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CYBERCRIME AND CYBERSECURITY RESEARCH

CYBER-SECURITY AND INFORMATION WARFARE

No part of this digital document may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means. The publisher has taken reasonable care in the preparation of this digital document, but makes no expressed or implied warranty of any kind and assumes no responsibility for any errors or omissions. No liability is assumed for incidental or consequential damages in connection with or arising out of information contained herein. This digital document is sold with the clear understanding that the publisher is not engaged in rendering legal, medical or any other professional services.

CYBERCRIME AND CYBERSECURITY RESEARCH Additional books and e-books in this series can be found on Nova’s website under the Series tab.

CYBERCRIME AND CYBERSECURITY RESEARCH

CYBER-SECURITY AND INFORMATION WARFARE

NICHOLAS J. DARAS EDITOR

Copyright © 2019 by Nova Science Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means: electronic, electrostatic, magnetic, tape, mechanical photocopying, recording or otherwise without the written permission of the Publisher. We have partnered with Copyright Clearance Center to make it easy for you to obtain permissions to reuse content from this publication. Simply navigate to this publication’s page on Nova’s website and locate the “Get Permission” button below the title description. This button is linked directly to the title’s permission page on copyright.com. Alternatively, you can visit copyright.com and search by title, ISBN, or ISSN. For further questions about using the service on copyright.com, please contact: Copyright Clearance Center Phone: +1-(978) 750-8400 Fax: +1-(978) 750-4470 E-mail: [email protected]. NOTICE TO THE READER The Publisher has taken reasonable care in the preparation of this book, but makes no expressed or implied warranty of any kind and assumes no responsibility for any errors or omissions. No liability is assumed for incidental or consequential damages in connection with or arising out of information contained in this book. The Publisher shall not be liable for any special, consequential, or exemplary damages resulting, in whole or in part, from the readers’ use of, or reliance upon, this material. Any parts of this book based on government reports are so indicated and copyright is claimed for those parts to the extent applicable to compilations of such works. Independent verification should be sought for any data, advice or recommendations contained in this book. In addition, no responsibility is assumed by the publisher for any injury and/or damage to persons or property arising from any methods, products, instructions, ideas or otherwise contained in this publication. This publication is designed to provide accurate and authoritative information with regard to the subject matter covered herein. It is sold with the clear understanding that the Publisher is not engaged in rendering legal or any other professional services. If legal or any other expert assistance is required, the services of a competent person should be sought. FROM A DECLARATION OF PARTICIPANTS JOINTLY ADOPTED BY A COMMITTEE OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION AND A COMMITTEE OF PUBLISHERS. Additional color graphics may be available in the e-book version of this book.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data ISBN: H%RRN

Published by Nova Science Publishers, Inc. † New York

CONTENTS Preface

ix

Chapter 1

SHERLINUX- A Tool Facilitating Linux Forensics Antonios Andreatos

Chapter 2

Acoustic Scattering for a Piecewise Homogeneous Obstacle Christodoulos E. Athanasiadis and Evangelia S. Athanasiadou

Chapter 3

Economic Implications of the Rise of Information Warfare, Cyber-War and Cyber-Security Kyriaki Athanassouli

Chapter 4

Cyber Warfare: A Beyond the Basics Approach Nikolaos Benias and Sozon A. Leventopoulos

Chapter 5

Real-Time Computational Intelligence Protection Framework against Advanced Persistent Threats Konstantinos Demertzis and Lazaros Iliadis

1 25

39 57

83

Chapter 6

Computer Ethics and Institutions Maria Dimarogona and Petros Stefaneas

Chapter 7

Notes on the Estimation of the Asymptotics of the Moments for the m Collector’s Problem Aristides V. Doumas

129

The Use of Millimeter and Sub-Millimeter Wave Frequencies in Future Military Applications M. Gargalakos, I. Karanasiou, R. Makri and N. K. Uzunoglu

137

Chapter 8

109

vi Chapter 9

Chapter 10

Contents On the Mechanics of Nanocomposite Structures Using Multiscale Computational Techniques Stylianos K. Georgantzinos Operational Analysis and Crisis Management (OACM) Framework: The Paradigm of 2011 Military Intervention in Libya Dionysios Gerontogiannis

Chapter 11

Artificial Intelligence in Cyber Defense Georgios Karapilafis

Chapter 12

A Case Study Analysis of Attacks and Losses in the Supply Chain with the Use of GPS or GSM Jammers by the Attackers Panayiotis Laimos, Michalis Chronopoulos, Chrysanthi Laimou and Nikoleta Atanasova

Chapter 13

Dynamic Response of Protein Microtubules A. K. Lazopoulos

Chapter 14

Time Temperature Superposition Response of Carbon Fiber Reinforced Composite Plaques under Accelerated Aging Conditions Dionysios E. Mouzakis and Stefanos P. Zaoutsos

Chapter 15

Attacks against Information Systems in the E.U. Environment: Legal Texts and the Joint Cybercrime Action Taskforce (J-Cat) Model Anastasios Papathanasiou and Georgios Germanos

Chapter 16

The Military Applications of Printed Flexible Electronics Fotios Pelesis

Chapter 17

The Computational Simulation of Passive Synchronization Method for Frequency Hopping Systems K. A. Psilopanagiotis and P. E. Atlamazoglou

Chapter 18

Economics, Financial Warfare and Economic Espionage: From Total War to Modernity. An Analysis of Selected Case Studies Ioannis-Dionysios Salavrakos

159

175 193

201

211

221

237 243

259

271

Chapter 19

Ethics in Cyberspace: Cyber-Security Stamatia Sofiou

325

Chapter 20

Bivariate Copulas-Based Models for Communication Networks Ioannis S. Triantafyllou

337

Contents Chapter 21

Chapter 22

Redesigning the Flood Training Unit of the Hellenic Navy: Principles and Aspects of Human Centered Design G. V. Lykos, N. P. Ventikos, A. K. Rammos and V. G. Petropoulos An Automated Procedure for the Utilization of Hellenic Army’s Empty Warehouses Theodoros Zikos, Dimitrios Zaires and Nikolaos V. Karadimas

vii

347

361

Editor Contact Information

381

Index

383

PREFACE “Cyber-Security and Information Warfare” consists of contributions written by research scientists and engineers from interdisciplinary fields. The chapters are devoted to significant advances in a number of innovating cybersecurity techniques and information management technologies along with new related mathematical developments and support applications from engineering, in order to explore new approaches, useful practices and related problems for further investigation. The volume presents as well a few survey papers which discuss the progress made in broader application areas which could be particularly useful to graduate students and young researchers. I would like to express our deepest thanks to the contributors of chapters as well as to the staff of Nova Publishers for their excellent collaboration in the presentation of this publication.

Nicholas J. Daras Athens, December 2017

In: Cyber-Security and Information Warfare Editor: Nicholas J. Daras

ISBN: 978-1-53614-385-0 c 2019 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

Chapter 1

SHERLINUX - A T OOL FACILITATING L INUX F ORENSICS Antonios S. Andreatos∗ Division of Computer Engineering & Information Science Hellenic Air Force Academy Dekeleia, Attica, Greece

Abstract Sherlinux is a novel Linux forensic tool. It is made of twenty-one bash scripts which automatically produce a complete report in HTML format. The report consists of twenty sub-reports divided into two sections: section A does not need Internet connection; section B needs an Internet connection. Section A includes a cover page plus eleven reports giving information about the operating system, the hardware, the disks and partitions, scheduled tasks, processes, system users, SSH connections, keys details, iptables rules, etc. A special script scans log files for errors and specific keywords. Section A completes its operation in seconds. Section B is optional because it needs an Internet connection and includes nine reports. Section B scripts download four different antiviruses and two rootkit detectors which scan the system for viruses and rootkits. The scan results are presented in separate reports. Section B also provides networking information, as well as, checks system file integrity. Section B takes several minutes to complete its operation, depending mainly on processor speed and Internet connection speed. Sherlinux enables investigators and users to get forensic information easily and quickly. It facilitates investigators to check if a Linux system has been attacked and compromised. Sherlinux also automates the tedious tasks of thoroughly checking a system and reporting the results by producing a presentable report in HTML5/CSS3. Finally, Sherlinux is expandable; there is a provision for adding new modules producing new reports.

Keywords: Linux, forensic tool, forensics report, cyber-defense, bash scripts, HTML report. ∗

Corresponding Author Email: [email protected]; [email protected]

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Introduction to Linux Forensics

“Digital forensics is the process of employing scientific principles and processes to analyze electronically stored information and determine the sequence of events which led to a particular incident” [Raghavan, 2013]. During the last decade, the exponential growth of technology has brought many innovative approaches for acquiring and analyzing digital evidence from diverse sources. Research is sub-classified into conceptual and practical advancements [Pollitt, 2010; Raghavan, 2013]. Evidence acquisition is concerned with the collection of clues from digital devices for subsequent analysis and presentation. It is extremely important that the digital evidence is collected by acquisition tools that do not affect the integrity of the evidence [Koen and Olivier, 2008]. Evidence acquisition from systems under test may be done with the system poweredoff or on. Traditional or “dead” forensics involves the recovery of evidence from computer systems that have been powered down [Adelstein, 2006; Carrier, 2006]. Unfortunately, it may not be possible to shut down vital enterprise systems to conduct forensic investigations. Also, shutting down a system results in the loss of important volatile data, e.g., from main memory [Koen and Olivier, 2008]. Live forensics on the other hand [Adelstein, 2006; Carrier, 2006] enables an investigator to recover and analyze data while a computer system is running. However, this technique has some limitations due to the possible presence of intermediaries, such as rootkits [Craiger, 2005; Wampler and Graham, 2007], which may modify data before they are presented to the investigator. Even if a rootkit is not present, the mere fact that an untrusted piece of code, in the form of a normal operating system service, was used to retrieve the forensic data, may cast doubt on the validity of the data. The two primary goals of an intruder are first to gain privileged access and second to maintain access to a target system as long as possible. A rootkit is essentially a set of software tools employed by an intruder after gaining unauthorized access to a system. It has three primary functions: (a) to maintain access to the compromised system; (b) to attack other systems; and (c) to conceal or modify evidence of the intruder’s activities [Chuvakin, 2003; Craiger, 2005; Wampler and Graham, 2007; Delta Hacker, 2012]. A rootkit replaces several important system files with “trojaned” versions. The trojaned versions work like the original system files with the exception that they hide suspicious activities of the intruder, such as running processes, open files or open sockets [Craiger, 2005]. Sherlinux is a novel live forensic tool for Linux systems. It is made of twenty-one bash scripts [Vossen and Albing, 2017; Flynt, Lakshman and Tushar, 2017] divided in two sections: section A consists of eleven tests while section B includes nine tests. Section A scripts make no changes on the system, collecting evidence for analysis and presentation without affecting the integrity and validity of the data. Section B scripts on the other hand, need an Internet connection in order to install and run a set of external tools which detect malware such as rootkits. All scripts produce corresponding reports as sub-pages of a complete report written in HTML5/CSS3. Beebe and Clarke [2007] propose an objective based framework for digital forensic process divided into six stages:

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1. Preparation 2. Incident response 3. Data collection 4. Data analysis 5. Presentation of findings; and 6. Incident closure. According to Craiger [2005], “as the amount of data grows, automated procedures for identifying, recovering, and examining digital evidence will be required to process evidence in a reasonable time period”. Sherlinux automates the stages of data collection (no. 3) and presentation of findings (no. 5), and facilitates data analysis (no. 4).

2.

Tool Description

Sherlinux consists of a set of bash scripts. Scripts (and corresponding tests) are grouped in two sets: part A includes those scripts which do not need an Internet connection, whereas part B includes those scripts that need an Internet connection in order to download and use external software. No installation is necessary. Sherlinux runs from the command line. A master script (generate report) calls the user to read the detailed instructions (“readme” file). The “readme” file provides the user with brief information about Sherlinux, such as the available tests and the estimated run time of each one. Next, the master script asks the user for their name and case information to integrate them into the generated report. This facilitates a security investigator who has to deliver the results of the system investigation. The master script also asks the user if they want to perform only group A (non-Internet) tests, or all. A screen-shot of this dialogue is provided in Figure 1. The master script runs the selected scripts which generate the corresponding reports as a set of HTML pages. The index page creates two vertical frames which will be populated with the reports generated with forensic information concerning the system under examination when the analysis is over. It is also possible to run each script independently. The full report consists of 21 HTML pages (sub-reports), grouped in two sets, giving information about the following issues (see Figure 2).

2.1.

Part A Tests

1. Case summary 2. System details 3. Details about the operating system (os info) 4. Details about the hardware (hw info)

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Figure 1. Sherlinux master script

Figure 2. Sherlinux main report.

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5. Details about disks, volumes and partitions 6. Scheduled tasks 7. Details about the system users (user details) 8. Details about the system processes 9. Details about the SSH connections 10. Details about the keys 11. Iptables settings 12. Logfile scan for critical keywords.

2.2. Part B Tests Part B tests need an Internet connection in order to download and install software. 13. Networking details 14. System file integrity test (debsums) 15. Check log files for specific keywords 16. Scan report of Clam Antivirus 17. Scan report of Avast Antivirus 18. Scan report of AVG Antivirus 19. Scan report of F-prot Antivirus 20. Rootkit check with Chkrootkit 21. Check for rootkits with Rootkit Hunter. A brief description of the scripts follows.

2.3.

Case Summary

This scripts produces the initial right frame. It represents the cover page of the overall report. It displays the examiner’s name, the case name and the date. This information is optional but it is useful when the user wants to generate a report for official use (see Figure 2).

2.4.

System Summary

This scripts recovers information about the system: computer name, Operating system, Kernel version, CPU model, no. cores, main memory, swap file, uptime, free memory, etc. (see Figure 3).

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Figure 3. System summary.

2.5.

Operating System Information

This script provides information about the Operating System Version, Operating System Architecture, Codename, Kernel version, Swap Memory, etc. (see Figure 4). This is important because each Operating System Version has particular vulnerabilities and proper patches are needed to close the security holes.

2.6.

Hardware Information

This script provides detailed information about the CPU model and its capabilities, main memory, disk partitions, PCI and USB modules (see Figure 5). This helps the investigator to locate suspicious devices such as keyloggers, etc.

2.7.

Mounted Volumes

This script provides detailed information about the Mounted volumes (Filesystem, Type, Size, percentage of free space). A screen shot is provided in Figure 6. This is important because the investigator must search for malware in all places.

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Figure 4. Operating System information.

Figure 5. Hardware Information.

2.8.

Scheduled Tasks

This script provides detailed information about the scheduled tasks in general and in particular for the system administrator (root user). See Figure 7. This is important because

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Figure 6. Mounted volumes. malicious activities may have been scheduled (for instance, starting netcat and opening a backdoor).

2.9.

User Accounts

This script provides detailed information about the system’s user accounts. Details about user accounts and groups, root users, sudoers, details about the users’ Homes, users’ bashrc files, last logged-in users (see Figure 8). Also this script produces two additional sub-reports: users’ bash history and system-wide profile (bash history.html & system profile.html). This is important because there may be suspicious unknown users (even without home directory); also, the bash history might reveal suspicious activities.

2.10. Processes Provides detailed information about running processes, total number of processes, processes per user, running bin, sbin processes, processes running in the foreground and processes running in the background, system users, users running processes, processes running (process tree), running bin and sbin processes (process tree), processes running in the foreground, running jobs, stopped jobs, processes running in the foreground, usage per CPU, text graph of memory and swap usage, monitors processes utilizing the CPU, identifies applications with particular high power demands and displays additional system information

SHERLINUX - A Tool Facilitating Linux Forensics

Figure 7. Scheduled tasks.

Figure 8. User Accounts. (see Figure 9).

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Figure 9. Processes. This script uses the powertop utility [powertop, 2017] and produces the auxiliary file top.txt, as well as, two html files, namely htop.html and powerreport.html (with 8 subreports, see Figure 10). This report is important because intruders may have launched suspicious processes.

Figure 10. Powertop subreport.

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2.11. SSH Connections Provides detailed information about ssh connections: number of valid connections, number of invalid usernames, number of invalid passwords, as well as, the SSH configuration file (see Figure 11). This is important because it might reveal suspicious connection attempts.

Figure 11. SSH connections.

2.12. Keys Details Provides details about encrypted communication keys stored in the system: home users’ SSH keys, root’s SSH keys, root’s known hosts, Kerberos tickets, and details about home users’ PGP keys (see Figure 12). This is important because installed malware could establish encrypted connections with external hosts.

2.13. Iptables Rules This script lists the iptables rules of the various chains and the NAT entries (see Figure 13). This is important because we can check if the firewall is enabled and how it is set up.

2.14. Logfile Scan for Critical Keywords This script scans specific log files for specific keywords that are considered critical or suspicious. Typical keywords include “error”, “wget” and “key”. The keywords are contained

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Figure 12. Keys. in file keywords.txt. The user can insert additional keywords (see Figure 14). This is important because it may reveal suspicious activities, such as downloading malware from the command line, etc. Most scripts of part B deal with malware detection. For this reason, external tools are downloaded, installed and used. A brief description of part B scripts follows.

2.15. Networking Details Networking details will display: a) current local (NAT) IP address and current Public IP address of the machine; b) Ethernet and Wi-Fi cards MAC addresses; c) Router local IP as well as MAC Address, services and corresponding ports; d) services and corresponding ports of the local machine; e) Known hosts; f) Network statistics, including: 1) Number of active connections, 2) Number of processes using sockets and 3) Number of open TCP and UDP connections (see Figure 15). Three detailed sub-reports are produced as separate text files, in order to keep sub-report short length limited [Nielsen, 1999]: “active connections.txt”, “processes sockets.txt” and “open connections.txt”. Finally, g) Socket statistics (number of open sockets) with sub-report the file “socket statistics.txt”. These sub-reports are bidirectionally linked to the networking report. This script uses nmap; if not already installed, it will install it automatically. The objective of this report is to reveal open sockets, suspicious connections to the Internet, etc. [Craiger, 2005; Delta Hacker, 2012].

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Figure 13. Iptables rules.

Figure 14. Logfile scan for critical keywords.

2.16. Check Debsums Craiger [2005] mentions two methods for identifying “trojaned” files. The first method is by comparing inode numbers of files within a directory. The second method is by hash

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Figure 15. Networking details. analysis; hash analysis compares the one-way hashes of “notable” files with hashes of system files. A match indicates that a file has been replaced with a trojaned version. A similar approach is that followed by “debsums”: debsums compares the MD5 sums of installed Debian packages against the MD5 checksums of the official Debian package files (from /var/lib/dpkg/info/*.md5sums) [Debsums, 2017]. Linux utilities that are commonly “trojaned” include ps (used to display system processes), netstat (used to display sockets and network connections) and top (used to display process information sorted by activity) [Craiger, 2005]. This script will initially check if debsums is installed and if not, it will install it. This feature is destined for deb distributions. Then it will run it in order to display system files that have been modified, either by the user or by malicious actions. The report displays useful information such as file rights, owner, group, date modified and path (see Figure 16). The objective of this test is to check system file integrity against malicious modifications.

2.17. Check Log Files This script checks current and past log files for unauthorized connections, as well as, kernel error messages (see Figure 17).

2.18. Scan with Clam AV Antivirus This script scans the system for malware with ClamAV antivirus [Linux Inside, 2011; 7 Best Anti-Virus, 2017]. The script tests if the software is installed and if not, it will download and install it (see Figure 18).

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Figure 16. A system file integrity test (debsums) report.

Figure 17. Example check log files report.

2.19. Scan with Avast Antivirus This script scans the system for malware with Avast antivirus [Linux Inside, 2011]. The script tests if the software is installed and if not, it will download and install it. Registation with Avast.com is needed (see Figure 19).

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Figure 18. Example ClamAV report.

Figure 19. Example Avast antivirus report.

2.20. Scan with AVG Antivirus This script scans the system for malware with AVG antivirus [Linux Inside, 2011]. The script tests if the software is installed and if not, it will download and install it (see Figure 20).

2.21. Scan with F-Prot Antivirus This script scans the system for malware with F-prot antivirus [Linux Inside, 2011; 7 Best Anti-Virus, 2017]. The script tests if the software is installed and if not, it will download and install it (see Figure 21).

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Figure 20. Example AVG Antivirus report.

Figure 21. Example F-prot Antivirus report.

2.22. Check for Rootkits with Chkrootkit This script scans the system for rootkits with Chkrootkit [Murilo and Steding-Jessen, 2006; chkrootkit, 2017; 7 Best Anti-Virus, 2017]. The script tests if the software is installed and

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if not, it will download and install it (see Figure 22).

Figure 22. Example chkrootkit report.

2.23. Check for Rootkits with Rootkit Hunter This script scans the system for rootkits with Rootkit Hunter [rkhunter, 2017; 7 Best AntiVirus, 2017]. The script tests if the software is installed and if not, it will download and install it (see Figure 23). All the above scripts download and install external tools in order to search for viruses and rootkits. Therefore, part B needs a lot of time for completion, due to the download and installation processes.

2.24. Produced Report The report is automatically generated as a collection of web pages consisting of two frames: on the left there is the navigation frame displaying the report titles which are hyperlinks, along with the corresponding 18x18 pixels icons; the right frame displays the “Case summary” page (initially) or the contents (details) of the selected report, should the user select one. In some cases extra text files (sub-report pages) are generated containing detailed information.

2.25. Performance Part A scripts run very fast while part B scripts take a lot of time, ranging from 30 to 50 minutes, depending on computer hardware capabilities and the speed of the Internet connection.

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Figure 23. Example rkhunter report.

3.

Maintenance and Expandability

3.1.

Maintenance

Sherlinux comes with two support tools which facilitate its maintenance and further development: 1. Code inspector 2. Maintainer 3.1.1.

Code Inspector

Code inspector has a structure identical to the main report, with the difference that the rightmost frame presents the code of the report selected from the navigation menu (leftmost frame). In this way the developer may easily inspect the code of any report instead of opening and closing the script files. Code inspector appears as an option in the end of the navigation menu of the main Sherlinux tool (see Figure 24). 3.1.2.

Maintainer

During the development phase, in order to keep track of the tasks to be done, (scheduled tasks, pending tasks, common recipes & how to’s, etc.), a special web site was constructed and maintained. Maintainer is a web-based collection of items with a structure similar to the main Sherlinux tool (two vertical frames). Hence, there is a home page consisting of two vertical frames: on the left, there is the navigation frame; on the right, there is the

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Figure 24. Code Inspector. detailed content of the selected item (see Figure 25). Currently Sherlinux scripts sum up to 2223 lines of code. Maintainer collects a set of useful information to the developer, namely: 1. Summary: the “About” section. 2. The concept: a brief description of the objective. 3. The process: How it works. 4. How To’s: useful recipes and development notes. 5. Add new report: guidelines and script for adding a new report. 6. Work in progress: what we are currently working on. 7. Pending tasks: tasks in abeyance; what could be improved. 8. New tasks: ideas for extending the tool (new bash commands and new reports); to be embedded in the future version. 9. Script versions: this is a report providing version information about the Scripts (version numbers, dates and lines of code). 10. Lines of code: it provides a histogram with the lines of code per script. 11. Publications: list of publications and presentations about Sherlinux.

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Figure 25. Maintainer.

Figure 26. Lines of code per script. 3.1.3.

Logfile

A central log file is generated; also, some scripts generate additional text files saving details.

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3.2.

Expandability

Sherlinux is expandable; there is provision for adding new modules hence new reports. For this reason, a special interactive script has been written, called “addnewreport”. This prompts the user for the new report name and then it embeds the appropriate entry to the navigation frame, as well as, the accompanying icon (provided that it has the same name). A generic script template containing the common components, called “make 00”, is provided. The steps are as follows: 1. Write the script (open & modify make 00) 2. Make script executable 3. Add code to the script to generate report in html 4. Add this html report to navigation frame 5. Add a proper icon (18x18 pixels) 6. Regenerate report 7. Move new html report to proper directory 8. Open index.html to check new report.

3.3.

Code Reusability

Sherlinux implements code re-usability in many ways: • All tools (main Sherlinux tool, Code inspector and Maintainer) share the same structure two vertical frames. • All tools use the same CSS file. • All reports share a common structure (initial and final commands), as well as, similar logic. • Some reports share the same functionality; for instance the antivirus scripts and the anti-rootkit scripts.

Conclusion and Future Work In this chapter we have presented Sherlinux, a novel Linux forensic tool. Sherlinux consists of shell scripts using common UNIX/Linux commands and HTML5/CSS3 tags. Sherlinux generates a 21-page report in HTML, presented in a common browser, so it is portable. Sherlinux automates data collection and presentation of findings; it also facilitates data analysis, as well as, the process of final report production. It is up to the forensic investigator to review the findings and come up with an in-depth analysis of events in chronological order. Sherlinux is expandable; a special script facilitates the incorporation of new reports

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along with the corresponding icons. It also provides tools which facilitate its maintenance and further development. Future work plans include scripts for recovering files from RAM, Trash (recycle bin) and other places [Craiger, 2005].

References [1] Adelstein, F. (2006). Live forensics: Diagnosing your system without killing it first, Communications of the ACM, vol. 49(2): 63-66. [2] Beebe, N.L. and Clark, J.G. (2005). A hierarchical, objectives-based framework for the digital investigations process. Digital Investigation 2(2):147-167. [3] Carrier, B. (2006). Risks of live digital forensic analysis, Communications of the ACM, vol. 49(2): 56-61. [4] Chuvakin, A. (2003). An overview of Unix rootkits, iALERT White Paper, iDefense Labs (www.megasecurity.org/papers/Rootkits.pdf). [5] Craiger, P. (2005). Recovering digital evidence from Linux systems. Chapter 19 in Advances in Digital Forensics, 233-244. [6] Flynt, C., Lakshman, S. and Tushar, S. (2017). Linux Shell Scripting Cookbook - Third Edition. PACKT Books. [7] Cyber Defence Directorate (2013). Hellenic National Defense General Staff of Greece, Technical manual for safe settings and safe personal computer use (in Greek). [8] Koen, R. and Olivier, M. (2008). An evidence acquisition tool for live systems. Chapter 25 in Indrajit Ray, Sujeet Shenoi (Eds.): IFIP International Federation for Information Processing, Volume 285; Advances in Digital Forensics IV (Boston: Springer), 325-334. [9] Murilo M. and Steding-Jessen K. (2006). Chkrootkit. www.chkrootkit.org. [10] Nielsen, J. (1999). Designing Web Usability: The Practice of Simplicity. New Riders Publishing Thousand Oaks, CA, USA. [11] Pollitt, M. (2010). A History of Digital Forensics, Chapter 1) in K.-P. Chow and S. Shenoi (Eds.): Advances in Digital Forensics VI, IFIP AICT 337: 3-15. [12] https://wiki.archlinux.org/index.php/powertop. Accessed 21 Nov. 2017. [13] Raghavan S. (2013). Digital forensic research: current state of the art. CSIT, 1(1): 91-114. [14] http://manpages.ubuntu.com/manpages/trusty/man1/debsums.1.html. Accessed 21 Nov. 2017. [15] Post-exploitation games in Linux (2012). Delta Hacker 13: 72-84 (in Greek).

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[16] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chkrootkit. Accessed 17 Nov. 2017. [17] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rkhunter. Accessed 17 Nov. 2017. [18] Linux anti-virus comparative test (2011). Linux Inside 2: 32-37 (in Greek). [19] The 7 Best Free Linux Anti-Virus Programs. Available online from: http://www.makeuseof.com/tag/free-linux-antivirus-programs. Accessed 20 Nov. 2017. [20] Vossen, J. P. and Albing, C. (2017). Bash Cookbook - Solutions and Examples for bash Users, 2nd Edition. O’Reilly Media. [21] Wampler, D. and Graham, J. (2007). A method for detecting Linux kernel module rootkits. Chapter 7 in P. Craiger and S. Shenoi (Eds.): IFIP International Federation for Information Processing, Volume 242; Advances in Digital Forensics III (Boston: Springer): 107-116.

In: Cyber-Security and Information Warfare Editor: Nicholas J. Daras

ISBN: 978-1-53614-385-0 c 2019 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

Chapter 2

ACOUSTIC S CATTERING FOR A P IECEWISE H OMOGENEOUS O BSTACLE Christodoulos E. Athanasiadis∗ and Evangelia S. Athanasiadou† Department of Mathematics, National and Kapodistrian University of Athens, Panepistimiopolis, Athens, Greece

Abstract A piecewise homogeneous scatterer with a resistive core is excited by a timeharmonic acoustic wave. An integral representation for the scattered field incorporating all the transmission and boundary conditions obtained. This result is then used to derive the corresponding acoustic far-field pattern. We prove reciprocity and general scattering theorems for plane wave incidence. We also evaluate the absorption cross-section and we prove an optical theorem, that is a connection of the far-field pattern to the extinction cross-section. Finally, we establish a mixed reciprocity theorem, relating the scattered field of a plane wave and the far-field pattern of a spherical wave.

Keywords: piecewise homogeneous obstacle, resistive core, acoustic scattering, plane waves, spherical waves, far-field pattern AMS Subject Classification: 31A10, 35C15, 76Q05

1.

Introduction

The present work deals with the problem of scattering of acoustic waves by a piecewise homogeneous scatterer with a resistive core. In particular we establish a general scattering theorem and reciprocity relations. An optical theorem is recovered as corollary of the general scattering theorem. In the plane-wave incidence, the optical theorem relates the far-field pattern in the forward direction to a certain integral of the far-field pattern over all directions. A mixed reciprocity relation,which connects one plane incident wave and ∗ †

Corresponding Author Email: [email protected]. Corresponding Author Email: [email protected].

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Christodoulos E. Athanasiadis and Evangelia S. Athanasiadou

one spherical wave and it has found much use in methods for solving inverse scattering problems is proved. Scattering theorems for plane waves and for various kinds of scatterers have been investigated extensively, see for example Refs. [9],[11],[16]. In [3] scattering relations have been proved for a multi-layered scatterer with either soft or hard core and plane incidence. Mixed reciprocity theorems have been used to study inverse scattering problems in [12],[14] and [15]. Corresponding relations for spherical waves have been established in [5], where a layered scatterer is excited by acoustic waves generated by a point-source located in its interior. Scattering theorems for spherical acoustic and electromagnetic waves have been proved in [4]. In elasticity, similar results have been proved in [10] and [11] for plane waves and in [6] for spherical waves. Recently, some scattering theorems for a thermoelastic body in an elastic enviroment have been established in [7]. For solvability of scattering problems of multi-layered obstacles we refer to [2]. In [1] the existence and uniqueness of solution for a problem of scattering by a resistive body has been studied. In section 2 the scattering problem is formulated. The far-field pattern of the piecewise homogeneous scatterer with a resistive core is obtained in section 3. In section 4 scattering relations are proved. A mixed reciprocity theorem is proved in section 5. Finally in section 6 we discuss various special types of scatterers.

2.

Formulation of the Problem

The piecewise homogeneous obstacle D is a bounded subset of R3 with a C 2 - boundary S0 . The exterior D0 = R3 \ D of the obstacle D is an infinite homogeneous isotropic lossless acoustic medium with mass density ρ0 and mean compressibility γ0 . The interior of D is divided by means of closed and non-intersecting C 2 -surfaces Sj , j = 1, 2, ..., N into N+1 subsets (layers) Dj , j = 1, 2, ..., N + 1 with ∂Dj−1 ∩ ∂Dj = Sj−1 . The surface ˆ of each point r of any surface Sj−1 surrounds Sj and there is one normal unit vector n(r) Sj pointing into Dj . Each layer Dj is filled with an isotropic lossless medium with mass density ρj associated with the velocity field and mean compressibility γj associated with the pressure field in Dj . In order to cover various cases that arise in applications the layer DN +1 is a resistive core within which the origin lies. All the physical parameters are positive real numbers and the real wave numbers in Dj are given by √ kj = ω γ j ρ j ,

j = 0, 1, ..., N,

(1)

ω being the angular frequency. The wave number kj is expressed in terms of k0 by the relation r γj ρj kj = k0 , j = 0, 1, ..., N, (2) γ0 ρ0 which is the exact form of the corresponding formula (1) in [3]. The obstacle D described above will be referred to as the piecewise homogeneous scatterer with a resistive core. Let ui and us be the incident and the scattered acoustic fields respectively. The total exterior field u0 is given by u0 = ui + us in D0 (3)

Acoustic Scattering for a Piecewise Homogeneous Obstacle

27

and the scattered field satisfies the Sommerfeld radiation condition lim r(

r→∞

∂us − ik0 us ) = 0, ∂n

(4)

r ∈ S 2 , where S 2 is the unit sphere and r = |r|. In what r w follows, for a vector w we shall denote by w = |w| the measure of w and w ˆ = the w corresponding unit vector. The total field uj (r), r ∈ Dj satisfies the Helmholtz equation

uniformly in all directions ˆ r=

∆uj + kj2 uj = 0

in Dj ,

j = 0, 1, 2, ..., N.

On the surface Sj we have the transmission conditions  uj = uj+1   j j+1 on Sj , j = 0, 1, ..., SN−1. ρj ∂u ∂u  =  ∂n ρj+1 ∂n

(5)

(6)

On the surface SN of the core we have the resistive boundary condition ∂uN + ikN λuN = 0 ∂n

on SN ,

(7)

where λ is a dimensionless real parameter. The problem consisting of (3)-(7) will be denoted by (P). The well-posedness of the problem (P) has been studied in [2], where using a generalized solutions approach,existence and uniqueness of the solution were proved.

3.

Integral Representations

The acoustic far-field pattern u∞ (ˆr) is closely related to the scattered field us (r) and it is given by the relation us (r) = u∞ (ˆr)h(k0 r) + O(

1 ), r2

r→∞

(8)

eix uniformly in all directions, where h(x) = is the zeroth order spherical Hankel function ix of the first kind. We construct an integral representation of the scattered field, where all the transmission and boundary conditions have been incorporated. We begin with the known integral representation [10] for the scattered field Z ∂Φ0 (r, r0 ) ∂u0 (r0 ) us (r) = [u0 (r0 ) − Φ0 (r, r0 ) ]ds(r0 ), (9) 0 0) ∂n(r ) ∂n(r S0 where Φ0 (r, r0 ) is the fundamental solution of Helmholtz’s equation (5) in D0 and it is given by 0 eik0 |r−r | 0 , r 6= r0 . (10) Φ0 (r, r ) = 4π|r − r0 |

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Christodoulos E. Athanasiadis and Evangelia S. Athanasiadou

Applying successively the scalar Green’s first theorem on uj (r) and Φ0 (r, r0 ) in Dj , j = 1, 2, ..., N and taking into account that uj , Φ0 are solutions of (5) in Dj and D0 respectively, and introducing the transmission conditions (6) and the boundary condition (7) we obtain the following representation of the scattered field us (r) = Dγ (r) + Dρ (r) + Sλ (r).

(11)

In (11) the term Dγ (r) is a sum of volume integrals in the layers D1 , D2 , ..., DN , expressing the contribution of the mean compressibilities of layers and it is given by Dγ (r) =

k02

Z N X γj uj (r0 )Φ0 (r, r0 )dv(r0 ). ( − 1) γ0 Dj

(12)

j=1

The term Dρ(r) is again a sum of volume integrals in the layers of the scatterer expressing the contribution of the mass densities and it is given by Dρ (r) =

N X j=1

ρ0 (1 − ) ρj

Z

Dj

∇uj (r) · ∇Φ0 (r, r0 )dv(r0 ).

(13)

The term Sλ (r) is a surface integral on the resistive core which expresses the dependence of the scattered field on λ and it is given by Z r ∂ γN ρ0 Sλ (r) = uN (r)( + ik0 λ )Φ(r, r0 )ds(r0 ) (14) 0 ∂n(r ) γ ρ 0 N SN Using the asymptotic relations |r − r0 | = r − rˆ · r0 + O(r −1 ), |r − r0 |−1 = r −1 + O(r −2 ),

r → ∞, r → ∞,

(15) (16)

we obtain the following asymptotic forms for the fundamental solution (10) Φ0 (r, r0 ) =

ik0 0 h(k0 r)e−ik0 rˆ ·r + O(r −2 ), 4π

r → ∞,

(17)

0

∂Φ0 (r, r0 ) ik0 ∂e−ik0 rˆ ·r = h(k0 r) + O(r −2 ), 0 ∂n(r ) 4π ∂n(r0 )

r → ∞,

(18)

Substituting (17) and (18) into (12)-(14) we obtain the asymptotic forms Dγ (r) = Dγ∞ (ˆr)h(k0 r) + O(r −2 ),

r → ∞,

(19)

Dρ (r) = Dρ∞ (ˆr)h(k0 r) + O(r −2 ),

r → ∞,

(20)

r → ∞,

(21)

Sλ (r) = Sλ∞ (ˆr)h(k0r) + O(r −2 ),

where Dγ∞ (ˆr)

Z N ik03 X γj 0 = ( − 1) uj (r0 )e−ik0 rˆ ·r dv(r0 ) 4π γ0 Dj j=1

(22)

Acoustic Scattering for a Piecewise Homogeneous Obstacle

29

is the ”compressibility” far-field pattern, Dρ∞ (ˆr)

Z N ρ0 ik0 X (1 − ) ∇uj (r0 ) · ∇r0 Φ0 (r, r0 )dv(r0 ) = 4π ρ j Dj

(23)

j=1

is the ”mass density” far-field pattern and r Z ik0 ∂ γN ρ0 ∞ N 0 Sλ (ˆr) = u (r )( + ik0 λ )Φ0 (r, r0 )ds(r0 ) 0 4π SN ∂n(r ) γ0 ρN

(24)

is the ”resistive” far-field pattern. Thus, from (11) and (19)-(21) we conclude that the far field pattern of the problem (P) is given by u∞ (ˆr) = Dγ∞ (ˆr) + Dρ∞ (ˆr) + Sλ∞ (ˆr).

(25)

This argument establishes the following theorem. Theorem 1. The far-field pattern for the piecewise homogeneous scatterer with a resistive core is given by (25).

4.

Scattering Relations ˆ

Let ui (r; bˆ ) = eik0 b·r be an incident time-harmonic acoustic wave , where the unit vector bˆ describes the direction of propagation. We shall indicate the dependence of the scattered field, of the total field in Dj and the far-field pattern for the problem (P) on the incident ˆ by writing us (r; ˆ direction b, b), uj (r; ˆ b), u∞ (ˆ r; ˆ b) respectively. In what follows we shall make use Twerky’s notation [16] Z ∂v ∂u {u, v}S = (u − v ) ds. (26) ∂n ∂n S

Theorem 2. (Reciprocity Theorem) Let ui1 = ui (r; ˆ b1) and ui2 = ui (r; ˆ b2) be two plane acoustic waves incident upon the piecewise homogeneous scatterer with a resistive core. Then for the corresponding far-field patterns we have ˆ1; ˆ ˆ 2 ; −b ˆ 1 ). u∞ (b b2) = u∞ (−b

(27)

Proof. Let us1 = us (r; ˆ b1) and us2 = us (r; ˆ b2) be the corresponding scattered fields. Then from the superposition (3) and in view of bilinearity of the form (26) we take {u01 , u02 }S0 = {ui1 , ui2 }S0 + {ui1 , us2 }S0 + {us1 , ui2 }S0 + {us1 , us2 }S0 .

(28)

Using the transmission conditions (6), applying successively Green’s second theorem on uj1 and uj2 and taking into account that uj1 and uj2 are regular solutions of the Helmholtz equation in Dj we get ρ0 N N {u01 , u02 }S0 = {u , u }S . (29) ρN 1 2 N

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Christodoulos E. Athanasiadis and Evangelia S. Athanasiadou

Introducing the resistive boundary condition on SN we conclude that {u01 , u02}S0 = 0.

(30)

Since ui1 and ui2 are regular solutions of the Helmholtz equation in D, Green’s second theorem gives {ui1 , ui2}S0 = 0. (31) From the integral representation (9), the superposition (3) and taking into account that ui is a solution of the Helmholtz equation in D0 we obtain ˆ 2 ) = {us ( · ; b ˆ 2 ), Φ0(b1 , · )}S , us (b1 ; b 0

b1 ∈ / S0 .

(32)

Using the asymptotic forms (17) and (18) for b1 → ∞, we take ˆ2) = us (b1 ; b

ik0 ˆ 1 )}S + O( 1 ), h(k0 b1 ){us ( · ; ˆ b2), ui( · ; −b 0 4π b21

b1 → ∞.

(33)

Then, by direct comparison of (8) and (33) we conclude that ˆ1; b ˆ2) = u∞ (b

ik0 s ˆ 2 ), ui( · ; −b ˆ 1 )}S = ik0 {us2 , ui }S . {u ( · ; b 0 1 0 4π 4π

(34)

For the integral of scattered fields in (28) we consider a large sphere SR centered at the origin surrounding the scatterer defined by SR = {r ∈ R3 , |r| = R}.

(35)

Applying the Green’s second theorem on us1 and us2 in the region exterior to S0 and interior to SR , in view of regularity of us1 and us2 , we take {us1 , us2 }S0 = {us1 , us2}SR .

(36)

Then, letting R → ∞ we pass to the radiation zone and thus we can use the asymptotic form (8), giving {us1 , us2}S0 = 0. (37)

From (28), (30), (31), and (37) we have {us1 , ui2 }S0 = {us2 , ui1 }S0 and in view of (34) we get ˆ1; b ˆ 2 ) = ik0 {us ( · ; b ˆ 2 ), ui( · ; −b ˆ 1 )}S u∞ (b 0 4π =

ik0 s ˆ 1 ), ui( · ; b ˆ 2 )}S {u ( · ; −b 0 4π

ˆ 2 ; −b ˆ 1 ). = u∞ (−b

(38)

Acoustic Scattering for a Piecewise Homogeneous Obstacle

31

ˆ 1) and ui = ui (r; ˆ Theorem 3. (General Scattering Theorem) Let ui1 = ui (r; b b2) be two 2 plane acoustic waves incident upon the piecewise homogeneous scatterer with a resistive core. Then for the corresponding far-field patterns we have 1 R ∞ r; b ˆ 2 )u∞ (ˆ ˆ 1 ) ds(ˆr) r; b 2 u (ˆ 2π S r λk02 γN ρ0 R − uN (r; ˆ b2)uN (r; ˆ b1) ds(r). 2π γ0 ρN SN

ˆ2; b ˆ1) = − ˆ1; ˆ u∞ (b b2) + u∞ (b

(39)

Proof. Let us1 = us (r; ˆ b1) and us2 = us (r; ˆ b2) be the corresponding scattered fields. Then from the superposition (3) and in view of bilinearity of the form (26) we take {u01 , u02 }S0 = {ui1 , ui2 }S0 + {ui1 , us2 }S0 + {us1 , ui2 }S0 + {us1 , us2 }S0 .

(40)

As in Theorem 1 and taking into account the resistive boundary condition on the core SN ,as well as the relation (2), we have {u01 , u02 }S0 =

ρ0 N N ρ0 R {u1 , u2 }SN = −2iλkN uN uN ds ρN ρN SN 1 2 = −2iλk0

r

γN ρ0 R uN uN ds. γ0 ρN SN 1 2

(41)

Also, ui1 and ui2 are regular solutions of the Helmholtz equation in D and hence we have {ui1 , ui2}S0 = 0.

(42)

From (34) we take

4π ∞ ˆ ˆ u (b1 ; b2), ik0 4π ∞ ˆ ˆ {us1 , ui2 }S0 = − u (b2 ; b1). ik0 For the integral of scattered fields, as in Theorem 1 we have {ui1 , us2 }S0 = −

{us1 , us2 }S0 = {us1 , us2}SR . Now, letting R → ∞ and using the asymptotic form (8) we conclude that Z Z 2i 2i s ∞ s ∞ {u1 , u2 }S0 = u u ds(ˆ r) = u∞ (ˆ r; ˆ b1)u∞ (ˆ r; ˆ b2) ds(ˆ r). k0 S 2 1 2 k0 S 2

(43) (44)

(45)

(46)

Substituting (41)-(44) and (46) into (40), the theorem is proved. In some applications, especially in inverse scattering problems, we consider as incident wave a superposition of plane acoustic waves, that is, [8] Z i uϕ (r) = ϕ(ˆ q)eik0 r·ˆq ds(ˆ q), (47) S2

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Christodoulos E. Athanasiadis and Evangelia S. Athanasiadou

where ϕ ∈ L2 (S 2) is the kernel of uiϕ . This superposition is a Herglotz wave function. Also we define the far field operator G : L2 (S 2) → L2 (S 2) with Z ˆ b) ˆ ds(b). ˆ (Gϕ)(ˆ r) = u∞ (ˆ r; b)ϕ( (48) S2

Then using the inner product (·, ·) in L2 (S 2 ), the general scattering theorem takes the following form.

Theorem 4. Let uiϕ and uih be two Herglotz wave functions incident upon the piecewise N homogeneous scatterer with a resistive core. If uN ϕ and uh are the total acoustic fields on SN , then for the corresponding far-field operator we have r Z λk02 γN ρ0 1 (Gϕ, h) + (ϕ, Gh) = − (Gϕ, Gh) − uN (r)uN (49) h (r) ds(r). 2π 2π γ0 ρN SN ϕ ∞ Proof. Let usϕ , ush and u∞ ϕ , uh be the scattered fields and the far-field patterns corresponding to the incident waves uiϕ , uih respectively. Then applying (43) for u∞ ϕ multiplying by h 2 and integrating on S we get Z 4π {usϕ , uih }S0 = u∞ (ˆ r)h(ˆ r) ds(ˆ r). (50) ik0 S 2 ϕ

Also, a simple consequence of (46) is the relation Z 2i {usϕ , ush }S0 = u∞ (ˆ r)u∞ r) ds(ˆ r). h (ˆ k0 S 2 ϕ

(51)

Using the operator G, the inner product (·, ·) in L2 (S 2 ) and taking into account the relations (50),(51), the Theorem 3 is restated as (49). Now, an optical theorem for the piecewise homogeneous scatterer with a resistive core can be derived as a corollary of the general scattering theorem. The scattering cross-section ˆ is given by [11]. σ s for the incident wave ui (r; b) Z 1 s ˆ 2 ds(ˆ σ = 2 |u∞ (ˆ r; b)| r), (52) k0 S 2 the absorption cross-section σ α is defined by Z 1 ∂u0 (r; ˆ b) σ α = Im u0 (r; ˆ b) ds k0 ∂n S0

(53)

and the extinction cross-section σ e is defined by σ e = σ s + σ α.

(54)

Acoustic Scattering for a Piecewise Homogeneous Obstacle

33

ˆ be an acoustic plane wave insident upon the Theorem 5. (Optical Theorem) Let ui (r; b) e piecewise scatterer and σ the corresponding extinction cross-section. Then it is valid σe = −

4π ˆ b)]. ˆ Re[u∞ (b; k02

(55)

ˆ1 = b ˆ2 = b ˆ we obtain Proof. Applying Theorem 3 for b Z r Z λk2 γN ρ0 2 2 ˆ b)] ˆ =− 1 |u∞ (ˆ r; ˆ b)| ds(ˆ r) − 0 |uN (r; ˆ b)| ds(r). 2Re[u∞ (b; 2π S 2 2π γ0 ρN SN (56) From (52) and (56) we take r Z 4π γN ρ0 s ∞ ˆ ˆ σ = − 2 Re[u (b; b)] − λ |uN (r; bˆ )|2 ds(r). (57) k0 γ0 ρN SN Applying successively Green’s first theorem and using the transmission conditions (6) we conclude R

0 ˆ 0 ˆ ∂u (r; b) ds(r) S0 u (r; b) ∂n

+

PN

j=1

iλkN ρ0 R N ˆ 2 SN |u (r; b)| ds(r) ρN ρ0 R ˆ 2 ]dv(r). [−kj2 |uj (r; bˆ )|2 + |∇uj (r; b)| ρ j Dj =

From (58) and the definition (53) we evaluate the absorption cross-section r Z γN ρ0 ˆ 2 ds(r). σα = λ |uN (r; b)| γ0 ρN SN

(58)

(59)

Hence, adding (57) and (59), the definition (54) gives (55).

5.

A Mixed Reciprocity Theorem

One effective reconstruction method for inverse scattering problems is the point-source method which is based on mixed reciprocity relations. These relations connect the far-field pattern due to scattering of a spherical wave and the scattered field due to scattering of a plane wave. Two acoustic waves are incident on the scatterer D. One plane wave ˆ ˆ = e−ik0 b·r ui (r; −b) ,

r ∈ R3 ,

(60)

with direction of propagation −bˆ and one spherical wave of the form uiα (r) =

eik0 |r−a| , 4π|r − a|

r 6= a,

(61)

due to a source located at a point with position vector a. The fields which uiα generates will be denoted by usα , ujα and u∞ α for the scattered, the total field in Dj and the far-field pattern respectively. We note that when the point source tends to infinity the spherical wave reduces to a plane acoustic wave with direction of propagation −ˆ a. The spherical wave uiα

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Christodoulos E. Athanasiadis and Evangelia S. Athanasiadou

is a solution of the Helmholtz equation that satisfies the Sommerfeld radiation condition (4). From (10) and (17) the spherical wave (61) satisfies the asymptotic relation uiα (r) = ui,∞ r)h(k0 r) + O( α (ˆ

1 ), r2

r → ∞,

(62)

where ui,∞ r) is the far-field pattern of point-source incident wave and it is given by α (ˆ ik0 −ik0 a·ˆr e 4π We consider a small sphere Sα,ε of radius ε, surrounding the point a defined by ui,∞ r) = α (ˆ

Sα,ε = {r ∈ R3 : |a − r| = ε}

(63)

(64)

and we prove the following lemma. ˆ be a plane Lemma 6. Let uiα (r) be a spherical incident acoustic wave. Let ui (r; −b) s ˆ incident wave with corresponding scattered field u (r; −b). Then ˆ lim {uiα, us (·; −b)} SR = 0

(65)

s ˆ ˆ lim {uiα , us (·; −b)} Sα,ε = u (a; −b),

(66)

R→∞

and ε→0

where SR is a large sphere of radius R surrounding the source a and the scatterer D, defined by (35) and Sα,ε is the small sphere defined by (64). Proof. Using the asymptotic forms (8) and (62), the relation (65) is proved. For equation (66) we evaluate uiα and its normal derivative in the outward direction on Sα,ε ∂uiα 1 eik0 ε , = (ik0 − )uiα(r). (67) 4πε ∂n ε Using the mean value theorem for the surface integral on Sα,ε and letting ε → 0, relation (66) is proved. uiα =

In general,the above Lemma 6 is valid for a bounded field u (ui , us, uj , u∞ ) ˆ lim{uiα , u( · ; ˆ b)}Sα, = u(a; −b).

(68)

→0

We are now in position to give an easy proof of the following mixed reciprocity theorem.

Theorem 7. (Mixed Reciprocity Theorem) Let uiα (r) be an incident spherical wave and ˆ be an incident plane wave. Then for the piecewise homogeneous scatterer let ui (r; −b) with a resistive core we have:

ˆ u∞ α (b)

=

 ik 0 s  ˆ u (a; −b),    4π

a ∈ D0 ,

   ˆ + ik0 ( ρ0 − 1)ui (a; −b), ˆ  ik0 ρ0 us (a; −b) 4π ρN 4π ρN

(69) a ∈ DN .

Acoustic Scattering for a Piecewise Homogeneous Obstacle

35

Proof. As in the proof of Theorem 1, we consider the analysis ˆ S = {uiα , ui ( · ; −b)} ˆ S + {uiα, us ( · ; −b)} ˆ S {u0α, u0 ( · ; −b)} 0 0 0 +{usα ,

ui (

(70)

ˆ S + {us , us ( · ; −b)} ˆ S . · ; −b)} 0 α 0

ˆ j = 1, 2, ..., N are regular solutions Let a ∈ D0 . Then, the total fields ujα , uj ( · ; −b), of the Helmholtz equation in Dj and by applying successively Green’s second theorem and the boundary condition on the surface SN of the core we take ˆ S = 0. ˆ S = ρ0 {uN , uN ( · ; −b)} {u0α , u0 ( · ; −b)} 0 N ρN α

(71)

ˆ are regular solutions of the Helmholtz equation in D, The incident fields uiα and ui ( · ; −b) so we have ˆ S = 0. {uiα, ui ( · ; −b)} (72) 0 For the next integral in (70) we consider a small sphere Sα, in D0 centered at a with radius , as well as a large sphere SR centered at the origin surrounding the scatterer and the sphere Sα, . Applying Green’s second theorem we take ˆ S = {ui , us ( · ; −b)} ˆ S − {ui , us ( · ; −b)} ˆ S . {uiα, us ( · ; −b)} α α α, 0 R

(73)

Applying Lemma 6 we find that ˆ S = −us (a; −b). ˆ {uiα, us ( · ; −b)} 0 From (34) we get ˆ S = {usα, ui ( · ; −b)} 0

4π ∞ ˆ u (b). ik0 α

(74)

(75)

ˆ are regular solutions of the Helmholtz equation satisfying the Since usα and us ( · ; −b) asymptotic relation (8) we get ˆ S =0 {usα , us ( · ; −b)} 0

(76)

Substituting (71),(72) and (74)-(76) in (70) gives ik0 s ˆ ˆ u∞ u (a; −b). α (b) = 4π

(77)

Let a ∈ DN . We use the same analysis (70) and we consider again a small sphere Sα, in the interior of the layer DN . Applying successfully Green’s second theorem and using the boundary condition on SN and Lemma 6 we get ˆ S + ρ0 {uN , uN ( · ; −b)} ˆ Sα, ˆ S = ρ0 {uN , uN ( · ; −b)} {u0α , u0 ( · ; −b)} 0 α N ρN ρN α ρ0 i ˆ + us (a; −b)]. ˆ = [u (a; −b) ρN

(78)

ˆ are solutions of the Helmholtz equation for r 6= a, Green’s second Since uiα and ui ( · ; −b) theorem gives ˆ S = {uiα , ui ( · ; −b)} ˆ Sα, . {uiα, ui ( · ; −b)} (79) 0

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Christodoulos E. Athanasiadis and Evangelia S. Athanasiadou

In view of Lemma 6 and for  → 0 we get ˆ S = ui (a; −b). ˆ {uiα, ui ( · ; −b)} 0

(80)

ˆ are regular solutions of the Helmholtz equation in D0 , as before, Since uiα and us ( · ; −b) we have ˆ S = {ui , us ( · ; −b)} ˆ S , {uiα , us ( · ; −b)} (81) α 0 R

where SR is the surface of a large sphere surrounding the scatterer. Using the asymptotic forms (8) and (62) for R → ∞ we take ˆ S = 0. {uiα, us ( · ; −b)} 0

(82)

ˆ S = 0. {usα, us ( · ; −b)} 0

(83)

ik ρ0 s ˆ + ik ( ρ0 − 1)ui(a; −b). ˆ ˆ u (a; −b) u∞ α (b) = 4π ρN 4π ρN

(84)

Similarly we have ˆ S the relation (75) is valid. For the integral {usα , ui ( · ; −b)} 0 Substituting (75),(78),(80),(82) and (83) in (70) gives

6.

Discussion

In this work we have established scattering relations for an acoustic piecewise homogeneous scatterer with a resistive core, which can be used to study inverse scattering problems. When γj = γ0 for j = 1, 2..., N, then from (22) and (24) we get Dγ∞ (ˆ r) = 0, Sλ∞ (ˆ r) =

ik0 4π

Z

uN (r0 )(

SN

∂ + ik0 λ ∂n(r0)

(85) r

ρ0 )Φ0 (r, r0)ds(r0 ), ρN

(86)

that is the scattering is independent of the compressibilities of the layers. When ρj = ρ0 for j = 1, 2..., N, then from (23) and (24) we get Dρ∞ (ˆ r) = 0, Sλ∞ (ˆ r) =

ik0 4π

Z

SN

uN (r0 )(

∂ + ik0 λ ∂n(r0)

(87) r

γ0 )Φ0 (r, r0)ds(r0 ), γN

(88)

that is, in this case, the scattering is independent of the mass densities of the layers. When both γj = γ0 and ρj = ρ0 for j = 1, 2..., N are valid then Dγ∞ (ˆ r) = 0 and Dρ∞ (ˆ r) = 0, that is scattering occurs on the surface SN of the resistive core only. r λk02 γN ρ0 R The term uN (r)uN h (r) ds(r) in the equations (39) and (49) is connected 2π γ0 ρN SN ϕ with the resistive core. In particular, the equation (49) shows that the far-field operator G is not a normal operator [3] and [8]. In this case for the study of the inverse scattering problems the far-field operator G is replaced by |Re(G)| + Im(G) [13]. We note that for a nonabsorbing scatterer the far-field operator is normal.

Acoustic Scattering for a Piecewise Homogeneous Obstacle

37

References [1] Angel T. S., Kleinman R. E. and Hettlich F., The resistive and conductive problems for the exterior Helmholtz equation, SIAM J. Appl. Math. Vol. 50 No6, pp. 1607-1622, (1990). [2] Athanasiadis C. and Stratis I. G., Low-frequency acoustic scattering by an infinitely stratified scatterer, Rend. di Matem. Serie VII 15, 133-152 (1995). [3] Athanasiadis C., On the acoustic scattering amplitudes for a multi-layered scatterer, J. Austral. Math. Soc. Ser. B , 431-438 (1998). [4] Athanasiadis C., Martin P. A., Spyropoulos A. and Stratis I. G., Scattering relations for point sources: Acoustic and electromagnetic waves, J. Math. Phys. 43 , 5683-5697 (2002). [5] Athanasiadis C. and Tsitsas N. L., Scattering theorems for acoustic excitation of a layered obstacle by an interior point source, Studies in Appl. Math. 118,397-418 (2007). [6] Athanasiadis C., Sevroglou V. and Stratis I. G., 3D elastic scattering theorem for pointgenerated dyadic fields, Math. Meth. Appl. Sci. , 31, 987-1003, (2008). [7] Athanasiadou E., Sevroglou V. and Zoi S., Scattering Theorems of Elastic Waves for a Thermoelastic Body, Math. Meth. Appl. Sci. ,(in press) (2017). [8] Cakoni F. and Colton D., Qualitative Methods in Inverse Scattering Theory, Springer, Series on Interaction of Mechanics and Mathematics, (2006). [9] Colton D. and Kress R., Inverse acoustic and electromagnetic scattering theory, Springer-Verlag, (1992). [10] Dassios G., Kiriaki K. and Polyzos D., On the scattering amplitudes for elastic waves, ZAMP, 38, 856-873 (1987). [11] Dassios G. and Kleinman R., Low Frequency Scattering, Clarendon Press, (2000). [12] Hu G., Kirsch A. and Sini M., Some inverse problems arising from elastic scattering by rigid obstacles, Inverse Problems 29 015009 (21pp) (2013). [13] Kirsch A. and Grinberg N., The Factorization Method for Inverse Problems, Oxford University Press, Oxford, (2008). [14] Liu X., Zhang B. and Hu G., Uniqueness in the inverse scattering problem in a piecewise homogeneous medium, Inverse Problems 26 015002 (14pp) (2010). [15] Potthast R., Point-Sources and Multipoles in Inverse Scattering Theory, Chapman and Hall/CRC, 2001. [16] Twersky V., Certain Transmission and reflection theorems, J. Appl. Phys. 25, 859-862, (1954).

In: Cyber-Security and Information Warfare Editor: Nicholas J. Daras

ISBN: 978-1-53614-385-0 © 2019 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

Chapter 3

ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF THE RISE OF INFORMATION WARFARE, CYBER-WAR AND CYBER-SECURITY Kyriaki Athanassouli, PhD Department of Military Sciences Hellenic Military Academy Vari Attikis, Greece

ABSTRACT The technological changes have impacts on economics and military activities. The Revolution in Military Affairs reinforces technological applications in the Army by the introduction of “intelligent arms,” giving new dimensions in the Art of War. Economic and military activities became increasingly reliant on the Internet and networked technologies. However, these evolutions and the interdependence between networks of critical infrastructures have led to new cyber-threats. The information revolution implies the rise of cyber-attacks (Estonia, Georgia) and the apparition of a new kind of war, the CyberWar. Cyber-War is defined as actions directed towards targeting any aspect of an adversary’s cyber-systems. For that reason, many States are developing defensive and offensive abilities aiming at the reinforcement and acceleration of securitization process. These concerns are reflected upon the effort made by countries in order to identify the level of securitization in cyber-space, in terms of readiness (Global Cyber-Security Index) and are also integrated in the arms and services of firms’ strategies. Moreover, a modern approach of public economics, using tools of games theory highlights some situations in which private benefits and costs fail to account for all of the social benefits and costs. Thus, the potential market failures in information sharing, network externalities are a result of the incentive of free riding. They constitute economic barriers to improve the securitization 

Corresponding Author Email: [email protected].

40

Kyriaki Athanassouli of cyber-space. Therefore, government involvement has to take into consideration the need for cyber-security while market failure evaluation is necessary. The demand for CyberSecurity is expected to increase in the future; measures are undertaken with private and international cooperation, while Cyber-Security strategies are in progress on national and international level.

Keywords: Cyber-War, asymmetrical warfare, Cyber-Security, potential market failure, government involvement

1. INTRODUCTION Post-industrial societies are characterized by rapid technological changes, which have influenced the sector of Armed Forces. In the early 90’s, after the end of the Cold War, the Revolution in Military Affairs reinforces the technological applications in the Army by the introduction of “intelligent arms,” giving new dimensions in the Art of War. Internet, being the main tool of the information society, has resulted from a series of military investigations. The appearance of the Internet is due to USA’s authorities (Advanced Research Project Agency (ARPA)) willing to possess a communication system able to resist a nuclear war from the Soviet Union. This initiative played a vital role in the creation of the Arpanet, the basis for the present form of the Internet. The information society is characterized by the wide use of Internet by an increasing part of the population. Economic and military activities became increasingly reliant on Internet and networking technologies. Indicatively, in 2015 the number of Internet users was estimated to 3.07 billion worldwide and they are expected to reach the number of 3.6 billion in 2018, representing 48.2% of Earth’s population. Internet access is becoming a basic priority. Nevertheless, access in technology upsets the geopolitical balance. Τhe introduction of technology in industry and the interdependence between networks of critical infrastructures has led to new cyber-dangers and cyber-threats. The information revolution implies the rise of cyber-attacks or Cyber-War. For instance, in 2007, the Estonian Government was victim of large-scale cyber-attacks, resulting in the interruption of the State services functioning. A year later, the Georgian Government became the next victim of such cyber-attacks. Hackers blocked the take-off of a military aircraft and caused problems in the accessibility of official media sites, ministries and public entities. These facts highlighted the intention of disruption or destruction of enemy’s information and communication systems and the vulnerabilities arising from the interconnectivity of computer systems. The appearance of Cyber-War is a culmination of the extended use of technology. Cyber-War consists of activities over the Internet that represents a new type of attack. Cyber-War is defined as actions directed towards targeting any aspect of an opponent’s cyber-systems such as communications, logistics or intelligence. Cyber-attacks target public or private sectors entities, while the perpetrator remains legally unknown. The

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military dimension has expanded into non-military areas. Cyber-War can also include either the destabilization of the government’s financial systems and critical infrastructures, infiltrating a computer system for the purposes of espionage, or false information by using cyber-weapons and making offensive interventions across the cyber-space. It can appear during both periods of peace and war. Questions arise whether Cyber-War is analogical to traditional warfare and in which circumstances. Furthermore, Cyber-War is an asymmetrical warfare, not realized in a precise geographical area, in which geopolitical instabilities can occur. Nowadays, many States are developing defensive and offensive abilities aiming at the reinforcement and acceleration of securitization processes. This has led to the Cyber-Security market. Cyber-Security is defined as an emerging field of protecting computer systems and data from interference through the Internet. This work focuses on the economic impacts of the variety of threats to cyber-space operations. A first section reviews the key cases of cyber-attacks, including the characteristics of this new kind of war, as an asymmetrical war. The following section advanced the need for Cyber-Security. Cyber-Security concerns are reflected at the efforts made by several countries in order to identify the level of securitization in the cyber-space. These concerns are integrated in the arms and services firms’ strategies. Furthermore, modern approach of public economics, using tools of microeconomics and games theory highlights some situations in which private benefits and costs fail to account for all of the social benefits and costs. Attack and defense behaviors can be modeled to analyze whether decisions made at individual levels are likely to result in the socially optimal amount of Cyber-Security.

2. CYBER-WAR: THE ENEMY OF THE DIGITAL ECONOMY In the area of the digital economy, there have been several cyber-attacks against the national security of a country, of varied nature. These facts highlight the dimension of a new type of war: Cyber-War.

2.1. Selected Examples of Cyber-Attacks In 2007, the Estonian Government was victim of large-scale cyber-attacks, resulting in the interruption of the State services functioning. Estonia government’s removal of the bronze soldier statue and the bodies of Red Army soldiers of World War II from a public park in Tallinn led to a cyber-attack by the Russian minority of the country and Russia. This caused contestations between Estonians and Russians. Subsequently, Estonia experienced the first wave of denial-of-service (DoS) attacks. During the 2007 surprise cyber-attack against Estonia, the websites of government agencies were affected (Kaiser

Kyriaki Athanassouli

42

2015). Afterwards, private sites and servers, banks and newspapers were hit. Although there were no human losses, the extended shutdown of the public services caused disorders in the Estonian economy. This had an impact on civilian’s infrastructure and affected the Estonian population by causing several dysfunctions. Moreover, the vulnerability of networks and a new form of threat to the proper functioning of an economic and social system were highlighted. Thus, this is characterized as the first large-scale cyber-attack. Nobody took the responsibility of this cyber-attack. Although, there is a suspicion of the involvement of the Russian Authorities behind this operation. Afterwards, in 2008, the network of the Republic of Georgia was attacked by a network of hundreds of computers that were infected by viruses (Zombie computers). The cyber-attacks were directly coordinated with a kinetic sea and air attack. The cyber-pirates forced a military aircraft to cancel the takeoff. These cyber-attacks also targeted on the smooth functioning of critical infrastructure. Sites of the major news media, government websites and public institutions, financial and educational institutions, business associations, were targeted and access to them was impossible. DoS attacks targeted command and control system. Other attacks of this kind followed and many of which are described in the following Table 1: Table 1. Description of few selected cases of cyber-attacks Year 2007

Preparator Russian Federation (alleged*)

Target Estonia

2007

China (alleged)

2008

Russian nationalist hackers Russian Federation

United-Kingdom, France, Germany Lithuania

2008

Georgia

2009

Russian Federation (alleged)

Kyrgyzstan

20092010

Unknown

Iran

2012

Unknown

2012

Unknown

Saudi Arabia’s State oil company Qatar

Summary of cyber-attacks Series of cyber-attacks first against Estonian government agencies, and then private sites and servers. Intrusions into government networks. Hacking of hundreds of Lithuanian government and corporate websites. Cyber-attack directly coordinated with a kinetic land, sea and air attack. Cyber-attacks focused on Internet Service Providers in Kyrgyzstan disrupting all internet traffic. Stuxnet, a cyber-worm, designed specifically to sabotage Iran’s nuclear reactors. The Sharmoon virus infected 30000 ARAMCO computers Sharmoon virus (oil company RasGas)

‘alleged’, this reflects the difficulty in ascertaining responsibility. Source: Flowers and Zeadally (2014).

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43

This disaster or ‘electronic Pearl Harbor’ on countries proves that there is a real threat. Cyber-attacks on government systems and civilian incited States to think about strategies of Cyber-Security. It also prompted the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to adopt a policy on cyber-defense, under which it created a cyber-defense management authority and supported the creation of a cooperative cyber-defense center of excellence in Tallinn (Revue Internationale et Stratégique 2012).

2.2. Cyber-War, an Asymmetrical Warfare According to NATO, Cyber-War is defined as a defensive or offensive cyber-operation aiming to cause death or general damage to individuals. This definition is restrictive since it does not include propaganda, espionage, destabilization of a nation’s financial system and the possible psychological consequences that might occur. According to another less restrictive definition, the military dimension of Cyber-War expands into non-military areas (Grivas 1999, Kyriazis and Spanos 2000). It is a form of informative warfare developed in the cyber-space. Cyber-War can include destabilization of the government’s financial systems and critical infrastructures, by infiltrating a computer system for the purposes of espionage. It concerns sabotage to gain information and access to critical computer systems, also false information by using cyber-weapons and making offensive interventions across cyber-space. Cyber-War or cyber-terrorism, as it is sometimes mentioned as, refers to any form of malicious action taken against governments or individuals that occurs in the cyber-space. Effectively, Cyber-War refers to situations of symmetrical conflict, between two or more States, and also to situations of asymmetrical conflict, between a State and one or more non-State actors. This asymmetrical dimension provides a disproportionate power to any kind of actors in comparison with powers in a traditional conflict. Effectively, on the contrary to conventional war, an isolated actor or group of actors can lead a cyber-attack. Cyber-space attacks can be initiated by one nation against another nation, or by one nation against the critical infrastructures of another nation. The cost of Cyber-attacks is much lower than the cost of conventional war. Nevertheless, act in Cyber-space requires owning an infrastructure, technological tools and technical expertise. Thus financial funds are required for all the above. Moreover, CyberWar can occur anytime and nations do not declare it. The act of surprising and the use of malicious actions (virus, Trojan horse) reveal a kind of attack which is an application of Sun Tzu axioms related to the Art of War. Additionally, there are significant barriers to technical attribution and human attribution. Technical attribution refers to the analysis of malicious functionality and malicious packets in order to locate the initial node of this attack. Human attribution refers to the identification of persons or institutions by using the

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Kyriaki Athanassouli

result of technical attribution and other information (Boebert 2010). Hackers’ identification is practically impossible: hackers remain anonymous and legally safe (Rid and Buchanan 2015). There is no incentive for anyone involved to be transparent. Attacking an enemy without being visible is a clear application of Sun Tzu’s maxims. However, a European-based effort aimed at measuring the frequency and source countries of attempted infiltrations. The German Telecommunications company, Deutsche Telekom (DTAG) established a network of sensors to serve as an early warning system to provide a real-time picture of ongoing cyber-attacks. The ‘top 15’ countries recorded as a source of cyber-attacks by the DTAG sensors are listed in the following Figure 1. Another main particularity of this new form of warfare is related to the fact that CyberWar takes place in the cyber-space. It is not realized in a precise geographical area but geopolitical instabilities can occur. In this type of war, the domination of information is of major importance. Thereby, technologically advanced countries tend to dominate in the cyber-space. So, as the vulnerabilities of nations to Cyber-War are growing, measures are necessary. This has economic impacts and has led to the appearance of the market of Cyber-Security.

Source: Flowers and Zeadally 2014. Figure 1. Number of Cyber-attacks alleged by countries (2013).

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45

3. CYBER-SECURITY MARKET AND ECONOMIC IMPACTS Cyber-Security is the ability to control access to network systems and the information they contain. It is also the capability to preserve the confidentiality, integrity and availability of cyber-space, and to ensure the protection of computer systems and data from interference through the Internet. The lack of Cyber-Security might have impact on the whole economy. Therefore, the Cyber-Security entails national and international security dimensions.

3.1. The Global Cyber-Security Index (GCI) “Cyber-Security refers to the protection of networks and information systems against human mistakes, natural disasters, technical failures or malicious attacks” (European Commission 2016). Cyber-Security involves attack protection and prevents proliferation of cyber-threats. It is related to national and international political agendas and communications infrastructure. These attacks are specifically oriented; they fall under the heading of information warfare and have an impact on automated supply and logistics chains (Hellenic National Defence General Staff - Department of Cyberdefence - Dir Sp. Papageorgiou - http://www.geetha.mil.gr/en/). Cyber-Security concerns are reflected upon the efforts made by several countries in order to identify the level of securitization in the cyber-space. The Global Cyber-Security Index is an initiative attempting to measure the commitment of countries to Cyber-Security (Telecommunication Union (ITU) 2015). The Global Cyber-Security Index (GCI) provides an overview of the countries’ level of Cyber-Security developments, including five areas: legal measures, technical measures, organizational measures, capacity building and international cooperation. Precisely, Legal measures provide a harmonized framework for entities in order to comply with common regulatory requirements and reduce cyber-threats. Technology constitutes a basic defense against cyber-threats and other online threats. Technical measures and features can detect and confront cyber-attacks in order to reduce the vulnerability of States such as CERT team. Indicators are created aiming to enforce internationally recognized Cyber-Security standards within the public sector and critical infrastructure. Organizational and procedural measures are fundamental for the development of organization and cooperation strategies. These measures are used to implement each type of national initiative on Cyber-Security. Furthermore, Capacity building concerns the development of people’s capacities on the adoption of legal, technical and organizational measures around Cyber-Security. For the manpower the knowledge of technology is necessary. Human and institutional capacity building is

Kyriaki Athanassouli

46

useful to improve knowledge and to know-how across sectors, to apply the most appropriate solutions, and to promote the progress of the professionals’ competency. Cyber-Security includes a multi-stakeholder approach. Finally, for a better dialogue and coordination, cooperation is a prerequisite. Information sharing is useful within the public and private sector, also on a national and international level. This index gives a global Cyber-Security ranking of each country. Many countries share the same ranking, which indicates that they have the same level of readiness. The index varies between 0 and 1. A number close to 1 indicates that the country is safe. In other words Cyber-Security is high, taking into consideration the above criteria. For instance, USA, Canada and Australia present the higher index: 0.824; 0.794; and 0.765 respectively. Countries such as France (0.588), Spain (0.588) and Italy (0.559) are in a middle condition. Greece is sharing the 22th rank, while other countries are positioned in a lower situation (Table 2). The overall results are listed in the following map (Figure 2). Table 2. Cyber-Security Index and the related rank in selected countries Country

Index

Rank

Country

Index

Rank

USA Canada Australia Malaysia Oman New Zealand

0.824 0.794 0.765 0.765 0.765 0.735

1 2 3 3 3 4

Singapore Latvia Sweden Turkey Hong Kong Finland

0.676 0.647 0.647 0.647 0.618 0.618

6 7 7 7 8 8

Norway Brazil Estonia Germany India Japan

0.735 0.706 0.706 0.706 0.706 0.706

4 5 5 5 5 5

Qatar Slovakia Uruguay Colombia Denmark Egypt

0.618 0.618 0.618 0.588 0.588 0.588

8 8 8 9 9 9

Rep. of Korea United-kingdom Austria Hungary Israel Netherlands

0.706 0.706 0.676 0.676 0.676 0.676

5 5 6 6 6 6

France Mauritius Spain Italy Morocco Cyprus

0.588 0.588 0.588 0.559 0.559 0.294

9 9 9 10 10 19

…/…

Greece

0.206

22

Source: International Telecommunication Union (ITU) 2015.

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47

Figure 2. Cyber-Security Commitment 2014.

Table 3. Measures of Cyber-Security Index in selected countries Countries

Legal measures 1.0000 0.7500 0.7500 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000

Technical measures 0.8333 1.0000 0.6670 0.6670 1.0000 0.6670

Organizational measures 0.8750 0.8750 0.870 1.0000 0.6250 0.7500

USA Canada Brazil Estonia Germany UnitedKingdom Israel 1.0000 0.6670 0.6250 Sweden 0.7500 0.6670 0.6250 Turkey 0.5000 0.6670 0.7500 Denmark 1.0000 0.6670 0.5000 France 1.0000 0.1667 0.5000 Spain 1.0000 0.6670 0.6250 Italy 0.7500 0.3333 0.6250 Poland 1.0000 0.3333 0.6250 Switzerland 0.5000 0.3333 0.2500 Cyprus 0.7500 0.1667 0.3750 Portugal 0.7500 0.5000 0.1250 Albania 0.7500 0.3333 0.1250 Greece 0.5000 0.3333 0.1250 Source: International Telecommunication Union (ITU) 2015.

Capacity Building measures 1.0000 0.8750 0.7500 0.5000 0.6250 0.7500

Cooperation measures 0.5000 0.5000 0.5000 0.5000 0.5000 0.5000

0.7500 0.6250 0.7500 0.5000 0.7500 0.6250 0.6250 0.6250 0.2500 0.1250 0.1250 0.1250 0.1250

0.5000 0.6250 0.5000 0.5000 0.6250 0.2500 0.5000 0.2500 0.5000 0.2500 0.2500 0.0000 0.1250

Kyriaki Athanassouli

48

Examining extensively the components of the GCI, cooperation seems utopic so as to be achieved at 100% for all countries (Table 3). The highest capacity Building, for example, are detected among USA (1.0000), Canada (0.8750), Brazil (0.7500), UnitedKingdom (0.7500) and Israel (0.7500). As far as organizational measures are concerned, the highest index is apparent in Estonia (1.0000). Concerning technical measures, the top position in the overall list goes to Canada (1.0000) and Germany (1.0000). Finally, high levels of legal measures index (about 1.0000) sustain USA, Estonia, Germany, UnitedKingdom, Israel, Denmark, France, and Spain. Greece is in a moderate situation regarding legal (0.5000) and technical (0.3333) measures. Efforts should be taken to improve organizational (0.1250), capacity building (0.1250), and cooperation measures (0.1250).

3.2. Development of Products and Services in the Cyber-Security Market The increase in demand for goods and services in the field of Cyber-Security has impact on arms-producing and military services companies and leads to the apparition of a Cyber-Security market. A Cyber-Security market includes the development of products and services for offensive and defensive applications. These applications are focused on government and military activity and are also referred to as cyber-weapons. The Cyber-Security industry is comprised of companies that provide products and services for offensive and defensive use across the information technology, telecoms and industrial field. Taking into account the growing importance of Cyber-Security, arms industry and services operate in Cyber-Security market aiming at the coverage of such needs. Typical are the cases of Airbus Defence & Space, BEA Systems, Lockheed Martin, Saab and Thales etc., which diversified into Cyber-Security in order to widen their production range and their customer base into the civilian sector and to develop technical competences for the military market. Almost, the half of SIPRI ‘Top 100’ arms and services firms has provided CyberSecurity solutions (SIPRI 2016). They became Cyber-Security providers such as Symantec, the Intel Corporation and IBM at a time of important reductions in public expenditures. These reductions had also affected the traditional weapon markets. Arms industry Cyber-Security covers four (4) main fields:    

Network and data protection software and services, Testing and simulation services, Training and consulting services and Operational support.

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49

It is worth mentioning, that they have developed different strategies. Their diversification strategy has involved collaboration with non-military companies. On one side, ΒΑΕ collaborates with Vodafone to improve security in the field of communications. Lockheed Martin made strategic alliances with key IT and Cyber-Security companies (Microsoft, Hewlett Packard). There has been a collaboration between with several U.S. based Cyber-Security solutions manufacturers such as Lockheed Martin and IBM in order to strengthen their Internet portals against cyber-attacks. On the other side, Airbus Defence and Space (former EADS) created a sector specialized in the field of Cyber-Security, involving more than 600 experts in Europe (France, United-Kingdom, Germany). The socalled ‘Cyber-Security made in Europe’ is spending more than 20% of its annual revenues for investment on R&D. Furthermore, Cyber-Security, from an economic perspective, using tools of costbenefit analysis can contribute to decision making in the context of risk management. It aims to determine the amount of investment in Cyber-Security depending on the expected cost (Gordon 2002). The results of Gordon-Loeb model conclude that: 



Up to a certain level, additional investment in Cyber-Security significantly reduces the risks of successful attacks. However, beyond this point, there is diminishing or no additional benefit. For a wide range of circumstances, firms should invest less than 37% of expected loss.

3.3. The Potential Market Failure in Cyber-Security Economic aspects of Cyber-Security are modeling attack and defense. Looking at Cyber-Security from an economic perspective can offer important insight into identifying important policy opportunities. Furthermore, standard tools of microeconomics can be applied to the analysis of evaluation of policies for achieving greater Cyber-Security. The question is now to know how much society should spend on Cyber-Security. An important public policy question is that of whether decisions made by private producers and consumers are likely to result in the socially optimal amount of Cyber-Security. Some policy makers are skeptical of the market’s ability to provide enough Cyber-Security. An extensive literature in public economics, points out cases where benefits and costs in the private markets will fail to account for all of the social benefits and costs, and this situation can arise in the market of Cyber-Security. In the field of public economics, CyberSecurity is often considered as a public good, since it presents some specific properties such as property of non-exclusion and non-rivalry in consumption. These characteristics can in turn create incentives for potential beneficiaries of such goods to act as free riders. It reflects the classic market failure that calls out for government involvement and

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government regulation. In other words, there are economic barriers to improving CyberSecurity. The case in which private investments in Cyber-Security are less than the social benefits, leaving Cyber-Security to the market place will lead to an under-investment in Cyber-Security. The potential market failure in Cyber-Security deals with network externalities, information asymmetries, incentives to free riding, public goods aspects of private security investment, coordination failures. Effectively, if an Internet user is sufficiently protected against cyber-attacks, his computer is less likely to be hacked. Consequently, we can conclude that this has a positive impact, on other users, as well as reduces the likelihood of transmission of viruses and other online dangers, and reciprocally. The above situation corresponds to a positive network externality and can lead to a free riding problem. A free riding problem is detected when one can benefit from a good, or a service, without paying for it. On the contrary, insecurity creates negative externalities. Consequently, the Cyber-Security is influenced by the security measures used by all Internet users. This is typically the case of public goods, because of externalities, investing in protection or in Cyber-Security reduces the threat of a cyber-attack (Dimitriou 1998, Anderson 2001a and 2001b). Furthermore, the market of Cyber-Security is characterized by information asymmetries that prevent optimal decision-making. Such cases create lemon problems (Ackerloff 1970, Anderson 2001a and 2001b). These situations produce barriers to improve Cyber-Security. Precisely, asymmetric information exists when one party to a transaction has better information about the quality than another one. In other words, one party of a transaction is better informed than the other one. In this case, information about quality is imperfect and asymmetrically distributed. Effectively, on one side, buyers are reluctant to pay for something they cannot measure. It is difficult for the buyer to know the truth about the quality of the product. On the other hand, producers or sellers are reluctant to invest in Cyber-Security, but they always argue that their products are secure. This can lead to an under-investment in Cyber-Security. However, standards are created in order to certify the quality of the product. But one more time, in practice the sellers have to bear this evaluation and this can induce perverse incentives. Since Internet users’ identification is impossible, nobody is legally responsible when a cyber-attack occurs. So cyber-attacks are very hard to attribute and their effects are hard to measure. Because of barriers to attribution, any individual who considers that he has not sufficient personal interest or incentives to protect the computer, neglects the protection and avoids the cost of this procedure and constitute incentives to free riding. Great pressure is posed on Cyber-Security, due to the fact that there is a lack of international regulations - legislation that could control the use of force in cyber-space as well as deter and attribute cyber-attacks (Liaropoulos 2013, Shmitt 1999). Coordination failures constitute a problem of economics that can be modeled as a game. The incentives confronting an individual user could be modeled like the prisoner’s

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51

dilemma: predictable behavioral reasons why market actors may not be expected to invest in socially optimal levels of security. It highlights why the market may fail to provide Cyber-Security. The analysis of the payoffs of Cyber-Security investment is similar to the prisoner’s dilemma. The prisoner’s dilemma is a simple example applicable to many situations where the two forces are in conflict and can choose between collision and cooperation (Daras 2007). The strategic interaction between two firms in a situation containing set rules and outcomes is modeled. The payoffs matrix shows the results of the game for each combination of strategies. Generally it is the utility - benefit. In the following matrix of payoffs are given the benefits enjoyed by both companies using the Internet (network system), taking into account factors utility and cost, depending on the firms’ or players’ strategies. Each cell of the matrix gives the payoffs to both firms for each combination of actions. The following four combinations firms’ strategies are presented. Two firms’ strategies are plausible. In the first case, the firm invests in Cyber-Security in order to have a secure network and in the second case the firm does not invest and its network is not secure. Matrix of payoffs Firm B

Firm A

Secure Network

Don’t Secure Network

Secure Network

(20, 20)

(10, 30)

Don’t Secure Network

(30, 10)

(15, 15)

Source: Powell 2005.

