Czechoslovakia's Interrupted Revolution 9781400871155

Table of contents :
Cover
Contents
Preface
List of Abbreviations
Part 1. The Historical Setting
I. Communism and Czechoslovak Traditions
National Traditions and the Communists
Czechs and Slovaks
Germans and Hungarians
The Break with the Past
East and West in Foreign Relations
A Nation of Švejks?
Sovereignty and Its Benefits
II. The Dualism of Czechoslovak Communism: From Gottwald to Novotný
The National Path to Socialism
Following the Soviet Model
The Transition to Novotný
A New Course
Crisis Averted
Novotný Supreme
Sham De-Stalinization
Part 2. Stalinism in Decline
III. The Mounting Crisis
Dropping the Stalinists
The Slovak Question Unsolved
Economic Crisis and Reform
The Writers and Freedom of the Press
Youth and the Youth Movement
Student Unrest
Conformity in Foreign Policy
IV. Science, Scholarship, and the Party
Partisanry and the Scientific Spirit
A Philosophy of Man
Rebirth of Sociology
Revival of History
Law and Justice
A Science of Politics
Foreign Policy and International Relations
Reform in Economics
The Scientific Revolution and Scholarship
Power and the Intellectuals
V. The Political System Under Fire
The Twelfth Party Congress
Limited Reforms, 1963-1964
The New Economic System and Political Change
Theoretical Discussions of Reform
The Thirteenth Party Congress
Response at Higher Levels
VI. The Fall of Novotný
Conflict at the Top
The October Plenum
The Crisis Develops
Climax in January
The Process of Succession
Part 3. The Politics of Change
VII. Prelude to Change (January and February)
Change of the Guard
Signs of Innovation
Divisions at the Top
Party and Public Uncertainty
End of the Beginning
VIII. Spontaneity and Consolidation (March and Early April)
The Emergence of Public Opinion
Rebelliousness at the Grass Roots
The International Context
Dubček Speaks
The Plenum Debate
Attempt at Consolidation
The Action Program
Conclusion
IX. The Step-By-Step Strategy Challenged (April and Early June)
Preparing for Reform
The Party's Tactics Challenged
Spontaneous Public Activity
Opinions Divided
Czech-Slovak Differences
The Split of the Slovak Writers
Bloc Relations
The May Plenum
X. Reforms amid Tension (June to Mid-July)
The First Reform Measures
Emerging Political Forces
Fresh Winds in the Party
Polarization of Forces: The Two Thousand Words
Slovaks and the Federal Question
Mounting Bloc Pressures
The Warsaw Letter
XI. The Storm Gathers (Before and After Čierna)
Outside Pressures Intensify
Reaction to Pressure
Confrontation at Čierna Nad Tisou
The Bratislava Conclave
Four Bilateral Meetings
Preparations for the 14th Congress
Gathering Crisis in Slovakia
Cracks in Political Unity
The Final Presidium Meeting
Part 4. The New Model of Socialism
XII. A New Political System
Reform of Top Party Organs
The Action Program
The Political System Evolves in Practice
The National Front
The Party: De Facto Change
The Party's Constitution
Debate over Pluralism
Public Opinion on the Political System
Human Rights and Constitutional Reform
Fourteenth Congress Perspectives
XIII. Rehabilitation and Justice
Rehabilitation—Initial Phase
Individual Cases Reexamined
Revelations and Accusations
"How Was It Possible?"
The Law on Judicial Rehabilitation
Extra-Judicial Rehabilitation
The Piller Investigation
Guarantees for the Future
Conclusion
XIV. Planned Market Socialism
The Initial Stage
Expert Opinion Advanced
The April Plenum and the Action Program
Changes at the Center
Continuing Dissatisfaction and Demands
Rehabilitation of the Market and of Enterprise
Slovakia and Economic Reform
Management and Enterprise Councils
Councils of the Working People
Trade Unions and the Councils
Economic Reform in Transition
XV. Federalism and the Slovak Problem
Slovak Initiative
The Official Response
Czech and Slovak Opinion Diverges
Economic Aspects of Federalism
Tripartitism: A Moravian Alternative
Official Planning: Progress and Deadlock
Substantive Questions at Issue
Parity and a Ban on Outvoting
The Division of Jurisdiction
Part 5. Contending Political and Social Forces
XVI. Conflicting Tendencies in the Party
"Conservatives," "Progressives," and "Anti-Socialists"
Party Division: Rank and File
Party Officials and Functionaries
14th Congress Delegates
The Central Committee
Presidium and Secretariat
The Slovak Party
XVII. Non-Communists and Public Opinion
Public Opinion and Politics
Public Opinion and Reform
The Non-Communist Parties
Prospects for New Parties
New Parties and Public Opinion
The National Front in Public Opinion
Conclusion
XVIII. Social Groups and Organizations
The Intellectuals
The Writers
The Journalists
Scholars and Scientists
The Working Class and the Unions
Farmers and Farmers' Organizations
Other Interest Groups
Young People and Students
Religion and the Church
The Nationalities
Conclusion
Part 6. The International Context
XIX. A Foreign Policy with "Its Own Face"
The Budapest Conference
Foreign Policy with "A New Face"
Foreign Policy Defined
A National Path to Socialism
Bloc and Foreign Relations
Public Opinion Emerges
Strengthening the Warsaw Pact
Foreign Trade and Comecon
The German Question and European Security
Foreign Policy in Crisis
Bratislava and After
Conclusion
XX. The Reactions of the Ruling Communist Parties
Initial Response
Mounting Soviet Concern
Climax at Warsaw
Calm Before the Storm
East German Hostility
Poland: Mixed Reactions
Hungary: Sympathetic Concern
Bulgaria: Belated Antagonism
Rumania: Open Solidarity
Yugoslavia: Firm Support
Albania: A Plague on Both Houses
Other Communist Parties
XXI. Military Intervention
The Invasion
Were the Soviet Troops Invited?
The Decision to Invade—When?
Were Counsels Divided?
The Decision to Invade—Why?
The International Factor
Domestic Issues
The Ukrainian Factor
The Problem of the Intellectuals
Bloc Unity and Divergency
Diversity of Communist Reactions
Dissidence in the Invading States
Western Response: NATO and the UN
XXII. Resistance and Capitulation
The Fiasco of Collaboration Attempts
An Extraordinary Party Congress
National Defiance
Civilian Resistance
Official Resistance
Slovak Reactions
The Slovak Congress
The Moscow Talks
Report to the People
CC Approval of Moscow Agreements
The Dilemma After Moscow
Epilogue. Dubček's Decline and Fall
Conclusion: Reform, Revolution, or Counterrevolution?
The Crisis of Stalinism
The Meaning of January
Reform or Revolution?
Some Marxist Views
Revolutionary Aspects of 1968
Counterrevolution?
Could the Experiment Succeed?
Was Dubček's Strategy at Fault?
The "Czech Question" in New Form
A Model for the Future?
Appendices
A. Members of CPCz Presidium and Secretariat, 1968
B. Poll of Party Delegates, 1968
C. Federation and the Nationalities Law
D. Smrkovskýs Testimony
E. The Mlynář Memorandum
Bibliography
Index

Citation preview

CZECHOSLOVAKIA'S INTERRUPTED

REVOLUTION

Czechoslovakia's Interrupted Revolution H. GORDON S K I L L I N G

Princeton University Press · Princeton, New Jersey

Copyright © 1976 by Princeton University Press Published by Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey In the United Kingdom: Princeton University Press, Guildford, Surrey ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data will be found on the last printed page of this book This book has been composed in Linotype Times Roman Printed in the United States of America by Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey

Written under the auspices of the Centre for Russian and East European Studies, University of Toronto A list of other Centre publications appears at the back of this book

To Alexander · Antonin · Ivan · Jan Jaroslav · Jin · Jirina · Josef · Karol Lisa · Michal · Olga · Pavel Vaclav · Vladimir · Vilem · Zdenek

For the human character is such that men wish to be governed in a human fashion, rather led than dragged, rather persuaded than compelled, for man was created in the image of God, a reasoning, free and independent being. The art of government is thus based upon wisdom and not upon force, upon caution and foresight and not upon trickery. J. A. Komensky (1668)

CONTENTS

PREFACE

xi

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

XV

PART O N E . T H E HISTORICAL SETTING CHAPTER I. C O M M U N I S M AND CZECHOSLOVAK TRADITIONS

3

National Traditions and the Communists · Czechs and Slovaks · Germans and Hungarians · The Break with the Past · East and West in Foreign Relations · A Nation of Svejks? · Sovereignty and Its Benefits CHAPTER II. T H E DUALISM OF CZECHOSLOVAK C O M M U N I S M : F R O M GOTTWALD TO NOVOTNY

21

The National Path to Socialism · Following the Soviet Model · The Transition to Novotny · A New Course · Crisis Averted · Novotny Supreme · Sham De-Stalinization PART Two.

STALINISM IN DECLINE

CHAPTER III. T H E MOUNTING CRISIS

45

Dropping the Stalinists · The Slovak Question Unsolved · Economic Crisis and Reform · The Writers and Freedom of the Press · Youth and the Youth Movement · Student Unrest · Conformity in Foreign Policy CHAPTER IV. SCIENCE, SCHOLARSHIP, AND THE PARTY

Partisanry and the Scientific Spirit · A Philosophy of of Sociology · Revival of History · Law and Justice Politics · Foreign Policy and International Relations · nomics · The Scientific Revolution and Scholarship · Intellectuals CHAPTER V. T H E POLITICAL SYSTEM UNDER FIRE

90

Man · Rebirth · A Science of Reform in EcoPower and the 134

The Twelfth Party Congress · Limited Reforms, 1963-1964 · The New Economic System and Political Change · Theoretical Discussions of Reform · The Thirteenth Party Congress · Response at Higher Levels CHAPTER VI. T H E FALL OF NOVOTNY

161

Conflict at the Top · The October Plenum · The Crisis Develops · Climax in January · The Process of Succession PART THREE. T H E POLITICS OF CHANGE CHAPTER VII.

PRELUDE TO CHANGE

183

(January and February) Change of the Guard · Signs of Innovation · Divisions at the Top · Party and Public Uncertainty • End of the Beginning vu

CONTENTS CHAPTER VIII. SPONTANEITY AND CONSOLIDATION

196

(March and Early April) The Emergence of Public Opinion · Rebelliousness at the Grass Roots · Response at Higher Levels · The International Context · Dubcek Speaks · The Plenum Debate · Attempt at Consolidation · The Action Program · Conclusion CHAPTER IX. T H E STEP-BY-STEP STRATEGY CHALLENGED

225

(April and Early June) Preparing for Reform · The Party's Tactics Challenged · Spontaneous Public Activity · Opinions Divided · Czech-Slovak Differences · The Split of the Slovak Writers · Bloc Relations · The May Plenum · Conclusion CHAPTER X. REFORMS A M I D TENSION

261

(June to Mid-July) The First Reform Measures · Emerging Political Forces · Fresh Winds in the Party · Polarization of Forces: The Two Thousand Words · Slovaks and the Federal Question · Mounting Bloc Pressures · The Warsaw Letter CHAPTER XI. T H E STORM GATHERS

295

(Before and After Cierna) Outside Pressures Intensify · Reaction to Pressure · Confrontation at Cierna nad Tisou · The Bratislava Conclave · Four Bilateral Meetings · Preparations for the 14th Congress · Gathering Crisis in Slovakia · Cracks in Political Unity · The Final Presidium Meeting PART FOUR. T H E N E W MODEL OF SOCIALISM CHAPTER XII. A N E W POLITICAL SYSTEM

333

Reform of Top Party Organs · The Action Program · The Political System Evolves in Practice · The National Front · The Party: De Facto Change · The Party's Constitution · Debate Over Pluralism · Public Opinion on the Political System · Human Rights and Constitutional Reform · Fourteenth Congress Perspectives CHAPTER XIII. REHABILITATION AND JUSTICE

373

Rehabilitation—Initial Phase · Individual Cases Reexamined · Revelations and Accusations · "How Was It Possible?" · The Law on Judicial Rehabilitation · Extra-Judicial Rehabilitation · The Piller Investigation · Guarantees for the Future · Conclusion CHAPTER XIV. PLANNED MARKET SOCIALISM

412

The Initial Stage · Expert Opinion Advanced · The April Plenum and the Action Program · Changes at the Center · Continuing Dissatisfaction and Demands · Rehabilitation of the Market and of Enterprise · Slovakia and Economic Reform · Management and Enterprise Councils · Councils of the Working People · Trade Unions and the Councils · Economic Reform in Transition CHAPTER XV. FEDERALISM AND THE SLOVAK PROBLEM

451

Slovak Initiative · The Official Response · Czech and Slovak Opinion Diverges · Economic Aspects of Federalism · Tripartitism: A Moravia

CONTENTS vian Alternative · Official Planning: Progress and Deadlock · Substantive Questions at Issue · Parity and a Ban on Outvoting · The Division of Jurisdiction PART FIVE. CONTENDING POLITICAL AND SOCIAL FORCES CHAPTER XVI. CONFLICTING TENDENCIES IN THE PARTY

493

"Conservatives," "Progressives," and "Anti-Socialists" · Party Division: Rank and File · Party Officials and Functionaries · 14th Congress Delegates · The Central Committee · Presidium and Secretariat · The Slovak Party CHAPTER XVII. NON-COMMUNISTS AND PUBLIC OPINION

526

Public Opinion and Politics · Public Opinion and Reform · The NonCommunist Parties · Prospects for New Parties · New Parties and Public Opinion · The National Front in Public Opinion · Conclusion CHAPTER XVIII. SOCIAL GROUPS AND ORGANIZATIONS

563

The Intellectuals · The Writers · The Journalists · Scholars and Scientists · The Working Class and the Unions · Farmers and Farmers' Organizations · Other Interest Groups · Young People and Students · Religion and the Church · The Nationalities · Conclusion PART SIX. T H E INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT CHAPTER XIX. A FOREIGN POLICY WITH " I T S O W N FACE"

617

The Budapest Conference · Foreign Policy with "A New Face" · Foreign Policy Defined · A National Path to Socialism · Bloc and Foreign Relations · Public Opinion Emerges · Strengthening the Warsaw Pact · Foreign Trade and Comecon · The German Question and European Security · Foreign Policy in Crisis · Bratislava and After · Conclusion CHAPTER XX. T H E REACTIONS OF THE RULING COMMUNIST PARTIES

659

Initial Response · Mounting Soviet Concern · Climax at Warsaw · Calm Before the Storm · East German Hostility · Poland: Mixed Reactions · Hungary: Sympathetic Concern · Bulgaria: Belated Antagonism · Rumania: Open Solidarity · Yugoslavia: Firm Support · Albania: A Plague on Both Houses · Other Communist Parties CHAPTER XXI. MILITARY INTERVENTION

713

The Invasion · Were the Soviet Troops Invited? · The Decision to Invade—When? · Were Counsels Divided? · The Decision to Invade— Why? · The International Factor · Domestic Issues · The Ukrainian Factor · The Problem of the Intellectuals · Bloc Unity and Divergency · Diversity of Communist Reactions · Dissidence in the Invading States · Western Response: NATO and the U N CHAPTER XXII. RESISTANCE AND CAPITULATION

759

The Fiasco of Collaboration Attempts · An Extraordinary Party Congress · National Defiance · Civilian Resistance · Official Resistance · Slovak Reactions · The Slovak Congress · The Moscow Talks · Report to the People · CC Approval of Moscow Agreements · The Dilemma after Moscow IX

CONTENTS EPILOGUE. DUBCEK'S D E C L I N E AND FALL

813

CONCLUSION: R E F O R M , REVOLUTION, OR COUNTERREVOLUTION?

824

The Crisis of Stalinism · The Meaning of January · Reform or Revo­ lution? · Some Marxist Views · Revolutionary Aspects of 1968 · Counterrevolution? · Could the Experiment Succeed? · Was Dubcek's Strategy at Fault? · The "Czech Question" in New Form · A Model for the Future? APPENDICES

853

A. Members of CPCz Presidium and Secretariat, 1968 · B. Poll of Party Delegates, 1968 · C. Federation and the Nationalities Law · D. Smrkovsky's Testimony · E. The Mlynar Memorandum BIBLIOGRAPHY

891

INDEX

899

χ

PREFACE

I first visited Czechoslovakia in the summer of 1937, at a high point in the history of the First Republic, I could not foresee that that country would soon experience the catastrophe of Munich and the German occupation. Thirty years later, in 1967, when I again spent a summer there, equally unforeseeable events were ahead—the outburst of reform and the Soviet invasion in the following year. In each case there were, of course, warning signals of impending calamity, but the blow, when it came, was unanticipated and produced the same collapse of high hopes and the same anger and hatred of the outside intervener. At the time of the invasion in 1968 I was taking part in a conference on Change in Communist Systems in the idyllic surroundings of the Institute for Behavioral Studies in Stanford, California. Few of the participants expected such a drastic interruption of the course of change then under way in Czechoslovakia. On the day of the intervention Robert Tucker, of Princeton University, and I exchanged views on the implications of the event for the two countries (the USSR and Czechoslovakia) to which we had devoted many years of study. Having already embarked on a program of research on group conflict in Czechoslovakia, I was easily persuaded to expand this into a more complete study of the 1968 events. We were both convinced that the short-lived experiment in the reform of communism in Czechoslovakia was of decisive historical importance, not only for the Czech and Slovak peoples, but also for Soviet Russia and world communism. My intention was to avoid elaborate theoretical schemes and to prepare an empirical case study, based on a systematic examination of all available sources. I was under no illusions that I could attain complete objectivity in the analysis of a subject so controversial, but could only hope, following the standards of scholarly research, to portray events as fully and fairly as possible. Although my attitude to the reform movement was sympathetic, I have taken account of all standpoints, favorable and unfavorable, and have tried to analyze its failings as well as its virtues. I have refrained from extensive personal interpretations and have sought to achieve a judgment more detached than was perhaps possible for protagonists and critics personally involved in these events. I am fully aware that a study of a historical episode at such close range cannot be in any sense definitive. In spite of the extraordinary freedom of expression that prevailed during 1968, much remained concealed or obscure and may never be fully revealed. After the manuscript had been WHEN

Xl

PREFACE

completed, the appearance, in 1975, of Smrkovsky-'s final testimony and a memorandum by Zdenek Mlynar (both of which are summarized in appendices) underlined the perils of writing contemporary history, without access to confidential documents and personal memoirs. No doubt the future historian will have the benefit of much fuller documentation and of later revelations. The contemporary observer has at least the advantage of having been able to follow events closely as they occurred and to discuss them on the spot with participants and observers, and may hopefully capture the spirit of the times better than a retrospective analyst. During visits to Czechoslovakia during May and June 1968, and also in the summer of 1967, the fall of 1968, and the spring of 1969, I conducted many interviews with Czechs and Slovaks which gave life to the written sources. Earlier trips before World War II, and in 1948, 1950, 1958, 1961, and 1962, provided a valuable perspective for interpreting more recent developments. Even before I began to write this book, I had thought of a possible title—The Interrupted Revolution. I am conscious of the ambiguities of these words, and the controversiality of the concept embodied in them, but for reasons set forth in my conclusions, have retained the title as expressing most fully the meaning of 1968. While writing and rewriting the conclusions I had the benefit of discussing them, and the title, on a number of occasions, in particular in seminars at the Russian Research Center, at Harvard University; at the York-Toronto Colloquium on the Politics of Socialism, and at Carleton University, Ottawa; in Great Britain, at the centers for Russian and East European studies at Birmingham, Glasgow, Swansea, and St. Antony's College, Oxford; at Cambridge and the London School of Economics and Political Science; and further afield, at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. Those who offered criticisms and observations may recognize some of their points in the final version of my concluding chapter. Appreciation must be expressed to many persons for assistance in preparing the book. First and foremost comes my wife, Sally, who accompanied me on many visits to Czechoslovakia over the years and who encouraged and helped me in the long and arduous task of research and writing. As always, her splendid editing of the manuscript has given it whatever lucidity and style that it may possess, and her construction of the index has made its contents readily accessible. Also invaluable was the contribution of my colleague at the University of Toronto, Dusan Pokorny, who, in making his gentle but cogent comments on the entire manuscript, drew upon his wide knowledge of the economics, politics, philosophy, journalism, and diplomacy of his native country, and his long experience in both Slovakia and the Czech lands. Karel Kovanda, xii

PREFACE

then a Ph.D. student at MIT, also read the manuscript, checking the spelling of Czech and Slovak names and words, and offering critical observations. Others who made valuable comments on the book as a whole were Stanley Pech, of the University of British Columbia, and Zvi Gitelman, of the University of Michigan. Jan Stepan, of Harvard University, and Oldfich Kyn, of Boston University, read chapters xm and xiv, respectively. Thanks go to many others, especially Czechs and Slovaks who offered their own ideas and useful information and gave other invaluable aid. They must remain anonymous but are represented by the first names of some of them in the dedication. Those who assisted me in research included: Douglas Evans and my wife (English-language materials); Lida Havrlant and Hilarion Kuksin (Czech and Slovak); Stefania Stanislawska-Fiszman and David Paul (Polish, Russian, and other languages, for chapter xxi). Special appreciation must be voiced to the expert typists of countless drafts and of the final version of the manuscript, LiIa Fernandez, of Waban, Mass., and Ahnna Lowry, of Toronto, and to the latter also for her patience and skill in performing the many administrative tasks involved. My gratitude is expressed to Sanford Thatcher, of Princeton University Press, for his encouragement and support from the beginning; to Polly Hanford, for her skilled editing; and to other members of the staff of the Press for contributing to the fine technical quality of the book. Appreciation is recorded for permission to use, in revised forms, parts of the following articles of mine: "The Fall of Novotny in Czechoslovakia," Canadian Slavonic Papers (Ottawa, Canada), 12, no. 3 (Fall 1970), 225-42; "Communism and Czechoslovak Tradition," Journal of International Affairs, xx, no. 1 (1966), 118-36; "Czechoslovakia," in Adam Bromke and Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, eds., The Communist States in Disarray, 1965-1971 (University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1972), pp. 62-71. Appreciation is also expressed to Praeger Publishers, Inc., for permission to use tables, in original and revised form, from Jaroslav A. Piekalkiewicz, Public Opinion Polling in Czechoslovakia, 1968-69 (New York, 1972), and to the Palach Press Ltd., London, for permission to use the materials by Josef Smrkovsk^ and Zdenek Mlynar in the appendices. Finally I wish to record my gratefulness to various institutions (and to their responsible officers) for financial and other support: to the Canada Council, for the initial generous Killam award and subsequent research grants; to the University of Toronto, for supplementary aid and for two full years of sabbatical leave, the latter taken in two separate parts; to the institutions which provided me with congenial workplaces xiii

PREFACE

during these later leaves: the Center for International Studies of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and the Russian Research Center of Harvard University, in 1972, and St. Antony's College, Oxford, in 1975; and to the Centre for Russian and East European Studies at the University of Toronto (in particular to Franklyn Griffiths and Donald Schwartz who served as acting directors during my absences). Toronto, Canada

xiv

H. GORDON SKILLING

LIST O F

PERIODICALS

ABBREVIATIONS

AND

NEWSPAPERS

AER—American Economic Review AJS—American Journal of Sociology APSR—American Political Science Review ASEER—American Slavic and East European Review BBC—British Broadcasting Corporation, Monitoring Service, Summary of World Broadcasts CCH—Ceskoslovensky casopis historicky CDSP—The Current Digest of the Soviet Press CEP—Czechoslovak Economic Papers CH—Current History CJEPS—The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science CJPS—Canadian Journal of Political Science CSM—The Christian Science Monitor CSP—Canadian Slavonic Papers DAS—Dejiny a soucasnost EC—Ekonomicky casopis EE—East Europe EEE—Eastern European Economics EEQ—East European Quarterly FC—Filosoficky casopis HC—Historicky casopis HN—Hospodarske noviny U—International Journal IR—International Relations JCEA—Journal of Central European

MN—Magyar Nemzet MT—Moravskoslezsky tyden MV—Afezinarodni vztahy NA—Narodna armiya NBIC—News From Behind the Iron Curtain ND—Neues Deutschland NLR—New Left Review NM—Nova mysl NS—Nove slovo NICE—New Trends in Czechoslovak Economics NYT—The New York Times OL—Obrana lidu PC—Problems of Communism PE—Politicka ekonomie PH—Planovane hospodarstvi PKD KSC—Prispevky k dejinam KSC PO—Pravny obzor PSQ—Political Science Quarterly PU—Pravda Ukrainy RD—Rabotnichesko delo Rep.—Reporter Reprints—Reprints from the Soviet Press RN—Rol'nicke noviny RP—Rude prdvo SCC—Studies in Comparative Communism SC—Sociologicky casopis SEER—Slavonic and East European Review SR—Sovetskaya Rossia

J. . 7 ASmrs JIA-Journal of International Affairs JP—Journal of Politics „ _ .. , , . Kat.nov.—Katolicke noviny KN-Kulturni noviny KT—Kulturni tvorba KZ-Krasnaya zvezda KZ—Kulturny iivot LD—Lidovd democracie LG—Literaturnaya gazeta LL—Literdrni listy LN—Literarni noviny MF—Mlada fronta

SS—Svobodne slovo zdkonnost SZ-Socialistickd _T „ , . T TL—Try buna Ludu ,n„r TI „ U f U.S. Joint Publication East Europe Research Service, Eastern EuroPe VN—Vychodoslovenske noviny VP—Vecerni Praha WT—The World Today ZIP—Zeri i Popullit ZN—Zemedelske noviny ZS—Zivot strany

XV

ABBREVIATIONS OTHER ABBREVIATIONS

ARS—Akademicka rada studentu (Academic Council of Students) CC—Central Committee CMEA or COMECON—Council for Mutual Economic Assistance CNR—Ceska narodni rada (Czech National Council) CPCz—Communist Party of Czechoslovakia CPS—Communist Party of Slovakia CPSU—Communist Party of the Soviet Union CSL—Ceskoslovenska strana lidova (Czechoslovak People's Party) CSM—Ceskoslovensky svaz mladeze (Czechoslovak Union of Youth) CSS—Ceskoslovenska strana socialisticka (Czechoslovak Socialist Party) CSSR—Ceskoslovenska socialisticka republika (Czechoslovak Socialist Republic) CSTV—Ceskoslovensky svaz telesne vychovy (Czechoslovak Union of Physical Training) CTK—Ceskoslovenska tiskova kancelar (Czechoslovak Press Agency) GDR—German Democratic Republic GFR—German Federal Republic JZD—Jednotne zemedelske druzstvo (collective farm) K231—Club 231 KRK—Kontrolni a revizni komise (Commission of Supervision and Auditing) KSK—Komise stranicke kontroly (Commission of Party Control) KSUT—Kulturna spilka ukrayinskykh trudyashchykh (Cultural Union of the Ukrainian Working People) KAN—Klub angazovanych nestraniku (Club of the Non-party Engages) KSC—Komunisticka strana Ceskoslovenska (Communist Party of Czechoslovakia) —in English, CPCz LCY—League of Communists of Yugoslavia MFA—Ministry of Foreign Affairs MPA—Main Political Administration NF—Narodni fronta (National Front) RFE—Radio Free Europe ROH—Revolucni odborove hnuti (Revolutionary Trade Union Movement) RSFSR—Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic R§0—Rok sedesaty osmy ν usnesenich a dokumentech UV KSC (The Year Sixty-eight in Decisions and Documents) StB—Statni bezpecnost (State Security) SCSS—Svaz ceskoslovenskych spisovatelit (Union of Czechoslovak Writers) SED-Socialist Unity Party of Germany (GDR) SKRO—Statni komise pro rizeni a organisac (State Commission for Management and Organization) SNB—Sbor narodni bezpecnosti (Corps of National Security) SNR—Slovenska narodna rada (Slovak National Council) UKRK—Ustredni kontrolni a revizni komise (Central Commission of Supervision and Auditing) UMPE—Ustav pro mezinarodni politiku a ekonomii (Institute of International Politics and Economics) UPS—Ustredni publikacni sprava (Central Publication Administration) URO—Ustredni rada odboru (Central Council of Trade Unions) UV—Ustredni vybor (Central Committee) UVVM—Ustav pro vyzkum verejneho mineni (Institute for Public Opinion Re­ search) VB—Verejna bezpecnost (Public Security) WTO—Warsaw Treaty Organization

XVI

PART ONE

THE HISTORICAL SETTING

CHAPTER I

Communism and Czechoslovak Traditions regimes have almost without exception repudiated the dominant traditions of their countries' history and claimed to have established brand-new patterns of politics and society. At the same time they have sought to depict communism as a projection of the "revolutionary" and "progressive" elements of their national heritage and to incorporate these in the mythology of the new order. In most cases, as, for instance, Soviet Russia, the past thus rejected was autocratic and reactionary, and only selected radical traditions were regarded as the forerunners of communism. In Czechoslovakia, however, the dominant tradition was democratic, deeply rooted in the feelings of the people, and regarded positively by most Czechs and by many Slovaks. The communists, therefore, had to renounce the advanced and progressive features of the past, such as the legacy of Masaryk, since these were integral elements of the dominant tradition.1 In another respect, also, Czechoslovakia seemed to stand in stark contrast to other communist countries. The regimes have usually, willy-nilly, been affected and influenced, often unconsciously, by their own historical backgrounds, including those elements which were condemned. For a decade or more, Czechoslovak communism seemed to have been successful in erasing the dominant national traditions and to have escaped even their indirect influence. In the sixties, however, the forces of the past began once more to make themselves felt. COMMUNIST

NATIONAL TRADITIONS AND THE COMMUNISTS

The strongest traditions with which the Czechoslovak communists had to grapple were those that had evolved during the twenty years of the First Republic between the two World Wars.2 Created largely as a result 1 Few scholars have attempted to discuss Czechoslovak communism in relation to Czech and Slovak traditions. The standard works by Edward Taborsky, Communism in Czechoslovakia, 1948-1960 (Princeton, 1961) and V. Busek and N. Spulber, eds., Czechoslovakia (New York, 1957) are completely lacking in historical background. Of two major studies of the communist victory in 1948, Paul E. Zinner, Communist Strategy and Tactics in Czechoslovakia, 1918-48 (New York, 1963) and Josef Korbel, The Communist Subversion of Czechoslovakia, 1938-1948: The Failure of Co-existence (Princeton, 1959), only Zinner, in a brief introduction, indicates some of the historical factors that affected the rise of communism to power. Korbel explains it almost exclusively in terms of the communist strategy of deceit. See also William E. Griffith, "Myth and Reality in Czechoslovak History," East Europe 11 (March 1962), 3-11, 34-36, 40-41. 2 For this period, see R. W. Seton-Watson, A History of the Czechs and Slovaks

3

THE HISTORICAL SETTING

of the victory of the Entente and the decisions of the Paris Peace Conference, Czechoslovakia emerged as an independent state after three centuries of subservience and brought Czechs and Slovaks together in a single political entity for the first time in history. Modeled politically in the image of the Western democracies by its two great leaders, the first President, Tomas G. Masaryk, and his successor, Edvard Benes, Czechoslovakia, the new state, alone in Eastern Europe, maintained a democratic system during the two decades between the wars. True, many of the "traditions" of Czechoslovakia were new and broke with the historical experience of the Czechs and Slovaks within the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. There were, however, important elements of continuity, so that the Republic could be regarded as a logical culmination of the national awakening and of decades of striving for a democratic life, social advance, and self-government.3 There were great disparities in the pasts of the Czechs and Slovaks, and their union in a single state, although not without historical justification, represented a new departure. Before 1919 the Czechs had risen to a high level of economic, social, and cultural development and had played an important political part in Austria; the Slovaks had remained at a lower level of development in all respects and possessed almost no political rights in Hungary. Their nationalism was less pronounced than that of the Czechs and was strongly influenced by the pressures of the Magyar environment and by the authority of the Catholic Church. The national movement, insofar as it existed, was mainly inspired and led by those Protestants and Catholics conscious of Slovak linguistic and cultural links with the Czech nation. After 1919, leadership by the larger nation, the Czech, led to the dominance of their traditional values, as represented by Masaryk and Benes, and the subordination of the distinctive ideals of Slovak nationalism. The concept of a "Czechoslovak" nation asserted by Czech leaders even denied that a separate Slovak nation existed. Many Slovaks, including General Milan Stefanik, cofounder of the Republic, accepted the notion of Czechoslovak national unity.4 Others increasingly stressed separate Slovak identity and urged (London, 1943), chap. 16; S. Harrison Thomson, Czechoslovakia in European History (Princeton, 1943), chap. 13; Robert J. Kerner, ed., Czechoslovakia: Twenty Years of Independence (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1940); and esp., Victor S. Mamatey and Radomir Lu2a, eds., A History of the Czechoslovak Republic, 1918-1948 (Princeton, 1973). On Slovakia, see Jozef Lettrich, History of Modern Slovakia (New York, 1955); I. Mikus, Slovakia: A Political History, 1918-50 (Milwaukee, 1963); Joseph M. Kirschbaum, ed., Slovakia in the 19th and 20th centuries (Toronto, 1973); and esp. C. A. Macartney, Hungary and Her Successors: The Treaty of Trianon and Its Consequences, 1919-1937 (London, 1937). 3 Thomson, Czechoslovakia, p. 157. 4 General Stefanik perished in a plane crash in 1919.

4

COMMUNISM AND CZECHOSLOVAK TRADITIONS

autonomy for Slovakia. Other minorities, such as the Germans, Mag­ yars, Poles, and Ruthenians had to reconcile themselves to the suprem­ acy of the "Czechoslovaks" as the state-nation and to life within a com­ munity reflecting the spirit and ideas of the Czechs. The concept of an independent Czechoslovak state had not attracted the left-wing socialists who eventually formed the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CPCz), as they had hoped for either a socialist revolu­ tion in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy as a whole, or the incorporation of the Eastern European peoples in a continent-wide Soviet federation.5 When independence was achieved, they accepted the new state as a polit­ ical reality but viewed it as an "imperialist" state subordinated to the general interests of the ruling classes of the Western powers. Bohumir Smeral, a leading pre-war socialist, and eventual founder of the Commu­ nist Party, endorsed the doctrine of proletarian dictatorship and pressed for membership in the Communist International, but openly recognized that conditions in Czechoslovakia were not ripe for revolution. By pre­ serving a large party he hoped ultimately to win mass support for revolu­ tion. Although opposed to the new political and social order, Smeral defended the territorial integrity of the new state and rejected the idea of self-determination for the national minorities. The democracy established by Masaryk and the major Czechoslovak parties was treated by the communists as a f acade which veiled the domi­ nance of the bourgeoisie and condemned the workers to wage slavery and exploitation.6 The "Castle" (Hrad), i.e. the President's office, was considered the pinnacle of power of the ruling classes, and Masaryk, and later Benes, as the personification of capitalist rule. Although the com­ munists benefited from the democratic rights established by the constitu­ tion, and functioned, subject to some restrictions, as a legal party during the life of the Republic, they considered themselves as outside the exist­ ing system and as its avowed enemy, and used its parliamentary and elec5 There is no full history of Czechoslovak communism. See Zinner, Com­ munist Strategy, chaps. 2-4 and H. Gordon Skilling, "The Formation of a Com­ munist Party in Czechoslovakia," American Slavic and East European Review 14 (Oct. 1955), 346-58; "The Comintern and Czechoslovak Communism: 19211929," ibid. 19 (April 1960), 234-47; "Gottwald and the Bolshevization of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, 1929-1939," ibid. 20 (Dec. 1961), 641-55. β For a communist interpretation of the First Republic, see M. Gosiorovsky, ed., Prehled ceskoslovenskych dejin, III, 1918-1945, These (Prague, 1956), esp. pp. 16, 29, 40. Czech communists, for some years, denied that the achievement of independence was due to the "foreign action" of Masaryk and Benes and the support of the Western powers, but claimed that it was the product of the impact of the October revolution in Russia and the revolutionary actions of the masses at home. The birthday of the Republic was taken to be not October 28, 1918, when the National Committee in Prague proclaimed independence, but October 14, when the Socialist Council carried through a mass demonstration in the name of independence. See O. Riha, ed., Prehled ceskoslovenskych dejin, II (do roku 1918), These (Prague, 1955), pp. 157-58.

5

THE HISTORICAL SETTING

toral opportunities as a means for its ultimate abolition. Always in radical opposition, they were treated by their opponents as outsiders, and not as legitimate participants in the democratic process. Although the communists functioned within a working democracy for two decades, this experience did not exert a strong influence on their thinking and behavior when they eventually achieved power. When the CPCz was formed in 1921, it was a massive party, representing a substantial part, perhaps a majority, of the members of the post-war Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party and could therefore be regarded as a legitimate heir of Austrian social democracy. This movement had been originally Marxist in outlook and international in its appeal and included representatives of all the nationalities of the Monarchy. But Czech socialism had become increasingly nationalist in orientation and like the rest of the movement, revisionist or evolutionary in strategy and tactics. Although after 1918, many Czech socialists, under Smeral's leadership, at first inclined toward the Comintern and its revolutionary program, at heart they were really left-wing socialists, rather than Bolsheviks. The left-wing element soon lost their dominant position to the more moderate wing of social democracy, which endorsed the Masaryk program of national liberation and became a governing party. There was also a substantial pre-war non-Marxist socialist tradition among Czechs, so that under these influences and Masaryk's leadership, the new state was "socialistic," but in a sense that was unacceptable to the communists with their dogmatic, revolutionary approach.7 The efforts of the Comintern were bent toward transforming the Czechoslovak movement, with its strong social democratic traditions, into a "Bolshevik" party, on the Leninist model. This required a constant struggle against so-called social democratic vestiges within its ranks and culminated in 1929 in the appointment of Moscow's choice, Klement Gottwald, as leader. Hostile to the existing Republic and its "bourgeois" democracy, the party, under his direction, devoted itself to the attainment of a proletarian revolution and the establishment of a Soviet Czechoslovakia. Successive purges produced a strong corps of proMoscow leading cadres and reduced the party to a small, sectarian, Moscow-oriented movement, shorn of its original social democratic and national heritage and lacking in popular appeal. Marx was replaced by Lenin in their pantheon, just as he was replaced by Masaryk in more moderate socialist circles. When the Comintern in 1924 adopted the doctrine of national self-determination, including even the right of secession, 7 See T. G. Masaryk's critique of Marxism before 1914, in Otdzka socialni (Prague, 1898); in English, E. V. Kohak, trans., Masaryk on Marx (Lewisburg, Pa., 1972). Cf. R. R. Betts, "Masaryk's Philosophy of History," Slavonic and East European Review 26 (Nov. 1947), 30-43.

6

COMMUNISM AND CZECHOSLOVAK TRADITIONS

and the CPCz incorporated this in their program, their ultimate objective became the disintegration of Czechoslovakia as a multinational state. As a result, communism's appeal was not so much to members of the ruling Czech nation as to the minority peoples, especially the Magyars in Slovakia and the Ruthenians. Nonetheless, in the years of deepening economic crisis, the party, with its radical program, began to gain support among the working class, and even among the intellectuals, and became a significant political factor, well represented in parliament.8 In the closing years of the Republic, the rise of Hitler to power, the danger of German aggression, and the formulation of the policy of the Popular Front by the Comintern led the Czechoslovak communists to adopt a more positive attitude toward the state and its democratic system. Still under Gottwald's leadership, in 1935, they embarked on a campaign for the defense of the Republic and its independence against the external threat from Germany, and of its democratic order against internal foes. This involved communist support for Edvard Benes, who was elected as President in that year. The conclusion of the CzechoslovakSoviet pact of mutual assistance in the same year removed any contradiction between the party's line and the foreign policy of the state. After Munich, the CPCz bitterly condemned what they called Benes' capitulation to the ultimatum of the Great Powers and opposed the partition of the country, the subsequent Nazi occupation of Bohemia and Moravia, and the formation of a separate Slovak state. This enhanced the patriotic image of the party and widened its popular appeal. From 1939 to 1941, however, this policy was abandoned, the war was denounced as "imperialist" and Benes' liberation movement was condemned. When the Soviet Union became involved in hostilities in 1941, however, the communists revived the democratic and nationalist approach and launched a crusade for the reconstitution of Czechoslovakia in its pre-war form. Their willingness to cooperate with Benes and to take part in the restored democratic system in 1945 suggested that they had abandoned their earlier hostility to Czech traditions and had themselves absorbed and been influenced by them. Until 1948 Gottwald seemed to have been successful in fusing Czech national interests with communist beliefs and objectives and by following what he called "a national path to socialism," won substantial support and sympathy for the Communist Party. The 8 In the general elections of 1929 and 1935, the Communist Party was in each case the fourth strongest party, with thirty seats (almost one-quarter of the total) in the House of Deputies, and with a popular vote of approximately 750,000 and 850,000 (in each case about 10 percent of the total). In 1925 they had been the second strongest party, with over 933,000 votes (13 percent of the total), and forty-one seats. For details, see Mamatey and Luza, eds., Czechoslovak Republic, pp. 128, 140, 154; Charles Hoch, The Political Parties in Czechoslovakia, 2nd ed. (Prague, 1936), table.

7

THE HISTORICAL SETTING

seizure of power in 1948 indicated, however, that the conversion of the communists, if there had been one, was superficial and that their repudiation of the nation's democratic past was total and permanent. Thereafter for twenty years, communism became the dominant, indeed the exclusive, political force and established new traditions of crucial significance for the future and in particular for the events after January 1968. CZECHS AND SLOVAKS

In one important respect there was striking continuity between the communist and pre-communist periods, namely, the restoration of Czechoslovakia after World War II mainly in the form and within the boundaries established by the Paris peace settlement of 1919.9 Masaryk's strategy of a union of Czechs and Slovaks was thus confirmed by the communists and has been continued ever since. Moreover, the longstanding Czech belief in the territorial integrity of Bohemia and Moravia, and the argument of Masaryk and Benes for incorporating the whole of these regions, in spite of a large German minority, into the liberated Republic, were again endorsed in 1945, although with the important change, to be discussed later, of the expulsion of the Germans. The less ancient tradition of including in the state Polish and Magyar minorities and the lands where they lived, largely within the 1919 frontiers, was also reaffirmed. The only exception to the restoration of the pre-war territorial structure was the cession of Subcarpathian Ruthenia to the USSR. This area had been assigned to Czechoslovakia in 1919 primarily for strategic considerations and had always been a heavy burden on the resources of Prague governments. Its loss, unlike the cession of Poland's eastern territories, did not represent the reversal of a deep historic tradition and was little lamented. Indeed, it was accepted by President Benes and other non-communists as a sacrifice well worth making in return for the assurance of the integrity of the rest of the Republic. The reunification of Czechs and Slovaks in a single state brought to an end the "independence" which Slovaks had enjoyed after 1939. During the First Republic the Slovaks had experienced great cultural and political development as contrasted with their lot under the Magyars, and many of them had identified strongly with the new Czechoslovakia. Their failure to secure the autonomy which they had expected and the assumption by the Czechs of a dominating role in the Republic had caused other Slovaks, led by Andrej Hlinka and his successor, Jozef Tiso, to expound a more pronounced Slovak nationalism and to demand home rule, or even independence. In successive elections the Slovak People's Party 9 See H. G. Skilling, "The Czechoslovak Struggle for National Liberation in World War II," SEER 39 (Dec. 1960), 174-97.

8

COMMUNISM AND CZECHOSLOVAK TRADITIONS

proved to be the strongest in Slovakia but was always outvoted by the combined votes of parties with a Czech or Czechoslovak orientation.10 Only after Munich was Slovakia granted the long-desired autonomy, but important elements in the People's Party began to turn toward complete independence as a preferable goal. The establishment, in 1939, for the first time in history, of a separate Slovak state, even under the suzerainty of Nazi Germany and under conservative, clerical-fascist leadership, created a distinctive tradition that was bound to have a continuing impact on Slovak thought. During the war the communists had formed a separate illegal Slovak party and some of its leaders had atfirstflirtedwith the notion of a future Slovak Soviet state. The CPCz leadership in Moscow, and eventually the leading Slovak communists at home, such as Gustav Husak and the poet, Laco Novomesky, however, committed themselves fully to the restoration of the pre-war Republic. During the Slovak Uprising of 1944, both communists and non-communists endorsed this policy and accepted the authority of the Benes government in London. They insisted, however, that the Slovaks must be recognized as a distinct nation and must be guaranteed home rule in a liberated Czechoslovakia. They rejected, therefore, not only the brief experience of Slovak independence, and the nationalist philosophy of Fathers Hlinka and Tiso, but also the pre-war concept of a single "Czechoslovak" nation and the very limited autonomy granted to the Slovaks in the First Republic. The Kosice government program of 1945 proclaimed anew the principle of Czech-Slovak unity but at the same time asserted the doctrine of Slovak equality and autonomy, thus forecasting a substantial change in Czech-Slovak relations. In the early post-war months the communists, both Czech and Slovak, were vigorous advocates of a distinct Slovak identity and of Slovak autonomy, but conscious of their own political weakness in the Slovak regions, they soon turned toward centralist rule in the Republic as a whole. Even after 1948 the communists continued to recognize the separate identity of the Slovak nation and to protect its cultural and linguistic rights, and in the 1948 constitution provided for organs of Slovak self-government. Nonetheless the powers of the government in Prague waxed steadily and the reality of home rule waned. Moreover, the Com10 In the elections of 1925, 1929, and 1935, the People's Party won the following votes: 489,000, 404,000, and 490,000, representing approximately 34, 28, and 30 percent of the total vote in Slovakia. The parties of Czech or Czechoslovak orientation received 400,000 (28 percent), 579,000 (40 percent), and 628,000 (39 percent). Slovak communists in these three elections accounted for 189,000, 152,000, and 211,000 votes, resp. (Kirschbaum, ed., Slovakia, p. 123; Mamatey and Luza, eds., Czechoslovak Republic, pp. 128, 141, 154; Macartney, Hungary and Her Successors, pp. 118, 144.)

9

THE HISTORICAL SETTING

munist Party, having reunited its Czech and Slovak branches in 1948, was predominantly Czech in membership and in leadership. The campaign against Slovak nationalism in the fifties resulted in the execution of Vladimir dementis, the imprisonment of Husak and others, and the subordination of the Slovak party to Prague. Czechoslovakia again became a state ruled by Czechs, but this time with even greater indifference to Slovak rights than before 1939. The 1960 constitution openly articulated extreme centralism and reduced even the forms of Slovak self-government to nil. After 1963 there was a resurgence of Slovak cultural nationalism and a certain advance in the political position of the Slovaks, but they continued to be minor partners in a predominantly Czech state and party. GERMANS AND HUNGARIANS

Conflict with the Germans has always been a central issue in Czech political life and a salient factor in the nation's historical tradition.11 The clash of the two nations within the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy was followed by the reversal of roles after 1919 when the Czechs became the rulers, and the Germans the ruled. The latter enjoyed the full freedom of a democratic society and substantial cultural rights but were relegated to the status of a minority within a predominantly Slavic state and fell easy prey, later, to Nazi propaganda. By 1937 the majority supported the autonomist and implicitly secessionist demands of Konrad Henlein, Sudeten German supporter of Hitler. The Munich partition in September 1938, Germany's ruthless occupation of the rump of Bohemia and Moravia, and the wartime struggle against Nazi rule contributed to the decision of the Czechoslovak government-in-exile that the Germans must be expelled from their historic homelands. This marked a sharp break with the past since, in spite of continuing hostility, the Czechs had always sought a basis of cohabitation with the Germans within a single political entity and, during some periods of the Republic, had even won the cooperation of certain German parties in coalition governments. It was also decided, after the war, to remove all or most of the Hungarians from Slovakia by exchanging them for Slovaks repatriated from Hungary. The Communist Party between the wars had included both Germans and Hungarians in its ranks; it had a number of German-speaking leaders, and tended to support the complaints of the German and other minorities. After 1945, the communists might have been expected either 11 For the view of the Czech historian, Frantisek Palacky, that the conflict with the Germans was the central question in Czech history, see the translation of essential passages from his works in M. Weatherall, "The Mainspring of Czech History," Central European Observer, June 26, 1942, p. 203.

