Current Sociology Trend Report: The Sociology of Humour and Laughter

Table of contents :
Introduction: The Sociology of Humour and Laughter — an Outstanding Debt
Humour: Playing with Meanings
Laughter: The Language of Humour
Humour and Laughter in the Social Fabric
Conclusion
Annotated Bibliography

Citation preview

Trend Report: The Sociology of Humour and Laughter Anton C. Zijderveld

1 INTRODUCTION: THE SOCIOLOGY OF HUMOUR AND LAUGHTER — AN OUTSTANDING DEBT Within the broad realm of the social sciences, humour and laughter have drawn interest primarily from philosophers and psychologists. Philosophers have discussed these topics since the days of Plato and Aristotle, while contemporary philosophy was greatly stimulated by Bergson’s classic essay, ‘On Laughter’ (5). The psychological study of humour and laughter in the 20th century, on the other hand, has been strongly influenced by two classic studies of Freud, one bearing the significant title Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious (64, 65). Both works helped prepare the ground for the philosophical and psychological study of humour and laughter in this century, even if theoreticians of various disciplines did not always agree with their main lines of argument. Even so, their influence transcended the boundaries of philosophy and psychology. Humour and laughter have also received attention from anthro­ pologists, and here too one study in particular has served as benchmark and stimulus. It was Radcliffe-Brown’s relatively short but influential paper called ‘On Joking Relationships’ (100). As its title indicates, the paper discusses both phenomena in terms of kinship relations in non-Western civilizations. However, anthropologists have since broadened the discussion, taking in, for example, the curious phenomenon of ceremonial clowning, as well as ritual rebellions in various American Indian tribes and in MesoAmerican and African societies (207). The notion of joking relationships has also been used outside anthropology and applied to the sociological study of modern industry (156, 187). If humour and laughter have thus become almost respectable research topics in philosophy, psychology and anthropology,

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sociologists in general have failed to pay much attention to these very human phenomena. There are, of course, some exceptions (34-49, 150-79). But, as is in the nature of exceptions, their studies stand apart from the main body of sociological research, and lack a general theoretical framework. Moreover, a classic statement comparable to those of Bergson, Freud and Radcliffe-Brown is lacking. Clearly, sociologists have not given enough time to theoretical reflection on and empirical study of humour and laughter. This Trend Report is a small beginning. It will adopt a theoretical stance which can be best characterized in terms of the sociology of knowledge, as formulated by Berger and Luckmann in their wellknown treatise The Social Construction o f Reality (1967). This perspective, which need not be elaborated here, will be comp­ lemented by some symbolic-interactionist notions, in particular in the second part of the Trend Report which deals with the phenomenon of laughter. Generally, humour and laughter are not clearly distinguished, and for reasons to be explained later, they will be discussed separately in the present argument. The concept of humour will be used as an overarching concept, covering such phenomena as wit, mirth and the comic. These concepts can admittedly be distinguished, but in this Trend Report little time or space will be spent on what could be a lengthy and complex debate about conceptual distinctions. It is, in any case, questionable whether such a debate would yield any useful heuristic results. Despite the high degree of specialization in the social sciences, there are still no real watersheds between philosophy, psychology, anthropology and sociology; certainly not when it comes to analysis of phenomena such as humour and laughter. Furthermore, the sociology of knowledge has always remained close to the other social sciences. Therefore, the present Trend Report should not be seen as a theoretical statement which is relevant exclusively to sociologists. Even if it provokes disagreement from the other social sciences, it may still contribute to a discussion that transcends the rather narrow boundaries of the various specialties within the discipline. It may reveal certain dimensions of humour and laughter which had formerly been hidden and relatively unknown. Meanwhile, the fact that sociologists generally have failed to show much interest in humour and laughter — first because both phenomena are eminently social, second because there are some

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intrinsic similarities between sociology and humour remains puzzling. With regard to the social nature of humour which, of course, will be demonstrated in some detail in this Trend Report, it hardly needs much reflection to realize its importance. Like most pleasures in human life, humour stands in need of at least one partner. The shipwrecked person on his lonely island may be the target of many jokes, but he himself has very little reason to laugh and few opportunities to engage in humorous exploits. Likewise, Cervantes had to invent Sancho Panza as Don Quixote’s companion in order to do full justice to the eerie mixture of tragedy and comedy which, according to his vision of life, is essential to the human condition. Bergson was right when he wrote that the comic aspects of human life can hardly be experienced in isolation. Laughter requires an echo (5, p. 5). Indeed, a passenger on a bus or subway, obviously travelling without a companion, does frighten us slightly if he or she suddenly bursts into laughter, or grins without interruption. Rose Coser remarked perceptively that a person who laughs or grins to him or her-self is usually viewed as being ‘probably crazy’ (158, p. 171; cf. 190, 192). The joke, as we shall see in more detail later, also needs a social context in order to make any sense. The quality of its humour and its success or failure depend on interaction within a social situation. In many cases, the content of the joke is far less important than the fact that it was told by this person in this situation. All this clearly illustrates how eminently social humour and laughter are. It therefore remains strange that sociologists have generally neglected them. But there is another reason why this neglect is remarkable. Sociology and humour have much in common, and are in a sense related. The sociologist is prone to relativize the routines of daily life by subjecting them to closer scrutiny. The things we generally take for granted, the ideas and emotions we hold dear primarily because we have grown accustomed to them, the actions we perform in an institutionalized manner — all are dissected, analysed, interpreted and thus relativized. Peter L. Berger has always argued that sociology confronts us with a precarious vision of reality, i.e. with a view of human life which debunks the things we tend to take for granted. He once added that sociologists share this vision with the fool who, according to tradition, held up a mirror and showed people what they were like, without pompous ideologies and justifications. It is not uncommon for us to look rather helpless, if not somewhat ridiculous.

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In the Weberian view which is fundamental to the sociology of knowledge, sociologists construct ideal types, i.e. rational constructions of human beings, social processes and cultural institutions. In these constructs, certain aspects of reality are intentionally overdrawn for heuristic purposes. Weber said they resemble utopias, but he could also have said they resemble caricatures. These ideal types ought to be compared with historical, ‘real’ reality and it is precisely the deviations from these constructs which ought to produce a rational understanding ( Verstehen) of social reality. That is, the ideal types are the method; Verstehen is the heuristic aim. Most humorists act in a similar fashion, although unhampered by the rules of rational logic, in contrast to the sociologists. They over-accentuate certain aspects of human behaviour; they emphasize what they call ‘typical’. Confronted by their jokes and witticisms, we suddenly realize that life has dimensions which we never knew or felt before, simply because we thought them ‘normal’, ‘natural’, or just trivial. If the similarities are so strong, why then the sociological neglect? Are they too strong for sociologists to see humour and laughter as valid issues at all? This can hardly be so. Rather, I shall offer two different, hypothetical reasons for the sociological neglect of humour and laughter. Cameron once remarked wryly: ‘One of the funniest things about sociologists is that they are so afraid of being funny’ (34, p. 81). This fear can easily be explained. In their desire to develop a scientific discipline which could stand comparison with the established natural sciences, most contemporary sociologists were driven by the ideal of exactitude. This led to the emergence and widespread acceptance of a neo-positivistic orientation which has become ever more sophisticated since the 1950s, but is nevertheless still strong today. It may be that this orientation was fed by a deep and hidden sense of inferiority vis-a-vis the truly ‘exact’ sciences. In any case, it is maintained with a well-nigh religious seriousness, and it stands to reason that such an attitude is doomed to remain rather insensitive to the more comic dimensions of daily life. Atoms studied by a physicist are hardly funny, and nor apparently are the human beings subjected to contemporary sociological research. (It should be said, in all fairness, that many psychological studies of humour and laughter have been conducted in a rather ‘behaviouristic’ manner, and are usually reported in bombastic language which sounds ‘scientific’ but comes close to the incomprehensible.) It should be added that the customary foe of neo-positivism, neo-

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marxist sociology, or what is called ‘critical theory’, has not improved the situation much. On the contrary, the political, often radical stance of its adherents prevents them from any relativizing studies of humour and laughter, unless they are presented as ideologically acceptable satire or cartoons. In general, politically involved sociologists rarely laugh, and have little use for such ‘trivialities’ as jokes, puns, witticisms and laughter. On the contrary, such ‘trivialities’ may well harm the political cause (cf. 113). A second consideration should be taken into account. As in the other social sciences, professionalization and specialization provided sociology with a deceptive aura of sophistication for which it had to sacrifice its original naivete. It is still refreshing to delve into the wide spectrum of sociological theorizing by authors such as Weber, Simmel, Durkheim, Mannheim and others. Reading these classic authors one is struck by the naivete which enables them to deal with a great variety of issues, to investigate many different problems, without ever becoming a true specialist in any of them. They were actually dilettantes in the original sense of the word. Measured by the standards of contemporary sociologial research, for example, Weber’s scientific efforts must strike us as rather foolish. No specialist in this field today would dare to tackle the puzzling question of why modern capitalism emerged in Europe and not in Asian civilizations. In fact, Weber’s central problem was even broader, for most of his research aimed to answer the following questions: What was the essence of modernization (which he viewed as a process of rationalization and disenchantment)? Why did it develop radically in the Occident and not in the Orient! Such a project required broad historical, economic and sociological knowledge, closely tied to the comparative study of religion. It required, in addition, a great knowledge of and insight into small details. None of this could have been achieved without a healthy dose of naivete, and without the enthusiasm of the true dilettante. It is, of course, impossible to return to the grand theories of the classics. Nor is it advisable to surrender thoughtlessly to contemporary professionalization and specialization. This dilemma (which, of course, transcends the boundaries of sociology and is truly a contemporary cultural dilemma) cannot be solved by the sociology of knowledge. However, it does offer a perspective with which one can fruitfully analyse and discuss these two curious phenomena which are so essential to human existence — humour and laughter.

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As stated earlier, these phenomena will be distinguished in this Trend Report, which defines the former as playing with traditional (institutionalized) meanings and the latter as the proper language of humour. The report concludes with a discussion of the main social functions of humour and laughter, but the approach will deviate from conventional functionalism. Throughout, the various arguments will be substantiated by bibliographical references to theoretical and empirical studies. 2 HUMOUR: PLAYING WITH MEANINGS Introduction In jokes, people play with meanings. For various reasons, meanings are inverted, turned upside down, reversed, etc. People often play with meanings just for fun — without any calculated intentions. Often, however, jokes are less innocent, and serve psychological and sociological needs. They can express hostility and aggression, release psychological and sociological tensions, or serve individual and collective interests. Perhaps because it usually elicits a relaxing laughter, humour is often reckoned among the more superficial and spurious expressions of human beings. But if one accepts the analyses of various philosophers and psychologists who have studied the phenomenon in depth, one must conclude that humour belongs to fundamental aspects of human life, comparable to, say, religion and language. The playful nature of humour may also suggest superficiality and spuriousness. This is another error. To begin with, one should never underestimate the serious nature of play. Moreover, any in-depth social-scientific study would also uncover the highly complex and ambiguous dimensions of humour. Without underestimating their playful nature, which of course is the main hazard of any scientific analysis of human behaviour, the more profound dimensions of humour and laughter should not be neglected either . The sociology of knowledge, it is my contention, presents the ideal frame of reference for such a study: it can do justice to both the playfulness and the profundity of humour.

