Debasing Political Rhetoric: Dissing Opponents, Journalists, and Minorities in Populist Leadership Communication 9819908930, 9789819908936

Table of contents :
Preface
Contents
Contributors
1 Introduction: Studying Political Debasement Discourse in the Public Sphere
1.1 Defining Political Debasement Discourse
1.2 Assessing Political Debasement
1.3 Key Factors in Political Debasement
1.4 Modes of Interaction Between Debaser(s) and Their Target(s)
1.5 Distinction Between Debasement, Incivility, and Hate Speech
1.6 Overview of the Volume
References
Part I Theoretical Background
2 Debasement Language as a Subset of Political Incivility: Characteristics and Effects
2.1 Introduction
2.2 Definitions and Types of Debasement Language in Politics
2.3 Why Is Debasement Language Used in Political Discourse?
2.4 Who Are the Recipients of Debasement Language in Political Discourse?
2.5 How Political Debasement Affects Audiences and Democratic Processes
2.6 Conclusion
References
Part II Critical Assessment of the Diversity of Debasing Language
3 Coarseness in Spanish Political Discourse: A Critical Discourse Analysis of Santiago Abascal and Pablo Casado’s Aggressive Language
3.1 Introduction
3.2 Research Framework: Critical Discourse Analysis
3.3 The Parliamentary Speech of Santiago Abascal
3.3.1 Insults and Personal Attacks (“Argumentum Ad Hominem”)
3.3.2 Hasty Generalizations (Red Herring Fallacy)
3.4 The Parliamentary Speech of Pablo Casado
3.4.1 Insults and Personal Attacks (“Argumentum Ad Hominem”)
3.4.2 Exaggerations and Hasty Generalizations
3.5 Conclusions
References
4 Debasing Language Expressed by Two Radical Right-Wing Populist Leaders in the Netherlands: Geert Wilders and Thierry Baudet
4.1 Introduction
4.2 The Communication Styles of Far-Right Political Leaders
4.3 Digital Media, Far-Right Populism and Debasing Speech
4.4 Case Study: Debasement in the Direct Communication of Wilders and Baudet
4.4.1 Method
4.4.2 Data Collection and Sample
4.4.3 Data Analysis and Coding
4.5 Findings
4.5.1 Hostile De-legitimization of the Establishment
4.5.2 Accusations of Deception and a Lying Press
4.5.3 Nativism and Exclusionary Language
4.6 Conclusion and Discussion: Implications of Debasing Language
References
5 The Sharp-Tongued Loudmouth: Incivility and Debasement in Brazil's President Jair Bolsonaro's YouTube Livestreams
5.1 Introduction
5.2 Methodology
5.3 Findings and Discussion
5.3.1 Name-Calling
5.3.2 Insulting Language
5.4 Discussion and Conclusion
References
Part III Debasement as Strategic Instrument
6 The Cuss that Cares? Paternalistic Cussing in Philippine President Rodrigo Roa Duterte’s Rhetoric
6.1 Introduction
6.2 Paternalistic Cussing: A Novel Approach for  Examining Duterte’s Rhetoric
6.3 Paternalistic Cussing Practices in Duterte’s Speeches
6.4 Concluding Remarks
References
7 The Shameless Normalization of Debasement Performance: A Critical Discourse Analysis of Pauline Hanson’s Australian, Far-Right, Populist Communication
7.1 Introduction
7.2 Debasement, Shamelessness, and the Far-Right
7.3 Research Approach
7.4 Case Studies
7.4.1 Racialized Debasement on Twitter
7.4.2 Debasement Through Populist Performance: The “Burqa Stunt”
7.4.3 Colonial Debasement in the Australian Parliament
7.4.4 Mediatized Debasement During COVID-19
7.5 Analysis and Discussion
7.6 Conclusion
References
8 Well-Mannered Debasement? Examining Abe Shinzô’s Discourse and Its Reliance on Japanese Communication Modes
8.1 Introduction
8.2 Methodology and Data
8.3 Results
8.3.1 Debasement as “Defense”
8.3.2 The Target of Abe’s Debasement Language
8.4 Conclusion: Debasement Needs a “Proper” Stage and Audience
References
9 Constructing Political Adversaries Through Debasement Language: A Framing Analysis of Kyriakos Mitsotakis’ Greek Speeches in 2020
9.1 Introduction: The Political Context of 2020
9.1.1 Polarization and Divisive Discourse in Greek Politics
9.2 Cultural Framing and Debasement Language
9.3 Methodology
9.4 Findings
9.4.1 The Frames Employed in Mitsotakis’ Political Speeches in 2020
9.4.2 Debasement Speech as a Framing Mechanism
9.5 Discussion
References
Part IV Leaders’ Debasement Effects: Voter Mobilization, Socio-Political Polarization, and  Shaping Political Reality Perception
10 The Strategic Use of Debasing and Vulgar Language in Italy’s Contemporary Politics: Beppe Grillo and Matteo Salvini
10.1 Introduction
10.2 Beppe Grillo’s Rhetoric
10.3 Matteo Salvini’s Differentialist and Rude Messages
10.4 Conclusions: The Force of Violent and Discriminatory Language in Recent History
References
11 Demonization, Derision, Polarization: Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s Political Rhetoric
11.1 Introduction
11.2 Context: The Use of Debasing Language in Turkish Politics
11.3 “A Rhetoric of Abjection:” Making Sense of Erdoğan’s Political Rhetoric
11.3.1 Binarism
11.3.2 Organicism
11.3.3 Demonization
11.3.4 Social and Political Ramifications
11.4 Conclusion
References
12 Tweets, Taunts, Tirades, and Tantrums: How America’s Donald Trump Transformed Transgressive Language into Political Power
12.1 Introduction
12.2 Starting at the Beginning—Self Definition, Enemy Definition, and Recruiting
12.3 Attacking the Media
12.3.1 Attacking Mainstream Media in General
12.3.2 Attacking Individual Journalists: The Conflicts with Megyn Kelly, Serge Kovaleski, and Yamiche Alcindor
12.4 Debasing the Political Establishment and Debasing Opponents
12.4.1 Attacking Establishment Leaders
12.4.2 Attacking Rivals
12.5 Real World Results—Creating the Perception of Threat and Dehumanizing the Enemy and Thus Encouraging Violence
12.6 Conclusion—The Ultimate Debasements
References
Part V Conclusions
13 Heroes or History? The Sources, Evolution, and Future of Debasement Rhetoric
13.1 Introduction
13.2 Expanding the Debasement Typology
13.3 Research Questions
13.4 Debasement as Body Politic Illness
References
Index

Citation preview

The Language of Politics

Ofer Feldman   Editor

Debasing Political Rhetoric Dissing Opponents, Journalists, and Minorities in Populist Leadership Communication

The Language of Politics Series Editor Ofer Feldman, Doshisha University, Kyoto, Japan Editorial Board Christ’l De Landtsheer, University of Antwerp, Antwerp, Belgium Catalina Fuentes-Rodríguez, University of Seville, Sevilla, Spain Augusto Gnisci, University of Campania “Luigi Vanvitelli”, Caserta, Italy Michael Hameleers, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands Michael Alan Krasner, City University of New York, New York, USA Sam Lehman-Wilzig, Bar-Ilan University, Ramat Gan, Israel Hongna Miao, Nanjing University, Nanjing, China Katarzyna Molek-Kozakowska, University of Opole, Opole, Poland Gene Segarra Navera, National University of Singapore, Singapore, Singapore Debbita Ai Lin Tan, Universiti Sains Malaysia, Penang, Malaysia Annemarie Walter, University of Nottingham, Nottingham, UK Ruth Wodak, Lancaster University, Lancaster, UK Sonja Zmerli, Sciences Po Grenoble, St. Martin d’Hères, France

The Language of Politics series is an interdisciplinary, critical, and analytical forum for the publication of cutting-edge research regarding the way language is used by political officials. It focuses mainly on empirically-based research aiming to analyze and discuss the role, function, and effects of the vocabulary used by politicians and other officials in Western and non-Western societies. Such language can be broadcast live in venues such as parliamentary debates and deliberations, election campaign assemblies, political party conventions, press conferences, media interviews, and even non-broadcast (but later reported) speeches in front of support groups or during international negotiations – in traditional as well as social media (e.g., Facebook, Twitter). It can include polite, respectful, and deferential public speaking, or conversely, impolite verbal discourse, debasing and derisive comments, and the use of crude, vulgar, or abusive terms – including curses and obscenities – through irony, sarcasm, cynicism, ridicule, and mockery, to demean, degrade, humiliate, and insult individuals, the political opposition, or groups in society. The series is located at the intersection of several social science disciplines including communication, linguistics, discourse studies, political sociology, political science, and political psychology. It aims to bring together multiple political and social theories and concepts; qualitative, quantitative, or mixed methodological approaches; and in-depth, empirical, communication- and language-oriented analyses. By addressing critical issues such as the use of words, terms, and expressions in parliamentary debate and political negotiations, and their effect from novel perspectives, it can expose the weaknesses of existing discourse analysis concepts and arguments, or reassess the topic in other ways through the introduction of different ideas, the integration of perspectives from disparate sub-fields or even disciplines. By challenging existing paradigms, authored books in the series will enrich current debates surrounding several complex, discourse relationships: between politicians’ and citizens; between decision-makers and their colleagues; and in general, the way language shapes political culture in an increasingly globalized world. All proposals and books in this series are peer-reviewed by international experts in the aforementioned fields.

Ofer Feldman Editor

Debasing Political Rhetoric Dissing Opponents, Journalists, and Minorities in Populist Leadership Communication

Editor Ofer Feldman Faculty of Policy Studies Doshisha University Kyoto, Japan

The Language of Politics ISBN 978-981-99-0893-6 ISBN 978-981-99-0894-3 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-0894-3 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore

To the Hatanis— Akifumi and Asaya, Your life is what you speak it to be. Speak life!

Preface

This book is a companion to Political Debasement: Incivility, Contempt, and Humiliation in Parliamentary and Public Discourse (Feldman, 2023). Whereas the first book focuses on speeches, statements, comments, and remarks of politicians in their parliamentarian and other official and less official private activities, the present book examines the language of selected political leaders in Western and non-Western countries, including Donald Trump (in the USA), Recep Tayyip Erdo˘gan (Turkey), Rodrigo Roa Duterte (Philippines), and Jair Bolsonaro (Brazil). The two books represent the collective wisdom of scholars and researchers, experts in fields such as communication, political science, international relations, and social and political psychology. They discuss and provide a number of novel insights of theoretical and practical importance regarding some of the most important aspects of a particular type of language in politics, debasing discourse, as well as potential avenues for future research on the nature and effect of this type of language. The two volumes form a collection with strong internal coherence and abundant cross-references among its contributions, and can be read jointly, as the chapters in the two books complement and “speak” to each other—or read separately as standalone books. Our intent (and hope) is that they preferably will be read and used together as a unified, polyphonic, and interdisciplinary contribution to the study of political debasement discourse. The two books are part of the same project with its manifold goals. This includes (1) To define, identify, and assess the nature, characteristics, role, and usage of debasement language of politicians in different societies; (2) To determine the target (individual or groups) at the center of such rhetoric; (3) To examine the venues and circumstances in which debasement language is used; (4) To consider the social, political, and psychological rationale behind the use of such discourse in politics; (5) To analyze the effect of such language within the general and political culture of a given country; and last, (6) To offer ideas to further advance the scholarly research and debate on the functions of debasement discourse in the conduct of politics. As a whole, the authors in these books address current and upcoming research opportunities in political debasement, by describing, analyzing, and anticipating the

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key areas of debasement on which students and researchers of political behavior and communication should focus. As the editor of this book I was very lucky to have the opportunity to bring together an extraordinary group of scholars from different countries and would like to sincerely thank all of them for their support and dedication throughout this collaborative project, working hard to complete their respective chapters in a timely and comprehensive fashion. I hope that the process of writing their chapters has been a rewarding endeavor to them as well. A special thanks to Sonja Zmerli for endless support and invaluable patience during the process of this project from its birth, and to my students and student/teaching assistants, Yuriko Kono and Yuki Nakagawa, for keeping my spirit and motivation high during the working on this project, and for finding applicable references and information. As always, Sam Lehman-Wilzig offered excellent language and copyediting work, attentively reading every word in this book while providing the authors with essential suggestions, feedback, and substantive criticism to obtain the highest quality in their contributions. We are all deeply indebted to him for his sincere and efficient work. I also want to thank the staff at Springer, especially to our editor Juno Kawakami, for their kind, enthusiastic, and competent work in preparing the book for publication. It goes without saying, as in my previous projects, none of the above-mentioned individuals assumes any responsibility for any mistake or flaws in this book—except perhaps my two grandsons Akifumi (3 years old) and Asaya (2 years old), to whom this book is dedicated. Kyoto, Japan

Ofer Feldman

Reference Feldman, O. (2023). (Ed.). Political Debasement: Incivility, Contempt, and Humiliation in Parliamentary and Public Discourse. Springer.

Contents

1

Introduction: Studying Political Debasement Discourse in the Public Sphere . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ofer Feldman

Part I 2

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Theoretical Background

Debasement Language as a Subset of Political Incivility: Characteristics and Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Silvana Neshkovska and Zorica Trajkova Strezovska

Part II

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Critical Assessment of the Diversity of Debasing Language

Coarseness in Spanish Political Discourse: A Critical Discourse Analysis of Santiago Abascal and Pablo Casado’s Aggressive Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . María del Mar Rivas-Carmona Debasing Language Expressed by Two Radical Right-Wing Populist Leaders in the Netherlands: Geert Wilders and Thierry Baudet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Michael Hameleers The Sharp-Tongued Loudmouth: Incivility and Debasement in Brazil’s President Jair Bolsonaro’s YouTube Livestreams . . . . . . . Gustavo Venturelli, Eduardo Ryô Tamaki, and Matheus Gomes Mendonça Ferreira

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Part III Debasement as Strategic Instrument 6

The Cuss that Cares? Paternalistic Cussing in Philippine President Rodrigo Roa Duterte’s Rhetoric . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ronald A. Pernia and Rogelio Alicor L. Panao

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Contents

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The Shameless Normalization of Debasement Performance: A Critical Discourse Analysis of Pauline Hanson’s Australian, Far-Right, Populist Communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107 Kurt Sengul

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Well-Mannered Debasement? Examining Abe Shinzô’s Discourse and Its Reliance on Japanese Communication Modes . . . 125 Junki Nakahara

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Constructing Political Adversaries Through Debasement Language: A Framing Analysis of Kyriakos Mitsotakis’ Greek Speeches in 2020 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143 Christos Kostopoulos

Part IV Leaders’ Debasement Effects: Voter Mobilization, Socio-Political Polarization, and Shaping Political Reality Perception 10 The Strategic Use of Debasing and Vulgar Language in Italy’s Contemporary Politics: Beppe Grillo and Matteo Salvini . . . . . . . . . . 165 Benedetta Baldi 11 Demonization, Derision, Polarization: Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdo˘gan’s Political Rhetoric . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183 H. Bahadır Türk 12 Tweets, Taunts, Tirades, and Tantrums: How America’s Donald Trump Transformed Transgressive Language into Political Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201 Michael Alan Krasner Part V

Conclusions

13 Heroes or History? The Sources, Evolution, and Future of Debasement Rhetoric . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221 Sam Lehman-Wilzig Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233

Contributors

Benedetta Baldi Department of Humanities and Philosophy, University of Florence, Florence, Italy Ofer Feldman Faculty of Policy Studies, Doshisha University, Kyoto, Japan Matheus Gomes Mendonça Ferreira Graduate Program, Federal University of Minas Gerais, Minas Gerais, Brazil Michael Hameleers The Amsterdam School of Communication Research (ASCoR), Amsterdam, The Netherlands Christos Kostopoulos Faculty of Humanities, Curtin University Malaysia, Miri, Malaysia Michael Alan Krasner Taft Institute for Government and Civic Education, Queens, NY, USA; Queens College, City University of New York, New York, NY, USA Sam Lehman-Wilzig School of Communication, Bar-Ilan University, Ramat Gan, Israel Junki Nakahara School of Communication, American University, Washington, DC, USA Silvana Neshkovska Faculty of Education, St. Kliment Ohridski University, Bitola, North Macedonia Rogelio Alicor L. Panao Department of Political Science, College of Social Sciences and Philosophy, University of the Philippines Diliman, Quezon City, Philippines Ronald A. Pernia Political Science Program, College of Social Sciences, University of the Philippines Cebu, Cebu, Philippines; Institute of Political Science, College of Social Sciences, National Sun Yat-sen University, Kaohsiung, Taiwan; Institute of Political Science, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan xi

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María del Mar Rivas-Carmona Faculty of Philosophy and Letters, University of Córdoba, Córdoba, Spain Kurt Sengul Department of Media and Communications, University of Sydney, Sydney, Australia Zorica Trajkova Strezovska Faculty of Philology, Ss. Cyril and Methodius University, Skopje, North Macedonia Eduardo Ryô Tamaki German Institute for Global and Area Studies, Hamburg and Willy Brandt School of Public Policy, University of Erfurt, Erfurt, Germany H. Bahadır Türk Department of Public Administration and Political Science, Ankara Haci Bayram Veli University, Ankara, Turkey Gustavo Venturelli Department of Political Science, University of São Paulo, São Paulo, Brazil

Chapter 1

Introduction: Studying Political Debasement Discourse in the Public Sphere Ofer Feldman

Abstract This chapter presents a general introduction to the book. It draws upon and summarizes the key aspects of political debasement discourse as detailed in the previous volume in the series of two books on political debasement. The chapter first defines political debasement discourse with its aim to demean or degrade a certain target in the polity. This is followed by a short discussion on the ways to assess and examine political debasement, in its narrow and broad senses, detailing the sub-categories of the latter. The ensuing sections consider key aspects at the center of the interaction between debaser(s) and their target(s), the modes of interaction between the two main players, and distinguish between debasement, incivility, and hate speech. The final section of this chapter details the structure of the book and briefly describes each of the contributions.

1.1 Defining Political Debasement Discourse In this project, and in the ensuing chapters, political debasement discourse is regarded as the use of derogatory language, including any type of insinuation, insult, abuse, and belittling, with the aim to strongly demean, decrease, degrade, or reduce the worth, quality, value, status, or reputation of a particular target in the polity1 . This type of language is used, either by speaking or by writing, by often employing rhetorical devices such as irony, cynicism, sarcasm, mockery, and ridicule. Its target can be an individual, or a group of people—whether or not actors in a formal political institution—based on their actual or perceived characteristics, their behaviors and attitudes, strategies, programs, intentions, orientations, and views.

O. Feldman (B) Faculty of Policy Studies, Doshisha University, Kyoto, Japan e-mail: [email protected] 1

This chapter draws on Feldman (2023). The interested reader should see this reference for a detailed discussion of the theoretical background, methodological perspectives, and numerous examples on the topic.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 O. Feldman (ed.), Debasing Political Rhetoric, The Language of Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-0894-3_1

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1.2 Assessing Political Debasement Debasement in political discourse can be applied (and observed, assessed, and studied) in narrow and broad senses. In the narrow sense, it refers to the speakers’ or writers’ use of obscene, abusive, or crude rhetoric, including curses, swearing, and vulgar words and expressions, that are related, for example, to digestive systems and sexual organs, offensive elements that fall outside the polite norms of discourse, the type of language that is not used regularly in the news media. In contrast, in its broad sense, debasement language includes not only “bad swearing language” but all the ways in which speakers or writers use it, whether by imputing malice or an ulterior motive to degrade or discredit a certain target. These include the use of the following three types of language, implying that expressions are not always exclusively confined to a given category: (1) Insulting, abusive, and disrespectful language, which includes (a) Strongly negative emotional expressions and phrases, and (b) The use of specific words as “stupid,” “liar,” and “criminal” that either directly or indirectly undermine the qualities of a given target or refer to their attitudes and behaviors, policies, strategies, intentions, and views (if however the target themselves are called “stupid,” “liar,” or “criminal,” this falls under the ensuing sub-section name calling). (2) Name-calling, which consists of any type of insulting and defamatory language directed at or in reference to a certain target, characterized by words and expressions such as “traitor,” “terrorist,” “liar,” “murderer” and “psychopath,” with the intention to debase the subject by making them look incompetent, unskilled, foolish, deceitful, corrupt, insincere, or vicious; and (3) Character assassination or character attack (ad hominem attacks), refers to a rhetorical strategy of personal attack, where the speaker or writer intentionally attempts to damage the target’s reputation or reduce their value by directly attacking the person or a group making an argument, by referring to their distinct characteristics, or permanent traits, questioning their character, motive, or appearance rather than the substance of their argument, whether a (political) issue, idea, or (policy) stances that they’re maintaining or advocating.

1.3 Key Factors in Political Debasement Here I suggest that several elements are crucial in considering and assessing political debasement: First, the intent of the ostensible debaser. To my mind, the intent includes the use of harsh, vituperative, and/or vicious language with the object to strip an individual or a group of their status, dignity, or to reduce their honor. In this respect, I distinguish debasement from “impoliteness,” as I see the former as something far more serious and malicious because it strikes at the very “humanness” and character of the “other.” Furthermore, I also distinguish between debasement and criticism. For example, criticizing a political opponent for promoting a given policy or for their comments on a given issue during a press conference, are normal, legitimate, and accepted verbal usages in a democratic society. Criticism based on assessment of a particular expression, attitude, or behavior makes discussion and debate possible, so that such “standard” political criticism is not considered debasement. Only when the

1 Introduction: Studying Political Debasement Discourse in the Public …

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character of the “other” is made to look “sub-human” or seriously flawed can it be considered “debasement.” The second element is the way the language is understood (perceived and decoded) by the target or the audience under certain circumstances (e.g., social situation, culture)—that is, the effect or the reaction to the intent of the debaser. Here I see political debasement discourse as a contextual phenomenon, understood and perceived as such first by the audience or the addressee within their specific linguistic and cultural environment. Cultural elements embodied in each society, including the speakers’ social status and roles, the manner of communication (e.g., face-to-face or mediated), and the information environment (i.e., journalistic cultures and media systems), affect and shape the nature and characteristics of individuals’ language and its decoding. Debasement is related thus to cultural expectations of the audience, or what is considered “normal,” and “accepted” in a language used in a given country, society, and even in a subculture within the same society. What would be uncivil in public talk in one society, would be considered standard dialogue in another. Furthermore, the perception and effect of debasement in society depend also on individual characteristics, that is, the way one perceives and interprets the language based on a person’s peculiar interpretation, attitudes, values, belief, and judgment. Considering both the cultural and personal aspects one could think of debasement as entirely being in the eye of the beholder. That said, obviously many expressions and vocabularies are perceived and considered as debasement language even in different societies and cultures, making them universally regarded as such, e.g., “traitor.” Third is related to the target of the debasement. This can be members of the political elite such as politicians or aspiring political candidates, members of political groups (e.g., political parties, grassroots movements), members of an organization (e.g., government agency or a ministry, an international body), and members of an institution (e.g., the news media). At the same time, a target can be also followers of a certain religion (e.g., Islam), a sector in society (minority groups, e.g., lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender—LGBT), or an individual citizen. Debasement language can thus be expressed in four ways: (1) by members of the political elite (e.g., politicians, public officials) towards a target that includes other members of the political elite (e.g., members of a political party); (2) by elite members toward nonelite members (e.g., within citizens’ associations); (3) by non-elite members toward elite members; and (4) by non-elite members toward similar groups in society. In this book, political debasement discourse is examined as the kind of language that is used by office holders and members of political groups and decision makers towards other elite members, and non-elite individuals and groups in a variety of societies. As a rule, the target of debasement can only be human beings. My basic idea is that such a target can’t be an organization itself (e.g., a political party, the news media), or a process (e.g., the election), and when referring to such association or process it means to the people comprising this organization or “the people running the institutions that held the elections at the local and state level” (see Chap. 12). In other words, even if lexically/literally no specific person is being debased, it can be considered debasement if the attack is clearly against those working within the organization, and not the organization itself.

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1.4 Modes of Interaction Between Debaser(s) and Their Target(s) As the above discussion suggests, political debasers (politicians) convey their remarks towards other members of the political elite (politicians and government officials), or members of the public (e.g., media reporters, citizens’ groups). They can do this in various settings and fashions. First, ostensible political leaders debase members of their own countries, including their political adversaries, individual members of general society such as media reporters, or members of groups, such as immigrants, or elders. They can also debase members of the international community, including leaders of other countries and ordinary citizens. Second, political leaders can use direct debasement language in the physical presence of their target(s) i.e., in face-to-face situations such as during parliamentary deliberation, when attending the same televised interview session, or when participating in a meeting of their supporters. Debasement can take place also in indirect fashion without the target attendance. This can occur during a closed political gathering after which the content of the talk is leaked to the target through other people or the media. Other cases of an indirect fashion include statements, tweets, or blogs that are made through the media, and particularly the social networking sites (SNS, e.g., Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, WhatsApp), increasingly used by office holders to reach and connect with voters and supporters, to boost their political strategies, and to encourage users in political activities. Third, debasement language can be expressed either in an explicit or implicit manner. In the former, a political debaser draws on any type of insinuation, insult, abuse, and belittling language to degrade the worth or importance of a person or a group, or to make them, their actions, or their views seem as if they are not important or relevant. Thus, the message of the debaser clearly indicates the intention to debase a certain target. In contrast, the message of the political debaser is not expressed directly, and their intent can be deduced from the use of, for example, a humorous or a funny remark, aimed to entertain their listeners by referring to the targets’ activities or appearance. In comparison to being explicit, the implicit style seems free of malice, or of bad intentions or motives, because it is “just a joke.” As such, it doesn’t mean to be taken seriously, and not as a serious attack on an individual or a group.2

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Notably, a political debaser can use “humor” to “protect themselves” (saying later “I was only joking…”) from the criticism of others regarding their debasing the victim of the joke. In other words, the debaser can have their cake and eat it too: the “humorous speech” is well understood by the audience as a debasing attack, but the debaser can say to the others who don’t like such speech, “I didn’t really mean it; it was just in jest.” I thank Sam Lehman-Wilzig for his observation in this regard.

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1.5 Distinction Between Debasement, Incivility, and Hate Speech Following the above definition of debasement, I suggest a distinction between debasement and incivility on the one hand and hate speech on the other. In my opinion, debasement language is viewed as constituting a spectrum, a continuum that ranges from impolite, uncivil, insulting language (aimed at individuals or groups), to hate speech (including the usage of stereotypical, homophobic, racist, and sexist terms).3 Similar to incivility, debasement discourse includes, as mentioned, such elements as name calling, obscene, and abusive language. Yet, with its distinct, limited goal (to decrease the worth or value of an individual or a group), and because it doesn’t include such elements as false or misleading speech that are included in incivility language, debasement speech can be distinguished from incivility or impoliteness. Furthermore, I observe that not all uncivil language is debasement, and on the other hand, not all debasement is the outcome of rude and uncivil language. Another important difference between incivility and debasement is that the former involves speech that somehow “breaks the discourse norm” of the language expected in a given environment, such as during televised political interviews or political debates, when the “rules” ask for each candidate to enable the opponent to finish their comment and then to react. Often, however, politicians or candidates for political office break into the talk of their adversary even before the latter finish presenting their views. This has often been monitored in studies on broadcast political interviews around the world, and in US presidential debates, to the extent that it can be regarded as “a pattern”—uncivil but not necessarily involving debasement. Debasement language can also be distinguished from “hate speech” in various ways. To begin with, unlike debasement, hate speech has a clear agenda, aims, priorities, and mode of operation, including propaganda, fundraising, and recruitment. All these are propagated mainly through the internet as other users do, but their intentions are sinister, anti-social, and violent. Through social media, hate speech can reach large numbers of people, and leaves traces over time, making it a particularly powerful tool. From this viewpoint, hate speech relies on a wider range of rhetorical tools and arguments, including conspiratorial narratives, and makes use of emotional and negative language to provoke, promote, or justify hatred, violence, and brutality against an outgroup based on their real or assumed membership in a given category. Debasement itself does not try to encourage violence or lead people to act, which explains why many countries have laws prohibiting “hate speech” but not “debasement.” In this regard, debasement is “only” about language, in comparison to the “behavioral” aspect associated with hate speech. Not less important is the fact that hate speech has a much broader scope than debasement language in the sense that it targets not only social (and minority) groups and their members based on race, ethnicity, gender, sexuality, and religion, but also their entire belief systems.

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See Lehman-Wilzig (2023), for a comprehensive, graded list from mildest to harshest invective.

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It is important to note that even though hate speech includes elements of debasement, not all hate speech includes debasement. On the other hand, most debasement does not include hate speech.

1.6 Overview of the Volume In examining debasement discourse in politics, the ensuing chapters consider this language as comprising of, and being affected by, eight elements or features. These elements form the key scientific issues that contributors to this book were asked to consider in their contributions (and that in my view should be also addressed in future related studies4 ): (1) The Debaser(s) (in this volume, chapters focus only on politicians or aspiring politicians). (2) The Target(s) (either individuals or members of groups on the domestic or international levels including opponents, fellow politicians, journalists, and citizens). (3) The Type of debasement language that is used (distinguished by the narrow or broader senses of the term). (4) The Setting in which debasement takes place (distinguished by the direct, physical presence of the debaser/s and their target/s, or an indirect contact, e.g., without the target/s presence, or through SNS e.g., Twitter, Facebook, and blogs). (5) The Manner in which debasement expression is presented (distinguished by explicit verbal indication of the intention, or implicit fashion, where the intent can only be inferred from the use of, for example, a humorous remark, an allegory, or a metaphor in the language). (6) The Motives behind expression of debasement (including political, social, economic, or psychological purposes). (7) The Effect or potential effect of debasement language (including short- and long-terms effects on opponents, citizens, voters, supporters, foreigners, and foreign leaders) (8) The political and socio-cultural, environmental Context (including the social, cultural, and political factors associated with a specific culture, country, or society; and the psychological or personal reasons related to the debaser/s). These key aspects constitute the core of this book’s chapters. Focusing on the language of selected leaders in Western and non-Western countries, the book is divided into five parts: The first part presents the theoretical background to the study of political debasement, and the last part serves as the conclusion, raising important 4

In this book, chapters consider only verbal communication. Future studies can include non-verbal expressions of debasement as well, such as eye-rolling and gestures, and visual elements such as photos and political cartoons.

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questions related to the study of debasing politics. Parts II, III, and IV detail the various facets of debasement and its usage in political discourse: the content and attributes of this language, the strategic use and instrumental function for which leaders use such a rhetoric, and its effect on the public, voters, and the political culture. These three parts are loosely organized under different titles as each of the chapters within these parts provides detailed information on the key themes at the center of political debasement, resulting in some overlap among the chapters as all of them discuss those elements around which debasement is formed, and the range of speech it embraces starting from impoliteness through humiliating and demeaning discourse. Part I presents the theoretical background to the study of debasement in politics. In Chap. 2 entitled “Debasement Language as a Subset of Political Incivility: Characteristics and Effects,” Silvana Neshkovska and Zorica Trajkova Strezovska utilize many examples from different countries, a variety of sources, and diverse formats of political discourse including public speeches, televised debates, and online statements, to offer, based on studies on incivility discourse, a broad perspective on political debasement. Their chapter addresses issues related to the types of debasement used in the public sphere, the rationale behind the use of such a language by public officials, the target at the center of debasement, and the function and influence of debasing language in contemporary democratic society. Part II of this volume, entitled “Critical Assessment of the Diversity of Debasing Language,” consists of three chapters examining the language of leaders in Spain, the Netherlands, and Brazil. They offer a critical assessment of the different aspects of debasing language expressed by radical populist (and right-wing) leaders when talking in parliament, or while communicating through the social media—Twitter or YouTube. Chapter 3 focuses, as the title indicates, on “Coarseness in Spanish Political Discourse: A Critical Discourse Analysis of Santiago Abascal and Pablo Casado’s Aggressive Language.” In this chapter María del Mar Rivas-Carmona examines the discourse of Spanish right-wing Pablo Casado of the People’s Party and of Santiago Abascal of the far-right Vox Party. She proposes several categories to look at the structure and content of these politicians’ discourse, including insults and personal attacks (e.g., crude and direct insults, rude allusions to physical appearance and clothing, and indirect ironic attacks), as well as exaggerations and hasty generalizations. Among other things, the chapter identifies a clear strategy not only of disqualification and delegitimization of the opponent, but also of ideological dissemination based on tiresome, insistent repetitions. It notes that the right and far-right opposition’s extensive use of argumentation strategies portrays extreme polarization and legitimization of self-originated standpoints, while delegitimatizing those of the opponent (positive self-presentation vs. negative other-presentation). In terms of the categories, insults and personal attacks (“argumentum ad hominem”) become the most prominent resource of the right and ultra-right. Very often the examined leaders used crude and direct insults, disqualifications to discredit the opponent, and mocking repetitions, even making threats or asking hurtful personal questions. The height of impoliteness and baseness consists of their attacking not only the proposals, ideology, or political

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and parliamentary capabilities of the adversary (that would be considered part of the parliamentary game) but also their opponent’s physical appearance, odor, or clothing. In Chap. 4, entitled “Debasing Language Expressed by Two Radical Right-Wing Populist Leaders in the Netherlands: Geert Wilders and Thierry Baudet,” Michael Hameleers delves into the use of debasing language in the social media by Geert Wilders of the Freedom Party/PVV, and Thierry Baudet of the Forum for Democracy/FvD. At the center of the chapter is the qualitative analysis of the leaders’ Twitter communication; Hameleers compares their messages prior to and during the COVID-19 pandemic i.e., tweets published consecutively in 2019 and 2020 (and parts of 2021). Hameleers’ study reveals that both leaders used explicit debasing speech through abusive language that demean targeted elite actors, but such references did not dominate their rhetoric. Rather, the use of explicitly insulting and devaluating language and swearing was at times employed to emphasize the severity of these two politicians’ anti-elitism and anti-immigration perspectives. On the individual level, Wilders used more explicit curses and insulting language that emphasized a strong sense of hostility to elites, journalists, and immigrants, whereas Baudet used less explicit constructions to discredit opponents. Taking a leap from European case studies, Chap. 5 looks at a case study from Latin America and is entitled “The Sharp-Tongued Loudmouth: Incivility and Debasement in Brazil’s President Jair Bolsonaro’s YouTube Livestreams.” In this chapter Gustavo Venturelli, Eduardo Ryô Tamaki, and Matheus Gomes Mendonça Ferreira focus on Jair Bolsonaro’s weekly YouTube livestreams, a channel the (former) president used in order to speak informally and directly to his supporters. The authors indicate that contrary to the expectation for decorum, respect, and polite language from a public figure who occupies the highest position in Brazilian politics, Bolsonaro demonstrated a great deal of debasement in his language. The chapter also identifies the targets and what categories of debasement were used most often. The study shows that Bolsonaro’s debasement language in his livestreams was mainly expressed as insults and making fun, especially in his relationship with the press, political adversaries, and social groups. Part III of this book, “Debasement as Strategic Instrument,” provides contextual discussion on debasement as a strategic instrument for politicians in their communication with other members of the political elite, officials, voters, and citizens. It includes four chapters examining the speech of leaders from the Philippines, Australia, Japan, and Greece. In Chap. 6, “The Cuss that Cares? Paternalistic Cussing in Philippine President Rodrigo Roa Duterte’s Rhetoric,” Ronald A. Pernia and Rogelio Alicor L. Panao propose that (former) President Duterte used debasement to ensure his political durability. In their view, cussing not only brought Duterte closer to his audience but the informality and directness of the language also improved his general perception as a legitimate source for his message. Swearing made Duterte more credible, honest, authentic, and empathetic. Although cases of cussing have become characteristic of his specific brand of speechmaking, Pernia and Panao reveal that these seemed to occur more frequently when speaking before economically and politically functional

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audiences, including local government officials, law enforcement officers, and chambers of commerce, whose cooperation and agreement was necessary to legitimize the government’s controversial campaign against illegal drugs. At the same time, the authors claim, Duterte’s tendency to choose abusive or threatening talk was a gesture aimed at signaling parental concern toward citizens. They refer to this phenomenon as paternalistic cussing—a symbolic predilection by a president who is fully aware of the political implications of actions and utterances—to preach tough love in order to protect citizens and maintain law and order. Paternalism in this case is regarded as the main cultural framework within which presidential rhetoric is mediated. Next is Chap. 7 entitled “The Shameless Normalization of Debasement Performance: A Critical Discourse Analysis of Pauline Hanson’s Australian, Far-Right, Populist Communication.” In this chapter, the author, Kurt Sengul employs the analytical tools of Critical Discourse Analysis to evaluate debasing and ridiculing discourse of far-right Pauline Hanson. At the center of his analysis are four illustrative case studies from prominent sites of political communication in Australia including Twitter, a breakfast television news interview, and the parliamentary Hansard transcripts i.e., the official report of the parliamentary debates. Sengul demonstrates that Hanson most frequently uses debased language against negatively racialized and marginalized communities, suggesting that debasement serves both ideological, political, and communicative functions. Strategically, debasement is used as a communicative device to generate controversy, provocation, and media attention. This corresponds with the broader communication strategy of the contemporary farright that strategically seeks to provoke and outrage. Sengul’s contribution suggests that Hanson was successful in generating significant media attention using debasement discourse, and debasement therefore must be understood as a key discursive strategy in the communicative arsenal of the contemporary far-right. In Chap. 8, entitled “Well-Mannered Debasement? Examining Abe Shinzô’s Discourse and its Reliance on Japanese Communication Modes,” Junki Nakahara’s contribution draws attention to the effect of Japanese culture and political culture on the language used by high-echelon leaders and lays a particular emphasis on the functional features associated with the language of Prime Minister Abe. Nakahara notes that, with a few exceptions, Abe’s debasement discourse took a form that positioned himself as a victim/target of illegitimate criticism, accusations, and debasement by his political opponents and the news media. His debasing language was used not only to question the trustworthiness of these opponents and the media but also to delegitimize the foundation for, and time spent on, deliberations on legislation as well as investigations into leading politicians’ abuse of power. The ways in which Abe denounced critical voices and incremental processes of scrutiny helped him impose a negative connotation on the word “criticism” itself. In this way, Nakahara observes, the significant consequence of Abe’s seemingly “defensive” debasement in a polite tone is to create an environment where “criticism” is a negative expression, and listening to opposing, particularly minority opinions, is considered unworthy. The broad political implications are that under these circumstances, the ruling elite in Japan, the party, and its leaders, do not need to invest energy in attracting public support for their political agendas and ideas nor need to be held accountable.

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In the ensuing Chap. 9, Christos Kostopoulos pays special attention to the language of Greece’s prime minister. In his contribution entitled “Constructing Political Adversaries through Debasement Language: A Framing Analysis of Kyriakos Mitsotakis’ Greek Speeches in 2020,” Kostopoulos analyzed 163 items including parliamentary addresses of the prime minister, his addresses to the Greek people, statements made before and after European meetings, and meetings with other officials. Based on these data the author contends that Prime Minister Mitsotakis’ use of debasement language against some citizens in regard to their lack of compliance with the COVID-19 pandemic measures worked to divide the society into “Us and Them,” with the in-group being compliant citizens with a conscience that care about other people, and the out-group being citizens that do not care and jeopardize everyone’s health. Furthermore, Kostopoulos indicates that the prime minister use debasement language also against Turkey and against the leader of the opposition Alexis Tsipras to project the image of a strong national leader that defends the interests of Greece, but also to discredit Turkey in the eyes of the global community, and Tsipras in the eyes of Greek constituents. Part IV of this book entitled “Leaders’ Debasement Effects: Voter Mobilization, Socio-Political Polarization, and Shaping Political Reality Perception,” addresses issues related to the ways in which the use of debasement language effects the public, voters, and the political culture. In this part’s three chapters, the authors lay out the idea that rude, aggressive, and insinuating rhetoric is effective in mobilizing the vote, creating socio-political polarization, changing the language of other political actors, differentiating opponents, instigating aggressive behavior, and affecting the reality and perceived reality of citizens in politics. In Chap. 10, entitled “Strategic Use of Debasing and Vulgar Language in Italy’s Contemporary Politics: Beppe Grillo and Matteo Salvini,” Benedetta Baldi elaborates on the public debasing and disrespectful expressions used by Beppe Grillo, founder and guarantor of the populist Movimento 5 Stelle party, and Matteo Salvini, the secretary of the Lega right-wing party, as they use these as a pragmatic tool to attack opponents aiming to activate an emotional reading of the facts. Baldi probes the reasons and the extent to which vulgar, expressive intensifiers or discriminatory appellatives are capable of eliciting a rapid response and immediate adhesion by the audience receiving the message. The analysis suggests that perhaps unlike the expectation that politeness and correctness should be more effective and more productive, the rude, degrading, aggressive, insinuating, and offensive rhetoric of both leaders was valuable in mobilizing the vote. Both groups that lead by these leaders obtained excellent results in the 2018 general election: The 5 Star Movement and the Lega party formed the new government, where Salvini, as the Minister of the Interior, promulgated the Immigrant and Security Decree, a discriminatory law aimed at distinguishing the so-called true refugees, deserving therefore to be welcomed into Italy, from all the others, presumably fraudsters. In Chap. 11, entitled “Demonization, Derision, Polarization: Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdo˘gan’s Political Rhetoric,” based on a rich and variety of sources H. Bahadır Türk suggests that President Erdo˘gan’s rhetoric is highly affiliated with

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debasing language. Türk notes that Erdo˘gan’s rhetoric combines binarism, organicism, and demonization, the impact of which is twofold. On the one hand, the combination turns Erdo˘gan’s rhetoric into that of abjection, characterized by his fear of losing the organic tie between himself and “his people,” that is, the fear of losing his own political existence. On the other, his rhetoric is shaped by a challenging and aggressive attitude, aimed at pinpointing political enemies. In detailing the effect of Erdo˘gan’s political rhetoric, Türk reveals its socio-political consequences: it contributes to the rise of political polarization in Turkey, resulting in a significant increase in political intolerance. Although Turkish politics has been prominently polarized since the transition to the multi-party system in 1945, a turning point for such polarization was reached as a result of the shift to the presidential system in 2018, Erdo˘gan’s aggressive and polarizing political rhetoric’s tone which became much more distinctive than that of the former political leaders, along with the rise of the social media and particularly pro-government Twitter trolling. This is reflected, for example, in the increasing emotional distance between the president’s party supporters and opponents, and the prevailing language within Turkish politics that has mostly been that of debasement, as the language internalized also by other politicians along the country’s political spectrum. In the penultimate chapter entitled “Tweets, Taunts, Tirades, and Tantrums: How America’s Donald Trump Transformed Transgressive Language into Political Power,” Michael Alan Krasner suggests that by debasing selected groups within society, the opposition Democratic Party, and the election system itself, President Trump made them the enemy, defined them as traitors and a threat to democracy, encouraged violence against them, and undermined Americans’ faith in the institutions that ran the elections at the local and state level. In Krasner’s view, Trump’s speech style debased not only individuals, in particular those running political institutions, but also distorted reality and the ability to perceive reality, thereby threatening the (ostensibly deeply flawed) American system of representative democracy. Trump and his allies have substantially altered American political culture, as many Americans believe their rhetoric, perceiving the government, media, and financial worlds in the US as controlled by a group of Satan-worshipping pedophiles, and that a strong leader for America is more important than having a democracy. Krasner warns that the most fundamental debasements—the debasement of reality and the debasement of the ability to perceive reality—are now crucial driving forces in American politics, and they threaten to produce a shift to authoritarianism, perhaps toward the next presidential elections. The fifth and final part of the book, “Conclusions,” consists of one chapter entitled “Heroes or History? The Sources, Evolution, and Future of Debasement Rhetoric.” In Chap. 13, Sam Lehman-Wilzig summarizes the lessons learned throughout the book and discusses the essential role debasing language plays in contemporary democratic society. Using examples from the book’s various chapters regarding their contribution to the study of political communication and behavior, Lehman-Wilzig starts with the core question of whether debasement rhetoric is more a matter of a strong political personality or deeply socio-cultural trends. Through this he raises significant research questions regarding the sources—past, present, and future—of

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debasing language in politics, including its behavioral and psychological effect on citizens and leaders, and the political or policy processes. Obviously, students and researchers of political communication are encouraged to challenge and answer these questions, thereby expanding the growing attention to debasing forms of political communication worldwide. Note: Throughout book, long quotes of politicians appear first in the English language followed by their original language in Roman letters.

References Feldman, O. (2023). Assessing the politics of debasement: From impoliteness to demonization in political communication. In O. Feldman (Ed.), Political debasement: Incivility, contempt, and humiliation in parliamentary and public discourse (pp. 1–28). Springer. Lehman-Wilzig, S. (2023). The linguistic and cultural ambiguities of parliamentary political invective. In O. Feldman (Ed.), Political debasement: Incivility, contempt, and humiliation in parliamentary and public discourse (pp. 231–245). Springer.

Ofer Feldman is Professor of Political Psychology and Behavior at the Faculty of Policy Studies, Doshisha University, Kyoto, Japan. His research centers on the psychological underpinnings of mass and elite political behavior in Japan. He has extensively published journal articles, books, and book chapters on issues related to political communication and persuasion, political leadership, and political culture. His books include The Rhetoric of Political Leadership (2020, edited), When Politicians Talk (2021, edited), Politische Psychologie (2022, 2nd ed., edited with Sonja Zmerli, in German), Adversarial Political Interviewing (2022, edited), and Seijika no retorikku (2022, with Ken Kinoshita, in Japanese). In 2021 he was elected Honorary Chair of the Research Committee on Political Psychology, International Political Science Association.

Part I

Theoretical Background

Chapter 2

Debasement Language as a Subset of Political Incivility: Characteristics and Effects Silvana Neshkovska and Zorica Trajkova Strezovska

Abstract On the pretext of safeguarding democratic values in contemporary societies, various forms of debasement language have become an integral part of political discourse. Impregnating political speeches, statements, debates, and discussions with coarse language that normally targets political opponents as well as other potential victims is not a new trend. However, most of the literature dedicated to defining incivility in political discourse mainly focuses on the use of hate speech. The chapter at hand aspires to offer a deeper analysis of the concept of debasement language as part of incivility in politics and offers answers to several key questions: (1) what exactly is debasement language and what types of debasement language are used in political discourse; (2) why is such language used; (3) who is the target of political debasement discourse; and (4) how such language affects individuals and the democratic process in modern societies. Several instances of debasement language used by current and former politicians, from different countries in the world, generated on various platforms (TV, newspapers, social media, etc.), and appearing in different formats (press statements, political speeches, TV debates, etc.), will be used to illustrate the points discussed.

2.1 Introduction The realm of politics is predominantly oppositional, and disagreements, disputes, and conflicts are quite often components of political encounters (Georgalidou, 2020). Although politics and government are public activities, and political discourse is supposed to be formal, fact-based, and polite (Neshkovska & Trajkova, 2020, p. 102), still, incivility in contemporary public discourse—in its various forms—seems to be gaining both momentum and prominence. S. Neshkovska (B) Faculty of Education, St. Kliment Ohridski University, Bitola, North Macedonia e-mail: [email protected] Z. T. Strezovska Faculty of Philology, Ss. Cyril and Methodius University, Skopje, North Macedonia e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 O. Feldman (ed.), Debasing Political Rhetoric, The Language of Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-0894-3_2

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The conflicting nature of the political arena becomes particularly conspicuous in moments of crisis, when politicians deal with sensitive and important socio-political and economic issues, or during political campaigns and elections, when the stakes for those running for office are extremely high (Neshkovska & Trajkova, 2020, p. 100). Under such circumstances and under the pretext of safeguarding and promoting democratic values such as the freedom of speech (Assimakopoulos et al., 2017), politicians frequently introduce various forms of uncivil language into their discursive practices, targeting an individual or a group of people (Sellars, 2016), or political adversaries, whom they address with face-threatening speech acts that move along a continuum from purely oppositional to aggressive (Georgalidou, 2020). This is particularly the case during televised political panel discussions (Zupnik, 1994), parliamentary debates (Harris, 2001; Pérez de Ayala, 2001), political broadcast interviews (Mullany, 2002) and electoral debates (Galasinski, 1998). Moreover, studies show that the “reduced quality and correctness of the political dialogue” (Ziccardi, 2020, p. 5) has become a general trend followed by politicians from diverse political provenances (Kopytowska, 2017). In the past, in Europe for instance, the political representatives of far-right parties were mainly credited with incorporating harsh tones in their discourse; today, however, political parties that were usually considered “quieter” undertake the same path (Ziccardi, 2020, p. 5). There is a broad literature dedicated to defining the concept of incivility in political discourse (Coe et al., 2014; Fridkin & Kenney, 2008, 2011; Massaro & Stryker, 2012; Muddiman, 2017; Mutz, 2007, 2015; Mutz & Reeves, 2005; Papacharissi, 2004; Sobieraj & Berry, 2011), some of which equates it with a violation of (interpersonal) politeness norms and rudeness (Herbst, 2010; Muddiman, 2017; Mutz, 2015), whereas others only with violations of public-level norms, norms of political and deliberative processes (Papacharissi, 2004; Stryker et al., 2016). The former is usually conceptualized by researchers as interactions in which people yell, name-call, swear and behave impolitely in various ways (Ben-Porath, 2010; Mutz, 2015), while the latter view it as the use of uncivil messages which “threaten a collective founded on democratic norms” (Papacharissi, 2004, p. 271), mostly by spreading misinformation, putting forward political arguments in terms of private gain and not the collective common good, and blocking compromise with people who disagree (Muddiman, 2017, pp. 3183–3184). Muddiman (2017) investigated citizens’ perception of these two types of uncivil interactions among political figures and found that personal-level incivility (impoliteness) and public-level incivility (lack of deliberativeness and reciprocity) are indeed viewed as two distinct concepts, with personal-level incivility being generally perceived as more uncivil than public-level incivility and, as expected, political figures from a person’s own political party being perceived as more civil than others. Despite researchers’ different approaches to defining incivility in politics, they are unanimous regarding the negative effects stemming from it that include reduced trust in the political candidates and the government; reduced capacity of elites and citizens to engage in reasoned discussion without emotional manipulation; polarization and incapability to reach compromise on urgent issues, etc. (e.g., Massaro & Stryker, 2012; Stryker et al., 2016).

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In addition, there is a growing amount of attention devoted to investigating how political incivility is manifested. Analyzing the absence of specific markers of civil discourse in online reader commentary to the Arizona Daily Star, Coe et al. (2014) found incivility expressed mostly by name calling, aspersion or derision of ideas, vulgarity, and pejorative speech. Similarly, Massaro and Stryker (2012) consider name calling, derisive or disrespectful speech and vulgarity, as well as intentional lies and misrepresentation to be uncivil in political discourse. Sobieraj and Berry (2011) investigated only the use of “outrage speech” in political discourse in blogs, talk radio, and cable television, and found 13 different manifestations of outrage, the most prominent being: mockery, misrepresentative exaggeration, insulting language and name calling. Rega and Marchetti (2021) recognize five types of incivility: mockery or sarcasm, misrepresentative exaggeration and insulting language representing the interpersonal-level of incivility and defamation or mudslinging and intolerant speech as public-level of incivility. Stryker et al. (2016) claim that political incivility is an overarching, latent construct incorporating three analytically distinct but empirically correlated latent dimensions: Utterance Incivility (speech and behaviors related to personal attacks, insulting language, and slurs), Discursive Incivility (behaviors tending to shut down or detract from inclusive and ongoing political discussion), and Deception (outright lying and failures of omission). In their study, they identified 23 potential indicators of incivility that they categorized in five clusters and measured their perception by respondents in terms of the level of incivility/civility expressed by each one, and found that respondents perceive slurs, threatening or encouraging harm as most uncivil, whereas issue-based attacks as the least uncivil activities. All these forms of incivility discussed above point to the fact that, overall, researchers tend to view political incivility as a broad concept that subsumes several verbal and nonverbal uncivil behaviors intended to show not just disagreement but a lack of respect towards one’s addressee and/or established societal norms. More precisely, they perceive it as a continuum (Fridkin & Kenney, 2008; Rega & Marchetti, 2021; Sobieraj & Berry, 2011; Stryker et al., 2016), with options that range from using slurs, name calling, pejorative language, insulting language, mockery and sarcasm, to threatening and encouraging harm, to exaggeration, misrepresentation, lying, and even blocking compromise, shutting down or detracting from inclusive political discussion. However, although the topic of incivility has been widely discussed, the studies that have dealt with this issue in the context of political communication mostly cover incivility generally generated by political figures (Jamieson et al., 2015; Muddiman, 2017; Otto et al., 2020; Rega & Marchetti, 2021; Stryker et al., 2016) or hate speech specifically (Butler, 1997; Kopytowska, 2017; Kopytowska & Baider, 2017; Solovev & Pröllochs, 2022). There are no studies, at least not that we are aware of, which touch upon the use of debasement language as a type of incivility. Hence, the main aim of this chapter is to tackle the use of debasement language in politics when political figures themselves are the source of such language. More specifically, this chapter, apart from establishing what debasement language is and what types of debasement language are used in political discourse, deals with several key questions. It looks into the targets of political debasement discourse; the reasons why

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such language is employed, and, finally, how such language affects its audience and the democratic processes in modern societies. Since this chapter aspires to pin down the distinct layering of debasement language in political discourse, the instances of such language discussed here are extracted from a variety of sources (politicians from different countries in the world) and come in different formats of political discourse (e.g., press conferences, public speeches, online statements, parliamentary debates, etc.). Some of these instances have received broad attention and have been profusely commented on in previous studies; others have been triggered by recent socio-political events transpiring in various parts of the world and, consequently, require due attention and analysis.

2.2 Definitions and Types of Debasement Language in Politics Defining debasement language is definitely not a straightforward matter. Semantically, debasement refers to “lowering the value or reputation of (someone or something) and making (someone or something) less respected” (Britannica, n.d.). We consider Cervone et al.’s (2021, p. 81) definition of derogatory language to describe most precisely what debasement language encompasses: “[…] any type of insinuation and allegation about members of a given social category that explicitly ridicules or insults them.” According to Cervone et al.’s (2021, p. 81) derogatory language includes various phenomena such as “ethnophaulisms, ethnic or racial slurs, sexist language, homophobic epithets, verbal bullying, etc.” In addition, they acknowledge hate speech as an extreme form of derogatory language which involves “the expression of hate and/or the encouragement of violence against others based on their real or assumed membership in a given category.” However, as mentioned, research has mainly focused on the analysis of hate speech as a type of incivility, often considering different uses of derogatory language like mockery, ridicule, belittlement, insult etc., as hate speech. The concept has been defined very broadly in the past, as “any speech which causes some offense to others” (Lewis, 2012), or as “all forms of expressions which spread, incite, promote or justify racial hatred, xenophobia, anti-Semitism or other forms of hatred based on intolerance, including: intolerance expressed by aggressive nationalism and ethnocentrism, discrimination and hostility against minorities, migrants and people of immigrant origin” (the Council of Europe), or as “bias-motivated, hostile, malicious speech aimed at a person or a group of people because of their actual or perceived innate characteristics” (Cohen-Almagor, 2018). Recently, however, researchers define hate speech only as an extreme form of speech or intolerant speech. Cervone et al. (2021, p. 82) depict it as “an extreme form of derogatory language” that includes an expression of hate and/or an encouragement of violence against others based on their real or assumed membership in a given

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category, such as race, ethnicity, gender, sexuality and religion. They ascribe a special status to hate speech as it can “incite, promote or justify hatred and violence to larger audiences; it is mainly propagated through social media; it often has a broader scope than derogatory language used in interpersonal discourse (for instance, targeting not only social groups and their members but also entire belief systems), and because it relies on a wider range of rhetorical tools and arguments (including conspiracy theories)” (Cervone et al., 2021, p. 82). Rega and Marchetti (2021), who investigated citizens’ reactions to leaders’ uncivil posts on Facebook during the 2018 Italian general election, categorize hate speech as public-level incivility within the category of intolerant speech (Rega & Marchetti, 2021, p. 113), so that according to them hate speech and defamation, or “the attacks aimed at delegitimizing opponents by questioning their integrity” depend less on contextual factors and more directly on questioning collective democratic principles, whereas all other types of incivility (sarcasm, outrage discourse based on dramatization, sensationalism, insulting language, name calling, vulgarities and offensive and/or denigrating language) are on an interpersonal level. Rossini (2019), on the other hand, separates hate speech from the concept of incivility, which presupposes the use of pejorative language, vulgarity, profanity, and treats it as intolerant discourse alongside with racism, offensive stereotyping in terms of gender, sexual orientation, religion, etc. that poses a great, inherent threat to democratic values. Taking into consideration all that has been previously said on the topic, we also make a distinction between the different varieties of uncivil discourse and try to define debasement language within a continuum (see Fig. 2.1). We treat debasement language as a type of uncivil discourse, as an aspect of verbal incivility in politics (different from lying, misrepresentation, understatement, exaggeration, shutting down and detracting from inclusive political discussion, blocking compromise, etc.) pertaining to any type of direct expression, or even insinuation, crude, or abusive language e.g., curses, obscenity, swearing, and vulgar words, mockery, that are intended to demean, humiliate, insult, belittle, i.e., reduce the worth, quality, dignity or value of an individual, or a certain group or institution within society, or politicians, government officials and public figures—understood by the audience or the addressee as such within their specific linguistic and cultural environment (see Feldman, 2023). In addition, we view hate speech as just one type of debasement language, in fact the crudest and most extreme form of debasement language, used to express intolerance towards an individual or a group, and which by making use of emotional and negative language is intended to incite, urge or justify hatred and violence against people, social groups or entire belief systems based on their real or assumed membership in a given category. Its destructive potential is such that it could lead to military conflicts and war with devastating results. And it is because of its deleterious nature that many countries have prohibited it legally. By comparison, debasement language is only about “the language” and its main goal is not to urge or justify action against a certain individual or group, but to decrease the worth and dignity they present to the public. However, whether such action is justifiable or not is in “the eye of the beholder” and it depends on various factors like the circumstances in which such language is produced, or the nature of the audience

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Political incivility

Verbal

Non-verbal (rolling one’s eyes, getting in one’s face, waving one’s hand dismissively etc.)

debasement language

other types of verbal incivility

(insults, profanity, slurs, (misrepresentation, lying, curses, swearing, pejorative language, exaggeration, name-calling, sarcasm, hate speech, etc.) understatement, etc.)

Fig. 2.1 Different types of incivility

to whom it is being presented, or the location, the tone of voice etc. For instance, if a politician considers the activities of their opponents to be a betrayal of the country’s inherent national values and then addresses them as “traitors,” thus trying to belittle the image the latter are trying to present to the citizens, or to hurt the reputation of honest and sincere politicians by “revealing” their act of betrayal—then we would consider such language as debasement language and not as hate speech. We, of course, would not go so far as to investigate whether such debasement language is justifiable or not. It is along these lines that we will proceed with our discussion on debasement language in political discourse in the remaining sections of this chapter. Next, we will make an attempt to explicate why such language has become part of political discourse.

2.3 Why Is Debasement Language Used in Political Discourse? Debasement language is undoubtedly gaining momentum in political discourse in contemporary fast-paced societies as political confrontation between politicians has become practically the norm (Neshkovska & Trajkova, 2017; Ziccardi, 2020). The literature underlines a number of plausible reasons why politicians resort to using vulgar, offensive and even aggressive rhetoric, in their political communication. Some of these reasons are discussed here along with examples of debasement language, extracted from the political discourse of several prominent politicians from different countries worldwide. Kopytowska (2017) attributes the recent rise in the use of radical discourse to attempts to intimidate the out-group and influence (unite) the in-group members, as well as to discriminate against minorities and promote ethno-violence as well as to preserve or challenge existing power structures. Psychological research has identified

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the psychological antecedents of disparaging language, including the affective or emotional states such as hate, contempt, disgust, and feelings of intergroup threat, thrill seeking, and self-esteem maintenance (in Cervone et al., 2021, p. 84). Some of the above-mentioned reasons for using coarse political discourse can easily be seen in the recent Macedonian political milieu, characterized by what seems to be irreconcilable and perpetual strife between two major political parties: Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization—Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity (VMRO-DPMNE) (currently in opposition), and the Social Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDSM) (the ruling party now). Thus, for instance, in 2019 the leftist SDSM-led government, in an attempt to pave the way of the country joining NATO and the European Union (EU), signed the Prespa Agreement with Greece and changed the country’s name from the Republic of Macedonia to the Republic of North Macedonia. The right-wing opposition led by VMRO-DPMNE, interpreted this as an act of high treason of national interests and reacted with a high dose of debasement language. The opposition leader, Hristijan Mickovski, was particularly vocal and in one of his public speeches prior to the name change, tried to denigrate his political opponents and to draw people’s attention to the government’s wrong doings by using carefully selected insulting lexis, associating his opponents with evil, weakness, darkness, corruption and lies (Neshkovska, 2019, p. 117). He called his adversaries “ill-intentioned and lazy politicians” [zlonamerni i mrzlivi politichari], “gamblers who gamble with principles” [kockari koi se kockaat so principi]; “liars whose statements and promises are nothing but lies” [se shto kazhaa, se shto vetija beshe laga]; “vultures whose favorite prey is the country” [nivniot najposkuvan plen]; “trespassers who slowly but surely take control of the country” [go zaposednuvaat nashiot dom/kukja] and so on (Neshkovska, 2019, p. 117). Obviously, all the above-mentioned examples were intended to belittle the government and downgrade the value of their decision, so in that sense, they cannot be considered hate speech but debasement language. Notably, the politicians used mostly assertive speech and assumed the social roles of either analysts, or analysts and judges, but almost never as activists (more on this in Atifi & Marcoccia, 2017; Trajkova & Neshkovska, 2018). More precisely, they generally analyzed the situation and commented on it, usually expressing a judgmental opinion on the attitude of other political figures or parties, but not urging or inciting action or violence against them. Similarly, in 2022 Macedonia’s membership in the EU was conditioned by another neighboring country, Bulgaria, and this time the government signed the so-called French Agreement, to be able to open the initial phase of the accession negotiations with the EU. According to opposition, this new agreement was extremely detrimental to Macedonia as it forced the country to change parts of its history and its constitution. Despite the protests organized at the Macedonian Parliament and Government, the officials signed the agreement, and thus became targets of vigorous verbal attacks again, particularly by the opposition itself. The derisory rhetoric used to refer to them on traditional and social media revolved around negative terms such as traitors, high treason, and grave diggers (Kurir, 2022, July 14).

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In contrast, let’s consider another example involving former Iranian President, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who during his term of office was known for his contentious speeches against Israel in which he refused to call Israel by name but rather the “Zionist regime” instead, appealing for the “elimination of the Zionist regime” (Wikipedia, 2022, September 7). He marked Israel’s 60th anniversary by saying: “Those who think they can revive the stinking corpse of the usurping and fake Israeli regime by throwing a birthday party are seriously mistaken” (Moghaddam & Harré, 2010, p. 1), clearly qualifying as hate speech because it could be interpreted as a threat, openly revealing the President’s strong emotions of hatred, contempt, and disgust towards Israel. So, the use of hate speech is almost always associated with the use of lexical and discursive fear-inciting strategies that urge people to act in a certain way. When expressing their hateful messages, politicians mostly assume the social roles of judges and activists (Atifi & Marcoccia, 2017; Trajkova & Neshkovska, 2018), as they not only express their judgmental opinion on others, but also stir up hatred and incite people to act in a violent manner. However, some politicians believe that such scandalous talk adds an element of entertainment (Wodak et al., 2020) using it as “an excellent attention getter […] to advertise themselves by taking advantage of media which immediately respond to aggressive i.e., reportable episodes” (Georgalidou, 2020, p. 46). Some politicians consider uncivil discourse advantageous as it makes them appear more authentic (Rosenblum et al., 2019) and visible than their colleagues who try to make calm speeches or who rebel against this kind of dialogue (Ziccardi, 2020, p. 23). Rega and Marchetti (2021) argue that for politicians, incivility is a strategy with which they can attract people’s attention and increase their statements’ visibility, particularly when they deal with seriously “divisive” issues (e.g., immigration, corruption, etc.). Thus, for instance, a Macedonian politician, Dimitar Apasiev, who is a leader of a relatively newly established leftist political party “Left,” in order to make his presence more visible and authentic on the Macedonian political scene, frequently steps forward in the current heated Macedonian context with shockingly harsh rhetoric, usually addressed to those in power. In a recent TV interview, when asked about the Macedonian President’s position regarding the French agreement, he used offensive language and called him “louse” [voshka] and “schizophrenic politician who is not worth commenting on” [shizofren politichar koj ne vredi da go komentiram] (Left Political Party, 2022, July 4). Additionally, debasement language has become so prominent in political discourse nowadays due to the ongoing relocation of typical political propaganda activities online (Ziccardi, 2020, p. 2). The virtual public sphere and new technologies have made discourses of hate and radicalism available to mass publics by removing the boundaries of time and space and by exploiting the potential of intertextuality and interdiscursivity (Duffy, 2003). However, the exploitation of social media as a channel for disseminating political messages has created an atmosphere of “permanent electoral campaign activity,” that in turn has contributed to the “continued collapse of thoughtful, reasoned, and respectful discourse on social media” (Ott, 2017, p. 62). Thus, for instance, Twitter was widely used by former US President Donald Trump, whose tweeting habits were assessed as “simple, impulsive, and

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uncivil,” reflecting “sexism, racism, homophobia, and xenophobia” and spreading “those ideologies like a social cancer” while teaching people “to see others as lessthan-human” (Ott, 2017, p. 62; see also Chap. 12 in this volume). In a similar vein, the Macedonian politician, Dimitar Apasiev, on his Facebook profile, recently used a swear word to address the Macedonian President, Stevo Pendarovski directly: “F**k you Mr. President” [P**ka ti mater pretsedatele] (MKD.mk, 2022, July 2). A very shocking move, indeed, but it seemed that he managed to pull down the president’s authority as he immediately responded to Apasiev in the same manner using offensive terms, such as “psychopath, drugged and nymph man” (A1.on.mk, 2022, July 3). Having inspected the specific reasons why debasement language is employed in a given political context, in the next two sections we look more closely into those affected the most and the ensuing negative effects.