10

COMMUNISM AND CZECHOSLOVAK TRADITIONS

to favor a multinational state, recognizing the autonomous rights of the Germans and other minorities, as in the USSR, or to advocate the breakup of Czechoslovakia and the cession of the German areas to Germany. Instead, the CPCz endorsed Benes' policy of expulsion and transfer, aiming at the establishment of a largely Slavic state of Czechs and Slovaks, and even outdid their colleagues in pressing this nationalistic policy. After the war they took an active part in resettling the vacated territories with Czechs and Slovaks from other parts of the Republic, and even from abroad, and were as adamant as the non-communists in insisting on the maintenance of the boundaries of the pre-Munich Republic. This gave the Czechs, like the Poles, a powerful national interest in an alliance with the Soviet Union as a guarantor of their territorial integrity against the threat of German revisionism. Although their hatred of the Germans was not as intense as that of the Poles, there was a similar apprehension of pressures by refugees and revanchist elements in West Germany, so that communist policy received strong backing from the population. Cooperation with East Germany was only in partial contradiction to this, as the existence of such a state, which recognized Czechoslovakia's western frontiers and weakened the position of the German nation by keeping it divided, served both the ends of communist policy and Czech national interests. THE BREAK WITH THE PAST

In the matters so far discussed, the communists, even when they retained certain traditional attitudes, significantly modified them in actual practice. As far as the political aspect was concerned, the break with the past was even more complete. The constitution of 1920 had provided Czechoslovakia with a government modeled on British, French, and American patterns, and included elements of both parliamentary and presidential systems. Although not without serious defects, this structure had functioned between the wars with considerable success as an effective democracy.12 This democratic tradition was prolonged for a few years after 1945 in the altered conditions of the National Front. In 1948, however, the communists took advantage of a crisis within the coalition government to seize power, under a constitutional guise, and to eliminate their partners from all political participation. The constitution of 1948, adopted after the February coup, preserved on paper some elements of 12

There has been little Western analysis of the Czechoslovak political system between the wars. See the chapters by Malbone W. Graham, in Kerner, ed., Czechoslovakia, chaps. 7 and 8, and also Graham, New Governments of Central Europe (New York, 1926), chaps. 12-14. The fullest analysis is by E. Taborsky, Nase nova ustava (Prague, 1948) and Czechoslovak Democracy at Work (London, 1945).

11

THE HISTORICAL SETTING

the pre-war system but could not conceal the reality of the dominance of a single party. Not even lip service was paid to the ideas of Masaryk and Benes, which had no effect, even indirectly or unconsciously, on communist political behavior. In the fifties a series of political trials represented the complete destruction of pre-communist legal traditions and even of the "socialist legality" professed by the communists. The constitution of 1960 moved Czechoslovakia still further away from its national past and closer to the Soviet pattern. The Russian autocratic tradition, as developed under communism, had thus more effect on Czechoslovak political life than indigenous national traditions. An equally sharp rupture with the past occurred in the economic and social field. Between the wars Czechoslovakia remained primarily a system based on free enterprise and private property but advanced far in the direction of a welfare state. The mixed economy of the early post-war years included a substantial private sector in agriculture, trade, and even part of industry, but after 1948, was transformed into a full-blown "socialist" system on the Soviet model. Czechoslovakia was unique among communist states in inheriting a well-developed industry, a skilled proletariat, and an experienced managerial class, but these were subjected to draconic and far-reaching changes. The economy was fundamentally reshaped, with the emphasis no longer on textiles, glass and other industries, and on trade with the West, but on heavy industrial products and dependence on the East. The position of the workers was basically modified as a result of the destruction of the free trade union movement and the harnessing of the labor force to the goals of the state through the transmission belts of party-controlled unions. Managerial talents were often squandered through the dismissal or emigration of managers, the appointment of party men without business experience as directors or state officials, and a downgrading of pay for white-collar workers. The economy was at first able, despite this radical transformation, to maintain a higher standard of living than other bloc countries and to stimulate productive growth in the favored sectors. The ultimate outcome, however, was an economic crisis from 1961 on and the recognition of the need for fundamental revision by economists and political leaders. This represented not a return to pre-war capitalism, but the restoration of some traditional elements of a market economy within the framework of a planned and state-owned system. In the intellectual realm, too, the transition to full communism after 1948 led to a basic reorientation of Czech and Slovak life. Prior to 1914 their culture, like that of most small nations, had been composed of many foreign ingredients, as well as native traditions. While they could not escape the impact of the German-Austrian and Hungarian worlds within which they were embedded, Czechs and Slovaks were also sub12

COMMUNISM AND CZECHOSLOVAK TRADITIONS

ject to the influences of more remote European cultures. As Slavs, they often felt the pull of Russian civilization and of pan-Slav attractions, especially in literature. In the latter half of the 19th century, however, Western cultures, including French, English, and American, had a more profound impact than Eastern or Slavic. Czechoslovak civilization, reflecting these influences and its own unique history as expounded by Frantisek Palacky and Masaryk, was identified with the ideas of freedom and humanity.13 Especially after 1919 Czech life was dominated by the views of Masaryk, an intellectual as well as a political leader, and was strongly Western as well as profoundly national, democratic, and humanist in its orientation.14 Karel Capek, the writer, who was a close friend of Masaryk, personified this trend most fully.15 There were also strong Marxist and socialist elements in Czech culture, and a powerful attraction to the Soviet Union and communism among the intellectuals.16 In Slovakia, other traditions competed with the liberal, Czech-oriented tendency, for instance, the more conservative, anti-Czech "populist" school of thought and the radical and nationalistic wing of Slovak communism. For a short time after the second World War, there was a return to the intermingling of diverse cultural elements, marked by a substantial advance in Soviet or Russian influence, and a decline in Western and traditional Czech currents of thought.17 After the coup of 1948, however, the wheel was made to turn exclusively in one direction, with the Soviet pattern proclaimed as the model in all spheres and with Western elements almost excluded.18 This was part of a full-scale effort to mold education, scholarship, and the creative arts according to Soviet concepts of socialist realism and historical materialism. AU indigenous traditions, as typified by Masaryk, Benes, and Stefanik, among both Czechs and Slovaks, and by Hlinka and Tiso, and even Clementis, Husak, and Novomesk^, among Slovaks, had to be eliminated in the drive against liberalism, social democracy, nationalism, and religion. Some threads of the past, such as the Hussite tradition or literary nationalism as repre13

See Hans Kohn, Not By Arms Alone (Cambridge, Mass., 1941) and Vaclav Benes, "Background of Czechoslovak Democracy," in M. Rechcigl, Jr., ed., The Czechoslovak Contribution to World Culture (The Hague, 1964), pp. 26776. 14 This is not to say that there were not Czechs who rejected the dominant Masaryk influence, and, among historians, some who challenged his interpretations of Czech history. See O. Odlozilik, "Modern Czechoslovak Historiography," SEER 30 (June 1952), 376-92; S. Harrison Thomson, "T. G. Masaryk and Czech Historiography," Journal of Central European Affairs 10 (April 1950), 37-52. 15 See W. E. Harkins, Anthology of Czech Literature (New York, 1953), p. 177; Milada Souckova, A Literature in Crisis: Czech Literature 1938-1950 (New York, 1954), pp. 102, 137-38. 16 Harkins, Anthology, pp. 172-73. 17 Souckova, Literature in Crisis, pp. 5 ff., 31-39, 138-39. 18 IWd., pp. 40-53, 139-43.

13

THE HISTORICAL SETTING

sented by Alois Jirasek, were preserved, but were interwoven with radical democratic or left-wing socialist historical trends and embroidered with Russian and Soviet features. In spite of unremitting indoctrination, many of the old patterns of thought remained buried in the consciousness of the people, and came to the surface with the restoration of a certain degree of intellectual freedom after 1963.19 Rehabilitation of such literary figures as Capek, Novomesky, and Franz Kafka represented a revival of some components of the national tradition. There were substantial obstacles in the way of a full, or even a partial, rehabilitation of Masaryk and Benes, since they embodied the main cultural orientation before the war and represented the antithesis of communist ideals and ideology. Yet vestiges of "Masarykism," of which the communists constantly complained, persisted, and were manifested in the sixties in the rebirth of critical realism and the search for truth among communist intellectuals. EAST AND WEST IN FOREIGN RELATIONS

The position taken by Czechoslovakia in world affairs has also reflected a counterpoint of East and West. It has been argued that from the outset Czech historical experience has always represented a mingling of elements of West and East, with the former predominant, but the latter never absent.20 Certainly in the modern period, the Czechs looked in both directions for succor and support—before 1914 as a counterpoise to the Austro-German context of their lives, and after 1919 as bulwarks against the threat of Germany. This balance was also present in the two World Wars in the effort that was made to win independence with the aid of both Eastern and Western powers. Yet there was a sharp contrast between the quarter of a century after 1914, and the one after 1939. In the earlier period, the pendulum swung heavily in a Western direction, as indicated by the alliance with France, the shaping of the state in a Western mold, and widespread sympathy with the USA, Great Britain, and France. The Eastern orientation was expressed in the alliance with the USSR after 1935 and the sympathy of many Czechs for Soviet communism and was continued during the war in Benes' policy of close co19 See Skilling, Communism National and International: Eastern Europe after Stalin (Toronto, 1964), chap. 7. 20 O. Odlozilik, "Components of Czechoslovak Tradition," SEER 23 (Jan. 1945), 97-106. See also Karel Capek and Ferdinand Peroutka, in Capek et al., At the Cross-Roads of Europe: A Historical Outline of the Democratic Idea in Czechoslovakia (Prague, 1938), pp. 8-10, 261, resp. For the views of Masaryk and Benes, see T. G. Masaryk, The Making of a State: Memories and Observations, 1914-1918 (London, 1927), pp. 377-85, and Edvard Benes, My War Memoirs (London, 1928), pp. 490-99.

14

COMMUNISM AND CZECHOSLOVAK TRADITIONS

operation with the USSR. In the post-1945 years, there were renewed efforts to achieve an equilibrium between East and West, but the balance tipped toward the East. After 1948, the weight was shifted entirely in that direction, with intimate association with the USSR and complete elimination of ties with the West. The swing to the East has sometimes been interpreted as a logical continuation of strong pro-Russian and pro-Soviet historical sympathies among Czechs, a proposition which greatly exaggerates the realities of the past. In fact what distinguished Czechs and Slovaks from Poles or Hungarians was the absence of a long-standing anti-Russian tradition, rather than the presence of a dominant pro-Russian one, and a somewhat less intense anti-Soviet attitude, rather than a strongly pro-Soviet one. What united the Czechs was a powerful anti-German historical tradition, reinforced by the experience of two World Wars and the occupation by Nazi Germany, which caused them to look favorably, albeit rather sentimentally, to the Russians as a counterweight against the main enemy. The communists, pro-Soviet rather than pro-Russian, took advantage of the lack of deep anti-Russian feelings and of vague pro-Soviet sentiments to justify a close alliance with the USSR. They also exploited to the full the discrediting of the Western powers caused by the Munich betrayal— a factor which profoundly affected Benes in his assessment of the balance between East and West and which contributed to a more positive Czech attitude toward communism and the Soviet alliance. After 1948, however, the communists transformed the relationship into a slavish subservience to the USSR and to all things Russian, which was entirely alien to the Czech past. The sequence of events after 1938 took the heart out of Czech and Slovak national spirit. Having achieved independence in 1919 largely with the aid of the West, they saw it undermined by the Western governments in 1938 and liquidated by Germany the following year. Munich was a crushing blow which negated the essence of at least two decades of Czechoslovak history and sapped faith in the West and its ideas. Similarly, having regained their independence in 1945 largely with the aid of the East, they lost it again in 1948 by the actions of the Czechoslovak communists. The February coup thus weakened another strand of Czechoslovak tradition by discrediting Russia and communism. Yet an appeal to the West in 1948 was excluded by the experience of Munich. Moreover, Germany and the Germans were still the main sources of danger in the consciousness of most Czechs and could not therefore be brought into the balance against Russia. In a new crisis, in 1956, communists and non-communists found their will to act paralyzed by successive disappointments and disillusionments. Neither communists nor non-communists could find much sustenance in their own national traditions, so 15

THE HISTORICAL SETTING

badly shaken by past experience. Continued subservience to Moscow, and conformity with the Soviet pattern, was therefore the path of least resistance, and the one preferred by the regime's leaders. In the sixties there was a rebirth of Czechoslovak intellectual and economic interest in the West and some evidence of a desire on the part of the communist government to restore a more balanced orientation toward East and West, thus suggesting the continuing strength of the pro-Western tradition. A NATION OF SVEJKS?

Another facet of the Czech tradition has often been cited but so far not seriously analyzed by Western or Czech scholars—namely, the supposed willingness of the Czech nation and its leaders to adapt passively to a given political system, and their unwillingness to resist even unpopular or hated rulers by violent or revolutionary means. The celebrated character of Jaroslav Hasek's novel, The Good Soldier Svejk, has often been considered the typical model of Czech behavior toward authority, foreign or native, and is offered as an explanation of the conformity of Czechoslovak communism, and of the passive acceptance of the regime by the population even during its Stalinist phases. This is not the place for a full examination of this facile, but unconvincing, interpretation of Czech history, which has been prevalent both in some Western circles, and among Eastern European communists, including the Czechs. Enough must be said, however, to indicate that it involves not only a misinterpretation of the meaning of Svejkism but a distortion of Czechoslovak history. The Svejk myth, it should be noted, relates only to the Czechs and not to the Slovaks, who possess, in their history, the figure of Janosik, a kind of Robin Hood of the 18th century, who became, in literature and folklore, a legendary symbol of Slovak nationalism and rebelliousness against social injustice. It must be admitted that Czechs lack an ancient revolutionary past, such as the Poles or Hungarians possess, and that their history has been more peaceful in content and reformist in methods. For at least a century theirs has been a tradition, not of violent nationalism or of extreme revolutionism, but of tolerance and democracy, moderate rather than radical.21 In the modern period, after a brief revolt in Prague in 1848, the Czechs eventually adopted a nonviolent course, seeking to secure and improve their position through piecemeal reform attained through cooperation with Austrian authorities. National radicalism gave way to cautious 21

Peroutka (Capek et al., Cross-Roads of Europe, p. 253) wrote: "The spirit of revolution was never at home in modern Bohemia as it was in Ireland or in Russia."

16

COMMUNISM AND CZECHOSLOVAK TRADITIONS

realism or opportunism, and revolutionary socialism to reformism. This involved practical work to improve their position within the Austrian system, rather than an effort to overthrow it by revolution. Strong nationalist feelings were, however, intensified by the persistent resistance of the Austrian Germans to their demands.22 During the years of war (in both World Wars) there was a readiness, on the part of some Czechs (and Slovaks), to adapt themselves to the prevailing system and to collaborate with their German rulers. When independence came in 1918 (and again in 1945), it was largely the result of decisions by the Great Powers, supported by the diplomatic actions of Czech exiles, and seemed therefore to be a gift from outside rather than a product of native struggle at home. Similarly, between the wars, Masaryk and Benes eschewed force and violence, based their political system on democratic procedures and moderate social reform, and founded their foreign policy on diplomatic compromise. It is also true that the communists themselves have been a party of reform, not of revolution. Although repudiating the pre-war Republic in words, they did not attempt its revolutionary overthrow. During the second World War, there was courageous resistance by communists, as well as by non-communists, but eventual liberation was effected by the tanks and planes of the Soviet army. The communist leaders, like their World War I predecessors, and like Benes in World War II, returned to the homeland as a result of an Allied victory and did not take control by their own efforts. After the war the communists at first chose to pursue a gradual approach, rather than to seize the reins at once by force. Even the 1948 coup was not so much a revolution as a consolidation of strength by a party already in power, and without bloodshed.23 The presence in the neighborhood of the Soviet army and the unwillingness of the West to intervene were important contributing factors, so that communist victory, like liberation in 1919 and 1945, was in considerable degree conditioned by outside forces. The acquiescence of Benes was a kind of second Munich, and like its forerunner, did not produce open revolt or popular resistance. The brilliantly successful communist strategy sapped the will of non-communists to resist, either then or later. In a similar way Czech communists, remote from the mainstream of Czech nationalism but influenced by the realist tradition, were unwilling to risk taking a stand against Stalinism, as their counterparts did in some other communist countries. The extreme terror of the fifties resulted in a failure of will which, although understandable under the circumstances, continued for 22 See Skilling, "The Politics of the Czech Eighties," in Peter Brock and H. Gordon Skilling, eds., The Czech Renascence of the Nineteenth Century (Toronto, 1970). 23 See Skilling, "The Prague Overturn in 1948," Canadian Slavonic Papers 4 (1960), 88-114.

17

THE HISTORICAL SETTING

some years after the death of Stalin and contributed to the absence of overt action in 1956. Nonetheless, there is another side to the picture. The Czechs have not been as passive and adaptive to authority as suggested by their description as "a nation of Svejks." For one thing, Svejk was in essence a radical and revolutionary figure, ridiculing not only state power and militarism, but also religion, nationalism, and all established conventions. Evincing outward conformity to the Austrian system, Svejk rejected it inwardly in every aspect and sought to destroy it by bringing it into derision and contempt. Moreover, in their long history, Czechs have often shown a readiness to challenge authority, not only by passive resistance but, when appropriate, by force or by active opposition. They possess as rich and deep a national past as any people of Eastern Europe, including such glorious episodes as the Hussite movement, and a galaxy of celebrated figures such as Jan Hus, Jan Zizka, Jan Amos Komensky, and King George of PodSbrady, and, in the modern period, Karel Havlicek, Palack^, and Masaryk. It is true that the tragedy of BiIa Hora in 1620 initiated three centuries of subjugation, during which the opportunity for heroic action was excluded. When the occasion presented itself, however, the Czechs did resist—by force in 1848, and after 1860 by abstention from participation in Austrian politics. In 1879, the Czechs entered the phase of "organic cooperation" (as the Poles have called their own comparable tactics) but this was accompanied by mounting nationalism and by a growing opposition to Austria, implicit until 1914 but explicit in 1918. When independence came, it was the result not merely of action by the Great Powers but also of brave acts of defiance by some Czechs and Slovaks at home and abroad, eventually endorsed by the people at large. The precedent of a liberation movement abroad was repeated in the second World War. Although in neither period was there widespread resistance, mass defection from the Austrian army; military action by the Czechoslovak Legions on the Allied side in World War I; the Slovak and Prague revolts; and the formation of military units abroad in World War II can hardly be reconciled with the myth of consistently passive adaptation to foreign rule. Although, for reasons discussed above, the latter theme did loom large in 1938, and again in 1948, events in the sixties indicated that the Czechs had not permanently reconciled themselves to their fate or rejected the possibility of changing it by their own actions. Although de-Stalinization was belated and strongly opposed by the communist leaders, it came as a result of independent thinking and courageous speaking by individuals, especially writers, scholars, and other professional persons. Resistance that was slight and abortive in 1953 and 1956 was more active and suc18

COMMUNISM AND CZECHOSLOVAK TRADITIONS

cessful after 1963. A new generation which had not lived through the days of Munich and the German occupation, and had not even personally experienced the worst phases of Stalinism, sought not to overthrow communism, but to reform it. Their ranks were strengthened by some members of the older generation, often the victims of the terror of the fifties who, having escaped with their lives and been rehabilitated, added their voices to the demand for change. Although resembling Svejk in their outward display of loyalty to the communist system, and acting in its name, they went beyond him in their blunt criticism of past and present defects and in their open insistence on the need for fundamental reform.24 SOVEREIGNTY AND ITS BENEFITS

There is one other example of the formal retention by the communists of a national tradition which, although vastly altered in substance, was of great actual and potential significance. Since 1945 Czechoslovakia has been a sovereign state, thus repeating the experience between the two World Wars. Its formal independence in 1918 was, however, primarily the product of a change in the balance of power and a function of Western support and German and Soviet weakness, and came to an abrupt end in 1938-39. For twenty years, however, Czechoslovakia, within the limits imposed on every small state, had been able to formulate its own domestic policy and to follow a somewhat independent course in foreign affairs. After 1948, in spite of formal independence, Czechoslovakia was in fact a political satellite, in the sense of being governed indirectly by the Soviet Union through the intermediary of a thoroughly submissive and loyal CPCz and its leaders.25 In a sense, its status was hardly different from what it would have been as a Union Republic within the USSR. Nonetheless, as later events demonstrated, the maintenance of Czechoslovakia and other communist satellites as sovereign states, at least in form, was to have profound repercussions. The preservation of the nation-state, and indeed its exaltation as the main vehicle of political action, made possible the rise of national communism in Yugoslavia, Poland, Rumania, and Albania.26 For twenty years the communists rulers of Czechoslovakia did not take advantage of the possibilities of independent action. Submission to 24

See Skilling, "Czechoslovakia" in Adam Bromke, ed., The Communist States at the Crossroads: Between Moscow and Peking (New York, 1965), pp. 102-5. 25 For this definition, see Ferenc A. VaIi, Rift and Revolt in Hungary (Cambridge, Mass., 1961), pp. 13-17. 26 See Paul Shoup, "Communism, Nationalism and the Growth of the Communist Community of Nations after World War II," American Political Science Review 56 (Dec. 1962), 886-98.

19

THE HISTORICAL SETTING

Moscow was their own choice, although alternative courses were possible. Just as they had accepted Soviet direction and policy, Czech and Slovak communists could, if they had wished, have rejected the former and criticized the latter—in other words, have ceased to act like a satellite. If they were to have shown greater initiative, and reflected the changing temper of their people, national traditions, suitably refashioned to reflect modern conditions, would inevitably have exerted a growing influence. In fact this was precisely what happened in the sixties, culminating in 1968, when many apparently extinct traditions were revived and began to have an impact on all spheres of Czech and Slovak life.27 27

This chapter was originally published in a slightly different version in Journal of International Affairs 20, no. 1 (1966), 118-36. It was severely criticized by Jaromir Obzina, Zivot strany, no. 21 (1970), pp. 45-48; ibid., no. 17 (1972), pp. 12-14. Obzina's first article was a sharp critique of Masaryk's Socidlnt otazka and his concepts of "bourgeois reformism" and "humanist democracy," which formed the basis of bourgeois rule under the First Republic and were revived again in 1945-1948 and 1968-1969. Skilling's article, he wrote, provided the "opportunists" and "revisionists" with helpful argumentation for their efforts in 1968-1969 to achieve "a renaissance of Marxism-Leninism with the aid of Masarykism" and thus to justify the conception of "national communism." In his second article Obzina criticized the efforts of the revisionists of 1968-1969 to effect the "erosion" of a socialism based on the general patterns of social development as set forth by Marxism-Leninism and to formulate "a specific Czechoslovak model" based on the conceptions of Masaryk (in effect the "Skilling model of socialism").

20

CHAPTER II

The Dualism of Czechoslovak Communism From Gottwald to Novotny THIS BRIEF excursion into the background of Czechoslovak communism brings out its ambivalent and erratic past, illustrated by the extraordinary shifts of policy between 1921 and 1929, between 1935 and 1940, and between 1945 and 1948. At times communism was in tune with the democratic and national views of Czechs and Slovaks and gained widespread sympathy and support. At other times it was at odds with the dominant national attitudes and became a dogmatic sect, isolated from the mainstream of national life. On some occasions it supported Czechoslovak democracy and the independence and territorial integrity of the Republic; on other occasions it opposed both. As a result, the degree of its "legitimacy," i.e. of its acceptance in Czechoslovak political life, varied greatly. Sometimes it was supported by a substantial part of the population, as in the early years under Smeral, and in the Popular Front period under Klement Gottwald. At other times, it was rejected by the bulk of the Czech and Slovak nations who regarded it as a force primarily imposed and controlled from outside, by the Comintern or the Soviet party. Yet paradoxically even when it had widespread support, it simultaneously met with strong opposition; when its policy was generally condemned, it managed to retain the loyalty of a hard core of "genuine believers." A critical element in this contradictory and shifting pattern of communist behavior was the relationship with the USSR and with the CPSU. In all periods, without exception, the Czechoslovak party remained a loyal and devoted follower of the CPSU and of its policies. Moscow was able to exercise direct control of the CPCz through the intermediary of leaders who were ready to accept without reservation and usually without reluctance all Soviet directives, and to purge from their ranks any who held divergent views. Yet the Soviet impact did not always tend in the same direction. At certain times Soviet influence reinforced the nationalist and democratic tendencies, at other times, the dogmatic and sectarian trends, of Czech and Slovak communists. The analysis is complicated further by the fact that the non-communist attitudes toward Russia were ambivalent, ranging from open antipathy to substantial sympathy. During and after World War I Masaryk adopted policies that could hardly be regarded as friendly to the Soviet Union; Benes, from 1935 on, and again

21

THE HISTORICAL SETTING

during World War II and its aftermath, based his strategy on close cooperation with the Soviet Union. The theme of duplexity, if not duplicity, of Czechoslovak communism may be further illustrated by a closer examination of the almost quarter of a century of communist rule under Klement Gottwald and his principal successor, Antonin Novotny. This is not a matter of contrasting the two leaders with each other, but rather of recognizing the duality that runs like a red thread through the tenure of each of them. In the case of Gottwald, two phases may be noted: from 1945 to 1948, when, with Soviet approval, he won a certain legitimacy by following policies favorable to democratic processes and national needs and circumstances; and from 1948 to 1953, when, under Soviet pressure, Gottwald gradually destroyed important elements of this legitimacy by his subservience to Soviet views and interests and by thorough Stalinization of Czech and Slovak life. In the case of Novotny, two phases, not so clearly marked, may also be discerned. In the first, from 1953 to 1961, Novotny continued the main lines of Gottwald's second phase, even though this was no longer appropriate in the light of the evolution of post-Stalin Russia. Although he experimented with a modest "New Course" for a brief time after 1953, he increasingly resorted to coercive measures to secure obedience and thereby weakened the legitimacy of his regime. In the second period, from 1961 to 1967, political terror gave way to less violent forms of repression but was not replaced by more persuasive means or by spontaneous loyalty. Under the impact of continued de-Stalinization in the Soviet Union, however, Novotn^ made successive retreats and concessions to the developing forces of opposition at home. The balance of this chapter will seek to develop this theme of duality as a background to a more detailed examination of the decline and fall of Novotn^ in the following chapters. THE NATIONAL PATH TO SOCIALISM

During the period from 1945 to 1948 the Communist Party, under Gottwald, emerged as the dominant, but not the exclusive, political force in liberated Czechoslovakia. Refraining from an attempt at violent and total revolution on the Soviet pattern, the party, with the sanction of the Soviet Union, opted for a more moderate course, more in line with the predominant national traditions of the country. Accepting the leadership of Benes as President and cooperating responsibly with other parties within the National Front, the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia espoused a program which represented a blend of continuity and revolution.1 Nationalization of a sector of industry, radical land reform, and a 1

22

See Stalling, "Revolution and Continuity in Czechoslovakia,

1945-1946,"

FROM GOTTWALD TO NOVOTNY limited system of short-term planning produced a mixed economy which included substantial elements of both capitalism and socialism. The prewar constitutional system was, in broad outline, preserved, although with some significant changes, including a broadened Slovak autonomy and a reformed system of local government in the form of the national committees. Non-communist parties were permitted, in the Czech areas as continuants of pre-war predecessors—the Czechoslovak National Socialist, People's, and Social Democratic Parties—and in Slovakia, the Labor Party and the newly established Democratic Party. Other leading prewar parties, such as the Czechoslovak Agrarian and the Slovak People's Parties, were, however, banned. The National Front, grouping the main political parties as a basis for the coalition government, was an unusual political formation, permitting no opposition to the Front as such, but allowing sharp conflicts and some electoral competition between its constituent elements. In spite of these limitations, political life took place within a general context of democratic freedom, in which the press, scholarship, and cultural life were largely free of party or government control. The "people's democracy" thus established was certainly not a complete nor a perfect democracy, but it embodied important democratic elements, far more genuine than in the neighboring "people's democracies" or in Soviet Russia and it retained important features of pre-communist Czechoslovak politics. This "national and democratic revolution," as Gottwald called it, continued the pre-war strategy of the Popular Front and identified the communists with important aspects of Czechoslovak tradition. Moreover, President Benes and the non-communist parties were prepared to accept, in the main, certain revolutionary changes advocated by the Communist Party. As a result the latter had a broad popular appeal and became a dominant factor in post-war politics. Numbering over a million members, it emerged from the elections in 1946, in relatively free competition with the other parties, as the leading party.2 The polls, however, also revealed some of the weaknesses of the CPCz and the continuing appeal of the non-communist parties. Moreover, although the communists were in almost full control of the trade union movement, headed by Antonin Zapotocky, other significant organizations, such as the United Farmers' Association, the Association of University Students, and the Sokol gymnastic movement, were not in their hands. It was soon clear that the goals of the party reached far beyond the limited post-war reforms and clashed with those of other segments of opinion. Within the Journal of Central European Affairs 20 (Jan. 1961), 357-77, and "Revolutions in Prague," International Journal 4 (Spring 1949), 119-36. 2 The communists secured 38 percent of the total vote (43 percent in the Czech lands), and 114 of the 300 parliamentary seats.

23

THE HISTORICAL SETTING

National Front divergence of views on fundamental issues became more and more evident and gradually led to a more or less open struggle for power.3 In Slovakia the communists were much less successful in making an effective appeal. In the 1946 elections the Democratic Party, which was to some extent an heir of the Slovak People's Party, emerged as the predominant political force, thus documenting the continuing strength of conservative nationalism and the relative weakness of communism among Slovaks.4 An indirect consequence was that the Czech parties, including the Communist Party, failed to implement their wartime promises of far-reaching Slovak autonomy for fear of the domination of Slovakia by conservatives and even the ultimate victory of separatism. The destruction of the Democratic Party by extra-parliamentary maneuvers and pressures became the first order on the agenda of the Communist Party and their success in achieving this goal in 1947 prepared the way for the seizure of power in Prague a few months later. The post-war revolution in Czechoslovakia occurred within the context of the changed balance of power in Europe and of the dominant influence of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe. This was expressed, as far as Czechoslovakia was concerned, in the alliance with the Soviet Union, which had been concluded by Benes during the war years, and was the keystone of her foreign policy. The communists regarded the bond with the Soviet Union as crucial and sought to make it the exclusive one, whereas the non-communist parties preferred to balance it by ties with the West. Although this primacy of Soviet influence was distasteful to many Czechs and Slovaks, they were consoled by the fact that the Soviet Union at the time favored the "national path" to socialism proclaimed by Gottwald and approved, if it did not initiate, the moderate course followed by their Czechoslovak comrades. For some of the latter, the general line of moderacy was much more to their taste than what followed and was presumably considered by them to be a permanent strategy. For other communists, doubtless including Gottwald, these were temporary tactics, designed to conciliate the non-communist forces (and some communists) and to prepare the ground for more radical steps 3 For the political conflict leading up to the 1948 seizure of power, see the following: Hubert Ripka, Czechoslovakia Enslaved: The Story of the Communist Coup d'itat (London, 1950); Josef Korbel, The Communist Subversion of Czechoslovakia, 1938-1948 (Princeton, 1959); Paul E. Zinner, Communist Strategy and Tactics in Czechoslovakia, 1918-48 (New York, 1963); William Diamond, Czechoslovakia Between East and West (London, 1947); Skilling, "The Break-up of the Czechoslovak Coalition, 1947-8," The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science 26 (Aug. 1960), 396-412. 4 The Democratic Party polled 62 percent of the votes, as compared with 30 percent for the communists, and secured 43 seats to 21 for the Slovak Communist Party.

24

FROM GOTTWALD TO NOVOTNY when appropriate. By 1948, with the drastic change in the international situation exemplified by the beginning of the "cold war" and the assertion of independence by Yugoslavia, the time had come for a shift in course in foreign and domestic affairs. Although the new policy, no doubt imposed by Moscow, represented a volte-face in Czech communist politics, it was willingly adopted by Gottwald and accepted by the bulk of the party.5 FOLLOWING THE SOVIET MODEL

February 1948 was the initial step in the break of Czechoslovak communism with national traditions and the ultimate undermining of the legitimacy which the movement had acquired in the early post-war years. The seizure of power, accomplished by forcing President Benes, through the use of extra-parliamentary pressures, to accept the hegemony of the Communist Party, has often been described and needs no further elaboration.6 The full impact and the ultimate implications of the February events were not immediately apparent to all, including even the communists. For most members and for other sympathetic sections of the population, February at first constituted a triumph over the "forces of reaction" represented by the other parties and their leaders. Although manipulation and deceit played an important part in Gottwald's victory, it must be conceded that he was able, by propaganda and masterly organization, to mobilize substantial support for the seizure of power, not only among the huge party membership, but also within the trade union movement and even among the intelligentsia and peasantry. Perhaps more moderate and nationalist communists, who had favored the post1945 tactics of the party, had inner misgivings about the ruthless tactics pursued, but they offered no serious opposition to the new line. Although Gottwald destroyed much of his previous appeal to the non-communist majority, as well as among communists and other sympathizers, his personal reputation as the foe of Munich and of Hitler, and as the postwar leader of the coalition, was enhanced by his newly won fame as the victor in February. The breach of continuity with the past was at once made evident by Gottwald's coercion and ultimate elimination of Edvard Benes as President and the transformation of the National Front and the coalition into 5 Taborsky writes of Gottwald as "a national communist at heart," but offers no evidence for a characterization that runs counter to all the evidence of Gottwald's continued loyalty to Moscow from 1928 onward. See Edward Taborsky, Communism in Czechoslovakia, 1948-1960 (Princeton, 1961), pp. 101-2. 6 For the February conquest of power see the sources listed in n. 3 above. Cf. Skilling, "The Prague Overturn in 1948," Canadian Slavonic Papers 4 (1960), 88-114.

25

THE HISTORICAL SETTING

a fagade for communist domination. Through the action committees, the non-communist parties were purged and remolded into satellites which had little or no support among their former adherents. The Social Democratic Party, some of whose leaders were purged, was merged with the Communist Party and ceased to be an independent force, although some of its former leaders, such as Zdenek Fierlinger, Evzen Erban, and Ludmila Jankovcova, were given high positions in the party and state hierarchies. The presence of Jan Masaryk in the immediate post-February cabinet represented an important personal bond with the past and with non-communist opinion, but his death within weeks, whether by suicide or assassination, brought this to an abrupt end. In the aftermath of February, down to his death in 1953, Gottwald seemed obsessed with an almost suicidal drive to extirpate not only national traditions but also those of the party itself, thereby causing even some communists to question the legitimacy of his regime. The concept of a "people's democracy," as a distinctive form of government and society, was emptied of meaning by its identification with the Leninist doctrine of "the dictatorship of the proletariat."7 The "national path" to socialism which Gottwald had himself espoused with vigor was treated as heresy and linked with the Titoist deviation. Under the slogan, "The Soviet Union, Our Model," Gottwald embarked on a slavish adoption of Soviet practice in every sphere and the elimination of distinctive national patterns. This was followed by a vindictive denigration of Masaryk, Benes, and Stefanik, and a campaign against "bourgeois nationalism" in Slovakia. The significance of the Slovak Uprising was minimized in historical writings and official propaganda, and Czechoslovakia's liberation was explained mainly in terms of Soviet military action. The reputation of the Czechoslovak army in World War II and of the Prague revolt at the end of the war, was also besmirched, with the removal of General Ludvik Svoboda, wartime commander-in-chief, from the Ministry of National Defense in 1950 and his relegation to a job as an accountant on a collective farm, and with the expulsion from the party and the imprisonment of Josef Smrkovsk^, the communist leader of the 1945 revolt. Still another important segment of the party's leadership, those of Jewish origin, was singled out for attack, notably in the trial of Rudolf Slansky (the party's general secretary), Vladimir d e mentis, and thirteen others, most of whom were executed. Twelve of the victims were Jewish. In the political trials beginning in 1950 and culminating in the case against Slansky and his associates, Gottwald showed most strikingly his 7 See Skilling, "People's Democracy: The Proletarian Dictatorship and the Czechoslovak Path to Socialism," American Slavic and East European Review 10 (April 1951), 100-116.

26

FROM GOTTWALD TO NOVOTNY subservience to Soviet will and his apparent impulse to destroy his own handiwork, the Communist Party and its prestige. Later evidence re­ vealed that these trials were conducted at the command of Stalin and his associates and were managed and directed by agents of the Soviet secu­ 8 rity police. Gottwald at first opposed the trial of Slansky, but eventually he became an accomplice in a grim spectacle in which some of his clos­ est comrades were liquidated. If he felt any reluctance, it was overcome by Soviet pressure, blind trust in Moscow's leadership, and his own fears of a similar fate. Perhaps he was brought to believe that Slansky, who had been at his side from his assumption of leadership in 1929 and who had shared power with him since 1945, had conspired against him and the regime. Many other party members were so imbued with faith in their own leaders and in the CPSU that they accepted without question the necessity of the trials and the justice of the verdicts. An intensive propa­ ganda effort successfully persuaded broad segments of the population of the Tightness of the condemnations. If doubts were entertained within the party ranks, they were hidden, or if revealed, ruthlessly punished. None­ theless, the trials delivered another damaging blow at the legitimacy of Gottwald's rule within his own party as well as in the nation as a whole, a blow the impact of which was felt most seriously in the subsequent period of de-Stalinization. The system of terror, embodied in a succes­ sion of trials of communists and non-communists alike, provided a cruel and crude means of securing obedience, based on fear and coercion. A full analysis of the second Gottwald period is not appropriate in this brief historical review.9 During those years the political framework with8 For an early Western analysis of the trial see Paul Barton, Prague a I'heure de Moscou (Paris, 1954). See also the post-January communist analysis by K. Kaplan, "Thoughts on the Political Trials," Νονά my si, nos. 6, 7, and 8 (1968), pp. 765-94, 906-40, 1054-78, resp. The trials were fully analyzed in the Piller report prepared in 1968 and published abroad in 1970 and discussed in detail below, chap. XIII. The members of the Political Secretariat during 1951 and 1952 were K. Bacilek, A. Cepicka, J. Dolansky, K. Gottwald, R. Slansky (until Dec. 1951), V. Siroky, A. Zapotocky, and from December, V. Kopecky and A. Novotny. Members of the Organizational Secretariat were G. Bares, S. Bast'ovansky, J. Frank (all three to early 1952), V. David, K. Gottwald, J. Hendrych (to 1952), A. Novotny; J. Tesla and J. Uher (after Jan. 1952); B. Voda-Pexa (after Feb. 1952). 9 See V. Busek and N. Spulber, eds., Czechoslovakia (New York, 1957); I. Gadourek, The Political Control of Czechoslovakia (Leiden, 1953); V. Chalupa, Rise and Development of a Totalitarian State (Leiden, 1959). See also Skilling, "The Czechoslovak Constitutional System: The Soviet Impact," Political Science Quarterly 57 (June 1952), 198-224; Skilling, "Czechoslovakia: Government in Communist Hands," The Journal of Politics 17 (Aug. 1955), 424-47; L. Feierabend, "The Gottwald Era in Czechoslovakia," JCEA 13 (Oct. 1953), 246-56; P. B., "Sovietization of the Czechoslovak Economy: The Effects in Industry," The World Today 9 (Feb. 1953), 72-81; J. A., "Sovietization of the Czechoslovak Economy: The Effects in Agriculture," ibid. 9 (April 1953), 174-84. For a severe post-January criticism of this period, see the first two articles in the series by

27

THE HISTORICAL SETTING

in which his successors continued to work for fifteen more years was es­ tablished. The constitution enacted in 1948 made some concessions to the continuity of Czechoslovak traditions, some not without importance, as for example the retention of the presidency. In the main, however, it was a meaningless document, hardly affecting the actual practice of politics. As we have noted, the National Front and the other parties be­ came nonentities, and in Slovakia, mere ciphers. The National Assembly was nothing more than a rubber stamp; the executive departments, mere administrative agencies; and the local government bodies, including Slo­ vak organs, tools of the central power. Even the presidency degenerated into a post held more or less ex officio by the party leader and lacked independent authority. The mass associations, including the large trade union movement, became transmission belts of the party. "Socialist legal­ ity" and the judicial system became a fagade for terror and injustice, accompanied by extensive Soviet interference in the security police. The party itself was transformed, the Secretariat and Presidium dominating the making of policy, and the Central Committee apparatus directly con­ trolling all other government and party bodies, as well as the mass orga­ nizations. The apparatus also subjected culture, education, and scholar­ ship to its control and conducted a barrage of propaganda in the press, radio, and television. Religion was countered by an intensive atheistic campaign; the churches were placed under official controls; and their dig­ nitaries often subjected to persecution and imprisonment. In the econ­ omy, the almost total collectivization of agriculture, and the nationaliza­ tion of the whole of industry and commerce, including even small trades and crafts, proceeded apace. Under the five year plan the economy was drastically reorganized and mobilized at breakneck speed to achieve ever higher goals, especially in heavy industry. These harsh measures generated dissatisfaction among many sectors of the population and awakened doubts, even in communist ranks, of the correctness of the course followed. As a result of the system of terror, lit­ tle or no open opposition was expressed and many retreated into apathy and political indifference. There were some groups who enjoyed special economic and social privileges, and certain individuals who attained a favored status through opportunism and hypocrisy. Moreover, in spite of the ills of society and the evils of the system, many communists sup­ ported Gottwald's policies, some even with enthusiasm. On the surface the regime seemed stable, but it had many weaknesses which were graduV. Mencl and F. Ourednik, "Jak to bylo ν lednu," Zivot strany, no. 14 (July 1968), pp. 22-26 and no. 15 (July 1968), pp. 10-13. See also Z. Elias and J. Netik, "Czechoslovakia," in William E. Griffith, ed., Communism in Europe (Cambridge, Mass., 1967), vol. n, chap. 8.

28

FROM GOTTWALD TO NOVOTNY ally to mature into a deepening crisis in the economy, in politics, and in society generally. THE TRANSITION TO NOVOTNY

The sequel to Gottwald's death in 1953 was a four-year period of dual rule by Antonin Zapotocky, veteran party leader, and Prime Minister under Gottwald, who succeeded to the presidency, and Antonin Novohrry, party functionary and a relative newcomer to the highest party circles, who became First Secretary. Closely associated in the top rank of what was described as a collective leadership were Viliam Siroky, elevated to the premiership, and Karol Bacflek, Slovak First Secretary. It is difficult to determine the degree to which Novotny^ as First Secretary, was the dominant figure and the degree to which his power was shared or influenced by others, in particular, Zapotocky. There were striking personal differences between Gottwald's two principal successors. Zapotocky enjoyed considerable prestige by virtue of his long association with pre-war social democracy and the trade union movement, and as a founder of the Communist Party, one of its inter-war leaders, a wartime concentration camp victim, and a writer of historical novels about the working-class movement. He was widely respected, even by non-communists, as a man of sincere convictions and humane attitudes, and often regarded, even in the absence of evidence, as being unsympathetic with the harsh policies of his associates. Novotny, on the other hand, a minor party functionary between the wars, was almost unknown to the general public until he became regional secretary in Prague after 1945, and a member of the party's leading bodies in 1951 after Slansky's fall. His previous life had been bounded by the narrow horizons of the lower levels of the party apparatus.10 He shared with Zapotocky a working-class origin, the absence of middle school education, and concentration camp imprisonment, but lacked the personal appeal of his older colleague. He had no reputation based on past achievements or prominence in the Gottwald era, and soon acquired the image of a person lacking in intellectual ability or qualities of leadership and primarily preoccupied with the maintenance of his own power. His very weaknesses may have been a reason for his selection by Gottwald after the removal of Slansky, and for his endorsement as First Secretary by the 10 Novotny, as regional secretary, had been a member of the Central Committee from 1946. Appointed to the Organizational Secretariat and the Political Secretariat in September and December 1951, respectively, he was entrusted with the direction of the work of the Secretariat in March 1953 and appointed First Secretary in September 1953.

29

THE HISTORICAL SETTING

Soviet leaders. His lack of decisive will and of popular support would hardly qualify him to follow an independent course of his own. The contrasts in personal character and background between Novotny and Zapotocky were not serious enough to produce an open conflict between advocates of a "hard" and a "soft" line such as occurred in the USSR and in other bloc countries. The customary dualism of Czechoslovak communism exhibited itself, therefore, not in a clash of personalities, but in the distinctive policies of the two major phases of the postGottwald era. Whatever conflicts there may have been behind the scenes, Novotny appeared to be as closely identified with the relaxations of the first year or two as was Zapotocky with the more repressive period that followed. A NEW COURSE?

The Zapotocky-Novotny duumvirate coincided at the outset with the Malenkov-Khrushchev partnership in Moscow and the "New Course" in the USSR and some other bloc countries. In Czechoslovakia, however, changes of policy came somewhat later and were more modest than those in Hungary and Poland, or even in the USSR.11 The initial step was Siroky's policy statement in September 1953, which provided mainly for economic relaxations and proposed no serious changes in the political system. The measures introduced were a product in part of the customary practice of following the Soviet example, and in part of the necessity of rectifying some of the difficulties resulting from Gottwald's post1948 policies of industrialization and collectivization. The economic chaos and exhaustion which had resulted, and the currency reform in June, produced a serious riot in Pilsen, amounting almost to a rebellion, which shook the new leaders' confidence. In what may be termed the Czechoslovak "New Course," an effort was made to relax the frantic drive for industrialization and collectivization of the previous five years; to place somewhat greater emphasis on agriculture, light industry, and consumer goods; to pay more attention to improving the standard of living; and in general to employ conciliation and propaganda to win the allegiance of the population. In agriculture, for instance, forceful collectivization was suspended and farmers were even permitted to leave collective farms.12 Some took advantage of this, 11

On this period, see G. L., "New Policy in Czechoslovakia," WT 9 (Oct. 1953), 439-49; J. A., "Politics and Economics in Czechoslovakia: The Tenth Congress of the Czechoslovak Communist Party," ibid. 10 (Aug. 1954), 35666; Ivo Duchacek, "Czechoslovakia: New Course or No Course?" Problems of Communism 4 (Jan.-Feb. 1955), 12-19. 12 Zapotocky was later criticized for allegedly encouraging departures from the collective farms. See Dejiny Komunisticki strany Ceskoslovenska (Prague,

30

FROM GOTTWALD TO NOVOTNY until the opportunity was withdrawn in 1954, but not on the same scale as in Hungary and Poland, so that the decline in the number of collective farms was relatively slight. But a year later, in September 1954, the desirability of establishing collective farms without the use of force was again proclaimed, and in the following June a renewed campaign for collectivization began. The economic measures introduced in 1953 and early 1954 were on the whole shifts in emphasis rather than basic changes of direction, and were not broadened or deepened in the subsequent two years. As a result, it is difficult to identify the date of the ending of the "New Course" which in a sense simply petered out during 1955 and early 1956. In the political field there were even fewer relaxations. Collective leadership was proclaimed, and the cult of personality was condemned, although without censure of its Czech embodiment, Klement Gottwald. The Soviet Union continued to be taken as the model, although more emphasis was laid on adapting it to Czechoslovak national conditions. Nor was there any admission that the party's line had been in any respect mistaken, although shortcomings in its implementation were acknowledged. The policies launched in September were described as continuations of previous ones, adapted to the circumstances of 1953. Changes in leadership were minimal, and the Gottwald team continued in power. The structure of government, inherited from Gottwald, remained unaltered. The elections of the national committees in May and of the National Assembly in November took place, without competition, on the basis of single National Front lists and did not produce any modification in the function and character of these bodies. The 10th CPCz Congress held in June 1954 was anticlimactic. The proceedings were mainly devoted to agricultural and industrial shortcomings, and there was no major revision in policies. The most significant changes in leadership were the appointments of Rudolf Barak as full member, and Otakar Simunek, as candidate, to the Politburo, and of Jin Hendrych to the Secretariat.13 Although serious defects in the work of the party were castigated, its leading role in society and its controlling 1961), p. 590. See also criticism of Zapotocky, ZS, no. 24 (Dec. 1964), p. 1496. Conflicts between Zapotocky and Novotny in 1953-54 on the issues of collectivization and the New Course, and in 1956 on the question of de-Stalinization, were referred to by Mencl and Ourednik, ZS, no. 15 (July 1968), pp. 12-13 and no. 16 (Aug. 1968), p. 18. Cf. a later sympathetic analysis of Zapotocky which cited, however, little evidence of a distinctive policy (Reporter, April 24-May 1, 1968, p. 14). 13 Fierlinger and Jankovcova who had been members of the broader Presidium from 1949, but not of the Political Secretariat created in 1951, were also named to the 1954 Politburo. The latter body consisted, on June 15, 1954, of K. Bacilek, R. Barak, A. Cepiika, J. Dolansky, Z. Fierlinger, V. Kopecky, A. Novotny, V. Siroky, and A. Zapotocky, and as candidates, L. Jankovcova, and O. Simunek.