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Joking invariably consists of playing with meanings. The technique used is generally quite simple: all the possibilities of an unexpected change or alteration of meaning are tried out and exploited. Moreover, meaning is an essential component of human communication, enabling people to live together and interact. It is the life blood of society. This meaning is not exclusively and primarily an individual-psychological component of human existence, but is embedded in rather strict patterns of behaviour (thinking, feeling, speaking and acting) which are handed down from generation to generation (tradition) in the process of socialization or, better, enculturation. People learn to think, feel and act according to these patterns or institutions. They also learn to rebel against them and to deviate from them, soon redeveloping their patterns of behaviour. In any case, meaning is not a mystery hidden deep in the human psyche, but a traditional and social quality of human behaviour which makes society possible. Meaning is defined here as that quality in human interaction which enables the interacting partners not only to understand each other’s behaviour cognitively and emotively, but also to predict, to a certain extent, the development of the interaction in the near future. A simple example may clarify this definition. If a teacher has to tell a student who asks a question to wait for a moment, as he will deal with the issue raised by the question shortly, he can be assured that his words have been meaningful to and were understood by the student. This, incidentally, could only happen because of what G.H. Mead called ‘taking the role or attitude of the other’: while teaching, the teacher internalized the role of a student: while listening, the student internalized the role of the teacher. In the example given, the student internalized the role of the teacher so successfully that he could, as it were, take a few steps ahead on his own. Meaning, as this dicussion and the example also indicate, is an emergent quality — it emerges from the unfolding interaction, making it into a meaningful (symbolic) one. Predictability, and thus comprehensibility, are much enhanced by the fact that meanings are embedded in the institutions of our culture, and in the language we have learned to speak together. When I play the roles defined by my society and speak the language of my culture, I realize and actualize the meanings of our socio-cultural life, transmitting them to others in a relatively predictable and thus understandable manner. However, culture which has become abstract and in which meanings have lost

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their existentially concrete content, floating about unpredictably, poses a very serious threat to human communication and thus to human life. Modernization may well have led to such a situation. This point cannot be discussed further here but should be mentioned briefly, since it is relevant to any theoretical consideration of the nature of cultural meanings. When a police officer, the player of a specific role and part of a specific institution, stops me because of a traffic violation, I understand immediately, semi-instinctively and without much cog­ nitive reflection, why he did so. Without much cognitive and emotive investment I can also predict what he will do next. It is a chain of events and actions which, on the whole, is relatively predictable and understandable. And when I deviate from this pattern of behaviour, for instance by attacking the officer physically, I can again predict with some precision what the consequences will be, because institutionalized, legal sanctions will trigger a new chain of events and actions. (The rather mechanical nature of institutional behaviour is, of course, over-emphasized here for the sake of the argument.) Humour can thus be defined as playing with institutionalized meanings. Indeed, the sudden attack on the police officer in the example, just given would, at first, be surprising and could strike an observer as being rather funny. The authority of the police force, which one expects to be respected, is suddenly rejected and challenged, if not negated. A predictable and routinely under­ standable chain of events and actions is suddenly broken, and a rather different chain of events and actions begins to develop. The meanings involved seem to be shaken and shuffled. This example suggests a few qualifications to the definition of humour as playing with institutionalized meanings. To begin with, it is the observer who defines the sudden punch on the police officer’s nose as being funny, and he or she does so not verbally but by bursting into laughter. That is, it was not the traffic violator who intended to be funny, nor did the officer make any effort to engage in any playful banter. Secondly, whether or not the observer defines the sudden change in the course of events and actions as being humorous and funny depends on his or her values. If he or she was one of those people who worry about law and order in present-day society, they would in all probability define the situation as being not at all funny. Thirdly, the definition of the situation by the observer which in fact made it humourous and funny was given by laughter,

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not by language. (This point is very important and deserves a separate discussion. It will be the main topic of the next section.) In short, humour is an interaction in which people play with institutionalized meanings within a situation that ought to be defined as being humorous and funny through laughter. In defining the situation as humorous or not, values play a decisive role. Playing with meanings is sometimes defined as funny, sometimes as irritating and embarrassing, sometimes as liberating, and sometimes as offensive and insulting. It all depends on the scale of values that people employ. Consequently, when people intend to be funny and want to reap the ‘success’ of laughter, they should not only time their jests or witticisms correctly, but should also take into account their audience’s scale of values. Shakespeare summed it up pointedly in Love's Labour's Lost: A jest’s prosperity lies in the ear Of him that hears it, never in the tongue Of him that makes it. (64, p. 144)

With regard to values, because humour deviates from the standard and traditional settings of meaning which we tend to call ‘normal’, it is mostly located somewhere between the normal and the abnormal, the civilised and the uncivilised, the couth and the uncouth, the sane and the insane — and, perhaps above all, between order and chaos. By playing with the meanings that structure our daily lives, the humorist is able to disturb our definitions of reality, causing the emergence of doubt as to the value of daily routines and giving rise to some confusion as to the very foundations of reality. However, it should be borne in mind that this mini-reign of chaos is but a mirage of true anarchy and usually lasts not much longer than the laughter it elicits. We realize the playful nature of even the most cruel joke and laugh our anxieties or tensions away: ‘It was only a joke!’. For the duration of the laughing response, humour may affect our faith in reality, but it can never completely destroy it. Humour remains a game, and if it aspires to be more than that, it withers away as humour and is transformed into something else — insults, propaganda, ideological warfare, etc. As we shall see in a moment, even in situations of social and political conflict, humour is doomed to remain playful banter, while the laughter it elicits has the tendency to transcend all ideological boundaries. This may be one of the reasons why political and religious fanatics usually lack any sense

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of humour. Humour and laughter are perhaps the only luxuries they cannot afford. These theoretical considerations should now be enlivened and further substantiated by some examples. Playing with meanings, of course, covers a wide variety of possibilities. For that reason, it is quite impossible to categorize humour satisfactorily. Yet, we can distinguish some broad fields of operation: our speech, our common-sense logic, our daily activities and our emotions tend to follow rather strict patterns which contain traditional and institutional meanings that can be played with abundantly. We shall now briefly discuss these fields of humorous operation.

Playing with the Meanings of Language In meaningful language, words and sentences are under the command of the rules of grammar and syntax. In fact, much of the meaning­ fulness of language derives from this linguistic order which, according to structuralism, has its very roots in structures that lie prior to any historical and cultural entities. Of course, this is not the place to discuss the relations between institutionalized meanings and linguistic depth-structures. It is sufficient to state that any deviation from the linguistic order of our daily speech has the comic effect of one soldier marching to the right, while the rest of the platoon follows the order to march to the left. Turning words and sentences about is a widespread and popular form of linguistic humour. The British call it spoonerism, a term derived from the name of a vicar, William Spooner (1884-1930), dean of an Oxford college, who was notorious for his absentmindedness (92). He did not, of course, invent the spoonerism, which Aldous Huxley nicely called paraphrasia. In fact, Rabelais was already a virtuoso in this branch of humour (88, 87). In addition, Spooner apparently left only a few specimens of this kind of linguistic humour, of which Robbins offers the following example. It is a series of spoonerisms, allegedly triggered by Spooner when he tried to buy a siphon of soda water for his daily whisky: ‘I want’, he began, ‘a soda o f siphon water to be delivered at my home’. ‘I beg your pardon, sir, I didn’t c a tch .. . ’ ‘I said, I want a cider of sophon water’. „ ‘A cider, sir?’

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‘No, no! Not a cider. I want a sofa o f sidon water, and will you send it round at once, please’. ‘A sofa?.. .Oh, you mean a sodon o f cipher water’. ‘No, not a sodon. . . A cipher o f sodon water. . . that is, a water o f sidon sofa, and I want it delivered white array’. (92, p. 459)

Of course the apex of linguistic chaos is reached when the shop­ keeper also gets caught up in the spoonerism. After a while, it becomes quite impossible to separate the normal from the abnormal, the correct from the incorrect. In a suggestive paper, G.B. Milner distinguishes the spoonerism from the chiasm. A spoonerism, he argues, consists of the reversal — BA — of a well-known structure, AB. One must know this structure in order to understand and appreciate the spoonerism. However, in a chiasm an existing structure, AB, is imposed on another structure, BA resulting in a cross-relationship that renders the reversal explicit and demonstrable (31, p. 1009). The effect is not always humorous, as in the biblical chiasm which says that the sabbath exists for man, not man for the sabbath. Such a chiasm can, of course, give rise to an array of humorous variations, yet as it was intended it borders more on wit and what the French call bel esprit than on humour. Milner gives a telling example of a humorous chiasm. In television comedy, two identical nuns showed up: the same height, the same age, the same posture. But one of them was black, wearing a white habit and veil, the other white, wearing a black habit and veil. The reversal of the chiasm, Milner warns, should not be interpreted as a revolt against an existing structure, but should rather be viewed as a way of throwing new light on an existing structure. It emphasizes the inherent meaning of the structure. He refers to a linguistic theory according to which the meaning of language depends on the possibility of an option. That is, the meaning of a word is defined by contrasting it with words that could have been used instead (31, p. 1010). This idea, which originated in the work of Ferdinand de Saussure, can also be found in Max Weber’s ideal type: the meaning of a social phenomenon is rendered rationally understandable (rational Verstehen) by contrasting it with a rationally constructed, artificial type. And as we saw earlier, this reminds us of humour (cf. satire and caricature). This point is of seminal importance for the understanding of humour in general. In their humorous exploits, people play with meanings, turn them about and inside out, twist them and contrast

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them with opposite meanings, rendering them meaningless and absurd. And in doing so, the existing meanings, which tend to grow stale and routine, are refreshed, intensified and consolidated. In this sense, humour is an exercise in meaningfulness and a confirmation of reality. The British, who are generally rich in linguistic humour (126, 127, 128), have another specimen of paraphrasia which they call Irish bull — a linguistic blunder which, in the words of P.A. Sillard, consists of ‘an amusing juxtaposition of opposite meanings and mixed metaphors’ (94, p. 696). The name derives from Obadiah Bull, an 18th century Irish barrister and eccentric, whose rather baroque sentence constructins became legendary. An example of an Irish bull is the following exclamation, heard in the old Irish Parliament: ‘There is not a man, a woman, or child present through whose mind the truth of what I have just stated has been ringing for centuries’ (94, p. 696). Less colourful but equally illustrative is the request of the president of a club at the start of a dinner with too many guests and too few chairs: ‘Gentlemen, please take your seats till we see how we stand’ (94, p. 696). The pun differs from the spoonerism and Irish bull through its lack of simplicity and silliness. It is a play with words that carries an element of surprising wit and ingenuity. Oscar Wilde may well have been the unsurpassed master of the pun. One example taken from a multitude is his description of a foxhunt in which a biting critique on the English upper class is hidden: ‘The unspeakable in full pursuit of the uneatable’ (131, p. 78). The art of punning stands in a long Irish tradition, and goes back, according to Vivien Mercier, to very ancient, magical rhymes (131, p. 80 f.). Sheridan (d. 1738) wrote a book on punning, the Ars Pun-ica, and used to write letters to Swift in a phonetic punning: ‘Eye mash aimed off knot wry tin yew’, to which Swift responded in anglicized, phonetic Latin: ‘Am I say vain Rabble is (Amice venerabilis)’. Sheridan was a virtuoso in this genre, which he called Latino-Anglicus: ‘Mi molis ab uti, an angeli se. An has fine iis, a fine face, ab re ast as no, a belli fora que en. Andi me quis mi molli as I pies’. (My Molly’s a beauty, an angel, I say. And has fine eyes, a fine face, a breast as snow, a belly for a queen. And I may kiss my Molli as I please.) (131, 98) Sheridan and Swift conducted an extensive correspondence in Latino-Anglicus, full of poems, ballads, riddles and tales. These were recirculated among friends. The modern reader realizes that these people made time for active humour, in order to amuse each other in a witty and funny

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way. We claim no longer to have the time for this, but the truth may well be that we are no longer able to practise such non-functional humour, purely for our own entertainment.