Firm A’s payoff appears as the first number of each pair, firm B’s as the second. So, if both firms invest in Cyber-Security to the same extent and in the same way, in order to have a secure network then they each get a payoff of 20 (payoffs (20, 20) in terms of utility or benefit). This appears in the upper-left cell. They followed a cooperative strategy and they share equally the cost and utility. Ultimately benefits (20, 20) for both players are increased. These strategies are socially optimal. If firm A invests in Cyber-Security in order to have a secure network and firm B doesn't, then firm A gets a payoff of 10 and firm B gets a payoff of 30. This appears in the upper-right cell. In this case, firm A is charged the total cost, whereas firm B enjoys the maximum benefits with zero cost and this is due to firm A’s strategy, firm B would receive 30 because it would still receive the benefit provided by firm A with a secure network. In this case, firm A is penalized versus Firm B, since the likelihood to be attacked because of the negligence B is increased (payoffs (10, 30)).

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The reverse situation, in which firm B invests in Cyber-Security in order to have a secure network and firm A refuses, appears in the lower-left cell. The payoffs are symmetrical (30, 10). If neither of them invests in Cyber-Security in order to have a secure network, they each get a payoff of 15. This appears as the lower-right cell. In this case both firms are exempted from the cost of the insurance, but they are at increased risk against potential cyber-attacks. As a result, the overall benefits are lower than those from a situation socially optimal. Firms don’t bother investing in security when they know that other firms won’t invest, leaving them vulnerable in any case. It corresponds to Nash equilibrium; in which each firm takes the best decision given the adversary most probable behavior (payoff (15, 15)). The model highlights why the market may fail to provide Cyber-Security (Powell 2005). The private benefits have to be great enough to make firms invest in Cyber-Security. In other words, firms will underprovide Cyber-Security on the market, when the costs for security are high, the private benefits low and the public benefits high. Similarly, when costs for security are low and the private benefits high, firms will provide close to efficient levels of Cyber-Security despite some positive externalities. A similar situation has to face, a government as a buyer of cyber-weapons or network services that affect national security, because in the absence of perfect information, from the governments’ side, it is difficult to differentiate between strong or weak performers in network security, secure firmware and software development (Dacus and Yannakogeorgos 2016). For the development of an economic policy, the question is to know whether a private initiative can provide enough Cyber-Security or some form of government involvement is justified. In general, the market fails to provide the correct amount of Cyber-Security.

CONCLUSION New technologies have transformed the economic and military world. The dependency on Internet network by the military organizations increases and the interdependence between networks of critical infrastructures has led to new cyber-dangers and cyberthreats. The enemy is not a conventional enemy. Cyber-War is a new kind of asymmetrical war, not visible, due to its nature, nonlinear and can disrupt society with the minimum investment cost. Asymmetrical attack frequency is rising. Thus, Cyber-Security becomes one of the most serious economic and national security challenges a country has to face and to deal with. The Global Cyber-Security Index (GCI) gives an overview of the countries’ level of Cyber-Security according to five measures: legal measures, technical

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measures, organizational measures, capacity building and international cooperation. This index expresses the level of readiness that countries have on these areas. Moreover, the increase in demand for goods and services in the field of Cyber-Security has impact on arms-producing and military services companies. Taking into account the growing importance of Cyber-Security, arms industry and services operate in Cyber-Security market aiming at the coverage of such needs. Typical are the cases of Airbus Defence & Space, BEA Systems, Lockheed Martin, Saab and Thales etc., which diversified into Cyber-Security in order to widen their production range and their customer base into the civilian sector and to develop technical competences for the military market. Finally, Cyber-Security from an economic perspective, using tools of cost-benefit analysis can contribute to decision making in the context of risk management. It aims to determine the amount of investment in Cyber-Security depending on the expected cost. Furthermore, Cyber-Security as an economic problem uses tools of microeconomics, modeling the attack and defense behavior in order to analyze whether decisions made at individual levels are likely to result in the socially optimal amount of Cyber-Security. Modern approach of public economics highlights some situations in which private benefits and costs fail to account for all of the social benefits and costs. The market economy is characterized by individual behaviors which are not always socially optimal for ensuring social welfare and the required degree of Cyber-Security. Specifically, cases in which these situations can arise are network externalities, prisoner’s dilemma, information asymmetries and public goods aspects of private security investment, such as non-rivalry and non-exclusion. The potential market failure in information sharing is a result of the incentive to free ride. Thus, economic barriers to improving the securitization of cyber-space call out for government involvement and regulation. The government needs to consider better the economics of Cyber-Security in order to achieve the socially optimal level and to examine if the market truly fails to provide the correct amount of Cyber-Security. Demand for Cyber-Security is expected to rise in the following years. The sustainability of this demand is related to the strategic, political and economic importance of Cyber-Security. From an economic point of view, the aim is to protect the interests of businesses and infrastructure. The strategic point of view raises the issue of the governance of cyber-space and digital sovereignty. The elaboration of cyber-strategies makes it possible to regulate the relations between individuals, organizations, companies and States. For these reasons, it is necessary for Cyber-Security to become a strategic national asset. Cyber-Security policy is depending on both public and private partnerships, via outsourcing. Current Cyber-Security measures have to be based on private and international measures (North Atlantic Treaty Organization-NATO, European Commission, and European Defence Agency), taking into account international cooperation and regulation.

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REFERENCES Akerlof, G. (1970). The market for lemons: quality uncertainty and the market mechanism. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84 (3): 488-500. Anderson, R. (2001a). Unsettling parallels between security and the environment. http://www.sims.berkeley.edu/resources/affiliates/workshops/econsecurity/ecnws/ 37.txt. Anderson, R. (2001b). Why information security is hard - an economic perspective. Proceedings of the 17th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference, New Orleans, LA. Boebert, W. E. (2010). A Survey of challenges in attribution. Proceedings of a Workshop on Deterring Cyber Attacks: Informing Strategies and Developing Options for U.S. Policy. http://www.nap.edu/catalog/12997.htm, National Academy of Sciences. Dacus, C. and Yannakogeorgos, P. (2016). Design Cyber-Security into defense systems: an information economics approach. Security & Privacy-Economics of Cyber-Security part 2, 14 (3): 44-51. Daras, N. (2007). Operational research and military applications. Hellenics Arms Control Center, Book 1, 2, www.armscontrol.info. Dimitriou, A. (1998). On the economic role of the State. Hellenic Military Academy, Vari. European Commission. (2016). Scoping paper: Cyber-Security. Scientific Advice Mechanism - Research and innovation. Flowers, A. and Zeadally, S. (2014). Cyber-War: the what, when, why, and how (Commentary). IEEE Technology and Society Magazine, 33 (3): 14-21. Gordon, L. and Loeb, M. (2002). The Economics of information security investment. ACM Transactions on Information and Systems Security, 5 (4): 438-457. Grivas, K. (1999). The war in the 21st century. Epikoinonies, Athens. Hellenic National Defence General Staff - Department of Cyberdefence - Dir Sp. Papagergiou - http://www.geetha.mil.gr/en/. International Telecommunication Union (ITU). (2015). Global Cyber-Security index & cyberwellness profiles. ABI research Telecommunication Development Sector, Geneve, www.itu.int. Kaiser, R. (2015). The birth of cyberwar. Political Geography, 46: 11-20. Kyriazis, N. and Spanos, S. (2000). The face of war in the 21st century. Estia, Athens. Liaropoulos, A. (2013). Exercising State sovereignty in Cyber-space: an international cyber-order under construction. Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on Information Warfare and Security, ICIW-2013, Regis University, Denver Colorado, USA, 25-26 Marsh, ed. Dr. Douglas Hart. Powell, B. (2005). Is Cyber-Security a public good? Evidence from the financial services industry. Journal of Law, Economics and Policy, 1(2): 497-510.

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Revue Internationale et Stratégique. (2012). Cyberspace, New Strategic Stake. Dir Huyghe F-B. and Pinard M., Armand Colin, 87/3: 55-121. Rid, T. and Buchanan, B. (2015). Attributing cyber attacks. Journal of Strategic Studies, 38 (1-2): 4-37. Shmitt, M. N. (1999). Computer network attack and the use of force in international law: thoughts on a normative framework. Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, 37: 885937. SIPRI YEARBOOK. (2016). Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

In: Cyber-Security and Information Warfare Editor: Nicholas J. Daras

ISBN: 978-1-53614-385-0 © 2019 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

Chapter 4

CYBER WARFARE: A BEYOND THE BASICS APPROACH Nikolaos Benias and Sozon A. Leventopoulos Hellenic Armed Forces – Armor, Greece

ABSTRACT Since the dawn of the “era of information” there has been a vast quantity of both academic and commercial research and papers analyzing the issue of IT technology security. The modern world of easily accessible information has taught us to base our every decision on the timely and accurate delivery of desired information. This contemporary practice could not leave military operations unaffected; they have become and are becoming more and more dependent on information. The immense amount of data usually created in military operations, no matter their size, is very difficult, if not impossible, to process. We owe the success of today’s operations solely on precise information, lack of which makes even multi-billion dollar systems fail. While we have not experienced a full cyber-attack against the Command and Control (C2) infrastructure during a full large-scale warfare, we could accurately predict that one could come from the 5th dimension of operations: cyber-space. Another key element researchers have shown, is that human factor will always be the “weakest link” in the chain of IT security. Although IT security contains a number of fields, like footprinting and enumerating techniques, web server and SQL injection attacks & Intrusion Detection System Avoidance, which an IT security professional ought to take into account when considering security measures, it is almost certain that problems across all fields occur due to human error. This chapter will attempt to examine whether the elimination of the human factor from the security chain could possibly render this infrastructure less prone to attacks and failures. It will start a discussion concerning today’s “education” and training, regarding cyberspace and how it can be improved and whether severe penalties could prevent human errors in the future. Next, we will assess the possibility of new generations of both hardware and software tailored for military use and evaluated for flawless operation under severe cyber warfare environments, with the ability of automatically repelling, attacking and retaliating, as well as the ways

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Nikolaos Benias and Sozon A. Leventopoulos which these systems could affect every-day operation. Finally, a discussion questioning how a new generation of Intrusion Detection/Prevention Systems could elevate the security level of critical infrastructure is going to be conducted. With the everyday advancement of technology human factor is no longer a necessary part of this equation, since various safer alternatives are available which do not jeopardize cyber-security.

1. INTRODUCTION It has been years since our everyday life is dominated by the use of a vast number of electronic devices which have the ability to interconnect and interoperate with other similar ones over various media systems (like radio waves, light and electrons). All of these devices are meant with a sole purpose, the collection, processing and distribution of every possible bit of information available. In that view, security aspects have stressed the ability of current systems to confront risks and mitigate the subsequent threats. The three major pillars of Information Systems Security (IS Sec) are confidentiality, integrity and availability1. Every pillar has consequent actions that should be followed and monitored in order to achieve the required level of results. In that view and through a rather complex process, we have the creation of what we can call, “the chain of security”. In that chain, the weakest link is the “human factor”, which at the same time, is the hardest to mitigate. In this chapter, we shall examine the basic aspects of current and future elements of IT security and we will also examine the possible ways – technical and non-technical – in order to make the “human factor” the hardest link in the chain of security.

2. LET’S START FROM THE BASICS 2.1. General Until the end of the 18th century, the basic communication between two entities was, at least, challenging. A letter could easily be lost, delayed or altered during its voyage between the sender and the recipient. Not only that, but sometimes letters could carry information that not only was invalid by the time of reception but, in a number of cases, could create significant problems (like a passionate love letter to an already married woman, etc.). In a world that kept “shrinking”, every fraction of information had growing importance, which goes beyond the simple example mentioned above. Consequently, science, which started to emerge and distinguish itself from the realm of magic or deception, tried to find ways to solve the problem of information. In that view, we can say 1

In view of the recent advantages in electronic mail and electronic transactions an additional term is often used, NON – REPUDIATION, which in general dictates that the sender cannot deny having sent a certain bit of information, or the receiver cannot deny reception.

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that today and after numerous inventions and efforts we leave in the “era of information”. Since the dawn of mankind, a single event had the potential to become “the game changer”. In the past, we had “stone”, “bronze” and “iron” ages, named after the core element that was used to manufacture weapons and tools. Today we can easily say that information can be seen, like before, as a weapon and as a tool. Despite our advances in speed and the amount (the volume) of data that we can put inside a fragment of information (like video, big data, etc.), the basic prerequisites of prompt delivery, confidentiality and integrity that were needed at the beginning of mankind are still valid today. The important role that information plays in our everyday life makes those prerequisites far more important than before.

2.2. What are the Challenges? So what are the challenges or the prerequisites that we have mentioned above? We can safely argue that the life-cycle of every bit of information follows, in general, the path: GATHER  PROCESS  EVALUATE  DISTRIBUTE. While in this chapter we shall not examine the challenges regarding the 3 first steps of the path, it is important to understand that if the DISTRIBUTION step fails, then it can affect the whole cycle. In brief:



If I can GATHER  PROCESS  EVALUATE information but cannot DISTRIBUTE it, then I have a vast amount of information that is probably useless for me. In order to make that clear, let’s say that a person is on a balcony enjoying his coffee. From this place, this person has a wider view of streets below. He can see the traffic (GATHER) and can predict (PROCESS and EVALUATE) that the course of two cars will lead to an accident. While he has the 3 out of 4 steps of the path, the information that this person has is useless because it won’t prevent the accident from occurring. So in that way, we have described the need for availability.

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



The first step of the life cycle can be primary when we have direct GATHER step or secondary when my GATHER step comes from another entities’ DISTRIBUTION step. When the latter occurs, then the validity of the information is important since there is no way to check it. Let’s go back to the previous example but this time we assume that the person can hear the pedestrians below. If that person shouts “DANGER, ACCIDENT” but for any reason, the pedestrians will hear only “DANGER”, the information is still useless because it will alert many, but not for the right purpose and there is the possibility to create more problems than intended. So the information we distribute should not have been altered during its distribution which leads us to INTEGRITY. Furthermore, every information is not intended for everyone for a number of reasons. Let’s go back to the previous example, but now our subject sees a crime in process. Again we have the first three steps of the life cycle. But now if the person shouts “DANGER, CRIME” that information will be distributed and to the entities committing the crime, giving them the INFORMATION that their actions are noticed and can give them the opportunity to cover their tracks. So the CONFIDENTIALITY of information is a key element of DISTRIBUTION. Finally, we need to ensure that the DISTRIBUTION step was concluded without errors and the information was actually received from the entity that was addressed to. This path is two-fold. Someone should not only be able to deny delivery but at the same time should not be able to deny having sent something. Again let’s examine a situation where the person on a balcony did DISTRIBUTE a valid information but the receiver failed to PROCESS and EVALUATE that piece of information, which led to an accident. The receiver could easily claim that he had never received the information and blame our person on the balcony for not taking any preventive actions. This example describes the need for NONREPUDIATION.

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In that point, we have established the basic triad, plus one, pillars of the overall concept of IT security, which are the well-known to IT security experts CIA acronym or CONFIDENTIALITY – INTEGRITY – AVAILABILITY plus NON-REPUDIATION. The ways and challenges of the implementation of the above controls will be examined shortly.

2.3. The Cyberspace

But where all these staffs live? In order to establish a human-recognized area, the term “cyberspace” was created. This is a rather new term and comes from cyborg2 (cybernetic organism). The first half is a loan from the Greek word «κυβερνήτης» which can be translated into English as someone that controls something (like a captain or a pilot). When we use the word “cyberspace” we are trying to describe a living world, similar to our own, in another dimension, where entities born and die, links are created, various languages exist, together with laws, regulations and standards. It is safe to describe cyber-space as a universe in another dimension. In this “world” we have terminal devices, like users PCs and smartphones, links, like the internet or the local area networks (LANs), protocols, like the TCP or UDP, rules and ethics and many others. This world was created with a sole purpose; to support the lifecycle of every bit of information that is needed for our world to survive and thrive. Unfortunately, every bright world has its dark side…

2

A cyborg – cybernetic organism – is a living being which is enhanced with the addition of technological parts. It should not be confused with terms like android or robots which have only technological parts. Terminator was a form of cyborg.

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2.4. The Non-Legitimate Users In the beginning, there were the hackers, highly trained and skilled computer experts that used their knowledge to overcome computer and IT problems. In the early days of computing, things were far more complicated than today. Actually, in the beginning, anyone, who could play games in his/her computer was kind of a hacker since you needed a couple of commands in order to strategically assign the available memory and running processes. As technology evolved, new players came along, like “script kiddies”, “crackers”, etc. Some hackers realized that it is far more profitable to exploit a vulnerability or misconfiguration than to fix it. Today the term “hacker” refers – mainly – to IT security. A hacker is someone that can penetrate into a system by exploiting vulnerabilities, misconfigurations or programming code errors. There are two main factors that drive someone to be a hacker (or more accurately a “black hat”3 hacker); money/power or ideas. In that view we can distinguish the following categories:    

Espionage Industrial Espionage Government employees and actions Hacktivists

While we can expand motivations behind those key players, the following two summarize everything:  

Money Power

Needless to say that in the era of information the holder of valid and prompt information could rule the world. A King once said that the only thing he requires is information. Furthermore, we should never forget that money leads to power. Finally, when we deal with Cybersecurity as a whole, we should always remember that EVERYONE IS A TARGET. Of course, we can categorize the attacking vectors against many targets, like industrial, political, financial, military, power grid, etc. We should always remember that even the “smallest” user could be targeted and through that tiny fragment of cyberspace, access to a much larger network could be achieved4. 3

In order to distinct non-legitimate hackers than legitimate ones, the terms black, white and grey hat were introduced. Legend says that hat colors come from “spaggeti” westerns, were the good guys always wear white hats while the bandits black ones. The main difference between the two groups is that the “white hats” or “ethical” hackers have the explicit and written consent of the owner of an IT system when they are performing penetration testing actions. 4 As an example we redirect you to the STUXNET worm and how it managed to enter IRAN’s nuclear program and virtually cripple it.

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2.5. Cyber Security and Military Operations 2.5.1. General One of the areas that solely depend on the information lifecycle is the Military. Since the dawn of military operations, military leaders would seek to reveal information about the terrain, the enemy (his strengths and weaknesses, his morale, his supply lines), the weather, people, etc. while at the same time keep the same information regarding their own troops hidden from the opponent. Many military theorists like Thoukididis, Sun Tzu or Clausewitz tried to implement measures and tactics that could provide necessary skills in order to achieve both requirements. It is in our belief that Clausewitz5 described very eloquently the uncertainty surrounding the information about the enemy as the “fog of war”. The first attempt to solve this problem was the creation of ARPANET (Advanced Research Projects Agency Network), a partially military funded, early attempt to implement a “new” technology – “packet switching”. ARPANET connected various universities and institutions in the whole US and was a breakthrough in communication systems of the time. ARPANET is the “grandfather” of the INTERNET which was born in the 1980s and at the moment incorporates a vast number of technologies and science. The INTERNET together with the World Wide Web (WWW)6, was proposed and created by Sir Timothy Berners-Lee7, dominate our everyday life (…and military operations). 2.5.2. Military Affairs and IT Systems8 While ARPANET was created, at least partially, to answer to data communication issues regarding military command and control networks, soon it escaped the limited military space and grow out of military control. In that view, the military is forced to use an IT infrastructure, which is not tailor-made for military operations. If we would like to describe the characteristics of the current and near-future battlefields, we could come to the conclusion that battlefields are more chaotic and nonlinear than ever before. These characteristics made the necessity of INFORMATION more crucial and critical than ever.

Carl Von Clausewitz, [* 1 June 1780 – † 16 November 1831]. Military Officer and theorist. Best known for his book Vom Kriege (On War). 6 It is a common mistake to mix the terms INTERNET and WWW. INTERNET is a number of interconnected devices, while the WWW are the services which run inside (or on top) of the INTERNET. Think of the INTERNET as the hardware and the WWW are the software of a computer system. 7 Sir Timothy John “Tim” Berners-Lee (OM, KBE, FRS, FREng, FRSA, DFBCS) (Born8 June 1955) is an English computer scientist. He is considered as the inventor of the World Wide Web as he managed to successfully communicate between a client computer and a server which were connected over the Internet using Hypertext Transfer Protocol, the well-known now HTTP. 8 For more information, please refer to “Cyber Warfare – Affecting Land, Sea, Air and Space Operations”, by Sozon A. LEVENTOPOULOS and Nikolaos BENIAS (http:// www.scienpress.com/ journal_focus.asp? main_id=58&Sub_id=IV&Issue=186959). 5

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Today military affairs should incorporate 2 more dimensions, the 4th (SPACE) and the 5th (The Cyberspace) with the centre of gravity leaning towards Cyberspace. An army that can dominate in cyber operations will have a great advantage, even if the enemy dominates in all other 4 dimensions. But today, technology is still trying to answer that problem, with limited success. Now we “GATHER” every possible bit of information, which makes the other steps of the life-cycle of information (PROCESS  EVALUATE  DISTRIBUTE) virtually impossible. Military radio and land-line networks are struggling to compete with the increased bandwidth demands, together with the need for Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability. Big data processing is still taking the first steps and Artificial Intelligence needs many more advances in order to compete with 2 well-trained eyes and a sharp mind.

2.6. Protection Measures Unfortunately, the above-mentioned quote is the bitter truth and UNIVERSAL law about IT security. It is virtually impossible to have a completely secure system, because: An IT system should promote and support business/organization functions When implementing security you should always balance it with FUNCTIONALITY

Every cyber security expert in the world should abide with the above major prerequisites. Every expert would like to have user account password of 24 characters long, with upper case and lower case letter, numbers and special characters, but if you will try to implement something like that and be still alive the next day, you will find yourself constantly unlocking locked accounts. The main reason behind that is that the end users do not know how to operate a computer system, whether it is a computer, an application or a smartphone. This is why Windows® was so successful against Linux/Unix; it is less complex. Today security experts have a vast amount of tools, baselines, guidelines, etc. to perform their duties. An extensive number of IT security certifications are present and universities are already providing Master Degrees in the field of IT Security. But we still fail.

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2.7. Attack Vectors One reason why IT security still fails (and sometimes fails big9!) is that the attacking vectors against any given computer system have increased exponentially. In the early days of computing, the majority of computers were not connected and were simple machines. Early viruses were rather harmful (like the one that opened the CD bay) and could not easily propagate. The only attack vector was the Floppy Disk Drive (USBs were science fiction then) and the steps needed to have a truly secure system were limited. Exemptions were present but proving only the general rule. Today things are far more complex. We have billions of devices connected, in an environment called the Internet of Things (IoT)10 and we are moving forward to the Internet of Everything (IoE)11. In order to accomplish this we created a huge number of devices (computers, mainframes, routers, switches, etc.), applications (Windows, MAC OS, UNIX/Linux, etc.) and protocols (TCP, UDP, IP, EPG, HTTP, etc.) that are impossible to master each and any of them. Consequently attacking vectors are virtually everywhere, whilst at the same time, profit and social status made malware more sophisticated and catastrophic. In cyber defence literature, you can find a vast number of definitions regarding the attacking vectors towards an IT system. In any case, every system, due to various reasons (lack knowledge, poor implementations techniques, etc.) has a number (limited or in worst cases extensive) of VULNERABILITIES. While a vulnerability is not harmful by itself, a THREAT can EXPLOIT a vulnerability in order to harm in general a system. The overall rule that combines the above definitions is the following “Risk Threat Analysis Formula”: RISK = THREAT * VULNERABILITY * IMPACT

The way a threat can exploit a vulnerability can be called an “attack vector”. For the needs of the current chapter, we will use 2 major categories regarding attacking vectors, technical and non-technical.

2.7.1. Technical With the term technical, we mean every method that requires a “machine” in order to be executed. In the technical environment we include:

9

While writing the current chapter the KRACK vulnerability was published, which affects every wireless device on the planet. It is not a cracking method, but a flaw in the implementation and design of WPA2 and was there for decades. For more information visit https://www.krackattacks.com/. 10 http://www.scienpress.com/journal_focus.asp?main_id=58&Sub_id=IV&Issue=186959. 11 The Internet of Everything (IoE) is a concept that extends the Internet of Things (IoT) emphasis on machine-tomachine (M2M) communications to describe a more complex system that also encompasses people and processes.

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2.7.1.1. Malware It is a modern name for malicious software in general. This category includes any piece of software that was written with the intent of doing harm to or taking control of data, devices or people. Malware includes:      

Virus: A computer virus mimics the behaviour of the biological one, by attaching and infecting clean files, damaging whatever they are programmed to do. Trojan: Disguised as legitimate software, it acts in discrete creating backdoors used by other malware. Spyware: Hidden as a background process, it spies on everything a user does on the infected computer. Worm: Infects entire networks of devices, no matter how big they are. Ransomware: Encrypts all files in a computer and prevents the user from accessing them, unless a ransom is paid to its owner. Adware: Advertising software that intelligently determines what a user is looking for online. It is dangerous because it can give a lot of other malware a way in.

2.7.1.2. Denial of Service In this category, we have the process of denying the use of a service or a system. There are two major examples, the simple Denial of Service (DoS) which can be seen as a oneto-one battle and the Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) which can, in turn, be seen as many-to-one. In order these attacks be successful they need a Botnet or a network of infected computers (zombies) that are made to work together under the control of an attacker (usually a Command and Control Entity). In the Denial of Service, we can also include attacks like Smurf, Ping of Death and many more, which have the potential to break down a system. 2.7.1.3. Databases In order to be able to provide functionality in a number of services (like e-commerce, e-banking, taxes, etc.) you need to implement a vast number of databases. These include, but not limited, SQL, Oracle and many more. One of the easiest ways to find a password is to “attack” a poorly protected database of an e-commerce site. Chances are that the user will be using the same password in a number of sites or systems. 2.7.1.4. Emails One of the easiest and more prominent attacking vectors is email. Using emails, attackers can launch a number of attacks, like phishing (when they are trying to “fish”

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their victims into actions otherwise not intended, like disclosure of private information, etc.) or installing harmful programs (aka malware) and more “dangerous” like Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF) and more.

2.7.1.5. Networks Again one of the major attacking vectors. Because the internet was built with the wrong assumption that we live in a “perfect” world, little or no consideration was made regarding security. In that view, basic networking protocols lack any form of security and rely on additional protocols (like SSL – Secure Socket Layer) to provide them with the necessary security posture. Like any other aspect in the ICT universe there is a number of ways that can be implemented in order to overcome these security features, like VPN hopping, ARP spoofing and many more.

2.7.2. Non-Technical In this category, we shall incorporate every attack vector that is “launch” by a human. While every attack is launched by humans (at least for now!), the technical attacks require a “machine” in order to be successful. The non-technical ones are simple, like talking to a person. It is important to note, that while the “non-technical” ones are less impressive (there are no super-computers, onion routers, programming skills involved, etc.) at the same time are far more harmful and difficult to confront because they deal with human nature itself.

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2.7.2.1. Social Engineering The vector with the most impact on the history of IT security. The exact definition by CNSS12 is “An attempt to trick someone into revealing information (e.g., a password) that can be used to attack systems or networks.” Social engineering is an attack vector that relies heavily on human interaction and often involves tricking people into breaking normal security procedures. In the context of information security, social engineering refers to the psychological manipulation of people, rather than machines, into performing actions or divulging confidential information, by taking advantage of predictable human responses to psychological “triggers”. It is worth to mention here Kevin Mitnick13, an excellent social engineer. 2.7.2.2. Insiders and Disgruntled Employees Together with social engineering, it is the most dangerous vector. While with social engineering you can have a form of education in order to confront these attacks, the insider and disgruntled employee threat is almost impossible to confront. Certain measures should be taken prior employment (like screening), during employment (rotation of duties, mandatory vacations, need-to-know basis, data leak preventions, etc.) and post-employment (certain termination procedure, the immediate lockout of accounts, etc.). If something in the employment life-cycle is done wrongly then the organisation is in jeopardy. 2.7.2.3. Social Media While social media cannot directly pose a threat to an organisation, at the same time they are a great, free and uncensored source of information regarding organisations worldwide. Social media are a feature of the “era of information”. The social media’s success and global permeation exceed the scope of the current chapter. Nevertheless, people in social media give the information willingly that in any other case would be reluctant to do. Thus social media had made the life of a penetration tester or social engineer a bit easier. 2.7.2.4. Other In this category we shall put all the rest of the non-technical vectors, like dumpster diving (yes, you should actually dive and dig someone else’s garbage), piggy packing, shoulder surfing and more.

12

Committee on National Security Systems. More is available at https://www.ncsc.gov/nittf/docs/CNSSI4009_National_Information_Assurance.pdf. 13 Kevin David Mitnick (* 6 August 1963). He is an American computer security consultant and author but he is also known as one of the best hackers of all times. He is well known for his excellent implementation of social engineering tactics and methods rather than his computer programming skills.

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2.7.3. The Power Grid Our civilization is heavily depended on electricity. For those of you participating in the “Earth’s Hour” the lack of electricity, even the pretended one, is not an unknown term. For the rest, we are challenging you to try living for 60 minutes without electricity, preferably in the afternoon and, of course, without internet (remember your router/modem need electricity in order to work!). In order to achieve the uninterrupted and flawless flow of electricity, a vast amount of devices and services should work together. The slightest interruption in that chain could lead to severe damage, loss of profit and even loss of life. We have to note here that in order to attack the “Power Grid” you need to implement one or, usually, more attacking vectors described above. We include the “Power Grid” here due to the impact that an interruption could have on our everyday survival, even life. 2.7.4. The Global Economic System Together with the Power Grid, the Global Economic System is the framework of today’s life. The “Global Economic System” is the major pillar and instrument of “capitalism14”. Even countries that do not follow the capitalistic system or ideology are (forced to) participating in a way or the other into this system. We use here the term “system” because any action in any given part affects the system as a whole. One has only to remember the “subprime mortgage crisis”, which started in the U.S. in December 2007, but triggered a global recession, with the after socks remaining until today (almost 10 years later). The “Global Economic System” comprises banking and funding institutes, stock exchanges and more. It is considered one of the most secure systems worldwide, even if certain breaches have occurred15. We have to state here that a combined attack against both the “Power Grid” and the “Global Economic System” could have the same impact as of a full-scale nuclear war! 2.7.5. Future Challenges Today humanity is moving forward to a future described mainly by science fiction and to a universal implementation of IoT. Today we have smartphones, and smart appliances controlled over Wi-Fi and the Internet, soon we will have smart homes, or human implanted chips and much more that today are only fantasy. In the future, attacking vectors and their impact would be heavily increased and thus stretching the ability of security infrastructure to confront these attacks. Imagine a “smart home” where an owner uses a poor password or Wi-Fi controlled appliances with the same vulnerability. The risk then would be, not only poor downloading speeds but the possibility of catastrophic failures (like switching on the oven when owners are on holiday….). 14

Capitalism: An economic system in which means of production are privately owned and their sole purpose is the creation of profit. As a term (and an ideology) dates back to 12 th century A.D. 15 While breaches in bank transactions, credit card databases have and will continue to occur, there is no – at least publicly known – attack regarding the infrastructure, like the stock exchange or the money transferring system.

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2.8. Lack of Punishment One fundamental truth regarding cybersecurity is “lack of punishment”. This is caused due to many reasons and factors. Namely, the fact that there is a thin line between state driven attacks and attacks by other entities leads to poor or no legal consequences and actions. Additionally, the primary concern of organizations facing attacks is to have the system back online and operational as soon as possible which in turn destroys every fragment of evidence that could remain in the system, together with the absence of certain procedures and guidelines for forensic investigation. It is indicative that in 2014, of all 56.218 federal criminal cases filed in the U.S, only 194 of them (just the 0,34%) was related to computer fraud.

2.9. Lack of Knowledge So, why we are still failing? One reason could be the complexity of modern IT networks and the absence of a focal point where various services (with the broad term of the word) could be merged, in order to have simpler systems (remember Simplicity equals Security). The other dominant reason is “Lack of Knowledge”. A well-known aphorism is expressed by Hanlon’s Razor16, which, in general, dictates that NEVER ATTRIBUTE TO MALICE WHICH IS ADEQUATELY EXPLAINED BY STUPIDITY In a recent speech at “Decentralized Web Summit” Tim Berners-Lee [among others Sir Tim Berners-Lee is the founder and director of World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) – a forum for the technical development of the Web to serve humanity and co-founded the Open Data Institute in London. He is a long-time defender of rights such as privacy, freedom, Net Neutrality and the openness of the Web] expressed his concern about how the WWW has evolved and pinpointed the heart of the problem: “It’s been great, but spying, blocking sites, repurposing people’s content, taking you to the wrong websites — that completely undermines the spirit of helping people create... We don’t have a technology problem, we have a social problem.”

So, the lack of knowledge that people in general have, is responsible for most IT security violations. Successful attacks do not require great skills or sophisticated tools since the biggest security threat and vulnerability are PEOPLE. 16

The term, in that form was first published in 1990 at the Jargon File, which is a glossary of computer programmer slag which later transformed to “The Hacker’s Dictionary”.

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3. CYBER WARFARE 3.1. Cyber Warfare – An Introduction The Cyberwarfare as a term is relatively new. It is used to demonstrate the full spectrum of operations that are performed within the cyberspace. Like in legacy military operations, we have both offensive and defensive operations together with supportive ones. In general, there are extensive similarities regarding cyber and classical military operations, with the only difference that there are until now known casualties inflicted during cyber warfare operations. Furthermore, we have not seen, until today, cyber operations running in full spectrum and capacity. The reason for the latter is that the implications of such attacks could be devastating for both the defender and the attacker.

3.2. Hybrid War Again a relatively new term, which is used when both classical military and cyber operations are conducted in close combination with overlapping goals and objectives. Here we would like to open a parenthesis and comment regarding the dispute between cyberwarfare and electronic warfare. While there are views stating that cyber warfare should be part of the electronic warfare (with a broader meaning), it is in our view that cyber warfare should be examined as a separate domain due to the extensive influence in military operations.

3.3. Case Study: Estonia In early 2007, the Estonian government decided to relocate a former Soviet monument regarding World War II, which was positioned in the Estonian capital city of Tallinn. This dispute triggered, on 27 April 2007, an extensive attack targeting various Estonian organizations. It is important to say that Estonia, at that time, was one of the few countries with extensive e-government infrastructure. These attacks, which were mostly DDoS and spam distribution mails using global botnets, managed to cripple the governmental operations which largely affected the everyday life of Estonian people and governmental operations. The extent of the attack made clear that attacks of such scale could only be state-sponsored or supported by a large telecom company. While the Estonian government launched a thorough investigation it soon became clear that many legal implications may arise during the investigation and the following prosecution phases. This attack rang the

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bell in military organizations around the world regarding the importance of network and other infrastructure security and availability.

3.4. Case Study: Georgia17 While the Georgia-Russian war of 2008 could be seen as a small-scale peripheral war, it poses a significant role in military history, since it appears to be the first case in the history of a coordinated cyberspace attack synchronized with major military operations. It was the first time that a nation (Russia) invaded another (Georgia) in all five spaces, Land, Sea, Air, Space and Cyber. Attacks began 3 weeks prior to military operations. During the major attack of the Russian army, many websites in Georgia related to communications, finance and government were attacked, making Georgian citizens unable to access websites for information or instructions. Georgian government was selected as the centre of gravity for the ongoing operations. Except attacking and disabling various networks and websites, the attacks also included website defacement for Russian propaganda purposes. Another important consideration is that there were no attacks against critical infrastructure (power stations, oil refineries, etc.) that could create chaos, but attacks were limited to those that could trigger a form of “inconvenience”. The preferred method of attack was DDoS, which is relatively easy to launch (especially when you are backed up by one or more ISPs) and could primary result in loss of AVAILABILITY. One other key event was that the local Georgian “hacking” community was also attacked and disabled. As a consequence, the “health” of the local “hacking” community can be used in the future as a significant metric when assessing the possibility of a large cyber-attack.

3.5. What If… (Worst Case Scenario) It is clear that in both cases the cyber-attacks were used mainly to disturb and not to destroy. Attacks were limited in DDoS and – mainly – against government institutions. Some instances affecting ATM transactions could not be categorized as attacks against the global financial system, because no transaction or account information was lost or altered. One thing that should be made clear is that these attacks were simply a “proof of concept” and if decided could have far more devastating results. If an attacker decides to attack both the financial institutions and critical infrastructures (like the power grid, which is largely

17

In view of forces engaged the Georgia – Russia war of 2008 falls into the category of a peripheral conflict. However, if seen from a more broader perspective then its importance increases because is the first war were Russia set boundaries to NATO expansion, into what she considers are her “area of interest”. In that view this war created a new geopolitical balance and was the prelude of the Crimea offensive.

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based on SCADA for its operation) then the results will not vary largely than that of a nuclear attack.

4. EXCLUDING THE HUMAN FACTOR 4.1. General So, once more we have to wonder why we are still failing when we have clear evidence of the devastating results of cyber warfare. Technology can be used as a control, but not in isolation. A successful defence will require resources to be channelled into education and cultural change to produce an effective information security architecture with policies and standards, personnel education and vulnerability assessment processes. In 2014, Symantec stated that the “anti-virus” software is – actually – dead. Defence-in-depth and layered security is “sin non qua” regarding today’s security principles. The common factor and universal truth are that HUMAN factor is the root of all problems. There is no effective way to protect against a social engineering attack because no matter what controls are implemented, there is always that human factor which influences the behaviour of an individual.

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4.2. Training The main effort in creating a secure environment is training. Today, computers and smartphones created a false impression of knowledge regarding computer systems. The truth is that the vast majority of users exploits around the 10% of the abilities and capabilities of computers and smartphones. Users today use their computers like an enchased typewriter or as a way to access the social media and pretty much they are performing the same actions when they use their smartphones (which are in turn used as a lightweight camera). As result security principles and best practices are not even understood by the majority of the end users. So, our first proposal is Training, which can be furthered categorized as following:   

Security Awareness Training Computer Training Certification

4.2.1. Security Awareness Training It is the initial step of the overall training principle and the easiest to accomplish. The major scope is to provide every person in the organization with basic training, regarding security and how to follow organizational principles and guidelines. Security Awareness is a simple on-going procedure; it should never stop or be underestimated. Every person in the organization must be given basic security awareness training on a timely basis, including that he/she should never give out any information without the appropriate authorization and that he/she should report any suspicious behaviour. The major objective of security awareness training is not to provide knowledge regarding security but to provide the basic background to recognize when security issues arise and what actions should be followed. The basic metric in order to determine if security awareness training is successful is the rise of security issues reported in the help centre. Periodic security awareness training programs should be conducted, following certain guidelines, like providing staff with clear boundaries, engender a sense of the importance of information, a no-blame culture18, certain procedures to be followed when an incident is taking place (like reporting sheets, checklists, escalation routes, etc.). It is recommended to commit annual assessments as part of annual security awareness training for entire staff. Training that is tied directly to the employee’s role and that involves scenarios is the most effective one.

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It should be made clear that the main scope of incident handling is not to blame (when there is no criminal action involved) so certain actions and measures be implemented in the future, in order to assure that same incidents will not reoccur.

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4.2.2. Computer Training The second step in the process of training should be extensive computer training regarding IT systems. This training should not be limited in how to operate a given application or system but how to operate it securely. Special considerations should be followed regarding security best practices and procedures, like password rules19, escalation procedures. Computer training should include: 4.2.2.1. Security Culture Starting with the weak link, people should have a security-oriented culture cultivated regarding computer use. This is not limited to work environment, but must also be covered in personal life. There is a certain amount of information that should not be disclosed in any case, like, personal information or information about an organization, information regarding the structure of an organization or its network infrastructure, etc. It should be made clear that EVERY BIT OF INFORMATION IS VITAL. While someone may think that disclosing the version of the internet browser is harmless, it still could lead to severe security breach i.e., if the browser version cannot support strong encryption that creates a vulnerability and an attack vector. Good patching policies (the motto “patch, patch, patch” it is not so accurate and patching before implemented into the production environment could create more problems than solutions, so always test patches in a secure lab), installation of antimalware software (not just anti-virus programs) with the malware database always current and updated, etc. are good security practices. The ultimate test for an individual is not to be afraid asking for proof of identity or cross-verify when he/she is about to disclose sensitive information to 3-rd party or entity when he/she is uncertain regarding the validity of the claim. 4.2.2.2. Accounts and Passwords A solid computer training should also lead to a swift in behaviour regarding accounts and passwords. Most websites and social media platforms (like Facebook or Google) offer a vast amount of controls regarding privacy and monitoring. A security driven individual would spend the required time to review and tailor these settings. Additionally, certain actions, like changing the default settings or Users in various platforms and services give a hint regarding a sound security driven training. How many have actually changed the default Wi-Fi password in their home router? How many have actually changed the Admin password in that router? Last, but not least, the use of well-structured passwords or passphrases20 is only the first step, in a long process of securing IT environments. While good password/passphrase policies have been already published, here we have to state two

19 20

It should be stated that as of today (December 2017) the “rainbow tables” have reached 10 digit password databases. There is an ongoing dispute among security specialists about what method – passwords or passphrases – is best. Our opinion, none. Both have advantages and disadvantages and for both some universal rules apply, so feel free to choose what suite you best.

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critical factors. The first one is that any password less than 10-digits long will be “broken” within seconds and second, any password will eventually break, so leaving it unchanged for more than 3 months or use it as a pass-par-tout for every account is NOT GOOD PRACTICES. Finally, from time to time Google your name…you don’t know what you might discover. 4.2.2.3. Emails Today, almost everyone uses emails for simple or more complex reasons. Emails, as mentioned earlier, is one of the most dangerous attacking vectors. The recent ransomware21 outbreaks were distributed globally within minutes due to emails. Every day we encounter a huge number of scam and phishing emails on daily basis, which tries to “lure” users into traps in order to gain unauthorized access to systems or gather critical personal and mostly financial information. The easiest way to attract people’s attention is to lure them to money. Somewhere, someone has left a multi-million legacy and they need “YOU”, in order to take that money. Of course, you will be awarded hundreds of dollars for your efforts, but firstly you should check all of you banking details together with a photocopy of your ID or passport. Next thing you realize is that your account’s balance is zero. The astonishing thing regarding this attack is not its simplicity or obviousness but the number of victims. While there is a vast number of features (like anti-phishing, anti-spam, content filters and many more), the best way to confront such an attack is training, because features tend to fail. So a good computer training should lead to:  





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Always be aware that you might be a target. Even if you receive a mail from a trusted contact, which is not expected, then you should start wondering. We never open, execute or download email attachments if we are not certain about the purpose of the email and the sender, alongside with the reason of the communication. Pay attention to the wording. No business entity and especially a bank will start a conversation with “My Dear” or something similar. Also, if you notice misspelt words or syntax errors this is a hint that “mechanical” translation was used. Pay attention to the e-mail address. Most companies and organizations have their own domain name, so [email protected] is not the same as [email protected].

One of the ransomware cases in 2017, which also drew public attention, was the WannaCry cryptoworm, which in May 2017, targeted Windows OSs (and exploited a flow around MS’ SMB protocol) around the world. While the reported number of globally infected system is rather small (230.000 computers) the speed that the worm propagated is of high concern. Another disturbing issue is that the worm affected a number of organizations, like Health institutes, banks, law enforcement agencies, ISPs that should have preventive measures in place. Soon after the NotPetya followed which infected thousands of computer systems in more than 100 countries and caused major financial damages.

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

 

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Poor arrangement of the page. Pay attention to the arrangement of text and images in the body of the email. Most attackers would use tools to create “legitimate like” pages or emails in order to provide assurance, but in most of the cases, the arrangement or the quality of the seals and logos will be altered. Do not respond to emails with words like URGENT in their title. Social engineers and non-legitimate users want you to act first and think later. Always remember that when something is truly URGENT, the preferred method is the phone and not email. Do your search. Google can provide with valuable information regarding hoax or malicious emails. Finally, if still in doubt, use “best judgment”. It is better to delete an email that to compromise your system.

4.2.2.4. URLs A good computer training should provide sound knowledge about paying attention to the URL of a website. The best practice is to always type the URL yourself. If you find this frustrating, then you should follow this rule at least for important websites, like your ebanking or email websites. Always pay attention to URL links in emails or when redirected from other sites; they could be compromised. It is actually very simple to deface a web page. Some alert hints include, but not limited to, the following: 



 

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No encryption in the page. Today most of the legitimate web pages use a form of encryption and/or certificate. This can be proven in more than one ways. One is to check for https:// instead of http://. Other is to check the green lock symbol; this means that the certification22 was issued by a trusted authority and has not been revoked. Check the top level domain, that’s the .com, .gov, etc. If you see a web page from a government organization with “.tv” instead of “.gov” or “.gov.com”, then you should not trust the web page. Stay in control by finding the website yourself using a search engine rather than a link. In that way, you are certain that you will land where intended. Use advanced features. Today many popular services allow seeing either a preview of the destination or a statistic page with the number of hits so far. For example, if you are using Bit.ly or received an URL with the Bit.ly format, you

Actually what we are describing here is the Public Key Infrastructure or PKI. Roughly PKI has a Certification Authority or CA, one or more Registration Authorities (RAs) and CRLs or Certification Revocation Lists. For more information please visit: https://www.giac.org/paper/gsec/2171/idiots-guide-public-key-infrastructure/ 103692.

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Nikolaos Benias and Sozon A. Leventopoulos can append the plus sign [+] at the end, which will guide you to open a preview page rather than the targeted one.

4.2.3. Certifications Today’s later can provide basic and profound knowledge about computers and IT systems networks and systems are very complex and specialized. In order to adequately support and manage these systems, IT specialist should not rely on past experience or some university degree. But, this does little to teach about security concepts or practices. It’s been a couple of years when major institutions around the globe started providing Master’s Degrees regarding cybersecurity. Still, most of them, rely on the concept of various certifications. Today a growing number, of cyber-security related, institutions, like SANS, EC-Council, CISCO, CompTIA and much more, provide a vast number of certifications, which append in turn, in various levels of learning. For example, the CompTIA Network+ is considered an entry-level certification, while CompTIA ASP or (ISC)2 CISSP are Mastery level ones. Bottom line is that personnel and IT professionals who deal with IT security and cyber-security related issues should be obligated to have some form of valid Certification. Every organization should tailor the certification that it needs to the cybersecurity issues that are going to face.

4.3. Documentation One of the biggest mistakes that organizations keep doing is the lack of proper documentation. There is a number of documents that an organization should publish, from security policies and password policies to incident response guidelines, change management procedures and many more. These documents should reflect the actual goal of the organization, should be tailored to meet the organizations goals and objectives (a simple copy – paste here should not suffice), should be clear, tested, reviewed and constantly updated. These documentations could provide a framework of what is allowed and what is not, what it is expected from the employees, what to do in any given case or in case of a disaster. The amount of documentation is actually large but, fortunately, a number of institutes around the globe, like the csrc.nist.gov site, can provide an excellent starting point. Here we should state that this documentation by itself is not enough. It is not even a good practice by itself, because, like in real life you cannot predict everything, and even if you do, then the result would be a 10 books regulations and guidelines that no one is going to read or implement. Documentation is good with adequate training and security awareness, which can provide the link between what is written and what the action should be. Furthermore, documentation provides the framework in which you can react in case of an event. How well a person will react – well, training.

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4.4. Creation of Tailored Made Operating System and Applications/Programs Solely for Military Use As we have mentioned earlier, technology is rapidly evolving. This process is basically driven by consumer needs and it is not tailored made for military use. Most military systems rely on a form of Windows or Solaris Operating Systems. While these systems are adequate for commercial and business use, they are far from military needs. Many services and processes required in the “outside” world could provide attacking vectors and unnecessary vulnerabilities to military systems. The relevant technology will be stressed in the near future, where information from every possible and impossible mean should go through the life-cycle mentioned in par. 1. Today a Northrop Grumman RQ-4A Global Hawk creates a 264 MBs of intel per single orbit. Imagine when a swarm of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles should fly and fight in a stretched environment. Security considerations and requirements are not yet fully addressed, which result in certain incidents23. So we should start a discussion if we need tailored made operating systems and or applications. The major concern here is the cost. Definitely, but what is the cost for a single human life loss? During the process of risk analysis, life-related threats take an infinitive value, so why not in this case.

4.5. Tailored Made Hardware Today we create ruggedized systems that are dust-proof, water-proof or splash-proof. No one speaks about cyber-proof…or almost no one. In April 2017 U.S. DARPA24 launched a programme aimed to provide cyber defence capabilities in current and feature programs. The program was aimed at the systems level and was tested in various platforms (including the UVTOL Little Bird). This program should largely expand and work together with the creators of OSs and applications. The key factors addressed should include:    

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The condition of military data networks. How certain we are that are not already compromised? How well our infrastructures can tolerate an attack? Are we prepared enough? TIME is of the ESSENCE!!! The main difference, besides ethics, between a hacker and a defender, is time. Hacker has all the time he needs. He could wait and slowly target small portions of our infrastructure until he finds a weak spot. He then can

Some argue that the RQ-170 STEALTH UAV that crashed in Iran was actually hacked. US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency.

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4.6. Endorsement by the Military of Best Practices from Civilian Experience Heraclitus said that “War is the father of everything” and no one has proven he was wrong. War and the threat of war have provided innovative ideas to humanity, which adapted them to civilian needs and most of the times, improved them for the greater good. Moreover, the military is documenting everything in extreme detail, in order to cover all contingencies that may occur. In cyber-warfare, however, civilian experience is much more mature and documented. Cyber-security plays a significant role in modern humanity. All economic transactions rely solely on it. One example for this is PCI DSS (Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard) that keeps our credit card transactions safe. In order to achieve that, many people have worked on procedures that need to be followed, which have led to international standards (ISOs). Inevitably, it is the military’s turn to endorse best practices from civilian experience and try to keep up with current trends in cyber-security.

5. EPILOGUE As Kevin Mitnick mentions: Technology is not a panacea, “You could spend a fortune purchasing technology and services, you can have the best firewalls, encryption tools and such in place, but they will neither detect nor protect you from a social engineering attack because your network infrastructure could still remain vulnerable to old-fashioned manipulation.”

With the present chapter, we aim to scratch the surface of cyber-warfare and the implications that it can create. Our presentation is based mostly on military operations since commercial infrastructure has already taken steps regarding cybersecurity. We demonstrate that technology is not the answer to every problem and a well-trained employee could prove far more effective than most of our technical controls in place. It is certain that for today and the foursome feature Internet and cyberspace would take over more and more of our everyday life. Challenges regarding security have just started to emerge and we are certain that we are going to be dealing with them more and more in the future. After all, HUMANs will always remain the weakest link in the chain of security.

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REFERENCES [1] [2] [3]

[4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20]

Carl Von, Clausewitz. “Vom Kriege” (On War). Everyman’s Library, Published by Alfred A. Knopf. Sun, Tzu. “The Art of War” (Greek Edition, Publish by MINOAS Publications). Luke, Harding. “The Snowden Files (The Inside Story of the World’s Most Wanted Man), First Published in 2014 by Guardian Books and Faber & Faber Ltd (copyright “The Guardian”). “War in the fifth domain. Are the mouse and keyboard the new weapons of conflict?” (The Economist, 01 July 2010). Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CBSA), The Maturing Revolution in Military Affairs (by Barry D. Watts), 2011. Markoff, John. “Before the Gunfire, Cyberattacks”. The New York Times (published 12 Aug 2008). Wentworth, Travis. “How Russia May Have Attacked Georgia’s Internet” (Newsweek, published 23 Aug 2008). Kathryn, Kerr. “Putting Cyberterrorism into Context”. Glossary of Information Warfare Terms (www.psycom.net/war.2.html). Rex, B. Hughes. “NATO and Cyber Defence, Mission Accomplished?” (Ar:2009nr1/4). Höller, J; Tsiatsis, V; Mulligan, C; Karnouskos, S; Avesand, S; Boyle, D. “From Machine-to-Machine to the: Introduction to a New Age of Intelligence. Commission of the European Communities (18 June 2009). “Internet of Things — An action plan for Europe”. Stephen, J. Blank. (Preparing for the Next War: Reflections on the Revolution in Military Affairs, Chapters 3 and 4). Tim Berners-Lee and the Development of the World Wide Web (Unlocking the Secrets of Science), Ann Gaines (Mitchell Lane Publishers, 2001). “National Cyber Security Framework Manual”, Edited by Alexander Klimburg, NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence. Kevin, Mitnick; Simon, William L. “The Art of Deception: Controlling the Human Element of Security” (Wiley Books). Kaspersky Lab Report: Financial cyber threats in 2013. Kimberly, Tam; Salahuddin, J. Khan; Aristide, Fattoriy; Lorenzo, Cavallaro. “CopperDroid: Automatic Reconstruction of Android Malware Behaviors”. Yajin, Zhou; Xuxian, Jiang. “Dissecting Android Malware: Characterization and Evolution”. The Economic Impact of Cybercrime and Cyber Espionage, Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 2013.

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[21] Lillian, Ablon; Martin, C. Libicki; Andrea, A. Golay. “Markets for Cybercrime Tools and Stolen Data. [22] Hackers’ Bazaar (RAND publications). [23] NIST Special Publication 800-12. “An Introduction to Computer Security: The NIST Handbook” (Barbara Guttman and Edward A. Roback). [24] The New Hacker’s Dictionary (aka The Jargon File) by Eric S. Raymond.

In: Cyber-Security and Information Warfare Editor: Nicholas J. Daras

ISBN: 978-1-53614-385-0 c 2019 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

Chapter 5

R-T C I P F A A P T Konstantinos Demertzis∗ and Lazaros Iliadis† Democritus University of Thrace, School of Engineering, Department of Civil Engineering, Faculty of Mathematics, Programming and General Subjects, Kimmeria, Xanthi, Greece

Abstract An Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) is a set of stealthy and continuous computer hacking processes in which an unauthorized person gains access to a network and stays there undetected for a long period of time. The “advanced” process signifies sophisticated techniques using zero-days malware to exploit vulnerabilities in systems. The “persistent” process suggests that an external command and control system is continuously monitoring and extracting data from a specific target. The “threat” process indicates human involvement in orchestrating the attack. APT attacks target organizations in sectors with high-value information, such as military networks, national defense, manufacturing and the financial industry. Traditional digital security mechanisms face such vulnerabilities in a conventional manner, they create often false alarms and they fail to forecast them. As APT activities are stealthy because they use Tor anonymity network, the command and control network traffic associated with APT can be undetected at the network layer level. Deep log analyses and log correlation from various sources cannot be useful in detecting APT activities and network agents are not able to collect logs TCP (Transfer Control Protocol) and UDP (User Datagram Protocol) directly from assets into a syslog server. This paper proposes an innovative fast and accurate Real-time Computational Intelligence Protection Framework against Advanced Persistent Threats (CIPFaAPT). It is about an automate forensic analysis system that uses Online Sequential Extreme Learning Machines. It can process millions of data points in real-time, establishing, or learning a “normal” baseline, comparing data points to past behavior and identifying anomalous differences in values over time, differences in rates over time and population outliers. Using computational intelligence and machine learning algorithms, all user transactions, server processes, ∗ †

E-mail address: [email protected]. E-mail address: [email protected].

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Konstantinos Demertzis and Lazaros Iliadis internet traffic, alerts caused by the IPS (Intrusion Prevention Systems) and traffic flow can all be analyzed for unusual activities. The CIPFaAPT is a next generation security platform that uses sophisticated analytics to monitor, track and classify risk across critical network infrastructures in order to identify APT.

Keywords: Advanced Persistent Threats, Tor Anonymity Network, Tor Traffic Analysis, online sequential learning, extreme learning machine

1.

Introduction

1.1.

Advanced Persistent Threats

Cyber-attacks differ regarding their complexity and they are characterized by their persistency and their targets. More specifically, Advanced Persistent Threats (APT) are recently introduced and they can belong to either of the following types [1], [2]: 1. Advanced: The opponent is totally familiarized with the Cyber intrusion methods. He/she is capable to develop personalized tools and it is possible to exploit vulnerabilities which are not known to the public (zero days) in order to achieve adjustability to the needs of every attack. 2. Persistent: The opponent has long term targets, which he/she is trying to achieve without being traced and without considering time limitations. 3. Threats: The opponent is extremely capable, organized, funded and he/she has motivations. During the APT attacks, the Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) are adjustable in order to forecast and overcome the defense systems and security practices of the target [3].

1.2.

APTs vs Traditional Threats

The APTs differ from the traditional cyber-attacks in terms of the following [1], [2], [3], [4]: 1. Customized attacks: Personalized tools and techniques are used for these attacks which are designed to perform optimally for the specific case. These tools include zero-day exploits, stealth virus, worms and rootkits. Additionally, the APTs apply tactics of multiple simultaneous attacks known as “kill chains”, aiming in violating the defensive mechanisms of the targets in order to ensure unlimited access. Their approach occasionally includes the sacrifice of a threat. In this way, the target might falsely believe that the attack has been successfully faced whereas he might be in big trouble. 2. Low and slow: The APT attacks take place and evolve in long periods of time, where the attackers are moving slowly and silently in order to avoid to be traced. The whole process includes application of simultaneous and continuous monitoring combined with targeted interaction till the achievement of their goals.

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3. Higher aspirations: The APTs differ from the opportunistic fast performance attacks, in the sense that they have being designed to satisfy the demands and the targets of international espionage organizations, secret services, states policies, industrial espionage, military or terrorist operations. All of the above usually include covered support by state officials. The groups behind the APTs are well funded by secret capitals. 4. Specific targets: The APT targets are very specific and they usually include critical infrastructure like electrical energy networks, government services, critical installations of national infrastructure like defense industry.

1.3.

How do APT Attacks Work?

The APTs are designed and executed very carefully and they include the following four specific phases: Incursion, Discovery, Capture, and Exfiltration [1], [3], [5]. Various techniques can be employed in each phase as indicated below [1], [2], [5]: 1. Phase 1 Incursion: In the cases of targeted attacks, the cyber criminals are trying to invade the target’s network and to overcome the defensive mechanisms by using social engineering, zero-day vulnerabilities, SQL injection, targeted malware or other methods. In most of the cases the above approaches are used in parallel and combined, aiming in the creation of an initial robust access point, that will be used to initiate long term secret cyber-attacks. 2. Phase 2 Discovery: After the successful intrusion, the intruder is mapping the organization’s systems and automatically scans for confidential data, operational instructions and functional information of the organism. This phase also includes the discovery of network, software or hardware vulnerabilities. This is done carefully, in order to avoid tracing and discovery of the attack. 3. Phase 3 Capture: This phase includes recording of the exposed data which are stored in unprotected systems and they are directly available, whereas rootkits are stored in targeted systems and access points, aiming in the full recording of the organism’s data. 4. Phase 4 Exfiltration: As soon as the targeted systems are captured, the intruders can move to the final actions of their plan, which can be related to the stealing of rights, patents, or other confidential data, the deactivation of weapons or the destruction of control systems.

2. 2.1.

Relevant Malicious Activity APTs Threat Intelligence

Exploring the way in which the ATP attacks are operating requires analysis of the complex attackers’ techniques, understanding their motivations plus intentions and moreover their own characteristics. The following concepts must be explored and understood [1], [2], [3], [4], [5]:

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Konstantinos Demertzis and Lazaros Iliadis 1. Victim’s intelligence: It is related to the recording of action methods and experiences gained by the staff that handled the attack case. 2. Machine intelligence: It refers to the search and analysis of the critical hardware and software points (e.g., Firewall, SysLog Servers, Switch) for the discovery of traces that reveal the types of attacker’s actions. 3. Adversarial intelligence: This term includes the collection of information gathered during the detection of the most recent attacks in the cyber space. It includes the data obtained from the start of the attack, the tools used and the targets of the attacks. More complex attacks like botnets, ransomware, remote access Trojans and zero-day malware, are related to or they are part of the APT attacks.

Searching the most recent methods and techniques used by the cyber criminals is a first priority process towards understanding the way the ATPs are operating [3], [5].

2.2.

Bots & Botnets

Bots [6] are one of the most sophisticated and popular types of cybercrime today. They allow hackers to take control of many computers at a time, and turn them into “zombie” computers, which operate as part of a powerful “botnet” [6]. Botnets employ evolving techniques to obfuscate the specific host involved in their phishing schemes, malware delivery or other criminal enterprises, like money mule recruitment sites, illicit online pharmacies, extreme or illegal adult content sites, malicious browser exploit sites and web traps for distributing virus [6]. One of the biggest challenges for botnet owners is the protection of Command-andControl traffic (C&C). C&C traffic is required to give orders to the “zombies”, the infected computers that are part of the botnets. Generally, up to now, two approaches existed for C&C traffic: Either a central control server is put somewhere on the Internet or Peer-toPeer-networks (P2P) are built up to ensure the chain of commands [6], [7], [8].

2.3.

IP-Flux

IP-Flux [9], [10] refers to the constant changing of IP address information (e.g., 192.168.1.1) related to a particular, fully qualified domain name (e.g., mypc.atl.damballa.com). Botnet operators abuse this ability to change IP address information associated with a host name by linking multiple IP addresses with a specific host name and rapidly changing the linked addresses. These IPs are interchanged too fast, with a very small Time-To-Live (TTL) for each partial DNS Resource Record [11], [12]. In this way, a domain name can change its corresponding IP address very often (e.g., every 3 minutes). This rapid changing aspect is referred to as “Fast-Flux” [9], [10], [11]. Single-flux is characterized by having multiple IP addresses associated with a domain name. These IP addresses are registered and de-registered rapidly – using a combination of round-robin allocation and very short TTL values against a particular DNS Resource Record. DNS A records that change quickly [9], [11]. On the other hand, Double-flux not only fluxes the IP addresses associated with the Fully-Qualified Domain Name (FQDN), but also fluxes the IP addresses of the DNS servers

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(e.g., NS records) that are in turn used to lookup the IP addresses of the FQDN. DNS A and NS records change quickly [9], [10], [11], [12].

2.4.

Blind Proxy Redirection (BPR)

Redirection disrupts attempts to track down and mitigate fast-flux service network nodes [10], [12]. What happens is the large pool of rotating IP addresses are not the final destination of the request for the content (or other network service). Instead, compromised front end systems are merely deployed as redirectors that funnel requests and data to and from other backend servers, which actually serve the content. Essentially the domain names and URLs for advertised content no longer resolve to the IP address of a specific server, but instead fluctuate amongst many front-end redirectors or proxies, which then in turn forward content to another group of backend servers [11].

2.5.

Domain Flux

Domain Flux [9], [10] is effectively the inverse of IP flux and refers to the constant changing and allocation of multiple FQDN’s to a single IP address or C&C infrastructure [11], [12]. Domain Wildcarding abuses native DNS functionality to wildcard (e.g., *) a higher domain such that all FQDN’s point to the same IP address. For example, *.damb.com could encapsulate both mypc.atl.damb.com and server.damb.com. This technique is most commonly associated with spam or phishing botnets – whereby the wildcarded information that appears random (e.g., “asdk” of asdk.atl.damb) is used by the botmasters to uniquely identify a victim, track success using various delivery techniques, and bypass anti-spam technologies [9], [10], [11], [12].

2.6.

Domain Generation Algorithm (DGA)

Bot agents create a dynamic list of multiple FQDN’s that can be used as rendezvous points with their C&C servers [13], [14], [15]. The large number of potential rendezvous points makes it difficult for law enforcement to effectively shut down botnets since infected computers will attempt to contact some of these domain names every day to receive updates or commands. By using public-key cryptography, it is unfeasible for law enforcement and other actors to mimic commands from the malware controllers as some worms will automatically reject any updates not signed by the malware controllers. For example, an infected computer could create thousands of domain names such as: www.gi9bfb4er2ig4fws8h.ir and would attempt to contact a portion of these with the purpose of receiving an update or commands. Embedding the DGA instead of a list of previously-generated (by the C&C servers) domains in the unobfuscated binary of the malware protects against a strings dump that could be fed into a network blacklisting appliance preemptively to attempt to restrict outbound communication from infected hosts within an enterprise [13], [14], [15].

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3. 3.1.

Konstantinos Demertzis and Lazaros Iliadis

Tor-Based Botnets Tor Network

Tor is generally known as web anonymization service for end users, but Tor [16] offers more than that: “Tor makes it possible for users to hide their locations while offering various kinds of services, such as web publishing or an instant messaging server.” Tor directs Internet traffic through a free, worldwide, volunteer network consisting of more than seven thousand relays to conceal a user’s location and usage from anyone conducting network surveillance or traffic analysis [17]. Using Tor makes it more difficult for Internet activity to be traced back to the user. In this particular case, the creators of the malware decided to build an IRC server as hidden service.

3.2.

Tor Traffic Analysis

The objective of Tor [16] is to conceal the user IDs and their activity in the network, in order to prevent the monitoring and analysis of the traffic and to separate the detection from the routing by using virtual circuits, or overlays, which change periodically. It is the implementation of onion routing [17], in which multiple layers of encryption are employed, in order to ensure perfect forward secrecy between the nodes and the hidden services of Tor, while launching randomly the communication via tor nodes (consensus) operated by volunteers worldwide. Although the Tor network is operating in the Transport layer of the OSI, the onion proxy software shows customers the Secure Socket Interface (SOCKS) which operates in the session layer. Also, a continuous redirection of traffic requests between the relays, (entry guards, middle relays and exit relays), takes place in this network. Both the sender and recipient addresses and the information are in the form of encrypted text, so that no one at any point along the communication channel cannot decrypt the information or identify both ends directly [17]. The most famous types of malware are seeking communication recovery and its maintenance with the C&C remote servers on a regular basis, so that botmasters can collect or transfer information and upgrades to the compromised devices (bots). This communication is usually performed using hardcoded address or default lists address (pool addresses) controlled by the creator of the. The mode of communication of the latest, sophisticated malware generations, lies in the creation of an encrypted communication channel, based on the chaotic architecture of Tor, in order to alter the traces and to distort the elements that define an attack and eventually to increase the complexity of the botnets. Although modern programming techniques enable the malware creators to use thousands, alternating and different subnet IP address, in order to communicate with their C2 servers, the trace of those IPs is relatively straightforward for the network engineers, or for the responsible security analysts. Once identified, they are included in a blacklist and eventually they are blocked as spam. On the other hand, the limitation of the Tor-based botnets is extremely difficult because the movement of the Tor network resembles that of the HTTPS (Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure) protocol [16], [17], [18].

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Tor vs HTTPS

The Tor network not only performs encryption, but it is also designed to simulate normal HTTPS protocol traffic, which makes the identification of its channels an extremely complex and specialized process, even for experienced engineers or network analyzers. Specifically, the Tor network can use the TCP port 443, which is used by the HTTPS, so that the supervision and interpretation of a session exclusively with the determination of the door cannot constitute a reliable method. A successful method for detecting Tor traffic is the statistical analysis and the identification of the Secure Sockets Layer protocol differences (SSL) [18]. The SSL protocol uses a combination of public and symmetric key encryption. Each SSL connection always starts with the exchange of messages by the server and the client until the secure connection is established (handshake). The handshake allows the server to prove its identity to the client by using public-key encryption techniques and then allows the client and the server to cooperate in the creation of a symmetric key to be used to quickly encrypt and decrypt data exchanged between them. Optionally, the handshake also allows the client to prove its identity to the server [18]. Given that each Tor client creates self-signed SSL, using a random domain name that changes around every 30 minutes, a statistical analysis of the network traffic based on the specific SSL characteristics can identify the Tor sessions, in a network full of HTTPS traffic.

4.

The Proposed System

4.1.

CIPFaAPT

Since information systems’ security is an extremely complex process, the systems’ administrators cannot be based only in the use of specific isolated protection products installed in each checkpoint aiming to avoid an incident. The detection of an intrusion in a terminal, in the network, or in the email gate is a manual and time consuming process, something that offers an important advantage to the attackers. In most of the ATPs this only aims to trick the system and to cover more serious threats. The CIPFaAPT is a forensic analysis system which uses Online Sequential Extreme Learning Machines (OSELM) [19], [20]. It can process multiple data in real time mode, in order to detect “non-normal” system’s behavior by comparing to past data. In this way, it is possible to check and detect potential anomalies in various cases over time (e.g., user transactions, server processes, internet traffic, IPS alerts and traffic flow). The analysis is done by using computational intelligence and advanced machine learning algorithms. The CIPFaAPT is a next generation platform using advanced systems for the tracing and classification of risk in critical infrastructures aiming in the detection of ARTs. It correlates the suspicious activities in all of the control points and it classifies the facts that appear to have the highest risk, whereas it activates the defense mechanisms as soon as it spots a critical threat. More specifically, the CIPFaAPT offers the following potentials: 1. It reveals the total spectrum of the APT threats with a combined trace of the key control points of the terminals and the network.

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Konstantinos Demertzis and Lazaros Iliadis 2. It offers priority for the confrontation of the threats that are worth attention among all local control points. 3. It blocks potential new incidents

This chapter proposes the development of the CIPFaAPT, a cyber-threat bio-inspired intelligence system, which provides smart mechanisms for the supervision of networks. It provides intelligent approaches and it can defend over sophisticated attacks and of exploiting effectively the hardware capabilities with minimum computational and resources cost. More specifically, this research proposes an innovative and very effective Online Sequential Extreme Learning Machine model that it is proper for big data analysis, for solving a multidimensional and complex cyber security problem.

4.2.

Innovation of the Proposed Method

APTs are the most sophisticated and highly intelligent techniques that make detection of “contamination” and analysis of malicious code, a very complex task. It is a fact that they spread through chaotic Tor-based botnets in which communication is done using the anonymity Tor network, which makes it impossible to identify and locate the Command and Control (C&C) servers. Tor is free software for enabling anonymous communication. The name Tor is derived from an acronym for the original software project name “The Onion Router”. In addition, the network traffic for the Tor packet is designed to simulate the respective traffic of the HTTPS protocol which causes serious Tor traffic identification weaknesses by the motion analysis systems. Finally, given the passive mode of traditional security systems, which are unable in most cases to identify these types of major threats, the development and use of alternative more radical and more substantial methods appear as a necessity. This work proposes the development and testing of a novel computational intelligence system named CIPFaAPT. The system requires the minimum consumption of resources and it significantly enhances the security mechanisms of the network OS. Specifically, the architecture of the proposed system is based on the Online Sequential Extreme Learning Machines. The CIPFaAPT employs the OSELM algorithm in order to perform malware localization, DGA and Tor traffic identification and botnets prohibition. The CIPFaAPT system is a Biologically inspired artificial intelligence computer security technique [21], [22], [23], [24], [25], [26], [27], [28], [29], [30], [31], [32], [33], [34], [35], [36]. Unlike other existing approaches which are based on individual passive safety techniques, the CIPFaAPT is an integrated active safety system. It provides intelligent surveillance mechanisms and classification of malware, it is able to defend itself and to protect from DGA malware, it detects and prevents encrypted Tor network activities and it can efficiently exploit the potential of the hardware, with minimal computational cost. An innovation of the CIPFaAPT approach is related to the architecture of the proposed computational intelligence system, which use for the first time a very fast and highly effective biologically inspired machine learning algorithm towards the solution of a multidimensional and complex IT security problem. Furthermore, a major innovative feature of this proposal is related to the identification and separation of the Tor network traffic from the traffic of the HTTPS protocol, which is presented from the authors for first time in network traffic analysis systems [28].

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91

Literature Review

Traffic analysis attacks have been extensively studied over the past decade [37], [38]. The authors have acknowledged the potential of machine learning-based approaches in providing efficient and effective detection, but they have not provided a deeper insight on specific methods, neither the comparison of the approaches by detection performances and evaluation practice. On the other hand, Cheng et al. [39] proposed the use of ELM methods to classify binary and multi-class network traffic for intrusion detection with high accuracy. Hsu et al. [40] proposed a real-time system for detecting botnets based on anomalous delays in HTTP/HTTPS requests from a given client with very promising results. Also, Haffner et. al. [41] employed AdaBoost, Hidden Markov, Naive Bayesian and Maximum Entropy models to classify network traffic into different applications, with very high SSH (Secure Shell, is a cryptographic network protocol operating at layer 7 of the OSI Model to allow remote login and other network services to operate securely over an unsecured network) detection rate and very low false positive rate, but they employed only few bytes of the payload. Furthermore, Alshammari et al. [42] employed Repeated Incremental Pruning, to Produce Error Reduction (RIPPER) and AdaBoost algorithms for classifying SSH traffic from offline log files without using any payload, IP addresses or port numbers. Nhauo et al. [43] proposed a method for Classification of Malicious Domains using Support Vector Machine and Bi-gram algorithm using only domain names and their results showed that features extracted by bi-gram were performing a lot better than single alphanumeric character. Antonakakis et al. [44] uses a combination of clustering and classi?cation algorithms to detecting the DGA-Based Malware. Zhao et al. [45] select a set of attributes from the network ?ows and then applies a Bayes network and a decision tree algorithm to classify malicious traffic. Chakravarty et al. [46] assess the feasibility and effectiveness of practical traffic analysis attacks against the Tor network using NetFlow data and proposed an active traffic analysis method based on deliberately perturbing the characteristics of user traffic at the server side, and observing a similar perturbation at the client side through statistical correlation. Almubayed et al. [47] proposed a research has considered many ML algorithms in order to fingerprint Tor usage in the network. Chaabane et al. [48] provides a deep analysis of both the HTTP and BitTorrent protocols giving a complete overview of their usage, depict how users behave on top of Tor and also show that Tor usage is now diverted from the onion routing concept and that Tor exit nodes are frequently used as 1-hop SOCKS proxies, through a so-called tunneling technique. Finally, Chakravarty et al. proposed methods for performing traffic analysis using remote network bandwidth estimation tools, to identify the Tor relays and routers involved in Tor circuits [49], [50].

4.4.

Datasets

The selection of the data was the result of an extensive research on the functionality of the protocol SSL, combined with a deep analysis of the independent variables, in order to obtain the ones that give the maximum precision under the strict condition of minimal computing resources consumption. This effort resulted in the creation of training sets, capable to properly train the employed learning algorithms.

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Konstantinos Demertzis and Lazaros Iliadis Table 1. MTA: Extracted features from network traffic (31 Independent and 2 depended) ID 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16

Feature Name seq number ack number src port dst port fin syn rst psh ack window check ip len ip id ip off ip ttl ip sum

ID 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32

Feature Name response seq number response ack number response src port response dst port response fin response syn response rst response psh response ack response window response check response ip len response ip id response ip off response ip ttl Classes (Benign or Malicious)

Four datasets with high complexity were constructed and used for testing by the CIPFaAPT. The first Malware Traffic Analysis (MTA) dataset comprised of 32 independent variables and 2 classes (benign or malware). This dataset containing 73,469 patterns (37,127 benign samples they were chosen from the Pcaps from National Cyber Watch MidAtlantic Collegiate Cyber Defense Competition and 36,342 malicious samples they were chosen from http://malware-traffic-analysis.net/) [51]. The idea of the network traffic analysis and the features extraction approach were based on the functional mode of the TCP protocol and moreover on the acknowledgement method of the reliable submission and receipt of the data. Also, it relies on the error-free data transfer mechanisms between the network layer and the application layer, of the TCP header structure and the three-way handshake process [52]. The full list of the 32 features with the class is detailed in Table 1. The second Network Traffic Classification (NTC) dataset comprised of 22 independent variables and 12 network traffic classes (TELNET, FTP, HTTP, HTTPS, DNS, Lime, Local Forwarding, Remote Forwarding, SCP, SFTP, x11 and Shell). This dataset containing 137,050 patterns they were chosen from the Pcaps from Information Technology Operations Center (ITOC), US Military Academy [53]. The features management and export (for tables 2 and 3) was based on the analysis of the network traffic and specifically on the methodology used in [54]. The full list of the 22 features with the corresponding classes is presented in the following Table 2.

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Table 2. NTC: Extracted features from network traffic (22 Independent and 12 depended) ID 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11

Feature Name min fpktl mean fpktl max fpktl std fpktl min bpktl mean bpktl max bpktl std bpktl min fiat mean fiat max fiat

12

std fiat

ID 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23

Feature Name min biat mean biat max biat std biat duration proto total fpackets total fvolume total bpackets total bvolume Classes (TELNET, FTP, HTTP, HTTPS, DNS, Lime, Local Forwarding, Remote Forwarding, SCP, SFTP, x11 and Shell)

The third Tor-Traffic Identification (TTI) dataset comprised of 45 independent variables and 2 classes (Tor or HTTPS). This dataset containing 217,483 patterns they were chosen from the Pcaps from [55]. The full list of 45 features with their corresponding classes is presented in the following Table3. In the preprocessing process the duplicate records and records with missing values were removed. Also, the datasets were determined and normalized to the interval [-1,1] to phase the problem of prevalence of features with wider range over the ones with a narrower range, without being more important [56]. Considering the limited capacity of resources and computing power of mobile devices and the limitations posed by their dependence on the battery, we have made a transformation of the TTI independent variables vector space, which is a very complex and extensive dataset. Principal Components Analysis (PCA) has been performed to obtain new linear combinations, capable to contain the largest possible part of the variance of the original information, without limiting the predictive capability and accuracy of the learning algorithm. However, since the results have deteriorated enough (almost 12% less accuracy was obtained) the approach was abandoned. Then, we have performed correlation analysis on various subsets of features which had the highest correlation with the obtained class, regardless of their interrelation. Also, other subsets were used, which were highly correlated with the class and they appeared to have high cross-correlation (Correlation Attribute Evaluation) [57].

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Table 3. TTI: Extracted flow statistics from network traffic (45 Independent and 2 depended) ID 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23

Feature Name srcip srcport dstip dstport proto total fpackets total fvolume total bpackets total bvolume min fpktl mean fpktl max fpktl std fpktl min bpktl mean bpktl max bpktl std bpktl min fiat mean fiat max fiat std fiat min biat mean biat

ID 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46

Feature Name max biat std biat duration min active mean active max active std active min idle mean idle max idle std idle sflow fpackets sflow fbytes sflow bpackets sflow bbytes fpsh cnt bpsh cnt furg cnt burg cnt total fhlen total bhlen dscp Classes (Tor or HTTPS)

Finally, we have tried to use subsets for which we have calculated the cost-sensitive classification, based on the cost-matrix (Cost Sensitive Subset Evaluation). The method takes a cost matrix and a base evaluator. Cost matrix is a way to change the threshold value for a decision boundary. If the base evaluator can handle instance weights, then the training data is weighted per the cost matrix, otherwise the training data is sampled per the cost matrix. The process of performing Cost Sensitive Subset Evaluation is a very effective method because the error-based methods consider the classification errors as equally likely, which is not the case in all the real-time applications. [57], [58]. The subsets for which the value of each feature was calculated using the information gain with respect to the class (Information Gain Attribute Evaluation) [57]. Eventually, the subset chosen was based on the method of Correlation-based Feature Subset Selection (subsets of features that correlate highly with the class value and appear low correlation with each other). From this dataset, we have obtained the minimum error of the classifier in the training and test data, in relation to the value of each feature (Attribute

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Evaluation with particle swarm optimization) [57]. Finally, we have gained 33,5% reduction of the initial parameters, whereas the accuracy dropped only by 0.1% compared to the accuracy of the system that used all 45 features. The following table 4 presents the 30 features included in the final dataset. Table 4. The TTI feature vector after the feature selection process ID 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

Feature Name srcip srcport dstip dstport total fpackets total bpackets min fpktl max fpktl min bpktl

10

max bpktl

11

min fiat

12

max fiat

13

min biat

14

max biat

15

duration

16 17 18 19 20

min active max active min idle max idle sflow fpackets

21 22

sflow fbytes sflow bpackets

23 24

sflow bbytes fpsh cnt

25

bpsh cnt

26

furg cnt

27

burg cnt

28

total fhlen

29

total bhlen

30

dscp

Interpretation The source IP address of the flow. The source port number of the flow. The destination IP address of the flow. The destination port number of the flow. The total number of packets travelling in the forward direction. The total number of packets travelling in the backward direction. The minimum packet length (in bytes) from the forward direction. The maximum packet length (in bytes) from the forward direction. The minimum packet length (in bytes) from the backward direction. The maximum packet length (in bytes) from the backward direction. The minimum interarrival time (in microseconds) between two packets. The maximum interarrival time (in microseconds) between two packets. The minimum interarrival time (in microseconds) between two packets. The maximum interarrival time (in microseconds) between two packets The time elapsed (in microseconds) from the first packet to the last packet. The minimum duration (in microseconds) of a sub-flow. The maximum duration (in microseconds) of a sub-flow. The minimum time (in microseconds) the flow was idle. The maximum time (in microseconds) the flow was idle. The average number of forward travelling packets in the subflows. The average number of bytes, travelling in the forward direction. The average number of backward travelling packets in the subflows. The average number of bytes, travelling in the backward direction. The number of times the PSH flag was set for packets travelling in the forward direction. The number of times the PSH flag was set for packets travelling in the backward direction. The number of times the URG flag was set for packets travelling in the forward direction. The number of times the URG flag was set for packets travelling in the backward direction. The total header length (network and transport layer) of packets travelling in the forward direction. The total header length (network and transport layer) of packets travelling in the backward direction. Differentiated services code point, a field in the IPv4 and IPv6 headers.

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Table 5. DGA dataset: Extracted features from domain names (5 Independent and 2 depended) ID 1 2

3

4

5 6

Feature Name length entropy

Interpretation

The length of the strings of the domains. The entropy of each domain as degree of uncertainty, with the higher values met in the DGA domains. alexa grams The degree of coherence between the domain and the list of domains originating from Alexa. This is done with the technique of the probability linguistic model for the forecasting of the next n-gram element. word grams The degree of coherence between the domain and a list of 479,623 words or widely used characters. It is estimated with the same method as in the previous one. differences The difference between the values of alexa grams and word grams. Classes Legit or Malicious.