31

THE HISTORICAL SETTING

function in relation to scholarship and the creative arts were reasserted. The congress was replete with attacks on "liberalistic" tendencies in art, films, music, architecture, and education, thus implying the existence of opposition to party control and socialist realism among intellectuals and scholars. Even more noteworthy was the continuing onslaught on so-called bourgeois nationalism, especially in Slovakia, which suggested the persistence of dissatisfaction with Prague centralism among Slovak communists. This campaign, dating from 1950, when Husak and Novomesky were expelled from the party, culminated, in April 1954, with their trial and long-term imprisonment. This trial, and that of Slansk^'s deputy, Marie Svermova, in January 1954, indicated that the policy of terror in Czechoslovakia still prevailed one year after Stalin's death. However, in an effort to follow to some extent the Soviet example of rectifying the injustices of the Stalin period, a committee, headed by the Minister of the Interior, Barak, was established in 1955 to investigate the political trials of the years 1949 to 1952.14 A number of the victims were quietly released, but without public rehabilitation. CRISIS AVERTED

By the time of the 20th Party Congress of the CPSU the Czechoslovak Party had overcome the difficulties created by the deaths of Stalin and Gottwald, the Pilsen riots, and the New Course, and was committed to a relatively hard line even in the economic field. Symbolic of this was the unveiling of a gigantic statue of Stalin on the bank of the Vltava on May 1, 1955. The fall of Malenkov in the USSR had no counterpart in Czechoslovakia where the leadership remained intact. It was comparatively easy to damp down a mild ferment among writers occasioned by Khrushchev's rapprochement with Tito and his policy of conciliation with the United States. More serious were the repercussions of the assault on Stalin at the 20th Party Congress in February 1956, which raised questions concerning the whole system of Stalinist communism and stirred up a wave of controversy throughout the Soviet bloc. The immediate reaction of the Czechoslovak party hierarchy was to join cautiously in the chorus of denunciation of the cult of personality but to exempt Gottwald from personal responsibility. Blame was placed primarily on Slansky^ and the trials conducted while he was in power were 14

Later evidence based on party archives indicated that the committee's mandate expressly excluded the Slansky case (Rude pravo, IuIy 25, 1968). This was confirmed by K. Kaplan, NM, no. 8 (1968), pp. 1069-70. A second Barak commission to investigate the Slansky trial was formed in 1956 and reported in 1957 (ibid., pp. 1072-73).

32

FROM GOTTWALD TO NOVOTNY

condemned as unjust. Slansky^ was not rehabilitated, but the anti-Titoist and the anti-Zionist charges against him were withdrawn. The only leader singled out for punishment was Alexej Cepicka, member of the Politburo and Minister of National Defense, who was accused of introducing the cult of personality in the army and was removed from all posts. The party's line concerning Slovak nationalism was defended as correct by Siroky\ and dementis was not rehabilitated. Some criticism of the campaign against bourgeois nationalism was expressed, however, and Slovakia was promised a wider autonomy. Such modest and ambiguous concessions were insufficient to allay the unrest of the youth generally and of students and writers. During April and May the dissatisfaction of young people was expressed in specific complaints and demands for reform at a series of meetings and demonstrations in Prague and Bratislava. The party-controlled newspapers and official critics sharply condemned these attitudes and actions. The most telling outburst of dissent occurred at the 2nd congress of Czechoslovak writers in late April 1956, when grave criticism of party policy in cultural affairs was voiced and the distinguished poet, Jaroslav Seifert, called on the writers to be "the conscience of the people." Spokesmen for the regime, including Zapotocky, vigorously defended the party's role. Even more widespread and acute was the dissatisfaction within party organizations, which expressed itself in "completely wrong demands" for an extraordinary congress, a change in the party line, and the abolition of press control.15 At a party conference in June, Novotn^ and Zapotocky justified the general line, endorsed party control of national life, and denied the charges made by students, writers, and party organizations. Novotn^ reiterated that there was no need to rehabilitate Slansky. After paying lip service to the principles of the 20th Party Congress of the CPSU, Novotny proclaimed the continuance of the class struggle and rejected abstract bourgeois concepts of freedom. The conference approved the directives of a second five year plan (1956-60) which emphasized heavy industry and proposed the completion of collectivization by 1960. It was clear that Czechoslovakia was not to be permitted even a shadow of the liberalization that was taking place in Poland and Hungary.16 15 See the later speech by B. Kohler, IS, no. 6 (March 1957), pp. 334-36. Cf. Dejiny KSC, pp. 615-16. 16 For reports on these events, see News from Behind the Iron Curtain 5, no. 7 (1956), pp. 3-9, and no. 8 (1956), 15-21; WT 12 (Aug. 1956), 339-48. See also Taborsky, "Czechoslovakia in the Khrushchev-Bulganin Era," ASEER 16 (Feb. 1957), 50-65 and "Political Developments in Czechoslovakia Since 1953," JP 20 (Feb. 1958), 89-113. For a severely critical analysis of CPCz policy from 1953 to 1960, see Erik Polak, in a collection of party lectures given in 1968, published by the CC

33

THE HISTORICAL SETTING

When the dissent in Poland and Hungary culminated in the crisis of October 1956, the firm stand taken by the Czechoslovak leaders prevented the involvement of their country in the revolt against Moscow and was a crucial factor in the maintenance of Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe. So, too, was Czechoslovak approval of Moscow's military action against Hungary and their immediate support of Kadar and the new Hungarian regime. The discontent of the spring had not been dissipated but did not express itself in any movement of solidarity with the Hungarians or the Poles. The Czechoslovak leaders could, with some justification, claim that their strict line in 1953 and early 1956 had been vindicated and had averted more drastic developments17 which might have proved fatal to the regime. There were other reasons for the relative passivity of Czechs and Slovaks during those tumultuous times. As a result of comparatively satisfactory economic conditions, no serious unrest occurred among peasants and workers, as in Hungary and Poland, so that no simultaneous movements of protest by dissenting intellectuals and the broader masses took place. Among intellectuals the task of reassessing the system was hindered not only by severe restrictions on freedom of expression, but by a continuing belief in socialism and its merits, persisting faith in the Soviet Union, as well as fear of Western "imperialism."18 The absence of a revolutionary tradition, or of a deep historical hostility toward the Russians, and the memories of British and French betrayal in 1938 and Western inaction in 1948, contributed to the failure of the Czechs and Slovaks to join the Hungarians and the Poles in resistance. In fact, the democratic tradition proved to be as impotent in 1956 as it had been in 1948 and may even have been a hindrance to militant action against dictatorial repression. Of crucial importance was the solidarity of the old core of leaders, among whom there was no person, such as Gomuika or Nagy, capable of heading a movement for reform and national independence. Zapotocky, in spite of earlier signs of a tendency toward conciliaideological Department, 50 let Ceskoslovenska 1918/1968: K nekterym politickym a ekonomickym probUmum let 1948-1968 (Prague, 1968), pp. 41-65. Polak described the inadequacies of the New Course and the "half-hearted and inconsistent measures" taken after February 1956, blaming this on the failure of the leadership to take advantage of the opportunities presented by the 20th CPSU Congress. 17 See for instance V. Kopecky, RP, April 20, 1957, and J. Hendrych, ibid., June 19, 1957. See also Dejiny KSC, pp. 623-25. is For discussions of the reasons for Czechoslovak inaction, see, in addition to Taborsky's articles cited above, anonymous articles in WT 13 (April 1957), 145-52, and 14 (March 1958), 101-9; Duchacek, "A 'Loyal* Satellite: The Case of Czechoslovakia," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, no. 317 (May 1958), pp. 115-22; Otto Pick, "Czechoslovakia—'Stable Satellite,'" PC 7 (Sept.-Oct. 1958), 32-39.

34

FROM GOTTWALD TO NOVOTNY tion, proved eventually as firm and unyielding to internal dissent as Novotny and his colleagues. Perhaps, too, the insecurity felt by the party leaders due to the events of 1953 and 1956 made them realize their dependence on the Soviet Union for maintaining their own power and discouraged them from any independent action. At the Central Committee in December 1956, Novotny set the tone of Czechoslovak policy by lashing out at "revisionism" and "national communism" in both its Polish and Yugoslav forms, and strongly supporting both Soviet policy and the Kadar regime. This refrain was repeated at the Slovak Party Congress in April 1957, when it was supplemented by denunciation of Slovak nationalism by Bacilek, and again at the CPCz Central Committee session in June. Repeated references to "incorrect opinions" and "mistakes" by writers, journalists, Slovaks, the youth, and others suggested that there was in fact good reason for the campaign against revisionism and nationalism. Criticism of the cult of personality was also continued but with warnings against the misuse of "de-Stalinization" as a cloak for opposition to socialism and the Soviet alliance. The anti-religious campaign, somewhat relaxed in 1956, was resumed. Some steps toward decentralization were announced both in local government and in industry, but the basic structure of the political and economic system remained unchanged. Collectivization proceeded apace, and the revised draft five year plan again placed the emphasis on heavy industry. In October 1957, the Barak commission reaffirmed the guilt of Slansky and most of the other victims of the trials of the early fifties and exonerated only a few. Some were released; others remained in prison.19 NOVOTNY SUPREME

The death of Zapotocky in November 1957 and the immediate succession of Novotny to the presidency initiated the period of the latter's unrestricted personal power that was to last for a decade. The struggle of Khrushchev with the "anti-Party group" in the summer of 1957 had had no repercussions in Prague, so that Novotny acquired the supreme state and party posts without a power conflict, and several months before his mentor in Moscow. The hard line already endorsed by the Czechoslovak party fitted in well with the general direction of Soviet policy as set forth at the world communist conference held a few days before Zapotocky's death. The Moscow meeting's condemnation of revisionism and national communism was endorsed by the CPCz Central Committee in December, and was amplified by an intensive propaganda campaign ^Dejiny KSC, p. 636; Kaplan, NM, no. 8 (1968), pp. 1073-74. See fuller discussion below, chap. xm.

35

THE HISTORICAL SETTING

in ensuing months against Yugoslav deviations, Czech and Slovak revisionism, and Slovak nationalism. Spokesmen for the regime, from Novotny down, in repeated speeches revealed their concern over the continued influence of "bourgeois democratic" ideas and of Slovak "populist" views and proclaimed war on these dangerous tendencies.20 An economic reform introduced in April 1958 was but a faint echo of Soviet decentralization measures and constituted a minimal attempt to modify the centralized system of planning without any fundamental recasting of economic management or diminishing of party control. A new climax in the ideological crusade was reached in May and June at the 10th Slovak and the 11th Czechoslovak Party Congresses. The latter set forth the goal of the "completion of socialist construction" and accelerated the tempo of economic development. The addition to the CPCz Politburo of Hendrych, leading ideologue, Simunek, economic planner, and Pavol David, Slovak Presidium (Buro) member from 1953, and to the Secretariat of Vladimir Kouck^, prominent theoretician, suggested the continuance of the hard line. Moscow Pravda, during a visit of Novotny to the USSR, referred to "the total identity of views" between the two parties, thus indicating full Soviet endorsement of the Czechoslovak leader and his policies.21 During the next two years Novotny pursued a course that involved a minimum of de-Stalinization and avoided any serious relaxation of the system, or basic changes in leadership. Any possible challenge by Siroky, who remained Prime Minister, was excluded by a decisive purge of state organs in 1958 and 1959. The dominant role of the party was constantly reiterated as the cardinal principle of statecraft and was taken to justify continued strict control of the mass associations. As a result congresses or conferences of the trade unions, the youth league, the journalists, and the writers, passed uneventfully. In agriculture the drive for collectivization won gradual success, without provoking open unrest among peasants. On the model of the Soviet Union, heavy agricultural machinery was to be transferred to the collective farms from the machine tractor stations. A revision of wage norms in industry was carried through without overt resistance by the workers. In October 1959 a draft five year plan for 1961-65 was approved, continuing to accent heavy industry and integrating the economy more than ever with the Soviet bloc. These relatively harsh measures were coupled with other actions designed to improve somewhat the living standards of both workers and peasants. In the cultural and intellectual spheres the years 1958 to 1960 were marked by a sustained effort to stamp out dissident and heretical ideas and to coerce the intellectuals into acceptance of the orthodox party line. 20 For example, K. Bacilek, Praca, Jan. 12, 1958. 21JuIy 2, 1958.

36

FROM GOTTWALD TO NOVOTNY The shock of de-Stalinization had galvanized some intellectuals to recall democratic traditions and to reexamine hitherto sacrosanct concepts and principles. Scarcely any professional group escaped criticism—writers, artists, composers, film makers, dramatists, philosophers, journalists, publishing houses, the cultural newspapers, the social science departments at the universities, and the youth.22 A seminar on revisionism in October 1958 set the tone for a campaign against unorthodox ideas which reached its peak in June 1959 at the Congress of Socialist Culture, when Ladislav Stoll and Hendrych were the chief spokesmen. In June 1960 a Committee on Socialist Culture, headed by the former, was established to enforce the party's line in the arts and scholarship. "Administrative measures," i.e. the removal of certain editors or professors, or the closing down of newspapers, were also used to curb heretical opinions. By 1960 the Czechoslovak regime, after twelve years of communist rule, had reached what it chose to describe as a new and higher stage of development.23 Following the example of Khrushchev's proclamation that the Soviet Union was entering on the period of transition from socialism to communism, Novotny declared that Czechoslovakia, too, had completed the building of socialism and was about to begin to lay the foundations of communist society, and that a new constitution was required to document this achievement. Novotn^ sought thus to establish himself as the architect of the successful building of socialism and as the leader authorized to guide the country in the next phase. He also presumably hoped to make Czechoslovakia appear not as a backward, conformist regime, lagging behind others, but as a state in the van of communist evolution, prepared to move, with the USSR, into the higher stage of communism. The special party conference in July 1960 was to be the turning point, with the approval of the draft of the third five year plan (1961-66) and of the text of the new constitution.24 The fundamental law went further than its Soviet counterpart in describing the party as "the leading force in society and in the state," in requiring that cultural policy and education be directed "in the spirit of the scientific world outlook, MarxismLeninism," and in endorsing the "fraternal cooperation" of the countries 22 Cf. the speeches of V. Koucky, RP, Nov. 1, 1958, and L. Stoll, ibid., Nov. 21, 1958. Koucky regretted the "vestiges of the years-old traditions of social democratism, Masarykism and nationalism"; Stoll lamented the existence of "a very numerous intelligentsia class which all too easily succumbs to the political and ideological influence of the bourgeoisie." See Pick, "Socialist Realism Obdurate," WT 15 (Sept. 1959), 364-74; Osteuropa 9, nos. 5-6 (1959), 382-88. 23 See Taborsky, "Czechoslovakia's March to Communism," PC 10 (MarchApril 1961), 34-41. 24 For an analysis of the constitution see Skilling, "The Czechoslovak Constitution of 1960 and the Transition to Communism," JP 24 (Feb. 1962), 142-66, and Josef Kalivoda, "Czechoslovakia's Socialist Constitution," ASEER 20 (April 1961), 220-36.

37

THE HISTORICAL SETTING

belonging to "the world socialist system." The constitution was trumpeted as the embodiment of "socialist democracy," although the elections to the representative bodies, which had already been held in June, were conducted in the old style, without competition. The constitution completely subordinated Slovakia to the Prague organs of government, thus reversing the slight advance toward Slovak autonomy in 1956. It also confirmed the revamping of the system of local government, carried out earlier in the year, which had established fewer and larger regions and districts, endowed with somewhat greater autonomy, but still subject to strict control from above.25 When the party celebrated its fortieth anniversary in May 1961, it seemed to have weathered the storms of the transition from Stalinism to Khrushchevism in the Soviet Union and of the succession from Gottwald to Novotny^ in Czechoslovakia. The latter had survived the impact of critical events in the USSR and of turmoil in neighboring Hungary and Poland and, with the evident endorsement of Khrushchev, was steering a relatively conservative course. While proclaiming faithfulness to the Soviet example, the Czechoslovak leader was able to follow a path that was in fact much less oriented to reform than Moscow's. When it suited the Prague hierarchy the Soviet model was followed, for example, in the revision of the educational system in the spirit of Khrushchev's reform, and in the decisions to merge the collective farms and to establish "people's courts" patterned after the "comradely courts." But on more sensitive issues such as rehabilitation, economic reform, or cultural freedom, as well as leadership, the regime took advantage of the somewhat freer relationship with the USSR and avoided significant reforms. Most important from the point of view of the Soviet leaders, Czechoslovakia had made quite clear its unwavering loyalty to the USSR, its acceptance of the obligations of the Warsaw Pact and of Comecon, and had given strong support to Moscow in the emerging conflict with Peking. SHAM DE-STALINIZATION

An initial shock came from the proceedings of the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, when Khrushchev assaulted Albania and renewed his onslaught on Stalin's heritage. The attack on Albania brought the Sino-Soviet conflict, simmering below the surface, into the open and confronted all communist parties with the necessity of choosing their allegiance. For the Czechs and Slovaks, this decision was relatively easy and had in fact already been made in the earlier hidden stage of the dispute. There was no evidence of a desire on the part of any 25 For a full description of the political system of 1960, see Taborsky, Communism in Czechoslovakia.

38

FROM GOTTWALD TO NOVOTNY of the leaders, or of the rank and file, to follow the model of Albania and to opt for China. Czechoslovak communism throughout its existence had been so bound up with Soviet communism, was so dependent on the So­ viet Union for support, and was so easily subject to Soviet counterpressures, that the choice of Moscow in preference to Peking was a foregone conclusion. In the years that followed, as the Sino-Soviet dispute became more and more intractable, Prague remained a pillar of loyalty to Mos­ cow and evinced no sympathy for Peking, nor did it show any sign of mediating between the two rivals.26 More embarrassing was Khrushchev's call for a new offensive against Stalinism. An acceleration of de-Stalinization in Prague might easily have produced crises comparable to those in Budapest and Warsaw and might have threatened the position of Novotny and his colleagues, who were deeply involved personally in the wrongs and failures of the old order. The Prague leaders were apparently confident that while paying homage in words to the crusade against the "cult of personality," they could avoid serious measures in this direction. As far as is known, none of them chose, as did Molotov or Rakosi, to reject outright the very notion of an anti-Stalin course. If there were some among them, such as Barak, who would have preferred a more drastic assault on the legacy of Stalin­ ism and on its chief exponents, they were effectively silenced.27 In his report to the Central Committee in November 1961, Novotny adopted a clever line of symbolic de-Stalinization which was designed to associate himself verbally with current Soviet policy and to ward off criticism of his own responsibility during his eight years in power.28 He declared his fervent support of the CPSU program and of the Khrushchevian strategy, and bitterly attacked both Albania and dogmatism, and Yugoslavia and revisionism, declaring that the latter was "the main danger." Admitting that "the cult of personality" had permeated the Czechoslovak party and in particular had led to its subordination to the security organs, he cunningly placed the blame for this on Slansky and his associates, who had been caught up between the "millstones" which they themselves had set in motion, and on Gottwald, who after 1948 had permitted the use of the methods of "the cult" and had been affected by it himself. He reminded his listeners that he (Novotny) had not been in the topmost leadership at the time, thus adroitly dissociating himself 26 See Skilling, "Czechoslovakia," in Adam Bromke, ed., The Communist States at the Crossroads (New York, 1965), chap. 5. 27 See below in this chapter. 28 For a fuller discussion, see Skilling, Communism National and International (Toronto, 1964), chap. 6. For Novotny's speech, see the official publication of decisions and documents, Usneseni a dokumenty (JV KSC, Od celostatni !confer­ ence KSC 1960 do XU. sjezdu KSC (Prague, 1962), π, 5-57. See also Duchacek, "Czechoslovakia: The Past Reburied," PC 11 (May-June 1962), 22-26.

39

THE HISTORICAL SETTING

from the actions of that period, and argued that everyone was in some measure responsible for the failures of the past, again diverting the finger of accusation from himself and his colleagues. According to his argument the liquidation of the Slansk^ group had been the first step in the elimination of Stalinist methods. The party had become fully aware of the danger of these methods in 1953, in the after­ math of the currency reform, Novotny said, and had taken substantial corrective steps, especially after 1956. In other words, the Czechoslovak party, far from lagging behind in de-Stalinization, had begun to eliminate the errors of the past from the time of Novotn^'s assumption of power. The process of restoring "socialist legality," Leninist methods of party work, and democratic political procedures must now, he declared, be carried further. As a symbol of this intent, the Prague monument of Stalin was to be removed, and Gottwald's embalmed body, which had been displayed a la Lenin in a special mausoleum, was to be buried. Con­ tradictorily, however, while announcing that some victims of the trials (unnamed) had been released and rehabilitated, Novotny declared that there was no need to revise the verdicts and rejected demands for any further widespread rehabilitation. These involved and contradictory ar­ guments left much unexplained. Moreover, by admitting that these past events had been "a black mark" on the party's record and that the party had, as a result, become "isolated" from the people, Novotn^ sullied the reputation of the party in the post-1948 years of triumph; by criticizing Gottwald's role, he weakened further the legitimacy of Czechoslovak communism and the prestige of its greatest personal embodiment.29 The sudden dismissal of Rudolf Barak from his party and government posts in February 1962, and his condemnation to fifteen years' imprison­ ment at a secret military trial in April, hinted at a crisis at the topmost level and seemed to be related to the matters just discussed.30 The case against him was limited to the charge of economic sabotage resulting from misappropriation of state funds and did not include accusations that he was seeking to advance his political power. Nonetheless, such 29 Novotny, referring to unnamed individuals in high office, spoke of "the strengthening of their personal power, the defense of their personal ambitions, and the creation of their personal untouchability," and admitted that their actions had "deadened the work of the party, inner party democracy, criticism and initiative." As a result, "the party is managed in an administrative and bureaucratic fashion, and is separated from the working people; the leadership of the party ceases to feel the pulse of the daily life of the country, and a barrier is formed between leadership and people" (Usneseni KSC, 1960 do XH. sjezdu, π, 25). Cf. XH. sjezd Komunisticke strany Ceskoslovenska (Prague, 1963), p. 92. 30 For further discussion of the Barak case, see Duchacek, "Czechoslovakia"; Elias and Netik in Griffith, ed., Communism in Europe, pp. 242 ff.; Pavel Tigrid, "The Ghost of Rudolf Slansky," New Leader, Dec. 24, 1962, pp. 11-14.

40

FROM GOTTWALD TO NOVOTNY 31

allegations were made or hinted at on a number of occasions. Barak, as Minister of the Interior from 1953 to 1961, a member of the Politburo from 1953, and chairman of the commission to investigate the trials, had been deeply involved both in the conduct of major political trials and in their subsequent reexamination. It does not seem farfetched to assume that his removal may have been linked with the question of de-Stalinization and perhaps with a struggle for power with Novotny. The latter, who at the 12th Congress accused Barak of concealing facts uncovered by the commission,32 may in fact have wished to avoid further revelations that would have proven his own complicity in these events. Whether Barak had tried to reopen the Slansky and other cases, as he himself later argued, and had hoped to oust Novotn^ and to initiate, with Khru­ shchev's support, a more thorough-going program of de-Stalinization, cannot at present be determined owing to lack of evidence.33 Novotn^ admitted later that there was some criticism within the party of Barak's dismissal and referred on another occasion to opposition to the party's policy.34 The elimination of Barak removed any threat to Novotn^'s posi­ tion and cleared the way for the appointment of a new commission of investigation into the trials and past revisions, under the direction of Drahomir Kolder. Novotny presumably felt he would be able to influence its work sufficiently to avoid unpleasant personal complications.35 The 12th Party Congress, held in December 1962, after a postpone­ ment of several months, offered testimony of the apparent success of Novotn^'s strategy. The old team of leaders continued without significant change, other than the addition of Kolder and Jozef Lenart to the Polit­ buro and of Alexander Dubcek and Antonin Kapek as candidate mem­ bers. The session was devoted largely to the deepening economic crisis and adopted a policy of intensified centralism as the recipe for economic ills. There was a slight relaxation in the hostility expressed toward Yugo­ slavia, and open attacks were made on China and dogmatism. This was 31

Novotny in a radio speech on Feb. 22, 1962 charged Barak with aiming at "seizing political power." This was not included in the newspaper report of his speech. L. Strougal, at the 12th Congress, referred to Barak's ambition to attain "the highest office in the state" (XII. sjezd KSC, pp. 536-37). 32 XII. sjezd KSC, pp. 91-92. 33 Barak's case was reexamined by the Supreme Court in July 1968. The proceedings resulted in his release and the cancellation of the charges of "economic sabotage" (RP, July 17-19, 1968). Barak and his defense lawyer, on this occasion, described the trial in political terms, as a product of Novotny's fear of a revela­ tion of his own complicity in the earlier trials and of other conflicts with Barak. For full discussion, see below, chap. xin. 3 * Usneseni KSC, 1960 do XII. sjezdu, π, 244-45, 344-45. 35 The Kolder commission began its work in the fall of 1962 and had not completed it at the time of the 12th Congress. For its report, see below, chap, in, and more fully, chap. xin.

41

THE HISTORICAL SETTING

accompanied by a reassertion of the leading role of the party in the new party statute and repeated warnings of the dangers of revisionism and bourgeois ideas. Belated progress with symbolic de-Stalinization had already been achieved with the demolition of the Stalin monument and the interment of the body of Gottwald in October. At the congress, Novotny referred to the "incorrectness of the trials" and the release of some thirty victims, and promised the completion of a full review of all trials held between 1949 and 1954 within four months. Hendrych, however, contradictorily asserted that there was no need to change the evaluation of Slansky which had already been made.36 38

XH. sjezd KSC, pp. 92, 175. See also below, chap. v. For a fuller account see Galia Golan, The Czechoslovak Reform Movement: Communism in Crisis, 1962-1968 (Cambridge, 1971), chap. 1. The Presidium members were K. Bacilek, J. Dolansky, Z. Fierlinger, J. Hendrych, D. Kolder, J. Lenart, A. Novotny, O. Simunek and V. Siroky. Candidate members were A. Dubcek, L. Jankovcova, and A. Kapek. The Secretaries were A. Novotny (First Secretary), J. Hendrych, D. Kolder, V. Koucky, B. Kohler, and V. Slavik. The majority of these had held high positions most of the time since 1954, and in some cases during the Gottwald period.

42

PART TWO

S T A L I N I S M IN D E C L I N E

CHAPTER III

The Mounting Crisis AT THE end of 1964 Novotny, having just attained his sixtieth year and having completed eleven years as First Secretary and seven as President, was reelected to the latter office by unanimous vote of the National Assembly. His reelection was not attended by a glorification of Novotny as an individual and was interpreted officially as an expression of confidence in the party and its successes during the previous decade. Errors and shortcomings were conveniently ignored. It was claimed that the union of the two positions, the presidency and the first secretaryship, had been proven correct, since the party had exercised "a direct and immediate influence on state policy at the highest level."1 In spite of repeated rumors of his impending fall, Novotny had thus survived all difficulties and met with no insuperable challenge to his position, either from his colleagues at the topmost level, or from dissenting forces within society. As a functioning system of power, the Novotny regime had shown itself to be no less stable than other communist states, and indeed stabler than some. Yet during the years 1963 and 1964 the signs of a deepening crisis were already revealed, and in retrospect these years marked the beginning of a process of decline which culminated in the fall of Novotn^ in 1968.2 The seeds of crisis, it was gradually recognized, had been sown in the years after 1948 when the moderate national path to socialism was abandoned and the Soviet model, in its Stalinist form, had been imposed on a country whose national tradition and special circumstances made it entirely inappropriate. It was a crisis of many dimensions, affecting all !Leading article, Zivot strany, no. 23 (Dec. 1964), pp. 1413-16. See also Z. Mlynar's review of the three-volume edition of Novotny's speeches and articles, Literarn'i noviny, Dec. 12, 1964, and the review by K. Innemann, ZS, no. 24 (Dec. 1964), pp. 1580-81. 2 The fullest account of the crisis is given by Galia Golan, The Czechoslovak Reform Movement (Cambridge, 1971). For contemporary comment, see Viktor A. Velen, "Czech Stalinists Die Hard," Foreign Affairs 42 (Jan. 1964), 320-28; Frank Osvald, "Cross-Currents in Prague," Survey, no. 49 (Oct. 1963), pp. 3563; H. Hanak, "Recent Trends in Czechoslovakia," The World Today 22 (Feb. 1966), 78-88, and 22 (March 1966), 130-34; E. Taborsky, "Changes in Czechoslovakia," Current History 48 (March 1965), 168-74; P. Tigrid, "Ferment in Czechoslovakia," New Leader, Sept. 27, 1965, pp. 14-17; E. Taborsky, "Where is Czechoslovakia Going?" East Europe 16 (Feb. 1967), 2-12. See also Barbara Jancar, "The Case for a Loyal Opposition: Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia," Orbis 12 (Summer 1968), 415-40; R. V. Burks, "The Decline of Communism in Czechoslovakia," Studies in Comparative Communism 2 (Jan. 1969), 21-49. 45

STALINISM IN DECLINE

spheres of life. No one factor, unless it be the economic, can be singled out as the decisive cause of the final collapse. The snail's pace of rehabili­ tation, Slovak discontent, the economic crisis, open dissent of the writers, political apathy of the youth, restiveness among students, muffled criti­ cism of foreign policy, and even strains in Czechoslovak-Soviet relations after the fall of Khrushchev (to be discussed in this chapter)—all con­ tributed to the sapping of the foundations of the system. The intellectual awakening in all fields of scholarship (chapter iv) was steadily under­ mining the legitimacy of the regime and its ideology and was expanding the limits imposed on freedom of thought and expression. AU of these forces of dissent ultimately converged on the political system, as the focal point of all other faults (chapter v). Several years were to pass before the accumulation of discontents and unsolved problems reached a climax in the latter part of 1967, when the crisis penetrated the highest party organs and affected the person of Novotn^ himself (chapter vi). DROPPING THE STALINISTS

Most remarkable had been Novotn^'s ability to ward off any challenge to his personal position of supremacy or even to his team of close associ­ ates. He had himself entered the topmost leadership at the very time of the removal of the Slansky group and of the early trials and had been directly responsible as First Secretary for the trials that followed in 1953 and 1954.3 Although he had eventually admitted the failures and indeed the crimes of his predecessors, Gottwald and Slansky, those who had worked most closely with these discredited leaders had remained in the highest places. During 1963, however, Novotny demonstrated his capacity for politi­ cal maneuver and intrigue by ridding himself of his most tarnished col­ leagues while still maintaining his own position. In early April, in a move announced only six weeks later, Karol Bacilek was displaced as Slovak First Secretary and removed from the CPCz Presidium. He had been a Presidium member from 1951, First Secretary of the Slovak Communist Party (CPS) from 1953, and, as Minister of Public Security after Janu­ ary 1952, had played a prominent part in the Slansky trials. At the same time, Bruno Kohler, one of the party's "founding fathers," Comintern delegate and official between the wars, and a CC Secretary from 1953, was dropped from the Secretariat. A pre-war associate of Gottwald, he had been a key figure in the preparation of the trials. Both Bacilek and 3 During the year prior to the Slansky trial, Novotny, as regional secretary in Prague, had, according to the public testimony of Bacilek, assisted substantially in the preparation of the case against Slansky {Νονά mysl, no. 12, 1952, pp. 1078).

46

THE MOUNTING CRISIS

Kohler remained in the Central Committee, however. Four months later, in August, Viliam Siroky, another veteran comrade of Gottwald's, who had been the chief architect of the trials against the Slovak leaders and had been associated with Novotny, as Prime Minister, from 1953, lost this position and his seat on the Presidium. Ludmila Jankovcova, former Social Democrat, who had been in the top party ranks since 1948, was removed from the Presidium and from her government post. By 1964 Novotny had almost completely dissociated himself from the Gottwald old guard. Only four persons in leading party posts had occupied high office between 1949 and 1954, namely Jaromir Dolansky (Politburo member from 1946); Fierlinger (Politburo member, 1948 to 1949, and from 1954); Simunek (Politburo candidate from 1954, full member from 1958); and Hendrych (Secretariat from 1954, Politburo member and Secretary from 1958).4 Prominent among the newcomers in the Presidium were two Slovaks, Alexander Dubcek, who succeeded Bacilek as CPS First Secretary, and Jozef Lenart, who replaced Siroky as Prime Minister, and a Czech, Drahomir Kolder, regional secretary of North Moravia. The new head of the Slovak National Council {Slovenska narodna rada, SNR), succeeding Lenart, was Michal Chudik, who a year later also joined the Presidium. These men had as yet no clear-cut political profile but represented at least a potential for future change.5 When Bacilek was dismissed, no explanation was given nor was there any public criticism of his record. When Siroky was removed, there were only vague references to "inadequacies" in his work and to "some errors in his political activity in the past," as well as to his health. It seemed clear, however, that these changes in leadership were closely related to the question of the reexamination of the trials. At the time of Bacilek's ouster, the Central Committee received and approved the final report of the Kolder commission on the Slansky trials, and a brief editorial article in Rude pravo indicated that the victims of the trials from 1949 to 1954 would be civically and judicially rehabilitated.6 4 Dolansky ceased to be deputy Prime Minister in September 1963 but retained his Presidium seat and was made head of the party's Commission on Living Standards. 5 It has been reported without confirmation that Novotny opposed the replacement of Bacilek by Dubcek in 1964 and later tried to get him removed and replaced by Chudik (L. Kohout, Pravda, April 14, 1968). The Presidium members as of May 1964, were M. Chudik, J. Dolansky, A. Dubcek, Z. Fierlinger, J. Hendrych, D. Kolder, B. Lastovicka, J. Lenart, A. Novotny, O. Simunek, and as candidates, A. Kapek, M. Sabolcik, and M. Vaculik. The Secretaries were A. Novotny, J. Hendrych, D. Kolder, V. Koucky, and F. Penc. Later changes included the replacement of Penc by L. Strougal in 1965; of Fierlinger by O. Cernik, and the addition of two candidates, M. Pastyrik and S. Sadovsky, in 1966. 6 Rude pravo, May 14, 1963.

47

STALINISM IN DECLINE

Certain parts of the Kolder report were divulged to members through brief versions distributed through party channels.7 Rank-and-file communists thus learned for the first time officially that no anti-state conspiracy had ever existed and that the trials, including the later ones, had been artificially constructed by the use of illegal methods of interrogation. They were informed that the leadership was recommending that the Supreme Court cancel the sentences but had decided that Slansky and some others were not to be restored to party membership. They were blamed for having introduced the unlawful methods of which they had later become the victims and for having committed other political errors. Apart from Slansky and some of his fellow victims, the responsibility for the trials and the breach of "socialist legality" was placed on Gottwald and the entire political leadership, in particular on Ladislav Kopriva, Cepicka, Bacilek, and Kohler, and for the later trials and the failure of rehabilitation, on Barak. The report blamed Stalin for his methods and doctrines, Beria's security officers, and Rakosi for direct pressure on the Czechoslovak leaders. Meanwhile none of this was revealed to the general public. There were persistent demands for a complete and systematic implementation of de-Stalinization and for a public exoneration of the victims, many of whom had already been released.8 The congresses of writers and journalists in April and May 1963 were dominated by this theme and provided a forum for bitter denunciation of the Stalinist past and the slowness of changes in policy.9 In June the Slovak party organ, Pravda, published the startling speech by Miroslav Hysko, lecturer in journalism and former chief editor of Pravda, directly attacking Siroky, then Prime Minister, and criticizing the failure to carry through de-Stalinization since 1956.10 7 The shortest version, some twenty pages, destined for local party organizations, was later published abroad, with commentary, in Svedectvi, no. 28 (1966), pp. 350-90. The full text was published in German, J. Pelikan, ed., Pervertierte Justiz (Vienna, 1972). The decision of the Supreme Court on May 14 rescinding the sentences was also published abroad, Svedectvi, no. 31 (Spring 1967), as a supplement, 1-45 pp. For the text of the Supreme Court decision in the Evzen Lobl retrial, see Lobl, Sentenced and Tried: The Stalinist Purges in Czechoslovakia (London, 1969), pp. 63-81. 8 M. Hysko, Pravda, March 28, May 8, 1963, and L. Novomesky, Kultumy zivot, April 5, 1963, and the defensive statement on behalf of the regime by J. Fojtik, RP, March 29, 1963. 9 For the congresses, see LN, May 25, June 1, 8, 1963, and Kulturni tvorba, April 27, May 4, June 1, 1963. 10 Pravda, June 3, 1963. Hysko wrote a letter, then unpublished, to the Central Committees of the Czechoslovak and Slovak parties, bitterly condemning the failure to proceed with rehabilitation and placing the blame on persons still in office (naming Bacilek and P. David), who were directly involved in the crimes of the fifties. He also criticized the continued exclusion of Husak from public life (text, Nove slovo, July 11, 18, 1968). Hysko was attacked by Novotny who ordered him expelled from the party. He was not expelled, however, and also

48

THE MOUNTING CRISIS

Only in late August was a laconic announcement published in the press revealing that the sentences of the victims of the major trials from 1949 to 1954 had been canceled, and giving the names of some of those exonerated.11 None of the report's conclusions concerning illegal methods or the analysis of responsibility was, however, revealed. Nor was the judicial exoneration coupled with political rehabilitation in all cases. Slansky and others were still treated as guilty of serious political failings and were not readmitted to the party, even posthumously, nor, in the case of the survivors, were they restored to posts commensurate with their previous status. Moreover, only a few hundred of the leading party victims had been exonerated by name, and thousands of others had not been publicly absolved of charges of serious crimes or compensated in any way. No action was taken against those who were responsible for the trials and dismissals of the fifties, either those at the topmost political level, or at the lower administrative level, among judges, security police investigators, etc. Novotny, who was deeply implicated in these past events, still held the highest offices in party and state, and had been able to shift the blame to his former associates, Bacilek, Kohler, and Siroky. Little could be said openly about these matters, but resentment ran deep. THE SLOVAK QUESTION UNSOLVED

This was especially true of the Slovaks among whom there was an outburst of angry discussion in the spring and summer of 1963 and demands that the charges of "bourgeois nationalism" be dropped.12 Hysko and the found support among his colleagues in the university and at Kulturny zivot (Pravda, March 23, 1968). 11 .RP, Aug. 22, 1963. For further details of the decision, see the later Piller report in Jiri Pelikan, The Czechoslovak Political Trials, 1950-1954 (London, 1971), pp. 160-61. For a fuller discussion, see below, chap. xm. Expulsion from the party was confirmed in the following cases: Slansky, O. Sling, B. Reicin, O. Fischl, K. Svab, and J. Taussigova. Expulsion from the Central Committee was confirmed in the case of the preceding persons, together with M. Svermova, Smrkovsky, V. Novy, Clementis, Husak, Novomesky, and others. According to the unpublished Kolder report, Kopriva and Cepicka were expelled from the party. 12 E.g., P. Stevcek, KZ, Aug. 31, 1963. The role of the Slovaks has often been underestimated in Western accounts. J. M. Kirschbaum, on the other hand, placed undue stress on the Slovak contribution in "Slovakia in the de-Stalinization and Federalization Process of Czechoslovakia," Canadian Slavonic Papers 10 (Winter 1968), 533-56. A more balanced treatment is given by the Slovak journalist in exile, Eugen Steiner, The Slovak Dilemma (Cambridge, 1973), from chap. 12 on. See also a useful study, Robert W. Dean, Nationalism and Political Change in Eastern Europe: The Slovak Question and the Czechoslovak Reform Movement (Denver, 1973). For a useful brief analysis of pre-1968 developments, see Stanley Riveles, "Slovakia: Catalyst of Crisis," Problems of Communism 17 (May-June, 1968), 1-9.

49

STALINISM IN DECLINE

writer, Roman Kalisky, were the targets of bitter attack by Novotny in a speech in Kosice in June, when he upheld the political "guilt" of the Slovak leaders and defended the status quo in Czech-Slovak relations.13 Dubcek, the Slovak First Secretary, also asserted the legitimacy of the charges of bourgeois nationalism but revealed that the victims were to regain their membership in the party, although not in the Central Com­ mittee.14 Meanwhile a special party commission, assisted by a team of Czech and Slovak experts (named the Barnabite commission after the former monastery in which it held its sessions) began work and in De­ cember 1963 presented a report which declared that the entire campaign against "bourgeois nationalism" had been unjustified. This report was approved by the CPCz Central Committee but its contents were not pub­ lished for some months and then only in briefest summary form.15 The volte-face of the regime on the charges of "bourgeois national­ ism" left many matters still unsettled. For one thing, the surviving lead­ ers of the Slovak National Uprising, especially Gustav Husak and Laco Novomesky, were not restored to their membership in the Central Com­ mittee (from which they had been removed in 1951) and were kept on the political sidelines. Novomesky had been named a member of the party's Ideological Commission but Husak received no political appoint­ ment of any kind. Both were eventually given research posts in the Slo­ vak Academy of Sciences. At the 13th Party Congress in 1966, and at the Slovak Congress immediately preceding, neither was elected to the Central Committee of either party. Meanwhile both threw themselves into the effort to rehabilitate some of the basic traditions of the Slovak past, particularly the Uprising. A special effort was made to restore the reputation of dementis, as a personification of Slovak communism and a symbol of the injustices perpetrated in the 1950s. With the support of historians, both Czech and Slovak, the Uprising was gradually cleared of some of the derogatory features attached to it during the campaign against "bourgeois nationalism."16 The Czechoslovak and Slovak parties, in a joint set of theses on the Uprising published in April 1964, admitted previous distortions in its treatment and sought to rehabilitate this his­ toric event but strongly warned of the danger of nationalism, especially 13

RP, June 13, 1963. "Ibid., June 27, 1963. RP and Pravda, Feb. 29, 1964. See chap, xm below for fuller discussion. 16 See, for instance, S. Falt'an, K problemom narodnej a demokratickej revolucie na Slovensku (Bratislava, 1965); also Husak's book on the Slovak Uprising, Svedectvo ο Slovenskom narodnom povstani (Bratislava, 1964). Husak's book was critically reviewed by the Czech historian, V. Krai (KT, Feb. 24, 1966); the latter in turn was sharply censured by Falt'an for his negative attitude to the new spirit of Slovak historiography (Historicky casopis 14, no. 4, 1966). See also a report on the conference of Czech and Slovak historians in June 1963, F. Beer et al., Dejinna krizovatka (Prague, 1964). Cf. M. Gosiorovsky, K2, June 10, 1963, and L. Novomesky, ibid., April 4, June 20, 1964. 15

50

THE MOUNTING CRISIS

"narrow demands for regional nationalism."17 A year later the CPCz, in theses issued on the anniversary of the 1945 liberation, managed to avoid even a mention of the Uprising in its account of the party's past triumphs.18 Although Novotny, with Khrushchev at his side, attended the celebration of the 20th anniversary of the Uprising in Bratislava, it was evident that he was not willing to draw the full implications of the change of attitude toward Slovak nationalism or to meet the rising tide of Slovak complaints. This discontent was particularly acute with regard to the place of Slo­ vakia in the system of political authority. The constitution of 1960 had shorn the Slovak organs of government of what little power they had previously enjoyed and had intensified the strictly centralist system of government. At first there were official criticisms of the Slovak organs for failing to use fully the powers which they possessed. Then on May 7, 1964, a joint resolution of both Central Committees, Slovak and Czecho­ slovak, sought to broaden somewhat the role of the Slovak National Council and its commissions, which resulted in a modest expansion of their activity. There was, however, still no readiness to countenance any serious change in the constitution, nor to restore the Board of Commis­ sioners, abolished in 1960, as an executive body or cabinet. Stress con­ tinued to be laid on maintaining the unified character of the political structure of the country as a whole and on improving the asymmetrical system in which Slovak organs, weak as they were, had no counterpart in Czech organs of autonomy. The notion of federalism was rejected by Slovak leaders as a retrogressive step in comparison with the existing system which, it was argued, reflected the special conditions of CzechSlovak relations.19 Although open discussion of this subject was taboo, federalism was a live issue in the minds of the Slovaks and in private dis­ 20 cussions, and was alluded to indirectly in public debates. 17

RP, April 26, 1964. Cf. speech by Dubcek, ibid., June 11, 1964. Ibid., April 3, 1965. 19 M. Chudik, in an interview, characterized the Slovak National Council as not merely "a Slovak national organ into whose competence fall matters of a national and regional character," but "a national link in the all-state political and economic order for the territory of Slovakia, whose task is directly and jointly to create and also implement all-state policy" (Pravda, Jan. 18, 1966). He criticized individuals who underestimated the significance of the Council and also those who "mechanically see the only solution in the federative form of organizing the state." M. Pecho and Bil'ak also expressly condemned federation (NM, Feb. 22, 1966 and RP, March 2, 1966, resp., both cited in Steiner, Slovak Dilemma, pp. 139-40). Dubcek, in his report to the Slovak Party Congress in May 1966, referred to the improved position of the Slovak National Council as "an organic component of the system of all-state direction" (Sjazd Komunistickej strany Slovenska, Bratislava, 1966, pp. 29-30, 42-43). See also Chudik's speech, ibid., pp. 166-67; Dubcek, RP, June 11, 1964. 20 The idea of federalism was broached in a confidential memorandum by Prof. M. Gosiorovsky sent to Νονά mysl and Central Committee members in 18

51

STALINISM IN DECLINE

Official pronouncements treated the Slovak question as solved, citing in particular the extraordinary economic development that had occurred in this relatively backward region and predicting a steady equalization of economic standards in the Czech and Slovak areas and a gradual "approximation" of the two nations. Slovakia was not regarded as a region requiring differentiated treatment so that all policies were to be applied more or less in the same way as in the Czech regions.21 The sharp attacks on nationalism that the party leaders, Czech and Slovak, constantly felt obliged to make were eloquent testimony that the Slovak question was by no means settled and that deep dissatisfaction still prevailed.22 Although the economic development of Slovakia under communist rule was not denied, there was keen awareness of the continued inferiority of the Slovak standard of living and some concern as to the effect on Slovakia of the introduction of the new economic model. There was a growing feeling that only if Slovakia were treated as a special national political region and its organs of government given greater authority, could the Slovaks hope to attain a position of genuine equal1963. In a historical review of the Slovak question in communist policy from 1921 on, Gosiorovsky severely criticized the 1960 constitution and advocated its revision, indicating his own preference for a federal solution. The document indirectly criticized Novotny, under whose auspices the constitution had been introduced, and explicitly criticized Lenart. Although it could not be published, the memorandum was widely known among intellectuals at the time. Its text was published later in HC 16, no. 3 (1968), 354-404. According to Gosiorovsky, Novotny attacked his memorandum as nationalistic and ordered strict party penalties for him. The CPS imposed a lesser penalty, and Gosiorovsky was not removed as chief secretary of the Slovak Academy of Sciences, or as member of the presidium of the Czechoslovak Academy. He was later elected chairman of the Slovak Historical Association and vice-president of the Czechoslovak Historical Society (Prace, March 28, 1968). In a series of interviews in 1969, J. Zrak, then a member of the Slovak Presidium, noted that "the idea of a federal constitutional arrangement was already (in the sixties) circulating intensively in the political atmosphere." The Slovak leadership at the time, he said, followed a policy of "consistently fulfilling the asymmetrical model" and had an "uncrystallized attitude" toward the idea of a federal solution (Pravda, Jan. 29, 1969). 21 See the theses for the 13th congress (RP, Dec. 23, 1965). 22 The following is based in part on conversations in Bratislava during the summer of 1967 and the fall of 1968. See articles by R. Kalisky, Kl, June 1, 1963; J. Krajci and J. Bocek, KT, June 20, 1963; A. J. Liehm, LN, Sept. 7, 1963; D. HavlKek, KT, March 10, 1966. An article by the Slovak party's ideological head, M. Pecho, referred to what he called a "suffocating atmosphere" of criticism, especially among the younger and better educated generation (NM, Dec. 1964, pp. 1441-48). See also Pecho, ibid., no. 4 (Feb. 22, 1966), pp. 3-7. See A. Hykisch, "The Everyday Life of a Younger Brother" (Plamen, no. 1, Jan. 1968, pp. 22-30) in which he deplored the inadequacies of mutual informedness of Czechs and Slovaks, including the lack of knowledge of the Slovak language and literature among Czechs, and "trifles" of daily behavior. He blamed this not on Czech nationalism, but on the lack of national feeling among Czechs.

