by our primary focus on the socio-economic aspects and the need to group together all forms of dependency derived from indebtedness, i.e., default. The two main causes of dependency in Emar sources can be identified as indebtedness (§ 3.2) and hardship (§ 3.3). Although the resulting conditions were probably the same or very similar, the sources referring to indebtedness must be distinguished from those referring to hardship. While texts clearly refer to indebtedness through specific terminology or phrases, hardship is a less precise criterion to categorize sources because it is used for documents that lack unambiguous reference to debts. Impoverishment and distress may be caused by factors other than indebtedness, such as drought, famine, plague, and other natural or human causes. A third group can be identified in some documents pertaining to slave transactions (§ 3.4). These documents do not initiate slavery, nor do they indicate its origin. The slaves treated in these sources can be regarded as chattel slaves, i.e., houseborn slaves, and foreigners captured in war or abducted, although some considerations will be provided below. The ancient Near East, like many ancient societies, knew different conditions of dependency that covered a spectrum of statuses, to use Finley’s words, between freedom and absolute rightlessness.1 The various forms of dependency are notoriously difficult to define and they vary across space and time. In particular, the nature of slavery2 and its distinction from other forms of dependency and 1 Finley 1964. 2 Note that as Finley (1968: 308) puts it: “Slavery is a species of dependent labor and not the genus.” https://doi.org/10.1515/9781501515309-003

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even from freedom have been much debated.3 The legal and economic approaches that have dominated the study of forms of dependency in the ancient Near East have been criticized for their inability to describe the experience and the reality of coerced laborers, especially slaves.4 However, the scope of the present study and the nature of the sources lead us to retain a legal-economic classification, while remaining well aware that practical differences in daily life between various forms of dependency are hardly distinguishable. Although the forms of dependency can be sorted into three main groups, ancient and modern terminology cut across these groups. The two most frequently attested terms for forms of dependency in Emar sources are amēlūtu and (w)ardu. Some documents use neither of these two terms but regulate forms of dependency that require to be classified contextually. The term amēlūtu is translated by CAD5 as “retainer,” but in Middle Babylonian sources it assumes a sense closer to slave than to retainer.6 In Kassite Nippur, an amēlūtu was subject to sale just as slaves were, whereas at Emar amēlūtus are never attested as the object of sale contracts and cannot be alienated. Therefore, at Emar, unlike in Kassite sources, a person taken as an amēlūtu had free (or semifree) status and must be clearly distinguished from a slave.7 Unlike the status of a slave, that of an amēlūtu was a temporary condition binding a debtor to serve his creditor or the person who repaid his debt; it lasted until the debt was repaid or until the master’s death. At Emar the term amēlūtu is only found in relation to debt, and as explained in detail below (§ 3.2.1), the condition of amēlūtus can be defined as indentured labor. The term amēlūtu is utilized in nine contracts that regulate the debtor’s 3 For an overview of research on ancient Near Eastern forms of dependency, chiefly slavery, see Culbertson 2011a and Baker 2017: 15–18 with previous bibliography. On the dichotomy between slavery and freedom see the antithetical positions of Culbertson (2011a: 10), who maintains that such polarity is “untenable,” and von Dassow (2018b), who argues for a clear distinction between freedom and slavery. The distinction between slavery, other forms of dependency, and freedom has sparked debates since the seminal works of Gelb and Diakonoff (Gelb 1967, Gelb 1972, Diakonoff 1974); also fundamental is the work of Dandamaev (1984: 67–80), who, unlike previous views that were influenced by Finley’s claim for a sharp distinction between the concept of freedom and slavery in the ancient Near East and the classical Graeco-Roman world (Finley 1964), pointed out that there is no basis for such a distinction; more recent studies, in addition to those just quoted are Adams 2010, Snell 2011, Tenney 2011a: 121–33, Tenney 2011b, von Dassow 2011, Tenney 2017: 716–25, Lewis 2018, von Dassow 2020; on the different forms of dependency see also Eltis and Engerman 2011. 4 Culbertson 2011a. 5 CAD A/2: 58. 6 For amēlūtu in Kassite sources see Sassmannshausen 2001: 117–19, Tenney 2011a: 129–32. 7 For a detailed discussion see § 3.2.1; on this point see also Démare-Lafont 2010: 75.

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service to his master (§ 3.2.1.1) and in one testament (§ 3.2.1.1.3). Two contracts lacking the term amēlūtu can nevertheless be identified as cases of indentured labor because they contain legal clauses similar to those in the amēlūtu contracts (§ 3.2.1.2). The Akkadian word (w)ardu is usually translated as “slave,” but, as often noted in the literature, it is a relational term that assumes different meanings according to the other terms it is associated with.8 It designates not only the subordination of a legally owned individual to a private or institutional household, but also various legal, ideological, and religious relationships of subordination. While (w)ardu identifies a relation of subordination, it does not necessarily imply unfree status; for instance, in a metaphoric sense, a king can be (w)ardu of the god and a high-ranking official can be (w)ardu of the king. Slavery is traditionally identified in terms of property, and (w)ardu means ‘slave’ when it refers to persons who are legally owned.9 Raymond Westbrook has distinguished three basic types of slaves in ancient Near Eastern sources: chattel slaves, debt slaves, and famine slaves.10 According to Westbrook, chattel slaves were houseborn slaves born to a female chattel slave or war prisoners.11 Chattel slaves belonged to their owners and as such were freely sold, bequeathed, 8 See most recently von Dassow 2018b: 662, 68–69, von Dassow 2020: 79–80, Baker 2017: 16, see also van Driel 1970, Dandamaev 1984: 81–90, Westbrook 1995: 1624, Westbrook 2003a: 380. 9 This interpretation of slavery has been challenged by the influential work of Patterson (1982), who defines slavery as “the permanent, violent domination of natally alienated and generally dishonoured persons” (p. 13); see also Culbertson 2011a, Baker 2017. 10 Westbrook 1995; for categories of slaves see also Wells 2005: 190–92; for the Old Babylonian period see Westbrook 2003a: 380–82 and van Koppen 2004: 11; for the Old Assyrian period see de Ridder 2017: 56–57, with previous bibliography. 11 Note that war prisoners were not automatically enslaved, for a ransom could be paid by the palace authority following an agreement between belligerents or by private individuals through merchants; when a merchant by his own will released a war prisoner by paying the ransom, the prisoner’s status with respect to the merchant was similar to that of debt slaves. He could be released either by reimbursing the merchant or by working off the price of the ransom, see Charpin 2014: 49–62. That war prisoners were not automatically enslaved is made explicit in an agreement between the kings of Šadlaš and Nerebtum that establishes different prices according to the status of war prisoners, i.e., freemen or slaves; this implies that the freemen retained their status even as prisoners, see Charpin 2014: 34–37. As argued by Seri (2013: 255–56) with respect to state management of forced labor, in the Old Babylonian period war prisoners seem to have undergone a change of status that turned them into slaves; consequently they were assigned to institutions and individuals, although the latter seem to act in their official capacity, see Seri 2013: 257–58. Recently, Richardson (2020: 55–59) has argued that in Babylonia during the Late Old Babylonian period, foreign-born slaves were not spoils of war or the result of Babylonian economic demand. Rather, he argued that foreigners became enslaved due to hardship in socio-economic marginal communities in their native lands.

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exchanged, or donated. As rightless people, chattel slaves were not granted the right of redemption and could be released only through manumission. Debt and famine slavery arise from the enslavement of freeborn individuals. Because such enslavement was considered an extreme act, debt and famine slaves were granted the right of redemption.12 Debt slaves were forced to forfeit their freedom through sale or self-enslavement. Famine slavery arose during times of duress, as people sold themselves or their relatives or voluntarily entered slavery in order to be kept alive. Although duress is a motivation for entering this type of contract, famine slaves are to be distinguished from debt slaves because their status does not arise from indebtedness. This is particularly evident in the redemption clause that stipulates the provision of substitutes rather than a price correlated to the debt, as in debt slavery. As argued by Westbrook, the rationale of the right of redemption is “no mere sop to sentimentalism, nor is it a fetter on ordinary commerce (since a sufficient price will overcome the right of redemption); it is rather an equitable measure to ensure that ancestral land [or family members, MV] is not lost forever due to temporary economic weakness.”13 Thus, a principle of equity grounded in the realm of social justice created measures for the relief of debtors. Although debt slaves were alienable, the right of redemption bound subsequent purchasers because, in Yaron’s words, followed by Westbrook, “the creditor will not be able to grant better title than he himself has got.”14 In Emar sources, the term (w)ardu is employed in a variety of text types to describe conditions that originated from debt and hardship as well as for chattel slaves, i.e., all three types of slaves in Westbrook’s classification. That the conditions originating from debt and hardship are legitimately defined as slavery is supported by the enslavement clause ana (w)ardūti nadānu/erēbu found in the majority of documents (see Table 15 below). While (w)ardu is a relational term, (w)ardūtu is only used for people owned by their masters.15 A feature common to all types of slaves is their salability, as attested in sale contracts. The term (w)ardu is also employed in the realm of pledge law, as attested in the Middle Assyrian letter AOAT 265.1, sent by an Emarite merchant who was pledged by his creditors (§ 3.2.2). Besides the terms (w)ardu and amtu, which show up in the majority of sources, slaves are also identified by ṣuḫārtu (MUNUS.TUR) and napištu (ZI). The Akkadian root √ṣḫr is semantically linked to smallness and youth, but the words 12 For differences in the applicability of the right of redemption between debt and famine slaves see Westbrook 1995: 1651–56; for Emar see see § 5.3. 13 Westbrook 1991: 101. 14 Yaron 1959: 158, Westbrook 1995: 1660–62. 15 Dandamaev 1984: 84.

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ṣuḫāru and ṣuḫārtu were used for both minors and adult slaves (e.g., E 25).16 The word napištu, always written in Emar texts with the logogram ZI, does not identify a category of slaves but simply means “person.” It is used to indicate persons purchased in slave transactions as well as persons demanded in exchange for redeeming slaves. Because it has a general meaning, it also turns up in two contracts that establish unclear types of dependency (Hirayama 37 and TBR 25; see below). Debt slavery was established through two legal procedures at Emar: sale (§  3.2.3.1) and enslavement (§ 3.2.3.2). Sales are known from two documents only, one of which is formulated as a self-sale. The term ‘enslavement for debt’ is employed in the present study for all cases in which slavery does not derive from sale. These include four contracts in which debtors enter into the condition of slavery to a third party who pays off their debts and who is obviously different from the original creditor (§ 3.2.3.2.1),17 and three lawsuits establishing slavery for defaulting debtors (§ 3.2.3.2.2). As explained above, hardship is a broad category that encompasses forms of dependency that are not explicitly related to indebtedness. The only legal procedure where hardship is the background of (w)ardūtu is sale. A group of twelve sale contracts in which freeborn persons are sold by members of their family can be described, following Westbrook’s terminology, as sales into famine slavery (§ 3.3.1). The Emar texts discussed under the heading of chattel slavery (§ 3.4) provide no hints about the cause of enslavement. People concerned in these documents differ from debt and famine slaves because they are never granted the right of redemption, and their personal names are not usually mentioned. Unlike the texts related to debt and famine slavery, the documents treated in § 3.4 do not initiate slavery but record transactions of people who were already enslaved and, regardless the origin of their status, were treated as chattel and were freely alienable with no encumbering right of redemption. For such reasons these documents must be distinguished from those pertaining to debt and famine slavery and are treated under the practical heading of ‘chattel slavery,’ with the caveat that the cause of enslavement remains unknown. Various types of documents concern what are usually identified as chattel slaves: eight sources pertain to the sale of chattel slaves (§ 3.4.1), two documents record unclear types of transactions involving slaves (§ 3.4.2), and various documents treat donations and exchanges of chattel slaves (§ 3.4.3). 16 See Finet 1972, Westbrook 1995: 1634–35, Richardson 2019: 13. 17 For the difference between the enslavement contracts and the contracts of indentured labor see § 3.2.1; although the two types of contracts regulate similar situations – i.e., a debtor entering the service of his creditor – the contractual stipulations reveal a difference of status.

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In addition to these forms of dependency, this chapter will also deal with documents that include none of the terms discussed above. Some make specific reference to debt, but the nature of the condition cannot be clearly classified as indentured labor or slavery (§ 3.2.4). Other documents that lack unambiguous references to debts will be discussed under hardship (§ 3.3.2). This chapter concludes with a discussion of the termination of slavery (§ 3.5), which at Emar was achieved through two basic mechanisms, redemption (§ 3.5.1) and manumission (§ 3.5.2). Almost all documents dealing with dependency were drafted according to the Syro-Hittite tradition. Only a single chattel slave sale contract (§ 3.4.1.1) and two documents pertaining to hardship written according to the Syrian tradition are preserved. Three letters in different scripts pertain to dependency: a Middle Assyrian letter concerns a pledged person (§ 3.2.2), a Middle Babylonian letter relates to the sale of a chattel slave (§ 3.4.1.3), and a letter of unknown provenance records an unclear type of transaction involving a slave (§ 3.4.2.1).

3.1.1 Legal Clauses in Documents pertaining to Debt and Famine Slavery Documents regulating slavery for debt or famine include several legal clauses that are shared by different text types, as summarized in Table 15. Enslavement was stipulated using several formulas. The enslavement contracts adopt the clause ana (w)ardūti erēbu, while in sales the verb nadānu is used, ana (w)ardūti/amūti nadānu.18 The latter clause is also employed in one lawsuit regulating enslavement for debt. All sale contracts include the clause ŠÁM.TIL.LA, “full price.” This clause, which may occur in sales of any type, including sales of chattel slaves, shows that contracts stipulating the purchase of freeborn people either because of debt or famine were regular sales.

18 Because females are mostly attested in sale contracts, the clause mainly appears as ana GÉME-utti nadānu.

Full price

YES

TBR 44

YES

YES

YES

E 215

GsK 1

Hirayama 36

YES

AuOr5 11

Nonvindication Clause

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

HARDSHIP-RELATED DOCUMENTS

(YES20)

YES

YES

(YES19)

Redemp tion Clause

DEBT-RELATED DOCUMENTS

ana (w)ardūti nadānu

19 TBR 26: 5–6, a-na GÉME . . . it-ta-nu-ši. 20 AuOr5 11: 5–6, a-na ARAD.MEŠ . . . it-ta-din-sú-nu-ti.

YES

ASJ10 E

Sales into Famine Slavery

E 252

E 205

E 33

Lawsuits Establishing Enslavement for Debt

YES

YES

ana (w)ardūti erēbu

E 121

Enslavement Contracts

YES

TBR 26

Sales into Debt Slavery

Document

Table 15: Legal Clauses in Documents Pertaining to Debt and Famine Slavery.

YES

zakû Clause

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

Voluntarily Clause

(continued)

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

Dead or alive Clause

3.1 General Remarks and Terminology   139

YES

YES

?

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

AuOr5 12

E7

E 79

E 83

E 84

E 118

E 217

Hirayama 17

Hirayama 18

TBR 52

ana (w)ardūti erēbu

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES?21

?

YES

YES

ana (w)ardūti nadānu

21 The clause is restored: E 83: 4, [a-na GÉME-ut-ti i]š-tu SAG.DU-ši.

Full price

Document

Table 15 (continued)

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

?

Redemp tion Clause

YES

YES

(YES) No disputation

Nonvindication Clause

YES

YES

zakû Clause

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

Voluntarily Clause

YES

YES

YES

YES

Dead or alive Clause

140   3 Default and Dependency

3.1 General Remarks and Terminology 

 141

Because deprivation of freedom and reduction to the status of slave for debt or famine was perceived as a social abuse, an extreme practice acceptable only in exceptional circumstances, enslavement required, at least formally, a voluntary act. At Emar this took the form of the “voluntarily” clause, which states that a person became slave “of his/her own will,” ištu SAG.DU-šu/ši.22 This clause finds a later parallel in the expression ina ḫūd libbīšu attested in the Neo Babylonian slave sales from Nippur.23 The “voluntarily” clause mostly occurs in sale contracts but is also found in documents related to enslavement for debt. In sale contracts the full price and the “voluntarily” clauses were variously combined, but the most frequently attested sequence is ana x KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ SÁM.TIL.LA ana ARAD/GÉME-utti ištu SAG.DU-šu/ši ana/ša PN ittadin. The redemption clause is included in seven out twelve sales into famine slavery, while neither of the two sales into debt slavery grant the right of redemption. As with other types of properties, redemption was set at twice the original price/debt.24 The redemption clause is not limited to sales, as it is found in two out of four enslavement contracts and two out of three lawsuits regulating enslavement for debt. Properties purchased from sellers pressured by debt or famine were alienable, but the right of redemption encumbered on the new owner, as clearly shown by TBR 29. As seen above, in this document Baʿla-kīmī’s son was granted the right to receive the price of redemption for properties he inherited from his mother and which her husband acquired by repaying someone’s debt. There is no reason to doubt that the same mechanisms applied to enslaved persons, as shown by Mesopotamian parallels.25 Not all the documents pertaining to debt and famine slavery grant the right of redemption, which can be specifically banned by the non-vindication clause, ṭuppu annû ilāʾēšu, “this tablet will prevail over him,” which establishes the irrevocability of the contract.26 The non-vindication clause is also found in a few docu-

22 The “voluntarily” clause was obviously a fictitious legal device, see Adamthwaite 2001: 139–44, Fijałkowska 2014a: 105–06 (with previous bibliography) and § 5.2.1. According to Arnaud (1981: 6) the ideogram SAG.DU stands for ramānu; by contrast Zaccagnini (1995: 103) interprets it as underlying the word qaqqadu. Note that the only self-sale, TBR 44, does not have this clause, probably because it was thought to be implicit; this testifies to the fictitious nature of the clause, since the sale is imposed by the relatives of the sold person. 23 Dandamaev 1984: 181, Zaccagnini 1995: 103. 24 For the redemption clause see § 1.5; for the redemption of real properties see § 4.9.2, and for persons see § 5.3. 25 Westbrook (1995: 1661) quotes a Middle Babylonian document describing redemption from a transferee; see also de Ridder 2017: 56–57; for Emar cf. Fijałkowska 2014a: 114–15. 26 For this clause see §1.5; one document, AuOr5 12 has a clause banning the slave from disputing her status, which can be assimilated to the non-vindication clause.

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ments pertaining to chattel slavery (Iraq54 5, E 35, E 211, E 214), in which it seems to refer to former owners, as explicitly mentioned in Iraq54 5. In a few sale contracts (one related to debt and two to famine), the zakû clause protects the buyer from claims, leaving the burden of settling any controversy to the seller.27 The document E 83 shows that this clause does not serve to bar redemption because it contains both the zakû clause and the redemption clause.28 Documents of various types related to debt and famine slavery contain the “dead or alive” clause, which states that the sold person was to remain (w)ardu/ amtu of the master, whether dead or alive, BA.UG₇ TI.LA ARAD/GÉME ša PN. This clause was inserted to indicate that the transaction was final, preventing any claim from the buyer should the slave die. In the end, the clause puts all the risk of the purchase on the buyer, relieving the seller from liability.29

3.1.2 The Boundaries of Slavery at Emar In a recent book on the slave system in Greece and the Near East during the first millennium B.C., David Lewis put forth strong arguments to abandon the use of the terms ‘chattel slave’ and ‘debt slave.’ Lewis’ understanding of slavery in terms of property leads him to distinguish slaves from all other forms of dependents “because a society’s laws grant their masters the rights of ownership over them.”30 Debt slaves are therefore not different from other types of slaves because “[e]nslavement for debt transforms the debtor into a slave, who can be bought, sold, inherited, and so on; and the creditor who enslaves him upon default becomes his owner.”31 By the same token, the term ‘chattel slave’ becomes a pleonasm because a slave is intrinsically property and does not require further specification. While this perspective can be justified by the scope of Lewis’s study

27 For this clause see § 1.5. 28 The function of this clause is very clear in the document of redemption BLMJ 12, which states that any claim against the redeemer will be settled by the former pledgeholder, see § 2.2.1.2.12. 29 According to Westbrook (2001a: 32–35), the rationale of the clause was to prevent the buyer’s claim that the sale was a pledge and, consequently, that the death of the slave did not extinguish the debt. Démare-Lafont (2010: 51) believes that if the slave died before being delivered, the loss was considered a fortuitous event to be borne by the new owner. According to Fijałkowska (2014a: 112–13), the clause might simply underscore the conclusion of the transaction. In my opinion, the rationale of the clause is purely economic, as it served as a disclaimer that, at the moment of the transaction, the slave had no health issues leading to his/her death; therefore, the seller would be relieved from any charge should the slave die after the transaction. 30 Lewis 2018: 8–11. 31 Lewis 2018: 10.

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 143

(Greece and the first-millennium Near East), it presents limitations for the study of Emar sources and more generally for the second millennium B.C. Lewis adopts Antony Honoré’s theory of property law, which defines ownership according to ten aspects: right to possess, right to use, right to manage, right to income, right to capital, right to security, transmissibility, absence of term, prohibition of harmful use, and liability to execution.32 Of these, the absence of term poses problems with the Emar sources. The right of redemption sets, at least in theory, a term limit on ownership over a slave.33 Applying Lewis’s definition of slavery to the Emar sources would result in limiting the term ‘slavery’ to chattel slaves, the only ones that were not granted the right of redemption. The question arises whether the right of redemption should be considered an indication that ownership was not transferred.34 This question is intertwined with the fact that the redemption clause is found in sale contracts that, by definition, transfer the title to property. We need first to lay out the nature of the sale of persons at Emar. On the one hand, a contract of sale is designed to effect the permanent transfer of ownership; on the other hand, although the limit to the duration of ownership is not specifically indicated in texts, the encumbering right of redemption could end ownership at any time. Forced sales of people at Emar do not differ from regular sale contracts, as shown by the presence of the “full price” clause. They clearly differ from the so-called slave laws of the Torah that, although dealing with sales, reflect a condition of indentured labor, as rightly argued by Lewis.35 Emar sales of persons must also be distinguished from pledge. Although the concept of the right of redemption derives from pledge law, the sold persons cannot be considered as securities for a debt.36 Sales of people under pressure of

32 Honoré 1961, cf. Lewis 2018: 33–39. 33 Although Lewis recognizes, following Honoré, that ownership has limits and restrictions, the right of redemption cannot be included in the last of Honoré’s aspects, liability to execution (pp. 35–36), because this concerns the deprivation of property by a third party, either as a consequence of the owner’s inability to fulfill obligations – i.e., in the case of foreclosure, forfeiture of pledge, or seizure of properties by the state for taxes in arrears – or for supreme public benefit. Redemption is a totally different concept and procedure, by which ownership is returned to the previous owner regardless of the new owner’s ability to fulfill obligations. 34 The right of redemption is largely overlooked by Lewis and limited to the redemption of pledge, Lewis 2018: 225–26; note that the word ‘redemption’ occurs only three times in the whole book. 35 Lewis 2018: 204–11. 36 This hypothesis has been advanced by Leemans (1988: 227–30) following Hengstl’s (1987: 11) similar suggestion for the Old Assyrian documentation; Leemans’s hypothesis is, however, based on the false assumption that the price of redemption was equivalent to the debt. The possibility

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debt or famine differ from pledge theoretically and practically. In theory, while being pledged is a temporary condition that may become permanent, being sold is a permanent condition that can, however, be ended. In practice, at Emar the redemption price is usually set at twice the purchase price or debt, whereas the price to redeem a pledge is the same as the debt simply because pledge, by nature, does not generate ownership before definitive forfeiture. Hence, sale contracts of persons must be considered sales in their own right. We need to ask whether sale contracts generated a different condition from other contracts pertaining to debt and famine slavery. Both sale contracts and enslavement contracts establish (w)ardūtu through very similar clauses, ana (w)ardūti nadānu and ana (w)ardūti erēbu respectively (Table 15). That the status in these two types of documents must be regarded as the same is further supported by the text TBR 44, which contains both the clause ana (w)ardūti erēbu, typical of enslavement contracts, and the clause ŠÀM.TIL.LA, “full price,” found in sale contracts.37 The cross-cutting distribution of legal clauses does not allow us to isolate sale contracts from the other documents. Remarkably, the “dead or alive” clause, which marks the final transfer of ownership, is attested in all types of documents. Once it has been established that all documents pertaining to debt and famine slavery generated the same form of dependency, we need to elucidate the nature of the right of redemption at Emar. Lewis, quoting Dandamayev,38 argues that temporary work can hardly be considered slavery since, in his view, owner’s rights over slaves are permanent.39 This is certainly true when limits to the duration of service are regulated at the outset of the contractual stipulation, as in pledge law. Yet, redemption does not set a limit to the duration of the service,40 but grants a right that merely represents a potential outcome. Lewis’s confidence in identifying universal and cross-cultural property rights (relying upon Honoré’s theory of property) that would enable us to distinguish slavery from other conditions collides with the specificity of the right of redemption at Emar and that sales of persons under the pressure of debt or famine are legal devices to provide a pledge has been ruled out, see Westbrook 2001a: 28–29, Fijałkowska 2014a: 162–63. There are no cases at Emar where an antichretic pledge is formulated as a sale contract, as in the case of the Old Assyrian document mentioned by de Ridder 2017: 58. 37 Note that this document, which is treated here among the sale contracts, has been classified as an enslavement contract by Fijałkowska 2014a: 109–10. 38 Dandamaev 1984: 80: “In the first place, the debtor, who only worked temporarily for the creditor, can hardly be considered a slave.” 39 Lewis 2018: 35. 40 The Code of Ḫammurabi (§ 117) sets a limit of three years for debt slavery but no such provisions are known from Emar sources.

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elsewhere. Two basic problems thus emerge: first, clarifying whether ownership can be applied to (w)ardus who were granted the right of redemption; second, understanding whether a criterion based on permanent ownership is sufficient to distinguish slavery from other forms of dependency at Emar. A feature that characterizes Emar sources and is partially shared by other corpora is that the redemption price is usually set at a higher value than the debt or sale price; usually it is doubled, or two persons must be exchanged for one.41 Westbrook noted that redemption in Emar “defies easy characterization,” pointing out that “[i]t can be classified neither as a simple reflex of the social justice measure found in the law codes nor as the untrammeled initiative of a party to a free market transaction, whether the buyer or the seller.”42 This feature requires attention. The setting of the redemption price at double the value of the debt/sale price is an implicit recognition of property rights and an offsetting of the customary right, inspired by the principle of social justice, that penalized the buyer. As discussed in more detail below (§ 5.4), saving someone from debt or hardship could represent an economic effort, given the price of slaves and the cost of supporting them. The double price of redemption would compensate the owner for the lost property, the money invested, and the loss of potential future work provided by the slave. Redemption could even turn into a profitable transaction for the owner, who obtained twice the amount disbursed in addition to the exploitation of the workforce prior to that moment. If redemption took place when the enslaved person was advanced in age (an unlikely eventuality but theoretically possible), the owner’s family (or himself if still alive) would gain a profit that they would not have been able to obtain by selling the person on the market because aging lowered the value of slaves. The double price of redemption acknowledged the owner’s rights over people who had been forced to relinquish their freedom because of debt or famine and protected his investment.43 We can therefore speak of a limited ownership, but ownership nonetheless. Ownership remains a valuable criterion for distinguishing slavery from other forms of dependency at Emar, notably indentured labor, but one needs to assume that it was conceptualized differently in antiquity. 41 See § 5.3. In the Old Assyrian texts, the double price of redemption appears to be less regular, but in most cases redemption was set at a higher amount than the original debt, see Veenhof 1978: 295–98, Bayram and Çeçen 1998, see also Leemans 1988: 228. In Middle Babylonian sale contracts, slaves could be redeemed by providing substitutes at the rate of two per one, Gurney 1983: 5, see also ch. 5 fn. 100. 42 Westbrook 2001a: 29. 43 That ownership was transferred to the buyer in forced sales is also shown in the Ur III sources, Culbertson 2011b: 40; note that in court cases, the parents did not attempt to free their enslaved children by contesting their status but by claiming that they never received a payment (p. 42); the same occured when slaves themselves claimed that they had not been sold (p. 43).

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Another problem concerns documents related to debt and famine slavery that lack the redemption clause (Table 15). One may argue that its absence could be taken as a criterion to distinguish slavery from other forms of dependency. Consequently, the term ‘slave’ would only be used in those documents that do not grant the right of redemption. Such a distinction would not take into account that, regardless of specific contractual stipulations, distressed people forced into slavery because of debt or famine were usually granted the right of redemption across various regions and periods in the ancient Near East.44 Because the other clauses are distributed across documents with or without the redemption clause, we are not justified in regarding as slaves only the (w)ardus who were not granted the right of redemption. In particular, the “dead or alive” clause that seems to stipulate the transfer of ownership appears together with the redemption clause. By the same token, documents lacking the “dead or alive” clause should not be treated separately.45 As discussed in detail in § 5.3, we cannot exclude that in some cases the right of redemption was granted even though it had not been explicitly stated, as a few texts (TBR 26, E 215, E 33, E 84) lack both the redemption clause and the non-vindication clause. That the two clauses (redemption and non-vindication) are not even mutually exclusive is shown by the text E 121, in which the redemption clause limits the right of redemption to the debtor, and the non-vindication clause prevents claims from third parties. In conclusion, there is not enough evidence that documents related to debt or famine that omitted the redemption clause granted a fuller right of ownership than those that included the redemption clause. The lack of the right of redemption can be ascribed to circumstantial causes. Alternatively, if the right of redemption was not implicitly granted in documents missing the redemption clause, we may assume that the owners were able to offset the rules of social justice. Either through the double price of redemption or the non-vindication clause the owner’s property rights were protected. That the translation of the term (w)ardu as “slave” is justified in all three of the major groups of documents where it occurs is further supported by the fact that in Emar sources, (w)ardus were subject to sale, regardless of the cause of their condition.46 That being subject to purchase and sale is a good criterion for distinguishing free from unfree is specifically indicated textually: in E 33 and

44 Westbrook 1995: 1651–56, see also van Koppen 2004: 11. 45 Admittedly, when the “dead or alive” clause is lacking, the non-vindication clause does not appear either, while the redemption clause is generally included, which could suggest that ownership was not transferred. However, this objection is invalidated by the fact that the majority of documents with the redemption clause also have the “dead or alive” clause. 46 As rightly pointed out by de Ridder, “There was only a thin line between debt and chattel slave,” and the Old Assyrian sources provide evidence for debt slaves becoming chattel slaves,

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Hirayama 46, people are declared free by means of the formula ša lā ŠÁM, “the one who is not purchased.”47 The text RE 26,48 in which unfree status is indicated by the term (w)ardu, further supports its translation as “slave.” Therefore, Westbrook’s terminology – debt slavery, famine slavery, and chattel slavery – is used here as a powerful heuristic tool, but with some caveats. First, the nature of ownership over debt and famine slaves is more limited than that over chattel slaves. Second, the sale has a different function for debt and famine slaves than for chattel slaves: for the former it is the mechanism for entering slavery, while for the latter it regulates a change of ownership. An important exception is represented by the Middle Assyrian text AOAT 265.1, in which a person has been pledged (šapartu) and forced to work as a (w)ardu. Given its relational nature and broad semantic range, the term (w)ardu is used to describe the actual condition of work, but in this case it does not imply that the person is owned by the creditor or could be sold. A pledge by its very nature is a means to secure a debt, and its ownership is not transferred to the creditor before default. The text clearly states that the debtor will be released upon repayment. Thus, in this case the term ‘slave’ cannot be applied.

3.2 Dependency caused by Default As argued above (§§ 1.2, 2), one of the major motivations of ancient Near Eastern moneylenders was obtaining the debtor’s labor.49 Although the entire practice of moneylending cannot be reduced to the purpose of acquiring cheap labor,50 the operation of the ancient Near Eastern credit system most often led to default when credit was granted for consumption. When the strategies of debt settlement discussed above (§ 2.2) could not be implemented, debtors did not satisfy their creditors. Forms of bonded labor were the inescapable consequence of default when debtors had no means to repay their obligations other than their physical labor.51

de Ridder 2017: 56–57. The term ‘debt bondage’ would be problematic as well because it identifies a temporary service like indentured labor, see Lewis 2018: 10. 47 For E 33 see § 3.2.3.2.2.3, for Hirayama 46 see ch. 3 fn. 344; see also Yamada 1995: 301–06, 309–11, Bellotto 2002: 132–37, d’Alfonso 2005b: 28–34, von Dassow 2018b: 668–70, von Dassow 2020: 95–96. 48 For this text see § 3.3.2.2.2. 49 See Steinkeller 2002: 110–13. 50 See Garfinkle 2012: 46–48, 64–65, 145–46. 51 See Chirichigno 1993: 49–52.

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The majority of Emar sources related to default identify one of two types of dependency: indentured labor (§ 3.2.1), mainly associated with the term amēlūtu; and debt slavery (§ 3.2.3). Additionally, a few documents concern personal pledge upon default (§ 3.2.2) and some sort of dependency for debt that cannot be clearly defined (§ 3.2.4). Apart from a single Middle Assyrian tablet, documents dealing with default are preserved on Syro-Hittite tablets only. Many of the documents pertaining to defaulting debtors record repayment of debts by a third party. However, for the purpose of the present study, which focuses on debtors and the socio-economic aspects of credit transactions, these documents will be discussed in this section,52 rather than in the section dedicated to the fulfillment of the obligation,53 because the debtors were deprived of their freedom or suffered restrictions on their freedom, whether the original creditor was satisfied or not. On the contrary, in family law contracts the debtor either receives the palāḫu duty or becomes an heir of the person who repaid his debt. In legal systems allowing slavery, any obligation can theoretically be worked off by service, and thus failure to repay debts would never force defaulting debtors into bankruptcy. However, forms of dependency are regarded as the last resort of defaulting debtors who had no means to meet their obligations.

3.2.1 Indentured Labor Forms of indentured labor can be detected in some Emar documents. This was a temporary condition binding debtors to work off their debt.54 The Emar archives yielded twelve documents, all Syro-Hittite, concerned with this type of dependency (Table 16). Eleven are contracts regulating the indentured labor, and one is a testament mentioning indentured persons. The debtor is identified as an amēlūtu in nine contracts that regulate the service for either his creditor or an individual who repaid the debt (ASJ10 A, E 16, E 77, E 117, Hirayama 38, RA77 5, QVO5 2, TBR 39, and TBR 40). The term amēlūtu is also used in the testament RE 39 (§ 3.2.1.1.3). Two other documents regulate the seizure of a person who can be regarded as an indentured person, despite the absence of the term amēlūtu. These

52 This situation is found in the amēlūtu contracts without a palāḫu formula (§ 3.2.1.1.1), in some non-amēlūtu contracts (§ 3.2.1.2), in the enslavement contracts (§ 3.2.3.2.1), and in documents describing an unclear type of dependency for debt (§ 3.2.4). 53 See the discussion in § 2.2 and ch. 2 fn. 214. 54 For the use of the term ‘indenture’ in ancient Near Eastern studies see Eichler 1973: 34–47. In the present work, ‘indenture’ is divested of its historical association with 17th and 18th century European immigrants to the Americas.

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are RE 63, which utilizes the same formulary as the amēlūtu contracts, and E 86, which, notwithstanding the use of different formularies, relates to the same type of dependency.55 This section will first argue why the debtor’s status can be regarded as similar in all documents, despite the use of different terminology, by elucidating the shared features of these sources, and will then define that status from a legal standpoint. It is first necessary to address the status of amēlūtus at Emar. As pointed out by Skaist,56 the amēlūtu contracts can be sorted into two groups according to the presence or absence of the palāḫu formula. As discussed above (§ 2.2.2), the verb palāḫu is employed in documents of different types to describe various duties imposed on natural and adoptive sons, as well as indebted persons.57 The first group, which includes three documents, does not contain the palāḫu formula and stipulates that a debtor shall serve as an amēlūtu in exchange for repayment of the debt (§ 3.2.1.1.1). Hence, the master is a third party reimbursing the original creditors, who are usually listed in the text. The second group includes six documents structured as adoption contracts and records a change in the relationship between the debtor and his master, who was the original creditor (§ 3.2.1.1.2). The latter canceled (ḫulluqu) the debt, gave the debtor a wife, and sometimes adopted him. In exchange, the amēlūtu was to fulfill the palāḫu duty, which implies serving in the creditor’s household and caring for elders. The two types of amēlūtu contracts also differ in the duration of the service. While in the contracts without the palāḫu formula the period of service terminates upon repayment of the debt, in the documents with the palāḫu formula the term of the amēlūtu’s service is set by the master’s and his wife’s lifetime: umī ša PN₁(C) ù PN₂ aššassu balṭū PN₃(D) liplaḫ-annâši/šunūti, “as long as PN₁(C) and PN₂, his wife, should live, PN₃(D) shall support us/them.” Having fulfilled the palāḫu duty, the amēlūtu is released: kīmē PN₁(D) ipallaḫ-annâši/šunūti arki šīmti-ni/šunūti ubbal-annâši/šunūti qāt aššassu mārūtīšu liṣbat-ma ašar libbīšu lillik, “As he supports us/them, after our/their fate carries us/them off, he shall take the hand of his wife and his children and go wherever he pleases.” The amēlūtu contracts containing the palāḫu formula can also be terminated in advance by either side on penalty of a fine. The penalty for the master is the 55 E 210 is perhaps another contract of indentured labor, but the tablet is badly preserved; perhaps the diviner Baʿal-qarrād is involved in the document, see Cohen 2009, 156 n. 35. 56 Skaist 2001: 247. 57 The verb palāḫu is used in such contexts all over Mesopotamia in different periods, see Petschow 1956: 111 n. 346, Eichler 1973: 115, Veenhof 1982: 376–79, Veenhof 1998: 130–34, Bellotto 2009: 27–32.

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loss of his money (i.e., the debt), while for the amēlūtu it is much weightier, corresponding to two or three times the debt in addition to relinquishing the wife he has received from the master together with their eventual children.58 In four contracts (E 16, E 117, Hirayama 38, and QVO5 2) the dissolution clause contains the “leaving the house” formula.59 The dissolution clause presents slight differences in each text but is formulated as a declaration of either side according to the following pattern: “If PN₁(C) should say to PN₂(D) ‘Leave my house and return my silver,’ PN₁(C) will have no (right) to his silver. PN₂(D) shall take the hand of his wife and his children and go wherever he pleases. And if PN₂(D) should say to PN₁(C) ‘Take your silver, I want to leave your house,’ PN₂(D) will have no (right) to his wife and his children (and) shall give x shekels of silver to PN₁(C) and go wherever he pleases.” In the other two contracts that contain the adoption formula (TBR 39 and TBR 40), the dissolution clause emulates the one found in regular adoptions and specifies a penalty of 60 shekels of silver, according to the following pattern:60 “If PN₁(C) should say to PN₂(D) his son, ‘You are not my son’ [penalty for PN₁(C)].61 And if PN₂(D) should say to PN₁(C), ‘I am not your son/You are not my father,’ he shall give 60 shekels of silver to PN₁(C) and go wherever he pleases.”62 As mentioned above (§ 3.1), the amēlūtu’s status must be clearly distinguished from slavery at Emar. In Kassite sources the term amēlūtu is the word most frequently applied to servile personnel and identifies individuals who were subject to sale.63 At Emar, however, amēlūtus are never attested as the object of sale contracts and cannot be alienated.64 Two other elements can be taken as criteria to differentiate amēlūtus from slaves. The first is the palāḫu duty, which was not performed by slaves unless they were destined for manumission.65 This duty was only performed by amēlūtus, by the persons concerned in the family law contracts (§ 2.2.2), and by the persons in distress discussed in some documents related to hardship (§ 3.3.2). None of these forms of dependency can be regarded as slavery. The second element concerns termination. A general difference is that slavery is a permanent condition that can be reversed by redemption. On the contrary,

58 See § 5.1.1 and Table 48. For asymmetrical penalties in some adoptions from Nuzi see Lion 2004: 557. 59 For this formula see § 1.5. 60 For the dissolution clause in adoption contracts see ch. 2 fn. 327. 61 TBR 40 contains no penalty on the master. 62 For differences in the dissolution clause in each text see Appendix. 63 Sassmannshausen 2001: 117–19, Tenney 2011a: 129–32. 64 Durand (1989d: 174) interpreted the amēlūtu as a sort of domestic. 65 E 177, RE 27, TBR 41, § 3.5.2.

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the condition of the amēlūtu is meant to be temporary in both types of contracts, and its term is set from the outset. More specific differences concerning termination relate to each group of contracts. In the amēlūtu contracts without the palāḫu formula, the service terminates upon repayment of the debt, which means that the labor performed served to pay the interest. This distinguishes the amēlūtu contracts without the palāḫu formula from documents regulating debt slavery because in the latter the price of redemption was usually set at twice the original debt/price. In the amēlūtu contracts containing the palāḫu formula, service could be terminated either upon the master’s death, or through dissolution of the contract. In any form of slavery, however, the master’s death would not lead to the release of the slave because the ownership right was transmitted to the master’s heirs.66 Dissolution imposed a penalty on each side in breach. In slavery, a master had the right to manumit his/her slave at any time without incurring penalties. The imposition of penalties on the master in the amēlūtu contracts containing the palāḫu formula reveals the equal legal (not economic) status of the contracting parties. Most importantly, the penalty on the master protected the debtor from an early termination of service. As discussed in § 5.1.1, a penalty preventing the master from releasing the debtor can only be justified if the amēlūtu was interested in prolonging his stay in the creditor’s dependency because he received support. Although the penalty on the amēlūtu usually fetched twice the debt and thus was equivalent to the redemption price, the procedure and application appear to be different. Redemption reversed the ownership of the slave, while penalties served to fine a person for breaking a contract. This difference is strengthened by the fact that in addition to the sum of silver, the penalties required the amēlūtus to relinquish their wives and children as a tangible sign of the end of the relation. The right of redemption was granted not only to the enslaved person but also to his/her family and perhaps was extended to outsiders. On the contrary, only the amēlūtu could dissolve the contract. Finally, compared to the price of redemption, penalties are less frequently proportional to the debt: some contracts (TBR 39 and TBR 40) impose a general penalty of 60 shekels, which is common to many types of contracts at Emar;67 in another contract (QVO5 2), the penalty is three times the debt. The creation of family ties between creditor and debtor, which could be adduced as a further criterion distinguishing amēlūtus from slaves, is less mean-

66 The right of ownership clearly distinguishes the amēlūtu contracts from the enslavement contracts (§ 3.2.3.2.1). 67 This is the penalty imposed in adoption contracts (Bellotto 2009: 36) and in the family law contracts, see § 4.9.3, Table 44.

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ingful. Slaves were given wives by their masters at Emar68 and the practice is attested elsewhere in ancient Near Eastern cuneiform records.69 Slaves usually married other slaves, but marriages between slaves and free persons are known70 and manumitted slaves were often adopted in the ancient Near East.71 A wellknown example is provided by the biblical book of Chronicles (I Chron. 2:34–35), in which a master gave his daughter to his slave as a wife and likely adopted him. Nevertheless, although less significant for the distinction from slavery, the creation of family ties between debtors and creditors at Emar is more commonly documented in the amēlūtu documents in virtue of the palāḫu duty and is very meaningful from the socio-economic standpoint.72 We have argued (§ 2.2.2) that the form of dependency established in the amēlūtu contracts with the palāḫu formula must also be distinguished from the debtor’s status in the family law contracts, although both groups of documents share the adoption formulary, the palāḫu duty, and penalties on each side. To repeat, while in the amēlūtu contracts only the debtor was obliged to perform the palāḫu duty, in family law contracts the person who performs the palāḫu duty may be either the debtor or the third party who repays the debt. Additionally, the debtor could be designated as heir, which does not happen to be the case with amēlūtus. Thus, in family law contracts the debtor either receives the palāḫu duty or becomes an heir. Penalties for breach were also different in the two types of contracts because the family law contracts stipulated similar penalties on each side. We can therefore conclude that the amēlūtus, although enjoying some of the rights of freemen, had their liberty limited by the constraints of bounded labor. That the amēlūtu’s freedom was somehow curtailed is futher clear from a clause stating that the amēlūtu shall remain “servant of the king” (ana (w)arad šarri riāḫu) after having served his master (E 117). This clause, which is also included in an enslavement contract (E 121) and in another document concerning dependency (GsK 2), indicates that the person will recover his status as a freeman.73 If 68 See QVO5 2, § 3.2.1.1.2.4. 69 Dandamaev 1984: 406–07, Stol 2011–2013: 570. 70 Mendelsohn 1949: 55–57, Dandamaev 1984: 411–14. 71 See § 3.5.2. 72 See the importance of this relation in the context of solidarity § 5.1.1. 73 While I agree with von Dassow’s characterization of the “servant of the king” as a free man serving the state, I disagree with her interpretation of the phrase as a generic term for any subject of the king (von Dassow 2020: 94–100). If it were a generic descriptor, it would be quite anomalous that the clause ana (w)arad šarri riāḫu only occurs in three documents. To justify such a limited attestation, von Dassow is forced to appeal to the idiosyncrasy of the Syro-Hittite texts by claiming that “In similar contracts that lack this statement it should probably be understood as

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the amēlūtu’s freedom had not been restricted, that clause would have been perceived as useless. An amēlūtu was a semi-free individual. Having clarified the amēlūtu’s status, it is now necessary to explain why two documents (E 86 and RE 63) lacking the term amēlūtu are discussed here under the heading of indentured labor. RE 63 includes the same provisions as the amēlūtu contracts of the second group, namely the ḫulluqu formula, the palāḫu formula, and the dissolution clause. E 86 is a brief text, and its classification is more complicated because it only includes the palāḫu formula and the dissolution clause. However, this document must be distinguished from the family law contracts because the penalty is four times the debt, and the dissolution clause contains the “leaving the house” formula, which is not attested in family law contracts.74 Despite the presence of the palāḫu formula, in both documents the debt appears to be repaid to an original creditor, as in the amēlūtu contracts without palāḫu formula. In conclusion, these two documents, which will be henceforth labeled as non-amēlūtu contracts, present sufficient reasons to consider that debtors had the same status as amēlūtus. The form of dependency regulated in the amēlūtu and non-amēlūtu contracts needs to be defined in legal terms.75 Scholars have argued that the amēlūtu was an antichretic debtor.76 Personal antichresis is a common form of bonded labor in agricultural societies. In the ancient Near East, debtors frequently resorted to this institution to secure and repay their debts.

implicit” (p. 99). The appearance of “servant of the king” as a title after personal names serving various roles such as witnesses, sellers, or owners of properties in sales contracts would equally remain unexplained (BLMJ 18, E 5, Hirayama 3, Hirayama 10, TBR 40; see also E 142, a Syrian tablet, and RA77 5, where one of the creditors bears the title of “female servant of the king,” § 3.2.1.1.1.2). Indeed, if “servant of the king” were a generic term, one would wonder why only certain individuals are identified as such in the same documents. It seems therefore more plausible that “servant of the king” indicates a generic title for a member of the Hittite administration, not necessarily one of high rank, who could therefore fall into debt. 74 Démare-Lafont (2010: 73–74, 76 n. 63) and Fijałkowska (2014a: 393–94) also regard E 86 as similar to the amēlūtu contracts. The “leaving the house” formula is also shared by TBR 25, which, however, is cautiously discussed as an unclear type of dependency for debt (§ 3.2.4.1.2). As mentioned in ch. 2 fn. 325, this clause also occurs in GsK 2; this document does not contain the term amēlūtu but resembles the contracts of indentured labor. Nevertheless GsK 2 will be discussed separately because it makes no reference to debts, see § 3.3.2.1.2. Perhaps the testament E 177 also included that clause, but the specific lines (6–8) are badly preserved. 75 The present analysis will mainly draw on Roman, Italian, and German legal categories. 76 For antichresis at Emar see Skaist 2001: 247–48, Westbrook 2003b: 685–86; see also Westbrook 1995: 1654–56. This characterization also applies to the non-amēlūtu documents.

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Antichresis is a type of contract found in many ancient legal systems77 and still survives in contemporary civil codes.78 Antichresis may assume different characteristics and serve different purposes. In its common form, antichresis is a method of securing a loan whereby the debtor pledges real property that the creditor may use as he pleases (Nutzungspfand). The exploitation and fruition of the antichretic pledge by the creditor may have served one of two functions: repaying either the interest (Zinsantichrese / anticresi compensativa) or the principal (Kapitalantichrese / anticresi estintiva).79 Antichretic pledges are not limited to real property and may include movable properties, including persons. The debtors pledge themselves or someone else to serve in the creditor’s household and repay the debt through service (Dienstantichrese). Examples of personal antichresis can be found in the Old Babylonian mazzazānūtum contracts80 and the tidennūtu contracts from Nuzi.81 Because antichresis implies the possession of the debtor’s property by the creditor, the pledge is usually provided at the onset of the loan or during its basic term. Antichretic pledges provided upon default are usually surrendered to a third party who agrees to satisfy the previous creditor.82 In such situations, 77 An overview of antichresis in antiquity is provided in Papadatou 2008. 78 See the Italian Civil Code, art. 1960: “L’anticresi è il contratto col quale il debitore o un terzo si obbliga a consegnare un immobile al creditore a garanzia del credito, affinché il creditore ne percepisca i frutti, imputandoli agli interessi, se dovuti, e quindi al capitale.” Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB) § 1213 Nutzungspfand: “(1) Das Pfandrecht kann in der Weise bestellt werden, dass der Pfandgläubiger berechtigt ist, die Nutzungen des Pfandes zu ziehen. (2) Ist eine von Natur Frucht tragende Sache dem Pfandgläubiger zum Alleinbesitz übergeben, so ist im Zweifel anzunehmen, dass der Pfandgläubiger zum Fruchtbezug berechtigt sein soll.” For an introduction to antichresis in contemporary civil law see Cicero 2010. 79 For this distinction see Petschow 1956: 103–06, Niedorf 2008: 204. 80 Westbrook 2001b: 64–65. 81 Eichler 1973. Zaccagnini (2001: 228) rightly pointed out that the nature of tidennūtu contracts only partially corresponds to classical antichresis because they “de facto represent a form of alienation of persons or land to third parties, in compensation for an outstanding obligation,” see also Zaccagnini 1976, Zaccagnini 2001: 224, 228–31. However, Nuzi is not the only place where antichretic arrangements were often made for purposes other than securing a loan. This observation has been made with respect to other periods and areas, as shown by Steinkeller 2001 for the Ur III period, and also in non-Oriental contexts such as Byzantine law (Papadatou 2008: 219–20). It appears, therefore, that antichresis operated in a broad range of cases in the ancient world. Even in contemporary legal systems, antichresis serves different purposes and is subject to various interpretations; see the recent study by Fulvio Mecenate on antichresis as a response to the 2008 economic crisis in Italy, “L’anticresi. Una possibile alternativa per il mercato immobiliare e per l’accesso al credito,” published in Gazzetta Notarile 7/9, 2014 as Studio Civilistico n. 425–2014/C; I thank Gabriela Amadeo for this reference. 82 Eichler 1973: 82, Westbrook 2001b.

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the ensuing contract represents a new loan and the third party becomes the new creditor of the debtor. Nevertheless, the antichretic pledge could be surrendered to the original creditor upon default (Verzugsantichrese)83 and eventually used to amortize the default interest. Antichresis could also operate outside the sphere of pledge law as a method for repayment of debts (anticresi satisfatoria).84 Having surveyed the main features of antichresis, we must investigate whether the contracts of indentured labor from Emar can be defined as antichretic arrangements, and if so of which type. To answer the first question, the agreement established in these contracts can generally be defined as personal antichresis, because the debtor performs a service in lieu of the debt. The second question is a more complicated matter. To understand both the function and type of the antichretic arrangement, it is necessary to identify the moment when the contract was written down. The contracts of indentured labor from Emar are not loan contracts but refer back to outstanding debts, as is clear from the fact that the debtor becomes the amēlūtu of an individual in exchange for the silver owed. That the issuing of the debt preceded the drafting of the amēlūtu contracts without the palāḫu formula is evident from the list of original creditors whose silver has been repaid (ASJ10 A and E 77). The same holds true for E 86, in which the repayment of the debt by a third party is clearly subsequent to default. In the amēlūtu contracts with the palāḫu formula, it is likewise the case that the taking of the debtor was subsequent to the granting of the debt because the silver obligation was canceled (ḫulluqu) by the lender. Thus, the Emar contracts differ from many contracts of personal antichresis that were drafted at the onset of the loan or during its basic term, such as those from Nuzi or from the Middle Assyrian and Neo Babylonian periods. In principle, the fact that these documents were written subsequent to the creation of the debt obligation does not imply that they were drafted upon default.85 Nonetheless, there are hints that the debtors were defaulting (i.e., debts were not repaid in due time) or that the main motivation for drafting these documents was the borrowers’ inability to fulfill their obligations. Resorting to a third

83 Petschow 1956: 104, see also Kienast 1978: Vol. I, 91–92. A form of personal hypothecary antichretic pledge can perhaps be discerned in E 209, see pp. 57ff. 84 Papadatou 2008: 210; see also Koschaker 1928: 108–10, Petschow 1956: 116–18, Eichler 1973: 94–95, Steinkeller 2001: 54–55, 58–61, Westbrook 2001b: 67–70, Steinkeller 2002: 122–23. 85 Personal antichretic pledges may also be given after the granting of the loan, but as explained below there is no evidence that these documents arise from loans previously secured by an antichretic pledge (either at the onset of the loan or during its basic term).

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party to satisfy the creditors who were listed in the tablets (E 77, RA77 5) indicates that debtors did not repay their debts in due time. In the amēlūtu contracts that contain the palāḫu formula, the creditor’s cancellation of an existing obligation and seizure of the debtor as an amēlūtu was the consequence of the latter’s inability to repay the debt.86 Since we are dealing with defaulting debtors, only two types of antichresis may describe the debtor’s situation: either Verzugsantichrese, i.e., a pledge surrendered upon default, or anticresi satisfatoria, i.e., a method of payment. We should bear in mind, however, that from the economic standpoint, the two legal processes have the same outcome. The texts offer no evidence that the seizure of the debtor arises from a loan contract secured by an antichretic pledge upon default. Indeed, there is no reference to any earlier encumbered pledge, and the indentured persons are never referred to as pledges. Furthermore, no loan contract is secured by an amēlūtu as a pledge. The main evidence that the term amēlūtu is legally and terminologically different from a pledge comes from two amēlūtu contracts without the palāḫu formula (E 77 and RA77 5) in which the scribes carefully distinguish between the debtor taken as indentured person (amēlūtu) and the security (qātātu). The debtors must provide additional securities, perhaps against flight or death, and the term qātātu is only applied to the persons or properties provided as possessory pledges (i.e., antichretic pledges), not to the indentured person. This dismisses the possible objection that in the documents where the debt is repaid by a third party (amēlūtu contracts without the palāḫu formula and E 86), the debtor who was taken as an indentured laborer served as an antichretic pledge for the new creditor, as could be inferred from the fact that two amēlūtu contracts without the palāḫu formula (ASJ10 A, E 77) contain the repayment clause, u₄-um/i-na u₄-mi ša KÙ.BABBAR-šú ú-šal-lam ṭup-pa-šú i-ḫap-pi, “When he pays back his silver, he will break his tablet.”87 In the amēlūtu contracts with the palāḫu formula, the legal function of the amēlūtu can hardly be defined as a pledge because the duration of the service is

86 The Roman nexum, which is occasionally compared to ancient Near Eastern forms of bonded labor, operated differently, as it was a state of bondage coterminous with the loan and not a consequence of default, see Finley 1981: 157–61. 87 This clause resembles the Lösungsklausel of the Old Babylonian contracts, which has been associated with antichretic pledge, see Skaist 1994: 213–14, Kienast 1978: Vol. I, 96–100.

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the creditor’s lifetime, and no repayment clause occurs.88 Moreover, the indentured person becomes a member of the creditor’s household through marriage or adoption. Thus, it does not seem that the function of the indentured person was to secure the loan. These observations further strengthen our contention that the legal function of these antichretic arrangements was to repay the debt, not to secure it. Although one may argue that the residence of the indentured person at his master’s house is de facto a security for debt, in my opinion there is no evidence that these contracts operated in the realm of pledge law or that their main concern was to secure a debt. With the caveat that modern legal terminology cannot fully capture all the nuances of ancient Near Eastern legal sources, which as a result often fail to be precisely categorized, it seems that these documents can be defined as antichretic arrangements used by defaulting debtors to settle debts (anticresi satisfatoria) through indentured labor.89 As will be argued below (§§ 5.1.1, 5.4), the contracts of indentured labor, specifically those containing the palāḫu formula, were inspired by principles of solidarity and social justice based on family models. They were mutual agreements in which the creditor was repaid through work service and the debtor was housed and fed. The penalties leveled on the master for an early termination of the contract clearly indicate that the debtor intended to remain in the creditor’s household and receive support. Differences, however, exist among the documents, as will be explained below.

88 Note that a penalty clause appended to these documents specifies a payment of double or triple the original debt if the indentured person wants to leave his master’s house, while the regular price for the redemption of pledge equals the debt, § 4.5.4. 89 Indentured labor defines the nature of the condition of the debtor while antichresis defines the function of the contract. For the relation between indentured labor and antichretic arrangements see Eichler 1973: 44–45. According to the interpretation of kiššātum as “penal servitude” arising from a crime, as suggested by Westbrook (1996), the condition of the indentured person (amēlūtu) in the Emar texts implies a different juridical background from that of the person given ana kiššātim; cf. Kienast 1978: Vol. I, 67–68, Eichler 1973: 82–83.

Debt

Penalty (D)

–

–

140 sh.

47 sh.

E 77

RA77 5

–

–

–

Family Ties

Iašur-Dagan son of Bada

Dagan-kabar son of Ḫima

Šeʾi-Dagan

Third Party

90 The creditors ‘names are not preserved due to a break in the tablet.

–

105 sh. and 40 grains

ASJ10 A

amēlūtu Contracts without the palāḫu Formula

Document

Table 16: Indentured Labor.

Itūr-Dagan son of Iddilli

Muḫra-aḫī son of Kutta son of Zadamma son of Baṣṣu

Dūdu son of Mašru Kiri-Dagan and Abdi-ili, sons of Dūdu

Indentured Person

Adda son of Muḫra-aḫī; House of Muḫra-aḫī

Ten creditors90

Aḫiu son of Ama (24 sh.); Naʾittu wife of Itūr-Dagan; Bēlu-Dagan son of Aḫiu Son of Itūr-Dagan; (1 sh. 40 grains); House of Itūr-Dagan Baʿla-ilī wife of Dagalli (2 1/3 sh.); Alal-abu son of Baʿla-ilī (1 sh. 40 grains); Ḫimaši-Dagan son of A[ . . . a]d (2 sh.); Šaggar-abu son of Šar[. . .] (2.5 sh.); Ikūn-Rašap son of Tūra-Dagan (1 1/3 sh.); Abī-naʿmī daughter of Nukra (1 sh.); Karbu son of Abba (1/2 sh.);

Daughters of Dūdu; Ṣāriptu wife of Dūdu (?)

Additional Pledge

NG

Creditor

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80 sh.

?

120 sh.

60 sh.

60 sh.

40 sh.

56 sh.

40 sh.

25 sh.

30 sh.

E 117

Hirayama 38

QVO5 2

TBR 39

TBR 40

> 25 sh. –

Adoption Marriage

Adoption Marriage

Marriage

Marriage

Adoption (?) Marriage

Marriage

TÉŠ.BI

10 sh.

14 5/6 sh.

2.5 sh.

RE 63

E 86

–

Adoption

Non-amēlūtu Contracts Regulating Indentured Labor

RE 39

A Testament concerning amēlūtu

61 sh.

41 sh.

E 16

amēlūtu Contracts with the palāḫu Formula

Dagan-kabar son of Dagan-taliʾ son of Ḫima

Mama son of Ummānu

Iadi-Dagan son of Baṣṣu

Bēlu-kabar son of Baʿal-mālik

A[. . .] (? sh.); A[. . .]pī-ilī son of Daqanu (25 sh.)

Taḫḫu son of Burāqu

Zū-Baʿla

Ḫišmia

Amzaḫi son of Abī-Dagan

Abia son of Zū-Aštarti

Bazila son of Abdi-ili

NG

NG

Igmulu

Zimrī-Dagan son of Udḫa-abu

Dagan-taliʾ son of Udḫa-abu

Kunaʾe son of Irrike

Pazuri-Dagan

Aḫī-Dagan son of Milki-Dagan

Šaggar-abu son of Baʿal-qarrād

Gullatu, female servant of the king (3 sh.); Baʿal-bēlī son of Šeʾi-Dagan, diviner (2 2/3 sh.)

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3.2.1.1 amēlūtu Documents 3.2.1.1.1 amēlūtu Contracts without the palāḫu Formula Three amēlūtu documents can be ascribed to this group, but only two, E 77 and RA77 5, are true contracts of amēlūtu that initiate the debtors’ service to someone who repaid their debt. The repayment of the debt is not indicated by the verb šalāmu but by a list of creditors who received their money. The other document, ASJ10 A, is a renewal of an amēlūtu contract without the palāḫu formula.91 Unlike E 77 and RA77 5, ASJ10 A contains no list of creditors. In E 77 and RA77 5, the debtors are required to provide subsidiary securities (qātātu). Additional securities seem to be provided also in ASJ10 A, but it is unclear whether they were demanded at the onset of the contract. The seizure of the debtor is differently formulated in each document: Table 17: Seizure of the Debtor in the amēlūtu Contracts without the palāḫu Formula. Document

Clause

E 77

PN₁(D) LÚ.Ú.LU-tù ša x KÙ.BABBAR ša PN₂(C)

RA77 5

PN₁(M) PN₂(D) ki-i x KÙ.BABBAR a-na LÚ!.Ú.LU-ut-ti al-ta-qè-šu

ASJ10 A

PN₁(D) a-na LÚ.MEŠ.Ú.LU-tì ša PN₂(C) ki-i-mu-ú x KÙ.BABBAR aš-bu

3.2.1.1.1.1 E 77 E 77 belongs to the archive of Ḫima. A certain Muḫra-aḫī, son of Kutta son of Zadamma son of Baṣṣu (not attested elsewhere), was taken as an amēlūtu by Dagan-kabar son of Ḫima in exchange for having his debt repaid. Muḫra-aḫī’s debt, 140 shekels of silver, is the highest recorded in the amēlūtu contracts. The list of creditors contains ten people but no personal name is preserved. The debtor gave his house and his son, Adda, as securities (qātātū). Skaist92 described the securities in this contract and in RA77 5 as hypothecary pledges, but because both contracts create a new obligation between a defaulting debtor (amēlūtu) and the person who repaid his debt, it seems more plausible that the additional security was provided at the onset of the new obligation as a possessory pledge. This hypothesis is strengthened by the parallel situation in ASJ10 A, where the debtor’s relatives, who have likely been taken as pledges, resided 91 Doubtless, the agreement did not require the amēlūtu to perform the palāḫu duty, because he could terminate his service by repaying the debt; conversely, in the amēlūtu contracts with the palāḫu formula, the indentured person is obliged to lifelong service. 92 Skaist 2001: 247.

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in the master’s house. It seems, therefore, that the antichretic use of the pledge in these documents served to amortize the interest because the principal was to be repaid. The economic background of the debt is not reported, but the large sum and the long list of creditors may suggest that the silver was intended to finance some business venture whose failure forced Muḫra-aḫī into indentured labor. The intense activity of the family of Ḫima in financing trade ventures93 could strengthen the interpretation of the debt as productive. It is also not excluded that Dagan-kabar was involved in the business from its onset. Although our interpretation cannot be fully verified, this document is nevertheless classified among the productive debts.94 At any rate, Muḫra-aḫī was obviously unable to meet his obligation. 3.2.1.1.1.2 RA77 5 RA77 5 is a very terse text because it does not include the repayment clause. Iašur-Dagan son of Bada took Itūr-Dagan son of Iddilli as an amēlūtu by repaying a debt of 47 shekels of silver. Both individuals are unattested in other Emar sources. The amēlūtu was required to provide additional securities and gave his wife Naʾittu, his son, and his house as supplementary pledges (qātātu) to Iašur-Dagan. Of the eleven creditors listed, only Alal-abu son of Baʿla-ilī wife of Dagalli95 is perhaps mentioned in another Emar document, the list of temple personnel E 275.96 Another individual, Baʿal-bēlī son of Šeʾi-Dagan, is qualified as a diviner but is otherwise unknown.97 It is worth noting that some of the creditors listed are women: Baʿla-ilī wife of Dagalli, Abī-naʿmī daughter of Nukra, and Gullatu,98 who also bears the title of “female servant of the king.” The first six creditors are called “bakers of sweet cake of the oven,” i.e., workers of the oven, a title that is nowhere else attested. This list ends with the name of the debtor himself, who received 5 shekels of silver.99 Oddly, the quantity of silver returned to the creditors does not correspond to the original debt. Including the 5 shekels received by Itūr-Dagan, the silver amounts to 46 shekels and 140 grains, i.e., 40 grains less than the total. According to Huehnergard100 this was a scribal mistake. 93 See E 75 and E 87, § 2.1.2.2. 94 See § 4.2. 95 For the restoration of the name see Tsukimoto 1991a: 300. 96 For this document see Cohen 2009: 156. 97 For this individual see § 1.3.7. 98 It is worth noting that Baʿla-ilī bears the masculine determinative; cf. ch. 3 fns. 346 and 368. 99 A similar case is RE 65, § 2.2.1.2.6. 100 Huehnergard 1983: 35.

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The long list of creditors can be compared with that in E 77, but a commercial context seems less likely. The amount of the debt and especially the small sums due to each creditor do not suggest that the silver was used to finance business activity. Moreover, the mention of “workers of the oven” among the creditors points towards a consumptive and craft context. If the silver was used for business activity, it was most likely some kind of manufacture. The sum received by Itūr-Dagan may perhaps be regarded as a new loan granted by Iašur-Dagan to his indentured person. If the debt was associated with a business activity, the 5 shekels of silver possibly corresponded to the sum invested by Itūr-Dagan. Regardless of the background of the debt, Itūr-Dagan was obviously unable to meet his obligation. Although there are some hints that the purpose of the debt was commercial, the evidence is somewhat weaker than it is in the case of E 77. For these reasons this document is cautiously included among the consumptive debts101 with the awareness that other interpretations are possible. 3.2.1.1.1.3 ASJ10 A ASJ10 A is a renewal of a former amēlūtu contract whereby a certain Dūdu son of Mašru, along with his two sons Kiri-Dagan and Abdi-ili, had become amēlūtus of Šeʾi-Dagan in exchange for 105 shekels and 40 grains of silver. The document lacks a list of creditors, but by analogy with the other two contracts of amēlūtu that do not include the palāḫu formula, Šeʾi-Dagan must not have been the original creditor. The document was drafted to regulate the debtor’s obligations after he returned 40 shekels and purchased his freedom. It is stipulated that Dūdu’s two sons, his wife Ṣāriptu, and his daughters were to remain in the house of Šeʾi-Dagan to work off the balance of the debt (65.4 sh.). The debtor’s wife and daughters had likely been taken as supplementary pledges, although the term qātātu is not employed. The repayment clause establishes that the period of service will be terminated (i.e., the tablet will be broken) upon repayment of the balance. The bonded labor is thus intended to repay the interest on the debt. Indeed, during his stay at Šeʾi-Dagan’s house, Dūdu was released from his work obligations for nine months. Consequently, when Dūdu returns the balance of the loan he is to provide one of his sons to perform nine months of work for Šeʾi-Dagan, corresponding to the balance on the interest: (15) ù mDu-u-du ki-⌜i i-na⌝ É (16) m Še-i-ᵈKUR a-šib [9 ITU.MEŠ KÍ]G.MEŠ102 (17) um-te-ši-ir it-[ta]-at-lak (18) ù ⌜i-na⌝ 101 See § 4.2. 102 The room and the traces of signs suggest the proposed restoration on the basis of line 20.

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 163

‹u₄-mi› ša mDu-u-d[u] KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ-šú (19) ú-šal-lam 1 DUMU-šú [a-n]a mŠe-iᵈKUR (20) i-na-din-ma 9 ITU.MEŠ KÍG.MEŠ i-ṣa-bat, “And Dūdu while residing in the house of Šeʾi-Dagan was released [from 9 months of w]ork and w[e]nt away. And on the day when Dūd[u] will pay his silver, he shall give one of his sons [t]o Šeʾi-Dagan and he (the son) will perform the work for 9 months.” While Dūdu is unknown elsewhere, it was noted above that a Šeʾi-Dagan served as guarantor in ASJ13 A, but it is uncertain whether they were the same person.103 Although the debt is quite high, unlike E 77 there is little to suggest any business activities. Therefore, this debt is cautiously regarded as consumptive. 3.2.1.1.2 amēlūtu Contracts with the palāḫu Formula There are six amēlūtu contracts extant in which a debtor is to fulfill the palāḫu duty for his master who, unlike in the documents of the first group, is also the original creditor (Table 16). The verb ḫulluqu “to cancel”104 is employed to describe the action of the creditor towards the debt.105 As discussed above (§ 3.2.1), the duration of the palāḫu duty corresponds to the lifetime of the master and his wife, and the debt is not expected to be repaid, contrary to the amēlūtu contracts without the palāḫu formula. The palāḫu duty is tied to the new relation established between debtor and creditor. Although the amount of the debts is lower on average106 than the debts in the amēlūtu contracts without the palāḫu formula, it can hardly be proved that the insertion of the palāḫu duty and the change in the relation between creditor and debtor was in any way linked to the size of debts. Unlike the contracts without the palāḫu formula, no subsidiary security is required in these documents, probably because the monetary obligation was transformed.107 In all documents the debtor is given a wife by the creditor, and in TBR 39, TBR 40, and perhaps E 117 the debtor is also adopted by his master. Unlike in the amēlūtu contracts of the first group, the clause stating the taking of the amēlūtu in the documents with the palāḫu formula is formulated as a standardized declaration by the creditor: PN₁(C) a-kán-na iq-bi ma-a a-nu-ma PN₂(D) LÚ.Ú.LU-ti-ia ša x GÍN KÙ.BABBAR (i-na-an-na) KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ-šú uḫ-tal-li-iq, “PN₁(C) spoke as follows: ‘Now PN₂(D) is my amēlūtu for x shekels of

103 See § 2.2.1.2.13. 104 For this meaning see Durand 1989d: 174. 105 Note that the family law contracts, despite the presence of the palāḫu formula, use šalāmu, “to pay,” § 2.2.2. 106 They range between 25 sh. (TBR 39) and 56 sh. (Hirayama 38). 107 See § 5.1.1.

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silver; (now) I have canceled his silver.’” In a single text, QVO5 2, this clause is written in the third person. Instead of a repayment clause, the amēlūtu contracts with the palāḫu formula contain a clause of dissolution. The contract could be ended unilaterally by either party. Penalties are imposed on each side in breach but are higher for the indentured person. The formulary of the amēlūtu contracts with the palāḫu formula can be summarized as follows: 1) Creditor’s declaration: taking of the debtor as an amēlūtu cancellation of the debt 2) palāḫu formula 3) Clause of dissolution 4) Accessory clause(s) 5) Witness list 3.2.1.1.2.1 E 117 E 117 belongs to the archive of Milki-Dagan. Aḫī-Dagan son of Milki-Dagan canceled a debt of 40 shekels of silver owed to him by Abia son of Zū-Aštarti, who is unattested elsewhere in the Emar documentation. In turn, Abia was to provide the palāḫu duty for the lifetime of his master and his wife. Despite the absence of the clause of adoption, Aḫī-Dagan is indicated as Abia’s father in E 117: 20 (see below).108 Moreover, a clause placed at the end of the contract states that Aḫī-Dagan was to give a wife to Abia just as he would do with one of his own sons: (29) a-nu-ma mA-ḫi-dKUR mA-bi-ia (30) DAM-ta₅ ú-ša-ḫa-az ki-i DUMU.MEŠ-šú. After Aḫī-Dagan’s death, Abia will be released but will remain a “servant of the king” (a-na ARAD LUGAL lì-ir-ti-iḫ), which indicates that he will recover his status as a freeman. According to the interpretation of this title suggested here, this clause would mark the return of the amēlūtu to serve the Hittite administration, after his period of indentured labor.109 That the relation between the two individuals was asymmetrical is clear from the clause of dissolution, which specifies that Abia shall pay 80 shekels of silver, i.e., twice the amount of the debt, to leave his master’s house. Conversely,

108 The context is, however, unclear and Bellotto (2009: 143) suggests that the text does not allude to adoption at all. 109 See ch. 3 fn. 73 and d’Alfonso 2005b. It should be recalled that at Emar the title “servant of the king” was not borne by high-ranking members of the bureaucracy as it was in the Hittite kingdom.

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 165

if Aḫī-Dagan dissolves the contract, he will only forfeit the silver lent to Abia. The creditor was protected against the indentured person’s death, because a clause stipulated that all of Abia’s possessions would remain in Aḫī-Dagan’s hands: (18) ù šúm-ma A-bi-ia BA.UG₇ mi-nu-me-e (19) bu-šu-‹šu› ba-ši-tu₄-šu ù ka-ia-an-zušú110 (21) a-na A-ḫi-KUR a-bi-šú ir-ti-iḫ, “And if Abia should die, all his goods, his possessions, and his property will remain with his father Aḫī-Dagan.” Because the termination of the indentured labor is set by the master’s death, this clause clearly operates only if the amēlūtu dies before his master. Despite the asymmetrical relationship, the terms of the contract appear quite favorable for the debtor: he was likely adopted and given a wife, like the creditor’s other sons. This treatment perhaps suggests that Abia had a close relationship with the family of Milki-Dagan. Such favorable conditions are not found in the other contracts of indentured labor where a member of the notable families is listed as master (E 77 and E 86).111 In the absence of any evidence of a commercial purpose, the debt is regarded as consumptive. 3.2.1.1.2.2 TBR 39 and TBR 40 TBR 39 and TBR 40 belong to the dossier of Udḫa-abu’s sons.112 Both documents follow the same pattern: in TBR 39 Dagan-taliʾ son of Udḫa-abu canceled 25 shekels of silver, the debt of Zū-Baʿla (no patronymic is reported); in TBR 40 Zimrī-Dagan, Dagan-taliʾ’s brother, canceled 30 shekels of silver, the debt of Taḫḫu son of Burāqu. The creditors also adopted the indentured persons and gave them their daughters, Al-ummī (TBR 39) and Ḫabiʾtu (TBR 40), as wives. Because it was unusual for creditors to marry their daughters off to debtors who served in their houses, it is plausible that these daughters were of second rank – adopted slaves as in QVO5 2, or illegitimate children, or children of a deceased or divorced woman.113 Nevertheless, the woman given as wife in E 117 does not seem to be of second rank because the creditor must marry his amēlūtu off as one of his biological sons. Thus, although the hypothesis of second-rank daughters in TBR 39 and TBR 40 remains the most plausible, their status cannot be confidently ascertained. None of the parties is attested elsewhere. In both documents the clause of dissolution does not include the “leaving the house” formula, but relates only to the cancellation of the adoption by either

110 For this term see ch. 2 fn. 362. 111 See also E 16 below. 112 For this family see § 1.3.7. 113 Bellotto (2009: 93) is of the same opinion.

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party.114 This suggests that the relation between creditors and debtors was particularly close, as evidenced by another proviso included in TBR 40 that granted the debtor the right to replace his wife with her sister, should she die: (18) ù [šú] m-ma ᶠḪa-bi-iʾ-tu₄ BA.UG₇ (19) ᶠNIN-ti-bi-iš-ti115 NIN-ši a-na tar!-te-nu-ti TUM, “And [i]f Ḫabiʾtu should die, Baʿlti-bištī, her sister will be brought in substitution.” However, the penalties for the debtors, which are set in both contracts at 60 shekels of silver, show the asymmetrical nature of the relationship. Only TBR 39 specifies a penalty for the creditor, who must relinquish his credit. Additionally, a few fragmentary lines (TBR 39: 25–28) seem to contain a clause barring vindication against the indentured person by the creditor’s son.116 TBR 40 contains the additional proviso that the debtor will remain a servant of the Hittite official Ari-Šarruma: (9) ARAD ša SÌ-dLUGAL-ma (10) [š]u-ut. The text discussed just above, E 117, as well as E 121 (§ 3.2.3.2.1) and GsK 2 (§ 3.3.2.2), establishes that the dependents will remain a “servant of the king” upon release, i.e., they will recover their freedom and serve the state. It is likely that the clause in TBR 40 does not refer to enslavement but to a return to public service under a Hittite official.117 Neither document provides any indication of the nature of the debt, and both are therefore regarded as consumptive. 3.2.1.1.2.3 E 16 The tablet E 16 was found in Area A and belongs to the archive of Šaggar-abu son of Baʿal-qarrād.118 Among the amēlūtu contracts with the palāḫu formula, E 16 is unique because it stipulates the cancellation of only part of the debt. In this long and articulated contract, Bazila son of Abdi-ili was taken as an amēlūtu by Šaggar-abu in lieu of 41 shekels of silver. Šaggar-abu canceled 20 shekels of the debt and gave a wife, named Abī-qīrī, to the debtor. As usual Bazila was to perform the palāḫu duty as long as his master and his wife should live. After their death, the indentured person would be released upon payment of the balance of 21 shekels of silver: (6) ki-i-me-e i-pal-làh-šú-nu-ti (7) EGIR ši-im-ti-šú-nu ub!-

114 TBR 39: “You are not our son,” “I am not your son”; TBR 40: “You are not my father,” “You are not my son.” 115 Bellotto (2009: 95 n. 436) rightly points out that according to the copy, the sign looks more like DAM than NIN, but the personal name would make little sense with DAM, cf. Pruzsinszky 2003: Index, 207. 116 TBR 39: 25–28, ù šúm-ma DUMU.M[EŠ] ᵐ[ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . a-n]a pa-ni // ᵐZu-Ba-l[a . . . ] // ma-a NÍG MU [. . .] // ù ṭ[up-pu . . . ]. 117 Zaccagnini (1996: 94 n. 21) also connects this document with the expression “remaining servant of the king.” A similar case is perhaps also attested in Hirayama 29, see ch. 3 fn. 163. 118 For this person and his archive see § 1.3.7.

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 167

bal-šú-nu-ti ŠU DAM-šú DUMU.MEŠ-šú (8) li-iṣ-bat-ma a-šar ŠÀ-šú lil-lik ù 21 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ (9) a-na DUMU.MEŠ-ni li-din, “As he supports them, after their fate carries them off, he shall take the hand of his wife and his children and go wherever he pleases and 21 shekels of silver he shall give to our sons.” It is clear that the debtor’s service was not intended to repay the balance that was inherited by the creditor’s sons. The fact that the debtor would be released after the creditor’s death is unrelated to the obligation to repay the balance due to the creditor’s sons, as clearly stated also in another clause: (33) ù šúm-ma u₄-mimeš ša md30-a-bu ù DAM-šú bal-ṭu (34) 21 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ ša-a-šú la-a i-di-na-šú-nu-ti i-na EGIR u₄-mi (35) Ba-zi-la 21 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ a-na DUMU.MEŠ-šú ša d30-a-bi (36) li-din-ma, “And if within the days that Šaggar-abu and his wife will live, he has not paid those 21 shekels of silver, in the future, Bazila shall give 21 shekels of silver to the sons of Šaggar-abu.” A unique clause stipulates that even if Bazila himself or someone else should pay the balance of the debt, Bazila would nevertheless fulfill the palāḫu duty for the creditor’s lifetime: (9) ù šúm-ma ur-ra-am še-ra-am (10) KÙ!.BABBAR.MEŠ a-na mBa-zi-la i-pa-a-da-šú a-na md30-a-bi (11) ù DAM-šú li-din ù EGIR KÙ.BABBAR. MEŠ-šú mBa-zi-la (12) u₄-mimeš ša md30-a-bu ù DAM-šú bal-ṭu lip-làh-šú-nu-ti, “And if, in the future, (someone) should recover the silver for Bazila (and) give (it) to Šaggar-abu and his wife, and after his silver (has been reimbursed), Bazila shall support Šaggar-abu and his wife as long as they live.”119 On the one hand, this proviso makes clear that the 20 shekels of silver of the debt canceled by the creditor are expected to be repaid through service. On the other hand, it also protected the amēlūtu, because it ensured that he was housed and fed until the creditor’s death. The clause of dissolution imposes different penalties on each side. The indentured person, in addition to relinquishing his wife and children, must pay the sum of 61 shekels of silver, which is explained by Zaccagnini120 as a fine set at the usual rate, i.e., twice the canceled amount of 20 shekels, plus the 21 shekels of the balance. Conversely, the creditor will lose the silver still due should he unilaterally dissolve the contract. Another clause established that the debtor’s wife, Abī-qīrī, will replace him in the palāḫu duty: (22) šúm-ma i-na EGIR u₄-mi mBa-zi-la BA.UG₇ fA-bi-qí-ri (23) DAM-šú u₄-mimeš ša md30-a-bu ù DAM-šú bal-ṭu (24) i-pal-làḫ-šú-nu-ti, “If, in the future, Bazila should die, Abī-qīrī, his wife, will support Šaggar-abu and his wife as long as they live.” This suggests that Abī-qīrī was not a relative of the creditor

119 The tentative translation follows Durand 1989d: 174. 120 Zaccagnini 1996: 101; he regards the additional 20 sh. as its “equivalent,” KÙ.BABBAR TÉŠ.BI.

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but rather his domestic. As this clause concerns Bazila, it is plausible that it had the dual purpose to protect the creditor against the debtor’s death and to ensure the means of living for the debtor’s widow. It is unlikely that the Šaggar-abu son of Baʿal-qarrād of this document was the son of the diviner for two reasons. First, E 16 postdates the Šaggar-abu of Zū-Baʿla’s family.121 Second, no member of the Zū-Baʿla family is named as a main party in tablets found in Area A.122 In the absence of counterevidence, the debt is considered consumptive. 3.2.1.1.2.4 QVO5 2 Two documents concern Kunaʾe son of Irrike and a woman named Anna-kīmī.123 According to QVO5 1, Kunaʾe took Anna-kīmī, daughter of a man from the town of Uri, and gave her to his slave as a wife. QVO5 2 is an amēlūtu contract between Kunaʾe and Ḫišmia, who was indebted for 40 shekels of silver. Kunaʾe canceled his debt and gave him Anna-kīmī as a wife. Clearly, she had been widowed or divorced. We are also informed that Anna-kīmī had borne children to her former husband and was adopted by Kunaʾe, as she is called his daughter (DUMU. MUNUS-šu). The clause of dissolution, although fragmentary, seems to differ from those in the other documents in that the creditor is to pay a certain amount of silver (unpreserved): (10) [šum-ma i-na EGIR-ki u₄-mi mKu-na-aʾ]-⌜e⌝ (11) [a-na pa-ni mḪiiz-mi-ia i-qab-bi ma-a KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ]-ia (12) [te-ra-mi iš-tu É-ia at-lak-mi] ⌜a-na⌝ Ḫi-iz-⌜mi⌝-ia (13) [x GÍN] ⌜KÙ.BABBAR li-din⌝-ma ŠU DAM-šu DUMU.MEŠ-šu (14) [li-i]ṣ-bat-ma a-šar ŠÀ-šu li-li-ik, “[If, in the future, Kunaʾ]e [should say to Ḫišmia: ‘Return] my [silver]; [leave my house,’ he] shall give [x shekels] of silver to Ḫišmia and [ta]ke the hand of his wife and his children and go wherever he pleases.” The penalty for the indentured person is 120 shekels and the surrender of his wife and children: (15) ⌜ù⌝ šúm-ma mḪi-iz-mi-ia a-na pa-ni (16) [mK]u-na-e a-kán-na i-qa-bi (17) [ma]-⌜a⌝ ul a-pal-la-aḫ-ka-mi (18) ⌜1⌝ me 20 GÍN a-na mKu-na-e li-din-ma (19) a-šar ŠÀ-šu li-li-ik i-na DAM-šu DUMU.MEŠ-šu (20) NU.TU[KU], “And if Ḫišmia should say to [K]unaʾe: ‘I will not support you,’ he shall pay 120 shekels (of silver) 121 On the basis of seal impressions (B2, B5, B6 in Beyer 2001: 121–23), E 16 can be synchronized with a document of the Awiru family, TBR 21, which dates to the time of the Overseer of the Land Aḫī-mālik (Viano 2007: 256); the latter was contemporary with the last generation of the Zū-Baʿla family, Cohen 2012a. The seal B6 belongs to Šaggar-abu, son of Dagan-tariʾ, who was a Hittite official, see § 1.3.7. 122 Only the administrative text E 22 mentions Imlik-Dagan, possibly the son of Kāpī-Dagan brother of Baʿal-qarrād, Cohen 2009: 159 and n. 44. 123 For the dossier of Kunaʾe see § 1.3.7.

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 169

to Kunaʾe and go wherever he pleases. He (Ḫišmia) will ha[ve] no (right) to his wife and his children.” According to the terms of the contract, Ḫišmia has no rights to Anna-kīmī’s children from her first marriage. Unfortunately, none of the parties is known elsewhere, but given the status of Anna-kīmī, Ḫišmia’s debt was clearly contracted for consumption. 3.2.1.1.2.5 Hirayama 38 Hirayama 38 is only partially preserved, but the formulary allows us to restore the term amēlūtu. In this document, Pazuri-Dagan canceled a debt of 56 shekels of silver owed by Amzaḫi son of Abī-Dagan. Additionally, Pazuri-Dagan gave Amzaḫi a wife, and perhaps he also added her dowry.124 Unlike in the other texts, the palāḫu duty is not performed for the creditor and his wife but for the creditor and his daughter. Unfortunately, the penalty for the debtor in case of unilateral dissolution is not preserved. The creditor, as usual, would forfeit his silver. This document also contains a proviso protecting the creditor against the debtor’s death, stipulating that someone, possibly the latter’s sons, will inherit the palāḫu duty: (23’) šum-ma mAm-za-ḫi BA.U[G₇-ma DUMU.MEŠ-šú (?)] (24’) m[P] a-zu-ri-dK[UR] ù [fdKUR-si-ma-ti DUMU.MUNUS-šú] (25’) li-ip-la-ḫu a-šar ŠÀ-š[ú-nu lil-li-ku], “If Amzaḫi di[es, his sons (?)] shall support [P]azuri-Da[gan] and [Dagansimātī, his daughter], [and then go] wherever they please.” As with E 16, this clause secured the creditor’s right while ensuring protection for the debtor’s sons, who were to receive housing and food. Although it is not specifically stated, the debt was possibly consumptive. Because the patronymic is not preserved, it is unknown whether Pazuri-Dagan can be identified with the individual concerned in MFA 1977.114.125 3.2.1.1.3 A Testament concerning Two amēlūtus (RE 39) RE 39126 is a Syro-Hittite tablet127 preserving the fragmentary testament of a certain Igmulu who established his wife, Āṣītu, as his universal heir. The share of inheritance included two credits: an unpreserved quantity of silver owed by a

124 Hirayama 38: 5, ù DAM-[t]a₅ ša NÍG.MUS[SA at-ta-din-šu!], “And [I gave him] a wi[f]e together with her dow[ry].” 125 See § 2.2.3.1. 126 The text has been recently reedited in Durand 2013b: 29–34, see also Yamada 2014. 127 Tsukimoto’s hypothesis (1998: 188) that the tablet is Syrian is to be rejected because the tablet format is typically Syro-Hittite. Additionally, the shape of the sign Aʾ is typical Syro-Hittite throughout the tablet; for the shape of Syro-Hittite signs see Wilcke 1992.

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man from Azu, whose name is almost completely broken, A[. . .], and 25 shekels of silver from a house sale that had not yet been received. This property reportedly belonged to Dagan-naʾi and Iaṣu-Dagan, sons of [. . .]-abu,128 who were the previous owners. It may be suggested that these two people were debtors whose house had been seized by Igmulu, who sold it in order to recover the sum he lent. Durand reads lines 7–9 as follows: (7) É mdKUR-na-i mIa!-⌜ṣú⌝-dKUR DUMU.M[EŠ ša x]-x-a-bu Š[U.I?] (8) a-na le-et ⌜mA⌝-[x-pí]-[AN DUMU Da-q]á-[ni] (9) a-na 25 GÍN [KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ (a-na PN) at-t]a-din, “La maison de Dagan-naʾi et Iaṣu-Dagan, fils de Baʾlu-abu, le barbier, jouxtant A[. . .]pī-ilī, fils de Daqanu, pour 25 sicles d’argent, je l’ai vendue (à . . . ).” However, ana lēt is never used with this nuance at Emar,129 but it is attested in conjunction with persons who have their money returned (E 85, Hirayama 37, GsK 1, RE 10, and TBR 78). Remarkably, in the family law contract RE 25130 ana lēt is used with the verb nadānu as a synonym of ana: (22) a-nu-ma a-šar KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ e-ru-bu 52 KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ a-na le-et (23) mA-zi-i DUMU Tu-ta-li-ti na-din 50 KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ (24) a-na mdKUR-NIR [DU]MU Ma-ti na-din 3 KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ a-na (25) mE-ṭì-ir-dU na-din 5 KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ ‹a-na› m A-bi-li-mu DUMU Mì-ka (26) na-din 3 KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ ‹a-na› mBi-šu DUMU Ib-šili-na na-din, “Now where the silver entered: 52 (shekels) of silver have been given to Azia son of Tutaliti; 50 (shekels) of silver have been given to Dagan-qarrād son of Matte; 3 (shekels) of silver have been given to Ēṭir-Adad; 5 (shekels) of silver have been given ‹to› Abī-liʾmu son of Mikku; 3 (shekels) of silver have been given ‹to› Biʾšu son of Ipšil-enna.” Therefore, there are grounds to assume that line 8 mentions the recipient of the house, namely the buyer. Accordingly, line 9 can be restored as a-na 25 GÍN K[Ù.BABBAR.MEŠ ŠÀM TIL.LA at-t]a-din, as convincingly suggested by Yamada,131 who also regards line 8 as recording the buyer. Durand’s restoration of the personal name in RE 39: 8 is based on the witness in RE 39: 11, A[. . .]pī-ilī (IGI mA-x-⌜pí⌝-AN DUMU Da-qá-[ni]), but the signs ⌜ma⌝** in RE 39: 8 are in the break and the only sign clearly visible is GA. Thus, I prefer not to identify the buyer in RE 39: 8 with the individual referred to in line 11.132

128 Perhaps the name can be restored as [dE]N-a-bu (RE 39: 7), see Durand 2013b: 31–32 n. 18. 129 For prepositions with lētu at Emar see Seminara 1998: 485–87, cf. CAD L: 151. 130 See § 2.2.2.1.4. 131 Yamada 2014: 142 and 43 n. 8. 132 Durand (2013b: 32 n. 22) admits that this is only a hypothesis. A problem with Durand’s identification is that it seems unlikely that the buyer mentions the seller as his witness; however, Durand’s identification might be correct if line RE 39: 13 contained just “witnesses” instead of “my witnesses,” so that RE 39 would report the witness list of the original sale contract in which the seller likely appeared as witness.

3.2 Dependency caused by Default 

 171

Following Durand, the debts are summarized in RE 39: 14, [25 + x GÍN] KÙ.BABBAR.M[EŠ] an-n[u-tu₄] ša 2 LÚ.MEŠ.Ú.LU-te-i[a], “Ces 25+x sicles d’argent de ces deux débiteurs.”133 Thus, it appears that two people had the status of amēlūtu. According to the interpretation proposed here, the two debtors are the man from Azu, A[. . .], and the buyer of the house. Nevertheless, the document does not specify the obligation of the two debtors towards the creditor’s heir. None of the parties is attested elsewhere in the Emar documentation. Although the debtors became amēlūtus, at least one of them was wealthy enough to purchase a house before falling into debt. Due to the fragmentary nature of the tablet, the debt is cautiously regarded as consumptive. The tablet is sealed by the ḫazannu Zū-Baʿla. As mentioned above,134 the presence of the ḫazannu in a Syro-Hittite text likely indicates that the tablet dates to the early phase of the Syro-Hittite documentation. 3.2.1.2 Non-amēlūtu Contracts Regulating Indentured Labor As discussed above, two documents can be regarded as regulating indentured labor even though they lack the term amēlūtu.135 RE 63 presents the same formulary as the amēlūtu contracts, including the ḫulluqu formula, the palāḫu formula, and the dissolution clause. The debtor is to perform the palāḫu duty also in E 86. Although E 86 uses formularies different from the amēlūtu contracts, it includes the “leaving the house”136 formula in the dissolution clause. Unlike the amēlūtu contracts that are formulated in the third person or as a declaration of the creditor, E 86 contains the debtor’s declaration. 3.2.1.2.1 RE 63 In RE 63, Mama son of Ummānu137 adopted his nephew or great nephew, Bēlu-kabar son of Baʿal-mālik, and paid his debt of 14 and 5/6 shekels of silver. Additionally, Mama gave a wife to Bēlu-kabar.138 In return, Bēlu-kabar was to fulfill the palāḫu duty for Mama and a certain Zū-Aštarti, who was likely a son of Mama. As in the amēlūtu contracts, the indentured person was bound to service for

133 For the plural form of amēlūtu see Durand 2013b: 33 n. 26. According to Yamada 2014, line 13 contains the sum lent to Azu. 134 See § 2.2.3.2, Viano 2018b. 135 For the classification of these documents as contracts of indentured labor see § 3.2.1. 136 For this formula see § 3.2.1. 137 For this individual see § 1.3.7. 138 The wife is not identified as Mama’s daughter: DAM-ta₅ ú-ša-ḫa-az-šu (RE 63: 8).

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the master’s lifetime: (9) u₄-miḫi.a ša mMa-ma ù mZu-Aš-tar-ti (10) bal-ṭu li-ip-làḫšu-nu-ti (11) ki-i-me-e mMa-ma ù mZu-Aš-tar-ti (12) EGIR-ki ši-ma-ti-šu-nu il-la-ku! (13) EN-GAL ŠU-ti DAM-šú DUMU.MEŠ-šú (14) li-iṣ-bat-ma a-šar ŠÀ-šú lil-lik, “As long as Mama and Zū-Aštarti should live, he shall support them. As Mama and Zū-Aštarti go after their fate, Bēlu-kabar shall take the hand of his wife and his children and go wherever he pleases.” The statement of the settlement of the debt by Mama in this text is unique in that it uses the two verbs šalāmu and ḫulluqu: (5) i-na-an-na mMa-ma ḫu-bula-ti-šu (6) ul-tal-li-im ù KU.BABBAR-šú uḫ-tal-liq, “Now Mama paid his debt and canceled his silver.” This clause is understood by Bellotto139 as referring to the repayment of the interest charged on the debt. However, a better explanation can be offered by comparing the clause with the amēlūtu contracts that contain the palāḫu formula, in which the verb ḫulluqu refers to the cancellation of the sum due in exchange for the palāḫu duty. The verb šalāmu implies that Mama reimbursed the debt to a creditor who is not reported in the text, while ḫulluqu indicates either that Mama was one of the creditors and canceled his own part of the debt, or that he canceled the sum he reimbursed to the creditors in exchange for the palāḫu duty. The dissolution clause is also unique: it stipulates that Mama will forfeit his silver, while a double payment (TÉŠ.BI) will be levied on Bēlu-kabar should he break the contract. This is the only dissolution clause containing the TÉŠ.BI/ mitḫāriš formula, which is usually found in the redemption clause in relation to properties (real estate or slaves). Nevertheless, the double payment is charged as a penalty in some amēlūtu contracts.140 This underscores the asymmetrical relation between debtor and creditor in RE 63. The most surprising aspect is that unlike the other contracts of indentured labor, RE 63 specifies that master and creditor were relatives before adoption. While one may argue that no moral or personal concerns would have prevented Mama from seizing his nephew as an indentured person, this text can also be interpreted in the opposite way as supporting our interpretation of the contracts of indentured labor as mutual agreements to face indebtedness:141 since the condition of indentured labor is imposed on a creditor’s relative, it follows that also unrelated debtors were seeking to be granted the same condition. We should also not exclude that Bēlu-kabar enjoyed a better condition than other indentured persons.

139 Bellotto 2009: 146. 140 See Table 48. 141 See § 5.1.1.

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Mama is likely to be identified with the testator of RE 56,142 who arranges the shares of his three sons: Zū-Aštarti, the eldest (DUMU-ia GAL), who is also mentioned in RE 63; Kitta; and Ipšil-enna.143 The fact that Bēlu-kabar is not mentioned among the heirs in Mama’s testament is a further hint that despite his adoption he was not granted the same status as Mama’s biological sons. Alternatively, it can be suggested that by the time Mama’s testament was written, the contract RE 63 had been dissolved by either side or Bēlu-kabar was already dead. As stated above, it is unclear whether Zū-Aštarti son of Mama is the person listed as debtor in RE 60.144 Given the small amount of the debt and the context of the contract, it seems plausible that the debt was consumptive. 3.2.1.2.2 E 86 E 86 records how Iadi-Dagan son of Baṣṣu was kept alive (bulluṭu) in a year of hardship (i-na MU KALA.GA) by Dagan-kabar son of Dagan-taliʾ of the family of Ḫima. Dagan-kabar repaid (šalāmu) a debt of 2.5 shekels of silver, the smallest sum of silver recorded in the contracts of indentured labor. In turn, Iadi-Dagan was to fulfill the palāḫu duty. Uniquely, the duration of the palāḫu duty is set as the debtor’s lifetime and not the creditor’s, as it is in the amēlūtu contracts: (1) mZU.dKUR DUMU Bá-aṣ-ṣa (2) a-kán-na iq-bi ma-a a-nu-ma (3) mdKUR-GAL DUMU dKUR-ta-li-iʾ DUMU Ḫi-ma (4) MU KALA.GA ub-ta-li-ṭá-ni-mi (5) ù 2+1/2 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR ḫu-bu-ul-li-ia (6) [ú-ša-a]l-lim-mi ù a-di bal-ṭá-ku (7) [a-pa-a]l-la-ḫaam-mi, “Iadi-Dagan son of Baṣṣu spoke as follows: ‘Now Dagan-kabar son of Dagan-taliʾ son of Ḫima in a year of hardship kept me alive and [pai]d 2.5 shekels of silver, my debt; and as long as I will live, [I will sup]port (him).’” The name of the original creditor is not reported. The dissolution clause, which as discussed above145 includes the “leaving the house” formula, does not mention the master but imposes a penalty for the unilateral ending of the contract only on the indentured person, who was to pay four times the original debt: (8) [šum]-ma i-na EGIR u₄-mi (9) [mZU.dK]UR a-na mdKURGAL (10) [i-qáb-b]i ma-a iš-tu É-ka (11) [at-ta]-lak-mi 10 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ (12) a-na mdKUR-GAL li-din-ma (13) a-šar ŠÀ-šú lil-lik, “[I]f, in the future, [Iadi-D]

142 The patronymic in RE 56: 1, may be restored as [Ú-ma]-ni. For the dating of RE 63 see p. 203. 143 For this name see Pruzsinszky 2003: Index, 499. 144 See § 2.1.2.10. 145 See § 3.2.1.

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agan [should sa]y to Dagan-kabar: ‘I want to [lea]ve your house,’ he shall pay 10 shekels of silver to Dagan-kabar and go wherever he pleases.” Due to its small amount, the debt was clearly consumptive. Among the contracts of indentured labor E 86 certainly provides the worst conditions for the debtor: the term of service is fixed for the life of the debtor and not the creditor; there are no penalties for the creditor; and the penalty for the debtor is four times the original debt. Note that in the other contracts where a member of the notable families is the master, the terms are not as harsh as in E 86.

3.2.2 Dependency Deriving from Pledge Law This section will discuss documents that govern the provision of personal pledges upon default. Accordingly, the provision of personal pledges in the stages prior to default will not be discussed here.146 A single document, AOAT 265.1, centers around an individual pledged upon default. The other three documents, ASJ10 A, E 77, and RA77 5 (discussed above),147 are amēlūtu contracts without the palāḫu formula recording additional pledges. 3.2.2.1 E 77, RA77 5 and ASJ10 A In E 77, Muḫra-aḫī, son of Kutta son of Zadamma son of Baṣṣu, who became amēlūtu of Dagan-kabar son of Ḫima, provided the latter with his house and his son Adda as a pledge (qātātū). In RA77 5, Itūr-Dagan son of Iddilli became amēlūtu of Iašur-Dagan son of Bada and gave him his wife Naʾittu, his son, and his house as supplementary pledge (qātātu). ASJ10 A is a renewal of an amēlūtu contract in which Dūdu son of Mašru gave his wife and daughters to Šeʾi-Dagan, who repaid his debt. Although the term qātātu is not employed, it seems that the debtor’s wife and daughters served as an additional pledge.

146 For those pledges see §§ 2.1, 2.2 and § 4.5. 147 These texts will be only summarized here; for a full discussion see § 3.2.1.1.1.

–

–

–

Daughters of Dūdu; Ṣāriptu wife of Dūdu (?)

Pledge

Dagan-kabar son of Ḫima

Ten creditors148

Aḫiu son of Ama Iašur-Dagan son of Bada (24 sh.); Bēlu-Dagan son of Aḫiu (1 sh. 40 grains); Baʿla-ilī wife of Dagalli (21/3 sh.); Alal-abu son of Baʿla-ilī (1 sh. 40 grains); Ḫimaši-Dagan son of A[ . . . a]d (2 sh.); Šaggar-abu son of Šar[. . .] (2.5 sh.); Ikūn-Rašap son of Tūra-Dagan (1 1/3 sh.); Abī-naʿmī daughter of Nukra (1 sh.); Karbu son of Abba (1/2 sh.); Gullatu, female servant of the king (3 sh.); Baʿal-bēlī son of Šeʾi-Dagan, the diviner (2 2/3 sh.)

Šeʾi-Dagan

Third Party

NG

Creditor

Ḫamis-Dagal servant of Baʿal- Assyrians qarrād

Naʾittu wife of Itūr-Dagan; Son of Itūr-Dagan; House of Itūr-Dagan

148 The creditors’ names are not preserved due to a break in the tablet.

Ḫamis-Dagal servant of Baʿal-qarrād

Itūr-Dagan son of Iddilli

Muḫra-aḫī son Adda son of Muḫra-aḫī; of Kutta son of House of Muḫra-aḫī Zadamma son of Baṣṣu

Dūdu son of Mašru

Redemption Debtor

2 minas and 5 sh. Tin 2 niksu-textiles 1 lubēru-textile

47 sh.

amēlūtu SH contract

RA77 5

MA

140 sh.

amēlūtu SH contract

E 77

AOAT 265.1 Letter

105 sh. and 40 grains

amēlūtu SH contract

ASJ10 A

Script Debt

Type

Document

Table 18: Pledged Persons.

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3.2.2.2 AOAT 265.1 AOAT 265.1 is a Middle Assyrian letter housed in a private collection in Japan. The letter was sent from Assyria by an Emarite merchant, Ḫamis-Dagal. He had purchased 2 minas and 5 shekels of refined silver measured by the weight-standard of Canaan (NA₄.MEŠ ša KUR Ki-na-ḫi),149 2 niksu-textiles, and 1 lubēru-textile150 on credit from Assyrians in exchange for tin. He entrusted these goods to several transporters hailing from Emar or its vicinity. As argued above, one of these transporters, Aḫī-raḫaq son of Iaʾšu, can be identified with the debtor in TBR 27.151 Because Ḫamis-Dagal was unable to pay the Assyrians, he was held as a pledge and forced to work as a slave, although his tasks are not reported: (18) Áš-šu-ra-ia-ú ki-i ⌜ša⌝-pár-⌜te⌝ (19) ú-kal-lu-ni ARAD-⌜ta⌝ (20) e-‹pa›-áš, “The Assyrians hold me in pledge, I have to work as a slave.” In order to be released, Ḫamis-Dagal addressed this letter to his lord Baʿal-qarrād, who can perhaps be identified with the son of Zū-Baʿla,152 and to his own wife Ḫilissa. She was instructed to barter silver for tin, or alternatively to collect the money to release Ḫamis-Dagal by selling their properties: (20) šúm-ma ⌜ṣar⌝-pa (21) ta-am-ta-ḫar AN.NA BABBAR (22) še-bi-la la-a-din la-pe-ṭé-er (23) šúm-ma ⌜ṣar⌝-pa la-a tam-ḫur (24) šub-ta KI.MEŠ! É.MEŠ-ni (25) a-na la-qa-e šu-ku-un, “If you have received the silver, send the tin so that I can give it and release (myself). If you have not received the silver, put (our) properties, whether fields or our houses, up for sale.” The term šapartu, “pledge,” indicates that the legal basis for holding ḪamisDagal was pledge law. The pledge is clearly in the possession of the creditor, but the moment when the pledge was transferred is unknown. Although possessory pledges of persons are usually given during the basic term of a loan,153 the commercial context of the letter as well as its tone suggests that the pledge was

149 For Kinaḫḫi = Canaan see Belmonte Marín 2001: 162–63. 150 These are typical Middle Assyrian textiles, Faist 2001: 253–54. According to Gaspa 2018: 259–60), niksu “probably designated a standard piece of cloth used as wrap, although Middle Assyrian attestations seem to confirm that it was a specific kind of garment”; lubēru was a wool garment probably used as tablecloths, Gaspa 2018: 331–32. 151 See § 2.1.2.5. 152 Pruzsinszky and Solans 2015: 327 and n. 88. Given that the letter reached Baʿal-qarrād, this text is provisionally assigned to the dossier of the Zū-Baʿla family; if this identification holds true, AOAT 265.1 should be dated toward the end of Baʿal-qarrād’s life, because Aḫī-raḫaq’s wife is attested after her husband’s death in RE 68, which is a very late text dating to the generations following Baʿal-qarrād, see Cohen 2009: 105–06. 153 See Abraham 2001: 174–75, Appendix A; Appendix A lists the following MA loans secured by a possessory šapartu pledge of persons: KAJ 17, KAJ 28, KAJ 53, KAJ 60, and TR 3021. KAJ 31 is a hypothecary šapartu pledge of a person.

3.2 Dependency caused by Default 

 177

transferred upon default.154 It seems very unlikely that Ḫamis-Dagal was held as a pledge from the beginning of the business venture. Most likely he was taken as a pledge when he was in Assyrian territory during the business trip and found himself unable to repay the debt. Notwithstanding the use of the term for pledge, it is unknown whether the original contract stipulated the pledge of Ḫamis-Dagal in case of default. Although Ḫamis-Dagal is not designated as distrainee, it is plausible that his seizure was a de facto measure to pressure him to pay the debt.155 The urgency of Ḫamis-Dagal’s letter might support this scenario. At any rate, the antichretic usufruct of Ḫamis-Dagal’s labor served to amortize the interest since the principal was to be repaid.156 The use of a Canaanite weight to measure the silver bought from the Assyrians suggests that the trade was directed towards Canaan. According to texts from the Maison d’Urtenu, several metals including tin were sent from Ugarit to Emar.157 It is therefore likely that the tin supposed to be shipped to Assyria was traded from the Mediterranean coast to inner Syria by Canaanite merchants.158 That the trade involved other intermediaries is made explicit in Ḫamis-Dagal’s instructions: (29) šúm-ma ṣar-pa (30) ⌜i⌝-tar-ṣu-ni-ku di-in (31) AN.NA BABBAR še-bi-la (32) a-na-ku la-tal-ka, “If they handed out the silver to you, give (it for tin) and send the tin. I want to leave!” It is clear that Ḫamis-Dagal’s wife needed the silver to barter for tin that reached Emar from somewhere else. The Emarite’s

154 Note that security, notably šapartu, was absent from loans with no sanctions before default (Type 5 in Abraham’s classification) because “the lien on the debtor’s assets that is provided in these loans was not a preliminary arrangement to secure the repayment of the loan, but rather a means of penalizing the defaulting debtor,” Abraham 2001: 169–70, and Appendix D. See also the personal kattû-liens in the commercial loans KAJ 41 and KAJ 46, cf. Saporetti 1978–1979: 68, 71; kattû-liens were likely an auxiliary type of security that is sometimes found in loans granted to finance business ventures and was in certain cases hypothecary, see Abraham 2001: 169, 90. I do not share here Zaccagnini’s opinion (2018, 48) that Ḫamis-Dagal was held as a pledge from the onset of the trade as Besitzpfand. Ḫamis-Dagal’s situation can be compared to that described in E 21, see ch. 2 fn. 260. 155 Note that distraint and pledge are terminologically differentiated and distraint is never contractual; for the Old Babylonian period see Westbrook 2001b: 84–90, for the Old Assyrian period see Veenhof 2001: 102–03, 28, 65–55. For the difficulties of the identification of distraint see also TBR 26 (§ 3.2.3.1.2) 156 The nature of the pledge resembles Verzugsantichrese, see § 3.2.1. 157 Pruzsinszky and Solans 2015: 326 and n. 82. 158 Faist (2001: 63–66) proposes that tin was imported to Assyria from the West. Our hypothesis finds support in an unpublished text from Tell Sabi Abyad (T 98–63) quoted by Faist (2001: 137–38 n. 138) that mentions tin among the exchange valuables of a merchant from Sidon; for the trade route of tin see also Bell 2006: 108–09.

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decision to carry a Canaanite weight to Assyria was clearly motivated by his trade with Canaanite merchants.159 Baʿal-qarrād’s role remains unclear. Perhaps he financed the trade venture, but Ḫamis-Dagal, who was apparently his dependent,160 was fully responsible for carrying it out.

3.2.3 Debt Slavery Slavery was a frequent consequence of default in the ancient Near East.161 Nevertheless, the Emar archives have yielded only a limited number of sources (9) – all Syro-Hittite tablets – where defaulting debtors are specifically referred to as slaves. Debt slavery may derive from either sale (§ 3.2.3.1) or enslavement (§ 3.2.3.2). Only two sales into debt slavery are known to us. Sales into debt slavery contain the formula ŠÀM.TIL.LA, “full price,” which unequivocally indicates that these documents were sale contracts.162 The term ‘enslavement for debt’ is used here to describe all cases in which debt slavery does not derive from sale. Enslavement is regulated in four contracts in which defaulting debtors become the slave of someone who repaid their debt (§ 3.2.3.2.1) and in three lawsuits (§ 3.2.3.2.2).163 Apart from E 252, all debts are regarded as consumptive.

159 The Canaanite shekel corresponded to the Ugaritic standard (9.4 g.), Chambon 2011: 82. 160 He identifies himself as a servant, ARAD. 161 For a general introduction to debt slavery see Mendelsohn 1949: 23–33, Chirichigno 1993, Westbrook 1995: 1643–45. 162 For the clauses in documents related to debt slavery see Table 15. 163 The texts E 18 and E 19 concerning the dispute between the prince Ḫešmi-Teššub, brother of Ini-Teššub, king of Karkemiš, and Kitta are not treated here because there is no clear indication that Kitta was indebted to Ḫešmi-Teššub; only E 19: 2, m[K]i-it-ta di-i-n[a] KÙ.BAB[BAR] uš-tam-ḫ[í]r, “Kitta opposed a claim over a sum of silver,” mentions a sum of silver, but it is not referred to as a debt and should not be automatically regarded as such (note Durand 1989d: 176 n. 48: “le texte . . . est grammaticalement suspect”). These texts will not be included among the documents concerning slavery, because although several scholars claimed that Kitta became Ḫešmi-Teššub’s debt slave (Yamada 1995: 309–11, Bellotto 2002: 130–32, d’Alfonso 2005a: 184–85, von Dassow 2018b: 669, Démare-Lafont 2019: 363–70), I do not think it is likely that a debt slave would have been allowed to travel to another city to meet the king in person and raise a claim against the king’s brother: ù ki-i LUGAL i-na KUR-ti-šu it-taḫ-sà mKi-ta // ù a-bu-šu LUGAL i-na uruÚr-ma imtaḫ-ru, “When the king came back to his land, Kitta and his father met the king in the town of Urma” (E 18: 7–8). In my opinion the two documents concern a dependent of the royal administration and specific duties of his family and himself that are not fully understood. Durand (1989d: 176) also regards Kitta as a high-ranking individual and not as a simple debt slave. The

Script

SH

SH

Document

TBR 26

TBR 44

20 sh.

10 sh. 1M

Slave 1F

Price 70 sh.

Debt

NG

Table 19: Sales into Debt Slavery.

Dagan-taliʾ son of Taʾe

Debtor

Itūr-libbu son of Apilu Unap-šenni, man of Karšu

Bulālu son of Arwu

Buyer

Creditor

Sold Person Wife of Dagan-taliʾ son of Taʾe

Ḫabu son of Bištu (F) Unap-šenni, man of Karšu

Aba son of Bada; Imlik-Dagan son of Šeʾi-Dagan; Imūt-Ḫamadi son of Šaḫlu; Abdi-Dagan son of the “kiln”; Abdi-ili son of Zazu

3.2 Dependency caused by Default   179

Script

SH

SH

SH

SH

Document

E 121

E 215

GsK 1

Hirayama 36

Slave

1M

2F 1M

1F 2M

2F

Debt

50 sh.

100 sh.

83 sh.

40 sh.

Table 20: Enslavement for Debt.

NO

TÉŠ.BI

–

TÉŠ.BI

Redemption

Zū-Aštarti son of Aḫī-mālik son of Kutbe

Zū-Aštarti son of Aḫī-mālik son of Kutbe

Baʿal-mālik son of Baʿal-qarrād

Milki-Dagan son of Aḫī-Dagan

Third Party

Baʿla-simātī daughter of Al-ummī daughter of Šapṭa

Ištar-bae; Pissa daughter of Ḫabu son of Paḫḫaru, wife of Ištar-bae; Ḫusiru son of Ištar-bae

Dagan-bēlu son of Aša-daʿi

Ḫimaši-Dagan son of Abba

Debtor

ENSLAVEMENT CONTRACTS

Aḫlamû son of Abbanu son of Mutri-Teššub (25 sh.: terḫatu); Unnamed creditors (15 sh.)

Tūri son of Ilī-bāni

Ibni-Dagan son of Bēlu-taliʾ (70 sh.); Itūr-Dagan son of Iddiʿ-aḫu (10 sh.); Ḫilaʾe son of Arib-šarri (20 sh.)

Kīn-abī (45 sh.) Tūra-Dagan son of Bur-[. . .] (4 or 5 sh.)

Creditor

Baʿla-simātī daughter of Al-ummī daughter of Šapṭa; Aštar-ummī daughter of Baʿla-simātī

Ištar-bae; Pissa daughter of Ḫabu son of Paḫḫaru, wife of Ištar-bae; Ḫusiru son of Ištar-bae

Dagan-bēlu son of Aša-daʿi with two wives and his share of a vineyard and fields

Ḫimaši-Dagan son of Abba

Transferred Properties

180   3 Default and Dependency

Script

SH

SH

SH

Document

E 33

E 205

E 252

-

2 slaves: Ilī-abī and Madi-šīmtu (F), children of Madi-Dagan son of Šeʾi-Dagan

?

30 sh.

25 sh.

26 sh. 1 shekel of gold Mutri-Teššub, Overseer of the Land Great Ones

Mutri-Teššub, Overseer of the Land Elders

Arma-nani

Court

Al-aḫātī sister of Itūr-Dagan

–

Third Party

LAWSUITS ESTABLISHING ENSLAVEMENT FOR DEBT

Repaid

Debt

Abdi-ili son of Atawa

Ibni-Dagan son of Zū-Baʿla

Zūzu

Creditor

Itūr-Dagan

Madi-Dagan son of Šeʾi-Dagan

Išmaʾ-Dagan

Debtor

3.2 Dependency caused by Default   181

182 

 3 Default and Dependency

3.2.3.1 Sales into Debt Slavery Two contracts belonging to the dossiers of Apilu and Awiru are the only sales into debt slavery known from Emar. 3.2.3.1.1 TBR 44 TBR 44 records a case of self-enslavement.164 During the siege of the TAR-WU troops,165 a certain Unap-šenni sold himself for 20 shekels of silver to a member of the Apilu family, Itūr-libbu son of Apilu. Unap-šenni originated from the town of Karšu, which is cited in the Alalaḫ texts and was likely located south of Karkemiš.166 The purchase price is twice the original debt owed to Ḫabu son of Bištu167 (nowhere else attested) because Unap-šenni kept 10 shekels of silver for himself (10 MIN m Ú-na-ap-še-ni-ma il-qi). The ability of the debtor to negotiate a good price underscores the voluntary nature of his enslavement. The document does not contain the redemption clause but includes the non-vindication clause (ṭuppu annû ilāʾēšu). 3.2.3.1.2 TBR 26 TBR 26 belongs to the archive of the Awiru family. A group of moneylenders had seized the wife of their debtor, Dagan-taliʾ son of Taʾe, and sold her for 70 shekels of silver to Bulālu son of Arwu. The legal basis for the creditors’ seizure and sale of the debtor’s wife is unclear. According to Skaist,168 followed by Fijałkowska, TBR 26 was a case of distraint, although in ancient Near Eastern law, usually cred-

same interpretation of Kitta as serving the Hittite authority is found in Yamada 2006: 229–32. This is further supported by Di Filippo’s observation (2008a: 47) that the tablets E 18 and E 19 together with the Syrian tablet E 17, which were found in the same jar, form the archive of Kitta’s family; it seems therefore unlikely that a debt slave owned his own archive. If E 18 and E 19 had been slavery-related documents, they should have been found in the archive of the slave’s master, but this was clearly not Ḫešmi-Teššub’s archive. As with TBR 40 (§ 3.2.1.1.2.2), the term ARAD associated with the Hittite authority can be understood as “servant of the king” (ARAD LUGAL). The text Hirayama 29, in which the testator’s sons are given in service to a Hittite official, supports the use of ARAD with the meaning of “servant of the king,” ù ARAD.ME // ⌜ša⌝ mḪi-iš-mi-dU-up DUMU LUGAL šu-nu, “And (my three sons) will be servants of Ḫešmi-Teššub, Son of the King” (Hirayama 29: 10–11), cf. Yamada 1995: 304 (according to Yamada, however, the use of ARAD in Hirayama 29 contrasts with that in E 18); for “servant of the king” see ch. 3 fn. 73. 164 For self-sales in the ancient Near East see Mendelsohn 1949: 14–19. 165 For these troops see § 1.5. 166 See Belmonte Marín 2001: 158–59; see also § 5.2.2. 167 Curiously, Ḫabu is identified by the name of his mother, Bištu. 168 Skaist 2001: 245.

3.2 Dependency caused by Default 

 183

itors were not allowed to economically profit from the sale of the distrainee; the purpose of distraint was to put pressure on the debtor.169 An alternative explanation is that the creditor’s right was rooted in pledge law: the woman was given as security by her husband during the basic term of the loan, and then sold when the loan became due. However, one should note that the woman is not referred to as a pledge (qātātu). Another interpretation takes into account the “voluntarily” clause, which states that the debtor’s wife was sold “of her own free will” (a-na SAG.DU-ši-ma). This expression is only found in conjunction with debt and famine slaves when the seller is a relative of the sold person. No sale of chattel slaves contains this expression. Therefore, its very presence allows us to surmise that the debtor agreed to and was involved in the sale of his wife. But does the contract contain anything to suggest that Dagan-taliʾ was the seller? A hint may be found in a clause protecting the buyer against any claim, which establishes that the sellers were liable for reimbursing the claimant: (8) [šum-m]a ur-ra-am še-ra-am (9) [ma]-am-ma a-na EN DI.KU₅-šú el-la-a (10) mA-ba DUMU Ba-da mdKUR-ta-li-iʾ (11) mIm-lik-dKUR DUMU Še-i-dKUR (12) mBA.UG₇-ḫama-dì DUMU Ša-aʾ-li (13) mARAD-dKUR DUMU UDUN-ni (14) mARAD-DINGIR-lì DUMU fZa-zi (15) i-ta-na-pa-lu-šú, “[I]f, in the future, [so]meone should come up as an adversary (in court), Aba son of Bada, Dagan-taliʾ, Imlik-Dagan son of Šeʾi-Dagan, Imūt-Ḫamadi son of Šaḫlu, Abdi-Dagan son of the ‘kiln,’ and Abdi-ili son of Zazu will reimburse him. Bulālu is free (of claims).”170 None of the sellers listed is attested elsewhere, but the Dagan-taliʾ mentioned in the list might be the debtor himself. If this identification holds true, the sale was undertaken by the debtor and his creditors, justifying the presence of the “voluntarily” clause. Since the amount of the debt is unreported, it is unknown whether the 70 shekels of silver corresponded to the original loan.171 TBR 26 records the highest price for the sale of a single person.172 A very tentative explanation for the payment of such a large amount of silver is that Dagan-taliʾ was somehow known to Bulālu through kinship, friendship, or patron-client relations.

169 See Veenhof 2001: 154–55, Westbrook 2001b: 84–90. The same mechanism applies in the Kassite period, see for instance van Soldt 2015: 39–40. In order to sustain this explanation, one should claim, as Fijałkowska (2014a: 103) does, that at Emar distraint operated differently than it did in Mesopotamia. 170 For the zakû clause see §§ 1.5 and 3.1.1. 171 See § 3.3.2.2.2. 172 For the prices of slaves see § 5.2.1.

184 

 3 Default and Dependency

3.2.3.2 Enslavement for Debt 3.2.3.2.1 Enslavement Contracts Four enslavement contracts are preserved (E 121, E 215, GsK 1, and Hirayama 36). Because they are not sale contracts, they make no mention of price. In the enslavement contracts, the defaulting debtor enters into slavery (ana ardūti erēbu) to a third party who pays off his/her debts (šalāmu), who is obviously different from the original creditor. All persons acting as a third party are members of the notable families. Although one might expect that the original creditors in such situations were wealthy enough to issue credit, only two original creditors are known from other Emar sources (GsK 1 and Hirayama 36). As expected, none of the debtors is otherwise known. Defaulting debtors were enslaved alone (E 121), or more often along with members of their own family (E 215, GsK 1, and Hirayama 36). All the contracts contain a list of creditors who have been repaid. 3.2.3.2.1.1 GsK 1 and Hirayama 36 The most important member of the Kutbe family, Zū-Aštarti son of Aḫī-mālik son of Kutbe, is featured in two enslavement contracts, GsK 1 and Hirayama 36. In GsK 1, a certain Ištar-bae together with his wife and his son became slaves of Zū-Aštarti in exchange for having his debt (83 sh.) repaid. The creditor Tūri son of Ilī-bāni likely belonged to the same social group as the family of Kutbe, because he was a military official and impressed his seal on documents belonging to the notable families.173 Redemption is open to anyone (mamma) who pays double the debt (TÉŠ.BI). Because the debtor’s personal name is not attested elsewhere in the Emarite onomasticon, one may wonder whether he was a foreigner. Hirayama 36 is the only enslavement contract where the principal debtor is a woman: Zū-Aštarti paid 40 shekels of silver, the debt of Baʿla-simātī daughter of Al-ummī daughter of Šapṭa, who was seized by her creditors. In exchange, Baʿla-simātī and her daughter Aštar-ummī became slaves of Zū-Aštarti. A single creditor is mentioned by name: Aḫlamû son of Abbanu, who was the grandson of the Overseer of the Land Mutri-Teššub.174 Aḫlamû receives 25 shekels of silver that are identified as Baʿla-simātī’s terḫatu. Tsukimoto175 suggested that at the time of marriage the terḫatu was received by Baʿla-simātī herself, and not by her family, and she was later asked to return it to Aḫlamû, who was perhaps her 173 See § 1.3.7. 174 See § 1.3.7. 175 Tsukimoto 1991a: 302.

3.2 Dependency caused by Default 

 185

former husband or father-in-law.176 This document sheds light on how women could fall into debt; what happened to Baʿla-simātī was probably experienced by other women.177 Because Aḫlamû himself certainly could have enslaved Baʿla-simātī and her daughter in lieu of the debt, Zū-Aštarti’s intervention could be seen as a favor to a peer, such as the grandson of a Hittite official. The remaining 15 shekels of silver are received by another creditor whose name is not reported, but it cannot be ruled out that he was included in the witness list.178 Unlike in GsK 1, here redemption is forbidden by the non-vindication clause (ṭuppu annû ilāʾēšu). 3.2.3.2.1.2 E 121 In E 121, a member of the last generation of Milki-Dagan’s family, Milki-Dagan son of Aḫī-Dagan, paid out 50 shekels of silver, the debt of Ḫimaši-Dagan son of Abba, who in a year of hardship that was characterized by inflation of the price of barley (i-na MU KALA.GA š[a 3? SÌLA ŠE.MEŠ] // a-na 1 [GÍ]N KÙ.BABBAR.ME iz-za-az) was unable to satisfy his creditors, Kīn-abī (45 sh.) and Tūra-Dagan179 son of Bur-[. . .] (4 or 5 shekels).180 Although the contract contains the non-vindication clause (ṭuppu annû ilāʾēšu), the right of redemption is limited to Ḫimaši-Dagan, who may redeem himself by paying twice the original debt: (13) šúm-ma KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ ša ŠU-ti-šú i-na-din! (14) KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ TÉŠ.BI li-din, “If he wants to reimburse the silver of his guarantor, he shall give the equivalent silver.” The guarantor cannot be anyone else than Milki-Dagan, who seemingly assumed the surety during the basic term of the loan.

176 Because of Aḫlamû’s high status compared to Baʿla-simātī’s disgrace, it seems more likely that Aḫlamû was her father-in-law rather than her husband, or even more likely that she belonged to his household but had no kinship ties to him. 177 Another case involving the terḫatu received by the bride may be that of Tarṣipu, the secondary wife of Baʿal-qarrād, son of the diviner Zū-Baʿla, who in E 202 was repudiated and compelled to return her terḫatu. 178 The tablet is sealed by the Overseer of the Land Aḫī-mālik followed by Aḫlamû and by Aba son of Abdia and Abī-Šaggar son of Šeʾi, who are nowhere else attested. The witness list includes Šurši-Dagan son of Ḫidda, Kāpī-Dagan son of Uginu, and Šurši-Dagan son of Abunnu, who are unknown from other sources; other witnesses are Bēlu-kabar son of Išmaʾ-Dagan, who witnessed two other slavery-related documents of Kutbe’s family (GsK 1 and Hirayama 37), and [. . .]-wa, whose father Dagan-kabar son of Aḫiu is possibly mentioned in the list E 336. 179 For this reading see Pruzsinszky 2003: Index, 784. 180 On this sum see the remarks in Durand 1990: 57.

