Cyberdemocracy: Transforming Politics 3031275438, 9783031275432

Table of contents :
Contents
1: Introduction
Bibliography
2: Democracy with an ‘E’
Introduction
Democracy: A Brief History
Modern Democracy
Current Issues Facing Democracy
Making a Path for Cyberdemocracy
The Rise of the Platform Society
Bibliography
3: The Enlightenment and Beyond
Introduction
The Enlightenment
Enlightenment Rationalism and the Rise of Capitalism
Questions of Subjectivity in the Enlightenment and Beyond
Questions of Representation in the Enlightenment and Beyond
Bibliography
4: Representative Democracy and Crisis
The Decline of Representative Democracy
Modern Democracy and Its Shortcomings: A Survey of Data and Recent Scholarship
Globalism, Populism, Representative Democracy, and Government
The Decline of the Nation-State (Die postnationale Konstellation)
Bibliography
5: The Public Sphere and Global Capital
Deliberation
Reconsideration of the Public Sphere (Institutions of Democracy)
Legitimation Crisis: Declining Confidence in Institutions and Leadership
Neoliberalism: Against Democracy and Equality
Cyberdemocracy: Addressing the Institutional and Political Vacuum Created by Neoliberalism
Bibliography
6: Deliberative Democracy
The Imminent Decline of Representative Democracy: Myth or Reality?
Can Representative Democracy Be Participatory and Deliberative?
Liquid Democracy and the Global Village
Bibliography
7: Theorising the Cyberdemocratic Terrain
Is Deliberative Mass Participation in the Political Sphere Possible Under Capitalism?
Democracy Transformed: Cyberdemocracy as the Fourth Democratic Transformation
Barriers to Cyberdemocracy
Technological Determinism: Crisis of Legitimation and Cyberdemocracy
Transforming the Ecology of Mobilisations (Extremism, Populism, Post-Truth)
Bibliography
8: Civic Engagement and the Privatisation of the Public Sphere
The Geisteswissenschaften Tradition: Free Will and Political Agency
Revitalising Civic Engagement Through Cyberdemocracy
Privatisation of the Public Sphere and the Platform Society
Bibliography
9: The Westminster Model: Points and Issues
Accountability and Transparency (Ethical Standards)
Free and Fair Flow of Information
Justice (The Rule of Law)
Merit-Based Competitions
Bibliography
10: Cyberdemocracy and the Public Sphere
John Rawls’s Theory of Justice and the Veiled Ignorance Thought Experiment
Freedom and Fairness for All
Collective, Direct Decision-Making (Inclusivity)
Frequent Citizens’ Consultation (Civil Discourse)
The Public Sphere
Empowering Citizen Participation
Bibliography
11: The Cyberdemocratic Future: Some Final Thoughts
Conclusion
Bibliography
Bibliography
Index

Citation preview

Cyberdemocracy Transforming Politics Harem Karem

Cyberdemocracy

Harem Karem

Cyberdemocracy Transforming Politics

Harem Karem Southampton, UK

ISBN 978-3-031-27543-2    ISBN 978-3-031-27544-9 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-27544-9 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover illustration: Lingxiao Xie\Getty images This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG. The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

To understand political power right, and derive it from its original, we must consider, what state all men are naturally in, and that is, a state of perfect freedom to order their actions, and dispose of their possessions and persons, as they think fit, within the bounds of the law of nature, without asking leave, or depending upon the will of any other man. ―Locke, 1690: Sec.4

Contents

1 Introduction  1 2 Democracy with an ‘E’  7 3 The Enlightenment and Beyond 27 4 Representative Democracy and Crisis 51 5 The Public Sphere and Global Capital 75 6 Deliberative Democracy 99 7 Theorising the Cyberdemocratic Terrain123 8 Civic  Engagement and the Privatisation of the Public Sphere149 9 The Westminster Model: Points and Issues173

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10 Cyberdemocracy and the Public Sphere187 11 The Cyberdemocratic Future: Some Final Thoughts211 Bibliography219 Index227

1 Introduction

This book is explicitly modernist at a time when many scholars have either forgotten the emancipatory promise of The Enlightenment or railed against it in the name of postmodernism. The book, broadly, adopts a hybrid epistemology that utilises the critical insights of Geisteswissenschaften Tradition (Weberian ‘Ideal-Type Analysis’) and the Habermas (1988) notions of the ‘public sphere’ and deliberative/dialogic democracy (‘ideal speech’) to advance a general proposition of democratic renewal by way of cyberdemocracy. Hence, my starting point is the belief that the Enlightenment philosophies were not only concerned with reconciling ‘the old ethics with the new economics’ (Hume, 1758), but provided inspiration for forms of representative democracy that emphasise dialogue as a critical practice and deliberation in democratic systems (Dewey, 1916). However, there has rarely been a period in the evolution of representative democracy without a declaration of ‘democracy is in crisis’, ‘representative democracy is in the doldrums’, or the ‘end of politics’ (Crozier et al., 1975; Habermas, 1987; Runciman, 2018). Indeed, scholars and the commentariat readily pick over the entrails of the dead democratic body and our so-called post-democratic future (Della Porta, 2020), but all agree at some level that representative democracy is on a downward © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 H. Karem, Cyberdemocracy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-27544-9_1

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trajectory if voter turnout, party membership, trust in politicians, interest in politics, and populist anti-politics are the true measures for the health and wellbeing of representative democracy. Curiously, as democracy spreads across the world in the age of globalisation, it has also been accompanied by increased discontent with democratic systems. To that end, I am not overly concerned with saving democracy beyond the liberal representative model, rather the focus is on how modern representative democracy has failed and how cyberdemocracy might function as a more effective model that truly represents the people by broadening participation and reflexive deliberation. To that end, I adopt a conceptual framework (multi-perspectival approach) that incorporates a wide body of evidence to critically evaluate both forms of democracy (representative democracy and cyberdemocracy) by way of critical scholarship, particularly Weber’s ideal-type analysis. Indeed, model of cyberdemocracy, proposed here, is not only a critique of the all-pervasive ‘dirigism’ of representative democracy (Westminster Model) but holds out the promise of vanquishing the inverted millenarianism of postmodernism (‘end of politics’) through the creation of a virtual public sphere; new forms of governance and organisation; citizenship; participation; deliberation, and democratised public reasoning. The central objective of this book can be summed-up by the following question: How democratic is contemporary representative democracy and does new technology, in the form of cyberdemocracy, expand, impede, or complement the contemporary form of democracy?

To address this question head-on, it is imperative to pose an additional question: What is democracy, and how does it—as a principle—differ from representative democracy? This question demands an historical analysis of the roots and evolutionary changes of the concept of democracy throughout time, so that we can make sense of modern forms, and ask whether cyberdemocracy is indeed rooted in earlier forms of democratic ideals.

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This question is also important because we are at a key historical juncture in political development, with both the Russian President Vladimir Putin and the Chinese President Xi Jinping questioning the legitimacy of Western democratic models. Indeed, under the present conditions of war in Ukraine, economists are asking whether globalisation is coming to an end. In this context, perhaps cyberdemocracy can salvage democracy as a way to solidify its core principles of civic participation, which would surely and firmly put Putin and Jinping in their place as they seek to justify authoritarianism. It’s not in my remit to prophesise on such matters, but we are minded of the possibility that Western systems of representative democracy will seek to intensify their defence of existing forms. If this is to be the case, then how would new technology and cyberdemocracy impact upon systems in times of crisis? Added to this are critiques from Western Marxists and the left in general against the contemporary form of representative democracy and the economic order it currently resides in, namely neoliberalism, which, to coin a famous phrase by Lenin, is currently the highest stage of liberalism. Chapter 2 ‘Democracy with an “E”’ is essentially a presentation of how cyberdemocracy can progress the concept of democracy from early history, and it does this firstly by revisiting the historical moment of when democracy emerged in Ancient Athens so to provide the background to the emergence of modern democracy and the issues that surround it. It rounds off with a section on the rise of the platform society, with the latter discussed in more detail in Chap. 6. Chapter 3 is an exploration of ‘The Enlightenment’ and its impact upon the evolutionary changes of democracy. It was at this historical moment that modern democracy emerged. Note that I have used ‘The Enlightenment’ in chapter title, and not simply ‘Enlightenment’ because, quote rightly, Kant made a distinction between the two. I’ll explore that distinction later. There are also sections on ‘representation’ and ‘subjectivity’ in relation to the political environment that emerged within and after the enlightenment period. Chapter 4 ‘Representative Democracy and Crisis’ begins briefly by explaining the historical origins of representative democracy, before assessing the failings of this model in terms of its limitations, not

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expansion, of citizen inclusion. There is an assessment of the current state of representative democracy in relation to the growth of globalisation and populism, before finally deliberating upon the decline of nation state and its impact upon forms of representative democracy. Chapter 5 ‘The Public Sphere and Global Capital’ begins with the concept of ‘deliberation’ in the context of Habermas’ public sphere and additionally the context of which it exists, that is, global capital. Following on from this, there is a reconsideration of the public sphere, and this is followed by an assessment of the crisis of legitimacy in political institutions, before ending with neoliberalism and cyberdemocracy. In Chap. 6 ‘Deliberative Democracy’, it begins by asking whether representative democracy—as we know it—is in decline. It further asks whether representative forms can be participatory and deliberative, given its inherent problems of limitation. This chapter then concludes with an assessment of what is term ‘liquid democracy’ in the context of the global village. Chapter 7 ‘Theorising the Cyberdemocratic Terrain’ begins with a discussion on deliberative mass participation and asks whether that is possible to achieve in the political sphere governed by the logic of capitalism. This is followed by an assessment of transforming democracy by validating cyberdemocracy as the ‘Fourth Democratic Transformation’. There are discussions on the barriers to cyberdemocracy, highlighting technological determinism, extremism, populism, and post-truth. Chapter 8 titled ‘Civic Engagement and the Privatisation of the Public Sphere’ begins by discussing the Geisteswissenschaften tradition forwarded by the German writer Wilhelm Dilthey. There’s a discussion on free will, as a means, to ensuring the authenticity of political agency, before discussing how civic engagement can be revitalised through cyberdemocracy. The final section offers some thoughts on the privatisation of the public sphere and the platform society. Chapter 9 ‘The Westminster Model: Points and Issues’ is a discussion on the Westminster Model of democracy in relation to significant areas of interest. Thus, there are sections on ‘Accountability and Transparency (Ethical Standards)’, ‘Free and Fair Flow of Information’, ‘Justice (The Rule of Law)’ and ‘Merit-based Competitions’. The overall objective in

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this chapter is to highlight the key points and issues relating to the Westminster Model of democracy. In Chap. 10, ‘Cyberdemocracy and the Public Sphere’, there is a substantial assessment of John Rawls Theory of Justice, particularly in relation to Rawls concept the ‘veil of ignorance’. There are discussions on freedom, fairness, inclusivity, and civil discourse in relation to cyberdemocracy. The chapter ends with a presentation of Habermas’s public sphere and how that can aid civic engagement. Chapter 11 ‘The Cyberdemocratic Future: Some Final Thoughts’ serves as a conclusion to the overall direction this book has taken, and it makes a proposition to governments to invest in research to flesh-out the potentialities that new technology awards cyberdemocracy. There’s also a brief return to Habermas’ concept of the public sphere in relation to the expanded sphere of knowledge and communications brought by the internet.

Bibliography Crozier, M., Huntington, S. P., & Watanuki, J. (1975). The crisis of democracy: On the governability of democracies. New York University Press. Della Porta, D. (2020). How social movements can save democracy: Democratic innovations from below. Kindle Edition. Dewey, J. (1916/2001). Democracy and education. An introduction to the philosophy of education. The Pennsylvania State University, p. 336. Habermas, J. (1987). Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns (Vol. 1 & 2). Suhrkamp. Habermas, J. (1988). The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Hume, D. (1758/2011). Essays, moral, political, and literary: Volume 1 & 2 in 2. Kindle Edition. Runciman, D. (2018). How democracy ends. Profile Books. Main edition (10 May 2018).

2 Democracy with an ‘E’

Introduction This book is about the possibilities that cyberdemocracy can offer in expanding both the political landscape and suffrage to citizens. Towards the end of this chapter, there is a section titled ‘Making a Path for Cyberdemocracy’, hence adding ‘E’ to the title. But before we get there, it is necessary to briefly dip into history, particularly of the emergence of a form of democracy in Ancient Athens before examining modern democracy and some of the issues therein.

Democracy: A Brief History The golden age and emergence of democracy, as it is understood in political philosophy, begins with the classical period of Athens known as the Age of Pericles (Kagan, 1998). At this time, democracy, or the right to vote, was granted to adult male Athenians of the property-owning class and it excluded women and slaves, who composed a considerable portion of the society (Kagan, 1998, p. 48). As a point of contrast to the golden age of democracy, the peak of Greek (Hellenic) philosophy emerged just after this when this system of politics was in decline (Ober, 2011). © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 H. Karem, Cyberdemocracy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-27544-9_2

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The three giants of philosophy during the Hellenic period were Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. Socrates was the teacher of Plato, and, in turn, Plato was the teacher of Aristotle. Overall, their respective philosophies of politics, it has been argued, was ‘post-democratic’ (Kagan, 1998, p. 33), despite Socrates himself being condemned for treason because he questioned the system that was in decline. Both Plato’s and Aristotle’s politics were certainly reactionary in their respective attempts to redefine politics. Added to this, another criticism of the environment within which Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle operated was the corrupting influence of the Sophists. These criticisms are worth analysing because some of the problems and challenges that they pose remain today and are arguably a factor in present-­day or post-truth politics. Post-truth politics is a knowledge system whereby persuasion shapes beliefs and perceptions that might not be in line with what is factual and regarded as accurate. To highlight this, what Plato called ‘mere opinion’ has equal status to ‘fact’—or truth as Plato argued—in various examples of life. So, an empirical example of this tension can be seen over arguments and debates about climate change where opinion and fact are often seen as two equal statements, despite the latter being based on solid, scientific evidence. The Sophists were educators who explicitly taught argumentation and oratory skills in Ancient Greece. These skills were needed by the citizens to be skilled debaters who were, in turn, essential to the success of the democratic system (Ober, 2011). It is not my intention to examine all the main theories and strategies of the Sophists and the extensive criticisms of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. However, it is important to stress one key area that is relevant to epistemology and democracy. The Sophists maintained that ‘perspective’ or ‘belief ’ (rather than any absolute truth) explained political reality. This meant that political debate was not about arriving at a balanced judgement based on the consideration of facts and structured reasoning (Tindale, 2012). Instead, the goal of argumentation was winning an argument by oratory skills. As a modern analogy, while it is true the legal system aims at balancing interests and arriving at a factual assessment to achieve justice, lawyers have different goals or ends whereby truth becomes obscured (Kagan, 1998; Tindale, 2012).

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Thus, while a legal argument concerns a presentation of facts, the goal of a lawyer in a courtroom is to win. The legal system enforces the idea that the role of a lawyer is to provide the best defence possible for a given client instead of focusing on achieving justice. Sophists also used manipulative techniques to persuade more than they tried to arrive at consensus-­ based facts. Modern democracy has benefitted from an understanding of the origins of this system, its decline, and criticism, but is grounded or founded on theories of natural rights rather than the metaphysical (Plato) or teleological (Aristotle) reasoning of the Ancients (Tindale, 2012). Epistemology and its relationship to democracy are crucial to understanding how philosophy intertwines with this system of politics. For the Ancients, the knowledge of truth was very different from the perception based on sensory experience. For Plato, epistemology was grounded on abstract forms that were beyond the senses, and for Aristotle, the grounding of knowledge was on a notion of ‘substance’ (Silier, 2017). While substance is connected to the world of sensory experience, it is simultaneously distinct from it. By contrast, modern epistemology aims at grounding truth on that which cannot be denied and that is the experience of our senses. That is not to say that our senses or perception can be trusted, but that neither substance nor abstract forms are satisfactory, given that they cannot be empirically proven. Instead, they are ideas that are founded on rationalism and our capacity to reason. Therefore, modern forms of epistemology concerning democracy are coextensive with natural rights theory, which is primarily founded on the idea that in a state of nature, humans are equal (Hirschmann, 2009). By contrast, the corrupting forces of society and political regimes that create equality and only the contingencies of this history are needed to understand inequality. In Politics, Aristotle expounded his political theory where he presented democracy as an anarchic form of political and social organisation and dismissed it as a form of ‘good government’. Aristotle set out to discuss what best form of government would serve the polis (State or more specifically the city-state of Athens). For Aristotle, the term ‘polity’ meant a community governed by a few in the common interest of said polity, and his preference for good governance was the aristocracy of so-called

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excellent stock, and that consent between members of the polity would be the preferred basis of such rule. Even though there was no universal suffrage in Ancient Athens, there are certainly echoes of Aristotle’s preference of such privilege especially within the British Conservative Party in the UK, which will be addressed in the chapter on the Westminster model of representative democracy. For example, the current leader of the Tories is Alexander Boris de Pfeffel Johnson, a product of Eton and Oxford. His predecessor, David Cameron, was also schooled at Eton and Oxford, and so it continues; Aristotle would unfortunately have approved.

Modern Democracy TO understand political power right, and derive it from its original, we must consider, what state all men are naturally in, and that is, a state of perfect freedom to order their actions, and dispose of their possessions and persons, as they think fit, within the bounds of the law of nature, without asking leave, or depending upon the will of any other man. (Locke, 1689: Sec.4)

John Locke’s comments in the late seventeenth century aren’t without fault, particularly Locke’s reference to a natural state of being—natural is after all a contested word, as opposed to manufactured or social engineered—but nevertheless the statement overall continues to resonate today in relation to understanding the ‘freedom to order their actions’ or to be frank, the absence of that in systems that operate representative forms of democracy. It is in this context that the idea of cyberdemocracy is situated; in other words, can cyberdemocracy return the current forms of representative democracy back to the ideal or principle set out in Locke’s statement; to expand it horizontally against its historical vertical structure? Whilst it is true that contemporary democracy exists in various guises, it is equally the case that each iteration of modern democracy is similar in that the concept is a reference to a system of government and organisation of society. However, none of the current models of democracy are

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direct as previously intended and, for all its faults, practised by the ancient Greeks. Moreover, the contemporary concept of democracy is perceived, in theory, as a set of principles in which freedom and justice are natural rights of every citizen. But the reality or the application of freedoms in the context of natural rights doesn’t have the value of equality in class-­ based systems which of itself undermines the notion of a natural state of being if we ever needed one. Democracy is generally understood to mean that everyone is free to exercise their rights free from external restraints (fairness for all). However, in practice, modern democracy is a system by government under which powerful and privileged elites manage the public sphere through the delegation of individual rights of the population in a process of manufactured ‘representation’.1 Here, freedom is not the exercise of sovereignty directly; justice does not mean fairness but is rather a mere application of doctrinal and draconian laws. Democratic representation has failed to include the voice of all people in the process of socially constructed representation. Deliberation, or rational conversation about current issues in the public forum, has essentially ceased to exist. The primary focus of this book is to explore the notion of inclusive democracy and the effective implementation of its core principles and values such as democratic engagement via the direct involvement of political citizenship, now that we have such solid advances in new technology to aid this process. As such, this book seeks to show how modern representative democracy has failed to produce the inclusivity of citizen involvement and assess whether advances in new technology can create a horizontal—more inclusive—system of democracy, referred to here as cyberdemocracy. While there has been much research on the failures of modern democracy and the potential of cyberdemocracy, few studies have used a multi-­perspectival approach to make a critical and comparative assessment of modern representative democracy with cyberdemocracy. To fully  Chomsky (1989, 2002) asks ‘why are we fixated on representative systems? Because this is a clever way for capitalists to circumvent substantive democracy replacing it with an illusory democratic system that they can manipulate while appeasing the masses, lending the system a semblance of legitimacy’ (Asimakopoulos, 2016, p. 18). 1

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understand the failings of modern democracy and the potential of cyberdemocracy to truly embody, ‘rule by the people’, it is important to delve deeply into two forms of democracy, their respective histories, and their strengths and weaknesses to create a democratic system fit for purpose in contemporary times. To accomplish this, the following questions need to be asked: Has modern representative democracy failed? Can cyberdemocracy function as a more effective, democratic model that authentically, represents the voice of the people?

Current Issues Facing Democracy What is vital in both the Ancient and modern contexts of democracy is the significance of grounding political systems within a further system of knowledge. But such epistemological issues are only viable if such knowledge can be communicated as an end-product, and in a democratically productive way. Otherwise, it may simply evaporate into ether and raises questions of legitimacy of representation in modern democratic systems. To highlight this point further, Blockmans and Russack (2019) argue that the European Union (EU) is facing a crisis of legitimacy. Citizens do not feel that they are being represented and, thus, have little trust in political institutions. Thomassen and Van Ham (2017, p. 3) state that ‘the growing disillusionment with politics is beyond dispute’. They indict the current state of democracy further, writing: In an era of democracy being desired, demanded, and fought for by citizens around the world, it seems the oldest democracies are faltering, giving rise to a worrying paradox: everyone seems to want democracy, but once attained, very few seem to be happy with it. (Thomassen & Van Ham, 2017, p. 3)

Legitimacy, in the minds of Thomassen and Van Ham (2017), is crucial for democracy to function. They define the concept of legitimacy simply: ‘a legitimate political system is a system in which political authority rests on the consent of its citizens’ (Thomassen & Van Ham, 2017,

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pp. 3–4). The question becomes, then, whether representative democracy’s authority is from the citizens themselves, or if an illegitimate authority has taken over (namely, the elite representatives and those who guide their opinions). According to Wilhelm (2000), a key component of democracy is what he terms inclusiveness. Democracy should ultimately reflect the voice of the people and inclusiveness ‘reflects a long-standing commitment in democratic social orders to universal participation in political decision making’ (Wilhelm, 2000, p. 33). However, representative democracy has begun to reflect the voices of the elite more substantially, negating the voices of the people, resulting in a crisis of legitimacy in which distrust in the political system is growing. In some ways, cyberdemocracy could help to overcome this crisis of legitimacy, allowing for a greater level of citizen participation in politics. Wilhelm (2000, p. 33) argues that ‘universal access to vital information channels thus serves the dual purpose of restoring confidence in democratic decision making and concurrently providing an alternative outlet to express preferences and needs’. Understood in this way, cyberdemocracy could combat the crisis of legitimacy taking place in representative democracy by providing greater access to information that informs political decision making and by allowing for a greater representation of individuals beyond the voice of the representatives. That said, Wilhelm (2000) does warn against an inherent pitfall of cyberdemocracy—the exclusion of the voices of those without access to the cyber network. Beyond the legitimacy crisis, globalisation has played an important role in how modern democracy functions today. Goodhart (2005, p. 3) succinctly describes the massive impact that globalisation has on modern democracy, arguing that, for democracy to continue, it must be re-envisioned: Globalization does seriously challenge not just the practice of modern democracy but also its conceptual coherence, only bold, imaginative thinking will allow us to envision a more democratic future. Modern democratic theory is full of insight and inspiration, but its basic assumptions no longer provide an adequate framework for democracy in the age of globalization.

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Globalisation, thus, has caused seismic changes that require challenging and changing the democratic model to meet the needs of a changed societal model. Democracy must be rethought, and exploring the cyberdemocratic model provides one such method to rethink the model of democracy currently in place. Digital Fordism has also played a major role in the changes that democracy has undergone in recent years. Much like Fordism, in which items began to be mass-produced and, thus, mass-consumed, digital Fordism involves the mass production of information and services with a similar level of consumption. An individual can consume large amounts of digital information (through, e.g., social media) and use any number of digital services to further consume, be it a consumption of entertainment with a service such as Netflix or a quick food delivery provided by Uber Eats. With social media nearly ubiquitous at this point, most companies have begun to employ a sort of digital Fordism so that they always reach their consumers. In fact, larger companies even employ people just to run their social media platforms and always interact with (potential) consumers. Digital Fordism has changed the face of modern democracy, theoretically allowing citizens to always access political information and their representatives. However, this constant access to, and consumption of, information is highly mediated by companies and those in power, begging the question of whether this information access truly allows the citizens to think critically and engage in discussion of issues that affect their livelihoods and overall wellbeing. Some scholars have criticised the news and media produced by digital Fordism as being ‘designed to keep the masses deluded in their oppression by offering a form of homogenized and standardized culture’, instead of ‘stimulating audiences’ (Creeber, 2009, p. 13). Others, like Mark Poster, have argued that the ‘Internet provides a “Habermasian public sphere”—a cyberdemocratic network for communicating information and points of view that will eventually transform into public opinion’ (Creeber, 2009, p. 20). While the internet might have played a role in causing representative democracy to fail, it also has the potential to create Poster’s ‘Habermasian public sphere’, allowing for

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critical deliberation and greater individual engagement in the cyberdemocratic model.

Making a Path for Cyberdemocracy Contemporary thinkers have borrowed Heidegger’s ontological difference in a variety of ways, and one of these is through his writings on technology. Specifically, how the ontology of a relationship between technology and an individual helps to shape and define that connection in ways that an individual is not aware of. Castells (2012) builds on the Heideggerian idea that the defining ontological difference in the modern age or in the twentieth century such that an individual’s relationship in the world is defined by an information economy that subsumes individuals who regard themselves as using it as a tool. In Being and Time (Heidegger, 1964, p. 98), one of the ways in which individual existence or Dasein is located is through how it interacts in the world, and this is partially explained with the analogy of a hammer. Heidegger argues that the essence of a hammer is not in the dimensions or even the application of those dimensions in terms of the artisanal skills involved with building a hammer. For Heidegger, the notion of essence in the Aristotelian or Platonic sense views objects that are defined by their necessary parts and so while a table leg doesn’t make sense without the universal of a table, so too with the parts of a hammer. The universal and essential part of it belongs to a design and even a representation. However, for Heidegger, the essence of the object must be understood as in the process of hammering (Heidegger, 1964, pp. 131–136). The analogy is important in technological terms because it is a question of when a tool is being understood in its use but also because it is one of the important dimensions of what describes a human being in the world. With technology, like the use of a hammer, there is no sense in which the hammer has any capacity of benefitting from your using it. Information is what stands out in terms of what is outside and what is likewise creating a hierarchy whereby humans are more a tool than they are the user of it.

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Castells (2012, p. 123) demonstrates how information has created a commodity in the very same way that previous economies viewed materials like coal, produce, or a precious mineral. Information can be bought and traded, and in these terms, it is representational. In Durkheim’s terms, the form that information takes means that it might be taken as sacred it can likewise be inverted at the same time. With information or data, the same inversion is occurring, according to Castells (2012, p. 160). As a commodity, information is likewise an extension of political power. Fajemisin (2012) presents a case and argument about how controlling the flow and manipulation of data is conducted in political campaigning and strategic operations. Data is a commodity because of the growing power of analytics and the growing capacity to take advantage of the brevity of data such that the content of the information might not be challenged. Information becomes a representational form of something sacred in the Durkheimian sense of it. There is an unchallenging and unquestioning that is occurring where Fajemisin (2012) proposes that it is more important than ever to question what constitutes a public space versus a private one. No one would think twice about the basic invasiveness of an individual following another through their daily life with a camera without any explicit authorisation. In turn, that person was using the content of the unsolicited film and monetising it again and even for political purposes that might not be in the own best interests of the individual. With a public space, there is a metric and understanding of what acceptable or fair practice regarding privacy is. However, in the online sphere, the exact parameters are occurring, given that the entire web activity is captured as a form of information for individuals and is then correlated with other information. This is a form of commodification that has occurred in a way that the individual who has sold their privacy has no way of completely understanding it (Fajemisin, 2012). For Castells (2012), this is a process of envelopment that is legitimated by the notion of an information economy, and so the discourse of what legitimates any type or form of an economy becomes operative at the social level. Castells (2012) argues that the way to understand the power relationship is by recognising that it is a form of abstraction that is

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achieved with interests behind the process. In basic terms, the material relations that control capital have an interest in abstracting this in a representational form such that its meaning can be constructed for certain purposes. Material relations as an ontological problem are inseparable from the economic framework that assumes this but does not explicitly address or question it. This is more appropriately a philosophical problem as Heidegger observed about fundamental questions. The battle of the Ancients versus the Moderns is one level, just as the battle of Plato and Aristotle against the atomists. In this case, it is a battle of the Ancients with themselves. Karl Marx was significantly influenced by Hegel’s dialectic and the progress of history, and his doctorate was about Democritus. Marx was a critic of idealism, and there is a strong case that a Hegelian critique of Marx and his conception of history is possible by looking at how material reduction leaves unchallenged some significant ontological considerations that are central to the political focus of Lash (2007a). Central to his economics is a materialist assumption that is based on the material relationship surrounding the means of production. Some own their means of production, and those that must sell their labour to subsist. Value and the effective generation of capital or value are generated by the difference between the productivity of the labourer against the overall cost of production itself. To exemplify this in contemporary terms, over the past few decades, the productivity of labour has risen much higher than the wages earned by the worker because of the deskilling of labour due to automation, offshoring for cheaper labour, and production costs. Workers create more value than they receive, and capital is formed through this value demarcation. Marx’s identification of where profit came from—the difference between output and its labour costs—very obviously led to political systems that would readdress this distribution issue by creating equality. However, it also led to the greater capacity to rationally exploit this value at the very same time. For example, Taylor’s theory of management that was adopted by Fordism emphasised the incentivising productivity for workers by rewarding higher rates of output. However, the theory as applied likewise emphasised that while rewards should be given to individuals that produce more, those rewards can still generate more value to

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ownership. If an individual is given an extra pound for producing three pounds more of output, the difference again is the exploitive value that Marx identified as the reduction of material or productive human output as exploited such that capital/value is abstracted. If one works for Uber or in the sharing economy, the management is a set of algorithms. Thus, productive labour generated by labour goes directly to the shareholder or owner. The impact of this relationship also highlights Marx’s notion of alienation from the value of labour. However, the problem shows the qualitative dimension of value raises a hornet’s nest of problems. Further, it will be suggested that Marx’s materialism reinforces and almost legitimates the very system that it criticises because of the ontological materialism that informs Marx’s model. Modern economic theory has expanded its research in areas like social capital, cultural capital, corporate social responsibility, and other areas that add value even though the relationship is difficult to define. A spouse who takes care of the housework that enables a working partner to earn an income is adding measurable value in terms of the labour hours that can, in turn, be earned in the labour market. If an individual is not making their meals or doing their laundry, they are gaining time/value. However, uniformity is difficult to measure. A spouse could be contributing to lost productivity as quickly as contributing to it. Likewise, a shift in terms of resource allocation creates value for companies. Corporate social responsibility practices are growing because of greater environmental practices, social engagement/charity involvement, and other cost incurring practices. The benefits are viewed as more significant, such that it has created higher incentives and, therefore, greater value. There is social value when an organisation can claim to be environmentally sustainable and social value is value, nonetheless. Conversely, corporations can lose value when the public perception of their community impacts such as their environmental practices. Companies routinely re-brand themselves when public perception impacts value. Value and the flow of capital are difficult to equivocate and adequately measure even on top of having complex ontologies that are assumed in ways that can make them dysfunctional. The focus on Hegel has been made because of his invoking of the Ancients against the Moderns, and the critique of materialism and

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instantiation of teleology. For Hegel, the Enlightenment is fused by a dialectic between rationalism and empiricism, and it is a dialectic that is ongoing. There are truths of mathematics and logic which he terms as abstract formalism. These truths are reconciled with their opposite— truths established by sense experience. Hegel views in Fichte the resolve to this division between rationalism and empiricism and maintains that the rational supposition of identity—a metaphysical concept—is before our capacity to discern individual objects in nature. It is a reconciliation of the subjective and the objective. In terms of politics, Hegel viewed the period he was in as one where mutual recognition is achieved through democratic ideals. Mutual recognition means that individuals view their values and their distinct sense of self or identity in the state and the laws that govern them. He maintains that there is a fundamental need for individuals to be recognised in the terms in which they view themselves. With democracy and greater individual freedom, this need to be recognised as autonomous is the very teleological purpose of history. Where the purpose is mutual recognition and freedom, history has progressed from the Reformation which freed the individual from religious authority to political revolutions where the individual is free from the tyranny of the state, and, finally, to the universal state that is defined by this freedom. History has a purpose, and this is defined by revolutionary changes in the relationships humans have with one another and the institutions that are involved with their social well-being and self-­interests. Heidegger argues that metaphysics remains a part of Hegel’s system but that it is in a mutually determining relationship with the empirical world. Further, contemporary critics like Lash have used Heidegger’s ontological difference to explain some of the unchallenged assumptions that underwrite and help to define our political and social relations with one another. Further, the significance of this for Lash is a challenge to the materialism and reductivism in the Enlightenment that culminates in the materialism of Marx and the application of this scientism through twentieth-­ century thought. The criticism highlights some important problems in democratisation, suffrage, and political participation in late modernity.

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The epistemological and ontological problems that Heidegger identified as unavoidable because they are mutually determining opposites have important implications in terms of how the Westminster approach to politics versus cyberdemocracy can be interpreted. Cyber politics is already a form of abstraction. However, it is not a form of abstraction that has equivalency. Consider what data is when the strategic possibility of hacking a digital voting system is weighed. The data concerns with digital democracy are radically different from an analogue of paper-ballot voting, as is the communication of political ideas with respect to the British House of Commons. A political house of commons is now a virtual community as much as it is a public space. Finally, a cyberdemocracy does not collect the opinions and beliefs in the same way as a public communal space. The cyber-­ world is anonymous, and the opinions are filtered based on algorithms such that it is possible that a user is going only to be interacting with individuals with existing shared beliefs (Castells, 2012, pp. 388–389). Both have an impact in how we can plausibly define public or political space. These are differences of ontology and not just different in style or form that are inconsequential. More importantly, they are differences that have an impact on how we think about the relationship between political concerns that have been transposed by the change to a virtual medium. Robert Dahl is a political theorist who maintains that we do not have a system that entirely embodies the ideals of individual freedom and autonomy. He argues that our system is characterised as a polyarchy. We have a hierarchy in society consisting of elites that represent individuals within political institutions. In turn, these institutions exert a significant influence on how society is governed and understood by individuals (Dahl, 1971). Currently, there is a lack of confidence in these institutions and an alienation from the perceived elites who compose this polyarchy. This is witnessed in declining voting turnout, growing cynicism, and the embracing of identity politics that include nationalism and various forms of cultural issues (including gender). Identity, as we have seen, is a metaphysical concept. As Leibniz, and, before him, Plato and Aristotle, maintained, the concept of unchanging, perfect equality is not something that we perceive

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with our senses. However, as Hegel and Fichte maintain, it is something that informs what we perceive. If one was to take this abstract notion and apply it to contemporary politics, the basic notions of identity could be more readily challenged. For example, the hegemony that defines a polyarchy could be deconstructed based on whose interests they serve. Are they the interests of individuals universally or are they the self-­ interested goals of the individuals who are the elites themselves? Likewise, the identity that underlies nationalism is equally problematic. What are the essential features of national identity and how does one go about legitimating these given that, at best, this form of identity is loosely grounded in a common culture, language, history, and political system? These are social dimensions that are key to understanding how the symbolic and the representational bear meaning on the material objects with which they are connected and how they are institutional and systemic. Further, on closer examination, these institutions are constructions and any absolute statement about them is easily challenged. For example, culture and history require interpretation and any such interpretation is only that—an interpretation that is easily challenged by looking at some of the assumptions or axioms that ground the perspective. It is further challenged by the fact that both are continually changing or in a state of flux rather than a static phenomenon. When they are taken as static, there is an important and essential metaphysics that has informed it and needs to be deconstructed. It is not that it can necessarily be overcome as Heidegger points out. However, it can be sublated and incorporated into a new or different knowledge system once it is better understood. Hegel sought to maintain that these are mutually determining. As has been stressed, where an assumption is made or considered axiomatic, it also becomes problematic in political terms. Our current age is one where it is difficult to see beyond the status quo. Late modernism contains the assumption that a liberal and democratic state is one that is agreed on; however, the ideals and values of the system do not reflect the actual application of the system. We have equality under the law, but we do not have equality in the form of equity. Our liberal democratic system has created even more equality as it has progressed. However, wealth is getting more concentrated in the hands of a

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few individuals and corporations, and distribution has become stagnant among those who contribute to it. This analysis reviewed the Enlightenment and the reductive materialist assumptions that are at the centre of it. Hegel recognised some of the important limitations of this vantage point and just as Plato and Aristotle challenged the materialism of Democritus, so too does German idealism question the empty formalism of the Enlightenment. In turn, Hegel views humans as having a purpose and not just caught in the systems of nature characterised by cause and effect. This analysis had examined the use of teleology and the reconciliation of empiricism and rationalism to demonstrate the limitations of the materialist perspective. Further, it has been argued that while these ontological problems cannot be resolved, they can be further clarified so that the progress of our understanding and our liberation from false assumptions can proceed. Pluralism supposes the equality of individuals and the diversity of public opinion in this regard is anticipated by the institutions that represent them. However, power is also consolidated within these institutions, and in turn, the interests of the polyarchy have usurped the pluralism of the people. As Durkheim and Habermas understood, there is no question that business interests exert greater control on political agendas than the interests of the average citizen. If these tyrannies of practice are going to be challenged, it is the theory that explains them that must be challenged. By questioning the difference between abstract or metaphysical equality, the notion of actual equality can be viewed as falling severely short of being realised. Where institutions guarantee equality, this is as abstract as the laws of nature that were discussed in this analysis. Abstract laws function with axioms that go unquestioned, such as the vacuum needed by Galileo’s theory of uniform acceleration. By contrast, Hegel wants a system where the laws are dynamic and changing, while the principle remains constant. The constitutional and legal system should realise the mutual recognition of individuals. By contrast, our modern democratic institutions are becoming less a reflection of society and more of a reflection of the power elites who represent the interests of their social class. This is true whether the abstraction is in the form of information or the form of a deity or logical proposition. We live

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in an age that requires more rigorous analysis and examination of the axioms on which these institutions are premised. Through a greater degree of understanding, these can bring effective change because the fixed and static concepts can become self-moving again. They can be viewed as purpose-driven or teleological rather than empty and causally driven.

The Rise of the Platform Society The internet has allowed a level of connectedness that has never been experienced before. It has given rise to what is sometimes termed the ‘platform society’, or a society in which ‘individual citizens or consumers organize themselves through online networks, so they are less dependent on legacy institutions or companies such as publishers, news organizations, hospitals, unions, brokers, and so on’ (Van Dijck et al., 2018, pp. 1–2). In terms of democracy, the internet allows individuals to be less dependent on traditional sources of information that shape their political opinions. The process of deliberation has moved from public forums to online forums and individual opinion is now subject to a barrage of political information. Representation could be said to be greater, as everyone may voice their concern on these online networks and, in turn, these networks rely on the participation of the individuals to function. Platforms are revolutionising the economy, politics, and social interaction on a global level, resulting in a ‘third globalization’ (Kenney & Zysman, 2016). This revolution is both rapid and dramatic, altering these areas of global society significantly. While the goals and uses of the various platforms may vary, all platforms rely on their users to function, or, as Kenney and Zysman (2016) put it, they depend on ‘mobilizing human beings to contribute’. Because of this, digital platforms allow for a much higher level of representation. They also provide many online forums in which deliberative political discussions can be held. However, the question of subjectivity and the shaping of opinion on digital platforms remains ambiguous. Individuals are bombarded with a

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new form of information (and significant disinformation) that they must parse out. The emerging platform society allows for global collaboration and deliberation, greater individual representation, and the potential for less manipulation. It may also be a double-edged sword, limiting deliberation between opposing viewpoints, muffling individual voices with those of the platform owners, and manipulating political views through social media and biased news campaigns—the very same issues that have caused modern representative democracy to fail. That said, the rise of the platform society has certainly spurred changes and offers opportunities that threaten modern representative democracy. Castells (2005, p. 3) wrote that ‘technology does not determine society: it is society’. He defines the network society as the ‘social structure resulting from the interaction between the new technological paradigm and social organization at large’ (Castells, 2005, p. 3). Castells breaks the fairy-tale image of human progression from the Enlightenment to the current ‘post-industrial/information/knowledge society, the shining hill where Homo Sapiens will finally make his dignified dwelling’ (Castells, 2005, p. 5). Instead, he argues that society must first ‘recognize the contours’ of its, new historical terrain … Only then it will be possible to identify the means by which specific societies in specific contexts can pursue their goals and realize their values by using the new opportunities generated by the most extraordinary technological revolution in humankind. (Castells, 2005, p. 5)

It is not technology that has changed the world, but how it is used and applied and by whom. Thus, for a viable cyberdemocratic model to function and succeed where representative democracy has failed, it must not just apply technology but use and apply it judicially in a way that enables suppressed voices to be heard and political deliberations to occur.

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Bibliography Asimakopoulos, J. (2016). Against the Grain: The British Far Left from 1956. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press. Blockmans, S., & Russack, S. (2019). Representative democracy in the EU: Recovering legitimacy. CEPS. Castells, M. (2005). The network society: From knowledge to policy. In M. Castells & G. Cardoso (Eds.), The network society: From knowledge to policy. Center for Transatlantic Relations. Castells, M. (2012). Networks of outrage and hope: Social movements in the internet age. Polity Press. Chomsky, N. (1989). Necessary Illusions: Thought Control in Democratic Societies. Boston, MA: South End Press. Chomsky, N. (2002). Media Control: The Spectacular Achievements of Propaganda. New York, NY: Seven Stories Press. Creeber, G. (2009). Digital theory: Theorizing new media. Digital cultures. Understanding New Media, pp. 11–22. Dahl, R. (1971). Polyarchy: Participation and opposition. Yale University Press. Dijck, J., Waal, M., & Poell, T. (2018). The platform society: Public values in a connective world. Oxford University Press. Fajemisin, J. O. (2012). Cyber-democracy and its impact on politics. Humanities and Social Sciences Review, 1(3), 435–446. Goodhart, M. (2005). Democracy as human rights: Freedom and equality in the age of globalization. Routledge. Heidegger, M. (1964). Being and time. Harper & Row. Hirschmann, N. (2009). Gender, class, and freedom in modern political theory. Princeton University Press. Kagan, D. (1998). Pericles of Athens and the birth of democracy. Simon and Schuster. Kenney, M., & Zysman, J. (2016). The rise of the platform economy. Issues in science and technology, 32(3), 61–69. Lash, S. (2007a). Capitalism and metaphysics. Theory, Culture & Society, 24(5), 1–26. Locke, J. (1689). Two Treatises of Government. London, UK: Awnsham Churchill. Ober, J. (2011). Political dissent in democratic Athens: intellectual critics of popular rule. Princeton University Press. Rousseau, J.-J. (1762). The Social Contract. Amsterdam, Netherlands: MarcMichel Rey.

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Silier, Y. (2017). Freedom: Political, metaphysical, negative and positive. Routledge. Thomassen, J., & Van Ham, C. (2017). A legitimacy crisis of representative democracy? In C. Van Ham, J. Thomassen, K. Aarts, & R. Andeweg (Eds.), Myth and reality of the legitimacy crisis. Oxford University Press. Tindale, C. W. (2012). Reason’s dark champions: Constructive strategies of sophistical argument. University of South Carolina Press. Wilhelm, A. G. (2000). Democracy in the digital age: Challenges to political life in cyberspace. Routledge.

3 The Enlightenment and Beyond

Introduction This chapter provides an assessment of ‘The Enlightenment’ and will argue that while the enlightenment ideals of equality under the law have been achieved, equity has not. For instance, wealth, privilege, and power remain concentrated with the elite and powerful. As a result, modern democracy—a consequence or product of the enlightenment—has been far more beneficial to the rich and powerful in terms of political control, rather than it has to the people. One of the interesting questions to ask about the enlightenment is this: what impact did it have on the shape of democracy, and what lessons can be learnt from the enlightenment, which has been perceived to empower Man, and failed, and can new technology rectify this failure via cyberdemocracy?