Playing with the Meanings of Common-Sense Logic In accordance with, and much like the language we speak, our everyday thoughts follow certain patterns which tell us what can and cannot be thought and said. In other words, there is a common-sense logic which is comparable in its controlling function to logic as a philosophical discipline, and closely related to the grammar and syntax of our language. Common-sense logicis a taken-for-granted series of rules which indicate (if not dictate) what can and cannot be thought and said. In this sense, the thought that a mouse could defeat an elephant, or that a human being could jump over a house, is illogical and crazy. One simply does not entertain a thought which is not even worthy of refutation. Yet, people do entertain such thoughts — not only ‘crazy’ people, but also small children, still living in an enchanted world, and adults who are fond of absurd humour or fascinated by the intrinsic logic of the absurd (cf. Lewis Carroll). Our common-sense thinking is full of axioms which we take for granted and which exert a rather strict control over our thought and speech. For the humorist, this is a rich field of operation. Just as science fiction tries to think the impossible within the frame of reference of the sciences, many jokes and anecdotes try to think the impossible within the frame of reference of common-sense logic. They are usually filed away under the category of absurd humour. Both science fiction and absurd humour play games with the rather fixed and taken-for-granted boundaries between the realms of what can and cannot be thought. The enchanting element of science fiction is its feasibility: one can never be sure whether these technological marvels will not be achieved some time in the future. Absurd humour, on the other hand, tends to erase the boundaries between the possible and the impossible, rendering everything meaningless, senseless and absurd. Unlike science fiction, it is never under pressure to maintain some degree of feasibility. However, playing with the meanings of common-sense logic can take two directions: it can deviate from normal logic by indulging in senseless and absurd ideas; but it can also score off average thought

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and intelligence by use of a shrewd and absurdly smart logic. Jokes without a story, or nonsense jokes of the ‘elephant joke’ variety, belong to the first category. To the second category belong the jokes in which victims outwit their tormentors and through which the teller of the joke outwits his audience. Jewish jokes often follow this second path (140, 146). Somewhere in the city, A. had discovered a little balcony full of the most beautiful flowers. He decided to steal them, and sell them on the market. In the middle of the night he went to the house with a ladder on a pushcart. Upon arrival he placed the ladder against the balcony and began to load the pots on the pushcart. When half o f the pots were on this cart, a patroling police officer caught him in the act and took him to the police station. ‘This is not nice of you’, A. protested indignantly, ‘now I am not able to finish my humane deed’. Much amazed, the officer asked him about the nature o f his charity. ‘Well, Sir, up there lives a good old friend o f mine who has his birthday tomorrow. I’m putting these pots with beautiful flowers up there on the balcony as a surprise for him. When he wakes up in the morning he will see all these flowers in front o f his window, and he will be very happy!’

The simple anecdote is ingenious, since the officer who had just arrived could not know in which direction the flow of pots actually went. It demands a swift reversal of the facts to realize this and then exploit it. Meanwhile, the anecdote’s audience is put on the same spot as the officer — wondering how A. would get out of this trap, and not thinking of the simple solution. A tension is built up which then can be released by laughter or a smile. If it does not slide off into the realm of the absurd and the bizarre, such playing with the meanings of common-sense logic may come close to what is called wit. The technique of the witticism is usually to confront two sets of meanings which should logically be kept apart. When one knows that in British politics the Conservatives are called Cons and the Labour Party Lab, the following remark of Paul Jenkins with regard to the pros and cons of Britain’s entry into the European Economic Community presents a very witty paradox: ‘The Cons were pro, while Lab has turned con’ (27, p. 64). Arthur Koestler gives another example: ‘What is a sadist? A sadist is a person who is kind to a masochist’. He skilfully dissects the different layers of this pun: ‘The link-concept is “ kindness” , bi-sociated with two diametrically opposed meanings; moreover, the whole definition is open to two different interpretations: (a) the sadist does a kindness to the masochist by torturing him; (b) the sadist is torturing the masochist by being kind to him’ (27, p. 65). This is, of

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course, as Koestler argues, a variation on the logical paradox of the Cretan who claims that all Cretans are liars. Playing with Emotional Meanings Not only do our common-sense thoughts and daily speech follow institutionalized paths which render them meaningful, understand­ able and communicable, but our emotions are also in general institutionalized to a degree of which we hardly are aware. That is, our emotional reactions and expressions, above all love and hate, are conditioned to a great extent by the institutions of our culture. Certain situations demand certain emotions: one does not laugh during a funeral service; one weeps when one’s daughter is led to the altar to be married, etc. Very early in our lives, we learn when and how to restrain or release our emotions. In fact, it takes a rather long ‘process of civilisation’ (Norbert Elias) to learn this. But above all, it is through the institutions that people learn what emotions actually are. We have to learn what precisely sorrow and joy are, what it means to be furious or to be in love. A considerable part of humour consists of deviations from, and playful banter with, the institutionalized patterns of our emotions. Black humour or gallows humour belongs to this category. By erasing the boundaries between the couth and uncouth, the proper and the improper, the decent and the indecent, the civilised and the uncivilised, etc., black humour at first hurts our feelings, until laughter covers up the embarrassment. Human situations which we have banished to the fringes of our consciousness — sexual intercourse, fatal illnesses, death, etc. — are surrounded by taboos which have deeply penetrated our emotional lives. Black humour mercilessly violates these taboos, and at first hurts the related emotions. To many of us, depending on our worldview and ethical convictions, such jokes are not really funny and are labelled as sick. However, this moral rejection of black humour is not always justified. In a short but suggestive paper, the noted linguist Viktor B. Schklovksy defended the thesis that anecdotes, including cruel ones, consist exclusively of a semantic opposition of words: ‘Things do not mean a thing in anecdotes. Crucial is above all the opposition of things’ (93, p. 758). Anecdotes, according to Schklovsky, do not refer to any sociological or psychological realities but are in essence only a play with words. He drew the following remarkable conclusion: ‘The blood in anecdotes is never bloody: not things are

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decisive but the relations between things’ (93, p. 757). The conclusion is, of course, too general to be true. Like all forms of humour, many anecdotes do refer to non-linguistic, sociologial and psychological functions. But in the case of black humour, Schklovsky’s thesis seems to be adequate and to the point. A cruel joke engages in an eerie play with the emotions and feelings, carrying its audience to the outer regions of the moral-emotional world. But the person who tells the anecdote is not necessarily cruel or inhuman, just as such masters of suspense as Agatha Christie and Alfred Hitchcock were not criminal. If one is cruel and inhuman by nature, one is unlikely to appreciate black humour, just as it is hard to believe that a hard-core criminal will spend his days in jail reading the suspense novels of Mrs Christie. Moreover, and this is Schklovsky’s point, almost all forms of humour, including the black variety, use the technique of playfully opposing and interchanging frames of meaning which in the routines of daily existence are neatly kept apart. In her study of Irish humour, Vivien Mercier introduces a distinction between macabre and grotesque humour, the first being generally related to death, the second to sexuality. Both types of humour, Mercier argues, neutralize, and thus make bearable, the fear of death and the mystery of sexuality. They are attempts, she writes, To accept death and belittle life’ (131, p. 48f.). Grotesque humour is often phallic and shows the male member enlarged and rather ridiculous. It fails to arouse any erotic lust and is for that reason not pornographic. Its proper frame of reference is rather the complex world of fertility magic. Mercier’s interpretation may be too Victorian, incidentally, when she stresses that grotesque humour ridicules The mysteries of reproduction’ and thus enables people to laugh away their fear and anxiety with regard to sexual life. It is questionable whether pre-modern people suffered from sexual anxieties. Many of their fears concerned the unknown magical forces of the cosmos, including those of sexuality. But even outside such magical beliefs, grotesque, phallic humour often lacked any sign of fear or anxiety. An illustrative example is the priapic poems of Antiquity and the Middle Ages. The priapee (derived from ‘Priapus’, the Greek god of fertility, usually shown in an ithusphallic posture) lost its original magical connotations and developed into a secular, often very funny ode on the male member and its possibilities. The priapic poem is grossly erotic and physical, and it shows, certainly in the late Middle Ages, very little sense of mystery, inhibition, shame or fear.

Humour: Playing with Meanings

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Macabre humour was, according to Mercier, prominent in the traditional Irish wake, where it performed a magical function. People would dance and sing and play various social games during the ceremony. One of these was ‘performing tricks on the corpse’ (131, p. 50). It is remarkable to learn that well-nigh identical tricks were performed by the Luguru of Tanganyika (96, p. 1317f.).

Playing with the Meanings of Everyday Life If we define humour as playing with meanings, we can continue to categorize it according to the many ‘provinces of meaning’ (Schutz) of our social life. Everything human is permeated by meaning, and thus the possibilities of playing with meaning are well-nigh inexhaustible. In music, to give an arbitrary example, one often en­ counters a playful banter with established harmonies and rhythms. If one has some knowledge of the rules of harmony and rhythm in Western, so-called ‘classical’ music, one can easily discover many, often very subtle forms of humour. Lothar Knessl, for instance, wrote: ‘The Finale of Beethoven’s Eighth Symphony strikes the expert’s sense of humour in particular when the main theme gets lost, ends up in F sharp, and is called back to the original F major by the tympanum’ (182, p. 72). Humour can even develop into an art form, as was the case in dadaism and pop-art. Artistic products are here often simply jokes — violations of traditional techniques, definitions, tastes and styles. Since meaning is the marrow of institutions, we could continue our discussion of humour’s fields of operation by considering the various institutional sectors of society: humour and religion (102, 107), humour and the law (181, 186), humour and the sciences (180,182,194), etc. This would not only be a cumbersome procedure, but would also yield few heuristic results. I therefore propose to discuss one last category —- a very broad field which should be seen as a kind of basket into which we can put some relevant remainders. Let us call this category ‘the routines of every­ day life’. Parody and satire fall into this category, as they imitate our daily lives by emphasizing the particular and peculiar in what we generally take for granted. This brand of humour has different degrees of sophistication, running from burlesque sketches in radio and television comedy to biting critiques of political leaders in satire. Closely related are the parable and the fable. The latter is

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characterized by a general moralism (cf. La Fontaine), whereas the former tends to moralize in a much more specific way (cf. the parables of the New Testament). Moreover, whereas the fable is usually inhabited by animals with stereotypical human features and habits, the parable has real people as the main dramatis personae. But both aim at the transcendence of historical reality, creating a kind of meta-historical world which the audience has to translate back into the ‘real’ world of everyday life. The fable of Reynard the Fox, for example, transferred medieval socio-political circumstances to a world of animals, but every person hearing or reading these stories knew perfectly well that this animal world was in fact his or her world. This simple technique creates room for fine expositions of humour, of which Orwell’s AnimalFarm (1945) is the most successful contemporary example. Because of its general character, the fable strikes us as more humorous than the parable which, perhaps because of its rather restricted literary form, makes an altogether more serious impression. In the fable the play with meaningful structures seems to occur for its own sake. The fun of exchanging frames of reference is at least as important as the moral that it tries to communicate. However, in the parable the moral lesson seems to supersede the playful element. The fable and the parable both resemble satire (219, 220, pp. 3-37). In satire, daily reality is confronted with an ideal, about which people love to talk but according to which they rarely live. Satire has a critical function. It berates the august resolutions of all sorts of human beings — and especially political and religious leaders, since they should set a good example. Nevertheless, satire must remain within the boundaries of humour and laughter, or it degenerates into derision or gossip. This was elegantly expressed by an anonymous poet (18th century): How me mistake; th’abusive we think bold; But who calls names in Satire is a Scold; If such be Satire, and if such the use, Call it no longer Satire, but Abuse: Nor with such Ribaldry had I fill’d the Page, But to show Scandal’s, not satirick rage. Scandal is what o f all things I detest. And scarce endure an inoffensive Jest. Ingenious general Satire, I can love, What all that’s personal I disapprove (224, p. 13)

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Satire can be ironic and sarcastic. Ironic satire reveals the disparity between the ideals of mankind and the realities of daily life in an objective and playful manner. It has a sophisticated character, and the response to it is not a loud burst of laughter, but a faint and pleased smile. Sarcastic satire, on the other hand, is much more subjective and aggressive. It often borders on character assassination. The response to it is not usually laughter and rarely a smile — at best a wry, sardonic smile. Caricature is a form of humour which comes close to satire (222, 223). It is an over-accentuation of certain physiognomic and bodily features of ‘important individuals’, usually with the intent to expose some allegedly hidden moral or immoral qualities and character traits. It has a distinctly critical function, and its focus is mainly on people in power, whom the caricaturist often tears from the pedestal they have been put on by others and by themselves. According to Grotjahn, the caricaturist aims at ‘the unmasking and degradation of a person of authority or fame’ (68, p. 17). Closely related is, of course, the cartoon — usually a short story in which the trivial and all too human features of certain people are slated (138, 221, 225). The cartoon focuses less on important or famous people, but tries to demonstrate how peculiar normal human beings actually are. The cartoon went through a true evolution in the so-called ‘funny papers’. Many cartoons (cf. Snoopy, Andy Capp, etc.) have over the years developed a kind of philosophy of life. In the cracker-barrel philosophy of many of them (cf. M ad, Asterix, etc.), satire and caricature appear to be the main ingredients of the humour. Like the parable, the fairy tale is a border-line case in the world of humour. It has much in common with the parable but also carries features of the fable and of satire. The fairy tale usually contains a moral lesson for young and old, and pierces through the taken-for grantedness of daily existence, exhibiting the deeper symbolic, if not metaphysical, structures of the human condition. It is perhaps the closest link that Western people have with the pre-modern world of mythology. Some fairy tales are very witty and humorous. Perhaps the best example is Hans Christian Andersen’s story of the emperor’s new clothes. The little boy, not yet thoroughy indoctrinated into adult definitions of reality, is the only person who shouts out that the emperor’s garments are not invisible but simply missing. In his innocence he unmasks a joke which could only be successful because adults tend to follow each other blindly and adhere solidly to their collective definitions of reality. The story has

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some profound philosophical implications, but it is primarily its humour and wit which have given it its lasting power and charm. Finally, we should realize that not all humour consists of outspoken and overt deviations from standard, institutionalized structures of meaning. There is, for example, the subtle humour contained in understatement, which is often witty and funny in an unobtrusive manner (cf. 128). Understatement is very common in the Anglo-Saxon world, and in a sense the direct opposite of slapstick which has also gained prominence there. Or is there a difference? Is understatement grounded in the lifestyle of the traditional British gentleman and his inherent, rather subdued conservatism? And is slapstick the product of America’s boisterous, expansive and massively reproduced lifestyle? We again reach the very limits of humour with the riposte. It is very similar to understatement. The riposte can be funny and witty, but one wonders whether it still falls within the realm of humour as defined in this section. Skinner gave a fine example of a witty riposte. During his exile in England, Napoleon III of France received much assistance and material help from an English lady, but once he had returned to the throne, he chose to ignore her. However, they met again at a reception in Paris. He asked coolly ‘Restez-vous longtemps a Paris?’ The lady’s quick response was: ‘Et vous, Sire?’ (80, p. 98).