2.4 Who Are the Recipients of Debasement Language in Political Discourse? There seem to be a number of different profiles of political debasement recipients ranging from individual, political rivals, to the political opposition taken as a whole, to foreign politicians and countries, other public figures (especially journalists, reporters and political activists), minorities and other vulnerable sections in society. Undoubtedly, the primary target of politicians’ debasement language is a political opponent. To promote their political position and to ensure the electorate’s votes, particularly during pre-election campaigns, politicians frequently exploit their linguistic repertoire to intentionally offend their political opponents (Trajkova & Neshkovska, 2018, 2019). They aim to damage their adversaries’ self-esteem and/or social status, their ultimate goal being to portray them as unfit for office (Georgalidou, 2020). Put differently, politicians try to legitimize themselves and delegitimize their opponents by creating binary conceptualizations, us versus them, with us always being presented in a positive manner and them in a negative manner (van Dijk, 1997). With their use of debasement language, politicians also organize opposition and resistance more easily, especially when they aspire to come to power (Georgalidou, 2020). If they are already in power, they utilize coarse language “to intimidate and contain the opposition” (Tulkens, 2013). Thus, while campaigning for the Republican nomination in 2016, President—Trump broke the traditional norms of restraint, courtesy, and deference with respect to the other candidates. He denigrated the former presidential candidate and war hero, Senator John McCain, by stating that “He’s not a war hero. He was a war hero because he was captured. I like people who weren’t captured,” thus questioning his war hero status; he devised demeaning nicknames for his rival candidates, or utilized the type of debasement called name-calling in addressing his adversaries (e.g. Jeb Bush, the early Republican leader, became “Low

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Energy Jeb,” Marco Rubio, the Republican Senator from Florida, was “Little Marco,” and Ted Cruz, the Senator from Texas, was called “Lyin’ Ted” (Krasner, 2021, p. 262; see also Chap. 12). These political attacks are sometimes collective, addressed to a number of political adversaries concurrently, particularly when burning state questions need to be resolved and urgent solutions are sought for challenges that affect the existence and prosperity of entire states. For instance, when the UK was caught in the whirlwind of the highly controversial Brexit referendum’s aftermath, the rhetoric of Prime Minister Boris Johnson was labelled as dangerous and divisive since he talked of his opponents as “traitors” and their legislative proposals that included a no-deal Brexit as “a surrender bill” (Brabin & Dromey, 2019, September 21; see also Walter & Poljak, 2023). The Turkish President, Recep Tayyip Erdo˘gan is also credited with occasionally shunning diplomatic, political language and with collectively attacking his political adversaries. He was particularly outspoken after the failed coup attempt in Turkey in 2016, holding responsible members of the political and religious Gulen movement, whom he dubbed “assassins, perverts, grave robbers, frauds, and slanderers” (Son Vesayet, 2014, September 13; see also Chap. 11). Politicians’ violent rhetoric is sometimes directed towards their foreign counterparts, in which case it has the potential to escalate into a full-blown military conflict. Thus, for example, it served as a prelude to the Gulf war of 1991, when then American President, George W. Bush, repeatedly provoked the former Iraqi President, Saddam Hussein, by calling him “butcher” and “madman.” The Iraqi President managed to maintain remarkable tolerance through most of the provocations, despite his quick temper, but finally snapped and hostilities began (Lakoff, 2000, pp. 24–25). Just a couple of years ago, the entire world stood on edge because of the prospect of a nuclear war due to Trump’s serious squabble with North Korean leader Kim Jong-Un. The American president fueled the conflict by addressing his adversary with highly offensive terms such as “madman, maniac, the little rocket man.” As a result, he too received similarly offensive labels by his North Korean colleague—“deranged” and “dotard” (Fifield, 2017, September 21). Philippine’s former President Rodrigo Roa Duterte’s, on the other hand, used a pejorative term for the former U.S. President, Barack Obama, “son of a whore,” in an attempt prior to their meeting to warn him not to raise human rights concerns over the way Duterte handled anti-drug operations in the Philippines in which thousands of people lost their lives (Navera, 2021; see also Chap. 6). The British prime minister, Boris Johnson, who recently resigned from office, also has a long history of controversial statements that could qualify as debasement language targeting high-profile foreign politicians (Birchall, 2022, July 6). Among them are: the former U.S. Secretary of State, Hilary Clinton, for whom he offered the following degrading depiction: “She’s got dyed blonde hair and pouty lips, and a steely blue stare, like a sadistic nurse in a mental hospital;” the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, to whom he assigned offensive labels such as “elf” and “tyrant;” and President Erdo˘gan’s of Turkey, whom he tried to humiliate by putting together verses for him which read “There was a young fellow from Ankara,/ Who was a terrific

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wankerer./ Till he sowed his wild oats,/ With the help of a goat,/ But he didn’t even stop to thankera,” thus depicting him as someone who has intercourse with animals (Birchall, 2022, July 6). Political actors sometimes hurl hurtful language at other public figures, especially reporters, journalists, and political activists, who for some reason oppose their line of reasoning and freely voice their discontent with the politician’s decisions. Thus, during the 2016 election campaign, Trump become infamous for attacking a disabled reporter suffering from arthogryposis, whom he tried to imitate by saying “Uhh I don’t know what I said. Uhh I don’t remember. He’s going like ‘I don’t remember. Maybe that’s what I said.’” Then, with the following utterance—“You could see there was blood coming out of her eyes, blood coming out of her wherever. In my opinion, she was off base”—he disgustingly mocked a female journalist for questioning his treatment of women (Krasner, 2021, p. 262). Italy’s former prime minister, Silvio Berlusconi, after making an offensive racist remark about President Barak Obama, tried to dismiss the criticism, ascribing it to a lack of sense of humor on the part of journalists, whom he called “imbeciles” (Wodak et al., 2020, p. 14). Often at the receiving end of politicians’ vilifying language are some vulnerable categories of people such as migrants, religious groups, and other minorities (Cervone et al., 2021, p. 82). This is particularly the case if they are seen as symbolic threats to cultural norms and values (Stephan & Stephan, 2000). For instance, President Trump infamously began his 2016 presidential campaign by attacking Mexican immigrants with terms such as “rapists, drug dealers and criminals.” Once he took office, he regularly made the headlines with his derogatory remarks aimed at minorities who come to the USA from “s***hole countries,” comparing them to “infestation, animals,” and “the worst of worst” (Wyatt, 2019, September 23). Former Prime Minster Johnson is known for making offensive comments on the basis of people’s religion and nationality too. He scandalously compared Muslim women wearing hijab to “bank robbers” and “letterboxes” (Brabin & Dromey, 2019); the people of Papua New Guinea to “savages” and “cannibals;” and the peoples of the Commonwealth to “piccaninnies” (Neshkovska & Trajkova, 2020, p. 107). The Prime Minister of Hungary, Victor Orban, amidst the recent, great migration crisis instigated by the war in Syria, has been one of Europe’s leading voices against migration into the European Union and has made controversial comments on minorities, depicting migration as an “invasion” and migrants as “Muslim invaders” and “poison,” clearly with the purpose to denigrate their worth as human beings (Staff & Agencies, 2016, July 27). The Philippines’ President, Duterte, has been accused of being sexist and using misogynistic language, referring to women as “the cause of rape, should be shot in their vaginas, incompetent, ignorant, dumb etc.” (Daantos, 2020). Brazil’s President, Jair Bolsonaro, is also known for targeting women with offensive rhetoric such as “I’m not going to rape you, because you’re very ugly” and homosexuals to whom his debasement language is usually realized as threatening to do them harm, as in the following instance: “I will not fight nor discriminate, but if I see two men kissing in the street, I’ll hit them” (Fishman, 2018, October 29; see also Chap. 5).

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Having surveyed what seems to be a long, but by no means exhaustive list of potential targets of political debasement language, we next focus on the actual implication of political debasement language for individuals, groups, and society at large.

2.5 How Political Debasement Affects Audiences and Democratic Processes The literature review shows that a great deal of attention has been given to identifying the actual repercussions of uncivil discourse in politics. Several effects have been outlined, the majority of which are negative. While some researchers assume that the effects of uncivil discussions and conflict are deeply contextual, interwoven within the political and media system they appear in and dependent on cultural perceptions of what is acceptable and what is not (Mutz, 2015), others take the opposite stance and claim that the effects of incivility are practically identical everywhere. Thus, Otto et al. (2020) tested whether uncivil discourse is a contextual variable analyzing its effects in three European countries (UK, Spain, and the Netherlands) and found that despite different levels of conflict, cynicism, and participation in those three countries, the effects of incivility were similar—uncivil political conflict had negative effects on political participation intent and policy support. In addition, regarding its effect on individuals, they found that citizens with low levels of tolerance for disagreement were more affected by uncivil conflict than those with a high level of tolerance, some of whom seemed immune against violation of social norms altogether. Stryker et al.’s (2016, p. 535) study identifies the same negative effects as the ones mentioned by Otto et al. (2020): incivility results in “reduced trust in and legitimacy of political candidates and government.” Furthermore, they pinpoint other negative effects such as “the reduced capacity of elites and citizens to engage in reasoned discussion without emotional manipulation, extreme political polarization, the impossibility of reaching bipartisan compromise on urgent issues and the specter of total policy gridlock” (Stryker et al., 2016, p. 535). Similarly, Mutz (2007) notes that (online) communication originating from politicians’ uncivil messages loses its quality of discussion and results in increased polarization and intolerance among users, questioning the capacity for listening, dialogue, and mutual understanding. In addition, as a violation of socially accepted norms incivility not only undermines citizens’ trust in political actors but also increases political cynicism (Mutz, 2007, 2015; Mutz & Reeves, 2005). Mutz (2007, 2015) also finds that arguments raised in an uncivil manner are perceived as less “legitimate” and this, as Otto et al. (2020, p. 92) state, “lowers the evaluation of a message which is thus less persuasive.” It is generally agreed that uncivil discourse is emotionally arousing i.e., it triggers an emotional response by those exposed to it and prompts them to act (Mutz, 2007). In fact, the more uncivil and offensive the politicians’ comments are, the more they attract the public’s attention and trigger their engagement, eventually resulting in

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imitating politicians’ behavior and producing reciprocal aggression (Andersson & Pearson, 1999). According to Jamieson et al. (2015, p. 209), because of its strong emotional effect incivility presents a “strategic tool in the arsenal of individuals seeking dramatic social or political change.” However, at the same time instead of provoking robust discussion of ideas, a prerequisite for democratic governance, political discourse destabilizes the communication environment and prevents that from happening (Kirk & Schill, 2021). Mutz and Reeves (2005) also comment on this “paradox of incivility”, which at the same time attracts and repulses those exposed to it. In a study of incivility’s influence on news frames, Borah (2014) finds that incivility increases the perception of credibility of a news article, but at the same time decreases political trust and efficacy. The same is found in Rega and Marchetti’s (2021) study analyzing citizens’ reactions to leaders’ uncivil posts on Facebook during the 2018 Italian general election. The study revealed that on the one hand such posts trigger greater online participation that increases the visibility of their posts and, consequently, mobilizes voters and strengthens their political affiliation, but on the other hand the emotional excitement leads to an increase in negative communication and encouragement of antagonistic and rude behaviors among users that eventually lowers the quality of online discussion. Another unfavorable effect of politicians’ uncivil communication is that they waste a lot more energy on discrediting and hurting their opponents’ reputation and dignity than on solving political issues. This observation is also made by Maisel (2012), according to whom increased incivility distracts politicians from focusing on solving real problems and focuses their attention on demonizing those who do not agree with them. This in turn results in elite incivility priming citizens for partisan combat, reducing their commitment to compromise and bipartisanship (Jamieson & Hardy, 2012; Strachan & Wolf, 2012). Hostility between political representatives can fuel polarized and anti-deliberative attitudes among citizens (Gervais, 2019), compelling them to disregard democratic principles and values (in Rega & Marchetti, 2021). On the positive side, Mutz (2015) claims that incivility contributes to making politics more physiologically arousing and entertaining to viewers, in turn encouraging more attention to political programs, stimulating recall of the content, and encouraging people to relay content to others. Additionally, politicians’ use of debasement language is deemed to present them as ordinary people (Wodak et al., 2020), authentic leaders, capable of solving problems, as was the case with the President Trump’s 2016 presidential election victory (Feldman, 2020). Cavazza and Guidetti (2014) explore the consequences of including swear words in political messages, in terms of impression of the source and persuasiveness. Their study suggests that the appropriate use of swear words by politicians works, and highlights that it works through perceived language informality that gets politicians closer to ordinary people. A number of studies have elaborated particularly on the effects of hate speech, as the most extreme form of debasement language. Thus, according to Vargo and Hopp (2020) since hate speech makes use of emotional and negative language, it urges the public to feel upset and/or take action. Individuals who are victims of public

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hateful discourse tend to experience a wide array of negative emotions including pain, distress, fear, embarrassment, and isolation (Nemes, 2002). It also brings about inequality problems and pushes members of the group into isolation, creating a feeling of disillusionment that in the worst case scenario, according to Mullen and Smith (2004, p. 346), can even lead to suicide. Constant exposure to hate speech against a specific group also results in greater distancing from its members, both physical and social, and less willingness to have social contact with them (Cervone et al., 2021, p. 89). Moreover, instead of silencing and distancing the victims, sometimes the hatefulness of political rhetoric may even inspire violence (Feldman, 2020, p. 5; see also Chap. 12), galvanizing the ‘victims’ to become aggressive and dangerous (Parekh, 2006). Politicians’ hate speech can encourage their supporters too, not only to engage in the production of “bad” language but also to take violent measures to suppress and eradicate what is disliked by their political leaders. Piazza (2020) points to a very strong relationship between politicians’ hateful rhetoric and domestic terrorism, drawing attention to the potential of hate speech to instigate civil wars and genocide (in Piazza, 2020, p. 4). Finally, prolonged exposure to discriminatory and hurtful language stemming from high-profile public figures desensitizes people to it, youngsters in particular, and over time they start to perceive it as less offensive, acceptable, and even worth imitating (Cervone et al., 2021, p. 89). Overall, then, most debasement language effects in political discourse are undoubtedly negative, especially the influence of hate speech that entails the most detrimental effects on individuals, members of specific groups, as well as society at large.

2.6 Conclusion This chapter looked into the specifics of debasement language used by political figures, attempting to define it more precisely by drawing on the findings and insights of studies that have approached the issue of incivility in political discourse from a number of angles. What can be concluded from the extensive discussion of political debasement language above is that it is a widespread phenomenon that is not new, nor is it typical of any particular culture or society. Rather, it affects major and minor political figures from the right to the left end of the political continuum. It has infiltrated itself very subtly into political discourse, mostly under the guise of free speech, becoming an integral part of political speeches delivered during election campaign rallies, political statements released for the press, political TV debates and discussions, interviews etc. Irrespective of the terms used to refer to it, this is clearly a multifaceted phenomenon, and it assumes a variety of linguistic forms ranging from curses, profanities, offensive slurs, threats to attack, irony, and sarcasm, hate speech etc. Politicians’ motivations for using such abrasive speech in formal settings where they are expected to use formal, polite, and fact-based language seem to be quite

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varied. They range from psychological states and emotions such as hatred, contempt, and discontent, to the urge to denigrate political opponents and all those who are not ‘us.’ It is also used to draw attention to the wrong doings of adversaries; to tarnish rivals’ reputation and delegitimize their position; to attract people’s attention; to make the politician appear authentic and deserving of political power; to earn politicians more extensive support by voters; and so on. The victims of politicians’ derisory language have a variety of profiles, with the primary targets always being other domestic and foreign politicians whom they address both individually and collectively; other public figures, especially journalists and political analysts, who do not think along the same lines as them; as well as some vulnerable categories of people such as minority groups, religious groups, immigrants, and even women, who are treated as less worthy than men by some politicians, well into the twenty-first century. The effects of debasement language in political discourse are almost never assessed positively, as they can be far-reaching and deeply damaging on an individual and collective level, inciting extremely negative feelings that could eventually lead either to withdrawal and isolation, or to aggression and violence, in the case of hate speech. Although the detrimental effects of such language outnumber its merits by far, it is fair to mention that it sometimes assists politicians in creating an image of an authentic, determined, strong-willed individual, and thus boosts their electability significantly; and ironically, it even sometimes helps in promoting basic human rights as its use almost invariably invokes strong reactions of disapproval on the part of the general public, various organizations, and human rights activists. In conclusion, political figures should be united in their efforts to discourage the normalization of debasement language in politics, particularly the instances that have the potential to incite violence, aggression, suffering, casualties, and war. Put differently, politicians have a responsibility to speak out about this issue and to promote a climate in which diversity of opinion and ethno-cultural background is considered a value, not a threat.

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Silvana Neshkovska is Associate Professor at the Faculty of Education, “St. Kliment Ohridski” University in Bitola, North Macedonia. Her main fields of interest are pragmatics and translation studies. She is the author of Introduction to the Theory and Practice of Translation: A Coursebook (2021) and the co-author of Speech Acts: Requesting, Thanking, Apologizing and Complaining in Macedonian and English (2014), and Translation from Multiple Perspectives: A Collection of Papers (2022). She has published a number of research papers on speech acts, verbal irony, hate speech, political discourse and translation in various scientific journals including Lodz Papers in Pragmatics, Respectus Philologicus, Acta Neophilologica, Thesis, Studies in Linguistics, Journal of Contemporary Philology, Horizons, and others. Zorica Trajkova Strezovska is Associate Professor of English Linguistics at the Department of English Language and Literature at Ss. Cyril and Methodius University in Skopje, North Macedonia. Her research interests are mainly in the area of pragmatics and critical discourse analysis. She is the author of Metadiscourse: Pragmatic Role of Metadiscourse Markers in Persuasion (2019) and the co-author of Speech Acts: Requesting, Thanking, Apologizing and Complaining in Macedonian and English (2014). She has published internationally in linguistic journals and volumes including Respectus Philologicus, Journal of Contemporary Philology, Lodz Papers in Pragmatics, Research in English and Applied Linguistics REAL Studies, Graduate Academic Writing in Europe in Comparison, Thesis, and others.

Part II

Critical Assessment of the Diversity of Debasing Language

Chapter 3

Coarseness in Spanish Political Discourse: A Critical Discourse Analysis of Santiago Abascal and Pablo Casado’s Aggressive Language María del Mar Rivas-Carmona Abstract The present chapter deals with the escalation of insults in the Spanish Parliament during the current term of office presided over by the government of the socialist Pedro Sánchez. It is often said that the Spanish right becomes discursively anti-system and insulting when it loses the power it believes to be its own. However, the right and far right opposition has raised the level of political debasement to an historically high level, especially since the first months of the pandemic in early 2020, with the oldest deputies confessing that they do not remember such verbal aggressiveness and personal insults in the past. The media constantly echo the “verbal carnage” that obscures the true silent parliamentary work that seems infected by the aggressiveness of social networks. Interestingly, Pablo Casado, one of the most skilled parliamentarians and leader of the main right-wing opposition Popular Party, has also raised his level of insults with the foul language of the extreme right represented in parliament by Santiago Abascal, the leader of the Vox party—a clear example of populist speech and hate speech, with xenophobic, racist, sexist and homophobic ideas. This chapter aims to examine the main linguistic characteristics and the contextual effects of both leaders’ discourse by using a Critical Discourse Analysis approach.

3.1 Introduction On December 12, 2021, the well-known newspaper El País titled one of its articles “The escalation of insults poisons Parliament: Senior deputies confess they cannot remember such verbal aggressiveness,” and its author, Xosé Hermida, described the tone of many interventions in Parliament as “verbal carnage.” Indeed, since the beginning of the second legislature of the socialist government presided over by Pedro Sánchez in January 2020, and as the pandemic progressed,

M. M. Rivas-Carmona (B) Faculty of Philosophy and Letters, University of Córdoba, Córdoba, Spain e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 O. Feldman (ed.), Debasing Political Rhetoric, The Language of Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-0894-3_3

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another pandemic also spread, crossing the limits of parliamentary norms that represented and even perhaps influenced general society’s verbal aggressiveness. Once again, in the midst of the worst global health crisis of our era, the Spanish rightwing opted for “tension” as a political strategy, disdaining the great cost and social wear and tear that this always entails. Neither their messages on social networks nor the statements of their representatives harbored “a concession, or an attempt at understanding: Only the insult and gross accusations” (Schwartz, 2020). Among the appellations that the right-wing leaders launched at the left-wing opposition were harsh expressions such as “son of a bitch” [Hijo de puta], “jerk” [mamarracho] or “slob” [guarro] (Fernando Martínez-Vidal, from the far-right party Vox, on social networks to the Vice President Pablo Iglesias), “they are worse than the virus” [son peores que el virus], “friends of hatred and destruction” [amigos del odio y la destrucción] (Isabel Díaz Ayuso, of the right-wing Popular Party [PP]), or “gerontocides” [gerontocidas] (Ignacio Garriga, from Vox). The accusations made were as serious as calling the president1 of the government “Pedro the gravedigger” [Pedro el sepulturero] (Macarena Olona, from Vox) or the vice president of the government Pablo Iglesias, from the left-wing party Unidas Podemos, “son of a terrorist” [hijo de un terrorista] (Cayetana Álvarez de Toledo, from the PP). The oldest deputies speak of a social climate impregnated with the “aggressive language of social networks,” and the reiteration and confluence of these behaviors over time contribute to the normalization of “shameful behavior” (Wodak et al., 2021). The great speeches are no longer valued as they were in previous times; on the contrary, criticism prevails over the defense of one’s own positions. Beyond harshness, that has always occurred in politics, now personal insults, even attacks on the family, have become normalized (Hermida, 2021). The Spanish press is flooded with articles using verbal aggressiveness, and the protagonists of such verbiage are always right-wing and far-right politicians, whose speech has become increasingly similar. A regional leader of the conservative Popular Party, Isabel Díaz Ayuso, President of the Community of Madrid, stands out for her rude and boastful tone. As Caballero (2021) points out, among other “niceties,” Ayuso recurrently labels left-wing representatives as “scoundrels!” [¡sinvergüenzas!], “Bolsheviks” [bolcheviques], or “criminals” [delincuentes], and she even attacks their physical appearance, the way they dress, or their hair style. In this chapter on aggressive and foul language in Spain, I will focus on the discourse of the leaders of the Spanish right-wing and far-right, Pablo Casado of the Partido Popular (PP) and Santiago Abascal of Vox. To do so, following the postulates of Critical Discourse Analysis, I will analyze their speeches in fourteen parliamentary debates in the Spanish Congress of Deputies between February 2019 and March 2022. The President of the Center for Sociological Research (CIS), José Félix Tezanos, has compared these two leaders’ speeches and arguments in the Congress of Deputies to the political messages of the 1920s and 1930s that led to dictatorial regimes: […] if we were to transfer the usual excesses of leaders like Casado and Abascal 1

Even though it is a parliamentary system, in Spain the term “president” is used as an equivalent to prime minister, which is associated with the British tradition.

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[…] to other times, their pronouncements and proclamations – not arguments – would seem equally unconscionable and unbecoming of educated, intelligent and constructive people. [In] the twenties and thirties of the twentieth century, we could find the same or very similar practices of excess and use of the resources of hatred, infamy and aggressiveness. […] si trasladáramos las desmesuras habituales de líderes como Casado y Abascal […] a otros tiempos, sus pronunciamientos y proclamas – que no argumentos – parecerían tan desmesurados como impropios de personas formadas, inteligentes y constructivas. [En] los años veinte y treinta del siglo XX, podríamos encontrarnos con las mismas o muy similares prácticas de desmesura y de utilización de los recursos al odio, la infamia y la agresividad. (Tezanos, 2021, p. 8)

Tezanos (2021, p. 4) describes these political behaviors as “pathologies” [patologías], as were Stalinism, National Socialism and Fascism in the 1930s. Pablo Casado, leader of the opposition and President of the Popular Party, has been raising his level of discursive aggressiveness to the point of resembling that of farright leader Santiago Abascal. Adriana Lastra, spokeswoman for the Socialist Party (PSOE) in Congress has addressed these words to him from the rostrum, warning him of the consequences of his aggressive discourse: “If you speak like VOX, say the same as VOX, propose what VOX proposes, behave like VOX and make policy like VOX […] It’s not that you become VOX, it’s that your voters will end up voting for VOX” (Cadena SER News Agency, January 5, 2020).

3.2 Research Framework: Critical Discourse Analysis Critical Discourse Analysis (henceforth CDA) encompasses different approaches to the social analysis of discourse varying in methodology, outstanding theoretical issues, and research subjects, but employing the same problem-oriented approach and focus on social-psychological, political and ideological dimensions (Fairclough, 2000). Politics is undoubtedly the field in which discursive and ideological differences are more vividly expressed, and this of course doubly applies in the parliamentary context. Most discursive strategies used in political situations find their origin in the particular ideological principles and standpoints of the actors involved, that make them stand for or oppose other actors. People tend to follow “the ideological square” i.e., to “emphasize our good things/their bad things” and “de-emphasize our bad things/their good things” (van Dijk, 2004, p. 8). Among the extensive number of discursive strategies expressing ideologies, especially relevant for our study, are those of “legitimization/delegitimization,” “positive self-presentation/negative other-presentation,” and “polarization” as opposed to “consensus.” Legitimization strategies are related to “positive self-presentation,” boasting, self-praise, expressions of high evaluative dimension, expressions of moral

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evaluation, etc. (Chilton, 2004; De Cillia et al., 1999; Van Leeuwen, 2005; Van Leeuwen & Wodak, 1999), whereas delegitimization includes “negative otherpresentation,” blaming, accusing, and relevant to our study, insulting, denigrating, annulling, or ridiculing. In political contexts, in particular, much of the meaning is not explicitly expressed but presupposed to be known, and it is general sociocultural knowledge that helps to infer the meaning. Paradoxically, in the case of the Spanish right’s and ultra-right’s language, it is striking to note the number of absolutely direct and blunt attacks that ironically and sadly facilitate the listeners’ inferential work but at the expense of moral damage to them.

3.3 The Parliamentary Speech of Santiago Abascal The year 1947 saw the publication of LTI. Notizbuch eines Philologen (The Language of the Third Empire) by Viktor Klemperer,2 a book that serves as a reference for the study of totalitarianisms and which focused on the use of language. Klemperer, a German philologist of Jewish origin, studied the words and expressions that National Socialism had been consistently introducing into German society since Hitler came to power in 1933. As Schwartz (2020) points out, beyond the appearance of a nagging repetition of “Spanishism,” Santiago Abascal’s discourse reveals the true ideological substratum of the far-right Vox party and reflects the purest language of the xenophobic, sexist, and anti-European, Spanish neo-fascism. In the October 2020 motion of censure, Abascal, who was running for the presidency of the government, began his speech by branding the government of socialist Pedro Sánchez as being “the worst government of Spain in the last 80 years,” that is, he was including and legitimizing the coup d’état, the civil war and the forty-year dictatorship of the genocidal Francisco Franco. As Schwartz (2020) indicates, “Can anyone imagine that in the German parliament a deputy accuses Merkel of leading “the worst government since 1933?”. In his speeches, instead of “deceased” [fallecidos], he calls the victims of the coronavirus “fallen” [caídos], the word used by Franco’s nationalist side for their casualties, thus seeming to ascribe them to a side; this added to the fact that he calls the current coalition government “Frente Popular” (“Popular Front”), the name of the government in power at the time of Franco’s coup d’état that he is legitimizing. As I suggest below, on the one hand, Santiago Abascal’s language is characterized by the constant and recurrent repetition of a series of ideas in the form of “mantras,” usually introduced in his speech regardless of the parliamentary debate’s subject matter. His most frequent argumentation fallacies consist of hasty generalizations alluding to the Government’s supposed insane behavior and disastrous performance,

2

We know Klemperer’s work thanks to the fact that he escaped being sent to an extermination camp because his wife was Aryan.

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bringing up issues that bear no relation at all to the matters under discussion (red herring fallacy). On the other hand, he also makes use of recurrent and constant strategies of derogation of the opponent. This turns his discourse into a projection of extreme polarization and legitimization of self-originated ideas or beliefs (not of proposals, because he really only launches attacks without making proposals of anything, except those relating to generalities in line with his ideology), while delegitimizing those of the opponent (positive self-presentation vs. negative other-presentation). The most aggressive form he uses to offer a “negative other-presentation” comes in the form of personal attacks and insults (“argumentum ad hominem”).

3.3.1 Insults and Personal Attacks (“Argumentum Ad Hominem”) 3.3.1.1

Crude and Direct Insults

Insults and personal attacks are a common feature of Abascal’s interventions. The main targets of these attacks, although not the only ones, are the president of the left-wing coalition government, the socialist Pedro Sánchez, and the Vice-President Pablo Iglesias, of the Unidas Podemos (United We Can) party, a left-wing coalition located in the political space close to communism. The following excerpt belongs to the debate on the motion of censure against the government presented by Santiago Abascal in October 2020. Abascal addresses the leader of the left-wing party Más País (More Country), Íñigo Errejón, and attacks him, taking the opportunity to also insult Pablo Iglesias, Errejón’s former partner in Unidas Podemos, calling him a “class bully, alpha male, extremist” [matón de clase, machito alfa, extremista]. Pablo Iglesias has been one of the politicians most attacked by the right and the extreme-right, to the point that he has suffered continuous harassment at his home and has been forced to leave politics. Mr. Errejón, you seem a little tormented by hearing about the class bully. I think that your cohabitation with the alpha male has been too long for you; but don’t worry, you’ve already got him out of the way[… ], the socialist party goes and signs the extremist, the alpha male, the class bully [… ]. [Señor Errejón, se le ve un poco atormentado a usted con lo del matón de clase. Yo creo que su convivencia con el machito alfa se le ha hecho muy larga; pero no se preocupe, ya se lo quitó usted de en medio [… ], va el partido socialista y ficha al extremista, al machito alfa, al matón de clase[… ]. (Debate on the motion of censure, October 21, 2020. Carlos91391, n.d.)

From the CDA’s perspective, the interpretation and explanation of these insults can be found in the fact that Abascal intends to humiliate Vice President Pablo Iglesias by attacking any personal aspect, whether from the political or private sphere. Iglesias is a skilled and intelligent politician, with great leadership and oratorical skills. By

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calling him a “class bully,” Abascal places him in the context of the classroom (Iglesias is a university professor), and turns these abilities around by showing his leadership as a violent imposition on his fellow party members. Calling him an “alpha male” is a way of mocking the fact that Iglesias has been romantically involved with other female politicians and is the partner of the Minister of Equality. In addition, in a macho and sexist way, Abascal usually humiliates these women by insinuating that their political positions are the result of their relationship with Iglesias. Moreover, when he calls Iglesias an “extremist,” he is trying to scare the electorate by describing him as a radical.

3.3.1.2

Rude Allusions to Physical Appearance and Clothing

For Abascal, the insult goes beyond the recipient’s political and parliamentary role, invading the personal and the family, even going so low as to criticize their physical appearance or clothing. In that same debate on the motion of censure against the government (October 2020), he alludes to the sartorial style of the progressive representatives, in his opinion “disrespectful,” and mentions their “odor” and their crudeness, comparing them with those who “burp” at the table. On this occasion, the object of his attacks is deputy Joan Baldoví from Compromís (Bloc Nacionalista Valencià): I feel sorry for you, Mr. Baldoví […] While you come in any way, I’m not going to get into what you smell […] your problem is coarseness, your problem is style, your problem is rudeness; […] Your Honor, you are like the rude guest who comes to the table and belches, well, look I’m not going to continue debating with you, go up again, belch again and save us a show. [Lo siento por usted, señor Baldoví […] Mientras ustedes vienen de cualquier manera, yo no voy a entrar en a qué huele usted […] su problema es la zafiedad, su problema es el estilo, su problema es la mala educación; […] señoría, usted es como el invitado maleducado que llega a la mesa y eructa, pues mire no voy a seguir debatiendo con ustedes, suba otra vez, vuelva a eructar y ahórrenos un espectáculo]. (Debate on the motion of censure, October 21, 2020. Carlos91391, n.d.)

To discredit the progressive representative Joan Baldoví, Abascal does not allude in this fragment to his political ideas, nor does he contrast them with any measure or proposal. Abascal limits himself to ridiculing Baldoví’s clothes, his smell, his supposed manners and his “style,” when in fact Baldoví is a decent and educated politician.

3.3.1.3

Disqualifications to Discredit the Opponent and Pounding Repetitions

When referring to or addressing the President of the government, Pedro Sánchez, Santiago Abascal constantly portrays him as a lying, egotistical character, interested

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in preserving power at all costs and a traitor to the country for relying on the votes of nationalist parties. In Abascal’s speech before the Congress on July 25, 2019, far from proposing constructive ideas Abascal limits himself to rejecting (repeating the structure “we will never support”), disqualifying, and attacking the then presidential candidate Pedro Sánchez, by calling him a “puppet” [marioneta], calling his ministers “[Venezuelan] chavistas,” and referring to the nationalist parties that would support the investiture as “terrorists” and “megalomaniacal paranoid” [paranoia de megalómanos]: We will never support the puppet that you want to place at the head of the Spanish government and against Spain. […] we will never support a government with Chavista ministers that leads Spain to the destruction of civil liberties at the hands of neo-communism. […] we will never support a government openly desired by the separatism and terrorism […] that paranoia of megalomaniacs that is separatism will never be able to beat the Spanish people. [Nunca apoyaremos a la marioneta que ustedes quieren colocar al frente del gobierno de España y contra España. […] no apoyaremos nunca un gobierno con ministros chavistas que lleva a la destrucción de las libertades civiles a manos del neocomunismo. […] no apoyaremos nunca un gobierno abiertamente deseado por el separatismo y por el terrorismo […] esa paranoia de megalómanos que es el separatismo nunca podrá con el pueblo español]. (Parliamentary debate, July 25, 2019. VOX España, n.d.-a)

Besides, in order to ridicule and discredit the president of the government, it is commonplace in his speeches to repeat ad nauseam that the president lies. Thus, through pounding repetitions, he links him to numerous expressions from the semantic field of lies [mentiras], such as “deceit” [engaño], “crap” [porquería], “fake news,” framed in a linguistic context full of “no, never, none” negations. In his attack on the government and perhaps in an attempt to confuse the recipient, Abascal even accuses the former of being made up of Putin’s “allies” in his war against Ukraine (“all of you are direct accomplices of this Russian aggression against Ukraine,” “you are Putin’s international allies”), when Spain has clearly positioned itself against that war and, paradoxically, it is precisely the Vox party that has been accused of having a relationship with Putin’s Russian oligarchs.3 Pounding repetitions of accusations of lack of credibility, reliability, capacity or respectability of the president are pronounced again, by means of direct assertions: “You are not credible,” “you are not reliable,” “you are not respectable,” “you are not qualified,” “you pull the wool over our own eyes,” “your magic tricks and your fireworks,” etc. He also relates his opponent to the concepts of “inability, ruin, insecurity:” Mr Sánchez, you are not credible, as your own voters know, whom you lied and whom you betrayed. […] You are unreliable […] And you are not respectable […] You are not capable of leading Spain, and this manifest incapacity translates into ruin and insecurity for the Spanish people. […] you are all direct accomplices in this Russian aggression against Ukraine. You are Putin’s international allies […]. You are so used to pulling the wool over our eyes that you think our European partners are going to accept your magic tricks and fireworks.

3

Among many other publications in this regard, see Casal (2022) and Abascal (2022).

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M. M. Rivas-Carmona [Señor Sánchez, usted no es creíble, lo saben sus propios electores a los que mintió y a los que traicionó […] Usted no es fiable […] Y usted no es respetable […]Usted no está capacitado para liderar a España y esa incapacidad manifiesta se traduce en ruina y en inseguridad para los españoles. […] todos ustedes son cómplices directos de esta agresión de Rusia contra Ucrania. Ustedes son los aliados internacionales de Putin. […]. está usted tan acostumbrado a darnos gato por liebre que piensa que nuestros socios europeos van a admitir sus trucos de magia y sus fuegos de artificio]. (Debate on the war in Ukraine, March 2, 2022. LibertadDigital, n.d.-a)

3.3.1.4

Indirect Ironic Attacks

Of course, Abascal’s attacks are not always so clear and direct; they also come in the form of irony. For example, in the investiture debate of January 4, 2020, he sarcastically accused Pedro Sánchez of not having any esteem for his Vox party: […] you love us very much, you are kind, it shows when you clench your jaw. […] usted nos quiere mucho, usted es bondadoso, se le nota cuando aprieta la mandíbula]. (Investiture debate, January 4, 2020. VOX España, n.d.-b)

3.3.2 Hasty Generalizations (Red Herring Fallacy) In its eagerness to discredit the government, allusions to central issues for Vox are repeatedly interspersed in practically any debate, whether or not they are related to the subject under discussion (red herring fallacy). It is always a good occasion, even when talking about the Corona virus or the extension of the state of emergency, to talk about key ideological issues for Vox such as Venezuela, Catalonia and the unity of Spain, feminism or immigration and the “menas” (unaccompanied minors). The Spanish right wing surprisingly and insistently talks about the situation in Venezuela in all circumstances, trying to induce in the recipients an assumption of equivalence between that situation and the one that would be caused by the presence of the “neo-communists” of Podemos in the coalition government. The allusion to the problem with Catalan nationalism also serves to inspire fear of the possible destruction of the unity of Spain, and is used as an excuse to discredit the government and its advisors: Rectify radically, apologize […] Stop the self-aggrandizement on television, do not try to appear constantly with a program that practically resembles ‘Aló presidente’ […] nor with the propaganda techniques of Mr. Maduro, nor with the witticisms of unscrupulous advisors. [Rectifique radicalmente, pida disculpas […] dejen el autobombo televisivo, no pretendan aparecer constantemente con un programa que prácticamente parecía el de “Aló presidente” […] ni con técnicas de propaganda del señor Maduro ni con las ocurrencias de asesores sin escrúpulos]. (Debate in the Congress of Deputies, March 23, 2020. El Mundo, n.d.-a)

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Although the debate deals with other issues, the sexist attack on left-wing feminists inevitably comes up. In his intervention on October 22, 2020, Santiago Abascal insistently reiterates that the Podemos representatives “are women, but they do not represent women,” ridiculing them as puppets at the order of the leader of their party, whom he once again calls, as usual, “macho alpha,” alluding to alleged illegalities in the party, none of which have been confirmed by the courts to date, such as party financing by Islamic republics like Iran. Once again we find unproven accusations of facts that, on the other hand, have been proven with respect to Vox, in a clear strategy to confuse the electorate.4 One more time we also find negation as a discursive strategy to annul the opposition: “You do not represent […], you are not […].” With a tone of contempt and disdain, in just a few seconds Abascal repeats eight times “[You are women, but] you do NOT represent women:” Ladies of Podemos who are moving towards a feminist republic […] You do not represent women. You are women, but you do not represent women. [Applause] […]. And you really want to make believe that you represent independent women and that is why only women are coming out here today to make a caricature of a male chauvinist character just because the alpha male has ordered it? Your honors, when you go to negotiate money with Iran, do they take you with a veil or do they not even invite you? […] you do not represent women, you do not represent the women we know, you do not represent the women in our families, you do not represent the members of other political groups and you do not represent millions of Spanish women who would never vote for you. [Señoras de Podemos que avanzan hacia una república feminista […] Ustedes no representan a las mujeres. Ustedes son mujeres, pero ustedes no representan a las mujeres. [Aplausos] […] ¿Y ustedes de verdad quieren hacer creer que representan a las mujeres independientes y por eso salen hoy aquí solo mujeres a hacer una caricatura de un personaje machista únicamente porque se lo ha ordenado el machito alfa? Señorías, ¿a ustedes también les custodian la tarjeta del móvil?, cuando va a negociar los dineros con Irán ¿las llevan a ustedes con velo o ni siquiera las invitan? […] ustedes no representan a las mujeres, ustedes no representan a las mujeres que nosotros conocemos, ustedes no representan a las mujeres de nuestras familias, ustedes no representan a las diputadas de otros grupos políticos y ustedes no representan a millones de españolas que jamás les votarían]. (Debate in the Congress of Deputies, October 22, 2020. LibertadDigital [n.d.-b])

3.4 The Parliamentary Speech of Pablo Casado As I pointed out earlier, the speech of Pablo Casado, president of the Popular Party (PP) from July 2018 until April 2022,5 was toughened with the irruption of the farright Vox party in Parliament. Perhaps the desire not to lose votes to the right led the PP to resemble Vox in their discourse, the tone of both being almost indistinguishable most of the times.

4

See Irujo and Gil (2020); and Lizón (2020). Following the political withdrawal of Mariano Rajoy, who lost a motion of censure presented by the socialist Pedro Sánchez.

5

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3.4.1 Insults and Personal Attacks (“Argumentum Ad Hominem”) 3.4.1.1

Crude and Direct Insults and Disqualifications

The socialist spokeswoman in Congress, Adriana Lastra, in one of her speeches to the House on May 7, 2020, reproached Pablo Casado for his offensive and contemptuous tone, also reflecting on the fact that he had uttered 37 insults directed at the president of the government in just 15 min of speech, “at a rate of three insults per minute:” manipulator, liar, caesarist, embezzler, incompetent, incapable, inept, sloppy, lousy, negligent, arbitrary, irresponsible, nefarious, opaque, fraudulent, arbitrary, quack, absurd, traitor, felon, squatter, ridiculous, egomaniac, mediocre, sociopath, fake president, the most radical president in the history of Spain, the least democratic of our democracy, pyromaniac, lame duck… [manipulador, mentiroso, cesarista, malversador, incompetente, incapaz, inepto, chapucero, pésimo, negligente, arbitrario, irresponsable, nefasto, opaco, fraudulento, arbitrario, curandero, absurdo, traidor, felón, okupa, ridículo, egomaníaco, mediocre, sociópata, presidente fake, el presidente más radical de la historia de España, el menos democrático de nuestra democracia, piromaníaco, pato cojo…]. (May 7, 2020. GranCanariaTv.com, n.d.)

In a brief appearance before the press on February 6, 2019, he also addressed 21 disqualifications to the president of the government in record time. As can be seen, the insults are similar to those used by Santiago Abascal and allude to the fact that Sánchez is a “traitor” [traidor], “illegitimate” [ilegítimo], “incompetent” [incompetente], to the point of calling him an “okupa” (“squatter”). From a critical perspective, the fact that politicians such as Abascal or Casado accuse Pedro Sánchez of being a traitor and an illegitimate president responds to a clear strategy of attrition and contempt for democracy. Both leaders of the right and the ultra-right base their attacks of delegitimization on the fact that Sánchez assumed the presidency after a motion of censure to the previous president of the PP Mariano Rajoy, and that for his investiture and subsequent government agreements he has been supported, among others, by the nationalist groups: [...] what is happening right now in Spain is that the president of the government is the biggest traitor[...], he is behaving like a felon [...], he is an illegitimate president [...], as of today the main champion of the rupture of legality in Spain [...], the biggest felon in the democratic history of Spain.... an irresponsible, unfit to govern and a disloyal person who is committing high treason [...], a compulsive liar [...], a person who is only looking at his navel, looking at his houses, looking at his palaces, looking at his plane, looking at his dog, in other words, he is simply a catastrophe for the future of Spain... a character with 84 seats[...], a person who already has more couch therapy, psychologist therapy, than parliamentary therapy [...], a person as incompetent and as mediocre as the president of the government[...], he is responsible, participant and accomplice of what is happening [...], this man is a catastrophe for Spain, help Spain to kick out this squatter, this incapable and irresponsible person [...]. These are not disqualifications, they are descriptions. [[...] lo que está pasando ahora mismo en España es que el presidente del gobierno es el mayor traidor[...], está siendo un felón[...], es un presidente ilegítimo[...], a partir de hoy el

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principal adalid de la ruptura de la legalidad en España[...], el mayor felón de la historia democrática de España[...], un irresponsable, un incapaz para gobernar y un desleal que está cometiendo alta traición[...], un mentiroso compulsivo[...], es una persona que está solo mirando su ombligo, mirando sus casas, mirando sus palacios, mirando su avión, mirando su perra, o sea, es sencillamente es una catástrofe para el futuro de España [...], un personaje con 84 escaños [...], una persona que tiene ya más terapia de diván, de psicólogo, que terapia parlamentaria[...], una persona tan incompetente y tan mediocre como el presidente del gobierno[...], es responsable, partícipe y cómplice de lo que está pasando[...], este hombre es una catástrofe para España, que ayuden a España a echar a este okupa, a este incapaz y a este irresponsable [...]. Esto no son descalificaciones son descripciones]. (Press appearance by Pablo Casado, February 6, 2019. El País. n.d.)

Like Santiago Abascal, Pablo Casado tries to discredit the president’s work by arguing that he is not working for the Spanish people, but for a personal desire for power. It is common for Casado to hurl insults related to the president’s ego (“presumptuous, arrogant, fatuous…, he likes to look at himself in the mirror”), even stating that he has a “sociopathic personal interest,” “you are your only country,” “you are a walking lie:” Mr. Sánchez, after so many metamorphoses, so many masks, so many lies, you don’t even recognize yourself in the mirror and look how you like to look at yourself in the mirror. Today you have even applauded your own speech, it is already the height of arrogance and fatuity, with a changing image only depending on a sociopathic personal interest [...] you are a walking lie, you talk about fighting fake news and you are a fake president. [Señor Sánchez, después de tantas metamorfosis, tantas máscaras, de tantas mentiras, ni se reconoce usted mismo ante el espejo y mira que le gusta mirarse al espejo. Hoy hasta se ha aplaudido su propio discurso, ya es el colmo de la arrogancia y de la fatuidad, con una cambiante imagen solo dependiendo de un sociópata interés personal [...] usted es una mentira andante, habla usted de combatir las fake news y es un presidente fake]. (Speech by Pablo Casado in the Congress of Deputies, January 4, 2020. Cadena SER, n.d.-a, Partido Popular, n.d.-a) [...] your disguise has fallen with all your lies, Mr. Sánchez. You are your only country. [[...] su disfraz se le ha caído con todas sus mentiras, señor Sánchez. Su única patria es usted.]. (Intervention by Pablo Casado in Congress, January 7, 2020. LibertadDigital, n.d.-c)

He even goes so far as to tell him that he is “a jinx:” Everything you touch goes wrong, there are already those who say that you are jinxed, because you declare the virus defeated and you get two other waves, you put your sticker on the vaccine and you stop getting it, you announce green bud and the GDP falls to the level of civil war [...]. [Todo lo que toca sale mal, hay ya quien dice que es usted gafe, porque declara el virus vencido y le llegan otras dos olas, pone su pegatina en la vacuna y le dejan de llegar, anuncia brotes verdes y le cae el PIB al nivel de la guerra civil [...]]. (Intervention by Pablo Casado in Congress, February 3, 2021. Cadena SER, n.d.-b)

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3.4.1.2

Threats and Personal Questions

Pablo Casado’s attacks consist not only of insults and disqualifications, but also threats and questions of a personal nature: “Mr. Sánchez, do you sleep well? Have you slept well tonight?” – pragmatically implying that he has no conscience if was able to sleep. Making a play on words with “oneiric,” he takes the opportunity to disqualify the other as a “nightmare government” and threatens that “what you dream of will not happen, but what you fear,” because this government “will be your political epitaph”: Mr. Sánchez, do you sleep well? Did you sleep well tonight? [Applause] It seems that you are interested in the dreamlike genre, and between mattresses and insomnia a nightmare government brings us here, especially for all Spaniards who live in Catalonia. But don’t be under any illusion, what you dream of will not happen but what you fear, and this government will be your political epitaph. Today you have turned the hourglass upside down and in the end it will not come for free; it will depend on the transfers you make to your partners, how quickly the grains are falling [...]. [Señor Sánchez, ¿usted duerme bien? ¿usted ha dormido bien esta noche? [Aplausos] Parece que a usted le interesa el género de lo onírico y entre colchones e insomnios nos trae aquí un gobierno de pesadilla, sobre todo para todos los españoles que viven en Cataluña. Pero desengáñese, no va a ocurrir lo que sueña sino lo que teme y este gobierno será su epitafio político. Hoy mismo ha dado la vuelta al reloj de arena y al final no le va a salir gratis; dependerá de las cesiones que haga a sus socios, con qué rapidez vayan cayendo los granos [...]]. (Speech by Pablo Casado in the Congress of Deputies, January 4, 2020. Cadena SER, n.d.-a, Partido Popular, n.d.-a)

3.4.1.3

Implied Insults Through Quotes and Derogatory Comparisons

On some other occasions, Pablo Casado resorts to well-known expressions or literary quotes that implicitly convey an attack on the government: Mr. Sánchez, you do like dystopian slogans. Remember Huxley when he said that facts do not cease to exist even if they are ignored. You try to draw a story outside of reality and you do it by lying [and] by manipulating. [...] Mr. Sánchez, to end also with a dystopia, remember Orwell when he said that in times of universal deception telling the truth becomes a revolutionary act [...] either you are supported or this is chaos, although you know how that mythical cartoon by Ramón in Brother Wolf ended: “What is chaos? and you ask me, you are chaos.” [...] you seem more and more installed in that absolutism of ‘after me the deluge.’ By the way, where did your Noah’s ark end up? [Señor Sánchez, a usted a quien le gustan los lemas distópicos. Recuerde a Huxley cuando decía que los hechos no dejan de existir aunque se les ignore. Usted pretende trazar un relato al margen de la realidad y lo hace mintiendo [y] manipulando [...]. Señor Sánchez, para acabar también con una distopía, recuerde a Orwell cuando decía que en tiempos de engaño universal decir la verdad se convierte en un acto revolucionario [...] o se le apoya a usted o esto es el caos, aunque ya sabe cómo terminaba esa mítica viñeta de Ramón en Hermano Lobo “¿qué es el caos? y usted me lo pregunta, el caos es usted” [...] usted parece cada vez más instalado en ese absolutismo de después de mí el diluvio. Por cierto ¿dónde acabaron sus arcas de Noé?]. (Plenary session in the Congress, May 6, 2020. LOYAL POST, n.d.)

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Casado relies on these “cultural” comparisons to paint a humiliating and vexatious portrait of the president, whom he presents as the protagonist and the trigger of a dystopia, as the personification of chaos or disaster, as harmful as the universal deluge.

3.4.2 Exaggerations and Hasty Generalizations Any intervention by Casado, like those of Abascal, tends to include allusions to general issues against the government. The fact that the socialist government has support of nationalist groups serves as a basis for the right to resort to fear for the break-up of the nation and to call the government’s partners and the government itself “traitors” [traidores]. When Casado alludes in the following intervention to the “purple elephant with a big yellow ribbon” [el elefante morado con un gran lazo amarillo], he is referring to the purple color of the Podemos party and the yellow ribbon that symbolically represents the Catalan independence movement. The parties that support the government are called an “amalgam of radicals” [amalgama de radicales] of whom the socialists are said to be “hostages” [rehenes]: Mr Sánchez, two hours of speech to say nothing... two hours without seeing the elephant in the room, without seeing the big purple elephant with a big yellow ribbon in the middle of the chamber [...] you think you are the joker in the pack [...], but you have a problem and that is that by the end of this session you will have too many creditors at your door and you will not be able to meet them all. With this amalgam of radicals [...] I get the feeling that you have activated a minefield from which you no longer know how to get out, you are hostages of the partners of the motion of censure [...]. [Señor Sánchez, dos horas de discurso para no decir nada… dos horas sin ver el elefante en la habitación, sin ver el gran elefante morado con un gran lazo amarillo que está en el medio del hemiciclo [...] usted se cree el comodín de la baraja [...], pero tiene un problema y es que cuando acabe esta sesión tendrá demasiados acreedores a su puerta y no podrá cumplir con todos ellos. Con esta amalgama de radicales [...] me da la sensación de que ustedes han activado un campo de minas del que ya no saben cómo salir, son rehenes de los socios de la moción de censura [...]]. (Speech by Pablo Casado in the Congress of Deputies, July 22, 2019. Cadena SER, n.d.-c)

As can be seen, any intervention is appropriate to allude to the fact that the coalition government, supported by various groups including the nationalists, is “a Frankenstein government” [un gobierno Frankenstein], “an elephantine government” [un gobierno elefantiásico], “the most radical in our history” [el más radical de nuestra historia], “the most radical in Europe” [el más radical de Europa], “the first coalition executive and the most radical in our democratic history, with communists, advisers to banana dictators and whitewashers of basque independentists and other separatists” [el primer ejecutivo de coalición y el más radical de nuestra historia democrática, con comunistas, asesores de dictadores bananeros y blanqueadores de batasunos y separatistas]. The coarse expression “¿Cuándo se jodió el socialismo constitucional?” (“When was constitutional socialism screwed up?”) is very surprising, and

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it even raises rumors among the representatives. In addition, whatever the debate is, it is to be expected that there will be allusions to Venezuela, Catalonia, or the extinct terrorist group ETA6 : When did constitutional socialism get screwed? (rumors)...this Frankenstein government... bestiary of pacts... a government against the state... the first coalition executive and the most radical in our democratic history, with communists, advisors to banana dictators and whiteners of Basque independentists and other separatists. [Applause] [...] with a Bolivarian international agenda in favor of the narco-dictatorships of Cuba, Venezuela, and their partners in countries such as Bolivia... [¿Cuándo se jodió el socialismo constitucional? (rumores) …este gobierno Frankenstein…, bestiario de pactos…, un gobierno contra el estado…, el primer ejecutivo de coalición y el más radical de nuestra historia democrática, con comunistas, asesores de dictadores bananeros y blanqueadores de batasunos y separatistas [...]con agenda internacional bolivariana en favor de las narco dictaduras de Cuba, Venezuela y sus socios en países como Bolivia…]. (Speech by Pablo Casado in the Congress of Deputies, January 4, 2020. Cadena SER, n.d.-a, Partido Popular, n.d.-a) [...] to hear the radicals who support the candidacy of Pedro Sánchez, the executors of ETA, talk of authoritarianism, terror or the last train in a hemicycle in which we only fit half the number of people they murdered is infinitely nauseating [...] this government against Spain is the most radical in our history [...] you have allowed your ultra-partners to continue in power in Spain [...] a party that has now become what it abhorred, the establishment of an elephantine government [...] [[…] oír hablar a los radicales que sustentan la candidatura de Pedro Sánchez, los albaceas de ETA, de autoritarismo, de terror o del último tren en un hemiciclo en el que solo cabemos la mitad del número de personas que ellos asesinaron produce una náusea infinita[...] este gobierno contra España es el más radical de nuestra historia[...] usted se lo ha consentido a sus socios ultras para seguir en el poder en España[...] un partido que ahora se ha convertido en lo que abominaba, en el establishment de un gobierno elefantiásico [...]. (Pablo Casado’s reply to Pablo Iglesias in the debate on the motion of censure, October 22, 2020. Partido Popular, n.d.-b) [...] you are the president of the most radical government in Europe, the most radical in the democratic history of Spain and the worst thing is that you are incapable of solving the problems of the Spanish people because you are the main problem in Spain [[...] es usted el presidente del gobierno más radical de Europa, el más radical de la historia democrática de España y lo peor es que es usted incapaz de resolver los problemas de los españoles porque el principal problema de España es usted.]. (The Sánchez and Casado clash after the president’s return to Congress, September 15, 2021. El Mundo, n.d.-b)

In short, in the absence of arguments, in order to criticize any proposal it is common to resort to distorted recourse of humiliating and discrediting the proponent for his alleged connection with “radical” communist governments, or the support of “terrorist” nationalist groups that endanger the stability of the country. 6

Venezuela is used as a negative example of the situation that could arise with the communists of Podemos in government; Catalonia is used as a weapon against the government, which is accused of making pacts with the Catalan nationalists who want to break up Spain, when in fact it is when the right wing governs that independence grows; likewise, the government is attacked by repeatedly alluding to the terrorist group ETA that ceased its activity thanks to the socialist government of José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero in 2011.

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3.5 Conclusions The analysis of the interventions of politicians Santiago Abascal, of the far-right Vox party, and Pablo Casado, of the right-wing Popular Party, in fourteen parliamentary sessions of the Spanish Congress of Deputies reveals an in crescendo use of derogatory and aggressive discourse strategies. Hodge and Kress (1993, p. 5) maintained that “There is no pure act of perception, no seeing without thinking […] What we actually see is limited by where we look and what we focus on.” The same can be applied to the political interlocutors in the sessions under analysis, whose discursive strategies were mediated by their interests and ideological standpoints. In politics, the intentions of the interlocutors are not always clear as the interests of the different political formations largely condition the focus of attention. In other words, priorities and ideologies are often not openly “observable.” When we are faced with clearly aggressive and derogatory, even rude and crude, speeches, it may give the impression that the message is reduced to denigrating the opponent. However, these politicians manage to muddy the political discourse, giving the appearance that the political class as a whole is like that. In addition, there is a clear strategy not only of disqualification and delegitimization of the opponent, but also a strategy of ideological dissemination based on tiresome, insistent repetitions. The right and far-right opposition’s extensive use of argumentation strategies portrays extreme polarization and legitimization of self-originated standpoints, while delegitimatizing those of the opponent (positive self-presentation vs. negative otherpresentation). Besides, their utterances convey presuppositions as well as assertions signifying that they defend national interests (denoting that they are Spain), sharply contrasted by indications suggesting that they will not support the Government and that consensus is far from their aims. All this is discursively constructed by resorting to argumentation fallacies such as hasty generalizations alluding to the Government’s “insane” behaviour and “disastrous” performance and to personal attacks either addressed to the Prime Minister, Mr. Pedro Sánchez, or to other members of the progressive coalition government, or deputies of formations that support it. In fact, the normalization of insults and personal attacks (“argumentum ad hominem”) become the most prominent resource of the right and ultra-right. On most occasions, they use crude and direct insults, disqualifications to discredit the opponent, and mocking repetitions, even making threats or asking hurtful personal questions; on other occasions, the attacks are ironic and indirect, with implicit insults wrapped in literary quotations and with derogatory comparisons. The height of impoliteness and baseness consists of attacking not only the proposals, ideology, or political and parliamentary capabilities of the adversary (that would be considered part of the parliamentary game) but also their opponent’s physical appearance, odor, or clothing. As stated earlier, foul, rude language denotes a decline in respect for the word. It is very worrisome that for certain political positions criticism of the adversary prevails over the defense of one’s own positions or proposals, normalizing personal insults,

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even attacks on the family (Hermida, 2021). This should never be acceptable in any political or social context. Unfortunately, the politicians of the Spanish right and ultra-right consciously employ these strategies because sadly they are well received by a large part of the right-wing electorate. Right-wing voters are traditionally very loyal to their parties and at “worst” they might transfer their vote between the Popular Party and Vox. Vox attracted the most conservative and far-right voters, but as the Popular Party hardened its language and began to resemble Vox it started winning back many of these more extreme voters. The populist, simple, and aggressive language against the opponent, whom they turn into the “enemy,” serves the purpose of addressing the concerns of that electorate, but aggressive words inflame tempers and carry the danger of awakening undesirable attitudes and actions. Future research could analyze more concretely the degree of effectiveness of this language of debasement in the electorate, observing the transfer of votes between right-wing and far-right parties according to their speeches. It would also be interesting to study the reasons for the success of some right-wing, regional politicians who obtain absolute majorities thanks to populist, simplistic, and aggressive language in Spain.

References Abascal, L. (2022, March 5). Why is Vox an ally of Putin’s Russia? El Plural. https://www.elplural. com/politica/vox-aliado-rusia-putin_285248102 (in Spanish). Caballero, F. (2021, September 14). The opposition stands up to Ayuso’s insults. elDiario.es. https:// www.eldiario.es/madrid/oposicion-planta-insultos-ayuso_1_8396390.html (in Spanish). Cadena Ser. (2020, January 5). Lastra’s warning to Casado for his aggressive speech. https://cad enaser.com/ser/2020/01/05/politica/1578225486_777697.html (in Spanish). Cadena SER. (n.d.-a). Pablo Casado’s speech, in three minutes [Video]. https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=fbJyLjdFDVs (in Spanish). Cadena SER. (n.d.-b). Pedro Sánchez, to Pablo Casado: “Even Abascal gives him lessons in responsibility” [Video]. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OWjKBTH65Jw (in Spanish). Cadena SER. (n.d.-c). Pablo Casado’s speech (and Sánchez’s reply) in 5 minutes [Video]. https:// www.youtube.com/watch?v=t2EyKV0JhPo (in Spanish). Carlos91391. (n.d.). Santiago Abascal answers the Plural Group in the debate on the motion of censure [Video]. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ndrdz3HC3bA (in Spanish). Casal, L. (2022, March 19). A far-right network links Vox with Putin’s Russian oligarchs through HazteOir and CitizenGo. El español. https://www.elespanol.com/reportajes/20220319/ultradere cha-vox-oligarcas-putin-traves-hazteoir-citizengo/658184665_0.html (in Spanish). Chilton, P. (2004). Analysing political discourse: Theory and practice. Routledge. De Cillia, R., Reisigl, M., & Wodak, R. (1999). The discursive construction of national identities. Discourse and Society, 10(2), 149–173. El Mundo. (n.d.-a). Full speech of Santiago Abascal in Congress [Video]. https://www.youtube. com/watch?v=NgdEwEf9Imk (in Spanish). El Mundo. (n.d.-b). Hard confrontation between Sánchez and Casado after the return of the president to Congress [Video]. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G3xg9cAIrf4 (in Spanish). El País. (n.d.). 21 DISQUALIFICATIONS from CASADO to SÁNCHEZ [Video]. https://www.you tube.com/watch?v=IkAoxvdrfAY (in Spanish).

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Fairclough, N. (2000). New labour, new language? Routledge. GranCanariaTv.com. (n.d.). 37 insults from Casado to Sánchez in 15 minutes Adriana Lastra [Video]. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zw5WU4LDXmA (in Spanish). Hermida, X. (2021, December 12). The escalation of insults poisons Parliament: Senior deputies confess they cannot remember such verbal aggressiveness. El País. https://elpais.com/espana/ 2021-12-12/la-escalada-de-insultos-envenena-elparlamento.html (in Spanish). Hodge, R., & Kress, G. (1993). Language as ideology (Politics of language). Routledge. Irujo, J. M., & Gil, J. (2020, January 28). Iranian exile paid Abascal’s and Espinosa’s salaries for eight months. https://elpais.com/politica/2020/01/27/actualidad/1580126990_082132.html (in Spanish). Klemperer, V. ([1947] 2001). Lti: The language of the Third Reich. Notes by a philologist. Minúscula [LTI. Notizbuch eines Philologen, 1947] (in Spanish). LibertadDigital. (n.d.-a). Abascal denounces in Congress that Putin’s “allies” are part of the Government [Video] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qzOYYlt25AQ (in Spanish). LibertadDigital (n.d.-b). Abascal, to the deputies of Podemos: “You are women, but you do not represent women” [Video]. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MZOR1dZOz5k (in Spanish). LibertadDigital. (n.d.-c). Pablo Casado attacks Pedro Sánchez: “Ultra is you and all those who support you” [Video]. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5jCuqIB8IhI (in Spanish). Lizón, J. (2020, January 28). Vox admits receiving money from Iranian exile for 2014 European election campaign. https://www.elperiodico.com/es/politica/20200128/vox-admite-recibio-din ero-exilio-irani-campana-elecciones-europeas-2014-7825254 (in Spanish). LOYAL POST. (n.d.). Pablo Casado—Plenary Session, Congress (2020, May 6) [Video]. https:// www.youtube.com/watch?v=cxtN1eshdeo (in Spanish). Partido Popular. (n.d.-a). Impressive review from Pablo Casado to Sánchez [Video]. https://www. youtube.com/watch?v=P2DvRQcM3WA (in Spanish). Partido Popular. (n.d.-b). Pablo Casado answers Iglesias in the motion of censure [Video]. https:// www.youtube.com/watch?v=8Z2yRWAksDU (in Spanish). Schwartz. M. (2020, October 21). Abascal’s language. eldiario.es https://www.eldiario.es/opinion/ zona-critica/lengua-abascal_129_6310288.html (in Spanish). Tezanos, J. F. (2021). “Covid shock” and political excesses. Revista Temas 324. https://fundacion sistema.com/revista-temas-numeros/ (in Spanish). Tremending. (2020, June 5). Worse than the virus, terrorists, geronticides, gravedigger, slob… Right-wing insults to the government during the pandemic. Público. https://www.publico.es/ tremending/2020/06/05/coronavirus-peores-que-el-virus-terroristas-gerontocidas-sepultureroguarro-los-insultos-de-las-derechas-al-gobierno-durante-la-pandemia/ (in Spanish). van Dijk, T. A. (2004). Text and context of parliamentary debates. In P. Bayley (Ed.), Cross-cultural perspectives on parliamentary discourse (pp. 339–372). John Benjamins. Van Leeuwen, T. (2005). Three models of interdisciplinarity. In R. Wodak & P. Chilton (Eds.), New agenda in (critical) discourse analysis: Theory, methodology and interdisciplinarity (pp. 3–18). John Benjamins. Van Leeuwen, T., & Wodak, R. (1999). Legitimizing immigration control: A discourse-historical analysis. Discourse Studies, 1(1), 83–119. https://doi.org/10.1177/1461445699001001005 VOX España. (n.d.-a). Santiago Abascal’s speech censored by television [Video]. https://www.you tube.com/watch?v=dEHZT9mtRTY (in Spanish). VOX España. (n.d.-b). Santiago Abascal humiliates Pedro Sánchez (2020, January 4) [Video]. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vTNZK-i0j9o (in Spanish). Wodak, R., Culpeper, J., & Semino, E. (2021). Shameless normalisation of impoliteness: Berlusconi’s and Trump’s press conferences. Discourse & Society, 32(3), 369–393. https://doi.org/10. 1177/0957926520977217

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Mar´ia del Mar Rivas-Carmona is a Senior Lecturer at the University of Cordoba, Spain. She has previously taught at Harvard University, USA, and the University of Seville, Spain. Her classes focus on Translation, Discourse and Pragmatics and her research interests include discourse analysis and specialized translation. Standing out among her recent publications are two international co-editions on the discursive aspects of translation, published by Peter Lang (2013) and Narr Verlag (2013).

Chapter 4

Debasing Language Expressed by Two Radical Right-Wing Populist Leaders in the Netherlands: Geert Wilders and Thierry Baudet Michael Hameleers Abstract Far-right political movements are on the rise internationally, and part of their success might be due to their leaders’ online communication. These leaders may appeal to the sentiments of disenchanted citizens by using debasing language targeting elites and societal out-groups. Additionally, they can exploit the affordances of social media to reach their constituents without the interference of gatekeepers that condemn debasing language. To test the assumption that radical right-wing politicians use debasing speech in their social media communication, this chapter reports on a qualitative analysis of the Twitter communication of Dutch political leaders Thierry Baudet and Geert Wilders. The findings indicate that both leaders use debasing language when referring to political elites and mainstream media. Wilders relies on a more explicit debasing vocabulary, and uses swearing, cursing and degrading language—including dehumanization—when referring to political opponents and religious or ethnic minorities. Baudet uses less uncivil forms of debasement, although his language frequently devaluates opponents in politics and media. Based on these findings, we can conclude that debasing language can be used to construct populist opposition to elites and out-groups. However, there are different degrees of debasement, and only Geert Wilders explicitly uses hate-driven language and swearing when excluding others.

4.1 Introduction The far right is on the rise across the globe and has historically been successful in amplifying and feeding on societal cleavages in the Netherlands (Aalberg et al., 2017). Extant literature has indicated that radical right-wing populists are likely to express incivility and debasing language that reduce the quality, character, worth, dignity or value of targeted out-groups (Ott, 2017). Yet we know little about how such language is expressed through the direct channels of communication mostly M. Hameleers (B) The Amsterdam School of Communication Research (ASCoR), Amsterdam, The Netherlands e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 O. Feldman (ed.), Debasing Political Rhetoric, The Language of Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-0894-3_4

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used by populists to communicate with their followers: social media (Engesser et al., 2017). Against this backdrop, this chapter assesses the extent to which the online communication of radical right-wing populists in the Netherlands can be considered as debasing, and what elements of their communication might indicate such insulting language. This chapter focuses on two prominent radical right-wing populists in the Netherlands: Geert Wilders (Freedom Party/PVV) and Thierry Baudet (Forum for Democracy/FvD). Both parties and leaders can be classified as radical-right and populist, as indicated by the emphasis on authoritarianism, nativism and populism in the communication of these political actors (Mudde, 2007). As both leaders bypass and delegitimize the mainstream media that they refer to as “enemies of the people” or “fake news outlets” (Hameleers & Minihold, 2021), their language is most visible in their direct communication to the public via their own controlled social media platforms (Engesser et al., 2017). Crucially, these ungated and largely unfiltered channels afford the expression of discriminatory, hostile, uncivil and hateful speech that strongly resonates with the radical and extremist tendencies of these leaders. In this chapter, I specifically focus on the debasing aspects of language used by political leaders when referring to targeted scapegoats. I focus on both the narrow and broad application of debasement (see also the introductory chapter for a detailed definition). Debasing language can explicitly refer to abusive language, indicated by swearing, cursing, vulgarity or other forms of humiliating speech used to insult or attack a targeted out-group. Beyond this explicit use of hostile language, it can also refer to all styles and modes of communicates that are used to demean, degrade, humiliate or discredit targeted groups or individuals (i.e., based on race, ethnicity or religion). This understanding of debasing language is close to uncivil communication—typically defined as an umbrella term that captures impolite, insulting, or otherwise offensive language used to discredit others (Ott, 2017). The central contribution of this chapter is to offer a critical perspective on the extent to which radical right-wing populists use debasing language when emphasizing the central cleavage between ordinary people and culpable others. I dissect the level of incivility and harmful speech in direct populist communication expressed online. All in all, this chapter aims to make a substantial contribution to the literature on populist communication and debasement by assessing the level of debasing language expressed by different radical right-wing populist leaders in online settings.