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The Enlightenment Perhaps one of the most fundamental principles that emerged during the age of enlightenment during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was ‘natural rights’.1 From the emergence of natural rights in the philosophy of John Locke and Thomas Hobbes until the American and French Revolution that resulted in the establishment of modern democracy, progress in the belief in natural equality was crucial for understanding a key distinction from the Ancients (Held, 2006). Natural rights are coextensive with the growth and progress of empirical forms of knowledge (Rutherford, 2006). One of the consistent epistemological considerations in these terms is the idea that our experience shapes our knowledge and that this experience is inseparable from the real world that we both sense and perceive. In a state of nature, there are no natural hierarchies. Instead, an imbalanced or hierarchical structure in society has occurred because of historical considerations and not because some individuals have a divine given authority to rule or because they are naturally superior (Silier, 2017). There was an overall recognition during the enlightenment that the actual, empirical social forces that provided education to some and not others explained some of the differences better than theories based on innate human qualities. By the end of the enlightenment, figures such as Jean Jacques Rousseau, Thomas Paine, and John Stuart Mill all argued that in the state of nature, all humans are equal (Hirschmann, 2009, pp. 80–85). What creates inequality are the forces of political power that both legitimate their authority and continue to act out of self-interest by suppressing any system that would create a balanced society. Both Paine and Mill, for example, did not view women as inferior in any innate sense and thought that their natural abilities could likewise be  The social and political institutions of feudalism, that derived their authority from convention and traditionalism, gave way to the Enlightenment philosophies of science, notably Newton, Locke and Montesquieu, and eventually led to ‘the abolition of the prevailing social and political order in Europe. The Enlightenment promised emancipatory freedom from dependence on nature through the progressive appropriation of scientific knowledge; freedom from the political tyranny through the development of rational government, and freedom from ignorance and conventionalism, through the development of humanist philosophies, notably; the rationalism of René Descartes, and the renaissance humanism of Blaise Pascal. 1

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enhanced and improved with better education and access to those advantages only afforded to the privileged classes of men. In practice, the right to vote for individuals other than property owners (e.g., women, individuals from the working classes, and slaves) came almost one hundred years after the philosophical recognition of natural equality (Hirschmann, 2009). Modern democracies established during the enlightenment were premised on the idea that individuals had equal and natural rights because there is nothing that is claimed about one individual that makes them naturally superior to another where there is a lack of social convention where hierarchies are defined. The problem is that the theory of universal ‘natural rights’ has never effectively been put into practice, thus undermining a central element of the enlightenment. There remain to this day substantial levels of inequality at the social, political, economic, and cultural levels. There is also inequality in material and economic relations and inequality in terms of access to the governmental power that is supposed to serve the interests of the majority. The scepticism of the democratic ideals during the enlightenment—that went no further than ideals—that subsequently emerged has today given rise to populism, which is a challenge to elite institutes, and it has created responses and alternatives that attempt to re-engage voters and citizens vis-a-vis political institutions. The focus of the enlightenment during the eighteenth century was the emergence of science and the challenge to religious, political, intellectual, and moral authority, and also it has been assumed that it had a vertical impact of thought and consciousness from above to below. Nietzsche’s famous pronouncement of the death of God epitomises or perhaps indicates an absence of a divine higher power beyond human faculties, and that Man began to think for himself; but to what extent did such free thinking extend beyond the intellectuals who were the driving force behind enlightenment thought? Nietzsche’s commentary on the death of God was also an attempt to discuss how that void in spiritual life is filled with regard to making decisions in everyday life. Kant referred to this as a process of ‘maturity’; to lift oneself from the ‘immaturity’ and to have the strength of purpose to make rational decisions without relying on the Church.

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Therefore, it is important to understand the distinction that Kant made between ‘The Enlightenment’—the actual concrete empirical reality of the eighteenth century—and ‘Enlightenment’—ideas and principles not necessarily put into actual practice, which forms a critique of the failures of actual practices. For example, Kant posed this following rhetorical question: ‘Are we living in an enlightened age today?’, before answering ‘no: but … we are living in an Age of Enlightenment’ (Berry, 2008, p. 2, my italics). The reason this distinction is important is because in part enlightenment was and remains an enabler for change or can be the basis for a critique of Representative Democracy in modern forms; of what is possible. It’s for this reason, I argue, that whilst there were radical moments within The Enlightenment, it nevertheless was restricted to elites. In other words, it was top-down, not bottom-up, and not based on inclusion or consent of the people. To use an analogy, it was more a political revolution—horizontal—rather than a social revolution—vertical, emerging from the bottom. To illustrate this point further, consider this quotation by Kant: Enlightenment is man’s emergence from his self-incurred immaturity. Immaturity is the inability to use one’s understanding without the guidance of another. This immaturity is self-incurred if its cause is not lack of understanding, but lack of resolution and courage to use it without the guidance of another. The motto of enlightenment is therefore: Sapere aude! Have courage to use your own understanding. (Reiss in Berry, 2008, p. 67)

This quote is important in the context of this book, because the idea of cyberdemocracy assumes a bottom-up, social change, and clearly Kant is stating that ‘resolution’ over democratic principles not only rely on ‘courage’ but control over the means of communication in a modern-day sense, allowing for a cyberdemocratic moment. However, how realistic is it that cyberdemocracy can somehow channel the possibilities of enlightenment and an expansive form of democracy? I will return to this question later in the book. For the moment then, the enlightenment is central to understanding the emergence of modern democratic states that usurped the authority of monarchical

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power and led to the emergence of modern science that usurped the authority of the Church. Nietzsche criticised modern institutions for their inability to allow the flourishing of a new society and culture. Modern democracy fell under Nietzsche’s broad critiques of modernity,2 as he felt that democracy, while useful against tyrants, snuffed out the potential of mankind to grow and achieve greatness (Kellner, 2000). Weber similarly critiqued modern democracy in his lesser known fourth type of legitimacy, encompassed by his description of it as the ‘Wille der Beherrschten’ (Szelenyi, 2016). Weber described democracy as a system in which legitimate authority stems from the will of the people. However, ‘Will’ was subject to domination by those ruling, and, thus, not truly a free exercise of Will (Szelenyi, 2016). This description expressed Weber’s scepticism towards the ability of democracy as it was originally intended to truly function in modern society.

 nlightenment Rationalism and the Rise E of Capitalism Because the enlightenment ideals and philosophy set the stage for modern representative democracy, it is important to first understand the enlightenment to better comprehend modern representative democracy and its failings. This section provides a general introduction to the enlightenment and its ideals, as well as the consequences of the enlightenment that paved the way for modern representative democracy. It sketches the eighteenth century in Europe to show how the emergence of modern science extended into the realm of politics and the public sphere. It argues that this rise in science and scientific thinking revolutionised political paradigms and led to significant social change. One major social  Kellner (1998) Modernity and Its Discontents. ‘Nietzsche criticizes many of the institutions and values of modern societies as oppressing bodily energies and creativity, while blocking the generation of stronger individuals and a more vigorous society and culture. In his appraisals of the modern age, Nietzsche developed one of the first sustained critiques of mass culture and society, the state, and bureaucratic discipline and regimentation, producing perspectives that deeply influenced later discourses of modernity’ (p. 1). 2

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change was the enlightenment ideal of natural rights (e.g., rights to life, liberty, and property). With the goal of improving the human condition in the here and now (rather than in the afterlife), the road to modern democracy was paved as political, religious, and moral authorities were challenged. For Marx, history moves dialectically through the clashes of opposing forces. His materialist conception of history argues that history is not the result of the ideals favoured by the time but rather by the actual material conditions that moment in time faced. This was in opposition to idealists like Hegel, Fichte, and Kant, who believed that subjective human consciousness and ideals shaped reality. For Marx, it was material reality that shaped human consciousness and true historical change occurred when the ownership of capital changed hands. At the same time, there is no denying that the idea of changing the order of power was significant to actual order being changed. The transformation of history in terms of material relations is also explained causally through the deep divisions of European history that include the Reformation wars and transformation of spiritual life along with economic and political relations. The enlightenment application of positive science was extended into the realms of polity and social change. In some ways, the rational actor that is perhaps paranoid can be partially explained by its comorbidity with Protestantism and Capitalism. In one of his seminal works titled The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, Weber maintains that capitalism could not have emerged in the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries if the Reformation did not happen. He illustrates this interpretation in several ways and one of them is the distinction created by Martin Luther over whether the priests of the church were an intermediary between God and the parishioners/citizens (Weber, 2013, pp. 43–44). Luther’s crisis was whether the body and blood of Christ were created as a miracle by the priest and the issues of the transubstantiation and consubstantiation were essential to the emergence of Protestantism and the revolution brought about by Luther. For a Protestant, the idea of a rational actor supposes that no single person has greater access to the truth than another. Weber argued that the Protestant movement played a significant role in the advent and emergence of capitalism. Because

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Protestants were encouraged to work in the secular world and accumulate wealth to be invested for the furthering of Protestantism, many pursued this accumulation for wealth, thus setting the stage for capitalism. Therefore, in the Protestant approach or difference, it was up to the individual to act as responsible for their own and individual actions and do everything, even physical labour, as if doing it for God (Weber, 2013). A rational actor is one that maintains that there is no reason to believe that another agent has the answer to something that might be unknowable and basic probability theory could predict an outcome where an individual no longer trusts the priest. However, one of the outcomes is that the social contract becomes a situation where imperialism and even colonialism are driven by rational self-interest that employs the state to its end and legitimates itself through culture and the legitimacy of the legal system. Weber (2013) observes the rise of capitalism as the rise of more and more ways to legitimise a system of power based on the individual ownership of a property through the law. In other words, throughout history, the growth of government has been an extension of the need to enforce and expand the legal structure to protect the interests that are based on the rational and individual ethic of self-interest rather than collective and more deliberative considerations. Like the Ancients who viewed their livestock as property rather than the land that the animals roamed, a good number of the nomadic populations signed land treaties during the colonial era of expansion when the legal right was used to appropriate property. It was often not the case that the individuals who signed over their land understood the letter of the agreement or even understood the concept of private property. Conversely, nomadic populations did not produce art for its own sake, given that it would be a surplus that would have to be carried at the expense of carrying something necessary like food. As Marx viewed the historical dialectic of turning over the control of capital by the aristocracy that was legitimated through the opiate of the masses or religion (Bloch, 2018, p. 48), he was also able to present a critical model to Weber because he understood how material property could not be ignored along with the exact measure of capital.

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In these terms, the rise of the bourgeoisie is inseparable from the emergence of democracy, the modern state, and its legal system that better explains exploitation and injustice. As a historical example of this distinction, in terms of trade, the fur that initially drove or incentivised settlement in North America was easily paid for by the exchange of items that would yield more profit such as guns and alcohol. Currency as a form of exchange was also an abstraction to which a more ‘law’ and rational interpreting agent system or social structure could better adapt. In terms of the religious underpinning of this distinction, the wafer and the wine are symbolic of an abstract and unknowable phenomenon that is only reconciled through belief or faith rather than rational understanding. This was the rational understanding that the priests, who were the definers and interpreters of the law before the rise of the government, the state, and the bureaucracy, used to serve the interests of those accumulating capital (Weber, 2013, p. 71). Capital is a constant that brings together a historical and materialist interpretation as a common denominator. Weber’s approach is qualitative and the distinction between religions is not a dichotomised interpretation of history and the expansion of capitalism. It does not preclude capital, but it does include the consideration of qualitative considerations, given that one would want that as an extension given to themselves on a naturally equal basis. At the same time, a naturally equal set of citizens who belonged within the social contract did not include other races or genders until the twentieth century. Natural equality supposes a notion of natural. With the Reformation came a challenge to religious authority. The Scottish thinkers were influential in the making of modern democracy and the capitalist system. The individual relationship to the spiritual and the political was redefined during this time, leading to citizen democracy and the rise of private property. The Scottish Enlightenment valued religious choice and tolerance, while also seeking the greatest good for the greatest number of people. This section argues that these ideals became embedded in society and led to the rise of capitalism and the foundation of modern democracy during this period. Both Scotland and the Netherlands, along with the colonial expansion of chartered companies in England, were historically coincidental with

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the Reformation. Weber interprets the history of capitalism as inseparable from the division between Protestant and Catholic nation-states. Luther challenged the authority of the clergy regarding their direct connection with God. Luther created a schism within the priesthood of Catholicism because he did not believe that the blood and body of Christ were manifest in the bread and wine that priests administered in the form of communion. The distinction between consubstantiation and transubstantiation initially became the schismatic question that challenged the divine authority of priests. In terms of the power of representation as defined by Durkheim, these become the intersection of one of the largest theological and political problems of the modern era. Durkheim binds the sacred with the profane through the medium of representation. Moreover, this distinction or schism eventually created an entirely different set of religious orders and Protestantism itself. It also created war that translated into the world expansion of European nations during the time of the religious conflict. For the Protestant adherents, the religious systems began to re-align and redefine themselves around the idea of equality. If there was no hierarchy of knowledge around human matters, what is to be maintained about the idea of the divine right of authority in the political systems? As a result, the idea of a system itself began to become abstracted from the actual human relationships as a subject of examination. Locke maintained that states of nature preceded the existence of socially determined relationships, and these states of nature cannot be understood as anything other than natural equality. This represented the beginning of the modern idea of citizen democracy, private property, and the state. This idea was significantly influenced by the English, French, and American Revolutions. Likewise, for Hobbes, the state became a Leviathan or a human-like form that controlled the behaviour of its members because the natural state was a condition where humans were self-interested agents that were solely trying to advance their interests. In a natural state, natural inequalities emerge because of the condition of a ‘war of all against all’. In contrast, Rousseau argued that it was the state itself that created the oppressive relations and that as a condition free of hierarchy, it was a condition of harmony and unity rather than a

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state that required the aid of mutual protection from one another. The importance of the Reformation is that it redefined the relationship of the individual to nature or reality because of science. Furthermore, the Reformation transformed the individual relationship to the political and spiritual (both social systems) that defined material relations. The Jacobite revolt took a significant hold on the Scottish individuals who identified with the opportunities afforded them under these political and religious changes. By the mid-1700s, the Jacobites were defeated and likewise intellectually usurped by a political viewpoint that did not elevate either religious or political authority. At the same time, the Scottish Enlightenment envisioned a social world with religious tolerance. In the same period that Protestantism was consolidating with capitalism during the Scottish Enlightenment, tolerance for equality or the natural right of individuals to choose their spiritual or religious path became entrenched. In this period, the Scottish introduced public education and citizenship to other religious groups, including the Jews, who were being persecuted throughout Europe. Likewise, the Netherlands was progressive culturally, socially, and politically during the same period. The primacy of the individual is essential politically and in terms of how epistemology and the knowledge of reality were re-framed. The systems of knowledge and politics were transformed in the eighteenth century and the roots for both were significantly defined in the prior two centuries. By the end of the eighteenth century, figures like David Hume and Adam Smith were cutting edge or significantly current in terms of their influence. For Hume, his scepticism had a major impact. In terms of knowledge and how humans relate to reality, Hume maintained that humans develop perceptions or impressions of reality that are not unlike the frames of motion film projections. Perception is like a single frame of a film that connects previous frames with subsequent ones. While it is true that human perception connects the sun rising in the morning, it is also the case that perception alone does not guarantee the next sequence. Although the sun indeed rises in the morning, any given day can begin with overcast skies. The progress of science has meant the proving and falsifying of relationships. Adam Smith’s concept of the invisible hand employs a point of equilibrium that is hypothetical enough that it is called ‘invisible’. Morally, it

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is defiantly neutral. What it presupposes is that a balance or harmony between supply and demand will be achieved because they both further accept a self-interested individual or player. Consider the debate about what humans are like in a state of nature. Hobbes maintained that humans act with their worst instincts, whereas Rousseau reasoned that human-beings would be more social and equitable in a more natural state. The model of economics defined by Smith, and effectively adopted by Marx, demoralises the participants by accepting the probability of a self-­ interested agent. Smith maintained the idea of an invisible hand that is underwritten by a natural self-interest of participants and the idea of equilibrium has remained constant in economic theory ever since. Perfect competition is where the actual demand and supply become constant, or they do not continue to grow or decline when no external influences exist. Price stabilises and becomes constant when the measurable number of buyers meets the likewise measurable number of sellers that realise the demand. The framework that became the laws of exchange was not only built on assumptions that might have begged the question but also more significantly on assumptions that made it possible to envision a system of economics and exchange that was completely detached from the individual. In the system of economic science, humans are reduced to agents or actors. Their relationships and predictable behaviours become laws. As stated, a human is a self-interested agent and that was all that is required in terms of understanding their impact on the markets of exchange. Both the utilitarian and Kantian golden mean are examples of a level of abstraction that occurred in the science of humans at this historical juncture. For the Ancients, there were no separating questions of morals or ethics without the consideration of how these questions were cultivated in the individual. With the Enlightenment, human ethics were removed from the consideration of individual education and background. They were replaced by the algorithm that states that the greatest good for the greatest number should be the right measurable judgement (Mill), or, that one, should not will something that could not be willed universally (Kant). By contrast, Aristotle maintains that there are actions that we do for the sake of other ends and there are things that we pursue for their own sake.

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We might pursue wealth for the sake of happiness, but we do not seek happiness for any other end than itself. When standards like this are considered, so too are the broader questions of value, and, in turn, the type of truth relations and ontological assumptions relate to the problems. To consider the idea itself that there is a distinction between ‘ends’ means a complete reconsideration of value. This is the core of a teleological approach to explaining human purpose and behaviour and this framework is extended to nature and the universe in Aristotle.

 uestions of Subjectivity in the Enlightenment Q and Beyond The study of the human began to replace the study of God as the enlightenment ideals began to replace (or at least reposition) religious beliefs. This led to significant study of how humans perceive themselves and the world around them and the role of rational knowledge in these subjective perceptions. Philosophers such as Kant, Fichte, and Hegel began to delve deeply into the concept of the subjective and its role in science and rational thinking. These explorations have helped to inform modern representative democracy in that a move has been made away from objective truth. Decision-making is no longer based on objective observation, but rather the complexity of individual experience. Because everyone’s experience is highly subjective, democracy is guided by the complex interchange of subjectivities. Individuals have become unable to see past their subjective experience to the objective reality, making true deliberation nearly impossible. These subjectivities are also guided by those in power, biased news reporting, and social media campaigns. This section looks at the impact of Enlightenment ideas on subjectivity and, in time, on representative democracy. Inspired by Kant, Fichte attempted to ground his version of idealism on subjectivity as a concept. Hegel states the following regarding Fichte’s need for a ground:

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The Ego does not find itself in its appearance, or its positing; it must annul its appearance to find itself as Ego. The essence of the Ego and its position do not coincide: Ego does not become objective to itself. (Hegel, 1977, p. 123)

Fichte maintains, therefore, that the self, and activity in-itself, are synonymous notions. As he states, they are identical concepts: He will perceive, let us hope, that, since this is the only way for the thought of himself to arise in him – since, as he has found, an opposite mode of thinking produces in him a wholly different thought – that, as I say, the thought of himself is nothing other than the thought of this act, and the word ‘I’ nothing other than the designation thereof; that self and self-­ reverting act are perfectly identical concepts. (Fichte, 1982, p. 37)

Similarly, in another passage, he states: ‘The intellect, for Idealism, is an “act”, and absolutely nothing more; we should not even call it an active something, for this expression refers to something subsistent in which activity inheres’ (Fichte, 1982, p. 21). If the self can only be taken in its essentiality as an activity, then the question concerning what is external to the self becomes problematic. By external, Fichte means the content of thought: ‘presentations of a world, of a material, spatially located world existing without our aid, which notoriously occurs in consciousness’ (Fichte, 1982, p. 21). Externality is problematic in the sense that if what is external to me is only known through my intellect, and my intellect, in turn, can, at best, only be called an activity, then what is external can consequently only be indeterminate: Nevertheless, a determinate cannot be deduced from an indeterminate: the grounding principle, which is the rule of all deduction, is inapplicable here. Hence this primordial action of the intellect must needs be a determinate one, and, since the intellect is itself the highest ground of explanation, action determined by the intellect and its nature, and not by something outside it. (Fichte, 1982, p. 21)

The purpose of The Science of Knowledge is to formulate a grounding principle or a proposition for the Ego. However, this principle is created

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from within the Ego itself, because the self is unavoidable in a system concerned with idealism, and unavoidable because of the regressive notion outlined earlier. Thus, Fichte claims that the self, having recognised itself as an act, or activity, posits itself an activity. ‘It is only through this act, and first by means of it, by an act upon an act itself, which specific act is preceded by no other whatever, that the self originally comes to exist for itself ’ (Fichte, 1982, p. 21). The effect of Descartes’ Meditations on First Philosophy (1641) was the acceptance of rational truths that seem counter-intuitive in nature—such as the problem, outlined earlier, of whether the existence of reality outside of the mind can legitimately be known. This epistemological scepticism can be of central importance to the German idealists. Kant addresses the prevailing scepticism by asserting: It remains a scandal to philosophy and human reason in general that the existence of things outside of us…must be accepted merely on faith, and that if anyone thinks good to doubt their existence; we are unable to counter his doubts with any satisfactory proofs. (Kant, 1966, Bxxxixn)

According to Kant, Descartes maintains that there is only one empirical assertion that is undoubtedly certain, namely, that ‘I am’, and, thus, the existence of objects outside of us is ‘merely doubtful and indemonstrable’ (Kant, 1966, p. 278). The only proof, therefore, of an external world is achieved by showing that ‘inner experience’ is possible only through outer experience in general (Kant, 1966, p. 278). The dichotomising of inner and outer experience led to what might be considered to be the most predominant philosophical issue of the eighteenth century—namely, the question of whether what is given in ‘inner experience’ such as ‘ideas’, ‘perceptions’, and ‘representations’ that exist within human consciousness provide us with true knowledge of what exists ‘outside of us’. In the essay titled ‘The Relationship of Scepticism to Philosophy’, Hegel argues that this subject/object split is the critical source of philosophical problems facing his age: It can be [re]cognised adequately from how it has apprehended its object, the interest of speculative Reason-as the problem of explaining the origin

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of human cognition of things; to spy out for the conditioned existence what exists is unconditioned. To begin with, ‘things’ are opposed to ‘cognition’ within [the context of ] Reason here. Secondly an explanation of its origin [is asked for], and in addition to that the causal relationship is dragged in the ground of cognition, then, is something other than what is grounded, the former the concept, the latter the thing. When once this false picture of rational thinking is presupposed, then there is nothing further to be done, except to repeat forever that ground and grounded, concept and thing are different modes; that all rational cognition aims just to pluck a being out of thinking, existence out of concepts, (as it is put in words that are likewise Kantian. (Hegel, 1985, p. 341)

For Hegel, scepticism is crucial to philosophy. It is a necessary part of philosophical thinking as it forces critical thought and reasoning rather than the blind acceptance of axioms. Many of the issues in modern representative democracy stem from a lack of scepticism and willingness to question the status quo. Cyberdemocracy would help to grow a healthy scepticism among constituents, allowing the internet to function as a public sphere in which rational and critical discourse can take place, questioning the law and those in power, and, ultimately, using scepticism to create a public sphere in which deliberation results in the representation of the rational and well-thought-out views of the majority that have undergone critical scrutiny. Like the story of the split hermaphrodite discussed by Aristophanes in Plato’s Symposium, the German Idealists (beginning with Kant) sought a reconciliation between the subject and the object, split not by Zeus but by philosophical scepticism. The consequence of this scepticism can be condensed in other terms: the subject which was undoubtable and the object which was, as Kant states, ‘indemonstrable’. Kant’s first Critique is an attempt to conciliate the two competing theories of knowledge of his epoch—namely, British empiricism and continental rationalism. Typified by Descartes and Leibniz, the rationalists maintained that knowledge of both the natural and supernatural world could be attained only through pure reason alone, the faculty of which is claimed as an incorporeal substance. The outer world is known only through this inner substance. That everything has a reason, as Leibniz’s principle states,

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implies that everything has a cause. The link between ‘reason’ and ‘cause’ in Leibniz has its origins in the Greek notion of aitía—in particular, within the thought of Aristotle. Aristotle’s four causes are formal (eídos), material (hyle), efficient (kinoún), and final (télos). These are relevant to Leibniz’s use of reason because aitía for Aristotle accounts not simply for physical motion, as it does, for example, in Newtonian mechanics, but also as the ‘material cause’ of a conclusion in a syllogism, where the premises literally cause the conclusion. Thus, like Aristotle’s aitía, there is an interchangeable nature to reason and cause. This is important because it represents a potential unity between thought and substance, or the subject and the object. Normally, or at least in modern terms, the cause is generally regarded as something pertaining to physics or the sciences of nature, while reason is linked to reasoning, and, in turn, with someone who reasons. Therefore, when Leibniz is concerned with the law of non-­contradiction, his concern is not on a parallel with what early Wittgenstein had in mind concerning a true proposition or the form of logical syntax. Nor is it merely the distinguishing mark between corporeal and incorporeal substance, as in Descartes, but instead, with ‘substance’ as much as ‘subject’, or Form and Matter together, to borrow a metaphor from Hegel. This is important insofar as ‘reason’ stands as the medium whereby principles concerning cognition and principles of being (subject and object) are, in Hegel’s system, united. That is, if reality, or all Being as Leibniz argues, is expressed in true or false propositions (law of non-­ contradiction), and conversely, that true and false propositions represent reality (Principle of Sufficient Reason), then Reason itself is the principle that unites thought and being. Leibniz writes: It is not ‘the prerogative of numbers alone’, or of the ideas which you call intellectual, to ‘afford proposition, which are sure to meet with assent, as soon as they are understood’. They are also encountered in ‘natural philosophy, and all the other sciences’, and even the senses provide some. For example, the proposition ‘that two bodies cannot be in the same place [at the same time], is a truth, that no body any more sticks at, than at this maxim, That the same thing cannot be, and not to be [at the same time];

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That white is not [red], That a square is not a circle, That yellowness is not sweetness’. (Leibniz, 1981, Sec. 18)

Kant argued that metaphysics was possible only if the truths established were different from either ‘synthetic truths’ or ‘analytic truths’. Synthetic truths are best exemplified as the truths established as contingent, or empirically: an a posteriori proposition whose truth or falsity is verified by sensible observation. Analytic statements are taken as truths when they are true on their own terms without recourse to verification outside the very terms of the given proposition such as those discussed in the context of Leibniz’s necessary truths raised earlier—that is, a form of knowledge which is independent of experience. The famous Kantian example of such an a priori proposition which constitutes knowledge is ‘a bachelor is an unmarried man’. Kant maintained that to overcome these dichotomised approaches of the empiricists versus the rational deductionists, it was necessary to posit ‘synthetic a priori statements’. These he claimed as statements which were true neither alone nor by facts established by sense experience. Human knowledge, Kant argued, is dependent on notions which are not empirical in origin. Instead, what Kant posits as ‘human understanding’ cannot be refuted by experience. It will be shown later that although such formalist notions are irrefutable by ‘experience’ and that for Hegel, they are still not the whole of the experience of consciousness. The harmony that Kant’s system creates between the senses and understanding is what is claimed to constitute a Copernican Revolution in epistemology. Habermas, in his monograph Knowledge and Human Interests, argues that science and philosophy have been separated for far too long in scholarship and that a reunification of the two would result in a far more enriched cycle of communication, discourse, and questioning. Similarly, this separation in the political realm has led to the disintegration of modern representative democracy. A difference between passivity and activity marks the distinction between sensibility and understanding. Kant writes: ‘We call sensibility the receptivity of our soul, or its power of receiving representations whenever it is in any wise affected while the understanding, on the contrary, is with us the power of producing representations, or the spontaneity of

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knowledge’ (Kant, 1966, p. 44). By this, Kant is arguing that although one’s senses are always at work, one does not need to be focused upon what is a sensible given. For example, my senses of touch are unquestionably at work as I sit in this chair, but the senses themselves do not stand in any intentional relation with the chair. Instead, it is a matter of my thinking about the chair, and my interaction with it, which distinguishes a move from passivity to activity, or which marks a distinction between sensibility and understanding. In the ‘Transcendental Aesthetic’, from the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant pursues what can be considered as transcendentally true concerning such sensuous intuition. That is, if the chair, for example, as a phenomenon represents the ‘matter’, what then is the form of this sensation as represented in the understanding? What can be maintained necessarily or a priori about the perception of phenomena? The foundation of a priori sensibility is then argued to be the a priori categories of space and time. His reasoning is that because all objects of sensible perception are necessarily located in space and time, then the continuum of knowledge is therefore in a relation of dependence to it. Objects can change and variegate over time, for example, in colour, shape, size, but they cannot be deprived in our understanding of space and time and remain perceptible as objects for thought. Space, Kant argues, is both a priori and sensuous in character. It is a priori, as opposed to a posteriori, because our immediate awareness of appearances, or of things outside of ourselves, cannot separate within this awareness, space from external reality: ‘It is impossible to imagine that there should be no space, though one might well imagine that there should be space without objects to fill it’ (Kant, 1966, p. 24). That is, any experience of something external is an experience which is conditioned by space because the notion of externality itself presupposes that which is external and is ‘in a different part of space from where I am’ (Kant, 1966, p. 23). Thus, what might be predicated of something external would constitute a posteriori knowledge, but that an object is external is presupposed in its being external and therefore a priori. As it pertains specifically to an ontological difference, as articulated in Heidegger’s seminar, there is a difference in this manifestation between

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(1) identity and (2) identity and non-identity. Where beings are both similar (identical) and different (non-identity) to each other, there stands above this, in Hegel’s thought, a Being as ‘absolute’ or ‘infinite’ that determines a priori the unity of these two opposites. Heidegger articulates the very difference between his concern, and Hegel’s in the following: For Hegel, the matter of thinking is: Being with respect to beings having been thought in absolute thinking, and as absolute thinking. For us, the matter of thinking is the Same, and thus is Being – but Being with respect to its difference from beings. Put more precisely: for Hegel, the matter of thinking is the idea as the absolute concept. For us, formulated preliminarily, the matter of thing is the difference as difference. (Heidegger, 1969, p. 47)

As was conveyed earlier, such a necessary unity, or ‘the matter’ of ‘the Same’, such as Hegel’s Absolute is one characterised as a reciprocal determination. This is the same as Aristotle’s teleological relationship, where the purpose is the same as the cause. Where difference is determined by identity and identity is determined by difference, the identity of identity and non-identity is a ‘holding-together in keeping-apart… of what we call the same and its sameness’ (Heidegger, 1969, p. 47).

Questions of Representation in the Enlightenment and Beyond In the wake of the materialism and empty formalism that arose because of the enlightenment, many German idealists began to critique and discuss theories of representation to better understand how ideas might go unquestioned. Representation is a crucial aspect of the debates surrounding democracy. Thus, it is worth pursuing a general overview of the body of philosophical thought considering representation to see where representative democracy begins to fail in its democratic efforts. This section considers the work of some of the German idealists and their critique of the materialism and empty formalism that arose because of the

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enlightenment. It considers inner experience as one of the main issues grappled with during the eighteenth century. It also looks at the importance of teleology and ontology as they relate to the issues at stake in modern democracy. Lash (2007a) argues that Western philosophical problems regarding ontology and metaphysics are significant to understanding the limitations of economic and philosophic thinking and theory. The following will look at the ‘ontological difference’ and the problem of knowledge as a key to understanding Lash’s interpretations of Marx and Western thought. The focus aims at developing the notion of ontological difference. It does this in terms of what Marx missed from one of the key figures of the Enlightenment, namely Hegel. This section argues that the materialistic and reductive models that were pioneered during the enlightenment are limited because of problems that are as old as ancient philosophy and that Hegel used these as a critique against Marx, like Plato’s criticism of the Atomists and Democritus. This is the materialist critique based on teleology, or purpose in nature, as opposed to the empty or purposeless universe of atoms about which Democritus theorised. Further, it will be demonstrated how these suppositions can inform and misinform theories in economics and the human sciences. That is, where there are human subjects, there are ontological problems and issues related to how we can know the human subject. There was an important transition at the end of the enlightenment and at the advent of Marxist materialism. This thesis argues that the period of German idealism and Hegel understood the ontological difference and the challenges it posed to a simple empirical and materialist model. When politics and metaphysics intersect with one another, a problem of reification and legitimation emerges that creates a value hierarchy. Durkheim and Habermas both examined the relationship between the fixed and the changing. For Durkheim, the relationship between metaphysics and society was articulated in a few different forms, but emblematically, they were a central focus of his first publication on religion (Durkheim, 1995, p. xl). Key to that work, among other concepts, was the dialectic between the sacred and the profane.

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These were concepts that were applied as a framework to describe relations of meaning both at the political and the spiritual level. It should be added that the binding quality to both religion and politics is social in its nature. Durkheim approaches the social process as the point of emphasis in their complementary approach as structuralists. As a general principle, one of the dividing lines that construct their meaning is the duality of constancy against that which is changing (Jensen, 2012, p. 70). A sacred object is one that is to be revered for all time or through eternity. For Durkheim and Habermas, the connection that is a static metaphysical one was broken by the representational dilemma that such objects created. When one goes into a sacred space like a church, synagogue, or mosque, there will be objects that are regarded as sacred. It is not hard to see that they are not sacred, but that they are representations of what is sacred. Thus, what is profane in Durkheim’s framework is necessarily related in a mutually determining way. For Habermas, the importance of representation articulated in the ‘Transformation of the Public Sphere’ (1991) was demonstrated in various ways. It was also shown through the line of communicative discourse from the time of the enlightenment to twentieth-century popular media. Representation in the modern era was the privilege of the elite who could adorn themselves with objects that had more value in their abstract form (Calhoun, 1992, pp. 70–71). In these terms, the abstraction of what is beyond becomes a type of metaphysics of value in more monetary forms. For Habermas, consumer capitalism is no different in that it is driven by the idea that what something represents is often more important than the object itself. Both Durkheim and Habermas recognised the power of discourse or representation in terms of whose interests it serves and how it is further integrated with other reinforcing ideologies (Habermas, 1991, p. 388; Jones et al., 2011, p. 185). More importantly, they use this framework as a way of defining what ought to be the rational discourses that can replace the ideologies and entire thought systems that are based on some type of totemic and metaphysical idea or presupposition. Both Durkheim and Habermas view rational discourse as one where the recognition of the universal or the abstracted can be one where social value is assigned (Habermas, 1992, pp. 41–43). In terms of when that

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occurs, the value is likewise weighted to serve a power interest. Under normal circumstances, the body political and the public sphere are only defined by the relations of the parts, which are necessarily defined as equal. Any imbalance is a consequence of those who control the flow and exchange of representations. This is particularly important in comprehending where representative democracy began to fail. With representation as a privilege of the elite, the voices of the general populace have been made subject to the voice of the elite. Because of this, representative democracy falters in its representation of the voice of the people. Instead, the voices represented are guided and controlled by a select few, affirming and upholding ideals that do not necessarily benefit those outside the circle of the elite. And lastly, it negates the ideals inherent to the notions of subjectivity discussed earlier, particularly how humans perceive themselves and the world around them, the role of rational knowledge in subjective perceptions, and application or subjective decisions in the process of representation.

Bibliography Berry, D. (2008). Journalism, ethics and society. Routledge. Bloch, E. (2018). On Karl Marx. Verso Books. Calhoun, C. J. (Ed.). (1992). Habermas and the public sphere. MIT Press. Durkheim, E. (1995). The elementary forms of the religious life. The Free Press. Fichte, J. G. (1982). Science of knowledge. Cambridge University Press. Habermas, J. (1991). The public sphere. In C. Mukerji & M. Schudson (Eds.), Rethinking popular culture: Contemporary perspectives in cultural studies (pp. 398–404). University of California Press. Habermas, J. (1992). Postmetaphysical thinking: Philosophical essays. MIT Press. Hegel, G. W. F. (1977). The difference between Fichte’s and Schelling’s system of philosophy (H. S. Harris & Walter Cerf, Trans.). State University of New York Press. Hegel, G. W. F. (1985). Relationship of scepticism to philosophy. In Between Kant and Hegel. Translated from the German and annotated by G. di Giovanni and H. S. Harris. State University of New York Press. Heidegger, M. (1969). Discourse on thinking. Harper Torchbooks. Held, D. (2006). Models of democracy. Polity.

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Hirschmann, N. (2009). Gender, class, and freedom in modern political theory. Princeton University Press. Jensen, H. (2012). Weber and Durkheim: A methodological comparison. Routledge. Jones, P., Bradbury, L., & LeBoutillier, S. (2011). Introducing social theory. Polity. Kant, I. (1966). Critique of pure reason. Translated from the German by F. Max Müller. Doubleday & Company Inc. Kellner, D. (1998). Intellectuals, the new public spheres, and techno-politics. In C. Toulouse & T. W. Luke (Eds.), The politics of cyberspace. Routledge. Kellner, D. (2000). Modernity and its discontents: Nietzsche’s critique. https:// pages.gseis.ucla.edu/faculty/kellner/papers/FNmod.htm Lash, S. (2007a). Capitalism and metaphysics. Theory, Culture & Society, 24(5), 1–26. Leibniz, G. W. (1981). New essays on human understanding. Cambridge University Press. Rutherford, D. (2006). The Cambridge companion to early modern philosophy. Cambridge University Press. Silier, Y. (2017). Freedom: Political, metaphysical, negative and positive. Routledge. Szelenyi, I. (2016). Weber’s theory of domination and post-communist capitalisms. Theory and Society, 45, 1–24. Weber, M. (2013). The Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism. Routledge.

4 Representative Democracy and Crisis

The Decline of Representative Democracy Representative Democracy had its beginnings in ancient Rome, and since the birth of this model, it has moved substantially from the context of a ‘city state’ to its present context in a world governed by ‘globalisation’. The global context has only served to expose the institutional failures of representative democracy in terms of contrasting with both plebiscitarian and deliberative democracy (Greven, 2009). Although representatives are elected democratically by the people, they often however, continue to represent the interest of wealthy, influential people in society with connections to business. This is sometimes offset by individuals with less wealth and so on; however, in total, this is a minority of an electorate that govern Western systems. Thus, if we use the UK as a modern-day example of the aforementioned, and compare the Conservative Party with the Labour Party, it’s clear that within the ranks of the former party, individual Members of Parliament in the Tories have quite considerable personal wealth at their disposal. The current Chancellor Rishi Sunak and his wife, Akshata Murty made the Sunday Times Rich List in 2022, placing them at number 222 out of 250. Sunak thus became the first front-line politician to © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 H. Karem, Cyberdemocracy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-27544-9_4

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make the list of the UK’s super rich, and jointly with his wife having £730 million at their disposal. Other Tory MPs such as Jacob Rees-Mogg is estimated to have wealth up to £150 million and Nadhim Zahawi up to £100 million. The list is too long for this chapter, but if we add to that the fact that the Tory Party are also recipients of donations from some of the wealthiest people in the UK, we can see that connections, influence, and lobbying are skewed towards wealthy interests. The Labour Party are not in the same financial position, and they are seen to represent the interests not of the rich and powerful, but of ordinary working people; however, this is an idealistic representation of the Labour Party. The real point to grasp, even if we are to concede that indeed Labour are the party of the people, this still represents a minimalist form of democracy because it excludes the people from being directly involved in the decision-making process, and that is why cyberdemocracy is seen to have the potential to expand participation and enhance inclusivity into the democratic project. As a result of the current forms and processes of representative democracy, ordinary citizens and their legitimate interests are seldom represented in the current political system. Hence, ordinary citizens often feel alienated, marginalised, and disempowered from the institutions of Parliament, impacting negatively on democracy in its modern manifestation. The term ‘democracy’ comes from the Greek term demos meaning ‘people’ and kratos meaning ‘rule’. Thus, in its simplest form, democracy is the rule of the people. Representative democracy that emerged in ancient Rome diverged significantly from its Greek origins and thus the original intent of the democratic model; power was in the hands of the few, not the many. The advent of the internet and the development of the cybersphere has opened the possibility of returning to the original Greek form of democracy as a template for change. After all, citizens can now access information quickly and make decisions based on this almost immediate access. The internet has made it possible to quickly disseminate commercialised information while, at the same time, it has also made it possible to develop new platforms that allow for deliberation and political

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discourse. Additionally, collectivistic values have been replaced by subjective values as a part of the transition to the post-industrial age (McFarland & Micheletti, 2012). Political engagement has been revolutionised through the internet, allowing individuals to take up single issues as opposed to supporting the collective issues espoused by political parties. Traditional forms of collectivistic action are being replaced by new individualistic approaches (e.g., Norris et al., 1999). Political parties and interest groups do not meet the needs of individuals, thus leading to individualistic collective action on singular issues. If democracy is to be understood as ‘citizen rule and citizen responsibility-taking’, according to Micheletti (2002, p. 12), ‘democracy means that it is citizens who decide the issues and arenas of politics as well as the tools of problem-solving and action’. The question is, then, whether modern representative democracy can meet the changing needs of citizens who feel that collectivistic approaches do not allow for individual representation. In the contemporary world, populism is changing mainstream politics in the UK, the US, and other nation-states across the world. In the UK, there has been a populist movement that has supported individuals like Nigel Farage and Boris Johnson and the outcome of that has been the capture of a majority of voters who supported exiting from the EU. In the US, the election of Donald Trump was widely recognised as the outcome of a wave of populism. Not unlike BREXIT, it is easy to see that the outcome of populist support has been the rejection of the rule of law (refusing subpoenas) and the rejection of transparent evidence or the ‘truth/reality’ about corruption such as the vote in the Senate to not hear any witnesses and to find Trump innocent of any impeachable offence. Amongst other things, populism can be viewed as the outcome of the erosion of trust in public institutions and the constitutional right to vote. The erosion in question is caused by many factors, necessitating an outline of the conflict between neoliberal public policy over and against a more organic social system that supported healthcare, social support, universal education, and insurance. It will be shown how a shift that occurred in the mid-1970s in UK politics made the public suspicious of public institutions, believing that these institutions were inefficient and, therefore, would be better managed as a business.

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The neoliberal assault on politics meant that neoliberal influence also shaped public policy in terms of deregulating trade and imposing tariff and manufacturing restrictions so that globalisation could occur. In terms of populism, the economic devastation caused by the loss of manufacturing jobs in the UK can be understood as a driver. Along with limiting or changing labour and trade laws, international exchange in the form of goods has also been aligned with people. The nationalism of populism intersects in the UK with racism among some of the followers. This chapter will demonstrate that the transformation to the neoliberal agenda can be understood from a theoretical perspective with Habermas’s argument about the decline of the nation-state. It will be argued that a potential remedy is the introduction of cyberdemocracy, which has the potential to engage individuals within Habermas’s notion of the public sphere. Populism is primarily driven by online engagement, so it is possible to create more of a unified or centralised platform for direct political engagement. New media technologies can facilitate deliberative democracy and reinvigorate democracy by providing a platform which allows for two-­ way decentralised communications. This form of communication builds a site of rational autonomous deliberation, thus creating a more viable form of democracy as democracy was intended to be. Papacharissi (2004, p. 267) wrote about the potential that the ‘internet and its accompanying technologies have for reviving political discussion’. Cyberspace functions as a virtual public sphere in which all internet users have access to the same information and communication platforms. This allows for the decentralised communication necessary for rational deliberation to take place. Many other scholars agree with Papacharissi (2004) on the potential of new technologies to facilitate deliberative democracy. Szabo (2007, p. 121) found that the internet, and social news sites in particular, ‘actively help, promote and reward reasoned debate to take place’. Dahlberg (2000, p. 259) found that in online discussions, ‘high levels of reflexivity, respectful listening, sincerity, and commitment to deliberations’ were possible. Thus, through these new technologies, the internet has the potential to form a virtual public sphere that acts as a space for decentralised communication that allows for rational discourse and deliberation.

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The significance of personal economic wellbeing is unquestionably a vital driver of the crisis that must be understood alongside the neoliberal political policy that underwrote the emergence of globalisation. As a vital driver of the discontent of political policy in terms of the economy, there is no question that the current problem of stagnation is a direct result of the neoliberal agenda. Since the 1980s, there has been growth in the form of more capital and growth in terms of the larger output each individual contributes. However, the share of this growth has progressively become held in the hands of fewer people (Picketty, 2014). Economic polarisation is a significant problem in public discourse, and it is the result of transferring middle-class jobs to the developing world. The job growth that has occurred since the Thatcher/Reagan era (1979/1980) has come at the expense of ordinary citizens (Dunleavy et al., 2018, p. 400). Stagnation also means that wages have not grown at the same rate as inflation, which means that the real wages of individuals have declined in the neoliberal period. Stagnation has an impact on the quality of life and network of individuals. Collectively, it creates a positive feedback loop with the broader economy because it creates a condition where fewer wages mean less spending and less spending means less growth. As wages used to increase, so too did the spending capabilities of the growing population, and as wages erode, so too does the spending that is vital to growth and greater distribution of wealth (Dunleavy et al., 2018, pp. 399–401). When capital is concentrated at the top as opposed to spent in the daily economy, the top mostly puts this capital in banks (often foreign) or they invest it in the market, which is a system accountable to shareholders and not those who work for them (Streeck, 2014). The erosion of the middle class is unquestionably one of the tangible outcomes of globalisation. There is no question that offshoring jobs has been another concrete outcome within this erosion that is measurable in the form of stagnation and greater wealth distribution that has progressively become more polarised. As a neoliberal political strategy that drove legislation, the deregulation of tariff and trade restrictions along with the active undermining of unions and labour organising created the conditions

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under which offshoring became both possible and a preferred option (Dunleavy et al., 2018, pp. 399–400). Along with deregulating the industry, the neoliberal policymakers changed significant areas of the institutions that financed the growth, namely the banks, investment banks, and capital investment markets. In terms of job growth, the financialisation of the economy means the transfer to the service and financial sector and away from manufacturing and office clerical forms of employment (Suarez-Villa, 2016). The neoliberal goal of promoting globalisation and increasing capital holder wealth resulted in economic stagnation caused by political policymakers and elites. This is a significant problem that is correlated with the current crisis of representative democracy. It is also a problem that has intersecting agreement with both populists and academics—there is no question that politics has represented the interests of elites more through the period of policymaking that created globalisation: ‘Right-wing populist political movements, and some sections of the press, with their intense anti-­ immigration focus, have created a political climate where rights risk being swept away to placate nativist sentiment’ (Dunleavy et al., 2018, p. 376). Moreover, what constitutes an elite has likewise shifted in the same period and this consequence is a crisis point between representative democracy and globalisation. Wealth has become more concentrated in those who own their means of production against those who must sell their labour to an owner so that they can subsist and thrive. The collusion between policymakers and owners of capital unquestionably makes the system represent the interests of the elite over the interests of the democratic majority. This is especially evident as the democratic majority is becoming poorer as a direct consequence of their lack of representation. There are several other critical structural problems. With representative democracy, there is a ratio of the politician to the individual voter that creates a distance to other political forces. At the political level of representation, many stakeholders shape local politics that are beyond the agenda of a given politician. Agendas, in this regard, can not only not represent the direct interests of constituents but also mean having immediate interests ignored or wholly neglected in the legislative process. In turn, the distance between the bureaucracy and forces of legislative

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control that happen from the centre or prime minister and outward from the core executive creates even greater alienation from the immediate representative (Dunleavy et al., 2018, 205–207). Again, the disconnect raises critical questions about who is being represented. Nietzsche offered the idea that globalisation has made the institutions of modernity ‘no longer fit for anything’, arguing that the ‘fault lies not in them but in us. Having lost all the instincts out of which institutions grow, we are losing the institutions themselves, because we are no longer fit for them’ (Nietzsche, 1990, p. 39). Similarly, many people have argued that current democratic institutions are dying, ‘no longer fit for anything’ (Nietzsche, 1990, p. 39). As such, representative democracy has been described as undergoing a crisis, as it has become a decaying institution that cannot meet the needs of the people (see, e.g., Diamond, 2018). Diamond (2018) holds such a viewpoint, arguing that the ‘great globalization disruption’ has irrevocably changed the world and, thus, requires changes be made to the democratic model. Goodhart (2005, p. 3) argues that the situation is much more complex, stating that globalisation has made it necessary to develop a new framework for the democratic model. Goodhart (2005, p. 15) also makes clear that globalisation has led to the flourishing of democracy and increased the number of states adopting democracies.

 odern Democracy and Its Shortcomings: M A Survey of Data and Recent Scholarship Modern representative democracy differs from the direct democracy that cyberdemocracy would offer in that it is characterised by representation over direct participation. It is worth noting that e-democracy and cyberdemocracy are not synonymous. E-democracy is not deliberative (as cyberdemocracy aims to be) and is, rather, a form of modern representative democracy in which the voting process is moved to an online platform to increase voter participation. In essence, e-democracy is representative democracy that uses new technologies to broaden access to the democratic process of electing representatives and, consequently, increase voter representation.