52

THE MOUNTING CRISIS

ity.23 There was resentment of alleged Czech superiority and smugness, and of discrimination against Slovaks. In almost all institutions, for instance, the trade unions, the Academy of Sciences, the youth league, and the cultural associations, Slovaks were in a subordinate position, subject to bureaucratic rule from Prague. There were demands for the federalization of institutions such as the Writers' Union, the Academy of Sciences, and the Union of Youth. Although it could not be publicly expressed, there was a mounting dislike, even hatred, of Novotny, who was blamed for his part in the original campaign against nationalism as well as for his continuing opposition to the resumption of political activity by such persons as Husak, and who was condemned for his arrogant attitude toward the Slovaks and his rigid rejection of greater power for Slovak organs.24 This discontent could not be openly expressed, except occasionally in the columns of newspapers such as the organ of the Slovak Writers' Union, Kulturny zivot. This newspaper became a kind of tribune for the discussion of national issues as well as of questions of de-Stalinization and liberalization in general and provided a forum for Gustav Husak to publish his views on Slovak history, the Uprising, and Clementis, at a time when he had no other means of influencing public opinion.25 By 1967 the question of constitutional relations of Czechs and Slovaks could be addressed more openly, as at a special symposium of leading Czech and Slovak scholars, organized by the Slovak Institute of Party History. There were references to continuing political centralism and vestiges of "Czechoslovakism," and frank mention of earlier programs for autonomy, such as that of the People's Party. Gosiorovsky argued that the solution of the unsolved problems in the relations of the two nations was a key aspect of democratization. In a state made up of several nations, he said, "each nation should have, within its ethnic territory, its own national-state {narodnostatna) organization." The form that this would take (an independent state, some form of federation, or some 23 See articles by the Slovak economists, V. Pavlenda, Pravda, Oct. 19, 26, Nov. 2, 9, 16, 1966; H. Koctuch, Slovenske pohl'ady, no. 1 (1967); Pavlenda, KT, July 30, 1967; P. Turcan, KZ, Nov. 17, 1967; Z. SuIc, RP, July 13, 1967. 24 In particular a visit by Novotny in August 1967 to the Matica Slovenska in Martin aroused great bitterness because of his behavior on that occasion. According to reports of this episode (in 1968), he was said to have been angered by criticisms of the representation of Slovak culture abroad by the Czechoslovak Foreign Institute and of the keeping of Slovak historical documents in Prague and described these charges as threats to Czechoslovak unity. He later refused to receive a gift sent to him by the Matica and did not respond to the proposal of a visit by a Matica delegation. See T. Goldbergerova, Reporter, March 3-10, 1968, p. 16; P. Vongrej, RP, April 14, 1968. Other trips by Novotny to Slovakia during which he rejected criticisms of party policy were reported by M. Ruttkay, Pravda, March 17, 1968; and by V. Salgovic, ibid., April 5, 1968. 25 See his series on Clementis, KZ, Aug. 4-25 inch, Sept. 8 and 22, 1967.

53

STALINISM IN DECLINE

form of autonomy) would depend on the advantages to the nations concerned, although it was beyond all doubt that the best solution for the Slovak nation was a common state with their Czech brother-nation. Another participant, Gustav Husak, stated that national equality could be guaranteed, not by a mere declaration, but by "concrete constitutional solutions in practice." He defined the right of self-determination as "the right of a nation to a state of its own or a common state shared with another nation"—"the democratic right of a nation to full state and political life, to the assertion of national and state sovereignty, to democratic self-government in various spheres."26 The Communist Party of Slovakia occupied a peculiar position in this struggle between Prague centralism and Slovak nationalism. As an integral part of the unified Czechoslovak party, the Slovak section enjoyed no autonomy whatever and had to follow all party decisions to the letter. It was unable, even if it had wished, to advocate a federal reform or urge more attention to Slovak needs and desires. Its most discredited leaders, Bacilek and Siroky, who scarcely deserved to be regarded as Slovaks, had been removed.27 In their place a new generation of leaders had come to the top, most of them becoming members of the Slovak Presidium either in 1958 or 1962. The four top figures, Dubcek, Chudik, Lenart, and BiI'ak, consolidated their position in 1963 and 1964 when old-time leaders, such as Bacilek, L'udovit Benada, Pavol David, Frantisek Zupka, and Jozef Kriz, were dropped. The supremacy of the "big four" in the Slovak party and their high rank in the all-national party was confirmed at the congresses of 1966 when they were reelected.28 The new Slovak leaders did not show any signs of actively articulating Slovak national interests or a more liberal viewpoint. Various observers have argued that from 1963-1964 there began to be a change of political conceptions by the Slovak party; that there were distinct cleavages 26 HC, no. 4 (1967), pp. 559-72. The historian, J. Mlynarik, published an article on Smeral's advocacy of a federal solution of Czech-Slovak relations (Ceskoslovensky (asopis historicky 15, Oct. 1967, pp. 653-66). 27 Bacilek was a Czech who had become Slovakized. Siroky's nationality was doubtful, but was probably mixed Magyar and Slovak. 28 The members of the Slovak Presidium after 1966 were as follows (date in parentheses indicates the year of membership if earlier than 1966): F. Barbirek (1963), V. Bil'ak (1962), V. Daubner (1955), Dubcek (cand. 1958, full member, 1962), H. Durkovic, Chudik (1957), J. Ianik (cand. 1964), J. Lorincz (1964) and M. Sabolcik (1962), and as candidates, K. Boda, F. Dvorsky (cand. 1958) and M. HruSkovic (1963). The Secretariat consisted of Dubcek (1962), Bil'ak (1962), Ianik (1964), Sabolcik (1963), and J. Zrak. The chairman of the Slovak Central Commission of Supervision and Auditing (UKRK) was V. SalgoviS, member of the Slovak CC from 1950 and of the UKRK from 1962. Slovak members of the CPCz Presidium, as of 1966, were Dubcek (cand. 1963, full member, 1964), Chudik (1964) and Lenart (1962); candidates, Sabolcik (cand. 1963) and Sadovsky.

54

THE MOUNTING CRISIS

among the Slovak leaders, and sharp conflicts between Dubcek and Novotny behind the scenes, but there is little evidence for these assertions. In the later words of Jozef Zrak, "Slovak politics . . . had really ceased to exist as a factor."29 Neither Lenart, Czechoslovak Prime Minister, nor Chudik, SNR chairman, nor Dubcek, as party chief, revealed, in their public utterances, a distinctively Slovak viewpoint or expressed dissent or reservations concerning the Czechoslovak party line.30 Dubcek, it is true, in a number of addresses on important anniversaries, including that of the Slovak National Uprising and the founding of the Matica Slovenska, in 1963, and the birth of L'udovit Stur, in 1964, emphasized the Slovak "national heritage" but was careful always to link this with the need for cooperation with the Czechs and the unity of the two nations, and even praised the policy of the CPCz, making no mention of the campaign against bourgeois nationalism.31 Only later, in 29

Zrak, Pravda, Jan. 29, 1969. For the assumed change of conception, see J. Hrabina, NM, no. 5 (1968), pp. 646-49. Cf. M. Pecho, ibid., no. 4 (1968), pp. 423-27. According to Hrabina, materials were prepared on the national question by the time of the 13th congress but were not discussed by the Central Committee. This presumably refers to a brief document of the CPCz Presidium which treated the Czech-Slovak relationship as merely a part of the nationality question in general and included no significant proposals (ibid., no. 12, June 13, 1967, pp. 7-8). See below, chap. xvin. Concerning party divisions, Zrak stated that the leadership was divided, some oriented toward Novotny and even toward Bacilek; others hesitating; and others, headed by Dubcek, forming a group with a more progressive policy. Zrak admitted the serious failings of the Slovak leadership and the difficulties of the conditions of their work. The more progressive wing sought to develop a program of advancing Slovak interests, but accepted the party line in order to avoid a premature conflict with Novotny (Pravda, Jan. 29, 1969). For the conflict of Dubcek and Novotny, see Kohout, Pravda, April 14, 1968. This conflict, and Dubcek's progressive role before 1968, are discounted by Steiner (Slovak Dilemma, pp. 124, 126, 155). Jan Uher reports that Dubcek, in spite of many disagreements, sought to avoid open clashes with Novotny and to follow "a form of political struggle oriented to the long run" (Vyber, no. 1, 1969, p. 35). For a more positive assessment of the position of the CPS and its conflict with the all-Czechoslovak party, see Dean, The Slovak Question, pp. 14 ff. 30 See as typical examples Dubcek's speech at the CPCz 13th congress, XIlI. sjezd Komunisticke strany Ceskoslovenska (Prague, 1966), pp. 165-72; and his main report to the Slovak Party Congress, Sjazd KSS, 1966, pp. 14-67. William Shawcross, in his Dubcek (London, 1970), cites a number of Dubcek's speeches indicating his general support of Novotny's line but assumes, without offering evidence, that Dubcek was, by 1964, pursuing a course of moderate reform which brought him into conflict with Novotny and prepared him for his post-January role (pp. 57-58, 70, 89-93, 152-53). Doubt is cast on this theory by a Czech writing under the pseudonym Moravus, in Listy (Nov. 1971), pp. 25 ff., also given in J. Pelikan, ed., lei Prague (Paris, 1973), pp. 358 ff. 31 These addresses were published under the title Komunisti a narodne dedicstvo (Bratislava, Nov. 1968). In the Matica speech Dubcek expounded at length on the great economic and cultural advance of Slovakia since 1948. Admitting undefined errors of party policy in 1938-1939 and 1944, and wrong interpretations of the Uprising and of the role of Husak and Novomesky (pp. 42-45), Dubcek

55

STALINISM IN DECLINE

1967, did Dubcek exhibit, in several of his statements, a significant dif­ ference in approach.32 Nonetheless, there was some evidence that the line followed by the CPS in Slovakia, especially in dealing with cultural and intellectual dis­ sent, was somewhat different than that adopted in Prague. Although there was no readiness to relax the leading role of the party, there seems to have been a genuine effort to implement it in a more moderate and less repressive manner. Dubcek, for instance, at the Slovak Congress in 1966, in an otherwise orthodox report, expressed a positive attitude toward the intelligentsia and the use of objective scientific knowledge. He laid stress on the use of persuasion, rather than administrative methods, and urged the support of "progressive" tendencies and persons in the struggle against "the old." Dubcek was also critical of sectarian as well as rightist views and referred to some who criticized the policy of "patient winning over" as "compromisingness" (kompromisnictvo). Bil'ak, on the same occasion, asserted the leading role of the party in thefieldof art and cul­ ture, but also urged the need to win over the artists by the more difficult process of persuasion rather than the easier method of administrative action.33 It was later revealed that a serious crisis had developed in 1964 within the Slovak party, especially its important Bratislava organization. At the municipal conference of that year there was open censure of party deci­ sions, dissatisfaction with the slow progress of ending the cult of per­ sonality and its consequences, reservations on cadre questions, and "even tendencies to negate everything in the past." Husak delivered an impor­ tant speech which was not, however, published, then or later. The next year at the Bratislava conference disagreement with the Slovak Central Committee was again expressed. By 1966 the crisis had been largely overcome, it was said, through the use of persuasion rather than adminis­ trative methods, and with unspecified assistance from the CPCz Central Committee.34 paid tribute to the policy of the Czechoslovak party, especially its wartime direc­ tives concerning the Uprising (pp. 38-41) and its later decisions from 1962 on (pp. 90, 93-94). He made no reference to the idea of federation, or even to the desirability of expanding the powers of the Slovak national organs. 32 See Dubcek's article, NM, no. 4, Feb. 21, 1967, pp. 6-10, discussed in chap, ν below. See also his speeches of November and December 1967, cited by Riveles, "Slovakia," p. 6. 33 Sjazd KSS (1966), pp. 52-53, 233-38, resp. But compare the severe criticism by the former editor-in-chief of Kulturny Bvot, J. Spitzer, of Bil'ak's treatment of the press, including the censorship of many articles on Czech-Slovak relations (written before the occupation, KZ, Aug. 30, 1968). Bil'ak's role in the sixties is sharply censured by Steiner, Slovak Dilemma, pp. 127, 139-43. 34 This is based on the speech at the Slovak congress in 1966 by Zrak in Sjazd KSS (1966), pp. 178-83. F. Dvorsky later reported that Prague exerted intense

56

THE MOUNTING CRISIS ECONOMIC CRISIS AND REFORM

Even more acute and pressing was the problem of the economy. The highly centralized system of directive planning had achieved rapid growth in industry, especially in preferred branches of heavy industry, and enhanced living standards for certain workers, but had also produced severe distortions in the economy, a standing crisis in agriculture, and serious deprivations for consumers. In 1961-1963 the swift advance in economic growth had ground to a complete halt, an event without parallel in the communist world. The national income actually fell between 1962 and 1963. Throughout 1961 serious consumer goods shortages offered dramatic testimony of the deepening crisis. Official admission of the serious state of affairs was delayed until the summer of 1962, when the regime announced that the five year plan, hardly begun, was to be abandoned, and a one year plan was to be introduced to solve the most pressing problems.35 The initial response of the regime was to blame the economic difficulties on the modest trend toward decentralization launched in 1958, and at the party congress at the end of 1962, to seek a cure in a renewal of centralization. It soon became obvious that more radical steps would be required if economic growth were to be restored and a balanced economy established.36 pressure on Bratislava to expel Husak from the party after his speech in 1964, but the CPS did not comply (Pravda, April 12, 1968). A summary of Husak's speech is given in A. Ostry, Ceskoslovensky problem (Cologne, 1972), pp. 11-13. 35 Novotny's address of April 12, 1962 revealed the dimensions of the crisis to the Central Committee but was not published at the time (Usneseni a dokumenty UV KSC, Od celostatn'i konference KSC 1960 do XII. sjezdu KSC, Prague, 1962, ii, 224 ff.). See also John M. Montias, "A Plan for all Seasons," Survey, no. 51 (April 1964), pp. 63-76. 36 For a discussion of the economic reforms at various stages, see V. Holesovsky, "Czechoslovakia's Economic Quandary," EE 13 (Nov. 1964), 7-13; V. Holesovsky, "Czechoslovakia's Economic Debate," ibid. (Dec. 1964), 13-19; Edward Taborsky, "Change in Czechoslovakia," CH 48 (March 1965), 16874; Vaclav E. Mares, "Czechoslovakia's Half Century," ibid. 52 (April 1967), 200-207; Harry G. Shaffer, "Czechoslovakia's New Economic Model, Out of Stalinism," PC 14 (Sept.-Oct. 1965), 31-40; V. Holesovsky, "Problems and Prospects," ibid., 41-45; Montias, "Economic Reform in Perspective," Survey, no. 59 (April 1966), pp. 48-60; Jan Michal, "The New Economic Model," ibid., pp. 61-71; Holesovsky, "Prague's Economic Model," EE 16 (Feb. 1967), 13-16; George J. Staller, "Czechoslovakia: The New Model of Planning and Management," American Economic Review 58 (May 1968), 559-67; V. Holesovsky, "Planning Reforms in Czechoslovakia," Soviet Studies 19, no. 4 (1968), 544-56; L. Urbanek, "Some Difficulties in Implementing Economic Reforms in Czechoslovakia," ibid., pp. 557-66. For a later explanation of the economic recession as a result of the centralized planning system, see M. Bernasek, "The Czechoslovak Economic Recession, 1962-65," ibid. 20, no. 4 (1969), 444-61; and for a reply denying this hypothesis, see Josef C. Brada, ibid. 22, no. 3 (1971), 402-5. Fuller studies, all completed prior to 1968, are available in book form: Kurt Wessely, "Wirtschaftsreformen in der Tschechoslowakei," in Karl C. Thalheim, ed., Wirtschaftsreformen

57

STALINISM IN DECLINE

The initiative in urging drastic change in the system of planning and in the institutions and procedures of economic life was taken by the professional economists, especially those in the Institute of Economics, headed by Ota Sik.37 The party leadership, however, was not easily won over to the idea of economic reform. When a lecturer at the Technical College in Prague, Radoslav Selucky, criticized the previous methods of planning and attacked the so-called cult of the plan, he was condemned by Novotny who defended the high "authority" of the plan.38 A turning point was reached, however, at the end of 1963, when the party's Economic Commission appointed a team of experts, under Sik, to examine the question of management and planning. Thus Sik, who had been a candidate member of the Central Committee from 1958 and a full member from 1962, had not only a technical base in his institute, but also a degree of political authority to proceed with a consideration of economic reform. In the CC session in December, he had severely censured the centralized planning system and advocated the expanded use of "profits" and other economic criteria at the enterprise level. He had warned against any compromise solution such as that of 1958.39 Less than a year later, in September 1964, the Central Committee accepted a draft of the in Osteuropa (Cologne, 1968); K. Paul Hensel et al., Die sozialistische Marktwirtschaft in der Tschechoslowakei (Stuttgart, 1968); George R. Feiwel, New Economic Patterns in Czechoslovakia (New York, 1968). See also contributions by Holesovsky, Shaffer, Michal, and Montias, in Feiwel, ed., New Currents in Soviet-type Economies (Scranton, Pa., 1968). For retrospective analysis, see Ivo Moravcik, "The Czechoslovak Economic Reform," CSP 10 (Winter 1968), 430-50; B. Korda and I. Moravcik, "Reflections on the 1965-1968 Czechoslovak Economic Reform," CSP 13 (Spring 1971), 4565; O. Kyn, "The Rise and Fall of Economic Reform in Czechoslovakia," AER 60 (May 1970), 300-306; O. Kyn, "The Fate of Economic Reform in Czechoslovakia" (mimeo.), an earlier version of which appeared in German, in HansHermann Hohmann, M. Kaser, and K. C. Thalheim, eds., Die Wirtschaftsordnungen Osteuropas im Wandel, 2 vols. (Freiburg, 1972), i, 139-80; J. Kosta and I. Slama, "Die tschechoslowakische Wirtschaft in den sechziger Iahren, Das Schicksal einer Wirtschaftsreform," Jahrbiicher fur Nationalokonomie und Statistik 185 (July 1971), 481-510; Sik, "The Economic Impact of Stalinism," PC 20 (May-June 1971), 1-10; Kosta and Bernasek, papers given at the Reading (England) conference, 1971, in V. V. Kusin, ed., The Czechoslovak Reform Movement 1968 (London, 1973), pp. 179-204, 205-20. See also R. Selucky, Czechoslovakia: The Plan that failed (London, 1970); V. Holesovsky, Planning and Market in the Czechoslovak Reform (New Haven, 1972); George W. Wheeler, The Human Face of Socialism: The Political Economy of Change in Czechoslovakia (New York, 1973); Benjamin B. Page, The Czechoslovak Reform Movement 1963-1968: A Study in the Theory of Socialism (Amsterdam, 1973). 37 See below, chap. rv. 3S Selucky's article was published in the party's cultural journal, KT, Feb. 7, 1963. Cf. similar radical criticisms by E. Lobl, KZ, Sept. 28, Oct. 5 and 12, 1963. For Novotny's reply, RP, March 24, 1963. SS >RP, Dec. 22-23, 1963.

58

THE MOUNTING CRISIS

principles of an improved system of planned management,40 and in January 1965, a project for the "improvement" of the planning system.41 The 13th Party Congress in June 1966 confirmed a CC decision in April to accelerate the introduction of the improved system in the whole economy, including agriculture.42 Detailed procedures for implementing the reform were approved by the party and set forth in successive government decrees.43 By 1967 then the party had committed itself on paper to a project of economic reform which went far beyond that contemplated by the Soviet Union and most other communist countries, although not as far as Sik and others would have liked. The party leadership had implicitly accepted the arguments of the reformers that the Soviet command model was no longer appropriate for Czechoslovakia and that a return to the modest decentralization of 1958-1959 was an inadequate solution. A decisive step was to be taken from a command to a regulated market system, which would facilitate a shift also from an extensive to an intensive pattern of growth. The basic plan would formulate the objectives of long-run developments; actual production would be under the control of enterprises seeking to maximize their profits and to compete both at home and abroad on the basis of quality and efficiency. Wages and prices would more and more be adjusted by natural market processes, although the state would still regulate the general conditions of the market. Wage rewards would be differentiated according to skills and productivity. There would be greater emphasis on technical innovation and on skilled management. Economic criteria would thus partially supplant political considerations in the making of crucial decisions. These measures did not, of course, mean the abandonment of central planning, still less of socialism, but sought to combine planning and other indirect central controls of the economy with a greater development of market relations, including the use of profit as an incentive. 40 For the text, ibid., Oct. 17, 1964; in English, in Eastern European Economics 3 (Summer 1965), 3-18. Cf. Sik's exposition of the reforms in NM, no. 10 (1964), pp. 1165-80; in English, in Czechoslovak Economic Papers, no. 5 (Prague, 1965), pp. 7-33. For a full summary of the principles and subsequent controversy among economists, see Golan, Czechoslovak Reform, pp. 53 ff. 41 Text in RP, Ian. 30, 1965; in English, in Economic Discussion in Czechoslovakia, Documents, no. 5 (Prague, 1965). See Sik's exposition in the world communist organ, Problemy mira i sotsializma, no. 3 (March 1965), pp. 23-32; in English, in EEE 4 (Fall 1965), 3-12. i2 XHI. sjezd Komunisticke strany Ceskoslovenska (Prague, 1967), pp. 586-94. iS SMrka zakonu, no. 90/1965; 242/1966; 100/1966. The latter two documents are given in full in German in Hensel, Soz. Marktwirtschaft. The Central Committee in March 1966 approved a version of the agricultural reforms, and in October the general conditions of enterprise management and a revised five year plan.

59

STALINISM IN DECLINE

The prospects for the establishment of the new economic model were still uncertain, however. The scheme of economic reform adopted by the party had been of a compromise character and its initial realization was slow and incomplete. The absence of a thoroughgoing price revision, an integral part of the program, was a serious handicap. A limited price reform, affecting mainly wholesale prices and providing for a restricted category of "free" prices, was introduced in 1966, but most prices remained frozen and were fixed centrally. The determination of wages was left to the individual enterprise but excessive increases were discouraged by "stabilization taxes" on the enterprise's wage fund. Although the annual plan did not contain binding obligations in 1966 or 1967, central controls, indirect and direct, were maintained and enterprises continued to feel bound by them. The enterprises were subject to uniform taxes rather than arbitrary transfers of funds to the state, and could use their own resources and bank credits for some of their investment. The old system of subsidies for weak enterprises had not, however, been fully replaced. The continuance in office of incompetent directors, persisting intervention by the party in enterprise affairs, the monopolistic position of the general directorates, and old habits of acting and thinking hampered the successful implementation of the new system.44 It was becoming increasingly evident that it was hard to introduce the reform gradually within the old system in circumstances not propitious for the radical institutional and structural changes required. Continuing economic difficulties necessitated frequent reservations and exceptions in the application of the principles of the reform. The fear of inflation, for instance, discouraged the introduction of complete price flexibility and led to continuing price controls. Meanwhile recovery in the rate of growth in 1966 and 1967 made the revisions seem less urgent and strengthened the hands of the opponents of reform. The reformers, on the other hand, emphasized the essential weaknesses of the economy, criticized the inadequacy of steps taken, and warned against delays or half-measures. Since few responsible spokesmen openly opposed reforms, controversy centered on the question of timing, with the more conservative stressing the difficulties to be overcome and arguing for a gradual and relatively long transition period, and the reform-oriented emphasizing the need for swift and simultaneous action on many fronts.45 44 For the above, see the sources in n. 36, especially Holesovsky and Urbanek (Soviet Studies), both of whom were skeptical of the ultimate success of the reform. See also Moravcik, CSP; Kyn, AER; Feiwel, New Econ. Patterns, pp. 383-99. For a full analysis of persisting economic problems, see Sik, NM, no. 8, April 18, 1967; in English, New Trends in Czechoslovak Economics, no. 5 (1967), pp. 15-41. 45 Kyn, "Fate of Econ. Reform." M. Kohoutek, deputy chairman of the State Planning Commission, is cited by Kyn (AER, p. 302) as an example of the re-

60

THE MOUNTING CRISIS

It was also clear that, in addition to economic obstacles, there were political impediments to the early implementation of reform, particularly the unrelenting opposition of more conservative elements who were dis­ turbed by the criticism of the old system and unable to accept the new ideas. Even at the topmost level there was evidently a difference of view, with Lenart, the Prime Minister, usually regarded as more sympathetic, and Oldrich Cernik, planning head, and Kolder, chief of the Economic Commission, as favoring a slower, more moderate approach. The need for maintaining and even strengthening central direction of the economy was regularly stressed by Novotny in his speeches.46 Official statements hinted that the introduction of the reforms would be "a long, slow process." At somewhat lower levels, the economists, who bore the main burden of the defense of reforms, had support from some of the managers, who hoped to benefit from greater freedom of action, and from some party apparatchiki who recognized the urgency of a solution. Others were ap­ prehensive, including many ministers, planning officials, and trust direc­ tors, who foresaw a reduction in their authority and a challenge to their traditional procedures; incompetent managers who feared the loss of their positions in a system favoring economic expertness and initiative rather than political reliability and administrative practices; party appa­ ratchiki who envisaged a decline in the role of the party at all levels, and hence a loss of their own power; and entrenched trade union bureaucrats whose functions as instruments of mobilizing the workers would no long­ er be necessary. Paradoxically, some sections of the working class were apprehensive, perceiving dangers of dismissals or transfers, greater wage inequalities, and the necessity of harder work. Many had been corrupted by a system offering an assured income for a minimum amount of work and were unwilling to sacrifice what they had for what was promised. Some workers, as well as party apparatchiki and trade unionists of prole­ tarian origin, were accustomed to think of themselves as the ruling class and saw a threat to this traditional concept in a reform stressing the value of expertise and knowledge. The general public, worn down by years of orientation of economic thinking among top economic administrators. Although Kohoutek did endorse reform, he emphasized the need for a "gradual carrying out of economic reform" and opposed "an instantaneous liberalization of market relations." He rejected criticism that they were not moving forward fast enough or putting fully into effect the theoretically formulated target model of manage­ ment and argued that it was impossible to disregard "real problems" and the concrete economic situation (ΡΙάηοναηέ hospodastvi, no. 9, 1967, pp. 17-25; in English, CEP, no. 10, 1968, pp. 125-37, quotation at p. 135). Cf. Turek's argu­ ment for an immediate introduction of reform at one stroke (below, chap. iv). See also Simon's estimate of a five-year transition (below, chap. rv). « F o r instance, RP, March 18, 1964; Oct. 29, 1965; Nov. 4, 1965.

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STALINISM IN DECLINE

hardship and unable to express their views openly, were apathetic and entertained little hope of serious improvement in their economic situation.47 The more radical critics were frank in deploring the "inertia" of old ideas and practices and warning of the danger of a return to the "old system." In particular, Sik drew attention to the resistance of "conservatives" and urged the need to accelerate the implementation of the principles of the reform.48 Some of the reformers began to realize that economic reforms could only be achieved if accompanied by political changes.49 THE WRITERS AND FREEDOM OF THE PRESS

Another intractable problem which confronted Novotny throughout the sixties was the persistent struggle for greater freedom of expression waged by the more liberal writers, conducted in the main through their association, the Union of Czechoslovak Writers (SCSS) and its principal organs, the Czech Literarni noviny and the Slovak Kulturny zivot. During the decade the writers managed to some extent to escape the restrictions imposed by the canons of socialist realism and by censorship. After long years of suppression and isolation from world currents, Czech and Slovak cultural life experienced a veritable renaissance, extending beyond prose and poetry to the theatre, thefilmindustry, radio, and television.50 For reasons of space, we must skirt the broad question of the 47 These comments are based on discussions in Prague during 1967. See also V. Meier, "Czechoslovakia: The Struggle for Reform," EE 14 (Aug. 1965), 26-28; A. Korbonski, "Bureaucracy and Interest Groups in Communist Societies: The Case of Czechoslovakia," SCC 4 (Jan. 1971), 57-79. For Italian communist discussion of opposition, see Rinascita, Dec. 1, 1967, quoted by Feiwel, New Econ. Patterns, pp. 399-400. 48 Sik, RP, Feb. 18, 22, 23, 1966; Sik, KT, Oct. 27, 1966; J. Kanturek, ibid., Jan. 5, 1967; Lobl, Kl, Jan. 20, 1967. In his speech at the 13th congress (XIH. sjezd KSC, 1967, pp. 535-43) Sik referred to "some comrades" who "can imagine only one, the hitherto so to speak unchangeable form of the plan" and "consider the transition to the new system of management as an attempt to liquidate planning." "He who would wish to confine the new system merely to a certain system of motives or market relations and at the same time to preserve the old administrative character and method of drawing up the plan, indicates that he has not advanced in his thinking further than we already were in 1958" (pp. 540-41). 49 Sik, XIIl. sjezd KSC (1967), p. 543. See also the panel discussion on "Market, Planning and Democracy," in Josef Sladek, ed., O lidech, ekonomice a demokracie (Prague, 1968). Cf. M. Gamarnikow, "Political Patterns and Economic Reforms," PC 18 (March-April 1969), 16-17. 50 The fullest treatment of this renaissance is given by Golan, Czechoslovak Reform. For a personal account of the "new wave" in film making, see Josef Skvorecky, All the Bright Young Men and Women: A Personal History of the Czech Cinema (Toronto, 1971). See also A. J. Liehm, ed., Closely Watched Films: The

62

THE MOUNTING CRISIS

relationship of literature and politics and concentrate on the more overt political activity of the union and its organs, and the closely connected problem of freedom of expression in the media of communications.51 The efforts of the government to harness the press, radio, and television to its purposes and to curb the cultural periodicals generated bitter resistance and resulted in a deadlock which contributed to the weakening of the regime and its ultimate collapse. The doctrine of the "leading role of the party" was usually interpreted as endowing the party, as Novotny once put it, with "the right to direct cultural life" just as it did other aspects of the country's life.52 This task was assigned to the CC Ideological Department and after 1962, also to the CC Ideological Committee, headed first by Jiri Hendrych, later by Vladimir Koucky, and then again by Hendrych, and in Slovakia, to the corresponding apparatus department, under the supervision of Vasil Bil'ak. As a result of the lip service that had to be paid to greater freedom of expression after the CPSU's 22nd Congress, the party adopted a somewhat less doctrinaire cultural line. Although this gave some endorsement to the ideas espoused by more liberal writers and artists and undermined the traditional rigidity of the ideologues, the latter continued to wage war against ideological deviations and mobilized all the instruments of control at their disposal for this purpose. Where "persuasion" failed, more direct "administrative measures" were used, such as the censorship of articles, the changing of editors, or the closing of journals. The Union of Writers, like its counterparts in music, the fine arts, the theatre, and journalism had originally been established on the Soviet model as a mechanism of control over its members and its particular sphere of creative endeavor. During the Stalinist period the union and its journals were used by the party as instruments in imposing socialist realism and in transforming literature into propaganda. Under the supervision of the Ideological Department, the officers, who were almost exCzechoslovak Experience (White Plains, N.Y., 1973), and a special issue containing extracts from this book, International Journal of Politics 3 (Spring-Summer, 1973). See also Hana Benesova, on Czech literature in the sixties, in E. J. Czerwinski and Jaroslaw Piekalkiewicz, eds., The Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia: Its Effects on Eastern Europe (New York, 1972); Pavel Tigrid, "Frost and Thaw: Literature in Czechoslovakia," EE 15 (Sept. 1966), 2-10; Vera Blackwell, "Literature and the Drama," Survey, no. 59 (April 1966), pp. 41-47. 51 For the political role of the writers, see Dusan Hamsik, Writers Against Rulers (London, 1971), translated from the Czech, Spisovatele a moc (Prague, 1969); citations from the English version. The part played by the cultural intelligentsia, especially the writers, as an "intellectual opposition," is described by A. J. Liehm, The Politics of Culture (New York, 1967, 1968); also in French, Trois Generations (Paris, 1970). See also F. L. Kaplan, "The Writer as Political Actor in Czechoslovak Society: A Historical Perspective," East European Quarterly 7 (Summer 1973). MRP, March 24, 1963.

63

STALINISM IN DECLINE

clusively party members and selected by the department, directed a financially well-off bureaucratic apparatus which served as a transmission belt for party decrees and a means of collective discipline. The members, 630 in number by 1967, were kept in step not only by ideological and administrative coercion but also by the corrupting influence of the perquisites of membership: the use of clubs and rest homes, stipends for travel and writing, and preference in the publication of their works. The union's journals, under carefully chosen editors, and its publishing house were the purveyors of the party line in cultural matters and helped to direct literature in the desired channels and to discourage nonconformist ideas or styles.53 In the early sixties, however, the union, its congresses, and its journals began to resist complete party control and to achieve greater leeway for free discussion, thus becoming, in the words of a Czech historian, "an oasis" of democracy.54 Both Kulturny zivot and Literarni noviny, whose editorial boards consisted almost entirely of communists, appointed by the union with the approval of the party apparatus, became forums for the expression of frank views not only by writers and literary critics, but by other intellectuals, including philosophers, historians, economists, and sociologists. In their columns every aspect of economic, social, political, as well as cultural, life was subjected to critical analysis, and the urgency of drastic reforms was voiced. Literarni noviny, in its own words, became "a political platform, an important factor in the process of social change."55 The two papers acquired a wide readership among professionals in all fields and thus became organs for the intelligentsia as a whole.56 Although Kulturny zivot had a much smaller circulation, there were times when it enjoyed a large audience among Czechs because of its outspoken content and its somewhat greater freedom from restrictive controls. In addition, as we have noticed earlier, it served as a channel for the expression of Slovak national interests. A high point in the political ferment among the writers came in the spring of 1963 with the congresses of Slovak writers, in April in Brati53 For the early phase of the Writers' Union, see Z. Eis, "Writers and the Time," Rep., April 3, 1969, pp. i-rv. For the transformation of the Writers' Union from a transmission belt to a genuine representative of the writers' interests and values, see Liehm, in the collection of essays, Sbornik, Systemove zmeny (Cologne, 1972), pp. 159-82. According to Liehm, the Film and Television Workers' Union, unlike the other creative unions, was founded not as a transmission belt, but as an organization to defend the interests of its members. 54 Karel Bartosek, "Revolution against Bureaucratism?" part 2 of a series, RP, July 24, 1968.

55 LN, Dec. 23, 1963. I n conversations in Prague and Bratislava in 1967 the author was told that the circulation of Literarni noviny was approximately 100,000, and of Kulturny zivot, 30,000. A total circulation of all cultural periodicals, including Kulturn'i tvorba, was given officially as 278,500 in 1964 (RP, April 3, 1964). 56

64

THE MOUNTING CRISIS

slava, and of Czechoslovak writers, in May in Prague, the stormy proceedings of which were fully published in the union's journals.57 Another congress, that of the Slovak journalists, was less lively but included a sensational speech by M. Hysko, referred to above, which was carried in full in Pravda.™ The Prague congress witnessed a much broader revolt than in 1956 and directly challenged the party's cultural policy as presented by Hendrych. The union was severely reproved by some for its failure to protect the interests of the writers, and the journals were criticized for their past support of party policy. The central theme of the sessions, however, was the damage done to literature, and the gross injustices to individual writers, during the period of the "cult." Speeches were not limited to purely literary matters, but included slashing critiques of Stalinism and of the delay in correcting abuses since 1956. The congresses, with their direct condemnation of the former cultural dictators, Vaclav Kopeck^ and Ladislav Stoll; eloquent denunciation of "the lies" and "the fear" pervading thefifties;and courageous demands for literary freedom, presented a damning indictment of the political system and of current cultural policies. "Art is hampered," said one Slovak writer, Vladimir Minac, "by any terror, whether administrative, psychological or moral; our cultural policy must be fundamentally changed."59 Faced with this explosion the party leadership reacted vigorously. Novotn^ led off with a savage speech in Kosice warning Kulturny zivot editors and writers that they had entered on a "dangerous path" and cautioning Pravda that attacks on the party "would not be permitted." "Only with the party, and under its leadership, and in its ranks, was it possible to conduct the struggle against the remains of the cult of the personality so as to serve the interests of socialist society." Hendrych followed with a speech rejecting the claim of the writers to speak for the nation and declaring that only the party could be "the conscience of our nation and the leading ideological centre of our society."60 Three months later, Novotiry proclaimed: "In the principles and the policy of the party we shall change nothing because their correctness is confirmed by life and the results of the development of socialist Czechoslovakia. In all our work, the supreme obligation is to defend and implement the party line 57

LN and KZ, from the end of April to early June. For a full account, see Skilling, Communism National and International (Toronto, 1964), chap. 7. 58 Pravda, June 3, 1963. See above, this chapter. It is, of course possible that Hysko was encouraged to make his speech by the Slovak party authorities, although evidence is lacking. The independence of Pravda in printing this speech was a rare case. The editor, O. Klokoc, who remained in his post to 1968, was reprimanded for his error and took no similar actions thereafter. 59 LN, May 25, 1963. so Pravda and RP, June 13, 1963; RP, June 29, 1963, resp. See also C. Cisar, NM, no. 4 (1963), pp. 385-97; editorial, RP, June 15, 1963; J. Fojtik, RP, July 11, 1963.

65

STALINISM IN DECLINE

and party principles, according to which every communist must conduct himself. . . . We do not wish to combat, nor shall we ever fight against responsible criticism, which we welcome and need like salt. Our party will support every down-to-earth, constructive, critical voice, but will sharply repudiate every attempt at criticism which wished to weaken the leading role of our party in the state and which impaired the unity of socialist society."61 An active campaign against the dissident writers was launched by the Central Committee in December 1963, culminating in a 10,000 word statement on the cultural periodicals in April 1964.62 Not only Literarni noviny and Kulturny zivot, but also the party's own cultural weekly, Kulturni tvorba, and many other journals were criticized for assuming the role of "autonomous interpreters of the political line of the party" and in the case of Kulturny zivot, of "negating the party's leading role." Even the Ideological Department was reprimanded for its failings. The campaign was widened to include the media of communications as a whole in another statement damning the deficiencies of the press, radio, and television and declaring that there could be "no room for opinions which do not agree with party politics."63 Aping Khrushchev, Novotn^ invited writers, journalists, and other groups to the Castle for long discussions, presumably hoping to persuade them to cooperate in implementing the party's cultural policy in their particular fields.64 The results of this systematic campaign were minimal. Only the Union of Journalists supported the party's statement. The Union of Writers and Literarni noviny asserted their intention to continue to attack dogmatism and to seek to make an impact on public opinion with "our positive and progressive ideas." "Literature must be an independent, energetic and active partner of the other social forces."65 Kulturny zivot, describing itself as "a political periodical," defended the correctness of its orientation. "We remain the allies of everything that is really new, progressive and human in our society, whereby a critical approach will continue to be the method of our work."66 In a later interview, published in both Literarni noviny and Kulturny zivot, Laco Novomesk^ urged, as a common objective for both Czechs and Slovaks, "absolute freedom of expression for writers to the greatest possible degree."67 That the problem was not solved was evident from the constant at62 «i RP, Sept. 23, 1963. RP, April 3, 1964. 63 25, no. 5 (March 1965). Cf. the criticism of the press by A. Hradecky, head of the Union of Journalists, NM, no. 9 (1964), pp. 1104-10. ei See J. Sotola on the first meeting of this kind, LN, Feb. 1, 1964. 65 Speech by J. Sotola, endorsed by the Writers' Union central committee (ibid., March 7, 1964). ™KZ, May 1, 1964. £ c o o s Q

District Conference

(1) D o you believe that the results of the May plenum positively influenced the party's authority CSSR Czech lands Slovakia

II. Evaluation of the situation in party.

Question

(in percentages)

(cont'd.)

13.8 14.6 11.2

15.7 16.5 13.3

10.5 11.3 8.2

4.7 5.2 3.1

8.6 10.2 3.4

-e « .2 asfe:

7.3 7.3 7.2

8.3 8.5 7.8

2.4 2.6 2.1

0.8 0.8 0.8

1.9 2.1 1.4

'3 u o

•o

Delegates

POLL OF PARTY DELEGATES

33.6 34.5 31.3

33.8 33.4 34.6

35.2 33.5 39.8

57.5 55.5 63.1

30.2 24.4 46.1

1

T3 S t, Q Js

32.2 33.6 28.2

30.0 30.7 28.0

36.0 38.4 29.2

29.7 31.9 23.8

51.4 55.9 39.1

-c o .2 as

4.8 4.5 5.6

4.3 4.1 4.9

8.5 8.9 7.3

4.4 4.5 4.0

6.8 6.8 6.6

£ 51 o5 c

14th Congress

15.1 15.5 13.9

18.4 19.2 16.2

13.2 13.4 12.7

5.2 5.5 4.2

7.3 8.8 3.3

as £

•c

Delegates

O

8.2 7.2 10.8

9.5 9.5 9.4

2.5 2.6 2.4

1.2 1.2 1.2

2.5 2.2 3.3

c

work:

18.1 8.9 18.6

42.0 44.4 34.5

16.8 16.6 17.4

19.2 19.5 18.1

26.5 27.1 24.5

13.6 13.3 14.7

13.2 13.3 11.0

Decidedly Yes 10.2 8.9 14.3

Rather Yes

4.6 4.3 5.5

11.9 12.2 10.6

4.5 3.6 7.3

3.1 3.6 3.6

11.2 11.4 10.6

22.0 23.3 17.9

20.3 20.7 18.9

15.1 20.7 13.0

ftj S;

-c

Source: Zprava o soucasne politicke situaci Ceskoslovenske socialisticke republiky Ceskoslovenska (srpen 1968) (Prague, Oct. 1968), pp. 78-80, 88-91.

Czech lands Slovakia

CSSR

( 4 ) A r e y o u of the opinion that it is in the party's interest to give up direct management of state and economic organs

Czech lands Slovakia

CSSR

( 3 ) D o you think that the party is giving up to a sufficient degree direct management of state and economic organs

Czech lands Slovakia

CSSR

( 2 ) D o you believe that the party is relinquishing its positions if it makes it possible for other parties and organizations to share in decision-making

Czech lands Slovakia

CSSR

( 1 ) D o you believe that it is quite dangerous for the party to give up its power position

III. Opinions on methods of party Don't Know

Delegates 14th Congress

20.9 20.7 21.4

32.4 33.6 28.9

14.1 12.9 17.4

17.0 17.8 14.6

4.2 3.2 6.8

11.8 11.8 11.8

4.9 2.7 10.8

4.4 3.9 5.6

Delegates

cinnosti Komunisticke

53.8 55.4 49.2

20.8 19.1 25.4

13.1 10.1 21.4

22.8 20.5 29.2

Decidedly Yes

a podm'mkach

10.3 9.9 11.5

9.9 10.0 9.6

39.0 43.2 23.5

21.8 43.2 17.0

Decidedly No

District Conference

Rather Yes

Question

Don't Know

{cont'd.)

9.8 9.0 12.2

9.5 8.8 11.3

45.2 50.7 10.1

30.7 32.8 24.7

strany

10.0 10.6 8.2

23.7 24.9 20.2

21.4 22.6 18.1

19.2 20.6 15.5

Rather No

POLL OF PARTY DELEGATES

Decidely No

APPENDIX C

Federation and the Nationalities Law THE FEDERALIZATION of the Republic was accomplished as planned on October 28, with the adoption of the constitutional law on federation by the National Assembly.1 Many Czechs, and even some Slovaks, had some doubts as to whether it was worthwhile proceeding with federaliza­ tion in the vastly changed circumstances produced by the occupation on August 21. On the other hand, the August events had demonstrated the unity of Czechs and Slovaks in their rejection of Soviet intervention and their insistence on the integrity of the Republic, thus dissipating suspi­ cions that may have lingered in Czech minds of Slovak separatist ten­ dencies. The Slovak reaction to the invasion was partly due to a greater feeling of confidence in the future of their association with the Czechs, based on the acceptance by the latter of their demand for federalization. Yet the immediate aftermath of the intervention revealed continuing political differences between Czechs and Slovaks, particularly regarding the relative priority of democratization and federalization. There were fears on both sides that the Soviet Union would seek to exploit any dis­ unity in its own interests and this strengthened their belief in the urgency of completing federalization to ward off this threat.2 During the days of crisis, official declarations made it clear that both nations were still committed to the goal of achieving federation by Octo­ ber 28.3 Yet time had been lost as a result of the invasion and the sched­ ule for preparing the federation had been seriously interrupted. The posi­ tion of the Czechs was particularly difficult since they had not had time to draft a proposal of their own and had perforce to take a position on 1 See above, chap, xv, n. 7, for sources on federation, most of which deal briefly with post-occupation developments and with federation as finally estab­ lished. For a full analysis of the latter, see Lothar Schultz, "Die tschechoslowakische Federation," Osteuropa-Recht 15 (1969), 318-32. 2 For some Slovak views, see Novomesky (on Sept. 5), Politika, Oct. 3, pp. 34-35; M. Hysko, Νονέ slovo, Sept. 26; for Czech views, Cisar (at the SNR ses­ sion), Pravda, Sept. 7; editorial, ibid., Oct. 3. See the joint interview, V. Hatala and Z. JiSinsky, ibid., Sept. 24. There were references to foreign "speculation" on disunity by Hatala and Jicinsky, ibid.; Kloko£, Pravda, Oct. 8; Smena, Oct. 8. On the unity of the Republic, Z. Eis and K. Jech, Reporter, Sept. 18-25. 3 See declarations of the 14th congress, National Assembly, CNR and SNR, CPS Central Committee, and CPS congress, chap, xxn above, passim (pp. 771, 786, 791, 794). A poll conducted in Slovakia in Sept. 1968 indicated that 88.1 percent approved decisions concerning Czech-Slovak equality and the na­ tional minorities; 6.3 percent approved but doubted their fulfillment; 2.1 percent had reservations (Zivot strany, no. 19, May 7, 1969, p. 9).

858

APPENDIX C

explicit Slovak demands and the fully elaborated plan of the federal com­ mission of experts.4 Moreover, in the absence of a Czech party congress, it was left to the Czech legal experts on the federal commission and in the Czech National Council to formulate a "Czech" standpoint, without the benefit of widespread public discussion or of any authoritative Czech statement of policy. A lesser problem, but one that could not be ignored, was the continued pressure from some Moravians, either for a tripartite federation, or since this had been rejected in official Czech and Czecho­ slovak quarters, for some recognition of a special Moravian position within the future Czech republic.5 At the time of the occupation the federal commission of experts had completed a draft statement of principles.6 Discussions in both the Czech and Slovak National Councils in early September indicated a willingness to accept this draft as a general basis for discussion but also revealed cer­ tain crucial differences of opinion which were again manifested in Czech and Slovak statements in mid-September.7 The CNR Standpoint (Stanovisko), for instance, which summed up the Czech position, warned the Slovaks that in view of the changes in the political system brought about by external influences, "it was not necessary to double or triple the constitutional legal guarantees of equality of the Slovak na­ tional-territorial whole." The Standpoint was praised by Slovaks for its exposition of general principles, but sharply criticized for some of its specific proposals, which would have produced, it was argued, "a sym­ metrical system of powerless national states in a powerful centralized federation once again dominated in the federal sphere by the most nu­ merous of the two partners."8 Moreover, although the Czechs were ready to accept October 28 as the deadline for federation, there was a feeling that on many crucial is­ sues only general principles could be endorsed by that date and that detailed decisions would need more time. It was also observed that the actual implementation of federalism would require many additional steps, including the holding of elections to the assembly and the two 4

Cisar, Rude prdvo, Oct. 3, 10. On Sept. 6, the Society for Moravia and Silesia issued a proclamation favoring the tripartite system (Moravskoslezsky tyden, no. 17, p. 4). For later statements indicating that the Moravians were reconciled to something short of trialism, such as the recognition of the Moravian land (zeme), see C. Prochazka, RP, Sept. 19; conference in Brno, ibid., Oct. 14; A. Rusek, ibid., Oct. 17; Jicinsky, ibid., Oct. 24. β See above, chap. xv. 7 For the Slovak viewpoint see CPS Central Committee (Pravda, Sept. 6); SNR, ibid., Sept. 7; F. Barbirek, ibid., Sept. 10. The Slovak draft proposal of Sept. 15 was not published. For the Czech position, see Cisar at the SNR (Pravda, Sept. 7) and in the CNR (RP, Sept. 19); "Stanovisko Ceske narodni rady k federativnimu usporadani CSSR" (RP and Pravda, Sept. 20), henceforth CNR Stanovisko. 8 Hatala and H. Koctuch, Pravda, Sept. 27. Cf. Koctuch, ibid., Sept. 25; K. Rebro, NS, Sept. 26. 5

859

APPENDIX C

councils, which could hardly be completed by January 1st.9 These reser­ vations on timing, as well as opposition on matters of substance, awak­ ened disquiet and suspicion on the Slovak side and a stiffer insistence on the acceptance of their viewpoint and their own conception of timing.10 The CPCz Presidium, however, on September 17, reiterated the goal of achieving a constitutional law by October 28, and stressed the need quickly to publish an agreed document in the name of the organs of the National Assembly, the CNR and SNR, and the government.11 By the end of the month the penultimate stage of deliberations began with the completion of a detailed draft law on federation by the commission of experts, its adoption by the government commission and by the govern­ ment, and its transmission to the two councils for their consideration.12 A joint meeting in Brno of the presidia of the two councils, and the simultaneous plenary meetings which followed immediately in Brati­ slava and Prague, indicated that although there was wide agreement on general principles, there were significant gaps on specific issues. The Brno meeting, the first direct Czech-Slovak confrontation, achieved a compromise on some matters, especially in the economic field, but left a number of questions open. Similarly, at the plenary sessions of the two councils, the draft constitutional law was endorsed but significant reser­ vations were expressed by both sides.13 When a common draft was sub­ mitted by the two councils to the National Assembly, on October 7, points of differences were not concealed but were in fact included in the document as alternatives. The party's Presidium, however, still described the original deadline of October 28 as the target." 9

For instance, L. Veltrusky, RP, Sept. 10; A. Pokorna, RP and Pravda, Sept. 19; Z. Jicinsky, speech in CNR, RP, Sept. 19, and fuller, Pravnik 107, no. 12 (1968), 1050-57. ι» SNR presidium, Pravda, Sept. 24; Pavlenda, ibid., Sept. 25. « Rok sedesdty osmy (Prague, 1969), p. 323. 12 The draft constitutional law was formally approved by the government com­ mission on Oct. 1 (RP and Pravda, Oct. 2). Its text was published later in NS, Oct. 10, as a supplement, but not elsewhere. The draft principles were also pub­ lished in final form over the signatures of Cernik, Husak, Cisar, and Klokoii, "Stanovisko k federalizaci CSSR" (RP, Sept. 26 and elsewhere), henceforth joint Stanovisko. Comments and amendments were requested, to be submitted by Oct. 15. Cisar later explained that he was able to sign only because it was noted that the views of the CNR could not be fully taken into consideration due to the shortness of time (NS, Oct. 24). 13 For the Brno meeting, especially the speeches by Cisar and Klokoi, RP, Oct. 3. For a full analysis of the conference, see Koctuch, and Hatala and K. Laco, NS, Oct. 10. For CNR session, RP and Pravda, Oct. 5; for SNR session, Pravda, Oct. 5. At the CNR meeting there was some opposition to a vote at that time and to the January 1st deadline for the coming into force of the law on federation, but the draft law was ultimately approved overwhelmingly. Similarly, although a number of suggestions and criticisms were offered, the SNR also approved the draft law. " RSO, pp. 326-27.