Finally, a dataset namely Domain Generation Algorithms (DGA) dataset constructed and used for testing. As legit domains 100,000 domain names were used. They were chosen randomly from the database with the 1 million most popular domain names of Alexa [59]. For the malicious domains, the updated list of the Black Hole DNS database was used [60]. This list includes 16,374 records from domains that have been traced and characterized as dangerous. More over 15,000 domain name records were added labeled as malicious. They were created based on a time stamp DGA algorithm, with length from 4 to 56 characters of the form 18cbth51n205gdgsar1io1t5.com. Also, 15,000 domain name records were added labeled as malicious, which were created with the use of words of phrases coming from an English dictionary. Their length varied from 4 to 56 characters of the form hotsex4rock69burningchoir.com. The full list of features with their corresponding classes is presented in the following Table 5 [61]. Duplicate records and records with incompatible characters were removed. Also, the outliers removed based on the Inter Quartile Range (IQR) technique [62]. After this preprocessing operation, the DGA dataset containing 136,519 patterns.

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5.

Research Methodology

5.1.

Online Sequential Extreme Learning Machine

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The CIPFaAPT is essentially a tool for analysis of web streaming traffic in fixed intervals, to extract timely conclusions in which some or all the incoming data is not available for access from any permanent or temporary storage medium, but it arrives in a form of consecutive flows. For these data, there is no control over the order in which they arrive, their size may vary and many of them offer no real information. Also, the examination of individual IP packets or TCP segments, can extract only few conclusions and therefore the interdependence of the individual packets to each other, their analysis cannot be done with simple static methods, but it requires further modeling of traffic and the use of advanced analytical methods for the extraction of knowledge from complex data sets. This modeling is achieved using the computational intelligence Online Sequential Extreme Learning Machine algorithm [19],[20]. The Extreme Learning Machine (ELM) [63] as an emerging biologically inspired learning technique provides efficient unified solutions to “generalized” Single-hidden Layer feed forward Networks (SLFNs) but the hidden layer (or called feature mapping) in ELM need not be tuned [63]. Such SLFNs include but are not limited to support vector machine, polynomial network, RBF networks, and the conventional feed forward neural networks. All the hidden node parameters are independent from the target functions or the training datasets and the output weights of ELMs may be determined in different ways (with or without iterations, with or without incremental implementations). ELM has several advantages, ease of use, faster learning speed, higher generalization performance, suitable for many nonlinear activation function and kernel functions [63]. According to the ELM theory [63], the ELM with Gaussian Radial Basis Function kernel (GRBFK) K(u,v)=exp(-γ||u-v||2 ) is used in this approach. The hidden neurons are k=20 that chosen with trial and error method. Subsequently, wi are the assigned random input weights and bi ,i=1,. . . ,N are the biases. To calculate the hidden layer output matrix H, the equation (1) is used [63].      h(x1 )   h1 (x1 ) · · · hL (x1 )      .. ..  (1) H =  ...  =  . .     h1 (xN ) · · · hL (xN ) h(xN ) h(x) = [h1 (x), . . . , hL (x)] is the output (row) vector of the hidden layer with respect to the input x. Also h(x) actually maps the data from the d-dimensional input space to the L-dimensional hidden-layer feature space (ELM feature space) H and thus h(x) is indeed a feature mapping. ELM is to minimize the training error as well as the norm of the output weights [63]: Minimize : ||Hβ – T||2 and||β||

(2)

where H is the hidden-layer output matrix of the equation (1), ||β|| is used to minimize the norm of the output weights and actually to maximize the distance of the separating margins of the two different classes in the ELM feature space2/||β||.

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To calculate the output weights β the function (3) is used [63]:

−1

β =( CI + H T H) H T T (3) where c is a positive constant is obtained and T resulting from the Function Approximation of SLFNs with additive neurons [63]  T   t1   .  T =  ..   T  tN which is an arbitrary distinct sample with ti =[ti1 , ti2 ,. . . ,tim ]T ∈Rm The OSELM [19],[20] is an alternative technique for large-scale computing and machine learning approaches that used when data becomes available in a sequential order to determine a mapping from data set corresponding labels. The main difference between online learning and batch learning techniques is that in online learning the mapping is updated after the arrival of every new data point in a scale fashion, whereas batch techniques are used when one has access to the entire training data set at once. It is a versatile sequential learning algorithm because of the training observations are sequentially (one-by-one or chunk-by-chunk with varying or ?xed chunk length) presented to the learning algorithm [19],[20]. At any time, only the newly arrived single or chunk of observations (instead of the entire past data) are seen and learned. A single or a chunk of training observations is discarded as soon as the learning procedure for that particular (single or chunk of) observation(s) is completed. The learning algorithm has no prior knowledge as to how many training observations will be presented. Unlike other sequential learning algorithms which have many control parameters to be tuned, OSELM with RBF kernel only requires the number of hidden nodes to be speci?ed [19],[20]. The proposed method uses an OSELM that can learn data chunk-by-chunk with a fixed chunk size of 20x20, with RBF kernel classification approach in order to perform malware localization, Tor traffic identification and botnets prohibition in an energetic security mode that needs minimum computational resources and time. The OSELM consists of two main phases namely: Boosting Phase (BPh) and Sequential Learning Phase (SLPh). The BPh used to train the SLFNs using the primitive ELM method with some batch of training data in the initialization stage and these boosting training data will be discarded as soon as boosting phase is completed. The required batch of training data is very small, which can be equal to the number of hidden neurons [19],[20],[63]. The general classification process with OSELM classifier described below: Phase 1 (BPh) [19],[20]. ˜ The process of BPh for a small initial training set N={(xi , ti )|xi ∈ Rn , ti ∈ Rm, i=1, ... , N} described as follows:

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1. Assign arbitrary input weight wβ(0) = M0 H0T T 0i and bias bi or center mi and impact ˜ where N˜ number for hidden neuron or RBF kernel for a specific width σi , i=1, ... N, application. 2. Calculate the initial hidden layer output matrix H0 = [h1 , ... , hN˜ ]T , where hi = [g(w1 ˜ where g activation function or RBF * xi + b1 ), ... , g(wN˜ * xi + bN˜ )]T , i = 1, ... , N, kernel. −1

3. Estimate the initial output weight, where M0 = (H0T H0 )

and T 0 = [t1 , ..., t N˜ ]T .

4. Set k = 0. Phase 2 (SLPh) [19],[20]. In the SLPh the OSELM will then learn the train data chunk-by-chunk with a fixed chunk size of 20x20 and all the training data will be discarded once the learning procedure on these data is completed. The essentials step of this phase for each further coming observation(xi , t1 ), where xi ∈ Rn , ti ∈ Rm and i = f N + 1, f N + 2, f N + 3, described as follow: 1. Calculate the hidden layer output vector h(k+1) = [g(w1 * xi + b1 ), ... , g(wN˜ * xi + bN˜ )]T −1

2. Calculate latest output weight β(k+1) by the algorithm b β = (H T H) H T T which is called the Recursive Least-Squares (RLS) algorithm. 3. Set k = k + 1 The proposed CIPFaAPT includes the following ruleset which is the core of its reasoning and described below. Step 1. Performs malware localization by OSELM with Malware Traffic Analysis (MTA) dataset. If the malware analysis gives a positive result (Malware) the network traffic blocked and the process terminated. If the malware analysis gives a negative result (Benign), no action is required and goes to step 2. Step 2. Performs network traffic analysis by OSELM with Network Traffic Classification (NTC) dataset. If the network traffic classification result is not a HTTPS, no action is required. If the network traffic classification result is a HTTPS, go to the next step 3. Step 3. Performs Tor-traffic identification by OSELM with Tor-Traffic Identification (TTI) dataset. If the botnet classification result gives a positive result (Botnet) the network traffic blocked and the process terminated. If the botnet classification result gives a negative result (HTTPS), go to step 4. Step 4. Performs domain identification by OSELM with Domain Generation Algorithms (DGA) dataset. If the botnet classification result gives a positive result (Malicious) the network access blocked and the process terminated. If the classification result gives a negative result (Legit), no action is required. The overall algorithmic approach of CIPFaAPT that is proposed herein is described clearly and in details in the following Figure 1.

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Figure 1. The proposed architecture of the CIPFaAPT

6.

Results and Comparative Analysis

Given the complexity of the analysis and of the network traffic monitoring which is a realistic and very difficult task of computer security sector, the proposed system managed to perform with high accuracy. Also, it is important that the created datasets appear to have particularly high complexity, as they emerged taking into account even the most unfavorable scenarios and almost all potential cases of network traffic that may occur. This is a factor that played an important role towards the generalization capacity of the proposed system. It is characteristic that during the classification process, in each case of different scenarios represented using different datasets, the proposed system achieved accuracy rates of at least 93.97%.

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Performance evaluation was performed based on a thorough comparative analysis (20 trials for each test and we compute the average result) of the obtained prediction accuracy and generalization capability between the CIPFaAPT and the following machine learning methods [19],[20],[63], namely: ELM with RBF activation function, ELM with Sigmoid activation function, OSELM with RBF activation function and 1 by 1 learning mode, OSELM with RBF activation function and 20 by 20 learning mode, OSELM with Sigmoid activation function and 1 by 1 learning mode and OSELM with Sigmoid activation function and 20 by 20 learning mode. It is extremely comforting and hopeful, the fact that the proposed system manages to solve a particularly complex cyber security problem with high accuracy. Regarding the overall efficiency of the methods, the results show that the OSELM with RBF activation function and 20 by 20 learning mode, has much better generalization performance and more accurate classification output from the other compared algorithms. The following tables 6, 7, 8 and 9 presents the analytical values of the predictive power of the method and the corresponding results when competitive algorithms were used. Table 6. Comparison between algorithms in the MTA dataset Classifier

Properties

ELM ELM OSELM OSELM OSELM OSELM

Activation Function RBF Sigmoid RBF Sigmoid RBF Sigmoid

Learning Mode Batch Batch 1 by 1 20 by 20 20 by 20 1 by 1

Classification Accuracy & Performance Metrics ACC RMSE Precision Recall F-Score 96.71% 96.64% 98.28% 96.99% 98.34% 96.81%

0.1421 0.1432 0.1342 0.1426 0.1331 0.1429

0.967% 0,967% 0.982% 0.970% 0.983% 0,969%

0.967 0.966 0.983 0.970 0.984 0.969

0.967% 0.966% 0.983% 0.970% 0.983% 0.970%

ROC Area 0.980 0.979 0.985 0.970 0.990 0.969

Table 7. Comparison between algorithms in the NTC dataset Classifier

Properties

ELM ELM OSELM OSELM OSELM OSELM

Activation Function RBF Sigmoid RBF Sigmoid RBF Sigmoid

Learning Mode Batch Batch 1 by 1 20 by 20 20 by 20 1 by 1

Classification Accuracy & Performance Metrics ACC RMSE Precision Recall F-Score 99.15% 99.11% 99.51% 99.68% 99.72% 99.44%

0.1027 0.1030 0.1006 0.0990 0.0982 0.1016

0.991% 0,991% 0.995% 0.996% 0.998% 0.994%

0.991 0.990 0.995 0.997 0.997 0.994

0.992% 0.990% 0.995% 0.996% 0.997% 0.994%

ROC Area 0.991 0.990 0.995 0.996 0.997 0.994

The Precision measure [64] shows what percentage of positive predictions where correct, whereas Recall [64] measures what percentage of positive events were correctly predicted. The F-Score [64] can be interpreted as a weighted average of the precision and recall. Therefore, this score takes both false positives and false negatives into account.

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Properties

ELM ELM OSELM OSELM OSELM OSELM

Activation Function RBF Sigmoid RBF Sigmoid RBF Sigmoid

Learning Mode Batch Batch 1 by 1 20 by 20 20 by 20 1 by 1

Classification Accuracy & Performance Metrics ACC RMSE Precision Recall F-Score 94.19% 94.10% 94.31% 94.24% 94.39% 94.28%

0.1561 0.1570 0.1537 0.1543 0.1521 0.1539

0.942% 0.941% 0.943% 0.942% 0.944% 0.943%

0.942 0.941 0.943 0.943 0.944 0.943

0.942% 0.941% 0.943% 0.943% 0.944% 0.943%

ROC Area 0.942 0.941 0.970 0.965 0.970 0.943

Table 9. Comparison between algorithms in the DGA dataset Classifier

Properties

ELM ELM OSELM OSELM OSELM OSELM

Activation Function RBF Sigmoid RBF Sigmoid RBF Sigmoid

Learning Mode Batch Batch 1 by 1 20 by 20 20 by 20 1 by 1

Classification Accuracy & Performance Metrics ACC RMSE Precision Recall F-Score 92.17% 91.35% 92.89% 93.13% 93.97% 91.92%

0.1877 0.2031 0.1804 0.1726 0.1711 0.2012

0.920% 0.914% 0.930% 0.932% 0.940% 0.919%

0.921 0.914 0.929 0.932 0.940 0.919

0.921% 0.914% 0.929% 0.932% 0.940% 0.920%

ROC Area 0.975 0.960 0.978 0.982 0.985 0.963

Intuitively it is not as easy to understand as accuracy, but F-Score is usually more useful than accuracy and it works best if false positives and false negatives have similar cost, in this case. Finally, the ROC [64] curve is related in a direct and natural way to cost/benefit analysis of diagnostic decision making. This comparison generates encouraging expectations for the identification of the OSELM with RBF activation function and 20 by 20 learning mode [19],[20],[63], as a robust online classification model suitable for difficult problems. According to this comparative analysis, it appears that CIPFaAPT is highly suitable method for applications with huge amounts of data such that traditional learning approaches that use the entire data set in aggregate are computationally infeasible. This algorithm successfully reduces the problem of entrapment in local minima in training process, with very fast convergence rates. These improvements are accompanied by high classification rates and low test errors as well. The performance of proposed model was evaluated in a high complex dataset and the real-world sophisticated scenarios. The experimental results showed that the OSELM with RBF activation function and 20 by 20 learning mode, has better generalization performance at a very fast learning speed and more accurate and reliable classification results. The final conclusion is that the proposed method has proven to be reliable and efficient and has outperformed at least for this security problem the other approaches.

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Conclusion This research effort, presented a timely, innovative, small footprint and highly effective security system which relies on advanced methods of computational intelligence and it greatly enhances the IT security mechanisms. It is a Real-time Computational Intelligence Protection Framework Against Advanced Persistent Threats, a next generation security platform that uses sophisticated analytics to monitor, track and classify risk across critical network infrastructures to identify APT. It performs classification by using an Online Sequential ELM with Gaussian RBF kernel and 20 by 20 learning mode, a very fast approach with high accuracy and generalization with minimum computational power and resources. The classification performance and the accuracy of the proposed model were experimentally explored based on several scenarios and reported very promising results. Moreover, CIPFaAPT is an effective system of network supervision, with capabilities of automated control. This is done to enhance the energetic security and the mechanisms of reaction of the general system, without special requirements. The performance of the proposed system was tested on four novel datasets of high complexity, which emerged after extensive research of how the SSL protocol operates and after performing comparisons inspections and tests of independent variables which give the maximum precision, while requiring minimal computational resources. Future research could involve its model under a hybrid scheme, which will combine semi supervised methods for the trace and exploitation of hidden knowledge between the inhomogeneous data that might emerge. Also, it would be important for the proposed framework to be expanded with automatic extraction methods of network traffic characteristics, so that it would fully automate the process of identifying malicious applications. Finally, the CIPFaAPT could be improved towards with other machine learning methods (unsupervised - competitive learning) or hybrid soft computing approaches (fuzzy-neural networks) and optimization algorithms aimed at even higher rates of correct classification.

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[52] Haining W., Danlu Z., Kang G. S., (2002), Detecting SYN flooding attacks, Proceedings on INFOCOM 2002, Twenty-First Annual Joint Conference of the IEEE Computer and Communications Societies, vol 3, pp 1530-1539. [53] http://www.netresec.com/?page=PcapFiles. [54] Arndt, D. J., Zincir-Heywood, A. N. (2011), A Comparison of Three Machine Learning Techniques for Encrypted Network Traffic Analysis, Computational Intelligence for Security and Defense Applications (CISDA), 2011 IEEE Symposium on pp. 107 – 114. [55] http://contagiodump.blogspot.gr/. [56] Iliadis L. Intelligent Information Systems and applications in risk estimation, (2008), ISBN: 978-960-6741-33-3 A. Stamoulis publication, Thessaloniki, Greece. [57] Bailey M., Oberheide J., Andersen J., Mao Z. M., Jahanian F., Nazario J.: Auto˜ mated classification and analysis of internet malware., (2007), in: C. KrAijgel, R. Lippmann, A. Clark (Eds.), RAID, Vol. 4637 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer, pp. 178–197. [58] Desai A., Jadav P. M., (2012), An Empirical Evaluation of Adaboost Extensions for Cost-Sensitive Classification, International Journal of Computer Applications, Vol 44, No 13. [59] http://www.alexa.com/. [60] http://www.malwaredomains.com/. [61] https://www.clicksecurity.com/. [62] Upton, G., Cook, I. Understanding Statistics, (1996) Oxford University Press. p. 55. [63] Cambria E., Guang-Bin H.: Extreme Learning Machines, (2013), IEEE InTeLLIGenT SYSTemS, 541-1672/13. [64] Powers, David M. W. (2011), Evaluation: From Precision, Recall and F-Measure to ROC, Informedness, Markedness & Correlation, Journal of Machine Learning Technologies, 2, 37-63.

In: Cyber-Security and Information Warfare Editor: Nicholas J. Daras

ISBN: 978-1-53614-385-0 © 2019 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

Chapter 6

C OMPUTER E THICS AND I NSTITUTIONS Maria Dimarogona∗ and Petros Stefaneas† Laboratory of Algorithmic Applications and Logic Department of Mathematics School of Applied Mathematical and Physical Sciences Iroon Polytechniou 9 Polytechnioupoli, Zografou National Technical University of Athens (NTUA), Greece

Abstract Computer ethics is a distinct field of study, concerned with issues like privacy, accessibility, work ethics, computer crime, and computer security. In this article we propose a hybrid formal semantics for computer ethics, based on the theory of institutions. In order to provide any such semantics, various logics need to be employed so that all the different concepts involved are formally captured. More specifically, we need deontic logic, which is concerned with obligation, permission, duties, rights and related concepts; dynamic (or action) logic, which in computer science provides a means of reasoning about programs; and epistemic logic, which is concerned with reasoning about knowledge. Abstract model theory in the form of institutions offers a flexible logical framework, which can encompass all these different logics. At the same time it allows us to abstract away from their individual details and concentrate on the study of the various computer ethics issues. The proposed framework is a combination of Grothendieck and Kripke institutions, and it can be used not only in applications in language design, system specifications and new algorithms, but also for the performance of computer-supported (or semi-automated) computer ethics.

Keywords: computer ethics, institutions, abstract model theory, formal semantics

Computer Ethics Computer ethics is a branch of applied ethics which studies the social and ethical implications of information and communications technology, and suggests methods for the development of relevant well-founded policies. Typically, computer ethics is concerned with ∗ †

Corresponding Author Email: [email protected]. Corresponding Author Email: [email protected].

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cybercrime, protection of personal privacy, copyrights, work ethics, the use of technology in workplaces, and the digital divide (the social discriminations caused by technology). More recent topics include computing and terrorism, electronic government, “agent” ethics (robots, softbots), and cyborg ethics. Some of the most characteristic questions studied by computer ethics are the following: • Which could be the next phase of our civilization, brought about by technological development? • How can we measure the implications of technological change? • What have the terms personal privacy and privacy of communications come to mean, based on the new facts? • Can electronic data be used as evidence in courts? • Under which circumstances is the electronic reproduction, or alteration, of a work of art legal? • Is the selling of personal data to a third party allowed, and if yes under which terms? • Who is responsible if fake financial data, or rumors, spread through the Internet and damage a citizen, or business; • Is anonymity allowed on the Internet? The apparent simplicity of some of the ethical dilemmas studied by computer ethics is often misleading; it conceals the underlying complex reality of the many different concepts involved. As Moor has pointed out in his seminal paper [35], the fact that computers are logically malleable leads to the informational enrichment of already existent concepts like money, warfare, privacy, and copyright. The theoretical foundation of new, and informationally enriched concepts - which cannot be dealt with using classical ethics - is one of the most basic research subjects in computer ethics [28].

Brief History of Computer Ethics The first concerns regarding the ethical implications of information and communications technology were expressed by the distinguished mathematician and founder of Cybernetics1 Norbert Wiener, in the mid forties. In his well-known book “Cybernetics: or control and communication in the animal and the machine” [48]. Wiener forsaw that humanity would be threatened by a great danger, relevant to the control of information and its processing. He believed that the potential negative effects of information technology would be comparable to the dangers of using atomic energy inappropriately; just as with atomic energy, the machine’s danger to society would not come from the machine itself, but from what man makes of it. Wiener took for granted that information technology would permeate all aspects of human activity2, and argued that this would lead to the re-establishment of society through a “second industrial revolution”. The modern age proved to be non other than the age of information, the age of communication and control that he envisioned. In his 1

With the term Cybernetics we mean the science of informational systems with feedback. A characteristic example of such a system is the automatic anti-aircraft gun, a technology developped by Wiener and others working for the American Government - during World War II. 2 Moor later attributed this permeation to the logical malleability of computing machines.

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book “The human use of human beings”, published in 1950, Wiener set the foundations of information and communications ethics – although nowhere in his writings did he use this term (or the currently used term computer ethics). Through his works, he addressed fundamental ethical questions concerning the purpose of human life, and the principles of justice governing the propagation of technology. He also suggested a methodology for information ethics and gave specific examples of information technology ethics [11, 49]. But Wiener’s insightful concerns were way ahead of his time, and remained widely unaknowledged until the last decade of the 20th century. The second important scientist to recognize the need for computer ethics was Donn Parker, who already since the mid sixties dealt with computer crime. He was the one who coordinated the development of the first code of professional ethics for the association of Computing Machinery (ACM) – an American association of computer scientists -, which was officially accepted in 1973. Parker used to say that many times, those who enter into the computing centers leave their ethos in the doorway [10]. His contribution is considered very important, especially in matters of proffessional behavior, and in raising the awareness of the scientific and technological community around ethical issues. In the late sixties, the implementation of a program for the support of psychotherapy developed by Joseph Weizenbaum from MIT, occasioned a variety of reactions regarding the limits of technology, and the threatening possibility of the substitution of humans by machines. Weizenbaum outlined the danger of propagating such ideas of replacement of certain human activities by machines in his book Computer Power and Human Reason: From Judgment to Calculation [46]. There he draws an important distinction between the concepts of decision and choice, arguing for the dinstinctly human character of the latter, as oposed to decision processes (which can be implemented by machines). Through his lectures at MIT and elsewhere, Weizenbaum played an important role in the advancement of key issues in information technology ethics, althought the latter term - as well as the term computer ethics - was not introduced until the mid seventies. The first to use it was probably Walter Maner, whose work has played an important role in raising the awareness of American citizens on the ethical dilemmas induced by computer science. Among others, he published – on his own expenses – the first computer ethics manual: “Starter Kit in Computer Ethics”. This manual was addressed to academics who wished to develop a class on the ethics of information technology (it included educational material, and pedagogical advice). Manner’s book was republished in 1980, with the help of Terrell Ward Bynum. Information technology ethics deals - according to Manner - with “the set of ethical problems which deteriorate, transform, or emerge due to this technology”[34]. In the middle of 1980, James Moor published an article entitled “What is computer ethics?”[35], in which he set a series of questions still relevant today. His definition of information technology ethics as “the field dealing with the policy gaps concerning the ethical use of information technology” played a pivotal role in subsequent research. Moor argued that computers are logically malleable and thus bound to infiltrate every aspect of our lifes. They are the most general purpose machines humanity has ever produced, in the sense that they can be manipulated to do any activity that can be modeled in terms of inputs, outputs, and connecting logical operators. More specifically, they can be manipulated both syntactically (changing what a computer does by changing its program), and semantically (using computer states to represent anything one chooses). This logical malleability is the reason

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why computers are now to be found in every aspect of our lives. And as more and more activities become increasingly computerized, often they also become informationalized; “the processing of information becomes a crucial ingredient in performing and understanding the activities themeselves.” [35] This results in the informational enrichment of both the activities themselves and their conceptions. Moor discusses, among other examples, the activity of warfare, which is rapidly becoming more and more computerized. As a consequence our concept of war is becoming informationally enriched; Moor argues that wars will ultimately be about the destruction of information or the introduction of misleading information. In 1990, Debora Johnson published the first widely used (university level) educational manual, which for many years has been - and still is today – an introductory reference point in the teaching of computer ethics [28]. In her view, the field studies “the way in which technology gives new dimensions to classical ethical problems and dilemmas, by causing the existing problems to deteriorate, and by imposing the use of common ethical rules in new unexplored settings”. The field of computer ethics reaches adulthood, as a branch of applied ethics, in 1990, taking a continuous turn towards proffessional ethics. The rapid growth of computers, networks, and their applications, gave rise to an academic concern regarding the ethical use of technology. Following this concern, new study programs, specialized journals, and research centers were created, and a large number of articles were published. Today computer ethics is one of the liveliest fields of applied ethics. An interesting recent development in the field is the advancement of Information Ethics by Luciano Floridi [20, 21, 19]. According to this patient-oriented, “e-nvironmental” approach, the reference framework of each theory of ethics should not have man as its focal point, but the relevant actions, intentions and characters. In Floridi’s view, whatever exists can be thought of as an “informational” object, or process: all entities could be described as information structures – data structures-, together with a collection of operators, functions, or processes. Since anything that exists is an informational object, the totality of all beings too has an informational character (“the infosphere”).

Computer Ethics Today Broadly speaking, we could say that information technology ethics is a very complex field, which studies relations between events, concepts, and policies, under the light of the ongoing interaction of information technology and society. The growing variety of technological applications creates new, unexpected situations and possibilities, as a consequence of which new dilemmas and values emerge. Creating web pages, for example, has value in our society, while this wasn’t the case a few years ago. We believe that only through the study and evaluation of different alternative policies can we acquire the knowledge necessary for the optimal utilization of new technologies. Information technology ethics deals with novel questions raised by technological development; but this does not mean that such questions accompany each and every issue in which technology is involved (as, for example, in a robbery of materials from a pc lab). Computer science created many new possibilities, the consequences of which have not yet been evaluated. Following Moor’s definition[35], the principal subject of computer

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ethics is the policy vacuums appearing in many of computer science’s applications. Thus, the central question is what do we have to do - and which policies do we have to follow – on a personal, as well as on a collective level. But in order to answer these questions, we must first solve the relevant theoretical problems and study, to this end, many different cases and applications. The lack of policies often leads to the simplified view that the object of information technology ethics is something easy: we must simply create new policies to fill the existing gap. But, as we have seen, in reality things are much more complex. A first approach to the ethical issues posed by computer science, is based on the extension of well-known rules and theories to the new conditions, to fill the existing policy gap. For example, the issue of freedom of speech on the Internet, or issues of software copyright, can be dealt with using classical rules of ethical behavior. This approach is called traditionalist account. But information and communications technology is always applied to a specific social environment, which has a history, values and ideas. Thus, the study of a society is a prerequisite for the creation of new policies related to the propagation of information technology. Furthermore, the latter’s range of applications spans many different fields of human activity like work, home, education, governance, administration, and medicine, each of which requires a specialized approach when it comes to the ethical issues presented in it. A country’s political tradition is another very important factor defining the relevant policies. In Britain and the US, for example, there is a long tradition of protecting private life, which is thought of as a foundation of their democracy. Finally, a basic motive for the study of information technology ethics comes from the reaction of each social environment to this technology. Through these reactions we can understand facets of the social environment that are unknown, or impossible to access otherwise. Thus, computer ethics offers a novel approach to the study of society. Of course the integration of new technologies in an environment takes place gradually. The initial requirements concern mainly the support of already existent processes in a technological way. During a second phase, and only after the technology has been fully introduced, men begin to discover new possibilities and change their habits in order to use them. Thus, although many times there is a gap in policy matters concerning technology, computer science is always applied to a specific social environment[35].

The Formal Logic of Computer Ethics Deontic, Epistemic and Action Logic Any formal logical system for computer ethics must combine deontic, epistemic, and dynamic (or action) logic, since all three are indespensable to ethical reasoning and specification. The formal framework of modal logic with Kripke-style possible-world semantics can accomodate them all. Deontic logic concerns the logical structure of (the concepts of) obligation, permission, and prohibition. The main logical operator of deontic logic is O (“it is obligatory that”). With the help of O, more operators of deontic logic can be defined like P p (‘it is permissible that p)= ¬O¬p, F p(”it is forbided that p”)= O¬p. Standard Deontic logic is the most studied formal system of deontic logic, an one of the first to be axiomatically specified. A member of the class of modal logics, it accepts a standard “Kripke-style” possible-world

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semantics (that is, characterized by accessibility relations between possible worlds). Although it was introduced in the context of philosophical logic, deontic logic has often been used in computer science. Epistemic logic is the logic of propositions concerning knowledge and belief. The logic of beliefs is often referred to separately as Doxastic logic, but here we will take epistemic logic to refer to a combination of both, captured formally by the standard modal approach to knowledge and belief. The two main operators of this logical system are: Ka (“agent a knows that”); Ba (“agent a believes that”). Some of the logical deduction rules of this logical system are the following:

1. Ka(A → B) → (KaA → KaB) 2. Ba(A → B) → (BaA → BaB) 3. KaA → BaA (knowledge implies belief) 4. KaA → A (knowledge presupposes truth) This model of epistemic logic also accepts Kripke-style semantics. Action logic concerns the properties of logical propositions in relation to action and has many applications in computer science, since it is an extension of dynamic modal logic originally intended for reasoning about computer programs (Propositional Dynamic Logic [44]). The main operator of this logical system is Stit(“sees to it that”). The logic of Stit is a branch of modal logic, and its semantics is similar to that of modal and temporal logic; it is based on possible worlds and the relations holding between them. The logic of Stit is especially rich, and it is often enhanced with elements from temporal logic.

Computer Ethics Reasoning Examples of propositions from computer ethics are the following[47]: • If Peter has a copyright over some song X, then John must have Peter’s permission in order to acquire, process, and circulate X (this proposition concerns copyright issues). • If X consists of John’s personal data, and Peter does not have them in his possession, then Peter is not allowed to have them without John’s consent. Peter must have John’s permission if he wishes to acquire, process, and circulate X (this proposition concerns personal data). • If A is informed concerning X, then all must be informed concerning X (this proposition concerns equal access to information). Especially when it comes to logical propositions concerning information, they can have one of the following forms, or a combination of them:

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1. A informs B 2. A tells B that p 3. A lets B know that p 4. A shares his knowledge that p with B 5. A informs B about p 6. A sends a message to the effect that p to B Logical propositions like the above concern, among others: • Agents • Information contexts • Information actions (types: acquisition, processing, dissemination) • Informational content • Information relations between agents For applications, it is many times necessary to combine more than one logical systems in one common logical framework[45]. n this way we can have expressions with operators belonging to more than one logical system (deontic logic, epistemic logic, action logic). Some examples are the following: 1. O(KaA → ∀xKxA) 2. O[aStit : ∀xKxA] 3. O[aStit : ∀x(F x → BxOA)] One way of approaching the synthesis of such logical systems is by using theory of institutions techniques. The advantages of such an approach are numerous. As we will see in the next section, institutions give us a way of formalizing the notion of a logical system independently of the underlying language and logic, and allows us to construct a single flexible framework containing all the logics involved in computer ethics reasoning. Furthermore, this formal framework can be readily used for the performance of computer-supported computer ethics, as some of the most interesting applications of formal logic are formal methods, and automated proof. Formal methods are techniques and tools based on formal logic and mathematics, used to model complex systems as mathematical entities, and perform formal verification and model checking in a more thorough fashion than empirical testing. In recent research, for instance, it is pointed out that multi-agent deontic logics can offer the appropriate application framework for trust-worthy robots [3] . Mechanically verified proofs via deontic logic are the appropriate means for the description and verification of agent actions.

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The Theory of Institutions Short Presentation The theory of institutions was developed by Joseph Goguen and Rod Burstall as an abstract model-theoretical framework, to be used in computer science for specification and programming [23]. The concept of institution has two theoretical sources; one is the abstract model theory of Barwise [5], and the other is the category theory of Eilenberg and MacLane [33, 32]. We could say that although mathematically institutions are categorical structures, their spirit is that of abstract model theory. Model theory studies classes of structures; these are usually collections of structures that satisfy a set of sentences of first-order logic. Model theory by definition works with the semantic aspect of logic, but the dialectics between the syntactic and semantic attitudes is central. Abstract model theory studies formal languages other than first-order logic (mostly extentions of first-order logic). The theory of institutions is a very general mathematical study of formal logical systems – with emphasis on semantics – that is not committed to any particular logic. It is based upon a mathematical definition of the informal notion of a logical system, called institution, which includes syntax and semantics, as well as the relationship between them. This definition relies heavily upon category theory concepts. Because of its very high level of abstraction, it accommodates not only well-established logical systems (like propositional and predicate logic), but also very unconventional ones (like higher-order, modal, and intuitionistic logic). Moreover it can serve as a template for defining new logics. An institution consists of four kinds of entities: signatures, sentences, models, and a satisfaction relation holding between models and sentences. All these are considered fully abstractly and axiomatically. This means that models and sentences may be arbitrary objects; the only assumption is that there is a satisfaction relation between them, telling whether a sentence holds in a model or not. Satisfaction is based on Tarski’s semantic definition of truth. The importance that institutions theory places on the dialectics between syntax and semantics - despite its emphasis on semantics - is not accidental. An adequate formalization of logic as used in computer science must achieve a tricky balance between syntax and semantics. On the one hand, syntax is fundamental, because we deal with finite texts that (partially) describe computations, and we manipulate such texts, e.g., with proofs, translations, and type checks. On the other hand, semantics is fundamental, because we are really interested in the models, not their descriptions; we are interested in computations and proofs, and we manipulate their syntactic representations, only because we hope that they correspond to reality3 . Tarski’s truth definition for first order logic [43] is a traditional reconciliation of these two views of what is fundamental, based on the notion of satisfaction as a binary relation between models and sentences. Some such notion is needed for the modelling of the very 3 Actually - as Goguen points out - this is a rather nave view, because we never really have reality, but only models; further, we do not really “have models” either, but only descriptions of them. Moreover, these descriptions are often given using powerful idealistic constructions, such as power sets and dependent types, whose ultimate consistency cannot be proved.

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basic notions of soundness and completeness of logical systems, because the latter depend in an essential way upon the relationship between provability (which is syntactic) and satisfaction (which is semantic i.e., concerns “truth” in the Tarskian sense). These notions, in turn, are basic to classical treatments of the adequacy of rules of deduction for logical systems; soundness and completeness with respect to an intuitively plausible class of models give us far greater confidence in a set of rules of deduction, and make their range of applicability more precise. Institutions were initially presented in the form of a specification language called Clear [9]. Clear’s driving idea was that the essence of a specification language is to provide the machinery for building large specifications from smaller ones in a way that is independent of the underlying logic. Logics are expressed there as institutions, and specifications as theories over institutions. The significance of such a development is evident, if one considers the population explosion of different logics used in computer science at the time. The classical definition of an institution is the following: Definition. (Institution): an institution I = (Sign, Sen, M od, ) is defined by: 1. a category Sign having signatures as objects, and signature morphisms as arrows; 2. a functor Sen : Sign → Set mapping each signature Σ in Sign to a set of Σsentences; 3. a functor M od : Sign → Catop assigning to eachΣ in Sign a category whose objects are Σ-models and whose morphisms are Σ-model morphisms; 4. a relation Σ ⊆ |M od(Σ)|×Sen(Σ) for each Σ ∈ |Sign|, called Σ-satisfaction, such that for each signature morphism φ : Σ → Σ´ , the satisfaction condition 0

m0 ’ Sen(φ)(e) iff M od(φ)(m )  e [18, 10] holds for each m0 ∈ |M od(Σ0 )| and each e ∈ Sen(Σ). We may denote the reduct functor M od(ϕ) by ϕ and the sentence translation Sen(φ) by φ(). Among the countless examples of logical systems that have been formally captured as institutions are equational logic, first, second, and higher-order logics, non-classical logics such as intuitionistic logics, a wide diversity of modal logics, fuzzy and many-valued logics, and semantic networks. In fact, it seems that any logic that has the notion of model is an institution in this sense (a detailed argument for this is given in [36]). Note that institutions can be generalized in various ways: one is to let the satisfaction relation take values other than true and false (generalized institutions [22]); another is to let model and sentence classes have more structure, such as a category [24]. To organize signatures, sentences and models, institutions rely on category theory. Categories allow the modeling of changes among these structures, including ways in which they can be combined. The satisfaction condition goes one step beyond Tarski’s classical semantic definition of truth, and generalizes Barwise’s translation axiom [23, 43, 36]. In essence, the satisfaction condition formalizes the well-known assumption that the truth of a sentence (in logic) is independent of the symbols chosen for its representation. This is

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assumed - but not clearly stated - as a philosophical axiom in both Tarski and Barwise. We believe that the independence of truth from notation is an important conceptual requirement for any abstract concept of semantics. Definition. (Theory over an Institution) 1. A Σ-theory presentation is a pair hΣ, Eiwhere Σ is a signature and E is a set of Σ-sentences. 2. A Σ-model satisfies a syntactic theory presentation hΣ, Ei if A satisfies each sentence in E, in which case we write A  E. 3. If E is a set of Σ-sentences, let E ∗ be the set of all Σ-models that satisfy each sentence in E. 4. I M is a set of Σ-models, let M ∗ be the set of all Σ-sentences that are satisfied by each model in M ; M ∗ also denotes hΣ, M ∗i. 5. By the closure of a set E of Σ-sentences we mean the set E ∗∗ , written E • . 6. A set E of Σ-sentences is closed if and only if E = E •. Then a Σ-theory is a syntactic theory presentation hΣ, Ei such that E is closed. 7. The theory presented by the theory presentation hΣ, Ei is hΣ, E •i Institutions form a category IN S which has as objects all institutions and as morphisms the so-called institution morphisms. The institution morphisms enable us to translate properly sentences from one logical system to sentences to another logical system. Within IN S we can also make categorical constructions in the style of ‘general system theory’, as for example, combining two institutions via colimits, etc. Definition. (Institution Morphisms) Let and 0 be institutions. Then an institution morphism 0 → consists of 1. a functor Φ : Sign0 → Sign, 2. a natural transformation α : Φ ◦ Sen ⇒ Sen0 , and 3. a natural transformation β : M od0 ⇒ Φop ◦ M od, such that the following satisfaction condition holds m Σ0 αΣ0 (e) iff βΣ0 (m) Σ0 Φ e for any Σ0 -model m0 from I 0 and any Σ0 Φ-sentence e from I. Definition. (Institution Modification) An institution modification between institution morphisms (Φ, α, β) ⇒ (Φ0, α0, β0)consists of 1. a natural transformation τ : Φ → Φ 2. a modification ω : β ⇒ β 0 ; τ M OD, i.e., for each Σ0 ∈ |Sign0 |, a natural transfor0 mation ωΣ0 : βΣ0 ⇒ βΣ 0 ; M OD (τΣ0 ).

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Semantics for Computer Science Ethics Kripke Institutions Possible worlds semantics (also called Kripke semantics) is a formal semantics for nonclassical logical systems created in the late fifties and early sixties by Saul Kripke [31]. Kripke semantics was initially developed for modal logics, and later adapted to intuitionistic logic and other non-classical systems. The discovery of Kripke semantics was a breakthrough in the theory of non-classical logics, because the model theory of such logics was almost non-existent before Kripke (algebraic semantics existed, but were considered ’syntax in disguise’). Apart from its great influence in philosophy, logic, and linguistics, possible worlds semantics have been repeatedly used in computing, and in particular in the dynamic logic of programs [38, 26, 30], process algebra [27, 7] and the temporal logic approach to concurrency [37, 18, 39]. A Kripke frame is a pair hW, Ri, where W is a non-empty set (of possible worlds) and R a binary relation on W . We write wRw 0 if and only if (w.w 0 ) ∈ R and we say that world w 0 is accessibe from world w, or that w 0 is reachable from w, or that w 0 is a successor of w. A Kripke model is a triple hW, R, V i, with W and R as above and V is a mapping P → 2W , where P is the set of propositional variables.V (p) is intended to be the set of worlds at which p is true under the valuation V . Given a model hW, R, V i with W and R as above and a world w ∈ W we define a satisfaction relation  by: w |= p w |= ¬A w |= A ∧ B w |= A ∨ B w |= A → B w |= A w |= A

iff iff iff iff iff iff iff

w ∈ V (p) w2A w  A and w |= B w  A or w |= B w 2 A or w |= B for all v ∈ W, (w, v) ∈ / R or v |= A there exists some v ∈ W, with (w, v) ∈ R and v |= A

We say that w satisfies A if and only if w |= A (without mentioning the valuation V ). A formula A is called satisfiable in a modelhW, R, V i, if and only if there exists some w ∈ W , such that w |= A. A formula A is called satisfiable in a frame hW, Ri , if and only if there exists some valuation V and some world w ∈ W , such that w |= A. A formula A is called valid in a model hW, R, V i, written as hW, R, V i |= A}, if and only if it is true at every world in W . A formula A is valid in a frame hW, Ri, written as hW, Ri |= A, if and only if it is valid in all models hW, R, V i. The most common way to interpret modal logic is via possible world semantics. In the case of deontic and epistemic logic, this is done in an obvious way; in the case of dynamic logic worlds are interpreted as states of a computer - in the application to program verification - , or as states of our environment - in applications to linguistics, AI, etc. (see also Predicate Dynamic Logic [44]). One role of possible world semantics is to formalize the intuitive notions of truth and validity for non-classical logics (like many-valued logic, modal logic, and intuitionistic logic), which are necessary for the definition of soundness and completeness for axiom systems. An inference rule is sound when validity of its premises implies validity of its conclusion. An axiom system is sound when all its axioms

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are valid and its inference rules are sound. An axiom system is complete when every valid formula is derivable as a theorem of that system. These concepts apply to all systems of logic including dynamic logic. Most attempts at modeling knowledge have been based on the possible worlds model. In order to do this, we must divide the set of possible worlds between those that are compatible with an agent’s knowledge, and those that are not. This generally conforms with common usage. If I know that it is either Friday or Saturday, then I know for sure that it is not Thursday. There is no possible world compatible with my knowledge where it is Thursday, since in all these worlds it is either Friday or Saturday. Deontic logic also accepts formal Kripke semantics. Possible worlds semantics can be introduced at an institution-independent level [17, 16]. More specifically, we can develop modal satisfaction (and consequently treat the satisfaction of modalities) on top of an abstract satisfaction relation. Given a base institution with amalgamation property of models, we can define a concept of Kripke model employing the models of the base institution [17]. The sharing constraint for the Kripke models (i.e., how much of the structure is shared between the models of the Kripke model) is managed abstractly by an institution morphism from the base institution to a simpler ‘domain’ institution. This provides a flexible method for tuning the level of rigidness of the Kripke models. This internalization of possible worlds semantics allows an extension of the satisfaction relation of the base institution to modal satisfaction for sentences extending the base sentences with modalities, Boolean connectives, and quantifiers. It has been proven that this yields a ‘modal’ institution on top of the base institution [17]. Alternatively, we can use stratified institutions (a decade old generalised version of the theory of institutions of Goguen and Burstall) as a fully abstract model theoretic approach to modal logic [16]. This allows for a uniform treatment of model theoretic aspects across the great multiplicity of contemporary modal logic systems. Moreover Kripke semantics (in all its manifold variations) is captured in an implicit manner free from the sometimes bulky aspects of explicit Kripke structures, also accommodating other forms of concrete semantics for modal logic systems. The conceptual power of stratified institutions is illustrated with the development of a modal ultraproducts method that is independent of the concrete details of the actual modal logical systems. Consequently, a wide array of compactness results in concrete modal logics may be derived easily. Note that because the institutional approach to modal logic is a model theoretic one, it differs from what is generally known under the name of ‘categorical modal logic’ which is proof theoretic inspired (a good reference of the latter is [2]). In what follows we will use the stratified institutions approach. Stratified Institutions Stratified institutions have been introduced by Marc Aiguier and Fabrice Barbier (see [4]) in order to model valuations of variables or states of models. Although it is possible to develop a great deal of model theory using this technique, its biggest promise seems to be for the problem of combining logics, which is currently one of the most challenging problems. Informally, the main idea behind the concept of stratified institution as introduced in [1] is to enhance the concept of institution with ‘states’ for the models. Thus each model

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M comes equipped with a set [M ]. A typical example is given by the Kripke models, where [M ] is the set of the possible worlds in the Kripke structure M . Definition. (Stratified Institution) (SignI , SenI , M odI , JKI , I ) consists of:

A

stratified

institution

I

=

• a category SignI of signatures, • a sentence functor SenI : SignI → Set; • a model functor M odI : (SignI )op → CAT; • a “stratification” lax natural transformation JKI : M odI ⇒ SET, where SET : SignI → CAT is a functor mapping each signature to Set; and • a satisfaction relation between models and sentences which is parameterized by I model states, M (I )w Σ % where w ∈ JM KΣ such that I M odI (φ)(M )(I )JM Kφ (w) ρ if and only if M (I )w Σ0 Sen (φ)(ρ)

holds for any signature morphism ϕ : Σ → Σ0 , Σ0 -model M , w ∈ JM KIΣ0 , and Σ-sentence ρ. Ordinary institutions are the stratified institutions for which JM KΣ is always a singleton set. Like for ordinary institutions, when appropriate we shall also use simplified notations without superscripts or subscripts that are clear from the context. Definition. For any stratified institution I = (Sign, Sen, M od, JK , ) we say that JK is surjective when for each signature morphism ϕ : Σ → Σ0 and each Σ0 -model M 0 ,JM 0 Kϕ : JM 0 KΣ0 → JM od(ϕ)(M 0 )KΣ is surjective. Fact.Each stratified institution I = (Sign, Sen, M od, JK , ) with JK surjective determines an (ordinary) institution I ∗ = (Sign, Sen, M od, ∗) (called the global institution of I) by defining (M ∗Σ ρ) = ∧ {M ∗Σ ρ} | w ∈ JM KΣ Fact.Let I be a stratified institution with JK surjective. For eachE ⊆ Sen(Σ)and each ρ ∈ Sen(Σ), we have that E # ρ implies E ∗ ρ The institutions I # andI ∗ represent generalizations of the concepts of local and global satisfaction, respectively, from modal logic (e.g. [8]). Examples of stratified institutions include modal propositional logic, first-order modal logic, and hybrid logics. In what follows we present the case for modal propositional logic, since this is the most common form of modal logic (e.g. [8], etc.). Let SignM P L = Set. For any signature P , commonly referred to as ‘set of propositional variables’, the set of its sentences SenM P L (P ) is the set S defined by the following grammar S ::= P | S ∧ S | ¬S | S

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A P -model is Kripke structure (W, M ) where • W = (|W | , Wλ )consists of set (of ‘possible worlds’) |W | and an ‘accesibility’ relation Wλ ⊆ |W | × |W |; and • M : |W | → 2P . A homomorphism h : (W, M ) → (V, N ) between Kripke structures is a homomorphism of binary relations h : W → V (i.e., h : |W | → |V | such that h (Wλ ) ⊆ Vλ ) and such that for each w ∈ |W | , M w ⊆ N h(w) . The satisfaction of any P -sentence ρ in a Kripke structure (W, M ) at w ∈ |W | is defined by recursion on the structure of ρ: w • ((W, M ) w P π) = (π ∈ M ); w w • ((W, M ) |=w P ρ1 ∧ ρ2 ) = ((W, M ) |=P ρ1 ) ∧ (((W, M ) |=P ρ2 )); w • ((W, M ) |=w P ¬ρ) = ¬ ((W, M ) |=P ρ); and   w0 • ((W, M ) |=w ρ) = ∧ 0 (W, M ) |= ρ . (w,w )∈Wλ P P

For any function ϕ : P → P 0 the ϕ-translation of a P -sentence just replaces each π ∈ P by ϕ(π) and the ϕ-reduct of a P 0 -structure (W, M 0) is the P -structure (W, M ) where for 0 each w ∈ |W |, M w = ϕ; M w . The stratification is defined by J(W, M )KP = |W |. Various ‘sub-institutions’ of M P L are obtained by restricting the semantics to particular classes of frames. Important examples are M P Lt, M P Ls4, and M P Ls5 which are obtained by restricting the frames W to those which are respectively, reflexive, preorder, or equivalence (see e.g. [8]). The semantics of Boolean connectives and quantifiers are extended from ordinary institutions (see [15, 12, 40] etc.) to stratified institutions. Based on the structure of the latter, we define the semantics of modalities at the level of abstract stratified institutions [16]. In this way we can construct three stratified institutions, corresponding to deontic, epistemic, and action logic.

Grothendieck Institutions Grothendieck institutions are an extention of the Grothendieck construction used in category theory, which has been suggested as an appropriate underlying mathematical structure for the semantics of multi-paradigm (heterogeneous) algebraic specifications [14]. For the same reasons, Grothendieck institutions are an ideal mathematical framework for the semantics of computer ethics, which require the simultaneous use of deontic, epistemic, and action logic. Multi-paradigm (heterogeneous) logical specification, or programming languages, admit institution semantics in which each paradigm has an underlying institution, and paradigm embedding formally corresponds to institution morphism. This leads to a concept of indexed institution which generalizes indexed categories of [29, 42]. Semantics of multiparadigm specification languages requires the extension of the institution concepts across indexed institutions; this can be naturally achieved by an extension of the Grothendieck

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construction for indexed categories to indexed institutions, which leads to the concept of Grothendieck institution. Indexed categories are categories (defined) over a collection of indices. The mathematics literature [29] develops indexed categories “up to coherent isomorphism”. In contrast, Tarlecki et al [42] develop “strict” indexed categories, which are defined “up to equality”, a special case that often arises in theoretical computer science. For our present purposes, we will use the “strict” approach. Any indexed category gives rise to a “flattened” category by taking the disjoint union of the component categories and adding reduct morphisms; this is the so-called “Grothendieck construction”[25]. A flattened indexed category has a projection functor, which maps each object to the index of the component category from which it came. This is the “fibred category”[25] presented by the indexed category. Benabou [6] argues that fibred categories formalise the same intuition as indexed categories, but are easier to work with and conceptually simpler. However, his argument does not apply to our strict indexed categories, which are simpler still, and are not proposed for use in foundations, but only as a tool for doing theoretical computer science. The Grothendieck construction for (“strict”) indexed categories is given below: Definition. (Indexed Category) An indexed category (Tarlecki et al., 1991) B over an index category I is a functor I op → Cat. Given an index i ∈ |I|, we may write Bi for the category B(i), and given an index morphism u : i → j, we may write Bu for the functor B(u) : B(j) → B(i). The following ‘flattening’ construction providing the canonical fibration associated to an indexed category is known under the name of the Grothendieck construction: Definition. (Grothendieck Category) Given an indexed category B : I op → Cat, let B # be the Grothendieck category having hi, Σi, with i ∈ |I| and Σ ∈ |Bi|, as objects and hu, ϕi : hi, Σi → hi0 , Σ0 i, with u ∈ I(i, i0) and φ : Σ → Σ0 B u , as arrows. The composition of arrows in B # is defined by hu, ϕi; hu0, ϕ0 i = hu; u0, ϕ; (ϕ0B u )i. By defining the canonical compositions (both vertical and horizontal) for institution morphisms and modifications, we can define a 2-category Ins which has institutions as objects (0-cells), institution morphisms as 1-cells, and their modifications as 2-cells. In the literature there are several other concepts of institution homomorphism (such as the so-called “institution representations”), each of them being adequate to some specific class of problems; a survey on this topic can be found in [41]. The definition presented above and originally given by [23] intuitively expresses that a “richer” institution is built over a “poorer” one This definition is also a structure preserving one. The following definition generalizes the concept of indexed category to institutions. Definition. (Indexed Institution) An indexed institution J is a functor J : I op → Ins. The following theorem generalizes the Grothendieck construction from categories to institutions:

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Theorem. The 2-category of institutions Ins admits a Grothendieck construction for each indexed institutionJ : I op → Ins. Proof. [R] The explicit structure of the Grothendieck institution of an indexed institution is given by the following: The Grothendieck institution J # of an indexed institution J : I op → Ins has 1. the Grothendieck category Sign# as its category of signatures,where Sign : I op → Cat is the indexed category of signatures of the indexed institution J, 2. M od# : (Sign#)op → Cat as its model functor, where (a) M od# (hi, Σi) = M odi(Σ)for each index i ∈ |I| and signature Σ ∈ |Signi|, and (b) M od# (hu, φi) = β u Σ0 ◦ M odi (φ) for each hu, φi : hi, Σi → hi0 , Σ0i. 3. Sen# : Sign# → Set as its sentence functor, where (a) Sen# (hi, Σi) = Seni (Σ) for each index i ∈ |I| and signature Σ ∈ |Signi|, and (b) Sen# (hu, φi) = Seni (φ) ; ◦αuΣ0 for each hu, φi : hi, Σi → hi0 , Σ0 i, i i 4. m| # hi,Σi e iff m  e, for each index i ∈ |I|, signature Σ ∈ |Sign |, model m ∈ |M od# (hi, Σi) |, and sentence e ∈ Sen# (hi, Σi).

where J i = (Signi, M odi, Seni, i) for each index i ∈ |I| and J u = (Φu , αu , β u ) for u ∈ I index morphism. Corollary. The concept of extra theory morphism across an institution morphism 0 → (with all its subsequent concepts) is recuperated as an ordinary theory morphism in the Grothendieck institution of the indexed institution given by the morphism 0 → (i.e., which has • • as its index category) [13].

Grothendieck Kripke Institutions: Semantics for Computer Science Ethics All that has been presented above was meant to show that with the help of Kripke and Grothendieck institutions we can construct a single logical framework combining deontic, epistemic, and action logic, and thus providing semantics for computer ethics. More specifically, each (modal) logical system is given a possible worlds semantics and is represented by a stratified institution. The modalities corresponding to each system are represented by the diamond and box operators; deontic logic’s obligation O is modelled by the box operator, knowledge K and belief B of epistemic logic by the box and diamond operators respectively, and action logic’s Stit by the diamond operator. Dynamic logic is a multimodal logic, associating to every action a the modal operators [a] and hai. Nevertheless,

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this is not a problem because multi-modal open first-order logic can be also represented by an institution. In this way we get three “modal” (stratified) institutions corresponding to deontic, epistemic, and action logic, each given possible worlds semantics. Now we wish to merge these three institutions D,E, and A into one single logical framework. This can be achieved by constructing a Grothendieck institution out of them. First we construct an indexed institution J, whose index set I contains the indices k, l, m ∈ I, such that J (k) = D, J(l) = E, and J(m) = A. Because of the theorem mentioned above, we can construct a Grothendieck institution J # out of the indexed instituntion J : I op → Ins. This new institution will have as its category of signatures the Grothendieck category Sign# , where Sign : I op → Cat is the indexed category of signatures of the indexed insitution J. In other words, the signature of J # consists in the signatures of institutions D, E, and A, Sign(k), Sign(l), and Sign(m) respectively. Its model functor will be M od# : (Sign#)op → Cat, which consists in the model functors of institutions D, E, and A. In a similar way, its sentence functor will be Sen# : Sign# → Set, that is, the sentence functors of D, E, and A. Finally, the satisfaction condition between models and sentences is parametrized by the index, that is, by the modal institution to which the signature, sentence, and model belong to. The Grothendieck institution we have constructed incorporates the modal institutions of deontic, epistemic, and action logic, offering an appropriate semantics for computer ethics. Apart from its usefulness for the analysis and theoretical study of computer ethics issues, it can also be used for the implementation of computer-supported computer ethics, which is a much promising area for further research. Such implementations would greatly facilitate the study of ethical problems characteristic of the information age. Even more, they invoke the possibility of computing machines capable of ethical reasoning, hopefully always under the close supervision of a humanity humble in recognizing its special nature, and wise enough to invest in its true flourishing.

References [1] Aiguier M. and Diaconescu R. Stratified institutions and elementary homomorphisms. Information Processing Letters, 103(1):5–13, 2007. [2] Alechina N., Mendler M., V. de Paiva and Ritter E. Categorical and kripke semantics for constructive s4 modal logic. In Proceedings of the 15th International Workshop on Computer Science Logic, pages 292–307. Springer-Verlag, 2001. [3] Arkoudas K, Bringsjord S. and Bello P. Toward ethical robots via mechanized deontic logic. In Proceedings of the AAAI 2005 Fall Symbosium, 2005. [4] Barbier F. Generalisation et preservation au travers de la combinaison des logique des resultats de theorie des modeles standards lies a la structuration des specifications algebriques. PhD thesis, Universite Evry, 2005. [5] Barwise J. Axioms for abstract model theory. Annals of Mathematical Logic, 7:221– 265, 1974.

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[6] Benabou J. Fibered categories and thew foundations of naive category theory. Journal of Symbolic Logic, 50:10–37, 1985. [7] Bergsta J., Ponse A. and Smolka S. Process Algebra. Elsevier, 2001. [8] Blackburn P., M. de Rijke and Venema Y. Modal Logic. Cambridge University Press, 2001. [9] Burstall R. and Goguen J. The semantics of clear, a specification language. In D. Bjorner, editor, Proceedings of the 1979 Copenhagen Winter School on Abstract Software Specifications, pages 292–332, 1979. [10] Terell W. Bynum. Computer ethics in the computer science curriculum. In Terrell Ward Bynum, W. Maner and John L. Fodor, editors, Teaching Computer Ethics. Research Center on Computing and Society, 1993. [11] Terrell W. Bynum. The foundation of computer ethics. Computers and Society, June issue 2000, 1999. [12] Diaconescu J., R. Institution-independent Model Theory. Birkhauser, Berlin, 2008. [13] Diaconescu R. Extra theory morphisms for institutions: Logical semantics for multiparadigm languages. Applied Categorical Structures, 6:427–453, 1998. [14] Diaconescu R. Grothendieck institutions. Applied Categorical Structures, 10(4):383– 402, 2002. [15] Diaconescu R. Institution-independent ultraproducts. Fundamenta Informaticae, 55(3-4):321–348, 2003. [16] Diaconescu R. Implicit kripke semantics and ultraproducts in stratified institutions. Journal of Logic and Computation, 27(5):1577–1606, 2017. [17] Diaconescu R. and Stefaneas P. Ultraproducts and possible-worlds semantics in institutions. Theoretical Computer Science, 379(1):210–230, 2007. [18] Emerson E. Temporal and modal logic. In van Leeuwen, editor, Formal Models and Semantics,Handbook of Theoretical Computer Science, volume 2, pages 995–1072. Elsevier, 1990. [19] Floridi L. Information ethics: Its nature and scope. In J. van den Hoven and J. Weckert, editors, Information Technology and Moral Philosophy, pages 40–65. Cambridge University Press, 2008. [20] Floridi L. Information ethics: Its nature and scope. Computers and Society, 36(3):21– 36, 2006. [21] Floridi L. Information ethics: Its nature and scope. Computers and Society, 36(3):21– 36, 2006.

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[22] Goguen J. A study in the functions of programming methodology: Specifications, insitutions, charters and parchments. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science, volume 240, pages 113–133. Springer, 1985. [23] Goguen J. and Burstall R. Institutions: Abstract model theory for specification and programming. Journal of the Association for Computing Machinery, 39(1):95–146, 1992. [24] Goguen J. and Rosu G. Institution morphisms. Formal Aspects of Computing, 13:274– 307, 2002. [25] Grothendieck A. Categories fibrees et descente [Fibered categories and descent]. In Revetements etales et groupe fondamental, Seminaire de Geometrie Algebraique du Bois-Marie 1960/61, volume Expose VI, pages 119–151. Institut des Hautes Etudes Scientifiques, 1963. [26] Harel D. Dynamic logic. In D. Gabbay and F. Guenthner, editors, Extensions of Classical Logic, Handbook of Philosophical Logic, volume 2, pages 497–604. Reidel, 1984. [27] Hennessy M. and Milner R. Algebraic laws for non-determinism and concurrency. Journal of the Association for Computing Machinery, 32:137–161, 1985. [28] Deborah G. Johnson. Computer Ethics. Pearson, Lincoln, 2003. [29] Johnstone P.I., Pare R., Rosebrugh R.D., Schumacher D., Wood R.J. and Wraith G.C. Indexed categories and their applications. In Johnstone P.I. and Pare R., editors, Lecture Notes in Mathematics, volume 661, chapter Abstract Families and the Adjoint Functor Theorems, pages 1–125. Springer, Berlin, 1978. [30] Kozen D. and Tiury@bookn J. Logic of programs. In Formal Models and Semantics,Handbook of Theoretical Computer Science, volume 2, pages 789–840. Elsevier, 1990. [31] Kripke S. A completeness theorem in modal logic. Journal of Symbolic Logic, 24:1– 15, 1959. [32] MacLane S. Categories for the working mathematcian. In Graduate Texts in Mathematics, volume 5. Springery, 1998. [33] MacLane S. and Eilenberg S. General theory of natural eqivalences. Transactions of the American Mathematical Society, 58(2):231–294, 1945. [34] Maner W. Starter Kit in Computer Ethics. Helvetia Press and the National Information and Resource Center for Teaching Philosophy, Hyde Park, New York, 1980. [35] James H. Moor. What is computer ethics? Metaphilosophy, 16(4):266–275, 1985. [36] Mossakowski T., Goguen J., Diaconescu R. and Tarlecki A.. What is a logic? In JeanYves Beziau, editor, Logica Universalis, pages 113–133. Birkhauser, Basel, 2007.

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[37] Pnueli A. The temporal semantics of concurrent programs. Theoretical Computer Science, 13:45–60, 1981. [38] Pratt V. Semantical considerations on floyd-hoare logic. In Proceedings of the 17th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, pages 109–121, 1976. [39] Stirling C. Modal and temporal logics. In Abramsky S., Gabbay D. and Maibaum T., editors, Handbook of Logic in Computer Science, volume 2, pages 477–563. Oxford University Press, 1992. [40] Tarlecki A., Quasi-varieties in abstract algebraic institutions. Journal of Computer and System Sciences, 33(3):333–360, 1986. [41] Tarlecki A., Moving between logical systems. In M. Haveraaen, O. Owe and O-J. Dahl, editors, Proceedings of 11th Workshop on Specification of Abstract Data Types, pages 478–502, Oslo, Norway, 1995. [42] Tarlecki A., Burstall R. and Goguen J., Some fundamental algebraic tools for the semantics of computation, part 3: Indexed categories. Theoretical Computer Science, 91:239–264, 1991. [43] Tarski A. The semantic conception of truth and the foundations of semantic. Philosophical Phenomenological Rresearch, 4(3):341–376, 1944. [44] J. van Benthem. Modal Logic for Open Minds. CSLI Publications, United States, 2010. [45] M.J. van den Hoven and Lokhorst G.J.C., Deontic logic and computer-supported computer ethics. Metaphilosophy, 33 (3)(3):376–386, 2002. [46] Weizenbaum J. Computer Power and Human Reason: From Judgment to Calculation. Freeman, 1976. [47] Wiegel V., M.J. van den Hoven and Lokhorst G.J.C., Privacy, deontic epistemic action logic and software agents. Ethics and Information Technology, 7(4):251–264, 2005. [48] Wiener N., Cybernetics: or Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine. MIT Press, Cambridge, 1948. [49] Wiener N., The Human Use of Human Beings: Cybernetics and Society. Doubleday Anchor, New York, 2nd edition, 1954.

In: Cyber-Security and Information Warfare Editor: Nicholas J. Daras

ISBN: 978-1-53614-385-0 c 2019 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

Chapter 7

N OTES ON THE E STIMATION OF THE A SYMPTOTICS OF THE M OMENTS FOR THE m C OLLECTOR ’ S P ROBLEM Aristides V. Doumas∗ Department of Mathematics, National Technical University of Athens, Zografou Campus, Athens, Greece

Abstract The general collector’s problem describes a process in which N distinct coupons are placed in an urn and randomly selected one at a time (with replacement) until at least m of all N existing different types of coupons have been selected. Let Tm (N ) the random variable denoting the number of trials needed for this goal. We briefly present the leading asymptotics of the (rising) moments of Tm (N ) as N → ∞ for large classes of coupon probabilities. It is proved that the expectation of Tm (N ) becomes minimum when the coupons are uniformly distributed. Moreover, a theorem on the asymptotic estimates of the rising moments of Tm (N ) by comparison with known sequences of coupon probabilities is proved.

Keywords: urn problems, coupon collector’s problem, double Dixie cup problem, rising moments, Zipf law, Schur functions AMS Subject Classification: 78M05;60F99; 41A60

1.

Introduction

We consider the following classical urn problem. Suppose that N distinct types of balls are placed in an urn from which balls are being collected independently with replacement, each one with probability pj , j = 1, 2, · · · , N . Let Tm (N ) be the number of trials needed until each ball has been collected m times, where m is a fixed positive integer. This process is, sometimes, called double dixie cup problem, while for the particular case where ∗

Corresponding Author Email: [email protected].

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m = 1 is the so-called coupon collector’s problem. The problem for the case m = 1 has a long history (its origin can be traced back to De Moivre’s treatise De Mensura Sortis of 1712 and Laplace’s pioneering work Theorie Analytique de Probabilites of 1812), and its applications lie on several areas of science hence (e.g., biology, linguistics, search algorithms). For general values of m and for pj = 1/N D. J. Newman and L. Shepp [7] and soonafter, P. Erd˝os and A. R´enyi [5] determined the expectation, as well as the limit distribution of Tm (N ). They proved that   Tm (N ) − N ln N − (m − 1)N ln ln N + N ln(m − 1)! −y ≤ y = e−e . lim P N →∞ N (1.1) For general values of m and for the case of unequal coupon probabilities one nay find useful results in [4], where the authors developed techniques of computing the asymptotics of the first and the second moment of Tm (N ), the variance, as well as, the limit distribution for large classes of coupon probabilities.Let Tm (N )(r) := Tm (N )(Tm(N ) + 1) · · ·(Tm (N ) + r − 1),

r = 1, 2, . . .

(1.2)

i.e., r-th rising moment of Tm(N ). In this paper we present leading asymptotics for the rising moments of the random variable Tm (N ), for rich classes of probabilities. We prove that E[ Tm(N )(r) ] becomes minimum when the pj ’s are uniformly distributed by using the Schur - Ostrowski criterion. Finally, a theorem that helps us obtain asymptotic estimates by comparison with sequences of coupon probabilities, for which the asymptotics are known, is presented.

2.

The Rising Moments of Tm(N )

Let α = {aj }∞ j=1 be a sequence of strictly positive numbers. Then, for each integer N > 0, one can create a probability measure πN = {p1 , ..., pN } on the set of types {1, ..., N } by taking N X aj pj = , where AN = aj . (2.1) AN j=1

By a Poissonization technique it is not hard to get explicit formulae for the moments and the moment generating function of Tm(N ) (see, [4]):   Z ∞ N  h i Y   1 − Sm (pj t)e−pj t E Tm (N )(r) = r 1− tr−1 dt (2.2)   0 j=1

Z h i G(z) := E z −Tm (N ) = 1 − (z − 1)

0



∞

1− 

N Y 

j=1

   1 − Sm (pj t)e−pj t e−(z−1)t dt, 

(2.3)

Notes on the Estimation of the Asymptotics of the Moments ...

131

for 1, r = 1, 2, . . . , and Sm (y) denotes the m-th partial sum of ey , namely Sm (y) := 1 + t +

m−1 X yl y m−1 y2 +···+ = . 2! (m − 1)! l!

(2.4)

l=0

We introduce the notation Em (N ; α; r) : = r

Z

∞

0



  N  Y 1 − 1 − e−aj t Sm (aj t)  tr−1 dt.

(2.5)

j=1

∞ For a sequence α = {aj }∞ j=1 and a number s > 0 we set sα = {saj }j=1 . Hence, h i E Tm (N )(r) = ArN Em (N ; α; r).

(2.6)

  Under (2.6) the problem of estimating E Tm (N )(r) can be treated as two separate problems, namely estimating ArN and estimating Em (N ; α; r, (see (2.5)). The estimation of ArN can be considered an external matter which can be handled by existing powerful methods, such as the Euler-Maclaurin sum formula, the Laplace method for sums (see, e.g., [1]), or even summation by parts. Let    Z ∞ ∞  Y 1 − Lm (N ; α; r) := lim Em (N ; α; r) = r 1 − e−aj t Sm (aj t)  tr−1 dt. N

0

j=1

(2.7)



Theorem 2.1. For any fixed positive integers m and r, E Tm (N ) when all pj ’s are equal.

 (r)

becomes minimum

Proof. To prove the theorem it suffices to show that, for a fixed t > 0, the maximum of the quantity N Y   1 − e−pj t Sm (pj t) , j=1

subject to the constraints p1 + · · · + pN = 1, pj > 0, j = 1, 2, · · · , N , occurs when all pj ’s are equal. Set φ : (0, 1)N −→ (0, ∞), φ(p1 · · · , pN ) :=

N X j=1

  ln 1 − e−pj t Sm (pj t) .

Clearly, φ is symmetric w.r.t. its variables. Now, if for all 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ N,   ∂φ (p1 , p2 , · · · , pN ) ∂φ (p1 , p2, · · · , pN ) (pi − pj ) − ≤ 0, ∂pi ∂pj

(2.8)

(2.9)

then, φ will be a Schur–concave function (see, [6], page 84, theorem A.4) and will attain its maximum when all pj ’s are equal (see, [6], page 413). We have ∂φ (p1 , p2 , · · · , pN ) t e−pi t (tpi )m−1 = · . ∂pi (m − 1)! 1 − e−pi tSm (pi t)

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It suffices to obtain that the function f (·) is decreasing, where f (x) :=

e−x xm−1 , x > 0. 1 − e−x Sm (x)

Observing that

we have


0 e−x xm−1 e−x Sm (x) = − , (m − 1)! f 0 (x) =

where

e−x xm−2 g(x), [1 − e−x Sm (x)]2

(2.10)

  e−x xm . g(x) := (m − 1 − x) 1 − e−x Sm (x) − (m − 1)!

(2.11)

Notice that g(x) extends to a smooth function on R. In particular g(0) = 0. If m = 1, then g(x) = −x and (2.11) implies that f 0 (x) < 0 for all x > 0. For m ≥ 2 we have g 0 (x) = −1 + e−x Sm (x) − and g 00 (x) = − (m − 1)

e−x xm−1 , g 0 (0) = 0, (m − 1)!

e−x xm−2 < 0, (m − 1)!

x > 0.

Thus g(x) < 0 for all x > 0. Therefore, f 0 (x) < 0 for all x > 0 and the proof is completed.  The following theorem is related to our recent work [4] and the proof is omitted. Theorem 2.2. Lm (N ; α; r) < ∞ simultaneously for all positive (fixed) integers m and r, if and only if there exist a ξ ∈ (0, 1) such that ∞ X

ξ aj < ∞.

j=1

If Lm (N ; α; r) < ∞, then for all positive integers m and r we have h i E Tm (N )(r) = ArN Lm (N ; α; r) [1 + o(1)] as N → ∞. Examples of this case are the positive power law, namely α = {j p}∞ j=1 , where p > 0. In particular, when p = 1 we have the so-called linear case. Also, the families ofsequences  ∞ ∞ κ = eqj j=1 and where q > 0 fall in this case. Notice that the sequences β = e−qj j=1 produce the same coupon probabilities with κ, hence they are covered too. For the challenging case where Lm (N ; α; r) = ∞ for some fixed positive integer r (and for any fixed m) we write aj in the form aj = f (j)−1

(2.12)

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Notes on the Estimation of the Asymptotics of the Moments ... where f (x) > 0

f 0 (x) > 0,

and

(2.13)

and we will discuss our problem for large classes of distributions. In particular, we will cover the cases where f (·) belongs to the class of positive and strictly increasing C 3 (0, ∞) functions, which grow to ∞ (as x → ∞) slower than exponentials, but faster than powers of logarithms. We assume that f (x) possesses three derivatives satisfying the following conditions as x → ∞: f 0 (x) → 0, f (x) f 000 (x) f (x)2 (iv) = O (1) . f 0 (x)3

(i) f (x) → ∞, (iii)

(ii)

f 00 (x)/f 0 (x) = O (1) , f 0 (x)/f (x)

(2.14)

These conditions are satisfied by a variety of commonly used functions. For example, f (x) = xp (ln x)q ,

f (x) = exp(xr ),

p > 0, q ∈ R,

0 < r < 1,

or various convex combinations of products of such functions. An important example falling in this case is the well known generalized Zipf law, namely f (x) = xp , where p > 0. Zipf’s law has attracted the interest of scientists of several areas of science, such as linguistics, biology, etc. With similar arguments as in [4] one has the following theorem for the rising moments of the random variable Tm (N ). Theorem 2.3. If α = {1/f (j)}∞ j=1 , where f (·) satisfies (2.13) and (2.14), then as N → ∞ h i (r) E TN ∼

3.

1 min1≤j≤N {pj }r

ln



f (N ) f 0 (N )

r

.

(2.15)

Asymptotic Estimates for the Rising Moments of TN by Comparison with Known Sequences

Here we will present a theorem that helps us obtain asymptotic estimates by comparison with sequences α for which the asymptotic estimates of Em (N ; α; r) are known (for instance, via Theorem 2.3). First, we recall the following notation. Suppose that {sj }∞ j=1 and ∞ {tj }j=1 are two sequences of nonnegative terms. The symbol sj  tj means that there are two constants C1 > C2 > 0 and an integer j0 > 0 such that C2 tj ≤ sj ≤ C1 tj ,

for all j ≥ j0 ,

(3.1)

i.e. sj = O(tj ) and tj = O(sj ). ∞ Theorem 3.1. Let α = {aj }∞ j=1 and β = {bj }j=1 be sequences of strictly positive terms such that limN Em (N ; α; r) = limN Em (N ; β; r) = ∞. (i) If there exists an j0 such that aj = bj , for all j ≥ j0 , then Em (N ; α; r) − Em (N ; β; r) is bounded,

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(ii) if aj = O(bj ), then Em (N ; β; r) = O (Em (N ; α; r) as N → ∞, (iii) if aj = o(bj ), then Em(N ; β; r) = o (Em (N ; α; r)) as N → ∞, (iv) if aj  bj , then Em (N ; β; r)  Em (N ; α; r) as N → ∞, (v) if aj ∼ bj , then Em (N ; β; r) ∼ Em (N ; α; r) as N → ∞. Proof. Case (i) follows easily from (2.5): |Em (N ; α; r) − Em (N ; β; r)| ˛Z ˛ " −1 # N ˛ ∞ Y 0 0 −1 “ ˛ ” ` ´ jY ` ´ jY ˛ ˛ = r˛ 1 − Sm (aj t)e−aj t 1 − Sm (aj t)e−aj t − 1 − Sm (bj t)e−bj t tr−1 dt˛ ˛ 0 ˛ j=j0 j=1 j=1 ˛ " #˛ Z ∞ ˛ jY 0 −1 0 −1 “ ” ˛ ` ´ jY ˛ ˛ ≤r 1 − Sm (aj t)e−aj t − 1 − Sm (bj t)e−bj t ˛ tr−1 dt ˛ ˛ ˛ 0 j=1 j=1 ˛ ( ! Z ∞˛ X X Y ˛ |J| ˛ =r (−1) exp −t a Sm (aj t) j ˛ 0 ˛J⊂{1,...,j0 −1} j∈J j∈J ˛ ! ) ˛ X Y r−1 ˛ − exp −t bj Sm (bj t) t ˛ dt < ∞, ˛ j∈J

j∈J

where we have used the formula N Y

j=1


1 − Sm (pj t)e−pj t =

X

J⊂{1,...,N }



(−1)|J| exp −t

X j∈J



pj 

Y

Sm (pj t).

(3.2)

j∈J

Notice that the sum extends over all 2j−1 subsets J of {1, ..., j − 1}, while |J| denotes the cardinality of J. (ii) Since aj = O(bj ), there is a positive constant M and an integer j0 , such that aj ≤ M bj , for all j ≥ j0 . By part (i) of the theorem we have |Em (N ; M β; r) − Em (N ; α; r)| ≤ C, for some positive constant C as N → ∞. Next observe that (2.5) implies Em (N ; sα; r) = s−r Em(N ; α; r).

(3.3)

Using (3.3) we get 1 r r M r Em (N ; β; r) − Em (N ; α; r) ≤ C, i.e. Em (N ; β; r) ≤ M Em (N ; α; r) + CM ,

and the result follows immediately from the definition of the O notation.

(iii) Fix an  > 0. Then aj ≤ bj , for all j ≥ j0 (). Thus, by part (i) there is an M = M () such that Em(N ; β; r) − Em(N ; α; r) ≤ M. By invoking (3.3) we get 1 Em (N ; β; r) ≤ Em (N ; α; r) + M, r

for all N ≥ N0 ().

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135

If we divide by Em (N ; α; r) and then let N → ∞, we obtain (iii), since  is arbitrary and limN Em (N ; α; r) = ∞. (iv) Since aj  bj , then from (3.1) we have aj = O(bj ) and bj = O(aj ). Using part (ii) we get as N → ∞, Em (N ; β; r) = O (Em (N ; α; r)) and Em (N ; α; r) = O (Em (N ; β; r)), the result follows again from (3.1). To prove (v) we first fix an  > 0. Then (1 − )bj ≤ aj ≤ (1 + )bj , for all j ≥ j0 (). Thus, by case (i) and (3.3) there is an M = M () such that r  r  1 1 Em (N ; β; r) − M ≤ Em (N ; α; r) ≤ Em (N ; β; r) + M, 1+ 1− for all N ≥ N0 (). If we divide by Em (N ; β; r) and then let N → ∞, we obtain (v) since  is arbitrary and limN Em (N ; β; r) = ∞ . 

References [1] Bender C. M. and Orszag S. A., Advanced Mathematical Methods for Scientists and Engineers I: Asymptotic Methods and Perturbation Theory, Springer-Verlag, New York, 1999. [2] Doumas A. V. and Papanicolaou V. G., The Coupon Collector’s Problem Revisited: Asymptotics of the Variance, Adv. Appl. Prob. 44 (1) (2012) 166–195. [3] Doumas A. V. and Papanicolaou V. G., Asymptotics of the rising moments for the Coupon Collector’s Problem, Electron. J. Probab. 18 (Article no. 41) (2012) 1–15 (DOI: 10.1214/EJP.v18-1746). [4] Doumas A. V. and Papanicolaou V. G., The Coupon Collector’s Problem Revisited: Generalizing the Double Dixie Cup Problem of Newman and Shepp, ESAIM: Prob. and Stat., Forthcoming article, DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1051/ps/2016016. [5] Erd˝os P. and R´enyi A., On a classical problem of probability theory, Magyar. Tud. Akad. Mat. Kutat´o Int. K¨ozl., 6 (1961), 215–220. [6] Marshall A. W. and Olkin I., Inequalities: Theory of Majorization and its Applications, Academic Press, New York, 1979. [7] Newman D. J. and Shepp L., The double Dixie cup problem, Amer. Math. Monthly 67 (1960) 58–61. MR0120672.

In: Cyber-Security and Information Warfare Editor: Nicholas J. Daras

ISBN: 978-1-53614-385-0 © 2019 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

Chapter 8

THE USE OF MILLIMETER AND SUB-MILLIMETER WAVE FREQUENCIES IN FUTURE MILITARY APPLICATIONS M. Gargalakos1, I. Karanasiou1, R. Makri2 and N. K. Uzunoglu3 1

Department of Mathematics and Engineering Sciences, Hellenic Military Academy, Greece 2 Institute of Communications and Computer Systems, Greece 3 National Technical University of Athens, School of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Greece

ABSTRACT During the last decade using frequencies exceeding 30 GHz is possible for military applications because of the sufficient development of relevant technologies. For future military communications the available wide bands seem attractive to move 5 th generation mobile military communications even above 100 GHz. From the other hand, while the microwave, the mm-Wave and the infrared frequency bands have been thoroughly investigated and characterized and their usage has been certified for various military and non-military applications, the intermediate frequency spectrum, sometimes also referred as the ‘THz gap’, is still unexploited and its usage remains uncertain for the majority of the candidate civil and non-civil applications. Although there is a growing research interest for this part of the spectrum, the fundamental question of choosing the most suitable applications for the sub-THz and THz frequency regions still remains open. Possible military applications that could be explored for these frequency regions are weapons and explosive detection, biochemical detection of lethal substances, short range radars and nonlethal weapons. Critical technical challenges that have to be properly tackled in order for these applications to become feasible are the development of cost effective powerful and efficient signal sources and the fast signal degradation due atmospheric attenuation. The

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M. Gargalakos, I. Karanasiou, R. Makri et al. later is an insurmountable obstacle for any type of medium to long range applications, making them currently viable only for very short ranges.

1. INTRODUCTION During the last decade using frequencies exceeding 30 GHz is possible for military applications because of the sufficient development of relevant technologies. For future military communications the available wide bands and also the relatively low (1-2 db/km) attenuation seem attractive to move 5th generation mobile military communications even above 100 GHz. Although rain attenuation is a serious obstacle, the use of multiple input multiple output (MIMO) signal processing technologies could be used to alleviate the rain attenuation problem. From the other hand sub-millimeter radar and scanner technologies are currently more frequently being investigated for weapons detection, explosives detection and identification of hazardous chemical agents. At the same time non-lethal weapons operating in W band have already been manufactured and tested in the field. In the current paper the prospects of the available technologies in the mm-Wave and sub mmWave frequency regions are reviewed and discussed for military applications. The atmospheric conditions (rain, fog, etc.), and other relevant factors that may affect the performance of the examined military systems are also examined.