Humour as Something Living in Something Mechanical Most social-scientific theories tend to neglect the sociological dimensions of humour and laughter. However, a noted exception is Bergson’s famous essay, ‘Le rire’. What he wrote about laughter is true of humour in general: in order to understand it, it ought to be viewed in its natural environment, which is society. In society, Bergson says with emphasis, humour carries out a very specific function (5, p. 7). But precisely because his argument is so sociological, we should at this point discuss it critically and in more detail. In accordance with his philosophy of life, Bergson defines humour (or ‘the comic’) as something mechanical imposed on something living (5, p. 4). Bergson was enchanted by the phenomenon of life, which he described vividly as an ongoing stream — duree — experienced as an ongoing stream of consciousness.

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Humour, on the other hand, is a mechanical repetition within this duree — a mecanisation de la vie which elicits laughter because it is completely unexpected. It is as if life freezes into a predictable, mechanical system. Bergson quotes Pascal’s observation that we have to smile when we see identical twins: we simply do not expect such a mechanical duplication within the non-mechanical stream of life. It is as if a machine, and not life, had been at work in producing these twins. Bergson’s theory of humour is very attractive to the sociologist, but his overarching definition of it as ‘something mechanical in something living’ is hard to maintain in a sociological frame of reference. In fact, the sociologist of knowledge is inclined to turn this definition about. In the sociology of knowledge we focus on the behaviour of people within the structures of institutions and organizations. We thus focus on repetitive behaviour or role behaviour — i.e. on the mechanical dimensions of social life. Institutionalization is a process of routinization, causing a certain mechanization of life. It renders our speaking, thinking, feeling and acting predictable, rationally understandable, and — in a sense — mechanical. Now, humour introduces into this institutionalized and mechanical order an element of surprise, of the unexpected, of the non-mechanical. The humorist, juggling with the institutionalized structures of meaning, deviates from the mechanical fabric of social life, upsetting it for the duration of the laughter he triggers. Humour, in short, is something living in something (institutionally) mechanical. We witness the antics of the jester. The order of routine meanings is thoroughly disturbed, but we realize at the same time that this reign of anarchy is only temporary because it is just a joke. The tension is dissolved in laughter. Laughter defines the whole happening as an innocent play with meanings. Arthur Koestler’s critique of Bergson’s definition of humour deserves attention too. He is worth quoting in extenso: According to Bergson, the main sources o f the comic are the mechanical attributes o f inertia, rigidity, and repetitiveness impinging on life; among his favorite examples are the man-automaton, the puppet on strings, Jack-in-the-Box, etc. However, if rigidity contrasted with organic suppleness were laughable in itself, Egyptian statues and Byzantine mosaics would be the best jokes ever invented. If automatic repetitiveness in human behaviour were a necessary and sufficient condition o f the comic there would be no more amusing spectacle than an epileptic fit; and if we wanted a good laugh we would merely have to feel a person’s pulse or

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The Sociology o f Humour and Laughter listen to his heart-beat, with its monotonous tick-tack. If ‘we laugh each time a person gives us the impression o f being a thing,’ there would be nothing more funny than a corpse (27, p. 47).

In fact, one of the major techniques of humour is not the endless repetition of the same, but on the contrary the skilful exploitation of the unexpected and the unpredictable. This is usually done by the opposition or mere juxtaposition of two totally different frames of meaning. Cameron, for instance, writes: ‘Many jokes derive their effect by contrasting two different frames of reference in which something which would be appropriate to one is mistaken and inappropriate to the other’ (34, p. 85). Meanings lose, so to speak, their fixed foundation and begin to float about when their frames of reference get mixed up, as in the following two examples from Cameron: Three deaf Englishmen travel by train. The first looks out o f the window and asks: I say, is this Wimberly?’. The second answers, ‘No, this is Thursday’. Whereupon the third: ‘So am I. Let’s get o ff and have a drink!’ A man brings his deaf uncle to church. ‘There’s the preacher’, he whispers. ‘Eh?’, says the uncle, ‘You say he’s a teacher?’ ‘No, he’s the preacher! H e’s a son o f the bishop!’ ‘Yes, indeed, aren’t they all!” (34, p. 90).

Max Eastman describes the technique used in most anecdotes and jokes as ‘the dispatch and the wreckage of a train of thought’ (16, p. 66). They arouse in the listener a certain expectation which, as a result of a sudden change of direction, remains unfulfilled. The joke is at the listener’s expense. In the following example an expectation is slowly build up which does not lead mechanically to its fulfilment — on the contrary: A man who stuttered badly told the manager of a country club that he loved to play golf and hated to play alone, but was shy about his stuttering. The manager said, ‘I know just the solution — a lady who often plays here stutters too and I am sure you would get along fine together’. A match was arranged and they met on the green. The man introduced himself. ‘My n-n-name is P-P-P-P-Peter’, he said smilingly, ‘but I am not a s-s-s-s-saint’. — ‘M-m-m-my name is M-M-M-M-Mary’, she replied with a smile, ‘but I am not a v-v-v-v-very good player.’

From his perspective — that of the sociology of knowledge — Peter L. Berger summed this up neatly: ‘Discrepancy is the stuff of which jokes are made, and frequently it is the punch line that reveals the “ entirely different meaning’’. The little Jew meets the big Negro.

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The mouse wants to sleep with the elephant. The great philosopher loses his pants’ (103, p. 87). But the role of the punch line is ambiguous. The end of a joke is not always unpredictable. Laughter can often be aroused precisely because a joke works towards a fully expected punch line. The clash of frames of meaning is, as it were, a little drama which unfolds before our eyes, and leads to a cathartic smile or relieving laugh. The following anecdote may serve as an illustration: Mr Ginzburg, 70 years old, had just lost his wife. The children decided to offer him a cruise on a steamer in order to divert him from his grief. He was brought to the boat by his oldest son who asked the steward to assign a nice table companion to his father, since he was rather lonely. At the first luncheon, Mr Ginzburg was seated at a table for two, soon enough joined by another gentleman who smiled at him and said kindly: ‘Bon appetit’. He smiled in return and said politely: ‘Ginzburg’. The same happened that evening at the dinner table: ‘Bon appetit’ — ‘Ginzburg’. The steward overheard this, realized his mistake, and took Mr Ginzburg apart after dinner. He explained to him the meaning o f the French words. Very embarrassed, Mr Ginzburg took the lead at the breakfast table next morning and said: ‘Bon appetit’, to which the Frenchman answered smilingly: ‘Ginzburg!’ (cf. also 34, p. 86 f.).

Ambiguity is the essence of humour. Therefore, the tragic and the comic are often hard to distinguish. A Dutch philosopher once defined tragedy as ‘the high endeavour that frustrates itself’ (19, p. 18 f.). One tries to reach perfection, but the opposite effect is realized as an unintended consequence. However, this mechanism is also at work in much comedy. An important difference is that tragedy results in pain and sense of guilt, whereas the comic causes pleasure and fades away in laughter. Yet, the boundaries are often very thin. What is subjectively experienced as distress and guilt may well be objectively defined, in the eyes of the beholder, as comedy. Moreover, with the lapse of time many tragedies are slowly transformed into comedies. Perhaps this mixture of tragedy and comedy can only be found in literature. Don Quixote was the classic example of this, but perhaps no one caught the blurring of comedy and tragedy in everyday life as well as Anton Chekhov in his short stories and his plays. This may well be the most sublime form of humour (21, pp. 209-18). At this point, two further observations deserve our attention. First, the joke itself may be surprising in its content; however, the telling of the joke is often not at all unexpected or surprising. Second, not all unexpected and surprising events are experienced as

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humorous or funny. Throughout history and in many different cultures, people have made a living from jesting, and these professional jesters were expected to entertain their audiences with various brands of surprising humour and wit. Jesters have appeared in many guises: ceremonial clowns in tribal societies of Africa and North America, circus clowns in Western civilisation, comedy actors on stage and the screen, court jesters in the Middle Ages, popular fools of the Till Eulenspiegel variety, etc. They were rewarded materially for their pranks and jokes, even if these jests were at times rather painful or embarrassing. Theirs was the legendary fool’s freedom. In addition, throughout several ages and in many different cultures, people have set apart certain periods for mirth and banter — times of fun during which the reins of social control were loosened, traditional values and norms desecrated, and taboos violated. Carnival, mardi gras, 1 April and Halloween are all survivals of such joking periods which in earlier times were, of course, permeated with fertility symbols and drenched in magic. Much of this has evaporated in the process of modernization, but we retain the faint notion that the bow cannot always remain taut. Humour and laughter are the perfect means to bring about this social and psychological relaxation (cf. 207). Yet, and this is the second observation, not all unexpected and surprising events are experienced as being humorous and funny. Sudden events in nature, for example an earthquake, or unexpected human acts, like a sudden slap in the face, frighten us. Only later, when the event has proved to be innocent or unimportant, do we laugh our fear away. But this is not always possible. Confronted by an unexpected event, people may lose their heads and panic. There are, in fact, three different strategies by which people can counter the unexpected: (1) it can be ridiculed: (2) it can be manipulated, in a pre-modern way by means of magic, in a modern manner by means of science and technology: and (3) it can be sublimated by elevating it into a metaphysical principle such as God or fate. Generally, it is impossible to predict which of these strategies people will choose, and a combination of strategies remains possible. We shall return to the first strategy when we discuss laughter in the next section.

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The Humorous Definition of the Situation Freedom is the prerogative of humour, yet most humour occurs in situations which are not merely circumstantial but on the contrary very constitutive of it. The success of a joke is very much dependent on the situation within which the audience decides to define the joke as being funny. A zote, for instance, is a risque joke with more or less subtle erotic allusions. It derives its prime power from the fact that its content is unknown. If someone tells a zote which has become widely known, it will strike us as rather embarrassing. However, if an unlikely person tells the dirty Witz, the joke may strike us as funny again. This means that the effect of the joke depends on the situation in which it is told and on the definition of that situation by the audience. Its effect depends much less on the intention of the person who tells the joke or on the content of the joke itself. However, in some cases the teller of the joke is a sort of humorous institution — professional comedians like Charlie Chaplin, Groucho Marx or Danny Kaye. No matter what they say or do, people will define their words, grimaces, gestures and acts as being funny (198,

201) . Like all interactions, joking and jesting take place in social situations, and whether or not we can call them humorous depends on the definition of these situations by the parties to the joking and jesting. Azote told by a nun in her convent is unlikely to be appreciated and met by hearty laughter, though she may have considerable success outside the religious institution, even when the content of the joke has long been common knowledge. One of the most difficult things we have to learn when growing up is which type of humour is or is not suitable to a given situation. If we are not skilled in this, we may cause considerable embarrassment (which, with hindsight, or looked at from the outside, may well be defined as being funny again!). A poorly placed or badly timed joke resembles a swear-word which is part of normal jargon in the army, but becomes unacceptable if transferred to the ranks of the Salvation Army. How do people define situations as humorous and funny? One thing is sure: people rarely state verbally that a situation can be labelled in terms of humour. We shall see next that laughter is the appropriate medium through which this message is communicated.