4.2 The Communication Styles of Far-Right Political Leaders Overall, the far-right can be considered as an umbrella-term referring to extreme and/or radical movements on the right-end of the political spectrum (De Jonge, 2019; Mudde, 2007). Radicalization on the right-wing entails a strong emphasis on identity

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politics: out-groups are excluded from the in-group of native citizens (De Jonge, 2019). This exclusionary component, central to radical right-wing movements can, for example, be based on the exclusion of groups based on ethnic, religious, or sexual grounds. Such radical ideas may resonate with debasing speech that emphasizes the humiliation and degradation of targeted out-groups. Hence, the exclusion of out-groups can be shaped rhetorically by name-calling, swearing or other modes of debasement. Different from radicalism, extremism opposes the principles and foundations of democracy, and connects to discourses that legitimize violence and oppositions against the democratic order. Extremist movements emphasize values that are anti-constitutional, anti-democratic, anti-pluralist, and authoritarian. For these movements, uniformity, collective goals, and authoritarianism are preferred over diversity, individual freedoms, and dialogue (Schmidt, 2013). When considering the far-right in the Netherlands, it is important to also focus on populist elements of this movement. In its essence, populism can be defined as the emphasis on a binary divide in society that stresses the opposition between “pure” or ordinary people as an in-group and the “corrupt” or “evil” elite as an out-group (Mudde, 2004; Taggart, 2000). In line with extant literature, I consider the political parties studied in this chapter—the Forum for Democracy and the Freedom Party in the Netherlands—as right-wing populist parties (RWPP). Hence, in line with this party type, they are essentially skeptical of liberal democracy without rejecting its foundations (Mudde, 2007). In addition, they possess inherently nativist, populist, and exclusionary perspectives on socio-political reality (Mudde, 2007). Against this backdrop, the selected parties engage strongly in exclusionary identity politics. The native in-group of ordinary Dutch people is juxtaposed to the elites (i.e., the alleged fake news media and corrupt politicians) as a “vertical” out-group. In addition, immigrants, ethnic, religious, or other “horizontal” out-groups are excluded from this in-group (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007). But how do these party families communicate, and how does their (relative) opposition to democratic values and exclusionary perspective translate to the use of incivility and debasing language? It should be emphasized that the communication of populist boundaries between ordinary people and evil out-groups is not regarded as debasing language in and of itself. In addition, extremist and radical narratives that emphasize a strong opposition to out-groups and democratic values are not debasing or uncivil per se. However, the construction of boundaries between “us” and “them” can be expressed through debasing language at targeted out-groups, such as immigrants or ethnic minorities. Here debasing language can be defined as verbally insulting and/or reducing the value of out-groups and elite actors, for example by swearing, cursing, dehumanization or other offensive language that delegitimizes and devalues an individual or group (Ott, 2017). For instance, radical right-wing, populist Facebook groups in the Netherlands typically use swearing to emphasize their opposition to the ‘corrupt’ elites, as can be illustrated with the following quote: “I will kill klootzak (i.e., son-of-a-bitch) Mark Rutte [the Dutch prime-minister] when I see him.” They also use dehumanizing language to note that certain foreign elements should be excluded from the in-group of ordinary citizens. Terms such as ratten (rats), ongedierte (vermin), and kakkerlakken

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(cockroaches) are quite common in the online discourse of right-wing populists, reducing the value of immigrants and ethnic minorities. Although we know that such debasing language based on out-group incivility is prominent in the communication of online communities consisting of populist voters (Hameleers, 2020), we know little about the extent to which explicit debasing language is also expressed by populist leaders. Hence, although these leaders communicate populist boundaries through blame-shifting, negativity, and conflict, they might be less likely to explicitly use swearing and insulting language as such derogatory speech can put their political legitimacy at risk. At the same time, however, they could use debasing language to clearly signal to their voters that they do not support the ruling elites, sharing their supporters’ disenchantment with ethnic minorities and other out-groups. Hence, it might be a rhetorical tool to showcase their Manichean, populist discourse that emphasizes a central cleavage between deprived people and evil others (Caiani et al., 2021; Waqas et al., 2019). Against this backdrop, this open empirical question is worthy of investigation: do the two most influential radical right-wing populist leaders in the Netherlands—Geert Wilders and Thierry Baudet— explicitly or implicitly use debasing language when communicating populist and radical right-wing boundaries?

4.3 Digital Media, Far-Right Populism and Debasing Speech As social media afford direct communication of (political) actors without the interference of gatekeepers, such channels offer an ideal discursive opportunity for right-wing populist leaders (Engesser et al., 2017). Hence, although traditional elite media may filter out or criticize hateful language and radical or extremist discourse, social media platforms offer a (more or less) unfiltered channel for expressing such language. In addition, as radical right-wing populist leaders often emphasize strong anti-media sentiments (i.e., by using the Fake News label; see Egelhofer & Lecheler, 2019), social media may offer a more people-centric alternative to these leaders. The affordances of social media to directly speak to members of the public without the interference of elite gatekeepers and the absence of professional norms striving toward balance, objectivity and diversity, should thus especially appeal to rightwing populists. These leaders in particular aim to communicate a direct link to the people while delegitimizing the established order including the mainstream media (Hameleers, 2022; Waisbord, 2018). The same affordances have been associated with the online expression of uncivil language, such as hate speech, by the radical right (Caiani et al., 2021). Ott (2017) has argued that the architecture and infrastructure of social media such as Twitter motivates people to use debasing language, and to be mean and hostile to others by degrading them. As Twitter and other social media alike may demand simplicity,

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impulsivity, and incivility, these platforms may be regarded as a most likely community for the expression of debasing content (Ott, 2017). The algorithmic amplification of like-mindedness and the cultivation of communities that bring together people with a similar outlook regarding socio-political reality can create a seemingly ‘safe space’ for the expression of hostile and anti-democratic communication. In line with this, empirical research has shown that hate speech, incivility and explicit debasing language mainly comes from radical right proponents, communicating their uncivil discourse via direct social media platforms (Pettersson, 2020). Ott (2017) has illustrated this with a case study on Trump’s Twitter communication, using examples of Tweets such as “@ariannahuff is unattractive both inside and out. I fully understand why her former husband left her for a man- he made a good decision.” to explicate how the affordances of Twitter may promote debasing speech that devalues persons or entire groups. Taken together, social media may offer an ideal discursive opportunity structure for radical right-wing politicians to express debasing language as these platforms enable uncensored, direct, populist communication of uncivil and derogatory language while circumventing elite gatekeepers that are part of the allegedly “corrupt” elites.

4.4 Case Study: Debasement in the Direct Communication of Wilders and Baudet 4.4.1 Method For the purpose of this chapter, where I aim to offer in-depth insights into the ways in which far-right leaders in the Netherlands use debasing speech when constructing populist boundaries via social media, I shall focus on the Twitter profiles of two prominent far-right politicians in the Netherlands: Geert Wilders and Thierry Baudet. As incivility and debasement expressed by the far-right online may be most prominent in times of crisis, such as the COVID-19 pandemic (see Caiani et al., 2021), I compare the Twitter communication of these leaders prior to and during the pandemic, resulting in a comparison of Tweets published consecutively in 2019 and 2020 (and parts of 2021). I specifically rely on a qualitative content analysis of Tweets communicated in both periods. Sensitizing concepts that guided the analysis of language included references to extremist or radical ideology as well as the leaders’ opposition to democratic values. I thus particularly explored the language of statements and Tweets in which the key values of radical and extreme right-wing discourse were present (Mudde, 2007). Here, the question is whether such messages that revolve around a binary opposition between ‘us’ and ‘them’ also shape and promote the use of debasing language that humiliates and degrades the constructed out-group.

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4.4.2 Data Collection and Sample Within both years, the selection of relevant Tweets was based on the principles of maximum variation and theoretical sampling (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). This means that Tweets that were relevant in light of the theoretical constructs of extremism, radicalism, democratic values and uncivil language were selected; I aimed to capture as much variety as possible in the language used to refer to these concepts. Using Twitter’s own advanced search options, all Tweets of Baudet and Wilders in the non-COVID-19 period (the full year of 2019) and an equally long COVID-19 period (March 2020–March 2021) were selected. All Tweets were read during the first round of relevance assessment, and a sub-sample of Tweets (N > 100) in which references to populism, extremism, radicalism, hostility or other relevant sentiments were made were coded in depth during the next rounds of the discourse analysis.

4.4.3 Data Analysis and Coding A discourse analytical approach guided by the subsequent coding steps of Grounded Theory was used (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). All relevant Tweets were read by the researcher in a first round of close reading. Complete line-by-line coding was conducted on all Tweets that offered insights into the language used in extremist and radical discourse. This line-by-line stage was informed by three steps of coding. First, open coding was conducted. In line with the Grounded Theory approach to coding (Charmaz, 2006), open coding was conducted to highlight and label relevant segments of Tweets offering insights into the language used by the politicians. Unstructured descriptive labels were attached to Tweet segments to highlight and summarize what these segments revealed about the sensitizing concepts (i.e., how they referred to extremist and debasing language). In the next step, also referred to as focused coding, the (more or less) unique open codes were merged, grouped, or formulated in a more general way to reach a higher level of abstraction. In this coding step, categories or themes of debasing, derogatory and uncivil language were constructed, including a hierarchical structure distinguishing between dimensions and their indicators. The final step of axial coding considered this more abstractly reduced list of themes and dimensions to establish their relationships, overlaps and discrepancies. Although all steps of data reduction were conducted by the same researcher, peer debriefing was conducted to discuss the coding procedures and outcomes with a second researcher less involved in the fieldwork. More specifically, the selection of relevant Tweets and the subsequent complete coding procedures were discussed with a peer and evaluated on trustworthiness and credibility. The peer arrived at similar conclusions on the main themes and variety as the principal investigator. Minor differences in assessment were discussed until complete agreement was reached.

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4.5 Findings In this section, the most prominent themes related to the language of the two radical right-wing populist leaders are presented and illustrated. The results were guided by the sensitizing question how—if at all—debasing discourse and speech were uttered by the radical right-wing politicians when referring to elites, out-groups, or the boundary between ordinary people and evil others.

4.5.1 Hostile De-legitimization of the Establishment Both leaders frequently communicate debasing language when framing a binary divide between ordinary Dutch citizens and the corrupt political elite. This can be exemplified by one of Wilders’ statements expressed in a Tweet sent in the early phases of the COVID-19 pandemic: “Rutte [the Dutch prime-minister] is protecting his own political friends but the ordinary citizen is genaaid [screwed]. Get out!” (Wilders, 2020h). The language used to mark the boundary between the people and the established order often involves debasing speech addressed to leading politicians. For example, Wilders uses terms such as faalhaas (failing idiot), gierig (greedy) and grote hypocriet (big hypocrite) to delegitimize the prime minister and other leading political actors. This hostile language can again be illustrated by another quote from Wilders: “Complete losers Rutte and [Hugo] de Jonge [part of the government] are discrediting others while they make an absolute mess of the test policy themselves” (Wilders, 2020d). Swearing was quite prominent when attacking opposed politicians, especially when blaming the government for failing to respond to the needs of the common ordinary citizen. When addressing the established political order of the Netherlands, both Wilders and Baudet use the terms maffia (mob) and partijkartel (party cartel) to de-legitimize elite actors. Baudet also refers to the establishment as dictators (dictators). Terms such as corrupt and leugenachtig (lying) are frequently used by both political leaders to debase the political establishment. In addition, the policies and actions of the Dutch government are frequently referred to as waardeloos (useless) or belachelijk (crazy or ridiculous). By using these references explicitly when referring to the actions and policies of political opponents, the two leaders delegitimize elite actors in a fact-free manner, thereby devaluing the leaders’ involvement in society. In the direct communication of both leaders, emotional language is frequently used to emphasize the frustration of the people and to highlight the de-legitimization of the establishment. Here, words with negative emotion are often used to delegitimize opposing political leaders and to discredit their behaviors. Wilders, for example, frequently refers to situations as teleurstellend (disappointing), belachelijk (ridiculous), or geschift (outrageous and crazy), accusing the elites of being “hateful” against their own people. The elites are often referred to as beroepsleugenaars (professional

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liars), which illustrates sarcastic and cynical ways of attacking the legitimacy of political opponents. Baudet uses similar terms to highlight the urgency and his frustration with the policies of the government, especially regarding the interventions used to fight the pandemic, using terms as “outrageous, “crazy” and “foolish” to describe the policies of the elites: “Just one of the many examples of the absurd, bizarre and completely ineffective and irrational corona rules!” (Baudet, 2021). Here, it should be noted that not all these references—even if they are delegitimizing—contain debasing language. As noted in this volume’s introduction (see Chapter 1), there is a difference between explicitly debasing language—as indicated by the swearing and offensive language used by Wilders—and more general ways of attacking and delegitimizing opponents, as illustrated by the more subtle ways in which political actors are referred to as worthless, disappointing, and deceptive. Still, there exists a distinction between general levels of negativity and critique, and the debasement of opponents. Here, I regard unjustified delegitimization without substantial arguments backing up the criticism as a more implicit form of debasement, as these accusations are meant to degrade and discredit opponents without clear offering a substantive justification. Both leaders also attack the scientific community, using sarcastic and cynical terms such as the linkse deugmentaliteit (left-wing virtue mentality) or linkse echokamer (left-wing echo chamber) to highlight scientists’ alleged bias and dishonesty. An example of the delegitimization of science was, for example, expressed by Baudet: “This is a funny example of professional deformation. Shows the terrible state of the left-wing academic echo chamber. They think it is completely normal to use swear words as ‘radical right’ to label my party. Tunnel vision!” (Baudet, 2019d). Interestingly, this Tweet also shows that the political leaders disagree with the academic labels used to describe their party type and ideology. Related to the delegitimization of science that is central to contemporary right-wing populist discourse, both Wilders and Baudet frequently used the term nepwetenschappers (pseudo-scientists or fake scientists) to voice attacks on the academic community. As Wilders Tweeted: “We should lock up these crazy pseudo-scientists who make up this nonsense” (Wilders, 2019a). By calling the scientific community “crazy,” and “phony,” or “fake,” Wilders diminished and devalued members of the scientific community who were regarded as deliberately deceiving ordinary people. Based on an in-depth analysis of the Tweets, when referring to the establishment both leaders use textbook populist language to delegitimize the established order. They emphasize a central divide between ordinary, pure, and native people—and failing, elite actors. This boundary is communicated by using hostile and negative emotional language when referring to political actors in government, and by repeatedly using labels related to corruption and harmful intentions when talking about elite actors. Although the emphasis on a boundary between ordinary people and failing elites is not considered as debasing language on its own, the implicit and explicit degrading comments targeting elite actors—for example by saying that they are “stupid,” “ignorant,” and “hypocrites,” or “fake”—can be considered as debasing. However, it should be noted that explicit swearing, hate speech or the incitement of violence is not often present in the language of the two political leaders. Their hostility

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mostly becomes apparent in the blame-shifting labels used to delegitimize the policy initiatives and actions of allegedly “failing” political actors, at times presented as a personalized attack when calling specific elite actors “idiots” or “losers.” Their policies were also labeled as failing, as can be illustrated with the terms klimaatwaanzin (Climate-nonsense), klimaathysterie (Climate-hysteria) or stikstofonzin (Nitrogenbullshit) used by Baudet to attack the policies of established politicians in a hostile way. By using these terms, Baudet reduced the value and worth of political elites by simply emphasizing negative sentiments, without offering any rational evaluation of their performance. Yet, extremist sentiments that would legitimize violence targeted at political opponents are not present at all—that at least illustrates both leaders seemingly avoiding explicit, hate-driven language that would also have ramifications for their presence on digital platforms. They strategically strike a delicate balance between hostile populist, blame-shifting rhetoric and hate speech that would potentially lead to being banned from their direct modes of communication. Most of the debasing language came from Wilders, who used swearing and name-calling and other verbal styles that reduced the quality, character and worth of elites in politics and science. Beyond emphasizing negativity and conflict, crude and offensive language was used to attack and devalue opponents. This can further be illustrated with a Tweet targeting political actors in the government, who are labeled as aartslui (bone lazy) and who allegedly are spending the entire day in their nest [derogatory term for bed] watching Netflix: “These aartsluie (bone lazy) members of the VVD are just like the elite D66 members of parliament, spending the entire day at home in their nest [bed] for 6000 euros after taxes watching Netflix” (Wilders, 2020g). In a similar vein, the elites were regarded as beroepsluilakken (professional bone lazy profiters).

4.5.2 Accusations of Deception and a Lying Press In both leaders’ delegitimizing language, the mass media and mainstream media channels are frequently accused of lying and deceiving the public. Explicit “Fake News” labels are often used by both leaders, especially to discredit sources and statements that are attacking them or their party. As illustrated by the following Tweet of Baudet, the mainstream media are typically referred to as one cluster of dishonest and “lying” channels, without distinguishing between specific sources or narratives. Terms as “fake” and “lies” are used often when the mainstream media are mentioned: “The government and mainstream media sow panic without any reason to do so. They deceive the public with fake numbers. The fearmongering messages are pure fake news” (Baudet, 2019b). In attacking the mainstream press, and in particular the public broadcaster, Baudet did not only refer to the media as failing to be objective but also explicitly called for the need to reform the media by “sanitizing” the public broadcaster: “The NPO [public broadcaster] is not objective and not representative. Almost 1 billion of our tax money goes to channels that support the policies of the party cartel, reinforcing

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and complimenting their ideas. Time for change! #FvD calls for transparency, access, and the sanitization of the press!” (Baudet, 2020f). This quote further illustrates the alleged affinity between mainstream media and corrupt elites—a theme that is central in the language of both Baudet and Wilders. Although most attacks were targeted at the mainstream media in general, Wilders and Baudet also shifted blame to journalists in their delegitimizing language. As Baudet emphasized in one of his Tweets: “It is crystal clear how these journalists manipulate everything and completely make up stories. Painful moment for the cartel media trying to make a fake accusation big news” (Baudet, 2020d). This quote further illustrates how Baudet frequently uses the insulting word kartel (cartel) as a delegitimizing label when referring to both the elites in government and the mainstream media. The language used to delegitimize and blame the media reveals an important element of perceived intention associated with elite actors that allegedly spread false information. Hence, both political leaders not only blamed the mainstream press and journalists for not covering the truth, but also claimed that they deliberately manipulated reality to deceive recipients and present the public with a “fake reality” that allegedly suited the corrupt elites. This is revealed by terms such as “dishonest,” “deceptive,” and “lying,” used when describing the coverage of mainstream media. As Baudet emphasized in one of his Tweets: “The media are well aware of this. They know their power and are constantly manipulating facts” (Baudet, 2020d). As another example, Baudet blamed the public broadcaster for “fabricating” a fake reality: “The #NPO [public broadcaster] fabricates their own #fake reality by selectively citing out-of-context. Come on!” (Baudet, 2020c). This alleged “fake” reality was also contrasted to an alternative reality based on facts that are allegedly kept hidden from the people—illustrated with Baudet’s Tweet on hydroxychloroquine to fight COVID-19: “Promising results from 14 hospitals that prescribed hydroxychloroquine. Many doctors wanted to use this. How come that CDA-minister Hugo de Jonge framed our call for research as quackery?” (Baudet, 2020e). The notion of deliberate deception is also expressed through the frequent use of the terms “propaganda” or “censorship” used by Baudet: “Very worrisome. The increasingly more pronounced censorship on social media. This should last no longer!” (Baudet, 2020b). Another prominent term used to delegitimize the press is “framing”—to emphasize how journalists are allegedly distorting reality by using a deceptive and value-laden angle: “This is nonsense frame #14. Please find an overview of all 21 frames that the party cartel and her media system has used to refer to #FVD here” (Baudet, 2020a). Just as explicit hate speech, violence or references to violent behaviors were not present in the politicians’ language when referring to the political establishment, explicit violent and extreme language is not used when referring to the media. However, both leaders expressed hostility and diminished the quality of the media and their worth by calling them nep or onecht (fake). As Wilders more explicitly noted upon using more debasing language when attacking the chief of the public broadcaster: “Can we kick out @MarcelGelauff [chief of the public broadcaster] and the rest of the lying press soon?” (Wilders, 2020c). Both Wilders and Baudet referred to journalists as lafaards (cowards), “losers” and idioten (idiots or fools).

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The following statement made by Wilders is representative: “The cowards in education, media and politics are ashamed of their own culture, and therefore accept this multicultural nonsense” (Wilders, 2020a). Next to the use of explicitly derogatory and insulting language, the explicit call to “remove” or “kick out” elite actors can be regarded as an uncivil attack that devalues and reduces the worth of opposed elites.

4.5.3 Nativism and Exclusionary Language The radical ideology of both leaders becomes more apparent in the language used to refer to out-groups who are often attacked and excluded from the “pure” people in a hostile manner. Although the language used was not always explicitly debasing in the sense of cursing or other abusive language, immigrants and other minorities were degraded and devalued by referring to them as one big group of criminals, violent, and evil “others”—and their religion, norms and values were devaluated and seen as inferior to the native people. Anti-Islam and anti-immigrant speech was most salient in the period before the outbreak of the pandemic. In his radical Tweets, Wilders frequently voiced hostile sentiments targeted at Moslems or immigrants. As illustrated with the following Tweet, Moslems were frequently referred to as a homogenous “evil” and “violent” out-group that should be removed: “This is Muslims at work again. They brutally slaughtered 11 persons. We have to ban this violent Islamic ideology and introduce travel bans for immigrants from Islamic countries” (Wilders, 2019b). Wilders’ language clearly reflected the undesirability of foreign elements, and the need to “remove” non-native elements from the nation. The incitement of violent acts, or fantasies of violence, were also (in)directly expressed by Wilders, as illustrated by the following Tweet on a Moroccan suspected of organized crime: “Excellent news [the suspect was arrested]. Now quickly extradite him and lock him up for life, if it is not possible to have him quartered” (Wilders, 2019c). When referring to the threat caused by immigration, Baudet used the term “suicide”—that could indirectly legitimize the violent exclusion of refugees and immigrants: “Asking the question is the same as answering it. Stop the suicide that the European elites are calling upon us!” (Baudet, 2019c). Also see the following example of a Tweet in which the same term is used to refer to the threat posed by immigrants: “My good friend @DouglasKMurray on the suicidal immigration policies our hopeless elites have been pursuing in the past decades—and why we need to STOP them NOW” (Baudet, 2019a). A hostile and delegitimizing term used by both leaders to refer to refugees was gelukzoekers (fortune seekers) or profiteurs (profiteers)—indicating that these rightwing populist leaders cultivated the impression that people fleeing their country to come to the Netherlands are only motivated by profit-seeking, and herewith deprive the native population of the resources they are entitled to. This sense of relative deprivation can be illustrated with one of Wilders’ Tweets: “They want our money, cigarettes and two hot meals a day. Our prime ministers all allowed them to enter. I

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want to kick out all these profiting elements and close our borders once and for all!” (Wilders, 2020e). Wilders used more explicit inflammatory and discriminatory language when referring to the threat caused by foreigners, as can be exemplified by the following quote: “What if some other Chinese gek (Chinese fool) puts another bat in a wok? This will cause another major health crisis” (Wilders, 2020f). In addition, Wilders referred to immigrants as onruststokende rotzakken (a nuisance, invoking scumbags) that needed to be “kicked out of our country en masse” (Wilders, 2020d). In addition, the term gevaarlijk or verschrikkelijk tuig (dangerous trash or scumbags) was often used to devalue immigrants, and to frame them as dangerous minorities that threaten the well-being of native people. See the following example of a Tweet in which the term tuig is used to refer to immigrants: “Horrific scumbags! For how much longer do we have to allow this? Make the PVV big in 2021 and we will clear our streets” (Wilders, 2020b). Here one can identify a salient difference in the language of both leaders. Although Baudet’s ideology has been referred to as more extremist and radical than Wilders, the language used by Wilders to refer to out-groups on Twitter is more explicitly debasing than Baudet’s. As opposed to Wilders, Baudet does not often use debasing language to refer to the out-groups themselves but blames the “party cartel” or “corrupt” politicians for not sufficiently dealing with the threat of immigration. On the other hand, Wilders frequently refers to immigrants as schoften and tuig (scumbags) to explicitly devalue minorities based on religion and race. Returning to the definitions of debasing language offered in this chapter and the volume as a whole, it can be argued that there is a thin line between debasement and other forms of delegitimizing discourse. For both leaders, explicit debasing speech communicated through abusive language that devalued targeted elite actors was certainly present, but such references did not dominate their populist rhetoric. Wilders used more explicit curse words and insulting language, whereas Baudet used less explicit constructions to discredit opponents. In the context of Tweets and embedded attacks, some of Baudet’s discrediting accusations could be seen as debasing in the sense that they are used to devalue others and diminish their worth and dignity through delegitimizing accusations. Here, references to the partijkartel (party cartel) or neppe leugenachtige media (lying fake news media) are especially prominent labels used to discredit others.

4.6 Conclusion and Discussion: Implications of Debasing Language In this chapter I aimed to offer insights into the language used by two prominent radical right-wing populist politicians in the Netherlands: Geert Wilders and Thierry Baudet. Although I found that the language used on Twitter emphasized a central populist boundary between “pure” ordinary people and “corrupt” elites—in line with

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the ideational core of populism (Busby et al., 2019)—speech targeted at the elites was not explicitly debasing. Although debasing language was not present at all times, the use of explicitly insulting and devaluating language and swearing was at times used to emphasize the severity of these two politicians’ anti-elitism and anti-immigration perspectives. Wilders, in particular, used a lot of crude and abusive language that emphasized a strong sense of hostility to elites, journalists and immigrants. Reflecting a more global trend of delegitimizing attacks targeted at established media and scientists (Egelhofer & Lecheler, 2019), the findings show that radical right-wing populist leaders in the Netherlands play an important role in sowing distrust and cynicism related to the truth claims made by the established order. By arguing that truth claims from the opposite side of the political spectrum are invalid and deceptive, and by referring to these as representing a neppe or gefabriceerde werkelijkheid (a fake reality), the leaders forwarded alternative facts and truth claims that resonated more closely with their populist agenda. Such attacks on the legacy press and the scientific community may result in segments of the electorate selectively avoiding empirical evidence and expert knowledge, while clinging to alternative facts and conspiracies that amplify their distance to other societal groups and the established order. There are noteworthy differences in the language expressed in the pre- versus postCOVID-19 period included in the sample. In the pre-pandemic period, both leaders pointed to the elites’ failures regarding the issue of immigration, and frequently used insulting language to reduce the capability of ruling elites dealing with the issue of immigration. The pandemic shifted the attention of both leaders who were presented with a new context of an urgent crisis to frame in populist and hostile terms. More specifically, the pandemic was used as an issue to emphasize the divide between pure people and failing or corrupt established politicians who were accused of deceiving the public about the threats of the pandemic and failing to deliver appropriate solutions. We can also see salient differences in the language used by both leaders. Although elements of Baudet’s ideology have been interpreted in light of extremism—considering that anti-democratic sentiments and the incitement to violence were voiced by this leader and his party—the direct communication on Twitter was less extremist and hostile in language than expected. Wilders, however, was much more explicit in the use of debasing language—including explicit swearing targeted at the established order, immigrants, and Islamic communities. Wilders hinted at hate speech by voicing discriminatory language at constructed out-groups, who were attributed negative qualities on a group level. These differences in the explicitness of debasing language could be driven by strategic considerations that differ for both leaders. Baudet might have aimed to circumvent explicit uncivil language and hate speech, presenting himself and his party as a viable and eloquent alternative to the establishment he refers to as the party cartel. Wilders, however, is already a more established right-wing populist in opposition, and probably lost any direct ambition to become part of the government. How undemocratic is the debasing language expressed by the different leaders? This question can be approached from different angles. In the sense that both leaders

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amplify distrust in commonly accepted truth by constantly delegitimizing expert sources and empirical evidence from the establishment, it can be argued that the foundation of deliberative democracy is at stake (see Arendt, 1967). Hence, people may no longer be able to rationally exchange arguments and interpretations if such exchanges are not based on an agreement on some basic facts. How can people discuss disagreements on COVID-19’s solutions if they disagree on the very existence of the virus causing this disease? Moreover, the calls from both leaders to abolish public broadcasting and their claims attacking the rule of law and the constitution undermines democracy. By attacking freedom of the press through accusations of Fake News targeted at professional journalists, they cast serious doubt on the pillars of our current democracy by delegitimizing the political regime involving separation of powers. Democratic values of diversity, civility, rationality, and dialogue are at stake in light of the antagonistic discourse and authoritarian claims voiced. The leaders’ debasing and insulting language undermines support for established political actors, and motivates public hostility and attacks on the media, policies, and minorities. Hence, if political actors refer to the government and immigrants as “idiots” and “scumbags”—this can diminish trust and support for these actors among citizens, as well as legitimizing offline and online hostility to targeted out-groups. A well-functioning democracy should be based on civil(ized) disagreements among political actors and citizens that share substantive and rational arguments underlying different viewpoints; debasing language that delegitimizes political opponents and out-groups by insulting them will undercut and even prevent a rational exchange of viewpoints. At the same time, however, both leaders claim to “restore” and “safeguard”democracy, for example by giving the power back to the people and by installing alternative and allegedly neutral and honest institutions. They vociferously claim to represent the voice of the oppressed and emasculated majority and want to punish the corrupt voices that are conspiring against the people. Yet the question remains whether these claims are truly driven by the desire to repair a broken democracy, or whether they reflect strategic, debasing language used to mobilize disenchanted segments of the electorate. In the sense that concrete solutions and viable alternatives are not offered by both leaders, it can be argued that the narratives emphasized online are mainly driven by strategic goals and an overall antagonistic outlook on society. This chapter comes with limitations that offer important avenues for future research. It looked at one specific platform, focusing on just two political actors on the right-wing—and also within a limited timeframe. The scope of this endeavor can be extended by comparing platforms (Facebook, Telegram, Twitter) across a more extended period of time. Moreover, future research need not focus exclusively on radical right-wing populist leaders but can also explore the extent to which populist, left-wing politicians engage in such language. Additionally, based on the findings that political actors themselves may not explicitly express debasing speech online, future research should integrate findings on debasing language of their followers— who are more likely to use the affordances of digital communication to express uncivil language. Finally, the case-specific findings on the Netherlands need to be compared and contrasted to different settings. I focused on a country in which the

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radical right is electorally successful, but it remains to be tested whether these findings are applicable to similar settings in Western Europe and beyond. Similarly, it is worth exploring whether countries that give rise to different types of populism or more normalized incivility in politics offer more or less of a favorable opportunity structure for debasing language.

References Aalberg, T., Esser, F., Reinemann, C., Strömbäck, J., & de Vreese, C. H. (2017). Populist political communication in Europe. Routledge. Arendt, H. (1967, February 25). Truth and politics. The New Yorker, p. 49. Baudet, T. [@thierrybaudet]. (2019a, May 18). My good friend @DouglasKMurray on the suicidal immigration policies our hopeless elites have been pursuing in the past decades—and why we need to STOP them NOW [Tweet]. Twitter. https://twitter.com/thierrybaudet/status/996158407 441813504 Baudet, T. [@thierrybaudet]. (2019b, October 1). What a heroes. #FVD supports our farmers completely. We have to get rid of the unnecessary strict phosphate rules, the #nitrogen-craziness and the increasingly higher taxes [Tweet]. Twitter. https://twitter.com/thierrybaudet/status/117 8955462554914816 (in Dutch). Baudet, T. [@thierrybaudet]. (2019c, November 28). Asking the question is the same as answering it. Stop the suicide that the European elites are calling upon us! Support #FVD [Tweet]. Twitter. https://twitter.com/thierrybaudet/status/1200004167546355712 (in Dutch). Baudet, T. [@thierrybaudet]. (2019d, December 9). This is a funny example of professional deformation. Shows the terrible state of the left-wing academic echo chamber. They think it is completely normal to use swear words as ‘radical right’ to label my party. Tunnel vision! [Tweet]. Twitter. https://twitter.com/thierrybaudet/status/1203981539945648136 (in Dutch). Baudet, T. [@thierrybaudet]. (2020a, March 4). Today in the Chamber: #partycartel votes AGAINST introduction of border security (resolution Hiddema) [Tweet]. Twitter. https://twitter.com/thierr ybaudet/status/1235232033233920001 (in Dutch). Baudet, T. [@thierrybaudet]. (2020b, July 28). Very worrisome: The increasingly more severe censorship on social media. Also see the YouTube message that responds to critique on the WHO [Tweet]. Twitter. https://twitter.com/thierrybaudet/status/1288123637682192404 (in Dutch). Baudet, T. [@thierrybaudet]. (2020c, September 24). The #NPO continuously fabricates or “paraphrases” (!) a #fake reality by selectively quoting/editing out of context. We show the unfiltered truth [Tweet]. Twitter. https://twitter.com/thierrybaudet/status/1309180839448772608 (in Dutch). Baudet, T. [@thierrybaudet]. (2020d, September 27). Once in a while it becomes crystal clear how journalists twist the truth…a painful moment for the cartel media [Tweet]. Twitter. https://twi tter.com/thierrybaudet/status/1310183569206267906 (in Dutch). Baudet, T. [@thierrybaudet]. (2020e, October 12). Promising results from 14 hospitals that prescribed #hydroxychloroquine: It seems to be effective against #corona [Tweet]. Twitter. https://twitter.com/thierrybaudet/status/1315550776488529920 (in Dutch). Baudet, T. [@thierrybaudet]. (2020f, November 5). Yesterday I discussed the very strong linkages and connections between the public broadcaster and the party cartel. A creative filmmaker visualized it! [Tweet]. Twitter. https://twitter.com/thierrybaudet/status/1324356910368346112 (in Dutch). Baudet, T. [@thierrybaudet]. (2021, January 11). The enormous increase in horrific domestic violence is just one of the examples of the ridiculous immigration policy [Tweet]. Twitter. https:// twitter.com/thierrybaudet/status/1348612202052407297 (in Dutch).

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Ben-David, A., & Matamoros-Fernández, A. (2016). Hate speech and covert discrimination on social media: Monitoring the Facebook pages of extreme-right political parties in Spain. International Journal of Communication, 10, 1167–1193. Busby, E. C., Gubler, J. R., & Hawkins, K. (2019). Framing and blame attribution in populist rhetoric. The Journal of Politics, 81(2), 616–630. Caiani, M., Carlotti, B., & Padoan, E. (2021). Online hate speech and the radical right in times of pandemic: The Italian and English cases. Javnost—The Public, 28(2), 202–218. https://doi.org/ 10.1080/13183222.2021.1922191 Charmaz, K. (2006). Constructing grounded theory: A practical guide through qualitative analysis. Sage De Jonge, L. (2019). The populist radical right and the media in the Benelux: Friend or foe? The International Journal of Press/politics, 24(2), 189–209. https://doi.org/10.1177/194016121882 1098 Egelhofer, J. L., & Lecheler, S. (2019). Fake news as a two-dimensional phenomenon: A framework and research agenda. Annals of the International Communication Association, 43, 97–116. https://doi.org/10.1080/23808985.2019.1602782 Engesser, S., Ernst, N., Esser, F., & Büchel, F. (2017). Populism and social media: How politicians spread a fragmented ideology. Information, Communication & Society, 20(8), 1109–1125. Glaser, B. G., & Strauss, A. L. (1967). Discovery of grounded theory: Strategies for qualitative research. Aldine. Hameleers, M. (2020). Populist disinformation: Exploring intersections between online populism and disinformation in the US and the Netherlands. Politics and Governance, 8(1), 146–157. Hameleers, M. (2022). Populist disinformation in fragmented information settings. Routledge. Hameleers, M., & Minihold, S. (2021). Constructing discourses on (un)truthfulness: Attributions of reality, misinformation, and disinformation by politicians in a comparative social media Setting. Communication Research. https://doi.org/10.1177/0093650220982762 Jagers, J., & Walgrave, S. (2007). Populism as political communication style: An empirical study of political parties’ discourse in Belgium. European Journal of Political Research, 46(3), 319–345. Mudde, C. (2004). The populist zeitgeist. Government and Opposition, 39, 542–564. Mudde, C. (2007). Populist radical right parties in Western Europe. Cambridge University Press. Ott, B. L. (2017). The age of Twitter: Donald J. Trump and the politics of debasement. Critical Studies in Media Communication, 34(1), 59–68. Pettersson, K. (2020). The discursive denial of racism by Finnish populist radical right politicians accused of anti-Muslim hate speech. In O. Cristian Norocel, A. Hellström & M. B. Jørgensen (Eds.), Nostalgia and hope: Intersections between politics of culture, welfare, and migration in Europe (pp. 35–50). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-41694-2_3 Schmidt, A. (2013). Radicalisation, de-radicalisation, counter-radicalisation: A conceptual discussion and literature review. ICCT Research Paper. http://www.icct.nl/app/uploads/download/file/ ICCT-Schmid-Radicalisation-De-Radicalisation-Counter-Radicalisation-March-2013.pdf Taggart, P. (2000). Populism. Open University Press. Waisbord, S. (2018). The elective affinity between post-truth communication and populist politics. Communication Research and Practice, 4(1), 17–34. https://doi.org/10.1080/22041451.2018. 1428928 Waqas, A., Salminen, J., Jung, S., Almerekhi, H., & Jansen, B. (2019). Mapping online hate: A scientometric analysis on research trends and hotspots in research on online hate. PLoS One, 14(9), e0222194. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0222194 Wilders, G. [@geertwilderspvv]. (2019a, November 27). I think that all cats should be allowed to be outside whenever they want to, if we make sure that these crazy fake and pseudo scientists [Tweet]. Twitter. https://twitter.com/geertwilderspvv/status/1199630400223617024 (in Dutch). Wilders, G. [@geertwilderspvv]. (2019b, November 29). If we want to preserve our culture we should stop the mass-immigration and free our country from the violent ideology Islam! .[Tweet]. Twitter. https://twitter.com/geertwilderspvv/status/1200417153092112384 (in Dutch).

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Wilders, G. [@geertwilderspvv]. (2019c, December 16). Excellent news! Now quickly extradite him and lock him up for life, if it is not possible to have him quartered [Tweet]. Twitter. https://twi tter.com/geertwilderspvv/status/1206607304440897537 (in Dutch). Wilders, G. [@geertwilderspvv]. (2020a, January 7). Such a bunch of scared cowards, all of these Dutch newspaper editors. If they would really stand for freedom of speech [Tweet]. Twitter. https://twitter.com/geertwilderspvv/status/1214466231203442689 (in Dutch). Wilders, G. [@geertwilderspvv]. (2020b, February 10). Horrific scumbags! For how much longer do we have to allow this? Make the PVV big in 2021 and we will clear our streets [Tweet]. Twitter. https://twitter.com/geertwilderspvv/status/1226887731323842561 (in Dutch). Wilders, G. [@geertwilderspvv]. (2020c, July 23). We are going to happily kick out the entire @NOS and the rest of the public broadcasters if we get the chance r [Tweet]. Twitter. https://twitter. com/geertwilderspvv/status/1286320734890086405 (in Dutch). Wilders, G. [@geertwilderspvv]. (2020d, August 13). Finally chase down the Moroccan scumbags on the street instead of the PVV! Losers from @Het_OM [Tweet]. Twitter. https://twitter.com/ geertwilderspvv/status/1299392008411324417 (in Dutch). Wilders, G. [@geertwilderspvv]. (2020e, September 17). Ten years of Rutte has resulted in 110.000 social houses being given to fortune seekers. And our own people were placed on a waiting list [Tweet]. Twitter. https://twitter.com/geertwilderspvv/status/1306602786927206401 (in Dutch). Wilders, G. [@geertwilderspvv]. (2020f, November 4). What if some other Chinese fool puts another bat in a wok? This will cause another major health crisis [Tweet]. Twitter. https://twitter.com/ geertwilderspvv/status/1324019247052427266 (in Dutch). Wilders, G. [@geertwilderspvv]. (2020g, November 19). These bone lazy members of the VVD are just like the elite D66 members of parliament, spending the entire day at home in their bed for 6000 euros after taxes watching Netflix [Tweet]. Twitter. https://twitter.com/geertwilderspvv/ status/1329523989358710784 (in Dutch). Wilders, G. [@geertwilderspvv]. (2020h, December 22). I already said this in September to @MinPres, the rule of law is completely bankrupt. Rutte is only protecting his political friends [Tweet]. Twitter. https://twitter.com/geertwilderspvv/status/1341285617876017157 (in Dutch).

Michael Hameleers is Assistant Professor in Political Communication at the Amsterdam School of Communication Research (ASCoR), Amsterdam, The Netherlands. His research focuses on the intersections between populism and the media. Specifically, his research aims to provide in-depth insights into the presence, prominence, and effects of populist blame attribution in the media. In the midst of the global rise of populist parties, this research agenda aims to offer new insights into the role of the media in the persuasiveness and electoral success of populism.

Chapter 5

The Sharp-Tongued Loudmouth: Incivility and Debasement in Brazil’s President Jair Bolsonaro’s YouTube Livestreams Gustavo Venturelli , Eduardo Ryô Tamaki , and Matheus Gomes Mendonça Ferreira Abstract This chapter focuses on debasement language in contemporary Brazilian political communication, analyzing Jair Bolsonaro’s YouTube livestreams from 2019 to 2020. We understand debasement language as a discourse aiming to demean, degrade, or discredit a specific target, such as individuals, social groups, and personnel within political institutions. To assess and measure debasement language in Bolsonaro’s livestreams, we apply content analysis that codes its elements. Findings indicate that debasement discourse is essential to his messages throughout 2019 and 2020. Bolsonaro’s derogatory language addresses two main targets: left-wingers and the media. Using name-calling and insulting language, Bolsonaro attacks political parties, politicians, outlet groups, and journalists, among other subjects. Bolsonaro’s interactions (often with the Brazilian press and mainstream media) are also subject to misinformation. While the topics of his interactions with the media vary, he usually attacks media groups and journalists when he disagrees with something they published or said, especially when he is the target of criticism.

G. Venturelli Department of Political Science, University of São Paulo, São Paulo, Brazil e-mail: [email protected] E. R. Tamaki (B) German Institute for Global and Area Studies, Hamburg and Willy Brandt School of Public Policy, University of Erfurt, Erfurt, Germany e-mail: [email protected] M. G. M. Ferreira Graduate Program, Federal University of Minas Gerais, Minas Gerais, Brazil e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 O. Feldman (ed.), Debasing Political Rhetoric, The Language of Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-0894-3_5

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5.1 Introduction Political communication should be carried out respectfully and decorously (Downs, 1957; Habermas, 1996). Politicians should follow the explicit and implicit rules of civility, respecting other politicians, judges, civil society, their supporters, adversaries, and the media. While impoliteness and incivility theories have expressed concern about inappropriate language and actions in political communication (Stryker et al., 2016; Wodak et al., 2020), heretofore no efforts have been made to examine these phenomena from the standpoint of debasement language. Therefore, this chapter applies the concept of debasement language in Jair Bolsonaro’s YouTube livestreams. Debasement language has a narrow definition and is built on three elements. Following Feldman (2023), we define debasement language as discourse aiming to demean, degrade, or discredit a specific target, such as individuals, and social groups. Often debasement language occurs when one uses derogatory language through rhetorical mechanisms such as mockery, derision, irony, insult, and sarcasm. These rude attacks are aimed at disqualifying, devaluing, delegitimizing, and rendering the target unworthy. Debasement discourse usually attacks the target’s characteristics, such as race, religion, age, and gender, but also can relate to their attitudes, policies, ideology, strategies, and views. As Feldman (2023) suggests, there are three dimensions of debasement language: (1) insulting language, (2) name-calling, and (3) character assassination. Insulting language refers to using offensive words toward the target’s behaviors, attitudes, policies, strategies, intentions, orientations, and views. Any insulting or disparaging rhetoric used to allude to, or in connection with, a specific target constitutes name-calling. Examples of name-calling are attacks that aim to make the target look clumsy, incapable, silly, weird, dishonest, corrupt, betraying, and menacing. To curse and swear at someone or some group and dehumanize them is also name-calling. Finally, character assassination refers to endeavors to destroy the target’s reputation based on their qualities or conduct rather than their viewpoints. Therefore, according to this definition and looking for these attributes, we shall show how Brazilian institutions deal with the issue of debasement language in politics, contextualize the 2018 Brazilian election, and explain why we believe Bolsonaro is an interesting case study. In Brazil, there are laws to guarantee parliamentary decorum; a similar law applies to the president, who cannot “behave in a manner incompatible with the dignity, honor, and decorum of the office” [proceder de modo incompatível com a dignidade, honra e decoro do cargo] (Law n. 1.079, 1950). However, specialized literature has shown debasement language to have been normalized in politicians’ addresses (Stryker et al., 2016; Wodak et al., 2020), being more prominent among far-right populist leaders (Krzy˙zanowski, 2020; Montgomery, 2017). Although the use of more aggressive language is, to some extent, acceptable in everyday relationships, politically it is still seen as a lack of decorum. Furthermore, the social imaginary of masculinity incorporates this performance of aggressive

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speech. For instance, Ciro Gomes, a then-presidential candidate in 2022, justified his truculent (aggressive) attitudes towards his opponents as typical behavior of northeastern people—where he comes from—who have, in the candidate’s words, a “wordy culture” [cultura palavrosa, in Portuguese]. Since Bolsonaro emerged years ago as a political force, debasement language became a usual occurrence in his speeches, mainly as a criticism of politically correct language. It works as a means by which Bolsonaro presents himself as more relatable to his followers, as a regular man who shows his masculinity in a way that appeals to his supporters. Jair Bolsonaro came to power after years of economic crisis and political scandals in Brazil, especially those related to the Workers’ Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores) and corruption accusations made by Operation Car Wash (Operação Lava Jato) (Hunter & Power, 2019). That general scenario discredited the traditional parties and undermined belief in democratic institutions. Bolsonaro portrayed himself as the outsider, the common man who could save Brazil. Throughout his campaign, he utilized slang and sometimes offensive language. It appears that such street talk served as a means to bring him closer to the people. Before exposing his rudeness and incivility as a congressman, it is vital to clarify the circumstances behind Bolsonaro’s election. The 2018 elections in Brazil interrupted the historical competition pattern between the Workers’ Party and the Brazilian Social Democracy Party (Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira), the two parties that have elected presidents from 1994 to 2014. In 2018, the Workers’ Party had Jair Bolsonaro, running for the Liberal Social Party (Partido Social Liberal) as its primary opponent, a candidate with seven terms in the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies. With scarce campaign financial resources and limited TV and radio time, Bolsonaro exploited social media very well, creating an image of an authentic, spontaneous, and original leader. Criticizing what he took as “political correctness,” his populist rhetoric garnered supporters who disregarded politeness and civility regarding political adversaries and social groups, such as women, LGBTQIA +, and black and indigenous people. Bolsonaro used verbal violence as a communication tool throughout his 2018 campaign, and incidents of rudeness were frequent. At a rally in Acre, in the north of Brazil, Bolsonaro referred to Workers’ Party partisans as scoundrels and stated, “Let’s machine-gun the petralhada” [vamos metralhar a petralhada1 ] (O Globo, 2018). Bolsonaro portrayed his political rivals as enemies who needed to be destroyed rather than mere competitors in a political struggle. However, his rudeness had started back in his early years in Congress, providing evidence that institutional constraints (e.g., law) do not necessarily affect one’s behavior. In 2003, as a congressman, Jair Bolsonaro said to congresswoman Maria do Rosário that he would never rape her because she did not deserve it. He tried to justify this by saying he would not rape her “because she is too ugly” [porque ela é muito feia] (STJ Notícias, 2017). That was not his only misogynist comment, for he also said women have lower incomes because they get pregnant (Foster, 2014). In 1

Reference to PT affiliates, a wordplay with the words “Metralha” from the Brazilian Portuguese translation of the Beagle Boys (mobsters) + Petista (member of PT).

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2018, when a journalist from Folha de São Paulo tried to get information to release “a scoop” [furo], Bolsonaro said she would like to “give her furo” [dar o furo] (there is a double entendre here, meaning that she was trying to have anal sex with her informer) (Isto é, 2020). When asked by Playboy magazine how he would deal with a potential gay son, he said he would prefer him to die in an accident rather than come home with a mustached guy (Terra, 2011). Three years later, Bolsonaro said most gays are a consequence of taking drugs (Martín, 2014). His lack of politeness and sensibility goes further. In 2016, he repeated what he had already said: “The mistake of the Brazilian dictatorship was torturing instead of killing” [erro da ditadura foi torturar e não matar] (Revista Fórum, 2016). During the pandemic, he made several atrocious statements. When a journalist told him about the number of dead people on a specific day, he replied, “So what? What do you want me to do?” [E daí? Quer que eu faça o que?] (Tajra, 2020). He offered other disrespectful comments e.g., “I am not a gravedigger” [eu não sou coveiro], and banalized deaths saying that “everyone is going to die eventually” [todos nós vamos morrer um dia] (Tajra, 2020). When Brazil set a new record for Corona deaths, he asked, “Cut the whining and stop being namby-pamby! For how long are you going to cry?” [chega de frescura e mimimi, vão chorar até quando?] (Toledo & Cici, 2021). Throughout his term, he continuously attacked the electoral system, alleging that he won the 2018 election in the first round (Dias, 2020) and that the results of the 2022 election would only be accepted if the Electoral Court held free and clean elections, implying that the process was already rigged (Pombo et al., 2022). Bolsonaro’s unmannered logorrhea runs the gamut from interpersonal relations with his peers and specific journalists to attacks on institutions and social groups. Thus, this chapter asks whether Bolsonaro’s use of debasement language continued after his term began. To do so, we focus on two aspects that recent studies have emphasized (Ekström & Johansson, 2019; Wodak et al., 2020). First, the advent of social media enables political leaders to communicate directly with their audiences without mediation. Second, the emergence of politicians whose bad manners function as a form of appealing to the people, making themselves more attractive and potentially more look-alike, ordinary men. This chapter applies the notion of debasement language to Bolsonaro’s weekly YouTube livestreams. Why YouTube livestreams? Aiming to circumvent the traditional media’s political correctness, Bolsonaro uses social media to speak directly to his supporters within a space where he rules with no formal constraints beyond the website’s terms and conditions of usage. Nonetheless, one should expect decorum, respect, and polite language from a public figure who occupies the highest position in Brazilian politics. Since debasement language has been a neglected topic in political communication, there is no blueprint for identifying and assessing it in different research subjects. Considering the elements suggested above as forms of debasement language, we identified when this type of language is used by Bolsonaro, who his targets are, and what categories are most frequently used. The findings show that Bolsonaro’s debasement language in his livestreams is mainly expressed as insults and making fun, especially in his relationship with the

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press, political adversaries, and social groups. Another aspect is using misinformation to demean his opponents and the media. We then offer some conclusions on why we believe he behaves like that and its possible consequences. What follows is divided into three parts. The next section presents our sources and procedures. Findings are discussed after that, and finally, the conclusion highlights concern regarding Bolsonaro’s final two years in office and whether his debasement language actually threatens Brazilian democracy.

5.2 Methodology There are numerous techniques for classifying texts, speeches, papers, etc., in the social sciences. We opted to use content analysis, a method enabling one to make inferences from different types of sources. Following Feldman’s (2023) debasement language definition, we looked for three elements through which one could debase others: insulting language, name-calling, and character assassination. Our sources are Jair Bolsonaro’s YouTube livestreams. We picked the third one each month from 2019 to 2020. The choice underlying grading and analyzing Bolsonaro’s livestreams was due to Bolsonaro having used his YouTube channel to communicate directly to the public since he began his term. They are usually issueoriented and look like an accountability space where he presents the previous week’s main topics and then comments on matters he thinks worthy. His YouTube livestreams also work as an alternative source of information, with Bolsonaro presenting his official social media channels as the only legitimate source. He not only mentions things he believes should be reported to his audience but often reacts to things said about him by the media or opponents, arguing (by himself, without any adversarial interaction) and mocking what others said. Guests are also present some weeks, but we do not consider what they say. Our focus is only on Bolsonaro’s words. Assessing debasement language on YouTube livestreams might be tricky for two reasons. First, although concepts like impoliteness and incivility are often evaluated according to the receiver’s reactions to the messages, the same is not the case for debasement language. In this sense, it is noteworthy that although Bolsonaro has an audience in his livestreams (and they comment while he speaks), these are often his primary supporters, and therefore do not reflect the average citizen’s perception. Second, the speaker is not subject to contextual constraints, as is the case in parliamentary debates, interviews, or electoral debates, among others. That said, our strategy is to follow a normative definition of debasement language within a specific context and identify the concept’s attributes in Bolsonaro’s livestream speeches. Beyond our conceptual orientation, we have two more documents to rely on. First, the Brazilian Federal Law n. 1.079, April 10th, 1950, defines the crimes of responsibility, regulates the respective trial process, and states the duties and obligations of the president in terms of decorum, honor, and dignity of the office. Even though presidents do not necessarily follow this formal document (this law does not imply sanctions and punishment), it is a declarative law, so that they should abide by it.

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There are also community policies for YouTube. Social media sites work on moderating their content for a safe and wholesome environment for their consumers (Kurdi et al., 2021). These contents are typically moderated using algorithms and human analysis to delete or censor unacceptable content. The community guidelines are designed to serve as a foundational standard to shield users from threats, hate speech, offenses, and other forms of violence. YouTube addresses issues like hate, harassment, and misinformation among these rules. It is crucial to emphasize that YouTube’s policy aims to create a space where “heated debates and strong exchanges of ideas” can occur. In this way, the platform supports the abovementioned beliefs, understanding that heated arguments are not always accompanied by debasement. So how does one decide if something should be taken as debasement language, or not? As our definition relates to using rhetorical devices to demean, degrade, or discredit a particular target, we looked for this type of oratory in Bolsonaro’s livestreams—following a definition that offers a short list of elements enabling us to assess debasement language as a latent concept, further operationalizing them as variables. Therefore, we dichotomously coded each element (insulting language, name-calling, and character assassination) for each livestream. We understand debasement language as a radial concept, which means that if at least one instance of the concept (name-calling, insulting language, or character assassination) is detected, the entire communication is coded as such. In other words, even if isolated, one defined element was sufficient to code a livestream as containing debasement discourse. Two coders analyzed each livestream to avoid a high level of subjectivity. Eventually, we computed and compared the proportion of each attribute in our dataset. Since we are dealing with videos, each livestream was considered as one observation because it would be arbitrary to divide them into paragraphs or sentences. For the entire dataset, we were not interested in the frequency or intensity of debasement language in each video but rather its presence. Finally, we calculated the intercoder reliability through Krippendorff’s alpha that ensures the results are not random but based on the mutual understanding of the concept (Krippendorff, 2004). For social science, a score of 0.80 is enough for drawing reliable conclusions, and we achieved 0.76. As Krippendorff (2004, p. 241) suggested, one should consider “variables with reliabilities between a = 0.667 and a = 0.800 only for drawing tentative conclusions.” Thus, the reader should regard the following analysis in this fashion.

5.3 Findings and Discussion The interaction between Bolsonaro and traditional media organizations is consistently the most critical aspect in these broadcasts. He consistently bemoans how these publications portray him as an authoritarian, attribute specific problems to him, and mischaracterize him, but he goes even further than that. He criticizes and disdains media professionals while discrediting the material they published through a spate of falsehoods and unfounded assertions that ultimately misinform Brazilian

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citizens. In his own eyes, Bolsonaro fights for the truth against those organizations that had monopolized information before the rise of social media. Let us unpack the findings. First, 73% (16 out of 22) of YouTube live streams involve some demeaning behavior or speech. Bolsonaro engages in insulting language, evident in 36.4% of his livestream videos, and name-calling, the most common disparaging conduct, appearing in 54.5% of our dataset. Insulting language and name-calling appear through insults, making fun of, curses, irony, sarcasm, mockery, etc. Character assassination, as defined in this book, is absent in Bolsonaro’s livestreams. The following discussion explores Bolsonaro’s debasement language relating to the defining elements with the main targets and topics. Jair Bolsonaro’s debasement communication is nothing new in his career as he had many instances of rudeness, as mentioned above. However, given that his position as president not only called for decorum and civility but also put him in the spotlight, our central research question is whether he continued to act impolitely as president. As already mentioned in general terms, Bolsonaro did employ debasement language in livestreams. We will now analyze these occurrences in greater detail.

5.3.1 Name-Calling Name-calling is Bolsonaro’s most common type of demeaning. On December 17, 2020, he also avoided naming a Senator, saying to an assessor, “do not name this crap, this São Paulo’s Senator who had deceived me” [não fala o nome dessa porcaria de senador, esse senador de São Paulo que me enganou] (Bolsonaro, 2020e). Here Bolsonaro cursed the Senator, calling him crap, but also labeled him a traitor who had deceived him. Bolsonaro often used the suffix “-alha,” which was also a pattern in his livestreaming when he named left-wingers “esquerdalha,” a pejorative way to refer to partisans from the opposite side of the ideological spectrum. As mentioned, Bolsonaro’s problematic relationship with the media forms the core of his streaming attacks, usually referring to these groups as liars who spread fake news against Bolsonaro’s administration. Nonetheless, there are also aggressions targeting specifically named journalists. These can appear subtly or indirectly, as in March 2020 when Bolsonaro sarcastically mentioned how a journalist published a piece and indirectly called her stupid. He attacked Miriam Leitão whom he sarcastically called a press genius, “a genius with the J, to be clear” [gênio com J, para não ter dúvida]2 (Bolsonaro, 2020b), while grinning in a combination of making fun of and insulting her through irony. In December 2019 he said: “Some little fat woman from São Paulo is meanly criticizing me, ok?” [maldosamente, tem uma gordinha do estado de São Paulo que tá me criticando. Um gordinha, tá certo?] (Bolsonaro, 2019). A year later, Bolsonaro attacked another journalist by saying, “You who like to criticize, who is a brat, and 2

In the Brazilian context, when you call someone a “genius with a J” you are implying the opposite; that this person is actually “dumb,” “stupid,” and/or “ignorant.”

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who likes to criticize everything, oh brat […]” [você que gosta de criticar, que é um fedelho, e gosta de criticar tudo, o fedelho […]], before getting more disrespectful and asking his critic: “Did you get it, you internet parrot? Idiot! Did you get it, asshole?” [explicou (sic), o papagaio de internet? Idiota! Entendeu, imbecil?] (Bolsonaro, 2020e). In this same livestream from December 2020, he attacked another journalist, asking someone: “The journalist Anselmo Góis was fired? Oh, did they cut his pay? He is going to write fewer lies. Instead of thirty lies a week, it will be only twenty” [o jornalista Anselmo Góis foi demitido da Globo? Ah, reduziu o salário? Vai escrever menos mentiras. Em vez de trinta notas de mentira por semana vai ter só vinte] (Bolsonaro, 2020e). During the COVID-19 pandemic, Bolsonaro’s relationship with supranational institutions such as the World Health Organization (WHO) was also disturbing. He spread uncountable lies regarding vaccines, recommended hydroxychloroquine for treating the illness, and criticized non-pharmacological interventions such as wearing masks, lockdowns, and social distancing measures. In October 2020, Bolsonaro showed a newspaper headline that contradicted recommendations by Tedros Adhanom and the WHO, using mockery and irony. He argued that the WHO was stating things he had said months before and subtly calling Adhanom incompetent, implying that he should be in Adhanom’s position at WHO (Bolsonaro, 2020c). Another case is the livestream from November 2020. Bolsonaro combined three ways of demeaning social groups and social movements. Although he used indirect means to debase his targets, it is clear how Bolsonaro labeled them. First, he attacked the Landless Workers’ Movement (Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra, MST ) by saying, “we are freeing the landless from the yoke of the MST. The number of land invasions by the MST is decreasing” [nós estamos libertando o sem-terra do julgo no MST. Vocês podem ver que diminuiu o número de invasões de terra pelo MST ] (Bolsonaro, 2020d). While the practices of this social movement are usually related to occupying non-productive lands, Bolsonaro implied that they steal land. By doing so, Bolsonaro disqualified and criminalized a social movement that historically fought for land reform. Moreover, Bolsonaro also used insulting language when labeling them as land invaders, thereby attacking their methods and strategies. Finally, there is also name-calling once they are depicted as a threat. The second example of overlap regards indigenous people. Bolsonaro complained and discredited news on the Brazilian Amazon deforestation, saying: “I guess that there are places, for instance, where Indians exchange a wood log for a Coke can or a beer” [eu acho que existe alguns locais onde o índio, por exemplo, troca uma tora por uma coca-cola ou cerveja] (Bolsonaro, 2020d), implying that they are corrupt. Furthermore, as in the previous example, Bolsonaro used insulting language beyond name-calling because he suggested corruption based on behavior, attacking indigenous people’s reputations by labeling them as corrupt. Then, when criticized by the media, NGOs, and foreign countries for his mismanagement of environmental issues, Bolsonaro transferred responsibility to other social actors and took advantage of the opportunity to arouse hostility towards indigenous people.

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Indigenous people are also targeted when Bolsonaro commented on a soccer competition between Guarani and Palmeiras. The former club has an indigenous name; the latter is Bolsonaro’s team. He said that he would support Palmeiras since he is a fan and apologized to the “bugrada,” referring to Guarani supporters (Bolsonaro, 2020a). However, it is a word derived from bugre, which is a very pejorative way to refer to indigenous people—thereby again demeaning and disrespecting indigenous people with name-calling.

5.3.2 Insulting Language Insulting language was used to attack several targets in Bolsonaro’s broadcasts. On two occasions, Bolsonaro made offensive comments toward LGBTQIA+ eople. When talking with his Fishery Secretary, Jorge Seif, Bolsonaro asked him if he ate fish or only mermaids, implying a sexual orientation issue and making fun and laughing while also insulting and disrespectfully mentioning the social group (Bolsonaro, 2020a). In another livestream, Onyx Lorenzoni—at the time Minister of Citizenship—was the guest; Bolsonaro asked him how many years he spent in the Chamber of Deputies. When Lorenzoni answered it was twenty-four years, Bolsonaro ironically commented while laughing, “good number, right?” [bom número, né?] (Bolsonaro, 2020a), because in Brazilian culture, the number twenty-four is associated with gay people.3 Although linguistically these are not offensive words, within the Brazilian semantic context and culture they are very disrespectful comments that demean a social group because of their orientations, attitudes, and behaviors. In another situation, Bolsonaro complained about how some outlets portrayed him by saying he supported a black candidate running for Congress in 2018 to pretend he was not a racist. His response: “Hey, idiots, assholes, am I going to give the guy a term if I do not like him?” [o, imbecil, o idiota, eu vou dar um mandato para um cara que eu não gosto?] (Bolsonaro, 2020e). Even though this example is borderline name-calling, one can view it as insulting language because it is based on these outlets’ professionals’ views, behaviors, and, potentially, their intentions. In February 2020, when discussing a conflict situation, Bolsonaro touched human rights issues and insulted people for their working practices such as requests for peace and employing symbolic gestures such as releasing white pigeons on the beach, placing crosses in the sand, and symbolically hugging monuments. Bolsonaro aggressively addressed these people by saying: If we are in an urban war, we have to send people there to solve the problem. We cannot be judged by peace laws when the war is over. Those assholes releasing white pigeons on Rodrigo de Freitas lagoon, placing little crosses on Copacabana beach, and hugging any monument, believe that thugs will care. They will laugh at you, assholes

3

In Brazil, the derogatory term “veado,” which means “deer,” refers to gay men. Brazilians can wager on animals in an illegal gambling game where the deer represents the number 24 in this game.

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G. Venturelli et al. [se estamos em guerra urbana, nós temos que mandar gente para lá para resolver esse problema. E acabou a guerra, não pode depois, sermos julgados por leis da paz. Onde aqueles otários ficam soltando pombinhas na lagoa rodrigo de Freitas, botando cruzinha na praia de Copacabana, abraçando um monumento qualquer achando que um vagabundo vai se importar. Ele só vai morrer de rir de vocês, desses otários aí ]. (Bolsonaro, 2020a)

Bolsonaro has historically repeated the idea that “a good hoodlum is a dead hoodlum,” so when it comes to public safety issues, he has always emphatically espoused passionate positions. In this case, he not only dehumanized alleged criminals but also attacked people and NGOs that protested against violence inflicted against particular communities by gangs and the state. He called these people “assholes” (name-calling) because of their behavior, intentions, strategies, and views (insulting language). Again, name-calling and insulting language overlap.