186 

 3 Default and Dependency

As with the contract of indentured labor E 117, this document specifies that after redemption Ḫimaši-Dagan will remain a “servant of the king” (ARAD LUGAL ir!-ti!-iḫ), i.e., he must return to serve the Hittite administration as a free man.181 3.2.3.2.1.3 E 215 The formulary of E 215 diverges from that of the other enslavement contracts, as it is structured as the debtor’s first-person declaration before the Elders of Uri, which was the debtor’s town. The diviner Baʿal-mālik son of Baʿal-qarrād repaid a debt of 100 shekels of silver, owed by Dagan-bēlu son of Aša-daʿi to three creditors: Ibni-Dagan son of Bēlu-taliʾ (70 sh.), Itūr-Dagan son of Iddiʿ-aḫu (10 sh.), and Ḫilaʾe son of Arib-šarri (20 sh.). In turn, Dagan-bēlu with his two wives entered into slavery to Baʿal-mālik, who also received Dagan-bēlu’s fields and his share of a vineyard. E 215 is also the only enslavement contract to contain the “voluntarily” clause: (9) a-na ARAD-ut-ti (10) ša mdU-ma-lik iš-tu SAG.DU-šú-ma (11) e-teru-ub, “(Dagan-bēlu) entered into slavery to Baʿal-qarrād of his own will.” Neither the non-vindication clause nor the redemption clause is included in the contract. On the basis of the present evidence, it remains unclear whether these differences from the other enslavement contracts are related to any particular status granted to the slave. Fijałkowska182 proposed to explain the uniqueness of the juridical formulary by noting that E 215 is the only enslavement contract including a transfer of properties from the debtor to the buyer. The debtor owned some parcels of land and had two wives, usually a prerogative of wealthy people.183 Additionally, among the enslavement contracts, E 215 records the largest debt, which may have resulted from some business activities. The fact that three creditors are involved could be a sign of a business partnership that eventually failed. However, in the absence of clear evidence of trade activity, this debt is regarded as consumptive. Dagan-bēlu is unknown elsewhere.184 Although it is not stated in the document, the debtor and his family were presumably bound to work the forfeited lands, which represented a source of income. Therefore, it may be inferred that Dagan-bēlu preferred to become a slave rather than to alienate his land in order to retain his means of subsistence.

181 For the title of “servant of the king” at Emar see ch. 3 fn. 73. 182 Fijałkowska 2014a: 112. 183 See Westbrook 2003–2005. 184 Dagan-bēlu’s father, Aša-daʿi, can perhaps be identified with an individual bearing the title of “servant of the king” in BLMJ 18: 8 because he is only named in these two documents; if this identification holds true, it would further show that the title “servant of the king” was not borne by high-ranking officials because they often appear as debtors.

3.2 Dependency caused by Default 

 187

One of the witnesses, a certain Putuḫulasi, is mentioned in another text, E 90A-B. Although Putuḫulasi in E 215 bears no patronymic, it is very likely that the two documents refer to the same individual because this personal name is only found in these sources. This identification is further supported by the fact that the vineyard sold in E 90A-B was located in Uri. Given that Putuḫulasi came from Uri, it may be suggested that the other witnesses were inhabitants of the same town; perhaps they can be identified with the Elders. 3.2.3.2.2 Lawsuits Establishing Enslavement for Debt 3.2.3.2.2.1 E 205 The lawsuit E 205, found in Building M₁, belongs to the archive of the Zū-Baʿla family. It concerns a dispute brought before the Overseer of the Land Mutri-Teššub and the Elders. Ibni-Dagan son of the diviner Zū-Baʿla had lent 25 shekels of silver to Madi-Dagan son of Šeʾi-Dagan, who died before he could repay his debt. As security for the debt, Madi-Dagan had left his children, Ilī-abī and his blind sister Madi-šīmtu,185 in the house of Ibni-Dagan. The two children were likely pledges, although they are not referred to as qātātu.186 Ibni-Dagan addressed the court, demanding that the debtor’s brothers redeem their nephew and niece by returning the sum due. The fact that Ibni-Dagan resorted to a lawsuit against the debtor’s brothers instead of asserting his rights over the pledged persons suggests that Madi-Dagan’s children were minors. Because the debtor’s brothers refused to repay the debt, Ibni-Dagan was entitled to take the children as slaves: (13) ù áḫ-[ḫi-a ša mA-bi-šu-nu] 25 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR. MEŠ ša mIb-ni-[dKUR] (14) na-da-ni [la-a] i-[m]a-gu-ru ù 2 DUMU.MEŠ ŠEŠ-šú-[nu] (15) a-na ARAD-ut-ti [ša m]Ib-ni-dKUR iš-tu ra-ma-ni-šu-nu-ma (16) ik-nu-ku-šu-nu[ti-ma], “But [their father’s] bro[thers ref]used to return the 25 shekels of silver of Ibni-[Dagan], and thus they (transferred) the two children of th[eir] brother into slavery [to] Ibni-Dagan, of their own will, by means of a sealed document.” This clause affirms the change in status of the children: only after the refusal to repay the debt did the debtor’s children become slaves.187 The contract also states that 185 For blind workers see Tenney 2011a: 60–62. 186 See Durand’s restoration of E 205: 5, i-na É mIb-ni-dK[UR a-na pu-ḫi] 25 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR. MEŠ ša-a-šú um-te-eš-ši-ir, “He has left (his two children) in the house of Ibni-Da[gan in lieu of] 25 shekels of silver.” The verb wuššurum is used for the transfer of a pledge to the lender in Old Assyrian sources, Veenhof 2001: 130. 187 The “voluntarily” clause is also reported in Ibni-Dagan’s request for repayment, šum-ma // 2 DUMU.MEŠ ŠE[Š-ku-nu te-le-qa ù] 25 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ-ia // te-er-ra [ú-la-šu-ma] 2 DUMU. MEŠ ŠEŠ-ku!-nu ša-a-šú-[nu] // iš-tu [ra-ma-ni-šu-n]u a-na ARAD-ut-ti-ia id-na-n[im-ma], “If [you

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the children will be the slaves of Ibni-Dagan whether dead or alive (BA.UG₇! bal-ṭu ARAD.MEŠ ša ᵐIb-ni-[ᵈKU]R šu-nu). Children were usually sold for 9 to 15 shekels of silver (§ 5.2), and thus the value of Madi-Dagan’s children corresponded to the debt. Their age is unknown, but if the pledge was antichretic, they were at least five or six years old, which was the approximate age when children entered the workforce in ancient Mesopotamia.188 The change in status from pledge to slave granted Ibni-Dagan full ownership of the children, who were therefore given as a means of payment, a sort of datio in solutum. The creditor was not entitled to automatically acquire ownership of the pledged children, as in a Verfallspfand, but rather had to secure the approval of their family in court. Although Ibni-Dagan obtained ownership of the slaves, a certain Abdu son of Ḫutammanu, likely a member of the debtor’s family, and the uncles were still granted the right of redemption. The double rate of redemption set for the children, i.e., two slaves for each person, is typical of sales when properties are fully alienated.189 The debtor was likely a villager from the vicinity of Emar because Abdu son of Ḫutammanu and some witnesses are said to come from the town of Eššu.190 3.2.3.2.2.2 E 252 E 252 was found in Building M₁ but does not relate to the Zū-Baʿla family.191 The judges in this litigation are Mutri-Teššub and the Great Ones of Emar. A certain Abdi-ili son of Atawa sued Al-aḫātī regarding the debt of her brother Itūr-Dagan, equivalent to 26 shekels of silver and 1 shekel of gold. This debt is defined as ma-an-da-at-tù-mi ša ŠEŠ-ia. The term mandattu assumes the meaning of “endowment capital” for merchants in sources from Ugarit.192 The lawsuit can be understood as concerning a commercial debt, but unlike in Ugarit, where mandattu-capital consisted of royal endowments, in E 252 this term seems to refer to

want to take] the two children of [your] broth[er], return me my 25 shekels of silver. [Otherwise], give me those two children of your brother into my slavery of t[heir own will]” (E 205: 9–12). 188 Baker 2001: 22–23, see also Reid 2017: 11, Tenney 2017: 739–50. 189 See § 4.9.2 and § 5.3; the redemption price of the pledges corresponded to the amount of the debt, § 4.5.4. 190 Belmonte Marín 2001: 76; Charpin’s (2016) suggestion that ālu eššu was a new part of the city of Emar is not followed here. 191 This is one of the few documents found in Building M₁ that neither records the private business of the Zū-Baʿla family nor serves as a title to property; see also E 256 (§ 3.3.2.1.1.1), E 257 (§ 3.4.3.2.4) and Viano 2020a: 425. 192 CAD M/1: 15; see Monroe 2009: 107–08.

3.2 Dependency caused by Default 

 189

private financing.193 The mention of gold is further evidence of the commercial background of the debt. Al-aḫātī was brought to court likely because she was acting as guarantor and as the business partner of her brother, who may have been away on a business trip. The woman produced witnesses who affirmed that she had paid her brother’s debt: (9) ù mMu-ut-ri-dU-ub [ṭup-pí]-ia (10) ša lú.mešši-bu-ti-ši [iš-te]-mi (11) ki-i fAlḫa-ti (12) ḫu-bu-ul-la ša mI-túr-dKUR (13) ŠEŠ-ši ú-šal-lìm, “‘And Mutri-Teššub [has liste]ned to her! [tablet] of her witnesses.’ According (to that tablet), Al-aḫātī paid the debt of Itūr-Dagan, her brother.” Unfortunately, due to the fragmentary preservation of the verdict of the court, it is difficult to understand the details of the judgment. This document is treated here under debt slavery because of the last lines of the text. It seems that the court did not rule in favor of the woman because of a redemption clause referring to her (?) daughter: (17) ur-ra-[am še-ra-am šum-ma (. . .)] (18) DUMU.MUNUS ša-a-šú [. . .] (19) KÙ.BABBAR.ME TÉŠ.BI [li-di]n ⌜DUMU?.MUNUS?⌝-ši194 lil-qi, “In the f[uture if . . . ] that daughter . . . he/she (?) [shall pa]y the equivalent silver and take her daughter.” The double price stipulated for redemption suggests that the girl was fully alienated as a slave girl.195 The identity of the girl is unknown, but the feminine possessive pronoun suggests that she was Al-aḫātī’s daughter. Alternatively, in line with our interpretation of the debt as commercial, one may propose that in this admittedly fragmentary text, the girl was not Al-aḫātī’s daughter but rather the daughter of Al-aḫātī’s slave, handed over as compensation or as the balance of the debt. Baṣṣu, Abdi-ili’s brother, acted as a witness and can probably be identified with one of the witnesses from the town of Karšu recorded in the sale into slavery Hirayama 17.196 If this identification holds true, Abdi-ili too stemmed from Karšu.

193 However, one may wonder whether Abdi-ili was a representative of the Zū-Baʿla family who financed the trade venture. This could explain the presence of E 252 within Building M₁. 194 Arnaud’s transliteration [li-di]n MU[NUS.NÍ]TA-ši raises two problems. First, the traces of the signs on the copy are not compatible with the sequence DIN MUNUS because if the Winkelhaken belongs to DIN, the following sign cannot be reconstructed as MUNUS based on the single horizontal. Second, it counters the logic of the text because the protasis only refers to a daughter (DUMU.MUNUS). Admittedly, we cannot exclude that MUNUS.NÍTA was written in the missing part of line 18, but this would not change the fact that the apodosis does not mention the daughter. For these reasons I prefer to integrate DUMU.MUNUS into line 19. 195 Although the TÉŠ.BI formula is attested in the dissolution clause in the non-amēlūtu contract RE 63, courts usually imposed slavery as a penalty, see Westbrook 1995: 1647. The court had the power to impose slavery for non-payment of debts, see Westbrook 2003a: 382 196 For this text see § 3.3.1.10.

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3.2.3.2.2.3 E 33 The tablet E 33 was found in Area C, but its archival context cannot be reconstructed due to the lack of clear archeological reports.197 This tablet contains a lawsuit concerning a dispute between a woman and her adoptive son.198 Išarte, wife of Aštar-abu, adopted Išmaʾ-Dagan and gave him her daughter as a wife. Later she repudiated Išmaʾ-Dagan as her son because he became indebted and stole some items belonging to his adoptive family to repay his debt. The woman specifically stated that she refused to be liable for Išmaʾ-Dagan’s debt:199 (1) f I-šar-te DAM mAš-tar-a-bu a-kán-na iq-bi (2) ma-a mIš-ma-aʾ-dKUR a-na DUMU-utti-ia (3) ú-š[e]-⌜ṣi⌝ ù a-na-ku ḫa-ma ḫu-ṣa-ba (4) ša [ma-a]n-ma ul ḫu-bu-la-ku-mi, “Išarte wife of Aštar-abu spoke as follows: ‘I di[smis]sed Išmaʾ-Dagan from the status of my son, and I am not indebted to [any]one for even a splinter of wood200 (i.e., a valueless thing).’” Then Išarte listed all the items that she owned before Išmaʾ-Dagan entered her house, for which she produced witnesses, and she brought Išmaʾ-Dagan before the Hittite dignitary Arma-nani: (12) i-na-an-na fI-šar-te mIš-ma-aʾ-dKUR (13) a-na pa-ni d30-ŠEŠ ul-te-zi-iz (14) ki-i mIš-ma-aʾ-dKUR ḫu-búl (15) ù mIš-maaʾ-dKUR 30 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ (16) ša mZu-zu ḫu-búl ù ki-i KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ (17) ša-a-šú i-na É mZu-zu e-te-ru-ub, “Now Išarte produced Išmaʾ-Dagan before Arma-nani because Išmaʾ-Dagan was indebted. And Išmaʾ-Dagan was indebted to Zūzu for 30 shekels of silver, and in lieu of the silver he has entered the house of Zūzu.” Thus, Zūzu was the creditor and Išmaʾ-Dagan entered his house as a slave because he was unable to repay the debt. It is plausible that he stole the items to repay the debt. The judge declared that Išmaʾ-Dagan had to return the items in order to keep his wife, and had he failed to return them he would have lost all rights to his wife.201 On the contrary, Išmaʾ-Dagan’s status as a slave is uncontested: (25) [at-t]a a-na ARAD LÚ ša-nim-ma (26) te-[te-ru-ub], “[Yo]u have entered as a slave of another man.”202 The verdict also explicitly states the free status of Išarte’s daughter: (27) ù DUMU.MUNUS fI-šar-te ša la-a ŠÁM (28) ki-i-ki-i ta-laq-qì, “And

197 Arnaud 1975a: 91–92, Rutz 2013: 65. 198 For this document see Yamada 1995: 309–11, d’Alfonso 2005a: 185–87, Bellotto 2009: 113–15. 199 See Durand 1989d: 181–82. 200 For this translation see CAD H: 259. 201 The restoration of E 33: 20 in d’Alfonso 2005b: 28–29, [ú-nu-temeš an-nu-t]i! i-na aš-⌜ri⌝-šu-nu, seems to be preferable to that proposed by Yamada (1995: 310), [KÙ.BABBAR ša mZu-z]u i-na aš⌜ri⌝-šu-nu, because of the plural possessive suffix in aš-⌜ri⌝-šu-nu and the parallel lines [šum-m]a ú-nu-temeš an-nu-ti // [i-na aš-ri]-šu-nu la-⌜a⌝ tu-ta-ar (E 33: 22–23). 202 This obviously refers to Zūzu.

3.2 Dependency caused by Default 

 191

how can you take Išarte’s daughter, who has not been purchased?”203 The verdict required the approval of the king of Karkemiš to gain effectiveness, as stated in a clause at the end of the document: (32) ù ki-i LUGAL il-la-ka (33) ù DI.KU₅ an-na-a a-na pa-ni LUGAL (34) i-šak-ka-nu, “And when the king will return, this judgment will be brought before the king.” Unfortunately, none of the parties is attested elsewhere.

3.2.4 Unclear Types of Dependency for Debt Three Syro-Hittite documents, two contracts (Hirayama 37 and TBR 25) and a lawsuit (Subartu 17), concern persons who entered into some form of dependency as a consequence of indebtedness. Some clauses in these documents resemble those found in the documents so far discussed, but the precise nature of the subjugated condition cannot be defined. No specific terms such as (w)ardu or amēlūtu are used. All three documents contain the “year of hardship” formula and specify that the debtor was kept alive (bulluṭu), a specification that is never found in slavery-related documents.204 In all three cases, the masters are members of notable families. The two contracts are worthy of discussion. Both documents resemble the contracts of indentured labor, but termination seems to be defined differently. In contracts of indentured labor, termination may occur either by returning the debt,205 by performing the palāḫu duty until the master’s death, or by paying a penalty for anticipated breach of contract.206 Conversely, in Hirayama 37 and TBR 25 the release of the dependent may be achieved by providing a substitute. This manner of termination resembles the redemption clause that we will encounter in the sales into famine slavery (§ 3.3.1).207 However, unlike those sales, Hirayama 37 and TBR 25 set a one-to-one rate of redemption. Hirayama 37 and TBR 25 further differ from

203 Different interpretations of the sentence have been put forth; see Arnaud’s edition and Durand 1989b, Yamada 1995: 310, d’Alfonso 2005b: 28–29. I here follow von Dassow (2018a: 670, 2020: 103–04), according to whom Arma-nani’s verdict contains rhetorical questions because the GIŠ.TUKUL duty cannot be imposed on unfree persons; von Dassow translates: “You have [become] the slave of another man, so (how can) you hold the weapon of the king? And how can you take Išarte’s daughter, who is not purchased?” On the GIŠ.TUKUL duty see Yamada 1995, Bellotto 2002, Yamada 2006: 229–32, von Dassow 2018b: 662–64. 204 This formula is also used in the family law contract SMEA30 9 (§ 2.2.2.2.2), and in the non-amēlūtu contract E 86 (§ 3.2.1.2.2), see Table 59. 205 amēlūtu contracts without palāḫu formula, § 3.2.1.1.1. 206 The latter two possibilities are mentioned in amēlūtu contracts with palāḫu formula (§ 3.2.1.1.2) and in the non-amēlūtu contracts (§ 3.2.1.2). 207 The provision of substitutes is also attested in the lawsuit E 205 (§ 3.2.3.2.2.1)

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some contracts of indentured labor because the palāḫu duty is not demanded and no penalties are imposed on the master in case of breach of contract.208 Table 21: Unclear Types of Dependency for Debt. CONTRACTS Document Debt

Dependent Redemption Third Party Creditor

Hirayama 37

25 sh.

TBR 25

20 parīsu 1 M of barley

1F

Debtor

1 female slave

Zū-Aštarti son of Aḫī-mālik son of Kutbe

Isertu Baʿla-ilī daughter daughter of of Arwu son of Dagan-taliʾ Pitnu son of Iašur-Dagan

1 person

–

Bulālu son of Arwu

Iašar-daʿi son of Aštartu-līt

LAWSUIT Document Debt Dependent Redemption Court Subartu 17

NG

1F

30 sh.

KāpīDagan son of Zū-Baʿla; Great Ones

Third Party

Creditor

Debtor Dependent

La-abuDagan son of KāpīDagan son of Zū-Baʿla

Bēlu-mālik Mattia Al-ummī son of daughter Matkaliof Zū-Baʿla Dagan son of (?) ḪAR-da

3.2.4.1 Contracts Regulating Unclear Types of Dependency for Debt 3.2.4.1.1 Hirayama 37 Hirayama 37 belongs to the archive of Kutbe. In a year of hardship characterized by great inflation (i-na MU KALA.GA ki-i 3 qa ŠE.MEŠ a-na 1 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR iz-za-az), Zū-Aštarti son of Aḫī-mālik son of Kutbe paid off 25 shekels of silver, the debt of Baʿla-ilī daughter of Arwu son of Pitnu, and kept her alive by supplying her with food and water. The debt was owed to another woman, Isertu daughter of Dagan-taliʾ son of Iašur-Dagan. Isertu’s father may have been a member of an important family, as he is probably to be identified with the sealer of four docu-

208 Penalties imposed on the master are usually related to the demand of the palāḫu duty; the only exception is E 86, which contains the palāḫu formula but imposes a penalty only on the debtor.

3.2 Dependency caused by Default 

 193

ments that belong to the archives of the notable families or are sealed by Hittite officials (E 117, Hirayama 45, SMEA30 8, TBR 22).209 Hirayama 37 includes several clauses already encountered in other text types, for example, the clause ša ipallaḫanni yānu, “there is no one to support me,” which is found in the family law contracts210 but is never attested in slavery-related documents. Likewise, the bulluṭu formula is not found associated with slaves. Despite these similarities with documents in which defaulting debtors were not enslaved, Hirayama 37 defines termination differently. It includes the redemption clause: (6) šúm-ma i-na EGIR u₄-mi (7) ma-am-ma fdU-DINGIR-lì a-na ba-qa-ri il₅-la-a (8) 1 ZI ar-da-ta a-na Zu-Aš-tar-ti li-din (9) lil-qì-ši, “If, in the future, someone should come up to claim Baʿla-ilī, he shall give one female slave to Zū-Aštarti and take her.” Because, as just discussed, such a clause is mainly found in sales into famine slavery and the substitute is specifically referred to as a female slave, the question arises whether Zū-Aštarti held full ownership over Baʿla-ilī. Nevertheless, unlike the sales into famine slavery that set redemption at the rate of two persons to one, Hirayama 37 sets a one-to-one rate of redemption.211 Such contrasting pieces of evidence hinder a clear definition of this form of dependency. 3.2.4.1.2 TBR 25 In TBR 25, the economic situation is even worse than in Hirayama 37 since the price of barley has tripled. Iašar-daʿi son of Aštartu-līt (otherwise unknown) became indebted to a member of the family of Awiru, Bulālu son of Arwu, for 20 parīsu of barley during a year of war that caused great inflation: (2) i-na MU ERIM. MEŠ TAR-WU (3) URU.KI la-mì 1 qa! ŠE!.MEŠ a-na 1 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ (4) 20 GIŠ pa ŠE.MEŠ ša mBu-la-li DUMU Ar-wu (5) ḫu-bu-la-ku-mi, “In the year when the TAR-WU troops besieged the city, when 1 qû of barley (correspond) to 1 shekel of silver, I was indebted for 20 parīsu of barley to Bulālu son of Arwu.” The consequence of indebtedness is described in the most tragic terms, as the debtor is said “to be bloated from starvation,” ana bubuti nuppuḫ. Bulālu saved

209 TBR 22 belongs to the family of Awiru; E 117 belongs to the family of Milki-Dagan and is sealed by Šaggar-abu, “Great one of the chariots”; Hirayama 45 belongs to the family of Kutbe and is sealed by the Overseer of the Land Tuwariša, who also held the title of Son of the King (see Yamada 2019a); SMEA30 8 is sealed by Kili-Šarruma, son of the Overseer of the Land Mutri-Teššub. 210 See § 2.2.2. The same clause also occurs in GsK 2 (§ 3.3.2.2.1). 211 See § 5.3. The lack of a specific statement of enslavement seems to be significant because the two enslavement contracts of the Kutbe family (Hirayama 36 and GsK 1) clearly indicate the status of the indebted person through the enslavement clause (ana ardūti erēbu) and the “dead or alive” clause. If Baʿla-ilī’s condition had been the same as that of the individuals in the two enslavement contracts, the same formulary would be expected.

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Iašar-daʿi from such a desperate condition and kept him alive (bulluṭu). Thus, Iašar-daʿi became a dependent of his creditor without the intervention of a third party as in Hirayama 37. The stative ḫubullaku-mi, “I am indebted,” cannot refer to a condition initiated by the drafting of the tablet.212 There is some disagreement over how TBR 25 should be classified. Some scholars regarded the debtor as a slave,213 but no mention is made of sale or price, and the typical enslavement clause stating that the debtor “entered into slavery” (ana (w)ardūti erēbu) is absent. Démare-Lafont214 questioned the debtor’s status as slave, suggesting that his condition was similar to that of domestics or minor children, thus similar to the status of an indentured person. The presence of the bulluṭu formula, which is not attested in relation to slaves, perhaps supports Démare-Lafont’s claim. Another feature shared with the contracts of indentured labor is the “leaving the house” formula, which is not used in the context of slavery. However, as with Hirayama 37, the termination of the dependency is subject to the provision of a substitute at a one-to-one rate: (8) ù šúm-ma ur-ra-am še-ra-am (9) mdIa-ša-arda-ì iš-tu É-ti (10) mBu-la-li it-ta-lak 1 ZI.MEŠ ki-i-mu-ú-šú (11) a-na mBu-la-li li-din šúm-ma iš-tu É-ti (12) 1 ZI i-pa-aš! a-na mBu-la-li (13) li-din a-šar ŠÀ-šú lil-lik (14) ù a-šar ša-ni-im-ma (15) 1 ZI i-la-qa-a ṭup-pu (16) [a]n-nu-ú i-la-e-šu, “If, in the future, Iašar-daʿi wants to leave the house of Bulālu, he shall give one person in exchange to Bulālu. If he provides one person from (his) household,215 he shall give him to Bulālu and go wherever he pleases, and if someone (wanted) to take the person,216 this tablet will prevail over him.” Despite this similarity, TBR 25 and Hirayama 37 use different clauses to regulate termination. Hirayama 37 includes the redemption clause regularly formulated with the verb baqāru, and it grants the right of redemption to anyone. The clause in TBR 25 reminds us the dissolution clause of the contracts of indentured

212 This form is always found in connection with outstanding debts (E 33, E 127, E 215, TBR 36), see Seminara 1998: 360. 213 See Adamthwaite 2001: 135, Westbrook 2001a: 32, Fijałkowska 2014a: 109 and n. 92. 214 Démare-Lafont 2014: 398–400. 215 Arnaud translates “Si, pour sortir de la maison, il fournit un esclave, c’est à Bulāli qu’il devra le livrer”; I regard “house” here as Iašar-daʿi’s household perhaps to be amended to É-ti‹šu›. This clause means that Iašar-daʿi may provide someone from his own family to release him, cf. TBR 34. 216 Unlike other commentators (Arnaud 1991a: 58, Westbrook 2003b: 668) who regarded this clause as banning Iašar-daʿi from taking (acquiring) a slave from someone else, I follow Seminara (1998: 555–56), who treats ašar as introducing a hypothetical clause and considers šanîmma to be an error for šanûmma or mannummê, and I regard the sentence as a non-vindication clause referring to claims by outsiders against the substitute person.

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 195

labor and restricts the right of terminating the dependency to the debtor alone. The second part of the clause can support two opposing interpretations. On the one hand, the substitute was not granted the right of redemption and was fully owned by the master. On the other hand, the non-redeemability of the substitute might suggest that he was not alienable, and thus not a slave; it follows that this clause should be viewed as protecting the substitute from becoming property. The duration of the dependency is not indicated in TBR 25, but the presence of the “leaving the house” formula suggests that the dependent was compelled to lifelong service. The type of commodity lent, barley, clearly indicates the agricultural context of the debt, which was issued for consumption as well as to remedy the desperate condition of the debtor. 3.2.4.2 A Lawsuit Ruling on an Unclear Type of Dependency for Debt (Subartu 17) Subartu 17 is a lawsuit involving the family of Zū-Baʿla. According to Démare-Lafont,217 a certain Al-ummī, daughter of Zū-Baʿla son of ḪAR-da, had no guarantor and was taken by Bēlu-mālik son of Matkali-Dagan as an amēlūtu: (1) fAl-um-mi DUMU.MUNUS mZu-ba-la (2) DUMU ḪAR-da a-na le-et mEN-ma-lik (3) DUMU NIR. d KUR a-na munusú-lu-du-ut-ti aš-ba-at (4) ù ša qa-ta-ti-ši il-qu-ú (5) ⌜i-ia⌝-nu,218 “(1–3) Al-ummī, fille de Zu-Bala, fils de HAR-da, réside chez Bēlu-mālik fils de Matkali-Dagān à titre d’antichrèse (4–5) et personne n’est sa caution.” Démare-Lafont regards munusú-lu-du-ut-ti as the feminine form of amēlūtu. Nevertheless, the term amēlūtu is always written LÚ.Ú.LU-ut-tu at Emar and is invariably used in cuneiform sources for both females and males.219 Additionally, in the preserved Emar sources, the person taken as an amēlūtu is always the debtor, but Al-ummī was not the borrower. In my opinion, the form munusú-lu-du-ut-ti is more likely to be derived from the verb walādu, but I am not able to provide an appropriate translation.220 The understanding of this document is far from clear, and the interpretation proposed here is tentative. The debtor was a certain Mattia who gave Al-ummī, probably his relative, as a personal pledge to Bēlu-mālik for an unpreserved quantity of silver (see below Subartu 17: 11).221 In order to have his money returned,

217 Démare-Lafont 2010: 78–84. 218 This expression is apparently patterned on ša ipallaḫanni yānu, “there is no one to support me,” which is attested in Hirayama 37 (see above) and in family law contracts (§ 2.2.2). 219 CAD A/2: 61. 220 A similar interpretation is offered by the editor of the text, see Cavigneaux and Beyer 2006: 499. 221 Note that the status of the amēlūtu is not regarded in the present study as equivalent to that of a personal antichretic pledge, see § 3.2.1.

196 

 3 Default and Dependency

Bēlu-mālik addressed the court, which was presided over by Kāpī-Dagan, son of the diviner Zū-Baʿla, and the Great Ones of Emar, who ruled that Mattia was to return the silver. However, Mattia refused to pay, allowing Bēlu-mālik to take Al-ummī: (10) um-ma mMa-ti-ia (11) [.  .  .] KÙ.BABBAR-šú la-a a-na-din-mi (12) [. . .] fAl-um-mi li-iṣ-bat-mi, “Mattia spoke as follows: ‘I do not want to pay his [x (shekels of)] silver, [. . .] let him take Al-ummī.’” Then we are informed of the intervention of a member of the Zū-Baʿla family, La-abu-Dagan son of Kāpī-Dagan, who assumed the surety for Al-ummī and apparently reimbursed Bēlu-mālik, allowing her to survive in a year of hardship (i-na MU.KAM dan-na-ti ù i-na MU.KAM ša nu-ku-ra-ti ub-tal-iṭ-ši). Despite the expression used for the assumption of liability, qa-ta-ti-ši il-qè (Subartu 17: 14),222 La-abu-Dagan seems not to act as an ordinary guarantor but to retain full ownership of Al-ummī, as expressed by a clause stipulating that Al-ummī was redeemable: (15) ⌜i⌝-na EGIR-ki u₄-mi šum-ma mMa-ti-ia (16) i-ia-nu-mi-e LÚ ša-nu-um-ma il-la-ak (17) ù fAl-um-mi i-la-aq-qè (18) 30 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ a-na m La-AD-dKUR li-din (19) fAl-um-mi lil-qè, “In the future, if Mattia is not present,223 (and) someone else comes and wants to take Al-ummī, he shall pay 30 shekels of silver to La-abu-Dagan and take Al-ummī.” This clause seems to extend the right of redemption to outsiders should Mattia be absent or dead. This clause likely served to implicitly affirm Mattia’s right of redemption rather than inhibiting it. The situation in Subartu 17 can be compared with that in E 121, where a debtor became a slave of the person who assumed his surety and repaid his debt. A comparison can also be made with E 205, but unlike that lawsuit, in Subartu 17 the transition from the condition of pledge to slavery is not explicitly indicated. The price of redemption may correspond either to the amount of Mattia’s original debt or twice that amount, as is usually the case in slavery-related documents. Because Al-ummī is referred to as someone’s daughter, she was perhaps unmarried and therefore quite young, although her age cannot be determined.224 As in Hirayama 37, a one-to-one rate of redemption is equally possible. Moreover, the document Hirayama 36, in which a woman identified by her patronymic is

222 This is the regular expression for the assumption of the surety; see CAD L: 145, CAD Q: 168–169; see also E 209 (pp. 57ff.); one has the impression that qātāti leqû is used here with a meaning like “to take into custody” that is otherwise unattested. 223 ianummi is a form from iānu “there is not,” Seminara 1998: 518–19; this clause has a parallel in TBR 52: 8–14. 224 By way of speculation, if she was a minor (i.e., under 15 years of age), she could have served as a pledge for a debt of 15 shekels of silver, with the redemption price fixed at twice the original debt. For the value of minors at Emar see § 5.2.1; for minors in the ancient Near East see ch. 5 fn. 41 and Garroway 2014: 19.

3.3 Dependency Related to Hardship 

 197

enslaved together with her daughter, shows that the absence of a husband does not imply that a female slave was a minor. Very little is known about the parties in Subartu 17. Unlike his brothers Bēlu-qarrād and Imlik-Dagan, who are mentioned in other sources,225 La-abu-Dagan is nowhere else attested. The creditor Bēlu-mālik is perhaps a sealer in E 90B, and no additional information is available on Mattia or Al-ummī.

3.3 Dependency Related to Hardship Documents that describe some form of dependency but make no reference to debt are discussed here under the heading of hardship. As discussed above (§ 3.1), hardship is a general category that may refer to various situations such as poverty, drought, famine, or epidemics that compromised people’s ability to support themselves. Two groups of sources are treated in this section. The first concerns the sale of persons by members of their families; following Westbrook’s terminology, they are called sales into famine slavery (§ 3.3.1). The second group includes several documents that cannot be clearly categorized because terms such as (w)ardu or amēlūtu do not appear, but they do contain legal clauses that are shared by texts regulating various forms of dependency (§ 3.3.2).

3.3.1 Sales into Famine Slavery Sale is the only legal procedure attested in the Emar sources through which freeborn people became slaves because of hardship. No documents comparable to the enslavement contracts for debt, which record individuals spontaneously entering into slavery (§ 3.2.3.2.1), are associated with cases of hardship leading to dependency. Twelve sales into famine slavery are preserved (Table 22), all formulated according to the Syro-Hittite tradition, in which freeborn persons are sold by members of their family. These people were mostly foreigners who traveled to Emar to sell their relatives.226 Members of the notable families often act as buyers. Sales into famine-slavery are formulated ex latere venditoris and the name of the person sold is clearly stated.

225 Cohen 2009: 158–60. 226 See Table 51.

Script

SH

SH

SH

SH

SH SH

SH

SH

SH

SH

SH

SH

Document

ASJ10 E

AuOr5 11

AuOr5 12

E7

E 79 E 83

E 84

E 118

E 217

Hirayama 17

Hirayama 18

TBR 52

1F

1F

1F

2F 2M

1F 1M

1F

1F 1F

1M

1F

2F 1M

1M

Slave

Table 22: Sales into Famine Slavery.

Madi-Dagan son of Zū-Aštarti

Ibni-Dagan son of the diviner Baʿal-bēlī and Abdi-Šaggar, sons of Irʾam-Dagan Dagan-kabar son of Ḫima Dagan-taliʾ son of Ḫima Dagan-taliʾ son of Ḫima; Dagan-kabar son of Dagan-taliʾ Aḫī-Dagan son of Milki-Dagan

70 sh.

33 sh.

52 sh.

55 sh.

Baʿal-mālik son of Baʿalqarrād Ḫimaši-Dagan son of Dūdu

Dagan-bāni son of Sina Ḫimaši-Dagan and Dagan-kabar, sons of Bēlu (?)

60 sh.

15 sh. 1 donkey 500 shekels of copper

22 sh.

12 sh.

42 sh.

? 9 sh.

Dagan-bāni

Buyer

?

Price

Talmal-enna and Mašadī, sons of Šenni-šarri

Ašmi-Te son of Anan-Te

Šaggar-umarri (F); Ummiši (F); Mārat (F); Ninaʾe (F); Talmaʾe

Dagan-qarrād and Dagan-madi sons of [. . .] Unišu son of Lū-Adda; Ḫaraqqu and Lassa, sons of Nād-pī-ša Kuʾe wife of Zadamma; Zadamma son of Karbu

? Abī-ḫamiṣ son of Zira

Asda-aḫī wife of Akiu

Aki-Šimike son of Šupal-enna

Tagia son of Malisu

Dagan-ilī (F)

Seller

Ḫizali daughter of Šadaʾe son of Šenni-šarri

Kanzaʾe wife of Ašmi-Te

Irʾam-ila (F)

Ḫab[. . .] daughter/wife of Dagan-kabar (brother of the sellers) Bāni wife of Rabbi-Damu (brother of the sellers); Lubāšu son of Bāni Baʿla-BEa (F), Baʿal-bēlī, Išmaʾ-Dagan, and Baʿla-ummī (F), children of Zadamma and Kuʾe

? [. . .]-ti daughter of Abī-ḫamiṣ

Bēlu-taliʾ (grand)son (?) of Asda-aḫī

Ammarianti daughter-in-law of Aki-Šimike

Eḫli-Kušuḫ son of Malisu; Arawali wife of Eḫli-Kušuḫ; Kuʾli daughter of Eḫli-Kušuḫ

Zū-Eia son of Dagan-ilī

Slave’s Name

198   3 Default and Dependency

3.3 Dependency Related to Hardship 

 199

3.3.1.1 E 217 In E 217 the diviner Baʿal-mālik purchases four children for the price of 60 shekels of silver. This text belongs to a dossier of five documents that also include a matrimonial adoption (E 216)227 and three clay impressions of footprints (E 218, E 219, and E 220).228 This dossier relates to the misfortune of Kuʾe and her husband Zadamma, a man of Šatappu.229 The story begins with E 216 when Kuʾe, because of her husband’s old age, was compelled to give her eldest daughter Baʿla-BEa as daughter and daughter-in-law to Anat-ummī, wife of Šegal, in order to keep her other children alive in a year of hardship:230 (3) ma-a lúmu-ti₄-ia il-t[a-bi-ir231 DUMU.MEŠ-ni] (4) ṣe-eḫ-ru ša ú-bal-laaṭ-s[u-nu ú-ul i-šu] (5) ù fdNIN-BE-a DUMU.MUNUS-ia a-na ma-⌜ar⌝-[tu-ti] (6) a-na DUMU.MUNUS-ša ša fA-nat-um-mi DAM mŠe-gal DUMU Ik-ki (7) at-ta-din-ši DUMU. MEŠ ṣe-eḫ-ru-ti i-na MU dan-na-ti (8) ú-bal-li-iṭ, “My husband is o[ld, our children] are small (and) [they have] no one who keeps them alive. And I gave Baʿla-BEa up for adopt[ion]232 as daughter of Anat-ummī, wife of Šegal son of Ikki. I kept alive (my) minor children in a year of hardship.” Baʿla-BEa was intended to become the secondary wife of Šegal should Anat-ummī bear no children: (8) šúm-ma fA-natum-mi DAM mŠe-gal (9) la tu-la-ad fdNIN-BE-a a-na DAM-šú ša ‹m›Še-gal (10) lúmutí-ša ta-na-din-ši, “If Anat-ummī, the wife of Šegal, does not give birth, she will give Baʿla-BEa as a wife to Šegal her husband.” Conversely, should Anat-ummī bear children, Baʿla-BEa would be given as a wife to a third party in order to receive the terḫatum: (13) ù šúm-ma fA-nat-um-mi i-na mŠe-gal (14) lúmu-tí-ša tu-la-ad (15) m Še-g[al] ù fA-nat-um-mi (16) [f]d[NIN-B]E-a DUMU.MUNUS-šú-nu i-na É e-mi (17) li-d[in-nu] KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ NÍG.MUSSA-ši (18) lil-[q]u-ú, “If Anat-ummī does bear children to her husband Šeg[al], Šegal and Anat-ummī may g[ive Baʿla-B]Ea, their daughter, to the house of a father-in-law and ta[k]e the silver of her terḫatu.” As we know from E 217, the matrimonial adoption recorded in E 216 was contingent on the payment of 30 shekels of silver. Because Anat-ummī did not pay, 227 For this legal contract see Justel 2008b, Bellotto 2009: 123–33, Lion 2001. 228 For the interpretation of the footprints see Zaccagnini 1994. 229 For the town of Šatappu see Belmonte Marín 2001: 267. 230 Note that in the Ekalte text Ek 28, a father gave his son as a servant for a period of ten years in order to save him from hunger; for this text see pp. 353f. 231 I here follow Durand’s interpretation, see Durand and Marti 2003: 180. 232 Although it is tempting to restore a-na ⌜É⌝.[GI.A] “as daughter-in-law (kallātu),” as suggested by Justel 2008b: 6 n. 27, I follow the reading in Durand and Marti 2003: 180, because it is based on collation. Nevertheless, Baʿla-BEa’s status as kallātu is unquestionable, as shown by E 217: 11–12, ù a-nu-ma fKu-ʾ-e pa-na-nu fBa-la-BE-a DUMU.MUNUS-ši // a-na 30 KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ a-na f É.GI₄.A.MEŠ a-na fA-nat-um-mi i-din, “And now, Kuʾe previously gave Baʿla-BEa, her daughter, to Anat-ummī as daughter-in-law, for 30 (shekels) of silver.”

200 

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Kuʾe and Zadamma approached the diviner Baʿal-mālik and sold him not only Baʿla-BEa but also her three siblings. E 217 records the sale of the children, this time as slaves. As is frequently attested in sales into famine-slavery, the transaction is said to occur of the children’s own will (iš-tu SAG.DU-šú-nu-ma!). As proof of the sale, Baʿla-BEa and her siblings Baʿal-bēlī and Išmaʾ-Dagan impressed their footprints in clay.233 As estimated by Zaccagnini, Baʿla-BEa was about two years old; her two brothers, likely twins, were one year old; and her sister, Baʿla-ummī, was still a suckling, thus too young to have her foot impressed.234 The contract contains a clause barring any claim by Anat-ummī, but the right of redemption was granted to anyone (mannummê) who would supply 10 persons (ZI.MEŠ) to Baʿal-mālik. There is an evident discrepancy between the price for a single child in E 216 (30 sh.) and the price for four children in E 217 (60 sh.). The slight difference in the ages of the children is not sufficient to explain why the eldest daughter alone should be assigned the same value as her three siblings together.235 Thus, it seems plausible that each child was sold for approximately the same price in the second transaction. We can explain this discrepancy by making two observations. First, we may infer that Kuʾe’s financial situation worsened and reduced her bargaining power. Second, Baʿla-BEa’s status differs in the two transactions. In E 216, Anatummī acquired Baʿla-BEa in “daughtership and daughter-in-lawship” (martūtu u kallatūtu) with the right to give her to her husband (as secondary wife) or to a third party. Nowhere is Baʿla-BEa referred to as a slave and so she retained her free status.236 Unlike Nuzi, where girls given into matrimonial adoptions seemingly had a semi-servile status, as they were often given into marriage to slaves, at Emar a kallātu was a free person and was not married off to a slave.237 The free status of a kallātu is explicitly stated in the matrimonial adoption RE 61, which

233 For the practice of footprinting see Leichty 1989, Garroway 2014: 104–08. 234 For suckling babies in the ancient Near East see Garroway 2014: 54–58, Tenney 2017: 739–42, 745–46. 235 Note that children from birth to two years old fall in the same age category, Garroway 2014: 18–19. 236 Although Baʿla-BEa was legally free, it is likely that in some cases adoption ana mārūti implied some sort of servile duties, see for instance TBR 77, § 3.3.2.1.2.2. Female slaves often served as concubines of their master to bear him children in case his wife could not conceive; this practice was instituted in order to prevent the master from taking a second wife, see Mendelsohn 1949: 50–52. Women serving this purpose were specifically referred to as slaves in Mesopotamian sources, while in E 216 Baʿla-BEa’s condition appears to be different. 237 Justel 2008b: 11; for the Nuzi evidence see Mendelsohn 1949: 10–12, Grosz 1987, Westbrook 1998a: 218–19, Lion 2001, Garroway 2014: 77–85.

3.3 Dependency Related to Hardship 

 201

contains the following clause: “If, in the future, a tablet stating that Imūt-Dabarī (the kallātu) is a servant should turn up, this tablet will prevail over it.”238 E 216 further adds that Baʿla-BEa will be “a widow with the widows, a divorcee with the divorcees” after her husband’s death: (10) i-na EGIR u₄-mi (11) fdNINBE-a al-mat-tu₄ it-ti al-ma-na-ti (12) ši-it a-zi-ib-tu it-ti az-ba-ti! ši-it. This formula describes a free woman,239 even though she occupies an inferior, unenviable socio-economic position.240 Although the payment of 30 shekels of silver for Baʿla-BEa is specifically mentioned as a price in E 217,241 it should be regarded as a bridewealth even though the term terḫatu is not used. This sum corresponds to the usual amount paid for the terḫatu in other marriage contracts,242 and the payment of a bridewealth is expected for matrimonial adoptions.243 Be that as it may, it is clear that as an extreme solution Kuʾe eventually decided to sell her four children to the diviner Baʿal-mālik for a sum of about 15 shekels of silver each.244 3.3.1.2 E 79, E 83 and E 84 Three sales into famine slavery (E 79, E 83, and E 84) belong to the archive of Ḫima. All three contracts concern the purchase of female slaves. E 79 is a fragmentary tablet that does not preserve the names of the seller(s) or the sold person, nor the purchase price. The buyer is Dagan-kabar, perhaps the son of Ḫima, although the patronymic is broken away. The document contains the “voluntarily” clause (iš-tu SAG.DU-[ši]-ma) and the “dead or alive” clause. Future claims are banned by the non-vindication clause (ṭuppu annû ilāʾēšu). In E 83, the brother of Dagan-kabar, Dagan-taliʾ, in a year of hardship ([i-na M]U dan-na-ti), purchased a suckling female child (DUMU.MUNUS-šu ša GAB) from her father Abī-ḫamiṣ son of Zira245 for 9 shekels of silver. As in E 79, the enslavement is said to be a voluntary act ([i]š-tu SAG.DU-ši). This contract includes the “dead or alive” clause; the zakû clause, which protected the buyer from external claims; and the redemption clause, which allowed

238 RE 61: 18–20, i-na EGIR-ki u₄-[mi ṭup-pu] // [ša GÉME-ut-ti ša fI-m]u-ut-Da-ba-ri-ma // [il-la-a ṭup-p]u an-nu-ú i-la-ʾe-[šu]; on this text see Durand 2013b: 56–60. 239 See Westbrook 2003b: 671, Yamada 2013a. 240 Démare-Lafont 2014: 401–06. 241 E 217: 13–14, f!A-nat-um-mi 30 KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ // ŠÀM fBa-ʿa-la-BE-a la-a i-din, “Anat-ummī did not give 30 (shekels) of silver, the price of Baʿla-BEa.” 242 See for instance RE 67, RE 72, and RE 76. 243 Justel 2008b: 8–9. 244 For the price of minors see § 5.2.1. 245 Note that this is the only attestation of the personal name Zira.

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Abī-ḫamiṣ to redeem his daughter in exchange for two persons: (6) [BA.UG₆ TI.L]A AGEMÉ ša ᵐᵈKUR-ta-li-iʾ ši-it (7) [ù ᵐᵈKUR-ta-l]i-iʾ za-a-ku (8) [šum-ma i-na] E[GIR u₄]-mi mA-bi-ḫa-mi-iṣ (9) [DUMU Zi-ra a-na] mdKUR-ta-li-iʾ (10) [DUMU Ḫi-ma iq-bi m]a-a DUMU.MUNUS-ia te-ra-mi (11) [ù KÙ.BABBAR-ka l]i-q[ì-m]i 2 ZI (12) [ma-luuš-ši li]-din-šu ù GÉME lil-qì, “[Dead or aliv]e she is the female slave of Dagan-taliʾ [and Dagan-ta]liʾ is free (of claims). [If, in the futur]e, Abī-ḫamiṣ [son of Zira] should [say to] Dagan-taliʾ [son of Ḫima]: ‘Give me back my [daughter] [and take your silver],’ he shall give two persons [in place of her and] take the female slave.” It is worth noting that the right of redemption was restricted to Abī-ḫamiṣ. This is the only text that combines the zakû clause and the redemption clause. In E 84, Dagan-taliʾ, this time together with his son Dagan-kabar, once again purchased a female slave, Ḫab[. . .], from two brothers, Dagan-qarrād and Daganmadi. Ḫab[. . .] was the sellers’ niece or sister-in-law. Although the tablet is broken, the high purchase price, 55 shekels of silver, suggests that she was an adult,246 probably the wife of the sellers’ (dead?) brother Dagan-kabar. The zakû clause stipulates that the sellers are liable for possible claims raised by their brothers and exempts the two buyers from charges: (6) šúm-ma i-na EGIR-ki u₄-mi LÚ.‹MEŠ›-a[ḫ-ḫi-a] (7) ša mdKUR-GAL aš-šúm GÉME ša-a-š[i] (8) i[l-lu-ú] mdKUR-NIR ù! md[KUR-ma-di] (9) it-ta-na-pal-l[u mdKUR-ta-li-iʾ] (10) ù md KUR-GAL za-a-ku, “If, in the future, Dagan-kabar’s br[others] should c[ome up] concerning tha[t] female slave, Dagan-qarrād and [Dagan-madi] will pay; [Dagantaliʾ] and Dagan-kabar are free (of claims).” 3.3.1.3 E 118 E 118 belongs to the archive of Milki-Dagan’s family. Three people from the otherwise unknown town of Ḫalmanukka247 sold their brother’s wife, together with her son, to Aḫī-Dagan son of Milki-Dagan for 42 shekels of silver: (1) mÚ-ni-šu DUMU Lu-A-da mḪa-ra-qu (2) ù mLa-às-sa-a DUMU.MEŠ Na-ad-pí-ša lúḪal-ma-nuka-a (3) fBa-a-ni qa-du mLu-ba-šu DUMU-ši (4) DAM mRa-ab-bi-Da-mi ŠEŠ-šu-nu (5) a-na 42 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ ŠÀM.TIL.LA (6) a-na mA-ḫi-dKUR DUMU Mil-ki-dKUR it-ta-an-nu, “Unišu son of Lū-Adda, Ḫaraqqu, and Lassa, sons of Nād-pī-ša, the man of Ḫalmanukka, sold Bāni, the wife of Rabbi-Damu, their brother, together with Lubāšu, her son, f[o]r 42 shekels of silver, the full price, to Aḫī-Dagan son of Milki-Dagan.” Redemption was open to anyone (mannummê) and was set at double the purchase price (TÉŠ.BI).

246 On differences in price between adults and children see § 5.2.1. 247 There are no other attestations of this town, see Belmonte Marín 2001: 114.

3.3 Dependency Related to Hardship 

 203

As the sellers’ patronymics make clear, they were not Rabbi-Damu’s biological brothers but rather members of an extended family. These persons sealed the tablet with their nail impressions. The fact that they did not own personal seals is indicative of their low socio-economic position. 3.3.1.4 AuOr5 12 In AuOr5 12, a certain Aki-Šimike son of Šupal-enna (otherwise unknown) sold his daughter-in-law Ammarianti for 33 shekels of silver during a year of hardship (i-na MU KALA.GA). The buyer, Ibni-Dagan, bears the title of “son of the diviner,” but he is probably not to be identified with the homonymous son of the diviner Zū-Baʿla and younger brother of Baʿal-qarrād (II generation)248 who lived at the time of the Overseer of the Land Mutri-Teššub. Through Matkali-Dagan son of Zū-Baʿla, who acts as a witness and sealer, AuOr5 12 can be synchronized with RE 63249 and TBR 68. The latter document links AuOr5 12 to the chronology of Emar because it dates to the generation following Baʿal-qarrād, that of his son Baʿal-mālik (III generation),250 and can be synchronized with the archives of Ḫima, Milki-Dagan, Kutbe, and Awiru. TBR 68

Synchronisms

Ḫemia son of Kutbe

TBR 66

I gen. Kutbe

Ḫemia son of Kutbe

Iaʾšuru son of Ameu

E 214

III gen. Zū-Baʿla

Baʿal-mālik son of Baʿal-qarrād

Alal-abu son of Ameu

E 76 E 85 E 117 RE 13 TBR 24

I gen. Ḫima II gen. Ḫima I gen. Milki-Dagan II gen. Kutbe II gen. Awiru

Dagan-kabar son of Ḫima Dagan-kabar son of Dagan-taliʾ Aḫī-Dagan son of Milki-Dagan Zū-Aštarti son of Aḫī-mālik Bulālu son Arwu

TBR 68 was contemporaneous with the first generations of these archives because Ḫemia son of Kutbe witnessed the document, and through another witness, Alalabu son of Ameu, it can be synchronized with Dagan-kabar son of Ḫima and Aḫī-Dagan son of Milki-Dagan. Alal-abu also turns up in documents of the second generation of the notable families (E 85, RE 13, and TBR 24). Because E 85 and TBR 24 date to the early stage of Aḫī-mālik’s career, prior to his appointment as

248 For Ibni-Dagan son of Zū-Baʿla see Cohen 2009: 163–64. 249 For this document see § 3.2.1.2.1. 250 Note that according to the legal document Hirayama 43, Zū-Baʿla’s descendants included his son Kāpī-Dagan and his grandson Baʿal-mālik but not Ibni-Dagan, who was plausibly already dead, see Cohen 2009: 165.

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Overseer of the Land,251 TBR 68 can be approximately dated to a period spanning from the predecessors of Aḫī-mālik, Laḫeia and Tuwariša,252 to the early stage of Aḫī-mālik’s career. The buyer in AuOr5 12 can be identified with Ibni-Dagan DUMU ḪAL, who is the first sealer in a document of Apilu’s family, the self-sale into debt slavery TBR 44. Indeed, these two documents can be synchronized through TBR 24.253 As suggested by Di Filippo,254 the Ibni-Dagan “son of the diviner” in TBR 44 can be identified with the sealer of RE 11, Ibni-Dagan son of Zū-Aštarti, who also bears the title “son of the diviner.”255 Accordingly, the Ibni-Dagan mentioned in AuOr5 12, TBR 44, and RE 11 was the same person. Cohen suggested that Zū-Aštarti son of Baʿal-qarrād was the father of our Ibni-Dagan.256 However, Zū-Aštarti son of Baʿal-qarrād never bears the title of diviner. In the absence of any clear evidence that Zū-Aštarti son of Baʿal-qarrād was the father of our Ibni-Dagan, AuOr5 12 is not presently regarded as belonging to the archive of the Zū-Baʿla family. The seller and three of the five witnesses bear Hurrian names that are attested only in this text.257 Another witness who bears an Anatolian name, Ḫattû, is from the town of Irridu, which was a Mittanian center.258 Thus, it is likely that the wit251 Cohen 2012a: 16. 252 Cohen (2012a: 18 n. 17) places Tuwariša either between Laḫeia and Aḫī-mālik or before Laḫeia. According to Yamada (2019b: 198), Tuwariša succeeded Aḫī-mālik as the last Overseer of the Land. However, this hypothesis seems unlikely. The only document where Tuwariša appears as Overseer of the Land, Hirayama 45, belongs to the last generation of the archive of Kutbe, and can be synchronized with another document of the same archival generation, Hirayama 37, through Dagan-taliʾ son of Iašur-Dagan. Nevertheless, this individual appears in two documents of the first generations of the archives of Milki-Dagan (E 117) and Awiru (TBR 22), see ch. 3 fn. 209. Therefore, it seems likely that Tuwariša held his office between the first and second generation of the archives of Kutbe, Milki-Dagan, and Awiru. Because in Hirayama 45 Tuwariša holds both the titles Overseer of the Land (on the sealing label) and Son of the King (on his seal), Cohen’s hypothesis of a short-lived office seems plausible: it can be suggested that the Son of the King Tuwariša momentarily held the office of Overseer of the Land before Aḫī-mālik was appointed. 253 TBR 24 belongs to the last generation of the archive of Awiru (Table 5), and TBR 44 is synchronized with another document of the same archive, TBR 25, see ch. 1 fn. 109 and Viano 2007: 255–56. 254 Di Filippo 2004: 187–88. 255 The seal of Ibni-Dagan son of Zū-Aštarti, son of the diviner, in RE 11 is similar but not identical to the seal TBR 44b, which was borrowed by another witness, Uginu son of Duqqanu, see Singer 1995: 59 and n. 11 (I thank Clelia Mora for reading the seals for me); the seal of Ibni-Dagan son of the diviner TBR 44a is also very similar, see Gonnet 1991: 204. Apparently, Ibni-Dagan owned at least three very similar seals, TBR 44a, TBR 44b, and RE 11. 256 Cohen 2009: 164. Zū-Aštarti son of Baʿal-qarrād is attested in E 279 and E 319, see pp. 59ff. 257 Only the personal name of the witness, Šup-šenni, is found in Hirayama 3. 258 Belmonte Marín 2001: 146.

3.3 Dependency Related to Hardship 

 205

nesses belonged to the family of the seller. A clause allowed Ibni-Dagan to oust Ammarianti should she contest her enslavement and protected him from any allegations of mistreatment in that situation.259 3.3.1.5 E 7 E 7 is part of an archive of thirteen tablets found in Area A that, as I recently suggested, belonged to Baʿal-bēlī and Abdi-Šaggar, sons of Irʾam-Dagan, who were perhaps members of the important family of Illatu.260 A woman, probably a widow, Asda-aḫī wife of Akiu, who was a man from Ekalte, sold her grandson Bēlu-taliʾ to Baʿal-bēlī and Abdi-Šaggar for 52 shekels of silver.261 Although the identification of Bēlu-taliʾ as a grandson might indicate his youth, the high price suggests that he was an adult.262 The contract contains the “voluntarily” clause (iš-tu SAG.DU-šú-ma), the “dead or alive” clause, and the non-vindication clause (ṭuppu annû ilāʾēšu). None of the other persons is mentioned elsewhere. 3.3.1.6 TBR 52 The tablet TBR 52 records another sale that occurred in a year of hardship (i-na MU KALA.GA). Talmal-enna and Mašadī, sons of Šenni-šarri, sold Ḫizali, the daughter of their brother Šadaʾe, for 12 shekels of silver. The sellers are from the town of Ḫatta. The Hittite inventory texts mention a town named Ḫatta that was perhaps located in Anatolia,263 but it can hardly be identified with the town mentioned in TBR 52 because it is unlikely that impoverished people would have traveled to Emar from Anatolia. As with other documents, TBR 52 states that Ḫizali entered into slavery of her own will (iš-tu SAG.DU-ši-ma). The buyers are Ḫimaši-Dagan and Dagan-kabar. Their patronymic has been restored as Be-[li?] by Pruzsinszki,264 and it would be tempting to identify Dagan-kabar with the person who lent money to the family of Zū-Baʿla in E 200 and sealed

259 This is how I interpret Arnaud’s reading of AuOr5 12: 10–11, i-na GIŠ.MUG.MEŠ i-na-an-din, “(Ibni-Dagan) la livrera à la ferule. Il n’aura pas d’accusateur.” The Progetto Sinleqiunnini proposes i-na ŠÁM.MEŠ i-na-an-din (which is not followed here); for another case of mistreatment see E 211 (p. 219). For the treatment of slaves see Mendelsohn 1949: 64–66, Westbrook 1995: 1665–75. 260 See § 1.3.7 and Viano 2020a. 261 I here follow Arnaud’s edition in regarding the sold person as the grandson of the seller but I restore ‹DUMU› DUMU.MUNUS-ši; Durand 1989d: 172 reads DUMU sal-ši, “third son.” 262 See § 5.2.1. 263 del Monte and Tischler 1978: 99. 264 Pruzsinszky 2003: Index, 227.

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the tablet TBR 22.265 Nevertheless, this hypothesis cannot be verified. His brother is not attested in other Emar sources. The clause of redemption stipulates that anybody could redeem Ḫizali in exchange for two slaves if her father and uncle were no longer living: (8) šum-ma i-na EGIR u₄-mi a-bu-ši (9) šum-ma ŠEŠ a-bi!-ši (10) ia-nu-ma-a a-na EN-ši ma-am[ma] (11) e-la-a 2 ZI.MEŠ ki-i-mu-[ú] (12) mḪi-za-li a-na mḪi-ma-ši-[dKUR] (13) ù md KUR-GAL DUMU.MEŠ! Be-[li? . . . ] (14) li-din-m[a . . . ] DUMU.MUNUS x x [x] x x, “If, in the future, there is no father or uncle, any[one] who comes up to her lord shall give 2 persons in exchange for Ḫizali to Ḫimaši-[Dagan] and Dagan-kabar, sons of Bē[lu (?)] [. . .] daughter [. . .].” The clause likely means that the right of redemption was granted to Ḫizali’s family first and only secondarily to outsiders. It is also likely that Ḫizali’s father was still alive at the moment of the sale, but if so, it is unclear why he played no role in the transaction. 3.3.1.7 ASJ10 E ASJ10 E records a transaction taking place in the city of Tuttul during a year of hardship that caused a barley price hike ([i-na MU] KALA.GA ša 3 SÌLA ŠE // [a-na 1 GÍ]N KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ iz-za-az). An impoverished woman, Dagan-ilī, sent her son, Zū-Eia, by boat to Tuttul,266 where he was sold of his own will ([iš-tu SAG.D]U-š[u?-ma]) to a certain Dagan-bāni who cannot be identified because his patronymic is unrecorded.267 Unfortunately, the purchase price is not preserved. The women’s status is unspecified, but because her husband is not mentioned she was probably a widow. Although his age is unknown, Zū-Eia was a child but old enough to travel on a boat unaccompanied by his mother. The contract contains the “dead or alive” clause as well as the non-vindication clause (ṭuppu annû ilāʾēšu). 3.3.1.8 AuOr5 11 In AuOr5 11, Tagia son of Malisu sold his brother Eḫli-Kušuḫ together with the latter’s wife Arawali and his daughter Kuʾli to Madi-Dagan son of Zū-Aštarti for 70 shekels of silver. The sellers are from the otherwise unknown town of Anabi.268 Two witnesses, probably relatives of the seller, stem from the same town. The doc265 For Dagan-kabar in E 200 and TBR 22 see § 2.2.1.2.1. 266 A document from Tuttul, which also reports the “year of hardship” formula, describes a similar occasion, see Durand and Marti 2003: 170–72. 267 Note that in another document written during “a year of plague,” RE 18, a certain Dagan-bāni son of Mattia appears as a sealer. 268 See Belmonte Marín 2001: 24.

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 207

ument contains the “voluntarily” clause (iš-tu SAG.DU-šú-nu-ma) and the “dead or alive” clause. A Madi-Dagan son of Zū-Aštarti is mentioned in the list E 36, but it is unknown whether the two persons were the same individual. A clause granted the right of redemption to anyone who would give four beautiful women to Madi-Dagan: (7) šúm-ma ma-am-ma (8) i-na EGIR u₄-mi a-na pa-ṭá-ri-sú-nu (9) il-la-a 4 MUNUS. MEŠ SAG₁₀ a-na mMa-di-dKUR (10) li-din lil-qì-sú-nu-ti, “If, in the future, someone should come up to release them, he shall give four beautiful women to Madi-Dagan.” Because the price of redemption is usually set no lower than twice the value of the purchased property, we may assume that the value of the three slaves – two adults and a minor – was reckoned to be about half the value of four beautiful women. It follows that the qualification “beautiful” implied a monetary evaluation.269 The document ends with a clause stating that the children of the slave couple were to remain at Madi-Dagan’s service: (21) ù mi-nu-me-e DUMU.MEŠ (22) ša ul-la-du₄ ARAD.MEŠ (23) ša mMa-di-dKUR šu-nu, “And all the children she will bear will remain slaves of Madi-Dagan.” The reason for the inclusion of this clause is unclear because children born to slave parents were already slaves.270 Perhaps the clause was intended to prevent the couple’s children from attempting to claim the former freeborn status of their parents. 3.3.1.9 Hirayama 18 The tablet Hirayama 18 records the sale of a woman, Kanzaʾe, by her husband Ašmi-Te son of Anan-Te. This man originated from Atira, a town plausibly in the vicinity of Emar but nowhere else attested.271 The buyer, Dagan-bāni son of Sina, who is otherwise unknown, purchased the slave for 22 shekels of silver. The document contains the “voluntarily” clause (a-na SAG.DU) and the “dead or alive” clause. Redemption was open to anyone in exchange for a beautiful woman: (8) šúm-ma i-na EGIR u₄-mimeš (9) ma-am-ma i-bá-q[a-r]ù-ši (10) 1 MUNUS SAG₁₀ li-din lil-qi-ši, “If, in the future, someone should cl[ai]m her, he shall give a beautiful

269 Female slaves qualified as beautiful are known in Neo Babylonian sale contracts, where they fetched above-average prices, Dandamaev 1984: 204–05. 270 Stol 2011–2013: 570, see also Mendelsohn 1949: 52–53, Dandamaev 1984: 406–08, Garroway 2014: 141–50; legal issues arose for children of mixed marriages between a slave and a free person, see Mendelsohn 1949: 55–57, Dandamaev 1984: 411–14, Garroway 2014: 150–58. 271 See Belmonte Marín 2001: 114.

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woman and take her.” As with AuOr5 11, redemption in Hirayama 18 is not established at a one-to-one rate, because the qualification “beautiful” implies that the woman to be exchanged for the slave would be valuable and merchandisable. The witness list is composed of men of the town of Atira, who were possibly relatives of the sellers. 3.3.1.10 Hirayama 17 In Hirayama 17, Ḫimaši-Dagan son of Dūdu (otherwise unknown) purchased a girl, Irʾam-ila, from four women, Šaggar-umarri, Ummiši, Mārat, and Ninaʾe, and one man, Talmaʾe. The buyer purchased the female slave for 15 shekels of silver, 1 donkey, and 500 shekels of copper.272 The document contains the “voluntarily” clause (a-na SAG.DU-ši-ma). The sellers originated from the town of Karšu, and people from this town are included in the witness list.273 It cannot be ruled out that members of Irʾam-ila’s family were among the witnesses. The relation between Irʾam-ila and the sellers is unclear as she is identified as a “daughter” (DUMU.MUNUS) without her father’s (or mother’s) name being recorded. In consideration of the high purchase price (see § 5.2.1), Irʾam-ila was likely an adult although she is identified as a daughter. Redemption is open to anyone and set at double (TÉŠ.BI) the purchase price.

3.3.2 Various Forms of Dependency Related to Hardship A few documents regulate forms of dependency that cannot be clearly classified because of the mixed legal clauses and the lack of unambiguous references to debts or slavery. Three out of the six documents discussed here (E 256, TBR 48, and GsK 2) make explicit reference to hardship by including the “year of hardship” formula. The documents can be sorted into two categories: adoptions (§ 3.3.2.1) and palāḫu contracts.274

272 For the price see ch. 5 fn. 35. 273 We suggested above that one of the witnesses, Baṣṣu son of Atawa, could be identified with the brother of Abdi-ili son of Atawa, who appears as creditor in the lawsuit E 252, § 3.2.3.2.2.2. 274 For this formula see §§ 2.2.2, 3.2.1.

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 209

Table 23: Various Forms of Dependency Related to Hardship. ADOPTIONS Document Script Adopter

Penalty

Redemption

E 256

S

Abī-kāpī son Aḫiu, Išarte (F), and Adoptee of Ḫamsi Aḫa-mi (F), children of Ḫulāʾu son of Addu son of Awiru

Adoptee

–

1000 sh.

TBR 48

S

Wae wife of Riḫṣu son of Lalû

Adopter

Loss of – house and family gods

E 216

SH

Anat-ummī Baʿla-BEa daughter wife of Šegal of Kuʾe and Zadamma

Adoptee

–

–

TBR 77

SH

Ummī-naʿmī daughter of Ana

Adoptee

–

1 male slave 1 female slave

Iaḫṣi-bēlu son of Ipqi-Dagan

Ilī-abī and BittiDagan (F), children of Gugatu daughter of Ana

Distress

palāḫu CONTRACTS Document Script Master

Dependent

Penalty for the Master

Penalty for the Dependent

GsK 2

SH

Zū-Aštarti son Ḫabu son of Zū-Baʿla 100 sh. of Aḫī-mālik son of Amašdu; son of Kutbe Zū-Aštarti son of Ḫabu

100 sh.

RE 26

SH

Ipḫur-Dagan Tuppil-enna son of Ilī-dūdu

Forfeit of wife and his children 100 sh.

Forfeit of Tuppil-enna’s wife

3.3.2.1 Adoptions due to Hardship Two Syrian and two Syro-Hittite tablets record family law contracts that regulate adoptions arranged due to hardship but do not refer to debts. 3.3.2.1.1 Syrian Documents 3.3.2.1.1.1 E 256 E 256275 is a document dated to the reign of King Zū-Aštarti concerning the adoption of three orphans.276 The tablet contains two sections divided by a single 275 This is one of the few Syrian texts found in Building M₁ that did not serve as a title to property, see ch. 3 fn. 191. 276 For the treatment of orphans in the ancient Near East see Garroway 2014: 108–12.

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ruling. The first section opens with the declaration of Addu son of Awiru, who repudiated his son Ḫulāʾu. Both individuals are unknown from other Emar documents. Then the text relates that upon Ḫulāʾu’s death, his son Aḫiu and his daughters Išarte and Aḫa-mi were abandoned on the public square in a year of war: (8) ù MUNUS.NÍTA.MEŠ-šu (9) a-na re-bi-ti ṣa-al-ú (10) a-na MU.KÁM ša KÚR. MEŠ nu-ku-ur-ti, “And his children were thrown out in the square in the year of war.” A certain Abī-kāpī son of Ḫamsi (otherwise unknown) saved these children from the street. The first section ends with a clause establishing the right of Ḫulāʾu’s brother to release the children upon the payment of 1000 shekels of silver: (15) ù šum-ma ur-[ra-am] (16) še-ra-am ŠE[Š-šu] (17) ša mḪu-la-[ú] (18) DUMU.MEŠ a-ḫi-šu (19) ú-pa!-ṭe₄-[er] (20) 1 li-im KÙ.BAB[BAR] (21) ip-ṭe₄-ri-šu-nu (22) li-id-dì-[in lil-qì], “And if, in the fu[tu]re, the broth[er] of Ḫulā[u] wants to release his brother’s sons, he shall giv[e] 1000 (shekels) of sil[ver] for their relea[se] and [take (them)].” This clause seems to combine the penalty clause typical of Syrian contracts, which stipulates artificially high penalties to guarantee the irrevocability of the contract and prevent any claim, and the redemption clause known from the Syro-Hittite documents.277 At any rate, this clause seems to suggest that the children were subject to some form of dependency. The second section is very brief and only contains Abī-kāpī’s adoption of the three children: (23) iš-tu u₄-mi an-ni-i[m] (24) ᵐA-bi-ka-pí (25) DUMU Ḫa-am-sí (26) ki-ia-am iq-bi a-nu-um-ma (27) ᵐA-ḫi-ú ù ᵐᶠI-šar-te (28) ù ᵐᶠA-ḫa-mi (29) DUMU. MEŠ ᵐḪu-la-i (30) a-na DUMU.NITÁ-ia (31) ù 2 DUMU.MUNUS-ia (32) aš-ku-unšu-nu, “On thi[s] day Abī-kāpī son of Ḫamsi spoke as follows: ‘I established, Aḫiu and Išarte and Aḫa-mi, sons of Ḫulāʾu, as my son and my two daughters.’” The relation between the two sections is not easily understood because it is unclear whether the adoption followed the apparent onset of dependency. In this case the children entered Abī-kāpī’s household first under some form of dependency and only later were adopted. The first section would simply report a previous contract. Nevertheless, E 256 does not report the adopter’s and adoptees’ duties. On the contrary, if the redemption clause also applies after the adoption, it seems that the children were not adopted as first-rank sons but likely as domestics or slaves.278

277 For the penalty clause in Syrian contracts see Fijałkowska 2014a: 126–41; for the peculiarity of E 256 see Fijałkowska 2014a: 157 n. 256. 278 This is also Bellotto’s interpretation (2009: 147–49).

3.3 Dependency Related to Hardship 

 211

3.3.2.1.1.2 TBR 48 In TBR 48, Wae the wife of Riḫṣu son of Lalû adopted Iaḫṣi-bēlu son of Ipqi-Dagan, who in return was to support (wabālu) his adoptive mother.279 Iaḫṣi-bēlu also became the son of Riḫṣu and was entitled to the house and the care of the family gods: (22) mIa-aḫ-ṣi-dEN (23) DUMU ma-ru ša Ri-ih-ṣi (24) É-ta ù DINGIR. MEŠ-šu (25) ša Ri-ih-ṣi (26) a-na Ia-ah-ṣi-dEN DUMU-šu (27) na-ad-nu, “Iaḫṣi-bēlu is the son of Riḫṣu; the house and the gods of Riḫṣu have been given to his son Iaḫṣi-bēlu.” In this case, it is the adopter who faced difficulties, as evidenced by the fact that Wae was supported by Iaḫṣi-bēlu in a year of hardship: (31) mIa-aḫ-ṣi-EN (32) f Wa-a-e AMA-šu (33) i-na MU.ḪI.A-ti dan-na-ti (34) it-ta-na-bal-ši, “Iaḫṣi-bēlu has supported Wae, his mother, in the years of hardship.” The contract contains a dissolution clause that deals only with Wae’s breach of the contract, stipulating that she would lose the right to her house and family gods: (11) šum-ma fWa-a-e (12) [a-na] pa-ni m[Ia-a]ḫ-ṣi-dEN (13) DUMUma-ri-ši (14) ta-qa-ab-‹bi› (15) ú-ul DUMU ma-ri-mi (16) at-ta-mi (17) a-na É-ti-š[i] (18) ù DINGIR.MEŠ-ši (19) ša Ri-iḫ-ṣ[i] (20) mu-ti-ši ú-u[l ti-ši] (21) a-šar ŠÀ-ši lu-[ú li-il-l]i-‹ik›, “If Wae should say [t]o [Ia]ḫṣibēlu, her son: ‘You are not my son,’ she will [have] n[o] (right) to he[r] house and her gods, (those) of Riḫṣ[u], her husband.” The fact that the dissolution clause does not mention Iaḫṣi-bēlu certainly reflects his dominant position over Wae. A noteworthy clause binds Iaḫṣi-bēlu to look after a certain Iaḫšuk-ilī as his own son. This was likely Wae’s biological son, who was apparently away from Emar: (38) šum-ma Ia-aḫ-šu-uk-DINGIR-lì (39) iš-tu KÁ.DIDLI.ḪI.A il-li-i[m] (40) m Ia-aḫ-ṣi-EN a-ba-šu (41) it-ta-na-bal (42) ù it-ti₄ DUMU.MEŠ-šu (43) i-za-az!, “If Iaḫšuk-ilī should go up through the gates, Iaḫṣi-bēlu, (as ?) his father, shall look after him and he will share with his sons.” This text may look like a typical example of exploitation comparable to Nuzi’s real estate adoptions because it does not contain clauses penalizing the adoptee, who receives all of the adopter’s property. However, it differs significantly from Nuzi sources because the adoptee is obliged to care for the adoptive mother and her child for life.280 Wae adopted Iaḫṣi-bēlu out of need but bound him to protect herself and her natural son.

279 In the Syrian text the adoptee’s duty is expressed by the verb wabālu, see Bellotto 2009: 32–33. 280 In Nuzi real estate adoptions, the adoptee has no obligations toward the adopter after providing the “gift,” Maidman 2010: 166 and n. 23; for Nuzi’s real estate adoptions see ch. 1 fn. 74. For similar cases see E 213 and TBR 78, § 2.2.2.1.

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As argued above,281 the tablets TBR 47-48 do not belong to the archive of Apilu. It follows that the Ipqi-Dagan mentioned in these texts with no patronymic was someone different from the son of Apilu named in TBR 45-46. Moreover, Iaḫṣi-bēlu is not mentioned in other documents of Apilu’s family. TBR 48 is undated and the parties are otherwise unknown. However, the witness list includes a certain Apilu son of Iddi-bēlu, who was likely the same witness attested in E 15,282 a document dated to the reign of King Baʿal-kabar I. Therefore, TBR 48 likely goes back to the beginning of the Second Dynasty.283 3.3.2.1.2 Syro-Hittite Documents 3.3.2.1.2.1 E 216 The matrimonial adoption E 216 from the Zū-Baʿla archive, which has been discussed above, regulates the adoption of Baʿla-BEa daughter of Kuʾe and Zadamma by Anat-ummī, wife of Šegal.284 Baʿla-BEa was adopted in exchange for 30 shekels of silver to be the secondary wife of Šegal or to be given in marriage to another man. We have argued above that this sum should be considered as a terḫatu although it is indicated as a price in E 217. Nevertheless, this contract was not a regular marriage or adoption but was motivated by serious difficulties. 3.3.2.1.2.2 TBR 77 In the will TBR 77, a certain Gugatu, daughter of Ana, states that her sister Ummīnaʿmī should support her as long as she lives: (3) um-ma-a fUm-mi-na-mi (4) NIN-ia a-di [b]al-ṭá-a-ku (5) it-ta-na-ba-la-ni-mi. Although Gugatu had no debts, the fact that she was unable to maintain herself indicates that she was either financially distressed or was an old or sick woman no longer able to feed her own children. In exchange for being supported, Gugatu gave her son Ilī-abī and her daughter Bitti-Dagan into adoption (ana mārūti) to her sister. Despite the formal adoption, the contract establishes a redemption price fixed at one male and one female slave: (15) ša i-ra-ag-‹gu›-um ARAD ù GÉME (16) ma-li-iš-šu-nu li-id-din ù

281 See § 1.3.6. 282 This individual was obviously different from the Apilu of TBR 43–46, despite the fact that the latter’s patronymic is unknown. 283 There is no evidence that the Ipqi-Dagan mentioned in TBR 48 as Iaḫṣi-bēlu’s father is the same individual attested in TBR 47. The date of TBR 48 seems to rule out this identification because TBR 47 is dated to the King Pilsu-Dagan. Additionally, the witness lists in the two documents are different. 284 For this document see § 3.3.1.1.

3.3 Dependency Related to Hardship 

 213

[lil-qi], “Who(ever) should raise a claim shall give a male slave and a female slave of their same amount and take (them).” The addition of this clause, which usually refers to fully alienated people, and the fact that the children can be redeemed in exchange for slaves may indicate that the two children were bound to some sort of dependency. Alternatively, it may be suggested that fixing the redemption in terms of an exchange of slaves was intended to secure recompense for the costs sustained while raising the children. 3.3.2.2 palāḫu Contracts for Hardship Two Syro-Hittite documents, GsK 2 and RE 26, stipulate agreements between people in distress and individuals for whom they perform the palāḫu duty in exchange for help. These contracts share clauses with the family law contracts and especially with the contracts of indentured labor but do not make reference to debts. 3.3.2.2.1 GsK 2 The text GsK 2 belongs to the archive of the family of Kutbe. As mentioned above,285 it shares features with the family law contracts as well as with the contracts regulating indentured labor. Nonetheless, it differs from both groups for several reasons. First of all, GsK 2 contains no reference to debt. A certain Ḫabu, son of Zū-Baʿla son of Amašdu, was in distress during a year of hardship that caused great inflation: (1) mḪab-ú DUMU Zu-Ba-la DUMU A-maš-du MU KALA. GA (2) ša 3 qa ŠE.MEŠ a-na 1 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR iz-za-az (3) ša i-pal-la-ḫu-šu ia-nu, “Ḫabu son of Zu-Baʿla son of Amašdu, in a year of hardship, when 3 qû of barley correspond to 1 shekel of silver, there was no one to support him.” Thus, together with his son Zū-Aštarti, he entered the house of Zū-Aštarti son of Aḫī-mālik son of Kutbe. In return, Ḫabu and his son had to perform the palāḫu duty for Zū-Aštarti and his wife Dagan-simātī as long as the couple lived. The contract contains several provisos regulating the relation between the two family groups. Zū-Aštarti of Kutbe’s family was obliged to provide a wife to Ḫabu’s son Zū-Aštarti. The children eventually born to the couple were to remain “servants of the king,” thus serving the Hittite administration as free persons:286 (6) ᵐZu-Aš-tar-ti DUMU A-ḫi-ma-lik DAM-ta₅ ᵐZu-Aš-tar-ti (7) DUMU ᵐḪab-i ú-šaḫa-az i-na EGIR u₄-mi ki-i-ma URU-lè-e (8) DUMU.MEŠ DUMU.MUNUS.MEŠ ᵐZuAš-tar-ti ul-la-ad DUMU.MEŠ-šu (9) a-na ARAD.MEŠ LUGAL ir-ti-ḫu, “Zū-Aštarti 285 See ch. 2 fn. 325 and ch. 3 fn. 74. 286 For this title see ch. 3 fn. 73; dependents returning to the status of “servant of the king” are also found in E 117 and E 121; see also TBR 40 and ch. 3 fn. 117, where the debtor’s sons were to remain servants of a Hittite official.

214 

 3 Default and Dependency

son of Aḫī-mālik will provide a wife to Zū-Aštarti son of Ḫabu. In the future, according to (the custom of) the city (concerning) the son and daughters whom Zū-Aštarti will bear, his sons will remain servants of the king.” Moreover, Ḫabu’s son would be entitled to receive the terḫatu of his daughters. Although both Ḫabu and Zū-Aštarti had to perform the palāḫu duty, only Zū-Aštarti was allowed to leave the house of Kutbe’s family: (13) ki-i-me-e i-palla-ḫa-na-ši EGIR ši-im-ti-‹ni› ni-a-ti (14) ub-ba-la-na-ši mZu-Aš-tar-ti ŠU DAM-šu (15) DUMU.MEŠ-šu li-iṣ-bat-ma a-šar ŠÀ-‹šu›-nu lil-lik (16) ù mḪab-ú a-bu-šu KÁ É ša mZu-Aš-tar-ti (17) la-a uṣ-ṣa, “As he supports us, after our fate carries us off, Zū-Aštarti shall take the hand of his wife and his children and go wherever they please, and Ḫabu, his father, shall not leave the door of Zū-Aštarti’s house.” The contract also states that Zū-Aštarti of the family of Kutbe entrusted Ḫabu with the role of caretaker or stepfather of his son Iadi-Dagan:287 (18) a-nu-ma ᵐIadi-ᵈKUR DUMU-ia a-na DUMU-šu ša ᵐḪab-i at-ta-din, “Now I have given Iadi-Dagan, my son, as son of Ḫabu.” No contract of indentured labor stipulates such an agreement. It is undeniable that Ḫabu and his son Zū-Aštarti were facing difficulties and were subordinated to the family of Kutbe, as shown by the presence of the “leaving the house” formula in the clause of dissolution. Nevertheless, their condition seems to differ from that of indentured persons, as underscored by the entrustment of Iadi-Dagan to Ḫabu. Most importantly, the dissolution clause uniquely specifies the same penalty, 100 shekels of silver, for each side in breach: (19) ša ur-ra-am še-ra-am mZu-Aš-tar-ti ù fdKUR-si-ma-ti (20) DAM-šu a-na pa-ni mḪab-i ù m Zu-Aš-tar-ti DUMU-šu i-qa-bu-ú (21) ma-a iš-tu É-ni at-la-ka-me (22) mZu-Aš-tar-ti ù DAM-šu 1 ME GÍN KÙ.BABBAR.ME a-na mḪab-i (23) ù DUMU-šu li-di-nu-ma a-šar ŠÀ-šu-nu lil-li-ku (24) ù šúm-ma i-na EGIR u₄-mi Ḫab-ú ù Zu-Aš-tar-ti DUMU-šu (25) a-na pa-ni mZu-As-tar-ti ù KUR-si-ma-ti DAM-šu i-qa-bu-ú (26) ma-a iš-tu É-ku-nu ni-tal-lak-me mḪab-ú ù DUMU-šu (27) 1 me-at GÍN KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ a-na ᵐZu-Aštar-ti ù DAM-šu (28) li-di-nu-ma a-šar ŠÀ-šu-nu lil-li-ku, “If, in the future, Zū-Aštarti and Dagan-simātī, his wife, should say to Ḫabu and Zū-Aštarti, his son: ‘Leave our house,’ Zū-Aštarti and his wife shall pay 100 shekels of silver to Ḫabu and his son, and go wherever they please. And if, in the future, Ḫabu and Zū-Aštarti, his son, should say to Zū-Aštarti and Dagan-simātī, his wife, ‘We want to leave your house,’ Ḫabu and his son shall pay 100 shekels of silver to Zū-Aštarti and his wife and go wherever they please.” Equal penalties are also found in family law contracts, but in GsK 2, unlike those documents, neither Ḫabu nor his son was entitled to receive Zū-Aštarti’s inheritance. The imposition of penalties on the benefactor, as in all

287 Bellotto (2009: 169) suggests that Ḫabu was not an adoptive father but a foster father.

3.3 Dependency Related to Hardship 

 215

the contracts where they are stipulated, underlines that the distressed person had no interest in breaking the agreement because they were housed and fed. In light of this scenario, Ḫabu’s obligation to reside in Kutbe’s house after his master’s death – a proviso that has no parallel in the contracts of indentured labor – can be understood as a consequence of Ḫabu’s adoption of Iadi-Dagan and his obligation to take care of him. Besides securing Iadi-Dagan’s future, his adoption certainly served to grant him the rights to Ḫabu’s inheritance. To sum up, this document describes people facing hardship who joined the household of a wealthy family in order to serve, support, and take care of the householder and his wife. The contract contains some clauses similar to those found in the contracts of indentured labor as well as in the family law contracts, but the condition of Ḫabu and his son is not fully equivalent to that of the people referred to in either of those two types of documents. GsK 2 differs from the contracts of indentured labor in its stipulation of equal penalties and the role assumed by Ḫabu in the benefactor’s family. On the other hand, it differs from the family law contracts in that the person providing the palāḫu duty is not entitled to the benefactor’s inheritance.288 The unique condition granted to Ḫabu and his son perhaps derives from their previous social status or from friendship or unrecorded family ties between the two family groups. 3.3.2.2.2 RE 26 In RE 26, Ipḫur-Dagan son of Ilī-dūdu, who is nowhere else documented, took Tuppil-enna289 and gave him Dagan-bītu as a wife. Tuppil-enna and his wife had to fulfill the palāḫu duty as long as Ipḫur-Dagan and his wife Baʿla-bītu should live. As in the contracts of indentured labor, Tuppil-enna would be freed after having performed the palāḫu duty. Tuppil-enna was allowed to marry off his daughter and was obliged to provide a wife to Ipḫur-Dagan’s son: (9) mDup-pí-liin-na (10) 1 DUMU.MUNUS-šú a-na É e-mi l[i-i]d-din-ma (11) DUMU mIp-ḫur-dKUR DAM-ta₅ l[i-š]a-ḫi-iz, “Tuppil-enna sh[all p]lace one of his daughters in the house of a father-in-law and sh[all enable] the son of Ipḫur-Dagan to take a wife.” Unlike Beckman, I regard 1 DUMU.MUNUS-šú as referring to Tuppil-enna’s daughter. Based on the parallel in GsK 2, the purpose of the clause was to grant Tuppil-enna the right to take the terḫatu of his daughter.290

288 It should be recalled that in the family law contracts, when the debtor performs the palāḫu duty he becomes the benefactor’s heir, RE 25, RE 88, TBR 74. 289 Beckman 1996a: 43, inserts ‹a-na DUMU-ut-ti-ia› in RE 26: 2 but there is no space in the line on the tablet. 290 In GsK 2, Zū-Aštarti was granted the same right.

216 

 3 Default and Dependency

Although Tuppil-enna and his wife were to bound to some form of dependency, a clause clearly states that they were not slaves: (12) šúm-ma mIp-[ḫ]ur-dKUR a-na pa-ni [m]Dup-pí-li-in-na (13) ù fdKUR-É i-qáb-bi m[a]-a ARAD.MEŠ-ia (14) at-tunu-mi mDup-pí-li-in-na ŠU DAM-šú (15) [DUMU].MEŠ-šú li-iṣ-bat-ma a-šar ŠÀ-šú lil-lik (16) EN.DI-šú i-ia-nu, “If Ip[ḫ]ur-Dagan should say to Tuppil-enna and Daganbītu, ‘You are my slaves,’ Tuppil-enna shall take the hand of his wife (and) his [child]ren and go wherever he pleases. He will have no legal opponent. If Ip[ḫ]urDagan should say in front of Tuppil-enna and Dagan-bītu, ‘You are my slaves,’ Tuppil-enna shall take the hand of his wife and his [child]ren and go wherever he pleases. He will have no legal opponent.” This clause can be understood in light of another proviso protecting Dagan-bītu against claims regarding her status: (21) šúm-ma mIp-hur-dKUR ṭup-pa ša GÉME-ut-ti (22) ša fdKUR-É ú-še-la-a ṭup-pu an-nu-ú (23) i-la-ʾ-e-šú, “If Ipḫur-Dagan should produce a tablet attesting to the slave status of Dagan-bītu, this tablet will prevail over it.” The reasons behind this clause are likely that Dagan-bītu was a released slave and that Tuppil-enna was unaffected by her previous status. The different penalties for either side in case of breach, however, underscore the asymmetrical relation.291 As seen in RE 26: 14–15, Ipḫur-Dagan was only bound to forfeit the woman he had given as a wife to Tuppil-enna, but the latter was obliged not only to relinquish his wife and children but also to pay 100 shekels of silver. Tuppil-enna was probably forced into a subordinate condition that was nevertheless different from slavery.292

3.4 Chattel Slavery Different types of sources pertain to chattel slaves.293 The sale of chattel slaves is the focus of a relatively small group of documents (§ 3.4.1). Two other documents regulate transactions of an unclear nature (§ 3.4.2). Slaves also appear in sources of various types as part of gifts, donations, inheritances, and exchanges (§ 3.4.3). As discussed above (§ 3.1), chattel slaves are mostly identified by the words (w) ardu and amtu, but ṣuḫārtu and napištu (ZI) are also used. In a few cases no specific term is used, and the nature of the condition can be assumed contextually. 291 The condition of the people involved in GsK 2 appears less similar to indentured labor than the condition of Tuppil-enna in RE 26. 292 A close parallel occurs in a Middle Assyrian text MARV 1 37 in which a person binds himself to domestic service and indebtedness is not mentioned, see Postgate 1979: 93–95, Postgate 2013: 16–17. 293 For the application of the term ‘chattel slave’ to the Emar documentation and its limitations see § 3.

SH

SH

E 211

E 214

E 224

Sale contract

Sale contract

Sale contract

Lawsuit

MB

Letter

SH

E 127

Receipt

E 25

SH

E 35

Type

Sale contract

Sale agreement

SH

Iraq54 5

Hirayama 40 SH

Script

S

Document

1F

4

1F

1F

4F 3M

1F 1M

1M

1M

Slave

NG

Kidin-Gula

70 sheep

40 sh.

Baʿal-mālik

Baʿal-mālik son of Baʿal-qarrād

35 sh. NG

Baʿal-qarrād son of Zū-Baʿla

120 sh.

Abdi-ili son of Ipqi-Dagan

45 sh. Aššur-aḫa-iddina son of Šamaš-abī

Sons of Tatia son of Iaṣi-ilī

43 sh.

5 talents of boxwood 2 oxen of good quality

Buyer

Price

Table 24: Documents Related to the Sale of Chattel Slaves.

Alazaia and his wife, Tatašše/Raʾīndu

Irbi-ilu and Qalāl-addin sons of Šallaeia on behalf of Zū-Aštarti son of Kutbe

Pukli-šarri son of Karb-ili, man of Guzini

Ari-Kušuḫ man of Nikippa

Dagan-taliʾ son of Zūzu son of Abunnu son of Tuteia

Lalû son of Zū-Baʿla

Wasti, wife of PiḫaTarḫunta

Iaḫṣu son of Mananu; Burami son of Utti

Seller

Aia-šumātu

NG

NG

NG

Šalilu, his wife, his 2 sons and 2 daughters

1 naššartu-woman and her son

Iaʾšuqa man of Uri

NG

Sold Slave

3.4 Chattel Slavery   217

218 

 3 Default and Dependency

3.4.1 Sale-related Documents Eight sources record sales of chattel slaves: six are written according to the SyroHittite tradition, one is a Syrian-type text, and one is a Babylonian tablet. The Syrian tablet (Iraq54 5) and three Syro-Hittite documents (E 211, E 214, and E 224) are sale contracts. The other Syro-Hittite documents include a receipt for a slave sale (E  35) and the aforementioned agreement regulating the delivery of slaves (Hirayama 40).294 Additionally, the previously discussed lawsuit E 127 (§ 2.2.3) pertains to commerce involving several commodities including slaves. The Babylonian tablet (E 25) is a letter concerning the trade of a slave. Unlike debt slaves and famine slaves, chattel slaves are not regularly identified by name in sale contracts. 3.4.1.1 A Syrian Sale of Slaves (Iraq54 5) The only preserved Syrian-type document recording the sale of a slave, Iraq54 5, dates to King Elli. Two men from the otherwise unknown town of Kamia,295 Iaḫṣu son of Mananu and Burami son of Utti, sold a female slave to the sons of Tatia son of Iaṣi-ilī for 43 shekels of silver. A certain Ḫutia acted as a guarantor protecting the buyers from claims raised by another (former?) owner: (6) šum-ma GÉME-tu₄ be-li (7) tu-še-li (8) ŠU.DU₈.A (9) mḪu-ti-ia, “If the slave girl produces a (former) owner, the guarantor is Ḫutia.” It may be posited that in a commercial context, Ḫutia acted as a middleman in the trade and was the sellers’ representative at Emar. As usual for Syrian tablets, neither the sellers nor the buyers are known elsewhere. Unlike the sellers, the buyers were Emarites because the transaction took place at Emar in the presence of King Elli, who is the first witness. Ḫutia may perhaps be identified with the father of the person who sealed the Syro-Hittite tablet E 215, because this personal name is only known from these two texts. 3.4.1.2 Syro-Hittite Documents 3.4.1.2.1 E 211, E 214 and E 224 Three out six Syro-Hittite sales of slaves were found in Building M₁ and belong to the archive of the diviners. It is therefore evident that the family of Zū-Baʿla played a considerable role in the slave market.

294 This document has been treated under § 2.1.2. 295 See Belmonte Marín 2001: 209.

3.4 Chattel Slavery 

 219

One contract, E 211, belongs to the second generation of Zū-Baʿla’s family. It was stipulated before the Son of the King Kulana-ziti and in the presence of other high dignitaries, including the Overseer of the Land Mutri-Teššub, who is the first sealer,296 and the Sons of the King Piḫa-Tarḫunta297 and Imlik-Dagan as witnesses. For 120 shekels of silver Baʿal-qarrād purchased seven slaves, namely Šalilu with his wife and his five children, from Dagan-taliʾ son of Zūzu son of Abunnu son of Tuteia. The witness list contains representatives of both parties, namely Baʿal-qarrād’s brother Kāpī-Dagan and the seller’s granduncle Ḫusiru son of Tuteia. The contract contains the non-vindication clause (ṭuppu annû ilāʾēšu). As in AuOr5 12,298 a clause establishes Baʿal-qarrād’s absolute authority over the slaves, protecting him against any allegation of mistreatment: (14) ù šum-ma mŠa-li-lu DUMU.ME[Š-šu DUMU.MUNUS.MEŠ-šu] (15) a-na mdIŠKUR-UR.SAG LÚ.ḪAL E[Nšu-nu] (16) i-qa-ab-bu-ú ma-a ú-ul AR[AD.MEŠ-ka] (17) ni-nu-mi mdIŠKUR-UR.SAG ki-i [ŠÀ-šu] (18) li-pu-uš-šu-nu-ti EN DI-šu-n[u NU.TUKU], “And if Šalilu, [his] son[s, or his daughters] should say to [their] lo[rd] Baʿal-qarrād, the diviner: ‘We are not [your] sla[ves],’ Baʿal-qarrād may treat them as [he pleases]. [He will have no] adversary (in court).” According to Westbrook,299 the slave did not want to affirm his freedom but rather to declare that he still belonged to his former owner.300 Despite the clauses protecting the buyer, after Baʿal-qarrād’s death Dagan-taliʾ, the former owner, contested the sale before the king (of Karkemiš) against Baʿal-mālik son of Baʿal-qarrād (E 212). On the basis of the evidence produced by Baʿal-mālik, namely the witnessed tablet (likely E 211), the king established that Dagan-taliʾ had no legitimate claim. Although Dagan-taliʾ and his family are unknown from other documents, his appeal to the court in E 212 after some time had passed suggests that he was an inhabitant of Emar. Thus it seems plausible that E 211 records the sale of Dagan-taliʾ’s own slave rather than a commercial trade of slaves. The other two contracts involve Baʿal-mālik himself. In E 214, he purchased a female slave for 35 shekels of silver from Ari-Kušuḫ, a man of Nikippa, an unknown town.301 The zakû clause protected Baʿal-mālik by establishing that AriKušuḫ would be liable for any future claim: (5) šum-ma ur-ra-am (6) še-ra-am «šum-ma» ma-am-ma aš-šum GÉME ša-a-ši (7) a-na EN di-ni-šu ša mdU-ma-lik (8) il-la-a mSÌ-d30 i-ta-nap-pal-šú (9) ù mdU-ma-lik za-ku, “If, in the future, ‹‹if›› con-

296 For the presence of Mutri-Teššub in this text (although he bears no title) see Balza 2009: 104–06. 297 For this Hittite official see E 35 below. 298 For this text see § 3.3.1.4. 299 Westbrook 1995: 1667–68. 300 This is not the case for AuOr5 12, where the sold person was freeborn. 301 See Belmonte Marín 2001: 99.

220 

 3 Default and Dependency

cerning that female slave, someone should come up as an adversary (in court) of Baʿal-mālik, Ari-Kušuḫ shall pay him and Baʿal-mālik is free (of claims). E 224 is a tiny and laconic tablet simply stating that Baʿal-mālik purchased a female slave from Pukli-šarri son of Karb-ili, a man from the otherwise unknown town of Guzini.302 Although Baʿal-mālik bears no patronymic, there is little doubt that he was the son of Baʿal-qarrād. The purchase price is not given. Because the tablet, which appears to be complete, lacks the price and all the common contractual clauses, it was perhaps a memorandum of the original contract written as an internal record for the family archive. This interpretation may be supported by the fact that this is the only sale of slaves formulated ex latere emptoris. The sales E 214 and E 224 were most likely conducted for profit by merchants who came to Emar to conclude their affairs. However, the fact that the sellers have Hurrian names and hail from unknown villages recalls similar circumstances found in sales of famine slaves. It cannot be completely excluded that these contracts record people facing economic difficulties who sold their slaves out of need. 3.4.1.2.2 E 35 The document E 35 is a tablet discovered in Area C.303 It is a receipt acknowledging that Wašti received from Abdi-ili son of Ipqi-Dagan 45 shekels of silver as the price of Iaʾšuqa, a man of the town of Uri: (1) 45 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR (2) ŠÁM ša mIaʾ-šu-qà (3) LÚ uruÚ-rì (4) iš-tu ŠU mARAD-DINGIR.[MEŠ DU]MU Ip-qì!-dKUR (5) fWaaš-ti im-ḫu!-ur, “45 shekels of silver, the price of Iaʾšuqa, man of the town of Uri from the hand of Abdi-ili son of Ipqi-Dagan, Wašti received.” Although Iaʾšuqa is not specifically qualified as (w)ardu, there is little doubt of his status. Indeed, he is listed without a patronymic, as is customary for chattel slaves, and his qualification as “man from Uri” indicates that he was an adult. The seller, Wašti, was the wife of the Son of the King Piḫa-Tarḫunta, who was the grandson of the king of Karkemiš, Ini-Teššub.304 Piḫa-Tarḫunta is mentioned in the aforementioned documents of Zū-Baʿla’s archive, E 211 (as witness) and E 212 (as sealer).305 In E 212, the seal was inscribed with the name of Piḫa-Tarḫunta as well as with that of his wife, while the seal impressed on E 35 only bears the

302 See Belmonte Marín 2001: 151. 303 The tablets discovered in Area C lack a complete archaeological record, see § 3.2.3.2.2.3. 304 For Wašti and her husband see § 1.3.7. 305 For this official see Mora 2004: 437–39, cf. Yamada 1995: 312 n. 61, Pruzsinszky 2003: 260 n. 53, Durand and Marti 2003: 160–61; this official is the sender of the letter PRU VI 7 (RS 17.148) found at Ugarit. Cohen (2011: 149 n. 24) wonders whether Piḫa-Tarḫunta and Wašti could be identified with the addressees of the letter E 258 and E 260.

3.4 Chattel Slavery 

 221

name of Wasti.306 It follows that Wasti was a very wealthy woman and that the sale did not originate from impoverishment. The non-vindication clause bars any claims against Abdi-ili,307 suggesting that this tablet was his copy and was stored in his archive. This is further confirmed by the presence of Wašti’s seal. The identity of the buyer is unknown as he is not documented in other texts. Because he bought a slave from members of the royal family of Karkemiš, one may presume that he was a wealthy person.308 3.4.1.2.3 Hirayama 40 As discussed above,309 Hirayama 40 is a document belonging to the archive of Kutbe that records a credit sale of slaves. Zū-Aštarti son of Kutbe entrusted two merchants, Irbi-ilu and Qalāl-addin, sons of Šallaeia, with the delivery of four slaves for the price of 70 sheep in rams and ewes. A clause protecting Zū-Aštarti established that the merchants were to pay a sum in gold corresponding to double the original price if they did not deliver the sheep within a month. 3.4.1.2.4 E 127 The lawsuit E 127310 pertains to the purchase of several goods by the Assyrian merchant Aššur-aḫa-iddina son of Šamaš-abī from the Emarite Lalû son of Zū-Baʿla. According to our interpretation, Aššur-aḫa-iddina sued Lalû because the latter had not delivered the goods for which he had already been paid. Indeed, Aššuraḫa-iddina affirms that Lalû was indebted to him. The goods were purchased with cash and slaves. According to Durand, part of the expenditure, namely 5 talents of boxwood and 2 oxen of good quality, was exchanged for a naššartu-woman and her son.311 It remains unclear, however, whether the slaves were given in advance or were supposed to be handed over only when Lalû delivered the goods.

306 Beyer 2001: 92–93, 163. 307 E 35: 8–10, ma-am-ma // a-na muḫ-ḫi mARAD-DINGIR.MEŠ // la-a i-ra-gu-‹um›; the formula ṭuppu annû ilāʾēšu does not occur. 308 Perhaps an in-depth study of Area C might uncover some clues about Abdi-ili’s family. One should note that an Ipqi-Dagan is mentioned in other texts from Area C: in E 31 as father of the testator and in the Syrian testament E 34 as one of the heirs; if this person was the father of Abdi-ili, then he belonged to an important family. 309 For a full discussion of this document see § 2.1.2.3. 310 For a full treatment of this document see § 2.2.3.2. 311 See ch. 2 fn. 377.

222 

 3 Default and Dependency

3.4.1.3 A Babylonian Letter (E 25) The letter E 25 is part of the dossier of the Babylonian merchants in House 5.312 The letter was sent from the merchant Alazaia to his wife Tatašše/Raʾīndu to give instructions concerning the delivery of several types of goods.313 The text is rather obscure, but it can be understood that among the other objects traded, a female slave named Aia-šumātu314 was to be delivered to Kidin-Gula,315 apparently for a price of 40 shekels of silver. The term for slave used in this document is ṣuḫārtu (MUNUS.TUR), which, as noted above (§ 3.1), may refer to either a minor or adult female slave. Most likely she was a young girl but not a child.

3.4.2 Slave Transactions of Uncertain Nature Two tablets of very different content and paleography (Hirayama 41 and JA 303) record slave transactions that cannot be safely regarded as sales because they do not mention a price. Table 25: Slave Transactions of Uncertain Nature. Document

Script

Type

Slave

Principal

JA 303

Unk

Letter

1M

Zū-Aštarti; Aḫī-mālik

Hirayama 41

SH

Receipt

1F

Zū-Aštarti son of Kutbe Āṣiu son of Ellati-Dagan

3.4.2.1 A Letter of Unknown Provenance (JA 303) JA 303 is a recently published tablet316 of unknown provenance that contains a letter from a governor of Emar, Talmi-Šarruma, to Nabunni, the governor of the land of Suḫu,317 concerning the case of Aḫī-mālik and Zū-Aštarti, who were sent to a river ordeal. The content is not fully clear and presents several problems of reading and interpretation. Without entering into the details of the scholarly discussion, the legal case can be summarized as follows. The two men, likely from Emar, had a dispute 312 For this dossier see § 1.3.8. 313 For the reconstruction of the text see Durand and Marti 2003: 165–66. 314 See Fijałkowska 2014a: 104. 315 For this individual see Cohen 2009: 183–89. 316 The first edition (Cohen 2015) has been superseded by a new corrected edition in Cohen and d’Alfonso 2021. 317 On the identity of Talmi-Šarruma and Nabunni see Cohen 2015: 177–78.

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 223

over a slave that was to be decided by ordeal. Aḫī-mālik had brought the slave from Assyria and handed it over, apparently without Zū-Aštarti’s approval. An otherwise unknown king Mazia318 imposed a fine of 6 minas of silver on Aḫī-mālik to compensate Zū-Aštarti, but the fine was apparently not paid. After Aḫī-mālik retorted that he himself had not been delivered as a slave to Zū-Aštarti, the two were sent to the river ordeal. It is possible that Zū-Aštarti and Aḫī-mālik were merchants trading slaves from Assyria. In any case, the legal basis of the dispute remains unclear. 3.4.2.2 A Syro-Hittite Document (Hirayama 41) Hirayama 41 is a Syro-Hittite tablet belonging to the archive of Kutbe. The document acknowledges that a certain Āṣiu son of Ellati-Dagan (unknown elsewhere) has given a female slave to Zū-Āštarti son of Kutbe, but he still owes him another good young woman: (1) mA-ṣí-ú DUMU El-la-ti-dKUR (2) GÉME a-na mZu-Aš-tar-ti DUMU Kut-be (3) it-ta-din ù 1-en ZI KI.SIKIL SAG₁₀ (4) a-na UGU-ḫi ᵐA-ṣi-ú (5) Ì.⌜GÁL?⌝, “Āṣiu, son of Ellati-Dagan, has given a female slave to Zū-Aštarti son of Kutbe, and one young good woman is still incumbent upon Āṣiu.” The document should be interpreted as a receipt for a partial delivery of a slave transaction. Perhaps Āṣiu was a merchant of slaves, although the document does not specify whether the transaction was a sale. A clause stipulates that the tablet will be broken once the second delivery has been made. 3.4.3 Slaves in Documents of Various Content Slaves play various roles in several legal documents: as objects of donations, i.e., in wills (§ 3.4.3.1); and as means of exchange (§ 3.4.3.2). 3.4.3.1 Donations of Slaves In ancient Mesopotamia slaves were often included in gifts, dowries, and inheritance shares like any other type of property.319 This custom is well attested at 318 According to Cohen 2015: 178–79, Mazia was a king of Emar, unrecorded in textual sources (outside of this tablet), who reigned after the Second Dynasty for a short period before the complete takeover of the city by the Hittites. This interpretation has been abandoned in Cohen and d’Alfonso 2021, where the authors suggest that Mazia was a king of Karkemiš known from the Ankara silver bowl as Mazi-Karḫuḫa. I would suggest another possibility, namely that this Mazia was king of a town in the Emar area where Aḫī-mālik possibly came from; note that apart from this text, the personal name Mazia is only borne by two individuals from the towns of Kuraraba (E 119; see pp. 91f.) and Atira (JCS40 1), Pruzsinszky 2003: Index, 622. 319 See Dandamaev 1984: 207–14.

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Emar. With a few exceptions, documents recording donated or bequeathed slaves are Syro-Hittite320 and predominantly concern female slaves.321 As expected, women also represent the majority of beneficiaries322 because slaves, notably female slaves, were particularly suited to provide help to widows and daughters. A female slave is always included in the kubuddāʾu-gift given to a wife.323 Slaves were frequently mentioned in dowries in cuneiform records. This confirms that female slaves were particularly sought after, as seen in sale contracts. 3.4.3.2 Slaves in Various Transactions As regular commodities, slaves could serve as a means of payment and compensation, or they could be exchanged along with other slaves.324 Four Syro-Hittite documents attest to this use of slaves. Table 26: Slaves in Various Transactions. Document

Type

Slave’s function

E 91

Testament

Compensation

E 257

Lawsuit

Penalty

TBR 75

Testament

Compensation

TBR 79

Agreement

Compensation

320 Texts related to the donation of slaves are not edited in the appendix. Share of inheritance: BLMJ 15, E 186–187, E 213 (see § 2.2.2), TBR 30 (the document is a verdict on a dispute over some properties), and TBR 74 (see § 2.2.2); perhaps RE 69 can be added here, but the text is fragmentary. Donations: AuOr5 14, E 31, Hirayama 19, Hirayama 20, Hirayama 23 (S), Hirayama 45 (this document belongs to the archive of Kutbe, see p. 123), RE 8 (S), RE 56, TBR 70. Slaves are also given as part of kubuddāʾu: AuOr5 15 (S), BLMJ 14, RE 8 (S), SMEA30 8, TBR 22 (this text belongs to Awiru’s family), TBR 71. An additional testament in which slaves are bequeathed is perhaps the Syrian text TBR 69, but the status of the donated persons is unclear; the document only states: a-di um-ma-šu a-na ši-im-ti-ši i-la-ak // mfI-lu-te a-na mMil-ka-ma na-ad-na // mfI-šar-te a-na mfA-biì-lí na-ad-na, “As soon as his mother will go to her fate, Ilūte shall be given to Milka-Ma and Išarte shall be given to Abī-ilī” (TBR 69: 20–22). Hirayama 29 is not included here because the slaves are intended to be “servants of the king,” see ch. 3 fn. 163. 321 Female slaves alone or together with males are attested in all documents quoted in ch. 3 fn. 320 except E 186. 322 In fourteen documents beneficiaries are female: AuOr5 15 (S), BLMJ 14, E 31, E 213, Hirayama 19, Hirayama 20, Hirayama 23 (S), RE 8 (S), RE 56, SMEA30 8, TBR 22, TBR 30, TBR 70, TBR 71. 323 Yamada 2016b: 399–400. 324 For the economic value of slaves as commodities see Mendelsohn 1949: 34–42, Richardson 2019: 38.

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 225

3.4.3.2.1 TBR 79 The fragmentary text TBR 79 is difficult to interpret. According to Arnaud, the document concerns an exchange of a nurse together with a female slave. However, his restoration needs to be corrected: (1) ta-ri-tu qa-du É Kir-r[a ši-it] (2) a-na ḪA.LA m Ḫu-zi 30 GÍN K[Ù.BABBAR (ŠÁM-ši)] (3) ù fEl-la-a GÉME sú-ti-tù (4) ki-i-mu-ú ši-iz-bi ša ta-[ri-ti la-a] (5) ra-a-ši325 a-na mḪu-zi it-tan-nu, “A dry nurse326 (staying/residing?) with the household of Kirra is for (i.e., belongs to) the inheritance share of Ḫuzu; [(her price is)] 30 shekels of silver and Ella, a Syrian female slave, they gave to Ḫuzu instead of the milk of the nurse that was not available.”327 According to this reading Ḫuzu inherited a dry nurse,328 but because she had no milk he received a female Syrian slave as compensation. The slave would have supplied Ḫuzu’s sons with milk. Apparently, the contract is not an exchange but a compensation, because Ḫuzu retained ownership of the dry nurse. The interpretation of the 30 shekels of silver remains uncertain because of the break in line 2: the silver could be the valuation of the nurse, as restored by Arnaud, or part of the compensation together with the female slave, as suggested by ù in line 3. As will be seen below, a valuation of the nurse at 30 shekels of silver would have been within the range of slave prices.329 The subject of the verb ittannū is not explicit, but the plural form suggests that it refers to Ḫuzu’s brothers, who are mentioned in the non-vindication clause (ṭuppu annû ilāʾēšu) that protects Ḫuzu against their claims. The absence of Ḫuzu as a possible claimant suggests that he did not give the nurse in exchange but retained her as his own property. Neither Ḫuzu nor Kirra bears a patronymic and their relation to each other is unknown. 3.4.3.2.2 E 91 The document E 91, found in Area T but not connected with the family of Ḫima,330 records the testament of Gumašši son of Atawa, who is nowhere else attested. Among his other dispositions, he left a house to his son Šaggar-taliʾ, with the proviso that his

325 Arnaud reads ša-a-ti, but the first sign seems more likely to be ra-; raši is a stative from rašû, “to have,” referring to šizbu. 326 CAD T: 232. 327 Alternatively, one might consider the 30 shekels of silver as part of the exchange and translate: “they gave 30 shekels of silver and Ella, a Syrian female slave, to Ḫuzu instead of the milk of the nurse that was not available.” 328 This translation follows Arnaud, but one may consider the house of Kirra as part of Ḫuzu’s share; therefore there is no need to restore šīt in the break. 329 See § 5.2.1. 330 There is no clear archaeological record on where the tablets in Area T were found, Margueron 1982b: 240, Dietrich 1990: 36–37, Rutz 2013: 77–78. For this text see also ch. 3 fn. 345.

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brothers were obliged to repair it or to pay for the renovation. The text then informs us that Šaggar-taliʾ complained that his brother Baṣṣu received a new house. Thus, Baṣṣu gave him the female slave Aruš-Ḫeba and her blind husband as compensation for the house renovation: (27) ù mBa-aṣ-ṣ[ú] (28) fA-ru-u[š-dḪ]é-ba GÉME qa-du LÚ IGI. NU.TUKU (29) lúmu-t[i-ši a-n]a md30-ta-li-iḫ ŠEŠ-šú ki-i-mu-ú (30) ri-i[ṣ-pi-š]ú it-ta-naaš-šú, “And Baṣṣ[u] gave the female slave Aru[š-Ḫ]eba, together with a blind man, [her] husb[and, t]o Šaggar-taliʾ, his brother, in lieu of [h]is (price of) reparat[ion].” The document further states that Dagan-[. . .], the son of Aruš-Ḫeba, was given as terḫatu on the occasion of Baṣṣu’s second marriage331 and that his brother was forbidden to raise a claim about him. This document indicates that slaves were used as money. 3.4.3.2.3 TBR 75 Slaves are also used as a means of exchange in the testament TBR 75. Baʿla-ilī, wife of Galalu son of Maṣi,332 adopted a certain Abdu and gave him her daughter Kitte as a wife. Abdu and his wife became entitled to inherit the properties of Baʿla-ilī’s husband after her death. The text states that Ḫannanu, Baʿla-ilī’s brother in law, who in E 128 had sold his share to Baʿla-ilī for 40 shekels of silver and 30 parīsu of barley, received three slaves: Ḫadidu, his brother Bēlu-Dagan, and his wife Dagan-niwārī. These slaves belonged to Baʿla-ilī’s father-in-law, namely Ḫannanu’s father, and were clearly intended to compensate Ḫannanu for relinquishing his brother’s share, i.e., the share that Abdu and Kitte would receive. Indeed, Ḫannanu was obligated to return the three slaves should he raise claims on Abdu’s share, (21’) šúm-ma i-na EGIR u₄-mi mḪa-na!-nu áš-šúm ḪA.LA-a ša [A]b-dì (22’) i-ra-gu-um 3 ZI.MEŠ ša-šú-nu li-iš-ku-un, “If, in the future, Ḫannanu should raise a claim concerning Abdu’s share, he shall give those three persons back.” 3.4.3.2.4 E 257 E 257 is a verdict on the theft of a slave.333 A certain Kilaʾe son of Tulpaʾe, a man from the town of Ḫalulazi,334 stole a male slave from Ḫusiru son of Rībi-Dagan335 and was ordered to stand trial before the king of Karkemiš.336

331 On the interpretation of the son of Aruš-Ḫeba as a terḫatu and not as a dowry see Durand 1990: 52. 332 Another testament issued by the same woman is E 128, see Yamada 1994. 333 Although the tablet was found in Building M₁, it cannot be directly associated with the Zū-Baʿla family; see also E 252 (§ 3.2.3.2.2.2) and E 256 (§ 3.3.2.1.1.1). 334 This town was likely in the vicinity of Alalaḫ, see Belmonte Marín 2001: 114. 335 It is unknown whether Ḫusiru can be identified with the person mentioned in SMEA30 9, see ch. 2 fn. 367. 336 The king of Karkemiš is simply identified as LUGAL, see d’Alfonso 2005a: 61–63.

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The king called the Great Ones of Šatappi, likely Ḫusiru’s hometown, to swear whether Kilaʾe was to become Ḫusiru’s slave: (6) ù LUGAL a-kán-na iq-bi ma-a šum-ma LÚ.GAL.MEŠ (7) i-ta-am-mu mKi-la-ʾ-e a-na ARAD ša mḪu-si-ri (8) i-ri-ḫi-ma, “And the king spoke as follows: ‘If the Great Ones swear, Kilaʾe will remain the slave of Ḫusiru.’” However, Kilaʾe did not make the Great Ones swear and gave his sister Kibian to Ḫusiru in lieu of himself. Because the transfer of Kilaʾe’s sister was a penalty, we may surmise that the value of Kilaʾe or his sister as slaves exceeded that of Ḫusiru’s slave.337 This may support Durand’s suggestion that the stolen slave was a child.338

3.5 Release A few documents concern the release of slaves. Two institutions of release are known at Emar, redemption and manumission, which differ with respect to the procedure of termination and the status acquired by slaves after release.339 Nine documents, all preserved on Syro-Hittite tablets, pertain to redemption and manumission. Redemption is concerned in only three contracts (Table 27) while six contracts relate to manumission (Table 28). In ancient Mesopotamia the right of redemption was granted exclusively to debt and famine slaves as a mechanism of social justice. People entitled to redeem slaves were relatives and rightholders, namely former owners, outsider claimants, and obviously the slave himself when he/she was able to find the means to buy his/her freedom. The motivation for buying back a slave was different for each claimant. Slaves redeemed by relatives or by themselves became free. Conversely, slaves redeemed by outsider claimants or rightholders became the property of the redeemer, who could decide whether to manumit the slaves or retain ownership. There is no preserved text from Emar documenting self-redemption, although it was stipulated in contracts. Manumission of slaves in Mesopotamia was mostly a reciprocal arrangement whereby masters liberated their slaves in return for being supported in old age. Manumission occurred either upon the master’s death or immediately. In the latter case, the slave was usually adopted so that he was bound to the same duty as slaves manumitted upon the master’s death.340 337 Cf. d’Alfonso 2005a: 154–55. 338 Durand 1990: 76 n. 170. For the difference in price between adults and minors see § 5.2. 339 For the termination of slavery by manumission and redemption in the ancient Near East see Westbrook 1995: 1648–56. 340 See Mendelsohn 1949: 74–81, Dandamaev 1984: 438–55, Westbrook 1995: 1648–49, Westbrook 2003a: 384–85.

Script

SH

SH

SH

Document

BLMJ 2

E 221

RE 25

Redemption Price 30 sh. 30 sh. 113 sh. 50 parīsu of barley

Formula

paṭāru

paṭāru

paṭāru

Table 27: Redemption.

–

TÉŠ.BI

60 sh.

Future Redemption

Ittinu, his wife, and his daughter

Abdi-[. . .]

Madi-Dagan son of Al-ummī

Slave

Baʿal-mālik son of Baʿal-qarrād

Sīḫu

Redeemer

Owner: Ia son of Ḫimaši-Dagan Išmaʾ-Dagan son of Gubba Pledgeholders: Azia son of Tutaliti; Dagan-qarrād son of Matte; Ēṭir-Adad; Abī-liʾmu son of Mikku; Biʾšu son of Ipšil-enna

Balāṭu and Pāliḫu

?

Owner

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Script

SH

SH

SH

SH

SH

SH

Document

E 177

RE 26

RE 27

RE 66

TBR 32

TBR 41

Abda-mālik, his wife, and his children

palāḫu Ipqi-Dagan

Kašia (F)

palāḫu

palāḫu

Dagan-bittu (F)

palāḫu

Baʿla-BEa daughter of Bitti-Dagan

Itti-bēlu, son of the master’s female slave

palāḫu

?

Slave

Slave’s duty

Table 28: Manumission.

1) Ikmu-Dagan son of Ḫuzu 2) Wife of Iku-Dagan and Baʿal-gamil son of Ikmu-Dagan

Bitti-Dagan daughter of Dagan-abu

Madi-Dagan

Abī-kāpī son of Tulli and his wife Mananu

Ipḫur-Dagan son of Ilī-dūdu

A[. . .]

Owner

3.5 Release    229

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3.5.1 Redemption The redemption clause features in a number of contracts concerning debt slaves and famine slaves (see § 5.3). In addition to the sources discussed above (§§ 3.2.3, 3.3.1), two Syro-Hittite documents regulate the redemption of slaves. Although these documents do not specifically state the cause of enslavement, there is no doubt that it was associated with either debt or famine, as no document pertaining to a chattel slave granted the right of redemption. Both documents record redemption by claimants who kept the property of the redeemed slaves. Additionally, RE 25 records the redemption of pledged slaves. 3.5.1.1 E 221 E 221, found in Building M₁ belongs to the Zū-Baʿla family. Baʿal-mālik, the son of the diviner, redeemed (paṭāru) the slave Abdi-[. . .] from Balāṭu and Pāliḫu for 30 shekels of silver. Because these two personal names only occur in this document, it is possible that these individuals came from outside Emar. As with sale contracts, the redemption fee against future claims is set at double (TÉŠ.BI) the purchase price in order to underscore that the ownership of the slave was fully transferred. 3.5.1.2 BLMJ 2 BLMJ 2 is formally a legal decision of the Overseer of the Land Aḫī-mālik concerning the status of a redeemed slave. The slave Madi-Dagan son of Al-ummī declared that he had been redeemed (paṭāru) for 30 shekels of silver by a certain Sīḫu, who then adopted him as son. Nonetheless, Madi-Dagan contested his redemption because he was obliged to perform the ilku service as a consequence of his new status. The judge annulled Madi-Dagan’s adoption and set the price for future claims at 60 shekels of silver, to be paid to Sīḫu. As observed by the editors of the text, it remains obscure why the condition of slave was preferable to performing the ilku service.341 According to von Dassow,342 the transaction was not initiated by the redeemed slave but by Sīḫu, who was seeking to secure Madi-Dagan’s status as a slave. However, this interpretation is not convincing because it remains unclear why Sīḫu would have freed and adopted Madi-Dagan if his intent was to retain full ownership over the slave. The text E 221 shows that Sīḫu was not obliged to free Madi-Dagan after redemption

341 Goodnick Westenholz 2000: 6. 342 von Dassow 2018b: 669, see also von Dassow 2020: 98–99.

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but could have kept him as a slave. The background of this document escapes us but, in my opinion, it is important to acknowledge that freedom is not always preferable to forms of dependency. This is clear in the amēlūtu contracts in which penalties are imposed on the master for breaking the contract, for the simple reason that it was in the amēlūtu’s interest to remain in the master’s house. BLMJ 2 can perhaps be understood against a similar scenario. As a consequence of his adoption, Madi-Dagan had the right to remain in Sīḫu’s house. However, we do not know whether he should have left his father’s house at a certain point because he was not granted the status of eldest son or was excluded from inheritance. We should also consider Madi-Dagan’s determination to avoid military service. It seems plausible that for some reasons Madi-Dagan preferred to remain in Sīḫu’s house as a slave, where he would receive housing and food, rather than to perform the ilku service. Admittedly, this interpretation does not explain why Sīḫu released Madi-Dagan. Neither of the parties is known elsewhere, making it impossible to better elucidate the text. 3.5.1.3 RE 25 A special case of redemption is known from the family law contract RE 25, discussed above.343 In this document, three slaves were taken either as a pledge or distraint by a creditor. A third party adopted the debtor and repaid his debt and released the slaves, who remained the property of the adoptee. The context of RE 25 clearly differs from the other two documents, as in this case slaves are not redeemed by a rightholder but as a consequence of the repayment of a debt.

3.5.2 Manumission A limited number of documents discovered at Emar concern the manumission of slaves. Some documents (RE 27, RE 66, and TBR 32) were purposely written to regulate the manumission,344 while others (E 177, TBR 26, and TBR 41) are docu343 For this document see § 2.2.2.1.4. 344 The text Hirayama 46 is not included here: this document has been variously interpreted (Durand and Marti 2003: 173–75, d’Alfonso 2005a: 187–89, Bellotto 2009: 115–17, von Dassow 2018b: 668–69, von Dassow 2020: 95–96), but Durand’s reading seems to me the most plausible one. According to Durand a certain Abdi-šuʾû (or Eršû), was a Hittite official, not a slave, of the prince Kunti-Teššub, who, as stated in the text (Hirayama 46: 26–27), was the son of the king of Karkemiš, Talmi-Teššub. This Abdi-šuʾu was adopted by a widow, Baʿla-ummī, wife of Kappupu son of Kamma, who bequeathed him her properties and married him off to her daughter. Baʿ-

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ments of various content, including testaments containing dispositions about the release of slaves.345 3.5.2.1 RE 27 RE 27 regulates manumission following the master’s death. Abī-kāpī son of Tulli and his wife Mananu, who are otherwise unknown,346 established that their

la-ummī’s concern, and also the main purpose of the document, was to secure the free status of her daughter’s children by declaring that she was free from debt. This declaration is suspect, and most likely derives from the acknowledgment that Baʿla-ummī, or most probably her deceased husband, previously had debts that were now settled. The free status of Abdi-šuʾu is clear from the fact that he was obliged to perform the GIŠ.TUKUL duty, which is only imposed on free persons. According to von Dassow (2020: 96–96), Baʿla-ummī wanted to secure the free status of her daughter’s children because Abdi-šuʾu was a slave. She claims that Hirayama 46: 22–23 acknowledges a difference of status between Abdi-šuʾu and his children: ù ᵐARAD-šú-ú ARAD-ia MUNUS.NÍTA.MEŠ-‹šu› LÚ.MEŠ a-ra-wa-an-nu ARAD.MEŠ LUGAL šu-nu // ša la-a ŠÁM šu-nu i-na É-ia ul-te-ri-ib, which she translates as “And ‘Abdī-šu’u is my slave (ÌR), (but his) male and female (relative)s are free persons (LÚ.MEŠ a-ra-wa-an-nu); they are subjects of the king (ÌR.MEŠ LUGAL). Without purchase I have caused them to enter my household.” However, her translation is misleading because, as shown by Durand, the proper function of ARAD-ia is apposition, and LÚ.MEŠ a-ra-wa-an-nu ARAD.MEŠ LUGAL šu-nu refers to both Abdi-šuʾu and to his children; thus we may translate “And Abdi-šuʾu, my servant, and his daughters and sons are free people and Servants of the King. Without purchase I have caused them to enter my house.” Even assuming von Dassow’s categories for distinguishing free from unfree (slaves), Abdi-šuʾu would not fit that of unfree because he is entitled to properties and has right over his offspring. Moreover, there is no reason to associate Baʿla-ummī’s declaration that she is free of debts with Abdi-šuʾu’s condition, as von Dassow does (“Securing the free status of Abdi-šu’u’s future offspring by her daughter is the reason why Baʿla-ummī declares herself to be free of debt at the time of undertaking the adoption”), because this declaration must be connected to Baʿla-ummī’s own previous record. Thus, it seems that the status of Abdi-šuʾu’s sons was not endangered by his own status but by Baʿla-ummī’s. 345 Manumission is perhaps also mentioned in BLMJ 13, a division of property, but the tablet is poorly preserved; note BLMJ 13: Rev. 6, [. . .] ub-bal-ši a-na a-ra-wa-nu, “[ . . . as her fate] carries her off, as a free person,” see Durand and Marti 2003: 176. The aforementioned testament E 91 (§ 3.4.3.2.2) contains a section regulating the status of three children (E 91: 5–7). This document is not treated here because there is no evidence to indicate whether these children, the sons of Aštar-bītu, who were given as sons to the testator’s wife, were actually slaves (Yamada 1994) or were simply sons born to the testator by Aštar-bītu (Durand 1990: 51–52). Aštar-bītu’s sons are never referred to as slaves, but the testament establishes that they should be released (wuššuru) after the death of the testator’s wife. According to Undheim (2001: 65–66), Aštar-bītu’s remaining sons were given to the testator’s sons, but in this case too their status is not specified. 346 Although the parties are unknown elsewhere, the text likely dates to the end of Emar’s history because one of the witnesses, Zū-Aštarti son of Ḫurulamnu, is also attested in E 128, which is sealed by the tartannu Šaggar-abu.