2. THE MM-WAVE AND SUB MM-WAVE BAND CHARACTERISTICS 2.1. Propagation The mm-Wave spectrum occupies the frequency region between 30GHz and 300GHz, while the following sub mm-Wave spectrum reaches up to 3 THz. The mm-Wave band is currently being occupied by military, radar, and backhaul applications, but in general its utilization is low compared with the preceding microwave spectrum. The sub-mm-Wave band is even more scarcely being used, since telecom applications are not yet feasible due to heavy atmospheric attenuation. The use of this band is mainly experimental and apart from that only specific applications for the detection of hazardous materials and biochemical agents have been examined. Referring to the characteristics of the mm-Wave and the sub mm-Wave frequency bands it should be noted that there are inherent characteristics of both frequency bands that make the development of military applications very promising. Nevertheless, the catastrophic effect of the atmospheric attenuation to the signal’s strength is a serious drawback that should be carefully accounted for. In general, the parameters of millimeter wave propagation, either indoor or outdoor, or through specific materials, have been well

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classified and reported over the past decades. Expected atmospheric path loss as a function of frequency has been calculated theoretically and verified experimentally by numerous research groups over the last 4 decades [1], [2]. A key observation that could be made regarding atmospheric attenuation is that the 500 GHz region seems currently to be the practical frontier for every short range link (< 100 m). The attenuation is estimated < 1 dB per 10 m below 500 GHz under normal atmospheric conditions. Beyond this frequency atmospheric attenuation is increasing rapidly making the implementation of any outdoor wireless link currently impractical. On the other hand for frequencies below 120 GHz, there is a plethora of commercial wireless telecom applications that could serve as a roadmap for future military ones [3], [4], [5], [6]. Weather phenomena such as heavy rain, fog and snow, that affect mm and sub- mm Wave propagation; have also been well characterized and categorized per geographical region, by many researchers and international authorities [7], [8], [9], [10], [11], [12], [13]. It is obvious that these phenomena act cumulatively to the signal deterioration due to frequency increment and may jeopardize the viability of the established wireless links [14], [15]. Especially for mm-wave access networks the atmospheric phenomena rarely pose additional problems to the established links, provided that an adequate power margin has been foreseen by the system designers. For the sub-THz frequencies the combination of the free space loss with severe weather conditions makes the implementation of any wireless link even for ranges below tens of meters practically unfeasible [16], [17]. Under this scope, only indoor 5G wireless applications have been recently examined for frequencies in the sub-THz region [18], [19], [20]. Finally the effect of atmospheric Oxygen or water vapor in signal propagation should be taken into account for the design of every future application. Both molecule O2 and H2O can be considered as independent selective attenuation factors that may dramatically affect any type of wireless application. So the peaks in absorption at specific narrow frequency bands (e.g., 60 GHz, 120 GHz, 183 GHz) should be carefully taken into consideration before designing any wireless application. On the other hand there are frequency bands within the mm and sub mm-Wave regions, in which this absorption is relatively small and thus they could be considered as signal propagation windows. The frequency regions of 70-100 GHz, where many commercial applications are currently being developed, and 125160 GHz are two characteristic examples [21], [22]. Both cases have critical advantages and disadvantages for future military applications, since propagation characteristics that were once considered as limitations are now seen as advantages. If a strong O2 or H2O absorption is present, autonomous very short range multiple ad-hoc military communications networks could be deployed with low probability of signal interception. In this case interference is also avoided since frequency reuse in simultaneously operating networks is possible. On the contrary, when the atmospheric absorption is not so significant (below 1db/Km), longer-distance mobile military communication networks could be installed. In this later case, signal interception or

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interference is more feasible and thus the necessary encoding and encryption procedures should be designed and implemented.

2.2. Spectral Capacity The mm-Wave and sub mm-Wave frequency region has a vast amount of available bandwidth, orders of magnitude higher than the microwave region, fact that permits applications that could potentially consume capacity of hundreds of Gbps [23], [24], [25]. The spectrum up to 30 GHz has been practically fully exploited and this results in spectrum conflicts when news technologies with bandwidth demanding applications (e.g., 5G mobile services) are introduced. The mm-Wave and sub mm-Wave frequency regions solve this problem, since they provide a whole new frequency spectrum that is practically unused and has a very low cost of licensing compared with the over populated frequency regions of the microwave band [26]. Moreover for frequencies above 120 GHz, the spectrum is mainly unlicensed; something that from one hand prohibits its commercial usage, but at the same time it enhances the acceleration of research and development in this spectral area, since the potential investors do not have to face any existing competition. In the near future a rapid transition above 100 GHz both for commercialization and licensing is expected, given the fact that a plethora of technologies such as fiber optics, laser and mm-wave is maturing and at the same time converging. Finally the spectral wealth of this frequency region, if combined with another critical characteristic of these waves which is penetrability, can enable a series of military imaging applications which are very promising and will be presented with every detail in the following paragraphs.

2.3. Penetrability The sub mm-Wave frequency region can penetrate a series of material that are used both in civil and military applications [27]. Some of these materials are impenetrable using microwave technologies and others are opaque to visible light. For some type of materials such as plastic, paper and textiles, microwaves can also provide images, but the resolution is much worse compared with the one achieved by using sub mm-Wave frequencies. Of course there are also other technologies such as X-rays which are considered more efficient and have a long successful record of extensive field use, but the ionizing nature of this radiation has raised serious concerns for the applications that involve human beings [28], [29]. So while imaging technologies such as X-rays have safety limitations, mm and sub mm-Wave frequencies are generally absorbed by skin and the only concern is the potential eye damage. The imaging capacity of this frequency region allows the implementation of

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a series of applications ranging from medical imaging, to security, customs services for container inspection and military radar [30], [31], [32], [33], [34]. Finally for wireless communications applications, the fact that sub mm-Wave frequencies have penetrating capabilities for certain materials permits the implementation of NLOS scenarios for data transmission especially for frequencies below 1 THz [35]. These scenarios can be proven extremely useful especially for indoor installations, where there is a continuous demand for extending data transfer capacities in complex working environments.

2.4. Reflectivity and Radar Properties There are many liquid or gaseous materials that present specific absorption behavior across the sub mm-Wave frequency region. Spectroscopic study of these materials reveals either absorption peaks or strong signal dispersion that if correlated properly with information regarding their composition, may serve as good identification patterns for these materials [36], [37], [38]. These applications could be extremely useful especially in cases where the investigated materials are suspected to be hazardous and life threatening [39]. Some researchers claim that these methods are capable of differentiating materials using chemical signatures as accurately as fingerprints [40], but so far outside the carefully calibrated conditions of the laboratory there is not enough data to support this argument. In addition there are materials perfectly innocent such as sugar that can be easily misinterpreted for plastic explosives due to very similar chemical signatures. The same observation is also valid for substances that are in a gaseous state. Concluding the identification of potential lethal liquids and gases is very promising using sub mm-Wave spectroscopy methods, but there are still a lot of technical challenges to be confronted before these methods are fully validated and commercialized [41]. Apart from the detection of gases these methods can be also applied for the identification of the composition, the shape and the size of solid state material [42], [43]. The technology limitations briefly mentioned in the previous paragraph are also valid for solid state materials, with one of the main advantages of using this frequency region being its non-ionizing nature. This is very important for specific applications such as inspection of food products [44]. Another purely military perspective of this frequency region is its anti-stealth capabilities. Especially sub mm-Wave radars will be able to emit Pico-second pulses containing a vast bouquet of frequencies that could potentially detect stealthy targets, which cannot be intercepted with the traditional narrowband radars [45], [46], [47]. The fast power degradation of the radar’s emitted pulses due to the atmospheric attenuation is the main obstacle for the full operational exploitation of these types of radars. Currently airborne stealthy targets can be detected using a combination of microwave radars, very

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low frequency band radars and passive radars, depending on the details of the target’s operational characteristics (altitude, range, direction) [48]. Since there is no evidence that any sole radar system is capable to credibly detect and intercept stealthy targets, mm-Wave and sub mm-Wave radars are expected to contribute towards this end, along with the other existing surveillance and tracking technologies.

2.5. Anti-Jamming and Non-Interceptive Capacity Another very important inherent characteristic of these two frequency zones is its antijamming and non-interceptive capacity. This can be achieved, since the large amount of the available bandwidth permits the implementations of anti-jamming techniques, such as spread spectrum and frequency hopping that are very commonly used in military communications. The problem in this case was that both of these techniques are considered bandwidth consuming and therefore their implementation in the microwave or RF band was problematic in terms of usage of the available spectrum. Moreover, extremely high frequencies allow multiple short-distance communications at the same frequency without interfering each other due to the atmospheric attenuation. Therefore by using the mm or sub mm-Wave frequency region, multiple short range wireless military networks could be deployed using the same frequency, while operating in an environment free of interferences from neighboring emitting networks. In addition the use of very narrow beams limits drastically the possibility of any network intruder to intercept the communication [49], [50], [51]. This last feature is also extremely useful for inter-satellite communications, since it prohibits any interception within the satellite networks. Finally mm or sub mm-Wave space communications do not suffer from atmosphere losses due to the lack of atmosphere in the stratosphere and from the other hand they have an advantage over infrared communication systems due to reduced free space loss compared to them. In these cases radar applications are also favorable, since sub mm-Wave radar systems have a better cloud penetration compared with infrared or optical sensors.

3. CURRENT MILITARY APPLICATIONS Although there is extensive open access research for the implementation of mm or sub mm-Wave technologies for civil applications, this is not the case for military applications, mainly because a great part of the on-going research is classified and it is released only when it is considered obsolete. There are of course research papers that refer to the military applications of these frequency bands, but these papers are mainly descriptive of the relevant technologies and their potential usage in military [52], [53], [54], [55]. More

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research work can be found for research topics which have a duality nature which can be civil and at the same time military. The best example are security applications which can be applied both homeland security and for pure military environments [56], [57], [58], [59].

3.1. Military Communications Military communications is one of the first sectors that will benefit from the introduction of novel wireless communication technologies using the mm and sub mmWave frequency regions. The need for very high speed short range soldier to soldier or unit to unit wireless communications is increasing in a very complex combat environment where Special Forces usually play the key role. These Special Forces as they usually operate in small groups in all types of environments (from dessert to urban), need to be equipped with high speed compact communication devices able to support from typical simple voice commands or messages to high speed real time video streaming. In addition these types of communications need to be as ‘silent’ as possible in order for the team to conceal its presence. A common tactic of the enemy, in order to reveal any operations conducted by Special Forces, is carried out by scanning the spectrum and identifying suspicious activity of any type. Therefore communications should be covert and encrypted. Apart from the special forces, short range communications could be exploited for other types of military operations including scenarios of ultra high speed links transferring real time radar images from helicopters to tanks or artillery units, and from ship to ship and ship to helicopter. All of these goals can be achieved by using mm-Wave frequencies and especially the 60 GHz region where the absorption peak of the atmosphere permits the deployment of short range wireless networks. Absorption peaks exist also in other mm-Wave frequency regions (120 GHz, 183 GHz), but the technology has not reach a maturity level that would permit an immediate exploitation of these frequency regions. On the contrary in the vicinity of the 60 GHz frequency region there are already many existing systems used for civil purposes that could be adjusted to the military needs [60], [61], [62]. In addition the availability of spectrum at these frequency regions could also enable usage of spread spectrum or frequency hopping techniques that are widely used in military communications in order to prevent signal interception [63]. So the parallel ongoing research for civil applications at mm-Wave frequencies mainly using MIMO technologies for indoor or outdoor 5G cellular networks will serve as the roadmap for the future military ones [64]. Additionally, the mm-Wave frequency region can also be exploited for long range tactical military communications. DAPRA (Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency) has announced that is carrying out a program using high-order modulation and spatial multiplexing techniques to achieve 100 Gb/s capacity at ranges of 200 km air-to-air and 100 km air-to-ground from an aerial platform [65]. The program is exploiting the

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characteristics of millimeter wave frequencies to achieve spectral efficiencies that reach up to 20 bps/ Hz. Although the program has just now entering its 2nd phase, which will be followed by a third one and the range goal seems extremely optimistic, there are other independent researchers that believe that ranges of Kms magnitude for the mm-Wave region are achievable [66], [67], [68]. Finally, a third area in which mm-Wave frequencies could be exploited for military purposes is satellite communications. Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) satellite system is a series of communications satellites operated by the United States Air Force Space Command. The AEHF satellites use partially microwave frequencies (downlink) and mm-Wave frequencies (uplink) with frequency hopping techniques in order to implement secure jam-resistant communications. Inter-satellite communications at 60 GHz are also used for link relay rather than communications via ground stations [69], [70], [71]. The use of mm-Wave frequencies for both uplink and inter-satellite communications offers the necessary bandwidth for the implementation of the jam resistant frequency hopping techniques and the availability of the necessary capacity for the increasingly demanding data rates. The usage of the 60 GHz frequency for the cross link is a good compromise compared to optical links, offering high speed data rates from the one hand with affordable free space loss from the other hand. Concluding it is evident that the military satellite communications are moving towards the mm-Wave frequency region and especially Q-V bands and Wband that seem to be the most promising ones. Despite this fact, there are many challenges and open technical issues that have to be carefully investigated before these frequency bands are fully exploited [72], [73].

3.2. Radar for Military and Security Applications Radar applications with military interest in the mm-Wave and sub mm-Wave frequency bands are currently scarce due to the technical challenges posed by the signal’s fast degradation by the atmosphere. As it has already been explained in the previous sections, although the sub-THz band possess a theoretical anti-stealth capability, identifying and intercepting airborne targets beyond few hundreds of meters is currently inefficient. Any type of research carried out in this field is currently experimental and most of the times concealed in a laboratory environment using scaled models [74], [75], [76], [77]. Therefore for stealthy targets with a medium or long range distance only a combination of passive and active radar techniques (including mm-Wave radars) could be effective [48]. The only exception currently existing for military operational radar is the US Army’s Longbow Apache attack helicopter that is equipped with an mm-Wave Longbow radar working in the Ka band. Helicopter missions do not usually require long operating range

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and therefore their radars do not need to intercept targets at long distances. Therefore utilizing radar technology operating at mm-Wave frequencies is considered an advantage, since it is more compact and has a relatively small antenna compared with other radars operating at lower frequencies. Moreover, there are a number of homeland civil security applications in the mm-Wave and sub mm-Wave frequency bands that seem to have a great exploitation potential for military purposes also. These applications use active radar methods for weapons detections, detection of concealed objects including explosives, screening of personnel, vital sign measurements and see through barriers, walls and large obstacles, [78], [79], [80], [81], [82], [83], [84], [85], [86]. In addition radiometric and remote sensing techniques are also used for similar applications, with the majority of them being confined solely in the mmWave band [87], [88], [89]. All of these active or passive technologies can be applicable for use in military operations provided that the related technical challenges of weight, size and portability are taken into consideration. The necessity to introduce these technologies to military operations is expected to rise sharply in the imminent future as nowadays almost every type of armed collision is evolving to a so called “hybrid” war [90]. These hybrid wars are usually carried out in complex urban environments (e.g., Syria, Iraq, and Crimea); where the operating ground forces have to deal with a variety of threats that are very different from the usual threats confronted in the traditional battlefields. Buildings or whole areas within cities that are mined or trapped with explosives, terrorists or guerillas mixed with innocent civilians, suicide bombers and snipers inside inhabited buildings are some of these asymmetric threats that are obliging the army forces to revise drastically their tactics. To this end, all of the above mentioned radar technologies will play a very important role for the success of the army’s missions in urban environments and will at the same time upgrade its operational capabilities and diminish its expected casualties. Concluding, the role of military radars operating in sub-THz bands is still questionable and has to be further tested and evaluated for its efficiency in traditional military operations. On the contrary, mm-Wave and sub mm-Wave radars serving domestic security purposes are expected to be widely used during the future hybrid wars that will have an epicenter around urban environments.

3.3. Chemical and Biological Agent Detection Chemical and biological, agents may be encountered by military personnel during all types of operations. These agents could also encountered by homeland security personnel in urban environments due to terrorist attacks. All of these agents, which in most cases are airborne, are extremely lethal and therefore the appointed personnel should be equipped with the necessary devices that will be able to detect and alert on time for the presence of

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the dangerous substances. The issue of false alarms in these cases is critical because the mobilization of the countermeasures mechanism is time consuming and costly. Therefore there is a requirement for a selective procedure providing fast identification of lethal biological and chemical agents using portable devices. To this end a number of methods and techniques have been proposed [91], [92], [93]. Recently, some of the proposed techniques exploit the mm-Wave and sub mm-Wave frequency region in order to achieve the detection of these hazardous agents. The advantage that these techniques are exploiting is that many chemical compounds show characteristic absorptions in the sub-THz region, but at the same time the lack of sensitivity is one of the main technical challenges that has to be confronted [36]. In this case, the usage of the appropriate spectral resolution may improve the sensitivity and enhance the reliability of the whole process [94]. Nevertheless the main technical challenges when utilizing the subTHz spectrum for the identification of chemical and biological hazardous agents is the quick signal degradation due to the atmospheric absorption. Therefore it may be necessary for the military or the security personnel to attempt to approach at the very close proximity of the area where the suspected chemical or biological agents are located. This tactic may give rise to safety concerns and therefore there are scenarios in which the detection will have to be performed from a safe distance. In these scenarios usage of mm-Wave and submm-Wave detection methods is not the optimum solution. On the other hand, there are applications such as explosive and poisonous substances detection for which the sub-THz technology is considered very promising and there is extensive research work in this field during the last decade [95], [96], [97]. The main theoretical and technical challenge here is the correct identification of the substance and the avoidance of any false identification of materials that could have lethal and catastrophic results. To this end various alternative methods have been proposed by the research community [98], [99], [100], [101]. Concluding, despite the fact that proof-of-principle experimentations have proven beyond any doubt the promising potential of sub-terahertz spectroscopy for sensing hazardous chemical and biological agents, the developed methodologies still lack the necessary sensitivity and specificity and need to be further validated with realistic scenarios. The detection distance is a serious problem for specific substances and in this case the THz spectroscopy must be used in combination with other methods that do not face this problem.

3.4. Non-Lethal Weapons A totally different category of weapons that operate at mm-Wave frequencies are the so called “non-lethal weapons” among which the most advanced is the U.S army Active Denial System (ADS). Other systems such as the Advanced Tactical Laser (ATL), the

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Pulsed Energy Projectile (PEP) and the Long Range Acoustic Device (LRAD) operate either at infrared frequencies or acoustic frequencies. The Active Denial System (ADS) operates at 95 GHz producing a beam which is absorbed in the upper 0.4 mm of skin. It has a range of hundreds of meters and a power of hundreds of kilowatts and its beam can heat the skin of enemy soldiers to unbearable temperatures producing skin burns within a few seconds. Several trials have been carried out with a prototype weapon mounted in a military multi-purpose vehicle and the results have shown that the ADS system is effective for ranges up to one Km depending of course of the level of the emitted power [102], [103]. The system has been deployed in Afghanistan back in 2010, but it was soon withdrawn from the battle fields without any further information. Currently an ADS II system is being designed to operate from aircrafts and moving ground vehicles. Although the ADS system has proved its efficiency, it use in military operation is still controversial. First of all, since the weapon must be deployed very closely to the enemy (< 1Km) it is exposed to retaliation fire and can be easily destroyed or damaged even by light weapons. ADS II, which will be airborne, is expected to partially confront this problem. In addition the weapon cannot be used in all types of operation theaters, since the landscape plays a very important role for the beam dissipation and the degradation of its efficiency. Finally its implementation in urban environments is also problematic since enemy forces are often mixed with civilians. A more probable use, which has also been discussed, is for security applications such as crowd control, prison perimeter security, prison control of conflicting gangs and control of suspicious vehicles. These applications could be also useful for military operations within urban zones where the military personnel are exposed to many unconventional threats. All of these applications are very interesting and there is no doubt that many lives of innocent civilians and security personnel can be saved by utilizing non lethal weapons. Of course there are still many open ethical questions that have to be answered before the use of these types of weapons is widely legalized for civilian applications. It is essential that more research is carried out regarding any potential collateral damages caused by their utilization and in the end their deployment by security forces must be done with extreme precautions and under very specific rules of operation.

4. FUTURE TRENDS 4.1. mm-Wave Band The further exploitation of the mm-Wave spectrum in the future is an indisputable fact. For the mm-Wave band, there already several civil applications in telecommunications, automobile industry, applied chemistry, remote sensing and imaging that are already being

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commercialized. The spectrum has been regulated and licensed up to 100 GHz and this trend is going to expand for higher frequencies very soon. Military applications have not progressed so fast as the civil ones, but they are expected to follow especially for the telecommunications sector and the radar sector. As the focus on mm-Wave frequencies will increase over the next decade it is estimated that Ka-band will account for almost 30% of the military satellite communications by 2024. Q and V bands are the next frequency areas that will draw the attention of military applications and there are already vendors offering MMICs at these bands suitable for the SatCom military sector. The U.S based Next Generation Jammer (NGJ) which is already under development by several U.S companies is expected to be able to operate in the mm-Wave band along of course with the UHF, VHF and microwave frequency bands. The Surface Electronic Warfare Improvement Program (SEWIP) is also pointing to a future direction of mm-Wave frequencies exploitation. The goal is to transcend from the use of the traditional vacuum tubes used by high power long range jammers to wideband materials such as GaN which will be able support multi-band operations including mm-Wave frequencies. In addition the future COMINT (Direction Finding and Communications Intelligence) and ESM/ELINT (Electronic Support Measures and Electronic Signals Intelligence) operations are also expected to expand in the mm-Wave frequency since the required technology for wideband solid state RF components is already available from the existing civil applications. Concluding, the increasing demand for spectrum in a complex operational environment dealing with asymmetric threats will drive military applications towards the full exploitation of the mm-Wave band. Satellite communications are already using the Ka band and this trend is going to expand to other types of military communications in the near future. The higher upload and download data rates, the increased spectral efficiencies, the less congestion in the spectrum band and the growing maturity of technology are some of the advantages that will support the transition to the mm-Wave era of the military applications.

4.2. Sub mm-Wave Band While the future for the exploitation of mm-Wave frequencies seems more or less predetermined, the same observation does not apply for the sub mm-Wave band. Although there is no doubt for the utility of this band for applications in imaging and spectroscopy including the relevant military ones, the technical difficulties involved in making efficient and compact sub mm-Wave power sources has delayed the research progress in the field [104], [105], [106], [107], [108]. Of course over the past decade there have been very significant advances in the electronics and photonics fields that have led to the production of new materials and devices enabling the boost up of the fundamental research and

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applications in this frequency band. On the other hand the atmospheric absorption of the propagating sub mm-Wave signals has still catastrophic effects for a lot of potential applications and prevents the implementation for any medium to long range wireless communications, although the technology has reached a maturity level that can theoretically support them [109], [110], [111]. At the same time NATO has identified the great potential of this frequency spectrum since 1995, and the NATO- Science for Peace and Security (SPS) program has organized specific scientific meetings dedicated to this emerging technologies. The main interest of NATO lies in sensing and imaging applications for concealed weapons detection, detection of any type of explosives and sensing of hazardous chemical and biological agents. One of the main challenges in this field is the development of easy to handle and operate portable devices that can be used in the theaters of operations, because until now most of the scanning devices that are used for civil applications are bulky and cannot be easily adjusted for a military operation. Through wall imaging is also a very promising application for military operations in urban environments, but in this case there are also technical constrains related to the materials of the wall, its thickness and the reflectivity of the objects behind the wall. As for the detection of the dangerous biological or chemical agents, the main problem is that the military personnel, even if it equipped with the adequate sensitive sensing devices, must reach the proximity of suspected contaminated area. In this case the mission is jeopardized and might be aborted, since the lives of the involved personnel are seriously endangered. Concluding the sub mm-Wave band has been the centre of the scientist’s attention for the past decade starting from spectroscopic applications in ground-based radio telescopes, and space based remote sensing and progressing to full body scanners for security applications. Technology innovations in photonics and new materials for THz MMIC applications are boosting the research more and deeper in the THz spectrum, while at the same time, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) has already presented a terahertz chip for high resolution imaging, advanced radar and sensors. So there is no doubt that the research community is moving faster towards exploiting this frequency band, but there are still some open research questions to be answered before this technology is widely utilized and commercialized.

CONCLUSION While the microwave, the mm-Wave and the infrared frequency bands have been thoroughly investigated and characterized and their usage has been certified for various military and non-military applications, the intermediate frequency spectrum, sometimes also referred as the ‘THz gap’, is still unexploited and its usage remains uncertain for the majority of the candidate civil and non-civil applications. Although there is a growing

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research interest for this part of the spectrum, the fundamental question of choosing the most suitable applications for the sub-THz and THz frequency regions still remains open. Beside this critical question, there are some other technical challenges that have to be properly tackled in order for this technology to become more viable. The first is the development of cost effective powerful and efficient signal sources and the second is the fast signal degradation due atmospheric attenuation which is an insurmountable obstacle for any type of medium to long range applications. Therefore currently only very short range military communications are possible in this frequency region. These applications will be realized during the next decade as civil telecommunication networks are in parallel moving towards 5G configurations. As for the remaining military applications such as weapons detection and explosive detection, these are very promising and will be feasible in the near future because the relevant technologies have already sufficiently matured for similar homeland security applications. Finally, for the biochemical detection of lethal substances, the corresponding techniques have to be further tested in the field in order to be certified for their accuracy and their validity, since any type of failure in the implementation of these methods could result in fatal casualties.

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[97] Konek, Christopher; et al. “Terahertz spectroscopy of explosives and simulants: RDX, PETN, sugar, and L-tartaric acid.” SPIE Defense, Security, and Sensing. International Society for Optics and Photonics, 2009. [98] Van Rheenen, Arthur D; Magnus, W. Haakestad. “Detection and identification of explosives hidden under barrier materials: what are the THz-technology challenges?” SPIE Defense, Security, and Sensing. International Society for Optics and Photonics, 2011. [99] Trofimov, Vyacheslav A; Svetlana, A. Varentsova. “2D THz signature for substance identification.” SPIE Defense, Security, and Sensing. International Society for Optics and Photonics, 2010. [100] Trofimov, Vyacheslav A; et al. “Identification of substance in complicated mixture of simulants under the action of THz radiation on the base of SDA (Spectral Dynamics Analysis) method.” Security+ Defence. International Society for Optics and Photonics, 2010. [101] Choi, Jindoo; et al. “Compound explosives detection and component analysis via terahertz time-domain spectroscopy.” Journal of the Optical Society of Korea, 17.5, (2013), 454-460. [102] LeVine, Susan. The Active Denial System. A Revolutionary, Non-lethal Weapon for Today’s Battlefield. National Defense Univ Washington DC Center for Technology and National Security Policy, 2009. [103] Kumar, Nitin; et al. “Design of 95 GHz, 100 kW gyrotron for active denial system application.” Vacuum, 99, (2014), 99-106. [104] Redo-Sanchez, Albert; Xi-Cheng, Zhang. “Terahertz science and technology trends.” IEEE Journal of Selected Topics in Quantum Electronics, 14.2, (2008), 260269. [105] Hochrein, Thomas. “Markets, Availability, Notice, and Technical Performance of Terahertz Systems: Historic Development, Present, and Trends.” Journal of Infrared, Millimeter, and Terahertz Waves, Volume 36, Issue 3, pp. 235-254, 36, (2015), 235-254. [106] Friederich, Fabian; et al. “THz active imaging systems with real-time capabilities.” THz and Security Applications. Springer Netherlands, 2014, 153-187. [107] Guillet, Jean Paul; et al. “Review of terahertz tomography techniques.” Journal of Infrared, Millimeter, and Terahertz Waves, 35.4, (2014), 382-411. [108] Mittleman, Daniel. ed. Sensing with terahertz radiation., Vol. 85, Springer, 2013. [109] Kürner, Thomas; Sebastian, Priebe. “Towards THz communications-status in research, standardization and regulation.” Journal of Infrared, Millimeter, and Terahertz Waves, 35.1, (2014), 53-62. [110] Nagatsuma, Tadao; Guillermo, Carpintero. “Recent progress and future prospect of photonics-enabled terahertz communications research.” IEICE Transactions on Electronics, 98.12, (2015), 1060-1070.

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In: Cyber-Security and Information Warfare Editor: Nicholas J. Daras

ISBN: 978-1-53614-385-0 © 2019 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

Chapter 9

ON THE MECHANICS OF NANOCOMPOSITE STRUCTURES USING MULTISCALE COMPUTATIONAL TECHNIQUES Stylianos K. Georgantzinos* Mechanics Lab, Division of Mathematics and Engineering Studies, Department of Military Science, Hellenic Army Academy, Vari, Greece Machine Design Laboratory, Department of Mechanical Engineering and Aeronautics, University of Patras, Patras, Greece

ABSTRACT This work presents computer aided engineering (CAE) techniques, appropriate for the numerical prediction of the mechanical behavior of composite structures reinforced by carbon nanomaterials. Based on the micromechanical theory, the mechanical analysis of the composite may be performed by utilizing a representative volume element (RVE). Within the RVE, the reinforcing material is modeled according to its atomistic microstructure. Linear spring-like elements are employed to simulate the discrete geometrical structure as well as the behavior of nanomaterials. The matrix is modeled as a continuum medium (macroscale) by utilizing solid elements and an appropriate constitutive material model. The stress transfer conditions between the nanomaterial and the matrix are described via special joint elements of variable stiffness interconnecting the two phases in a discrete manner. Using the proposed multi-scale CAE model, the mechanical behavior for various values of reinforcement volume fraction is analyzed. Comparisons with available published works found in the literature demonstrate the accuracy of the proposed method.

*

Corresponding Author Email: [email protected].

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Keywords: nanomaterials, nanocomposites, finite element method, mechanical properties

1. INTRODUCTION Since there has been a request in military technological applications for strong composite materials, pioneering reinforcements having exceptional properties must be presented. Such reinforced materials might be established in the area of nanotechnology. Since carbon-carbon covalent bond is one of the strongest in nature, a stabilized nanostructure, such as carbon nanotubes (CNTs) and graphene, based on a pristine arrangement of such bonds could yield an extraordinarily strong reinforcement. The combination of the excellent mechanical performance, i.e., the exceptional Young’s modulus and tensile strength, the small size and the low density of CNTs and graphene, make them, therefore, ideal material components as strong reinforcing materials. More details on the mechanical properties of CNTs can be found in the recent review article by Ruoff et al. [1]. Recently, the use of CNTs as structural reinforcement has resulted in a significant enhancement of the mechanical properties of a variety of materials [2]. Moreover, it has been found that graphene demonstrates potential as reinforcement in highperformance nanocomposites [3]. Its high levels of stiffness and strength can lead to the production of nanocomposites with outstanding mechanical properties [4]. Hence, the work on the mechanical performance of CNT-based or graphene-based composites and the detection of possible innovative military applications has recently attracted the curiosity of many researchers. In the open literature, Molecular Dynamics (MD) [5-7] as well as continuum mechanics [8-11] methods have been utilized to predict nanocomposite structures performance. The behavior of nanocomposites is greatly influenced by the interfacial region which presents dissimilar properties from those of the matrix material and the reinforcement. Generally, there are three reasons of interfacial stress transfer, i.e., micromechanical interlocking, chemical bonding, and van der Waals interactions between the matrix and reinforcing materials. Al-Ostaz et al. [12] investigated SWCNT-polymer interface interactions in nanoscale via MD. To represent the CNT-polymer load transfer characteristics and consequently the interface between the CNTs and the polymer, Frankland et al. [13] employed just van der Waals forces. Saber-Samadari and Khatibi [14] considered a continuum interfacial zone with variable elastic modulus to investigate a CNT composite via a unit cell method. However, in the specific study the mechanical response of all phases including CNT were assumed as continuum. Multiscale techniques dealing with the prediction of mechanical properties of nanocomposite structures have been well established and presented in the literature. Montazeri et al. [15] provided a comprehensive examination of the mechanical properties of graphene-based nanocomposites. They employed a molecular structural

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mechanics/finite element (MSM/FE) multiscale modeling method to explore the effect of graphene sheets (GS) inclusions on the Young’s Modulus of a polymer matrix. They also calculated the elastic mechanical parameters of CNT-reinforced polymer composite and compared them with those of the GS-reinforced case, within the similar method. A multiscale methodology for predicting the elastic constants of graphene-reinforced nanocomposite structures was also established by Chandra et al. [16]. Their model described the graphene system with a FE atomistic model represented by higher order Timoschenko beam elements. It has also the capability to capture the overall nonlinear mechanics of the composite and the failure mechanism of the polymer matrix. Graphene appears to be strong sufficiently across all of its in-plane directions, has a larger surfaceto-volume ratio [17] with chipper raw materials than CNTs and is easier to be industrialized [18]. Here, a finite element based CAE formulation, founded on micromechanical theory, is suggested for the estimation of the elastic mechanical performance of a polymer or metal matrix, filled with short nano-reinforcements. Concerning the nanomaterial modeling, the approach employs the three dimensional atomistic microstructure of the CNTs and graphene, defining nodes at the corresponding atomic positions of carbon atoms in a Cartesian coordinate system. Appropriate spring-like elements, which interconnect the atoms, incorporate directly the potential energies provided by molecular theory and therefore describe accurately the interatomic interactions. On the other hand, the matrix is considered as a continuum macroscopic medium. Additionally, the stress transfer conditions among the reinforcing material and the matrix are simulated by special joint elements of adjustable stiffness. In this manner, a heterogeneous interfacial region can be described. The benefit of the proposed hybrid method is that it implements macroscopic properties in order to explain the matrix and interface behavior. Detailed representation of the matrix molecular nanostructure is avoided, making the proposed formulation attractive and at the same time, significant decreases in computational cost and complexity are accomplished. Obtained results from the proposed approached regarding the nanocomposite mechanical properties are presented and compared to corresponding ones extracted from the literature.

2. CAE MODEL 2.1. Micromechanical Approach In order to analyze a nanocomposite structure the philosophy of micromechanical theory and multiscale modeling are employed. Figure 1 represents the steps have to be followed, here, for achieving the prediction of the structure response. In the first step,

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nanocomposite structures with homogenously dispersed nanomaterials are considered. It is assumed that the reinforcing nanomaterials have the same sizes and alignment. In the case of CNTs, it is assumed that their edges are capped. The structure of the nanotube is developed around a mean diameter d n  2rn . The reinforcement length is  n . Its thickness is taken equal to t n  0.34nm . It is considered that the longitudinal distances, between neighboring reinforcement ends, are equal to the corresponding transverse distances and equal to d . Because of the periodic distribution, the representative repeated unit cell of Figure 2a is actually modeled. In Figure 1, one quarter of the matrix material has been detached for clearness. A Cartesian coordinate system is implemented as reference with x, y and z axes, associated with the key dimensions of the unit cell. The longitudinal axis of the nanotube is parallel with the uniaxial loading direction (Figure 1a). The volume fraction of the CNT in the composite is: Vnfr 

Vn Vm  Vn

(1)

where Vn is the volume of the nanotube in the nanostructure and Vm is the corresponding volume of the matrix material.

Figure 1. CAE strategy in order to design and analyze the nanocomposite structure behavior.

In the case of graphene, a uniformly reinforced matrix material with a short length graphene sheet is considered as well. Therefore, all the computations could be performed in a suitable RVE. As Figure 2b shows, the RVE consists of two phases, i.e., a graphene sheet and the matrix material. The length and the width of the RVE are equal to the matrix length Lm and width Wm respectively. The graphene width is Wg. Lastly, the lengths are Lg and Lm and the thicknesses are tg and tm for the graphene sheet and the matrix, respectively. The volume fraction of the graphene in the nanocomposite in respect of the RVE may be expressed via the next equation:

On the Mechanics of Nanocomposite Structures … V gfr 

Vg

163 (2)

Vm  V g

A negligible interaction between adjacent reinforcing nanomaterials can be considered, since small volume fractions are assumed.

(a)

(b)

Figure 2. Representative volume element of the nanocomposite structure with (a) CNT, and (b) graphene reinforcement.

2.2. Formulation of Nanomaterial Mechanical Behavior The mechanical performance of a carbon nanomaterial is toughly dependent on its atomistic structure and, thus, it is important to be introduced into the present models. Nanomaterials are considered as space frame structures, in which the carbon atoms are represented by nodes. The nodes are appropriately linked by straight spring-like elements, which simulate the potential energy of the interatomic interactions depicted in Figure 3.

Stretching

Figure 3. Interatomic interactions and the corresponding structural model.

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The total potential energy, omitting the electrostatic interactions between carbon atoms which have minor effect, is [19]: 1 1 1 U  U r  U  U   k r (Δr ) 2   k (Δ ) 2   k ( ) 2 2 2 2

(3)

where U r represents the energy due to bond stretching, U the energy due to bond angle bending and U the energy due to torsion. The terms k r , k and k are the bond stretching, bond angle bending and torsional resistance force constants, respectively, while r ,  and  represent the bond length and bond angle variations, respectively. In order to represent the bond stretching interaction between carbon atoms, a linear spring element of stiffness k r is utilized while a torsional linear spring element of stiffness k is utilized for the representation of torsional interaction [24-27]. For simplicity reasons, the bond angle bending interaction is simulated by the use of an equivalent straight spring element, connecting the opposite atoms-nodes of the C-C-C nanostructure, as Figure 2 shows. It is easy to prove that for small deformations its stiffness is: kb 

kθ (ac - c )  0.25(lc - c - c ) 2 2

(4)

where ac -c  0.1421nm is distance between two neighboring carbon atoms while is the distance between two opposite atoms in a C-C-C nanostructure. The finite elements as well as their stiffness values, used in the analysis are presented in Figure 2. The a elements describe the stretching and torsion interaction, while the b elements describe the angle bending interaction. These elements are two-noded and have 3 degrees of freedom per node (three translations), that are expressed in the global coordinate system. The two nodes of these elements are connected with three translation springs. All finite elements are characterized by six values of stiffness, agreeing to the above-mentioned translation and rotation springs: ( k x , k y , k z , krotx , kroty , krotz ) .

2.3. Formulation of Matrix Material Mechanical Behavior The matrix material modeling, by in light of its molecular structure, would growth meaningfully the computational cost, as well as the complexity of the entire model. Consequently, the matrix is viewed as a continuum isotropic elastic medium of Young’s modulus Em and Poisson’s ratio  m . Linear three-dimensional hexahedral isoparametric elements are used for the meshing of the matrix (annotated hereafter as s elements). These

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elements have eight nodes with three degrees of freedom per node (three translations) and a linear strain variation displacement mode.

2.4. Formulation of Interface Mechanical Behavior Between the matrix and the nanomaterial, complex phenomena happen such as chemical bonding and van der Waals interactions depending on the type of the interacting atoms and relative distances. In order to overcome this complexity, a novel formulation that is able to represent an overall interfacial mechanical behavior is implemented. The nanostructure of a carbon nanomaterial is developed around a theoretical thickness t n . Therefore, from a physical point of view, it is assumed that the interfacial interactions take place along a distance equal to tn / 2 . Due to the discrete modelling of nanomaterials, a discrete modelling of the interfacial area is assumed. Two-noded joint elements (j elements), are introduced. These elements interconnect the atoms-nodes of the nanomaterial with corresponding nodes, belonging to the inner surface of the matrix. A sequence of J elements of equivalent lengths tn /(2 J ) , is employed to cover the distance tn / 2 . The translational stiffness, along the three directions of those elements are expressed regarding a local coordinate system ( R, , ) . It is considered that their values are expressions of the radial coordinate R : ki  i (R)

(5)

where i  R, ,  . The next phase is to describe the lower and upper limits for functions i (R) , by considering their smallest and largest allowable values. The radial reaction f R , generated by the joint directly above the nanomaterial, for a ΔR distortion, is as stated by Eq. (6): f R   R ( R1 )ΔR

(6)

where R1 represents the position of the joint element and is equal to: R1  rn  t n /(2 J )

(7)

Eq. (8) may take the form: f R  R ( R1 )(t n / 2 J ) ΔR  An An (t n / 2 J )

(8)

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where An describes the average external surface area of the nanomaterial affected by the joint, given by the equation: An 

2πrn l n nc

(9)

where nc is the total number of carbon atoms of the tube. Eq. (8) may be rewritten as: R 

 R ( R1 )t n nc R 4π Jrn l n

(10)

where  R and  R denote radial stress and strain, respectively. It is coherent to assume that the radial elastic modulus of the interface, exactly above the reinforcement, is equal to the corresponding radial elastic modulus of the nanotube E R n . Consequently, from Eq. (14) the following constrained equation is obtained:  R ( R1 ) 

4π Jrn l n ERn t n nc

(11)

A similar constrain equation can be obtained for function   . The circumferential reaction f  , produced by the joint above the SWCNT for a Δ deformation, is: f R   R ( R1 )ΔR

(12)

f   R ( R1 )t n nc Δ  An 4π Jrn l n (t n / 2 J )

(13)

or

For small strains the above equation becomes:  

 R ( R1 )t n nc R 4π Jrn l n

(14)

where   and   represent shear stress and strain, respectively. The above expression leads to the next constrain equation:   ( R1 ) 

4π Jrn l n G n t n nc

(15)

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where G n is the circumferential shear modulus. Accordingly, function   becomes:   ( R1 ) 

4π Jrn l n G n t n nc

(16)

where G n is the longitudinal shear modulus. In a similar manner and by making the same considerations for the joint element located exactly below the matrix material, the following equations are obtained:  R ( R2 ) 

4π J (rn  t n / 2)l n ERm t n nc

(17)

  ( R2 ) 

4π J (rn  t n / 2)l n G m t n nc

(18)

  ( R2 ) 

4π J (rn  t n / 2)l n G m t n nc

(19)

where E R m , G m and GZ m are the radial elastic modulus, the circumferential shear modulus and longitudinal shear modulus of the matrix material, respectively. Finally R2 denotes the radial position of the specific joint element and is given by the following equation: R2  rn  t n / 2  t n /(2 J )

(20)

Figure 4. Boundary values and linear interpolation defining the stiffness of interfacial interactions.

Summarizing, a heterogeneous interfacial region is modeled in a discrete way by introducing joint elements of variable stiffness properties. Their mechanical response is

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prescribed by user-defined functions, along the three dimensions of a local coordinate system. These functions, from physical point of view, are set to be bounded exclusively by macroscopic parameters of the two phases surrounding the interface. The stiffness definition strategy for the elements employed for the interface simulation is presented in Figure 4, as applied for a graphene-based nanocomposite. The interfacial region does not take constant stiffness values but it always depends on the type and size of the reinforcement and the type of the matrix.

2.5. Computational Analysis Applying the aforementioned technique, characteristic examples of the developed models are presented in Figure 5. In order to analyze the mechanical performance of the nanocomposite structure, a linear static analysis has to be carried out. Thus, the system of linear equations is constructed by using the elemental stiffness equations for every single element of the entire model and then transforming them from local coordinate systems to the global coordinate system. Then, all the linear equations are assembled in keeping with the requirements of nodal equilibrium and the following system of equations derives: KU  F

(21)

where K, U, and F are the assembled stiffness matrix, assembled generalized displacement, and force vectors, respectively, of the nanostructure. Eq. (21) can be solved by taking into consideration all the boundary conditions. The nanostructure of a carbon nanomaterial is developed around a theoretical thickness t n .

(a)

(b)

Figure 5. Representative volume element models of the nanocomposite structure with (a) CNT, and (b) graphene reinforcement.

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3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 3.1. CNT-Based Nanocomposite Structure Before investigating the mechanics of nanocomposite structures, various convergence tests have been performed in order to choose the appropriate mesh density concerning the matrix material. After that, applying appropriate boundary conditions, the variation of longitudinal and transverse elastic moduli versus volume fraction, for a single walled CNT length equal to 10nm, is extracted and presented in Figure 6.

Figure 6. Longitudinal and transverse moduli of (6,6) SWCNT/ LaRC-SI nanocomposite RVE versus volume fraction.

Modulus (GPa)

8 Proposed method Erand

Odegard et al. [20] Erand

Grand

Grand

6

4

2

ln = 10nm 0 0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Vn (%) Figure 7. Longitudinal and transverse moduli of (6,6) SWCNT/ LaRC-SI nanocomposite RVE versus volume fraction.

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The present model gives similar results compared with the corresponding ones proposed by the MD work of Odegard et al. [20]. It has been noticed that the present methodology has a clear advantage in terms of simplicity and computational cost compared with MD techniques. Moreover, it is observed that the greater the volume fraction the greater the longitudinal elastic modulus. On the other hand, the transverse elastic modulus seems to keep a constant value and be independent to the change of volume fraction. After computing the elastic moduli, predictions concerning the randomly oriented single walled CNTs are performed, by using the following Halpin-Tsai relationships for randomly oriented short fiber composites [21]: Erand 

3 5 E L  ET 8 8

(22)

Grand 

1 1 E L  ET 8 4

(23)

where and are the elastic and shear modulus of a composite with randomly distributed short reinforcements, respectively. Hence, the isotropic elastic and shear modulus of a nanocomposite structure, with randomly aligned single walled CNTs, is semi-analytically obtained, by substituting the numerically predicted values of longitudinal and transverse elastic moduli, into Eq. (22) and (23), respectively. Figure 7 depicts the elastic and shear modulus of the nanocomposite structure with randomly aligned tubes of 10nm length versus volume fraction.

3.2. Graphene-Based Nanocomposite Structure In this section, the effected mechanical properties of graphene nanocomposite structures are examined. Applying suitable boundary conditions in the proposed model and performing conventional finite element procedures the elastic moduli of the nanocomposite may be revealed. It is noted that the mechanical behavior of the structure is significantly affected by the interfacial region stiffness and thus the interface modeling is a crucial task to deal with. The coupling of nanomechanical distinct pattern of graphene with micromechanical continuous material (matrix), causes rippling in the stress response in the region of the matrix towards the reinforcement area. This happens because of the discontinuities generated by the joints connected discretely to nodes of the continuous matrix. Also here, various convergence tests have been performed in order to choose the appropriate mesh density concerning the matrix material. The scarcity of the geometry of the basic models did not help in the search for direct comparisons. For this reason the sandwich-like model, with a simpler and more common

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geometry, was used for the validation of the present work. In comparison with other studies, the present method produces appropriate results that are presented in Table 1. Table 1. Comparisons on stiffness enhancement (%) of nanocomposite structures reinforced by grapheme Graphene Concentration (%) wt. Vgfr 0.05 0.025

Present study

Chandra et al. [22]

12.1

12.5

Present study

Cho et al. [23]

Stiffness enhancement (%)

0.1

Molecular structural analysis

0.05

17.5

16

It is obvious that the different methods give similar results for different geometric characteristics. It has been noticed that the present approach has a clear advantage in terms of computational cost compared with the other techniques. Therefore, it could be concluded that the present method can describe also the mechanics of the graphene based nanocomposite structure.

CONCLUSION In the present study, a hybrid CAE method capable of predicting the mechanics of nanomaterial based composite structures has been established. The method combines the discrete geometric nature of the carbon nanomaterials and the macroscopic mechanical response of the matrix. Furthermore, it employs a distinct description of the interfacial region, considering suitable interfacial stiffness variations defined by functions of distance, bounded by the macroscopic properties of the matrix and nanomaterial.

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This hybrid method decreases meaningfully the computational cost and modeling complexity compared with molecular dynamics techniques, since it uses macroscopic representation for the matrix and the interface. Consequently, the effort of detailed facts regarding the matrix atomistic structure, probable covalent bonding and van der Waals interactions between the two phases is avoided. The method has been tested successfully for different composite structure configurations by comparison with other corresponding data available in the open literature. The outcomes make known a dependence of the elastic mechanical performance of nanomaterial-based composite structures on the reinforcement volume fraction.

REFERENCES [1]

Ruoff, R. S., Qian, D., Liu, W. K.: Mechanical properties of carbon nanotubes: theoretical predictions and experimental measurements. CR Physique 4 993–1008 (2003). [2] Mamedov, A. A., Kotov, N. A., Prato, M., Guldi, D. M., Wicksted, J. P., Hirsch, A.: Molecular design of strong single-wall carbon nanotube/polyelectrolyte multilayer composites. Nat. Mat. 1 190–194 (2002). [3] Young, R. J., Kinloch, I. A., Gong, L., Novoselov, K. S.: The mechanics of graphene nanocomposites: a review. Compos. Sci. Technol. 72 1459–1476 (2012). [4] Simões, S., Viana, F., Reis, M. A. L., Vieira, M. F.: Influence of dispersion/mixture time on mechanical properties of Al-CNTs nanocomposites Compos. Struct., 126 114–122 (2015). [5] Franklanda, S. J. V., Harik, V. M., Odegard, G. M., Brenner, D. W., Gates, T. S.: The stress–strain behavior of polymer–nanotube composites from molecular dynamics simulation. Compos. Sci. Technol. 63 1655–1661 (2003). [6] Zou, J., Ji, B., Feng, X. Q., Gao, H.: Molecular-Dynamic Studies of Carbon–Water– Carbon Composite Nanotubes. Small 2 1348-1355 (2006). [7] Han, Y., Elliott, J.: Molecular dynamics simulations of the elastic properties of polymer/carbon nanotube composites. Comp. Mater. Sci. 39 315–323 (2007). [8] Chen, X. L., Liu, Y. J.: Square representative volume elements for evaluating the effective material properties of carbon nanotube-based composites. Comp. Mater. Sci. 29 1-11 (2004). [9] Seidel, G. D., Lagoudas, D. C.: Micromechanical analysis of the effective elastic properties of carbon nanotube reinforced composites. Mech. Mater. 38 884-907 (2006). [10] Ashrafi, B., Hubert, P.: Modeling the elastic properties of carbon nanotube array/polymer composites. Compos. Sci. Technol. 66 387-396 (2006).

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[11] Liu, Y. J., Chen, X. L.: Continuum models of carbon nanotube-based composites using the boundary element method. Electron. J. Bound. Elem. 1 316-335 (2003). [12] Al-Ostaz, A., Pal, G., Mantena, P. R., Cheng, A.: Molecular dynamics simulation of SWCNT-polymer nanocomposite and its constituents. J. Mater. Sci. 43 164-173 (2008). [13] Frankland, S. J. V., Caglar, A., Brenner, D. W., Griebel, M.: Molecular simulation of the influence of chemical cross-links on the shear strength of carbon nanotubepolymer interfaces. J. Phys. Chem. B 106 3046-3048 (2002). [14] Saber-Samandari, S., Khatibi, A. A.: The effect of interphase on the elastic modulus of polymer based nanocomposites. Key Eng. Mat. 312 199-204 (2006). [15] Montazeri, A., Rafii-Tabar, H.: Multiscale modeling of graphene- and nanotubebased reinforced polymer nanocomposite. Phys Lett A 375 4034–4040 (2011). [16] Chandra, Y., Scarpa, F., Chowdhury, R., Adhikari, S., Sienz J.: Multiscale hybrid atomistic-FE approach for the nonlinear tensile behaviour of graphene nanocomposites. Compos. Part A Appl. Sci. Manuf. 46 7 (2013). [17] Stankovich, S., Dikin, D. A., Dommett, G. H., Kohlhaas, K. M., Zimney, E. J., Stach, E. A. et al.: Graphene-based composite materials. Nature 442 282–286 (2006). [18] Li, D., Kaner, R. B.: Materials science – graphene-based materials. Science 320 1170–1171 (2008). [19] Gelin, B. R.: Molecular modeling of polymer structures and properties, Hanser/Gardner Publishers. (1994). [20] Odegard, G. M., Gates, T. S., Wise, K. E., Park, C., Siochi, E.: Constitutive modeling of nanotube-reinforced polymer composites. Compos. Sci. Technol. 63 1671-1687 (2003). [21] Mallick, P. K.: Fiber-Reinforced Composites: Materials Manufacturing and Design, Marcel Dekker. (1988). [22] Chandra, Y., Scarpa, F., Chowdhury, R., Adhikari, S., Sienz, J.: Multiscale hybrid atomistic-FE approach for the nonlinear tensile behaviour of graphene nanocomposites. Compos Part A Appl. Sci. Manuf. 46 147-153 (2013). [23] Cho, J., Luo, J. J., Daniel, I. M.: Mechanical characterization of graphite/epoxy nanocomposites by multi-scale analysis. Compos. Sci. Technol. 67 2399–2407 (2007). [24] Georgantzinos, S. K., Markolefas, S., Giannopoulos, G. I., Katsareas, D. E., Anifantis, N. K.: Designing pinhole vacancies in graphene towards functionalization: Effects on critical buckling load. Superlattice Microst. 103 343-357 (2017). [25] Georgantzinos, S. K., Giannopoulos, G. I., Anifantis, N. K.: Coupled thermomechanical behavior of graphene using the spring-based finite element approach. J. Appl. Phys. 120(1) 014305 (2016).

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[26] Georgantzinos, S. K., Giannopoulos, G. I., Pierou, P. K., Anifantis, N. K.: Numerical stability analysis of imperfect single-walled carbon nanotubes under axial compressive loads. Int. J. Struct. Integr. 6(4) 423-438 (2015). [27] Georgantzinos, S. K., Giannopoulos, G. I., Anifantis, N. K.: Mechanical vibrations of carbon nanotube-based mass sensors: an analytical approach. Sensor Rev. 34(3) 319-326 (2014).

In: Cyber-Security and Information Warfare Editor: Nicholas J. Daras

ISBN: 978-1-53614-385-0 © 2019 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

Chapter 10

OPERATIONAL ANALYSIS AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT (OACM) FRAMEWORK: THE PARADIGM OF 2011 MILITARY INTERVENTION IN LIBYA Dionysios Gerontogiannis, PhD* Hellenic Army Academy and University of Crete, Hellas, Greece

ABSTRACT The aim of this chapter is to outline a research on Operational Analysis & Crisis Management (OACM) using integrated paradigm, like the 2011 military intervention in Libya. The research involves the use of theory with relevant findings and conclusions. The methodology uses deductive approach, whose theory and hypothesis have been developed through the research strategy as a result of OACM. The research has been applied in 3 principal aspects: (a) search of the literature, (b) interview of ‘experts’ for the specific subject and (c) conduction of focused group interviews. The applications of this research, focus on Military Operations Research and Analysis (performance measurement in military operations - military readiness) and also on Human Systems (human factors evaluation of military systems - protection and sustainment - factors of socio-cultural modeling). The main results of the chapter come from the analysis of 2011 military intervention in Libya, according to the actions of the opposite sides, confirming in this way the methodological framework of operational analysis and crisis management. In this context, procedures, *

Corresponding Author Email: [email protected], Former Commandant of Hellenic Infantry School, Adjunct Professor of Module: “Operational Analysis and Crisis Management,”Applied Operational Research and Analysis, Interdepartmental Postgraduate Programme, Hellenic Army Academy and University of Crete, Hellas, Greece. Tel.: +30 210 8904 256. URL: http://www.sse-tuc.edu.gr/web/guest/58, Personal Webpage: https://gr.linkedin.com/in/dr-dionysios-gerontogiannis-24b46373.

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Dionysios Gerontogiannis factors & variables were described (through quantitative and qualitative analysis), such as: ‘Operational Management,’ ‘Operational Geometry,’ ‘Operational Configuration,’ ‘Structure and Analysis of the Mission,’ ‘Operational Art Tools,’ ‘Operational Timetable,’ ‘Operational Level’ & ‘Command and Control Structure.’

Discipline: Applied Operational Research & Operational Analysis, Behavioral Sciences and Military Leadership, Media and Communications, Military Strategy Keywords: conflict and crisis management, operational analysis, organizational changes, abilities/skills, structural and organizational elements, dynamic model of crisis management, strategic and operational decisions

INTRODUCTION The various crisis management models perceive and accurately capture crisis management by organizations/states. We rarely find crisis management models that adopt a dynamically interrelated approach, combining operations and conflict area data. Typically, the models are designated as identifiers and monomers. But the conflict area where operations are called to survive is not a functioning system of stable features but an open system of interactions that, depending on the variables that affect it at any given time, may indicate the emergence of threats or the opportunities for the organization/state [1]. Under no circumstances, however, this system can be portrayed statically, nor can it ignore its contribution, positive or negative, to the management of a crisis by an organization/state [2]. We therefore find the need to cover a research gap that will provide a dynamic framework for crisis management by organizations/states, based on a set of processes that respond to the combination of crisis management and the operational framework of the organizations/states, in order to maintain and increase their viability in the conflict environment in which they operate. The bibliographic review and qualitative research were the foundations on which our problem was structured, which is summarized in the following sentence: “Crisis management, as implemented in organizations/states, is not the end of a specific static (or evolutionary) defined process or a defined selection strategy (or a given conflict environment), but appears as the result of multiple interdependencies and interactions between (organizational changes and management redefining) of the organization/state and variables associated with the processes that make up the organization crisis management framework. The plurality of dependent variables in the literature (besides the vast amount of independents) emphasizes even more the need to adopt an approach to integrating crisis management action by organizations/states. This action should cover and describe the

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framework of crisis management by organizations/states as well as the various functions that make up this framework, distinguishing in this way the variables linked to the various functions of crisis management. The process of Operational Analysis & Crisis Management (OACM) have been used using integrated paradigm of 2011 military intervention in Libya which the need have been raised for the design and conduct of military operations. The historical background of the Libyan Civil War of 2011 was a series of riots and clashes that occurred in the North African state of Libya against the government and the head of state Muammar Gaddafi. In this investigation “Gaddafi’s Regime against Libyan Rebels” have been investigated. The stage being analyzed is Desired End State (DES).

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY The process used to collect information and data for the purpose of making operational decisions. The methodology includes publication research, interviews, surveys and other research techniques, and also includes both present and historical information. The methodology applied was based on qualitative [3] and quantitative [4, 5] research, data collection and analysis, to ensure that organizations/states can describe and explain crisis management by applying multiple inter-linked research methods and this because the use of qualitative and quantitative data leads to maximizing the internal and external validity of research [6, 7]. In terms of quality research [8], we chose the form of conducting interviews. In this way, we attempted to identify crisis-related factors - variables that are directly derived from the conflict area reality [9] that they have not identified previous surveys and are not recorded in the bibliography, or we have not been able to identify through of the bibliographic review [10]. The interviews - conversations were conducted in accordance with NATO Defense College/NRCC5 work research with different countries, legal form, construction methods for dealing with crises, escalation of the results of the crisis(es) experienced, etc., mainly from executives who were responsible for the crisis management of the relevant countries. The set of variables identified from bibliography and qualitative research [11] was used to develop our core research tool, the closed qualitative questionnaire [12]. The quantitative survey that followed has been aimed at addressing a number of organizations/states to enable us to draw more general conclusions and to test our research cases through the construction of a closed-ended qualitative questionnaire comprised of the variables we identified in the bibliography [13] as well as qualitative research. As a sampling frame for the needs of our research, a list of organizations/states [14] that was drawn up and could have managed a crisis (or crises) [15].

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RESULTS 1. The Base of Operational Analysis and Crisis Management (OACM) Process The Operational Analysis & Crisis Management (OACM) Process is issued cognisant of the fact that there is still much on-going work that will have an influence on the OACM, such as: adjusting to the roles and responsibilities of the new Operational Analysis approach, including the Context of Crisis Management Phases; changes to the mechanisms available of Operational Lines to Desired End State [16]; and, especially for Crisis Management Framework. This substantial amount of on-going change is the reason that the OACM remains for the time being a flexible version as analyzed below:

1.1. Operational Lines to Desired End State [17]

Figure 1. Operational lines to desired end state.

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1.2. Context of Crisis Management Stages and Phases [18]

Figure 2. Context of crisis management stages and phases.

1.3. The Framework of Crisis Management Model [19] The author defends the view that it should be given a more strategic focus in the management of crises and conflicts from organizations/states. Targeting should focus on the various dimensions of organizational structure, education (culture) and the strategy, and also in the way they affect the crisis/conflict management mechanism, organizations/ states. Therefore, the existence of a structured set of processes that forms an actuation system for organizations/states to a management action, to address the crisis, is seen as the best solution. The crisis management framework is not a one-dimensional context, but is a different, dynamically determined dimension, derived from a “functional routine” which is fed from different “actions,” “strategies” and “resources.” This context is shaped by the abilities/skills of individuals (or groups) to undertake crisis management, as well as the

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choices of actions for crisis management, taking into account the management strategies chosen, either before or during an event crisis. This framework in order to operate should be checked, regarding the capacity that presents, so that the anticipated results in organizations/states to occur, in 2 levels. First level, is characterized by the existence (or not) of “abilities/skills,” “strategies” and “resources” in addressing crises by organizations/states or government entities and is composed of three dimensions: 

 

First dimension, this of “responsibilities and compliance of an effective operational framework” which focuses on persons/groups managing the crisis – considering abilities/skills. Second dimension, this of “existence of strategies” which focuses on the strategic options for crisis response operations. Third dimension, this of “actions” that focus on the implementation of the strategic options for crisis response actions.

Figure 3. Context of crisis management stages and phases.

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The second level has the characteristic that, an organization/state, is as much in managing the crisis, as both its redefines “organizational elements,” “the strategies” and “the managing of efficiency” and this level is composed of two dimensions: 



First dimension, this of “the continuation of the effective functioning of the organization/state framework” that focuses on realigning elements to maintain (or increase) the efficiency and operational process. Second dimension, this of “the re-organization of the organization/state” which focuses on increasing the resilience and the social or conflict area reality.

The Framework of Crisis Management Model is shown in Figure 3.

2. Description of Desired End State (DES) [17] in 2011 Libyan Civil War Network model of graphical representation of the action of an entity “B” in the other functional entity “A” is shown in Figure 4.

Figure 4. Network model of graphical representation of the action of an entity “B” in the other functional entity “A”.

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3. The Completion of DES via Center of Gravity [20] (CoG) Analysis The core equation that determines CoG is: HuGo + D[pursuit] OP = CoG HuGo = Human factor of Governing body D[pursuit] OP = Decision making Objective Purpose with D[pursuit] OP ≠ 0

3.1. Human Factor of Governing Body (HuGo) – “Algorithmic Process Flow Chart for Identifying a Consistent Family of Criteria with the in-Line Use of PESTLE [21] and SWOT [22] Analysis” Firstly, following the analysis of the systemic environment of the entity under consideration and of the international status, should determine the factors that may have influence in the decision-making process to CoG via DES. These factors are then grouped using the PESTLE assay method by activity class. Subsequently, the above factors are grouped using the SWOT analysis method into two distinct blocks, i.e., internal and external factors. The factors of each cluster are further subdivided according to the type of their effect - positive or negative - on the aforementioned decision of the individual or group of individual’s concerned (center of gravity). The result of the preceding process is the determination of the following list of factors: 







Internal (i) factors with positive impact (+): political (Pol,i, +), social (Soc, i, +), economical (Ec, i,+), legal (Leg, i, +), technological (Tech, i, +), environmental (Env, i, +), military (Mil, i, +) and infrastructure (Inf, i, +). Internal (i) factors with negative impact (-): political (Pol,i, -), social (Soc, i, -), economical (Ec, i,-), legal (Leg, i, -), technological (Tech, i, -), environmental (Env, i, -), military (Mil, i, -) and infrastructure (Inf, i, -). External (e) factors with positive impact (+): political (Pol,e, +), social (Soc, e, +), economical (Ec, e,+), legal (Leg, e, +), technological (Tech, e, +), environmental (Env,e, +), military (Mil,e, +) and infrastructure (Inf, e, +). External (e) factors with negative impact (-): political (Pol,e, -), social (Soc, e, -), economical (Ec, e,-), legal (Leg, e, -), technological (Tech, e, -), environmental (Env, e, -), military (Mil, e, -) and infrastructure (Inf, e, -).

The above factors, depending on the type of effect (positive or negative) on the feasibility of achieving the DES by CoG are divided into maximizing or minimizing criteria that compose the consistent family of all criteria of operational analysis as shown in Figure 5 [23].

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Figure 5. Process Flow Chart for Identifying a Consistent Family of Criteria with the in-Line Use of PESTLE and SWOT Analysis

3.2. Decision Making Objective Purpose (D[pursuit] OP) – “Multi-Criteria Decision Making (MCDM)” Based on the output of the preceding process (to wit, consistent family of criteria), it is possible to evaluate all elements [Hypothesis Set - H = {hi, I = 1, 2, 3,.., n}] of a new set Η΄ that Η΄ ⊂ H and Η΄= {hj, j = 1, 2,.., k with hj ≥ 2)} using the MCDM methodology [24].

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Figure 6. Hierarchical structuring of the problem of identifying the DES of the examined entity.

The maximum Compatibility Score (CSmax) with interaction to criteria can be selected and characterized as DES that identified as the CoG of the examined entity. Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) can be the desired MCDM methodology. The building blocks of this method are the following:   

Goals: Determination of the DES that intended to be performed by the individual or group of individuals identified as the CoG of the examined entity. Alternatives: Elements of equation Η΄= {hj, j= 1, 2,.., k with hj ≥ 2)} that Η΄ ⊂ H Criteria: Consistent family of criteria (maximizing or minimizing criteria).

The hierarchical structure of the problem is shown in Figure 6.

3.3. Center of Gravity (CoG) Way of Influence Finding Process (CoG WIFP) Finding the way to influence the focus of an entity [25, 26], i.e., the actions to be undertaken, is a top - down process. It is implemented in 9 distinct and counter-fed individual steps, which are divided into 3 phases and summarized in the flow chart in Figure 7.

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Figure 7. Flowchart summarizing 9 distinct and counter-fed individual steps, which are divided into 3 phases.

DISCUSSION The above-mentioned research process is a dynamic and complex integrated representation of the reality with regard to crisis management by organizations/states, with multiple interactions and interrelationships of the processes that create the crisis management framework with a multitude of structural and organizational-administrative features of the organization/state (with main emphasis on organizational changes and administrative redesigns). This methodological approach is the answer to basic reflection and as we can see from the research of the structured OACM, the organizational-administrative aspect of the organizations/states (organizational changes and management redefinition) is mutually determined, interdependent and interdependent with the crisis management processes by

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the organizations/states. It is the one that identifies and synthesizes the dynamic framework in which crisis management takes place by the organizations/states. It is now perceived that, we have formulated through the crisis management methodological approach the representation of a multivariate and complex dynamic framework that may sometimes work with some specific combinations of interdependence of variables, crisis management processes with those of structure-functional and organizational-administrative variables (with the main focus on organizational change and administrative redefinition) and sometimes it may work with someone else [27, 1, 7]. Based on this assumption, we fully understand the reason why some organizations/states with a lack of organization and design for dealing with crises, by activating some of their other characteristics, can handle crises. In fact, crisis management by organizations/states is not the result of a predetermined selection strategy or a defined process or a defined environment, rather than a set of conjunctural, dynamically evolving variables characterized by interdependence in specific points that affect the course and the sign of the crisis [6, 7]. Aligning to conclusions of the theoreticians who have formulated a position on crisis management, we have argued that a more strategic (administrative) emphasis should be placed on crisis management by organizations/states. Targeting should focus on the different dimensions of organizational structure, culture, and strategy, as well as how they affect the crisis management mechanism in organizations/states. Therefore, the existence of a structured set of processes that set up a system of activating the organizations/states in managing action to deal with crises seems to be the best solution. The interaction of the processes of our theoretical approach compose a multifaceted, multidisciplinary, complex and dynamic mechanism that shapes the organization’s idea, propensity, tendency and perception of crisis management to such an extent that it holds organizations/states in a permitted rhythm for effective crisis management. As a result, when the processes and relationships that define them work positively, then they become levers and push for the crisis management actions, while when they act negatively (i.e., when relations and interdependencies are not developed), then the management capacity of the organization/state is against crises. In the case where negative processes appear, then the organization/state activation in crisis management is diminished. It should be stressed that the crisis management framework is not a one-dimensional framework but is a different, dynamically defined, dimension derived from a “functional routine” which is being refreshed by different “actions,” “strategies” ‘and’ “resources.” This context is shaped by abilities/skills of individuals (or team) taking charge of crisis management as well as the choices of crisis management actions, taking into account the management strategies chosen either before or during an event of the crisis. This framework for operation should be checked, in terms of its capacity, to deliver the expected results to the organizations/states.

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The case of the civil war in Libya in 2011 is structured in such a way that its acceptance (or rejection) from the analysis signals whether this approach applies (or not). In this respect, we have not checked the correlation of the individual variables with each other, to the extent that, for example, a variable in the structure-functional and the organizationaladministrative framework (in organizational changes and management redefinition) or in a crisis management process, display another variable of the same frame. Above all, what we were interested in was whether our problem actually existed, namely that crisis management as implemented in organizations/states is not the end of a specific static (or evolutionary) defined process or a determined strategic choice as the result of multiple interdependencies and interactions between variables, the strategically shaped organizational-administrative framework of the organization/state and variables related to the processes that make up the crisis management of the organization/state. One fundamental limitation of the above approach is the fact that we are referring to a crisis management framework that responds to organizations/states operating in North Africa. It may be that the crisis management processes, but also the structural and organizational-administrative characteristics of these organizations/states (with the main emphasis on organizational changes and administrative redesigns), with which these processes interdepend and interdepend, are more responsive in the case where the organizations/states are investigating another latitude. Our proposals for future research could be directed to adopting a different problem through the investigation of the correlation of crisis management processes by organizations/states focused not only on the CoG in relation to the DES, taking into account the structure-functional and their organizational and administrative features (organizational changes and management redefinition), with respect to the influence of one process on the other. Finally, attempting to carry out the same research, by size class of different actors in a range of organizations/states, may have yielded results that are more responsive to the crisis management mechanism.

CONCLUSION The Gaddafi’s regime, although it was able to identify the CoG of the rebels, it did not follow all the elements of Operational Analysis Planning methodically, with the result that it partly implemented the DP’s to DES (did not implement “Air Supremacy” and “Defense Organization in the cities that regime prevailed”). However, it attempted with a surprise attack on the weak initially rebels to conquer the COG’s, which it did not manage because it did not realize the necessary intermediate stages. It overestimated its power/influence, underestimated the dynamics of popular dissatisfaction, failed to properly analyze the correlation of forces and the international environment. By choosing to maintain low-level military forces while making declarations of global interest without having secured the

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necessary alliances. As a result, it was an overwhelming defeat that would have happened sooner if the alliance had chosen to intervene with land forces. At the outset, rebels did not follow any of the Operational Analysis Planning elements to occupy one of the COG’s, as they were not organized yet. However, after NATO’s involvement on their part, we can see that the necessary DP’s to DES (aside from the air superiority covered by the NATO forces) and the necessary elements of the Operational Planning have brought about the seizure of COG’s of Gaddafi’s regime. They have chosen the right way of doing right and in time, while making the most of all available means and circumstances (people, media, etc.). Allied forces also correctly assessed the situation and organized (resolutions, suppression of air defense, etc.). As a natural consequence, it was a comfortable victory against opponents with zero human losses on the part of allied power. Based on the above and in accordance with the quantitative research, as well as the analysis of the collected data, led us to answer our research questions and to accept (or reject) the series of research cases we had structured. The analysis of factors, which is one of the basic assumptions in the verification of the proposed methodological approach, confirmed, for the most part, the significance of the individual variables that make up each crisis management process, since most of them were confirmed by the derivation of its variables of each process, proving that the variables had been (or were crossed) by the reality of the operational environment, as recorded by the research. On the other hand, the analysis of factors worked within a systematically structured grouping of variables, which delineated new ways of perception of individual crisis management processes by organizations/states. Clustering analysis has highlighted the fact that the specificities that systematize organization/state differentiation determine how different groups of variables in individual crisis management processes can affect them by displaying variables that affect each other a set of organizations/states at the same time have no significant influence on another set of organizations/states. Discrimination analysis and logarithmic regression, combined with cluster analysis by factor, shaped the likelihood that the organization/state belongs to a particular cluster that applies (or does not) specific crisis management procedures, depending on organizational strategies and the administrative changes it decides (or does not decide) to do to manage the actual reality of the conflict region. The synthesis of the results of our quantitative analysis led us to construct an integrated methodological approach of the crisis management framework by the organizations/states, with the main characteristic of the dynamic interaction and interdependence of the crisis management procedures with the strategic choices at the organizational/administrative level of the organization/state (i.e., the adoption or not by organizations/states involved in crisis management, strategic changes at organizational and administrative level).

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The study of bibliography on crisis management and the analysis of the methodological approach we have structured us in identifying its contribution to the theoretical approaches to crisis management, and are identified in three points: 





Unlike most, to date fragmented and fragmented analyzes of crisis management by organizations/states that isolate specific points of the crisis management framework and analyze them under specific perspectives, this methodical approach - focusing on the COG as a key feature of achieving DES, seeks to provide a comprehensive effect of the crisis management framework by the organizations/states, involving and analyzing all the particular abilities/skills, appearing in crisis management and procedures that appear to assemble. Contrary to the most recent descriptions of crisis management by organizations/states, mainly containing static and evolutionary data, this methodological approach reflects the crisis management framework as a dynamic mechanism of interaction and interdependence of abilities/skills in dealing with conjunctural situations and crisis management processes, with the organizationaladministrative strategic changes undertaken by the organization/state in everyday reality. Thus, this approach operates through various combinations of interdependence, interpreting in this way the differentiation of the course between the organizations/states in terms of crisis management and recognition of the actors, not only as good actions in crisis management, they are prompted to increase their involvement in crisis management actions, but also as bad actions in crisis management that may lead them to reduce their involvement (or not) in the management crisis. The strategic organizational-administrative choice of the continual change of organizations/states is by no means a secondary aspect of the crisis management process by organizations/states, as it has been perceived and described so far in the various approaches and models of crisis management. Instead, as it is represented in this methodological approach, it is interdependent and interdependent with the managerial abilities/skills and emerging crisis management processes by organizations/states in dealing with conjunctural situations. It is a dimension of continuous organizational and administrative changes that identifies and synthesizes the dynamic framework in which crisis management takes place by organizations/states.

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Baker, D. (2007) - Strategic Crisis Management in Organizations. Oxford, Chandos, pp. 16.

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Dionysios Gerontogiannis Van Wart, M., Kapucu, N., (2011) - Crisis Management Competencies. Public Management Review, 13(4):489-511. Leavy, B., (1994) - The Craft of Case-Based Qualitative Research. Irish Business and Administrative Research, 15:105-118. Johnston, I., (2009) - Beyond “best practice” road safety thinking and systems management - A case for culture change research. Safety Science, 48(9):1175-1181. Zhang, Z., Chu, X., (2010) - Risk prioritization in failure mode and effects analysis under uncertainty. Expert Systems with Applications: An International Journal, 38(1):206-214. Sapriel, C., (2003) - Effective crisis management: Tools and best practice for the new millennium. Journal of Communication Management, 7(4):348-355. Boin, A., Fishbacher-Smith, D., (2011) - The importance of failure theories in assessing crisis management: The Columbia space shuttle disaster revisited. Policy and Society, 30(2):77-87. Kyriazi, N., (1999) - Sociological Research. Critical Overview of Methods and Techniques. Edition: Greek Letters. Coviello, N. E., (2005) - Integrating Qualitative and Quantitative Techniques in Network Analysis. Qualitative Market Research: An International Journal, 8(1):3960. Yeung, W. C., (1995) - Qualitative Personal Interviews in International Business Research: Some Lessons from a Study of Hong Kong Transnational Corporations. International Business Review, 4(3):313-339. Gephart, R. P., (2004) – Qualitive Research and the Academy of Management Journal. Academy of Management Journal, 47(4):454-462. Bourque, L. B., & Clark, V. A., (1994) - Processing Data: The survey example. In Lewis-Beck, M. S., Research Practice, London, Sage: 1-88. Scandura T. A., & Williams, E. A., (2000) - Research Methodology in Management: Current Practices, Trends, and Implications for Future Research. Academy of Management Journal, 43(6):1248-1264. Saunders, M., Lewis, P., & Thornhill A., (2009) - Research Methods for Business Students. 5th Edition. Prentice Hall. European Union Regulation no.70/2001/12.1.2001 (EL 2001 L 10/33). COPD V2.0. (2013). Allied Command Operations Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive Interim V2.0. – UNCLAS. NATO/SHAPE. Gerontogiannis, D., (2015), Operational Analysis & Crisis Management, Handbook, Hellenic Army Academy - University of Crete. http://moodle.sse-tuc.edu.gr/ moodle/course/view.php?id=30 (access to subscribers). Gerontogiannis, D., (2011), The Context of Crisis Management Stages and Phases, Handbook, University of the Aegean. https://aegeanmoodle.aegean.gr/course/ view.php?id=82 (access to subscribers).

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[19] Gerontogiannis, D., (2014) - Crisis management in the Business Processes and Activities of Organizations/Enterprises. Journal. Hellenic National Documentation Centre. http://www.didaktorika.gr/eadd/handle/10442/34751 [20] Eikmeier, Dale (2004), Center of Gravity Analysis. Military Review 84. [21] Joseph Kim, Keung Ho, (2014). Formulation of a Systemic PEST Analysis for Strategic Analysis. European Academic Research - Vol. II, Issue 5. [22] Caddell, J. D., (2017) - A systems analysis of the Army’s tactical evaluation process. Engineering and Management Program; System Design and Management Program. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. [23] Ssdjevic, Zorica, Ratko Bajcetic, και Bojan Srdjevic (2012). Identifying the Criteria Set for Multicriteria Decision Making Based on SWOT/PESTLE Analysis: A Case Study of Reconstructing a Water Intake Structure. Water Resour Manage vol 26: 3376 - 3393. [24] Matsatsinis, N. (2010). Decision Support Systems. Athens: New Technologies Publishing. [25] Heuer, Richards J., Jr. (1999). Analysis of Competing Hypotheses. Psychology of Intelligence Analysis, Richards J., Jr Heuer, Chapter 8. Center for the Study of Intelligence/ Central Intelligence Agency. [26] Wheaton, Kristan J., Diane E. Chido, (2006). Structured Analysis of Competing Hypotheses. Competitive Intelligence Magazine. vol. (9). no. (6): 12-15. [27] Downing, J., R., (2003) - American Airlines’ use of mediated employee channels after the 9/11 attacks. Public Relations Review, 30:37-48.

Bibliography Coombs, W., T., Holladay, S., J., (1996) - Communication and attributions in a crisis: An experimental study of crisis communication. Journal of Public Relations Research, 8(4):279-295. Crawford, E., (2008), Blurring the Lines between International and Non-International Armed Conflicts - The Evolution of Customary International Law Applicable in Internal Armed Conflict, Australian International Law Journal, 15: 29 - 54. Echevarria, A., (2002), Changing Our Warfighting Doctrine-Again, Journal, Clausewitz’s Center of Gravity, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 26 p. Fink, S., (1996) - Crisis management: Planning for the inevitable. Published by American Management Association, US. Garraway, C., (2010), Military manuals, Operational law and the Regulatory Framework of Armed Force, Journal, National Military Manuals on the Law of Armed Conflict, 2:45-53.

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Heintschel von Heinegg, W., (2015), Belligerence, Warfare-Air, Warfare-Land, WarfareSea, Economic Sanctions, Armed conflicts, Encyclopedia Entries, The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law - Oxford University. Kash, J., T., Darling, R., J., (1998) - Crisis management: prevention, diagnosis and intervention. Leadership & Organization Development Journal, 19(4):179-186. Mitroff, I., Harrington, K., & Gai, E. (1996) - Thinking about the unthinkable. Across the Board, 33(8), pp. 44-48.

In: Cyber-Security and Information Warfare Editor: Nicholas J. Daras

ISBN: 978-1-53614-385-0 © 2019 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

Chapter 11

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN CYBER DEFENSE Georgios Karapilafis* Military Academy of Euelpidon, Technical University of Crete, Thessaloniki, Greece

ABSTRACT In a rapidly changing world, in which organizations put efforts in safeguarding data to survive in a challenging and unclear in its definition cyber space arena, data play a key role in their functionality, prestige and survivability. The speed of processes and the amount of data to be used in defending cyber space cannot be handled by humans without considerable automation. The already existing techniques of analyzing data and recognizing abnormal behaviors and traffics, keep facing unseen types of attacks and challenges. As such, decision making is a hard task and intelligent decision support is one of yet unsolved problems in Cyber Defense. This paper presents a brief survey of potential artificial intelligence applications in cyber defense era.

1. INTRODUCTION In a rapid changing and demanding environment, decision makers need to have at their disposal the most valuable information at the right time, to follow the best course of action. Cyber operations, defensive or not need just that. Accurate and time-sensitive information that give competitively advantages against the virtual adversaries and threats. Each problem that a company or an organization face, either it is military or civilian, is a matter of information. The amount, the complexity and the variety of information make the *

Corresponding Author E-mail: [email protected], [email protected].

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decision process a demanding task. The wish for effective decision making process is the factor that makes the need of information such important. In cyber era, all this information cannot be processed by human brain without considerable automation and this automation, cannot be offered from conventional algorithms anymore. A good decision may be either the best decision that could be taken or just a satisfactory one. But in our case, what matters is precision. For example, we want to recognize immediately when a network is under attack, and the way this happens. Thus, it is not a matter of satisfaction, but precision and timely available and accurate information of the underlying situation when it comes to confidentiality, integrity and availability of data. The role of intelligent software in cyber operations increased rapidly over the years, because handling large amount of information very fast in order to describe and analyze events in cyber space and make the required decisions remains a difficult task, and without automation that is offered from such intelligent applications, fighting against persistent adversaries would be a lost battle. Events of the past years, have shown a rapidly increasing intelligence of malware and cyber-weapons. Adversaries use new techniques that constantly try to obfuscate the origin of data by using for example advanced cryptography and tunneling methods that re hard to analyze. The new defense methods like dynamic setup of secured perimeters, comprehensive situation awareness, and highly automated reaction on attacks in networks will require wide usage of artificial intelligence methods and knowledge-based tools. “American cyber defense has fallen far behind the technological capabilities of our adversaries [such] … that the number of cyber-attacks is now so large and their sophistication so great that many organizations are having trouble determining which new threats and vulnerabilities pose the greatest risk”[1]. The above, is a clear indication for the need of new approaches in cyber defense.

2. WHY ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE It is generally accepted that AI can be considered in two ways: as a science aimed at trying to discover the essence of intelligence and developing generally intelligent machines, or as a science providing methods for solving complex problems that cannot be solved without applying some intelligence like, for instance, playing good chess or making right decisions based on large amounts of data. To have a comprehensive regard of Artificial Intelligence, a comparison must be made between AI and human knowledge (Kaplan, 1984). Next, we provide such comparison results (Nikolaos Matsatsinis et al.): 

Human knowledge is altered, either due to opinion change either because it forgets, in comparison to AI that remains inalterable.

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The process of knowledge extraction in an AI system is done once, in comparison to human knowledge that needs training every time it is needed to transfer from one person to another. The cost of AI systems is smaller than that of training of humans. Human reaction and intelligence is unstable and prone to external factors Human logic use a wide field of knowledge for a specific answer in comparison to AI that is centralized only for specialized issues and solving specific problems.

Generally, businesses exist to make money. None of them exist specifically to deploy and maintain firewalls, intrusion detection systems, identity management technologies and encryption devices. On the other hand, nonprofit organizations such as military and government organizations need to constantly update their incident response capabilities and comply with several security regulations and best practices. In such an environment, AI and its offering capabilities in solving complex problems, is a promising era towards a safe cyber environment for the above-mentioned organizations. Neural nets, expert systems, intelligent agents, pattern recognition, machine learning, data mining are some of the techniques that exist for solving complex problems and assist difficult and intelligent decision making. Large scale government and corporate networks are irresistible targets for cyberattacks - from hackers, hostile government agencies and malicious NGOs. These networks are complex by their nature. Each of the following components like, user, application, data source, and sensor and control mechanism increases the threat surface for cyber-attacks. Defending a network by simplifying network complexity is not an option. Taking functionality away from a network would be self-defeating. Thus, cyber security depends on understanding complexity - not simplifying it. AI has the potential to enable cyber security systems to detect, evaluate and counter threats by assessing anomalies within packets, byte-patterns, data traffic and user behaviors across the entire network. The advantages of machine learning as a first line of defense against zero-day attacks include:    

Force multiplication - enabling fewer human analysts to identify, thwart and counter far greater numbers of attacks than programmatic approaches. Evolutionary advantage - enabling cyber defenses to preempt threat adaptations by detecting any change within byte patterns. Battlespace awareness - providing network security analysts with situational awareness by identifying and classifying byte pattern mutations. Proactive defenses – Constant monitoring of the entire threat surface to detect any patterns of vulnerability before they can be exploited by the enemy.