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The Sociology o f Humour and Laughter 3 LAUGHTER: THE LANGUAGE OF HUMOUR

Introduction Voltaire, Kant wrote in 1790, claimed that heaven gave mankind two things to relieve the many troubles of life: hope and sleep. He could have added laughter, Kant believed. As a profound philosopher, Kant knew how essential laughter is to human existence. Both before and after him, philosophers have thought about humour and laughter, and their intrinsic relationship to the human condition. It suffices to mention Plato, Aristotle, Hobbes and, in our century, Bergson and Plessner (cf. 79). Although this is rarely done, humour and laughter are best discussed separately, since there is humour without laughter and laughter without humour. They usually go together, but are far from synonymous. Moreover, laughter should not be interpreted exclusively, as is often done, simply as a reaction to a humorous stimulus. Laughter, this section will argue, is an autonomous expression which may or may not be part of a humorous interaction. In this interaction, laughter functions in a way which reminds us very much of the role that language plays in daily communicative behaviour. In addition to drawing the broad outlines of a sociological theory of humour, this section will attempt to sketch a sociological theory of laughter which starts, and in part deviates from, some influential contemporary theories, notably those of Bergson, Freud and Plessner. After their ideas about laughter have been discussed briefly, an attempt will be made to indicate how laughter could be interpreted sociologically. Some of Bergson’s ideas will prove particularly helpful, while G.H. Mead’s thoughts on meaningful social interaction can also be put to an heuristic use. In fact, the frame of reference of symbolic interactionism (so-called) will enable us to avoid the serious mistake of viewing laughter merely as a more o r less automatic, psychological response to a humorous stimulus. Rather, laughter plays a constitutive role in humorous interactions. Laughteriis, metaphorically speaking, the very language of humour.

from the SAGE Social Science Collections. All Rights Reserved.

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Freud, Bergson and Plessner on Laughter In his Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious (1905) Freud views laughter as a mechanism by which psychic energy is discharged. Laughter thus causes psychic relief which produces a libidinal experience of pleasure. This is particularly the case with laughter in response to a joke: the Witz expresses things one tends to repress, and thus psychic energy is saved which would otherwise have been needed for the repression demanded by the super-ego. Thus the pleasure aroused by laughter is of a psychic-economic nature: The physical process in the hearer, the joke’s third person, can scarcely he more aptly described than by stressing the fact that he has bought the pleasure o f the joke with very small expenditure on his own part. He might be said to have been presented with it (64, p. 148).

In other words, the brake put on the emotions by the super-ego has become superfluous, and the psychic energy thereby saved is now discharged with pleasure. Laughter is actually the most adequate method for this release and discharge: . . . the hearer o f the joke laughs with the quota o f psychical energy which has become free through the lifting o f the inhibitory cathexis; we might say that he laughs this quota o ff (64, p. 149)

It is interesting to note that, independently of Freud, Sylvia Bliss had drawn quite similar conclusions in her perceptive paper on laughter. She wrote, for example: ‘[For] laughter is the result of suddenly released repression, the physical sign of subconscious satisfaction* (55, p. 239). Freud made a distinction among what he called Witz, Humor and Komik. The distinction remains, like most conceptual differentiations concerning humour, quite arbitrary and rather vague. Moreover, although his interpretation of laughter as a release mechanism which causes pleasure applies to all three categories, his brief analysis of laughter remains restricted to the first. Laughter, to Freud, is mainly a response to a joke {Witz) and jokes are again reduced to representations of forbidden ideas, that is to zotes — a risque joke of an erotic and aggressive nature. Max Eastman was correct when he observed that Freud obviously had little use for innocent, nonsensical jokes (cf. 15, p. 76). According to Freud, our

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jokes resemble our dreams — or, in psychoanalytical argot, Witzarbeit is similar to Traumarbeit. Like dreams, jokes transport the unconscious past the censor and give vent to deeply hidden and repressed feelings of aggression. Joking and its concomitant laughter are never in fact a rather superficial play-with-meanings, or a gay banter with the taken-for-granted meaning structures of reality. Huizinga’s homo ludens is brutally pushed aside here by Hobbes’ homo homini lupus. Without denying the existence of an aggressive element in the human personality, such anthropological reductionism can hardly be adequate to a sociological analysis of humour and laughter. Moreover, Freud’s theory of laughter remains mechanical: to him, laughter is not an autonomous human expression. It remains a response, a reaction and a method. At this point, Plessner’s theory of laughter provides a welcome alternative (cf. 33). To Plessner, laughter is more than a gesture or psychic mechanism. It is primarily a human expression, comparable and congenial to crying. In his thoughtful study entitled Lachen und Weinen (1941), laughing and crying are interpreted as expressions which have in common that they lie on the borderline of the conscious and meaningful on the one hand, and the unconscious and psychical on the other. Both reveal, on closer scrutiny, the essence of the conditio humana which consists in the fact that human beings do not only have a body, but at the very same time also are a body: they are not only physical bodies but simultaneously psychic beings. This fundamental ambiguity — which is unique in the cosmos — was captured by Plessner in the notion of ‘man’s eccentric position in nature’. This anthropological eccentricity becomes obvious in the case of crying and laughing. Human beings never identify completely with their bodies. It is typically human to be somewhat distanced from one’s own body:4A human being is always at the same time body (head, trunk, extremities with everything that is in them) — also when he is convinced there is an eternal soul in this body somehow — and has a body as this body’ (33, p. 43, my translation — A.Z.). With crying and laughing, the body-one-has appears to have taken over from the body-one-is: the first has overruled the second and run off. In a sense, as the bodies-we-are — i.e. psychic beings — we fall victim to a burst of crying or laughing by the bodies-we-have. We cannot help but cry or laugh — our bodies run away with us. Thus, crying and laughing are symptoms of a disturbance of equilibrium between the

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body-we-have and the body-we-are. Two questions demand an answer. First, what causes such disturbances of equilibrium? Second, what is the precise difference between crying and laughing, if both are to be viewed as an imbalance between physical body and psychic personality? Plessner argues that crying or laughter are caused by circumstances to which people cannot respond readily and adequately — an unexpected word, a sudden event. We lose our heads, we capitulate as persons, and the body-we-have takes the lead — through laughter, or tears. The body-we-have is now no longer an instrument of mind, language and behaviour. On the contrary, the crying or laughing body has taken command of the mind and expresses what the body-we-are could not express. In this sense, crying and laughing are autonomous expressions, and thus not mere responses to stimuli. It should be noted that these autonomous expressions remain in Plessner’s theory primarily physiological in nature. Moreover he views them as human capitulations: the body-we-have takes over command and assumes responsibility, as a result of which we break up as a unity of mind, psyche and body. Plessner calls this the last trump card (33, p. 153). When we are not really concerned with an unanswerable situation, we can and will easily ignore it. But when such a situation does touch us existentially, it results in tensions because we do not know how to react meaningfully and adequately. We should do something but we do not know how; and the body-we-have takes command: we laugh or cry incessantly. It is here that we must examine the fine distinction between crying and laughing. In crying, the body-we-have responds to an unanswerable situation which is existentially important and in which the body-we-are still plays a (subjective) role. Grief wells up, we try to compose ourselves, but finally surrender to the body-wehave. As much as we are overtaken by the body-we-have, we are still subjectively involved in this crying spell. Laughing people, on the other hand, are more objective and personally less involved in their laughter. Laughter often gives them a sense of superiority over others. Plessner does not hesitate to speak about the ‘emotional frigidity of laughter’: ‘Even the most affectionate, humorous, profoundly sensitive laughter has a touch of the superficial. Man reacts by laughter in a direct manner, without being involved in the answer. In a sense, he becomes anonymous in laughter — reasons why laughter possesses an infectious power’ (33, p. 125).

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Plessner seems to abandon this explanation of laughter as an autonomous (bodily) expression and begins to interpret it more as response to a stimulus when he discusses various inducements to laughter in the third chapter of his book — for example tickling, playing, comedy and jokes, embarrassment and despair. In the case of tickling, such a stimulus-response explanation might have validity. But in the case of humorous laughter within the context of social groups, such a behaviouristic approach seems insufficient. It is now time to introduce some sociology. Here Bergson’s famous essay Le rire (1900) may give us a helpful start. The essay — which deals more with humour than with laughter — states right at the beginning that our laughter is always the laughter of a group. In order fully to understand it, we ought to put it back in its natural environment, which is society. We should try to determine, Bergson argues, its useful function — that is, a social function: laughter needs to respond to certain exigencies of social life and must have a social meaning (5, p. 8). As we saw in the previous section, humour — which Bergson calls Te comique’ — is defined by him as a mechanization of life: within the ongoing stream of life and consciousness an unexpected mechanism seems to be at work, with human beings acting like puppets on a string, and with events occurring as if driven by a huge clockwork. Laughter, then, is viewed by him as a correction of this mechanism: it underscores the mechanical and automatic, yet tries to loosen it up. The mechanical and automatic are humorous; and laughter loosens them up: ‘cette raideur est le comique et le rire en est le chatiment’ (5, p. 21). However, Bergson does not argue that the laughing person defines the mechanical and automatic as being humorous, correcting the rigidity by laughter. He rather views laughter instrumentally by defining it as a corrective response to a humorous rigidity. To this he adds another social function which in his argument weighs heavily: the function of social control. Social life demands that we be alert and notice continuously what goes on in life (‘attention a la vie’). This requires us to be mentally and physically flexible, to be able, in other words, to adjust quickly and adequately when necessary. Tension and elasticity are the two complementary forces that are at stake in life (5, p. 18f.). Laughter has a double function in respect of these forces: it causes relaxation and elasticity, yet keeps people under control. Laughter prevents people from deviating too radically from what is generally deemed to be couth, normal, proper

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and decent. Stressing this control function, Bergson gradually defines laughter as being at the expense of other people. Once again, the playful nature of laughter is sacrificed to a reduced vision of it. Plato had already argued in Philebus that laughter has a malicious nature, since it occurs at the expense of others (cf. 79, p. 152). Hobbes adopted this interpretation and believed that laughter expresses a sense of superiority and triumph over the weaknesses of others (cf. 75, p. 160). Freud’s interpretation ought to be seen in the same light, since he sees laughter as causing not only a sense of pleasure but also of superiority. The same applies in Bergson’s theory of laughter, where it not only corrects the rigidities of social life but also manages to keep people in line for fear of being laughed at. Laughter does loosen up social rigidities, yet it prevents the resulting elasticity from degenerating into sheer chaos. Part of these one-sided and rather humourless interpretations of laughter finds its origin in the fact that laughter is constantly viewed instrumental^, namely as a reaction to a stimulus. These theorists have somehow failed to view laughter as something autonomous, as a constitutive element of a (usually playful) social interaction. Even Plessner’s theory, which comes close to such an interpretation, relapses into a behaviouristic explanation. At this point, G.H. Mead’s notion of meaningful social interaction, together with some basic ideas of symbolic interactionism, may offer a valuable and heuristically useful corrective (cf. 41).