5.4 Discussion and Conclusion This chapter approached Bolsonaro’s YouTube livestreams between 2019 and 2020 from the perspective of debasement language. We aimed to answer whether Bolsonaro’s well-known rudeness devolved into debasement in his communications after becoming the 38th Brazilian president. We found that Bolsonaro’s debasement language became a significant part of his transmissions through YouTube livestream videos. Bolsonaro’s debasing language focused on two main targets: left-wingers and media professionals. Using name-calling and insulting language, Bolsonaro attacked political parties, politicians, outlet groups, and journalists, among other subjects. Based on the livestreams we examined, Bolsonaro’s interactions with the press were full of misinformation. Even though no character assassination was found, he frequently attacked opponents through accusations of faking news, lying, and misleading. While the topics of his interactions with the media vary, there is a pattern regarding the timing of his attacks. They happened when he disagreed with something they published or said, especially when he was the target of their criticism. As a response, he created counter-facts to dispute the truth and demoralize, disqualify, and delegitimize these actors. In doing so, Bolsonaro’s livestreams were full of name-calling and insulting language. Nevertheless, the concept of “debasement language” has limitations. An example is the common overlap of name-calling and insulting language in Bolsonaro’s speeches. Using name-calling to demean others usually goes along with insulting language, whereas the opposite is not always the case. Thus, these elements pertain to a grey zone of the concept, where it is difficult to establish if a behavior or speech is one or another. Further research should consider these theoretical implications to facilitate the concept’s operationalization. There are other limitations that should be taken into consideration. First, debasement language is a new approach to a specific type of communication that aims to demean others. Hence, it is difficult to establish a “dialogue” with the present state

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of the research literature without analytically comparing the concept to related, but less severe, notions such as impoliteness and incivility. Another issue is that debasement language is also culturally located. It is hard to compare countries; what might be considered debasement language in Brazil can have a different meaning in India, and vice-versa. Also, there might be different understandings of derogatory language among people living in the same country and culture. Hence, there is a considerable level of subjectivity when coding. Defining it as we have done and listing the variables with clear descriptions of what they mean is a valid approach to avoid the subjectivity issue by way of a normative guideline. Furthermore, we draw our analysis upon twenty-two livestreams that could be considered problematic as a small sample. However, we applied a clear standard throughout the selection, picking the third YouTube livestream of each month from 2019 to 2020. Nonetheless, it is worth mentioning some differences one might find if applying the same strategy for the last two years of Bolsonaro’s term. The most concerning aspect of Bolsonaro’s 2021 and 2022 livestreams is that his attacks on democracy intensified. The mismanagement of the pandemic, the decrease in Bolsonaro’s approval rating, and the inflation Brazil faced in these last two years forced Bolsonaro to cope with potential electoral defeat in 2022 (that did occur). Dealing with this challenge, Bolsonaro continuously discredited the electoral process, arguing that the Brazilian electronic machine vote system is vulnerable and easily rigged. A piece by Piauí has shown that 31 out of 87 livestreams between 2021 and 2022 included attacks against the Superior Electoral Court (TSE - Tribunal Superior Eleitoral), as plotting against his reelection, favoring his primary opponent, Lula da Silva (Revista Piaui, 2022). Bolsonaro insistently asked the TSE to hold clean and transparent elections and suggested using print ballots instead of electronic machines. However, Bolsonaro has never shown evidence of fraud regarding Brazilian electoral methods. In contrast, a study (Figueiredo Filho et al., 2022) using methods to determine whether fraud happened found no irregularities or fraud in the 2018 Brazilian elections, which Bolsonaro claims he would have won in the first round. Whether Bolsonaro used debasement language or not over the last two years of his Presidency demands empirical analysis, but it is likely that he did so, for two reasons: (1) The pattern we noticed in his YouTube livestreams throughout his first two years in office; (2) Looking at only his interactions with the TSE and the election process, it is clear that he engaged in debasement language against the organization and its members: in his September 28, 2022 livestream, Bolsonaro attacked the Minister of the Superior Electoral Court (TSE) and of the Supreme Court (STF), Alexandre de Moraes, daring him to “be a man for once in his life” [seja homem uma vez na vida], and also calling him a “scoundrel” [patife], and “brat” [moleque] (Bolsonaro, 2022). What we have seen in the livestreams analyzed throughout this chapter does not directly threaten democracy. Even though episodes of undermining democratic values and traditions took place, no explicit threats of upending democracy or disrupting institutions were voiced. Nonetheless, words matter. Bolsonaro continuously discredited the electoral process and the electronic machine votes during his term. A few days after Lula da Silva’s inauguration, a mob of Bolsonaro supporters

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stormed Brasilia’s executive, legislative, and judiciary buildings, mirroring the Capitol event in the United States on January 6th, 2021. They did this after weeks of camping outside army headquarters, claiming stolen elections and calling for a coup d’état. Despite the lack of facts to show a causal link between Bolsonaro’s words and his supporters’ riot, it is reasonable to intuitively conclude that Bolsonaro fueled his devotees, particularly the zealots, with conspiracy theories and fake news. According to the literature, Bolsonaro has utilized fake news or conspiracy theories for various purposes, including spreading misinformation about COVID-19 (Kalil et al., 2021) and assaulting the media (Amorim, 2021; Burni & Tamaki, 2021). Furthermore, “popular expectations” remain that he benefited from circulating fake news during the 2018 elections (Rennó, 2020, p. 12). Another aspect that needs further clarification is tactics such as expressing vague and ambiguous statements that make it difficult for the coder to categorize speeches. By making contradictory statements that can easily be interpreted to deny what he just said, Bolsonaro can shield himself from potential accusations. Even though it is hard to quantify the degree to which the normalization of these actions and statements endangers democracy, it is possible to assert that the public sphere and political communication, in general, have turned into hostile environments where discussion and exchange of ideas have become more difficult.

References Amorim, A. P. (2021). The press in the Bolsonaro government under attacks on freedom of expression. In L. Avritzer, F. Kerche, & M. Marona (Eds.), The Bolsonaro government: Democratic backlash and political degradation (pp. 467–480). Autêntica. (in Portuguese). Bolsonaro, J. (2019, December 19). Weekly live with President Jair Bolsonaro. https://www.you tube.com/watch?v=Ir_9nkwjZfk. (in Portuguese). Bolsonaro, J. (2020a, February 20). Weekly live with President Jair Bolsonaro. https://www.you tube.com/watch?v=eJD7C8e1oN0. (in Portuguese). Bolsonaro, J. (2020b, March 19). Weekly live with President Jair Bolsonaro. https://www.youtube. com/watch?v=hH0JhakIwf0. (in Portuguese). Bolsonaro, J. (2020c, October 15). Weekly live with President Jair Bolsonaro. https://www.you tube.com/watch?v=DUxALENSYSc. (in Portuguese). Bolsonaro, J. (2020d, November 19). Weekly live with President Jair Bolsonaro. https://www.you tube.com/watch?v=nkdMo9XQ-YM&t=1s. (in Portuguese). Bolsonaro, J. (2020e, December 17). Weekly live with President Jair Bolsonaro. https://www.you tube.com/watch?v=zNVRld3flao&t=2s. (in Portuguese). Bolsonaro, J. (2022, September 29). Weekly live with President Jair Bolsonaro. https://www.you tube.com/watch?v=Gpf9DihVKs8&ab_channel=SabinadaBrasil. (in Portuguese). Burni, A., & Tamaki, E. (2021). Populist communication during the Covid-19 pandemic: The case of Brazil’s President Bolsonaro. Partecipazione e Conflitto, 14(1), 113–131. http://sibaese.unisal ento.it/index.php/paco/article/view/24018/20008 Dias, M. (2020, March 9). Without presenting evidence, Bolsonaro says there was electoral fraud and that he was elected in the 1st round. Folha de São Paulo. https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/ poder/2020/03/sem-apresentar-provas-bolsonaro-diz-que-houve-fraude-eleitoral-e-que-foi-ele ito-no-1o-turno.shtml (in Portuguese).

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Downs, A. (1957). An economic theory of democracy. Harper and Row. Ekström, M., & Johansson, B. (2019). Talk Scandals: The power of mediated talks. In H. Tumber & S. Waisbord (Eds.), The routledge companion to media and scandal (pp. 183–192). Routledge. Feldman, O. (2023). Assessing the politics of debasement: From impoliteness to demonization in political communication. In O. Feldman (Ed.), Political debasement: Incivility, contempt, and humiliation in parliamentary and public discourse (pp. 1–28). Springer. Figueiredo Filho, D., Silva, L., & Carvalho, E. (2022). The forensics of fraud: Evidence from the 2018 Brazilian presidential election. Forensic Science International: Synergy, 5, 100286. https:// doi.org/10.1016/j.fsisyn.2022.100286 Foster, G. (2014, December 12). Bolsonaro says he does not fear lawsuits and makes a new offense: “She does not deserve to be raped because she is very ugly. GaúchaZH. https://gauchazh.clicrbs. com.br/politica/noticia/2014/12/bolsonaro-diz-que-nao-teme-processos-e-faz-nova-ofensa-naomerece-ser-estuprada-porque-e-muito-feia-cjkf8rj3x00cc01pi3kz6nu2e.html. (in Portuguese). Habermas, J. (1996). Between facts and norms: Contributions to a discourse theory of law and democracy. MIT Press. https://mitpress.mit.edu/9780262581622/between-facts-and-norms/ Hunter, W., & Power, T. J. (2019). Bolsonaro and Brazil’s illiberal backlash. Journal of Democracy, 30(1), 68–82. https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/bolsonaro-and-brazils-illiberalbacklash/ Isto é. (2020, February 18). Bolsonaro offends Folha journalist: “Wanted to give the scoop.” https://istoe.com.br/bolsonaro-ofende-jornalista-patricia-campos-mello-ao-citar-dep oimento-em-cpi/ (in Portuguese). Kalil, I., Silveira, S. C., Pinheiro, W., Kalil, Á., Pereira, J. V., Azarias, W., & Amparo, A. B. (2021). Politics of fear in Brazil: Far-right conspiracy theories on COVID-19. Global Discourse, 11(3), 409–425. https://bristoluniversitypressdigital.com/view/journals/gd/11/3/article-p409.xml Krippendorff, K. (2004). Content analysis: An introduction to its methodology. Sage. https://us.sag epub.com/en-us/nam/content-analysis/book258450 Krzy˙zanowski, M. (2020). Discursive shifts and the normalisation of racism: Imaginaries of immigration, moral panics and the discourse of contemporary right-wing populism. Social Semiotics, 30(4), 503–527. https://doi.org/10.1080/10350330.2020.1766199 Kurdi, M., Albadi, N., & Mishra, S. (2021). “Think before you upload”: An in-depth analysis of unavailable videos on YouTube. Social Network Analysis and Mining, 11(1), 1–21. https://www.springerprofessional.de/en/think-before-you-upload-an-in-depth-analysis-ofunavailable-vide/19187088 Lei Nº 1079, de 10 de Abril de 1950, Brazilian Code § 5 (1950). http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_ 03/leis/l1079.htm Martín, M. (2014, February 14). Gays are not demigods. Most are the result of drug use. El País. https://brasil.elpais.com/brasil/2014/02/14/politica/1392402426_093148.html (in Portuguese). Montgomery, M. (2017). Post-truth politics? Authenticity, populism and the electoral discourses of Donald Trump. Journal of Language and Politics, 16(4), 619–639. https://doi.org/10.1075/jlp. 17023.mon O Globo. (2018, September 3). Campaign confirms video in which Bolsonaro talks about ‘shooting Acre’s petralhada’: ‘It was a joke.‘ https://oglobo.globo.com/politica/campanha-con firma-video-em-que-bolsonaro-fala-em-fuzilar-petralhada-do-acre-foi-brincadeira-23033857 (in Portuguese). Pombo, B., Murakawa, F., & Freitas, C. (2022, August 22). To JN, Bolsonaro says he will respect the result of ‘clean and transparent elections. Valor. https://valor.globo.com/politica/noticia/ 2022/08/22/ao-jn-bolsonaro-diz-que-respeitara-resultado-de-eleicoes-limpas-e-transparentes. ghtml (in Portuguese). Rennó, L. (2020). The Bolsonaro voter: Issue positions and vote choice in the 2018 Brazilian presidential elections. Latin American Politics and Society, 62(4), 1–23. https://doi.org/10.1017/ lap.2020.13

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Revista Fórum. (2016, July 8). Jair Bolsonaro: “Dictatorship’s mistake was to torture and not kill.” https://revistaforum.com.br/politica/2016/7/8/jair-bolsonaro-erro-da-ditadura-foi-torturarno-matar-16711.html. (in Portuguese). Revista Piauí. (2022). The anatomy of a coup speech. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gyBnW2 yhn3E&ab_channel=revistapiau%C3%AD (in Portuguese). STJ Notícias. (2017, August 15). Jair Bolsonaro will have to compensate Congresswoman Maria do Rosário for moral damages. https://www.stj.jus.br/sites/portalp/Paginas/Comunicacao/Not icias-antigas/2017/2017-08-15_18-37Jair-Bolsonaro-tera-de-indenizar-deputada-Maria-do-Ros ario-por-danos-morais.aspx (in Portuguese). Stryker, R., Conway, B. A., & Danielson, J. T. (2016). What is political incivility? Communication Monographs, 83(4), 535–556. https://doi.org/10.1080/03637751.2016.1201207 Tajra, A. (2020, May 1). We are all going to die one day: see Bolsonaro’s lines about the coronavirus. Noticias UOL. https://noticias.uol.com.br/saude/ultimas-noticias/redacao/2020/ 05/01/todos-nos-vamos-morrer-um-dia-as-frases-de-bolsonarodurante-a-pandemia.html (in Portuguese). Terra. (2011, June 8). Bolsonaro says: “I prefer a son killed in an accident to a homosexual.” https://www.terra.com.br/noticias/brasil/bolsonaro-prefiro-filho-morto-em-acidente-aum-homossexual,cf89cc00a90ea310VgnCLD200000bbcceb0aRCRD.html (in Portuguese). Toledo, M., & Cici, L. C. (2021, March 4). ‘No more fuss and whining about it, until when are you going to cry?’ says Bolsonaro on the pandemic. Folha de São Paulo. https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/equilibrioesaude/2021/03/chega-de-frescura-e-mim imi-vao-chorar-ate-quando-diz-bolsonaro-sobre-pandemia.shtml (in Portuguese). Wodak, R. (2015). The politics of fear: What right-wing populist discourses mean. Sage. https:// doi.org/10.4135/9781446270073 Wodak, R. (2019a). Analysing the micropolitics of the populist far right in the ‘post-shame era’. In P. Bevelander & R. Wodak (Eds.), Europe at the crossroads: Confronting populist, nationalist and global challenges (pp. 63–92). Nordic Academic Press. http://www.nordicacademicpress. com/bok/europe-at-the-crossroads/ Wodak, R. (2019b). Entering the ‘post-shame era’: The rise of illiberal democracy, populism and neo-authoritarianism in Europe. Global Discourse, 9(1), 195–213. https://doi.org/10.1332/204 378919X15470487645420 Wodak, R., Culpeper, J., & Semino, E. (2020). Shameless normalisation of impoliteness: Berlusconi’s and Trump’s press conferences. Discourse & Society, 32(3), 369–393. https://doi.org/10. 1177/0957926520977217

Gustavo Venturelli is a Ph.D. candidate in Political Science at the University of São Paulo (USP). His research focuses on populism and its intersections with other concepts, such as nationalism and masculinity. Currently, he is developing his dissertation on Brazilian contemporary populism. He is a member of Team Populism’s Young Scholars Initiative on Populism (OPUS). Eduardo Ryô Tamaki is a Research Fellow at the German Institute for Global and Area Studies (GIGA Hamburg) and a Ph.D. student at the University of Erfurt, Germany. He is also a researcher at the Institute for Latin American Studies (ILAS - GIGA), Willy Brandt School of Public Policy (University of Erfurt), and the Center for Studies on Political Behavior (CECOMP-UFMG), and member of Team Populism (BYU) as well as team leader of Team Populism’s Young Scholars Initiative on Populism (OPUS). Matheus Gomes Mendonça Ferreira is a researcher at the Center for Studies on Political Behavior (CECOMP-UFMG). He received his PhD in Political Science from the Federal University of Minas Gerais (UFMG), Minas Gerais, Brazil. His research focuses on political behavior and public opinion, with an emphasis on religion and electoral behavior.

Part III

Debasement as Strategic Instrument

Chapter 6

The Cuss that Cares? Paternalistic Cussing in Philippine President Rodrigo Roa Duterte’s Rhetoric Ronald A. Pernia

and Rogelio Alicor L. Panao

Abstract This chapter offers an unconventional view of Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte’s rhetoric by contending that his use of abusive language is a symbolic predilection by a president who is fully aware of the political implications of actions and utterances—to preach tough love to protect citizens and maintain law and order. We call this phenomenon paternalistic cussing which serves to reassure a culturally conservative constituency that privileges order, discipline, and social stability. Through a critical reexamination of Duterte’s public pronouncements, we demonstrate that although cussing has become characteristic of his particular brand of speechmaking, it seems to occur more frequently when speaking before economically and politically high-function audiences (e.g., local government officials, law enforcement officers, and overseas Filipinos) whose cooperation and agreement are necessary to legitimize the government’s controversial campaign against illegal drugs. While Duterte’s propensity to swear is intimately akin to a caring parent talking to an unwieldy child to behave in a particular manner, to a great extent this has resonated well with a national political culture that puts a premium on traditional norms of hierarchy, a collectivist mindset, and material values. Ultimately, this chapter provides a more nuanced view of Duterte other than being a vulgar strongman.

R. A. Pernia (B) Political Science Program, College of Social Sciences, University of the Philippines Cebu, Cebu, Philippines e-mail: [email protected] Institute of Political Science, College of Social Sciences, National Sun Yat-sen University, Kaohsiung, Taiwan Institute of Political Science, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan R. A. L. Panao Department of Political Science, College of Social Sciences and Philosophy, University of the Philippines Diliman, Quezon City, Philippines e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 O. Feldman (ed.), Debasing Political Rhetoric, The Language of Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-0894-3_6

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6.1 Introduction There was a time when presidential speech was eloquent and stately. Nowadays, presidents can cuss in public and get away with it. Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte, in particular, is occasionally heard swearing and making threats in his public discourse. Despite it all, the former Davao mayor remains tremendously popular. What explains Duterte’s continuing prominence and public support in spite of his ubiquitous offensive remarks? This question has long caught the attention of pundits whose efforts now make up what some refer to as the “Duterte Studies Industry” (Abinales, 2021). These scholarly ventures take several strands. The more common one includes those who construe the former Davao mayor’s presidency as an episode in democratic deconsolidation akin to what the literature refers to as “regression” (Diamond, 2021), “decoupling” (Ding & Slater, 2021), “backsliding” (Bermeo, 2016), or “third wave autocratization” (Lührmann & Lindberg, 2019). Another strand is characterized by an almost instinctive tendency to designate anything associated with Duterte as either populist or authoritarian. Both share the consensus that Duterte’s offensive spiels are offsetting liberal democratic gains and promote strongman rule in the country. There are also accounts that construe Duterte’s profanities as a “recontextualization and an extension of a long-standing discourse that renders women as servants of men, as political ornaments, and as tributaries of the establishment […] that regards men as the core, the primary source of strength, and the arbiter of good behavior in society” (Navera, 2021, p. 122). This sort of speechmaking, according to one study, contributes “to the maintenance and production […] of transgressive populist rule” (Montiel et al., 2021, p. 2). Along with his provocative remarks, Duterte’s government-sanctioned interviews are also seen as calculated rhetorical strategies that enhance his image or sustain its general appeal that is fundamental to his grip on political power and legacy building (Navera, 2022). Another strand looks at Duterte’s rhetorical provocation as feeding on the country’s patriarchal structure and machismo culture (Montiel et al., 2021; Navera, 2021), reinforcing a brand of politics whose core can be bleakly described as an authoritarian, strongman, foul-mouthed populist, punisher, fascist, and sovereign trickster1 (Bello, 2017; Curato, 2017; McCoy, 2017; Rafael, 2021; Teehankee & Thompson, 2016; Thompson, 2020). While these generally negative ascriptions in extant literature provide a rough baseline of the critical dimension of Duterte’s presidency, they do not represent any empirical and theoretical consensus. These studies are also criticized for, among other things, their penchant to ignore the ‘democratic’ potential within the Duterte administration (see, e.g., Arguelles, 2019; Curato, 2016), their careless resort to populism as a convenient label, and for turning a blind eye to the fact that Duterte’s functional support includes both elites and the masses (Panao & Pernia, 2022). Duterte, in fact, 1

Representing the character of Juan Pusong—a figure in Philippines folk tales “who makes fun of those in power while managing through deceit or humor to gain power himself” (Rafael, 2019, p. 155).

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drew a high level of elite collaboration—particularly those “outsider” local political elites—especially in the implementation of the government’s controversial antidrug policy (Ravanilla et al., 2022). Interestingly, recent scholarship shows how the incorporation of citizens’ latent authoritarian values and political disposition not only helps to explain Duterte’s continuing political popularity amidst the government’s bungled COVID-19 response, but also an important dimension of academic inquiry that sorely misses the broader landscape of populism research in the country (Pernia, 2022a, 2022b). A few studies also construe Duterte’s brand of speechmaking as an important leadership quality that proved crucial in rallying allies and followers. Duterte’s populism conveyed a sense of authenticity and hope to the masses who have long been disillusioned and marginalized in national political life (Arguelles, 2019; Curato, 2016). Duterte’s strategic linguistic devices that deliberately targeted key functional audiences also dispel the myth of a mindless demagogue, suggesting instead a president, “[…] who has a keen understanding of his constituents’ primal preferences— economic well-being and security—and how they can be activated or highlighted by means of a rhetorical strategy that is excessively fixated on crime” (Panao & Pernia, 2022, pp. 90–91). Some might claim that the Machiavellian use of rhetorical devices is veritable proof of democratic reversion. However, it must be pointed out that the proverbial “different strokes for different folks” is a familiar raison d’etre among leaders contending with political survival (De Mesquita et al., 2005). Duterte’s transgressive rhetoric might be more symbolic than anything, meant only to placate concerns that resonate with the public, without necessarily confronting the underlying problem substantively (Oliver & Marion, 2006). After all, it is customary for leaders to engage in symbolic language to appeal to the public in an attempt to inflame emotion or reaction (Marion & Oliver, 2013; Stolz, 1999). Presidential profanity in the case of Duterte is arguably motivated by emotional pandering and has little to do with substantive policy and logical consistency. How it resonates with the public, however, is the greater empirical puzzle. By the media’s account, Duterte has sustained his public approval at very satisfactory levels for most of his term and may even go down as the Philippines’ most popular president (Ranada, 2021). However, one recent study found that Duterte is more likely to relish his speech with anti-crime rhetoric when speaking before politically and economically important audiences (Panao & Pernia, 2022). In other words, far from simply being a “populist,” Duterte is in many respects an astute politician strategically using linguistic barbs to ensure his political durability. Yet, this political tactic is seldom scrutinized in the rapidly expansive scholarship on Duterte. In light of this recent reinterpretation of Duterte’s politics, we hope to add another layer to the ongoing debate. We refine existing theoretical lenses in explaining Duterte’s crass rhetoric (Montiel et al., 2021; Navera, 2021) by building on and going beyond the notion of “impoliteness” (Culpeper, 2011) and “shameless normalisation” (Wodak et al., 2013, 2021) that provides sufficient analytical dynamism in capturing why and how politicians resort to becoming offensive to “appeal to strategic sectors of

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the public” through intentional and strategic provocation and scandalization (Wodak, et al., 2021, pp. 25–26). This chapter contributes to unraveling the nature and context of symbolic speech by looking at Duterte’s evocative utterances. We contend that Duterte’s proclivity for using abusive or threatening talk is a gesture aimed at signaling parental concern toward citizens. We refer to this phenomenon as paternalistic cussing—a symbolic predilection by a president who is fully aware of the political implications of actions and utterances—to preach tough love in order to protect citizens and maintain law and order.2 Before we proceed, some conceptual clarification is in order. Although cussing can include debased language, the purpose of cussing is not necessarily to degrade. Debasement or the use of derogatory language encompasses any disparaging language meant to ridicule or insult a member of a social category (Cervone et al., 2021). Technically, this conceptualization entails no debasement of drug lords and drug dealers because their activity by definition is already debased. Cussing, on the other hand, can denote something positive (Lafreniere et al., 2022), such as a higher degree of authenticity and honesty at the societal level (Feldman et al., 2017). There are accounts in Duterte’s case where cussing is used to cultivate a vernacular identity with the masses and navigate the contending spectrum of political support available to a populist leader (Montiel et al., 2021). As part of symbolic politics, paternalistic cussing resonates with a culturally conservative constituency that privileges order, discipline, and social stability. The blasphemous and debased linguistic invocations, we argue, not only reflect the Filipinos’ collective yearning for political order but also the rhetorician’s sensitivity to the citizens’ cultural and psychological predispositions. Not only is there a conscious attempt to ‘order democracy’ and instigate discipline and punishment to delinquent citizens in Duterte’s public speeches, but it also involves a deliberate effort to shape a narrative of public order as an instinctive filial matter. Specifically, we show that when Duterte engages in his trademark rhetoric: 1. The objects of allusions are typically those he perceives as enemies of the state (e.g., criminal offenders, drug lords, corrupt politicians, etc.) who, in effect, are also enemies of the Filipino family; 2. The audience is comprised of economically and politically significant sectors of society (e.g., local government officials, overseas Filipino workers, etc.) whose support is necessary to implement government’s antidrug policy; 3. The narrative deliberately frames the personal as political, painting the task of ridding the country of criminality as a duty expected of any good father of a family.

2

Although we could have called this parental cussing, we decided instead to use the term paternalistic cussing as it is more theoretically and empirically consistent with prevailing research. Nevertheless, we acknowledge that the latter term can have a gender dimension given that the focus is on a male i.e., Duterte. This, however, is not to cast aside the prospect of having female leaders exhibiting similar cussing behavior—a task that can be explored in future studies.

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The chapter proceeds as follows. We begin with a brief discussion of key theoretical considerations on Duterte as a subject and source of political inquiry. We then introduce the notion of paternalistic cussing and situate it within the ongoing scholarly debate on Duterte and the larger populism research in the Philippines. This is followed by a discussion of the Philippines political and cultural landscape to give context to paternalistic cussing as a conceptual framework. We then demonstrate instances of such rhetorical flourishes in public pronouncements in front of various audiences on many occasions. We discuss how Duterte’s colorful remarks take on a distinctly familial tenor in articulating and defending his controversial anti-drug program. Despite opposition and disaffection, Duterte was able to weather political storms through a peculiar rhetorical posturing that echoes a national political culture placing a premium on traditional norms of hierarchy, a collectivist mindset and material values. Through this, Duterte has constructively harnessed the power of debased language for political ends by an effective and skillful use of rhetoric based on a keen awareness of his people’s cultural psyche.

6.2 Paternalistic Cussing: A Novel Approach for Examining Duterte’s Rhetoric We refer to paternalistic cussing as a linguistic trope incorporating cultural norms such as strong family relations, kinship ties, collectivist mindset, disdain for trouble, and preference for social cohesion delivered strategically to achieve political ends. As a subtype of symbolic politics, it resonates with a culturally conservative constituency that privileges order, discipline, and stability. Paternalistic cussing, therefore, unveils a new form of symbolic political strategy by a president who is not only politically cognizant, but also acts as a parental figure extremely apprehensive about his family. Duterte’s blasphemous and debased linguistic turn, it is argued, may actually mirror the collective embodiment of Filipinos’ psychological impulse for political order and the harmonization of “democratic rule” (Garrido, 2020, 2021; Pernia, 2019, 2021). Duterte’s language is provocative, but it strikes a chord with the public due to its candor and frankness—arguably traits that Filipinos do not normally expect in a national public official. More important, when the president threatens, cusses, and intimidates people, he draws sustenance and legitimacy within the traditional Filipino values of family centeredness and preservation, caring for the young and the weak, and nurturing close ties, (Morillo et al., 2013). In other words, beyond being vulgar his rhetorical style is akin to a parent disciplining or admonishing a child to the extent necessary not just to “bend the young in the right direction” (De la Cruz et al., 2001; Jocano, 1970) but also to prepare them to be future leaders (Alampay, 2014; Alampay & Jocson, 2011; Sanapo & Nakamura, 2011). For collectivist societies like the Philippines, being tough on children, corporal punishment, and verbal dressing down are customary parenting and childrearing practices. As is typical in most Asian cultures, the Filipino family is normally cohesive. Mutual support and filial piety are

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regarded as good (Enriquez, 1994). Children are not supposed to talk back when admonished; they are expected to take care of their parents in their twilight years (De la Cruz et al., 2001). In the plethora of analytical approaches that underpins many Philippine political scholarships, the patron-client framework (PCF) remains predominant (Hollnsteiner, 1963; Kerkvliet, 1995; Lande, 1968; Scott, 1972). PCF is used far and wide to explain not just the dynamics of the country’s oligarchic and dynastic rule but the role of such elite formation in state and nation-building. Due to its ubiquity, it is easy to forget that at the core of patron-clientelism is the family (McCoy, 1994; Rivera, 1994; Simbulan, 2005; Tadem & Tadem, 2016). Political clans and families employ a variety of mechanisms to rise and perpetuate themselves in power—violence, rentseeking behavior, patrimonial plunder, as well as ventures into media and education, among others (Hedman & Sidel, 2005; Hutchcroft, 1998; Hutchcroft & Rocamora, 2003; McCoy, 1993; Pernia, 2017; Sidel, 1997, 1999; Wurfel, 1991). Paternal cussing as a rhetorical device is simply turning an otherwise domestic or private moment into a public spectacle. Instead of being repulsed, Filipinos seem to welcome the candor and authenticity of such language, consistent with literature finding a strong association between swearing and being truthful (Feldman et al., 2017).3

6.3 Paternalistic Cussing Practices in Duterte’s Speeches Although raising a child is a universally shared experience, how parents behave towards their children is mostly contingent on the socio-cultural milieu. As part of the larger Asian cultural landscape of collectivism and hierarchy, Filipino parents’ childrearing attitudes are generally described as authoritarian (Alampay, 2014; Alampay & Jocson, 2011; Morillo et al., 2013). This type of upbringing may help explain why it is typical for members of the household to maintain kinship ties and honor family obligations even years after their emancipation. Like parents, leaders are also charged with guiding, directing, and nurturing those who are weaker, or whose survival depends on them (Popper & Mayseless, 2003). Just as parents are concerned with helping children grow into functioning adults, presidents are also emotionally and morally invested in helping citizens grow and develop as a people (Farrell, 2018). It is no surprise, then, to see the same tone in President Duterte’s public pronouncements. Heralding what would be a defining feature of his term, he said in his inaugural speech: I have seen how illegal drugs destroyed individuals and ruined family relationships. […] I have seen how criminality, by means all foul, snatched from the innocent and the unsuspecting, the years and years of accumulated savings. Years of toil and then, suddenly, they are back to where they started. […] Look at this from that perspective and tell me that I am wrong. […] Love of country, subordination of personal interests to the common good, 3

Although some scholars have voiced opposition to this assumption (de Vries et al., 2018), it has not been fully applied in the context of studying Duterte’s rhetoric.

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concern and care for the helpless and the impoverished—these are among the lost and faded values that we seek to recover and revitalize as we commence our journey towards a better Philippines. (Duterte, 2016a)

This parental tactic would become familiar in subsequent public pronouncements, especially those that touch on public order. In a speech before members of the national police, months after assuming office, he even indicated willingness to resort to take the law into his own hands like any aggrieved parent would in retribution for a loved one taken by crime: Me, for example, if I were an ordinary citizen, and I’ve lost my daughter to drugs, she gets pregnant five times a year, she’s despoiled because of drugs; I’ve lost my son and another son, bullshit, I will kill you. I will kill you. I will take the law into my own hands. I will not ache stepping down. Forget about the laws of men, forget about the laws of international law, whatever. I’ll just ask you simply, the eternal justice that runs this universe. But what right do you have to cook shabu and feed it to my children to make them crazy and become useless forever? Who gave you the right in this universe, in this planet to rape my one-year-old daughter, to kill a six-year old son, to despoil the body of my son and daughter? Because you were under the influence of shabu, which makes you crazy. (Duterte, 2016b)

As commander in chief of the armed forces he also pleaded before his troops to assist him in his cause. Because victims of crime are weak, Duterte makes it sound as if it is divine justice when authorities pursue criminals: I hope that we would have a brighter tomorrow of children safe from being harmed. The criminals are everywhere—in Pandacan, Sta. Ana, and Tondo [Itong mga kriminal, maski saan, Pandancan, Sta. Ana, Tondo, the criminals have hijacked]. They have taken over the public streets and public places. Our kids cannot even go out for a stroll. And every time they would take the bus—as not all of us are rich—they would get robbed…We have to remove that fear. Let us transfer that fear in the hearts of the criminals…It’s retribution. If the courts cannot give it, somebody will — God [Ang ating mga anak, hindi na sila makapasyal. And every time magsasakay ng bus, ‘yung mga anak natin na hindi naman — hindi naman lahat mayaman e, nagpapawis na ‘yung kamay and they are under stress because “holdup”]. (Duterte, 2016c)

The framing of the government’s antidrug campaign as parental concern reverberates more strikingly before people who lost family members to heinous crime. Who gave you the right to cook shabu, sell it to my sons and daughters and make them crazy? Who? Do not invoke God. Do not invoke the law. Let us set aside human rights. Forget about vigilantes either. Who gave you the right to distribute shabu and destroy a community? If you are going to destroy my country, you will die you son of a […]. Let us be clear, I will not allow it. I will not compromise the next generation; they will die wherever they are. Look at families now. If there is in a family a drug pusher or a drug user, that family collapses. Automatically that family becomes dysfunctional because the kids will start to steal once hooked. [Who gave you the right to cook shabu, sell it to my sons and daughters and make them crazy? Sino? Huwag muna ang Diyos. Huwag muna ang batas. Wala iyong Human Rights. Huwag muna iyang sabi mong mga vigilantes. Who gave you the right to distribute shabu and destroy a community? You are going to destroy my country, you will die. Anak ka ng […]. magklaro tayo dito. I will not allow it. I will not compromise the next generation, patay sila nasaan man iyan. Ang pamilya ngayon, if there is in a family, may drug, pusher or drug user, sira ang pamilya. Automatically, that family becomes dysfunctional, kasi magnakaw na iyong bata kung wala nang makuha doon sa ano]. (Duterte, 2016d)

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However, it was not long until Duterte’s war on drugs began to stir up domestic and international alarm. In early 2017 alone, human-rights groups and activists estimated a record of between 7,000 and 13,000 casualties in the antidrug campaign. A June 2017 survey of the Social Weather Stations also reported that while 63 percent of Filipinos said they were satisfied with the government’s war on drugs, seven in 10 adults Filipino also expressed apprehension of extrajudicial killings that had come to characterize the campaign. In his second State of the Nation Address, Duterte responded to detractors: I do not intend to loosen the leash in the campaign or lose the fight against illegal drugs. Neither do I intend to preside over the destruction of the Filipino youth by being timid and tentative in my decisions and actions. To the critics against this fight, your efforts will be better spent if you use the influence, moral authority and ascendancy of your organizations over your respective sectors to educate the people on the evils of illegal drugs instead of condemning the authorities and unjustly blaming for every killing that bloodies this country. But don’t get me wrong. I value human life the way I value mine. Each life that is snuffed out translates into future generations lost. It is like cracking the acorn from which an oak tree grows– which, in turn, produce the seeds to complete the cycle of [life in] perpetuity [emphasis added]. (Duterte, 2017a)

Of interest is how the speech frames the president as an anxious custodian of people’s welfare and interest. There are also constant references to “children” and “families” who are framed as the most vulnerable as illegal drugs worsen into a social malaise. There is a jungle out there. There are beasts and vultures preying on the helpless, the innocent [and] the unsuspecting. I will not allow the ruin of the youth, the disintegration of families and the retrogression of communities, forced by criminals whose greed for money is as insatiable as it is devoid of moral purpose. Neither will I be immobilized into inaction by the fear that I will commit an act that will expose me to public condemnation or legal prosecution. You harm the children in whose hands the future of this Republic is entrusted, and I will hound you to the very gates of hell [emphasis added]. (Duterte, 2017a)

Among Duterte’s high-functioning audiences, overseas Filipinos are considered among the most invested in the government’s anticrime campaign, especially since most Filipinos who live abroad are economic migrants forced to leave families back home for greener pastures (Panao & Pernia, 2022). The government’s bloody campaign against illegal drugs is portrayed as never more vicious than what is necessary to preserve the family and honor the sacrifices of overseas Filipino workers: Do not destroy the Filipino. Do not deprive our children their hope you sons of bitches. You have not looked into this. We are but a poor country. I hope you are listening you demons. We are sending our children to school. These children are the reasons why these people here are leaving the country. We all hope that one day they can help their families (applause) and eventually send their own kids to school. But the children now are drug addicts. Their parents have practically consigned to work themselves to death overseas only to find either their children being hooked into drugs, or worse, raped or killed because of drugs. That is why I would really kill you. Because it is not fair at all. There is an estimated 4 million already addicted, some of whom have become completely broken. These kids are cracked up so who is going to take care of their parents now? Hear me out, my compatriots.

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[Huwag mong sirain ang Pilipino, huwag mo kaming kunan ng pag-asa sa mga anak namin eh p**** i** ninyo, hindi ninyo naaral ito. Mahirap lang kami kung nakikinig kayong mga y***. Kaya namin pinapaaral yan, kaya ito sila lumalabas ng bayan, para makatulong doon sa mga kamag-anak nila [applause] kaya para makapag aral yung mga anak nila. Ngayon yung mga durugista, nagpakamatay na nga dito for their work pagkatapos, pag uwi nila nakadroga na, kung hindi, nadisgradya ng rape o pinatay dahil sa droga. Yan ang ibig kong sabihin papatayin ko talaga kayo [applause]. Because it is not fair at all. Estimated is about 4 million already addicted at ang mga ilan diyan may liki na. Bisaya. May crack na so papaano yan pagkatanda namin? Makinig kayong mga taga-Pilipinas]. (Duterte, 2017b)

Curiously, unlike speeches delivered before other high-level audiences, pronouncements before Filipinos overseas are more intimate. Also, cussing tends to occur more often, not necessarily to intimidate but rather to elicit audience attention and gain approval (Kwon & Cho, 2017). How do I look at the situation. You know how. Son of a bitch. They will really get it. I will not allow them to do that to my country. Here you are making countless sacrifices. You are willing to risk sexual abuse. You are willing to endure work without sleep or food, and to be treated as trash. Who will give justice? But all they care about is the list of the sons of bitches who are already dead [referring to local and international human rights bodies]. Should we not be glad for they are already in hell [laughter]. Would you rather that they wreak havoc here? That is the truth. I am just being frank. Human life. You must be here and when you live with your fellow men, you must respect human—not only rights but life. [How do I look at the situation. Alam na ninyo. T**** i** mo, hihiritan talaga kita. Hindi ako papayag na ganunin mo ang bayan ko. Sakripisyo, sakripisyo. Magpa-rape na nga. Magtrabaho doon, walang tulog, walang kain, basura tapos pagkatapos niyan, ‘yung pagod niya ganun na lang. Who will give justice? Ang nakikita nila ‘yung listahan sa mga p***** i**** patay na. mabuti na nga ‘yun andun sa impyerno, ayaw mo pa? [laughter] Eh kung dito ‘yan magkalat? ‘Yan ang totoo diyan. Nagpaprangka talaga ako. Human life. You must be here and when you live with your fellow men, you must respect human—not only rights but life]. (Duterte, 2017c)

Interestingly, angry rants that accompany allusions to families and children are not exclusive to speeches made before overseas Filipinos. The framing of the government’s campaign against illegal drugs as a leadership obligation akin to a parental duty also reverberates even in pronouncements before investors and members of the business community. For example, before a group of exporters, he preached: Remember that constant use of shabu even for six months to one year will cause the shrinkage of the human brain. So those kids around you are now starting to answer back. How can those kids grow to become functional fathers? Young adults in their 20s are affected, resulting in the breakup of the family, and the children lose. The family loses direction when couples break up. And to think that would be the generation that would come after us, these idiots do not realize that. The UN is concerned with just a thousand bones. Can they not look at the hundreds of thousands of Filipinos? What do we expect of our country for the next generation? [Remember that shabu—constant use of shabu even for six months to one year will cause the shrinkage of the human brain. Kaya yung mga anak ng kilala ninyo, pag sumagot paganon-ganon na, at kung mag-ganon, paano maging functional na tatay yan? And most of them, yung tinamaan naka-generation na, the lower—about 20—pinaka, so it results in the breakage of the family, wala na mga anak. Walang—ang pamilya, pag naghiwalay ang asawa,

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Duterte and his speechwriters seem to be acutely conscious that drug-free communities are as important to business owners and investors as they are to remittancesending overseas workers. Rampant criminality takes a toll on communities by lowering property values, increasing insurance premiums, and dissuading investments in crime-prone areas. It is, thus, not unusual to hear illegal drugs framed as spelling the demise of Filipino families and played before investors and businesses. You want your enemies to suffer? You just get one of the family into drugs, two or three and it will be hell for them in this planet. Having just a kid or two hooked on drugs will leave the family dysfunctional [Meron kang isa dalawa na anak nasa droga, that family is dysfunctional]. Now, if it is the father, the breadwinner, who is addicted or contaminated…he does not go to work. He sits there in a stupor and waits for the drugs to come. If he does not have any money, he would start to sell everything. (Duterte, 2018)

In fact, speeches before chambers of commerce are more likely to be accompanied by stories about illegal drugs and its toll on families than the conventional bragging about government infrastructure projects. During the 45th Philippines Business Conference and Expo, for example, Duterte opted to justify the violence that attended the drug war rather than elaborate on the massive transportation and road projects undertaken by the administration: What do you think would happen to the next generation of Filipinos? What would be the face of the Filipino? Shabu? Let us not kid ourselves. Just look at the crawler. They do nothing but take methamphetamine every day. Meanwhile, the cursed people from the Commission on Human Rights act deaf. You sons of bitches you have no clue. And you would rather grieve over the carcass of a criminal? Why not look at what these sons of bitches have been up to—raping a blind mother, raping a wife, raping a 14-year-old daughter, and killing them. Are the Filipinos happy about this? [Oh, how do you think the Filipino [would be] by the next generation? What would be the face of the Filipino? Shabu? Huwag na tayong magbolahan. Just look at the crawler. Every day ’yan, araw-araw, shabu, shabu, shabu. Itong mga p***** i**** human rights akala mo bingi. T******** kayong mga p***** i** ninyo. ’Yan ang hindi niyo na alam eh. And you grieve with one carcass there of a criminal? Hindi mo nga tiningnan kung anong ginawa, anong nagawa nitong mga p***** i**** ’to. Raping a blind mother, raping the wife, raping the 14 years old, pati ’yung four years old, patayin pa. And look what happened. Maligaya ba ang Pilipino?]. (Duterte, 2019)

Duterte’s controversial antidrug campaign was eventually considered a failure. In a campaign sortie in support of administration candidates in 2019, no less than Duterte himself admitted not only that the government failed the war on drugs but that the drug problem may have actually worsened (Villanueva, 2019). Meanwhile, in an April 2022 news report he confessed that he was only making a campaign spiel when he said he would rid the country of illegal drugs in six months (Corrales, 2022). Months after Duterte declared a state of emergency due to the threat of COVID19, the Philippines government also shifted its efforts to implementing community

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quarantine measures and distributing ameliorative assistance (Vallejo & Ong, 2020). Although by this time Duterte’s drug rhetoric mellowed, the erstwhile paternalistic cussing remained. Consider, for instance, his speech before a weary crowd of typhoon victims in an evacuation center in Bais City, Negros Oriental. Duterte was halfway through his speech when he was interrupted by one local government official who apprised him of the state of the distribution of relief goods and services for the beneficiaries. Duterte: This money is intended for the family, especially the children. Don’t mess with me by using the money to purchase alcoholic drinks. If you do that, I’ll come back here for you and punch you. Yes, I will. If somebody reports to me that you spent your money on cockfighting, ah damn it. There will be no sacred cows. I will really come back for you. But… Official: The money is here, sir, it just needs to be distributed. Duterte: Ah the damn money just arrived today. Official: It should be turned over to every family [Duterte: Kanang kwartaha para na sa pamilya, para sa bata. Ayaw ko ninyo’g binuangi kanang mag-inom mo, gamiton ninyo ang kwarta. Balikan ta ka ngari, sumbagon taka. Bitaw. Naa gani mu-report na ang inyong kwarta nahurot na kay gitari-tari, ah leche.4 Way amigo-amigo. Anhion ta mo. Pero… Official: Naabot na, sir. Naay mag-distribute, sir. Duterte: Ah karon pa diay muabot ang kwartang yawa. Official: Ngayon ang turnover, sir. Ah i-turn over karon per family]. (Duterte, 2021)

As it unraveled, the president did not admonish. Although the English translation sounds threatening, the Visayan listener would likely construe the speech as an endearment since tough talk is part of the lingguistic subculture. The quote that follows illustrates poignantly that Duterte can cuss and still remain endearing to Filipinos: So I won’t stay long. This is all I came here for, to ask for your forgiveness that government relief arrived late. But there’s nothing I can do about that. I cannot do anything because there’s a law. I’m always saying, “This law is bullshit.” I told Congress to repeal that law... [So dili na ko magdugay, mao ra nay akong tuyo ngari. Mangayo ko’g pasaylo nadelatar tinood. Wa koy mabuhat ana. I cannot do anything because naay balaod. Nagsige na ko’g “Kaning balaora ni, b*** s*** ni.” Giingnan nako ang Kongreso tangtanga ng kondisyon. Ana pag...]. (Duterte, 2021)

4

Leche is a Spanish cuss word assimilated into the Cebuano lexicon. According to the UP Diksyunaryo ng Wikang (Almario & Center of the Filipino Language, 2010) “leche” or “letse” literally implies that the person to who it is directed needs more milk. It is akin to saying that the person is infantile, immature or slow. It can also imply that the person at the receiving end has a comprehension similar to a toddler. Cebuano is President Duterte’s mother tongue. The authors speak this local dialect.

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6.4 Concluding Remarks In this chapter, we explored paternalism as the main cultural framework within which presidential rhetoric is mediated. In the case of Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte, although cussing has become characteristic of his particular brand of speechmaking they seem to occur more frequently when speaking before economically and politically functional audiences (local government officials, law enforcement officers, chambers of commerce, and overseas Filipinos) whose cooperation and agreement is necessary to legitimize the government’s controversial campaign against illegal drugs. Cussing is a highly contextual linguistic device whose implication for speech is dependent not just on the relationship between the rhetorician and the audience, but on the political and economic significance of the message being conveyed in the discourse. Duterte rants, threatens, and cusses but remains appealing to these important types of citizens because he frames the antidrug campaign as a genuine personal duty any good parent would boldly undertake to preserve the family. Instead of being feared, it appears that he is actually admired. Cussing, then, not only brings Duterte closer to his audience but the informality and directness of the language also improves his general perception as a legitimate source for his particular message. Swearing makes him more credible, honest, authentic, and empathetic—leadership ideals that some say have been lost due to the introduction of an alien ideology and borrowed notions of independence (Alfiler & Nicolas, 1997). Given this chapter’s unique analytical assertion, we acknowledge that some measure of clarity and restraint are necessarily in order when extrapolating the broader implications of our argument. It should be emphasized that Duterte’s paternalistic cussing behavior constitutes one of many other facets of his political rhetoric. That is, while such rhetorical strategy arguably possesses democratic dimensions (that we attempted to argue here), it may also conjure up adverse repercussions that go against the established norms and models of presidential and political leadership (in particular the bellicose elements and the macho narratives that define much of his speeches; see for instance, Navera, 2020; Parmanand, 2020). Hence, scholars of political behavior and political communication should interpret Duterte’s rhetoric in a more fine-grained and nuanced sense, instead of merely lumping them into a singular, homogenized, and hegemonic discourse. Viewed from the lens of rhetorical citizenship (Kock & Villadsen, 2012, 2017), Duterte’s rhetoric therefore engenders rhetorical practices for democratic engagement and anti-democratic leadership as well. It may be possible that despite all academic efforts to implicate Duterte as a strongman, we missed the forest for the trees; we might not realize that he merely acts as if he is the democratically-elected representative of his people. However, it is also plausible that his linguistic and rhetorical trope is both aimed at “reframing or recontextualizing political expression” to fit his personality, agenda, and appreciation of the socio-political dynamics while in office (Navera, 2014, p. 219) in order to render himself as a “democrat” despite being an authoritarian leader (Navera,

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2018). Regardless, the notion of paternalistic cussing adds another layer to Duterte’s presidential rhetoric. Future research could pursue several lines of inquiry such as: (1) empirical testing this type of rhetoric and examining how these might be related to other political outcomes; (2) analyzing previous Philippines presidents’ speeches to explore potential similar or different rhetorical tropes; (3) integrating citizen attitudes through surveys or focus groups to gain insights as to how the public perceives such language; and (4) comparing other authoritarian or populist leaders (although not necessarily foul-mouthed nor male) to see whether our unique theoretical claim is relevant beyond the Philippines context.

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Ronald A. Pernia is Assistant Professor in the Political Science Program of the College of Social Sciences, University of the Philippines Cebu. He is a Ph.D. candidate in the Institute of Political Science, National Sun Yat-sen University (NSYSU), Kaohsiung, Taiwan and a predoctoral fellow in the Institute of Political Science at Academia Sinica (IPSAS) in Taipei, Taiwan. Rogelio Alicor L. Panao is Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science, University of the Philippines Diliman. He is a member of the Philippine Bar.

Chapter 7

The Shameless Normalization of Debasement Performance: A Critical Discourse Analysis of Pauline Hanson’s Australian, Far-Right, Populist Communication Kurt Sengul Abstract The purpose of this chapter is to critically explore the use of debasing and ridiculing discourse by Australia’s most prominent far-right populist politician, Pauline Hanson. Drawing on Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), this chapter analyzes four case studies that demonstrate the strategic use of debasement as a discursive strategy. This chapter argues that Hanson’s frequent use of debasement and ridicule throughout her political communication is emblematic of what Ruth Wodak (The politics of fear: The shameless normalization of far-right discourse. Sage, 2021) calls shameless normalization, to describe the phenomenon where traditional rules of “politeness and respect are deliberately broken…without any negative sanctions or consequences,” (Wodak in The politics of fear: The shameless normalization of far-right discourse. Sage, p. 1, 2021). This chapter argues that the pervasiveness of debasement in contemporary discourse is the result of the decades long process of mediatization, and the interrelated logics that govern commercial media. It is argued that media organizations reward political actors who engage in scandalous, provocative, debased, and antagonistic rhetoric through disproportionate coverage. It is further argued that the communication and performance style of the modern farright aligns with this media logic. The chapter concludes by arguing that debasement and ridicule are now core elements of the far-right populist communicative toolkit aiming to exploit the contemporary mediatized political landscape.

7.1 Introduction The mainstreaming and normalization of far-right populist politics throughout the twenty-first century has resulted in a coarsening of political discourse and has challenged the principles of a healthy, inclusive, and vibrant public sphere. As the central role of media and communications to the success of the contemporary far-right is K. Sengul (B) Department of Media and Communications, University of Sydney, Sydney, Australia e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 O. Feldman (ed.), Debasing Political Rhetoric, The Language of Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-0894-3_7

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increasingly acknowledged in the literature (Sengul, 2019a), scholars have conceptualized core elements of far-right populist communication, including hostility, impoliteness, shamelessness, bad behavior, incivility, and hate speech. However, the rise of prominent far-right and populist actors such as Jair Bolsonaro, Rodrigo Duterte, and Donald Trump (for a detailed discussion see Chaps. 5, 6, and 12) have necessitated a rethink in how we conceptualize far-right populist communication and have exposed the limitations of concepts such as impoliteness and incivility in explaining this phenomenon. Indeed, much of the rhetoric we have seen from actors like Rodrigo Duterte and Donald Trump has gone far beyond notions of impoliteness and incivility into what can more accurately be described as debasement. Some scholars have even gone so far as to suggest that the rhetoric of contemporary far-right populist figures is akin to “behaviors that could be described as the verbal equivalent of ‘shooting somebody’,” (Wodak et al., 2021, p. 370). Therefore, the purpose of this chapter is to critically explore the under-researched role of debasement and ridicule in the political communication of Australia’s most prominent far-right populist politician, Pauline Hanson. Drawing on a Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) of four illustrative case studies, this chapter demonstrates how debasing rhetoric and discourse is deployed against a range of targets throughout a hybrid media system (Chadwick, 2017). Furthermore, this chapter shows that Hanson’s debasement discourse is frequently directed towards racialized and marginalized minorities. Drawing on Ruth Wodak’s (2021) idea of shameless normalization, this chapter advances a number of arguments: First, that the proliferation of debasing and ridiculing discourse is the result of the mainstreaming of the far-right that has occurred throughout the twenty-first century (Mudde, 2019). Second, that the processes of mediatization and the commercial media logic have incentivized controversial, provocative, and debased discourse through excessive media coverage. Third, that debasement must be understood in strategic terms, as a core pillar of the populist far-right’s communicative and discursive toolkit. The findings of this chapter reinforce the culturally contingent nature of debasement and give readers an insight into how debasement discourse manifests itself in Australian politics. It is hoped that this chapter, along with global case studies explored in this edited volume, will advance our understanding of how and why debasement is employed in contemporary political communication.

7.2 Debasement, Shamelessness, and the Far-Right The proliferation of debasement and ridicule in political discourse is inexorably linked to a number of interconnected twenty-first century phenomena. Indeed, it is argued in this chapter that debasement discourse cannot be separated from the wider context of the mediatization of politics (Mazzoleni, 2008) and the mainstreaming and normalization of the far-right (Mudde, 2019; Sengul, 2022b). Mediatization refers to the long-term process of the increasing influence, pervasiveness, and importance of media in social and political life (Stromback & Esser, 2014). As noted by Stromback

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and Esser (2014, pp. 8–9) “[…] as the importance of the media has increased, and the media have become more and more embedded and integrated in all key aspects of social and political life, so has the influence of the media.” A by-product of the mediatization of politics has been the concerted effort of political actors to engage with the media, employing a range of communicative and performative strategies (Mazzoleni, 2008). In this context, it is argued that a key feature of the twentyfirst century far-right is their adeptness in navigating and exploiting the mediatized political environment (Waisbord, 2019). The communication style of the contemporary populist far-right is said to align with the set of logics that govern commercial media. Far-right populists are said to adopt this media logic by providing controversial and newsworthy content to media outlets who “privilege conflict and negativity, which in turn foster political alienation and cynicism” (Mannuci, 2017, p. 468). As noted by Waisbord (2019, p. 225), the populist style of communication can be characterized as “colourful, uncivil, undignified, emotional…[and] frank.” Thus, media outlets have created an incentive for far-right actors to engage in uncivil discourse by rewarding them with media attention and coverage. Mediagenic far-right populist actors throughout the twenty-first century have been given disproportionate media platforms as journalists know they will provide controversy and spectacle (Mudde, 2019). The use of debasing, uncivil, ridiculing, provocative, and offensive discourse should be understood as part of the communicative toolkit of the contemporary farright. Populists, and far-right populists in particular, employ a transgressive performative style that eschews a range of political and cultural norms, customs and standards of behavior (Moffitt, 2016). Wodak (2021, p. 163), for example, suggests that the modern far-right maintain “an overall antagonistic habitus which does not comply with hitherto conventional rules of negotiation and compromise… [and] the continuous breaking of taboos and flouting rules of politeness, as well as conventional norms of political correctness.” This is echoed by Moffitt (2016) and Sorensen (2021) who both note the use of ‘bad manners’ as a core element of the populist political style. Sorensen (2021, p. 142) argues that populist “bad manners and low style display identification and simultaneously breach institutional; and professional norms of politics, whether through speech, tone, dress, gesture, or other means.” A key reason for this, as suggested by Fieschi (2019), is that by continuously violating the rules of the political establishment, right-wing populist actors demonstrate that they are on the side of “the people.” What this leads to is the recognition that the use of debasing and ridiculing language by the populist far-right should be viewed in strategic terms. In other words, far-right populist actors employ transgressive and offensive rhetoric for a range of political purposes. Wodak and colleagues (2021, p. 371) argue that far-right populist politicians like Donald Trump and Pauline Hanson “actively and strategically seek scandalization.” Moreover, “[…] they appear to instrumentalise the fact that, as well as eliciting negative reactions, such incidents are positively evaluated by their supporters, and contribute to a polarization of societal and political attitudes which their style of leadership relies upon” (Wodak et al., 2021, p. 371). This phenomenon is intimately connected to the trolling culture associated with the so-called alternative

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right (alt-right), referring to acts of being “[…] deliberately offensive, or provocative online with the aim of provoking a hostile, negative, outraged reaction” (Hermansson et al., 2020, p. 123). The result of the sustained media attention given to the contemporary far-right throughout the twenty-first century has been their mainstreaming and normalization. Indeed, far-right actors, discourse, and policies, which were once considered fringe and marginal, are increasingly becoming tolerated and accepted in mainstream politics and culture. This makes the study of debasing discourse pertinent given that this kind of rhetoric is no longer found only at the margins. As argued by Wodak (2021, p. 6), “[…] we are confronted with widespread and growing normalization of far-right policies, of formerly tabooed topics, wordings and impolite or shameless behavior (i.e., ‘bad manners’).” Wodak (2021) refers to this shifting political culture as shameless normalization where the boundaries of what can be said have shifted and are continuing to shift. This is further supported by Krzy˙zanowski and colleagues (2021, p. 3) who suggest that: Indeed, both uncivility and racism have been very significantly enabled and reinstated in the public mindset due to the recently prevalent populist-political thinking and actions which yield fertile ground for their articulation and acceptance – and their long-term normalisation – in the wider society.

So, while debasement, ridicule, incivility, hostility, and impoliteness are certainly not new in political discourse, their presence has been augmented by the processes of mediatization and the structural mainstreaming and normalization of the contemporary far-right. This suggests that debasing discourse is likely to be a common feature of the democratic political process as traditional norms and conventions are violated by media savvy political actors.

7.3 Research Approach This chapter employs the analytical tools of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) that has been extensively applied to the study of far-right populist communication and discourse (Bromfield et al., 2021; Sengul, 2019b). Moreover, the research agenda of Critical Discourse Studies (CDS) has taken a recent interest in political discourse characterized by incivility (Krzy˙zanowski et al., 2021), shamelessness (Wodak, 2021), bad behavior (Moffitt, 2016), performative stunts (Sengul, 2022a), impoliteness (Wodak et al., 2021), and norm breaking (Ekström et al., 2022). As such, CDA offers a useful framework and is well placed to analyze debasing and ridiculing discourse associated with the contemporary populist far-right. CDA aims to “expose strategies that appear normal or neutral on the surface, but which may in fact be ideological and seek to shape the representation of persons for particular ends” (Machin & Mayr, 2012, p. 5). In this context, CDA not only allows for the identification of debasing and ridiculing discourse, but a critical analysis of the strategic and ideological motivations

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of its use. As a critical approach to research, CDA is fundamentally concerned with issues of power. Indeed, for critical discourse analysts, “language is not powerful on its own; it gains power by the use powerful people make of it” (Wodak, 2009, p. 35). Therefore, the use of debasement as a discursive strategy becomes especially relevant when deployed against a marginalized individual and/or community by a powerful actor and/or group. A key advantage of CDA for this study is its acute sensitivity to the contextual nature of discourse (Fairclough et al., 2011). This is paramount given the culturally contingent nature of debasement discourse which can differ greatly depending on the norms, values and practices of a particular country or region. Furthermore, CDA is said to be useful for “studying social phenomena which are necessarily complex” (Wodak & Meyer, 2009, p. 2). A key feature of the contemporary far-right is the increasing complexity of their political communication which frequently employs “a more subtle, coded version of previously blunt exclusionary text and talk” (Wodak, 2021, p. 68). As further noted by Wodak (2021, p. 68): Far-right ideologies and practices have moved and continue to move from the margins to the centre. Thus, we are able to observe the simultaneity of a range of coded and explicit discursive practices that seem to test the stability/flexibility of conventional norms, oscillating between the sayable and the unsayable. (emphasis in original)

To examine the use of debasement and ridicule as a discursive strategy, the present study draws on four illustrative case studies that demonstrate the use of debasement discourse by the populist far-right in Australia. The four cases discussed in this chapter were selected purposively (Braun & Clark, 2013) and center around Australia’s most prominent far-right political actor, Pauline Hanson. The four cases selected generated significant media attention and controversy at the time and were deemed by the researcher to be rich examples of far-right populist debasement discourse. Purposive sampling is widely used in CD and “[…] involves selecting data cases (participants, texts) on the basis that they will be able to provide information rich data to analyze […] with the aim of generating insight and in-depth understanding” (Braun & Clark, 2013, p. 53). The dataset is publicly accessible and was collected from prominent sites of political communication in Australia including the social media platform Twitter (Pauline Hanson [@PaulineHansonOz], 2022), a breakfast television news interview (Graham, 2020), and the parliamentary Hansard transcripts (Commonwealth of Australia, 2017, 2022a, 2022b). Additionally, and consistent with CDA, a range of media sources were also used for contextual and historical information. Underpinning this research is the belief that political communication is an “[…] intentional plan of practices adopted to achieve a particular social, political, psychological or linguistic goal” (Reisigl & Wodak, 2009, p. 94).

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7.4 Case Studies 7.4.1 Racialized Debasement on Twitter The first case to be examined occurred in the wake of the death of Queen Elizabeth II on September 8, 2022, and involved a Twitter exchange between Senator Pauline Hanson and Senator Dr. Mehreen Faruqi of the Australian Greens Party. Subsequent to Queen Elizabeth’s passing, many political leaders took to social media platforms like Twitter to offer their condolences. Like all members of the Commonwealth of Nations, Queen Elizabeth is the Australian Head of State, which elevated the interest and significance of her death. The dominant discourse prevalent in the media and political class was one of mourning and sadness. However, also present on social media was counter-discourse that critically reflected on the legacy of the British Empire and the Monarchy. These discussions, emerging in particular from First Nations peoples, sections of the political Left, and the Australian Republican movement, reflected on the history and ongoing violent legacies of colonialism and empire. Indeed, the prominent Indigenous media organization IndigenousX tweeted on September 9, 2022: Extract 1 @IndigenousX: For those saying we should be magnanimous about the passing of the queen, a reminder that the queen inserted herself into the lives of Indigenous people here multiple times. She wasn’t a bystander to the effects of colonisation and colonialism, she was an architect of it. (IndigenousX, 2022)

Within the context of these critical discussions around the legacy of Queen Elizabeth, Australian Greens senator Mehreen Faruqi tweeted the following on September 9: Extract 2 @MehreenFaruqi: Condolences to those who knew the Queen. I cannot mourn the leader of a racist empire built on stolen lives, land, and wealth of colonised people. We are reminded of the urgency of Treaty with First Nations, justice, and reparations for British colonies, and becoming a republic. (Faruqi, 2022)

Senator Faruqi’s tweet attracted several critical replies from conservative and promonarchy Twitter users, many of the comments offensive, sexist, hostile, and racist. Faruqi’s tweet also attracted a response from Pauline Hanson on September 9: Extract 3 @PaulineHansonOz: Your attitude appals and disgusts me. When you immigrated to Australia you took every advantage of this country. You took citizenship, bought multiple homes, and a job in parliament. It’s clear you’re not happy, so pack your bags and piss off back to Pakistan. (Hanson, 2022)

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The tweet attracted over 11,000 likes and was retweeted 2,000 times in the following days. While Senator Faruqi’s tweet may have been upsetting to some people, it certainly was not debasing and did raise legitimate points about the status of Australia as a Commonwealth nation and the well documented continuing legacy of colonialism and settler colonialism (Wolfe, 2006). Hanson’s tweet is a clear example of racist and debasing language. Most overtly, the profanity of Hanson telling Faruqi to “piss off” is a clear violation of the norms commonly associated with political debate in Australia. The use of profane language is somewhat uncommon for Hanson, particularly when compared with other populist leaders like Rodrigo Duterte or Donald Trump. More egregious was the racism of telling a Muslim immigrant to “piss off back to Pakistan.” Telling immigrants, refugees, and other racialized peoples to “go back to where you came from” is a common racist attack used by the far-right. Indeed, in Pauline Hanson’s 2016 maiden speech to the Australian senate, she told immigrants that “if you are not prepared to become Australian and give this country your undivided loyalty. […] then I suggest you go back to where you came from” (cited in Sengul, 2020, p. 24). Drawing on the analytical tools of CDA, Hanson’s tweet can be seen as an example of the discursive strategy of intensification. Strategies of intensification and mitigation refer to how language is strategically intensified or mitigated, depending on the goal of the speaker (Wodak, 2021). Hanson’s tweet also drew on the well-worn racist and right-wing discourse of the ungrateful immigrant/refugee (Nayeri, 2017) to describe migrants and refugees who go to a particular country to take advantage of the generosity and resources of the native people. As a clear example of debased and racist rhetoric, Hanson’s tweet was widely condemned and attracted significant media attention. The tweet also received initial praise from Senator Jacqui Lambie who later walked back her support and apologized. Interestingly, Senator Faruqi was not the only Australian politician to make those reflections about the Queen, and yet was the only one targeted by Hanson. White politicians who made similar remarks did not attract Hanson’s critical attention. As one of the only Muslim members of Parliament, Senator Faruqi is frequently the target of racist, far-right attacks online and in the media. As reported by The Guardian, in the days after Hanson’s tweet Faruqi received several hateful and violent emails, including comments such as “go kill yourself” and “fuck off to where you came from while you still can” (Butler, 2022). In response to Hanson’s debasing tweet, Senator Faruqi was considering referring the tweet to the Australian Human Rights Commission (AHRC), the body that investigates complaints about discrimination and human rights breaches. The Australian Greens moved a senate motion in late September to censure Hanson over the comments. Despite the criticism, Hanson appeared to revel in the media attention and criticism, sharing critical news stories about the tweet as well as Faruqi’s intent to file a complaint with the AHRC and the censure motion brought forward by Faruqi. In response to the senate motion, Hanson doubled down on her original comments, offering to drive Senator Faruqi “to the airport.”

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7.4.2 Debasement Through Populist Performance: The “Burqa Stunt” This case presents an example of Hanson engaging in debasement and ridicule through the interplay of rhetoric and political performance. Commonly referred to as the “burqa stunt” (Sengul, 2022a), on August 17, 2017, Hanson entered the Australian Senate for Question Time dressed in a black burqa. The extracts are available through the Hansard record (Commonwealth of Australia, 2017). The act generated substantial media attention and was condemned by a range of politicians from the major parties, minor parties, and independents for its Islamophobia and offensiveness to the Muslim community. Muslim parliamentarian Anne Aly described the burqa stunt as “a debasement of this institution” (Sainty, 2017). As Hanson entered the chamber wearing the burqa, Senators could be heard whispering and groaning as well as visibly reacting to the stunt. Minor party senator Derryn Hinch rose to make a point of order: Extract 4 Senator Hinch: I would like to know if Senator Hanson can stay here unchallenged – I understand that she’s not a Muslim and she is not of Islamic faith – can I appear tomorrow in fancy dress unchallenged? (Commonwealth of Australia, 2017)

Further into Question Time, Senator Hanson rose to her feet to ostensibly ask a question and ripped off the burqa to reveal her face: Extract 5 Senator Hanson: I’m quite happy to remove this, because this is not what should belong in this parliament…My question is to Senator Brandis, the Attorney-General. Senator Brandis, in light of the national security of this nation, will you work to ban the burqa in Australia […]. In light of what is happening with national security? There have been 13 foiled national threats against us from terrorism, three that have been successful, and Australians have lost their lives…What I would like to ask on behalf of the Australian people – considering a large majority of Australians wish to see the banning of the burqa. (Commonwealth of Australia, 2017)

Hanson’s removal of the burqa was theatrical as she revealed her face. Through her question, Hanson made the offensive and erroneous conflation between the burqa and terrorism, drawing on far-right tropes of Islam as a totalitarian ideology. A number of rhetorical devices and discursive strategies were at play here. Hanson employs a Topos of Threat (if specific dangers or threats are identified, one should do something about them) (Wodak, 2009). Moreover, in claiming that a large majority of Australians wish to see the burqa banned, Hanson draws on the Topos of Numbers which holds that if sufficient numerical/statistical evidence is given, a specific action should be performed (Wodak, 2009). These argumentative strategies construct Muslim Australians as a danger and existential threat to the security and culture of Australia. In response to Hanson’s call to ban the burqa, Senate Leader George Brandis admonished Hanson for ridiculing the Muslim community:

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Extract 6 Senator Brandis: No, we will not be banning the burqa. Now, Senator Hanson, I am not going to pretend to ignore the stunt that you have tried to pull by arriving in the chamber dressed in a burqa when we all know that you are not an adherent of the Islamic faith […].To ridicule that community, to drive it into a corner, to mock its religious garments is an appalling thing to do, and I would ask you to reflect on what you have done. (Commonwealth of Australia, 2017)

The stunt received near universal condemnation from members of the Senate who agreed that the act of wearing a burqa in the Senate to call for its public ban represented ridicule, debasement and mockery of all Muslims, and Muslim women in particular. What the burqa stunt revealed was that ridicule and debasement can be enacted not just through language, but through performativity, gestures, and dress. As Feldman (2023) notes, debasement language includes not only “bad language” but all the ways, including deviousness and subtlety, that speakers or writers use to degrade or discredit a certain target (individual or group). In this context, wearing a burqa to call for its ban must be considered an egregious act of debasement discourse. Hanson’s stunt was deemed to be not only an act of debasing the Muslim community, but also the debasement of the Senate as a political institution, by breaching conventional norms, conventions and standards of behavior associated with it.