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In Table 1 “Five Pillar” framework defined by the US Military for cyberwarfare is presented as shown in [17]. Table 1. “Five Pillar” framework Cyber Warfare Pillar Cyber domain is like other elements in battlespace

Proactive defenses

Protection of critical infrastructure Collective defense

Potential Roles for Machine Learning Transparency to command & control of emerging threats Unbiased Detection and analysis of threats by detecting anomalies Empower human analysts with actionable intelligence Constant real time monitoring of every packet across network Near instant recognition of anomalies within packet payload or communication frames Enhance intrusion detection protection systems with real time libraries and heuristic approximations of potential threats Early detection and instant response across entire network

3. NEURAL NETS, SUPPORT VECTOR MACHINES, CLUSTERING Neural nets provide a functionality of massively parallel learning and decision-making. Their most distinguished feature is the speed of operation. They are well suited for learning pattern recognition, for classification, for selection of responses to attacks [2], etc. They can be implemented either in hardware or in software. They are simple computational programs that construct models by using the trial and fault method. Neural nets are well applicable in intrusion detection and intrusion prevention [2, 3, 4, 5]. There have been proposals to use them in DoS detection [5], computer worm detection [6], spam detection [7], zombie detection [8], malware classification [9] and in forensic investigations [10]. Especially they are suitable for on-line training, by using data that are provided on real time through systems like routers or firewalls. A reason for the popularity of neural nets in cyber defense is their high speed, if implemented in hardware or used in graphic processors. There are new developments in the neural nets technology: third generation neural nets – spiking neural networks that mimic biological neurons more realistically, and provide more application opportunities. Most of the times experts need to assess the grade of a specific danger, based on small quantity of data under uncertain circumstances. And that is also true for a network operation center. The need for development of such intelligent systems, capable of operating in an unclear environment and assess fuzzy data is obvious.

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Table 2. Characteristics of Neural Nets Precision Speed Elasticity Adaptiveness Complexity tolerance Ease of usage Independence from experts Speed

High High High High High Medium High Medium

Data noise tolerance

Medium to High

Training Data are needed Training Data are needed

Depends from process understanding and computer speed Preparatory treatment of data is needed

4. PATTERN RECOGNITION Signature-based approach is the most commonly used for Network Intrusion Detection. The IDS have a set of manually written rules called attack signatures. The content of network packets is inspected and an alarm is raised if it matches any of the rules. One of the main challenges in signature based IDS is that the signature of each attack must be updated immediately and the manual signature generation is too slow. The manual analysis of network data to extract classification rules is difficult and slow and reverse engineering is needed on an exploit-based scenario, opposed to a vulnerability-case scenario. Pattern recognition offers that higher generalization ability that is needed to detect variants of known attacks and zero-day attacks. Of course, for such tasks to run, data is what is needed. Data collection can be made either my simulation or live capture. In order to define a model a pattern can be represented as a point in the feature space. Classification is then formulated as the task of finding the optimal separating surface between normal activities and intrusions. The tuning of the system is performed in an error minimization approach. The estimation of the separating surface requires a training set of data and of course the more representative the data is the more effective the detection will be. Misuse and anomalybased patterns could be discovered through a classifier of pattern recognition technique. Emerging technologies such as behavioral authentication, behavioral biometrics and fraudulent activities based on behavioral prints, work to identify patterns of user behavior in certain applications, creating user profiles that can then be matched to subsequent visits. Such technology use atypical variations in parameters, like typing speed, mouse movement, keyboard strokes, tapping force and swipe patterns. In that way, the system progressively learns how you typically interact with another IT system matching a pattern to that person. If anything unusual happens, the system will trigger a fraudulent use, preventing security breaches.

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Some of the strengths of this approach include a “touchless” system, which learns and adapts on its own without direct intervention, and the fact that these patterns can’t be easily learned or faked by an external system. There are some weaknesses, however, as human behavior isn’t always consistent; these systems could trigger false positives and potentially lock people out of their own accounts. They also do nothing to ensure first-line security, such as protecting passwords from leaking in the first place.

CONCLUSION Today’s security professional needs to understand many things on many different levels because the world of technology is only getting more complex and the risks are only increasing. As sophistications of cyber-attacks and malware grow rapidly, the need for development of intelligent cyber defense methods becomes unavoidable. Areas such as decision support, situation awareness and knowledge management are some that could benefit the most from the development of expert systems and AI in general. New developments in knowledge understanding, representation and handling as well in machine learning will greatly enhance the cyber defense capability of systems that will use them. Such intelligent approaches, in combination with conventional security practices — encrypted data, multi-level authentication requirements and general best practices, could provide the necessary tools needed to keep up in a challenging cyber environment.

REFERENCES [1] [2]

[3]

[4]

The Lipman Report, “Threats to the Information Highway: Cyberwarfare, Cyber Terrorism and Cyber Crime.” October 15, 2010, p. 1. Bitter D. A., Elizondo T., Watson. Application of Artificial Neural Networks and Related Techniques to Intrusion Detection. WCCI 2010 IEEE World Congress on Computational Intelligence. July, 18-23, 2010 - CCIB, Barcelona, Spain, 2010, pp. 949-954. Chang R. I., Lai L. B., Su W. D., Wang J. C., and Kouh J. S., “Intrusion detection by back propagation neural networks with sample-query and attribute-query,” International Journal of Computational Intelligence Research, vol. 3, no. 1, 2007, pp. 6-10. De Looze L., Attack Characterization and Intrusion Detection using an Ensemble of Self-Organizing Maps, Proceedings of the IEEE Workshop on Information Assurance United States Military Academy, West Point, NY, 2006.

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[6]

[7]

[8]

[9]

[10]

[11] [12] [13] [14] [15]

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Iftikhar B., Alghamdi A. S., “Application of artificial neural network in detection of dos attacks,” in SIN ’09: Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Security of information and networks. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2009, pp. 229-234. Stopel D., Boger Z., Moskovitch R., Shahar Y., and Elovici Y., “Application of artificial neural networks techniques to computer worm detection,” in International Joint Conference on Neural Networks (IJCNN), 2006, pp. 2362-2369.103. Wu C. H., “Behavior-based spam detection using a hybrid method of rule-based techniques and neural networks,” Expert Systems with Applications, vol. 36, No. 3, Part 1, 2009, pp. 4321-4330. Salvador P. et al. Framework for Zombie Detection Using Neural Networks. In: Fourth International Conference on Internet Monitoring and Protection ICIMP-09, 2009. Shankarapani M., Kancherla K., Ramammoorthy S., Movva R., and Mukkamala S. Kernel Machines for Malware Classification and Similarity Analysis. WCCI 2010 IEEE World Congress on Computational Intelligence. Barcelona, Spain, 2010, pp. 2504-2509. Fei B., Eloff J., Olivier M. S., Venter H. The use of self-organizing maps of anomalous behavior detection in a digital investigation. Forensic Science International, v. 162, 2006, pp. 33-37. http://www.ai-one.com. Demertzis Konstantinos, Iliadis Lazaros, Hybrid Artificial Intelligence System for Cyber Security. Matsatsinis N., Decision Analysis. Iliadis L., Intelligent Systems and applications in danger estimation. http://www.biocatch.com.

In: Cyber-Security and Information Warfare Editor: Nicholas J. Daras

ISBN: 978-1-53614-385-0 © 2019 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

Chapter 12

A CASE STUDY ANALYSIS OF ATTACKS AND LOSSES IN THE SUPPLY CHAIN WITH THE USE OF GPS OR GSM JAMMERS BY THE ATTACKERS Panayiotis Laimos1, Michalis Chronopoulos2, Chrysanthi Laimou2 and Nikoleta Atanasova1, 1

G4S Secure Solutions, Bulgaria 2 G4S Telematix, Greece

ABSTRACT As the value of transported goods continuously increases, organized crime has developed modern methods to take advantage of any security gaps in the supply chain. This is particularly true for transportations taking place over long distances and multiple countries. Criminals also seem to make an increasing use of jamming devices, in an effort to disturb or block GSM signals emitted or GPS signals received by the telematic devices of supply chain trucks. This chapter presents selected incidents where jamming was involved as well as an analysis of the modus operandi of the respective attackers. Finally, the encryption methods applied to the supply chain tracking-related communications are investigated and the relative technology’s current status and trends are presented.

Keywords: supply chain, attacks, losses, case studies, GSM, GPS, jammers



Corresponding Author Email: [email protected].

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1. INTRODUCTION The applications of telematics in the supply chain range from vehicle tracking targeted to enhanced safety of the driver and security of the truck and cargo to optimised fleet management, resulting in cost reduction and operational savings. The above can be achieved by the physical installation of a telematic device in the supply chain truck; the former will use the available GSM network (via an embedded SIM card) to perform transmissions of the acquired 2D position (latitude and longitude), established by an internal GPS receiver. These transmissions will then reach a centralised database for decoding and will be available to the final user for remote monitoring of the position and status of the supply chain truck. However, both the GSM and GPS networks are not immune to interferences, a fact that is well known to and being taken advantage by criminals targeting the supply chain operations worldwide. These interferences can be performed by devices which are easily accessible on the market, also known as jammers, and which can typically operate in one (or more) of the three following modes: 





GPS Jamming: In general, signal jamming occurs when there is an obstruction between the signal’s transmitter and receiver. Particularly in the GPS network, jamming refers to masking satellite transmissions before the any GPS receiver can locate and lock on them. The process is fairly simple; the receiver’s module that monitors the airwaves for satellite signals fails to receive any, even though the broadcasting from the source continues, resulting in its inability to determine a location. GPS Spoofing: Spoofing features an entirely different mentality compared to jamming. A device featuring GPS spoofing will attempt to deceive any GPS receiver by broadcasting counterfeit GPS signals, structured to resemble a set of normal ones, or by rebroadcasting genuine signals captured at a different location or at a different time. GSM Jamming: A GSM jammer is a device that blocks any and all transmission or reception signals, usually by creating some form of interference at the same frequency ranges used by telecommunication providers. As a result, any SIM card (either in a phone or any other device) will either lose signal entirely or experience a significant and sometimes impairing loss of signal quality.

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1.1. Incident Data and Trends According to the Transported Asset Protection Association (TAPA) [1], the number of security incidents in the supply chain that have been reported to its Incident Information Service (IIS), have demonstrated a steady increase in the past years, as can be seen in Figure 1. More specifically, recorded incidents in TAPA’s IIS involving jamming are shown in Figure 2. Although the current rate of attacks using jamming is at very low figure (as shown in Table 1), it is expected that the use of jamming devices shall keep increasing in the next years, particularly due to their accessibility, making the need for countermeasures on behalf of telematics and the supply chain imperative.

Figure 1. Security Incidents reported in TAPA IIS (2011-2016).

Figure 2. Security Incidents Reported in TAPA IIS involving Jamming 2011-2016.

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Panayiotis Laimos, Michalis Chronopoulos, Chrysanthi Laimou et al. Table 1. Percentage of Incidents involving Jamming (2011-2016)

Year Qty Incidents with Jamming Involved % 2011 793 0 0.000% 2012 922 1 0.108% 2013 1378 4 0.290% 2014 1363 2 0.147% 2015 1643 3 0.183% 2016 798 0 0.000% Sum 6897 10 0.145% Remark 1. Data presented in Figures 1 & 2 and in Table 1 range from January 2011 up to May 2016.

2. CASE STUDIES OF SUPPLY CHAIN ATTACKS 2.1. Hijacking & Forced Stop – Italy This incident took place on the 15th of June 2015 in Bari, in the southern region of Apulia, Italy, where five thieves armed with a handgun tried to use their own vehicle to block the path of a cargo truck carrying food products. The truck was pulling out from a company located along the SS16 Ring Road that runs around the city. The driver of the cargo truck rammed the vehicle and escaped. Police arrived shortly afterwards and arrested the criminals, who were also in possession of GPS jamming technology and specially constructed nails to place on the road in order to intercept police vehicles in the event of a car chase.

2.2. Hijacking & Violence/Threat of Violence – Zambia On the 14th of June 2015, a vehicle under escort was confronted by armed suspects in three vehicles; a silver BMW, a black Nissan Navara and a silver Range Rover. The black Nissan Navara pulled up next to the escort and opened fire, while the silver Range Rover passed both and stopped in front of the truck. The truck’s driver was then confronted by two armed suspects with handheld firearms and was forced into the cabin, where the latter proceeded to switch off his mobile phone. The black Nissan Navara continued to pursue the escort vehicle; however, during the pursuit the escort vehicle’s driver managed to activate a panic button and transmit the duress code via the base radio. It would appear that the silver BMW was only used as a backup vehicle. A signal jamming device was used during this hijacking in order to prohibit any communication between the truck/escort vehicle and their headquarters.

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The hijacked truck was recovered 15-20 minutes after the incident in the Bredel area, with a reported loss of € 76,101.

2.3. Hijacking & Forced Stop – Zambia On the 13th March 2015, a truck under armed escort carrying HV cargo (mobile phones & electronics) was attacked and hijacked on the route to a warehouse. The four hijackers were heavily armed with AK 47/R assault rifles and were driving a white Series 3 BMW and a red VW Golf. In the shootout that followed between them and the escort’s security officers, the latter were critically wounded and air lifted by helicopter to a hospital. Although the criminals were in procession and actually used a jamming device, the truck’s monitoring center was able to receive and act upon a transmitted alarm signal.

2.4. Hijacking & Driver Involvement – Zambia A truck carrying a container full of branded clothing and shoes was hijacked on Wednesday, 27 August 2014 on the regional N17 near Alberton (in the south-eastern outskirts of Johannesburg), just off the N3 national road which connects Johannesburg and Durban. Thanks to actively monitored tracking devices embedded in the container, the full cargo was later recovered near the city of Springs, some 50km east of Johannesburg. First results of the ongoing investigation revealed that the truck driver was actively involved in what was described by investigators as more than a hijacking. The criminals used a jamming device to block the tractor’s GPS signal (the jammer was later recovered by police) but it apparently did not affect the tracking device in the container which continued to report and made the recovery possible. The route deviation was noted by the monitoring centre and led to the successful emergency response. One suspect was arrested, while several other perpetrators were able to escape when the intervention team reached the container. The reported loss for this incident was € 140,000.

2.5. Hijacking & Violence/Threat of Violence – Italy A truck carrying high-value designer clothing, perfumes and cosmetic products believed to be worth well in excess of € 100,000, was hijacked on the 14th January 2014 by violent criminals in Senago, a small town in the northern outskirts of Milan (Lombardy region).

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The shipment had just left the warehouse in the western outskirts of Milan when, on a regional road, the truck driver was forced into stopping by two vehicles (a car and a van) driving in front of him, which suddenly slowed down and blocked the road. Three criminals jumped out of the car, immediately smashed the tractor’s window, opened the door, attacked the driver, tied him up and pushed him into the back of the cabin with his face down. They then took over the truck and drove away to an unknown location where they unloaded the goods. The group is likely to have used a jamming device to interrupt the truck’s GPS signal because the security company which had been monitoring the shipment was no longer able to receive any GPS data from the truck, nor did it succeed to call the driver on his mobile phone. Police was alerted immediately but, in first instance, was unable to locate the stolen truck. It was only when the jamming device was deactivated that the security company and the police were able to locate the abandoned truck in Senago, very close to where the incident originally occurred. The driver was still lying in the back of the tractor’s cabin, severely shocked but reportedly unharmed, while part of the load was missing.

2.6. Hijacking & Violence/Threat of Violence – Zambia A truck with a mixed load of smartphones and medication, worth a total with € 540,000, was hijacked by armed gangsters on Wednesday, 17th July 2013 in Boksburg (Gauteng province) in South Africa. The vehicle and almost the totality of the load were recovered only hours later by police in Primrose (a small village near Germiston, Gauteng) following a major police operation. The shipment was on its way to a local distribution centre when it was hijacked around 11:00 am on Innis Road, Boksburg North. Armed gangsters driving in three cars blocked the road and forced the driver into stopping. Police assume that the criminals used a jamming device because the truck’s GPS signal could not be captured. “It is suspected that as soon as the truck was hijacked, the suspects activated a jamming device and the truck could not be located by a tracking signal”, a spokesperson for the Gauteng police said. At some point, however, the truck regained its GPS signal and police was able to locate it in front of a shop in Primrose. When police arrived at the scene, some of the goods were already unloaded into the back of the shop. One box with cell phones had been opened and several packets stolen. Eight boxes with phones, each box containing 720 smartphones, as well as the totality of the medical products were recovered. The truck’s driver and the shop owner were arrested, while the police seized a tracking device and continued its search for more suspects.

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2.7. Hijacking & Violence/Threat of Violence – Italy On Tuesday, 25th June 2013 at around 14:30 in the Milan area, Lombardy, Italy, a group of people (based on the driver’s information) forced a truck loaded with fashion products to stop, although it was very close to its destination facility. The attackers probably used a jamming device and threatened the driver with guns on hand. The Carabinieri notified by the truck’s Alarm Monitoring Center run on site and found the truck partially unloaded, while the driver was fortunately safe. Regarding the stolen goods, the value is currently undisclosed while investigations by the Carabinieri are ongoing.

2.8. Hijacking & Violence/Threat of Violence – Italy On the 28th February 2013, two men in a car, one believed to be armed, hijacked a lastmile delivery vehicle carrying pharmaceuticals, as it pulled to a stop. The vehicle was recovered later the same day, however, minus the load. It is claimed that jamming devices were used.

2.9. Hijacking & Violence/Threat of Violence – Italy This incident occurred on the 18th February 2013, when armed robbers forcefully stopped a truck at the intersection between the A14 and A16 motorway near Canosa di Puglia, Italy. The truck was carrying various goods, from clothing to technological equipment and tools. During the robbery, the driver was held hostage, but was able to activate the alarm system which functioned properly, even though a jamming device was used by the attackers.

2.10. Hijacking & Violence/Threat of Violence – Italy On the 14th March 2012, three armed men blocked a truck carrying computers & electronics, with a grey Fiat Multipla at a ramp leading up to a highway in Milan, Italy. A suspect in a white Renault also pulled up behind the truck. After the suspects subdued the truck driver and used a jamming device to block all GPS and GSM communication, they drove the truck to a remote area, unloaded it and left the driver behind, unharmed. The loss reported for this incident was € 520,000.

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3. SAFEGUARDING & COUNTERMEASURES The importance of proper safeguarding of transmitted and received data via telematic devices in the supply chain is becoming more and more evident, especially when considering the losses that occur when sensitive information reaches unlawful and wrongful individuals. There are several countermeasures currently in use by telematic companies, which are widely applied not only in the supply chain but in other business sectors as well. These include, but are not limited to:

   

the use of private APNs and predefined ports in mobile networks, proprietary communication channel protocols, unit access control via predefined gateways and encrypted unit access control communication.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS As the technical expertise of the attackers increases during the last years and the value of the transported cargo becomes higher and higher, more sophisticated jamming mitigation measures shall be in place to ensure the safety of the drivers and the security of the products. Existing experience from military anti-jamming techniques should be taken into account in order to develop best practices that will decrease the vulnerability of transported cargoes to jamming, therefore increasing the security of the transportation. Application of dual channel communication methods should be further investigated as far as complexity and cost are concerned and applied to High Value Theft Targeted cargoes. Smart Vehicles should be further introduced in this sector of transportation that shall ensure that the vehicle is able to take control of the situation in case jamming is detected and no communication with the base station is allowed in order to protect both the drivers and the cargo.

REFERENCES Czajkowski, K., Fitzgerald, S., Foster, I., Kesselman, C.: Grid Information Services for Distributed Resource Sharing. In: 10th IEEE International Symposium on High Performance Distributed Computing, pp. 181–184. IEEE Press, New York (2001).

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Foster, I., Kesselman, C.: The Grid: Blueprint for a New Computing Infrastructure. Morgan Kaufmann, San Francisco (1999). Foster, I., Kesselman, C., Nick, J., Tuecke, S.: The Physiology of the Grid: an Open Grid Services Architecture for Distributed Systems Integration. Technical report, Global Grid Forum (2002). May, P., Ehrlich, H.C., Steinke, T.: ZIB Structure Prediction Pipeline: Composing a Complex Biological Workflow through Web Services. In: Nagel, W.E., Walter, W.V., Lehner, W. (eds.) Euro-Par 2006. LNCS, vol. 4128, pp. 1148–1158. Springer, Heidelberg (2006). National Center for Biotechnology Information, http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov. Smith, T.F., Waterman, M.S.: Identification of Common Molecular Subsequences. J. Mol. Biol. 147, 195–197 (1981).

In: Cyber-Security and Information Warfare Editor: Nicholas J. Daras

ISBN: 978-1-53614-385-0 © 2019 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

Chapter 13

DYNAMIC RESPONSE OF PROTEIN MICROTUBULES A. K. Lazopoulos, PhD Department of Mathematical Sciences and Mechanics, Hellenic Military Academy, Vari, Greece

ABSTRACT Dynamic response of protein microtubules (MTs) is discussed. Microtubules are modeled as thin flexural beams on an elastic foundation, studied in the context of strain gradient elasticity. The present study is performed in the context of the linear strain gradient theory of elasticity, described in Lazopoulos [1]. The equations of motion are derived through a variational method. A new term is introduced, indicating the importance of the cross-section area in the bending of thin beams. That term is connected to the coupled stresses and is missing from existing strain gradient beam theories. Indeed, due to that term, the stiffness of the beam is highly increased when it is thin. The frequencies of the vibration of the microtubules derived from the proposed theory are compared to the existing theories, pointing out the sources of the differences.

Keywords: protein microtubules, gradient elastic flexural beams, free vibrations, micromechanics, new term 2010 Mathematics Subject Classification 74B99, 74E99, 74M25

1. INTRODUCTION Protein microtubules (MTs) are basic elements of the cytoskeleton. They are hollow cylinders with axial length that ranges from 10nm to 100 micrometer, and inner diameter

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from 15 to 25nm. MTs are the basic elements of the cytoskeleton that are able to undertake bending contrary to actin and intermediate filaments that are relatively very thin. Hence they are considered as the rod elements of the cytoskeleton whereas the actin filaments are considered as the string elements undertaking tension. Their mechanical behaviour was studied using classical theory of elasticity. Unfortunately, these studies ignored size effects. Classical theory does not analyze the effects of length scale parameters. In contrast, in micro and nano scales, those effects have important contribution. Thus, in order to analyze these structures we must use higher-order continuum theories which include parameters, revealing size effects. Such theories are: Cosserat theory (Cosserat [2]), Couple stress theory (Midlin [3]) and strain gradient theory (Altan and Aifantis [4], Ru and Aifantis [5]). In the present article we are going to study MTs with the help of thin beam theory which is described in Lazopoulos [1]. Thin beam theories based on strain gradient elasticity theories were also introduced by Papargyri et al. [6], Park and Gao [7], Yang et al. [8]. In Lazopoulos [1] bending Bernoulli-Euler beam theory is discussed, into the context of a simplified strain gradient elasticity theory. A new term is introduced, that depends on the area of the cross section of MT. That term strongly increase the stiffness of the beam, especially for thin beams. In fact the theory in [1] bridges the theories presented by Papargyri et al. [6] and Yang et al. [8] in a consistent way, adding inertia terms as in Xu [9]. The equations derived from [1] are going to be compared with equations of motion written in Karimi et al. [10] and many interesting conclusions are going to be extracted.

2. EQUATIONS OF VIBRATIONS OF A STRAIN GRADIENT FULL TERM ELASTIC BEAM INSIDE CYTOPLASM The equations of the vibration of the MT’s are going to be derived with the help of a simple version of Mindlin’s linear theory of elasticity with microstructure. The procedure of the derivation of these equations is described in Lazopoulos [1] p. 29. According to that study, the equations and boundary conditions which determine the vibration of a strain gradient full term elastic beam are:

E I  g 2 A

4w 6w 6w 2w 2 2  g EI  EI  ( )    q 0 x 4 x 6 x 4 t 2 t 2

(1)

with the boundary conditions,

Vn  E I  g 2 A

5 3w 5w 2 2  w or w  0 at x=0,  g EI  EI  x 3 x 5 x 3 t 2

(2)

Dynamic Response of Protein Microtubules

M  E I  g 2 A

m  EIg 2

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2w 4w 4w 2 2 or w, x  0 at x=0,L  g EI  EI  x 2 x 4 x 2 t 2

(3)

3w 2w or w, xx  0 at x=0,L  l EI x x 3 x 2

(4)

In these equations E is the Young modulus, I is the moment of inertia, g is the intrinsic bulk length, A is the area of the cross section of the beam, w the displacement of the elastic line, x the horizontal variable (Figure 1), τ the inertia time variable, t the time variable, ρ the density of the beam, Vn the shear forces at the end of the beam, M the bending moment, m the double moment of the beam and q the distributed loading on the beam. The governing equilibrium equation (1) along with the boundary conditions, Eqs. (2, 3, 4), are different from the ones presented by various people, Papargyri et al. [6-11], Park 2

and Gao [7]. The difference lies in the increase of the moment of inertia by a term g A in the terms of second higher derivative. This quantity increases the stiffness of the gradient elastic beam. This difference is due to the consideration of the hyperstress  yxx  g E yxx 2

(Lazopoulos [1]) that is missing from the already presented strain gradient beam theories. For thin beams, where the height h may be compared to the intrinsic length g, the contribution of those additional terms becomes of major importance. In equation (1) q(x) represents the distributed total applied external lateral forces derived by the difference between the initial external forces (q0(x)) and the effect qc(x) of elastic foundation, generated by the deformation of the surrounding elastic medium (cytoplasm), Figure 1.

Figure 1. The model of microtubules with cytoplasm medium.

The load of the elastic medium qc(x) has been modelled by Pasternak elastic foundation model which includes linear and shearing parameters (Karimi et al. [10]). It is given by the relation:

A. K. Lazopoulos

214

qc(x)=2qpasternak(x)=2(k1bw-k2b

2w x 2

(5)

where k1 = 2.7 Ec and k2 is one tenth of k1. Ec is the elasticity modulus of the medium and it is reported to be about Ec = 1Kpa, (Karimi et al. [10] Figure 1). Finally, b is the external diameter of the MT.

3. THE VIBRATIONS Studying the free vibrations of microtubules, we consider Eq. (1) free of the external

load. Free flexural behavior of the beam is described by Eq. (1) with q0 x   0 . The solution has the form:

w(x,t)=sin (

nx iωt )e L

(6)

From (1) with τ = 0:

k 2 n 2 2 E ( Ag 2  I )n 4 4 Eg 2 In 6 6 2   A  2b(k1  )0 L4 L6 L2

(7)

Eq. (7) accepts a solution of the form:

1 

k 2 n 2 2 1 ( g 2  I )n 4 4 Eg 2 In 6 6 (   2 ( k  )b) 1  L4 L6 L2

(8)

Nevertheless, the corresponding solution of Karimi et al. [10] is:

2 

k 2 n 2 2 Bn 4 4 n 6 6V   2 ( k  )b 1 L4 L6 L2 

(9)

With

B  E ' I  l 22  2l02 

8 l12 15

(10)

Dynamic Response of Protein Microtubules

2 V  2(l 02  l12 ) 5

215

(11)

E' 

E (1  v) (1  v)(1  2v)

(12)



E (Lame constant) 2(1  v)

(13)

where l0,l1,l2 are the material length scale parameters and ν the Poisson ratio. In the next paragraphs the values of the frequencies ω1 and ω2 will be studied discussing the influence of various parameters.

3.1. Non-Gradient Microtubules Frequency In this paragraph the frequencies of the two models are examined with k1 = k2 = 0 and g = l0 = l1 = l2 = 0. Furthermore, E = 2 109 Pa, ρ = 1470kgr/m3, d1 = b = 25 10-9m, d2 = 15 10-9m, L = 1 10-6m and n = 1. Therefore, Eq.(8) becomes:

1 

1 EIn 4 4 ( )  L4

(14)

And the corresponding equation from Karimi et al. [10] is:

2 

Bn 4 4 n 6 6V  L4 L6 

(15)

The diagrams of the two frequencies with respect to the axial length of the microtubules have been drawn and comparing them we may conclude that: 1. The results show a slight difference between ω1 and ω2 2. The smaller the L the larger this difference is

A. K. Lazopoulos

216

L-ω diagram 1200000 1000000 800000 ω1

ω 600000

ω2

400000 200000 0 0,00E+00

2,00E-05

4,00E-05

6,00E-05

8,00E-05

1,00E-04

1,20E-04

L(m)

Figure 2. ω1, ω2 versus L for the two cases. L-ω diagram 8,00E+08 7,00E+08 6,00E+08 5,00E+08 ω1

ω(Hz) 4,00E+08

ω2

3,00E+08 2,00E+08 1,00E+08 0,00E+00 0

0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0001 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 L(m)

Figure 3. ω1, ω2 versus L for the two cases.

It is obvious that although close, the results show a slight difference especially for small L. There is no gradient influence since the material length scale parameters l0, l1, l2 are zero as well as g. Consequently, the introduced new term in [1], in the present case, is not important. Furthermore, the effect from the cytoplasm is negligible. Thus the results should be identical but are not. The difference between the results is due to the method of derivation of the equations describing the vibration of the beam.

Dynamic Response of Protein Microtubules

217

3.2. MT’s Frequency without Cytoplasm Medium Effect In this case the frequencies of the two models are scrutinized without cytoplasm medium effect, but with size effects. Therefore we have: k1 = k2 = 0 and g = l0 = l1 = l2 = 10-6m. Therefore, Eq.(8) becomes:

1 

1 ( g 2  I )n 4 4 Eg 2 In 6 6 (  )  L4 L6

(16)

while the corresponding equation from Karimi et al. [17] is:

2 

Bn 4 4 n 6 6V  L4 L6 

(17)

The diagrams of the two frequencies with respect to the axial length of the microtubules have been drawn and comparing them we may conclude that: 1. The results show again a considerable difference between ω1 and ω2 2. The smaller the L the larger this difference is. 4 In this case it is obvious that the term Eg 2 A  w plays its important role: For relatively 4

x

small L the difference is high, while as L increases the term has a negligible impact to the results. It should be pointed out that the elastically deformed cytoplasm medium effect is not included, while in the next case this effect changes the results considerably.

3.3. MT’s Frequency with Cytoplasm Medium Effect In this case the frequencies of the two models are studied with cytoplasm medium effect and size effects. Therefore we have: k1 = 2700 Pa k2 = 270 Pa and g = l0 = l1 = l2 = 10-6m. Therefore, Eq.(8) becomes:

1 

k n 2 2 1 ( g 2  I )n 4 4 Eg 2 In 6 6 (   2(k1  2 2 )b) 4 6  L L L

And the corresponding solution from Karimi et al. [17] is

(18)

A. K. Lazopoulos

218

L-ω diagram 6,00E+11

5,00E+11

4,00E+11 ω1

ω(Hz) 3,00E+11

ω2

2,00E+11

1,00E+11

0,00E+00 0,00E+00

2,00E-07

4,00E-07

6,00E-07

8,00E-07

1,00E-06

1,20E-06

1,40E-06

1,60E-06

L(m)

Figure 4. ω1, ω2 versus L for the two cases.

2 

k 2 n 2 2 Bn 4 4 n 6 6V   2 ( k  )b 1 L4 L6 L2 

(19)

The diagrams of the two frequencies with respect to the axial length of the microtubules have been drawn and comparing them we may conclude that: 1. The results show a considerably large difference between ω1 and ω2. 2. The smaller the L the larger this difference is, but contrary to the previous cases the results do not seem to converge as quickly as in the previous cases, especially for large L. It is obvious that in this case the cytoplasm medium effect does not quench the 4 important influence of the term Eg 2 A  w4 . We can see that the difference in small L is so

x

large, that we must admit that not only the cytoplasm medium effect determines the phenomenon but also the area of the cross section A. Let us remind that the proposed strain gradient beam theory and the proposed elastic cytoplasm effect include terms depending upon the shear behavior of the beam and their interaction yields the differences in the frequency values.

CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION In this study, the influence of the strain gradient component along the transverse direction of the MTs is studied.

Dynamic Response of Protein Microtubules 2

That hyper-stress adds the term EAg w0

( 4)

219

( x) to the governing equation of the beam

motion (Lazopoulos [1]). That additional term depending not upon the moment of inertia of the cross-section, but upon the area of the cross-section turns thin beams stiffer. After derivation of the motion equations, it is evident that the proposed theory yields different results from other established theories, Karimi et al. [10], especially in the interaction of cytoplasm and shear effect due to strain gradient elasticity theory. Finally the two theories approximately coincide for large L.

REFERENCES [1]

Lazopoulos, A. K., (2012). Dynamic response of thin strain gradient elastic beams. Int. Jnl. of Mechanical Sciences, 58, 27 - 33. [2] Cosserat, E., Cosserat, F. (1909). Theory of deformable bodies, Scientific Library, A. Herman and Sons, Paris, Sorbonne 6. [3] Mindlin, R. D., (1965). Second gradient of strain and surface tension in linear elasticity, Int. Jnl. Solids and Struct., 1, 417 - 438. [4] Altan, B. S. and Aifantis, E. C., (1997). On some aspects in the special theory of gradient elasticity. J. Mech. Behav. Mater., 8 231 - 282. [5] Ru, C. Q. and Aifantis, E. C., (1993). A simple approach to solve boundary-value problems in gradient elasticity, Acta Mechanica, 101, 59 - 68. [6] Papargyri-Beskou, S., Tsepoura, K. G., Polyzos, D., Beskos, D. E., (2003). Bending and stability analysis of gradient elastic beams, Int. Jnl. Solids and Struct., 40. 385 - 400. [7] Park, S. K. and Gao, X. L., (2006). Bernoulli-Euler beam model based on a modified couple stress theory, Jnl. Micromech. Microeng., 16, 2355 - 2359. [8] Yang, F., Chong, A. C. M., Lam, D. C. C., Tong, P., (2002). Couple stress based strain gradient theory for elasticity, Int. Jnl. Solids and Struct., 39, 2731 - 2743. [9] Xu, K.-Y., Aifantis, E. C., Yan, Y.-H. (2008).Gradient models for free transverse vibrations of a double-walled carbon nanotube, Jnl. Appl. Mech., 75 /021013. [10] Karimi Zeverdejani, M., Tadi Beni, Y. (2013). The nano scale vibration of protein microtubules based on modified strain gradient theory, Current Applied Physics, 13(8) 1566 – 1576. [11] Papargyri-Beskou, S., and Beskos, D., (2008).Static, stability and dynamic analysis of gradient elastic flexural Kirchhoff plates, Arch. Appl. Mech.,78, 625 - 635.

In: Cyber-Security and Information Warfare Editor: Nicholas J. Daras

ISBN: 978-1-53614-385-0 © 2019 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

Chapter 14

TIME TEMPERATURE SUPERPOSITION RESPONSE OF CARBON FIBER REINFORCED COMPOSITE PLAQUES UNDER ACCELERATED AGING CONDITIONS Dionysios E. Mouzakis1,* and Stefanos P. Zaoutsos2 1

Hellenic Army Academy, Department of Military Sciences, Sector of Mathematics and Engineering Applications, Applied Mechanics Laboratory, Vari – Greece 2 Technological Educational Institute of Thessaly, Department of Mechanical Engineering, Larissa, Greece

ABSTRACT Composite materials in aviation-related structures are subjected to a continuous environmental aging procedure. Our findings on glass fiber polyester composites used in the manufacturing of wind turbine blades have already shown the dramatic alteration of the mechanical properties in aged structures [1]. The benefits in commercial flights in adopting all-composite passenger aircrafts are weight and fuel reduction and therefore an all composite aircraft is much greener than the conventional types. Composite aircraft are supposed to provide at least 20% economy on fuel consumption. Therefore, study of the exposure of high performance materials to environmental aging such as varying temperature, humidity, ultraviolet radiation, etc. is of paramount importance, in order to study the impact of these important aging factors on their mechanical behavior. Viscoelastic data of polymer matrix carbon fiber composites upon exposure to climatic aging has been assessed in the present study. In order to investigate the combined action of temperature and humidity on composites subjected to changes of temperature from -35 to + 40°C and humidity variations from Tg, where Tg = 100°C, Tref = 180°C It was expected that according to theory of TTS analysis the William-Landel-Ferry equation is valid within the glass transition regime temperatures, whereas the Arrhenius models are useful in temperatures above the Tg. In the three Figures discussed below the validity of each approximation is discussed with respect to the three reference temperatures chosen. In Figure 2, where Tref < Tg modeling was employed, it is clearly evident that the model linearity as prescribed by TTS theory holds only in the Temperature regime [50°C, 140°C] for all types of specimens. Though seemingly valid also for temperatures below 50°C, this is not the case for the 30-day accelerated specimens. Wholly non-linear behavior is observed for all specimens above 140°C. Interestingly, in the case where Tref  Tg, the linearity regime is shifted to the temperature region of ca. [63°C, 150°C]. Again, though linearity seems to hold for the pristine and thermally shocked specimens, the 30-day aged ones show a nonlinear response below 63°C. Possibly, the internal damage they have sustained due to aging contributes to this effect.

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Dionysios E. Mouzakis and Stefanos P. Zaoutsos

Figure 1. Storage Moduli DMA Curves overlay for all types of specimens. pristine-txt tts 5,000 pristine-txt tts, Step 12 day s-txt tts, Step 30 day s#6-txt tts, Step pristine-txt tts, Step - TTS A rrhenius 12 day s-txt tts, Step - TTS A rrhenius 30 day s#6-txt tts, Step - TTS A rrhenius

0

-5,000

X - s h if t

T T S A r r henius - P r istine Ea: 2 0 6 ,0 kJ/mol T r ef: 3 2 2 ,1 K T r ef: 4 9 ,0 °C standar d er r or : 5 0 ,3 4

-10,00

T T S A r r henius-1 2 day s Ea: 2 3 1 ,2 kJ/mol T r ef: 3 2 2 ,1 K T r ef: 4 9 ,0 °C End condition: Finished nor mally

-15,00

T T S A r r henius Ea: 1 9 7 ,6 kJ/mol T r ef: 3 2 4 ,2 K T r ef: 5 1 ,0 °C standar d er r or : 5 2 ,1 5 End condition: Finished nor mally

-20,00

-25,00 25,0

50,0

75,0

100,0

125,0 150,0 temperature (°C )

175,0

200,0

225,0

250,0

Figure 2. TTS results; Shift factor for all specimens as a function of Temperature for T ref < Tg.

Finally, in Figure 4, the effort to apply WLF and Arrhenius models for reference temperatures well above the material glass transition is presented. Evidently, both models fail to adapt or comply with the experimental curves’ shift factor. In this case, although, some linearity appears to exist for the pristine and 12-day thermally shocked specimens, this cannot provide valid neither WLF nor Arrhenius parameters. Therefore, although mother-curves were produced for these data families, they should not be further discussed due to failure to comply with both models prescriptions.

Time Temperature Superposition Response of Carbon Fiber Reinforced …

229

10,00

pristine-txt tts, Step 12 day s-txt tts, Step 30 day s#6-txt tts, Step pristine-txt tts, Step - TTS A rrhenius 12 day s-txt tts, Step - TTS A rrhenius 30 day s#6-txt tts, Step - TTS A rrhenius

5,000

0

X - s h if t

T T S A r r henius - P r istine Ea: 2 1 2 ,4 kJ/mol T r ef: 3 7 3 ,2 K T r ef: 1 0 0 ,0 °C standar d er r or : 6 9 ,9 4

-5,000

T T S A r r henius-1 2 days Ea: 2 1 7 ,6 kJ/mol T r ef: 3 7 3 ,2 K T r ef: 1 0 0 ,0 °C standar d er r or : 2 9 ,8 1

-10,00

T T S A r r henius- 3 0 days Ea: 2 0 5 ,6 kJ/mol T r ef: 3 7 2 ,2 K T r ef: 9 9 ,0 °C standar d er r or : 4 5 ,5 0

-15,00

-20,00 25,0

50,0

75,0

100,0

125,0 150,0 temperature (°C )

175,0

200,0

225,0

250,0

Figure 3. TTS results; Shift factor for all specimens as a function of Temperature for Tref  Tg. 10,00 pristine-txt tts, Step 12 day s-txt tts, Step 30 day s#6-txt tts, Step pristine-txt tts, Step - TTS A rrhenius 12 day s-txt tts, Step - TTS A rrhenius 30 day s#6-txt tts, Step - TTS A rrhenius

7,500

5,000

2,500

0 X - s h if t

T T S A r r henius-P r istine Ea: 1 1 1 ,7 kJ/mol T r ef: 4 5 4 ,1 K T r ef: 1 8 1 ,0 °C standar d er r or : 2 7 8 ,0

-2,500

T T S A r r henius- 1 2 days Ea: 1 4 9 ,9 kJ/mol T r ef: 4 5 4 ,1 K T r ef: 1 8 1 ,0 °C standar d er r or : 1 0 1 ,1

-5,000

T T S A r r henius - 3 0 days Ea: 1 4 1 ,7 kJ/mol T r ef: 4 5 3 ,2 K T r ef: 1 8 0 ,0 °C standar d er r or : 1 0 2 ,0

-7,500

-10,00

-12,50

-15,00 25,0

50,0

75,0

100,0

125,0 150,0 temperature (°C )

175,0

200,0

225,0

250,0

Figure 4. TTS results; Shift factor for all specimens as a function of Temperature for T ref > Tg.

Further, it would be interesting to study how the mother curves are reproduced when different reference temperatures are chosen and the impact of the corresponding T ref’s on the viscoelastic parameters like storage modulus and tan(delta). So, in Figure 5, the storage modulus mother curves are shown on the examples of pristine specimens at a very wide frequency regime. Obviously, different reference temperatures produce a pronounced monotonous mother-curve shifting effect. The higher

230

Dionysios E. Mouzakis and Stefanos P. Zaoutsos

the reference temperature the higher the Tg regime (with respect to frequency) of the mother curve. Moreover, the magnitude of the storage moduli per se, are increased too somewhat as seen in Figure 4. Similar effects were observed for both other aged specimen types. Shifting of the mother-curve glass transition was also observed for the damping coefficient at a wide frequency range. In this case however, the maximum values of tan() do not increase with increasing Tref, however, tan() peak shifts to higher frequencies as Tref is increased. An interesting finding was the double peak which appeared for T ref = 180°C, showing possibly incomplete post-curing. This double peak vanished during both aging procedures. pristine-txt 49 0 tts 1,000E11

E ' (P a )

pristine-txt 49 0 tts, Step pristine-txt 100 0 tts, Step pristine-txt 181 0 tts, Step

8,000E9 1,000E-13

1,000E-10

1,000E-7

1,000E-4

0,1000 100,0 frequency (Hz)

1,000E5

1,000E8

1,000E11

1,000E14

Figure 5. Storage modulus vs frequency mother curves at all reference temperatures. Pristine Specimens. pristine-txt 49 0 tts 0,5000

Dimorphism (double tan peaks)

t a n ( d e lt a )

pristine-txt 49 0 tts, Step pristine-txt 100 0 tts, Step pristine-txt 181 0 tts, Step

0,01000 1,000E-24

1,000E-21

1,000E-18

1,000E-15

1,000E-12

1,000E-9

1,000E-6 1,000E-3 0,1000 frequency (Hz)

10,00

1000

1,000E5 1,000E7 1,000E9

1,000E14

Figure 6. Tan (delta) vs frequency mother curves at all reference temperatures. Pristine Specimens.

Time Temperature Superposition Response of Carbon Fiber Reinforced …

231

4.2. Effects of Aging on the TTS-Modeled Long Term Response Since only two reference temperatures showed to produce valid results for TTS the results obtained for Tref = 180°C, will not be discussed here. Figure 7 shows the mother curves for the storage moduli of all specimen types. Two main characteristics can be observed here as results of the two different aging procedures: (a) E’ slopes characteristic for a range of frequencies tend to displace with aging time, and (b) storage moduli plateaus move to lower values, typical indication of an decreasing material dynamic stiffness. Especially in the case of 12 days aged-specimens data are reasonably similar to those of the pristine specimens, however the 30-day aged ones are showing a total differentiation with respect to magnitude. In Figure 8 the corresponding mother curves for tan() data are shown. Similar behavior is shown in that case. The Tan delta peak of the pristine specimens lies amidst the two curves of the aged specimens. Interestingly, the damage inflicted by thermal shock within 12days, appears to keep the tan() delta data maximum, 3 frequency orders of magnitude lower, whereas environmental aging shifts them almost 3 orders of magnitude higher. So, as verified by the storage moduli too, thermal shock tends to shift the transition frequencies of the material to lower values whereas the environmental to higher. Possibly, environmental aging is related to matrix stiffening, and thermal shock to matrix microcracking producing the effect exhibited in the mother curves. Again, as shown in Figure 9, the TTS mother curves obtained at T ref = 100°C, the specimens aged for 12 days have a similar behavior with respect to dynamic stiffness as the pristine ones, and the 30 days aged specimens differentiate with respect to position and magnitude of the E’(f) data. The dynamic damping coefficient data as presented in Figure 10 present little differentiation of the peaks of the curves, which all lie in the region 0,2-1 Hz. 30 days#6-txt 51 0 tts 8,000E10

E ' (P a )

30 days#6-txt 51 0 tts, Step pristine-txt 49 0 tts, Step 12 days-txt 49 0 tts, Step

6,000E9 1,000E-13

1,000E-11

1,000E-9

1,000E-7

1,000E-5

1,000E-3 frequency (Hz)

0,1000

10,00

1000

1,000E5

Figure 7. Storage modulus vs frequency mother curves after TTS modeling at Tref = 50C.

1,000E7

232

Dionysios E. Mouzakis and Stefanos P. Zaoutsos 30 days#6-txt 51 0 tts 0,5000

t a n ( d e lt a )

30 days#6-txt 51 0 tts, Step pristine-txt 49 0 tts, Step 12 days-txt 49 0 tts, Step

0,01500 1,000E-13

1,000E-11

1,000E-9

1,000E-7

1,000E-5

1,000E-3 frequency (Hz)

0,1000

10,00

1000

1,000E5

1,000E7

Figure 8. Tan() vs frequency mother curves after TTS modeling at Tref = 50°C. 30 days#6-txt 99 0 tts 1,000E11

E ' (P a )

30 days#6-txt 99 0 tts, Step pristine-txt 100 0 tts, Step 12 days-txt 100 0 tts, Step

5,000E9 1,000E-12

1,000E-10

1,000E-8

1,000E-6

1,000E-4

0,01000 1,000 frequency (Hz)

100,0

10000

1,000E6

1,000E8

1,000E10

Figure 9. Storage modulus vs frequency mother curves after TTS modeling at Tref = 100°C. 30 days#6-txt 99 0 tts 0,5000

t a n ( d e lt a )

30 days#6-txt 99 0 tts, Step pristine-txt 100 0 tts, Step 12 days-txt 100 0 tts, Step

0,01500 1,000E-12

1,000E-10

1,000E-8

1,000E-6

1,000E-4

0,01000 1,000 frequency (Hz)

100,0

10000

1,000E6

Figure 10. Tan() vs frequency mother curves after TTS modeling at Tref = 100°C.

1,000E8

1,000E10

Time Temperature Superposition Response of Carbon Fiber Reinforced …

233

CONCLUSION Based on the above TTS analysis performed on aged and pristine carbon fiber reinforced composite specimens the following conclusions can be drawn: The Time Temperature Superposition procedure has been verified as applicable only up to temperatures matching the glass transition of the polymer matrix. Above that temperature both WLF and Arrhenius approaches fail to deliver valid data. A strong effect of the reference temperature was verified on the mother curves glass transition region and storage moduli maximum data; they both monotonously shift to higher values with increasing Tref. Finally, adverse effects of aging were verified for TTS performed for temperatures below and up to the glass transition regime; thermal shocking tends to shift the frequencyrelated transition region of the material to lower values whereas the environmental to higher.

REFERENCES [1]

[2]

[3]

[4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9]

Mouzakis, D. E., Zoga, H. & Galiotis, C. (2008). Accelerated environmental ageing study of polyester/glass fiber reinforced composites (GFRPCs) Composites: Part B, 39, 467–475. Hodzic, A., Kim, J. K., Lowe, A. E. & Stachurski, Z. H. (1994). The effects of water aging on the interphase region and interlaminar fracture toughness in polymer–glass composites. Compos Sci Technol, 64, 2185–95. Mouzakis, D. E., Kandilioti, G., Elenis, A. & Gregoriou, V. G. (2006). Ultraviolet radiation induced cold chemi-crystallization in syndiotactic polypropylene claynanocomposites, J Macromol Sci- Pure and Appl Chem, 43(2), 259-67. Ferry, J. D. (1980). Viscoelastic properties of polymers. 3rd edition. John Willey and Sons, Inc. ISBN: 978-0-471-04894-7. Williams, M. L., Landel, R. F. & Ferry, J. D. (1955). J. Am. Chem. Soc., 77, 3701. Leaderman, H. (1943). Elastic and Creep Properties of Filamentous Materials. Textile Foundation, Washington D.C., USA. Markovitz, H. (1975). Superposition in rheology. J Polym Sci, Symposium. No. 50 Tobolsky, A. V. & Andrews, R. D. (1945). Systems manifesting superposed elastic and viscous behavior. Chem Phys, 13, 3-27. Okubo, N. (1990). Preparation of Master Curves by Dynamic Viscoelastic Measurements, DMS, 6.

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[10] O’Connell, P. A. & McKenna, G. B. (1997). Large Deformation Response of Polycarbonate: Time-Temperature Time-Aging Time and Time-Strain Superposition. Polymer Engineering and Science, 37, 1485-1495. [11] Cavaille, J. Y., Jourdan, C. & Perez, J. (1987). Time-Temperature Superposition Dynamic Mechanical Behavior of Atactic Polystyrene. Journal of Polymer Science: Part H: Polymer Physics, 25, 1235-1251. [12] Matsumoto, D. S. (1988). Time-Temperature Superposition and Physical Aging in Amorphous Polymers. Polymer Engineering and Science, 28(20), 1313-17. [13] Palade, L. I., Verney, V. & Attad, P. (1995). Time-Temperature Superposition and Linear Viscoelasticity of Polybutadienes. Macromolecules, 28, 7051-7057. [14] Lee, A. & McKenna, G. B. (1988). Effect of crosslink density on physical ageing of epoxy networks. Polymer, 29, 1812 - 1817. [15] Li, R. (2000). Time-temperature superposition method for glass transition Temperature of plastic materials. Materials Science and Engineering A, 278, 36–45. [16] Brinson, L. C. (1995). Effects of physical aging on long term creep of polymers and polymer matrix composites. Inf. J. Solids Structures, 32(617), 827-846. [17] Han, C. D. & Kim, J. K. (1993). On the use of time-temperature superposition in multicomponent/multiphase polymer systems. Polymer, 4(12), 2533-39. [18] Colby, R. H. (1989). Breakdown of time-temperature superposition in miscible polymer blends. Polymer, 30, 1275-78. [19] Alwis, K. G. N. C. & Burgoyne, C. J. (2006). Time-Temperature Superposition to Determine the Stress-Rupture of Aramid Fibres. Appl Compos Mater, 13, 249–264. [20] Tajvidi, M., Falk, R. H. & Hermanson, J. C. (2005). Time–Temperature Superposition Principle Applied to a Kenaf-Fiber/High-Density Polyethylene Composite. Journal of Applied Polymer Science, 97, 1995–2004. [21] Georgiopoulos, P. & Kontou, E. (2015). Τhe effect of wood-fiber type on the thermomechanical performance of a biodegradable polymer matrix. J Appl Polym Sci, 132, 42185, doi: 10.1002/app.42185. [22] Pothan, L. A., Oommen, Z. & Thomas, S. (2003). Dynamic mechanical analysis of banana fiber reinforced polyester composites. Composites Science and Technology, 63, 283–293. [23] Poetschke, P., Abdel-Goad, M., Alig, I., Dudkin, S. & Lellinger, D. (2004). Rheological and dielectrical characterization of melt mixed polycarbonatemultiwalled carbon nanotube composites. Polymer, 45, 8863–8870. [24] Choong, G. Y. H., De Focatiis, D. S. A. & Hassell, D. G. (2013). Viscoelastic melt rheology and time–temperature superposition of polycarbonate–multi-walled carbon nanotube nanocomposites Rheologica Acta, 52(8-9), 801-814. [25] Povolo, F. (1985). Scaling relationships in a constitutive equation with one structure variable. J Mater Sci Let, 4, 619-623.

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In: Cyber-Security and Information Warfare Editor: Nicholas J. Daras

ISBN: 978-1-53614-385-0 c 2019 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

Chapter 15

ATTACKS AGAINST I NFORMATION S YSTEMS IN THE E.U. E NVIRONMENT: L EGAL T EXTS & THE J OINT C YBERCRIME ACTION TASKFORCE (J-CAT) M ODEL Anastasios Papathanasiou∗ and Georgios Germanos† Hellenic Police - Cyber Crime Division, Athens, Greece

Abstract While investigating attacks against information systems, experts from law enforcement agencies and the computer emergency response teams need to take into consideration the existing legal framework and the practical barriers that may limit their field of actions. In this paper we discuss the efforts from the side of E.U. to tackle cyber attacks against information systems through legislation and its agencies. Moreover, we explain the role of the Joint Cybercrime Action Taskforce, established within the European Cybercrime Centre at Europol, which is an excellent example of effective cooperation on the fight against cyber attacks at E.U. level and beyond.

Keywords:cybercrime, cyber attacks, Europol, ENISA, Eurojust, Convention on Cybercrime, J-CAT

1.

Introduction

Rarely, nowadays, are cybercrime and cyber incidents limited to the boundaries of a single state. Due to the nature of cyberspace, criminals and victims can be located anywhere, crimes and attacks may be performed within few seconds, while the incident could affect an enormous number of people or machines. This is why their investigation requires the representatives of law enforcement authorities, the representatives of the Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs) and the competent prosecutors and magistrates to seek, based on bilateral and multilateral agreements, the assistance and cooperation of companies, bodies ∗ †

Corresponding Author Email: [email protected]. E-mail address: [email protected].

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and organizations established in other Member States within the European Union, or other States worldwide.

2.

Legal Texts within the E.U.

Especially for the European Union, cyber security issues and effective response to cyber incidents have led to the co-decision and drafting of legal texts, with compulsory or voluntary compliance for the Member States. Characteristic and representative texts are the Convention on Cybercrime (better known as the Budapest Convention - 2001), the Directive 2013/40/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council (2013) on attacks against information systems and the European Union Strategy for cyber security ”to an open, safe and secure cyberspace” (2013), where Member States have clearly declared their will to formulate ideal conditions in cyberspace to ensure the smooth and healthy development of social and economic activities.

2.1.

Convention on Cybercrime

The Convention on Cybercrime of the Council of Europe serves as a guideline for any country developing comprehensive national legislation against cybercrime and as a framework for international cooperation between State Parties to this treaty [1]. It is worth noting that the Convention on Cybercrime is considered today a rather outdated text [11]. At the time it was formulated, it used to be an innovative one, but since technology advances much faster than legislation, important parts of todays digital world are missing: neither ”attack” nor ”critical infrastructure” terms can be found in the text.

2.2.

Directive on Attacks against Information Systems

A more recent text which has entered into force at E.U. level is the directive on attacks against information systems. Member States have identified that (cyber) attacks, and especially those linked to organized crime, are a growing menace in the Union and globally. There is also an increasing concern about the potential for terrorist or politically motivated attacks against information systems which form part of the critical infrastructure of Member States and of the Union. The directive aims to fight cybercrime and promote information security through stronger national laws, more severe criminal penalties and better cooperation between relevant authorities [5].

2.3.

E.U. Strategy For Cyber Security

In 2013 European Union has also published its strategy for cyber security ”to an open, safe and secure cyberspace” [2]. This strategy includes five priorities: (a) the achievement of cyber resilience, (b) the drastical reduction cybercrime, (c) the development of cyber defence policy and capabilities related to the Common Security and Defence Policy, (d) the development of the industrial and technological resources for cybersecurity and (e) the establishment of a coherent international cyberspace policy for the European Union and the promotion of core E.U. values. The previously mentioned priorities affect both LEAs and CERTs, both directly and indirectly.

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E.U.’s Agencies

Decisive role in the actions of the competent bodies of the Member States plays the contribution of the European agencies, in particular ENISA, Eurojust and Europol. ENISA. The mission of ENISA (European Union Agency for Network and Information Security) is to contribute to securing Europes information society by raising awareness of network and information security and developing and promoting ”a culture of network and information security in society for the benefit of citizens, consumers, enterprises and public sector organizations in the Union” [8]. Eurojust. Eurojust’s role is the stimulation and improvement of the coordination of investigations and prosecutions between the competent authorities in the M.S.. It also supports in any way possible the competent authorities of the M.S. to render their investigations and prosecutions more effective when dealing with cross-border crime - including cybercrime [3]. Europol. Europol (European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation) is helping achieve a safer Europe for the benefit of all EU citizens. This is done by assisting the M.S. in their fight against serious international crime and terrorism. In 2013 Europol set up the European Cybercrime Centre (EC3) in order to strengthen the law enforcement response to cybercrime and thus to help protect European citizens, businesses and governments from online crime [6]. Cyber-Security Ecosystem. Europol has suggested in its Internet Organized Crime Threat Assessment (IOCTA) 2016 report the development of a ”cyber-security ecosystem”, at EU level and beyond, in which all the relevant partners and stakeholders should be included. Moreover, networks, interfaces and links to legal and regulatory frameworks should be identified. In this way, all involved parties could achieve ”easier capacity building” and discover ”opportunities for the further strengthening of cyber security in the EU” [7].

4.

Joint Cybercrime Action Taskforce (J-CAT)

Particular mention should be made to the Joint Cybercrime Action Taskforce (J-CAT) model. J-CAT is a group that operates under the umbrella of the European Cybercrime Centre (EC3) of Europol. It was launched on 1 September 2014 as a response to further strengthen the fight against cybercrime in the European Union and beyond. The objective of the J-CAT is to ”pro-actively drive intelligence-led, coordinated action against key cybercrime threats and top targets”. The J-CAT has the ability to coordinate large-scale operations to arrest criminals, seize illegally used equipment and collect digital evidence, not limited to the territorial boundaries of a single state. Through its activities, it is demonstrated that close cooperation between states is not only theoretical discussion, but a reality with tangible and enviable results [9, 10].

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Members

Its members are law enforcers - experts in the investigation of cybercrime from several States. More specifically, the J-CAT is currently composed of cyber liaison officers from committed and closely involved EU Member States (Austria, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands and the UK), non-EU law enforcement partners (Colombia, Australia, Canada and the US - represented by two agencies: Federal Bureau of Investigation and Secret Service) and EC3. All of them are located in one single office to ensure that they can communicate with each other in the most effective way.

4.2.

Types of Cases Investigated

The J-CAT is involved in: (a) high-tech crimes (such as malware, botnets and intrusion), (b) crime facilitation (bulletproof hosting, counter-anti-virus services, etc.), (c) online fraud (online payment systems, carding, social engineering) and (d) the various aspects of child sexual exploitation online.

4.3.

Procedures

In order to actively fight cybercrime, the J-CAT chooses and prioritises the cases to pursue. For that purpose, the different country liaison officers submit proposals on what could be investigated. The taskforce members then select the most relevant ones and proceed to share, collect and enrich data. They then develop action plans, which are led by the country that submitted the chosen proposal. Finally, the J-CAT goes through all the necessary steps to make the cases ready for action, which includes involving judicial actors, identifying the required resources and allocating responsibilities.

4.4.

Real Cases

Some of the recent cases in which J-CAT contributed were the operation against the cybercriminal group DD4BC (DDoS for Bitcoin - December 2015), the takedown of the DORKBOT botnet (December 2015), the Operation Source (dismantling of the BEEBONE botnet - April 2015) and the Operation Onymous (action against dark markets on TOR network November 2014).

Conclusion and the Way Forward The progress regarding the legal framework of cooperation among relevant authorities of E. U. Member States and the harmonization of the measures against cybercrime and cyber incidents is significant. Though, faster legal responses, adapted to technological evolution, are more than necessary. In practice, J-CAT has proven that, in several cases (and at least in serious organized crime), land borders should not be considered as obstacles any more. The model of J-CAT is a good point to start discussions for further, more effective and closer international cooperation between countries in the field of attacks against information systems. Without doubt, effective collaboration requires the harmonization of national laws concerning cybercrime. However, this model can be emulated by other organizations with

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transnational action, not only in the field of law enforcement. Last but not least, during cybercrime investigation and response to cyber incidents, specialists have to face several other issues regarding legislation (e.g. data retention, information exchange, penalties, cooperation with private sector) and technology (cloud services, encryption, anonymization etc.), which require further consideration.

References [1] Council of Europe: Convention on Cybercrime CETS No: 185 (2001). [2] Council of the European Union: Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union: An Open, Safe and Secure Cyberspace - JOIN(2013) 1 final - 7/2/2013 (2013). [3] Eurojust, http://www.eurojust.europa.eu/. [4] European Cybercrime Centre (EC3), https://www.europol.europa.eu/. [5] European Parliament, Council of the European Union: Directive 2013/40/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 August 2013 on attacks against information systems and replacing Council Framework Decision 2005/222/JHA (2013). [6] Europol, https://www.europol.europa.eu/. [7] Europol: Internet Organised Crime Threat Assessment (IOCTA) 2016. p. 9 (2016). [8] ENISA, https://www.enisa.europa.eu/. [9] Joint Cybercrime Action Taskforce (J-CAT), https://www.europol.europa.eu/. [10] Reitano, T., Oerting, T., & Hunter, M.: Innovations in International Cooperation to Counter Cybercrime: The Joint Cybercrime Action Taskforce. The European Review of Organised Crime, 2(2), 142-154 (2015). [11] Yannakogeorgos, P. A., Lowther, A. B.: Conflict and Cooperation in Cyberspace: The Challenge to National Security. CRC Press, ISBN 9781466592025, p. 253, (2016).

In: Cyber-Security and Information Warfare Editor: Nicholas J. Daras

ISBN: 978-1-53614-385-0 © 2019 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

Chapter 16

THE MILITARY APPLICATIONS OF PRINTED FLEXIBLE ELECTRONICS Fotios Pelesis, PhD Technipetrol Hellas S. A. (TechnipFMC Group), Athens, Greece

ABSTRACT Printed flexible electronics is an innovative technology which offers superior characteristics compared to conventional electronics. Their research and development opens new horizons to the military and spreads across a wide range of applications such as energy, security and anti-terrorism. This paper emphasizes on the potential military applications of printed flexible electronics which will significantly improve the capabilities and survivability of tomorrow’s army. In addition, the most advanced printing techniques, substrate and ink types are discussed with the aim to provide an in-depth and spherical knowledge of the specific technological field.

Keywords: printed flexible electronics, defence, security, counter-terrorism, energy, technology

1. INTRODUCTION The military has the biggest interest in technology and its applications among all fields. It is well known that, most of the technology used in every day’s life was invented exclusively for military purposes and eventually, was declassified and became commercially-available. Every year, many countries spend billions of dollars to research and develop new weapon systems which will provide tactical advancement, counteract

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opponent’s systems and result in the least possible friendly casualties on the battlefield. The author’s belief is that a country’s power and influence is based onto four independent foundations: military, economic growth, diplomacy and alliances. Therefore, it is necessary to have strong military which uses leading-edge technology, can be deployed rapidly and can operate drastically. This paper presents in detail the concept of printed flexible electronics, the most advanced manufacturing techniques and the types of substrates and functional inks which are currently being used. Great emphasis is given on the military applicability with the aim to highlight the benefits which the military branches will experience by incorporating them.

2. PRINTED FLEXIBLE ELECTRONICS Printed flexible electronics is an emerging technology which has attracted large attention from private companies, research groups and of course, the military sector. This technology is a sub-category of printed electronics and refers to single conductive elements or integrated systems being printed onto thin substrates for example, plastic. The electronics can be printed onto one side or onto both sides of the substrate. They can be divided into two categories: single- or multi-layer. The first consists of simple circuits while the latter of devices having sophisticated architecture. Printed flexible electronics are cheaper and lighter than conventional electronics, offer unique mechanical properties such as flexibility, bendability, robustness and can function over adverse weather conditions (Randjelovic & Muck & Kaltsas, 2013; Organics and Printed Electronics Association, 2014). The aim is to substitute all except long-life electronics and in addition, to expand to areas which were not accessible in the past. The forecasts predict great prospects of success. More specifically, the market size in 2017 is estimated at $29 billion and is expected to grow by 250% in 2027 reaching $73 billion (Das & Ghaffarzadeh & Chansin & He, 2017). Printed flexible electronics cover a wide range of potential products: OLED and EL displays, lighting, batteries, solar cells, medical devices, sensors, heaters, memories, interconnects, e-papers and RFIDs (Zhang, 2014; Troadec, 2015, Huber & Popp & Kaiser & Ruediger & Schindler, 2017). These in turn, fit into many sectors such as automotive, healthcare, energy harvesting and smart packaging. Hence, it can be easily understood why top-class military research groups are so much interested in this technology. One of these is the American Defence Advanced Research Project Agency (DARPA, 2017). Their potential military applications are discussed in Section 6. The success of printed flexible electronics is mostly dependent on their conductivity and durability compared to conventional electronics; the main parameters influencing printed flexible electronics’ performance are the printing technique, substrate and the

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functional inks. Continuous research is conducted in order these products to meet the set targets and hence, enter the mass-production phase which is expected within the next years.

3. MANUFACTURING TECHNIQUES This section presents and discusses the printing techniques which are mostly used for the fabrication of flexible electronics by presenting the mechanisms of ink transfer, their applicability and the associated limitations. Each technique is a complex system which interacts with the substrate and the ink. Changes in the environmental conditions tend to create inconsistencies in the end-product’s characteristics and thus, production is performed in controlled environment. The manufacturing process can rely on a single or incorporate more printing techniques all of which, are being used in graphics industry for decades. The latter configuration is known as Roll-to-Roll process and is usually preferred for challenging projects. Printing as manufacturing process requires lower capital cost, lower energy consumption, has faster production rate and is characterized by simplicity compared to conventional techniques. The additive nature of printing produces less waste and uses smaller volumes of aggressive chemicals making it environmentally friendlier (Randjelovic et al., 2013). The manufacturing of printed electronics can be accomplished by a wide variety of techniques. The first question which arises is “which one should be used?” The answer is not straight-forward because it is dependent on the product’s specifications, production volume, and the level of capital investment. Table 1 illustrates the characteristics of the most advanced techniques. By observing Table 1, screen-printing is the leading technique because it can deposit the thickest layer of ink and can print on any substrate. The layer’s thickness is probably, the most important parameter since it dictates the product’s electrical performance. When dealing with rough or absorbent substrates, deposition of thick conductive layers is prerequisite to overcome discontinuities or inhomogeneities caused by the substrate. Its production speed is adequate for small and medium volumes such as military equipment. Flexography is more popular in the printing industry, yet gravure has more superior characteristics; both are ideal for high-volume production. Inkjet falls behind the competition because its capabilities are the least attractive when mass-production of products is required. This paper focuses on screen-printing and gravure which are considered the most advantageous manufacturing techniques for the mass-production of military printed flexible electronics.

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Table 1. Characteristics of Printing Techniques (Jurgen, 2010; Troadec, 2015) Characteristics Ink Viscosity (Pas) Max. Ink Layer’s Thickness (μm) Max. Resolution (μm) Registration (μm) Substrates Max. Production Speed (m2/s) Capital Cost

Printing Techniques Screen-printing 0.5-50 100 20 25 Any 3 Low

Flexography 0.05-0.5 8 80 200 Flexible 30 High

Gravure 0.01-0.2 12 75 20 Flexible 60 High

Inkjet 0.001-0.04 0.5 5 5 Any 0.5 Low

3.1. Screen-Printing Screen-printing lies at the top of the most established techniques for the fabrication of printed electronics and graphics (FESPA, 2015). High-precision, repeatability and versatility are few advantages of this technique (Bohan, 2012). It presents no operational limitations; it can use the widest range of ink types and can print onto the most challenging rigid and flexible substrates (PNEAC, 2017). For these reasons, it is the industry’s primary choice when an application requires deposition of thick conductive layers or when the substrate has rough surface. The screen-printing’s inks, also known as pastes, are substantially more viscous than those used in other printing techniques such as gravure (Troadec, 2015). Screen-printing’s disadvantages are the time-consuming preparation and the low production rate which results in low-production volume (Technical Print Ltd, 2012). The printing industry has come up with solutions to overcome these drawbacks: automations have been introduced to improve production rate and the research of cylinder screen-printing’s configuration now allows continuous operation (Technical Print Ltd, 2012). Screen-printing consists of four mechanical components which are listed below: a) Screen: the screen is divided into the frame, the image carrier and the stencil. The image carrier is a dense mesh of polyester or stainless steel threads. The material’s selection relies on the print’s requirements. Polyester is cheaper while stainless steel threads are preferred when better durability and print quality are desired. The bottom surface of the mesh is coated with a photo-sensitive material leaving selected areas open to create the image. The frame can be either stainless steel or aluminium and holds the mesh at a pre-defined distance from the substrate. b) Flood bar: A typical flood bar has rectangular shape and is made of stainless steel. Prior to squeegee’s cycle, it distributes the ink along the screen. An even and continuous layer of ink is very important.

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c) Squeegee: Its cross-section can be square, rectangular or triangular. It is usually made of polyurethane. During the cycle, the squeegee applies hydrodynamic pressure onto the ink transferring it onto the substrate through the screen’s open pores. d) Bed: In a print stroke, the bed supports the substrate and keeps it in place by applying vacuum conditions (Banks & Foster & Kadara, 2016; Leach, 1988; NIIR Board of Consultants & Engineers, 2017). Figure 1 depicts schematically the screen-printing process:

Figure 1. Schematic representation of the screen-printing process (Banks et al., 2016).

3.2. Gravure Gravure, or rotogravure, is the ideal high-volume technique for military printed flexible electronics. As mentioned at the beginning of this Section, its main competitor is flexography. Compared to flexography, it is more robust, more stable and has better print consistency. It stands out from the competition for the fabrication of multi-layer electronics due to its incomparable layer-to-layer registration. Also, a gravure’s production line can be very flexible by having fast changeovers and hence, it can easily adapt to market’s trends and needs. On the other hand, it has larger press footprint, higher heat consumption and higher operating and maintenance costs (Mas, 2009; Durling, 2009). The last sentence reveals the main reasons why the industry prefers flexography but this does not apply to the military because a compromise in performance in favour of money can costs lives.

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Fotios Pelesis Gravure is divided into the following components: a) Ink fountain: The fountain is an open-top tank which contains the ink. Its configuration can be simple or more sophisticated by having a feed system, an agitator or a re-circulating system. b) Doctor blade: The blade is in contact with the engraved cylinder at a specified angle dictating the ink’s quantity carried by that mechanical component. More specifically, it removes the excess ink located on the cylinder’s top-surface leaving ink only in the cells. c) Engraved cylinder/Printing roll: Undoubtedly, it is the core of gravure. As the name implies, the cylinder carries a negative image; The image’s area consists of V-shape cells in the order of micro-scale. The print’s quality and the cylinder’s ink capacity depend on the cells’ pattern, uniformity, number, opening and depth. The cylinder core is usually of steel alloy or ceramic which is covered by a thin layer of copper. After engravement, the cylinder’s top-surface is chrome-plated to improve durability. Various methods have been developed over the years for the engraving process: acid etching, electro-mechanical and laser. Laser engraving is the newest and most advanced technique and as a result, produces the optimal cells. On the other hand, it is the most expensive. d) Impression roll: The impression roll/cylinder applies constant and uniform pressure onto the substrate with the aim the latter to be in smooth contact with the engraved cylinder. The cylinder core is metallic and is covered by an elastic sleeve to prevent damage to the flexible substrate. Surface irregularities or uneven pressure can affect the image quality (Durling, 2009; Serenius, 2011). Figure 2 depicts schematically the gravure process:

Figure 2. Schematic representation of gravure (Jurgen, 2010).

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4. SUBSTRATES The success of printed flexible electronics passes through the development of innovative substrates which promise to radically change the nature of today’s electronics. The substrate has a considerable influence on the device’s performance and properties by dictating the press/substrate’s and ink/substrate’s interactions. Broadly speaking, the substrates can be divided into two categories: paper and plastic. The substrate’s selection is mainly driven by the application. The decision is rather trivial because each substrate type is accompanied by advantages and drawbacks which add up into the equation. Table 2 performs a detailed comparison between them: Paper is considerably more-complex compared to plastic due to its non-uniform inner porous structure. Paper industry is focused on developing coating layers for counteracting paper’s non-uniformity and ultimately, produce coated papers which will be far more superior than plastics. The author’s belief is that the specific breakthrough should be expected in the next couple of years. Coatings are used to improve paper’s properties such as surface roughness, absorbency and surface energy. The coating is a water solution which consists of pigments, binder/s and a thickener (Larsson & Engström, 2004). Additives such as surfactants are often used to further improve paper’s properties. Kaolin, Precipitated Calcium Carbonates and Ground Calcium Carbonates are the most popular minerals used as pigments in the paper industry (Preston, 2001). Such coatings do not apply to plastics, which tend to be uncoated. The most frequently used plastic films are polyamide (PA) and polyethylene terephthalate (PET). An endless debate regarding which substrate type is optimal is taking place in the global research community during the last years; in the meantime, the industry is mostly using plastic films to produce printed flexible electronics. However, this trend is going to change by 2022; the forecasts state that paper will capture most of the market by providing significantly better properties compared to plastics (Harrop & Das, 2012). Table 2. Comparison between paper and plastic substrate types (Serenius, 2011) Properties Surface roughness Absorbent Folding capacity Ageing rate Mechanical strength Shrinkage Bio-degradable Stability w.r.t. temperature Vulnerable to chemicals Cost Weight

Paper Nano/Micro-scale Yes High Low Low/Medium Low Yes High High Extremely low Very low

Substrate Plastic Nano-scale No High Low High High No Low/Medium Low Low Low

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5. INKS Graphic inks are used for decades in publications, advertising, labelling and decoration. A typical graphic ink consists of soluble (dye) or insoluble (particles) material, binder and solvent/s (Lichtenberger, 2004). The first component provides the printed area with the desired colour; binder adheres the deposited material onto the substrate and the solvent/s control the viscosity, printability and the drying rate. The concept of printed electronics has generated the need to produce a completely new category of inks, known as functional inks. The main requirements are satisfactory viscosity per printing process, adequate rub resistance, adherence with the substrate, controlled drying rate and the ability to form a continuous and homogeneous layer. Functional inks can be sub-categorized with respect to their nature into: conductive, semi-conductive and dielectric. Focusing on the conductive inks, which have attracted the largest attention, they are typically composed by conductive particles, a binder, solvent/s, co-solvent/s and additives (Pekarovicova, 2015). The conductive particles can be in the nano- or micro-scale and the most widely used materials are carbon, graphite, graphene, gold, silver and copper (Bhore, 2013). Each of these is associated with certain advantages and limitations. For example, copper is highlyconductive but oxidizes rapidly when in contact with air. Nano-particles tend to form more conductive layers compared to micro-particles, yet the latter interact better with rough substrates. Figure 3 illustrates a typical printed layer of silver nano-particles: Straight after the ink transfer, the substrate passes through a drying unit to immobilise the printed layer. Afterwards, it is a common practice to pass the substrate through a highenergy drying stage, known as sintering, to improve its electrical characteristics. It has been reported that sintering improves the layer’s conductivity by more than four orders of magnitude in milliseconds (Mark Lee, 2011).

Figure 3. Typical printed layer of silver nano-particles (Prof. Shlomo Magdassi Research Group, 2015).

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6. MILITARY APPLICATIONS Traditionally, the military is one of the most profitable industries. In 2016, the global military’s expenditures increased by 0.4% compared to 2015 reaching $1.686 trillion (Tian & Fleurant & Wezeman & Wezeman, 2017). This can be generally attributed to global instability driven by geopolitical changes, and the decisiveness of certain countries to establish and increase their regional influence with military acts. On top of this, the terrorist attacks in Europe and America has flooded the planet with fear and insecurity. As a result, many countries have substantially increased their counter-terrorism’s expenditures. For example, USA’s expenditure in homeland security has increased by $360 billion per year since 2001 while the European countries follow similar trend (European Parliament, 2015). Printed electronics not only offer unique capabilities but also, they are considerably cheaper compared to conventional electronics. The low cost of printed electronics allows the production of large volumes of military equipment which will multiply the military strength of a country. In this section, the author identifies the potential military applications of printed flexible electronics by taking into consideration their performance, efficiency, life-cycle and cost.

6.1. Energy Harvesting and Supply Solar cells have high potentials and promise to reduce the world’s dependency from oil. Sunny countries such as Greece, can tremendously benefit by massively adopting this technology. In terms of conventional solar cell’s efficiency, the world’s record is 43.5% (McGehee, 2011). The most-efficient printed flexible solar cell ever produced reached 18.6% (Mihailetchi & Jourdan & Edler & Kopecek & Stichtenov & Lossen & Boschke & Krokoszinski, 2010). Even though printed flexible solar cells are currently less efficient and have smaller life compared to conventional ones, they are many orders of magnitude cheaper and can cover larger areas. In addition, researchers have come up with transparent printed solar cells (Wan Hasan & Husain, 2017). Printed flexible solar cells could be mounted onto military buildings, airplane’s shelters and hangars or cover unused large areas of military bases and airports. Transparent solar cells could be used in facilities which location and camouflage must not be compromised. This environmentally-friendly application will generate enormous amount of energy which in turn, will dramatically reduce the military’s operating costs while ensuring energy independency. The applicability of printed solar cells could be expanded on satellites, unmanned vehicles, airplanes, vessels and soldier’s portable equipment. Figure 4 illustrates a set of non-transparent and transparent printed flexible solar cells:

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Figure 4. Set of non- transparent and transparent printed flexible solar cells (Beach, 2015; Marks, 2013).

6.2. Structural Health Monitoring In the event of attack, the enemy’s priority is to bomb or sabotage the opponent’s critical infrastructure. The term ‘Critical infrastructure’ refers to power plants, oil refineries, water stations, bridges, dams and electricity pillars. A smart network of printed piezoelectric sensors could be mounted onto or embedded into the previously-mentioned high-value infrastructural elements, depending on their architecture. This will enable the Structural Health Monitoring (SHM) in real-time which will substantially improve the efficiency and quality of strategic decision making. A hypothetical scenario is presented below: Two countries claim a specific geographical region. The enemy starts an attack and bombs a bridge which would primarily be used by the friendly units to deploy and protect that region at any cost. The SHM smart network rises an alert that the element has been critically-damaged. At no time, the Headquarter activates the backup plan and deploys its land units through a secondary bridge or road. The SHM system has prevented the land units from being trapped or lose vital time which could result in severe losses and the region been captured by the enemy. The SHM system is not only proposed for war scenarios. By transmitting a large volume of data, it can be used to plan and schedule maintenance works. A promising potential application could be the monitor of electricity networks. In case an electricity pillar gets damaged by severe weather conditions, its location will be known and the backup electricity network will be automatically activated saving money and time.

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6.3. Soldier’s Equipment A low-cost ‘smart’ uniform with an embedded dense grid of printed piezoelectric sensors could be designed for soldiers. The grid would be integrated with a series of electrical components such as a battery, an active RFID and a chip; printed batteries and active RFIDs have been successfully tested and could be used to reduce the uniform’s production cost (National Centre for Flexible Electronics, 2015; FicusSoft, 2004). If the soldier gets heavily injured by enemy fire, the ‘smart’ uniform will automatically inform the Command Centre by transmitting the soldier’s location and which body’s part or even organ has been injured; the latter can be precisely determined by knowing the location of piezoelectric sensors which have recorded the bullet’s impact while a simple algorithm could reveal the angle of penetration. Knowing these information, the Command Centre can immediately initiate a Rescue mission by sending friendly units to clear the area, offer him/her First Aid assistance and ultimately, transfer him/her to a hospital. The ‘smart’ uniform could be developed further by incorporating on its inner side a grid of resistors connected to an energy source. When the soldier is exposed to cold environments, the resistors will supply the necessary heat safeguarding the soldier’s health and optimal operational performance. Furthermore, printed wearable hardware aim to substitute the heavy and nonergonomic computers being used nowadays in military missions. Thinner, flexible, foldable, cheaper are few of the superior characteristics of tomorrow’s military flexible electronics. The OLED display, circuit boards, memory and powering system will be fullyprintable. The only component which is difficult to be printed using conventional printing techniques is the chip, yet this is expected to be 3D printed soon. Such equipment will drastically improve the soldier’s capabilities by providing ergonomic usability, decision support and situational awareness (McNally, 2013). Figure 5 depicts a representation of tomorrow’s military wearable electronics:

Figure 5. Representation of tomorrow’s military wearable electronics (www.printedelectronicsworld.com, 2016).

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Moreover, printed flexible biosensors are currently being evolved and are certainly applicable to military hospitals and medical teams deployed in the battlefield. They are considered advantageous compared to conventional biosensors because they are cheap, disposable and carriable allowing on-site tests (Nissinen, 2015). The biosensors which have already been developed are capable of measuring among others, glucose, cholesterol, urea, drugs and toxins (Nissinen, 2015; Keiichiro & Mun’delanji & Eiichi, 2016).

6.4. Sensors for Ammunition and Missiles The reserves of ammunition and missiles are stored in high-security facilities. Ordering such equipment can take months or even years and their price can reach millions of dollars. Once received, they must be kept in excellent condition and the probability of being stolen by terrorist groups must be eliminated. From this perspective, printed flexible electronics offer realistic and cost-effective solutions. Temperature and humidity sensors can now be printed onto paper and plastic substrates having satisfactory performance (Dankoco & Tesfay & Benevent & Bendahan, 2015; Matija & Tadeja & Matej & Janez & Anton, 2014). These sensors can be installed onto ammunition and into missile cases to monitor the conditions which are exposed to. Prior to usage, the military staff will evaluate the data recorded by the sensors and if any of the missiles has been exposed to unacceptable levels of temperature or humidity, will be withdrawn. The temperature and humidity sensors’ applicability expands beyond the previously-mentioned example into diagnostic systems in robotics and food packaging. In addition, active RFIDs could be mounted onto the ammunition and missiles to track their location. This will improve the storage facilities’ level of safety. In the unlikely event of a missile being stolen, the military forces can track it, arrest the terrorist group and get the missile back before it is used in an attack.

6.5. Counter-Terrorism (CT) 9/11 changed the game’s rules. The war was spread in the western cities in the form of terrorist attacks. Countries such as the United Stated of America suffered the loss of hundreds of innocent civilians. Printed flexible electronics could be used against terrorism by improving the safety of urban environments. Novel studies have demonstrated quite promising results for printed gas sensors which detect a range of gases such as CO, H2S, NO, NO2 and NH3 (Fabritius & Gornostayev & Hakola & Halonen & Hassinen & Hast & Jabbour & Jantunen & Jokinen & Kordas & Kukkola & Kyllönen & Lappalainen & Myllylä & Mäklin & Popov, 2010; Kubersky & Syrovy & Hamacek & Nespurek & Stejskal, 2015). Similar gas sensors could

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be developed for poisonous and toxic gases. The specific type of sensors could be used in hospitals, underground stations and public trains. Printed pH sensors could be installed in central water stations and in the water pipeline network to monitor the water quality and alert in the event of contamination by deadly substances. Such equipment is not far from being brought into life since research works have presented fully-printed pH sensors for other applications (Kampouris & Kadara & Jenkinson & Banks, 2009; Hayat & Marty, 2014).