G.H. Mead on Laughter What Max Eastman said about Spencer applies to most theorists who have thought about laughter: he ‘undertook to explain all laughter. . . in the same manner that you would explain the operation of a pump or a siphon’ (14, p. 175). Mead is happily an exception, although he never did establish a complete symbolic-interactionist theory of laughter. His thought remained fragmentary. According to Mead’s theory of social interaction, ‘society’ consists of countless interactions between human beings who not only exchange physical gestures but also communicate with each other through language and meaningful (symbolic) actions. Crucial to this communication is the fact that people assume the attitudes and roles of their partners during interaction. Mead called this ‘taking the role (or attitude) of others’. If I explain something to

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someone, this partner in the interaction will not just listen to the sounds that pour out of my mouth but also and at the very same time address my words to himself; while I myself will not just address him, opposite me, but also assume his role of listener and thus address myself as if I were my own listener. It is only because of this internalization of roles (or attitudes), of which we are hardly aware during the daily course of events and actions, that we are able to understand each other and to communicate socially and meaning­ fully. Moreover, taking the role of the other has an important sociological dimension. Mead argues that we do not merely internalize the attitudes of specific (significant) individuals around us. On the contrary, the greater part of these attitudes represent collective and traditional roles which are structurally related to one another. Mead calls these roles, which we learn to internalize during the process of socialization, institutions and the structured whole of institutions: society. At this point, Mead’s theory reminds us strongly of Durkheim’s idea of the collective representations (also called institutions by Durkheim) which make up society. In his discussion of laughter, Mead gives the following example: we walk along the street and see a man stumble and fall flat on the pavement. Why do we laugh? We identify, Mead argues, with the falling man — we take over his attitude, and seem to fall with him; The event at first frightens us, but when we realize that nothing serious has happened and that we do not have to crawl to our feet in order to regain our normal, upright position — that we can, on the contrary, come to the rescue and help the man to his feet again — we burst into laughter, or suppress it in a smile. The tension disappears, we can relax (44, p. 206). Mead’s theorizing, including his brief treatment of laughter, remains fragmentary and ought to be extrapolated. As it stands now, it remains too close to the Freudian notion of discharge and superiority. Moreover, the example he gives suggests that he too viewed laughter primarily as a response to a stimulus. As to the latter, however, one should bear in mind that in Meadean interactionism ‘response’ never represents an independent reaction to an independent stimulus. Through the process of taking the role of the other, a response is immediately changed into a stimulus and vice-versa. In Mead’s theory, a social interaction resembles a spiral in which it is hard to determine what is the stimulus and what is the response, what is the cause and what is the effect. Even a ‘meaningless’ physical gesture occurs in a meaningful context of

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interactions and may receive its own symbolic meaning from that context. The m an’s stumbling and falling is in itself a ‘meaningless’ event, but it is in a meaningful context, in which people are defined as creatures who ought to move in an upright position, that this event is defined as being funny and humorous — and the definition is not made verbally but by means of laughter. This should be elaborated next.

Laughter as a Language The wild and uncontrolled movements of the stumbling and falling man are in themselves nothing but physical gestures — instinctive, bodily reactions. However, they change into a meaningful (i.e. understandable) act because of the reactions of the beholders and bystanders. They define this act verbally, if need be, not as a lunatic fit, or as a rather amateurish ballet performance, but as a fall. There is usually no need for such a verbal explanation. Laughter does as well, if not better. Let us assume that one witness to this fall had inwardly followed what had happened, and had then burst into laughter. What does this laughter mean? Why did he or she not react with a straight face? The laughter indicates that the incident proved to be perfectly innocent, irrelevant and not serious: the man was obviously not hurt. He stumbled, made erratic movements with his arms and legs, and fell down like a small child who is not yet able to keep its body under control. The whole event fell out of the ordinary, deviated from the routine course of daily life, deviated from the established meanings to which we are accustomed, and showed human reality from a different angle. At first it had no clear meaning, and thus called for a quick interpretation, a quick re­ definition of reality: the event could well be threatening and dangerous, or irritating and stupid. But it could be harmless and innocent as well — funny, humorous or comic. The latter can indeed be expressed verbally, and sometimes is: ‘Oh my God, did you scare me; please, let me help you to get up!’ But the laughing response is probably more adequate: ‘Nothing serious happened, we can laugh our fears away’. It invites the victim, who may have assumed the attitude of the beholder, to join in the laughter, and thus return smoothly to reality and the routine course of events. In sum, after laughter had defined the event as an innocent, humorous incident, a symbolic interaction between the beholder and the victim of the fall

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emerged from what started as a set of crudely physical gestures and movements. Thus laughter is more than a response: it is constitutive of the emerging symbolic interaction which can now be called a humorous incident. Without much mutual involvement and emotional investment, the situation is defined as an innocent and irrelevant one, enabling the beholder and the victim of the fall to return to the routines of daily life — to restore reality and its customary meanings. The laughing definition, far from being a simple response to a stimulus, brought back a strange and unusual event to the common and familiar routines of everyday existence in which people maintain their upright position, do not crawl like reptiles or infants, and do not stagger or throw their legs and arms around erratically. We could change the old dictum of W .I. Thomas slightly and apply it to laughter: ‘If people define situations as humorous by laughing, they are humorous in their consequences’. The infectious nature of laughter can also be understood now: just as speech invites speaking, causing the emergence of a discussion, so laughter triggers laughing, giving rise to a humorous situation. Laughter is infectious because, like the spoken word, it needs a response: the only adequate response to laughter is, of course, laughter. Humour is thus viewed as an emergent property of human interaction. It emerges from the interaction because of the defining work of laughter. Just as language is indispensable to thought and not the simple outcome of it, so laughter is constitutive of humour and not just the response to a humorous stimulus. Rose L. Goser summed this up nicely when she wrote: ‘A situation is defined as humorous by the laughing response that it elicits’ (158, p. 172). This shows once more that the intention to be funny, on the part of someone who tells a joke, is actually quite irrelevant to the humorous quality of his spoken words. Crucially important, however, is the willingness of his audience to define a given situation, or a certain event, or some spoken words, as being humorous, funny or comic. Again, this willingness depends very much on the circumstances of the moment and the definitions that prevail — variables, in other words, which have nothing to do with humour. The partner who laughs during an interaction has followed the joke, taking over the attitudes of its raconteur and the roles of its dramatis personae. He has observed and inwardly felt the bantering play with established meanings — how they gradually lose their

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plausibility and are turned around, inside-out or upside-down, perverted, inverted or distorted. It dawns on him that reality could be different, radically different. A cognitive dissonance arises in him — dissonance between the reality of everyday life and the reality of the joke. The only way to dissolve this dissonance is to laugh it away and to thus define it as implausible, impossible, irrelevant or innocent — an incident not to be taken seriously. Instead of breaking the cognitive dissonance verbally (which, of course, could be done as well), the raconteur’s audience bursts out laughing: ‘Don’t worry, the incident is just funny, reality and its established meanings are not really shaken’. Common sense triumphs. Donald Hayworth expressed the very same idea in another context: ‘Social usages are being violated but we recognize that the violation is not vital — that society will still be safe. And we give the signal of our opinion by laughing’ (18, p. 375). One question remains to be answered. We have compared laughter to language, defining it as a response to cognitive dissonance which, in turn, serves as a stimulus and thus causes the emergence of a humorous interaction. Why should not verbal language be useful? Why could not the beholder of the fall, or the audience of a joke, simply state: ‘Reality has not been threatened, this is just a joke or a humorous incident, now carry on as normal! ’ Why do the beholder of the fall or the audience of the joke laugh? (cf. also 32). To begin with, a verbal response would run the risk of being taken as a joke, and thereby lose the capacity to dissolve the dissonance. On the contrary, a second cognitive dissonance would be introduced. However, another consideration is more relevant. Intentionally or not, people play with daily and established meanings in humour. These meanings are, so to speak, stored in language. If one responded in words to this play with meanings, one would from the outset assume the legitimacy of this reversal or perversion of meanings. The sudden event or the meaning­ transforming joke are then treated as potential realities. Thus one would leave the realm of common sense and encounter the event or joke in terms of the cognitive dissonance involved. One would get caught in its web and be doomed to lose eventually: everything one says seriously is in danger of being held up to ridicule. It will thus be impossible to restore reality — cognitive dissonance will run riot. Laughter, on the other hand, is able to escape this dilemma. It defines the event or the spoken words (the joke) as unreal, untrue, senseless, irrelevant and funny. Cognitive dissonance is dissolved in

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favour of daily life and common sense. Reality and its established meanings are triumphantly maintained and remain, in the end, unharmed. Laughter is irrefutable. The only adequate response to laughter is: laughter! Carpenter was right when he called laughter ‘a glory in sanity’ (cf. 8). Is there then no aggressive and vicious laughter? Of course, laughter can be at the expense of other human beings — in fact, it quite often is. But in this section the playful dimension of laughter has been deliberately singled out as an antidote to the still predominant Hobbesian vision of laughter as an expression of aggression and superiority.

Conclusion Is the reality of humour — a reality of inverted and perverted meanings, a true looking-glass reality — absurd and senseless? If, for the sake of argument, we bracket our reassuring laughter, is this reality the abyss of chaos, the symbolization of the primordial darkness prior to the creation of the cosmos — as many profound myths have claimed? Moreover, is it altogether clear who is the sensible and sane partner in the humorous interaction — the bantering clown or his laughing audience? Of course, these are philosophical questions which cannot be answered by the social sciences. Perhaps no satisfactory answer is possible outside the frame of reference of mythology. With great stylistic virtuosity and ingenious wit, Erasmus dealt with these questions in Encomium Moriae (1509), an ironic praise of folly. Convinced of the inanities of medieval scholasticism and of the political follies of his time, he presented to his readers a silly, yet very cunning goddess, Stultitia, who systematically dethrones all earthly wisdom and power by putting them on a par with mundane follies. The boundaries between wisdom and folly which we try painstakingly to maintain are dissolved. They evaporate during the course of this goddess’s long and foolish exposition. Erasmus conceived the outline of the story during one of his long and often boring journeys through Europe. He finally wrote it in the house of his great friend Thomas More, to whom it is dedicated with a pun on his name (moria means folly). Both enjoyed the book greatly, as millions of readers have done after them. It was and still is savoured as an entertaining and witty comedy. Yet, the message is very

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profound, if also rather eerie: Stultitia rules mightly in this book, but do not forget that her reign is as powerful in the reality in which the readers live. Is the reality of Don Quixote the reality of a deranged man? Of course not. Cervantes’ immortal story of the knight of rueful countenance and his simple servant is not a chronicle of psychopathology. It is a mythological description of the human condition. Cervantes, one should never forget, wanted to tell an entertaining and funny story. Yet, intentionally or not, he laid bare some of the fundamental dimensions of human life. Are dreams such as those of Don Quixote real, or is reality just a quixotic dream? Is the madman wise and the wise man mad? Is the fool serious and the serious person a fool? In fact, these questions, formulated in this faulty manner, still separate two spheres of reality — the meaningful and the absurd, the wise and the foolish, the sane and the mad. Cervantes, like Erasmus, believed that these spheres cannot be separated at all: to them, human life is in essence characterized by the fact that both spheres tend constantly to merge. Here, verbal language halts, and begins to stammer. The only adequate language left at this point is laughter. 4 HUMOUR AND LAUGHTER IN THE SOCIAL FABRIC Introduction People in many different cultural and societal settings spend much time in bantering and frolicking, in telling jokes and funny stories, in teasing and in pulling each other’s legs, and in laughing together. Why? Or, to follow an attractive line of thought developed by Berlyne in his paper on humour, laughter and play, why is it so hard to conceive of the human race as a species that conducts its daily business in deadly earnest? (53). At first sight, humour and laughter do not seem to be essential to the species’ adaptation and survival. But this is obviously a deception. Somehow, the frivolity of humour and laughter must be indispensable to it, because their occurrence is universal and almost all people attribute great importance to them. ‘It may be’, Berlyne writes, ‘that all societies have their share of killjoys and spoilsports and prigs, but most of their members seem to prize opportunities for play and laughter and to appreciate other

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individuals who make appropriate use of them. In our own society, those who devote themselves professionally to the provision of such opportunities are among the most lavishly remunerated and fulsomely idolized’ (53, p. 796). Somehow, therefore, humour and laughter are essential to the mechanics of social life. Bergson, as we have seen, was one of the first to call society their natural environment, and he set himself the task of investigating their social functions. What are the social functions of humour and laughter? Unlike Bergson, who stressed the social control function, many psychological and sociological theories emphasize the liberating effect of humour and laughter — as relief from psychological, social and even political pressures. With regard to the latter, humour is often viewed as a potential, disguised rebellion against a status quo. In this context, the rather old and apparently very attractive metaphor of the safety valve is often used. The metaphor may well be so attractive because it can satisfy both revolutionary and conservative moods: the rebellious nature of humour and laughter is duly recognized, yet they can be seen as outlets which do not really threaten the system. In any case, without arguing in defence of the other extreme position — denying any liberating effect and outlet function — the present section will try to deal with the matter with more circumspection than is customary. Another point that stands in need of more circumspect treatment than it usually receives is the relationship between humour and aggression. Ever since Plato, the supposedly aggressive nature of humour and laughter has drawn much attention from philosophers, psychologists and sociologists. It also acquired great popularity outside the scientific realm. Once again, the existence of aggressive humour and laughter cannot, of course, be denied, but it is, to say the least, questionable whether one could define their essential character in terms of man’s aggressive thrust — whatever the latter may be. Psychoanalysis has developed and spread this reductive view of humour and laughter. Before we discuss the more social functions of humour and laughter, we must deal briefly with their relations to aggression.