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As Hagen (1997) states, e-democracy ‘does not want to establish direct forms of democracy but wants to improve representative democracy’. Cyberdemocracy, in contrast, is meant to be truly deliberative and direct, using cyberspace as the new public sphere for this political deliberation and creating a direct democracy model. Cyberdemocracy will be further defined and evaluated in Chap. 4. As democracy and technological advances have become more widespread, much research has been undertaken to determine if and how technology will better democracy and to understand how democracy is viewed both globally and by individual countries. Disagreement is high on both these issues (the ability of technology to improve democracy and democracy’s standing in the world). It is worthwhile to consider these viewpoints to see if cyberdemocracy can truly offer a better form of democracy that allows for true deliberation, greater representation, and less subjectivity. A recent report by the Pew Research Center looks at predictions of how technology might enhance and improve democracy by 2030. The report proposes that democracy will undergo great change due to evolving technology (Pew Research Center, June 2020b, p. 3). However, the extent to which this change will improve the democratic model is uncertain. Some experts believe that the change ‘will result in positive outcomes for the public good; others are less convinced’ (Pew Research Center, June 2020b, p. 3). This split is in line with similar conceptualisations of democracy and the changes technology brings that arise in scholarship discussing the ‘crisis’ that democracy faces (see, e.g., Goodhart, 2005; Wilhelm, 2000; Thomassen & Van Ham, 2017, Diamond, 2018). Another report by the Pew Research Center studied democratic values and democratic satisfaction in 34 countries. It found that, globally, 52% of the people surveyed in the target countries were dissatisfied with democracy in their countries (Pew Research Center, February 2020a, p. 7). This dissatisfaction was due primarily to the belief that elected officials did not care about or voice the opinions of the people they represent (Pew Research Center, February 2020a, p. 7). For example, in the US, 71% of people believed politicians did not listen to their opinions and, in the UK, 70% of people felt the same frustration with how their politicians

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were not truly representing them (Pew Research Center, February 2020a, p. 19). The number of governments that identify as democracies is at an all-time high, with more than half of the governments in 167 studied countries identifying as democracies or as a mix of a democratic and autocratic government (Pew Research Center, May 2019). Though many have considered democracy to be in crisis, it is stronger than ever as a form of government. However, the levels of dissatisfaction with how democracy currently functions are high. Anticipated changes in social media, misinformation, democratic activity, and social connectivity may have significant implications for modern representative democracy. The Pew Research Center report found that experts anticipate that social media will be greatly changed and may become divided according to partisan interests (Pew Research Center, June 2020b, p. 6). This could, in some ways, lead to less deliberation, as individuals would flock to new social media platforms based on shared partisan beliefs. Experts also predict that social media platforms will focus more on accuracy and honesty, which may lead to less division among social media users (Pew Research Center, June 2020b, p. 6). In terms of misinformation, scepticism will likely become the starting point for information found on the internet, better fact-checking tools will be developed, and more information will be confirmed through in-­ person meetings (Pew Research Center, June 2020b, p. 6). In addition, the public will demand accuracy of information, which is the driving force behind these anticipated changes (Pew Research Center, June 2020b, p. 6). Democratic activity will also likely undergo significant change from emerging technologies. This may occur through the development of online voting systems (e-democracy) or policy changes driven by ‘digital civic engagement’ in which constituents are able to voice their concerns more easily through digital platforms (Pew Research Center, June 2020b, p. 7). Additionally, online platforms will likely be developed that allow for wider deliberation (Pew Research Center, June 2020b, p. 7). In this sense, deliberation may be brought back into the democratic model through tenets of cyberdemocracy. Current scholarship on modern representative democracy centres around three strands of evidence when it comes to describing the failures

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of modern democracy: a marked decline in direct participation in the government (often due to distrust in government institutions), low voter turnout, and a lack of representation of the individuals the democracy is intended to serve. This section will briefly address the scholarship on each of these strands of evidence before turning to a more in-depth analysis of the issues at stake. That citizen participation is the basis of democracy is unquestioned. Arnstein (1969, p. 216) stated that ‘participation of the governed in their government is, in theory, the cornerstone of democracy’. Zittel and Fuchs (2007, p. xiv) have noted that ‘democracy is inconceivable without citizens’ participation’. In their opinion, ‘turnout seems to be declining, parties find it increasingly difficult to recruit candidates and members, and local democracy is in danger of drying up due to a lack of interest by those living in the communities’ (Zittel & Fuchs, 2007, p. xiv). Macedo et al. (2005) state that citizen participation has declined significantly and argue that ‘whether consciously intended or not, the design of our current political institutions and practices turns citizens off’ (p. 2). In their opinion, democratic engagement is of the utmost importance as participation ‘enhances the quality of democratic governance’ (Macedo et al., 2005, p. 4). Participation is a necessary component of modern democracy, but participation has declined significantly over the years. In 2018, a study found that political participation was often limited to voting (78% of people in the 14 countries surveyed stated that they had voted, Pew Research Center, October 2018). In contrast, other forms of citizen participation in government were much lower, with 33% of surveyed individuals stating that they had attended a political event and only 17% noting that they had been part of an online political discussion (Pew Research Center, October 2018). Representative democracy’s marked decline in citizen participation points to a need for change. Low voter turnout is a crucial indicator of failed democracy. When the represented do not exercise their voice and participate democratically, the model has failed. Many studies have attributed low voter turnout to a lower level of education (e.g., Zittel & Fuchs, 2007; Macedo et al., 2005). Martin Rosema (2007) views low voter turnout as a threat to democracy, but for a more nuanced reason. He argues that ‘voters do not abstain at random’ and that some groups are more likely not to vote than others.

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This results in ‘politicians primarily serv[ing] the interests of those who (may) vote for them’, causing the needs of some citizens not to be represented (Rosema, 2007, p. 612). Lijphart (1997, p. 1) notes the seriousness of low voter turnout, as it means the democratic system becomes ‘systematically biased against less well-to-do citizens’. This is especially problematic in terms of representing the entire country, as the lower the political activity and voter turnout, ‘the greater the inequality in participation’ (Lijphart, 1997, p. 1). When the voices of all individuals are not represented through participation in voting, this leads to a failure of democracy to meet the needs of the entire population. A global report from the International IDEA found that while the number of democracies has increased since the 1990s, voter turnout has decreased since then (International IDEA, 2016, p. 43). This shows that while the current model of democracy has gained traction, it is not functioning as democracy should. Another key shortcoming of modern democracy is that it often fails to address the needs of the individuals, instead benefitting the elite and the powerful. It is also difficult for democracy to allow for the representation of individuals as society is not homogeneous and the needs of one group may conflict with another (e.g., Fisher & Ury, 1989; Sager, 2009). Macedo et al. (2005, p. 4) also point to this phenomenon, stating that ‘democracy is supposed to represent the interests of the people, but ample evidence supports the notion that political institutions are most responsive to those who mobilise’. Democracy as such does not stand when only a portion of the voices of the represented are included and many are disregarded. Gilens (2005) found that when there was a conflict between the needs of the rich and the needs of the poor or middle-class, the government’s actions and policies ‘strongly reflect the preferences of the most affluent’, ignoring the needs of many and showing a lack of political equality (p. 778). As discussed above, dissatisfaction with democracy is high, with 52% of those surveyed feeling dissatisfied with the current state of democracy with 64% viewing ‘political elites as out of touch’ (Pew Research Center, February 2020a, p. 7). Each of these issues plays an important role in understanding how modern democracy has failed. The remainder of this chapter will delve

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more deeply into these issues and point to cyberdemocracy’s ability to improve upon these issues as modern democracy, despite its prevalence, does not fully meet the needs of the constituents.

 lobalism, Populism, Representative G Democracy, and Government In The Postmodern Condition, Lyotard (1984) argued that with the transition from an industrial society to the post-industrial age, the status of knowledge was altered forever. Society became information based as technology evolved. As such, knowledge became commodified, to be bought and sold. This overflowed into the democratic sphere, as news and social media platforms have commercialised the information they disseminate, opting to share news and information that sells, rather than news and information that enriches democratic deliberation and critical thought. Along with the problems brought about by globalisation and the rise of neoliberalism that has impacted populism in terms of provoking growth there is a widely recognised growth of disengagement from political systems. Both the voter turnout rate and a marked decline in direct participation in politics are strong indicators that there is a problematic relationship between the general population and the systems of government and representative institutions. A direct link between the rise of populism in the UK, the US, France, and Germany, and political alienation has been documented through several survey-focused studies (Eatwell & Goodwin, 2018). In the context of the UK, there is a public disaffection that is documented in terms of the belief that these institutions are both inaccessible and also limited in terms of the perspective of effectively changing or impacting them. There is a widespread view that the representatives of these institutions are self-­ motivated or acting from a place of self-interest rather than working for the public good (Wike & Fetterolf, 2018). Finally, there is a perception that the system is not functional and that the basic role and protocol of Parliament ought to be redefined. One of the major components of daily news broadcasts that concerns Parliamentary politics is the procedure or performance of Question Time.

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The public perception of Question Time views the practice as ineffective and just a medium for politicians or political parties to communicate an agenda and score points against the opposition through criticism (Blackburn, 2017). As a daily procedure that occurs when Parliament is sitting, the debates are mostly succeeded by media interviews that, in turn, create a significant portion of the daily news content. The perception of the daily news that is determined by the outcomes and media interviews that surround the protocol of Question Time has an impact on the problem of a growing disenfranchisement. The erosion of trust in public and government institutions is an indisputable problem and is demonstrated by many basic participation or engagement indicators along with extensive survey data as noted earlier. One of the important and transformational elements of this public attitude is the more organic social solidarity that existed with the social systems that were widely valued and arguably somewhat functional until they were dismantled in the neoliberal period or after the late 1970s and onward. The emergence or birth of the modern social welfare state in the UK is associated with an influential report that would provide some of the foundational ideas of systems that remain in place to date. William Beveridge is most associated with the Beveridge Report, which created the Social Insurance and Allied Services, and it was overseen and managed by the interdepartmental committee on the coordination of social insurance. The creation of social welfare was the outcome of the report, and it was established in 1941 under Arthur Greenwood, who was the minister for reconstruction (Perrin, 1992). Per Beveridge, the goal of the report’s recommendations was to eliminate the ‘five giant evils’, which were defined as Want, Disease, Ignorance, Squalor, and Idleness (Leaper, 1991, p. 3). Following the 1941 report, a Whitehall committee was established to consider the main recommendations of the report and this committee then produced four white papers in 1944, among which was the ‘White Paper on Employment Policy’ (Perrin, 1992). The goal of this analysis was to utilise a theory that was central to Maynard Keynes and directly influenced by him. This was the commitment of high rates and stable rates of employment, and this was a goal that came directly from the

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demand side economic model that he initially developed in the UK in the late 1920s and a model that began to influence both the governments in the US and the UK during the Great Depression. Neoliberalism is a direct rejection in the form of inverting the supply and ‘demand’ sides of employment and basic financial living standard. Keynes maintained that the only way to emerge from an economic recession is by stimulating the economy by placing more income into the hands of average citizens (Tribe, 2009). The theory proposed that the greater amount of capital circulating in the general economy, the greater the potential for growth would be. However, the trajectory of that growth would begin with capital circulating at the bottom with regular citizens and then moving upward to the suppliers and owners of wealth or capital. By contrast, the neoliberal or supply economic strategy is to increase the amount of capital in the hands of the owners and corporations in the form of tax breaks such that the surplus generated through these breaks created the capital that could be reinvested. As creators of employment, the owners of capital would effectively have a trickle-down effect and increase both employment and wages. As an inversion of the Keynes model, capital is beginning at the top and then making its way downward. As noted, the neoliberal model has only brought about stagnation or zero growth such that wealth did not trickle down and, therefore, the average wage or salary owner is unable to spend as much with the result that the flow of capital among basic citizens is contracting. The progressive nature of this demand-side focus that was the application of Keynes also led to the creation of the Family Allowance Acts just prior to the general election of 1945 general election (Leaper, 1991). In 1946, the National Insurance Act was also the result of the Whitehall committee and there is a direct link to the influence of the 1942 Beveridge Report (Perrin, 1992). What the vision of Beveridge fulfilled was the type of organic relationship presented in several places, including the work of T.H. Green (Brink, 2007). An organic state is one that reflects the basic features of any life form such that it needed an environment to sustain itself. It must have the capacity to move and obtain sustenance from the environment and it must have the capacity to reproduce. The basic goal of an organism is to

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maintain homeostasis. Above all else, the organism is functioning because all the necessary parts and components are functioning to sustain the whole of them. In the post-war and progressive era in the UK, the influence of Keynes and Beveridge must be understood within a broader range of political thought to emphasise how it was more collectively driven than founded on the basic behaviour and self-interest of an individual that is the hallmark of neoliberalism. At the same time that the collective and organic model of Beveridge represented an ideal in the abstract, Beveridge was personally concerned about the dynamic of the state and individual such that it could become an organic system that broke down because the individual ceased to function effectively: ‘to leave room and encouragement for voluntary action by each individual to provide more than that minimum for himself and his family’ (quoted in McDermont, 2010, p. 48). William Beveridge expressed concern that state intervention might diminish the associational life of civil society. One of the lasting effects of the Beveridge report was diminished participation in the democratic process, thus endangering civil society. By offering citizens protection ‘from the cradle to the grave’, citizens became lazy through their increased dependence on state intervention. State intervention diminished active participation, thereby making Beveridge’s fear a reality. Many scholars have pointed to the importance of associational life for democracy. Associational life includes the social relationships held in families, workplaces, and communities (e.g., Nisbet, 2015; Eberly, 2000; Bellah et al., 1985). The state intervention put into place through the Beveridge report and its aftereffects led to repeated attempts to eradicate abnormal forms of the division of labour. Division of labour is meant to serve as a form of social cohesion, where individuals have a role to play in the larger whole. However, by 1974, state intervention in the UK led to a dissolution of the relationship between individuals and communities. Without incentive to work, the associational life in the workplace and other communities began to break down. With associational life reduced, so also was democratic participation reduced as active participation on behalf of the community was not important for the individual with lessened community ties and interactions. Watson (2014, p. 646) found that

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work-based welfare conditionality ‘leads people to lose interest in the political process’ and that ‘such individuals vote less and join and are active in fewer civic organisations’. Thus, though state intervention intended to provide for civil society, it ultimately failed it, weakening associational life and, in turn, weakening democracy.

 he Decline of the Nation-State (Die T postnationale Konstellation) Habermas’s concept of postnationale Konstellation has a contradictory strain of both affirming but also criticising the post-national world that has been brought about because of globalisation. On the one hand, he does not view nationalism as anything more than the product of modernity and, in that context, a way of legitimating the political system that protects the economic interests of the elite. In these terms, he is critical of globalisation because it has shifted power to multinational corporations who are now ‘competitors with nation-states’ (Habermas, 2001, p. 78). This is a marked transition caused by neoliberal agendas that view business as the engine of economic growth and prosperity (instead of the average citizen as a holder of capital). On the other hand, Habermas’s criticism of corporate power challenging the nation-state is a champion of post-nationalism. Habermas situates nationalism within the context of historical identities that are primarily the outcome of arbitrary borders created through the process of modern European history. He views this historical nationalism that is central to identity politics and the contemporary xenophobia that is growing, as ‘contradictory to universalism’ and based on acts of ‘exclusion’ which typify the fascism of Hitler (Habermas, 2001, p. xi). The concept of the post-national constellation is a framework that presents the opportunity to redefine what the state is, but in terms that represent the interests that are universalist. Instead, his constellation is one that aims at achieving a ‘constitutional patriotism’ (Habermas, 2001, p. 76). Where the legitimation of liberal democratic principles had an impact during the East and West divide or World communist powers

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against the West, since the communist world disappeared or the Cold War ended, democracy has become re-valued and, consequently, reconsidered and questioned in distinct ways (Habermas, 2001, p. 44). His constellation aims to continue the reconsideration of democracy and what it is as an individual to have a relationship to the state, but these strategies that he steers his theory towards run counter to the democratic realignments that have resulted in ‘barbaric nationalism’ (Habermas, 2001, p. 103). The elements of hate described earlier are robust instances of barbaric nationalism and expressions of xenophobia which are more benign but also increasing and more prevalent. What Habermas aims toward is ‘civic solidarity’ (Habermas, 2001, p. 74) against solidarity based on identities. However, this is also a critique of the identity politics that can be understood as progressive such as multiculturalism. To criticise the liberal democratic values that have emphasised the type of pluralism as the ideal that legitimated multiculturalism would appear to run counter to the progressive politics of Habermas. Populism is often referred to as a ‘thin’ ideology that is dependent on other, more comprehensive ideologies to provide complete answers to political questions (e.g., Stanley, 2008). Stanley (2008, p. 95) argues that populism ‘should be regarded as a distinct ideology’, but that it ‘is unable to stand alone as a practical political ideology’. Populism has grown in recent years, particularly in Western democracies, due to both ‘the growing independence and commercialisation of the popular media, and the increased cognitive mobilisation of a better educated public’ (Stanley, 2008, p. 96). Populism centres around the idea that there are two distinct groups, ‘the people’ and ‘the elite’ (Stanley, 2008, p. 102). It also privileges the voice of the people over the voice of the elite, often calling for direct democracy to truly project the majority voice of ‘the people’ (Stanley, 2008, p. 104). Beyond these ideas, populism, according to Stanley (2008), fails to develop a full political ideology and depends on other ideologies to answer key questions. Ultimately, one can also argue that representative democracy is not truly a democracy, but rather an elective aristocracy (Rousseau, 1762). In this sense, it does not represent the will of the people, but the will of the elite. Populism purports to represent the will of ‘the people’, but who ‘the people’ are exactly, is a vague concept (Stanley, 2008, p. 107). In fact,

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Stanley (2008, p. 107) argues, populism only insists that ‘the people ought to get what they want, when they want, however they want’, a both impractical and implausible ideology. Multiculturalism and ‘individualisation’ were pluralistic ideals that were premised on an idea of pluralism based on the recognition of ‘difference’ but only as an ‘abstract form of civil solidarity in the sense of a universalism sensitive to difference’ (Habermas, 2001, p. 84). The problem with this ‘abstraction’ is that it belies the reality that difference reinforced has only resulted in the legitimation and the re-legitimation of older historical forms of nationalism. By identifying a pluralism that respects difference, the cultural difference becomes more punctuated or prominent as a defining attribute. Further, the political institutions both promoted it as an ideal and legislated its existence by more open borders and through greater integration with other economies. The EU stands as an excellent example of a power structure that is legitimated through the post-nationalism of multiculturalism. In the post–World War II period, the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) became the template for a new multinational order that shared democratic ideals like pluralism and representative democracies and then legitimated them through a post-national view of identity. However, two problems are central to Habermas’s post-national constellation First, it was premature in terms of defining what cultural or pluralism concerning identity was and this compromised a redefinition based on a more complex concept of a nation-state. Second, it was introduced in a way that was uncritically looking at the shift in power that went from the political sphere to the economic one where interests defined by the owners of capital were already in place (Habermas, 2000). For GATT and the EU to serve the interests of business and those who benefit from greater trade, a more integrated network among European nation-states and the redress of language barriers had to be achieved. Looked at in these terms, the move to embrace the pluralistic ideal of multiculturalism and the affirmation of difference as social and political infrastructure must be understood regarding whose interests they serve, and this is one of the perceived problems with the post-national world.

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For example, the Brexit problem is unquestionably an extension of this ideology of legitimation for a more global economy. The idea that a more integrated migration should be a legally codified and multinational extension of this form of the pluralistic ideal of multiculturalism is now perceived as a threat. This is an important feature of populism as it intersects in its current form with globalisation, neoliberalism, and the state of political alienation and disaffection that was discussed earlier in this analysis. Nietzsche’s idea that we have outgrown the institutions of modern society, including representative democracy, comes into play here. Representative democracy is undergoing a crisis, as it has decayed to the extent that it no longer meets the needs of the people. There is an out-group bias against other cultures and the separation from the EU is viewed by many as a way of also separating from the integration with other cultures and the free movement of EU citizens among nation-states. What multiculturalism has done by emphasising identity was to create it as a distinct object or target for criticism. The difference is the legitimating idea that allows for the distinction between in-group and out-group distinctions that are defined by culture, a shared history, or a particular linguistic group. The oppositions that are created through difference and its affirmation have been forms of identity that have grown into the very means by which Britain has a population who wants to separate, and how the separation has been fuelled by negative perceptions of the distinctions that were supposed to be celebrated (Dunleavy et al., 2018, p. 386). For Habermas, identities are complex, and they are reduced or oversimplified when they become handrails in times of political uncertainty. Habermas (1994, p. 4) claimed that ‘politics may not be assimilated to a hermeneutical process of self-explication of a shared form of life or collective identity’. He also wrote that ‘political questions may not be reduced to the type of ethical questions where we, as members of a community, ask ourselves who we are and who we would like to be’ (Habermas, 1996, pp. 296–302). This stands in contrast to communitarian theories in that he argues that ‘universal morality thus transcends the politics of identity and cultural contexts’ (Delanty, 1997, p. 32). For Habermas, universal morality stems not from identity or culture, but from rational (democratic) deliberation

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that reflects on its own identity and cultural context rather than relying on the state to construct and impose these. For example, it is difficult to think that France, Switzerland, Italy, and Belgium could be reduced to a single identity given the distinction and legal recognition of entire linguistic groups. Likewise, the UK was only united because the English asserted their dominance over the Welsh, Irish, and Scottish (Dunleavy et al., 2018). In terms of a more nuanced approach to identity, the cultural differences and even linguistic origins of these supposedly united countries will yield a conclusion that identity itself is problematic to define. At the intersection of political and cultural interests in the UK is a Commons that needs to be better defined in terms of the civic and civil institutions that create the similarities that tolerate difference. If we were an entirely rational society, we would understand the value and benefit of diversity, but this diversity has instead been state-imposed. Worse still, it is an imposition that has been historically achieved to integrate international trade better, and this imposition has gone to serve the interests of the few over and against the many. As outlined earlier, this is central to understanding why representative democracies do not entirely represent the people they are intended to serve. Whether democracy is truly in crisis due to globalisation and the issues concerning the nation state in the global context is questionable, but equally the idea that representative democracy is the best democratic model suited towards modern times and new technology is highly questionable.

Bibliography Arnstein, S. R. (1969). A ladder of citizen participation. Journal of the American Planning Association, 35(4), 216–224. Bellah, R., et al. (1985). Habits of the heart: Individualism and commitment in American life. Harper and Row. Blackburn, R. (2017). The politics of parliamentary procedure at Westminster. Journal for International & Comparative Law, 4(2), 279.

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Brink, D. (2007). Mill’s moral and political philosophy. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mill-moral-political/ Dahlberg, L. J. (2000). The internet and the public sphere: A critical analysis of the possibility of online discourse enhancing deliberative democracy. PhD thesis. Massey University. https://mro.massey.ac.nz/bitstream/handle/10179/2273/02_whole.pdf Delanty, G. (1997). Habermas and occidental rationalism: The politics of identity, social learning, and the cultural limits of moral universalism. Sociological Theory, 15(1), 30–59. Diamond, P. (Ed.). (2018). The crisis of globalization: Democracy, capitalism and inequality in the twenty-first century. Bloomsbury. Dunleavy, P., Park, A., & Taylor, R. (2018). The UK’s changing democracy: The 2018 democratic audit. LSE Press. Eatwell, R., & Goodwin, M. (2018). National populism: The revolt against liberal democracy. Penguin UK. Eberly, D. E. (Ed.). (2000). The essential civil society reader: Classic essays in the American civil society debate. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. Fisher, R., & Ury, W. (1989). Getting to yes. Hutchinson Business Books. Gilens, M. (2005). Inequality and democratic responsiveness. Public Opinion Quarterly, 69(5), 778–796. Goodhart, M. (2005). Democracy as human rights: Freedom and equality in the age of globalization. Routledge. Greven, T. (2009). The Rise of Neoliberalism and Institutional Analysis. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Habermas, J. (1994). Three normative models of democracy. Constellations, 12(1), 1–10. Habermas, J. (1996). Between facts and norms. MIT Press. Habermas, J. (2000). Crossing globalization’s valley of tears. New Perspectives Quarterly, 17(4), 51–57. Habermas, J. (2001). The postnational constellation: Political essays. MIT Press. Hagen, M. (1997). A typology of electronic democracy. http://martin-hagen. net/publikationen/elektronische-demokratie/typology-of-electronicdemocracy/ International IDEA. (2016). Voter turnout trends around the world. Leaper, R. (1991). Introduction to the Beveridge report. Social Policy & Administration, 25(1), 3–13. Lijphart, A. (1997). Unequal participation: Democracy’s unresolved dilemma presidential address. The American Political Science Review, 91(1), 1–14.

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Lyotard, J. F. (1984). The postmodern condition. University of Minnesota Press. Macedo, S., et al. (2005). How political choices undermine citizen participation and what we can do about it. Brookings Institution Press. McDermont, M. (2010). Governing independence and expertise: The business of housing associations. Bloomsbury Publishing. McFarland, A. S., & Micheletti, M. (2012). Creative Participation: ResponsibilityTaking in the Political World. Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers. Micheletti, M. (2002). Individualized collective action, Nordic Political Science Association, Aalborg, Denmark. http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/downlo ad?doi=10.1.1.202.9849&rep=rep1&type=pdf Nietzsche, F. (1990). Twilight of the idols and Anti-Christ (R. J. Hollingdale, Trans.). Penguin Books. Nisbet, R. (2015). The quest for community: A study in the ethics of order and freedom. ISI Books. Norris, P., et al. (1999). Critical citizens: Global support for democratic government. Oxford University Press. Papacharissi, Z. (2004). Democracy online: Civility, politeness, and the democratic potential of online discussion groups. New Media & Society, 6(2), 259–283. Perrin, G. (1992). The Beveridge Plan: The main principles. International Social Security Review, 45(1–2), 39–52. Pew Research Center. (2018, October). Many around the world are disengaged from politics. Pew Research Center. (2019, May). Despite global concerns about democracy, more than half of countries are democratic. https://www.pewresearch.org/ fact-tank/2019/05/14/more-than-half-of-countries-are-democratic/ Pew Research Center. (2020a, February). Democratic rights popular globally but commitment to them not always strong. Pew Research Center. (2020b, June). Experts predict more digital innovation by 2030 aimed at enhancing democracy. Picketty, T. (2014). Capital in the twenty-first century. Harvard University Press. Rosema, M. (2007). Low turnout: Threat to democracy or blessings in disguise?: Consequences of citizens’ varying tendencies to vote. Electoral Studies, 26, 612–623. Rousseau, J.-J. (1762). The Social Contract. Amsterdam, Netherlands: MarcMichel Rey. Sager, F. (2009). Governance and coercion. Political Studies, 57(3), 537–558.

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Stanley, B. (2008). The thin ideology of populism. Journal of political ideologies, 13(1), 95–110. Streeck, W. (2014). How will capitalism end? New Left Review, 87, 35–64. Suarez-Villa, L. (2016). Globalization and technocapitalism: The political economy of corporate power and technological domination. Routledge. Szabo, A. (2007). The impact of the internet on the public sphere and on the culture industry: A study of blogs, social news sites and discussion forums. Master’s Thesis. University of Vaasa. https://core.ac.uk/download/ pdf/197963736.pdf Thomassen, J., & Van Ham, C. (2017). A legitimacy crisis of representative democracy? In C. Van Ham, J. Thomassen, K. Aarts, & R. Andeweg (Eds.), Myth and reality of the legitimacy crisis. Oxford University Press. Tribe, K. (2009). Liberalism and neoliberalism in Britain, 1930-1980. In P. Mirowski & D. Plehwe (Eds.), The road from Mont Pèlerin: The making of the neoliberal thought collective (pp. 68–97). Harvard University Press. Watson, S. (2014). Does welfare conditionality reduce democratic participation? Comparative Political Studies, 48(5), 645–686. Wike, R., & Fetterolf, J. (2018). Liberal democracy’s crisis of confidence. Journal of Democracy, 29(4), 136–150. Wilhelm, A. G. (2000). Democracy in the digital age: Challenges to political life in cyberspace. Routledge. Zittel, T., & Fuchs, D. (2007). Participatory democracy and political participation. Routledge.

5 The Public Sphere and Global Capital

Deliberation Douglas Kellner (1998, p. 174) wrote of the internet that it has ‘produced new public spheres and spaces for information, debate, and participation that contain the potential to invigorate democracy and to increase the dissemination of critical and political ideas’. The internet has changed significantly since Kellner’s pronouncement, but still holds great potential for democracy in the form of the cyberdemocratic model. The internet creates a space for deliberation, or the rational and critical discourse that helps to inform public opinion, and, therefore, policy. Deliberation is critical to democracy and a key component of the cyberdemocratic model. Dahlberg (2000, p. 22) defines a deliberative democracy as follows: Deliberative democracy demands more of democratic interaction. In free and open dialogue participants put forward and challenge claims and arguments about common problems, not resting until satisfied that the best reasons have been given and fully defended. Participants attempt to come to an understanding of their interlocutors and to reflexively modify their pre-discursive positions in response to better arguments. In the process, private individuals become publicly-oriented citizens. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 H. Karem, Cyberdemocracy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-27544-9_5

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Cyberdemocracy exists as a form within the public sphere to achieve just this. It aims to provide a platform on which true deliberation can happen, moving away from the mediated conveyance of private interests that have caused representative democracy to fail and towards an open and free space for arguments to be presented, questioned, and defended for citizens to make informed decisions that are in their best interests. Both Habermas and John Stuart Mill have significantly discussed the concept of the public sphere in relation to democracy. Because the public sphere and deliberation are important in the remainder of this thesis and the case it presents in favour of cyberdemocracy, it is important to briefly discuss both of their conceptions of the public sphere. Habermas (1989) defined the public sphere as a place where individuals could engage in a public debate that was both rational and critical. For Habermas, a public sphere was intended to inform public opinion and should be open and accessible to all individuals. There should be no restrictions to the rational-critical discourse, meaning individuals should be free to assemble, present, debate, discuss, and defend issues that are of interest to all. The public sphere should also be free from political and economic control, not corrupted by commercialisation or the opinions of individuals. Habermas set high expectations for the public sphere and, for cyberdemocracy to succeed where representative democracy has succumbed to both political and economic control, it must strive to create such a public sphere. For John Stuart Mill, the public sphere was an integral component of democracy. In his Considerations on Representative Government, he wrote that to have ‘the utmost possible publicity and liberty of discussion’, the entire public must be ‘participants in the government’ (Mill, 1991, p. 436). Mill spoke vehemently against censorship of opinion, arguing that censoring any opinion in the public sphere would go against the freedom required to sufficiently discuss any matter of political import. This meant that censorship should be avoided completely so that the discussions were not tainted by majority opinion or current political policy. Baum describes Mill’s approach to the public sphere and censorship as one that bears in mind how public opinion is often formed. Baum (2001, pp. 502–503) writes:

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He [Mill] shows that how public opinion is formed is linked to who has social power. He pays special attention to the ownership and control of newspapers—the primary mass medium in his time. Although he never addresses this topic in a systematic way, he illuminates the sociology and political economy of how political ideas circulate and how public opinion is formed. … Nonetheless, his sociological and political economic analysis of the public sphere sheds light on one of the most important dangers to freedom of thought and discussion in contemporary capitalist societies: the increasingly oligopolistic character of the mass media.

For Mill, deliberation was a way to break out of preconceived political notions, instead bringing common political matters to the public sphere for extensive, uncensored discussion, ultimately resulting in the preference of policy that brings the greatest happiness to the citizens. Mill considered the public sphere to be the network of outlets for political debate and expression, including but not limited to newspapers, public political forums, political tracts and flyers, clubs and associations, and so on. Mill’s conception of the public sphere is, in many ways, similar to the networks of expression provided by the internet and his ideas are also important to keep in mind when considering how to evaluate representative democracy and cyberdemocracy in order to make a critical assessment of the two democratic models. Global capital is held mainly by corporations owned by anonymous shareholders, and Habermas’s concern regarding the shift towards power in the hand of private business raises primary considerations regarding what we hold as the public sphere. A world defined by corporate power can be understood from the control of interest rates through international finance and banking and the volatility of markets such that fluctuations in one single market and one national economy can have international repercussions. In a global context, there are certain limitations to representative democracy, especially in a cosmopolitan, media-dominated public sphere. Because of the structural changes that have occurred, representative democracy has decayed significantly, no longer reflecting the voice of the people. Cyberdemocracy has great democratisation potential in light of this decay. Habermas linked democratisation with ‘emphasis on political

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participation as the core of a democratic society and as an essential element in individual self-development’ (Kellner, 2000, p. 262). Habermas’s conceptualisation of the bourgeois public sphere portrayed an arena of ‘social spaces where individuals gathered to discuss their common public affairs and to organize against arbitrary and oppressive forms of social and political power’ (Kellner, 2000, p. 264). With the rise of state capitalism, the public sphere began to disintegrate, as companies and the state took over the public sphere, transforming actively participating citizens into mere consumers (Kellner, 2000. p. 262). Cyberdemocracy can provide a virtual public sphere in which individuals can gather to deliberate rationally and organise against the oppression of the state and the economic elite. It can rebuild the community that has been shattered through the division of labour, thus also improving associational life. Cyberdemocracy can build a platform for deliberation and direct democracy, something that has disintegrated in the current public sphere. It can offer a platform for the dissemination of information and for communication among citizens, both of which are necessary (according to Habermas) for the formation of a true public sphere and the creation of self-governing social networks. As an example, the mortgage-backed securities that were hedging on homeowners defaulting or failing became an over-inflated and over-­ leveraged form of investment. When they failed, there was an international downturn and significant disruption because of a single investment scheme failing. Moreover, not to oversimplify the rating agencies that play a significant role in shaping investor opinion had likewise misread the relative market health. There is a disproportionate impact of corporate power on the broader public sphere when the public sphere is defined by the distribution of capital in this regard. In terms of the impact this problem had on public perception, it was apparent that there was a travesty of justice as an outcome given that bailout money from the Government went directly towards paying multimillion-­dollar bonuses to some of the brokers who had mostly sold these morally questionable securities. As a problem of optics, there was a blatant transfer of capital from the Government to the elite rather than capital being distributed among the individuals ruined by a questionable mortgage scheme or any of the public, given that a downturn in the economy has an impact universally.

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One of the problems arising from globalisation is that stockholders and brokers exist beyond the people, hidden away, thus provoking the question that asks how we define a public sphere that is not solely based on the international flow of capital and the legislation that stands to protect it. Economic metrics are not sufficient when some stakeholders are individuals and others are limited liability corporations that have less accountability than a single person whom they may disproportionately impact. As a point of distinction, Habermas emphasises that international accountability through treaty conventions was the domain of nation-­ states and now they have created an integrated world economy such that power has been shifted to private interests (Habermas, 2001). Before the emergence of multinational economic trade treaties, all nation-states had tariffs, import, and trade laws. Likewise, agreements were typically from one nation to the next. Although the legislative side and diplomatic interaction are still within the domain of nation-states, the reality is that globalisation is inseparable from a change in the flow of capital and, as mentioned, even growth in the net amount of capital (Picketty, 2014). Fewer individuals are generating higher amounts of value, and the developers of the Android phone are a good example of how a $10,000 software investment can yield a billion-dollar return within a matter of a year or so (Goggin, 2012). In terms of fewer people creating capital or value, it also means fewer wages paid to individuals producing something or providing a service in the developing world to a market in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) nations. The problem with capital and its impact on the public sphere is the polarisation of energy consumption and the production of carbon emissions. While the US produces twice the amount of carbon pollution per capita than the European Union (EU), it is also the case that the average African consumes only a fraction of that. When one further considers the consumption of resources and production of carbon in the long term, it is likewise OECD countries that have the most extensive history compared with other parts of the world.

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There is an international imbalance in the consumption of natural resources and production of carbon, and that has implications globally, and a person-to-person imbalance that is likewise shaped by competition for capital against the scarcity of resources (Purdon, 2017). In the public sphere, there is a conflict that highlights the contrast between whose interests that globalisation serves. This is the opposition between the finite resources over and against capital markets where there is no known ceiling to the amount of value or capitalisation that can be realised. Cyberdemocracy has the potential to enhance associational life and revitalise participation and civic engagement. Chun (2012) found that cyberspace (and social networking sites in particular) have become new spaces for associational life. Online communication has begun, in some ways, to replace face-to-face communication and rebuild community. This improvement in associational life has led to an increase in political participation online with spill over to increased political participation offline (Chun, 2012). Thus, interactions between citizens and between citizens and politicians in the virtual public sphere have to potential to increase political participation and mobilisation. It is becoming increasingly clear that a more sustainable relationship with the natural environment is necessary for our collective survival. A more globalised view of a public sphere might potentially challenge the concentration of wealth along with the excessive production of carbon emissions. Where Habermas’s later notion of the post-national constellation significantly explains how globalisation has created a shift in power that now favours the corporate and the private interests of an elite, his early (1962/1989) concept of the public sphere will be presented in the following as a framework for the reconsideration of its definition.

 econsideration of the Public Sphere R (Institutions of Democracy) The failure of both capital and nation-states to protect the interests of the entire public in terms of better distributive wealth and justice means the public ought to reject both if the aim is to create a space and a public

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sphere (Öffentlichkeit) that is horizontally rather than vertically integrated. A vertically integrated relationship is one that is top to bottom, whereas a horizontal one is lateral and more equal. In terms of political history, a monarchy-owned state defines a vertically integrated power relationship with the broader population. In more recent history, power as measured by capital private corporate shareholders and owners create the same enveloping disconnect from the people. For Habermas, the public sphere is modelled on spaces like coffee houses in London and salons in Paris, where the issues of the day were discussed and debated (Habermas, 1989). In the period of the enlightenment, shared public spaces emerged, and these replaced spaces like churches where individuals interacted and where information was acquired. In these new and more public spheres and spaces, there was a commitment to reason and evidenced-based information that would persuade the commons. Further, there was a condition of mutual recognition of the public nature of the social and political relationships that existed among individuals who engaged with one another. Habermas points to this cultural ethos as the very birthplace of the ideas and values that would shape the modern democracies that emerged from the ashes of the English, American, and French Revolutions. There was a consensus about the value of egalitarianism because it rationally allowed for the greater probability of being tested in the commons. A commitment to the rational pursuit of truth was not viewed as the exclusive domain of the elite among the individuals who hung out in these public spaces. For example, Habermas points out that many of the educated and elite classes did intermingle to engage in the level of topics that would range from the sciences to theology, literature, art, and politics. Salon culture was a cosmopolitanism that integrated some general principles or values that defined the public sphere, but where that sphere was at the same time open to any opinion, theory, case, or perspective that would improve the knowledge or condition of the sphere. There is a collective rational agreement that the public sphere itself can only be strengthened if the egalitarian and virtue of true goals were maintained (Habermas, 1989). According to Habermas’s theory, the public sphere was transformed or redefined after industrialisation and because of

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the mass production of culture and information. According to Habermas, one of the after-effects of the industrial revolution was that the means of exchange and person-to-person engagement changed irreversibly. The public space became private in this regard. A different form of cosmopolitanism occurred when the transformation from an agrarian-­ based economy to an industrialised one resulted in the eradication of city centres that had to that point only gradually evolved over a matter of many centuries. He notes that it began to erode when private publishers tried to capitalise on the growing number of coffee houses, salons, and public spaces by producing journals and then creating markets for them. The source of information changed from person-to-person engagement towards an exchange of information in print and, eventually, on radio and television (Habermas, 1989). For Habermas, the change became one where stratification grew again because the interests of content production could make revenue through advertising rather than having to sell subscriptions or copies of print-based information. The transformation in these terms means that the person-to-person exchange became a more vertical relationship between content producer and content consumer. One could argue that the internet had the potential for creating forms of engagement and community integration that were more horizontal. However, content is being distributed and provided by large entities who have used all manner of predatory tactics to control distribution. When content providers direct the consumer to other pre-defined content, it follows that democratic institutions are being skewed or distorted by those who own the means to distribute content. Information is a commodity, and along with continuing to benefit from advertising as did print, radio, and television, the internet has now commodified personal information and financialised it to create new value. The public space that Habermas wants us to connect with is one where equity leads to more rationality, and where more rationality, in turn, leads to greater equity. However, as he notes, that space was also the space of the bourgeoisie, and it is a space that continued to define the material relations or how capital was controlled under self-interest. There was a concern with universal equality, as well as the assumption that some were more equal than others. This is evident in voting being only a right for property holders

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and not individuals who had to sell their labour to subsist. Further, it did not include women, who only gained the right to vote more than a century after their property-owning husbands. Situated in terms of a growing digital and information-based economy, it is worth noting that the commodification of information by significant business interests is no different from the eighteenth-century publishers who tried to capitalise on markets for intellectual publications. The internet was, in principle, egalitarian and commonly shared, and that is why it is a public sphere that originally was committed to the value of rationalism. In political reality, it has become the exact opposite, and it is unquestionably a significant factor that has contributed to greater polarisation among political opponents and their supporters. This is unquestionably one of the critical drivers for the legitimation crisis that our democratic institutions and our civic ideals and values are currently having.

L egitimation Crisis: Declining Confidence in Institutions and Leadership Over the past decade, focus has been given to what is termed the ‘legitimation crisis’ in Western representative democracies. Milstein (2021) writes that the ‘public consciousness of crisis … precipitated a dramatic loss of confidence in established parties and trust in leadership’. This view is shared by Ibsen (2019, p. 807), who said, it is the increasing inability of welfare states to successfully manage economic crises and prevent the negative social consequences of globalization that has translated into a growing withdrawal of legitimation from the governing political institutions and ruling political elites across the West.