7.4.3 Colonial Debasement in the Australian Parliament The third case study demonstrates the colonial and racialized debasement of Indigenous peoples, as well as the transgression of the Australian senate’s institutional customs, norms, and procedures. In July 2022, Pauline Hanson interrupted the Acknowledgement of Country that preceded the start of Question Time (Commonwealth of Australia, 2022b). An Acknowledgement of Country is a common practice in Australia at the beginning of meetings, events, and gatherings. The acknowledgement is recognized as an important cultural protocol in demonstrating respect for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples, recognizing the sovereignty of First Nations peoples as traditional owners of land, as well as acknowledging “[…] the history and dispossession and colonisation […that] lies at the heart of the disparity between Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander and other Australians today” (Reconciliation Australia, 2022). Beginning a parliamentary sitting week with an Acknowledgement of Country has been a long-standing practice of the Australian House of Representatives and the Senate. On July 27, 2022, as the Senate President acknowledged the Ngunnawal and Ngambri people—the tradition owners of the land in which the Parliament sits— Hanson interrupted and screamed across the chamber: Extract 7 Hanson: No I won’t and I never will. (Commonwealth of Australia, 2022b)

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Hanson then proceeded to walk out of the chamber before the acknowledgement was concluded. Hanson later suggested that the Indigenous flag and the Acknowledgement of Country was “divisive:” Extract 8 Hanson: I will never pay respect. I find this flag divisive […].We are now hearing it on flights and aeroplanes. I’m sorry – this is my country too. (Commonwealth of Australia, 2022b)

Hanson’s actions were immediately criticized by Greens Senator Lidia Thorpe, a DjabWurrung Gunnai Gunditjmara woman, taking to Twitter: Extract 9 Thorpe: Pauline Hanson, you are an ignorant racist. (Thorpe, 2022)

These sentiments were echoed by Ken Wyatt, the former Minister for Indigenous Australians who labelled Hanson’s stunt as “extremely disappointing.” The act of not only refusing to participate in the Acknowledgement of Country, but loudly interrupting it and leaving the chamber is a clear example of debasement in its broadest sense of First Nations people, and the Senate as a democratic institution. Due to its status as an important Indigenous cultural protocol, Hanson’s stunt goes beyond mere disrespect, and must be seen as an act of racialized debasement.

7.4.4 Mediatized Debasement During COVID-19 The final case study occurred in the context of a breakfast television interview with Hanson during the first few months of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. The extracts and video of the interview are accessible through Graham (2020). The topic of the interview was the Victorian State Government’s response to the COVID-19 outbreak that imposed city-wide lockdowns on residents. In July 2020, several social housing towers in Melbourne were locked down under police guard, with residents unable to leave in order to manage an outbreak of COVID-19 in that community. A subsequent investigation by the Victorian Ombudsman found that the lockdowns imposed on the social housing residents constituted a violation of their human rights (Victorian Ombudsman, 2020). Hanson was invited on the Today Show breakfast program to discuss the Melbourne lockdowns in a segment that included a News Corp journalist. At the time, Hanson maintained a regular fortnightly guest spot on the program. When the Today Show host Allison Langdon asked Hanson for her opinion on the plight of the locked down residents, Hanson responded: Extract 10 Hanson: Oh come on Ally, we’ve seen food being delivered there. The fact is that a lot of them are drug addicts as well. They’re getting their medication, they’re actually alcoholics, so they’re being looked after that way. (Hanson cited in Graham, 2020)

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Here we can see Hanson baselessly labelling the public housing residents as “drug addicts” and “alcoholics.” The interview was adversarial in nature with the host and fellow guest pushing back on Hanson’s comments. Hanson followed those comments by insinuating, again without evidence, that many of the residents could not speak English and were to blame for the COVID-19 outbreak: Extract 11 Hanson: A lot of these people are from non-English speaking backgrounds, probably English is their second language who haven’t adhered to the rules of social distancing. They all used a lot of the same laundry. (Hanson cited in Graham, 2020)

What is clear in these extracts is Hanson accusing the social housing residents of breaking lockdown rules and smearing them as “drug addicts” and “alcoholics,” further arguing that the COVID-19 outbreak was due to the residents being unable to speak English and not adhering to the social distancing policies. Hanson went on to say that the residents shouldn’t be given sympathy because they come from “war torn countries”: Extract 12 Hanson: You know, these people, I saw them taking a truck load of food to them, all the rest of it, if they are war torn countries, which some of these people are, they know what it’s like to be in tough conditions. (Hanson cited in Graham, 2020)

During the adversarial interview, journalist Sarrah Le Marquand took issue with Hanson’s comments: Extract 13 Le Marquand: This is not a war-torn country – it’s Melbourne. It doesn’t matter whether they speak English or where they have come from. We are talking about young children and families. (Hanson cited in Graham, 2020)

Hanson’s comments on the Today Show represent an overt example of racialized discrimination against a disadvantaged community. The comments were clearly debasement in making a number of insulting, unfounded and demeaning statements about a negatively racialized community. In fact, Hanson’s comments against the Melbourne residents align with a number of debasing strategies outlined by Feldman (2023), including character assassination, name-calling and insults. Hanson’s appearance generated a widespread backlash and condemnation, resulting in her regular spot on the Today Show being cancelled. The program’s news director Darren Wick released a statement announcing Hanson’s ban from the Today Show program: Extract 14 Wick: The Today Show has advised Pauline Hanson that she will no longer be appearing on our program as a regular contributor. We don’t shy away from diverse opinions and robust debate […]. But this morning’s accusations from Pauline Hanson were ill-informed and divisive. (Lyons, 2020)

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In response to the criticism and banning from the program, Hanson refused to apologize and doubled down on her original statements. Moreover, she argued that she didn’t need the platform provided by the Today Show as she has her Facebook page which connects her to her supporters.

7.5 Analysis and Discussion This research highlights the use of debasement and ridicule as a core discursive strategy of the contemporary far-right in Australia. It also reveals the culturally contingent nature of debasement discourse. Indeed, while the far-right in Australia typically does not exemplify the vulgarity of debased rhetoric seen in other far-right populist leaders such as Rodrigo Duterte, we can nonetheless observe debasement used in a variety of contexts. Consistent with Pauline Hanson’s communicative style, debasement was used discursively and performatively in the case studies above. We can also see through the aforementioned examples that debasement and ridicule can be used against an individual, group, or an institution. It is noteworthy in the case studies analyzed that Hanson’s use of debasement discourse was employed through social media, traditional media, and in parliament—across the hybrid media system (Chadwick, 2017). Moreover, this chapter’s findings demonstrate that Pauline Hanson most frequently uses debased language against negatively racialized and marginalized communities. Indeed, even when Hanson’s debasement was deployed at an elite level, the target was nonetheless a Muslim parliamentarian. This suggests that debasement serves both ideological, political, and communicative functions. Ideologically, debasement is used to target Hanson’s political enemies, as well as those who are considered dangerous “Others” in Hanson’s far-right populist construction of “the people” (Sengul, 2021b). Strategically, debasement is used as a communicative device to generate controversy, provocation, and media attention. This corresponds with the broader communication strategy of the contemporary far-right which strategically seeks to provoke and outrage. This is what Wodak (2021, p. 16) calls the far-right populist perpetuum mobile which refers to the intentional “[…] violation of conventional rules of politeness […] [and] breaking taboos.” In all four cases discussed in this chapter, Hanson was successful in generating significant media attention through the use of debasement discourse. In two of the examples analyzed, debasement was enacted through the use of political stunts consistent with Hanson’s performative communication style in her modern iteration (Sengul, 2021a). Debasement, therefore, must be understood as a key discursive strategy in the communicative arsenal of the contemporary far-right. In understanding the proliferation of debasement discourse in modern politics, this chapter argues that a convergence of three interrelated phenomena are present: (1) The mediatization of politics and the logics that govern contemporary media; (2)

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the mainstreaming and normalization of populism and the far-right in the twenty-first century and; (3) the transgressive enjoyment of far-right politics. The processes of mediatization and the commercial imperatives of media organizations has resulted in a situation where controversy, scandal, and antagonism are privileged by the media. The has created incentive structures for political actors to engage in hostile, debasing, and provocative political communication. This is where far-right populist actors have proven to be particularly adept in the twentyfirst century as their communication style has converged with commercial media logic (Manucci, 2017). Understanding debasement as a discursive and communicative strategy enables us to think about the motivations and rewards underpinning far-right populist communication. Pauline Hanson understands the power of generating media attention and controversy. As noted by Deutchman and Ellison (1999, pp. 34–35), Hanson “[…] could not have become as important as she has without the media. Her current popularity is a result of deliberate journalistic decisions which spread her message and helped generate interest in her agenda.” Thinking about the use of debasing rhetoric in strategic terms gives us insight into why far-right populist actors are increasingly deploying it against their political opponents. The processes of mediatization and the realities of media logic help to explain why far-right populist actors use debasing and ridiculing language against their political opponents and those considered to be in the out-group. Concurrently, the processes of mainstreaming and normalization of the far-right that have occurred throughout the twenty-first century help to explain why we are seeing a proliferation of debasement discourse in public communication. Cas Mudde (2019) argues that we are now witnessing the fourth wave of the far-right which is defined by their increasing normalization and mainstreaming. Furthermore, the far-right of today is “[…] closely connected to the mainstream; and in more and more countries, it is becoming the mainstream” (Mudde, 2019, p. 2). Therefore, we are seeing hostile communicative strategies associated with the far-right such as debasement become mainstreamed and normalized. In other words, as the far-right is increasingly tolerated within society, so too is their discourse, communication styles and tactics. The mainstreaming of the contemporary far-right has resulted in behavior that was once considered taboo and marginal, now being normalized and accepted in public discourse. As Wodak (2021, p. 6) notes: The boundaries of the “sayable” are being shifted, and “anything goes”. Traditional norms and rules of political culture, of negotiation and deliberation, are transcended by continuous provocations, disseminated via the media, supported by mainstream conservatives, and thus normalized. I propose labelling this new characteristic of political culture as “shameless normalization.”

Finally, an under-discussed but vital element of why debasement discourse is proliferating globally is the sense of enjoyment associated with transgressive far-right populist politics. Jutel, for example, suggests that we can understand far-right populist figures like Donald Trump and Pauline Hanson as “permissive agents of jouissance offering the obscene enjoyment of degrading their enemies through an unbridled

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conspiracy that speaks to the irrational drives of the libidinal” (2019, p. 250). In this way, by debasing their political enemies, far-right populists like Hanson are “offering the transgressive enjoyment of ruthlessly attacking those” (Jutel, 2019, p. 252) who would deprive the ‘real people’ of their sovereignty and rights. This affective dimension to right-wing populist discourse is central to movements such as the alternative-right (alt-right) and the Make America Great Again (MAGA) movement who employ debasing and trolling tactics online against a range of ‘enemies’ strategically, and for enjoyment. To bring all three points together, the contemporary far-right employs debasement discourse because they can, because they want to, and because it benefits them.

7.6 Conclusion The purpose of this chapter was to critically explore the various manifestations of debasement discourse in Australian politics. Drawing on a CDA of four illustrative case studies from across traditional media, social media, and the Australian parliament, the findings of this chapter demonstrate how Australia’s most successful far-right populist politician Hanson deploys debasing and ridiculing language against her political enemies. The findings demonstrate that Hanson frequently uses debasing rhetoric against negatively racialized and marginalized individuals and communities. Moreover, through her prolific use of political stunts, Hanson was also found to have debased parliament as a democratic institution. It was argued in this chapter that the proliferation of debasing rhetoric within public discourse is part of a wider trend of mainstreaming and normalizing far-right politics globally. It was also argued that debasement must be viewed as a key discursive and communicative strategy of the contemporary far-right in their goal of “strategic scandalization” (Wodak, 2021, p. 6). Moreover, the findings of this chapter highlight the complexity and culturally contingent nature of debasement discourse. Indeed, the forms of debasement exhibited by Pauline Hanson differ from what we have seen from actors like Rodrigo Duterte. This suggests that acts of violating the norms, conventions, and standards of behavior will differ based on the country and context in which they take place. This reinforces the need for comparative research in this space to holistically understand the use of debasement as a core discursive strategy of the global far-right. It is hoped that this chapter complements the work of other scholars in this volume in advancing our understanding of the increasing use and pervasiveness of debasement in political discourse.

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References Braun, V., & Clarke, V. (2013). Successful qualitative research: A practical guide for beginners. Sage. Bromfield, N., Page, A., & Sengul K. (2021). Rhetoric, culture, and climate wars: A discursive analysis of Australian political leaders’ responses to the Black Summer Bushfire crisis. In O. Feldman (Ed.), When politicians talk: The cultural dynamics of public speaking (pp. 149–167). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-3579-3_9 Butler, J. (2022). Mehreen Faruqi considering human rights commission complaint over Pauline Hanson tweet. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2022/sep/15/meh reen-faruqi-considering-human-rights-commission-complaint-over-pauline-hanson-tweet Chadwick, A. (2017). The hybrid media system: Politics and power (2nd ed.). Oxford University Press. Commonwealth of Australia. (2017, August 17). Parliamentary debates. The Senate. Commonwealth of Australia. (2022a, July 27). Parliamentary debates. The Senate. Commonwealth of Australia. (2022b, July 27). Parliamentary debates. The Senate. Deutchman, I. E., & Ellison, A. (1999). A star is born: The roller coaster ride of Pauline Hanson in the news. Media, Culture & Society, 21(1), 33–50. https://doi.org/10.1177/016344399021001002 Ekström, M., Patrona, M., & Thornborrow, J. (2021). Reporting the unsayable: Scandalous talk by right-wing populist politicians and the challenge for journalism. Journalism, 146488492110017,. https://doi.org/10.1177/14648849211001779 Fairclough, N., Mulderrig, J., & Wodak, R. (2011). Critical discourse analysis. In T. A. van Dijk (Ed.), Discourse studies: A multidisciplinary introduction (2nd ed., pp. 357–378). Sage. Faruqi, M. [@MehreenFaruqi]. (2022, September 9). Condolences to those who knew the Queen. [Tweet]. Twitter. https://twitter.com/MehreenFaruqi/status/1568054570169024514 Feldman, O. (2023). Assessing the politics of debasement: From impoliteness to demonization in political communication. In O. Feldman (Ed.), Political debasement: Incivility, contempt, and humiliation in parliamentary and public discourse (pp. 1–28). Springer. Fieschi, C. (2019). Populocracy: The tyranny of authenticity and the rise of populism. Agenda Publishing. Graham, B. (2020). Pauline Hanson axed from Channel 9 after Melbourne towers rant. News.com.au. https://www.news.com.au/entertainment/tv/morning-shows/drug-addicts-pauline-hanson-bla sts-melbourne-tower-residents-for-not-learning-english/news-story/f0e4e53ce6851698382d1 f99ed29b171 Hanson, P. [@PaulineHansonOz]. (2022, September 9). Your attitude appals and disgusts me. When you immigrated to Australia you took every advantage of this country [Tweet]. Twitter. https://twitter.com/PaulineHansonOz/status/1568118251640750083?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw% 7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1568118251640750083%7Ctwgr%5Ea5c1ea7cf6 687ae6f8199c41c0d11b468c1b92e9%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.sbs. com.au%2Fnews%2Farticle%2Fwhy-a-tweet-from-pauline-hanson-could-be-referred-to-thehuman-rights-commission%2Fvsdxipyjr Hermansson, P., Lawrence, D., Mulhall, J., & Murdoch, S. (2020). The international alt-right: Fascism for the 21st century? (1st ed.). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429032486 IndigenousX [@IndigenousX]. (2022, September 9). For those saying we should be magnanimous about the passing of the queen [Tweet]. Twitter. https://twitter.com/indigenousx/status/156799 0400736178176 Jutel, O. (2019). Donald Trump, American populism, and affective media. In C. de la Torre (Ed.), Routledge handbook of global populism (pp. 249–263). Routledge. Krzy˙zanowski, M., Ekman, M., Nilsson, P.-E., Gardell, M., & Christensen, C. (2021). Uncivility, racism, and populism: Discourse and interactive practices in anti- & post-democratic communication. Nordicom Review, 42(1), 3–15. https://doi.org/10.2478/nor-2021-0003

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Lyons, E. (2020, July 6). Pauline Hanson banned from appearing on the Today show. News.com.au. https://www.news.com.au/national/politics/pauline-hanson-banned-from-appear ing-on-the-today-show/news-story/9e818a6c04d3b5dde145bdb0faae29b5 Machin, D., & Mayr, A. (2012). How to do critical discourse analysis: A multimodal introduction. Sage. Manucci, L. (2017). Populism and the media. In C. R. Kaltwasser, P. Taggart, P. O. Espejo, & P. Ostiguy (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of populism (Vol. 1, pp. 467–492). Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198803560.013.17 Mazzoleni, G. (2008). Populism and the media. In D. Albertazzi & D. McDonnell (Eds.), Twenty-first century populism: The spectre of Western European democracy (pp. 49–64). Palgrave. Moffitt, B. (2016). The global rise of populism: Performance, political style, and representation. Stanford University Press. Mudde, C. (2019). The far right today. Polity. Nayeri, D. (2017). The ungrateful refugee: ‘We have no debt to repay’. The Guardian. https://www. theguardian.com/world/2017/apr/04/dina-nayeri-ungrateful-refugee Reconciliation Australia. (2022). Acknowledgement of country and welcome to country. Reconciliation Australia. https://www.reconciliation.org.au/acknowledgement-of-country-and-welcometo-country/ Reisigl, M., & Wodak, R. (2009). The discourse-historical approach (DHA). In R. Wodak & M. Meyer (Eds.), Methods of critical discourse analysis (2nd ed., pp. 87–121). Sage. Sainty, L. (2017). Pauline Hanson just walked into the senate wearing a burqa, no, really. Buzzfeed. https://www.buzzfeed.com/lanesainty/pauline-hanson-burqa-senate Sengul, K. (2019a). Populism, democracy, political style and post-truth: Issues for communication research. Communication Research and Practice, 5(1), 88–101. https://doi.org/10.1080/220 41451.2019.1561399 Sengul, K. (2019b). Critical discourse analysis in political communication research: A case study of right-wing populist discourse in Australia. Communication Research and Practice, 5(4), 376–392. https://doi.org/10.1080/22041451.2019.1695082 Sengul, K. (2020). ‘Swamped’: The populist construction of fear, crisis and dangerous others in Pauline Hanson’s senate speeches. Communication Research and Practice, 6(1), 20–37. https:// doi.org/10.1080/22041451.2020.1729970 Sengul, K. (2021a). ‘It’s OK to be white’: The discursive construction of victimhood, ‘anti-white racism’ and calculated ambivalence in Australia. Critical Discourse Studies, 1–17,. https://doi. org/10.1080/17405904.2021.1921818 Sengul, K. (2021b). Never let a good crisis go to waste: Pauline Hanson’s exploitation of COVID-19 on Facebook. Media International Australia, 178(1), 101–105. https://doi.org/10.1177/132987 8X20953521 Sengul, K. (2022a). Performing islamophobia in the Australian parliament: The role of populism and performance in Pauline Hanson’s “burqa stunt.” Media International Australia, 184(1), 49–62. https://doi.org/10.1177/1329878X221087733 Sengul, K. (2022b). The role of political interviews in mainstreaming and normalizing the farright: A view from Australia. In O. Feldman (Ed.), Adversarial political interviewing: Worldwide perspectives during polarized times (pp. 357). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-98119-0576-6_18 Stromback, J., & Esser, F. (2014). Mediatisation of politics: Towards a theoretical framework. In F. Esser & J. Stromback (Eds.), Mediatisation of politics: Understanding the transformation of western democracies (pp. 3–28). Palgrave. Sorensen, L. (2021). Populist communication: Ideology, performance, mediation. Springer. https:// doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-65756-7 Thorpe, L. [@Senator Thorpe]. (2022, July 27). Pauline Hanson, you are ignorant and you are racist. [Tweet]. Twitter https://twitter.com/senatorthorpe/status/1552077364318060544?lang=en Victorian Ombudsman. (2020). Tower lockdown breached human rights, Ombudsman finds. https:// www.ombudsman.vic.gov.au/our-impact/news/public-housing-tower-lockdown/

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Waisbord, S. (2019). Populism as a media and communication phenomenon. In C. de la Torre (Ed.), Routledge handbook of global populism (pp. 221–234). Routledge. Wodak, R. (2009). The discourse of politics in action. Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1057/ 9780230316539 Wodak, R. (2021). The politics of fear: The shameless normalization of far-right discourse (2nd ed.). Sage. Wodak, R., & Meyer, M. (Eds.). (2009). Methods of critical discourse analysis (2nd ed). Sage. Wodak, R., Culpeper, J., & Semino, E. (2021). Shameless normalisation of impoliteness: Berlusconi’s and Trump’s press conferences. Discourse & Society, 32(3), 369–393. https://doi.org/10. 1177/0957926520977217 Wolfe, P. (2006). Settler colonialism and the elimination of the native. Journal of Genocide Research, 8(4), 387–409. https://doi.org/10.1080/14623520601056240

Kurt Sengul is a sessional lecturer and tutor at the University of Sydney, Australia. His research focuses on the political communication of the contemporary far-right and he has published widely in the areas of critical discourse studies, populist communication and the far-right.

Chapter 8

Well-Mannered Debasement? Examining Abe Shinzô’s Discourse and Its Reliance on Japanese Communication Modes Junki Nakahara

Abstract This chapter focuses on former Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzô’s use of debasement and related expressions in public settings, such as Diet deliberations, his official social media accounts, and their relationship to Japanese communication modes and etiquettes. A qualitative analysis of the collected text data shows that Abe’s debasement discourse positioned him as a victim of illegitimate criticism, accusations, and debasement by his political opponents (e.g., members of the current opposition party and former prime ministers from the Democratic Party of Japan) and the media (e.g., liberal-leaning newspapers Asahi and Mainichi). The significant consequence of his seemingly “defensive” debasement is to delegitimize the foundation of democratic processes—from legislative deliberations to investigations into high-echelon politicians’ abuse of power. It also helped create an environment where “criticism” is a negative word that connotes “nuisance” or “irrational.” Abe’s case suggests that his political debasement needed a “proper” stage and audience. Specifically, his latent forms of aggression that were not necessarily abusive and even used a polite tone, relied heavily on the audience who could decode his nuanced debasement expressions and amplify them as ordinary people’s words.

8.1 Introduction The assassination of Abe Shinzô,1 Japan’s longest-serving prime minister, on July 8, 2022, sparked debates not only on this shocking incident but also on his complicated political legacy. Although he was credited with his economic revitalization policy Abenomics and his pragmatic approach to diplomacy, Abe was also known as

1 Personal names are given in the Japanese order i.e., family name first. In Japanese, vowels can either be short or long; a diacritical mark, for example, â, ê, î, ô, or û over the vowel indicates that it is a long vowel.

J. Nakahara (B) School of Communication, American University, Washington, DC, USA e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 O. Feldman (ed.), Debasing Political Rhetoric, The Language of Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-0894-3_8

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the “face” of revisionist ideologues who downplayed the country’s wartime atrocities, reinterpreted the “war renunciation” and “pacifist” principle of the constitution, and advocated for patriotic education (Filippov, 2017; Leonhardt, 2022; McNeill, 2022; NPR, 2022). He and his party’s iconic “Take Back Japan” [Nippon wo Torimodosu] slogan and their goal of “restoring [the deprived] national pride” indicate that he shared key features with recent right-wing populist leaders such as Presidents Donald Trump (see also Chap. 12) and Jair Bolsonaro (see Chap. 5), and Prime Minister Narendra Modi (with their respective slogans, i.e., “Make America Great Again,” “Brazil above Everything, God above Everyone,” and “India Shining”). Critics have warned that suppression of free media under Abe and his tolerance for discrimination and hate speech against marginalized communities would lead to Japan’s authoritarian turn (Morris-Suzuki, 2013; Nakano, 2019). Nevertheless, a puzzle remains—whether an experienced, hereditary politician like him who survived in the political world for many years, should be regarded as a populist challenging the traditional order. Just as evaluations of his political competence, ideology, and legacy are deeply divided (NPR, 2022), the scrutiny surrounding Abe’s communication style and more specifically his use of debasement expressions is not straightforward. It is important first to understand Japanese culture and etiquette that “emphasize politeness, empathy, respect, care, and sympathy for the feelings and ‘face’ of others” (Feldman, 2023). Also, in its highly contextualized culture, Japanese communication modes prefer “vagueness, indirectness, and hesitation” over “precision, clarity, and forthrightness” (Feldman, 2021, p. 207). The dual concepts of honne (genuine and often informal thoughts) and tatemae (surface pretense to obscure one’s honne) play a significant role when a speaker decides which idea(s) in his/her mind to share with the hearer and to what extent. Political talk is no exception. Particularly in public speaking, including official statements, parliamentary debates, election campaign speeches, and interviews, most members of the National Diet, other political leaders, and government officials carefully “present their views with varying degrees of directness (honne) or fuzziness (tatemae)” (Feldman, 2021, p. 204). To do so, they try to sense and adjust themselves to the mood/atmosphere [fun-iki or kûki]; direct expressions of anger and hostility are mostly refrained from to avoid confrontation and awkward moments in public. Generally, harmony and order in politics, even during intense debates on highly contentious issues, are thus maintained. Despite this widely preferred communication style, not every Japanese politician follows the “unwritten” rules. Numerous high-profile politicians have been criticized because of their debasement-related expressions, such as hôgen (indiscreet remark), bôgen (violent or abusive language), or shitsugen (a slip of the tongue or misstatement), and on many occasions they are pressured to apologize and step down from their high position (Feldman, 2021, p. 211). Those “controversial” remarks range from abusive language in order to insult political opponents, to discriminatory comments targeting specific groups and individuals, such as women, LGBTQ communities, the elderly, racial/ethnic minorities, and sick people (for detailed remarks see Feldman, 2021, 2023). They cause trouble because using such language—from “inappropriate” public disclosure of genuine feelings to more

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overtly “bad” language—is considered to violate “norms” in Japanese communication etiquette. In other words, many politicians apologize for having chosen to make remarks that could have sounded insulting in public (and failed to keep them unspoken), and not necessarily for the language itself. Abe Shinzô himself was not a politician particularly notorious for shitsugen or bôgen—neither careless speech that failed to sense the mood/atmosphere nor explicitly derogatory words. Rather, as a prime minister he was often the one who apologized for his “responsibility” in appointing such people as ministers or to other highlevel positions. Perhaps for these reasons, previous studies have hardly focused on Abe’s communication style and strategy except for a few examples. Azuma (2022) analyzed Abe’s speaker-oriented speaking style in several political scandals and press conferences on the COVID-19 pandemic and noted that Abe “pursues what he, himself, wants to accomplish, and not what the general public wants to know or achieve” (Azuma, 2022, p. 202). Other works examined his strategy of politeness that was employed to build a good relationship with the hearer and protect himself from criticism (Demiyati et al., 2021; Kartika & Aziz, 2021). Abe’s debasement language and related expressions, hidden behind more outstanding cases of shitsugen/bôgen ministers, remains underdiscussed. It was only recently—since he faced allegations of corruption (e.g., the Moritomo and Kake Gakuen scandals in 2017)2 —that scholars, critics, and liberal-leaning media began problematizing his political incivility as a reflection of the “arrogance” [manshin] of his long-term government. They focused on Abe’s words that were used to create a sharp divide between his friends and foes, disregarding democratic procedures (e.g., Asahi, 2021; Nakano, 2019; Tokuyama, 2020). “Everyone, we must not be defeated by such people!” [Kon’na hitotachi ni, minasan, watashitachi wa makeru wake niwa ikanai!]—a video of Abe’s campaign rally in Akihabara, Tôkyô, where Abe showed support for Liberal Democratic Party (LDP3 )-backed candidates for the 2017 Tôkyô Metropolitan Assembly election, went viral (Egawa, 2017). Faced by protesters chanting for his resignation, he attempted to unify his supportive audience while pointing fingers and condemning those protesters. The remark, specifically his “such people” [kon’na hitotachi] contrasted with “we” [watashitachi], drew much attention because the use of such in this context carries a significantly negative nuance and an intention of emphasizing someone’s bad quality. This seemingly defensive comment may have come out of frustration 2

A series of corruption allegations since 2017 played a significant role in decreasing public support for the Abe administration. He was believed to have influenced the process of the sale of stateowned land to the Osaka-based educational institution Moritomo Gakuen and the later cover-up by altering official documents. The school operator Kagoike Yasunori used his tie with Abe’s wife, who was named the honorary principal of the school to be built on the site, to receive an extreme discount from purchasing the land. Months later, Abe was alleged to have helped his long-time friend Kake Kôtarô, the president of Kake Gakuen Education Institution, “obtain permission to run a veterinary school despite public consensus” against it (Feldman, 2021, p. 208). Despite his denial, these two scandals drew extensive media coverage and public criticism, remaining a stain on the longest-serving prime minister. 3 Abe served as the President of the LDP from 2006 to 2007 and from 2012 to 2020.

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with those who interfered with his speech. But it was quite effective in othering and delegitimizing those who disagreed with him as “nuisances” that disturbed the harmony of the event (Nakahara, 2021). His “counter-attack” against Akihabara protesters can also be understood as a form of name-calling that took advantage of the Japanese communication etiquette. Another prominent example was Abe’s yaji (i.e., heckling) during Diet deliberations. Normally, Diet meetings are dominated by formal interactions (exchange of tatemae) among Diet members and government bureaucrats; they are also aired live and documented as Diet meeting minutes. All the questions for deliberations, expected respondents and responses (mostly scripted), and time allocation, are planned in advance. Besides that, all members except those scheduled to speak are required to remain seated and quiet. Therefore, statements unrelated to the agenda, offensive comments, and irregular remarks that interfere with the progress of the meeting are considered unacceptable. Abe’s heckling mostly targeted members of the opposition party who were in a position to interrogate his policymaking and scandals. Facing a “harsh” question and comment on February 12, 2020, from Tsujimoto Kiyomi (of the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan) on his responsibility regarding a series of bribery allegations, he responded dismissively: “That’s a stupid question. It’s a meaningless question” [Baka mitai na shitsumon da na. Imi no nai shitsumon da yo] (Makabe, 2020). His impulsive reaction was soon “denounced as uncivil and inappropriate for a prime minister” (Azuma, 2022, p. 205). Abe was also known for his “Nikkyôso heckling” in 2015. In the middle of Tamaki Yûichirô’s (then-Party of Hope) question on unlawful political donations to one of the ministers in the Abe Cabinet, the prime minister suddenly yelled from his seat, “Nikkyôso (Japan Teachers Union)!” When Tamaki and Committee Chair Ôshima Tadamori tried to stop his irregular remarks, Abe repeated loudly, “what about Nikkyôso!” In Japanese political talk, this example is beyond the realm of heated/intense debates because, first, Abe was not the one scheduled to speak, and more importantly, the ongoing interrogation then had nothing to do with the Teachers Union. The “Nikkyôso heckling” may be on the borderline between debasement and simply more impolite or immature behavior as it was not a direct attack against Tamaki. However, it is crucial to note Abe’s use of “whataboutism” to reduce the value and quality of the question/meeting, as well as his way of undercutting serious debate by disrupting the flow of questions and responses. Abe continued to be influential in his party’s decision-making process and an active public speaker after his resignation as prime minister in 2020 due to illness (Leonhardt, 2022). In mid-July 2021, his comment on the hosting of the Tôkyô Olympics that had been postponed for a year due to the global COVID-19 pandemic, sparked controversy (Yoshii, 2021). Regarding the spread of critical voices opposing the event, Abe argued: I can’t help but feel that they [those who were against hosting the event] have an extreme political agenda. They may be offended by the success of the Olympics in Japan. As represented by the Japanese Communist Party, people who have been criticized by some as being

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anti-Japan [han’nichi] in their historical view and other areas are strongly opposed to the event. The Asahi Shimbun and others have also clearly expressed their opposition. [Kiwamete seiji-tekina ito wo kanjizaru wo emasen ne. Karera wa, nihon de orinpikku ga seikô suru koto ni fukai-kan wo jitte iru node wa nai ka. Kyôsantô ni daihyô sareru yô ni, rekishi ninshiki nado ni oite mo ichibu kara han’nichi-teki dewanai ka to hihan sarete iru hitotachi ga, konkai no kaisai ni tsuyoku hantai shite imasu. Asahi shimbun nado mo meikaku ni hantai wo hyômei shimashita]. (Ishii & Nakayama, 2021)

Han’nichi is a word used frequently by right-wing internet users [netto uyoku or neto-uyo] to verbally attack particular neighboring countries like South Korea and China that oppose Japan on the issues of Japan’s war/colonial responsibility and specific wartime atrocities, such as the Nanjing Massacre4 and the so-called “comfort women”5 issue. Interestingly, the label is also used to demonize their perceived enemies within the country—from relatively liberal lawmakers (e.g., the former Democratic Party of Japan—DPJ) and news outlets (e.g., Asahi and Mainichi) to individuals, especially political, religious, ethnic, and gender minorities (Schäfer, 2022; Yamaguchi, 2019). This is the way to draw the line between “good,” “normal” Japanese citizens and “unpatriotic” han’nichi people, who disturb social harmony, and to delegitimize the latter. In his statement on the Olympic Games, Abe employed the exact same dichotomy, not merely to demean the Japanese Communist Party and Asahi as representative of “han’nichi.” He refused to treat public voices worrying about an increase in COVID-19 cases and inadequate countermeasures as valuable criticism or rational debate. Those voices were reduced to a distorted emotion shared by people who “hate the country” and its “success.” Besides the language itself, attention should also be paid to the context of Abe’s “han’nichi” debasement. The quote above was part of his conversation with journalist Sakurai Yoshiko on Monthly Hanada, one of the conservative magazines that feature pro-Abe, pro-LDP journalists and intellectuals. Although han’nichi is one of the most popular and convenient labels used by Abe-friendly media and individuals, until then Abe himself almost never used it publicly to attack his opponent. It seems that he chose to use the word in the interview on Monthly Hanada, because at the point he was no longer the incumbent prime minister whose every move and word can be a point of contention. Second, he may have believed that the magazine, the interviewer, and the audience shared with him an antipathy towards liberal lawmakers, media, 4

The Nanjing Massacre is known as a mass killing by the Imperial Japanese Army force in late 1937, when Japan occupied Nanjing (or Nanking), the capital of Nationalist China, in the midst of the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945). Victims are considered to include both soldiers and civilians. The revisionist discourse spreading primarily among Japanese conservative nationalists, ranging from denial of the number of victims to denial of the occurrence of the horrific event altogether, has angered the Chinese for years. 5 “Comfort women” [ianfu] or “military comfort women” [jûgun ianfu] is a euphemistic expression to describe women who were forced to provide sexual services to Japanese soldiers before and during WWII. The 1993 Kôno Statement, issued by a non-LDP cabinet, acknowledges the military’s involvement in the establishment and management of the brothels called the “comfort stations” [ianjo], particularly the recruitment of women against their will. Since Abe took office for the first time in 2006, he has showed his enthusiasm for invalidating the Kôno Statement that declared general remorse and apology to those victimized.

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and individuals, and therefore would decode his message favorably as he intended. He was aware of the “stage” where his honne, a genuinely negative attitude toward his political rivals, was highly accepted and appreciated. These examples suggest that examining Abe’s debasement, including latent forms of aggression that at first glance are not necessarily “abusive” within Japan’s “highcontext” culture and communication etiquette, will help reexamine and extend the definition of “debasement discourse.” After a brief description of my research design, the remainder of this chapter focuses on the following key questions: what type of language—from particular words and phrases to discursive strategies—did Abe use in his debasement discourse and related expressions? Who were the main targets when Abe used such expressions and why? What could have been the purpose and expected effect(s) of his debasement language?

8.2 Methodology and Data To analyze Abe’s debasement discourse in a structured manner, including many examples that did not receive intense media coverage and public attention, I first identified keywords he used in his interviews and commentaries on conservative magazines to describe particular political and social actors “opposing” him. As described in the previous section, the conservative magazine was an important media platform on which Abe would have been confident and comfortable using debasement language. To access the transcribed interview data, this stage of data collection took advantage of four “memorial” [tsuitô] volumes of popular conservative magazines published in response to Abe’s assassination in July, 2022: Monthly Sêron September Special Issue [Gekkan Sêron Kugatsu-gô Zôkan], Monthly WiLL September Special Collection [Gekkan WiLL Kugatsu Tokushû-gô], Monthly Hanada September Extra Edition [Gekkan Hanada Kugatsu Tokudai-gô], and Monthly Hanada Selection: Thank you and Goodbye, Former Prime Minister Abe Shinzô [Gekkan hanada serekushon: Arigatô soshite sayonara abe shinzô motosôri]. Each of them reprinted Abe’s past interviews and commentaries and/or each writer’s essay describing Abe’s accomplishments and remarks. Reading these volumes helped identify five key terms and phrases (detailed below) that Abe frequently mentioned in talking negatively about specific groups or individuals. There were many occasions where the interviewer used more explicit debasements, and Abe as the interviewee went with the flow and gave his opinion without denying them. While they can be seen as his implicit endorsement for such debasements, this chapter only analyzed the words Abe himself used. The second stage focused on exploring whether and how Abe used those keywords on platforms other than conservative magazines. Data were collected from the National Diet meeting minutes (National Diet Library, n.d., https://kokkai.ndl.go. jp/#/) and Abe’s social media accounts (Twitter and Facebook). Diet deliberations and politicians’ social media posts can be both categorized broadly as public speaking,

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but each has a different nature. Diet meetings are less formal compared to policy speeches delivered by the prime minister in the Diet (i.e., shisei hôshin enzetsu and shoshin hyômei enzetsu) and press conferences, but they are also recorded and often aired live on television. The collected data helped analyze Abe’s debasement usage in “direct” interactions, especially confrontations, with his political opponents and rivals. Numerous political leaders use social media as a tool to reach a wider audience, particularly “digital native” young voters. Also, their voices can easily get amplified by supporters using the platform’s interactive functions (e.g., repost, retweet, quote, reply). With 2.5 million followers on Twitter (@AbeShinzo) and more than 670 thousand fans on Facebook (as of September 2022), Abe was the most successful Japanese politician on social media (Zappa, 2020). Analyzing his debasement tweets and Facebook posts potentially addresses the following questions: Did his debasement and related expressions in online and offline settings use different styles? How did he choose to use or not use such language to please his supporters and at the same time maintain his persona that was “universally” accepted?

8.3 Results 8.3.1 Debasement as “Defense” A qualitative analysis of the collected text data showed that Abe’s debasements were dominated by several typical words and phrases, including “labelling” [retteru hari], “impression manipulation” [inshô sôsa], “disinformation/hoax” [dema], “fabrication” [netsuzô], and “to demean” [otoshime(ru)]. Labelling is the most prominent and frequent word/phrase used in his debasements and related expressions. The Japanese term always carries an explicitly negative connotation and implies that the labelling is one-sided, definitive, and with a malicious intention of degrading someone or something. During a meeting of the House of Representatives Budget Committee on February 24, 2017, Abe responded to Imai Masato (then-Democratic Party member), the chairperson of the Moritomo Gakuen scandal investigation team, and argued: You people are so quick to try to label me as such. You have been repeating that kind of impression manipulation for a long time on this issue, as if I was really involved in it, using the televised time of this Budget Committee, and you are all good at it, and maybe that is all you are capable of doing. […] There is no way I […] would be involved in covering up the Moritomo Gakuen website, is there? That kind of image manipulation should stop. I can clearly say that it is because you are doing such things that you are unable to gain the people’s trust. [Anata-tachi wa sugu ni sô yatte retteru hari wo shiyou to shite iru. Kono mondai ni tsuite mo, marude watashi ga kan’yo shite iru ka nogotoku no, zutto sô iu imêji sôsa wo kono yosan iinkai no terebi-tsuki no jikan wo tsukatte en’ento kurikaeshite imasu ga, minasan wa sore ga tokui da shi, sore shika nai no kamo shirenai. […] Watashi ga […] moritomo gakuen no

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hômupêji ni taishite watashi ga inpei shiyôganai janai desu ka. Sô iu imêji sôsa wa yameru beki desu yo. Sô iu koto wo shite irukara kokumin no shinrai wo eru koto ga minasan wa dekinai ndesu yo, hakkiri to môshiagete]. (National Diet Library, 2017, p. 13)

Abe used two keywords, “labelling” and “image/impression manipulation,” to counter Imai’s question, claiming that the opposition party had a clear political agenda to attack Abe and manipulate public opinion. This example also indicates his attempt to emphasize and tell the audience through television that his opponent is only capable of wasting the limited time of the Diet meeting by making meaningless and baseless accusations. In this way, Abe belittled the effort to interrogate his scandal as inconsequential and inappropriate for the National Diet. Related to this aspect, he made a similar comment in 2020: maintaining a polite tone, he said, I am very afraid/sorry that we have to go on and on with interactions like this [on the issue of his political scandals] in this important Budget Committee meeting, even though there are many serious issues to be discussed. [En’ento kô iu yaritori wo kono taisetsu na yosan iinkai de yaranakereba ikenai to iu no wa taihen kyôshuku de gozaimasu, jûyô na mondai ga takusan aru ni mo kakawarazu desu ne]. (National Diet Library, 2020, p. 34)

In the first example, Abe also concluded the “reason” why the opposition party cannot gain public trust and popularity. It is beyond the scope of this study to judge if his statement was tactical, or even partially scripted, or was an “unintentional” debasement that came from his frustration at that moment and urgency to protect himself from the accusation. But it is not hard to find his sarcasm and derisive attitude in portraying the opponent working so hard but never achieving their alleged “goal”—to shake the Abe Cabinet and his power as prime minister. Another prominent example was found in a debate on February 29, 2016, over the Abe administration’s pressure on mass media. Ridiculing Okuno Sôichirô’s (thenDPJ member) “effort” to claim that the government threaten freedom of the press, Abe said: “You spent more than 30 minutes trying your best to manipulate the image and to label [negatively], but my impression is that it might not have worked very well” [Isshôkenmei, sanjû sû-fun tsukatte, imêji sôsa shiyô, retteru hari wo shiyô to shita ndesu ga, kore wa nakanaka umaku ikanakatta node wanai ka na to iu no ga watashi no kansô de gozaimasu] (National Diet Library, 2016, p. 26). The way Abe called for Diet members’ “calm” and “rational” discussion is also noteworthy. On March 20, 2015, he tried to restrain the heated political and public debate on the collective self-defense (CSD) legislation, or what the administration called “peace legislation” by stating: Discussions on security legislation should be conducted in a calm and collected manner. […] I believe that we should avoid throwing around labels or irresponsible criticism. For example, I think it is fair to say that calling the CSD legislation “the war bill,” “the draft” is demagogic. The Liberal Democratic Party has just celebrated its 60th anniversary this year, and I believe that our pride is to fulfill our responsibility without becoming a demagogue and without being defeated by demagoguery.

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[Anzen hoshô hôsei no giron to iu no wa reisei ni giron wo suru beki de ari. […] retteru hari aruiwa musekinin’na hihan no nageai wa yokeru bekina ndarou to…. Iwaba, tatoeba sensô hôan, chôhei-sei ga hajimaru, kore wa demagogî to itte mo watashi wa î ndarou to omoimasu. Jiyûminshutô wa kotoshi rittô roku jû-nen wo mukaeta tokoro de arimasu ga, wareware no hokori wa, kesshite demagôgu ni wa narazu, soshite demagogî ni wa makezu ni sekinin wo hatashite iku to iu koto]. (National Diet Library, 2015, p. 44)

Abe’s seemingly polite statement on how to proceed with legislative debates was concluded by delegitimizing many critical voices against the bill as disinformation/hoax [dema]. On the same day, facing Konishi Hiroyuki (then-Democratic Party) criticizing Abe’s arbitrary use of “cabinet decisions” [kakugi kettei] as a violation of Japan’s parliamentary government system [giin naikaku sei], the prime minister responded: Diet member Konishi, I think it would be better for us to discuss things a little more calmly. This is not a place for labelling, defamation, or slander targeting the other, so I think we should both calm down a little and stop pointing fingers at each other. [Konishi iin, môsukoshi reisei ni natte giron wo shita kata ga watashi wa î to omoimasu yo. Aite ni retteru wo hattari toka, hibou chûshô wo suru basho de wa gozaimasen kara, otagai ni chotto ochitsuite, aite wo dondon yubisashitari toka, sô iu koto wo suru no wa otagai ni yameta kata ga î to…]. (National Diet Library, 2015, p. 15)

These examples may not be recognized as debasements in other countries and cultures. It is also fair to say that Abe simply tried to protect himself from criticism and accusations by distracting people’s eyes from the issue itself to his opponent’s “inappropriate” speech style. However, in Japan, “reminding” or “teaching” someone how to behave well, using “should or shouldn’t” [beki or beki de wanai], implies a more complex meaning, specifically but not exclusively, an emphasis on the person’s misbehaviors or bad manners. The significance of this expression is twofold. First, publicly and directly indicating someone’s bad manners is avoided unless there are clear power dynamics, such as between a supervisor and a supervisee, between the superior and the subordinate, and between parents and children. In the context of Diet deliberations, no member is supposed to have “authority” or “superiority” to teach other members (his/her colleagues) how to behave properly because it has a risk of showing a condescending attitude. In this sense, Abe’s comment neglected the Japanese communication etiquette. But Abe still chose to use the expression in a way that was preferable in the Japanese communication etiquette. Here lies the second key point. Using an auxiliary verb (e.g., masu, gozaimasu, and desu) signifying politeness helped his comment sound well-mannered. It not only obscured his irritation toward the opponent but also contrasted his manner with the opponent’s alleged “labelling, defamation, or slander” (National Diet Library, 2015, p. 15). Such nuance helped Abe implicitly blame the opponent for creating unnecessary confrontations and disrupting parliamentary harmony—the least acceptable form of public behavior. It was a subtle way to delegitimize critical voices by relying on the socio-cultural features of the Japanese language. The tatemae, “[we should] discuss things a little more calmly” could (not necessarily aways but usually) imply a honne, “the opponent is not calm enough;” “our pride is […] without becoming a demagogue and

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without being defeated by demagoguery” could be followed by an unspoken honne, “unlike you and your party.” In some cases, Abe used a similar type of sarcasm in a somewhat more explicit manner. For instance, he commented on Fukushima Mizuho (of the Social Democratic Party) and her question regarding the CSD legislation in a dismayed tone: “I hope you could discuss [the issue] seriously and with some integrity; I really think so” [majime ni fukushima-san mo giron wo shite itadakitai na to, kore wa hontô ni sô omou wake de gozaimasu] and blamed her for “trivializing” [waishôka] the discussion by using “labelling” [retteru hari] (Mainichi, 2015).

8.3.2 The Target of Abe’s Debasement Language As the previous section showed, Abe used debasements primarily to protect himself from criticism regarding his controversial legislation, such as the reinterpretation of Article 9 of the “pacifist” constitution (the CSD legislation) in 2015, the socalled “labor law reforms” [hatarakikata kaikaku] in 2018, and accusations about corruption and abuse of power. More precisely, his use of debasement was in the context of defending himself, the “legitimate” leader, from “illegitimate” accusations “fabricated” by those with malicious intentions and biases. The core of his seemingly defensive debasement is to reduce the worth of time and space for scrutiny and deliberation—the rejection of democratic, deliberative procedures (Nakano, 2019). Therefore, any actors critical of him or his policy, especially politicians from the opposition party participating in Diet deliberations and often contradicting him, could be the target of his debasement language. Nonetheless, the collected data suggest that there were also several “permanent” targets of Abe’s name-calling: the mass media, especially liberal-leaning Asahi, and former Prime Minister Kan Naoto (then-DPJ member).

8.3.2.1

Mass Media

Abe’s relationship with the mass media, particularly his hostility toward liberalleaning news media’s critical coverage, had been problematized long before he first took office in 2006 and restored power in 2012 (McNeill & Hayashi, 2022). In his interviews and commentaries on conservative magazines such as Hanada, Sêron, and WiLL, he repeated how “baseless” liberal/left-leaning media’s relentless attacks were and the ways he managed to “overcome” the unfriendly media coverage and maintain his power.6 6

In those interviews, Abe rarely used debasement to delegitimize the media’s criticism. It was the interviewer that frequently tried to debase anti-Abe/LDP news coverage and asked him to agree with how “baseless” or “ludicrous” the coverage was. Abe either gave tacit agreement or chose to show generous and humble attitudes by using polite language and laughs, presenting himself as tolerant even to the media “hostile” against him. While it can be seen as a subtle form of promoting his kind personality, his language also implied a sarcasm that the media’s “effort” to denounce him

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Abe seized the opportunity to discredit Asahi again in the Moritomo Gakuen scandal. He left a reply to an LDP member’s Facebook post titled “Asahi, who cannot/never apologize,” detailing its mistake in reporting the scandal, saying: “It is pathetic. A miserable excuse, typical of Asahi – It was as expected” [Aware desu ne. Asahi rashî mijimena îwake. yosô dôri deshita] (J-Cast News, 2018, the reply was deleted later). His resignation as prime minister in 2020 further enabled him to share his sarcastic comments targeting Asahi with a wider audience outside the conservative “bubble.” In the middle of the COVID-19 pandemic, Abe tweeted that Asahi and Mainichi are bôgai yukaihan, that can be translated as an obstructionist felon who takes delight in people’s reaction: “The Asahi and the Mainichi can be described as extremely malicious obstructionists. It will be interesting to see how both companies respond to the Defense Ministry’s protest” [Asahi, mainichi wa kiwamete akushitsuna bôgai yukai-han to ieru. Bôei-shô no kôgi ni ryôsha ga dô kotaeru ka chûmoku] (Abe, 2021a). Abe quoted his young brother and Defense Minister Kishi Nobuo’s tweet denouncing these liberal newspapers that found a flaw in the state’s system/platform for coronavirus vaccination applications. Kishi argued that their actions could prevent the Self-Defense Force Mass Vaccination Center from carrying out its business and lead to a waste of limited vaccines for elderly people (Kishi, 2021). Abe’s namecalling in his comment reads not only as an attack against Asahi and Mainichi, known for their consistently critical attitude toward Abe, but also as a means of helping his brother evade criticism by distracting public attention from the flawed system/platform itself. Another tweet posted on May 28, 2021, introduced a book titled “The Collapsing Asahi Shimbun” [Hôkai, asahi shimbun], written by former Asahi reporter Hasegawa Hiroshi. Abe praised the book that focused on where Asahi’s “chronic disease” [shukua] of “fabrication” [netsuzô] and its nature come from, saying, “It is worth reading as 10 mystery novels. This is not just a book of criticism, but a book of Mr. Hasegawa’s whole heart” [Misuterî shôsetsu jussatsu bun no yomigotae. Tan’naru hihanbon dewanai hasegawa-shi konshin no sho desu] (Abe, 2021b). This ironic expression discredited Asahi as a “disinformation spreader” by nature and tried to impress the audience with the contribution made by Hasegawa, who decided to leave Asahi and put his energy into exposing its “chronic disease” to the public.7

was worthless and their “goal” would never be achieved. This type of indirect debasement that borrowed someone else’s mouth is excluded from the main analysis because it is outside the focus of this volume. 7 The image of the book attached to the tweet is also noteworthy. The book has a book band [obi] that reads, “From the comfort women issue to the Moritomo-Kake report, there is a parade of false information. Asahi is no longer a newspaper, but an ‘agitation flyer’ and ‘scratch paper’!” A blurred Asahi newspaper serves as background. This attachment seems to imply Abe’s implicit endorsement of Hasegawa’s debasement language targeting Asahi. He used Hasegawa’s words to complement his own tweet.

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Former Prime Minister Kan Naoto

Strong criticism, sometimes accompanied by sensational expressions of rival parties and politicians is commonly used in efforts to either maintain dominance or take (back) office and does not necessarily constitute debasement. Abe’s language on such occasions, particularly against the DPJ and some of the leading figures from the party, is still worth analyzing because of its persistence. It lasted even after the DPJ fell from power as the ruling party in 2012 and later the party was dissolved in 2016. Abe called the DPJ administration a “nightmare,” to emphasize the legitimacy of his LDP as the ruling party (Nakahara, 2021). Later, he also repeatedly used the term to remind the public of the “bad” experience and memory of the regime change. As an individual politician, former Prime Minister (2010–2011) Kan Naoto is the one who consistently received Abe’s name-calling. Some examples can be found in Abe’s Facebook posts. The two veteran politicians had a direct confrontation in court in 2015. The defamation lawsuit filed by Kan was over Abe’s newsletter article denouncing then-Prime Minister Kan’s “false decision and lies” [machigatta handan to uso] during the Fukushima nuclear disaster in 2011 (The Huffington Post, 2015). Abe won the lawsuit, and Kan’s appeal was dismissed by Tôkyô District Court, Tôkyô High Court, and Supreme Court. In his Facebook post on February 22, 2017, regarding the court decision that admitted that the newsletter was within the scope of legitimate criticism, Abe emphasized the “victory of truth” [shinjitsu no shôri]. With the confidence of representing “truth,” he denounced Kan’s action as a time-wasting “publicity stunt” [baimê kôi] to “demean” [otoshimeru] Abe with a clear political agenda right before an election (Abe, 2017). There might have been a lack of evidence to say the newsletter itself was a debasement or a fabrication to attack Kan, as the Courts ruled. But the Facebook post that used baimê kôi, an aggressive expression to reduce the value of Kan’s accusation and court action to a selfish publicity stunt or self-advertisement, can be understood as another example of Abe’s “defensive” debasement. This post with a photo of Kan’s smiling face as an ironic attachment drew many celebratory responses, mainly from his supporters, and criticism on Abe’s way of blurring his responsibility for promoting nuclear power generation. Besides, Abe’s messages of support for LDP candidates could also become a site of debasement and related expressions targeting his (former) political rivals like Kan. Below is an excerpt from Abe’s Facebook post calling for people to vote for LDP candidate Tsuchiya Masatada running against Kan: As you all know, Mr. Kan Naoto is the person who signed the petition for the life of Shin Kwang-soo, the former North Korean agent who was responsible for the abductions. He is also the person who through the Democratic Party of Japan provided 100 million yen in funding to the Citizens’ Circle, an organization that supports those associated with the Yodo-go criminals who were also involved in the abduction operation. The candidate of our party, Mr. Tsuchiya Masatada, is a man who has accomplished great achievements as the mayor of Musashino City. [Kan naoto-san wa minasan gozonji no yô ni, rachi jiken no jikkô-han de aru kitachôsen no moto kôsaku-in, shingansu no jomei tangan-sho ni sain shita jinbutsu desu. Soshite rachi sakusen ni kakawatte ita, yodo-gô-han no kankei wo shien shite iru dantai de aru “shimin

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no kai” ni ichi okuen mo no shikin teikyô wo minshutô wo tôshite itte ita jinbutsu demo arimasu. Tai suru waga tô no kôho, tsuchiya masatada-san wa musashino shichô to shite ôkina jisseki wo agete kita jinbutsu desu]. (Abe, 2012)

Abe’s description of Kan’s “commitment” to individuals and groups associated with North Korean abductions of Japanese citizens and far-left extremists was not a complete fabrication but a simplified “fact” to mislead the audience to believe Kan’s “tie” or even “sympathy” with abduction criminals. The post reflects the intention of using North Korean abduction, one of the most contentious and politicized problems in Japan’s international relations, to discredit Kan, exploiting the audience’s anger and fear about the horrible crime. The entire post was concluded by calling for public support for Tsuchiya “for Japan” [nihon no tame ni] (Abe, 2012). The dichotomy between allegedly “pro-North Korean” Kan and a decent politician, Tsuchiya, seems to be a careful way to claim that voting for Kan would be an “unpatriotic” behavior/decision.

8.4 Conclusion: Debasement Needs a “Proper” Stage and Audience Most of the examples examined in this chapter suggest that Abe’s debasement discourse took a form that positioned himself as a victim/target of illegitimate criticism, accusations, and debasement by his political opponents and the media. It was used not only to question the trustworthiness of such actors but also to delegitimize the foundation for, and time spent on, deliberations on legislation as well as investigations into high-echelon politicians’ abuse of power. Regardless of whether his debasement language was tactically chosen by his team or more simply due to his own personality, the ways in which he denounced critical voices and incremental processes of scrutiny helped him impose a negative connotation to the word “criticism” [hihan] itself. To put it another way, the significant consequence of Abe’s seemingly “defensive” debasement in a polite tone is to create an environment where “criticism” is a negative word, and listening to opposing views, particularly ones considered minority opinions, is regarded unworthy. In such an environment, the ruling LDP and its leaders do not need to put energy into attracting public support for their political agendas and ideas nor need to be held accountable. There are some exceptions to Abe’s “defensive” or even “well-mannered” debasements. In his interview on Monthly Hanada in 2022, Abe used the direct expression “enemy within” to debase intellectuals and mass media opposing his stance on rewiring Japan’s war history or what conservative lawmakers and intellectuals

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call “history wars” [rekishi sen].8 After labelling those who criticized his revisionist historical view, whom he regarded as “the Left” and “liberal fascist,” Abe also noted: The trouble with history wars [rekishi sen] is that the enemy is on Japan’s “inside.” They shoot [us] from behind. The Asahi is a typical example. They reported the contents of a textbook, a so-called “white cover book,” before it officially passed [the textbook examination/censorship] and set it on fire, turning it into a diplomatic issue […] the comfort women issue, Yasukuni Shrine visits, and the list goes on and on. [Rekishi-sen de yakkaina no wa, nihon no “uchigawa” ni teki ga iru koto desu. Ushiro kara utareru. Asahi shimbun ga tenkei desu ne. Gôkaku mae no tokutei kyôkasho, iwayuru shirabyôshi hon no naiyô wo hôdô wo shite hi wo tsuke, gaikô mondai-ka saseta “shinpen nipponshi” mondai ya ianfu mondai, yasukuni sanpai nado, agereba kiri ga arimasen]. (Abe & Kato, 2022, p. 70)

In this example, Abe pointed to Asahi as a typical example of “traitors” in what he called a “history war” that Japan must unite to fight (against certain neighboring countries). Such a manifest form of debasement was avoided in both Diet deliberations and social media. Particularly in the Diet meetings, he almost never used the term “the Left” “leftist,” or even “left-leaning.” By doing so, he avoided clearly positioning himself as a right-wing politician or giving such an impression to the general citizenry. This “strategy” needs to be understood in the context of Japanese culture and communication that prefers vagueness and indirectness (Feldman, 2021). For any individuals and groups, even those in politics, promoting clear-cut political ideologies or being overly “opinionated” is not something preferable because it can increase the risk of confrontation. Same for the “han’nichi” label. The early section introduced Abe’s remark on the spread of critical voices against the Olympic Games, but such language was quite rare and limited to conservative magazines, in which he did not have to hide his “knife” because a favorable audience reception was mostly guaranteed. In contrast, on Facebook his debasement language was “diluted” as follows: “We will inform you on Facebook, as NHK will not report on the summit meeting with a pro-Japan country like Mexico” [Mekishiko no yôna shin’nichi-teki na kuni tono shunô-kaidan wa, NHK mo hôdô shinai node, feisubukku de oshirase shimasu.] (Abe, 2013). The label “pro-Japan” [shin’nichi] was used to suggest the existence of “antiJapan” [han’nichi] countries and then imply that Japan Broadcasting Corporation (Nippon Hôsô Kyôkai, NHK) prioritized covering such countries over reporting about countries friendly to Japan. It also conveyed the nuance that he, as prime minister, would dare to share the information with his followers directly because NHK failed to fulfill its role as a news organization. 8

The term “history wars” was initially coined by right-wing opinion magazine Sêron under the daily Sankei, a pro-Abe/LDP national newspaper (Yamaguchi, 2020). It refers to the effort led by conservative lawmakers, intellectuals, and citizens, to address “misunderstanding” about Imperial Japan’s expansionism and wartime atrocities, including the denial of the Japanese military’s responsibility in the forceful recruitment of the “comfort women.” They have attempted to “restore” Japan’s international reputation that was allegedly harmed by “disinformation” spreading among neighboring countries such as China and South Korea due to, based on their argument, Asahi’s “fabrication.”

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Further, his supporters on social media, who share the use of the shin’nichi vs. han’nichi dichotomy as a common vocabulary, might also have been able to decode the message claiming that NHK’s reporting is leaning toward “anti-Japan” or “unpatriotic.” This quick post avoided using overtly abusive language known to wide audiences. It appealed to his supporters/fans by using a contextualized cue “pro-Japan” and at the same time maintained his polite character that was “universally” accepted as a public figure. Abe’s debasement discourse relied heavily on specific environments in which negative impressions on non-LDP actors are normalized, and on “proper” audiences who could decode his latent, indirect debasement expressions and amplify them as ordinary people’s words. In this sense, his debasement language should have been a complex mix of top-down and bottom-up elements, rather than aggression (bôgen) that exploited his own distinctive personality or iconoclastic charisma as a “populist” leader. The significant limitation of the data analyzed in this chapter is that they did not enable me to empirically examine the actual discursive space that provided Abe with the foundation for debasement or made him believe it was “safe” to use debasement language. Further studies, particularly audience-focused research, need to be conducted to discuss how such language was received and interpreted, as well as the extent to which it was accepted and amplified.

References Abe, S. (2012, November 24). Today, I made a speech in Kichijôji. It is my favorite town where I used to go every day when I was a student [Image attached] [Status update]. Facebook. https:// www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=269464219843695&set=a.131635893626529 (in Japanese). Abe, S. (2013, April 8). We will inform you on Facebook, as NHK will not report on the summit meeting with a pro-Japan country like Mexico [quoted a post by the Prime Minister’s Office]. Facebook. https://www.facebook.com/abeshinzo/posts/227094157433358 (in Japanese). Abe, S. (2017, February 22). Regarding the defamation lawsuit filed by former Prime Minister Kan Naoto against my mail magazine article [Image attached] [Status update]. Facebook. https:// www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=1174462802677161&set=a.132334373556681 (in Japanese). Abe, S. [@AbeShinzo]. (2021a, May 18). The Asahi and the Mainichi can be described as extremely malicious obstructionists [Tweet; quoted Kishi Nobuo’s tweet on March 17, 2021a]. Twitter. https://twitter.com/abeshinzo/status/1394572582058217478 (in Japanese). Abe, S. [@AbeShinzo] (2021b, March 28). “Collapsing Asahi Shimbun” by former Asahi reporter Hasegawa Hiroshi [Tweet; attached a photo of Hasegawa’s book]. Twitter. https://twitter.com/ abeshinzo/status/1398165430854840321 (in Japanese). Abe, S., & Kato, K. (2022, June). This is a “history war.” Sado gold mine’s “World Heritage registration issue.” Monthly Hanada Selection: Thank you and goodbye, former Prime Minister Abe Shinzô, 71–79 (in Japanese). Asahi. (2021, March 19). Ask me a question quickly! Abe yells 112 times, and his aides, too. https://www.asahi.com/articles/ASP3L31PNP35UTFK02Y.html?_requesturl=art icles%2FASP3L31PNP35UTFK02Y.html&pn=7 (in Japanese). Azuma, S. (2022). A study of former Japanese Prime Minister Abe’s speaking style in 2020: Listener-oriented or speaker-oriented? Athens Journal of Mass Media and Communications, 8(3), 201–218.

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Demiyati, L., Muslim, M. U., & Aryanti, U. (2021). Hedging in Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s political speech. In N. Nazarudin & V. Engelenhoven (Eds.), On language, education, politics, and identity: A cross-linguistics perspective (pp. 391–404). Nova Science. Egawa, S. (2017, July 3). The real cause of Abe’s defeat as seen in the “such people” [kon’na hitotachi] comment. Yahoo! Japan News. https://news.yahoo.co.jp/byline/egawashoko/2017070300072877 (in Japanese). Feldman, O. (2021). Decoding Japanese politicians’ rhetoric: Socio-cultural features of public speaking. In O. Feldman (Ed.), When politicians talk: The cultural dynamics of public speaking (pp. 203–220). Springer. Feldman, O. (2023). Challenging etiquette: Insults, sarcasm, and irony in Japanese politicians’ discourse. In O. Feldman (Ed.), Political debasement: Incivility, contempt, and humiliation in parliamentary and public discourse (pp. 93–116). Springer. Filippov, D. (2017, June 13). Shinzo Abe: Ideologue or pragmatist? The Diplomat. https://thedip lomat.com/2017/06/shinzo-abe-ideologue-or-pragmatist/ Ishii, K., & Nakayama, G. (2021, July 8). Former Prime Minister Abe’s labeling that does not read public will/opinion: The “anti-Japanese people oppose the Olympic Games” comment sparked criticism. Tôkyô. https://www.tokyo-np.co.jp/article/115259 (in Japanese). J-Cast News. (2018, February 11). Prime Minister Abe comments on Moritomo article on FB: “It’s a miserable excuse, typical of Asahi” and “it’s pathetic.” https://www.j-cast.com/2018/02/113 21005.html?p=all (in Japanese). Kartika, D., & Aziz, M. (2021). The strategy of politeness in expressive speech act of Shinzo Abe’s resignation speech. 4th English Language and Literature International Conference (ELLiC) Proceedings, 4, 325–340. Kishi, N. [@KishiNobuo]. (2021, March 17). About the news coverage of [coronavirus vaccination application] at the Self-Defense Force Mass Vaccination Center [Tweet]. Twitter. https://twitter. com/KishiNobuo/status/1394440062125805572 (in Japanese). Leonhardt, D. (2022, July 12). Making sense of Shinzo Abe. The New York Times. https://www.nyt imes.com/2022/07/12/briefing/shinzo-abe-legacy-funeral-japan.html Mainichi (2015, May 4). “Freedom of speech in the Diet” - LDP rebuffed the “war bill” remark, causing uproar. https://mainichi.jp/articles/20150504/org/00m/040/018000c (in Japanese). Makabe, T. (2020, February 12). Forced to apologize! Prime Minister Abe Shinzô: “That’s a stupid question. It’s a meaningless question,” he heckled at Diet Member Tsujimoto Kiyomi on February 12, 2020, House of Representatives Budget Committee meeting. [Video]. YouTube. https://www. youtube.com/watch?v=7JG2uHTD9sA (in Japanese). Monthly Hanada. (2021, August). Interview: Abe Shinzo vs. with Sakurai Yoshiko, 34–53 (in Japanese). McNeill, D. (Ed.). (2022). The Abe legacy: A compendium. The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, 20(16). https://apjjf.org/2022/16/McNeil.html McNeill, D., & Hayashi, K. (2022). No friend of the free media. In D. McNeill (Ed.), The Abe legacy: A compendium. The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, 20(16). https://apjjf.org/2022/ 16/McNeil.html Morris-Suzuki, T. (2013). Freedom of hate speech; Abe Shinzo and Japan’s Public Sphere. The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, 11(8). https://apjjf.org/2013/11/8/Tessa-Morris-Suzuki/3902/ article.html Nakahara, J. (2021). Deconstructing Abe Shinzo’s “Take back Japan” nationalism. The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, 19(24). https://apjjf.org/2021/24/Nakahara.html Nakano, K. (2019, March 29). The leader who was ‘Trump before Trump.’ The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/29/opinion/abe-trump-japan-illiberal-authoritarian-turn.html National Diet Library. (n.d.). Diet meeting minutes search engine [Kokkai kaigiroku kensaku shisutemu]. https://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/#/ (in Japanese). National Diet Library. (2015, March 20). The 189th session of the House of Councillors Budget Committee No. 10, Diet meeting minutes search engine. https://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/txt/118915261 X01020150320 (in Japanese).