Humour, Laughter and Aggression The Hobbesian vision of laughter as derisive laughter couched in Schadenfreude concerning the infirmities of others was first

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expounded by Plato in Philebus. In this dialogue, Socrates argues that people who do not know themselves and are thus ignorant strike us as ridiculous and comic. Our ensuing laughter is both pleasant and painful — it is nice to laugh, but painful to laugh at the (epistemological) misfortunes of others. In Poetics, Aristotle takes up this argument but claims, rather, that we laugh at the aesthetic misfortunes of others — their deformity or ugliness. The laughing subject is superior, the laughed at object inferior (cf. 20). Descartes’ The Passions o f the Soul (1649) pays attention to the psychological process of laughing and then describes the psychological circumstances of this process as a combination of joy with ‘some element of hate or at least wonder’ — three elements which return in Hobbes’ theory of laughter as delight, superiority and suddenness. When this derisive joy befalls us unexpectedly, because we are exposed to some inferiority, we will burst into laughter or mocking derision. This is the Schadenfreude of which Plato’s Socrates spoke. However, alongside this kind of laughing scorn, Descartes left room for playful, bantering laughter devoid of feelings of superiority — indeed, devoid of any emotional content whatsoever (20, p. 289). Hobbes, who discussed laughter in the ninth chapter of Human Nature (1650) and in chapter 6 of Leviathan (1651) within the context of his theory of passions, was deeply influenced by these philosophical predecessors. He elaborated on their superiority thesis, claiming that laughter expressed selfassertion, pride and superiority (which he assembled in the concept of ‘glory’). Notably, laughter is not necessarily linked to humour; ‘for men laugh at mischances and indecencies wherein there lieth no wit or jest at all’ (20, p. 287). The superiority thesis received perhaps its most influential, contemporary elaboration in Freudean psychoanalysis, where it was tied to the notion of aggression. Freud, it should be noted, was rather cautious in his argument in favour of the aggressive nature of humour and laughter. It was his followers who gave it an allembracing quality. In Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious (1905), Freud distinguished (not very successfully) between Humor, Witz and das Komische, roughly equivalent to the humorous, the comic-funny and the comic-ludicrous. At the end of the book this rather rigid distinction is abandoned in favour of a simpler distinction between Humor and Witz (cf. 65). The former represents a denial of the reality principle, while the latter stands for the liberation of

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repressed aggression. Humor enables people to master situations and is thus a triumph vis-a-vis reality. The humorist possesses the dignity which parents have with regard to their children, and is inclined to treat the ego in a parental manner. Witz, on the other hand, emerges from the unconscious as disguised aggression, passing the censorship of the super-ego. Like a dream, a joke tricks the censor and transfers aggression from the dark regions of the unconscious to the light of the conscious. Grotjahn summarized this adequately (although ‘wit’ is not a correct translation of Witz, which literally means ‘witty joke’): ‘Wit utilizes infantile pleasure in order to release aggressive tendencies; in humour, the saving of emotions reactivates a joyful narcissistic state during which the super-ego treats the ego with kindliness and not with the usual sternness’ (68, p. 21). In sum, Freud’s own theory is rather circumspect and differentiated. Most followers of Freud have been less subtle, though. Jacob Levine, for example, reiterates the regressive and aggressive features of humour and laughter: ‘aggression is an important component of the humour process, whether it is expressed as tickling, teasing, kidding, poking fun, being witty, or making wisecracks’ (76, p. 5). In such arguments aggression becomes a very general, all embracing category, gradually losing all heuristic utility. It has also invaded sociology, where it should have been treated with more caution. Rose Coser, for example, claimed in one of her seminal empiricosociological papers on humour and laughter that ‘humour and wit always contain some aggression whether or not it is directed against a manifest target’ (159, p. 83). Criticizing the aggression thesis is difficult, not because the theory is based on solid scientific evidence but because it operates with Freud’s disguise theory. The comparison of wit-work with dreamwork presents an illustrative case. All components of a dream and all components of a joke are explained as symbols that transport unconscious aggression in disguise to the level of consciousness. This even includes those elements (or should I say: in particular those elements?) which at first sight seem to have nothing in common with aggression. Thus if one tells a joke which is innocent and infantile, the psychoanalyst will immediately suspect some symbolically disguised aggression and apply the label of regression. Such logic can never go wrong, but it also fails to be explanatory. Max Eastman drew our attention to absurd humour — to nonsense jokes — when he set out to criticize the aggression theory

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of humour and laughter (cf. 62). We may use, in line with his argument, the once popular elephant jokes as an example of this brand of humour. Their rather simple technique was the manipulation of the impossible and, in particular, the juxtaposition of mutually exclusive entities. ‘How does one put four elephants in a [Volkswagen] Beetle? Quite easy: two in the front, two in the back’. Now, where is the aggression here? It is just a superficial and innocent playing with the physically and ‘logically’ impossible. The joke, a staunch defender of the aggression theory may argue, is on the person to whom the question was posed. But the notion of aggression has to be stretched a very great deal to maintain this argument. Neither is it very convincing to treat the four elephants and the Beetle as symbols of unconscious aggression. Eastman took the Freudians in particular, to task, when it came to a supposed lack of a sense of humour in children (cf. 208-18). If humour is defined as a paternalistic mechanism which liberates people from the pressures of reality, it stands to reason that children are not humorous, since they are not yet under such pressure and lack the ability to act parentally. Yet, the idea, Eastman claimed, is quite absurd. He gave the fine example of a child of four who played intensively with a broomstick. To his amazement and amusement, he heard the child giggle and laugh while moving the stick. Asked why it took such a delight in this rather simple toy, the child answered that it made such a funny noise: ‘Kolunkit, kolunkit, kolunkit’. The little boy was right, Eastman concluded, it was a funny sound, but we adults are usually too busy and boring to notice such simple things (62, p. 78, cf. also 211). In this context Schklovsky’s observation — that the blood in anecdotes is not bloody — should be recalled (93). Although, as was said earlier, his argument is too formalistic, we should indeed realize that a considerable part of our humour consists of a rather formalistic playing with semantic or logical opposites and incongruities without much psychological (or sociological) substance. Like all forms of playing, humour is both profound and superficial, and some forms of humour are simply more superficial than profound. Psychoanalytic theories run the risk of underestimating the superficial and naive dimensions of humour and laughter — if they do not actually deny them altogether. The human being is not exclusively a homo homini lupus, but also, and at least as much, a homo ludens. We are, as human beings, able to kill even by means of jokes and laughter. But we are just as capable of

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playing innocently and naively, particularly in our jokes and laughter!

Humour as Counterpoint and Mirror Societies are never fully integrated. Even in a society with a dominant value system one would sooner or later discover more or less hidden, competing values which express dissatisfaction and opposition. Religious movements like the cargo cults, legends about popular fools — like Tyl Eulenspiegel in medieval Europe or Nasreddin in the Near East — or an institution like the late-medieval and early-modern court jester, are mentioned by Wertheim, the Dutch sociologist, as examples of socio-cultural realities which express conflicting and opposing values. They function, he concludes, ‘as a kind of counterpoint to the leading melody’ (205, p. 26). The metaphor is a useful one: counterpoint opposes the leading melody, but the two make for one piece of music. The opposition, in other words, contributes dialectically to the total composition of society. Without embracing the facile inclusiveness of functionalism, which views all forms of conflict in terms of their integrating power, we should realize that humour and laughter in particular fail to function as truly revolutionary forces in society. On the contrary, a humorist who was out to destroy the dominant values and traditional meanings of his society would be like a small child who destroys its toys. As we saw in the first section, the meanings and values of society are in a sense the toys with which the humorist plays his funny games. Jokes and laughter may, of course, generate a sense of solidarity with the majority among the members of a minority and thus weaken the position of the latter. Moreover, true humorists rarely join ideological movements. To the ideologically involved, humour remains inscrutable and dubious. This inscrutability is duly expressed by the smile, the laugh and the grin. The late-medieval or early-modern court jester, who reached the apex of fame in the 17th century and rapidly declined thereafter, presents a telling example. He is often put on a pedestal as the rare and lonely critic of an absolutist regime — the safety valve of a repressive system, the voice of powerless people in the absence of democracy, or the moral conscience of an all too powerful and greedy monarchy. Yet, historical reality, as I demonstrated

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elsewhere (cf. 207), was quite different. The jokes and pranks of the court jester, even those made at the expense of the monarch, were most appreciated by his king and master who, by means of this whole charade and travesty of power, demonstrated to the world his absolute sovereignty. The officially appointed court jester was in many respects the counterpoint of absolutist power, and his pranks — even the most irrelevant and blasphemous tricks — were in the final analysis contributions to the existing power structure. The same point applies to the so-called ceremonial clowns (or buffoons) of African and North American tribal societies, who at certain times violated all the sacred taboos o f their culture, turning values into their ludicrous opposites, regressing into animalistic and monstrous behaviour and inverting social roles (207, pp. 131-55). Even the pranks and jests of Tyl Eulenspiegel and Nasreddin — at the expense of the rich, the powerful, the wise and the holy — were appreciated by their beholders as funny and enjoyable excursions from the rut of daily life — very much comparable to today’s holidays, which are also enjoyed primarily because it is nice to come home again. After the excursion, the burdens of everyday life and its routines can be borne again. The old and powerful metaphor of the mirror should be mentioned at this point. Seneca once said that he had only to look into a looking-glass if he wanted to see a fool. Erasmus once called his Praise o f Folly a mirror in which he could see his own essence revealed (206, p. 35). One of Holbein’s woodcuts shows a fool staring pensively at a hand-mirror — and the image in the mirror is sticking its tongue out. Humour does have this reflexive function: it reflects people as innocent, funny or helpless individuals, despite their imposing words and deeds. Laughter reminds us of how transient and relative these words and deeds actually are. Yet, they also tell us that we are the ones who have to make our living, that the values and meanings which are distorted in the mirror form the cognitive and emotional structures which determine the sense and substance of human life. The fool in Holbein’s fine illustration stares at his own mirror image and seems to discover dimensions of life which cannot be caught by words. Once again, laughter is the only appropriate language.

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Humour, Laughter and Communication People convey messages to each other through the exchange of jokes, and through laughter in particular. In an instructive paper on the social origin and functions of laughter, Donald Hayworth even advanced the hypothesis that laughter originally functioned (i.e. phylogenetically) as a sign for the members of a group or band that a dangerous threat had passed, that the situation was safe again, and that it was time to relax and return to the normal course of events (18, p. 370). When human evolution began, Hayworth argued in a typically evolutionist manner, homo sapiens lived in hazardous and dangerous circumstances. When threatened and in danger, primeval man would strain his muscles and nerves in order to avert the peril instinctively. But he also needed a signal to indicate when the threat had passed, when relaxation could set in again — a signal which could dlso re-group the scattered members of the band (18, p. 369). Hayworth hypothesized that laughter once functioned as such a signal. This, he claimed, could well have been the case because even today it has such a relaxing function, resulting in a sense of pleasure and relief. He concluded that ‘the relaxation always found in laughter, resulted originally from a consciousness of safety’ (18, p. 370). And the smile, he added, might well have the very same origin: it communicated to others that there was no need for fear, that the situation was perfectly safe. Laughter, all theorists agree, produces pleasure — the experience of physical and psychologial relief and liberty. For that reason, some theorists have argued, people engage in the exchange of jokes and humorous exploits in order to provoke laughter and bring about its relieving pleasure. Hayworth, for instance, assumed that people may well seek threat and danger in order to experience the sense of relaxation that follows (18, p. 372). Laughter, we see once more, is thus not merely a response to a humorous stimulus but a communicative signal — not so much that a threat or danger is over, but that it had been sought for the sake of the ensuing pleasure of laughter. The threat or the danger, we may add, is often transferred to a symbolic level, as in the case of ceremonial warfare, ritual duels, and the jokes of black (gallows) humour. However, not all laughter can be interpreted in this way. Laughter can be without a communicative message, as in the case of a fit of hysterical laughter. In addition, a smile may well signal some sort of mental disturbance (cf. 192). Hayworth was right to mention the fact that people

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sometimes burst into laughter when they are suddenly confronted with bad news — the death of a close friend, or the destruction of their home by a fire. The nervous laughter and giggling which often occurs after the burial of a loved one is also indicative of such emotional shocks. In such cases, laughter readily alternates with crying. Laughter may sometimes lack any sense or meaning, as when one is subjected to a fit of giggling because of complete mental and/or physical exhaustion (cf. 190). Yet, it is through the exchange of jokes that shocked emotions in embarrassing situations are often made bearable for the members of a group. In a sense, emotional experiences which are hard to express verbally are thus made collective and communicable. Cognitive and eihotional dissonances are lifted, and reality is restored. George Arndt discussed this important mechanism in his instructive paper on ‘Community Reactions to a Horrifying Event’ (1959). He analysed how the members of a small Wisconsin community reacted to the discovery of several bizarre murders and crimes that one of them had committed over the course of several years. The man was known as a loner — a quiet, good-natured, somewhat lazy person who was accepted, Arndt wrote, as the town’s fool (150, p. 106). However, by sheer chance the police discovered that he had killed several women over a period of years, and that he had also desecrated the graves of women and taken the corpses to his house. There he had done gruesome things to them: Portions o f viscera, sections o f human skin, a box o f noses and remains o f extremities were found in the trash-littered, dingy rooms o f his home. Ten human skulls neatly arranged in a row, books on anatomy, embalming equipment, pulp magazines, furniture upholstered with skin, and dirty kerosene lamps completed the macabre scene. Gein [as the man was called, A.Z.] also stated he made belts and purses from skin sections (150, p. 106).