CONCLUSION This chapter has demonstrated the potential military applications of printed flexible electronics and how the military sector will benefit from by incorporating them. It is believed that they will serve as an excellent tool against terrorism and on the battlefields.

REFERENCES [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]

[7]

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A Flexible Future for Today’s Technology. 2016. www.printedelectronicsworld. com. Accessed 24/09/2017. Banks, C. E., & Foster, C. W., & Kadara, R. O. 2016. Screen-Printing Electrochemical Architectures. Springer. Beach, G. 2015. Paper-Thin Solar Cells Could Provide Power for 1.3 Billion People. http://inhabitat.com. Accessed 24/09/2017. Bhore, S. S. 2013. Master Thesis: Formulation and Evaluation of Resistive Inks for Application in Printed Electronics. Western Michigan University, USA. Bohan, M. F. J. Introduction to printing and coating. Level 1 Module Notes, B.Sc. In Printing and Coating. Swansea University. Accessed 20/04/2012. Dankoco, M. D., & Tesfay, G. Y., & Benevent, E., & Bendahan, M. M. 2015. Temperature Sensor Realized by Inkjet Printing Process on Flexible Substrate. Materials Science and Engineering: B. doi: 10.1016/j.mseb.2015.11.003. Das, R., & Ghaffarzadeh, K., & Chansin, G., & He, X. 2017. Printed, Organic & Flexible Electronics Forecasts, Players & Opportunities 2017-2027. http://www.idtechex.com. Accessed 15/08/2017. Defence Agency Research Projects Agency. https://www.darpa.mil. Accessed 17/08/2017. Durling, W. E. 2009. Flexible Packaging Printing Processes Overview. 2009 Consumer Packaging Solutions for Barrier Performance Course. http://www.tappi.org. Accessed 22/08/2017.

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[10] European Parliament. 2015. Counter-Terrorism Funding in the EU Budget. www.europarl.europa.eu. Accessed 24/09/2017. [11] Fabritius, T., & Gornostayev, D., & Hakola, E., & Halonen, N., & Hassinen, T., & Hast, J., & Jabbour, G., & Jantunen, H., & Jokinen, K., & Kordas, K., & Kukkola, J., & Kyllönen, T., & Lappalainen, J., & Myllylä, R., & Mäklin, J., & Popov, A. 2010. New selective gas sensors based on printed semiconductor nanoparticles – SEGASE. Proceedings of the SkyPro Conference 2010. http://nortech.oulu.fi. Accessed 24/09/2017. [12] Federation of Screen Printers Association. 2015. The Future of Screen Printing. https://www.fespa.com. Accessed 17/08/2017. [13] FicusSoft. 2004. Active RFID Solutions for Asset Tracking and Inventory Management. www.werc.org. Accessed 24/09/2017. [14] Harrop, P., & Das R. 2012. Printed, Organic & Flexible Electronics Forecasts, Players & Opportunities 2012-2022. www.idtechex.com. Accessed 18/09/2017. [15] Hayat, A., & Marty, J. L. 2014. Disposable Screen Printed Electrochemical Sensors: Tools for Environmental Monitoring. Sensors 2014, 14, 10432-10453; doi:10.3390/s140610432. [16] Huber, B., & Popp, P. B., & Kaiser, M., & Ruediger, A., & Schindler, C. 2017. Fully Inkjet Printed Flexible Resistive Memory. Applied Physics Letter, online publication April. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1063/1.4978664. [17] Jurgen, D. 2010. Printed Electronics: Technologies, Challenges and Applications. https://www.parc.com. Accessed 17/08/2017. [18] Kampouris, D. K., & Kadara, R. O., & Jenkinson, N., & Banks, C. E. 2009. ScreenPrinted Electrochemical Platforms for pH Sensing. Analytical Methods. 1. 25-28. doi: 10.1039/b9ay00025a. [19] Keiichiro, Y., & Mun’delanji, C. V., & Eiichi, T. 2016. Printable Electrochemical Biosensors: A Focus on Screen-Printed Electrodes and Their Application. Sensors 2016, 16(10), 1761; doi:10.3390/s16101761. [20] Kubersky, P., & Syrovy, T., & Hamacek, A., & Nespurek, S., & Stejskal, J. 2015. Printed Flexible Gas Sensors Based on Organic Materials. Procedia Engineering 2015, Volume 120, p. 614-617; doi:10.1016/j.proeng.2015.08.746. [21] Larsson, M. & Engström, G. 2004. Interactions in Coating Colours Based on GCC of Broad and Narrow Particle Size Distribution and Their Effect on Pore Structure. 2004 Coating and Graphic Arts Conference. [22] Leach, R. H. 1988. The Printing Ink Manual, 4th Edition. Springer. [23] Lichtenberger, M. 2004. Inks – Water-Based. http://davidlu.net. Accessed on 23/09/2017. [24] Mark Lee, A. 2011. Nanoparticle Sintering Methods and Applications for Printed Electronics. Aalto University. https://aaltodoc.aalto.fi. Accessed 23/09/2017.

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[25] Mas, A. 2009. Flexo vs Gravure. 2009 Flexible Packaging – Trends and Technology Developments Symposium. http://www.tappi.org. Accessed 22/08/2017. [26] Matija, M., & Tadeja, M., & Matej, P., & Janez, T., & Anton, P. 2014. Humidity Sensors Printed on Recycled Paper and Cardboard. Sensors 2014, 14(8), 1362813643; doi:10.3390/s140813628. [27] McGehee, M. 2011. An Overview of Solar Cell Technology. https://web.stanford.edu. Accessed 24/09/2017. [28] McNally, D. 2013. Future Soldiers Will Have Flexible Electronics Everywhere. www.army.mil. Accessed 24/09/2017. [29] Mihailetchi, V. D., & Jourdan, J., & Edler, A., & Kopecek, R., & Stichtenov, D., & Lossen, J., & Boschke, T., & Krokoszinski, H. J. 2010. Screen-Printed N-Type Silicon Solar Cells for Industrial Application. Proceedings of the 25th European Photovoltaic Solar Energy Conference and Exhibition, Valencia, Spain. [30] National Centre for Flexible Electronics. 2015. Call for Expression of Interest – Printed Flexible Batteries. www.iitk.ac.in. Accessed 24/09/2017. [31] NIIR Board of Consultants & Engineers. 2017. Handbook on Printing Technology (Offset, Flexo, Gravure, Screen, Digital, 3D) 3rd Revised Edition. Asia Pacific Business Press. [32] Nissinen, M. 2014. Printed electrochemical biosensor principles and applications. Oulu University of Applied Sciences. www.oamk.fi. Accessed 24/09/2017. [33] Organic and Printed Electronics Association. 2014. Organic and Printed Electronics, Applications, Technologies and Suppliers. http://www.oe-a.org. Accessed 15/08/2017. [34] Pekarovicova, A. 2015. Graphics and Functional Inks. www.wseas.us. Accessed 23/09/2017. [35] Preston, J. S. 2001. Ph.D. Thesis: The influence of coating structure on the print gloss of coated paper surfaces. University of Bristol, UK. [36] Printers’ National Environmental Assistance Center. Print Process Descriptions: Printing Industry Overview: Screen Printing. http://www.pneac.org. Accessed 17/8/2017. [37] Prof. Shlomo Magdassi Research Group, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem. 2015. https://scholars.huji.ac.il. Accessed 23/09/2017. [38] Randjelovic, D., & Muck, T., & Kaltsas, G. 2013. Printed Sensors – State of the Art and the Latest Trends. http://virtual.vtt.fi. Accessed 15/08/2017. [39] Serenius, E. 2011. Printed Electronics and Gravure. Paper Conference and Tradeshow 2011 (PaperCon 2011). http://www.tappi.org. Accessed 27/08/2017. [40] Technical Print Ltd. Introduction to Screen-Printing. http://www.technical printservices.co.uk. Accessed 11 February 2012. [41] Tian, N., & Fleurant, A., & Wezeman, P. D., & Wezeman, S. T. 2017. Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2016. www.sipri.org. Accessed 24/09/2017.

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[42] Troadec, C. 2015. Workshop Flexible Electronics IITC/MAM Conference. http://www.iitc-conference.org. Accessed 15/08/2017. [43] Wan Hasan, W. Z., & Husain, A. A. F. 2017. Transparent Solar Cells Using Spin Coating and Screen-Printing. www.researchgate.net. Accessed 24/09/2017. [44] Zhang, C. 2014. Printed Electronics: Manufacturing Technologies and Applications. http://thor.inemi.org. Accessed 15/08/2017.

In: Cyber-Security and Information Warfare Editor: Nicholas J. Daras

ISBN: 978-1-53614-385-0 c 2019 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

Chapter 17

T HE C OMPUTATIONAL S IMULATION OF PASSIVE S YNCHRONIZATION M ETHOD FOR F REQUENCY H OPPING S YSTEMS K. A. Psilopanagiotis∗ and P. E. Atlamazoglou, PhD † Hellenic Army General Staff, Athens, Greece

Abstract The scope of this chapter is to present the results of the computational simulation of a passive synchronization method for frequency hopping systems. This particular method was presented thoroughly in [5] by its inventor. Moreover, the special purpose of this chapter is to confirm via the realized tests, the functionality of the method and beyond that the efficiency of the implementation algorithm that was developed in Matlab.

PACS: 05.45-a, 52.35.Mw, 96.50.Fm Keywords: frequency hopping, synchronization, LFSR

1.

Frequency Hopping Spread Spectrum (FHSS) Technique, Hopping Pattern Generation and Synchronization Methods

The establishment of secure wireless communication systems and networks is an endless challenge against the counter measures of eavesdropping, interception, localization and interference. The basic responses onto these challenges are diachronically considered to be on one hand the cryptography (Communication Security) and on the other hand the spread spectrum technique (Transmission Security). Part of the last one is the frequency hopping (FH), on which is based the continuous and periodical change of the carrier frequency of the transmitted modulated signal, during the communication process. Details about Frequency Hopping Spread Spectrum Systems (FHSS) in [6] and [3]. ∗ †

Corresponding Author Email: [email protected]. E-mail address: [email protected].

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The frequencies that are included in the hopping pattern are selected and alternated on the basis of the function of particular circuits known as “pseudorandom binary numbers” generators (PRNGs), or pseudonoise bit source as given in details in [2]. Such circuits that present exceptional pseudorandomness and maximal periodicity are the Linear Feedback Shift Registers (LFSRs) and for this reason they are thoroughly examined in this chapter as the basic circuit of a FH system. As an LFSR (Figure 1) is defined a simple circuit comprised by flip-flop registers, being universally timed by a common clock. At each clock pulse, the state - contents of each register shift to the next one to the right, while the first one, to the left, is filled by the result of a Boolean function having as “operands particular registers” contents, among the ones that comprise the LFSR, as a feedbacking process. Details about LFSRs are given in [1]. 

Figure 1. Linear Feedback Shift Register (LFSR). The synchronization process among the distant devices of a FH system-network renders its designing and planning procedure, as one of the most basic and challenging matters. The existing - known, in the open bibliography, synchronization methods are mainly countered as active, as far as there is the need of a synchronization signal for the presence announcement of the transmitter that will enable the correct timing and clock synchronization of the receiver. At this point, it is needed to underline that the active synchronization method is considered as one of the shortcomings of a FH system, causing communication establishment delays, waste - misuse of bandwidth or respective decrease in the useful transmission rate and last but not least endangers the channel security, especially if the beacon frame signal is transmitted in open air, modulating a fixed frequency carrier. Details about the synchronization process and the different circuits - versions for that are given in [4]. On the contrary, the passive synchronization method is entirely free of these - considered as - drawbacks, because there is no demand for synchronization signal transmission, rendering this procedure quite transparent and non-traceable from an eventual malicious system intruder. As being described in paper [5], this particular method is based on a synchronization process during which the receiver stores the valid transmissions of a particular surveyed frequency, counting the time intervals between them, factor that is inserted as main input in an algorithm that solves the LFSR, disclosing the hopping pattern, based on a fully described mathematical process of linear algebra.

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2.

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Outline of Passive Synchronisation Method

In the described in [5] method of passive synchronisation, each subordinate station of the wireless network willing to get synchronized knows the below initial parameters of the LFSR that generates the carrier frequency used at each hop: a. The amount of registers that comprise the LFSR, denoted in this paper by “N”. b. The frequency selection registers, denoted in this paper by “fsr b”, the binary sequence that determines the registers whose sequential contents (0 or 1) give the binary equivalent of the selected at each hop frequency. c. The tap sequence, denoted in this chapter by “ts b”, the binary sequence that determines the registers whose contents (0 or 1) are feedbacked as factors of the Boolean function that determines the first register”s state at each hop, substituting the shifted content to the next register. d. The surveyed frequency, denoted in this chapter by “f b”, the binary equivalent of the frequency that is monitored by the receiver station during the synchronization process. 

Figure 2. Simplified Example of LFSR and Parameters for Synchronization. In Figure 2 we give particular example of an LFSR and the above initial parameters. Given the initialization of the 5bit LFSR, e.g., 1 1 1 1 1, we can see below in Figure 3, the sequential LFSR’s states. We observe that the first valid monitoring of the surveyed frequency is apparent at the time slot t1=2, while the second one is observed at t2=10. The time interval between the two sequential observations, denoted in this paper by “T”, is the extra factor - input of our algorithm that is inserted automatically by the receiver. It is underlined that the receiver ignores all the contents of the LFSR’s registers except the ones of the registers L2, L3 and L4, at the timeslots of both observations (see red bits in Figure 3). The passive synchronisation method is based mathematically on the solution of a linear matrix system, A ∗ H = B, where A is the coefficients’ matrix, H the unknowns’ array and B the constant terms’ array. The five unknown terms of the system comprise the state of the LFSR at the time slot of the first valid observation (between the two) of the surveyed frequency.

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Figure 3. Sequential States of the LFSR, given the initialization “11111”. The initial equations, come up easily as they are as many as the length of the surveyed frequency binary and they denote the known contents-bits among the LFSR’s registers at the first valid time slot. After this time slot, implementing the shifting and the feedbacking of the LFSR, we are able to complete all the states of the LFSR, as functions of the unknown registers at the first valid observation. Now, we are ready to formulate the three extra equations, among which we need the two. See below thoroughly. 

Substituting step-by-step the lines of the matrix system with the initial and extra equations, we are leaded to the final solution (array H) of our linear system. We owe to denote that the key of the passive synchronisation method that is described in [5] is an additional auxiliary matrix C, which simulates the shifting and the feedbacking processes of the LFSR, providing the extra needed equations.

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The final solution of our example is easily proved as correct, by checking the state of the LFSR at time slot t1 (see Figure 3, t=2). Needless to say that, the receiver ignores the exact time slots t1 and t2 but it has only computed the time interval between them. Despite of that, by solving the matrix system the receiver completes all the LFSR’s states and achieves the synchronization by concluding the current time slot.

3.

Function and Flow Diagram of Our Algorithm

The basic steps of the algorithm that implements the passive synchronization method are the following: a. Step 1: Determine the initial parameters of the LFSR, as described above: “N”, “f b”, “fsr b”, “ts b”. b. Step 2: Create initial matrix B, derived from the “fsr b”.

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Figure 4. Steps 2 and 3 - Initial Matrices A, B.



c. Step 3: Create initial matrix A, from “fsr b” and “f b”. Both steps 2 and 3 are depicted to Figure 4, for the previous example of LFSR and parameters shown in Figure 2. d. Step 4: Construct initial auxiliary matrix C0, from ts b. e. Step 5: Transform matrix C0 in T (=t2-t1-1) steps, resulting to final auxiliary matrix C. Both steps 4,5 are shown in Figure 5, for a different example of 8-LFSR parameters and for one step of transformation.



Figure 5. Steps 4 and 5 - Initial Matrix C0 and Transformation to Matrix C. f. Step 6: Zero the lines from matrix C that do not satisfy some particular criteria. We continue with the previous example of LFSR, in Figure 6. g. Step 7: Complete matrix A substituting its zero lines, with the appropriate lines of matrix C2 and simultaneously complete the array B, by the correspondent frequency selection bits. In Figure 7, continuing the same example, except for the completion of

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Figure 6. Step 6 - Zero Inappropriate Lines of Matrix C1 − > C2. matrix A from the matrix C2, we explain the complexity of this step.



Figure 7. Step 7 - Completion of Matrix A by C2. The completion of the array B, according to the previous example is: B(2) = B(5), B(3) = B(1), B(8) = B(4), for the version 25-31-84 of matrix A. h. Step 8: Solve the final matrix system by Gaussian elimination method adjusted to Algebra Boole. The operation of XOR among lines for the zeroing of 1 and the pivoting of lines are the main processes for the solution of the matrix system. The adjustment to Algebra Boole means that the multiplication of numbers is replaced by XOR and the addition by the OR operation among binaries.

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K. A. Psilopanagiotis P. E. Atlamazoglou The flow diagram of our algorithm is thoroughly depicted in Figure 8.



Figure 8. Flow Diagram of the Algorithm.

4.

Computational Simulation of the Method

In this section we present the algorithm testing scenarios, divided in particular categories, and the conclusions that came up as outcomes of the realized tests.

4.1.

Algorithm Testing Scenarios

The testing of our algorithm via different scenarios rendered feasible the continuous improvement of the code and the drawing out of reliable and plausible conclusions. The categorization of the 85 (as a whole) simulated scenarios was based on conclusions

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that were raised during the development and computational simulation of our algorithm. The criteria that differentiate the scenarios’ categories, providing the capability of distinguishing the testing conclusions, are the ones that are depicted thoroughly in Figure 9.



Figure 9. Categorization of Scenarios via Particular Criteria.

4.2.

Conclusions of Simulation

The basic conclusions that came up by the computational simulation of our algorithm, via the most representative scenarios are the following: a. 1st Conclusion



Figure 10. Explanation of 1st Conclusion (About the Last Legister)

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The compliance with criterion 4, concerning the last register, is mandatory. If not, the algorithm is non-functional, meaning that we are obliged to use the last register as a “feedbacking register” , if not used as a “frequency selection register”. The explanation of this conclusion is thoroughly depicted in Figure 10. b. 2nd Conclusion The length of “frequency binary” (f b) has to abide by the criterion 1, meaning that it must be more than the half of the registers, as a whole. Unless it happens, the algorithm does not lead to solution. The explanation is shown in Figure 11.



Figure 11. Explanation of 2nd Conclusion (About Lenght of Frequency Binary). c. 3rd Conclusion A N-LFSR has maximal period(= 2N - 1) if both of criteria 2 and 3 are being observed. In general, our algorithm and its simulation demonstrated useful conclusions that abide by - and extend - the rules of maximal periodicity of an LFSR that are described in [1].



Figure 12. Explanation of 3rd Conclusion (Period < −− > Efficiency)

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Moreover, it was proved that the observation of criteria 1 and 2 is not valid inversely, meaning that does not always give a maximal-period LFSR. Beyond that, it was proved that there were enough LFSR scenarios that, despite of presenting non-maximal periodicity, they were very efficient. The explanation of this conclusion, concerning the “non-mandatory relation” between periodicity and efficiency of an LFSR, is depicted in Figure 12.

5.

Method and Algorithm Evaluation

The basic advantages of our algorithm, as proved by the extended and targeted simulations and their conclusions, are the following: a. FLEXIBILITY (1) Known criteria for selection of maximal LFSRs. (2) Exceptional scenarios within problematic categories of LFSR, that presented a “relatively poor periodicity”. (3) Particular rules for rectification of problematic scenarios. (4) Increased amount of plausible choices of compatible LFSRs. b. EFFICIENCY - CORRECTNESS (1) Full functionality assuring the successful passive synchronization process, among FH systems. (2) The use of an auxiliary algorithm, which provided the capability of proving the results of the algorithm. That renders the basic algorithm assuredly correct and reliably functional. c. HIGH PROCESSION RATE During the computational simulation, the algorithm was proved adequately quick, credible for successful implementation in systems with very high frequency hop rates (> 1,500 hops/sec). d. ADAPTABILITY The logic of the method and the algorithm’s development technique render them adaptable to every system that requires synchronization or engages the FH technique, using every plausible pseudorandom technique-circuit (beyond the LFSRs).

6.

Extensions and Implementations of Method - Algorithm

a. Reliable designing of more secure and flexible FHOP systems-networks (Military Radio Stations, Mobile Telephony, Wi-Fi). b. Implementation in Software Defined Radios (SDR). c. Enhancement of the frequency and network management, with flexibility in designing. d. Reduction of the consumed bandwidth or the respective increase of the useful transmission rate.

References [1] Schneier B., Applied Cryptography, John Wiley & Sons, 1996.

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[2] Stallings W. 2, Wireless Communications & Networks, Pearson Education Inc., 2005. [3] Simon M., Omura J., Scholtz R., Levitt B., Spread Sprectrum Communications Handbook, McGraw-Hill Inc., 2011. [4] Lopelli E., Tang J., Roermund A., Architectures and Synthesizers for Ultra-Low Power Fast Frequency Hopping WSN Radios, Springer, 2011. [5] Atlamazoglou P. and Uzunoglu N., Passive Synchronization Method for Frequency Hopping Systems, Journal of Applied Mathematics & Bioinformatics, vol. 3, no. 1, 2013, 151 - 161. [6] Torrieri D., Principles of Spread Spectrum Communication Systems, Springer, 2015.

In: Cyber-Security and Information Warfare Editor: Nicholas J. Daras

ISBN: 978-1-53614-385-0 © 2019 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

Chapter 18

ECONOMICS, FINANCIAL WARFARE AND ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE: FROM TOTAL WAR TO MODERNITY. AN ANALYSIS OF SELECTED CASE STUDIES Ioannis-Dionysios Salavrakos* University of Athens, Department of Turkish and Modern Asian Studies, Athens, Greece Hellenic Air-Force Academy, Hellenic Navy, Command and Control Naval School, Acharnes, Greece

1. INTRODUCTION The Intellectual aspiration of the chapter is to cast light to a rather neglected aspect of war, that of economic and financial warfare and economic espionage. The paper argues that during various conflicts the belligerent countries used various economic and financial techniques as weapons against their opponents. These include: 1) Causing inflation, 2) Depreciation of enemy’s currency in the international financial markets, 3) Causing “financial drowning” by terminating bank loans to the economy of the enemy, 4) Imposition of capital controls and asset freezing, 5) Creating trade barriers which destroy enemy’s trade with the rest of the world especially on critical goods such as raw materials, as well as food supplies, *

Corresponding Author/Visiting Professor; Email: [email protected].

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Ioannis-Dionysios Salavrakos 6) Follow a policy of scorched earth, 7) Creating negative expectations related to the future of the enemy’s economy by spreading unsubstantiated rumors to international press, 8) Follow a slave labor policy with the enemy war prisoners, 9) Targeting enemy’s industrial base and infrastructure, 10) Targeting enemy’s entrepreneurial class by pointing out that they should continue the “business as usual” policy before the war, thus undermine the war effort of the opponent.

The aim of these techniques is to destroy the moral of the enemy. If the home front collapses then the civilian population does not support the war effort. If this happens the government will seek a peaceful resolution. The paper examines the application of these techniques from the era of the Napoleonic wars until nowadays using various case studies. It also demonstrates how modern cyber warfare can be used as a tool similar to the above policies in the current era of information capitalism.

2. TRAITS OF CONVENTIONAL WARFARE When war erupts there are four unique traits. The first is time duration. No pre-war plan can accurately assess the time duration of the conflict. To illustrate, in August 1914 when WWI erupted the conventional belief was that the boys will be back home for Christmas. However they were back for Christmas of 1918 and not of 1914. When Germany invaded Poland (September 1939) a blitzkrieg style war followed and this was repeated in the cases of Scandinavia, Western Europe and the Balkans. However when Germany attacked USSR and the US entered the war in December 1941 the conflict became global and lasted until September 1945. When NATO attacked Yugoslavia in 1999 no-one predicted a 78 days air-campaign. Thus most conflicts last longer than anticipated. The second trait of modern warfare is that it is total. Total war makes the civilian population a legitimate target.1 Although the Geneva Convention prohibits the mass murder of civilians and war prisoners the former have been targeted many times. To illustrate during WWI the allied naval blockade was responsible for the death of at least 600,000 civilians in Germany, whereas the air bombing of towns in the Spanish Civil War and during WWII was responsible for many deaths and for the destruction of thousands works of art.

1

See: R. Chickering: “Total War. The Use and abuse of a concept,” in the volume: M. Boemeke (et al.) (eds.): “Anticipating Total War. The German and American experiences 1871-1914,” Cambridge, 1999, pp: 13-28.

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The third trait of conventional warfare is associated with the type of victory that we wish to achieve. Here we use the terminology of Martell (2007) who points out that there are three types of victory: a) The tactical victory, which is achieved at the battlefield, b) The political-military victory which is achieved in limited warfare and c) The grand strategy/total victory which is associated with the unconditional surrender of the enemy and imposition of regime change.2 The fourth trait of war is associated with the type of war and with the strategy that belligerents endorses. There are many types of war. We can identify: 1.“Offensive wars,” 2) “Defensive wars,” 3) “Wars with or without allies,” 4) “Wars of intervention in the internal affairs of another state,” 5) “Pre-emptive wars,” 6) “Wars of opinion or ideological wars,” 7) “National Wars,” 8) “Civil wars,” 9) “Guerilla or partisan wars,” 10) “Total wars,” 11) “Wars of religion,” 12) “Wars of annihilation,” “Wars of Imperialism or nationalism,” 13) “Hegemonic wars,” 14) “Peoples wars.”3 The tactical aspects of warfare are associated with the various types. We differentiate between “land warfare,” “naval warfare,” “air-warfare,” “nuclear and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) warfare,” “cyber warfare,” “communication-intelligence warfare,” “economic warfare.”4 See: W.C. Martell: “Victory in War Foundations of modern military policy,” Cambridge 2007, pp: 83-103. The analysis of warfare is immense see: 1) J.S. Levy: “War in the Modern Great Power System, 1495-1975,” University Press of Kentucky, 1983, 2) R. Rotberg & Th. K. Rabb (eds.): “The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars,” Cambridge University Press, 1998, 3) Dale C. Copeland: “The Origins of Major War,” Cornell University Press, 2000, 4) M.E Brown & O. R. Cote Jr. & S.M. Lynn-Jones & S. E. Miller (eds.): “Theories of War and Peace,” MIT Press, London, 2001, 5) B. Heuser: “The Evolution of Strategy Thinking War from Antiquity to the Present,” Cambridge University Press, 2010. For the evolution of “total war” the most brutal type of conventional warfare see: 6) Manfred F. Boemeke & Roger Chickering & Stig Förster (eds.) (1999): “Anticipating Total War. The German and American Experiences 1871-1914,” 7) Roger Chickering & Stig Förster (eds.) (2000): “Great War, Total War. Combat and Mobilization on the Western Front,” 8) R. Chickering & Stig Förster (eds.) (2003): “The Shadows of Total War Europe, East Asia and the United States 1919-1939,” 9) Roger Chickering & Stig Förster & Bernd Greiner (eds.) (2005): “A World at Total War Global Conflict and the Politics of Destruction 1937-1945” all volumes published by Cambridge University Press and the German Historical Institute. For the theoretical definition of total war see: R. Chikering: “Total War. The Use and Abuse of a Concept,” in the volume: Manfred F. Boemeke & Roger Chickering & Stig Förster (eds.) (1999): “Anticipating Total War. The German and American Experiences 1871-1914,” pages 13-28. For an excellent analysis of the various war types see: B. Heuser: “The Evolution of Strategy Thinking War from Antiquity to the Present,” Cambridge University Press, 2010. 4 See: J. F. Dunnigan: “How to Make War,” William Morrow and Company, New York, 1993. Tactical issues and aspects of warfare are also analysed in the following: 1) Rob Johnson & M. Whitby & J. France: “How to Win on the Battlefield,” Thames & Hudson, London, 2010, with excellent analysis on land warfare tactics. For the logistical support see: 2) M. Van Creveld: “Supplying War Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton,” Cambridge University Press, 2004, 3) J. Thompson: “Lifeblood of War Logistics in armed conflict,” Brassey’s 1998, 4) J. A. Lynn (ed.): “Feeding Mars Logistics in Western Warfare from the Middle Ages to the Present,” Westview Press, 1993. For naval logistics see the outdated but still useful: 5) G.C. Dyer: “Naval Logistics,” US Naval Institute, 1960. For air-force logistics see: 6) W. J. Boyne: “Beyond the Wild Blue A History of the United States Air Force 1947-2007,” St. Martins Press, 2007. For an overall assessment of warfare evolution see: C. Archer & J. R. Ferris & H. Herwig & T. H. E. Travers: “Cassel’s World History of Warfare,” Cassell, London, 2003. In the Greek bibliography see: 1) D. Dimoulis & Chr. Giannouli: “The Dialectics of War,” Athens, Kritiki Publications, 1995, 2) Panayotis Kondilis: “Theory of War,” Themelio editions, Athens, 1997. The economic warfare is analysed according to various case studies. See for example: 1) J.M. Winter (ed): “War and Economic Development,” Cambridge University Press, 1975, 2) St. Broadberry & M. Harrison (eds.): “The Economics of World War I,” 2 3

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3. ECONOMIC MODELS WHICH CAN BE APPLIED TO ANALYZE CONFLICT There are two main models which can be used to the analysis of economics and warfare. The former is the Diamond Model, whereas the latter is the New Institutional Economics (NIEs), Square of Power Model. The Diamond is originally a model which aims to examine the competitiveness of any economy in the international economic system; however this model can capture very well the nexus between the real economy and the military apparatus of any nation during warfare. The second model; that of the Square of Power, captures the nexus between the financial sphere of the economy and the military apparatus of any nation during the era of warfare.

3.1. The Diamond Model Τhe model is demonstrated in Figure 1.

Firm’s strategy, structure rivalry

Factors of Production

Demand Conditions

Related and supporting industries

Source: M. Porter: “The Competitive Advantage of Nations,” 1990, page 72. Figure 1. Τhe Diamond Mοdel.

An analysis follows:

3.1.1. Production Factors Every economy has a certain level of capital, labor, technology, and space with certain natural resources. These factors will change when war erupts. We expect that capital will Cambridge University Press, 2005, 3) M. Harrison (ed.): “The Economics of World War II,” Cambridge University Press, 1998,Source: 4) J. Brauer &“The H. Van Tuyll:Advantage “Castles,ofBattles Bombs M. Porter: Competitive Nations”,&1990, pageHow 72. Economics Explains Military History,” University of Chicago Press, 2008. The reader has to treat the above list as indicative and certainly incomplete.

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be reduced due to enemy bombardment; labor will also change since men will become soldiers (traditionally men were replaced by women in factories, transportation, agricultural facilities etc.). Women entered the labor market en mass during WWI and the phenomenon was repeated during WWII. Turning to technology the machine tools inside the various industries before the war have to be ideally modern in order to ensure maximum productivity. Turning to space and natural resources the war will either end in conquering space and land from the enemy; or vice versa. In the first case if the conquering territories are not “scorched earth” they can be useful to the war effort; if however they are fully or partially perished their use is limited. In the second case the opposite occurs.

3.1.2. Demand Conditions The economy during the war will have to meet the enormous demand for consumer products and military hardware for the front at the same time. If the economy is maximizing the production of military hardware (guns, ammunitions, etc.) and marginalizes the production of consumer goods this will result in shortages in the home front and this will trigger public dissatisfaction which will result in the Clauzewitz assertion that the public dissatisfaction will sooner or later force the leaders to seek for a diplomatic solution to the conflict in spite of what is occurring at the tactical level. A typical example of the “Demand Trap” is the case of the German economy in the two world wars. In WWI the German economy produced more defense articles than any other belligerent economy. This maximum war production marginalized the needs of the home front which eventually collapsed under the minimum supply of consumer goods. In the case of WWII the opposite occurred. Hitler who had the experience of the previous war had maximize the supply of the home front with consumer goods. When the German economy mobilized in 1944 and increased the supply of defence articles en mass it was too late to much the quantitative superiority of the combined allied production. Furthermore the Germans made the mistake of not concentrating in specific high quality weapons like the Me-262 fighter jet and apply mass production techniques. Thus the result was complete defeat in May 1945. 3.1.3. Related and Supporting Industries (and Services) During war the so-called related and supporting industries have a crucial role to play. Obviously we do not refer to defense industry or to other crucial industries like steel, oil, petrochemicals, coal [historically] etc. it goes without saying that the more developed these are the better the chances to prevail in the war. We are talking here about other industries (or services) like the fire-brigade. In war thousands of fires will erupt due to enemy bombardment. The case of Hamburg in 1943 is unique when the fire-brigade force had to face 360,000 fires simultaneously!! The better equipped the fire-brigade from the era of peace the less damage will occur in the era of war. Another example is the case of the telecommunication industries. When WWI erupted the Germans enjoyed very powerful electrical generators of up to 5,000 volts which allowed them to send signals up to 5,000

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nautical miles. When war erupted the German Pacific fleet was notified immediately, mobilized and started to sink British merchant navy ships immediately, however the British had to notify the Pacific fleet with pigeons thus the Germans gained a three day advantage.5 The transportation network is an additional advantage. Again a typical example comes from WWI when the railway network of Germany used only for the Western front 11,000 trains with 250,000 wagons. Between 2-18th August 1914 2,150 trains with 44 wagons each passed every ten minutes the seven bridges of the Rhine river transporting 640,000 men, 200,000 horses and 300,000 tons of ammunition.6 Another example again from German is the network of Prussia during the Seven Years War which allowed the Prussian army to cover the 150 miles distance between Dresden and Erfurt in September 1757 in 13 days. Two months later the distance of 225 miles between Leipsich and Parvitz was covered in 14 days. In September 1758 the distance between Κürstrin- Dresden (140 miles) was covered in 7 days.7 The NHS (National Health System) is an additional asset. During the era of war any society will have thousands of wounded civilians and soldiers. Furthermore we can anticipate spread of diseases either through enemy activity (via chemical warfare attacks) or simply because living and medical conditions will deteriorate. The ability of the Health System to cope with multiple cases of wounded humans and the ability of the pharmaceutical industries to maximise production of medical equipment as well as drugs is key for victory. Again a WWI example illustrates the point. In Germany the highly developed medical treatment and practices before and during the war made the average wound mortality for the whole 1914-1918 period to just 8%.8 Finally agriculture is an additional related and supporting industry. The Napoleonic assertion that “an army marches on its stomach” is well known; however agricultural supplies are needed for the home front as well. To illustrate General Ludendorff in his memoirs points out that Germany needed to import 1,800,000 tons of final food products or seeds annually. These imports were denied by the allied blockade and caused immense strain to the home front. He points out with regret that “we have failed to pay any attention to agriculture in our pre-war planning.”9

3.1.4. Firm’s Strategy, Structure, Rivalry The final aspect of the Diamond is the role of the private sector and of entrepreneurship. It is well known that during the era of peace firms aim to maximize profits either via cost reduction strategies or via qualitative superiority, marketing etc. The

See: Hew Strachan: “The First World War,” Vol. I To Arms, Oxford 2001, pp: 450-452 and 468-469. See: E.D. Brose: “The Kaiser’s Army,” Oxford, 2001, page 186. 7 See: Martin Van Creveld: “Supplying War Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton,” Cambridge University Press, 2004, pp. 28-29. 8 See: H. Herwig: “The First World War Germany and Austria-Hungary 1914-1918,” Arnold, 1997, London, pp: 296301. See also: H. Jager: “German Artillery of World War One,” Crowood Press, 2001, pp: 212-214. 9 See: E. Ludendorff: “Total War,” Greek edition, Athens, 1938, page 56. 5 6

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question is what is the role of the enterprise during war? Is it still business as usual or there is a social responsibility for the enterprise and the entrepreneur? A typical example comes from the Russian defence industry in WWI. When the war erupted the Russian army had a huge deficit in small fire arms and ammunition. The Russian state industries like Putilov did not have the ability to produce en mass thus the Czar asked the private enterprises to increase their production of fire-arms. However many private entrepreneurs took the state funds but instead of investing them to production lines they bought the local agricultural production and sold it back to the black market. A typical example is the case of the Revdinskoye industries in the Urals.10 In the Second World War US oil firms and hightechnology industries have supplied the Axis powers even after the entry of US in the conflict with oil and technology via neutral states of Spain, Portugal, Switzerland and via Latin America.11 So what the private entrepreneur will do is essential, for victory or defeat in war. However it is not just the real economy which contributes to victory or defeat in war but it is also the financial sphere of the economy. A war-any war – which in the majority of cases last longer from what is anticipated by pre-war planners has to be financed and there are three ways to finance war: a) via taxes, b) via loans (domestic or international), c) via increased money supply. In order to capture these we need to address the second model that of Square of Power.

3.2. The Square of Power model and NIE (New Institutional Economics) The Square of Power model is demonstrated in Figure 2.

Source: Niall Ferguson: “The Cash Nexus Money and Power in the Modern World 1700-2000,” Penguin, 2002, page 16. Figure 2. Τhe Square of Power Model.

10 11

See: N. Stone: “The Eastern Front 1914-1917,” Penguin, London, 1998, page 197. See for example: 1) C. Leitz: “Economic Relations between Nazi Germany and Franco’s Spain 1936-1945,” Clarendon Press, 1996, 2) J. Pool: “Hitler and his secret partners,” Pocket books 1997, 3) E. Black: “IBM and the Holocaust,” Little Brown, 2001.

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3.2.1. Bureaucracy-Tax Authorities Any war can theoretically be financed exclusively by taxation. However, if this is the case, then heavy taxation will create social unrest and eventually, the government will be forced to seek a diplomatic solution. The second issue associated with taxation is the efficiency of the tax authorities per se. If taxes are not collected fully during the era of peace they shall be collected during war times? Two examples in order to illustrate this point: During WWI the British authorities practically nullified the inheritance tax, which was reduced from 13.8% of total tax revenues in 1914 to 3.4% of tax revenues in 1918.12 The rationale behind this was simple. The human cost of the war was high and if the society was to remain disciplined a fiscal measure was needed to guarantee satisfaction. People across social classes inherited from their dead relatives and they had a pschychological cost to pay. This should not become pecuniary as well. However it goes without saying that other taxes like the income tax increased immensely during the war. The second example comes from Germany during WWII. The allied air campaign destroys not only the houses of the civilian population but also the state archives and records thus the state does not have information about the wealth of the individuals so on what basis it an formulate a tax policy? However tax revenues increased during the period 1939-1943 due to the fact that ordinary Germans did whatever it was possible to assist the war effort.13 3.2.2. National Debt/Money Markets The second way to finance a war is via internal or external loans. If the option of internal loans is exercised this requires adequate level of savings from the era of peace. If the citizens do not save during peace or they are in debt how can they finance a war? If this is the case then interal financing is impossible and the government has to offer any bonds to international markets and investors. In this case the optimum strategy is that the loans have a long-time duration with low interest rates. The opposite option (i.e, short-time duration and high interest) is not desirable. However the international investors will buy the bonds in time of uncertainty only if the state entered the war with low public debt. The cases of Great Britain, Russia and Germany during WWI illustrate the above points.14 3.2.3. Money Supply-Central Banks The third way to finance a war is historically the excess print of money by the central bank (i.e., excess money supply). However especially under gold standard the excess money supply triggered hyperinflation thus triggered social unrest. The examples are ample. To illustrate in the US Civil War the Confederate attempted to finance the war via

See: Hew Strachan: “The First World War,” Vol. I To Arms, Oxford 2001, page 864. See: 1) K. Hardach: “The Political Economy of Germany in the Twentieth Century,” University of California, 1980, pp: 85-86 and 2) A. Speer: “Inside the Third Reich,” Phoenix, 2002, page 352. 14 See: N. Ferguson: “The Pity of War,” Penguin, 1998, pp: 126-131. 12 13

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the “cotton-bonds.” These were bonds which the South issued to the international investors promising to repay them with cotton exports. However these exports never occurred due to the naval blockade which the North imposed on the South. When this occurred the only way for the South to finance the war effort was via taxation and excess money supply which both triggered social dissatisfaction. These developments with two major tactical defeats in Gettysburg and Vicksburg forced eventually the Confederates to surrender.15

3.2.4. Institutions and Parliament The fourth invisible force which will determine victory or defeat in war is associated with institutions. There are two dimensions here. The first is the quality of civil-military relations. WHO DECIDES IN WAR? The answer to this question by the German General Staff has been that the commander in chief at the tactical theatre of operations has the freedom to take all the necessary decisions in order to achieve victory. To illustrate, the command for the German retreat in the West after the battle of the Marne was given to the army by Lieutenant Colonel Richard Hentsch who “had sweeping powers to make whatever adjustments seemed appropriate…On September 9th …he concurred …to withdraw to the Aisne.”16 Thus 1.5 million soldiers withdraw after the order of a Colonel. Opposite to this rationale is the well known phrase that: “War is a too serious matter to entrust it to military men,” by Clemenceau. The institutional conflict is obvious. However there is a second dimension about institutions and how they affect war. The role of the Parliament is also crucial. In a parliamentary democracy various political parties will win elections and rule for a certain period of time. Obviously all political parties have voters (supporters) which belong to certain social classes; and social classes have conflicting interests. The main task of the Parliament is to legislate and the crucial question according to the NIE paradigm is if the parliamentary majority will legislate in order to support exclusively the interests of its own voters or if the legislation will try to compromise conflicting social interests. In the first case, when the interests only of the voters of the specific party which won the election are satisfied, class struggle will increase since the interests of other social classes are marginalised. In this case social instability (violence, strikes, demonstrations etc.) will certainly decrease the growth rate of the economy and will also have a harmful effect on the morale of the population in case of war. If the opposite occurs (i.e., a social compromise via the legislation) then all social classes will be satisfied. This will create a stable social environment which will promote economic growth and the morale for sacrifices will be high in case of war. A typical

See: 1) Niall Ferguson: “The Ascent of Money A Financial History of the World,” Allen Lane, 2008, pp. 92-97, 2) Bruce Catton: “American Civil War,” Vol. 3, Phoenix Press, 2001, pp. 70-80. 16 See: S.C. Tucker: “The Great War 1914-1918,” UCL Press, 1998, pages 31-32. 15

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example of social compromise from economic history is provided by the case of the Second German Reich (1871-1918). German capitalism was based on a social compromise. The landowners (Junkers) needed the termination of cheap Russian wheat imports, in order to achieve high prices for agricultural products. The industrialists opposed the idea, since higher prices for food would mean higher salaries for industrial workers. The syndicates objected to the idea as well. However eventually the state decided to terminate Russian cheap imports; however in exchange of higher food prices the landowners accepted the development of a big German navy (a move associated with huge demand for iron and steel, thus high profits for the heavy industry). In exchange of the higher food prices, the labour movement was compensated with the creation of a welfare state (free health and education for the working class). Under this social compromise model Germany flourished. Thus when war erupted all social classes supported the war effort.17 The above two models analyse the nexus between economics and warfare at the strategic level. The above analysis demonstrates that in conventional wars which have a long time duration the side with the limited resources is in most cases doomed to fail. According to one study during the period 1800-1849 in the 88.2% of armed conflicts the “strong side” prevailed on the “weak.” During the 1850-1899 period in the 79.5% of conflicts the “strong” prevailed over the “weak.” During the period 1900-1949, in the case of 65% of conflicts the strong prevailed. The situation is reversed during the period 19501999, when the weak prevail on the 51.2% of conflicts. For the whole period 1800-2003 in the 71.5% of conflicts the “strong” prevail over the weak.18 The only chance that the “weak” have to prevail in war is to mobilize the maximum of their limited resources (manpower, economic, financial, industrial etc.) sooner than the stronger side; thus create a window of opportunity for specific time which will allow them to achieve a decisive blow to the stronger enemy. The other optional strategy is to achieve the attrition of the stronger opponent via guerrilla warfare.

17

18

For the rise of German capitalism see: 1) A.D. Chandler Jr.: “Scale and Scope The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism,” Harvard University Press, 1990, pages: 399-400, 425, 2) R. Chickering: “Imperial Germany and the Great War 1914-1918” Cambridge, 1998, page 2, 3) P. Watson: “The German Genious,” Simon & Schuster 2010, pages 340-397 (with the nexus between sciences and economics), 4) J. Fear: “German Capitalism,” in the volume: Th. K. McCraw (ed.): “Creating Modern Capitalism,” Harvard University Press, 1997, pages: 135-184 and especially pages 141-152. See also: 5) K.D. Barkin: “The Controversy of German industrialization, 1890-1902,” University of Chicago Press, 1970. Finally see: S. Halperin: “War and Social Change in modern Europe,” Cambridge 2004, pages 148-149 where there is an excellent analysis of the class struggle inside Germany and the ramifications that this struggle had on Germany’s economic relations. See: Ivan Arreguίn-Toft: “How the Weak Win Wars. A Theory of Assymetric Conflict,” Cambridge University Press 2005. For the 1800-1849 period 34 conflicts are examines, for the 1850-1899 period, 78 conflicts are examined, for the 1900-1949 period 43 conflicts are examines, and the same number of conflicts is examined for the 1950-1999 period. In total for the 1800-2003 period 200 conflicts are examined.

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4. TOOLS OF ECONOMIC/FINANCIAL WARFARE WHICH HAVE BEEN USED ACROSS CONFLICTS AND DIPLOMATIC DISPUTES: SELECTED CASE STUDIES As already pointed the tools of economic warfare are as follows: 1) Imposing trade embargo which destroy enemy’s trade especially on raw materials, as well as food supplies, 2) Causing inflation and depreciation of enemy’s currency in the international financial markets, 3) Looting, 4) Asset freezing, 5) Financial Warfare (Currency Crisis and speculative attacks-hidden financial/warfare), 6) Policy of scorched earth, 7) Creating negative expectations related to the future of the enemy’s economy by spreading unsubstantiated rumors to international press (Black economic propaganda), 8) Follow a slave labor policy with the war prisoners, 9) Targeting enemy’s industrial base and infrastructure, 10) Targeting enemy’s entrepreneurial class by pointing out that they should continue the “business as usual” policy before the war thus undermine the war effort of the opponent, 11) Imposition of capital controls, 12) Causing “financial drowning” by terminating bank loans to the economy of the enemy. All the above measures if implemented will destroy the enemy’s Diamond or Square of Power Models, thus creating an immense blow to the enemy’s war effort from within. The ultimate strategic aim of economic warfare is to perish the enemy from within. Typical recent historical examples are the wars of Vietnam (1964-1975) and Iraq (2003-2014). In both cases the US public opinion (society-home front) objected the policies of the US Administration. Eventually under the social internal pressure the US leadership terminated the conflicts. Various cases of all types of economic financial warfare are either briefly presented in Table 1 or additional major cases-studies follow immediately below the table. We point out that the cases presented and analysed are not the complete list of available case-studies. However due to limitations of space we presume that are cases and the discussion provide to the reader the overall picture.

Table 1. Cases Studies of Economic Warfare across History Tool of Economic Warfare 1. Trade Embargo

2. Inflation & currency depreciation, as an instrument of economic warfare

Cases Napoleonic Warfare – Continental System US Civil War Allied blockade of Central Powers during World War I Embargo on Italy after the invasion of Abyssinia Allied blockade of Germany in World War II US embargo on Cuba Arab oil embargo on the West Trade embargo on North Vietnam UN embargo on Yugoslavia Greek trade embargo on FYROM Israeli blockade of Gaza strip EU/US/Australia/Canada/Norway sanctions on Russia In Ancient Athens a law decree pointed out that all coins had to be checked for counterfeit reasons. In Hellenistic world Polycrates ruler of Samos used counterfeit-currency successfully in order to deceive the Spartans and buy them. The first Arab mint was established making dirhams and any worker who was caught counterfeiting had his hands cut off. In China the first paper money was made but by 1311 no more printing occurred due to counterfeiting. In the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation after 1559 the value of silver was higher compared to that of silver coins. Money was counterfeit until the end of the Thirty Years War -The British after the French Revolution counterfeited the banknote of “assignats” and supported the exile King Louis XVI. US Civil War World War I French troops occupation of the Ruhr The Soviet GRU (Section 6) printed $10 million in $100 notes and circulated them across the globe.

Period (21-11-1806 until 11-04-1814) (1861-1865) (1914-1918) (October 1935) (1939-1945) (February 7th 1962-2015) 1973-1974 (1964-1975) 30-05-1992 until 21-11-1995 (1994-1995) (1967, 1982 and 2007-) From August 2014 onwards 375 B.C (538-522 B.C.) 702-3 A.D. between 1275-1292 and 1311 (1618-1648)

(1789-1814) 1861-1865 1914-1918 1923 1928-1932

Tool of Economic Warfare 3. Looting (as wealth gain) versus scorched earth policy 4. Asset freezing 5. Financial Warfare: Currency Crisis and speculative attacks-hidden financial/warfare

Cases See text

6. Scorched Earth policy

Napoleonic Wars Napoleon’s invasion in Russia Eastern Front in WWI Eastern Front in WWII Western Front in WWII “Tulip,” “The South Sea Company” and “Mississippi” bubbles respectively.

7. Creating negative expectations related to the future of the enemy’s economy by spreading unsubstantiated rumors to international press (Black economic propaganda) 8. Follow a slave labor policy with the war prisoners. 9. Targeting enemy’s industrial base and infrastructure

10. Targeting enemy’s entrepreneurial class by pointing out that they should continue the “business as usual” policy before the war thus undermine the war effort of the opponent 11. Imposition of capital controls 12. Causing “financial drowning” by terminating bank loans to the economy of the enemy, portray a bad picture for the economy.

Period

See text See text 1812 1914-1917 1941-1945 1944-1945 (1623-1637) (1720-1721) (1717-1720) German occupied Europe Allied bombardment of Germany Allied bombardment of Japan US bombardment of North Vietnam Industrial Espionage/ Cyber-warfare German deceiving actions against the USSR

1939-1944 1942-1944 1944-1945 1964-1973 2007-2017 1940-1941

Greece Transparency International Reports Asian Banking systems, etc.

2015 2015 and 2016

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Some of these cases are analyzed in the present paper since due to limited space a complete analysis of all cases was not possible. Thus the structure of this section is as follows: In Table 1 we provide a brief analytical picture of various economic warfare tools and selected cases where these tools have been implemented. In addition other cases which are not presented in the table are discussed in the following text in more detail. On the first tool of economic warfare (trade embargo) some brief remarks must be made for some cases of the table. Thus the Arab oil embargo on the West was imposed after the termination of the Arab-Israeli war of 1973 and the Arabian defeat. The Arabs immediately blamed the West in general, and the US in particular, for their military defeat. In the eyes of the Arabs it was the military assistance of the West to Israel which constantly made the Arabs losers thus the oil embargo was a necessary measure in order to force the West to change its pro-Israeli attitude. The crisis of 1973-1974 was triggered by oil. The nominal value of oil (price per barrel) increased from $3.29 to $11.58 (an increase of 252%) in just one year. The next oil crisis occurred during the 1979-1981 period when the oil price increased from $14.55 to $37.96 (increase of 161%). The oil crises of the 1970s were devastating, since the phenomenon of stagflation became the dominant characteristic of most western economies.19 In the case of the Greek embargo on FYROM this was imposed an all goods excluding medical aid and food in an attempt to force the country to change its name in the GreekFYROM dispute over the denomination. However since many Greek enterprises had invested in the country the official embargo was easily bypassed. Greek firms had increased during the 1994-1995 period their exports to Bulgaria and then these goods were again re-exported from Bulgaria to FYROM. Under these developments the embargo was officially terminated by 1996. In the case of EU/US/Australia/Canada/Norway sanctions on Russia from August 2014, the West imposed restrictions on Russian-West trade after the annexation of Crimea from Russia. Russia re-acted by imposing sanctions to the EU as well as increasing its trade ties with China, and India. Creating negative expectations related to the future of the enemy’s economy by spreading unsubstantiated rumors to international press (Black economic propaganda). This type of economic warfare can target either whole economies or even specific enterprisers. These negative rumors can easily spread in the stock market and in international financial markets.

19

See: J.L Betrand & S. Justeau: “Typology of Oil Shocks: Why 2004 is Different,” Global Business & Economics Anthology, 2006, Vol. II, pages 425-435.

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4.1. Trade Embargo, as an Instrument of Economic Warfare This has been an instrument of economic warfare from the era of antiquity. In modern times the most well known cases of trade warfare are as follows:

4.1.1. Napoleonic Warfare – Continental System (21-11-1806 until 11-04-1814) One of the aims of French trade policy during the Napoleonic Wars was the disruption of British trade. The French trade embargo against the British started on May 16th 1806. In 1793 France terminated all imports from Britain and the British replied by imposing a naval trade embargo. The main rationale behind this trade war was mercantilism. According to the doctrine of the era the main purpose of trade was the export of goods in order to bring gold for payment and thus increase the state gold reserves. Thus the exports of the enemy had to be reduced so that the gold revenues of the opponent would decrease. This would force the enemy to use the existing gold reserves and when these would be exhausted the ability to finance the war effort would collapse and thus the war would be terminated. Thus trade war was associated with exports not imports. Especially food imports would be accepted for humanitarian reasons and these were the only source for gold. Thus when in 1810 Napoleon exported to Britain immense quantities of cereals which could cover almost the 13% of British needs he did it in order to get the gold payments and thus reduce the British ability to finance the war. However this rationale did not take into consideration the British ability to finance the war via bank loans. In addition with adequate food supplies Britain could continue the war effort. Τhe initial trade war between Britain and France forced the other states in December 1800 to seek an alliance in order to protect their trade interests. Thus Prussia, Russia, Sweden and Denmark signed a trade treaty which gave priority in exchange of goods between them. Britain re-acted by reducing its trade volume with these states (with the exemption of Prussia) and eventually British military action against Copenhagen terminated the trade agreement of these states in 1801. In addition the US Navy benefited from the European crisis since US commercial ships transported goods from French colonies to France. US commercial ships increased from 558,000 tons in 1802 to 981,000 tons in 1810.20 The initial bilateral French-British trade war became more severe as Napoleon re-enforced France diplomatic position across Europe. In November 1806 Napοleon issued the “Berlin Decree” according to which the British Isles were under constant naval blockade and thus trade with Britain was prohibited not only for France but also for the states allied to France (Spain, Holland and Naples).21

20 21

See: Α. D. Harvey: “Collision of Empires Britain in Three World Wars,” Phoenix, 1994, page 61. The complete provisions of the Berlin Decree can be found in Frank Edgar Melvin: “Napoleon’s Navigation System. A study of trade control during the Continental Blockade,” University of Pennsylvania, Ph.D. Thesis 1919, pages 7-9.

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In 1807 Russia and Prussia were also included in the Continental System, but according to one source “on August 26 [1807] at a session of the Council of Ministers, the Minister of Marine secured from Napoleon a secret decision favourable to the commerce of Denmark, tacitly exempting it in a large measure from the Berlin Decree.” 22 It was the first obvious sign that the trade policy could not function in the long run. However in 1810 three more countries (Denmark, Νorway and Sweden) joined. However the results from the trade blockade against Britain were not the anticipated ones and actually the trade war had harmful effects on the French economy as well. To illustrate the French-British trade did not collapse. What actually happened was that exporters could send their products to Britain under a special license. This was known as “trade by exception policy.” According to one source: “The first important summary of licence trade results …shows that [until June 1810] 354 licences had been signed, of which 351 had been delivered. Although returns were incomplete, wine grain and other articles valued at over 10,000,000 francs had been exported, and medicines and raw materials worth some 6,000,000 francs had been imported. For 1809 total exports were 340,605,400 francs and total imports [were] 357,803,500 francs …Aggregate figures for British-French trade up to 25/11/1811 provide the figure of 27,740,134 francs of exports to Britain and 29,144,351 francs of imports from Britain giving a difference of 1,404,217 against France…Accurate statistics regarding the extent of trade of 1812…are not available…the records …show that Napoleon signed 799 licences and permits during the period, of which 310 were never delivered …and …of the licences actually delivered a large percentage remain unused. …during the same period the Board of Trade had 11,181 applications for licences of which perhaps a fourth were refused …but the actual number of licences granted would run about 20,000 for the year. [These figures may be compared with 14,965 applications for 1810, 9,862 for 1811, 5,611 for 1813 and 2,492 for 1814].”23 It was obvious that bilateral French-British trade was never completely interrupted during the Years of Continental Blockade.

4.1.2. US Civil War (1861-1865) The naval blockade of the North on the South forced the collapse of the so called cotton bonds on the international financial markets; thus forced the South to finance the war with excess money supply. On April 16th 1861 the North imposed the trade/naval blockade on the South. The US Civil war is a typical example of economic dominance versus inferiority struggle. In 1860 the value of the agricultural capital of the North was $12,104,982, whereas that of the South was just $1,582,483. The value of machine tools in the North was $43,057,747 and in the South it was just $4,060,803. The value of industrial production

22

23

See: Frank Edgar Melvin: “Napoleon’s Navigation System. A study of trade control during the Continental Blockade,” University of Pennsylvania, Ph.D. Thesis 1919, page 29. See: Frank Edgar Melvin: “Napoleon’s Navigation System. A study of trade control during the Continental Blockade,” University of Pennsylvania, Ph.D. Thesis 1919, pages 133-134, 136 and 330-331 see also footnote 63 in page 331.

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in the North was $192,376,912, and in the South it was just $30,767,457.24 In 1860 the North had 110,000 industrial plants with 1,300,000 workers; whereas the South had just 18,000 facilities with 110,000 workers. In the arms industry the North had enjoyed an immense superiority of 25 industries against every one (1), of the South!25 However the South had two advantages. The first was the presence of more than 200 harbors which allowed shipping communications to flourish. The second advantage of the South was the production of cotton, which was the main raw material for the textile industry. The South asked from British and French banks (and their governments) loans in exchange for cotton. Already by 1862 to loans were issued at a nominal value of $15 m. and $100 m. respectively. Since the domestic banking system of the South could not absorb these huge bonds issues the British and French banks were the obvious target buyers. In order to absorb fund the South issued twenty year duration bonds with 7% interest and offered them to British investors. These bonds were pegged to cotton. Each bond could instantly be exchanged with cotton priced at the pre-war level of £0,06 per libre. However cotton imports to Britain from the South collapsed. In 1860 Britain imported 2,600,000 balls of cotton but in 1862 the imports were just 72,000. When the North captured the port of New Orleans the exports of the South collapsed completely. From 1863 Britain decided to import cotton from China, India and Egypt and by September 1864 the cotton bonds of the South had collapsed in the international market. As a result the South could finance the war effort only via printed money which caused inflation. Under the circumstances the collapse of April 1865 was inevitable.26

4.1.3. Allied blockade of Central Powers during World War I (1914-1918) Before WWI Germany imported the 25% of its agricultural needs (eggs, fresh milk, fish, meat, olive oil), the 27% of its protein needs, the 42% of its needs in fat. 27 When the war started Germany did not face any serious food shortages; however this changed quickly. The naval blockade perished domestic agricultural production which was reduced by 25%. The mobilization of 8 million men during the 1914-1915 period, made the problem even worse. In January 1915 the first serious bread shortages started across the country. During the period March-April 1915 9 million pork animals were slaughtered and by the end of 1915 total agricultural production was reduced by 2.5 million tons. In 1916 agricultural shortages became a major problem. Butter and fat imports were reduced from 175,000 tons in 1916, to 95,000 tons in 1917 and to 27,000 in 1918. Fish imports were reduced from 420,000 tons in 1916, to 150,000 tons in 1917 and to 80,000 tons in 1918. Meat imports were reduced from 120,000 tons in 1916, to 45,000 in 1917 and just 8,000 in See: Philip Katcher: “ALMANAC The American Civil War,” Brassey’s 2003, pages 210-211. See: S. D. Engle: “The American Civil War,” Osprey, 2001, pages 17-22. 26 For the cotton bond market see: Niall Ferguson: “The Ascent of Money A Financial History of the World,” Allen Lane, 2008, pages 92-97 and 2) Bruce Catton: “American Civil War,” Volume 3, Phoenix Press, 2001, pages 7080. 27 See: J. M. Winter: “The Experience of World War I,” Greenwich editions, 2003, page. 178. 24 25

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1918. In addition animal fat imports were reduced from 356,000 tons in 1916, to 236,000 tons in 1917 and to 125,000 tons in 1918.228 The winter of 1916 was extremely heavy and the maximum daily food consumption per individual was just 1,300 calories. Shortages in coffee, bread, soups, eggs, cheese and beer was immense. By November 1916 the industrial workers were eating horse’s meat and that was a luxury portrayed even in propaganda brochures.29 During 1916 there was social unrest across 31 German towns due to food shortages.1030 During 1914-1918 meat production was reduced by 42%, milk production by 50% and butter production by 40%.31 By November 1917 the daily consumption of calories in the army was 2,300-2,500. In the civilians it was just 1,400-1,730 calories.32 The deaths which the naval blockade triggered increased across time. In 1915 there were 88,235, in 1916 there were 121,114 deaths, in 1917 the figure was 259,627 and in 1918 it was 293,760 deaths. A total of 762,736 civilians passed away due to food shortages and diseases.1133

4.1.4. Embargo on Italy after the Invasion of Abyssinia (October 1935) After the Italian invasion in Abyssinia the League of Nations imposed trade sanctions on Italy. These however were imposed for very limited time (November 1935-June 1936). One impact of sanctions was the change of the geographical pattern of Italian exports. From 1936 25% of exports were absorbed by the Italian colonies in Africa and another 25% from Germany.1234 In addition the “Autarchy Doctrine,” was endorsed as the main economic policy objective. The sanctions included a total restriction on sales of army related equipment to Italy, abolishment of bank credits to Italian banks and enterprises as well as to any loans made to the Italian state and finally prohibition of Italian imports and exports. However coal, oil, pig iron, steel, and gold bullions were excluded from the embargo. As a result the real consequences to the Italian economy were minimal. 4.1.5. Allied Blockade of Germany in World War II (1939-1945) This is best captured by the following: “The blockade has virtually cut Germany off from all non-European sources of oil imports, all her neutral rubber, about three-quarters of her copper, practically all her cotton and over two-thirds of her wool requirements. See: Martin Gilbert: “The Routledge Atlas of the First World War,” Routledge, second edition, London, 1994, p. 76. 29 See: Gerald D. Feldman: “The Great Disorder. Politics, Economics and Society in the German Inflation 19141924,” Oxford University Press, 1997, p. 60. The social dissatisfaction related to the war started to increase from 1916 onwards in the German society. 30 See: Martin Gilbert: “The Routledge Atlas of the First World War,” Routledge, second edition, London, 1994, p. 77. 31 See: 1) Ian Cawood & D. McKinnon-Bell: “The First World War,” Routledge 2001, pages 52-53 and 58. See also: Friedrich Aereboe: “Der Einfluss des Krieges auf die landwirtschaftliche Produktion in Deutschland,” Stuttgart, Berlin: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1927. 32 See: Leo Grebler & Wilhelm Winkler: “The Cost of the World War to Germany and Austria-Hungary,” Yale University Press, 1940, p. 81. 33 See: Martin Gilbert: “The Routledge Atlas of the First World War,” Routledge, second edition, London, 1994, page 77. 34 See: M. Clarck: “Modern Italy,” Longman, 1996, p. 266. 28

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The...blockade forced Germany to rely on limited sources of ferro-alloys (chrome, nickel, manganese, tungsten and molybnenum) ...about 80 per cent of Germany’s nickel supplies, were cut off by the blockade ...the effect of the blockade on the oil position has been twofold. First ...it had ...handicapped operations at the fronts...second compelled the Germans to depend more on synthetic production, with the consequent diversion of labour and materials...the sealing of all supplies of natural rubber ...forced the production of all substitutes including buna [to] use about one-quarter of Germany’s total electricity output ...The British ...has successfully immobilised enemy firms in countries overseas...the principal effect of the blockade on agricultural policy has been a greater concentration on such corps as oilseeds...and roots crops which require considerable care and have probably used more valuable labour...over 95% of the pre-war requirements of natural phosphates were imported and ...in July 1944 it was announced [in Germany] that only 18% of the peacetime consumption of phosphate fertilisers would be allowed to farmers for the year 1944-45...The Royal Navy has successfully prevented sea traffic between Germany and Italy, and Germany and the Balkans... ”35 The Axis merchant shipping losses in the Mediterranean were as follows: In 1940: 46 ships of 186,631 tons, in 1941: 178 ships of 714,410 tons, in 1942: 148 ships of 522,082 tons, in 1943: 225 ships of 767,734 tons; thus total Axis losses were 597 ships of 2,190,857 tons.36

4.1.6. US Embargo on Cuba (February 7th 1962-2015)37 On October 19th 1960 US imposed a trade embargo on Cuba. At that initial phase US exports to the island were frozen (with the exception of food and medical supplies). The US also terminated sugar imports from Cuba. During the missile crisis of October 1962 complete embargo was imposed on Cuba and from May 1964 the US returned to the previous policy of allowing food and medical exports to Cuba under the approval of the Department of Commerce. In January 1978 the US acknowledged for the first time to Cubans living in the US the right to send back home remittances up to $500 per quarter of the year. However in May 1982 the US prohibited any travel to Cuba and the strict embargo rules were re-implemented; as a result on September 1982 Cuba became insolvent since it could not repay its public debt of $1.3 billion to Western banks. In August 1986 the US reduced even further the remittances of individuals to Cuba to just $1,200 per year and by November 1990 the US tightened the embargo even further by prohibiting to US affiliates in other countries to conduct any trade with Cuba. This policy resulted in the collapse of an annual bilateral trade between US companies outside the US and Cuba of $320 million. See: “What Britain has Done 1939-1945,” British Ministry of Information, first edition in 1945, second edition Atlantic Books, London, 2007 (with an introduction by R. Overy), pages 82-88. 36 See: John Ellis: “The World War II Databook,” Aurum Press, 1995, pages 266-268. 37 This section is based on: 1) Gary Clyde Hufbauer: & Jeffrey J. Schott & Kimberley Ann Elliott & Milica Cosic: “US vs. Cuba,” Case Studies in Economic Sanctions and Terrorism, Case 60-3, Peterson Institute for International Economics, October 2011 and 2) information provided by www.wikipeadia.org 35

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The collapse of the USSR in December 1991 made economic life in Cuba even harder since oil deliveries from the USSR to Cuba (in exchange for sugar) were almost perished. To illustrate in 1990 Cuba received 13 million tons of oil and in 1991 10 million tons. However in 1993 Russian oil deliveries were down to just 2.3 million tons. On November 28th 1992 the UN requested the lifting of trade sanctions on Cuba mainly due to the critical humanitarian situation that has occurred on the island. The US Administration partially eased the trade sanctions and allowed US firms to invest in the telecommunications network of Cuba but food shortages in Cuba were so severe that by August 1994 more than 27,000 Cubans were becoming refugees to the US because of hunger. In October 1995 the US eased economic sanctions again and Russia promised higher oil exports and aid; however food shortages remained critical. By September 1998 partially due to the collapse of domestic agriculture Cuban food shortages remained high and the World Food Program Director estimated that at least $20.5 million were needed in order to cover the food deficit of the country. In 1998 the annual cost of US embargo to the Cuban economy was estimated at $800-900 million and the aggregate cost to Cuban economy was $67 billion for the 1962-1998 period. On the other hand, the US Multinationals by denying them access to Cuban market for 25 years was estimated at $30 billion. The embargo did not only have a humanitarian cost but a financial cost as well. However until May 2002 almost 10 years after the UN call to lift the trade restrictions on Cuba nothing concrete was achieved. US, EU, Canada and even some Latin American countries had very limited transactions with the island. On May 20th 2002 the new US President George Bush announced a new policy towards Cuba which would allow private US individuals, US Christian organisations and NGOs to establish limited economic relations with Cuba. However this policy again did not produce any significant results and on October 25th 2004 Cuban President announced that in two weeks all USD transactions would be banned across all Cuban banks. On October 10th 2006 the US announced that a task force from various US governmental authorities would be established in order to monitor the implementation of the US sanctions to Cuba more effectively. From 2009 the US policy changed again. On April 13th 2009 the US eased travel restrictions to Cuba for Cuban nationals and on January 14th 2011 additional restrictions were lifted for students and religious groups. On July 16th 2012 the US ship “Anna Cecilia” became the first ship to travel from US port of Miami in Florida to Cuba carrying food and medical supplies on 2014 the US announced their intentions to re-open the diplomatic ties with Cuba and in February 2016 the US government allowed a US investment of $5-$10 million for tractors in Cuba for the first time. On March 21st 2016 US President Obama visited Cuba. It seems that the US has eventually changed its policy towards Cuba.

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4.2. Inflation and Currency Depreciation, as an Instrument of Warfare When wars erupt the value of money depreciates. Most citizens loose faith in paper currency and thus they prefer to use gold, silver, foreign currency, precious stones (diamonds etc.) in order to finance their transactions. The following examples are just a small sample of cases which demonstrate the nexus between inflation and warfare. 



In the US Civil War (1861-1865) almost half of the currency under circulation in both North and South was counterfeit from the enemy. President Lincoln famously asserted that: “I have two great enemies, the Southern army in front of me and the bankers in the rear. And of the two, the bankers are my greatest foe.” Lincoln, being short of money to finance the North's war effort, went to the bankers of New York, who agreed to lend him money at interest rates varying from 24 to 36 percent. Lincoln refused, knowing perfectly well that this was usury and that it would lead the United States to ruin. But his money problem was still not settled! In order to finance the war Lincoln was forced to increase the money supply. The cost of the war for the North was $3.4 billion whereas for the South it was $3.3$6.7 billion. In order to finance the war the North increased the money supply from $442 million in 1860 to $1,180 million in 1865. The outcome was an immense inflation thus wholesale prices in the North increased from 1860=100 to 1865=199. In the South prices increased from 1860=100 to 1865=192.38 In WWI (1914-1918) the first German counterfeit currency in Britain was spotted on January 25th 1916. Both countries pumped huge amounts attempting to cause inflation. During the war the broad money supply in the UK (M3) increased from 1913=100 to 1918=190, whereas inflation increased from 1913=100, 1918=199. In France money supply increased from 10,042 million FF in 1914 to 30,250 million in 1918. Inflation in 1917 was 80% higher compared to that of 1914. In Italy money supply between 1915-1918 increased by 504% and inflation rate was 27% in 1915 and 45% in 1916. In Russia money supply increased from 1914=100 to 1917 (first quarter)=473 and 1917 (second quarter)=819. Inflation increased from 1914=100 to 1917 (first quarter)=702 and 1917 (second quarter)=1,172. In Germany monetary circulation in July 1914 was 6,970 million M and in 1918 the figure was 33,106 million. Inflation increased from 1914=100 to 1918=313. In Austria-Hungary money supply increased from 2,405,350,660 korone in July 1914 to 33,528,693,000 in the end of October 1918.39

See: Jonathan Hughes & Louis P. Cain: “American Economic History,” fifth edition, 1998, Addison-Wesley, pages 254-257. 39 See: I-D Salavrakos: “Economy and Total War,” Vol. I The case of World War I, Athens, Scientific Library, Kritiki publications 2007. 38

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292 

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In 1923 when French troops occupied the Ruhr German mark was counterfeited en mass and in return in 1924 the Germans counterfeited FF (by printing) in Hungary. The German plan was: 1) to produce $100 million FF notes, 2) finance a regime change in Hungary on Christmas Day 1925, 3) restore the monarchy. By the summer of 1925 the German plan was abolished. In WWII (1939-1945) Britain and Germany produced immense quantities of counterfeit currency. German plan production of £1 billion from 1941; however by 1945 only £132 million were produced. The SS used counterfeit sterling of more than 100,000 value for espionage and even personal wealth in occupied Europe (France, Greece, Albania) and Turkey. In WWII British M3 money supply index increased from 1938=100 to 1945=208.5. Inflation increased from 100 to 147.5 over the same period. In Germany money supply increased from 8.7 billion RM in 1939 to 52.8 billion at the beginning of 1945. German inflation index increased from 1939=100 to 1944=113. The low inflation is associated with the exploitation (looting) of occupied Europe.40 Between August-December 1966 in Vietnam the US dropped 1.6 million banknotes of North Vietnamese (NV) currency in order to destabilize the NV economy. In 1994 Interpol recorded that counterfeit USD increased from 24.9 million in 1992 to 120 million in 1994. This huge increase in just two years was associated with organized counterfeit operations by Iran, N. Korea and the Russian Mafia. Between 1992-1996 confiscated counterfeit USD in Latin America reached the amount of $46,281,980. Major operations were made in London, Cyprus, Vienna and Zurich as well against counterfeit currencies. In the Second Iraq war (2003) on 24/9/2003 the US Military Police discovered 20 billion counterfeit Iraqi dinar-notes (equal to $10 m). A new Dinar was introduced on October 15th. The new dinars worth 6.38 trillion and weighted 2,300 tons. They replaced old dinars of 13,000 tons of weight.

4.3. Looting as Wealth Gain 

40

In WW I Germany looted from occupied Belgium: 43,000 tons of iron, 50,000 tons of lead, 36,000 machine tools, horses of 800 million francs value. Belgian banks paid to the German army 2.3 billion francs during the war although the German investments were 4 billion marks.

See: I-D Salavrakos: “Economy and Total War,” Vol. II The case of World War II, Athens, Scientific Library, Kritiki publications 2008.

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Romania supplied 2 million tons of wheat, 300,000 animals and Serbia supplied 170,000 oxes, 190,0000 sheep. Ukraine provided 5 million tons of coal, 106,000 animals, and 37.6 million kg of various agricultural products. In WW II Germany extracted from occupied Europe 83,895.9 million RM as levy for occupation forces but the cost of the occupation was 51,620 million; thus a net inflow of 32,275.9 million of paper currency was made. Turning to raw materials occupied Europe provided 161 million tons of coal, 22.4 million tons of iron, 67,000 tons of copper, 1,176,000 tons of bauxite, 800,000 tons of oil, 20,400,000 tons of steel, 64,000 tons of aluminum, 268,000 vehicles, 264,000 tons of wheat, 59,400 tons of wool, 45.4 million cattle, 27,8 million pork animals. On 7/4/1945 in Merkers the US found: 2,760,000,000 RM banknotes, $2,000,000, 98,000,000 FF, £110,000, 4,000,000 Norwegian Korone, gold valued at $238.49 million representing the 93.17% of total gold reserves of the Reichsbank, 40 bags of silver bars, 55 bags with silver plates, 6 platinum bars, 2 million books, 15 paintings, one ancient Egyptian statue, 400 tons of patents, small amounts of Portuguese escudos and Turkish liras. In the Berlin offices of the Reichsbank remained gold worth of $17.48 million, bonds worth of over $400 million, millions of RM. In the Peissenberg region of Bavaria by 22/04/1945 the US found 730 gold bars valued at $7,843,375 and gold coins valued at $2,156,625, 6 bags with Danish Korone, 520 million RM in cash, 34 printing machines for RM, another 147 bags with foreign currency. These were coming from the Reichsbank offices in Munich. Diamond wars: 1) Sierra Leonne (1991-2000), 25-75 million financing per year of the rebels with diamonds, 2) Angola (1991-2002), $200-600 million per year, 3) Congo 1960-1962, 4) Liberia (1989-1996 and 2000-2003), 5) Ivory Coast (20022005). In WWII The Japanese occupation of Korea, Formosa, north and central China extracted 26,8230,000 tons of coal, 2,031,000 tons of bauxite, 16,586,000 tons of iron-ore, 63,000 tons of lead, 3,478,000 tons of rice, 211,000 tons of rubber, 22,787.05 barrels of oil, 6,859,000 tons of salt, 2,176,000 tons of dolomite. From the Dutch East Indies only in 1940 Japan took 1,936,000 tons of oil, 3,000 tons of copper, 10,000 tons of magnum, 150,000 tons of nickel, 250,000 tons of bauxite, 15,000 tons of rubber, 20,000 tons of cacao. Gold of at least $22 billion value was extracted as well.

4.4. Asset Freezing This policy was implemented on July 25th 1941 when the US freezed the assets of Japanese wealth in the US. After the Second World War the US had founded in December 1950 the OFAF (Office of Foreign Assets Control). From 1950-2016 the Agency had

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freezed state assets as well as individual personal assets or companies assets which are associated with illicit activities. Involves asset freezing of Iran, Iraq, Syria, Congo, Libya (under Quaddafi regime), Yugoslavia (during 1990s), Yemen, Zimbabwe, Venezuela, Lebanon, Cuba. In addition after September 11th an anti-terrorist campaign started aiming to find and confiscate the funds of Al-Queida (Executive Order 13224) and the ISIS state. In August 2002 a UN report stated that in 144 UN member stated that: “some $112 million in suspected Al-Queda assets were frozen.” The campaign had mixed results. The assertion that only Osama Bin Laden wealth was in the range of $300 million cannot be substantiated.

4.5. Financial Warfare: Currency Crisis and Banking WarsSpeculative Attacks This type of policy is associated with specific individuals who make gains in the international financial markets via opportunistic methods (i.e., complete disrespect of public interest viz. a viz. the personal interest). Currency wars are associated with minor daily changes of exchange rates between currencies and with complete changes and shifts from one currency regime to another. In the first case –that of minor every day developments- the changes can produce and destroy wealth and also have an effect on trade balance by affecting the status of exports and imports. In the case of complete shifts from one currency regime to another this development has long term ramifications for the national and even the global economy. To illustrate the Gold Standard regime (1870-1918) collapsed after the numerous Gold Standard, crises of 1873, 1890, 1893, 1907, 1914-1918. These are analysed as follows:

4.5.1. The Crisis of 1873 The crisis started in 1873 in Germany and soon spread to Austria-Hungary and the rest of Europe. After the termination of the Franco-Prussian war of 1870-1871 France had to pay to Germany the sum of 5 billion francs in gold as war reparations payments. The French gave the full amount by September 1873. From that sum only 120 m. marks remained in the Central Bank (Reichsbank) and with the rest the Germans financed immense investments in railways, new industries (pharmaceuticals, chemicals, dyes, etc.), and in the banking sector; thus creating a liquidity shock in the market. Furthermore an immense number of FDI was directed from Germany to Austria-Hungary. When investors attempted to capitalize in the stock markets of Vienna and Berlin, these collapsed (May 1873) and very soon the crisis from the financial sphere of the economy moved to the real sphere of the economy. Only in the case of Austria-Hungary 340 enterprises collapsed in a few weeks time and the crisis spread to France, Holland, Βelgium, Russia, Great Britain. In order to finance various enterprises which suffered from the events a consortium of Austrian banks

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provide a financial package of 20 m. gulden. The crisis affected the US as well, since the US authorities were forced to change the ratio/exchange rate between gold and silver with the Monetary Act of 1873 (which bears the notorious nick-name the Crime of 1873 in economic history).41

4.5.2. The Crisis of 1890 The starting point of the 1890 crisis was two years earlier in 1888, when the German investors stopped buying bonds of the Argentine government. Their decision, however, was viewed in London as a unique opportunity for the British banks to fill the gap and have a strong position in the Latin American market. The Barings bank decided to invest heavily in Argentine bonds. By 1890 Barings had invest £19.2 m. in the bonds of Argentina, out of a total exposure of £100 m. in the global bond market. Under the circumstances, Barings had a high risk exposure, and that made the Russian government to withdraw during the January 1889-October 1890 period the sum of £5 m. of Russian deposits to the bank. A few days later (11-11-1890) Russia demanded a further withdraw of an additional £1.5 m. of deposits leaving just a fraction of £0.9 m. to the bank. The above developments created havoc to the financial markets and the City. Barings, defaulted and a huge consortium of banks from various countries rescued the institution. However the crisis of confidence was spread across many economies with savers demanding their money back. (Holland, Italy, Belgium, Portugal, Germany, France, Russia). Obviously Argentina defaulted and abandoned the Gold Standard. This development created immense difficulties to US firms and the crisis was spread to the US as well. British FDI, across the globe, was also reduced.42 4.5.3. The Crisis of 1893 The crisis of 1893 was a direct result of the 1890 crisis. The crisis started in the US, when in 1890 the price of silver in the market was reduced to $0.93 per ounce and the US Treasury had in reserve silver worth of $380 m. In order to finance money supply, the Treasury used the silver as “collateral” for monetary circulation. The strategy was simple. The additional dollars would buy additional gold and then a bigger amount of silver would be bought (assuming that silver would continue to depreciate against gold). Then the new silver would further expand money supply and the same cycle could continue. This policy however was short sighted, because there was no consideration of the developments of the balance of payments and the underline assumption was that constantly silver would devalue against gold. Thus by 1893 the oversupply of silver had practically transformed the metal to a worthless commodity and simultaneously the gold reserves were also low. The result was catastrophic since more than 15,000 enterprises (many railway companies and banks) See: 1) W.O. Henderson: “The Rise of German Industrial Power 1834-1914,” Temple Smith, London, 1975, pages 161-170, 2) Jonathan Hughes & Louis P. Cain: “American Economic History,” Addison-Wesley, 1998, page 384. 42 See: Philip Ziegler: “The Sixth Great Power. Barings 1762-1929,” Collins, London, 1988, pages 244-266. 41

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between May-December 1893, defaulted. The crisis created a huge number of unemployed workers and was terminated only in 1897, when new gold mines were found in Alaska and South Africa.43

4.5.4. The Crisis of 1907 and 1914-1918 The roots of the 1907 crisis can be found in the immense damages which were caused in San Francisco from the earthquake of April 1906. The huge damages could not be financed by the insurance companies and by October 1906 the US insurance companies started to borrow immense amounts from the market of London. That month a total amount of £50 m. in gold was raised. The outflow of gold from Britain to the US continued and by January 1907 the Bank of England was forced to increase interest rates in order to stop the above outflow of capital. In addition, the Bank of France invested 80 m. francs in gold US $ in the London market; an attempt to assist the Bank of England. However the cash flow injections from Europe to the US continued until the autumn of 1907.44 Back in the US the general public was astonished with the financial inability of the US insurance companies and a confidence crisis erupted across the banking-financial system during the period October 1906-October 1907. During the 1897-1907 decade the assets of insurance companies were increased by 244%, whereas the assets of national banks were increased only by 97%, and finally the assets of the various banks only in New York were increased by 82%.45 Since insurance companies were the best performers, but during the crisis they had to rely to foreign funds the financial health of banks was questioned severely. Between, September 1906-March 1907 the stock-market lost 7.7% of its value. Only during the 9-26 March 1907 period the stock-market lost an additional 9.8% and the total loss for the first 9 months of 1907 was 24.4% of its value.46 The crisis was at its peak during the 14-24 October period. During those days many companies defaulted among them “United Copper,” “Knickerbocker Trust Company,” “State Saving Bank of Montana,” “National Bank of North America,” “New Amsterdam National.” A banking consortium led by J.P. Morgan restored confidence, however the crisis affected other economies as well (Britain, France, Germany, Αustria-Hungury, Βelgium, Holland, Russia, Ιndia, Australia).47 The First World War forced all states to abandon the Gold Standard by printing massive sums.