860

APPENDIX C

Although the Moravian demand for tripartitism was once again for­ mally rejected by official Czech spokesmen, the problem of local govern­ ment or samosprava raised by the Moravians was left unsettled as a task to be dealt with by the future Czech republic. There was no indication of any willingness to accept the idea of Moravia as a "land" (zeme) or province, nor any clarification of the future of the national committee system.15 MAJOR POINTS AT ISSUE

The main controversies after the Brno meeting related to the same questions as prior to the occupation, namely, parity and majority-domi­ nation in the federal organs, and the distribution of competence between federal and national organs.16 Subsequent discussions had resolved some differences, but also pinpointed persistent conflicts. Even the title of the new federal state, for instance, became a bone of contention, with Czechs favoring the retention of the previous title and Slovaks proposing a new one, the Federative Czechoslovak Socialist Republic.17 The timing of the establishment of federation was still a source of controversy, with Slo­ vaks opposing any postponement beyond January 1st of the federation's coming into existence and arguing for provisional arrangements there­ after until elections could be held. The Czechs, convinced that without elections federation could not be effectively implemented, wanted a more flexible deadline, linked with elections, and a gradual establishment of the new federal and national organs.18 As to substantive matters, there were not only differences among Czechs, and to a lesser extent among Slovaks, but also a clash between the government's viewpoint, as ex­ pressed in the draft constitutional law, which approached in many re15

CNR Stanovisko, RP, Sept. 20; Cisar, ibid., Oct. 3; Jicinsky, Mlada fronta, Oct. 4. The CNR Stanovisko described the position of Moravia and Silesia and of the regions as a domestic matter for the Czech republic and promised to consider Moravian ideas of samosprava in preparing the future administrative organization of the republic. Jicinsky flatly stated that no change in the regional system was possible under existing conditions (Pravnik, no. 12, 1968, p. 1054). The govern­ ment's draft constitutional law did not refer to Moravia or the national committees. The joint Stanovisko referred to a new law on national committees in two or three years, and certain specific changes to be introduced, on the suggestion of the two national councils, by Oct. 28. 16 The differences were set forth by Rebro, NS, Sept. 26; Grospic and Hatala, Rep., Oct. 9-16; A. Psenicka, Politika, Oct. 17; Laco, Pravda, Oct. 18. For expositions of Czech views, see the CNR Stanovisko; Jicinsky, CNR speech, Pravnik, no. 12 (1968), pp. 1050-57; Cisar, RP, Oct. 3, 9; Grospic, Νονά mysl, nos. 9-10 (1968), pp. 1103-6. For Slovak views, see Rebro, NS, Sept. 26; Hatala and Koctuch, Pravda, Sept. 27; Koctuch, JVS, Oct. 10; Law Faculty, Komensky University, Pravda, Oct. 10; M. Gaspar, NS, Oct. 17; J. Ferianc, NS, Oct. 24. 17 SNR, Pravda, Oct. 24. ι» Jicinsky, Pravnik, no. 12 (1968), p. 1056.

861

APPENDIX C

spects the Slovak standpoint, and the attitude of other Czech official spokesmen. There were also divergent opinions within the various assembly committees, and perhaps within the government, and differences among these official organs. Ultimate agreement, it was clear, would require, within a very short space of time, complicated and difficult negotiations and a willingness to compromise on both sides. The differences, to be discussed in greater detail in the following pages, reflected persisting diversity concerning the underlying principles of the federal system. Slovaks continued to emphasize the principles of "national equality," expressed in parity and a ban on majority-domination in federal organs, and of self-determination, expressed in wide authority for the Slovak organs, thus seeking to achieve maximum influence in decision-making in the center, and maximum control of their own affairs in Slovakia. The Czechs, on the other hand, stressed the principle of democracy, or rule by the majority, and firm central powers, thus seeking to achieve a maximum of unity and uniformity in all spheres of political action and to assure the efficient functioning of the federal organs. Both sides professed a willingness to accept a compromise between these opposed principles and objectives but found it difficult in fact to reconcile conflicting views. This was most clearly exemplified in the economic sphere in the difficult problem of striking a balance between all-state integration and national economic independence. The Czech Stanovisko, for instance, devoted much attention to the desirability of attaining economic integration, economic equalization, a unified market, uniform currency and tax policies, and a common approach to economic reform. Although recognizing that all tasks of economic policy not assigned to the federal organs would be within the province of the national organs, the Standpoint urged that federal institutions should have the necessary competence to fulfill their tasks, and warned against "absolutizing" the ban on majoritydomination, especially in economic politics, "so as not to affect the efficiency of direction and the flexibility of the economy." Slovak experts, however, while stressing the desirability of "a higher synthesis of the two national economies," warned against measures that would take key branches out of the Slovak national economy and thus deprive self-determination of "its basic economic dimension."19 The government draft sought to bridge the gap between these concepts, at least in words, by warning that "the unified market, advantageous for both partners, objectively required that the independence of the economic policy of the national organs should not be absolutized, that economic integration should not be weakened and that the mobility of the federal organs be assured. 19

862

Hatala and Koctuch, Pravda, Sept. 27; Koctuch, NS, Oct. 10.

APPENDIX C

On the other hand, it did not require an excessive centralization of competence in the federal organs. This economic system will create the conditions for a flexible economic policy, respecting the diversity of conditions (level of development, structure, etc.) and variegated forms of integration."20 These divergent points of departure expressed themselves more concretely in clashes of opinion concerning the role and the procedures of the federal organs. With regard to the National Assembly, Czechs and Slovaks had reached agreement on the desirability of a two-chamber body, which would reconcile the principles of democratic rule and national equality. Although some Czechs continued to advocate a singlechamber parliament,21 most had accepted the bicameral system, on condition, however, that the two chambers would be clearly distinguished, both as to their competence and the manner of their formation. It was proposed that the Chamber of the People should be directly elected by popular vote and should have authority in all spheres of federal jurisdiction. The Chamber of Nations, on the other hand, should be composed of delegations from the two national councils, and should deal only with questions relating to national interests, including constitutional matters. The need for a qualified majority in certain cases affecting national interests was recognized. This scheme, in the Slovak view, would reduce the Chamber of Nations to hardly more than a "formality" and assign the main authority to the Chamber of the People, with its Czech majority. Their preference was for two houses of equal status, both directly elected, and taking an equal part in legislation in all spheres of activity. This would assure that Slovak interests and opinions could be clearly articulated, and would in effect give Slovak representatives a veto power in all questions. In Czech eyes this would make the Chamber of the People, representing the population as a whole, a "useless" body since the real power would lie with the national delegations.22 This suggested to some the desirability of reverting to the idea of a one-chamber legislature. Slovaks were just as convinced that theirs was the "only solution" that would guarantee equality in the federal parliament. If it were not accepted, the whole question of the division of jurisdiction and the composition of the federal government would have to be reexamined.23 20 NS, Oct. 10. See the detailed formulation of the economic aspects of federation in the joint Stanovisko. 21 Psenicka (Politika, Oct. 17) referred to a minority report, supported by 31 members of the CNR, favoring this. 22 Cisar, RP, Oct. 3. 23 Hatala and Laco, NS, Oct. 10; Laco, Pravda, Oct. 18. The government draft law provided for equality of competence of the two chambers, as the Slovaks wished, but required the indirect election of the Chamber of Nations and a

863

APPENDIX C

This controversy raised other problems concerning the assembly, notably the procedures for a vote of confidence or non-confidence, and for settling deadlocks. The Czechs proposed, and Slovaks opposed, a provision that a qualified majority of the Chamber of the People would have the right to adopt a vote of non-confidence; the Slovaks proposed, and the Czechs rejected, a provision which permitted either house alone to do so. In cases of dispute, where no solution had been reached in "agreement procedures," the Czechs favored the application of the rule of a simple, or perhaps a qualified, majority. The Slovaks suggested other measures, including in the last resort a vote of non-confidence in the government or the dissolution of the assembly. Differences also persisted concerning the structure and operation of the government. Although the Slovaks preferred full parity, they were willing to accede to something less, namely, that state secretaries be appointed, as full members of the government, in all departments, and that parity be required in all federal committees.24 They apparently were ready to accept the principle of decisions by majority vote in the executive organ.25 They advocated a constitutional endorsement of the principle of the "balanced" appointment of Czechs and Slovaks to head up mutually related departments, so as to assure Slovaks key posts in important spheres of activity.26 The Czechs were unconditionally opposed to full parity in the government, arguing that this would make federal administration "clumsy" and "complex" and create the danger of immobility.27 Although originally they had been willing to accept state secretaries only in the two departments dealing with exclusive affairs (foreign affairs and defense) they had by this time agreed to such posts in all federal ministries (although not in federal committees), and to parity representation in some federal 3/5 majority vote in both houses in constitutional questions. A simple majority in both parts of the Chamber of Nations was required in a long series of cases where "majority-domination" was forbidden, including laws concerning plans, budgets, currency questions, taxation, etc. A vote of non-confidence could be adopted by a majority in either house. There was also a provision for parity within the National Assembly presidium. 24 See Gaspar, NS, Oct. 17, for full treatment of this question. 25 Cf., however, G. Olah (Pravda, Oct. 5) who proposed the requirement of a 2/3 vote if there were opposition on national grounds. 26 Koctuch, NS, Oct. 10. Thus if a Slovak were Minister of Foreign Affairs, a Czech would be Minister of National Defense; if a Czech headed the bank of issue, a Slovak would be Minister of Finance, etc. According to Koctuch, the Brno conference had demonstrated the need for a government of no more than eighteen members, including a chairman, two deputy chairmen, ten ministers, and five state secretaries. A Czech proposal, he reported, envisaged a government including thirteen to fourteen Czechs, and six to seven Slovaks. 27 Jicinsky, Pmvnik, no. 12 (1968), pp. 1053-54. 864

APPENDIX C

committees.28 They accepted the need, as did the Slovaks, for proportionate representation of Slovaks in the federal administrative service. The actual composition of the federal government, and the manner of determining and creating the individual ministries and other organs, were also sources of dispute, relating, however, more to the thorny problem of federal competence. On the division of competence, there was consensus on the three types of jurisdiction (exclusively federal, common, and exclusively national), and on the assignment of certain spheres to these categories, but there was not yet agreement on some matters of general principle or on the locus of authority in certain fields. The Czechs contended that the constitutional law should settle the division of competence only in terms of general principle, leaving it to later laws to delimit the exact spheres. Similarly the constitutional law on federation should establish only the "types and character" of federal organs, especially ministries and committees, and future statutes would establish the individual ministries. In areas where national authority would be exclusive, the Czechs insisted on the maintenance of a unified legal order, to be assured through federal committees, a supreme federal court as the highest judicial instance, and a federal general procuracy. The Slovak position was diametrically opposed on all these issues. The exact distribution of competence and the formation of individual ministries should be included in the draft constitutional law, and should not be left to later ordinary laws. The distribution of authority would thus be firmly established from the beginning, avoiding future conflicts and preventing easy later changes. Legal unity could be safeguarded through consultation or coordinating committees and did not require a federal judicial system, apart from a constitutional court.29 It was still more difficult to settle opposing views concerning certain specific spheres of government action and the appropriate federal ministries and committees. Pressures from existing ministries and Czech de28 The government's draft law provided for state secretaries in all departments, parity in all federal committees, but a simple majority vote in the government. 29 The government draft law left open the question as to whether federal ministries would be created by laws requiring a majority in both parts of the Chamber of Nations or by ordinary laws. It set forth detailed provisions for a constitutional court, but left the judicial structure to be defined later by separate constitutional laws. Although accepting the three main categories of competence, the draft also provided for different kinds of legislative competence for the National Assembly. This included not only competence in areas of exclusive and common federal jurisdiction, but also in certain matters where administration was in exclusive national hands. Although the draft law purported to set forth only "basic criteria" for the division of competence, in fact it prescribed extensive federal authority in all common affairs (arts. 10 to 24), and gave a long listing of federal ministries (4) and federal committees (6, of which 2 were not settled) (art. 77).

865

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mands for strong federal authority often clashed with Slovak desires for unfettered national control. According to Koctuch agreement had been reached at Brno in early October on five federal ministries: defense and foreign affairs (exclusive); planning, finance, and foreign trade (common); and on five federal committees: labor and social affairs, prices, transport, post and telecommunications, and internal affairs. He also reported that no federal committees would be established in technology, internal trade, and agriculture and food, assigning these to exclusive national organs.30 The government draft law envisaged a somewhat different structure, adding a Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, and listing as possibilities federal committees for industry and domestic trade, and science and technology. It also provided for a parity-based organ in the Federal Bank.31 It had been agreed that there would be no Ministry of Culture, and that there would be both federal and national Commissions of People's Control.32 In other areas, such as health, industry, domestic trade, technology, construction, agriculture, and even security, continuing discussion had led to no consensus as to whether federal committees would be established or not.33 Some Slovaks pressed hard for purely national organs in suchfields,as well as in justice and transport.34 They also proposed that international relations should be a "common," rather than exclusively federal, responsibility, and that appropriate national organs be set up.35 FEDERATION ENACTED

The final stage of deliberations began in mid-October when the debate was transferred to the National Assembly, particularly to its committees, which met jointly and separately, with spokesmen of the two councils present and taking an active part, and then to the committees and plenary sessions of the CNR and SNR.36 These discussions revealed cleavages on important issues and persistent doubts as to whether the full federation law could be completed by the deadline of October 28 or 30 JVS, Oct. 10. Koctuch complained that these questions were later reopened by the Czechs and by the government (ibid., Nov. 28). 3 i NS, Oct. 10. 32 RP, Sept. 19; Pravda, Oct. 16; S. Gasparik, RP, Sept. 25, Oct. 17. 33 For instance, RP, Oct. 5, 9, 16, 17, 22, 24, 27; Pravda, Oct. 16. 34 Pravda, Oct. 2; Sept. 23, 25, Oct. 2, 11. The Minister of Transport was criticized for his resistance to the proposal of Slovak control of their own railway system, which they strongly urged. 35 Ibid., Oct. 14. A secretariat for international relations was established in the SNR presidium (ibid., Oct. 1). 36 For assembly committees, RP, Oct. 5, 9, 12, 15-17, 22-23; for the CNR's organizational committee, ibid., Oct. 12, 17; for its plenary session, ibid., Oct. 24, 25; for the SNR, Pravda, Oct. 22, 24. Jicmsky reported that some 300 suggestions had come in from the public. The SNR received some 1,000 proposals for change.

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APPENDIX C

whether a "framework" law should be approved on that date, leaving detailed settlement until later. There were also doubts as to whether the federal system could be inaugurated by January 1st in the absence of elections to the new representative bodies. The government offered a mediating proposal which apparently came closer to the Slovak viewpoint than to the Czech.37 The Slovak National Council in its meeting of October 23 reiterated its familiar views and appointed a delegation, under Klokoc, to defend these in Prague. A stormy debate in the Czech National Council on the morning of October 24 was followed by negotiations with the government in the afternoon, and this in turn led to an acceptance of the government's mediation proposal and of the January 1st deadline. It was resolved, however, that the Czech delegation to the final sessions of the assembly's constitutional and legal committee should continue to defend the Czech position and if no agreement ensued, should propose the postponement of a decision. The climax was reached at a meeting of the government on October 24, when, with delegations of the two councils present, a compromise proposal was adopted, endorsing the establishment of federal committees for industry, and for agriculture and food, and the indirect elections of the Chamber of Nations.38 Even then the assembly's committees still had a part to play. On October 25 the constitutional and legal committee accepted the two additional federal committees, but postponed its decision on the other recommendation.39 Finally, in a concluding joint meeting of the parliamentary committees on October 26 (unreported), the direct system of electing the Chamber of Nations was reintroduced and the agreed draft approved. The constitutional law was then adopted without serious debate, and by unanimous vote in the plenary session of the National Assembly on Sunday, October 27.40 The ceremonial signing of the law on federalization followed on October 30 in the Bratislava Castle, the restoration of which was completed just in time for the occasion. The constitutional law was achieved, as Professor Viktor Knapp admitted, in spite of "the pressure of time," a "disturbing stubbornness" on both sides, and "the inadequacies of preparations."41 Moreover, it was 37 Laco, Pravda, Oct. 24. According to Laco, the government proposal accepted the indirect election of the Chamber of Nations, the establishment of federal organs by constitutional law, the retention of the present title of the country, and a constitutional provisorium until elections were held, and added industry, and agriculture and food, to the category of common affairs. 38 39 RP, Oct. 25. Ibid., Oct. 26. 40 For speeches on this occasion, see RP and Pravda, Oct. 28. The author was privileged to attend this historic session held in the Spanish Hall of the Prague Castle. 41 KP, Oct. 28. For text of law, Sb'irka zakonit, no. 143/1968. For a summary, see Pravda, Nov. 1, and for a detailed analysis in a series of nine articles, RP, Nov. 5-19, passim. See also the booklet, with text and commentary, by J. Chova-

867

APPENDIX C

negotiated in the difficult environment produced by the Soviet occupation. It is not known whether there was direct Soviet intervention in the last weeks of debate, and hence impossible to judge whether any such interference may have affected the ultimate form of federation. The document was certainly the product of intense controversy in the three months after the occupation and represented a genuine compromise between Czech and Slovak views. In the following brief analysis of the text, indication is given of those elements in the law enacted which represented a primarily Czech (C) or Slovak (S) point of view.42 The new state, its title unchanged (C), was described as "a voluntary union of equal national states," based on "the right of self-determination" of each nation and on "their will . . . to live in a common federative state" (S). Sovereignty would rest with each republic, as well as with the federal republic as a whole. Although the 1960 constitution remained valid, large sections, including the whole of chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6, and many other individual articles, were replaced by the constitutional law (S). A new constitution was to be introduced later, as well as constitutions for each of the republics (S). The individual republics, through their own independent organs of government, were to exercise a broad range of exclusive powers including education, culture, justice, health, trade, construction, forest and water resources, and the supervision of the national committees (S). The federal organs, on the other hand, were to possess a limited number of exclusive powers, encompassing, in addition to foreign affairs and defense, federal state material reserves, federal legislation and administration, and the protection of constitutionality. But there was to be a wide array of "common affairs," not initially envisaged by the Slovaks, including certain areas, such as agriculture and food, and industry, which were to the last minute regarded by them as exclusively national (C). 43 Moreover, the federal organs were assigned substantial authority in the common economic spheres through articles 10 to 26, empowering them to establish "general principles" and to encourage "coordination" of action (C) .44 Federal power was further enhanced by the definition of the comnec, L. Kacer, S. Matousek, and R. Trella, CSSR: Federativny socialisticky Stat (Bratislava, 1969). 42 These designations are approximate only. Some original Slovak views had come to be accepted by Czechs, and vice versa. 43 The common affairs listed in art. 8 were: planning, finance, currency issue, price questions, foreign economic relations, industry,* agriculture and food,* transport, post and telecommunications, science and technology, labor, wages and social policy, social and economic information, legal settlement of the socialist enterprise,* normalization, weights and measures and patent rights, internal order and state security, press and other information media.* The ones starred* were added to the government's original draft law. 44 Cernik laid great stress on the factors making for unity in his address (RP, 868

APPENDIX C

petence of the National Assembly (arts. 36-39) which was given the right to legislate, not only in regard to exclusive and common affairs, but also in spheres where the executive power rested solely with the repub­ lics (e.g. family law, civil and criminal law, higher education laws, etc.) or where "the unity of the legal order" required it (e.g. health, educa­ tion, association and assembly, nationality and religion, etc.) (C). 4 5 In addition, the powers allocated to the President were substantial, thus giv­ ing him "a quite powerful position" (C).46 Although the Slovaks had yielded substantial power to the federal organs, they had attained many, although not all, of their demands con­ cerning their status at the center. The National Assembly was to consist of two chambers, equal in status and competence (S), and both directly elected (S). Each house would have to pass a proposed law by a simple majority, or in certain defined spheres, mainly constitutional, by a threefifths majority (S). In other areas, embracing most federal economic activities, laws had to be approved in the Chamber of Nations by a ma­ jority of deputies elected in each of the two republics, voting separately (art. 42) (S). This was also true of the ratification of the government's program and of a vote of confidence in the government (S). A vote of non-confidence, on the other hand, could be adopted by a simple major­ ity in the Chamber of the People or in either section of the Chamber of Nations.47 In the event of different decisions by the two chambers, agree­ ment proceedings were to be conducted by a parity committee, and if this failed, the dissolution of the assembly might follow, at the discretion of the President (S). Finally, the presidium of the National Assembly was to be formed on the basis of parity, and with the same safeguards against majority-domination as applied to the assembly as a whole (S). These provisions, taken together, did not grant full parity nor the complete ban on majorization demanded by the Slovaks, but afforded them substantial safeguards against outvoting and assured them a powerful position in the enactment of all-state legislation. In the government parity was not established (C), and a simple majority vote was sufficient for a decision (C). State secretaries were, 48 however, to be appointed in all ministries (art. 67) (S). Federal organs Oct. 28). In this "sensitive sphere," wrote certain commentators, there would be need for "intimate cooperation" of the federal and republican governments so as to "avoid possible conflict situations by preventive political measures" (Chovanec et al., p. 66). 45 4β Chovanec et al., pp. 47-48. RP, Nov. 8. 47 This could mean, in the Chamber of Nations, a vote of only 38 Czech or Slovak deputies (ibid., Nov. 7). 48 The state secretaries were described not as persons of Czech or Slovak na­ tionality but as "citizens" of the Czech or Slovak Republic. It was not excluded, therefore, although unlikely, that a state secretary might not be of the opposite nationality.

869

APPENDIX C

were not listed in the constitutional law (C), as had been proposed in the draft, but were to be formed by separate constitutional laws, requiring a three-fifths majority (S). Other federal organs, such as the bank of issue, were to be established by an ordinary law, subject to the ban on majorization. Federal committees were to be based on parity (S), with the possibility of an appeal by the minister, or by "one of its national parts," to the government as a whole (art. 82). A constitutional court was to be established, as the Slovaks had urged, in the constitutional law itself and was to be composed on a parity basis (S). Its purpose was primarily to watch over the constitutionality of actions taken by both federal and republican organs and to settle disputes over jurisdiction, but it was also to protect the rights of citizens against decisions of the federal organs. It was empowered to make suggestions for the improvement of federal or republican legislation, thus giving it a significant influence in the promotion of uniformity of the legal order.49 Republican constitutional courts were to be established later (S), and other courts and the procuracy were to be settled by a special constitutional law (C). IMPLEMENTING FEDERATION

The constitutional law on federation was welcomed by both Czechs and Slovaks. The Slovaks saw it as the culmination of their long struggle for national equality and as a repudiation of any thought of separation.50 Husak, in a speech at the ceremonial signing, declared that the "idea of a common Czechoslovak state" was deeply rooted in Slovak consciousness and that there should "never be any doubt, today or in future, either at home or in the world," of Slovak intentions.51 Czech commentators characterized the law as strengthening the stability of the common state, but noted persisting Czech doubts, aggravated by the absence of adequate time for the crystallization of Czech opinion.52 It was generally recognized, however, that the adoption of the statute was only the first stage in introducing the federal system and that its consummation on January 1 would require many complex organizational steps. This second stage, just like the first, had to be accomplished in a relatively short time and under the unfavorable conditions of the occupation. The impossibility of holding elections in these circumstances meant that certain transitional measures would have to be taken. These were set forth in the 49

RP, Nov. 13. For instance, articles by F. VaseSka, M. Kusy, J. Spisiak, and D. M. Krno, NS, Oct. 31; Husak, ibid., Nov. 7; R. Olsinsky, Politika, Nov. 7. si RP, Oct. 31. 52 Z. Eis, Rep., Oct. 23-30; Ji&'nsky, Politika, Oct. 24; Cisar, RP, Oct. 28; M. Filip, ibid., Oct. 31; J. Lipavsky, ibid., Nov. 1. 50

870

APPENDIX C

law itself and provided for the National Assembly to continue in exis­ tence as the new Chamber of the People, for the Chamber of Nations to be formed by indirect delegation from the two national councils, and for the two councils to expand their own membership by cooptation. The preparatory work for the inauguration of federation on January 1 involved the adoption of a whole series of laws, including the crucial con­ stitutional law concerning the formation of federal ministries and com­ mittees. From late November the preparation of these measures pro­ ceeded in the government, the assembly committees, and finally in plenary sessions of the assembly in late December.53 Although press re­ ports were terse and uninformative, they revealed continuing differences, in particular as to whether federal organs should be established in certain spheres or not. For instance, five of the assembly committees, and most of the CNR committees, urged a federal committee for health, but this was opposed by the government and the decision was postponed for later legislation. There were disputes over whether there should be a federal committee for press and information, as proposed by the government, or merely an office, as suggested by the CNR.54 The Slovaks voiced com­ plaints concerning what they deemed to be an expansion of federal com­ petence contrary to the federation law.55 They demanded increased Slo­ vak representation in the federal administrative organs, where they were grossly underrepresented.56 There were also those who advocated that Slovak influence should be assured in treaty-making and that national organs in the sphere of international relations be established.57 The outcome was a batch of federal laws passed in late December 1968 just in time to make possible the inauguration of federation in Jan­ uary. The important constitutional law on federal ministries and commit­ tees (Sb. ζ., no. 171) established seven ministries, each with a state secretary, and seven federal committees. Two were exclusively federal: foreign affairs and national defense. Five were common: interior, plan­ ning, finance, foreign trade, and labor and social affairs. The federal committees were as follows: prices, technical and investment develop­ ment, industry, agriculture and food, transport, posts and telecommuni­ cations, and press and information. A separate law on federal commit­ tees provided that these would be organized on the basis of parity and headed by a minister-chairman, with a deputy chairman of another na53

RP, Nov. 26-28; Dec. 4 on; Dec. 19-22. Ibid., Dec. 5, 10, resp. Klokoc, ibid., Nov. 15; M. Mitosinka, NS, Dec. 12. 56 J . Mesko, Pravda, Nov. 15. There were only 521 Slovaks of 14,000 employees (i.e. 3.7 percent) in the federal organs, he reported. Slovaks numbered only 15 of 109 deputy ministers; 53 of 605 directors and division heads; and 39 of 1,144 department heads. 57 J. Tomko and J. Azud, NS, Dec. 12. Cf. J. Cierny, Pravda, Nov. 28. 54 55

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tionality (Sb. ζ., no. 172). 58 Another law stipulated that Czechoslovak citizenship was derived from citizenship in either of the two republics, to be determined normally by the place of birth (Sb. z., no. 165). A federal statute defined the city of Brno as "an independent territorialadministrative entity," with its own national committee directly under the government of the Czech republic, and described in detail the assis­ tance to be offered by the Czech government and its organs in assuring the development of the city and of its neighboring territory (Sb. z., no.175). The two national councils were confronted with a huge agenda to be completed in the short interim before January I. 5 9 Both had to expand their membership by cooptation and to elect delegates to the Chamber of Nations. Both had to consider and approve the draft federal laws and elaborate their own legislative measures, for example, concerning rules of procedure, citizenship, etc.60 Most important of all, the councils had to determine the number of national ministries and their spheres of activ­ ity. The CNR finally decided to establish seventeen ministries, plus a Price Office.61 The Slovaks at first had contemplated the same number of ministries, but as a result of public criticism of excessive bureaucracy, reduced the number to fifteen.62 58

Another law established a Federal Statistical Office, with a chairman and deputy chairman of the two nationalities, and with a parity council, and an Ad­ ministration of Federal Material Reserves, and prolonged the existence of cer­ tain agencies, including the State Bank, until later legislative settlement (Sb. z., no. 170). The Czech and Slovak Insurance and State Savings institutions were divided into two Czech and Slovak agencies (Sb. z., nos. 162-63). The state budget for 1969 was also adopted, with provision for its reworking into three separate budgets, in agreement with the Czech and Slovak governments, by May 31 (Sb. z., no. 158). Federal competence was established in specified areas of internal affairs and security (Sb. z., no. 166) and in the formulation of the general prin­ ciples for, and the legislative regulation of, press and other information media, including publishing enterprises (Sb. z., no. 167). All references to Sb. z. in text and notes are to 1968, unless otherwise noted. 59 See interviews with Cisar, RP, Nov. 14; Klokoc, ibid., Nov. 15 and Pravda, Nov. 13. 60 For rules of procedure, Sb. z., CNR, no. 1; SNR, no. 204. For citizenship laws, Sb. z., SNR, no. 206; CNR, no. 39/1969. 61 Sb. z., CNR, no. 2. The law listed the ministries and defined the primary function of each. The ministries were: planning, finance, labor and social affairs, construction and technology (originally construction and building), education, culture, youth and physical training, health, justice, interior, industry, building, agriculture and food, forest and water resources, transport, posts and telecom­ munication, and commerce. In addition there was to be a Czech Statistical Office, a Price Office, etc. 62 Sb. z., SNR, no. 207. See also Husak, Pravda, Dec. 23. The ministries were the same as those listed in the Czech law, without, however, the ministry for youth and physical training, and with transport, post and telecommunications combined. In addition the Slovak law established a Slovak Statistical Office, a Price Office, and an Office for Press and Information.

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APPENDIX C

Certain questions, such as the structure of the courts and new electoral laws, were left to future legislation. The decision on the territorialadministrative structure, in particular the fate of the regional committees, was also deferred. Differences of opinion on the latter questions were already evident. The Czechs were still uncertain about the future shape of the administrative system, including the place of Moravia.63 The Slovaks had already decided that a two-tier system of national committees was adequate and that the regional committees in Slovakia should be abolished as soon as possible.64 The shape of federation as embodied in these implementing laws was somewhat more centralist than had been originally expected and aroused some Slovak criticism.65 The leadership had evidently concluded that although the forms, and much of the reality, of the federal system were to be respected, special efforts must be made to strengthen the central powers and safeguard the unity of the legal and political order. Cernik, in a major speech at the CC plenum in mid-December, stressed "common interests," "integration," and "unified economic policy" and warned against "unhealthy disintegrating and centrifugal tendencies." Cernik also emphasized the responsibility of the federal organs for setting the basic policy through legislation and referred to the need for "advisory and coordinating organs" to assure the necessary unity in fields which were under national competence, such as education, health, etc.66 Ten days later, Husak expressed the opinion that the federation would "not weaken the firmness and unity of our common Czechoslovak state" and declared that the CPS "will strive for this all-state unity with all its means."67 A factor pointing in this same direction was the failure to carry through the original idea of federalizing the Communist Party. It is reported, without confirmation, that the Soviet authorities, although not opposing the establishment of the federal system, had forbidden the application of the same principle to the party. Certainly the congress of the Czech party was not held, even though delegates had been selected and 63 Cisar (RP, Nov. 15) mentioned as possibilities the establishment of regional administrations for certain spheres such as planning, education and health, and a special Ministry of Moravia and Silesia, with its seat in Brno. 64 CPS Central Committee decision, Pravda, Dec. 23; Husak, ibid. The regional committees were in fact abolished in July 1969 but restored again in Dec. 1970. See Robert W. Dean, Nationalism and Political Change in Eastern Europe (Denver, 1973), pp. 44-45. 65 Hatala, NS, Christmas, 1968; M. Lakatos, Zli*ek, Dec. 18. 66 RP, Dec. 13. Cf. the CC decision which also underlined the need for the closest cooperation of the two republics (ibid., Dec. 16). 67 CPS Central Committee, Pravda, Dec. 23. A strong trend toward recentralization began in Sept. 1969 and reached a high point in Dec. 1970 and Jan. 1971 (Dean, Nationalism, pp. 38-47).

873

APPENDIX C

preparations made. The joint Stanovisko of September 26 had referred openly to the need to establish federal forms in the National Front and the Communist Party. Other commentators, before and after the ratification of the constitutional law, regretted that there had been no opportunity for the Czech party, or for that matter, the Czechoslovak party as a whole, to discuss the project.68 The concept of federalizing the party was, however, replaced by an alternative: the forming of a bureau for the Czech lands in the CPCz Central Committee. This was announced on October 22 and created in November.69 The CPCz Central Committee, through the bureau and the Slovak CC, would perform, it was said, "an integrating function by linking together the national and international elements in the structure and life of the party."70 Dubcek dispelled any doubt that might remain. "Any breach of the unity of the party," he warned, "or of its all-state character, would be a serious error." The party can "best express and best co-create the integrated unity of Czechs and Slovaks, represent its international content, unify the national and all-society interests of the people, and represent the idea of Czechoslovak unity (ceskoslovenskost) in the best sense of the word."71 Clearly such a conception of the role of the party would deprive the federal state structure of much of its significance. There was, however, a much more serious drawback, namely, that the new federation was to be initiated not as a component of democratization, as originally anticipated, but within a political system in which the basic elements of democracy were lacking. For Czechs and for those Slovaks who had regarded democratization as the primary goal, and had considered federalization without this almost meaningless, this was a confirmation of their worst fears.72 Even for those Slovaks who had con68

Eis, Ji2insky, and others, cited above, n. 52. Presidium, Oct. 22, RSO, p. 328; CC decision, RP, Nov. 18 (also RSO, pp. 368-69, 371). This arrangement was described as "transitional" until the 14th congress. The bureau, headed by Strougal, was to prepare the eventual Czech founding party congress—a congress which was in fact never held. The position of the bureau was weakened somewhat in Dec. 1968, and it was ultimately abolished in May 1971. The unitary character of the party was stressed increasingly from June 1969 on (Dean, Nationalism, pp. 39-43). 70 Cf. Husak, RP, Oct. 31, on the party as "a politically integrating force." According to the CC decision, the CPCz's unity would be expressed in the common program, common membership and common statute, and in the binding character of CC decisions. 71 .RP, Oct. 31. Cf. Dubcek at CPS Central Committee, Pravda, Dec. 22. 72 Nevertheless, a poll of Slovak opinion in Feb. 1969 revealed that 61.4 percent believed that the creation of the Slovak republic would deepen the democratization process; only 14.5 percent did not agree. In response to a question as to whether the development of Slovakia would be quicker and better as a result, 57.3 percent replied affirmatively; 15.4 percent replied "neither better nor worse"; and 15.3 percent, "worse" (ZS, no. 19, May 7, 1969). The February poll also yielded the interesting result that 70 percent of those polled believed that the most positive 69

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APPENDIX C

sidered federalization as the primary goal, and democratization as secondary, the outcome was a severe disappointment. Could the theoretical sovereignty of the two republics, or of Czechoslovakia as a whole, have any substance in view of the limits on sovereignty imposed by the Soviet invasion? Moreover, if federation were to weaken the bonds between the two nations, some elements, within or outside the state, might be able to manipulate this disunity for their own purposes. If, on the other hand, federalization contributed to a strengthening of Czech-Slovak bonds, as many believed, the two nations could ward off this "mortal danger" by presenting a united front to "any efforts to divide us, from within or from outside."73 THE NATIONALITIES LAW

The idea of legal guarantees for the rights of the nationalities was not abandoned in the wake of the occupation but was embodied in a constitutional law adopted by the assembly at the same session at which the law on federation was enacted. The "loyal" attitude of the nationalities had been frequently noted and had provided a basis for improved relations, especially between Slovaks and Hungarians. Husak, in a major address to the Hungarian association, Csemadok, less than a month after the occupation, praised their reaction to the invasion and assured them of the passage of a federal law, as well as separate Czech and Slovak nationality laws, which would take cognizance of the different nationality problems of the two republics.74 In early October, a draft law elaborated by government experts and approved by the Slovak party Presidium, became, however, the subject of sharp controversy before its ultimate adoption, with some significant changes, on October 27.75 Its proposals were regarded as relatively satisfactory by the Hungarians but were censured by many sectors of the Slovak public as ignoring their demands and threatening national interests. element after January was the deepening of democratization (RP, March 20, 1969)—a result in sharp contrast to the usual assumption of the greater interest of Slovaks in federalization. 73 Jicmsky, Rep., Nov. 26-Dec. 3; Eis, ibid., Dec. 25. The quotation is from Eis. On this last point, see also Olsinsky, Politika, Nov. 7; M. Gosiorovsky, RP, Oct. 30. 74 Pravda, Sept. 12; NS, Sept. 12. For praise of the behavior of local Hungarians and Ukrainians during the invasion, see Pravda, Sept. 6; L. SuIc, RP, Sept. 23, Oct. 18. 75 Text of draft law, Pravda and RP, Oct. 4. For exposition and defense, V. Plevza, NS, Oct. 10. The Slovak National Council established a Commission for Nationalities, made up of deputies of Slovak, Hungarian, and Ukrainian nationality living in mixed areas. Its first task was to prepare a Slovak nationality law (Pravda, Oct. 5).

875

APPENDIX C

In particular, the guarantee of the right of citizens of the nationalities to receive instruction in their own language and to use their language in relations with offices and other state organs (art. 3) was said to endanger the position of Slovaks in the mixed regions of southern Slovakia. Since the draft law did not establish Slovak as the state language or require the Hungarians to learn Slovak in school, Slovaks would be forced to become bilingual or to leave these districts of their own homeland. This led to the reiteration of the demand for legislation establishing Slovak as the state language and to suggestions that the passage of the law be deferred to allow time for further discussion.76 The law finally adopted recognized four nationalities—Hungarian, German, Polish, and Ukrainian (Ruthenian)—as constituting, with the Czech and Slovak nations, "in an inseparable community," the working people as the source of state power, and assured them "participation in state power" and "effective guarantees of their further development."77 The nationalities were to be represented in proportion to their numbers in the representative bodies and other elected organs. The citizens of the four nationalities would be guaranteed the right to instruction in their own language; the right to full cultural development; the right to use their languages in official relations in regions inhabited by the relevant nationality; the right to associate in cultural organizations; and the right to a press and media of information in their languages. The extent and conditions of these rights would be defined by law. Each citizen would freely decide his nationality "according to his own conviction." All forms of pressure tending toward denationalization were forbidden. The constitutional law would be implemented by federal and national laws. The latter would designate the representative and executive bodies in which organs to guarantee the realization of nationality rights would be established.78 T0 For Hungarian approval, RP (Slovak ed.), Oct. 15. Ukrainians were less pleased, ibid., Oct. 12. For criticism by the Matica Slovenska, the Slovak Writer's Union, members of the Law Faculty of Komensky University, and in letters to the press, see RP (Slovak ed.), Oct. 9, 12; RP, Oct. 18 (K. Doudera); Pravda, Oct. 14, 22, 23. For a detailed critique, see J. Dorul'a, NS, Oct. 10. 77 Sb. z., 144/1968. The designation Ruthenian was not included in the original draft law. The Germans had not been mentioned in the 1960 constitution. The gypsies were not included in the nationality law, but in the meantime formed a Union of Gypsies (RP, Oct. 22, Nov. 1, Dec. 18). 78 The draft law had been stronger and more specific than the final text, assuring the nationalities "equal position and participation in the formation of the state will and in the performance of state power" and "legal guarantees of further development." Proportional representation in "political organs, representative bodies, and other state organs" and "an equal position in economic and cultural life" had been guaranteed. Moreover, the right to use their own languages in official relations had been expressed more generally, without reference to areas inhabited by the nationality. The "special organs" in the representative bodies and executive organs were also to "decide independently concerning their specific interests.'*

876

APPENDIX C

The nationalities law was greeted with relative satisfaction by Hungarian spokesmen and with considerable discontent by Slovaks. Csemadok, for instance, welcomed it as defining the nationalities, for the first time in a constitutional law, as "constitutional factors (statotvorni cinitele)" but regretted that it did not proclaim their political, economic, and cultural equality and did not guarantee their right to their own nationality organs or the right to proportional representation in executive as well as representative organs.79 Slovaks claimed that the law took no account of their earlier criticisms and hoped that the detailed provisions of the republican law would give protection to their interests.80 ™RP, Dec. 18. 80 Dorul'a, Pravda na weekend, Nov. 1. See also J. Mesko, Pravda, Oct. 30, Nov. 14.

877

APPENDIX D

Smrkovsky's Testimony THE FIRST personal account of 1968 by a major participant was given by Josef Smrkovsky some six years later, not long before his death in January 1974, in the form of a taped interview given from his hospital bed. It was published abroad in a weekly close to the Communist Party of Italy, Giorni: Vie nuove (Feb. 20 and after, 1975) and in its original Czech form in a special issue of Listy (March 1975, pp. 4-25). Extemporaneous in character, this memoir makes no startling revelations, but provides new information and personal judgments of considerable interest. This brief summary (to which reference has been added in a number of footnotes above) gives only important highlights of the document.