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 233

female slave Kašia was to be manumitted (a-na dUTU um-te-ši-ir-ši)347 after she had supported (palāḫu) Abī-kāpī and his wife for their lifetime. The formula of manumission concludes with the following clause: (5) wa-ra!-ša a-bal-li-la NU.TUKU, “(She is) heir; there is no (other) sharer.” After a single ruling, a non-vindication clause protected Kašia’s manumission against any complaint by the couple’s son: (6) ù SUM-ᵈA.A DUMU-ia (7) a-na UGU-ḫi-ši la-a i-ra-gu-um (8) ša i-ra-gu-um a-na INIM-ia lu-li-ik (9) ᵈIŠKUR? ù ᵈUTU lu-ú EN DI.KU₅-šú, “And Ari-Eia,348 my son, shall not raise a claim against her. Whoever should raise a claim, let him go against my word. Adad and Šamaš shall be his legal opponents.” The clause lúwaraša aballila is normally intended to designate the principal heir and exclude other sharers.349 Yet, in this context it is hardly possible that the manumitted female slave Kašia was made the principal heir of the couple by exclusion of their legitimate son. If Ari-Eia was denied the role of future householder, it is difficult to understand why he sealed the tablet. Moreover, nowhere is it stated that Kašia was adopted. In my opinion, lúwaraša aballila here refers to a share received by Kašia that was separated from Ari-Eia’s inheritance. Accordingly, the non-vindication clause was to bar Ari-Eia from raising a claim on that share. If this reasoning is valid, we may infer that Ari-Eia sealed the tablet because he agreed with this decision. 3.5.2.2 RE 66 The document RE 66 opens with a declaration by a certain Madi-Dagan – no patronymic is preserved – that he manumitted his slave Abda-mālik together with his wife and children and granted them the maryannu status:350 (1) um-⌜ma mMa⌝-diᵈKUR ma-a (2) mARAD-ma-lik ARAD-ia qa-⌜du⌝ (3) DAM-šú DUM[U].MEŠ-šu a-na lú mar-⌜ia-nu⌝-ut-ti (4) um-te-eš-ši-ir-šu: “Thus speaks Madi-Dagan: ‘I have released my slave Abda-mālik, together with his wife and his chil[d]ren, to the maryannu status.’” The manumitted slaves were obliged to serve (palāḫu) Madi-Dagan and his wife Ruttu for the couple’s lifetime and would retain their maryannu status after the master’s death. The non-vindication clause (ṭuppu annû ilāʾēšu) barred any complaints against Abda-mālik by Madi-Dagan’s son.351

347 For the expression “to be released to Šamaš” see Durand and Marti 2003: 172. 348 For this personal name see Pruzsinszky 2003: Index, 148. 349 For this clause see ch. 2 fn. 333. 350 For this procedure see von Dassow 2008: 276–77; for a different reading see Durand and Marti 2003: 176. 351 For the interpretation of the non-vindication clause see Durand 2004.

234 

 3 Default and Dependency

3.5.2.3 TBR 32 TBR 32 is a short note recording the manumission of Baʿla-BEa by Bitti-Dagan daughter of Dagan-abu. Although it contains an expression found in documents of this type, a-na a-ra-wa-na-ti um-te-ši-ir-ši, “She released her to the status of arawannātu” (i.e., freedom),352 Baʿla-BEa is not called a slave but rather the daughter of Bitti-Dagan, most likely because she was adopted after manumission.353 It may be suggested that Baʿla-BEa kept TBR 32 as proof of her manumission. Baʿla-BEa was protected against any claims to her dowry and any vindications: (3) NÍG!.MUSSA!-ši (4) ma-am-ma la i-la-qi (5) šúm-ma i-na EGIR u₄-mi ma-am-ma (6) a-na muḫ-ḫi fGAŠAN-be-a i-ra-gu-um (7) ṭup-pu an-nu-ú i-la-e-šú (8) lúwa-ra-ša a-bal-li-la NU.TUKU, “No one will take her dowry. If, in the future, someone should raise a claim against Baʿla-BEa, this tablet will prevail over him. (She is) heir; there is no (other) sharer.”354 Baʿla-BEa surely received a share, but as in the case of RE 27 it cannot be determined whether this clause confirmed that she was made the principal heir. Arnaud regarded TBR 31 and TBR 32 as belonging to the same dossier because they both mention a Bitti-Dagan. Because this personal name only occurs in a few documents,355 Arnaud’s suggestion is not excluded, but there is no sure prosopographic link that could establish that both documents refer to the same individual.356 None of the other persons mentioned in this document is known from other Emar sources. 3.5.2.4 E 177 E 177 is the testament of a certain A[. . .] drafted before the king of Karkemiš, IniTeššub. This document has been attributed to the private archive of the Zū-Baʿla family as it probably deals with the principal wife of Zū-Baʿla and mother of Baʿal-qarrād, Dagan-laʾi, who is mentioned as the testator’s daughter (E 177: 17’).357

352 For different interpretations of this term see Durand and Marti 2003: 176–77 and d’Alfonso 2005a: 91–92, with previous bibliography. 353 Yamada (1995: 304) suggests that Baʿla-BEa was either the daughter of Bitti-Dagan, whom she released from slavery, or her slave, whom she manumitted and adopted; von Dassow (2020: 102), further suggests that Bitti-Dagan made her daughter legally autonomous, with control over her own marriage and property, in order to protect her from the risk of distraint for her mother’s debts. 354 For this clause see ch. 2 fn. 333. 355 In addition to TBR 31 and TBR 32, the name Bitti-Dagan appears in TBR 77 (§ 3.3.2.1.2.2) as the name of a child and in the administrative text E 321. 356 Note that also Arnaud (1991a: 12–13) is dubious about the identification of Bitti-Dagan. 357 See Di Filippo 2008a: 58 n. 49, Viano 2020a: 422.

3.5 Release  

 235

Among several other dispositions, in E 177: 19’-21’ A[. . .] determined that Ittibēlu, the son of his female slave, was to support (palāḫu) his wife Ḫudi as long as she should live and that he would be released (E 177: 20’, a-na dUTU muš-šur) after her death. The document also bars any claims against Itti-bēlu by the sons of A[. . .] (E 177: 21’, DUMU.MEŠ-ia a-na muḫ-ḫi-šu la-a i-ra-gu-mu). 3.5.2.5 TBR 41 In the testament TBR 41, Ikmu-Dagan son of Ḫuzu made his wife Naʿmī-šadâ his principal heir (father and mother). Ikmu-Dagan donated his slave Ipqi-Dagan as a son to his wife and to his son Baʿal-gamil. The document stipulates that Ipqi-Dagan will be released (a-na dUTU za-ku) after supporting (palāḫu) Naʿmī-šadâ and Baʿal-gamil as long as they live. 3.5.2.6 RE 26 A reference to manumission is perhaps included in the document RE 26 if the interpretation proposed above is valid.358

358 See § 3.3.2.2.2.

Part II: Synthesis

4 The Emar Credit System 4.1 The Corpus of Texts Credit transactions incorporate two phases: the creation of the obligation, i.e., when the credit is issued, and the fulfillment of the obligation, i.e., when the debt is repaid. If the debt is not repaid, then a third phase follows: default, which deals with the consequences of not meeting the obligation. The first phase (§ 2.1) is represented by documents creating an obligation, i.e., loan contracts, debt notes, and other documents recording the onset of a debt obligation. The second phase (§ 2.2) is represented by documents acknowledging the fulfillment of a debt obligation, i.e., repayment of debts (§  2.2.1), family law contracts (§  2.2.2), and lawsuits (§ 2.2.3). Evidence for the third phase (§ 3) comes from a number of documents dealing with forms of dependency caused by default, i.e., indentured labor (§ 3.2.1), dependency derived from pledge law (§ 3.2.2), debt slavery (§ 3.2.3), and documents concerning unclear types of dependency for debt (§ 3.2.4). The archives of Emar yielded 84 documents dealing with credit and debts.1 The vast majority (72) were written on Syro-Hittite tablets. Only six Syrian-type documents are preserved, and they relate exclusively to the first two phases of credit transactions. Most of the Syrian-type documents date to the earliest phases of this scribal tradition. Of the four Syrian tablets recording the creation of the obligation, three (Hirayama 33, Hirayama 34, and RE 96) are dated to the First Dynasty, while one other document (RE 84) cannot be dated. Two Syrian tablets recording the payment of debts are preserved; one (E 109) is dated to the second king of the Second Dynasty, Baʿal-kabar I, and the other (TBR 82) is the only document stemming from the late Second Dynasty, during the reign of Elli.2 As a formal indication of the successful termination of the contract, tablets recording the issuing of credit were usually broken when debts were repaid, or other tablets recording the fulfillment of the obligation were written, as in the case of the documents from the second phase. However, Mesopotamian sources show that not all the tablets from the first phase were broken,3 and we cannot simply assume that a preserved tablet records an unpaid debt. Syrian texts are

1 The documents are listed in Table 11, Table 12, Table 13, Table 14, Table 16, Table 18, Table 19, Table 20, and Table 21. 2 For the two dynasties of Emar see § 1.1. 3 See Charpin 2000: 203–06 for cases of tablets that were preserved although invalidated. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781501515309-004

240 

 4 The Emar Credit System

usually preserved as titles to properties.4 Yet only the two Syrian repayments of debts, E 109 and TBR 82, mention real properties.5 With the dubious exception of Hirayama 33,6 none of the four Syrian documents creating an obligation served as a title to property. When no real properties are recorded, it may be surmised that Syrian tablets have accidentally been preserved. Perhaps the two consumptive debts RE 96 and RE 84 were never repaid. The outcome of the commercial loans Hirayama 33 and Hirayama 34 remains unclear, but it is not excluded that the business ventures were unsuccessful and the debts were never repaid. If these debts were not repaid in due time, we may assume that the tablets were first kept by the lenders as titles to their credit, but their survival from the time of the First Dynasty is likely due to chance, because the lenders’ offspring would hardly have expected the debts to be repaid after such a long time. In addition to the tablets written by local scribes, there are three Babylonian script tablets from House 5 (E 23, E 24, and E 26) that can be dated to the very end of the Emar archives, two Middle Assyrian tablets of unknown provenance (AOAT 265.1 and RE 19), and one tablet of uncertain script (GsK 5).

4.2 Purpose and Types of Documents All three phases of credit transactions are well represented in the 84 documents from Emar. The formation of the obligation is the subject of 25 documents; 34 documents relate to the fulfillment of the obligation; and 25 documents pertain to default (Table 29). Out of the 25 documents concerning the formation of the obligation, only nine were certainly or probably drafted at the onset of the loan: five are loan contracts (E 24, E 87, GsK 5, Hirayama 33, and Hirayama 34), three are debt notes (JCS40 3, RE 72, and TBR 27), and one is a business agreement (Hirayama 40). The administrative records from Building M₁ (E 277, E 278, E 279, and E 319) were also plausibly drafted when the commodities were allotted. The documents related to outstanding debts are two debt notes (E 75 and TBR 34), a record of debts (TBR 49), and, obviously, the testament (RE 18) and the security documents (E 209, RE 19, and

4 This is the starting point of the relation between Syrian and Syro-Hittite tablets assumed in the present work; see the discussion in § 1.1. 5 It is possible that E 109 entered the archive of Milki-Dagan’s family because they purchased the property recorded in it, see Viano 2020b, Viano 2020a. 6 Depending on the interpretation, Hirayama 33 may record the pledge of a real property, see § 2.1.1.1.

4.2 Purpose and Types of Documents 

 241

Table 29: Types of Credit-related Documents. Type

Documents

Syrian

Syro-Hittite

Other

25

4

18

1 MB 2 MA

5

2

1 (?)

1 MB 1 Unk

Debt notes

7

–

7

–

Records of debts

8

1

7

–

Testaments

1

–

1

–

Security

3

1

1

1 MA

1

–

1

34

2

30

Creation of the Obligation Loan contracts

Business agreements Fulfillment of Obligations Repayments of debts

21

2

17

Family law contracts

8

–

8

Lawsuits Default Indentured labor

– 2 MB 2 MB –

5

–

5

25

–

24

1 MA

–

12

–

12

–

Debt slavery

9

–

9

–

Pledge

1

–

–

1 MA

Unclear type of dependency for debt

3

–

3

–

RE 84). The context is not fully clear for three other debt notes (E 88 and RE 75) as well as for three records of debts (PdA 68, RE 60, and RE 96). Excluding the administrative records, the number of documents that were doubtless drafted as true loans is quite limited. It is unclear whether the low proportion of true loans among the documents is simply a misperception deriving from our poor understanding of several documents, or whether it accurately reflects the preserved data. Various explanations for the scarce preservation of documents written at the onset of a credit transaction can be suggested. It is possible that many or most loans were repaid and that many or most of the corresponding tablets were broken. One should also consider the role of orality in legal contracts.7 It is generally acknowledged that many categories of legal documents were produced only for exceptional cases. Certain arrangements in family law such as marriages do not

7 On the relation between orality and writing see Charpin 1982b, see also McGeough (2007: 206, 220–21), who points out that not all economic activities required a textual record, and Wilcke 2007: 76.

242 

 4 The Emar Credit System

usually require written proof.8 Transactions between merchants were also carried out orally unless they could lead to judicial consequences, as in the case of international loans, credit sales, or Lieferungskäufe.9 When transactions involved real properties, written proof was normally produced. However, it cannot be excluded that on many occasions loans were stipulated orally and that the parties resorted to a written record only when the terms of the contract departed from the customary laws. Accordingly, some debt notes may be understood as written versions of initially orally loan contracts that were created at a later time when problems arose. In this regard, one should also note that a large proportion of the extant documents concern debts that were settled by a third party, who may have wished to establish a written record of the previous oral agreement (see § 4.9). Nonetheless, the extent of oral legal practices can hardly be determined. The economic circumstances that led debtors to incur debts are frequently unclear. As explained in § 2, debts can be divided into productive debts (Table 30) and consumptive debts (Table 31). Since only a limited number of documents explicitly state or unambiguously imply the purpose of the debt, our classification is necessarily tentative. Indeed, our determination of the purpose of many debts derives from textual analysis based on context and prosopography. Consumptive debts in particular comprise a loosely defined category because they include all types of non-productive debts, whether contracted by impoverished people facing drought, famine, war, or financial distress, or by well-to-do people experiencing temporary economic difficulties. Consumptive debts were issued not only for survival (i.e., buying or producing food) but also to pay taxes. While the consumptive nature of a debt is rendered conspicuous when the debtor is said to be “kept alive” (bulluṭu; E 86, Hirayama 37, SMEA30 9, Subartu 17, and TBR 25), the context of other documents is harder to infer, since most loans were granted in silver. Included here among the consumptive debts are all documents whose economic background is unclear and which cannot be directly associated with entrepreneurial or commercial activities. All debts recorded in family law contracts (§ 2.2.2) are regarded as consumptive, a classification supported by the role of barley as the commodity lent in five out of eight documents. Documents pertaining to dependency caused by default (§ 3.2) are also discussed as consumptive debts, with the exception of AOAT 265.1 and E 252, which clearly relate to commercial activities. In addition, the amēlūtu contract E 77 has been tentatively regarded as recording a productive debt. A major problem of classification concerns the documents recording high debts. Documents such as ASJ10 A (105 sh. and 40 grains), RE 25 (113 sh. 50 parīsu

8 Beckman 1996b: 58. 9 Kestemont 1977: 200; see also Faist 2001: 162–63.

4.2 Purpose and Types of Documents 

 243

of barley), and E 215 (100 sh.) have been regarded as consumptive because they offer no hints of a commercial purpose. On the contrary, we have suggested a productive background for the debts recorded in E 77 (140 sh.), E 85 (292 sh.), and E 109 (130 sh.). Admittedly, the classification of these texts is very tentative and somewhat speculative. Nevertheless, the amount of the debt does not always seem to be a direct indicator of the purpose of the debt: TBR 34 seems to provide more solid grounds for inferring that it is consumptive in nature than RE 25 and E 215 do, although it records a debt of 115 shekels of silver. Table 30: Productive Debts. Script

Document

Debt

CREATION OF THE OBLIGATION (14) Syrian

Hirayama 33

200 sh.

Hirayama 34

20 sh.

E 75

272 sh.

E 87

150 sh.

E 277 (?)

?

E 278 (?)

260 shekels of bronze

Hirayama 40

70 sheep

RE 72

1) 12 (?) + 7 satu-vessels of fine oil 2) 4 aribû-garments

RE 75

30 sh. 40 satu-vessels of fine oil

TBR 27

?

TBR 49

1) 23 sh. 200 shekels of purified tin 500 shekels of blue wool 2) 9 sh. 3) 8 sh. 4) 5 sh. 5) 6 sh. 6) 30 sh.

Middle Babylonian

E 24

100 sh.

Middle Assyrian

RE 19

NG

Unknown Script

GsK 5

?

Syro-Hittite

FULFILlMENT OF THE OBLIGATION (12) REPAYMENTS OF DEBTS Syrian

E 109 (?)

NG

Syro-Hittite

Anatolica 16

Bronze chain

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 4 The Emar Credit System

Table 30 (continued) Script

Middle Babylonian

Document

Debt

E 21

60 sh. Textiles for 14 sh.

E 85 (?)

292 sh.

E 119

15 parīsu of barley

E 200

30 sh.

RE 65 (?)

58.5 sh.

E 23

> 60 sh.

E 26

3 shekels of gold LAWSUITS

Syro-Hittite

E 28

30 sh.

E 127

100 sh. 2 slaves additional silver

MFA 1977.114

45 sh.

DEFAULT (3) INDENTURED LABOR Syro-Hittite

E 77 (?)

140 sh.

AOAT 265.1

Tin for: 2 minas and 5 shekels of silver 2 niksu-textiles 1 lubēru-textile

E 252

26 sh. 1 shekel of gold

PLEDGE Middle Assyrian

DEBT SLAVERY Syro-Hittite TOTAL

29 S

3

SH

20

MB

3

MA

2

Unknown

1

The majority of debts (55) can be regarded as consumptive, but a substantial number (29) derive from investments and commercial activities. Despite the higher number of consumptive debts, in documents recording the creation of the obligation there are slightly more productive debts (14 vs. 11). In documents of the second phase consumptive debts (22) outnumber productive debts (12). However,

4.2 Purpose and Types of Documents 

 245

Table 31: Consumptive Debts. Script

Document

Debt

CREATION OF THE OBLIGATION (11) Syrian

Syro-Hittite

RE 84 (?)

?

RE 96

64.5 sh. 221 parīsu (?) of barley

E 88 (?)

60 sh.

E 209

14 sh.

E 279 (?)

> 433 parīsu of barley

E 319 (?)

138 parīsu of barley

JCS40 3 (?)

?

PdA 68

30 parīsu of barley

RE 18 (?)

35 sh.

RE 60 (?)

1) 6 sh. 2) 4 months of work

TBR 34

115 sh.

FULFILLMENT OF THE OBLIGATION (22) REPAYMENTS OF DEBTS Syrian

TBR 82

30 sh.

Syro-Hittite

ASJ13 A (?)

65 sh.

BLMJ 12

30 sh.

E 115

20 sh.

E 116

5 sh.

E 123

30 sh.

Hirayama 39

25 sh.

RE 58

20 sh.

TBR 28

50 sh.

TBR 29

60 sh.

TBR 33

31 sh.

TBR 65

45 sh.

E 213

20 sh. 30 parīsu of barley

RE 10

51 sh. 30 parīsu of barley

RE 13

51 sh. 30 parīsu of barley

RE 25

113 sh. 50 parīsu of barley

FAMILY LAW CONTRACTS Syro-Hittite

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 4 The Emar Credit System

Table 31 (continued) Script

Document

Debt

RE 88

?

SMEA30 9

20 sh. 20 parīsu of barley

TBR 74

30 sh. (?)

TBR 78

9 sh.

TBR 36 (?)

77 sh.

TBR 84

20 sh.

LAWSUITS Syro-Hittite

DEFAULT (22) INDENTURED LABOR Syro-Hittite

ASJ10 A (?)

105 sh. and 40 grains

E 16

41 sh.

E 86

2.5 sh.

E 117

40 sh.

Hirayama 38

56 sh.

QVO5 2

40 sh.

RA77 5

47 sh.

RE 39

> 25 sh.

RE 63

14 5/6 sh.

TBR 39

25 sh.

TBR 40

30 sh.

E 121

50 sh.

E 205

25 sh.

E 215

100 sh.

E 33

30 sh.

GsK 1

83 sh.

Hirayama 36

40 sh.

TBR 26

NG

TBR 44

10 sh.

DEBT SLAVERY Syro-Hittite

UNCLEAR TYPE OF DEPENDENCY FOR DEBT Syro-Hittite

TOTAL

Hirayama 37

25 sh.

TBR 25

20 parīsu of barley

Subartu 17

NG

55 S SH

3 52

4.3 Lent Commodities 

 247

if we exclude the family law contracts, which were purposely written to resolve financial difficulties, the proportion between productive debts (12) and consumptive debts (14) is similar in documents recording the repayment of debts (§ 2.2.1) and lawsuits ruling on debts (§§ 2.2.3).10 As extensively discussed below (§ 4.10), consumptive debts were not always necessitated by impoverishment, especially when they were incurred by wealthy people who owned several real properties or by families that could easily cover the debts.

4.3 Lent Commodities The vast majority of credit-related documents at Emar are concerned with silver. As shown in Tables 30 and 31, silver can be associated with both productive and consumptive debts. Nonetheless, it is to be recalled that several debts that are here described as consumptive for lack of sufficient evidence to the contrary might be misclassified. Commodities other than silver are documented to a limited extent, as shown in Table 32. Table 32: Commodities Other Than Silver. Commodity

Document Type

Document

Script

Quantity

Purpose

Barley

Documents creating an obligation

E 279

SH

> 433 parīsu

Consumptive

E 319

SH

138 parīsu

Consumptive

PdA 68

SH

30 parīsu

Consumptive

RE 96

S

221 parīsu (?) (+ 64.5 sh.)

Consumptive

Repayments of debts

E 119

SH

15 parīsu

Productive

Family law contracts

E 213

SH

30 parīsu (+ 20 sh.)

Consumptive

RE 10

SH

30 parīsu (+ 51 sh.)

Consumptive

RE 13

SH

30 parīsu (+ 51 sh.)

Consumptive

RE 25

SH

50 parīsu (+ 113 sh.) Consumptive

SMEA30 9 Unclear dependency TBR 25 for debt

SH

20 parīsu (+ 20 sh.)

Consumptive

SH

20 parīsu

Consumptive

10 With the inclusion of the lawsuits establishing forms of bonded labor (§§ 3.2.3.2.2, 3.2.4.2), namely E 252, among the productive debts, and E 33, E 205, and Subartu 17 among the consumptive debts, the proportion is 13 productive debts and 17 consumptive debts.

248 

 4 The Emar Credit System

Table 32 (continued) Commodity

Document Type

Document

Script

Quantity

Purpose

Livestock

Documents creating an obligation

Hirayama 40

SH

70 sheep

Productive

Gold

Repayments of debts

E 26

MB

3 shekels (?)

Productive

Debt slavery

E 252

SH

1 shekel (+ 26 sh.)

Productive

Bronze

Documents creating an obligation

E 278

SH

260 shekels

Productive

Repayments of debts

Anatolica 16

SH

1 bronze chain

Productive

Copper

Repayments of debts

Anatolica 16

SH

2 talents and 2400 shekels

Productive

Tin

Documents creating an obligation

TBR 49

SH

200 shekels of purified tin

Productive

Pledge

AOAT 265.1

MA

tin worth 2 minas and 5 shekels of silver 2 niksu-textiles 1 lubēru-textile

Productive

Unknown Metal

Documents creating an obligation

TBR 27

SH

1 talent (?)

Productive

Oil

Documents creating an obligation

RE 7211

SH

7 satu-vessels of fine oil

Productive

RE 75

SH

40 satu-vessels of fine oil (+ 30 sh.)

Productive

Documents creating an obligation

RE 72

SH

4 aribû-garments

Productive

Repayments of debts

E 21

SH

textiles worth 14 sh. Productive

Pledge

AOAT 265.1

MA

2 niksu-textiles 1 lubēru-textile

Productive

Wool

Documents creating an obligation

TBR 49

SH

300 shekels of blue wool

Productive

Slaves

Documents creating an obligation

Hirayama 40

SH

4 slaves

Productive

Textiles

11 RE 72 includes 12 measures of an unknown commodity, possibly bread.

4.3 Lent Commodities 

 249

Metals, including gold, copper, bronze, and tin, are only documented in productive debts. Next to silver, the most frequently attested commodity is barley, which occurs in eleven documents but is listed as the sole commodity in only five texts (E 119, E 279, E 319, PdA 68, and TBR 25). As expected, barley is almost exclusively found in consumptive debts. The sole non-consumptive debt, E 119, is a payment for a credit sale of barley that was either consumed by the borrowers or lent to other people for consumption. Other commodities include oil, textiles, and slaves, all associated with business activities. Thus, the purpose of barley debts clearly contrasts with that of other debts. The attestations of barley debts at Emar are very limited in number when compared with contemporary sources from other sites. It is unclear whether the textual evidence accurately reflects the Emar economy, due to the ever-present possibility that consumption loans of staples and livestock were carried out orally. If we limit ourselves to written sources, Emar records are conspicuously different from those from Nuzi, where the majority of loans (ḫubullu) concern cereals.12 If one enlarges the scope of the analysis to the tidennūtu contracts from Nuzi (loans secured by personal or real pledges), the picture remains similar, with staples (mainly barley) and livestock representing the most frequently lent commodities, although metals occur more often in the tidennūtu contracts than in the ḫubullu loans.13 Similarly, the majority of the Kassite loans published to date concern barley.14 In Middle Assyrian loans the most commonly lent commodities were barley and tin.15 Conversely, credit practice at Ekalte and Alalaḫ IV resembles that at Emar, as silver is the most commonly lent commodity at those sites.16 As already mentioned above, silver should not be automatically associated with the commercial sphere,17 as it is also related to agricultural activities. Outside of the present study, this is supported by several cuneiform records, including Ur III and Nuzi sources that indicate that silver and other metals were lent as a means of payment to cover different needs, including purchasing staples and other items.18 It is also not excluded that silver served as a currency and that debts 12 See Zaccagnini 2003: 607. 13 For types and quantities of commodities in Nuzi credit transactions see Zaccagnini 1984b: 146–49. Note also that the few loans as well as the recently published tidennūtu contracts from the temple precinct at Nuzi mainly concern cereals, Lion and Stein 2016: 13, 89. 14 Gurney 1983: 129–32, 65–67, Sassmannshausen 2001: 195–202, van Soldt 2015: 37–40, 51–54. 15 Abraham 2001: 201–07, Saporetti 2012: 39. 16 For Alalaḫ see Niedorf 2008: 204, 206; for Ekalte see Table 45; note that silver was the most commonly used commodity in Ugarit as well, Nasgowitz 1976: 50–51. 17 Note that Renger (1994: 198) unconvincingly limits silver loans to trading ventures. 18 For Ur III sources see Steinkeller 2002: 120–21: peasants borrowed both barley and silver in the same loans. For Nuzi sources see Zaccagnini 1984b: 156–59; see also the remarks by Zacca-

250 

 4 The Emar Credit System

were recorded in silver as an indication of their value.19 Staple loans could have been recorded by converting the value of the commodities into silver. Remarkably, metal loans were issued to impoverished peasants at Nuzi. It is to be recalled that silver could be borrowed to pay taxes and fulfill obligations to institutions.20 On the other hand, barley itself could be the object of business activities (E 119).

4.4 Interest Interest is mentioned in a limited number of documents all related to the creation of the obligation. The other text types make no reference to interest. Table 33: Interest. Document

Script

Type

Debt

Purpose

Formula

Hirayama 33

S

Loan

200 sh.

Productive

MÁŠ li-ṣa-ab

Hirayama 34

S

Loan

20 sh.

Productive

RE 96

S

Record of debts

64.5 sh. 221 parīsu (?) of barley

Consumptive

ki-ma ⌜URU MÁŠ? ú⌝-ṣa-ab

E 75

SH

Debt note

272 sh.

Productive

MÁŠ-šú na-d[in]

JCS40 3

SH

Debt note (true loan)

?

Consumptive (?)

[(ú-ul) uṣ-ṣa-a]b?

E 24

MB

Loan

100 sh.

Productive

1 ME 20 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR MÁŠ-sú

KÙ.BABBAR-pu an-nu-ú ša ṣi-bu-ti

Not surprisingly, interest is mostly documented in true loans (E 24, Hirayama 33, and Hirayama 34). Due to the fragmentary nature of JCS40 3 we cannot determine whether the loan was interest-bearing [uṣ-ṣa-a]b? or contained the antichretic gnini (2002: 179) on Nuzi silver loans. In an age of strong monetization such as the Neo Babylonian period, credit was normally issued in silver, and it is often impossible to distinguish between consumptive and productive debts, Jursa 2010: 787–90. 19 In relation to the debts from Ugarit, McGeough (2007: 199) notes: “Whether these loans were made in silver, presumably so that the individual could purchase something else with silver, or whether the loans were simply recorded in terms of silver as a means of fixing the value of the loan is unclear. Whatever the case, this demonstrates the use of silver as an abstract medium of exchange, as well as the existence of private property independent of palace property.” 20 In the Old Babylonian period, farmers borrowed silver from entrepreneurs who advanced payments to the palace or the temple, Van De Mieroop 2013: 59–61, Van De Mieroop 2015: 84–86.

4.4 Interest 

 251

formula [ú-ul uṣ-ṣa-a]b?. E 75 records the payment of interest, which was either 20% or 30%.21 No document contains a formula indicating the interest rate, which can be precisely calculated only in the Babylonian-script tablet E 24 (20%).22 Debts issued at interest were mainly productive. Only a single consumptive debt (RE 96) can be described with confidence as interest-bearing, given the uncertainty whether JCS40 3 should be classified as a consumptive debt. It follows that the purpose of moneylending in these productive debts was to earn a profit through interest. The text Hirayama 34 shows that there was a customary interest rate which perhaps amounted to 20%, as was common (at least in theory) in Mesopotamian silver loans.23 The existence of a “customary” rate of interest may have eliminated the need to record it in the contracts. However, it is unknown whether the customary interest rate existed only at the time of the Syrian scribal tradition (to which Hirayama 34 belongs), or whether it also functioned afterwards when texts were written according to the Syro-Hittite tradition. Default interest applies to a single loan, Hirayama 33.24 Although interest is stipulated in a very limited number of sources, only two transactions, E 319 and TBR 49, were specifically framed as interest-free loans (ḫubuttatu). Three other documents (E 119, E 200 and RE 18) that use the expression ana pūḫi leqû probably recorded interest-free loans.25 The scant evidence for the charging of interest at Emar is possibly due to the limited number of true loans preserved, but one must consider that about half of the contracts drafted at the onset of the loan (4 out of 9)26 bore interest. Therefore, interest was probably charged quite frequently at Emar, but it was not reported in documents pertaining to the subsequent phases of credit transactions. However,

21 For the calculation of interest see Zaccagnini 2018: 57–59. 22 The Middle Assyrian loans do not mention the rate of interest either, Démare-Lafont 2003: 549. 23 For the stability of the interest rate in Mesopotamia see Van De Mieroop 2002: 84–85; in the Old Babylonian period the interest rate was usually 20% for silver and 30% for barley, Westbrook 2003a: 404; among Old Assyrian merchants the interest rates varied considerably, Veenhof 2016–2018: 314–15; the normal rate of interest at Nuzi was 50%, Zaccagnini 1977: 185; in a few Middle and Neo Assyrian documents interest reaches 100% on barley loans, Zaccagnini 1996: 108–09. 24 Note also the business agreement Hirayama 40, in which a penalty is charged to defaulting debtors for delayed payment, see § 2.1.2.3. 25 For this expression see Durand 1990: 56–57; note that E 200 certainly records an interest-free loan. 26 E 24, Hirayama 33, Hirayama 34, JCS40 3; one may add RE 96 but it is unknown when it was written.

252 

 4 The Emar Credit System

a distinction should be drawn between productive and consumptive debts. The fact that interest-bearing loans mainly relate to business activities suggests that consumptive debts were usually interest-free or bore antichretic interest. Unfortunately, the limited evidence hampers a complete understanding of the effective application of interest at Emar. In the amēlūtu contract without the palāḫu formula, the repayment clause makes clear that the work performance was intended to repay not the principal but the antichretic interest, whose amount is by nature uncertain.27 Such antichretic contracts were open-ended arrangements in which the exploitation of the servant ended only with the repayment of the debt. There seems to be no limitation to the antichretic exploitation of the indentured person at Emar, unlike in a few Old Babylonian contracts.28 The amount of interest to be paid in the form of work was certainly not established at the onset of the loan, because the amēlūtu’s master was different from the original creditor. The work performance was the master’s reward for repaying the amēlūtu’s debt.

4.5 Security for Debt Credit transactions in the ancient Near East were often secured by forms of security, either a surety (guarantor) or a pledge. Both forms of security are termed qātātu in the Emar texts, although Syro-Hittite texts employ qātātu more consistently for surety than for pledge. Less than half of the credit-related documents from Emar attest to a form of security (ca. 34 out of 84).29 Both real and personal pledges are documented, and a few debts were secured by more than one instrument of security (for the details, see Tables 35 and 36). The number of debts secured by pledges (ca. 17⁄18), with an equal distribution of both real pledges (ca. 10⁄11) and personal pledges (ca. 11), is approximately the same as the number of debts secured by sureties (ca. 19).30 Securities appear in both productive and consumptive debts and are attested in documents from all three phases of the credit transaction, with the following distribution:

27 For the nature of antichretic interest see Westbrook 2001b: 66. 28 On the creditor’s limitations see Skaist 1994: 129–31. 29 It should be recalled that the presence of securities in some texts cannot be determined with certainty. 30 Note that securities in Hirayama 33 are counted both under pledge and surety because the interpretation of the text is not fully clear, see § 2.1.1.1.

4.5 Security for Debt 

 253

Table 34: Proportion of Documents Mentioning Securities, by Type and Phase. Productive Debts

Consumptive Debts

TOTAL

Creation of the obligation

6/14

43%

4/11

36%

10/25

40%

Fulfillment of the obligation

5/12

42%

8/22

36%

13/34

38%

Default

3/3

100%

8/22

36%

11/25

44%

TOTAL

14/29

48%

20/55

36%

34/84

40%

With the exception of productive debts pertaining to default, which are very few in number and therefore not a sufficient statistical sample, the proportion of secured debts in every category ranges between 36% and 44%. Although consumptive debts provide more attestations of security, productive debts were proportionally secured more frequently than consumptive debts. Probably this result is also influenced by the higher number of productive true loans, where securities are usually recorded. Nevertheless, securities in productive debts are mostly sureties, while pledges occur less frequently. Using business partners as sureties instead of relying on pledges was a more efficient strategy for repaying commercial debts. One may also consider the fact that people resorting to debts for consumption often had no means to secure their obligation. The majority of documents related to consumptive debts concern outstanding debts, and it is possible that securities were not recorded because the economic situation of the debtor had already deteriorated to the point that forms of dependency were the only solution. Moreover, as explained in more detail below,31 it was a common practice in commercial credit transactions for a partner to serve as a guarantor while the merchant was away on a business trip. It is also remarkable that securities were demanded at the onset of a loan only to a limited extent. Securities occur in just two true loans, E 87 and Hirayama 33, both issued to finance commercial activities, to which we may add the credit sale Hirayama 40. The rarity of securities at the onset of credit transactions was likely associated with the option of requesting additional guarantees if problems arose during the basic term of the loan (e.g., E 209 and RE 84). The following tables summarize the forms of security found in the Emar sources.

31 See §§ 4.5.1, 4.8.

Script

Debt

S

MA

SH

SH

SH

Hirayama 33

RE 19

RE 75

TBR 27

TBR 49

SH

MB

SH

SH

SH

E 21

E 23

E 119

E 200

RE 65

Repayments of Debts

SH

E 87

Real Pledge

Personal Pledge

man

sons (?)

Oath qātātu – apālu clause

> 60 sh.

30 sh.

58.5 sh.

merchant

FULFILLMENT OF THE OBLIGATION

Outstanding debts

house

house (?)

5 talents of alum

CREATION OF THE OBLIGATION

15 parīsu of barley

–

šalāmu clause

60 sh. Textiles for 14 sh.

qātātu

30 sh.

–

30 sh. 40 satu-vessels of fine oil

?

šapartu

–

200 sh.

Delivery of a worker

qātātu

Type

150 sh.

Documents Creating an Obligation

Document

Table 35: Securities in Productive Debts.

business partner

2 men (?)

2 middlemen

merchant (woman)

business partner

wife

household (?) sons (?)

man (merchant?)

Surety

–

–

–

–

Upon payment

–

–

(Upon delivery)

(Upon payment)

(Upon payment)

Redemptiona

–

YES

–

–

YES (mutual)

–

–

–

–

–

Non-vindication Clause

254   4 The Emar Credit System

E 252

Debt Slavery

AOAT 265.1

Pledge

E 77

SH

MA

SH

Indentured Labor

26 sh. 1 shekel of gold

2 minas and 5 shekels of silver 2 niksu-textiles 1 lubēru-textile

140 sh.

-

šapartu

qātātu house

DEFAULT

debtor

son

sister (?)

Upon payment

Upon payment

–

–

4.5 Security for Debt   255

Script Debt

SH

SH

SH

E 209

RE 84

TBR 34

RE 25

SH

–

–

30 sh.

SH

TBR 82

113 sh. 50 parīsu of barley

qātātu

Family Law Contracts

–

20 sh.

qātātu

5 sh.

25 sh.

ukâl-lien

30 sh.

SH

SH

E 116

qātātu

65 sh.

1) ukâl-lien 2) qātātu

115 sh.

RE 58

SH

BLMJ 12

apālu clause

qātātu

14 sh.

?

qātātu

60 sh.

Type

Hirayama 39 SH

SH

ASJ13 A

Repayments of Debts

SH

E 88

Documents Creating an Obligation

Document

Table 36: Securities in Consumptive Debts.

house

Surety

1) wife; 3 sons 2) debtor

relative

2 men

brother sister-in-law nephews

slave; slave’s wife and daughter

wife brother (?)

brother (?)

family member

brother (?)

man

FULFILLMENT OF THE OBLIGATION

1 kierṣetu-plot

house

Personal Pledge

CREATION OF THE OBLIGATION

Real Pledge

Other

YES

–

–

YES (mutual)

YES

–

–

–

Non-vindication Clause

YES (Upon payment) –

–

(Upon payment) –

–

–

(20 sh.)

–

Upon payment

–

–

–

Redemptiona

256   4 The Emar Credit System

SH

SH

E 205

qātātu

wuššuru clause

25 sh.

SH

?

qātātu

2 sons

man

master

–

indentured person replaced by his sons upon death

30 sh.

Upon payment

–

–

–

–

–

YES

–

YES

–

(Upon payment) – indentured person – replaced by his wife in case of death –

YES

Balance (65 sh.) –

(20 sh.)

a Redemption here refers only to the right of the debtor or other rightholders to redeem the pledged property from the pledgeholder (creditor); redemption of fully alienated properties is discussed in § 4.9.2 (real properties) and § 5.3 (persons).

Subartu 17

Unclear Type of Dependency for Debt

SH

E 121

Debt Slavery

50 sh.

–

56 sh.

Hirayama 38 SH

properties forfeited in case of death

–

40 sh.

E 117

SH

SH

E 16

–

SH

RA77 5

41 sh.

SH

ASJ10 A wife son

DEFAULT

qātātu house

?

47 sh.

–

daughters wife

20 sh.

105 sh. and – 40 grains

Indentured Labor

TBR 84

Lawsuits Concerning the Fulfillment of Obligations

4.5 Security for Debt   257

258 

 4 The Emar Credit System

4.5.1 Securities in Productive Debts As expected, the most commonly used form of security in productive debts is surety, which is attested in 8 or 9 documents out of 14 recording secured debts; it was usually assumed by business partners or investors. Guarantors were usually the form of security used for privately financed trade ventures.32 Serving as guarantor for a commercial venture was a major duty for a business partner (E 23, E 87, E 252, RE 65, TBR 27, and TBR 49), likely because this was a practical method to reimburse capital investments and distribute the profits while the merchant was away on a business trip. This is clear from E 23, which explicitly says that the borrower was undertaking a business trip. Productive debts were also secured by forms of pledge in E 77, E 87, TBR 49, RE 75, and perhaps Hirayama 33. Only three of these documents mention real estate properties, and in no case was a pledge given at the onset of the loan. In RE 75, a house served as security against the debtor’s death. In the amēlūtu contract E 77,33 the real property was not provided at the onset of the original loan, but upon default as a supplementary security to the person who repaid the debtor’s debts. It is uncertain whether the house mentioned in Hirayama 33 served as a pledge, but if this was the case the nature of the pledge seems to be hypothecary. The other documents present different kinds of real pledge. E 87 provides the only evidence for valuable movables given as a possessory pledge (Besitzpfand), while in TBR 49 a loan is secured by outstanding debts owned by the borrowers. Personal pledges are attested in two Middle Assyrian tablets, AOAT 265.1 and RE 19, and in the Syro-Hittite tablets E 2134 and E 77. Depending on the interpretation, the Syrian document Hirayama 33 might contain a personal pledge. A debt is secured by both real and personal pledges in E 77 and perhaps Hirayama 33, while the combination of pledge and surety as security for productive debts can be observed in E 87 and TBR 49. Various expressions are used for securities. The term qātātu is employed for pledge in E 77 but for surety in TBR 27 and E 119. In E 87, this term is used for both pledge and surety. Apart from the Middle Assyrian documents, which adopt the typical Assyrian term for pledge, šapartu, the remaining productive debts do not employ specific terms for either surety or pledge. In two documents creating an obligation the guarantor was bound to repay the debt (TBR 49) or had already

32 See Zaccagnini 1977: 181; a similar case is the wine debt recorded on CDLN 2012: 5, a tablet probably from Ekalte, which was paid by a third party. 33 Note that the commercial context in E 77 is uncertain. 34 Note that the moneylender in E 21 was also perhaps an Assyrian.

4.5 Security for Debt 

 259

paid it (RE 65).35 Similarly, it seems that in the lawsuit E 252 the debtor’s sister acted as guarantor because she was sued by the creditor and claimed to have repaid her brother’s debt. In the Babylonian tablet E 23, a guarantor assumed the surety for someone’s debt by oath. In the Syrian loan Hirayama 33, the creation of the security (either pledge or surety) is oddly formulated. In E 200, two witnesses perhaps assumed the surety. Finally, in RE 75 the creditor was entitled to seize (ṣabātu) the debtor’s house should the creditor die. A debt is repaid by a third party also in the lawsuit MFA 1977.114. However, the intervention of the king of Karkemiš’s mother on behalf of an Assyrian merchant surely did not arise from a previously assumed responsibility for the debt but was likely dictated by political reasons.

4.5.2 Securities in Consumptive Debts Less than half of consumptive debts (20 out of 55) attest some form of security.36 There is an equal distribution of sureties and pledges, each occurring in 10 documents. The same distribution is seen in the number of real pledges, which are attested 5 or 6 times, and personal pledges, which appear 6 times. It follows that some consumptive debts were secured by both real and personal pledges, but the combination of surety and pledge only occurs in E 209.37 In this document a real property was pledged and two individuals assumed the surety; additionally, debt slavery may have been stipulated for the borrower in case of default as a form of hypothecary antichretic pledge. As shown by Table 37, which lists consumptive debts secured by pledge or surety in increasing order of the amount of the debt, these two forms of security cannot be precisely correlated with small or large debts.38 Both pledge and surety are associated with small debts. It is worth noting that the three consumptive debts above 100 shekels of silver are secured by personal pledges.

35 In TBR 49, it is stated that the guarantor will pay (ušallam) the debt; in RE 65 the debt has already been paid (īpul), but the commercial context of the document makes clear that the third party was acting as guarantor. 36 Note that the consumptive nature of ASJ10 A, E 88, and RE 25 is uncertain and they could be reclassified as productive debts. 37 One may add here BLMJ 12; this document records the redemption of a pledged house by the debtor’s brother, but it is unclear whether he acted as guarantor because he assumed liability as surety before the creditor, or whether he simply came to the aid of his brother. 38 E 16 and Hirayama 38, which were secured by a different form of security, are not listed in the table, see below.

260 

 4 The Emar Credit System

Table 37: Amount of Debt in Secured Consumptive Debts. Document

Script

Debt

Pledge Type

Surety YES

E 116

SH

5 sh.

E 209

SH

14 sh.

Real

RE 58

SH

20 sh.

Personal – Real

TBR 84

SH

20 sh.

?

E 205

SH

25 sh.

Personal

YES

Hirayama 39

SH

25 sh.

BLMJ 12

SH

30 sh.

TBR 82

S

30 sh.

E 117

SH

40 sh.

Real

RA77 5

SH

47 sh.

Personal – Real

E 121

SH

50 sh.

YES (?) Real

YES (?) YES

YES

E 88

SH

60 sh.

YES

ASJ13 A

SH

65 sh.

YES

ASJ10 A

SH

105 sh. and 40 grains

Personal

TBR 34

SH

115 sh.

Personal

RE 25

SH

113 sh. 50 parīsu of barley

Personal

RE 84

S

?

YES

Subartu 17

SH

?

YES

Out of ten consumptive debts secured by sureties, the term qātātu is employed only in six cases (see Table 36). In the other documents (RE 84, BLMJ 12, Hirayama 39, and TBR 82), no specific term is used to refer to the guarantor. Only in RE 84 is the assumption of liability specifically indicated by a clause binding the guarantor to repay (apālu) the debt. The other three debts are repaid by a third party, but they are regarded as secured by a surety in virtue of the relation between the debtors and guarantors. Although consumptive debts from Emar are often repaid by a third party who is not specifically referred to as a guarantor, it may be suggested that the person who repaid someone’s debt acted as a guarantor – i.e., he/ she had legally assumed the surety during the basic term of the loan – only when he/she was a debtor’s relative, as in BLMJ 12, Hirayama 39, and TBR 82, which are therefore listed in Table 36 under surety. In consumptive debts repaid by someone who has no apparent kinship with the debtor, which include straightforward repayments of debts (RE 58, TBR 28,

4.5 Security for Debt 

 261

and TBR 29) as well as documents pertaining to dependency,39 the third party did not act as a guarantor but rather as a businessman who aimed to obtain the debtor’s property or labor. The lawsuits TBR 36 and TBR 84 represent yet another type of debt repaid by a third party. Here loans were claimed from the debtors’ sons, who most likely inherited their late fathers’ debts rather than formally acting as guarantors.40 In the family law contracts (§ 2.2.2) debts are repaid by a third party who did not assume liability for the debt during the basic term of the loan, because the very nature of the documents implies the subsequent intervention of a third party who establishes a new family-like relation with the debtor (i.e., adoption, marriage, etc.). The employment of the term qātātu for pledge in consumptive debts is limited to three documents (TBR 34, RE 58, and RA77 5). Two Syro-Hittite documents, BLMJ 12 and TBR 34, use the clause employed for ukâl-liens in Middle Assyrian loans, kī/kīmū KÙ.BABBAR ukâl, in order to state that the pledge is held instead of the lent object.41 The other documents (RE 25, ASJ10 A, E 117, and E 205) present no specific term for pledge. Pledged persons were usually members of the debtor’s family. Slaves were rarely pledged, but perhaps this was simply because most borrowers owned no slaves due to their economic condition. Only in the family law contract RE 25 are slaves given as a pledge. In the lawsuit E 205 we observe a change of status from pledge to slavery: two children given as pledges by their father to secure a loan were taken as slaves by the creditor (the diviner) after the debtor’s death. Self-pledge only occurs in TBR 34, whereby the borrower replaces his family as a pledge.42 It has been argued that indentured persons (§ 3.2.1) did not serve as personal antichretic pledges. Nonetheless, as seen above for E 77 (§ 4.5.1), some contracts specify supplementary guaranties to be provided by the debtor:43 a personal pledge is given in ASJ10 A, and both personal and real pledges are provided in RA77 5, but only in the latter is the supplementary pledge referred to as qātātu. 39 amēlūtu contracts without palāḫu formula (§  3.2.1.1.1): ASJ10 A, RA77 5; non-amēlūtu contracts (§ 3.2.1.2): E 86; enslavement contracts (§ 3.2.3.2.1): E 215, GsK 1, Hirayama 36; contracts regulating unclear types of dependency for debt (§ 3.2.4.1): Hirayama 37, TBR 25. 40 Note that the debtor’s relative, who according to our interpretation repaid the debt as guarantor in BLMJ 12, Hirayama 39, and TBR 82, is never the debtor’s son. 41 Abraham 2001: 178–79. The expression kīmu, “instead of” (the borrowed object) was similar to kī našlamte, “as full compensation” (for the borrowed object); in loans secured by sale of the encumbered property (Verfallspfand), these expressions indicate that the pledge was accepted in lieu of the debt as compensation for the loan, see Abraham 2001: 184–85. 42 Note that at Alalaḫ self-pledges occur in half of the loans, Niedorf 2008: 205. 43 Additional securities can also be found in the tidennūtu contracts from Nuzi, Zaccagnini 2001: 229–34.

262 

 4 The Emar Credit System

Some amēlūtu contracts that include the palāḫu formula refer to forms of security against the indentured persons’ death without using established legal terms such as qātātu. On two occasions, the indentured person is to be replaced by his wife (E 16) or his sons (Hirayama 38), while in E 117, in case of death, the indentured person’s property will be forfeited to the creditor.44 The real properties given as pledges are almost exclusively houses. Although it is never clearly stated, we cannot exclude that in certain documents “house” referred not only to the building but to the entire household. A kierṣetu plot is pledged in a single document (E 209). Although TBR 84 makes no specific mention of pledge, it is not excluded that the debt was secured by a (real?) pledge whose nature, however, cannot be precisely defined. It is remarkable that agricultural lands never occur as pledges, perhaps because socio-economic dynamics at Emar allowed debtors to retain their fields for subsistence.45 The Emar situation stands in sharp contrast not only to the contemporaneous Middle Assyrian and Nuzi sources46 but also to the Old Babylonian documentation, where pledges of agricultural lands clearly outnumber pledges of other real estate properties.47

4.5.3 The Nature of the Pledge: Possessory, Hypothecary, and Antichretic Pledges The nature of pledges, namely possessory or hypothecary, is often unclear. Most of the pledges of persons in productive and consumptive debts (E 77, TBR 34, RE 58, RE 25, ASJ10 A, RA77 5, and E 205) should be regarded as possessory and antichretic. In two commercial debts, AOAT 265.1 and E 21, personal pledges are hypothecary because they were delivered upon default. In AOAT 265.1, the pledged merchant was obliged to work as a slave, while in E 21 the merchant probably was not on the premises of the creditor long enough to be exploited. The nature of the personal pledge in RE 19 is different: the pledged person served to secure the delivery of a professional worker but also as a temporary replacement. Because the professional plowman was certainly a better worker than the pledge, the pledgeholder had little to gain from the substitute. This is the reason why penalties are imposed for the late delivery of the worker. The commercial loan Hirayama 33 may be added here, if the persons mentioned as security were given as a per44 Note that the provision of substitutes also served to guarantee them means of living for the future, see § 5.1.1. 45 See § 4.10. 46 See Appendix A in Abraham 2001: 201–07; for Nuzi see Zaccagnini 2001: 228–29. 47 Se the list of pledged properties in Kienast 1978: 114–15.

4.5 Security for Debt 

 263

sonal pledge that was likely hypothecary. The proviso in E 209 prescribing slavery for the debtor if he borrows additional money from the lender can be regarded as a sort of hypothecary personal pledge, but the document is not fully clear. The nature of real pledges is more complicated to ascertain. The pledge of valuable movables in the commercial debt E 87 (Besitzpfand) was obviously possessory. Pledges of real properties were mostly possessory and antichretic in consumptive debts (BLMJ 12, RE 58, RA77 5, and perhaps TBR 84). A single debt possibly connected to productive activities (E 77) was secured by a possessory and antichretic pledge of real estate. However, in E 77 the pledge was not consigned at the onset of the original debt but only at the creation of the new obligation, which bound the debtor to indentured labor and no longer had a productive nature. Near Eastern parallels indicate that houses could be exploited by the creditor either as a residence or as a source of rent (besitzlose Immobiliarnutzpfand).48 Nevertheless, we have no information on the usufruct of the pledged properties and the rental system at Emar. A hypothecary pledge of a real property is perhaps attested only in the consumptive debt E 209. Real properties may serve other functions as securities, as in the productive debt RE 75 in which a house protected the creditor against the debtor’s death. Similarly, in the amēlūtu contract E 117 all the debtor’s properties would be transferred to the creditor should the debtor die. The existence of antichretic pledges (Table 38) raises the question whether the pledge was intended to repay the interest (Zinsantichrese) or the capital (Kapitalantichrese). The term “interest” is used here imprecisely and deserves clarification. None of the documents discussed here indicates the amount of the interest or even refers to its accrual. Interest here is regarded as the creditor’s gain from the antichretic exploitation of the pledge, on top of the principal. The amount of antichretic interest is by nature undetermined, especially in open-ended loans. Table 38: Antichretic Pledges. Document

Script

Type

Purpose

Pledge Type

TBR 34

SH

Debt note

E 21

SH

Repayment of debt

Productive

Personal

BLMJ 12

SH

Repayment of debt

Consumptive

Real

CREATION OF THE OBLIGATION Consumptive

Personal

FULFILLMENT OF THE OBLIGATION

48 For the Old Babylonian period see Kienast 1978: 83; for the Neo Babylonian period see Petschow 1956: 106–08.

264 

 4 The Emar Credit System

Table 38 (continued) Document

Script

Type

Purpose

Pledge Type

RE 58

SH

Repayment of debt

Consumptive

Personal – Real

RE 25

SH

Family law contract

Consumptive

Personal

TBR 84

SH

Lawsuit

Consumptive

Real (?)

Consumptive

Personal

DEFAULT ASJ10 A

SH

amēlūtu contract

E 77

SH

amēlūtu contract

Productive

Personal – Real

RA77 5

SH

amēlūtu contract

Consumptive

Personal – Real

E 205

SH

Lawsuit

Consumptive

Personal

AOAT 265.1

MA

Letter

Productive

Personal

Various formulas stating that an antichretic pledge was given in lieu of interest occur in the Old Babylonian sources49 and continued to be used in Alalaḫ IV50 and Ekalte51 and later in the Neo Babylonian period.52 A specific formula known from Alalaḫ VII and Ekalte, (KÙ.BABBAR) ul uṣṣab ul iddarar, “The silver bears no interest nor is it affected by a decree of remission of debts,”53 might be restored in JCS40 3, but the fragmentary nature of the tablet allows other interpretations. Beside this uncertain example, antichretic formulas are unknown at Emar. This absence is probably related to the fact that no preserved true loan (the only type of contract where the antichretic formula can be found) was secured by an antichretic pledge. Thus, only the context allows us to understand the nature of the antichretic pledge, which must be considered on a case-by-case basis. The pledges in TBR 34 and BLMJ 12, which both employ the ukâl-lien formula, may have had different functions. In TBR 34, the debtor’s family was taken as an ukâl-lien and later replaced by the debtor himself, who acted as a pledge (qātātu). Because it is unlikely that the ukâl-lien and qātātu reflected different types of pledges and because the debtor was to be released upon repayment, the usufruct of the pledge must have been obtained in lieu of the interest. On the other hand, in BLMJ 12, which records the redemption of a pledged real property, the nature of the antichretic exploitation is unclear and Kapitalantichrese cannot be excluded.

49 Skaist 1994: 211–15, 20–25. 50 Niedorf 2008: 202. 51 Westbrook 2003b: 685. 52 Petschow 1956: 103–04. 53 See Ek 68, Eichler 1973: 73. This formula is unknown in Alalaḫ IV, Niedorf 2008: 210–11.

4.5 Security for Debt 

 265

In another document, RE 58, the debtor gave his house and wife ana qātāti ša 20 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ to the new creditor who repaid his debt. Because the pledge was provided at the onset of the new obligation, it was possessory in nature and was most likely intended to repay the interest. In RE 25, the labor of the redeemed slaves amortized the interest, because they were released upon repayment of the debt. The labor of the pledged children in the lawsuit E 205 would have served to repay the interest if, as has been suggested, they were old enough to perform work service, because the pledgeholder requested that his money be returned in exchange for their release. The subsidiary pledge in the amēlūtu contracts ASJ10 A and RA77 5 plausibly contributed to amortize the interest. Because the properties pledged in TBR 84 are unknown, we cannot determine how they were exploited. In the Middle Assyrian commercial debt AOAT 265.1, the principal is expected to be repaid, and thus the pledged person’s labor was intended to repay the (default?) interest. The same seems to be the case for the Syro-Hittite tablet E 21. It may be concluded that in the vast majority of documented debts, antichretic pledges are found in consumptive debts and mostly concerned persons. Almost all antichretic pledges served to repay the interest. The later the debtor repaid the principal, the bigger the creditor’s gain. Because consumptive loans were often not expected to be repaid, by exploiting the pledge the creditor could not only recover the principal but also a significant amount on top of it.54 In some contracts, the repayment clause might simply have been a legal formula that bound the debtor to his creditor but had no practical effect. The motivation of pledgeholders in commercial contexts could be radically different from that of pledgeholders involved in consumptive debts because commercial pledgeholders were not interested in exploiting the pledge. In AOAT 265.1, the Assyrian creditors clearly sought to have their credit repaid because they allowed the Emarite merchant to send a message to his wife requesting money. The same holds true for E 21, which records the repayment of a debt and the release of the personal pledge. The pledge in these two documents seems to be a de facto way to put pressure on the debtor to force the repayment of the debt. The pledgeholder in RE 19 was less interested in keeping the pledge because he wanted his professional worker to be delivered as soon as possible. On the contrary, in the amēlūtu contract E 77, although the debt possibly derived from commercial activities, the pledgeholder exploited the pledge.

54 For a parallel situation at Nuzi see Zaccagnini 1976: 196–97.

266 

 4 The Emar Credit System

4.5.4 Redemption of Pledges Possessory pledges were by nature redeemable, but only a few documents, mostly concerning personal pledges, explicitly refer to redemption using various clauses (Table 39). Table 39: Redemption of Pledges. Document

Type

Pledge Type Clauses PRODUCTIVE DEBTS

Expected Redemption AOAT 265.1

Default – Pledge

Personal

E 77

Default – Indentured Personal labor

la-a-din la-pe-ṭé-er u₄-um ša KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ-šú a-na PN(C) ú-šal-lam ṭup-pa-šú i-ḫ[ap-p]í

Completed Redemption E 21

Repayment of debt

Personal

ip-ṭe₄-ri-šu

CONSUMPTIVE DEBTS Expected Redemption Personal

ki-i-me-e PN(D) KÙ.BABBAR an-na-am ú-šallam ṭup-pa an-na-am i-ḫé-pí

TBR 34

Creation of the obligation

ASJ10 A

Default – Indentured Personal labor

i-na u₄-mi ša PN(D) KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ-šú-nu ú-šal-lam ṭup-pa-šú-nu i-ḫap-pì

E 205

Default – Debt slavery

Personal

šum-ma 2 DUMU.MEŠ ŠE[Š-ku-nu te-le-qa ù] 25 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ-ia te-er-ra

Completed Redemption BLMJ 12

Repayment of debt

Real

a-na 20 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR.MÉŠ ki-i lúni-ka-ri iš-tu le-et PN(C) ip-ta-ṭar-šu

RE 25

Family law contract

Personal

ù a-nu-ma PN ARAD-šú it-ti DAM-šú DUMU. MUNUS-šú ki-i lúni-ka-ri ap-ta-aṭ-ra

TBR 84

Lawsuit concerning the fulfillment of an obligation

Real (?)

ki-i ni-ka-rì! ṭup-paḫi.a ša a-bi-šu-nu a-na 20 KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ iš-tu É PN(C) [i-t]a-aṭ-ra

A single document creating an obligation (TBR 34) and two contracts of indentured labor (ASJ10 A and E 77) contain a clause stating that the tablet will be broken upon repayment as an indication that the debt has been settled. TBR 34 is a unique case because the pledged person whom the redemption clause refers

4.5 Security for Debt 

 267

to had replaced his family as a pledge. However, this was not a true redemption but merely a substitution of the pledged persons and hence the debt remained to be settled. Although not explicitly stated, it is clear that the pledged property was to return to its owner. In the lawsuit E 205, the right of redemption is indicated by the pledgeholder’s request to the uncles of the pledged children to return his silver. Two documents, BLMJ 12 and RE 25, record the redemption of pledges, which is expressed by the verb paṭāru, “to release.” Expressions based on the meaning of the verb paṭāru are also found in the productive debts AOAT 265.1 and E 21: the letter AOAT 265.1 reports the condition for releasing the pledged person; E 21 records the release of the personal pledge. Another case of redemption perhaps occurs in TBR 84, which states that the tablets of debt were withdrawn from the house of the creditor. We have suggested that these tablets recorded a real pledge. In the other documents recording the acceptance of a possessory pledge – the productive debts E 87 and the consumptive debts RA77 5 and RE 58 – redemption was likely achieved upon repayment, although this is not explicitly stated. The same holds true for the Middle Assyrian tablet RE 19, although the debt is not recorded in silver or barley but consists of the delivery of a professional worker. In all cases, the redemption price of pledges corresponded to the lent capital. This represents the main difference between the redemption of pledges and that of alienated properties, whose redemption was usually set at twice the original debt or price.55 Only RE 19 stipulates the term for the repayment of the debt, i.e., for the delivery of the professional plowman; after the term of two months has elapsed, a penalty fee will be charged. In the other documents there was no proviso binding the debtor to pay the (default) interest, as known, for instance, from some Middle Assyrian loans;56 no additional interest was added on top of the antichretic exploitation of the pledge, and no terms for repayment are attested in documents recording debts secured by pledge. Not surprisingly, lenders were in no rush to recover their money because they could take advantage of the pledge for a longer time.

4.5.5 The Value Relation between Debts and Pledges A fundamental issue is the relation between the value of the pledge and the amount of the debt. The Emar texts do not contain the equivalency clause, found

55 For real properties see § 4.9.2, for slaves see § 5.3. 56 Abraham 2001: 179–82.

268 

 4 The Emar Credit System

in some Old Babylonian contracts, which establishes that the value of the pledge is equivalent to that of the debt.57 Therefore our attempt to assess the value of pledges and debts must be considered very tentative. We begin with personal pledges. On the assumption that the market value of slaves was reckoned according to their ability to work, one may tentatively compare the prices of slaves with the actual amounts of debts that were secured with a personal pledge, despite the fact that slaves, unlike pledges, were alienated properties. This comparison is based on the valuation of an adult slave at 30–45 shekels of silver and of a child at 9–15 shekels of silver.58 Some documents show a certain equivalence. We have noted that the debt in E 205 (25 sh.) may correspond to the value of two pledged children. In ASJ10 A, the value of the persons who were possibly taken as pledges was close to the balance of the debt (65 sh.), if we assume that the pledge consisted of a woman with two or three minor daughters.59 The text RE 25, in which two adult slaves and a child were pledged to secure a debt of 113 shekels of silver and 50 parīsu of barley, is difficult to evaluate.60 Emar sources do not provide the silver-barley rate of exchange, but sources from Ugarit and Alalaḫ do. According to the rate of 1 shekel of silver per 1 parīsu of barley attested at Ugarit, the debt would exceed the value of the pledge.61 The Alalaḫ sources date to the Old Babylonian period, but they have the advantage that the standard of silver was the same as in Emar.62 By using the silver-barley rate attested at Alalaḫ (1/2 sh. per 1 parīsu), the difference between the value of the debt and the value of the pledge would be reduced.63 However, the estimated value of the pledge would approximate the value of the debt only according to the highest valuation of slaves attested in the Emar sources.

57 Kienast 1978: 77–79, 101–02, 15–16, Westbrook 2001b: 70–71, Skaist 1994: 211–12, 18–20. 58 See § 5.2 and Table 51. 59 The number of daughters is unspecified. 60 The highest prices recorded in the Emar sources for slaves are 70 sh. for an adult female, 52 sh. for an adult male, and 15 sh. for a child, see § 5.2.1. However, because 70 sh. is an isolated value, I would use the second-highest price for an adult female (55 sh.) to calculate the value of the pledge, which would be 122 sh. 61  Vargyas 1986: 108–10. According to this rate, 50 parīsu of barley would correspond to 1 mina of silver at Emar based on an Ugarit mina of 50 shekels of 9.4 g. and an Emar mina of 60 shekels of 7.83 g.: 50 × 9.4 ÷ 7.83 = 60.02; for the weight standards at Emar and Ugarit see Zaccagnini 2018. Accordingly, the debt would amount to 173 sh. 62 Both cities used a shekel of 7.83 g., Chambon 2011: 82–83, Zaccagnini 2018: 49–53. 63 For the silver-barley rate at Alalaḫ see Heltzer 1978: 86–87 and 92 n. 3; despite the negative reception of Heltzer’s book (Stieglitz 1980, Pardee 1981–1982: 270–72, Vargyas 1986), this datum seems to be confirmed by Vargyas 1986: 109. Accordingly, the debt in RE 25 would amount to 138 sh.

4.5 Security for Debt 

 269

TBR 34 is a difficult case; the debt (115 sh.) would only correspond to the value of the pledge, an adult woman and three children, according to the highest values for a female slave (70 sh.) and a child (15 sh.) recorded in the Emar texts. If the average values of slaves are assumed here, then the debt exceeds the value of the pledge. The difference increased when these four people were replaced by a single person – the debtor – as a pledge.64 Other documents show no equivalence between the value of the pledge and the amount of the debt. In the Middle Assyrian document RE 19, the value of the pledged person is obviously lower than that of the professional plowman who was to be delivered. Indeed, the document stipulates a penalty for the late delivery of the worker that is based on idle and working days. In the Middle Assyrian letter AOAT 265.1 and in E 21, two merchants are held as pledges. According to Zaccagnini,65 the value of the debts was within the range of Late Bronze Age ransoms for one adult male.66 One may concede that the value of the debt in E 21 – 60 shekels of silver and textiles worth 14 shekels of silver measured according to the weight of Amurru (9.4 g. × 74 = 695.6 g.) – falls within the range of the examples of ransoms provided by Zaccagnini, although it is higher than the common value of 50 shekels of silver.67 However, the value of the debt in AOAT 265.1 – 2 minas and 5 shekels of silver, 2 niksu-textiles, and 1 lubēru-textile – greatly exceeds that range; Zaccagnini calculated that the silver alone amounted to 987 g., to which the textiles (which may have been very expensive) must be added. It seems therefore more likely that the value of the pledge was inferior to the debt in both instances. Indeed, we have seen that in these documents the creditors were seeking the return of their money and were not interested in keeping the pledge or profiting from the ransom. The ratio between the value of pledged real estate properties and the amount of the debt is more difficult to ascertain. The value of these properties was dependent upon many variables, and without knowing their dimensions it is impossible 64 Note that the woman and the three children were held as an ukâl-lien, while the debtor was identified as a pledge (qātātu). 65 Zaccagnini 2018: 55. 66 The examples of ransoms provided by Zaccagnini (1977: 175–78) mostly fall within one mina of silver weighed according to different systems: 60 sh. at Nuzi corresponding to 500 g. according to the Mesopotamian weight system (1 shekel = 8.34 g.); 50 shekels at Ugarit corresponding to 1 Western mina of 470 g. according to the Ugarit system (1 shekel = 9.4 g.); 30, 50, and 100 sh. are attested in two Amarna letters for ransoms “from the mountains,” from Beya and from Amurru respectively, corresponding to 282 g., 470 g., and 940 g. (the Ugarit system was used in the Levant). 67 50 shekels corresponded to one mina in the Ugarit system, while the amount of the debt in E 21 (74 sh. in the Amurru system, which was the same as the Ugarit system) corresponded to one and a half minas in the system in use at Emar (1 mina = 60 shekels of 7.83 g.).

270 

 4 The Emar Credit System

to obtain an accurate estimate of their worth. More specifically, the antichretic value of houses, which are virtually the only pledged real properties in Emar sources, can hardly be reckoned and may have significantly differed from the values recorded in sale contracts. Additionally, the possibility that some pledges consisting of a “house” referred to an entire household further erodes our basis for comparison. As stated above, in Emar sources possessory pledges of houses are attested almost exclusively in consumptive debts. Houses secured consumptive debts of 20 (RE 58), 30 (BLMJ 12), and 47 (RA77 5) shekels of silver. Based on the average purchase price in Syro-Hittite house sales (58.15 sh.),68 the value of the pledge apparently exceeded the amount of the debt. The disproportion is even more striking in the case of RE 58 and RA77 5, which were secured with both real and personal pledges. Nevertheless, it is not excluded that the houses pledged in these contracts were in reality of little value, as several contracts record the sale of houses at low prices.69 Houses were also pledged in the productive debts E 77 and RE 75.70 In E 77, the value of the pledge, consisting of a house plus the debtor’s son, was probably lower than the amount of the debt (140 sh.) unless the house was of high value. In RE 75, a house serves as security against the debtor’s death, but the debt-topledge ratio cannot be inferred because part of the debt consists of vessels of oil. Apart from houses, an kierṣetu is given as a pledge in E 209 for a debt of 14 shekels of silver. The average purchase price of an kierṣetu in Syro-Hittite records (24.62 sh.) is about twice the amount of that debt. The commercial loan contract E 87 is the only loan secured by movable property, namely 5 talents of alum, but it is unknown whether the pledge corresponded to the debt (150 sh.).71 Finally, the lien placed on all of the debtor’s possessions to protect the creditor from the debtor’s death in E 117 surely exceeded the amount of the debt (40 sh.). To sum up, our documents offer little evidence for determining whether the value of the pledge corresponded to the value of the debt. However, it seems that in most instances the value of the pledge exceeded the amount of the debt. It is

68 See § 1.4. 69 Among the Syro-Hittite documents, see E 80A (30 sh.), E 80B (18 sh.), E 113 (20 sh.), E 122 (20 sh.), Hirayama 9 (26 sh.), RE 39 (25 sh.), TBR 33 (31 sh.), TBR 37 (33 sh.), and TBR 53 (20 sh.). Note that the arithmetic mode of Syro-Hittite purchase prices is 20 sh. 70 Depending on the interpretation, the commercial loan Hirayama 33 may also have been secured by a pledged house, see § 2.1.1.1. 71 Note that Ugarit sources do not provide evidence for the price of alum, Nasgowitz 1976, Heltzer 1978, Stieglitz 1979.

4.6 Private-sector Debts and State Debts 

 271

possible that in these cases, creditors wanted to secure their money and were seeking to obtain the property of indebted people. In other cases, it is plausible that the debtor, especially a defaulting one, was compelled to provide the creditor with whatever security was at his disposal, regardless of its value relative to the debt. This scenario could explain those dubious cases in which the value of the pledge might have been inferior to the debt. Only the productive debts RE 19, AOAT 265.1, and E 21 provide more consistent evidence for pledges of inferior value to the debt. Apparently, there was no clause protecting the debtor from excessive exploitation of the pledged property during the period defined by the Emar documentation, as there was in other periods.72

4.6 Private-sector Debts and State Debts Most documented credit transactions, whether related to consumptive or productive debts, took place within the private sector. Credit issued by local institutions – namely the king, the temple authority Ninurta, the Elders, and the “Brothers,” which are only mentioned in Syrian-type tablets – is not preserved in the extant sources.73 The only institutional loan recorded in the Syrian-type documentation is RE 84, whereby the god Bēlu of Buzqa, a temple authority, acts as lender, and this temple was not located at Emar.74 Evidence of institutional supervision of moneylending practices in Syrian sources can perhaps be found in the loan contract Hirayama 33, to which a member of the First Dynasty is a witness. One may argue that the absence of evidence of Emarite institutional lenders is related to the scarcity of Syrian credit-related documents, which in turn depends on the fact that the vast majority of Syrian tablets are preserved because they were kept as titles to properties.75 However, the Syro-Hittite credit-related documents, which are more numerous than the Syrian ones, show a similar absence of institutional moneylenders. Thus, institutional moneylenders are not present in the preserved Emar sources. In the Syro-Hittite sources, neither Hittite nor local authorities act as lenders, apart from two documents. In Anatolica 16, the palace, likely to be identified with 72 Petschow 1956: 104, Abraham 2001: 185, Veenhof 2003–2005: 441, Jursa 2003–2005: 452. 73 For these institutions see § 1.1. 74 The origin of this tablet is debated, see ch. 2 fn. 57. 75 It is to be recalled that tablets recording repaid debts were likely destroyed, and debts that could not be used as titles to properties (i.e., debts not secured by the pledge of real properties) are likely to be accidentally preserved, see § 4.1.

272 

 4 The Emar Credit System

the court of Karkemiš, is mentioned as the lender. In E 119, the city of Kururaba acts as a lender/seller in the context of a credit sale.76 The family of diviners seems to act privately. Possible exceptions are two administrative records discovered in Building M₁, E 279 and E 319. These documents recorded consumptive debts77 that were likely issued by the authority managing the building, namely the Zū-Baʿla family, which in this case perhaps acted as an institution. One may compare the evidence from Emar with other Late Bronze Age sources. At Nuzi, the ḫubullu contracts stipulated by the palace authority are very limited and economically insignificant,78 and the manifold credit activities of the prince Šilwa-Teššub were conducted independently of the palace economy. Nuzi provides evidence for trade ventures directly financed by the palace, with merchants acting as dependents, as well as for private investments.79 At Alalaḫ, the palace or members of the palace administration were the principal moneylenders.80 Loan documents from Ekalte have a private nature, but some of them were found in a building that might have been the archive of the Elders. Additionally, the Brothers are attested as lenders in one document (Ek 67).81 Sources from Ugarit point to a fluid relation between the private and state spheres of trade.82 There is plentiful information for royally funded trade,83 but there is no evidence that traders were royal dependents at Ugarit; the palace and the king were involved in international trade, but in the role of facilitators and sponsors.84 The palace was the largest moneylender while there is little evidence for debts recorded in private households.85 Such differences may reflect the nature of the various archives, as the Emar and Ekalte tablets mostly stem from private contexts. Given the limited role of the 76 Another attestation of an institutional loan possibly appears in the administrative document BLMJ 20: 27, 2 ME GIŠ-pa ŠE.MEŠ a-na pu-u-ḫi SU[M], “200 parīsu of barley are given in exchange,” but the context remains unclear, and the document could simply record a delivery of barley; this document has been attributed by Fleming (2002) to the bīt tukli, “House of Assistance (?),” a cultic institution attested in the ritual texts from Emar. These inventories list enormous quantities of barley along with persons, paraphernalia, various commodities, and livestock that were managed by different households. 77 Note that their nature as debts is uncertain, see pp. 59ff. 78 Zaccagnini 2002: 177. 79 Zaccagnini 1977: 178–83, Maidman 1980: 187–89, Zaccagnini 2002: 177–79. 80 Niedorf 2008: 194. 81 See Torrecilla 2014: 95–96. 82 The role of merchants and their relation with the state was the subject of a stream of studies over the years, summarized in Monroe 2009: 151–57. 83 Monroe 2009: 105–15. 84 Monroe 2009: 203–05. 85 McGeough 2007: 199–201.

4.7 Principals and Moneylenders 

 273

king at Emar, however, it is unlikely that credit activities were carried out by the palace administration at the time of the monarchy.86

4.7 Principals and Moneylenders 4.7.1 Archives and Dossiers Credit transactions from Emar record a plurality of moneylenders and borrowers. Only occasionally does one debtor or creditor appear in more than one document. None of the moneylenders recorded in the Syrian-type tablets is known from other sources. Only Abda son of Nunia, who acts as buyer in E 109 but is not involved in the credit transaction, is attested in another tablet (E 110) and perhaps belonged to a wealthy family. In the Syro-Hittite and contemporary sources (i.e., Middle Babylonian and Middle Assyrian), a prominent role is played by the families of Zū-Baʿla, Ḫima, Milki-Dagan, Kutbe, Awiru, and Apilu, which for the sake of simplicity we have referred to collectively as the notable families. The archives and dossiers belonging to these families represent a primary source for credit-related documents (§ 1.3.) However, despite their plausible wealth and importance in Emar society, less than half of the 78 Syro-Hittite and contemporary credit-related documents (Table 40) stem from their archives and dossiers.87 The notable families are mostly involved in consumptive debts, but only 21 out of 52 Syro-Hittite consumptive debts stem from their archives or dossiers.88 Out of 26 productive debts, only 8 to 10 documents89 belong to these families. Apart from the notable families, only a limited number of Syro-Hittite Middle Babylonian and Middle Assyrian credit-related

86 In my opinion it is unlikely that the impression of the king’s limited role suggested by the currently available documentation would have substantially changed if the royal archive had been discovered; Fleming (2012) speculates the palace was located in the part of the site submerged by Lake Assad. 87 The number of documents belonging to those families included in Table 40 is 31. E 277 and E 278 are tentatively assigned to the family of Zū-Baʿla only because they were found in Building M₁ but they record no clear evidence for the involvement of this family. Another document that is provisionally attributed to the Zū-Baʿla family is AOAT 265.1. The total number of credit-related documents (78) and the following figures include only Syro-Hittite, Middle Babylonian, and Middle Assyrian tablets; Syrian tablets are excluded because they represent a separate and older set of data. 88 Only Syrian and Syro-Hittite consumptive debts are known, see Table 31. 89 Texts are given according to the order in Table 40: E 200, AOAT 265.1, E 75, E 87, E 85, E 77, E 119, Hirayama 40. E 277 and E 278 may be added here but, as said, the presence of the Zū-Baʿla family is uncertain.

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 4 The Emar Credit System

documents can be attributed to discrete archives or dossiers. These dossiers were introduced in §§ 1.3.7 and 1.3.8 and belong to Emarites and foreign merchants. Table 40: Credit-related Documents Belonging to Private Archives and Dossiers. Document

Type

Purpose

Role

E 209

1

Consumptive

Creditor

E 279

1

Consumptive

Creditor (?) / debtor

E 319

1

Consumptive

Creditor (?) / debtor

E 277 (?)

1

Productive

?

E 278 (?)

1

Productive

?

E 200

2/1

Productive

Debtor / guarantor (?)

E 213

2/2

Consumptive

Third party: repaying debts

AOAT 265.1 (?)

3/2

Productive

Financier (?)

E 215

3/3

Consumptive

Third party: repaying debt – master

E 205

3/3

Consumptive

Creditor – master

Subartu 17

3/4

Consumptive

Third party: repaying debt (?) – master

E 75

1

Productive

Creditor

E 87

1

Productive

Creditor

E 88

1

Consumptive

Creditor

E 85

2/1

Productive

Buyer

E 77

3/1

Productive

Third party: repaying debt – master

E 86

3/1

Consumptive

Third party: repaying debt – master

E 115

2/1

Consumptive

Buyer

E 116

2/1

Consumptive

Creditor

E 119

2/1

Productive

Debtor

E 117

3/1

Consumptive

Creditor – master

E 121

3/3

Consumptive

Third party: repaying debt – master

Hirayama 40

1

Productive

Creditor – seller

RE 10

2/2

Consumptive

Debtor / Creditor

RE 13

2/2

Consumptive

Debtor / Third party: repaying debt

GsK 1

3/3

Consumptive

Third party: repaying debt – master

Hirayama 36

3/3

Consumptive

Third party: repaying debt – master

Hirayama 37

3/4

Consumptive

Third party: repaying debt – master

Family of Zū-Baʿla

Family of Ḫima

Family of Milki-Dagan

Family of Kutbe

4.7 Principals and Moneylenders 

 275

Table 40 (continued) Document

Type

Purpose

Role

TBR 26

3/3

Consumptive

Buyer

TBR 25

3/4

Consumptive

Creditor – master

3/3

Consumptive

Buyer

E 24

1

Productive

Debtor

E 23

2/1

Productive

Debtor / Third party: surety – repaying debt

E 26

2/1

Productive

Creditor / Debtor

E 28

2/3

Productive

Creditor / Debtor

RE 72

1

Productive

Creditor / Debtor

RE 75

1

Productive

Creditor

TBR 36

2/3

Consumptive

Creditor

Family of Awiru

Family of Apilu TBR 44 Merchants of House 5

Family of Laḫma

Abī-liʾmu son of Abī-liʾmu TBR 28

2/1

Consumptive

Third party: repaying debt

TBR 29

2/1

Consumptive

Third party: repaying debt

TBR 39

3/1

Consumptive

Creditor – master

TBR 40

3/1

Consumptive

Creditor – master

3/1

Consumptive

Creditor – master

3/1

Consumptive

Third party: repaying debt – master

2/1

Consumptive

Buyer

Consumptive

Creditor – master

Productive

Debtor

Family of Udḫa-abu

Kunaʾe son of Irrike QVO5 2

Mama son of Ummānu RE 63 Family of Abdi-ili TBR 65

Šaggar-abu son of Baʿal-qarrād E 16

3/1

Imlik-Dagan son of Dagan-bēlu E 21

2/1

Legend. Document types: 1 – documents creating an obligation; 2/1 – repayments of debts; 2/2 – family law contracts; 2/3 – lawsuits concerning the fulfillment of obligations; 3/1 – indentured labor; 3/2 – pledge; 3/3 – debt slavery; 3/4 – unclear types of dependency for debt

276 

 4 The Emar Credit System

The notable families participate in varying degrees in credit transactions and play various roles in them. As expected, the most frequently attested family is that of Zū-Baʿla, which was by far the wealthiest and most important family at Emar toward the end of its history. Members of the Zū-Baʿla family are predominantly attested in documents recording consumptive debts; they are involved in only two business documents (AOAT 265.1 and E 200) and play different roles in each. In AOAT 265.1, Baʿal-qarrād (if the identification is correct) participates in an international trade with the Assyrians, possibly as a financier. In E 200, Zū-Baʿla borrows a small quantity of silver (30 sh.) that was probably used for purchase.90 No true loan is issued by this family, and its activity as moneylenders is limited to two consumptive debts, E 205 and E 209. With the possible exception of AOAT 265.1, it does not finance trade ventures. On three occasions this family repays someone’s debt (E 213, E 215, and Subartu 17). The family of diviners was perhaps more interested in obtaining bonded labor, as shown by E 205, E 215, and Subartu 17, and possibly E 209, which seems to prescribe debt slavery for the borrower in case of default. Two administrative records perhaps relate to debts (E 279 and E 319). To repeat, these documents were found in Building M₁ and record distributions of barley to several people, including a member of Zū-Baʿla’s family, but it remains unclear whether the distributions were managed by the family itself. The family of Ḫima was the most active in financing trade activities. In two instances (E 75 and E 87) they lend money to foreign merchants. In E 85, three individuals, who were possibly partners in some business activities, sold properties to a member of the family of Ḫima to repay their financiers. The family of Ḫima appears as a lender in another document, E 88, whose nature is unclear and has therefore been regarded as a consumptive debt. The family was also active in repaying someone’s debt to obtain bonded labor (E 77 and E 86), although in E 77 the debt was perhaps originally contracted for the purpose of business. The involvement of the family of Kutbe in business activities is limited to a single sale of slaves (Hirayama 40), which is also the sole document in which this family acts as creditor. The family of Kutbe concentrated on the slave market but also sought to obtain dependents by repaying someone’s debt (Hirayama 36, Hirayama 37, and GsK 1). Despite the socio-economic position of this family, one of its members experienced economic difficulties and was forced to resort to other people, first to Bēlu-qarrād son of Tūra-Dagan (RE 10), possibly a peer or even a relative, and then to his brother (RE 13).

90 It remains unclear whether one of the witnesses, Baʿal-qarrād, can be identified with Zū-Baʿla’s son, and whether he acted as a guarantor, see § 2.2.1.2.1.

4.7 Principals and Moneylenders 

 277

The family of Milki-Dagan is mostly named in documents concerning debtors in financial distress and acquires real properties from financially distressed people. Two documents found in the archive of the family of Milki-Dagan deal with debts of the same family: in E 115 the debtors sold properties to the family of Milki-Dagan to repay their debt; in E 116 the debtors transferred properties as datio in solutum to the family of Milki-Dagan. In two documents the family of Milki-Dagan obtains bonded labor: in E 117 the debtor has his debt canceled and becomes amēlūtu; in E 121 the family acts as a third party repaying someone’s debt and enslaving the debtor. In the latter document, the member of Milki-Dagan’s family seems to have also acted as guarantor. A single credit transaction pertains to the business activity of this family: E 119 records the payment of a credit sale of barley by a member of the family together with some business associates. The aforementioned Syrian tablets E 109 and E 110 forming the dossier of Nunia were found in the same area as the tablets belonging to the family of Milki-Dagan, but due to the lack of precise archaeological reports it is unclear whether they later entered the archive of Milki-Dagan as titles to properties. The families of Awiru and Apilu were much less involved in credit transactions, as reflected in their small dossiers (particularly that of Apilu). The family of Awiru only appears in two documents pertaining to defaulting debtors. In TBR 25, an individual who borrowed a quantity of barley from a member of the family of Awiru became his dependent. In TBR 26, the same member of Awiru’s family purchased a debt slave. The sole credit-related document stemming from the archive of Apilu concerns the purchase of a debt slave (TBR 44). Credit-related documents from the small archives and dossiers reconstructed in §§ 1.3.7 and 1.3.8 can be summarized as follows.91 An important archive belonging to foreign merchants has been found in House 5. Four credit-related documents stem from this archive (E 23, E 24, E 26, and E 28) and record credits taken out or issued by the merchants for their business activities. The only true loan is E 24, which records an interest-bearing loan taken out by Tatašše/Raʾīndu from a local townsman who was possibly associated with the family of Ḫima. The other three documents record debt settlements or agreements between merchants for the payment of commercial debts. Three documents can perhaps be attributed to the sons of Laḫma. Two debt notes (RE 72, RE 75) record the trade of oil, garments, and other goods undertaken by Ḫinnu-Dagan son of Laḫma. TBR 36 is a lawsuit establishing that Uginu, Ḫinnu-Dagan’s brother, was to receive several fields as a repayment of a debt.

91 The dossier of the sons of Irʾam-Dagan is not discussed here because E 7 is not a credit-related document but a sale into famine slavery.

278 

 4 The Emar Credit System

Apart from the dossier of the merchants from House 5, that of Ḫinnu-Dagan is the only minor dossier that contains documents recording productive debts. Two family groups are the principals in four credit-related documents but are not attested elsewhere. In TBR 28 and TBR 29, Abī-liʾmu son of Abī-liʾmu repays someone’s debt in exchange for real properties. The sons of Udḫa-abu act as creditors and masters in two amēlūtu contracts (TBR 39, TBR 40). Some individuals who appear as principals in individual credit-related documents are mentioned in other texts. Kunaʾe son of Irrike, who is the creditor and master in the amēlūtu contract QVO5 2, also functions as the principal in QVO5 1, in which he arranges the marriage of his slave. Mama son of Ummānu, who repays his nephew’s debt in RE 63 and takes him as an indentured person, is a testator in RE 56. Bēlu-kabar and Dūdu, sons of Abdi-ili who purchase a house from indebted people in TBR 65, act as buyers in another sale contract, TBR 64.92 The archaeological context helps us to reconstruct two further dossiers. A small archive of three tablets found in a jar can be attributed to Šaggar-abu son of Baʿal-qarrād, the creditor and master in the amēlūtu contract E 16, but he is only attested in this document. The tablet E 21, which was found alone in a jar, records the repayment of a productive debt by the merchant Imlik-Dagan son of Daganbēlu, who had been held as a pledge by foreign merchants. Credit-related documents can be therefore grouped in a substantial number of private archives and dossiers (15), for a total of 47 documents (Table 40), but only a few tablets are associated with each dossier. It is unlikely that this situation is due to the extensive looting that the site suffered over the years, which prevents a reliable reconstruction of the Emar archives. Even the areas regularly excavated did not yield large archives apart from that in Building M₁ belonging to the Zū-Baʿla family. The remaining 31 documents, which amount to about 40% of the credit-related documents, represent isolated sources. Of these a small number (9)93 are productive debts concerning the activities of local and foreign merchants. The majority (22) have been regarded as consumptive debts. Besides the people discussed so far, only a few moneylenders (who were not principals in the documents) are known from other sources, or at least some

92 These individuals had some financial means, but note that given its location, the kierṣetu bought in TBR 64 appears to be of low value, Viano 2012: 153–54. 93 Anatolica 16, E 127, E 252, GsK 5, MFA 1977.114, RE 19, RE 65, TBR 27, TBR 49; E 252 is included here despite its clear archaeological context because it cannot be associated with the private dossier of the Zū-Baʿla family.

4.7 Principals and Moneylenders 

 279

bits of information can be gleaned about them.94 The moneylenders in Hirayama 36 and GsK 1, which record debts repaid by the family of Kutbe in exchange for dependents, can be identified with Aḫlamû, the grandson of the Overseer of the Land Mutri-Teššub (Hirayama 36), and Tūri son of Ilī-bāni (GsK 1), who was a military official. In another document in which the family of Kutbe repays someone’s debt (Hirayama 37), the creditor is Isertu, the daughter of an individual whose seal appears in documents of the notable families. In the family law contract RE 10, in which a member of the family of Kutbe is the debtor, one of the creditors is Šeʾi-Dagan son of the tartannu Šaggar-abu. In the amēlūtu contract RA77 5, the person who repays the debt is unknown elsewhere, as are the eleven moneylenders, but one of them, Baʿal-bēlī son of Šeʾi-Dagan, bears the title of diviner, which could be an indication of high status. The creditor in the redemption contract BLMJ 12, Ea-damiq son of Zikria, is attested together with members of the Zū-Baʿla family and also as a the owner of a vineyard.

4.7.2 The Social Position of the Principals The distribution of the families of Zū-Baʿla, Ḫima, Milki-Dagan, Kutbe, Awiru, and Apilu across the three phases of credit transactions is uneven. Only about 26% of the Syro-Hittite and contemporary documents from the first two phases of credit transactions (14 out of 53)95 belong to these families. Conversely, 56% of the documents pertaining to default (14 out of 25) stem from their archives and dossiers. Quite interestingly, within this latter group of tablets, they appear in only three documents as the original creditors (E 117, E 205, TBR 25). Remarkably, all the sales into debt slavery and the enslavement contracts (§§ 3.2.3.1, 3.2.3.2.1) stem from the archives and dossiers of the notable families. The notable families are poorly attested among the original moneylenders, the vast majority of whom remain unknown. In the 78 Syro-Hittite and contemporary credit-related documents, the presence of members of the notable families as the original moneylenders can be safely ascertained in only 10 documents (ca. 13%),96 most of which (7) are related to consumptive debts. The role of these families as moneylenders in productive debts is therefore limited to merely three 94 For details see § 1.3.7; other individuals not treated in § 1.3.7 but for whom some information is available will be discussed here. 95 As above, Syrian tablets are excluded; cf. Table 29. 96 E 209, E 205, E 75, E 87, E 88, E 116, E 117, Hirayama 40, RE 10, TBR 25; AOAT 265.1, E 279, E 319, and perhaps E 277 and E 278 may be added here, but the role of the Zū-Baʿla family as moneylender is uncertain.

280 

 4 The Emar Credit System

documents, two belonging to the family of Ḫima (E 75 and E 87) and one to the family of Kutbe (Hirayama 40). Sources preserve the names of 136 original moneylenders.97 This figure does not account for all the creditors because a number of sources (17) do not provide or preserve the creditors’ names.98 Only nine creditors belong to the notable families (Table 41), and only a single member of the family of Ḫima, Dagan-kabar son Ḫima, perhaps acts as a moneylender in more than one document.99 The only other person who appears more than once as a creditor is Ḫinnu-Dagan son of Laḫma (RE 72 and RE 75). Even if we add the eight creditors from the small archives and dossiers reconstructed above, as well as those for whom we have some kind of information, we are considering only a small fraction of the total number of moneylenders. Table 41: Original Moneylenders from the Notable Families and Private Dossiers. Family of Zū-Baʿla

Baʿal-qarrād son of Zū-Baʿla

E 209

Ibni-Dagan son of Zū-Baʿla

E 205

Dagan-kabar son of Ḫima

E 75 E 87 (?)

Dagan-kabar son of Dagan-taliʾ

E 88

Aḫī-Dagan son of Milki-Dagan

E 117

Aḫī-Dagan son of Dagan-kabar

E 116

Zū-Aštarti son of Kutbe

Hirayama 40

Zū-Baʿla son of Aḫī-mālik

RE 10

Family of Awiru

Bulālu son of Arwu

TBR 25

Merchants of House 5

Kidin-Gula

E 26

Aḫlamû son of Abī-Bēlu

E 28

Ḫinnu-Dagan son of Laḫma

RE 72 RE 75

Uginu son of Laḫma

TBR 36

Dagan-taliʾ son of Udḫa-abu

TBR 39

Zimrī-Dagan son of Udḫa-abu

TBR 40

Family of Ḫima

Family of Milki-Dagan Family of Kutbe

Family of Laḫma

Family of Udḫa-abu

97 Institutions are counted as one. 98 AOAT 265.1, ASJ10 A, E 23, E 86, E 115, E 278, E 279, E 319, Hirayama 39, RE 58, RE 60, RE 63, RE 88, SMEA30 9, TBR 28, TBR 29, TBR 74; in AOAT 265.1, the financier of the trade venture was possibly Baʿal-qarrād, who can perhaps be identified with the son of Zū-Baʿla, but the creditors in the credit sale are simply indicated as Assyrians. 99 The attribution of E 87 to Dagan-kabar son of Ḫima is uncertain, see § 1.3.2.

4.7 Principals and Moneylenders 

 281

Table 41 (continued) Kunaʾe son of Irrike

QVO5 2

Šaggar-abu son of Baʿal-qarrād

E 16

Aḫlamû son of Abbanu

Hirayama 36

Šeʾi-Dagan son of Šaggar-abu

RE 10

Baʿal-bēlī son of Šeʾi-Dagan

RA77 5

Tūri son of Ilī-bāni

GsK 1

Isertu daughter of Dagan-taliʾ son of Iašur-Dagan

Hirayama 37

Ea-damiq son of Zikria

BLMJ 12

Apart from the members of the notable families and perhaps the merchants, the socio-economic status of the other moneylenders can hardly be detected. Nevertheless, some observations can be made. Certainly, among the elite were Aḫlamû, the grandson of the Overseer of the Land; Šeʾi-Dagan son of the tartannu Šaggar-abu; and perhaps the diviner Baʿal-bēlī son of Šeʾi-Dagan, as well as the military official Tūri son of Ilī-bāni. A high status has been suggested for Abī-liʾmu son of Abī-liʾmu but on tenuous grounds. On the contrary, a person such as Mama son of Ummānu (RE 63), although he had the means to repay the debts of others, does not seem to be one of the wealthiest inhabitants of Emar given the types and quantities of goods bequeathed in his will (RE 56),100 the rather modest share of each son (only one receives a house), and the small amount of the debt repaid (14 and 5/6 sh.). There are other moneylenders who have not been discussed in the context of the notable families or the minor dossiers because they are known from one source only, but who certainly had substantial financial means based on the amount of money they lent. A certain Kāpī-Dagan financed foreign merchants with a sum of 100 shekels of silver in E 24. In TBR 34, Abdi-ili son of Kulabu, who bears the title of herald, lent 115 shekels of silver for what was likely a consumptive debt. The majority of the people who repay someone’s debt are also unknown from other sources. There are 33 credit-related documents in which a third party repays a debt. Most documents (27) concern consumptive debts101 and only a small number (6) pertain to productive debts.102 Commercial debts were com100 One house, 48 sh., 8 oxen, 3 asses, and other items. 101 ASJ10 A, ASJ13 A, BLMJ 12, E 86, E 116, E 121, E 213, E 215, GsK 1, Hirayama 36, Hirayama 37, Hirayama 39, RA77 5, RE 10, RE 13, RE 25, RE 58, RE 63, RE 88, SMEA30 9, Subartu 17, TBR 28, TBR 29, TBR 36, TBR 74, TBR 78, TBR 84. 102 E 23, E 77, E 119, E 252, MFA 1977.114, RE 65.

282 

 4 The Emar Credit System

monly repaid by business partners (§§ 4.5.1, 4.8). The notable families provide contrasting evidence. On the one hand they repay someone’s debt in less than one-third of the instances of repayment on behalf of others (10 documents).103 However, 8 of these documents pertain to default, representing 67% of the total number of cases of third parties repaying someone’s debt in documents related to default104 – a ratio that is in line with their presence in documents of the third phase (see above). If we combine the attestations of the notable families as original moneylenders and as third parties, members of these families are revealed to be active creditors in only about one-fourth (ca. 26%) of the credit transactions known from Emar sources. It follows that members of the notable families intervene mostly to obtain real properties and especially bonded labor. Even in the sole case of a debt (possibly) generated by commercial activity to be settled by a member of one of these families (E 77), the debtor becomes an amēlūtu. In the only two contracts that do not lead to dependency, the debtors were a member of the family of Kutbe (RE 13) and probably a wealthy woman (E 213). Four documents recording debts settled by a third party (E 23, RE 63, TBR 28 and TBR 29) stem from the other archives and dossiers reconstructed above. Of these, a single document (E 23) records a productive debt and is an agreement between business partners on the settlement of a debt. Sources preserve the names of 31 people who acted as a third party. Only three persons are attested more than once: Zū-Aštarti son of Aḫī-mālik son of Kutbe (RE  13, GsK 1, Hirayama 36, and Hirayama 37), Baʿal-mālik son of Baʿal-qarrād (E 213 and E 215), and Abī-liʾmu son of Abī-liʾmu (TBR 28 and TBR 29). As in the case of moneylenders, we are poorly informed about the persons who repaid the debts, apart from the notable families. Based on the amount of the debt, we may surmise that Išmaʾ-Dagan son of Gubba, who repays 113 shekels of silver and 50 parīsu of barley in the family law contract RE 25, and a certain Šeʾi-Dagan, who repays 105 shekels and 40 grains of silver in the amēlūtu contract ASJ10 A, were people with substantial financial means, but we have no further information about them. Members of the notable families also appear in other roles. In four documents they purchase debt slaves or real properties from indebted people.105 Probably the most interesting and least expected role is that of debtors, which is attested in six 103 E 213, E 215, Subartu 17, E 77, E 86, E 121, RE 13, GsK 1, Hirayama 36, Hirayama 37; order of texts according to Table 40. 104 Documents related to default that record debts repaid by someone who does not belong to the notable families are ASJ10 A, RA77 5, RE 63, and E 252; note, however, that in RE 63 the third party is Mama son of Ummānu, who is listed in Table 40 as owner of a small dossier. 105 E 85, E 115, TBR 26, TBR 44.

4.7 Principals and Moneylenders 

 283

documents.106 However, we must distinguish between the productive debts E 119 and E 200, which relate to the purchase of goods, and the consumptive debts RE 10 and RE 13, where a member of a notable family was unable to satisfy his creditors himself. The context of the administrative documents E 279 and E 319 remains unclear. In a few documents (E 85, E 213, Hirayama 37, RA77 5, TBR 27, and TBR 33) women act as moneylenders. Two of these, E 85 and TBR 27, have been regarded as related to productive debts. Female moneylenders are qualified as wives (RA77 5, TBR 27, and TBR 33), as daughters (Hirayama 37 and RA77 5), or bear no specific qualifications (E 213). In E 213, the creditor’s name is written with both feminine and masculine determinatives, while in RA77 5 one woman among the creditors, Baʿla-ilī, only bears the masculine determinative. This use of the masculine determinative suggests that these women were made the head of the household before their husband’s death and were possibly widows. The other documents provide no specific evidence that any creditors were widows. When women are qualified as daughters, it is possible that they were not married. In addition to playing the role of moneylenders, women also appear as third parties repaying someone’s debt (E 23, E 252, and TBR 74). E 23 and E 252 record productive debts in which women act as business partners. We may conclude that banking activities and moneylending were not concentrated in the hands of a few people. The large number of moneylenders mentioned in Emar sources indicates a rather wide distribution of wealth. The notable families were far from monopolizing the banking system at Emar. They were more inclined to intervene at a later time to acquire real properties and dependents than they were to lend money. These families were driven by the aim to acquire dependents, and they certainly represent the main acquirers of dependents. As discussed below (§ 5.4), we also must consider that they had the financial means to help ruined people. A few other people who intervened in such cases are known from different sources, but it is often difficult to evaluate their socio-economic status. Comparison of the Emar documentation with that from other centers such as Nuzi shows that the profiles of lenders and the systems of credit radically differ between the cities. At Nuzi, in both the ḫubullu and the tidennūtu contracts, loans are issued by a restricted circle of moneylenders107 who expanded their land own106 E 279, E 319, E 200, E 119, RE 10, RE 13; note that in RE 10 and perhaps E 279 and E 319, members of the same families appear as lenders and borrowers. We have suggested that also in the Ekalte text Ek 46 a wealthy individual is the borrower, see ch. 2 fn. 239. 107 For ḫubullu contracts see Owen 1969: 43–44; for tidennūtu contracts see Zaccagnini 1976: 199.

284 

 4 The Emar Credit System

ership at the expense of the indebted peasantry. Out of 217 tablets containing ḫubullu loans collected by Owen, about 90 can be grouped in three archives only, one of which amounts to nearly one-third of all texts. In my opinion, the different credit systems at Nuzi and Emar are related to the structure of land ownership. Emar is characterized by a system of widespread small owners,108 while at Nuzi, moneylending practices conceal the accumulation of lands by a limited number of landowners exploiting the impoverished peasantry. Even when accumulation of properties is revealed by the study of private archives, however, the properties were acquired by purchase and not through the exploitation of impoverished people.109

4.8 Credit in Business and Commercial Activities As shown in Table 30 above, a number of debts can be associated with various business or trade activities. Textual sources concentrate on the stipulation of credit transactions and provide little information on the trade and business ventures to which they relate. Our interpretation of the sources (Table 42) must therefore be considered tentative, and the reader should be warned that the understanding of several documents remains unclear. Most investors sought to profit from trade, especially long-distance trade undertaken by local and foreign merchants. Credit-related documents provide little information on trade routes but frequently report the provenance of merchants or commodities. Emar and the Middle Euphrates region traditionally played an important commercial role as a junction between Mesopotamia, Northern Syria, Assyria, Anatolia, and the Levant.110 A variety of commodities were traded according to the Emar sources, including metals such as silver, gold, tin, and copper, as well as several types of wood, textiles, animals, and slaves, but in several documents the type of commerce remains unclear.

108 See Viano 2010a. 109 The creation of large land assets may perhaps be ascribed to the family of Zū-Baʿla; this apparently did not occur through the exploitation of impoverished peasants, however, but through regular purchases, see ch. 6 fn. 23 and Viano 2020a, Viano 2020b; see also ch. 1 fn. 20 for the attribution of the tablets in Building M₁ to the Zū-Baʿla family. 110 For Emar’s role in international trade see Pruzsinszky and Solans 2015, Viano 2018a.

Script

Type

Debt

Commodity

S

S

SH

MB

MB

MB

SH

SH

SH

SH

SH

SH

Hirayama 33

Hirayama 34

E 21

E 23

E 24

E 26

E 28

E 75

E 87

E 252

E 277

Hirayama 40

1

1

3/3

1

1

2/3

2/1

1

2/1

2/1

1

1

?

26 sh. 1 shekel of gold

70 sheep

4 slaves

Clothes

?

150 sh.

Unclear

?

272 sh.

?

100 sh.

?

?

> 60 sh.

30 sh.

Textiles

60 sh. Textiles for 14 sh.

330/340 fabrics (?)

?

20 sh.

3 shekels of silver/gold

?

200 sh.

Trade involving Syrian, Babylonian, and Anatolian Merchants

Document

Table 42: Business Activities.

Zū-Aštarti son of Kutbe

Rībi-Dagan; Kāpī-Dagan; Šaggar-abu son of Baššu; Ibni-Dagan son of Kamma

Abdi-ili son of Atawa

Dagan-kabar son of Ḫima

Dagan-kabar son of Ḫima

Aḫlamû

Kidin-Gula

Kāpī-Dagan

NG

Atteu son of Sapu

Iaṣi-bēlu son of Imliku

Šeʾi-Baʿali; Bēlu-kabar; Ilī-Dagan

Creditor

(continued)

Irbi-ilu and Qalāl-addin, sons of Šallaeia

Talmi-Kušuḫ; Kāpī-Dagan; Baba

Itūr-Dagan; Al-aḫātī sister of Itūr-Dagan

Puḫrila[. . .] (?)

Marduk son of Ḫazannu

Inbuia

Nabunni

Tatašše/Raʾīndu

Ali-Nani

Imlik-Dagan son of Dagan-bēlu

Šamaš-abu son of Milki-Dagan

Idi-Dagan son of Baʿal-abu

Debtor

4.8 Credit in Business and Commercial Activities   285

Script

SH

SH

SH

Document

RE 65

TBR 27

TBR 49

Table 42 (continued)

1

1

2/1

Type

? ?

1) 23 sh. 200 shekels of purified tin 500 shekels of blue wool 2) 9 sh. 3) 8 sh. 4) 5 sh. 5) 6 sh. 6) 30 sh.

?

58.5 sh.

?

Commodity

Debt

1–5) Abu-ṭāb and Ḫattû 6) Abbanu the scribe

Ḫudatu wife of Abunnu

Aliu son of Zulalu (10 sh.); Tabili son in law of Ḫania (10 sh.); Itūr-Dagan son of Ḫumāmu (10 sh.); Kamma son of Tuttul (13 sh.); Dagalli son of Šaḫlu (5 sh.); Puʾašu son of Dagan-BE (2 sh.); Šamiḫu son of Bianu (2 sh.); ‹PN› son of Nuʾāru (2 sh.); Aḫu-waqaru son of Enia (1.5 sh.); Walda-aḫī (1 sh.); Aštar-abu son of Adute (1 sh.); Quʾu son of Šazi (1 sh.)

Creditor

1) Ḫattû son of Mamma-ka 2) Tūra-Dagan son of the scribe Imlik-Dagan 3) Muttatti son of Rībatu 4) Nūra-līmur 5) Šaggar-napšir 6) Abu-ṭāb and Ḫattû

Aḫī-raḫaq son of Iaʾšu

Bura-ziki

Debtor

286   4 The Emar Credit System

SH

SH

SH

MA

MA

Unk

MFA 1977.114

E 127

AOAT 265.1

RE 19

GsK 5 (?)

1

1

3/2

2/3

2/3

2/1

2/1

?

NG ?

good plowman

Assyrians

2 minas and 5 sh. 2 niksu-textiles 1 lubēru-textile

Tin

Aššur-aḫa-iddina son of Šamaš-abu

10 shekels of gold.; oil for 100 sh.; 5 talents of boxwood and 2 good oxen (= the value of a naššartu-woman and a child); 1 talent of copper of 4000 sh. in weight

100 sh. 2 slaves additional silver

Abu-kīn

Kāzanu son of Kušuḫ-atkal

Pazuri-Dagan

?

45 sh.

Atteu son of Sapu

Palace

Textiles

2 talents and 2400 shekels of copper

60 sh. Textiles for 14 sh.

Bronze chain

111 This text is listed twice in the table because it involves merchants of different provenance.

SH

E 21 (?)111

Trade with Assyria

Anatolica 16 (?)

? (continued)

Apḫama-Adad son of Aḫī-raḫīqu Matkal-Dagal son of Ḫabiʾi

Ḫamis-Dagal servant of Baʿal-qarrād

Lalû son of Zū-Baʿla

Ari-Teššub man of Aššur

Imlik-Dagan son of Dagan-bēlu

Sons of Laḫma and Zū-Baba

4.8 Credit in Business and Commercial Activities   287

Script

Type

SH

E 200

SH

S

SH

SH

SH

E 85 (?)

E 109 (?)

E 278

RE 72

RE 75

1

1

1

2/1

2/1

3/1

2/1

2/1

Ḫinnu-Dagan son of Laḫma

30 sh. 40 satu-vessels of fine oil –

1) Ḫinnu-Dagan son of Laḫma 2) Aḫiu son of Tūbu

NG ?

–

(130 sh. ?)

17 creditors, only a few names preserved: Iškur-[. . .] (25 sh.) Šamaš-[. . .] (10 sh.) Qīrī-Dagan (50 sh.) Šalim-Dagan (20 sh.)

1) 12 (?) + 7 satu- – vessels of fine oil 2) 4 aribû-garments

?

292 sh.

260 shekels of bronze –

?

140 sh. 10 creditors (no names preserved)

Dagan-kabar son of Bēlu

–

30 sh.

Creditor City of Kuraraba

Commodity

15 parīsu of barley –

Debt

Aḫiu son of Tūbu

1) Aḫiu son of Tūbu 2) Ḫinnu-Dagan son of Laḫma

Dagan-abu son of Baṣṣa

Ilia son of Aḫī-ḫamiṣ

Tīri-Dagan, Zū-Baʿla, and Šaggar-abu, sons of Kāpī-Dagan son of Baṣṣu

Muḫra-aḫī son of Kutta son of Zadamma son of Baṣu

Zū-Baʿla

Aḫī-Dagan son of Milki-Dagan Ipqi-Dagan son of Ḫu-um/un-zi (?) Zū-Baʿla son of Ḫattiu

Debtor

Legend. Document types: 1 – documents creating an obligation; 2/1 – repayment of debts; 2/3 – lawsuit concerning the fulfillment of obligations; 3/1 – indentured labor; 3/2 – pledge; 3/3 – debt slavery

SH

E 77

Other Business Activities

SH

E 119

Debts for Purchase of Goods

Document

Table 42 (continued)

288   4 The Emar Credit System

4.8 Credit in Business and Commercial Activities 

 289

Business and trade activities were financed by private investors. Unlike other Late Bronze Age centers in Syria, Emar offers almost no trace of palatial or institutionally administered trade.112 A single document, Anatolica 16, perhaps reveals the existence of super-regional trade managed by the palace. We have suggested that this tablet records a credit sale of a bronze chain entrusted by the palace of Karkemiš to merchants of probably Syrian origin in exchange for a large quantity of copper. Perhaps palace supervision is reflected in the Syrian tablet Hirayama 33, because a member of the First Dynasty serves as a witness for the loan. Another institutional loan is E 119, although the lender is not the palace but a collective power called the city of Kururaba. Most of the merchants mentioned in credit-related documents were foreigners. Merchants of various origin were established in House 5 (Area A), where a cache of Babylonian tablets was found.113 The archive of Ḫima in Area T provides further information on international trade. Two merchants mentioned in documents from the archive of Ḫima, Marduk (E 75), and Puḫrila[. . .] (E 87), belonged to the entourage of merchants from House 5. Marduk was a Kassite trader who is mentioned in a letter found in the Maison d’Urtenu at Ugarit, probably sent from House 5. Puḫrila[. . .] – likely a foreign merchant – secured his own debt by providing another merchant from House 5 as a guarantor.114 The close relations of the family of Ḫima with the merchants of House 5 is confirmed by the presence of one of Ḫima’s sons in the Babylonian tablet E 24, where he serves as a witness for the lender, a certain Kāpī-Dagan, who was likely a wealthy person. A link between the businessmen documented in E 21 and the merchants of House 5115 could be confirmed if the debtor’s father was the Ugaritic merchant Dagan-bēlu. The latter was a representative of a commercial firm at Emar and is named in letters from the Maison d’Urtenu in which the merchants from House 5 are also mentioned. Trade ventures carried out by the merchants from House 5 could be financed by local Emarites, as shown by E 24 and likely E 23, and notably by the archive of Ḫima, which records some of the largest silver loans: 272 shekels of silver to Marduk (E 75) and 150 shekels of silver to Puḫrila[. . .] (E 87). The merchants from House 5 also issued credit to each other (E 28). These merchants jointly managed business partnerships and served as guarantors for each other, especially when someone was away on a business trip (E 23, E 87). Apart from E 26, which indi112 See § 4.6. 113 For the epigraphic finds from this archive see § 1.3.8. 114 For the association of Puḫrila[. . .] with the merchants from House 5 and his identification with the borrower see pp. 62f. 115 Note that E 21 stems from Area A, where also House 5 was located; for the details see § 2.2.1.2.4.

290 

 4 The Emar Credit System

cates the commodities traded, the nature of the trade for which credit was issued remains unknown.116 Trading activities spread to several regions, including Upper Mesopotamia, specifically Subaru (E 23), the land of Suḫu (E 26), and Babylonia, as well as Ugarit and the Levant (E 75 and E 87117). The documents E 24 and E 28 contain no geographical references that might indicate the target areas of the trade. Textiles, perhaps imported from Assyria, were traded via Emar, Palmyra, and Amurru in E 21, which is witnessed by two merchants from Palmyra. Another foreign merchant, who is not associated with House 5, was likely Bura-ziki118 (RE 65). It is not excluded that also a certain Ḫattû (TBR 49) was a foreign trader, perhaps from Anatolia.119 These merchants had business partnerships with people from Emar or the Middle Euphrates who served as guarantors and paid their debts (RE 65) or lent them money (TBR 49). Commerce with Qadeš and Salḫu120 is known from the fragmentary document E 277, which mentions Emar townsmen such as Kāpī-Dagan and foreigners such as Talmi-Kušuḫ, who was stationed in the town of Salḫu. Some documents illuminate trade with Assyria and the role of Emar as a commercial hub. Assyrian merchants were present in Emar, trading from (MFA 1977.114) and to Assyria (E 127). At the same time, Emarite merchants traveled to Assyria (AOAT 265.1 and RE 19).121 Emarite merchants served as intermediaries between the Levant and Assyria in E 127 and AOAT 265.1. Credit was issued both by Assyrians to Emarites (E 127 and AOAT 265.1) and vice versa (MFA 1977.114). Another possible case of trade between Emarites and Assyrians is E 21, where the financier was perhaps an Assyrian.122 Trade with Assyria concerned luxury commodities from the Levant such as boxwood (E 127), tin traded by Canaanite merchants, silver, and textiles from Assyria (AOAT 265.1 and E 21). The Middle Assyrian tablet RE 19 deals with the trade of a plowman, but it remains unclear whether he was a slave or a wage worker. The only indications of where Emarites conducted their business within Assyria are found in E 127 and RE 19, as the Assyrians involved in the trans-

116 The letter E 25 concerns the trade of slaves and fabric but it does not relate to credit, see § 3.4.1.3. 117 Note that in addition to providing a guarantor to secure the loan, Puḫrila[. . .] supplies as a pledge a quantity of alum, which is an Egyptian product exported to the Levantine coast. 118 On this personal name see ch. 2 fn. 270. 119 Note that also another Ḫattû mentioned in AuOr5 12 (§ 3.3.1.4) is a foreigner. 120 Note that Ali-Nani, the debtor in E 23, stems from this town. 121 For Emarites in Assyrian territory see Faist 2001: 128–38. 122 Zaccagnini 2018: 45.

4.8 Credit in Business and Commercial Activities 

 291

actions were from the towns of Šadikanni and Kailu respectively.123 Another credit document possibly recording trade between Syria and Assyria is GsK 5, although the fragmentary nature of the tablet as well as the unclear script and provenance hinder the understanding of the type of trade and of the identity of the lender and borrower. In this loan, the lender apparently expected to be rewarded with a share of the profits, because the document seems to make no mention of interest and contains a proviso that the lent capital shall be returned after the business trip. The two lawsuits E 127 and MFA 1977.114 and the letter AOAT 265.1, which concerns the plea of an Emarite merchant held as a pledge, as well as E 21, in which another Emarite merchant was pledged, show a certain friction between Assyrians and Emarites. Lawsuits were filed by Assyrian merchants against Emarites (E 127) and vice versa (MFA 1977.114) and were adjudicated under Hittite rule. Because these lawsuits involved foreigners, they were presided over by the highest Hittite authorities in Syria: the king of Karkemiš (MFA 1977.114), who judged the case in his capital, and the Son of the King (E 127), who likely traveled to Emar for the trial.124 A few other documents relate to trades carried out by merchants who were likely local125 – either Emarites or merchants stemming from other centers in the Middle Euphrates region.126 Local merchants were financed by Emarites in TBR 27, which probably relates to international trade,127 and also in E 77, if our interpretation of this text as recording a productive debt is valid. In the lawsuit E 252, which records an endowment capital (mandattu), an Emarite merchant was financed by a person who possibly stemmed from the town of Karšu. In TBR 27 and E 252, merchants belonged to family enterprises and were supported by relatives who served as guarantors. The target areas and commodities of these trades are unfortunately unknown. The loan form is used for the exchange of oil, garments, and silver between Emarites in RE 72 and RE 75. It is unclear whether this exchange derived from international trade or (more likely) small-scale business.

123 On the trade between Emar and Assyria see also Monroe 2009: 255. 124 For the places where these Hittite authorities administered justice see d’Alfonso 2005a: 62, 71–72. 125 The attestation of local merchants does not indicate that trade was limited to the Middle Euphrates region; see, for instance, Hirayama 33 and Hirayama 34, in which the indication of the weight system likely implies that the trade was carried out abroad. 126 BLMJ 14 is another document discussed in the present study that is related to trade ventures carried out by an Emarite, although it does not record debts, see § 2.2.2.1.1. 127 The merchant is Ḫamis-Dagal’s partner in AOAT 265.1.

292 

 4 The Emar Credit System

Slaves were the object of the credit sale recorded in Hirayama 40: the family of Kutbe entrusted the sale of four slaves to some merchants for the price of 70 sheep in rams and ewes, to be paid within a month on penalty of double the sale price. The merchants stemmed from the district of the Abalḫumi-canal, whose location is unknown but was likely in the vicinity of Emar. The financing of Emarite merchants by fellow townsmen seems to be the background also of the two Syrian loans Hirayama 33 and Hirayama 34, which, however, are silent on the purpose of the endeavor. Debts were also incurred for the purchase of goods. These debts concerned different commodities: barley (E 119), silver (E 200), and bronze (E 278). The silver, only 30 shekels, was borrowed by the diviner Zū-Baʿla probably due to a lack of cash and was presumably used to purchase unknown goods. The barley (15 parīsu) was sold by the city of Kururaba to a member of the family of Milki-Dagan and his associates in a credit sale secured by two guarantors who were acting as middlemen. The barley was consumed by the borrowers or lent to outsiders. The large quantity of bronze recorded in E 278 was likely used for some manufacturing activity. To sum up, commercial partnerships are frequently attested in the Emar sources, which often mention debts paid by business associates.128 Merchant partnerships were commonly established within the family circle, with women, mostly wives, actively managing the business and serving as guarantors.129 Tatašše/ Raʾīndu was in charge of the Emar bureau for her husband Alazaia (E 23, E 24, and E 25). Two merchants associated in a partnership, Aḫī-raḫaq (TBR 27) and Ḫamis-Dagal (AOAT 265.1), conducted their business with the assistance of their wives. In E 252, a merchant formed a partnership with his sister, who served as his guarantor. Credit granted for business activities encompasses different instruments and practices. The majority of documents record amounts of capital (i.e., silver or other metals) lent for trade ventures by private moneylenders and investors.130 In addition to straight loans, Emar sources provide examples of other forms of financing, such as credit sales (Anatolica 16, AOAT 265.1, E 21, Hirayama 40, E 119, and E 278) and Lieferungskäufe (E 127 and MFA 1977.114 (?)131). E 26 is either a bill

128 See § 4.5.1. 129 On the familial basis of commercial enterprises in the Late Bronze Age, see Arnaud 1991c: 187–88, Monroe 2009: 207–15. 130 Hirayama 33, Hirayama 34, E 23, E 24, E 75, E 87, E 200, E 252, E 277 (?), GsK 5, RE 65, TBR 27 (?), TBR 49, MFA 1977.114 (?). 131 The classification of MFA 1977.114 is unclear: the 45 shekels of silver given by Pazuri-Dagan to the Assyrian merchant Ari-Teššub could be an advance payment (Lieferungskauf) for goods that the Assyrian merchant was supposed to bring from Assur, or capital lent for a trade venture.

4.8 Credit in Business and Commercial Activities 

 293

of exchange or a Lieferungskauf in which several items (perhaps fabric) were purchased for 3 shekels of gold. TBR 49 attests the use of a particularly sophisticated credit instrument, as the two merchants Abu-ṭāb and Ḫattû secured a loan with credit they had obtained from Emarites, which included quantities of silver, tin, and wool. Emarites invested in trade carried out by both foreign merchants132 and local traders.133 At the same time foreigners, notably Assyrians, invested in trades carried out by Emarite merchants (AOAT 265.1, E 21 (?), E 127, E 252). A common strategy of merchants in the ancient Near East was to re-invest the profits from trade in real estate.134 Although we do not have documentary evidence of merchants buying real estate, Emar records attest real properties owned by merchants.135 There is also evidence for investors purchasing real properties, as is the case of the family of Ḫima, which acts as a buyer in several sale contracts.136 Merchants’ economic and personal risks are illustrated by E 21 and AOAT 265.1. In both documents two Emarite merchants were held as pledges because they were unable to pay their debts in due time. In AOAT 265.1, the pledged merchant, Ḫamis-Dagal, was forced to work as a slave for his Assyrian creditors. The trade venture was carried out under the authority of Baʿal-qarrād, likely the diviner, who perhaps financed the enterprise. Although Ḫamis-Dagal formally addressed the letter to Baʿal-qarrād – who apparently took no action – he was fully responsible for the business venture because he secured the credit sale with his own freedom. Indeed, the real addressee of the letter was Ḫamis-Dagal’s wife, who was instructed how to collect the money necessary to release her husband. As we have argued, the Assyrians were not interested in Ḫamis-Dagal’s labor but rather wished to recover their money, because they allowed him to employ an Assyrian scribe to write back home. In E 21, the merchant’s financial difficulties were only temporary, as the document records the repayment of the debt and his release. Another document witnessing the failure of a business venture seems to 132 E 23 (the lender was likely an Emarite, although the document does not report his name because its purpose was to regulate an agreement between two merchants), E 24, E 75, E 87, MFA 1977.114, RE 65, and TBR 49. 133 E 77 (?), Hirayama 33, Hirayama 34, Hirayama 40, and TBR 27. 134 See, for instance, for Nuzi Morrison 1993: 99–103; for the Old Assyrian period see Michel 1996. 135 The letter AOAT 265.1 specifically indicates that the merchant Ḫamis-Dagal owned real estate; Ḫudi’s husband (E 213), Abiu, from whom she inherited several properties, was a merchant as shown by BLMJ 14: 4; we have suggested that the real estate sold in E 109 (S) and E 85 (SH) belonged to traders. The Middle Assyrian text KAJ 145 shows that an Emarite merchant owned properties in Assur, Faist 2001: 138. 136 E 76, E 80, E 81, E 82.

294 

 4 The Emar Credit System

be the lawsuit E 252, because a girl associated with the debtors is sentenced to slavery. E 77 also possibly deals with the misfortune of a merchant, since a certain Muḫra-aḫī became an amēlūtu of a member of the family of Ḫima in exchange for having his debt repaid. Another example of business activity between Assyrians and Emarites secured by a personal pledge is RE 19, but it remains unclear whether the person pledged was a slave or a business partner. The number of documents related to business credit and the quantity of money invested in these activities reveal the important commercial role of Emar during the Late Bronze Age as a center of exchange between East and West. The present study has shown that several documents that at first glance seem to record debts contracted because of economic difficulties in fact attest intense business and commercial activities. In addition, documents that have been regarded as recording consumptive debts due to the lack of any evidence of commercial activity might in fact be related to business activities.

4.9 Debt Settlement Emar sources attest several ways to settle debts. This section will only deal with the repayment of debts that do not lead to forms of dependency, which will be treated below (§ 5.1). Debts can be repaid in due time by the borrower. Not surprisingly, this form of debt settlement has left scant traces in textual sources, as the loan tablets were normally broken137 and written records were no longer required. When loans encompassed complex transactions, especially in commercial contexts, a receipt could be issued.

4.9.1 Repayment of Debts Only productive debts are attested as being spontaneously repaid by the borrowers (Anatolica 16, E 21, E 26, E 119, and E 200).138 As discussed above (§ 4.8), commercial debts were also frequently repaid by guarantors/partners when borrowers were away on business trips. Two debts that possibly ensued from business activities (E 85 and E 109) were repaid by selling real properties. Given the high prices received for the sold properties, we have argued that the sale was voluntary

137 See, however, the discussion on the preservation of tablets in § 4.1. 138 As mentioned above (§ 4.2), long-distance trade was more likely to lead to judicial claims and therefore required written proofs more often.