See: Jonathan Hughes & Louis P. Cain: “American Economic History,” Addison-Wesley, 1998, pages 384-386. See: Charles P. Kindleberger: “Manias, Panics and Crashes A History of Financial Crises,” 2005, pages 208-209. 45 See: Moen John & Tallman Ellis: “The Bank Panic of 1907: The Role of Trust Companies,” The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 52 (No.3), 1992, pp. 611-630, especially page 612. 46 See: Bruner Robert F. & Carr Sean D.: “The Panic of 1907: Lessons Learned from the Market’s Perfect Storm,” John Wiley & Sons, New Jersey, 2007, pages 19-20 and 32. 47 See: Larry Neal & Marc Weidenmier: “Crises in the Global Economy from Tulips to Today,” in the volume: Michael D. Bordo & Alan M. Taylor & Jeffrey G. Williamson (eds.): “Globalization in Historical Perspective,” University of Chicago, 2005, pp. 473-514, especially pages 497-501. 43 44

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4.5.5. The German Hyperinflation of 1923 By the November 1918 the German state debt had reached the staggering amount of 150 billion M. To make things worse more than 2 million former soldiers returned home asking for jobs, which did not exist. During November 1918 only the 1.8% of members in syndicates was unemployed, however by January 1919 this had reached the level of 6.6%. The production of civil goods (consumer goods) has been decreased. To illustrate in the textile industry alone in 1914 the average employment was 471 workers and the average production level was 215,480 kilos of cloth, but by 1919 the average employments was only 269 workers and the average production was just 38,325 kilos of cloth.48 The exchange rate had also deteriorated thus in 1919 the exchange rate was £1=250 M, when in 1914 it was just £1=20 M.49 In this negative economic environment the Allies decided to impose war reparations. The initial allied request was for 269,000 m. gold M (more than £14.000 m.), to be paid in 42 annual instalments. However, the final amount was set to the lower level of 132,000 m. gold M, (£6,600 m., or $40 billion, with the exchange rate of the time). This amount was also immense for the Germans, since at that time it represented the double of their GNP.50 The Germans had already increased their money supply in order to finance the domestic war debt of the 150 billion. Thus money circulation was increased from 16.7 billion in October 1918, to 28.3 billion in June 1919 and by December 1919 money circulation was 50.06 billion marks. When the allied demand for war reparations was made, the only available option for the Germans was the further increase of money supply. The Germans paid the first instalment of 1 billion M ($250 m. or £50 m.), but then they defaulted. The allied response was severe; French troops occupied the Ruhr (11 January 1923). From this point hyperinflation hit the economy. The exchange rate between £/RM at the beginning of 1921 was £1=500 M, however by the end of 1921 it was £1=1,000 M. The average exchange rate during 1922 was £1=35,000 M. Inflation skyrocketed. The price of one loaf of bread was 0.63 M in 1918; increased to 163.15 M in 1922 and by January 1923 it was 250 M. In January 1923 the exchange rate was $1=17,972 M, however by 20th of November it was at the astonishing level of $1=4,200.000.000.000. The exchange rate between £/M in November 1923 was £1=16.000.000.000.000 M. The price of the loaf of bread in July 1923 was just…3,465 M, in September it was 1,500.000.000 M, and by November it was 201,000.000.000 M.51 By October 1923 12-15 m. people were unemployed, and the unemployment benefit was worthless since a four member family had a weekly benefit of 8,500,000 M; however it needed a minimum of 683.300.000.000 M.

See: Gerald D. Feldman: “The Great Disorder. Politics, Economics and Society in the German Inflation 19141924,” Oxford University Press, 1997, pages 127-128. 49 See: D. Evans & J. Jenkins: “Years of Weimar & the Third Reich,” Hodder & Stoughton, 1999, page 41. 50 See: H. Kissinger: “Diplomacy,” Simon & Schuster, 1994, p. 257. 51 See: 1) D. Evans & J. Jenkins: “Years of Weimar & the Third Reich,” Hodder & Stoughton, 1999, pages 41-42, 2) Gerald D. Feldman: “The Great Disorder. Politics, Economics and Society in the German Inflation 1914-1924,” Oxford University Press, 1997, page 782. 48

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Money circulation increased immensely. In October 1923 it reached the level of 2,504,956 trillion M. and by November the amount was 400,338,326 trillion M. (sums equal to 353.1 m. gold M and 551.7 m. gold marks respectively).52 Under these circumstances it is not accidental that the first attempt of the Nazi’s to gain power occurred in November 8th 1923 with the unsuccessful coup-de-etat in Munich Burgenbraukeller by Hitler and Ludendorf. At this point the government of Gustav Stresseman (1878-1929) decided to act in order to face the crisis. The governor of the Reichsbank Dr. Hjalmar Schacht, decided to set in circulation a new mark, the so-called “Rentenmark.” The exchange rate was 1 “Rentenmark”=10,000,000,000,000 m. old marks (M)! However, the new currency was pecked to…land and not to the gold! This was a huge transformation for the international monetary system of the time; although no-one realized it. Also the Minister of Finance Hans Luther made 900,000 public sector workers redundant and decided to increase taxation. The results were impressive, and from 1924 the country adopted again the gold standard.53

4.5.6. The Crisis of 1929 and the Developments up to 1945 Although the 1920s was a decade of economic growth for the US economy the wealth was not equally distributed across states or the population. To illustrate, Roberts (1974) points out that although overall per capita income increased by 25% between 1921-1929 (from $660 to $857) there were immense differences and by the end of the 1920s the 60% of US households had an income below the level of $2,000 per year, which was the minimum level for a decent living.54 Galbraith (1974), points out that the US economy was facing four immense problems: a) An uneven distribution of income since by 1929 only 5% of the population had at its control the 1/3 of personal income, b) The US was the world’s biggest financier after WWI, which means that the US had to import more and export less in order to make certain that its debtors will not default and also it had to keep foreign bonds, c) there was a huge overextension of investments from various companies across different industries. Thus companies were becoming very exposed to high risk. Thus if one sector was facing a crisis that would spread to industries across the economy since different enterprises were holding different assets and shares, d) finally the stock-market had made vast increases, bigger than any other investment, and this was very tempting for investors to liquidate their shares and gain the profit. The crisis, begun, on Thursday October 24th 1929, (the so called “Black Thursady”), when 12,894,650 shares were

See: Gerald D. Feldman: “The Great Disorder. Politics, Economics and Society in the German Inflation 19141924,” Oxford University Press, 1997, pages 766-767 and 785. 53 See: 1) D. Evans & J. Jenkins: “Years of Weimar & the Third Reich,” Hodder & Stoughton, 1999, pages 46-47 and 2) Gerald D. Feldman: “The Great Disorder. Politics, Economics and Society in the German Inflation 1914-1924,” Oxford University Press, 1997, pages 815-818. 54 See: J. M. Roberts: “The New Era: America during the 1920-1930 decade,” in the volume Parnell: “History of the 20th century,” Greek edition, Gold Press, Αthens 1974, Vol. 3, pages 1,137-1,142 and especially pages 1,137 and 1,139. 52

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liquidated and there was an immense collapse of the market.55 Panic was spread and the next day (25 October) almost 6,000,000 shares were sold, followed by more than 2,000,000 during Saturday. During Monday (28 October) 9,212,800 shares were sold. Then Black Tuesday occurred were only in the first half hour of the stock-market operation orders for 33,000,000 liquidations were given, but only 16,410,030 sale transactions have occurred. During 1929 659 banking institutions collapsed, whereas in 1930 their number reached 1,352 and during 1931 another 2,294 banks were closed. In 1921 there were 31,076 commercial banks in the US, however by 1934 only 14,771 banks were left; thus 16,305 banks defaulted.56 In March 1933 Roosevelt took office, and immediately established the NRA (=National Recovery Administration), the first plan of the policy of the New Deal, which made the US to exit the crisis. It goes without saying that the crises of 1923 and 1929 had political ramifications. First they generated the monsters of Fascism and Nazism in Europe. Although Fascism was already established in Italy in 1922 the 1923 crisis and that of 1929 made the “movement” stronger. In addition the crises paralysed the countries of Europe as well, and created the path for their immediate collapse during the 1939-1941 period. To illustrate how damaging the crisis was we can simply refer to the fact that between 1914-1945 the French Franc (FF) was devalued 16 times!! The devaluations of the Franc caused immense social dissatisfaction to the public and forced it to attempt to rescue its savings by placing them in gold, silver and other safe assets. As one source points out: “No one knows precisely how much gold is held privately in France, but most conservative estimates put it at 4,000 to 5,000 tons, which is ten per cent of all nonmonetary stocks. This golden hoard was originally amassed in the years between the two world wars, but a good 1,500 tons has been added since 1945.”57

4.5.7. The 1944-1974 Period-The Epitomy of Economic Warfare The developments between 1944 to 1974 reflect not only the political status of the time (i.e., US dominance via the dollar) but also the first challenge to US dominance by the emerging European powers. During the period we have the establishment of the Bretton Woods regime (1944), the 1961 DM appreciation, the Sterling crisis (1964-1967), the 1965 French abandonment of USD. All these developments eventually triggered the August 15th 1971 US abandoned the gold standard, the introduction of floating EX rates between currencies, the DM overvaluation by 50% and the decline of USD between 1977-1981. These developments were not exclusively economic. They were planned and triggered with one aim that is to make geopolitical ramifications. To begin with under the Bretton Woods all major currencies were pegged to the USD at a specific exchange rate which could not alter. Thus the USD was the anchor of the international monetary system in other words it See: J.K Galbraith: “Τhe Great Wall Street Crash,” in the volume Parnell: “History of the 20 th century,” Greek edition, Gold Press, Αthens, 1974, Vol. 3, pp. 1,260-1,265. 56 See: Jonathan Hughes & Louis P. Cain: “American Economic History,” Addison-Wesley, 1998, page 483. 57 See: Timothy Green: “The new world of gold. The inside story of the mines, the markets, the politics, the investors,” Walker and Company, New York, 1981, page 204. 55

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was the “Heads versus Tales” coin image. In other words its was the financial strength of the post war US which reflected its political and military dominance. This complete US supremacy had to change and the first step to challenge it was that of currency markets. Between 1945-1960, the economy of West Germany, experienced a spectacular growth. As one source points out: “On March 6th 1961 the decision was taken to revalue the (Deutsch) mark by 5 per cent from DM 4.20 to DM 4.00 to the dollar. Many judged this revaluation to have been too timid, and a raise by 10 or even 15 per cent had been widely expected.”58 This simple economic decision had immense pschycological and geopolitical ramifications. It was the first time that the US was challenged in one way or another from its European allies successfully. The second step to challenge US supremacy occurred in France. According to one source: “French President De Gaulle… on January 14th 1963 announced the French veto of British membership in the Common Market [but] his most venomous words were reserved for the United States. He claimed that if Britain were admitted “in the end there would appear a colossal Atlantic Community under American dependence and leadership which would soon completely swallow up the European Community.” Then… he cast serious doubt on American willingness to defend Europe in case of Soviet invasion. De Gaulle double veto marked the beginning of the end of French cooperation with NATO…Throughout 1963 and 1964 a quiet tug of war took place between France and the United States with other nations…seeking compromises. Giscard d Estaing [the French finance minister] was …in a weak position because the Americans had enough votes [in the IMF] to swing some increase in funds …but the French did succeed in cutting the amount of the increase to twenty-five per cent and in boosting the amount of gold that the United States and Britain would have to pay into the IMF for the privilege of getting currency out of it. At the Tokyo meeting of the IMF in …autumn 1964 the new quotas were adopted.”59 The third step occurred with the Sterling crisis (19641967). According to one source: “The first shot [of the French] against sterling came in the autumn of 1965. For several years France had contributed substantial sums to various international support operations for Britain either in form of short term credits negotiated between central banks …or in the form of medium term loans under the General Agreements to Borrow through the International Monetary Fund. But when Britain ran into yet another foreign exchange crisis in the autumn of 1965, France refused to help …The abstention of the Banque de France from the September 1965 package was taken as a shocking repudiation …not only in Britain but elsewhere…The following year …another international loan package was set up for Britain…The French did not participate in this joint arrangement which was set up through BIS in June 1966…but the Banque de France did make available an entirely separate and parallel credit of one hundred million

See: Gustav Stolper: “The German Economy: 1870 to the Present,” Harcourt & World Inc. New York, 1967, page 274. 59 See: Ian Davidson & Gordon Weil: “The Gold War. The secret battle for financial and political domination from 1945 onwards,” Secker & Warburg, London, 1970, pages 81 and 90-91. 58

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dollars…[but De Gaulle appeared to be playing a double game]….the French press was full of articles [making the public] to believe that the pound problems could be solved only by devaluation and…many… believed that it should have been devalued by the end of 1964…By the beginning of 1967 Britain was clearly on the point of renewing its application for membership of the European Community [but] the second French veto [occurred]…The French hammered …at the weakness of sterling and once it became clear that Britain …application might stand or fall on this issue, the British Chancellor of the Exchequer James Callaghan was forced to adopt a slightly more realistic line… France was not the only member of the Community to raise doubts over the sterling…The other members were uneasy at the prospect that Britain’s economic difficulties would disrupt the Common Market…At the first [EEC] debate in Luxembourg on October 23 1967 [the French Foreign Minister] told [to] the other members …that France would not agree to negotiations with Britain until the British balance of payments had been restored to surplus and the reserve role of sterling had been abandoned….The French government’s open campaign against the pound was an unprecedented break with tradition, and for that reason its impact was the more powerful…On November 13 [1967] …Britain had secured 250 million dollars in credits from the Bank of International Settlements…[but]…Sterling had been under heavy pressure from speculators for several months…When the Monetary Committee of the Common Market met on the Saturday afternoon November 23 [1967] the French told their partners that they planned to devalue [the FF] by five percent if Britain devalued by fifteen percent…On the Saturday night …the British government …announced the devaluation of the pound by just under fifteen percent, from $2.80 to $2.40…This was the first time ever that a currency devaluation had been internationally negotiated….”60 The final stage of the tragedy occurred with the re-evaluation of the DM in 1968. According to one source: “A student demonstration at the Sorbonne on Friday May 3, escalated into a serious clash with the police…The next day week the situation deteriorated…On Monday May 13 about eight hundred thousand trade-unionists demonstrated in Paris in support of the students… De Gaulle …left France at the height of the crisis on May 14 for a state visit to Romania and did not return until May 18. For six days he did nothing and on Friday May 24 he appeared on television to offer …a referendum on a group of legislative reforms…still the …demonstrations continued…their consequences were obvious: a serious dislocation of the French economy amounting to the loss of 750 million working hours, or some three percent of the country’s annual production…In June alone over one billion dollars left the country …and the French reserves fell to 5.5 billion dollars…[however France borrowed abroad] 885 million from the IMF in June, followed by a 1.3 billion dollar line of credit from foreign central banks in July…In July and August the flight of capital from France slowed down …but the speculative money rushed to Frankfurt …the world scrambled feverishly for marks and the 60

See: Ian Davidson & Gordon Weil: “The Gold War. The secret battle for financial and political domination from 1945 onwards,” Secker & Warburg, London, 1970, pages 108-125.

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stream grew to such a torrent that in the first three weeks of November 1968, the Bundesbank took in nearly 2.5 billion dollars of foreign exchange, and …on November 15, it took in eight hundred million dollars in a single day…On November 13 France had been forced to raise its official discount rate to six percent and to introduce credit restrictions…[On] November 23…the French press confidently announced devaluation [of the FF] and even gave the amount…11.11 percent…by the end of the year French reserves had dropped to 4.2 billion dollars…on July 16 [1968 the FF was devalued by 12.5% [and] …on October 24 [1968 revaluation of the DM occurred and] it turned out to be larger than expected, a 9.29 percent change from 4 Deutschmarks to the Dollar to 3.66.” 61 However the depreciation of the USD and the £ was just one aspect of the monetary developments. The second aspect was the reduction of gold reserves of both Anglo-Saxon Powers (USA and UK) viz. a viz. the other major economies of Europe. To illustrate, in 1950 US official gold reserves were over 20,000 metric tons and the British reserves were 2,500 metric tons respectively. In 1971 the US gold reserves were just over 9,000 metric tons and the British reserves were only 690 metric tons. In the same period (1950-1971) Germany’s gold reserves increased from nearly zero to 3,600 metric tons; French reserves increased from 588 metric tons to over 3,100 metric tons; Italian reserves increased from 227 metric tons to over 2,500 metric tons and Dutch reserves increased from 280 to almost 1,700 metric tons.62 These developments occurred during the Vietnam war era and demonstrated the first attempt by the re-birthed Europe (namely the French-German Axis) to challenge the US and Anglo-Saxon post World War II dominance.

4.5.8. The 1974-2007 Period This period is associated with the emerging globalization process which aimed to reduce the strength of the nation states and replace them with international organizations, regional trade blocks, emergence of financial capitalist system by giving emphasis to the development of financial markets viz. a viz. that of enterprises which are activated in the real economy. The process started with the Big-Bang in the UK financial system, followed by the early strength of the USD, during the 1982-1985 period. The Stock Market crisis of 1987 temporally delayed the process but the developments in Eastern Europe between 1987-1991 and the collapse of Communism generated new impetus. In addition the rapid technological changes and the free movement of goods, individuals and services boosted international trade and growth. However the period was also associated with low interest rates and an immense increase of state and households debts in most countries. Finally income distribution remained unfair however the process generated winners and losers.

See: Ian Davidson & Gordon Weil: “The Gold War. The secret battle for financial and political domination from 1945 onwards,” Secker & Warburg, London, 1970, pages 142-173. 62 See: James Rickards: “Currency Wars. The making of the next global crisis,” Portfolio-Penguin editions, 2011, USA, pages 108-109. 61

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The losers were the states which championed for the liberal open market economic policy doctrines whereas the winners were the emerging economies of China, India, Brazil, etc. Table 2 demonstrates the shift of industrial powers from the globalization process. Thus in 2014 the ten main emerging economies (China, South Korea, India, Taiwan, Mexico, Brazil, Russia, Turkey, Indonesia, Poland) had an aggregate industrial output of 3,510 billion dollars which represented the 35% of total global Table 2. Manufacturing output in 2014 (in 2005 US dollars and using 2005 exchange rates) Country Output in $ billion Output per head $ % of national output % of world manufacturing China 1,882 1,400 28% 19% USA 1,843 5,700 12% 19% Japan 1,001 7,900 19% 10% Germany 680 8,400 23% 7% South Korea 369 7,400 30% 4% India 290 200 17% 3% France 267 4,000 11% 3% Italy 257 4,300 15% 3% UK 247 3,800 11% 3% Taiwan 190 8,100 30% 2% Mexico 170 1,400 18% 2% Canada 150 4,200 11% 2% Brazil 145 700 11% 1% Russia 140 1,000 15% 1% Spain 134 2,900 13% 1% Turkey 120 1,600 18% 1% Indonesia 110 400 22% 1% Switzerland 95 11,600 19% 1% Poland 94 2,400 19% 1% Netherlands 87 5,200 12% 1% Source: Chris Rhodes: “Manufacturing: International Comparisons,” House of Commons British Parliament serial number 05809, 18-8-2016, page 4.

manufacturing.The traditional Western industrial powers (USA, Germany, UK, France, Italy, Switzerland, Netherlands, Japan) had an aggregate industrial output of 4,447 billion dollars which represent the 47% of total global industrial production. Although the traditional industrial powers (US, Germany, Britain, Japan) had in 2014 a total of 39% of global industrial production one can simply refer to 1913-1914 when their share was 61.4% (US: 32%, Germany: 14.8%, Britain:13.6%, Japan: 1%). In 1938 the major Western industrial powers had a total share of 54.9% of global production (US: 28.7%, Germany: 13.2%, Britain: 9.2% and Japan: 3.8%).63 In the post World War II economic order one can 63

See: 1) Paul Kennedy: “The Rise and fall of Great Powers,” Fontana Press, 1989, page 259 for Britain, Germany and US and 2) V. Kremmidas: “Introduction to the Economic History of Europe,” Gnosi editions, Athens, 1989, page 337 for Japan. For 1938 data see: Lawrence James: “The Rise and Fall of the British Empire,” Abacus, 1998, page 457.

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mention that in 1950 the share of the four major Western industrial powers was 82.3% (US: 61.9%, Germany: 10.1%, Britain: 8.2% and Japan: 2.1%), whereas in 1977 it was 77.9% (US: 44%, Germany: 16%, Britain: 4.5% and Japan: 13.4%).64

4.5.9. The 2007-2016 Period This period is associated with four major currency wars. The first is a war against the Chinese currency, the second is a war against the USD and the third is a war against the Euro. The fourth is the introduction of Bitcoin crypto-currency. The first war between US and China reflects broader strategic disputes (military rise of China, South China sea, trade issues, environmental issues, monetary policy issues). This war is depicted by the following source: “the United States had a secret weapon. That financial weapon was what went by the ungainly name “quantitative easing,” or QE, which… consists of increasing the money supply to inflate asset prices…QE… policy bomb dropped on the global economy in 2009 …[and] by using quantitative easing to generate inflation abroad the United States was increasing the cost structure of almost every major exporting nation and fast growing emerging economy in the world all at once…Quantitative easing …was the perfect currency war weapon and the Fed knew it. [It] worked because of the yuan-dollar peg maintained by the People’s Bank of China. As the Fed printed more money in its QE programs, much of that money found its way to China …once the dollars got to China, they were soaked up by the central bank in exchange for newly printed yuan. The more money the Fed printed the more money China had to print to maintain the beg….”65 By triggering domestic Chinese inflation the US were triggering social unrest in China in the hope of a new Tien-an Men Square type rebellion which could result in the collapse of China from the internal home front. The Chinese response was swift. China started to buy less and less US government bonds in the international markets. To illustrate during the period 2009-2011 China was buying more and more US bonds (2009: $1,414 billion, 2010: 1,464 billion, 2011: 1,727 billion). However in June 2012 Chinese holding of US bonds were just $1,584 billion, and in November 2013 the People’s Bank of China has announced “that it is no longer in the country’s interest to built foreign currency reserves.” Since the USD reserves were the primary policy option this new policy was directed against the US. Thus in October 2015 were $1,254.8 billion, in December 2015 were $1,246.1 billion in June 2016 were $1,240.8 billion and in October 2016 were just $1,115.7 billion.66 In addition China shifts its FX reserves from USD to FDI in Africa, Asia, Europe. See: William H. Branson & Herbert Giersch & Peter G. Peterson: “Trends in United States international trade and investment since World War II,” in the volume: Martin Feldstein (ed.): “The American Economy in Transition,” University of Chicago Press, 1980, pages 183-274, especially page 191. 65 See: James Rickards: “Currency wars. The making of the next global crisis,” Portfolio-Penguin, 2011, pages 134135. 66 See: 1) Wayne M. Morrison & Marc Labonte: “China’s holdings of US Securities: Implications for the US economy,” Congressional Research Paper 19-08-2013, page 6, and 2) US Department of Treasury Data on December 15th 2016 available at http://ticdata.treasury.gov 64

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The second war is associated with the attempt to marginalize USD from the international financial markets and from its pivotal role as a reserve currency. It is obvious that by assuming a QE policy the oversupply of dollars made its value to decline viz. a viz. that of other currencies. The problem becomes worse due to the chronic deficits in US state budget and balance of payments which resulted in an immense increase of US debt from $3.2 trillion in 1990 to $5.6 trillion in 2000, to $13.5 trillion in 2010, to $16.7 trillion in 2012 and to $19.9 trillion on January 8th 2017.67 These developments certainly undermine the USD however at this point we are talking about a deliberate and well prepared plan against the dollar which is coming from various governments and individuals. The motives behind this development are unclear. One may speculate that they are associated with the decline of US in the world economic affairs, or with the attempt to make speculative gains from buying and selling dollars in the international markets. In addition the actions of these players are not necessarily coordinated. However the following developments have to be taken into consideration:           

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28-10-2008: Russian Prime minister at that time Vladimir Putin advised Chinese premier to abandon the USD as a transaction and reserve currency 15-11-2008: Iran converts its financial reserves into gold 19-11-2008: China sets a target of 4,000 metric tons of gold reserves to diversify from USD. 9-2-2009: Gold bullion transactions reach a record high. 18-3-2009: UN calls for the abandonment of US dollar as a global reserve currency 30-3-2009: Russia and China are reported to cooperate on the creation of a new global currency 31-3-2009: China and Argentina enter into a currency swap agreement on bilateral trade in order to avoid the USD 26-4-2009: China calls for a reform of the global monetary system and replace of USD as a leading reserve currency 18-5-2009: Brazil and China start discussions to replace USD from bilateral trade 16-6-2009: BRIC summit calls for a more “diversified, stable, and predictable currency system” 6-10-2009: British newspaper Independent reports that Gulf Arab states (Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, Abu Dabi) along with China, Russia, Japan and France plan to terminate dollar dealings for oil payments and move to a basket of currencies which will include Japanese yen, Chinese yuan, the Euro, gold and a new unified currency from the GCC Arab states. Few days later the report is dismissed. 3-11-2009: India purchases $6.7 billion of IMF gold in order to diversify from the weak USD.

See: www.USdebtclock.org

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7-11-2010: World Bank president states that G20 should “consider employing gold as an international reference point of market expectations about inflation, deflation and future currency values” 13-12-2010: French president calls for the consideration of a wider role of SDRs in the international monetary system 15-12-2010: China and Russia jointly call for the dollar’s role in world trade to be diminished and launch a yuan-ruble trade currency settlement mechanism.

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Iran in 2013 eliminated the USD and the Euro from its foreign trade Venezuela and Russia agreed to finance their bilateral trade with their national currencies and thus replace the USD. In addition Venezuela announced that its trade with 12 other Latin American states will be made on barter exchange thus removing the USD from its local trade as well. In March 2013 Australia and China decided to eliminate the USD from their bilateral trade. China and Brazil decided to finance their direct trade without the USD but by using their local currencies (26-3-2013) China and Japan started also to deal with their local currencies (1-6-2012) China and Germany intensify their trade in their own currencies and China and Uruguay started also to deal with their local currencies China and Argentina started also to deal with their local currencies and China and Chile started also to deal with their local currencies. Finally China and Switzerland signed a deal which boosted the role of yuan in European trading system and marginalised partially the USD (23-1-2015). Russia eliminated the USD from all commodity trade (June 2014) and from September 2015 Russia abolished USD and Euro from all trade with CIS states. North Korea and Russia trade also in their local currencies bypassing the USD. On 11-8-2016 Turkey threatened to finance its bilateral trade with Russia on local currencies and avoid the USD. Between 2009-2015 the gold reserves of various states increased massively. To illustrtate, Chinese gold reserves increased from 1,054 tons in April 2009 to approximately 1,797.5 tons in the first quarter of 2016. Russian gold reserves increased from 550.12 tons in the second quarter of 2009 to 1,094.73 tons in the second quarter of 2014 and total increase for the year was 172 tons. In 2015 Russia added another 208 tons of gold in its reserves and by February 2016 Russian gold reserves were at 1,446 tons almost 260% higher compared to the 2009 level. US gold reserves on the other hand remained the same during the second quarter of

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2009-2014 period at 8,133.46 tons, German gold reserves slightly declined over the period from 3,408.29 tons in 2009 to 3,384.19 tons in 2014, Italian reserves remained unchanged to 2,451.84 tons and French reserves declined slightly from 2,445.55 to 2,435.38 tons (always between 2009-2014). By December 2014 US gold holdings were 8,133.5 tons, German reserves were 3,384.2 tons, Russian reserves were 1,208.2 tons, Chinese reserves were 1,054.1 tons. The increase of gold reserves by central banks during 2010-2016 remains to be seen if it will continue or not. Only then we will be able to deduct sound conclusions if this is a permanent long term policy or a policy of current short and medium term goals.68 The third currency war is associated with the Euro and the Euro-zone. The monetary developments in the EEC and later in the EU started with the decision of the Hague summit in 1969 which decided to “create a plan which would gradually give shape to an economic and monetary union in the Community.” The outcome of the above was the Werner Report in 1970, which proposed fixed exchange rates, full convertibility of currencies, transfer of economic decision making from national to community level and common monetary policy.69 The roots of the EMU and the Euro can be traced here. With the signing of the Maastrich Treaty on February 7th 1992 the European Economic Community (EEC) ended and the European Union (EU) was created. Furthermore, the decision to establish a common currency has been enacted; as well as the economic criteria (convergence criteria) for participating in the EMU were determined. These criteria where the following: 1) The annual ratio of public deficit/GNP should not exceed the 3% and the equivalent between public debt/GNP the 60%, 2) Inflation must not exceed the 1,5% of the average of the lowest percentage inflation rates which three member states had in the previous year, 3) The national currency should be in the EMS limit for a period of two years minimum, 4) The long term interest rates must not exceed the 2% average of the interest rates of the three countries with the lowest inflation. For two members especially, (UK and Denmark) with a special protocol it was acknowledged to them to have the right-option of non participation in the single currency process. During the period 1999-2002 the EMU the plan was implemented, thus from January 1st 1999 a new currency was created but it did not circulate. The old ECU was be abolished and replaced by the Euro and the ECB started to operate as well as the European system of central banks. The new currency was placed in circulation by 1-1-2002 and all the national currencies were abolished a process which terminated on July 1st 2002. However many economists were sceptical about the process and warned that the EMU was not an optimal currency area. The reservations were

68

Data obtained from: 1) http://worldgoldcouncil.org 2) http://marketrealist.com 3) http://russia-insider.com 4) http://www.primevalues.org 5) http://sputniknews.com 6) http://www.independent and also from: James Rickards: “Currency wars. The making of the next global crisis,” Portfolio-Penguin, 2011, pages 165-166. 69 See: “Report on the economic and monetary union in the European Community,” 1990.

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expressed mainly by US economists.70 When the international financial crisis erupted in 2007 the majority of EMU countries had violated the Treaty criterion of debt and deficit. Throughout the period 2007-2016 the majority of EMU states had higher debts above the 60% limit and higher annual fiscal deficits above 3%. However instead of re-negotiating the Maastrich Treaty Germany imposed an austerity policy especially in the South European countries members of the EMU (Greece, Cyprus, Italy, Spain, Portugal). Across Europe austerity has been the primary economic policy which however failed to address the structural problems of the EU and the EMU states. At this point it is essential to make a brief reference to the European economic history. The efforts to establish a monetary union in Europe started in the nineteenth century. In 1863 the “Latin (Monetary) Union” was established between France, Belgium, Switzerland, and Italy. Greece entered the Union in 1868. The purpose of the Union, which lasted until the end of World War I, was to achieve stability between the exchange rate of gold and silver, an aim which was accomplished in a ratio 15.5 to 1. Furthermore, all country members were obliged to accept the circulation of currencies from other member states in their territories. Some states such as Spain and Bulgaria in spite of the fact that they were out of the Union adopted their monetary policy to the new reality. From the above it goes without saying that the EMU is not a new idea, but in order to succeed the mistakes of the past must be avoided. There are many who are critical about the final outcome of the austerity policy in Europe predicting a final collapse of the EMU under immense social and economic pressure. In addition they point out that the introduction of these policies created a pschycological barrier across the EU states and nations. The developments in the EU and in the Euro-zone are expected to be exciting especially after the June 2016 decision of Britain to disintegrate from the EU. The introduction of Bitcoin a crypto-currency is another important element and can be regarded as the fourth currency war. The Bitcoin was introduced on 31-10-2008 by an individual under the name Satoshi Nakamoto (many however dispute that this is the true identity of the individual). By February 2015 the number of merchants who accepted Bitcoin for transactions passed the limit of 100,000. This electronic currency has unlimited supply, it is unanimous, decentralized, easy to set up, transparent and fast according to the supporters of this innovation. However the critics point out that the Bit coin has been already used extensively by criminals in the so-called “dark-web” in order to finance illegitimate activities. In addition in many states the legal status of the Bitcoin is debatable.71 The future of Bitcoin or any other electronic currency is still debatable. It remains to be seen if this represents a threat to all types of physical money or not. It goes without saying that electronic money (even in its conventional form) is associated with Cybersecurity: 1) electronic transfer of currency, 2) ATM retail global services can be targeted, 3) financial data on line protection, 4) industrial espionage via penetration of For the theory of optimal currency areas see: Robert A. Mundell: “Theory of Optimal Currency Areas,” American Economic Review, 51, 1961. 71 Data obtained from http://www.coindesk.com and from http://www.wikipeadia.org. 70

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hackers in the computer systems of companies, banks, government services, international organizations. The economic cost of such attacks and the additional cost of defending the computer systems is high. Thus transaction costs are generated. To the above one must add the following developments:

4.5.10. 1992-Sterling Crisis The £ had entered the EMS on 8-10-1990. In 1/7/1992 the UK assumed the EU presidency. In 1/9/1992 the DM was appreciated and markets stated to sell FX and accumulate DM. Between 3-8 September the £ was under pressure and on Black Wednesday (16/9/1992) the Bank of England used $20 billion almost 50% of its FX reserves to support the £, and the currency was out of the European Exchange Rate Mechanism. 4.5.11. 1994-Mexican Peso Crisis Political developments during December 1993-May 1994 triggered a crisis and foreign portfolio investments reduced from $28.4 billion in 1993 to $7.8 billion in 1994. On 2212-1994 the country defaulted under a stock market collapse and a collapse of peso exchange rate. The IMF entered. 4.5.12. 1997-1998 Asian Crisis The crisis started in Thailand when the banks collapsed due to bad loans (June). In July 2nd 1997 the baht depreciated against the USD. The result was a complete stock-market collapse across the region (Singapore, Hong-Kong, Malaysia, Philippines, Indonesia, South Korea). The IMF entered across the region. 4.5.13. 1998-The Russian Crisis The crisis started on August 14th from an FT article by G. Soros who pointed out that the currency was overvalued. As a result the rouble was depreciated as much as 70% against the USD, the stock-market collapsed and from August 17th the Russian government terminated all FX payments abroad. 4.5.14. 2007-2012 Global Crisis The crisis started with the collapse of the US housing market ($17 trillion of housing value was lost between 2007-March 2009) which triggered the collapse of various financial institutions. The cost of the crisis for the US economy was more than $14 trillion. The combined global debt of banks, households, companies and states between 2008-2015 had risen by $57 trillion; three times the global GDP According to US Pentagon the economic evolution was the outcome of a hidden financial warfare as follows:

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Phase 1: A $2 trillion excess wealth from oil producing nations was gathered (January 2007-June 2008). Phase 2: Attacks against specific US financial institutions (June-September 2008) via buying and selling their stocks and assets Phase 3: (June-October 2009) Direct attack on US Treasury in June with the attempt to spread in the international financial markets

134.5 billion US counterfeit bonds and secret meetings by Russia, China, Japan, Brazil, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar and Abu-Dabi aiming to replace USD in the oil industry and trade as an exchange currency.72

4.6. Scorched Earth Policy The case of scorched earth policy this was used extensively from Russians/Soviets in the cases of the Napoleonic invasion in Russia (June –December 1812), in the case of the Eastern Front during 1914-1917 and during the German penetrations and also during the period 1941-1942 during the Soviet-Nazi war. When the Germans retreated in the East in Italy and in the West during the years 1943-1944 they also followed a similar policy. This perished the infrastructure of the territories which were liberated by the Allies thus depriving them from bridges, electricity, water supply, gas and oil pipelines, food, medical equipment, telecommunication installations. Although Hitler wanted to impose this policy inside German territory which was captured by the Allies his armaments minister Albert Speer objected to this policy on German soil and simply disregarded the orders of his Fuhrer.

4.7. Black Economic Propaganda This is associated with creating negative expectations related to the future of the enemy’s economy and spreading unsubstantiated rumors to international press and financial markets. Many stock market crises occurred due to black economic rumors. Typical examples are known in economic history as the “Tulip,” “The South Sea Company” and “Mississippi” bubbles respectively. The Tulip bubble occurred in United Provinces (Holland) during 1630s. The first tulips were imported in the United Provinces from Constantinople in 1593, and quickly became very popular among the wealthy class of the country, endorsed as a symbol of status. By

72

See: Kevin Freeman: “Secret Weapon. How Economic Terrorism brought down the US Stock Market and why it can happen again,” Regnery Publishing, 2012, Washington DC.

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1623 a tulip could cost 1,000 florins, when the average yearly income was just 150 florins. In 1635 the sale of 40 tulip bulbs cost 100,000 florins! This sum was equivalent to the cost of 4 tons of wheat, 8 tons of rye, 4 oxen, 8 pigs, 12 ship, 1,000 pounds of cheese, 2 tons of butter, 4 tons of beer, 1 bed, 1 silver drinking cup, 2 casks of wine combined. By next year (1636) tulips were traded in the Amsterdam stock-exchange, as well as in the market of other Dutch cities (Rotterdam, etc.). They were also very popular in German cities. However the picture changed from February 1637, when it was obvious that the demand for tulips could not continue to increase, and the high values were perished.73 The Mississippi Bubble is well known. It occurred in France during the 1717-1720 period. In September 1717, John Law, a Scottish economist, who was already a successful economic advisor to the French viceroy and had already in 1716 established a bank in France entitled “Banque General,” was granted permission to establish a new company entitled “Compangie d’ Occident.” The aim of the company was to exploit the Mississippi valley which at the time was under French rule. In order to raise capital for the venture, the new company issued 200,000 shares which sold them to the public for the price of 500 livres per share. The public could buy up to three quarters of the shares using government bonds (billets d’ etat). In 4th of December 1718, another important development occurred. Law’s Banque General was renamed “Royal Bank” and the banknotes which were issued were compulsory across France. New shares were issued for the Compangie d’ Occident with a nominal value of 500 livres, however they were traded in the market even ten times higher. Everyone was anticipating quick and high profits. The French viceroy was granted 24,000 shares in the Compangie. The high expectations were spread across the Paris market. Shares of various firms were increased by 80 times in a year! By December 1719 the world millionaire was recorded for the first time in France. To illustrate one waiter gained 30m in a year. At that time everyone wanted to capitalize his or her profit. The same time (December 1719) the Duke of Bourbon gained 20m livres, while Prince de Conti gained 14m. At the same time the first bad news for the Compangie d’ Occident arrived, the company had small profits and there were no gold reserves in Mississippi. The outcome was a catastrophe. The share prices collapsed from 12,000 livres (December 1719) to 2,000 in August 1720, and just 200 in December 1720. Law was exiled from France and his personal wealth was confiscated.74 The South Sea Company bubble is the third most notorious crisis of the era of commercial capitalism, which occurred almost in the same time with the Mississippi bubble in France. The South Sea Company was established in England in 1711, and was granted exclusive trading rights with South America. However in reality the company could not start trading exchanges in 1711, since a British-Spanish war was occurring. It 73 74

See: Peter Garber: “Tulipmania,” Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 97 (3), 1989, pages: 535-560. For an analytical presentation see: Will & Ariel Durant: “The Story of Civilization The Age of Voltaire,” Simon and Schuster 1965, [Greek edition Spyropouloi & Koumandareas, 1966, pages: 21-28.

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was only in 1713 with the Treaty of Utrecht which gave to the company the legal and exclusive right to sell slaves across South America with the Asiento clod. By 1719 the South Sea Company had held £11.7m out of the total £50m of Britain. The Company’s share price started to increase in 1720. The January price was £128, in February it was £175 and in March it was £330, and £550 in May. In June the Company acquired a Royal Charter and the price increased to £890. In early August the price increased to the astonishing level of £1,000. However in September the price was just £150, since most investors wanted to capitalize their high earnings. By December the price was around £100 and a Parliament investigation was triggered, which by 1721 reported massive internal trading techniques (in today’s standards). The South Sea Company was restructured and continued its operations until the middle of the nineteenth century.75 The era of commercial capitalism had ended. The lessons of the previous crises were not learned. As the era of industrial revolution was occurring new crises would shock the system. The “Railway Mania” of the 1844-1848 period is the most significant crisis of the first industrial revolution, which occurred in Britain. The first steam locomotive to run on rails was designed in 1804 by Richard Trevithick in South Wales. The first public steam line journey occurred on 27 September 1825 by the Stockton & Darlington Railway, and after this milestone new lines were created rapidly across England. The Liverpool & Manchester railway started its operations in September 1830 and “by 1845 more than 600 new lines were proposed and another 600 were likely to be adopted” according to the Times. At that time everyone wanted to invest in a railway company or wanted to establish a company of its own. During 1846 1,200 (!) new railway companies were set up, however it was George Hudson, a businessman from York, who controlled more than 20% of railways and his nickname was the “Railway King.” However when in 1847 the Bank of England increased its interest rates, most of the small railway companies were perished. By 1848 there were just 20 railway companies. These have practically acquired the small railway enterprises for worthless sums.76 The above crises are typical examples of missinformation and of high expectations.

4.8. Follow a Slave Labor Policy with the War Prisoners According to one source the number of foreign workers in Germany evolved as follows: July 1942: 5,129,000 workers, December 1942: 6,381,000, June 1943: 7,437,000, December 1943: 8,349,000 and September 1944: 9,335,000 workers. However it points out that the statistics may not reflect the reality since many foreign workers passed away during the trip from occupied Europe to Germany due to hunger, diseases etc. In addition 75 76

See: John Carswell: “The South Sea Bubble,” London, Cresset Press, 1960. See: Collin Garratt: “The History of Trains,” Chancellor Press, London, 2004, pages 7-11, and D. Plihon: “Le nouveau capitalisme,” La Decouverte, 2003, page 44.

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many escaped from the various concentration camps.77 However the importance of foreign workers to defence industry was important. To illustrate in 1941 the 13.4% of the workers were foreigners. In 1942 it was 29.5%, in 1943 it was 30.2% and in 1944 it was 35%.78 However the local populations of occupied Europe which were oppressed quickly started guerrilla type warfare against the German conquerors.

4.9. Targeting Enemy’s Industrial Base and Infrastructure Typical examples are the allied bombardment over Germany (1943-1945), the allied bombardment against Japan (1944-1945) and the US bombardment of North Vietnam (1964-1973). Due to space limitations only the German and the Vietnam cases are briefly analyzed. During the period 1943-1945 the allied strategic offensive used against Germany and occupied Europe the astonishing amount of 2,539,043 tons of bombs. From those the 772,528 tons (or 30.42%) was directed against the economic infrastructure of the Reich and occupied Europe. The remaining 70% of the bombs were directed against the German cities and against military targets. The outcome of the allied strategic air-force campaign is hugely debated until today. Many academics have pointed out that the allied strategic air-force campaign was a failure since throughout the war the German industrial production increased across all industries and the types of war material were in full supply. Furthermore the allied campaign did not stop the German industry to innovate and produce new types of tanks, aeroplanes, guns etc. of high quality. According to this view the cost of the campaign in terms of losses for the allies was also high.79 In the case of the Vietnam war the US Air-Force used 7,188,032 tons of bombs against enemy targets in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. One of the key objectives of the US effort was the transportation network of North Vietnam and the Ho Chi Minch route which was using territories of Cambodia and Laos in order to supply the guerrilla fighters. The prevailing US view insists that the bombing was effective. To illustrate only for the Linebacker operation it is often claimed that: “attacks…had struck 125 rail bridges and another 270 highway bridges …seriously disrupting the movement of supplies.”80 For the

See: Dietrich Eichholtz: “Geschichte der deutschen Kriegswirtschat 1939-1945,” Band II, Teil I, K.G. Saur Verlag, Μunich, 2003, page 246. 78 See: G. Ranki: “The Economics of the Second World War,” 1993, page 96. 79 This assertion is expressed in the following: 1) John J. Mearsheimer: “The tragedy of the politics of the Great Powers” Poiotita publications, (Greek edition), Athens 2007, 2) Oskar Pincus: “The war aims and strategies of Adolf Hitler,” 2005, 3) N. Ferguson: “The War of the world,” Allen-Lane, 2006, 4) John Mosier: “The Blitzkrieg Myth. How Hitler and the Allies misread the strategic realities of World War II,” Harper Collins, 2003. See also R. Overy: “The Penguin Historical Atlas of the Third Reich,” 1996, p. 132 on statistics of bombing across various targets. 80 See: Stephen P. Randolph: “Powerful and Brutal Weapons,” Harvard University Press, 2007, p, 338. 77

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Rolling Thunder it is claimed that: “The …attacks seemed to be successful in terms of destroyed vehicles, burned out tank farms, and other material losses.”81 However the Chinese and Soviet aid continued almost uninterrupted throughout the war. Before the US intervention (1955-1963) China had provided 247 million yuans of military aid to North Vietnam including 240,000 rifles, 2,730 artillery pieces, 15 airplanes, 28 naval vessels, 175,000,000 rounds of ammunition and other military equipment.82 When the US involvement in the war became decisive the total Chinese military aid increased substantially. Thus between 1964-1969 China delivered to North Vietnam 949,197 rifles, 23,983 artillery guns of all types, 831,460,000 rounds of ammunition, 8,003,000 artillery shells, 11,301 radio transmitters, 23,733 telephones, 60 tanks, 46 naval vessels, 90 airplanes, 1,286 automobiles, 3,400,000 uniforms. During the period 1970-1975 Chinese aid was as follows: 973,700 rifles, 40,546 artillery guns of all types, 216,260,000 rounds of ammunition, 9,071,000 artillery shells, 19,507 radio transmitters, 25,159 telephones, 500 tanks, 106 naval vessels, 74 airplanes, 14,485 automobiles, and 6,600,000 uniforms.83 The two cases demonstrate the opposing outcomes from air-bombardment offensive. The 1943-1945 offensive was successful and created an immense cost to the German economy. However the air-offensive in Vietnam lacked the political will to kneel the enemy. Thus in Vietnam the US avoided targets were Chinese and Soviet military advisors were stationed. The fear was that any massive Soviet or Chinese casualties could trigger a direct Soviet or Chinese involvement in the conflict. Thus the North- Vietnamese were left free in specific locations and it was in these places were the massive Chinese and Soviet aid came. In the era of peace this can occur via industrial espionage and cyber-warfare against important economic activities. In the past years many times the Western authorities have identified Chinese, Russian hackers and Islamic terrorists as major sources of industrial espionage and cyber-warfare.

4.10. Targeting Enemy’s Entrepreneurial Class by Pointing out That They Should Continue the “Business as Usual” Policy before the War; Thus Undermine the War Effort of the Opponent before the War Is Declared Before wars all economies function below the full employment (capacity) level. During the years of peace the enemy who has already decided to attack can convince the opposing state that no military mobilization is needed. If this happens then the surprise attack will See: Walter J. Boyne: “Beyond the wild blue: A history of the United States Air-Force 1947-2007,” St. Martins Press, 2007, p. 164. 82 See: Xiaoming Zhang: “The Vietnam War (1964-1969): A Chinese Perspective,” Journal of Military History, Vol. 60, No.4 (Oct. 1996), pp: 731-762, especially pages 735-737. 83 See: Chen Jian: “China’s involvement in the Vietnam War 1964-1969,” The China Quarterly, No. 142, June 1995, pp: 356-387 and especially page 379. 81

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be quite successful. There are two ways to undermine the enemy’s economy during the years of peace. The first is with undercover operations such as strikes, sabotage, industrial espionage, cyberwarfare, immigration (if the immigrants which are send to the other state are criminals, spyies, or low human capital individuals with low productivity etc.). However there is a second more sophisticated way this is associated with trade expansion which does not imply any hostility movement, foreign investments, extensive economic links etc. A typical example of this strategy is the analysis of the German-Soviet relations during 1939-1941. When the German-Soviet Friendship was signed on 23 August 1939 it had a ten year duration. The two states with a secret protocol curved the Eastern European states of Poland, Baltic States, and established zones of influence. Hovever when in June 1940 Germany occupied France and by September 1940 it had failed to invade Britain Hitler demanded a closer friendship with the Soviet Union. The Soviet foreign minister Molotov made another official visit to Berlin on November 12-14 1940. During this visit Hitler asked for USSR entry in the Axis alliance and for finalization of spheres of influence between USSR and Germany however no agreement occurred and by December 18th 1940 Hitler issued Directive No. 21 which asked for another campaign against the USSR by the summer of 1941.84 Thus between December 1940-June 1941 the German side concentrated not only on war preparations against the USSR but also on a deceiving plan against the USSR economy. This plan had two dimensions. The first was to extract from the Soviets as many raw materials as possible before the start of the hostilities thus reduce the capacity of the Soviet industry. To illustrate German imports from the USSR in the period January 1939-June 1941 were as follows: In 1939: 4,797 million Reichsmarks, in 1940: 5,012 million RM, during January-June 1941: 3,293 million RM. It is obvious that the imports of the January-June 1941 period represent the 65.70% of the 1940 imports and the 68.64% of the 1939 imports. It is obvious that Germany was sending to Stalin the message of “business as usual” and practically increased business. However if we look the “other side of the hill” that is what Germany had sent to the USSR the figures are: In 1939: 5,222 million RM, in 1940: 4,868 million RM and in January-June 1941: 3,332 million RM. It was obvious that Germany was sending less goods to the Soviet Union. Thus the 1941 German exports were just the 68.44% of those of 1940 and the 63.80% of the 1939 exports.85 The Soviets were completely deceived. And this was reflected in the Soviet war production of the 1939-1941 period. The data of Table 3 demonstrate that Soviet armaments production during JanuaryJune 1941 was the 60.71% of 1940 production in tanks, the 52.31% of 1940 production in artillery, the 27.70% of 1940 mortars production, the 56.77% of 1940 rifles production, 56.60% of 1940 aircraft production and the 57.57% of 1940s ammunition production. See: 1) Edward E. Ericson III: “Feeding the German Eagle. Soviet Economic Aid to Nazi Germany 1933-1941,” Praeger, London 1999, pages 143-145 and 2) Evan Mawdsley: “Thunder in the East. The Nazi-Soviet War 19411945,” Hodder Arnold, London, 2005, page 4. 85 See: Edward E. Ericson III: “Feeding the German Eagle. Soviet Economic Aid to Nazi Germany 1933-1941,” Praeger, London 1999, pages 187-188. 84

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These figures demonstrate that the Soviet armaments production did not accelerate before the war, and between the January-June 1941, period. It was slightly higher of the 50% of armaments production of the 1940 year. This demonstrates that Stalin did not expect an attack. The Germans had managed to extract more resources from the Soviets and simultaneously keep their industrial production at the 1940 levels. Table 3. Soviet Armaments Production 1939-June 1941 1939 1940 January-June 1941 Tanks 3,000 2,800 1,700 Artillery 17,100 15,100 7,900 Mortars 4,100 37,900 10,500 Rifles 1,396,700 1,395,000 792,000 Machine-guns 73,600 52,200 Aircraft 10,400 10,600 6,000 Ammunition 20,000,000 33,000,000 19,000,000 Source: Evan Mawdsley: “Thunder in the East. The Nazi-Soviet War 1941-1945,” Hodder Arnold, London, 2005, page 43.

4.11. Imposition of Capital Controls The importance of capital controls can be realized by making a reference to Irving Fisher’s money equation MV=PY. In this equation Money (i.e., the quantity of money which circulates in the economy) is affecting the price level under the assumption that V (Money velocity) and Y (National income) are independent variables. However if capital controls are introduced money velocity is reduced and this has a harmful effect on national income this is a way to cause economic decline and depression. A typical example has been the imposition of capital controls in the Greek economy at the end of June 2015 (28-062015). This occurred for political purposes. On July the 5th a referendum was planned to occur in which the Greeks were asked if they accepted a new proposed deal between the Greek government and the lenders of the Greek state (EU partners, ECB and IMF). However the ECB had an open credit line to the Greek banking system which expired on June 30th and had stated that this would not be re-opened after that date. The outcome was that on the evening of June 28th the Greek monetary authorities were forced to impose capital controls of daily withdraws of just 60 Euros and close all the banks until July the 6th. After that date and with a referendum result of 61.3% which opposed the new deal the capital controls remained in the Greek economy. There is no doubt that the imposition of capital controls just before the referendum was a direct attempt by the lenders to send a clear warning to the Greek government, the political system and the general public about the status of the country in the EMU and in the EU, in general. It is still debatable if this move assisted the pro-EU forces in the Greek society and political system or not in the long run. However this has been certainly a typical economic warfare tool.

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4.12. Causing “Financial Drowning” by Terminating Bank Loans to the Economy of the Enemy or Targeting the Banking System of the Enemy by Spreading Rumors About Corruption, Financial Mismanagement, Money Laundering Etc. Capitalism is associated with ethics and especially business ethics. A typical strategy of creating economic isolation is the attempt to portray a nation as “corrupted or lazy or incompetent” and its banking system as an “opaque, secretive, complex mechanism” which allows money laundering and tax evasion via its private banking mechanisms. If foreign media portray such a picture for a nation, its economy, its public sector apparatus and its banking system, then its government, and the monetary authorities, must realize that the long term goal of this black propaganda campaign is the economic isolation of the state. The political ramifications of such acts are obvious since if the economic status of the state is undermined in the international trade, in the international financial markets and in the investment community sooner or later economic sanctions will occur. According to Transparency International the majority of states in Asia, Africa, South-Europe, and Latin America are corrupted. This accusation and assessment includes almost 80% of global population.86 It includes states with totally different regimes (democracies, dictatorships, monarchies etc.) and cultures (Christian, Muslim, Hindu, Buddhist etc.). To what extent these assessments reflect reality is open to debate. However it allows foreign aid to be provided under specific reasons, circumstances, cases and under specific terms. In addition various banking scandals can be magnified and eventually trap a whole banking system instead of just one bank. To illustrate over the years various Asian banking systems have been accused for making loans with non economic criteria and based on family ties and other banking systems have been accused on promoting money laundering. Although these allegations can be partially true there is always the risk that they may conceal an economic warfare element strategy. In Global Ethics Summit in 2010 in New York the US for the first time that global corruption is a national security issue. In recent years the US Department of Justice has endorsed various measures (such as the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act etc.) and had allowed the US legal system to prosecute subsidiaries of foreign multinationals in other states outside the US. There is no doubt that drug cartels, prostitution and human trafficking, illicit arms trade exist but a dichotomy has to be imposed between various Mafia groups and the portrait of whole nations and their governments, political systems and civil service as corrupt. Accusations of the second type can easily become reciprocal and eventually destabilize the international economy, international trade and investment flows for totally legitimate purposes. Economic history demonstrates that integration can be a positive win-win situation.

86

See data on http://www.transparency.org.

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CONCLUSION The intellectual aspiration of the current paper has been to analyse economic warfare, its tools and its nexus to national security. We have pointed out that economic warfare can undermine the security of one country in the era of peace many years before the war erupts. We have also pointed out that it can take various forms during this peaceful era (industrial espionage, cyber-warfare, bank crisis, creation of social crisis and instability, devaluation of currency, stock-market collapse, capital controls, corruption accusations, increased debt etc.). In the era of war economic warfare can take more open forms (trade embargo and naval blockade, submarine warfare against enemy’s commercial ships, bombing of enemy’s economic infrastructure, inflation triggering by printing counterfeit money etc.). We have also provided various case studies across history, which buttress our results. It goes without saying that additional analysis is required but we assume that the current essay will trigger debate on the issue.

REFERENCES The following extensive list refers to works cited and consulted for the current essay.

Official Publications Dyer, G. C., “Naval Logistics,” US Naval Institute, 1960. European Commission: “Report on the economic and monetary union in the European Community,” 1990. Morrison, Wayne M. & Labonte, Marc, “China’s holdings of US Securities: Implications for the US economy,” Congressional Research Paper 19-08-2013. Rhodes, Chris, “Manufacturing: International Comparisons,” House of Commons British Parliament serial number 05809, 18-8-2016. “What Britain has Done 1939-1945,” British Ministry of Information, first edition in 1945, second edition Atlantic Books, London, 2007 (with an introduction by R. Overy). In addition the following official publications have been used: Boemeke, Manfred F., Chickering, Roger, and Förster, Stig, (eds.) (1999): “Anticipating Total War. The German and American Experiences 1871-1914,” Cambridge University Press and the German Historical Institute.

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Chickering, R., & Förster, Stig, (eds.) (2003): “The Shadows of Total War Europe, East Asia and the United States 1919-1939,” Cambridge University Press and the German Historical Institute. Chickering, Roger, Förster, Stig, and Greiner, Bernd, (eds.) (2005): “A World at Total War Global Conflict and the Politics of Destruction 1937-1945” Cambridge University Press and the German Historical Institute. Chickering, Roger, & Förster, Stig, (eds.) (2000): “Great War, Total War. Combat and Mobilization on the Western Front,” Cambridge University Press and the German Historical Institute.

References in English Archer, C., Ferris, J. R., Herwig, H., and Travers, T. H. E., “Cassel’s World History of Warfare,” Cassell, London, 2003. Arreguίn-Toft, Ivan, “How the Weak Win Wars. A Theory of Assymetric Conflict,” Cambridge University Press 2005. Barkin, K. D., “The Controversy of German industrialization, 1890-1902,” University of Chicago Press, 1970. Betrand, J. L., and Justeau, S., “Typology of Oil Shocks: Why 2004 is Different,” Global Business & Economics Anthology, 2006, Vol. II, pages 425-435. Black, E., “IBM and the Holocaust,” Little Brown, 2001. Boyne, Walter J., “Beyond the wild blue: A history of the United States Air-Force 19472007,” St. Martins Press, 2007. Branson, William H., Giersch, Herbert, and Peterson, Peter G., “Trends in United States international trade and investment since World War II,” in the volume: Martin Feldstein (ed.): “The American Economy in Transition,” University of Chicago Press, 1980, pages 183-274. Brauer, J., and Van Tuyll, H., “Castles, Battles & Bombs How Economics Explains Military History,” University of Chicago Press, 2008. Broadberry, St., and Harrison, M., (eds.): “The Economics of World War I,” Cambridge University Press, 2005. Brose, E. D., “The Kaiser’s Army,” Oxford University Press, 2001. Brown, M. E., Cote, Jr. O. R., Lynn-Jones, S. M., Miller, S. E., (eds.): “Theories of War and Peace,” MIT Press, London, 2001. Bruner, Robert F., Carr, Sean D., “The Panic of 1907: Lessons Learned from the Market’s Perfect Storm,” John Wiley & Sons, New Jersey, 2007 Carswell, John, “The South Sea Bubble,” London, Cresset Press, 1960. Catton, Bruce, “American Civil War,” Volume 3, Phoenix Press, 2001.

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Cawood, Ian, and McKinnon-Bell, D., “The First World War,” Routledge 2001. Chandler, Jr. A. D., “Scale and Scope The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism,” Harvard University Press, 1990. Chickering, R., “Imperial Germany and the Great War 1914-1918” Cambridge, 1998. Chickering, R., “Total War. The Use and abuse of a concept,” in the volume: M. Boemeke (et al.) (eds.): “Anticipating Total War. The German and American experiences 18711914,” Cambridge, 1999, pp: 13-28. Clarck, M., “Modern Italy,” Longman, 1996. Copeland, Dale C., “The Origins of Major War,” Cornell University Press, 2000. Davidson, Ian, and Weil, Gordon, “The Gold War. The secret battle for financial and political domination from 1945 onwards,” Secker & Warburg, London, 1970. Dunnigan, J. F., “How to Make War,” William Morrow and Company, New York, 1993. Ellis, John, “The World War II Databook,” Aurum Press, 1995. Engle, S. D., “The American Civil War,” Osprey, 2001. Ericson, III, Edward E., “Feeding the German Eagle. Soviet Economic Aid to Nazi Germany 1933-1941,” Praeger, London 1999. Evans, D., and Jenkins, J., “Years of Weimar & the Third Reich,” Hodder & Stoughton, 1999. Fear, J., “German Capitalism,” in the volume: Th. K. McCraw (ed.): “Creating Modern Capitalism,” Harvard University Press, 1997, pages: 135-184. Feldman, Gerald D., “The Great Disorder. Politics, Economics and Society in the German Inflation 1914-1924,” Oxford University Press, 1997. Ferguson, Niall, “The Ascent of Money A Financial History of the World,” Allen Lane, 2008. Ferguson, Niall, “The Cash Nexus Money and Power in the Modern World 1700-2000,” Penguin, 2002. Ferguson, Niall, “The Pity of War,” Penguin books, 1998. Ferguson, Niall, “The War of the world,” Allen-Lane, 2006. Freeman, Kevin, “Secret Weapon. How Economic Terrorism brought down the US Stock Market and why it can happen again,” Regnery Publishing, 2012, Washington DC. Garber, Peter, “Tulipmania,” Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 97 (3), 1989, pages: 535560. Garratt, Collin, “The History of Trains,” Chancellor Press, London, 2004. Gilbert, Martin, “The Routledge Atlas of the First World War,” Routledge, second edition, London, 1994. Grebler, Leo, and Winkler, Wilhelm, “The Cost of the World War to Germany and AustriaHungary,” Yale University Press, 1940. Green, Timothy, “The new world of gold. The inside story of the mines, the markets, the politics, the investors,” Walker and Company, New York, 1981.

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Halperin, S., “War and Social Change in modern Europe,” Cambridge University Press 2004. Hardach, K., “The Political Economy of Germany in the Twentieth Century,” University of California, 1980. Harrison, M., (ed.): “The Economics of World War II,” Cambridge University Press, 1998. Harvey, Α. D., “Collision of Empires Britain in Three World Wars,” Phoenix, 19941. Henderson, W. O., “The Rise of German Industrial Power 1834-1914,” Temple Smith, London, 1975. Herwig, H., “The First World War Germany and Austria-Hungary 1914-1918,” Arnold, 1997, London. Heuser, B., “The Evolution of Strategy Thinking War from Antiquity to the Present,” Cambridge University Press, 2010. Hufbauer, Gary Clyde, Schott, Jeffrey J., Elliott, Kimberley Ann, and Cosic, Milica, “US vs. Cuba,” Case Studies in Economic Sanctions and Terrorism, Case 60-3, Peterson Institute for International Economics, October 2011. Hughes, Jonathan, and Cain, Louis P., “American Economic History,” Addison-Wesley, 1998. Jager, H. “German Artillery of World War One,” Crowood Press, 2001. James, Lawrence, “The Rise and Fall of the British Empire,” Abacus, 1998. Jian, Chen, “China’s involvement in the Vietnam War 1964-1969,” The China Quarterly, No. 142, June 1995, pp: 356-387. John, Moen, and Ellis, Tallman, “The Bank Panic of 1907: The Role of Trust Companies,” The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 52 (No.3), 1992, pp. 611-630. Johnson, Rob, Whitby, M., and France, J., “How to Win on the Battlefield,” Thames & Hudson, London, 2010. Katcher, Philip, “ALMANAC The American Civil War,” Brassey’s 2003. Kennedy, Paul, “The Rise and fall of Great Powers,” Fontana Press, 1989. Kindleberger, Charles P., “Manias, Panics and Crashes A History of Financial Crises,” John Wiley 2005. Kissinger, H., “Diplomacy,” Simon & Schuster, 1994. Leitz, C., “Economic Relations between Nazi Germany and Franco’s Spain 1936-1945,” Clarendon Press, 1996. Levy, J. S., “War in the Modern Great Power System, 1495-1975,” University Press of Kentucky, 1983. Lynn, J. A., (ed.): “Feeding Mars Logistics in Western Warfare from the Middle Ages to the Present,” Westview Press, 1993. Martell, W. C. “Victory in War Foundations of modern military policy,” Cambridge 2007. Mawdsley, Evan, “Thunder in the East. The Nazi-Soviet War 1941-1945,” Hodder Arnold, London, 2005.

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Melvin, Frank Edgar, “Napoleon’s Navigation System. A study of trade control during the Continental Blockade,” University of Pennsylvania, Ph.D. Thesis 1919. Mosier, John, “The Blitzkrieg Myth. How Hitler and the Allies misread the strategic realities of World War II,” Harper Collins, 2003. Mundell, Robert A., “Theory of Optimal Currency Areas,” American Economic Review, 51, 1961, p. 657-665. Neal, Larry, and Weidenmier, Marc, “Crises in the Global Economy from Tulips to Today,” in the volume: Michael D. Bordo & Alan M. Taylor & Jeffrey G. Williamson (eds.): “Globalization in Historical Perspective,” University of Chicago, 2005, pp. 473-514, Overy, R., “The Penguin Historical Atlas of the Third Reich,” 1996. Pincus, Oskar, “The war aims and strategies of Adolf Hitler,” McFarland & Company, 2005. Pool, J., “Hitler and his secret partners,” Pocket books 1997. Porter, M., “The Competitive Advantage of Nations,” 1990. Randolph, Stephen P., “Powerful and Brutal Weapons,” Harvard University Press, 2007. Ranki, G., “The Economics of the Second World War,” Böhlau Verlag, Vienna, 1993. Rickards, James, “Currency wars. The making of the next global crisis,” PortfolioPenguin, 2011. Rotberg, R., and Rabb, Th. K., (eds.): “The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars,” Cambridge University Press, 1998. Speer, A., “Inside the Third Reich,” Phoenix, 2002, seventh edition. Stolper, Gustav, “The German Economy: 1870 to the Present,” Harcourt & World Inc. New York, 1967. Stone, N., “The Eastern Front 1914-1917,” Penguin, London, 1998. Strachan, Hew, “The First World War,” Vol. I To Arms, Oxford University Press, 2001. Thompson, J., “Lifeblood of War Logistics in armed conflict,” Brassey’s 1998. Tucker, S. C., “The Great War 1914-1918,” UCL Press, 1998. Van Creveld, M., “Supplying War Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton,” Cambridge University Press, 2004. Watson, P., “The German Genious,” Simon & Schuster 2010. Winter, J. M., “The Experience of World War I,” Greenwich editions, 2003. Winter, M., (ed.): “War and Economic Development,” Cambridge University Press, 1975. Zhang, Xiaoming, “The Vietnam War (1964-1969): A Chinese Perspective,” Journal of Military History, Vol. 60, No.4 (Oct. 1996), pp: 731-762, Ziegler, Philip, “The Sixth Great Power. Barings 1762-1929,” Collins, London, 1988.

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German and French References Aereboe, Friedrich, “Der Einfluss des Krieges auf die landwirtschaftliche Produktion in Deutschland” [“The influence of the war on agricultural production in Germany”] Stuttgart, Berlin: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1927. Eichholtz, Dietrich, “Geschichte der deutschen Kriegswirtschat 1939-1945” [“History of the German war economy 1939-1945”], Band II, Teil I, K.G. Saur Verlag, Munich, 2003. Plihon, D., “Le nouveau capitalisme” [“The new capitalism”], La Decouverte, 2003.

Greek References (Greek Writers and Foreign Writers Translated into Greek) Dimoulis, D., and Giannouli, Chr., “The Dialectics of War,” Athens, Kritiki Publications, 1995. Galbraith, J. K., “The Great Wall Street Crash,” in the volume Parnell: “History of the 20th century,” Greek edition, Gold Press, Athens, 1974, Vol. 3, pp. 1,260-1,265. Kondilis, Panayotis, “Theory of War,” Themelio editions, Athens, 1997. Kremmidas, V., “Introduction to the Economic History of Europe,” Gnosi editions, Athens, 1989. Ludendorff, E., “Total War,” Greek edition, Athens, 1938. Mearsheimer, John J., “The tragedy of the politics of the Great Powers” Poiotita publications, (Greek edition), Athens 2007. Roberts, J. M., “The New Era: America during the 1920-1930 decade,” in the volume Parnell: “History of the 20th century,” Greek edition, Gold Press, Αthens 1974, Vol. 3, pages 1,137-1,142 and especially pages 1,137 and 1,139. Salavrakos, I. D., “Economy and Total War,” Vol. I The case of World War I, Athens, Scientific Library, Kritiki publications 2007. Salavrakos, I. D., “Economy and Total War,” Vol. II The case of World War II, Athens, Scientific Library, Kritiki publications 2008. Will and Durant, Ariel, “The Story of Civilization The Age of Voltaire,” Greek edition Spyropouloi & Koumandareas, Athens, 1966.

Internet Sources http:/www.archive.org http://www.coindesk.com http://www.independent

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In: Cyber-Security and Information Warfare Editor: Nicholas J. Daras

ISBN: 978-1-53614-385-0 © 2019 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

Chapter 19

ETHICS IN CYBERSPACE: CYBER-SECURITY Stamatia Sofiou*, PhD Hellenic Military Academy, Attiki, Greece

“In civilized life, the law floats in a sea of ethics.” (Earl Warren, Chief of Justice of the US Supreme Court)

ABSTRACT The ethical approach to cyber space examines ethical dilemmas, the result of divergent conduct that disturbs the system of a responsible administration, while restoring fundamental democratic principles that govern a well-governed state: freedom, prosperity and happiness. Internationally, cyber war has taken huge dimensions as cyber attacks increase every day with regard to complexity. It constitutes a great challenge regarding stability, prosperity and security in a region. Today, no one is wondering whether there is going to be an attack but when there is going to be an attack. To face “asymmetrical threats,” we *

Corresponding Author Email: [email protected].

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Stamatia Sofiou need the active, ethical cooperation of all factors whose common interest is the regular function of cyberspace. Powerful governments need to assume responsibility with regard to their actions as they are responsible for the protection of their citizens: “Prosperity in a country depends on the security of its cyberspace” (Barack H. Obama, 29 May 2009). Cyberspace is the new expanded environment of the collective Nous. It is created by the Internet and telecommunication networks. The new digital environment or the new “Far West” of the post-industrial era of the 21st century demands the abolition of physical boundaries. It constitutes a field of technological achievements, aiming to influence human thought and redefine human relations, while defining “the site of human engagement with each other and self-creation” (Jones, 2003:69). Technology itself is neutral: it is neither good nor bad. The benign or malign circulation of information lends it a positive or negative character in the interactive function of cyberspace and its progressive evolution. According to Aristotle in Nicomachean Ethics, “in republics governed by law and social values there is no demagogue.” Ethics in cyberspace balances between uneducated progress and threat. The safe use of cyberspace demands a qualitative, not a quantitative regulation. As Socrates said 2500 years ago, “self-control” is the constant component of ethical conduct. What is more, according to Professor A. Merezhko, self-regulation preserves the anthropocentric character of the technological “common inheritance of the human species.” Contemporary forms of attacks are reconsidering defense and security issues on a national and international level while they are setting masterminds thinking about the best ways to face their catastrophic consequences. Cyber war, in this dynamically evolving environment, comprises one of the most serious threats because it aims to destabilize society by striking the crucial sectors of a country’s infrastructure. This announcement attempts to link ethics to cyberspace, common ground of action and reaction of man and technology, with regard to the issue of security when taking into consideration “quiet, asymmetrical threats,” namely electronic crime, cyber attacks and cyber war – all principles of jus ad bellum and jus in bello.

Keywords: cyberspace, ethics, philosophical concepts, asymmetrical threats, Jus Bellum Iustum, cyber warfare, cyber security

1. INTRODUCTION Cyberspace is the means of communication and information in the post-industrial era of the 21st century. This new ecological environment of the collective Nous knows neither geographical nor time restrictions. It advocates total liberty and independence and it is “an act of nature, growing within the collective activity of its users” (John P. Barlow, “A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace,” Davos, 9 February 1996). However, some users aim to harm cyberspace by attacking and destroying its smooth cooperative and evolutionary function. This paper will present how such a catastrophe can be foreseen or avoided. Before this, it will deal with cyberspace and ethics by distinguishing between morality and ethics and underlining the difference between ethics and law in order to draw a line between man’s arbitrary attitude and “correct” behaviour in cyberspace.

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The paper will also study “silent asymmetric threats,” which disturb safe communication in the digital world and in the natural environment and it will conclude with cyber-security which is the corner stone of engineering and technological “common inheritance of the human understanding” (O. Merezhko, Professor of International Law, Ukraine).

2. PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPTS 2.1. Morality versus Ethics It is important to distinguish between “morality” and “ethics” as they are different concepts, distinct philosophical branches, though they are both present in the same social frame. Morality is a system of compulsory rules, influencing man’s appropriate conduct and leading to his conquest of the “supreme good.” For Aristotle, morality is “bliss” though for Epicurus, morality is the “absence of pain.” The Stoics equate morality with “apathy” and the Christian Church claims that it is as the conquest of paradise.

The golden code of morality is summarised as follows: “Do unto others as you would have them do unto you.” In other words, morality has to do with the religious, philosophical and civil values which govern society; it has to do with man’s social behaviour while ethics has to do with man’s personal behaviour. According to the French philosopher Paul Ricœur, “morality” has to do with obligation, while ethics has to do with the sense of “good.” As morality has to do with man’s behaviour/upbringing and choice, it is the sum of non-forced rules, addressing man’s inner world and obliging him to conform to a certain type of behaviour with regard to his fellow men. Morality answers dilemmas like what is right and what is wrong, or what is good and what is evil, balancing between illiteracy, progress or threat. Socrates preached that “the

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type of life that is not tested fits no man.” In other words, knowledge is required to generate some kind of ethical activity realised consciously through man’s free will and responsibility since according to the Argentine psychoanalyst Horatio Etchegoyen “most human actions are characterised by ethics” (1991). The conventional theories of ethics are usually divided into deontological and utilitarian. The deontological theory is defined as follows: the ethical option is a personal thing. On the other hand, the utilitarianism approach controls the utility of the ethical choice. The weak point in both conventional theories is man. Personal ethics is not the ethics of a society and man cannot foresee the consequences of his options. According to Winkler and Coombs, authors of Applied Ethics: A Reader (1993), the dialectic/inductive approach is derived from the comparative analysis of previous cases as ethics is considered to be an “evolutionary social tool.” The German philosopher Jürgen Haberbas believes that ethical values can be valid only if they have the general acceptance of society. He sees ethical choice as “potential ethics” because circumstances are affected by time and place. Ethical behaviour induces activity or it is “the field of the human involvement with the Other and the self-creation (Jones, 2003: 69); it also induces discipline; dilemmas/choice; and it is responsible for the viability of society, the security of prosperity and happiness. Ethics is a process of circumspection, quest and research and gives no clear answer to man’s questions. On the other hand, it defines and characterises man’s course of actions. Alexander III of Macedonia is called Great not only because he was one of the most important generals and rulers of the world but also because his choices, when ruling his vast empire, shaped history.

2.2. Ethics versus Law Ethics is different from law as Ethics is ruled by free will and ethical data; it leads to man’s self-regularity and contributes to globalisation though it does not punish. On the other hand, law controls, regulates and punishes; law is based on facts; it is applied independently of personal esteem and it is restricted by the rules of the land.

2.3. Ethics and Cyberspace The word cyberspace is a compound word: it comes from the Greek word ‘cyber’ which means ‘κυβερνήτης’and the 13th century French word espace (which comes from the Latin word spatium), meaning space or distance. It is an anti-loan of the English phrase ‘cybernetic space’ coined by the Canadian science-fiction writer W. Gibson in 1989. The

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active or passive use of the verb “cyber” activates all the potentially changeable functions of cyberspace.

Cyberspace is the global domain inside the informational environment, consisting of a web of interdependent and interconnected structures of computerised technology. It is a domain built by man, unlike the other four domains, i.e., land, air, sea and space, and a domain of strong activity. It is the essence of globalisation. This new “global village” is characterised by specific phenomena such as the abolition of all borders, the bypassing of the human body, the expansion of the sense of space and place and the rise of computerisation as the “moving force of the new era” (Constantellos, 2007:48). This virtual world consists of a “metaphysical laboratory and a tool research of this perception itself that we have about the reality” (Hein, 1993: 82).

3. CONTEMPORARY ASYMMETRIC THREATS Contemporary asymmetric threats are threats that undermine “the efforts of an opponent - the exploitation of his weaknesses through the implementation of methods which differ considerably from the adversary’s usual methods of conducting operations” (Hellenic Ministry of Defence, “Asymmetric threats” ). Cyber-attacks are contemporary asymmetric threats with unexpected consequences: they disturb the smooth function of man’s natural environment as they attack his freedom and safety, the result being economic, political, social, cultural and even psychological effects.

3.1. The Just War Theory The Just War Theory (Jus bellum iustum) is a doctrine referred to as a tradition, of

military ethics studied by theologians, ethicists, policy makers and military leaders. The purpose of the doctrine is to ensure war is morally justifiable through a series of criteria, all of which must be met for a war to be considered just. The criteria are split into two

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groups: the right to go to war (Jus ad bellum) and the right conduct in war (Jus in bello). The first concerns the morality of going to war and the second has to do with moral conduct within war.

Both Aristotle and Cicero’s views, regarding war in our world, coincide with the view of the Christian Church, emphasizing that man’s freedom and safety are of at most importance and we all need to fight for them. An important question here is when is an attack (conventional or governmental) to be considered an act of war (casus belli) or the right to go to war (jus ad bellum)? A series of questions based on the criteria of the Just War Theory reveal the moral concerns involved in a cyber attack.    

In the frame of self-defence, when can a country react to cyber-warfare to prevent an attack? Can a country react via retaliation? What are the codes of involvement (jus in bello)? How can the principles of discrimination and proportionality be applied?

Regarding the last criterion, the principle of discrimination excludes the involvement of “civilians.” In case of a massive attack, discrimination requires the protection of the common user and his personal data. As for the principle of proportionality, it refers to the collateral damage relating to the importance of the accomplishment of the operational target.

3.2. Cyber-Warfare “Each era has its own kind of war with its own restrictive terms and its own peculiar prejudices” the Prussian General Carl von Clausewitzwritesin his well-known book On

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War, 1832. In our era, cyber war targets the infrastructure of our society and threatens our national and universal security. It is a kind of war with a particular geopolitical identity and geostrategic functions. It is a war of words, a menace to our businesses, conducted in the shadows and thus code-named “silent war.”

What is more, cyber war is used as a powerful means to enforce a country’s policy on another country, i.e., North Korea’s efforts to make its dictatorial policy accepted by the West; it is “an act of violence with the purpose of enforcing one’s will on one’s enemy” (Clausewitz). Unlike conventional war, cyber war is the attractive, “clean,” inexpensive and alternative choice. And as such, it has grown enormously everywhere in the universe as cyber-attacks have increased and acquired gigantic proportions. Countries try hard to think of strategies that will help them defend their existence in case of a cyber war. Today nobody wonders if there is going to be an attack but when there is going to be an attack.

3.2.1. Particular Characteristics Cyber-warfare is a universal threat regarding the contemporary and evolutionary environment of the collective Nous as we can see when we consider its particular characteristics.

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332        

It has neither beginning nor end; It has no home, it can take place everywhere; It is “undeclared” - no country has ever accepted the responsibility of a cyberattack; It is asymmetric because it is characterized by invisible attacks and unofficial policies; It aims to devastate the whole structure of the electronic government; It threatens to destroy human factor and its potentials; It is relatively inexpensive; It can cause immense financial losses as the fog of war is unpredictable.

3.2.2. Targets of Cyber Warfare Cyber-warfare aims to achieve the following three things: attack the confidentiality of data, i.e., ensure that data is accessible only to the authorised user of the system; undermine the integrity of data, i.e., prevent precision, exactness and truth by manipulating it, claiming that any change in the enemy’s data must be the result of authorised action; strike the availability of the resources of an automatic system of information, so as to make it instantly accessible to every authorised user. The above reveal the necessity to shape the deontological behaviour of the active participants – visible or invisible. Users have to remember the old saying: “character is what you do when nobody looks”; they also need not to forget that “for every action, there is an equal and opposite reaction.” (Newton’s Third Law).

4. CYBER-SECURITY

Cyber-security concerns the unhindered operation of the informative and communicational structure of cyberspace and its protection against technological failure or malignant use. It covers the defensive and aggressive use of web systems of information related to every human activity in the natural world.

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In an era of fast change, modern societies face new unknown and unpredictable threats which demand credible and effective answers. Freedom and safety are the two means, the two values, which are totally related to each other; they are both intertwined with the state of justice. The sense of security here has a slippery dimension as threats do not come from one side but from various sides; they are of various dimensions too. Security in cyberspace is a necessity and a common responsibility as “the welfare of a country depends on cybersecurity,” as US President Barack H. Obama said during a speech he delivered in the White House on May 29, 2009. Today security strategy can be neither static nor passive: for the sake of global security, a confrontation strategy must be adopted, regarding provocations, and a commitment must be made by all the countries around the world. The global community, but primarily countries with a developed digital technology, recognising the importance of the security of cyberspace for the promotion of their interests and the existent threats against their national security and welfare, must work on codes of conduct regarding cyberspace, having understood how important a strategic plan is – a plan that will secure the safe flow of information; it’s safe storage that will enable us to face cyber-attacks successfully. The aim of all countries should be the natural protection of cyberspace and its survival, its armour defence via the development of multisided and multileveled international co-operations and co-working.

In the frame of global ethics, the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development has introduced a special committee managing the Policy of Information, Informatics and Communication (PIIC). The agreement between the European Congress and the European Union governments underlines the intense anxiety concerning cybersecurity and cyber-attacks which can lead to a violation of data. Andrus Ansip, the European commissioner of digital strategy, has stated that the new rules (codes) will enforce the trust of consumers regarding the various website services particularly across boundaries. Predictions for 2016 reveal intense activity in the section of cyber-security because of the rise of “asymmetric threats.”

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CONCLUSION Dynamic evolution in our global environment cannot be taken for granted. In this environment, the means of “security” and “insecurity” can confuse us because of the complicated dangers involved in asymmetric threats. Rulers and/or governments should respond to the general demand for safety. In order to make this modern dynamic environment functional, we need a commitment that will enable us to achieve stability; we also need viable solutions and some kind of legislation based on the principles and values of democracy and the protection of human rights. It is of absolute necessity to adopt strong strategies in order to face, anticipate and manage this type of crisis while bearing in mind that “we owe respect to the ideals and principles which define the policy and civilisation of all the contemporary democratic societies” (Angelopoulos, 2015, http://www.elesme.gr/elesmegr/periodika/t19/t19_ 03.htm.).

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The study of ethics in cyberspace does not only cover the sphere of philosophy but fields like education, scientific research and the identity of cyberspace itself. The question here is this: do we want a cyberspace with potential reality, with human trace? A civilisation of Nous based on man’s happiness and welfare? Or do we want a human society which has surrendered its management to the immaterial and lifeless products of the digital world? The choice is ours.

REFERENCES [1]

[2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]

[9]

Angelopoulos, Hellenic Police First LieutenantD. P., Cyberspace – International Actions in the Greek Being, 2015; http://www.elesme.gr/elesmegr/periodika/t19/ t19_03.htm. Clausewitz, Car Philip Gottfried von, On War, trans. N. Ksepoulia. Thessaloniki: Vanias Editions, 1999. Constantellos, Lieutenant Commander A., “Cyber Security Operations: The World Wide Web as a Theatre of Operations,” Joint Review, July-October 2007, 48-51. Gibson, W., Neuromancer. New York: Ace Books, 1984. Habermas, J., Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993. Hein, M., The Metaphysics of Virtual Reality. New York: OUP, 1993. Hellenic Ministry of Defence, “Asymmetric threats”. Jones, D., “The Origins of the Global City: ethics and morality in contemporary cosmopolitanism,” British Journal of Politics and International Relations 5, pp. 5073, 2003. Winkler, E. R. and J. R. Coombs, authors of Applied Ethics: A Reader, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1993.