There are currently several markers that indicate that there is a global legitimation crisis when it comes to the public confidence in politicians and the political institutions and systems that they are elected to operate for the universal good. The broadest global marker is the decline of democratic forms of government. Since 1975, there has been a steady growth

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in nation-states adopting these systems, and a peak in democracy occurred in 2007 (Diamond, 2015b, p. 141). The growth in this period went from 29% of all nation-states having a democratic electoral system in 1975 to 61% in 2007. The growth is attributed to the dismantling of the Soviet Bloc countries and to more African nations because of greater decolonisation or the creation of independent states. However, from 2004 to 2014, Diamond (2015b) identified 25 different democracies that had a breakdown, and he noted another grey area in nation-states like Russia where the evidence of electoral fraud is not transparent even though it is widely questioned. Likewise, in places like Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe controlled the opposition party or the Movement for Democratic Change and this ensured an effective breakdown that indicates again a grey area that is important to consider. In terms of these metrics, Diamond (2015a, 2015b) points to the decline of liberal democratic institutions and protections, including political rights, civil liberties, government transparency, and the rule of law through the same period of decline (2004–2014). At the broadest scale and the international level, there is a marked legitimation crisis caused by the recession rather than the growth of electoral forms and liberal democracies (Diamond, 2015a, 2015b). One of the more compelling studies and data sets that is a reliable indicator of a legitimation crisis demonstrates a quantifiable distinction between politics following the will of the people, against when it is representing other interests. Gilens and Page (2014) evaluated 1779 policy and legislative issues over 30 years in US politics. Using polling data to measure the support or opposition to these issues, a baseline average of citizens was obtained, and this was correlated with average incomes among populations. What Gilens and Page (2014) demonstrated is that the average citizen has no impact on the policy decisions of the government. The authors used data sets from extensive polling to demonstrate that the minority, who are the top percentile of income earners along with particular interest organisations, had their interests represented more consistently. What Gilens and Page (2014) demonstrated is quantifiable and makes it almost impossible to reject the conclusion that the functioning of democratic institutions has a legitimation crisis:

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In our 1,779 policy cases, narrow pro-change majorities of the public got the policy changes they wanted only about 30 percent of the time. More strikingly, even overwhelmingly large pro-change majorities, with 80 percent of the public favouring a policy change, got that change only about 43 percent of the time. (Gilens & Page, 2014, p. 573) Although the authors noted that it is not necessarily the case that the wider population and the elite or special interest groups do not share positions. Further, the level of interest and direct engagement is also a factor that influences this distinction. However, when there is a conflict or difference between the general population, the top percentile of income earners, or special interest groups, the average voter is not represented as they ought to be. This disproportion is the case in areas like gun control, abortion, and environmental regulation where most of the population in the US very clearly are not being represented on these policy issues. Instead, special interests and those of the affluent are achieving representation from their politicians and the institutions they serve. Where the public often perceives that their interests are not being represented in the political process, Gilens and Page (2014) conclusively demonstrated that this is the case. Along with the total number of democratic nations and actual representation, there are other measures worth noting about the legitimation crisis. Legitimation also involves democratic participation, for example, are citizens participating so that the elections legitimately reflect the voice of the people? Does it entail systemic change; the shift from the expression of collective needs to individual needs and the disruption of normative structures which, in turn, lead to social disintegration. One distinct representation of the legitimation crisis in terms of participation is declining voter turnout rates in the US, EU, and the UK. In the UK, the declining voter trend has been a median trend among all age groups since the early 1960s, and some of these patterns are worth noting (Dunleavy et al., 2018, p. 81). Voter turnout is correlated with age in the sense that the older one is, the higher the probability that they will vote. Moreover, the younger the individual is, the higher the decline in participation (Dunleavy et al., 2018, p. 81).

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As an indicator that is influenced by age and a reflection of it, there is a troubling trend of more and more youth taking less and less of an interest in electoral politics in the UK. At the same time, there is an uptick in youth participation that has occurred since 2014. In 1964, the youth voter turnout was roughly the same as those 65 and older, and that was just under 80% of all eligible voters. However, the lowest participation among youth was at 38% in 2005, whereas the lowest for those who were over 65 was only marginally less than 70% and that was in 2001. A 10% drop against a drop that was over 40% indicates a growing trend of disaffection among younger votes in the UK, and there is no question that this is a substantial problem connected to the legitimacy of these institutions. Further indicators include polls that look at public trust and confidence in political institutions. For example, the Pew Research Center (May 2021b) demonstrated that, in 1964, public trust was just below 80% of the US population, and that percentage had dropped to 20% in 2017 before rising slightly to 24% in 2021. Another statistic of concern is the growing number of individuals who would take strong leadership over democratic institutions. By growing, it is also implied in terms of the correlation between age and this preference, and the younger an individual is, the higher the probability that they would take strong leadership against democratic institutions. For individuals who were born around 1940, the percentage of individuals who prefer strong leadership was 25%, but for individuals who were born around 1985, that preference is 45% (Mounk & Foa, 2016). The legitimation crisis is quantifiable as measured by the decline in electoral democratic nations but also in how they metrically represent the interests of the people as indicated by polling data. However, the roots and causal interpretations of the problem are mainly qualitative or limited because of current research but also cultural and political differences. The collection of these numbers and their conclusions are an attempt to show falsifiable information regarding the legitimation problem, but it should be added that the causes in decline and the availability of comparative or trans-national data are limited. It would be difficult to account for class, gender, race, and other key demographics to find an adequate understanding of decline in confidence. A multivariate analysis can narrow down the attitudes that are universally

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shared, which now shape the progressive trend of a contrary opinion towards democratic institutions and values. Cyberdemocracy has the potential to increase democratic participation, better represent the needs of the individual, and lessen social disintegration, thus improving legitimation and restoring faith in the direct democratic model it utilises. As Papacharissi (2004, p. 259) found, cyberdemocracy would be able to ‘increase political participation’ if the voices deliberating in the virtual public sphere are many and diverse. Cyberdemocracy also has the potential to better represent individual needs, but one hurdle that must be overcome is partisan grouping in the virtual public sphere. Over the next decade, it is predicted that social media will be divided by individual interests and groups, meaning that deliberation cannot truly occur unless these divisions are put aside for the sake of rational discourse (Pew Research Center, June 2020b, p. 6). In terms of lessened social disintegration, cyberdemocracy has the potential to revitalise democratic life by ensuring equal access to the virtual public sphere. As internet usage has increased dramatically over the last 20 years, many can find community online that overcomes geographical, economic, and social barriers.

 eoliberalism: Against Democracy N and Equality The outcome of politics that have adopted neoliberal agendas has been less equality and even higher polarised disparities between the affluent and the poor; however, the intentions of it as a theoretical model can be said to be radically libertarian, which does intersect with a model for equality and even equity. The theoretical model that has informed and, for the most part, steered, the mandates of governments in nations like the UK, the US, France, Canada, Australia, and Germany to name a few, begins in the post-World War II period with the economists Frederick Hayek and Milton Friedman.

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The Laffer Curve is Friedman’s explanation of economic growth, and it came to replace the model of Maynard Keynes, whose approach informed the New Deal designed under Franklin Roosevelt during the US Depression. Keynes’s influence on UK political policy is well documented and, put in general terms, it maintains that economic growth is created when individuals have disposable income to circulate through the economy. The social institutions established included the welfare state in the UK, and the collective vision of William Beveridge was discussed above. In this model, it is an investment to provide sufficient housing, education, health care, and a liveable income to individuals given that all four factors have measurable outcomes in terms of health and the long-term achievement of self-sufficiency. Neoliberal economics inverts this approach to growth and maintains that the less government uses capital, the more it can be circulated in the hands of investors who are the engines of potential growth. In terms of the New Deal approach that viewed social supports as an investment rather than an expenditure, a new strategy that would create an ethos of austerity would be introduced. Further, it was an ethos along with a questionable economic theory that maintained that the private sector, and not the government, ought to provide public services. The model claimed that the private sector is more motivated by profit, thereby creating more efficiency, and that profit generated in the private sector will, in turn, get re-invested. In the neoliberal period, stagnation, greater wealth ownership polarisation, and a declining middle class have been the outcome of these political and economic strategies. The economic model deregulated the privatised and then cut back government spending that would create more equity. The political agenda shifted by creating a culture and attitude of austerity about health, education, social support benefits, and income supplements, and the result was that the affluent improved their share of capital in this period at the expense of everyone else. The underlying problem of this vision was that its onset was not under conditions of equality in terms of the share of capital. With government austerity as a driving ethos, it is not as though those who had to enter the private market to gain services that had been provided by the state began that process with an equal share of capital. The problem with this model

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is how value is measured. Social value is not a consideration, and this impacts the economic model of growth. Further, neither is the value or equity of the use of essential public services. An individual who works at home is causing less road damage by not driving, and couples or individuals without children are not using the education system. This is a form of social equity that, before neoliberalism, was accepted as a part of the liberal democratic ideal. There is a social contract that holds that some share of the public good should be accessible to all like fire and police services and in some governments, health care, education, and social services. In practice, neoliberalism has not been an economic model in service of legitimating an agenda of consolidating power and wealth into fewer hands. As a cultural ethos characterised by austerity and individualism, those who are poor are now viewed as individually responsible for their condition and, consequently, they are individually deficient in some way. By contrast, it is an ideology that legitimates the equally false idea that the affluent have achieved their status because of merit or natural superiority. The emphasis on the self-interest of the individual and the responsibility of the individual makes this a very cynical political and economic paradigm as well. There is a continuity between Weber’s Protestant Work Ethic and neoliberalism in this regard. In both historical periods, the emphasis on individual frugality and rationality has served and legitimated a market economy. Neoliberalism has left many negative consequences in its wake and there is no question that there has also been a significant impact on the faith in political and democratic institutions. The historical context and cultural significance of J.S. Mill’s period emerge in the Age of the Enlightenment. By the early 1800s, when Mill’s principal works were written (‘On Liberty’ and ‘Utilitarianism’), democracy and the idea that humans are born in a state of nature where they are equal were significant social forces. In the decades preceding Mill’s principal works, both the French and the American Revolution brought about democracies that challenged the old imperial and aristocratic order. It should be noted that by Mill’s time, ‘natural equality’ had not come to include the right to vote for women or slaves. However, Mill did support democracy and equality for all humans, if they were educated (Mill, 2003, p. 116).

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For Mill, democracy and natural equality were established or axiomatic ideas. What natural equality meant for Mill was that all individuals had an equal right to pursue their self-interests if those interests did not conflict or interfere with the natural right of others to pursue or seek the same. Natural justice is viewed as co-extensive as natural equality and its measure is determined by how our actions impede or compliment the freedom of actions for others: ‘The only freedom which deserves the name, is that of pursuing our own good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs or impede their efforts to obtain it’ (Mill, 2003, p. 97). Along with protecting and promoting natural equality, he further defines moral decision-making by the utilitarian standard, which maintains that the right action is the one that promotes or produces the greater amount of good for the greater amount of society. What this supposes is that humans naturally pursue their own self-interests, and if this is a given, it follows that all individuals share in this natural behaviour. In Mill’s formulation of utilitarianism, the happiness or pleasure principle is axiomatic. By axiomatic, this means that it is a principle that is unquestionable or cannot be challenged. Mill argues that this principle can be deduced from the following set of reasons. In ‘Utilitarianism’, he argues that there are some actions and decisions we make that are goals in themselves, and there are other goals or actions that we pursue for the sake of another end or objective. For example, we listen to music because it produces pleasure, the action of listening to music has the end of producing pleasure. However, the end of pursuing pleasure is an end-in-itself. We pursue pleasure or happiness not for the sake of some other end but for the sake of itself. Listening to music or whatever form of enjoyment one pursues is considered by Mill as a means to an end and not the end in itself: pleasure, and freedom from pain, are the only things desirable as ends; and that all desirable things (which are as numerous in the utilitarian as in any other scheme) are desirable either for the pleasure inherent in themselves or as means to the promotion of pleasure and the prevention of pain. (Mill, 2003, p. 186)

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In these terms, he has made a deductive argument about pursuing pleasure. Further, he also makes a distinction between higher and lower pleasures: ‘Human beings have faculties more elevated than the animal appetites, and when once made conscious of them, do not regard anything as happiness which does not include their gratification’ (Mill, 2003, p. 187). Mill is defending the idea that humans do pursue higher pleasures because of their capacity to reason or think, but at the same time, he is not making a necessary argument that holds that every human must follow these. He is defending utilitarianism against a form of unquestioned or undefined hedonism. He also argues that a ‘fool’ or a ‘pig’ has only one type of pleasure that they understand, whereas an individual who has experienced the higher pleasures has a comparative advantage. Someone who has experienced higher and lower pleasures can evaluate and compare the two: ‘if the fool, or the pig, is of a different opinion, it is because they only know their own side of the question’ (Mill, 2003, p. 188). At the same time, it remains open as to what truly constitutes happiness or pleasure. That is, it remains an ‘end’ and not a ‘means’, and that is how all individuals are equal. They derive pleasure from different means but pursue pleasure or happiness as an end-itself universally. Likewise, with the notion of harm, it functions as an axiom for the broader system in Mill as pleasure does. For Mill, the measure of when harm is done is straightforward as a principle because it can only occur when it is used to prevent it from happening. If harm exists in human behaviour, it must do so only to prevent it from occurring (Mill, 2003, p. 97). There is a check or a balance in that there is the accountability of the state not to inflict harm. Moreover, this entails that the ‘only purpose’ of government is the prevention of restraint on individual freedom: ‘The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others’ (Mill, 2003, p. 94). If an individual is impacting the freedom or access of an individual to pursue their own pleasure, there is a harm being done that is distinct from a harm occurring where the state was preventing it. That is, someone is being harmed in terms of being ‘not forced or deceived’ (Mill, 2003, p. 97).

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Further, harm is defined by Mill in terms of restraint or constraint on ‘freedom’ or the arbitrary infliction of ‘pain’ (Mill, 2003, pp. 42–43) or harm that can be either ‘physical’ or a form of pain that is imposed on ‘conscience’, and he maintains that this can be ‘physical’, ‘moral’, ‘political’, and ‘religious’ in scope (Mill, 2003, p. 37). For Mill, both pleasure and pain are ends in themselves. One can impose harm or pain for the sake of preventing it from occurring, but to define it is to maintain that avoiding it is an end or a goal that needs no justification or further reasons, or they are self-evident and ‘without proof ’ (Mill, 2003, p. 184). Similarly, we acquire money or goods for the sake of pleasure but seek pleasure for no other end. Likewise, the avoidance of pain needs no further end for an explanation. Finally, Mill argues that allowing harm is not just an ‘active’ but also a ‘passive’ form of immorality. By allowing it to happen to someone else or doing ‘nothing’, one is not passively complicit but actively complicit. In ethics, neglect can be viewed as a form of abuse. For example, when children are neglected, the parents are charged with abuse because the neglect itself has the same effect as if it was actively or directly imposed. If a child experiences health problems or physical injury because they are ignored, the cause and effect are the same. Mill maintains that individuals have an obligation to prevent harm from being done by others, and not just avoid inflicting it as an individual. Utilitarianism is a measurable way that happiness or pleasure can be promoted as a moral standard by which we can judge or evaluate the actions of others. If it is the case that all individuals do pursue their own happiness (and avoid pain), it follows that moral action or decision is one where this universal condition is realised. If we all share this goal, it is therefore measurable that the right social and political norms are those that promote the greatest amount of it: ‘for that standard is not the agent’s own greatest happiness, but the greatest amount of happiness altogether’ (Mill, 2003, p. 189). For Mill, this is an objective measure. Where our own pleasures or that of others is qualitative or subjectively defined, the fact that we do pursue it is objective and measurable. In this regard, it is necessary that we pursue pleasure or happiness and avoid pain, but the pleasures we seek are contingent. One’s actions or those of a government are either facilitating more individuals to pursue pleasure or they are hindering it. Mill argues that the greater good for the greater

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number both realises an objective measure because it is mathematical or can be quantified, and it is premised on a necessary rather than a contingent dimension of human existence or human behaviour. Mill maintains that humans pursue their own self-interest, and that means the pursuit of individual freedom and happiness and the avoidance of pain. Mill is a champion of democracy. Mill would argue that good government would reflect the will of the people and that the greatest good for the greatest number would harmonise with the fundamentals of democracy. Thus, good government serves the interests of the people rather than the interests of those who inherit power as the aristocrats. If one accepts that humans act out of self-­interest, it can be argued that the fulfilment of self-interest for more is preferable to the self-interest of very few. In this sense, if the government does not reflect the interests of the people, its democratic model is no longer functioning. If the interests of the representatives take precedence over those of the people they represent, the representative democracy is no longer representative and, essentially, ‘dead’.

 yberdemocracy: Addressing the Institutional C and Political Vacuum Created by Neoliberalism Neoliberalism as a paradigm has an extensive reach in the government and the political sphere. Public trust in both the government and the democratic process is at an all-time low (Pew Research Center, February 2020a, p. 7). As such, an institutional and political vacuum has been created that cannot be replaced with a viable alternative until neoliberalism’s, impacts and implications are fully identified, “named and shamed”. For elements of neoliberal ideology now dominate in the media, business and social institutions, as well as the political and policy-making sphere. (Jones & O’Donnell, 2017)

Cyberdemocracy’s potential to address the institutional and political vacuum created by neoliberalism lies in its ability to function as a model

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of dialogic interactivity and political mobilisation. Thus, the question is whether cyberdemocracy would be able to revitalise political participation via social networking sites and if this revitalisation would spill over into offline politics. Further, it is a question of whether virtual associational life and virtual political participation could effectively create political mobilisation. Social networking sites are crucial as virtual public spheres in which rational deliberation can occur. The potential for the internet to serve as a public sphere is well-documented in scholarship. Szabo (2007, p. 121) noted the promise of the internet to ‘help, promote and reward reasoned debate’. Dahlberg (2000, p. 259) found a ‘commitment to deliberations’ was present in online discussions, indicative of the potential for cyberspace to encourage rational deliberation. Papacharissi (2004, p. 267) discussed the improved deliberation that the virtual public sphere can provide, stating that ‘anonymity online … enhances free and open communication, thus promoting a more enlightened exchange of ideas’. This evidence in recent scholarship attests to the potential of cyberdemocracy to facilitate dialogues between citizens, as well as between citizens and politicians, thus enabling a direct democratic model that restructures and replaces the current model of representative democracy. Putnam (1995) linked the rapid decline in political participation to the decay of associational life. He argued that associational life generates trust in democratic and government institutions and that spending time with mass media causes the collapse of community, and, thus, of associational life. For cyberdemocracy to revitalise political participation, it must also revitalise associational life. Critics of cyberdemocracy have argued that the internet reduces associational life, destroying community and replacing it with a weakened community in the form of interactions such as ‘likes’ that simply cannot replace true face-to-face conversations (see, e.g., Fernback & Thompson, 2000; Sproull & Kiesler, 1985). However, as Chun (2012, p. 6) states, ‘advocates of cyber-democracy have argued that the Internet would restore community by creating new forms of interaction and filling the void of lack of face-to-face interactions’. Chun (2012, p. 7) sees the potential of the internet to be ‘an

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instrument of mobilization tool for reengaging fragmented citizens’. In fact, Chun (2012, p. 9) argues that social networking sites ‘encourage people to engage in political activities … by facilitating dialogic interactions between citizens or between citizens and politicians’. He goes on to state that this ‘political mobilization may not be so direct and immediate as optimists have praised but may be sufficient to be a gateway activity to other political activities that have a real impact in the offline’ (Chun, 2012, p. 9). There is also potential for cyberdemocracy to reshape the political structure as the crisis of representative democracy has necessitated. Chun (2012, p. 10) argued that social networking sites ‘reshape the current political world by increasing informal and extra-institutional engagement that has never been possible in the past’. The dialogic interactions that take place in the virtual public sphere give new ways for citizens to engage in the political process and, thus, be politically mobilised. Through a transformation of the political system in which citizens dialogue with each other and with politicians, citizens are politically empowered and mobilised through these dialogic interactions in the virtual public sphere. This reshaping is also possible because younger generations are politically mobilised in different ways (e.g., through online interactions), which is reshaping the democratic model (Dalton, 2008; Theocharis, 2011). Chun (2012, p. 45) argues that ‘empowered by participatory web technologies, the ordinary citizens who have been the passive recipients of mass-produced information are now becoming active in both production and consumption of information’. He continues, stating that ‘the citizens empowered by new web technologies can actively present their opinions in the virtual space as well as can have more opportunities to meet the other citizens who have similar or different opinions’ (Chun, 2012, p. 45). Changing technologies allow for a robust and evolving virtual public sphere that is already reshaping political structures and interactions and mobilising citizens not through traditional means but through online interactions. That is not to say that the virtual public sphere is not dominated by mass media or economic interests. The Cambridge Analytica scandal is an example of the misappropriation of digital assets to influence political opinion.

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Using harvested data to influence swing voters shows the need for decentralised networks not controlled by government, political, or other entities. Such a system would build trust in a democratic system centred around deliberation, rather than consumption of targeted advertising. The exploitation of personal data is a significant issue for the implementation of cyberdemocracy, as it can also lead to concerns of legitimation in the political process. Online manipulation must be addressed through decentralised platforms that are not controlled by political interests.

Bibliography Baum, B. (2001). Freedom, power and public opinion: J.S. Mill on the public sphere. History of Political Thought, 22(3), 501–524. Chun, H. (2012). Social networking sites and cyberdemocracy: A new model of dialogic interactivity and political mobilization in the case of South Korea. PhD Thesis. University at Buffalo. Dahlberg, L. J. (2000). The internet and the public sphere: A critical analysis of the possibility of online discourse enhancing deliberative democracy. PhD thesis. Massey University. https://mro.massey.ac.nz/bitstream/handle/10179/2273/02_whole.pdf Dalton, R. J. (2008). Citizenship norms and the expansion of political participation. Political Studies, 56(1), 76–98. Diamond, L. (2015a). Facing up to the democratic recession. Journal of Democracy, 26(1), 141–155. Diamond, L. (2015b). In search of democracy. Routledge. Dunleavy, P., Park, A., & Taylor, R. (2018). The UK’s changing democracy: The 2018 democratic audit. LSE Press. Fernback, J., & Thompson, B. (2000). Virtual communities: Abort, retry, failure? http://www.rheingold.com/texts/techpolitix/VCcivil.html Gilens, M., & Page, B. I. (2014). Testing theories of American politics: Elites, interest groups, and average citizens. Perspectives on Politics, 12(3), 564–581. Goggin, G. (2012). Google phone rising: The Android and the politics of open source. Continuum, 26(5), 741–752. Habermas, J. (1989). The structural transformation of the public sphere: An inquiry into a category of bourgeois society. MIT Press.

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Habermas, J. (2001). The postnational constellation: Political essays. MIT Press. Ibsen, M. F. (2019). The populist conjuncture: Legitimation crisis in the age of globalized capitalism. Political Studies, 67(2), 795–811. Jones, B., & O’Donnell, M. (2017). Alternatives to neoliberalism: Towards equality and democracy. Policy Press. Kellner, D. (1998). Intellectuals, the new public spheres, and techno-politics. In C. Toulouse & T. W. Luke (Eds.), The politics of cyberspace. Routledge. Kellner, D. (2000). Modernity and its discontents: Nietzsche’s critique. https:// pages.gseis.ucla.edu/faculty/kellner/papers/FNmod.htm Mill, J. S. (1991). Considerations on representative Government. Prometheus Books. Mill, J. S. (2003). Utilitarianism and on liberty (M. Warnock, Ed.). Blackwell Publishing. Milstein, B. (2021). Justification crisis: Brexit, Trump, and deliberative breakdown. Political Theory, 49(4), 554–583. Mounk, Y., & Foa, R. S. (2016). Yes, people really are turning away from democracy. Washington Post, 8 December. Retrieved December 10, 2018, from https://www.washintonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/12/08/yes-millennials-really-are-surprisingly-approving-of-dictators/?noredirect=on&utm_ term=.d61162891e3b Papacharissi, Z. (2004). Democracy online: Civility, politeness, and the democratic potential of online discussion groups. New Media & Society, 6(2), 259–283. Pew Research Center. (2020a, February). Democratic rights popular globally but commitment to them not always strong. Pew Research Center. (2020b, June). Experts predict more digital innovation by 2030 aimed at enhancing democracy. Pew Research Center. (2021b, May). Public trust in government: 1958-2021. https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2021/05/17/public-trust-ingovernment-1958-2021/ Picketty, T. (2014). Capital in the twenty-first century. Harvard University Press. Purdon, M. (2017). Neoclassical realism and international climate change politics: Moral imperative and political constraint in international climate finance. Journal of International Relations and Development, 20(2), 263–300. Putnam, R. D. (1995). Bowling alone: America’s declining social capital. Journal of democracy, 6(1), 65–78.

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Sproull, L., & Kiesler, S. (1985). Reducing social context cues: Electronic mail in organizational communication. Management Science, 32(11), 1492–1512. Szabo, A. (2007). The impact of the internet on the public sphere and on the culture industry: A study of blogs, social news sites and discussion forums. Master’s Thesis. University of Vaasa. https://core.ac.uk/download/ pdf/197963736.pdf Theocharis, Y. (2011). Young people, political participation and online postmaterialism in Greece. New Media & Society, 13(2), 203–223.

6 Deliberative Democracy

The human race is gradually learning the simple lesson that the people as a whole are wiser for the public good and the public prosperity than any privileged class of men, however, refined and cultivated, has ever been, or, by any possibility, can ever become. Governments over societies the most advanced are still in a transitional stage, and they are necessarily and logically moving; in the direction of democracy; that form of self-government which represents and expresses the average intelligence and virtue of free and educated people. (Lewis Henry Morgan, Ancient Society)

 he Imminent Decline of Representative T Democracy: Myth or Reality? The problem of centralised power, failed institutions, interference of religion and ideology, endemic corruption, and the emergence of elites within representative democracy have severely eroded the ideals of real representation. As a result of this, people began to say that democracy is dead and long live democracy. Ideally, when the information revolution and communication networks bring people closer, it should transform the nature of governance, making it more transparent, decentralised, and participatory (Kadlec & Friedman, 2007). © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 H. Karem, Cyberdemocracy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-27544-9_6

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The new generation of communication tools helps to manage people better in a decentralised and participatory manner, questioning the need for highly centralised bureaucratic machinery. The existence of a sophisticated and hierarchical layer of an administrative structure from top to bottom is futile in an era when the new media facilitates communications in a fast, efficient manner. Ohmae similarly described the state of democracy: The democratic nation-state has become an unnatural, even dysfunctional unit for organising human activity and managing economic endeavour in a borderless world. It overlooks the true linkages and synergies that exist among often disparate populations by combining essential measures of human activity at the wrong level of analysis. (Ohmae, 1993, p. 78)

Not only is the government itself redistributed among agencies operating above and below the government but the policy agenda is also undergoing a fundamental redefinition. The result is less and less a nationally organised citizen-focused government and more and more a corporate-­ controlled one. The state is rolled back, vacating the public spaces it hitherto prominently occupied, leaving the vacuum to be occupied by the gigantic corporations, lobbyists, and powerful businesses that often have foreign interests. The contemporary ‘democratic’ system is divisive, as the candidates and the campaigns on all sides spend tens of millions of pounds to spread negative information and often misinform the electorate to their advantage (Hoppe, 2001). The proliferation of modern means of communication and the emergence of social media have severely affected the nature and content of democratic processes. Sophisticated marketing tools, propaganda campaigns, professional managers (spin-doctors), and advertising agencies have completely altered elections. Political parties are presented as different commodities which must be sold in the election market after careful packing and branding. This approach is quite inefficient, and the worst effect is that it generates confused and disenfranchised people on all sides. Stein (2016) asks whether democracy, sovereignty, and globalisation are compatible. He argues that the three are incompatible ‘in their

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full-­blown form’ (Stein, 2016, p. 327). Stein (2016, p. 327) contends that ‘the expansion of democracy and continued globalization in a sovereign state system has placed strains and pressures upon all three’. Globalisation and sovereignty work to constrain democracy, creating a democratic deficit, thus creating the illusion that representative democracy is dead (Stein, 2016). Stein (2016, p. 310) places the issue in the fact that ‘democratic governance is national in character and the forces of economic globalization are transnational in character’. With globalisation occurring in sovereign state systems that are becoming increasingly more democratic, there has been significant growth of ‘supranational institutions that are removed from, and less accountable to, individual citizens and voters’ (Stein, 2016, p. 310). Thus, with the constraints to democracy posed by globalisation and sovereignty, democracy appears to be outdated. There are also several measures through which the health of democracy may be assessed, namely, voter turnout, party membership, trust in politicians, interest in politics, and disenfranchisement. These measures reveal that while democratic systems are prospering and growing, democratic engagement is waning, thus leading to the impression that representative democracy is dead. Public trust in both the government and the democratic process is at an all-time low (Pew Research Center, February 2020a, p. 7), meaning that the health of representative democracy is declining rapidly. Dissatisfaction with democracy is high, with 52% of those surveyed feeling dissatisfied with the current state of democracy and with 64% viewing ‘political elites as out of touch’ (Pew Research Center, February 2020a, p. 7). A 2016 report (IDEA, 2016) found that voter turnout was declining rapidly, pointing to the serious problem democracy faces. However, declining turnout did not necessarily mean declining political participation, as citizen activism has increased (IDEA, 2016). The report describes ‘plummeting’ voter turnout in Europe as a ‘worrying problem’ (IDEA, 2016, p. 25). These sentiments are expressed throughout scholarship, pointing to the declining health of representative democracy and its seemingly inevitable ‘death’. History shows that democracy and election victory may not necessarily lead to social stability, economic prosperity, and good governance.

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Representative democracy reflects the image of conflict and stalemate. Though we had the experience of procedural democracy through elections, the challenge of establishing a functional democracy was never dealt with severely. The hopes and aspirations for a legal system were always shattered by a dysfunctional administrative system and a fragile, yet authoritarian political structure. Additionally, the military also played a vital role in reshaping and destructing the natural and organic growth of democracy in the world (Hoppe, 2001). The democratic experiment was turbulent and often short-lived in many countries—leaving the masses alienated and disempowered (Estlund, 2008). Representative democracy is, like an imperial power, in decline. The most important responsibility today is to safeguard democratic values and institutions as well as secure the active participation of the people through an alternative mechanism. The existence of a systemic crisis is apparent in both the advanced capitalist countries like the US and UK and the extremely underdeveloped countries like Uganda. The difference between the crisis in these countries is only cosmetic. Representation of the people is only rhetoric or slogan; it has no relevance except in constitutional texts. Therefore, the opportunities lie in deepening the democratic process to the roots through people’s participation and engagement of civil society institutions in the nation-building process. The periodic election alone cannot foster democracy and economic empowerment and the democratically elected government is not a magic bullet to solve the problems of instability and violence. Finally, the blame for the failure or death of democracy often falls on social media and the emergence of the cybersphere. Social media activism has changed the scope and content of democracy and its functions. It has also made democracy more volatile and transformed the ecology of interest groups and mobilisations of the people (Margetts, 2017). Furthermore, social media activism revolutionised the nature of social movements and made democracy more focussed and organised, allowing it to truly articulate the marginalised. It is the cybersphere that challenged the authoritarian rules and elitist orientation in representative institutions through profoundly influencing the voting process, campaigns, and voting decisions in the cybersphere. It

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enabled the common man to fight against any form of injustice across the world (Margetts, 2017). Hence, it is wrong to conclude that cyberactivism will lead to the decline and eventual death of normative democracy. Instead, the change we witness today is strengthening democracy through participation and inclusion of the hitherto alienated and excluded sections of society. It can only ignite the democratic spirit and strengthen democracy.

 an Representative Democracy C Be Participatory and Deliberative? The cybersphere poses a unique threat to the exercise of national sovereignty due to its global reach. In addition, the ubiquity of digital and internet technologies has begun to threaten national security. Thus, in many ways, representative democracy is not the problem, but rather the issue is that democracy gets in the way of government function and has been undermined by the desire of the government to exercise autocratic powers. Because the government is the political administration of the state and the state is a sovereign geographic entity where the government can exercise its powers, the global nature of cyberspace threatens both government and sovereignty. A pertinent question to pursue is whether plebiscitary or deliberative democracy has truly ever existed beyond the ancient agora of Athens. In this sense, the question is whether it is plausible for representative democracy to be both deliberative and participatory or if cyberdemocracy is the only democratic form in which democratic deliberation and participation as originally intended can truly exist. Plebiscitarian democracy is, in essence, the rule of the people by direct democracy (Offe, 2017). Offe (2017) notes the changing nature of democracy, stating that ‘democracies are constantly being negotiated’ and that they are ‘political systems “on the move”, driven by the legitimacy of rule and its effectiveness’. Liberal democracy, Offe (2017) argues, faces a major problem. While most of the world believes in ‘democratic principles and promises’, ‘large minorities and sometimes majorities of

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inhabitants of existing liberal democracies are dissatisfied with, and feel left out by or alienated from, the democratic routines and practices they experience’. While democracy is more widespread than ever, it is met with high levels of frustration and discontent. Representative democracy’s crises arises from four main sources (Offe, 2017). First, political participation is declining. Second, levels of distrust of political parties and elites are high. Third, the political mobilisation that does occur happens in populist ways, undermining the tenets of representative democracy. Finally, globalisation has limited national sovereignty and the ability of democracy to function in a way that meets the needs of a sovereign nation’s people (Offe, 2017). The response to these challenges to representative democracy has been a call for plebiscitarian, or direct, democracy in which the people decide what is best for a nation (Offe, 2017). As a result, many countries have begun to adopt direct democratic practices. One such example of these direct democratic practices was the 2016 Brexit referendum. This was a ‘concession to the rightist populist demand to let “the people” express its will directly, rather than being represented by distrusted elites suspected of being corrupted by their own or other special or “foreign” interests’ (Offe, 2017). This application of plebiscitarian democracy and its direct methods came at a high cost, ‘undermining the authority of Parliament, the members of which opposed Brexit by a large majority’ (Offe, 2017). The problem with these plebiscitarian methods, Offe (2017) argues, is that there is a lack of deliberation during which information can be disseminated and decisions can be made rationally, rather than based on emotion and ‘gut feeling’. Plebiscitarian methods can, thus impoverish the tool box of democratic politics by eliminating the space for postvoting reasoning and compromise-finding in the institutional framework of representative democracy. They privilege the fast, impulsive snapshot reaction generated by passions and visceral instincts over the more time-consuming balancing of interests and the typically lengthier process of persuasion through argument. As a consequence, consistency is not required: voters can simultaneously opt for lower taxes and greater expenditures, or for cheaper gas and stricter environmental standards. (Offe, 2017)

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In the absence of deliberation, ‘direct’ democracy will fail. Offe (2017) notes that in regular elections where representative democracy is practised, ‘contending political parties provide some guidance to voters and tend to make an effort to mobilize in demographically balanced ways’. This points to the existence of deliberation in representative democracy. The cybersphere must provide both direct democratic methods and a platform for true deliberation before the move to cyberdemocracy can be made. Otherwise, it will face the same problems modern representative democracy faces today. Offe (2017) points to the limits of plebiscitarian democracy if there is no deliberation: Referenda encourage the accountability-free expression of poorly considered mass preferences and de-emphasize requirements of consistency, compromise-­building, and the reflection on consequences. By inviting citizens to leap into the dark, they create irrevocable facts and preclude learning.

Offe (2017) suggests supplementing representative democracy with ‘aleatory, or randomized, representation’. This would help offset the preferences of the ruling elite with input from the average citizen. Additionally, Offe (2017) calls for the reconstitution of active citizenship through the formation of deliberative panels that help ‘citizens form preferences that they would then express in elections’. These preferences would be formed through the ‘discursive confrontation of diverse members of an organized body’ (Offe, 2017). Weber’s concept of plebiscitarian democracy is a notion that is informed by both the rationalisation of the marketplace and rational actors, as well as a more qualitative dimension that is nominal to the history of the circumstances. What is essential at this juncture is how much it creates a professionalisation of politics in the modern state. In many regards, Weber’s approach to democracy and the different styles of authority or rulership can be the manifestation of the political science that was initially envisioned by Machiavelli and the humanists. Weber’s concept of plebiscitarian democracy was a system that stood solely between different levels of leadership. There is a deliberative element because Weber viewed any given modern state as hovering between the balance of charismatic leadership, traditional authority, rational authority, and legal authority (Weber, 1978).

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In this instance, one cannot define charismatic authority in solely mathematical terms, and this means that a part of this approach as political science is limited as a science. It requires an interpretation rather than being a formula or formal system that can be solely decided on as it would be in a purely rational and legal framework. Likewise, the notion of tradition is also present in the decision-making process that is supposed to be divorced from the circumstance. For Weber, this balance is what he observes as a simple case of history. He was very interested in the unification of Germany during World War I. This was a consideration of what would define a single and modern state. A modern state consisted of previous systems and regions that had more traditional authorities and charismatic ones, rather than pure reason and self-interest as a rational actor as the only criteria (Weber, 1978). Weber’s concept of plebiscitarian democracy cannot take a strictly universal and quantitative approach but is informed by tradition and other factors that must be taken into consideration. In this regard, Weber’s concept of plebiscitarian democracy is also magnified as a system that demands greater participation. In a system that is based on rational actors and that governs the rationality of the actors such as those in a bureaucracy, it is crucial to be a rational actor and understand the influence and impact of less rational beliefs that inform a political decision or form of thinking. The science of political science expressed in Weber’s concept of plebiscitarian democracy is a science that assumes that all individuals are not acting rationally. There is a significant element of mistrust that informs Weber’s concept of plebiscitarian democracy. This is one of the critical dimensions that allow a more participatory system to better achieve market equilibrium. In an either/or coin toss game, one is going to get a more balanced state between the odds of 50/50 the more one tosses the coin. This Bayesian binary theory was an important discovery in the age of the Enlightenment and represented a type of abstract formalism. At some point in the game of tossing a coin, the number of tosses will achieve a perfect balance, but that might take many moves or exchanges. The same happens in a supply and demand economy with the voting system itself. Weber’s concept of plebiscitarian democracy is like a higher number of coin tosses that ensures a greater amount of accountability.

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Curato et al. (2019, p. 3) make a case for the importance of deliberation and its potential to ‘confront state power, big media, and corporate propaganda by creating discursive environments that expose lies, spin, and manipulation’. True deliberative democracy can ‘redistribute political power by moving the centre of politics away from authorities to ordinary citizens’ (Curato et al., 2019, p. 3). Curato et al. (2019, p. 12) argue for the introduction of deliberative forums ‘with the aim not of replacing institutions of representative democracy, but of supplementing legitimacy or epistemic gaps’. In looking at the implementation of deliberation in representative democracy, Curato et al. (2019, p. 61) offer the idea of mini publics that have the ‘capacity to redistribute political power by equalising opportunities to speak and be heard, addressing asymmetries of knowledge, and curbing inequalities in political authority’. Mini publics are inclusive and make ‘experts and reference materials available to participants’, allowing ‘ordinary citizens’ to ‘enrich their understanding of a complex topic’ (Curato et al., 2019, p. 70). Curato et al. (2019, p. 74) are clear that mini publics are no ‘magic bullet’ but rather a bridge between ordinary citizens and political decision-makers. In this sense, they are supplements to representative democracy that seek to balance power and individual voices through reasoned discussion. Curato et al. (2019, p. 120) call not for a replacement of representative democracy but for a reformation of ‘existing structures of representative democracy’ in order for ‘deliberative stances to be developed’. They argue that for deliberative democracy to effectively use and fight power, we must remain open to the discomfort and gratification of learning from others, even those we view as our adversaries (Curato et al., 2019, p. 181). Their view of democracy is a representative system that incorporates deliberation into representation. There is, however, much scholarship that questions the validity and longevity of representative democracy as a viable democratic form. The next paragraphs will review this literature to better understand the limitations of representative democracy and whether it is truly a viable democratic model. The conceptual criticism of representative democracy dates to the twentieth century. Schumpeter (1942) perceived democracy as an ideal condition in terms of the involvement of politically informed citizens.

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According to Schumpeter, citizens lack political will and, therefore, are often exposed to the political manipulation and populist rhetoric of the political parties. In a representative democracy, the pressure groups and media can manufacture the collective will of the people and falsely claim that it reflects individual will. Based on this argument, Schumpeter (1942) highlighted the limits of representative democracy and perceived it as inherently senseless and flawed. According to Urbinati (2012), one of the limitations of representative democracy is that it surrenders the transfer of power from the principal to the agent. In other words, ‘representative’ democracy is an oxymoron term because, in its essence, liberty cannot be made indirect, or it cannot be alienated from the will (Urbinati, 2012). Critics like Mayo (1960) stated that if citizens in a representative democracy are not provided with the opportunity to practice direct democracy to the maximum extent possible, it will remain as a mere representation and not a democracy. In the contemporary form of representative democracy, although citizens get an equal share in determining the political will (voting rights), they do not get an equal share in expressing their public voice and, thus, lack the power to control those who represent them. Representative democracy focuses on electoral authorisation instead of enhancing the interdependency between the elected representatives and the people they represent (Ankersmit, 2002). Other recent theorists like Green (2010) highlighted the limits of representative democracy as predominantly inefficient, oligarchic, and leaning towards inequality and bargaining. According to Green (2010), the exclusion and alienation of many people from the legislative process and the control of institutions by a powerful minority is a concealed reality of democracy. Although democracy promises collective authorship of law, representative democracy does not create such a collective and fails to empower the voices of the people. There is inequality of power between the rulers and the ruled (Green, 2010). Another key argument against representative democracy is that social inequality erodes the proper functioning of democratic institutions. Noam Chomsky (2006) argues that, in western democracies, political and economic power is concentrated in the hands of wealthy elites and ordinary citizens are primarily excluded from exercising their legitimate

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rights. Although equal voice is an integral part of democracy, the direction of politics in a representative democracy is towards the business interest of the elites. Here, there is a large gap between the will of the people and the decisions of the representatives. This leads to disillusionment, apathy, and indifference towards government (Chomsky, 2006). Scheler supports this view, citing that democracy failed to keep its promise of ending social inequality (Mona, 2018). Another recent criticism against representative democracy points to the rise of personalised politics based on the charismatic personality of leaders instead of the prominence of issues and national priorities. The depersonalised power requirement, one of the fundamental features of representative democracy, is often violated in the contemporary political context (Taggart, 2000). The leaders are more concerned with enhancing their public appeal and the actual communication between the public and representatives is eroding quickly. This affects public accountability, control, and public participation in the democratic process (Taggart, 2000). Further, Bittner (2016) asserts that unfulfilled expectations about prosperity and lack of equal representation limit the promises of representative democracy. According to Brennen, the most significant limitation of representative democracy is the lack of political education and knowledge of the average citizen. Brennen categorised voters into three types: Hobbits, Hooligans, and Vulcans. Hobbits are those who do not know anything about politics and issues, whereas Hooligans are blind and irrational followers of a particular ideology or leader. Ideal voters are the Vulcans who are rational, prejudice-free, and knowledge-driven. Unfortunately, Vulcans are a rare minority in the contemporary representative democracy (Brettan, 2016). The alternative democratic mechanism that encourages the Vulcans to flourish and take precedence could be cyberdemocracy. To summarise, volonté générale can only exist in a democracy, and supporters of representative democracy believe that periodic elections provide the ruling class with a mandate to reign by their agenda as they represent the ‘will’ of the people. Nevertheless, accountability to the will of the people ends with the election process. There exists a gap between promise and performance in democracy. There is a problem of misplaced

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trust in democracy. Citizen control over government ends with elections and the so-called representatives use their power to enhance their political gain (Urbinati, 2014). Representation has emerged in political practice as an institution of power, control, and containment. It is also perceived as a tool to unify a diverse population. However, the success largely depends on the democratic transformation of society in such a way that all citizens should engage creatively in the political process with their votes as well as judgment (Urbinati, 2014). The inability to ensure the citizens’ right to have an equal share in determining the political will is a serious impediment of representative democracy. Taming the voice of citizens and controlling the power of citizen surveillance along with lack of opportunities for social equality also affect the quality of representation and limit the potential of democratic institutions. Deliberative democracy is a representative form of strategic thinking, and it is at the very opposite end in terms of direct participation. The deliberative process is intended to have aid the collective general will. However, with an attention to the possible parameters and implications of the issue at hand, the demands on the individual and collective of legislators and policymakers are arguably a narrow representation of who the general will is likely to be. On the one hand, there is the general will of the voting population, and, on the other hand, there is a disproportionate number of voters that are at the older end of the age spectrum. As a concept, deliberative democracy was first formulated by Bessette in 1980 in a work titled Deliberative democracy: the majority principle in republican government and deliberative democracy (Bessette, 1997). The demands in terms of engagement are essentially like the expectations of a legal adjudicator, but with a broader scope in terms of public interest or the public sphere. Bessette has been expanded on and theorised about widely. Deliberative democracy is generally understood to be a concept that can address some of the limitations of representative democracy because, in deliberative democracy, discussion or deliberation is central to governance. Deliberative democracy maintains that a decision will be deliberate only if it is channelled through authentic deliberations (Bessette, 1980). Although the basic tenets of deliberative democracy date back to

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Aristotle, it was Habermas and his theory of ‘communicative rationality’ that popularised the concept. In representative democratic models, deliberative democracy is practised through formal legislatures, judiciary, etc., while in direct democracies, democracy is exercised through a group of citizens who are empowered to influence the decision-making process (Fishkin & Laslett, 2003). According to Cohen (1989), one of the main features of deliberative democracy is that deliberations play a vital role in the creation of the institutions. Similarly, institutions also allow the process of deliberations to influence their decision. Unlike representative democracy, deliberations in decision making provide much-needed legitimacy, and each policy or law can be connected to the transparent deliberative process behind it. Mutual respect, harmony, and consensus characterise the deliberative process and there is no substantive hierarchy among members. Aside from that, deliberations are intended to reach rational consensus rather than individual interest (Cohen, 1989). Although deliberative democracy is perceived as a more consensual, rational, and legitimate model of decision making based on civic engagement and participatory politics, there are many limitations to deliberative democracy as well. A plethora of theorists criticise the reasoned, inclusive, liberal, and equality projection of deliberative democracy. For example, one of the limitations is the chance of bias in deliberation and neglect of dissenting opinions. This often leads to discrimination and group polarisation (Sunstein, 2003). A like-minded group of people can influence the deliberation process through continuous sophistical arguments which strengthen their position within the decision-making process. Another danger of deliberative democracy is the information cascade in which people support an argument not based on evidence but only on the fact that there are many people who support the argument. To be specific, reasoned deliberation is often a myth in an actual situation (Sunstein, 2003). Thus, the rational choice theorists argue that the epistemological claims of deliberative democracy are wrong. Rather than reflecting the general will of the people or reasoned consensus of all, deliberative democracy may lead to ill-informed and vivid explanations based on wrong information, biased facts, and emotional imageries (Estlund, 2008).