4.9 Debt Settlement 

 295

rather than a decision motivated by economic distress. Not infrequently, controversies broke out in commercial contexts, and in two lawsuits borrowers were convicted and ordered to repay their debts (E 28 and E 127). A controversy of particular interest is resolved in MFA 1977.114, in which a Syrian claimant against an Assyrian merchant was reimbursed for his credit by the king of Karkemiš’s mother, who transferred to him a field in Emar. In consumptive debts, when debtors had no means to meet their obligations, they frequently resorted to selling real properties in order to collect silver (E 115, TBR 33, and TBR 65), or they directly transferred properties to the creditors, i.e., datio in solutum (E 116, E 123, and TBR 36). Buildings, mainly houses, are forfeited in E 115, E 123, TBR 33, and TBR 65, while fields are surrendered only in E 115, E 116, and TBR 36. The most common mode of debt settlement in consumptive debts was the intervention of a third party (see § 4.5). In 17 out of 22 documents recording the fulfillment of consumptive debts,139 the obligations were repaid by either a debtor’s relative140 or more frequently by an outsider,141 who often, but not always, is specifically referred to as a guarantor. Third parties receiving real properties as recompense for repaying a debt could be relatives (Hirayama 39 and TBR 82) or outsiders (TBR 28 and TBR 29). In BLMJ 12, a pledged house was redeemed by the debtor’s brother, but it is unclear whether he returned the house to his brother or kept it for himself. The value of properties transferred as datio in solutum was higher than the amount of the debt. The same holds true for the properties given as recompense to the third party, whether the latter was a relative or an outsider. This might indicate that the parties who intervened were exploiting economic difficulties, but at the same time it is possible that the properties forfeited were all that the debtors owned. A different situation is described in RE 58, where an outsider does not obtain full ownership of a debtor’s properties after repaying his debt but instead takes the debtor’s wife and house as pledges. This situation is comparable to documents of indentured labor (§ 3.2.1) and other similar forms of dependency (§ 3.2.4) in which a third party repays someone’s debt, not only with the expectation of obtaining his assets but also as a way to secure the future of a ruined debtor and

139 These figures include repayments of debts (§ 2.2.1), family law contracts (§ 2.2.2), and lawsuits (§ 2.2.3), see Table 31. 140 BLMJ 12, Hirayama 39, RE 13, RE 25 (?), TBR 36, TBR 82, TBR 84. 141 ASJ13 A, E 213, RE 10, RE 58, RE 88, SMEA30 9, TBR 28, TBR 29, TBR 74, TBR 78.

296 

 4 The Emar Credit System

his family.142 Indeed, in RE 58 the debtor’s wife resided in the house of a wealthy family, who granted her a means of subsistence.

4.9.2 Alienated Properties and Redemption Real properties forfeited in lieu of the debt, whether sold or transferred, were fully alienated (Table 43). Table 43: Alienated Properties in Repayments of Debts. Document Script Transfer

Debt

Property

Redemption Verb

Redeemer

400 sh.

baqāru

anyone

–

–

–

PRODUCTIVE DEBTS 1 kierṣetu

E 109

S

Sale

NG

E 85

SH

Sale

292 sh. 1 house 1 ḫablu

TBR 82

S

Recompense

BLMJ 12

SH

E 115

SH

E 116 E 123

CONSUMPTIVE DEBTS 30 sh.

1 house

1) 2000 sh. 1) ragāmu 1) brothers 2) 30 sh. 2) elû 2) debtor

Redemption

30 sh.

1 house

20 sh. (?)

elû

LÚ.EN DI.KU₅

Sale

20 sh.

1 tugguru 5 fields

TÉŠ.BI

baqāru

brother

SH

Datio in solutum

5 sh.

fields

5 sh.

baqāru

anyone

SH

Datio in solutum

30 sh.

1 house

1) 30 sh. 2) TÉŠ.BI

1) nadānu 1) debtor 2) baqāru 2) anyone

Hirayama SH 39

Recompense

25 sh.

(1) house mitḫāriš inheritance share

ragāmu

anyone

TBR 28

SH

Recompense (?) 50 sh.

2 houses

mitḫāriš

baqāru

anyone

TBR 29

SH

Recompense (?) 60 sh.

2 houses

mitḫāriš

baqāru

anyone

TBR 33

SH

Sale

31 sh.

1 house

TÉŠ.BI

baqāru

anyone

TBR 36

SH

Datio in solutum

77 sh.

lands

–

–

–

TBR 65

SH

Sale

45 sh.

1 house

TÉŠ.BI

leqû

debtor

Most of these properties were encumbered by the right of redemption, which was commonly granted across the ancient Near East for properties sold under the 142 For this form of solidarity see Démare-Lafont 2014 and §§ 3.2.1, 5.4.

4.9 Debt Settlement 

 297

pressure of debts or impoverishment.143 In the Old Babylonian period, when the return of the sold properties was enforced by a royal edict (mīšarum), redemption occurred without payment.144 Conversely, when redemption arose from contractual terms or customary laws, the owner obtained his property back at the original purchase price.145 Only two documents recording the forfeiture of properties to settle a debt omit the redemption clause. In the possible productive debt E 85, the redemption of the sold properties was forbidden by the non-vindication clause, perhaps because the sellers were not interested in buying back their asset. In the lawsuit TBR 36, the non-vindication clause bars mutual claims by debtor and creditor. Redemption was mostly open to anyone (ša / mannummê), although it is unclear whether this expression literally referred to any outsider or only to certain rightholders.146 To protect the buyer, the redemption payment was usually set at twice the purchase price or debt (TÉŠ.BI/mitḫāriš).147 This double payment distinguishes the redemption of fully alienated properties from the redemption of pledges (§  4.5.4), which only required the return of the debt. As with alienated persons (§§ 3.1.2, 5.3), the doubled price of redemption achieves a balance between the interests of the buyers/creditors, who have their ownership rights guaranteed, and those of the debtors, who are granted the possibility to buy back their property. In two cases (E 123 and TBR 82), redemption was set at the same amount of the debt but was limited to the debtor. In E 123, the right of redemption was limited to the term of one year. In the Syrian document TBR 82, no time restriction applies to redemption, likely because the debtor and the third party were brothers. As a further protection of the debtor’s right, a high price of redemption (2000 sh.) was imposed on outside claimants. In a single case, E 116, the one-toone rate of redemption is open to any claimant for reasons unknown. Finally, in BLMJ 12, a pledged property was redeemed for ten shekels less than the amount of the debt, and a clause stipulates that the pledgeholder was liable to satisfy any future redeemers, but the price of redemption is not clearly indicated.

143 For the right of redemption see § 5.3; although the right of redemption was established in laws, the redemption clause is rarely documented in legal documents, see ch. 5 fn. 98. 144 Veenhof 1999b: 607–08. 145 Westbrook 1991: 92–100. 146 On this point see § 5.3; cf. Fijałkowska 2014a: 166, Fijałkowska 2015a: 28–29. 147 For these expressions see § 1.5.

298 

 4 The Emar Credit System

4.9.3 Debt Settlement in Family Law Contracts Another mode of debt settlement is documented in the family law contracts (§ 2.2.2). These documents are patterned as adoptions and establish a relation, described by the verb palāḫu, between the debtor and someone who repays his debt. This duty is usually found in adoption contracts and is demanded of the adoptee. In the family law contracts, the palāḫu duty was performed by the debtor on behalf of the third party, or vice versa. The family law contracts can be sorted into two groups. The first is formed by true contracts of adoption (E 213, RE 25, RE 88, TBR 74, and TBR 78) stipulating that the adoptee must perform the palāḫu duty for the adopter (§ 2.2.2.1). Three of the adoptions are paired with the marriage of the adoptee to the adopter’s daughter (E 213, RE 25, and RE 88). In three cases (RE 25, RE 88, and TBR 78), the adopter is the third party repaying the debt, while in other two documents (E 213 and TBR 78) the adopter is the debtor. The second group includes three contracts (RE 10, RE 13, and SMEA30 9) in which no adoption is stipulated and the recipient of the palāḫu duty is always the debtor (§ 2.2.2.2). Only in SMEA30 9 were the debtor’s daughters married off to the benefactor’s sons. The recipients of the palāḫu duty were to bequeath their properties to the performers (Table 44). The heir could therefore be either the third party who repays the debt (E 213, RE 10, RE 13, SMEA30 9, and TBR 78) or the debtors themselves (RE 25, RE 88, and TBR 74). Compared to other forms of debt settlement, this kind of agreement was quite favorable to the debtors because both sides were bound by reciprocal relations: the benefactors repaid the debt and provided livelihood, while the debtors provided support and at times their share of the inheritance. It follows that the debtors could secure their future by obtaining the means to support themselves. Debtors are male except in E 213. In a single case a woman repays someone’s debt (TBR 74). Various motives can be posited for paying off someone’s debt and bequeathing them their own inheritance share through adoption. A lack of male children (RE 88) might lie behind the benefactor’s decision to marry off his daughters to the debtors, thus securing the continuation of his family line. One benefactor was a widow who was seeking someone to look after her (TBR 74). Family ties between the debtor and the benefactor could also supply a motive (RE 25). The properties transferred in these documents were not encumbered by redemption because they belonged to a share of an inheritance. Therefore, when the heir is the one who repays the debt, it may be suggested that this arrangement was intended to avoid future claims. The agreement was protected by penalties on both sides (Table 44).

4.9 Debt Settlement 

 299

Table 44: Penalties in Family Law Contracts. Document Debt

Heir

Inheritance

Penalty TPa

Penalty D

Adoptions E 213

20 sh. Third party House; 30 parīsu (Adoptee?) All possessions of barley (including a vineyard); House in Ziʾlu district

RE 25

113 sh. Debtor 50 parīsu (Adoptee) of barley

RE 88

?

TBR 74

30 sh. (?) Debtor (Adoptee)

TBR 78

9 sh.

Loss of credit; NG Loss of rights to debtor’s possessions

Share of a house and 60 sh. of all possessions with the adoptive brothers

Debtors ? (Adoptees)

House; All possessions

Third party House (Adoptee)

palāḫu Contracts

Loss of rights to wife and sons; 60 sh.

Loss of rights to daughters; House (?); 60 sh. (?)

Loss of rights to wives; 60 sh.; House (?); Silver (?)

House; All possessions

Loss of rights to the third party’s house; 30 sh.

Loss of rights House; to debtor’s 60 sh. house; 60 sh.

RE 10

51 sh. Third party House; Loss of credit; 30 parīsu All possessions 60 sh. of barley Property in the city and in the countryside; Inheritance share; Bridewealth of the debtor’s daughters

RE 13

51 sh. Third party House; Loss of credit; House; 30 parīsu All possessions; 60 sh. All possessions; of barley Property in the city and 60 sh. in the countryside; Inheritance share; Bridewealth of the debtor’s daughters

SMEA30 9 20 sh. Third party Unclear inheritance 20 parīsu of barley a

Loss of rights All possessionsc to debtor’s possessionsb; 250 sh. (?)

Loss of credit refers to the money disbursed to repay the debt. This penalty applies to the third party’s sons. c This penalty applies to the debtor’s daughters. b

House; All possessions; Bridewealth; 60 sh.

300 

 4 The Emar Credit System

The penalties imposed on each side in breach are similar and only slightly higher for the debtor; they usually consist of a sum of silver, generally 60 shekels, and the loss of certain rights. Remarkably, in E 213, penalties are imposed only on the benefactor. Additionally, in TBR 74 it is the benefactor/adopter who was punished with harsher penalties, most likely because she was a woman and a widow. In some contracts penalties only served as deterrence because they were higher than the debt. The imposition of similar penalties underscores that parties enjoyed equal (or similar) status and legal standing, even though one side was indebted to the other. Unlike indentured labor, where the palāḫu duty was only performed by the debtor for his master, and probably implied more compelling obligations, in the majority of family law contracts the palāḫu duty is performed by the one who repays the debt and therefore becomes the debtor’s heir. When the debtor is adopted and performs the palāḫu duty, he is also entitled to become heir, which clearly separated the family law contracts from the contracts of indentured labor. The notable families rarely feature in the family law contracts, appearing in only three out of eight documents. In each case, a member of these families is attested as benefactor and always acts to support a relative (RE 10, RE 13) or someone who was also likely a wealthy person (E 213). None of the other individuals who are known from more than one source (§ 1.3.7) shows up as a third party in family law contracts. One might perhaps suggest that wealthy people were not particularly prone to enter these contracts because of the equal penalties unless a friend, a relative, or a peer was involved.

4.10 The Economic Context of Credit Transactions at Emar Emar sources record debts arising from both commercial and consumptive contexts (§ 4.2). A number of documents (29) pertaining to trade and various business activities illuminate Emar’s role as a junction in a network of intense commercial exchanges connecting Mesopotamia, Syria, Anatolia, and the Levant. Emar flourished under these circumstances as local townsmen invested large amounts of capital in international trade often carried out by foreign merchants. One should be aware that a business or commercial context is not per se an indication of financial prosperity. Financial problems lurk around the corner should a venture fail. The economic and personal risk of trade and business activities was high, as clearly exposed in AOAT 265.1, E 21, E 252, and perhaps E 77. Business outcomes are at stake also in two Syrian-type commercial loans (Hirayama 33 and Hirayama 34). Their preservation from the time of the First Dynasty may have been accidental. However, it is possible that these business ventures failed, and the tablets

4.10 The Economic Context of Credit Transactions at Emar 

 301

were initially preserved because the debts were not repaid. Unsuccessful ventures may lie in the background of two sales of real properties that perhaps recorded productive debts (E 85 (SH) and E 109 (S)). We have argued that these sales were undertaken willingly, in virtue of the high prices the sellers were able to obtain. Nevertheless, we should consider the possibility that the borrowers were compelled to sell their properties by business failures but were nevertheless able to obtain favorable prices. Despite these remarks, Emar documents show no signs of economic crises or difficulties that may have hampered or limited commerce or business activities (see § 6). When we move to what we have called consumptive debts, the reader needs to recall that our definition of “consumptive” is based more on the absence rather than the presence of distinguishing features. Any debt that does not clearly manifest a commercial or business background – or at least allow it to be inferred – is treated here as consumptive. Naturally, we cannot exclude that some debts labeled as consumptive arose from business activities. A precise classification of consumptive debts is complicated by the fact that the vast majority of debts thus categorized are concerned with silver, which is mostly associated with business activities.148 Therefore, the conclusions drawn in this section must be considered tentative. To understand the economic background of consumptive debts, one must keep in mind that different degrees of indebtedness existed, and that outstanding debts did not inevitably lead to financial collapse. The amount of money borrowed, the borrower’s social status, and the assets available to the borrower to secure the debt, including real estate and family members, are all significant elements to consider when evaluating a debtor’s financial condition. We may attempt to quantify the sources revealing financial distress. Needless to say, economic hardship was the background of documents pertaining to default (23 documents)149 and subsequent conditions of dependency, which are extensively treated below (§ 5.1). 148 Garfinkle 2012: 41–42. 149 The productive debts AOAT 265.1 and E 252 are not included here, although they led to dependency. Conversely, E 77 is included, primarily because its classification as a productive debt is conjectural, and secondarily because the debtor’s condition of dependency appears to be established for a longer term compared to AOAT 265.1 and E 252. In both documents the release is foreseeable in a short time: in AOAT 265.1 dependency is clearly short-term because the debtor is actively seeking his freedom and the pledgeholders are not interested in keeping the pledge; in E 252 the debtor is not the enslaved person, who, therefore, can be released by the creditor. On the contrary, in E 77 the debtor became the amēlūtu of someone who repaid his debt after the complete failure of his business. Also note that other documents of dependency, the amēlūtu contract ASJ10 A and the enslavement contract E 215, record high debts, which might suggest business activities.

302 

 4 The Emar Credit System

The economic circumstances of a number of consumptive debts from the first two phases of the credit transaction show no signs of financial distress and are probably not determined by dramatic economic situations.150 These include two documents creating an obligation, E 279 and E 319; the family law contracts E 213, RE 10, RE 13, and SMEA30 9; and the lawsuit TBR 84. E 279 and E 319 are two administrative documents stemming from Building M₁, possibly related to debts, in which a member of Zū-Baʿla’s family and other high-ranking Emarites act as borrowers. In E 213, the debtor was a widow who owned several properties and gave her daughter into marriage to the diviner Baʿal-mālik. In exchange for support for her daughter and herself, the woman bequeathed all her real properties to Baʿal-mālik. Both her ownership of properties and the fact that the diviner agreed to marry the daughter of an indebted woman speak in favor of her high socio-economic status. In RE 10 and RE 13, the debtor is a member of the family of Kutbe, who obviously did not suffer from impoverishment. In SMEA30 9, the person who repaid the debt entered with his family into the debtor’s house, and the two parties concluded a matrimonial agreement that was perhaps the main concern of the contract. These details support the view that the two parties shared the same social status. In the lawsuit TBR 84, the family of the debtor repaid his debt and won a suit against the former creditor. TBR 36 and BLMJ 12 may also be listed here. In the lawsuit TBR 36, although the debtors are sentenced to relinquish properties to repay the debt, the size of the fields given to the creditor suggests that the debtors owned quite substantial tracts of land. In BLMJ 12, the debtor is certainly facing financial problems but they do not affect his brother, who repays the debt. Our understanding of the economic context of credit transactions is limited by the unclear background of several consumptive debts of the first two phases: these include documents creating an obligation (S: RE 84, RE 96; SH: E 88, JCS40 3, RE 60), a repayment of debt (ASJ13 A), and a family law contract (RE 88). A number of documents (17) from the first two phases offer certain or probable evidence of economic distress as the cause of indebtedness.151 Four of them (E 209, PdA 68, RE 18, and TBR 34) are documents creating an obligation. It may be argued that documents pertaining to the formation of the obligation were preserved because the debt was not repaid. This is the most likely scenario for E 209, which contains a title to property. Conversely, the preservation of TBR 34 may be linked to contractual stipulations protecting the debtor’s family that deserved to be kept

150 There are 33 consumptive debts from the first two phases. 151 E 115, E 116, E 123, E 209, Hirayama 39, PdA 68, RE 18, RE 25, RE 58, TBR 28, TBR 29, TBR 33, TBR 34, TBR 65, TBR 74, TBR 78, TBR 82.

4.10 The Economic Context of Credit Transactions at Emar 

 303

regardless of his ability to repay the debt. A different explanation might be suggested for RE 18 and PdA 68. Because RE 18 and PdA 68 cannot be precisely dated, it is not excluded that they were drafted in the final period of the Emar archives and, therefore, that the terms of the loans had not elapsed yet. As a consequence, it is unknown whether the debtors were eventually able to fulfill their obligations. The remaining documents from the first two phases that reveal financial distress (13) pertain to repayments of debts152 and family law contracts.153 Some remarks on these sources are in order. The repayment of debts through the transfer of real properties154 underscores the lack of financial means, i.e., silver, to fulfill the obligation.155 Likewise, when debts are repaid by a third party, it is clear that financial difficulties hampered the debtor from fulfilling his obligation. Nevertheless, a closer look reveals that among the repayments of consumptive debts that were incurred through economic hardship, the majority are concerned with the transfer of real properties.156 As was usual in the case of unpaid debts secured by pledges, such documents were preserved for their function as titles to properties. Thus, they might be more instructive regarding archival and legal practices and less indicative of the state of indebtedness at Emar, because it is unknown how many debts were acknowledged as repaid simply by breaking the tablet. At any rate, the conclusion to be drawn from the documents pertaining to the fulfillment of the obligation is that despite economic difficulties, debtors repaid their debts either through alienation of their assets, or through the intervention of family members, friends, or outsiders. We must note that with the exception of RE 58, the debtors named in documents dealing with the second phase of the credit transaction are clear of their debt and are no longer obliged to reimburse the capital. Somehow these people were able to overcome their financial difficulties without losing their freedom. Since submitting to some form of dependency was often preferable to forfeiting properties, which represented sources of income and livelihood,157 it may be suggested that the properties relinquished to repay debts were not the only ones owned by the debtors. One must also recall that the

152 E 115, E 116, E 123, Hirayama 39, RE 58, TBR 28, TBR 29, TBR 33, TBR 65, TBR 82. 153 RE 25, TBR 74, TBR 78. Another family law contract that may belong here is RE 88, but the economic context of the document is unclear due to its fragmentary nature. 154 E 115, E 116, E 123, TBR 33, TBR 65, see § 4.9.2 155 This situation is well known from the Nuzi evidence, Zaccagnini 1976, Zaccagnini 1984a, Zaccagnini 1984c. 156 To the texts mentioned in ch. 4 fn. 154 are to be added the repayments of debts by a third party who receives in recompense real properties as either a pledge or as a full transfer (all SH): Hirayama 39, RE 58, TBR 28, TBR 29, TBR 82. 157 § 5.4.

304 

 4 The Emar Credit System

family law contracts create a family tie between the debtor and the person who repays the debt that certainly mitigates financial distress.158 Consumptive debts arising from serious financial distress represent only half of the credit transactions from Emar (40/42 out of 84).159 It must be noted that this number could be either larger or smaller, because the economic background of several documents is unclear. It is of the utmost significance that in the documents of the second phase, debts are repaid without drastic consequences for the debtors. Notably, the family law contracts witness strategies for confronting indebtedness. Accordingly, if we discarded these sources, the number of documents recording severe economic conditions that could lead to inability to satisfy the creditors could be further reduced to approximately one-third of credit transactions.160 In addition, one should bear in mind that the amēlūtu contracts with the palāḫu duty create a peculiar relation between the creditor and the defaulting debtor that cannot be reductively described as a master-servant relation and was likely inspired by principles of solidarity and social justice that tended to protect debtors (see § 5.1.1). The amēlūtus obtained the cancellation of a debt and a livelihood in exchange for a labor obligation related to care of the elderly. This argument can be extended to some slavery contracts. The aim of this quantification is not to provide a precise calculation but to illustrate general tendencies that will not be altered by a possible reclassification in the future. Moreover, one should be careful not to place too much weight on the quantitative analysis of credit data extracted from textual evidence, because we do not know to what extent credit transactions were conducted orally. Nevertheless, it is evident that a consistent number of sources show little or no evidence of financial collapse. This study has revealed intense commercial and business activity financed through credit. Numerous aspects of economic life are captured in Emar credit transactions, such as commercial ventures, local business affairs, individual financial difficulties, and the loss of personal freedom. 158 Note also that of the three family law contracts revealing financial distress, in TBR 78 the third party becomes an heir of the debtor, which indicates that the latter still owned properties to dispose of, while in RE 25 and TBR 74, the economic hardship seems to be less severe. 159 This figure includes 23 documents pertaining to default and 17 documents of the first two phases showing financial distress; it is possible to add two Syrian documents possibly recording unpaid loans (RE 84 and RE 96). 160 Sources discarded are the repayments of debts listed in ch. 4 fn. 152, with the exception of RE 58, and the family law contracts listed in ch. 4 fn. 153. The number of credit transactions witnessing severe hardship would range between 27 and 30; these figures include the 23 documents of default, 4 documents creating an obligation that reveal financial distress, the two Syrian documents possibly recording unpaid loans (ch. 4 fn. 159), and the repayment of debts RE 58, in which the borrower was likely unable to satisfy his creditor.

4.10 The Economic Context of Credit Transactions at Emar 

 305

The Late Bronze Age is often regarded as a period when lower social classes suffered socio-economic degradation, usually associated with a high level of indebtedness.161 The Emar sources, however, do not confirm this picture, depicting instead a flourishing economy characterized by extensive trade as well as a particular concern to minimize the negative effects of economic processes – i.e., impoverishment and indebtedness – on community members. These observations could be further strengthened if some of the debts classified as consumptive for lack of evidence could be shown to be productive.162 The Ekalte corpus, although limited in numbers, shows a similar picture.163 Table 45: Debts from Ekalte. Document

Type

Debt

Purpose

Ek 29

Loan

100 5/6 sh.

Productive

Ek 30

Loan

100 2/3 sh.

Productive

Ek 46

Repayment of debts

? sh.

Productive

Ek 52

Repayment of debts

76 sh.

Productive (?)

Ek 68

Loan

12 sh.

Consumptive

Ek 69

Loan

1/2 sh. minus 2 grains

Consumptive (?)

Ek 70

Repayment of debts

NG

?

Ek 71

Record of debts

Unclear

?

RE 89 (Ek 93)

Record of debts

39 1/3 sh. to 6 debtors

Consumptive (?)

CDLN 2012: 5

Repayment of debts

8 ḫupu-jars of wine

Productive

About half of the Ekalte documents record debts that can be associated with trade or business activities.164 The information provided by the other documents is not very clear, but some likely record consumptive debts.165

161 See Liverani 1987, see also Zaccagnini 1995; indebtedness as a reason of the collapse of the Late Bronze Age system is discussed in more depth in § 6. 162 Note that the possibility that debts classified as productive were in fact consumptive is virtually limited to the sale contracts E 85 and E 109, the amēlūtu document E 77 and, but less likely the repayment of debts RE 65. 163 Two documents that Torrecilla (2014: 95) regards as recording debts are not included here: the payment in Ek 33 is termed mullû, which refers to a payment in compensation for a crime, CAD M/2: 189–190; Ek 67 is a division of inheritance, see Mayer 2001: 73. 164 In Ek 29 and Ek 30, the debts are high and the silver is weighed according to the weight of Ekalte; for Ek 46 see p. 90; Ek 52 is a receipt of payment (i.e., the debtor had the means to fulfill his obligation himself; cf. § 4.9) and the debt is quite high; CDLN 2012: 5 relates to the sale of wine. 165 For Ek 68 see ch. 2 fn. 162; Ek 69 appears to be consumptive due to the very small amount of the debt; RE 89 records several debts of small magnitude.

306 

 4 The Emar Credit System

Emar sources show limited signs of the exploitation of impoverished lower social classes by magnates that is typically seen in the Nuzi documentation166 and in other Late Bronze Age textual corpora.167 There is no evidence for the rise of a class of large landlords exploiting a generalized trend toward pauperization at Emar.168 It has been noted that agricultural lands are never pledged and are also rarely alienated to settle debts. At Nuzi, peasants were often forced to sell agricultural lands as the ultimate expedient against indebtedness.169 Although it is not easy to evaluate this tendency in economic terms, it may be suggested that Emarites preferred to retain their agricultural lands as a source of livelihood while other assets were more willingly forfeited. If this holds true, debtors at Emar enjoyed enough freedom and well-being to avoid forfeiting the principal source of their income.170 One characteristic element of Emar credit-related documents is the prevalence of silver as the commodity lent. The need for silver is a common reason for obtaining credit, and in certain circumstances it is a stronger motivation than economic hardship. This is abundantly clear when a cash shortage affects high-ranking families such as that of Zū-Baʿla (E 200), or persons with large landholdings but little silver at their disposal (TBR 36). In this context one can understand why members of the notable families would have relied on a third party to repay their debt, even though they owned properties that were then bequeathed to the benefactor (see the palāḫu contracts RE 10 and RE 13).

166 A clear example of this process can be found in Maidman 2010: 143–61; note also the lawsuits from Nuzi, Zaccagnini 1984c: 711–14. 167 Abraham 2001: 190–94, Saporetti 1979, Saporetti 1982. 168 See the results of the survey of moneylenders at Emar, § 4.7. There is evidence that the expansion of landownership occurred through purchase, see ch. 4 fn. 109 and ch. 6 fn. 23. 169 See Zaccagnini 1979: 12–13, Zaccagnini 1976: 199–201. 170 This hypothesis makes sense if normal sales did not disguise forced alienations; while certain sales encumbered by the right of redemption were likely concluded in response to economic distress (Westbrook 2001a: 23–31), I am not inclined to regard the sale contract as the preferred means for issuing loans secured by a pledge (i.e., the sold property), cf. Leemans 1988: 229–32.

5 Forms of Dependency at Emar As introduced in § 3, Emar sources witness various forms of dependency that can be sorted into three main groups: dependency for debt (§ 3.2), dependency caused by hardship (§ 3.3), and chattel slavery (§ 3.4). Indentured labor (§ 3.2.1) and debt slavery (§ 3.2.3) are the two main forms of dependency that result from the inability of defaulting debtors to repay their creditors. Textual sources also attest to cases of dependency related to pledge law (§ 3.2.2) as well as other forms of dependency for debt that cannot be precisely classified (§ 3.2.4). Hardship concerns forms of dependency unrelated to debt incurred by freeborn people. Most commonly, people stricken by hunger in times of famine could resort to selling their relatives to keep themselves alive. This form of dependency has been labeled famine slavery (§ 3.3.1). Other unclear types of dependency unrelated to debt that are undertaken by freeborn people are classified under hardship (§ 3.3.2). Those individuals who were probably slaves before the transaction occurred have been discussed under the heading of chattel slavery. As they were treated as pure commodities, their names are often not recorded. The mechanism of enslavement is not specifically indicated in texts; the term ‘chattel slave’ is usually employed for individuals who were born into slavery or were war captives and abductees. However, other forms of enslavement should not be excluded outright.1 Chattel slaves are the subject of documents related to sales (§ 3.4.1) and of transactions of various types (§§ 3.4.2, 3.4.3). Emar sources also offer evidence for the redemption and manumission of slaves (§ 3.5). This chapter presents a synopsis of dependency at Emar. First, it addresses forms of dependency resulting from debt and hardship (§ 5.1), and then offers an analysis of the slave market according to sale contracts (§ 5.2), as well as an examination of the ways in which slavery could be terminated (§ 5.3). The chapter ends with a comprehensive discussion of the socio-economic aspects of dependency at Emar (§ 5.4). Table 46 summarizes all the documents dealing with forms of dependency.2

1 See discussion in § 3.1. 2 Donations of slaves (§ 3.4.3.1) are not included in the table. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781501515309-005

308 

 5 Forms of Dependency at Emar

Table 46: Forms of Dependency. Document

Script DEFAULT

INDENTURED LABOR (12) amēlūtu Contracts without the palāḫu Formula ASJ10 A

SH

E 77

SH

RA77 5

SH

amēlūtu Contracts with the palāḫu Formula E 16

SH

E 117

SH

Hirayama 38

SH

QVO5 2

SH

TBR 39

SH

TBR 40

SH

A Testament concerning amēlūtu RE 39

SH

Non-amēlūtu Contracts Regulating Indentured Labor RE 63

SH

E 86

SH

DEPENDENCY DERIVED FROM PLEDGE LAW (4)3 AOAT 265.1

MA

ASJ10 A

SH

E 77

SH

RA77 5

SH

DEBT SLAVERY (9) Sales into Debt Slavery TBR 26

SH

TBR 44

SH

Enslavement Contracts E 121

SH

E 215

SH

GsK 1

SH

Hirayama 36

SH

3 Only AOAT 265.1 will be counted toward the total because the other documents are already counted under the amēlūtu contracts.

5 Forms of Dependency at Emar 

 309

Table 46 (continued) Document

Script

Lawsuits Establishing Enslavement for Debt E 33

SH

E 205

SH

E 252

SH

UNCLEAR TYPES OF DEPENDENCY FOR DEBT (3) Contracts Hirayama 37

SH

TBR 25

SH

Lawsuit Subartu 17

SH HARDSHIP

FAMINE SLAVERY (12) Sales into Famine-slavery ASJ10 E

SH

AuOr5 11

SH

AuOr5 12

SH

E7

SH

E 79

SH

E 83

SH

E 84

SH

E 118

SH

E 217

SH

Hirayama 17

SH

Hirayama 18

SH

TBR 52

SH

VARIOUS FORMS OF DEPENDENCY RELATED TO HARDSHIP (6) Adoptions E 256

S

TBR 48

S

E 216

SH

TBR 77

SH

palāḫu Contracts GsK 2

SH

RE 26

SH

310 

 5 Forms of Dependency at Emar

Table 46 (continued) Document

Script CHATTEL SLAVERY

SALE-RELATED DOCUMENTS (8) Iraq54 5

S

E 35

SH

E 127

SH

E 211

SH

E 214

SH

E 224

SH

Hirayama 40

SH

E 25

MB

SLAVE TRANSACTIONS OF UNCERTAIN NATURE (2) JA 303

Unk

Hirayama 41

SH

SLAVES IN DOCUMENTS OF VARIOUS CONTENT (4) E 91

SH

E 257

SH

TBR 75

SH

TBR 79

SH RELEASE

REDEMPTION (3) BLMJ 2

SH

E 221

SH

RE 25

SH

MANUMISSION (6) E 177

SH

RE 26

SH

RE 27

SH

RE 66

SH

TBR 32

SH

TBR 41

SH

TOTAL

66

S

3

Unk

1

SH

60

MB

1

MA

1

5.1 Consequences of Default and Hardship 

 311

5.1 Consequences of Default and Hardship When defaulting debtors were not able to resort to a relative or benefactor who could repay their debt (§ 2.2), they could satisfy their creditors through forms of bonded labor. Likewise, freeborn people under the pressure of hardship resorted to forms of dependency to keep themselves alive. Forms of dependency for debt or hardship can be described as temporary or permanent according to the expected duration. Temporary forms of dependency are indentured labor (§ 3.2.1), dependency derived from pledge law (§ 3.2.2), and the palāḫu contracts stipulated for hardship (§ 3.3.2.2). Permanent forms of dependency imply ownership and salability of the dependent. Although encumbered by the right of redemption, debt and famine slavery (§§ 3.2.3, 3.3.1) are regarded as permanent forms of dependency.4 Other documents attest to forms of dependency for debt (§ 3.2.4) and hardship (§ 3.3.2.1) of unclear nature. Apart from a Middle Assyrian letter concerning a pledged person and two Syrian adoptions for hardship, all documents related to default and hardship were written on Syro-Hittite tablets.

5.1.1 Temporary Forms of Dependency for Debt: Indentured Labor and Pledge As extensively discussed in § 3.2.1, the contracts of indentured labor were antichretic arrangements binding debtors to perform labor service for a certain period in order to repay their debt. The condition of indentured labor clearly differs from slavery because it is temporary and does not imply ownership of the debtor. The indentured person’s ability to terminate his service through unilateral dissolution of the contract confirms his equal legal standing with the creditor and consequently his legally (semi)-free status. Apart from E 77, which possibly relates to a productive debt, all contracts of indentured labor are likely to derive from consumptive debts. In the majority of contracts of indentured labor, the dependent is defined by the term amēlūtu. The amēlūtu contracts may include a stipulation that the amēlūtu must perform the palāḫu duty. In addition to the amēlūtu contracts, indentured labor is regulated in two other documents in which the debtor is not identified by the term amēlūtu. These two contracts (RE 63 and E 86) contain provisos similar to those in the amēlūtu contracts, including the palāḫu formula and the dissolution clause.

4 While in the temporary forms of dependency the termination is certain and is contractually stipulated, redemption of slaves is only a possibility and may never occur; for the applicability of the right of ownership to debt and famine slavery despite the presence of the right of redemption see § 3.1.2.

312 

 5 Forms of Dependency at Emar

In the amēlūtu contracts without the palāḫu formula (§ 3.2.1.1.1), a third party repaid the debt of a defaulting debtor. The debtor’s labor was intended to pay the antichretic interest on the debt, as he was to be released upon repayment of the principal. The purpose of labor service in the amēlūtu contracts with the palāḫu formula (§ 3.2.1.1.2) seems to be different. These contracts are patterned as adoptions and stipulate that a debtor who becomes an amēlūtu must perform the palāḫu duty for the lifetime of the creditor and his wife. In exchange, the amēlūtu received a wife and occasionally was adopted by his creditor. The palāḫu duty is indeed required of the adoptee in regular adoptions. The status of the woman married to the amēlūtu is not always specified. In TBR 39 and TBR 40, the wives are the creditors’ daughters. In QVO5 2, the wife seems to have originally been a slave who was later adopted by the creditor. In E 117, the status of the wife is not directly specified, but we may surmise that she was not a slave because the contract states that the creditor shall give his amēlūtu a wife as one of his biological children. Finally, in E 16 and Hirayama 38 the wife’s condition is not indicated. The status of the wives given to amēlūtus may therefore range from slave to ex-slave to free person. Because E 117 belongs to the family of Milki-Dagan, it seems that even important members of Emar society could give their daughters as wives to their amēlūtus. It is usually understood that the creditor canceled (ḫulluqu) the debt,5 but it is self-evident that the debt was not remitted because the indentured person was bonded to service. Moreover, the clause of dissolution, which establishes a penalty to be paid by the indentured person who wants to leave his creditor’s house – usually twice the amount of the debt – indicates that the creditor expected a form of repayment. A closer examination of the ḫulluqu clause reveals that the verb does not refer to the debt per se, but to the silver: Table 47: The ḫulluqu Clause. Text

Clause

E 16

i-na-an-na 20 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR iš-tu ŠÀ KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ ša-a-šú uḫ-tal-li-iq

E 117

i-na-an-na KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ-šú uḫ-tal-liq-mi

Hirayama 38

KÙ.BABBAR.ME[Š ša-a-šú uḫ-tal-li-iq]

TBR 39

i-na-an-na a-na-ku KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ-šú uḫ-tal-li-iq

TBR 40

i-na-an-na KÙ.BABBAR-šú uḫ-tal-iq

QVO5 2

KÙ.BABBAR-šu uḫ-tal-l[i-iq]

5 Westbrook 2003b: 685–86.

5.1 Consequences of Default and Hardship 

 313

The payment clause in the family law contracts, in the amēlūtu contracts without the palāḫu formula, and in the other contracts where the debt, not the silver, is paid off is strikingly different: ḫubullīya ultallim, “he has paid my debt.”6 The ḫulluqu clause, on the other hand, implies that a monetary obligation (i.e., the debt) was not remitted but rather was transformed into a personal obligation. A non-amēlūtu contract that happens to include the same clause as the amēlūtu contracts with the palāḫu formula, RE 63,7 will help to clarify the meaning of the ḫulluqu clause. RE 63 includes both šalāmu and ḫulluqu to indicate two distinct actions: šalāmu indicates the payment of the debt to the creditors, while ḫulluqu refers to the transformation of the nature of the obligation. Although the amēlūtu contracts with the palāḫu formula were drawn up to settle a debt, there was no correlation between the amount of work performed and the amount of the debt, since the period of service corresponded to the lifetime of the creditor and his spouse. These documents can be defined as aleatory contracts, because the repayment of the debt is contingent upon the lifetime of the creditor, who may die soon after the conclusion of the contract without being reimbursed. The debtor’s service terminates with the death of the creditor and cannot be claimed by his sons. Conversely, a debt of silver was heritable, as clearly stated in E 16, where only part of the debt was remitted: the service terminates with the creditor’s death, but the balance of the debt is to be repaid to creditor’s sons.8 These documents demonstrate that there was a clear dichotomy between the valuation of money and of labor.9 In my opinion, the clue to understanding why labor service in these documents was not heritable is its association with the verb palāḫu. The following discussion of the palāḫu formula is also relevant to the two non-amēlūtu documents with the palāḫu formula, E 86 and RE 63. As shown by the amēlūtu contract without the palāḫu formula ASJ10 A, labor service is quantifiable when it is not associated

6 This clause does not refer to the cancellation of the interest because there is no evidence that at Emar the term ḫubullu assumed the meaning “interest,” as attested in some MB records, see CAD H: 217–218. This is clear in cases when a person declares himself to be indebted and someone repays his debt: the quantity of silver returned to the creditors listed in the text as ḫubullu is too large to be the interest alone; it must be equivalent to the amount of the original debt, or perhaps the debt plus the interest. Note that ḫubullu loans from Nuzi may be formulated with or without interest, see Owen 1969, cf. Zaccagnini 2002: 179–80. 7 See § 3.2.1.2. 8 Another example of inherited credit is RE 39, which also concerns two amēlūtus, § 3.2.1.1.3. In TBR 36, a debt is inherited by the sons of their late father, see § 2.2.3.4. 9 To draw a distinction between repayment of the interest (Zinsantichrese) or the capital (Kapitalantichrese), as done in the case of the amēlūtu contracts without the palāḫu formula, makes little sense here because of the indefinite duration of the service.

314 

 5 Forms of Dependency at Emar

with the palāḫu duty.10 The verb palāḫu, which is largely used in family law documents throughout Mesopotamia, creates an immaterial bond that is connected to the verb’s basic meaning of “to honor, to fear” and is expressed in the form of care for the elderly. Thus, palāḫu expresses a personal action directed towards a specific individual that cannot be transferred to or claimed by someone else, namely the creditor’s offspring. It is not by chance that new family ties, namely adoption and marriage, are created between creditor and debtor as a corollary to the palāḫu relationship. The surprising aspect of this relationship is that while the benefits of the personal obligation cannot be inherited by the creditor’s sons, the family of the debtor is bound to fulfill the obligation if the debtor dies before his creditor. Two documents (E 16 and Hirayama 38) establish that the deceased amēlūtu was to be replaced by a member of his family who would perform the palāḫu duty during the creditor’s lifetime. One may therefore conclude that the “debit” and “credit” connected to the palāḫu obligation are heritable as long as the creditor lives. Nevertheless, there is still some risk for the creditor, if, for example, the debtor should die without offspring or relatives to succeed him in fulfilling the palāḫu duty. Why would the creditor accept the risk that his debt might not be repaid through work performance? The very nature of the documents, which are mutual agreements binding both sides to contractual terms, reveals that the condition of dependency was not unilaterally imposed by the creditor but was accepted by the debtor in the context of an exchange of services between two parties. Veenhof11 argued that the aim and purpose of these contracts was to secure care for an individual in old age by binding someone to provide lifelong service. Although this interpretation may account for certain contracts, Veenhof’s argument is insufficient to explain cases in which the creditor was wealthy or had sons who could take care of him (E 16, E 117). Perhaps a lack of male offspring motivated the creditor to enter into such an agreement. But the fact that some creditors had sons indicates that lack of male offspring cannot be assumed as the primary motivation behind the amēlūtu contracts with the palāḫu formula. Moreover, the amēlūtu was not granted the status of heir, as in some family law contracts, and therefore he could not have become the head of the family after the creditor’s death. A unique clause in E 117 further demonstrates that the service performed by the amēlūtu was not confined to elder care but derived from an obligation that was expected to be repaid. This clause, which should be interpreted as a security against the debtor’s failure to repay the debt through labor, stipulated that the 10 After the indentured person was released from his work obligations, he still owed nine months of work. Note also that in the MA document RE 19 the value of labor is quantified, see § 2.1.4. 11 Veenhof 1998: 127–36.

5.1 Consequences of Default and Hardship 

 315

debtor’s properties would be transferred to the creditor if the debtor died first.12 It is clear that despite the transformation of the monetary obligation into a personal one, the debt was expected to be repaid through a performance that went beyond elder care. Thus, elder care was only part of the palāḫu duty, and it cannot be treated as the sole motivation of these contracts.13 Rather, it is necessary to adopt a broader understanding of the palāḫu relationship. We may explore different explanations for why a creditor would enter into such a relationship. First, the creditor may have agreed to accept the debtor’s service because the latter owned no silver. This explanation seems to be unlikely in cases in which the debtor owned properties that could be sold (E 117). Because the amēlūtu contracts with the palāḫu formula stipulate the debtor’s marriage, one may argue that the debt concealed an unpaid terḫatu. However, it remains unclear why a creditor should agree to a marriage between his daughter (or another member of his household) and his debtor without receiving the terḫatu. Moreover, there was apparently no need to fictitiously disguise a terḫatu as a debt, because several documents from Emar attest to the practice of erēbu marriages that likely involve no transfer of terḫatu or dowry.14 According to another explanation – which is, in my opinion, the most likely – these contracts were inspired by ideals of solidarity and social justice based on familial models, which tended to protect indebted persons.15 As argued in particular by Westbrook and Démare-Lafont, forms of solidarity were widespread in small communities on the Middle Euphrates that were characterized by strong familial ties and the absence of a dominant royal power, as Emar was.16 The family ties established by these contracts between debtors and creditors are precisely a sign of solidarity based on family models. Personal relationships already existing between parties may also have led the creditor to agree to a palāḫu contract. This is suggested by the non-amēlūtu contract RE 63, in which the creditor binds his own nephew to indentured labor and receives the palāḫu duty from him. 12 See § 3.2.1.1.2.1. 13 Similarly, manumitted slaves were bound to perform the palāḫu duty for the master’s lifetime (§ 5.3), but it is unrealistic to assume that the slave’s performance was limited to elder care. 14 Bellotto 2009: 120–21, Justel 2009: 11–13. 15 Similarly, Finley (1981: 155) argued that “‘Debt’ may also have been arranged in order to create a state of bondage, just as, between equals, its purpose may have been to maintain bonds of solidarity or to provide a kind of insurance against a future need . . . labour power and solidarity were historically prior to profit in the form of interest.” 16 For solidarity and social justice see Beckman 1996b, Westbrook 2001a, and Démare-Lafont 2014; see also Westbrook 1995: 1639, Westbrook 1998b, particularly 246–49, and Viano 2010a. Note that Westbrook (1998b: 242) stated that the ancient Near Eastern family was “a mechanism for supporting non-productive persons: young children, the sick and the aged.”

316 

 5 Forms of Dependency at Emar

Our interpretation is strengthened by looking at the penalties. All contracts of indentured labor containing the palāḫu formula stipulate penalties in the case of unilateral dissolution of the agreement (Table 48). With just two exceptions (TBR 40 and E 86), penalties are imposed on either side in breach. Table 48: Penalties in Contracts of Indentured Labor. Document

Debt

Type

Penalty for Master

Penalty for Debtor

E 16

41 sh.

amēlūtu

Loss of credit

61 sh. Loss of wife and sons

E 117

40 sh.

amēlūtu

Loss of credit

80 sh.

Hirayama 38

56 sh.

amēlūtu

Loss of credit

?

QVO5 2

40 sh.

amēlūtu

x silver to the debtor

120 sh. Loss of wife and sons

TBR 39

25 sh.

amēlūtu

Loss of credit and daughter

60 sh. Loss of wife and sons

TBR 40

30 sh.

amēlūtu

No penalty

60 sh.

RE 63

14 5/6 sh.

non-amēlūtu

Loss of credit

TÉŠ.BI

E 86

2.5 sh.

non-amēlūtu

NG

10 sh.

Unlike the family law contracts, which impose the same or very similar penalties on either side (§ 4.9.3), the contracts of indentured labor stipulate a harsher penalty for the debtor. Indentured persons were obliged to pay a sum of silver typically corresponding to twice the outstanding debt, and to forfeit the wife they had received from the master and the children she had borne.17 The penalty for the masters was the loss of their money.18 The imposition of penalties on the masters can be understood in the context of our interpretation of the relation established by the palāḫu formula: masters were not free to release their dependents, as they could do with slaves, but were obliged to keep them in their houses. The penalty on the masters indicates that the indentured persons had no interest in an early termination because they were housed and fed during the service period. These contracts provided a remedy to

17 In this respect, note that indentured persons were not subject to severe penalties for their unilateral dissolution of the contract, as was the case in Old Babylonian adoptions, where adoptees were sold into slavery, as well as some adoptions from Nuzi where the adoptee was sold into slavery, Westbrook 2003a: 393, Lion 2004: 562–63. For the procedural differences between the penalties in the contracts of indentured labor and the redemption price in the slavery-related documents see § 3.2.1. 18 Note that in RE 63 and E 86, the master is different from the original creditor.

5.1 Consequences of Default and Hardship 

 317

indebtedness grounded in solidarity. Similarly, it seems plausible that the replacement of the indentured person by his wife (E 16) or sons (Hirayama 38) had the dual function of securing the repayment of the obligation to the master as well as continuing to provide a livelihood for the indentured person’s family, at least until the master’s death. Although the dependent in the amēlūtu contracts with palāḫu formula could terminate the contract at any time, the master obviously had the upper hand in these arrangements, as the indentured person’s early termination of his service was discouraged by the high penalties it incurred. With all due caution, one may suggest that in Emar society the responsibility for debt remission had shifted from the institutional sphere, where it was associated with royal edicts, to the private one. This is not to say that the ḫulluqu formula in the Emar records had the same effect as the andurāru edicts (contrary to what the royal edicts prescribe, the obligation is not remitted in the Emar records); rather, social attitudes towards the consequences of indebtedness may have been different at Emar.19 The people involved in documents regulating indentured labor – creditors, debtors, and third parties – are often unknown elsewhere. Members of the notable families are listed as masters in only three documents (out of 12):20 in E 117 they are also the original creditors, while in E 77 and E 86 they repay someone’s debt. In two of these documents (E 86 and E 117), the relation between debtor and creditor is expressed with the verb palāḫu.21 The presence of the notable families is quite limited when compared with other forms of dependency, notably debt slavery, where members of the notable families are masters in the majority of sources (§ 5.1.2). Despite the limited involvement of the notable families, the highest debt recorded in the amēlūtu contracts is repaid by the family of Ḫima (E 77).22 The low rate of involvement of notable families in contracts of indentured labor is not easy to understand. On the one hand, one may argue that wealthy and important people rarely needed to resort to such agreements to procure the benefits that they accrued, in particular elder care. It is also possible that these people were reluctant to grant mutual agreements establishing a reciprocal exchange between debtor and creditor/benefactor. This attitude may be compared with the limited attestations of the notable families in the family law contracts, where they only repay the debts of someone closely related (§ 4.9.3). It is not excluded that also in the contracts of indentured labor, the notable families intervened on 19 On attestations of edicts of debt remission in the Late Bronze Age see § 1.2. 20 The number of contracts initiating and regulating indentured labor is 11. 21 We may add here the palāḫu contract for hardship GsK 2, see § 5.1.3. 22 Note that in light of the high debt, we have suggested that E 77 recorded a productive debt, see § 4.2.

318 

 5 Forms of Dependency at Emar

behalf of people with whom they were connected. This was perhaps the case at least for E 117, given the favorable conditions offered to the debtor.23 This very document shows, however, that important families wanted to protect themselves from the risks of such contracts. It does not seem to be a coincidence that the only amēlūtu contract stipulating that the debtor’s property will be transferred to the master in case of death belongs to a notable family. Similarly, in documents pertaining to debt and famine slavery, we observe that the notable families tended to include clauses protecting their property rights (§ 5.3). If we enlarge our investigation to include the owners of the minor archives and dossiers discussed in § 1.3.7,24 the number of documents rises to 8 out of 12.25 The socio-economic status of the people discussed in § 1.3.7, in particular in relation to the notable families, cannot easily be determined, but certainly they had some financial means. Thus, it remains unclear whether wealthy people were less interested in the contracts of indentured labor, or whether this attitude was limited to the notable families.26 What can be stated with certainty at the present state of research is that even the wealthiest persons, such as the notable families, were subject to the same principles and rules as other people. In the contracts stipulating the palāḫu duty, the notable families risked losing their money and had to submit to penalties in case of dissolution of the contract. Another general assumption that can be drawn is that, given their peculiarities, the contracts of indentured labor, particularly those providing the palāḫu duty, were preferably employed between people who were somehow connected by friendship, kinship, or shared socio-economic status. It is worth recalling that the contract TBR 40 even grants the amēlūtu the right to replace his wife, who is his creditor’s daughter, with her sister. Another form of temporary dependency derived from default is related to pledge law. This form of dependency is recorded in only a few documents: one is a letter sent by a merchant who was being held as a pledge to demand the collection of money for his release (AOAT 265.1); the other documents (ASJ10 A, E 77, and

23 Note that also in GsK 2 the debtors seem to be closely related to the family of Kutbe. 24 It must be recalled that the notable families and the individuals discussed under § 1.3.7 are the only principals treated in the present work for whom information can be gleaned outside of the individual sources in which they appear. 25 Five documents stem from the minor dossiers or archives: E 16, QVO5 2, RE 63, TBR 39, TBR 40. 26 Note that the fact that the owners of minor dossiers appear more frequently than members of the notable families as masters in contracts of indentured labor (5 VS 3), even though the minor dossiers contain a much smaller number of sources, can be also interpreted, in a very different way, as evidence of the higher status of the notable families.

5.1 Consequences of Default and Hardship 

 319

RA77 5) are contracts of indentured labor that record the consignment of additional pledges. As with indentured persons, pledged persons were bound to work. However, the purpose of indentured labor was to repay the debt, while pledged persons served as security for the debt.27

5.1.2 Debt Slavery and Other Forms of Dependency for Debt Unlike indentured persons, debt slaves were unfree, and as argued in § 3 they were the property of their masters. Debt slavery is the focus of nine documents. At Emar, debt slavery could be initiated through either of two legal procedures, sale (§ 3.2.3.1) or enslavement (§ 3.2.3.2). Sale was a legal device rarely used to establish debt slavery at Emar; it is attested in only two sources that refer to a self-sale (TBR 44) and the sale of a relative (TBR 26). This stands in sharp contrast with famine slavery, where sale is the only attested legal procedure of establishing slavery (§ 3.3.1). The most common legal procedure was enslavement, which was established either through a contract in which a debtor enters into the service of the person who repays his debts (§ 3.2.3.2.1), or as a consequence of a lawsuit (§ 3.2.3.2.2). In either case, the master was different from the original creditor. The enslavement contracts (Table 49) are self-enslavements that can be regarded as a means of settling a debt without cash, similar to the forfeiture of properties in order to repay an obligation. With the exception of the lawsuit E 252, which pertains to a commercial debt, the debts recorded in the other documents were likely contracted for consumption. Table 49: Documents of Debt Enslavement. Document

Debt

Slave

Minor

Redemption

Master

TÉŠ.BI

Milki-Dagan son of Aḫī-Dagan

Enslavement Contracts E 121

50 sh.

1M

E 215

100 sh.

1M 2F (1 vineyard fields)

GsK 1

83 sh.

2M 1F

YES – 1

TÉŠ.BI

Zū-Aštarti son of Aḫī-mālik son of Kutbe

Hirayama 36

40 sh.

2F

YES (?) – 1

NO

Zū-Aštarti son of Aḫī-mālik son of Kutbe

Baʿal-mālik son of Baʿal-qarrād

27 On the function of the contracts of indentured labor see § 3.2.1.

320 

 5 Forms of Dependency at Emar

Table 49 (continued) Lawsuits Establishing Enslavement for Debt E 33

30 sh.

E 252

26 sh. 1F 1 shekel of gold

(?)

TÉŠ.BI

Abdi-ili son of Atawa

E 205

25 sh.

YES – 2

4 slaves

Ibni-Dagan son of Zū-Baʿla

1M

1M 1F

Zūzu

Debts recorded in the enslavement contracts range between 40 and 100 shekels of silver. Very tentatively, one may compare the amount of each debt with the value of the enslaved individuals, as recorded in sale contracts.28 In GsK 1, the value of the slaves (one man, one woman, and a child) approximately equals the amount of the debt. In Hirayama 36, 40 shekels of silver may be within the range of the value of an adult female slave and a child. The utmost disproportion is found in E 215 where three adult slaves, several fields, and a share of a vineyard, which was the most expensive type of agricultural land at Emar,29 were reckoned at only 100 shekels of silver. On the other hand, in E 121 a single man is valuated slightly above average, but still in the range of prices per adult, most likely due to the fact that the debtor had no other relatives or properties to forfeit. Not surprisingly, these contracts, being the last resort for indebted people, do not accurately reflect the market prices for slaves. In the lawsuit E 33, the debt is approximately equal to the value of the slaves, although slightly below average prices. In E 205, the value of the debt perfectly corresponds to the value of two children. Perhaps the judges sought an equitable agreement between the parties. The context of E 252, which records a commercial debt, was clearly different, but it seems that the amount of the debt corresponded to the value of the slave.30 Although debt slaves were by definition redeemable,31 the right of redemption was not granted in every document. As Table 15 shows, the redemption clause is attested in only four out nine documents pertaining to debt slavery.32 However, 28 See § 5.2.1 and Table 53; prices per adult range between 20 and 70 sh., with the majority between 30 and 45 sh.; prices per adult male range between 20 and 52 sh., with an average of 40 sh.; prices per adult female range between 22 and 70 sh., with an average of 42.43 sh.; prices per child range between 9 and 15 sh., with an average of 13.25 sh. 29 See Viano 2016. 30 Note that 1 shekel of gold corresponded to 3–4 shekels of silver at Ugarit, Nasgowitz 1976: 54, 243, Stieglitz 1979: 18, Vargyas 1986: 105–06. 31 Westbrook 1995: 1651–53. 32 Enslavement contracts: E 121, GsK 1; lawsuits: E 205, E 252; none of the sale contracts has the redemption clause.

5.1 Consequences of Default and Hardship 

 321

it is not excluded that in some cases the right of redemption was granted even if it was not explicitly stipulated (§ 5.3). The redemption value of debt slaves is usually set at double the debt or purchase price. Notable families monopolized the market for debt slaves. In 7 out of 9 documents regulating debt slavery – whether ensuing from sale or enslavement – the masters were members of notable families (Table 50). Table 50: Notable Families as Masters in Documents of Debt Slavery. Family

Document

Type

Family of Zū-Baʿla

E 215

Enslavement – Contract

E 205

Enslavement – Lawsuit

GsK 1

Enslavement – Contract

Family of Kutbe

Hirayama 36

Enslavement – Contract

Family of Milki-Dagan

E 121

Enslavement – Contract

Family of Awiru

TBR 26

Sale into debt slavery

Family of Apilu

TBR 44

Sale into debt slavery

Only the families of Zū-Baʿla and Kutbe are attested in more than one document; remarkably, the family of Ḫima is not mentioned in documents of debt slavery. The remaining documents, E 33 and E 252, are two lawsuits. The masters are unknown elsewhere, but the one in E 252 was likely a merchant or businessman from Karšu. As usual, the names of the debtors/slaves are unknown from other documents, but quite surprisingly the original creditors themselves are nowhere else attested. The only exceptions are Aḫlamû, who was one of the creditors in Hirayama 36 and was the grandson of the Overseer of the Land Mutri-Teššub, and Tūri son of Ilī-bāni, who acted as creditor in GsK 1 and was associated with the notable families (§ 1.3.7). Unlike famine and chattel slaves, who frequently stemmed from outside Emar (§ 5.2.2), debt slaves seem to come from Emar or the surrounding areas. Only TBR 44 provides a precise indication of the provenance of the slave, who is said to come from the town of Karšu. E 215 is an enslavement contract drafted before the Elders of Uri, which is presumably the slave’s provenance. Uri was an agricultural center in the vicinity of Emar that is frequently mentioned in real property sales as the location of fields and orchards belonging to Emarites. In E 205, the list of witnesses is populated by people from the town of Eššu, a village frequently mentioned in the Emar sources, which was perhaps the debtor’s town. The other documents do not specify the slaves’ provenance, which is an indication of their local

322 

 5 Forms of Dependency at Emar

origin. A tenuous indication of one slave’s foreign provenance is perhaps found in GsK 1, because the slave’s personal name is attested only in this document. Unclear types of dependency for debt are documented in two contracts, Hirayama 37 and TBR 25, and a lawsuit, Subartu 17 (§ 3.2.4). Although these documents share features with other text types, neither (w)ardu nor amēlūtu are employed. Hirayama 37 and Subartu 17 include the redemption clause usually associated with slavery, while TBR 25 has a clause that includes the “leaving the house” formula that is found in the contracts of indentured labor. Nevertheless, in both Hirayama 37 and TBR 25, the debtor can be released by providing a substitute at the rate of oneto-one. The rate of redemption is unclear in Subartu 17, but a one-to-one rate is not excluded. It remains therefore unclear whether the masters retained full ownership in these documents. In all three cases, the masters are members of notable families who repaid the debts and kept the debtors alive (bulluṭu) in years of hardship. As in the documents related to debt slavery, the indebted people are likely from Emar.

5.1.3 Dependency related to Hardship To reiterate, hardship is a generic heading that is used here to categorize documents that do not explicitly report debt as the cause of dependency. Two groups of documents have been discussed under this heading. The first concerns what have been labeled sales into famine slavery (§ 3.3.1). The second includes documents of different types that regulate forms of dependency that are not clearly definable (§ 3.3.2). Twelve Syro-Hittite sales into famine slavery are preserved. These documents have a substantially uniform pattern. Freeborn people are sold by their relatives to collect the money to face distress. As discussed below (§ 5.2.1), these people were foreigners who travelled to Emar to find purchasers. In 5 out of 12 contracts the buyers are members of notable families.33 Two additional purchases (E 7 and AuOr5 12) stem from the minor dossiers (§ 1.3.7). The second group includes two types of documents, adoptions and palāḫu contracts. The condition of dependency cannot be uniquely defined across these documents, which employ no specific terms (e.g., (w)ardu or amēlūtu). The nature of dependency may differ even within each subgroup, i.e., adoptions and palāḫu contracts. Adoptions include both Syrian (E 256 and TBR 48) and Syro-Hittite documents (E 216 and TBR 77). This legal device served different purposes. In E 256, three orphans are adopted but their status is uncertain: a high penalty is imposed for the release of the children, but it is unclear whether it applies after the adop-

33 See § 5.2.2 and Table 54.

5.2 The Slave Market 

 323

tion. Similarly, in TBR 77 a woman gives her children into adoption to her daughter in exchange for her support. The redemption clause stipulates that two slaves shall be delivered to redeem the children. The clauses in these two contracts perhaps suggest that the adopted children were owned by their adoptees, although this cannot be stated conclusively. Very differently, in TBR 48 a woman, clearly a widow, adopted a man to obtain his support. The adoptee is also made the son of the woman’s husband and is entitled to his house and family gods. The clause of dissolution stipulates a penalty only for the woman, probably because of her inferior condition. Finally, E 216 is a matrimonial sale adoption, in which a child is sold under the understanding that she will be adopted by the purchaser and married. Two Syro-Hittite documents (GsK 2 and RE 26) regulate the palāḫu duty: people facing difficulties must perform the palāḫu duty for someone who helped them. In both documents the person performing the palāḫu duty is also responsible for taking care of the master’s son. In RE 26, the dependent receives a wife from the master. Although the form of dependency in these documents is similar to indentured labor, in GsK 2 the dependents appear to be in a better position in light of the equal penalties on each side and the fact that the master’s son is given into adoption to his dependent. The non-slave status of the dependent is specifically stated in RE 26. Because of their similarity to the contracts of indentured servitude, these documents should probably be interpreted as illustrations of the same principle of solidarity (§ 5.1.1). Out of both groups of documents, only in GsK 2 is the master a member of a notable family, and his intervention seems to be motivated by the fact that the persons in distress were closely associated with him, perhaps friends.

5.2 The Slave Market 5.2.1 Prices of Slaves The archives of Emar yielded twenty-two documents recording sales of slaves. Twelve contracts pertaining to famine slaves (§ 3.3.1) list a total of eighteen people sold. Eight documents relating to chattel slaves record the sale of eighteen people (§ 3.4.1). Only two contracts – each dealing with one person – record the sale of people into debt slavery (§ 3.2.3.1). Female slaves (21) outnumber male slaves (13) in sale contracts (Table 51).34 34 These figures do not include Hirayama 40, because it does not indicate the gender of the sold persons. Note that females are concerned in the majority of documents pertaining to slavery from Ekalte, Torrecilla 2014: 97.

324 

 5 Forms of Dependency at Emar

Table 51: Slave Prices. Document

Script

Slave

TBR 26

SH

1F

TBR 44

SH

1M

Purchase Price

Seller’s Provenance

DEBT SLAVES 70 sh.

NG

20 sh.

Karšu

FAMINE SLAVES ASJ10 E

SH

1M

?

Tuttul (?)

AuOr5 11

SH

1M 2F

70 sh.

Anabi

AuOr5 12

SH

1F

33 sh.

NG

E7

SH

1M

52 sh.

Ekalte

E 79

SH

1F

?

?

E 83

SH

1F

9 sh.

NG

E 84

SH

1F

55 sh.

NG

E 118

SH

1M 1F

42 sh.

Ḫalmanukka

E 217

SH

2M 2F

60 sh.

Šatappu

Hirayama 17

SH

1F

15 sh. 1 donkey 500 shekels of copper

Karšu

Hirayama 18

SH

1F

22 sh.

Atira

TBR 52

SH

1F

12 sh.

Ḫatta

CHATTEL SLAVES Iraq54 5

S

1M

43 sh.

Kamia

E 35

SH

1M

45 sh.

Uri

E 127

SH

1M 1F

5 talents of boxwood 2 oxen of good quality

Assyria

E 211

SH

3M 4F

120 sh.

NG

E 214

SH

1F

35 sh.

Nikippa

E 224

SH

1F

NG

Guzini

Hirayama 40

SH

4

70 sheep

District of Abalḫumi-canal

E 25

Bab

1F

40 sh.

Babylonia (?)

Purchase prices are preserved in ten sales into famine slavery, five sales of chattel slaves, and both sales into debt slavery. This uneven distribution poses a challenge when comparing the three groups of sale contracts. Furthermore, in a few instances, the purchasers of slaves did not pay with silver, or not only

5.2 The Slave Market 

 325

with silver. Unfortunately, we do not know the copper-silver rate and the prices of donkeys at Emar, but we do know the prices from Ugarit, which allow us to estimate the price of the female slave in Hirayama 17 to be between 30 and 54 shekels of silver.35 In the following calculations the mean value, 42 shekels, will be used. The price in Hirayama 40 is calculated on the basis of Zaccagnini’s tentative assessment of the value of 70 rams and ewes as about 70 to 100 shekels of silver.36 As in the previous case, the mean value, 85 shekels, is used. The price in silver of the two slaves in E 127, a naššartu-woman and her son, who were exchanged for five talents of boxwood and two oxen of good quality, cannot be calculated. Thus, prices per person in the sales of slaves range from 9 to 70 shekels of silver. Prices per person in all types of sales vary widely: they range from 9 to 55 shekels of silver in sales into famine slavery and from about 17 up to 45 shekels of silver in sales of chattel slaves. The only two sales into debt slavery show the largest variation in prices: 20 and 70 shekels of silver. The first step in analyzing the prices is to determine whether the different groups of sales are comparable. Because the sales into debt and famine slavery arise from conditions of distress, one may ask whether the buyers exploited the sellers’ situation to gain reduced prices. The prices in sales of debt slaves and famine slaves have a slightly greater dispersion than the prices of chattel slaves, as confirmed by the standard deviations of the prices per person: 18.54 shekels of silver for debt and famine slaves and 10.68 shekels of silver for chattel slaves.37 Nevertheless, the average price per person is quite similar in the two groups: 27.06 shekels of silver for debt and famine slaves, and 24.53 shekels of silver for chattel slaves. The average price per person of debt and famine slaves is highly influenced by TBR 26, which lists the highest price for an individual (70 sh.); when this value is excluded, the average price per person in each of the two groups is exactly the same

35 Tsukimoto (1991a: 277) assessed the full price in Hirayama 17 at “a bit less than 30 shekels of silver,” using the data provided by Heltzer (1978, 86–87), which are collected from different sites and are often unreliable. The above figures were obtained by using the documentation of Ugarit alone as a basis for comparison, according to which the copper-silver rate was 200:1 (Vargyas 1986: 108) and the prices of donkeys ranged between 10 and 30 shekels of silver (Nasgowitz 1976: 242–43); the results were then converted according to a ratio of about 1.2 between the Ugaritic shekel of 9.4 grams and the Emar shekel of 7.83 grams (Zaccagnini 2018, cf. Chambon 2014: 108), returning 30.01 sh. and 54.02 sh. 36 Zaccagnini 1996: 96. 37 In multiple sales (famine slaves: AuOr5 11, E 118, E 217; chattel slaves: E 211, Hirayama 40), the price per person is calculated by dividing the purchase price by the number of sold people; for a refined standard deviation, see below.

326 

 5 Forms of Dependency at Emar

(24.53 sh.).38 This is evidence that we are dealing with prices of approximately the same magnitude that were determined by the market. As a consequence, buyers of debt and famine slaves did not exploit the sellers’ condition to gain a reduced price. Hence our comparison of the prices from the three groups is legitimate. The factors that determine slave prices, primarily age and gender, need to be investigated. Because prices of slaves largely depended on their potential to supply labor, minors were usually appraised at a lower value than adults in ancient Near Eastern cuneiform records.39 Additionally, the high infant mortality rate,40 which was a very risky variable for a buyer, and the care needed by children, which could have been expensive in terms of time and money, contributed to the lower valuation of minors. However, texts are often silent on the age of the sold persons. In E 217 they were certainly minors:41 four children were purchased for 60 shekels of silver. The price per person, 15 shekels of silver, is comparable to the prices recorded in E 83 (9 sh.) and TBR 52 (12 sh.). Indeed, in E 83 the sold person is still a suckling baby (DUMU.MUNUS ša GAB), and in TBR 52 two men sell their niece, who was likely a child.42 These values for children are confirmed by a text that is not a sale, E 205,43 where two children are appraised at 25 shekels of silver, or 12.5 shekels each. Thus, prices of children ranged between 9 and 15 shekels with an average of 13.25 shekels of silver. Adults can be identified with certainty as the sole object of the sale in only a handful of documents: two are sales into famine slavery, AuOr5 12 (33 sh.) and Hirayama 18 (22 sh.); two are sales into debt slavery, TBR 44 (20 sh.) and TBR 26 (70 sh.); and one concerns a chattel slave, E 35 (45 sh.). Based on the prices of minors, we can assume that higher prices in texts providing no indication of the age of the sold persons refer to adults. It follows that the chattel slaves in E 214,

38 Without the value of TBR 26 also the standard deviation of the prices per person of debt and famine slaves (15.02) becomes closer to that of chattel slaves. One should recall that average prices are influenced by the calculations of individual prices in Hirayama 17, a sale into famine slavery, and Hirayama 40, a sale of chattel slaves. The average price per person in sales into famine slavery is 24.81 sh. Note that due to the scant documentation, average prices are subject to distortion, and so the difference of a few shekels of silver between types of slaves should not be overestimated. Note also that the average price of all slaves (debt/famine slaves and chattel slaves) is 25.91 sh., but 24.53 sh. when the anomalous sale in TBR 26 is excluded. See Table 53. 39 For the prices of children see Garroway 2014: 146, Dandamaev 1984: 205. 40 For infant mortality in Babylonia see Tenney 2017: 735–36. 41 Minors are individuals from birth to 15 years old; childhood is defined as the first 12 years of life, with an internal differentiation between infants (0–2 years old) and children (3–12 years old), see Garroway 2014: 18–19. The terms minors and children are here used interchangeably. 42 On this point see Fijałkowska 2014a: 104 n. 44. 43 See § 3.2.3.2.2.1.

5.2 The Slave Market 

 327

a female sold for 35 shekels of silver, and in Iraq54 5, a male sold for 43 shekels of silver, were adults, as was the female famine slave purchased in E 84 for 55 shekels of silver. Despite her qualification as a “daughter,” the person sold in Hirayama 17 is regarded as an adult in virtue of the high price, 42 shekels of silver. The same can be assumed for E 25, a letter about the delivery of a female slave sold for 40 shekels of silver: the slave is defined as ṣuḫārtu, which is semantically associated with youth but was used for adults as well. In E 7, the sold person was the seller’s grandson, which would suggest that the slave was a child. However, the exceptionally high price, 52 shekels of silver, makes it likely that he was able to work as an adult; he was probably a young and strong man. Other documents provide no clear-cut evidence for the age of the sold persons (E 79, E 224, and Hirayama 40). In E 79 and E 224, the price is not given or not preserved, while Hirayama 40 does not even provide the gender of the sold slaves. The presence of the “voluntarily” clause provides no indication of the age of the sold person because it is associated with minors (ASJ10 E, E 217, E 83, and TBR 52) and adults (Hirayama 17, Hirayama 18, and TBR 26) alike, as well as in sales combining adults and minors (AuOr5 11). When sold individually, the prices of adults range between 20 and 70 shekels of silver, with the majority falling between 30 and 45 shekels and averaging 41.55 shekels of silver.44 Excluding the high value of 70 shekels of silver recorded in TBR 26, the average price per adult slave is 38.70 shekels of silver. The average price in sales of individual adults is similar for chattel slaves (40.75 sh.) and debt and famine slaves (42.00/37.34 sh.).45 This shows once more that the different types of slaves were appraised according to the same market rules. The prices of individual slaves seem high when compared to the prices fetched by combinations of adults and children. There are three contracts in which adults and children are sold together:46 two sales into famine slavery (AuOr5 11 and E 118) and one sale of chattel slaves (E 211).47 Starting from the average price of a child

44 Sales of adults: AuOr5 12, E 7, E 25, E 35, E 84, E 214, Hirayama 17, Hirayama 18, Iraq54 5, TBR 26, TBR 44. Note that in TBR 44, despite the low price, the debtor was able to sell himself for twice the value of the original debt. 45 The second figure is the average price of single adults in sales of debt and famine slaves excluding TBR 26 (70 sh.). Note that the number of sales of chattel slaves recording the purchase of single adults (E 25, E 35, E 214, Iraq54 5) is less than that of debt and famine slaves (TBR 26, TBR 44, AuOr5 12, E 7, E 84, Hirayama 17, Hirayama 18). 46 Children were often sold together with their mothers in Mesopotamia, as the offspring of a slave was normally considered to be an alienable property, Reid 2017: 13. 47 E 127 also records the sale of a mother together with her child, but they are exchanged for wood and oxen.

328 

 5 Forms of Dependency at Emar

slave, we may attempt to calculate the prices of adults.48 In AuOr5 11, two adults and a child are sold for a total price of 70 shekels of silver. Assuming a value of 13 shekels of silver for the child, the price of the adults would be 28.5 shekels of silver each. A similar figure results from E 118, where a woman and her son were sold for 42 shekels of silver. Thus, assuming 13 shekels of silver for the child, the price of the adult would have been 29 shekels of silver. In E 211, five children and two adults are sold for 120 shekels of silver. Assuming that the price per child was 13 shekels of silver, each adult was valuated at 27.5 shekels of silver. The lower prices probably indicate that combinations of adults and children were viewed as package deals in which the sold persons fetched lower prices than if they were sold individually. The reasons for this are not clear, but we may speculate that adults, in particular, were obligated to spend a certain amount of time caring for their children and thus the amount of labor they could perform – and in turn their overall value – was reduced. In addition, prices of adults in multiple sales are strongly influenced by the value used for the price of the children.49 Therefore, the prices of individual slaves are retained as the reference values.50 Nevertheless, the calculation of prices in sales of multiple individuals can be used to refine the standard deviation, which yields even closer results in the sales into debt and famine slavery, excluding TBR 26 (13.65), and in the sales of chattel slaves (11.06). Once again, the similarity of the two groups of sales supports the claim that slaves were bought and sold at market prices. Gender was another key factor in the appraisal of slaves in the ancient Near East, with males usually fetching higher prices than females.51 Nevertheless, Emar sources provide little evidence regarding the influence of gender on prices. In seven documents, the object of the sale can be identified as an adult woman: four concern famine slaves (AuOr5 12, E 84, Hirayama 17, and Hirayama 18), two are sales of chattel slaves (E 25 and E 214), and one is a sale into debt slavery (TBR 26). Prices range between 22 and 70 shekels of silver, with an average of 42.43 shekels of silver; when TBR 26 (70 sh.) is excluded, the average price is 37.84 shekels of silver. Adult males were sold individually in only four documents: one sale into debt slavery (TBR 44), one sale into famine slavery (E 7), and two sales of chattel slaves 48 The price of individuals in multiple sales is calculated from the average price of children because their prices have a lower spread than those of adults in individual sales, as demonstrated by their respective standard deviations, 2.03 for children vs. 13.75 for adults. 49 For instance, if we assign the minimum recorded price to each child (9 sh.) in E 211, each adult would have fetched 37.5 sh. 50 Note that by using the prices of adults calculated in multiple sales, the average price per adult from the combined data of individual and multiple sales would be 36.88 sh.; this figure is based on AuOr5 11, AuOr5 12, E 7, E 25, E 35, E 84, E 118, E 211, E 214, Hirayama 17, Hirayama 18, Iraq54 5, TBR 26, and TBR 44. 51 Mendelsohn 1949: 117–18, Stol 2011–2013: 567.

5.2 The Slave Market 

 329

(E 35 and Iraq54 5). Thus, sales of adult males provide a rather small sample for comparison with sales of females.52 Prices of adult males range between 20 and 52 shekels of silver with an average of 40 shekels of silver. One may note that the two highest-priced slaves were females (TBR 26 = 70 sh.; E 84 = 55 sh.), while the next two most expensive slaves were males (E 7 = 52 sh.; Iraq54 5 = 43 sh.). The higher number of sales of females in general, along with the top prices fetched by female slaves, suggests that they were more sought after than males, likely because they could procreate and serve as wet nurses. Nevertheless, there is no clear evidence that females and males were appraised according to different scales of value.53 The difference between the value of adult slaves of the same gender certainly depended on their quality. This factor is never mentioned in the documents but included fundamental features such as strength, health, and beauty (for females).54 Although the masters will be treated in detail in the following section (§ 5.2.2), another factor that may have influenced the prices of slaves is the social position of the buyers. As mentioned several times already, the social position of many individuals cannot be precisely determined. However, we may distinguish between notable families, merchants and individuals with minor dossiers, and other individuals who are unattested elsewhere. In the present analysis we will only deal with documents in which the price per person can be calculated. The largest group comprises nine documents from the dossiers of the notable families that record the purchase of nineteen slaves.55 Only two documents (AuOr5 12 and E 25) can be associated with merchants and minor dossiers, with one slave each. Seven documents record the purchase of twelve slaves by people whose social status cannot be determined.56 Prices per person in documents belonging to the notable families range from 9 to 70 shekels of silver with an average of 24.37 shekels of silver; when the extremely high price of 70 shekels (TBR 26) is excluded, the average drops to 21.83 shekels of silver. The spread of prices per person for slaves acquired by individuals categorized as “others” is smaller – 12 to 45 shekels of silver – and the average is slightly higher, 26.58 shekels of silver. The average price per person in the two documents associated with merchants and minor dossiers is appreciably higher (36.5 sh.), but a set of two documents is not statistically

52 Note that Iraq54 5, being a Syrian tablet, refers to a period when prices could have been different. 53 Note that when TBR 26 is omitted from the calculation, the average price per person of adult females is a bit lower than that of adult males. 54 Note that beauty is considered a merchandisable quality, see § 5.3. 55 E 7, E 83, E 84, E 118, E 217, E 211, E 214, TBR 26, TBR 44. 56 AuOr5 11, Hirayama 17, Hirayama 18, TBR 52, E 35, Hirayama 40, Iraq54 5; note that the seller in Hirayama 40 is a member of a notable family.

330 

 5 Forms of Dependency at Emar

relevant.57 The small difference in the average price per person between slaves purchased by the notable families and those acquired by other individuals does not allow us to infer that the notable families purchased slaves at a reduced price by virtue of their socio-economic position. The small difference can be explained by the fact that the sale contracts belonging to the notable families included a higher number of minors (11)58 than those categorized as “others” (2).59 We may therefore conclude that slaves were exchanged at the same price rate regardless of the social position of the buyers. This obviously raises the question of who the individuals categorized as “others” were. They certainly had the financial means to purchase slaves, but their socio-economic status cannot be inferred. The influence of contextual factors must also be investigated. Some slavery-related sales contain formulas that allude to episodes of war and famine. It is often argued that hardship was the ultimate cause of enslavement. Nevertheless, only four sales of famine slaves (ASJ10 E, AuOr5 12, E 83, and TBR 52) and one sale into debt slavery (TBR 44) include the “year of hardship” formula.60 E 217 can be added here because only a short time had elapsed after the first sale recorded in E 216, which includes the “year of hardship” formula.61 The duress is described more explicitly in ASJ10 E, which refers to a period of great inflation when the silver-barley exchange rate increased to 3 qû of barley for 1 shekel of silver. Table 52: Sales of Slaves with the Year of Hardship Formula. Document

Slave

Seller

Price

Formula

ASJ10 E

1M

F

?

[i-na MU] KALA.GA ša 3 qa ŠE [a-na 1 GÍ]N KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ iz-za-az

AuOr5 12

1F

M

33 sh.

i-na MU KALA.GA

E 83

1F

M

9 sh.

[i-na M]U dan-na-ti

E 217

2F 2M

F

60 sh.

–

TBR 44

1M

M

20 sh.

TBR 52

1F

M

12 sh.

i-na MU KALA.GA ša ERIM.MEŠ TAR-WU E-mar il-mi-ma

uru

i-na MU KALA.GA

57 Note that if we count the two merchants’ documents together with those of the notable families, the average price per person is 25.52 sh.; if we count them together with the documents of the “others,” then the average price per person is 28 sh. 58 E 83, E 118, E 217, E 211. 59 AuOr5 11, TBR 52. 60 For this clause see § 1.5, see also § 6. 61 Note that E 216 is not regarded here as a slave sale, see § 3.3.1.1.

5.2 The Slave Market 

 331

In sales of real property, the “year of hardship” formula had no direct influence on prices, although it might have served to indicate the background of the transactions.62 Adamthwaite argued that prices of slaves are lower in texts mentioning the “year of hardship” formula.63 Although the data are too limited to ensure a useful comparison between sales in times of hardship and sales in normal times, the low prices seem to be correlated with factors other than the hardship formula. In E 83, E 217, and TBR 52, prices were low because the sold persons were children. In TBR 44, the price is low for an adult slave, but this was a self-sale into debt slavery and the debtor was able to negotiate a price that was twice the amount of the original debt. In the remaining document, AuOr5 12, the price is just slightly lower than the average for adults and in any case it is within the range of most prices. Although famine and war were the likely causes of impoverishment, there is no clear-cut evidence that prices were somehow influenced by the “year of hardship” formula. The “voluntarily” clause, which is used in the majority of sales into famine slavery64 and in one sale into debt slavery (TBR 26), fictitiously indicates that the transaction was carried out with the consent of the sold person.65 Documents containing the “voluntarily” clause attest the full range of slave prices, and likewise there are sales lacking this clause that record prices below (TBR 44) and above average (E 84). Thus, there is no evidence that this clause affected prices. The provenance of slaves cannot be correlated with prices.66 On the one hand, the highest recorded prices are assigned to people likely stemming from Emar (TBR 26, E 84). On the other hand, two sales of foreign persons, E 7 and Iraq54 5, also record above-average prices. Late Bronze Age sources show that at Alalaḫ slave prices ranged between 25 and 50 shekels of silver, with an approximate average of 30 shekels of silver per person.67 Likewise, the Nuzi evidence shows that the average price of slaves was about 30 shekels of silver each.68 The meager quantity of sources precludes a full

62 Viano 2010b: 268, Viano 2012: 125–26, Viano 2016: 173. 63 Adamthwaite 2001: 152–54. Note that he mistakenly calculates the average price of each set using the average price per person in each of several multiple sales; when the average price is calculated by summing all the purchase prices listed for both individual slaves and groups of slaves and dividing the total by the number of sold slaves, the difference between sale prices in the years of hardship and in normal times is much reduced. 64 ASJ10 E, AuOr5 11, E 7, E 79, E 83, E 217, Hirayama 17, Hirayama 18, TBR 52, see Table 15. 65 A similar clause is attested in the lawsuit E 205 (§ 3.2.3.2.2.1). 66 For the provenance of slaves see § 5.2.2. 67 See Niedorf 2008: 178–79 and n. 749, 205–06. 68 Zaccagnini 1977: 177.

332 

 5 Forms of Dependency at Emar

understanding of the prices of slaves at Ugarit, but male slaves were reckoned between 40 and 70 shekels of silver.69 Slave prices attested in Kassite Babylonia are also comparable.70 Despite the use of different weight systems and the lack of comprehensive studies on slave prices according to age and gender, it seems that slave prices at Emar and neighboring areas were approximately of the same magnitude. During the Old Babylonian period, there is evidence of great variation in slave prices depending on the supply of slaves and their provenance.71 Nevertheless, the value of slaves was apparently higher at Emar, Alalaḫ, and Nuzi than in earlier Mesopotamian sources.72 During the Neo Babylonian and Persian periods we observe a significant fluctuation in slave prices, but their average value was higher in comparison to the Late Bronze Age.73 To conclude, the primary factors affecting the prices of slaves seem to have been the age and quality of the persons sold, which were clearly related to their potential as workers. Slave prices at Emar can be summarized in Table 53. Averages listed in parentheses were calculated without including the anomalously high sale price in TBR 26. Table 53: Summary of Slave Prices. Range per person

Average

All slaves

9 – 70 sh.

25.91 sh. (24.53 sh.)

Debt and famine slaves Chattel slaves

9 – 70 sh.

27.06 sh. (24.53 sh.)

17 – 45 sh.

24.53 sh.

Adult slaves

20 – 70 sh.

41.55 sh. (38.70 sh.)

Adult males

20 – 52 sh.

40.00 sh.

Adult females

22 – 70 sh.

42.43 sh. (37.84 sh.)

Children

9 – 15 sh.

13.25 sh.

69 Nasgowitz 1976: 227; according to Heltzer (1999: 445) the average price of slaves was 33 sh.; see, however, the remarks by Vargyas 1986: 107. Ekalte sources provide scant evidence for slave prices, Torrecilla 2014: 97–100. 70 Petschow 1974: 11–12, Gurney 1983: 14–16. 71 van Koppen 2004: 17–19. 72 For Mesopotamian evidence see Mendelsohn 1949: 117–18, Snell 2011: 9–10, Richardson 2019: 19–20. 73 Dandamaev 1984: 204–06, Jursa 2010: 232–34, 741–45.

5.2 The Slave Market 

 333

5.2.2 Masters and Slaves This section discusses the people involved in the sale contracts, namely sellers, buyers, and the sold persons themselves. As seen in Table 51, a number of documents record the sellers’ provenance. Sales of chattel slaves provide information on the sellers’ provenance but are usually silent on that of the slaves. We cannot exclude, however, that in some cases it was the same. Merchants are clearly acting as sellers in E 25, E 127, and Hirayama 40. In E 25, a female slave, probably from Babylonia, was traded by foreign merchants belonging to the entourage from House 5. In E 127, an Assyrian merchant traded two slaves perhaps of Hurrian origin.74 In Hirayama 40, the seller is a member of the family of Kutbe, but the trade was entrusted to merchants stemming from the otherwise unknown region of the Abalḫummi canal, which was probably in the vicinity of Emar.75 In three other sales of chattel slaves, the sellers come from the villages of Nikippa (E 214), Guzini (E 224), and Kamia (Iraq54 5). None of these places76 nor the sellers are attested elsewhere in the Emar documentation. Worth noting are the Hurrian names of two sellers, AriKušuḫ (E 214) and Pukli-šarri (E 224).77 As with E 25 and Hirayama 40, it is possible that the sellers in E 214, E 224, and Iraq54 5 were merchants carrying slaves to Emar from elsewhere.78 Although the commercial context is the most probable, it cannot be excluded that the slaves in E 214 and E 224 were sold out of need by people facing economic difficulties. A single sale, E 35, specifies the provenance of the sold person, the well-known town of Uri, which was an important agricultural district in the vicinity of Emar.79 In addition to the sale-related documents discussed in § 5.2.1, two documents, JA 303 and Hirayama 41, record slave transactions of uncertain nature.80 In the letter JA 303, a slave from Assyria seems to be traded by an Emarite merchant. Hirayama 41 does not report the provenance of the slave, but it is not excluded that the text recorded a trade of slaves from outside Emar.

74 Durand 1990: 59 n. 121: “Les naššartu sont attestées dans l’entourage du dieu (hourrite) de l’Orage (cf. GLH II, p. 179) et, souvant – quoique sans preuve –, comprises comme ‘ses concubines.’ Il peut s’agir d’une sorte de servantes, éventuellement de ‘chanteuses.’” 75 Note that this name is not mentioned in Belmonte Marín 2001. 76 Cf. Belmonte Marín 2001: 99, 151, 209. 77 Pruzsinszky 2003: 226, 230. 78 Note that in Iraq54 5 the sale is secured by a guarantor who perhaps acted as middleman. 79 See Adamthwaite 2001: 216–17; for the land sales see Viano 2010b: 262, Viano 2016. 80 For these documents see § 3.4.2.

334 

 5 Forms of Dependency at Emar

Unlike sellers of chattel slaves, sellers of debt and famine slaves were people facing severe economic difficulties who were forced to sell their relatives. As discussed above (§ 5.1.2), apart from the sale contract TBR 44, which mentions the town of Karšu as the provenance of the sold person, debt slaves originated from the area surrounding Emar. The town of Karšu seems to be located south of Karkemiš.81 Most of the sales into famine slavery report foreign places as the provenance of slaves and sellers. These contracts mention the towns of Anabi (AuOr5 11), Ḫalmanukka (E 118), and Atira (Hirayama 18), whose locations are unknown.82 In AuOr5 11 and Hirayama 18, the sellers and the sold persons bear Hurrian names, suggesting that the towns of Anabi and Atira might have been situated in a Hurrian-speaking environment. The town of Karšu is also mentioned as the seller’s provenance in Hirayama 17. The sellers in TBR 52 originated from the town of Ḫatta. As we have argued, it is likely that this town was different from the town of the same name mentioned in the Hittite inventory texts.83 Since the location of the latter Ḫatta is also unknown, the Hittite and Emar sources may be reconciled only if it is assumed that they both refer to a town located in northern Syria. A northern Syrian location for Ḫatta better suits the Hurrian personal names borne by the sold person and the sellers. The sealers of the tablet also have Hurrian names, and one of them, Zizza son of Ari-Aštabi, originates from Ḫatta. The transaction recorded in ASJ10 E took place outside Emar, because the document records the purchase of a male slave at Tuttul, which was likely also the provenance of the sold person. The sellers in E 7 and E 217 were from two important cities in the vicinity of Emar, Ekalte and Šatappu.84 The seller and the sold person in AuOr5 12 may perhaps be included among the persons who originated from outside Emar because of their Hurrian names, which are attested only in this text.85 E 83 and E 84 might be the only sales into famine slavery that record sales by Emarites because they are silent on the slaves’ provenance,86 which may be an indication of local origin. Sellers are usually men. Women act as sellers mainly in sales of famine slaves, where they sell their relatives out of necessity (ASJ10 E, E 7, E 217, and Hirayama 17). Their condition is particularly evident in E 7 and ASJ10 E, where the sellers were

81 Belmonte Marín 2001: 158–59. 82 Belmonte Marín 2001: 24, 46, 114. 83 See § 3.3.1.6. 84 Šatappu was a town close to Emar and is mentioned in several texts, see Belmonte Marín 2001: 267; see also Cohen 2011: 151 n. 37. 85 See Pruzsinszky 2003: Index, 115, 32. 86 E 79 is too fragmentary.

5.2 The Slave Market 

 335

likely widows. In a single sale of a chattel slave, the seller is a woman: Wašti, who was the wife of a Hittite official at Emar. Buyers of slaves were usually local townsmen or people residing in Emar, but sales outside the town are also attested. The notable families were particularly active on the slave market (Table 54). Table 54: Notable Families in Slavery-related Sales. Family

Document

Role

Type

Family of Zū-Baʿla

E 217

Buyer

Famine slaves

E 211

Buyer

Chattel slaves

E 214

Buyer

Chattel slaves

E 224

Buyer

Chattel slaves

E 79

Buyer

Famine slaves

E 83

Buyer

Famine slaves

E 84

Buyer

Famine slaves

Hirayama 40

Seller

Chattel slaves

Hirayama 41

Buyer (?)

Chattel slaves

Family of Milki-Dagan

E 118

Buyer

Famine slaves

Family of Awiru

TBR 26

Buyer

Debt slaves

Family of Apilu

TBR 44

Buyer

Debt slaves

Family of Ḫima

Family of Kutbe

Chattel slaves were usually acquired by Emarites. Members of the family of Zū-Baʿla are named as buyers in three documents (E 211, E 214, and E 224). The buyers in E 35 and in the Syrian sale Iraq54 5 were likely Emarites but are unknown elsewhere. The buyer of the female slave in E 25, although residing at Emar, was the Babylonian scribe Kidin-Gula. Sales of slaves outside Emar are recorded in Hirayama 40 and E 127. The buyer in Hirayama 40 likely resided somewhere outside Emar because two merchants were entrusted by the family of Kutbe with the sale. The slaves recorded in E 127 were to be traded to an Assyrian merchant. Although the type of transaction is unclear, the slave brought from Assyria in the letter JA 303 was likely destined for Emar. Hirayama 41 records a slave transaction of unclear nature in which a member of the family of Kutbe is attested as the recipient of female slaves. Although he was likely the buyer, no price is mentioned in the text.

336 

 5 Forms of Dependency at Emar

The majority of the debt and famine slaves were purchased by members of the notable families, who act as buyers in the two sales into debt slavery (TBR 26 and TBR 44) and in 5 out of 12 sales of famine slaves. Another purchaser who was likely of high status is the son of the diviner Ibni-Dagan (AuOr5 12). We may also add the sons of Irʾam-Dagan (E 7) who, according to the reconstruction proposed here, owned an archive in area A.87 The other buyers were plausibly Emarites, but none of them can be conclusively identified. To sum up, the majority of buyers in all groups of documents resided at Emar. Members of the notable families were buyers in about half of the sales of slaves (11 out of 24).88 This clearly indicates that there was a plurality of buyers and that the market was not controlled by a few. Besides the members of the families of Zū-Baʿla and Ḫima, no purchaser is attested in more than one document. If we count the acquisitions by members of these two families as if they were made by individual purchasers, a total of 19 buyers is known from Emar sources. Slaves were also sold outside Emar and were purchased by foreign merchants (E 25, E 127, Hirayama 40, JA 303). Because several buyers are unattested in other Emar sources, their socio-economic position can hardly be determined.89 Sellers in many cases seem to have been foreigners. The majority of the sellers in sales into famine slavery originated outside Emar, and some bear Hurrian names. These foreigners were plausibly distressed members of rural communities who traveled to Emar to sell their relatives.90 The sellers of chattel slaves were foreign merchants. Most of the chattel slaves are of unknown provenance, but they too were likely foreigners. 87 For these people see § 1.3.7. TBR 52 may contain another attestation of a buyer known from other sources, if he was the same Dagan-kabar mentioned in E 200 and TBR 22, see §§ 2.2.1.2.1 and 3.3.1.6. 88 Although the Syrian texts represent an older and separate set of data, Iraq54 5 is included here because it is dated to Elli, the last king of Emar and thus very close to the beginning of the Syro-Hittite tradition. Zū-Baʿla was probably born before his reign, because his father Šuršu was active during the reign of Elli’s father Pilsu-Dagan. 89 It goes without saying that the buyers did not belong to the bottom stratum of Emar society. Buyers who are unknown from other sources appear in five sales into slavery, ASJ10 E, AuOr5 11, Hirayama 17, Hirayama 18, and TBR 52 (for TBR 52, however, see ch. 5 fn. 87), and one sale of slaves, E 35, and the Syrian sale Iraq54 5. JA 303 can be added here because the details of the transaction remain unclear, and the protagonists of the document are unknown elsewhere. 90 Démare-Lafont and Fleming (2015: 63) offer a different interpretation: the presence of foreigners in slavery-related documents is associated with the fact that the Syro-Hittite tablet format (“free format,” according to their legal classification) was used for non-townsmen and as a shared legal platform. They also wonder whether sales of slaves were even accepted among Emar townsmen. However, one may note that at least one Syrian sale of slaves survives in which the sellers were not townsmen of Emar.

5.3 Redemption and Manumission 

 337

5.3 Redemption and Manumission The Emar sources reflect the common Mesopotamian practice of stipulating the right of redemption only when slavery is a response to economic distress, either debt (§ 3.2.3) or famine (§ 3.3.1).91 No document pertaining to chattel slaves contains the redemption clause. The right of redemption was granted when slavery was the product of both sale and enslavement.92 Two contracts were specifically written to regulate redemption (§ 3.5.1), and there is little doubt that the cause of slavery in both cases was also either debt or famine, although it is not specifically indicated. For the sake of completeness, Table 55 includes three documents, Hirayama 37, Subartu 17, and TBR 25 (§ 3.2.4), that regulate a form of dependency that cannot be clearly classified but contain either the standard redemption clause or a clause regulating the termination of the dependency.93 In ancient Mesopotamia, redemption of debt slaves was usually conditional on payment of the original price/debt.94 In cases where the price of redemption could not be calculated in terms of a purchase price or the amount of a debt, the provision of a substitute was the usual practice.95 In Emar sources, the payment of a redemption price was mostly enforced for debt slaves, while the provision of substitutes was the more common mechanism for releasing people enslaved for famine. However, the provision of a substitute is also attested in relation to debt slavery (E 205), and in two sales into famine slavery (E 118 and Hirayama 17), cash payment is required for redemption. Both forms of redemption are attested in the documents regulating unclear types of dependency for debt: the two contracts (Hirayama 37 and TBR 25) stipulate the provision of a substitute while the lawsuits (Subartu 17) establish a cash payment. The provision of a substitute was more common than cash payment when minors were involved (in five out of eight documents). The proportion is higher if we limit ourselves to slavery-related documents (five out six). This tendency might be connected to the lower value assigned to children at the time of purchase. Instead of fixing a redemption price commensurate with the value of the children

91 Westbrook 1995: 1651–56; for the redemption clause, the non-vindication clause, and the other clauses pertaining to slavery-related documents see §§ 1.5, 3 and Table 15. 92 Redemption of persons pledged to secure a debt (§ 3.2.2) is not discussed here, see § 4.5.4 93 The two contracts for adoption resulting from hardship that contain the redemption clause, E 256 (S) and TBR 77 (SH) (§ 3.3.2.1), are not included in Table 55 because they concern children who are at least formally adopted; moreover, the redemption in E 256 recalls the penalty clause in Syrian contracts, which served to discourage claims by imposing extremely high penalties. 94 Westbrook 1995: 1651–53. 95 Westbrook 1995: 1654–56.

Slaves

1M

TBR 44

1F

E 252

26 sh. 1 shekel of gold

30 sh.

9 sh. YES

2 persons

father

1F

E 83

YES

1M

E 79

?

(YES) YES

52 sh.

1M

E7

anyone

33 sh.

1F

YES

1 M 2 F 70 sh.

YES

YES

YES

YES

Non-vindication Clause

AuOr5 12

4 beautiful women

?

debtor’s family

anyone

debtor

Rightholder

AuOr5 11

YES

FAMINE SLAVERY

TÉŠ.BI

2 persons for each slave

TÉŠ.BI

TÉŠ.BI

DEBT SLAVERY

Redemption

1M

?

YES

YES

YES

Minors

ASJ10 E

Sales into Famine Slavery

1M

1 M 1 F 25 sh.

E 33

E 205

Lawsuits Establishing Enslavement for Debt

30 sh.

2 M 1 F 83 sh.

GsK 1

2F

1 M 2 F 100 sh.

Hirayama 36

1M

E 215

50 sh.

20/10 sh.

70 sh.

Price/Debt

E 121

Enslavement Contracts

1F

TBR 26

Sales into Debt Slavery

Document

Table 55: Redemption in Slavery-related Documents.

YES

YES

zakû Clause

338   5 Forms of Dependency at Emar

1F

?

30 sh.

1 person

20 parīsu of barley

1M

anyone if the debtor is not present

debtor

anyone

UNCLEAR TYPES OF DEPENDENCY FOR DEBT

1st: anyone (?) 2nd: his master

1st: 30 sh. 2nd: TÉŠ.BI

YES

a

“1st” and “2nd” refer to the first and second redemptions: the first redemption is the one recorded in the document, while the second is any future claim.

Subartu 17

Lawsuit

TBR 25

Hirayama 37

?

1st: anyone (?) 2nd: anyone

a

anyone if father or uncles are not present

anyone

anyone

anyone

anyone

1st: 30 sh. 2nd: 60 sh.

1 female slave

1M

E 221

?

25 sh.

1M

BLMJ 2

2 persons REDEMPTION CONTRACTS

1 beautiful woman

12 sh. YES

22 sh.

1F

1F

TBR 52

Contracts

1F

Hirayama 18

TÉŠ.BI

10 persons

TÉŠ.BI

15 sh. 1 donkey 500 shekels of copper

YES

1F

2 M 2 F 60 sh.

E 217

Hirayama 17

YES

1 M 1 F 42 sh.

E 118

55 sh.

1F

E 84

YES

5.3 Redemption and Manumission   339

340 

 5 Forms of Dependency at Emar

at the time of enslavement, a value that would obviously increase over time, the master likely opted to grant the right of redemption through exchange, in order to prevent any loss of capital.96 Whether by cash payment or the provision of a substitute, the price of redemption in slavery-related documents was set at the typical rate used in sale contracts for fully alienated properties, namely twice the price/debt or two people per slave. In Hirayama 18, one female slave can be redeemed by supplying one beautiful woman. In this case, however, the rate of redemption was not set at oneto-one, because the qualification “beautiful” implies a higher market value. The same holds true for AuOr5 11, in which three slaves can be redeemed by providing four beautiful women. The clause of redemption, grounded in the principle of social justice, imposed limits on the exploitation of impoverished people, but at the same time it protected the rights of creditors/buyers by setting the rate of redemption at double the original price of the slave.97 Although known from royal edicts and laws, the right of redemption is rarely stipulated as a contractual term in ancient Near Eastern records.98 In the Old Assyrian slave sales, the amount of the redemption payment was higher than the original sale price.99 In Middle Babylonian sale contracts, enslaved persons were usually redeemable by a third party who supplied substitutes at the rate of two per slave, but the circumstances under which these individuals were enslaved are unknown.100 Of the three documents pertaining to unclear types of dependency, only Hirayama 37 includes the typical redemption clause formulated with the verb baqāru. In Subartu 17, the act of redemption is expressed through the verb leqû, while TBR 25 does not include a proper redemption clause but rather a clause resembling the dissolution clause of the contracts of indentured labor, which grants the debtor the exclusive right to terminate the condition of dependency. While in Subartu the rate of redemption is unknown, Hirayama 37 and TBR 25 stipulate a one-to-one rate, requiring the provision of one person/slave as a substitute. Démare-Lafont associated the one-to-one rate of redemption in these texts with the presence of the “year of hardship” formula, which would limit the creditor’s rights because the sale occurred out of dire need, due to war or famine,

96 Note in particular E 205, which is the only debt slavery document that stipulates the provision of substitutes. 97 See §§ 1.5 and 3.1.2. On the meaning of the clause of redemption cf. Fijałkowska 2014a: 160–63. 98 Leemans 1988: 228–29, Fijałkowska 2014a: 160–61, Westbrook 2001a: 28 and n. 10. 99 Veenhof 1978: 295–98, Bayram and Çeçen 1998, see also Leemans 1988: 228. 100 Gurney 1983: 8, see nos. 21, 22, 23, 25, 27; note that in HS 2068, where slaves are sold by merchants, the redemption clause is not mentioned, see Petschow 1974: 11–14.

5.3 Redemption and Manumission 

 341

and allow redemption on terms favorable to the debtor.101 However, some documents including the “year of hardship” formula stipulate redemption at twice the original price (E 83, E 121, and TBR 52). Most likely, the one-to-one rate of redemption in Hirayama 37 and TBR 25 was associated with the type of dependency that was stipulated in these contracts.102 Liberality and personal relationships between parties, which are not evident in the textual record, should also be taken into account. The two redemption contracts (BLMJ 2 and E 221) pose additional difficulties for understanding the mechanisms regulating the price of redemption. In both documents, slaves were redeemed for 30 shekels of silver and a new redemption price was set at twice the original one. While the new price of 60 shekels of silver corresponds to the usual two-to-one rate of redemption, the price of 30 shekels for the first redemption is unexpected because it is approximately equal to the price of one adult slave.103 To explain this discrepancy, it is useful to consider how the former owners may have acquired the slaves. If the slaves were purchased through a sale, it follows that either redemption was previously set at a one-toone rate, or the slaves were children when they were purchased. In the latter case, the redemption price of a minor purchased for about 15 shekels of silver would correspond to 30 shekels of silver. In this case we need to assume that in BLMJ 2 several years have passed between the time of redemption and adoption and the moment when the former slave contested his status. However, as noted above, the provision of a substitute was preferable for redeeming children. Conversely, if slavery arose from debt through self-enslavement, the price of redemption was commensurate to the original debt, which might have been very different from the average price for slaves. Another question that cannot be answered presently regards the correlation between the paṭāru clause used to describe the redemption of property and the baqāru clause regulating the price of future claims.104 Redemption was not granted on every occasion. More than half of the documents pertaining to debt and famine slavery contain the redemption clause

101 Démare-Lafont 2010: 81–83, “Le paiement au double sert à dédommager le créancier pour le préjudice qu’il subit. C’est précisément cet argument que la clause sur la détresse permet d’écarter. Elle sert donc à limiter les prétentions financières du créancier ou de la caution en plafonnant le taux de rachat.” 102 This hypothesis seems to be strengthened by looking at the adoption for hardship TBR 77 (§ 3.3.2.1.2), which stipulates a one-to-one rate of redemption. 103 See § 5.2.1. 104 On the attestations of these clauses see Fijałkowska 2014a: 152–60. The clause stipulating the price of a future claim is not formulated exclusively with the verb baqāru; note that in a single case (AuOr5 11) this clause is written with the verb paṭāru.

342 

 5 Forms of Dependency at Emar

(13  out of 23).105 Redemption is mentioned just slightly more frequently in the sales into famine-slavery (7 out of 12) than in documents pertaining to debt slavery (4 out of 9).106 Redemption was granted to both male and female slaves, although more cases of the latter are documented, probably because of the higher number of women enslaved. The ratio of males enslaved alone who were granted the right of redemption (3 out of 7)107 approximates that of females (5 out of 9).108 If we limit ourselves to adults, the ratio slightly favors males (3 out of 6)109 over females (3 out of 7).110 Therefore gender was probably not a factor in granting the right of redemption. Fijałkowska argued that sales into famine slavery contain the redemption clause only when prices are low.111 Purchase prices in sales into famine slavery with the redemption clause range between 9 to 70 shekels of silver. Admittedly, the average price per person (19.77 sh.) is lower than in the sales into famine slavery, where redemption is not allowed (46.67 sh.). However, a closer look at the sales into famine slavery without the redemption clause shows that only three contracts preserve the purchase price (AuOr5 12, E 7, and E 84), and in all three cases adults are the object of the sale. Conversely, in five out of seven sales into famine slavery that include the redemption clause, minors were involved, either as the only object of the sales or together with adults (AuOr5 11, E 83, E 118, E 217, and TBR 52). Prices are therefore lower because of the presence of children and because combined sales were package deals. If we broaden the scope of the analysis to include all documents concerning slavery, only two documents involv-

105 See Table 55 these and the following calculations do not include Hirayama 37, Subartu 17 and TBR 25 because it is unclear whether full ownership was implied. With their inclusion the proportion is 16 out of 26. Note that E 79 is included among the documents without the redemption clause, primarily because it contains the non-vindication clause, but it is not excluded that it also contained the redemption clause because of its fragmentary nature. 106 Given the restricted pool of data, this difference is not particularly significant. 107 E 121, BLMJ 2, E 221; we may add here the unclear type of dependency TBR 25. Redemption is not attested in the other documents whereby men were enslaved alone: ASJ10 E, E 7, E 33, TBR 44. 108 E 252, E 83, Hirayama 17, Hirayama 18, TBR 52; females are enslaved alone also in TBR 26, AuOr5 12, E 79, and E 84. 109 BLMJ 12, E 121, and E 221; adult males are sold also in E 7, E 33, and TBR 44. 110 E 252, Hirayama 17, and Hirayama 18; adult females are sold also in AuOr5 12, E 84, TBR 26, and perhaps E 79. The age of the slave in E 79 is unclear, but the ratio would be exactly the same as for males if we counted E 79 among the sales of children. 111 Fijałkowska 2014b: 391–92; AuOr5 11, E 83, E 118, E 217, Hirayama 17, Hirayama 18, TBR 52.

5.3 Redemption and Manumission 

 343

ing children do not contain the redemption clause.112 Therefore, the presence of children is a major motivation for granting the right of redemption.113 The non-vindication clause (ṭuppu annû ilāʾēšu), which bans future claims, is included in six slavery-related documents (TBR 44, E 121, Hirayama 36, ASJ10 E, E 7, and E 79) and in one contract regulating an unclear type of dependency for debt (TBR 25). In E 121 and in TBR 25, the non-vindication clause only served to bar external claims because the right of redemption is limited to the debtor. In a single document (AuOr5 12), the non-vindication clause is replaced by a clause forbidding the slave from contesting her status. Three documents (E 83, E 84, and TBR 26) contain the zakû clause that relieved the buyer from outsiders’ claims and placed the liability for settling controversies on the seller.114 Two of these documents, E 84 and TBR 26, lack both the redemption and the non-vindication clause while E 83 contains the redemption clause. Only two documents lacking the redemption clause, E 33 and E 215, do not contain any type of clause banning claims regarding ownership of the slave(s). A substantial number of slavery-related documents, 10 out of 23,115 do not contain the redemption clause, but only in 6 of these documents does redemption appear to be prohibited.116 The other four documents (E 33, E 84, E 215, and TBR 26) contain neither the redemption clause nor the non-vindication clause. Thus, a form of redemption is allowed, or at least not explicitly banned, in three-quarters of the debt– and famine-related documents, suggesting that in some cases redemption was implicitly granted. At this point we should explore the relation between the granting of the right of redemption and the masters’ status. The notable families appear as masters in 13 documents pertaining to debt and famine slavery. In addition, two other documents (E 7 and AuOr5 12) stem from the minor dossiers discussed in § 1.3.7 (Table 56).

112 ASJ10 E and Hirayama 36. AuOr5 11, E 83, E 118 E 205, E 217, GsK 1, and TBR 52 grant the right of redemption. 113 The adoptions for hardship E 256 and TBR 77 further strengthen this hypothesis, because they concern children and they do grant the right of redemption; see, however, the remarks on E 256 in ch. 5 fn. 93 and § 3.3.2.1.1.1. 114 For the non-vindication clause and the zakû clause see §§ 1.5 and 3.1.1. 115 ASJ10 E, AuOr5 12, E 7, E 33, E 79, E 84, E 215, Hirayama 36, TBR 26, TBR 44. 116 ASJ10 E, AuOr5 12, E 7, E 79, Hirayama 36, TBR 44; these documents include those with the non-vindication clause, apart from E 121, which also includes the redemption clause; they exclude the documents with the zakû clause, because it does not bar redemption, as well as E 33 and E 215, because they include neither the redemption nor the non-vindication clause.

344 

 5 Forms of Dependency at Emar

Table 56: Clauses in Debt and Famine Slavery Documents from the Dossiers of the Notable Families and Minor Dossiers. Document

Redemption clause

Clause Protecting the Owner

Family of Zū-Baʿla E 205

YES

E 215 E 217

YES

E 221

YES

Family of Ḫima E 79 E 83

non-vindication YES

zakû zakû

E 84 Family of Kutbe GsK 1

YES

Hirayama 36

non-vindication

Family of Milki-Dagan E 118

YES

E 121

YES

non-vindication

Family of Awiru TBR 26

zakû

Family of Apilu TBR 44

non-vindication

Baʿal-bēlī and Abdi-Šaggar sons of Irʾam-Dagan E7

non-vindication

Ibni-Dagan son of Zū-Aštarti AuOr5 12

(non-vindication)

Table 56 clearly shows that notable families were inclined to grant the right of redemption. In addition, in the three documents dealing with unclear types of dependency for debt, redemption is allowed, and the masters belong to the family of Zū-Baʿla (Subartu 17), Kutbe (Hirayama 37), and Awiru (TBR 25). However, the presence of the notable families is statistically different in documents containing the redemption clause and in those protecting the master through the non-vindication clause or the zakû clause. On the one hand, the documents belonging to the notable families represent about half of the documents of debt and famine slavery containing the redemption clause (7 out of 13). The masters in the remaining six documents are unknown elsewhere and therefore their socio-economic

5.3 Redemption and Manumission 

 345

status cannot be determined.117 On the other hand, the majority of the documents of debt and famine slavery that contain a clause protecting the slave master (7 out of 10) stem from the dossiers of the notable families. The ratio is even larger when the two documents stemming from those minor dossiers (E 7 and AuOr5 12) whose owners may have been wealthy individuals are included. Only in a single case of famine slavery is the master otherwise unknown.118 In slavery-related documents, the notable families and other perhaps important individuals were more likely than others to include clauses that protected their property rights more efficiently. This assessment is strengthened by the observation that of the six documents mentioned above that do not allow any redemption, five stem from the dossiers of notable families (E 79, Hirayama 36, and TBR 44) or the other minor dossiers (E 7 and AuOr5 12). Figure 8 summarizes the distribution of clauses permitting redemption, clauses protecting the master, and clauses prohibiting redemption in documents pertaining to debt and famine slavery according to the status of the master: masters from notable families, masters attested in minor dossiers, and other masters.

Figure 8: Distribution of Clauses in Documents pertaining to Debt and Famine Slavery.

Although the notable families tended to protect their property rights, it is clear that even the wealthiest in Emar society could not completely escape the principles of social justice (see § 5.4). When the granting of the redemption right could not be

117 These are one lawsuit (E 252), four sales into famine slavery (AuOr5 11, Hirayama 17, Hirayama 18, and TBR 52) and one lawsuit regulating redemption (BLMJ 2), see § 5.2.2. The only possible exception is TBR 52, see ch. 5 fn. 87. 118 ASJ10 E; The buyer in ASJ10 E perhaps came from Tuttul.

346 

 5 Forms of Dependency at Emar

avoided, the double price of redemption secured the masters’ property rights and constituted a de facto recognition of their ownership over the slave. The double price could serve both as a deterrent against future claims and as compensation. In a case of successful redemption, the master would obtain twice as much as he had initially disbursed to purchase the slave or to settle the debt. Although it is undeniable that the masters were in a position of strength, the Emar contracts seem to reach an equitable balance between opposite interests. As with debt remission (§ 5.1.1), it seems that at Emar the responsibility to enforce the release of debt and famine slaves had shifted from royal authority to private contractual agreements. As with the redemption of forfeited properties (§ 4.9.2), many documents formally granted the right of redemption to whoever (mamma / mannummê) might raise a claim. It has been argued that the right of redemption was not granted to literally “anyone,” but only to certain rightholders, such as relatives or former owners.119 However, in TBR 52 and Subartu 17, redemption seems to be open to anyone after the death of the debtor and the slave’s father and uncles. Similarly, in E 123 the alienated house could be redeemed by anyone after the first year, during which only the debtor was entitled to redemption. The expression used in Subartu 17, LÚ šanûmma, “any other,” seems to point specifically to external claimants. In the redemption contract E 221, there is no connection between the claimant and the redeemed slave; indeed, the claimant is the son of the diviner Baʿal-mālik, who surely had not been previously forced to alienate his slave. Accordingly, it seems that the right of redemption could be granted to individuals outside the narrow circle of rightholders. In the majority of documents containing the redemption clause the right of redemption is granted to anyone;120 in the few documents that limit the right of redemption to specific rightholders, however, either the non-vindication clause or the zakû clause is usually present.121 This might suggest that the redemption clause was required when the right of redemption was extended outside the circle of rightholders. Indeed, none of the documents granting the right of redemption to anyone includes a clause protecting the owner (a non-vindication or zakû clause). This observation could strengthen the hypothesis that the right of redemption was implicitly granted to the slave’s family on a customary basis.

119 Fijałkowska 2014a: 166. 120 Texts according to the order in Table 55: GsK 1, AuOr5 11, E118, E 217, Hirayama 17, Hirayama 18, TBR 52, BLMJ 2, Hirayama 37, Subartu 17; in E 221 the first redemption was most likely open to anyone, while the redemption clause limits the right of redemption to the master. 121 Texts according to the order in Table 55: E 121, E 83, TBR 25; only the lawsuit E 205 does not contain either clause.

5.3 Redemption and Manumission 

 347

The principles of manumission at Emar fully correspond to what is known from Mesopotamian and Near Eastern sources.122 Both male and female slaves could be manumitted. Manumission could be postponed until the master’s death (as in the majority of the documents) or could occur immediately (only in TBR 32). Nevertheless, in either case, manumitted slaves were bound to support their master for the latter’s lifetime. The verb describing this duty is palāḫu, the same used in family law contracts and contracts of indentured labor. As usual, when manumission occurred immediately, slaves were adopted and thereby bound to perform elder care. Nonetheless, TBR 41 shows that adoption occurred not only when the slave was immediately manumitted (as in TBR 32), but also when freedom was granted after the master’s death.123 In a single case (RE 26), the former master of a manumitted female slave arranged her marriage to a man with whom she would perform the palāḫu duty. Table 57: Features of Manumission. Document Type

Slave’s Duration Manumission Gender of Service

Adoption or Non-vindication Marriage Clause

RE 27

Manumission

F

Master’s life

Upon master’s – death

YES

RE 66

Manumission

F–M

Master’s life

Upon master’s – death

YES

TBR 32

Manumission

F

–

Immediately

YES

E 177

Testament

M

Master’s life

Upon master’s – death

TBR 41

Testament

M

Master’s life

Upon master’s Adoption death

RE 26

palāḫu contract F

Master’s life

Upon master’s Marriage death

Adoption

YES

YES

Manumission was not simply an act of liberality but also a reciprocal arrangement. The purpose of the documents in Table 57 was twofold: on the one hand, to assure the master that his slaves would continue to look after him, and on the other hand to protect the slaves against claims from the master’s family. With

122 Westbrook 1995: 1648–51. 123 Note that in a text from Tell-Munbaqa recording a manumission that occurred during the slave’s service (Ek 39), a female slave was released by a member of her own family and her owner married her adoptive father, cf. Torrecilla 2014: 105–07.

348 

 5 Forms of Dependency at Emar

a single exception (TBR 41), all documents contain the non-vindication clause securing the manumission of the slave. One must also note that manumission was not synonymous with termination of slavery, because slaves might die before being released.

5.4 Final Considerations on Dependency at Emar Various forms of dependency are known from Emar sources. Between the poles of freeman and chattel slave, individuals possessed different degrees of freedom. These intermediate forms of dependency included indentured persons obliged to work off their debt, manumitted slaves, various forms of dependency that cannot easily be placed along the spectrum between free and unfree,124 and, toward the bottom, debt or famine slaves, who were, however, granted the right of redemption, unlike chattel slaves. While absolute freedom is clearly distinguished from slavery, the boundary between free and unfree becomes opaque when one proceeds toward the middle of the spectrum, as shown by the amēlūtus who enjoyed some of the rights of free people but were forced to serve.125 Attempts to distinguish between the free and the non-free focus on the opposite poles of the scale of freedom but neglect the intermediate gray area where the amēlūtus reside. The various forms of dependency and their relations are graphically represented in Figure 9:126

124 See §§ 3.2.4, 3.3.2. 125 Note Piketty’s remark: “In practice, however, the boundary between slavery and serfdom was never clear and could vary quite a bit depending on the context and the owner,” Piketty 2019: 206. 126 Because of their indeterminacy, the conditions discussed in § 3.2.4 and § 3.3.2 are not included in Figure 9.

5.4 Final Considerations on Dependency at Emar 

 349

Figure 9: Forms of Dependency. Legend: dotted area represents forms of dependency that were not subject to sale.

The notable families played a central role in acquiring dependents, but as Table 58 shows,127 they did not monopolize the market. Table 58: Documents in Which Notable Families Appear as Masters. Dependency

Documents

Ratio of Percentage of Ratio of Percentage of Documents Documents Dependents Dependents

Indentured labor

amēlūtu contracts 3/12 without palāḫu formula: E 77128 amēlūtu contracts with palāḫu formula: E 117 Non-amēlūtu contracts: E 86

25%

3/15

20%

Pledge upon default129

amēlūtu contracts without palāḫu formula: E 77

25%

1/7

14%

1/4

127 With the exception of a single sale of chattel slaves (Iraq54 5), Syrian sources are not counted in the table, see ch. 5 fn. 88. Slaves mentioned in donations or exchanged (§ 3.4.3) and cases of manumission (§ 3.5.2) are also excluded from the table. 128 This document was possibly a productive debt. 129 For this category see § 3.3.2.

350 

 5 Forms of Dependency at Emar

Table 58 (continued) Dependency

Documents

Debt slavery

Sale contracts: TBR 26, 7/9 TBR 44 Enslavement contracts: E 121, E 215, GsK 1, Hirayama 36 Lawsuits: E 205

78%

13/12

87%

Unclear type of debt dependency

Contracts: Hirayama 37, 3/3 TBR 25 Lawsuits: Subartu 17

100%

3/3

100%

Famine slavery

Sale contracts: E 79, E 83, E 84, E 118, E 217

5/12

42%

9/18

50%

Redemption

Contracts of redemption: E 221

1/2

50%

1/2

50%

Chattel slavery130

Sale contracts: E 211, E 4/10 214, E 224 Uncertain transaction: Hirayama 41

40%

10/20

50%

0%

0/3

0%

Uncertain type palāḫu contracts: GsK 2 1/2 of dependency due to hardship

50%

2/3

67%

Total

24/53131

45%

42/86

48%

Documents pertaining to default

13/25

52%

20/40

50%

Documents pertaining to hardship

6/16

38%

11/24

46%

Documents pertaining to distress

19/41

46%

31/64

49%

Uncertain type Adoptions of dependency due to hardship

Ratio of Percentage of Ratio of Percentage of Documents Documents Dependents Dependents

0/2

Notable families were involved in less than half of the documents that establish or regulate a form of dependency.132 As discussed above (§ 4.7.2), members of these families were mostly active as third parties. This is reflected in their acqui130 This category includes the eight sale-related documents (§ 3.4.1) and the two slave transactions of uncertain nature (§ 3.4.2). 131 Since three out of four documents related to pledge upon default concern additional securities given in contracts of indentured labor, they are not counted towards the total number of documents; the ratio of notable families appearing as masters in documents related to pledge is 0/1. 132 RE 25 is not counted among the documents pertaining to redemption because it relates to pledged slaves.

5.4 Final Considerations on Dependency at Emar 

 351

sition of about half of the distressed people documented in the Emar sources as dependents (49%). The greatest contrast in the level of involvement of notable families in particular types of dependency is revealed when we compare documents dealing with temporary and permanent dependency. While members of notable families are listed as masters in about half of the documents pertaining to permanent types of dependency (17 out of 35),133 they are attested in only a small number of documents concerning temporary types of dependency (4 out of 15).134 Debt slaves almost exclusively entered the households of notable families.135 About half of the famine slaves and chattel slaves were purchased by members of notable families. Of the redeemable forms of slavery (i.e., debt and famine slavery), members of notable families appear as masters in 12 out of 21 documents, to which we may add the three unclear types of dependency for a total of 15 out of 24 documents. It is clear that a number of masters did not belong to notable families. A few (7) are documented in the minor archives and dossiers discussed in § 1.3.7: Baʿal-bēlī and Abdi-Šaggar, sons of Irʾam-Dagan (E 7), the family of Udḫa-abu (TBR 39 and TBR 40), Kunaʾe son of Irrike (QVO5 2), Mama son of Ummānu (RE 63), Šaggar-abu son of Baʿal-qarrād (E 16), and the son of the diviner Ibni-Dagan (AuOr5 12). Because of the paucity of sources, the status of these persons is mostly unknown, although some were likely important individuals in Emar society. The foreign scribe Kidin-Gula who purchased a slave in E 25 belonged to the entourage of merchants from House 5 (§ 1.3.8). In two transactions (Hirayama 40 and JA 303), slaves are traded by merchants but the final purchasers are not reported.136 Similarly, E 127 records goods exchanged for two slaves who were handed over by an Assyrian merchant to a certain Lalû son of Zū-Baʿla. This person is unknown elsewhere and it is unclear whether he was the final recipient of the slaves. A temporary form of dependency in the context of international trade is recorded in AOAT 265.1, in which Assyrians held an Emarite merchant as a pledge. In a number of documents (17)137 the masters are unknown elsewhere and their level of wealth and social status remain opaque, although they had enough

133 Debt slavery, famine slavery, redemption, chattel slavery, and adoptions for hardship. 134 Temporary forms of dependency include indentured labor (3 out of 12), pledge (0 out of 1, cf. ch. 5 fn. 131), and the palāḫu contracts for hardship (1 out of 2). 135 All sales into debt slavery (§ 3.2.3.1) and contracts of enslavement (§ 3.2.3.2.1) belong to the notable families. 136 Note that the seller in Hirayama 40 is a member of the family of Kutbe, and the purchaser was probably a foreigner. 137 ASJ10 A, ASJ10 E, AuOr5 11, BLMJ 2, E 33, E 35, E 216, E 252, Hirayama 17, Hirayama 18, Hirayama 38, Iraq54 5 (S), RA77 5, RE 26, RE 39, TBR 52, TBR 77.

352 

 5 Forms of Dependency at Emar

financial means to buy slaves or repay someone’s debts. The distribution of the documents pertaining to dependency according to the principals can be summarized in Figure 10:138

Figure 10: Principals in Documents related to Dependency.