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National Diet Library. (2016, February 29). The 190th session of the House of Representatives Budget Committee No. 17. https://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/txt/119005261X01720160229 (in Japanese). National Diet Library. (2017, February 24). The 193rd session of the House of Representatives Budget Committee No. 15. https://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/txt/119305261X01520170224 (in Japanese). National Diet Library. (2020, February 5). The 198th session of the House of Representatives Budget Committee No. 5. https://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/txt/120105261X00720200205 (in Japanese). NPR. (2022, July 9). Shinzo Abe’s complicated political legacy. https://www.npr.org/2022/07/09/ 1110698769/shinzo-abes-complicated-political-legacy Schäfer, F. (2022). Japan’s shift to the Right: Computational propaganda, Abe Shinz¯o’s LDP, and internet right-wingers (netto uyo). The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, 20(2). https://apjjf. org/2022/2/Schfer.html The Huffington Post. (2015, December 5). Former Prime Minister Kan Naoto criticized Prime Minister Abe: “He tried to put all the responsibility for the mess on me.” https://www.huffingto npost.jp/2015/12/05/kan-naoto-shinzo-abe-fukushima-daiichi_n_8726166.html (in Japanese). Tokuyama, Y. (2020, August 31). The unbearable state of the media entangled in Abe’s politics discriminating between friend and foe. RONZA. https://webronza.asahi.com/national/articles/202 0083100006.html?page=4 (in Japanese). Yamaguchi, T. (2019). Internet right-wingers and feminism. In N. Higuchi, K. Yagayoshi, M. Matsutani, K. Kurahashi, D. Schäfer, & T. Yamaguchi (Eds.), What is an internet right-winger? [Netto uyoku towa nani ka] (pp. 104–132). Seikyu-sha Library (in Japanese). Yamaguchi, T. (2020). The “history wars” and the “comfort woman” issue: Revisionism and the right-wing in contemporary Japan and the U.S. The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, 18(6). https://apjjf.org/2020/6/Yamaguchi.html Yoshii, R. (2021, July 14). “Anti-Japan [han’nichi] people oppose the Olympics.” Even those in favor of the Olympics were shocked by Abe’s “worldview.” Mainichi. https://mainichi.jp/articles/ 20210712/k00/00m/010/214000c (in Japanese). Zappa, M. (2020). Pleasing the “bubble”: Abe Shinz¯o’s strategical self-exhibition on Facebook. In The conference of the global council for anthropological linguistics in Asia conference proceedings (pp. 454–462). https://glocal.soas.ac.uk/cala2020-proceedings/

Junki Nakahara is currently a Ph.D. candidate at American University’s School of Communication. Her research focuses on nationalism and xenophobia in East Asian contexts, critical and cultural studies, feminist media studies, and international relations. Her publications include contributions to the Asia–Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, New Media & Society, and Sanctions as war: Anti-imperialist perspectives on American geo-economic strategy (Edited by S. Davis and I. Ness, 2021).

Chapter 9

Constructing Political Adversaries Through Debasement Language: A Framing Analysis of Kyriakos Mitsotakis’ Greek Speeches in 2020 Christos Kostopoulos Abstract This chapter focuses on the tumultuous year of 2020 and the multiple challenges it posed to the Greek government, starting with the Evros events, the COVID-19 pandemic, the tensions with Turkey throughout the year, and the reform agenda. By examining the speeches of the Greek prime minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis, the research aims to shed light on how he framed the top political issues of the year, but also how he made use of debasement language as a framing mechanism in order to construct the image of his opponents. Through a qualitative, inductive, framing analysis of 163 Mitsotakis speeches and press materials, this chapter reconstructs the frames employed by the Greek prime minister, and reveals the use of debasement language.

9.1 Introduction: The Political Context of 2020 The 2010s have been one of the most politically tumultuous periods of modern Greek history, with the Greek debt crisis erupting at the start of the decade. On top of the economic hardships that the country experienced, the crisis was the catalyst for significant shifts on every level, including the political landscape’s restructuring after thirty years (Lyrintzis, 2005). The political configuration that governed Greek politics after the end of the seven-years military dictatorship in 1974 came to be known as the metapoliteysi era (Voulgaris, 2002), characterized as a “two-party system” dominated by the center-left PASOK, and the right-wing ND (Pappas, 2003). Popular dissatisfaction brought about the liquidation of the once dominant PASOK as one of the poles of the Greek political system, and a new equilibrium ensued. The new “two-party system” continued to involve ND as the dominant right-wing party, with SYRIZA being the party that replaced PASOK as the opposite pole of the system.

C. Kostopoulos (B) Faculty of Humanities, Curtin University Malaysia, Miri, Malaysia e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 O. Feldman (ed.), Debasing Political Rhetoric, The Language of Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-0894-3_9

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Additionally, the previous decade was also marked by the so-called European Migrant Crisis that broke out in 2014. The political responses to this “crisis” were mainly driven by the reluctance of some EU member states to host migrants, and are reflected in the Dublin regulations and the EU-Turkey deal that was a direct consequence of increased mobility towards the EU border. As a result of these regulations, a growing number of migrants and refugees have been stranded in Greece, with the management of migration becoming another sore spot for Greek-Turkish relations. The relations between the two countries throughout the decade were no exception to the historic tensions between them, connected to nationalist and politico-economic antagonisms associated with border sovereignty (Özkırımlı & Sofos, 2008). Popular discontent with the economic hardships that continued during the years of the SYRIZA administration, the signing of the Prespa agreement between Greece and North Macedonia that settled the naming dispute of the neighboring country, and increasing dissatisfaction with immigration, played a significant role in the increasing popularity and subsequent election of the ND in July 2019. The right-wing party led by Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis was elected with nationalist and anti-immigrant agendas and an authoritative neoliberal policy framework (Mylonas, 2020). However, shortly after its election, a new set of challenges and crises arose in 2020. On February 28, 2020, Turkey decided to open its European borders to migrants and refugees, who then attempted to enter Greece in order to reach the EU. The Greek government responded by closing the land border with Turkey and halting the asylum application process. For approximately one month, until the border closure on March 18, 2020, the border area became heavily policed by Greek and European police in an attempt to stop the migrants from entering the country. This resulted in frequent scuffles between the migrants trying to breach the border and the police, that came to be known as the “Evros events.” The events were instrumentalized by nationalist, far-right politicians and citizen groups through social media to mobilize anti-migrant and anti-Turkish public sentiment (Avraamidou et al., 2021). At the same time, media coverage of the events assisted the ND government to present a “tough stance” on migration, and the events as a “national epic” with the public uniting with the government to defend the borders against the migrants and Turkey (Kostopoulos & Mylonas, 2022). The Evros events eventually faded out of the political and media spotlight, as the international borders closed on March 18, due to the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. The first case of coronavirus in Greece was indexed on February 26, 2020, and by March 10 the government began imposing restrictions culminating in a full lockdown of the country on March 22 (Narlikar & Sottilotta, 2021). The measures were gradually lifted starting from May 4, 2020, coinciding with the beginning of the tourist season. This first wave of the pandemic saw Greece emerge as one of the unlikely success stories of the pandemic and secured high levels of support for the government, with Greece managing to have significantly a lower number of cases and deaths compared to other European countries. However, the second wave of COVID-19 hit Greece harder, and forced a new set of restrictions imposed by the government from November 7, 2020. This second lockdown was significantly more

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politically contested, especially as the pandemic progressed and case numbers and deaths skyrocketed. Finally, on top of the challenges posed by the dual crises of the Evros events and the COVID-19 pandemic, the political agenda in 2020 also revolved around the government’s effort to introduce reforms in the labor market as well as the legal framework concerning protests. At the same time, relations between Greece and Turkey remained tense throughout the year, not only due to the Evros events but also because of ongoing disputes regarding the exclusive economic zones in the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean seas. All of these events of the past decade or so led to an increase in political polarization and the resurfacing of the adversarial style of rhetoric that has been characteristic of Greek politicians (Georgakopoulou, 2013; Georgalidou, 2011, 2017). Georgalidou and her colleagues (2019) note that during 2014–2019 personal attacks and marked impoliteness bordering on aggression became more frequent, strategically employed to enhance intergroup bonding and also to delegitimize opposing political ideologies and opponents. This chapter focuses on how the Greek prime minister framed the political issues that were on the agenda during 2020 in his speeches, but also as to whether he made use of debasing language, and how that language played a part as a framing mechanism. Although research so far has focused on media coverage of these issues, there has been less research on how the Greek prime minister framed them, and whether his speeches during that year continue the trend of employing adversarial and debasing rhetoric. Therefore, the research question that drives this chapter is a two-fold one and aims to address this gap: How did Greek Prime Minister Mitsotakis frame the political issues of 2020 in his speeches, and how did he employ debasing language as a framing mechanism? Given that the language employed in parliamentary speeches, especially ones given by the prime minister in Greece, tends to follow strict rules of decorum, this chapter adopts a broader sense of debasement, following Feldman (2023). The prime minister’s speeches will therefore be analyzed for the use of rhetorical devices such as irony, cynicism, sarcasm, mockery, and ridicule, as well as insinuations and insults that aim to reduce the worth, quality, value, status, or reputations of a specific target. Thus, although it is rather improbable that Mitsotakis’ speeches would employ harsh language, they will be analyzed based on their effects and the reaction he seeks to cause.

9.1.1 Polarization and Divisive Discourse in Greek Politics Debasement and inflammatory language are expected in Greek politics, as Greece is often seen and described as a populist democracy with a deeply polarized political culture (Pappas, 2014). A number of historical legacies inform this polarization,

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starting with the legacy of the Greek Civil War (1945–1949) that has influenced party polarization and ideological antagonisms ever since (Andreadis & Stavrakakis, 2019). The ideological divisions of the Greek Civil War carried on in the metapolitefsi era as well, especially in the 1980s that were dominated by PASOK and its founder Andreas Papandreou. The legacy of PASOK in the 1980s and its “openly and consistently confrontational political strategy” (Kalyvas, 1997, p. 84) is another historical legacy that influences Greek political culture to this day, alongside the discourse employed by ND at the time “which presented the social and political space as divided into two opposed fields” (Lyrintzis, 1987, p. 671). Polarization remained at very high levels throughout the 1980s with PASOK depicting the right as “one and indivisible from the collaborationist Security Battalions of the Second World War through the Civil War, the subsequent repressive parliamentary regime and then the military dictatorship, up to its most recent reincarnation as New Democracy” (Pridham & Verney, 1991, p. 46). Contributing to the polarization, Nea Dimokratia (New Democracy, a liberal-conservative political party) framed PASOK as an agent of subversion of Greek democracy (Kalyvas, 1997, p. 88). The 1990s and 2000s and the global developments in the politics of the time brought about a convergence of the policies of the two dominant parties and a relative subsiding of polarization (Andreadis & Stavrakakis, 2019). This period of relatively lower polarization in Greek politics ended abruptly with the onset of the Greek debt crisis, and the subsequent replacement of PASOK as one of the poles of the “two-party system” by SYRIZA. In the early years of the 2010s SYRIZA rose in prominence by taking on the role of the representative of those that were hit by austerity policies (Andreadis & Stavrakakis, 2019), focusing on a populist rhetoric that defended the Greek people from “oppressing power-elites within and outside the debt-ridden country” (Katsambekis & Stavrakakis, 2017, p. 401). On the other hand, the opposition to SYRIZA employed a divisive discursive strategy that was connected to post-civil war divisions, by bringing forward the “two extremes hypothesis” that identified the party with left terrorism and directly juxtaposed it to right-wing extremism and fascist/Nazi ideologies (Georgalidou, 2021). Additionally, verbal attacks were used in order to defame the political personnel of SYRIZA and its administration while in power (2015–2019), a strategy that bore fruit in the results of the 2019 elections. Kostopoulos (2020) points out that throughout the era of the memoranda (2010–2015) the country’s political discourse was highly polarized, albeit on secondary issues and with a strategic convergence between ND and SYRIZA, especially after the latter signed the third memorandum. Furthermore, an examination of the speeches given by Alexis Tsipras and Kyriakos Mitsotakis between 2015 and 2021 revealed that while Tsipras’ strategy was reminiscent of Andreas Papandreou and polarization was high in 2015, a reduction in polarization took place in the following years (Kostopoulos, 2021).

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9.2 Cultural Framing and Debasement Language Framing is an essential aspect of political communication, as politicians vie with one another to promote their preferred interpretations of social and political reality. Frames are selective views on political issues, and the act of framing involves a process of selecting some aspects of reality and bringing them forward in a communication text or act (Entman, 1993). As political and social realities are complicated, political actors engage in a conscious act of interpreting them in simpler terms that can be understood by their audiences that bring forward their preferred understanding of the matter and delegate blame on their preferred targets. Matthes (2012, p. 249) describes the process of framing in political communication: The key idea is that strategic actors, journalists, and audiences do not simply reflect or transport the political and social realities. In contrast, politics, issues and events are subject to different patterns of selections and interpretations. These interpretations of issues are negotiated, contested, and modified over time. In light of this, frames are selective views on issues, views that construct reality in a certain way leading to different evaluations and recommendations.

Therefore, political actors actively frame social reality and struggle with other political actors for the framing of a political issue in the media and in the minds of the audience. Entman (1993, p. 52) explains the four functions of frames: Frames, then, define problems – determine what a causal agent is doing with what costs and benefits […] diagnose causes – identify the forces creating the problem; make moral judgments – evaluate causal agents and their effects; and suggest remedies – offer and justify treatments for the problems and predict their likely effects.

It is exactly within these functions of identifying the forces creating the problem and making moral judgments that debasement language is expected to feature as a framing mechanism, as direct or indirect derision and debasement tend to be deployed for political gains, such as dividing society into Us and Them, to discredit political opponents, or to cultivate fear and conflict (Cap, 2021). Impolite and debasing language can also be strategically used to enhance intergroup bonding and delineating group borders, as well as bringing forward political and ideological divisions. It is common in politics to attack the collective face of one’s political rivals, or to present them as non-eligible for office (Georgalidou et al., 2020). Adversaries can be constructed as lacking a personal ethos or competence, in order to limit their appeal to the electorate. Additionally, such language can be employed to gain the media’s attention, enabling politicians to advertise themselves, especially in highly polarized political systems such as found in Greece. Frames are important power mechanisms in politics; however, it is important to understand how frames work in influencing the audience in order to make sense of their power. Van Gorp (2007) argues that frames do not reside inside the individuals who make use of them, but rather are situated within a given culture. The individuals who use them simply choose to apply and magnify them in their communication texts. Matthes (2012, pp. 248–249), further elucidates this process by arguing that frames “are part of culture, they guide how the elite construct information, they

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affect journalists’ information selection, they are manifest in media texts, and they influence cognitions and attitudes of audience members.” In the context of political communication, this means that political actors select frames from the cultural repository in order to construct information, and it is precisely this connection with culture that enables frames to make an impact on the individual schemata of their audiences. Whereas framing for a journalist entails a process of interpreting and structuring information, political actors are invested sponsors of particular frames with the ultimate goal of influencing the media and the audience. Therefore, the communicating texts of political actors are persuasive instruments and the frames promoted by them are called “advocate frames” (Tewksbury et al., 2000, p. 806). The present research uncovers the advocate frames promoted by Kyriakos Mitsotakis in order to shed light on his preferred interpretations of the multiple political issues that took place in 2020, and also to shed light on how he employed such frames in order to construct the image of his political adversaries, and what role debasement language played in that framing.

9.3 Methodology This research discusses the political speeches given by the Greek prime minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis during the year 2020. In order to address the research question, shed light on the advocate frames employed by the Greek prime minister but also on the use of debasement language as a framing mechanism, the following methodology was adopted. The research employs a qualitative approach in order to reconstruct cultural advocate frames from the speeches of Mitsotakis and bring to the fore the specific use of language as a framing mechanism. The qualitative approach to frame analysis has been selected as it enables the researcher to provide in-depth analysis of the data sample, and then make relevant connections with critical literature (de Vreese, 2005). Additionally, Van Gorp’s (2007) approach to reconstructing frame packages was preferred, because it facilitates the dissection of political and cultural meanings attached to the frames, thus allowing for a closer inspection of the frames’ constituent elements and the linguistic choices made by the frame sponsor. The political speeches and press materials of Mitsotakis were collected and analyzed from the official website of the Greek prime minister primeminister.gr, with a time frame that covers all of 2020. In total, 163 items were collected from the website, and these include among others the parliamentary addresses of the prime minister, his addresses to the Greek people, statements made before and after European meetings and meetings with other officials. The unit of analysis was the complete speech, but there was consideration for multiple frames coexisting within a unit. In order to reconstruct the advocacy frames embedded in Mitsotakis’ speeches a qualitative inductive analysis was employed unveiling framing packages that consist

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of various cultural and reasoning devices. The inductive approach was used in this research, as it enables the researcher to analyze the political speeches without a set of pre-defined frames. In this manner, the reconstructed frame packages emerge from meticulous analysis, affording deep insights and a more focused level of analysis (de Vreese, 2005). This approach has been criticized for relying on small samples and for being difficult to reproduce; nevertheless, it fits the aims of this chapter, enabling connections between the frames and the wider culture, but also bringing forward constituent elements of the frames that enable closer inspection of the prime minister’s linguistic choices. Van Gorp (2007, p. 64) argues that cultural frames become embedded in messages that are constructed in such a way that many elements refer to that frame. Therefore, the analysis of political speeches can unveil these cultural frames by uncovering how the speeches have been constructed in such a way that many elements refer to the frame, and then the frame can be represented as a “frame package.” Frame packages are composed by the manifest framing devices, the manifest or latent reasoning devices, and an implicit cultural phenomenon that displays the package as a whole. This cultural phenomenon, for example an archetype, a mythical figure, a value, or a narrative, is the central organizing theme of the frame, whereas the framing devices that can be found in the text can be word choices, metaphors, exemplars, descriptions, arguments, and visual images that all point to the same core idea. Finally, the reasoning devices of the frame package are the mechanisms that define and make sense of an issue. These reasoning devices consist of Entman’s (1993) definition of framing functions. Therefore, the framing packages were completed with reasoning devices that consisted of problem definitions, causal attributions, moral evaluations, and treatment recommendations. To reconstruct the frame packages, I analyzed all the data, coding each framing mechanism as it was found in the text. After that, the mechanisms were grouped together in framing packages, based on the core idea of the frame and the central organizing cultural theme. That way, all the mechanisms that were grouped together in a frame package all point together to the same core idea. After the reconstruction of the frame packages, those were macro-analyzed, looking at the big picture of all the frames employed by the Greek prime minister, to shed light on his preferred interpretations of the topics he addressed. Additionally, the framing mechanisms were micro-analyzed with a second level of coding for framing mechanisms that can be categorized as debasement speech, to unveil how such utterances have been employed to frame the prime minister’s political adversaries.

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9.4 Findings 9.4.1 The Frames Employed in Mitsotakis’ Political Speeches in 2020 The frame analysis of Mitsotakis’ 163 speeches from 2020 yielded six frames (Table 9.1). Two of them address the COVID-19 pandemic (Individual responsibility, Coronacrisis), whereas two more revolve around the relations of Greece with Turkey (Turkey as a villain), and the border tensions in Evros (Migration as invasion). Finally, the “Modernization” frame concerns the reforms that the Mitsotakis government introduced, whereas the “Tsipras as a villain” frame is a perfect example of the increased tension and polarization of politics during this year. I started with the “Individual responsibility” frame that was employed over the two lockdown periods and in the first months of the pandemic, mainly focusing on narratives that pointed towards the danger that COVID-19 posed to Greek society and citizens, with the threat being compared to that of war and the government’s response to a war effort. Accordingly, the staff of the NHS were equated with heroes, and although the individual responsibility of the citizens was highlighted, they were praised for their response and their trust in the government. The treatment recommendation revolved around the government’s effort to improve the NHS and “fortify” it for the coming months. However, as the pandemic progressed and the second wave hit Greece harder, Mitsotakis started mentioning the citizens’ fatigue from the measures, pointing to the few citizens who did not comply to the measures as the culprits for the worsening situation. Individual responsibility became the primary concern and any additional measures that had to be taken were blamed on those that did not comply, especially the decision to move to a second lockdown of the country, shifting blame from other reasons such as opening up the tourism sector. His speech in the Greek parliament in November 12, 2020, is highly representative of this frame: We tried many defensive plans. The truth is that these were betrayed by the behavior of some. We need to finally come out here and recognize that, recognize it bravely, let’s not ignore those who with their dishonorable and irresponsible behavior undermined the health of the many [Dokimasame polla amyntika schedia. I alithia einai oti ayta prodothikan apo ti simperifora kapoion. Na bgoume epitelous edo kai na to anagnorisoume ayto, na to anagnorisoume me tharos, na min kleinoume to mati se kapoious i opoioi me tin anentimi kai aneythini symperifora tous iponomeysan tin igeia ton pollon].

The “coronacrisis” frame, on the other hand mostly addresses the economic fallout. The framing selected by Mitsotakis stresses that the government is facing a once in a lifetime crisis that has been imported from abroad, responding to the opposition that blamed the recession on the policies of the government. At the same time, the frame stresses that the EU needs to show solidarity with its member states and make bold decisions that will allow governments to support their citizens and

Individual responsibility narrative, war metaphors, heroes in green and white shirts narrative, invisible enemy simile

The NHS is under pressure from the COVID-19 pandemic, citizens and youth that are not following the measures are jeopardizing the NHS and the economy

Cultural devices

Problem definition

The economy is being affected by the lockdowns and the pandemic

Once in a lifetime crisis narrative

Turkey engages in illegal and provocative actions, the agreement between Turkey and Libya is illegal and void, Turkey sends migrants over to destabilize Greece

Turkey as a villain narrative, Turkey blackmails Europe narrative

“Corona-crisis” frame “Turkey as a villain” frame

Turkey, Erdogan Causal attribution Citizens, youth, the The pandemic and pandemic citizens being careless are to blame for any further measures that impact the economy

“Individual Responsibility” frame

Frames

Table 9.1 Kyriakos Mitsotakis’ frames “Tsipras as a villain” frame

Migrants, Turkey

Migrant flows threaten Greek borders and sovereignty, Turkey is using migration to blackmail Europe and destabilize Greece, migratory flows are illegal

Tsipras

Tsipras distorts the truth, lies to the Greek people and destroyed the country

Migration as invasion Tsipras as a villain narrative, narrative asymmetrical warfare simile, instrumentalization of migration narrative

“Migration as invasion” frame

(continued)

Populism, SYRIZA, fear of reforms

Bureaucracy, labor market lacks flexibility, lack of growth plan, last in technology and innovation

Modernization narrative

“Modernization” frame

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Citizens need to demonstrate discipline, the EU member states need to act in solidarity

The government will support business and workers for the duration of the pandemic, the European recovery fund demonstrates an opportunity to restructure the country and for the economy to come back stronger

The government wants to save lives above everything else, some citizens that are not complying to the measures are unconscionable, NHS staff are heroes, the government has acted swiftly to address the crisis

Improve the NHS, hire more staff, lockdowns and curtailing of freedoms are a result of citizens not complying, the vaccine will end the pandemic

Moral evaluation

Treatment recommendation

The EU and US must sanction Turkey, the agreement between Turkey and Libya must be cancelled, Turkey must end the provocations so that negotiations based on international law can begin

Turkey is intransigent and a “troublemaker,” Erdogan threatens and has imperial ambitions, Turkey is aggressive and spreads fake news about Greece, Greece is calm and seeks peace

“Corona-crisis” frame “Turkey as a villain” frame

“Individual Responsibility” frame

Frames

Table 9.1 (continued)

Tsipras is irresponsible, hypocritical, and mocks the constituents

“Tsipras as a villain” frame

The migrants should N/A not come to the EU, the government secures the Greek borders that are European at the same time, new European asylum policies

The migrants are violent, and we don’t know where they come from, Greece has taken an unfair share of the burden and it’s time for the EU to demonstrate solidarity with Greece, some EU member states are “freeloaders”

“Migration as invasion” frame

Change governance, digitalization, growth, foreign investment, flexibility

Society embraces entrepreneurship and innovation, the government moves forward with its sweeping reforms

“Modernization” frame

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save jobs in the face of this crisis. The decision to go to a lockdown is contrasted with the necessity to save human lives, whereas in the second wave of the pandemic some of the blame is doled out to individual responsibility, as Mitsotakis stresses in the run up towards the second lockdown. In his public televised address on September 24, 2020, the Greek prime minister stresses the contrasting interests between saving lives and saving the economy: Universal measures might seem simple. And, indeed, they were extremely effective in the first stage of the pandemic. In the long run, though, they bring tragic outcomes for the economy and great injustices in society [Ta katholika metra mporei na fainontai apla. Kai, ontos, itan exairetika apotelesmatika stin proti fasi tis pandimias. Mesoprothesma, omos, fernoun tragikes epiptoseis stin oikonomia kai megales adikies stin koinonia].

The next two frames concern relations between Greece with Turkey. The “Turkey as a villain” frame takes aim at the overall stance of the neighboring nation and frames it as a “troublemaker” state that engages in actions that are illegal and provocative towards Greece, but also other states of the Eastern Mediterranean, such as Cyprus, Israel, and Egypt. At the same time, the frame identifies Greece as a peaceful and stable nation, a staunch and “predictable” ally of the US, especially in comparison to the erratic behavior of Erdogan’s government. The Greek prime minister discusses the solutions to the disputes with Turkey and the frame encompasses the ending of provocations from the Turkish side in order for negotiations to begin based on international law, but also in building up Greek alliances in the region and internationally. Mitsotakis’ statement from the Euro-Mediterranean Conference MED7, on September 10, 2020, demonstrates this frame: If Turkey truly wants an honest dialogue with Greece, with Cyprus, with the European Union, it has to prove it through action. It has to immediately stop unilateral actions, to give convincing examples that they invariably and not selectively respect international rules [Ean I Tourkia thelei pragmatika enan eilikrini dialogo me tin Ellada, me tin Kypro, me tin Evropaiki Enosi, prepei na to apodeixei stin praxis. Na stamatisi amesos monomereis energies, na dosei pistika digmata oti sevete aparegklita kai ochi epilektika tous diethnis kanones].

On the other hand, the “migration as invasion” frame also partly revolves around Turkey, due to its involvement in the Evros events, but mainly discusses migration as a threat to Greek sovereignty. In Mitsotakis’ speeches messages are addressed to the migrants asking them not to come to the EU as they will be sent back, while at the same time Greece is praised for taking on an unfair burden when dealing with the migration “crisis.” EU member states that refuse to receive any migrants are framed as part of the problem by the Greek prime minister who calls for more solidarity from the EU and for new migration and asylum policies on a continental level. Finally, the migrants themselves are dehumanized and migration flows are structured as part of an “invasion” against Greece, a framing that is highly problematic and encapsulates the “Fortress Europe” policies supported by conservative parties around the EU.

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The “Modernization” frame refers to the reform agenda of the government, especially in connection to digitalization, policies of the so-called green transition, and a plan for restructuring the economy after the pandemic. In this frame, the pandemic is viewed as an opportunity to move forward with reforms that should have been pushed forward years ago and to bring Greece up to speed with the other European nations. Technology is viewed in a rather deterministic manner, as a force in and of itself that will solve the problems of the Greek citizens. This frame echoes the modernization culture of the “cultural dualism” thesis of Diamandouros (1994), but at the same time modernization is conflated with neoliberal reforms and a technocratic understanding of politics. While the modernization frame appears to be commonsense and apolitical, a closer inspection reveals that the frame puts forward one type of modernization that is highly ideological and neoliberal. In a cabinet meeting in regards to the Recovery Fund, Kyriakos Mitsotakis mentions on November 19, 2020: It is clear that this plan serves two directions: it responds to the current questions of circumstance, with the protection and enhancement of employment, but at the same time it is also an opportunity for a radical overhaul of the national economy towards a growth model that is externally-directed, innovative, that will signal in essence the Greece of the future [Einai xekatharo oti to schedio afto, ipiretei dio kateythinsis: apanta sta trechonta zitoumena tis sigkirias me kiriarchi tin prostasia kai tin tonosi tis apascholisis, alla taytochrona einai kai mia efkairia gia mia riziki metastrofi tis ethnikis oikonomias pros ena anaptixiako montelo exostrefes, kainotomo, to opoio tha simatodotei epi tis ousias tin Ellada tou mellontos].

The final frame reconstructed in the speeches of Mitsotakis is the “Tsipras as a villain” frame that is highly polarized and takes aim at the leader of the opposition party SYRIZA. However, the frame is not so much taking aim at the opposition party and its policies, but rather at the leader of the opposition and his personality traits. Therefore, the frame points towards a new era of polarization in Greek politics after the relative calm of the previous couple of years. However, this polarization is not based on ideological premises, given that the two parties have converged in their central policies, but on judgements on the personality of the party leaders. For example, in a parliamentary discussion on a vote of no confidence for the minister of the economy on October 25, 2020, Mitsotakis says: “Thank you for giving us the opportunity for a while to remind the citizens of the size of your hypocrisy” [Sas efcharistoume pou mas prosferete aplochera ti dinatotita na epanaferoume gia ligo sti mnimi ton politon to megethos tis ipokrisias sas].

9.4.2 Debasement Speech as a Framing Mechanism Out of the six frames reconstructed from Kiriakos Mitsotakis’ speeches in 2020 four of them feature instances that debasement speech is employed as a framing mechanism. Specifically, debasement speech was identified in the “Individual responsibility,” “Turkey as a villain,” “Migration as invasion,” and “Tsipras as a villain.”

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When debasement speech is featured in the frames reconstructed it is mostly featured as a causal attribution or a moral evaluation device. Starting with the “Individual responsibility” frame, debasement language is used in the causal attribution and moral evaluations of the frame to discuss the behavior of some citizens that are not complying to the measures. To be sure, such behaviors existed and the prime minister was within his rights to criticize them. However, the word choices were important here in an effort to separate the Greek society into an “Us and Them” dichotomy, and absolve the government of any responsibility of mismanaging the health crisis. Of particular interest is the use of the slur psekasmenoi (“sprayed” people), referring to people that subscribe to conspiracy theories and especially the chemtrails conspiracy theory. This is a derogatory term in Greek politics, that rose to prominence after the 2012 election and was usually employed against the right-wing party ANEL, a minority partner in SYRIZA’s 2015 government. The term is used to attack the person as a conspiracist who is not to be taken seriously in political debate. The word was used by the Greek prime minister on October 31, 2020, in his public address on the second wave of the pandemic: If we lose our trust in the experts, we will obey more easily to the calls of easy and simplistic slogans. And I am not referring only to the few “sprayed people” (psekasmenous). But also to those that are tired from this long adventure [An chasoume tin empistosini mas stous idikous tha ipakousoume pio efkola sta kelevsmata ton efkolon kai aploikon sinthimaton. Kai den anaferome mono stous ligous psekasmenous. Alla kai se ekeinous pou dikaiologimena einai kourasmeni apo ayti tin polimini peripeteia].

In this instance Mitsotakis’ employs debasement speech in the broader sense, as he uses an ironic term to discredit the people that are opposed to the government’s measures. To be sure, some of the opposition to the measures was based on conspiracy theories, but there were a lot of critics that focused on the government’s failures and mismanagement of the pandemic. Therefore, Mitsotakis arguably chooses to focus on an “easier” opponent, circumventing the more rational critiques and constructing a dichotomy between his government as the valid and rational actor and those that oppose him, all bundled together under the conspiratorial umbrella. However, it should be mentioned that debasing iterations were not so prevalent in this frame, as there was a risk of alienating the constituents. On the other hand, debasement language was more prevalent on the other three frames, starting with the “Migration as invasion” frame. The cultural narrative suggested in this frame dehumanizes the migrants, by presenting them as one group and not different categories ranging from asylum seekers and refugees to economic migrants without a legal claim to enter the country. Additionally, the migrants are placed in the stereotypical “intruder” frame (Van Gorp, 2005) and the structural causes of migration are concealed, with migration being presented as an invasion of Greece. This representation of immigration as an invasion, has been common for the Greek Right (Boukala, 2021, p. 334). Additionally, in the causal attribution dimension of the frame the migrants are characterized as illegal by the prime minister, a term that is very charged and controversial in the Greek political culture and is designed to cause a reaction from the opposition parties on the left and center-left

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of the political spectrum. This quote from Mitsotakis’ statement during his visit at the Greek-Turkish border with the heads of the EU institutions on March 3, 2020, signifies how migration is represented as an invading army, debasement speech in the broader sense as it seeks to discredit the migrants as a group: Dear friends, this problem is no longer a refugee and migration problem. It consists an asymmetrical threat to the eastern border of Greece, which is also the border of Europe. And the illegal invasion of thousands of people takes on the form of a threat of our national territory, with people that are of unknown origin and unknown purpose often as its vanguard [Agapiti fili, to provlima afto den ine pia prosfigiko kai metanasteftiko. Sinista mia asimetri apili sta anatolika sinora tis Elladas, pou ine kai sinora tis Evropis. Ke i paranomi isvoli chiliadon anthropon perni ti morfi tis epivoulis tou ethnikou mas edafous, me emprosthofilaki sichna anthropous agnostis proelefsis alla kai agnoston skopon].

The two frames that featured the majority of the debasing utterances in the prime minister’s speeches, however, were the “Turkey as a villain” and “Tsipras as a villain” frames. The former discusses the relations between Greece and Turkey, and albeit the Greek prime minister has legitimate political grounds to raise against the actions of the neighbouring country, oftentimes he employs debasing language in order to stress the difference between Greece and Turkey, to attack the collective face of Turkish politicians and Erdogan specifically, but also following the use of debasing language towards Greece from the opposite side as well. An example of debasing language in the broader sense in this frame comes from the statement of Mitsotakis in the border town Kastanies of Evros, that he visited with the European Commission president on March 3, 2020: “Unfortunately, Turkey has turned into an official migrant trafficker” [Distichos, i Tourkia echei metatrapei se episimo diakiniti metanaston]. On another instance of the prime minister’s message for the reconstitution of democracy in Greece on July 24, 2020, Mitsotakis says: “With troublemakers, such as Turkey, threatening peace in the Eastern Mediterranean, and questioning the sovereignty of Greece and Cyprus” [Me tarachopoious opos I Tourkia na apeiloun tin irini stin Anatoliki Mesogio, amfisvitontas kiriarchika dikaiomata tis Ellados kai tis Kiprou]. What these two examples demonstrate is that tensions in the relations between the two governments run high, and the Greek prime minister wants to project an image of power to his internal and external audiences through the use of debasing language towards the Turkish government. Mitsotakis employs stark insulting terms to attack the collective face of Erdogan as the leader of Turkey by saying the country acts as a trafficker, and that it is a troublemaking nation. At the same time Mitsotakis aims to present Greece as a stable Western ally in the Mediterranean, in contrast to Turkey that he portrays as a country that seeks to distance itself from the West. On July 14 he mentions in his statement after his meeting with the Cypriot prime minister Nikos Anastasiadis: “With this backward move, Turkey chooses to cut ties with the Western world and its values” [Me tin opisthodromiki ayti kinisi, i Tourkia epilegi na kopsei desmous me ton Dytiko kosmo kai tis axies tou]. In this instance, Mitsotakis attempts to present Turkey as a country that is moving away from Western values, and by using impolite language he aims to galvanize the alliance grouping between Greece, Cyprus and Israel, as well as to create a division between Western allies and Turkey.

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The same can be noted in his statement from August 12, 2020: “The reaction of Turkey in the legal agreement of EEZ delimitation with Egypt shows, unfortunately, that it cannot come to terms with the European principles of the twenty-first century. And that it is stuck in the logic of coercion and bullying. A logic that belongs to previous times” [I antidrasi tis Tourkias stin kath’ola nomimi symfonia oriothetisis AOZ me tin Egipto dichni, distichos, oti den mpori na simfiliothei me tis Evropaikes arches tou 21ou aiona. Kai oti parameni proskollimeni sti logiki tou exanagkasmou kai ton ekfobismon. Logiki pou aniki se alles epoches]. Here, Mitsotakis employs impolite political language to achieve the same goals, but instead of juxtaposing Turkish behavior with the West, he does so specifically with European values pointing towards the EU, in order to aggravate the political divisions between Turkey and the EU and enhance the intergroup bonding of Greece with its European counterparts at the same time. Finally, the frame “Tsipras as a villain” is the one with the most use of debasement language. The frame is rife with name calling and irony, not surprising given the confrontational culture of Greek politics and high polarization. In January 2020, Mitsotakis addresses the Greek parliament and says: “You (Tsipras) are like an arsonist who after he has burned down a house comes and celebrates because he called the fire department” [eiste san ton piromani o opoios afou echei kapsei to spiti erxete kai panigirizi giati fonakse tin pirosvestiki]. Here Mitsotakis attacks the collective face of his political rival, an attested strategy in political combat, in order to increase polarization and create a clear-cut division between ND and SYRIZA. In this specific instance, Mitsotakis uses debasement language to attack Tsipras’ competence based on his performance as a prime minister from 2014 to 2019. On another instance on June 12, 2020 in the Greek parliament the prime minister again attacks the leader of the opposition: “And you come here and you lie for yet another time and then you wonder why all the people are calling you a liar. Mr Kotzias and your colleagues call you a liar. Shame on you, Mr Tsipras. Shame on you” [Kai ercheste edo pera kai psevdeste gia Akoma mia fora kai meta aporite giati sas leei olos o kosmos psefti. Psefti sas leei kai o kyrios Kotzias kai i diki sas sinadelfi pseftes sas lene. Ntropi sas, kirie Tsipra. Ntropi sas]. Here Mitsotakis is using impolite language to attack the ethos of his political opponent by calling him a liar and saying he should feel shame for his behavior, therefore undermining his moral status, which is debasement in the broader sense through name-calling and character attack. During another parliamentary confrontation between Mitsotakis and Tsipras on January 30, 2020, the prime minister received criticism for a ban imposed on the football team PAOK and the government’s legal intervention. He responded thus: “Mister Tsipras, I’d much rather have a hard time due to football, rather than for unnecessary referenda, for bank closures, and for how you led the country to the brink of destruction” [Kirie Tsipra, protimo na pernao diskoles ores gia to podosfairo para gia achriasta dimopsifismata, gia klisimata trapezon kai gia to pos odigisate tin chora sto chilos tou gremou]. Once again here, Mitsotakis deflects criticism by attacking the competence of his rival based on his performance in office. In all of these instances that have been used as examples of debasement language in Mitsotakis’ speeches we can see that humor, irony, and even

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personal attacks on the ethos or competence of his opponent have been employed in order to present a clear-cut political division to the Greek electorate between the two men.

9.5 Discussion This chapter has endeavored to shed light on the framing of the political issues of 2020 by the Greek prime minister and the use of debasement language as a framing mechanism, through an examination of his speeches and press materials. In total, 163 items were analyzed, and six frames were reconstructed. Out of these six frames, four of them included debasement language as a framing mechanism. What these findings confirm is that Greece is still very much a populist democracy with a deeply polarized political culture (Pappas, 2014). However, a closer examination of the frames and the linguistic choices by the Greek prime minister also reveal that in many instances politics in Greece right now is much more personal, rather than ideological. The convergence between the main political parties of the country, in light of the country’s commitments to the EU and NATO that severely limit the alternative policies that can be adopted without questioning these wider frameworks, means that the ideological cleavages that have characterized the Greek political scene since the Greek Civil War have diminished. To be sure, there are other parties that still demonstrate the influence of that legacy in Greece such as the Greek Communist Party (KKE). However, when it comes to the governing parties of ND, PASOK, and SYRIZA, at this point these differences are more cultural than actual. Therefore, the prime minister attacks Tsirpas directly, instead of SYRIZA, and the criticisms of the frame have to do with his personality and characteristics, rather than his ideas. Judging from the findings of this research it can be argued that presently the more the parties vying for government in Greece converge in policies, the less political and ideological confrontation there is. Instead, political competition devolves into the sphere of the party leaders’ personal traits, specifically here the personal confrontations between Mitsotakis and Tsipras. Therefore, the language employed is more personal as well, with ad hominem attacks employed to attack the opponent’s personality compared to the personality of the speaker. This chapter’s findings support such a conclusion, given the language employed by the Greek prime minister when addressing his predecessor. Georgalidou and colleagues’ (2019) research also points in this direction. However, more research is required on the linguistic choices of other politicians from the two parties, in order to draw more generalized conclusions. The use of debasement language as a framing mechanism in four of the six frames featured in Mitsotakis’ speeches reveals some examples of how debasement language can be used in political communication. For example, debasement language against some citizens in regard to their compliance to the pandemic measures works to divide the society into “Us and Them,” with the in-group being compliant citizens with a

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conscience that care about other people, and the out-group being citizens that do not care and jeopardize the health of everyone. In a country that was actually one of the most compliant in the EU, this type of framing and the use of debasement language is used to absolve the government of any blame for the mismanagement of the second wave of the pandemic, instead moving the responsibility towards the citizens and individual behavior. At the same time, the use of debasement language against the migrants is not surprising given that the ND government was elected under nationalist and anti-immigrant agendas (Mylonas, 2020). Finally, debasement language is also used against Turkey and against the leader of the opposition Alexis Tsipras. Using debasement language in these instances Mitsotakis wants to project the image of a strong national leader that defends the interests of Greece, but also to discredit Turkey in the eyes of the global community, and Tsipras in the eyes of Greek constituents. Overall, what this article has revealed is that polarization during 2020 was quite high given the many and important political issues that the country faced. Additionally, it points to a tendency by the Greek prime minister to construct an opponent through the frames he selects and then use that construction in order to pose dilemmas to his audience. Given that the economic crisis after the pandemic, the energy crisis, and the Russian-Ukrainian war pose even more challenges for the Greek government, it is likely that polarization will remain high in the Greek parliament. In any case, more research is needed regarding the political communication style of Greek leaders and the use of debasement language—in periods of national stress, and even (compared with) other times when more normal politics is the rule.

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Christos Kostopoulos is Lecturer of Mass Communication at Curtin University, Sarawak Campus, Malaysia. He is the author of Journalism and Austerity: Digitization and Crisis During the Greek Memoranda (2020) and has also published journal articles and book chapters in the field of Media and Communication. His research focuses on media framing, journalism, and media systems analysis.

Part IV

Leaders’ Debasement Effects: Voter Mobilization, Socio-Political Polarization, and Shaping Political Reality Perception

Chapter 10

The Strategic Use of Debasing and Vulgar Language in Italy’s Contemporary Politics: Beppe Grillo and Matteo Salvini Benedetta Baldi

Abstract This chapter addresses the debasing and rude public language of Matteo Salvini, secretary of the Lega party, and the derisory and deliberate contemptuous language of Beppe Grillo, founder and guarantor of the Movimento 5 Stelle, instantiated in speeches at meetings or occurring on social networks. The expressions examined cover the period preceding the general election of 2018 and the following years, including the time when Salvini was Interior Minister in the same government together with the Movimento 5 Stelle. This public discourse style used to express ideas and to attack adversaries exploits derisory and foul language and vulgar remarks as pragmatic devices aimed at activating or evoking an emotional reading of the facts. Its persuasive strength is typically based on latent attitudes in traditionalist groups and on the securitization of many aspects of social life.

10.1 Introduction The crucial question of this study is how debased and rude expressions can replace argumentation and elicit persuasion in people. Impoliteness and vulgar words are rhetorical tools frequently adopted in political debate. They, together with assertive and apodictic messages, contribute to realizing what Perloff (2003) calls powerful speech i.e., a type of language that gives rise to an intense representation of the emotional stratum underlying discourse, by avoiding discursive forms of attenuation, uncertainty, and hesitation, and using rhetorical means to shape a strong direct appeal to people. Along these lines, strongly emotional words (Perloff, 2003, p. 202) increase the persuasive power of language so that the argumentative weakness of the exclamatory expressions can function as a special form of pragmatic intensifiers as, arguably, they are able to activate subliminal meanings and other symbolic values. The result is that rude and offensive expressions and discourse are able to provide the audience with an alternative, overt or, more often, hidden or allusive reading of the world. B. Baldi (B) Department of Humanities and Philosophy, University of Florence, Florence, Italy e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 O. Feldman (ed.), Debasing Political Rhetoric, The Language of Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-0894-3_10

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Generally, impoliteness is studied in relation to the recipient (Culpeper, 2008, 2011), but in political polemic, the semantic differential introduced by discriminatory, vulgar, and rude language is a way to exercise and enact power relations in speech (Fairclough, 2013, p. 36). Access to this type of discourse is reserved for powerful persons: inequality with the non-powerful is evident insofar as only the former can break conventions of politeness and give persuasive force to vulgarity or discrimination. The power relationship implied is functional to the ideological nature of these speeches. As Fairclough (2013, p. 73) notes, ideological struggle involves all speech devices, as they are implemented “in language” but also “over language,” “in the sense that language itself is at stake in social struggle,” and, complementarily behind language, as concealed or implicit social values or practices are evoked. What is a politician’s interest in using rude, foul, or derisory language? The public debasing and disrespectful expressions used by Beppe Grillo, founder and guarantor of the populist Movimento 5 Stelle party, and Matteo Salvini, the secretary of the Lega right-wing party, give rise to an easily recognizable discourse style in attacking opponents, that uses derision and denigratory expressions as a pragmatic tool aimed to activate an emotional reading of the facts. The question is how and why vulgar expressive intensifiers or discriminatory appellatives are capable of eliciting a rapid response and immediate adhesion by the audience receiving the message. We would expect that politeness and correctness should be more effective and more productive for those who must appear trustworthy, at least insofar as they take into account the sensitivity of people to the annoyance produced by foul language and to social discrimination and misfortunes of others. On the contrary, the shared rules excluding discrimination and offense in public and, more, in institutional discourse, can be swept away, leaving room for expressions that apparently reverse the more common values, such as minimum respect for others and the fear of being misunderstood or judged as vulgar persons, of losing face. But, unexpectedly, this way of expressing has the contrary effect: impolite and rude discourse by attacking the face of the target ends up causing face loss (Culpeper, 2008, 2011). This runs independently of the words used, the epithets, and the racist or gender-injurious expressions. The politically correct and its capacity of shaping the shared respectability of people are engulfed by the performative strength of this type of language and communication. This discourse style, at present reinforced by the uncontrolled and emotional nature of new media, works as an effective appeal to the recipient’s identity and involvement based on common feelings and the same symbolic imagination and impulses. This style leverages covered messages that trigger differentialist and prejudicial contents, resulting in performative effectiveness and perlocutionary effects. Logical validity and truth conditions of sentences often are an optional property of political discourse (D’Agostini, 2010), which, in itself, essentially aims to represent the power relationship between the speaker and his/her overt and implicit addressees and to define the cognoscitive background of interlocutors and their social imaginary. Thus, a key role in the political struggle pertains to the performative tools of discourse, frequently elliptic, covert, or displaced insofar as they are capable of

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forcing, confirming and enriching the system of beliefs and convictions of the audience through the hidden logic introduced by emotions and implicatures (Sperber & Wilson, 1995 [1986]). It is no accident that theoretical models foreground the crucial role of the audience, and focus on “how sender and receiver come together to create a shared reality” (Borchers, 2013, p. 17; cf. Baldi, 2017, 2019). Chilton (2005), in examining Mein Kampf , wonders “How do ideas get transferred from mind to mind?”—how could a text that tapped into the darkest and most horrible sides of the human soul be successful in spreading the ideas of Nazism? Indeed, the linguistic organization of discourse is not an innocuous surface property but contributes, not less than pragmatic properties, to shaping, or better, to bringing out the meanings and the symbolic values shared by the sender and the audience. This is to say that persuasion, however conceived, is a property inherent in the linguistic interaction by humans, insofar as natural language semantics is based on and mediated by mental operations concerning the conceptualization of experience and the world, common to speakers and their audience (Chomsky, 2000). We are here at the interface between linguistic knowledge as establishing a specific lexicalsyntactic level of meaning, and the use of language in discourse, where the intentions of the speaker give rise to a particular representation of reality (Baldi, 2007, 2012, 2018; Baldi & Savoia, 2017). In this sense, a crucial property of political discourse is the ability to replace the experience of reality with its representation employing the semantics, the symbols, and the beliefs of the audience. In other words, linguistic expressions incorporate pre-political meanings and beliefs that influence explicit political rhetoric. The fundamental influences upon political beliefs flow, however, from language not perceived as political at all but nonetheless structures perceptions of status, authority, merit, deviance, and the causes of social problems. (Edelman, 1977, p. 21)

Syntax, lexical choices and illocutionary tools implicitly interpret the prevailing ideology of the community, favor the acritical acceptance of conventional theses and prevent the expression of dissonant or opposing ideas (Edelman, 1985). This explains why in political discourse the verbal structure of argumentation is in many cases dramatically reduced and defective.

10.2 Beppe Grillo’s Rhetoric The rhetoric used in debasement may directly deride political opponents or break the symbolic imagery and moral values of the addressee. The latter typically exploits the strength of naming attitudes and behaviors that disrupt the conventional rules governing the usual polite use of words referring to social attributions, inherent properties, and the physical state of persons. All in all, the lexicon of Beppe Grillo is characterized by a mix of political technicalities, semantic changes—in his rhetoric “democracy” means ‘direct democracy through internet’—and metaphors, including an extensive use of profanities. Petrilli (2018) notes the high frequency of scurrilous,

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insulting, and bad language, such as fuck, ass, shit, combined with or alternating with descriptive terms such as previous offender, mouse, pig, bitch, dwarf, talk, army, populism. Thus, for Grillo, today’s politicians are “assholes” and their politics a “policy of shit” (from the corpus of Grillo’s speeches in Ondelli, 2014, pp. 5–6): […] these assholes, because the typical face of today’s politician is represented […]. Politics turns to shit [[…] queste facce da culo, perché è rappresentata la faccia tipica del politico di oggi […] La politica diventa merda].

It is no accident that the first public political initiative of Grillo, an event held on September 8, 2007, in many squares of Italian cities for the collection of signatures for a law on the eligibility of parliamentarians, is called by the strategic name of “Vaffanculo day/Fuck you day.” However, we will focus on a persistent and apparently less overt type of expression used by Grillo with the intention of mocking others by attributing some kind of disease to them. More precisely, he exploits the derisory force of names of mental disorders to designate political opponents or, more generally, people with different ideas. Naturally, he does not disdain even the typical degrading communication introduced by vulgar invectives and exclamations. Both cases, apparently embarrassing to the audience, actually create a close emotional bond between the speaker and the listener, more than any clear argumentation. The use of offensive and denigratory labels has characterized Grillo’s speeches since his initial political activity and then, for example, during the governments of Silvio Berlusconi (1994–1995; 2001–2006; 2008–2011), Mario Monti (2011–2013) and Matteo Renzi (2014–2016). To them, he applied health and disqualification metaphors, such as psiconano (i.e., psycho-dwarf) (Berlusconi), ebetino (demented) (Renzi), and big loden (Monti), referring to the conventional overcoat worn by Prime Minister Monti. Conceptual frames are used here to unveil the true nature of these protagonists, the frame of mental illness insinuating a sick psyche, and contempt for élites, recalling the formal world of Bocconi, the prestigious private university in Milan.1 Their distance from the common people is thus insinuated, where psiconano indicates the unhealthy mind of Berlusconi, greedy for power as the revenge of a dwarf, ebetino designates the degree of dementia of a young premier who does not know what he says, big Loden the social and directive position of the élites, the conformist of power manifested in his face. A strong populistic moralism is hidden below the narration of Grillo, a moralism against the establishment, in all its alleged manifestations, where the interpretive key of people plays a crucial role. In the Movimento 5 Stelle convention in Rome on 20–21 October 2018, after the electoral victory of the Movement and its entry 1

Bocconi University is a private university in Milan founded in 1902 by the entrepreneur Ferdinando Bocconi, who named it after his son Luigi, who died in the Battle of Adwa in Italian Occupation War of Abyssinia (1896). The first Italian university to offer a degree in Economics and Commerce, it represents a university of reference for the prestige of its studies and for its relations with the economic establishment.

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into the government with the right-wing party of Lega, Grillo’s oratory (Grillo, 2018) repeatedly refers to mental illness by virtue of the metaphor of the mentally ill attributed to politicians who pay attention to economic indicators placed in the traditional frame of a world now outdated, linked to interests and past political morality. The new is interpreted by the Movement and its head, self-proclaimed the “High:” We don’t know shit anymore, [...] but who are we, where are we? we’re full of neurotic diseases, we’re full of autism, autism is the disease of the century, gentlemen [...], and there’s full of these philosophers on television who have Asperger’s syndrome [...] they always have the same tone [...] there’s full of psychopaths, alexithymia syndrome [...] it allows these here from Europe to make laws without emotions [Non sappiamo più un cazzo, […] ma chi siamo, dove siamo? siamo pieni di malattie nevrotiche, siamo pieni di autismi, l’autismo è la malattia del secolo, signori […], e c’è pieno di questi filosofi in televisione che hanno la sindrome di Asperger […] hanno sempre lo stesso tono […] c’è pieno di psicopatici, sindrome di alexitimia […] permette a questi qui dell’Europa di fare leggi senza emozioni].

The approximate definition of Asperger syndrome as ‘those that speak that way and do not understand that the other is not understanding’ provoked the reaction of experts in the official media, but, at the same time, matched the popular imagination of an abstruse and distant disease, suitable for élite intellectuals. Grillo’s stories feed the communicative power of prophetic discourse based on a new semantic by metaphors. Thus, the discriminatory use of the disease becomes the tool to debase others and their social vision, as the most immediate rhetorical expedient of breaking with the values of civil life, a true appeal to shared feelings. It is the different possible reality that is evoked; it is received and felt like a substitute for the real world, precisely because it is interpretable and readable in terms of prejudices and stereotypes shared by the audience to which Grillo turns. Nevertheless, Grillo has always pursued a provocative approach to social and political issues, using a more or less explicit health key. This hidden inspiration in Grillo’s speech can explain his public approach to the story of the indictment for rape against his son, on 19 July 2021, when the situation inside the Movimento 5 Stelle had become complicated because of the divisions within it and the different political positions of its leaders. The Prosecutor’s Office of the Republic of Tempio Pausania had to decide whether to submit the request for the indictment or dismissal against Ciro Grillo, son of Beppe Grillo, and three other young men suspected of sexual assault. Grillo feels free to broadcast a video on his blog, in which he rants against the judges using a discriminatory justification. Grillo (2021) attacked the newspapers, a workhorse in his political arguments, denouncing the media pillory of his son, claiming that My son is in all the papers, but he didn’t rape anyone. There is a video that proves it, you see that there is consensus: a group that laughs, 19-year-old boys who are having fun [...] They’re assholes, not rapists [Mio figlio è su tutti i giornali ma non ha stuprato nessuno. C’è un video che lo dimostra, si vede che c’è la consensualità: un gruppo che ride, ragazzi di 19 anni che stanno divertendosi [...] Sono quattro coglioni, non quattro stupratori].

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He ends by accusing the victim: Why didn’t you arrest them right away? […] I would have taken them to jail, and kicked their asses. Because you have realized that nothing is true, there has been no rape. A person who is raped in the morning, in the afternoon they go kitesurfing and after eight days the complaint... It seemed strange to you. Well, it is [Allora perché non li avete arrestati? […] Ce li avrei portati io in galera a calci nel culo Perché vi siete resi conto che non è vero niente che c’è stato lo stupro. Perché una persona stuprata la mattina, al pomeriggio fa kitesurf e dopo 8 giorni fa la denuncia vi è sembrato strano. Bene, è strano!].

Thus, a person “who is raped in the morning” and the afternoon goes kitesurfing and makes the complaint after eight days, cannot be the victim of violence. Rapists should be pitied because they’re just dumb kids. The reaction on social media was immediate, needless to say, evidencing the utterances of Grillo as undercutting political correctness, given clear discrimination against the female victim. The most classic of the victim’s “secondary victimization” schemes is implemented, so that the victim becomes, in some way, almost guilty. Actually, Grillo places his argument in a very current approach of the media to rape cases against women, according to which the assailant was not fully aware, and the young woman was implicitly consenting or partially responsible. Some political commentators wondered if Grillo had been overpowered by wrath and emotions or if his outburst was political calculated. Zeta Luiss, the magazine of the Luiss University School of Journalism in Rome concludes that in the situation of great confusion of the Movement 5 Stelle, such brutal and negative statements regarding the condition of women increased the movement’s critical state (Stati, 2021). Moreover, Grillo’s approach to facts appears to be in contrast with the judicial, Peronist approach always foregrounded by the Movement. However, the attack on the generally accepted public view regarding the relationship between women’s condition and social sanction seems to be a good starting point for a kind of intolerance to be aired. And a political leader fighting against hypocrisies of the establishment can indulge in it.

10.3 Matteo Salvini’s Differentialist and Rude Messages Politicians know that proposing alternative truths to established ones can bring out the most intimate feelings and fears of individuals, and for this reason it is a very powerful rhetorical tool. These considerations specifically apply to extreme political positions, right and left, insofar as they refer to a sort of motivating mythology that evokes occult and conspiratorial powers, a fundamental conceptual component of extreme conservative and reactionary thinking (Caiani & della Porta, 2011). In the case of the extreme right, securitization and differential linguistic constructs resort to the rhetoric of emergency (Rydgren, 2008). At a meeting of the Lega in the Lombard city of Barzago, on July 18, 2019, Salvini, the Minister of the Interior in the Lega-Movimento 5 Stelle right-wing government,

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called Carola Rackete, the captain of the NGO ship Sea-Watch 3 with which she had forced the blockade of the port of Lampedusa to rescue 42 migrants, the “German parasite” (or “tick”). She was accused of aiding and abetting illegal immigration by Matteo Salvini who said (Sea-Watch, 2019): Carola also reported me, among the many complaints there was also that of the German tick […] Carola, all you have to do is look at her in the face, right here she had to turn up! […] In the meantime, I’ll block the ship and ask you for a lot of money, with which maybe, instead of helping illegal immigrants, I’ll go to help the many Italian earthquake victims [Pure Carola mi ha denunciato, fra le tante denunce pure quella della zecca tedesca [...] Carola, uno basta che la guarda in faccia, proprio qua doveva arrivare […] intanto ti blocco la nave e ti chiedo un bel po’ di quattrini, con cui magari, invece di aiutare i clandestini, vado ad aiutare i tanti terremotati italiani].

The dehumanizing metaphor of Salvini provokes the liberating laughter of those present, immediately implying the narration of societal security as its other reassuring face. The metaphors of parasites and noxious bacillus chosen in Mein Kampf by Hitler for naming the Jews (Chilton, 2005) are emblematic cases. The effect is strong, as the metaphor provides a new meaning, different from both source and target, adhering to people’s conceptual system, where the person(s)-target is moved to a sort of no man’s land, devoid of cultural values. The rhetoric of Salvini is rooted in the right-wing cultural and emotional space, with messages that introduce an allusive and embracing symbology, increased by the communicative strength of Twitter and other social media. The security construction framed by long-standing immigration from North Africa is the conceptual core of the power struggle pursued by the Lega and represents an original semantic key, where the racist background is part of the great semantic space of political hatred, giving voice to feelings of intolerance for differences. Thus, when the ex-Vice-President of the Senate Roberto Calderoli of the Lega described the Afro-descendant, ex-Minister Cécile Kyenge Kashetu, as an orangutan (La Repubblica, 2013), he expressed the violence represented in society. The point is that such a narration reflects the mindset and an imaginary rooted within society, similar to the feelings that some years later inspired the story of Rama Malik.2 So when she announced on Facebook her adherence to a political movement, a media shitstorm of humiliating expressions overran her, including once again the comparison to a monkey, as for instance “my name is Rama and I am a monkey,” “but go work the streets in your country,” etc. (Next online, 2019). The act of naming brings out a historicized way of seeing the difference, making the stereotypes associated with contempt and submission very effective (Butler, 1997; De Mauro, 2016). A concealed world manifests itself, and rude and incorrect language reveals belonging to the same semantic environment. Tweets are initially the preferred place for the electoral campaign of Salvini. The out-of-control world of social media, free from moral restraint and rhetorical prudence, provides Salvini with a permanent platform enabling him to express 2

Rama Malik, a girl of Senegalese origin living in Faenza posted a video on Facebook on December 14, 2019, where she declared her support for the ‘sardines’ (a left-wing movement animated by young people) and criticized the politics and language of Matteo Salvini and the League. This video was the subject of a real shitstorm on Salvini’s Instagram profile, mainly related to her person.

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his vision. Dehumanization of migrants, labelled with the evocative name of ‘new slaves’, the use of an assertive style based on vulgar language, the call to an elementary type of racism, and the defence of Italian identity, all bring to light the deep cultural roots of the right. The criticisms against the operations prepared by the government for the protection of migrants (Mare Nostrum and then Triton) are the leitmotif of this oratory, typically in the period from 2013 to 2018, when, after winning the elections, Matteo Salvini promulgates the Security and Immigration decree for the rejection of immigrants: racial identity and the obsession for the mixed society, criminalization and dehumanization of migrants. He described them either as Islamic terrorists… 496 clandestine immigrants landed in #Lampedusa, 381 in Porto Empedocle. The attempt of “ethnic substitution” wanted by the left continues! [496 clandestini sbarcati a #Lampedusa, 381 a Porto Empedocle. Continua il tentativo di “sostituzione etnica” voluto dalla sinistra!] (Salvini, June 6, 2015)

…or derision of adversaries, drunkards: Gov. #Renzi: “Islamic terrorists are a DANGER for Italy”. Meanwhile #MareNostrum landed 100,000 immigrants. Are they drunkards? [Gov.#Renzi: “Terroristi islamici sono un PERICOLO per Italia”. Intanto #MareNostrum fa sbarcare 100.000 immigrati. Ma sono degli UBRIACONI?] (Salvini, August 20, 2014).

The foul and vulgar language, as in the following, is the true trait-d’union, the underground bond that constantly calls for unity with his followers: #MareNostrum becomes TRITON, #Alfano is happy. They TOOK THE PISS OUT OF ITALIANS AGAIN: you need to stop landings, not to change the name! #Salvini [#MareNostrum diventa TRITON, #Alfano è contento. ALTRA PRESA PER IL CULO per italiani: serve fermare sbarchi, non cambiare nome! #Salvini] (Salvini, October 10, 2014). [#stopinvasione, 8.500 clandestini in arrivo nei porti italiani. Basta, cazzo!!!] (Salvini, July 27, 2017). #stopinvasione, 8,500 clandestine immigrants arriving in Italian ports. Stop, fuck!!!

What shows up is a racist and identity-laden, imaginary universe that feeds the essential values of his political choices and affirmations. This resumed when Salvini was later also Minister of the Interior, a kind of watchword: “Fuck you, get out!” Yesterday, in front of the Coliseum, two Senegalese insulted and pushed local police officers engaged in checking and stopping illegal sellers. These DELINQUENTS have been arrested and sentenced by direct order [“Vaffanculo, vai via!” Ieri, davanti al Colosseo, due senegalesi hanno insultato e spintonato agenti della polizia locale impegnati a controllare e fermare i venditori abusivi. Questi DELINQUENTI sono stati arrestati e condannati per direttissima] (Salvini, June 19, 2019).

The frame of these Salvini tweets depicts the imagined relationship between a supra-national power and the individual as the fight between the interest of the real people and mysterious and uncontrollable bankers, financiers, and freemasons:

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In Europe it is the bankers, the financiers, and freemasons that are in charge. I am on the other side [In Europa comandano banchieri, finanzieri e massoni, è presa d’atto. Io sto dall’altra parte] (Salvini, May 29, 2016). But where have we ended up in Italy? Freedom for our symbols and our culture. No conventional wisdom [Ma dove siamo finiti in Italia? Libertà per i nostri simboli e la nostra cultura. No al pensiero unico!] (Salvini, September 23, 2016).

That is the threatening frame in which crucial ideological contents are inserted: the real nature of Europe, otherwise kept hidden by the establishment (Salvini, May 29, 2016), and the notion of freedom, understood as an ethnocentric consideration of the cultural specificity of Italians (Salvini, September 23, 2016). Freedom and culture introduce an alternative interpretation compared with the one generally advanced by the pro-Europe faction and by liberal and progressive thought. In his Tweet, Salvini (September 23, 2016) clarifies this implicitly by detailing the fundamental points with recourse to keywords such as Italy, symbols, conventional wisdom (aka pensée unique), future, roots, sufficient to evoke the deep fears, values, and attitudes of the audience. Here the use of offensive and vulgar expressions is inscribed, and we can compare it with the notion of coercive impoliteness (Culpeper, 2011, p. 227) insofar as “Coercive impoliteness […] seeks a realignment of values between the producer and the target.” Needless to say, in political discourse, the injurious expression is addressed to an adversary that is generally distant and not immediately present, with the rude or foul expression exercising value identity with the audience, induced to share the same aggressiveness. As noted in Grillo’s rhetoric, impolite and vulgar expressions can be a crucial instrument of rupture with the values of civil society, denying the current state of affairs and introducing a different social and moral view based on hidden or unconscious feelings. The quote below (#1 through #5) relating to the years 2016–2018 were written by Salvini on Twitter and other social media (cf. Baldi et al., 2019), or spoken by Salvini at meetings during the 2018 election campaign. In those years, all political fights are mediated by foul or rude language. The “fuck off” formula is the key expression of a self-referential rejection of the political choices of the government and Brussels. The allusive and embracing symbolic system proves to be communicatively effective through sexual or scatological expressions behaving like other metaphors by opening a frame of connected semantic representations. The following excerpts (and the following examples, most of them from Ondelli (2017, 2018) illustrate the deep cultural ground forming the relevant semiotic frame. This includes the patriarchal/natural style of life (#1 and #2 below), the fears engendered by cultural diversity (#3), and by globalization (#1), the connection of civil and personal liberties to personal responsibility and identity (#2), and the classical suspicion of conspiracies against the ‘pure’ identity of a given nation resulting from migratory and globalization processes (#3). Real people are distant from the élites and

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the establishment that Monti represents, and only derision reveals them completely; finally, in (#5) below, the invective against the Court that rejects the referendum prompted by Lega in order to repeal the law on retirement income justifies the foul language, an extreme defence against the regime that surrounds the Lega party! (#1) A single culture, a single school, a single judiciary. Bollocks. Small is fine, different is fine! [la cultura unica, la scuola unica, la magistratura unica. Che palle. Piccolo è bello, diverso è bello!] (Ondelli, 2017, p. 4). (#2) No, rights for everybody – my ass! If you don’t respect human beings I won’t even give you half a right [No, diritti a tutti un par de palle. Se tu non rispetti l’essere umano io non ti do mezzo diritto.] (Ondelli, 2017, p. 4). (#3) #Salvini The only thing I regret is not sending the last four governments home first. We are undergoing programmed ethnic substitution [#Salvini L’unica cosa di cui mi pento è non aver mandato a casa prima gli ultimi quattro GOVERNI. Stiamo subendo una sostituzione etnica programmata] (Salvini, March 12, 2017). (#4) […] we leave the fucking professors as Mario Monti to the others and we have the real people [agli altri lasciamo i professo3ri del cazzo alla Mario Monti e noi abbiamo la gente vera] (Ondelli, 2017, p. 3). (#5) The Constitutional Court REJECTS #Referendum vs Fornero Law. Democracy dies today, FUCK YOU. But it doesn’t stop there [Consulta BOCCIA #Referendum contro Legge #Fornero. Oggi muore la Democrazia, VAFFANCULO. Ma non finisce qui. #Salvini] (Salvini, January 20, 2015).

EU and Brussels are the hated enemies of this traditionalist and identity ideology, as in the following: Fuck off Brussels and all bureaucrats! From Merkel to the Euro, to the mob who wants to buy us and make us slaves! [Vaffanculo Bruxelles e tutti i burocrati! Dalla Merkel all’euro, a questa gentaglia che vuole comprarci e ci vuole schiavi!] (Ondelli, 2017, p. 6) #Salvini, borders, currency, agriculture, commerce, banks. Fuck Brussels and all the bureaucrats! [#Salvini, Confini, moneta, agricoltura commercio, banche. Vaffanculo a Bruxelles e a tutti i burocrati!] (Salvini, September 18, 2016).