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Another limitation of deliberative democracy is the overemphasis on procedures rather than participation and outcome. As a result, citizens are often disillusioned with the deliberations and stay out of politics and civic responsibilities. In the contemporary context, the lack of political will from the leaders to make the system more inclusive and democratic make deliberative democracy a steep terrain to travel (Chappell, 2008). As of now, in most countries, deliberative democracy is limited to citizen juries and deliberative polling procedures. There is no incentive for citizens to participate in democracy, and, hence, they prefer to leave the affairs to politicians as in the case of representative democracy (Chappell, 2008). Ideal deliberation requires reciprocity, equality, tolerance, inclusion, reasoned discussion, and, most importantly, facts. These procedural requirements are seldom practised within deliberative systems, which limits the potential outcome. Another limitation of deliberative democracy is the cost associated with conducting the procedures. Unless and until citizens are better motivated and genuinely informed about the merits of the deliberative process in an inclusive manner, the impact will be minimal (Estlund, 2008). Further, the lack of equality of opportunity is another limitation of deliberative democracy. The morally justifiable and rationally sound salutations that emerged out of deliberative democracy will be meaningful only if the citizens who participate in the deliberations consider each other as equal and provide an equal chance for all to articulate their rational arguments (Sanders, 1997). However, such theoretical assumptions are seldom practised in a real situation in which more powerful and more articulate citizens control the deliberative process. Thus, the view of the less advantaged and marginalised citizens, including women, ethnic minorities, and people of limited means, are not represented in the process. Addressing structural inequalities is very important in deliberative democracy. Without this, exclusive tendencies kill the inherent spirit of deliberative democracy and make it far below the general will of the people (Sanders, 1997). One of the recent criticisms of deliberative democracy is its inability to understand the power relation in modern society and its impact on the articulating capability and degree of civic engagement (Kadlec & Friedman, 2007). Powerful elites who represent the hegemonic social

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segments in society tend to control the deliberative process, paving the way for deliberation to be biased and serve the interest of the structurally robust strata of society. Even though the internal inconsistencies are addressed, the design of such a deliberative structure with equal participation, equal power, and mutual respect is challenging to create (Kadlec & Friedman, 2007). In deliberative democracy, positive change can be attained through the cultivation of social intelligence, or ‘a cumulative, generative process of continuous, multilevel interaction that can change perceptions and create opportunities that did not seem to exist before’ (Kadlec & Friedman, 2007). Recent scholars have argued that the continuous and multilevel interactions and engagements which generate social intelligence can make deliberative democracy more meaningful and change driven. Social intelligence necessarily implies the authentic democratic engagement of all citizens in an equal manner through expanding their capacity for free and communicative inquiry. The set of dynamic inter-actors generated through an actively communicative intelligence can propose a meaningful democratic change (Kadlec & Friedman, 2007). In the contemporary context, such meaningful and inclusive social intelligence without a hierarchical and hegemonical power relationship can be cultivated only within the social sphere of the internet. Hence, cyberdemocracy can be perceived as an advanced model of a deliberative democratic apparatus that reflects a more inclusive, just, and equal platform of mutually respecting individuals. Finally, the reality of the contemporary social sphere in the UK is different from the last century; the attitude towards representative democracy is changing along with the notion of the nation-state. Decades of radical individualism and mass media have, to a certain degree, disintegrated the notion of nation-state, divided society into smaller, more visible communities and groups that are bound by class, geography, religion, sports, ethnicity, educational background, generations, political views, and economic interests. The common denominators such as language, culture, value system, and sense of collective identity are slowly fading. The reversal or even prevention of these changes is beyond the scope of the current representative governing system. Therefore, a generic, technologically facilitated,

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democratic governing system that works for everyone is urgently needed to prevent further disintegration and encourage individual decision making towards a collective goal.

Liquid Democracy and the Global Village Italian philosopher Antonio Gramsci expanded on Karl Marx’s theory that dominant societal ideologies reveal the interests and beliefs held by the ruling class. Gramsci’s concept of cultural hegemony thus argued that the ruling class gains the consent to rule through the spread of its ideologies. These ideologies are spread via social institutions that work to force the people into accepting the norms, values, and beliefs of the ruling class. According to Gramsci, the people who control these institutions control society. This cultural hegemony leads to domination through consent, rather than through deliberation. Thus, hegemony, or agreement with the status quo, is a result of the socialisation that occurs through the dominating ideologies of the ruling class. Capitalism dominates due to this cultural hegemony. Many scholars have pointed to the incompatibility of capitalism and democracy, and the decline of democracy has often been linked to the rise of capitalism (see, e.g., Offe, 2003; Crouch, 2004; Merkel, 2004; and Streeck, 2013). For democracy (and cyberdemocracy) to function, domination must not occur through consent but through deliberation. This means that social power must be shared, and ideologies constructed through deliberation, not through socialisation with the ideologies of the ruling class. In a world where the hegemonic values are incorporated in and almost inseparable from capitalism, efforts must be undertaken to help citizens see past this cultural hegemony. The internalised values of capitalism must be revealed through deliberation, transforming them from unchallengeable and normative to values that are discussed and deliberated upon rationally. To that end, many scholars and politicians have posited that ‘liquid democracy’, or a ‘cyber democracy that combines representative democracy and spontaneous direct democracy by using technologies of the web 2.0’, could fulfil the democratic process of freedom and equality

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(Dingeldey, 2019). Liquid democracy is defined as a cyberdemocratic approach that is highly participative, meaning that there is the ‘possibility of everyone to participate in the decision processes or to delegate his/her voice’ (Dingeldey, 2019). A highly participatory and deliberative democracy could lead to domination through deliberation, rather than consent to internalised ideologies of the ruling class. The rapid transformation in the nature and content of the democratic process and the engagement of citizens in the social sphere is clearly articulated by McLuhan and other post-modern thinkers through the concepts of the ‘global village’ and the ‘global agora/virtual town hall’. According to McLuhan, the global village is a new phenomenon that came into existence after the emergence of electronic media, and it corresponded to the globalisation of technology. The term global village essentially implies the very active and in-depth social participation of the hitherto ‘aloof and dissociated literate man of the Western world’ due to the advent of electronic media (McLuhan, 1994, p. 83). It can be read as the alienated citizen of modern representative democracy. In essence, it is a new articulation of space in which any marginal area can be at the centre and marginality can be experienced even at the centre as well. Similarly, in the global village, no one is marginal or alienated; instead, all have an equal right to participate in the public sphere (Krewani, 2013). This term of the global village, therefore, has limitless possibilities while explaining the concept of cyberdemocracy. According to McLuhan, the global village is not just globalisation; instead, it is a dynamic relationship between a mediated sense of the local and an equally mediated sense of the global. There is no sharp demarcation between the two (Krewani, 2013). McLuhan argued: Our specialist and fragmented civilisation of centre-margin structure are suddenly experiencing an instantaneous re- assembling of all its mechanised bits into an organic whole. This is the new world of the global village. (McLuhan, 1994, p. 85)

In his theory, the medium is the message, and the medium moulds and defines the form and content of human association and action (McLuhan,

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1967). Here, in the contemporary context, the medium is the cybersphere, although McLuhan was talking about the pre-world-wide-web period of the early era electronic boom. The concept of the global village recognises that there is a crisis of identity between the deeply institutionalised values of the old form of culture and the decentralised and flexible identities that have emerged out of cyberspace (Roesle, 2017). Here, a community does not mean the conventional communities defined by shared language, culture, or geographical location. Instead, persons with similar interests and ideas can join regardless of physical location, thus creating a virtual community in cyberspace (McLuhan, 1994). Like nomadic gatherers of knowledge and information, people engage in social space with enthusiasm (McLuhan, 1994). In the global village, information moves at such a speed that everyone in the village will be involved in lightning speed and affected by the event. The total involvement of all in the activities of the village is the most distinguishing aspect of the global village. As the learning process and participation in human dialogue are complete in the virtual global village, the responsibility is to maximise the learning opportunities (McLuhan, 1989). The chances of deep personal involvement and inclusive consciousness make it a distinct entity. According to McLuhan, brotherhood is one of the core components of the global village because it changes the position of racial, ethnic, and economic differences (Negroponte, 1995). McLuhan asserted that the marginalised could not be contained in the virtual space; they are very much involved in it. In the global village, there is no centre of apex authority; all inhabitants are equal and enjoy living in the conditions of complete democratic spirit created by technology (McLuhan, 1994). Although the term global village was coined by McLuhan much earlier, it has become more relevant in the current era of cyberactivism. The internet has led to the shrinking of the world into a global village, in which everyone can interact with each other. In this global village, the electronic culture acts as a counterculture, and it is based on scientific optimism rather than fear (Leary, 1994). The virtual town hall is again another imagery coined in the globalised era. Unlike the Greek agora, it is a digital global commons and community library for the inhabitants of the global village (Stone, 2013). This is

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characterised by uncertain power relations, weak institutions, and multiple networks in cyberspace. Stone (2013) asserts that the concept of the agora and virtual town hall is a central idea that dismantles the concept of centralised sovereignty through the celebration of a mingling of the communities irrespective of geography and space. It is a political marketplace for negotiations, a public sphere for recognition, and, above all, a market for gaining reputation based on our knowledge. While the Greek agora was elitist, this new model is participatory and universal with a normatively neutral basis (Stone, 2013). The discussion on the global village, global agora, and virtual town hall reflects a transformation in our perceptions towards power and democracy. It shows that the symbols, values, practices, discourses, and institutions that constitute the new cyberdemocracy and politics are conditioned and shaped by the forces of globalisation, the internet, and thousands of non-state actors who have appropriated power through their active engagement and negotiation in the cyberspace (Touaf & Boutkhil, 2008). Manuel Castells’s (2011) and Anthony Giddens’s (1991) concepts of agora are different in ways that continue the qualitative and quantitative distinctions. The distinction between the more binary system of Manuel Castells against Anthony Giddens’s system, which is a combined relationship between a system and the individual, can be illustrated using the system of a chess game and two distinct ways of looking at the same game. One of the more revolutionary events in the game of chess over the past decade or so is the consistency by which computers can beat even the best chess players. There are several reasons for this; however, what is important is the conquering of the individual by a system and one that is based solely on a binary logic at its core. Anthony Giddens (1991) views the relationship between a social system and an individual as mutually determining. He calls this ‘structuration’. In terms of the analogy with chess, there are a formal set of rules and a social system that define the limitations and choices of the individual. However, there is a free relationship that is mutually determining in those individuals have choices and freedoms built into the game or the formal system. A formal system is one where the players are not significant

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because they are only representations, but the system defines the possible moves that the token or representation of a soldier can make in the game of chess. However, while the system is constant and limits the choices that the players or rational agents can make within it, at the same time, the rational agents change the dynamic of the game and even the outcome with the same set of rules. In the simplest terms, one individual might beat the other at one game and the reverse happens in the following. There is a constancy of the rules and the sets of rules that define a formal system that manipulates tokens. However, two players can adapt to one another because they are going to be making different rational decisions where reason or rationality is based on the rules that govern the choices. At the same time, there is a qualitative side in Giddens’s (1991) framework. The heuristic dynamic between the individuals based on rational free choice are actions taken in response to the challenger based on the best options that can be interpreted. This is how the individual still shapes society in the form of structuration. By contrast, a binary system is one that might better be illustrated by a two-party political system. In a two-­ party system or bilateral system of power, there are only two choices. In some senses, the formal system as a political agora is little more than the pawn over and against the potential options presented by a player who can move in many directions such as the Queen. For Manuel Castells (2011), the formal system is at a point of maturity in terms of Weber’s bureaucratisation as a digital system. It is more significant and powerful in the same way that advanced computers can consistently beat humans. A human in this instance can know a set of past games as precedent on which to choose their strategies. By contrast, it is possible that a computer can know every game on which to base its strategies. This is a set of networks rather than a single network and it is a key dimension of Manuel Castells. For Castells, the platform economy is more typical than an economy that might exchange information for property. In a platform economy or digital one, the information is the commodity. The information of a driver along with the information of someone in need of a ride are coordinated by an algorithm that generates the actual

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capital in the exchange. Here, mere information generates capital and more complex information can likewise generate even more capital (Castells, 2011). Capital is transferred whereby the ‘middling institution’ is not even an institution like a banking system, but it is middled by a formula that is driven by information. As a point of emphasis and perhaps not a full distinction, the notion of ‘structuration’ means that Giddens’s rational actor is lost within the power dynamic; however, capital at the same time must be understood in some material condition or some material state. If an algorithm can be monetised and generate capital out of information, that money still must be transferred to another material state in order for it to have value. Moreover, the value itself is a human determination and not solely that of a formula when it comes to the aims and subjective motives of individuals. It can be said that the chess players continue to shape the game even if they are confined within a formal system. In the agora of Manuel Castells, humans are taken out and replaced by the laws themselves. Giddens maintains that individuals can impact the system. The notion of engagement and disengagement in the current political process is deeply rooted and goes beyond the disillusionment with mainstream politics. The ever-decreasing participators in the conventional political process demonstrate that the link between citizens and their political system is astringently damaged if not broken. This requires urgent attention to revitalise the political process and ultimately give birth to new political citizenship. As a concept and practice, cyberdemocracy offers an alternative, inclusive mechanism which is critically needed to inform, encourage, and rejuvenate political citizenship and accommodate collective actions through individual decision making in real-time for the benefit of all. In the wake of globalisation and the dominance of capitalism, a highly participative cyberdemocracy seems a somewhat idealistic model. However, many scholars are hopeful that cyberdemocracy can overcome the barriers that it faces (many of which are barriers to representative democracy as well).

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Bibliography Ankersmit, F. R. (2002). Political representation. Stanford University Press. Bessette, J. M. (1980). How democratic is the Constitution? AEI Press. Bessette, J. M. (1997). The mild voice of reason: Deliberative democracy and American national government. University of Chicago Press. Bittner, J. (2016). Democracy – Is its time running out? DIE ZEIT, (24/2016). Brettan, J. (2016). Against democracy. Princeton University Press. Castells, M. (2011). The rise of the network society. John Wiley & Sons. Chappell, Z. (2008). Deliberation disputed: A critique of deliberative democracy. PhD thesis. London School of Economics and Political Science. Retrieved October 10, 2020, from http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/2340/1/ U615287.pdf Chomsky, N. (2006). Deterring democracy. Random House. Cohen, J. (1989). Deliberative democracy and democratic legitimacy. In A. Hamlin & P. Pettit (Eds.), The good polity (pp. 17–34). Blackwell. Crouch, C. (2004). Post-democracy. Polity Press. Curato, N., Hammond, M., & Min, J. B. (2019). Power in deliberative democracy: Norms, forums, systems. Palgrave Macmillan. Dingeldey, P. (2019). A fourth transformation of democracy? Liquid democracy, supra-­ national democracy and the fate of participation. Law, Democracy and Development, 23(1), 181–201. https://doi. org/10.17159/2077-4907/2019/ldd.v23b7 Estlund, D. M. (2008). Democratic authority: A philosophical framework. Princeton University Press. Fishkin, J., & Laslett, P. (2003). Debating deliberative democracy. Wiley-Blackwell. Giddens, A. (1991). Structuration theory: Past, present and future. In C. Bryant & D. Jary (Eds.), Giddens’ theory of structuration: A critical appreciation. Routledge. Green, J. E. (2010). The eyes of the people: Democracy in an age of spectatorship. Oxford University Press. Hoppe, H. (2001). Democracy: The god that failed. Transaction Publishers. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA). (2016). The Global State of Democracy: Exploring Democracy’s Resilience. Stockholm, Sweden: International IDEA. Kadlec, A., & Friedman, W. (2007). Deliberative democracy and the problem of power. Journal of Public Deliberation, 3(1), 1–28.

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Krewani, A. (2013). McLuhan’s global village today: Transatlantic perspectives. Routledge. Leary, T. (1994). Chaos and cyberculture. Ronin Publishing, Inc. Margetts, H. (2017). Democracy is dead: Long live democracy!, open Democracy, 12 November. Retrieved December 7, 2018, from https://www. opendemocracy.net/helen-margetts/democracy-is-dead-long-live-democracy Mayo, H. B. (1960). An introduction to democratic theory. Oxford University Press. McLuhan, M. (1967). The medium is the massage: An inventory of effects. Penguin Press. McLuhan, M. (1989). War and peace in the global village. Simon & Schuster. McLuhan, M. (1994). Understanding media: The extensions of man. MIT Press. Merkel, W. (2004). Embedded and defective democracies. Democratization, 11(5), 33–58. Mona, N. (2018). Democracy and its discontents: Why representative democracy is in crisis today and how to respond. MaRBLe, 3, 1–20. Negroponte, N. (1995). Being digital: The road map for survival on the information superhighway. Hodder & Stoughton. Offe, C. (2003). Herausforderungen der Demokratie. Campus. Offe, C. (2017). Referendum vs. institutionalized deliberation: What democratic theorists can learn from the 2016 Brexit decision. Daedalus, 146(3), 14–27. https://www.amacad.org/publication/ referendum-vs-institutionalized-deliberation-brexit Ohmae, K. (1993). The rise of region state. Foreign Affairs, 4(2), 78–80. Pew Research Center. (2020a, February). Democratic rights popular globally but commitment to them not always strong. Roesle, P. (2017). Marshall McLuhan predicted digital-mediated tribalism, McLuhan Galaxy, 16 February. Retrieved December 7, 2018, from https:// mcluhangalaxy.wordpress.com/2017/02/16/marshall-mcluhan-predicteddigital-mediated-tribalism/ Sanders, L. M. (1997). Against deliberation. Political Theory, 3(347), 1–17. Schumpeter, J. (1942). Capitalism, socialism and democracy. Taylor and Francis. Stein, A. A. (2016). The great trilemma: Are globalization, democracy, and sovereignty compatible? International Theory, 8(2), 297–340. Stone, D. (2013). Knowledge actors and transnational governance: The privatepublic policy nexus in the Global Agora. Palgrave Macmillan. Streeck, W. (2013). Gekaufte Zeit. Die vertagte Krise des demokratischen Kapitalismus. Suhrkamp. Sunstein, C. R. (2003). Why societies need dissent. Harvard University Press.

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Taggart, P. A. (2000). Populism. Open University Press. Touaf, L., & Boutkhil, S. (2008). The world as a Global Agora: Critical perspectives on public space. Cambridge Scholars Publishing. Urbinati, N. (2012). Representative democracy and its critics. In S. Alonso, J. Keane, & W. Merkel (Eds.), The future of representative democracy (pp. 1–27). Cambridge University Press. Urbinati, N. (2014). Democracy disfigured: Opinion, truth, and the people. Harvard University Press. Weber, M. (1978). Economy and society: An outline of interpretive sociology. University of California Press.

7 Theorising the Cyberdemocratic Terrain

Is Deliberative Mass Participation in the Political Sphere Possible Under Capitalism? Papacharissi (2011, p. 11) describes five tendencies that characterise democracies: ‘nostalgia for past forms of political engagement’, ‘limitations to civic involvement imposed by the representative democracy model’, ‘the aggregation of public opinion within representative democracy models through polling’, ‘declining civic participation through formal channels of political involvement’, and the ‘growth of public cynicism and disillusionment towards politics and the mass media’. Papacharissi (2011, p. 11) states that technology is often portrayed as the solution to these problems. Papacharissi (2011, p. 9) argues, however, that rather than pit the benefits and problems inherent to cyberdemocracy against each other, it is much more effective to ‘concentrate on how newer civic habits, enabled by online networked platforms, shape and are shaped by our civic technology’. Papacharissi (2011, p. 14) notes that boundaries between the political, economic, social, and legal spheres have essentially collapsed, resulting in what Papacharissi terms a convergence. There are no longer neat divisions of spheres, and this is represented in © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 H. Karem, Cyberdemocracy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-27544-9_7

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technology. Papacharissi (2011, p. 15) concludes that these converged virtual spheres are ‘capable of serving the expressive and connective needs of multiple publics’. However, these public spheres may not necessarily lead to deliberation, and it is ‘important that public service, private, and online media not be understood in terms of their ability to recreate civic ideals that may not have existed in the past to begin with’ (Papacharissi, 2011, p. 15). Thus, there is the potential for these virtual public spheres to lead to deliberation and transformation, but these may not occur in the cybersphere in the same way as they do in the world of face-to-face interactions. Papacharissi (2004, p. 267) argued that ‘the internet and its accompanying technologies have [potential] for reviving political discussion’. Szabo (2007, p. 121) found that the internet and social news sites can ‘help, promote and reward reasoned debate’. Dahlberg (2000, p. 259) found that in online discussions, ‘high levels of reflexivity, respectful listening, sincerity, and commitment to deliberations’ were possible. Thus, even under capitalism, the internet has the potential to form a virtual public sphere that is both inclusive and deliberative. The deliberation that takes place in cyberspace can be civil and polite. However, there is room for improvement and a need to ensure that representation in the public sphere is broad, both issues that also face modern representative democracy. Others have been more pessimistic and argue that democracy and capitalism are simply not compatible (e.g., Merkel, 2014). Dingeldey (2018, p. 15) argues that, under capitalism, and with widespread social inequality, cyberdemocracy is simply not possible without significant change. However, in a recent survey of experts performed by the Pew Research Center, the consensus was that the needed changes are coming (Pew Research Center, June 2020b). In the report experts predict that social media platforms will focus more on accuracy and honesty, which may lead to less division among social media users (Pew Research Center, June 2020b, p. 6). Rather than blindly accept information from commercialised platforms, the public will likely begin as sceptics of the information they find online. This will lead to better fact-checking tools and more information will be confirmed through in-person meetings (Pew Research Center, June 2020b, p. 6).

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Because the public will likely demand information accuracy, this will drive many of these predicted changes (Pew Research Center, June 2020b, p. 6). Additionally, democratic activity will be revolutionised by emerging technologies. This may occur through the development of online voting systems (e-democracy) or policy changes driven by ‘digital civic engagement’ in which constituents can voice their concerns more easily through digital platforms (Pew Research Center, June 2020b, p. 7). Finally, experts predict that online platforms will be developed that allow for wider deliberation (Pew Research Center, June 2020b, p. 7). In this sense, true and extensive deliberation, as well as mass participation, may be possible in cyberdemocracy due to the evolving virtual public sphere. Thus, despite the challenges to cyberdemocracy under capitalism and there is great potential for cyberdemocracy to allow for mass deliberative participation as technology and modes of civic engagement evolve. The next chapter will further discuss these issues and how the cyberdemocratic model performs when compared to the Westminster model.

 emocracy Transformed: Cyberdemocracy D as the Fourth Democratic Transformation Robert Dahl describes the history of democracy as having three distinct waves (Dahl, 1989, pp. 13–36). The first wave of democracy came at the establishment of democracy in Ancient Greece. In this wave, democracy was equated with the equal participation of free citizens in the political sphere. It was, quite literally, the rule of the people. The second wave began to come at the end of the eighteenth century and took hold at the beginning of the nineteenth century with the establishment of representative democracy in individual modern states. It is at this point, some scholars argue, that democracy began to decay as it moved from the participation of the individual citizens to the election of political elites tasked with the representation of the will of the people (see, e.g., Dingeldey, 2018). Dahl’s (1989, pp. 311–321) third

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transformation of democracy came in the wake of globalisation, as representation in supranational governing bodies (like the European Union) grew. Globalisation, in some ways, has caused democracy to decline further, as the will of the people becomes relegated into the hands of a very small group of elite representatives of sovereign nations. As democracy has moved beyond the Greek city-state and the agora to the larger nation-­ state and, finally, to the supranational state, participation has declined significantly, and political decisions remain in the hands of the elite represented minority. With cyberspace, there is the potential to reverse this decline and create a more participatory wave of democracy that relies on deliberation for decision-making and includes all citizens, not just the elected representatives. Until the internet became popular, inclusive democracy as intended by the ancient Greeks was impractical because of the development of large nation-states. However, today, the internet provides a practical means for everyone to record their opinion and, thus, inclusive democracy is attainable. Cyberdemocracy has the potential to combine and integrate the democratic process into government. It is a system that will respect people’s wishes without playing around with elections or influencing voters. It is a system that does not suffer from any of the disadvantages and has the majority, if not all, of the advantages of the current representative system. The internet provides us with the platform for a collaborative and emancipatory system under which political citizenship can be revitalised and where citizens can make informed decisions directly, swiftly, and efficiently on motions affecting their lives, instead of deciding who should decide for them collectively. Cyberdemocracy can potentially be disruptive to conventional politics in the way that cryptocurrencies are disruptive to conventional banking and currency exchange. On the one hand, the disrupting potential is arguably much needed; on the other, the trajectory of the unknown or unchartered progress is difficult to predict. There are always ways in which technology is being manipulated and exploited. From the hacking of personal phones of individuals who are heads of state to using artificial intelligence to filter targeted voting information on citizens and feeding

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them specific news sources and feeds, there are countless ways in which digital environments can be exploited and manipulated. In short, the security and manipulative exploits that are likely going to continue as they have been in places like the US will continue to present obstacles towards convincing the public that it is a direction worth pursuing. There is a current pessimism or scepticism of security and manipulation capabilities, but the question raised earlier about the engagement is likewise a strong consideration, and the potential for cyberdemocracy to succeed is contingent upon broad engagement. The disruptive capabilities are significant and there are currently good examples of ways in which a reintegrated electorate could make a significant impact. As a potential for disruption, this greater participation can make accountability to the democratic process itself greatly enhanced. In the current representative form, it is easy to question whose interests our public servants are serving. Likewise, it is disruptive to national, and even global, political systems because of the potential for vertical integration. Consider the potential where a cooperative can be formed that uses the only cryptocurrency. Such a cooperative should be retailing or providing any service that Amazon is. The cooperative platform movement shadows platform capitalism and the opportunity for vertical rather than horizontal integration can make global and national levels of government less powerful. There is a potential for re-alignment along entirely different grids. Further, it is easy to dismiss the concept of cyberdemocracy as naive and utopian. However, it is impossible to ignore the fact that there is a great need to bring people out of isolation and encourage them to take a proactive role in public policy. It is a severe indictment of the shortcomings of representative democracy as an institutional system in which many people prefer not to participate. The upsurge of interest in cyberdemocratic governance demonstrates how the interpretation of democracy as a system of government has transformed over the centuries. This, of course, is not surprising. As various thinkers make new contributions, changes in institutional expressions will continually occur. What is more surprising, however, is that from ancient Greece to date, there have been little alterations in the

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perception of the guidelines which democracy should use in its decision-­ making process and the normative values which it should try to realise. Decentralisation implies the transfer of political, economic, and social powers to the local governments operating at various levels through devolution. The degree of autonomy endowed upon the local-level governments varies from country and political contexts in which it operates. As a result of decentralisation, there are public functions to plan, implement, and monitor the affairs of the specific locality and power will be transferred from higher tiers to lower tiers of governance. Decentralisation has three dimensions—administrative (transfer of civil servants and public functions to the local level), fiscal (devolution of fiscal resources and revenue-generating powers), and political (devolution of decision-­making powers)—or a mixture of these. How does cyberdemocracy decentralise national and global politics? The cyberdemocracy system offers a mechanism that allows citizens to participate in the affairs of the state. Citizens can directly engage, monitor, and criticise the actions and policies of the government, a collective approach to managing public policy for the common good. In a representative democracy, people do not enjoy a direct role in the process of decision making. In the cyberdemocratic space, people can raise their opinion, vote for policies, provide directions, and initiate corrective measures if the decision-­makers fail to conduct their functions effectively and responsibly. The very essence of decentralisation is the direct participation of the citizen in administration. Under the cyberdemocratic system, citizens can exert their influence directly through bottom-up channels, by default avoiding many communication channels, propaganda machinery, and hierarchical departments that are expensive to maintain. The decentralised and direct democratic structure that cyberdemocracy offers can decentralise both national as well as global politics. Issues and decisions, regardless of whether they are local, national, or global, can be effectively attended via the cyber platforms (Touaf & Boutkhil, 2008), and citizens will have the ability to access the administrative services from anywhere in the world without the need to visit a particular office or administrative department as the data and details of administrative services are securely accessible via the internet.

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The main objectives of decentralised governance include the following: • To ensure citizens participate in the management of their affairs. • To value local initiatives. • To reduce the interventions of the central/state government over local affairs. • To decrease the financial burdens of the state. • To create the conditions for sustainable development through making civil society organisations more responsible. With regards to cyberdemocracy, it is evident that the institutional structure is not only in resonance with a decentralised system, but it can potentially strengthen the decentralisation through its key features such as active participation of the actual majority if not all citizens. Moreover, it will facilitate an enlightened understanding of social and political issues and give the equal right to participate in affairs of the state and the right to take control over the agenda (Margolis & Moreno-Riano, 2009). Cyberdemocracy reduces the issues of geographical location, allows the administration to be more responsive and accountable, and minimises the ‘tyranny of the majority’. The impetus behind cyberdemocracy is to put a system in place that prevents the concentration of power in the hands of a few individuals or a party. Cyberdemocracy empowers individuals and encourages them to participate in the collective decision-­ making process. Cyberdemocracy is the ultimate form of shared responsibility: a road needs to be repaired here, a clean-air initiative introduced there, all stakeholders are making collective decisions on the matter, and everyone must own responsibility for it. Such a system does not leave any chance for lobbyists to instruct lawmakers how to vote and, consequently, the meaning of sovereignty will undergo a complete transformation, rejecting notions of an omnipotent and all-pervasive state apparatus. The size of government will be reduced, yet the efficiency of public service delivery will be accelerated, avoiding many layers of the government hierarchy. The people will be the real sovereign, sharing equal power and responsibility. This form of participatory and inclusive democracy is the true meaning of power, the basis of ideal liberty. It is also highly efficient.

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This reality raises some pertinent questions. Societies have developed from primitive to agrarian, to industrial, to digital. Can there be a higher form of democracy such as cyberdemocracy as an alternative to representative democracy at the next stage of this modernisation process?

Barriers to Cyberdemocracy Some scholars are highly sceptical of the potential of cyberdemocracy to be a viable democratic model that succeeds where representative democracy fails (e.g., Barber, 1999; Dingeldey, 2019). Such scholars argue that the digital ecosystem is rife with disinformation, distraction, and misrepresentation and that this will render cyberdemocracy an ideal rather than a viable model. Thus, cyberdemocracy has barriers that must be overcome before it becomes the fourth, more participatory democracy. These barriers include but are not limited to issues of information, lack of inclusivity, limited internet access, emotional digital interactions, and the economic interests that dominate the virtual public sphere. The question becomes, then, whether deliberative mass participation in the political sphere is even possible under these conditions. One of the major barriers to cyberdemocracy is related to information. The internet is filled with ‘unfiltered and contradictory information’, much of which is also fake news (Dingeldey, 2019). Citizens may well find it difficult to parse out what information is real and what is fake. Without access to correct information, it is impossible to make an informed and rational decision. If most voices in the cyberdemocracy are making decisions based on false information, it would render democracy ineffective (Dingeldey, 2019). For cyberdemocracy to function as a true democracy, strides must be made to have the internet be a source of correct and reliable information so that citizens can make informed and rational decisions. Otherwise, cyberdemocracy will lack legitimacy as the voice of the people will be based on false information. This formation of opinion based on false information has already been seen. In recent years, the issue of Russian interference in US and international politics, including the Brexit vote, has raised several important

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concerns and some crucial questions for consideration. The problems that were created by the Russians were two-fold. First, they used trolling methods to create and spread false information. By this, fake accounts were created, and false information was sent to targeted populations of individuals to try to manipulate their political opinion. On one level, this was criticised because it was a foreign agent interfering in an election, and, on another level, this form of interference was built on political lies told by individuals that were not real. These dimensions must be going to be constant when one considers the future potential of cyberdemocracy. That is, there will always be ways of abusing the systems to manipulate perceptions, voting opinions, and election outcomes. A lack of true inclusivity is another barrier to cyberdemocracy. Dingeldey (2019) argues that ‘digital floods of information do not lead to pluralistic discourses, but digital fragmentation and segregation’. With social media and the internet, ‘groups separate themselves and will hardly interact’ (Dingeldey, 2019). The deliberation necessary for cyberdemocracy to function cannot occur with such segregation, with what Sunstein (2001) terms ‘deliberative enclaves’ forming instead. Instead of forming a cohesive whole of citizenry that is inclusive, divided groups may form in the virtual sphere, disallowing true political deliberation. Further, there is the issue of using artificial intelligence and data analytics to guide and source information. Individuals who use Google, Facebook, or Twitter are all targeted for advertising based on the choices that they make as users. For instance, if an individual is continually following links and reading sources from social media regarding a political viewpoint, they will automatically begin to receive similar information. Rather than being a free exchange of information based on the access of all perspectives and sources of knowledge, data analytics has created a situation where more significant fragmentation has occurred. Because individuals are being steered towards information that confirms their viewpoint and steered towards communities who share the same, it can be said that it has effectively created more hegemony and more division. There is greater hegemony given that individuals are continually fed information that confirms their current worldview, and this creates greater division because the opposite hegemonies are likewise being created.

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Online individuals are more likely to interact with groups, sources, and people that confirm their politics than individuals who might exchange and challenge that viewpoint. In this regard, it is being observed that although the internet has the potential to deliver a broader and more diverse framework on which to participate and politically engage socially, the actual result has been the opposite. Additionally, the dark side of technology and freedom has been the ease of hate speech and the dissemination of viewpoints that fundamentally challenge the democratic rights of targeted groups and individuals. The internet offers anonymity for posting and communicating, and it allows for closed groups of participants who control who their members are. There are many examples of hate groups that use conventional social media to organise and communicate, and it should be noted that a hate crime is one where someone’s safety and security are at stake because of the racist, sexist, xenophobic, or oppositional viewpoint of any kind. By hate, the principle of harm is essential because racism can incite violence and hateful communication can be understood as a form of emotional and psychological abuse, which is likewise a form of harm. It is important to stress that the freedom of cyberdemocracy raises several significant problems and how we think about the space as a public space is problematic. Another significant barrier to cyberdemocracy is access to the internet itself. Some scholars believe that internet access will be limited to the elite (e.g., Norris, 2001), even going so far as to argue that most users will be ‘male, young, and educated’ (Dingeldey, 2019). Internet access, knowledge of digital devices, and classes of active and passive users would limit the success of cyberdemocracy. With these barriers to participating in democracy, cyberdemocracy cannot truly be ‘inclusive, egalitarian, or participatory’ (Dingeldey, 2019). Fajemisin (2012) presents a position that maintains that equality is jeopardised and the very values that underpin democracy itself if there is no equity of access. Fajemisin (2012) emphasises that this presents considerable obstacles when it comes to international cyberdemocracy potential, as well as at every level of social participation. A fundamental problem with accessibility is the fact that cyberdemocracy utilises a new medium or occupies

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a new space that some individuals will never access. There are a host of reasons to suggest that there will be individuals who will not have access or will not acquire the ability to use the technologies or have the ability to use the technologies. There are also social barriers to consider given that the engagement with any activity is time-consuming, and it does require a financial commitment in terms of acquiring and maintaining technology. Accessibility, along with security, is a concern and consideration or a negative question that remains an obstacle of note towards the progress of further stages of cyberdemocracy (Fajemisin, 2012). It is particularly crucial because there is no separating this problem from the broader question of rights and there is no equality in cyberdemocracy that can be guaranteed. Although there is a broad range of research committed to overcoming such obstacles, it remains a fact that there will be individuals who will not enter this space. In keeping with the analogy of the marketplace or the agora versus hyper or cyberspace, it is a way of telling an individual that they have a vote in the system because they are physically not allowed to be impeded from voting. However, they are unable to walk to the city marketplace where ideas are exchanged, and knowledge is acquired or use a library. The lack of rationality that pervades the virtual public sphere limits the potential of cyberdemocracy. Dingeldey (2019) argues, provocative or extreme opinions are discussed much more than arguments. Quite often emotional debates, hate speech, and masses of vulgar, verbal violence dominate the arenas and harm the free speech that is necessary for a democracy.

Deliberation cannot occur in the virtual public sphere under these circumstances. Some of this is because participants in the virtual sphere are not acting as citizens because ‘they hide themselves in anonymity; and sometimes the participants are bots’ (Dingeldey, 2019). Reasoned, respectful debate based on correct information must be able to take place for cyberdemocracy to be truly deliberative and participatory. Because the internet is a commercialised space, Dingeldey (2019) and others argue that a true virtual public sphere cannot exist. Where there is potential for deliberation, there is also potential for economic gain

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(through commercialisation) and crime (through hacking, identity theft, promotion of false information, etc.). Dingeldey (2019) states, web 2.0 is driven by oligopolies, such as Facebook and Google. If people mostly become informed by and discuss by using the tools and algorithms of those companies, they may not get pure political information and debates, because of the interests of the dominating companies.

According to Dingeldey (2019), cyberdemocracy would only be possible through the ban of the ‘economic power of digital capitalism’, a highly unlikely scenario. There are also some problems concerning rights and the use of space regarding current online behaviour. These are considerations that would likewise impact cyberdemocracy such that it warrants some inspection. The manipulation of information is often referred to as misinformation and disinformation. They are both forms of false information with the critical difference being the intent. The latter is a deliberate, systematic campaign targeting specific audiences to dismiss criticism, distort facts, distract opponents, and dismay competitors through online and offline platforms. The former is the spread of inaccurate information online at an individual level without being aware of the facts or implications. The misinformers are often victims of the disinformers. Misinformation with political interference committed by the Russians is a two-tiered problem that highlights an essential dimension to rights and online information. First, one of the problems with trolling that is difficult to control is that the algorithms that control the flow of information can be tricked. For example, if a large group of fake users began to become friends of real individuals, the fake users would then have a direct impact on the information to which the real users were exposed. A tactic that the trolling activity used was to drive individuals to news articles and political materials that would, in the case of the US election, promote a pro-Republic Party or Donald Trump message. In the UK case, they would amplify pro-Brexit views. In terms of the issue of rights, this highlights the question of who owns one’s personal experience. If data about your online activity and who your friends are can be used to create tailored marketing feeds, this is a monetising of private experience

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for the sake of profit. One’s own experiences are being used and there is no compensation for it. In turn, the information is being resold and value is being created from the data. The trolls who created deliberate problems in the US election were able to achieve their ends because the data had already been monetised and they were very easily capable of paying for the profiles of social media users that would harmonise with the political messaging. The problem of space and an issue of ontology is an essential consideration concerning privacy and rights and an essential challenge and obstacle for the progress of cyberdemocracy is the ownership of data and the legal issue of confidentiality. Rights are a challenge to define concerning personal data and without a rigid prescriptive set of laws in place to protect this, there is a potential for unanticipated forms of manipulation. A good illustration of this type of rights problem is the current use of social credit scores in China that poses a critical danger. Chinese social credit scores factor in variables like whether an individual pays their bills on time, how much time they spend on online gaming, what their spending habits involve, who their friends are, and even the scores of their friends. These variables are only a small sample of several considerations whereby a series of algorithms create a profile that will have an impact on the life of the person. A social credit score will impact an individual’s ability to apply for credit or acquire a mortgage, and it will even stand in the way of receiving a passport to leave China. The central information system of the country is so centralised and integrated that it is coupled with facial recognition systems. Chinese individuals have photos taken just for this computer system. The system is so effective that an individual can illegally cross a street and then receive a ticket sent to their phone immediately. However, it is also a system that can track where individuals go and how they spend their time in public spaces, and these are serious considerations when it comes to the privacy rights potential of cyberdemocracy. One of the core issues that has interfered with politics and that involves privacy is the ill-defined area of what constitutes ownership. This requires defining the ownership of space. In the Periclean Age of Athens, which is regarded as the golden age of democracy, the agora was the city

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marketplace. However, it meant more specifically, the place where individuals would also go and exchange ideas. Space was a public space and there were formal laws and social conventions that allowed for the exchange of contrary viewpoints without infringing on the space of another individual in the shared space. In the cyber world, the shared space is not well defined and so potential abuses are occurring that are not illegal or are not subject to a civil code that is a shared definition of what is allowable in a public space. In a work titled Surveillance Capitalism, Zuboff (2019) argues that the commodification of individual experience is occurring, and it raises a question of ownership. If an individual’s web activity is tracked and is sold or commodified in any form, it follows that the private experience of an individual has been monetised without consent. Consider the analogy of a shoe company inserting tracking technology in their products and then using that information to increase their profit or someone else’s (or both). Instead of shoes, Zuboff (2019) argues that Google, Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, and many others use the technology of browsers, location devices, communications devices, computer operating systems, and telephone operating systems to capture and track private experience. Where a shoe company that protected the privacy but collected the experience of an individual for profit would be liable, the social apps and various other technologies that capture this same data have not only monetised it but also re-sold it to organisations that have and continue to manipulate it for harmful ends. Cyberspace is not well defined. When it comes to defining what shoes are and what a public space is, the rules of conduct and what is acceptable or a matter of right is almost self-evident; however, when space is different, those rules do not apply. In cyberspace, hate speech and the organisation of agendas and individuals that seek the direct infringement of rights for some others is common, and so too is the surveillance of private experiences that are, in turn, commodified without the individual receiving any compensation. A further vital issue that is widely represented in the literature of cyberdemocracy is security issues. The manipulation and capturing of information raise several concerns and considerations when it comes to what that potential is for governments and a potentially integrated network of

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governments with cyberdemocracy as a potentially more extensive network. With cyberdemocracy, there are considerations and concerns about underlying security at several levels, and there has been extensive abuse of systems documented. There is no reason to assume that this abuse will not continue to grow as eGovernment and online politics grow (Carayannis et al., 2018; Contucci, 2019). There are optimistic perspectives about the use of blockchain technology as a form of encryption, which has so far satisfied the security confidence levels of millions of individuals who trade in billions within cryptocurrencies of various types. At the same time that there are potential ways to ensure privacy and security for individuals, there are a number of nodes of consideration about security that expand a range of computer systems that virtually includes all ministries, agencies, departments, and so on. Likewise, there are digital voting systems used at polling stations that have been proven to be vulnerable (Carayannis et al., 2018; Rose et al., 2015; Schnoll, 2015). The complexity of the security problems of cyberdemocracy cannot be overemphasised, and, further, breaches of security are overwhelmingly caused by individuals who had access to a system rather than by intruders who have successfully penetrated a computer firewall. In other words, the human factor makes any complex system of computers vulnerable, given that the more nodes and users with access to data, the higher the risk of a security problem. The real security vulnerability is human, and no amount of technology or protocol systems of security can control for that problem with cyberdemocracy. This remains a crucial obstacle recognised widely in the literature.

 echnological Determinism: Crisis T of Legitimation and Cyberdemocracy Cyberdemocracy, or liquid democracy, has many barriers to overcome to be a viable political model true to democratic ideals. Considering these barriers, the question becomes whether deliberative mass participation in

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the political sphere is possible under these conditions and the extent to which cyberdemocracy, through democratic participation, can reconcile fragmentation, alienation, persistent risks to digital rights, and huge social inequalities. Technological determinism is a term that describes the technological progress of Western society as shaped by industrialism, and is in marked contrast to the idea of free will. When the Industrial Revolution began in the late 1700s, coal-driven energy created the mechanical energy that facilitated factory production. With factory production came the transformation from an agrarian lifestyle and cottage industry trades and crafts to large city living and forms of labour that were possible because of technology (Noble, 2017). The Industrial Revolution was a transformative and determining force on society such that every area of human relations was shaped as a result of it. Where progress was once marked by the industrial production of clothing in factories replacing homemade clothes and digital databases replacing paper files, technology has been the determining factor. With the advent of machine learning, the individuals who once had to program the systems that were replacing humans are less needed because programs are capable of self-correction and improvement. The term platform economy describes the current state whereby algorithms manage individuals. If an individual works for a car-sharing program and an individual uses one, they are brought together by a program rather than a human dispatcher. Technological determinism has been the defining social influence ever since the Industrial Revolution and its transformative impact has shaped human relations, geographical settlement, education, communications, and virtually every aspect of living above and beyond just work (De la Cruz Paragas & Lin, 2016). Society is now on the cusp of being shaped entirely in the political sphere, and this raises several fundamental problems regarding the basics of democracy, human rights, the significance of subjectivity, and the freedom of choice. Technological determinism has been extended into the political system and there is no reason to expect that it will not continue to progress. Cyberdemocracy is a growth area facilitated by technology, information systems, social networks, and digital sources for politically relevant