The fact that many different people are attested as masters is significant on its own because it could be a sign of a certain degree of widespread wealth and low social stratification (see § 6). This hypothesis could be supported by the similar prices received for slaves in all transactions, which would indicate that various individuals could afford similar expenses (§ 5.2.1). We can assume that debt slavery was the extrema ratio for defaulting debtors. Nonetheless, it is difficult to understand why certain debtors could resort to family law contracts or to temporary forms of dependency, while others were forced to forfeit their freedom. A correlation between the amount of a debt and the type of relief (e.g., family law contracts, indentured labor, debt slavery) available to the debtor should be excluded. Likewise, the provenance of debt slaves was irrelevant, as they were mostly from Emar, like the debtors who became indentured persons. Some contracts of indentured labor were mutual arrangements to cope with adversities. The mutual aspect of these agreements was ensured by the penalty clause that obliged the masters to keep their dependents in their house until their own death (§ 5.1.1). This secured the support (housing and food) of the indentured person. It seems also possible that both parties, masters and dependents, were related through personal relations, friendship, kinship or membership in the

138 The group “merchants” includes Hirayama 40, JA 303 and AOAT 265.1; E 127 is included under others.

5.4 Final Considerations on Dependency at Emar 

 353

same socio-economic groups (at least before indebtedness). This is explicit in the non-amēlūtu contract RE 63, in which the indentured person was a nephew of his master, but we cannot exclude that family ties between parties existed in other contracts of indentured labor although they are not reported in the documents. As discussed above (§ 5.1.1), the contracts of indentured labor, particularly those containing the palāḫu formula, were inspired by principles of solidarity that, as argued by Démare-Lafont, were based on family models and social justice.139 The same interpretation can be advanced for some palāḫu contracts discussed under hardship (§ 5.1.3) Solidarity did not exist only horizontally among people of lower socio-economic status. Indeed, two out of three contracts of indentured labor in which the masters are members of notable families stipulate the palāḫu duty, which imposes specific constraints on the master. Nevertheless, the notable families had a limited role in the contracts of indentured labor and in the family law contracts (§ 4.9.3). Moreover, in the only contract concerning dependency due to hardship of an unknown nature that features a member of a notable family as the master, GsK 2, the terms of the arrangement suggest that the family in need was closely associated with the master’s family. It seems, therefore, that the sense of solidarity of wealthy and important people was generally (but not exclusively) oriented towards peers, or people of their own socio-economic status. The enslavement of distressed people can certainly be seen as marking the exploitation of impoverished people by the wealthiest, but it is not excluded that the principles of solidarity recognizable in the contracts of indentured labor also extended to other forms of dependency, perhaps influenced by what may be described as patron-client relations (see below). It should be recalled that slaves were very expensive140 – due to their purchase price as well as maintenance costs (food and clothing) – and could be subject to redemption. A text from Ekalte, Ek 28, illustrates just how expensive maintaining a servant might have been. A father gave his son to another man as a servant for a period of ten years, yet still had to pay an additional fee to cover the cost of the food provided to his son.141

139 Démare-Lafont 2014; she rightly pointed out that “Ces actes ne sont ni totalement généreux ni totalement opportunists” (p. 398) and that “Les montages complexes décrits dans les textes d’Émar détournent la structure familiale à des fins économiques, sans exclure pour autant les sentiments charitables: le créancier n’est pas un cynique puisqu’il renonce à une partie de son argent; le débiteur n’est pas un profiteur puisqu’il est tenu de travailler. De cette manière, chacun concède quelque chose à l’autre, dans une sorte de partenariat imitant le cadre familial” (p. 400). 140 Mendelsohn 1949: 118–20, Jursa 2010: 232–34, 741–45; see also Richardson 2019: 1, 44, 47. 141 Ek 28: 1–15, “On this day, Ḫinna-Baʿal, son of Ḫemi, man of Ekalte, in order to save from hunger Iani, his son, in his ninth (?) year, gave him to Niru son of Šiggu. In exchange for saving him,

354 

 5 Forms of Dependency at Emar

In this case, the cost of maintaining a servant exceeds the value of the servant’s labor. As wealthy as the notable families and other individuals who could afford to purchase slaves were, they were not great kings, but bankers and merchants who were certainly cost-conscious. Therefore, the enslavement of indebted and impoverished people can be seen not only as a sign of exploitation but also as a remedy for their condition because they were housed, fed, and clothed. Slavery in the ancient Near East was economically marginal, and the slave population was small and not a mass of depersonalized laborers.142 In such an economic system, slaves, as Seth Richardson points out, were not socially “dead” and completely dehumanized but retained, at least partially, their identity and personhood.143 Slaves, as well as other types of dependents, were individually known by name within their communities, especially in small ones such as Emar. Losing personal freedom by becoming a dependent, whether a slave or not, was not a degrading process leading to self-alienation but, in many cases, a way to cope with adversities. Indeed, the Emar sources show that not infrequently, dependency coupled with material support was preferable to freedom without the means of survival.144 A hint of a social duty to aid ruined people is perhaps detectable in the acquisition of debt slaves, since they were mostly from Emar (§ 5.1.2). The overwhelming presence of members of the notable families as owners in documents pertaining to debt slavery (7 out of 9) could be understood as an intervention to arrange mutually beneficial relations with members of their community. Perhaps it is not by chance that in three out of the four enslavement contracts stemming from the archives of the notable families (E 215, GsK 1, and Hirayama 36), whole families entered into slavery. This means that entire families were saved from ruin and received a livelihood. Other clues to the charitable attitude of the notable families can perhaps

he will make him enter the house of Niru for ten years as a servant. 100 wooden [. . .] Ḫinna-Baʿal will give to Niru in exchange for consumed food.” 142 Richardson 2019: 5, 10, 14–17; Richardson aptly states (p. 17): “That specific knowledge about the individuality of slaves and servants was expressed does not represent an overwhelming interest in their social identity by their masters. But the individual focus and particular identities begin to build criteria for their personhood. At the least, the practice of Old Babylonian servitude was overwhelmingly marked by personal interaction between individuals known to each other. It was in almost no context a ‘mass experience.’” 143 Richardson 2019: 47–51. 144 See E 215 and BLMJ 2; see also Richardson 2019: 30, and Richardson 2020: 68: “Though it may run against our preference, the subjective experience of self-sale or the sale of family members for reasons of impoverishment may have looked a lot like a rational economic choice for a disinherited younger son, a widow without a paternal household to return to, an unmarried woman with a child, or any householder unable to pay his debts – if only because this alternative was preferable to the loss of the household and starvation.”

5.4 Final Considerations on Dependency at Emar 

 355

be seen in E 205, where two orphans are enslaved; in TBR 44, where the purchase price of the slave is double the original debt; and in TBR 26, which records the highest price paid for a single slave at Emar.145 Explaining the acquisition of famine slaves as a form of welfare is more complicated, in light of the foreign provenance of the slaves. However, it is not excluded that principles of solidarity guided at least some of the purchases of famine slaves.146 What it is certainly clear is that buyers of famine slaves did not exploit people’s difficulties to drive a hard bargain because the purchases occurred at the market price – the prices of famine slaves matched those of chattel slaves. To sum up, it is likely that the acquisition of slaves was driven by a combination of solidarity and speculative interest to increase the labor force. As we have argued (§ 3.1.2), an indication of this balance can be found in the redemption clause, which is incorporated in more than half of the documents pertaining to debt and famine slavery from Emar (§ 5.3), although it was not often included in cuneiform legal contracts from other periods. This observation could be strengthened if the right of redemption was implicitly granted on a customary basis when not explicitly denied, as some texts seem to hint (§ 5.3). The double price of redemption secured the buyer’s interests, but its mere presence is still significant for the slave. Although the notable families and other important individuals tended to secure their ownership over the slaves, they could not completely avoid granting the right of redemption, which is indeed found in about half of their acquisitions. In a context in which the responsibility for social justice no longer rested on the royal authority but on private individuals (§ 5.1.1), the granting of the right of redemption upon payment of twice the amount of the debt or of the sale price can be understood as an equitable measure that reconciles opposing interests, the master’s and the slave’s. Another sign of solidarity can also be detected in the documents of manumission, in which manumitted slaves are protected against vindication by the master’s sons (§ 3.5.2). It is legitimate to pose the question whether the attitude towards impoverished people at Emar could be compared to patronage, which was not alien to ancient Near Eastern societies.147 In pursuing this question, we find evidence of both similarities and differences. Patronage is defined as “a social relationship which is essentially (i) reciprocal, involving exchanges of services over time

145 We have suggested that debtor and buyer were linked by kinship, friendship, or patron-client relations. 146 Note that the right of redemption is slightely more frequently attested in sales into famine slavery than in contracts regulating debt slavery, § 5.3. 147 For patronage in the ancient Near East see Westbrook 2005; for Late Bronze Age Syria-Palestine see most recently Pfoh 2016: 123–49; Pfoh, however, focuses more on the political relations between polities, interpreting them in light of patronage (see in particular pp. 150–167).

356 

 5 Forms of Dependency at Emar

between two parties, (ii) personal as opposed to, e.g., commercial, and (iii) asymmetrical, i.e., between parties of different status.”148 The relation established in the amēlūtu contracts seems to adhere to this general definition. More specifically, parallels can be drawn between practices at Emar and Greek and Roman forms of patronage, such as the provision of financial support through loans and repayment of debts, which was a duty of patrons towards their clients in ancient Rome.149 Emar sources use terminology that, as in Roman and Greek sources concerning patron-client relations, is not exclusive to that type of relationship but is drawn from interpersonal and social relationships.150 Thus the term amēlūtu, elsewhere denoting a slave, designates an individual experiencing economic distress who looks for material support. In a few documents, the material support specifically consists in saving the debtors from starvation, as expressed by the verb bulluṭu, “to keep alive.”151 The benefits gained by debtors are reciprocated through a complex of duties and services delineated by the verb palāḫu. The basic meaning of this verb is “to honor, to pay respect,” and honor, respect, and gratitude are essential components of the τιµή and χάρις that were expected to be returned to the patron in Greek philia-relations,152 as well as with gratia, which describes the return of a favor, beneficium, in Roman patronage.153 Moreover, the elder care that is a fundamental obligation of the one performing the palāḫu duty was also included in the Roman patronage relationship.154 Forms of patronage are observable in the relation between Milki-Dagan’s family and the “Sons of Immaru” (E 115 and E 116). We have surmised that the “Sons of Immaru” were members of a disgraced family who became the clients of their creditor, a member of Milki-Dagan’s family. Despite these basic similarities, differences stand out. Unlike in Roman and Greek patronage, there is no trace at Emar of any political exploitation of patron-client relations aimed at gaining public deference or increasing one’s reputation

148 This definition relies on the sociological approach to patronage adopted by historians, Wallace-Hadrill 1989a: 1–8; see also Verboven 2002: 49–51, Nicols 2014: 2.3, Saller 1982: 1–6, Saller 1989: 49–50. 149 Verboven 2002: 120–25. 150 For the lack of a specific vocabulary suited to describe patron-client relations in the ancient Near East see Westbrook 2005: 213–14. 151 Note that the material support conveyed in the context of the patron-client relation is defined in some Greek sources by the verb τρέφειν, “to nourish, to feed,” Zelnick-Abramovitz 2000: 69–70. 152 Zelnick-Abramovitz 2000: 67–69; for Greek patronage see also Pébarthe 2007. 153 Saller 1982: 21, 126–29, Verboven 2002: 37–39, 45–48. Note that both palāḫu and gratia referre denote the respect and fear paid to gods; for Roman society see Saller 1982: 23. 154 See Saller 1982: 26–27.

5.4 Final Considerations on Dependency at Emar 

 357

and prestige.155 The creditor-debtor relation was solely a personal one limited to financial support in exchange for service. If solidarity with indebted and socially inferior people brought about any prestige, it was associated with an individual’s respect for social and moral obligations to the community, not with personal ambitions of power and fame. Rather than serving as an instrument of social control,156 the kind of patron-client relations attested at Emar operated on a more restricted level and derived from a disposition of wealthy people. Such a disposition was based on principles of solidarity permeating small communities such as Emar and can be compared to euergetism.157 Historians have underlined the continuous and cross-generational nature of patronage, especially in Roman times. Exchanged goods and services were not precisely totaled and balanced on both sides; a favor did not extinguish a debt but led to another favor in return, binding patrons and clients in a continuous exchange that often continued for generations.158 On the contrary, at Emar the monetary aspect of the relation was always in the foreground, even in the amēlūtu contracts with the palāḫu formula, because the nature of the dependency did not generate a continuous series of reciprocal exchange(s). The relationship could be terminated by payment of the debt or a penalty. Descendants inherited only the responsibility for the debt and the supply of services (see E 117), not the relation of dependence itself. The family law contracts (§ 2.2.2) present characteristics similar to the contracts of indentured labor, including first and foremost the presence of the palāḫu formula. However, the family law contracts do not create a master-dependent relation between parties (i.e., benefactor and debtor), and the palāḫu duty could be performed by the debtor as well as by the benefactor.159 When the debtor performs the palāḫu duty he is entitled to the benefactor’s inheritance. Once again,

155 Wallace-Hadrill 1989b: 81–84; for the political and public sphere of patronage in Greek society see Zelnick-Abramovitz 2000: 72–77. For patronage as an enhancer of prestige in the ancient Near East see Westbrook 2005: 218–21. 156 This can be seen in Roman patronage, Wallace-Hadrill 1989b: 71–78. 157 On euergetism at Emar see Démare-Lafont 2014: 406. Dionysius of Halicarnassus’s description of patronage ideology in Romulus’s Rome, which has been branded as “artificial” by Roman historians (see Wallace-Hadrill 1989b: 71–78, Drummond 1989), can paradoxically be used to describe the Emar situation: “The purpose of this arrangement [i.e., patronage] was to avoid the dissension that arises in other cities through the abuse inflicted on the weak by superiors” (Antiquitates Romanae 2.9.2). 158 See Nicols 2014: 2, 9–11, Verboven 2002: 37–39. 159 In principle, these are not features unattested in historical patronage: at Rome patronage existed between senior and junior aristocrats (Saller 1989: 57–61), and clients were obliged to financially support their patrons in case of need, Verboven 2002: 84–89.

358 

 5 Forms of Dependency at Emar

we notice the broad semantic spectrum of the verb palāḫu, which assumes different meanings according to the scope of the document. Overall, the family law contracts are reciprocal agreements concerning inheritance and the continuation of the family line, although some features of patron-client relations may be seen in the background. These contracts ensue from a social and ethical framework of solidarity and friendship similar to that found in the contracts of indentured labor,160 which is a characteristic of patronage in ancient societies and of the anthropological definition of patronage (see below).161 Likewise, slavery, whether arising from debt or famine, which should in principle be distinguished from patronage, shows some traits of solidarity.162 The type of relation established in the amēlūtu contracts with palāḫu formula163 displays several characteristics corresponding to the anthropological definition of the patron-client relation given by Eisenstadt and Roniger:164 (a) it is particularistic; (b) it is characterized by a reciprocal exchange of resources (e.g., service for payment of debts); (d) it builds long-range credit as it ensures lifelong service; (e) it has a strong element of solidarity; (g) it is voluntary, as it can be terminated by either side;165 (h) it is undertaken in a vertical fashion; (i) it is asymmetrical and based on inequality. Additionally, this relation reflects paradoxical contradictions typical of patron-client relations, namely “a peculiar combination of inequality and asymmetry in power with seeming mutual solidarity,” and a “combination of potential coercion and exploitation with voluntary relations and mutual obligations.” Nevertheless, the relationship developed in the Emar sources differs in other aspects. The most important difference is the contractual and lawful nature of

160 See in particular the intervention by members of the notable families to help peers in E 213, RE 10, and RE 13. 161 In Roman society amicitia, “friendship,” a relation that at least in principle bound men of equal status, shared with patronage the same core of ethical and ideological principles, see Saller 1982: 11–15, Verboven 2002: 49–62. 162 Note also that according to Saller (1982: 18, 24), “master-slave and patron-freedman relationships were to some extent governed by notions of reciprocal exchange.” 163 The same reasoning can be extended to the palāḫu contracts for hardship, § 3.3.2.2. 164 Eisenstadt and Roniger 1984: 48–49. Points (c) and (f) are discussed below. 165 Point (g) must be particularly stressed because the relation could be terminated by unilateral action, although a financial penalty was imposed. Note how Westbrook distinguishes patronage from other relations: “Kinship obligations have many similarities to those of patronage, but are based upon an involuntary, indissoluble tie. Patronage exists only as long as its obligations are met. Serfdom and slavery are analogous to kinship in so far as they are formalized, coercive relationships that cannot be dissolved at will, at least by the servient party,” Westbrook 2005: 212.

5.4 Final Considerations on Dependency at Emar 

 359

Emar agreements, which is in sharp contrast with point (f) of the anthropological definition, according to which patron-client relations are not regulated by law and are often opposed to the official laws, thus constituting an illegal or semi-legal condition.166 Also, in historical sources from the ancient world, particularly Roman and Greek, patron-client relations were not legally enforced or formally regulated,167 outside of some forms of Roman patronage.168 Another difference between the Emar practices and the anthropological definition of patronage relates to its diffusion (point a),169 which cannot be precisely established at Emar due to the limited number of sources. Finally, the enforcement of what Eisenstadt and Roniger termed a “package deal” (point c) – namely the combination of exchanged resources that must be jointly provided – cannot be determined, because the types of reciprocal obligations are not clearly specified. The “patron” paid or canceled the debts, but his obligations thereafter are unknown, although they evidently included the material support of the “client.” Above all, the complex of duties and services communicated by the palāḫu formula remains undetermined. Another characteristic of the Emar documents that finds no parallel in patronage is the establishment of family ties in the amēlūtu contracts with the palāḫu formula. In sociological theory, the broader institutional context of patron-client relations concerns the place and role of such relations in the “central institutional matrix of a society” and in the “mode of structuring generalized exchange.”170 A true “clientelistic” society is one where patron-client relations are the central mode of regulation of the institutional structure and of the flow of resources – that is, the distribution of all goods and services is mediated by patrons. Although the institutional framework of Emar society, particularly as reflected in the Syro-Hit-

166 Note Westbrook’s definition: “patronage is the antithesis of a legal relationship,” Westbrook 2005: 215. 167 For Roman patronage see Saller 1989: 50–52, Drummond 1989: 89–91, Nicols 2014; note that debts and loans were informal in friendship and patron-client relations, Verboven 2002: 121–22. For Greek patronage see Zelnick-Abramovitz 2000: 79–80. 168 The relation between the master and his former slave was regulated by law but it was not voluntary, see Nicols 2014: 3, Wallace-Hadrill 1989b: 76. In Roman civic patronage, which differs from the personal patronage discussed so far, only the establishment of the relationship was formally defined and the nature of the exchange itself remained vague, Nicols 2014: 313–14. 169 According to Eisenstadt and Roniger point (a) comprises two characteristics, particularism and diffusion (“Patron-client relations are usually particularistic and diffuse”, Eisenstadt and Roniger 1984: 49), i.e., true patronage concerns relationships between individuals, and such relationships are widespread in a given community or society; however, only the first characteristic can be verified at Emar (see above). 170 Eisenstadt and Roniger 1984: 49.

360 

 5 Forms of Dependency at Emar

tite documents, is much debated, this mode of regulation does not seem to apply to Emar. There is no evidence that access to the centers of power, to the regulation of resources, to the means of production, to the setting up of public goods, and to the major markets was controlled and mediated by patrons. On the contrary, the amēlūtus seemingly had free access to the market and were free to collect money from business transactions in order to repay their debts. The seeming patronclient relationships envisaged in some legal documents from Emar remain on an interpersonal level and are intended to provide economic support; they simply integrate features belonging to different models of generalized exchange.171 To conclude, Emar sources concerned with various forms of dependency show some basic traits of patron-client relations combining different degrees of exploitation and solidarity.

171 For the difference between the “clientelistic” model of structuring generalized exchanges and other models, such as the corporate kinship model, the ascriptive hierarchical model, and the universalistic model, which can be subdivided into the pluralistic, the monolithic, and consociational models, see Eisenstadt and Roniger 1984: 166–70.

6 Conclusions The aim of this chapter is to discuss the Emar evidence in light of previous scholarship and in the context of the economy of Late Bronze Age Syria. Scholars are of the opinion that the economic crisis that struck Syria during the Late Bronze Age also involved Emar.1 Liverani argues that a social breakdown caused by the excessive exploitation of rural communities led to an increase in indebtedness and eventually to the collapse of the Late Bronze Age palace system in Syria.2 As anticipated in the introduction (§ 1.2), the following reconstruction, which should be considered as a provisional interpretation subject to changes and reassessments, argues that the Emar evidence does not fit Liverani’s (and others’) model of Late Bronze Age socio-economic relations.3 Episodes of war and famine mentioned in textual sources have been construed as evidence of a socio-economic crisis that afflicted Emar – a crisis that is regarded as one of the main causes of the degradation of the lower social classes and indebtedness. If one limits the survey to the documents treated in the present study, the “year of hardship” formula occurs in seventeen documents, mostly in association with dependency. Another document (RE 18) mentions the “year of plague.” These documents represent almost half of the occurrences of the formula in the entire Emar corpus.4 The “year of hardship” formula is occasionally supplemented by a reference to price inflation. In a handful of documents, the effects of famine are further stressed by another formula stating that the debtor was kept alive (bulluṭu). Clauses referring to hard times are not exclusive to Emar and have led to several interpretations.5 We have seen above (§ 5.2.1) that the presence or absence of the “year of hardship” formula cannot be correlated with the prices of slaves. Regardless of the legal meaning of the formula, one should note that documents mentioning famine or war represent only a small proportion of the sources discussed here. Moreover, of the documents listed in Table 59, only half (10) relate

1 See § 1.2 and ch. 1 fn. 82. 2 Liverani’s model and other explanations of the collapse of the Late Bronze Age system are discussed in the introduction, see § 1.2. 3 On the limits of Liverani’s model see already McClellan 1992 and particularly Monroe 2009: 292–94. 4 40 texts contain this formula, see the attestations in Zaccagnini 1995 supplemented by Démare-Lafont 2014: 398 n. 5, see also Divon 2008; note that RE 96 listed by Démare-Lafont does not contain references to hardship, see § 2.1.1.3. 5 See Adamthwaite 2001: 133–75, Westbrook 2001d, Divon 2008: 106–09, Démare-Lafont 2010: 80–84, Fijałkowska 2014a: 167–69, Fijałkowska 2018. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781501515309-006

362 

 6 Conclusions

Table 59: Years of Hardship. Formula

bulluṭu

Document

Script Type

RE 18

SH

Document creating an obligation – Testament

TBR 65

SH

Repayment of debts

In the year of hardship

TBR 74

SH

Family law contract – Adoption

In the year of hardship when 2 qû of barley (correspond) to 1 shekel of silver

SMEA30 9

SH

Family law contract – palāḫu contract

In the year of hardship

E 86

SH

Indentured labor

In the year of hardship

E 121

SH

Debt slavery – Enslavement

In the year of hardship when 3 qû of barley correspond to 1 shekel of silver

TBR 44

SH

Debt slavery – Sale contract

In the year when the TAR-WU troops besieged the city of Emar

Hirayama 37

SH

Unclear type of dependency for debt – Contract

In the year of hardship when 3 qû of barley correspond to 1 shekel of silver

YES

TBR 25

SH

Unclear type of dependency for debt – Contract

In the year when the TAR-WU troops besieged the city, when 1 qû of barley (corresponds) to 1 shekel of silver

YES

CREATION OF THE OBLIGATION In the year of plague

FULFILLMENT OF THE OBLIGATION

YES

DEFAULT

Subartu 17 SH

Unclear type of dependency In the year of war for debt – Lawsuit

ASJ10 E

SH

Sale into famine slavery

In the year of hardship when 3 qû of barley correspond to 1 shekel of silver

FAMINE SLAVERY

AuOr5 12

SH

Sale into famine slavery

In the year of hardship

E 83

SH

Sale into famine slavery

In the year of hardship

TBR 52

SH

Sale into famine slavery

In the year of hardship

DOCUMENTS RELATED TO HARDSHIP E 216

SH

Adoption

The in the year of hardship

E 256

S

Adoption

In the year of war

GsK 2

SH

palāḫu contract

In the he year of hardship when 3 qû of barley correspond to 1 shekel of silver

TBR 48

S

Adoption

In the year of hardship

YES

YES

6 Conclusions 

 363

to debts and none of them was drafted at the onset of the obligation, when the “year of hardship” formula could have been used to underscore the background of the debt. The remaining documents relate to forms of dependency that are not associated with debt.6 Therefore, although the “year of hardship” formula refers to a stressful situation that may affect people’s economic condition, it provides little information on the socio-economic factors forcing people into debt and cannot be assumed as the main cause of indebtedness. The chronological distribution of the formula points to periods of hard times, limited in duration, that were probably the result of bad harvests. The documents containing the “year of hardship” formula cover the whole duration of the Emar archives: out of 40 texts, 21 belong to the Syrian tradition,7 and the oldest of these date to the so-called First Dynasty.8 Spanning more than 150 years, references to hardship cannot be taken as evidence for a worsening of the economic situation at a specific time. Equally, there is no evidence that an enduring state of emergency afflicted Emar during the duration of the archives; economic activities, as shown in the present study, continued to thrive (see below). Rather, the hardships that arose in certain years should be regarded as occasional episodes of draught, famine, and war that were common in the ancient Near East and indeed in every pre-industrial society. Thus, the “year of hardship” formula simply alludes to the general circumstances that hindered people from meeting their obligations or forced them to enter some form of dependency. Written sources do not provide evidence of a decline in trade. A consistent number of debts relate to investments in business and commercial activities, revealing intense international trade relations at Emar that often involved foreign merchants (§§ 4.2, 4.8). Debts resulting from severe economic distress represent only half of the credit documents from Emar. Additionally, debts of barley and other staples, which are usually associated with precarious economic conditions, are very limited in number (§ 4.3).9 Most importantly, the consequences of indebtedness and hardship were mitigated through strategies practiced at the family

6 Sales into famine slavery (§ 3.3.1) and forms of dependency caused by hardship (§ 3.3.2). 7 AuOr5 7, E 20, E 111, E 138, E 139, E 149, E 158, E 162, E 256, Hirayama 15, Hirayama 16, Iraq54 2, Iraq54 4, RE 31, RE 35, RE 64, RE 77, TBR 9, TBR 48, TBR 57, TBR 58. Nineteen documents belong to the Syro-Hittite tradition: ASJ10 C, ASJ10 E, AuOr5 12, E 83, E 86, E 121, E 196, E 208, E 216, GsK 2, Hirayama 37, RE 18, SMEA30 9, Subartu 17, TBR 25, TBR 44, TBR 52, TBR 65, TBR 74. 8 E 149 is dated to Liʾmi-šarru, and Hirayama 15 can be dated to the time of the last ruler of the First Dynasty, Zū-Baʿla son of Išbi-Dagan, through Kunanu son of Abu-Da, who appears in RE 4. 9 Whether or not any debts of staples were recorded in silver, the number of debts originating in severe economic difficulties remains limited.

364 

 6 Conclusions

and community levels. The success of these strategies is reflected in a quantity of documents attesting to the repayment of debts (§ 4.10). The socio-political context of Emar and the Middle Euphrates differed from that of other Syrian and northern Mesopotamian urban entities that formed the basis for Liverani’s model. The monarchy had probably come to an end already by the time most of the documents discussed in the present study (i.e., the Syro-Hittite tablets) were written, and its power was limited by the central role of the community and forms of collective governance.10 The system of royal land grants, which in Liverani’s model plays a central role in strengthening the ties between the king and the aristocracy, is virtually absent from Emar.11 Emar sources provide no evidence for an excessive and systematic exploitation of people of inferior socio-economic status, as demonstrated above for each group of sources. Because the majority of the sources are Syro-Hittite tablets, the royal family as well as other important families attested in the Syrian-type tablets never occur in documents concerning credit, slavery, or distressed people. Archaeological finds and prosopographic studies facilitated the reconstruction of some dossiers belonging to six Emar families. These dossiers comprise Syro-Hittite tablets produced by the families themselves and, with respect to the archives found during legal excavations, include Syrian tablets preserved as titles to properties. These families, in particular that of Zū-Baʿla, were among the wealthiest and most important at Emar and were largely involved in banking activities and in the slave market. Their role in the documents discussed in the present work can be summarized in Table 60: Table 60: Notable Families: A Summary. Role

Ratio documents

Percentage

First two phases of credit transactions

14/53

26.4%

Default

14/25

56.0%

Original moneylenders

10/78

12.8%

Original moneylenders in consumptive debts

7/52

13.5%

Original moneylenders in productive debts

3/26

11.5%

Creditors from notable families

9/136

6.6%

Third party

10/33

30.3%

8/12

66.7%

Third party in documents related to default

10 See § 1.1. 11 See Cohen and Viano 2016: only a single royal land grant, dated to Pilsu-Dagan (Hirayama 7), is documented at Emar.

6 Conclusions 

 365

Table 60 (continued) Role Active creditors

12

Ratio documents

Percentage

20/78

25.6%

Debtors

6/78

7.7%

Masters

24/53

45.3%

Masters in documents related to default

13/25

52.0%

Masters in documents related to distress

19/41

46.3%

Masters in temporary forms of dependency

4/15

26.7%

Masters in permanent forms of dependency

17/35

48.6%

Although they are widely attested in the documents discussed in this study, textual sources clearly show that a plurality of economic actors were actively present at Emar as moneylenders, masters, or slave purchasers. The notable families, however, rarely initiated an economic transaction by issuing credit themselves. They more often intervened as a third party in an existing arrangement. In particular, these families would intervene upon default to repay debts, thus obtaining dependents and real property. About half of the defaulting debtors and distressed people documented in the Emar sources became dependents of these families. However, we have noted that a number of masters did not belong to these families (§§ 4.7, 5.4). Some of these people were likely wealthy and part of the city elite, but for the majority their socio-economic status is difficult to ascertain, even when they are known from other sources. Merchants are also attested as purchasers and traders of chattel slaves. The notable families appear to have held different attitudes towards temporary and permanent forms of dependency. They were mostly interested in forms of dependency that imply ownership, as shown by their limited attestations in documents regulating indentured labor. A key indicator of the socio-economic situation can be gained by evaluating the quality and quantity of properties and goods obtained by creditors and by people exploiting the indebtedness and distress of economically disadvantaged individuals. If we had a clear understanding of the socio-economic status of all Emar inhabitants, we could observe the elite’s behavior towards distressed people. With our limited knowledge, we can nevertheless study those Emarites who are best known. These include the families of Zū-Baʿla, Ḫima, Kutbe, Milki-Dagan, Awiru, and Apilu, as well as the subjects of minor dossiers and the other individuals introduced in § 1.3.7.13 12 ‘Active creditors’ here refers to occurrences of the families as moneylenders and as third parties. 13 Merchants of House 5 are not included because they were foreigners.

Type

–

Chattel slavery – Sale

Redemption of a slave

E 224

E 221

E 87

Document creating an obligation

Family of Ḫima

–

Chattel slavery – Sale

5 talents of alum (P)

–

–

–

–

E 214

Unclear type of debt dependency – Lawsuit

Subartu 17

–

Famine slavery – Sale

Debt slavery – Lawsuit

E 205

–

Chattel slavery – Sale

Debt slavery – Enslavement

E 215

–

E 211

Family law contract

E 213

1 kiersetu-plot (P)

Temporary holdings: Pledges (P) Temporary Dependent (TD)

E 217

Document creating an obligation

E 209

Family of Zū-Baʿla

Document

Table 61: Properties Obtained by Notable Families and Other Individuals.

–

–

–

–

–

–

1 person

2 slaves

3 slaves; Share of a vineyard; Fields

–

–

Transferreda

–

1 slave

1 slave

1 slave

7 slaves

4 slaves

–

–

–

–

–

Purchased

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

House; All possessions (including a vineyard); House in Zi’lu district

–

Inherited

366   6 Conclusions

– –

Famine slavery – Sale

Famine slavery – Sale

E 83

E 84

– –

Hirayama 36 Debt slavery – Enslavement

Hirayama 37 Unclear type of debt dependency – Contract

Hirayama 41 Unclear type of slave transaction

–

Debt slavery – Enslavement

GsK 1

–

Family law contract

RE 13

Family of Kutbe

1 person (TD)

Indentured labor

Famine slavery – Sale

E 86

E 79 –

1 person (TD) house and son (P)

Indentured labor

E 77

–

Repayment of debts

E 85

1 person

2 slaves

3 slaves

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

1 slave

–

–

–

–

1 slave

1 slave

1 slave

–

–

1 house 1 ḫablu

–

–

–

(continued)

From a member of the same family: House; All possessions; Property in the city and in the countryside; Inheritance share

-

-

-

–

–

–

6 Conclusions   367

Dependency for hardship – Contract

GsK 2

Famine slavery – Sale

E 118

Debt slavery – Sale

Document creating an obligation

1 house (P)

-

-

-

-

-

-

1 person

-

-

1 slave

fields

-

–

Transferreda

-

1 slave

-

1 slave

2 slaves

-

-

1 tugguru 5 fields

–

Purchased

-

-

-

-

-

-

(properties)

-

-

–

Inherited

14 Note that this document does not contain any reference to debt and that the condition of the persons taken to serve the family of Kutbe somehow differs from that of indentured persons, see § 3.3.2.2.

RE 75

Family of Laḫma

TBR 44

Family of Apilu

Debt slavery – Sale

Unclear type of debt dependency – Contract

TBR 26

TBR 25

Family of Awiru

Debt slavery –Enslavement -

E 121

1 person (TD)

Repayment of debts

Indentured labor

E 116

-

Repayment of debts

2 persons (TD)14

Temporary holdings: Pledges (P) Temporary Dependent (TD)

E 117

E 115

Family of Milki-Dagan

Type

Document

Table 61 (continued)

368   6 Conclusions

Lawsuit regulating the fulfillment of an obligation

TBR 29

TBR 40

Indentured labor

Indentured labor

Repayment of debts

Indentured labor

1 person (TD)

-

1 person (TD)

1 person (TD)

1 person (TD)

1 person (TD)

-

-

-

Famine slavery – Sale

Famine slavery – Sale

AuOr5 12

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

2 houses

2 houses

Fields

1 slave

1 slave

1 house

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

a

This column includes properties transferred as a means of debt settlement, as well as the debt slaves who entered into slavery in lieu of the debt in those enslavement contracts (§ 3.2.3.2.1) where no purchase price was paid.

Ibni-Dagan son of the diviner Zū-Aštarti

E7

Baʿal-bēlī and Abdi-Šaggar sons of Irʾam-Dagan

E 16

Šaggar-abu son of Baʿal-qarrād

TBR 65

Family of Abdi-ili

RE 63

Mama son of Ummānu

QVO5 2

Kunaʾe son of Irrike

Indentured labor

Indentured labor

TBR 39

Family of Udḫa-abu

Repayment of debts

Repayment of debts

TBR 28

Abī-liʾmu son of Abī-liʾmu

TBR 36

6 Conclusions   369

370 

 6 Conclusions

Table 61 lists properties obtained by these people in the documents discussed in the present study, either for a limited time (i.e., pledges and indentured persons) or through definitive alienation (i.e., transfers of property, sales, inheritances).15 The most sought-after goods were dependents, and in particular slaves. The table lists 49 dependents, of whom the majority (39) are distressed people. Most of these people (25) entered a permanent form of dependency as either debt or famine slaves.16 Three other persons entered into an unclear type of dependency because of debt (Hirayama 37, TBR 25, and Subartu 17). Only a limited number of persons entered a temporary form of dependency (11), which confirms that full ownership was the preferred form of dependency, particularly among the notable families, who acquired only 6 temporary dependents. The biggest acquirers were the families of Zū-Baʿla and Kutbe, who gained 10 and 8 dependents respectively for debts and hardship. They are followed by the families of Ḫima and Milki-Dagan, which acquired 6 and 4 dependents respectively. Only two dependents for debt were acquired by the family of Awiru, and just one by the family of Apilu. The family of Udḫa-abu acquired more dependents, but they were temporary and were granted particularly favorable conditions. Only 10 chattel slaves are attested, all purchased by the families of Zū-Baʿla (9) and Kutbe (1).17 Real properties are less frequently mentioned. Only 14 documents record real properties, but their precise number is unknown because some documents do not specify the quantities. As with dependents, most of these properties were acquired in full ownership. Domestic houses are the most commonly attested property: 2 are pledged, 6 are transferred or purchased, and 2 are expected to be inherited. As discussed at various points in this study (§§ 4.5, 4.10), agricultural lands seldom appear in credit transactions and never as pledges.18 Perhaps social customs permitted debtors to keep their lands as a source of livelihood. Therefore, textual records contain no evidence of an expansion of landownership.19 Buildings, notably houses, occur more frequently, but not in sufficient numbers to support the claim that wealthy families accumulated real estate through the

15 Donation of slaves within the same family are excluded, e.g., Hirayama 45 and TBR 22. 16 13 debt slaves (2 purchased and 11 enslaved) and 11 famine slaves. One of these slaves, either a debt slave or famine slave, was redeemed. 17 According to Hirayama 41, another slave is to be delivered. 18 Agricultural lands are mentioned in E 115, E 116, E 213, E 215, TBR 36, and most likely in RE 13; in addition, it is possible that the properties mentioned in E 117 included agricultural lands. 19 Taking a different approach to the relation between Syrian and Syro-Hittite traditions, Démare-Lafont and Fleming (2015) suggest that only townsmen documented on Syrian tablets could purchase land.

6 Conclusions 

 371

exploitation of impoverished people. Agricultural lands were acquired by the families of Zū-Baʿla, Ḫima, Kutbe, Milki-Dagan, Laḫma, Abī-liʾmu, and Abdi-ili. As Table 61 shows, the extant sources contain no evidence that notable families or other individuals amassed large assets through the exploitation of indebted or impoverished people. Only the family of Zū-Baʿla can be credited with the ownership of many real properties. Evidence of their holdings comes from documents recording their acquisitions, as well as Syrian and Syro-Hittite tablets found in Building M₁ that are not directly associated with the family’s affairs but were presumably stored as titles to property.20 Although it is possible that not all the Syrian and Syro-Hittite tablets recorded properties belonging to the Zū-Baʿla family,21 it is undeniable that the Zū-Baʿla family was the wealthiest and most powerful family during the last phases of the Emar documentation and owned a large estate, probably the largest at Emar.22 Nevertheless, its acquisitions of real properties seem to have occurred through regular purchases at no reduced price.23 Besides the few properties and dependents listed in Table 61, there is no evidence that the assets of the Zū-Baʿla family derived from the exploitation of distressed people. The Emar sources provide no evidence that a limited number of landlords controlled large real estate holdings. In fact, the contrary is demonstrated by the presence of numerous moneylenders and economic actors in the documents discussed (§ 4.7). It is also to be recalled that members of the notable families, including the family of Zū-Baʿla, also appear as debtors. Setting aside the possible case of the Zū-Baʿla family, sale contracts show that land was parceled into small plots owned by a high number of landowners.24

20 Viano 2020b, Viano 2020a; for the acquisition of properties by other families see Viano 2020a: 415–21. 21 On this point see ch. 1 fn. 20. 22 Viano 2020b: 479–81; we should also consider the possibility that with the demise of the monarchy, the family of Zū-Baʿla was granted properties that once belonged to the royal family of Emar by the Hittites who directly controlled the city. 23 There is no evidence that the purchases by the Zū-Baʿla family conceal forced sales. There are four sale contracts recording purchases by the Zū-Baʿla family (BLMJ 8, E 199, E 206, and E 207); BLMJ 8 and E 207 record the highest prices per square ikû of orchards (Viano 2016: 159–60); the two kierṣetus purchased in E 207 record some of the highest prices per cubit (Viano 2012: 146–47); in E 199 the price is not preserved. Additionally, forced sales would have been recorded on tablets, as in the case of sales of debt and famine slaves, or properties sold to relieve a debt (E 115, TBR 65). More generally, sales should not be forcedly attributed to financial problems, as shown by the Syrian document E 142, in which the king Elli appears as seller. 24 Viano 2010a.

372 

 6 Conclusions

The exploitation of impoverished people at Emar never reached the levels known from other centers such as Nuzi or Assur.25 Emar sources provide no evidence of the so-called real estate adoptions that were commonly employed at Nuzi to transfer properties from impoverished peasants to rich magnates. In order to cope with financial problems, Nuzi peasants ceded their land by adopting another party in exchange for a “gift” of barley. None of the parties, however, was subject to the usual obligations of adoptions. The peasants continued to work the fields, but the property was transferred to the adoptee, who received a share of the crop.26 In Nuzi the famous Teḫip-tilla became the adoptee and principal heir of hundreds of people indebted to him. The Emar sources offer no evidence of multiple adoptions,27 and, unlike at Nuzi, the debtor is more frequently the adoptee rather than the adopter.28 There are only a few cases of creditors adopted by their debtors, and they clearly differ from the Nuzi practice. In the family law contract E 213, the adoptee was Baʿal-mālik of the Zū-Baʿla family, who might be suspected of dispossessing the debtor of her property by exploiting her condition. However, we have argued that the debtor was likely a wealthy woman who owned other properties and was seeking to settle a rather small debt. The debtor arranged her daughter’s marriage with Baʿal-mālik, and the contract imposed penalties only on the adoptee. No such stipulations are found in Nuzi, where clauses only penalize the debtor. In another family law contract, TBR 78, the adoptee is unknown elsewhere and there is no reason to suspect that he was creating large patrimonies by dispossessing indebted people. The Syrian contract TBR 48 also differs from Nuzi’s real estate adoptions in that the creditor/adoptee is bound to care for his adoptive mother and her natural son. Although cases of exploitation obviously occurred, we cannot speak of a generalized system of exploitation of rural communities at Emar. Although not formally adopted, the third party who repays someone’s debt is entitled to the debtor’s inheritance also in the palāḫu contracts RE 10, RE 13, and SMEA30 9.29 However, none of these contracts offer examples of exploitation. In RE 10 and RE 25 On similarities between Nuzi and Assur see Zaccagnini 1979. 26 It seems to me that the best explanation has been provided by Fincke (2010), who regards the real estate adoption as a legal device to transfer titles to properties without transferring possession of the fields, thereby allowing impoverished peasants to continue to use the fields as a source of livelihood. Note that the real estate adoption is basically the only known legal instrument used at Nuzi for the transfer of properties; as pointed out by Zaccagnini (1979: 1–7, 11–13), real properties were valuated at a steep discount because the creditor exerted pressure on the debtor, cf. ch. 6 fn. 23. 27 See Beckman 1996b: 65–66. 28 See Bellotto 2009: 176. 29 § 2.2.2.2.

6 Conclusions 

 373

13, the debtor is a member of the family of Ḫima, and at least in RE 13, the third party is his brother. SMEA30 9 is the least likely candidate as a case of exploitation because the person repaying the debt enters the debtor’s house, the debtor’s daughters are married off to the third party’s sons, and finally a heavy penalty is imposed on the third party. These contracts, which are indicative of a very different relation between debtors and creditors compared to Nuzi, are examples of the strategies used to face indebtedness and impoverishment at Emar. Unlike at Nuzi, the legal formulation of adoption contracts is employed at Emar to find remedies to financial problems and distressful situations, as in the family law contracts (§ 2.2.2), the amēlūtu contracts with the palāḫu formula (§ 3.2.1.1.2), and other adoption-like contracts (§ 3.3.2). We have argued (§§ 5.1.1, 5.4) that these strategies were inspired by principles of social justice and solidarity based on family models. Even the family of Zū-Baʿla and other wealthy families could not escape these principles, which operated horizontally between peers but also very likely vertically between people of different status. This attitude was perhaps also fostered by the shift of the responsibility for debt relief and social justice from royal authority to private individuals. The picture that emerges from textual sources is coherent with the archeological evidence, which has shown a low degree of social stratification at the Middle Euphrates sites.30 With the exception of the residence of the Zū-Baʿla family (Building M₁), most of the houses at Emar, including those in Area T and V belonging to the families of Ḫima and Milki-Dagan, as well as the houses sold in sale contracts, show little variation in size and layout.31 The typical residential structure at Emar is the front room house, which is rather small compared to the residences of high-ranking people at Ugarit, Alalaḫ, and Nuzi.32 Although Otto pointed out that the size of houses alone cannot be relied on as an indicator of a household’s wealth and social position,33 the urban layout is certainly revealing of the social organization. The lack of differentiation in residential units is indicative of a society with little social stratification.34 As is common in small societies and close-knit groups, socio-economic differentiations may not be particularly

30 Otto 2012, Otto 2014. 31 For the size and shape of houses in textual sources see Mori 2003a: 26–34. 32 McClellan 1997: 33–36, McGeough 2007: 246–60, Otto 2014: 42–44. 33 Otto 2014: 53. House size might not be an outright indicator of wealth and social status, as assumed by McClellan (1997: 43), but it remains significative when taken contextually; while wealthy individuals might choose to live in smaller houses, it is unlikely that a big house is the residence of poor people unless it has a less valuable location. In other words, size is indicative of wealth when comparing houses in the same location. 34 Note the low standard deviation of the sizes of Emar houses in McClellan 1997: 34, Fig. 5.

374 

 6 Conclusions

large in magnitude. The family of Zū-Baʿla was certainly the wealthiest and most preeminent household in Emar, as confirmed by textual and archeological evidence. However, Building M₁, which is an example of a side-room house, is not exceptionally larger than other houses. To sum up, the textual sources from Emar discussed here show a flourishing commerce-based economy and a system of social and legal strategies based on principles of solidarity and social justice that protected and assisted indebted people. Emar records provide limited evidence for an economic crisis that led to the degradation of people of lower socio-economic status. However, a warning is in order here. The present analysis and the proposed explanations are obviously based on extant textual evidence alone. We cannot know to what extent legal procedures relied exclusively on orality at Emar. It is possible that the account of debt and dependency developed here on the basis of the written record would be overturned if we could query Emarites about their financial practices. For instance, data concerning the so-called “soft loans” that were granted orally is unavailable to us. Another observation already anticipated in the introduction (§ 1.3) is that our analysis is based on the assumption that the families who left the largest dossiers, i.e., the notable families, were also the wealthiest and most important families at Emar. However, the status of the many creditors or slave buyers who are mentioned in only a single source can hardly be determined and thus it is not possible to know whether Emar was home to families wealthier than the notable families.35 Nevertheless, it is unlikely that legal contracts concerning the dispossession of properties or changes of personal status were simply oral agreements.36 Cases that could be brought to court were more likely to be recorded on a tablet. It is therefore probable that textual sources from Emar, while not exhaustive, are representative of the situation. Although an in-depth study of the economy of Late Bronze Age Syria, Anatolia, and Northern Mesopotamia is far beyond the limits of the present work, the socio-economic conditions at Emar at the end of the Late Bronze Age can be compared to those of neighboring political entities. The main question is whether 35 This observation does not involve the Zū-Ba’la family who was certainly the most important local family at Emar; because of the relation of this family with the other notable families it is likely that our interpretation of their status is correct. 36 The Emar evidence is scant when compared with the hypertrophic proliferation of credit transactions at Nuzi. Orality may be adduced to explain this difference, but one may wonder why at Nuzi there was a need to record in writing what was agreed upon orally at Emar. Note that Alalaḫ also provides limited sources for credit transactions. Furthermore, the non-vindication clause presumes the existence of written documents; the appearance of a tablet is also mentioned in relation to slavery (RE 26), which indicates that enslavement was normally recorded on clay.

6 Conclusions 

 375

Emar was exceptional and was spared from the economic crisis, or whether the models used to explain the end of the Late Bronze Age should be reconsidered in light of the Emar evidence. Unfortunately, it is not possible to answer this question at the present state of research, but some preliminary observations can be stated. Letters from Ugarit and Ḫattuša detail expenditures of cereals to relieve a certain city or land from famine. Our knowledge has recently been augmented by the publication of the Akkadian letters from the Maison d’Urtenu at Ugarit, which are almost exclusively dated to the city’s two last kings, Niqmaddu III (ca. 1225/20 – 1215 B.C.) and Ammurapi (ca. 1215 – 1190/85 B.C.).37 These documents have commonly been regarded as evidence of a dramatic situation caused by persistent hunger.38 More recently de Martino39 argued that these sources only refer to “temporary shortages of food,” and that in certain cases the references to severe famine can be interpreted as rhetorical exaggerations to secure relief or, conversely, to dodge requests for aid.40 Sources from Ḫattuša and Ugarit related to famine span a period of more than fifty years, from the mid-13th century to the time of Ugarit’s last king, Ammurapi.41 Although a period of more than fifty years of persistent famine is not unrealistic,42 it must be noted that the geographical distribution of famines changed over time, and that a city may appear in one source as famine-stricken yet in another source as a supplier of food to another town. Besides Ḫatti, which always appears to be

37 Lackenbacher and Malbran-Labat 2016. 38 Klengel 1974, Singer 1999: 715–19, Yakar 2006, Singer 2017: 622–23, see also Cohen 2021. 39 de Martino 2018: 28–31. 40 That the king of Ugarit’s complaint of a lack of food in his city was simply an excuse for not sending the grain requested by the Hittite king (Ugaritica 5 33 = RS 20.212) was already suggested by Singer 1999: 716–17; Devecchi (2019), seems to take the words of Ugarit’s king more seriously. 41 The oldest documents are two letters found in the Hittite capital that are related to the correspondence with the Egyptian court: KUB 21.38 is a draft written in Hittite of a letter sent by the Hittite queen Pudu-Ḫeba to the pharaoh Ramses II; KUB 3.34 is a letter sent by Ramses II to a Hittite king, either Ḫattušili III or Tutḫaliya IV, Edel 1994: Vol. I, 182–85, Vol. 2, 274–82. 42 It is useful, by way of comparison, to consider the series of famines that afflicted Europe in the late 16th and 17th centuries (A.D.). The crisis was particularly severe in Italy, which suffered from a tremendous famine in 1590–1593 (a Malthusian crisis), followed by dearth in the 1620s, 1645–1652, 1678–1679, and 1693–1694, combined with the plagues of 1629–1630 and 1656–1657; however, after the 1629 plague, Italy’s food-producing capacity increased, preventing a dearth from developing into a severe famine, see Alfani 2010 (in particular pp. 34–44). These periods of dearth and famine in the early modern period, however, were “triggered by climatic and environmental factors operating at a time when the maximum carrying capacity of the system had been reached or, at least, when the population was exerting considerable pressure on the potential for food production” (p. 42), and this does not appear to have been the case in the Late Bronze Age.

376 

 6 Conclusions

in a state of desperate need, Ugarit, for example, on one occasion demands help from Egypt,43 but on another receives a plea for aid from a neighboring kingdom, likely Qadeš.44 Fluctuations in agricultural production capacity seem to be supported by another letter from Ugarit: in RSO 23 21 (RS  94.2571), the Son of the King Tasi45 requested that the king of Ugarit send desperately needed staples and reminded him that Ugarit was once saved by grain sent by Siyannu; then Tasi assured the king of Ugarit that he would return the grain after the following year’s harvest, which he hoped would be large. Two points deserve our attention. First, this document provides another example of a city that overcame a previous food-shortage and was then able to provide help to other cities. Second, although Tasi’s promise to return three times the amount of grain received may be implausible, his statement regarding the prospect of a good harvest for the following year appears credible and likely was intended as a guarantee to Ugarit’s king. Therefore, it seems evident that these sources refer to episodic cases of dearth associated with bad harvests that were probably due to a gradual worsening of climatic conditions at the end of the Late Bronze Age, rather than to a single long-lasting period of famine.46 The evidence of hardship at Emar discussed above supports this scenario. Nevertheless, it is indeed possible that food shortages became more frequent in the last two decades of the Late Bronze Age;47 references to famine are more numerous during the reign of Ammurapi,48 probably as a consequence of the worsening of the political-military situation due to the migrations of the Sea

43 RSO 23 40 (RS 94.2002+). 44 RSO 23 47 (RS 94.2287); see also RSO 23 107 (RS 94.2540), in which Ugarit receives a request for help from one of its subjects. 45 Lackenbacher and Malbran-Labat (2016: 45: 8) suggest that Tasi resided in Mukiš. 46 Cf. Cline 2014: 142–47. 47 This hypothesis may agree with some climatological studies, such as Kaniewski, et al. 2010, Langgut, et al. 2013, Kaniewski, et al. 2015; however it less in agreement with the refined chronology in Kaniewski, et al. 2019. Note, however, Knapp’s warning against using such studies for historical reconstruction, Knapp 2021: 40–45. 48 See the following letters: KTU3 2.39 = PRU V 60 (RS 18.038), a letter probably sent by Šuppiluliuma II, who requests food from Ammurapi despite quoting the latter’s claim that Ugarit has no food; and RSO 23 40 (RS 94.2002+), a letter sent by a pharaoh, likely Merenptah, that reports Ammurapi’s plea to rescue Ugarit from hunger. Perhaps also to be dated to the reign of Ammurapi is Ugaritica 5 33 (RS 20.212) (cf. ch. 6 fn. 40), a letter sent by the king of Ḫatti, who demands that the king of Ugarit provide a ship to transport grain from Mukiš to Ura in a matter of “death (or) life.” One may also mention here the famous inscription of Merenptah from the 5th year of his reign (corresponding to 1209 B.C.), in which the pharaoh boasts of having saved Ḫatti, Singer 1999: 715.

6 Conclusions 

 377

Peoples.49 However, since not all of the relevant documents can be precisely dated, it remains unclear whether that situation was specific to Ammurapi’s reign. Tentatively, one may envisage a worsening of the situation at Emar as well,50 because six of the nineteen Syro-Hittite documents including the “year of hardship” formula can be dated to the last generation of the archives of the notable families,51 but difficulties remain as other documents date to earlier generations or cannot be dated at all. Overall, the extent and impact of famine and food shortages are difficult to determine at present. Similarly, it is difficult to assess how these events impacted trade and credit transactions. At the present state of research, the Emar records show no indication of a decline in trade, as the documents from House 5 and the archive of Ḫima amply illustrate. This is supported by archeological evidence that shows that metal production and trade continued at the close of the Late Bronze Age.52 The same has been noted for Ugarit.53 The main evidence for a dramatic worsening of the political-economic situation is given by the aforementioned letter RSO 7 40 (RS 34.152), probably sent from a trading outpost in Emar to Urtenu, which requests immediate action to escape a terrible famine. Because the outpost was probably House 5 and the people mentioned in the letter are attested in House 5 and in the archive of Ḫima, the thriving commercial and banking activities witnessed by the documents from these archives cannot easily be reconciled with the catastrophic situation depicted by the letter. Possible explanations depend on the relative chronology of the documents. If these sources were absolutely contemporary, it follows that either trade activities continued (undisturbed or little disturbed) under the famine and the adverse political-military situation, or adversities are simply not recorded in the types of documents unearthed at Emar. Warfare could temporarily impede trade but certainly not for a long time. As shown by the Babylonian tablet E 26 (§ 2.2.1.3), the southeastern route to the land of Suḫu seems to have been secure in 1185 B.C. (or 1175),54 despite the military operations undertaken by the governor of

49 Note that in one of the latest documents from Ugarit, the letter RSO 23 12 (RS 94.2169), the king Ammurapi desperately asks for the assistance of the king of Karkemiš against enemy forces that are already stationed in Ugarit’s port, Raʾšu (modern Ras Ibn Hani), only about 5 km away from the city, see Cohen 2021. 50 Cf. Adamthwaite 2001: 227–29, although the chronology provided there is outdated. 51 E 86, (see § 1.3.2), E 121 (see § 1.3.3), GsK 2, Hirayama 37 (see § 1.3.4), TBR 25 (see § 1.3.5), TBR 44 (see § 1.3.6). 52 Sherratt 2003, Bell 2006: 14–16, Sherratt 2016, Millek 2019: 232–33, 259–61. 53 See Malbran-Labat 1995: 107, and ch. 6 fn. 58, Freu 2006: 254–57. 54 The tablet is dated to the second year of the Kassite king Meli-Šipak.

378 

 6 Conclusions

the land of Suḫu a few years earlier and described in the letter E 263,55 which was likely addressed to Aḫī-mālik, the last overseer of Emar, in the early stage of his career.56 On the other hand, if the letter found at Ugarit should be dated some time (months? years?) after the documents from Emar,57 the situation would seem to have suddenly fallen apart. Indeed, in the letters sent from Emar by the Ugaritic merchant Dagan-bēlu (RSO 7 30–33) at the beginning of the 12th century, there is no hint of an imminent collapse, as Arnaud has stressed.58 Perhaps future prosopographic studies will be able to assign a relative chronological sequence to the Emar documents, particularly those on hardship – and will ideally be able to synchronize them with the Ugarit sources – in order to achieve a better understanding of political-economic developments in the last decades of the Late Bronze Age.59 At a certain point after 1185 B.C. (or 1175), Emar was attacked by enemy forces that destroyed the city, probably in the wake of migrations of newcomers. One may recall here that the two texts mentioning the siege of the TAR-WU troops, TBR 25 and TBR 44, date to the last overseer of Emar.60 Surely the fall of the Hittite empire and then of Ugarit left the small town of Emar unguarded and cut off the commercial outlets vital for its mercantile economy. Nevertheless, it remains unexplained why Karkemiš, lying only about 100 km northwest of Emar, shows no signs of destruction, and why the local dynasty continued to rule the city into the Iron Age.61

55 For the content of this letter see Durand and Marti 2005 and Singer 2008: 233–37. 56 See Cohen 2012a: 16–20. 57 Note that the terminus post quem for the destruction of Ugarit is given by the letter RSO 14 18 (RS 86.2230), sent by the Egyptian Great Cancellor Beya, who was executed in the 5th year of the pharaoh Siptah, ca. 1190 B.C., see Cohen and Singer 2006: 135 n. 46. 58 Arnaud 1991b: 65: “Pourtant, dans ce monde au bord de l’anéantissement, rien n’avertit de l’approche de la catastrophe ni ne fait pressentir la montée des périls: les contre-temps sont fortunes de terre; les voyageurs vont loin et sans escorte; ils parcourent sans appréhension les routes ouvertes de Carkemis à Canaan, du pays d’Astata à Chypre.” For these letters see also Monroe 2009: 136–37. 59 Miller (2020) has argued that also Hittite textual sources provide little or no evidence for the decline of the empire; however, as Miller himself pointed out, textual sources pointing to the collapse are not expected to be found in Ḫattuša because the Hittite capital was likely abandoned in the last decades of the Empire. Additionally, one may also add that Hittite sources from any period yield little or no information on economic activities. 60 Viano 2007: 255–56; although his sequence of the Overseers of the Land differs from that followed here, also Yamada (2019b: 200–03) dates the attack of the TAR-WU troops toward the end of Emar history. 61 Singer 1999, Marchetti 2016, de Martino 2018: 26.

6 Conclusions 

 379

To conclude, the sources related to debt have shown that Emar was a small but rich community that flourished due to commerce and banking. A clear sign of the city’s wealth is that impoverished people from various towns, even quite distant ones, traveled to Emar to sell their relatives (§ 5.2.2).62 Even if the deterioration of the political-economic situation due to wars and famines occurred only in the last years of the Late Bronze Age, not only at Emar but throughout north-western Syria (i.e., Ugarit), neighboring political entities seem to have suffered from a socio-economic crisis that was unknown (or much less severe) at Emar. It may be suggested that Emar, as a small and wealthy center, remained relatively untouched by the surrounding crisis. The size of the community, the intertwined relationships among its members, and expressions of solidarity at different levels prevented Emar from suffering an economic crisis. Solidarity was not simply inspired by generosity but was a strategy to preserve the community by ensuring that the impoverishment of some of its members would not affect the others. Only a complete reconsideration of the material from Nuzi, Alalaḫ, Assur, and Ugarit can determine whether Emar was exceptional, or whether socio-economic crisis did not strike Syria and Northern Mesopotamia until the final years of the Late Bronze Age. Hopefully, future research and the much-awaited publication of the texts from Tell Sabi Abyad will help to answer the many questions that this work must leave open.

62 Note also that in the Syrian document GsK 6, dated to the First Dynasty, large quantities of silver and gold are paid to the Hurrian king by a private individual, Cohen and Viano 2016.

Appendix

Note: The transliterations are a revised and corrected version of the Progetto Sinleqiunnini edition. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781501515309-007

382 

 Appendix

Anatolica 16 (SH) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.

ŠÈR.ŠÈR ZABAR.MEŠ ša muḫ-ḫi DUMU.MEŠ La-aḫ-ma ù Zu-ba-ba TA 2 GUN 2 LIM 4 ME URUDU.MEŠ ša É.GAL-lim i-na x x ⸢x mPu⸣-ḫi-ŠEŠ ú-šal-li-mu a-na É ᵈKUR ša NA.KIŠIB ša É.GAL-lim ú-še-ri-bu-šu DUMU.MEŠ La-aḫ-ma ù Zu-ba-ba za-ku-ú

AOAT 265.1 (MA) 1. 2.

a-na mEN-UR.SAG EN-⸢ia⸣ ṭup-pí mḪa-mì-is₅-dDa-gal ARAD-ka

3. 4.

a-na fḪi-il-is?-sa DAM!-ia! qi-bi-ma

5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19.

2 MA.NA 5 GÍN ṣar-pu i+na NA₄.MEŠ ša KUR Ki-na-ḫi 2 túgni-ik-su 1 lu-be-ru Áš-šu-ra-ia-ú a-na mA-bi-sa-ma-ka ḫur-di ša mTu-a-na-ni a-na mA-ḫi-ra-aḫ-qa DUMU Ia-aʾ-ṣú a-na mŠe-ʾi-Ba-ʾa-lu DUMU Bu-ú-la LÚ.ZADIM BAN! a-na mA-bi-Ra-eš-⸢pa⸣ at-ta-na-šu-nu a-na AN.NA BABBAR at-⸢ti⸣-din Áš-šu-ra-ia-ú ki-i ⸢ša⸣-pár-⸢te⸣ ú-kal-lu-ni ARAD-⸢ta⸣

AOAT 265.1 

A bronze chain (?) that is upon the sons of Laḫma and Zū-Baba, they paid by means of 2 talents and 2400 (shekels) of copper – (good) of the palace – in the presence of (?) Puḫi-šenni. They deposited (the object) of the seal document of the palace (i.e., the copper) in the temple of Dagan. The sons of Laḫma and Zū-Baba are free.

To Baʿal-qarrād my lord: tablet of Ḫamis-Dagal, your servant. Say to my wife Ḫilissa:

2 minas and 5 shekels of silver according to the Canaanite weight, 2 niksu-textiles and 1 lubēru-textile, all Assyrian, I have given to Abī-samaka, the posthumous son of Tuanani, to Aḫī-raḫaq son of Iaʿšu,1 to Šeʾi-Baʿal son of Būla, the stonecutter, (and) to Abī-Rašap. I have given (them) for tin. The Assyrians hold me in pledge, I have to work as a slave.

1 For this personal name see TBR 27.

 383

384 

 Appendix

20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28.

e-‹pa›-áš šúm-ma ⸢ṣar⸣-pa ta-am-ta-ḫar AN.NA BABBAR še-bi-la la-a-din la-pe-ṭé-er šúm-ma ⸢ṣar⸣-pa la-a tam-ḫur šub-ta KI.MEŠ! É.MEŠ-ni a-na la-qa-e šu-ku-un a-na-ku al-la-ka i-na di-ni a-da-bu-ub

29. 30. 31. 32.

šúm-ma ṣar-pa ⸢i⸣-tar-ṣu-ni-ku di-in AN.NA BABBAR še-bi-la a-na-ku la-tal-ka

ASJ10 A (SH) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22.

⸢ᵐ⸣Du-u-du DUMU Maš-ru qa-du ᵐKi-ri-⸢ᵈKUR⸣ ⸢ù⸣ ᵐ⸢ARAD-DINGIR⸣.MEŠ DUMU.MEŠ-šú ⸢a⸣-na LÚ.MEŠ.Ú.LU-tì š[a] ᵐŠe-i-ᵈKUR ki-i-mu-ú 1 ME 5 GÍN 40 KÙ.BABBAR.M[EŠ] ⸢aš⸣-bu ⸢i⸣-na-an-na ᵐ⸢Du⸣-u-[d]u [4]0 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ ⸢a-na⸣ ᵐŠe-i-ᵈKUR [iš]-tu ⸢ŠÀ⸣ KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ ⸢ša⸣-a-šú ut-te!-er [ᵐDu]-ú-du ra-man-šú ul-te-ṣi [ᵐK]i-ri-ᵈKUR ù ⸢ᵐARAD⸣-DINGIR.MEŠ [k]i-i-mu-ú 65 ‹GÍN› 40 KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ a-na É ᵐŠe-i-ᵈKUR aš-bu ᶠṢa-ri-ip-tu₄ AMA-šú-nu ‹ù› NIN.MEŠ-šú-nu i-na u₄-mi ša ᵐDu-u-du ⸢KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ⸣-šú-nu ú-šal-lam ṭup-pa-šú-⸢nu⸣ i-ḫap-pì ù ᵐDu-u-du ki-i ⸢i-na⸣ É ᵐŠe-i-ᵈKUR a-šib [9 ITU.MEŠ KÍ]G.MEŠ um-te-ši-ir it-[ta]-at-lak ù i-na ‹u₄-mi› ša ᵐDu-u-d[u] KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ-šú ú-šal-lam 1 DUMU-šú [a-n]a ᵐŠe-i-ᵈKUR i-na-din-ma 9 ITU.MEŠ KÍĜ.MEŠ i-ṣa-bat NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐᵈ30-ta-li-iʾ NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐᵈU-NIR DUMU Pí-da DUMU ᵈKUR-ta-ri

ASJ10 A 

If you have received the silver, send the tin so that I can give it and release (my self). If you have not received the silver, put (our) properties, whether fields or our houses, up for sale. I will then come to testify in court. If they handed out the silver to you, give (it for tin) and send the tin. I want to leave!

Dūdu son of Mašru, with Kiri-Dagan and Abdi-ili, his sons, stood as amēlūtu o[f] Šeʾi-Dagan in lieu of 105 shekels and 40 (grains) of silver. Now Dūdu returned 40 shekels of silver to Šeʾi-Dagan from that silver. (Thus), Dūdu released himself, (but) Kiri-Dagan and Abdi-ili, in place of 65 ‹shekels› and 40 (grains) of silver, remained in the house of Šeʾi-Dagan; so did Ṣāriptu, their mother ‹and› their sisters. On the day when Dūdu will pay their silver, he will break their tablet. And Dūdu, while residing in the house of Šeʾi-Dagan, was released [from 9 months of w]ork and w[e]nt away. And on the ‹day› when Dūd[u] will pay his silver, he shall give one of his sons [t]o Šeʾi-Dagan and he (the son) will perform the work for 9 months. Seal of Šaggar-taliʾ Seal of Baʿal-qarrād son of Pida son of Dagan-tariʾ

 385

386  23. 24. 25. 26.

 Appendix

NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐDu-u-dì DUMU Maš-ru NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐᵈ⸢30⸣-a-bi ⸢DUMU I-ku-ᵈKUR⸣ NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐᵈ[. . .] [DUMU . . .]-ᵈU

ASJ10 E (SH) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12.

[i-na MU] KALA.GA ša 3 SÌLA ŠE [a-na 1 GÍ]N KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ iz-za-az ᶠᵈKUR-DINGIR-lì [x] x ᵐZu-e-ia DUMU-ši a-na GIŠ.MÁ [t]u-še-li-šú ù iš-tu GIŠ.MÁ [ᵐKU]R-[b]a-ni ‹i-na› uruTu-túl ú-še-ri-da-šú [a-na x G]ÍN KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ ŠÀM.TIL.LA a-na ARAD-ut-[t]i? [iš-tu SAG.D]U-š[u!(ŠI)-ma] ta-ta-din-šú [BA.UG₇ T]I.[LA] ARA[D š]a ᵐᵈKUR-ba-ni [šu-ut šúm-ma ur-ra]-am [še-ra-am ma-am-ma a-na bá-q]a-ri-šú [il-la-a ṭup-pu an-nu-ú i]-la-e-šú [. . . -d]in-šú some missing lines at tḫe bottom of tḫe obverse and top of reverse

13’. [NA₄.KIŠIB . . .] 14’. DUMU Še-ni-na 15’. [N]A₄.KIŠIB mA-me 16’. DUMU A-lál-a-bi

ASJ13 A (SH) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

[. . . ᵐ]ᵈUTU-i-lu-lí [. . .] ⸢DUMU.MEŠ ᵐŠi⸣-mi-da-ru LÚ [x] [ᵐŠe]-⸢i-ᵈKUR⸣ DUMU Ip-qí-ᵈKUR qa-ta-te-e [ša] DUMU.MEŠ ᵐŠi-mi-da-ri ṣa-bi-it [i-n]a-an-na ᵐᵈUTU-i-lu-li lil!-li-kam-ma ᵐŠe-i-ᵈKUR a-na KÙ.BABBAR iṣ-bat ù ᵐŠe-i-ᵈKUR 1 MA.NA 5 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR

ASJ13 A 

Seal of Dūdu son of Mašru Seal of Šaggar-abu son of Ikūn-Dagan Seal of [. . .] [son of . . .]-Baʿal

[In the year] of hardship when 3 qû of barley correspond [to 1 shek]el of silver, Dagan-ilī [. . .] had Zū-Eia, her son, embark on a boat and from the boat [Dag]an-[b]āni made him disembark ‹in› Tuttul. [For x she]kels of silver, full price, she sold him into slavery of his! [own wil]l [Dead or ali]ve he will be Dagan-bāni’s slav[e]. [If in the futu]re [someone should come up to clai]m him [this tablet will prev]ail over him [. . .]2 some missing lines at tḫe bottom of tḫe obverse and top of reverse [Seal of . . .] son of Šennina Seal of Ameu son of Alal-abu

[. . .] Šamaš-iluli [. . .] sons of Šimi-dārû, man of [. . .] [Še]ʾi-Dagan son of Ipqi-Dagn, the guarantor of Šimi-dārû’s sons, was seized. [N]ow, Šamaš-iluli came and seized Šeʾi-Dagan for silver, and Šeʾi-Dagan paid to Ša[maš-iluli] 1 mina and 5 shekels of silver

2 Tsukimoto restores [ᶠᵈKUR-DINGIR-lì a-na ᵐᵈKUR-ba-ni ta-ta-d]in-šú.

 387

388  8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13.

 Appendix

ša muḫ-ḫi DUMU.MEŠ ᵐŠi-mi-da-ri a-na ⸢ᵐᵈ⸣U[TU-i-lu-li] it-ta-din na-di-in a-n[a ᵐᵈUTU-i-lu-li] ù EGIR-nu ᵐᵈUTU-i-lu-li a-[na muḫ-ḫi ᵐŠe-i-ᵈKUR] [l]a-a ‹‹1›› i-ra-gu-um ù ᵐ[Še-i-ᵈKUR] [a-n]a [mu]ḫ-ḫi ᵐᵈUTU-[i-lu-l]í! [la-a i-ra-gu-um] [x x DUMU.]MEŠ ᵐŠi-mi-[da-ri] [. . .]

AuOr5 11 (SH) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.

ᵐTa-gi₅-ia DUMU Ma-li-si LÚ uruA-na-bi ᵐKAR-ᵈ30 ŠEŠ-šú qa-du ᶠA-ra-wa-li DAM-šú ᶠKu-ʾ-li DUMU.MUNUS-ši 3 ZI.MEŠ a-na 70 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ ŠÀM.TIL.LA iš-tu SAG.DU-šú-nu-ma a-na ARAD.MEŠ ša ᵐMa-di-ᵈKUR DUMU Zu-Aš-tar-ti it-ta-din-sú-nu-ti BA.UG₇ TÌ.LA ARAD.MEŠ ša ᵐMa-di-ᵈKUR šu-nu šúm-ma ma-am-ma i-na EGIR u₄-mi a-na pa-ṭá-ri-sú-nu il-la-a 4 MUNUS.MEŠ SAG₁₀ a-na mMa-di-dKUR li-din lil-qì-sú-nu-ti

11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23.

NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐTa-gi₅-ia DUMU Ma-li-si NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐAs-mi-ia DUMU Eḫ-li-ᵈIŠKUR-ub LÚ uruA-na-bi NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐTi-la-si DUMU Ma-zi-ᵈIŠKUR-ub LÚ uruA-na-bi NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐᵈ30-a-bu DUMU GUR-ᵈKUR DUMU GUR-da NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐᵈ30-ta-li-iʾ DUMU ᵈKUR-EN DUMU Ra : NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐNIR-ᵈKUR DUMU BA.UG₇-ḫa-ma-dì NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐE-e DUMU Zu-Ba-la ù mi-nu-me-e DUMU.MEŠ ša ul-la-du₄ ARAD.MEŠ ša mMa-di-dKUR šu-nu

AuOr5 11 

 389

that were upon the sons of Šimi-dārû. (The silver) has been paid t[o Šamaš-iluli]. And, in the future, Šamaš-iluli shall [n]ot raise a claim a[gainst Šeʾi-Dagan], and [Šeʾi-Dagan] [shall not raise a claim agai]nst Šamaš-[ilul]i. [. . .]

Tagia son of Malisu, man of Anabi, has sold Eḫli-Kušuḫ, his brother, together with Arawali, his wife, (and) Kuʾli, her daughter – 3 persons (in total) – for 70 shekels of silver, full price, of their own will, as slaves of Madi-Dagan, son of Zū-Aštarti. Dead or alive they will be Madi-Dagan’s slaves. If someone in the future should come up to redeem them, he shall give four beautiful women to Madi-Dagan and take them. Seal of Tagia son of Malisu Seal of Asmia son of Eḫli-Teššub man of Anabi Seal of Tila-si son of Mazi-Teššub man of Anabi Seal of Šaggar-abu son of Tūra-Dagan son of Tūra-Da3 Seal of Šaggar-taliʾ son of Dagan-bēlu son of Ra Seal of Matkali-Dagan son of Imūt-Ḫamadi Seal of Eʾe son of Zū-Baʿla And all the children she will bear will remain slaves of Madi-Dagan.

3 Readings of personal names according to Pruzsinsky 2003: Index, 782-83.

390 

 Appendix

AuOr5 12 (SH) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11.

ᵐA-ki-ᵈUTU DUMU Šu-pá-li-na ᵐᶠAm-ma-ar-ia-an-ti ᶠka-la-at-šu a-na 33 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ ŠÁM.TIL.LA i-na MU KALA.GA a-na ᵐIb-ni-ᵈKUR DUMU ḪAL a-na GÉME-ut-ti it-ta-din šum-ma ᶠAm-ma-ar-ia-an-ti EGIR u₄-mi a-na pa-ni ᵐIb-ni-ᵈKUR iq-ta-bi ma-a ú-ul GÉME-ka ána-ku ᵐIb-ni-ᵈKUR i-na GIŠ.MUG.MEŠ i-na-an-din 4 EN DI NU.TUKU

12. 13. 14. 15.

IGI ᵐKi-ba-ak-ki DUMU A-kà ur[uIr-ri-da?] IGI ᵐPí-in-ᵈIŠKUR ŠE[Š-šu] IGI ᵐŠu-up-še-ni ŠEŠ-šu-ma IGI ᵐḪa-ta-ʾ-e uruIr-ri-da

16. 17. 18. 19.

IGI ᵐNIR-ᵈKUR DUMU Zu-Ba-la NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐPí-in-ᵈU-ub NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐNIR-ᵈKUR DUMU Zu-Ba-la NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐKi-ba-ak-ku

BLMJ 2 (SH) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.

a-na pa-ni LÚ.UGULA KALAM.MA ù LÚ.MEŠ.ŠU.GI ᵐMa-di-ᵈKUR DUMU ᶠAl-um-mì it-ti ᵐSi-i-ḫi iš-ni-qu ᵐMa-di-ᵈKUR a-kán-na iq-bi ma-a ᵐSi-i-ḫu a-na 30 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ ip-ta-aṭ-ra-ni-mi a-na DUMU-ut-ti-šu i-tap-ša-ni-me ma-a i-na-an-na a-na il-ki iṣ-ṣa-ab-tu-nin-ni-mi ù LÚ.UGULA KALAM.MA ṭup-pa ša-na-ti

4 I follow here Arnaud’s primary edition; the Progetto Sinleqiunnini has i-na ŠÁM.MEŠ i-na-andin but being sold is unlikely to be a punishment for a slave.

BLMJ 2 

Aki-Šimike son of Šupal-enna has sold into slavery Ammarianti, his daughter-in-law, for 33 shekels of silver, full price, in a year of hardship, to Ibni-Dagan son of the diviner. If Ammarianti, in the future, should say to Ibni-Dagan: “I am not your slave!,” Ibni-Dagan will leave her in the wood (?) He will have no adversary in court. Before Kibakku son of Aka (from) the town of [Irrida (?)] Before Pin-Teššub, his brother Before Šup-šenni, his brother Before Ḫattû (from) the town of Irrida Before Matkali-Dagan son of Zū-Baʿla Seal of Pin-Teššub Seal of Matkali-Dagan son of Zū-Baʿla Seal of Kibakku

Before the Overseer of the Land and the Elders Madi-Dagan son of Al-ummī came together with Sīḫu. Madi-Dagan spoke as follows: “Sīḫu redeemed me for 30 shekels of silver (and) adopted me as his son. Now I was seized for the ilku-service.” Then the Overseer of the Land made another tablet

 391

392  10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22.

 Appendix

ša ᵐMa-di-ᵈKUR a-na ᵐSi-i-ḫi i-pu-uš ṭup-pa ša DUMU-ti-šu iḫ-ta-pí šum-ma i-na EGIR u₄-mi ma-am-ma i-bá-qa-ar-šú 60 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ a-na ᵐSi-i-ḫi Ì.LÁ-ma l[i]l-qè-šú NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐA-ḫi-ma-lik LÚ.UGULA KALAM.MA NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐᵈ30-a-bi DUMU ᵈKUR-ta-ri-i[ʾ] NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐEN-ma-lik DUMU ᵐ[Ṣa-al]-mi NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐA-bi-lal-li DUMU Ka-pí

BLMJ 12 (SH) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16.

É-tu₄ ša mARAD-DINGIR-lì DUMU Ku-um-ri É-a-SAG₁₀ DUMU Zi-ik-ri-ia ki-i 30 KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ ú-ka-al-šú i-na-an-na ᵐᵈKUR-GAL DUMU Ku-um-ri a-na 20 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR.MÉŠ ki-i lúni-ka-ri iš-tu le-et ᵐᵈÉ-a-SAG₁₀ ip-ta-ṭar-šu šum-ma i-na EGIR u₄-mi LÚ.EN DI.KU₅-šú ša ᵐᵈKUR-GAL il-la-a ᵐᵈKUR-GAL za-a!-ku ᵐᵈÈ-a-SAG₁₀ i-ta-na-pal-šu

md

NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐA-bi-ra-šap DUMU DINGIR-lì-a NA₄.KIŠIB EN.GAL DUMU Ḫu-ra-ṣi NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐAb-ba-nu

NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐᵈKUR-ta-li-iʾ DUMU Ka-a-zi

DUMU Ka-a-pí NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐKa-pí-ᵈKUR LÚ.ḪAL

E 7 (SH) 1. 2.

NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐKa-aš-ka DUMU A-ni-ni

ᶠÀs-da-ʾa-ḫi DAM ᵐA-kí-ú LÚ uru.kiI-kal-tá

E 7 

concerning Madi-Dagan for Sīḫu. He has broken the tablet of his adoption. If, in the future, someone should raise a claim over him he shall pay 60 shekels of silver to Sīḫu and t[a]ke him. Seal of Aḫī-mālik the Overseer of the Land Seal of Šaggar-abu son of Dagan-tariʾ Seal of Bēlu-mālik Son of [Ṣal]mu Seal of Abī-lalu son of Kāpu

Ea-damiq son of Zikria held the house of Abdi-ili son of Kumri in lieu of 30 shekels of silver. Now Dagan-kabar son of Kumri has redeemed it for 20 shekels of silver as an outsider from Ea-damiq. If, in the future, an adversary (in court) of Dagan-kabar should come up, Dagan-kabar will be free (of claims). Ea-damiq will pay him. Seal of Abī-Rašap son of Ilia Seal of Bēlu-kabar son of Ḫurāṣu Seal of Abbanu

Seal of Kaška son of Anini

Seal of Dagan-taliʾ son of Kāzi

son of Kāpu Seal of Kāpī-Dagan, diviner

Asda-aḫī, wife of Akiu, man of Ekalte, has sold

 393

394 

 Appendix

3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

ᵐEN-ta-li-iʾ ‹DUMU› DUMU.MUNUS-ši a-na 52 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ ŠÁM.TIL.LA iš-tu SAG.DU-šú-ma a-na ARAD-ut-ti a-na ᵐᵈU-EN ù ᵐARAD-ᵈ30 DUMU.ME ᵐIr-am-ᵈKUR it-ta-din-šú BA.UG₇ TI.LA ARAD ša ᵐᵈU-EN ù ᵐARAD-ᵈ30 šu-ut

9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18.

šúm-ma ur-ra-am še-ra-am i-na EGIR u₄-mi ma-am-ma a-na bá-qa-ri-šu il-la-⸢a⸣ ṭup-pu an-nu-ú i-la-ʾe-šú NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐQur-d[i-ia] LÚ uruA-zu NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐᵈU-UR.SAG DUMU Ku-na-zi NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐIp-qí-ᵈKUR DUMU E-e NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐTu-ri DUMU DINGIR-ba-ni

E 16 (SH) 1 2 3 4 5 6. 7. 8 9. 10 11 12

30-a-bu DUMU dU-UR.SAG ‹‹SAG›› a-kán-na iq-bi ma-a a-nu-ma Ba-zi-la DUMU ARAD-DINGIR-lì LÚ.Ú.LU-ti-ia ša 41 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ i-na-an-na 20 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ iš-tu ŠÀ KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ ša-a-šú uḫ-tal-li-iq ù fA-bi-qí-ri a-na DAM-šú at-ta-din u₄-mimeš ša md30-a-bu ù fAr-na-bu DAM-šú bal-ṭu m Ba-zi-la lip-làḫ-šú-nu-ti ki-i-me-e i-pal-làḫ-šú-nu-ti EGIR ši-im-ti-šú-nu ub!-bal-šú-nu-ti ŠU DAM-šú DUMU.MEŠ-šú li-iṣ-bat-ma a-šar ŠÀ-šú lil-lik ù 21 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ a-na DUMU.MEŠ-ni li-din ù šúm-ma ur-ra-am še-ra-am KÙ!.BABBAR.MEŠ a-na mBa-zi-la i-pa-a-da-šú a-na md30-a-bi ù DAM-šú li-din ù EGIR KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ-šú mBa-zi-la u₄-mimeš ša md30-a-bu ù DAM-šú bal-ṭu lip-làḫ-šú-nu-ti

13. 14.

šúm-ma ur-ra-am še-ra-am md30-a-bu ù DAM-šú a-na pa-ni mBa-zi-la i-qab-bu-ú ma-a KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ-ni te-er-ra-mi ⸢iš⸣-tu É-ni at-lak-mi

md m

E 16 

 395

Baʿal-bēlī, the son of her daughter, for 52 shekels of silver, full price, of his own will, into slavery to Baʿal-bēlī and Abdi-Šaggar, sons of Irʾam-Dagan. Dead or alive, he will be the slave of Baʿal-bēlī and Abdi-Šaggar. If, in the future, in the future days, someone should come up to claim him, this tablet will prevail over him. Seal of Qurd[ia] man of Azu Seal of Baʿal-qarrād son of Kunazu Seal of Ipqi-Dagan son of Eʾe Seal of Tūri son of Ilu-bāni

Šaggar-abu son of Baʾal-qarrād spoke as follows: “Bazila son of Abdi-ili is my amēlūtu for 41 shekels of silver. Now I canceled 20 shekels of silver from that silver, and I gave (him) Abī-qīrī as a wife.” As long as Šaggar-abu and Arnabu, his wife, should live, Bazila shall support them. As he supports them, after their fate carries them off, he shall take the hand of his wife and his children and go wherever he pleases, and 21 shekels of silver he shall give to our sons. And if, in the future, (someone) should recover5 the silver for Bazila (and) give (it) to Šaggar-abu and his wife, and after his silver (has been reimbursed), Bazila shall support Šaggar-abu and his wife as long as they live. If, in the future, Šaggar-abu and his wife should say to Bazila: “Return our silver, leave our house,”

5 According to Durand (1989d: 174) the verb padûm is attested at Mari with the meaning of “to pay the ransom price, to buy back.”

396 

 Appendix

15. 16.

md

30-a-bu ù DAM-šú a-na KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ-šú-nu NU.TUKU mBa-zi-la ŠU DAM-šú DUMU.MEŠ-šú li-iṣ-bat-ma a-šar ŠÀ-šú lil-lik

17. 18. 19. 20. 21.

ù šúm-ma mBa-zi-la a-na pa-ni md30-a-bi ù DAM-šú i-qab-bi ma!-a la-a a-pal-làḫ-ku-nu-ši ma-a KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ-ku-nu li-qa-mi iš-tu É-ku-nu at-ta-lak-mi mBa-zi-la [a]-na DAM-šú DUMU.MEŠ-šú NU.TUKU 61 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ a-na md30-a-bi ù DAM-šú li-din-ma a-šar ŠÀ-šú lil-lik

22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29.

š[ú]m-ma i-na EGIR u₄-mi mBa-zi-la BA.UG₇ fA-bi-qí-ri DAM-šú ⸢u₄⸣-mimeš ša m⸢d⸣30-⸢a-bu⸣ ù DAM-šú bal-ṭu i-pal-làḫ-šú-⸢nu⸣-ti k[i-i-me-e] i-p[al-là]ḫ-šú-nu-ti EGIR ši-im-ti-šú-nu ⸢ub-bal⸣-šú-nu-ti [a]-na EGIR u₄-mi f A-bi-qí-ri al-ma-tu₄ ⸢it-ti⸣ a[l-m]a-[n]a-ti [e-zi]-ib-tu₄ it-ti az-ba-ti DUMU.MEŠ-šú š[a] md30-a-bi [a]-na muḫ-ḫi-š[i] la-a i-ra-gu-mu ⸢šúm⸣-ma ⸢i⸣-ra-gu-mu ṭup-pu an-nu-ú i-la-ʾe-e-šú-nu-ti

30. 31. 32. 33 34. 35 36.

ù šúm-ma fA-bi-qí-ri BA.UG₇ ù mBa-zi-la u₄-⸢mi⸣meš ša ᵐᵈ30-a-bu ù DAM-šú bal-ṭu i-pal-làḫ-š[ú]-nu-ti EGIR ši-im-ti-šú-nu ub-bal-šú-nu-ti ⸢a⸣-šar ŠÀ-šú lil-lik ù šúm-ma u₄-mimeš ša md30-a-bu ù DAM-šú bal-ṭu 21 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ ša-a-šú la-a i-di-na-šú-nu-ti i-na EGIR u₄-mi m Ba-zi-la 21 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ a-na DUMU.MEŠ-šú ša d30-a-bi li-din-ma a-šar ŠÀ-šú lil-lik

37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42.

⸢NA₄.KIŠIB⸣ md30-a!-bí DUMU ᵈKUR-ta-ri-iʾ NA₄.KIŠIB mAm-za-ḫi DUMU Eḫ-li-ia! NA₄.KIŠIB mEN-ma-lik DUMU Ṣa-al-mi  NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐI-la-ni DUMU A-ḫi-i NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐEl-li NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐTi-la-e DUMU ᵈKUR-ta-[x] DUMU Zu-Ba-la NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐᵈKUR-ta-li DUMU Ḫu-za-mi

E 21 (SH) 1. 2. 3.

ᵐIm-lik-ᵈKUR DUMU ᵈKUR-EN DUMU Ma-tik-ka 60 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ ip-ṭe₄-ri-šu i-na NA₄.MEŠ KUR A-mur-ri

E 21 

 397

Šaggar-abu and his wife will have no (right) to their silver. Bazila shall take the hand of his wife and his children and go wherever he pleases. And if Bazila should say to Šaggar-abu and his wife: “I will not support you, take back your silver, I want to leave your house,” Bazila will have no (right) to his wife and his children (and) shall give 61 shekels of silver to Šaggar-abu and his wife and go wherever he pleases. If, in the future, Bazila should die, Abī-qīrī, his wife, will support Šaggar-abu and his wife as long as they live. A[s] she su[ppo]rts them after their fate carries them off, in the future, Abī-qīrī will be a widow with w[idow]s, a [divo]rcee with divorcees. Šaggar-abu’s sons shall not raise a claim against her; should they raise a claim, this tablet will prevail over them. And if Abī-qīrī should die, Bazila should serve Šaggar-abu and his wife as long as they live. After their fate carries them off, he shall go wherever he pleases. And if within the days that Šaggar-abu and his wife will live, he has not paid those 21 shekels of silver, in the future, Bazila shall give 21 shekels of silver to the sons of Šaggar-abu and go wherever he pleases. Seal of Šaggar-abu son of Dagan-tariʾ Seal of Amzaḫi son of Eḫlia Seal of Bēlu-mālik son of Ṣalmu Seal of Ilānu son of Aḫiu Seal of Elli Seal of Tilaʾe son of Dagan-ta[. . .] son of Zū-Baʿla Seal of Dagan-taliʾ son of Ḫuzāmu

Imlik-Dagan son of Dagan-bēlu son of Madi-ka paid 60 shekels of silver, his ransom, according to the weight of the land of Amurru,

398  4.

 Appendix

5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11.

ù 14 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ ŠÁM TÚG.ḪI.A.MEŠ i-na NA₄.MEŠ KUR A-murri-ma a-na ᵐKal-bi-i ARAD ša ᵐAt-te-i DUMU Sa-pi ul!-tal-lìm ur-ra-am še-ra-am ᵐAt-te-ú áš-šúm KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ-šú a-na muḫ-ḫi! ᵐIm-lik-ᵈKUR la-a i-ra-gu-um šúm-ma i-ra-gu-um ṭup-pu an-nu-ú i-la-e-š[ú]

12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21.

NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐKal-bi-i   NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐᵈKUR-⸢GAL⸣ ARAD ᵐAt-te-i DUMU Ku-na-zi IGI ᵐIa-ab-lu-ṭu DUMU A-du-ni-ṣa-du-qi IGI ᵐGi-ri LÚ uruTa-ad-mi-ir IGI ᵐŠa-ak-ni-ú LÚ uruTa-ad-mi-ir-ma IGI ᵐA-ra-zi-ru-ú DUMU Sur-ši-a IGI ᵐᵈKUR-GAL DUMU Ku-na-zi

E 23 (MB) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.

[ᶠT]a-at-ta-še DAM ᵐA-la-zi-ia-i [x]+30 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ i-na NA₄.GAL KUR Sú-ba-ri-i [pu-uḫ ᵐ]A-li-Na-ni LÚ KUR Sa-al-ḫi [ul-tal]-lìm ù 30 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ [. . . NA]M.ÉRIM.ME ir-ti-iḫ [ù T]a-at-ta-še [it-ma (?)] ù šúm-ma [ᵐA-li-Na-ni i]š-tu [KASKAL-ni la-a] it-taḫ-sa [30 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR.M]E ú-šal-lam

11. 12. 13. 14.

[NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐA]-bi-la-li [DUMU A]b-ba-ni [NA₄.KIŠ]IB [ᵐ]A-li-Na-ni [L]Ú KUR S[a-a]l-ḫi

E 23 

 399

and 14 shekels of silver, the price of clothes, according to the weight of the land of Amurru, to Kalbiu the servant of Atteu son of Sapu. In the future, Atteu, concerning his silver, shall not raise a claim against Imlik-Dagan. Should he raise a claim this tablet will prevail over hi[m]. Seal of Kalbiu    Seal of Dagan-kabar servant of Atteu   son of Kunazu Before Iabluṭu son of Adūnī-ṣaduqu Before Gīrī man of Palmyre Before Šakniu man of Palmyre Before Arazirû son of Šuršia Before Dagan-kabar son of Kunazu

Tatašše wife of Alazaia [has pai]d [x]+30 shekels of silver according to the big weight of the land of Subaru [in place of] Ali-Nani, man of the land of Salḫu. And 30 shekels of silver [secured by] oath remains (unpaid) [and T]atašše [swore (an oath) (?)]. And if [Ali-Nani] should [not] return from [(his) business trip], she will pay [30 shekels of silver]. [Seal of A]bī-lalu [son of A]bbanu [Seal of] Ali-Nani [m]an of the land of S[a]lḫu

400 

 Appendix

E 24 (MB) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14.

1 ME GÍN KÙ.BABBAR NA₄ URU ša ᵐKa-pí-ᵈDa-g[an] ᶠRa-in-du DAM A-la-za-a ma-ḫa-ra-ti i-na ITI GAN.GAN.È 1 ME 20 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR MÁŠ-sú ᶠRa-in-du a-na ᵐKa-pí-ᵈDa-gan i-nam-din NA₄.KIŠIB-ša i-ḫé-pi [p]í i-ta-di-m[a] [KÙ.BAB]BAR ù MÁŠ-sú i-nam-din

15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25.

IGI ᵐᵈIŠKUR-še-mi DUMU ᵐPi-ni-a-ti IGI ᵐLÚ-ᵈIŠKUR IGI ᵐDU₁₀.GA-ia LÚ.DUB.SAR ᵐA-ḫi-DU-A IGI ᵐRa-ba-a DUMU ᵐQa-ri IGI ᵐIa-di-ᵈD[a-gan] DUMU ᵐḪu-nu-[ia] IGI ᵐᵈDa-gan-[GAL/ta-li-iʾ] DUMU ᵐḪé-ma

E 256 (MB) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

a-na ᶠTa-ta-sa qí-bi-ma um-ma-a ᵐA-la-za-a-a um-ma-a MUNUS.TUR É-a-šu-ma-tu₄ a-di a-na!-ku a-ka-ša-da

6 This edition is based on Durand’s collations in Durand and Marti 2003: 165–67.

E 25 

100 shekels of silver, according to the weight of the city belonging to Kāpī-Dagan, Raʾīndu wife of Alazaia has received. Within the month of Kislim, 120 shekels, the silver and its interest, Raʾīndu shall pay to Kāpī-Dagan (and) her sealed document she will break. She has promised an[d] she will pay [the silv]er and its interest. Before Adad-šemi son of Piniati Before Amēl-Adad Before Ṭābia scribe of Aḫī-mukīn-apli Before Rabâ son of Qariʾ Before Iadi-D[agan] son of Ḫunu[ia] Before Dagan[kabar/taliʾ] son of Ḫima

To Tatašše speak. Thus speaks Alazaia concerning the female slave Aia-šumātu: Until I arrive

 401

402  6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27.

 Appendix

MUNUS.TUR ᵐK[i-din]-ᵈGu-la la ú-še-ṣi um-ma-a MUNUS.TUR-šá šu-ṣi-ma um-ma-[a] 2/3 MA.NA KÙ.BABBAR 13 GÍN KÙ.SIG₁₇ ⸢a-na⸣ 26 TÚG.ḪI.A na-a-ad-nu la ta-di-na-šu 1/3 MA.NA KÙ.SIG₁₇ TÚG.ḪI.A na-a-ad-nu 1 MA.NA KÙ.BABBAR KASKAL 1 MA.NA KÙ.BABBAR e-la-tu₄ ša KASKAL il-li-ku 3! GÚ.UN URUDU 1 ANŠE ᵐKi-din-ᵈGu-la ᵐᵈ30-IBILA-SÌ ša 1 MA.NA KÙ.[BABBAR] i-śál-ma an-ni-tám a-ša-al 1 GÚ.UN 15 MA.NA 2 GÚ.UN AN.NA! ⸢ù⸣-lu 1 GÚ.UN-⸢ma⸣

E 26 (MB) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11.

DUB 3 GÍN K[Ù.SIG₁₇?] i-na É mKi-din-d[Gu-la] DUMU md30.NUMUN.M[U] m Na-bu-u[n-ni] DUMU Ú-lam-t[i-. . . DU]B?.SAR ki-i 3 ME 40+2?[/5?/8? . . .] i-na URUki A[n-a]t im-ḫu-ur ITI KIN 2 K[AM]7 MU 2 KÁM Mé-li-ši-ḪU

7 Brinkman (2017: 28 n. 243) reads ITI GU₄ UD.1.KAM. 

E 26 

the female slave of K[idin]-Gula shall not go out. Thus: let her (i.e., your) female slave go out and thus: 2/3 mina of silver (is her value). 13 shekels of gold for 26 garments have (already) been given; do not give it (i.e., gold). 1/3 mina of gold for garments has been given. 1 mina of silver (is for) the business trip. 1 mina of silver (is for) the caravan that made the business trip. 3 talents of copper (are for) 1 donkey of Kidin-Gula. Sîn-apla-iddin demands 1 mina of silver; this is what I demand: 1 talent and 15 minas (of copper?) (and) 2 talents of tin or 1 talent.

The tablet of 3 shekels of g[old (?)], (which was stored) in the house of Kidin-[Gula] son of Sîn-zēra-idd[in], Nabu[nni] son of Ulam-t[i . . ., the sc]ribe, received in exchange for 330+/340+ [. . .], in the city of A[na]t. Month of Elūlu inter[calated], second year of Meli-Šipak,

 403

404  12. 13. 14.

 Appendix

LUGAL.E NA₄.KIŠIB mNa-bu-un-ni uru An-at

E 28 (SH) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16.

ᵐᶠIn-bu-ia ù ᵐAḫ-la-mu-[ú] áš-šúm 30 KÙ.BABBAR a-na pa-ni LÚ.MEŠ.GAL a-na di-ni iq-ru-ba um-ma LÚ.MEŠ.GAL a-na ma-mi-ti it-ta-šú-nu i-na-an-na la-ma-ma i-na bi-ri-šú-‹nu› it-ma im-taḫ-ra um-ma ᵐAḫ-la-mu-ú ma-a 15 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR id-ni a-na ma-mi-ti la-a na-lak-mi ᶠIn-bu-ia 15 KÙ.BABBAR a-na ᵐAḫ-la!-me-ú it-ta-din i-na EGIR u₄-mi ᶠIn-bu-ia a-na muḫ-ḫi ᵐAḫ-la-me-ú la i-[ra-gu-u]m ù ᵐAḫ-la-me-ú [a-na muḫ-ḫi] ᶠIn-bu-ia la-a i-[ra-gu-um] [š]a i-ra-gu-um ṭup-pu an-nu-ú i-la-ʾ-e-šú

17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24.

NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐAḫ-la-me-i DUMU A-bi-EN IGI ᵐBe-lu₄-mi DUMU A-mi-l[i]-ia IGI ᵐŠu-ru-qu-ú ŠEŠ-šú IGI ᵐAr-tu₄ DUMU Pu-ḫa-ni IGI ᵐKu-du-ru DUMU Bi-te-en-ni IGI ᵐKi-te-Ma-ma DUMU Zu-Ḫa-ia i-na ITI.KÁM ša Ta-aš-ri-tì [U]₄ 16 KÁM KÙ.BABBAR ma-ḫi!-ir

E 33 (SH) 1. 2. 3.

I-šar-te DAM mAš-tar-a-bu a-kán-na iq-bi ma-a mIš-ma-aʾ-dKUR a-na DUMU-ut-ti-ia ú-š[e]-⸢ṣi⸣ ù a-na-ku ḫa-ma ḫu-ṣa-ba

f

E 33 

the king. Seal of Nabunni City of Anat

Inbuia and Aḫlam[û] approached the Great Ones for a legal decision concerning 30 (shekels) of silver. The Great Ones (spoke) as follows: “What suits them is an oath.” Indeed, before they swore between them, they met. Aḫlamû (spoke) as follows: “Give me 15 shekels of silver so that we will not go to the oath.” (Therefore) Inbuia gave 15 (shekels) of silver to Aḫlamû. In the future, Inbuia shall not r[aise a clai]m against Aḫlamû, and Aḫlamû shall not [raise a claim against] Inbuia. [Who]ever should raise a claim, this tablet will prevail over him. Seal of Aḫlamû son of Abī-Bēlu Before Bēlu-mi son of Amēl[i]a Before Šurruqû his brother Before Artu son of Puḫani Before Kudurru son of Bitenni Before Kitte-Mama son of Zū-Ḫaia On the 16th [day] of the month of Tašritu the silver was received.

Išarte wife of Aštar-abu spoke as follows: “I di[smis]sed Išmaʾ-Dagan from the status of my son, and I am not indebted to [any]one

 405

406 

 Appendix

4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28.

ša [ma-a]n-ma ul ḫu-bu-la-ku-mi ù ki-i ᵐIš-[ma-a]ʾ-ᵈKUR a-na muḫ-ḫi É-ia e-te-er-ba 5 GU₄ 50 UDU.ḪI.A 1 ANŠE 40 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ 3 ME gišPA ŠE.MEŠ 2 ŠEN ZABAR 4 ka-bi-lu ZABAR 1 ŠEN.TUR ZABAR 2 ḫa-ṣi-in-nu ZABAR 1 TÙN ZABAR 1 du-up-pu-ru ZABAR 1 GÍR ZABAR KUR Ḫa-at-ti 2 GÍR ZABAR KUR Aš-šur ú-nu-tumeš an-nu-tu₄ i-na É-ia šak-nu ù LÚ.MEŠ.ŠU.GI : ú-še-zi-iz i-na-an-na fI-šar-te mIš-ma-aʾ-dKUR a-na pa-ni d30-ŠEŠ ul-te-zi-iz ki-i mIš-ma-aʾ-dKUR ḫu-búl ù mIš-ma-aʾ-dKUR 30 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ ša mZu-zu ḫu-búl ù ki-i KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ ša-a-šú i-na É mZu-zu e-te-ru-ub i-na-an-na ᵐᵈ30-ŠEŠ a-na ᵐIš-ma-aʾ-ᵈKUR [a-kán-na i]q-bi ma-a ki-i-me-e [ú-nu-temeš an-nu-t]i! i-na aš-⸢ri⸣-šu-nu8 [tu-ta-ar] ⸢ù⸣ DAM-tu₄ at-tu-ka-mi [šum-m]a ú-nu-temeš an-nu-ti [i-na aš-ri]-šu-nu la-⸢a⸣ tu-ta-ar [ù DAM]-ka la-a ta-ra-gu-um m[a-a at-t]a a-na ARAD LÚ ša-nim-ma te-[te-ru-ub] ù GIŠ.TUKUL ša LUGAL-ri ta-‹laq›-qì ù DUMU.MUNUS fI-šar-te ša la-a ŠÁM ki-i-ki-i ta-laq-qì

29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34.

NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐNIR-ᵈKUR DUMU ᵈKUR-Ta

NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐᵈ30-ŠEŠ NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐᵈKUR-ta-ri-iʾ DUMU NIR-ᵈKUR

ù ki-i LUGAL il-la-ka ù DI.KU₅ an-na-a a-na pa-ni LUGAL i-šak-ka-nu

8 I follow here D’Alfonso’s (2005b: 28–29) restoration; differently Yamada (1995: 310) who restores [KÙ.BABBAR ša mZu-z]u i-na aš-⌈ri⌉-šu-nu, but lines 22–23 suggest that unūtu is expected.

E 33 

 407

for even a splinter of wood9 (i.e., a valueless thing). And when Iš[ma]ʾ-Dagan entered my house, 5 oxen, 50 sheep, 1 donkey, 40 shekels of silver, 300 parīsu of barley, 2 bronze cauldrons, 4 bronze kabilu, 1 small bronze cauldron, 2 bronze ḫaṣinnu, 1 bronze pāšu ax, 1 bronze duppuru, 1 Hittite bronze dagger, 2 Assyrian bronze daggers – these items were stored in my house. And she brought forward the witnesses. Now Išarte produced Išmaʾ-Dagan before Arma-nani (saying that) Išmaʾ-Dagan was indebted. And Išmaʾ-Dagan was also indebted for 30 shekels of silver to Zūzu, and because of that silver he entered the house of Zūzu. Now Arma-nani [s]poke to Išmaʾ-Dagan [as follows]: “When you will [return these items] to their place, the wife will be yours. [If] you will not return these items [to] their [place], you shall not claim your [wife]. [Yo]u have [become] the slave of another man, so (how can) you hold the weapon of the king? And how can you take Išarte’s daughter, who is not purchased?

Seal of Matkali-Dagan son of Dagan-ta

   Seal of Arma-nani    Seal of Dagan-tariʾ    son of Matkali-Dagan And when the king will return, this judgment will be brought before the king.

9  For this translation see CAD H: 259.

408 

 Appendix

E 35 (SH) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16.

45 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR ŠÁM ša mIa-ʾ-šu-qà LÚ uruÚ-rì iš-tu ŠU mARAD-DINGIR.[MEŠ DU]MU Ip-qì!-dKUR f Wa-aš-ti im-ḫu!-ur ur-ra-am! še-ra-am! ma-am-ma a-na muḫ-ḫi ᵐARAD-DINGIR.MEŠ la-a i-ra-gu-‹um› IGI ᵐZu-E-ia DUMU ᵐA-ri-iB-x-x IGI ᵐNu-bi-ᵈ[KU]R [DUMU] ᵐZu-A-a[n-na] IGI ᵐᵈKUR-EN [LÚ.DU]B.SAR NA₄.KIŠIB ᶠW[a-aš-]ti

E 75 (SH) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

2 ME 72 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ ša ᵐᵈKUR-GAL DUMU Ḫi-ma i-na NA₄.MEŠ uru!E-mar a!-na! muḫ!-ḫi ᵐMar-duk DUMU Ḫa-za-an-ni u₄-um ša KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ-šú a-na ᵐᵈKUR-GAL ú-ta-ar ṭup-pa-šú i-ḫap-pí MÁŠ-šú na-d[in]

10 11 12 13

NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐMar-duk [I]GI mB[a]-ni-ia D[U]MU-šú [I]GI ᵐᵈKUR-EN D[UMU Ab]-dì-ᵈ[. . .] [IG]I ᵐIa-di-ᵈK[UR x] x x [. . .]

E 75 

45 shekels of silver, the price of Iaʾšuqa, man of the city of Uri, from the hand of Abdi-i[li so]n of Ipqi-Dagan, Wašti received. In the future, no one will raise a claim against Abdi-ili. Before Zū-Eia son of Arip-[. . .] Before Nuʾbi-[Daga]n [son of] Zū-An[na] Before Dagan-bēlu, [the scr]ibe Seal of W[aš]ti

272 shekels of silver belonging to Dagan-kabar son of Ḫima (weighed) according to the weight of Emar are upon Marduk son of Ḫazannu. The day when he will return his silver to Dagan-kabar, he will break his tablet. The interest has been giv[en]. Seal of Marduk [Be]fore B[a]nnia, his s[o]n [Be]fore Dagan-bēlu s[on of Ab]di-[. . .] [Befo]re Iadi-Da[gan . . .]

 409

410 

 Appendix

E 77 (SH) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

ᵐMu-uḫ-ra-ḫi DUMU Kut-ta DUMU Za-dam-ma D[UMU Ba]-ṣa LÚ.Ú.LU-tù ša 1 ME 40 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ ša ᵐᵈKUR-GAL DUMU Ḫi-ma EN.MEŠ.ŠU.MEŠ-⸢šú⸣ É-šú ù ᵐAd-da [DU]MU-šu u₄-um ša KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ-šú a-na ᵐᵈKUR-GAL DUMU Ḫi-ma ⸢ú-šal-lam ṭup-pa⸣-[š]ú i-ḫ[ap-p]í

7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17.

[a-nu-ma a-šar KÙ.BABBAR.M]EŠ i-[ru-ub] [……………………………………………] x x […………] x x ḫi [. . .] [. . .] 10 [MIN . . .] 10 [MIN . . .] 50 [MIN . . .] 10 MIN [. . .] 15? MIN [. . .] 12 MIN ᵐ[. . .] 3 MIN D[UMU . . .]

18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26.

NA₄. KIŠIB ᵐA-bi-⸢ᵈ⸣[. . .] NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐᵈUTU-da-i DUMU Ku-da-li

NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐKa-pí-ᵈKUR DUMU DINGIR-lì-Da

[………………………. (DUMU)] A-ia-aḫ-ḫi […………………………. (DUMU)] ᵐIš-bi-ᵈKUR [NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐTu-t]u DUMU Šáḫ-li NA₄.KI[ŠI]B ᵐA-ḫi-ma-lik DUMU ᵈKUR-a-bi NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐA-ḫi-ma-lik DUMU Ba-ṣa

E 79 (SH) 1 2 3 4 5 6

[………… a-na ᵐ]ᵈ[KUR]-GAL DU[MU Ḫi-ma] [………]-la iš-tu SAG.D[U-ši]-ma [a-na x KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ] it-ta-din-ši [BA.UG₇ TI.]LA GÉME ⸢ša⸣ ᵈKUR-GAL [ši-it šum]-ma i-na EGIR u₄-mi […………....] x x x ša ᵐᵈKUR-GAL

E 79 

Muḫra-aḫī son of Kutta son of Zadamma s[on of Ba]ṣṣu is amēlūtu for 140 shekels of silver of Dagan-kabar son of Ḫima. His securities (are) his house and Adda, his [so]n. The day when he will pay his silver to Dagan-kabar son of Ḫima, he will b[rea]k [h]is tablet. [Now where the silv]er e[ntered]: . . . . . . . . . 10 [ditto to . . .] 10 [ditto to . . .] 50 [ditto to . . .] 10 ditto [to . . .] 15 (?) ditto [to . . .] 12 ditto [to . . .] 3 ditto to the s[on of . . .] Seal of Abī-[. . .] Seal of Šamaš-daʾi son of Kudalu

Seal of Kāpī-Dagan son of Ilī-Da

[………………....... (son of)] Aia-aḫu […………………........ (son of)] Išbi-Dagan [Seal of Tu]tu son of Šaḫlu Seal of Aḫī-mālik son of Dagan-abu Seal of Aḫī-mālik son of Baṣṣu

[…………... to Dagan]-kabar s[on of Ḫima] [………...] of her own will [for x shekels of silver] has sold. [Dead or al]ive [she is] the female slave of Dagan-kabar. [I]f, in the future, [. . .] of Dagan-kabar

 411

412  7 8

 Appendix

[aš-šum] GÉME-[š]ú il-la!-a [ṭup-pu an-nu-ú i]-la-e-šú

missing lines 9’ 10’ 11’ 12’ 13’ 14’ 15’

[. . .] x [. . .] [NA₄.KISIB] ᵐAš-tar-‹tu›-lit DUMU ᵈKUR-[. . .] [NA₄.KISIB] ᵐᵈU-UR.SAG DUMU Ku-na-[zi] [NA₄.KISIB] ᵐḪi-[x-l]i-ᵈ30 NA₄.[KISIB] [. . .] LÚ.ḪAL [NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐ]LI-EN [. . .] x-ᵈKUR

E 83 (SH) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

[ᵐA-bi-ḫa-mi-i]ṣ DUMU Z[i]-ra [ᵐᶠ. . .-t]i DUMU.MUNUS-šu ša GAB a-na 9 KÙ.BABBAR [ŠÁM.TIL.LA i-na M]U dan-na-ti [a-na GÉME-ut-ti i]š-tu SAG.DU-ši [a-na ᵐᵈKUR-ta-l]i-iʾ ⸢DUMU⸣ Ḫi-ma id-⸢din⸣-ši [BA.UG₇ TI.L]A GÉME ša ᵐᵈKUR-ta-li-iʾ ši-it [ù ᵐᵈKUR-ta-l]i-iʾ za-a-ku

8. 9. 10. 11. 12.

[šum-ma i-na] E[GIR u₄]-mi mA-bi-ḫa-mi-iṣ [DUMU Zi-ra a-na] mdKUR-ta-li-iʾ [DUMU Ḫi-ma iq-bi m]a-a [DUMU.MUNUS]-ia te-ra-mi [ù KÙ.BABBAR-ka l]i-q[ì-m]i 2 ZI [ma-lu-uš-ši li]-din-šu [ù] GÉME lil-qì

13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19.

[NA₄.KIŠIB I]k-ki-dKUR [NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐZu-Ba-l]a [DUMU A-ḫi]-ma-lik

NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐNi-in-ni

DUMU Kín-⸢ni⸣-pí [IGI ᵐNi-in-ni DUMU Kín-ni]-pí [IGI ᵐ…….....]-bu DUMU GUR-Da [IGI ᵐ]Zu-Ba-la DUMU A-ḫi-[ma]-lik DUMU Kut-bi

E 83 

[concerning h]is female slave should come up [this tablet] will prevail over him missing lines . . . [Seal of] Aštartu-līt son of Dagan-[. . .] [Seal of] Baʾal-qarrād son of Kunazu [Seal of] Ḫi-x-li-Šaggar (?) Seal of [. . .] diviner [seal of] Zimrī-bēlu [. . .]-Dagan

[Abī-ḫami]ṣ son of Z[i]ra sold [. . .]-ti, his suckling female child, for 9 (shekels) of silver, [full price, in a ye]ar of hardship, [into slavery] of her own will [to Dagan-tal]iʾ son of Ḫima. [Dead or aliv]e she is the female slave of Dagan-taliʾ, [and Dagan-ta]liʾ is free (of claims). [If in the futur]e Abī-ḫamiṣ [son of Zira] should [say to] Dagan-taliʾ [son of Ḫima]: “Give me back my [daughter] [and take your silver],” he shall give two persons [in place of her and] take the female slave. [Seal of I]kki-Dagan [Seal of Zū-Baʿl]a Seal of Ninni [son of Aḫī]-mālik

son of Kinnipi [Before Ninni son of Kinni]pi [Before ……]-bu son of Tūra-Da [Before] Zū-Baʿla son of Aḫī-[mā]lik son of Kutbe

 413

414 

 Appendix

E 84 (SH) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.

ᵐᵈKUR-NIR ù ᵐᵈKUR-ma-di [DUMU.MEŠ . . .] ᶠḪa-ab-x-[. . . DUMU.MUNUS ᵈKUR-GAL ŠEŠ-šu-nu] a!-na! [GÉME-ut-t]i a-na ᵐᵈKUR-[ta-li-iʾ ù ᵐᵈ]KUR-G[AL] DUMU-šú-ma a-na 55 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ ŠÁM.TIL.LA it-tan-nu-ši šúm-ma i-na EGIR-ki u₄-mi LÚ.‹MEŠ›-a[ḫ-ḫi-a] ša mdKUR-GAL aš-šúm GÉME ša-a-š[i] i[l-lu-ú] mdKUR-NIR ù! md[KUR-ma-di] it-⸢ta⸣-na-pal-l[u mdKUR-ta-li-iʾ] ù mdKUR-GAL za-a-ku

11. 12. 13. 14.

NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐAm-za-ḫi DUMU El-li ⸢NA₄.KIŠIB⸣ [. . .] [. . .]

E 85 (SH) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15.

É-[tu₄ ma-la ma-ṣu]-ú 20 [i-na am-ma-ti GÍD.DA-šú] 10 [(+x) i-na am-ma-ti ru]-up-šú ZA[G-šú] KASKAL-nu ù [. . .]-ka GÙB-šú É ᵐA-ma-ma ša [ᵐ]La-al-ú DUMU [. . .]-x-ša a-na ŠÁM il-qu-ú EGIR-šú ḫu-ḫi-in-nu [. . .]-mi pa-nu-šú KÁ Ba-ṣí É-tu₄ ḫa-ab-lu aš-[ri-i]š-ma 20 i-na am-ma-ti GÍD.DA-šú 15 i-na am-ma-t[i r]u-up-šú É-tu₄ ù É ḫa-[ab]-lu ša ᵐTi-ri-ᵈKUR ᵐZu-B[a-la] ù ᵐᵈ30-a-bi 3 DU[MU.M]EŠ ᵐKa-pí-ᵈKUR DUMU B[a]-ṣí iš-tu le-et ᵐTi-r[i-ᵈK]UR ᵐZu-Ba-la ᵐᵈ30-a-[bi] ᵐᵈKUR-GAL DUMU ᵈKUR-ta-l[i-i]ʾ DUMU Ḫi-ma a-na 3 ME 10 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR.M[EŠ ŠÁ]M.TIL.⸢LA É-tu₄ ù⸣ [É ḫa-ab-lu i-ša-am] ur-ra-am še-ra-[am] x x [. . .] i-bá-qa-ar ṭup-p[u an-nu-ú i-la-e-šu]

16. 17.

a-nu-ma a-šar KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ [i-ru-ub] 20 a-na le-et ᵐx-[. . .]

E 85 

 415

Dagan-qarrād and Dagan-madi [sons of . . .] have sold Ḫab[. . . daughter of Dagan-kabar, their brother], into [slavery] to Dagan-[taliʾ and] Dagan-kab[ar], his son, for 55 shekels of silver, full price. If, in the future, the br[others] of Dagan-kabar should c[ome up] concerning tha[t] female slave, Dagan-qarrād and [Dagan-madi] will pay; [Dagan-taliʾ] and Dagan-kabar are free (of claims). Seal of Amzaḫi son of Elli Seal of . . . . . .

A house, [to its full extent], 20 [cubits, its length], 10 [(+x) cubits] its [bre]adth. On [its] righ[t]: the road and [. . .]ka; on its left: the house of Amama that Lalû son of [. . .]ša has bought; on its rear: the alley [. . .]mi; on its front: the gate of Baṣṣu. A ḫablu building in the same p[lac]e, 20 cubits its length, 15 cubit[s] its [b]readth. The house and the ḫa[b]lu building belong to Tīri-Dagan, Zū-B[aʿla], and Šaggar-abu, the three s[on]s of Kāpī-Dagan son of B[a]ṣṣu. From Tīr[i-Da]gan, Zū-Baʿla, and Šaggar-a[bu], Dagan-kabar son of Dagan-tal[i]ʾ son of Ḫima [bought] the house and [the ḫablu building] for 310 shekels of silver full [pri]ce. In the future [. . .] should raise a claim, [this] tabl[et will prevail over him]. Now where the silver [entered] 20 to [. . .]

416 

 Appendix

18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33.

20 MIN DAM ᵐ[. . .] 25 MIN ᵐᵈIŠ[KUR-. . .] 10 MIN ᶠᵈUTU-x-[. . .] 20 MIN [. . .] x da a [. . .] 50 MIN [ᵐ]Qí-ri-ᵈKUR 20 MIN ᶠNIN-É x[. . .] 20 [MIN ᵐ]Šá-lim-ᵈKUR DU[MU . . .] 10 [MIN . . .]-x-ᵈKUR 25 MIN [. . .] 10 MIN [. . .] 10 MIN ᵐ[. . .] 10 MIN ᵐ[. . .] 10 MIN DAM [ᵐ. . .] 10 MIN MUNUS ša ᵐx-[. . .] 20 MIN x x x [. . .] 2 MIN ᵐx x [. . .]

34. 35.

a-nu-ma ṭup-pu ša [gam-mu-ri i-na É EN-lí-ša] šá-kín šúm-ma il-l[a ù ḫi-pí]

36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45.

NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐA-x[. . .-ᵈ]KUR [. . .] x [. . .] x [ᵐBA.U]G₇-ḫa-ma-dì [NA₄.KIŠ]IB ᵐA-ḫi-ma-[lik NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐ]A-ḫi-ma-lik DUMU Ḫa-as-ia [DUMU ᵈ]A-a-SAG₁₀ N[A₄.KI]ŠIB ᵐᵈKUR-[. . .]      [NA₄.KIŠI]B A-bi-LUGAL-ma-ti      [DUMU . . .] NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐA-lál-a-bi DUMU A-me-i

E 86 (SH) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

ZU-dKUR DUMU Bá-aṣ-ṣa a-kán-na iq-bi ma-a a-nu-ma md KUR-GAL DUMU dKUR-ta-li-iʾ DUMU Ḫi-ma MU KALA.GA ub-ta-li-ṭá-ni-mi ù 2 1/2 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR ḫu-bu-ul-li-ia m

E 86 

20 ditto to the wife of [. . .] 25 ditto to Baʿ[al-. . .] 10 ditto to Šamaš-[. . .] 20 ditto to . . . 50 ditto to Qīrī-Dagan so[n of . . .] 20 ditto to Baʿla-bītu [. . .] 20 [ditto] to Šalim-Dagan 10 [ditto to . . .]-Dagan 25 ditto to [. . .] 10 ditto to [. . .] 10 ditto to [. . .] 10 ditto to [. . .] 10 ditto to the wife of [. . .] 10 ditto to the daughter of [. . .] 20 ditto to [. . .] 2 ditto to [. . .] This [complete] tablet has been placed [in the house of its owner] if (another tablet) should co[me up, it will be broken]. Seal of A[. . .]-Dagan . . . [. . . Imū]t-ḫamadi [Sea]l of Aḫī-mā[lik Seal of] Aḫī-mālik son of Ḫasia [son of] Aia-damiq Seal of Dagan-[. . .] [Seal of] Abī-šar-māti [son of . . .] Seal of Alal-abu son of Ameu

Iadi-Dagan son of Baṣṣu spoke as follows: “Now Dagan-kabar son of Dagan-taliʾ son of Ḫima in a year of hardship kept me alive and [pai]d 2.5 shekels of silver, my debt;

 417

418 

 Appendix

6. 7.

[ú-ša-a]l-lim-mi ù a-di bal-ṭá-ku [a-pa-a]l-la-ḫa-am-mi

8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13.

[šum]-ma i-na EGIR u₄-mi [mZU-dK]UR a-na mdKUR-GAL [i-qáb-b]i ma-a iš-tu É-ka [at-ta]-lak-mi 10 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ a-na mdKUR-GAL li-din-ma a-šar ŠÀ-šú lil-lik

14. 15. 16. 17.

[N]A₄.KIŠIB ᵐZu-aš-tar-ti DUMU LI-EN NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐIb-ni-ᵈKUR DUMU I-ku-ᵈKUR IGI ᵐᵈ30-a-bu DUMU GUR-ᵈKUR IGI ᵐ[Zu-A]š-tar-ti DUMU Ia-ṣì-EN

E 87 (SH) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

[1 ME 50 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ] [a-n]a ᵐ[. . .] it-ta-din-na-š[u . . .] it-ta-din-šú [. . .] m ‹E›-ri-ba-d[AMAR.UTU] EN.ŠU.MEŠ-šú

7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13.

5 GÚ.UN NA₄ g[a-bi-i] i-na NA₄.MEŠ ka-[a-ri] i-na É ša ᵐᵈKUR-G[AL] šak-na EN.ŠU.MEŠ ša 1 ME 50 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR.M[EŠ] NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐPu-uḫ-ri-la-[. . .] NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐ[. . .]

E 88 (SH) 1. 2. 3. 4.

60 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ ša ᵐᵈKUR-GAL DUMU [dKUR-ta-li-iʾ(?)] a-na muḫ-ḫi ᵐARAD-ᵈEN DUMU ᶠDU₁₀.G[A-ma-li]k-ti

E 88 

and as long as I will live, [I will sup]port (him). [I]f, in the future, [Iadi-D]agan [should sa]y to Dagan-kabar: “I want to [lea]ve your house,” he shall pay 10 shekels of silver to Dagan-kabar and go wherever he pleases. Seal of Zū-Aštarti son of Zimrī-bēlu Seal of Ibni-Dagan son of Ikūn-Dagan Before Šaggar-abu son of Itūr-Dagan Before [Zū-A]štarti son of Iaṣi-bēlu

[150 shekels of silver] [t]o [. . .] has given to him [. . .] has given to him [. . .]. Erība-[Marduk] is his guarantor. 5 talents of al[um] weighed according to the weight of the kā[ru] have been placed in the house of Dagan-k[abar] as pledge for 150 shekels of silver. Seal of Puḫrila[. . .] Seal of [. . .]

60 shekels of silver belonging to Dagan-kabar son of [Dagan’taliʾ] are upon Abdi-Bēli son of Ṭābat-[māli]ktu.

 419

420  5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20.

 Appendix

EN.ŠU.MEŠ-šú DUM[U.M]EŠ DU₁₀.GA-ma-li[k]-ti DAM ŠEŠ-šú ù ᵐḪi-ma-ši-ᵈ[. . .] ŠEŠ-šú KÙ.[BABBAR.M]EŠ ú-šal-la-mu a-n[u-ma] ṭup-pa i-ḫap-pu-ú NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐᵈKUR-GAL IGI ᵐŠe-i-ᵈKUR DUMU Bi-x-[. . .] IGI ᵐᵈU-ma-[lik] IGI ᵐMaš-ši-tu₄-mil-ki IGI ᵐTi-ri-ᵈKUR DUMU A-ḫi-ma-lik NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐTi-ri-‹ᵈ›KUR DUMU A-ḫi-ma-lik f

E 91 (SH)10 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

ᵐGu-maš-ši DUMU A-ta-wa ši-im-ti É-šú DAM-šú DUMU.MEŠ-šú i-[ši-i]m a-kán-na iq-bi ma-a a-nu-ma ᶠDa-[a]-dì DAM-ia a-na a-bi ù AMA-mì ša É-ia aš-ku-[u]n-ši a-nu-ma 3 DUMU.MEŠ ᶠAš-tar-É a-na DUMU.ME ša DA[M-i]a [a]t-[t]a-din-šú-nu-ti ki-[i]-me-e DAM-ia EGIR-ki [š]i-im-ti-ši ub-ba-[lu-ši] li-maš-ši-ir-šú-nu-ti [š]um-ma DAM-ia EGIR-k[i mu-ti-ia DUMU.MEŠ-ia i]-ze-er [TÚ]G-ši i-na GIŠ.ŠÚ.A li-[iš-ku-un a-šar ŠÀ-ši lil]-lik

9. 10. 11. 12. 13.

a-nu-ma É-tu₄ i-n[a . . .] x [. . .] [a-na] ᵐᵈ30-ta-li-iʾ [DUMU-ia GAL at]-ta-din [É an-ni-ta₅] [ŠEŠ].ME-šú li-ir-[ṣi]-pu-ni-iš-šú ù šum-ma É [an-ni-t]a₅ [la i-]ra-[ṣi-p]u-ni-eš-šu lu-ú ri-ṣi-ip É an-ni-[ti] [li-di-nu-n]i-iš-šú

14. 15. 16.

[a-nu-ma] 70 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ [si-k]íl-ta ša ᵐBa-aṣ-ṣí DUMU-ia [lu-ú i-šu] ù ki-i-mu-ú si-kíl-ti-šú [É-ta₄ ù É-ta₄] ḫa-ab-la ša KÁ-bi É ᵐKu-ú-bi

10 For restorations in this text see Durand 1990: 51–52.

E 91 

 421

His securities are the so[n]s of Ṭābat-māli[k]tu, his brother’s wife, and Ḫimaši-[. . .], his brother. (When) they pay the s[ilv]er, t[hen] they will break the tablet. Seal of Dagan-kabar Before Šeʾi-Dagan son of Bi[. . .] Before Baʿal-mā[lik] Before Maššītu-milki Before Tīri-Dagan son of Aḫī-mālik Seal of Tīri-Dagan son of Aḫī-mālik

Gumašši son of Atawa d[etermine]d the future of his house, his wife, and his children. He spoke as follows: “Now I made Dādī, my wife, father and mother of my house. Now I [ga]ve the three sons of Aštar-bītu as sons to [m]y wif[e]. My wife, after her [f]ate carrie[s her] off, shall let them go. [I]f my wife b[reaks (her relationships) with my sons] afte[r my death], she shall [place] her [garme]nt on the stool [and go wherever she pleases]. Now [I g]ave the house in . . . [to] Šaggar-taliʾ [my eldest son]. His [brother]s shall re[p]air [this house] for him, and if [they do not want] to re[pa]ir [thi]s house, the (price) of repair of thi[s] house [they shall giv]e him. [Now] 70 shekels of silver are the [poss]essions that my son Baṣṣu [has acquired], and in lieu of his possessions I gave [the house and] the ḫablu [building] in the irrigation district of the house of Kūbu

422 

 Appendix

17.

[. . . a-na ᵐBa-aṣ]-ṣí DUMU-ia at-ta-din

18. 19. 20. 21. 22.

[a-nu-ma . . . a]g-ga qa-du ka-ia-an-[zi-ia] [. . . a-na ᵐ]Zu-Aš-tar-ti DUMU-ia at-ta-din [ù a-na muḫ]-ḫi ka-ia-an-zi-ia ri-iḫ-t[i (. . .)] […………....] É a-na ᵐᵈ30-ta-li-iʾ [ù ᵐBa-aṣ-ṣ]í 2 DUMU.MEŠ-ia at-ta-din

23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34.

[EGIR-ki za-az-za] an-na-a ip-pu-šu DUMU.MEŠ ᵐG[u-maš-ši] za-az-za [i-na] bi-ri-šú-nu il-ták-nu ù ᵐᵈ30-t[a-l]i-iʾ a-na ᵐBa-aṣ-ṣí i-qab-[bi] [ma]-a ak-ka-[š]a a-bu-ka É GIBIL it-ta-‹an›-na-ak-ku ⸢ù⸣ a-na-ku ⸢e⸣-ka-a uš-šab ù mBa-aṣ-ṣ[ú] ⸢f⸣A-ru-u[š-dḪ]é-ba GÉME qa-du LÚ IGI.NU.TUKU lú mu-t[i-ši a-n]a md30-ta-li-iʾ ŠEŠ-šú ki-i-mu-ú ri-iṣ-[pi-š]ú it-ta-na-aš-šú ù aš-šum ᵐᵈK[UR-. . . DUM]U-ši ša ᶠA-ru-uš-ᵈḪé-ba ŠEŠ.ME-šú ša [ᵐBa-aṣ-ṣ]í a-na muḫ-ḫi-šú la-a i-ra-gu-mu ki-[i-mu-ú NÍG].MUSSA ša DAM-šu ša-ni-ti ᵐ[Ba-aṣ-ṣ]ú il-ta-qì-šú

35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42.