The “single thought” attributed to Europe is rejected in the name of diverse national cultures. The recourse to coarse expressions replaces motivations, introducing a direct identity recall for all people that share the same values. In other words, profanity is a figurative means endowed with several ‘positive’ effects, substantially able to introduce a direct call to common feelings. The exclamatory structure excludes the predicative part of the clause i.e., the argumentation supporting the thesis. This is

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similar to vocatives and allocution formulas; exclamatory sentences have a syntactic organization that lacks the representation of the event, as in “Fuck off Brussels and all bureaucrats!” (Ondelli, 2017, p. 6). The consequence is that only the symbolic and perlocutionary delegitimizing intentions and their expected effects support the lexical designation of the enemy. This rhetoric aims at “the cancellation of the opponent, who is no longer a true interlocutor in the political arena but an enemy with whom it is not worth discussing” (Ondelli, 2017, p. 8). In the above quote (#1) the exclamatory pragmatic form of the thesis “Small is fine, different is fine!” suggests that what is presupposed by ‘single,’ is the conventional wisdom favored by the economic and political establishment, contrasting with small, different values underlying ‘the search for identity’. The use of coarse expressions thus becomes a link with all people that share the same values, by manifesting their disquiet.

10.4 Conclusions: The Force of Violent and Discriminatory Language in Recent History Avoiding an overt argumentative structure, as traditionally in slogans and claims of politicians and parties, is now increasing as a general way to communicate ideas through social media such as Twitter and Facebook. D’Agostini (2010) and Ferraris (2017) warn that a new type of absolutism is born i.e., assertions devoid of falsifiability, new true dogmas. Politicians know that proposing truths different from the established ones triggers the innermost feelings and fears of individuals. The symbolic world alternative to European politics, globalization, immigration processes, and recognition of civil rights, is the main thesis shared with the audience. It is suggested in the attacks on the establishment, presented as inaccessible, a cluster of lobbies and interests extraneous to citizens. But why resort to the strategy of turpiloquium, i.e., to sexist, referential use of language? Culpeper (2011, p. 117 et seq) wonders if and in what sense vulgarity is inherent in language. Of course, expressions like “Fuck you” and the like are words, and even formulas with a negative connotation, but until someone uses them they cannot cause harm. As De Mauro (2016) reminds us, it is the intention that makes a linguistic expression violent. Vulgar forms, idioms, and expressive intensifiers give rise to a coercive language that is operational at the moment of the illocutionary act. Butler (1997) stresses the character of “citations” of acts of sexist/racist language, that is, acts capable of going beyond the issuer by consolidating in a ritual way, recognizable for society, aggression and contempt. They are able to historicize from time to time sexist or racist hierarchies and differences of power, implementing the subjection and inferiority of the recipient. In other words, foul language perpetuates a disparity of power, or at least wants to reproduce such a disparity, thus shaping what Carofiglio (2021, p. 37) characterizes as totalitarian language, “[…] a language swollen with

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hatred and hysteria, that appropriates the words and usurps them, feeding with them the threats […].” We face a language that is totalitarian insofar as it does not admit any form of reply or argumentation, working through the violence of words with exclamations, orders, and threats. The speaker/receiver refers to an object, an individual, or a state of things only when the sentence is realized in a communicative context with a certain intention, where it connects to the collective imagination, to what Butler (1997) calls the historicity of an utterance, taking up the thought of Derrida. Foucault (2006 [1974]), and Derrida respectively approach power and language as a problematic and elusive relationship with the other, leading Butler (1997) to conclude that language is part of those regulatory practices that create consistent identities and ways of thinking about oneself. According to Butler (1990), discriminatory discourse has an anticipatory effect, itself generating gender and social differences, and represents an essential component of the discourse of power. The semiotic of reality coded by discursive tools creates and changes power relations so that using stereotypes and a certain linguistic representation of gender or other social attributes gives them historicity. And this is precisely what happens with the allusive subtleties and the implicatures of Grillo. If we consider Grillo’s oratory in this light, it appears that like every good populist head, he indulges the most traditional prejudices by hiding them under the label of a moral revolution. Here we are dealing with his way of conceptualizing politicians based on metaphors within the domains of psychological attributions, and, especially in the speech at the convention of Rome where he uses conventional wisdom and traditional discriminatory sentiments regarding the facts. We may wonder how public opinion has perceived this type of communication by politicians. In fact, Western democratic publics, in general, are addicted to aggressive and possibly abusive communication. Talk shows and, in recent years, the use of social media by political actors empowered devoid of argumentation and emotional formulas based on feelings and identity. Needless to say, Donald Trump’s communication rhetoric in the United States was a striking example (see also Chap. 12). As to Italy, its complex and dramatic history in the twentieth century (Gotor, 2019) experienced the left- and rightwing terrorism, investigations by the judges of the Milan Public Prosecutor’s Office (the “Mani Pulite” team), that decreed the end of the so-called first republic, and cultural and economic cleavages in society that reinforced a conservative sensibility among the people. So, the escape into private life, traditionalism and familialism, the fear of disturbing trends, as in the case of immigration, all feed the imaginary of large parts of society. Distrust of state administration and establishment inspired populist movements, and such insecurity was exploited by political parties—a drift that is now generally shared by many Western democratic states. These parts of the public feel recognized in the messages of Salvini and Grillo, in their emotional and rude approach, perceived as the appropriate way to interact with dominant forces, otherwise difficult to counter. But is the rude and derisory language effective? The answer is yes, because electoral outcomes rewarded Salvini’s degrading and aggressive rhetoric and Grillo’s

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insinuating and offensive discourse. In fact, both the Lega and the Movimento 5 Stelle obtained excellent results in the 2018 general election: The Lega party gained 17.35% and was the top party on the right; the justice program of the Movimento 5 Stelle achieved 32.68% and became the largest parliamentary group. So, domestic security content stimulated by Salvini and the loose social protest embodied by Grillo’s party successfully brought out and interpreted the deep feelings of a large part of the electorate. The 5 Star Movement and the Lega party formed the new government, where Salvini, as the Minister of the Interior, promulgated the Immigrant and Security Decree, a discriminatory law aimed at distinguishing the so-called true refugees, deserving therefore to be welcomed into Italy, from all the others, presumably fraudsters. However, the incompatibility of the League, attentive to the interests of the reactionary bourgeoisie and small businessmen of the North, and the pauperist Peronism of the Movement, led to the rapid end of the government. The subsequent government between the Movement and the Democratic Party had to deal with the difficult and complex period of the pandemic. The current government includes all political forces except the far-right Fratelli d’Italia party. In the meantime, Salvini has gradually moderated his communication style, partly abandoning his previous highly aggressive and rude tones—a decision possibly connected to the strange story of drug and sex that involved his spin doctor Luca Morisi, creator of the Beast i.e., the communication structure of Salvini that had inspired his aggressive strategy. As to the 5 Star Movement, it is deeply divided between different orientations and weakened by the positions taken by Grillo (see Sect. 10.3). Needless to say, xenophobic right-wing identity and, analogously, the populist thrusts against the establishment, are rooted in the collective imagination. It is no accident that Salvini keeps combining the insecurity and fire for unknown dangers as in the recent tweet for Orban’s victory in Hungary where he evokes the threat against the Christian roots of Europe, as well as his ambiguity towards Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and his opaque opposition to Europe’s choices. Bravo Viktor! Alone against all, attacked by the sinister fanatics of the single thought (i.e. pensée unique), threatened by those who would erase the Jewish-Christian roots of Europe [Bravo Viktor! Da solo contro tutti, attaccato dai sinistri fanatici del pensiero unico, minacciato da chi vorrebbe cancellare le radici giudaico-cristiane dell’Europa] (Salvini, April, 3, 2022).

Turpiloquium, however, has not really disappeared, but it is ironically directed towards himself. Many of his recent tweets include the key expression ‘Fuck you’ but attributed to his opponents and addressed to himself, as in the following tweets: #primagliitaliani “Salvini careful, the wind is still blowing!”, “Bella ciao”, “Salvini, Salvini, fuck you” [#primagliitaliani “Salvini attento, ancora fischia il vento!”, “Bella ciao”, “Salvini, Salvini, vaffanculo”. “Compagni cambiate spartito, siete noiosi!”] (Salvini, September 19, 2019). #primagliitaliani “Fuck Salvini” social centers, ‘sardine’ [a left-wing movement] And Bella Ciao. Even in Crotone, the large group of ‘democrats’ we respond with a smile and many kisses

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[“Vaffanculo Salvini”, centri sociali, pesciolini e Bella Ciao. Anche a Crotone, alla folta schiera di ‘democratici’ noi rispondiamo con un sorriso e tanti baci] (Salvini, January 10, 2020)

Here it is the opponents who take on this sort of emotional and degrading jargon, but the semiotics of the political arena has not changed. The same imaginary is awakened, the same kind of struggle between irreconcilable feelings that cannot be traced back to motivated and rational discussion. Thus, as noticed, many of the linguistic or symbolic devices of persuasion are manipulative in the sense that the cognitive process of information is disturbed by the improper use of words, more generally, by the use of vagueness and semantic voidness, crucially betraying the maxims of Grice, mainly that of quality. Interestingly, Saussure (2005, pp. 119–121) observes that manipulative discourse is not “about using metaphors” and other syntactic or semantic solutions, but about how these tools play a particular pragmatic role. This type of discourse has to do with moral statements concerning the desirable state of affairs and not with the current state of affairs. A particular way of evading or avoiding the listener’s assessment is the use of expressive intensifiers and meanings that make interpretation impossible or difficult, thus creating an irrational consensus.

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Salvini, M. [@matteosalvinimi] (2014, August 20). Gov. #Renzi: “Islamic terrorists are a DANGER for Italy” [Tweet]. https://twitter.com/search?q=Gov.%23Renzi%3A%20%E2%80%9CTerrori sti%20islamici%20sono%20un%20PERICOLO%20per%20Italia&src=typed_query&f=top (in Italian). Salvini, M. [@matteosalvinimi] (2014, October 10). MareNostrum becomes TRITON, #Alfano is happy [Tweet]. https://twitter.com/search?q=%5B%23MareNostrum%20diventa%20T RITON%2C%20%23Alfano%20%C3%A8%20contento.%20ALTRA%20PRESA%20PER% 20IL%20CULO%20&src=typed_query&f=top (in Italian). Salvini, M. [@matteosalvinimi] (2015, January 20). The Constitutional Court REJECTS #Referendum vs Fornero Law [Tweet]. https://twitter.com/search?q=Consulta%20BOCCIA%20% 23Referendum%20contro%20Legge%20%23Fornero.%20Oggi%20muore%20la%20Demo crazia%2C%20%09VAFFANCULO.%20Ma%20non%20finisce%20qui.%20%23Salvini& src=typed_query (in Italian). Salvini, M. [@matteosalvinimi] (2015, June 6). 496 clandestine immigrants landed in #Lampedusa, 381 in Porto Empedocle [Tweet]. https://twitter.com/search?q=496%20clandestini% 20sbarcati%20a%20%23Lampedusa%2C%20381%20a%20Porto%20Empedocle.%20Cont inua%20il%20tentativo%20di%20%09%E2%80%9Csostituzione%20etnica%E2%80%9D% 20voluto%20dalla%20sinistra!&src=typed_query&f=top (in Italian). Salvini, M. [@matteosalvinimi] (2016, May 29). In Europe it is the bankers, the financiers, and freemasons that are in charge [Tweet]. https://twitter.com/search?f=top&q=In%20Europa% 20comandano%20banchieri%2C%20finanzieri%20e%20massoni%2C%20%C3%A8%20p resa%20d%E2%80%99atto.%20Io%20sto%20dall%E2%80%99altra%20parte&src=typed_ query (in Italian). Salvini, M. [@matteosalvinimi] (2016, September 18). Salvini, borders, currency, agriculture, commerce, banks [Tweet]. https://twitter.com/search?q=%5B%23Salvini%2C%20Confini% 2C%20moneta%2C%20agricoltura%20commercio%2C%20banche.%20Vaffanculo%20a% 20Bruxelles%20e%20a%20tutti%20i%20burocrati!%5D%20&src=typed_query&f=top (in Italian). Salvini, M. [@matteosalvinimi] (2016, September 23). But where have we ended up in Italy? Freedom for our symbols and our culture [Tweet]. https://twitter.com/search?f=top&q= Ma%20dove%20siamo%20finiti%20in%20Italia%3F%20Libert%C3%A0%20per%20i%20n ostri%20simboli%20e%20la%20nostra%20cultura.%20No%20al%20pensiero%20unico!& src=typed_query (in Italian). Salvini, M. [@matteosalvinimi] (2017, March 12). #Salvini The only thing I regret is not sending the last four governments home first [Tweet]. https://twitter.com/search?f=top&q=%5B%23Salv ini%20L%27unica%20cosa%20di%20cui%20mi%20pento%20%C3%A8%20non%20aver% 20mandato%20a%20casa%20prima%20gli%20ultimi%20quattro%20%09GOVERNI.%20S tiamo%20subendo%20una%20sostituzione%20etnica%20programmata&src=typed_query (in Italian). Salvini, M. [@matteosalvinimi] (2017, July 27). #stopinvasione, 8,500 clandestine immigrants arriving in Italian ports [Tweet]. https://twitter.com/search?q=%23stopinvasione%2C% 208.500%20clandestini%20in%20arrivo%20nei%20porti%20italiani.%20Basta%2C%20c azzo!!!&src=typed_query&f=top (in Italian). Salvini, M. [@matteosalvinimi] (2019, June 19). “Fuck you, get out!” Yesterday, in front of the Coliseum, two Senegalese insulted [Tweet]. https://twitter.com/search?q=%5B%22Vaff anculo%2C%20vai%20via!%22%20Ieri%2C%20davanti%20al%20Colosseo%2C%20due% 20senegalesi%20hanno%20insultato%20e%20spintonato%20agenti%20della%20polizia%20l ocale%20&src=typed_query&f=top (in Italian).

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Salvini, M. [@matteosalvinimi] (2019, September 19). #primagliitaliani “Salvini careful, the wind is still blowing!” [Tweet]. https://twitter.com/search?f=top&q=%E2%80%9CSalvini% 20attento%2C%20ancora%20fischia%20il%20vento!%E2%80%9D%2C%20%E2%80%9CB ella%20ciao%E2%80%9D%2C%20%E2%80%9CSalvini%2C%20Salvini%2C%20vaffanc ulo%E2%80%9D.%20%E2%80%9CCompagni%20cambiate%20%09spartito%2C%20siete% 20noiosi!%E2%80%9D&src=typed_query (in Italian). Salvini, M. [@matteosalvinimi] (2020, January 10). #primagliitaliani “Fuck Salvini” social centers, ‘sardine’ [Tweet]. https://twitter.com/search?q=%5B%E2%80%9CVaffanculo%20S alvini%E2%80%9D%2C%20centri%20sociali%2C%20pesciolini%20e%20Bella%20Ciao.% 20&src=typed_query&f=top (in Italian). Salvini, M. [@matteosalvinimi] (2022, April 3). Bravo Viktor! Alone against all, attacked by the sinister fanatics of the single thought [Tweet]. https://twitter.com/search?q=Bravo%20V iktor!%20Da%20solo%20contro%20tutti%2C%20attaccato%20dai%20sinistri%20fanatici% 20del%20pensiero%20unico%2C%20%09minacciato%20da%20chi%20vorrebbe%20cancell are%20le%20radici%20giudaico-cristiane%20dell%E2%80%99Europa&src=typed_query& f=top (in Italian). Saussure de, L. (2005). Manipulation and cognitive pragmatics: Preliminary hypotheses. In L. de Saussure & P. Schulz (Eds.), Manipulation and ideologies in the twentieth century (pp. 113–145). John Benjamins. Sea-Watch. (2019, July 19). Salvini’s offense against Carola Rackete: “The German mint also denounced me.” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_bHuKlui0XI Sperber, D., & Wilson, D. (1995 [1986]). Relevance, communication and cognition. Blackwell. Stati, F. (2021). The two minutes of Grillo. Zeta Luiss. https://zetaluiss.it/2021/04/25/video-grillo/ (in Italian). Terkourafi, M. (2008). Toward a unified theory of politeness, impoliteness, and rudeness. In D. Bousfield & M. Locher (Eds.), Impoliteness in language: Studies on its interplay with power in theory and practice (pp. 45–74). Mouton de Gruyter. Virtanen, T., & Halmari, H. (2005). Persuasion across genres: Emerging perspectives. In H. Halmari & T. Virtanen (Eds.), Persuasion across genres: A linguistic approach (pp. 1–24). John Benjamins.

Benedetta Baldi is Full Professor of Communication and Discourse Analysis at the University of Florence, Italy. She is President of the Second Cycle Degree Course in Communication Theories. Her research includes different fields of linguistics and pragmatics, language teaching and communication theory, specifically political discourse and the relationship between media and socio-cultural imaginary. Her latest books in this field are Opinione immediata (2018), about public opinion and media, and Il linguaggio del potere (2021), addressing the persuasive and manipulative nature of political discourse.

Chapter 11

Demonization, Derision, Polarization: Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdo˘gan’s Political Rhetoric H. Bahadır Türk

Abstract Using an interpretive-textual methodology, this chapter seeks to analyze the characteristics of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdo˘gan’s rhetoric through his speeches and statements on domestic policies. The chapter is divided into two major sections. The first section briefly explains the role of debasing language in the context of Turkish politics, and the second discusses the case of Erdo˘gan from 2003, when he became prime minister, to the present. The latter section focuses on three questions: (1) What are the major characteristics of Erdo˘gan’s political rhetoric? (2) Why does Erdo˘gan use such rhetoric? (3) What are the consequences of using this rhetoric? To answer, this study’s argument is threefold: First, Erdo˘gan’s rhetoric combines binarism, organicism, and demonization. Second, he uses the rhetoric for pragmatic and ideological reasons. Third, his rhetoric has facilitated the rise of political polarization in Turkey and reduced politics to a highly moralized field. Furthermore, it has had an impact on political socialization processes in Turkey.

11.1 Introduction On 30 January 2022, a ten-year-old boy was brought on stage during a rally of President Recep Tayyip Erdo˘gan (leader of the Justice and Development Party [Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP]) in Trabzon, a conservative city located on the north coast of Turkey. The boy addressed the crowd, saying: “Mr. Kemal” (Kemal Kılıçdaro˘glu, leader of the main opposition Republican People’s Party [Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP]) “is a traitor.” Although this was not an election rally, he urged the crowd to vote for “the best” and “the greatest”: Erdo˘gan (Haber Global, 2022). This speech, which lasted only 15 seconds, was followed by eager applause from the crowd while Erdo˘gan and his ministers laughed with joy.

H. B. Türk (B) Department of Public Administration and Political Science, Ankara Haci Bayram Veli University, Ankara, Turkey e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 O. Feldman (ed.), Debasing Political Rhetoric, The Language of Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-0894-3_11

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For any observer of Turkish politics, it is obvious that the boy holding a red toy racing car in his hand simply imitated Erdo˘gan’s political rhetoric that is predominantly based on the demonization and derision of political opponents. Using an interpretive textual methodology, this study seeks to determine the major characteristics of this rhetoric by analyzing Erdo˘gan’s speeches and statements on domestic policies. Accordingly, the study is divided into two major sections: The first section briefly discusses the role of debasing language in Turkish politics, and the second discusses the case of Recep Tayyip Erdo˘gan from 2003, when he became prime minister, to the present. The latter will focus on three questions: (1) What are the major characteristics of Erdo˘gan’s political rhetoric? (2) Why does Erdo˘gan use such rhetoric? (3) What are the consequences of using this rhetoric?

11.2 Context: The Use of Debasing Language in Turkish Politics Turkish political history is rife with examples of debasing language. Such political language is a byproduct of a multi-dimensional, historical process that has bolstered the leader-centered perspective—an extension of a sui generis synthesis of patrimonialism, patriarchy, populism, and militarism that also strengthens the forms of charismatic leadership (Türk, 2017). Furthermore, this perspective has facilitated the use of masculine political language that considers aggressiveness, courage, competitiveness, and risk-taking as manly virtues. Such language is in line with political leaders’ populist attempt at idealizing the will of the people, that is, voters. This also involves identifying with the people. As such, representation is transformed into an act of reconstruction. Voters’ beliefs, grievances, desires, and fears are not only represented but also reconstructed by political leaders. This process is dependent on the political reconstruction of the everyday language of the people or, in Wilhelm Reich’s words, of the “little man” (Reich, 1974). Through this reconstruction, the language penetrates the field of political rhetoric. “Speaking the language of the man on the street” is considered a political ability that can help leaders win the voters’ hearts and minds. Political leaders in Turkey are generally eager to show off this ability. A good example is the case of “Little Turgut” in 1989. When Erdal ˙Inönü, leader of the opposing Social Democratic Populist Party (Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti, SHP), criticized the privileged position of the then Prime Minister Turgut Özal’s (leader of the Motherland Party, Anavatan Partisi, ANAP]) family members by targeting his son Ahmet Özal, Turgut Özal said: “˙Inönü is picking on our Ahmet. Ahmet is a little heavy [big] for him. There is a smaller one. There is little Turgut. He can ˙ deal with him/it” [Inönü bizim Ahmet’le u˘gra¸sıyor. Ahmet biraz a˘gır gelir. Daha

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ufa˘gı var. Küçük Turgut var. Onunla u˘gra¸ssın] (Cemal, 2013, p. 76).1 Although, Özal later claimed that by “little Turgut,” [küçük Turgut] he had meant his five-yearold grandson who was also called Turgut, this phallocentric comment was heavily criticized. Remarkably, these criticisms were also mostly in a similar vulgar, masculine language. For instance, Cüneyt Canver, a member of parliament from the SHP, replied to Özal, “Let Mrs. Semra (Turgut Özal’s wife) deal with little Turgut. She knows better […]” [Küçük Turgut’la Semra Hanım u˘gra¸ssın, o daha iyi tanır […]] (“The Little Turgut Controversy”, 1989). In another instance, Necmettin Erbakan, leader of the National Outlook Movement, commented on Turgut Özal’s advisor Güne¸s Taner. During the plebiscite of October 1987, which marked the return of the ex-political leaders who had been banned from politics by the military junta of the 12 September coup d’état, the ruling ANAP campaigned against the return of leaders such as Erbakan, Süleyman Demirel, and Bülent Ecevit. However, the leaders’ supporters won this plebiscite and Erbakan commented regarding Taner, who had worn an orange (the color of the ballots for “no”) t-shirt saying “NO, NO, NO” during the campaigns: “Mr. Özal had a political advisor. Was he ‘No, No’ or Nono¸s?” [Sayın Özal’ın bir mü¸saviri vardı. No no muydu, Nono¸s muydu?] (Birand & Yalçın, 2012, p. 296). Nono¸s, which means a gay man in Turkish slang, thus became part of the masculine vocabulary of Turkish politics. This vocabulary also consists of some creative curses. For instance, Sevki ¸ Yılmaz, a controversial deputy of the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi, RP), once referred to the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) as an “assembly that is composed of pimps” [pezevenklerin olu¸sturdu˘gu Türk parlamentosu] (Rain of insults, 1997). It is noteworthy that the TGNA itself has been the scene of exchange of insults such as “son of a bitch” [orospu çocu˘gu], “pimp” [pezevenk], “stupid” [kelek], “fascist octopus” [fa¸sist ahtapot], “pervert” [sapık], and “inglorious” [¸serefsiz] (Mumcu, 2019, pp. 15, 16, 34, 36, 37, 46). These are just a few examples. In the late 1980s, when the intra-party competition within the ANAP reached its peak, Bülent Akarcalı, an ANAP deputy, challenged his colleague from the same party, saying: “If Mehmet Keçeciler becomes minister, I will cut off my balls” [Mehmet Keçeciler bakan olursa ta¸saklarımı keserim] (Keçeciler, 2014, p. 90). In 1993, Cavit Ça˘glar, a member of parliament from the True Path Party (Do˘gru Yol Partisi, DYP), called Mesut Yılmaz, the ANAP leader, “yav¸sak” (an abusive word that means young louse but is used in Turkish slang to comment on smarmy people) (The third case, 2005). In December 1995, during a heated television ˙sçi Partisi, ˙IP), called Ertu˘grul debate, Do˘gu Perinçek, the Workers’ Party leader (I¸ Kürkçü, a Freedom and Solidarity Party (Özgürlük ve Dayanı¸sma Partisi, ÖDP) member, “pu¸st” (meaning catamite in Turkish slang) (32. Gün Ar¸sivi, 2016). Such vocabulary goes hand in glove with other examples of abusive language. In 1946, the then Prime Minister Recep Peker described the speech of Adnan

1

In Turkish, “onu” is an object pronoun that means “him,” “her,” and “it.” This ambiguity made it possible for Özal to claim that he did not mean “it,” which would stand for phallus, but “him,” which meant his grandson.

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Menderes, the opposing Democratic Party leader (Demokrat Parti, DP), as a reflection of “the morbid darkness of a pessimistic psychopath soul” [kötümser bir psikopat ruhun mariz karanlı˘gı] (Menderes, 1991, p. 142). In 1957, the then Prime Minister Menderes had claimed that ˙Ismet ˙Inönü, CHP leader, was “sick” [hasta]: “˙Ismet Pasha says ‘There is a crisis.’ My beloved citizens, the crisis is within ˙Ismet Pasha’s own head. ˙Ismet Pasha is sick” [Ismet ˙ Pa¸sa ‘Buhran vardır’ diyor. ˙ ˙ Buhran, Ismet Pa¸sa’nın kendi kafasındadır sevgili vatanda¸slar. Ismet Pa¸sa hastadır] (Menderes, 1992, p. 362). Even earlier, in the 1954 election campaign, when the DP circles claimed that Kasım Gülek, the CHP general secretary, was “uncircumcised,” [sünnetsiz] Gülek replied: “[Their] daughter is too talkative” [[Kızları] da amma gevezeymi¸s] (32. Gün Ar¸sivi, 2017). In 2013, Oktay Vural, a Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, MHP) deputy, called Hüseyin Çelik, an AKP deputy, “manhole cover mouthed” [rögar kapa˘gı a˘gızlı] (Vural, 2013). In 2003, Cem Uzan, the Young Party leader (Genç Parti, GP), addressed Recep Tayyip Erdo˘gan as a “Godless (an expression usually used to describe one’s ruthlessness) guy” [Allahsız herif ] and a “treacherous man” [kalle¸s adam] (Türk, 2008, pp. 90–92). In 2015, when Aydın Ünal, an AKP deputy, harshly accused Devlet Bahçeli, the MHP leader, of insulting Erdo˘gan’s family and said that he was “miserable” [zavallı], the MHP’s official Twitter account posted a tweet: “This is our advice to the AK Saray [the presidential complex]! [They] should vaccinate all [their] dogs for rabies” [Ak Saraya tavsiyemizdir! Bütün itlerinin kuduz a¸sısını yaptırsın] (A very harsh tweet from the MHP to the palace, 2015). Accordingly, it can be said that the prevailing language within Turkish politics has mostly been that of debasement. Such language has also been internalized by political actors along the country’s political spectrum. Recep Tayyip Erdo˘gan’s political rhetoric also takes its roots from this historical habitus. However, his aggressive and polarizing tone has much more distinctive characteristics than that of the former political leaders.

11.3 “A Rhetoric of Abjection:” Making Sense of Erdo˘gan’s Political Rhetoric Researchers have focused on different aspects of Erdo˘gan’s leadership and his growing impact on Turkish politics.2 However, the peculiarities of his rhetoric are relatively less examined. This study seeks to fill this gap by examining the nature of Erdo˘gan’s political rhetoric that has three particular characteristics: binarism, organicism, and demonization.

2

For example, see Görener and Ucal (2011), Özbudun (2014), Öni¸s (2015, 2016), Aydın-Düzgit (2016), Türk (2014, 2018), Baykan (2018), Selçuk et al. (2019), Aytaç and Elçi (2019), Eksi and Wood (2019), Elçi (2019), Çapan and Zarakol (2019), Kesgin (2020), Rogenhofer and Panievsky (2020), Yılmaz (2020), Yolaçan (2021), Aslan (2021).

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11.3.1 Binarism Binarism is the hallmark of Erdo˘gan’s rhetoric and is characterized by oppositions between the pure and the corrupted, the people and the elite, and the friend and the enemy. This rhetoric is based on the populist belief that “only some of the people are really the people” (Müller, 2016, p. 21). As an extension of this belief, Erdo˘gan has attempted to retain the cultural distinction between beyaz Türkler (white Turks), mostly the secular elites and modern urban upper middle classes, and siyah Türkler (black Turks), the conservative segment of the society and the lower classes.3 In 2015, he said, “I am proud of being a zenci (negro) Turk” [Zenci Türk olmaktan s¸eref duyuyorum] (Erdo˘gan, 2015a). In a similar vein, following an incident where a four-year-old girl sustained severe injuries from a pit bull attack in December 2021, Erdo˘gan urged “the White Turks” to get their dogs under control (Erdo˘gan, 2021a) and said, “the owners of these dogs are the ones who have plenty of money” [bu köpekler parası bol olanların köpekleri] (Erdo˘gan, 2021a). Here one should pause to note that one of the most strategic mistakes that the opposition in Turkey has made is facilitating the repetition of such distinctions, which are an integral part of Erdo˘gan’s political rhetoric. For instance, Muharrem ˙Ince, the CHP candidate who lost against Erdo˘gan in the June 2018 presidential elections, sought to reverse this distinction: “Who is Erdo˘gan, who is ˙Ince? Let me tell you. Erdo˘gan is a white Turk, I am negro. I am the negro of Turkey” [Erdo˘gan kim, ˙ Ince kim? Söyleyeyim. Erdo˘gan beyaz Türk, ben zenci. Ben Türkiye’nin zencisiyim] ˙ 2018). (Muharrem Ince, To understand binarism, it is important to focus on how Erdo˘gan describes the elites in general. Erdo˘gan has spoken of the elites “as the parasites that have clung to this country” [bu ülkeye asalak gibi yapı¸san elitler] (Erdo˘gan, 2018a) and said that they have multiplied their wealth and politically dominated the country (Erdo˘gan, 2019j, pp. 136–137; 2020a, 2022a). He has also emphasized how “the majority in this country has always been subjected to the domination of a handful elites” [bu ülkede ço˘gunluk, her zaman bir avuç seçkinin tahakkümüne maruz kaldı] and how these elites “have treated everyone but themselves as second-class [citizens]” [kendileri dı¸sındaki herkese ikinci sınıf [yurtta¸s] muamelesi yapmı¸stır] (Erdo˘gan, 2019j, pp. 214, 256; 2019l, p. 283). In Erdo˘gan’s rhetoric, the elites are equated with sefa (enjoyment) whereas the people are equated with cefa (suffering) (Erdo˘gan, 2019k, p. 28). Erdo˘gan also believes that the hallmark of the elites is that they are “not able to speak the same language as the people” [milletle aynı dili konu¸samayan seçkinci zümreler] (Erdo˘gan, 2019k, p. 182). Accordingly, he separates himself from these elites saying, “We did not grow up in the elite streets of Paris” [Paris’in elit sokaklarında büyümedik] (Erdo˘gan 2019k, p. 171). His description of the elites reflects the political language of debasement, referring to them as being kaba (rude), küstah (arrogant), and kifayetsiz (inadequate) (Erdo˘gan, 2021b). 3

For this distinction that emerged in the 1990s, see Demiralp (2012), Bora (2013), White (2013), and Ramm (2016).

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Furthermore, Erdo˘gan almost always accuses the CHP of representing the interests of the elites (Erdo˘gan, 2019c, p. 398; 2019d, p. 380; 2019e, p. 272; 2019f, p. 273; 2019g, p. 175; 2019h, p. 162, 170, 196), using derision as a rhetorical strategy. For instance, he mostly refers to Kemal Kılıçdaro˘glu as Bay Kemal (Mr. Kemal). On the one hand, the emphasis on “mister” is used as a reminder of the CHP’s, and Kılıçdaro˘glu’s, elitist distance from “the real people.” On the other, it is a sarcastic reference to the modernization project of Kemalism, the founding ideology of the modern Turkish Republic since words such as Bay (Mr.) and Bayan (Mrs.) were circulated by Kemalist elites during the 1930s. He uses derision when referring to Kılıçdaro˘glu’s statements as well. In 2017, during a live interview on Ahaber, a progovernment news channel, while Erdo˘gan was answering questions, a clip entitled “Kılıçdaro˘glu’s contradictions” was also broadcast and the screen was divided into two parts. While the left side of the screen featured the “contradictory” remarks made by Kılıçdaro˘glu, the right side showed Erdo˘gan laughing at these remarks (Great Meeting, 2017). Here, it can be argued that there is a strong correlation between Erdo˘gan’s process of consolidating political power and his populist rhetoric that reflects the basic tenets of anti-elitism. In his early years of power, Erdo˘gan predominantly confined himself to a narrow critique of elitism, considering it a political attitude that damages the ideal of democracy (Erdo˘gan, 2019a, p. 382; 2019b, p. 61; 2019l, p. 116). However, his criticism towards elitism became more comprehensive and harsher as the AKP’s power gradually increased and expanded. In this vein, the usage frequency of words such as seçkin (elite), seçkinci (elitist), seçkincilik (elitism), elit (elite), elitist (elitist), and elitizm (elitism) became notably common in his rhetoric. At this point, looking at the usage frequency of these words in Erdo˘gan’s speeches within the book entitled Beraber Yürüdük Biz Bu Yollarda (We Walked Together on These Roads) (Erdo˘gan, 2019a, 2019b, 2019c, 2019d, 2019e, 2019f, 2019g, 2019h, 2019i, 2019j, 2019k), consisting of 11 volumes and covering the period between 2003 and 2014, might give us an idea. Table 11.1 presents this data. This increase in usage frequency can be explained by the transformed nature of Erdo˘gan’s political power. In the first few years of his rule, Erdo˘gan’s position against the actors of the political establishment such as the army or big capital circles was relatively fragile. In a sense, both Erdo˘gan and the AKP were walking on ice. However, with each election victory, Erdo˘gan not only consolidated his power but also changed the composition of “the power elite” (Mills, 2000). His rhetoric has also been increasingly laden with various references to the supposedly insidious role of the elites. It can be argued that this tendency is a byproduct of his strategy to use populism as a medium of mass mobilization (Türk, 2018). In accordance with this strategy to consolidate the AKP’s power, Erdo˘gan’s rhetoric aimed to revitalize and reconfigure the enemy status of the elites. Simultaneously, his rhetoric turned into that of war, fetishizing the idea of struggle. This tendency is particularly visible in his statements such as “Our struggle is the struggle of our nation. Our anger is the anger of our nation” (Erdo˘gan, 2018b) or “Our struggle is the last hope of the oppressed and the wronged” (Our Struggle, 2018). Similarly, he has also emphasized the necessity of “closing the ranks around

11 Demonization, Derision, Polarization: Turkish President Recep Tayyip … Table 11.1 Usage frequency of the words Seçkin-Seçkinci-Seçkincilik (Elit-Elitist-Elitizm)

Years

Usage frequency (times)

2003–2004

4

2004–2006

2

2006–2007

5

2007–2008

7

2008–2009

5

2009–2010

8

2010–2011

15

2011–2012

21

2012–2013

10

2013–2013

17

2014–2014

22

189

Source Erdo˘gan, 2019a, 2019b, 2019c, 2019d, 2019e, 2019f, 2019g, 2019h, 2019i, 2019j, 2019k

[the] blessed cause,” “maintaining [the] struggle,” and “standing shoulder to shoulder and not taking eyes off [the] range” (Erdo˘gan, 2019p). This rhetoric turns the idea of struggle into a necessity for defeating the enemy. This tendency can be considered along the lines of an old Nietzschean maxim: “Anyone who lives for the sake of battling an enemy has an interest in keeping that enemy alive” (Nietzsche, 1995, p. 271).

11.3.2 Organicism As mentioned earlier, Erdo˘gan’s rhetoric is also based on an understanding of organicism. This understanding rests on the assumption that the leader, that is, Erdo˘gan, is an organic extension of the people (Türk, 2018) and is based on the claim that he is the “vox populi” (voice of the people) (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017, p. 62). As “one of them,” Erdo˘gan has constantly emphasized his admiration for the people. Remarkably, Erdo˘gan tends to use a “We-language” even when referring to himself. On one hand, this rhetorical choice reflects the religious-conservative political language that considers the use of the “I-language” arrogance. On the other, it magnifies the position of the speaker by implying the togetherness of the leader and his followers, the leader, and a gigantic institutional network. Accordingly, Erdo˘gan says “We are in love with you” or “We love you” [Biz size a¸sı˘gız] instead of simply saying “I love you” (Erdo˘gan, 2022b). He has even described the nature of the relationship between him and his followers: “We are in love with each other. Love is such a thing that [the lover] disappears in the beloved. We love you and we disappear in you” [Birbirimize a¸sı˘gız. A¸sk, öyle bir s¸eydir ki

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[ki¸sinin] sevdi˘ginde yok olmasıdır. Biz sizi seviyoruz ve sizde yok oluyoruz] (Erdo˘gan, 2022c). However, for Erdo˘gan, this relationship contains rules to be obeyed and principles to be followed. Organicism here is based on the assumption that there is a vital relationship between society and the state, in other words, the ruled and the ruler. From a Platonic perspective, each social segment corresponds to an organ in the human body and has a key function in ensuring the health of the whole (Plato, 2003). Therefore, this leads to what can be called the naturalization of hierarchy. This tendency can be seen in how Erdo˘gan reacted to the Turkish trade unions’ demands for celebrating the International Workers’ Day in Taksim Square in 2008, saying “When the feet begin to govern the head, it becomes doomsday” [Ayaklar ba¸s olursa kıyamet kopar] (PM Erdogan, 2008).

11.3.3 Demonization Organic togetherness between the leader and the mass is always under external and internal threats. Here, binarism, organicism, and demonization are intertwined. Erdo˘gan’s political rhetoric is marked by a continuous attempt at demonization. Even legal political actors are easily juxtaposed with illegal ones. For instance, Erdo˘gan termed the CHP and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partîya Karkerên Kurdistanê, PKK) as “two dirty structures” [iki kirli yapı] and “political allies” [siyasi müttefik] (Erdo˘gan, 2020b). He addressed Nuray Mert, an academic and a journalist who had criticized the AKP’s policies, as namert (“coward and despicable”), inverting the meaning of her surname Mert, that is, courageous and trustworthy (Harsh words from Erdo˘gan, 2011). He also described the Gezi protestors in 2013 as çapulcu (looter) and kemirgen (rodent) (Rodents, 2013). In addition, in January 2022, reacting to the controversy stemming from Turkish pop star Sezen Aksu’s song, which includes the lyric “Say hello to those ignorant Eve and Adam,” he said: “No one can defame his holiness, Adam. It is our duty, when the time comes, to rip out the tongues of those who defame him” [Hazreti Adem efendimize kimsenin dili uzanamaz. O uzanan dilleri yeri geldi˘ginde koparmak bizim görevimiz] (President Erdo˘gan, 2022).4 The demonization of political opponents in Erdo˘gan’s rhetoric is accompanied by the deification of the people. “The people” are categorized as divine and juxtaposed with God. For instance, in 2010, Erdo˘gan said, “we are not the ones who give account to the elites that disdain the people. We only give account to God and the nation” [Biz hesabını millete tepeden bakan seçkinlere verenlerden de˘giliz. Biz bir Allah’a, bir de millete hesap veririz] (Erdo˘gan, 2019m, p. 218). Furthermore, demonization is built on a distinction between “the old Turkey” and the new one. Accordingly,

4

See also Singer Sezen Aksu (2022). Erdo˘gan later stated that he did not address Sezen Aksu in his speech. See Erdo˘gan: The addressee of my speech (2022).

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There is no more the old Turkey where a great country and a great nation are ruled by a handful of self-styled elites and lumpens who call themselves intellectuals and academics. Now we are in the construction process of the new Turkey where the word and the authority are in the hands of the nation [Koskoca ülkeyi, koskoca milleti bir avuç kerameti kendinden menkul seçkinin, kendine aydın, akademisyen diyen lümpenin yönetti˘gi eski Türkiye artık yok. Artık sözün de, yetkinin de milletin elinde oldu˘gu yeni Türkiye’nin in¸sası sürecindeyiz”]. (Erdo˘gan, 2018, p. 384)

Obviously, Erdo˘gan uses such a rhetoric for both pragmatic and ideological reasons. On the one hand, this rhetoric is an extension of the influential populist strategy that helps Erdo˘gan keep his followers together (Türk, 2018). On the other, it is a byproduct of Erdo˘gan’s own ideological orientation, shaped by the writings of intellectual figures such as Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, whom he considered “a great thinker” (Erdo˘gan, 2019n, p. 113) and “an exceptional person” [müstesna s¸ahıs] (Erdo˘gan, 2019o, p. 285). Kısakürek championed an authoritarian socio-political perspective that was based on the synthesis between Turkishness and Islamism. His ideas laid the intellectual foundations not only for the Turkish right but also its political language. The major characteristics of Kısakürek’s political writings such as an attempt at demonization and name-calling (Kısakürek, 2015),5 a stark moralism (Kısakürek, 2012a),6 and an alarmist search for national authenticity (Kısakürek, 2013),7 have shaped Erdo˘gan’s political rhetoric. Erdo˘gan even said that Kısakürek’s ideas “continue to guide us” (President Erdo˘gan’s Speech, 2021). Therefore, it can be argued that Erdo˘gan’s political rhetoric provides a sui generis synthesis of pragmatic political calculations and sincere ideological devotion (Türk, 2014).

5

Kısakürek never hesitated to use derogatory language toward those he criticizes. Some examples of such terms are Gübre beyinli (“manure brained”), pembe kıçlı maymun (“pink-assed monkey”), kâfir (“infidel”) ha¸sere (“insect”), ahlaksız (“immoral”), deyyus (“cuckold”), and lüpçü (“parasite”) (Kısakürek, 2012a, pp. 99, 145, 172, 199, 501, 544). 6 According to Kısakürek, “our society” has suffered from countless “moral wounds” such as “adulation, favoritism, theft, bribery, prostitution, alcohol, murder, gambling” (Kısakürek, 2012a, pp. 156–158). Therefore, he emphasizes the necessity of a moral revival. He believes that this revival can only be possible by embracing the core values of Islam (Kısakürek, 2012a, pp. 92, 97, 103, 116). 7 Not surprisingly, this multi-dimensional search is intertwined with his anti-Western rhetoric, which is xenophobic (Kısakürek, 2012a, pp. 546–548; 2013, p. 73). Kısakürek’s rhetoric is also shaped by a strong commitment to anti-communism (Kısakürek, 2010, 2012b). According to him, the basic principle of communism is “the denial of God” (Kısakürek, 2013, p. 86). Additionally, his rhetoric is overwhelmingly characterized by anti-elitism. In this context, Kısakürek refers to an alliance of the elites including journalists, academics, intellectuals, and politicians (Kısakürek, 2013, pp. 35, 78, 81, 106, 153). Furthermore, he sees the CHP as an extension of this alliance and the ideology of Westernization (Kısakürek, 2008, pp. 112–118).

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11.3.4 Social and Political Ramifications Undoubtedly, Erdo˘gan’s political rhetoric has socio-political consequences. First, it has contributed to the rise of political polarization. Although Turkish politics has been prominently polarized since the transition to the multi-party system in 1945, the shift to the Presidential System in 2018 became a turning point for such polarization (Somer, 2019; Törenli & Kıyan, 2022). Consequently, political polarization notably heightened demonization and the perception of threat (Laebens & Öztürk, 2021) and has become intertwined with polarization on social media. Twitter trolling and particularly pro-government trolls have exacerbated the polarization in Turkey (Bulut & Yörük, 2017). This has also increased the emotional distance between the AKP supporters and opponents (Erdo˘gan & Uyan-Semerci, 2018). Emotional distance, escalated by the combination of party identification and political polarization, also characterizes how voters identify themselves and others. In this vein, this distance transforms politics into a conflict based on the division of us versus them. At this point, the primary function of Erdo˘gan’s political rhetoric is to construct a negative other, mostly regarding the political opposition, expected to represent the ultimate evil of which the AKP supporters should be aware. Erdo˘gan’s rhetoric seeks to imbue this negative other with what Julia Kristeva called “abjection.” According to Kristeva, abjection is “what disturbs identity, system, order. What does not respect borders, positions, rules. The in-between, the ambiguous, the composite” (Kristeva, 1982, p. 4). In Erdo˘gan’s rhetoric, abjection arises from the probability of any external subject approaching the beloved object, that is, the people. Therefore, any external subject, in this case the opposition, is considered a subject of abjection that gives rise to repulsion and fear.8 This subject also triggers Erdo˘gan’s fear of losing the organic tie between himself and “his people.” Since his rhetoric rests on the assumption that he and the people are merged, Erdo˘gan considers others’ attempt to maintain any relationship with the people a border violation that disturbs the symbiotic and symbolic togetherness between himself and “his people.” Such a disturbance also causes abjection. Consequently, Erdo˘gan’s political rhetoric frequently emphasizes the threats posed by such external political subjects. Accordingly, Erdo˘gan intentionally uses the word Bunlar, meaning “they/these/those.” The deliberate ambiguity of the term emphasizes a wide variety of threats against not only the people but also the country. For instance, Erdo˘gan has addressed the opposition as follows: These are terror gangs. These are pirates [Bunlar terör çetesi, bunlar korsan] (They Have Weighed Down, 2013); They are bloodsuckers, killers of dignity [Bunlar kan emicidir, haysiyet katilidir] (President Erdo˘gan, 2016); These are nearly lie machines [Bunlar adeta bir yalan makinasıdır] (President Erdo˘gan, 2021); 8

According to Inbar et al. (2012), there is a strong correlation between disgust sensitivity and conservatism.

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They are shameless [Bunlar utanmaz] (From Erdo˘gan to CHP, 2021); “They are ungrateful” [Bunlar nankör] (Erdo˘gan, 2021b); They are miserable. They are not even apprentices [Bunlar zavallı, bunlar çırak bile de˘gil] (President Erdo˘gan Reacts, 2018); They are anarchists [Bunlar anar¸sist] (From Erdo˘gan to Sarıgül, 2014); and, They are atheists. They are terrorists [Bunlar ateist, bunlar terörist] (From Erdo˘gan to protesters, 2014).

In this context, the usage of Bunlar reflects an attempt at demonization, a crucial element of Erdo˘gan’s rhetoric, making use of both anxiety and anger. The anxiety stems from the belief that the nation represents the ultimate form of purity and lack of corruption. Therefore, it should be preserved at any cost and by any means. Meanwhile, the anger is directed toward the political adversaries who are likely to damage this purity. This anger has transformed Erdo˘gan’s political rhetoric into that of war. In this vein, he mostly uses a rhetorical and challenging question in addressing his opponents: “Who are you?” [Sen kimsin?/Siz kimsiniz?] (Erdo˘gan, 2015b; From ˙ 2015; Mr. Kılıçdaro˘glu, Erdo˘gan to prosecutor, 2018; From Erdo˘gan to TÜSIAD, 2011; We Cannot Say Okay, 2012; Who Are You, 2021) and “Who are you? Know your place!” [Sen kimsin? Haddini bil!] (Erdo˘gan, 2014). This understanding of politics, needless to say, tends to erase any possibility for reconciliation and damages the climate of pluralism. Besides, such a rhetoric also gives impetus to what Chantal Mouffe called “the moralization of politics” (Mouffe, 2004, p. 73). Here, politics is reduced to a set of morally right and wrong positions and the entire political field is reorganized according to moral categories. Therefore, political opponents can easily be labeled as political enemies. For this reason, the moralization of politics means the death of “agonistic debate” (Mouffe, 2004, p. 74). Additionally, as mentioned earlier, this rhetoric has impacted political socialization processes. Erdo˘gan’s powerful yet polarizing rhetoric not only seeks to represent and reflect the language of “the man on the street” but also reproduces such language. This process also facilitates individuals’ internalization of a politically redesigned language as a moral compass. For example, the ten-year-old boy in Erdo˘gan’s rally used words such as “Mr. Kemal” and “traitor.” Therefore, it can be said that the internalization of this political rhetoric has contributed to an increase in political polarization that already “attained dangerous levels” in Turkey (Esmer, 2019, p. 143). Within this framework, another element of Erdo˘gan’s political rhetoric is its stable nature. For Erdo˘gan, the election process is a continuous one. Therefore, his main concern is to keep his voter base united and motivated. For this purpose, his political rhetoric has become an instrument that makes use of recurrent themes such as demonization, derision, and polarization. The only exception to this tendency is Erdo˘gan’s “balcony speeches” that he delivers from the balcony of the AKP’s headquarters to celebrate his election success and greet the crowds, as he did in 2007, 2011, 2014, 2018, and 2019. In these speeches, Erdo˘gan’s rhetoric mostly revolves around themes such as reconciliation, unity in diversity, and the value of democracy, and his tone is notably moderate (Ünlü, 2015). This change in tone in the balcony speeches can be considered his pragmatic attempt to ease tensions created by the election atmosphere and by himself.

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11.4 Conclusion On 17 February 2022, Turkish pop music icon Tarkan released his latest single Geççek (It will pass), singing “Everything has an end. This ordeal, too, will end.” The release of the song on YouTube triggered an immediate, heated debate on the meaning of lyrics. Whereas some claimed that the song was about the COVID-19 pandemic, others argued that Tarkan’s song referred to the ruling AKP and therefore, President Erdo˘gan. Consequently, the polarized political climate of Turkey witnessed a social media war discussing the song (Tarkan’s New Song, 2022; Who Says What, 2022). It is obvious that polarization in Turkey has gained a new form during the AKP era, marked by what can be called “the politicization of everything.” Ranging from the rise of social media to the transition to the presidential system, from the nature of the political habitus that absolutizes the sociocultural values of individuals to the rise of identity politics, the reasons for this are manifold. The rising atmosphere of populism in Turkish politics has also provided impetus to this process, facilitating the use of debasing language. The current study has argued that Erdo˘gan’s rhetoric is highly affiliated with debasing language. His rhetoric combines binarism, organicism, and demonization, the impact of which is twofold. On the one hand, the combination turns Erdo˘gan’s rhetoric into that of abjection, characterized by his fear of losing the organic tie between himself and “his people” and, therefore, the fear of losing his own political existence. On the other, it transforms this rhetoric into that of war, shaped by a challenging and aggressive political language that tends to pinpoint political enemies. Furthermore, Erdo˘gan’s political rhetoric has contributed to the rise of political polarization in Turkey, resulting in a significant increase in political intolerance. Borrowing Ludwig Wittgenstein’s famous dictum, “the limits of my language mean the limits of my world” (Wittgenstein, 2009, p. 88), one can say that the limits of political leaders’ language mean the limits of their political world. The use of political language and the understanding of politics are intertwined. Accordingly, this study has sought to examine this intertwined relationship by analyzing the case of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdo˘gan, one of the most powerful political figures in Turkish political history whose influence through the medium of language spans not only the political field but also the layers of everyday life. As this language becomes pervasive and widespread, Erdo˘gan himself turns into a source of inspiration and a role model for others. Therefore, it is possible that today there is not only one Erdo˘gan in Turkey but many in waiting.

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H. Bahadır Türk is Professor of Political Science at Ankara Hacı Bayram Veli University, Turkey. He is the author of the books S¸ irket ve Parti: Genç Parti ve Yeni Siyaset [The Party and The Firm: The Young Party and New Politics] (2008) and Muktedir: Türk Sa˘g Gelene˘gi ve Recep Tayyip Erdo˘gan [Potent: Turkish Right Tradition and Recep Tayyip Erdo˘gan] (2014). His articles appear in journals such as Turkish Studies, Middle Eastern Studies, National Identities, and International Area Studies Review.

Chapter 12

Tweets, Taunts, Tirades, and Tantrums: How America’s Donald Trump Transformed Transgressive Language into Political Power Michael Alan Krasner Abstract This chapter applies Murray Edelman’s concept of enemy/leader and opponent/enemy construction to analyze the ways in which Donald Trump’s use of debasing language helped him to gain and keep support. The chapter focuses on how debasing language affects the ways in which the person using the language is perceived, how the person or institution being attacked is perceived, and how the target audience of potential supporters perceives themselves. In particular, this chapter shows how in the context of the legitimacy crisis that gripped the U.S., Trump could use debasing language to distinguish himself from “establishment politicians,” thus gaining support. Analyzing one key example, the chapter shows how the crude, racist language in Trump’s announcement speech worked to define him as an outsider, and a populist, attracting supporters fed up with the existing system. The chapter then considers three questions: How did debasing language affect Trump’s relations with the mainstream media? How did debasing language affect his relations with rival candidates? What were the real-world consequences of Trump’s debasing language in terms of appealing to violence against minorities and in terms of violence against the American system of government. The chapter concludes by considering the ways in which Trump’s use of debasing language threatened the ability to perceive reality and even the concept of reality itself.

12.1 Introduction This chapter analyzes how debasing language affects political relationships – particularly the gaining or losing of support—in terms of perception: the perception of the person or group using the debasing language (“the attacker”); and the perception, including the self-perception, of the person or group being attacked (“the target”). The chapter will show that far from being the uncontrolled expression of childish M. A. Krasner (B) Taft Institute for Government and Civic Education, Queens, NY, USA e-mail: [email protected] Queens College, City University of New York, New York, NY, USA © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 O. Feldman (ed.), Debasing Political Rhetoric, The Language of Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-0894-3_12

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impulses, debasing language is usually a consciously deployed and powerful political weapon, especially in the hands of a practitioner such as US President Donald Trump, hailed by one acute analyst for his “rhetorical genius” (Mercieca, 2020). One crucial analytical distinction derives from Murray Edelman’s (1988) classic text on the political spectacle: “opponents” versus “enemies.” Opponents are those with whom one differs on policy, but with whom one shares a basic allegiance as in the formulation, “Democrats or Republicans, we are all Americans.” Enemies, on the other hand, are those one regards (or caricatures) as a threat to fundamental values and institutions, those with whom one is engaged in a life-or-death conflict. One major function of debasing speech is to transform political opponents into enemies. By using debasing speech, the attacker changes his supporters’ perception of the opponent. Instead of seeing them as fellow Americans, part of the same national community, supporters are led to see the other side as a threat to the nation. If this process succeeds, if large numbers of people come to see the targeted opponents as enemies, it produces enormous political benefits for the unscrupulous attacker. It attracts and energizes supporters, mobilizing them to take actions ranging from voting to violence. The support thus gained can be crucial to winning elections or overthrowing a democratically elected opponent. In recent American history, the 2016 election is an example of success through voting, whereas the January 6, 2021, assault on the Capitol is an example of failure using violence. The latter pattern – demeaning language leading to violence – will be analyzed in Sect. 12.5. The chapter begins with an analysis of the demeaning language in Trump’s announcement speech (Sect. 12.2). Section 12.3 focuses on demeaning language that targets the media and Sect. 12.4 analyzes political rivals as targets. Section 12.6, the conclusion, summarizes the findings and suggests directions for further research, especially the effects of demeaning language and other rhetorical devices on the perception of reality. It is important to point out that while this chapter focuses on Donald Trump, he is simply the most recent, most extreme, and most vulgar and crude example of a long-term trend in the Republican Party. Political scientists have noted this trend to use different language; Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018, p. 147) write that Newt Gingrich led the Republican Party to treat politics as “a war for power” while Hacker and Pierson (2010) call the Republican strategy and practice, “winner-take-all politics.” Whatever the terminology, the essential point is that the pre-Trump Republican Party had already begun using demeaning language and treating the Democratic Party as the enemy, a process led and financed by enormously wealthy, extreme right-wing individuals and groups (Mayer, 2016).

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12.2 Starting at the Beginning—Self Definition, Enemy Definition, and Recruiting Donald Trump’s campaign for president began with his now famous (or infamous) escalator ride to the lobby of Trump Tower in New York City where he made a speech whose most frequently quoted lines were (Trump, 2015a): When Mexico sends its people, they’re not sending their best. They’re not sending you. [Indicating members of the audience] They’re not sending you. They’re sending people that have lots of problems, and they’re bringing those problems with us [sic]. They’re bringing drugs. They’re bringing crime. They’re rapists. And some, I assume, are good people.

This debasing language, which characterized a whole national group as mostly drug dealers, criminals, and rapists, was widely and vociferously criticized, but considering its effects in context will show how it served Trump’s political purposes. The United States was in the throes of a legitimacy crisis—most Americans lacked confidence in America’s institutions, and they were fed up with political correctness (Habermas, 1975; Krasner, 2019). Trump’s demeaning language toward Mexicans sent two clear, self-identifying messages that resonated in this context: (1) I, Trump, am not an ordinary politician, not one of those you’ve come to mistrust and despise. I use the racist language that such politicians avoid which shows I am not like them, but more like you, the ordinary American, who likely share these stereotypes and attitudes. (2) Like you, I resent and hate political correctness, which means being told what I can say and not say by condescending elites. I defy these strictures and say what I want to say in plain language. If it’s considered politically incorrect, I don’t care. I take this as a badge of honor.

In this way, Trump defined himself as an outsider who was not part of the discredited political establishment and as someone who shared the widespread frustration with political correctness. Both these points made him attractive to disenchanted voters; they served as recruiting tools by making him the champion of everyday Americans who felt disillusioned with the system and fed up with political correctness. As Oliver and Rahn point out (2016, p. 191), this style and outcome put Trump squarely in the tradition of populism in that “[p]opulists often employ a style that is simple, direct, emotional, and frequently indelicate.” They further note that “This transgressive political style signals to the people that the populist politician will go to great lengths to protect her interests, even if it means bending or breaking the rules […]. By ‘performing’ populism, the psychological distance between populist leaders and their followers is reduced and the bonds among followers solidified (Oliver & Rahn, 2016, pp 191–192). In other words, Trump was encouraging the perception that he was a fighter for the people, one not afraid to challenge the elites and the norms they defended. While many people would abhor the racism and xenophobia (typical of rightwing populism) that they perceived in such statements, for many of the disillusioned

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they were more virtue than vice. This language established that Trump was not an ordinary politician. He was not careful. He was not “politically correct.” He would say whatever he felt. What came into his mind would come out of his mouth. He would not calculate. He would not trim his sails or alter his views to fit the fashion. Surveys indicated that 71% of Republican voters believed that Trump “told it like it was” (MSNBC/Telemundo/Marist Poll, 2015). Crucially, then, Trump’s supporters saw him as honest and trustworthy, and strong and aggressive precisely because he was “rough around the edges.” He was as different as he could be from the detested conventional, mealy-mouthed, calculating politicians who constantly promised and never delivered, who said one thing and turned around after the election and did something else (Hochschild, 2016). Krasner (2019) noted that in addition to helping to define himself as an outsider and a fighter for the (white) people, Trump’s racist language helped him to define enemies and thus to define himself further as the defender of ordinary Americans against those enemies. As Edelman (1988) pointed out, defining enemies is a key process in contemporary politics because the leader who defines an enemy simultaneously defines himself or herself as the protector of the people against that enemy. When Trump described Mexicans as rapists, criminals, and drug dealers, he was, quite obviously, defining them as a threat to everyday Americans. To the extent that this definition resonated with American voters, Trump gained support for two reasons. First, he was seen as a truth teller. Second, because he was the truth teller—the one potential leader who said out loud and plainly what these people are thinking—he was also automatically the best person to lead the fight against the dangerous invaders. By defining the enemy in terms that other politicians would not use, but which corresponded to the thinking of many Americans, Trump established himself as the champion of those everyday Americans. Further, as noted in point two above, Trump defined a second enemy, the condescending elites who enforced political correctness and looked down on hard-working, taxpaying, God fearing, (white, Christian) Americans. In particular, Trump defined the mainstream media and the political establishment as the enemy because they were responsible for the attitudes and policies that prevented anyone from telling the truth about it. Either the elites were actively scheming to bring in these people of color to replace white voters and guarantee electoral success or their liberal attitudes led them to foolish policies that had the same threatening result. Trump made the replacement theory version of this idea explicit in a 2018 tweet that demeaned both the Democrats and immigrants. “Democrats are the problem. They don’t care about crime and want illegal immigrants, no matter how bad they may be, to pour into and infest our Country, like MS-13. They can’t win on their terrible policies, so they view them as potential voters!” (Trump, 2018, as cited by Stephens, 2019). Note that the tweet conflates immigrants and violent gangs by the mention of MS-13, one of the most notoriously violent gangs with origins in Central America, a point discussed further in Sect. 12.3. As Sides et al. (2018) point out, following an argument by Larry Bartels (2017) the language of his announcement speech also helped Trump tap related feelings that had previously been less salient. In particular, they argue that a crucial factor was the

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feeling among white, working-class voters that certain groups, especially minorities and undocumented immigrants, were getting undeserved help from the government. As President, Trump continued to use racist language. One flagrant example occurred in January of 2018 when he denigrated entire countries. In a White House meeting on immigration in which members of Congress referred to Haiti, El Salvador, and African nations, Trump reportedly said (Dawsey, 2018), “Why are we having all these people from shithole countries come here?”. Again, this derogatory language does not seem to have done Trump political harm and may have reinforced some of the supportive feelings noted above. Less than half the American polled—48%—said the language was racist, while 51% said it was not. More importantly, from the point of view of gaining or losing political support, the responses were highly partisan. Only 10% of Republicans said the language was racist, while 83% of Democrats and exactly half the independents (50%) said it was racist. At least one Republican Congressional candidate, Marco Gutierrez of California, tweeted enthusiastic support, saying, “Finally a president that says what we all think! You go @POTUS! #ShitholeCountries #shithole #America1st” (Malone, 2018). This enthusiasm may reflect three other dimensions. First, by using extremely vulgar language Trump was defining himself as someone with no limits on what he would say, or by implication, on what he would do. If supporters accept this selfdefinition, they are also likely to think that there are no limits on what Trump would do to fight for them. They may also take away the idea that they themselves need not be restrained any longer by political correctness, since their leader—a high status individual—is not. Finally, there is immediate satisfaction in hearing that same leader says what the supporters may have been thinking. As David Denby (2015) wrote, “[h]e (Trump) does something now – he brings emotional release, even satisfaction.” Illustrating the point, one active Trump supporter said of Trump’s attacks on the media (Hessler, 2017) “For those of us who believe that the media has been corrupt for a lot of years, it’s a way of poking at the jellyfish. Just to make them mad.” The use of profanity may also have reinforced the perception that Trump was more honest than other politicians. Feldman et al. (2017) and Bergen (2016) report research results supporting this pattern. The juxtaposition of “#America1st” and “#ShitholeCountries” in the tweet suggests that for Gutierrez, and perhaps for many Trump supporters, a direct, vulgar, racist denigration of other countries was part of restoring American greatness. In other words, this use of racist language may also have tapped nationalist feelings, a major theme in Trump’s campaigns, as the slogan, “Make America Great Again,” demonstrates. However, as the next section illustrates, such language has results that go beyond attracting and cementing support.

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12.3 Attacking the Media 12.3.1 Attacking Mainstream Media in General Relying on Edelman’s proposition that leaders define themselves by defining enemies, this section focuses on Trump’s debasement and demonizing of the mainstream media. At a July 21, 2016, rally, Trump pointed at the cameramen and other journalists and said (Hessler, 2017): “One of those scum back there […].” Such virulent attacks were a regular and powerful feature of Trump’s campaign rallies as a journalist’s description of a rally in Colorado late in the 2016 campaign demonstrates: During the rally he [Trump] said, ‘There’s a voter fraud also with the media, because they so poison the minds of the people by writing false stories.’ He pointed in our direction, describing us as ‘criminals,’ among other things: ‘They’re lying, they’re cheating, they’re stealing! They’re doing everything, these people right back here!’ The attacks came every few minutes, and they served as a kind of tether to the speech. The material could have drifted off into abstraction—e-mails, Benghazi, the Washington swamp. But every time Trump pointed at the media, the crowd turned, and by the end people were screaming and cursing at us. One man tried to climb over the barrier, and security guards had to drag him away. (Hessler, 2017)

The attacks continued and escalated after Trump moved into the White House, perhaps reflecting the opinion of Steve Bannon, Trump’s campaign manager and key aide in the White House, that (Grynbaum, 2017) “The media here is the opposition party.” In a February 17 tweet, Trump said (Trump, 2017): The FAKE NEWS [emphasis in original] media (failing @nytimes, @NBCNews, @ABC, @CBS, @CNN) is not my enemy, it is the enemy of the American People!” He repeated the accusation during a speech to a conservative political group a week later, saying (Jackson, 2017): “A few days ago I called the fake news the enemy of the people, and they are — they are the enemy of the people.” By continuing and intensifying these attacks while he was president, Trump reinforced the perception that he remained the tribune of the people against the hated elitist media. He had not sold out; he had not compromised the outsider status that won him support in the primaries and general election.

12.3.2 Attacking Individual Journalists: The Conflicts with Megyn Kelly, Serge Kovaleski, and Yamiche Alcindor As noted above, Trump identified the mainstream news media and the political establishment as enemies and attacked them. It comes as no surprise, then, that he used demeaning language in conflicts with individual reporters, beginning with Megyn Kelly, one of the moderators of the first debate among contenders for the Republican nomination for president in 2016. Their exchange is worth quoting in full in part

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to set the context for the attacks that came later, but more importantly because it demonstrates a more subtle form of demeaning speech (CBS News, 2015): KELLY: Mr. Trump, one of the things people love about you is you speak your mind and you don’t use a politician’s filter. However, that is not without its downsides, in particular, when it comes to women. You’ve called women you don’t like “fat pigs, dogs, slobs, and disgusting animals.” (LAUGHTER) Your Twitter account… TRUMP: Only Rosie O’Donnell. (LAUGHTER) KELLY: No, it wasn’t. (APPLAUSE) Your Twitter account… (APPLAUSE) TRUMP: Thank you. KELLY: For the record, it was well beyond Rosie O’Donnell. TRUMP: Yes, I’m sure it was. KELLY: Your Twitter account has several disparaging comments about women’s looks. You once told a contestant on Celebrity Apprentice it would be a pretty picture to see her on her knees. Does that sound to you like the temperament of a man we should elect as president, and how will you answer the charge from Hillary Clinton, who was likely to be the Democratic nominee, that you are part of the war on women? TRUMP: I think the big problem this country has is being politically correct. (APPLAUSE) I’ve been challenged by so many people, and I don’t frankly have time for total political correctness. And to be honest with you, this country doesn’t have time either. This country is in big trouble. We don’t win anymore. We lose to China. We lose to Mexico both in trade and at the border. We lose to everybody. And frankly, what I say, and oftentimes it’s fun, it’s kidding. We have a good time. What I say is what I say. And honestly Megyn, if you don’t like it, I’m sorry. I’ve been very nice to you, although I could probably maybe not be, based on the way you have treated me. But I wouldn’t do that. (APPLAUSE) But you know what, we – we need strength, we need energy, we need quickness and we need brain in this country to turn it around. That, I can tell you right now.

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After Kelly quotes the demeaning language Trump has addressed to women, he says the language was only directed to Rosie O’Donnell, a riposte that draws a supportive burst of laughter from the audience. The focus shifts from the offensive language to the idea that Rosie O’Donnell somehow deserves to have these terms applied to her and that Trump is being selective in how he uses such language. This successful humor functions to make the demeaning language acceptable by making it not serious (Krasner, 2019). Kelly struggles to reassert the point, and to reassert her control of the agenda, but it’s a difficult battle because she’s going against the successful joke and makes herself seem overly serious by doing so. Trump has demeaned her and taken command of the situation by using humor, a powerful rhetorical tool (Krasner, 2019). The effect is to preserve Trump’s ability to use demeaning language by making it seem not a serious matter. When Kelly persists, Trump changes tactics. First, he rejects political correctness, again commanding the agenda by associating her with being overly serious and overly concerned with a widely hated norm associated with educated elites. Kelly is demeaned by being framed as a supercilious scold. Against this somewhat subtle attack, Kelly isn’t quick enough to say, “This has nothing to do with political correctness. It has to do with simple human decency.” Thus, Trump’s frame of the situation goes unchallenged, and Kelly remains demeaned. Trump also demeaned Kelly directly in the aftermath of this exchange. As this excerpt indicates, Kelly pressed Trump hard on his treatment of women. In response, Trump lost no time in attacking Kelly later that very night, first tweeting that she and the other Fox moderators were “not very good or professional” [emphasis in original] (Trump, 2015b), and then tweeting, “Wow, @Megyn Kelly really bombed tonight. People are going wild on twitter! Funny to watch.” [emphasis in original] (Trump, 2015c). The next night, during an interview on CNN (Trump, 2015d) Trump was even more aggressive. Here are excerpts from his comments: I don’t have a lot of respect for Megyn Kelly. She’s a lightweight […]. When you meet her, you realize she’s not very tough and she’s not very smart. Well, I just don’t respect her as a journalist. I have no respect for her. I don’t think she’s very good. I think she’s highly overrated […]. She starts asking me all sorts of ridiculous questions. You could see she had blood coming out of her eyes, blood coming out of her wherever [the last word was delivered in a sneering tone: author’s interpretation].