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information (Carayannis, 2014). Further, cyberdemocracy has the potential to continue to progress in areas specific to e-democracy or the use of online technologies for actual voter participation. Currently, there are automated digital systems for voting in numerous voting systems, and this raises several problems regarding privacy and security. However, the more important question is whether the risk to actual democracy is higher than the promise of virtual democracy (Carayannis, 2014, p. 10). In terms of cyberdemocracy, it has been demonstrated in recent years that the manipulation of social media has shaped or influenced election outcomes such as the US elections and the Brexit referendum. Furthermore, the hacking of political communications and digital voting systems has likewise demonstrated that there is a significant risk towards the progress of this form of technological determinism. There is greater access to an extensive political commons and virtual participation has grown more convenient. These are both promising strengths of these technologies to enhance equality in the political sphere, but they are not without several critical challenges. In terms of the risk that might be greater, the notion of equality itself is a crucial problem. Phrased in terms of the models of epistemology discussed so far, the greater equality promised by cyberdemocracy is more of an ‘ideal-type’ that might be challenged as too abstract. That is, it is abstracted from the human subjectivity that has had a historical tendency to exploit technologies for the sake of self-interest rather than a collective social benefit. Articulated in terms of the science of human spirit (Geisteswissenschaften tradition) it can be said that an analytic view of humans in history will yield a tendency of corruption and a compromised political system. In Ancient Greek terms, technology and its manipulation are akin to how Sophists used argumentation and language. That is, as a tool that facilitated corruption and the abuse of power or the acquisition of an unequal share of power. Where the Ancients used the language of persuasion to shape political opinion and the exercise of the individual right to a vote, cyberdemocracy creates the condition under which persuasion is achieved through the manipulation of means of communication such as social media (Dahlberg, 2000)

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Moreover, these are forms of manipulation that are automated. For example, social media will continue to provide links and information that reflect an already existing interest. If an individual is reading news that is associated with right-wing media, they will continue to receive more information based on their interests. While this can be said to be an important freedom, it shows how technology can be used to limit the choices where freedom itself can be exercised. Although the cyber environment ideally provides an abundance of perspectives and information, the actual use of it in its current form is narrow, and it has arguably created more fragmentation and less democracy in the form of a shared mutual recognition in our equality along with individual differences.

 ransforming the Ecology of Mobilisations T (Extremism, Populism, Post-Truth) The banality of evil is a concept that Hannah Arendt used to describe the culture that facilitated German fascism in the Second World War and it is a framework employed by Henry Giroux (2018) to describe the current post-truth populism that often lapses into violent extremism. Concerning the notion of banality as it is articulated in Arendt’s book on the Nazi, Adolph Eichmann, Giroux writes that banality is ‘a type of thoughtlessness, the inability to think, and the disavowal of any form of self-­reflection and critical inquiry’ (Giroux, 2018, p. 220). Banality is unquestionably one of the adjectives that can describe current discourses that are inherently racist. In most respects, the lack of sophistication underlying racist positions is mostly no different than in past forms. This fact alone speaks to the lack of thoughtful engagement. At the bottom of Plato’s Cave in the Republic, it is the recognition of the ‘difference’ between the shadow makers and the shadows themselves that allows for progress or elevation upward along the divided line or out of the cave. How much self-reflection is required for the idea of a humanistic or even natural right of world populations? The banality that Arendt points to is one where no differentiation or nuanced awareness brought about

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through self-reflection has created thoughtlessness as a problem of consciousness, and thoughtlessness is a form of violent actions against innocent individuals which are unquestionably a form of evil. Racist vandalism and hate crimes against individuals have increased throughout Europe, the UK, and the US. The banality of thoughtlessness that typifies populism, extremism, and the post-truth world has been furthered with the emergence of a platform society. In the pre-internet world, the consumption of media and news was confined to newspapers, radio, and television. These media represented a narrow source for information overall. It was unquestionably the case that more individuals were consuming the same sources of information. On the one hand, this creates a hegemony; on the other, it creates a common language, a general set of values expressed through the media itself, and a common understanding of what is happening in the world and what is worth covering. The internet has created more fragmentation because of the broader range of media sources, and with the broader range of sources comes a more specialised market and, also, the rise of post-truth sources where fact-checking is rigorous. One of the reasons that populism-driven media has been influential is because of the common criticism they level against the elites. A shift away from conventional media outlets in the minds of populists means a shift away from concentrated ownership of elites who systematically ignore the interests of the working or middle classes. One of the more severe distinctions between old and new media is the fact-checking of older sources, and even though this is not perfect, there is also the larger incentive within these organisations to avoid legal libel. In other words, there are conventional journalistic practices regarding the presentation of facts and what they entail but also a secondary incentive because media outlets can be sued when they get these facts wrong and legal departments are a normal part of any media organisation. Populism in the post-truth era can be said to be a negative feedback loop in that the more that is consumed, the more there is produced. Platforms like Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram further narrow the scope or breadth/depth of knowledge because they provide sources that match an individual’s interests and political perspective. When interests are only

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mirrored, there is less of a chance of a challenging or alternative viewpoint entering their private rather than public space. Following the dismantlement of the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires emerged the embodiment of new nation-states. The organisation of society and government formation was based on a misunderstood form of democracy that Churchill (1947) referred to as ‘… the worst form of government except for all those other forms that have been tried from time to time’, being less bad than Nazism and fascism. This was a system that enabled the minority to delegate their political rights to representatives in order to exercise power on behalf of the entire population, through which the rule of the organised political elites emerged. It is a process that can be described as mis-embodiment. Decades of such mis-embodiment have resulted in mounting public discontent and created a political vacuum that is often exploited by the populists who are more concerned with nativism over globalism and often encourage irrational decisions like Brexit without considering the long-term implications. Without a viable and robust mechanism that encourages the re-embodiment of the nation-state, encourages individuals to think globally and act locally, and instils the notion of collective responsibility, decision making based on facts, inclusiveness, and diversity, there is a real risk of populism exploiting cyberdemocracy, polarising the social sphere, and further weakening the nation-state. Hence, extremism, populism, and post-truth are the significant challenges that cyberdemocracy needs to address while building its vision, mission, and structure on the will and participation of the people. Extremism can be in any form. It can be religious, ethnic, environmental, and economic. Social media and the cybersphere have played a vital role in legitimising and popularising the extremist ideologies. The echo chambers of cybersphere can politically brainwash and polarise users and alienate them from expressing dissenting opinions. After the terrorist attack in London, the British Prime Minister Theresa May criticised Google and Facebook for breeding extremist terrorism in cyberspace. She also argued for an international regulatory framework that can effectively monitor and control extremist ideas spreading through social platforms (Triffit, 2018). Studies show that extremism and the breeding of extremist ideas develop mainly because of the disillusionment

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with mainstream media, the political system, and institutions. There is a high level of mistrust towards government among the youth across the world. In Australia, for example, public trust in democracy declined drastically over the last few years. The percentage of people who trust the government in the US is less than 30% (Triffit, 2018). When the popularity of democratic governance declines and the trust factor diminishes considerably, people think about alternatives which can satisfy their expectations. Often, extremism exploits such alienated feelings. The election of Trump and the popular votes received for Brexit reflect the growth of extremist ideas as a reaction to their disillusionment with mainstream politics and its outcome (Triffit, 2018). In the case of cyber-terrorism, it is evident that cyberspace and social media platforms have been widely used by extremist groups to propagate their ideas and manufacture a well-designed process of online hate. The internet is used as a tool to recruit terrorists, attract vulnerable people, and spread their ideology to others, or worse still, live-stream violence to a global audience just as the Christchurch white supremacist terrorist did as he went on a shooting spree at two mosques. As Sunstein noted, two dangers of cyberspace promote extremism: it provides the chance to the individual user to filter out the content they want to see and the ability of the platform itself to present the content based on our priority (Hoppe, 2001; Sunstein, 2009). Sunstein summarised the danger of extremism in the following words: Unplanned, unanticipated encounters are central to democracy itself … They are important to ensure against fragmentation, polarisation, and extremism, which are predictable outcomes of any situation in which like-­ minded people speak only with themselves. (Sunstein, 2009, p. 300)

The rise of populism is closely linked to extremist politics and post-­ truth. Although populism is not a new phenomenon, it became popular after the global financial crisis. As a political strategy, populism used to attract masses based on rhetoric public policies which are intended to exploit the public resentment, especially after a social and political crisis (Maldonado, 2017). It is an effort to get support from the masses through

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non-institutional channels and direct interaction through the media. Donald Trump used populism as an effective strategy to gain power through his rhetoric on the issue of immigrants (Maldonado, 2017). Populism is based on sentiments, not on facts. Moreover, the result is the rise of post-truth. Similarly, the post-truth phenomenon has emerged as a viable medium to manufacture consent. In post-truth, a culture of emotion is developed largely ignoring the factual basis of information (Gewin, 2017). We now live in the era of corporate media, which means that the news, the facts that are supposed to be given to us objectively, are filtered through the bottom line of corporate profits. This means that any story the news relates is going to be given a ‘spin’. The story is going to be told in such a way that it will gather the most attention and, thus, make the most money. As such, it is practically impossible to discern the truth of any incident under the current arrangement. Everything we read on the internet or hear from the mainstream media is someone’s interpretation of the event. These outlets depend upon their political affiliation and air specific parts of the PM/President’s speech to influence public opinion and confuse the masses. In recent years, governments, as well as social movements, have used this method of disseminating disinformation to mislead and brainwash their citizens, instigate wars, and blackmail foreign regimes (Tallis, 2016). In cyberspace, post-truth has gained momentum through the popularity of alternative media. Challenging the news in mainstream media, alternative media often use rhetoric and present facts without valid evidence or sources. Since regulation on online media is lower, this tendency is quite high in the virtual public sphere and plays a significant role in misleading the people (Schackmuth, 2018). Post-truth is one of the essential foundations of extremist groups in social media. At the same time, alternative media provide the much-needed space for the marginalised and socially excluded groups that are ignored by the mainstream media (Schackmuth, 2018). Extremism, populism, and post-truth are realities of the cyber age. Cyberdemocracy needs a balanced approach to these tendencies. Cyberdemocracy is a concept of infinite possibilities, yet the alchemy of

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power politics can always dilute the inherent spirit and vitality. An uncontrolled and privatised social platform indeed offers dangers as well. In the era of the digital revolution, addressing inequality and the alienation of citizens from the decision-making process requires a multifaceted normative and policy approach that puts human beings at the centre of politics. Therefore, there is a need to check extremism in any form. Cyberdemocracy needs to be socially sustainable in reducing poverty and inequality; it must be culturally sustainable in protecting pluralism, diversity, and values, and simultaneously alienate religion from politics.

Bibliography Barber, B. (1999). Three scenarios for the future of technology and strong democracy. Political Science Quarterly, 113(4), 573–589. Carayannis, E. G. (2014). From development as democracy to innovation as development. In E. G. Carayannis, D. F. Campbell, & M. P. Efthymiopoulos (Eds.), Cyber-­ development, cyber-democracy and cyber-defense (pp. 5–22). Springer-Verlag. Carayannis, E. G., Campbell, D. F., & Efthymiopoulos, M. P. (Eds.). (2018). Handbook of cyber-development, cyber-democracy, and cyber-defense. Springer. Churchill, W. S. (1947, November 11). House of Commons Speech. London, UK: The National Archives. Contucci, P. (2019). The future of digital democracy: An interdisciplinary approach. Springer. Dahl, R. (1989). Democracy and its critics. Yale University Press. Dahlberg, L. J. (2000). The internet and the public sphere: A critical analysis of the possibility of online discourse enhancing deliberative democracy. PhD thesis. Massey University. https://mro.massey.ac.nz/bitstream/handle/10179/2273/02_whole.pdf De la Cruz Paragas, F., & Lin, T. T. (2016). Organizing and reframing technological determinism. New Media & Society, 18(8), 1528–1546. Dingeldey, P. (2018). The next wave away from democracy? http://blogs.oii. ox.ac.uk/policy/wp-content/uploads/sites/77/2018/09/IPP2018Dingeldey.pdf Dingeldey, P. (2019). A fourth transformation of democracy? Liquid democracy, supra-­national democracy and the fate of participation. Law, Democracy and

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Development, 23(1), 181–201. https://doi.org/10.17159/2077-4907/2019/ ldd.v23b7 Fajemisin, J. O. (2012). Cyber-democracy and its impact on politics. Humanities and Social Sciences Review, 1(3), 435–446. Gewin, V. (2017). Communication: Post-truth predicaments. Nature, 541, 425–427. Giroux, H. A. (2018). The public in peril: Trump and the menace of American authoritarianism. Routledge. Hoppe, H. (2001). Democracy: The god that failed. Transaction Publishers. Maldonado, M. A. (2017). Rethinking populism in the digital age: Social networks, political affects and post-truth democracies. Congreso AECPA, Santiago de Compostela, 20–22 September. Margolis, M., & Moreno-Riano, G. (2009). The prospect of internet democracy. Ashgate. Merkel, W. (2014). Is capitalism compatible with democracy? Zeitschrift fuer Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft. https://projects.iq.harvard.edu/files/ mobilized_contention/files/merkel__is_capitalism_compatible_with_ democracy.pdf Noble, D. (2017). Forces of production: A social history of industrial automation. Routledge. Norris, P. (2001). Digital divide: Civic engagement, information poverty, and the internet world wide. Cambridge University Press. Papacharissi, Z. (2004). Democracy online: Civility, politeness, and the democratic potential of online discussion groups. New Media & Society, 6(2), 259–283. Papacharissi, Z. (2011). On convergent supersurfaces and public spheres. International Journal of Electronic Governance, 4(1/2), 9–17. Pew Research Center. (2020b, June). Experts predict more digital innovation by 2030 aimed at enhancing democracy. Rose, J., Persson, J. S., Heeager, L. T., & Irani, Z. (2015). Managing e-Government: Value positions and relationships. Information Systems Journal, 25(5), 531–571. Schackmuth, A. (2018). Extremism, fake news and hate: Effects of social media in the post-truth era. PhD Thesis. DePaul University. https://via.library. depaul.edu/etd/245/ Schnoll, H. J. (2015). E-Government: information, technology, and transformation. Routledge. Sunstein, C. R. (2001). Republic 2.0. Princeton University Press.

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Sunstein, C. R. (2009). Going to extremes: How like minds unite and divide. Oxford University Press. Szabo, A. (2007). The impact of the internet on the public sphere and on the culture industry: A study of blogs, social news sites and discussion forums. Master’s Thesis. University of Vaasa. https://core.ac.uk/download/ pdf/197963736.pdf Tallis, B. (2016). Living in post-truth: New perspectives. Interdisciplinary Journal of Central & East European Politics and International Relations, 24(1), 7–18. Touaf, L., & Boutkhil, S. (2008). The world as a Global Agora: Critical perspectives on public space. Cambridge Scholars Publishing. Triffit, M. (2018). A growing mistrust in democracy is causing extremism and strongman politics to flourish. The Conversation, 10 July. Retrieved October 11, 2020, from https://theconversation.com/a-growing-mistrust-in-democracy-is-causing-extremism-and-strongman-politics-to-flourish-98621 Zuboff, S. (2019). The age of surveillance capitalism: The fight for a human future at the new frontier of power. Public Affairs.

8 Civic Engagement and the Privatisation of the Public Sphere

 he Geisteswissenschaften Tradition: Free Will T and Political Agency Free Will is seen as ‘individual’ freedom of expression, speech, and thought that in theory at least underpins the very notion of democracy. An appropriate concept to begin with therefore is Geisteswissenschaften because it is a concept that is about the spirit of individuality or to put it another way, ‘subjective thought’. Geisteswissenschaften is however a curious idea, because it appears— and remember appearances are not all that are made out to be—to have an inherent contradiction at its core. It incorporates human subjectivity simultaneously as a problem, and yet, as a model for approaching behaviour in scientific terms. The term ‘Geist’ translates from the German into English as spirit and Wissenschaften translates as science. The concept means the science of the human spirit, and it is meant to be distinguished from natural science (Dilthey, 1991). Geisteswissenschaften emerged in the thought of Wilhelm Dilthey within the academic tradition of Germany, and it came to be associated with the humanities as opposed to the hard sciences. Whereas Weber used the ideal-type as an abstract ideal to accommodate individual human © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 H. Karem, Cyberdemocracy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-27544-9_8

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behaviour such that it either conforms to the ideal or it does not, Geisteswissenschaften leaves subjectivity open (Harrington, 2000, p. 438). That is, subjectivity is not something that can be reduced the way the natural sciences explain phenomena according to natural laws. To use a contemporary example from the philosophy of the mind, one can reduce the human mind to neuroscience and the patterns of brain activity. However, individuals do not always recognise those patterns in their thinking. Consciousness and self-consciousness remain distinct from the reductive model of humans to biology such as neuroscience. For example, the magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) machine can demonstrate how parts of the brain interact with each other, and it can create a model whereby thinking is viewed as a pattern of neurological activity. However, when an individual is being observed in an MRI, they are not experiencing what is being observed. Instead, they are experiencing subjective mental representations, subjective emotions, and very individual memories. The concept of Geisteswissenschaften attempts to isolate what is subjective from what is objective and the current emphasis using neuroscience and subjective consciousness demonstrates the problem identified that remains a problem today. Objectively, an individual is not a ‘ghost in a machine’, but they are conscious. Their consciousness and self-­awareness might have a physiological explanation, but the physiology does not entirely account for or accommodate the individual who is living that experience. As an approach or as a method, the goal of this distinction between the science of spirit (Geist) and natural science is to allow for subjectivity by recognising when and where it occurs in the natural world. This is an essential notion for Dilthey (Harrington, 2000) and those who expanded on it because it creates the condition under which free will is possible. In political terms, it is significant because it can further allow for individual exceptions to predictable behaviour. The politics of democracy are often understood as patterns of self-interest, but often, these structured behaviours have exceptions. In turn, these exceptions might need to be understood beyond the democratic model itself.

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Under normal circumstances, one would assume that individuals acting out of rational self-interest would identify with the political bodies that represent those interests. In the United States, for example, there is a voting pattern whereby individuals accept the ideology of the owning class rather than embrace the ideology of their class. While a structural or natural scientific method of looking at behaviour would infer that those individuals ought to vote for the services and policies that serve their interests as a class, this is not what is occurring. Therefore, a social scientific model that maintains that individuals are defined by class and, therefore, would rationally support the policies that improve the reasoned self-interest of their class, has critical explanatory limitations. If it were not the case that there is the individual freedom to choose between competing or different interests, there would be no practical explanation of how it is even possible to make such choices. Again, using the basic tenets of economic behaviour, individuals tend to try to maximise their gains and minimise their losses (Stenberg, 2018, p. 76). Similarly, John Stuart Mill’s theory of utilitarianism argued that a person desires their own happiness and will act in such a way as to ensure this happiness (Brink, 2007). As such, representative democracy should pursue that which provides happiness to the most people. For example, there is no question that free healthcare would be a rational self-interested choice under normal circumstances of observation and that voters would choose a free healthcare system to ensure their own happiness and well-being. However, this voting pattern has not been observed in the United States. Individuals who struggle financially and would benefit from such a system often vote against this system. Individuals often vote and make choices that are not rational in terms of serving their real interests—even under conditions where they understand their interests. One of the main assumptions about economics and democratic processes is that behaviour can be modelled by examining and analysing self-interest. The notion of Geisteswissenschaften, therefore, brackets or isolates the subjectivity of individuals so that it can be better understood. This means that the subject is better understood in terms of the limitations and boundaries of approaching the social and economic relations of people. In keeping with the example of the working classes supporting private

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healthcare, this model allows for understanding the subjective decision-­ making and those forces that might or shape and influence it. In this instance, there is an ideology that often shapes the way individuals behave that stray beyond the rational model of self-interest. In the United Kingdom, for example, government-run systems are often portrayed as forms of socialism, and many believe that socialism is antithetical to democracy and individual choice and freedom. There are values and social forces that create the conditions in which disadvantaged individuals continue to perpetuate this state rather than work towards maximising their benefits. Although the problem is more complex than this, this example shows exactly what might be called subjective and individual freedom and how it is that those free choices are made. If there were no freedom of choice or subjective individuality, it would follow that behaviour in voting and economics would be predictable based on rational self-interest.

 evitalising Civic Engagement Through R Cyberdemocracy In his monograph Democracy in the Digital Age, Wilhelm (2000) gives four key features for online spaces that will enable cyberdemocracy to be successful. These four features are useful in evaluating the potential of cyberdemocracy and whether it can truly replace representative democracy. Considering Wilhelm’s (2000) features of antecedent resources, inclusiveness, deliberation, and design will allow for a thorough evaluation of cyberdemocracy’s potential to be a valid alternative, democratic model. Wilhelm (2000, p. 21) argues for a careful study of cyberdemocracy, as scholars and politicians alike ‘tend to view technology as the great equalizer, possessing magical powers that can wake up a sleepwalking democracy’. Given that Wilhelm’s research into cyberdemocracy’s potential occurred over 20 years ago, it is certainly worthwhile to revisit his features and consider them considering current technological advancement to contribute further to scholarship on the merits of cyberdemocracy.

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A comprehensive study of the role of technology in the political sphere notes just how little is known about this relationship (Robbin et al., 2004, p. 414). Given the rapid transformation of technology to a more interactive format, the next paragraphs will consider Wilhelm’s four key features of a successful cyberdemocratic space in terms of more recent scholarship. Wilhelm (2000, p. 32) defines antecedent resources as the ‘skills and capacities that a person brings to the table to achieve a certain (political) functioning’. In terms of cyberdemocracy, this means that for cyberdemocracy to function, individuals must have basic computer literacy and the skills to use and participate in the online spaces. They must also have access to the digital platforms that would be needed to participate in cyberdemocracy. Osvaldo Larancuent estimates that today ‘50% of the global population has access to digital platforms to participate in democracy. But this number will improve as many governments will reduce the digital divide’ (Pew Research Center, June 2020b, p. 22). In 2000, 48% of American adults stated that they did not use the internet. By 2021, only 7% of American adults say that they do not use the internet (Pew Research Center, April 2021a). The digital landscape is changing quickly and the lack of internet access and internet adoption that Wilhelm proposed in his text is quite outdated. As internet usage has become rapidly more prevalent, both in the United States and worldwide, the potential for cyberdemocracy to function as a democratic model that allows for a greater level of individual participation has increased. However, increased access does not mean that Wilhelm’s requirement of antecedent resources has been met regarding cyberdemocracy. While access may be widespread, misinformation still abounds and is another barrier to both representative and cyber democracy. Experts are, however, relatively hopeful that the next decade will bring more digital literacy education, fact-checking tools, and more people demanding transparency and truth from political institutions (Pew Research Center, June 2020b, p. 6). These changes will be crucial if cyberdemocracy is to become the standard democratic model. Inclusiveness is the ‘long-standing commitment in democratic social orders to universal participation in political decision making’ (Wilhelm, 2000, p. 33). In this sense, cyberdemocracy must not exclude any group

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from participation to be truly democratic. It seems that technology and cyberspace would lead to greater inclusiveness in the political sphere. However, some scholars have argued that this technology has led to greater inequality in political participation (see, e.g., Luke, 1998; Roper, 1998). In contrast, Norris (1999, p. 84) writes that the virtual democracy ‘lowers barriers to participation and widens access to those currently excluded from the policymaking process’. Melissa Michelson, a scholar of political inclusiveness, feels that ‘by 2030 we will see increased pushback against the negatives of the digital age in the form of new technologies, more fact-checking, and more skepticism … What I see happening already is that people are more cynical but also more likely to engage in various forms of political participation, both on and offline’ (Pew Research Center, June 2020b, p. 5). Stowe Boyd predicts ‘a grassroots movement’ led by younger generations that will ‘lead to large-scale political reforms, such as universal health care, direct democracy, a new set of rights for individuals and a large set of checks on the power of corporations and political parties’ (Pew Research Center, June 2020b, p. 13). Technology has already provided broader access to courts for ‘those who otherwise face significant issues (childcare, absence from work, attorney costs)’ in a cost-effective way using e-courts (Pew Research Center, June 2020b, p. 23). Thus, for cyberdemocracy to be a viable democratic model, it must be inclusive. This inclusivity, once characterised by those who had access to the internet and those who did not (Wilhelm, 2000), is now more nuanced and requires the mobilisation of those who have disengaged from the political process. New technology platforms, such as YouTube, are beginning to take on this role of mobilisation in cyberspace, ‘fostering whole new methods for generating awareness about various issues, educating the public and mobilizing communities to take action’ (Pew Research Center, June 2020b, p. 39). In this sense, the virtual public sphere can be used to increase participation in democracy, and cyberdemocracy must strive to see this trend continue. For Wilhelm (2000, p. 34), deliberation means that ‘interlocutors in a political debate need to provide reasons to support their arguments, reasons that can be validated intersubjectively in a public space free from the

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interference of corporate powers seeking to mobilize purchasing power or entrenched political actors attempting to manipulate voter preference’. This means that cyberdemocracy needs to provide a deliberative space that allows all voices to be heard, not just those that are the most dominant. Robbin et al. (2004, p. 423) assert that the ‘ideal of participatory and deliberative democracy is confronted by the reality of substantial empirical evidence that has accumulated over the last fifty years’. They note that ‘large numbers of people do not participate in the political process or civic life; civic engagement and trust have declined; and most people lack the necessary political skills and resources, such as time and money, are not well informed about political issues, and have low levels of interest in politics’ (Robbin et al., 2004, p. 423). These are all hurdles that both representative democracy and cyberdemocracy must overcome to function effectively. The Pew Research Center’s canvassing of experts is quite hopeful for the ability of technology to solve some of these problems, as 69% of the experts surveyed felt that technology would ‘significantly mitigate problems’ in ‘democratic institutions and representation’ (Pew Research Center, June 2020b, p. 3). The online public sphere might offer an excellent opportunity for deliberation, but political engagement must increase for this online deliberative public sphere to succeed. Finally, design is related to ‘whether a network is interactive, moderated, secure, and uncensored, with sufficient capacity reserved for noncommercial purposes’ (Wilhelm, 2000, p. 34). Cyberdemocracy must take place on a platform not controlled by large corporations and where all are allowed to freely express their opinions and support them with evidence. Ethan Zuckerman highlights the importance of such a system, noting the need for ‘mass innovation in design of social tools that help us bridge fragmentation and polarization, bring diversity into our media landscapes and help find common ground between disparate groups. With these as conscious design goals, technology could be a powerful force for civic change’ (Pew Research Center, June 2020b, pp. 8–9). Cyberdemocracy must fulfil Wilhelm’s design requirements, which is a difficult task. However, with many believing that Big Tech will be held accountable and new platforms will be developed that do not rely on

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tracking-based advertising (Pew Research Center, June 2020b), such a design may well be plausible soon. In the existing political arrangement of representative democracy, there are social and economic inequalities and a lack of opportunities that contribute to social disintegration. Many people remain excluded from the political process, and the hopes, aspirations, and concerns of those who have no chance to express themselves are frequently overlooked and ignored. According to the United Nations, ‘entrenched power systems that tend to favour a select minority reinforce these inequalities and discourage social integration’ (UNDP, 2005). In this current era of escalating religious and ethnic conflicts across the world, only social integration will lead to peace and harmony. Cyberdemocracy can engender greater social integration through revitalising democratic life and modalities of civic engagement. Since all members of the society enjoy equal rights and liberty and take part in the affairs of the country, it will undoubtedly ensure the empowerment of all, including the poorest and marginalised (Dubow, 2017). Civic engagement implies political activism, deliberations, problem solving, and participation in shaping the culture. In cyberdemocracy, it is argued that society can be more tangibly felt in the cyber public sphere than the offline world. The social platforms, including blogs, social media, petition platforms, discussion forums, crowdfunding sites, and voting sites, allow expanded opportunity to participate in political as well as civic affairs (Norris, 2001). Participants can read and compare news from diverse sources, collect valid information on a particular issue, share information with other members in the online network, send emails to policymakers, discuss the alternative policy options with them, lead campaign for a specific local/ global cause, and so forth (Norris, 2001). While one can engage in these activities without a physical presence, it attracts many people, particularly the young. On the one hand, it enhances citizen-to-citizen engagement, and on the other hand, it strengthens the citizens-to-state interface using the same platform (Norris, 2001). Cyberdemocracy can help revitalise democratic life and bring about new modalities of civic engagement. However, there are growing concerns about the transparency of how and where data collection/

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interpretation occurs with proprietary communications software. There is also concern about the imbalance towards younger users over and against the older populations. In a 2016 media conference, the former German chancellor, Angela Merkel, articulated her concerns about younger cohorts being more engaged with the algorithms that are not transparent about how the information is used and how it is used to make it more addictive (Connolly, 2016). The usage of technologies as an addictive behaviour can be measured in terms of the proliferation of the usage, the number of hours spent, the mental health consequences (e.g., depression and anxiety), and the need for various stimulus generating interactions such as those that would provoke the pleasure reward system of the brain to produce dopamine and oxytocin. The connection between the algorithms and social engagement does not necessarily mean the private collection of information and the neurological manipulation of users. Just as there is a platform economy that is growing based on profit incentive systems, so too with the open-­ source economy whereby knowledge and software are shared such that virtual co-operatives are just as possible as virtual private entities who extract profit, likewise, in the political sense of openness. There is not much precluding that engagement can generate more of it, but it would require transparency to recognise that it is legitimate entirely. By this, it is implied in terms of the legislative process and how that legislative process is processed itself in a virtual environment. In terms of the nominal nature of a historicist like Gramsci or Weber, the system as a structure can potentially be used to measure the proportional age representation more widely. The age difference means significant differences in terms of qualitative distinctions, but it is also a further opposition that has had broad implications because there is a very quantitative turnout in terms of representation. For individuals who vote in a physical or conventional sense of the term, a cyber environment might be viewed as a means of invigorating participation by allowing for some form of representation with minimal time commitment. Further, it can potentially be a system that instantly calibrates with some accuracy as to the proportion of a population that is a specific age group such that it is adjusted. For instance, if there were only ten

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millennials/youth for every 100 over-55 voters, the proportion can be adjusted for turnout. This is a shift in the way we think about representation and democracy. One of the critical questions raised by Angela Merkel is one that addresses the relationship between the individual and the system. If the system is not transparent, then there is equity with what can be done with primary data. Without understanding unanticipated consequences and knowing the cybersecurity problems that are widespread in existing systems, it follows that there is an underlying pessimism towards a system that can be either a beast or a human according to the laws that govern it. However, the revitalising effect of cyberspace is not a straightforward and automatic process. These transformations in a digital democracy are influenced mainly by the changes in the offline world (Dubow, 2017). Globalisation, technological innovation, demographic shifts, and destabilisation of traditional identities have immensely contributed to the development of enhanced interest in cyber-politics and civic engagement. The ‘imagined community’ and civic engagement based on the imaginary brotherhood may be limited or distorted by echo-chamber, post-truth, and populist projections that have already affected the objectivity and neutrality of the internet (Dubow, 2017). How can the modalities of civic engagement be revitalised? In addition to the education mentioned earlier, one crucial aspect in the context of post-truth and extremism is the access to accurate data by all citizens in an easily understandable manner. All the stakeholders need to have objectively presented and synthesised data regarding political and civic problems. The second dimension is strengthening citizen voices by providing them with equal chances to interact with the leaders and decision-­makers. Here, marginality and diversity should not be limiting factors. Thirdly, citizen-to-citizen communication on the online forum needs to be used to mobilise communities and expand the size beyond geographical boundaries (Dubow, 2017). This type of engagement in the cybersphere will result in what Habermas has described much earlier as the ‘universal communicative community’. Collective participation in public affairs through networks and networking sites certainly enhance collective self-determination, which is critical for the success of a functioning democracy (Habermas, 1991).

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Everyone needs to have a voice in how they want to be governed. In a cyberdemocratic system, no one person can take over because everyone has a voice and an opportunity to make laws and decide what is good or not good for the populace. Also, to utilise human psychology in the political system, this approach based on civic engagement will emphasise pride and responsibility for what they develop, whether that is a social programme, government, or even building a road. This will also encourage cooperation, unity, and, finally, peace (Dijck et al., 2018). Governance cannot be effective unless and until the individuals are prepared to engage themselves in making it better. In this context, Jefferson’s words to William Charles Jarvis remain relevant: I know of no safe deposition of the ultimate power of society but the people themselves, and if we think them not enlightened enough to exercise their control with a wholesome discretion, the remedy is not to take it from them but to inform their discretion through education. This is the true corrective of abuses of constitutional power.

The main concern of civic engagement visualised in cyberdemocracy is how to take back the power from bureaucracy and corporate and expand the concept of citizenship beyond the traditional functions of casting a vote. Though the movement for such engagement was able to create resonance across the world recently, it failed to restructure the existing democratic system mainly because it was limited to students and young generation who use digital technology. Thus, most of the approaches towards greater civic engagement through digital platforms could not offer a pragmatic strategy to deconstruct the political systems towards a participatory model. Though there are many models and approaches towards greater civic engagement, all these models focus mainly on two issues. First, they are concerned with the inability of the representative democracy to address the fundamental aspirations and expectations of the people. Second, these models are based on a deep commitment to inclusion, equality, fairness, and freedom. The democratic potential and practical relevance of cyber communities, however, depend on strengthening the networkorganisational capabilities, linkages, and ability to derive accurate data on issues.

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Additionally, cyberdemocracy is growing in interest because of the promise it holds to potentially deliver greater access to our collective state and the services that are meant to represent our interests as citizens. Further, there is an enormous potential to expand the levels of engagement within the broader context of cyberdemocracy. The following will outline various strategies of online civic engagement that involve the functioning of government services, the creation of legislation, and the election of representatives. These are essential dimensions of cyberdemocracy. The positive potential of expanding the marketplace of ideas and the marketplace of exchange of this broad range of data or knowledge is unquestionably the most utopian of all cyberdemocracy considerations, and this will be a focus in terms of the positive dimensions of cyberdemocracy. However, the space of this public space remains to be defined, and there are both barriers to access and concerns about security that remain vital considerations. It will be argued in the following that there is a tendency of individuals and organisations to take advantage of digital systems and manipulate them. Currently, what is regarded as cyberspace is not well defined and, in turn, neither is the issue of ownership and the rights about privacy. Just as the city marketplace in ancient Athens had rules of social convention and conduct as well as legal rights ensuring the safety of individuals who exchanged ideas within it, the space of cyberspace requires the same. This will be maintained as one of the critical obstacles along with access and security. Although the same democratic growth can happen as it did in Athens, ensuring that it happens for and with the collective interests of all citizens poses some challenges and if cyberdemocracy is to succeed, it must be rigorous and uncompromising about reflecting the values or ideals of equality. There are several vital intersections between cyberdemocracy and existing and growing digital services offered by the government. This is a growing area that is now referred to as eGovernment (Fajemisin, 2012; Meier, 2012). There is no separating cyberdemocracy from what the government functions to do in general and in brief, the elected representatives are there to improve and maintain government services. Since the

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1990s, government services have been increasingly integrated with online technologies. One of the robust cases that can be made about the preference of cyberdemocracy over conventional forms of political interaction and governance is a case that maintains that there is already a growing and existing body of government that is interactive. In a future collaborative environment, there is a separation of the action of collaboration or government participation and the information that is available (Fajemisin, 2012; Meier, 2012). Currently, eGovernment is broken down into general areas that include procurement, contracting, services, and assistance. These are productive and two-way web-based interactive exchanges. Procurement involves the contract and tendering process for services that the government will outsource to non-governmental organisations. One of the crucial dimensions of this process is the issue of transparency through exchanges and the selection process. A bid is supposed to succeed in the UK system of government when it is a competitive bid or less expensive than the others and when the qualifications and work proposal are likewise measured against other bidders. The process is rigorously audited and monitored, and it has been the case that the government has both made postings available for contracts available online. How to apply and the follow-up information regarding how the process was conducted and finalised are also available online. The fact that this is online makes it accessible and transparent when compared with older models of the process. Along with procurement, services are another growth area for eGovernment. This includes any exchange, transaction, renewal, application, and so forth that might have at one time been a paper transaction. Anything from a driver’s license renewal, income tax payment, or building permit application can be done online. These were services that at one time would have had to have been conducted by paper and often in person (Sun et al., 2015). There is no question that there are advantages to this form of digitisation or creation of eGovernment and this is measured in terms of cost-­ efficiency through reduced labour costs and greater access and in particular, access for people who might be geographically remote or have some form of disability or mobility problem. The final existing and

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growing area of web-based formal exchanges include assistance and support (Meier, 2012; Rose et al., 2015). Again, this is a wide-ranging area of services that cover several ministries and services. Highlights might include the use of telephone health services which allow for telephone-­ based and video conference–based health consultations both for clients and for professionals that might be servicing remote populations. Another form of assistance would be the interactive posting boards that can facilitate the response to questions ranging from tax problems to legal property concerns. These highlights are meant to emphasise the use-­ value, and, in this case, the potentially life-saving value of eGovernment expansion (Schnoll, 2015). For present purposes, there are good reasons to infer that the process of digitisation will continue and one of the dimensions that is emphasised in the literature about cyberdemocracy is that as the population ages, the average citizen is defined by comfort and familiarity with online technologies, and this means the reduction of the need for conventional forms of exchange. As an instance of this process, conventional banks are reducing the number of branches precisely because the person-to-person service need has declined over time. Cyberdemocracy is participatory, whereas eGovernment is an exchange based on existing services. Currently, there are approaches to cyberdemocracy that examine and highlight several areas that can be defined in terms of increasing levels of engagement or participation. The services described above fall under the general category of eGovernment portal resources and that means the specific entitlements that any individual has a right to access. A domain above is the use of citizen discussion forms of online opinion surveying. One of the earliest forms of engaged levels of cyberdemocracy was the type of bulletin board systems (BBS) or forums that allow individuals to share viewpoints or information that are relevant to the given area or topic. Likewise, the solicitation of opinion through surveys and questionnaires has also been an engaged form of cyberdemocracy that has been around and in use for some time (Carayannis et al., 2018). The value of this type or form of system is significant for all parties and it is mutually beneficial to the government and the citizens. A feedback loop can create threads of information that can grow and expand depending on how it is responded to and who responds. In the

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case of a necessary discussion board, both citizens and the government can be participants that can create feedback that will elicit even more responses and potentially, areas of information that can prove to be beneficial or value-adding over the long term. The benefits of accessibility and transparency are achieved through this medium of exchange, but so too are greater efficiencies with the delivery of services or assistance (Meier, 2012). In these terms, consider how a feedback loop would function before there were online technologies and just a simple online forum. A mail system is almost inconceivable and the value-added by this simple form of exchange or participation is formidable when it is considered against a logistical alternative that is impractical in the domains of collaboration and participation, above the level of discussion and free information exchange in project participation. Participation has occurred on several levels of collaboration over the years. One of the solid examples that precede the digital age is the voluntary contribution that citizens have made to cultural and historical organisations like the National Trust. Local history and UK history have benefitted from citizen participation in various forms of historical and cultural artefact research, and, notably, these are areas of government that can have large amounts of data and information. However, few resources to make productive use of it. For instance, the digitisation of historical documents and their organisation is a substantial investment when one considers that there is not an enormous population of individuals who are interested in it. This is not to say that cultural history is not important, but to emphasise that resources are directed towards competing areas like health care, social services, and education. When it comes to some areas of eGovernment, there might be a wealth of information with few resources to make use of it. In these cases, the use of public participation in the form of projects is an area of anticipated future growth and its success as a collaborative enterprise has been proven in several areas. Project participation can also be understood in collaborative environments, both academically and in open-source knowledge or open-source software development. The internet is older than the creation of the World Wide Web, which was launched in 1993. From the early 1970s,

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there have been exchanges and collaborations occurring online (Carayannis et al., 2018). At the outset, the internet was designed by the US military to coordinate a nationwide network of missiles and military operations, and, by the 1970s, the universities and medical sciences started becoming involved with its use. From that period forward, online exchange and collaboration of all kinds of software began occurring, and it has evolved into a broad consortium of open-source software packages (Carayannis et al., 2018). As ‘open source’, the code itself can neither be sold. A project-based collaboration is one where there are a focus and a purpose, and then there is the dependence on human resources and talent drawn from the public. Currently, under the eGovernment Action Plan in the EU, many projects range from cultural projects to the creation of public policy and the outcomes in terms of efficiencies and productivity are likely to be a future driver for more such endeavours (Meier, 2012). The progress of engagement and participation in politics and government moves from projects upward to voting. By voting, it is not implied in terms of election voting. Rather, some policy strategies are currently using citizen councils that function like juries. Although they are experimental and not often used, the ease at which technologies could facilitate these types of councils means that they are being looked at and considered within the research and in organisations like the EU. In brief, this is a form of participation that could elicit feedback in a formal way that might be better described as a referendum. It is not uncommon that these are attached to elections within the range of voting options and they are likewise used as instruments in wider and important considerations such as the Brexit vote. Because there is an ease at which voting can occur online along with the information accessibility or transparency of information on a given issue, it follows that this is an area of participation that has a solid future potential (Fajemisin, 2012; Rose et al., 2015; Schnoll, 2015). In terms of being democratic, it adds to the existing structure of representative democracy insofar as policy decisions are being made not by Members of Parliament or by elected representatives. Rather, it is a form of direct participation, and there is no question that it is an expansion of equality and accessibility in this regard.

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Finally, above voting for policy initiatives or local considerations, election voting is the final area of collaborative eGovernment strategies that can involve and encourage participation. Currently, there is a wide range of digital systems being used in the formal electoral process and they include web polls, electronic voting systems, digital election machines, networked election machines, and e-Voting or e-Elections (Carayannis et al., 2018; Meier, 2012). Again, it is inferred that this will continue to be a consideration for future political and policy initiatives. There is an overarching concern about security, and, at the same time, the assumption that this will move forward, given that it has the strong potential to increase participation. There is a convenience to e-Voting that entails that the time commitment is less, the physical obstacles that stand in the way of individuals who are challenged are removed, and individuals who live in other regions can likewise participate. All these efficiencies have led to the assumption that they will increase participation because they remove barriers and create a potential growth area among youth who are already online in significant numbers and with an ease of use that makes this form of political change one that can challenge the long-standing trend of fewer and fewer youth participating in mainstream politics. Currently, social media systems like Twitter and Facebook are staples for political campaigning along with political causes and social activism. There is an obvious convenience to these mediums, given that they are free, easy to use, widely used, and easily integrated with areas of interest or life. In this latter respect, it can be said that eGovernment can have an actual competitor in social media. One of the considerations of increasing participation is the ease of integration with existing digital behaviours and in many regards, creating a system that functions and operates outside of the main systems of social interaction could pose some future challenges. Currently, the influence of these media is wide and extensive. In the case of the Arab Spring, the ability to communicate and organise through Facebook helped facilitate political revolutions and upheaval in several Arab nations, including Egypt and Tunisia. As a tool, the power of its reach is significant for proactive political participation or engagement.

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Further, it is a tool that also facilitates direct interaction and more immediate engagement between politicians and their constituents. As was noted earlier regarding the importance of a growing feedback loop, the same process applies to social media and the relationship between politicians and citizens. There is an existing two-way communication that occurs in politics, and it allows for politicians to bypass the conventional forms of media and constituency outreach and, in turn, directly provide information through places like Twitter and Facebook. Conversely, these are open forums of exchange and that means that there is a two-way level of communication occurring because politicians or representatives can receive feedback from constituents and other political actors and social stakeholders. As with the feedback loop, this two-­ way relationship expands as individuals contribute to the exchange. In many regards, a general mistrust of the media and the perception of being directly communicated to has the advantage that is being realised in politics when it comes to Twitter, Instagram, or Facebook. Conversely, in an ideal world, the given feedback provided by citizens on social media could very well influence the decision-making of an individual in politics. Finally, there is a greater volume of information through this feedback loop such that the electorate can make better choices based on the potential for acquiring greater knowledge about a given policy issue and in turn, the position on the given issue that a politician might hold. Transparency is already a factor of consideration. For example, it is the case that there is a complex range of issues related to Donald Trump and his political agenda. However, it is most definitely the case that he is using Twitter to communicate with his supporters directly and there is a sincere egalitarian dimension to this style of interaction, even if it is a tool being used for manipulative purposes as opposed to a tool that can aid in the creation of public policy that truly represents the interests of the individuals it is supposed to serve or aid. Cyberdemocracy holds a significant amount of promise, and it has been maintained that the promise itself has the potential to deliver even greater access to our collective state and the services that are meant to represent our interests as citizens. Further, there is an enormous potential to expand the levels of engagement within the broader context of cyberdemocracy. This analysis has outlined various strategies of online civic

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engagement that involve the functioning of government services, the creation of legislation, and the election of representatives. Further, the positive potential of expanding the marketplace of ideas and the marketplace of exchange of this broad range of data or knowledge is unquestionably the most utopian of all cyberdemocracy considerations. However, the space of this public space remains to be defined and there are both barriers to access and concerns about security that remain crucial considerations. Just as the agora in Ancient Athens had rules of social convention and conduct, and legal rights ensuring safety, the space of cyberspace requires the same. Although the same democratic growth can happen as it did in Athens, ensuring that it happens for and with the collective interests of all citizens poses some challenges.

 rivatisation of the Public Sphere P and the Platform Society Neoliberalism has unquestionably been the driving ideology behind the move to privatise what has been in the public sphere. From the era of Thatcher to the present, one of the neoliberal assumptions is that the private sector can achieve government service delivery more efficiently. Moreover, the profit that is turned over to the private sector will become reinvested, or it will ‘trickle down’ such that a higher amount of capital will be circulating in the economy and job creation will be the outcome. The first experiment in the political and economic reasoning of Frederick Hayek, Milton Friedman, and the Chicago school was the Pinochet government in Chile. Chile’s socialist government was overtaken with direct US government and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) involvement, and after the installation of Pinochet as a dictator, a wide range of government functions and collective resources were privatised. The US government, in the era of Nixon, wanted to monitor and measure the impact of this strategy. Ever since these origins, neoliberalism has been the dominant ideology that has promoted the idea that the public sphere ought to be in private hands and the ‘platform society’ is an extension of this agenda but also a new media that has furthered or accelerated the process of privatisation.