In: Cyber-Security and Information Warfare Editor: Nicholas J. Daras

ISBN: 978-1-53614-385-0 c 2019 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

Chapter 20

B IVARIATE C OPULAS -BASED M ODELS FOR C OMMUNICATION N ETWORKS Ioannis S. Triantafyllou∗ Department of Computer Science and Biomedical Informatics, University of Thessaly, Thessaly, Greece

Abstract Copulas are functions that join or couple multivariate distributions to their onedimensional marginal distribution functions. In words, copulas are multivariate distributions whose margins are uniform on the interval (0,1). In the present article, we restrict our attention to bivariate copulas and more precisely we discuss the AliMikhail-Haq bivariate model. The special case of the aforementioned model with logistic margins is studied in detail and closed formulas for its basic characteristics are derived. In addition, reliability properties for systems with two exchangeable logistic components are established.

Keywords: bivariate copulas functions, Ali-Mikhail-Haq model, failure rate, Mean Residual Lifetime, parallel and series system AMS Subject Classification: 62E15, 62N05, 62H10, 60E05

1.

Introduction

The study of copulas and their applications in the field of Probability and Statistics has attracted a lot of research interest in the last two decades. Hutchinson and Lai [1] were among the early authors who popularized the notion of copulas. Furthermore, Nelsen [2] studied in detail the bivariate copulas, while Cherubini, Luciano and Vecchiato [3] illustrated interesting applications of copulas in the field of Insurance and Finance. Copulas are functions that join or couple multivariate distributions to their onedimensional marginal distribution functions. Alternatively, copulas are multivariate distributions whose one-dimensional margins are uniform on the interval (0,1). Copulas offer ∗

Corresponding Author Email: [email protected].

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also a way to produce scale-free measures of dependence or construct families of bivariate distributions. For more details about the development and study of copulas-based distribution models, the interested reader is referred to the excellent monographs of Nelsen [2] or Balakrishnan and Lai [4]. In the present article, we study the bivariate Ali-Mikhail-Haq distribution model. The copula function of the model is presented, while some results for the case of logistic margins are discussed. In Section 3, exact formulae are derived for the basic characteristics of the model, such as the joint cumulative density function or the bivariate survival odds ratio, when θ = 1. In Section 4, the general results presented previously in this paper are exploited in order to reach conclusions referring to lifetime of communication networks.

2.

The Ali-Mikhail-Haq Copula

Generally speaking, let X, Y be two random variables with corresponding cumulative distribution functions F (x) = P (X 6 x) and G(y) = P (Y 6 y), while H(x, y) = P (X 6 x, Y 6 y) denotes their joint distribution function. Each pair (x,y) of real numbers leads to a point (F(x),G(y)) in the unit square and this ordered in turn corresponds to a number H(x,y) ∈ [0,1]. This correspondence, which assigns the value of joint distribution function to each ordered pair of values of the individual distribution functions, is indeed the function called copula. In terms of random variables, let H be a joint distribution with margins F, G. Then, there exists a copula C such that for all values (x,y) H(x, y) = C(F (x), G(y)).

(1)

It is worth mentioning that in case of continuous margins F, G, the copula C is unique. Let us now restrict our attention to the Ali-Mikhail-Haq distribution model. For u, v ∈ (0,1) and a design parameter θ ∈ [-1,1], the Ali-Mikhail-Haq copula is defined as follows Cθ (u, v) =

uv . 1 − θ(1 − u)(1 − v)

(2)

Note that the Ali-Mikhail-Haq model can be equivalently expressed as Cθ (u, v) = uv

∞ X

(θ(1 − u)(1 − v))k .

k=0

This class of distributions was first introduced by Ali, Mikhail and Haq [5] and since then it has attracted some research attention (see, e.g., Genest and MacKay [6] or Mikhail et al. [7]). The following proposition offers some general results for the aforementioned copula. Proposition 1. (i) The Ali-Mikhail-Haq copula function (defined in (2)) is positively ordered. (ii) If Ca , Cb are two members of the Ali-Mikhail-Haq distribution family (defined in

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(2)), then the harmonic mean of Ca , Cb belongs also to the Ali-Mikhail-Haq copulas. Proof. (i) A parametric family {Cθ } of copulas is said to be positively ordered if Ca ≺ Cb whenever a ≤ b. For the distribution model defined in (2), the following ensues 1 − b(1 − u)(1 − v) Ca = ≤ 1, Cb 1 − a(1 − u)(1 − v) where −1 ≤ a ≤ b ≤ 1 and u, v ∈ (0,1). Therefore, the desired result is straightforward. (ii) Let Ca , Cb denote two copulas that belong to the Ali-Mikhail-Haq family defined in (2). Therefore, we have uv uv Ca (u, v) = , Cb (u, v) = , 1 − a(1 − u)(1 − v) 1 − b(1 − u)(1 − v) The harmonic mean of Ca , Cb can be expressed as 2 2Ca Cb 2uv = = = C(a+b)/2 . 1/Ca + 1/Cb Ca + Cb 2 − (a + b)(1 − u)(1 − v) It goes without saying that the harmonic mean is a Ali-Mikhail-Haq copula function with parameter θ = (a + b)/2.

3.

The Ali-Mikhail-Haq Model with Logistic Margins

Let us denote by T1 , T2 two random variables with corresponding copula function that belongs to the Ali-Mikhail-Haq family (defined in (2)). Let us next assume that the marginal distributions F , G are logistic, namely
−1
−1 F (t1 ) = 1 + e−t1 , G(t2 ) = 1 + e−t2 . (3) The joint cumulative distribution function of T1 , T2 is given as Hθ (t1 , t2 ) = (1 + e−t1 + e−t2 + (1 − θ)e−t1 −t2 )−1 .

(4)

It is of some research interest to shed light on the special case θ = 1. In this case, the general model reduces to the well-known Gumbel bivariate logistic distribution (see Gumbel [8]). Indeed, the joint distribution function takes now the following form H(t1 , t2 ) =

1 1+

e−t1

+ e−t2

.

Note that may one apply equation (2) and replace u, v with the logistic margins F, G the following result comes true C1 (F (t1 ), G(t2)) = H(t1 , t2 ). The last equation verifies the well-known Sklar’s Theorem for the bivariate distribution mentioned above. (Sklar [9]). The notion of odds for survival for a random variable X, namely the ratio P (X ≥ x)/P (X ≤ x) is of some importance, especially when the random variable

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expresses the lifetime of a component. Analogously, the bivariate survival odds ratio of two random variables X, Y is defined as P (X ≥ x or Y ≥ y)/P (X ≤ x, Y ≤ y). The following remark offers some expressions for the bivariate survival odds ratio of T1 , T2 defined earlier. Remark 1. If T1 , T2 denote two random variables with bivariate Gumbel logistic distribution (defined in (4)), then the bivariate survival odds ratio of T1 , T2 is given as P (T1 ≥ t1 or T2 ≥ t2 ) = e−t1 + e−t2 P (T1 ≤ t1 , T2 ≤ t2 ) P (T1 ≥ t1 ) P (T2 ≥ t2 ) P (T1 ≥ t1 or T2 ≥ t2 ) (ii) = + P (T1 ≤ t1 , T2 ≤ t2 ) P (T1 ≤ t1 ) P (T2 ≤ t2 ) (i)

Proof. (i) Since the following holds true P (T1 ≥ t1 or T2 ≥ t2 ) 1 − H(t1 , t2 ) = P (T1 ≤ t1 , T2 ≤ t2 ) H(t1 , t2 ) the desired result is deduced by employing equation (4). (ii) The result we are chasing for, is straightforward by recalling that the univariate survival odds ratio for each of the random variables T1 , T2 takes on the following form P (Ti ≥ ti ) Ri (ti ) = = e−ti , i = 1, 2, P (Ti ≤ ti ) 1 − Ri(ti ) where Ri (ti ) = e−ti /(1 + e−ti ) denotes the survival function of Ti , i = 1, 2. The following proposition offers an expression for the conditional survival function of T1 given T2 = t2 . Proposition 2. If T1 , T2 denote two random variables with bivariate Gumbel logistic distribution (defined in (4)), then the conditional survival function of T1 given T2 = t2 satisfies the following P (T1 > t1 | T2 = t2 ) =

e2t2 + 2et1 +t2 (1 + et2 ) . (et1 + et2 + et1 +t2 )2

Proof. The conditional survival function of T1 given T2 = t2 is defined as Z ∞ P (T1 > t1 | T2 = t2 ) = f (u | t2 )du.

(5)

(6)

t1

Note that f (u | t2 ) denotes the conditional probability density function of T1 given T2 = t2 and can be expressed via f (u | t2 ) =

f (u, t2 ) , fT2 (t2 )

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where f (u, t2 ) is the joint probability density function of T1 , T2 while fT2 (t2 ) is the probability density function of T2 . Since f (u, t2 ) =

2e−u−t2 (1 + e−u + e−t2 )3

and e−t2 , (1 + e−t2 )2

fT2 (t2 ) =

the integral appeared in (6), takes on the following form P (T1 > t1 | T2 = t2 ) =

R ∞ 2e−u (1 + e−t2 )2 t1 (1 + e−u + e−t2 )3 du

and the proof is complete.

4.

Applications to Communication Networks

In this section, we shall present some results based on the copulas-based model described earlier, but now in the framework of communication networks. More specifically, let us consider a structure (network) that consists of two exchangeable components (units) with lifetimes T1 , T2 respectively. The components are assumed to have bivariate Gumbel logistic distribution, namely (T1 , T2) are associated to the Ali-Mikhail-Haq model with θ = 1. In the sequel, we study reliability properties of a series and a parallel communication system that consists of bivariate Gumbel logistic components (T1 , T2). A similar study has been already accomplished in the literature for different bivariate models (see, e.g., Navarro, Ruiz and Sandoval [10] or Eryilmaz [11]). The next proposition offers explicit formulas for the survival (reliability) functions of series and parallel structures with two logistic components. Proposition 3. Let T(1), T(2) denote the lifetimes of a series and a parallel system with two components T1 , T2 respectively. If (T1 , T2) follow the bivariate Gumbel logistic distribution (defined in (4)), then (i) the reliability function of the parallel system T(2) is given as R(2)(t) =

2 2 + et

(7)

(ii) the reliability function of the series system T(1) is given as R(1)(t) =

2 . 2 + 3et + e2t

Proof. (i) Since R(2)(t) = P (T(2) > t) = P (T1 > t or T2 > t) = 1 − H(t, t),

(8)

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the desired result is effortlessly reached by recalling equation (4). (ii) Recalling the following well-known equality R(1)(t) = 2Ri(t) − R(2)(t), i = 1, 2 (see, e.g., Baggs and Nagaraja [12]), the proof is complete. It is of some research interest to study the failure rate of the abovementioned reliability structures. Generally speaking, if X is an absolutely continuous random variable with reliability function R(x) and probability density function f (x), the univariate failure rate is defined as f (x) (9) r(x) = R(x) for all x such that R(x) > 0 (see, e.g., Kuo and Zuo [13] or Triantafyllou and Koutras [14]). Proposition 4. Let T(1), T(2) denote the lifetimes of a series and a parallel system with two components T1 , T2 respectively. If (T1 , T2) follow the bivariate Gumbel logistic distribution (defined in (4)), then (i) the failure rate of the parallel system T(2) is given as r(2)(t) =

e−t (et + 2) , 2(e−t + 1)2

(10)

(ii) the failure rate of the series system T(1) is given as r(1)(t) =

et (et + 2) , 2(et + 1)

(11)

Proof. (i) The probability density function of lifetime T(2) is given by f(2) (t) =

2et . (2 + et )2

The conclusion is reached by recalling equation (7). (ii) The probability density function of lifetime T(1) can be expressed as f(1) (t) =

2et (2et + 3) . (2 + 3et + e2t )2

The conclusion is reached by recalling equation (8). The mean residual lifetime (MRL) of a structure is an important characteristic that determines its reliability and quality in time (see, e.g., Eryilmaz, Koutras and Triantafyllou [15], Triantafyllou and Koutras [16]). The next proposition offers formulae for the computation of the MRL function for the reliability systems mentioned in the present section.

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Figure 1. Failure rates of T(1) and T(2) for Gumbel bivariate logistic distribution.

Figure 2. MRL functions of T(1) and T(2) for Gumbel bivariate logistic distribution.

Proposition 5. Let T(1), T(2) denote the lifetimes of a series and a parallel system with two components T1 , T2 respectively. If (T1 , T2) follow the bivariate Gumbel logistic distribution (defined in (4)), then (i) the mean residual lifetime (MRL) of the parallel system T(2) is given as m(2)(t) = −

1 ln(1 − R(2)(t)). R(2)(t)

(12)

(ii) the mean residual lifetime (MRL) of the series system T(1) is given as m(1)(t) = −

1 R(1)(t)

ln(1 − R(1)(t)).

(13)

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Figure 3. MRL functions of T(1) and T(2) for Gumbel bivariate logistic distribution.

Proof. (i) By definition, the mean residual lifetime of T(2) can be expressed as m(2)(t) = E(T(2) − t | T(2) > t) =

1 R(2)(t)

Z

t

∞

R(2)(x)dx,

(14)

where R(2)(t) is the respective reliability function (see formula (7)). The integral in the above equality, may be rewritten as Z ∞ R∞ R∞ 2 R (x)dx = dx = − (1 − u)−1 du. (2) t t 2 + ex R(2) (t) by employing the transformation u = 2(2 + ex )−1 . We next replace the last expression in (14) and the proof is complete. (ii) Employing analogous arguments as in part (i) and using the transformation u = 2(2 + 3ex + e2x)−1 the result is readily deduced. Remark 2. Based on the above results, the mean time to failure (MTTF) of both series and parallel structures can be easily computed. More specifically, let us denote by M T T F(1) and M T T F(2) the mean time to failure of a series and a parallel structure with two components (T1 , T2) that follow the bivariate Gumbel logistic distribution. Then, we may deduce that R∞ M T T F(1) = E(T(1)) = 0 R(1)(x)dx = ln(4/3) M T T F(2) = E(T(2)) =

R∞ 0

R(2)(x)dx = ln3.

The following figures display the failure rates and the M RL functions of a series and a parallel system with two components that follow the bivariate Gumbel logistic distribution.

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References [1] Hutchinson, T. P. and Lai, C. D. (1990). Continuous Distributions: Emphasising Applications, Rumsby Scientific Publishing, Adelaide. [2] Nelsen, R. B. (2006). An Introduction to Copulas, Springer Series in Statistics, 2nd Edition, Springer, U.S.A. [3] Cherubini, U., Luciano, E. and Vecchiato, W. (2004). Copula Methods in Finance, John Wiley & Sons, Chichester. [4] Balakrishnan, N. and Lai, C.-D. (2009). Continuous Bivariate Distributions, 2nd Edition, Springer, U.S.A. [5] Ali, M. M., Mikhail, N. N. and Haq, M. S. (1978). A class of bivariate distributions including the bivariate logistic, Journal of Multivariate Analysis, 8, 405-412. [6] Genest, C. and MacKay, R. J. (1986). Copules archimediennes et families de lois bidimension-nelles dont les marges sont donnees, Canadian Journal of Statistics, 14, 145-159. [7] Mikhail, N. N., Falwell, J. A., Bogue, A. and Weaver, T. L. (1987). Regression curves to a class of bivariate distributions including the bivariate logistic with application. In Computer Science and Statistics: Proceedings of the 19th Symposium on the Interface (ed. Heiberger, R. M.), 525-530. [8] Gumbel, E. J. (1961). Bivariate logistic distributions, Journal of American Statistical Association, 56, 335-349. [9] Sklar, A. (1959). Fonctions de rpartition a n dimensions et leurs marges, Publ Inst Statist Univ Paris,8, 229-231. [10] Navarro, J., Ruiz, J. M. and Sandoval, C. J. (2008). Properties of systems with two exchangeable Pareto components, Statistical Papers, 49, 177-190. [11] Eryilmaz, S. (2012). Reliability properties of systems with two exchangeable loglogistic components, Communication in Statistics-Theory and Methods, 41, 34163427. [12] Baggs, G. E. and Nagaraja, H. N. (1996). Reliability properties of order statistics from bivariate exponential distributions, Stochastic Models, 12, 611-631. [13] Kuo, W. and Zuo, M. J. (2003). Optimal Reliability Modeling: Principles and Applications, John Wiley & Sons, N. J. [14] Triantafyllou, I. S. and Koutras, M. V. (2008). On the signature of coherent systems and applications, Probability in the Engineering and Informational Science, 22, 1935.

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[15] Eryilmaz, S., Koutras, M. V. and Triantafyllou, I. S. (2011). Signature based analysis of m-consecutive k-out-of-n: F systems with exchangeable components, Naval Research Logistics, 58, 344-354. [16] Triantafyllou, I. S. and Koutras, M. V. (2014). Reliability properties of (n,f ,k) systems, IEEE Transactions on Reliability, 63, 357-366.

In: Cyber-Security and Information Warfare Editor: Nicholas J. Daras

ISBN: 978-1-53614-385-0 © 2019 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

Chapter 21

REDESIGNING THE FLOOD TRAINING UNIT OF THE HELLENIC NAVY: PRINCIPLES AND ASPECTS OF HUMAN CENTERED DESIGN G. V. Lykos1,*, N. P. Ventikos2,†, A. K. Rammos1,‡ and V. G. Petropoulos1,§ 1

Damage Control School, T. C. Palaskas, Naval Training Command, Hellenic Navy, Greece 2 Laboratory for Maritime Transport, Division of Ship Design & Maritime Transport, School of Naval Architecture and Marine Engineering, NTUA, Greece

ABSTRACT The purpose of this chapter is show the importance of a human centered design in the field of naval architecture with regards to safety and overall efficiency. This design approach aims to minimize the risk of human error, since this factor is the main direct or indirect cause of accidents. New trends realize that human centered design can go beyond ergonomics to improve (significantly) the emergency response operations onboard ships as shown by the Hellenic Navy flood training unit, which is used for representing in a realistic and reliable manner potential situations to be faced by the crew under multiple and adverse conditions. The design of the presented flood training unit is based on real warship compartments; it is capable of performing a rolling motion while being flooded under continuous control, through predesigned damaged piping and bulkheads. It is primarily designed for navy training so as to identify and project human limitations, under realistic conditions, in a controlled but problematic, harsh and “unfriendly” environment. With *

Corresponding Author Email: [email protected]. Corresponding Author Email: [email protected]. ‡ Corresponding Author Email: [email protected]. § Corresponding Author Email: [email protected]. †

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G. V. Lykos, N. P. Ventikos, A. K. Rammos et al. statistics emerging via the scenarios performed in the simulator, this chapter considers and presents the redesign of the unit with respect to the usability and safety of the trainees and trainers. The participants’ performance reveals weaknesses in the design and thus hazards and flaws (otherwise unidentifiable), so that next generation designs mitigate the risk of human injury during training. Empirical and theoretical knowledge has shown that designing units or products with respect to human centered design principles (such as usability, workability, etc.) can help the potential user to perform the assigned duties so as to assess the parameters of interest in a safe environment.

Keywords: human centered design, human factors, flood training unit, Navy simulator

1. INTRODUCTION Ship operation and maintenance create a hazardous environment for crew members which make it difficult to deal with the multitude of accidents that can occur by both the everyday routine operations of the crew and the machinery as well as the external random events such as extreme weather conditions. One of the greatest dangers for the ship is the flooding, since even the smallest occurrence can lead to catastrophic results, with the crew unable to control the damage in open seas. There are many protocols established to tackle this issue and make flood detection and repair a viable goal, however, most of the measures aim to mitigate the damage until external help arrives. Crew members are being trained in controlled environments that simulate the emergency they may face in a safe manner. Training in such environments teach the crew valuable technical and non-technical skills. However, even though these training simulations may be even more strenuous than real-life situations, they cannot take into account the random hazards that vary greatly from case to case. This paper aims to proactively support the damage control efforts from the first ship-design steps, before the vessel leaves the shipyard with respect to human centered design principles. The method used takes into account both theoretical and experimental data to utilize statistical tools and test them in near-real life situations. This is achieved through methods already being practiced in shipping and other industries with added evaluation via visual data analysis from flood control training simulations. The human centered design principles must take into account the everyday usability ease aside safety, since, as research on this topic grows, performance seems to be affected by complex, remote and unexpected factors. Additionally, human centered design can help seamen perform their respected tasks in a more efficient manner, in a friendlier environment. At this point, it should be noted that the focus of this chapter is placed on warships (with operational oriented goals, a lot of trained crew members) but the same principles may apply on commercial vessels.

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2. PURPOSE In the undesired event of an accident, crew members must quickly act to mitigate the damage. Since every case is at least slightly different from previous ones, unexpected difficulties are possible to occur. As an example, the high number of debris during flooding may block emergency exits and rupture points that need repair. These added hazards could be proactively foreseen in the design process to make the damage-control, when the accident happen, more effective. The purpose of this chapter is to suggest construction practices in this perspective through the combination of performance measurements in trainees and ergonomics.

3. HUMAN FACTORS This study emerges the issue of human limitations that lead to black swan events, even in the most solid procedures and controls. Following a brief presentation of the built requirements the IMO has established as well as the supplementary systems provided, the extensive analysis of investigation branches highlighted the common ground regarding human factors. To a lesser or greater extend, human behavior reaches far from optimal in both emergency situations and every day, boring, ineffective routines. The events are summarized in brief with emphasis on the points where crew members’ actions may interfere with later decisions or inabilities. The importance of task assignment has been described by Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, famous for describing and naming “Flow” as a highly focused mental state. Besides flow, which would be the optimal condition for the crew to be in, focus should be given to avoid conditions that interfere with the safety of the task by messing with the level of challenge and the individual assigned to it [3]. The proposal of detailed protocols for optimization through this point of view reaches beyond the scope of this study. However, the author’s opinion is that more strict or detailed procedures may have negative results in the overall outcome. The holistic view of the system with the human element integrated could be a more effective way for improvement. That being said, task assignment reaches from day to day activities to emergency responses as damage control. Minor improvements with major results may come from upgrading or even updating some already perfectly functional parts of the alarm system. This change acts synergistically with more targeted patrols in order to keep the crew alarmed, but not fatigued over time.

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Figure 1. Challenge/Skill levels.

Furthermore, extra focus should be given to sleep patterns. The science of sleep makes serious leaps with state-of-the-art studies suggesting that mandatory sleep patterns are established for operators to avoid sleep deprivation and it’s many effects on fatigue and cognition [4, 5, 6]. Besides the noted and discussed effects on fatigue and cognition one tested and effective way to improve the crew performance is to manage stress [7, 8]. As aforementioned, the hazardous conditions during an accident create an environment that is very difficult to be prepared for, because of the lack of occurrences and successes. That is why the crew should be trained in realistic conditions as well as theory lessons. In fire simulators, the crew takes the role of the firefighter like he would on the real-life situation, with fire and thermal loads close enough to produce a physiological effect. When the trainee leaves the role of the observer and acts close to the event, the added stress in addition to the safety of the simulator train the trainee for actual, realistic scenarios. This study aims to highlight the possibly unnoticed effects that even the smallest flaws in human factors can have on the outcome of an emergency. The field of safety in the marine industry is vast and complex and perhaps an analysis of simple tasks can act proactively, in accordance to Safety-II principles, to mitigate the risk of fire onboard. Further analysis and replicable tests are needed to measure the approximate effects of the observations cited in the present study.

3.1. Situational Awareness [1] Situational Awareness refers to the perception of the events and the elements in the surrounding environment and one’s ability to understand their meaning even after some

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variable changes. In other words, it is to be aware of the impact one’s actions make in any given situation. It is a very important aspect in emergency responses since the hazardous environment of these situations change the surrounding environment rapidly, making it difficult for non-stressed decision making.

4. HUMAN BASED DESIGN Human centered design is an approach to interactive systems development that aims to make systems usable and useful by focusing on the users, their needs and requirements, and by applying human factors/ergonomics, usability knowledge, and techniques. This approach enhances effectiveness and efficiency, improves human well-being, user satisfaction, accessibility and sustainability; and counteracts possible adverse effects of use on human health, safety and performance. ISO 9241-210:2010(E). Human based design principles focus on these axis: workability, maintainability, controllability, workability, survivability, habitability and occupational health and safety. These design principles, with regards to safety, should utilize the support of technical knowledge to identify high risk points in any structure, room or appliance used. The points in high risk should be prioritize.

5. ANTHROPOMETRY Anthropometry, is the branch of the human science that studies the physical measurement of the human body, particularly size and shape. Ergonomics is the science of work: of the people who do it and the way it is done; the tools and equipment they use, the places they work in, and the psychological aspects of the working environment [3]. These measurements also show the human limitation regarding the physical ability to succeed. A ruptured pipe near the ceiling is far more dangerous and difficult to repair than a pocketlevel rupture that is easily accessible.

6. SAFETY-I AND SAFETY-II The traditional view of safety, called Safety-I, is usually accepted as the absence of accident. As a result, safety research and suggestions for improvement require an accident to happen to analyze what went wrong. In contrast to the traditional view, resilience engineering maintains that ‘things go wrong’ and ‘things go right’ for the same basic reasons. An alternative view, called Safety-II, focus on what consistently goes right, i.e.,

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succeeds even through varying factors. This chapter focus on things that go right in an emergency response and try to reduce hazards that impair damage control [2].

7. REAL LIFE EXAMPLE In the context of this chapter, it is important to present an example of marine accidents where the human factor is critical and therefore designing the ship human centered could mitigate the damage done significantly. In the following case study, the human element and its limiting factors as well as some design flaws are added hazards onboard. What we need to single out of the example is the common hazard of debris during flooding and the roll motion and the physical and psychological abilities required to escape from such unfriendly environments. That being said, part of the damage could be avoided with a design more respectful to the human factor. One lesson from the Appendix A, regarding the US Navy's Fitzgerald accident, is that during an emergency situation, minor design flaws that were neglected added up impairing the survival of the crew members and their damage control abilities.

8. DAMAGE CONTROL SCHOOL The Damage Control School of the Hellenic Navy, was founded in 1951 in order to provide the theoretical and practical formation and training, mainly for the onboard personnel, so as they will be prepared to accomplish effectively and efficiently Damage Control activities such as firefighting or flooding control on board ships, on port or underway. At present the training starts in theoretical level in classroom type teaching which is followed by practical training, using the three Simulators that Damage Control School possesses. The Fire Fighting Training Unit: At this point the Damage Control School has a high end, well established training program in onboard firefighting, and provides firefighting courses of various levels simulating real time fire conditions and scenarios, which are preferred by many foreign navies and shipping companies. The provided courses comply with the standards established by international treaties and in many cases, exceed those standards. The Escape Training Unit: All firefighting courses include training scenarios in the ETU, in which the trainees are called to escape from hazardous, human unfriendly enclosed space.

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8.1. The Flood Control Unit The recent commissioned Flood Control Unit is a high-tech construction designed following the construction plans of a modern warship’s compartments. The two main comportments that the training is conducted are the sprinkler room and the flood room. The control room of the FCU is the “operation center” of the unit, in which the instructors can control the flood level, the water pressure and the damage points activation in order to organize and differentiate the various training scenarios. Inside the two training compartments there are various damage points that can simulate pipe, floor of side shell leakage. The sketch presented in Figure 2 shows the basic layout of the FCU and the position of the damage points. The damage points 1,6,7 represent steel pipe leakage, the damage points 3,5 represent floor panel leakage while the damage points 2,4 represent side shell panel leakage. The sprinkler room has a permanent water runoff system while in the flood room it is possible a 1.6-meter-high flood to be achieved, closing the hydraulic flaps that are located on the compartment’s floor panel and the intermediate water tight door between the two compartments. These technical details give the instructors the potentiality to organize and perform a lot of different training scenarios with scalable difficulty level. In addition, there is access to each compartment through hatches located on the weather deck of the construction making the instructors able to plan advanced entrance scenarios on a damaged compartment. The whole construction is established on a longitudinal main axle and is supported by four hydraulic cylinders, working in pairs (two in each side), an arrangement that can simulate a roll motion similar to a ship’s behavior in different sea states. The hydraulic system is also controlled (manually or automated) by the instructor in the control room of the unit. A 3-D model of the exterior design of the FCU is presented in Figure 3.

Figure 2. The basic layout of the Hellenic Navy’s Flood Training Unit.

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Figure 3. FCU’s Exterior layout.

Training equipment -The trainees are provided with a variety of equipment which is commonly used in flooding control by the navies and the shipping industry. This equipment consists of pipe and steel shell patches, sealing ropes and rubber patches, wooden wedges, as well as wooden and steel supporting beams. The presence of water in addition to heavy objects handling makes even the training in flood control a very hazardous procedure because of the extended muscle strain of the trainees. The trainers and the trainees use selfprotective gear such as helmets and protective goggles as well as watertight suits especially on winter period. The trainees during a training scenario must use the provided equipment to deal with multiple flooding points. This means that they have to patch a pipe or shell hole or construct a safe supporting construction for the compartments door using wooden supporting beams. The procedure of quick measuring and cutting the wooden supporting beams and the patching of a high-pressure pipe network in a flooding wet environment, makes the training very realistic and the completion of the course very challenging. However, all the restoring techniques are first conducted in dry condition so the trainees get familiarized with the equipment and the compartments’ structure. Leakage and flooding could be fatal for a ship and its crew. A well-trained crew in flooding control can preserve the ship’s stability even in extreme cases of damage on the outer shell of a ship. The ability to quickly construct a supporting structure of a damaged compartment, through the adjoining compartments can limit the flooding even if the damage is really extended. In addition, the quick response to pipe network leaking using isolation or patching techniques can save vital compartments such as the engine or the diesel generators rooms. The previous examples highlight the value and the importance of real condition training in flooding control.

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9. TOOLS 9.1. Theoretical Perspective A theoretical perspective is a set of assumptions about reality that inform the questions we ask and the kinds of answers we arrive at as a result. In this sense, a theoretical perspective can be understood as a lens through which we look, serving to focus or distort what we see. It can also be thought of as a frame, which serves to both include and exclude certain things from our view. For the suggestions that will follow, this chapter takes into account the aforementioned theoretical background. Anthropometric data help us predict the performance on damage control in some degree (unreachable pipes would be near impossible to repair, let alone repair safely). Technical knowledge gives focus for the structural most likely failures and without human centered design principles to guide us the research would be impossible. For the redesigning suggestions human limitations are the main focus.

9.2. Measurements The data collected are the results of the trainees' performance as analyzed via:     

Visual tools (waterproof cameras inside the simulator) Stopwatch (to compare response speed) Expert opinion (trainers of the H.N. Palaskas T.C. Damage Control School provided as with useful notes) Training Experience (from the perspective of the participants) Actigraphs (attached to the trainees to measure fatigue and stress during each task)

This data analysis provides performance and fatigue evaluation for each of the varying flood points position.

10. RESULTS-SUGGESTIONS The observations made during the training simulations as well as the on-spot measurements agreed with what was expected. The human limitations described above lead to significant variations in performance, especially in time needed and fatigue generated. It is also important to note that the comments made by trainers did not contradict those made by trainees nor those expected. The feedback received by this training process may

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be qualitative but the lessons acquired from everyone involved agreed with each other. Next, the most repeated notes are presented, coupled with an optimization solution based on the data. Activity monitors indicated strenuous activity when the trainees performed each damage control scenario. As expected, the flood points that were not easily accessible due to height generated more fatigue than those mounted on the wall or the floor. Some trainees found it impossible to repair ruptures on high rise pipes since they were clearly unreachable. However, flood points on floors very quickly became extremely difficult to repair because of the rising water levels. Fatigue also played a major role, as seen both from the trainees’ perspective and from the increased heartbeats per minute, when the water level rose. With water around chest level, and as few degrees tilt (as is the case for every flooded vessel) the effort needed to cross the short-distance room was exceptionally high. It is suggested that -especially -larger compartments should be designed with more than one exits, should one become inaccessible. This increased effort in the emergency situation also highlights the importance of adequate equipment carefully placed in safe and frequent positions. Another point of interest is the time required to succeed in damage control. Flooding is a constant danger that if left unnoticed become increasingly more difficult to handle and greatly jeopardizes the safety and sea keeping of the ship. Experts noted that space was a priority when repairing the rupture, with flood points located near corners being significantly more difficult since only one crew member at a time was close enough. Additionally, the loss of coordination when trying to control damages in heights or without enough room space to use the hammer, resulted in missed hits that put nearby crew members at risk. Walls should not be loaded with unnecessary equipment since this equipment may block the possible rupture. The same applies for piping since if they are close to walls, there is not enough space to be repaired. The naval architect should also focus on the positioning of doors and hatches with respect to the human element. Those should not create traffic and allow to be open and closed without creating new hazards on nearby compartments. Finally, one major issue with flooded compartments that unfortunately could not be realistically replicated in the flood control training unit is the uncontrolled debris that float around posing direct danger for the crew and a great hazard for moving on board. There are many examples of trapped sailors because of floating debris that should be anchored (at least to the point that does not greatly impair everyday activities). In the conducted experiment, two mattresses floating uncontrollably and they were enough of a hazard by themselves. All these recommendations were noted in many different simulation scenarios as well as real life accidents. The naval industry should realize that each recommendation based on human centered design is case based and should be carefully examined before being applied to avoid creating unexpected risks.

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Flooding could occur in many different ways and have various initial causes on a ship. The most common incident is collision between vessels or port structures or grounding on uncharted reefs and rocks. In addition, many structural defects such cracks on the vessel’s hull or defective welding could develop in hazardous level for the ships water tightness. Concerning a ship’s pipe network, inadequate maintenance or extensive oxidation in high pressure dedicated pipelines could lead to leakage in vital compartments of the ship.

APPENDIX A: USS FITZGERALD CASE On 17th of July 2017 at 0130 AM, the Arleigh Burke Class destroyer USS Fitzgerald collided with the Philippine-flagged containership MV ACX Crystal, 56 nautical miles southwest of the city Yokosuka from which has departed. This accident killed 7 US seamen and injured 3 more. The US warship was in eyesight distance from the mainland of Japan in a modified ZEBRA alarm state and the sea was fully calm with extensive moonlight. The containership’s bulb bow hit the US destroyer between at the height of the second and third deck bellow the weather deck on the port side, creating a 17 by 13 feet breach. This breach left the Berthing 2 Compartment completely exposed to the sea water. The size of the breach led to instant full flooding of some compartments and the lack of closed watertight doors due to the alarm led to the partial flooding of some more. The water and foam pipes to the breach on the breach area broke due to the impact strength and the extent of the breach. The US warship suffered a 14-degree angle of heel at the time of the incident that was sustained at 7 degrees a short after. After the collision the communications systems was lost as well as the power supply forward of the breach, and the ship was set in Red over Red alarm state. The Berthing 2 compartment contains three level berths as well as entertainment equipment and resting rooms and has a capacity of 42 seamen, 5 of which was on the watch and 2 was not onboard, the rest 32 was on sight at the time of the accident. The compartment is accessible by two doors on the starboard side and one on the port. During the accident many members of the crew on Berthing 2 fell from their births while many others did not wake up until the flood level reached their bunks. The largescale flooding, the angle of heel and the floating objects made the exit from the compartment a very difficult case. In addition, the only accessible exit points were the doors on the starboard side. The first reactions of the crew were to form a line to the exit point following the procedures. The first two seamen that reached the exit point helped all the others to ascend to Birthing 1 right above the collision point. Such was the struggle of saving all the crew that the water level reached Birthing one which started flooding as well. It must be noted that Birthing one could not be isolated in a watertight way from its adjoining compartments. One crew member was trapped at the point that 7 seamen killed instantly by the collision,

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but he managed to escape from the port side door. The CO of the warship was trapped in his cabin as well but he was saved after efforts of the crew. After the collision all the crew members manned their emergency posts and the injured received first aid. After the crew’s strong effort, the stability, power and propulsion of the ship was preserved. USS Fitzgerald was certified on damage control cases on April 2017. At the time of the collision the DCA team of the vessel was in its cabin. The team’s response was really quick and short after received Damage Control duties. The IMC system failed and NET80 was used. The flood was controlled using water eductors and three pumps one of which was finally out of order. The water educator system worked efficiently on the port side corridor. The radio central room, the main engine room and other compartments started flooding due to non-watertight connection with flooded room and the flood control was conducted by the crew using the water eductors system and buckets. On the decks below the collision point the crew reacted professionally and quickly, realizing the excessive damage that took place even before communicating with the decks above. After stabilizing the water level and controlling the flood, all crew members were called onto the weather deck for counting, at which point the loss of 7 crew members was verified. The ship has called aid from another US warship close to the collision sight, and the aiding ship arrived with emergency response teams and flood control equipment. In addition, the Japanese Coast Guard sent tug boats, patrol boats and helicopters to aid the damaged US warship. After the damage control effort, the ship had a stable 5-degree angle of heel. It is notable that the stable water level report was announced at 0914 hours, seven and a half hours after the collision time. The US Government Accountability Office found that one third of the safety certificates of the Japan based US fleet had expired and was not renewed. The general audit of the certificates was conducted because of the four major accidents that happened this year to US Pacific Fleet. US Navy Officers reported that the personnel departing from the US is highly trained in all possible emergency scenarios but the large operational duties on abroad naval bases leave no time for actual training but just for drill case during wargames. Returning to the incident, the response of the crew members highlights the wellestablished training on damage control scenarios. However, the ability to react on a same way during real naval warfare is a real question. At this incident, the crew did not have to perform flood control under extensive fire and smoke presence. In addition, there were not additional enemy fire against the ship and all the crew effort was focused on controlling the flood. Moreover, the ship’s crew was aided by friendly ships’ crew and dedicated personnel, since it was close to friendly naval base and allied mainland and the sea was really calm as it is already mentioned. In the crew’s defense, there was not any Red state alarm and many of the personnel was off-duty at the time. The procedure that was followed for the damage control was not totally correct. The crew members that were on the damaged compartment, trying to save as many of their

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colleagues as they could, left the Birthing 1 hatch cover open for more time than they should. This detail made the isolation of the Birthing 1 impossible after a while. The water level was stabilized because of the slow steaming of the ship. In other case more compartments could have been flooded due to sequential flooding and the whole ship could have been lost along with its crew. The lack of high speed also leads to the inability of using the exhaling pumps to Birthing 1 but also lead to the opportunity to save more crew members that were trapped inside. And at this point the main question is if a damage control team should save crew members, endangering the ship. This decision has to be made by highly trained damage control personnel that are able to make the right choices and use every human possible for damage control. Finally, stabilizing every movable object during a trip, without making the ship inhabitable is a way to reduce the risk of blocking vital exit and access points in a damaged compartment, making damage control impossible even for the experts.

REFERENCES [1]

[2] [3] [4] [5]

[6]

[7] [8]

US Department of Homeland Security, United States Coast Guard, Office of auxiliary and boating safety (CG-BSX) Auxiliary Division (CG-BSX-1), Team Coordination Training Guide, Chapter 5. Hollnagel, Erik, Safety-I and Safety–II: The Past and Future of Safety Management. Rodriguez-Añez, Ciro Romelio, Anthropometry and it application in ergonomics. Caldwell, John A. (2012), Crew Schedules, Sleep Deprivation, and Aviation Performance, Current Direction in Psychological Science. Robinson, Sarita J., Leach, P. John., Owen-Lynch, Jane., Sünram-Lea, Sandra I., 92013, Stress Reactivity and Cognitive Performance in a Simulated Firefighting Emergency, Aviation, Space and Environmental Medicine, Vol 84, No. 6 Romet, Tiit T., Frim, John. (1987), Physiological responses to fire fighting activities, European Journal of Applied Physiology and Occupational Physiology, Vol. 57, Issue 6, pp 633 – 638. Anish (2017), Your guide to tackle emergency situation on board ships, www.marineinsight.com/marine-safety. Driskell, James E., Johnston, Joan H. (1998), Stress Exposure Training, In J. A. Connon-Bowers & E. Salas (Eds.), Making decisions under stress: Implications for individual and team training (pp. 191-217). Mahwah, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

In: Cyber-Security and Information Warfare Editor: Nicholas J. Daras

ISBN: 978-1-53614-385-0 © 2019 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

Chapter 22

AN AUTOMATED PROCEDURE FOR THE UTILIZATION OF HELLENIC ARMY’S EMPTY WAREHOUSES Theodoros Zikos1,*, MD, Dimitrios Zaires2, MD and Nikolaos V. Karadimas3, PhD 1

2

Logistics Department, Hellenic Army General Staff, Athens, Greece Logistics Department, Hellenic Army General Staff, Thessaloniki, Greece 3 Military Science Department, Hellenic Army Academy, Vari, Greece

ABSTRACT The aim of this chapter is to analyse all factors concerning the utilisation and exploitation of empty warehouses belonging to the Hellenic Army pointing out that in periods of economic crisis the Hellenic Army has the capability of self-sustainability at every level of administration. This approach begins with the citation of the factors that lead to the necessity of the study, such as the adequacy of the warehouses, the reduction of human resources, the difficulty of maintaining the facilities by allocated credits and the capability of their evacuation. Data and knowledge are important elements of such systems. Formal methods like SWOT (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats) analysis and decision-making processes are used for the accurate determination of all alternative options which will lead to the best possible solution for the development and utilisation of the facilities. This proposal invests in the extroversion of the Hellenic Army by creating an automated process for the exploitation of the warehouses by the Hellenic Army units and by suggesting the best possible provision of information for their operational use.

*

Corresponding Author Email: [email protected].

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Keywords: warehousing management, utilisation of empty warehouses, Hellenic Army, Hellenic Military Logistics Department, decision making, storage optimization, warehouse tasks and activities, third party logistics (3PL)

INTRODUCTION Effective logistics management requires good decision-making in a variety of areas according to Langevin, A. & Riopel, D. (2005). Warehouses and distribution centres perform various activities in every stage of a supply chain such as material handling, distributing goods, materials and spare parts between facilities in various echelons and levels as well as keeping inventories. In the military supply chain and logistics, the accuracy of inventory and the analysis of all the factors concerning the warehousing operations constitutes a new frontier in the decision-making process, as well as, in the utilisation and the full operation of the empty warehouses. Furthermore, factors such as the storage optimisation capability and the management of materials are also important elements in enabling efficiency and in providing the best possible solution for the employment of facilities, allowing the strengthening concept of their full exploitation in different ways. In this concept, it was decided to explore the continuously growing field of the military warehousing management and exploitation of non-operating facilities, highlighting their critical contribution in the modern supply chain and the military logistics management. The Hellenic Army and especially the Hellenic Military Logistics Department through this study tries to analyse all factors concerning the utilisation and exploitation of empty warehouses pointing out that in periods of economic crisis the Hellenic Army has the capability of self-sustainability at every level of command. The vision of the study is to achieve the full employment and exploitation of the empty warehouses by suggesting the best possible provision of information for their operational use. Through the exploitation of the warehouses, the Hellenic Army can improve the services provided and the reduction of logistic costs (by maintaining the facilities) with the proper selection and use of warehousing and material handling systems. In addition, cost effectiveness and cost efficiency will be achieved by utilising all possible resources and pointing out that in periods of economic crisis the Hellenic Army has the capability of self-sustainability at every level of administration. In recent years, all the military logistics departments and military logistics corps have completely reconfigured their supply chain to address increasing unit service levels and demand variability. Following Manzini et al. (2015) warehousing and material systems play a pivotal and critical role in the supply chain and the requirements for such types of operations (warehousing and handling) have significantly increased. Throughout the literature, the topic of warehouse and material handling system, design and management

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has been widely debated and it aims at minimising the operational costs and time while increasing the supply chain performance. But no author is focused on the exploitation of the military warehouses from individuals other than the development of warehousing tasks and activities in the form of innovation and entrepreneurship. This study tries to answer the following research questions: 1. Which are the factors concerning the utilisation and exploitation of empty warehouses belonging to the Hellenic Army? 2. Which are the best possible solutions for the utilisation and employment? 3. Which are the criteria that will be used in the decision-making process for the full exploitation of the empty warehouses? 4. What is the necessity of the overall project? 5. What are the results of the SWOT Analysis and of the automated decision-making process? 6. How can they be implemented in the Hellenic Military Environment? 7. Is this proposal the optimal solution for the supply chain management and the military logistics of the Hellenic Army?

THE NECESSITY OF THE STUDY Many factors have led to the necessity of this study and the urgent utilisation and operation of the Hellenic Army’s empty warehouses. The principal factors are the economic crisis, the reduction of human resources, the adequacy of the warehouses, the capability of their evacuation and the weather conditions. In particular, the economic crisis and the existing financial situation of the country does not permit, for the next few years, the appropriation of the necessary credits for maintaining the existing facilities, the construction of new ones, the obtainment of new arms systems and the creation of stock while the existing one keeps decreasing. The cash flows for armaments costs are continuously declining and the budget provision has been decreased from 558 million in 2016 to 457 in 2017 and to 500 million euros in 2018. This means that the financial situation requires alternative financial sources drawing upon all means and the army’s facilities. Furthermore, the existing staff of the units is expected for the military personnel to be maintained or reduced according to the transfers/assignments of the executives. As far as the civilian personnel is concerned, it is expected to be reduced due to retirements as well as the suspension of recruitments mainly of technical staff and workers. In this case, the human resources management, which deals with practices and policies required for taking care of the aspects related directly to personnel, is facing problems. These practices and

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policies are important for the optimisation of the military supply chain as well as the logistics management since they are directly related to the staff and include:       

The conduct of job analyses (determination of the nature of work of each employee) The design of the need for labor and attracting potential employees (not possible) The candidate employee selection (not feasible) The provision of guidance and training of technical warehousemen, logistics workers and technical engineers for the maintenance of the facilities Evaluation of performance of personnel The management of salaries and wages (due to the strict financial status) Motivation and tenders

Another very significant factor which affects the maintenance of the facilities prevailing throughout the year is weather conditions. Strong winds which most of the times destroy (lift) the roofs, heavy rainfall throughout the year and snowfalls during the winter destroy the clear plastic and the gutters creating static issues for the buildings. Technical maintenance consists of several activities aimed at keeping the facility in good repair, so that it meets all the requirements laid down at the design stage. In addition, technical maintenance is a part of activities connected with facility management which can be divided into three dimensions: technical, economic and social factors according to Gajzler (2013) and Thiel (2008). Based on this background, this study is aimed at conducting the life cycle of economic, technical and social assessment for establishing the optimal implementation strategy for the operation of the military warehouses. These factors combined with the adequacy of the warehouses and the capability of their evacuation reinforces the need of finding alternative resources for their maintenance, their full exploitation and employment. The results can help the decision-makers to determine the optimal strategy for implementation.

FEASIBILITY PHASE The existing companies can develop alternative, innovative business actions and goals to achieve their growth, profitability etc. The entrepreneurship and innovation are the source of growth and competitive advantage that operates as a tool to achieve their goals. This leads the operator to the innovation and the existence of a proper business plan to make rational decisions. This business plan is a promising and a navigational tool to pursuit objectives and a means to transform the vision into reality, while aiming at the necessary funding.

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The Hellenic Army has all the necessary characteristics to be competitive and exploit all the chances presented in the external environment. These characteristics include: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

Orientation towards the future and vision Confidence and determination Leadership, inspiration and ability to use all the means Target setting and focus on the results Capable of operating efficiently under pressure and uncertainty Ability to overcome the difficulties by addressing the mistakes

After the identification and opportunity assessment, the Hellenic Military Logistics Department was led to the development of this feasibility study in order to evaluate whether it is possible to properly exploit the empty warehouses. In this phase of the study, an effort was made to give prominence to the logistics work in the context of the Hellenic Army Logistics Department, the existing experience in material management as wells as the storage optimisation capability and techniques.

Basic Principles All products required for equipment, support and maintenance of the military departments are characterised as supplies. All other remaining products are characterised as materials which are basically all the main materials or equipment together with their spare parts. In this context, supplies and materials are classified into five classes. This categorisation took place for the priority of the procedures and for the better monitoring of the management according to STANAG 2961 (Standardisation Agreement) of NATO (NATO Logistics Handbook, 2012). The five classes of supply are: 1. Class I: Items necessary for life, subsistence e.g., food and supplies, which are consumed by the staff in proportion unit, regardless of changes in the business or place of conduct. 2. Class II: Supplies whose volume results from the material and equipment organisation tables, e.g., clothing, weapons, tools, parts, vehicles. 3. Class III: Fuels and lubricants for all uses except weaponry. 4. Class IV: Equipment not falling into any of the above classes of supplies. Mainly include fortification products and construction infrastructure. 5. Class V: Ammunition, explosives and chemicals of all types. According to international logistics standards, which the Army follows, a supply unit can perform the following tasks:

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1. Receive, store and preserve/maintain the materials which come from the internal and external sources of supply. 2. Supply the operational units with materials. 3. Receive and handle the returnable material (weapon systems and their spare parts) of the operational units by separating the inspected one from the useless one and forward it for recycle, repair etc. 4. Keep stocks according to existing plans and superior commands. 5. Make regular and occasional stocktaking, so that there will be absolute accuracy between the audit and the physical inventory at any time. 6. Cover the operational needs.

Security and Safety Management One of the major issues in companies of both the public and the private sectors is the safety and security management. The developing techniques in the security programmes and plans provide expertise in security training and vulnerability assessments in a variety of functional areas. There are several overarching concepts that should be taken into consideration regarding safety and security planning as well as regarding logistics companies. The first thing that must be checked is the safety and security principles that form the foundation to be used within our own organization’s plans and procedures. The next area is planning, which encompasses the development of safety and security plans and procedures, risk assessment methods, and the identification of potential threats and vulnerabilities to an organisation. The safety and security principles according to Wayland (2014) include:  



Preparatory actions to ensure the success of the planning. Primary fundamentals of security: identification of critical resources, defense in depth notification, response, simplicity (of both equipment and procedures), securing the weakest links, use of choke points, unpredictability, separation of duties. Balancing the needs of safety and security with business efficiency and effectiveness.

All the logistics companies or other companies that implement logistics and warehousing activities focus on the safety and the security of their facilities. In most cases, they spend a lot of money on security companies to ensure the safety of their camps or of their facilities. The Hellenic Army has the expertise and the knowledge in developing security and safety camps. In this context, it has developed its own activities to ensure appropriate

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physical security according to the international bibliography and military standards. This leads the logistics department to procedures for planning and designing an integrated physical security system for new facilities as well as the upgrade of existing facilities. The common ways to secure a military base where the units and their facilities are located can be achieved with garrison and direct response forces, military dogs and their companions, system of circumferential visual surveillance, alarm systems in the warehouses, perimeter wall and barbed wire fence. All these measures meet the principle requirements of safety facilities: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Defensible space - Territoriality Surveillance Lighting Securing the weakest links Physical Security

Management of Materials Following Manzini et al. (2015) there are three different angles from which a warehouse, and similarly a material handling system, may be viewed: processes (1), resources (2) and organisation (3), which include planning and control procedures. The main warehouse processes are the following: receiving materials, storage, order picking and shipping. Concerning the resources, the main types are summarised as the storage units, the storage systems including both manual and automated solutions, other equipment and support (e.g., RFID - barcode scanners), a computer system (IT accounting application), material handling vehicles and personnel. The main problems to be addressed in optimising a pick area through the management of materials can be found by answering the following questions: Which items to store in the area? How much of each item to store? Which are the most suitable locations for each item where the travelling, searching, and picking times are minimised? etc. Moreover, two of the most important problems are the storage allocation and the storage assignment (Accorsi et al. 2014). In addition, by extending technologies such as RFID and Barcode to military environment, real-time and multi-source data have become more accessible and ubiquitous. In this context, the Hellenic Military developed its own method for the material handling and the management of materials and warehouses. The placement of the materials in the warehouses of a single management takes place according to the class of the material. The class of every material concerns the general category the material belongs to. E.g., pneumatic tires- air chambers or engines. A similar procedure was followed for grouping all the materials to be placed in the warehouses of every management. The level of the

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stock in the departments is substantially low and it is estimated that this situation will not change soon. On the contrary, it is estimated that due to the financial situation of the country the level of the stock will be lower, and the portions of materials and spare parts will be reduced.

Existing Facilities The existing facilities, where the military units and the Hellenic Military Logistics Department could storage their materials, are located in the main distribution centres next to major transport hubs, airports and ports. The storage space is enough for storing all parts and materials with their warehouses concentration on management optimisation and the correct principles of storage material. They are composed by:    

Administrative areas, which houses transaction and administrative support offices. Storage rooms, where management of materials is located and include the warehouses. Storage sheds, where bulky materials are stored in layers. Back-up facilities, such as export centre, squads for receiving foreign materials etc.

The military personnel and specially the Engineering Department has the know-how and the expertise to meet the requirements for their maintenance but in most cases, the appropriation of the necessary credits for the overall maintenance and development is not permitted.

Storage Optimisation Capability Using the experience of the logistics personnel of the Hellenic Military Logistics Department and the Hellenic Army practices it is concluded that the main factors involved in storage are: 1. 2. 3. 4.

The flow of spare parts and materials from the supply sources. Existing management of the materials. Existing facilities - Warehouses Equipment of the warehouse:

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In packaging materials (crates palettes, etc.) and storage materials (shelves, tubs, chests of drawers, etc.). Materials for the protection of the warehouses (insulations, water leaks, etc.). Storage conditions.

Through the storage optimisation and the appropriate warehousing management the following are succeeded: 1. Better monitoring of the materials since the multiple positions for every material are limited. 2. Reduction of movement of personnel and means. 3. More effective maintenance of the materials and weapons systems spare parts. 4. Better maintenance of the warehouses and administrative areas. Under these conditions, a gradual transfer of materials at any level of command has taken place by concurrent arrangement of the materials at the new warehouse. At the same time actions were initiated for the transfer of the next materials to avoid any problems. This procedure (of transferring materials) took place after a full inventory of all portions. As a result, the materials could be moved and placed in secure places appropriate for storing the corresponding class, as it was defined in the paragraph of management of materials.

UTILISATION OF VACANT WAREHOUSES All these factors lead us to the utilisation of vacant warehouses. For this purpose, a research was conducted at the local logistics companies to collect information about the modern methods they apply to the maintenance, as well as to receive suggestions regarding their use. The investigation showed that the companies maintain their facilities from the income they make via the storage of materials and products. It is indicative that a warehouse with dimensions of 500 m2, similar to the one Hellenic Army Units use, is rented for 2,500 euros monthly. Additionally, the logistics companies face a serious problem with their safety and thus they spend a lot of money on security. However, the most important is that they show an interest at the prospect of renting army’s warehouses to individuals.

SWOT ANALYSIS It is considered imperative before proposing the necessary actions to be taken for the proper exploitation of the warehouses to define within the unit the strong and weak points

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as well as to distinguish the opportunities given at the exterior space as well as the threats that may emerge. This study is known as SWOT analysis (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats). Table 1. SWOT Analysis

External Factors

Internal Factors

Positive Factors Strengths

Negative Factors Weaknesses

    

Adequacy of the storage rooms.  Staff reduction of the Unit. Safety of the military facilities.  Problems of maintaining the existing facilities. The personnel are trained  Bureaucratic approval procedures to use military facilities by individuals. Geographical position of the Unit Fully organised and operational logistics system. Opportunities Threats       

Finding financial resources. Exploitation of inactive facilities. Reconstruction of the spirit management to the personnel of the Unit. Extroversion. Incentives for providing more logistics services. Collaboration with logistics companies (3PL and 4PL). Exploitation of the NSRF programmes.



 



Individuals’ entry to military facilities with what this might mean regarding security issues of the camp. Lack of experience of relevant collaboration of the Unit with individuals. Ensuring deterrence of storing illegal products (smuggled etc.) due to the frequent controls by the competent services within the military facilities. Logistics companies (3PL and 4PL) to see the move of the Unit as competitive.

A major advantage of the unit and the main source of its power is the big number of storage rooms. The existence of warehouses of different dimensions and construction gives the opportunity for storing different kinds of materials as well as better grouping them. The management of the materials is conducted through logistical equipment (such as IT Software, barcode scanners, forklift trucks etc.) which helps all the operations of the unit. Finally, it can provide multifaceted safety not only in safeguarding the material which is in the storage rooms but also protecting it from external threats. A great weakness is the lack of cash flow for the maintenance of the facilities and the bureaucratic approval procedures involved in using military facilities by individuals. The economic crisis constitutes a very big opportunity for concluding trade agreement regarding the exploitation of the empty warehouses since individuals, companies and agencies (of both the public and private sector) are looking for inexpensive storage rooms. Under these circumstances the unit should invest in extroversion. The threats emerging from the exploitation of the empty warehouses are the entry of unknown personnel to the

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unit if they are given for rental as well as the monitor of the materials which will be stored to ensure deterrence of illegal materials (smuggled, forbidden, etc.). Finally, the logistics companies (3PL and 4PL) will react negatively seeing the unit as a competitor which claims a share in the market.

DECISION ANALYSIS Decision analysis is the discipline comprising the philosophy, theory, methodology, and professional practice necessary to address important decisions in a formal manner and refers to the broad quantitative field, overlapping operation research and statistics that deal with modelling, optimising and analysing decisions made by individuals, groups and organisations. The purpose of decision analysis is to assist decision makers in making better decisions in complex situations, usually under uncertainty. The quality of the decisions is measured by their expected consequences and the stated preferences of the decision maker(s). The decision analytic framework helps the decision maker think systematically about his or her objectives, their preferences, and the structure and uncertainty in the problem, then model quantitatively these and other important aspects of the problem and their interrelationship. It includes many procedures, methods, and tools. The five steps in decision analysis which the Hellenic Logistics Department follows are: 1. Clearly define the problem: The first stage of the rational process in decisionmaking is to identify the problem (or opportunity) for which a decision is required. The identification of “problem” or “opportunity,” as described, is essentially the conception of the person stimulated from the environment aiming at a decision and the action taken. The three essential elements of a proper “definition problem” are the causes, goals and limitations. Taking under consideration all these factors the definition of the problem is the full employment and exploitation of the Hellenic Army empty warehouses. 2. List all possible alternatives: At this stage, all variables relating directly or indirectly to the problem were researched, identified and analysed including the relationships between them in order to find all possible alternatives through which the decision will occur. The alternatives imply the possible path, way, action, means, etc., which can reduce or eliminate the difference between the current and desired situation to deal with the problem in accordance with its definition. The information system, the knowledge, the experience, the intelligence as well as the creativity of the executive play a significant role in finding alternatives.

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Theodoros Zikos, Dimitrios Zaires and Nikolaos V. Karadimas 3. Determine all possible outcomes for each alternative: In order to be able to select the optimal or satisfactory solution it is necessary to assess the outcome of every action or choice. 4. Determine the payoff (profit) of every alternative and the combination result: The first element of assessment is the possibility of implementation in the supply units of the Hellenic Army. The second element of assessment is to identify the costs and benefits of each alternative. The third element is to identify the advantages and disadvantages of each option compared to the other options. This allows their hierarchical classification, according to their value on the effective response to the problem. 5. Use a modelling technique to select an alternative: The last stage in the decisionmaking process is the selection between alternatives. Usually the choice does not emerge automatically from the previous stage because it is impossible to accurately determine the effects of each alternative and the conditions of uncertainty. Therefore, in the process of selecting a person or group, on several occasions, it must be selected through judgment or intuition and through the use of models and techniques. Among them, the linear programming, the probability theory, the inventory management models, the Programme Evaluation and Review (PERT) method, the costing methods, the decision trees and other quantitative models are important.

The Decision Analysis Environment Type 1: Decision Making under Certainty In the first case, the decision maker operates with certainty on the influencing factors and the best decision or optimal choice will be obvious. The result of each alternative is known. Usually there is only one result for each alternative, but this rarely happens. The decision maker must select the alternative that maximises welfare - gain (best result). In the payoff table, there will be only a column and it will always be the judgment leading to the optimum gain. Type 2: Decision Making under Uncertainty It is the decision-making process, when the influencing factors (states of nature) are unknown and the probabilities of possible outcomes are not known and cannot be predicted. The decision-making operator who makes the decisions may have little information about what the probability of the influencing factors (states of nature) is. This usually happens when there is a lack of information and the company’s management cannot easily and accurately calculate what will probably happen to the one or the other event that

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would affect the decision. They choose a criterion - a decision making method that does not require the knowledge of these probabilities.

Type 3: Decision Making under Risk This method is developed with remarkable and useful estimate probabilities relating to influencing factors (states of nature) which deflect on the term risk. In those cases, where individual business and people who make decisions use the right information to appreciate what probability influences each factor (state of nature). There are two popular decisionmaking criteria that can be applied to such cases and make use of probabilities. These criteria are:  

The Expected Monetary Value criterion (EMV) The Expected Opportunity Loss criterion (EOL)

For this study it was chosen type 2 Decision Making under uncertainty because the probabilities of possible outcomes are not known and cannot be predicted. It is the first approach to the definition of the problem for the fully utilisation of the empty warehouses of the Hellenic Army and the personnel involved does not have the experience to estimate the accurate probabilities for the risk assessment and the use of the type 3.

List of All Alternative Solutions In order to approach the list of all possible solutions three methodologies were used for generating new ideas for the project.

Method of Brainstorming In the first stage, the military logistics workers of a specific supply unit where a research took place were grouped in 4 groups of 6 people. The organisational committee consisted of the coordinator and the secretary. Then Brainstorming began. Burst of spontaneous ideas (first ideas in bulk and then the examination). The problem was defined to the groups and then an exchange of spontaneous thoughts and ideas followed which were recorded without interpretation by the secretary. This procedure was done three times with a 30-40 minute break. In the end, the organisation committee reviewed and ranked the ideas. Method Lotus Bloom In the second phase, an effort was made to look into the lotus bloom using a more specific method. Similar to Brainstorming, with the same grouping method used to search

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for new ideas around an initial – core that set the limits (exploit via 3PL). Similar to the central idea, separate concepts or alternative applications were investigated to make an evaluation of the first phase of the brainstorming. This method was also applied to the same unit.

Delphi Technique For the total assessment, the Delphi Technique was used in order for more executives to be involved in the list of all alternatives and especially the Military Logistics Department. Delphi technique constitutes a way of collecting opinions from experts divided into small and large groups (one at the supply unit and one in the military logistics department). The facilitator encourages each team member to express his opinion on an issue or problem and listen to each other carefully. He uses auxiliary questions where needed to collect and classify the responses. The answers are sent back to all participants to evaluate and grade through a specific scale (1 to 5). In this context, we tried to approach all the possible solutions for the full utilisation and exploitation of the empty warehouses of the Hellenic Army. These are: 1. Logistics Companies: They showed an interest at the prospect of renting warehouses from the Army. 2. Conferral of the warehouses to other Units: No necessity since there are problems concerning their structure, monitor and use as well as maintenance due to lack of funding. 3. Used by the personnel of the Armed Forces by paying a fee: There was an interest in using these warehouses by the personnel of the Armed Forces by paying a fee. (Not fully exploited) 4. No Use. Possible outcomes: High (full employment of warehouses), Moderate (average employment of warehouses), Low (minimum employment of warehouses).

The Model The Model is a simplified but as possible closer to a reality representation of a real system. It presents the form of quantitative relationships between various variables to achieve certain goals. Our model tries to calculate the profit from the exploitation of empty warehouses. Definitions:  

TP = Total Profit PL = Profit from Logistics Company

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PS= Profit from Army Staff A = Available warehouses (500cm2 dimension) DL = Disposed warehouses to logistics company DS = = Disposed warehouses to Army Staff RL = Rent for 1 warehouse per month to a logistics company RS= rent for 1 person of the Armed Forces per month M = months for renting a warehouse S = Number of the Individual of the personnel of the Armed Forces wanted to use warehouses

TP = PL+PS A = DL + DS (fully employment) PL = DL x M x RL PS = DS x M x RS x S

Pilot Application A Major Supply unit (main distribution centre) may use up to 70 warehouses. Following a research in a specific supply unit it was found that: It has stock, far less than the total volume of the warehouses, active portions of material from 30% to 50%, possibility for 14 warehouses to be available, amount necessary for maintenance 357,000€, requested 90,000€, disposal 12,000€. For one year: warehouse rented for 2,000€ per month (average cost) considering that a similar warehouse to the one in the Hellenic Army Unit’s is rented for 2,500 euros without security, no existing necessity to other units, individual rent for 30€ per month (average cost), staff (50 individuals). The profit of other units and no use is 0€ since there is no exploitation. According to our model: Example of calculating for Logistics Companies with Outcome High: A = 14 warehouses, DL = 14 warehouses, RL = 2,500 euros M = 12 months PL = DL x M x RL = 14 x 12 x 2,500 = 336,000 euros

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Table 2. Payoff Alternatives

Logistics C. Other Units Staff (50 individuals) No Use

High (14 Warehouses) 336,000 0 18,000 0

Outcomes (Demand) Moderate (7 Warehouses) 168,000 0 18,000 0

Low (1Warehouse) 24,000 0 18,000 0

Example of calculating for Staff (50 individuals) with Outcome Low: A = 14 warehouses DS = 1 warehouse RS= 30 euros M = 12 S = 50 Individuals PS = DS x M x RS x S = 1 x 12x 30 x 50 = 18,000 euros Example of calculating in Moderate Outcome: Logistics Companies: A = 14 warehouses, DL = 7 warehouses, RL = 2,500 euros M = 12 months PL = DL x M x RL = 7 x 12 x 2,500 = 168,000 euros Staff Individuals: DS = 1 warehouse RS= 30 euros M = 12 S = 50 Individuals PS = DS x M x RS x S = 1 x 12x 30 x 50 = 18,000 euros

Methods of Decision-Making 1. Maximax Criterion: The optimistic approach. Assume what the best result for each alternative is and choose the best one, that is, the one with the highest profit. Choose the Logistics C. (336,000 euros best payoff). 2. Maximin Criterion: A pessimistic or otherwise conservative approximation. Suppose that the worst will occur for each alternative. Τhe best of the worst case scenario should be selected. Choose the Logistics C. (24,000 euros best payoff). 3. Criterion of Realism: It uses the realism factor (a) to assess the optimism of decision making (0 < a < 1) Appreciation of the optimism of decision making a = 30% from our IT experts. Realism payoff = a*(best)+(1-a) * worse

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Table 3. Criterion of Realism Alternatives Logistics C. Other Units Staff (50 individuals) No Use

Realism Payoff 117,600 0 18,000 0

Choose the Logistics C. 117,600 euros best payoff. 4. Equally Likely Criterion: All results are equally likely to emerge and the average wage is used. Select the highest. Table 4. Equally Likely Criterion Alternatives Logistics C Other Units Staff (50 individuals) No Use

Average Payoff 176,000 0 18,000 0

Choose the Logistics C. 176,000 best payoff 5. Minimax Regret Criterion: Minimax Regret Criterion is based on the difference between the decision taken and the decision that you believe would bring the greatest profit under other circumstances and influencing factors. This difference is called opportunity loss or regret and reflects the costs borne by not selecting any other decision. Regret or opportunity loss measures: how better one could have done, if one had made another choice. The decision maker must remove the profit corresponding to each combination (alternative) of the greatest gain of all possible decisions (outcome). In this way, the opportunity cost table (opportunity loss table) is formed. Regret = (best payoff) – (actual payoff). Table 5. Of Opportunity Loss

Alternatives Logistics C. Other Units Staff (50 individuals) No Use

High (14 Warehouses) 0 336,000 318,000 336,000

Outcomes (Demand) Moderate (7 Warehouses) 0 168,000 150,000 168,000

Low (1 Warehouse) 0 24,000 6,000 24,000

MAX REGRET 0 336,000 318,000 336,000

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Minimize Loss Choose the Logistics C Once the opportunity loss table is formed, gather the bigger sum of each alternative decision in the table of MAX REGRET. Then select the decision corresponding to the lower opportunity cost with the one that minimizes the loss.

CONCLUSION This chapter constitutes an automated procedure - decision making for the full exploitation of the Hellenic Army’s empty warehouses, aiming to achieve optimal solutions by analysing all factors concerning their operational use. Our competitive advantage is the extroversion of the Hellenic army, the lower cost, our fully-organised and operational logistics system in coordination with the social acceptance, our ethical corporate responsibility and the devotion to duty. The only credible proposal to avoid obsolescence of vacant warehouses in time is to grant them: 1. Individuals for professional use. 2. Staff of the Armed Forces. In addition, this chapter highlights the work of the Military Logistics department and the expertise of the personnel to use modern tools and models in the military logistics supply chain management. The concepts of warehousing management, utilisation of empty warehouses, SWOT analysis, decision making, storage optimisation, warehousing tasks and activities are used to define the problem and give the best possible provision of information. The literature lacks when it comes to objectives other than decision making of the employment of the vacant military facilities. In this context, the area that will draw attention upon, is the research optimisation and the assessment of all factors following the strategic management process, so that these solutions are functional at all levels of command of the Hellenic Army (department – business – functional levels). The future work will focus on the research optimisation regarding the exploitation of the Hellenic Army’s empty warehouses, aiming to achieve optimal solutions by analysing the strategic level of the logistics department.

REFERENCES Abbasi, M., (2011), “Storage, Warehousing, and Inventory Management,” Logistics Operations and Management - Concepts and Models, Elsevier Inc, 181–197 [online at: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/B9780123852021000104].

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Accorsi, R., Manzini, R., Maranesi, F., (2014), “A decision-support system for the design and management of warehousing systems” Computers In Industry. Vol. 65, 175-186. Armstrong, G., Kotler, P., (2013) “Principles Of Marketing,” Pearson Prentice Hall, 14th Ed. [Online at: https://wiican.files.wordpress.com/2013/10/principles-ofmarketing.pdf]. Botter, R., Fortuin, L., (2000) “Stocking strategy for service parts—a case study.” International Journal of Operations & Production Management, Vol 20 (5-6), 656– 674. Bowerman, B., O’Connel, R., Murphree, E., (2014) “Business Statistics in Practice,” McGraw Hill higher education, 7th edition. Bowerman, B., O’Connel, R., Murphree, E., Orris, J.B., (2015) “Essentials of Business Statistics,” McGraw Hill higher education, 5th edition. Bradley, T., (2007) “Essential statistics for economics, business and management,” John Wiley & Sons. Cohen, M. A., Kleindorfer, P. R., Lee, H. L., (1986) “Optimal stocking policies for low usage items in multi-echelon inventory systems,” Naval Research Logistics Quarterly Vol 33, 17–38, [online at: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/ nav.3800330103/abstract. Dessler, G., (2012), “Human Resource Management,” Prentice Hall, 12th Edition. Gajzler, M., (2013) “The support of building management in aspect of technical maintenance.” Procedia Engineering, Vol. 54, 2013, 615-624. Gleissner, H., Femerling, J. (2013) “The principles of logistics, in: Logistics, Springer Texts in Business and Economics,” Springer International Publishing, pp. 3–18. Jobber, D. (2010) “Principles and Practice of Marketing,” McGraw-Hill Higher Education, London. Langevin, A., Riopel, D. (2005) “Logistics Systems Design & Optimization,” Springer Science & Business Media. Lind., D., Marchal, W., Walthen, S., (2015) “Statistical Techniques in Business and Economics,” McGraw Hill higher education, 16th edition. Manzini, R., Bozer, Y., Heragu, S. (2015) “Decision models for the design, optimization and management Of warehousing and material handling systems,” International Journal of Production Economics, Vol. 170, Part C, 711-716 [Online at: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0925527315002923]. NATO, (2012) “NATO Logistics Handbook.” Thiel, T., (2008) “Decision aiding related to maintenance of buildings: technical, economic and environmental aspects,” International Journal of Environment and Pollution, Vol. 34, 158-170.

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Van den Berg, J. P. Zijm, W. H. M. (1999) “Models for warehouse management : classification and examples,” International Journal of Production Economics, vol 59, 519–528. Wayland, B. A., (2014) “Security for business professionals: how to plan, implement, and manage your company’s security program,” Butterworth-Heinemann.

EDITOR CONTACT INFORMATION Dr. Nicholas J. Daras Professor of Mathematics Dean of the Hellenic Military Academy Department of Mathematics and Engineering Sciences Hellenic Military Academy, Vari Attikis, Greece Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected]

INDEX # 3PL, 362, 370, 371, 374 4PL, 370, 371

A abilities/skills, 39, 41, 63, 67, 68, 70, 74, 176, 179, 180, 186, 189, 348, 352 abstract model theory, 109, 116, 125 accelerated environmental aging, 226 acoustic scattering, v, 25, 27, 29, 31, 33, 35, 37 advanced persistent threats, v, 83, 84, 103 arms systems, 363 asymmetrical threats, 325, 326 asymmetrical warfare, 40, 41, 43 attack vector, 65, 67, 68, 75 attacking vectors, 62, 65, 66, 67, 69, 76, 79 attacks, vi, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 49, 50, 52, 54, 55, 57, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 83, 84, 85, 86, 90, 91, 104, 108, 145, 191, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 201, 203, 204, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 251, 254, 276, 281, 283, 294, 309, 310, 313, 325, 326, 329, 331, 332, 333 automated procedure, vii, 3, 361, 378

B bash scripts, 1, 2, 3 biosensors, 254, 256 bivariate copulas functions, 337

C carbon fabric, 225 carbon fiber composites, 221, 222 case studies, vi, 201, 204, 271, 272, 273, 281, 289, 318, 321 certification, 74, 77, 78 Command and Control (C2) infrastructure, 57, 88, 224 composite laminates, 225 computer ethics, v, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 117, 119, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128 computer training, 74, 75, 76, 77 conflict and crisis management, 176 convention on cybercrime, 238 counter-terrorism, 243, 251, 254, 256 cyber attacks, 39, 40, 41, 42, 44, 45, 49, 50, 52, 54, 55, 72, 194, 195, 198, 237, 325, 326, 331, 333 cyber defense, vi, 43, 92, 193, 194, 195, 196, 198 cyber security, v, vi, ix, 39, 40, 41, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 58, 62, 63, 64, 70, 78, 80, 90, 101, 104, 105, 195, 199, 238, 239, 241, 308, 325, 326, 327, 332, 333, 335 cyber space, vi, 39, 41, 43, 44, 45, 50, 53, 55, 57, 61, 62, 64, 71, 72, 80, 86, 193, 194, 237, 238, 241, 325, 326, 328, 329, 332, 333, 335 cyber threats, 39, 40, 45, 52, 81 cyber war, v, 39, 40, 41, 43, 44, 52, 54, 57, 63, 71, 73, 80, 196, 272, 273, 314, 318, 325, 326, 330, 331, 332 cyber warfare, v, 57, 63, 71, 73, 80, 196, 272, 273, 314, 318, 326, 330, 332

Index

384 cybercrime, vi, 81, 82, 86, 110, 198, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241

D decision analysis, 199, 371, 372 decision making, 49, 53, 102, 183, 191, 193, 194, 195, 252, 307, 351, 362, 372, 373, 376, 378 defence, 23, 45, 48, 49, 53, 54, 65, 73, 79, 81, 154, 156, 157, 238, 243, 244, 255, 275, 277, 313, 329, 330, 333, 335 Delphi Technique, 374 distribution centres, 362, 368 double Dixie cup problem, 129, 135

E enchased typewriter, 74 endorsement, 80 energy, 85, 110, 147, 163, 164, 224, 243, 244, 245, 249, 250, 251, 253, 257 ENISA, 237, 239, 241 environmental aging, 221, 222, 226, 231 era of information, 57, 59, 62, 68, 272 ethics, v, vi, 61, 79, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 117, 119, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 317, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 333, 335 Eurojust, 237, 239, 241 Europol, 237, 239, 241 extreme learning machine, 83, 84, 89, 90, 97, 105, 108

F failure rate, 337, 342, 344 finite element method, 160 five classes of supply, 365 flood training unit, vii, 347, 348, 353 forensic tool, 1, 2, 22 forensics report, 1 formal semantics, 109, 119 free riding, 39, 50 free vibrations, 211, 214 frequency hopping, vi, 142, 143, 144, 259, 270 functional inks, 244, 245, 250, 257

G gas sensors, 254, 256 Global Economic System, 69 good security, 75 government involvement, 40, 49, 52, 53 GPS, vi, 201, 202, 204, 205, 206, 207 gradient elastic flexural beams, 211 gravure, 245, 246, 247, 248, 257 GSM, vi, 201, 202, 207

H Hellenic Army, vii, 159, 175, 190, 221, 259, 361, 362, 363, 365, 366, 368, 369, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 378 Hellenic Military Logistics Department, 362, 365, 368 HTML report, 1 human centered design, vii, 347, 348, 355, 356 human factors, 175, 348, 349, 350, 351 human nature, 67 hybrid war, 71, 145, 156

I institutions, v, 42, 43, 63, 72, 78, 109, 111, 113, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 279, 299, 309, 310 international logistics standards, 365

J jammers, vi, 148, 201, 202 Just War Theory (Jus bellum iustum), 326, 329, 330

L lack of knowledge, 70 lack of punishment, 70 layered security, 73 LFSR, 259, 260, 261, 269 Linux, v, 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 21, 22, 23, 24, 64, 65 logistical equipment, 370

Index logistics, 40, 45, 273, 276, 318, 321, 322, 346, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379 logistics companies, 366, 369, 370, 371, 374, 375, 376 logistics department, 362, 365, 367, 368, 371, 374, 378 losses, vi, 42, 142, 188, 201, 208, 252, 289, 313, 314, 332 lure, 76

M management, vi, ix, 43, 49, 53, 78, 92, 106, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 195, 198, 202, 256, 269, 335, 359, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 372, 378, 379, 380 market failures, 39 mean residual lifetime, 337, 342, 343, 344 mechanical properties, 160, 161, 170, 172, 221, 222, 226, 235, 244 micromechanics, 211 military environment, 143, 363, 367 military supply chain, 362, 364 military use, 57, 79 model(s), vi, 5, 6, 49, 52, 90, 91, 96, 97, 102, 103, 107, 109, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 124, 125, 126, 127, 144, 151, 155, 159, 161, 163, 164, 168, 170, 173, 176, 179, 181, 189, 196, 197, 213, 215, 217, 219, 222, 224, 225, 227, 228, 237, 239, 240, 274, 277, 280, 337, 338, 339, 341, 353, 371, 372, 374, 375, 378, 379 money, 62, 69, 76, 86, 110, 195, 247, 252, 277, 278, 279, 282, 286, 287, 291, 292, 295, 297, 301, 304, 308, 316, 317, 318, 320, 366, 369 mother-curve, 224, 228, 229, 230 motivations, 62, 85

N nanocomposites, 160, 172, 173, 225, 233, 234 nanomaterials, 159, 160, 162, 163, 165, 171 navy simulator, 348 network externalities, 39, 50, 53 new term, 61, 71, 211, 212, 216

385 O online sequential learning, 84 operational analysis, vi, 175, 176, 177, 178, 182, 187, 188, 190 optimal solutions, 378 optimal strategy, 364 optimising a pick area, 367 organizational changes, 176, 185, 187

P parallel and series system, 337 people, 45, 63, 65, 66, 68, 70, 71, 75, 76, 80, 188, 198, 207, 213, 237, 255, 278, 297, 304, 351, 373 pH sensors, 255 philosophical concepts, 326, 327 piecewise homogeneous obstacle, v, 25, 26, 27, 29, 31, 33, 35, 37 piezoelectric sensors, 252, 253 plane waves, 25, 26 potential market failure, 39, 40, 49, 50, 53 power, 8, 43, 62, 69, 72, 93, 101, 103, 111, 116, 120, 128, 132, 139, 141, 147, 148, 187, 188, 244, 252, 255, 270, 273, 274, 277, 281, 295, 298, 320, 321, 322, 357, 358, 370 power grid, 62, 69, 72 practices and policies, 363 printed flexible electronics, vi, 243, 244, 245, 247, 249, 251, 254, 255 printing techniques, 243, 245, 246, 253 proper documentation, 78 protein microtubules, vi, 211, 219

R resistive core, 25, 26, 28, 29, 32, 34, 36 RFIDs - barcode scanners, 244, 253, 254, 256, 367 rising moments, 129, 130, 133, 135 rotogravure, 247

S Schur functions, 129 Screen-printing, 246, 255, 257, 258 security, v, vi, ix, 1, 3, 6, 25, 39, 40, 41, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 57, 58, 61,

Index

386 62, 63, 64, 65, 67, 68, 69, 70, 72, 73, 74, 75, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 88, 89, 90, 98, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 129,141, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 149, 150, 152, 154, 155, 156, 157, 195, 197, 198, 199, 201, 202, 203, 205, 206, 208, 237, 238, 239, 241, 243, 251, 254, 259, 317, 318, 325, 326, 327, 328, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 337, 359, 366, 367, 369, 370, 375, 380 security awareness training, 74 sensors, 44, 142, 149, 152, 174, 244, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257 smart home, 69 social engineering, 68, 73, 80, 240 social media, 68, 74, 75 solar cells, 244, 251, 252, 255, 257, 258 spherical waves, 25, 26 storage, 97, 222, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 254, 333, 362, 365, 367, 368, 369, 370, 378 storage optimisation capability, 362, 365, 368 storage optimization, 362 storage space, 368 strategic and operational decisions, 176 structural and organizational elements, 176 structural health monitoring, 252 supply, vi, 45, 63, 201, 202, 203, 204, 208, 251, 253, 275, 277, 278, 286, 291, 292, 295, 297, 304, 308, 310, 313, 357, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 368, 372, 373, 374, 375, 378 supply chain, vi, 201, 202, 203, 204, 208, 362, 363, 364, 378 supply unit, 365, 372, 373, 374, 375 SWOT analysis, 182, 183, 363, 369, 370, 378 synchronization, vi, 259, 261, 263, 265, 267, 269, 270

T tailored made, 79 tan() delta, 231 technology, 2, 40, 45, 48, 54, 57, 62, 63, 64, 70, 73, 79, 80, 92, 104, 106, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113,

126, 128, 141, 143, 145, 146, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 191, 196, 197, 198, 201, 204, 234, 238, 241, 243, 244, 251, 255, 257, 274, 277, 326,329, 333 the global economic system, 69 the model, 116, 117, 119, 120, 125, 176, 227, 338, 374 thermal shock, 222, 226, 231, 233 Third Party Logistics (3PL), 362, 370, 371, 374 time temperature superposition, vi, 221, 222, 223, 233 tor anonymity network, 84 Tor network(s), 88, 89, 90, 91 Tor Traffic Analysis, 84, 88 Tor traffic identification, 90, 98 Tor-based botnets, 88, 90 training, vii, 48, 57, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 91, 94, 97, 98, 99, 102, 195, 196, 197, 347, 348, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 358, 359, 364, 366

U unnecessary vulnerabilities, 79 urn problems, 129 utilisation of empty warehouses, 362, 378

W warehouse processes, 367 warehouse tasks and activities, 362 warehouses, vii, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378 warehousing management, 362, 369, 378 weak link, 75 wearable hardware, 253

Z Zipf law, 129, 133