The last comment stirred enormous controversy for its vulgar sexism, but the point here must be that it was another demeaning comment that aimed to delegitimize the criticism that Kelly had made and to distract from the point that she was trying to make. Ironically, Trump used a sexist comment to stir controversy that would distract from the issue of his sexism. But to his followers, who saw Trump as their heroic defender, the frame on this conflict was that Trump was being attacked by the detested mainstream media and was simply defending himself and by extension his supporters who also felt ignored and disdained by mainstream journalists. In this way Trump reinforced the self-definition that in turn reinforced his connection to his supporters.

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To further illustrate Trump’s conflicts with individual journalists and the political functions those conflicts served, this section turns to episodes with Serge Kovaleski of the Washington Post and Yamiche Alcindor, who worked at the time as the White House correspondent for the Public Broadcasting System. Trump’s conflict with Kovaleski took place during the nomination campaign and arose from a challenge to Trump’s assertion that on September 11, 2001 (the day of the successful attack on the World Trade Center) he watched as (Trump, 2015e) “[i]n Jersey City, New Jersey…thousands and thousands of people [presumably Muslims] were cheering as that building was coming down.” The day after the rally at which he made this statement, Trump was challenged by George Stephanopoulos, but doubled down on his statement (Trump, 2015f): There were people that were cheering on the other side of New Jersey, where you have large Arab populations. They were cheering as the World Trade Center came down. I know it might be not politically correct for you to talk about it, but there were people cheering as that building came down – as those buildings came down. And that tells you something. It was well covered at the time, George. […]. Now, I know they don’t like to talk about it, but it was well covered at the time. There were people over in New Jersey that were watching it, a heavy Arab population, that were cheering as the buildings came down. Not good.

It should be noted that this is an example of demeaning a group by insinuation. Trump is calling into question the patriotism of people of Arab descent living in the United States, a practice whose consequences will be further discussed in Sect. 12.6. But to return to the focus on the media – Trump’s statement was widely questioned, and in his own defense Trump on November 23 (Gonyea, 2015) cited a Washington Post article by Serge Kovaleski and Fredrick Kunkle and published on September 18, 2001, which said in the fifteenth paragraph (Kovaleski & Kunkle, 2001): “In Jersey City, within hours of two jetliners’ plowing into the World Trade Center, law enforcement authorities detained and questioned a number of people who were allegedly seen celebrating the attacks and holding tailgate-style parties on rooftops while they watched the devastation on the other side of the river.” In response to questions in 2015 from a fact-checking Washington Post reporter, Kovaleski and Kunkle denied that they had ever said hundreds or thousands and further said that they had been unable to verify the reports (Kessler, 2015). In response to this story Trump chose to escalate the conflict at a rally in Myrtle Beach, South Carolina on the November 24, 2015. His verbal assault was accompanied by a physical parody of the disability—arthogryposis—from which Kovaleski, whom Trump knew well from Kovaleski’s days as a New York-based reporter (Haberman, 2015), suffered. As he spoke the words that follow (meant to be quotations from Kovaleski), Trump changed his voice to a high-pitched, strained, hoarse tone, widened his eyes as he leaned backwards from the waist, loosened his mouth, rocked back and forth and sideways, and flapped his arms and hands, saying, “Uhh, uhh. Don’t know what I said. Uh, I don’t know what I wrote […]. He’s going like, ‘I don’t remember. Oh, maybe that’s what I said’” (Trump, 2015g).

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Like the comment about “blood coming out of her wherever,” these words generated substantial controversy, but again the controversy performed an essential political function to divert attention from the original issues – was Trump telling the truth, was he engaging in sexism or racism—by creating a sharp, personal conflict: a melodrama in which the new populist hero was pitted against the old, corrupt, snobbish establishment and media, a melodrama that was sure to dominate the media agenda. It was also sure to reinforce the perception among supporters of Trump fighting back against powerful forces that tried to make him a victim. One other dimension should be noted. By making these outrageous comments, Trump sent a message to his followers that had the power to shift their perceptions of the appropriate limits on their own speech and action. The message was: If there are no limits on what a famous, wealthy man who might become president can say and do, why should there be any limits on what I can say and do? In other words, Trump’s demeaning words offered the possibility of psychic satisfactions to those who followed his example. By their example, these words offered his followers permission to express their most primitive emotions. Thus, they offered another reward for supporting him.

12.4 Debasing the Political Establishment and Debasing Opponents 12.4.1 Attacking Establishment Leaders The two categories to be discussed in this chapter overlap, especially since Trump portrayed all his opponents as representatives of the political establishment. But Trump went further than merely attacking opponents. He also demeaned at least one non-rival—the former presidential candidate of the Republican party whose nomination he sought—Senator John McCain of Arizona. In addition to his status as the party’s former standard bearer, McCain was widely venerated for his courageous stand against the vicious torture he endured as a prisoner of the North Vietnamese, torture which went on for years and left him with permanent disabilities. Thus, demeaning McCain as Trump did violated at least two long standing and powerful norms—not to demean veterans, especially those who suffered during and after their service, and not to demean the senior leaders of one’s own party. Trump broke both strictures. First, as part of a war of words with McCain, he tweeted (Trump, 2015h): “SenJohnMcCain should be defeated in the primaries. Graduated last in his class at Annapolis—dummy! [emphasis in original].” Then in response to an interviewer who questioned this language because McCain was a war hero, Trump said (Trump, 2015i): “He’s not a war hero […]. He was a war hero because he was captured. I like people who weren’t captured” (Schreckinger, 2015). These departures from tradition and the establishment’s rules of the game reinforced Trump’s self-definition as the outsider, the non-politician, the maverick who

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could be counted on to reverse the ways of the corrupt political establishment that had failed ordinary Americans. They also reinforced the appealing perception that he would be a strong, direct, and effective leader. As one supporter put it (Hessler, 2017), “I’m not voting for him to be my pastor. I’m voting for him to be President. If I have rats in my basement, I’m going to try to find the best rat killer out there. I don’t care if he’s ugly or if he’s sociable. All I care about is if he kills rats.” Trump also established his anti-establishment and anti-political correctness (white supremacist) credentials in demeaning the presidency of Barack Obama. Beginning in 2011, Trump had used implicitly racist accusations in his position as the chief spokesperson for the “birther” campaign, that is, the most prominent public figure alleging that Barack Obama, the first black president of the US, was an illegitimate president because he had not been born in the US (The US Constitution requires that presidents be “natural born citizens”). In this context, Trump’s demeaning language was generally less crude and vulgar. He largely confined himself to insinuations and sarcasm, but the plain intent was to discredit Obama precisely because of his race. Here are three representative tweets (cited by Abramson, 2016): An ’extremely credible source’ has called my office and told me that @BarackObama’s birth certificate is a fraud. — Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump) August 6, 2012 Wake Up America! See article: “Israeli Science: Obama Birth Certificate is a Fake”http:// t.co/f7esUdSz — Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump) September 13, 2012 How amazing, the State Health Director who verified copies of Obama’s “birth certificate” died in plane crash today. All others lived — Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump) December 12, 2013

After securing the Republican nomination, Trump became more reticent on this point, suddenly refusing to discuss it or to offer a conclusion. For example, he refused to answer a direct question on September 15, but then on September 16 he made the following statement (Trump, 2016): “Now, not to mention her in the same breath, but Hillary Clinton and her campaign of 2008 started the birther controversy. I finished it. I finished it. You know what I mean. President Barack Obama was born in the United States period. Now, we all want to get back to making America strong and great again.” Notice Trump’s deft use of the occasion to shift from one anti-establishment posture to another, that is, from demeaning Obama to demeaning Clinton as the author of the conspiracy theory that Trump had promoted for five years. Notice also that Trump uses the occasion to shift back to his campaign theme of making American great again, which in the context sends the message to the most race conscious of his supporters that the White House must be occupied by a white man. Thus, Trump defines himself as the leader of those who would restore the dominant position of white male people in the United States, a self-definition with great appeal to white working-class voters who feel their status being undermined by economic, cultural, and demographic trends (Sides et al., 2018).

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12.4.2 Attacking Rivals Although Donald Trump insulted his Republican rivals and Hillary Clinton in the same way that he insulted reporters, this discussion will focus on his use of nicknames, a particularly effective form of demeaning language. Trump called Jeb Bush, the Republican front runner “Low energy” and used that label relentlessly against Bush beginning on August 14, 2015, in an interview with the Hollywood Reporter when he said, “Jeb is a very nice person, but he is very low energy (Trump, 2015i).” This label ridiculed Bush’s dignified, low-key manner. Trump also dubbed Senator Ted Cruz, “Lying Ted,” and Senator Marco Rubio became “Little Marco.” Most prominently, Trump labelled the Democratic candidate, “Crooked Hillary,” a phrase that he repeated incessantly at rallies, where he also encouraged his supporters to chant, “Lock her up!” a practice that made the accusation of corruption vulgar and visceral. The nicknames changed the interrelations of the candidates and perceptions of them. First, Trump, as he himself claimed (Trump, 2015j)—“I defined Bush”— made himself the dominant person among the Republican candidates by branding the others. He challenged the other candidates to disprove his characterizations, and when they tried, as Bush did in a later debate by being more voluble and aggressive, Trump retained command by saying (Trump, 2015k), “More energy tonight. I like that.” Thus, Trump retained dominance by making himself the judge of Bush’s performance. But, for the most part, the other candidates did not try to challenge these characterizations directly, reinforcing the perception among Trump’s supporters that their candidate was the most aggressive, and that he would be a strong leader because he dominated others. From the supporters’ point of view, the obvious virtue in this dominance was that he would be dominating the leaders, domestic and foreign, who threatened their interests. Once again, the use of demeaning language produced a large political benefit.

12.5 Real World Results—Creating the Perception of Threat and Dehumanizing the Enemy and Thus Encouraging Violence Demeaning language encourages violence in two ways—directly and indirectly. The direct relationship was noted above. If demeaning language identifies an enemy— an existential threat—the use of violence against that enemy is justified since the enemy is trying to destroy all that is held dear. Secondly, demeaning language can dehumanize another group; can shift the perception that the attacker’s supporters have of the group so that they are seen as subhuman, and therefore unworthy of the consideration and protection that humans deserve. Obviously, these two things can

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combine to encourage violence—the first justifies the violence and the second offers an escape from the usual inhibitions against using violence (Smith, 2011). By debasing groups in the manner described in Sects. 12.2 and 12.4.1, Trump made them the enemy and encouraged violence against them. Overall, hate crimes rose nearly twenty percent during Trump’s time in office, according to an FBI report (Villarreal, 2020). More telling, two studies verify the “Trump effect,” that is a Trump-caused upsurge in racial animosity and hate crimes. One study (Edwards & Rushin, 2018), using times series analysis and panel regression techniques, found that counties that voted for Trump by the widest margins had the largest increases in reported hate crimes. The authors argue that Trump’s rhetoric was one cause and that his election validated that rhetoric and fueled the hate crime surge. Another study (Schaffner, 2018) found that subjects exposed to the racist statements in Trump’s announcement speech were more likely to write offensive things about other groups, while those who read a Hillary Clinton statement lamenting prejudice were less likely to do so. The most serious debasing statements Trump and his associates made concerned elections and the opposition Democratic Party. In both 2016 and 2020 they said that the Democrats could only win if they cheated, that Trump could only be defeated by enemies who betrayed the democratic order (Mercieca, 2020). Of course, this proposition followed logically from Trump’s often repeated assertion that the people loved him as they did no other because he was their champion against the corrupt elites. As noted, the debasing nickname “Crooked Hillary” and the chant “Lock her up,” regularly heard at Trump rallies, encapsulated these ideas. Trump himself began to recite the Big Lie in May of 2020, long before the election, and repeated the idea incessantly throughout the campaign (Krasner, 2021). Thus, he was debasing the opposition party and undermining Americans’ faith in the people running the institutions that held the elections at the local and state level. At the same time, Trump and his associates promoted the idea, as they had in 2016, that this election represented the last chance for the survival of democracy in the United States (Trump, 2021). This rhetoric set the stage for the attempts to overthrow the results of the 2020 election that culminated in the attack on the Capitol on January 6, 2021. Debasing language had succeeded in convincing many everyday Americans—not members of militias, not the highly alienated (Pape & Ruby, 2021)—that their patriotic duty lay in “stopping the steal” of an election by (paradoxically) disrupting the peaceful transfer of power essential to democracy. Thus, debasing language demonstrated extraordinary power in the U.S. during Trump’s time in office. It laid the ground for additional speech that constituted a “call to action” e.g., “Stop the Steal.” But there were even more powerful effects which are discussed in the next section.

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12.6 Conclusion—The Ultimate Debasements Debasing speech not only debases individuals, especially those running institutions, but also distorts reality and the ability to perceive reality. It distorts reality by presenting the leader’s (and supporting media’s) grotesquely inaccurate, selfserving versions of reality so incessantly that the picture of the world blurs irrevocably in a manner reminiscent of George Orwell’s (1949) descriptions of totalitarian society. When such warping speech is extended from targeting individual journalists and leaders to falsely criticizing core practices and non-partisan officials, it threatens the (deeply flawed) American system of representative democracy. Trump produced this threat by carrying to its logical and extreme conclusion the process of making the Democratic Party the enemy. In collaboration with other Republican leaders, right-wing talk radio, Fox News, and other media outlets such as Breitbart, he succeeded in convincing millions of Americans, including a majority of Republicans, that Joseph Biden was not legitimately elected in 2020 (Economist/YouGov, 2022), that the Democratic Party had stolen the election, and, most ironically, that the Democratic Party was a threat to democracy. This assertion implicated and slandered literally thousands of state and local election workers and officials, including Republicans such as the Georgia Secretary of State Brad Raffensperger and the Arizona House Speaker, Rusty Bowers, all of whom who conducted both elections in a fair, unbiased manner. To assert the opposite was to debase the most important part of American political reality. But this assertion—the Big Lie—played a key part in the closely related process of undermining people’s ability to perceive reality. By making the Big Lie a key tenet of loyalty to Trump, in the movement he led, which he claimed was the last desperate hope for saving America, debasing speech became a demand for loyalty (Trump, 2021). A Trump supporter was faced with the choice of abandoning the group by accepting the certified reality of the election defeat or remaining a loyal member by accepting the Big Lie and the fictional universe that went with it (Kolbert, 2017). Surveys demonstrate that most Republicans opted to accept the distortionary speech and the reality it defined (Greenberg, 2022). They accepted a version of reality based on debasing speech that portrayed the Democratic Party as traitors to the United States, paving the way to violent resistance to the processes that would make Joseph Biden president as a justified action to preserve democracy. Thus, the debasing speech of the Big Lie elevated group loyalty above the simple ability to perceive and accept the reality of a defeat that had been accepted even by Trump supporters, including his Attorney General, William Barr, the two state officials mentioned above, and thousands more. Trump and his allies have substantially altered American political culture. Over one-third of Americans believe the Big Lie about the 2020 election (Economist/YouGov, 2022). Nearly one in five go further and believe that “government, media, and financial worlds in the US are controlled by a group of Satanworshipping pedophiles” (PRRI staff, 2022). Over forty per cent believe that having

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a strong leader for America is more important than having a democracy (Wintemute et al., 2022). The most fundamental debasements that paint a false picture of opponents lead to the distortion of reality and the ability to perceive reality – are now crucial driving forces in American politics. They threaten to produce a shift to authoritarianism, perhaps as soon as 2024. If control of elections at the state level passes to BigLie Trump supporters, these extremists would be positioned to reverse unfavorable results in 2024. They could simply ignore the popular vote and award their states’ electoral votes to Trump or another Republican presidential candidate. Such actions would mark the triumph of authoritarianism and a politics of manufactured “reality.” This situation cries out for research to address how such forces have become so powerful and how their effects might be mitigated or even reversed. What factors— economic, social, psychological, cultural—have made people vulnerable to such reality-distorting claims? How have right-wing media influenced these trends? What factors and remedial processes might return affected people to the ability to perceive reality accurately? Is there a civic system of education that can equip people to resist gaslighting and other reality-debasing techniques? On the answers to questions such as these rests the future of the democratic experiment in the USA.

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Gonyea, D. (2015, November 24). Trump reasserts claim that ‘thousands’ of New Jersey Muslims cheered after 9/11. NPR. https://www.npr.org/2015/11/24/457203786/trump-tells-ohio-crowdhe-will-be-tough-on-isis Greenberg, J. (2022). Most Republicans still falsely believe Trump’s stolen election claims. Poynter. https://www.poynter.org/fact-checking/2022/70-percent-republicans-falsely-believe-sto len-election-trump/ Grynbaum, M. (2017, January 26). Trump strategist Stephen Bannon says media should keep its mouth shut. New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/26/business/media/stephen-ban non-trump-news-media.html Haberman, M. (2015, November 26). Trump says his mocking of New York Times reporter was misread. https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/27/us/politics/donald-trump-says-his-mockingof-new-york-times-reporter-was-misread.html Habermas, J. (1975). Legitimation crisis (T. McCarthy, Trans.). Beacon. Hacker, J. S., & Pierson, P. (2010). Winner-take-all politics: How Washington made the rich richer– and turned its back on the middle class. Simon and Schuster. Hessler, P. (2017, July 17). How Trump is transforming rural America. The New Yorker. https:// www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/07/24/how-trump-is-transforming-rural-america Hochschild, A. R. (2016). Strangers in their own land: Anger and mourning on the American right. The New Press. Jackson, D. (2017, February 17). Trump again calls media ‘enemy of the people.’ USA Today. https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2017/02/24/donald-trump-cpac-media-enemyof-the-people/98347970/ Kessler, G. (2015, November 22). Trump’s outrageous claim that ‘thousands’ of New Jersey Muslims celebrated the 9/11 attacks. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/ wp/2015/11/22/donald-trumps-outrageous-claim-that-thousands-of-new-jersey-muslims-celebr ated-the-911-attacks/ Kolbert, E. (2017, February 19). Why facts don’t change our minds. The New Yorker. https://www. newyorker.com/magazine/2017/02/27/why-facts-dont-change-our-minds Kovaleski, S. F., & Kunkle, F. (2001, September 18). Northern New Jersey draws probers’ eyes. Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2001/09/18/northernnew-jersey-draws-probers-eyes/40f82ea4-e015-4d6e-a87e-93aa433fafdc/ Krasner, M. A. (2019). The new American electoral politics: How invited behavior and reality TV explain Donald Trump’s victory. In O. Feldman & S. Zmerli (Eds.), The psychology of political communicators: How politicians, culture, and the media construct and shape public discourse (pp. 13–30). Routledge. Krasner, M. A. (2021). Donald Trump: Dividing America through new-culture speech. In: O. Feldman (Ed.), When politicians talk: The cultural dynamics of public speaking (pp. 257–274). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-3579-3_15 Levitsky, S., & Ziblatt, D. (2018). How democracies die: What history reveals about our future. Broadway Books. Malone, S. (2018, January 12). Trump’s profanity delights supporters, horrifies etiquette experts. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-language/trumps-profanity-delights-sup porters-horrifies-etiquette-experts-idUSKBN1F12SR Mayer, J. (2016). Dark money: The hidden history of the billionaires behind the rise of the Radical right. Doubleday. Mercieca, J. (2020). Demagogue for president: The rhetorical genius of Donald Trump. A&M University Press. MSNBC/Telemundo/Marist Poll. (2015, December n.d.). National questionnaire. MSNBC. http:// msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/MSNBC/Sections/A_Politics/MSNBC_Telemundo_Marist%20Poll_ National%20Annotated,20Questionnaire_December%202015.pdf Oliver, J. E., & Rahn, W. M. (2016). Rise of the “Trumpenvolk:” Populism in the 2016 election. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 667, 189–206. https://doi. org/10.1177/0002716216662639

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Orwell, G. (1949). Nineteen eight-four: A novel. Secker and Warburg. Pape, R. A. & Ruby, K. (2021, February 2). The Capitol rioters aren’t like other extremists. The Atlantic. https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2021/02/the-capitol-rioters-arent-like-otherextremists/617895/ PRRI staff. (2022, February 24). QAnon in the post-Trump era: An analysis of who believed the conspiracy. https://www.prri.org/research/the-persistence-of-qanon-in-the-post-trump-eraan-analysis-of-who-believes-the-conspiracies/ Schaffner, B. (2018, n.d.). Follow the racist: The consequences of Trump’s expression of prejudice for mass rhetoric. Ashford.zone. https://ashford.zone/images/2018/09/followtheracist_v2.pdf Schreckinger, B. (2015, July 18). Trump attacks McCain: ‘I like people who weren’t captured.’ Politico. https://www.politico.com/story/2015/07/trump-attacks-mccain-i-like-people-who-wer ent-captured-120317 Sides, J., Tesler, M., & Vavreck, L. (2018). Identity crisis: The 2016 presidential campaign and the battle for the meaning of America. Princeton University Press. Smith, D. L. (2011). Less than human: Why we demean, enslave, and exterminate others. St. Martins. Stephens, B. (2019, August 8). Trump’s rhetoric and conservative denial. New York Times. https:// www.nytimes.com/2019/08/08/opinion/trump-el-paso-shooting-nationalism.html Trump, D. (2015a, June 16). Announcement Speech. Time. http://time.com/3923128/donald-trumpannouncement-speech/ Trump, D. [@realDonaldTrump]. (2015b, August 7). I really enjoyed the debate tonight even though the @Fox News Trio… [Tweet]. https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/01/19/upshot/trumpcomplete-insult-list.html Trump, D. [@realDonald Trump]. (2015c, August 7). Wow! @megynkelly really bombed tonight [emphasis in original]. People are going wild on twitter. Funny to watch [Tweet]. https://www. nytimes.com/interactive/2021/01/19/upshot/trump-complete-insult-list.html Trump, D. (2015d, August 8). Trump on Kelly: Blood was coming out of her eyes. CNN. https:// www.cnn.com/2015c/08/08/politics/donald-trump-cnn-megyn-kelly-comment/index.html Trump, D. (2015e, November 21). Speech: Donald Trump in Birmingham, AL. https://factba.se/tra nscript/donald-trump-speech-birmingham-al-november-21-2015e Trump, D. (2015f, November 22). ‘This Week’ transcript: Donald Trump and Ben Carson. ABC News. https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/week-transcript-donald-trump-ben-carson/story?id=353 36008 Trump, D. (2015g, November 24). Donald Trump. Full speech. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=ENNiaBIIlk844:00ff. Trump, D. [@realDonaldTrump]. (2015h, July 20). @SenJohnMcCain should be defeated in the primaries [emphasis in original]. Graduated last in his class at Annapolis—dummy! [Tweet]. https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/01/19/upshot/trump-complete-insult-list.html Trump, D. (2015i, July 20). Trump: McCain not a ‘war hero.’ YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=UNugcPeCZZE Trump, D. (2015j, December 17). As quoted by Wright, D. (2015j) Trump on Kimmel Show. CNNPolitics. https://www.cnn.com/2015j/12/17/politics/trump-jimmy-kimmel-live-int erview/index.html Trump, D. (2015k, September 16). Donald Trump on Jeb Bush: More energy tonight. I like that. Bloomberg. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/videos/2015k-09-17/donald-trump-on-jeb-bushmore-energy-tonight-i-like-that Trump, D. (2016, September 16). Trump: ‘Obama was born in the United States.’ YouTube. https:// www.youtube.com/watch?v=hzpY7aDPhtw Trump, D. [@realDonaldTrump]. (2017, February 17). The FAKE NEWS media (@failing nytimes, @NBCNews, @ABD, @CBS, @CNN) is not my enemy, it is the enemy of the American People! [emphasis in original] [Tweet]. https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/01/19/upshot/trumpcomplete-insult-list.html Trump, D. [@realDonbald Trump]. (2018, June 19). Democrats are the problem. CNN Politics. https://www.cnn.com/2018/06/19/politics/trump-illegal-immigrants-infest/index.html

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Trump, D. (2021, February 8). Read: Former President Donald Trump’s January 6 speech. CNN. https://www.cnn.com/2021/02/08/politics/trump-january-6-speech-transcript/index.html Villarreal, D. (2020, November 16). Hate crimes under Trump surged nearly twenty percent says FBI report. Newsweek. https://www.newsweek.com/hate-crimes-under-trump-surged-nearly-20percent-says-fbi-report-1547870 Wintemute, G. J., et al. (2022). View of American democracy and society: First report from a nationwide population-representative survey. https://www.medrxiv.org/content/10.1101/2022. 07.15.22277693vl. https://doi.org/10.1101/2022.07.15.22277693

Michael Alan Krasner is Associate Professor Emeritus of Political Science at Queens College, CUNY, USA, and also co-directs the Taft Institute, that promotes political participation. His articles have appeared in the Journal of Peace Research, New German Critique, Social Policy, New York Affairs, and Urban Education, and he is the co-editor of and a contributor to Immigrant Cross-roads: Globalization, Incorporation, and Placemaking in Queens NY (2021).

Part V

Conclusions

Chapter 13

Heroes or History? The Sources, Evolution, and Future of Debasement Rhetoric Sam Lehman-Wilzig

Every philosophy of history which recognizes that men can and do make their own history also concerns itself with the conditions under which it is made. […] These ideals, plans, and purposes are causally rooted in the complex of conditions, but they take their meaning from some proposed reworking of conditions to bring them closer to human desire. Sidney Hook, The Hero in History, p. xiii (1943)

Abstract Using examples from the various chapters of this book, several research questions are raised centering on the core question of whether the origin of debasement speech is more a function of the “Hero in History” or an outcome of deep-seated historical trends i.e., culture, economics, politics, crises and so on. The same question is also relevant when assessing the contemporary impact of such extreme rhetoric, and its influence on the future of political and social communication—as well as public policy and electoral continuity of populist leaders—in each specific country under study. Several chapters suggest the “Hero” hypothesis has greater validity, whereas other chapters show “History” to be more decisive regarding the past, present, and/or future of debasement speech. The chapter concludes with a discussion of audience psychology—Pathos or Logos—in explaining the relative popularity of debasing forms of political communication.

13.1 Introduction One of the most contentious controversies among historians is whether History (historical change) is influenced more by broad, subterranean social, economic, cultural etc. trends (Braudel, 1995), or rather by what the title of Hook’s book suggests: An individual leader can change the course of history. But as his introductory quote makes clear, Hook understood that the “Hero Theory” is not so simple; S. Lehman-Wilzig (B) School of Communication, Bar-Ilan University, Ramat Gan, Israel e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 O. Feldman (ed.), Debasing Political Rhetoric, The Language of Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-0894-3_13

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indeed, so that the public would not be misled, a subtitle was added to the later, revised edition: A Study in Limitation and Possibility (Hook, 2008). A similar question was raised by Harry Eckstein (1988) regarding the factor(s) underlying cultural change. He argued that we tend to view (somewhat simplistically) culturalist theories as implying some sort of continuity as they emphasize political activity as being mediated through, and moderated by, a general inclination or a basic belief system all learned in the process of long-term, consistent socialization from generation to generation. Instead of this, Eckstein distinguishes between two types of cultural change: situational change and political transformation. The former maintains traditional patterns in general but enables some cultural change as an adaptation to new circumstances—in order to preserve intact society’s basic cultural arrangements. However, at times cultural discontinuity occurs as a result of rapid environmental changes (e.g., war, economic collapse). The other type of change involves political transformation i.e., efforts to employ political power to drastically change economic, social, and/or political structures—and in their wake, cultural patterns are permanently altered as well. This is very hard to produce, for as Minkenberg (1993, p. 65) argues: “Remaking culture and political culture requires a long-run perspective, since norms are not learned through formal education and indoctrination but through socialization across generations.” The present book does not deal with “history” per se, nor with “culture” directly. Nevertheless, the same overarching question of rapid and dramatic change by a political “hero” is relevant to public rhetoric in general, and political debasement discourse in particular: is that driven by cultural (and other) factors, or do leaders appear on the scene to significantly change (in this case, debase) the language of politics in their country? As Türk (Chap. 11) warily warns at the end of his study: “it is possible that today there is not only one Erdo˘gan in Turkey but many in waiting.” Most of the chapters in this book do not directly address this question, but many do provide lots of ammunition for both sides of the argument. This is not a “mere” academic subject but rather one with practical—even serious—ramifications. For if the “underlying trends” theory is correct, then what we are witnessing these days regarding rising debasement rhetoric on the political scene is something that will be staying with us for a long time moving forward. However, if the “Great (Wo)Man Theory” of politics is correct, then the phenomenon might be a passing phase in the modern history of democracy. As noted by Feldman in his Preface, this book is a companion to the earlier Political Debasement: Incivility, Contempt, and Humiliation in Parliamentary and Public Discourse (Feldman, 2023). That volume is closer to the “underlying trends” theory as it offers quotes from a wide range of politicians in each country, suggesting that debasement rhetoric is not a matter of this or that specific politician. Conversely, the present book focuses on such language used by each country’s would be, or actual, leader (president, prime minister etc.). However, focusing on a country’s specific political ruler will not in and of itself prove anything if we don’t take other matters into account—especially political

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culture and history. For example, in Chap. 8, Nakahara shows how a Japan’s longestserving prime minister—Abe Shinzô—used only “mild” debasement terms, clear evidence that despite this being a sort of Japanese “Hero in History,” he was still circumscribed by Japanese cultural norms and etiquette. In other words, Abe certainly did “push the envelope” in harshening Japan’s political rhetoric, but this still left the country far “behind” (in a positive sense) the debasement rhetoric of America’s Trump (Chap. 12) or Brazil’s Bolsonaro (Chap. 5), both far less “restrained” within a more competitive (i.e., less harmonious) culture. On the other hand, one could conclude on first thought that President Erdogan’s very harsh, divisive, and debasing invective was a rhetorical departure for Turkey, but as Türk (Chap. 11) clearly shows, “Turkish political history is rife with examples of debasing language.” Thus, in its own way, Erdogan’s “contribution” here was similar to Japan’s Abe, except that Erdogan was building on a prior, much more intense level of political debasement. The point: one cannot look only at the harshness of a particular leader’s debasement speech but rather it is incumbent on the researcher to ask what level preceded that ruler. In short, then, in order to arrive at some sort of reasonable (even if not definitive) answer to this complex issue, a wider lens has to be employed. As the Japanese and Turkish case studies suggest, there is no alternative but to background each analysis of a major leaders’ political debasement speech with a survey of that society’s culture of political communication. As I will explain below, this is true not only for ascertaining past sources of such debasing rhetoric but also when trying to assess its influence on the polity, in the present and also moving forward towards the future.

13.2 Expanding the Debasement Typology Before turning to the major questions that ensue from such a hero/culture comparison, there is a terminological question that should be raised, if not necessarily answered definitively. In Feldman’s companion book Political Debasement, I offered a “Typology of (Political) Invective” (Lehman-Wilzig, 2023), listing in order of relative harshness (from mild to extreme) the numerous types of aggressive rhetoric (short explanations for each are included there): 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

Impoliteness/Coarseness Incivility/Rudeness/Discourteousness/Impertinence Disrespect/Disregard/Insolence/Ironic Sarcasm/Demeaning/Name Calling Dissing/Dumping/Discrediting/Deprecation/Dishonoring Disparagement/Belittling/Denigration/Derogation/Disdain/Intimidation Cursing/Vituperation/Profanity/Vulgarity Derision/Humiliation/Mockery/Ridicule/Contempt/Scorn/Insulting/Smearing /Abusiveness/Mortification Shaming/Ignominy

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9.

Degradation/Vilification/Defamation/Disgrace/Slander/Character Assassination 10. Debasement/Abomination/Defilement 11. Demonization/Hate Speech 12. Dehumanization. These were all found among the numerous parliamentarians investigated in that book. However, the rhetoric of at least one leader (perhaps others too) studied in the present book—President Trump—raises an interesting question: does outright lying (falsehood) constitute a form of debasement language? The Washington Post (Kessler et al., 2021) found that during his term of office, Trump lied over thirty thousand (!) times. A lie in and of itself is not debasing (e.g., Wife: how do I look in this dress? Husband: it’s really nice…). In public, however, especially regarding political matters—whether regarding a person’s character or political activity—the prevarication could be (but certainly not must be) considered debasing, or some other specific category from the above list. This is especially true if it involves saying something negative but not true about the addressee, usually the case in politics (compared to marital or friendly “white lies” aimed at smoothing over potential inter-personal conflict). The one exception to this rule is a self-aggrandizing lie (or significant exaggeration) designed to present the politician in a better light than deserved or factually true—something that Trump did on a consistent basis e.g., calling himself “smart” six times before half his tenure was complete (Keneally, 2018)! Thus, even simply stating incorrectly that an opposition politician didn’t address an issue when she (politician X) actually did so, could be considered a form of debasement. Again, this becomes the case only when such a lie is meant to suggest— subtly, indirectly, but still clearly—that she is “lazy” or “politically incompetent.” One can easily think of other falsehoods whose true intent is easily understood by the audience, that paint opposing politicians in a very negative light, without employing any invective language per se. Obviously, for the researcher this is a tricky issue because politicians—as everyone else in life—will tend to exaggerate matters here and there, and even “lie” about something unknowingly (e.g., politician X actually did work on that issue, but behind the scenes in secret). This renders the research task more complex in that the motivation and prior knowledge of the “liar” has to be discerned before we can conclude that this involved purposeful debasement. In short, it is worth considering for the purpose of future research in this rhetorical area—as an expansion of Feldman’s description of debasement in Chap. 1—whether words that do not directly attack an opponent might also be a form of debasement language. One has to be careful not to include anything and everything that smacks of negativity as “debasement,” but conversely not every type of “neutral” language should automatically be dismissed as not belonging to political debasement.

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13.3 Research Questions In general, there are several key questions on the debasement speech agenda that researchers must contend with (not necessarily all at once): (1) Prior to that leader’s appearance at the helm (or before their political progression to the top of the pyramid), what was the general level of political discourse in that country i.e., was debasement a significant part of such public communication? (2) If the answer to that first question is “no,” then we can at least state that the leader has introduced a new dimension into that country’s political arena. If the answer is yes, we still have to determine if such debasement language was common and spanned the political spectrum, or rather was merely expressed by a specific segment of society and/or only a particular political “wing.” Moreover, even if large scale, prior debasement rhetoric is found, was that something recent or rather belonging only to a distant era? The latter by itself does not indicate a “culture of debasement” if followed by a long period of relative rhetorical calm. For instance, political discourse in nineteenth century America was extremely rough (candidates would call their adversaries adulterers or illegitimate by birth; attack their opponents’ spouses or mothers as whores etc.) but that dissipated in most of the twentieth century, only to make a “comeback” with the Trump candidacy in 2016 (or a few decades before, as I note immediately below). In such a case, we can hardly claim that he “merely continued an American tradition.” Several of the chapters in this book provide some “political discourse culture” background. That can run from a relatively short period to a country’s deep history. An example of the former: Krasner (Chap. 12) reminds us that Trump’s excoriating rhetoric was preceded for at least twenty years by US Republican Party stalwarts such as Newt Gingrich in the 1990s. The latter, as Kostopoulos (Chap. 9) explains, is evidenced by the very high level of political polarization in modern Greek history, from the mid-twentieth century onward. However, it is also possible that such debasing rhetoric increases very gradually over time before its full expression by the leaders studied here. Sengul (Chap. 7) mentions the slow but steady expansion of debasing political speech among far-right politicians in Australia (elsewhere as well). However, they raise different factors behind this. Kostopoulos points to growing political polarization as a result of several Greek crises, thereby heating up the political environment in which harsher invective can flourish. Sengul argues that the central factor behind the phenomenon is not crisis, but rather “mediatization” i.e., commercial media logic that incentivizes political leaders to make policy and behave/communicate in light of what gets covered in the media—itself driven by the audience’s predilection for “political blood and gore” (metaphorically speaking). In short, the media tail wags the political dog, so to speak (pun intended). And as the mediatization phenomenon has been slowly evolving over several decades, so too debasement speech has increased incrementally during that same period. Whether in evolutionary fashion or through a radical break with the past, if we conclude from the above general analysis that several leaders have debased the level

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of political discourse, the next inevitable question becomes: will this stick? In other words, does such change necessarily entail permanent change in the language used in that nation’s politics? Here too this involves two questions: (3) Does the leader’s debasing invective simultaneously influence other politicians to follow that lead and start using such rhetoric as well? If yes, then we can conclude that at the least there is some modicum of contemporary influence on the country’s rhetoric. If no, then does that politician get reelected? If no, then we can assume that we are witness to a “one-time” phenomenon (for the time being). If yes, then that leader’s length of tenure at the helm is indicative of rhetorical influence, at the least moderately changing the discourse rules of the game (as in the case of Japan’s Abe). (4) Is there a longer-term change in the tone of politicians’ communication, whether or not that specific politician wins election? (There are many reasons—irrelevant to political rhetoric—for a leader deciding not to run again: old age, illness, family pressure, criminal indictment—or Constitutional limitations that prevent reelection.) In short, within parliament and/or on during future election campaigns, does the new, more debased, political language outlast the leader? Obviously, this question is problematic for researchers who want to analyze the phenomenon when it is “hot” i.e., relatively new. This book is an example of such relatively “contemporaneous” research. The question still stands and requires longitudinal study moving forward in the coming years. Indeed, it calls for a later version of the accompanying book (focusing on the broader political picture of parliamentarians and other political functionaries, and not merely on leaders) to study the extent to which future politicians in that country continue the language of debasement, if at all. Nevertheless, provisional answers can already be offered. For example, take the cases studied here of Trump (Chap. 12) and Bolsonaro (Chap. 5). After all, despite both running for a second term they were defeated at the ballot box, thereby removing them (to some extent) from the center of political discourse—whether because of somewhat reduced media interest, flight from the country (as of this writing, Bolsonaro has fled to Florida to escape potential criminal indictment in Brazil!), or general “licking their wounds” i.e., reassessing their political future. Of course, there are other factors that come into play in election outcomes but given that debasement language is their “calling card” (i.e., political “brand”), if such rhetoric doesn’t continue to pervade that country’s politics, then this strongly suggests that other than the debasing politician’s hardcore “base,” such language is not particularly attractive when it becomes an integral (perhaps only?) part of their persona.

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Indeed, a very recent report (Meyer, 2023), analyzed populism1 around the world and found that between 2021 and 2023 the number of people living under populist governments dropped from 2.5 billion to 1.7 billion. The drop in these numbers was heavily influenced by the departure of Trump, Bolsonaro, and the Philippines’ Duterte, the latter studied here by Pernia and Panao (Chap. 6). However, even if extreme rhetoric does not lead to “political/electoral longevity/success,” it might well affect public, social communication over the longterm. In other words, just because the debasing leader loses the ensuing election (or does not run), the influence could continue to be felt outside the formal political system e.g., in the media, especially social network platforms, by average citizen commenters/responders—even if such rhetoric reverts to its former lower (more civil) level among politicians. Here too follow-up research is needed beyond the debasing politician’s term(s) of office—not regarding their rhetoric but rather public discourse, comparing pre-debaser and post-debaser communication among online citizens. There is an additional question/aspect that needs to be considered as well: (5) Is the leader’s political invective accompanied by significant policy change? For instance, in Chap. 11 we have seen how Turkey’s Erdogan not only raised the level of invective but introduced policy changes that reflect that type of rhetoric. Türk notes that under Erdogan’s leadership, “politics is reduced to a set of morally right and wrong positions and the entire political field is reorganized according to moral categories. Therefore, political opponents can easily be labeled as political enemies.” Thus, it is no coincidence that he concurrently jailed hundreds (perhaps thousands?) of opponents, while passing wide-ranging Islamic legislation—all to ostensibly give day-to-day, living voice to mainstream Turkish people and their culture, while distancing and even removing the nontrue others (“those,” in Erdogan’s parlance). As Türk puts it: “rhetoric is based on the populist belief that ‘only some of the people are really the people’.” This brings us to the next question: (6) How politically effective is debasement rhetoric? This is obviously connected to the previous question; indeed, it can be viewed as the opposite side of the same coin. On the one hand, there are clear instances in which debasement speech is a major factor in opposition politicians reaching the political pinnacle e.g., Grillo and Salvini, as Baldi shows (Chap. 10). On the other hand, if a debasing leader is successful in attaining leadership, but subsequently loses the following election, then almost by definition we can conclude that such language might not be very effective electorally and perhaps even counterproductive. In such a situation, not only will that politician be removed from the center of political discourse 1

The Tony Blair Institute for Global Change that issued the report defines “populism” having two claims: first, a country’s “true people” are locked in moral conflict with “outsiders”; second, nothing should constrain the will of the “true people” (Meyer, 2023). To be sure, populist leadership does not have to use debasing language, but almost all certainly do so, given the need to distinguish between “true people” and “outsiders.”

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but the lesson of such rhetoric’s electoral “ineffectiveness/counterproductivity” might be internalized by other politicians. Moreover, as Krasner (Chap. 12) notes, almost by definition the debasing politician is an outsider who attacks the “Establishment” (whether the courts, media, or traditional politicians)—with the harsh invective constituting an important part of the anti-Establishment persona. However, once in power, that leader then becomes part of the old Establishment or the core of a new Establishment, thus losing some supporters who are alienated from society in general and just wish to “kick ass” i.e., punish those in power. An interesting recent example of this is former, and now again present, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. After a decade in power, he could no longer avoid being perceived as part of the Establishment, despite his continual rhetoric debasing “Leftists,” not to mention insinuations regarding the loyalty of Israel’s Arab sector. Thus, in mid-2021 he lost power to a “Change Government,” but over the ensuing year and a half he once again was able to rebrand himself as the “anti-Establishment” candidate and returned to power by late 2022. As Ben-Rafael Galanti and Hisherik (2023) show in detailed fashion he was aided in this by other Israeli Parliament (Knesset) members within his party (Amsalem, Golan etc.) who used even stronger debasement language than he did. This brings us up an ancillary question: to what extent, if any, can parliamentary members of a party help the populist leader by adding their own debasement rhetoric—sometimes even stronger than the party leader—to electoral success? To put it in terms of Feldman’s present book and accompanying one (2023), in order to receive the full picture of debasement rhetoric’s success (or failure), perhaps we must combine the study of parliamentary representatives (and other party officials) with the investigation of their leader trying to become the country’s ruler (or already in power). In other words, debasement rhetoric might be most successful when that kind of speech by the country’s leader is accompanied by the party’s legislative rank and file. Therefore, as Feldman suggests in this book’s Preface, these two books are best read together as they complement each other. Conversely, another way of assessing the electoral success or failure of debasement rhetoric is to study party leaders who are vying to become their country’s ruler and fail to do so. Thus, for example, Rivas-Carmona’s Chap. 3 investigation of recent Spanish political rhetoric focuses on two right-wing party heads—Abascal and Casado—who (for now) have not succeeded in gaining the top spot. Similarly, as Sengul shows (Chap. 7) Pauline Hanson has not won a race for Australia’s premiership despite her ever-increasing political invective in the years 2017, 2020, 2022. In short, to assess the effect of debasing speech it is not enough to focus on the supreme leader and their length of tenure; we must also look at those vying to replace the leader but not succeeding to do so despite their populist tone. Reaching the possible conclusion that debasement rhetoric might not be a productive long-term strategy for politicians (at least in some, if not all, cases)—if that is what found in additional case studies—would not be surprising, given modern political history. Perhaps the most egregious example of debasement discourse was

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Adolf Hitler (accompanied by his Minister of Propaganda Joseph Goebbels)—thirteen years of extremely popular, even mesmerizing public diatribes in speeches and other media. And yet, after Germany’s military defeat, the tone—even the entire German political culture (from hyper-militarism to deep pacifism)—changed drastically to a highly circumspect and respectful level of political debate and speechifying within a new “civic culture” (Minkenberg, 1993). On the other hand, debasement rhetoric could reach long-term stasis i.e., moves to a more aggressive level and stays there. Finally, it is not enough to look only at the formal political sphere for debasement speech’s political effects. Two recent, similar events are unusually illustrative of this: the January 6, 2021, insurrection attack on the U.S. Congress and the January 8, 2023, riotous attack on Brazil’s Congress and presidential offices. These were civilian uprisings egged on by Presidents Trump’s and Bolsonaro’s accusations that their respective elections were “stolen.” Although incendiary calls such as Trump’s “Stop the Steal” were not debasement invective in the literal sense of the term, they were addressed at those running the election system. Trump, especially, turned to the Secretaries of State in several states that had a close election result, demanding that they find the “missing” votes; even before Election Day, Bolsonaro warned that election officials would fake the results. In short, although they did not accuse the system itself of being intrinsically “wrong,” they did raise serious doubts about the integrity of those running the elections—and thus can be considered debasement speech. This is an important lesson for political analysts and academic researchers: The debasing politician need not even be present; like an earthquake under the ocean, the waves can gather strength as time goes along with the tsunami hitting shore quite a while after the initial tectonic quake has already ended. Such violent political eruptions, in addition to the electoral popularity of politicians using debasement rhetoric, bring up one of the more important questions in politics in general, and political communication specifically: (7) What has greater influence on voters and the public in general: Logos or Pathos i.e., rational logic or emotion? These are actually two different questions. There seems to be solid evidence that such speech affects negative social behavior. For example, Krasner brings several studies that show Trump’s tenure to be marked by a significant increase in hate crimes (and worse: the January 6, 2021, insurrection). Regarding electoral effects, however, as I already mentioned above, the jury is still out. Yes, Trump and Bolsonaro lost their second election; but Abe and Erdogan (among others) continued to win election campaigns. In both contexts (social and electoral), the Logos versus Pathos question looms large. When political science started out as a social scientific discipline, the mainstream answer was “Logos” e.g., Anthony Downs’ An Economic Theory of Democracy (1957). However, this has come under increasing fire, especially after the pioneering “Behavioral Economics” (Fox, 2015) research of Kahneman & Tversky (the former being awarded the 2002 Nobel Prize for Economics; the latter had died before then and was therefore ineligible for the prize). They indubitably showed the myriad ways humans make irrational (or severely flawed) decisions.

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Moreover, given that the brain’s seat of emotions is the evolutionary prior amygdala as opposed to the much later developed frontal cortex in charge of rational thought, it is not at all surprising that emotion trumps logic (pun intended). Debasement language drives emotion; civil speech involves logic. This is called the “affect heuristic” (Slovic et al., 2007), essentially meaning that emotion-inducing speech (positive or negative) will bias the receiver’s perception and comprehension of rational arguments. Therefore, humans/citizens unfortunately have to work much harder mentally to have the frontal cortex overcome the more deeply ingrained and powerful amygdala; many, perhaps most, are unsuccessful in this—if they even try. Even more unfortunately, quasi-fascist (and certainly dictatorial) leaders understand this well, seemingly a lot better than far more civilized, democracy-abiding politicians. And they now have a more appropriate tool for such emotional-laden speech: social media. As Baldi (Chap. 10) notes: “Avoiding an overt argumentative structure, as traditionally in slogans and claims of politicians and parties, is now increasing as a general way to communicate ideas through social media such as Twitter and Facebook.” If serious (non-yellow journalism) legacy media such as broadcast TV and print newspapers emphasized Logos, social media turn this state of affairs on its head: the public along with their leaders can “let go” on venues such as Twitter, expressing raw emotion at the expense of any rational discourse. This is precisely what Hameleers tested (Chap. 4), finding strong evidence for the veracity of such a claim. Indeed, as he discovered, Dutch right-wing leader Wilders uses social media to attack not only the political opposition but the traditional media (“enemies of the people”) as well!

13.4 Debasement as Body Politic Illness In the final analysis, then, perhaps a more appropriate metaphor for the phenomenon under study is medical. Political debasement can be perceived as an infection leading to a fever. The fever (in our case: debasement rhetoric) is the clinical symptom, but at its core it is a function of the underlying infection (here: some contextual social illness). This sort of ailment has three possible outcomes: (a) acute sickness but passing relatively quickly; (b) untreated or unremedied long-lasting illness; (c) ultimate death. The parallelism with debasement rhetoric: “A” is debasing rhetoric that disappears with the ensuing election defeat of the debasing leader; “B” has debasement spreading in the body politic, a function of the leader’s political success and subsequent strategic copying by other politicians; “C” involves not merely the spread of debasing rhetoric but also the translation of such debasement into political action and policy: emasculation of democratic institutions; heavy discrimination and persecution of minorities; possibly even democratic collapse into dictatorship. It is worth repeating here what I wrote in the accompanying book’s concluding chapter: “the subject of this book is not merely ‘academic,’ but has real-world applications in restoring and strengthening civic politics and the democratic system of

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government” (Lehman-Wilzig, 2023, p. XX). By comprehending the sources of such damaging political rhetoric, and through an understanding of the relationship between the specific leader and the general societal context in which s/he talks and acts, we can better assess where debasement speech comes from, to what extent it will have staying power, and how to ameliorate its most damaging political effects.

References Ben-Rafael Galanti, S., & Hisherik, M. (2023). The Israeli national camp’s political rhetoric of debasement as a new nationalist populist (NNP) tool. In O. Feldman (Ed.), Political debasement: Incivility, contempt, and humiliation in parliamentary and public discourse (pp. 209–227). Springer. Braudel, F. (1995). A history of civilizations (Trans. R. Mayne). Penguin Books Ltd. Downs, A. (1957). An economic theory of democracy. Harper and Row. Eckstein, H. (1988). A culturalist theory of political change. American Political Science Review, 82, 787–804. Feldman, O. (Ed.). (2023). Political debasement: Incivility, contempt, and humiliation in parliamentary and public discourse. Springer. Fox, J. (2015, May 1). From “economic man” to behavioral economics. Harvard Business Review. https://hbr.org/2015/05/from-economic-man-to-behavioral-economics Hook, S. (1943). The hero in history. Cosimo, Inc. Hook, S. (2008). The hero in history: A study in imitation and possibility. Cosimo, Inc. Keneally, M. (2018, January 9). President Trump has called himself smart six times before. ABC News. https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/president-trump-called-smart-six-times-before/story?id= 52209712 Kessler, G., Rizzo, S., & Kelly, M. (2021, January 24). Trump’s false or misleading claims total 30,573 over 4 years. Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/01/24/tru mps-false-or-misleading-claims-total-30573-over-four-years/ Lehman-Wilzig, S. (2023). The linguistic and cultural ambiguities of political invective. In O. Feldman, (Ed.). Political debasement: Incivility, contempt, and humiliation in parliamentary and public discourse (pp. 231–245). Springer. Meyer, B. (2023, January 5). Repel and rebuild: Expanding the playbook against populism (White Paper). Tony Blair Institute for Global Change. https://institute.global/policy/repel-and-rebuildexpanding-playbook-against-populism Minkenberg, M. (1993). The wall after the wall: On the continuing division of Germany and the remaking of political culture. Comparative Politics, 26(1), 53–68. Slovic, P., Finucane, M. L., Peters, E., & MacGregor, D. G. (2007). The affect heuristic. European Journal of Operational Research, 177, 1333–1352.

Sam Lehman-Wilzig served as Chair of Bar-Ilan University’s Department of Political Studies (2004–2007), and also its School of Communication (2014–2016) in Israel. He was also Chairman of the Israeli Political Science Association (1997–1999). He has published 43 academic journal articles; 23 chapters in academic books; and authored four scholarly books, the latest: Virtuality and Humanity: Virtual Practice and Its Evolution from Pre-History to the 21st Century (Springer Nature, 2021). His areas of expertise are: New Media; Technology & Society; Political Communication; and Extra-Parliamentary Behavior. Further info: www.ProfSLW.com.

Index

A Abascal, Santiago, 7, 38–42, 45–47, 51 Abe Shinzô, 125, 127, 130, 223 Abusive language, 5, 8, 19, 56, 65–67, 126, 139, 185 Accusation, 9, 38, 45, 62, 64, 66, 68, 75, 82, 84, 117, 132–134, 136, 137, 206, 211, 212, 229 Ad hominem attacks. See attack Adversarial, 77, 117, 145 Adversary, 5, 8, 24, 51, 173 Aggression, 27, 29, 43, 79, 130, 139, 145, 175, 177 Alcindor, Yamiche, 209 Antidrug campaign, 95, 96, 98, 100 Anti-immigration, 8, 67 Anti-Japan/Japanese (han’nichi), 129, 138, 139 Argumentum ad hominem. See attack, ad hominem Asahi (newspaper), 127, 129, 134, 135, 138 Attack, 3, 4, 7, 10, 17, 19, 21, 24, 25, 28, 38, 40–46, 48, 51, 52, 56, 61–68, 74, 76, 79–83, 113, 120, 128, 129, 132, 134–136, 146, 147, 155–158, 166, 169, 170, 175, 177, 187, 205–210, 213, 224, 225, 228–230 ad hominem, 2 Audience, 3, 8, 10, 18, 19, 76, 77, 91–93, 96, 97, 100, 127, 129, 131, 132, 135, 137–139, 147, 148, 156, 159, 165–169, 173, 175, 203, 208, 224, 225 Australia, 8, 9, 108, 111–115, 118, 120, 225, 228

B Bannon, Steve, 206 Baudet, Thierry, 8, 56, 58, 59, 61–67 Belittling, 1 Big Lie, 214 Binarism, 11, 186, 187, 190, 194 Bolsonaro, Jair, 8, 25, 74–84, 108, 126, 223, 226, 227, 229 Brazil, 7, 74–76, 83, 223 Bush, Jeb, 23, 212

C Casado, Pablo, 7, 38, 39, 45–51, 228 Character assassination (or character attack), 2, 74, 78, 82 Childrearing attitude, 94 Clinton, Hillary, 24, 207, 211–213 Coarseness, 42 Coercive impoliteness, 173 Corrupt elites, 64, 213 Corruption, 21, 22, 62, 75, 80, 127, 134, 193, 212 Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), 9, 38, 39, 41, 64, 108, 110, 111, 113, 120 Cultural elements, 3 expectations, 3 frames, 155 Culture, 3, 6, 7, 9, 10, 28, 65, 81, 83, 90, 93, 109, 110, 114, 119, 126, 130, 133, 138, 145–149, 154, 155, 157, 158, 173, 174, 214, 222, 223, 227, 229 Cursing, 56, 57, 65, 206. See also swearing

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 O. Feldman (ed.), Debasing Political Rhetoric, The Language of Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-0894-3

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234 D Debasement, 1–11, 18–29, 52, 56, 57, 59, 62, 66, 74–79, 82, 83, 92, 108, 110, 111, 114–120, 126–132, 134–139, 145, 147–149, 154, 155, 157–159, 167, 186, 187, 206, 222–231 attributes, 7, 74, 77 labels, 24, 129, 131 language, 1–11, 17–29, 52, 56, 74–79, 82, 83, 115, 127, 130, 134, 136–139, 145, 147, 148, 155, 157–159, 186, 187, 222, 224–226, 228, 230 political, 1–3, 6–9, 11, 17, 23, 26, 28, 222–224, 227, 229, 230 assessing of, 2, 77 broad sense, 2 definition, 5, 74, 130 narrow sense, 2 Dehumanization, 57, 172, 224 Dehumanizing metaphor, 171 Delegitimization, 7, 40, 46, 51, 62 Demirel, Süleyman, 185 Democracy, 11, 46, 57, 68, 77, 83, 84, 145, 146, 156, 158, 167, 188, 193, 213–215, 222, 230 Democratic deconsolidation, 90 Democratic Party (USA), 11, 177, 186, 202, 213, 214 Demonization, 11, 184, 186, 190–194 Derogatory, 1, 18, 19, 25, 51, 58–60, 63, 65, 74, 83, 92, 127, 155, 205 speech, 58 Diet (Japanese Parliament), 126 Discourse, 1, 2, 5–7, 9, 16, 17, 19, 20, 28, 38–41, 45, 51, 58–62, 66, 68, 74, 78, 90, 100, 108–113, 115, 118–120, 129, 130, 137, 139, 146, 165–167, 169, 176–178, 222, 226–228, 230 debasement, 1, 3, 5, 6, 9, 17, 108, 111, 115, 118–120, 130, 228 of power, 176 parliamentary, 18 strategy, 9, 146 uncivil, 17, 19, 22, 26, 59, 109 Discriminatory language, 66, 67 Discursive strategies, 9, 39, 45, 51, 111, 114, 118, 120, 130, 146 Disinformation, 131, 133 Disqualifications, 7, 42, 46, 48, 51, 168 Duterte, Rodrigo, 8, 9, 24, 25, 90–93, 95–101, 108, 113, 118, 120, 227

Index E Edelman, Murray, 167, 202, 204, 206 Elites, 8, 16, 26, 57–59, 61–67, 90, 91, 146, 187, 188, 190, 191, 203, 204, 208 Emotional trigger/effect, 26 Erbakan, Necmettin, 185 Erdo˘gan, Recep Tayyip, 10, 11, 24, 183, 184, 186–194, 222 Establishment, 50, 61, 62, 64, 67, 68, 90, 109, 168, 170, 173–177, 188, 203, 204, 206, 210, 211, 228 Etiquette, 126–128, 130, 133, 223 Evros events, 144, 145, 153 Expressive intensifiers, 10, 166, 175, 178

F Fabrication, 131, 135–137 Fake news, 43, 47, 56–58, 63, 66, 68, 79, 84, 152, 206 Far-right, 7, 9, 16, 38–40, 45, 51, 52, 56, 57, 59, 74, 107–111, 113, 114, 118–120, 144, 177, 225 mainstreaming of, 107, 108, 110, 119, 120 transgression, 115 Filipino family, 92, 93 Forum for Democracy (the Netherlands), 8, 56, 57 Frame package, 148, 149 Framing, 61, 64, 95, 97, 145, 147–150, 153, 154, 158, 159 qualitative, 148 Freedom Party (the Netherlands), 57 Functional audience, 9, 91, 100

G Greece, 8, 10, 144, 145, 147, 150–159 Greek, 10, 143–146, 148–159, 225 crisis, 143, 146, 153 -Turkish relations, 144

H Hanson, Pauline, 9, 108, 109, 111–120, 228 Harmony, 126, 128, 129, 133 Hate speech, 5, 6, 17–22, 27–29, 58, 59, 62–64, 67, 78, 126 Heckling (yaji), 128 Honne, 126, 130, 133, 134 Hostility, 8, 18, 27, 60, 62, 64, 67, 68, 80, 110, 126, 134 Humiliation, 57

Index I Identity, 56, 57, 92, 166, 172–177, 192, 194 Ideology, 7, 41, 51, 59, 62, 65–67, 74, 100, 114, 126, 167, 174, 188 Iglesias, Pablo, 38, 41, 42, 50 Illocutionary tools, 167 Impoliteness (or im/politeness), 2, 5, 7, 16, 51, 74, 77, 83, 91, 108, 110, 145, 165, 166 Impression manipulation, 131, 132 Incivility, 5, 15–19, 22, 26–28, 55–59, 69, 74, 75, 77, 83, 108, 110, 127 in politics, 16, 19, 69 political, 16 verbal and non-verbal, 17, 19 In-group, 10, 20, 57, 158. See also out-group ˙Inönü, Erdal, 184, 186 Insulting, 2, 17, 21, 40, 56, 57, 64, 68, 74, 79, 81, 117, 127, 156, 186 Insults, 7, 8, 18, 37, 38, 41, 46–48, 51, 76, 79, 145, 185 Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization – Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity (VMRO-DPMNE), 21 Interviews, 4, 5, 16, 28, 77, 90, 126, 130, 134 political, 5, 16. See also political interviews televised, 4, 5, 7, 16, 153 Intolerance, 11, 18, 19, 26, 170, 171, 194 Irony, 1, 28, 74, 79, 80, 145, 157

J Japan, 8, 9, 12, 126, 128–130, 133, 137, 138, 223, 226 Johnson, Boris, 24, 25 Justice and Development Party (Turkey), 183

K Kan, Naoto, 134, 136, 137 Kelly, Megyn, 206, 208 Kılıçdaro˘glu, Kemal, 183, 188 Knesset (Israel Parliament), 228 Kovaleski, Serge, 209 Kristeva, Julia, 192

L Labelling, 117, 119, 131–134, 138

235 Language, 2, 4, 5, 8, 16, 17, 19, 22, 51, 56–58, 60, 62, 63, 65–68, 74, 75, 78, 80–82, 166, 171, 173, 176, 208, 211 belittling, 4 disrespectful, 2 insulting, 2, 5, 8, 17, 19, 56, 58, 65–68, 74, 78, 80–82, 168 offensive, 2, 19, 22, 56, 57, 62, 63, 75, 208 rude, 5, 51, 166, 171, 173 uncivil, 5, 16, 58, 60, 67, 68 Latent authoritarian values, 91 Latin America, 8 Lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT), 3 Lexical choices, 167 Liberal Democratic Party – LDP (Japan), 127, 132, 136, 137 Livestreams, 8, 74, 76–83

M Mainichi (newspaper), 129, 134, 135 Mass media, 63, 132, 134, 137 Materialist values, 93 McCain, John, 23, 210 Mediatization, 108–110, 118, 119, 225 Menderes, Adnan, 186 Minorities, 3, 5, 9, 18, 20, 23, 25, 29, 57, 58, 65, 66, 68, 108, 126, 129, 137, 155, 205, 230 Misogynistic comments, 75 Mitsotakis, Kyriakos, 10, 144–146, 148, 150, 151, 153–159 Mockery, 1, 17–19, 74, 79, 80, 115, 145 Motherland Party (Turkey), 184 Mouffe, Chantal, 193

N Name-calling, 2, 23, 57, 63, 74, 78–82, 128, 134–136, 157, 191 Nea Dimokratia Party (Greece), 146 Netanyahu, Benjamin, 228 (the) Netherlands, 7, 8, 26, 55–59, 61, 65, 67, 68

O Obama, Barack, 24, 25, 211 Organicism, 11, 186, 189, 190, 194 Out-group, 10, 20, 55–59, 61, 65–68, 119, 159. See also in-group Özal, Turgut, 184, 185

236 P Parliamentary performance, 41 PASOK, 143, 146, 158 Paternalistic cussing, 9, 92, 93, 99–101 Personal attack, 2, 7, 17, 41, 51, 145, 158 Persuasion, 165, 167, 178 Philippines, 8, 24, 25, 91, 93–95, 98, 101, 227 Polarization, 7, 10, 11, 16, 26, 51, 109, 145, 146, 150, 154, 157, 159, 192–194, 225 Political, 1–12, 15–29, 38–42, 45, 48, 51, 56–59, 61–64, 67, 68, 74–77, 82, 84, 90–94, 100, 101, 107–115, 118–120, 125–132, 136–138, 143–149, 155–159, 165–173, 175–178, 184–194, 201–212, 214, 222–231 communication, 8, 9, 11, 12, 17, 20, 56, 58, 74, 76, 84, 100, 108, 111, 119, 147, 148, 158, 159, 223, 229 correctness, 16, 75, 76, 109, 170, 203–205, 207, 208 discourse, 3, 7, 15–18, 20–22, 27–29, 51, 107, 108, 110, 120, 146, 166, 167, 173, 181, 225–227 incivility discourse, 7 interviews, 5, 16. See also interviews invective, 227, 228 Politically correct, 75, 166, 204, 207, 209 Popular Party (PP) (Spain), 38, 39, 45, 51, 52 Populism, 56, 57, 60, 67, 69, 90, 91, 93, 119, 184, 188, 194, 203, 227 Populist, 7, 10, 52, 56–59, 62, 63, 66–68, 74, 75, 90–92, 101, 107–111, 113, 118–120, 126, 139, 145, 146, 158, 166, 176, 177, 184, 187, 188, 191, 203, 210, 227, 228 communication, 9, 55–59, 108–110 performance, 40, 63 Pragmatic devices, 125 Presidential, 5, 9, 11, 23, 25, 27, 43, 75, 90, 91, 100, 101, 186, 187, 194, 210, 215, 229 profanity, 91 speech, 38, 75, 90, 101

R Racism, 19, 23, 110, 113, 172, 203, 210 Red herring fallacy, 41, 44 Republican Party (USA), 202, 210, 225 Republican People’s Party (Turkey), 183

Index Rhetoric, 1, 2, 5, 7–11, 19–22, 24, 25, 28, 58, 63, 66, 74, 75, 78, 90–94, 99–101, 108–110, 113, 114, 118–120, 145, 146, 167, 170, 171, 173, 175, 176, 184, 186–194, 213, 222–231 Right-wing, 7, 10, 21, 38, 44, 51, 52, 57–59, 61, 62, 65–68, 109, 113, 120, 126, 129, 138, 143, 144, 146, 155, 166, 169–171, 176, 177, 202, 203, 214, 215, 228, 230 populism, 55–58, 61, 62, 65–68, 109, 120, 126 radical, 55–59, 61, 66–68 S Sánchez, Pedro, 37, 40–44, 46, 50, 51 Sarcasm, 1, 17, 19, 28, 74, 79, 132, 134, 145, 211 Semantics, 18, 43, 166, 167, 169, 171, 173, 178 Sexism, 23, 208, 210 Shameless normalization, 108, 110, 119 Social Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDSM), 21 Socialist Party (PSOE) (Spain), 39 Social media, 5, 7, 8, 11, 19, 21, 22, 56, 58, 59, 64, 75–79, 111, 112, 118, 120, 130, 131, 138, 139, 144, 170, 171, 173, 175, 176, 192, 194, 230. See also Social networking service (SNS) Social networking service (SNS), 4, 6. See also Social media Facebook, 4, 6, 19, 27, 57, 68, 130, 131, 135, 136, 138, 171, 175, 230 Twitter, 4, 6–9, 11, 22, 58–60, 66–68, 111, 112, 130, 131, 175, 192 WhatsApp, 4 Spain, 7, 26, 38, 40, 43, 44, 46, 50–52 Swearing, 2, 8, 19, 56–58, 61–63, 67, 90, 94, 100. See also cursing Symbolic rhetoric, 91 SYRIZA, 143, 144, 146, 151, 154, 155, 157, 158 T Tatemae, 126, 128, 133 True Path Party (Turkey), 185 Trump, Donald, 11, 22–25, 27, 59, 108, 109, 113, 119, 126, 176, 202–206, 208–215, 223–227, 229, 230

Index Tsipras, Alexis, 10, 146, 151, 157–159 Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA), 185 Turpiloquium, 175, 177 U Uncivil, 3, 5, 16, 17, 19, 26, 27, 56, 57, 59, 65, 109, 128 attack, 65 discourse, 19, 22, 26, 59, 109 Unidas Podemos party (Spain), 38, 41 United States (USA), 25, 84, 176, 203, 209, 211, 213–215

237 V Violence, 5, 11, 18–21, 28, 29, 57, 62–65, 67, 75, 78, 82, 94, 98, 170, 171, 176, 202, 212, 213 Vox Party (Spain), 7, 40, 43–45, 51

W Welfare Party (Turkey), 185 Wilders, Geert, 8, 56, 58–67, 230