[NA₄.KIŠI]B ᵐZu-Aš-tar-ti NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐA-ḫi-a-bi DUMU ᵐÌ-lí DUMU Duq-qà N[A₄.KIŠ]IB ᵐNi-i-na IGI ᵐA-qa-te IGI ᵐḪu-bá-bu DUMU EN-ᵈKUR DUMU [Q]u-ma-la LÚ.DUB.SAR [IGI ᵐQur-d]i-ia DUMU Gu-x-[d]a [IGI ᵐḪu-z]a-mu DUMU Pa-zu-ra [IGI ᵐ]Zu-Ba-la DU[MU] DINGIR-lì-a

E 109 (S) 1. 2. 3. 4.

er-ṣe-tu₄ ma-la ma-ṣú-ú 22 i-na am-ma-ti GÍD.DA-ši 18 i-na am-ma-ti ru-pu-ši ZAG-ša SILA.DAGAL.LA ki

E 109 

 423

[. . . to Baṣ]ṣu, my son. [Now . . .] I gave . . . with [my] proper[ty] [. . . to] Zū-Aštarti, my son. [And as fo]r my property, the res[t (. . .)] [. . .] I gave the house (?)11 to Šaggar-taliʾ [and Baṣṣ]u, my two sons. [After] he made this [division], the sons of G[umašši] determined the division among them. And Šaggar-t[al]iʾ say[s] to Baṣṣu: “Your father gave you a new house, and where I will live?” And Baṣṣ[u] gave the female slave Aru[š-Ḫ]eba, together with a blind man, [her] husb[and, t]o Šaggar-taliʾ, his brother, in lieu of [h]is (price of) reparat[ion]. And concerning Da[gan-. . . the so]n of Aruš-Ḫeba, the brothers of [Baṣṣ]u shall not raise a claim against him. [Baṣṣ]u had taken him in l[ieu of the ter]ḫatu of his second wife.

[Sea]l of Zū-Aštarti Seal of Aḫī-abu son of Ilī son of Duqqu S[ea]l of Nina Before Aka-Te Before Ḫubābu son of Bēlu-Dagan son of [Q]ummālu the scribe [Before Qurd]ia son of Gu-x-[d]a [Before Ḫuz]āmu son of Pazuru [Before] Zū-Baʿla s[on of] Ilia

An kierṣetu, to its full extent, 22 cubits, its length, 18 cubits its breadth. On its right: the main street; 11  Arnaud transliterates (20) [DUMU.MEŠ-ši] (21) [ša fAš-tar]-É, but as noted by Durand (1990: 52) there is no space in Arnaud’s copy at the end of line 20 for this restoration.

424  5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44.

 Appendix

GÙB-ša É DUMU.MEŠ I-ik-ki-ri EGIR-ša kier-ṣe-tu₄ DUMU.MEŠ Ab-da DUMU Nu-ni-ia pa-nu-ša ḫu-ḫi-nu ki er-ṣe-tu₄ ša Ì-lí-ia DUMU A-ḫi-ḫa-mi-iṣ be-lu-ú ḫu-bu-ul-li ᵐÌ-l[í-ia] iṣ-bat!-tu ᵐAb-da DUMU Nu-ni-ia a-na 1 me-at 1/2 MA!.NA KÙ.BABBAR-pí i-na ŠÁM.TIL.LA ga-am-ri ki er-ṣe-tu₄ i-ša-mu KÙ.BABBAR-pa ma-ḫi-ir lìb-bu-šu-nu DU₁₀.GA-a-ab NINDA ḫu-ku₈ ka-‹si›-ip GIŠ.BANŠUR GIŠ.Ì pa-ši-iš ku-bu-ru ša! kier-‹ṣe-tu₄› na-ad-nu 1 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR-pa lú.meš aḫ-ḫi ma-aḫ-ru ša ur-ra še-ra ki er-ṣe-tu₄ i-ba-qa-ru 2 me-at KÙ.BABBAR-pa a-‹na› ᵈNIN.URTA! 2 me-at a-na LU.MEŠ-aḫ-ḫi Ì.LÁ.E IGI! A-ḫi-ḫa-mi-iṣ ‹‹DUMU›› DUMU Ì-lí-ia IGI Ša₁₀-di-Da DUMU I-túr-Da IGI Ab-da DUMU At-ti-ia IGI Ir-ib-ᵈIŠKUR DUMU Ip-qí-ᵈDa-gan IGI Be-la-nu DUMU La-na-ša IGI A-bu-ka-nu DUMU ᵈDa-gan-ka IGI Še-i-ᵈA-a DUMU A-ḫi-ma IGI A-bi-ka-pí DUMU I-túr-DINGIR-lì IGI A-bi-EN DUMU A-ḫi-ma-lik IGI I-da-Da DUMU Im-li-ki IGI ᵈIŠKUR-ka DUMU A-bi-ka

E 109 

on its left: the house of the sons of Ikkiri; on its rear: an kierṣetu of the sons of Abda son of Nunia; on its front: the alley. The kierṣetu belongs to Ilia son of Aḫī-ḫamiṣ. The creditors seized Ilia. Abda son of Nunia for 130 (shekels) of silver, full price, bought the kierṣetu. The silver has been received and their heart is satisfied; the ḫukku bread has been broken and the table anointed with oil. The kuburu-payment for the kierṣetu has been given: the “Brothers” have received 1 shekel of silver (each). Whoever in the future should raise a claim over the kierṣetu shall pay 200 (shekels) of silver to Ninurta (and) 200 (shekels) of silver to the “Brothers.” Before Aḫī-ḫamiṣ ‹‹son›› son of Ilia Before Šadī-Da son of Itūr-Da Before Abda son of Attia Before Irʾib-Baʿal son of Ipqi-Dagan Before Bēlānu son of La-naša Before Abu-kānu son of Dagan-ka Before Šeʾi-Aia son of Aḫima Before Abī-kāpī son of Itūr-ilu Before Abī-Bēlu son of Aḫī-mālik Before Iddaʿ-Da son of Imliku Before Baʿal-ka son of Abī-ka

 425

426  45. 46.

 Appendix

IGI ᵈIŠKUR-ma-lik DUB.SAR IGI I-li-ia-mu-ut DUMU I-túr-Da

E 115 (SH) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

É tu-gu-ru qa-du TÚL-ši ‹‹x x x›› i-na uruKu-la-ti 5 A.ŠÀ.MEŠ i-di dE-ni [. . .]-ti ù A.ŠÀ.MEŠ DUMU.MEŠ Im-ma-ri i-di si-pa-ḫi [. . .] ša mḪu-za ù mdU.EN DUMU.MEŠ EN.GA[L] [l]ú⸢ṣa!⸣-bi-ḫi iš-tu le-et mḪu-za ù mdU-EN DUMU.MEŠ E[N-GA]L m A-ḫi-dKUR DUMU dKUR-GAL DUMU Mil-ki-dKUR a-na 20 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ ŠÁM.TIL.LA iš!-am

8. 9. 10. 11.

ur-ra-am še-ra-am šúm-ma mdU-NIR ŠEŠ-šú-nu il-la-a i-bá-qar-ši KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ TÉŠ.BI a-na mA-ḫi-dKUR DUMU mdKUR-GAL li-din É tu-gu-ra lil-qi

12. 13. 14.

a-nu-ma KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ ša-a-šu a-na LÚ.MEŠ.EN.MEŠ ḫu-bu-la-ti ša gab-bi-šú-nu-ma e-te-ru-ub

15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24.

NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐAm-za-ḫi DUMU Eḫ-li-ia NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐḪa-ri-ᵈKUR ŠEŠ-šú NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐᵈ30-a-bu NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐARAD-DINGIR.MEŠ DUMU ᵈKUR-ta-ri-iʾ DUMU A-bi-ia NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐBa-na-ta NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐᵈ30-GAL DUMU Mil-ki-ᵈ[. . .] DUMU Ḫa-ra NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐ[. . .] DUMU Uz-na! NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐḪi-li[. . .] LÚ KUR Ḫat-ti!

E 115 

 427

Before Baʿal-mālik, scribe Before Ilī-iamūt son of Itūr-Da

A tugguru-building with its pit in the town of Kullati, 5 fields near the divine spring of [. . .], and the fields of the sons of Immaru near the area of sipḫu-fields (?)[. . .] belonging to Ḫuzu and Baʿal-bēlī, sons of Bēlu-kabar, the zabiḫu, from Ḫuzu and Baʿal-bēlī, sons of B[ēlu-kab]ar, Aḫī-Dagan son of Dagan-kabar son of Milki-Dagan bought for 20 shekels of silver, the full price. In the future, if Baʿal-qarrād, their brother, should come up and claim it (the tugguru), he shall give the equivalent silver to Aḫī-Dagan son of Dagan-kabar (and) take the tugguru. Now that silver reached the creditors, all of them.

Seal of Amzaḫi son of Eḫlia Seal of Ḫari-Dagan, his brother Seal of Abdi-ili son of Abia Seal of Šaggar-kabar son of Ḫara Seal of Ḫili[. . .] man of the land of Ḫatti

Seal of Šaggar-abu son of Dagan-tariʾ Seal of Banata son of Milki-[. . .] Seal of [. . .] son of Uzna

428 

 Appendix

E 116 (SH) 1. 2.

m

Ba-ba DUMU ARAD!-DINGIR.MEŠ mdU-EN DUMU EN-GAL ŠEŠ-šú 5 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ ša mA-ḫi-dKUR DUMU dKUR-GAL ŠU.MEŠ-ti-šú ṣa-bít

3. 4. 5. 6.

i-na-an-na mBa-ba A.ŠÀ.MEŠ mi-ri-ša ù GIŠ.ḪAŠḪUR.KUR.RA li-ki-is ša uruKu-la-ti ḪA.LA-šú ša dU-EN ŠEŠ-šú ma-la it-ti ŠEŠ.‹MEŠ›-šú-‹nu›12 DUMU.MEŠ Im-ma-ri i-kaš-ša-ad-šú a-na mA-ḫi-dKUR DUMU dKUR-GAL it-ta-din

7. 8. 9. 10.

ur-ra-am še-ra-am ma-an-nu-me-e A.ŠÀ mi-ri-ša š[a DU]MU.MEŠ Im-ma-ri i-bá-qar 5 GÍN a-na mA-ḫi-dKUR DUMU dKUR-GAL li-din A.ŠÀ.MEŠ lil-qi

11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21.

NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐARAD-DINGIR.MEŠ DUMU A-bi-ia NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐA-ḫu-qa-mu NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐᵈKUR!-GAL DUMU Ḫi-ma-a DUMU Mil-ki-ᵈKUR [N]A₄.KIŠIB ᵐQa-te-ia DUMU Gu-ra-nu DUMU Ma-duk-ka IGI ᵐARAD-DINGIR.MEŠ DUMU A-bi-ia IGI ᵐᵈKUR-GAL DUMU Ḫi-ma-a IGI ᵐA-ḫu-qa-mu DUMU Mil-k[i-ᵈKUR] IGI ᵐḪé-me-ia DUMU Kut-be LÚ.D[UB.SA]R LUGAL IGI ᵐBa-ba DUMU ARAD-DINGIR.MEŠ [LÚ.Ḫ]AL IGI ᵐQa!-te-ia DUMU Gu-ra-ni DUMU Ma-duk-ka

E 117 (SH) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

ᵐA-ḫi-ᵈKUR DUMU Mil-ki-ᵈKUR a-kán-na iq-bi ma-a a-nu-ma ᵐA-bi-ia DUMU Zu-Aš-tar-ti LÚ.Ú.LU-ti-ia ša 40 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ i-na-an-na KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ-šú uḫ-tal-liq-mi u₄-mimeš ša ᵐA-ḫi-ᵈKUR ù DAM-šú bal-ṭu ᵐA-bi-ia lip-làḫ-na-a-ši ki-i-me-e i-pal-làḫ-na-a-ši EGIR-ki ši-im-ti-ni

12  For the restoration of this line see Durand 1990: 55.

E 117 

 429

Baba son of Abdi-ili – Baʿal-bēlī son of Bēlu-kabar (is) his brother – was seized as guarantor for 5 shekels of silver belonging to Aḫī-Dagan son of Dagan-kabar. Now Baba shall withdraw the cultivated fields and apple wood in Kullati, the share of Baʿal-bēlī, his brother, which he will receive together with his brothers, the sons of Immaru – he (Baba) gave it (the share) to Aḫī-Dagan son of Dagan-kabar. In the future, whoever should claim the cultivated fields o[f the so]ns of Immaru, he shall pay 5 shekels of silver to Aḫī-Dagan son of Dagan-kabar and take the field. Seal of Abdi-ili son of Abia Seal of Aḫu-qâmu Seal of Dagan-kabar son of Ḫima son of Milki-Dagan [S]eal of Qāteia son of Guranu son of Madukka Before Abdi-ili son of Abia Before Dagan-kabar son of Ḫima Before Aḫu-qâmu son of Milk[i-Dagan] Before Ḫemia son of Kutbe royal sc[rib]e Before Baba son of Abdi-ili [div]iner Before Qāteia son of Guranu son of Madukka

Aḫī-Dagan son of Milki-Dagan spoke as follows: “Now Abia son of Zū-Aštarti is my amēlūtu for 40 shekels of silver. Now I have canceled his silver. As long as Aḫī-Dagan and his wife should live, Abia shall support us. As he supports us, after our fate

430 

 Appendix

7. 8.

ú-bal-na-a-ši ᵐA-bi-ia ŠU!-ti DAM-šú DUMU.MEŠ-šú li-iṣ-bat a-na ARAD LUGAL li-ir-ti-iḫ

9 10. 11. 12.

šúm-ma ᵐA-ḫi-ᵈKUR a-na pa-ni ᵐA-bi-ia i-qab-bi ma-a iš-tu É-ia at-lak-mi ù KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ-ia te-ra-am-mi ᵐA-ḫi-ᵈKUR a-na KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ-šú NU.TUKU ᵐA-bi-ia a-šar ŠÀ-šú lil-lik

13. 14. 15. 16. 17.

ù šúm-ma ᵐA-bi-ia a-na pa-ni ᵐA-ḫi-ᵈKUR i-qab-bi ma-a KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ-ka li-qì ù iš-tu É-ka at-ta-lak-mi ᵐA-bi-ia 80 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ li-din a-šar ŠÀ-šú lil-lik

18. 19. 20. 21.

ù šúm-ma A-bi-ia BA.UG7 mi-nu-me-e bu-šu-‹šu› ba-ši-tu4-šu ù ka-ia-an-zu-šú a-na A-ḫi-dKUR a-bi-šú ir-ti-iḫ ma-am-ma a-na muḫ-ḫi-šú lu-ú la-a i-ra-gu-um

22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30.

NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐᵈ30-a-bi LÚ.GAL GIŠ.GIGIR.MEŠ NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐA-lál-a-bu DUMU A-me-i NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐBa-na-ta NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐᵈKUR-ta-li-iʾ NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐA-ḫu-qa-mu DUMU Ia-šur-ᵈKUR DUMU Mil-ki-ᵈKUR NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐDINGIR-lì-a-ḫi LÚ.BAḪÁR a-nu-ma ᵐAḫi-ᵈKUR ᵐA-bi-ia DAM-ta₅ ú-ša-ḫa-az ki-i DUMU.MEŠ-šú

E 118 (SH) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

Ú-ni-šu DUMU Lu-A-da mḪa-ra-qu ù mLa-às-sa-a DUMU.MEŠ Na-ad-pí-ša LÚ Ḫal-ma-nu-ka-a f Ba-a-ni qa-du mLu-ba-šu DUMU-ši DAM mRa-ab-bi-Da-mi ŠEŠ-šu-nu a-[n]a 42 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ ŠÀM.TIL.LA a-[n]a mA-ḫi-dKUR DUMU Mil-ki-dKUR it-ta-an-nu ur-ra-am še-ra-am ma-an-nu-me-e ᶠBa-ni ù ᵐLu-ba-aš DUMU-ši i-bá-qa-rù m

E 118 

carries us off, Abia shall take the hand of his wife and his children and will remain servant of the king. If Aḫī-Dagan should say to Abia: “Leave my house and return my silver,” Aḫī-Dagan will have no (right) to his silver (and) Abia shall go wherever he pleases. And if Abia should say to Aḫī-Dagan: “Take your silver and I want to leave your house,” Abia shall give 80 shekels of silver and go wherever he pleases. And if Abia should die, all his goods, his possessions, and his property will remain with his father Aḫī-Dagan. No one shall raise a claim against him. Seal of Šaggar-abu, “Great one of the chariots” Seal of Alal-abu son of Ameu Seal of Banata Seal of Dagan-taliʾ Seal of Aḫu-qâmu son of Iašur-Dagan son of Milki-Dagan Seal of Ilī-aḫī, potter Now Aḫī-Dagan will give a wife to Abia as one of his sons.

Unišu son of Lū-Adda, Ḫaraqqu and Lassa, sons of Nād-pī-ša, the man of Ḫalmanukka, sold Bāni, the wife of Rabbi-Damu, their brother, together with Lubāšu, her son, f[o]r 42 shekels of silver, the full price, to Aḫī-Dagan son of Milki-Dagan. In the future, whoever should claim Bāni and Lubāšu, her son,

 431

432 

 Appendix

9. 10.

KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ TÉŠ.BI a-na ᵐA-ḫi-ᵈKUR DUMU M[i]l-ki-ᵈ[KUR] li-din ᶠBa-ni ù DUMU-ši l[i]l-q[ì]

11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20.

NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐKa-pí-ᵈKUR DUMU.ḪAL NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐEl-li DUMU GEŠTIN-ŠEŠ NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐNa-na DUMU Ba-ʿ-li UZU.DUMBIN UZU.DUMBIN ᵐḪa-ra-qu ᵐLa-a-sa-a NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐBe-li DUMU Ba-ia NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐÚ-[. . .] DUMU A-ba

N[A₄.KIŠIB ᵐᵈ30-a-bi] DUMU tar-ta-an-ni

UZU.DUMBIN ᵐÚ-ni-ši

E 119 (SH) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.

A-ḫi-dKUR DUMU Mil-k[i-d]KUR Ip-qí-dKUR DUMU Ḫu-⸢um⸣/⸢un⸣-zi m Zu-Ba-la DUMU Ḫa-ti-i 15 gišPA ŠE.MEŠ iš-tu uru Ku-ra-ra-ba a-na pu-u-ḫi il-te-qu ‹. . .› ù mŠur-ši-dKUR ENmeš.ŠUmeš i-na-an-na [Š]E.MEŠ ša-a-ši a-na [md. . .-ták-la]k ù mŠur-ši-dKUR [u]l-tal-li-m[u]

10. 11.

[a-nu]-ma x [. . .] [. . .] x x x x x [. . .]

12. 13. 14. 15.

NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐZu-Ba-l[a D]UMU Kut-be NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐMa-zi-ia uruKu-ra-ra-ba NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐIa-aḫ-ṣú-ᵈKUR DUMU Ba-ṣí

m m

E 121 (SH) 1. 2.

i-na MU KALA.GA š[a 3? SÌLA ŠE.MEŠ] a-na 1 [GÍ]N KÙ.BABBAR.ME iz-za-az

E 121 

shall give the equivalent silver to Aḫī-Dagan son of M[i]lki-[Dagan] and t[a]k[e] Bāni and his son. Seal of Kāpī-Dagan son of the diviner S[eal of Šaggar-abu] Seal of Elli son of Ḫamar-šenni son of the tartannu Seal of Nāna son of Baʿlī Nail impression Nail impression Nail impression Ḫaraqqu Lassa Unišu Seal of Bēlu son of Baia Seal of U[. . .] son of Abu

Aḫī-Dagan son of Milk[i]-Dagan, Ipqi-Dagan son of Ḫum/unzi (and) Zū-Baʿla son of Ḫatiu borrowed 15 parīsu of barley from the city of Kuraraba. ‹. . .› and Šurši-Dagan are their guarantors. Now they have paid this barley to [. . .] and Šurši-Dagan.

[No]w [. . .] [. . .] Seal of Zū-Baʿl[a s]on of Kutbe Seal of Mazia from the town of Kuraraba Seal of Iaḫṣu-Dagan son of Baṣṣu

In the year of hardship [when 3 (?) qû of barley] correspond to 1 [shek]el of silver,

 433

434 

 Appendix

3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12.

ᵐ[Ḫi-ma]-ši-ᵈKUR DUMU Ab-ba i[q-bi m]a ḫ[u-bú]l-la-ti!-šú šal-lu-mi ul i-la-e e-ni-na ᵐMil-ki-ᵈKUR DUMU A-ḫi-ᵈKUR 50 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ ḫu-búl-la-šú ú-šal-lìm a-na ARAD-ut-ti-šú e-te-ru-ub BA.UG₇ TI.LA ARAD ša ᵐMil-ki-ᵈKUR šu-ut šúm-ma ur-ra-am še-ra-am ma-am-ma a-na bá-qa-ri-šú il₅-la-a ṭup-pu an-nu-ú i-la-e-šú

13. 14. 15. 16.

šúm-ma KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ ša ŠU-ti-šú i-na-din! KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ TÉŠ.BI li-din a-na ARAD LUGAL ir!-ti!-iḫ [a]-šar KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ e-ru-ub 45 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ ᵐKin-na-bi 5 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ ᵐGUR-ᵈKUR DUMU Bu-ur-x

17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24.

NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐA-ḫu NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐDINGIR-lì-a-bi DUMU ᵈ30-a-bi DUMU Še-i-ᵈKUR! d NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐAD- UTU-ši DUMU ᶠḪu-da-ra-ti NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐᵈU-ra-pí-iʾ DUMU I[a-. . .] NA₄!.KIŠIB ᵐᵈU-EN DUMU [. . .]

E 123 (SH) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.

ᵐZu-Ba-la DUMU Ia-i-ri 20 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR.ME ša ᵐPu-uḫ-a DUMU Ú-ma-ni ù 10 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR.ME ša ᵐA-bi-ᵈ30 DUMU Zu-An-na ḫu-bu-ul ù šu-ul-lu-me la i-li-e i-na-an-na mZu-Ba-la É-šú a-na mPu-uḫ-a ù mA-bi-d30 ki-i-mu-ú 30 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR.ME ša-a-šú ŠÁM.TIL.LA it-ta-din-šu ù ṭup-pa la-be-ra ša É-šú ša-a-šú ša iš-tu NA₄.KIŠIB ᵈNin.urta kán-ku! it-ta-an-na-šu-nu-ti šúm-ma ur-ra-am še-ra-am ᵐZu-Ba-la

E 123 

[Ḫima]ši-Dagan son of Abba d[eclared that] he was not able to pay his d[eb]t.13 Now Milki-Dagan son of Aḫī-Dagan paid 50 shekels of silver, his debt, and he (i.e., Ḫimaši-Dagan) became his slave. Dead or alive he is Milki-Dagan’s slave. If, in the future, someone should come up to claim him, this tablet will prevail over him. If he wants to return his guarantor’s silver, he shall give the equivalent silver and will remain the servant of the king. (This is) the [p]lace where the silver entered: 45 shekels of silver to Kīn-abī, 5 shekels of silver to Tūrā-Dagan son of Bur[. . .] Seal of Aḫu son of Šaggar-abu Seal of Abī-Šamaš son of Ḫudāratu seal of Adda-rāpiʾ, son I[a. . .] Seal Baʿal-bēlī son of [. . .]

Seal of Ilī-abī son of Šeʾi-Dagan

Zū-Baʿla son of Iairu was indebted for 20 shekels of silver belonging to Pūḫu son of Ummānu and 10 shekels of silver belonging to Abī-Šaggar son of Zū-Anna but he could not pay. Now Zū-Baʿla gave his house to Pūḫu and Abī-Šaggar, in lieu of those 30 shekels of silver, as full price, and he gave them the old tablet of that house sealed with Ninurta’s seal. If, in the future, Zū-Baʿla, 13 A first-person declaration is expected.

 435

436  11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23.

 Appendix

a-du U₄ 1 MU.KÁM KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ 30 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR.ME ša-a-šú a-na EN.MEŠ-šú i-na-din É-šú lil-qì ia-nu-ma-a U₄ 2 MU.KÁM e-ti-qa ša i-na EGIR u₄-mi É-ta₅ ša-a-šú i-bá-qa-rù KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ TÉŠ.BI li-din-ma ⸢É⸣-šú lil-qì [N]A₄.KIŠ[IB] ᵐKAR-ᵈ30 NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐᵈKUR-ta-li LÚ.ŠAGIA-qí DUMU Qa-ba-ri NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐNa-ni NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐEN-ᵈKUR DUMU Il-la-li DUMU Ia-i-ri ‹‹ŠEŠ-šú›› ŠEŠ-šú ša ᵐZu-Ba-la IGI mᵈKUR-‹GAL› DUMU Ab-di LÚ.I₃.DU₈ IGI ᵐḪi-ma-ši-ᵈKUR DUMU Ba-aṣ-ṣa

E 127 (SH) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

a-na pa-ni ᵐTu-wa-at-LÚ ᵐᵈAš-šur-ŠEŠ-SÌ-na DUMU ᵈUTU-a-bi LÚ Šu-wa-di-ka-n[i] ᵐLa-al-a DUMU Zu-Ba-la a-na ḫu-bu-ul-li iṣ-ṣa-bat ù ᵐLa-al-ú DUMU Zu-Ba-la a-kán-na iq-bi ma-a mim-ma ša! ḫu-bu-la-ku-mi ù ú-šal-la-am-ka-mi

6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13.

10 GÍN KÙ.SIG₁₇ za-ku-ú Ì.GIŠ ša 1 me-at KÙ.BABBAR.ḪI.A 5 GÚ.UN gišTAŠKARIM.ḪI.A 2 GU₄ SAG₁₀ ša munus!na-aš-šar-ti 1 TUR NÍTA 1 GÚ.UN URUDU ša 4 li-im KI.LÁ.BI ᵐLa-al-ú ú-nu-te-e an-nu-tì ki-i-ma ḫu-bu-ul-li ša ḫu-bu-ul a-na ᵐᵈAš-šur-ŠEŠ-SÌ-na DUMU ᵈUTU-a-bi ú-šal-li-im šum-ma i-na EGIR u₄-mi ᵐᵈAš-šur-ŠEŠ-SÌ-na ṭup-paḫi.a ša ḫu-bu-ul-li-ti-š[ú] ú-še-la-a ṭup-pu an-nu-ù i-ḫé-pí!-šu-nu-t[i]

14. 15. 16. 17. 18.

IGI Ik-ki-ᵈKUR lúḫa-za-nu IGI Ú-ra DUMU Ti₄-i-ra IGI EN-ᵈKUR DUMU A-píl-la IGI Še-i-ᵈKUR ŠEŠ-šu IGI GISSU-ᵈIDIGNA LÚ.DAM.GÀR

E 127 

 437

within the term of one year, gives the silver – these 30 shekels of silver – to his creditors, let him take back his house. Now after the day (marking the beginning of) the second year has passed,14 whoever in the future should claim that house, he shall give the equivalent silver and take his house. Sea[l] of Eḫli-Kušuḫ Seal of Dagan-taliʾ the cup-bearer son of Qabbāru Seal of Nani Seal of Bēlu-Dagan son of Illalu son of Iairu ‹‹his brother›› brother of Zū-Baʿla Before Dagan-kabar son of Abdu, doorkeeper Before Ḫimaši-Dagan son of Baṣṣu

Before Tuwata-ziti, Aššur-aḫa-iddina son of Šamaš-abu man of Šadikann[i] seized Lalû son of Zū-Baʿla for a debt, and Lalû son of Zū-Baʿla spoke as follows: “Everthing I owe you I will pay to you.” 10 shekels of pure gold, oil for 100 shekels of silver, 5 talents of boxwood, (and?) 2 oxen of good quality (in exchange for?) a naššartuwoman and a child (of her), 1 talent of copper of 4000 shekels in weight. Lalû gave these goods in lieu of the debt that he owed to Aššur-aḫa-iddina son of Šamaš-abu. If, in the future, Aššur-aḫa-iddina should bring up the tablets of hi[s] debt, this tablet will break the[m]. Before Ikki-Dagan, mayor Before Ura son of Tīru Before Bēlu-Dagan son of Apilu Before Šeʾi-Dagan, his brother Before Ṣilla-Idligat, merchant 14 For this reading see Zaccagnini 1996: 93.

438 

 Appendix

19. 20.

IGI DUMU-Še-ru-ia LÚ.DUB.SAR LÚ.DAM.GÀR ša LUGAL IGI Ip-qí-ᵈKUR LÚ.DUB.SAR ša ṭup-pa il-ṭu-ru!

21. 22. 23. 24.

NA₄.KIŠIB ᵈAš-šur-ŠEŠ-SÌ-na NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐEN-ᵈKUR NA₄.KIŠIB Še-i-ᵈKUR NA₄.KIŠIB Ik-ki-ᵈKUR NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐGISSU-ᵈIDIGNA

E 177 (SH) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

[a-na pa-ni ᵐI-ni-ᵈU-ub LUGAL KUR Kar]-ga-mis DUMU Ša-ḫu-r[u-nu-wa] [LUGAL KUR Kar-ga-mis DUMU.DUMU LUGAL]-ᵈ30 LUGAL KUR K[ar-ga-mis-ma UR.S]AG ᵐA-[. . .] x x [. . .] x-šu DUMU ᵐ[. . .] ù [. . .] x ta ṣ[a ………………………………………………........]-ti 3 [DUMU.MEŠ (?)]-ia-ma šu-[nu . . .]

6. 7. 8.

x [……………...] il-qì-mi É-ta₅[. . .] ù [šum-ma] ta-qab-bi ma-a iš-tu [È (?) . . .] ‹li›-iṣ!-[b]a-at!-mi TÚG-ši i-na GIŠ.ŠÚ.A l[i-iš-ku]-un a-šar ŠÀ-ši lil-li[k]

9.

ù [šum-ma ᵐA-bi]-ᵈ30 BA.UG₇ ŠEŠ.MEŠ-šu DA[M-šu . . .]

10. 11. 12. 13.

ù [šum-ma ᶠᵈKUR]-ḫa-ta-ši DUMU.MUNUS-ia a-[na . . .] […………………......] at-ta-din i-na [………………………….......] lil-lik […………………......]-lik [……………………………………………………………..................]-zu-šu missing lines

14’. [………………………………...........] a-ḫi x [………………………….......] x x x x 15’. [a-n]u-ma ᶠTa-ta DUMU.MUNUS-ia NÍG.M[USSA-ši te-el-qì] a-na muḫ-ḫi-ši ut-te-[er] 16’. [ŠE]Š.MEŠ aš-šum NÍG.MUSSA-ši a-na mu[ḫ-ḫi-ši la-a] i-ra-gu-mu 17’. a-nu-ma ᶠᵈKUR-la-i DUMU.MUNUS-ia ṭup-pa ša É-ia [t]a-ka-al ṭup-pa-ša

E 177 

 439

Before Mār-Šerūʾa, royal scribe and merchant Before Ipqi-Dagan, scribe, who wrote (this) tablet. Seal of Aššur-aḫa-iddina Seal of Bēlu-Dagan Seal of Šeʾi-Dagan Seal of Ikki-Dagan Seal of Ṣilla-Idligat

[Before Ini-Teššub king of the land of Kar]kemiš, son of Šaḫur[unuwa] [king of the land of Karkemiš, grandson of Šarri]-Kušuḫ king of the land of K[arkemiš, the he]ro, A[. . .] . . . [. . .] . . . son of [. . .] and [. . .] . . . [. . .] they are my three [sons (?) . . .] [. . .] took. The house [. . .] And [if] she should say: “From [the house (?) . . .] let him take. She shall [place] her garments on the stool and go wherever she pleases. And [if Abī]-Šaggar should die, his brothers [. . . his] wif[e]. And [if Dagan]-ḫataši, my daughter, t[o . . .] [. . .] I gave, in [. . .] he/she shall go . . . . . . missing lines [. . .] brother [. . .] [N]ow, Tata, my daughter [received her] do[wry] and I return[ed] (it) to her. (Her) [bro]thers [shall not] raise a claim agai[nst her] concerning her dowry. Now Dagan-laʾi, my daughter, holds the tablet of my house. She shall return her tablet

440 

 Appendix

18’. a-na ŠEŠ.MEŠ-ši li-te-er ŠES.MEŠ-ši 30 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ l[i-di]-nu-ni-iš-ši 19’. a-nu-ma ᵐIt-ti-EN DUMU.NÍTA GÉME-ia ᶠḪu-di₁₂ D[AM-ia li]-ip-làḫ 20’. ki-i-me-e ᶠḪu-di₁₂ EGIR-ki ši-im-‹ti›-ši ta-lak ᵐ[It-t]i-EN a-na ᵈUTU muš-šur 21’. DUMU.MEŠ-ia a-na muḫ-ḫi-šu la-a i-ra-gu-mu 22’. É GAL ḪA.LA ᵐIa-ši-it-a!-bu DUMU-ia GAL kier-ṣe-tu₄ ša EGIR É-ti 23’. ᵐWa-bi-il-i-la-i ḪA.LA ᵐA-bi-ᵈ30 ŠEŠ.ME-šu it!-t[i-š]u li-ir-ṣi-p[u!] 24’. É-tu₄ ša it-ti É EN Ta-ab-ni-ia ḪA.LA ᶠ!ᵈKU[R-ḫa-ta]-ši DUMU.MUNUS-ia

25’. [……………] šu?-nu-šu AMA-šu-nu EGIR […………] x-šu-nu 26’. [……………] É-ši ba-ši-ti it-[ti a-ḫa-mèš ki-ma URU-l]ì li-zu-zu DINGIR-lì É.[GAL]

27’. 28’. 29’. 30’.

[………………] a-na 30 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR [……..... ᵐA]-ḫi-ra-ḫa-aq [………………] x x x [………………………………............] at-ta-din-šu […………………………………………………….............. EG]IR-ki u₄-mi [……………………………………….......... i-na GI]Š.ŠÚ.A [l]i-iš-ku-un missing lines

E 200 (SH) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

ᵐZu-Ba-la [LÚ.ḪAL] 30 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ i[š-tu] ᵐᵈKUR-GAL DUMU B[e-li] a-na pu-ḫi il-q[ì] i-na-an-na KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ-šu ú-šal-l[ìm] ša 20 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ ‹IGI› ᵐᵈU-UR.S[AG] ù ša 10 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ

E 200 

 441

to her brothers. Her brother sh[all gi]ve her 30 shekels of silver.

Now Itti-bēlu, son of my female slave, [shall] support Ḫudi, [my] w[ife]. After Ḫudi has gone to her fate, [Itt]i-bēlu will be released to Šamaš. My sons shall not raise a claim against him. The main house is the share of Iašīt-abu, my eldest son; the kierṣetu behind the house of Wābil-ilai (?)15 is the share of Abī-Šaggar. His brothers shall buil[d] (it) wit[h h]im. The house that is together with the temple of the lord of Tabnia is the share of Daga[n-ḫata]ši, my daughter.

[. . .] . . . their mother after [. . .] . . . [. . .] let them divide bet[ween them] her house (and) the properties, according to the custom of the city. The gods (belong) to the [main] house.

[. . .] for 30 shekels of silver [. . . A]ḫī-raḫaq I gave him [. . .] [. . .] in the future [. . .] he/she shall place [his/her garments on the st]ool. missing lines

Zū-Baʿla, the diviner, borrowed 30 shekels of silver f[rom] Dagan-kabar son of B[ēlu] Now he pai[d] his silver. For 20 shekels of silver ‹the witness› is Baʿal-qarrād, and for 10 shekels of silver 15  Arnaud translates “porteur d’idole” but we expect a personal name as the house’s owner, although Wābil-ilai is not attested elsewhere.

442 

 Appendix

8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13.

IGI mLa-al-ú DUMU Pu-ḫu-na šúm-ma ur-ra-am še-ra-am ᵐᵈKUR-GAL DUMU Be-li áš-šúm KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ a-na muḫ-ḫi ᵐZu-Ba-la i-ra-g[u-um] ṭup-pu an-nu-ú i-l[a-e-šú]

14. 15.

NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐᵈKUR-GA[L] DUMU Be-l[i]

E 205 (SH) 1. 2.

a-na pa-ni ᵐMu-ut-ri-ᵈIŠKUR ù LÚ.MEŠ.ŠU.GI URUki ᵐIb-ni-ᵈKUR DUMU Zu-Ba-la LÚ.ḪAL ᵐMa-di-ᵈKUR DUMU Še-i-ᵈKUR

3. 4. 5.

25 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ ḫu-ub-bu-ul ù i-na-an-na ᵐMa-di-ᵈKUR DUMU Še-i-ᵈKUR BA.UG₇ ù 2 DUMU.MEŠ-šú i-na É mIb-ni-dK[UR a-na pu-ḫi] 25 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ ša-a-šú um-te-eš-ši-ir ù i-na-an-na ᵐ[Ib-ni-ᵈKUR DUMU Z]u-⸢Ba⸣-la! LÚ.ḪAL 2 DUMU.MEŠ ᵐMa-[di-ᵈKUR DUMU Še-i]-ᵈKUR a-na pa-ni ᵐMu-ut-ri-ᵈIŠKUR ù LÚ.MEŠ.[ŠU.GI URUki a-n]a pa-ni áḫ-ḫi-a ša ᵐa-bi-šu-nu ú-še-zi-iz [a-kán-na iq-bi um-m]a-a šum-ma 2 DUMU.MEŠ ŠE[Š-ku-nu te-le-qa ù] 25 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ-ia te-er-ra [ú-la šum-ma] 2 DUMU.MEŠ ŠEŠ-ku!-nu ša-a-šú-[nu] iš-tu [ra-ma-ni-šu-n]u a-na ARAD-ut-ti-ia id-na-n[im-ma] ù áḫ-[ḫi-a ša ma-bi-šu-nu] 25 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ ša mIb-ni-[dKUR] na-da-ni [la-a] i-[m]a-gu-ru ù 2 DUMU.MEŠ ŠEŠ-šú-[nu] a-na ARAD-ut-ti [ša m]Ib-ni-dKUR iš-tu ra-ma-ni-šu-nu-ma ik-nu-ku-šu-nu-[ti-ma] BA.UG₇! bal-ṭu ARAD.MEŠ ša ᵐIb-ni-[ᵈKU]R šu-nu ur-ra-am še-ra-am šum-ma ᵐAb-du DUMU Ḫu-tam-ma-ni ù ŠEŠ.MEŠ ša a-bi-šú-nu i-qáb!-bu-ú ma-a 2 DUMU.MEŠ ŠEŠ-ni ni-pa-ṭár-mi 2 ZI.MEŠ ma-la ᵐDINGIR-lì-a-bi ù 2 ZI.MEŠ ma-la ᶠMa-di₄-šim-ti IGI.NU.TUKU a-na ᵐIb-ni-ᵈKUR DUMU Zu-Ba-la LÚ.[ḪAL] li-id-di-nu 2 DUMU.MEŠ ŠEŠ-šú-nu [lil-qu-ú]

6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23.

E 205 

 443

the witness is Lalû son of Puḫuna. If, in the future, Dagan-kabar son of Bēlu will rais[e a claim] concerning the silver against Zū-Baʿla, this tablet will pr[evail over him]. Seal of Dagan-kabar son of Bēl[u]

Before Mutri-Teššub and the Elders of the city, Madi-Dagan son of Šeʾi-Dagan was indebted to Ibni-Dagan son of Zū-Baʿla, the diviner, for 25 shekels of silver, and now Madi-Dagan son of Šeʾi-Dagan is dead and he has left his two children in the house of Ibni-Da[gan in lieu of] 25 shekels of silver. And now [Ibni-Dagan son of Z]ū-Baʿla, the diviner, produced the two children of Ma[di-Dagan son of Šeʾi]-Dagan before Mutri-Teššub and the Eld[ers of the city in the] presence of their father’s brothers [(and) spoke as follow]s: “If [you want to take] the two children of [your] broth[er], return me my 25 shekels of silver. [Otherwise] give [me] those two children of your brother into my slavery of t[heir own will].” But [their father’s] bro[thers ref]used to return the 25 shekels of silver of Ibni-[Dagan], and thus they (transferred) the two children of th[eir] brother into slavery [to] Ibni-Dagan, of their own will, by means of a sealed document. Dead or alive, they are the slaves of Ibni-[Dag]an. In the future, if Abdu son of Ḫutammanu and their father’s brothers should say: “We want to redeem the two children of our brother,” they shall give two persons for Ilī-abī and two persons for Madi-šīmtu, the blind (girl), to Ibni-Dagan, son of Zū-Baʿla, the [diviner], [and take] the two children of their brother.

444  24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35.

 Appendix

NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐḪab-ú NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐMu-ut-ri-ᵈIŠKUR DUMU Pa-bá-ḫa NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐᵈEN-GAL lú[ú-ṭu] NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐBu-ra-qu DUMU Ma-duk-ka IGI! ᵐTu-u-tu DUMU A-bi-ka-pí IGI ᵐᵈ30-GAL DUMU Zi-im-ri-ᵈKUR IGI ᵐKa-pí-ᵈKUR DUMU A-ḫi-ḫa-mì LÚ uruEš-ši IGI ᵐEN-GAL lúú-ṭu IGI ᵐGUR-ᵈKUR DUMU MUŠ.MEŠ IGI ᵐKúl-me LÚ.NAGAR LÚ uruEš-ši IGI ᵐIb-ni-ᵈKUR DUMU Ma-di IGI ᵐAb-du DUMU Ḫu-tam-ma-ni LÚ uruEš-ši

E 209 (SH) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11.

ᵐ[B]u-zé-zu D[UM]U Ḫa-b[i-ti] kie[r-ṣ]e-tu₄ q[á-du] NA₄.MEŠ-šu a-na 14 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR.[MEŠ a-na ᵐᵈIŠKUR-U]R.SAG DUMU Zu-Ba-la a-[na q]a-[t]a-ti it-ta-[din-š]u šum-ma mBu-zé-zu DUMU Ḫa-bi-ti in-[n]a-ab-ba-at mL[u]-A-da DUMU Nu-ú-ri [š]a PA₅ Ta-am-ni-ti iṣ-ṣa-ab-ba-tu₄ mLu-A-da DUMU Nu-ú-ri PA₅ Ta-am-ni-tu₄ qa-[t]a-ti-šu il-qì ur-ra-am še-ra-am m Bu-zé-e-zu KÙ.BABBAR iš-tu qa!-ti mdIŠKUR-UR.SAG i-ra-aš-ši ARAD-ma ša mdIŠKUR-UR.SAG šu-ú-ut m La-aq-ra-ʾu DUMU Kàr-bi DUMU A-bi-te-ri ša mLu-A-da DUMU Nu-ú-ri qa-ta-ti il-qì

12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18.

IGI ᵐI-la-a-la-a-ṣi DUMU Ab-du ša PA₅ Ba-aḫ-na IGI ᵐLa-ar-i-la DUMU Ša-du-ú-na ša PA₅ Ba-aḫ-na-ma IGI ᵐḪa-ḫi-bu DUMU Ia-aʾ-ri-bi ša PA₅ Ba-aḫ-na-ma IGI ᵐBu-ru-mu DUMU Ia-an-ša ša PA₅ Ba-aḫ-na IGI ᵐTe-ni-tu₄ DUMU Ia-aʾ-di-ib PA₅ La-ka-lu

19. 20. 21. 22.

NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐEN-ma-lik DUMU ᵈKUR-ta NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐḪi-ma-ši-ᵈKUR ŠEŠ ᶠmaš-ar-ti [IGI] ᵐPu-wa DUMU Ḫu-ra-si [IGI] ᵐᵈIŠKUR-EN DUMU Ṣa-al-mu

E 209 

Seal of Ḫabu Seal of Mutri-Teššub son of Pabaḫa Seal of Bēlu-kabar the [. . .] Seal of Burāqu son of Madukka Before Tūtu son of Abī-kāpī Before Šaggar-kabar son of Zimrī-Dagan Before Kāpī-Dagan son of Aḫī-ḫāmī, man of Eššu Before Bēlu-kabar, the . . . Before Tūra-Dagan son of Pitnu Before Kulme, carpenter, man of Eššu Before Ibni-Dagan son of Madi Before Abdu son of Ḫutammu man of Eššu

[B]uzēzu s[o]n of Ḫab[itu] has giv[en] an kie[rṣ]etu w[ith] its foundations a[s a ple]dge for 14 shekels of silver [to Baʿal-qa]rrād son of Zū-Baʿla. If Buzēzu son of Ḫabitu should flee, L[ū]-Adda son of Nūru, [fr]om the water district of Tamnitu, will be seized. Lū-Adda son of Nūru, from the water district of Tamnitu, will take his su[r]ety. (If), in the future, Buzēzu obtains (additional) silver from Baʿal-qarrād, he will be Baʿal-qarrād’s slave. Laqraʾu son of Karbu son of Abī-tēri will take the surety for Lū-Adda son of Nūru.

Before Ilā-lā-āṣi son of Abdu, from the water district of Baḫna Before Lar-ila son of Šadûna, from the water district of Baḫna Before Ḫaḫibu son of Iaʾribu, from the water district of Baḫna Before Burrumu son of Ianša, from the water district of Baḫna Before Tenitu son of Iaʾdib, from the water district of Lakalu Seal of Bēlu-mālik son of Dagan-ta Seal of Ḫimaši-Dagan brother of the mašʾartu priestess [Before] Puwa son of Ḫurāṣu [Before] Baʿal-bēlī son of Ṣalmu

 445

446  23. 24. 25.

 Appendix

IGI ᵐPá-aq-du₄ DUMU Ḫu-da [IG]I ᵐḪi-ma-ši DUMU Ša-li-ti [IG]I ᵐKa-aš-ka DUMU A-ni-ni

E 211 (SH) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13.

[a-na pa-ni ᵐK]u-la-na-[LÚ] DUMU.LUGAL ᵐᵈK[UR-ta-li-i]ʾ DUMU Z[u]-ú-zi DUMU A-bu-un-ni DUMU ᵐT[u]-te-ia ᵐŠa-li-la ARAD-šu q[a]-du D[A]M-šu 2 DUMU.MEŠ-šu ù 3 D[UMU.MUNUS.MEŠ-šu] a-na 1 ME 20 KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ [a-na ᵐᵈIŠKUR-UR.]SAG DUMU Z[u-B]a-la [a-na ŠÁM] it-[ta-din ur-ra-am še-ra-am] aš-šu[m ᵐŠa-li-li DAM-šu DUMU.MEŠ-šu] a-na [muḫ-ḫi ᵐᵈIŠKUR-UR.SAG LÚ.ḪAL] ma-a[m-ma la-a i-ra-gu-um] ša [i-ra-gu-um] ṭup-pu an-[nu-ú i-la-ʾ-e-šu]

14. 15. 16. 17. 18.

ù šum-ma mŠa-li-lu DUMU.ME[Š-šu DUMU.MUNUS.MEŠ-šu] a-na mdIŠKUR-UR.SAG LÚ.ḪAL E[N-šu-nu] i-qa-ab-bu-ú ma-a ú-ul AR[AD.MEŠ-ka] ni-nu-mi mdIŠKUR-UR.SAG ki-i [ŠÀ-šu] li-pu-uš-šu-nu-ti EN DI-šu-n[u NU.TUKU]

19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25.

[NA]₄.KIŠIB ᵐMu-ut-ri-ᵈIŠKUR [NA₄.KIŠIB] ᵐMa-di-ᵈKUR NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐKa-pí-ᵈKUR [IGI ᵐBu-ra-q]u DUMU Ma-dú-ka16 IGI ᵐIm-lik-ᵈKU[R] IGI ᵐPí-ḫa-ᵈU DUMU Up-pa-[ra-mu-wa] DUMU.LUGAL ša KUR [Ḫat]-ti!17 [IGI ᵐḪ]u-si-rù DUMU ᵐTu-te-ia

16 Arnaud’s edition has [NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐBu-ra-q]u, but because the tablet contains only four sealing impressions belonging to Kāpī-Dagan (C6), Madi-Dagan (C13), Imlik-Dagan (C16) and MutriTeššub (I2), I restored IGI in line 22. 17 Following the Progetto Sinleqiunnini database, I regard DUMU.LUGAL ša KUR [Ḫat]-ti, which is written underneath Imlik-Dagan (l. 23), as a continuation of line 24, which is written on the left edge, because Piḫa-Tarḫunta is a well known Hittite official bearing the title of Son of the king, see E 35.

E 211 

 447

Before Paqdu son of Ḫuda [Befo]re Ḫimaši son of Šalītu [Befo]re Kaška son of Anini

[Before K]ulana-[ziti] Son of the king Da[gan-tali]ʾ son of Z[ū]zu son of Abunnu son of T[u]teia s[old] Šalilu, his slave, w[i]th his w[i]fe, his two sons, and [his] three da[ughters], for 120 shekels of silver [to Baʿal-qar]rād son of Z[ū-B]aʿla. [In the future], concer[ning Šalilu, his wife, and his children] no [one will raise a claim] ag[ainst Baʿal-qarrād, the diviner]. Whoever [should raise a claim] th[is] tablet [will prevail over him]. And if Šalilu, [his] son[s, or his daughters] should say to [their] lo[rd] Baʿal-qarrād, the diviner: “We are not [your] sla[ves],” Baʿal-qarrād may treat them as [he pleases]. [He will have no] adversary (in court). [S]eal of Mutri-Teššub    [Seal of] Madi-Dagan Seal of Kāpī-Dagan [Before Burāq]u son of Madu-ka Before Imlik-Dag[an] Before Piḫa-Tarḫunta son of Uppa[ramuwa], Son of the King of the land of [Ḫat]ti [Before Ḫ]usiru son of Tuteia

448 

 Appendix

E 213 (SH) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.

iš-tu u₄-mi an-ni-i fḪu-di₁₂ DAM mA-bi-ú DUMU Zi-ik-ri-ia ši-im-ti É-ši i-ši-im a-kán-na iq-bi ma-a a-nu-ma É-ia GIŠ.KIRI₆.GEŠTIN Ḫa-zi-ir-tu₄ qa-du DUMU.MUNUS-ši gáb-bá mim-mu-ia a-na fBa-at-ti DUMU.MUNUS-ia at-ta-din lú wa-ra-ša a-bal-li-la NU.TUKU a-nu-ma ŠEŠ.MEŠ mu-tì-ia zi-i-zu ba-aṣ-ru li-im A.ŠÀ.MEŠ a-na É-ia mim-mu-ia la-a i-ra-gu-mu ša i-ra-gu-um ṭup-pu an-nu-ú i-la-e-šu

10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15.

ù a-nu-ma EGIR LÚ mu-ti-ia muš-kè-na-ku uḫ-ta-bíl ù i-na ŠÀ ŠEŠ.MEŠ mu-tì-ia ša i-pal-la-ḫa-an-ni ia-nu ù ᵐᵈU-ma-lik DUMU.ḪAL ip-tal-ḫa-an-ni ù ḫu-bu-la-ti-ia ul-tal-lim f Ba-a-ta DUMU.MUNUS-ia a-na DAM-šú at-ta-din É-ia gáb-bá mim-mu-ia at-ta-na-šu

16. 17. 18. 19. 20.

a-nu-ma ḫu-bu-la-tu₄-ia ša ú-šal-li-mu 30 gišPA ŠE.MEŠ i-na É ᵐMa-di na-din 20 KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ ᵐᶠA-gi-ti na-din a-nu-ma ḫu-bu-la-tu₄-ia ša ᵐᵈIŠKUR-ma-lik DUMU-ia ú-še-li-mu

21. 22. 23.

ur-ra-am še-ra-am šum-ma mdU-ma-lik DUMU.MUNUS-ia ú-maš-šar a-na mim-mu-šu ‹‹NU.TUKU›› ú-še-li-mu ù a-na! mim-mi-ia NU.TUKU

24. 25.

ù a-nu-ma É-ia ša KÁ Zi-iʾ-li ša mdU-ma-lik-ma DUMU-ia

26. 27.

NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐTi-di-ia NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐNIR-ᵈKUR DUMU ARAD-DINGIR.MEŠ IGI ᵐA-lál-a-bu ŠEŠ-ši ša ᵈNIN.DINGIR

E 213 

 449

On this day, Ḫudi, wife of Abiu son of Zikria, established the fate of her household. She spoke as follows: “Now I have given my house, the vineyard, Ḫazirtu (i.e., a maidservant) with her daughter, and all my possessions to Batta my daughter. She is heir; there is no (other) sharer. Now my husband’s brothers have shared and divided (and) not even from afar18 shall they raise a claim upon my house and my possessions. Whoever should raise a claim, this tablet will prevail over him. And now after (the death) of my husband, I became poor and fell into debt, and among my husband’s brothers there was no one to support me. And Baʿal-mālik, the son of the diviner, supported me and paid my debt. I gave Batta, my daughter, as his wife, and I left him my house and all my possessions. Here is my debt that he paid: 30 parīsu of barley have been returned to the house of Madi 20 (shekels) of silver have been returned to Agitu. Now (this is) my debt that Baʿal-mālik, my son, paid. In the future, if Baʿal-mālik should abandon my daughter, he will have no (right) to everything he paid and to all my possessions. And now my house in the irrigation district of Ziʾlu belongs to Baʿal-mālik, my son.” Seal of Tidia Seal of Matkali-Dagan son of Abdi-ili Before Alal-abu brother of the entu priestess

18 For (1) lim A.ŠÀ see Durand 2004.

450  28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34.

 Appendix

IGI ᵐḪi-ma-nu DUMU ᵈKUR-ta NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐBa-aṣ-ṣí IGI ᵐTi-di-ia IGI ᵐI-túr-ᵈKUR DUMU A-ḫi-mi IGI ᵐA-na-ni DUMU A-ḫi-i IGI ᵐḪi-ma-ši-ᵈKUR DUMU I-li-Da NA₄.KIŠIB ᵈKUR-ta NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐA-lál-a-bu ŠEŠ-ši ša ᵈNIN.DINGIR

E 214 (SH) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18.

ᵐA-ri-ᵈ30 LÚ uruNi-ki-ip-pa GÉME-šú a-na ᵐᵈIŠKUR-ma-lik DUMU ᵈU-UR.SAG LÚ.ḪAL a-na 35 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR ŠÀM.TIL.LA it-ta-din šum-ma ur-ra-am še-ra-am ‹‹šum-ma›› ma-am-ma aš-šum GÉME ša-a-ši a-na EN di-ni-šu ša mdU-ma-lik il-la-a mSÌ-d30 i-ta-nap-pal-šú ù mdU-ma-lik za-ku NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐARAD-DINGIR.MEŠ DUMU Ib-ni-ia NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐᵈKUR-ta-ri-iʾ NA₄.KIŠIB DUMU NIR-ᵈKUR ᵐIb-ni-ᵈKUR DUMU Ú-ri-ú NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐIa-šu-rù DUMU A-me-ú [IG]I ᵐᵈ30-GAL DUMU Zi-im-ri-ᵈKUR [I]GI ᵐBa-ba DUMU EN-ma-lik IGI ᵐA-ḫi-ma-lik DUMU DINGIR-lì-ba-ni NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐIb-ni-ia DUMU A-lál-a-bu

E 215 (SH) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

a-na pa-ni LÚ.MEŠ.ŠU.GI uruÚ-ri ᵐᵈKUR-EN DUMU A-ša-Da a-kán-na iq-bi ma-a a-nu-ma 1 ME GÍN KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ ḫu-ub-bu-la-ku-mi ù ᵐᵈU-ma-lik DUMU ᵈU-UR.SAG LÚ.ḪAL ḫu-búl-li-ia ul-tal-lìm ki-i-mu-ú ḫu-búl-li-ia ša ú-šal-lìm ù a-na-ku qa-du 2 DAM.MEŠ ù ḪA.LA-šú

E 215 

Before Ḫimanu son of Dagan-ta Seal of Baṣṣu Before Tidia Before Itūr-Dagan son of Aḫī-mi Before Ananai son of Aḫiu Before Ḫimaši-Dagan son of Ilī-Da Seal of Dagan-ta Seal of Alal-abu brother of the entu priestess

Ari-Kušuḫ, man of Nikippa, has sold his female slave to Baʿal-mālik son of Baʿal-qarrād, the diviner, for 35 shekels of silver, full price. If, in the future, ‹‹if›› concerning that female slave, someone should come up as an adversary (in court) of Baʿal-mālik, Ari-Kušuḫ shall pay him, and Baʿal-mālik is free (of claims). Seal of Abdi-ili son of Ibnia Seal of Dagan-tariʾ Seal of son of Matkali-Dagan Ibni-Dagan son of Uriu Seal of Iašuru son of Ameu [Befo]re Šaggar-kabar son of Zimri-Dagan [Be]fore Baba son of Bēlu-mālik Before Aḫī-mālik son of Ilī-bāni Seal of Ibnia son of Alal-abu

Before the Elders of the town of Uri Dagan-bēlu son of Aša-daʿi spoke as follows: “Now I was indebted for 100 shekels of silver and Baʿal-mālik, son of Baʿal-qarrād, the diviner, paid my debt. In lieu of my debt that he paid, I, together with (my) two wives and my! share

 451

452 

 Appendix

8. 9. 10. 11.

ša GIŠ.KIRI₆.GEŠTIN ma-la ša it-tì ŠEŠ.MEŠ-šú ik-šu-ud-šú ù A.ŠÀ.MEŠ-šú a-na ARAD-ut-ti ša mdU-ma-lik iš-tu SAG.DU-šú-ma e-te-ru-ub

12. 13. 14. 15.

ù a-nu-ma KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ-šú a-šar e-te-ru-ub 70 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ a-na ᵐIb-ni-ᵈKUR DUMU EN-ta-li-iʾ SÌ 10 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR a-na ᵐI-túr-ᵈKUR DUMU Id-di-id-da-ḫi SÌ 20! GÍN KÙ.BABBAR a-na ᵐḪi-la-ʾ-e DUMU SÌ-ib-LUGAL-ri SÌ

16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27.

NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐGu-x-x DUMU Ḫu-di-ia NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐIp-ḫur-ᵈKUR

NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐI-túr-ᵈK[UR] DUMU Aš-tar-tu-UR.SAG NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐŠe-i-ᵈKUR DUMU Ib-ni-ᵈKUR DUMU GUR-di NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐTa-ʾ-e LÚ.DUB.SAR IGI ᵐId-di-nu DUMU A-bi-SAG₁₀ IGI ᵐNa-aṣ-bu DUMU A-bu-ᵈKUR IGI ᵐI-ku-ᵈKUR DUMU A-bu-ᵈKUR DUMU I-šar-DINGIR-lì IGI ᵐARAD-DINGIR-lì DUMU Ta-at-ti IGI ᵐŠe-i-EN DUMU A-ḫi-ia-ú IGI ᵐPa-tù-uḫ-tal-la-si IGI ᵐPa-zu-ri-ᵈKUR DUMU Ni-ra-ri

E 216 (SH) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14.

ᶠKu-ʾ-e DUMU.MUNUS ᵐZu-[. . .] DAM ᵐZa-dam-ma [a-kán-na iq-bi] ma-a lúmu-ti₄-ia il-t[a-bi-ir DUMU.MEŠ-ni] ṣe-eḫ-ru ša ú-bal-la-aṭ-s[u-nu ú-ul i-šu] ù fdNIN-BE-a DUMU.MUNUS-ia a-na ma-⌈ar⌉-[tu-ti] a-na DUMU.MUNUS-ša ša fA-nat-um-mi DAM mŠe-gal DUMU Ik-ki at-ta-din-ši DUMU.MEŠ ṣe-eḫ-ru-ti i-na MU dan-na-ti ú-bal-li-iṭ šúm-ma fA-nat-um-mi DAM mŠe-gal la tu-la-ad fdNIN-BE-a a-na DAM-šú ša ‹m›Še-gal lú mu-tí-ša ta-na-din-ši i-na EGIR u₄-mi fd NIN-BE-a al-mat-tu₄ it-ti al-ma-na-ti ši-it a-zi-ib-tu it-ti az-ba-ti! ši-it ù šúm-ma fA-nat-um-mi i-na mŠe-gal lú mu-tí-ša tu-la-ad

E 216 

of the vineyard that he received together with his brothers, and of his fields, entered into slavery to Baʿal-mālik of his own will.”

And now where the silver has entered: 70 shekels of silver have been given to Ibni-Dagan son of Bēlu-taliʾ 10 shekels of silver have been given to Itūr-Dagan son of Iddiʿ-aḫu 20 shekels of silver have been given to Arib-šarri Seal of Gu[. . .] son of Ḫudia Seal of Ipḫur-Dagan

Seal of Itūr-Da[gan] son of Aštartu-qarrād Seal of Šeʾi-Dagan son of Ibni-Dagan son of Tūra-Da Seal of Taʾe, scribe Before Iddinu son of Abī-naʿmī Before Naṣbu son of Abu-Dagan Before Ikūn-Dagan son of Abu-Dagan son of Išar-ilu Before Abdi-ili son of Tatti Before Šeʿi-Dagan son of Aḫiau Before Putuḫulasi Before Pazuri-Dagan son of Nīrāru

Kuʾe daughter of Zū-[. . .], wife of Zadamma, [spoke as follows:] “My husband is o[ld, our children] are small (and) [they have] no one who keeps t[hem] alive. And I gave Baʿla-BEa up for adopt[ion] as daughter of Anat-ummī, wife of Šegal son of Ikki. I kept alive (my) minor children in a year of hardship.” If Anat-ummī, the wife of Šegal, does not give birth, she will give Baʿla-BEa as a wife to Šegal her husband. In the future, Baʿla-BEa will be a widow with widows, a divorcee with divorcees. And if Anat-ummī does bear children to her husband Šegal,

 453

454 

 Appendix

15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22.

m

Še-g[al] ù fA-nat-um-mi [f]d [NIN-B]E-a DUMU.MUNUS-šú-nu i-na É e-mi li-d[in-nu] KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ NÍG.MUSSA-ši lil-[q]u-ú i-na EGIR u₄-mi DUMU.MEŠ ᶠKu-[ʾ]-e a-na ᵐŠe-gal ù ᶠA-nat-um-mi aš-šum KÙ.BABBAR[.MEŠ N]ÍG.MUSSA-ši ša ᶠᵈNIN-BE-a NIN-šú-nu la [i-r]a-gu-mu ša i-ra-gu-um ṭup-pu an-nu-ú i-li-e-šu-nu-ti

23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30.

NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐᵈKUR-ta-ri NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐPa-na-a DUMU Na-na DUMU x x x IGI ᵐDINGIR-lì-a-bi DUMU ᵐᵈ30-a-bi DUMU ᵐNa-ni-ia

NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐᵈIŠKUR-NIR

NA₄.[KIŠIB . . .]

E 217 (SH) 1. 2. 3.

5. 6. 7. 8.

ᵐZa-dám-ma DUMU Kàr-bi LÚ uruŠa₁₀-tap-pa ù ᶠKu-ʾ-e! DAM-sú ᶠBa-ʾa-la-BE-a ᵐᵈIŠKUR-EN ᵐIš-ma-aʾ-ᵈKUR ù ᶠBa-ʾa-la-um-mi DUMU.MUNUS GAB 2 DUMU.MEŠ-šú-nu 2 DUMU.MUNUS. MEŠ-šú-nu! a-na 60 KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ ŠÀM.TIL.LA a-na ARAD-ut-ti iš-tu SAG.DU-šú-nu-ma! a-na ᵐᵈIŠKUR-ma-lik DUMU ᵈIŠKUR-UR.SAG LÚ.ḪAL it-ta-din ma-an-nu-me-e ša 4 DUMU.MEŠ Za-dám-ma DUMU Kàr-bi i-bá-qar 10 ZI.MEŠ ma-lu-uš-šu-nu a-na ᵈU-ma-lik li-din-ma MUNUS.NITA.MEŠ-šú lil-qì

9. 10.

ù a-nu-ma GÌR.MEŠ-šú-nu ᵐZa-dám-ma-ma a-bu-šu-nu ᶠKu-ʾ-e AMA-šú-nu i-na IM.MEŠ iš-ku-nu

11. 12. 13. 14. 15.

ù a-nu-ma fKu-ʾ-e pa-na-nu fBa-la-BE-a DUMU.MUNUS-ši a-na 30 KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ a-na fÉ.GI₄.A.MEŠ a-na fA-nat-um-mi i-din ù ṭup-pa e-te-ep-šu-ma f!A-nat-um-mi 30 KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ ŠÀM fBa-ʾa-la-BE-a la-a i-din šum-ma i-na EGIR u₄-mi ᶠA-nat-um-mi

4.

E 217 

 455

Šeg[al] and Anat-ummī may g[ive Baʿla-B]Ea, their daughter, to the house of a father-in-law and ta[k]e the silver of her terḫatu. In the future, the children of Ku[ʾ]e shall not [ra]ise a claiam against Šegal and Anat-ummī concerning the silver of terḫatu of Baʿla-BEa, their sister. Whoever should raise a claim, this tablet will prevail over them. Seal of Seal of Baʿal-qarrād Dagan-tariʾ Seal of Panaia son of Nana son of . . . Se[al of . . .] Before Ilī-abī son of Šaggar-abu son of Nania

Zadamma son of Karbu, man of Šatappu, and Kuʾe, his wife, sold their two sons and two daughters, Baʿla-BEa, Baʿal-bēlī, Išmaʾ-Dagan, and Baʿla-ummī, a suckling baby, for 60 shekels of silver, full price, of their own will, into slavery to Baʿal-mālik, son of Baʿal-qarrād, the diviner. Whoever should claim the four children of Zadamma son of Karbu shall give 10 persons, as their compensation, to Baʿal-mālik and take his female and male (children). And now Zadamma, their father, (and) Kuʾe, their mother, placed their feet (i.e., the children’s) on the clay. And now Kuʾe previously sold Baʿla-BEa, her daughter, to Anat-ummī as daughter-in-law for 30 (shekels) of silver, and they made a tablet but Anat-ummī did not pay the 30 (shekels) of silver, the price of Baʿla-BEa. If, in the future, Anat-ummī

456  16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26.

 Appendix

ṭup-pa ša-a-šú ú-še-la-a ṭup-pu an-nu-ú i-ḫap-pì-šu ᶠBa-la-um-mi a-na ᵐᵈU-ma-lik ir-ti-iḫ NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐḪí-ma-ši-ᵈKUR DUMU Níq-qa₄ NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐᵈKUR-EN NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐA.A-SAG₁₀ DUMU Ma-di-ᵈKUR NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐGUR-ᵈKUR DUMU Ia-ad-da NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐGa-la-lu DUMU Ḫu-un-ba IGI ᵐEN-ma-lik DUMU ᵈKUR-GAL IGI ᵐÚ-ka-li DUMU LI-ᵈKUR NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐIa-dì-ᵈKUR DUMU GUR-ᵈKUR NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐLa-ḫé-ia DUMU Mu-ut-ri-ᵈU

E 221 (SH) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21.

ᵐᵈIŠKUR-ma-lik DUMU.ḪAL ARAD-[(x)-x] iš-tu li-it ᵐBa-la-ṭì ù ᵐPa-li-ḫu a-na 30 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR.ME[Š] ip-ta-ṭar šum-ma ur-ra-am [š]e-ra-am be-lu-ú-šu [i]l-lu-ú KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ TÉŠ.BI [a-na i]p-ṭá-ri-šu li-din-ma [ARAD-(x)]-x lil-qì [IGI ᵐḪi-li]-ia LÚ ša KUR Ḫa-ti [NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐ]Pa-li-ḫu [NA₄.KIŠIB] ᵐBa-la-ṭu ⸢IGI⸣ ᵐ‹ᵈ›30-AD DUMU tar-ta-ni IGI ᵐAm-za-ḫi DUMU Eḫ-li-[ia] IGI ᵐEN-ma-lik DUMU Ṣa-[al-mi] IGI ᵐI-la-nu DUMU A-ḫi-i IGI ᵐEl-li DUMU GEŠTIN-ŠEŠ IGI ᵐA-bi-ᵈUTU LÚ KUR Ḫat-ti [……………………………….........]x […………………………….........]x […………………………........-t]a-li-iʾ […………………………........]-da-ti

E 221 

should produce that tablet, this tablet will break it. Baʿla-ummī remains to Baʿal-mālik. Seal of Ḫimaši-Dagan son of Niqqu Seal of Dagan-bēlu Seal of Aia-damiq son of of Madi-Dagan Seal of Tūra-Dagan son of Iadda Seal of Galalu son of Ḫunbu Before Bēlu-mālik son of Dagan-kabar Before Ukāli son of Zimrī-Dagan Seal of Iadi-Dagan son of Tūra-Dagan Seal of Laḫeia son of Mutri-Teššub

Baʿal-mālik, the son of the diviner, redeemed Abdi-[. . .] from Balāṭu and Pāliḫu for 30 shekels of silver. If, in the future, his owners should [c]ome up, he shall give the equivalent silver [to r]edeem him (and) take [Abdi-. . .]. [Before Ḫil]ia, man of the land of Ḫatti [Seal of] Pāliḫu [Seal of] Balāṭu Before Šaggar-abu son of the tartannu Before Amzaḫi son of Eḫl[ia] Before Bēlu-mālik son of Ṣa[lmu] Before Ilānu son of Aḫiu Before Elli son of Ḫamar-šenni Before Abī-Šamaš, man of the land of Ḫatti [. . .] [. . .] [. . .-t]aliʾ [. . .]-dati

 457

458 

 Appendix

E 224 (SH) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

ᵐPu-uk-li-šar-ri DUMU Ka-ar-bi-li ša uruGú-zi-ni ᵐᵈU-ma-lik GÉME-šú a-na ŠÁM il-qì IGI ᵐIa-ra-pí-iʾ DUMU Ri-bi-ᵈKUR IGI ᵐᵈIŠKUR-EN DUMU A-bi-ḫa-mi IGI ᵐA-ḫi-Ba-šar DUMU Te-ti-ia IGI ᵐᵈKUR-EN DUMU Zu-E-ia

E 252 (SH) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19.

a-na pa-ni mMu-ut-ri-dIŠKUR ù LÚ.MEŠ.GA[L.M]EŠ uruE-mar f Al-ḫa-t[i it-ti] mARAD-DINGIR-lì DUMU A-ta-wa it-ti [lú].mešši-bu-ti-ši a-na pa-ni LÚ.UGULA KALAM.MA iz-zi-iz [a]-kán-na iq-bi ma-a 26 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR.ME 1 GÍN KÙ.SIG₁₇ ma-an-da-at-tù-mi ša ŠEŠ-ia a-na AR[AD-DING]IR-lì ú!-šal-[lìm] ù mMu-ut-ri-dU-ub [ṭup-pí]-ia ša lú.mešši-bu-ti-ši [iš-te]-mi ki-i fAl-ḫa-ti ḫu-bu-ul-la ša mI-túr-dKUR ŠEŠ-ši ú-šal-lìm ù x [. . .] ù a-nu-[um-ma . . .] ŠEŠ-ši x[. . .] ur-ra-[am še-ra-am (. . .)] DUMU.MUNUS ša-a-šú [. . .] KÙ.BABBAR.ME TÉŠ.BI [li-di]n ⸢DUMU?.MUNUS?⸣-ši lil-qì19

20. 21. 22.

IGI ᵐEN-[. . . DUMU] Aʾ-a IGI ᵐZu-Ba-la DUMU ᵈA-a-LUGAL IGI ᵐAm-za-ḫi [DUMU Ia]-qù-um-Da IGI ᵐBa-aṣ-ṣú DUMU [A]-ta-wa

19  For the reconstruction of this line see the discussion of the text in § 3.2.3.2.2.

E 252 

Pukli-šarri (is) the son of Karb-ili from the town of Guzini; Baʿal-mālik purchased his female slave. Before Iarappiʾ son of Rībi-Dagan Before Baʿal-bēlī son of Abī-ḫāmī Before Aḫī-Bašar son of Titia Before Dagan-bēlu son of Zū-Eia

Before Mutri-Teššub and the Grea[t] Ones of Emar, Al-aḫāt[ī] stood [against] Abdi-ili son of Atawa, together with her witnesses, before the Overseer of the Land (and) spoke as follows: “I paid 26 shekels of silver and 1 shekel of gold, the mandattu of my brother, to Ab[di-i]li, And Mutri-Teššub [has liste]ned to my [tablet] of her witnesses.” According (to that tablet), Al-aḫātī paid the debt of Itūr-Dagan, her brother. And [. . .] And no[w . . .] Her brother [. . .] In the f[uture . . .] that daughter [. . .] he/she (?) [shall pa]y the equivalent silver and take her daughter. Before Bēlu-[. . . son of ] ʾA Before Zū-Baʿla son of Aia-šarru Before Amzaḫi [son of Ia]qūm-Da Before Baṣṣu son of [A]tawa

 459

460 

 Appendix

E 256 (S) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22.

iš-tu u₄-mi an-ni-im! ᵐAd!-du DUMU A-wi-rù ki!-ia!-am iq-bi a-nu-um-ma ᵐḪu-la-ú DUMU-ia 2 gišḫa-aṭ-ṭá-šu še-eb-ra-at ú-ul DUMU-ia šu-ut ù i-na-an-na ᵐḪu-la-ú e-mu-ut ù MUNUS.NÍTA.MEŠ-šu a-na re-bi-ti ṣa-al-ú a-na MU.KÁM ša KÚR.MEŠ nu-ku-ur-ti ù ᵐA-bí-ka-pí DUMU Ḫa-am-s[í i-la]-mi-du-ni MUNUS.NITÁ.MEŠ-šu ša ᵐḪu-[la]-ú [DUMU Ad]-du iš-tu re-bi-[ti] iš-ši-šu-nu ù šum-ma ur-[ra-am] še-ra-am ŠE[Š-šu] ša mḪu-la-[ú] DUMU.MEŠ a-ḫi-šu ú-pa!-ṭe₄-[er] 1 li-im KÙ.BAB[BAR] ip-ṭe₄-ri-šu-nu li-id-dì-[in lil-qì]

23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32.

iš-tu u₄-mi an-ni-i[m] ᵐA-bi-ka-pí DUMU Ḫa-am-sí ki-ia-am iq-bi a-nu-um-ma ᵐA-ḫi-ú ù ᵐᶠI-šar-te ù ᵐᶠA-ḫa-mi DUMU.MEŠ ᵐḪu-la-i a-na DUMU.NITÁ-ia ù 2 DUMU.MUNUS-ia aš-ku-un-šu-nu

33. 34. 35.

IGI Zu-Aš-tar-ti LUGAL DUMU ⸢ᵈ⸣IŠKUR-GAL LUGAL IGI A-bi-Ra-šap ŠEŠ-šu

E 256 

On this day, Addu son of Awiru spoke as follows: “Ḫulāʾu (is) my son (but) his two sticks are broken and he is no longer my son.” And now Ḫu[lā]ʾu is dead, and his children were thrown out in the squar[e] in the year of war. And (when) Abī-kāpī son of Ḫams[i lear]ned (about it), he lifted the children of Ḫulāʾu [son of Ad]du from the square. And if in the fu[tu]re the broth[er] of Ḫulāʾ[u] wants to release his brother’s sons, he shall giv[e] 1000 (shekels) of sil[ver] for their relea[se] and [take (them)]. On thi[s] day Abī-kāpī son of Ḫamsi spoke as follows: “I established Aḫiu and Išarte and Aḫa-mi, sons of Ḫulāʾu, as my son and my two daughters.”

Before Zū-Ašarti, the king son of Baʿal-kabar, the king Before Abī-Rašap, his brother

 461

462  36. 37.

 Appendix

IGI Ab-ba-nu ŠEŠ-šu-ma IGI Im-lik-ᵈKUR LÚ.DUB.SAR

E 257 (SH) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17.

ᵐKi-la-ʾ-e ARAD ša mḪu-si-ri DUMU Ri-bi-ᵈKUR iš-ri-iq-ma it-ti ARAD-di₄ šu-wa-ti iṣ-ṣa-ba-at a-na pa-ni LUGAL i-na di-ni iš-ku-un-šu ù LUGAL LÚ.MEŠ.GAL.MEŠ ša uruŠa-tap-pí i-na ma-mi-ti it-ta-din-šu-nu-ti ù LUGAL a-kán-na iq-bi ma-a šum-ma LÚ.GAL.MEŠ i-ta-am-mu mKi-la-ʾ-e a-na ARAD ša mḪu-si-ri i-ri-ḫi-ma ù ᵐKi-la-ʾ-e LÚ.GAL.MEŠ ša URUki a-na ma-mi-ti la i-ma-gu-ur-šu-nu-ti ᶠKi-bi-ia-an a-ḫa-at-šu a-na téš-pe-li-šu a-na ᵐḪu-si-ri i-na GÉME it-ta-din-ši ‹‹šum-ma›› ur-ra-am še-ra-am ᵐKi-la-ʾ-e DUMU Tul-pá-ʾ-e LÚ uruḪa-lu-la-zi a-na muḫ-ḫi ᵐḪu-si-ri DUMU Ri-bi-ᵈKUR la-a i-ra-gu-am šum-ma i-ra-gu-am ṭup-pu an-nu-ú i-li-ʾ-e-šu

18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24.

NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐA-bu-un-ni NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐPa-a-ḫa NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐARAD-Iš-ḫa-[r]a [N]A₄.KIŠIB ᵐḪi-ni-ia IGI ᵐARAD-ᵈIš-ḫa-ra DUMU A-ḫi-ú IGI ᵐA-ma-du DUMU Ḫa-li-ia IGI ᵐA-i-zi-ni DUMU Ka-nu-ta-rù IGI ᵐA-bu-un-ni DUMU I-mu-ut-ḫa-ma-dì IGI ᵐPa-ḫa DUMU A-bi-ḫa-ma

E 277 (SH) 1. 2. 3. 4.

[x GÍN š]a ᵐRi-bi-ᵈ[KU]R [(. . .)] [x GÍ]N ša ᵐKa-pí-ᵈKUR [x GÍ]N ša ᵐᵈ30-a-bu DUMU Ba-aš-š[u] [x G]ÍN ša ᵐIb-ni-ᵈKUR DUMU Ka-ma

E 277 

Before Abbanu, his brother Before Imlik-Dagan the scribe

Kilaʾe stole a slave of Ḫusiru son of Rībi-Dagan and has been caught with that slave. He (i.e., Ḫusiru) produced him (i.e., Kilaʾe) before the king and the king and the Great Ones of Šatappu. He (i.e., the king) sent them to the oath, and the king spoke as follows: “If the Great Ones swear, Kilaʿe will remain the slave of Ḫusiru.” But Kilaʾe refuses (to make) the Great Ones of the city swear. (Thus) he gave Kibian, his sister, in exchange for himself to Ḫusiru as a slave. ‹‹If›› In the future, Kilaʾe son of Tulpaʾe, man of Ḫululazi, shall not raise a claim against Ḫusiru son of Rībi-Dagan; should he raise a claim this tablet will prevail over him. Seal of Abunnu Seal of Paḫa Seal of Abdi-Išḫa[r]a Seal of Ḫinia Before Abdi-Išḫara son of Aḫiu Before Amadu son of Ḫalia Before Aizini son of Kanutaru Before Abunnu son of Imūt-ḫamadi Before Paḫa son of Abī-hama

[x shekels (of silver) belon]ging to Rībi-[Daga]n [x sheke]ls (of silver) belonging to Kāpī-Dagan [x sheke]ls (of silver) belonging to Šaggar-abu son of Baš[šu] [x sheke]ls (of silver) belonging to Ibni-Dagan son of Kamma

 463

464 

 Appendix

5. 6. 7. 8. 9.

[x GÍ]N a-na KUR Ki-in-za [x G]ÍN a-na ᵐGAL-ᵈ30 i-na uruSà-a[l!-ḫi] 4 GÍN a-na TÚG.ḪI.A ša mKa-pí-dKUR 36 GÍN a-na ᵐBa-ba ša ma-[x] 20 GÍN a-na ᵐKa-pí-ᵈKUR

10.

[x ᵐZ]u-Aš-tar-ti mu-[šen] [. . .] [x GÍN] ⸢a-na⸣ [. . .] [x] GÍN a-na ᵐx[. . .] x GÍN a-na KUR [. . .] [x GÍN a]-na x[. . .] [x GÍN a]-na x[. . .] [. . .] x GÍN ᵐ[. . .] x GÍN ᵐᵈ3[0. . .] 10 GÍN ᵐAm-za-ḫi [. . .] [x GÍN] ᵐIp-[qí-. . .] [x GÍN ᵐ]Bu-x[. . .]

11’. 12’. 13’. 14’. 15’. 16’. 17’. 18’. 19’. 20’.

E 278 (SH) 1. 2.

2 me-at! 60 ZABAR a-na mdKUR-a-bu DUMU Bá-aṣ-ṣa

3. 4.

[. . .] x ḫu-bu-la-ti [……...] ᵐᵈKUR-a-bu DUMU Bá-aṣ-ṣa

5.

[………..... L]Ú.ŠÌR

6.

[……………...... -R]a-šap DUMU A-i-[. . .] x

7. 8. 9.

[. . .] [. . .]-uz [. . .]

E 278 

[x sheke]ls (of silver) to the land of Qadeš [x sheke]ls (of silver) to Talmi-Kušuḫ in the town of Sa[lḫu (?)] 4 shekels (of silver) for clothes belonging to Kāpī-Dagan 36 shekels (of silver) to Baba . . . 20 shekels (of silver) to Kāpī-Dagan [x Z]ū-Aštarti mu[šennu] [. . .] [x shekels (of silver)] to [. . .] [x] shekels (of silver) to [. . .] x shekels (of silver) to the land of [. . .] [x shekels (of silver) t]o . . . x shekels (of silver) t]o . . . [. . .] x shekels (of silver): [. . .] x shekels (of silver): Šag[gar-. . .] 10 shekels (of silver): Amzaḫi [. . .] [x shekels (of silver)]: Ip[qi-. . .] [x shekels (of silver)]: Bu[. . .]

260 (shekels) of bronze to Dagan-abu son of Baṣṣu [. . .] x debt [……..] Dagan-abu son of Baṣṣu [………...] singer [……………..... -R]ašap son of Ai[. . .] [. . .] [. . .]-uz [. . .]

 465

466 

 Appendix

E 279 (SH) 1. 2.

30 gišPA ŠE.MEŠ ᵐIp-ḫur-ᵈKUR DUMU A-bi-ka ù ᵐḪa-[a]s-su DUMU A-ḫu-te ù ᵐI-túr-ᵈKUR DUMU Ka-ri-mi

3. 4.

30 gišPA ŠE.MEŠ ᵐAr-wu DUMU Ip-qí-dì 26 MIN ᵐA-bi-ᵈ30 LÚ.Ú.LU-tù ša ‹ᵐ›A-wi-ri DUMU Ba-[. . .] x x [. . .]

5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.

20 MIN ᵐZu-Aš-tar-ti DUMU LÚ.ḪAL 25 MIN ᵐAm-za-ḫi DUMU Ú-ri-ú 20 MIN ᵐḪi-ma-ši-ᵈKUR DUMU Mi-ik-[k]u 20 MIN ᵐIp-ḫur-ᵈKUR DUMU I-li-ia-ap-da 20 MIN ᵐKa-pí-EN DUMU A-ri-ib-šu-ni 20 MIN ᵐEN-UR.SAG DUMU Aʾ-a

11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16.

10 MIN ᵐIp-ḫur-ᵈKUR DUMU Kat-ti 10 MIN ᵐARAD-DINGIR-lì DUMU La-la 10 MIN ᵐKa-pí-ᵈKUR DUMU Bi-is-su 10 MIN ᵐTu-ra-ᵈKUR DUMU Da-a-di 10 MIN ᵐIb-ni-ᵈKUR DUMU Ú-ri-ú 18 MIN ᵐIb-ni-ᵈKUR DUMU LÚ.ḪAL

17. 18. 19. 20.

7 MIN ᵐᵈ30-a-bu DUMU A-a x MIN ᵐKa-aš-ka DUMU A-ni-ni [x] MIN ᵐᵈU-EN DUMU A-píl-la [x] MIN ᵐRi-bi-ᵈKUR DUMU A-ḫi-ra-ḫa-aq

21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33.

4 MIN ᵐA-ḫi-ḫa-mi LÚ.SANGA ša ᵈKUR 5 MIN ᶠᵈU-ki-mi DUMU.MUNUS Kám-ma 5 MIN ‹ᶠ›Al-um-mi DUMU.MUNUS ᵐKám-ma 10? MIN ᵐA-ḫu DUMU Ku-da-li [10? MI]N ᵐDINGIR-lì-ia-a-mu-ut DUMU Ḫe-e-bá [5? MIN] ᵐKáp-pu-pu DUMU Kà-am-ma [10? MIN] ᶠḪi-zi-li DAM ᵐᵈ30-LÚ 10? MIN ᵐḪi-ma-nu DUMU Nu-uk-ra 2 MIN ᵐᵈU-EN DUMU A-bi-te-ri 4 MIN ᵐEN-GAL DUMU A-ia-ḫi 5 MIN ‹ᶠ›ᵈKUR-i-il-a É.GI₄.A ša ᵐA-ḫi-ḫa-mi 5 MIN ᶠPu-ul-li DAM ᵐEN-GAL 5 MIN ᶠUm-mi-na-aʾ-mi DAM ᵐLa-la

E 279 

30 parīsu of barley: Ipḫur-Dagan son of Abī-kā and Ḫassu son of Aḫute and Itūr-Dagan son of Karīmu 30 parīsu of barley: Arwu son of Ipqidu 26 ditto: Abī-Šaggar, amēlūtu of Awiru son of Ba[. . .] 20 ditto: Zū-Aštarti son of the diviner 25 ditto: Amzaḫi son of Uriu 20 ditto: Ḫimaši-Dagan son of Mik[k]u 20 ditto: Ipḫur-Dagan son of Ilī-iapdā 20 ditto: Kāpī-bēlu son of Arib-šuni 20 ditto: Baʿal-qarrād son of ʾA 10 ditto: Ipḫur-Dagan son of Kattu 10 ditto: Abdi-ili son of Lalû 10 ditto: Kāpī-Dagan son of Bissu 10 ditto: Tūra-Dagan son of Dādu 10 ditto: Ibni-Dagan son of Uriu 18 ditto: Ibni-Dagan son of the diviner 7 ditto: Šaggar-abu son of Aia x ditto: Kaška son of Anini [x] ditto: Baʿal-bēlī son of Apilu [x] ditto: Rībi-Dagan son of Aḫī-raḫaq 4 ditto: Aḫī-ḫāmī, priest of Dagan 5 ditto: Baʿla-kīmī daughter of Kamma 5 ditto: Al-ummī daughter of Kamma 10 (?) ditto: Aḫu son of Kudalu [10 (?) dit]to: Ilī-iamūt son of Ḫeba [5 (?) ditto:] Kappupu son of Kamma [10 (?) ditto:] Ḫizili wife of Arma-ziti 10 (?) ditto: Ḫimanu son of Nukra 2 ditto: Baʿal-bēlī son of Abī-tēri 4 ditto: Bēlu-kabar son of Aia-aḫu 5 ditto: Dagan-ila daughter-in-law of Aḫī-ḫāmī 5 ditto: Pulli wife of Bēlu-kabar 5 ditto: Ummī-naʾmi wife of Lalû

 467

468  34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50.

 Appendix

5 MIN ᵐA-wi-ru DUMU Qa-li-e 5 MIN ᵐŠe-i-ᵈKUR DUMU Am-mi-ᵈKUR 10 MIN ᵐBu-ra-qu DUMU ᵈ30-GAL 5 MIN ᶠBi-i-bi DUMU A-ma 5 MIN ᵐA-bi-ᵈUTU DUMU Ma-at-te 5 MIN ᵐḪa-an-na-nu DUMU A-bu-[x]-x 7 MIN ᵐ!Um-ma DUMU.MUNUS ‹ᶠ›Ba-a[ʾ-l]a-ki-mi 3 MIN ᵐÚ-lu-ú-lu DUMU Ki-ri-ᵈKUR 5 MIN ᵐEN-GAL DUMU Tá-at-te 5 MIN ᵐḪu-si-ru DUMU Am-mi-ᵈKUR 5 MIN ᵐᵈKUR-EN DUMU [ᵈK]UR-ta-ri-iʾ 2 gišPA ŠE.MEŠ A-p[í]l-la ḫa-ta-nu ša ᶠḪa-du-da [………. M]EŠ ᵐKa-pí-ᵈKUR DUMU Ia-ra-si-ti […………..]-da LÚ.SANGA ᵈ30 […………..] Ḫa-an-na-nu DUMU Ša-li […….] 5 MIN ᵐᵈÉ-a-GAL DUMU A-ḫu-da-qa-ni

E 319 (SH) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16.

ŠE.MEŠ ša i-na ḫu-ub-te-ti na-ad-⸢na⸣ 20 gišPA ŠE.MEŠ ᵐZu-Aš-tar-ti DUMU ᵈU-UR.SAG 20 gišPA ŠE ᵐAm-za-ḫi DUM[U] ⸢Ú⸣-ri-ú 5 MIN ᵐA-ḫi-ḫa-mi LÚ.[SANGA š]a ᵈKUR 5 MIN ᶠᵈU-ki-mi DUMU.MUNUS Kám-[m]a 5 MIN ᶠAl-um-mi DUMU.MUNUS Kám-[m]a 10 MIN ᵐA-ḫu DUMU Ku-[d]a-li 10 MIN ᵐDINGIR-lì-ia-mu-ut ARAD ša LÚ.SANGA 5 MIN ᵐKapᵪ-pu-pu DUMU Kám-ma 10 MIN ᵐIp-ḫur-ᵈKUR DUMU Kat-ti 10 MIN ᶠḪi-zi-il-li 10 MIN ᵐḪi-ma-nu DUMU Nu-uk-ra 2 MIN ᵐᵈU-EN DUMU A-bi-te-ri 4 MIN ᶠᵈIš-ḫa-ra-DINGIR-lì 4 MIN EN!-GAL DUMU A-ia-ḫi 18 MIN Ib-ni-ᵈKUR DUMU Ri-bi-ᵈKUR

E 319 

5 ditto: Awiru son of Qaliu 5 ditto: Šeʾi-Dagan son of Ammī-Dagan 10 ditto: Burāqu son of Šaggar-kabar 5 ditto: Bibi son of Ama 5 ditto: Abī-Šaggar son of Matte 5 ditto: Ḫannanu son of Abu-[. . .] 7 ditto: Umma daughter of Ba[ʿl]a-kīmī 3 ditto: Ulūlu son of Kiri-Dagan 5 ditto: Bēlu-kabar son of Tatti 5 ditto: Ḫusiru son of Ammī-Dagan 5 ditto: Dagan-bēlu son of [Da]gan-tariʾ 2 parīsu of barley: Ap[i]la son-in-law of Ḫaduda [………...] . . . Kāpī-Dagan son of Iara-ziti [………….....]-da priest of Šaggar [………….....] Ḫannanu son of Šalu [……...] 5 ditto Ea-kabar son of Aḫu-daqanu

Barley that has been given as loan 20 parīsu of barley: Zū-Aštarti son of Baʿal-qarrād 20 parīsu of barley: Amzaḫi so[n] of Uriu 5 ditto: Aḫī-ḫāmī, [priest o]f Dagan 5 ditto: Baʿla-kīmī daughter of Kam[m]a 5 ditto: Al-ummī daughter of Kamma 10 ditto: Aḫu son of Ku[d]alu 10 ditto: Ilī-iamūt, servant of the priest 5 ditto: Kappupu son of Kam[m]a 10 ditto: Ipḫur-Dagan son of Kattu 10 ditto: Ḫizili 10 ditto: Ḫimanu son of Nukra 2 ditto: Baʿal-bēlī son of Abī-tēri 4 ditto: Išḫara-ilī 4 ditto: Bēlu-kabar son of Aia-aḫu 18 ditto: Ibni-Dagan son of Rībi-Dagan

 469

470 

 Appendix

GsK 1 (SH) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22.

ᵐEš₄-tár-ba-e qa-du ᶠPí-is-sà DUMU.MUNUS Ḫab-i DUMU Pa-ḫa-ri DAM-šu ù ᵐḪu-si-rù DUMU-ši a-na ARAD.MEŠ GÉME.MEŠ ša ᵐZu-Aš-tar-ti DUMU ᵐA-ḫi-ma-lik DUMU Kut-be e-tar-bu ù ᵐZu-Aš-tar-ti 83 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR ḫu-búl-la-šu-nu ul-tal-lìm iš-tu u₄-mi an-ni-i ᵐEš₄-tár-ba-e ᶠPí-is-sà DAM-šu ù ᵐḪu-sì-rù DUMU-šu BA.UG₇ TI.LA ARAD.MEŠ GÉME.MEŠ ša ᵐZu-Aš-tar-ti DUMU A-ḫi-ma-lik DUMU Kut-be šu-nu šúm-ma i-na EGIR u₄-mi ma-am-ma a-na bá-qa-ri-šu-nu el-la-a KÙ.BABBAR TÉŠ.BI li-din lil-qì-šu-nu-ti a-nu-ma a-šar 83 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR i-ru-ub a-na li-it ᵐTu-ri DUMU DINGIR-lì-ba-ni NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐA-bi-ᵈ30 NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐEN-GAL DUMU LI-EN DUMU Šur-ši NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐBu-la-li DUMU Ta-e DUMU Id-dì-e NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐŠur-ši-ᵈKUR DUMU Ì-lí [. . .] DUMU Bi-li-la DUMU [. . .] IGI ᵐEN-GAL DUMU ᵐIš-ma-ᵈKUR IGI ᵐIa-di-ᵈKUR DUMU Šap-ṭa

GsK 2 (SH) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12.

Ḫab-ú DUMU Zu-Ba-la DUMU A-maš-du MU KALA.GA ša 3 SÌLA ŠE.MEŠ a-na 1 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR iz-za-az ša i-pal-la-ḫu-šu ia-nu i-na-an-na ᵐḪab-ú qa-du ᵐZu-Aš-tar-ti DUMU-šu a-na É ᵐZu-Aš-tar-ti DUMU A-ḫi-ma-lik DUMU Kut-be a-na pa-la-ḫi-šu-nu e-te-er-bu ᵐZu-Aš-tar-ti DUMU A-ḫi-ma-lik DAM-ta₅ ᵐZu-Aš-tar-ti DUMU ᵐḪab-i ú-ša-ḫa-az i-na EGIR u₄-mi ki-i-ma URU-lè-e DUMU.MEŠ DUMU.MUNUS.MEŠ ᵐZu-Aš-tar-ti ul-la-ad DUMU.MEŠ-šu a-na ARAD.MEŠ LUGAL ir-ti-ḫu ù DUMU.MUNUS.MEŠ-šu ᵐZu-Aš-tar-ti a-na É e-mi li-din-ši-na-ti KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ NÍG.MUSSA.MEŠ-šu-nu lil-qì u₄-mimeš ša ᵐZu-Aš-tar-ti ù ᶠᵈKUR-si-ma-ti DAM-šu bal-ṭu ᵐḪab-ú ù ᵐZu-Aš-tar-ti DUMU-šu lìp!-la-ḫa-na-ši m

GsK 2 

Ištar-bae with Pissa, daughter of Ḫabu son of Paḫḫaru, his wife, and Ḫusiru, his son, entered as male and female slaves of Zū-Aštarti son of Aḫī-mālik son of Kutbe, and Zū-Aštarti paid 83 shekels of silver, their debt. On this day, Ištar-bae, Pissa, his wife, and Ḫusiru, his son, dead or alive, will be male and female slaves of Zū-Aštarti son Aḫī-mālik son of Kutbe. If, in the future, someone should come up to claim them, he shall pay the equivalent silver and take them. Now where 83 shekels of silver entered: to Tūri son of Ilī-bāni. Seal of Abī-Šaggar Seal of Bēlu-kabar son of Zimrī-bēlu son of Šuršu Seal of Bulālu son of Taʾe son of Iddiʿe Seal of Šurši-Dagan son of Ilī . . . son of Bilila son of . . . Before Bēlu-kabar son of Išma-Dagan Before Iadi-Dagan son of Šapṭa

Ḫabu son of Zū-Baʿla son of Amašdu, in a year of hardship, when 3 qû of barley correspond to 1 shekel of silver, there was no one to support him. Now Ḫabu with Zū-Aštarti, his son, entered into the house of Zū-Aštarti son of Aḫī-mālik son of Kutbe to support him. Zū-Aštarti son of Aḫī-mālik will provide a wife to Aū-Aštarti son of Ḫabu. In the future, according to (the custom of) the city (concerning) the son and daughters whom Zū-Aštarti will bear, his sons will remain servants of the king and Zū-Aštarti may give his daughters to the house of a father-in-law and take the silver of their terḫatu. As long as Zū-Aštarti and Dagan-simātī, his wife, should live, Ḫabu and Zū-Aštarti, his son, shall support us.

 471

472  13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34.

 Appendix

ki-i-me-e i-pal-la-ḫa-na-ši EGIR ši-im-ti-‹ni› ni-a-ti ub-ba-la-na-ši mZu-Aš-tar-ti ŠU DAM-šu DUMU.MEŠ-šu li-iṣ-bat-ma a-šar ŠÀ-‹šu›-nu lil-lik ù mḪab-ú a-bu-šu KÁ É ša mZu-Aš-tar-ti la-a uṣ-ṣa a-nu-ma ᵐIa-di-ᵈKUR DUMU-ia a-na DUMU-šu ša ᵐḪab-i at-ta-din ša ur-ra-am še-ra-am mZu-Aš-tar-ti ù fdKUR-si-ma-ti DAM-šu a-na pa-ni mḪab-i ù mZu-Aš-tar-ti DUMU-šu i-qa-bu-ú ma-a iš-tu É-ni at-la-ka-me m Zu-Aš-tar-ti ù DAM-šu 1 ME GÍN KÙ.BABBAR.ME a-na mḪab-i ù DUMU-šu li-di-nu-ma a-šar ŠÀ-šu-nu lil-li-ku ù šúm-ma i-na EGIR u₄-mi Ḫab-ú ù Zu-Aš-tar-ti DUMU-šu a-na pa-ni mZu-As-tar-ti ù KUR-si-ma-ti DAM-šu i-qa-bu-ú ma-a iš-tu É-ku-nu ni-tal-lak-me mḪab-ú ù DUMU-šu 1 me-at GÍN KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ a-na ᵐZu-Aš-tar-ti ù DAM-šu li-di-nu-ma a-šar ŠÀ-šu-nu lil-li-ku NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐA-bi-SAG₁₀ NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐGa-ni ? DUMU Šar-ia -an-ti DUMU EN-ᵈKUR DUMU Ga-ni NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐᵈU-GAL NA₄.KIŠIB DUMU Ka-pí-ᵈKUR DUMU A-ḫu-ᵈ[. . .] ᵐᵈU-UR.SAG DUMU ᵈKUR-É.GAL NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐKAR-ᵈKUR NA₄.KIŠIB DUMU Iš-me-ᵈKUR ᵐKi-ú-bé DUMU Ú-ka-li

GsK 5 (MA) 1’. 2’. 3’. 4’. 5’. 6’. 7’. 8’. 9’. 10’. 11’. 12’. 13’. 14’.

[. . .] DUMU [. . .] KÙ.BABBAR [. . .] i-na DAM.[GÀR-ru-tì (?)] DUMU ᵐBu-[x. . .] LÚ.DAM.GÀR ᵐA-bu-GI.NA a-na ḫa-ra-[an . . .] it-ti-di-in i-na tu-ar KASKAL-ni KÙ.BABBAR a-na ᵐA-x-ú ú-sal-la-am šum-ma i-na tu-a-ar KASKAL-ni-šu m

GsK 5 

 473

As he supports us, after our fate carries us off, Zū-Aštarti shall take the hand of his wife and his children and go wherever they please, and Ḫabu, his father, shall not leave the door of Zū-Aštarti’s house. Now I have given Iadi-Dagan, my son, as son of Ḫabu. If, in the future, Zū-Aštarti and Dagan-simātī, his wife, should say to Ḫabu and Zū-Aštarti, his son: “Leave our house,” Zū-Aštarti and his wife shall pay 100 shekels of silver to Ḫabu and his son, and go wherever they please. And if, in the future, Ḫabu and Zū-Aštarti, his son, should say to Zū-Aštarti and Dagan-simātī, his wife, “We want to leave your house,” Ḫabu and his son shall pay 100 shekels of silver to Zū-Aštarti and his wife and go wherever they please. Seal of Abī-naʿmī Seal of Ganu son of Šarianti son of Bēlu-Dagan son of Ganu Seal of Baʿal-kabar Seal of son of Kāpī-Dagan son of Aḫu-[. . .] Baʿal-qarrād son of Dagan-ekallī Seal of Eḫli-Dagan Seal of son of Išme-Dagan Kiubi son of Ukāli

[. . .] son of [. . .] silver [. . .] for the co[mmerce (?)] son of Bu[. . .] merchant Abu-kīn gave for the business venture At the return of the business venture he will pay the silver to Abu-kīn (?) If, at the return of his trip,

474  15’. 16’. 17’. 18’. 19’. 20’. 21’. 22’. 23’. 24’. 25’. 26’.

 Appendix

KÙ.BABBAR la ú-sal-la-am KASKAL LUGAL i-ṣa-bat IGI ᵐTu-ri-ia lú ma-ki-sú IGI ᵐA-ḫi-ᵈKUR lú ma-ki-su-ma IGI ᵐRi-bi-ia IGI ᵐKi-[x . . .] ša [. . .] IGI [. . .] IGI [. . .]

Hirayama 17 (SH) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12.

ᶠᵈ30-ú-ma-⸢ri⸣ ᶠ⸢AMA-ši⸣ DUMU.MUNUS Ni-na-eʾ?-e ù ᵐTal-ma-aʾ-e LÚ.MEŠ uruKar-ša ᶠ!I-ra-am-e-la DUMU.MUNUS a-na 15 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ 1 ANŠE ù 5 me-at URUDU.MEŠ a-na ŠÀM.TIL.⸢LA.ÀM⸣ a-na SAG.DU-ši-ma a-na GÉME-ut-ti š[a] ᵐḪi-ma-ši-ᵈKUR DUMU Dú-u-da it-ta-din ur-ra-am še-ra-am ma-an-nu-me-e i-na EGIR-ki u₄-mimeš i-bá-qa-ar-ši KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ TÉŠ.BI a-na ᵐḪi-ma-ši-ᵈKUR DUMU Dú-u-da ⸢li-id-din⸣-ma DUMU.MUNUS ša-a-ši lil-‹‹il››-qì

13.

NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐᵈKUR-GAL DUMU EN-ᵈKUR

14. 15. 16. 17.

IGI ᵐᵈKUR-GAL DUMU EN-ᵈKUR IGI ᵐBa-aṣ-ṣú DUMU A-ta-wa IGI ᵐRi-bi-ᵈKUR DUMU Zu-Aš-tar-ti IGI ᵐZu-Aš-tar-ti DUMU A-maš-du

18. 19.

[I]GI ᵐTal-ma-[aʾ-e DU]MU Ú-ri-li [IGI] ᵐḪu-ut-[x-x DU]MU Pu-ur-pí-[r]a

Hirayama 17 

he should not pay the silver, he will take the king’s business venture. Before Tūria the tax collector Before Aḫī-Dagan the tax collector Before Ribia Before Ki[. . .] . . . Before [. . .] Before [. . .]

Šaggar-umarri, Ummiši, Mārat, and Ninaʾe and Talmaʾe, people from Karša sold Irʾam-ila, a (?) daughter, for 15 shekels of silver, 1 donkey, and 500 shekels of copper, full price, of her own will, into slavery t[o] Ḫimaši-Dagan son of Dūdu. In the future, whoever at a later time should claim her, he shall give the equivalent silver to Ḫimaši-Dagan son of Dūdu and take that daughter.

Seal of Dagan-kabar son of Bēlu-Dagan _______________________________________________

Before Dagan-kabar son of Bēlu-Dagan Before Baṣṣu son of Atawa Before Rībi-Dagan son of Zū-Aštarti Before Zū-Aštarti son of Amašdu [Be]fore Talma[ʾe s]on of Urri-ili [Before] Ḫut[. . . s]on of Purpi[r]a

 475

476 

 Appendix

20. 21.

IGI ᵐ⸢Tal!⸣-ma-a[ʾ]-e ⸢DUMU⸣ Pu-ḫi-ŠEŠ ⸢LÚ.MEŠ uruKar-ša⸣

22. 23.

IGI ᵐDINGIR-lì-a-bi ⸢DUMU⸣ Ma-ra-⸢at⸣

Hirayama 18 (SH) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

ᵐAz-me-Te DUMU A-na-an-Te ša uruA-ti-ra ᶠKa-an-za-e DAM-šú ‹a-na› 22 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ ŠÀM.TIL.LA a-na SAG.DU a-na GÉME-ut-ti ša ᵐᵈKUR-ba-ni DUMU ⸢Si?⸣-na it-ta-din-ši BA.UG₇ TI.LA GÉME ša ᵐᵈKUR-ba-ni ši-it

8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15.

šúm-ma i-na EGIR u₄-mimeš ma-am-ma i-bá-q[a-r]ù-ši 1 MUNUS SAG₁₀ li-din lil-qi-ši NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐMa-ṣí-ia DUMU Zu-Ḫu-ra IGI ᵐGa₁₄-ma-la DUMU Ša-ra-e IGI ᵐPa-za-ka DUMU Ke-la-e ša uruA-ti-ra

Hirayama 33 (S) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11.

2 me-ti KÙ.BABBAR ṣur-pu NA₄ uruE-marki KI Še?-i?-ba-aḫ-li md EN-ka-bar ù Ì-lí-dDa-gan m I-[d]í-dDa-gan DUMU d[IŠ]KUR-a-bu É-šu ù DUMU.MEŠ-šu ŠU BA.AN.TI.MEŠ MU 8 KÁM KÙ.BABBAR Ì.LÁ.E! ú-še-et-te-eq-ma

Hirayama 33 

Before Talma[ʾ]e son of Puḫi-šenni Men of Karša Before Ilī-abī son of Mārat

Ašmi-Te son of Anan-Te from the town of Atira, sold Kanzaʾe, his wife, for 22 shekels of silver, full price, of (her) own will into slavery to Dagan-bāni son of Sina. Dead or alive, she is the slave of Dagan-bāni. If, in the future, someone should cl[ai]m her, he shall give a beautiful woman and take her. Seal of Maṣia son of Zū-Ḫurra Before Gamālu son of Šaraʾe Before Pazaka son of Kilaʾe from the town of Atira

200 (shekels of) refined silver weighed according to the weight of Emar from Šeʾi-Baʿli, Bēlu-kabar, and Ilī-Dagan, I[dd]iʿ-Dagan son of [Ba]ʿal-abu, his house, and his sons borrowed. Within eight years he shall pay the silver. Should he let (the term) expire,

 477

478  12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19.

 Appendix

MÁŠ li-ṣa-ab IGI Zu-An-na DUMU A-bi-ì-lí! IGI ᵈIŠKUR-GAL DUMU Li-mì-šar-ra IGI Ra-ša₁₀-ap-ì-lí DUB.SAR ITU Za-ra-ti MU Ip-ḫur-ᵈDa-gan 2 KÁM.MA

Hirayama 34 (S) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15.

1/3 [M]A.NA KÙ.BABBAR ṣur-pu ⸢NA₄ uru⸣E-mar⸢ki⸣ ki-ma ⸢URU MÁŠ?⸣ ⸢ú⸣-ṣa-ab KI Ia-aḫ-ṣi-ᵈEN DUMU Im-li-ki ᵐᵈUTU-a-b[u] DUMU Mil-ki-ᵈD[a-gan] ŠU.BA.AN.TI IGI Li-mi-LUGAL DUMU Ma-a-mi IGI Ir-ib-ᵈIŠKUR DUB.SAR ITU ᵈMa-lik-ki-nu? MU Ip-ḫu-rù 2 KÁM.MA ⸢Da⸣-gal-⸢li⸣-a-bi

Hirayama 36 (SH) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

[ᶠᵈNIN]-si-ma-ti DUMU.MUNUS Al-um-mi DUMU.MUNUS Šap-ṭá [ḫu-bu-la-a]t EN.MEŠ ḫu-búl-la-ti-ši iṣ-ṣab-tu!-ši [ù š]ul-lu-mi-šu-nu ul il-e i-na-an-na [ᵐZu-Aš]-tar-ti DUMU A-ḫi-ma-lik DUMU Kut-be 40 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ [ḫu]-búl-la-ši ša ᵐᶠᵈNIN-si-ma-ti ul-tal-lam i-na-an-na ᶠᵈNIN-si-ma-ti qa-du ᶠAš-tar-um-mi DUMU.MUNUS-ši a-na GÉME.MEŠ ša ᵐZu-Aš-tar-ti DUMU A-ḫi-ma-lik DUMU Kut-be te-te-ru!-ub iš-tu u₄-mi an-ni-i ᶠᵈNIN-‹si›-ma-ti

Hirayama 36 

he shall pay the interest. Before Zū-Anna son of Abī-ilī Before Baʿal-kabar son of Liʾmi-šarru Before Rašap-ilī scribe Month of Zārati Year of Ipḫur-Dagan for the second time

1/3 [m]ina of refined silver weighed according to the weight of Emar – he shall add the interest corresponding to the custom of the city – from Iaḫṣi-bēlu son of Imliku, Šamaš-ab[u] son of Milki-D[agan] borrowed. Before Liʾmi-šarru son of Mama Before Irʾib-Baʿal, scribe Month of Mālikkinu Year of Ipḫuru for the second time Dagalli-abī

[Baʿla]-simātī, daughter of Al-ummī, daughter of Šapṭa [was indebte]d and her creditors seized her, [but] she was not able to [p]ay them. Now [Zū-Aš]tarti son of Aḫī-mālik son of Kutbe has paid 40 shekels of silver, the [d]ebt of Baʿla-simātī. Now Baʿla-simātī with Aštar-ummī, her daughter, entered into slavery to Zū-Aštarti son of Aḫī-mālik son of Kutbe. On this day, Baʿla-simātī

 479

480 

 Appendix

9. 10.

ù ᶠAš-tar-um-mi DUMU.MUNUS-ši BA.UG₇ TI.LA ARAD.MEŠ GÉME.MEŠ ša ᵐZu-Aš-tar-ti DUMU A-ḫi-ma-lik šu-nu

11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19.

ur-ra-am še-ra-am i-na EGIR u₄-mi ma-am-ma áš-šúm ᶠᵈNIN-si-ma-ti ù DUMU.MUNUS-ši a-na muḫ-ḫi ᵐZu-Aš-tar-ti DUMU A-ḫi-ma-lik la-a i-ra-gu-um ša i-ra-gu-um ṭup-pu an-nu-ú i-la!- ʾ-e-šú a-nu-ma a-šar KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ i-ru-ub 25 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ NÍG.MUSSA-ši a-na ᵐAḫ-la-ú DUMU Ab-ba-ni i-ru-ub 15 EN ḫu-búl-li-ši lil-qì

20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28.

NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐA-ḫi-ma-lik LÚ.U[GULA] NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐAḫ-la-ú DUMU ᵈÉ-a-SAG₁₀ DUMU Ab-ba-ni DUMU Mut-ri-ᵈU-ub NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐA-ba NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐA-bi-ᵈ30 D[UM]U Ab-di-ia DUMU Še-i [IGI ᵐŠu]r!-ši-ᵈKUR DUMU Ḫi-id-da [IGI ᵐKa!]-pí-ᵈKUR DUMU Ú-gi-ni [IGI ᵐEN]-GAL DUMU Iš-ma-ᵈKUR [IGI . . .]-wa DUMU ᵈKUR-GAL DUMU A-ḫi-i IGI ᵐŠur-ši-ᵈKUR DUMU A-bu-un-[ni]

Hirayama 37 (SH) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11.

ᶠᵈU-DINGIR-lì DUMU.MUNUS ᵐAr-wi DUMU MUŠ.MEŠ a-kán-na iq-[b]i ma-a i-na MU KALA.GA ki-i 3 SÌLA ŠE.MEŠ a-na 1 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR iz-za-az ša i-pal-la-ḫa-an-ni ia-nu i-na-an-na ᵐZu-Aš-tar-ti DUMU A-ḫi-ma-lik DUMU Kut-be 25 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR ḫu-búl-li-ia ul-tal-lam ù MU KALA.GA iš-tu NINDA.MEŠ ù A.MEŠ ub!-tal-li-ṭa-an-ni šúm-ma i-na EGIR u₄-mi ma-am-ma fdU-DINGIR-lì a-na bá-qa-ri il₅-la-a 1 ZI ar-da-ta a-na Zu-Aš-tar-ti li-din lil-qì-ši a-nu-ma a-šar 25 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR i-ru-ub a-na le-et I-si-ir-ti DUMU.MUNUS ᵈKUR-ta-li DUMU Ia-šur-ᵈKUR

12. 13.

NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐEN-GAL DUMU Ta-e DUMU Id-dì-e

NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐA-bi-ᵈ30 DUMU LI-EN DUMU Šur-ši

Hirayama 37 

 481

and Aštar-ummī, her daughter, dead or alive, will be the slaves of Zū-Aštarti son of Aḫī-mālik. In the future, at a later time, no one will raise a claim concerning Baʿla-simātī and her daughter against Zū-Aštarti son of Aḫī-mālik. Whoever should raise a claim, this tablet will prevail over him. Now where the silver entered: 25 shekels of silver, her terḫatu, went to Aḫlamû son of Abbanu. Let her creditors take 15 (shekels of silver). Seal of Aḫī-mālik, the Over[seer] (of the Land) Seal of Aḫlamû son of Ea-damiq son of Abbanu son of Mutri-Teššub Seal of Aba Seal of Abī-Šaggar s[o]n of Abdia son of Šeʾi [Before Šu]rši-Dagan son of Ḫidda [Before Kā]pī-Dagan son of Uginu [Before Bēlu]kabar son of Išma-Dagan [Before . . .]wa son of Dagan-kabar son of Aḫiu Before Šurši-Dagan son of Abun[ni]

Baʿla-simātī daughter of Arwu son of Pitnu spo[k]e as follows: “In the year of hardship, when 3 qû of barley corresponded to 1 shekel of silver, there was no one to support me. Now Zū-Aštarti son of Aḫī-mālik son of Kutbe paid 25 shekels of silver, my debt, and kept me alive in the year of hardship with bread and water.” If, in the future, someone should come up to claim Baʿla-ilī, he shall give one female slave to Zū-Aštarti and take her. Now where 25 shekels of silver entered: to Isirtu daughter of Dagan-taliʾ son of Iašur-Dagan. Seal of Bēlu-kabar son of Taʾe son of Iddiʾe

Seal of Abī-Šaggar son of Zimrī-bēlu son of Šuršu

482  14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19.

 Appendix

NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐBu-la-li DUMU Ì-lí NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐŠ[ur-š]i-ᵈKUR DUMU [Bi!-li!]-la IGI ᵐEN-GAL DUMU Iš-ma-ᵈKUR IGI ᵐIa-di-ᵈKUR DUMU Šap-ṭá

Hirayama 38 (SH) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.

ᵐPa-zu-ri-ᵈKUR DUMU [. . .] a-kán-na iq-bi m[a-a a-nu-ma] ᵐAm-⸢za⸣-ḫi [D]UMU A-bi-ᵈ[KUR! LÚ.Ú.LU-ut-ti-ia] ša 56 KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ KÙ.BABBAR.ME[Š ša-a-šú uḫ-tal-li-iq] ù DAM-[t]a₅ ša NÍG.MUS[SA at-ta-din-šu! u₄-mimeš ša] ᵐPa-zu-ri-ᵈKUR ù [ᶠᵈKUR-si-ma-ti! DUMU.MUNUS-šú! ba-al-ṭu] li-ip-la-ḫa-na-[a-ši EGIR ši-im-ti-ni] ub-ba-la-na-ši Š[U! DAM-šú ù DUMU.MEŠ-šú] li-iṣ-bat-ma a-šar [ŠÀ-šú lil-lik]

10. 11. 12. 13’. 14’. 15’. 16’. 17’. 18’. 19’. 20’. 21’. 22’.

šum-ma ᵐAm-za-ḫi a-na pa-ni ᵐP[a-zu-ri-ᵈKUR] ù ᶠᵈKUR-si-ma-ti DUMU.MUNUS-[šú i-qab-bi] ma-a ⸢iš⸣-tu É-[k]u-nu a-t[a-al-lak] [. . .] [. . .] [. . .] [. . .] [. . .] [šum-ma ᵐPa-zu-ri-ᵈKUR ù ᶠᵈKUR-si-ma]-ti a-na [pa-ni ᵐAm-za-ḫi] [i-qab-bu-ú ma-a iš-tu É-ni at]-lak-ma [. . .] [. . .]-am-me a-na KÙ.BABBAR.ME[Š-šu-nu NU.TUKU ᵐAm-za-ḫi] Š[U DAM-š]ú DUMU.MEŠ-šú li-iṣ-ba[t-ma] a-šar ŠÀ-šú [lil-lik]

23’. šum-ma mAm-za-ḫi BA.U[G₇-ma DUMU.MEŠ-šú (?)] 24’. m[P]a-zu-ri-dK[UR] ù [fdKUR-si-ma-ti DUMU.MUNUS-šú] 25’. li-ip-la-ḫu a-šar ŠÀ-š[ú-nu lil-li-ku] 26’. [N]A₄.KIŠIB ᵐZu-aš-tar-ti 27’. DUMU ⸢A-lál⸣-AD

NA₄.KI[ŠIB . . .] DUMU A-lál-[AD]

Hirayama 38 

Seal of Bulālu son of Ilī Seal of Š[urš]i-Dagan son of [Bili]la Before Bēlu-kabar son of Išma-Dagan Before Iadi-Dagan son of Šapṭa

Pazuri-Dagan son of . . . spoke as follows: “[Now] Amzaḫi [s]on of Abī-[Dagan is my amēlūtu] for 56 shekels of silver. [I canceled that] silve[r] and [I gave him] a wi[f]e together with her dow[ry. As long as] Pazuri-Dagan and [Dagan-simātī, his daughter, should live], he shall support u[s. As our fate] carries us off, he shall take the ha[nd of his wife and his children] [and go] wherever [he pleases]. If Amzaḫi [should say] to P[azuri-Dagan] and Dagan-simātī [his] daughter, “I want to [leave y]our house” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . [If Pazuri-Dagan and Dagan-simā]tī [should say] to [Amzaḫi], [“Le]ave [our house” . . .] . . . [they will have no (right) to their] silver. [Amzaḫi] shall tak[e] the ha[nd of hi]s [wife] and his children [and go] wherever he pleases. If Amzaḫi di[es, his sons (?)] shall support [P]azuri-Da[gan] and [Dagan-simātī, his daughter], [and go] wherever they please. [S]eal of Zū-Aštarti son of Alal-abu

Se[al of . . .] son of Alal-[abu]

 483

484  28’. 29’. 30’. 31’.

 Appendix

[N]A₄.KIŠIB ᵐAm-za-ḫi DUMU Ḫa-az-ri NA₄.[KIŠIB ᵐÚ]-kal-ᵈKUR [DUMU] Ḫu-za-me

NA₄.K[IŠIB . . .] DUMU [. . .] NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐᵈKUR-⸢ta-li⸣ DUMU Ḫu-za-me

Hirayama 39 (SH) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19.

[i]š-tu u₄-mi an-ni-[i] ᵐDINGIR-lì-a-ḫi DUMU A-ḫi-ia DU[MU? . . .] a-kán-na iq-bi [ma-a a-nu-ma] 25 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR ḫu-bu-[la-ku-ma] ù ᵐIk-mu-ᵈKUR ŠE[Š-ia] 25 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR a-[na LÚ.EN ḫu-búl-la]-ti-ia ú-šal-li-im [. . .] ša a-na [. . .] ir-ta-[. . .] ša a-š[ar (?) . . .] it-ta-[din (?) . . .] ki-i-mu-[u KÙ.BABBAR ša ᵐIk-mu-ᵈKUR ŠEŠ-ia] a-na LÚ.[EN ḫu-búl-la-ti-ia] ú-šal-li-i-mu [È ḪA.LA-ia a-na ša-a-šú at-ta-din] ur-ra-am še-ra-am [ma-am-ma aš-šum É ḪA.LA-ia] a-na muḫ-ḫi mIk-mu-dKUR ŠEŠ-ia ù DUMU.MEŠ-šu la i-‹ra›-gu-mu ša i-ra-gu-um KÙ.BABBAR mi-it-ḫa-ri-i[š] li-id-din-šú É ḪA.LA-ia lil-qì

20. 21. 22. 23. 24.

IGI ᵐNa-i-ᵈKUR DUMU Re-eʾ-ṣi-ia IGI ᵐMu-mu DUMU Mu-ti IGI ᵐḪi-ma-ši-ᵈKUR DUMU I-še-ia IGI ᵐIb-ni-ᵈKUR DUMU A-ḫu-un-na IGI ᵐKa-pí-ᵈKUR LÚ.DUB.SAR

25. 26.

NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐMu-mu NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐḪi-ma-ši-ᵈKUR

Hirayama 39 

[S]eal of Amzaḫi son of Ḫazru Se[al of U]kal-Dagan [son of] Ḫuzāmu

 485

Se[al of. . .] son of . . . Seal of Dagan-taliʾ son of Ḫuzāmu

[F]rom thi[s] day Ilī-aḫī son of Aḫia so[n of . . .] spoke as follows: [“Now] [I am] indebted for 25 shekels of silver and Ikmu-Dagan, [my] broth[er], paid 25 shekels of silver t[o] my [credito]r . . . Whoever . . . . . . Whoever . . . gav[e (?) . . .] In exchan[ge for the silver that Ikmu-Dagan, my brother], paid to [my] cr[editor], [I gave him my house and my share of inheritance]. In the future, [no one] shall raise a claim [concerning my house and my share of inheritance] against my brother Ikmu-Dagan and his children. Whoever should raise a claim shall pay the equivalent (silver) and take the house and my share of inheritance. Before Naʾi-Dagan son of Rēṣia Before Mumu son of Mūtu Before Ḫimaši-Dagan son of Išeia Before Ibni-Dagan son of Aḫunna Before Kāpī-Dagan scribe Seal of Mumu Seal of Ḫimaši-Dagan

486 

 Appendix

Hirayama 40 (SH) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.

ᵐIr-bi-lu ù ᵐQa-la-la-din DUMU.MEŠ Šal-la-e-ia ša PA₅ A-bal-ḫu-mi 4 ZI.MEŠ ša ᵐZu-‹Aš›-tar-ti DUMU Ku-ut-be a-na 70 uduṣe-ni ŠÁM.TIL.LA udu zi-qi-ti ù udugu-ra-ti i[t]-ta-ás-ḫu u₄-um ša 70 ṣe-ni udu [z]i-qi-ti ù udugu-ra-ti a-na 1 ITU U₄.MEŠ a-na e-da-ni-šu-nu a-na mZu-‹Aš›-tar-ti ú-šal-la-mu ṭup-pa-šu-nu i-ḫa-pí-ú

11. 12. 13. 14.

šúm-ma a-na ITU U₄.MEŠ a-na e-da-ni-šu-nu uduṣe-ni la ub-ba-lu-ni ka-ás-pu a-na UGU ṣe-ni TÉŠ.BI

15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26.

12[+ x GÍN K]Ù.SIG₁₇ ša mZu-Ba-la ù mZu-‹Aš›-tar-ti a-[na] UGU mIr-bi-li-ma [NA₄].KIŠIB ᵐKa-pí-ᵈDa-gal NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐᵈDa-gal-ta-li DUMU Ú-gi-ni DUMU Zi-im-ri-EN ša-rat Ir-bi-li DUMU Šal-la-e-ia UMBIN ᵐQa-la-la-din ŠEŠ-šu NA₄.KIŠIB ᵈKUR-ta-li NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐZu-Ba-la ši-bu ᵐZ[u]-Ba-la DUMU Ku-[u]t-be ši-[b]u ᵐᵈDa-ga[l]-ta-li DUMU A-ḫu-qa-r[i]

Hirayama 41 (SH) 1. 2. 3. 4.

A-ṣí-ú DUMU El-la-ti-dKUR GÉME a-na mZu-Aš-tar-ti DUMU Kut-be it-ta-din ù 1-en ZI KI.SIKIL SAG₁₀ a-na muḫ-ḫi ᵐA-ṣi-ú m

Hirayama 41 

Irbi-ilu and Qalāl-addin, sons of Šallaeia, from the district of the Abalḫumi-canal, have transferred 4 persons belonging to Zū-Aštarti son of Kutbe for the full price of 70 sheep in rams and ewes. On the day they pay 70 sheep in [r]ams and ewes, within one month, the term established for them, to Zū-Aštarti, they will break their tablet. If within one month, the term that was established for them, they do not deliver the sheep, silver (must be paid) for the ‘equivalent’ (quantity) of sheep. 12[+ 1? shekels of go]ld belonging to Zū-Baʿla20 and Zū-Aštarti are upon Irbi-ilu [Se]al of Kāpī-Dagal Seal of Dagal-taliʾ son of Uginu son of Zimrī-bēlu Hair bundle of Irbi-ilu son of Šallaeia Fingernail of Qalāl-addin, his brother Seal of Daga-taliʾ Seal of Zū-Baʿla Witn[es]s: Z[ū]-Baʿla son of K[u]tbe Witness: Daga[l]-taliʾ son of Aḫu-qār[u]

Āṣiu, son of Ellati-Dagan, has given a female slave to Zū-Aštarti son of Kutbe, and one young good woman is still incumbent upon Āṣiu. 20  Zū-Baʿla is Zū-Aštarti’s brother.

 487

488 

 Appendix

5. 6. 7.

Ì.⸢GÁL?⸣ ⸢u₄-um?⸣ 1 ZI a-na ᵐZu-Aš-tar-ti i-na-din ṭup-pa-šu i-ḫap-p[ì]

8. 9. 10. 11.

NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐTu-ri DUMU DINGIR-lì-ba-ni NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐᵈKUR-GAL DUMU LI-EN IGI ᵐᵈ30-a-bu DUMU Ḫu-si-rù

Iraq54 5 (S) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13.

ᵐIa-aḫ-ṣí DUMU Ma-na-nu ᵐBu-ra-mi DUMU Ut-ti LÚ.MEŠ uruKa-mi-ia GÉME a-na DUMU.MEŠ Tá-ti-ia DUMU Ia-ṣí-iḫ-li a-na 43 KÙ.BABBAR ŠÀM.TIL.LA id-din šum-ma GÉME-tu₄ be-li tu-še-li ŠU.DU₈.A ᵐḪu-ti-ia IGI Il-li DUMU Píl-su-ᵈDa-gan IGI Ma-zi ⸢DUMU Ar?⸣-im-mi [IGI …………...]-ḫi na-sí-ki

JCS40 3 (SH) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11.