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A platform society is defined as ‘a society in which social and economic traffic is increasingly channeled by a (corporate) global online platform ecosystem that is driven by algorithms and fueled by data’ (Dijck et al., 2018). A platform is ‘a programmable digital architecture designed to organize interactions between users—not just end users but also corporate entities and public bodies’ (Dijck et al., 2018). While the Big Five (Google, Apple, Facebook, Amazon, and Microsoft) dominate the digital platform sphere, these tech companies are not the only platforms. Increasingly, other players are entering the field, including governments, actively shaping, and reshaping the platform society. The platform society reinforces the neoliberal agenda of lean production, privatisation, and higher capital placed in the hands of corporations against belonging collectively in the public sphere. For example, the Big Five companies have combined value equivalent to the German economy. At the same time, the platform society offers an alternative. One can as easily belong to a platform co-operative and share the profits in a conventional sense as opposed to choosing the privately owned options. The higher the diversity and accessibility options, the greater the public choice, which represents a counter to the neoliberal hegemony that runs through public policy and now, public consciousness. The commercialisation of the internet and unequal access to a digital platform is perceived as one of the critical challenges of cyberdemocracy. While the term public sphere refers to the domain of society in which public opinion is formed, expressed, articulated, and debated, it is fundamental necessity to mediate between state and society (Habermas, 1991). In other words, the public sphere, according to Habermas, allows the citizens to control state activities and power; it helps to ensure the protection of the rights and freedoms of the people (Habermas, 1991). However, this idealistic and normative conception of the public sphere has undergone a profound transformation in the digital era, making it privatised and commercialised. Widespread access to the internet is not universal because there is vast inequality among people on their ability to access the internet and participate in digital deliberations (Jørgensen, 2018). Thus, the digital public sphere is owned, controlled, and designed by private corporate interests. In other words, the digital space in which

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public deliberations are expected to take place is a commercial sphere designed by their commercial interests and priorities. They create profit out of the discussions and deliberations that take place in the digital platforms resulting in data capitalism (Dijck et al., 2018). This transformation is different from the normative conceptions of the public sphere envisaged by Habermas. The private corporations that currently control the space can also control and regulate the nature and content of the discussions and deliberations; hence the boundary of individual freedom lies with private ownership (Jørgensen, 2018). In the current era, the public sphere on the digital platform provides a participatory culture through instant connectivity. The online social networks enable us to bypass existing political and social institutions for connectivity and this will ultimately result in the creation of collectivity emerging out of the ‘connectedness’. This phenomenon has given rise to the emergence of the term ‘platform society’ (Dijck et al., 2018). A platform society means the penetration of online platforms into the heart of social institutions, structures, economic institutions, and cultural practices in such a way that formal government and social institutions must adjust their legal and political apparatus by the platform social order (Dijck et al., 2018). The platform society has already infiltrated into the mainstream political, legal, and social institutions to germinate the seeds of new political engagements. Platform society is a term that connects the link between online platforms and societal structures (Dijck et al., 2018). In essence, the platform does not reflect the social; it produces the social structure in which we live (Dijck et al., 2018). Although the emergence of the privatisation of the public sphere and the platform society is criticised for the inherent urge for private gain embedded in it, it is an equally important fact that platform society takes care of collective means and public services as well. However, the connectedness in the platform society does not turn into public values automatically (Dijck et al., 2018). There is a dichotomy between privacy issues and the dissemination of data. If the transparency of data in the online platform is critical for law enforcement agencies, it may alternatively violate the privacy and confidentiality of individual users. Additionally, the individual behaviour and social interactions in the platforms are determined mainly by the

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data-driven and algorithmically organised policies of the private owner of the platform. Such processes are already in conflict with the traditional organisational structure of western democratic institutions (Dijck et al., 2018). The dynamics of a linkage between social media and politics in recent times clearly show that the communication revolution cannot always be a watchdog of democracy. Instead of strengthening the spirit of democracy, social media platforms often attempt to support and practice the commercialisation of politics in various ways. In this process, social media has altered the nature and content of the democratic political process, making it more business-orientated and less political. The platforms are powerful with abilities to infiltrate every conceivable space on the internet (Dijck et al., 2018). They can brainwash the public into buying into whatever story or even viewpoint they want. With the effective use of media, political parties’ resort to persuasive techniques in campaigns to promote both politicians and their policies. The borrowing of professional communication tools, such as advertising and public relations, is believed to epitomise this process. Often the phenomenon of the image in politics is said to have arisen because of digital platforms and their increasing influence over people. For the supporters of cyberdemocracy, the challenge is to understand that the privatised public sphere and platform societies are not value-­ neutral constructs; instead, they are firmly embedded in the market and ideological positions that they represent (Dijck et al., 2018). There are three main actors in this context: the state, the market, and civil society. Hence, the question is how to make these forces accountable and responsible for the projection of overall public values and the public good in the digital public sphere (Fajemisin, 2012). These public values consist of protection of privacy, equality, safety, security, accuracy, fairness, inclusion, equal accessibility, and accountability. To understand the public values of the privatised platforms, one must explore the ideology, social implications, and functioning of the platform ecosystem. If we understand how these platforms are built to restructure societies, we can also understand how the collective will of the citizens can govern these platforms and use them for the common good (Margolis & Moreno-Riano, 2009).

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Pew Research Center. (2021a, April). 7% of Americans don’t use the internet. Who are they? https://www.pewresearch.org/ fact-tank/2021/04/02/7-of-americans-dont-use-the-internet-who-are-they/ Robbin, A., Courtright, C., & Davis, L. (2004). ICTs and political life. Annual Review of Information Science and Technology, 38, 411–482. Roper, J. (1998). New Zealand political parties online: The World Wide Web as a tool for democratization or for political marketing? In C. Toulouse & T. W. Luke (Eds.), The politics of cyberspace. Routledge. Rose, J., Persson, J. S., Heeager, L. T., & Irani, Z. (2015). Managing e-Government: Value positions and relationships. Information Systems Journal, 25(5), 531–571. Schnoll, H. J. (2015). E-Government: information, technology, and transformation. Routledge. Stenberg, L. (2018). The Politics of Common Sense: How Social Movements Use Public Discourse to Change Politics and Win Acceptance. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Sun, P. L., Ku, C. Y., & Shih, D. H. (2015). An implementation framework for E-Government 2.0. Telematics and Informatics, 32(3), 504–520. UNDP. (2005). Report on the world social situation. UNDP. Wilhelm, A. G. (2000). Democracy in the digital age: Challenges to political life in cyberspace. Routledge.

9 The Westminster Model: Points and Issues

Accountability and Transparency (Ethical Standards) The history of political scandals in Parliament and governments worldwide is history that would take volumes to detail. The limitations of accountability and transparency in governmental processes and transactions can include a wide range of problems that include the following which Transparency International (2019) has identified: access to information, limited auditing and oversight, the time delay in the exchange of information, bribery, basic compliance with Parliamentary codes of conduct, collusion, conflict of interest problems, corruption, cronyism, embezzlement, facilitation payments, lobbying, nepotism, lack of oversight, patronage, political contributions that are not fully transparent, the abuse of procurement procedures, and the protection of whistle-blowers. Gorwa and Ash (2020, p. 286) argue that transparency has ‘emerged as one of the leading accountability mechanisms through which platform companies have attempted to regain the trust of the public, politicians, and regulatory authorities’. Transparency as a form of accountability plays a major role in governance debates today, especially with disclosure © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 H. Karem, Cyberdemocracy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-27544-9_9

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tools being built into democratic elections. While transparency is lauded, being transparent can often be at odds with privacy and intellectual property (e.g., Edwards & Veale, 2017). As Gorwa and Ash (2020, pp. 305–306) argue, transparency ‘should help consumers and policymakers make informed choices’ and, despite the shortcomings of transparency, increasing transparency would ‘contribute to the public understanding of the digital challenges facing democracies around the world’. Among the problems identified by Transparency International (2019), a substantial number of these can very much be improved or challenged through cyberdemocracy. The metaphor of a hive mind expresses the significance of potential participants in overall accountability and transparency. For instance, the Commons Public Accounts Committee (PAC) and the National Audit Office (NAO) annually audit £200 billion per year of public money spending (Fenwick, 2015). Both offices issue annual reports that are select audits. The issue that is significant to the question of the Westminster Model versus cyberdemocracy is the amount of selection of what becomes audited. Leaving aside the issues that the selection itself can be politically motivated, and the problem that standing governments are only accountable for a select number of financial problems, the fact that only a tiny portion of the overall government annual spending is wholly audited is problematic. Not to overemphasise a problem, there are annual measures of accountability and budgetary practices that expansively capture Government expenditures across every Ministry. Moreover, the annual reports from both the PAC and NAO are publicly available. The hive-­ mind potential of cyberdemocracy could significantly expand beyond the ceiling of £200 billion per year of public money spending. With many potential auditors in the virtual public sphere, auditing could extend past this selective auditing. The hive-mind becomes, in essence, a Rawlsian ‘impartial spectator’, through which unbiased decisions can be made that benefit the hive, not just the individual. However, Rawls does not necessarily believe individuals will accept this extreme altruism and utilitarianism, instead promoting his theory of justice in which reciprocity is key. His sense of justice aims to ‘lead[] us to promote just schemes and to do our share in them

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when we believe that others, or sufficiently many of them will do theirs’ (Rawls, 2002, p. 236). Thus, the hive can work together to promote justice with the use of digital tools to oversee those in power. Hypothetically speaking, one can imagine school and university programmes teaching the very practice of auditing by examining public accounts recording. As a scenario, the hive-­ mind effect can likewise be broad and expansive. One could hypothetically imagine that the institutes that regulate the various types of accountants might solicit members to volunteer their time to oversight. Finally, any citizen could contribute to improving the transparency and accountability of government spending if the political system was cyberdemocracy versus the Westminster Model. The hypothesis being made suggests that the ease and access to public documents through a digital environment can significantly expand the primary area of auditing. It might be said that second only to sex scandals involving Members of Parliament are financial and conflict of interest problems. The hive-mind effect or impact can be significantly applied to other areas of cyberdemocracy, and there are further reasons to demonstrate because of how deficient a medium the Westminster Model is by comparison. Beyond the annual audits that are limited, so too is the paper-­ based and only moderately digitised data regarding accountability. Consider the Transparency International problems of lobbying, patronage, and political contributions. It is the case that lobbyists do need to be registered and that whom they are representing must be transparent. It is also true that politicians must follow careful guidelines that make their accountability transparent, and that includes listing the contributors. However, crossing both sets of data is not immediately searchable. One of the robust cases for cyberdemocracy against the Westminster Model is how the hive-mind effect can have unanticipated ways of manipulating data once it is accessible. The example of patronage is significant because it is a problem that might be viewed as routine. During the life of politicians and Ministers, in particular, is the routine of spending public money and, most significantly, this is an issue that is always high in public consideration. As a matter of routine, there is no avoiding the procurement of services and goods, and, therefore, no way of entirely avoiding the interaction with individuals and organisations.

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As a matter of routine, it is also the case that politicians need to raise funds to finance campaigns. Likewise, there is no way of avoiding the reality that private citizens and organisations will gain personal access to the politician in question because of financing. Lobbying and patronage, in some ways, cannot be entirely eradicated and it is unquestionably one of the most significant problem areas given that it is routine. At the same time, accountability measures and even unanticipated ones can be improved through cyberdemocracy. As previously claimed, democracy in its current form will not survive the changes coming with the ever-evolving digital landscape. However, as modes of civic engagement and technology advance and evolve, there is great potential for cyberdemocracy to overcome the current fragmentation, alienation, and persistent risks to digital rights. It was raised earlier that a hypothetical correlation between registered lobbyists and campaign financing would suggest that more detail might be pursued. Again, the hive-mind effect can have unanticipated outcomes, such as the correlation between different data sets that are currently not integrated, but they can also contribute to the volume of individuals that can make useful findings from the information. Moreover, the hive-mind has a number higher than the 900 individuals that work in the National Accountability Office, and they have the further ability to redefine the hive itself. That is, the medium of digital is more easily manipulated than non-integrated and non-uniform conventional forms of information and data. In terms of the volume of information, the potential is to digitise everything short of issues of national security or issues that impact personal privacy. Again, the hive-mind has a bigger hive in this regard. In keeping with the simple problem of lobbyists, the medium of collection for this data is limited under its current form and not usable in a way that can be maximised through community effort. When one considers the collaboration that has gone on with open-source software development through volunteers, it is not difficult to imagine this collectively having an impact. In essence, the efficiency of accountability is demonstrated through this example, and it is another point about cyberdemocracy against the Westminster Model. However, this is an example of

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accountability and transparency that is inseparable from the issue of freedom of access and on time.

Free and Fair Flow of Information Freedom of speech and expression is one of the cornerstones of democratic values that is worth considering when comparing cyberdemocracy with the Westminster Model. In terms of its general association with democratic and classically liberal ideals, the concept of harm is the only test of this elemental freedom. As the cliché goes, one cannot yell ‘fire’ in a crowded theatre because of the genuine potential of physical but also emotional/psychological harm. So long as there is a single case that is an exception to the rule, it does follow that there are limitations with the contingent relationship as opposed to a law that was entirely indisputable such as the harm principle itself. One has a right to be free from harm more so than having a right to say whatever and wherever. While there are limitations, the principle of harm itself is a reasonably extreme threshold even though there are instances that cross the range of actions or abuses such as the liability associated with defaming an individual’s character in a public and potentially impactful way. There is a principle of harm defining liability just as with expression, but short of those two potential problems, it can be argued that cyberdemocracy ensures a more accessible or a more free and fair flow of information and that amounts to the consensus of factual truth whenever possible and in terms of how it is articulated in Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948): Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.

Because the Gramscian concept of hegemony is part of daily life and requires consent, cyberdemocracy can offer a freer flow of information in terms of factual truth and lessened censorship and information

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manipulation. Cyberdemocracy can, thus, allow internet users to see past the rhetoric of the political elite by providing citizens with access to more unbiased information. There is little distinction to be made between media and the individual right to freedom of speech, and it is, in most modern democratic nation-states, a right that is regarded as more or less axiomatic and because of the very long history of the value of challenging an idea in the marketplace. As detailed earlier in the context of Rawls’s thought experiment with the veil, a rational decision that needs to be made can only have its outcomes improve when there is as much fact-­ based information as possible. As a value in the democratic framework in this respect, it has an impactful way in the opposite of harm. Effective change can be the result of the capacity to debate and the ability to access information available to inform the position that was to be debated. In specific terms, the right to seek information, receive it, and express it is a right short of harm that is protected. It is the expansive and comprehensive nature that can quantifiably be preferable to the House of Commons as a debating forum. It is a forum that does not exchange facts and reason with them, it is a forum where rhetoric is more characteristic, and the classical technique of apophasis efficiently characterises the limitations of arguing in the Commons, and that is a cornerstone of the Westminster Model. An apophasis is a technique whereby one ironically brings up a subject by denying that it should be talked about. As a political example that is conventionally used: I will not talk about my worthy opponent’s marriage infidelities today, but I will talk about their fiscal policy. This is a simple technique that deflects away from the issue being debated, and it is ironic while the politics of diversion are effectively achieved. As a technique, one can easily see how the media and, consequently, the public, might be more inclined to be interested in the non-debated marriage infidelity than the fiscal issue that is the actual issue. The debate is so significantly limited when one uses the standard of the Ancient Greeks as a medium as opposed to the model of cyberdemocracy that aims at incorporating all the freely flowing information available that can aid in making fact-based or evidence-based decisions. Likewise, it is inherently more promoted as positive freedom in that cyberdemocracy

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also provides an individual voice in the market of ideas. In many regards, the media is often driven by the issues and individuals that they are disposed to. In the context of cyberdemocracy, the general populous can potentially control the media discourse as it can also contribute to the direct democracy of the system. The media are obsessed with public opinion and polling, and they are likewise concerned about their viewers, listeners, and readers in terms of profitability. It can also be argued that the protection or freedom of the press along with expression has the potential to both add to our domains of knowledge but also better reflect the knowledge that is needed according to the interests of the public. In these terms, cyberdemocracy against the Westminster Model means that the interests of the public could potentially define the news, and in a mutually beneficial way. One of the considerations about the free flow of information that places the Westminster Model ahead of cyberdemocracy is the issue of privacy. This is in terms of government obligations under GDPR; however, the state now has the Coronavirus Act 2020 that grants emergency powers considering the pandemic, the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 that expands the government’s powers with regard to electronic surveillance, and the Counter Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019 that allows for more extensive information retention. In keeping with the principle of harm which is consistent with self-­ evident notions that we ought to assume as equal among us, where the freedom of expression is positive freedom, the right to deliberately not express anything but the demand for a right to privacy is problematic when it comes to cyberdemocracy. However advanced the technology is in terms of security, there are no absolutes when it comes to security (Richards, 2015). There is a significant human factor that cannot be controlled by technology, and that is the fact that information would, at some point of the digital chain, be handled by individuals. It is a fact that most of the computer privacy and information breaches have been the consequence of the non-technical factor of human access, and then distribution or illegal exchange. Leaks of humankind cannot be controlled for, and it is a way of saying that though next-generation blockchain systems of security

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demonstrate good privacy potential, it is the case that the principle of harm that can be the result of privacy problems has to be taken into consideration. In terms of the Westminster Model, there is a good case that says that caution is a way to proceed into cyberdemocracy without considering whether it is even feasible in a long way given the powerful potential for security problems and unforeseen manipulations. In English Common Law, the harms caused by privacy breaches are not considered in the same ‘rule of law’ terms as a physical law. This is because it is only relatively defined and everyone and even different cultures have boundaries that it is their right to protect. While that is true in terms of measuring boundaries for protection, it remains a problem because there is not an equivalent consensus to think that harm can be defined with privacy as it can in terms of achieving a rule of law status regarding harm caused by physical assault. Because of this distinction, the lack of privacy ambiguity makes it an issue of Tort law rather than criminal law when it comes to the issue of harm and damages (Solove & Schwartz, 2014). By Tort, it means that it is true that damages were the effect, but the cause was not necessarily deliberate or may have been from naive neglect. For example, a similar situation would be one where an individual injured themselves by slipping on a banana peel dropped by another customer in some retail store or service office. Privacy is regarded as an area of Tort also because it has not been fully tested and very clearly defined. What is important in terms of the concept of harm and the notion of equality of self-evident harm (Rawls) is that there are fundamental limitations to how harm is defined. At the same time, the harm is very consistently compensated for, and that means that there are unquestionably levels of culpability that ought to define more clearly what constitutes harm in a way that it can satisfy a notion of harm accepted universally. To date, such a definition has been difficult to achieve, and it remains a Tort or situation where harm was the result even though malfeasance or intent was not a factor. The state has the potential for harm, and there is a further consideration of how it is defined such that the complex problem of privacy in both security and public disclosure in various forms must succeed at the Rawlsian veil test. Harm with this respect is not self-evident in the same way that waking up in slavery would mean that we agree that it is self-evident to abolish it.

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Regarding cyberdemocracy, access to information is sometimes an invasion of privacy, and the stakes are unquestionably higher for individuals who are well known or are political figures. There is an imbalance of potential harm in terms of career impact that is further difficult to define within legal positivist criteria of law accurately—that is, a law where there are fundamental questions of fact. While the free flow of information is better facilitated by cyberdemocracy, it is also the case that the existing privacies are currently controlled for with the given apparatus. As a point worth mentioning, in its current form, the privacy of information is not a perfectly secure system and cannot be given human interaction (Carayannis, 2014). However, the interaction is minimised if a piece of information is solely on paper. For instance, consider how few people would handle a single paper document as opposed to how many people would need access to the very same information but in a digital format. What this finally suggests in the current context is that unanticipated problems with cyberdemocracy and the potential for security problems or abuse might mean that the balance of harms that such a change away from the Westminster Model might be a measure of risk not worth taking. However, what harm itself remains to be defined in terms of making a just and equitable system that supports a transition to a cyberdemocracy.

Justice (The Rule of Law) The veil of ignorance is a state where an individual is devoid of self-hood in terms of personal memories, and they are also devoid of personal interests, likes, or intentions, but they do have a capacity for reason and access to information. However, there is a condition where one also must have access to the knowledge/information to make a rational decision, and they decide to trade those very rights. The right to knowledge and information is fundamental to individuals such that they have equal access to make rational choices. In a non-digital environment, this is just not true, and this means that information and its access is greater for one individual with digital participation in cyberdemocracy and an individual who does not:

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The predictable ambivalence between knowledge and democracy as essentially contested concepts accounts for the difficulties to estimate the impact of knowledge on the ‘quality’ of democratic decision-making. Efforts to assess quality of democratic systems usually include a combination key or proxy variables such as ‘freedom’, ‘equality’, ‘control’ and ‘sustainable development’ or ‘civil rights’, ‘participation’, ‘inequity’ and ‘competition’ respectively. (Carayannis, 2014, p. 17)

One issue impeding the free and fair flow of information in the digital world is privacy, and there is a case to be made that an individual should have access to every single document that any government body (Tax/ Revenue, Health Records, Education Records, Social Service, Military, etc.) has created about that individual. However, given cyber vulnerability, there is also a case to be made that each one of those documents should only be kept on paper. Cyber is digital, so should an individual be worried about the issue of privacy along with cybersecurity vulnerability? If so, there should be an option for paper-only information. That is not to say that a rational agent has the right and equal access to information such that it is very plausible that one could want the social contract that views justice as the rule of law, but one might want access on a different medium such as paper. Where the right to own or have property is a primary, the exchange of it is likewise possible but also accidentally occurring. The Rule of Law broken with criminal intent reflects culpability that means that the State has a right to deny your freedom physically. That is, you have made a choice as a rational agent to become enslaved. Conversely, if that right is denied to you by a citizen along with the state, it is a criminal offence and will be addressed in a Criminal Court that is now down the hall from the Court that would deal with a Tort issue. In England, the Right to Privacy is not clearly defined, and it remains an issue of Tort when a case is also being made that it should be considered the Rule of Law, but it has not been thoroughly tested. A system of secondary rights protects that access to address the primary right but those secondary rights as outlined above, Tort Law which is not Rule of Law, is a form of having primary and secondary systems.

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However, also a system that is collectively accepted as a primary and even a permanent Rule of Law. In a world of cyberdemocracy, the equal access to information is impossibly denied to an individual who complies with the alternative of cyberdemocracy in existence. They are not informed and, therefore, rational agents have the freedom of choice under the veil of ignorance. Thus, for cyberdemocracy to be superior to the Westminster model, it must provide greater access to information than the Westminster model does. In this sense, cyberdemocracy performs better than the Westminster model, as it provides ‘universal access to vital information channels [that] thus serves the dual purpose of restoring confidence in democratic decision making and concurrently providing an alternative outlet to express preferences and needs’ (Wilhelm, 2000, p. 33). Moreover, there is an off-the-grid state when an individual can choose to comply with paying their tax and respecting the civil and fundamental rights of others. Likewise, one must educate their children by law but only until a certain age. In Rawls’s framework, an argument is being made that there is no equivalency between cyberdemocracy and the Westminster Model, and, at best, this equivalency must be more clearly defined, and that means proceed with caution on the issue of Rule of Law. There is a potential loss of property that may not be compensated through Tort, and one could wake up from a veil of ignorance and either care about the loss or not depending on your disposition towards the issue. Put in other terms, fundamental or primary rights may not be something that can be traded, whereas other individuals would more likely settle out of court or through a Tort system.

Merit-Based Competitions This final section provides an overall evaluation of the Westminster model discussed thus far against cyberdemocracy and helps to determine whether the points of evaluation improved upon by cyberdemocracy will enhance democracy. Thus, this section will consider each of the previous six evaluation points: whether each model provides freedom and fairness for all; whether they allow for collective, direct decision-making; whether there is potential for mass participation in civil discourse; whether the

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democratic model is transparent and accountable for its actions; whether information is free and accessible; and whether justice is equally distributed. This final competition allows for a quantifiable decision as to which model best functions in a true democratic manner. The first point of evaluation asks whether the democratic model is transparent and accountable for its actions. Transparency is both vital to a democracy and problematic (Gorwa & Ash, 2020). The merits of more expansive market accessibility which typify cyberdemocracy, accountability and transparency, have more productive outcomes, and this is inseparable from the fact that it is significantly better than the political competition which is based on ideology and demagoguery. The dangers of tyranny are some of the problems of democracy. In terms of the model of justice being used by Rawls, greater accessibility can mean that there could be a rational choice to re-make reality such that the world is significantly better when the veil of ignorance is lifted, and it is not solely an informed and reason-driven way. Accessibility and transparency are likewise mutually determining. That is, the greater the accessibility, the more the government will achieve greater transparency, and this means that there is a significant competition-driven superiority with cyberdemocracy over and against the Westminster Model when it comes to accessibility and transparency. The second point of evaluation seeks to understand whether information is free and accessible. The internet has allowed for the mass production of information. Cyberdemocracy, through participation, has the potential to transform citizens from passive consumers of information into active information users (Chun, 2012). This is not to say that cyberdemocracy gets everything right when it comes to free and accessible information. There is certainly great potential for online misinformation and manipulation. However, great effort is being made to combat this misinformation (Pew Research Center, June 2020b). Cyberdemocracy gets a ‘double hit’ by being a more accessible model, but where accessibility also has the potential impact of improving the system itself. The third and final point of evaluation wants to determine if justice is equally distributed. It has been maintained that cyberdemocracy is a more merits-driven model because of the fulfilment of Rawls’s model of justice, and that includes fundamental freedoms based on equality, the

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right to property and the right to trade or exchange that property, civil rights, and engagement and participation. Along with these measurable outcomes that are accepted into law or have the rule of law defining them, it improves the problem of inequity and, at the same time, promotes merit-based competition. The rule of law is the system of laws that have no way of disputing facts either than being true or false. We want the law to be true in terms of protecting the freedom of movement that could even include torture, property, and the expression among other rights. However, the freedom from restraint can also be transgressed given that a rational actor who is informed of their transgression and its legal consequences may be convicted of a crime such that they have forfeited to their natural or primary right. The importance of this being a primary rather than secondary right is supported by the consensus or social contract that Rawls argues can be tested by the veil situation. However, the right to participate in cyberdemocracy creates a significant inequity. One cannot have the right to vote without access to information, and it has been demonstrated that one medium of politics provides an inequitable advantage over another. In other terms, the model of cyberdemocracy poses some difficult challenges against the theoretical model of Rawls’s view of a just system. Further, some people would prefer to live off the grid, and there are good privacy concerns to justify that choice such that cyberdemocracy is limited against the Westminster Model. Consider the difference in the following terms, in a binary system such as one that would be defined by cyberdemocracy: it is also the case that being off the grid is a form of information that can be bought and traded. The fact that one has chosen not to participate in the virtual political system is a fact with the impact that suggests that the medium transforms the way we think about cyberdemocracy, and these rights issues further suggest that caution needs to be proceeded. There can be a tyranny of the majority against the interests and rights of the individual, and therefore Rawls argues that utilitarianism is limited: ‘It is often objected, for example, that utilitarianism may allow for slavery and serfdom, and for other infractions of liberty’ (Rawls, 2002, p. 137). A fundamental freedom might need to be protected by the Westminster Model against the incorporation or replacement of cyberdemocracy.

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This does not mean that cyberdemocracy is perfect. Democracy must evolve to meet the needs of its citizens and the Westminster model is failing (Gardels & Berggruen, 2019). Cyberdemocracy has many issues that must be overcome (e.g., issues of privacy, polarisation, fragmentation, and access), but this assessment shows its potential to better meet the needs of the citizens of today and empower mass, deliberative democratic participation in the virtual public sphere that allows for greater representation and rational decision-making.

Bibliography Carayannis, E. G. (2014). From development as democracy to innovation as development. In E. G. Carayannis, D. F. Campbell, & M. P. Efthymiopoulos (Eds.), Cyber-­development, cyber-democracy and cyber-defense (pp. 5–22). Springer-Verlag. Chun, H. (2012). Social networking sites and cyberdemocracy: A new model of dialogic interactivity and political mobilization in the case of South Korea. PhD Thesis. University at Buffalo. Edwards, L., & Veale, M. (2017). Slave to the algorithm? Why a “Right to an Explanation” is probably not the remedy you are looking for. Duke Law & Technology Review, 16, 18. Fenwick, J. (2015). The problem of sub-national governance in England. Public Money & Management, 35(1), 7–14. Gardels, N., & Berggruen, N. (2019). Renovating democracy: Governing in the age of globalization and digital capitalism. University of California Press. Gorwa, R., & Ash, T. G. (2020). Democratic transparency in platform society. In N. Persily & J. Tucker (Eds.), Social media and democracy. Cambridge University Press. Pew Research Center. (2020b, June). Experts predict more digital innovation by 2030 aimed at enhancing democracy. Rawls, J. (2002). A Theory of Justice (Rev. Ed). Harvard University Press. Richards, N. (2015). Intellectual privacy: Rethinking civil liberties in the digital age. Oxford University Press. Solove, D. J., & Schwartz, P. (2014). Information privacy law. Wolters Kluwer Law & Business. Transparency International. (2019). Corruption Perceptions Index 2019. Berlin, Germany: Transparency International. Wilhelm, A. G. (2000). Democracy in the digital age: Challenges to political life in cyberspace. Routledge.

10 Cyberdemocracy and the Public Sphere

J ohn Rawls’s Theory of Justice and the Veiled Ignorance Thought Experiment In the previous chapter, there was a discussion concerning relevant points and issues in relation to the Westminster Model of democracy. Therefore, in this chapter, I want to begin and expand on that debate with specific reference to John Rawls work The Theory of Justice and illustrate how Rawls’ work can help us to imagine a vibrant cyberdemocracy for the twenty-first century. It’s also worth reminding the reader at this stage that earlier in Chaps. 5 and 7 there was a thorough evaluation of both representative democracy and cyberdemocracy. They addressed the positives and negatives of each model, their failures and successes, and the challenges each model faces or, in the case of cyberdemocracy, will face. From the detailed study of these two models, the following seven points have been developed. Each point involves a crucial aspect of democracy and allows for the two models to be compared and evaluated, ultimately determining which model best reflects democracy as it was intended to be: ‘the negotiation of competing interests, the balancing of different values’, rather than the ‘mob rule’ of populism (Gardels & Berggruen, 2019, p. 25). © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 H. Karem, Cyberdemocracy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-27544-9_10

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These seven points form the ideal democratic type. By comparing the reality of both the Westminster Model and cyberdemocracy to this Weberian ideal type, discoveries can be made, and reality can be better understood (Swedburg, 2018). Thus, evaluating both models against the ideal type developed by this thesis (embodied in the seven points below) will allow for a better understanding of which model is closest to the ideal democratic form and what issues and challenges will need to be overcome to best embody democracy: 1 . Freedom and fairness for all; 2. Collective, direct decision-making (inclusive); 3. Frequent citizens’ consultation (civil discourse); 4. Accountability and transparency (ethical standards); 5. Free and fair flow of information (the truth); 6. Justice (the rule of law); 7. Merits-based competitions. Before turning to the close study of these seven points, a brief thought experiment will be used to set the stage for the Weberian ideal-type analysis. A critical thought experiment that was first used by the political philosopher John Rawls asks the reader to imagine a situation where they are under a ‘veil of ignorance’ (Rawls, 2002, p. 5) and that is a state where they have rational thought and access to the facts and information that would be sufficient to make a sound political judgement. However, the veil of ignorance assumes that the individual does not know ‘his place in society, his class position or social status, nor does anyone know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence, strength, and the like’ (Rawls, 2002). This means, Rawls argues, that if this individual under the veil attempts to make political decisions, he will make decisions based on what is fair to all members of society because this individual does not know his position in society. Decision-making behind the veil will lead to fairer outcomes. Imagine that when the veil is lifted, the individual finds himself a slave or living in a country where there is an official religion, which can mean the potential for religious persecution. One would hope that the individual made a decision that was fair to even the slave. The thought experiment is meant

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to demonstrate that we will hold the collective view that slave ownership is wrong and that the government and religion should not be integrated. Without expanding further into Rawls’s theory of justice, the thought experiment has one further relevant consideration, and that is how it can be expanded as a consideration. Politically speaking, the veil is lifted, and individuals must conceptualise the fact that there are even greater shared values than just religion and slavery. Rawls is demonstrating a portion of what he calls ‘distributive justice’, and it is intended to replace the idea of the ‘greatest good for the greatest number’ (or utilitarian) view of equality and justice. It will be argued that cyberdemocracy can improve on what Rawls argues is deficient because the utilitarian formula can unfairly be punitive and mostly the decision axiom is quantifiable ‘greater’. The 50+1 formula in Westminster Parliament can be said to be a legislative embodiment of utilitarianism in this regard for the notion of justice and equality, and the following will argue that Rawls’s critique of this model and his notion of distributive justice, present the foundation for a position that there is a ‘distributive justice’ that cyberdemocracy can add to the improvement of equity and equality of the Westminster. It will be argued that Rawls’s criticisms of utilitarianism present a case that maintains that cyberdemocracy can expand what we consider to be collectively significant and that it can achieve this improvement because of the higher and more expansive ability for direct democracy and that makes cyberdemocracy more of an ideal type than representative democratic institutions.

Freedom and Fairness for All Equity, or fairness, is a key democratic ideal and any successful democratic model should provide all citizens (e.g., Wilhelm, 2000). Rawls’s theory of justice has two core principles. The first is that all citizens should have equal liberties. The second is that there is fair equality of opportunity. Both principles take precedence over his difference principle which is related to the distribution of income and wealth. The difference

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principle allows for inequal distribution only when it benefits the lowest members of society. One of the vital core notions of equality in Rawls in terms of truths that we hold as self-evident can be more easily explained through an analogy with the concept of equity. Rawls’s theory of justice is very much informed by the social and political discourse of his day, which in the 1960s concerned the inequities as defined by race and social class. Under President Lyndon Johnson, in 1964, the United States passed legislation that made it illegal to discriminate based on race, colour, religion, sex, and national origin and that means both the federal and state governments and some public places (Clapham, 2015). The Bill was the recognition that the conditions of radicalised underclasses were systemically prevented from achieving equity and the conditions that made this possible are very easily defined by history. That is, in the United States, it is a history that includes slavery but also systemic discrimination that has a net consequence of the oppression of people because of race and colour. This is a conceptual framework that informs Rawls, and that is the difference between equity and equality, and this difference of distinction more clearly explains this key concept explained through the thought experiment about the ‘veil of ignorance’ outlined earlier. Further, the distinction between ‘natural equality’ and equity is crucial because it helps frame an argument that cyberdemocracy achieves greater equity than the Westminster Model. In particular, the greater accountability and transparency will be held as areas where cyberdemocracy is superior to the Westminster Model, and because Rawls’s theory emphasises the rational citizen who can only be informed if the facts and information are available, and to be in a contrary position, is to be under the veil: Ideally citizens are to think of themselves as if they were legislators and ask themselves what statutes, supported by what reasons satisfying the criterion of reciprocity, they would think is most reasonable to enact. (Rawls, 2001, p. 56)

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While Rawls views the citizen as better understood in the role of legislation, it also follows that any legislator should have the best evidence-­ based policy materials to make rational decisions. Rawls insisted that individuals should not be concerned with ‘logical possibilities’, but rather with legitimate possibilities that are aligned with human nature. As such, the ideal of a perfectly fair world is likely unachievable, but there are genuine possibilities for improvement. Hume (2010) shares this sentiment, writing that ‘a rule, which, in speculation, may seem the most advantageous to society, may yet be found, in practice, totally pernicious and destructive’. Thus, any renovation of democracy must keep in mind the limits of human knowledge, human nature, and technology. If democracy can be fully renovated, as Gardels and Berggruen (2019) argue it should be, cyberdemocracy has the potential to provide greater equity. Gardels and Berggruen (2019, p. 184) suggest that all citizens should have an ‘equity stake’ in digital technologies, which will provide a ‘universal safety net that protects workers’ and ‘foster[s] opportunity by bolstering the ladder of upward mobility’ through ‘pre-distribution’. This would allow for a focus on spreading ‘digital-era skills through investment in public higher education and infrastructure—all of which disproportionately benefit the less well-off’ (Gardels & Berggruen, 2019, p. 184). Current representative democracy simply cannot provide equity to all citizens in its current state (Gardels & Berggruen, 2019). Cyberdemocracy, however, can bring further equality and equity through its use of the virtual public sphere. Habermas’s public sphere requires ‘the rights to unrestricted inclusion and equality’ (Habermas, 1996, p. 374). Cyberdemocracy, if it can harness the participatory power of social media through the creation of impartial online deliberative platform to which every citizen has equal and equitable access, is much more viable in terms of meeting the democratic ideal of freedom and fairness for all.

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Collective, Direct Decision-Making (Inclusivity) A fundamental notion of Rawls’s pertinence to this thesis being presented in this is the relationship between the concept of justice and how it can better define a just ‘justice is the first virtue of social institutions’ and spell out a conception of justice as a fairness principle. Having covered some of the critical elements of Rawls’s theory of justice, the following will look at the concept of fairness as applied to the Westminster model, and the goal will be to outline where representative democracy fails or demonstrates some deficiencies that can be compensated or improved by cyberdemocracy. Noveck (2003, p. 4) points to the potential of cyberspace to make ‘large-scale, informed participation possible because it makes communication so cheap’. Noveck (2003, p. 5) goes so far as to argue that representative democracy is failing because it does not make use of cyberspace as a deliberative virtual public sphere, stating that ‘more sophisticated communications technology can transform democratic political institutions, making them more participatory and deliberative’. The key, according to Noveck (2003, p. 7), is to create deliberative spaces and processes in cyberspace: If technology is to help us overcome the problems of distance and difference that have hindered us from augmenting participation in our dispersed and pluralistic society, deliberative processes must be designed for cyberspace. So long as shopping malls instead of town halls proliferate in the virtual landscape, electronic democracy cannot take root.

Thus, cyberdemocracy has the potential to be highly deliberative and participatory, leading to collective, direct decision-making, but technology must be developed that support these democratic efforts. The exclusion of some from democracy along with constraints on freedoms that can only improve as necessary aids are deficient in the Westminster model, and the following will address some of those fundamental theoretical foundations and practical outcomes that demonstrate where cyberdemocracy can be a positive agent for change creating a more inclusive virtual public sphere that is both highly participatory and deliberative.

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Diecker and Galan (2014, p. 231) argue that information and communication technologies are ‘seen as a potential cure to democratic deficits’ and that, while successful, they do not meet their full potential. They argue that for cyberdemocracy to be viable in the EU, a cyber public sphere must be developed that allows for deliberation (Diecker & Galan, 2014, p. 232). They view a democratic deficit in the EU, caused by several things, among which is a lack of ‘popular participation’ (Diecker & Galan, 2014, p. 236). Diecker and Galan (2014, p. 252) note that ‘recent sociological work shows that elites in the EU are indeed merging into a stronger interconnected community, leaving most of the citizens behind’. In this essence, representative democracy is failing to provide collective, deliberative decision-making. Additionally, cyberdemocracy could allow for greater democratic participation by allowing for anonymity and disembodiment. Some argue that anonymity is ‘an essential part of democracy and democratic transformation’ (Asenbaum, 2015, p. 2) and that the disembodiment that occurs in cyberspace allows citizens to leave their identities behind and engage in ‘free communication’ (Asenbaum, 2015, p. 2). The cybersphere is porous, filled with multiple territories. While some argue that this leads to fragmentation among citizens, others view cyberspace as a place where citizens can overcome fragmentary boundaries. Lambach (2019) shows that territories in cyberspace ‘are rarely static’ and that they ‘are not exclusive but will overlap and mingle’. Thus, citizens are not stuck in a particular area, but are free to move through cyberspace and deliberate, overcoming fragmentation and able to communicate freely beyond boundaries. In a constitutional democracy, it has been observed that there are two types of freedoms, and they are typified as the ‘freedom from’ and the ‘freedom to’, or positive and negative freedoms. Both types are evident in the Westminster model in the sense that individuals are protected from the arbitrary use of the law and have the right to be free from physical abuse or restraint without due process. Conversely, the positive freedoms include the right to free speech, the right of access to information, the freedom to participate in the political system, including the right to vote, and the freedom to move within a given nation-state among other forms that are characteristic of the

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Westminster model. One of the critical ways of looking at limitations of the Westminster Model is the right to access and the freedom to influence and participate in the system. The Westminster model holds these freedoms in theoretical terms, but in practical terms, the access and the distribution of justice are limited and so too are some very core elements of this political system itself. There are several circumstances of the Westminster model that demonstrate this. First, it is representational, and that means there is a question of whether one can even know whose interests are being served in the system. Without the capacity to make a rational and fact-based evaluation of this dimension of the Westminster model, it follows that there are limitations that can be compensated for or just improved by cyberdemocracy. Cyberdemocracy allows for direct decision-making through deliberation, thus superior to the representation of the Westminster model (e.g., Nielsen & Fletcher, 2020; Wilhelm, 2000; Papacharissi, 2004). In terms of representation, it is daily news that politicians are influenced by the donors who contribute to their campaigns and influenced by the lobbyists who act as policymakers for the clients that hire them. To think that an average system has as much access to the person who represents them as opposed to a powerful lobbyist or corporate political donor is just naive. The unequal access to politicians is not an idea or challenge that any informed individual in our current world would make. In terms of the freedom of accessing the system of representation, there is a balance of power problem with the practical functioning of the Westminster model. This freedom of access for the sake of making informed decisions as a right is further diminished because the essential knowledge exchange within the Westminster model system is the practice of Question Time. The House of Commons, and, of course, the Lords, is essentially where the theoretical distillation of ideas will inform legislative policymaking. However, like the idea of equal interests being served, few would view the contemporary Question Time as anything more than a sophistical and rhetorical exercise which is often meant to deflect or even create a diversion from the actual issue being debated. If this is a domain of knowledge exchange, it is the case that little fact-based evidence is ever a

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part of a portion of the process. To be fair in this regard, the various legislative committees that will oversee the actual drafting of bills involves a more comprehensive and more in-depth look at expert opinion and often extensive amounts of policy documents. It is further the case that there is a proportional representation within the legislative committees such that it cannot be solely said that Question Time is the only means of exchanging knowledge. At the same time, a good portion of the day for any MP is defined by the talking points that they need to make to gain media attention and to deflect issues that might be too controversial to engage in honestly. In these terms, Question Time is a media exercise more than it is the fact-based means by which a rational actor can make the best decision, and, optimally, a decision that is representative of their constituents. However, an easy case could be made that challenges the very value of Question Time within the Westminster model, and, consequently, the further suggestion could be made that the time of a Member of Parliament could serve the public in better ways than sitting in chambers for daily debates. The access or freedom to participate requires rational deliberation, and that further requires access to the best evidence-based information available. Along with the problem of representation, and how cyberdemocracy can bring about more direct democracy, the following will look more specifically at this function of participation and access, such that greater knowledge and information is one of the core strengths of a more contemporary and digitised approach to the Westminster model.