OCTOBER 1967-JANUARY

1968

Smrkovsky said little concerning the CC meetings or other events during this period, but described two conversations with Novotny just prior to the December plenum. In the first, Novotny informed him of changes he planned to make in the Presidium, including Smrkovsky's own appointment. Smrkovsky urged the need for more extensive changes, including the separation of the functions of the President and First Secretary, and suggested Lenart as the most suitable candidate for the latter post. A few days later Novotny told Smrkovsky that, on the advice of "old comrades," he had decided not to resign. Following the plenum, Smrkovsky learned indirectly of a conversation which three persons had with Mestek who reported that Novotny was determined to resist, using the army and the militia, and that warrants had been prepared for the arrest of certain persons, including Smrkovsky. The latter thereupon redrafted his plenum speech (prepared originally for the December sitting) in "more militant" terms and delivered it in January, referring in it to his conversations with Novotny. Concerning Brezhnev's visit, Smrkovsky sought in vain to learn the content of his talks with Novotny and was told that "Brezhnev listened . . . but refused to interfere in the matter—this was the well-known statement—'eto vashe dyelo.' " 878

APPENDIX D THE JANUARY DECISION AND AFTER

Concerning Dubcek's appointment, Smrkovsky heard that he was selected as the only person who would be acceptable to all and took the post unwillingly. Smrkovsky and others were dissatisfied with the CCs original intention not to give a report to the public and urged the issuance of a decision giving the main principles of future party policy. Thereafter they pressed for the speedy elaboration of a relatively simple provisional document on post-January policy and were disappointed that the Action Program was so lengthy and so much delayed. He, and others, were embarrassed when reporting to party organizations, not knowing "what to say, and what not to say." Hendrych finally informed them that they could speak of "all matters dealt with by the Central Committee" but without indicating the standpoint of individual members. Smrkovsky related his own efforts to secure the political rehabilitation of Husak in 1964 or 1965, when Novotny had agreed to appoint Husak as deputy Minister of Justice but had rejected certain conditions set by Husak. In mid-January 1968, Smrkovsky secured Dubcek's immediate approval of the idea of activizing Husak "on the state level" and prepared the way for his appointment to the government by conversations with Bil'ak and Husak in Bratislava. Smrkovsky stated that between January and March Svoboda visited him almost daily to inform himself concerning the political situation (of which he knew little, said Smrkovsky) and later traveled widely throughout the country. When he learned of the likelihood of Svoboda's becoming President in the event of Novotny's fall, Smrkovsky viewed it "on the whole positively," and later supported it. Moscow TALKS IN MAY The Czechoslovak delegates had to listen, he said, to an enumeration of Soviet complaints about events in Czechoslovakia (which he likened to the White Book) and sought to "deny or explain" these matters and to provide more substantial information. The Soviet delegates were not interested in "the imposing and spontaneous participation of the people" on May 1 st, involving millions, but only in meetings of KAN and K 231 attended by 50 to 100 people. They spoke only marginally of the April plenum and expressed reservations concerning the Action Program. "We saw they were not interested in facts or in our situation in its entirety but were seeking pretexts for a stand against us." Bil'ak argued for their position so that "we were three against five, not four against four." They demanded "strict administrative—I should say police—action against any 879

APPENDIX D

one who . . . was not fully in agreement . . . with party policy." We stressed that "we would gain control of the outburst of political activity by democratic discussion and negotiation but . . . would use administrative measures against extremes if things went beyond the bounds of law and discussion did not meet with success." Smrkovsky referred to their request for a Soviet loan of 400 to 500 million rubles, and if this were impossible, "a loan from the international bank or somewhere else" but "without political conditions." Kosygin promised to examine their request but expressed himself negatively as to the prospect of Czechoslovakia's exporting consumer goods either to the West or to the Soviet Union. The purpose of Soviet trade policy was, said Smrkovsky, "calculatedly political," designed to make "our economy . . . completely dependent" and to "subordinate us firmly to their policy." Smrkovsky denied that any warning of the possibility of military intervention was given either then or at any other meeting prior to August 20. "[There was] nothing from which one could logically deduce that their words could lead to military intervention. There were only criticisms and charges, everything possible, but a threat of such a kind—even indirect or veiled—I did not hear." THE MAY PLENUM

The Dubcek report and the plenum resolution were affected by "the spirit with which we came away from Moscow." Smrkovsky himself recognized the existence of "extremes and extremists" and published a sharp article against them (Rude pravo, May 19). He took the view that "if the radical extremists wanted to push things still further, toward some kind of conflict, . . . I would not have hesitated to use tough measures against all who threatened the very existence of the Republic." Although he recognized extremes on the right, Smrkovsky also stressed the extremes on the left, the conservatives or dogmatists, and regretted that the May resolution was predominantly directed against the right. This was due to "pressure from outside, from the Soviet Union." After the plenum, however, things quieted down, and "the prospect of a power clash practically disappeared from the horizon." THE TWO THOUSAND WORDS

Smrkovsky strongly opposed the conclusions drawn by this document and when Cernik informed him that he had been unable to convince the government to oppose it, he requested permission to attend a night session of this body. He warned that if the government did not take a firm 880

APPENDIX D

stand, "a different government" would do so a week later. He approved Cernik's eventual statement and issued one of his own. He recognized that the authors intended no harm, certainly not a counterrevolution, and that the declaration reflected "fears of the people that the old times could return"—fears, he said, which were shown to be justified by later events —and the inadequacy of the party's actions against the dogmatists. Smrkovsky told of a planned student demonstration against the Warsaw pact and of his own role in the preparation of measures by the Prague city committee to ward off this danger by persuasion, or by action by the militia if necessary. As a result, there was no meeting and no demonstration. PARLIAMENTARY DELEGATION TO MOSCOW

During this visit Smrkovsky spoke so openly of the problems at home that he was asked not to do so, since the Soviet people were "not enough informed" and "their heads would be confused." At his Moscow press conference, he spoke out clearly, for instance, on foreign loans, but almost nothing appeared in the Soviet press. He reported a private meeting with Brezhnev in which the latter expressed his dissatisfaction with Dubcek and implied that Smrkovsky had the responsibility for effecting a change. Smrkovsky defended Dubcek and "rejected the offer which was in fact made to me." THE WARSAW CONFERENCE

The meeting was "not a conference at all, but a summons to an accounting." Dubcek's description of the course of events before Warsaw at the CC in September 1969 was correct, he said. He reported a decision by the Presidium, he thought at Cernik's suggestion, that "our party Presidium should not leave the territory of our Republic." It was the Slovak Presidium which first proposed that they not go to Warsaw, a decision which was published in Rude pravo and Pravda on July 16 or 17 and brought to Prague by Bil'ak. (This did not in fact appear in either newspaper and seems most improbable.) CONFERENCE AT CIERNA

Their task, he said, was to defend the post-January program and to prevent a split with the Soviet Union. Brezhnev had "assistants on our Czechoslovak side"—Bil'ak, Kolder, Svestka, and others, who "spoke from the position of the Soviet arguments." The Soviet delegates were united. The talks were broken off at one point when Dubcek and others 881

APPENDIX D

left the meeting because of charges by Shelest that they were responsible for leaflets distributed in Subcarpathian Russia demanding its separation from the Soviet Union. Negotiations were resumed after the Soviet delegates apologized. The Soviet side raised six concrete demands: the removal of Kriegel from the National Front chairmanship, and of Cisar from his post as Secretary; a ban on the Social Democratic Party, and on KAN and K 231; and "the communications media." "We said . . . we did not wish to introduce censorship anew . . . but wished to do it democratically, to reach agreement—by the discipline of the journalists; we shall undertake the necessary steps in this direction. After our return from Cierna we talked much with them (the journalists) . . . and finally took various governmental measures to prevent various excesses in the communications media." Almost at once the Soviet side complained that the Czechs were not fulfilling the agreement. "There were no agreements; we said either that this was decided or that this will be decided and how it will be decided." Smrkovsky admitted that he did not know whether the Soviet leaders had "a completely clear idea of what would come next and how." He was not convinced that they had already decided upon military intervention. He realized that "it was not a matter of concrete particulars, but rather of the entire concept of our policy. That was the cause of everything that was done. But it was difficult to step forward and say: we are against democratization of the party; we are against democratization of the social order; we are against humanism; we are against modernization of the management of the socialist state. They could not take up such a stand. But this was in fact the issue. Everything they said there were pretexts; hence the difficulty in coming to an agreement. These were details which could not give reasons for a conflict of any kind, because we were solving or had resolved them." The Czechs urged Brezhnev to come to Czechoslovakia and see for himself. In Moscow Smrkovsky had complained that Chervonenko (the Soviet ambassador) was not informing Moscow correctly and urged his removal. Dubcek and Brezhnev had agreed to a meeting in Bratislava in a private talk at Cierna. At Bratislava there was no negotiation, but merely an editorial council which elaborated the declaration. PRESIDIUM—AUGUST

20-21

Smrkovsky's report on the final Presidium meeting is confined to the proceedings after the invasion. Both Dubcek and Cernik had "broken down" and "were not capable of acting." When discussions concerning 882

APPENDIX D

a standpoint to be made public reached no conclusion, Smrkovsky' demanded an end to further debate and called upon each member to vote for or against a communique drafted by Mlynar. The result was seven to four, Bil'ak and others opposing that part relating to the breach of the Warsaw pact and international law. Sadovsky and Piller, who as Secretaries, did not have a vote, expressed themselves in favor. Svoboda was present but without a vote, and did not express an opinion. The broadcast of the resolution was interrupted by Karel Hoffmann, and its publication in Rude pravo prevented by Svestka, but in each case, after receiving assurances from Smrkovsky, radio and newspaper employees took steps to assure that the Presidium's decision was made public. In spite of urgings, Smrkovsky and Dubcek refused to leave the CC building, and when the tanks arrived at 5:00 a.m., were confined, along with Spacek, Kriegel, and perhaps Simon, and later taken to Ruzyne airport. Smrkovsky, Spacek, and Kriegel were transported by plane to Legnica in Poland, and then to Subcarpathian Russia, where they were joined by Cernik, who had been flown from Prague with Dubcek. They were later called to Moscow to join Dubcek—first Cernik alone, and then Smrkovsky, Spacek, and Kriegel. THE MOSCOW TALKS

In Moscow Smrkovsky and Spacek met with Brezhnev, Kosygin, and Podgorny in the CC headquarters where they learned for the first time of the 14th Party Congress, of the general strike, and of the popular resistance from Brezhnev, who told them they must return and "liquidate" the congress. They were then taken to the Kremlin to join Dubcek and some twenty to thirty others. Mlynar informed them of the events in Czechoslovakia, including the congress. The negotiations were "chaotic," with Dubcek lying down most of the time in an adjacent room, suffering from heart trouble (as was Indra); the others in the "Dubcek camp" conducted the negotiations, constantly consulting Dubcek; others who had come to Moscow with Svoboda "wandered around and were always off somewhere." All, he admitted, had suffered a "nervous shock" and "wept," either in Prague, or in Moscow when they read in Russian the original Soviet draft: "one after the other they broke down." They found the Soviet draft protocol "absolutely unacceptable" and submitted their own. "Officially, so to speak formally, in all discussions no one in our delegation supported the original Soviet proposal. I do not know anyone who agreed with it, so that our rejection was unanimous." Smrkovsky, as head of a delegation, which included Lenart and Svestka, informed Ponomarev that they could not sign it, and were told that their draft was unacceptable to the Soviet Union. They managed to have some changes 883

APPENDIX D

made in the original draft, such as the omission of references to counterrevolution and "international aid," the addition of the word "temporarily" to the mention of troops "remaining," and the inclusion of a reference to the continuance of the post-January policy. When the Czechoslovaks informed Ponomarev that the protocol was still unacceptable and that they would not sign it, he replied that they would sign it in a week, or two weeks, or a month. No alternative was left but to take the Soviet draft as the basis of negotiations and to seek "tiny corrections." Only Kriegel refused to sign the document when it was taken to him in another building, and again when he was brought to the Kremlin. At the final session the talks were close to breakdown when Dubcek sought to reply to Brezhnev's renewed charges and were saved only by the intervention of Svoboda who urged that "they take the protocol and begin to discuss it point by point, word by word. He said that all will be well and that when the Soviet troops . . . leave our land, they will be inundated with flowers." "So in the end we signed it. . . . We all hesitated. I hesitated long—should I? should I not? . . . Today it would be difficult to say who resisted more or who was more willing to sign, because we all more or less resisted. No one wanted to. . . . In my address (after returning home) I said that history will sometime judge whether we did well or whether we committed treason. I do not know. But under the circumstances in which we were, I acted on my own decision. But I long, long hesitated." Only later, after the signing, did they learn that Ulbricht, Gomufka, Kadar, and Zhivkov were there and that "everything had been agreed" with them. When told that the others wished to drink a glass of cognac with them, the Czechoslovak delegates firmly refused, saying that they did not want even to see them, let alone drink together. Even at this point the entire agreement was threatened again when they learned that the Soviet leaders did not want to permit Kriegel to return to Prague, as originally promised. In a new conversation between Dubcek, Svoboda, Cernik, and Smrkovsky, and Brezhnev, Kosygin, Podgorny, and Suslov, Dubcek declared that they would not return home without Kriegel. The Soviet representatives eventually yielded, and Kriegel was waiting in the plane at the airport. THE RETURN HOME

For ten days the delegates lived in the Castle. Meetings were held with the government, with the assembly, and with the party officials elected at the 14th congress. Dubcek had to inform the latter of the provision of the Moscow protocol that the congress should not be recognized. "The negotiation was very complex, complicated, and emotional—in effect it 884

APPENDIX D

was designed to overturn the result of the congress." In the end Dubcek's conclusions were accepted. Smrkovsky had to report to parliament and to negotiate with General Pavlovsky concerning the removal of wall inscriptions all over Prague. Major addresses to the nation were given. Smrkovsky's speech awakened dissatisfaction in Moscow. He was convinced that everything depended on maintaining unity between the leadership and the people. Unity within the leadership began to crumble in September and culminated in the crisis surrounding his exclusion from the chairmanship of the assembly.

885

APPENDIX E

The Mlynar Memorandum Zdenek Mlynar, in early 1975, prepared a memorandum on the theory and practice of reform in 1968 which included a critique of the reform leadership. Dated January-February 1975, signed by the author, and entitled "Teorie a praxe pokusu ο reformu politickeho systemu socialismu ν Ceskoslovensku roku 1968," it circulated in typescript (249 pp.) in Czechoslovakia and was sent abroad for publication in Czech and other languages. It was intended to provide a basis for dis­ cussion of the Czechoslovak question among the Communist Parties of Europe at a forthcoming conference. The document is significant as the first critical analysis by a leading scholar who was also in the ranks of the top leadership. His comments are relevant to many of the issues discussed in the conclusion of this book (which was completed before the memorandum became available). No page references are given owing to its typewritten form. The first part, entitled "The Theoretical Conception of the Optimal Development of the Political System of Socialism," was devoted to a de­ fense of the work of the Mlynar team on political reform and of his own views in this respect (see chap, iv, n. 97, and chap, xn, n. 100). Highly polemical in tone, it was directed against Jaroslav Matejicek, and his article "Criticism of the right-wing revisionist construction of a 'new model' of the political system in the CSSR," Pravnik, no. 9 (1974). Mlynaf, citing his own writings of 1967 and 1968, reasserted his concep­ tion of pluralism under the leadership of the party. Although admitting that a two-party system was an optimal solution, he repeated his earlier denial of the feasibility or the desirability of such a system in Czecho­ slovak circumstances. Mlynar stressed the fact that the team's work was in its initial phase only. Its tentative conceptions were embodied, in most positive form, in the Action Program. The second, longer, part of the memorandum, entitled "Political Prac­ tice and the Actual Development of the Political System in Czechoslo­ vakia in the Year 1968," was a systematic analysis of certain crucial as­ pects of the movement for reform and of the strategy and tactics of the CPCz leadership. Apart from the issues discussed below, the memoran­ dum also contained a discussion of the social forces involved (in par­ ticular the working class and the intelligentsia) and the situation within the party, relevant to chapters xvi and XVII of this book. 886

APPENDIX E

Mlynar contended that what was involved in 1968 was a reform, not a revolution, and strongly denied that there was any tendency toward a restoration of capitalism or any threat of counterrevolution. He rejected charges that the CPCz leadership had lost control of the situation and emphasized the overwhelming support of reform by the population and the widespread public participation. He admitted that there were serious differences of opinion within the party, and some opposition to the reform, but was convinced that these problems would have been solved at the 14th Party Congress. He considered the Action Program a realistic solution of the most pressing problems and condemned "radical" elements who sought to go beyond it. Because of the distortion of socialism after 1948, pre-revolutionary ideas of bourgeois democracy had come to the fore, and a certain "idealization of the First Republic" had taken place. This tendency was, in Mlynar's view, a positive support for the policy of democratizing socialism, and removed the danger of violence which might have occurred had such traditions been absent. Although recognizing faults on the part of the leaders, Mlynar left no doubt that the responsibility for the military intervention rested, not with them, but with the Soviet leaders. Mlynar was sharply critical of the "radical" wing of the intelligentsia, expressing itself principally in the mass media. The radicals did not recognize that politics was "the art of the possible" and created difficulties for the leadership, especially in the international context. He was particularly severe in his censure of the Two Thousand Words. Nonetheless Mlynar recognized the positive aspects of the mass media in mobilizing the population for reform. Mlynar charged the leadership with the following errors of tactics, stating that he had warned against most of them at the time: 1) the failure of the party to retain the initiative for reform after January by offering a fully elaborated political program. The Action Program was ready in late February and should have been published earlier. 2) the abolition of censorship before the publication of the program, thus allowing the mass media to become the main vehicle of reform ideas, and the failure to set certain limits on the media during subsequent months. Mlynar criticized the press law amendment for abolishing all limits on freedom of expression, contrary to the June 14 proposals of the Legal Commission, of which he was the chairman. 3) the failure to call the 14th congress earlier and to hold elections to the National Assembly, thus leaving the leading personnel largely unchanged. 4) the failure to take certain measures in July, such as the adoption of the draft statute on the National Front, which would have set limits to 887

APPENDIX E

the activity of certain new political organizations; also, there should have been restrictions on the mass media, including the banning of Student. 5) the failure to devote sufficient attention to the economic aspects of reform and thus to satisfy the main concern of the workers. 6) delay in carrying through the democratization of the CPCz itself. These errors in leadership, and the activity of the radicals, led to the continuance of the "eruptive" character of the post-January development and delayed political stabilization. This strengthened the hands of those against reform; gave some of the reform-minded the impression that the leadership had lost control; and pushed some leaders (such as Kolder and Svestka) into opposition to the reform. Nonetheless, in Mlynaf's view, the leading role of the party was maintained, and no counterrevolutionary situation developed. The Communist Party was united in favor of the Action Program, enjoyed great authority, and faced no serious competing force. It was able to operate as "a decisively regulating force." The armed forces, including the People's Militia, were strong and united, and could have been used in case of need. Negotiations had been successful in dealing with the problem of KAN and K 231, so as to prevent the development of an "opposition," and like measures would have solved the problem of the proposed Social Democratic Party. The formation of this party would have brought about a competition for power, having grave international repercussions and involving the "destruction," not the reform, of the political system. Although he approved the avoidance of the use of force against certain tendencies, Mlynaf was not averse to the employment of "measures of power," even against party members who sought radical steps. In a final section dealing with the "international context," Mlynaf presented views which he described as retrospective, not held at the time. He rejected the charge that the reform policy desired changes in foreign policy. The objective was to express specific Czechoslovak interests within the "common foreign policy" of the socialist countries. Owing to their lack of experience in international affairs, the Prague leaders, however, gave insufficient attention to the international implications of the reform. They failed to recognize that it was bound to have grave repercussions in the entire socialist system, and particularly to create problems for the leaders of the GDR and Poland (although not, in his view, for those of the USSR). Instead of insisting that their reform was a purely domestic affair, the Prague leaders should have recognized that it was a problem of the entire communist movement and seized the initiative in seeking a solution jointly with the other socialist countries and with the European Communist Parties. This would have required setting certain limits to the reform and effecting them so as to avoid causing complications among their allies. Although some of the radicals were ready to contemplate a 888

APPENDIX E

rupture with the Soviet Union, in the style of Yugoslavia in 1948, the reform leaders rejected any thought of such a break, and, quite rightly, accepted the necessity of the "integration" of the socialist bloc. Mlynar categorically condemned any resort to armed force by Czechoslovakia, arguing that this would have offered evidence of counterrevolution and produced another Hungary. In Mlynar's opinion the cause of the invasion was not the Action Program or general ideological differences, but the misunderstanding by the Soviet Union and its allies of the actual situation in Czechoslovakia, and their fear of its ultimate outcome and its implications in other bloc countries. The developments in Czechoslovakia were also seen as complicating the Soviet strategy of relaxing tensions—especially, he thought, in matters such as the size and disposition of the Soviet armed forces and relations with the world communist movement—thus giving the Western countries opportunities to take advantage of these problems. Mlynar expressed doubts that the reform movement could have succeeded, even if the Prague leaders had avoided the errors mentioned above, because certain responses would also have been required by the other side. The USSR would have had to change its attitude, especially in respect of the relationship of the "common" and the "specific" features of socialism. This would have involved the abandonment of the concept that the features of socialism adopted in the Soviet Union were obligatory for all, and the recognition that variant forms, such as those of Yugoslavia or Czechoslovakia, were legitimate "embodiments of the general in the specific."

889

A BIBLIOGRAPHIC NOTE

of books and thousands of articles have been published in connection with the events of 1968 in Czechoslovakia. A comprehensive bibliography, edited by V. V. Kusin and Z. Hejzlar, Czechoslovakia 1968-1969: Annotation, Bibliography, Chronology (Garland Publishing Inc., New York, 1974) (which appeared after the completion of this book) lists more than 600 books published in the West and over 1,000 Czech and Slovak articles which relate to the Prague Spring and its after­ math. An earlier brief bibliography was compiled by Michael Parrish, The 1968 Czechoslovak Crisis: A Bibliography, 1968-1970 (Clio Press, Santa Barbara, CaI., 1971). See also my review articles, "Thaw and Freeze-up: Prague 1968," International Journal 25 (Winter 1969-70), 192-201; "Reform aborted: Czechoslovakia in retrospect," ibid. 28 (Summer 1973), 431-445; correction, ibid. (Autumn 1973), p. 800. In writing my own book, I consulted all available books that have ap­ peared in English, French, German, and Czech, including the four out­ standing works by Vladimir V. Kusin and Galia Golan listed below. With one exception, all these works were utilized and where appropriate, cited. The exception was Galia Golan's study, Reform Rule in Czechoslovakia: The Dubcek Era 1968-1969 (Cambridge, 1973), which covered ap­ proximately the same ground as mine and which I read only after the completion of my own work. Research for this book started from a detailed chronology, based on a specially constructed index of the events of 1968 as reported in The New York Times and The Christian Science Monitor, Moscow Pravda, Rude pravo, and Pravda (Bratislava), East Europe, and the Situation Reports of Radio Free Europe. The most useful chronologies were: B. Krizenecka and Z. SeI, eds., Ceskoslovensko 1968: Prehled udalosti (Prague, 1969), and J. Hronek, ed., CSSR: The Road to Democratic Socialism: Facts on Events from January to May 1968 (Prague, 1968). The main sources were the newspapers, journals, and books which appeared in 1968 and 1969. Research was based on specially prepared indexes of Rude pravo, Bratislava Pravda, Literarni listy, Kulturny zivot, Νονέ slovo, Reporter, Νονά mysi, and Zivot strany. These sources were supplemented by the use of Czech and Slovak articles selected by Radio Free Europe for publication in its Prehled tisku (Prehl'ad tlace) and by clippings from the Prague press prepared by myself and by a research assistant in Prague. Radio broadcasts, which sometimes suffered from poor reception and hurried translation, were used sparingly, with the exception of certain chapters where other HUNDREDS

891

BIBLIOGRAPHY

sources were not available. The Soviet press, apart from Pravda, was covered in The Current Digest of the Soviet Press. Party documents and speeches by Dubcek and others were taken from the press and from the useful collections of party decisions and docu­ ments, Rok sedesatf osmy (Prague, 1969) and of Dubfiek's speeches, K otazkam obrodzovacieho procesu ν KSC (Bratislava, 1968). A num­ ber of party documents published for intra-party use were also available to the author. Only books used extensively are listed in the bibliography that follows. Similarly, only newspapers and periodicals examined systematically are listed. For fuller lists of sources, see footnotes in each chapter. Books, newspapers, and other materials used in preparing this volume will be deposited in a special collection on Czechoslovakia in 1968 in the University of Toronto Thomas Fisher Rare Book Library.

892

SELECTIVE BIBLIOGRAPHY

A.

SCHOLARLY AND INTERPRETATIVE STUDIES

Aptheker, Herbert. Czechoslovakia and Counter-Revolution (New York, 1969). Barton, S. W. and Martin, L. M. "Prague," in Gregory Henderson, ed. Public Diplomacy and Political Change: Four Case Studies: Okinawa, Peru, Czechoslovakia, Guinea (New York, 1973). Borin, M. and Plogen, V. Management und Selbstverwaltung in der CSSR: Biirokratie und Widerstand (Berlin, 1970). Brahm, Heinz. Der Kreml und die CSSR, 1968-1969 (Stuttgart, 1970). Broue, Pierre. Le printemps des peuples commence a Prague (Paris, n.d.). Czerwinski, E. J. and Piekalkiewicz, laroslaw A., eds. The Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia: Its Effects on Eastern Europe (New York, 1972). Dean, Robert W. Nationalism and Political Change in Eastern Europe: The Slovak Question and the Czechoslovak Reform Movement (Denver, 1973). Ermarth, Fritz. Internationalism, Security, and Legitimacy: The Challenge to Soviet Interests in East Europe, 1964-1968 (Santa Monica, CaL, 1969). Feiwel, George R. New Economic Patterns in Czechoslovakia (New York, 1968). Golan, Galia. Reform Rule in Czechoslovakia: The Dubcek Era 1968-1969 (Cambridge, 1973). . The Czechoslovak Reform Movement: Communism in Crisis, 1962-1968 (Cambridge, 1971). Gueyt, Remi. La mutation tchechoslovaque (Paris, 1969). Hajek, JiK. Mytus a realita ledna 1968 (Prague, 1970). , trans. Demokratiserung oder Demontage? Ein Prager Handbuch. Translated by Peter Lux (Munich, 1969). Hensel, K. Paul, et al. Die sozialistische Marktwirtschaft in der Tschechoslowakei (Stuttgart, 1968). Hodnett, Grey and Potichnyj, P. J. The Ukraine and the Czechoslovak Crisis (Camberra, 1970). James, Robert R., ed. The Czechoslovak Crisis 1968 (London, 1969). Jancar, Barbara. Czechoslovakia and the Absolute Monopoly of Power (New York, 1971). King, Robert R. Minorities under Communism: Nationalities as a Source of Tension among Balkan Communist States (Cambridge, Mass., 1973). Klaiber, Wolfgang. The Crisis in Czechoslovakia in 1968 (Institute for Defense Analyses, Arlington, Va., 1969). Krejci, Jaroslav. Social Change and Stratification in Postwar Czechoslovakia (London, 1972). Kusin, Vladimir V. Political Grouping in the Czechoslovak Reform Movement (London, 1972). , ed. The Czechoslovak Reform Movement 1968 (London, 1973). . The Intellectual Origins of the Prague Spring (Cambridge, 1971). Lobl, E. and Griinwald, L. Die intellektuelle Revolution (Diisseldorf, 1969). Miiller, A. and Utitz, B. Deutschland und die Tschechoslowakei: Zwei Nachbarvolker auf dem Weg zur Verstandigung (Freudenstadt, 1972). Ostry, Antonin. Ceskoslovensky problem (Cologne, 1972). Page, Benjamin B. The Czechoslovak Reform Movement 1963-1968: A Study in the Theory of Socialism (Amsterdam, 1973). Piekalkiewicz, Jaroslaw A. Public Opinion Polling in Czechoslovakia, 1968-69: Results and Analysis of Surveys Conducted During the Dubcek Era (New York, 1972).

893

BIBLIOGRAPHY Plevza, V. Ceskoslovenskd itdtnost a slovenskd otdzka ν politike KSC (Bratislava, 1971). Prag und die Linke (Hamburg, 1968). Remington, Robin A. The Warsaw Pact (Cambridge, Mass., 1971). Sborn'ik, Systemove zmeny (Cologne, 1972). Selucky, Radoslav. Czechoslovakia: The Plan that failed (London, 1970). Shawcross, William. Dubcek (London, 1970). Steiner, Eugen. The Slovak Dilemma (Cambridge, 1973). Sterling, Claire. The Masaryk Case (London, 1968, 1969). Suda, Zdenek. The Czechoslovak Socialist Republic (Baltimore, 1969). Tigrid, Pavel. Le printemps de Prague (Paris, 1968). . La chute irresistible d'Alexander Dubcek (Paris, 1969). , trans. Why Dubcek Fell (London, 1971). Although an accent on Dubcek is not given in the title of Tigrid's books as published, it has been included in all citations given. UIc, Otto. Politics in Czechoslovakia (San Francisco, 1974). Vesely, Ludvik. Dubcek (Munich, 1970). Wheeler, George W. The Human Face of Socialism: The Political Economy of Change in Czechoslovakia (New York, 1973). Windsor, Philip and Roberts, Adam. Czechoslovakia, 1968 (London, 1969). Wolfe, Thomas W. Soviet Power and Europe: 1945-1970 (Baltimore, 1970). Zartman, I. William, ed. Czechoslovakia: Intervention and Impact (New York, 1970). Zeman, Z.A.B. Prague Spring: A Report on Czechoslovakia, 1968 (Harmondsworth, 1968). B. SCHOLARLY AND LITERARY WORKS BY CZECHS AND SLOVAKS

Dziedzinska, Libuse. Inteligence a dne&ek (Prague, 1968). Fal'tan, Samo. K problemom ndrodnej a demokratickej revolucie na Slovensku (Bratislava, 1965). Goldmann, J. and Kouba, K. Hospoddfsky rust ν CSSR (Prague, 1967, 2nd ed., 1969). , trans. Economic Growth in Czechoslovakia (New York, 1969). Hamsik, Dusan. Spisovatele a moc (Prague, 1969). , trans. Writers Against Rulers (London, 1971). Kalivoda, Robert. Modern'i duchovni skutecnost a marxismus (Prague, 1968). Klokocka, Vladimir. Volby ν pluralitn'ich demokraci'ich (Prague, 1968). , trans. Demokratischer Sozialismus (Hamburg, 1968). Kosik, Karel. Dialektika konkretniho (Prague, 1963). , trans. Die Dialektik des Konkreten (Frankfurt, 1967). Kotyk, Vaclav. Svetovd socialistickd soustava (Prague, 1967). Kouba, Karel et al. Uvahy ο socialisticke ekonomice (Prague, 1968). Krai, Miroslav, ed. Veda a rizeni spolecnosti (Prague, 1967). Lakatos, Michal. Obcan, prdvo a demokracie (Prague, 1966). . Uvahy ο hodnotdch demokracie (Prague, 1968). Liehm, Antonin J. Generace (Vienna, 1968). , trans. The Politics of Culture (New York, 1967, 1968). , trans. Trois Generations (Paris, 1970). Lobl, Evzen. Uvahy ο duievnej praci a bohatstve ndroda (Bratislava, 1967). , trans. Geistige Arbeit: Die Wahre Quelle des Reichtums (Vienna, 1967). Machonin, Pavel, ed. Ceskoslovenskd spolecnost (Bratislava, 1969). , ed. Socidlni struktura socialisticke spolecnosti (Prague, 1967). Mlynar, Zdenek. Stat a clovek (Prague, 1964). 50 let Ceskoslovenska 1918/1968: K nekterym politickym a ekonomickym problemum let 1948-1968 (Prague, 1968).

894

BIBLIOGRAPHY Pavlenda, V. Ekonomicke zaklady socialistickeho riesenia narodnostnej otazky ν Ceskoslovensku (Bratislava, 1968). Rebro, Karol. Cesta naroda (Bratislava, 1969). — , trans. The Road to Federation (Bratislava, 1970). Richta, Radovan, et al. Civilizace na rozcest'i: Spolecenske a lidske souvislosti vedeckotechnicke revoluce (Prague, 1966; 3rd ed., Prague, 1969). , trans. Civilization at the Crossroads: Social and Human Implications of the Scientific and Technological Revolution (Prague and New York, 1969). Rohan, Rene. Politicki strany (Prague, 1968). Samalik, Frantisek. Clovek a instituce (Prague, 1968). . Pravo a spolecnost (Prague, 1965). Selucky, Radoslav and Milada. Clovek a hospodarstvi (Prague, 1967). Sik, Ota. Czechoslovakia, The Bureaucratic Economy (White Plains, N.Y., 1972) radio speeches given in 1968. . Ekonomika, zajmy, politika (Prague, 1962; revised ed. Ekonomika a zajmy, Prague, 1968). , trans. Ekonomika, interesy, politika (Moscow, 1964). . Plan a trh za socialismu (Prague, 1968). , trans. Plan und Markt im Sozialismus (Vienna, 1967). trans. Plan and Market Under Socialism (White Plains, N.Y., and Prague, 1967). Skvorecky, Josef. All the Bright Young Men and Women: A Personal History of the Czech Cinema (Toronto, 1971). Slovaci a ich ndrodny vyvin (Bratislava, 1969). Snejdarek, Antonin. Vybor ζ prednasek a stat'i, 1968 (Prague, 1968). Sorm, Frantisek. Veda ν socialisticke spolecnosti (Prague, 1967). Svitak, Ivan. Man and His World: A Marxian View (New York, 1970). . The Czechoslovak Experiment, 1968-1969 (New York, 1971). . Verbotene Horizonte (Freiburg im Breisgau, 1969). Tomasek, L., Litera, J., and Vecera, J. Strana a dnesek (Prague, 1967). Tomasek, Ladislav. Veduca uloha strany a politicky system (Bratislava, 1968). Turek, Otakar. O planu, trhu a hospodarske politice (Prague, 1967). C. NEWSPAPERS AND PERIODICALS

A-revue Dejiny a soucasnost Ekonomicky casopis Hospodarske noviny International Relations Kulturni noviny Kulturni tvorba Kulturny zivot Lidova democracie Listy (Rome) Literarni noviny Literarn'i listy Mezinarodn'i vztahy Mlada fronta Nova mysi Νονέ slovo Novinar Obrana lidu Pldnovane hospodarstvi Praca

Prace Pravnik Phspevky k dejinam KSC t Pravda (Bratislava) i Pravda (Moscow) Pravny obzor Reporter Rol'nicke noviny Rude pravo Socialisticka zakonnost Sociologicky casopis Student Svedectvi (Paris) Svobodne slovo The Christian Science Monitor The New York Times Tribuna Vecerni Praha Zemedelske noviny Zivot strany

t Cited as Pravda throughout except in chap, xx and xxi. t Cited as Pravda throughout chap, xx, xxi.

895

BIBLIOGRAPHY D. PARTY DOCUMENTS

(i) Congresses (in chronological order; date in parentheses is that of publication) XII. sjezd Komunisticke strany Ceskoslovenska (Prague, 1963). XIII. sjezd Komunisticke strany Ceskoslovenska (Prague, 1966). XIII. sjezd Komunisticke strany Ceskoslovenska (Prague, 1967). A fuller version of preceding. Sjazd Komunistickej strany Slovenska (Bratislava, 1966). Pelikan, Jin, ed. Tanky proti sjezdu: Protokol a dokumenty XlV. sjezdu KSC (Vienna, 1970). Title as given on cover of book. Alternative title also given: XIV. mimofadny sjezd KSC (Protokol a dokumenty). , trans. The Secret Vysocany Congress: Proceedings and Documents of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, 22 August 1968 (London, 1971). , trans. Le congres clandestin, protocole secret et documents du xiv" congres extraordinaire du p. c. tchecoslovaque (Paris, 1970). , trans. Panzer uberrollen den Parteitag, Protokoll und Dokumente des 14. Parteitags der KPTsch am 22. August 1968 (Vienna, 1969). Mimoriadny zjazd Komunistickej strany Slovenska (Vybrane dokumenty) (Brati­ slava, 1968). (U) CC Plena Plendrni zasedan'i UV KSC 29. kvetna -1. cervna 1968 (Prague, 1968). O zasedan'i Ustredniho Vyboru KSC due 31. srpna 1968 (Prague, 1968). Zasedan'i Ustredniho Vyboru KSC ve dnech 14.-17. listopadu 1968 (Prague, 1968). (Ui) Decisions and Documents Akcni program komunisticke strany Ceskoslovenska pfijaty na plenarnim zasedan'i UV KSC dne 5. dubna 1968 (Prague, 1968). , trans. The Action Programme of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (Prague, April 1968). Rok sedesaty osmy ν usnesenich a dokumentech UV KSC (Prague, 1969). Usnesen'i a dokumenty UV KSC, Od xi. sjezdu do celostatni konference, 1960 (Prague, 1960). Usnesen'i a dokumenty UV KSC, Od celostatni konference KSC 1960 do xii. sjezdu KSC, 2 vols. (Prague, 1962). Usnesen'i a dokumenty UV KSC, 1962-63 (Prague, 1964). Usnesen'i a dokumenty UV KSC, 1964 (Prague, 1965). (iv) Speeches and Articles Bil'ak Vasil. Pravdd zustala pravdou: Projevy a Hanky, rijen 1967-prosinec 1970 (Prague, 1971). Dubcek, Alexander. Komunisti a ndrodne dedictvo (Bratislava, Nov. 1968). . K otdzkam obrodzovacieho procesu ν KSC, Vybrane prejavy prveho tajomnika UV KSC sudruha Alexandra Dubceka (Bratislava, 1968). (v) Reports Pelikan, JiFi, ed. Pervertierte Justiz (Vienna, 1972). , ed. Potlacena zprava (Zprava Komise UV KSC ο politickych procesech a rehabilitacich ν Ceskoslovensku 1949-68) (Vienna, 1970). Title on cover: Zakazany Dokument. , ed. trans. Das unterdruckte Dossier, Bericht der Kommission des ZK der KPTsch iiber politische Prozesse und "Rehabilitierungen" in der Tschechoslowakei 1949-1968 (Vienna, 1970). , ed. trans. The Czechoslovak Political Trials, 1950-1954 (London, 1971). Pouceni ζ krizoveho vyvoje ve strane a spolecnosti po XIII. sjezdu KSC (Prague, 1971).

896

BIBLIOGRAPHY Trans. Lesson Drawn from the Crisis Development in the Party and Society after the 13th Congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (approved by the plenary session of the CC CPCz in December 1970; n.p., n.d.). Zprava ο soucasne politicke situaci Ceskoslovenske socialisticke republiky a podm'inkach cinnosti Komunisticke strany Ceskoslovenska {srpen 1968) (Prague, Oct. 1968). E. OTHER DOCUMENTS

IV. sjezd Svazu ceskoslovenskych spisovatelu (Protokol), Praha, 27.-29. cervna 1967 (Prague, 1968). Dokumenty ο Narodnim shromazdeni ve dnech 21.-28. srpna 1968 (Prague, n.d.). Dokumenty ο okupacii CSSR (Bratislava, 1968). Grospic, J., ed. Ceskoslovenska federace, Zakony ο federativnim usporadani (Prague, 1972). Informacni zpravodaj Ustredniho vyboru Narodni fronty (Prague, Oct. 1968). Littell, Robert, ed. The Czech Black Book (New York, 1969). Translation of Sedm prazskych dnu, below. Rambousek, O. and Gruber, L., eds. Zprava dokumentacni komise K231 (Toronto, 1973). Sb'irka zdkonu Ceskoslovenske socialisticke republiky. Sedm prazskych dnu, 21.-27. srpen 1968, Dokumentace (Prague, Sept. 1968). (The so-called Black Book) Zakon ο sudnej rehabilitacii (Bratislava, 1968). F. PRESS AND RADIO BROADCASTS (IN TRANSLATION)

British Broadcasting Corp., Monitoring Service, Summary of World Broadcasts, ι (USSR), H (Eastern Europe). The Current Digest of the Soviet Press (New York). Reprints from the Soviet Press (Compass Publications, N.Y.). U.S. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report. U.S. Joint Publication Research Service, Eastern Europe. G. DOCUMENTS AND MATERIALS (IN TRANSLATION)

de Sede, Gerard, ed. Pourquoi Prague? (Paris, 1968). ElIo, Paul, ed. Czechoslovakia's Blueprint for "Freedom" (Washington, D.C., 1968). Grunwald, Leopold. CSSR im Umbruch (Vienna, 1968). Haefs, Hanswilhelm, ed. Die Ereignisse in der Tschechoslowakei vom 27. 6. 1967 bis 18. 10. 1968, Ein dokumentarischer Bericht (Bonn, 1969). Information Bulletin (Central Committee, CPCz, Prague, 1968). K sobytiyam ν Chekhoslovakii, Fakty, dokumenty, svidetelstva pressy i ochevidtsev (Moscow, 1968). (The so-called White Book) , trans. K udalostem ν Ceskoslovensku, Fakta, dokumenty, svedectv'i tisku a ocitych svedkii (Moscow, 1968). , trans. On Events in Czechoslovakia, Facts, documents, press reports and eye-witness accounts (Moscow, 1968). Oxley, Andrew, Pravda, Alex, and Ritchie, Andrew, eds. Czechoslovakia: The Party and the People (London, 1973). Pelikan, Jin, ed. Ici Prague: L'Opposition interieure parte (Paris, 1973). Remington, Robin A., ed. Winter in Prague: Documents on Czechoslovak Com­ munism in Crisis (Cambridge, Mass., 1969). Roll, F. and Rosenberger, G., eds. CSSR, 1962-1968: Dokumentation und Kritik (Munich, 1968). Skvorecky, Josef, ed. Nachrichten aus der CSSR (Frankfurt, 1968).

897

BIBLIOGRAPHY H. PERSONAL MEMOIRS AND COMMENTARIES

Brodsky, Jaroslav. Resen'i gama (Toronto, 1970). , trans. Solution Gamma (Toronto, 1971). Clementis, Vladimir and Clementisova, Lida. Listy ζ vdzenia (Bratislava, 1968). Kohout, Pavel. From the Diary of a Counter-revolutionary (New York, 1972). . Journal d'un contre-revolutionnaire (n.p., 1971). Kovaly, H. and Kohak, E. The Victors and the Vanquished (New York, 1973). Lobl, Evzen. Svedectvo ο procese s vedenim protistatniho sprisahaneckeho centra na cele s Rudolfom Sldnskym (Bratislava, 1968). , trans. Sentenced and Tried: The Stalinist Purges in Czechoslovakia (Lon­ don, 1969). , trans. Stalinism in Prague: The Lobl Story (New York, 1969). London, Artur. Doznani (Prague, 1969). , trans. L'aveu, Dans I'engrenage du proces de Prague (Paris, 1968). , trans. The Confession (New York, 1970). Mnacko, Ladislav. The Seventh Night (New York, 1969). Slanska, Josefa. Report on my Husband (London, 1969). Slingova, Marian. Truth Will Prevail (London, 1968). I. REPORTAGE

Daix, Pierre. Journal de Prague (Paris, 1968). Journalist M. A Year Is Eight Months: Czechoslovakia, 1968 (New York, 1970). Translation of Maxa below. Kucera, Jaroslav. Prazsky srpen (Munich, 1971). Marcelle, Jacques. Le deuxieme coup de Prague (Brussels, 1968). Marko, MiIoS. Cierne na bielom (Bratislava, 1971). Maxa, Josef. Die kontrollierte Revolution, Anatomie des Prager Friihlings (Vienna, 1969). Salomon, Michel. Prague, La revolution etranglee, Janvier-Aout 1968 (Paris, 1968). , trans. Prague Notebook: The Strangled Revolution (Boston, 1971). Schmidt-Hauer, Christian and Miiller, Adolf. Viva Dubiek (Cologne, 1968). Schwartz, Harry. Prague's 200 Days: The Struggle for Democracy in Czechoslo­ vakia (New York, 1969). Szulc, Tad. Czechoslovakia Since World War II (New York, 1971). Tatu, Michel. L'heresie impossible (Paris, 1968). Wechsberg, Joseph. The Voices (New York, 1969). J. ADDENDA

Alex Pravda. Reform and Change in the Czechoslovak System: January-August 1968 (Sage Publications, Beverley Hills and London, 1975). Pravda pobezhdaet (Moscow, 1971), transl. of Pouceni . . . , cited above under D (v), and other Czechoslovak post-occupation materials.

898

Index Abraham, L., 792, 796 Academic Council of Students (ARS), 202, 599 Academy of Agricultural Science, 576n Academy of Sciences, 90, 93, 145, 232, 575-77; federalization of, 53. See also individual institutes (by name) Academy of Sciences (Slovak), 53, 576 Academy of Sciences and Art, 576 Action Program, 191, 207, 211, 214, 215, 217-21, 222, 564-65, 580-81, 587-88, 592, 597, 598, 601, 604, 726, 786, 802, 804, 810n, 827, 879, 887, 888; CPS extraordinary congress on, 794; and economic reform, 221, 41819; on federation, 458-59; 14th extraordinary congress and, 771, 772; implementation of, 255, 258, 343; on party's role, 339; and political reform, 218-19, 221, 337-41; public opinion on, 502, 530, 531, 536-37; on rehabilitation, 376-77; Soviet Union on, 250, 879. See also individual subjects (by topic) administrative measures, 37, 56, 63, 94, 105, 147, 158, 879-80, 888 administrative procedure, law on, 110-11 Agricultural Cooperatives, Congress of, 186, 188 agriculture, 413, 587-88; Slovak public opinion on, 586. See also farmers Albania, 38, 39; attitude to CSSR, 708-10, 749-50; on Warsaw letter, 710 Aleksandrov, I. (pseud.), 285, 326, 660, 668, 685; article in Moscow Pravda (August 18), 673, 675, 716, 721, 722 all people's state: and CSSR, 136, 137, 138-39, 141, 142, 145, 151-52, 153; and Soviet Union, 135, 141 amnesties, general, 378, 401 Andrzejewski, J., 754 anti-Semitism, 200, 273, 634, 682 anti-socialist forces, 209, 223, 236-41 passim, 249, 254, 259, 272, 273, 292, 295, 296, 303, 326, 494, 628, 661, 679, 683, 697, 699-705 passim, 815, 857; analysis of, 497-98; Dresden conference on, 660, 661; Hajek on, at UN, 758; Hungary on, 689, 690, 693, 695; party polls on, 508, 512, 523,

524; and political leaders (CSSR), 238-40; public opinion polls on, 538, 543; Soviet Union on, 663, 837; Warsaw letter on, 669-70 aparat, 134, 150, 335, 337, 338, 503-9; attitudes to reform, 506-9, 612; defined, 503; opinion polls of, 506-9. See also party functionaries apparatchiki, 61, 834, 841 apparatus (party), 343n, 351-52. See also aparat armed forces, and the invasion, 714-15, 759, 768n, 775. See also invasion and armed resistance arms caches, reports of, 297, 670n, 680, 698 army: action program for, 641; role of, in Novotny's removal, 172-74, 197 assembly and association, law on, 369 assembly, right of (post-August), 814 Association of the Marxist and NonMarxist Left, 549 asymmetrical system, 51, 454-58 passim, 462, 463, 477, 481 Auersperg, Pavel, 151-52, 212, 376 Austria, Czechoslovak relations with, 87,627,631 Austria-Hungary, 4, 17, 18 Axen, Hermann, 678 Bacilek, Karol, 29, 35, 46-47, 48, 49, 54, 185, 223, 254, 375, 376, 383, 385-86, 390, 403 Barak, Rudolf, 31, 48, 376, 386, 400, 401, 403; trial of, 40-41, 379-81 Barak commission, 32, 35, 376, 400401 Baranski, W., 673, 688 Barbirek, Frantisek, 216, 470, 519, 520, 524, 717, 762, 763, 770, 796, 807 Barnabite commission report, 50, 376, 402 Bartosek, Karel, 830-31, 850 Bartuska, Jan, 204, 375, 379, 403 Bast'ovansky, Stefan, 386 Battek, Rudolf, 527 Benada, Eudovit, 54 Benes, Edvard, 4-8 passim, 13-17 passim, 21-26 passim, 102, 236, 341, 679 Benes, Jan, 71, 205, 378, 568 Beran, Cardinal Josef, 203, 601 Beria, L. P., 375, 381, 382, 385

899

INDEX Bernal, J. D., 126 Bil'ak, Vasil, 54, 56, 63, 68, 167, 170, 190, 216, 223, 239, 240, 254, 268, 280, 281-82, 292n, 309, 330, 347, 367, 453, 488, 504, 516-20 passim, 524, 542, 560, 635n, 693n, ,716, 717, 723n, 760, 762, 763, 770, 781, 796, 807, 815, 817, 818, 824; on appeal for aid, 718 nn. 14, 17; on Bratislava conference, 311; on CC plena (1967), 185; on Cierna conference, 306; as CPS First Secretary, 184-85, 521, 522, 525; as critic of Dubcek, 186n, 188n, 191n; on Dresden conference, 661; on federation, 321; on Moscow visit (May), 663-64; on Presidium declaration on invasion, 883; speech at May plenum, 24On, 243; speech to Slovak CC (April), 241; on support for Soviet Union, 879, 881 bilateral meetings (August), 314-17 bilateral talks, proposed, 288, 291', 293, 296-97, 651 Black Book, 773, 803n Black, Cyril, 829 Blaha, I. A., 100 Blazek, Vladimir, 313, 847, 850 Blazkova, Jaroslava, 246 Blessing, Karl, 687 bloc: attitude to democratization, 19495, 208-9, 284-85, 626, 660, 704, 705; common foreign policy of, 620, 665, 685, 888; common patterns of development, 673, 889; Czechoslovak relations with, 194-95, 208, 248-49, 286-87, 301, 626-27, 627-29, 631, 651-53, 655, 728; Kotyk on, 117-18, 632, 652-53; unity of, 82-83, 87, 652-56 passim, 667, 674, 682-88 passim, 889 (see also socialist commonwealth) Bloch, Ernst, 754 Bob, Josef, 245 Bocek, Otmar, 377, 406 Bod'a, K., 792, 796 Boffa, G., 712 Bogoraz-Daniel, Larisa, 753 Boguszak, Jiri, 479-80 Borba, 702, 705, 707 Boruvka, Josef, 167, 184, 216, 226, 419, 587, 771 Boy Scouts, revival of, 233. See also Junak Brabec, Jin, 481,847 Brandt, Willy, 647n, 649 Bratislava, law on status of, 451-52

900

Bratislava "agreements," not implemented, 716, 721-22, 746 Bratislava conference, 309-13, 674, 800, 882; Albania on, 710; Bulgaria on, 698; declaration of, 309-11, 312; GDR on, 680, 681; Hungarian attitude to, 694-95; and invasion, 716, 719-20, 721, 724, 746; Poland on, 687; and public polemics, 671-72; Rumanian attitude to, 701, 702; Yugoslavia on, 707 Brest'ansky, J., 232 Brezhnev, Leonid, 84, 186, 209, 286n, 287-88, 305, 307n, 309, 660, 662n, 667, 723, 724-25, 727n, 729, 881, 882; at Dresden conference, 661; on 14th extraordinary congress, 883; on military intervention, 730; and Moscow talks, 796, 799; and Novotny crisis, 168-69, 179; visit to Prague (December 1967), 168-69, 878 Brezhnev doctrine, 729-30, 758 Brinton, Crane, 828-29, 840 Brno, 472, 473, 474, 475n, 872 Brown, A. H., 827 Broz, M., 631-32 Brus, Wfodzimierz, 119, 121 Bruzek, Miloslav, 821 Brzezinski, Z. K., 679 Budapest, see communist party conference Bulgaria, 745, 757; attitude to CSSR, 695-98, 745, 754; and invasion, 713, 714, 745; military aid to CSSR offered, 698; treaty with CSSR, 628, 631,651,654,696,745 Bystrina, Ivan, 358-59 Cabelka, J., 578 cadre ceiling, 266, 349, 527 cadre policy, poll of 14th congress delegates on, 511-12, 523 cadres, changes in, 229, 270, 281; qualifications of, 142, 145, 155, 564 Canada, Communist Party of, 752 Canada, Czechoslovak relations with, 627 Capek, Karel, 13, 14, 235n Castro, Fidel, 751,836 Cause of Conciliar Renewal, 600 Ceausescu, N., 695, 699-700, 702, 704, 748; on invasion, 747-48; Prague visit of, 313, 315-16, 654, 655, 657, 674, 681, 687, 722 censorship, 67-71 passim, 192, 220, 221, 307, 367-68, 572, 573, 574, 814, 818,

INDEX 828; abolition of, 198, 262-63, 368, 887; public opinion on, 560. See also press law Central Commission of Supervision and Auditing (CPCz), see UKRK Central Committee (CPCz), 138, 143, 231, 350-51, 513; bureau for Czech lands, 814, 874; commissions of, 139-40; Department for Societal Organizations, 351; Department for State Administration (8th), 172, 193, 299, 351; division of opinion in, 166-67, 168, 171-72, 183; Ideological Commission, 93, 99, 100, 125, 193, 215; Ideological Depart­ ment, 63, 66, 67; Legal Commission, 109, 113, 887; members of, meeting at Hotel Praha, 762-63, 766, 767n; and Moscow talks, 801-2; opposition in, 164; in party statute, 319-20; report on political situation (Zprava), 444n, 494n, 500-501, 507-9, 511, 516-17, 520-21, 523, 530, 53132, 544, 547, 548, 561, 562, 574, 600η, 629n, 657n; role of, 140, 335, 336-37, 350-51, 353; Unit for Information, 351 elections: candidates for, 514-15; candidates for, blacklisted, 513, 518; nominations to, 269, 317; preferences for, in party polls, 515-17, 524-25; preferences of Slovak delegates for Slovaks in, 524; probable choices in, 515-16, 518; procedures of, 514; Slovak candidates for, 514; Slovaks and extraordinary congress, 771 plena, pre-1968: November 1961, 39-40; December 1963, 66, 92; No­ vember 1964, 142; Ianuary and August 1965, 142-45, 152; February and March 1967, 163, 587; Septem­ ber 1967, 71, 157, 163-64; October 1967, 165-68; December 1967, 16972; October-December 1967 plena, Bil'ak on, 184-85, and fall of Novotny, 162-77 January 1968 plenum, 174-77, 451, 879; communique of, 183-84; lack of information on, 210; public opin­ ion on, 534-35, 536n; resolution of, 183n; significance of, 186-87 April 1968 plenum, 211-15; Action Program approved, 217-21; Dubcek's report to, 210-11, 214; on federation, 458; and leadership changes, 215-16; on rehabilitation, 376; on political situation, 214;

public opinion on, 502; significance of, 222; Soviet reaction to, 223 May 1968 plenum, 251-57, 258-59, 880; party poll on, 507-8, 511; as political offensive, 252, 253, 258; poll of Slovak congress delegates on, 523; resolution of, 255-57; Soviet press on, 665-66; Yugoslav press on, 704-5 July 1968 plenum, 292-93 August 31, 1968 plenum, 759, 806-7; approval of Moscow negotia­ tions, 804-7; and 14th extraordinary congress, 805 November 1968 plenum, 815 plena, January and May 1969, 819, 821; December 1970, "Lesson," 718 Central Publication Administration (OPS), 68, 368 Central Union of Agriculture and Foodstuffs, 590 centrists, 216, 222, 497 Cepicka, Alexej, 33, 48, 375, 380, 385, . 403 Cepicky, Josef, 177 Cernik, Oldiich, 61, 163, 168, 176, 196, 208, 212, 216, 254, 274, 277, 287, 307, 309, 311, 326, 342-43, 344, 366, 377, 519, 520, 524, 541, 542, 580, 598, 601, 622, 663, 664, 768, 770, 774, 782, 786, 796, 807, 822, 873, 880, 882; arrest of, 760, 883; cabinet under, 225-26; on economic reform, 412, 413-14, 419, 420-21, 422; report after Bratislava, 653-54; speech at May plenum, 253; speech to National Assembly (April), 225-27, 228; on Moscow talks, 801, 802 Cerny, Josef, 505 Cerny, Vaclav, 568, 576 Cerovsky, M., 377 Chalupecky, J., 569 Chamber of Nations, 482, 863, 865n, 867, 869, 871, 872 Chamber of the People, 482, 863, 864, 869, 871 Charles University, Philosophical Faculty of, 235, 396, 577-78 Chervonenko, S. V., 723n, 737, 882 China, 38-39, 41, 657; attitude to CSSR, 710-11; on the invasion, 750 Chfioupek, B., 212-13, 242n, 376 Chudik, Michal, 47, 54, 55, 170, 172, 175, 203, 204, 212, 215, 227, 241, 521, 791 Chvatik, K., 569 Chytil, V., 528-29