[………………....] x […………….. ša?] mA-ḫi dKUR [……………... UGU? Z]i-im-ri-dKUR LÚ uruSa-r[a?] […………………….....] [………………... uṣ-ṣa-a]b? […………………….....] x [……………... š]a? 30 UD.MEŠ [………………....] x ma-la! […………...] KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ ú-ma-la [……………....] NA₄.KIŠIB mI-túr-dKUR!  DUMU A-bu-ni

JCS40 3 

The day when one person he will give to Zū-Aštarti, he will brea[k] his tablet. Seal of Tūri son of Ilī-bāni Seal of Dagan-kabar son of Zimrī-bēlu Before Šaggar-abu son of Ḫusiru

Iaḫṣu son of Mananu, Burami son of Utti, men of Kamia, sold a female slave to the sons of Tatia son of Iaṣi-ilī for 43 shekels of silver, full price. If the slave girl produces a (former) owner, the guarantor is Ḫutia. Before Elli son of Pilsu-Dagan Before Mazi son of Arim-mu [Before . . .]ḫi, sheik

The tablet is too damaged for translation

 489

490 

 Appendix

MFA 1977.114 (SH) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36.

a-na pa-ni ᵐI-ni-ᵈIŠKUR LUGAL KUR Kar-ga-mis DUMU ᵐŠa-ḫu-ru-nu-wa LUGAL KUR Kar-ga-mis DUMU.DUMU-šu ša ᵐLUGAL-ᵈ30 LUGAL KUR Kar-ga-mis-ma UR.SAG ᵐPa-zu-ri-ᵈKUR DUMU ᵐA-kal-li-na a-kán-na iq-bi ma-a ᵐA-ri-ᵈIŠKUR LÚ KUR Aš-šur 45 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR-ia ú-ka-a-al-mi i-na-an-na ᵐA-ri-ᵈIŠKUR iš-tu KUR uruAš-šur a-na lúmu-i[r-ri] it-tal-kán aš-šum 45 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR-ia aṣ-ṣa-bat-šu-mi ù ᶠᵈU-IR!-AŠ-mi AMA LUGAL iš-tu qa-ti-ia il-te-qè-mi um-ma-a a-na-ku KÙ.BABBAR-ka ú-šal-lam-ka-a-mi i-na-an-na ᶠᵈU-IR!-AŠ-mi AMA LUGAL ki-i-mu-u 45! GÍN KÙ.BABBAR ša-a-šu A.ŠÀ i-na uruKu-la-at-ti 2 IKU GÍD.DA-šu 1 IKU ru-pu-uš-šu ÚS.SA.DU AN.TA ᵐDINGIR-lì-a-bi DUMU ᵐTu-uq-na-ni ù ᵐMil-ki-ᵈKUR DUMU ᵐTu-ri-ia ÚS.SA.‹DU› KI.TA ᵐTu-ra-ᵈKUR DUMU ᵐDa-qa-ni SAG 1 KÁM LUGAL-ru₄ SAG [2 KÁM ᵐ. . .] a-na [ᵐPa-zu-ri-ᵈKUR DUMU ᵐ]A-kal-li-na it-[ta-din ur-ra-am š]e-ra-am aš-šu[m A.ŠÀ ša-a-šu ᵐSUM-ᵈIŠKUR] a-n[a muḫ-ḫi ᵐPa-zu-ri-ᵈKUR] [la-a i-ra-ag-gu₅-um ù a-na m]uḫ-ḫi ᵐSUM-ᵈIŠKUR [ᵐPa-zu-ri-ᵈKUR la-a i-ra-ag-gu₅]-um [a-ḫu a-na a-ḫi la-a i-ra-ag-gu₅-u]m! šu[m-ma i-ra-a]g?-gu₅-um ṭup-p[u an-nu-ú i-le-eʾ-e]-šu

MFA 1977.114 

Before Ini-Teššub, king of the land of Karkemiš, son of Šaḫurunuwa, king of the land of Karkemiš, grandson of Šarri-Kušuḫ, king of the land of Karkemiš, the hero, Pazuri-Dagan son of Akal-enna, spoke as follows: “Ari-Teššub, a man of the land of Aššur, holds my 45 shekels of silver. Now Ari-Teššub from the land Aššur (has returned and) to the ‘dire[ctor’] has come. Because of my 45 shekels of silver I had seized him but Tarḫunta-azammi, the king’s mother, took him from my hands, (saying) as follows: ‘I will repay your silver.’” Now Tarḫunta-azammi, the king’s mother, in place of those 45 shekels of silver, g[ave] a field in Kullati – 2 ikû its length, 1 ikû its width; (along its) upper side (it is bordered by the properties of) Ilī-abī son of Tuqnānu and Milki-Dagan of Tūria, (along its) lower side (it is bordered by the property of) Tūra-Dagan son of Daqanu, (along its) first short side (it is bordered by the property of) the king, along [the second] short side [. . .] – to [Pazuri-Dagan son of] Akal-enna. [In the fu]ture, concerni[ng that field, Ari-Teššub] ag[ainst Pazuri-Dagan] [shall not raise a claim, and ag]ainst Ari-Teššub [Pazuri-Dagan shall not raise a clai]m. [Brother against brother shall not raise a clai]m. I[f (someone) should raise a c]laim, [this] tabl[et will prevail over] him.

 491

492  37. 38. 39. 40. 41.

 Appendix

ṭup-pa an-na-a a-na pa-ni ᵐÚ-ri-ᵈIŠ[KUR] EN É a-bu-us-sí ša ᵐI-ni-ᵈIŠKUR LUGAL ᵐMa-ša-mu-wa GAL LÚ.MEŠ.DUB.SAR IN.SAR

PdA 68 (SH) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14.

ERIN.MEŠ A ⸢GIŠ⸣ ŠÀ ŠE.MEŠ ⸢LÚ! na-x⸣21 ša mAm-za-ḫi DUMU G[u!]-a-an-ni 3 GIŠ ŠÀ ŠE.MEŠ mTu-ra-dKUR DUMU Pa-[zu-ri]-dKUR 3 GIŠ ŠÀ ŠE.MEŠ mZu-⸢ba-la⸣ DUMU Ki-is-i 3 GIŠ ŠÀ ŠE.MEŠ mMa-⸢dì⸣-dKUR DUMU La-wi 3 GIŠ ŠÀ ŠE.MEŠ mIr-ib-dIŠKUR DUMU Ku-na-na 3 GIŠ ŠÀ ŠE.MEŠ mAd-da DUMU Qa-ba-ri 3 GIŠ ŠÀ ŠE.MEŠ mdÉ-a-ba-ni DUMU Ḫa-la-qi 3 GIŠ ŠÀ ŠE.MEŠ Za-dam-ma DUMU Ir-ib 3 GIŠ ŠÀ ŠE.MEŠ mŠu-ṭur-dKUR DUMU Ga-bar-ni 3 GIŠ ŠÀ ŠE.MEŠ mA-ḫi-ia DUMU DU₁₀-dKUR 3 GIŠ ŠÀ ŠE.MEŠ mZi-i-zi 30 GIŠ ŠÀ ŠE.MEŠ KÚR.MEŠ a-na muḫ-ḫi mdÉ-a-ba-ni

QVO5 2 (SH) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.

ᵐḪi-iz-mi-ia LÚ.Ú.LU-t[ù š]a ᵐKu-na-aʾ-e DUMU Ir-ri-ge ša 40 GÍN KÙ.[BABBAR.ME]Š KÙ.BABBAR-šu uḫ-tal-l[i-iq ù ᶠan]-na-ki-mi DUMU.MUNUS-šu a-na DAM-šu i[t-ta-din u₄-mimeš] ša ᵐKu-na-‹‹na››-⸢e⸣ ù ᶠx[-x-x-x DAM-šu bal-ṭu ᵐḪi-iz-mi-ia ‹‹li]p-la›› [l]i-ip-la-[aḫ-šu-nu-ti ki-i-me]-e! [i-p]al-[làḫ-šu-nu-ti EGIR-ki ši-im]-ti-šu-nu [ub-bal-šu-nu-ti ᵐḪi-iz-mi-ia ŠU DAM-šu] [DUMU.MEŠ-šu li-iṣ-bat a-ša]r ŠÀ-šu li-li-ik

21 This line is not translated because it requires collation, see Durand and Marti 2003: 144.

QVO5 2 

This tablet, before Uri-Te[ššub], the master of the treasury of Ini-Teššub, the king, Mašamuwa, the chief scribe, has written.

. . . belonging to Amzaḫi son of G[u]anni 3 parīsu of barley (to) Tūra-Dagan son of Pa[zuri]-Dagan 3 parīsu of barley (to) Zū-Baʿla son of Kisu 3 parīsu of barley (to) Madi-Dagan son of Lawi 3 parīsu of barley (to) Irʾib-Baʿal son of Kunana 3 parīsu of barley (to) Adda son of Qabbāru 3 parīsu of barley (to) Ea-bāni son of Ḫalāqu 3 parīsu of barley (to) Zadamma son of Irʾibu 3 parīsu of barley (to) Šuṭur-Dagan son of Gabarni 3 parīsu of barley (to) Aḫia son of Ṭāb-Dagan 3 parīsu of barley (to) Zizi 30 parīsu of barley (to) . . . are upon Ea-bāni

Ḫišmia is the amēlūt[u o]f Kunaʾe son of Irrike for 40 shekels of si[lver]. He (Kunaʾe) cancel[ed] his silver [and] g[ave him An]na-kīmī, his daughter, as his wife. [As long as] Kunaʾe and [. . . his wife should live, Hišmia] shall sup[port them. A]s [he supports them, after] their [fat]e [carries them off, Ḫišmia shall take the hand of his wife] [and his children] and go [wherev]er he pleases.

 493

494 

 Appendix

10. 11. 12. 13. 14.

[šum-ma i-na EGIR-ki u₄-mi ᵐKu-na-aʾ]-⸢e⸣ [a-na pa-ni ᵐḪi-iz-mi-ia i-qab-bi ma-a KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ]-ia [te-ra-mi iš-tu É-ia at-lak-mi] ⸢a-na⸣ ᵐḪi-iz-⸢mi⸣-ia [x GÍN] ⸢KÙ.BABBAR li-din⸣-ma ŠU DAM-šu DUMU.MEŠ-šu [li-i]ṣ-bat-ma a-šar ŠÀ-šu li-li-ik

15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21 22. 23.

⸢ù⸣ šúm-ma ᵐḪi-iz-mi-ia a-na pa-ni [ᵐK]u-na-e a-kán-na i-qa-bi [ma]-⸢a⸣ ul a-pal-la-aḫ-ka-mi ⸢1⸣ ME 20 GÍN a-na ᵐKu-na-e li-din-ma a-šar ŠÀ-šu li-li-ik i-na DAM-šu DUMU.MEŠ-šu NU.TU[KU] ⸢iš⸣-tu DUMU.MEŠ ᵐKu-na-e a-na ⸢UGU⸣ ᵐḪi-iz-mi-ia ma-am-ma la-a i-[r]a-gu-um ša i-ra-gu-um ṭup-pu an-⸢nu⸣-ú i-la-e-šu

24.

ᵐḪi-iz-mì-ia i-na DUMU.MEŠ ᶠAn-na-ki-mì pa-nu-ti la i-qa-ri-ib

25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34.

N[A₄.KIŠI]B ᵐIa-di-di DUMU Ab-di DUMU La-aḫ-⸢ma!⸣ NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐRA-PA-IP-ᵈKUR ⸢DUMU A-bi-ᵈ⸣30 NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐ⸢A⸣-[ḫ]u-GAL DUMU Za-bi-ḫi NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐA-ḫi-ma-lik DUMU A-da-ia [IGI ᵐᵈKUR-ta-li-i]ʾ DUMU Zu-An-na [NA₄.KIŠIB] ᵐᵈKUR-ta-li-iʾ DUMU LI-EN [NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐ]⸢ᵈ⸣A.A-GAL

RA77 5 (SH) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

ᵐIa-šur-ᵈKUR DUMU Ba-da ᵐI-túr-ᵈKUR DUMU Id-di-il-li ki-i 47 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR a-na LÚ!.Ú.LU-ut-ti al-ta-qè-šu ᶠNa-it-tu₄ DAM-su qa-du DUMU.NITA-ši ù É-su a-na qa-ta-ti il-ta-kán

RA77 5 

 495

[If, in the future, Kunaʾ]e [should say to Ḫišmia: “Return] my [silver]; [leave my house,” he] shall give [x shekels] of silver to Ḫišmia and [ta]ke the hand of his wife and his children and go wherever he pleases. And if Ḫišmia should say to [K]unaʾe as follows: “I will not support you,” he shall pay 120 shekels (of silver) to Kunaʾe and go wherever he pleases. He (i.e., Ḫišmia) will ha[ve] no (right) to his wife and his children. No one among Kunaʾe’s descendants shall raise a claim against Ḫišmia. Whoever should raise a claim, this tablet will prevail over him. Ḫišmia will lay no claim on the former children of Anna-kīmī. S[ea]l of Iadidi son of Abdi son of Laḫma Seal of . . .-Dagan son of Abī-Šaggar Seal of A[ḫ]u-kabar son of Zabiḫu Seal of Aḫī-mālik son of Adaia [Before Dagan-tali]ʾ son of Zū-Anna [Seal of] Dagan-taliʾ son of Zimrī-bēlu [Seal] of Aia-kabar

Iašur-Dagan son of Bada (spoke as follows): “I have taken Itūr-Dagan son of Iddilli in lieu of 47 shekels of silver as amēlūtu.” He has placed Naʾittu, his wife, with her son and his house as security.

496 

 Appendix

7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22.

ù a-nu-ma a-šar ⸢KÙ⸣.BABBAR-šú e-⸢ru⸣-bu 24 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR ᵐA-ḫi-⸢ú⸣ [DU]MU A-ma 1 40 MIN ᵐEN-ᵈKUR DUMU-šu 2 1/3 MIN ᵐNIN-DINGIR-lì DAM ᵐDa-[gal]-li 1 40 MIN ᵐA-lál-a-bu DUMU-ši 2 MIN ᵐḪi-ma-ši-ᵈKUR DUMU A-[. . .a]d? 2 1/2 MIN ᵐᵈ30-a-bu DUMU Ša[r!-. . .] a-na LÚ.MEŠ.MU.NINDA.DÙ.DÙ ša imŠU.RIN id-di-in 1 1/3 GÍN ᵐI-kur-Ra-šap DUMU Tu-ra-ᵈKUR 1 GÍN ᶠA-bi-SAG₁₀ DUMU.MUNUS ᵐNu-uk-ra 1/2 GÍN ᵐKàr-bu DUMU Ab-ba 3 GÍN ᶠGu-la-tu₄ GÉME LUGAL-rù 2 2/3 GÍN ᵐᵈIŠKUR-EN DUMU Še-i-ᵈKUR LÚ.ḪAL 5 GÍN ᵐI-túr-ᵈKUR-ma i-na É-šú il-qè

23. 24. 25. 26. 27.

IGI ᵐÚ-gi-nu DUMU La-aḫ-ma IGI ᵐA-ḫi-a-bi DUMU A-dú-ni IGI ᵐKi-it-ta DUMU Ba-ia IGI ᵐTi-tu₄ DUMU EN-ma-lik : DUMU A-ḫi-ú

28. 29. 30.

NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐÚ-gi-nu NA₄.⸢KIŠIB ᵐA-ḫi-a-bi⸣ DUMU Ka-pí-ᵈKUR

RE 10 (SH) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.

ᵐḪe-mi-ia DUMU A-ḫi-ma-lik a-kán-na iq-bi ma-a ša i-[pal-la-ḫ]a-ni ma-am-ma i-ia-nu i-na-an-na ᵐEN-UR.SAG DUMU GUR-ᵈKUR a-na pa-la-ḫi-ia él-te-qa-an-ni 51 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ ù 30 gišPA ŠE.MEŠ ḫu-búl-li-ia ul-tal-lìm u₄-mimeš ša ᵐḪe-mi-ia ù ᶠAl-a-ḫa-ia DAM-šú bal-ṭu ᵐEN-UR.SAG lip-la-ḫa-na-a-ši ki-i-me-e i-pal-la-ḫa-na-a-ši EGIR-ki ši-im-ti-ni ub-ba-la-na-a-ši É-ia gab-ba mim-mu-ia ka-ia-an-zi-ia ša URUk[i] ù ša EDIN ḪA.LA-ia ma-la it-ti ŠEŠ.MEŠ-ia i-kaš-ša-da-an-ni lil-qè

RE 10 

 497

And now where his silver entered: 24 shekels of silver: Aḫiu [s]on of Ama 1 40 ditto: Bēlu-Dagan his son 2 1/3 ditto: Baʿla-ilī, wife of Da[gal]li 1 40 ditto: Alal-abu her son 2 ditto: Ḫimaši-Dagan son of A[. . .a]d 2 1/2 ditto: Šaggar-abu son of Ša[r. . .] he gave to the “bakers of sweet cake of the oven” 1 1/3 shekels: Ikūn-Rašap son of Tūra-Dagan 1 shekel: Abī-naʿmī daughter of Nukra 1/2 shekel: Karbu son of Abba 3 shekels: Gullatu, woman-servant of the king 2 2/3 shekels: Baʿal-bēlī son of Šeʾi-Dagan, diviner 5 shekels: Itūr-Dagan likewise took in his house. Before Uginu son of Laḫma Before Aḫī-abī son of Adūnu Before Kitta son of Baia Before Titu son of Bēlu-mālik : son of Aḫiu Seal of Uginu Seal of Aḫī-abī son of Kāpī-Dagan

Ḫemia son of Aḫī-mālik spoke as follows: “There was no one to s[upport] me. Now I took Bēlu-qarrād son of Tūra-Dagan to support me and he paid 51 shekels of silver and 30 parīsu of barley, my debt. As long as Ḫemia and Al-aḫaia, his wife, should live, Bēlu-qarrād shall support us. As he supports us, after our fate carries us off, he shall take my house, all my possessions and property in the city and in the countryside – my inheritance share, as much as it comes to me along with my brothers.”

498 

 Appendix

10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19.

a-nu-ma a-šar KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ ù ŠE.MEŠ ḫu-búl-‹‹la››-li-ia i-ru-ub 10 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ a-na le-et ᵐZu-Ba-la DUMU A-ḫi-ma-lik 10 MIN a-na le-et ᵐᵈKUR-ta-li-iʾ DUMU Zi-ik-ri-ᵈKUR 10 MIN a-na le-et ᵐŠe-i-ᵈKUR DUMU tar-ta-ni 10 MIN a-na le-et ᵐEN-UR.SAG DUMU GUR-ᵈKUR 5 MIN a-na le-et ᵐŠur-ši-ᵈKUR DUMU Bi-li-la 3 MIN a-na le-et ᵐIb-bi-lu DUMU Ḫu-li 3 MIN a-na le-et ᵐIk-mu-ᵈKUR DUMU Iš-bi-ᵈKUR 10 gišPA ŠE.MEŠ a-na le-et ᵐEN-UR.SAG DUMU GUR-ᵈKUR 20 gišPA ŠE.MEŠ a-na le-et ᵐᵈIŠKUR-UR.SAG DUMU DINGIR-lì-a-[bi]

20. 21. 22.

a-nu-ma 2 DUMU.MUNUS.MEŠ-ia ᶠA-bi-qí-ri ù ᶠᵈU-mil-ki ᵐEN-UR.SAG li-šàr-bi-ši-na-ti a-na É e-mì li-din-ši-na-ti ša NÍG.MUSSA-ši-na lil-qè

23. 24. 25. 26.

šúm-ma ur-ra-am še-ra-a[m ᵐE]N-UR.SAG a-na pa-ni ᵐḪe-mi-ia i-qa-bi ma-a ul a-pal-l[àḫ-ka-m]i ᵐEN-UR.SAG a-na KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ-šú ŠE.MEŠ-šú NU.TUKU 60 GÍN K[Ù.BABBAR.MEŠ a-na] ᵐḪe-mi-ia li-din-šu a-šar ŠÀ-šú lil-lik

27.

ù šúm-ma ᵐḪe-mi-ia a-na pa-ni ᵐEN-UR.SAG i-qa-bi ma-a la-a ta-pal-‹la›-ḫa-ni ᵐ⸢Ḫe⸣-mi-ia a-na É-šú mim-mu-šu ‹NÍG›.MUSS[A!-š]ú NU.TUKU 60! GÍN KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ a-na ᵐEN-UR.SAG li-din-ma a-šar ŠÀ-šú l[il-l]ik

28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41.

a-nu-ma mdIŠKUR-GAL DUMU-ia mEN-UR.SAG 30* GÍN K[Ù.BABBAR].M[EŠ] ša DAM-šú li-din-na-šu áš-šúm É-ia gab-ba mi[m-mu-ia] a-na UGU ᵐEN-UR.SAG la-a i-ra-gu-um šúm-ma i-r[a-gu-u]m ṭup-pu an-nu-ú i-l[a-e-š]ú NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐᵈ30-a-bi lútar-ta-ni NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐIm-lik-ᵈKUR

NA₄.KIŠI[B ᵐᵈ30]-a-bi DUMU I-ku-ᵈKUR NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐḪi-ma-ši-ᵈ[K]UR

DUMU I-ku-ᵈKUR IGI ᵐŠe-i-KUR DUMU tar-ta-ni DUMU Ú-ka-l[i] IGI ᵐᵈKUR-ta-li DUMU Ḫu-za-me IGI ᵐI-la-nu DUMU A-ḫi-ia NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐA-bi-la-li DUMU Ka-pí

RE 10 

 499

Now where the silver and the barley of my debt entered: 10 shekels of silver to Zū-Baʾla son of Aḫī-mālik 10 ditto to Dagan-taliʾ son of Zikri-Dagan 10 ditto to Šeʾi-Dagan son of the tartannu 10 ditto to Bēlu-qarrād son of Tūra-Dagan 5 ditto to Šurši-Dagan son of Bilila 3 ditto to Ibbi-ilu son of Ḫulû 3 ditto to Ikmu-Dagan son of Išbi-Dagan 3 parīsu of barley to Bēlu-qarrād son of Tūra-Dagan 20 parīsu of barley to Baʿal-qarrād son of Ilī-a[bī] __________________________________________________ “Now Bēlu-qarrād shall raise my two daughters, Abī-qīrī and Baʿla-milki; he may then place them in the house of a father-in-law and take their terḫatu.” If in the futur[e Bē]lu-qarrād should say to Ḫemia: “I will not supp[ort you],” Bēlu-qarrād will have no (right) to his silver and barley and shall give 60 shekels of s[ilver to] Ḫemia and go wherever he pleases. And if Ḫemia should say to Bēlu-qarrād: “You shall not support me,” Ḫemia will have no (right) to his house, his possessions, and hi[s] terḫat[u]. He shall pay 60 shekels of silver to Bēlu-qarrād and go wherever he pleases. “Now Baʿal-kabar is my son. Bēlu-qarrād shall give him 30 sh[ekels] of silver for his wife. Concerning my house (and) all [my] po[ssessions], he shall not raise a claim against Bēlu-qarrād. If he ra[ises a clai]m, this tablet will prev[ail over hi]m.” Seal of Šaggar-abu the tartannu Seal of Imlik-Dagan

Sea[l of Šaggar]-abu son of Ikūn-Dagan Seal of Ḫimaši-[Da]gan

son of Ikūn-Dagan Before Šeʾi-Dagan son of the tartannu son of Ukal[i] Before Dagan-taliʾ son of Ḫuzāmu Before Ilānu son of Aḫia Seal of Abī-lalu son of Kāpu

500 

 Appendix

RE 13 (SH) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11.

ᵐḪé-mi-ia D[UMU] A-ḫi-ma-lik a-kán-na iq-bi ma-a ᵐEN-UR.SAG DUMU GUR-ᵈKUR a-na pa-la-ḫi-ia él-qa-an-ni-mi ù i-na-an-na pa-la-ḫi-ia la-a i-ma-gur-mi ù ᵐZu-Aš-tar-ti DUMU A-ḫi-ma-lik ŠEŠ-ia a-na p[a-l]a-ḫi-ia ù LÚ.MEŠ-ḫu-búl-la-ti-ia šul-[l]u-mi [é]l-qa-ni-mi u₄-mime[š š]a ᵐḪe-mi-ia ù ᶠA[l-a-ḫa]-ia [b]al!-ṭu ᵐZu-Aš-tar-⸢ti⸣ li-ip-la-ḫa-na-ši ki-i-[me]-e i-pal-la-ḫa-na-ši EGIR ši-im-ti-ni ub-ba-la-na-ši É-ia ⸢gáb-ba⸣ mim-mu-ni ka-ia-an-zi-[i]a š[a] URUki ù ša EDIN [Ḫ]A.LA-ia ma-la it-ti [ŠEŠ.MEŠ]-ia ik-šu-da-ni ᵐZu-Aš-tar-ti lil-qè

12. 13.

a-nu-[m]a 51 GÍN ⸢KÙ⸣.BABBAR.MEŠ 30 gišPA ŠE.MEŠ ḫu-[búl-l]i-ia ᵐZu-[Aš]-tar-ti a-na ᵐEN-UR.SAG i-din

14. 15. 16.

a-nu-ma 2 DUMU.MUNUS.‹MEŠ›-ia ᶠA-bi-qí-ri ù ᶠᵈU-mil-ki ᵐZu-[Aš]-tar-ti li-[ša]r₄-bi-ši-n[a]-‹ti› i-[n]a É e-mì li-din-ši-na-ti ša NÍG.MU[SSA-š]i-na lil-qè

17. 18. 19. 20. 21.

šúm-ma ur-ra-am še-ra-am ᵐZu-Aš-tar-ti a-na pa-ni ⸢ᵐ⸣Ḫé-mi-ia i-qab-bi ma-a ú-⸢ul⸣ a-pal-làḫ-ka-mi ᵐZu-Aš-tar-ti a-na KÙ.BABBAR-šú ù ŠE.MEŠ-šú N[U.]TUKU 60! GÍN KÙ.BABBAR.ME[Š] a-na ᵐḪe-mi-ia li-din-ma a-š[ar Š]À-šú lil-lik

22. 23. 24. 25.

šúm-ma mḪe-mi-ia a-na pa-ni mZu-Aš-tar-t[i] i-qa-bi ma-a la-a ta-pal-la-ḫa-na-ši m⸢Ḫe-mi⸣-i[a a-n]a É-šú gab-ba mim-mu-šu NU.TUKU 60 GÍN ⸢KÙ.BABBAR⸣.MEŠ a-n[a mZ]u-Aš-tar-ti li-din-ma a-šar ŠÀ-šú lil-lik

26. 27. 28. 29. 30.

a-nu-ma mdU-GAL DUMU-ia mZu-Aš-tar-ti DAM-ta₅ li-ša-ḫi-iz-šu a-šar ŠÀ-⸢šú lil⸣-lik ù a-na mu[ḫ]-ḫi ᵐZu-Aš-tar-ti ⸢áš⸣-šúm É-⸢ia gab-ba⸣ mim-mu-ia bu-ši ba-ši-ti la-a i-ra-⸢gu-um šúm-ma i-ra-gu⸣-um ṭup-pu an-nu-ú i-la-e-šú

RE 13 

 501

Ḫemia s[on] of Aḫī-mālik spoke as follows: “I took Bēlu-qarrād son of Tūra-Dagan to support me, and now he refuses to support me. So [I] took Zū-Aštarti, son of Aḫī-mālik, my brother, to su[ppo]rt me and to pay my creditors. As long as (I), Ḫemia, and A[l-aḫa]ia should live, Zū-Aštarti shall support us. As he supports us, after our fate carries us off, Zū-Aštarti shall take my house, all our possessions, and [m]y property in the city and in the countryside – my [inhe]ritance share, as much as has come with my [brothers].

Now 51 shekels of silver and 30 parīsu of barley, my d[eb]t, Zū-[Aš]tarti gave to Bēlu-qarrād. Now Zū-[Aš]tarti shall [ra]ise my two daughters Abī-qīrī and Baʿla-milki and place them i[n] the house of a father-in-law and take [t]heir terḫ[atu]. If, in the future, Zū-Aštarti should say to Ḫemia: “I will not support you,” Zū-Aštarti will have no (right) to his silver and his barley and shall pay 60 shekel[s] of silver to Ḫemia and go wher[ever] he [pl]eases. If Ḫemia should say to Zū-Aštart[i]: “You shall not support us,” Ḫemi[a] will have no (right) [t]o his house (and) all his possessions. He shall pay 60 shekels of silver t[o Z]ū-Aštarti and go wherever he pleases. Now Baʿal-kabar is my son. Zū-Aštarti shall enable him to take a wife and he shall go wherever he pleases. And ag[a]inst Zū-Aštarti, concerning my house, all my possessions and the extant properties he shall not raise a claim. If he raises a claim, this tablet will prevail over him.

502  31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36.

 Appendix

NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐIa-ṣì-EN DUMU Kut-be NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐḪé-mi-ia DU[MU] ᵈU-EN NA₄.KIŠI[B] ᵐKut-ta DUMU A-me-i

NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐA-lál!-a!-bi DUMU A-me-i

RE 18 (SH) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13.

iš-tu u₄-mi an-ni-i ᵐᵈ30-ta-li-iʾ DUMU Ma-ti-ia a-kán-na iq-bi ma‹-a› a!-nu-um-ma! ‹‹a!-nu-ma›› 35 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ-ia a-na muḫ-ḫi! mḪa-an-na-nu DUMU Gu-ur-a i-na MU-ti ša mu-ta-ni a-na pu-u-ḫi él-qè ù ar-ka-nu mu-ta-nu i-na ŠÀ KUR-ti uruE-mar it-ta-aš-ka-nu ma-an-nu-me-e i-na ŠÀ 4 DUMU.MEŠ-ia šum-ma mMil-ki-ᵈKUR m Aš-tar-tu-li-it ù šum-[m]a fUm-mi ù šum-ma fSi-i-bi a-ú-me-e i-na ŠÀ-šu-nu TI.LA 35 KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ-ia iš-tu muḫ-ḫi mḪa-an-na-nu DUMU Gu-ur-a li-il-qè

14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23.

IGI ᵐTa-ʾ-e DUMU Maš-ru IGI ᵐARAD.DINGIR.MEŠ DUMU Ia-aš-bi NA₄.KIŠIB A-wi-rù DUMU Ba-ia NA₄.KIŠ[IB] ᵐᵈKUR-ba-ni DUMU Ma-ti-ia NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐKAR-ᵈ30 DUMU B[a?]-at-te N[A₄].KIŠIB ᵐBa-ba DUMU I[a-ku-u]n?-Ra IGI ᵐDa-a-du DUMU Ka-at-[t]e? IGI ᵐMa-qa-ra DUMU NIR-ᵈKUR IGI ᵐIk-ki-ᵈKUR DUMU Bu-ra-qu

24. 25. 26. 27.

IGI ᵐḪi-ma-ši-ᵈKUR DUMU EN-ta-li-iʾ IGI ᵐḪa-ia DUMU Aʾ-a IGI ᵐᵈKUR-ta-ri-iʾ LÚ.DUB.SAR

RE 18 

Seal of Iaṣi-bēlu son of Kutbe Seal of Ḫemia so[n] of Baʿal-bēlī Sea[l] of Kutta son of Ameu

Seal of Alal-abu son of Ameu

On this day, Šaggar-taliʾ son of Mattia spoke as follows: “Now ‹‹Now›› my 35 shekels of silver are upon Ḫannanu son of Gūru; in the year of plague he borrowed (them).” And afterward the plague took hold in the land of Emar. Whoever among my four children, be it Milki-Dagan, be it Aštartu-līt, be it Ummī, be it Sēbû, whoever among them should survive, shall take my 35 (shekels) of silver from Ḫannanu son of Gūru.

Before Taʾe son of Mašru Before Abdi-ili son of Iašbi Seal of Awiru son of Baia Se[al] of Dagan-bāni son of Mattia Seal of Eḫli-Kušuḫ son of B[a]tta S[e]al of Baba son of I[akū]n-Ra Before Dādu son of Kat[t]u Before Maqara son of Matkali-Dagan Before Ikki-Dagan son of Burāqu Before Ḫimaši-Dagan son of Bēlu-taliʾ Before Ḫaia son of ʾA Before Dagan-tariʾ, the scribe

 503

504 

 Appendix

RE 19 (MA) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26.

NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐAp-ḫa-ma-‹ᵈ›⸢U⸣ ‹NA₄.›KIŠIB ᵐMa-at-ka!-la-Da-gal ᵐAp-ḫa-ma-ᵈIŠKUR DUMU A-ḫi-ra-ḫi-qu ᵐMa-at-kal-Da-gal DUMU Ḫab-ʾi LÚ.ASGAB i-ma-ra-ia ša uruI-mar! ša a-na ᵐKa-za-a-ni DUMU ᵈ30-at-kal ša uruKa-i-lu ᵐMa-li-ia uru?x-ri-ta! ki-i ša-pár-te ú-še-ši-bu-ú-ni ki-i-mu? 1? LÚ.ENGAR SAG₁₀ ᵐMa-li-ia a-na É ᵐKa-za-a-ni e-rib la DI? U IŠ KA22 me-et ḫa-la-qa i-na muḫ-ḫi-šu-nu šúm-ma a-di 2 ITI U₄.MEŠ LÚ.ENGAR SAG₁₀ la i-tab-lu-ni a-na ᵐKa-za-a-ni la i-ta-nu i-na U₄.MEŠ! ri-qu-te 1/2 MA.NA TA.ÀM ‹i-na› U₄.MEŠ ša ši-ip!-ri 1 MA.NA TA.ÀM ri-qa-a-tu ᵐAp-ḫa-ma-ᵈIŠKUR ᵐMa-at-kal-ᵈDa-gal a-na Ka!-za-a-ni i-ḫi-ṭu

27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33.

IGI ᵐRi-ma-ni-ᵈIŠKUR DUMU DU₁₀-TU₁₅-DINGIR LÚ.ASGAB IGI ᵐᵈIŠKUR!-DA DUMU Aš-šur!-MU-KAM [I]GI ᵐAš-šur-ke-ti-še-ṣi DUMU Aš-šur-id-na-ni IGI ᵐU!-EN!-nap-šá-a-te DUB.SAR DUMU ARAD-ku-be

22 Deller (1999: 31) reads la u+bar iš-šak, “Er ist nicht Beisasse und (nicht) Kolon (?)”, referring to the plowman (p. 34) but what he reads as u+bar looks more like DI because the sign has two initial Winkelhaken, as the photograph of the tablet shows.

RE 19 

Seal of Apḫama-Adad Seal of Matkal-Dagal Apḫama-Adad son of Aḫī-raḫīqu (and) Matkal-Dagal son of Ḫabʾu, the leatherworker an Emarite from Emar, who pledged Malia of the town of . . . to Kāzanu son of Kušuḫ-atkal from the town of Kailu

In place of a good plowman Malia entered into the house of Kāzanu; He will not . . . Should he die or flee, (the responsibility) is upon them. If within 2 months they have not brought a good plowman and given (him) to Kāzanu, (then) for the idle days 1/2 mina each, and for the working days 1 mina each, as a replacement payment, Apḫama-Adad and Matkal-Dagal will pay to Kāzanu.

Before Rimanni-Adad son of Ṭāb-šār-ili, the leatherworker Before Adad-leʾi son of Aššur-šuma-ēriš [B]efore Aššur-kettī-šēṣi son of Aššur-idnani Before Adad-bēl-napšate the scribe, son of Urad-kūbe

 505

506  34. 35.

 Appendix

ITI ᵈ30 U₄ 15 KÁM li-mu ᵐdBe-er-PAP

RE 25 (SH) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.

ᵐIš!-ma-aʾ-ᵈKUR DUMU Gub-ba-a ᵐI-ia DUMU Ḫi-ma-ši-ᵈKUR DUMU Tu-ta-li-ti a-na DUMU-ia e-te-pu-uš-šú ù ᶠḪé-bat-DINGIR-lì DUMU.MUNUS-ia a-na DAM-šú at-ta-din u₄-mimeš ša ᵐIš-ma-aʾ-ᵈKUR a-bu-šú ù ᶠᵈKUR-si-ma-ti AMA-šú TIL.LA ᵐI-ia DUMU-ni li-ip-la-ḫa-na-ši ki-i-me-e i-pal-la-ḫa-na-ši EGIR ši-im-ti-ni ub-ba-la-na-ši É-ia gáb-bá mim-mu-ia it-ti DUMU.⸢MEŠ⸣-ia li-zu-zú GAL ù TUR i-na ŠÀ-šú-‹nu› i-ia-nu

10. 11. 12. 13.

šúm-ma i-na EGIR u₄-mi ᵐIš-ma-aʾ-ᵈKUR a-na pa-ni ᵐI-ia DUMU-šú i-qáb-bi ma-a ul DUMU-ia at-ta-mi ᵐIš-ma-aʾ-ᵈKUR 60 KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ a-na ᵐI-ia DUMU-šú li-din-šu DAM DUMU.MEŠ li-iṣ-bat a-šar ŠÀ-šú lil-lik

14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19.

ù šúm-ma ᵐI-ia a-na pa-ni ᵐIš-ma-aʾ-ᵈKUR a-bi-šú i-qáb-bi ma-a ul a-bu-ia at-ta-mi ᵐI-ia DUMU Ḫi-ma-ši-ᵈKUR 60 KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ a-na Iš-ma-aʾ-ᵈKUR a-bi-šú li-din a-na DAM-šú DUMU.MEŠ-šú NU.TUKU TÚG-šú i-na GIŠ.ŠÚ.‹A› li-‹iš›-ku!-un-ma! a-šar ŠÀ-šú lil-lik

20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27.

ù a-nu-ma mIt-ti-na ARAD-šú it-ti DAM-šú DUMU.MUNUS-šú ki-i LÚ-ni-ka-ri ap-ta-aṭ-ra a-nu-ma a-šar KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ e-ru-bu 52 KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ a-na le-et ᵐA-zi-i DUMU Tu-ta-li-ti na-din 50 KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ a-na ᵐᵈKUR-NIR [DU]MU Ma-ti na-din 3 KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ a-na ᵐE-ṭì-ir-ᵈU na-din 5 KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ ‹a-na› ᵐA-bi-li-mu DUMU Mì-ka na-din 3 KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ ‹a-na› ᵐBi-šu DUMU Ip-ši-li-na na-din 50 giš!PA ŠE.MEŠ

28. 29. 30.

NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐᵈ30-AD DUMU ᵈKUR-ta-ri-iʾ NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐA-bi-lál-li

[NA₄.KI]ŠIB ᵐᵈ30-AD DUMU I-ku-ᵈKUR NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐA-ḫi-ma-lik

RE 25 

 507

Month of Sîn, 15th day Eponym year of Bēr-nāṣir

I, Išmaʾ-Dagan son of Gubba, have made Ia, son of Ḫimaši-Dagan son of Tutaliti, my son, and I have given (him) Ḫebat-ilī, my daughter, as his wife. As long as Išmaʾ-Dagan, his father, and Dagan-simātī, his mother, should live, Ia, our son, shall support us. As he supports us, after our fate carries us off, he shall divide my house and all my possessions with my (other) sons; there is no senior or junior among them. If, in the future, Išmaʾ-Dagan should say to Ia, his son: “You are not my son,” Išmaʾ-Dagan shall pay 60 (shekels) of silver to Ia, his son. He shall take his wife and his sons and go wherever he pleases. And if Ia should say to Išmaʾ-Dagan, his father: “You are not my father,” Ia, son of Ḫimaši-Dagan, shall give 60 (shekels) of silver to Išmaʾ-Dagan, his father. He will have no (right) to his wife (and) his children. He shall place his garment on the stool and go wherever he pleases. And now I have released Ittinu, his slave, with his wife, and his daughter as an outsider. Now where the silver entered: 52 (shekels) of silver have been given to Azia son of Tutaliti; 50 (shekels) of silver have been given to Dagan-qarrād [s]on of Matte; 3 (shekels) of silver have been given to Ēṭir-Adad; 5 (shekels) of silver have been given ‹to› Abī-liʾmu son of Mikku; 3 (shekels) of silver have been given ‹to› Biʾšu son of Ipšil-enna, as well as 50 parīsu of barley. Seal of Šaggar-abu son of Dagan-tariʾ Seal of Abī-lalu

[Sea]l of Šaggar-abu son of Ikūn-Dagan Seal of Aḫī-mālik

508  31. 32. 33. 34.

 Appendix

DUMU Ka-pí

DUMU Ḫa-as-ia-ni NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐA-zi-i IGI ᵐBA.UG₇-ḫa-ma-dì DUMU Ka-aš-ka DUMU Tu-ta-li-ti

RE 26 (SH) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11.

ᵐIp-ḫur-ᵈKUR DUMU DINGIR-lì-du-du a-kán-na iq-bi ma-a a-nu-ma ᵐDup-pí-li-in-na él-ta-qè ù ᶠᵈKUR-É a-na DAM-ut-ti-šú at-ta-din u₄-m[i]meš ša ᵐIp-ḫur-ᵈKUR ù ᶠᵈIŠKUR-É ⸢bal-ṭu⸣ ‹ᵐ›Dup-pí-li-in-na ù ᶠᵈKUR-É li-ip-làḫ-šu-nu-ti ki-i-me-e i-pal-làḫ-šu-nu-ti EGIR ši-im-ti-šú-nu ú-bal-šú-nu-ti ŠU DAM-š[ú DUM]U.MEŠ-šu li-iṣ-bat a-šar ŠÀ-šú lil-l[i]k mDup-pí-li-in-na 1 DUMU.MUNUS-šú a-na É e-mi l[i-i]d-din-ma DUMU mIp-ḫur-dKUR DAM-ta₅ l[i-š]a-ḫi-iz

12. 13. 14. 15. 16.

šúm-ma mIp-[ḫ]ur-dKUR a-na pa-ni [m]Dup-pí-li-in-na ù fdKUR-É i-qáb-bi m[a]-a ARAD.MEŠ-ia at-tu-nu-mi mDup-pí-li-in-na ŠU DAM-šú [DUMU].MEŠ-šú li-iṣ-bat-ma a-šar ŠÀ-šú lil-lik EN.DI-šú i-ia-nu

17. 18. 19. 20.

šúm-ma ᵐDup-pí-li-in-na ù ᶠᵈKUR-É a-na pa-ni ᵐIp-ḫur-ᵈKUR ù ᶠᵈU-É i-da-in23 a-na DAM-šú DUMU.ME-[š]ú NU.TUKU 1 ME KÙ.BABBAR li-id-din a-šar ŠÀ-šú lil-lik

21. 22. 23.

šúm-ma mIp-ḫur-dKUR ṭup-pa ša GÉME-ut-ti ša fdKUR-É ú-še-la-a ṭup-pu an-nu-ú i-la-ʾ-e-šú

24. 25.

ŠEŠ.MEŠ-šú ù DUMU.MEŠ-šú a-na m[uḫ-ḫi] ᵐDup-pí-li-na DAM-šú ù DUMU.MEŠ-šú la-a i-[ra]-gu-um

23  According to Huehnergard this verbal form might be an Assyrian form of danānu, see Beckman 1996a: 45.

RE 26 

 509

son of Kāpu

son of Ḫasiani Seal of Azia Before Imūt-Ḫamadi son of Kaška son of Tutaliti

Ipḫur-Dagan son of Ilī-dūdu spoke as follows: “Now I took Tuppil-enna and I gave (him) Dagan-bītu as his wife.” As long as Ipḫur-Dagan and Baʿla-bītu should live, Tuppil-enna and Dagan-bītu shall serve them. As he supports them after their fate carries them off, he shall take the hand of h[is] wife (and) his [chil]dren and go wherever he pleases. Tuppil-enna sh[all p]lace one of his daughters in the house of a father-in-law and sh[all enable] the son of Ipḫur-Dagan to take a wife. If Ip[ḫ]ur-Dagan should say to Tuppil-enna and Dagan-bītu, “You are my slaves,” Tuppil-enna shall take the hand of his wife (and) his [child]ren and go wherever he pleases. He will have no legal opponent. If Tuppil-enna and Dagan-bītu should become arrogant in the presence of Ipḫur-Dagan and Baʿla-bītu, he will have no (right) to his wife and [h]is children. He shall pay 100 (shekels) of silver and go wherever he pleases. If Ipḫur-Dagan should produce a tablet attesting to the slave status of Dagan-bītu, this tablet will prevail over it. His brothers and his children (i.e., Ipḫur-Dagan’s) shall not rais[e a c]laim aga[inst] Tuppil-enna, his wife, and his children.

510 

 Appendix

26.

ša i-ra-gu-um-[m]a ṭup-[pu an-nu]-ú i-la-ʾ-e-šú

27. 28. 29. 30.

NA₄.⸢KIŠIB ᵐA-bi⸣-[. . .] [N]A₄.KIŠIB ᵐAḫ-la-me-e DUMU ⸢Ša⸣-dì-ᵈKUR DUMU Ri-bi-ᵈKUR IGI ᵐQàd-du DUMU Zu-An-na IGI ᵐZu-Aš-tar-ti DUMU DINGIR-lì-ba-ni

RE 27 (SH) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

ᵐAD-DIR DUMU Túl-li ù ᶠMa-na-[n]a DAM-š[u iq-bu] ᶠKa-ši-ia? GÉME-šu-nu li-ip-la-ḫa-na-š[i] EGIR-ki ši-im-ti-ni ú!-ba-la-na-ši a-na ᵈUTU um-te-ši-ir-ši wa-ra!-ša a-bal-li-la NU.TUKU

6. 7. 8. 9.

ù SUM-ᵈA.A DUMU-ia a-na muḫ-ḫi-ši la-a i-ra-gu-um ša i-ra-gu-um a-na INIM-ia lu-li-ik ᵈIŠKUR? ù ᵈUTU lu-ú EN DI.KU₅-šú

10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19.

NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐAD!-DIR! DUMU Túl-li NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐSUM-ᵈA.A ‹‹DUMU›› DUMU-šú NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐZu-Aš-t[ar-t]i DUMU ᶠḪa-ru-l[a]m-nu IGI ᵐI-túr-ᵈKUR DUMU Ḫa-as-ia-ni IGI ᵐIa-šur-ᵈKUR DUMU KAR-Da? NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐLi?-iš-[. . .] DUMU A-me-i

RE 39 (SH) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

[iš]-tu u₄-mi a[n-ni-im ᵐ]Ik-m[u-lu DUMU . . .] [ši-i]m-ti É-⸢šu DAM-šu DUMU⸣.MEŠ-šu [i-ši-im a-kán-na] i[q]-bi ma-a a-nu-ma É-ia gáb-bá m[im-mu-ia ša fA-ṣi-ti DAM-ia] [x G]ÍN KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ i-na uruA-zu a-na muḫ-ḫi ᵐA[-. . . DUMU . . .] [ᵐ]Zu-Aš-tar-ti DUMU Bi-i-ú-ši It-⸢ti-EN DUMU⸣ x [. . .]

RE 39 

 511

Whoever should raise a claim, [thi]s tabl[et] will prevail over him. Seal of Abī-[. . .] [S]eal of Aḫlamû son of Šadī-Dagan son of Rībi-Dagan Before Qaddu son of Zū-Anna Before Zū-Aštarti son of Ilī-bāni

Abī-kāpī son of Tulli and Mana[n]u hi[s] wife [spoke as follows]: “Kašia, our! female slave, shall support us. After our fate carries us off, I will release her to Šamaš. (She is) heir; there is no (other) sharer. And Ari-Eia, my son, shall not raise a claim against her. Whoever should raise a claim, let him go against my word. Adad and Šamaš shall be his legal opponents.” Seal of Abī-kāpī son of Tulli Seal of Ari-Eia ‹‹son›› his son Seal of Zū-Ašt[art]i son of Ḫaral[a]mnu Before Itūr-Dagan son of Ḫasiani Before Iašur-Dagan son of Eḫli-Da Seal of Liš[. . .] son of Ameu

[O]n t[his] day, Ikm[ulu son of . . .] [determined the fa]te of his house, wife, and children. He sp[o]ke as follows: “My house, all [my] p[ossessions belong to Āṣītu, my wife]. [x sh]ekels of silver in the town of Azu are upon A[. . . son of . . .]; Zū-Aštarti son of Biʾušu, Itti-bēlu son of [. . .],

512 

 Appendix

6.

[ù m]I-li-ia DUMU Ka-ti-ra 3? [L]Ú.⸢MEŠ⸣ an-nu-t[u₄ ši-bu-ti-ia (?)]

7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13.

É mdKUR-na-i mIa!-⸢ṣú⸣-dKUR DUMU.M[EŠ ša x]-x-a-bu Š[U.I?] a-na le-et [m…………………………………………....... G]A-[. . .] a-na 25 GÍN [KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ ŠÀM TIL.LA at-t]a-din IGI ᵐIm-ma-r[i? ù] ⸢Pi-il⸣-l[a DUMU.MEŠ ᵐZu-Ba]-la l[úḫa-za]-an-nu ⸢IGI⸣ ᵐA-x-pí-DINGIR ⸢DUMU⸣ Da-qá-n[i IGI . . .]-ia [DUMU . . . ]-mi [4! LÚ.MEŠ an-n]u-ut-te Ma-li-s[i …………….....] ⸢x⸣ IM24 [LÚ.MEŠ an-nu-ut]-te ⸢ši⸣-[bu-tu-ia]

14. 15. 16. 17.

[25 + x GÍN] KÙ.BABBAR.M[EŠ] an-n[u-tu₄] ša 2 LÚ.MEŠ.Ú.LU-te-i[a] [an-nu-tu]₄ ⸢a⸣-[na] ⸢ᶠA⸣-ṣi-tu₄ DAM-ia at-t[a-din] a-šar [t]a-⸢ra⸣-aʾ-am [l]i-id-din i-ia-nu-ma [a-šar (?)] a-na ⸢A⸣-[. . .] li-i[d-din] ⸢EN⸣ ⸢DI?.KU₅?⸣ [NU.TUKU]

18. 19. 20. 21.

ŠEŠ.ḪI.A-ia ù DUMU.MEŠ-i[a] a-na UGU É-ia-m[a] gáb-bá mim-mu-ia ⸢UGU⸣ ⸢ᶠ⸣A-ṣi-ti DA[M-ia] 1 li-im A.ŠÀ la-a i-r[a]-ag-gu-mu ša! i-ra-ag-gu-mu ṭ[up-]pu an-nu-ú i-le-eʾ-[šu]

22. 23.

NA₄.KI[ŠIB] ᵐZu-Ba-la lúḫa-za-an-ni [ …………………………….........] x [. . .] missing lines

24’. 25’. 26’. 27’.

[IGI …………………………….........] ú x [. . .] [IGI …………………......] IGI mx-te DUMU Na-aṣ-[bi] [IGI ……… DUM]U A-bi-ma [IGI . . .] x x DUMU Am-la-ki [LÚ.DUB].SAR

RE 58 (SH) 1. 2. 3. 4.

ᵐZa-dam-ma DUMU Ip-qí-ᵈKUR a-kán-na iq-bi ma-a a-nu-ma 20 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ ḫu-bu-ul-la ša ᵐPé-en-ti DUMU I-túr-ᵈKUR

24 The comparison with line 16 suggests that the sign is not SAR, as in Durand 2013b, but IM.

RE 58 

[and] Ilia son of Katira: thes[e] me[n are my witnesses (?)] The house of Dagan-naʾi (and) Iaṣu-Dagan son[s of . . .]-abu the ba[rber] [I have s]old to [. . .] for 25 shekels [of silver full price]. Before Immar[û and] Pill[a sons of Zū-Baʿ]la [the ḫaza]nnu Before A[. . .]pī-ilī son of Daqan[u Before . . .]ia [son of . . .]mi: [th]ese [four men], Malis[u], . . . [thes]e [men] (are) [my] wi[tnesses]. Th[ese are the 25+x shekels of] silver of m[y] two amēlūtus I g[ave this] t[o] Āṣītu, my wife. She shall [g]ive (this silver) to whom she [l]ikes; but if there is no one . . . she shall g[ive (it)] to A[. . .]. [There will be no adversary in court] My brothers and m[y] sons, concerning my house an[d] all my possessions, against Āṣītu [my] wif[e] – not even from afar shall (they) raise a claim. Whoever should raise a claim, this ta[bl]et will prevail over [him]. Se[al of] Zū-Baʿla the ḫazannu . . . missing lines [Before] . . . [Before ……………....] Before x-te son of Naṣ[bu] [Before …………... so]n of Abima [Before . . .] . . . son of Amlaki [the scr]ibe

Zadamma son of Ipqi-Dagan spoke as follows: “Now I paid 20 shekels of silver, the debt of Penti son of Itūr-Dagan,

 513

514 

 Appendix

5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.

a-na DUMU.MEŠ ᵐDINGIR-lì-a-bi DUMU Qu-ú-ki ul-tal-lim-mi ù mPé-en-ti DUMU I-túr-dKUR É-šú ù DAM-šú a-na qa-ta-ti ša 20 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ a-na mZa-dam-ma DUMU Ip-qí-dKUR il-ta-kán

11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16.

IGI ᵐNu-bi-ᵈKUR DUMU Zu-An-na IGI ᵐUt-ri-ia DUMU Ni-qa-la IGI ᵐZi-im-ri-ᵈKUR DUMU Ša-mi-ia NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐNu-bi-ᵈKUR DUMU Zu-An-n[a] NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐUt-ri-ia NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐZi-im-ri-ᵈKUR

RE 60 (SH) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

ᵐI-la!-nu DUMU Ba-ṣa ᵐNa-bu-zu ᵐARAD-DINGIR-lì DUMU E-e ᵐI-túr-ᵈKUR DUMU ᵈLAMMA?-ra-pí-iʾ ᵐEN-ta-li-iʾ DUMU Uz-na ᵐḪu-us!-sa DUMU Kut-be

7. 8. 9. 10.

2 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR a-na muḫ-ḫi ᵐZu-Aš-tar-ti DUMU Ma-ma 1 MIN ᵐᵈKUR-ta-li-iʾ DUMU Ḫa-ra-qà 2 MIN ᵐPu-uʾ-a DUMU DINGIR-lì-a-bi 1 MIN ᵐA-ḫi-Ba-šar DUMU Ti-ti-ia

11. 12. 13. 14. 15.

NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐᵈKUR-ta-li-iʾ DUMU Ḫa-ra-aq-qà 2 ITI u₄-mimeš mI!-la-nu DUMU Ba-ṣa il*-lik 4 ITI u₄-mimeš a-na UGU-ḫi-šú ir-ti-iḫ

16. 17. 18.

NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐZu-Aš-tar-ti DUMU Ma-ma NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐᵈKUR-GAL DUMU Ku-ku-ba?-ti

RE 60 

to the sons of Ilī-abī son of Kukku, and Penti son of Itūr-Dagan has placed his house and his wife as a pledge for 20 shekels of silver to Zadamma son of Ipqi-Dagan.”

Before Nuʾbi-Dagan son of Zū-Anna Before Utria son of Niqala Before Zimrī-Dagan son of Šamia Seal of Nuʾbi-Dagan son of Zū-Ann[a] Seal of Utria Seal of Zimrī-Dagan

Ilānu son of Baṣṣu Nabuzu Abdi-ili son of Eʾe Itūr-Dagan son of Lamma-rāpiʾ Bēlu-taliʾ son of Uznu Ḫussa son of Kutbe 2 shekels of silver are upon Zū-Aštarti son of Mama 1 ditto Dagan-taliʾ son of Ḫaraqqu 2 ditto Puʾa son of Ilī-abī 1 ditto Aḫī-Bašar son of Titia Seal of Dagan-taliʾ son of Ḫaraqqu Two full months (of work) Ilānu son of Baṣṣu has performed; 4 full months remain upon him. Seal of Zū-Aštarti son of Mama Seal of Dagan-kabar son of Kukubati

 515

516 

 Appendix

RE 63 (SH) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14.

ᵐMa-ma DUMU Ú-ma-ni a-kán-na iq-bi ma-‹a› a-nu-ma ᵐEN.GAL DUMU ᵈIŠKUR-ma-lik DUMU ŠEŠ-ia 14 5/6 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR ḫu-bu-ul-mi i-na-an-na mMa-ma ḫu-bu-la-ti-šu ul-tal-li-im ù KÙ.BABBAR-šú uḫ-tal-liq a-na DUMU-ut-ti-šu e-te-púš-šu DAM-ta₅ ú-ša-ḫa-az-šu u₄-miḫi.a ša mMa-ma ù mZu-Aš-tar-ti bal-ṭu li-ip-làḫ-šu-nu-ti ki-i-me-e mMa-ma ù mZu-Aš-tar-ti EGIR-ki ši-ma-ti-šu-nu il-la-ku! EN-GAL ŠU-ti DAM-šú DUMU.MEŠ-šú li-iṣ-bat-ma a-šar ŠÀ-šú lil-lik

15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22.

šum-ma ᵐMa-ma a-na pa-ni ᵐEN-GAL DUMU-šu a-kán-na i-qab-bi ma-a ú-ul DUMU-ia at-ta-a-mi ᵐMa-ma a-na KÙ.BABBAR-šú ŠU-ti li-i-te!-li ù šum-ma ᵐEN-GAL a-na pa-ni ᵐMa-ma a-bi-šu ma-a ú-ul a-bu-ia at-ta-a-mi KÙ.BABBAR TÉŠ.BI li-din-ma a-šar ŠÀ-šú lil-lik

23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29.

NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐI-ia IGI ᵐᵈIŠKUR-EN DUMU A-píl-la IGI ᵐIa-aʾ-ṣú-ᵈKUR LÚ.SAG IGI ᵐI-ia DUMU DINGIR-lì-a IGI ᵐNIR-ᵈKUR DUMU Zu-Ba-la IGI ᵐPa-zu-ri-ᵈKUR DUMU ᶠNa-na NA₄.KIŠIB NIR-ᵈKUR NA₄.KIŠIB Pa-zu-[r]i-ᵈ[K]UR

RE 65 (SH) 1. 2. 3.

10 KÙ.BABBAR a-na mA-li-ú DUMU Zu-la-li 10 KÙ.BABBAR mTa-bi-li LÚ ḫa-ta-nu ša mḪa-ni-ia 10 KÙ.BABBAR mI-⸢túr⸣-dKUR DUMU Ḫu-ma-mu

RE 65 

Mama son of Ummānu spoke as follows: “Now Bēlu-kabar son of Baʿal-mālik son of my brother was indebted for 14 and 5/6 shekels of silver.” Now Mama paid his debt and canceled his silver. He made him his son and will enable him to take a wife. As long as Mama and Zū-Aštarti should live, he (i.e., Bēlu-kabar) shall support them. As Mama and Zū-Aštarti go after their fate, Bēlu-kabar shall take the hand of his wife and his children and go wherever he pleases. If Mama should say to Bēlu-kabar his son as follows: “You are not my son,” Mama shall forfeit his silver. And if Bēlu-kabar should say to Mama his father: “You are not my father,” he shall give the equivalent silver and go wherever he pleases. Seal of Ia Before Baʿal-bēlī son of Apilu Before Iaḫṣu-Dagan the courtier Before Ia son of Ilia Before Matkali-Dagan son of Zū-Baʿla Before Pazuri-Dagan son of Nana Seal of Matkali-Dagan Seal of Pazu[r]i-Dagan

10 (shekels) of silver to Aliu son of Zulalu 10 (shekels) of silver (to) Tabilu son-in-law of Ḫania 10 (shekels) of silver (to) Itūr-Dagan son of Ḫumāmu

 517

518 

 Appendix

4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14.

13 KÙ.BABBAR mKa-a-ma LÚ uruTù-túl 5 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR mDa-gal-li DUMU Ša-aḫ-lu 2 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR mPu-a-šu DUMU dKUR-BE 2 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR mŠa-mi-ḫu DUMU Bi-ia-nu 2 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR m‹PN› DUMU Nu-a-ri 1 1/2 GÍN mA-ḫu-wa-qa-rù DUMU E-ni-ia 1 GÍN mWa-al-da-ḫi 1 GÍN mAš-tar-a-bu DUMU A-du?-te 1 ⸢GÍN mQu?-ú DUMU Ša?-zi⸣ 3 GÍN mBu-ra-zi-g[i-m]a il-qé

15. 16. 17.

KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ an-nu-ú ḫu-bu-la-tu₄ ša mBu-ra-zi-gi m A-lál-a-bu i-pu-ul-šu-nu

RE 66 (SH) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15.

um-⸢ma mMa⸣-di-ᵈKUR ma-a m ARAD-ma-lik ARAD-ia qa-⸢du⸣ DAM-šú DUM[U].MEŠ-šu a-na lúmar-⌈ia-nu⌉-ut-ti um-te-eš-ši-ir-šu i-na u₄-⸢mi⸣meš ša ᵐMa-di-ᵈKUR EN-šu ù ᶠ⸢Ru?⸣-ut-tu₄ NIN-šú ‹bal-ṭu› i-pal-làḫ-šu-nu-ti EGIR ši-im-ti-šu-nu ub-bal-šu-nu-ti lú mar-ia-an-nu qa-du DUMU.MEŠ-šu šu-ut DUMU.MEŠ-ia a-na muḫ-ḫi-šu la-a i-ra-gu-mu 1 li-im A.⸢ŠÀ⸣ a-na muḫ-ḫi-šu [l]a-a i-qa-ri-bu ma-an-nu-me i-na ŠÀ DUMU.MEŠ-ia a-na muḫ-ḫi-šu i-ra-gu-um ṭup-pu an-nu-ú i-le-e-šu

RE 66 

13 (shekels) of silver (to) Kama, man of Tuttul 5 shekels of silver (to) Dagalli son of Šaḫlu 2 shekels of silver (to) Puʾašu son of Dagan-BE 2 shekels of silver (to) Šamiḫu son of Bianu 2 shekels of silver (to) ‹PN› son of Nuʾāru 1 1/2 shekels of (silver to) Aḫu-waqaru son of Enia 1 shekel (of silver to) Walda-aḫī 1 shekel (of silver to) Aštar-abu son of Adute 1 shekel (of silver to) Quʾu son of Šazu (and) 3 shekels (of silver) Bura-zik[i] took. This silver is the debt of Bura-ziki. Alal-abu paid it.

Thus speaks Madi-Dagan: “I have released my slave Abda-mālik, together with his wife and his chil[d]ren, to the maryannu status. As long as Madi-Dagan, his lord, and Ruttu, his lady, ‹should live›, he shall support them. After their fate carries them off, he and his sons will be maryannū. My sons shall not raise a claim against him. Not even from afar shall they raise a claim against him. Whoever among my sons should raise a claim against him, this tablet will prevail over him.

 519

520 

 Appendix

RE 72 (SH) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

12 NINDA?.ḪI?.A 7 dugsà-tu₄ Ì DU₁₀.GA ša ᵐḪi-nu-ᵈKUR DUMU ᵐLa-aḫ-ma a-na muḫ-ḫi ᵐA-ḫi-ú DUMU ᵐTu-u-bi

6. 7. 8. 9.

4 TÚG.ḪI.A a-ri-bu ša ᵐA-ḫi-ú DUMU ᵐTu-u-bi a-na muḫ-ḫi ᵐḪi-nu-ᵈKUR DUMU La-aḫ-ma

10. 11. 12. 13. 14.

IGI ᵐZu-Ba-la DUMU ᵐTu-uq-qá IGI ᵐDINGIR-lì-a-bi DUB.SAR NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐA-ḫi-ú NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐḪi-nu-ᵈKUR

RE 75 (SH) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

30 KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ 40 DUG sà-tu₄ Ì.DU₁₀.GA ša ᵐḪi-nu-ᵈKUR DUMU La-aḫ-ma ⸢a-na muḫ-ḫi ᵐA-ḫi⸣-ú DUMU Tù-ú-bi šum-ma m⸢A-ḫi-ú⸣ DUMU Tù-ú-bi BA.UG₇ m Ḫi-nu-⸢dKUR DUMU La⸣-aḫ-ma É-šú i-ṣa-bat

7. 8.

NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐᵈIŠKUR-ra-pi-iʾ DUMU Wa-la-ti

9. 10. 11. 12.

IGI ᵐAb-ba-nu DUMU Ku-ut-be IGI ᵐZi-im-ri-ᵈKUR LÚ.DUB.SAR NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐZi-im-ri-ᵈKUR NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐAb!-ba-nu

RE 75 

12 loaves (?) 7 satu-vessels of fine oil belonging to Ḫinnu-Dagan son of Laḫma are upon Aḫiu son of Tūbu. 4 aribu garments belonging to Aḫiu son of Tūbu are upon Ḫinnu-Dagan son of Laḫma. Before Zū-Baʿla son of Tuqqa Before Ilī-abī the scribe Seal of Aḫiu Seal of Ḫinnu-Dagan

30 (shekels) of silver (and) 40 satu-vessels of fine oil belonging to Ḫinnu-Dagan son of Laḫma are upon Aḫiu son of Tūbu. If Aḫiu son of Tūbu should die, Ḫinnu-Dagan son of Laḫma will seize his house. Seal of Baʿal-rāpiʾ son of Waladi Before Abbanu son of Kutbe Before Zimrī-Dagan scribe Seal of Zimrī-Dagan Seal of Abbanu

 521

522 

 Appendix

RE 84 (S) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17.

iš-tu u₄-mi an-ni-i-im DUMU.MEŠ A-da-ab-bi-li GAL.GAL ù TUR.TUR uš-bu-ma ki-a-am-ma! iq-bi iš-tu u₄-mi an-ni-i-im i-na KÙ.BABBAR ša dEN uruBu-uz-qaki ša UGU DUMU.MEŠ A-da-bi-li i-šu-ú DUMU.MEŠ A-da-bi-li za-ku-⌈ú⌉ m Ik-ki-dDa!-gan DUMU dDa-gan-EN KÙ.BABBAR i-pa-al ù ŠEŠ.MEŠ-šu ki-ma ᵈUTU za-ku IGI LÚ.MEŠ-⸢aḫ⸣-ḫi-a GAL.GAL ù TUR.TUR

RE 88 (SH) 1’. 2’. 3’.

x [. . .] ᵐI-⸢ia⸣-[ti ù ᵐIr-ib-ᵈKUR a-na? . . .] li-ri-b[u-ma ki-ma URUki li-zu-zu]

4’. 5’. 6’. 7’. 8’.

ù šum-[ma ᵐI-ia-ti ù ᵐIr-ib-ᵈKUR] DAM.⸢MEŠ⸣-[šu-nu . . .] i-ḫa-zu [. . . a-na DAM].MEŠ-šu-[nu] NU.TUKU ⸢TÚG⸣-šú-nu i-na GIŠ.ŠÚ.A li-iš-ku-nu a-šar ŠÀ-šú-n[u li]l-li-ku a-na É-šú-nu NU.T[UKU]

9’. 10’. 11’. 12’. 13’. 14’.

šum-⸢ma⸣ ᵐI-[ia-ti] ù ᵐIr-ib-ᵈKU[R] ⸢a-na⸣ ᵐA-ḫi-i[a-ú a-kán-na i-qa-bu]-ú ma-a ú-[ul] [a]-bu-ia at-t[a-mi ú-ul ni-p]al-làḫ-[ka] ⸢60⸣ GÍN KÙ.BABBAR a-na ᵐ⸢A⸣-[ḫi-ia-ú a-bi-šú-n]u-ma [li-di-nu] [a-na] DAM.MEŠ-šu-nu N[U.TUKU] ⸢a⸣-na É-[šu-nu] [Š]U-šu-nu li-i-‹te-›l[i a-šar Š]À-šú-nu li[l!-li-ku]

RE 88 

On this day, the sons of Adabili, senior and junior, sat down and spoke! as follows: “On this day, concerning the silver belonging to the god Bēlu of Buzqa, which is owed by the sons of Adabili, the sons of Adabili are free (of claims). Ikki-Dagan son of Dagan-bēlu will pay the silver, and his brothers will be as clear as the Sun-god. Before the “Brothers” senior and junior

. . . Ia[ti and Irʾib-Dagan . . .] shall ent[er and divide according to the custom of the city] And i[f Iati and Irʾib-Dagan] [their] wives [. . .] they take . . . they will have no (right) to th[eir wive]s. They shall place their garments on the stool and go wherever they please. They will h[ave no (right)] to their house. If I[ati] and Irʾib-Daga[n] should say to Aḫia[u as follows]: “Yo[u] are n[ot] our! [f]ather [and we will not su]pport [you],” [they shall give] 60 shekels of silver to A[ḫiau their father]. [They will have no (right) to] their wives; they shall forfeit [their] house and g[o wherever] they please.

 523

524 

 Appendix

15’. 16’. 17’. 18’. 19’. 20’.

⸢ù šum⸣-ma ᵐA-ḫi-ia-ú a-na ᵐI-ia-ti ù ᵐI[r-ib-ᵈKUR] a-kán-na i-qáb-bi ma-a ú-ul DUMU.MEŠ-ia at-t[u-nu-mi] ⸢NÍG.MUSSA⸣.MEŠ ⸢ša DUMU⸣.MUNUS.MEŠ-ia id-na-nim-mi [60 GÍN KÙ.BABBA]R mA-ḫi-ia-ú a-na mI-ia-ti ù mIr-[ib-dKUR li-di-in] [a-na] É?-šu a-na DUMU.[MU]NUS.MEŠ-šu NU.TU[KU] ⸢TÚG-šú⸣ i-na GIŠ.ŠÚ.A [li-i]š-ku-un a-šar ŠÀ-⸢šú lil⸣-[lik]

21’. 22’. 23’. 24’. 25’. 26’. 27’. 28’. 29’. 30’.

[N]A₄.KIŠIB ᵐA-bi-ᵈKUR

NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐI-i DUMU ‹‹DUMU›› Ba-⸢da⸣

[DUMU B]a-ba-ia [IGI . . . DUMU] x-za-wa [IGI . . . DUMU . . .-d]a [IGI . . . DUMU . . .]-x-ia ù fdIŠKUR-É ⌈i-na⌉ É e-mì li-[lik] NÍG.MUSSA ⌈lil⌉-qu-ú-ma ù ḫu-bu-ul-la-šú-nu li-šal-li-mu

RE 96 (S) 1. 2. 3. 4.

⸢6? GÍN ù⸣ [x še-im] ⸢UGU I⸣-tú[r-. . . DU]MU ⸢Iš⸣-ᵈDa-gan 1/3 MA.NA 6 GÍ[N ù x+]44 še-im ⸢UGU Am?-za?⸣-[ḫi?] DUMU Nu-ri-ᵈDa-gan

5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18.

6 GÍN ù 11 še-im ⸢UGU⸣ x-x-x-nu ⸢ŠEŠ⸣-šu ⸢2? GÍN ù 42?⸣ še-im ⸢UGU Zi-ik-ra⸣-ᵈA[š-tar] ⸢DUMU Iš⸣-ᵈ[D]a-gan 1/3 MA.NA 4 1/2 GÍN ⸢ù⸣ [x] še-i[m] UGU ᵈGÌR-GAL DUMU Ia-aḫ-ṣi-ᵈ⸢Da⸣-ga[n] 43 še-im ⸢UGU Ig⸣-mu-⸢lu!⸣ [DUMU . . .]-ši 40 ⸢še-im UGU Ḫe-e-mi⸣ DUMU ᵈDa-gan-⸢GAL⸣ 10 še-i[m] ⸢UGU⸣ Ab-da-ma-lik DUMU Tu!-ra-ᵈDa-gan 31 ⸢še-im UGU A-bi-ka⸣-pí DUMU D[a]-⸢i⸣ KÙ.BABBAR-pu an-nu-ú ša ṣi-bu-ti

RE 96 

And if Aḫiau should say to Iati and I[rʾib-Dagan] as follows: “Yo[u] are not my sons, pay me the terḫatu of my daughters,” Aḫiau [shall give 60 shekels of silve]r to Iati and Ir[ʾib-Dagan]. He will ha[ve] no (right) to his house and his daughters; [he shall pl]ace his garment on the stool and g[o] wherever he pleases. [S]eal of Abī-Dagan

Seal of Iʾi son ‹‹son›› of Bada

[son of B]abaia [Before . . . son of] x-zawa [Before . . . son of . . .d]a [Before . . . son of . . .]-x-ia And Baʿla-bītu shall g[o] to the house of a father-in-law. They shall take the bridewealth and pay their debt

6? shekels (of silver) and [x parīsu of barley] are upon Itū[r-. . . so]n of Iš-Dagan. 1/3 mina and 6 shek[els (of silver and x+] 44 (parīsu of) barley are upon Amza[ḫi] son of Nūri-Dagan. 6 shekels (of silver) and 11 (parīsu of) barley are upon x-x-x-nu his brother. 2? shekels (of silver) and 42 (parīsu of) barley are upon Zikra-A[štar] son of Iš-[D]agan. 1/3 mina 4 1/2 shekels (of silver) and x (parīsu of) barle[y] are upon Rašap-kabar son of Iaḫṣi-Daga[n]. 43 (parīsu of) barley are upon Igmulu [son of . . .]ši. 40 (parīsu of) barley are upon Ḫemi son of Dagan-kabar. 10 (parīsu of) barle[y] are upon Abda-mālik son of Tūra-Dagan. 31 (parīsu of) barley are upon Abī-kāpī son of D[a]ʿu. This silver (lent) at interest

 525

526  19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26.

 Appendix

ù še-im an-nu-ú ša A-bi-li-mu DUMU Ì-lí-ia-ni-il lú.meš aḫ-ḫu ip-ḫu-ru-ma ù aš-šum ⸢ú*-nu⸣-te-šu ni-iš DINGIR.MEŠ iz!-ku-ru KÙ.BABBAR ù še-im UGU-šu-nu iš-ku-nu

SMEA30 925 (SH) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16.

ᵐARAD-DINGIR-lì DUMU Ša-me-ḫi DUMU Ia-x-[. . .] a-kán-na iq-bi ma-a DUMU.NITA NU.[TUKU ša i-pal-la-ḫa-an-ni] i-ia-nu i-na-an-na mḪu-si-rù D[UMU . . .] qa-du DAM-šú 2 DUMU.MEŠ-ši a-na pa-la-[ḫi-(ia)] a-na É-ia e-te-[e]r-ba ù ḫu-[búl-la-ia ú-šal-lim] i-na MU.KÁM KALA.GA a-nu-ma 2 DUMU.MUNUS.MEŠ-ia [ub-tal-li-iṭ] ù ᶠAš-tar-ta-kú[l-t]i a-na DAM-[ut-ti . . .] ᵐḪu-si-rù 1-en PEŠ₄ [b]u-un-nu ù [ᶠ. . .] a-na DAM-ut-ti ša-an-nu-ti at-t[a-din . . .] ᵐARAD-DINGIR-lì a-kán-na iq-bi ma-a x [. . .] ᵐḪu-si-rù a-ia-ši ù AMA-ia [li-ip-làḫ] EGIR ši-im-ti-ni ub-[b]a-la-na-a-š[i] a-na 2 DUMU.MUNUS.MEŠ-ia É.GI₄.A.ME ma-[am-ma NU.TUKU] lú wa-ra-ša a-bal-‹li›-la NU.T[UKU] ur-ra-ad DUMU.MUNUS.MEŠ-ia it-ti-š[ú-nu li-zu-zu . . .] 4 ME KI.LÁ.BI ša 2 DUMU.MUNUS.MEŠ-ia [. . .]

17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24.

a-nu-ma fA-gi-tu₄ DUMU.MUNUS-ia [. . .] ša a-na É-ia e-te-púš [. . .] [i-n]a-an-na um-te-eš-ši-i[r! . . .] [la]-a ip-tal-ḫa-an-ni [. . .] [ta]-al-te-qì i-na-an-[na . . .] [a-na] mim-mu-ia NU.TUKU iš-t[u u₄-mi an-ni-im] [É-tu₄ i]š-tu KÁ.GAL ša qa-ab-li x [. . .] [lu-ú la]-a i-qar-ri-ib ù šum-ma ṭ[up-pu . . .]

25 I refer to Arnaud’s edition for the critical points of the text.

SMEA30 9 

 527

and this barley belongs to Abī-liʾmu son of Ilī-ianil. The Brothers assembled and concerning his possessions (they) swore by the gods. They placed the silver and the barley upon them.

Abdi-ili son of Šameḫu son of Ia[. . .] spoke as follows: “[I have] no male son, there is no one [to support me]. Now Ḫusiru s[on of . . .], with his wife and her two sons, entered my house to suppor[t me], and [he paid my] d[ebt]. Now in the year of hardship [he kept alive] my two daughters, and I g[ave] Aštar-takultī into marri[age to . . .] Ḫusiru, first descendant, and . . . into marriage to the second (son).” Abdi-ili spoke as follows: . . . Ḫusiru [shall support] me and my mother. As ou[r] fate car[r]ies us off, no [one (else) will have (a right) to] my two daughters, the brides. He (i.e., Ḫusiru) is the heir; there is no (other) sharer. [They shall divide] between t[hem] the inheritance of my daughters [. . .] weighing 400 (shekels) belongs to my two daughters [. . .] Now Agitu, my daughter [. . .], whom I made into my house [. . .], [n]ow I have let her go, (because) she has not supported me . . . [she] took. No[w . . .] she has no (right) [to] my possessions. O[n this day] [the house a]t the central gate . . . [she will n]ot lay a claim, and if a t[ablet . . .]

528 

 Appendix

25.

[. . .] x ṭup-pu an-nu-ú i-ḫap-pí-šú

26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32.

[ᵐARAD-DINGIR-lì] a-kán-na iq-bi ma-a šum-ma 2 DUMU.MU[NUS.MEŠ-ia] [lu-ú la-a š]àr-ba-a ù DUMU.MUNUS.MEŠ a-na D[AM-ut-ti] [ša-an-nu]-ut-ti-im-ma i-laq-qu-ú a-na mim-[ma gáb-bi-ia NU.TUKU] [TÚG-šú-nu i-n]a GIŠ.ŠÚ.A li-iš-ku-nu-ma a-šar ŠÀ-šú-nu [lil-li-ku] [ù šum-ma] DUMU.MUNUS.MEŠ ša ᵐARAD-DINGIR-lì a-na pa-ni 2 DUMU.M[E] ᵐ[Ḫu-si-rù] [ta-qab-bu]-ú ma-a ú-ul mu-tu-ni at-tu-nu-mì a-na mim-[ma] [gá]b-bi-šú NU.TUKU

33. 34. 35.

ᵐḪu-si-rù a-kán-na iq-bi ma-a 20 KÙ.BABBAR 20 ŠE.MEŠ ḫ[u-bul-la] ša ᵐARAD-DINGIR-lì ú-šal-lim ᵐARAD-DINGIR-lì a-kán-na iq-bi ma-a šum-ma EGIR-nu DUMU.MEŠ a-ra-aš-ši iš-tu É-ia [. . .]

36.

NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐMa-di-ᵈKUR NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐᵈKUR-ta-li-iʾ NA₄.K[IŠIB . . .] LÚ.GAL.DUB.SAR 37. DUMU Zu-ú-zi DUMU A-wi-[ri] 38. NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐI-la-nu 39. DUMU Aḫ-la-me-ú 40. IGI ᵐMe-tu₄ DUMU Zu-uk-ri 41. IGI ᵐᵈKUR-ta-li-iʾ DUMU A-dú-ni missing lines

42’. 43’. 44’. 45’. 46’.

[šum-ma ᵐḪ]u-si-rù i-na E[GIR-n]u [i-qab-bu]-ú ma-a a-ta-l[a-ak] [a-na] KÙ.BABBAR NAM.TAB.BA-šú [. . .]x 2 ME 50? KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ [. . .]x NAM.TAB.BA-šú li-din

Subartu 17 (SH) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

Al-um-mi DUMU.MUNUS mZu-ba-la DUMU ḪAR-da a-na le-et mEN-ma-lik DUMU NIR.dKUR a-na munusú-lu-du-ut-ti aš-ba-at ù ša qa-ta-ti-ši il-qu-ú ⸢i-ia⸣-nu ù ᵐEN-ma-lik ᶠAl-um-mi a-na pa-ni ᵐKa-pí-ᵈKUR ù ⸢GAL⸣.MEŠ uruE-mar f

Subartu 17 

 529

[. . .] this tablet will break it. [Abdi-ili] spoke as follows: “If [my] two daugh[ters] [are not trea]ted well and they take (my) daughters as [second]dary w[ives], [they will have no (right)] to [all my] possessions. They shall place [their garments o]n the stool and [go] wherever they please. [And if] Abdi-ili’s daughters [should say] to the two sons of [Ḫusiru], ‘You are not our husbands,’ they will have no (right) to all their!? possessions.”

Ḫusiru spoke as follows: “I paid 20 (shekels of) silver (and) 20 (parīsu of) barley, the d[ebt] of Abdi-ili.” Abdi-ili spoke as follows: “If, in the future, I will raise children, from my house . . . Seal of Madi-Dagan chief scribe

Seal of Dagan-taliʾ

Se[al of . . .]

son of Zūzu Seal of Ilānu son of Aḫlamû

son of Awi[ru]

Before Metu son of Zukru Before Dagan-taliʾ son of Adūnu missing lines

[If Ḫ]usiru in the f[uture] [should say]: “I want to le[ave],” [to the] silver of his companionship . . . 250 (shekels of) silver he shall give . . . his companionship.

Al-ummī daughter of Zū-Baʿla son of ḪAR-da resides with Bēlu-mālik son of Matkali-Dagan as . . . and there is no one who assumed the surety for her. And Bēlu-mālik produced Al-ummī before Kāpī-Dagan and the Great Ones of Emar,

530 

 Appendix

7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20.

ul-te-li ù GAL.MEŠ uruE-mar a-na ᵐMa-ti-ia i-⸢dáb⸣-bu-bu ma-a KÙ.BABBAR-šú! ša ᵐEN-ma-lik ⸢te⸣-er-mi um-ma ᵐMa-ti-ia-ma [. . .] KÙ.BABBAR-šú la-a a-na-din-mi [. . .] fAl-um-mi-ma li-iṣ-bat-mi [. . .] ᵐLa-AD-ᵈKUR DUMU Ka-pí-ᵈKUR qa-ta-ti-ši il-qè ⸢i⸣-na EGIR-ki u₄-mi šum-ma mMa-ti-ia i-ia-nu-mi-e LÚ ša-nu-um-ma il-la-ak ù fAl-um-mi i-la-aq-qè 30 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ a-na mLa-AD-dKUR li-din ᶠAl-um-mi lil-qè i-na MU.KAM dan-na-ti ù i-na MU.KAM ša nu-ku-ra-ti ub-tal-iṭ-ši

21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26.

IGI ᵐKa-pí-ᵈKUR DUMU Zu-ba-la LÚ.ḪAL IGI ᵐᵈKUR-GAL DUMU Ṣa-al-mu IGI ᵐI-ku-ᵈKUR DUMU ᵈKUR-EN IGI ᵐA-bi-ka-pí DUMU Iš-ma-aʾ-ᵈKUR IGI ᵐTa-ri-in-na DUMU A-ṣí-ti IGI ᵐZu-An-na DUMU Ip-qí-ᵈKUR

TBR 25 (SH) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.

ᵐᵈIa-ša-ar-da-i DUMU Aš-tar-tu-lit a-kán-na iq-bi ma-a i-na MU ERIM.MEŠ TAR-WU URUki la-mì 1 SÌLA! ŠE!.MEŠ a-na 1 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ 20 gišPA ŠE.MEŠ ša mBu-la-li DUMU Ar-wu ḫu-bu-la-ku-mi ù a-na bu-bu-ti nu-pu-uḫ ù ᵐBu-la-li ub-tal-li-ṭá-an-ni-mi ù šúm-ma ur-ra-am še-ra-am md Ia-ša-ar-da-ì iš-tu É-ti m Bu-la-li it-ta-lak 1 ZI.MEŠ ki-i-mu-šú

TBR 25 

and the Great Ones of Emar address Mattia: “Return Bēlu-mālik’s silver!” And Mattia (spoke) as follows: “I do not want to pay his [x (shekels of)] silver, [. . .] let him take Al-ummī.” [. . .] La-abu-Dagan son of Kāpī-Dagan assumed the surety for her. In the future, if Mattia is not present, (and) someone else comes and wants to take Al-ummī, he shall pay 30 shekels of silver to La-abu-Dagan and take Al-ummī. In the year of hardship and in the year of hostilities, he kept her alive. Before Kāpī-Dagan son of Zū-Baʿla the diviner Before Dagan-kabar son of Ṣalmu Before Ikūn-Dagan son of Dagan-bēlu Before Abī-kāpī son of Išmaʾ-Dagan Before Tārinna son of Āṣītu Before Zū-Anna son of Ipqi-Dagan

Iašar-daʿi son of Aštartu-līt spoke as follows: “In the year when the TAR-WU troops besieged the city, when 1 qû of barley (correspond) to 1 shekel of silver, I was indebted for 20 parīsu of barley to Bulālu son of Arwu, and from starvation I was bloated and Bulālu kept me alive.” If, in the future, Iašar-daʿi wants to leave the house of Bulālu, he shall give one person in exchange

 531

532 

 Appendix

11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16.

a-na mBu-la-li li-din šúm-ma iš-tu É-ti 1 ZI i-pa-aš! a-na mBu-la-li li-din a-šar ŠÀ-šú lil-lik ù a-šar ša-ni-im-ma 1 ZI i-la-qa-a ṭup-pu [a]n-nu-ú i-la-e-šú

17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22.

NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐŠur-ši-ᵈKUR DUMU Bi-li-la      NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐA-ḫi-ᵈKUR      DUMU Kut-be      NA₄.KIŠIB LI-ᵈKUR NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐA-lál-a-bi DUMU A-me-i     DUMU Uz-na

TBR 26 (SH) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

ᵐᵈKUR-ta-li-iʾ DUMU Ta-i ḫu-bu-ul e-ni-na EN-lu-ú! ḫu-‹bu›-ul-la-ti DAM-šú iṣ-ṣa-ab-tù-ši a-na 70 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ SÀM.TIL.LA a-na SAG.DU-ši-ma a-na GÉME ša ᵐBu-la-li DUMU Ar-wu it-ta-nu-ši [B]A.UG₇ TI.LA GÉME ša ᵐBu-la-li ši-it

8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13.

[šum-m]a ur-ra-am še-ra-am [ma]-am-ma a-na EN DI.KU₅-šú el-la-a m A-ba DUMU Ba-da mdKUR-ta-li-iʾ m Im-lik-dKUR DUMU Še-i-dKUR m BA.UG₇-ḫa-ma-dì DUMU Ša-aḫ-li m ARAD-dKUR DUMU UDUN-ni

TBR 26 

 533

to Bulālu. If he provides one person from (his) household,26 he shall give him to Bulālu and go wherever he pleases. And if someone (wants) to take the person,27 this tablet will prevail over him. Seal of Šurši-Dagan son of Bilila      Seal of Aḫī-Dagan      son of Kutbe      Seal of Zimrī-Dagan Seal of Alal-abu son of Ameu  son of Uznu

Dagan-taliʾ son of Taʾe was indebted. Now (his) creditors seized his wife. For 70 shekels of silver, full price, they sold her, of her own will, as a female slave of Bulālu, son of Arwu. [D]ead or alive she is the female slave of Bulālu. [I]f, in the future, [so]meone should come up as an adversary (in court), Aba son of Bada, Dagan-taliʾ, Imlik-Dagan son of Šeʾi-Dagan, Imūt-Ḫamadi son of Šaḫlu, Abdi-Dagan son of the “kiln,”

26 I regard “house” here as Iašar-daʿi’s household, family, perhaps to be amended to É-ti-‹šu›; differently Arnaud who translates “Si, pour sortir de la maison, il fournit un esclave, c’est à Bulāli qu’il devra le livrer.” 27 I follow Seminara (1998: 555–56) who regards ašar as introducing a hypothetical clause and considers šanîmma to be an error for šanûmma or mannummê; consequently I regard the sentence as a non-vindication clause referring to claims by outsiders against the substitute person. Differently, Arnaud (1991a: 58) and Westbrook (2003b: 668) regarded this clause as banning Iašar-daʿi from taking (acquiring) a slave from someone else.

534 

 Appendix

14. 15. 16.

m

ARAD-DINGIR-lì DUMU fZa-zi i-ta-na-pa-lu-šú ᵐBu-la-lu za-ku

17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26.

NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐA-ba DUMU Bad-da NA₄.KIŠIB Tu-tu DUMU Ša-aḫ-li NA₄.KIŠIB Im-lik-ᵈKUR DUMU ⸢Še-i-ᵈKUR⸣ NA₄.KI[ŠIB BA.UG₇-ḫ]a-[m]a-dì DU[MU Ša-aḫ]-li NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐBA.UG₇-ḫa-m[a-dì] [DUMU] Ta-li-ti

TBR 27 (SH) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.

1 GÚ.UN 1 li-im 6 ME KI.LÁ.BI ša ᶠḪu-da-ti DAM ᵐA-bu-ni a-na muḫ-ḫi ᵐA-ḫi-ra-ḫa-aq DUMU Ia-ʾ-šú ù ᶠNIN-ki-mi DAM-šú EN.MEŠ ŠU-ti-ši ša ᶠḪu-da-ti i-na ITI ša A-bi-e la-qì NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐGUR-ᵈKUR DUMU Šap-ṭá NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐA-ḫi-ra-ḫa-aq DUMU Ia-ʾ-šu IGI ᵐᵈ30-ta-li-iʾ DUMU Ba-ba

TBR 28 (SH) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

⸢ᶠ⸣ᵈIŠKUR-ki-mi a-kán-na iq-bi ma-a a-nu-ma ᵐIa-ak-mu-ᵈKUR DUMU Kà-am-ma 50 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ ḫu-bu-ul! ù ᵐA-bi-li-ʾ-mu DUMU A-bi-li-ʾ-mu 50 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ ḫu-bu-ul-la-te-šú ú-šal-li-im 2 É ša-šú-nu il-qì ù i-na EGIR u₄-mi ma-nu-me-e 2 É ša-šú-nu i-bá-qar KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ mi-it-ḫa-ri-iš li-id-din ù 2! É

TBR 28 

and Abdi-ili son of Zazu will reimburse him. Bulālu is free (of claims).    Seal of Aba  son of Bada Seal of Tūtu    son of Šaḫlu Seal of Imlik-Dagan son of Šeʾi-Dagan Sea[l of Imūt-Ḫ]a[m]adi s[on of Šaḫ]lu Seal of Imūt-Ḫam[adi] [son of] Tālittu

1 . . . weighing 1600 (shekels) belonging to Ḫudatu, wife of Abunnu, is upon Aḫī-raḫaq son of Iaʾšu, and he took Baʿla-kīmī, his wife, as surety for Ḫudatu in the month of Abu. Seal of Tūra-Dagan son of Šapṭa Seal of Aḫī-raḫaq son of Iaʾšu Before Šaggar-taliʾ son of Baba

Baʿla-kīmī spoke as follows: “Iakmu-Dagan son of Kamma was indebted for 50 shekels of silver, and Abī-liʾmu son of Abī-liʾmu paid 50 shekels of silver, his debt, (and) he took these 2 houses. And, in the future, whoever should claim these 2 houses, he shall give the equivalent silver

 535

536 

 Appendix

8.

ša-šú-nu lil-qì

9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17.

a-nu-ma ᶠGa-ni AMA-ia a-na a-bi ù AMA ša É-ia al-ta-qì-ši a!-nu-ma 3 DUMU.MEŠ-ia ù ᵐRi-bi-ᵈKUR DUMU-ia ᶠGa-ni a-ba-šú-nu AMA ‹. . .› ki-i-me-e i-pal-la-ḫu-ši EGIR ši-im-ti-ši ub-ba-lu-ši É-ia gáb-ba mim-mu-ia a-na ᵐRi-bi-ᵈKUR DUMU-ia ir-ti-iḫ ù a-nu-ma ᵐRi-bi-ᵈKUR ᶠGa-ni ù ᶠNIN-ki-mi 2 AMA-mi-šu li-ip-làḫ

18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29.

ᶠᵈIŠKUR-ki-mi a-kán-na iq-bi ma-a a-nu-ma 1 TÚG 1 ŠEN ZABAR 3 ME KI.LÁ.BI 10 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ na-qa-bu ZABAR a-gu-ri-in-nu ZABAR ú-nu-temeš an-nu-ti a-na ᵐMil-ki-ᵈKUR lúmu-ti-ia at-ta-din ŠU ᵐᵈIŠKUR-ma-lik ‹DUMU›-šú li-iṣ-ba-at-ma a-šar ŠÀ-šú lil-li-ik be-li DI.KU₅-šú NU.TUKU NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐAš-tar-tu-li-it DUMU Ta-e DUMU A-lál-a-bi NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐᵈKUR-ta-li DUMU A-lál-a-bi IGI ᵐḪi-ma-nu DUMU Nu-uk-ra IGI ᵐAš-tar-tu-li-it

TBR 29 (SH) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.

iš-tu u₄-mi a[n-ni-im] ᶠᵈU-ki-mi DAM ᵐA-bi-li-mi a-kán-na iq-bi [ma]-a 60 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ ḫu-búl-la ša ᵐNa!-aʾ-m[a]-ᵈKUR DUMU ᵈU-EN ᵐA!-bi-li-mu lúmu-ti-ia ú-šal-lam-mi 2 [É].ḪI.A an-nu-ti il-qì-mi i-na-an-na 2 É [še]-e-nu a-na ᵐRi-bi-ᵈKUR DUMU-ia at-ta-din-mi [u]r-ra-am še-ra-am ma-an-nu-me-e [2] É.ḪI.A i-bá-qa-ar KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ TÉŠ.[B]I a-na mRi-bi-dKUR DUMU-ia li-din 2 É.ḪI.A lil-qì

10.

NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐᵈKUR-GAL

NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐZu-Aš-tar-ti

TBR 29 

and take these 2 houses. Now I took Gani, my mother, as father and mother of my house. Now Gani is the father and mother of my three sons, and Rībi-Dagan, my son, ‹. . .› As they support her, after her fate carries her off, my house (and) all my possessions remain to Rībi-Dagan, my son. And now Rībi-Dagan shall support Gani and Baʿla-kīmī, his two mothers.” Baʿla-kīmī spoke as follows: “Now 1 garment, 1 bronze cauldron weighing 300 shekels, 10 shekels of silver, a bronze hammer, a bronze agurinnu – I gave these items to Milki-Dagan, my husband. He shall take the hand of Baʿal-mālik, his son, and go wherever he pleases. He will have no legal opponent.” Seal of Aštartu-līt son of Taʾe son of Alal-abu Seal of Dagan-taliʾ son of Alal-abu Before Ḫimanu son of Nukra Before Aštartu-līt

On t[his] day Baʿla-kīmī wife of Abī-liʾmu spoke as follows: “Abī-liʾmu, my husband, paid 60 shekels of silver, the debt of Naʿm[a]-Dagan son of Baʿal-bēlī, and took these 2 [house]s. Now I gave [bo]th (of the) two houses to Rībi-Dagan, my son. In the [f]uture, anyone wishing to redeem the [2] houses shall give the equival[en]t silver to Rībi-Dagan, my son, and take the 2 houses.” Seal of Dagan-kabar

Seal of Zū-Aštarti

 537

538  11. 12. 13. 14.

 Appendix

[DUMU . . .]-x-wa NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐZu-zi ‹DUMU› Ḫar-a

DUMU Aš-tar-tu-li-it NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐI-túr-ᵈKur DUMU Ib-ni-ᵈKUR DUMU Ú-ri-i

TBR 32 (SH) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

ᶠDUMU.MUNUS-ᵈKUR DUMU.MUNUS ᵈKUR-AD ᶠGAŠAN-BE-a DUMU.MUNUS-ši a-na a-ru-wa-na-ti um-te-ši-ir-ši NÍG!.MUSSA!-ši ma-am-ma la-a i-la-qí šúm-ma i-na EGIR u₄-mi ma-am-ma a-na muḫ-ḫi fGAŠAN-BE-a i-ra-gu-um ṭup-pu an-nu-ú i-la-e-šú lú wa-ra-ša a-bal-li-la NU.TUKU

9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16.

NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐZu-Aš-tar-ti DUMU EN-ma-Iik NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐAD-ᵈ30 DUMU Ki-dan-na NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐTu-ri-ia DUMU SIMUG NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐI-túr-ŠÀ DUMU SIMUG

TBR 33 (SH) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11.

É-tu₄ ma-la ma-ṣú-ú 25 i-na am-ma-ti GÍD.DA-šú 23 i-na am-ma-ti ru-up!-šú ZAG-šu É.UDUN ša DUMU.MEŠ ᵐGa-ni GÙB-šú É DUMU.MEŠ ᵐBa-at-ta pa-nu-šú ᵐᵈKUR-a-bu DUMU Ga-ni EGIR-šú ᵐAt!-tu₄ DUMU Zu-Ba-la É ša ᵐA-ḫi-ᵈKUR ù ᵐARAD-DINGIR.MEŠ DUMU Ib-ni-BE KI ᵐA-ḫi-ᵈKUR ù ᵐARAD-DINGIR.MEŠ DUMU Ib-ni-BE ᵐAb-du DUMU Zu-Aš-tar-ti DUMU Qa-ba-ri a-na 31 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR É-ta₅ iš-am

TBR 33 

[son of . . .]wa Seal of Zūzu son of Ḫara

son of Aštartu-līt Seal of Itūr-Dagan son of Ibni-Dagan son of Uriu

Bitti-Dagan daughter of Dagan-abu released Baʿla-BEa to the status of arawannātu. No one will take her dowry. If, in the future, someone should raise a claim against Baʿla-BEa, this tablet will prevail over him. (She is) heir; there is no (other) sharer. Seal of Zū-Aštarti son of Bēlu-mālik Seal of Abī-Šaggar son of Kidanna     Seal of Tūria     son of the smith     Seal of Itūr-libbu     son of the smith

A house, to its full extent, 25 cubits, its length, 23 cubits its breadth. On its right: the oven of the sons of Gani; on its left: the house of the sons of Batta; on its front: Dagan-abu son of Gani; on its back: Attu son of Zū-Baʿla. The house belongs to Aḫī-Dagan and Abdi-ili son of Ibni-BE. From Aḫī-Dagan and Abdi-ili son of Ibni-BE Abdu son of Zū-Aštarti son of Qabbāru bought the house for 31 shekels of silver.

 539

540 

 Appendix

12. 13. 14. 15.

ma-an-nu-me-e ur-ra-am še-ra-am É-ta₅ i-bá-qa-ru KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ TÉŠ.BI a-na ᵐAb-dì DUMU Zu-Áš-tar-ti li-din É-ta₅ lil-qì

16. 17. 18. 19.

ù a-nu-ma a-šar KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ e-ru-bu 20 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ a-na ᵐIb-ni-ia DUMU Ma-di-Te 10 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ a-na DAM ᵐᵈKUR-a-bi DUMU Ga-ni 1 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR a-na ᵐAD-DIRI DUMU Da-a-i

20. 21. 22.

a-nu-ma ṭup-pu la-be-ru ša É an-ni-i ḫa-liq šum-ma i-na EGIR u₄-mi ú-še-lu-šu ṭup-pu an-nu-ú i-ḫap-pè-e-šú

23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30.

NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐA-ḫi-ma-lik NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐA-ḫi-ᵈKUR LÚ.UGULA DUMU Ib-ni-ᵈKUR EN É NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐBe-li DUMU Ba-ia IGI ᵐI-mu-ut-ḫa-ma-dì DUMU ᵈKUR-GAL! IGI ᵐAm-za-ḫi DUMU Eḫ-li-ia IGI ᵐEN-ma-lik DUMU Ṣa!-al-mì IGI ᵐARAD-DINGIR.MEŠ DUMU Ib-ni-BE EN É

TBR 34 (SH) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

1 me-at 15 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR ša ᵐARAD-DINGIR.MEŠ DUMU ᵐKu-la-bi [. . .] na-gi-r[u] a-na muḫ-ḫi ᵐṢa-al-mu DUMU Zu-Aš-tar-ti ù ᵐARAD-DINGIR.MEŠ DUMU.MUNUS Zu-qa-du 3 DUMU.MEŠ-ši ki-i-mu-ú KÙ.BABBAR-šu ú-ka-al i-na-an-na ᵐṢa-al-mu a-na ŠU.MEŠ-ti ša DAM.MEŠ-šu DUMU.MEŠ-‹šu› i-te-ru-ub DAM-šu DUMU.MEŠ-šu ul-te-ṣi ki-i-me-e mṢa-al-mu KÙ.BABBAR an-na-am ú-šal-lam ṭup-pa an-na-am i-ḫé-pí

9. 10. 11. 12.

šum-ma mṢa-al-mu BA.UG₇ ba-li-iṭ m Zu-Aš-tar-ti a-bu-šu aš-šum DAM-šu DUMU.MEŠ-šu a-na muḫ-ḫi-ša la-a i-ra-gu₅-um ‹‹ša i-ra-gu₅-um››

lú

TBR 34 

Whoever in the future should claim the house, he shall give the equivalent silver to Abdu son of Zū-Aštarti and take the house. And now where the silver entered: 20 shekels of silver to Ibnia son of Mādī-Te 10 shekels of silver to the wife of Dagan-abu son of Gani 1 shekel of silver to Abī-kāpī son of Daʿu. Now the old tablet of this house has been lost; if, in the future, (someone) should produce it, this tablet will break it. Seal of Aḫī-mālik Seal of Aḫī-Dagan the Overseer son of Ibni-Dagan, owner of the house Seal of Bēlu son of Baia Before Imūt-ḫamadi son of Dagan-kabar Before Amzaḫi son of Eḫlia Before Bēlu-mālik son of Ṣalmu Before Abdi-ili son of Ibni-BE owner of the house

115 shekels of silver belonging to Abdi-ili son of Kulabu [. . .] the herald are upon Ṣalmu son of Zū-Aštarti, and Abdi-ili holds the daughter of Zuqadu and her three sons in lieu of the silver. Now Ṣalmu entered as pledge for his wife and ‹his› children and released his wife and his children. When Ṣalmu will pay this silver, he shall break this tablet. Be Ṣalmu dead or alive, Zū-Aštarti, his father, concerning his wife and his sons, shall not raise a claim. ‹‹Whoever should raise a claim››

 541

542 

 Appendix

13. 14.

ša i-ra-gu₅-um ṭup-pu an-nu-ú i-li-[e-šu]

15. 16.

[NA₄].KIŠIB ᵐIa-ra-LÚ [DUMU Ma-at]-ka-li-ᵈKUR GAL.LÚ.MEŠ.GIŠ.GIGIR

TBR 36 (SH) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25.

a-na pa-ni LÚ.UGULA KALAM.MA ᵐÚ-gi-nu D[UMU Làḫ-ma] it-ti ᵐA-bi-ᵈ30 ù ᵐAb-ba DUMU.M[EŠ] A-pí-l[a] a-na di-ni ís-ni-q[u ᵐ]Ú-gi-nu a-kán-[na] iq-bi ma-a ᵐA-pí-la a-ba-šu-nu 77 [GÍN K]Ù.BABBAR.MEŠ ḫu-bu-la-ku-mi ù ᵐAb-ba a-kán-na iq-bi ma-a i-na KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ ḫu-búl-li ša-a-šú ú-ul su-um-mu-ḫa-ku-mi ù ‹ᵐ›A-bi-ᵈ30 ᵐAb-ba iš-tu di-ni a-na pa-ni LÚ.UGULA [KALA]M.MA il-te-ʾ-e-šu ù LÚ.UGULA KALAM.MA [ᵐÚ-g]i-nu a-na NAM.ÉRIM a-kán-na id-din ma-a šúm-ma KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ [ḫu-b]úl-lu₄ an-ni-tu₄ ú-ul ša a-bi-šu-mi ù ᵐÚ-gi-nu a-na [pa]-ni DINGIR.MEŠ e-te-ru-ub ù mA-bi-d30 KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ ša-a-šú šu-ul-lu-mi ú-ul i-li-ʾ-e ù A.ŠÀ.ḪI.A ka-ia-an-za ša a-bi-šu ša KÁ uruI[z]-bi ki-i-mu-ú KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ ša-a-šú ḫu-búl-li ša a-bi-šu a-na mÚ-gi-ni DUMU Láḫ-ma it-ta-din 4 aš-lu ša 38 IKU.MEŠ i-na ba!-li-ti 2 aš-lu₄ ša 22 IKU.MEŠ a-na pa-ni dKUR 4 aš-lu₄ ša 45 IKU.MEŠ i-na e-bir₅-ta-a-an i-na K[Á]-bi ka-pí A.ŠÀ.MEŠ an-na-tu₄ ša mA-bi-d30 ù mAb-ba DUMU.MEŠ A-pí-la a-na mÚ-gi-nu DUMU Làḫ-ma ki-i-mu-ú 77 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ ša ḫu-búl-li ša a-bi!-šu-nu it-ta-an-nu ù 2 aš-lu i-na ŠÀ A.ŠÀ.MEŠ ša mGUR-dKUR DUMU Qí-ri-dKUR DUMU Na-mar-ti ur-ra-am še-ra-am ᵐÚ-gi-nu aš-šum 77 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ ša-a-šú a-na muḫ-ḫi ᵐA-bi-ᵈ30

26. 27. 28.

ù ᵐAb-ba DUMU.MEŠ A-pí-[l]a la-a i-ra-gu-um ù ᵐA-bi-d30 ù ᵐAb-ba DUMU.ME A-pí-la aš-šum A.ŠÀ.MEŠ ša KÁ-bi Iz-bi ša a-bi-šu-nu a-na muḫ-ḫi ᵐÚ-gi-nu

TBR 36 

 543

Whoever should raise a claim, this tablet will preva[il over him]. [Se]al of Iara-ziti [son of Mat]kali-Dagan, “Great one of the chariots”

Before the Overseer of the Land, Uginu s[on of Laḫma] cam[e] for judgment with Abī-Šaggar and Abba, son[s] of Apil[u]. Uginu spoke as follo[ws]: “Apilu, their father, was indebted for 77 [shekels of s]ilver.” And Abba spoke as follows: “I am not involved in the silver of that debt.” And Abī-Šaggar defeated Abba in the lawsuit before the Overseer of the [La]nd. And the Overseer of the Land sent [Ug]inu to the oath (saying) as follows: “(I swear) that the silver of this [de]bt was owed by his father.” And Uginu went [be]fore the gods. And Abī-Šaggar was not able to pay out that silver. So, the fields, property of his father, at the irrigation district of I[z]bu, in lieu of that silver, the debt of his father, (he) gave to Uginu son of Laḫma: 4 ašlu of 38 ikû in the dead meander of the river; 2 ašlu of 22 ikû in front of Dagan; 4 ašlu of 45 ikû on the opposite bank of the river in the irrigation district of the stone; these fields (belonging) to Abī-Šaggar and Abba, sons of Apilu, they gave to Uginu son of Laḫma in lieu of 77 shekels of silver of the debt of their father, and (they also gave) 2 ašlu in the fields of Tūra-Dagan son of Kiri-Dagan son of Namartu. In the future, Uginu shall not raise a claim concerning those 77 shekels of silver against Abī-Šaggar and Abba, sons of Api[l]u. And Abī-Šaggar and Abba, sons of Apilu, concerning the fields at the irrigation district of Izbu belonging to their father, shall not raise a claim against Uginu.

544 

 Appendix

29.

la-a i-ra-gu-mu š[a] i-ra-gu-um ṭup-pu an-nu-ú i-li-e-šu

30. 31. 32. 33.

NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐMu-[ut]-ri-dU-ub NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐBu-ra-qu NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐTu-u-tu DUMU A-bi-ka-pí

NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐᵈKUR-ta-rí-iʾ DUMU NIR-dKUR

TBR 39 (SH) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13.

ᵐᵈKUR-ta-li-iʾ DUMU ᵐᵈUd-ḫa-a-bi a-kán-na iq-bi ma-a a-nu-ma ᵐZu-Ba-la LÚ.Ú.LU-ti-ia ša 25 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ i-na-an-na a-na-ku KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ-šú uḫ-tal-li-iq ù a-na DUMU-ia e-púš-šú ù ᶠAl-u[m-mi] DUMU.MUNUS-ia a-na DAM-šú at-ta-din u₄-mimeš ša ᵐᵈKUR-ta-li-iʾ a-bu-š[ú] ù ᶠᵈNIN-ta-ḫa-an-na AMA-šú bal-ṭu ᵐZu-[B]a-la DUMU-ni [l]i-ip-la-ḫa-an-na-ši ki-i-me-e i-pal-la-ḫa-na-ši EGIR ši-im-ti-ni ub-bal-la-na-ši ŠU DAM-šú DUMU.MEŠ-šú li-iṣ-bat-ma a-šar ŠÀ-šú lil-lik

14. 15. 16. 17.

šúm-ma i-na EGIR-ki u₄-mi ᵐᵈKUR-ta-li-iʾ ‹ù DAM-šú› a-na pa-ni ᵐZu-Ba!-la! DUMU-šú-nu i-qáb-bu-ú ma-a ul DUMU-ni at-ta-mi ᵐᵈKUR-ta-li-iʾ a-na KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ-šú DUMU.MUNUS-šú NU.TUKU

18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28.

ù šúm-ma ᵐZu-Ba-la [a-n]a pa-ni ᵐᵈKUR-ta-li-iʾ ù DAM-šú a-bi-šú AMA!-šú i-qáb-bi ma-a ul DUMU-ru-ku-nu a-na-ku-mi a-na DAM-šú DUMU.MEŠ-š[ú] NU.TUKU 60 KÙ.BABBAR a-na ᵐᵈKUR-ta-li-iʾ ⸢a-bi-šú⸣ ᶠᵈNIN-ta-ḫa-an-na AMA-šú li-din-[ma] TÚG-šú i-na GIŠ.ŠÚ.‹A› li-iš-ku-⸢un⸣-ma a-[šar ŠÀ-šú] lil-lik ù šúm-ma DUMU.M[EŠ] ᵐ[………………..... a-n]a pa-ni ᵐZu-Ba-l[a ……………………………………………..............] ma-a NÍG MU [………………………………………..............] ù ṭ[up-pu ………………………………………………...............]

TBR 39 

Who[ever] should raise a claim, this tablet will prevail over him. Seal of Mu[ut]ri-Teššub Seal of Buraqu Seal of Tūtu son of Abī-kāpī

Seal of Dagan-tariʾ son of Matkali-Dagan

Dagan-taliʾ son of Udḫa-abu spoke as follows: “Now Zū-Baʿla is my amēlūtu for 25 shekels of silver. Now I have canceled his silver, and I made him my son, and Al-u[mmī] my daughter I gave (him) as his wife.” As long as Dagan-taliʾ, h[is] father, and Baʿla-taḫanna, his mother, should live, Zū-[B]aʿla our son [shall] support us. As he supports us, after our fate carries us off, he shall take the hand of his wife and his children and go wherever he pleases. If, in the future, Dagan-taliʾ ‹and his wife› should say to Zū-Baʿla, their son: “You are not our son,” Dagan-taliʾ will have no (right) to his silver and his daughter. And if Zū-Baʿla should say [t]o Dagan-taliʾ and his wife, his father and his mother: “I am not your son,” he will have no (right) to his wife and h[is] children. He shall give 60 shekels to Dagan-taliʾ, his father, and Baʿla-taḫanna, his mother, (and) shall place his garment on the stool and go wh[erever he pleases]. And if the sons [………………....... t]o Zū-Baʿl[a . . .] . . . [. . .] and the t[ablet . . .]

 545

546  29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34.

 Appendix

NA₄.KI[ŠIB ᵐDa-dì NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐᵈU-wa-pí-iʾ] DUMU Qu-kix DUMU ᵈU-ma-lik IGI ᵐDa-dì DUMU Qu-kix IGI ᵐᵈU-wa-pi-iʾ DUMU ᵈU-ma-lik IGI ᵐIk-ki-ᵈKUR DUMU ᶠA-bi-qí-ri IGI ᵐSur-ši-ᵈKUR DUMU Zu-Aš-tar-ti

TBR 40 (SH) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.

ᵐZi-im-ri-ᵈKUR DUMU ᵈUd-ḫa-a-bi a-kán-na iq-bi ma-a a-nu-ma ᵐTa-aḫ-ḫu DUMU Bu-ra-qi LÚ.Ú.LU-ti-ia ša 30 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ i-na-an-na KÙ.BABBAR-šú uḫ-tal-iq a-na DUMU-ia e-te-púš-šú ᶠḪa-bi-iʾ-ta DUMU.MUNUS-ia a-na DAM-šú at-ta-din u₄-mimeš ša ᵐZi-im-ri-ᵈKUR a-bu-šú ù DAM-šú bal-ṭu ᵐTa-aḫ-ḫu DUMU-ni lip-la-ḫa-na-a-ši ki-i-me-e i-pal-la-ḫa-na-a-ši EGIR ši-im-ti-ni ub-ba-lu-na-ši ù i-na EGIR u₄-mi ŠU DAM-šú DUMU.MEŠ-šú li-iṣ-bat-ma ARAD ša ᵐSÌ-ᵈLUGAL-ma [š]u-ut

11. 12. 13. 14.

[ù] šúm-ma ur-⸢ra⸣-am še-ra-am ᵐTa-aḫ-ḫu [a-na] pa-ni ᵐZ[i-im-ri]-ᵈKUR a-bi-šú i-qab-bi [ma-a ú]-ul a-bu-[ia at-t]a-mì 60 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ [a-na ᵐ]Zi-i[m-ri-ᵈKUR l]i-din-ma a-šar ŠÀ-šú lil-lik

15. 16. 17.

ù šúm-ma ᵐ[Zi-im-r]i-ᵈKUR a-[n]a pa-ni ᵐ⸢Ta⸣-aḫ-ḫi DUMU-šú i-qab-[bi ma-a ú]-ul DUMU-ia at-ta-m[ì] ŠU DAM-šú [DUMU.M]EŠ-šú li-iṣ-bat-ma a-šar ŠÀ-šú ⸢lil⸣-lik

18. 19.

ù [šú]m-ma ᶠḪa-bi-iʾ-tu₄ BA.UG₇ ᶠNIN-ti-bi-iš-ti NIN-ši a-na tar!-te-nu-ti TUM

20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25.

NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐEN-UR.SAG NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐᵈ30-GAL [DUMU . . .-t]i-ia ARAD LUGAL [NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐ]ᵈKUR-ta-li-iʾ DUMU Tu-ra-ᵈKUR DUMU Ka-pí NA[₄.KIŠ]IB ᵐDa-di-i DUMU ⸢ᵈ⸣Ud-ḫa-a-bi

TBR 40 

 547

Se[al of Dādī Seal of Baʿal-wāpiʿ] son of Kukku son of Baʿal-mālik Before Dādī son of Kukku Before Baʿal-wāpiʿ son of Baʿal-mālik Before Ikki-Dagan son of Abī-qīrī Before Surši-Dagan son of Zū-Aštarti

Zimrī-Dagan son of Udḫa-abu spoke as follows: “Now Taḫḫu son of Burāqu is my amēlūtu for 30 shekels of silver. Now I have canceled his silver, I made him my son, (and) I gave (him) Ḫabiʾtu my daughter as his wife. As long as Zimrī-Dagan, his father, and his wife should live, Taḫḫu, our son, shall support us. As he supports us after our fate carries us off and in the future, he shall take the hand of his wife and his children, and he will remain servant of Ari-Šarruma. [And] if, in the future, Taḫḫu should say [t]o Z[imrī]-Dagan, his father: “[Yo]u are [n]ot [my] father,” he [shall] give 60 shekels of silver [to] Zi[mri-Dagan] and go wherever he pleases. And if [Zimr]ī-Dagan should sa[y] to Taḫḫu, his son: “You are [n]ot my son,” he shall take the hand of his wife and his [childre]n and go wherever he pleases. And [i]f Ḫabiʾtu should die, Baʿlti-bištī, her sister, will be brought in substitution. Seal of Bēlu-qarrād Seal of Šaggar-kabar [son of . . .t]ia Servant of the King [Seal of] Dagan-taliʾ son of Tūra-Dagan son of Kāpu Se[al] of Dādī son of Udḫa-abu

548 

 Appendix

TBR 41 (SH) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12.

iš-tu u₄-mi an-ni-i ᵐIk-mu-ᵈKUR DUMU Ḫu?-uz?-[zu] ši-im-ti É-šú DAM-[š]u DUMU.MEŠ-šú i-ši-im a-kán-na iq-bi ma-a a-nu-ma ᶠNa-aʾ-mi-ša-[da] DAM-ia a-na a-bi ù [A]MA-mi ša É-ia aš-ku-un-ši a-nu-ma É-ia gáb-bá mim-mu-ia a[d-di-n]a-aš-ši ù a-nu-ma ᵐᵈIM-ga-mil [ᵐEN-GAL] ᵐTaḫ-ḫu ù ᵐA-ḫi-ḫa-mi-iṣ [4 DUMU.MEŠ-ia ᶠNa]-aʾ-mi-ša-da DAM-ia a-ba-šu-nu u AMA-[šu-nu li-ip-l]a-ḫu ki-i-me-e i-pal-la-ḫu-ši E[GIR ši-im-ti]-ši ub-ba-lu-ši 4 DUMU.MEŠ-ia i-na [É-ti-ia] li-ru-bu [gá]b-bá mim-mu-ia it-ti [a]-ḫa-mèš [li-zu]-zu [DINGIR-lì] É GAL

13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18.

[ma-an]-nu-mi-e i-na 4 DUMU.MEŠ-ia [a-na ᶠ]Na-aʾ-mi-ša-da DAM-ia [a-bi-šu ù] AMA-šu i-qáb-bi ma-a ú-ul a-bu-ia [ù AMA-ia] at-ti-mi a-na HA.LA-šú g[áb-b]i mim-mu-šú NU.TUKU [TÚG-šú i-na GI]Š.ŠÚ.A li-iš-ku-un-ma [a-šar ŠÀ-šú lil-li]k

19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25.

[šum-ma i-na É ur-ši ša ᶠNa-aʾ-mi-ša-da DA]M-ia [ma-am-ma ir-ru-ub ù i-na EGIR LÚ sà]-ar-ra-ri ta-lak [ù] a-na pa-ni ᵐIM-ga-mil DUMU-ia GAL ᵐEN!-GAL ᵐTaḫ-ḫu ᵐA-ḫi-ḫa-mi-iṣ 3 DUMU.MEŠ-ia a-kán-na i-qáb-bi ma-a ú-ul DUMU.MEŠ-ia at-tu-nu-mi a-na É-ia gáb-bi mim-mu-ia NU.TUKU TÚG-ši i-na GIŠ.ŠÚ.A li-iš-ku-un-ma a-šar ŠÀ-ši lil-lik

26.

a-nu-ma É GAL HA.LA ᵐᵈIM-ga-mil DUMU-ia GAL

27. 28. 29.

a-nu-ma ᶠZa-pa-tu₄ DUMU.MUNUS-ia ᵐEN-GAL ŠEŠ-ši i-na É e-mi li-id-din-ši-ma NÍG.MUSSA-ši lil-qì DAM-ta₅ li-ḫu-uz

30. 31. 32. 33.

a-nu-ma ᵐIp-qí-ᵈKUR ARAD-ia [a-na] DUMU-ru-ut-ti ša ᶠNa-aʾ-mi-ša-da DAM-ia at-ta-din-šu ù ᵐIM-ga-mil DUMU-ia GAL u₄-mimeš ša ᶠNa-aʾ-mi-ša-da DAM-ia

TBR 41 

 549

On this day, Ikmu-Dagan son of Ḫuz[zu] determined the fate of his house, [h]is wife, and his children. He spoke as follows: “Now I made Naʿmī-ša[dâ], my wife, father and mo[ther] of my house. Now I g[ave] her my house and all my possessions. And now Baʿal-gamil, [Bēlu-kabar], Taḫḫu, and Aḫī-ḫamiṣ, [my four sons, shall suppo]rt [Na]ʿmī-šadâ, my wife, their father and mother. As they support her, a[fter] her [fate] carries her off, my four sons can enter [my house]; [let them divid]e together [a]ll my possessions. [The gods] (belong) to the main house. [Who]ever among my four sons should say [to] Naʿmī-šadâ, my wife, [his father and] mother, “You are not my father [and my mother],” he will have no (right) to my share (and) a[ll] his possessions. He shall place [his garments on the s]tool [(and) g]o [wherever he pleases]. [If in the bedroom of Naʿmī-šadâ], my [wif]e, [someone should enter, and] she follows a [di]shonest [man] [and] should say to Baʿal-gamil, my eldest son, (and) Bēlu-kabar, Taḫḫu, and Aḫī-ḫamiṣ, my three (other) sons, as follows: “You are not my sons,” she will have no (right) to my house (and) all my possessions (and) shall place her garments on the stool and go wherever she pleases. Now the main house is the share of Baʿal-gamil, my eldest son. Now Zapatu (is) my daughter; Bēlu-kabar, her brother, shall give her into the house of a father-in-law and take her terḫatu. Let him marry. Now I gave Ipqi-Dagan, my slave, as a son to Naʿmī-šadâ, my wife, and Baʿal-gamil, my eldest son. As long as Naʿmī-šadâ, my wife,

550 

 Appendix

34. 35. 36. 37.

ù ᵐIM-ga-mil DUMU-ia bal-ṭu ᵐIp-qí-ᵈKUR lip-làḫ-šu-nu-ti ki-i-me-e i-pal-làḫ-šu-nu-ti EGIR ši-im-t[i-šu-nu] ub-bal-šu-nu-ti a-na ᵈUTU za-ku

38. 39. 40. 41.

[IGI ᵐ]Am-za-ḫi DUMU La-la [IGI ᵐ]Ḫab-ú DUMU Pa-pa-ḫa IGI ᵐA-bi-a-ḫi [x x x x] a mu ni [IGI ᵐA-ḫi]-ma-lik DUMU Ba-ṣí DUMU A-qa-⸢te?⸣

TBR 44 (SH) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11.

ᵐÚ-na!-ab-ši-ni uruKar-ši i-na MU KALA.GA ša ERIM.MEŠ TAR-WU uru E-mar il-mi-ma i-na u₄-mi-šú a-na 20 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ ŠÀM.TIL.LA a-na ARAD ᵐI-túr-ŠÀ DUMU A-pí-li e-te-ru-ub BA.UG₇ TIL.LA ARAD ᵐI-túr-ŠÀ šu-ut ur-ra-am še-ra!-am ma-am-ma a-na muḫ-ḫi ᵐI-túr-ŠÀ la-a i-ra-gu-um ša i-ra-gu-um ṭup-pu an-nu-ú i-la-e-šú

12. 13.

10 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ a-na ᵐḪab-i DUMU ᶠBi!-iš!-ti ŠUM₂ 10 MIN ᵐÚ-na-ab-še-ni-ma il-qí

14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22.

[NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐ]Ib-ni-ᵈKUR DUMU.ḪAL [NA₄.KIŠIB . . .]-li

NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐÚ-gi-ni DUMU Bi-e DUMU Duq-qa-ni NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐSUM-ᵈ[KUR] NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐZu-Aš-tar-ti DUMU It-ti-ni DUMU ᶠTa-ta-e IGI ᵈKUR-ta-li DUMU ᶠBi-iš-ti IGI ᵐZu-E-ia DUMU Im-lik-ᵈKUR

TBR 44 

and Baʿal-gamil, my son, should live, Ipqi-Dagan shall support them. As he supports them, after [their] fat[e] carries them off, he will be free to Šamaš. [Before] Amzaḫi son of Lalû [Before] Ḫabu son of Papaḫhe Before Abī-aḫī . . . [Before Aḫī]-mālik son of Baṣṣu son of Aka-Te

Unap-šenni, of the town of Karšu, in the year of hardship when the TAR-WU troops besieged Emar, in (those) days, for 20 shekels of silver, full price, entered into slavery to Itūr-libbu son of Apilu. Dead or alive, he is the slave of Itūr-libbu. In the future, no one should raise a claim against Itūr-libbu. Whoever should raise a claim, this tablet will prevail over him. 10 shekels of silver have been given to Ḫabu son of Bištu 10 ditto Unap-šenni took (it). [Seal of] Ibni-Dagan    son of the diviner [Seal of . . .]li son of Biʾu Seal of Perʾi-[Dagan] son of Ittinu Before Dagan-taliʾ son of Bištu Before Zū-Eia son of Imlik-Dagan

Seal of Uginu son of Duqqānu Seal of Zū-Aštarti son of Tataʾe

 551

552 

 Appendix

TBR 48 (S) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38.

iš-tu u₄-mi an-ni-im ᶠWa-a-we DAM-tu₄ ša Ri-iḫ-ṣi DUMU La-la ᵐIa-aḫ-ṣi-ᵈEN DUMU Ip-qí-ᵈDa-gan i-n[a] DUMUmar-ú-ti-ši ta-ar-ku-uš-šu ᵐIa-aḫ-ṣi-ᵈEN DUMUma-ru ša ᵐRi-iḫ-ṣi ù ᶠWa-a-e AMA-šu it-ta-na-bal-ši šum-ma fWa-a-e [a-na] pa-ni m[Ia-a]ḫ-ṣi-dEN DUMUma-ri-ši ta-qa-ab-‹bi› ú-ul DUMU ma-ri-mi at-ta-mi a-na É-ti-š[i] ù DINGIR.MEŠ-ši ša Ri-iḫ-ṣ[i] mu-ti-ši ú-u[l ti-ši] a-šar ŠÀ-ši lu-[ú li-il-l]i-‹ik› m Ia-aḫ-ṣi-dEN DUMUma-ru ša Ri-iḫ-ṣi É-ta ù DINGIR.MEŠ-šu ša Ri-iḫ-ṣi a-na Ia-aḫ-ṣi-dEN DUMU-šu na-ad-nu ma-am-ma-an aš-šum DUB! É-ti u DINGIR.MEŠ-šu! UGU Ia-aḫ-ṣi-EN ú-ul i-ši m Ia-aḫ-ṣi-EN f Wa-a-e AMA-šu i-na MU.ḪI.A-ti dan-na-ti it-ta-na-bal-ši ù É-ta ù DINGIR.MEŠ ša mu-ti-ši it-ti-na-ši il-qì šum-ma Ia-aḫ-šu-uk-DINGIR-lì

TBR 48 

On this day, Wae, wife of Riḫṣu son of Lalû, bound (to herself) Iaḫṣi-bēlu son of Ipqi-Dagan as a son. Iaḫṣi-bēlu is the son of Riḫṣu and will support Wae, his mother. If Wae should say [t]o [Ia]ḫṣi-bēlu, her son: “You are not my son,” she will [have] n[o] (right) to he[r] house and her gods, (those) of Riḫṣ[u], her husband, (and) [shall g]o wherever she pleases. Iaḫṣi-bēlu is the son of Riḫṣu; the house and the gods of Riḫṣu have been given to Iaḫṣi-bēlu, his son. No one has (rights) concerning the tablet of the house and his gods against Iaḫṣi-bēlu. Iaḫṣi-bēlu supported Wae, his mother, in the years of hardship and took the house and the gods that her husband has given to her. If Iaḫšuk-ilī

 553

554  39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50.