F requent Citizens’ Consultation (Civil Discourse) Cyberdemocracy can improve the access for citizens to the political system and the civil discourse that goes into defining the core principles and values of the system. One of the keys to this as an improvement is simply the provisions that cyberdemocracy allow for in terms of providing access. Cataldo (2014, p. 11) notes that ‘if implemented correctly,

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cyberdemocratic government websites can include all users with access, disregard an individual’s social status, and strive to address the common concerns of the public’. With growing ease of access to the internet, cyberdemocracy can provide greater access to the political arena than current representative democracy can, as it ‘provides individuals with the opportunity to be politically involved in virtual venues and serves as a potential equalizer for all involved parties’ (Cataldo, 2014, p. 12). Given the estimate that today ‘50% of the global population has access to digital platforms to participate in democracy’ and the fact that ‘this number will improve’ and ‘reduce the digital divide’ (Pew Research Center, June 2020b, p. 22), cyberdemocracy has far greater potential in terms of accessibility to the public sphere and political system. Habermas’s (1989) conception of the public sphere requires civil discourse and access to information, both of which cyberspace can readily provide. Cyberdemocracy also has great potential for allowing and increasing deliberation, which is necessary for democracy to function and something that has been lost in current representative democracy (Gardels & Berggruen, 2019). Papacharissi (2004, p. 267) describes this great deliberative potential, as do other scholars such as Szabo (2007) and Dahlberg (2000). Civic engagement, currently at an all-time low, can be effectively revitalised by cyberdemocracy. Some scholars have pointed to virtual public spheres as polarising spaces (e.g., Sunstein, 2001), but others have pointed to this as being a ‘widespread perception of polarization’ (Barbera & Rivero, 2015). The importance of deliberation in civil society is great, as it helps to correct misinformation and reduce polarisation. Bago et al. (2020) found that online deliberation ‘facilitates accurate belief formation and not partisan bias’. Civil discourse has been shown to be possible in cyberdemocracy (Papacharissi, 2004), and if polarisation is truly a ‘widespread perception’, then cyberdemocracy can, indeed, foster deliberation and civil discourse in a virtual public sphere that is accessible to many and becoming more accessible each day as the digital divide is bridged. Earlier some of the core issues of access within the Westminster Model were raised, and the following will look at the more participatory potential of cyberdemocracy to address these limitations outlined earlier. It was

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hypothesised in the form of a thought experiment that one could imagine each citizen could vote within the House of Lords in the same capacity that they now serve. That is, they have the power to suggest and make amendments to the legislation if it is not a bill that is constitutional, or it is one where money from the government is being allocated. What is important in this example is not so much the specific rights and privileges that cyberdemocracy can offer that the Westminster Model cannot, but that this is a form of democracy that could more engage with the direct participation of legislation. One can imagine that sitting at home with a registered identification voting card and following with the entire legislative process. For any one piece of legislation, public consultation in a direct form is possible with cyberdemocracy. Beyond e-democracy, which simply seeks to improve representative democracy, cyberdemocracy can offer consultation in the form of both providing information to the public and through expert discussion with the public via the virtual public sphere. This leads to greater deliberative involvement on the part of the public and broader access to expert opinion through which the public can be informed in an interactive manner. An individual could view Question Time and the launch of a bill and follow along each stage of the voting process, such as at the level of the committee process that was outlined earlier. What direct access to the information that is equally provided to MPs and Lords, can easily be provided through a cyberdemocracy environment and, in many respects, the formal Hansard system is already the primary information source for the legislative and parliamentary processes. To further examine the environment, there is a way in which this can be described as a platform in the way that the Ancient classical Greek agora was. The agora was the marketplace, and over time, it has come to mean a place where ideas can be exchanged. Plato consistently presents his Socratic dialogues in the agora. To understand a digital platform is to imagine a medium of communication and exchange like Facebook (without privacy and content issues) where a new agora can redefine civil discourse. It has long been the case that the exchange of ideas in politics under the Westminster Model is more characterised as a partisan game of upstaging the opposition or presenting an

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alternative type of messaging on issues that is more tailored to the demands of the media for the sake of gaining attention than it is a way of transparently sharing information that is informative of the political process. With a more accessible and transparent form of exchange, direct interaction and consultation with citizens become possible through cyberdemocracy. Leaving aside the thought experiment about transforming the House of Lords to a citizen’s body, even without direct participation in the legislative process, cyberdemocracy still provides a forum whereby politicians can directly consult with constituents. Under normal circumstances, most politicians share little more than photo-opportunities and personal achievements on their websites. Further, the interaction with actual constituents is often confined to their offices in the constituency on days when they are not sitting in Parliament. This aspect of the Westminster Model system is nowhere near as capable as cyberdemocracy for the sake of a two relationship between politicians and their constituents. As a basic example, when one considers that a politician will be at Parliament for four out of five days of the week when it is sitting, how much time does that leave for citizen participation. Moreover, how much of the consultive process is mostly aimed at helping citizens access government services or overcome systemic obstacles that only a Member of Parliament can make. Cyberdemocracy can break down the barriers for accessing government for direct consultations. There are many ways to achieve this, but direct polling with voters is an easy way of achieving this. In a sense, a political poll represents a model for gaining collective perspectives, but it does not fully capture the direct democratic process that can be facilitated through cyberdemocracy. Creating a platform for participation has the further potential of increasing participation. A digital platform or virtual agora can break down geographical divides and the time it takes to participate in the political process in alternative ways. As Barbera (2020, p. 36) notes, ‘access to the Internet dramatically lowers the costs of exchanging messages and finding information regardless of geographic distance’. Communication can happen anywhere and at any time in the virtual public sphere. The potential dark side to these

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lessened barriers to communication is the formation of communities of like-minded individuals in which the polarisation of political viewpoints is possible (Barbera, 2020). Because citizens are not ‘bound by physical proximity’, they can ‘connect and organize based on shared interests’ online (Barbera, 2020, pp. 36–37). Barbera (2020) sees this dark side as more nuanced and more perception than reality, arguing that empirical data does not always point to polarisation, but rather deliberation in the virtual sphere. A strong sense of alienation from the political process can be said to be one of the defining features of contemporary life. Polling and surveys demonstrate the alienation very consistently among citizens, and this can be understood to be further manifest or reflected in declining voter participation. Accessibility and direct participation have a significant potential to challenge these trends. In the simplest of terms, if alienation can be defined as a standpoint where an individual neither feels they have access to the political process or the politicians who represent them, direct consultations, the solicitation of public input and participation can vary potentially challenge the trend. On the one hand, it is the case that cyberdemocracy can overcome some of these issues of participation that the Westminster Model has typified, but it is also only an inference. To suggest the medium of communication will improve participation based on efficiency and ease of access might be overstating the potential. The potential in this regard is an inference made on the basis that cyberdemocracy offers productive alternatives to the Westminster Model. However, this potential might not be actualised, given that other social and even cultural factors contribute to the political attitudes of the average citizen. In terms of democratic renewal and the potential of cyberdemocracy, a case might be made that it is more accurate to infer those attitudes have gone past a point of no return. Alvin Toffler’s notion of anticipatory democracy provides more understanding here. Anticipatory democracy, simply put, is ‘a process for combining citizen participation with future consciousness’ (Bezold, 1978). Toffler argued that representative government was the key political technology of the industrial era but insisted that new forms (e.g., anticipatory democracy) must evolve if democracy is to survive and remain meaningful in the age of globalisation.

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Anticipatory democracy is a set of ‘tools and practices that allow the public to more effectively steer legislation’ (Bezold, 2010, p. 167). Cyberdemocracy must meet the needs of the public and steer it towards increased involvement in the political sphere. It could be argued that the perception of corruption and many of the other systemic problems that have created alienation are factors that may never be renewed. Therefore, greater participation must be understood as not solely the outcome of the medium or a new platform alone. One can see the cultural shift in attitudes just insofar as racism is now a part of the political landscape and this has transpired through the Brexit campaign and voting and in the United States, along with Donald Trump. People form opinions based on emotions more than reason, and they are also subjected to the manipulation of emotions. Both Brexit and the Trump phenomenon speak to the cultural and social forces that more shape political attitudes and alienation than only the institutions that define it, such as the Westminster Model. Moreover, it is indicative of citizens as emotionally driven than rational actors. It is essential to promote the value of civil discourse itself along with the tools to achieve this end of greater participation. Although it is an inference that cyberdemocracy can have the potential for greater involvement through the consultation process, it is also being argued that a structural or systemic change such as this is only one of several factors that create alienation and the general perceptions, beliefs, and opinions about mainstream politics. There are several barriers that cyberdemocracy must overcome, but these are barriers that representative democracy also faces. Cyberdemocracy can be a more effective model in terms of civil discourse, but it must also be careful to not promote polarisation or inequity of access.

The Public Sphere Habermas (2006, p. 416) described the contemporary public sphere as being ‘dominated by the kind of mediated communication that lacks the defining features of deliberation … The dynamics of mass communication are driven by the power of media to select, and shape the

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presentation of messages, and by the strategic use of political and social power to influence the agendas as well as triggering and framing of public issues’. Thus, in representative democracy today, the element of true deliberation is missing from the public sphere. Instead, representative democracy presents a public sphere that uses political power and media to influence voters, giving the facade that ‘deliberation’ is a part of this sphere, while, in fact, no true deliberation can occur due to the heavily mediated communication that relies on subjectivity to sway voters. Individuals are no longer motivated by rational considerations through deliberation, but by the ideas presented by the political powers through the media. Media has abused its power and sought to influence election outcomes, again denying the public a true sphere for deliberation (see, e.g., McKnight & McNair, 2012; Leveson, 2012; Davies, 2014). There are limits of Habermas’s bourgeois public sphere that must be overcome to create a truly deliberative space. First, there is the limitation of freedom of speech and public opinion that is associated with social inequalities (such as access to material resources and formal education) that ‘limits participation in the public sphere’ (Habermas, 1991, p. 227). Second, there is the limitation of freedom of association and assembly. This means that the large political and economic organisations ‘enjoy an oligopoly of the publistically effective and politically relevant formation of assemblies and associations’ (Habermas, 1991, p. 228). Cyberdemocracy must overcome these limitations to have the potential to facilitate civic engagement for a more participatory democracy in a world where social media platforms are often misused, undermining democracy. As ‘shared exposure to dissimilar views [is] a necessary condition for the type of healthy political deliberation that takes place in thriving democratic societies’ (Barbera, 2020, p. 44), it is a necessary part of a virtual public sphere. Current social media platforms both increased awareness of other viewpoints and create political polarisation (Barbera, 2020). It is, thus, worth considering if the internet can provide a public sphere for true deliberation and how. The question of whether the internet can truly provide a public sphere for true deliberation has been discussed widely in scholarship (see, e.g., Dahlberg, 2000; Szabo, 2007; Papacharissi, 2004; Thompson, 2002;

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Galston, 2002). Dahlberg (2000, p. 66) argues that the distinction between the public and private sphere is ‘not a division of content but of communicative form’ and states that the public sphere is a place for rational discourse that ‘emphasizes the process of reaching understanding more than consensus’. In response to arguments that the internet cannot provide a true public sphere for deliberation, Dahlberg (2000) relies on Habermas’s (1992) argument that the deliberations of the public sphere have always been mediated, as deliberation has occurred in political newspapers and literary journals. The internet, thus, can serve as another mediator for deliberation, provided it is inclusive and not ruled by commercial interests. Dahlberg (2000, p. 97) believes that the internet can enhance the public sphere and that Habermas’s public sphere conception ‘does not privilege a face-to-­ face model of interaction’. The internet can allow for ‘argumentation’ and the ‘reasoned exchange of validity claims’ because ‘cyber interactions constitute individuals as autonomous, active, and reflexive, able to know themselves, to manage and integrate their multiple and changing Identities’ (Dahlberg, 2000, p. 99). Many proponents of cyberdemocracy have hailed the internet as the panacea for all that is wrong with representative democracy (e.g., Ferber et al., 2007; Ferber et al., 2006). However, for cyberdemocracy to be a viable model, the internet must have emancipatory potential, able to offer a new and unified public sphere in which deliberation can take place and direct democracy can occur. In an essay on cyberdemocracy, Thompson (2002) details the potential and limits of the internet in relationship to the development of a public sphere. He writes that the ‘internet undoubtedly provides more information to more people than has ever before been possible and by means of this service certainly effects a positive contribution’ (Thompson, 2002, p. 33). Thompson, however, fears that the internet may make majority or minority tyrannical rule easier, as it breaks down geographical barriers and allows communication across bounds that would previously never have happened (Thompson, 2002, p. 34). According to Thompson (2002, p. 38), ‘democracy, properly understood, requires technologies that support forums accessible to citizens of diverse perspectives and opportunities for active and regular interchange,

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all governed by norms of mutual respect and openness’. To be a legitimate political space, the internet must provide this sort of public sphere. Thompson also offers five ways in which the internet can promote the aims of democracy. Cyberspace must have forums open to everyone, those using the internet must participate, interactions should be ‘sustained’, interactions should be civil and respectful, and everything should be transparent (Thompson, 2002, p. 39). Cataldo (2014, p. 12) argues for the emancipatory potential of the internet, arguing that it ‘provides individuals with the opportunity to be politically involved in virtual venues and serves as a potential equalizer for all involved parties’. What, then, is the status of the current public sphere? Is it filled with opportunities for lengthy deliberation to reach consensus? Are these deliberations respectful and civil? Are they open and accessible to all? Are they transparent? Today, political disengagement is high and often voting is the only political action citizens engage in (Pew Research Center, October 2018). While a median of 78% of those surveyed said they had voted, a median of 33% had attended a political event and even fewer participated in discussions of political issues online (median of 17%; Pew Research Center, October 2018). Thus, even when provided with opportunities for deliberation, few take these opportunities. Media has become biased and commercialised, lacking transparency, and manipulating the beliefs and opinions of the public. Cyberdemocracy can offer what the current public sphere cannot—a platform for deliberation and direct democracy; the creation of social capital; and an agorian space that strengthens democratic values. It offers a platform for the dissemination of information and for communication among citizens, both of which are necessary (according to Habermas) for the formation of a true public sphere and the creation of self-governing social networks. If, per Habermas, political power can only be legitimate when it adheres to the collective, society, therefore must find a way to determine what these best interests are. This occurs in the public sphere through extensive deliberation and rational discourse. Given that the public sphere barely exists, many scholars have questioned whether the internet can help to revitalise the public sphere. Papacharissi (2004, p. 259)

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investigated whether the belief that ‘online discourse will increase political participation and pave the road for a democratic utopia’ was true and found that the internet has the ‘potential to revive the public sphere, provided that greater diversity and volume of discussion is present’. Of the potential of the internet to enhance the public sphere, Papacharissi (2004, p. 267) writes: Anonymity online obliterates real-life identity boundaries and enhances free and open communication, thus promoting a more enlightened exchange of ideas. A growing body of literature attests to the potential that the internet and its accompanying technologies have for reviving political discussion.

Similarly, Szabo (2007, p. 121) found that the internet and social news sites offer a ‘promising opportunity … because such sites actively help, promote and reward reasoned debate to take place’. Dahlberg (2000, p. 101) investigated ‘the extent to which the public sphere is actually being enhanced by online interaction, and how it can be more fully developed through the Internet’. He found that in online discussions, ‘high levels of reflexivity, respectful listening, sincerity, and commitment to deliberations’ were possible (Dahlberg, 2000, p. 259). However, there are still barriers to cyberdemocracy’s public sphere that must be overcome: ‘There is a need to develop greater reflexivity, respectful listening to difference, and deliberative equality. The most serious problem identified is a lack of representation of a broad demographic of the “target population” in the deliberations’ (Dahlberg, 2000, p. 259). Thus, the internet has the potential to form a virtual public sphere that is both inclusive and deliberative. The deliberation that takes place in cyberspace can be civil and polite. However, there is room for improvement and a need to ensure that representation in the public sphere is broad. Given that internet access is being rapidly expanded, there is reason to believe that representation will also expand. The level of dissatisfaction with democracy and the rapid growth of global access to the internet have given rise to the possibility for cyberdemocracy to become a truly viable and vibrant model of democracy. The virtual public sphere is not only the principal means by which social

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capital can be created, but it also has the potential to create a true agorian space that can strengthen democratic values. Cyberspace offers communication and information as its currencies, as it allows for the rapid spread of information as well as easy communication that transcends geographical barriers. In this way, it creates social capital, or networks of relationships between individuals that allow for deliberation and rational discourse to determine the political action in their best collective interests.

Empowering Citizen Participation Gardels and Berggruen describe the current state of the public sphere as ‘appallingly withered’. They link this decay to the growing fragmentation of mass society into diverse tribes fortified by the participatory power of social media, and the advent of digital capitalism, which is divorcing productivity and wealth creation from employment and income. (Gardels & Berggruen, 2019, p. 1)

They note the decline of civic discourse and the lack of an informed public due to ‘fake news, hate speech, and “alternative facts”’ (Gardels & Berggruen, 2019, p. 2). Gardels and Berggruen (2019, p. 2) argue for a renovation of democracy that integrates new forms of direct participation into present practices of representative government while restoring to popular sovereignty the kind of deliberative ballast the American Founding Fathers thought so crucial to avoiding the suicide of republics.

They propose to ‘spread wealth and opportunity fairly in a future in which intelligent machines are on track to displace labour, depress wages, and transform the nature of work to an unprecedented degree’ to offset the gaps created by digital capitalism (Gardels & Berggruen, 2019, p. 3). According to Gardels and Berggruen (2019, p. 6), renovation is ‘the point of equilibrium between creation and destruction, whereby what is

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valuable is saved and what is outmoded or dysfunctional is discarded’. One way they propose to accomplish this is by empowering participation without populism by integrating social networks and direct democracy into the system through the establishment of new mediating institutions that complement representative government. (Gardels & Berggruen, 2019, p. 6)

The current political situation, Gardels and Berggruen (2019, p. 8) argue, has resulted ‘out of the decay of democracy itself ’. This is particularly evident in the election of Donald Trump, for when ‘an unresponsive elite forsakes average citizens in a system legitimated by popular sovereignty, demagogues who fashion themselves as tribunes of the people ride the rage to power’. Most important, Gardels and Berggruen (2019, p. 19) argue, is ‘renovating the practices and institutions of democratic deliberation’. Only through democratic deliberation can the ‘contest over contrasting visions of the future … be settled’ (Gardels & Berggruen, 2019, p. 21). Because of changes in society and technology, democracy must renovate current institutions of deliberation to meet these new modes. Because of ‘the demise of socializing institutions and the rise of polarizing norms and practices’, societal fragmentation prevails (Gardels & Berggruen, 2019, p. 23). Paired with the fact that the ‘business model of social media companies maximizes virality among the like-minded, society has been divided and will remain so without the restoration of deliberation in a new form’ (Gardels & Berggruen, 2019, pp. 23–24). Through renovation, democracy must return to what it was intended to be, ‘the negotiation of competing interests, the balancing of different values’, not the ‘mob rule’ of populism (Gardels & Berggruen, 2019, p. 25). As Gardels and Berggruen (2019, p. 26) put it, social media platforms ‘challenge the custodianship of elites and even the legitimacy of representative democracy’. It ‘heralds a new distribution of power that goes hand in hand with Western publics’ increasing preference for the direct democracy of referenda and citizens’ initiatives’ (Gardels & Berggruen, 2019, p. 26). However, letting the people simply decide is a perversion of

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democracy. Democracy involves civil deliberation of contested ideas and viewpoints to reach decisions, not simply the voice of the majority. Thus, the ‘countervailing institutions of deliberation must be … strengthened’ (Gardels & Berggruen, 2019, p. 27). Social media, while it can transmit and spread information widely, also stymies deliberation by increasing fragmentation and ‘amplify[ing] the human tendency to bind with one’s own kind’ (Gardels & Berggruen, 2019, p. 28). To overcome the divisiveness of current social media platforms and harness their participatory power, a renovation of democracy must engage the participatory power of social media and the increasing preferences of publics for direct democracy by designing new, impartial institutions and practices that interpose a deliberative check against the false claims, misinformation, intolerance, and magical thinking that come with the immediate wash of networked popular sentiment. (Gardels & Berggruen, 2019, p. 35)

In terms of bridging the digital divide and ensuring that inequality and discrimination are not deepened through digital capitalism, Gardels and Berggruen (2019, p. 81) argue for a redistribution of wealth. If, they argue, two main things occur, inequality will be lessened, and democracy will evolve. First, Gardels and Berggruen (2019, p. 81) state that ‘unemployment and health benefits must be provided universally and not tied to a specific job or company’. Second, there should be a shift from ‘taxation on wealth to pre-distribution policies that enhance the skills needed to navigate the steady disruptions of innovation and that bolster the capital assets of all citizens’ (Gardels & Berggruen, 2019, p. 82). This would include policy shifts such as investing in public education and giving all citizens ‘an equity share in the robots creating the new wealth of the future’ (Gardels & Berggruen, 2019, p. 82). Additionally, the growth of a sharing economy ‘has the potential to mitigate the worst problems of economic insecurity’ (Gardels & Berggruen, 2019, p. 93). Gardels and Berggruen (2019, pp. 99–100) are certain that ‘the impact of technological advance is so great that it will force a rethinking of our political and social institutions’, meaning that democracy, as it is today, is dead and no longer viable.

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If representative democracy cannot be returned to its original state, then change must occur. Because current institutional arrangements have decayed and become outmoded due to changes in society and technology, representative democracy must be, as Gardels and Berggruen (2019) put it, ‘renovated’. This renovation comes in the form of cyberdemocracy. If cyberdemocracy can overcome the challenges that currently face democracy (overcoming fragmentation, alienation, and inequality linked to the risks associated with the interconnectedness of new technologies), it has the potential to allow for true deliberation through mass participation in the virtual public sphere. The Westminster model of representative democracy is thought to be among the most effective democracies in the world, but the increasing complexity of contemporary problems poses challenges beyond the scope of this model’s strength. Modern technological infrastructure has made it possible for greater social and institutional collaborations whose affairs are managed by an analogue system often incapable of meeting their demands. Today, the internet provides a practical means for everyone to record his or her opinion and, thus, inclusive democracy is attainable. Modern technological infrastructure enables us to build a participatory and collaborative democratic system based on the original idea of democracy, where everyone is empowered to exercise the right to decide for him/herself without interference.

Bibliography Asenbaum, H. (2015). Revisiting e-topia: A social movements contribution to the debate on democratic innovation. https://pdfs.sematicscholar.org/7afe/2 ea711bd64d47fcf5109a5d14bb00dae5250.pdf Bago, B., Rand, D. G., & Pennycook, G. (2020). Fake news, fast and slow: Deliberation reduces belief in false (but not true) news headlines. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 149(8), 1608–1613. https://doi. org/10.1037/xge0000729 Barbera, P. (2020). Social media, echo chambers, and political polarization. In N. Persily & J. Tucker (Eds.), Social media and democracy. Cambridge University Press. Barbera, P., & Rivero, G. (2015). Understanding the political representativeness of Twitter users. Social Science Computer Review, 33(6), 712–729.

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Bezold, C. (Ed.). (1978). Anticipatory democracy: People in the politics of the future. Random House. Bezold, C. (2010). Anticipatory democracy and aspirational futures. Journal of Future Studies, 15(2), 167–170. Cataldo, M. (2014). Cyberdemocracy: Assessing the European Parliament. Thesis. Rochester Institute of Technology. Retrieved June 20, 2021, from https://scholarworks.rit.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=9643&co ntext=theses Clapham, A. (2015). Human rights: A very short introduction. Oxford University Press. Dahlberg, L. J. (2000). The internet and the public sphere: A critical analysis of the possibility of online discourse enhancing deliberative democracy. PhD thesis. Massey University. https://mro.massey.ac.nz/bitstream/handle/10179/2273/02_whole.pdf Davies, N. (2014). Hack attack: How the truth caught up with Rupert Murdoch. Chatto and Windus. Diecker, J., & Galan, M. (2014). “Creating” a public sphere in cyberspace: The case of the EU. In E. G. Carayannis, D. F. Campbell, & M. P. Efthymiopoulos (Eds.), Cyber-development, cyber-democracy and cyber-defense. Springer. Ferber, P., Foltz, F., & Pugliese, R. (2006). Community networks and public participation: A forum for civic engagement or a platform for ranting irate malcontents? Bulletin of Science, Technology & Society, 26(5), 388–397. Ferber, P., Foltz, F., & Pugliese, R. (2007). Cyberdemocracy and online politics: A new model of interactivity. Bulletin of Science, Technology & Society, 27(5), 391–399. Galston, W. (2002). The impact of the internet on civic life: An early assessment. In E. Kamarck & J. Nye (Eds.), Governance.com: Democracy in the information age. Brookings Institution Press. Gardels, N., & Berggruen, N. (2019). Renovating democracy: Governing in the age of globalization and digital capitalism. University of California Press. Habermas, J. (1989). The structural transformation of the public sphere: An inquiry into a category of bourgeois society. MIT Press. Habermas, J. (1991). The public sphere. In C. Mukerji & M. Schudson (Eds.), Rethinking popular culture: Contemporary perspectives in cultural studies (pp. 398–404). University of California Press. Habermas, J. (1992). Postmetaphysical thinking: Philosophical essays. MIT Press. Habermas, J. (1996). Between facts and norms. MIT Press. Habermas, J. (2006). Political communication in media society: Does democracy still enjoy an epistemic dimension? The impact of normative theory on empirical research. Communication Theory, 16(4), 411–426.

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Hume, D. (2010). A Treatise of Human Nature. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Lambach, D. (2019). The territorialization of cyberspace. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/308720083_The_Territorialization_of_Cyberspace Leveson, B. (2012). An inquiry into the culture, practices, and ethics of the press. Stationery Office. McKnight, D., & McNair, B. (2012). The empire goes to war: News Corporation and Iraq. Australian Journalism Review, 34(2), 7–18. Noveck, B. S. (2003). Designing deliberative democracy in cyberspace: The role of the cyber-lawyer. Boston University Journal of Science & Technology Law, 9(1), 1–33. https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/cgi/viewcontent. cgi?article=1580&context=fac_articles_chapters Nielsen, K. B., & Fletcher, G. (2020). Handbook of Ethical Research with Ethnocultural Populations and Communities. Cham, Switzerland: Springer. Papacharissi, Z. (2004). Democracy online: Civility, politeness, and the democratic potential of online discussion groups. New Media & Society, 6(2), 259–283. Pew Research Center. (2018, October). Many around the world are disengaged from politics. Pew Research Center. (2020b, June). Experts predict more digital innovation by 2030 aimed at enhancing democracy. Rawls, J. (2001). The law of peoples: With “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited”. Harvard University Press. Rawls, J. (2002). A Theory of Justice (Rev. Ed). Harvard University Press. Sunstein, C. R. (2001). Republic 2.0. Princeton University Press. Swedberg, R. (2018). How to use Max Weber’s ideal type in sociological analysis. Journal of Classical Sociology, 18(3), 181–196. Szabo, A. (2007). The impact of the internet on the public sphere and on the culture industry: A study of blogs, social news sites and discussion forums. Master’s Thesis. University of Vaasa. https://core.ac.uk/download/ pdf/197963736.pdf Thompson, D. (2002). James Madison on cyberdemocracy. In E. Kamarck & J. Nye (Eds.), Governance.com: Democracy in the information age. Brookings Institution Press. Wilhelm, A. G. (2000). Democracy in the digital age: Challenges to political life in cyberspace. Routledge.

11 The Cyberdemocratic Future: Some Final Thoughts

This final chapter serves as a conclusion and presents a proposition that governments should strive to implement a model of cyberdemocracy to better meet the needs of citizens. Because representative democracy requires renovation (Gardels & Berggruen, 2019), cyberdemocracy has the potential to become the new model of democracy that provides mass participation, robust deliberation, greater equity, accountability, and transparency, ease of access to both the public sphere and information, and a fulfilment of Rawlsian distributive justice. It provides propositional knowledge of the cyberdemocratic system. Despite its challenges and shortcomings, cyberdemocracy has the potential to overcome the limitations of the Westminster model. This proposition is based on truth and corresponds to the real world. This means that cyberdemocracy is based in the reality of current technological advances that can empower citizen participation in the democratic process. Cyberdemocracy is expansive democracy because it allows citizens a 50+1% ratio through regular, direct participation in the political process. This participation would take place in a virtual public sphere that allows for collective decision-making without systematic interferences from ideologies, theologies, lobbies, external powers, or interest groups. The virtual public sphere would allow for policies to be critically examined. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 H. Karem, Cyberdemocracy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-27544-9_11

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Policies would be presented to the citizens by subject experts. Citizens could also easily access the proposed policies and discuss their advantages and disadvantages with rational deliberative discourse. The citizens’ political decisions might be influenced at the individual level by the national value system, personal beliefs, and interests. Cyberdemocracy is a democratic governing system that would encourage individual decision-making towards a collective goal. Cyberdemocracy would have the potential to inform, encourage, and rejuvenate the political citizenship and accommodate collective actions through individual decision-making for the benefit of all (e.g., Barth & Schlegelmilch, 2014). Further, it would allow the citizens’ collective wisdom, general wills, and common interests to be reflected in the laws that define the contours of freedom and fairness for all. Through cyberdemocracy, modern technology could help expand our democratic condition, inform, and encourage citizens to engage in the political process, and promote better ethical standards and accountability of those entrusted with power and resources (e.g., Xavier & Campbell, 2014). Societies have developed from primitive to agrarian, to industrial, to digital. Can cyberdemocracy replace the analogue Westminster model at the next stage of this modernisation process? Cyberdemocracy would use direct and participatory decision-making. There would be no need for representatives or parliament; instead, a council of experts in different domains from across the spectrum would be elected by the citizens, from which administrators would be selected to run public affairs under the gaze and scrutiny of the entire nation through a virtual assembly of cyberspace. Under cyberdemocracy, the government structure and civil services could remain the same. However, politicians would be replaced with technocrats through the virtual assembly and there would be direct elections of technocratic governments without the use of parties or representatives. Blue papers (combined white and green papers) would be presented directly to the citizens and those receiving 50+1% approval would be executed by the state machine and its civil servants without political, racial, sectarian, class, outside lobby influences, or bribery. Experts would explain the pros and cons of their ideas directly to the citizens, and the citizens could make up their minds without interference. Millions of

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citizens could make a much better assessment of expert projects than single or a small number of politicians with vested interests. Under cyberdemocracy, experts would be frequently elected to the governing councils directly by the citizens. From these experts, the most popular candidates would fill the governing cabinet, and the candidate with the most votes would assume the position of prime minster. Given the practicality of this system, at least 50+1% of the population would always participate in the decision-making process. Experts would be identified and vetted by the senior civil servants through the state engine before being presented to the public for a vote. Candidates would then join the expert queues of the governing councils according to the number of votes they have achieved, in descending order. Human beings inherently strive to pursue and protect self-interests through decision-making at the individual level. Through cyberdemocracy, the collective wisdom of the society can be harnessed for the common good, instead of ideologically and theologically driven representatives deciding on what is good for them collectively. Cyberdemocracy’s approach would ensure that it is the collective wisdom that makes decisions. Representative democracy is incoherent with the core democratic principles and representatives do not have the democratic mandate to determine its direction as they currently do through the analogue Westminster system. Cyberdemocracy would ensure that the citizens are the real leaders of their destiny and give them the power to decide on all important issues affecting them and their future. Cyberdemocracy would discourage all ideology- or theology-driven actions against weaker or vulnerable sections of society and limit institutional mismanagement, mass deception, war-mongering tendencies, corporate greed, ideologies, and theologies. It would encourage individuals’ freedom and fairness through harnessing collective capacity to manage public policy for the common good. Democracy in its status cannot be viewed as a magic solution applied to social problems. The fact is, due to the increasing complexity of contemporary lives, citizens are often unable to devote time to politics in its current state and mechanism. However, if there was a cyberdemocratic model that allowed them to participate at the flick of a button on their digital devices, and their decisions would make a direct impact, the

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majority would be likely to participate. Under the current mechanism, the British value system is superseded by the ideologically and theologically driven laws of whoever gets into power. The legal system revolves around the application of the law; it might be flawed and too often fail to achieve fairness and justice in its real sense. Lawyers are not trained to achieve justice but to defend the indefensible often through finding loopholes in the written laws, whereby judges are explicitly trained to apply the written laws instead of achieving justice, not to mention the process under which they are appointed. The alternative mechanism will ensure that collective wisdom, common sense, and the value system take priority and by default pave the way for good quality legislations and justice prevail in its true sense. Under the current Westminster system, the government agenda is informed by general elections, during which political parties put forth several different sets of ideas. The party with the most popular idea (manifesto) forms the government (minority rule). These ideas then become the foundations on which the legislations are generated by gradually flowing through the parliamentary system. Lobbies, interest groups, other politicians, private citizens, and foreign entities often influence the government’s political agenda through the media, trade deals, or campaigns. In this process, the electoral mandate is flawed; electorates must accept or reject manifestos in their entirety. The government produces two types of policy documents: first, through white papers, firmly setting out its proposals for legislation without public consultations, and second, through green papers seeking public feedback on its proposed legislation but not necessarily taking them into account. Proposals to address an issue originate from a variety of sources and require the endorsement of at least a government minister to be set in motion and considered for legislations by the cabinet committee, followed by the legislation committee’s decision on whether it will be presented to the representatives in parliament. Legislations approved by the cabinet are then drafted by parliamentary counsel (specialised lawyers) and added to the Queen’s Annual State Opening Speech. For a bill to become a law, it must be approved by both House of Commons (Bill Committees of around 20 representatives) and House of Lords, throughout all three stages (1st, 2nd, and 3rd readings), then

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approved by the Queen through Royal Assent. The laws then impact the entire population (UK Parliament, 2018). Under the current mechanism, Bill Committee members are not necessarily subject experts when examining the proposed bill and are often influenced by external factors far from the interests of the electorate. The electorate is excluded from the decision-making process until the next general elections. One of the salient injustices of the current system is the fact that a government of one colour will tend to decide in the same ideological manner for as long as it is in power on behalf of the entire nation. Therefore, those outside that ideological mainframe will be at the receiving end of the effects of the government’s decisions for the entire period. Those who disagree will lose out. Because of the prejudices and ideological influences on the current representative system, the democratic process is restricted, decisions made by the government and produced laws will often change the national culture and the entire value system. Under the current system, instead of limiting their objectives to serving the electorate, the representatives strive to convert the nation to their way of thinking. Under cyberdemocracy, the true majority would make political decisions while elected experts would limit their objectives to serving the nation. Modern technology would be leveraged, since 93% of British households have access to the internet (ONS, 2019) and 79% of British nationals accessed the internet ‘on the go’ (ONS, 2019), to expand the democratic condition and fix the broken link between citizens and their government by devising a cloud-based emancipatory and collaborative platform that could encourage citizen engagements in civil discourse. The system could be employed as a communication tool between the governing technocrats and the masses. The triangular approach of political decision-making under cyberdemocracy is based on a two-tier system of Facts, Objectives, and Decisions: the governing councils and the public. The governing councils, through the state entities, acquire, assimilate, and evaluate facts that form the basis for blue papers using their expertise, set out the objectives, determine the pros and cons of each blue paper, and decide whether it is going to be presented to the public.

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The citizens receive, assess, and decide on the blue papers at the individual level. The collective decision (50+1%) is then used by the governing council as a public mandate to execute the formalisation process. The governing councils follow the same procedure for all its government agenda except where the matter is sensitive, related to national security, or an emergency. Instead of public consultation, the governing councils have the private mandate to decide and execute actions accordingly. One of the biggest challenges to cyberdemocracy is related to the rights and freedom of citizens (Campbell, 2014). While cyberdemocracy allows for free flow of information, there is also the potential for information misuse, particularly misuse by the government. Citizens’ rights and freedoms must be protected from information monitoring if this monitoring is in ‘conflict with the principles of quality of democracy’ (Campbell, 2014, p. 115). The other great challenge is that of capitalism. However, as Gardels and Berggruen (2019) argued, this challenge can be lessened by what they term a ‘pre-distribution’ of wealth, or equity sharing in the technology of the future. Barth and Schlegelmilch (2014, p. 196) argue that it ‘seems almost impossible to ensure the needed security measures which a Cyberdemocracy would require for the participation, the competition, the freedom and the equality in the virtual world of the Internet’ and that cyberdemocracy can, instead, be ‘a very useful additional tool to share political information and knowledge with the population’. However, a recent survey of experts found that they predict the development and implementation of new digital tools that can, in fact, provide the needed security measures (Pew Research Center, June 2020a). As Campbell and Carayannis (2014, p. 140) put it, ‘the evolution of cyberdemocracy still is at the very beginning’, and in my view, cyberdemocracy has the potential to better embody democratic values such as freedom, equality, and justice than the Westminster model currently does. Only by discussing and further investigating these challenges will cyberdemocracy become a stronger democratic model. The proposition forwarded here is based on an ideal, but it is an ideal that far exceeds the dying Westminster model in terms of its embodiment of the essence of democracy. This described possible model gives a very tangible view of how cyberdemocracy could function despite the challenges to it, whereas

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most descriptions of cyberdemocracy are far from concrete. This allows for a deeper exploration of the potential of cyberdemocracy in comparison to the current Westminster model.

Conclusion Habermas’s concept of public sphere has had many criticisms thrown at it, many of which are correct, but as Julian Petley (2012) argued the internet has to a large degree reinvigorated Habermas’s idea into a ‘New Public Sphere’ where communications—some rational, others far from it—appear, and I, like Petley, acknowledge that corporate powers have a substantial presence and influence in the new public sphere, to which I would add right-wing conspiracy theories, state-backed propaganda, advertising, and so on, but this does not negate the reality that there are other forces that counter these pernicious ideologies. The new public sphere that confirms cyberspace has much to offer in terms of the creation of a virtual public sphere that allows true deliberation, greater representation, and rational discourse over subjectivity. In terms of freedom and fairness for all, cyberdemocracy is more equitable than the Westminster model. Cyberdemocracy would also provide higher levels of accountability and transparency. In relation to collective, direct decision-making, cyberdemocracy would be preferable, because it would result in a more direct form of democracy with a higher level of participation due to its digitised approach. Through technology, cyberdemocracy could break down the barriers and allow citizens easier and more direct access to the government for consultations. In this context, the cyberdemocratic model could put constraints on political lobbying and patronage through higher levels of citizen auditing. The free and fair flow of information is necessary for a functioning democracy. Cyberdemocracy would ensure that information is more accessible, and that this information would give voice to the individual. This means that cyberdemocracy would more accurately reflect the interests of the general populace, instead of the elite, as is the case in the Westminster model. However, one caveat to this freer flow of and access to information is the concern of privacy that comes with it. One must weigh the harm of less privacy against the benefit of a more equitable political system to

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determine if the transition to the cyberdemocracy model is a risk worth taking. In terms of justice based on Rawls’s framework, there is no equivalency between cyberdemocracy and the Westminster model. This is an issue that must be further investigated as individuals should have equal access to information, but some individuals will take advantage of this access and others will choose not to access it. Finally, cyberdemocracy is preferable in terms of merits-based competitions. Cyberdemocracy would be a more accessible model and this accessibility could improve the democratic system itself. The more accessible the government is, the greater its transparency.

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Index1

A

Accountability, 4, 79, 91, 105, 106, 109, 127, 170, 173–177, 184, 188, 190, 211, 212, 217 Age of Enlightenment, 28, 30 The Age of Pericles, 7 Algorithm, 18, 20, 37, 119, 134, 135, 138, 157, 168 American and French Revolution, 81 Ancient Athens, 3, 7, 10, 160, 167 Aristotelian, 15 Atomists, 17, 46 B

Bayesian binary theory, 106 Beveridge, William, 63–65, 88 Bourgeois, 78, 201

Brexit, 53, 69, 104, 130, 142, 143, 164, 200 British House of Commons, 20 Bureaucratisation, 118 C

The Cambridge Analytica, 95 Capitalism, 4, 32–36, 47, 78, 114, 119, 123–125, 127, 169, 216 Castells, Manuel, 15, 16, 20, 24, 117–119 Catholicism, 35 Chinese social credit scores, 135 Civic engagement, 4, 5, 59, 80, 111, 125, 149–170, 176, 201 Commercialisation of public sphere, 76, 134, 168

 Note: Page numbers followed by ‘n’ refer to notes.

1

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 H. Karem, Cyberdemocracy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-27544-9

227

228 Index

Commodification, 16, 83, 136 Copernican Revolution, 43 Critique of Pure Reason, 44 Cyberactivism, 103, 116 Cyberdemocracy, 1–5, 7, 10–13, 15–23, 27, 30, 52, 54, 57–59, 62, 76–78, 80, 87, 93–96, 103, 105, 109, 113, 114, 119, 123–140, 142, 144, 145, 152–156, 160–162, 166, 168, 170, 174–179, 181, 183–208, 211–213, 215–218 Cyberspace, 54, 58, 80, 94, 116, 117, 124, 126, 133, 136, 142–144, 154, 158, 160, 167–170, 192, 193, 196, 203–205, 212, 217

Digital Fordism, 14 Dilthey, Wilhelm, 4, 149, 150 Disinformation, 130, 134 Durkheim, E., 16, 22, 35, 46, 47 E

Empiricism, 19, 22, 41 Empty formalism, 22, 45 The Enlightenment, 1, 3, 19, 22, 24, 27–48, 81, 106 Epistemology, 1, 8, 9, 36, 43 Extremism, 4, 140, 142–145, 158 F

Fichte, J.G., 19, 21, 32, 38–40 Fourth Democratic Transformation, 4, 125–130

D

Dasein, 15 Decentralisation, 128, 129 Decline of nation state, 4 Deliberation, 1, 2, 4, 11, 15, 23, 24, 38, 41, 52, 54, 58, 59, 62, 69, 75–80, 94, 96, 103–105, 107, 110–115, 124–126, 131, 133, 154–156, 168, 169, 193, 194, 196, 199–208, 211, 217 Democracy in the Digital Age, 152 Democratic ideals, 2, 19, 29, 68, 89, 137, 189, 191 Democritus, 17, 22, 46 Descartes, R., 28n1, 40–42 Determinism, 138, 139 Die postnationale Konstellation, 66 Digital capitalism, 205, 207

G

Galileo’s theory of uniform acceleration, 22 Geisteswissenschaften, 1, 4, 139, 149–152 General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT), 68 German idealism, 22, 46 Gidden, Anthony, 117–119 Global agora, 115, 117 Globalisation, 2–4, 13, 14, 51, 54–57, 62, 66, 69, 70, 79, 80, 83, 101, 104, 115, 117, 119, 126, 158, 199 Global village, 4, 114–119 Gramsci, Antonio, 114, 157

 Index 

229

H

M

Habermasian public sphere, 14 Hegel, G.W.F., 17–19, 21, 22, 32, 38, 39, 41–43, 45, 46 Hegelian critique of Marx, 17 Heidegger, M., 15, 17, 19–21, 44, 45 Hellenic, 7, 8 Hermeneutical process, 69 Hobbes, Thomas, 28, 35, 37 Hume, D., 1, 36

Marx’s materialism, 18 McLuhan, M., 115, 116 Meditations on first philosophy, 40 Merit-based Competitions, 4, 183–186 Metaphysical, 9, 22, 47 Metaphysical concept, 19, 20 Mill, J.S., 28, 37, 76, 77, 89–93, 151 Misinformation, 59, 134, 153, 184, 196, 207 N

I

Idealism, 17, 40 Inclusiveness, 13, 142, 152–154 Industrialisation, 81 Industrialism, 138 Industrial Revolution, 82, 138 Instantiation of teleology, 19 Internet neutrality, 158

Natural rights, 9, 11, 28, 29, 32, 36, 90, 140 Neoliberalism, 3, 4, 62, 64, 65, 69, 87–96, 167 Newtonian mechanics, 42 Nietzsche, F., 29, 31, 31n2, 57, 69 O

K

Kantian, 37, 41, 43 Knowledge society, 24

Öffentlichkeit, 81 Ontological difference, 15, 19, 46 Ontological materialism, 18 P

J

The Jacobite revolt, 36 L

The Laffer Curve, 88 Legitimation crisis, 83–87 Leibniz, G.W., 20, 41–43 Liquid democracy, 4, 114–119, 137 Locke, John, 10, 28, 28n1, 35

Paine, Thomas, 28 Platform society, 3, 4, 23–24, 141 Platonic, 15 Plebiscitarian, 51, 103–106 Pluralism, 22, 67, 68, 145 Populism, 4, 29, 53, 54, 62–69, 140–145, 187, 206 Post-industrial, 24, 53, 62 Postmodernism, 1, 2 Post-truth, 4, 8, 140–145, 158

230 Index

Principle of Sufficient Reason, 42 Privatisation of the public sphere, 4, 149–170 Protestantism, 32, 33, 36 Public sphere, 1, 4, 5, 11, 14, 31, 41, 48, 54, 58, 75–96, 110, 115, 117, 124, 149–170, 186–208, 211, 217 R

Rationalism, 9, 19, 22, 28n1, 31–38, 41, 83 Rawls, John theory of justice, 5, 174, 187–190, 192 Reductivism, 19 Reformation, 19, 32, 34–36, 107 The Relationship of Scepticism to Philosophy, 40 Rousseau, J.J., 28, 35, 37, 67

Technological paradigm, 24 Teleological, 9, 19, 23, 38 Theory of justice, 5, 174, 187–190, 192 Thought experiment, 178, 187–190, 197, 198 Transcendental Aesthetic, 44 Transforming the ecology of mobilisations, 140–145 Transparency, 4, 84, 153, 156, 157, 161, 163, 164, 166, 169, 173–177, 188, 190, 203, 211, 217, 218 U

Utilitarian, 37, 90, 189 Utilitarianism, 89–92, 151, 174, 189 V

The Science of Knowledge, 39 Scottish Enlightenment, 34, 36 Smith, Adam, 36, 37 Sophists, 8, 9, 139 Sphere of knowledge, 5 Structuration, 117, 119 Surveillance Capitalism, 136

Veil of ignorance, 5, 181, 183, 184, 188, 190 Virtual global village, 116 Virtual public spheres, 2, 54, 78, 80, 87, 94, 95, 124, 125, 130, 133, 144, 154, 174, 191, 192, 196, 197, 201, 204, 208, 211, 217

T

W

Taylor’s theory of management, 17 Technological determinism, 4, 137–140

Weber’s Protestant Work Ethic, 89 Westminster, 20, 189, 213, 214

S