901

INDEX Cierna nad Tisou, conference at, 304-9, 707, 881-82; "agreements" at, 307, 316, 800; and decision to invade, 719-20, 724; and press polemics, 307, 308; prior discussion of, 303-4 Circle of Independent Writers, 233, 528 Cisar, Cestmir, 92, 138, 205, 207, 212, 216, 223, 229, 273, 285, 300, 301, 323, 326, 474, 476-77, 519, 520, 524, 541, 542, 566, 671, 726, 770, 786, 807, 882; attacked by Soviet Union, 285, 666, 675; speech on national path to socialism, 625 citizenship, under federation law, 872 civil rights, 108, 109, 110, 220, 227, 262, 366, 370 class conflict, 139, 147, 153, 165 Clementis, Vladimir, 10, 13, 26, 33, 50, 53, 378, 388, 62On Club of Critical Thought, 202, 569 Club of Farmers (Slovakia), 589 Club of the Non-party Engages, see KAN Club of the Young Generation of Slovakia, 244 CMEA, see Comecon collaboration, 715n, 788; government of, 759, 760-64, 766, 770, 78In, 782, 783, 789, 796 collective farms (JZD), congress of, 587, 588, 591; public opinion on (Slovakia), 586. See also farmers collectivization, 30-31, 35, 36, 585-87, 588 Colotka, P., 225, 226, 459, 566, 783, 786, 792, 818 Comecon, 84, 316, 621, 628, 630, 645, 700n, 708; economic reform in countries of, 644-45; reform of, 623, 64345, 653-56 passim, 688, 702n Cominform (1948), 652, 705 Committee of Defenders of the Peace, 596 Common Market, 631, 650 communism, transition to: in CSSR, 37, 139; in USSR, 135-36,139 communism in CSSR: crisis of, 824-26; dualism of, 21-22, 30, 824; legitimacy of, 21-22, 25, 26, 27, 40 Communist International (Comintern), 5,6,7 communist movement, international, 85-86, 175, 257, 295, 617-19, 622 communist parties, European conference of, 295, 296 communist parties, European: and

902

invasion, 752-53; and Warsaw letter, 295 communist parties, non-ruling: attitude to CSSR, 711; attitudes to invasion, 751-53 communist parties, ruling: attitudes to CSSR, 710-11; attitudes to invasion, 750-51 communist parties, world, 14th extraordinary congress appeal to, 768, 769 communist party conference (Budapest), 195, 248, 617-19, 653, 699 Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CPCz): criticism of, 163, 166; democratization of, 405, 888; differences of opinion in, 203-4, 237-40, 328, 493-94, 498-99, 561; dominance of, 498, 559; foundation of, 5, 6; loyalty to Moscow, 21, 27; policy of, 22-23, 32-38, 228-29; pre-war, 5-10 passim, 17; public support for, 223, 499, 502, 537, 538-40, 545-46, 55455, 560, 561-62, 708; relations with parties in National Front, 348; and science and scholarship, 90-101; seizure of power (1948), 8, 11, 17, 25; situation in, poll on, 857; Soviet influence on, 21, 24-25, 26, 27 conferences of, 33, 37; congresses of: 10th, 31-32; 11th, 36; 12th, 4142, 135-38, 152; 13th, 50, 59, 68, 79, 125, 152-56, 184, 564; 14th regular, 229, 231, 814, 887. See also 14th extraordinary congress membership, 23, 155, 499, 500, 596; and extraordinary congress, 231; opinion of, 231, 500-503; and party policy making, 349, 352; screening of, 822; suspensions from, 253, 254; expulsions from (Kriegel), 821; (Dubcek), 822; (others), 822n organizations of: Commission of Party Control (KSK), 379; district conferences, 203, 268-69, 352, 85557; Prague city, 238n, 269, 277-78, 280-82, 288, 352, 494, 505, 513, 675, 765-66; regional conferences, 230-31, 268-69, 352; regional organizations, 788, 789, 803n See also apardt; Central Committee; Communist Party of Slovakia; federalization of party; Czech communist party; functionaries; party leaders; party opinion polls; party reform; party statute; Presidium; Secretariat; UKRK

INDEX Communist Party Secretaries, conference (Moscow), 249-50, 653, 664, 879-80 Communist Party of Slovakia (CPS), 9, 24, 54, 56, 138, 170, 337, 560; Bratislava city committee, 304, 789, 791, 792n; congresses of: (1957),35; (1958), 36; and draft party statute, 322; on federation, 320, 521; on federation and democratization, 561; functionaries and reform, 522-23, 561; as lagging behind, 521; membership of, 500, 522, 596n; power struggle in, 321-22, 521; regional organizations, 244, 282-83, 789; Secretariat, 521-22, 789-90, 796; Supervision and Auditing Commission (KRK), 795 Action Program, 242, 461, 565n, 577n, 604, 609; on federation, 46061; on reorganization of CPCz, 461 Central Committee, candidates for, 320, 321, 525; and federation, 241, 242, 460; 1968 plena: (April) 241, (May) 241, 242-43, (July) 283, (August 25), 791-92 extraordinary congress, 282, 320, 525, 792-96; and CPCz extraordinary congress, 793, 794-96; elections at, 795-96; timing of, 280-83 passim, 478 leaders, 54-55, 184-85, 241, 243, 280-83, 521, 522, 791-92; attacked by Husak, 280-81, 321-22; defended by Bil'ak, 321; public trust in, 540-41 party opinion, see party opinion polls Presidium: divisions in, 521-22; membership after extraordinary congress, 796; and mission to Moscow, 781, 790; post-invasion divisions in, 790; post-invasion statements of, 78990; post-January changes in, 185; and Warsaw conference, 292, 881 Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU): CC April plenum, 224, 662, 738-39; CC July plenum, 669; letter to CPCz, 674-75, 721, 722; Politburo, and Bratislava declaration, 672; statute of (1961), 137, 138n; 20th congress of, 32; 22nd congress of, 38, 135 confederation, 462, 468 conservative forces, 239, 254, 259, 328, 501, 503, 699, 701, 705, 707, 813-19 passim, 880; analysis of, 496-97; danger from, 273, 274, 278, 293; and

economic reform, 415, 422; opinion polls on, 508, 512, 523, 524, 543, 857 conservatives, 194, 207, 216, 223, 272-73 constitution: committee on, 263, 370; of 1920, 11; of 1948, 9, 11-12,28, 370; of 1960, 10, 12, 37-38, 51, 90, 140-41, 370, 453, 465; revision of, 220-21 constitutional court, 484, 870 Corps of National Security (SNB), 408 Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, see Comecon counterrevolution, 209, 230, 240, 242n, 257, 278, 290, 297, 889; Albania on, 709; analysis of, 836-40; "bloc warnings of, 661, 663, 674, 677, 679, 683 n.96, 684, 697; denials of, 692, 701, 887, 888; Husak on, 822n; and invasion, 746, 747; poll on, 810n; Warsaw letter on, 670 counterrevolutionary forces, 237n, 32829 creative unions, 566-68; Coordinating Committee of, 529, 567 Csemadok (Cultural Union of the Hungarian Working People), 236, 606-9 passim, 875, 877 CSM, see Union of Youth, Czechoslovak Cuba, 711,751 cult of personality, 31, 32-33, 35, 39, 90, 135, 138, 145, 149-50 culture: Action Program on, 221; party on, 63, 67, 68, 565-66 cultural influences, 12-14 cultural policies, 36-37 cumulation of functions, 45, 166-69 passim, 193, 336, 337, 338 Cvik, R., 243, 255 Cyrankiewicz, J., 683-84, 686, 746 Czech communist party, 283, 319, 322, 328,488,814,873-74 Czech National Council (CNR), 263, 274, 283, 323, 476-77, 786, 860; draft statute on, 476; on federation, 487, 859, 862, 866-67, 872 Czech national organs, 462, 464-65, 475, 476-77 Czech national traditions, 3-4, 14, 1518, 91, 239; communism and, 3-8, 11, 12, 17, 19, 20, 22, 23, 26; criticism of, 831, 847, 850; revival of, 848-50 Czechoslovak Agrarian Party, 23, 589 Czechoslovak Foreign Institute, 609

903

INDEX Czechoslovak National Socialist Party, 23 Czechoslovak People's Party (CSL), 23, 264-65, 364, 543, 544-46, 602; and National Front, 348; polls of, 534n, 550-51, 557-59; program of, 233; revival of, 203, 205, 232-33 Czechoslovak Press Agency (CTK), 234, 299, 574 Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party, 6, 23, 26, 547, 554n Czechoslovak Socialist Party (CSS), 264-65, 364, 543, 544-46, 554-55; and National Front, 348; outline of principles, 233; polls of members, 534n, 550-51, 557-59; revival of, 203, 205, 232-33 Czechoslovak Sociological Society, 99 Czechoslovak unity, 451, 459, 858 "Czech question," 846-52 Czech-Slovak differences, 241-44; on bicameral assembly, 863-64; on democratization, 246-48. See also economic reform, federation; public opinion Czech-Slovak relations, 8-10, 53-54, 55n, 227, 254, 456, 461-62; Action Program on, 220-21; public opinion on, 535, 536 Czechs-Slovaks, political unity of, 4-5, 8,858 Dalimil (pseud.), 304, 313, 630 David, Pa vol, 36, 54, 254 David, Vaclav, 174, 204, 208, 227, 622 defense: and a Czechoslovak military doctrine, 636-38, 640; against Soviet attack, no preparation for, 654, 657-58 defense policy: democratic control of, 638; Gottwald Military Political Academy memorandum on, 639-41; party and, 638 Dejiny a soucasnost, 103, 105 Demichev, P. N., 666, 724 democracy, guarantees of, Rude pravo poll on, 502 democratic centralism, 137, 139, 151, 155, 191 Democratic Party (Slovak), 23, 24 democratization: and bloc relations, 626-27, 629; poll of CPS functionaries on, 523; public opinion on, 537 demonstrations, 72, 79-82, 305-6, 325, 817,881 de-Stalinization, 36, 39-40, 41, 42, 48, 90, 161, 824-25

904

detente, 730, 731, 754, 755, 756 dictatorship of proletariat, 138, 147, 153 Dockalova, Vera, 170, 254 dogmatism, 39, 41, 90, 92, 94, 103, 105, 109, 690 Dolansky, Jaromir, 47, 168, 212, 215 Doubek, B., 386-87, 400-401 Doudera, Karel, 617-18 Dresden conference, 208-9, 635, 653, 661, 662, 696; communique of, 647, 660, 661n; Rumania on, 699-700 Dub£ek, Alexander, 41, 47, 50, 54, 55, 158, 170, 171, 179, 194, 201, 216, 222, 229, 239, 242, 252, 254, 265, 274, 281, 282, 296, 300, 301, 305, 316, 322, 377, 408, 459, 498, 516-20 passim, 524, 540, 541, 542, 600, 628, 655, 709, 718, 720, 726, 761, 765, 768, 770, 774, 807, 824, 882; on Action Program, 211, 215, 217, 218; on aparat, 351, 504; arrest of, 760, 883; attitudes of (post-January), 185-86, 187-89, 196, 208-11, 827; on Bratislava conference, 309, 310, 311, 653, 672; Brezhnev's dissatisfaction with, 881; career of, 185; on Cierna conference, 306, 307, 311; and CPS extraordinary congress, 791, 792, 793-95; critic of party (October 1967), 166; criticism of, 166-67, 522, 525, 819, 822; on Czechoslovak statehood, 451, 459; on democracy, 18788, 210-11, 230; on Dresden conference, 208-9, 660; on economic policy, 444-45; on economic reform, 413, 418, 580; on 14th extraordinary congress, 211, 252, 258, 805; as First Secretary, 176-77, 183-84, 186, 187, 349-50, 786, 879; resignation as, 820; and foreign policy, 208, 617, 621, 628-29, 633; on the intelligentsia, 158, 564; on invasion, 806; on leading role of party, 210-11, 333; letter to, from extraordinary congress, 769; on mass media, 210, 367, 571, 629; meeting with Gomulka, 186, 682; meetings with Kadar, 289n, 688; as a moderate, 223, 229-31, 253, 258, 497; and Moscow talks, 796, 799, 801, 802-3, 805-6; on National Front, 263-64; on national path to socialism, 624, 628, 651; and Novotny, 168, 178, 185; political pressures on, 223-24, 231; and political reform, 158, 340-41; popular support for, post-August, 819; removal of, 823; and Slovak national-

INDEX ism, 55-56; and Slovak question, 164, 166, 185-86, 451, 453, 457; strategy of, criticized, 843-46; on strikes, 583; on trade unions, 584; on troop withdrawal, 805-6; on Two Thousand Words, 277; on unity of party, 488, 874; visit to Budapest, 691; visit to Moscow (January), 186, 194, 660; (May), 249, 663; on WTO, 634-35 speeches: at CPS congress (1966), 56; at Slovak CC (January 1968), 187-88; to Agricultural Cooperatives (February), 186, 188, 587; on 1948 anniversary (February), 188-89; of March, April, 208-11; on political situation (April), 229-31; report to CC April plenum, 210-11, 340-41, 592; to May plenum, 252-53, 256, 257, 258; at July plenum, 292-93; at Kosice regional conference (July), 282; at August 31 CC plenum, 804, 805-6; at November CC plenum, 815 Dubska, Irena, 99 Duris, Julius, 140 Dvorsky, F., 243, 521 Dzur, Martin, 173, 177, 226, 251, 299, 517, 520, 622, 635n, 635-36, 637-38, 639, 781 East Germany, see German Democratic Republic Echo, 200 Economic Commission, 58, 61 Economic Commission for Europe, 86, 627, 650 Economic Council, 226, 419, 420, 426 economic policy, 22-23, 28, 30-31, 33, 36, 41, 227, 416, 419, 420-21, 423, 444n; criticism of, 444, 445; and 14th extraordinary congress, 445; guidelines for (1969), 445-48; public opinion on, 534-35, 536, 537. See also New Course economic reform, 36, 57-62, 120, 12425, 142-45, 163, 227, 414-17, 42225, 448-49; Action Program on, 221, 418-19; apparatchiki and, 61; and Cernik government, 419-21, 423; Czech-Slovak differences, 429-30, 430-32; and federation, 429-33, 46566, 468; and foreign economic policy, 644-46; managers and, 613; and market, 59, 121-25, 426-28; and Novotny, 57-59, 61; and political reform, 61, 62, 142-45, 146, 156, 415, 423, 444; post-invasion, 816, 822, 834-35,

836, 888; and Slovakia, 429-33, 46566; slowness of, 412-14, 417, 419-20, 422, 443-44, 445, 446-48, 449; and socialism, 449-50; and trade with non-socialist countries, 645-46; workers' attitude to, 61, 579-80, 584, 585 economic reforms, enacted by Cernik government, 421-22 economics, revival of, 119-20 economists, on economic reform, 11925, 414-17, 424-25. See also Slovak economists economy: crisis in, 12, 57; difficulties in, 121, 413, 415, 424, 444n, 445, 447; party's role in, 143, 154; postwar changes in, 12 education, reform of, 78 Ekonomicka revue, 119 elections, 263, 358; in 14th congress draft report, 371; postponement of, 207, 220, 345 [post-August], 814; preferences in, 562; public opinion on, 365-66, 545-46, 554-55; results of, poll on, 372 electoral law, 345, 348 electoral reform, 137, 140-41, 148, 157, 163, 207, 220 enterprise councils, 418, 419, 422, 43336, 823. See also workers' councils; working people, councils of enterprises, directors of, power of, 43439 passim; draft statute on, 426, 816; independence of, 418, 424-27 passim, 448; property of, 439; types of, 426; and withdrawal from directorates, 421-22, 426-27; and world market, 428 Erban, Evzen, 26, 234, 255, 265, 519, 520, 524, 807 Ermarth, Fritz, 723 extremist forces, 253, 328, 501 Falt'an, Samo, 102, 241, 521, 796 farmers, 23, 202, 585-92; organizations of, 586, 587, 588-92; and reform, 585, 611-12; rehabilitation of, 58687, 588 federal assembly, see Chamber of Nations, Chamber of People Federalization of the Economy, Principles of, 467 federalization of party, 242, 280, 281, 322, 452, 459, 460, 461, 475, 488, 873-74; parity rejected in, 319, 322, 488

905

INDEX federalization of organizations, 459, 592; farmers, 591; interest groups, 593, 594, 595; trade unions, 583, 584; Union of Journalists, 573; Writers' Union, 53, 568; youth movement, 53, 599; parity in, 583, 591,593 federation, 51, 52n, 204, 215, 220, 263, 283, 320, 321, 452, 453, 459-60, 461, 470, 475, 476, 487, 785-86, 816, 823, 834, 836, 861-62, 868, 873; Academy of Sciences, report on, 464-65; and assembly, 482, 483, 863-64; bipartite, 473; CPS extraordinary congress on, 794; Czech attitudes to, 456-57, 462, 463-64, 466-68, 477, 488-89, 858; Czech proposals for, 463-65, 479-80; Czech-Slovak differences on, 247-48, 429-30, 431, 432, 484-86, 859-70, 871-73; deadline for, 242, 280, 281, 322, 323, 324, 460, 464, 465, 475, 478, 487, 489, 858-61 passim, 86667; and democratization, 245, 246-48, 323, 456, 489, 874-75; division of powers in, 454, 455, 459, 463-70 passim, 484-86, 865-66, 868-69, 87172; economic aspects of, 429-33, 46570, 476n; expert commission on, 279, 460, 473, 475, 477, 478-81, 486, 487, 859, 860; and foreign policy, 484-85; 14th extraordinary congress and, 487, 488 n.154, 771, 787; government commission on, 460, 475, 487; implementation of, 859, 870; and judicial system, 484; law on, 858, 860, 867-70; open or loose, 479-80; poll of CPS functionaries on, 523; proposals for, 478-80; quadripartite, 471, 479; rigid or closed, 479; Slovak attitude to, 242, 248, 322-23, 455-56, 464, 465, 469, 488, 489; Slovak concerns about, 279-80, 281, 282, 323; SNR proposals for, 454-55, 470, 479; tripartite, 236, 279, 470-74, 478-79, 859, 861. See also asymmetrical system; federalization; outvoting of Slovaks; parity in federal organs; Slovak; Slovakia; symmetrical system Feher, L., 747 Ferianc, Jan, 430-31, 469, 486 Fibich, Jindrich, 270, 271, 318 Fierlinger, Zdenek, 26, 47, 169, 189, 234, 379, 780 Fikar, L., 568 Filipec, J., 677 First Republic, 3-7, 11, 91, 370, 887; and Slovaks, 8-9, 247

906

Fischer, Ernst, 7On, 75, 97, 133, 569 Fischer, J. L., 100 Fischerova, M., 595 Fiser, Zbynek, 548-49 Fock, Jeno, 689 Fojtik, Jan, 133, 152, 164, 191n, 192, 212 foreign policy, 82-83, 86-87, 248, 617, 620-24, 626, 627, 630-33, 667, 834, 835; Action Program on, 221, 621-22; after Bratislava conference, 653, 655, 656; bloc criticism of, 677, 686, 687, 726, 734; bloc orientation of, 208, 286-87, 620-21, 626, 627, 628-29, 63031, 632, 651; Cernik government declaration on, 623; conduct of, 88, 62324; and developing countries, relations with, 627, 631; domestic criticism of, 82-83, 88-89, 620, 658n; East-West orientation of, 14-16, 24; and economic policy, 642-43, 645-47, 649 n.113, 880, 881; and European security, 86, 119, 631, 641, 642, 64950, 655; 14th congress materials on, 656; initiative in, 227, 617, 620-21, 622, 651, 656; leadership changes and, 622-23; in Middle East, 69, 86, 88, 623, 634; and national interest, 620, 621, 631, 632, 640, 653, 656; public opinion and, 88-89, 542, 62934; Soviet attitude to, 655n; study of, 116-19; Warsaw letter on, 650-51, 670. See also individual countries (by name); bloc; neutrality 14th extraordinary congress (CPCz), 211, 371-72, 445, 717, 720, 762, 763, 764-72, 791, 792, 800, 803, 805; decision to call, 252, 254, 258, 259, 261, 523; decisions of, 768-69, 772; decisions approved by National Assembly, 784; delegates to, 269, 271-72, 317-18, 509-11, 518n, 767, 792, 793; and election of CC, 513, 514, 516-17, 769-71; Husak and, 794; materials for, 370-72, 561, 565n, 574; message to Slovakia, 771; Moscow protocol and, 884-85; and Piller report, 410; preparations for, 254, 269, 317-20, 674, 726, 761; proceedings of, 766-71, 772; on protest strike, 768; Slovak delegates to, 765-66, 767, 770, 771-72; Slovak extraordinary congress and, 793, 79495; Slovak statements on (postinvasion), 789-92 passim; supported by CNR (post-invasion), 786; Soviet reaction to, 772

INDEX Frank, Josef, 378 freedom of assembly, 220, 227 freedom of expression, 62-72, 198-99, 220, 238, 262, 263, 307, 367-69, 494, 572, 573, 834, 836; curbed, 821, 822; poll of party secretaries on, 506 freedom of the press, 367-68, 573-74; limitations on, 368, 369. See also press law Freedom of the Press, Workers' Committees for the Defense of, 238, 367, 581 French Communist Party: attitude to CSSR, 295-96, 711; and invasion, 752-53 Friedrich, Carl, 829 Fris, Edo, 303 functionaries (CPCz), 134, 155-56; definition of, 503. See also aparat Fund of the Republic, 302 Galanskov, Y., 738 Galluzzi, C , 712 Galuska, M., 226, 262, 565 Garaudy, Roger, 70n, 75, 97, 752 Gasparik, M., 273 German Democratic Republic (GDR), 11, 170, 175, 757; and alliance with CSSR, 87; attitude to CSSR, 297, 675-81, 740-41; Berlin visa measures, 676, 678, 741; and Bratislava declaration, 680, 681; Czechoslovak relations with, 86, 647, 648, 649, 651, 656; and alliance with CSSR, 87; diplomatic protest of, to Prague, 250, 676; and European security, 656, 681; and intervention in CSSR, 677; and invasion, 714, 741, 746, 754; and relations with GFR, 678n, 679-80, 681,741 German Federal Republic (GFR): Czechoslovak relations with, 87, 627, 631, 640, 641, 645, 647-49, 651, 732, 741; danger from, 674, 675, 679, 683, 684; danger from, as reason for invasion, 728, 732-33, 741, 746; and NATO exercises, 298, 733; Ostpolitik, 665, 666, 671, 678n, 681n, 682, 732, 733; Poland's attitude to, 683-87 passim, 732, 742; protest of, to USSR, 733; relations with CSSR, bloc criticism of, 687, 732 Germans (CSSR), see national minorities Germany, Czech historical attitude to, 10, 11, 15 Gierek, Edward, 683, 685, 743

Ginsberg, Allen, 72 Ginzburg, A., 738 Golan, Galia, 827 Goldmann, Josef, 123 Goldstucker, Edward, 69, 81, 97, 193, 201, 204, 205, 209, 273, 375, 378, 400, 517, 520, 541, 542, 568, 569, 573, 598, 786, Gomutka, Wladyslaw, 186, 661, 682-83, 684, 685, 723n, 742, 743, 746, 884 Gosiorovsky, M., 5In, 53-54 Gosztonyi, J., 689, 692 Gottwald, Klement, 7, 21-24 passim, 29,31,39,46, 103, 188,215,216, 341, 388, 624; and national traditions, 6, 7; responsible for trials of fifties, 48, 375, 385, 388, 403; rule of, 25-28 Gottwald Military Political Academy, 639-41 government, 145, 204-5, 225, 226, 340, 342-43, 344, 419; and 14th congress, 767-68; organs of, and economic reform, 144-45; post-invasion, 780, 781, 782-83, 784, 786, 801; responsible to Assembly, 343, 344, 419; under Cernik: federation, 459-60; policy declaration of, 226-27; public confidence in, 538, 540. See also ministries; individual ministries (by name) Graca, 795, 796 "The Great Roadsweeper," letter to, 398 Grechko, A. A., 250, 635, 636, 722, 737, 796, 819 Greek Catholic Church, 601, 603, 606 Grigorenko, Pyotr, 753 Grishin, V. V., 662-63 Grohman, J., 379 Gromyko, Andrei, 666-67, 758, 796 Grospic, J., 457, 463-65, 467-68, 477, 479, 485-86 Hagara, F., 453 Hager, Kurt, 209, 676, 677 Hajek, Prof. Jiri, 81, 226, 248, 286, 622, 624n, 663, 678, 697, 700, 726, 783, 814; on foreign policy, 626-28; speech at UN, 757-58 Hajek, Jiri (writer), 69, 568, 574n Hamouz, F., 225, 226, 254, 419, 516, 520, 622, 643 Hamsik, Dusan, 385, 388, 570 Hanak, J., 621 Hanzelka, Jiri, 274, 517, 520, 541, 542

907

INDEX Harencar, Robert, 185, 521, 598, 792, 796 Hasek, Jaroslav, 16, 97, 828 Hatala, Vojtech, 464, 477 Havel, Vaclav, 69, 356, 357, 527, 570, 679 Havlicek, F., 193 Havlicek, Karel, 18 Havlicek, Miroslav, 270 Hegedus, Andreas, 754 Hejzlar, Zdenek, 200, 379, 767, 768, 786,787,814 Hendrych, Jin, 31, 36, 37, 42, 47, 63, 65-71 passim, 102, 113, 125, 157, 163-64, 165, 168, 190-91, 192, 203, 207, 212, 215, 216, 879 Henlein, Konrad, 10 Henry, Ernst, 673 Herbell, H., 677 Higher Party School (CC), 90, 93, 105, 232, 270, 505 historians: congresses of, 102, 106; Slovak, 106 history: reassessment of, 236; revival of, 102-6; of party, reevaluated, 103-6 passim Hlinka, Indrej, 8, 9, 13 Hochman, Jin, 304, 381, 630 Hodnett, Grey, 736-37 Hoffmann, K., 164, 883 Holdos, L., 603 Holecek, Lubomir, 78, 597 Holub, Miroslav, 567, 569, 578 Honecker, Erik, 678 Horak, R., 579 Horakova, Milada, 378 Horvath, Ivan, 695 Hospodarske noviny, 120; supplement on economic reform (Nastin), 41718, 425-26, 427 Host do domu, 471 Hotel Praha meeting, see Central Committee Hradecky, Adolf, 72, 572 Hrbek, Jaromir, 821 Hrdinova, L., 762, 786-87, 792 Hron, Pavel, 207, 212, 216 Hruskovii, Miloslav, 185, 282, 419, 521, 522, 525 Hiibl, Milan, 94, 104, 105, 232, 452, 463n, 505, 520, 786 human rights, 202, 233-34 Human Rights, Organization for the Defense of (Slovak), 202, 267 Human Rights, Society for, 233, 234, 267, 548

908

Hungarians in CSSR, see national minorities. See also Csemadok Hungary: attitude to CSSR, 287, 288, 628, 688-95, 743, 744, 747; Communist Party of, support for CPCz, 691; and conference in Moscow (May), 689-90; and invasion, 714, 745, 747, 754; reform in, 743-44, 747; in 1956, 661, 668, 674, 689, 693-94, 695, 744, 747, 758; Slovak minority in, 608; treaty with CSSR, 628, 631, 651, 654, 691, 692; at UN, 757; at Warsaw conference, 693 Huntington, Samuel, 829 Hus, Jan, 18 Husak, Gustav, 9, 10, 13, 32, 50, 53, 54, 56, 189, 201, 225, 226, 239, 248, 254, 255, 377, 378, 380, 397, 399, 400, 402, 453, 488, 516, 517, 52425, 520, 541, 542, 560, 601, 717, 781, 786, 791n, 795, 796, 807, 815, 818, 820-21, 823, 824, 875, 879; and CPS extraordinary congress, 791, 792, 793-95; as critic of Bil'ak, 280-81, 521, 522; as critic of Novotny and Dubcek, 818, 823; on federation, 242, 280-81, 282, 322, 459-60, 464n, 477, 478, 873; and 14th extraordinary congress, 805; on invasion, 822; on Moscow talks, 798; support of postJanuary course, 794; trial and rehabilitation of, 378, 380,383, 384,397, 399, 400, 402, 879; on trials of the fifties, 385, 386 Husek, J., 374 "Hyde Park" discussions, 325 Hykisch, Anton, 245 Hysko, Miroslav, 48, 49, 65, 573-74 Iliescu, V., 700 Il'nitsky, Y. V., 737, 738 imperialism: danger from, 660-67 passim, 671, 675-81 passim, 684, 697, 750; Warsaw letter on, 670 individual freedom, public opinion on, 560 Indra, Alois, 170, 216, 223, 229, 254, 268, 269, 272, 277, 318, 319, 329, 330, 367, 446, 475, 516, 519, 520, 717, 766, 781, 784n, 797n, 817; and collaboration, 760-64 passim, 770 Indra-Kolder memorandum on political situation, 329-30, 761 inflation, 414, 416, 421, 424, 445, 447 Institute of CPCz History (CC), 103, 270, 505

INDEX Institute of Economics (AS), 58, 90, 119 Institute for the History of Socialism (CC), 270 Institute of International Politics and Economics (OMPE), 116, 117 Institute of Marxism-Leninism for Higher Schools, 76, 99, 101 Institute of Philosophy (AS), 96, 98, 99, 101 Institute of Philosophy, Slovak (AS), 98 Institute of Political Science (CC), 112, 333, 501-3, 530n Institute for Public Opinion Research, UVVM (AS), 99, 503, 530-32 Institute of Sociology (AS), 99, 101 Institute of State and Law (AS), 108, 112-13 intellectuals: appeal by (1967), 71; control of (1970), 822-23; official attitude to, 132-33, 564-66, 567; role of, 131-33, 158, 564, 566, 611, 887; Ten Points Manifesto of (1969), 821 intelligentsia, see intellectuals interest groups, 147, 148, 202, 588, 592-93, 594-95, 816. See also farmers, journalists, etc. interest organizations, formation of, 267; and National Front, 347 interests in socialist society, 10 In, 120, 148, 151-52, 153 international relations, study of, 116 intervention in domestic affairs rejected, 208, 209, 257, 287-88, 290, 311, 316, 625, 626, 629, 653, 654n, 700, 704, 706, 707 invasion, 713-15, 836; appeal for assistance, 716-18, 757; and armed resistance, 714-15, 775, 804, 808, 843, 844-46, 889; Central Committee (December 1970) on, 718; condemnation of, 716, 759, 761, 779-80, by 14th extraordinary congress, 768; Husak on (1969), 822; knowledge of, 714, 716, 717n, 760, 761; no warning of, 327n, 844n, 880; political failure of, 715, 760-64, 775-76; Presidium declaration on, 716, 759, 761 bloc and invasion: justification of, 740, 745-48; opposition to, 753-54; participation in, 714, 740 resistance to invasion: demands raised, 774, 779-80; effect of, 775-76; methods of, 776-77; national unity in, 772-73, 779-80, 789; nonviolence in, 773-75; official, 780-88; popular,

715, 717, 759, 852; role of media in, 777-79; Soviet reports of, 775 Soviet Union and invasion: armed forces during, 777, 778, 782, 783, 788; Cierna and Bratislava, relation to, 716, 719-20, 721-22, 724; Czechoslovak domestic factors in decision on, 727-28, 735-36; Czech views on reasons for (Dubcek), 806, (Smrkovsky), 882; division of leaders on, 72225; international factors in decision on, 727, 728-30, 730-35; justification of, 726, 729-30; military and, 725-26; protests against, 753-54; reasons for, 726-29, 735n, 741 n.89, 837, 842, 889; responsibility for, 887; role in, 714; strategic reasons for, 733-35, 746; statement at UN, 757; termed counterrevolutionary, 839-40; threat to Eastern Europe, as cause of, 729, 730, 732, 733; timing of, 719-22; Ukrainian factor in, 736-38; and WTO, 733-35, 740, 746, 757 United Nations: debate on, 756-58; resolution on, 757 the West and invasion: attitude of USA to, 755; reaction of NATO to, 755-56 world communist parties and invasion, 747-53; Asian, 750, 752; Chinese, 750; Cuban, 751; European, 752-53; non-ruling, 751-53; ruling, 750-51 See also individual countries (by name) Israel, 682, 683; Czechoslovak relations with, 71,86, 88, 287, 621, 627, 631, 633-34 Italian Communist Party, attitude to CSSR, 711-12,752 Izvestia, 668, 670, 724 Jakes, Milos, 207, 212, 216, 254, 304, 378-79, 717, 762, 796 Janik, J., 791 Janko, Vladimir, 174, 177, 197 Jankovcova, Ludmila, 26, 47 Janosik, 16 Janousek, K., 378 January changeover, 189-91, 191-92, 194; bloc reaction to, 194-95, 660-61; opposition to, 193, 238; public attitude to, 192, 193; significance of, 183-84, 187, 194 Jaszczuk, B., 686 Jednotne zemedelske druistvo (JZD), see collective farms

909

INDEX Jenys, V., 379 Jesenska, Zora, 245, 246, 247 Jews: Poland and, 682, 683; in political trials, 26 Ji5insky, Zdenek, 111, 463-64, 467-68, 474, 477, 479, 485-86, 505 Jirasek, Alois, 14 Jodas, Josef, 193, 204, 238, 272, 497 Jodl, Miroslav, 72-73, 100, 237, 324, 325 Johnson, Chalmers, 829 Johnson, Lyndon B., 730, 731, 755 journalists, 571-74; and Bratislava con­ ference, 312; and freedom of expres­ sion, 367-68, 368-69, 572, 573; as interest group, 573; meeting of, with Presidium, 326-27; organization of, in Prague, 572-73; party attitude to, 571, 574; and self-censorship, 572. See also Union of Journalists judicial independence, 109, 110, 406, 410 Junak, 595, 599 Kabrna, B., 762, 786 Kadar, Janos, 288, 628, 661, 691, 743, 744, 884; on Bratislava declaration, 694-95; meetings with Dubiek, 186, 289n, 313, 316-17, 655, 688, 722; role at Moscow meeting (May), 689; visit to Moscow (July), 667, 691-92; visit to Prague, 688-89 Kadlec, Prof. V., 226, 254, 566 Kadlecova, Erika, 601-2 Kafka, Franz, 14, 97, 568 Kahn, Herman, 842 Kalab, MiIoS, 99, 101 Kalandra, Zavis, 569 Kalecki, M., 123 Kalisky, Roman, 50 KAN, 202, 233, 307, 347, 498, 529, 546, 547-48, 879, 882, 888; banned (post-August), 814; on civil rights, 367n; Moscow protocol on, 805; as political party, 265-66; and political reform, 358; in Slovakia, 547; Svitak and, 547 Kanturek, Jiri, 517 Kapek, Antonin, 41, 216, 254, 330, 519, 520, 807, 822 Kaplan, Karel, 387, 389-91, 397, 405, 527 Karlik, Jiri, 588, 590 Karlik commission, 588, 590, 591 Karvas, Peter, 245 Kaspar, Jan, 515 Kaspar, Vlado, 573

910

Kaspar report, see CC report on politi­ cal situation (Zprava) Katolicke noviny, 602 Katushev, K. F., 723n, 724, 796, 817 Kazakov, M. L, 721 Kejf, J., 578 Khrushchev, Nikita, 35-39 passim, 51, 135, 380, 830 Kiesinger, Kurt G., 87, 648 Kirilenko, A. P., 304 Kladiva, Jaroslav, 81, 164, 254, 566 Klima, Ivan, 69, 71 Kliment, Alexander, 69, 356-57, 527, 528, 570 Kliszko, Z., 684, 685 KlofaS, Jaroslav, 99, 100 Klokoc, 0., 241, 521, 786, 790n, 791, 793n, 796, 867 Klokocka, Vladimir, 361-62 Knapp, Viktor, 108, 263, 370, 478, 867 Koctuch, Hvezdon, 431, 462, 486, 795 Kodaj, Samuel, 276, 278 Kohler, Bruno, 46-47, 48, 49, 254 Kohout, J., 647 Kohout, Pavel, 69, 200, 201, 274, 301, 634 Kohoutek, Miloslav, 125, 400-401, 412 Kolar, F. J., 104 Kolar, Jan, 787 Kolder, Drahomir, 41, 47, 61, 168, 189, 197, 212, 215, 216, 217, 223, 229, 239, 268, 269, 329, 330, 419, 446, 516, 519, 520, 524, 717, 761, 784n, 796, 807, 817, 822, 824, 881; and col­ laboration, 760-63 passim, 770; memorandum of, on Warsaw meeting, 288-89; on rehabilitation, 376 Kolder commission, 41, 376; Piller report on, 401-2; report of, 47-49, 107 Kolder-Indra memorandum, 329-30, 761 Kolman, Α., 577n Komenda, B., 119 Komensky, Jan Amos, 18 Komocsin, Z., 689, 695 Komunist, 702, 704, 707 Konev, I. S., 248 Konstantinov, F., 666 Kopecky, Vaclav, 65 Kopriva, Ladislav, 48, 383, 385-86, 390, 403 Koryta, J., 578 Koscelansky, Jan, 791-92, 796 Kosice program, 9, 175, 453, 459, 607, 608

INDEX Kosik, Karel, 94-98 passim, 129, 520, 569, 585, 847-48 Kosterin, A. Y., 739 Kosygin, Alexei, 250, 668, 722, 724, 880 Kotlar, J., 381,382 Kotyk, Vaclav, 620-21, 653, 692, 69798; on bloc relations, 117-18, 632, 652 Kouba, Karel, 119, 123, 422, 505 Koucky, Vladimir, 36, 63, 78, 86, 92, 104, 109, 195, 212, 216, 376, 402, 618-19,796 Kovak, 779 Kovalcik, L., 807 Kovalev, S., 729, 730 Kozel, J., 193, 237 Kozlov, V., 624 Kozusnik, C, 119,422 Krai, Vaclav, 577 Krasnaya zvezda, 298, 668-69, 724 Kreibich, Karl, 379, 391n Kreibichova, Charlotte, 379 Krejci, Jaroslav, 840 Kren, Jan, 102 Kriegel, Frantisek, 166, 167, 216, 223, 227, 228, 234, 265, 273, 326, 330, 346, 347, 462, 516, 519, 520, 524, 760, 770, 774, 786, 796, 807, 815, 821, 882, 883; on National Front, 264; refusal to sign at Moscow talks, 884; return from Moscow talks, 797n, 884 Kriz, Jozef, 54 Krosnar, J., 212 Kruczek, W., 685 K 231, 202, 233, 240, 267-68, 307, 347, 498, 546, 548, 879, 888; banned, 814; Moscow protocol on, 805; and rehabilitation, 374, 393, 394 Kubes, V., 378 Kucera, B., 205, 226, 261, 347, 377, 405, 406, 781 Kucera, V., 589 Kudrna, J., 204, 375 Kulturni tvorba, 66, 199 Kulturny zivot, 53, 62, 64, 65, 66, 72, 244-47 passim, 301, 312, 789 Kundera, Milan, 69, 569 Kusin, V. V., 827, 828 Kusy, Miroslav, 95, 150, 495, 832 Kutlvasr, K., 378 Kuznetsov, V. V., 817 Labor Party (Slovak), 23 Laco, Karol, 462, 464, 478 Lajciak, Milan, 792

Lakatos, Michal, 111, 145, 146, 147-51, 358, 359, 409-10, 53In Lange, Oskar, 121, 123 Laqueur, Walter, 829 Lastovicka, B., 176, 215, 216, 227 Lausman, Bohumil, 380-81 Law for the Defense of the Republic, 1948 (Statute no. 231),374 leaflets, illegal, 238, 325 Lederer, Jiri, 369 Lefebvre, Henri, 95 legal reform, 107-8, 109-11, 221, 370, 373, 404-5, 406-7, 816; and political reform, 111. See also rehabilitation Lenart, Jozef, 41, 47, 54, 55, 61, 170, 174,175, 176, 204, 208, 215-16, 229, 248, 255, 309, 402, 516, 519, 520, 524, 541, 542, 560, 619, 622, 723n, 763, 770, 796, 807, 878 Lenin, V. L, 6 Leonov, L., 754 "Lesson drawn from the Crisis . . ." (CPCz CC plenum, December 1970), 718 Liben letter, 193 Liben meeting, 818n, 819 Liblice conference, 97 Lidovd demokracie, 199, 265, 285, 286, 533-34, 668 Lidove noviny, 570n Liehm, Antom'n, 69, 71, 565, 573 Lipavsky, J., 412 Liska, L., 650 Listy, 816, 821 Litera, Jaromir, 766, 767, 770, 786 Litera, Josef, 375 Literarni listy, 199-200, 274, 275, 278, 293, 301-2, 312, 568, 569-70, 579, 630, 694 Literarni noviny, 62, 64, 66, 71, 81, 95, 163, 246, 569-70, 573 literature, political role of, 569-70 Literaturnaya gazeta, 672, 676 Little Entente, 650n, 655 Litvinov, Pavel, 753 living standards, 421, 424 Lobl, Evzen, 373, 375, 388, 390, 400, 430-31, 439, 624-25; on his interrogation and trial, 382-84; on intellectual revolution, 832-33 local government, 38, 861. See also national committees Logan-Sowinski, L, 684 Lomsky, Bohumir, 173, 174-75, 178, 203, 204, 208, 212, 227, 255, 622 London, Artur, 382 n.39, 384n, 400 Longo, Luigi, 248, 711, 752

911

INDEX Lorincz, Julius, 608 Losonczi, Pal, 695 Lowenthal, Richard, 720, 736 Lukacs, Gyorgy, 94, 95, 569n, 754 Lukes, K., 379 Luptak, S., 796 Lustig, A., 634 Macek, Josef, 102-8, 254, 566, 596, 762 Macha, Karel Hynek, 72 Machacova, Bozena, 768, 782 Machonin, Pavel, 76, 99, 101, 326, 563, 585 Machonin team, 101, 130 Main Political Administration (MPA), 172 Magyar Hirlap, 694 Magyar Nemzet, 690, 694 Majales, 72 majorizacia, meaning of, 455n. See also outvoting of Slovaks Malek, Ivan, 167, 579 Malik, Yakov, 757 Mamula, Miroslav, 172-73, 174, 193, 269, 375, 379, 386, 622 Maoism, 549, 625 Marchenko, A. T., 739 Marx, Karl, 6, 94-98 passim, 367, 830, 850 Marxism, reexamination of, 94-96, 97 Marxism-Leninism, 90, 92, 94, 100, 102-3,105, 106,115 Masaryk, Jan, 26, 201, 236, 250, 38182, 665 Masaryk, Tomas G., 4-18 passim, 20n, 21, 26, 95, 100, 103, 106, 199, 201, 236, 243, 273, 341, 665n, 679, 696, 846, 849, 850 Masherov, P. M., 724 mass media, 67, 68, 236, 238, 245, 256, 258, 259, 506, 624; CC report on, 574; criticism of, 237, 367, 574, 887, 888; Cierna conference and, 882; 14th congress materials on, 574; under Husak, 823; Moscow protocol on, 801, 805; opinion of public on, 571, 572; Presidium on, after Cierna, 308; role of, during occupation, 777-79, 784; [post-January], 197, 210. See also press mass organizations, 137, 143, 202, 232, 592, 816 Matejicek, Jaroslav, 886 Matejicek, V., 787 Matica Slovenska, 202, 605, 609-10 May Day (1968),235,879 Mazurov, K. T., 724

912

Mencl, V., 640 Mestek, Karel, 586, 762, 784 Meusel, Alfred, 829 Mezinarodn'i vztahy, 116 Micunovic, V., 704 Mihalik, V., 245, 293, 792 Mikoyan, A. L, visit to Prague, 386, 398 Minac, Vladimir, 65, 174, 247, 248, 293, 303-4 ministries, 93, 396, 420; under federal system, 865-66, 871-72 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), 88, 116,396,620,782,783 Ministry of Foreign Trade, and occupation, 783 Ministry of Interior, 227, 407-8; and new political parties, 235, 546-47; and registration of organizations, 234, 267, 268n; report of, on Strahov, 205; Soviet advisers in, 408-9 Ministry of National Defense, 172, 177, 193, 300, 396; on Prchlik, 299-300 Mlada fronta, 80, 199, 533-34, 597 Mlynar, Zdenek, 91, 108, 111, 113, 145, 146, 148, 149, 151, 212, 216, 254, 255, 259, 386, 434, 442, 519, 520, 524, 566, 577, 771, 796, 815, 883; memorandum of (1975), 88689; on political reform, 334-35, 356n, 360-61,886, 888 Mlynarik, Jan, 105 Mlynar team, on federation, 457; on political reform, 112-13,130, 333-34, 886 Mfiacko, Ladislav, 71, 88, 235, 245, 246, 568, 633-34 Moc, Z., 786 Moczar, Mieczyslaw, 742, 743 Moravek, L., 204 Moravia, 470-74, 873; recognition of zeme, 473, 474, 859n, 861 Moravia and Silesia, Ministry for, 873n; Society for, 471, 473-74, 859n; and tripartite federation, 47074, 859 Moscow talks (post-invasion), 781, 796, 797-801, 805, 883-84; communique of, 798, 799, 800; communique endorsed by bloc leaders, 799-800; Husak on, 798; and normalization, 802, 803; popular reaction to, 803-4; Presidium on, 787, 790; reports of leaders on, 801-3, 884-85; Smrkovsky on, 798, 883-84; Soviet demands at, 798; Soviet draft proposal at, 883-84 protocol of, 798-802, 798 n.104,

INDEX 807-10, 817; approved by bloc lead­ ers, 884; Smrkovsky on, 884 Muller, Jiri, 77-78, 597 multi-party system, 150, 151, 356-62 passim Munich agreement, 7, 9, 15, 87; invalid ab initio, 627, 628, 647, 648 Muzik, Jan, 757 Nagy, Imre, Literarni listy article on, 628n, 691, 693 Narodna armiya, 698 Ndstin, see Hospodafske noviny National Assembly, 142, 148, 206, 34344, 451-52, 768, 781, 784; Action Program on, 221, 340; chambers in, 361, 362, 482, 483, 863-64; defense and security committee of, 344, 407, 409; elections to, 140, 157, 887; government responsible to, 221, 34243, 419; and law on federation, 86667, 869; "permanent" session of (post-invasion), 783-86; protests of (post-invasion), 784, 785; revival of, 141, 204, 225, 227-28, 343-44; role of, 88, 340, 342, 624; session of June 1968, 261-63; statement of, after Moscow talks, 801; and treaty on troops (October), 815 national committees, 137, 144, 153, 340; elections of, 140, 157, 205, 215, 228, 345, 474; reform of, 157, 474 national communism, 35-36 National Front, 22-28 passim, 205, 228, 256, 346-48, 371, 555-60, 599, 610, 807, 823, 835; Action Program on, 219, 220, 339, 340-41; agricultural organizations and, 588-92 passim; creative unions and, 348, 567, 578, 579; in draft report for 14th congress, 371; and elections, 140-41, 348; and leading role of party, 229, 346; and mass organizations, 267, 346, 347-48; membership in, 234, 264-67; and new parties, 234-35, 264, 346-47, 546, 814; and non-communist parties, 23233, 263-65, 346, 348, 544, 559-60; and political reform, 358, 359-60, 361, 362; polls on, 365-66, 555, 55758; role of, 263-64, 348; statute on, 346, 347, 348, 371, 814, 887; and youth, 348, 598, 599 nationalities, statute on, 221, 604, 610, 816, 875-77; Hungarians and, 875, 877; Slovak criticism of, 875-77 national minorities, 603-4, 608n, 875; after World War II, 8, 10-11; in Czech lands, 604-5; under First