 Appendix

iš-tu KÁ.DIDLI.ḪI.A il-li-i[m] Ia-aḫ-ṣi-EN a-ba-šu it-ta-na-bal ù it-ti₄ DUMU.MEŠ-šu i-za-az! IGI A-ḫi-ma-lik DUMU Ik-ki-ᵈDa-gan IGI A-ḫi-ma-lik! DUMU A-ḫi-ma-lik IGI A-pí-il-lu DUMU Id-di-EN IGI Na-i-ᵈDa-gan DUMU Ba-ba ša a-wa-ti an-na-ti ú-na-ka-ar-ru! ᵈIš-ḫa-ra u ᵈIŠKUR be-el GUR-x-[x-a]d NUMUN-šu li-ḫal-li-iq m

TBR 49 (SH) 1. 2. 3.

23 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR 2 ME AN.NA za-ku-ú 5 ME SÍG ZA.GÌN ša ᵐA-bu-DU₁₀.GA ù ša ᵐḪa-at-ta-ú UGU ᵐḪa-at-ti DUMU ᵐMa-ma-ak-ka

4. 5.

9 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR ša ᵐA-bu-DU₁₀.GA ù ša ᵐḪa-at-ta-ú UGU ᵐTu-ra-ᵈKUR DUMU ᵐIm-lik-ᵈKUR LÚ.DUB.SAR

6. 7.

8 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR ša ᵐA-bu-DU₁₀.GA ù ša ᵐḪa-at-ta-ú UGU ᵐMu-ta-at-te-e ù DUMU ᵐRib-ba-ti

8. 9.

5 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR ša ᵐA-bu-DU₁₀.GA ù ša ᵐḪa-at-ta-ú a-na UGU ᵐNu-ra-li-mur

10. 11.

6 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR ša ᵐA-bu-DU₁₀.GA ù ša ᵐḪa-at-ta-ú a-na UGU ᵐᵈ30-na!-ap-ši-ir

12. 13. 14. 15.

30 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR ḫu-bu-te-tu₄ ša ᵐAb-ba-nu LÚ.DUB.SAR UGU ᵐA-bu-DU₁₀.GA ù ᵐḪa-at-ta-ú šum-ma mA-bu-DU₁₀.GA ù mḪa-at-ta-ú uḫ-ḫa-ru-ni m Ik-mu-dKUR DUMU A-pí-li

TBR 49 

should go up through the gates, Iaḫṣi-bēlu, (as?) his father, shall look after him, and he will share with his sons. Before Aḫī-mālik son of Ikki-Dagan Before Aḫī-mālik son of Aḫī-mālik Before Apilu son of Iddi-bēlu Before Naʾi-Dagan son of Baba Whoever will change these words, let Išḫara and Baʿal lord of Gur[. . .a]t destroy his offspring.

23 shekels of silver, 200 (shekels) of purified tin, 500 (shekels) of blue wool belonging to Abu-ṭāb and Ḫattû are upon Ḫattû son of Mamma-ka. 9 shekels of silver belonging to Abu-ṭāb and Ḫattû are upon Tūra-Dagan son of Imlik-Dagan, the scribe. 8 shekels of silver belonging to Abu-ṭāb and Ḫattû are upon Muttatti son of Rībatu. 5 shekels of silver belonging to Abu-ṭāb and Ḫattû are upon Nūra-līmur. 6 shekels of silver belonging to Abu-ṭāb and Ḫattû are upon Šaggar-napšir

30 shekels of silver as an interest-free loan granted by Abbanu, the scribe, are upon Abu-ṭāb and Ḫattû. If Abu-ṭāb and Ḫattû are late, Ikmu-Dagan son of Apilu

 555

556 

 Appendix

16. 17. 18. 19.

ḫu-bu-te!?-ti28 ša mA-bu-DU₁₀.GA ù ša mḪa-at-ta-ú mIk-mu-dKUR29 i-ṣa-bat-ma 30 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR ša mAb-ba-nu LÚ.DUB.SAR i-na ITI.KÁM dNIN.URTA ú-šal-lam

20. 21. 22. 23.

IGI ᵐZa-dam-ma DUMU ᶠḪal-te-ia IGI ᵐTu-ra-ᵈKUR DUMU ᵐIm-lik-ᵈKUR IGI ᵐḪa-at-tu DUMU ᵐMa-ma-ak-ka NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐḪa-at-ta-ú

TBR 52 (SH) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

ᵐTa-al?-ma?-li-na ù ᵐMa-ša-di?-e [DU]MU.MEŠ ᵐŠe-ni-LUGAL-ri LÚ.MEŠ uru[Ḫa-t]a ᶠḪi-za-li DUMU.MUNUS ᵐŠa-da-aʾ-e ŠEŠ-šú-nu a-na ᵐḪi-ma-ši-ᵈKUR ù ᵐᵈKUR-GAL DUMU.MEŠ ᵐBe-[li?] i-na MU KALA.GA a-na 12 GÍN.NA [a-na] ŠÀM.[TIL.LA] iš-tu SAG.DU-ši-ma a-na GÉME-ut-ti it-ta-an-nu-ši

8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14.

šum-ma i-na EGIR u₄-mi a-bu-ši šum-ma ŠEŠ a-bi!-ši ia-nu-ma-a a-na EN-ši ma-am-[ma] e-la-a 2 ZI.MEŠ ki-i-mu-[ú] m Ḫi-za-li a-na mḪi-ma-ši-[dKUR] ù mdKUR-GAL DUMU.MEŠ! Be-[li? . . .] li-din-m[a . . .] DUMU.MUNUS x x [x] x x

15. 16.

NA₄.K[IŠIB ᵐZi-iz-za] DUMU SUM-ᵈAš-t[a-b]i uruḪa-ta

17. 18. 19. 20.

IGI ᵐZi-i-z[a] DUMU SUM-ᵈAš-ta-bi [IGI] ᵐA-ri-ᵈAMAR.UTU DUMU Ú-ra-li IGI ᵐMaš-ru-wa-i DUMU.SA[NGA] ᵈKUR! IGI ᵐBi-el-lu DUMU Li-mi!-Da

28 For the reading of -te!?- instead of -la- see the discussion in § 3.3.1.6. 29 Ikmu-Dagan is misplaced because he is the subject of the verb ušallam in line 19.

TBR 52 

will take the debt of Abu-ṭāb and Ḫattû. Ikmu-Dagan will pay 30 shekels of silver of Abbanu, the scribe, within the month of Ninurta. Before Zadamma son of Ḫalteia Before Tūra-Dagan son Imlik-Dagan Before Ḫattû son of Mamma-ka Seal of Ḫattû

Talmal-enna and Mašadī, [so]ns of Šenni-šarri, men of [Ḫatt]a, sold into slavery Ḫizali, daughter of Šadaʾe, their brother, to Ḫimaši-Dagan and Dagan-kabar son of Bē[lu (?)], in the year of hardship, for 12 shekels (of silver) [full] price, of her own will.

If, in the future, there is no father or uncle, any[one] who comes up to her lord, shall give 2 persons in exchange for Ḫizali to Ḫimaši-[Dagan] and Dagan-kabar, sons of Bē[lu (?)] [. . .] daughter [. . .]. Se[al of Zizza] son of Ari-Ašt[ab]i of the town of Ḫatta Before Zizz[a] son of Ari-Aštabi [Before] Ari-Šanta son of Urāli Before Mašru-wai son of the pri[est] of Dagan Before Bēlu son of Liʾmi-Da

 557

558  21. 22.

 Appendix

NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐA-ri-ᵈAMAR.UTU DUMU Ú-ra-li

TBR 65 (SH) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13.

ᵐᶠA-da-ma-DINGIR-lì DAM ᵐA-bi-ka-pí DUMU Ga-a-ki it-ti ᶠᵈKUR-ni-wa-ri ù it-ti ᶠIm-mi ᵐḪa-ab-ú ù it-ti ᵐA-bi-ú 4 DUMU.MEŠ ᵐA-bi-ka-pí É-tu₄ ša ᵐa-bi-šu-nu a-na ᵐEN-GAL ù ᵐDú-ú-dú 2 DUMU.MEŠ ᵐARAD-DINGIR.MEŠ a-na 45 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ a-na MU.1.ti dan-na-ti a-na ŠÁM it-ta-an-nu-ú ur-ra-am še-ra-am šum-ma DUMU.MEŠ mA-bi-ka-pí ki er-ṣe-tu₄ iš-tu ŠU mEN-GAL ù mDu-u-du i-li-iq-qu-ú 90 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ TÉŠ.BI a-na mEN-GAL ù mDú-ú-du li-id-id-din-ma ki er-ṣe-tu₄ šu-nu lil-qu-ú

14. 15. 16.

ù šum-ma ‹m›EN-GAL ù mDú-u-du a-na 4 DUMU.MEŠ mA-bi-ka-pí a-kán-na i-qáb-bi ma-a É-ku-nu la-a a-la-qì-mi a-na KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ NU.TUKU

17. 18.

a-nu-ma KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ ŠÁM É-tu₄ a-na ᵐTu-ra-ᵈKUR DUMU At-tu-wu e-te-ru-ub

19.

NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐZu-Aš-tar-ti DUMU Ma-ni-ni NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐGUR-ᵈKUR DUMU At-tu-wu NA₄.KISIB ᵐA-bi-ka-pí DUMU Zu-ba-aʾ-li IGI ᵐA-ḫi-ú DUMU A-ḫu-da-qa-ni IGI ᵐZi-im-ri-ᵈKUR DUMU Mil-ki-ia IGI ᵐMa-di-ᵈKUR DUMU Pa-zu-ri-ᵈKUR IGI ᵐᵈKUR-GAL DUMU La-la IGI ᵐGUR-da DUMU Zu-Ba-la IGI ᵐᵈ30-a-bu DUMU Dú-ú-da IGI ᵐRa-šap-pa-DINGIR-lì DUMU Ḫa-as-sà

20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28.

TBR 65 

Seal of Ari-Šanta son of Urāli

Adama-ilī wife of Abī-kāpī son of Gaku, together with Dagan-niwārī and together with Immi, (and) Ḫabu, and together with Abiu, the four children of Abī-kāpī, sold the house of their father to Bēlu-kabar and Dūdu, the two sons of Abdi-ili, for 45 shekels of silver in the year of hardship. In the future, if the children of Abī-kāpi want to take the kierṣetu from Bēlu-kabar and Dūdu, they shall pay 90 shekels of silver, the equivalent silver, to Bēlu-kabar and Dūdu and take their kierṣetu. And if Bēlu-kabar and Dūdu should say to the four sons of Abī-kāpi as follows: “I do not take your house,” they have no right to the silver. Now the silver, the price of the house, went to Tūra-Dagan son of Attuwa. Seal of Zū-Aštarti son of Maninu Seal of Tūra-Dagan son of Attuwa Seal of Abī-kāpī Before Aḫiu Before Zimri-Dagan Before Madi-Dagan Before Dagan-kabar Before Tūra-Da Before Šaggar-abu Before Rašap-ilī son of Ḫassu

son of Zū-Baʿla son of Aḫu-daqanu son of Milkia son of Pazuri-Dagan son of Lalû son of Zū-Baʿla son of Dūdu

 559

560 

 Appendix

TBR 74 (SH) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12.

[ᶠDa-a-da D]UMU.MUNUS GUR-da! a-kán-na iq-bi [ma-a] ᵐGUR-da a-bu-ia a-na DUMU.NITA i-pu-ša-an-ni ù ŠEŠ.MEŠ-ia BA.UG₇ ù É a-[n]a ⸢a⸣-ia-ši ir-te-ḫa i-na-an-na a-na-ku DUMU.NITA NU.TUKU ù ša i-pal-la-ḫa-an-ni i-ia-nu i-na-an-na ᵐᵈU-UR.SAG DUMU Qa?-s[u?-l]i? i-na MU KALA.GA ša 2 SÌLA ŠE.ME a-na 1 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ ḫu-búl-lu ù a-na DUMU-ut-ti-ia e-te-púš-šú U₄.MEŠ ša bal-ṭá-ku lip-la-ḫa-an-ni ki-i-me-e i-pal-la-ḫa-an-ni EGIR ši-im-ti-ia ub-la-an-ni É-ia gáb-bá mim-mu-ia lil-qì lú wa-ra-ša a-bal-lil-la NU.TUKU

13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32.

[š]um-ma i-na EGIR u₄-mi ᵐ[ᶠDa-a-d]a a-na pa-ni ᵐᵈU-UR.SA[G DUMU-ši] ⸢i⸣-qa-bi ma-a ul DUMU-[ia at-t]a-mi [ᵐD]a-da a-na É-ši mim-mu-ši NU.TUKU [a-š]ar ŠÀ-ši lil-lik ù šum-ma ᵐᵈU-UR.SAG a-na pa-ni ᶠDa-a-da AMA-šú ⸢i⸣-qa-bi ma-a ul AMA-ia at-ti-mi ᵐᵈU-UR.SAG a-na É NU.TUKU 30 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ a-na ᶠDa-da li-din a-šar ŠÀ-šú [li]l-lik ù a-nu-ma mBu-la-lu ù mdKUR-ta-li-iʾ DUMU.ME DUMU-ia GÉME-šú ša a-bi-šú-nu [i]l-ta-qu-ú ù i-na EGIR u₄-mi aš-šum É a-bi-i[a] a-na muḫ-ḫi mU-UR.SAG DUMU-ia la-a i-ra-gu-mu šum-ma i-ra-gu-mu [ṭup-pu an-n]u-ú i-la-eʾ-e-[šu-nu]-ti [………………….....] NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐᵈKUR-ta-li-iʾ […………………………....] x x x [……………………. NA₄.KIŠI]B ᵐIr-am-ᵈKUR […………………….......] DUMU A-gal-li NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐ[. . .]

TBR 74 

 561

[Dada d]aughter of Tūra-Da spoke as follows: “Tūra-Da, my father, made me as (his) son because my brothers were dead, and the house remained to me. Now I have no son and there is no one to support me. Now Baʿal-qarrād son of Qas[ul]i, in the year of hardship, when 2 qû of barley (corresponded) to 1 shekel of silver, was indebted and I have made him my son.” As long as I should live, he shall support me. As he supports me, after my fate carries me off, he shall take my house and all my possessions. He (i.e., Baʿal-qarrād) is the heir; there is no (other) sharer. [I]f, in the future, [Dad]a should say to Baʿal-qarrā[d, her son]: “[Yo]u are not [my] son,” [D]ada will have no (right) to her house and her possessions (and) shall go [wher]ever she pleases. And if Baʿal-qarrād should say to Dada, his mother: “You are not my mother,” Baʿal-qarrād will have no (right) to the house, shall pay 30 shekels of silver to Dada (and) [g]o wherever he pleases. And now Bulālu and Dagan-taliʾ, my son’s children, have taken the female slave of their father, and in the future, concerning the house of my father, they will not raise a claim against Baʿal-qarrād, my son. Should they raise a claim, [thi]s [tablet] will prevail over [the]m. […………………........…] Seal of Dagan-taliʾ . . . [………………….......…. Sea]l of Irʾam-Dagan [……………….......…] son of Agalli Seal of [. . .]

562 

 Appendix

TBR 75 (SH) missing lines 1’. 2’. 3’. 4’. 5’.

[lip-la-ḫa-an-ni ki-i-me-e] i-pal-la-ḫa-ni [EGIR ši-im-ti-ia u]b-ba-la-ni-ni mi-nu-me-e [bu-ši ba-ši-ti ša l]úmu-ti-ia ša URUki [ù ša EDIN.NA a-na ᵐA]b-dì DUMU-ia ù ᶠKi-it-te DUMU.MUNUS-ia at-ta-d[in lúwa-ra-š]a a-bal-li-la NU.TUKU

6’. 7’.

ù šúm-ma ᵐAb-[du a]-na pa-ni ᶠᵈIŠKUR-DINGIR-lì AMA-šú i-qáb-bi ma-a DUMU.MUNUS-ki ú-maš-šar-mi 60 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR a-na ᶠᵈIŠKUR-DINGIR-lì AMA-šú li-din a-na DAM-šú NU.TUKU TÚG-šú i-na GIŠ.ŠÚ.A li-iš-ku-un-ma a-šar ŠÀ-šú lil-lik ù šúm-ma ᶠᵈIŠKUR-DINGIR.MEŠ a-na [ᵐA]b-dì DUMU-ši ta-qa-bi ma-a ú-ul [DUMU-ia at-t]a-mi 60 KÙ.BABBAR a-na ᵐAb-dì li-din q[a-at DAM-šú] DUMU.MEŠ-šú li-iṣ-bat a-šar ŠÀ-šú l[il-li]k ù šúm-ma ᶠKi-it-te DUMU.MUNUS-ia BA.UG₇ DUMU.MUNUS ša-ni-‹ta›-ma ú-ša-ḫa-az-šu ᵐAb-du DUMU-ia iš-tu É-ia lu-ú la-a uṣ-ṣa DINGIR.MEŠ-ia BA.UG₇-ia li-ip-la-aḫ

8’. 9’. 10’. 11’. 12’. 13’. 14’. 15’. 16’.

17’. a-nu-ma 60 KÙ.BABBAR ša ᵐAb-dì DUMU-ia ša a-na É-ia ú-še-ri!-ba

18’. 19’. 20’. 21’. 22’. 23’.

a-nu-ma ᵐḪa-na-nu ŠEŠ-šú ša lúmu-ti-ia 3 ZI.MEŠ il-qì ᵐḪa-dì-da ᵐEN-ᵈKUR ŠEŠ-šú ᶠᵈKUR-ni-wa-ri! DAM-šú [ARA]D-šú-nu ša É e-mi-ia ù ᵐḪa-na-nu il-qì-šú-nu-ti šúm-ma i-na EGIR u₄-mi mḪa-na!-nu áš-šúm ḪA.LA-a ša [A]b-dì i-ra-gu-um 3 ZI.MEŠ ša-šú-nu li-iš-ku-un É-ta₅ [ᶠḪ]u-da-ti ù ᶠKi-it-te DUMU.MUNUS.MEŠ-ia li-zu-[z]u

24’. [………….....……] NA₄.[KIŠIB . . .] 25’. [. . .]

TBR 75 

 563

missing lines [they shall support me. As] they support me [after my fate c]arries me off, I will give [the goods and possesions of] my husband in the city [and in the countryside to A]bdu, my son, and Kitte, my daughter. [He (i.e., Abdu) is the hei]r; there is no (other) sharer. And if Ab[du] should say [t]o Baʿla-ilī, his mother: “I want to repudiate your daughter,” he shall give 60 shekels of silver to Baʿla-ilī, his mother. He will have no (right) to his wife. He shall place his garments on the stool and go wherever he pleases. And if Baʿla-ilī should say to [A]bdu, her son: “[Yo]u are not [my son],” she shall give 60 shekels of silver to Abdu, he shall take the h[and of his wife] and his children and g[o] wherever he pleases. And if Kitte, my daughter, should die, I will let him marry (my) second daughter. Abdu, my son, shall not leave my house. He shall support my gods and my dead. Here (are) the 60 (shekels) of silver belonging to Abdu, my son, whom I made enter into my house. Now Ḫannanu, my husband’s brother, took three persons: Ḫadidu; Bēlu-Dagan, his brother; (and) Dagan-niwārī, his wife, were the [slav]es of my father-in-law, and Ḫannanu took them. If, in the future, Ḫannanu should raise a claim concerning Abdu’s share, he shall give those three persons back. [Ḫ]udatu and Kitte, my daughters, shall divi[d]e the house. [………….....…….] Se[al of . . .] . . .

564 

 Appendix

TBR 77 (SH) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16.

ᶠGu-ga-tu₄ DUMU.MUNUS A-na? i-na bu-ul-ṭi-ši a-kán-na iq-bi um-ma-a fUm-mi-na-mi NIN-ia a-di [b]al-ṭá-a-ku it-ta-na-ba-la-ni-mi ù a-nu-um-ma ᵐDINGIR-lì-a-bi DUMU-ia ù ᶠBi-it-ti-ᵈKUR DUMU.MUNUS-⸢ia⸣ a-na DUMU-ut-[t]i ša ᶠUm-mi-na-m[i] NIN-⸢ia⸣ at-ta-din-šu-nu-ti [u]r-ra-am še-ra-am ma-am-m[a] [a-n]a muḫ-ḫi ᶠUm-mi-na-mi [NIN-i]a aš-šum ᵐDINGIR-lì-[a-bi] ù ᶠ[Bi-it]-ti-ᵈ[KUR] ú-ul i-ra-ag-g[u-um] ša i-ra-ag-‹gu›-um ARAD ù GÉME ma-li-iš-šu-nu li-id-din ù [lil-qì]

17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25.

IGI ᵐA-ia-aʾ-ḫu lúkar-tap-pu IGI ᵐZu-Ba-la DUMU Ki-it-ta IGI ᵐA-wi-rù DUMU Li-e-da IGI ᵐA-ḫi-ú DUMU La-aḫ-ma IGI ᵐIk-ki-ᵈKUR IGI ᵐTu-ri-ia IGI ᵐIb-ni-ᵈKUR IGI ᵐṢa-al-mu DUMU Pa-zu-ra ᵐA-bi-ú il-ṭur NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐIk-ki!-ᵈKUR NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐA-ia-[aʾ-ḫi] NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐA-bi-ú LÚ.DUB.SAR

TBR 78 (SH) 1. 2. 3.

ᵐDINGIR-lì-a-bi DUMU A-bi-ᵈKUR a-kán-na iq-bi ma-a a-nu-ma DUMU.MEŠ-ia um-ḫír-ru-ni-ni30 la-a ip-la-ḫu-ni-ni ša i-pal-la-ḫa-ni

30 Arnaud regards this verb as resulting from a metathesis from *imḫurru-ninni; Durand (2013a) suggests a possible reading i-ze-ru-ni-ni from zerû, “to destroy” to indicate the rupture of social relationships.

TBR 78 

Gugatu daughter of Ana in her health spoke as follows: “Ummī-naʿmi, my sister, will support me as long as I [l]ive. And now Ilī-abī, my son, and Bitti-Dagan, my daughter, I gave as children to Ummī-naʿmi, my sister.” In the future, no on[e] will raise a claim against Ummī-naʿmi, [m]y [sister], concerning Ilī-[abī] and [Bit]ti-[Dagan] Who(ever) should raise a claim shall give a male slave and a female slave of their same amount and take (them). Before Aia-aḫu the charioteer Before Zū-Baʿla son of Kitta Before Awiru son of Lieda Before Aḫiu son of Laḫma Before Ikki-Dagan Before Tūria Before Ibni-Dagan Before Ṣalmu son of Pazuru Abiu wrote (this tablet). Seal of Ikki-Dagan Seal of Aia-[aḫu] Seal of Abiu the scribe

Ilī-abī son of Abī-Dagan spoke as follows: “Now my sons confronted me (and) they did not support me. There is no one to support me.

 565

566 

 Appendix

4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.

ma-am-ma i-ia-nu i-na-an-na ᵐŠu-uš-ka-[si]-di [ARA]D ša LÚ.UGULA KALAM.MA a-na DUMU-ia e-te-púš-šú [li]p-la-ḫa-ni-ni ki-i-me-[e] i-pal-la-ḫa-an-ni [EG]IR ši-im-ti-ia ub-ba-la-an-ni É-ia lil-qì DUMU.MEŠ-ia DAM-ia a-na m[u]ḫ-ḫi-šú lu-ú la-a i-ra-gu-mu šúm-ma i-ra-gu-mu ṭup-pu an-nu-ú i-la-eʾ-e-šu-nu-ti

11. 12. 13. 14.

šúm-ma mDINGIR-lì-a-bi a-na pa-ni mŠu-uš-ka-si-di DUMU-šú [i-q]ab-bi ma-a ul DUMU-ia at-ta-mì m DINGIR-lì-a-bi a-na É-šú NU.TUKU 60 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR a-na mŠu-uš-kaLÚ-di DU[MU-šú li-i]d-din-ma a-šar ŠÀ-šu lil-lik

15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20.

[ù šúm-ma ᵐŠu-uš-k]a-si-di [a-n]a pa-n[i mDINGIR-lì-a-bi a-bi-šú] i-iq!-bi m[a]-⸢a⸣ ul a-bu-ia a[t-t]a-mì m Šu-uš-ka-s[i-d]i [a-n]a É NU.TUKU 60 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ a-na mDINGIR-lì-a-bi a-bi-šú li-din-ma a-šar ŠÀ-šú lil-lik

21. 22. 23. 24.

a-nu-ma ᵐŠu-uš-ka-si-di 9? GÍN KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ ḫu-búl-la ša ᵐDINGIR-lì-a-bi ul-ta-lam a-nu-ma KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ a-na le-et ᵐZu-Aš-tar-ti DUMU EN-ma-lik i-ru-ub

25. 26. 27. 28.

NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐAm-za-ḫi DUMU Eḫ-li-ia NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐAb-ba-ni DUMU Ḫa-za-an-ni NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐDINGIR-lì-a-bi DUMU I-ku-ᵈKUR NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐḪi-ma-ši-ᵈKUR DUMU Ú-ka-li

TBR 79 (SH) 1. 2. 3. 4.

ta-ri-tu qa-du É Kir-r[a ši-it] a-na ḪA.LA mḪu-zi 30 GÍN K[Ù.BABBAR (ŠÁM-ši)] ù fEl-la-a GÉME sú-ti-tù ki-i-mu-ú ši-iz-bi ša ta-[ri-ti la-a]

TBR 79 

 567

Now I have made my son Šuška-ziti [servan]t of the Overseer of the Land. [He shall] support me. As he supports me, [aft]er my fate carries me off, he shall take my house. My sons and my wife shall not raise a claim a[g]ainst him. Should they raise a claim, this tablet will prevail over them. If Ilī-abī should [s]ay to Šuška-ziti, his son: “You are not my son,” Ilī-abī will have no (right) to his house (and) [shall g]ive 60 shekels of silver to Šuška-ziti, [his] so[n], and go wherever he pleases. [And if Šušk]a-ziti should say [t]o [Ilī-abī, his father]: “Y[o]u are not my father,” Šuška-z[it]i will have no (right) [t]o the house and shall give 60 shekels of silver to Ilī-abī, his father, and go wherever he pleases.

Now Šuška-ziti has paid 9? shekels of silver, the debt of Ilī-abī. Now the silver went to Zū-Aštarti son of Bēlu-mālik.

Seal of Amzaḫi son of Eḫlia Seal of Abbanu son of Ḫazannu Seal of Ilī-abī son of Iku-Dagan Seal of Ḫimaši-Dagan son of Ukāli

A dry nurse (staying/residing?) with the household of Kirr[a] is for (i.e., belongs to) the inheritance share of Ḫuzu, [(whose price is)] 30 shekels of s[ilver]; and Ella, a Syrian female slave,

568  5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14.

 Appendix

ra-a-ši31 a-na mḪu-zi it-tan-nu ù ŠEŠ.MEŠ-š[u a-n]a muḫ-ḫi-šu [l]a-a i-[ra-gu-mu] ša i-ra-gu-[mu] [ṭ]up-p[u an-nu-ú] i-la-eʾ-e-šu [NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐ. . .]-x-bi NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐA-wi-ri [DUMU …………..] DUMU I-túr-ŠÀ [NA₄.KIŠIB …….. NA₄KIŠI]B ᵐA-pí-li [DUMU …………..] DUMU I-túr-ᵈKUR IGI ᵐKa-pí-ᵈKUR! DUMU ᵈKUR-ta-ri-[iʾ] IGI ᵐEN-UR.SAG DUMU A-bi-ka-pí D[UB.SAR]

TBR 82 (S) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23.

É-tu₄ ma-la ma-[ṣú]-ú 25 i-na am-m[a-ti GÍ]D.DA-šu 15 i-na am-m[a-t]i [r]u-up-šu ZAG-šu SILA DAG[AL.L]A GÙB-šu ᵐA-ḫi-[x]-x DUMU A-bi-ia EGIR-šu ᵐAb-d[u] DUMU Zu-Ḫé pa-nu-šu ḫu-ḫi-n[u] É-tu₄ ša ᵐA-a DUMU A-bi-ia ù ᵐGa-ri-bu ŠEŠ-šu 30 GÍN ḫu-bu-la-ti-šu i-pu-ul ù É-ti-šu ki-ma KÙ.BABBAR-pí-šu il-qì ur-ra-am še-ra-am LÚ.MEŠ.AḪ.ḪI.A-šu aš-šum É-ti an-ni-im muḫ-ḫi ᵐGa-ri-bi ú-ul i-ra-gu-mu ša i-ra-gu₅-um! 2 li-im KÙ.BABBAR a-na É.GAL Ì.LÁ.E.MEŠ šum-ma mA-a iš-tu KÁ-bi URU.DIDLI!.ḪI.A i-li-ia

31 Arnaud reads ša-a-ti but the first sign seems more likely to be ra-; raši is a stative from rašû, “to have,” referring to šizbu. 

TBR 82 

they gave to Ḫuzu instead of the milk of the nu[rse that was not] available. And h[is] brothers [should no]t r[aise a claim] against him. Whoever should raise a claim, [this t]able[t] will prevail over him. [Seal of . . .]bi Seal of Awiru [Son of ………….....] son of Itūr-libbu [Seal of …….... Sea]l of Apilu [son of ………...] son of Itūr-Dagan Before Kāpī-Dagan son of Dagan-tari[ʾ] Before Bēlu-qarrād son of Abī-kāpī the s[cribe]

A house to [its] full extent, 25 cubi[ts], its [len]gth, 15 cubi[ts], its [b]readth. On its right: the m[ai]n road; on its left: Aḫi-[. . .] son of Abia; on its rear: Abd[u] son of Zū-Ḫe; on its front: the alley. The house belongs to Aia son of Abia, and Garibu, his brother, paid 30 shekels (of silver), his debt, and took his house in lieu of his silver. In the future, his “Brothers” shall not raise a claim concerning this house against Garibu. Whoever should raise a claim, he shall pay 2000 (shekels) of silver to the palace. If Aia returns through the city gate and pays 30 shekels of silver,

 569

570  24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33.

 Appendix

30 GÍN KÙ.BABBAR Ì.LÁ.E.MEŠ É-ta-šu li-il-qì IGI Il-Ii DUMU Píl-su-ᵈKUR IGI Ia-ṣí-ᵈKUR ŠEŠ-šu IGI Zu-zu ŠEŠ-šu IGI Ḫi-mi-ia ŠEŠ-šu-ma IGI Ib-ni-ᵈKUR DUMU A-ḫi-ma-lik IGI Zu-E-ia ŠEŠ-šu IGI Iš-ᵈKUR LÚ.DUB.SAR

TBR 84 (SH) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20.

[a-na pa]-ni ᵐMu-ut-ri-ᵈU ⸢ù⸣ [LÚ.MEŠ.ŠU.GI URUki (?)] [ᵐAš-tar-t]u-li-it DUMU Ba-bu-la-i [it-ti] ᵐKàr-bu DUMU Bu-uz-za aš-šum [20 K]Ù.BABBAR.MEŠ ša ᵐGa-la-li DUMU Iš-ḫa-ra-bi [š]a ᵐBu-uz-za ḫu-bu-lu ‹a-na di-ni ís-ni-qu›32 ù 2 ṭup-paḫi.a ki-i 20 KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ i-na É ᵐGa-la-li na-ad-nu ù mdARAD-dIš-ḫa-ra «ki-i» ki-i ni-ka-rì! ṭup-paḫi.a ša a-bi-šu-nu a-na 20 KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ iš-tu É mGa-la-li [i-t]a-aṭ-ra ù ᵐMu-ut-ri-ᵈU [ki-i Š]EŠ.MEŠ a-bi-šú ša ᵐAš-tar-tu-li-it [lu-ú la-a] it-tág-ru ù a-na ma-mi-ti [id-di-in]-šu-nu-ti-ma ù it-tur₆-ru?! [pu-ḫa]-at 20 KÙ.BABBAR.MEŠ ᵐARAD-ᵈIš-ḫa-ra [a-na ᵐ]Ga-la-li it-ta-din [ù] i-na EGIR-ki u₄-mi ᵐKàr-bu [DUMU B]u-uz-za a-na muḫ-ḫi ᵐAš-tar-tu-li-it DUMU Ba-bu-la-i la-a i-ra-gu-um šum-ma i-ra-gu-um ṭup-pu an-nu-ú i-la-ʾ-e-šu

32 This is the regular expression for filing a legal case, see BLMJ 1, Hirayama 44, TBR 30 and TBR 36.

TBR 84 

he can take his house back. Before Elli son of Pilsu-Dagan Before Iaṣi-Dagan Before Zūzu his brother Before Ḫemia his brother Before Ibni-Dagan son of Aḫī-mālik Before Zū-Eia Before Iš-Dagan the scribe

[Befo]re Mutri-Teššub and [the Elders of the city], [Aštart]u-līt son of Bābu-laʾu ‹came for judgment› [with] Karbu son of Buzza, concerning [20 (shekels) of s]ilver belonging to Galalu son of Išḫara-abu [th]at were owned by Buzza. And two tablets had been given in Galalu’s house in lieu of the silver, and Abdi-Išḫara [has wi]thdrawn as an outsider the tablets of their father for 20 shekels of silver from the house of Galalu. And Mutri-Teššub, [given that] Aštartu-līt’s [u]ncles did not agree, [deferred] them to the oath but they refused (?): [in exchan]ge, Abdi-Išḫara has given 20 (shekels) of silver [to] Galalu. [And], in the future, Karbu [son of B]uzza shall not raise a claim against Aštartu-līt son of Bābu-laʾu. Should he raise a claim, this tablet will prevail over him.

 571

572  21. 22. 23. 24. 25.

 Appendix

NA₄.KIŠIB LÚ.UGULA KALAM.MA IGI ᵐKa-pí-ᵈKUR DUMU Zi-i[m-rí-ᵈKUR] IGI ᵐḪu-si-rù DUMU Ib-ni-[. . .] [IGI] ᵐMa-qa-ra DUMU A-ḫi-ḫa-[. . .]

NA₄.KIŠIB ᵐTu-ut-te DUMU Ku₈-ú-ki

TBR 84 

Seal of the Overseer of the Land Before Kāpī-Dagan son of Zi[mrī-Dagan] Before Ḫusiru son of Ibni-[. . .] [Before] Maqara son of Aḫī-ḫa[. . .]

Seal of Tuttu son of Kukku

 573

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Personal Name Index Name ‹PN› x-x-x-nu [. . .]-ti A[. . .] A[. . .]pī-ilī Aba Aba Abba Abbanu Abbanu Abda Abda-mālik Abda-mālik Abdi-[. . .] Abdi-Bēli Abdi-Dagan Abdi-ili Abdi-ili

Relations son of Nuʾāru son of Nūri-Dagan daughter of Abī-ḫamiṣ

Abdi-ili Abdi-ili Abdi-ili Abdi-ili Abdi-ili Abdi-ili Abdi-ili Abdi-ili Abdi-Išhara Abdi-Šaggar

son of Dūdu son of Eʾe son of Ibni-BE/Dagan son of Ipqi-Dagan son of Kulabu son of Kumri son of Šameḫu son of Ia-[. . .] son of Zazu brother of Karbu son of Buzza son of Irʾam-Dagan

Abdi-šuʾû (or Eršû) Abdu Abdu Abdu Abia Abī-ḫamiṣ Abī-kāpī Abī-kāpī Abī-kāpī Abī-kāpī Abī-kāpī son of Gaku Abī-liʾmu

Abī-liʾmu Abī-liʾmu

son of Daqanu son of Abdia son of Bada son of Apilu ruler of the second dynasty (?) scribe son of Nunia son of Tūra-Dagan son of Ṭābat-māliktu son of the “kiln” family of son of Atawa

son of Ḫutammanu son of Zū-Aštarti son of Qabbāru son of Zū-Aštarti son of Zira son of Daʿu (Syrian tablet) son of Daʿu (Syro-Hittite tablet) son of Ḫamsi son of Tulli (sons of) son of Abī-liʾmu

son of Ilī-ianil son of Mikku

https://doi.org/10.1515/9781501515309-009

Page 85 table 12, 286 table 42 48 table 11, 53 198 table 22 159 table 16 159 table 16 185 n.178, 481 179 table 19, 183 126 table 14, 129–131 3 n.11, 95 n.253 49 table 11, 65–66, 286 table 42 88–90, 273 49 table 11 229 table 28, 233 228 table 27, 230 44 table 11, 63 and n.108 179 table 19, 183 275 table 40, 369 table 61, 371 181 table 20, 188–189, 285 table 42, 320 table 49 158 table 16, 162–163 73 86 table 12, 100 217 table 24, 220–221 49 table 11, 70, 281 83 table 12, 103–104 113 table 13, 116, 124–125 179 table 19, 183 126 table 14, 132 27–28 and table 7, 198 table 22, 205, 336, 344 and table 56, 351, 369 table 61 231 n.344 188 100 226 159 table 16 198 table 22, 201–202 49 table 11, 54 n.47 86 table 12, 100 209 table 23, 210 229 table 28, 232–233 100–101 28 table 7, 29, 85 table 12, 97–98, 275 table 40, 278, 281–282, 369 table 61, 371 53 112 table 13, 119, 170, 228 table 27

600 

 Personal Name Index

Abī-naʿmī Abī-qīrī Abī-qīrī Abī-Šaggar Abī-Šaggar Abī-Šaggar Abī-Šaggar Abiu Abu-kīn Abu-ṭāb

daughter of Nukra daughter of Ḫemia wife of Bazila son of Apilu son of Šeʾi son of Zū-Anna son of Zū-Baʿla (Zū-Baʿla family) son of Zikria

Adabili Adama-ilī Adda1 Adda Addu Agitu

(sons of) wife of Abī-kāpī son of Gaku son of Muḫra-aḫī son of Qabbāru son of Awiru daughter of Abdi-ili

Aḫa-mi

daughter of Ḫulāʾu son of Addu son of Awiru brother of Aia son of Abia son of Ṭāb-Dagan

Aḫī-[. . .] Aḫia Aḫiau Aḫī-Bašar Aḫī-Dagan Aḫī-Dagan Aḫī-Dagan

Aḫī-Dagan Aḫī-Dagan Aḫī-ḫāmī Aḫī-ḫamiṣ Aḫī-mālik Aḫī-mālik Aḫī-mālik Aḫī-raḫaq Aḫiu Aḫiu Aḫiu

Aḫlamû

158 table 16, 161, 175 table 18 123 166–167 126 table 14, 129–131 185 n.178 84 table 12, 101 20 fig. 2 114–116 and n.337, 293 n.135 46 table 11, 80, 287 table 42 49 table 11, 65–66, 286 table 42, 293 48 table 11, 54, 55 n.56 86 table 12, 100 158 table 16, 160, 174, 175 table 18 46 table 11, 74 210 112 table 13, 115–116, 124–125 and n.366 n.368 209 table 23, 210

88 47 table 11, 74 112 table 13, 121 son of Titia 47 table 11, 73–74 son of Dagan-kabar (Milki-Dagan 23 fig. 4, 24 table 3, 84 table 12, family) 92–94, 280 table 41 son of Ibni-BE/Dagan 86 table 12, 100 son of Milki-Dagan (Milki-Dagan 23 fig. 4, 24 table 3, 84 table 12, family) 91–95, 159 table 16, 198 table 22, 202–203, 280 table 41, 288 table 42 tax collector 80 n.204 46 table 11, 72 priest of Dagan 45 table 11, 60 and n.88 son of Ilia 89 overseer of the land 230–231, 378 son of Kutbe (Kutbe family) 24 fig. 5, 204 and n.252 222–223 son of Iaʾšu 49 table 11, 67, 176, 286 table 42, 292 son of Ama 158 table 16, 175 table 18 son of Ḫulāʾu son of Addu son of Awiru 209 table 23, 210 son of Tūbu 29 and n.118, 47–48 table 11, 69–70 and n.150, 288 table 42 son of Abbanu, grandson of 30 and table 8, 180 table 20, Mutri-Teššub 184–185, 279, 281 table 41, 321

1 For Adda/Addu see Pruzsinski 2003: 154 n. 66.

Personal Name Index 

Aḫlamû Aḫu Aḫu-waqaru Aia Aia-šumātu Aki-Šimike Al-aḫaia Al-aḫātī Al-ummī Al-ummī Al-ummī Alal-abu Alal-abu Alal-abu Alazaia Ali-Nani Aliu Ammarianti Ammurapi Amzaḫi Amzaḫi Amzaḫi Amzaḫi Amzaḫi Amzaḫi Anat-ummī Anna-kīmī Apḫama-Adad Apilu

Apilu Arawali Ari-Eia Ari-Kušuḫ Ari-Šarruma Ari-Teššub Arma-nani Arwu Asda-aḫī

son of Abī-Bēlu

 601

126 table 14, 129, 280 table 41, 285 table 42 son of Kundalu 45 table 11 son of Enia 85 table 12, 286 table 42 son of Abia 86 table 12, 87–88 and n.223 217 table 24, 222 son of Šupal-enna 198 table 22, 203–205 wife of Ḫemia son of Aḫī-mālik (Kutbe 121 family) sister of Itūr-Dagan 181 table 20, 188–189, 285 table 42 daughter of Kamma, sister of 45 table 11, 60 n.87 Baʿla-kīmī daughter of Zū-Baʿla son of ḪAR-da 192 table 21, 195–197 daugther of Dagan-taliʾ son of 165 Udḫa-abu son of Ameu 203 son of Baʿla-ilī wife of Dagalli 158 table 16, 161, 175 table 18 85 table 12, 98 217 table 24, 222, 292 foreign merchant 32, 56 n.61, 62, 83 table 12, 106, 285 table 42, 290 n.120 son of Zulālu 85 table 12, 99 n. 271, 286 table 42 daughter-in-law of Aki-Šimike 198 table 22, 203–205 king of Ugarit 375–377 and n.48–49 son of Abī-Dagan 159 table 16, 169 son of Eḫlia 29 n.117 son of Guanni 46 table 11, 74–75 son of Nūri-Dagan 48 table 11, 53 son of Uriu 45 table 11, 60 n.88 and n.91 35 n.156 wife of Šegal 199–201, 209 table 23, 212 daughter of a man from Uri 168–169 son of Aḫī-raḫīqu 47 table 11, 77–79 and n.191 n.195, 287 table 42 family of 17–18, 26 and fig. 7, 65, 182, 273–284, 321 table 50, 335 table 54, 344 table 56, 365, 368 table 61, 370 126 table 14, 131 wife of Eḫli-Kušuḫ 198 table 22, 206–207 son of Abī-kāpī and Mananu 233 man of Nikippa 217 table 24, 219–220, 333 Hittite official 166 man of Aššur 126 table 14, 127, 287 table 42, 292 n.131 181 table 20, 190 son of Awiru (Awiru family) 25 and fig. 6, 26 table 5 wife of Akiu 198 table 22

602 

 Personal Name Index

Āṣītu Āṣiu Ašmi-Te Aššur-aḫa-iddina

wife of Igmulu son of Ellati-Dagan son of Anan-Te son of Šamaš-abu

Aštar-abu Aštar-ummī Aštartu-līt Aštartu-līt Atteu Awiru

son of Adute daughter of Baʿla-simātī son of Bābu-laʾu son of Šaggar-taliʾ son of Sapu family of

Azia

son of Tutaliti

Baʿal-bēlī Baʿal-bēlī Baʿal-bēlī

son of Abī-tēri son of Bēlu-kabar son of Irʾam-Dagan

Baʿal-bēlī

son of Šeʾi-Dagan, diviner

Baʿal-bēlī Baʿal-gamil Baʿal-gamil Baʿal-kabar Baʿal-kabar Baʿal-kabar I Baʿal-kabar II Baʿal-ma Baʿal-mālik

son of Zadamma and Kuʾe son of Ikmu-Dagan son of Kutbe (Kutbe family) son of Ḫemia (Kutbe family) son of Liʾmi-šarru ruler of the second dynasty alleged ruler of the second dynasty son of Abda son of Baʿal-qarrād (Zū-Baʿla family)

Baʿal-mālik Baʿal-mālik Baʿal-qarrād

son of Ṣalmu son of Zū-Baʿla brother of Baʿal-bēlī and Ḫuzu sons of Bēlu-kabar son of [. . .] son of Ilī-abī son of Qasuli

Baʿal-qarrād Baʿal-qarrād Baʿal-qarrād

169 222–223 and table 25 198 table 22, 207–208 126 table 14, 127–128 and n.378, 217 table 24, 221, 287 table 42 85 table 12, 286 table 42 180 table 20, 184 126 table 14, 131–132 72 83 table 12, 96, 287 table 42 17–18, 25 and fig. 6, 31, 122, 168 n.121, 182, 204 n.253, 273–284, 321 table 50, 335 table 54, 344 table 56, 365, 368 table 61, 370 112 table 13, 119–120 and n.358, 170, 228 table 27 45 table 11 84 table 12, 92–94 27 table 7, 28, 198 table 22, 205, 336, 344 and table 56, 351, 369 table 61 30–31 and table 8, 159 table 16, 161 and n.97, 175 table 18, 279, 281 table 41 198 table 22 36 n.158, 229 table 28, 235 24 fig. 5 24 fig. 5, 122 51, 52 3 n.11, 88 and n.227 n.229 3 n.11 88 n.226 20 fig. 2, 21 and table 1, 74, 112 table 13, 114–116, 180 table 20, 186, 198 table 22, 199–201, 217 table 24, 219–220, 228 table 27, 282, 302, 319 table 49, 371 29 n.117 19, 230 93 112 table 13 113 table 13, 122 118–119

Personal Name Index 

Baʿal-qarrād

son of Zū-Baʿla (Zū-Baʿla family)

Baʿla-BEa

daughter of Zadamma and Kuʾe

Baʿla-BEa Baʿla-bītu Baʿla-bītu Baʿla-ilī Baʿla-ilī

daugther of Bitti-Dagan daughter of Aḫiau (?) wife of Ipḫur-Dagan son of Ilī-dūdu daughter of Arwu son of Pitnu wife of Dagalli

Baʿla-ilī Baʿla-kīmī

wife of Galalu son of Maṣi daughter of Kamma, sister of Al-ummī wife of Abī-liʾmu son of Abī-liʾmu wife of Aḫī-raḫaq wife of Matkali-Dagan daughter of Ḫemia (Kutbe family) daughter of Al-ummī daughter of Šapṭa daughter of Zadamma and Kuʾe wife of Kappupu daugther of Zimrī-Dagan son of Udḫa-abu son of Abdi-ili

Baʿla-kīmī Baʿla-kīmī Baʿla-kīmī Baʿla-milki Baʿla-simātī Baʿla-ummī Baʿla-ummī Baʿlti-bištī Baba Baba Balāṭu Bāni Bannia Baṣṣu Baṣṣu Batta Bazila Bēlānu Bēlu-Dagan Bēlu-Dagan Bēlu-kabar Bēlu-kabar Bēlu-kabar Bēlu-kabar Bēlu-kabar Bēlu-mālik Bēlu-mālik Bēlu-qarrād Bēlu-qarrād Bēlu-qarrād Bēlu-taliʾ

wife of Rabbi-Damu son of Marduk son of Ḫazannu (?) brother of Abdi-ili son of Atawa brother of Šaggar-taliʾ son of Gumašši daughter of Ḫudi wife of Abiu son of Abdi-ili son of Lanaša brother of Ḫadidu son of Aḫiu son of Abdi-ili son of Aia-aḫu son of Baʿal-mālik son of Ismaʾ-Dagan son of Baʿal-gamil (Kutbe family) son of Matkali-Dagan son of Baʿal-qarrād (Zū-Baʿla family) son of Kāpī-Dagan (Zū-Baʿla family) son of Tūra-Dagan (grand)son of Asda-aḫī

 603

19, 20 fig. 2, 21 table 1, 44 table 11, 57–58, 72 n.160, 91?, 149 n.55, 176?, 217 table 24, 218–220, 276, 280 table 41, 293 198 table 22, 199–201, 209 table 23, 212 229 table 28, 234 121 215–216 192 table 21, 192–193 158 table 16, 161 and n.98, 175 table 18, 283 226 45 table 11, 60 n.87 69 n.140, 97 and n.265 49 table 11, 67–69 and n.140 69 n.140 123 180 table 20, 184–185 198 table 22 231 n.344 166 84 table 12, 93–95 and n.253 44 table 11, 285 table 42 228 table 27, 230 198 table 22, 202–203 61 and n.96 189, 208 n.273 225–226 114–116 159 table 16, 166–168 88 n.227 226 158 table 16, 175 table 18 28 table 7, 30, 100–101, 278 45 table 11 159 table 16, 171–173 185 n.178 46 table 11, 50, 285 table 42 24 fig. 5 192 table 21, 195–197 20 fig. 2 20 fig. 2 113 table 13, 121–124, 276 198 table 22, 205

604 

 Personal Name Index

Bēlu-taliʾ Beya Bišu

son of Uznu Egyptian Great Cancellor son of Ipšil-enna

Bitti-Dagan Bitti-Dagan Bulālu Bulālu

daughter of Dagan-abu daughter of Gugatu daughter of Ana grandson of Dada son of Arwu (Awiru family)

Bura-ziki Burami Buzēzu Buzza Dada Dagalli Dagan-[. . .] Dagan-abu

son of Utti son of Ḫabitu

Dagan-abu son of Gani Dagan-bāni Dagan-bāni Dagan-bēlu Dagan-bēlu Dagan-bēlu Dagan-bītu Dagan-ilī Dagan-kabar

(wife of)

Dagan-kabar

son of Dagan-taliʾ (Ḫima family)

Dagan-kabar

son of Ḫima (Ḫima family)

Dagan-kabar Dagan-kabar Dagan-kabar

son of Kukubati son of Kumri son of Milki-Dagan (Milki-Dagan family) wife of Zū-Baʿla (Zū-Baʿla family) son of [. . .] son of [. . .]-abu, brother of Iaṣu-Dagan

Dagan-laʾi Dagan-madi Dagan-naʾi

daughter of Tūra-Da son of Šaḫlu son of Aruš-Ḫeba son of Baṣṣu

son of Sina brother of Abiu son of Zikria son of Aša-daʿi Ugaritic merchant wife of Tuppil-enna son of Bēlu

73 378 n.57 112 table 13, 119, 170, 228 table 27 229 table 28, 234 209 table 23, 212–213 119 and n.355 25 and fig. 6, 26 table 5, 179 table 19, 182–183, 192 table 21, 193–195, 280 table 41 85 table 12, 98 and n.270, 286 table 42, 290 217 table 24, 218 44 table 11, 57–59 126 table 14, 131–132 112 table 13, 118–119 85 table 12, 286 table 42 226 44 table 11, 55 and n.58, 288 table 42 86 table 12, 100 198 table 22, 207–208 198 table 22, 206 114 180 table 20, 186 63 n.103, 97 and n.262, 289, 378 215–216, 229 table 28 198 table 22, 206 84 table 12, 90–91 and n.237, 198 table 22, 205–206, 288 table 42, 336 n.87 22 fig. 3 and table 2, 23, 63 and n.107, 95, 159 table 16, 173–174, 198 table 22, 280 table 41 22 fig. 3 and table 2, 23, 31, 44 table 11, 61–62, 158 table 16, 160–161, 174, 175 table 18, 198 table 22, 201–202, 280 table 41, 285 table 42 74 83 table 12, 103 23 fig. 4, 24 table 3 234 198 table 22, 202 170

Personal Name Index 

Dagan-niwāri Dagan-qarrād Dagan-qarrād

wife of Ḫadidu son of [. . .] son of Matte

Dagan-simātī Dagan-taliʾ Dagan-taliʾ Dagan-taliʾ

wife of Zū-Aštarti son of Aḫi-mālik (Kutbe family) grandson of Dada son of Ḫaraqqu son of Ḫima (Ḫima family)

Dagan-taliʾ Dagan-taliʾ Dagan-taliʾ Dagan-taliʾ

son of Ḫuzāmu son of Iašur-Dagan son of Taʾe son of Udḫa-abu

Dagan-taliʾ Dagan-taliʾ Daqanu Dūdu Dūdu Dūdu

son of Zikri-Dagan son of Zūzu son of Abunnu son of Tuteia son of Kutbe (Kutbe family) (daughters of) son of Abdi-ili son of Mašru

Ea-bāni Ea-damiq

son of Ḫalāqu son of Zikria

Eḫli-Kušuḫ Ella Elli Erība-Marduk Ēṭir-Adad

son of Malisu

Galalu Garibu Gugatu Gullatu Gumašši Ḫab[. . .]

son of Išḫara-abu son of Abia daughter of Ana servant of the king son of Atawa daughter/wife of Dagan-kabar (brother of Dagan-qarrād and Dagan-Madi sons of [. . .]) daugther of Zimrī-Dagan son of Udḫa-abu son of Bištu son of Zū-Baʿla son of Amašdu

Ḫabiʾtu Ḫabu Ḫabu Ḫadidu Ḫamis-Dagal Ḫannanu

ruler of the second dynasty

merchant, servant of Baʿal-qarrād (?) brother-in-law of Baʿal-ilī wife of Galalu

 605

226 198 table 22 112 table 13, 119, 170, 228 table 27 213 119 and n.355 47 table 11, 73 22 fig. 3 and table 2, 76 n.184, 198 table 22, 201–202 29 n.117 204 n.252 179 table 19, 182–183 29, 159 table 16, 165, 280 table 41 113 table 13, 122 217 table 24, 219–220 24 fig. 5 158 table 16, 162 28 table 7, 30, 100–101, 278 158 table 16, 162–163, 174, 175 table 18 46 table 11, 75 83 table 12, 103–104 and n.293, 279, 281 table 41 198 table 22, 206–207 225 3 n.11, 336 n.88, 371 n.23 32, 62 112 table 13, 119, 170, 228 table 27 126 table 14, 131–132 86 table 12, 87 212–213 159 table 16, 161, 175 table 18 225–226 198 table 22, 202

165–166 179 table 19, 182 209 table 23, 213–215 226 175 table 18, 176–178, 287 table 42, 291–293 and n.127 226

606 

 Personal Name Index

Ḫannanu Ḫaraqqu Ḫattû Ḫattû Ḫattû Ḫattušili III Ḫazirtu Ḫebat-ilī Ḫemi Ḫemia Ḫemia Ḫešmi-Teššub

son of Gūru son of Nād-pī-ša from Irridu son of Mamma-ka

maidservant of Ḫudi daughter of Išmaʾ-Dagan son of Dagan-kabar son of Aḫī-mālik (Kutbe family)

Ḫilaʾe Ḫilissa Ḫima

son of Kutbe (Kutbe family) brother of Ini-Teššub king of Karkemiš son of Arib-šarri wife of Ḫamis-Dagal family of

Ḫimanu Ḫimaši-[. . .] Ḫimaši-Dagan Ḫimaši-Dagan Ḫimaši-Dagan Ḫimaši-Dagan Ḫinna-Baʿal Ḫinnu-Dagan

son of Nukra brother of Abdi-Bēli son of A[. . .a]d son of Abba son of Bēlu (?) son of Dūdu son of Ḫemi, man of Ekalte son of Laḫma

Ḫišmia Ḫizali Ḫizili Ḫudatu Ḫudi Ḫudi Ḫulāʾu Ḫusiru Ḫusiru Ḫusiru Ḫusiru Ḫussa Ḫutia Ḫuzu

daughter of Šadaʾe son of Šenni-šarri wife of Arma-ziti wife of Abunnu wife of A[. . .] wife of Abiu son of Zikria son of Addu son of Ištar-bae son of Rībi-Dagan son of Tuteia son of Kutbe son of Bēlu-kabar

47 table 11, 72 198 table 22, 202–203 204 49 table 11, 65–66, 286 table 42 49 table 11, 65–66, 286 table 42, 290, 293 375 n.41 114 119 48 table 11 24 fig. 5, 25 table 4, 113 table 13, 121–124 24 fig. 5, 25 table 4 178 n.163, 182 n. 163 180 table 20, 186 176 17–18 and n.94, 22, 30, 62–63, 76–77 n.186, 95–96, 160–161, 201–202, 225–226, 273, 289, 321, 335 table 54, 336, 344 table 56, 365–366 and table 61, 370–373 45 table 11, 60 n.91 44 table 11, 63 and n.109 158 table 16, 175 table 18 180 table 20, 185–186 198 table 22, 205–206 198 table 22, 208 353 n.141 29 and n.118, 47–48 table 11, 69–70 and n.148 n.150, 131, 280 table 41, 288 table 42 159 table 16, 168–169 198 table 22, 205–206 45 table 11, 60 n.87 49 table 11, 67–69, 286 table 42 235 112 table 13, 114–116, 293 n.135 210 180 table 20 125 n.367, 226–227 219–220 113 table 13, 124–125 and n.366 n.367 73 218 84 table 12, 92–93

Personal Name Index 

Ḫuzu Ia Iaʾšuqa Iaʾšuru Iadi-Dagan Iadi-Dagan Iaḫmu Iaḫṣi-bēlu1 Iaḫṣi-bēlu Iaḫṣu Iaḫšuk-ilī Iakmu-Dagan Iani Iaṣu-Dagan Iašar-daʿi Iašur-Dagan Iati Ibbi-ilu Ibnia Ibni-Dagan Ibni-Dagan Ibni-Dagan Ibni-Dagan

son of Ḫimaši-Dagan son of Tutaliti man of Uri son of Ameu son of Baṣṣu son of Zū-Aštarti (Kutbe family) son of Abda son of Imliku son of Ipqi-Dagan son of Mananu son of Wae wife of Riḫṣu (?) son of Kamma son of Ḫinna-Baʿal son of [. . .]-abu, brother of Dagan-naʾi son of Aštartu-līt son of Bada

Ibni-Dagan Ibni-Dagan

son of Ḫulû son of Mādī-Te son of Bēlu-taliʾ son of Kamma son of Rībi-Dagan son of the diviner (= Ibni-Dagan son of Zū-Aštarti) son of Uriu son of Zū-Aštarti

Ibni-Dagan

son of Zū-Baʿla (Zū-Baʿla family)

Iddaʿ-Da Iddiʿ-Dagan Igmil-Dagan Igmulu Igmulu Ikki-Dagan Ikki-Dagan Ikmu-Dagan Ikmu-Dagan Ikmu-Dagan Ikmu-Dagan Ikūn-Dagan Ikūn-Rašap

son of Imliku son of Baʿal-abu ruler of the first dynasty son of [. . .] ḫazannu son of Dagan-bēlu son of Aḫia son of Apilu son of Ḫuzu son of Išbi-Dagan scribe son of Tūra-Dagan

 607

225 112 table 13, 119–120, 228 table 27 217 table 24, 220–221 203 159 table 16, 173–174 24 fig. 5, 214–215 90 46 table 11, 52, 285 table 42 209 table 23, 211–212 and n.283 217 table 24, 218 211 85 table 12, 97 353 n.141 170 192 table 21, 193–195 158 table 16, 161–162, 174 112 table 13, 121 113 table 13, 122 86 table 12, 100 180 table 20, 186 44 table 11, 285 table 42 45 table 11, 60 and n.87 198 table 22, 203–205, 336, 351 60 n.91 30 and table 8, 344 table 56, 369 table 61 20 fig. 2, 21 table 1, 181 table 20, 187–188, 280 table 41, 320 table 49 88 n.226 46 table 11, 50–51, 285 table 42 3 n.10, 51 48 table 11 159 table 16, 169–170 128 and n.380 48 table 11, 55 and n.56 84 table 12, 102 65–66 and n.121 36 n.158, 229 table 28, 235 113 table 13, 122 42 n.17 158 table 16, 175 table 18

1 Given the difficulties to discern between Iaḫṣi/u- and Iaṣi/u-, names are rendered according to their writing in each text, see Pruzsinski 2003, 208–11.

608 

 Personal Name Index

Ilānu Ilānu

son of Aḫiu son of Baṣṣu

Ilī-abī Ilī-abī Ilī-abī

son of Abī-Dagan son of Gugatu daughter of Ana son of Madi-Dagan son of Šeʾi-Dagan (sons of) son of Aḫia

Ilī-abī son of Kukku Ilī-aḫī Ilī-Dagan Ilī-iamūt Ilia Illatu Imlik-Dagan

Imlik-Dagan Imlik-Dagan Imlik-Dagan Immaru Imūt-Ḫamadi Inbuia Ini-Teššub

slave of the priest, son of Ḫeba son of Aḫī-ḫamiṣ (family) son of Dagan-bēlu

son of Kāpī-Dagan (Zū-Baʿla family) son of Šeʾi-Dagan son of the king (sons of) son of Šaḫlu

Ipḫur-Dagan

king of Karkemiš, son of Šaḫurunuwa son of Ilī-dūdu

Ipḫur-Dagan Ipḫur-Dagan Ipqi-Dagan

son of Kattu son of Zū-Baʿla (Zū-Baʿla family) son of Apilu (Apilu family)

Ipqi-Dagan Ipqi-Dagan Ipqi-Dagan Ipšil-enna Irʾam-ila Irʾib-Dagan Irʾib-Baʿal Irʾib-Baʿal Irbi-ilu

son of Baʿal-mālik (Zū-Baʿla family) son of Ḫu-um/un-zi(?)

Isertu

daughter of Dagan-taliʾ son of Iašur-Dagan daughter of Ḫulāʾu son of Addu son of Awiru wife of Aštar-abu ruler of the first dynasty

Išarte Išarte Išbi-Dagan Išḫara-ilī Iškur-[. . .] Išmaʾ-Dagan

son of Mama ruler of the first dynasty son of Kunānu son of Šallaeia

son of Gubba

29 n.117 47 table 11, 73 and n.166, 74 and n.171 112 table 13, 117–118 209 table 23, 212–213 181 table 20, 187 84 table 12, 105 84 table 12, 102 46 table 11, 50, 285 table 42 45 table 11, 60 n.87 84 table 12, 88–89, 288 table 42 28, 205 83 table 12, 96–97 and n.260, 275 table 40, 278, 285–287 table 42 20 fig. 2, 168 n.122 179 table 19, 183 219 92–95 and n.245 n.253, 356 179 table 19, 183 126 table 14, 129, 285 table 42 6, 126 table 14, 127 and n.371 209 table 23, 215–216, 229 table 28 45 table 11 20 fig. 2 5 n.21, 26 fig. 7 and n.109, 27 table 6 19, 20 fig. 2, 116 84 table 12, 91, 288 table 42 229 table 28, 235 173 198 table 22, 208 112 table 13, 121 3 n.10 46 table 11, 74 46 table 11, 64–65, 217 table 24, 221, 285 table 42 192 table 21, 192–193, 279, 281 table 41 209 table 23, 210 190–191 3 n.10 45 table 11, 60 83 table 12, 288 table 42 112 table 13, 119–120, 228 table 27, 282

Personal Name Index 

Išmaʾ-Dagan Išmaʾ-Dagan Ištar-bae Itti-bēlu Itti-Da Ittinu Itūr-[. . .] Itūr-Dagan

son of Zadamma and Kuʾe

Itūr-Dagan Itūr-Dagan Itūr-Dagan Itūr-Dagan

son of Abunnu son of Ḫumāmu son of Iddiʿ-aḫu son of Iddilli

Itūr-Dagan Itūr-libbu

son of Lamma-rāpiʾ son of Apilu (Apilu family)

Kalbiu Kamma Kanzaʾe Kāpī-Dagan Kāpī-Dagan Kāpī-Dagan

servant of Atteu son of Sapu “son of” Tuttul wife of Ašmi-Te brother of Abiu son of Zikria son of Uginu son of Zū-Baʿla (Zū-Baʿla family)

Kāpī-Dagan Kāpī-Dagan Kappupu Karbu Karbu Kašia Kaška Kāzanu Kibian Kidin-Gula

Kilaʾe Kili-Šarruma Kīn-abī Kiri-Dagan Kiri-Dagan Kiri-Dagan Kirra Kitta Kitte Kuʾe Kuʾli Kulana-ziti

father of Šuršu (Zū-Baʿla family) slave of Ia son of Ḫimaši-Dagan son of Iš-Dagan brother of Al-aḫātī

son of Kamma son of Abba son of Buzza son of Anini son of Kušuḫ-atkal sister of Kilaʾe scribe, son of Sîn-zēra-idd[in]

son of Tulpaʾe son of Mutri-Teššub son of Dūdu son of Namartu son of Mama daughter of Baʿla-ilī wife of Gulalu wife of Zadamma daughter of Eḫli-Kušuḫ

 609

198 table 22 181 table 20, 190 180 table 20, 184 229 table 28, 235 20 fig. 2 120 48 table 11, 53 181 table 20, 188–189, 285 table 42 73 85 table 12, 286 table 42 180 table 20, 186 158 table 16, 161–162, 174, 175 table 18 73 26 fig. 7, 27 table 6, 179 table 19, 182 96 85 table 12, 99, 286 table 42 198 table 22, 207–208 114 185 n.178 19 and n.102, 20 fig. 2, 21 table 1, 44 table 11, 56–57 and n.62, 104 n.294, 192 table 21, 196, 219–220, 285 table 42 56–57 and n.63 76, 281, 285 table 42, 289 45 table 11, 60 n.87 158 table 16, 175 table 18 126 table 14, 131 229 table 28, 233 60 47 table 11, 77–79, 287 table 42 227 32, 83 table 12, 106–109, 217 table 24, 222, 280 table 41, 285 table 42, 335, 351 226–227 193 n.209 180 table 20 158 table 16, 162–163 130–131 83 table 12, 95 n.255 225 173 226 198 table 22, 199–201 198 table 22, 206–207 219

610 

 Personal Name Index

Kunaʾe

son of Irrike

Kunanu Kunti-Teššub Kutbe

son of Abu-Da

La-abu-Dagan Lada-Dagan Laḫeia Laḫma

son of Kāpī-Dagan (Zū-Baʿla family) brother of Abiu son of Zikria son of Mutri-Teššub family of

Lalû Lalû

son of Puḫuna son of Zū-Baʿla

Laqraʾu Lassa Liʾmi-šarru Lū-Adda Lubāšu Madi Madi-Dagan Madi-Dagan Madi-Dagan Madi-Dagan Madi-Dagan Madi-šīmtu

son of Karbu, son of Abī-tēri son of Nād-pī-ša ruler of the first dynasty son of Nūru son of Bāni

Malia Mama

family of

son of Al-ummī son of Lawi son of Šeʾi-Dagan son of Zū-Aštarti daughter of Madi-Dagan son of Šeʾi-Dagan son of Ummānu

Mananu Mār-Šerūʾa Mārat Marduk

wife of Abī-kāpī son of Tulli merchant

Mašadī Matkal-Dagal

son of Šenni-šarri son of Ḫabʾu

Matkali-Dagan Matkali-Dagan Mattia

son of Papaḫa son of Zū-Baʿla

son of Ḫazannu

27 table 7, 29, 159 table 16, 168–169, 275 table 40, 281 table 41, 351, 369 table 61 363 n.8 231 n.344 17–18, 24 and fig. 5, 31, 64, 92, 121–122, 184, 213–215, 273–284, 302, 318 n.23, 321 table 50, 333, 335 table 54, 344 table 56, 351 n.136, 365, 367 table 61, 370–371 20 fig. 2, 192 table 21, 196–197 114 104 n.294, 204 and n.252 27 table 7, 29, 69, 83 table 12, 99, 275 table 40, 287 table 42, 368 table 61, 371 91 126 table 14, 127–128, 217 table 24, 221, 287 table 42, 351 44 table 11, 57–58 198 table 22, 202–203 3 n.10, 363 n.8 44 table 11, 57–58 198 table 22, 202–203 112 table 13, 115 228 table 27, 230–231 46 table 11, 74 181 table 20, 187–188 198 table 22, 206–207 229 table 28, 233 181 table 20, 187 77–79 and n.196 n.198 28 table 7, 29 and n.120, 74 n.169, 159 table 16, 171–173, 275 table 40, 278, 281, 351, 369 table 61 229 table 28, 232–233 127 and n.378 198 table 22, 208 44 table 11, 61–62, 285 table 42, 289 198 table 22, 205–206 47 table 11, 77–79 and n.191 n.195, 287 table 42 70 198 table 22, 203–205 192 table 21, 195–197

Personal Name Index 

Mazia Merenptah Milki-Dagan Milki-Dagan

(king?)

Milki-Dagan Milki-Dagan

former husband of Baʿla-kīmi son of Aḫī-Dagan (Milki-Dagan family) son of Šaggar-taliʾ ḫazannu son of Kutta son of Zadamma son of Baṣṣu

Milki-Dagan Muḫra-aḫī Muḫra-aḫī

brother of Abda son of Nunia family of

Muršili II Muršili III/Urḫi-Teššub Mutri-Teššub overseer of the land Muttatti Muwatalli II Naʾittu

son of Rībatu

Naʿma-Dagan Naʿmī-šadâ Nabunni Nabunni

son of Baʿal-bēlī wife of Ikmu-Dagan governor of Suḫu son of Ulam-ti[. . .] or Ulamburiaš

Nabuzu Ninaʾe Niqmaddu III Niru Nuʾbi-Dagan Nunia Nūra-līmur Pāliḫu Pazuri-Dagan Pazuri-Dagan Penti Piḫa-Tarḫunta Pilsu-Dagan Pissa Puʾa Puʾašu Pudu-Ḫeba

wife of Itūr-Dagan

king of Ugarit son of Šiggu son of Zū-Anna (family of) son of Akal-enna son of Itūr-Dagan grandson of Ini-Teššub, king of Karkemiš ruler of the second dynasty daughter of Ḫabu son of Paḫḫaru, wife of Ištar-bae son of Ilī-abī son of Dagan-BE

 611

223 376 n.48 88 and n.229 17–18 and n.94, 23 and fig. 4, 91–92, 127, 164, 185, 202–203, 273–284, 292, 312, 321 table 50, 335 table 54, 344 table 56, 356, 365, 368 table 61, 370–373 97 23 fig. 4, 24 table 3, 180 table 20, 185, 319 table 49 72 90 and n.239 158 table 16, 160–161, 174, 175 table 18, 288 table 42 1, 128 128 126 table 14, 129, 131, 181 table 20, 187–189, 219 49 table 11, 65, 286 table 42 128 158 table 16, 161, 174, 175 table 18 85 table 12, 97 36 n.158, 235 222–223 32 and n.134, 83 table 12, 106–109 and n.309 73 198 table 22, 208 375 353 n.141 105 n.296 88 and n.226 49 table 11, 65, 286 table 42 228 table 27, 230 126–127 and table 14, 287 table 42, 292 n.131 159 table 16, 169 84 table 12, 105 30, 219–221 3 n.11, 105, 336 n.88, 364 n.11 180 table 20 47 table 11, 73 85 table 12, 286 table 42 375 n.41

612 

 Personal Name Index

Puḫi-šenni Puḫrila[. . .](?)

overseer of the land

Pūḫu Pukli-šarri Putuḫulasi Qalāl-addin

son of Ummānu son of Karb-ili

Qīrī-Dagan Qīrī-Dagan Quʾu

son of Baʿal-qarrād (Zū-Baʿla family)

Ramses II Ramses III Rašap-ilī Rašap-ilī

son of Šallaeia

son of Šazi

scribe son of Irʾib-Baʿal, brother of Igmil-Dagan son of Iaḫṣi-Dagan

Rašap-kabar Rība-[. . .] Rībi-Dagan Sēbû Sīḫu Siptah Ṣalmu Ṣalmu Ṣāriptu Ṣilla-Idiglat Ṣuḫmaiatu Šaggar-abu

(wife of, daughter of Zuqadu) son of Zū-Aštarti wife of Dūdu merchant servant of Ḫemia son of Baʿal-qarrād (Zū-Baʿla family)

Šaggar-abu Šaggar-abu

son of Baššu son of Dagan-tariʾ

Šaggar-abu Šaggar-abu Šaggar-duši Šaggar-napšir Šaggar-taliʾ Šaggar-taliʾ Šaggar-umarri Šaḫurunuwa Šalilu Šalim-Dagan

son of Kāpī-Dagan son of Baṣṣu son of Šar[. . .]

Šamaš-[. . .] Šamaš-abu Šamaš-iluli Šamiḫu

son of Šaggar-taliʾ

son of Gumašši son of Mattia king of Karkemiš wife of Dagan-taliʾ son of Zūzu

son of Milki-Dagan son of Bianu

99 and n.272 n.273 44 table 11, 62–63, 285 table 42, 289 84 table 12, 101 217 table 24, 220, 333 187 46 table 11, 64, 217 table 24, 221, 285 table 42 20 fig. 2 288 table 42 85 table 12, 99 n. 271, 286 table 42 375 n.41 12 51 and n.36, 52 51 and n.36 48 table 11 44 table 11 44 table 11, 97–98, 285 table 42 72 228 table 27, 230–231 378 n.57 49 table 11 49 table 11, 70–71 158 table 16, 162, 175 table 18 127 and n.378 123 19, 20 fig. 2, 27 table 7, 28, 159 table 16, 166–168, 275 table 40, 278, 281 table 41, 351, 369 table 61 44 table 11, 285 table 42 29 n.117, 30 and n.126, 120 n.359, 168 n.121 83 table 12, 95, 288 table 42 158 table 16, 175 table 18 35 n.157 49 table 11, 65, 286 table 42 225–226 47 table 11, 72 198 table 22, 208 6 217 table 24, 219–220 83 table 12, 95 n.255, 288 table 42 83 table 12, 288 table 42 46 table 11, 52, 285 table 42 83 table 12, 104–105 85 table 12, 286 table 42

Personal Name Index 

Šeʾi-Baʿali Šeʾi-Dagan Šeʾi-Dagan

son of Ipqi-Dagan son of the tartannu Šaggar-abu

Šeʾi-Dagan

Šilwa-Teššub Šimi-dārû Šipṭi-Baʿal Šuppiluliuma II Šup-šenni Šurši-Dagan Šurši-Dagan Šurši-Dagan Šurši-Dagan Šuršu

prince of Nuzi (sons of)

Šuška-ziti Šuṭur-Dagan Ṭābat-māliktu Tabili

servant of the overseer of the land son of Gabarni (sons of) son in law of Ḫania

Tagia Taḫḫu Talmaʾe Talmal-enna Talmi-Kušuḫ Talmi-Šarruma Talmi-Teššub Tarḫunta-azammi Tasi Tatašše/Raʾīndu

son of Malisu son of Burāqu

Tatia son of Iaṣi-ilī Teḫip-tilla Tīri-Dagan Tuppil-enna Tūra-Dagan Tūra-Dagan Tūra-Dagan Tūra-Dagan Tūra-Dagan Tūra-Dagan Tūra-Dagan Tūra-Dagan Tūri

(sons of)

brother of Ibni-Dagan son of Attuwa son of Bur-[. . .] son of Ilī-aḫī son of Attuwa son of Kiri-Dagan son of Namartu son of Pazuri-Dagan son of the scribe Imlik-Dagan son of Zū-Baʿla (Zū-Baʿla family) son of Ilī-bāni

Tūria

tax collector

son of Abunnu son of Bilila son of Ḫidda father of Zū-Baʿla (Zū-Baʿla family)

son of Šenni-šarri governor of Emar son of Ini-Teššub, king of Karkemiš mother of Ini-Teššub son of the king wife of Alazaia

 613

46 table 11, 50, 285 table 42 83 table 12, 104–105 30 and table 8, 113 table 13, 122, 279, 281 table 41 104 and n.295, 158 table 16, 162–163, 174–175 table 18, 282 272 83 table 12, 104 97 and n.262 376 n.48 204 n.256 185 n.178 113 table 13, 122 185 n.178 84 table 12, 91 19 n.99 and 100, 20 fig. 2, 336 n.88 112 table 13, 117–118 47 table 11, 75 44 table 11, 63 85 table 12, 99 n. 271, 286 table 42 198 table 22, 206–207 159 table 16, 165 198 table 22, 208 198 table 22, 205 44 table 11, 56, 285 table 42, 290 222–223 6 126 table 14, 127 376 and n.45 32 and n.133, 44 table 11, 76, 83 table 12, 106, 217 table 24, 222, 276, 285 table 42, 292 217 table 24, 218 372 83 table 12, 95, 288 table 42 209 table 23, 215–216 60 86 table 12, 100 180 table 20, 185 101 n.279 130 46 table 11, 74 49 table 11, 65–66, 286 table 42 20 fig. 2 30 table 8, 31, 180 table 20, 184, 279, 281 table 41, 321 80 n.204

614 

 Personal Name Index

Tutḫaliya IV Tuwariša Tuwata-ziti Udḫa-abu

overseer of the land son of the king family of

Uginu

son of Laḫma

Ummī-naʿmī Ummiši Ummu Unap-šenni Unišu Wae Walda-aḫī

daughter of Ana son of Šaggar-taliʾ man of Karšu son of Lū-Adda wife of Riḫṣu son of Lalû

Wašti

wife of Piḫa-Tarḫunta

Zadamma Zadamma Zadamma Zadamma Zikra-Aštar Zimrī-Dagan Zimrī-Dagan

son of Baṣṣu son of Ipqi-Dagan son of Irʿibu son of Karbu son of Iš-Dagan man of Sara[. . .] son of Udḫa-abu

Zizi Zizza Zū-Aštarti Zū-Aštarti

son of Ari-Aštabi ruler of the second dynasty son of Aḫī-mālik (Kutbe family)

Zū-Aštarti

son of Baʿal-qarrād (Zū-Baʿla family)

Zū-Aštarti Zū-Aštarti Zū-Aštarti Zū-Aštarti

son of Bēlu-mālik son of Ḫabu son of Ḫurulammu son of Kutbe (Kutbe family)

Zū-Aštarti

son of Mama

Zū-Aštarti Zū-Aštarti

son of Qabbāru (sons of)

375 n.41 204 and n.252 126 table 14, 127–128 28 table 7, 29, 165, 275 table 40, 278, 351, 370 29, 126 table 14, 129–131 and n.386, 280 table 41 209 table 23, 212–213 198 table 22, 208 72 179 table 19, 182 198 table 22, 202–203 209 table 23, 211–212 85 table 12, 99 n. 271, 286 table 42 30 and table 8, 217 table 24, 220–221 288 table 42 84 table 12, 105 47 table 11, 75 198 table 22 48 table 11, 53 46 table 11, 72 29, 159 table 16, 165, 280 table 41 47 table 11, 74 334 3 n.11, 65 24 fig. 5, 25 table 4, 113 table 13, 122–124, 180 table 20, 184–185, 192 table 21, 192–193, 209 table 23, 213–215, 282, 319 table 49 20 fig. 2, 21 table 1, 45 table 11, 60 and n.87, 204 n.256 112 table 13, 117–118 and n.354 209 table 23, 213–215 232 n.346 24 and fig. 5, 25 table 4, 46 table 11, 64–65, 217 table 24, 221–223 and table 25, 280 table 41, 285 table 42 47 table 11, 73–74 and n.169, 171–173 70 n.151 222–223

Personal Name Index 

Zū-Baʿla

family of

Zū-Baʿla Zū-Baʿla Zū-Baʿla

ḫazannu ruler of the first dynasty son of Aḫī-mālik (Kutbe family)

Zū-Baʿla Zū-Baʿla Zū-Baʿla Zū-Baʿla Zū-Baʿla Zū-Baʿla Zū-Baba Zū-Eia Zūzu Zūzu

son of Ḫatiu son of Iairu son of Kāpī-Dagan son of Baṣṣu son of Kisu son of Kutbe (Kutbe family) (sons of) son of Dagan-ilī son of Baʿal-mālik (Zū-Baʿla family)

 615

4–5 and n.12 n.20, 17–18 and n.91, 20–21 fig. 2 and table 1, 44–45 table 11?, 55–60 and n.59, 84 table 12, 90–91, 104–105 n.296, 114, 187, 218–220, 234–235, 272–284, 292, 302, 306, 321 table 50, 335–336 and table 54, 344 table 56, 364–366 and table 61, 370–374 171 3 n.10, 54, 363 n.8 24 fig. 5, 113 table 13, 280 table 41 84 table 12, 91, 288 table 42 84 table 12, 101–102 83 table 12, 95, 288 table 42 46 table 11 24 fig. 5, 64–65 and n.115, 92 159 table 16, 165 83 table 12, 99, 287 table 42 198 table 22, 206 19, 20 fig. 2, 116 181 table 20, 190, 320 table 49

Source Index Source Anatolica 16 AOAT 265.1

ASJ10 A

ASJ10 C ASJ10 E

ASJ13 A AuOr5 3 AuOr5 7 AuOr5 9 AuOr5 11

AuOr5 12

AuOr5 14 AuOr5 15 BATSH 4 10 BE 14 36 BE 14 84 BE 14 115 BE 15 11 BE 15 19 BE 15 20 BE 15 22 BE 15 24 BE 15 90 Bi 9 BLMJ 1 BLMJ 2

Page 82 n. 217, 83 table 12, 99, 243 table 30, 248 table 32, 271–272, 278 n. 93, 287 table 42, 289, 292, 294, 382 21 table 1, 50 n. 26, 51 n. 30, 67–68, 96 n. 260, 147, 174, 175 table 18, 176–178 and n. 152, 240, 242, 244 table 30, 248 table 32, 255 table 35, 258, 262, 264–267 and table 38–39, 271, 273 n. 87 and n. 89, 274 table 40, 276, 279 n. 96, 287 table 42, 290–293 and n. 135, 300–301 and n. 149, 308 table 46 and n. 3, 318, 382 73 n. 168, 104 and n. 295, 148, 155–156, 158 table 16, 160 and table 17, 162–163, 174–175 table 18, 242, 246 table 31, 257 table 36, 259 n. 36, 260–262 and table 37 and n. 39, 264–268 and table 38–39, 280 n. 98, 281–282 and n. 101 n. 104, 301 n. 149, 308 table 46, 313, 318, 351 n. 137, 384–385 363 n. 7 139 table 15, 198 table 22, 206, 309 table 46, 324 table 51, 327, 330–331 and table 52 and n. 64, 334, 336 n. 89, 338 table 55, 342–343 and n. 107 n. 112 n. 115 n. 116, 345 n. 118, 351 n. 137, 362 table 59, 363 n. 7, 386 68 n. 134, 82 n. 216, 83 table 12, 104–105, 163, 245 table 31, 256 table 36, 260 table 37, 281 n. 101, 295 n. 141, 302, 386–387 7 363 n. 7 70 139 table 15 and n. 20, 198 table 22, 206–208, 309 table 46, 324–325 and table 51 and n. 37, 327–330 and n. 50 n. 56 n. 59, 331 n. 64, 334, 336 n. 89, 338 table 55, 340–343 and n. 104 n. 111 n. 112, 345–346 and n. 117 n. 120, 351 n. 137, 388–389 30 and table 8, 140 table 15, 141 n. 26, 198 table 22, 203–205 and n. 259, 219 n. 300, 290 n. 119, 309 table 46, 322, 324 table 51, 326–331 and n. 44 n. 45 n. 50 and table 52, 334, 336, 338 table 55, 342–345 and n. 108 n. 110 n. 115 n. 116 and table 56, 351, 362–363 and table 59 and n. 7, 369 table 61, 390 224 n. 320 224 n. 320 n. 322 80 n. 210 108 n. 316 108 n. 316 42 n. 23 108 n. 310 and n. 312 59 n. 83 108 n. 310 and n. 311 108 n. 310 and n. 311 108 n. 310 and n. 316 59 n. 84 108 n. 313, 109 n. 319 570 n. 32 228 table 27, 230–231, 310 table 46, 339 table 55, 341–342 and n. 107, 345–346 and n. 117 n. 120, 351 n. 137, 354 n. 144, 390–391

https://doi.org/10.1515/9781501515309-010

618 

 Source Index

BLMJ 12

BLMJ 13 BLMJ 14 BLMJ 15 BLMJ 18 BLMJ 20 CDLN 2012: 5 E1 E5 E7

E8 E 10 E 12 E 13 E 14 E 16

E 17 E 18 E 19 E 20 E 21

E 22 E 23

E 24

E 25

E 26

E 27

82 n. 216, 83 table 12, 102–104 and n. 289 n. 294, 108 n. 309, 142 n. 28, 245 table 31, 256 table 36, 259 n. 37, 260–261 and table 37 and n. 40, 263–264 and table 38, 266–267 and table 39, 270, 279, 281 table 41 and n. 101, 295–297 and n. 140 and table 43, 302, 342 n. 109, 392 122, 232 n. 345 114–115, 224 n. 320 n. 322, 291 n. 126, 293 n. 135 53, 60, 224 n. 320 153 n. 73, 186 n. 184 272 n. 76 42 n. 17, 258 n. 32, 305 table 45 and n. 164 28 28 n. 113, 35–36, 153 n. 73 27 table 7, 28, 31, 130, 140 table 15, 198 table 22, 205, 277 n. 91, 309 table 46, 322, 324 table 51, 327–329 and n. 44 n. 45 n. 50 n. 55, 331 and n. 64, 334, 336, 338 table 55, 342–343 and n. 107 n. 109 n. 115 n. 116, 344–345 and table 56, 351, 369 table 61, 392–395 105 105 28 n. 113 28 8, 88 n. 227 27–30 and table 7 and n. 126, 148, 150, 159 table 16, 165–169 and n. 111 n. 121, 246 table 31, 257 table 36, 259 n. 38, 262, 275 table 40, 278, 281 table 41, 308 table 46, 312–314 and table 47, 316–318 and table 48 and n. 25, 351, 369 table 61, 394–397 182 n. 163 178 n. 163 178 n. 163 82 n. 220, 89 n. 233, 363 n. 7 51 n. 30, 68, 82–83 and n. 217 and table 12, 96–97 and n. 263, 177 n. 154, 244 table 30, 248 table 32, 254 table 35, 258 n. 34, 262–263 and table 38, 265–267 and table 39, 269 and n. 67, 271, 275 table 40, 278, 285–287 table 42, 289–294 and n. 115, 300, 396–399 168 n. 122 31 and table 9, 56 n. 61, 61, 63, 82 n. 219, 83 table 12, 106 and n. 299, 240, 244 table 30, 254 table 35, 258–259, 275–277 and table 40, 280–283 and n. 98 n. 102, 285 table 42, 289–290 and n. 120, 292–293 and n. 130 n. 132, 398–399 4, 31 and table 9, 42–44 and table 11, 50 n. 26, 57 and n. 63, 61, 76 and n. 184, 107, 240, 243 table 30, 250–251 and table 33, 275–277 and table 40, 281, 285 table 42, 289–290, 292–293 and n. 130 n. 132, 400–401 31 and table 9, 61, 76 n. 181, 107, 137, 217–218 and table 24, 222, 231, 290 n. 116, 292, 310 table 46, 324 table 51, 327–329 and n. 44 n. 45 n. 50, 333, 335–336, 351, 400–403 4, 31–32 and table 9 and n. 134, 61, 82–83 n. 219 and table 12, 106–109 and n. 302, 240, 244 table 30, 248 table 32, 275–277 and table 40, 280 table 41, 285 table 42, 289–290, 292, 294, 377, 402–405 31 and table 9, 62

Source Index 

E 28 E 30 E 31 E 33

E 34 E 35

E 36 E 67 E 75

E 76 E 77

E 78 E 79

E 80 E 81 E 82 E 83

E 84

E 85

 619

31 and table 9, 125, 126 table 14, 129 and n. 383, 244 table 30, 275–276 and table 40, 280 table 41, 285 table 42, 289–290, 295, 404–405 35 n. 154 221 n. 308, 224 n. 320 n. 322 139 table 15, 146 and 147 n. 47, 181 table 20, 190–191 and n. 201, 194 n. 212, 220 n. 303, 246 table 31, 247 n. 10, 309 table 46, 320–321 and table 49, 338 table 55, 342–343 and n. 107 n. 109 n. 115 n. 116, 351 n. 137, 404–407 221 n. 308 30 and table 8, 142, 217–218 and table 24, 220–221 n. 307, 310 table 46, 324 table 51, 326–329 and n. 44 n. 45 n. 50 n. 55, 333, 335–336 n. 89, 351 n. 137, 408–409, 448 n. 17 207 28 22–23 and table 2, 43, 44 table 11, 50 n. 26, 61–63 and n. 96, 76–77 n. 182 n. 184 n. 186, 89 n. 230, 96–97 and n. 263, 161 n. 93, 240–241, 243 table 30, 250–251 and table 33, 273 n. 89, 274 table 40, 276, 279–280 and n. 96 and table 41, 285 table 42, 289–290, 292–293 n. 130 n. 132, 408–409 22 table 2, 203, 293 n. 136 22 table 2, 68 n. 134, 71 n. 155, 89 n. 230, 111 n. 331, 120 n. 360, 148, 155–156, 158, table 16 and n. 90, 160, 162, 174, 175 table 18, 242–244 and table 30, 255 table 35, 258 and n. 33, 261–267 and table 38–39, 270, 273 n. 89, 274 table 40, 276, 281–282 and n. 102 n. 103, 288 table 42, 291, 293–294 and n. 133, 300–301 and n. 149, 305 n. 162, 308 table 46, 311, 317–318 and n. 22, 349 table 58, 367 table 61, 410–413 22 table 2 22–23 and and table 2, 140 table 15, 198 table 22, 201–202, 309 table 46, 324 table 51, 327, 331 n. 64, 334 n. 86, 335 table 54, 338 table 55, 342–343 and n. 105 n. 108 n. 110 n. 115 n. 116, 334 table 56, 345, 350 table 58, 367 table 61, 410–413 22 table 2, 270 n. 69, 293 n. 136 22 table 2, 293 n. 136 22 table 2, 293 n. 136 22 table 2, 140 table 15 and n. 21, 142, 198 table 22, 201–202, 309 table 46, 324 table 51, 326–327, 329 n. 55, 330–331 and table 52 and n. 58 n. 64, 334–335 and table 54, 338 table 55, 341–343 and n. 108 n. 111 n. 112, 344 table 56, 346 n. 121, 350 table 58, 362 table 59, 363 n. 7, 367 table 61, 412–413 22 table 2, 29 n. 117, 140 table 15, 146, 198 table 22, 201–202, 309 table 46, 324 table 51, 327–329 and n. 44 n. 45 n. 50 n. 55, 331, 334–335 table 54, 339 table 55, 342–344 and n. 108 n. 110 n. 115 and table 56, 350 table 58, 367 table 61, 414–415 22 table 2, 82 and n. 217, 83 table 12, 89 n. 230, 95–96 and n. 255, 170, 203–204, 243–244 table 30, 273 n. 89, 274 table 40, 276, 282–283 and n. 105, 288 table 42, 293–294 and n. 135, 296–297 and table 43, 301, 305 n. 162, 367 table 61, 414–417

620  E 86

E 87

E 88

E 90A-B E 91 E 109

E 110 E 111 E 112 E 113 E 114 E 115

E 116

E 117

E 118

E 119

E 120

 Source Index

22 table 2, 149, 153 and n. 74, 155–156, 159 table 16, 165, 171, 173–174, 191 n. 204, 192 n. 208, 242, 246 table 31, 261 n. 39, 274 table 40, 276, 280–282 and n. 98 n. 101 n. 103, 308 table 46, 311, 313, 316–317 and table 48 and n. 18, 349 table 58, 362 table 59, 363 n. 7, 367 table 61, 377 n. 51, 416–419 22–23 and table 2, 42–44 table 11, 61–62, 76 n. 184, 77 n. 186, 89 n. 230, 96, 106 n. 300, 161 n. 93, 240, 243 table 30, 253, 254 table 35, 258, 263, 267, 270, 273 n. 89, 274 table 40, 276, 279–280 and n. 96 n. 99 and table 41, 285 table 42, 289–290, 292–293 n. 130 n. 132, 366 table 61, 418–419 22–23 and table 2, 43, 44 table 11, 61, 63–64, 241, 245 table 31, 256 table 36, 259 n. 36, 260 table 37, 274 table 40, 276, 279 n. 96, 280 table 41, 302, 418–421 104 and n. 293 n. 294, 187 35, 224 table 26, 225–226, 232 n. 345, 310 table 46, 420–423 23, 27 n. 111, 33, 82 and n. 218, 84 table 12, 87–89 and n. 226 n. 227 n. 233, 96 n. 257, 239–240 and n. 5, 243 and table 30, 273, 277, 288 table 42, 293–294 and n. 135, 296 table 43, 301, 305 n. 162, 422–425 23, 27 n. 111, 88, 273, 277 23, 88 n. 226, 363 n. 7 23–24 and table 3 23–24 and table 3, 270 n. 69 23–24 and table 3, 82 n. 220 23–24 and table 3, 29 n. 117, 32, 82 and n. 216, 84 table 12, 92–95 and n. 247, 127 n. 370, 245 table 31, 274 table 40, 277, 280 n. 98, 282 n. 105, 295–296 and table 43, 302–303 n. 151 n. 152 n. 154, 356, 368 table 61, 370–371 n. 18 n. 23, 426–427 23–24 and table 3, 32, 82 and n. 216, 84 table 12, 88, 92–93 and n. 245, 95 and n. 253, 101 n. 282, 127 n. 370, 245 table 31, 256 table 36, 260 table 37, 274 table 40, 277, 279 n. 96, 280–281 and table 41 and n. 101, 295–297 and table 43, 302–303 n. 151 n. 152 n. 154, 356, 368 table 61, 370 n. 18, 428–429 23–24 and table 3, 30 n. 126, 111 n. 330, 123 n. 364, 148, 150, 152, 159 table 16, 163–166, 186, 193 and n. 209, 203–204 and n. 252, 213 n. 286, 246 table 31, 257 table 36, 260–263 and table 37, 270, 274 table 40, 277, 279–280 and n. 96 and table 41, 308 table 46, 312 and table 47, 314–318 and table 48, 349 table 58, 357, 368 table 61, 370 n. 18, 428–431 23–24 and table 3, 30 n. 126, 140 table 15, 198 table 22, 202–203, 309 table 46, 324–325 and table 51 and n. 37, 327–330 and n. 50 n. 55 n. 58, 334–335 and table 54, 337, 339 table 55, 342–343 and n. 111 n. 112, 344 table 56, 350 table 58, 368 table 61, 430–433 23–24 and table 3, 82 n. 217, 84 table 12, 90–92 and n. 238, 223 n. 318, 244 table 30, 247 table 32, 249–251, 254 table 35, 258, 272–274 and n. 89 and table 40, 277, 281 n. 102, 283 and n. 106, 288–289 and table 42, 292, 294, 432–433 23–24 and table 3

Source Index 

E 121

E 122 E 123 E 127

E 128 E 136 E 138 E 140 E 142 E 149 E 153 E 156 E 158 E 177 E 186 E 187 E 194 E 197 E 199 E 200

E 201 E 202 E 205

E 206 E 207 E 208 E 209

E 210

 621

23–24 and table 3, 139 table 15, 146, 152, 166, 180 table 20, 184–185, 196, 213 n. 286, 246 table 31, 257 table 36, 260 table 37, 274 table 40, 277, 281–282 n. 101 n. 103, 308 table 46, 319 table 49, 320–321 and n. 32 and table 50, 338 table 55, 341–344 and n. 107 n. 109 n. 116 and table 56, 346 n. 121, 350 table 58, 362–363 table 59 and n. 7, 368 table 61, 377 n. 51, 432–435 23, 270 n. 69 23, 82 and n. 216, 84 table 12, 88, 101–102, 245 table 31, 295–297 and table 43, 302–303 and n. 151 n. 152 n. 154, 346, 434–437 23, 53, 67 n. 126, 125–128 and table 14, 194 n. 212, 217–218 and table 24, 221, 244 table 30, 278 n. 93, 287 table 42, 290–293, 295, 310 table 46, 324–325 and table 51, 327 n. 47, 333, 335–336, 351–352 and n. 138, 436–439 23, 30 n. 126, 226 and n. 332, 232 n. 346 23 363 n. 7 105 153 n. 73, 371 n. 23 363 n. 7, 8 51 n. 36 8 n. 44 19 n. 99 and 100, 363 n. 7 21 table 1, 150 n. 65, 153 n. 74, 229 table 28, 231, 234–235, 310 table 46, 347 table 57, 438–441 114–116 and n. 336 n. 345, 224 n. 320 n. 321 114–116 and n. 336 n. 337 n. 345, 224 n. 320 19 n. 100, 105 n. 296 7 371 n. 23 21 table 1, 82 n. 217, 84 table 12, 90, 205–206 and n. 265, 244 table 30, 251 and n. 25, 254 table 35, 259, 273–274 and n. 89 and table 40, 276, 283 and n. 106, 288 table 42, 292 and n. 130, 294, 306, 336 n. 87, 440–443 99 n. 273, 131 n. 396 185 n. 177 21 table 1, 139 table 15, 181 table 20, 187–188 and n. 186 n. 187, 191 n. 207, 196, 246–247 table 31 and n. 10, 257 table 36, 260–262 and table 37, 264–268 and table 38–39, 274 table 40, 276, 279–280 and n. 96 and table 41, 309 table 46, 320–321 and table 49 table 50 and n. 32, 331 n. 65, 337–338 and table 55, 340 n. 96, 343–344 n. 112 and table 56, 346 n. 121, 350 table 58, 355, 366 table 61, 442–445 371 n. 23 371 n. 23 43 n. 25, 363 n. 7 21 table 1, 33, 43–44 and table 11, 53 n. 40, 55, 57–58 and n. 64 n. 67, 60, 155 n. 83, 196 n. 222, 240, 245 table 31, 253, 256 table 36, 259–263 and table 37, 270, 274 table 40, 276, 279–280 and n. 96 and table 41, 302 and n. 151, 366 table 61, 444–447 21 n. 105, 149 n. 55

622  E 211

E 212 E 213

E 214

E 215

E 216 E 217

E 218 E 219 E 220 E 221

E 224 E 252

E 254 E 255 E 256 E 257 E 258 E 260 E 261 E 263 E 275 E 277

 Source Index

21 table 1, 142, 205 n. 259, 217–220 and table 24, 310 table 46, 324–325 and table 51 and n. 37, 327–330 and n. 49 n. 50 n. 55 n. 58, 335 and table 54, 350 table 58, 366 table 61, 446–447 219–220 21 table 1, 109–111 and n. 324 n. 329, 112 table 13, 114–116 and n. 339 n340, 125 and n. 368, 211 n. 280, 224 n. 320–321, 245 table 31, 247 table 32, 274 table 40, 276, 281–283 and n. 101 n. 103, 293 n. 135, 295 n. 141, 298–300 and table 44, 302, 358 n. 160, 366 table 61, 370 n. 18, 372, 448–451 21 table 1, 60 n. 91, 142, 203, 217–220 and table 24, 310 table 46, 324 table 51, 326–328 and n. 44 n. 45 n. 50, 333, 335 and table 54, 350 table 58, 366 table 61, 450–451 21 table 1, 28 n. 113, 32, 111 n. 330, 116 n. 344, 139 table 15, 146, 180 table 20, 184, 186–187, 194 n. 212, 218, 243, 246 table 31, 261 n. 39, 274 table 40, 276, 281–282 and n. 101 n. 103, 301 n. 149, 308 table 46, 319 table 49, 320–321 and table 50, 338 table 55, 343–344 and n. 115 n. 116 and table 56, 350 table 58, 354 and n. 144, 366 table 61, 370 n. 18, 450–453 35, 199–201 and n. 236, 209 table 23, 212, 309 table 46, 322–323, 330 and n. 61, 351 n. 137, 362–363 and table 59 and n. 7, 452–455 21 table 1, 35, 140 table 15, 198–201 and table 22 and n. 232 n. 241, 212, 309 table 46, 324–327 and table 51 and n. 37, 329–331 and table 52 and n. 55 n. 58 n. 64, 334–335 and table 54, 339 table 55, 342–344 and n. 111 n. 112 and table 56, 346 n. 120, 350 table 58, 366 table 61, 454–457 199 199 199 21 table 1, 30 n. 126, 228 table 27, 230, 310 table 46, 339 table 55, 341–342 and n. 107 n. 109, 344 table 56, 346 and n. 120, 350 table 58, 366 table 61, 456–457 21 table 1, 74, 217–220 and table 24, 310 table 46, 324 table 51, 327, 333, 335 and table 54, 350 table 58, 366 table 61, 458–459 139 table 15, 178, 181 table 20, 188–189 and n. 193, 208 n. 273, 226 n. 333, 242, 244 table 30, 247 n. 10, 248 table 32, 255 table 35, 258–259, 278 n. 93, 281 n. 102, 285 table 42, 291–294 and n. 130, 300–301 and n. 149, 309 table 46, 319–321 and table 49 and n. 32, 338 table 55, 342 n. 108 n. 110, 345 n. 117, 351 n. 137, 458–459 65 60 n. 91, 116 188 n. 191, 208–210 and table 23 and n. 277, 226 n. 333, 309 table 46, 322, 337 n. 93, 343 n. 113, 362 table 59, 363 n. 7, 460–463 125 n. 367, 188 n. 191, 224 table 26, 226–227, 310 table 46, 462–463 220 n. 305 220 n. 305 56 n. 59 378 161 21 table 1, 43, 44 table 11, 55–57 n. 62, 76, 106 n. 298, 240, 243 table 30, 273–274 and n. 87 and n. 89 and table 40, 279 n. 96, 285 table 42, 290, 292 n. 130, 462–465

Source Index 

E 278

E 279

E 309 E 319

E 321 E 336 Ek 2 Ek 19 Ek 28 Ek 29 Ek 30 Ek 33 Ek 39 Ek 46 Ek 52 Ek 67 Ek 68 Ek 69 Ek 70 Ek 71 Ek 93 GsK 1

GsK 2

GsK 5 GsK 6 GsK 7 Hallo 2 Hirayama 2 Hirayama 3 Hirayama 9 Hirayama 10 Hirayama 11 Hirayama 13 Hirayama 15/ AuOr5 6 Hirayama 16

 623

21 table 1, 43, 44 table 11, 55–56, 240, 243 table 30, 248 table 32, 273–274 n. 87 and n. 89 and table 40, 279–280 n. 96 n. 98, 288 table 42, 292, 464–465 21 table 1, 43, 44 table 11, 55, 59 and n. 85, 60–61 and n. 87–88 n. 91, 204 n. 256, 240, 245 table 31, 247 table 32, 249, 272, 274 table 40, 276, 279–280 n. 96 n. 98, 283 and n. 106, 302, 466–469 65 21 table 1, 43, 44–45 table 11, 55, 59–61 and n. 87 n. 88 n. 91, 65 n. 119, 204 n. 256, 240, 245 table 31, 247 table 32, 249, 251, 272, 274 table 40, 276, 279–280 n. 96 n. 98, 283 and n. 106, 302, 468–469 234 n. 355 104, 185 n. 178 14 7 199 n. 230, 353 and n. 141 305 table 45 and n. 164 305 table 45 and n. 164 305 n. 163 347 n. 123 90 and n. 239, 283 n. 106, 305 table 45 and n. 164 305 table 45 and n. 164 272, 305 n. 163 72 and n. 162, 264 n. 53, 305 table 45 and n. 165 305 table 45 and n. 165 305 table 45 305 table 45 305 25 table 4, 30 table 8, 31, 122, 139 table 15, 170, 180 table 20, 184–185, 193 n. 211, 246 table 31, 261 n. 39, 274 table 40, 276, 279, 281–282 table 41 and n. 101 n. 103, 308 table 46, 319–322 table 49 and table 50 and n. 32, 338 table 55, 343 n. 112, 344 table 56, 346 n. 120, 350 table 58, 354, 367 table 61, 470–471 25 table 4, 35–36 n. 149 n. 160, 110 n. 325, 152 and 153 n. 74, 166, 193 n. 210, 208–209 table 23, 213–216 and n. 290, 309 table 46, 317–318 n. 21 n. 23, 323, 350 table 58, 353, 362 table 59, 363 n. 7, 368 table 61, 377 n. 51, 470–473 42–43, 46 table 11, 79, 240, 243 table 30, 278 n. 93, 287 table 42, 291–292 n. 130, 472–475 3 n. 10, 379 n. 62 24 26 table 5, 81 n. 215 51 and n. 36 153 n. 73, 204 n. 257 270 n. 69 153 n. 73 103 n. 289 32 363 n. 7, 8 363 n. 7

624 

 Source Index

Hirayama 17

Hirayama 18

Hirayama 19 Hirayama 20 Hirayama 22 Hirayama 23 Hirayama 29 Hirayama 33

Hirayama 34

Hirayama 35 Hirayama 36

Hirayama 37

Hirayama 38

Hirayama 39

Hirayama 40

Hirayama 41 Hirayama 43 Hirayama 44 Hirayama 45 Hirayama 46

140 table 15, 189, 198 table 22, 208, 309 table 46, 324–329 and table 51 and n. 35 n. 38 n. 44 n. 45 n. 50 n. 56, 331 n. 64, 334, 336–337 and n. 89, 339 table 55, 342 n. 109 n. 110 n. 111, 345 n. 117, 346 n. 120, 351 n. 137, 474–477 140 table 15, 198 table 22, 207–208, 309 table 46, 324 table 51, 326–329 and n. 44, n. 45 n. 50 n. 56, 331 n. 64, 334, 336 n. 89, 339 table 55, 340, 342 n. 108 n. 110 n. 111, 345–346 n. 117 n. 120, 351 n. 137, 476–477 224 n. 320 n. 322 224 n. 320 n. 322 25 table 4 224 n. 320 n. 322 35 and n. 154, 166 n. 117, 182 n. 163, 224 n. 320 42–43, 46 table 11, 50, 89 n. 230, 239–240 and n. 6, 243 table 30, 250–251 and table 33 and n. 26, 252–154 and n. 30 and table 35, 258–259, 262, 270–271 and n. 70, 285 table 42, 289, 291–293 and n. 125 n. 130 n. 133, 300, 476–479 42–43, 46 table 11, 50 n. 26, 52, 76 n. 182, 107 n. 308, 239–240, 243 table 30, 250–251 and table 33 and n. 26, 285 table 42, 291–293 and n. 125 n. 130 n. 133, 300, 478–479 131 n. 395 25 table 4, 30 and table 8, 139 table 15, 180 table 20, 184–185, 193 n. 211, 196, 246 table 31, 261 n. 39, 274 table 40, 276, 279, 281–282 and table 41 and n. 101 n. 103, 308 table 46, 319–321 and table 49 table 50, 338 table 55, 343–345 and n. 112 n. 115 n. 116 and table 56, 350 table 58, 354, 367 table 61, 478–481 25 table 4, 122, 137, 170, 185 n. 178, 192–196 and n. 218, 204 n. 252, 242, 246 table 31, 261 n. 39, 274 table 40, 276, 279, 281–283 and table 41 and n. 101 n. 103, 309 table 46, 322, 337, 339–342 and table 55 and n. 105, 344, 346 n. 120, 350 table 58, 362 table 59, 363 n. 7, 367 table 61, 370, 377 n. 51, 480–483 148, 150, 159 table 16, 163 n. 106, 169 and n. 124, 246 table 31, 257 table 36, 259 n. 38, 262, 308 table 46, 312 and table 47, 314, 316–317 and table 48, 351 n. 137, 482–485 82 and n. 216, 84 table 12, 102 and n. 286 n. 287, 245 table 31, 256 table 36, 260–261 and table 37 and n. 40, 280–281 n. 98 n. 101, 295–296 and n. 140 and table 43, 302–303 n. 151 n. 152 n. 156, 484–485 25 table 4, 42–43, 46 table 11, 64, 217 table 24, 221, 243 table 30, 248 table 32, 251 n. 24, 253, 273 n. 89, 274 table 40, 276, 279–280 and n. 96 and table 41, 285 table 42, 292–293 n. 133, 310 table 46, 323 n. 34, 324–327 and table 51 and n. 37 n. 38, 329 n. 56, 333, 335–336 and table 54, 351–352 and n. 136 n. 138, 486–487 25 table 4, 31, 222–223 and table 25, 310 table 46, 333, 335 table 54, 350 table 58, 367 table 61, 370 n. 17, 486–489 105 n. 296, 203 n. 250 570 n. 32 25 table 4, 123–124 and n. 364, 193 and n. 209, 204 n. 252, 224 n. 320, 370 n. 15 147 and n. 47, 231 n. 344

Source Index 

Hirayama 51 HS 2068 IM 85014 Iraq54 2 Iraq54 5

JA 303 JCS40 3 KAJ 17 KAJ 28 KAJ 31 KAJ 41 KAJ 46 KAJ 53 KAJ 60 KAJ 145 KTU3 2.39 MARV 1 37 MFA 1977.114 PdA 68 PRU V 60 PRU VI 7 QVO5 1 QVO5 2

RA77 3 RA77 5

RE 4 RE 7 RE 8 RE 9 RE 10

RE 11 RE 13

 625

35 n. 154 340 n. 100 108 n. 314 363 n. 7 142, 217–218 and table 24, 310 table 46, 324 table 51, 327–329 and n. 44 n. 45 n. 50 n. 52 n. 56, 331, 333 and n. 78, 335–336 n. 88 n. 89, 349 n. 127, 351 n. 137, 488–489 222–223 and table 25, 310 table 46, 333, 335–336 and n. 89, 351–352 n. 138 43, 46 table 11, 72–73 and n. 165, 240, 245 table 31, 250–251 and table 33 and n. 26, 264, 302, 488–489 176 n. 153 176 n. 153 176 n. 153 177 n. 154 177 n. 154 176 n. 153 176 n. 153 293 n. 135 376 n. 48 216 n. 292 32–33, 125–127 and table 14 and n. 371, 169, 244 table 30, 259, 278 n. 93, 281 n. 102, 287 table 42, 290–291 and n. 130 n. 131, 294, 490–493 43, 46 table 11, 74–75, 241, 245 table 31, 247 table 32, 249, 302–303 and n. 151, 492–493 see KTU3 2.39 220 n. 305 29, 168, 278 27 table 7, 29, 148, 150–152 n. 68, 159 table 16, 164–165, 168–169, 246 table 31, 275 table 40, 278, 281 table 41, 308 table 46, 312 and table 47, 316 table 48, 318 n. 25, 351, 369 table 61, 492–495 74 n. 169 30–31 and table 8, 71 n. 155, 111 n. 331, 131 and n. 395, 148, 153 n. 73, 156, 158 table 16, 160–162 and table 17, 174–175 and table 18, 246 table 31, 257 table 36, 260–265 and table 37 table 38 and n. 39, 267, 270, 279, 281–283 table 41 and n. 101 n. 104, 308 table 46, 319, 351 n. 137, 494–497 363 n. 8 130 224 n. 320 n. 322 88 n. 225 25 table 4, 30 and table 8 and n. 126, 110–111 n. 329, 113 table 13, 118 n. 351, 119 n. 355, 121–124 and n. 364, 170, 245 table 31, 247 table 32, 274 table 40, 276, 279–281 table 41 and n. 96 n. 101, 283 and n. 106, 295 n. 141, 298–300 and table 44, 302, 306, 358 n. 160, 372, 496–499 30, 204 and n. 255 25 table 4, 110–111 n. 329, 113 table 13, 118 n. 351, 119 n. 355, 121–124 and n. 364, 203, 245 table 31, 247 table 32, 274 table 40, 276, 281–283 and n. 101 n. 103 n. 106, 295 n. 140, 298–300 and table 44, 302, 306, 358 n. 160, 367 table 61, 370 n. 18, 372–373, 500–503

626  RE 18 RE 19

RE 25

RE 26 RE 27 RE 31 RE 35 RE 39 RE 56 RE 58

RE 60 RE 61 RE 63

RE 64 RE 65

RE 66 RE 67 RE 68 RE 69 RE 72

RE 73 RE 74 RE 75

RE 76 RE 77 RE 82

 Source Index

43, 47 table 11, 72, 206 n. 267, 240, 245 table 31, 251, 302–303 and n. 151, 361–363 and table 59 and n. 7, 502–503 43, 47 table 11, 57 n. 70, 68, 77–79 and n. 191 n. 195–196, 240, 243 table 30, 254 table 35, 258, 262, 265, 267, 269, 271, 278 n. 93, 287 table 42, 290, 294, 314 n. 10, 504–507 30 n. 126, 109–110, 112 table 13, 119–120 and n. 355 n. 356 n. 358 n. 360, 124, 170, 215 n. 288, 228 table 27, 230–231, 242–243, 245 table 31, 247 table 32, 256 table 36, 259 n. 36, 260–262 and table 37, 264–268 and table 38–39 and n. 63, 281–282 and n. 101, 295 n. 140, 298–299 and table 44, 302–303 n. 151 n. 153, 304 n. 158, 310 table 46, 350 n. 132, 506–509 147, 209 table 23, 213, 215–216 and n. 289 n. 291, 229 table 28, 235, 309–310 table 46, 323, 347 and table 57, 351 n. 137, 374 n. 36, 508–511 150 n. 65, 229 table 28, 231–232, 234, 310 table 46, 347 table 57, 510–511 363 n. 7 8 and n. 44, 363 n. 7 72 n. 158, 148, 159 table 16, 169–171, 246 table 31, 270 n. 69, 308 table 46, 313 n. 8, 351 n. 137, 510–513 29, 74 and n. 169, 173 and n. 142, 224 n. 320 n. 322, 278, 281 68 n. 137, 81–82 and n. 216, 84 table 12, 87 n. 222, 105 and n. 296, 245 table 31, 256 table 36, 260–265 and table 37 table 38, 267, 270, 280–281 n. 98 n. 101, 295, 295–296 and n. 141, 302–304 and n. 151 n. 152 n. 156 n. 160, 512–515 43, 47 table 11, 73–74 and n. 167, 173, 241, 245 table 31, 280 n. 98, 302, 514–515 7, 35 n. 155, 200–201 and n. 238 28–29 and table 7, 74 and n. 169, 149, 153, 159 table 16, 171–173 and n. 138 n. 142, 189 n. 195, 203, 246 table 31, 275 table 40, 278, 280–282 and n. 98 n. 101 n. 104, 308 table 46, 311, 313, 315–316 and table 48 and n. 18, 318 n. 25, 351, 353, 369 table 61, 516–517 363 n. 7 82 n. 217, 85 table 12, 98 and n. 269, 161 n. 99, 244 table 30, 254 table 35, 258–259 and n. 35, 278 n. 93, 281 n. 102, 286 table 42, 290, 292–293 n. 130 n. 132, 305 n. 162, 516–519 229 table 28, 231, 233, 310 table 46, 347 table 57, 518–519 201 n. 242 69 and n. 140, 176 n. 152 224 n. 320 27 table 7, 29, 43, 47 table 11, 69–70 and n. 148 n. 150, 131, 201 n. 242, 240, 243 table 30, 248 table 32 and n. 11, 275–277 and table 40, 280 and table 41, 288 table 42, 291, 520–521 31 29 n. 118, 70 and n. 150 27 table 7, 29, 43, 48 table 11, 69–70 and n. 148 n. 150, 131, 241, 243 table 30, 248 table 32, 254 table 35, 258–259, 263, 270, 275–277 and table 40, 280 and table 41, 288 table 42, 291, 368 table 61, 520–521 29, 60 n. 91, 131 and n. 395, 201 n. 242 363 n. 7 35 and n. 156

Source Index 

RE 84 RE 88 RE 89 RE 96

RS 17.148 RS 18.038 RS 20.212 RS 34.152 RS 86.2230 RS 94.2002+ RS 94.2169 RS 94.2287 RS 94.2443 RS 94.2540 RS 94.2571 RSO 7 30 RSO 7 31 RSO 7 33 RSO 7 40 RSO 14 18 RSO 23 12 RSO 23 19 RSO 23 21 RSO 23 40 RSO 23 47 RSO 23 107 SMEA30 7 SMEA30 8 SMEA30 9

Subartu 17

T 98–63 TBR 5 TBR 9 TBR 14 TBR 15 TBR 19 TBR 20 TBR 21 TBR 22

 627

9, 42–43, 48 table 11, 54–55 and n. 56, 239–241, 245 table 31, 253, 256 table 36, 260 and table 37, 271, 302, 304 n. 159, 522–523 109–110, 112 table 13, 121 and n. 361, 215 n. 288, 246 table 31, 280–281 n. 98 n. 101, 295 n. 141, 298–299 and table 44, 302–303 n. 153, 522–525 90 and n. 240, 128 n. 381, 305 table 45 and n. 165 42–43, 48 table 11, 53–54 and n. 46 n. 48–49, 60 n. 90, 73 n. 164, 239–241, 245 table 31, 247 table 32, 250 table 33, 302, 304 n. 159, 361 n. 4, 524–527 see PRU VI 7 see KTU3 2.39 see Ugaritica 5 33 see RSO 7 40 see RSO 14 18 see RSO 23 40 see RSO 23 12 see RSO 23 47 see RSO 23 19 see RSO 23 107 see RSO 23 21 97, 378 63 n. 103 63 n. 103, 97, 378 61–62 and n. 96, 97, 377 378 n. 57 12 n. 59, 377 n. 49 53 and n. 43 376 376 n. 43 n. 48 376 n. 44 376 n. 44 60 193 and n. 209, 224 n. 320 n. 322 110–111 n. 329, 113 table 13, 116, 124–125 and n. 365 n. 366 n. 368, 191 n. 204, 226 n. 335, 242, 246 table 31, 247 table 32, 280–281 n. 98 n. 101, 295 n. 141, 298–299 and table 44, 302, 362–363 table 59 and n. 7, 373, 526–529 21 table 1, 191–192 table 21, 195–197, 242, 246–247 table 31 and n. 10, 257 table 36, 260 table 37, 274 table 40, 276, 281–282 n. 101 n. 103, 309 table 46, 322, 337, 339–340 and table 55, 342 n. 105, 344, 346 and n. 120, 350 table 58, 362–363 table 59 and n. 7, 366 table 61, 370, 528–531 177 n. 158 28, 95 n. 253 363 n. 7 7 51 and n. 36 53–54 and n. 46 26 table 5, 82 n. 220 26 table 5, 29 n. 117, 35, 168 n. 121 26 table 5, 90, 122, 193 and n. 209, 204 n. 252, 206 n. 265, 224 n. 320 n. 322, 336 n. 87, 370 n. 15

628 

TBR 23 TBR 24 TBR 25

TBR 26

TBR 27

TBR 28

TBR 29

TBR 30 TBR 31 TBR 32 TBR 33

TBR 34

TBR 35 TBR 36

TBR 37 TBR 38 TBR 39

TBR 40

 Source Index

26 table 5 26 table 5, 31, 203–204 n. 253 26 table 5 and n. 109, 35 n. 149, 122, 137, 153 n. 74, 191–192 table 21, 193–195, 204 n. 253, 242–243, 246 table 31, 247 table 32, 249, 261 n. 39, 275 table 40, 277, 279–280 table 41 and n. 96, 309 table 46, 322, 337, 339–346 and table 55 and n. 105 n. 107 n. 121, 350 table 58, 362–363 table 59 and n. 7, 368 table 61, 370, 377–378 and n. 51, 530–533 26 table 5, 139 table 15 and n. 19, 146, 177 n. 155, 179 table 19, 182–183, 231, 246 table 31, 275 table 40, 277, 282 n. 105, 308 table 46, 319, 321 table 50, 324–329 and table 51 and n. 38 n. 44 n. 45 n. 50 n. 53 n. 55, 331–332, 335–336 and table 54, 338 table 55, 342–344 and n. 108 n. 110 n. 115 and table 56, 350 table 58, 355, 368 table 61, 532–535 43, 49 table 11, 50 n. 29, 56, 67–69 and n. 130 n. 140, 176, 240, 243 table 30, 248 table 32, 254 table 35, 258, 278 n. 93, 283, 286 table 42, 291–293 and n. 130 n. 133, 383 n. 1, 534–535 28–29 and table 7, 60 n. 91, 69 n. 140, 82 n. 216, 85 table 12, 97 and n. 264 n. 265, 245 table 31, 260, 275 table 40, 278, 280–282 and n. 98 n. 101, 295–296 and table 43 and n. 141, 302–303 and n. 151, n. 152 n. 156, 369 table 61, 534–537 28–29 and table 7, 60 n. 91, 69 n. 140, 82 n. 216, 85 table 12, 97–98 and n. 264 n. 265, 141, 245 table 31, 261, 275 table 40, 278, 280–282 and n. 98 n. 101, 294–296 and n. 141 and table 43, 302–303 and n. 151, n. 152 n. 156, 369 table 61, 536–539 69 n. 140, 224 n. 320–321, 570 n. 32 234 and n. 355 118 n. 354, 229 table 28, 231, 234 and n. 355, 310 table 46, 347 and table 57, 538–539 54 n. 47, 70 n. 151, 82 and n. 216, 86 table 12, 100 and n. 275, 245 table 31, 270 n. 69, 283, 295–296 and table 43, 302–303 and n. 151 n. 152 n. 154, 538–541 43, 49 table 11, 68 n. 137, 70–71 and n. 151 n. 152, 108 n. 309, 194 n. 215, 240, 243, 245 table 31, 256 table 36, 260–264 and table 37 table 38, 266–267 and table 39, 269, 281, 302 and n. 151, 540–543 29 n. 119 27 table 7, 29 and n. 119, 32, 125–126 table 14, 129–131 and n. 395, 194 n. 212, 246 table 31, 261, 275–277 and table 40, 280–281 and table 41 and n. 101, 295–297 and table 43 and n. 140, 302, 306, 313 n. 8, 369–370 table 61 and n. 18, 542–545, 570 n. 32 270 n. 69 32 28–29 and table 7, 148, 150–151, 159 table 16, 163 and n. 106, 165–166 and n. 114 n. 116, 246 table 31, 275 table 40, 278, 280 table 41, 308 table 46, 312 and table 47, 316 table 48, 318 n. 25, 351, 369 table 61, 544–547 28–29 and table 7, 148, 150–151 and n. 61, 153 n. 73, 159 table 16, 163, 165–166, 182 n. 163, 214 n. 286, 246 table 31, 275 table 40, 278, 280 table 41, 308 table 46, 312 and table 47, 316 table 48, 318 and n. 25, 351, 369 table 61, 546–547

Source Index 

TBR 41 TBR 42 TBR 43 TBR 44

TBR 45 TBR 46 TBR 47 TBR 48 TBR 49

TBR 52

TBR 53 TBR 57 TBR 58 TBR 64 TBR 65

TBR 66 TBR 68 TBR 69 TBR 70 TBR 71 TBR 72 TBR 74

TBR 75 TBR 77 TBR 78

TBR 79 TBR 82

 629

36 and n. 158, 150 n. 65, 229 table 28, 235, 310 table 46, 347–348 and table 57, 548–551 36 n. 158 26–27 and n. 109 and table 6, 212 n. 282 26–27 and n. 109 and table 6, 30, 139 table 15, 141 n. 22, 179 table 19, 182, 204 n. 253 and n. 255, 246 table 31, 275–277 and table 40, 282 n. 105, 308 table 46, 319, 321 and table 50, 324 table 51, 326–331 and n. 44 n. 45 n. 50 n. 55 and table 52, 334–336 and table 54, 338 table 55, 342–345 and n. 107 n. 109 n. 115 n. 116 and table 56, 350 table 58, 355, 362 table 59, 363 n. 7, 368 table 61, 377–378 and n. 51, 550–551 26–27 table 6, 212 26–27 table 6, 212 26, 212 and n. 283 26 and n. 108, 208–209 table 23, 211–212 and n. 283, 309 table 46, 322–323, 362–363 table 59 and n. 7, 372, 552–555 26, 43, 49 table 11, 59 n. 79, 65–66 and n. 116 n. 125, 108 n. 315, 240, 243 table 30, 248 table 32, 251, 254 table 35, 258, 278 n. 93, 286 table 42, 290–293 and n. 132, 554–557 90 n. 237, 140 table 15, 196 n. 223, 198 table 22, 205–206, 309 table 46, 324 table 51, 326–327, 329–331 and table 52 and n. 56 n. 59 n. 64, 334, 336 n. 87 n. 89, 339 table 55, 341–343 and n. 108 n. 111 n. 112, 345–346 and n. 117 n. 120, 351 n. 137, 362–363 table 59 and n. 7, 556–557 101 n. 280, 270 n. 69 363 n. 7 363 n. 7 30 and n. 122, 101 and n. 279, 278 and n. 92 28 table 7, 30, 82 and n. 216, 86 table 12, 100–101 and n. 277 n. 279, 245 table 31, 278, 295–296 and table 43, 302–303 and n. 151 n. 152 n. 154, 362–363 table 59 and n. 7, 369 table 61, 371 n. 23, 558–559 25 table 4, 203 32, 203–204 224 n. 320 224 n. 320 n. 322 55 n. 58, 224 n. 320 n. 322 104 and n. 293 n. 294 109–110, 112 table 13, 118–119, 215 n. 288, 224 n. 320, 246 table 31, 281 n. 101, 295 n. 141, 298–300 and table 44, 302–304 n. 151 n. 153 n. 158, 362–363 table 59 and n. 7, 560–561 224 table 26, 226, 310 table 46, 562–563 36 and n. 159, 200 n. 236, 209 table 23, 212–213, 234 n. 355, 309 table 46, 322–323, 337 n. 93, 341 n. 102, 343 n. 113, 351 n. 137, 564–565 109–110 and n. 324, 112 table 13, 115 n. 338, 117–118, 119 n. 355, 170, 246 table 31, 281 n. 101, 295 n. 141, 298–299 and table 44, 302–304 n. 151 n. 153 n. 158, 372, 564–567 224–225 and table 26, 310 table 46, 566–569 34 n. 155, 82 and n. 218, 86 table 12, 87–88, 102, 239–240, 245 table 31, 256 table 36, 260–261 and table 37, 295–297 and table 43, 302–303 and n. 151 n. 152 n. 156, 568–571

630 

 Source Index

TBR 84 TBR 88 TR 3016 TR 3021 Ugaritica 5 33

125, 126 table 14, 131–132, 246 table 31, 257 table 36, 260–263 and table 37, 264–267 and table 38–39, 281 n. 101, 295 n. 140, 302, 570–573 120 n. 358 108 n. 313, 109 n. 319 176 n. 153 375 n. 40, 376 n. 48