Republic, 4-5, 10; in Slovakia, 60510; Germans, 8, 10-11, 604-5 gypsies, 605 Hungarians, 7, 8, 10, 603, 605, 606-8, 690, 691, 744, 875, 877; Hun­ gary and, 608, 690, 691; Slovak conflict with, 608-9 Poles, 8, 605 Ruthenians (Ukrainians), 7, 599, 603, 605-6, 876n national path to socialism, 7, 22-25, 26, 256-57, 388, 542, 624-26, 628, 679 national sovereignty, 651, 652, 653 national traditions, 34, 624, 887 NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Or­ ganization), 649, 733, 755-56 Nawrocki, W., 685 Nekrasov, Viktor, 753 Neues Deutschland, 297, 678-80, 681 Neuman, A., 203, 205, 375, 377 Neuman, Sigmund, 829 Neumann, S. K., 104 neutrality, 118-19, 632, 641, 642, 734, 746, 774-75; rejection of, 620, 629, 630n, 633, 654, 656, 785, 787, 794 New Course, 22, 30-31, 586 newspapers, 199-200, 312, 569-70, 571; public opinion on, 533-34. See also mass media; press Nikezic, Marko, 248, 704, 706 NKVD, 381, 382n nomenklatura, 349 non-communist parties, 23, 26, 226, 227, 349, 357-58, 527, 528, 529, 544, 55960; polls on, 544-46; revival of, 203, 205, 232-33; size of, 543-44. See also individual parties (by name); National Front; political parties non-communists, opinion on: CPCz and a new party, 553-54; elections, 554-55; formation of political parties, 551, 552; National Front, 555-59; opposition party, 553; political party system, 550-51; post-January changes, 538n (see also public opinion polls); roll of, 526-29, 562, 567, 570 normalization, 802, 803, 806, 810, 813, 814,815,817,820 Nosek, V., 403 Νονά my si, 199 Νονέ slovo, 248, 312, 323, 789 Novomesky, Ladislav, 9, 13, 14, 32, 50, 66, 69, 205, 246, 247, 248, 282, 293, 321, 400, 462, 517, 520, 634, 792, 795, 796

INDEX Novotny, Antonin, 22, 29, 30, 33-42 passim, 75, 78-79, 84, 85-86, 105, 111, 140, 141, 164, 196,215,216, 223, 281, 493, 660, 709; attitude to criticism, 136, 159, 163, 171, 174; and Barak case, 379-80; Brezhnev's attitude to, 168-69, 179; conflict with Dubcek, 55, 167; criticism of: by Bil'ak, 170, by Dubcek, 166, 178, bySmrkovsky, 175-76; defended, 170, 172, 176; and democracy, 15354, 159-60; and de-Stalinization, 3940, 161-62; and economic reform, 58, 61, 145, 153; and federation, 214, 458n, 462; and freedom of expression, 62, 63, 65-66, 68; on intellectuals, 70, 125,130-31,132; leadership changes planned, 878; and party's leading role, 159-60, 165; and political reform, 136-38,153-54, 333; on post-January course, 214; and rehabilitation, 213, 376, 385, 401, 403; and rehabilitation of Husak, 879; and removal from presidency, 198, 201, 203, 205, 208; removed from CC, 254, 255, 397; removed as First Secretary, 176, 178, 183; role of army in removal of, 172-74, 177, 178-79, 214; responsibility of, for trials, 46, 49, 213, 375, 376, 380, 384, 385, 403; rule of, 45-47, 134-35, 161-62, 187, 339, 825-26; and Slovakia, 51, 53, 55, 170, 282, 402; Stalinism under, 161-62; suspended from party, 253, 254, 397, 404 regime: crisis of, 162, 168-77; his defense of, 213-14; Husak's restoration of, 823 speeches: in Kosice (1963), 50, 65-66; at December 1967 plenum, 169; in February 1968, 190, 204; at April plenum, 212, 213-14; at May plenum, 270 Novotny, Antonin, Jr., and Sejna, 198 Novy, Vilem, 104-5, 172, 212, 250, 254, 262, 762 Obrana lidu, 199 Ondratek, J., 380 Opat, J., 489 oponentum, 78n, 151, 154n, 228, 346n, 360; definition of, 115n; Smrkovsky on, 15 In, 342 opposition, 356-57, 358, 359, 360, 36162, 546; Lakatos on, 151; Mlynar on, 335; Strinka on, 150; Svitak on, 358

914

opposition parties, 219; Action Program on, 339 opposition party, public opinion on, 551,553 Orel, restoration of, 594 Oren, M., 383 Ort, Alexander, 118, 633, 650 Orthodox Church (Slovakia), 603 outside interference, poll on, 543 outvoting of Slovaks: safeguards against, 455, 463, 476, 477, 869; Czech attitude to, 463, 481, 483; in party, 154, 281, 320, 322, 454, 514, 766; Slovak attitude to, 280, 481, 482, 862. See also majorizacia Page, Benjamin, 838 Pajetta, G., 712 Palach, Jan, 818 Palacky, Frantisek, 13, 18 parity in federal organs, 454, 484; Czech-Slovak differences on, 481-83, 862, 864-65, 869, 870; under federation law, 869, 870, 871-72; Slovak demand for, 323 parliamentary delegation to Moscow (June), 665, 666, 881 partisanry in scholarship, 93, 106 Party of Freedom (Slovak), 232-33, 264, 544 party leaders, 27n, 29-35, 36, 41-42, 46-47, 518-21; Albania on divisions among, 709; arrest of, 760, 883; bloc criticism of, 670, 726; criticism of, 26, 203, 269, 273, 887-88; differing opinions among (post-January), 168, 187-88, 189-91, 192, 196, 212-14, 222-23; public support for, 293-94, 301-2, 303, 324, 327, 540, 541-42, 779, 788, 803-4, 809, 816; release of, demanded, 768, 772; Slovak confidence in, 560; succession of, 178 changes in: CC November plenum, 815; post-January, 204, 206-7, 208, 215-16, 254-55; post-invasion, 79192; after Moscow talks, 806-7, 814; after April 1969, 821, 822 party, leading role of, 36, 41, 63, 65, 66, 90, 94, 115-16, 125, 137, 139-40, 143, 149-50, 151, 154-55, 157, 158-60, 164-66, 167-68, 189, 255-56, 301, 339, 355, 362, 371, 372, 405, 527, 553, 582, 665, 678, 695, 696, 697, 735, 835, 888; Action Program and, 219, 220, 221, 339; in National Front, 235; opinion polls on, 363, 501n, 502, 506, 538n, 558. See also

"Theses on the Position and Leading Role of the Party." party opinion polls, 354-55, 356, 494n, 501n; functionaries, 506-9; CPS functionaries, 501n, 522-24; delegates to district conferences, 507-9, 516n, 517, 855-57; delegates to 14th congress, 511-13, 515-17, 855-57; Slovak delegates to 14th congress, 517, 52324. See also public opinion polls party, reform of, 114-15, 154, 158, 165, 166, 168, 169-70, 176, 187, 189, 190, 268-69, 270-71, 335-36, 352-53. See also federalization of party party, scientific study of, 114 Party of Slovak Revival, 232-33, 264, 544 party statute, draft, 270-71, 318-20, 322, 352-54, 354-55, 355-56, 514, 520, 671, 674, 681, 722, 726, 814; 1962, 137-38; 1962 and 1966, 15455; revision of, 268, 269, 270-71 Pastynk, Miroslav, 215, 581, 582, 762 Patrascanu, Lucretiu, 699 Paul, David W., 724 Pavel, J., 226, 297, 377, 378, 400, 407, 408, 409, 517, 520, 542, 671, 782-83, 814 Pavlenda, Viktor, 241, 431, 453, 465-66, 468-69, 520, 521, 787, 791, 795, 796 Pavlik, A., 243 Pavlovsky, Ivan G., 721, 783, 885 Pavlovsky, Oldrich, 176, 762, 763, 782 peaceful coexistence, 83, 86, 90, 92, 97, 674 Peace Movement of the Catholic Clergy, 600 Pecho, Michal, 185, 322, 453, 521 Pelikan, Jin, 622, 767, 769-70, 785, 814, 846 Pelikan, Pavel, 124 Pelsche, A. J., 724 people's control, commissions of, 139, 145, 157 "people's democracy," 23, 26 People's Militia, 237-38, 274, 285, 296, 325-26, 666, 685, 819; abolition of, proposed, 325, 673, 675, 695 Pepich, Egyd, 193, 208, 622 Peter, Janos, 692 Pfaff, Ivan, 378 philosophers, 94-98 philosophy, CPCz on, 94-95, 98: ferment in, 94-98 Pika, H., 378 Pilar, J., 568

Piller, Jan, 170, 184, 215, 216, 269-70, 330, 516, 519, 520, 524, 716, 717, 762n, 763, 781, 807, 883 Piller commission, 215, 269-70, 377; interim report of, 254; report of, 397-404, 405, 407, 410, 735, 816 Pioneers, 599 Pithart, Petr, 304, 358, 359-60 Plamen, 69, 568 planning, reform of, see economic reform Plojhar, L, 203, 205, 600 Pludek, A., 489 pluralism, 115, 356-63, 373, 423, 835, 886 Pocepicky, 1., 232 Podgorny, N. V., 670-71, 724, 737, 738 Pokorny, Dusan, 388 Polacek, Karel, 302, 520, 582, 598, 807 Poland: aid offered to CSSR, 687, 688; attitude to CSSR, 681-88, 742; and Bratislava declaration, 687; CC July plenum, 685; diplomatic protest by, 250, 634, 683, 684; domestic crisis in, 682-83, 685, 742, 743; and invasion, 714, 743, 746; opposition to invasion in, 754; party instructions on CSSR, 683 n.96; relations with Rumania, 687-88, 701; Soviet praise of, 674; sympathy for reforms in CSSR, 682, 683n; treaty with CSSR, 87; and West Germany, 683, 684, 742; Yugoslav attitude to, 702; and Zionism, 682-83, 684, 685 Poles (CSSR), see national minorities Polevoi, B., 739 political forces: analysis of, 493-98; and nationalism, 495; polarization of, 272-79. See also anti-socialist; centrists; conservatives; counterrevolutionary; progressives political organizations: registration of, 234; rise of, 202, 546-47; in Slovakia, 244. See also KAN; K 231; Social Democratic Party political parties: Action Program on, 219-20; National Front and, 234-35, 264, 346-47, 546, 814; new, Presidium on, 235; new, public opinion on, 550-55; 1945-1948, 23-24; post1948, 25-26; prospects for new, 54650. See also individual parties (by name); non-communist parties political party system, public opinion on, 550-51 political reform, 111, 113n, 114-16,

915

INDEX political reform {cont.) 128-29, 135-42, 146-52, 153-54, 15658, 189, 190, 193, 333-35, 529, 834, 835, 886; Action Program on, 33841; and CC January resolution, 333; and 14th congress materials, 370-72; Mlynar team on, 113, 886; relationship to economic reform, 423, 448; and 12th party congress, 136-38 political science, revival of, 111-12 political situation: post-January spontaneity, 196; May, 253-54, 25759; August, 561-62; post-August, 81314, 818-19; Central Committee report on {Zprava), 327-29; CPCz in control of, 837, 888 political system, 134-35; 1945-1948, 2324; post-1948, 28; 1953-1957, 31; after 1960, 37, 38; bureaucratic nature of, 134; as cause of trials, 39899; crisis in, 45-46; criticism of, 14652, 159, 405; Yugoslav model of, 146, 148 Politicka ekonomie, 119 Politika (Prague), 270, 705-6, 779, 816, 821 Polyansky, D. S., 304 Pomelov, L, 673 Ponomarev, B. N., 723, 724, 796, 883, 884 Popular Front, 21, 23 PospiSil, A., 205, 347 post-January course: differing attitudes to, 204, 212-14; criticized by K. Hager, 209, by Soviet Union, 208-9, 249, 250; defended by Dubcek, 815; Czechoslovak Marxist interpretations of, 830-33, 839; public opinion on, 538n; as reform, 827-29, 887; retreat from, 814, 819; reversal of, 820-21, 822-23; as revolution, 827, 829-36; support for, 887 Potichnyj, Peter, 736-37 Poupa, O., 575, 578 Prdca, 199, 244, 581 Prdce, 199, 278, 312, 533-34, 581, 685 Praga letter, 302-3, 324-25, 673, 675 "The Prague Club," 549-50 Prague Uprising, 593 Pravda (Bratislava), 65, 244, 303, 312, 778, 792 Pravda (Moscow), 664, 670, 671, 672, 674, 724; editorial on invasion, 726 Prchlik, Vaclav, 173, 175, 193, 287, 324, 377, 622, 671, 681, 694, 695, 698, 726, 815; press conference of, 288, 298-300, 638-39, 675, 687, 693;

916

Soviet criticism of, 298, 675; on WTO, 638-39 Precan, Vilem, 104, 457 Predvoj, 248 presidency: candidates for, 205; powers of, 206, 341; resignation of Novotny from, 205; rotation of, 484; Svoboda elected to, 205-6 Presidium (CPCz), 142, 168, 235, 236, 567, 588, 602-3; and bilateral talks, 296-97; on Bratislava conference, 309; changes in, 184, 215-16, 255, 350, 518-19, 520, 807; and collaboration, 770; declaration of, on invasion, 759, 761, 763; disunity in, 328, 350; and fall of Novotny, 162, 174, 176; on federation, 478; on hooliganism, 325; and invasion, 330, 716; and mass media, 327; meetings of (April and May 1968), 228-29; meetings of (August 13 and 20), 327-30, 761, 882-83; membership of (1968), 350, 853; on People's Militia, 325; and political activity, 207-8; on political reform (March), 336-38; postinvasion, 786-88; and Praga letter, 325; on rehabilitation, 375-76; reply to Warsaw letter, 291, 297, 301; role of, 335, 336, 350, 353; on Slovak question, 451, 457-58; on strikes, 583; support of, 301-2; and Two Thousand Words, 276; and Warsaw invitation, 288-89 press: bloc reaction to, 250; change in, post-January, 199-200; discussion in, 197, 198-99, 235-36; law on control of, post-August, 814; post-August, 816. See also mass media press, revised law on, 68, 69, 70, 72, 198, 227, 262, 368, 828, 887 press polemics, Cierna conference and, 307, 308 Preucll, F., 383 prison system, reform of, 408 Prochazka, Jan, 69, 71, 200, 245, 634, 679, 696 progressives, 254, 273-74 progressive forces, 494-96; analysis of, 497; post-August, 813, 815, 819 proletarian internationalism, 664n, 668, 672n, 689, 698n Protestants, and reform, 60On Prucha, Milan, 95 Prusek, J., 575, 577n public opinion: Czech and Slovak differences of, 243, 534, 535, 536; as

INDEX political factor, 192, 199, 349, 52934, 560, 816 public opinion polls, 494, 53On, 531; of Rude pravo readers, 501-3; on abolition of censorship, 262, 560; on Action Program, 536-37; on Action Program implementation, 809 n.123; on anti-socialist forces, 240-41, 538; on attitudes to politics, 532-33; on Bratislava conference, 313; on CC January plenum, 534, 535; on Cierna conference, 313; on confidence in Cernik government, 538, 540; on confidence in CPCz, 538-39; on confidence in individual leaders, 541-42, 809 n.122; on councils of working people, 440-41; on CPCz policy, 537; on Czech-Slovak relations, 461; on Czechoslovak socialism as internal affair, 542; on danger of counterrevolution, 809 n.123; on dangers to post-January course, 542-43; on democracy, 536; on democratization, 537; on economic reform, 447; on economic situation, 447; on elections, 545-46, 554-55; on electoral system, 365-66; on foreign loans, 647n; on foreign policy, 629n; on freedom of expression, 240; on the future, 53738; on guarantees of socialist democracy, 364; on individual freedom, 560; on leading role of party, 363, 538n; on mass media, 240; on "most urgent problems," 534-36; on National Front, 365-66, 555-59; on national path to socialism, 542; on a new party and CPCz, 553-54; on new political parties, 551, 552; on newspapers, 533-34; on non-communist parties, 544-45; on an opposition party, 551, 553; on political participation, 532-33; on political party system, 550-51; on the political system, 363-66; on reform, 612; on reform priorities, 537; on rehabilitation, 392; on socialism, 450, 536, 538; on socialist democracy, 364, 535-36; on troop withdrawal (July), 543; on troop withdrawal (September), 809 n.123; on trust in CPCz leadership, 540. See also party opinion polls; Slovakia public opinion research, 100, 101, 199, 530-32. See also Institute for Public Opinion Research public, political participation of, 200201, 207-8, 223, 232-36

Public Security (VB), 80, 81, 408, 783n PudMk, J., 287, 300, 620 radio and television: and freedom of expression, 368; role of (pOstJanuary), 200; supervision of, 574. See also mass media Radio Free Europe (RFE), 81, 694 Radio Vltava, 778, 817 Rais, S., 254, 403 Rajk, Laszlo, 389 Rakosi, Matyas, 48 Rakosnik, 0., 212 Rapacki, Adam, 682 Rattinger, B., 264 Razl, S., 784 Rebro, Karol, 477 reform, post-January: and bloc reaction, 727, 728, 736; as cause of invasion, 726, 735-36; attitude of social groups to, 611-13; attitude of Soviet intellectuals to, 739-40; international context of, 888; leaders and (after Moscow talks), 802; as model for future, 851-52; nature of, 834-35; outlined by Cernik, 226-27; possibility of success, 841, 842-43, 889; preparation for, 225-29; as revolutionary process, 835-36; public opinion on, 534-43; public support of, 560 (postAugust), 816-17, 819; Soviet fears of, 285-86, 735-36, 882; spillover effect of, 727, 736; Trotskyist view of, 838; youth support of, 596-97. See also economic reform; political reform; post-January course rehabilitation, 32, 33, 38-42 passim, 47-49, 215, 220, 227, 232, 376-77, 568-69, 816, 823, 834; and collectivization, 586-87; end of (1970), 823; and leadership changes, 397; number of cases in, 374-75, 392; and revolutionary measures, 376, 377, 393, 394, 395 extra-judicial, 374-75, 395-96 judicial, 373-78; individual cases of, 378, 379-80; law on (June 1968), 261-62, 376, 377, 392-95, 409-10, 828; public opinion on, 392 party, 229, 254, 269, 378-79, 816 Reimann, Pavel, 103 religion, 28, 35, 203, 601-2; Action Program on, 601; freedom of, 600, 602 Reporter, 199, 274, 278, 312, 568, 630, 816,821

917

INDEX resistance fighters, rehabilitation of, 374, 593 revisionism, 35-36, 39, 41, 90, 92-94, 95, 685, 688; Albanian analysis of, 708-10 revolution: Marxist view of, 830-34; meaning of, 828-29; stages of, 84041 "revolutionary left," 548-50 Ribi£ic\ M., 703, 707 Richta, Radovan, 98, 125-29, 130n, 577; moderate views of, 128, 130n Richta team, 125-29; party attitude to, 129-30; on party reform, 270-71; and political reform, 128-29 right to travel, law on, 370 Rigo, Emil, 184, 216, 254, 519, 520, 717, 761, 796, 807 Roberts, A., 736 Rochet, Waldeck, 295-96, 711 Rodionov, P., 674 ROH (Revolutionary Trade Union Movement), 273-74, 396, 578; activization of, 581-85; conferences of (June 1968), 442-43 (1969), 819; and locomotive engineers, 584; and strikes, 583. See also trade unions Central Council of Trade Unions (URO), 421, 582-83, 786 Rol'nicki noviny, 199 Roman Catholic Church, Slovakia, 244, 560, 601 Roman Catholic priests, and rehabilitation, 374 Roman Catholics, 203, 600-601, 602 Rosa, J., 422 Royal Scientific Society, 576 Rudepravo, 199, 209, 236, 301, 303, 312, 326, 413, 489, 533, 534, 630, 664, 676, 692, 776, 778; readers, poll of, 501-3 Rumania, 748, 755; and Bratislava conference, 701, 702; and Budapest conference, 618, 619, 688, 699; and Dresden conference, 699-700; on independence of parties, 699-702 passim; on intervention in internal affairs, 699-702 passim; opposed to invasion, 747-48; Polish attitude to, 687-88; reforms in, 699; relations with Poland, 701; support for CSSR, 300, 315-16, 698-702; treaty with CSSR, 300, 316, 631, 654, 701; and Warsaw conference, 700; on WTO and intervention, 748. See also Ceausescu Ruml, V., 164

918

Rusk, Dean, 731-32, 755, 758 Rusov, K., 622 Russia, Czech historical attitudes to, 15 Ruthenia (Subcarpathian), 8 Ruthenians (CSSR), see national minorities Rytif, Otakar, 174, 176, 806 Sabata, Jaroslav, 767, 768, 769, 806 Sabolcik, Michal, 215, 241, 243, 521 Sadovsky, Stefan, 157, 163, 216, 229, 419, 516, 519, 520, 524, 786, 792, 796, 807, 883 Sakharov, Andrei, 739 Salgovic, Viliam, 176, 408n, 782 Samalik, Frantisek, 146n, 495, 839 samospmva, 148, 363n, 435 n.71, 438, 705; and national committees, 472, 474, 861. See also self-management Scheel, Walter, 300, 649, 687 scholars, 91-92, 130-31, 574-79, 624. See also Academy of Sciences; scientists scholarship, revolution in, 91-92, 94, 125 Schramm, Franz (Gustav), 381 Schroeder, Gerhard, 732 science, Action Program on, 221, 56465; criticism of, 576; and policymaking, 575, 579; Slovak Action Program on, 565n, 577n. See also scientists Scientific and Technical Society, 578-79 scientific and technological revolution, 125-29 Scientific Workers, Association of, 57778; Committee of (ROH), 578 scientists, 574-79, organizations of, 577-79 Scmteia, 700, 701 Sebesta, Stefan, 243, 322, 323 Secretariat (CPCz), 351, 353, 519; changes in, 216, 518-19, 520, 787n, 807; membership of (1968), 351, 854; role of, 229 security forces, 221, 390, 407-8, 408-9. See also State Security Sedivy, Jaroslav, 83, 116n, 117, 630-31, 633, 648, 650 Sedivy, Josef, 631, 634, 652 Sedivy, Zdenek, 646 Sedlakova, Maria, 163, 166, 174, 241, 521, 796 Seifert, Jaroslav, 33, 209, 568 Sejna, Jan, 172-74, 193, 214, 254, 285, 286; defection of, 197-98; and removal of Novotny, 177, 197-98

INDEX Sekaninova-Cakrtova, G., 393, 815 Sekera, Jin, 319, 807 self-management, 148, 434-35, 436; in Yugoslavia, 439, 705 Selucka, Milada, 124 Selucky, Radoslav, 58, 124, 415, 430, 466-67 Semyenov, Konstantin, 819 separation of functions, 169-77 passim, 184, 187,213,341,878 separation of party and state, 335, 336, 338, 339-40 separation of powers, 342-43 Shcherbitsky, V. V., 738 Shehu, Mehmet, 749-50 Shelepin, N. A., 723, 724 Shelest, P. Y., 66, 723, 724, 725, 737, 738, 882 Shtemenko, Sergei M., 720-21, 722 Sik, Ota, 119, 130, 163, 176, 178, 196, 201, 212, 213, 216, 225, 226, 239, 254, 255, 272, 273, 274, 300, 352, 419, 446-47, 449, 498, 516, 520, 524, 541, 542, 566, 577, 690, 726, 744, 783, 786, 814, 821; on councils of the working people, 434; and economic reform, 58, 62, 120-22, 415-16, 418, 422, 423, 424-25; on federation, 430; on party reform, 169-70, 33637; on political reform, 156 Silesia, 470-71 Silhan (Silhan), V., 767, 781, 784, 786, 787; criticism of economic policy, 443-44; on working people's councils, 439 Simecek, V., 770, 786 Simes, Dimitri K., 725n Simon, Bohumil, 124, 254, 255, 505, 516-20 passim, 524, 644, 645, 765, 766, 770, 786, 796, 883 Simonov, K., 739, 753 Simunek, Otakar, 31, 36, 47, 170, 172, 212, 215, 227, 622 Siroky, Viliam, 29, 33, 47, 48, 49, 54, 223, 254, 280-81, 379, 385, 386, 38889, 402 Skilling, H. Gordon, Soviet criticism of, 20n Skoda, Vaclav, 203, 255, 403 Skodovak, 779 Slama, JiH, 325, 496-97 Slanska, Josefa, 373, 383 Slansky, Rudolf, 26, 29, 39, 42, 46, 48, 49, 385, 388, 389, 397, 403; arrest of, Stalin's responsibility for, 386; Barak commissions and, 400; Kolder commission and, 401; rehabilitation

of, 376, 378, 380; trial of, 200, 380, 389, 398 Slavik, Vaclav, 112, 170, 189, 212, 216, 333, 516, 519, 520, 524, 786, 787 Slejska, D., 438 Sling, Otto, 378, 397 Slovak Appeal to Czechs and Slovaks, 322 Slovak as official language, 609, 876 Slovak National Council (SNR), 47, 51, 141-42, 145, 184, 215, 428, 451, 452, 453, 784, 786; Commission for Nationalities, 875n; and federation, 204, 263, 454-55, 470, 866-67, 872 Slovak People's Party, 8-9, 23, 24, 53 Slovak Uprising, 26, 50-51, 53, 102, 106, 388, 462n, 593 Slovak: Board of Commissioners, 51, 142, 454; bourgeois nationalism, 10, 26, 32, 33, 49-50, 383-89 passim, 397, 399, 402; discontent, 49-51, 5253; journalists, congress of (1963), 65; leaders, trials of, 388-89; nationalism, 4-5, 10, 35, 36, 52, 167, 175, 388, 495; national traditions, 13, 50, 55, 91, 848, 849, 850; noncommunist parties, 543-44, see also individual parties (by name); organs of government, 51, 52-53, 453, 456, 458-59, 465, 466; question, 162, 166, 170, 175, 236, 451-53, 457-58, 848; representation in state administration, 482-83, 864; representation in top positions, 818; youth organization, 599 economy, closed or integrated, 42932 passim, 465-70 passim; equalization of, 432, 433, 456, 459, 466-70 passim; special treatment for, 429-33 passim economists, attitudes to economic reform, 430-32; differences among, 430-33; on federation, 465-70 public opinion polls: on Action Program, 537; on agricultural life, 586; on anti-socialist forces, 53 8n; on censorship, 560; on CC January plenum, 534, 535; on CPS leadership, 540-41; on Czech-Slovak relations, 455, 535, 536; on democratization, 874n; on federation, 874n; on individual freedom, 560; on leaders, 54142, 809 n.122; on mass media, 240; on political participation, 533; on Slovak Action Program, 461, 532; on troop withdrawal, 543, 809 n.123.

919

INDEX Slovak (cont.) See also public opinion polls; party opinion polls Union of Writers, 53, 245-46, 293; congress of (1963), 64-65 (1967), 69; and democratization, 244, 247-48; and federalization, 24445, 246, 247; Hungarian section of, 607 writers, and relations with Israel, 634; split in, 244-48 Slovakia: Action Program on, 220-21; and agricultural organization, 590, 591-92; and autonomy, 8, 9, 10, 23, 24, 33, 38, 51, 142, 453; Czech attitudes to, 463; democratization and, 241-44 passim, 321, 323, 826; division of opinion in, 238, 246-48, 323, 495; economic aid for, 432, 433, 470; economic development of, 52, 164; economic reform in, 465-66; enterprises, and economic reform, 429, 431, 432, 433, 466; under First Republic, 8; and foreign trade, 428; incorporation of, in USSR, 790, 799n; independence of, 8-9, 462; message to, from 14th extraordinary congress, 771; National Assembly letter to (post-invasion), 785-86; national committees in, 474, 873; press, role of, in, 244; resistance to occupation in, 789-92; separation of, from CSSR, 790, 799; support of Cernik government (post-invasion), 783; and unity of Czechoslovak state, 790, 791, 792, 802. See also federation Slovaks: and conflict with Hungarian minority, 608, 609, 744; in Czech lands, 605 Smena, 199, 244, 513 Smeral, Bohumir, 5, 6, 21 Smrkovsky, Josef, 26, 174, 200, 201, 204, 205, 206n, 207, 209, 212, 216, 223, 227, 234, 239, 249, 254, 265, 284, 288, 300, 301, 309, 326, 330, 373, 375, 376, 377, 378, 400, 451, 459, 498, 519, 520, 524, 541, 542, 580, 629, 676, 682, 760, 768, 770, 774, 784, 786, 807, 818, 820, 822, 824; on Cierna conference, 305-6, 307; on extremist forces, 880; on Moscow talks, 796-805 passim; and Novotny, 169n, 178; parliamentary visit to Moscow, 274, 285-86, 626, 665, 666, 881; popularity of, 274; on reforms, 190; speech at CC June plenum, 172n, 175-76, 878, to Na-

920

tional Assembly, 227-28, 342, 344, 622-23; testament of, 878-85; on Two Thousand Words, 277; visit to Moscow (May), 663, 879-80 Snejdarek, Antonin, 648, 649-50, 677 Social Democratic Party (proposed), 229, 234, 256, 265, 307, 358, 547, 548n, 801, 814, 882, 888 social groups: activity of, 563; attitude to reform, 611-13; Sik on, 613n. See also interest groups social insurance laws, 422 socialism: danger to, a common concern, 288, 290, 663, 686, 694, 729-30 {see also Brezhnev doctrine); as domestic affair, polls on, 502, 506, 542; different concepts of, 837-39; public attitudes to, 450, 538, 553, 559, 562; Soviet model of, 12, 25, 31, 38, 59, 146, 388, 389 "socialism with a human face," 301, 821, 827, 833 Socialist Academy, 579 socialist commonwealth, unity of, 662, 667, 669, 670. See also bloc socialist democracy, 135-36, 145, 15354, 157, 158, 226-27, 338-39, 356; polls on, 364, 506n, 535-36 socialist legality, 40, 48, 107, 108, 227 Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED), 632; criticism of CPCz, 680; document on Czechoslovakia, 677, 679 social sciences, 92-93, 125, 576, 577 societal organizations, see mass organizations Sociologicky casopis, 99 sociology, rebirth of, 98-101 Sokols, 23; revival of, 233, 594-95 Solzhenitsyn, Aleksandr, 69, 738; letter of (1967), 245 Sommer, Josef, 232, 387 Sorm, F., 91, 169, 566, 576-77 Soukup, L., 382 South Moravia, 279 Soviet Union: aid offered to CSSR, 662, 670, 671; alliance with CSSR, 24, 83, 620, 621, 623, 629, 630, 655; attitude to post-January course, 194, 208, 209, 250-51, 285, 296, 301, 303, 304, 661, 666, 703n, 735-36, 740, 837, 839, 842, 879-80; and bloc solidarity, 733-34; Czechoslovak relations with, 14-15, 21-22, 39, 82, 83-84, 85-87, 248-49, 256, 631, 632, 643, 651, 822; and Dresden conference, 208-9, 661, 662; economic

agreement with CSSR (1969), 822; economic aid to CSSR, 249; intellectual dissent in, 738-39; intellectuals in, and CSSR reform, 739-40; leadership, division in (Albania on), 710; letters to CPCz, 288, 316, 317 n. 79; and loan to CSSR, 249, 646, 647, 880; press polemics in, 284-85, 297, 326, 664-66, 668-69, 670, 671, 67274; pressure on CSSR (post-invasion), 817, 819-20, 823, 880; relations with GFR, 732-33, 755-56; and removal of Dubcek, 819-20; security advisers in CSSR, 383-90 passim, 398, 399, 408-9; treaty with CSSR (1969), 822; treaty on troop stationing (October 1968), 814-15, 817; troop maneuvers of, 298, 713; troop stationing in CSSR, 85, 251, 635, 636, 642, 719; and USA, 730-31; warnings to CSSR, 663, 664n, 66667, 667-68. See also invasion, troop withdrawal (post-invasion), WTO maneuvers Spacek, Iosef, 158-59, 166, 178, 184, 189, 192, 196, 207, 209, 212, 213, 216, 239, 475, 505, 519, 520, 524, 726, 760, 770, 786, 796, 805, 807, 824, 883 Spitzer, J., 245 Stalin, Josef, 27, 48, 104, 121, 375; and responsibility for trials, 385, 386, 388,389,398 Stalinism (in CSSR), 161-62, 703, 707, 824-25 Stary, Oldrich, 81, 566 state commissions, 145 State Defense Council, 638 state and law, discipline of, revival of, 107 state of the entire people, see people's state state organs: draft law on legal responsibility of, 407; and party, 339-40, 349 State Planning Commission, 124-25, 145, 420 State Price Office, 420 State Secretaries, appointment of Slovaks as, 454, 455, 459, 864, 865n, 869 State Security (STB), 381, 408, 409, 783n statute of limitations, 375, 393, 395 Statute no. 231,374 Stefanik, Milan, 4, 13, 26, 236, 243, 849

Stevcek, Pavol, 245-48 passim, 293, 304, 323, 795 Stewart, Michael, 758 Stoll, Ladislav, 37, 65, 104, 577 Strahov demonstration, 79-82, 168, 205, 596, 597; Hajek report on, 81-82 strikes, 443, 581, 582, 583; postinvasion, 775, 779, 784-87 passim, 816-17 Strinka, Julius, 95, 150 Strougal, Lubomir, 163, 216, 225, 226, 286, 379, 419, 446, 516, 520, 524, 782,815,818 Student, 80, 200, 286, 498, 599, 888 student academic councils (ARS), 82 students, 23, 75-80 passim, 881; attitudes of, 76; organization of, 202; parliament of, 599; party membership of, 76-77; post-invasion activity of, 816-17; in Slovakia, 599; Strahov demonstration of, 79-82. See also Union of Youth Stur, Eudovit, 55 Subcarpathian Russia, separation from USSR, 882 Subrt, J., 392 Sucharda, B., 412, 418, 419, 784 Sudeten Germans, 649, 671, 685, 687 suicides, post-January, 197, 232, 387 SuIc, Z., 237, 412 Sulek, M., 814 Sundic, M., 707 Suslov, Mikhail, 618, 619, 664n, 723, 724 Svab, Karel, 386 Svarc, B., 631-32, 640 svaz, svazy, number of, 583-84. See also ROH, trade unions Svazarm, 595 Svec, A., 262 Svejk, 16, 18, 19, 97, 828 Svermova, Marie, 32, 200, 201, 373, 380, 386, 397 Svestka, Oldrich, 164, 190, 212, 214, 216, 223, 228, 236, 239, 268, 269, 273, 312, 326, 330, 516, 519, 520, 524, 571n, 716, 761, 787, 796, 807, 822, 881, 883; on "Questions of Working Class Policy," 326, 585 Svitak, Ivan, 94, 96, 98, 236, 498, 504n, 527, 529, 585, 679, 735n, 841, 846; on democratic revolution, 831-32; on Jan Masaryk's death, 381; and KAN, 547n; on Moscow protocol, 809n; on totalitarianism and democracy, 35758 Svoboda, 777

921

INDEX Svoboda, Ludvik, 26, 178, 226, 304, 309, 341-42, 398n, 517, 520, 541, 542, 610, 664, 759-60, 764, 768, 770, 774, 780-81, 807, 879, 883, 884; career of, 206; on Cierna conference, 305; elected as President, 205-6; and invasion, 714-15; and Moscow talks, 781, 785, 796, 797, 798, 802, 804 Svobodne slovo, 199, 265, 533-34 Svobodova, Nina, 383 symmetrical system, 453, 457-58, 462 Synek, Ivan, 625 Szirmai, Istvan, 689 Tatarka, Dominik, 245, 246 Tazky, A., 241, 453, 521, 786, 793, 795, 796 Teige, Karel, 569 Ten Points Manifesto, 821 terror, 27, 32, 823 "Theses on the Position and Leading Role of the Party" (CC, Oct. 1967), 164-65, 166, 167, 168, 184, 333, 334 Tigrid, Pavel, 71, 841 Tiso, Jozef, 8, 9, 13 Tito (Josip Broz), 85, 300n, 703, 706, 707, 747, 748, 749; visit to Prague, 313-14, 654, 655, 657, 674, 681, 687, 695, 707-8, 722 "Titoism," 703 Todorovic, M., 706, 748 Tomasek, Frantisek, 203, 374, 600-601 Tomasek, Ladislav, 115 trade unions, 12, 23, 232, 449, 581, 819; Action Program on, 580-81; alliance with students, 817; and councils of working people, 441-43; elections in, 581; and enterprise councils, 433, 436; as interest group, 443, 581, 582, 584; and invasion, 779; and reform, 61, 143-44, 611, 816; role of, 144, 580-81, 584; and strikes, 443, 583. See also ROH trials of the fifties, 26-27, 32-33, 102, 236, 269-70, 388-89, 391, 401; domestic context of, 398-99; illegal methods used, 48, 49, 383-84, 401; international context of, 389, 398; personal testimonies on, 382-84; punishment of those responsible for, 49, 375, 393, 395, 404; responsibility for, 48, 49, 375, 376, 379-80, 384-87, 402-3; role of Rakosi in, 389, 398; and Slovak bourgeois nationalists, 383, 385, 386; Soviet advisers in, 27, 48, 375, 383-87 passim, 389; Stalin's role in, 389. See also Barak commission; Barnabite commission;

922

Kolder commission; Piller commission, report of; rehabilitation Tribuna, 270, 779, 818 troop maneuvers, see Soviet Union; WTO troop stationing, see Soviet Union, WTO troop withdrawal, post-invasion, 814, 815n; conditions for, 801-10 passim; Czechs and Slovaks and, 768, 772, 783, 801-6 passim, 814-15, 820; Moscow protocol on, 801; public opinion poll on, 809 Trud, 724 Trybuna Ludu, 683, 686 Tucker, Robert C , 830 TuriSan, Pavol, 430-31, 469-70 Turcek, J., 787, 796 Turek, Otakar, 119, 122-23, 414 Tvar, 67 Tvardovsky, Aleksandr, 753 two-party model, 357-58, 360, 886 Two Thousand Words, 272, 275-79, 293, 504n, 629, 705n, 887; bloc reaction to, 678, 679, 685, 686, 692, 693, 697; controversy over, 276-78; on federation, 276, 279, 280; and freedom of expression, 368; government and, 880-81; leadership and, 276-77; party discussion of, 277-78; public support for, 278; Slovakia and, 278; Smrkovsky on, 880-81; Soviet reaction to, 285, 668; termed counterrevolutionary, 277, 296, 678, 679; Warsaw letter on, 290, 670 Uj Sza, 606, 608 Ukrainians (CSSR), see national minorities, Ruthenians Ukrainians (USSR): attitude to invasion, 754; and developments in CSSR, 736-37; as factor in invasion, 736-38; and federation, 738; nationalism in 668, 737, 738; and Ruthenians, 737; and Slovakia, 737 Ukrainians in CPSU leadership, 736 UKRK (Central Commission of Supervision and Auditing, CPCz), 139, 145, 207, 229, 269, 337, 351, 353, 378-79, 513, 515n, 771, 807 Ulbricht, Walter, 76-77, 661, 675, 67778, 723n, 884; on Bratislava declaration, 315; Karlovy Vary visit of, 313, 314-15,655,674,680,722 unemployment, 414, 424, 447 Union of Agricultural Employees (ROH), 589-90 Union of Airmen, 593

INDEX Union of Anti-Fascist Fighters (SPD), 374, 394, 593 Union of Consumers' Cooperatives, 592 Union of Cooperative Farmers, 588, 590, 591, 592 Union of Cooperative and Private Farmers (Slovak), 591, 592 Union of Czechoslovak Officers, 593 Union of Czechoslovak Writers, 62, 63-64, 193, 202, 235, 567, 568, 56970, 572, 573; attacked by Hendrych, 71; campaign against, 66-67; 2nd congress (1956), 33; 3rd congress (1963), 48, 64-65; 4th congress (1967), 69-70, 88, 159; and rehabilitation, 396, 568-69; Slovak letter to 4th congress, 69-70, 245, 246 Union of Czechoslovak-Soviet Friendship, 595-96, 780 Union of Farmers, 589-92 passim Union of Fighters for Freedom, 593-94 Union of Film and Television Artists, 567 Union of Gypsies, 605, 876n Union of Industry, 593 Union of Journalists, 48, 66, 235, 274; 5th congress of (1967), 71-72, 572, 573; extraordinary congress of (1968), 573-74 Union of Physical Training, Czechoslovak (CSTV), 594 Union of Physical Training-Sokol, 594 Union of Producers' Cooperatives, 592 Union of University Students, 599 Union of Women, Czechoslovak, activization of, 595 Union of Youth Clubs, 599 Union of Youth, Czechoslovak (CSM), 73, 74-75, 76, 77-78, 138, 143, 202, 205n, 232; and Cernik government, 598; congresses of, 75, 79; CPCz and, 79; crisis in, 597, 598-99; federation of, advocated, 78-79, 598, 599; statutes of, 75, 79; and students, 76, 77-78, 82, 599 United Nations (UN), 86, 657; Declaration on Human Rights, 202, 233, 366; and human rights, 631, 753; and invasion, 748, 755, 756-58, 801 United States (USA): attitude to invasion, 755; Czechoslovak relations with, 623, 627; imperialism and, 297, 665, 671, 731, 750; policy on CSSR, 731-32 Urban, Jozef, 642 URO, see ROH Urvalek, Josef, 254, 375, 386, 403

USA, Communist Party of, 751-52 USSR, see Soviet Union Vaculik, Ludvik, 69, 71, 159, 275, 378, 517, 568, 679 Vaculik, Martin, 166, 176, 178, 203, 216, 254-55, 352-53, 717, 762, 763, 766, 771, 787 Valasek, O., 386 Valek, Miroslav, 245, 246, 293, 569 Valenta, Jin, 724-25 Vales, V., 300, 419, 622, 784 Valka, J., 312-13 VaIo, Jozef, 175, 784 Vecernik, 779 Vecerni Praha, 779 Veltrusky, L., 468 Vermeersch, Jeannette, 752 Vesely, L., 313 Vieska, Juraj, 109 Vlasak, F., 418, 419, 445, 446 VIc, K., 192, 237 Vlcek, V., 226 Vodiika, Felix, 847 Vodslon, Frantisek, 164, 169, 200, 212, 771, 772, 792, 815, 821 Vojacek, B., 786 Vokrouhlicky, Z., 597, 598 Volenik, O., 167, 216, 519, 520, 807 Volkszeitung, 605 Voronov, G. I., 724 Vyshinsky, Andrei, 109 Vysocany congress, see CPCz 14th extraordinary party congress Waldheim, Kurt, 756 Warsaw conference, 288-89, 300-301, 635n, 669, 881; Hungarian position at, 693; Prchlik on, 287; and Rumania, 700 Warsaw letter, 289-90, 295, 306n, 449, 650-51, 669-70, 671, 710, 729; Czechoslovak reply to, 291-94, 651, 671, 686, 697n, 700-701 Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO), 84-85, 621, 628, 629n, 634-41, 642, 649, 656, 665, 668, 708, 733-34; Albanian withdrawal from, 749-50; conference in Sofia, 208, 635; CSSR as threat to, 837; Czechoslovak attitude to, post-invasion, 785, 787, 838; and defense of socialism, 729n; and invasion, 733-35, 740, 746, 757; maneuvers in Czechoslovakia, 251, 275, 284, 297, 635-36, 713, 719, 721; not for intervention in socialist countries, 700, 702, 729n, 748, 749; Political Advisory Committee, 639;

923

INDEX Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) (cont.) proposals for reform of (Czechoslovak), 635, 636-39, (Soviet) 634, 635; Soviet obligations under, 668; strengthening of, 316, 623, 634-35, 639, 640, 653, 660, 70On; troop stationing in CSSR, 298, 635, 639, 642. See also Soviet Union; troop withdrawal (June), 284, 287, (July) 297, 299, 309, 543, 639, 720 Wehner, H., 648 western frontiers, security of, 287, 298, 636, 654, 663, 664 West Germany, see German Federal Republic Wheeler, George, 838 White Book (Soviet), 449, 531 Wichterle, O., 566, 575 Windsor, P., 736 women, see Union of Women workers, Action Program on, 580; Dubcek on, 209; and economic reform, 61, 579-80, 584, 585; after 1948, 12, 132; and reform, 204, 326, 580-81, 585, 611-12; role of, 581, 585 workers' councils, 437, 549. See also working people, councils of working class, leading role of, 137, 151, 153, 158, 564, 580 working people, councils of, 434-35, 436-41, 448-49, 581, 816, 819; differing concepts of, 434-35, 438-39, 440-41; government principles of, 436-37; powers of, 437, 438, 440; public attitudes to, 440-41; role of party in, 440; trade unions and, 441-43 World Bank, 631,646 World Youth Festival, 698n writers, 33, 62-72, 163-64, 215, 568-70. See also Union of Writers Yakhimovich, Ivan, 753 Yakir, Pyotr, 753 Yakubovsky, 1.1., 284, 635-36, 665, 667n, 721, 722 Yepishev, A. A., 251, 662n, 722

924

Yevtushenko, Yevgeny, 753 youth, 33, 72-75, 235, 596-99; Action Program on, 597, 598; manifesto of (March 1968), 201; meetings of, 200-201, 235, 596-97, 633, 634; and National Front, 598, 599; organizations of, 599; and party, 74, 75, 235; party membership of, 74, 596; political inactivity of, 73-74; and relations with Israel, 633. See also Union of Youth Yugoslavia, 619, 631, 632, 642, 653, 749; attitude to CSSR, 300, 314, 702-8; Czechoslovak relations with (pre-January), 39, 41, 85; domestic crisis in, 705; on independence of communist parties, 705-6; invasion of CSSR denounced, 748-49; visit by Ceausescu, 704. See also Tito League of Communists (of Yugoslavia) (LCY); CC guidelines (June 9), 705; CC July plenum, support for CPCz, 706; on socialism and Czechoslovak reforms, 704 ZaIa, Tamas, 690 Zamek, A., 787 Zapletalova, J., 530-31 Zapotocky, Antonin, 23, 29-35 passim, 341, 403 Zavadil, Miroslav, 75, 79, 597 Zemedelske noviny, 199, 533-34, 589 Zed i Popullit, 708 Zhivkov, Todor, 248, 628, 696, 745, 884 Zhukov, Yuri, 297 Zingor, V., 378 Zionism, 389, 634, 674, 682-85 passim, 702, 743, 746 Zitrek, 816 Zivot strany, 192 Zizka, Jan, 18 Zolnierz Wolnosci, 687 Zpravy, 779, 817, 818, 821 Zrak, Jozef, 55, 241, 521, 787, 791, 795, 796 Zralek, W., 683 Zuda, J., 792 Zupka, Frantisek, 54

CENTRE FOR RUSSIAN AND EAST EUROPEAN STUDIES UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO

Feeding the Russian Fur Trade. By James R. Gibson. (University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, Wisconsin, 1969) The Czech Renascence of the Nineteenth Century. Edited by Peter Brock and H. Gordon Skilling. (University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1970) The Soviet Wood-Processing Industry: A Linear Programming Analysis of the Role of Transportation Costs in Location and Flow Patterns. By Brenton M. Barr. (University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1970) Interest Groups in Soviet Politics. Edited by H. Gordon Skilling and Franklyn Griffiths. (Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1971) Between Gogol' and Sevcenko. By George S. N. Luckyj. (Harvard Series in Ukrainian Studies. Wilhelm Fink Verlag, Munich, Germany, 1971) Narrative Modes in Czech Literature. By Lubomir Dolezel. (University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1973) The Collective Farm in Soviet Agriculture. By Robert C. Stuart. (D. C. Heath and Company, Lexington, Mass., 1972) Leon Trotsky and the Politics of Economic Isolation. By Richard B. Day. (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, England, 1973) Literature and Ideology in Soviet Education. By Norman Shneidman. (D. C. Heath and Company, Lexington, Mass., 1973) Guide to the Decisions of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 1917-1967. By Robert H. McNeal. (University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1974) Resolutions and Decisions of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union 1898-1964. General Editor, Robert H. McNeal. Four Volumes. (University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1974). Dated: June 13, 1975

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOGING IN PUBLICATION DATA

Skilling, Harold Gordon. Czechoslovakia's interrupted revolution. Bibliography: p. Includes index. 1. Czechoslovak Republic—History—Intervention, 19682. Czechoslovak Republic—Politics and government—1968I. Title. DB215.6.S58 943.7Ό4 75-30209 ISBN 0-691-05234-4 ISBN 0-691-10040-3 pbk.