The discovery was made late in 1957 and received wide media coverage. The villagers were very shocked by it all, and reluctant to speak to the many reporters who suddenly flooded this otherwise quiet, rural community. But some twenty miles outside the village, in the neighbouring communities, reactions to this horrifying event were of a humorous nature. People exchanged jokes of the black humour variety. Arndt spoke of ‘grim humour’ (150, p. 107). Some people even competed to exchange the latest ‘Geiners’, while children sang a well-known Christmas carol with a slightly changed text: ‘Deck the walls with limbs of Mollie’ (150, p. 107). The content

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of most jokes revolved around such taboo subjects as cannibalism and sexual perversion. Arndt focused in particular on the interesting role children played in this humorous communication. They functioned, he discovered, as the couriers of the most revolting and crude jokes, which they would tell each other in the presence of adults. Their parents invariable reacted with dismay and revulsion, yet, Arndt observed, never prevented their children from telling the latest ‘Geiners’. Interpreting this interesting fact, Arndt developed a psychoanalytic argument which unfortunately lacks clarity. An explanation in terms of the sociology of knowledge might be heuristically more useful. These children, not yet initiated into the meanings of adult taboos, and still living in a ‘province of meaning’ (Schutz) which differs significantly from adult reality, lack their parents’ emotional inhibitions, and can therefore fool around freely with these jokes. The ‘blood’ of these grim jokes is not yet bloody to the children, if to anybody. The content of the jokes is not linked by them to wider frames of reference, and they are still unaware of the dangers of the event. Their parents, on the other hand, are very upset: their most fundamental values and norms had been violated, human reality had been reduced to a monstrous level, and the very pit of existence had been laid bare by someone who had been accepted as a (somewhat strange) member of the community. The black jokes their children bring home are truly shocking to them, yet they enable them to share emotions collectively, to digest the cognitive and emotional dissonance socially, to laugh anxieties away, and to thus restore the reality of everyday life. This communicative function of humour and laughter, it should be noted in conclusion, is also relevant to empirical social research. Jokes can provide relevant insights into people’s communicative behaviour. Charles Winick, for example, in his paper entitled ‘Space Jokes as Indication of Attitudes toward Space’ (1961), presented a content analysis of 944 space jokes, collected between 1957 and 1959, and concluded that, contrary to the results of official opinion polls which indicated general lack of interest in the subject, these jokes seemed to demonstrate a rather widespread ambivalence, insecurity and even fear about matters concerning space travel and space research. According to Winick, jokes told to and by friends constitute ‘a relatively underground channel of communication’ which may perhaps uncover attitudes and opinions more reliably than the formal techniques of the survey and the opinion poll (179,

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pp. 43-9). The point may be of special relevance in cases of social conflict. By asking schoolchildren, living in a situation of socio­ political and cultural conflict (black versus white, francophone versus anglophone in Quebec, Protestants versus Catholics in Northern Ireland, etc.), to tell a few of the best jokes they have recently heard, one may receive an insight into the nature of the conflict and its related emotions which no survey could ever collect. Children, it should be said once more, are the most uninhibited and therefore ‘honest’ and ‘reliable’ couriers of jokes.

Humour, Laughter and Solidarity Humour and laughter often mark the boundaries of a group. If groups have a solid basis, they will employ various symbols to indicate their identity. Contemporary youth culture, for instance, consists of various rather short-lived movements and cliques which develop their own lifestyles. The symbols of their group identity — jargon, gestures, clothes, musical tastes, jokes, etc. — are often incomprehensible, and therefore irritating or shocking to outsiders. These symbols are passwords, shibboleths or cues, by which the members of the group are able to recognize one another, and segregate themselves from outsiders. Under the influence of commercialism (the youth culture, is an attractive market) and the close attention of the media (youth culture offers a welcome variation within the news package which is dominated by ‘adult’ politics), these cues are in danger of rapidly becoming common, if not cliche. However, of all the symbolic cues of group identity, humour may well be best able to withstand these levelling tendencies. If necessary, clothes and jargon can be removed from their original cultural environment and used in a different social context. However, this is impossible with humour and jokes. Outside their own cultural matrix, they easily wither away and lose their meaning. Joking and laughter unite people. They can even bring into association people who were previously unknown to each other, or otherwise have little to say to each other. This integrating and boundary-setting function is, of course, of special importance when the group is somehow endangered or threatened. Under threat or in danger, a group might easily disintegrate in panic, but humour and laughter usually manage to keep its members together: they talk, as it were, some common sense into them, provide them with some

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energy and even hope, and thereby strengthen their morale. In fact, jokes and their ensuing laughter may even elevate an endangered group of people to a level on which they can experience a sense of superiority — as illusory as this may be in reality. After the German invasion of Czechoslovakia, the AmericanCzech sociologist Antonin Obrdlik stayed in the country for nine months. In this period he did a remarkable thing: while the German occupation forces were gradually tightening their grip, he focused his attention on the varieties and different stages of humour. The jokes in circulation were of a special nature which he termed ‘gallows humour’. People in danger, Obrdlik wrote, often engage in cynical humour, but when the danger is of a political nature these jokes often carry an element of hope — that the oppression will one day end. Shortly before the invasion — during the ‘days of Munich’ — the humour of the Czechs was still one of bravado: the Nazi leaders were ridiculed. This apparently bolstered the morale of the threatened Czechs (117, p. 710). But after the debacle of Munich and the brutal invasion of their country, the Czechs seemed to abstain from humour for a while. Jokes had to make room for patriotism. When the jokes emerged again, they were of a different nature: they were directed primarily against political collaborators who, under a pretence of pragmatism, decided to co-operate with the occupation forces. The Nazis installed a ‘loyal’ president who ruted over what was called the ‘Second Czechoslovak Republic’. In the streets the man was immediately branded ‘The First President of the Second Republic of the Third Reich’ (117, p. 711). In March 1939 even this puppet was removed, and the reign of terror commenced. At that moment, Obrdlik observed, true gallows humour began to spread rapidly. Some Czechs collected jokes with a seriousness that reminded him of a philatelist collecting rare stamps. These jokes apparently had a psychological and sociological function. They created, above all, the illusion that the down-trodden nation somehow still possessed a degree of independence and power — a moral independence and power which would eventually conquer the enemy. Some jokes were simple but witty puns; others, Obrdlik argued, were ‘a manifestation of a very determined and well-planned passive resistance’ (117, p. 715). A graffito on the wall of a graveyard, for instance, summoned the Czechs to leave this place instantly — ‘Don’t you know this is the German Lebensraum?’ (ibid.). However, it should not be forgotten that the occurrence of such jokes is as much an indicator of the oppressor’s strength.

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Obrdlik pointed out correctly that the oppressor who allows such defiant humour and laughter is obviously still in full command of the situation. The moment he begins to curb such derision, he is losing his grip on power. No sabre-rattling could obscure this fact (117, p. 716). In his study on the functions of social conflict, Lewis Goser mentioned a comment of Goebbels in which he stated that he did not object to critical political humour, since it functioned as an innocent outlet for antagonistic feelings against the Nazi regime (cf. 115,118). It was said earlier that humour withers away when it is separated, for whatever reason, from its original cultural and social matrix. This point needs further qualification. Jokes which are typical of a specific socio-cultural environment can be (and often are) adopted by outsiders. Jewish jokes, for instance, are often told by non-Jews in non-Jewish circles but it is obvious that both the meaning and the function of such jokes will change rather drastically. An ethnic joke, told within its own ethnic environment, strengthens the morale of the group members and bolsters their sense of identity, but the very same joke may easily acquire a derisive and even insulting quality when told by an outsider who tries to imitate the tone and gestures typical of the ethnic group. Rosenberg and Shapiro claimed in their perceptive paper on Jewish humour that ‘the jokes Jews tell to one another about themselves are fundamentally different in spirit (even when identical in words) from those told about them by Gentiles with anti-semitic intent’ (156, p. 70). Even without anti-semitic intent, it may be said, Jewish jokes change qualitatively when transferred to a non-Jewish social and cultural context. Moreover, this is true of most ethnic humour. This brand of humour is closely related to the collective identity of the members of the ethnic group. Again, Jewish humour presents a clear example. The fact that many Jewish jokes seem to take a critical stance vis-a-vis the identity of Jews in modern society has drawn much attention, in particular from psychoanalytical^ minded psychologists who tend to interpret it as ‘Jtidischer Selbsthass’ — Jewish self-hatred. It is remarkable that many American-Jewish jokes seem to make fun of the overbearing Jewish mother, the strong status consciousness of many Jews, etc. — qualities which are not attributed to Jews by outsiders, as is for instance the case with ethnic jokes, like those at the expense of the Poles in the US, or of the Belgians in the Netherlands (cf. 136). On the contrary, these qualities are imputed by the Jews who tell these jokes. Worries about class and status, for example, are expressed

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wittily by the joke about the Jewish lady running up and down Miami beach, yelling: ‘Help, help! My son-in-law, Irving, the doctor from Park Avenue, is drowning!’ (146, p. 75). In a psychoanalytical study of Jewish humour which compares this alleged self-hatred to clinical melancholy, Theodor Reik argues that the emphasis upon inferiority in these jokes conceals an aggressive tendency: by feigning weakness an attempt is made to beat the opponent or antagonist (cf. 143). These jokes are, in Nietzschean terms, expressions of resentment and slave morality. Salcia Landmann, who gives an interesting historical exposition on Jewish humour, claims that the typical Jewish joke emerged during the Enlightenment — a period when many Jews began to secularize and became gradually alienated from their religious traditions and heritage, yet could not assimilate to modernity in toto. From this ambiquity and tension emerged many Jewish jokes, and to Landmann the notorious wit of Heinrich Heine stands as a model for this kind of humour (140, p. 74f.). Rosenberg and Shapiro developed a similar hypothesis with respect to American-Jewish humour and wit (cf. also 139). In the past, they argue, American Jews often hated themselves as a group for their lack of assimilation to the American culture, but this has changed into a sense of guilt about too much assimilation and secularization: Whereas we previously hated ourselves for being Jews, we now frequently hate ourselves for n o t being Jews. The ghetto Jew in his presumed backwardness and very real poverty, was often an object o f scorn to newly emancipated European Jewry. At present in America, it is the prosperous, indeed the rich and smug Jew, single-mindedly pursuing wealth and deeply committed to material values, who has become an object o f disgust to himself (146, p. 74).

Rosenberg and Shapiro illustrate this by the joke about the three Jewish ladies bragging over tea about the careers of their sons. After two ladies have related the material successes of their sons, the third tells timidly of her own son, who became a rabbi with a very modest salary. At this, her friends exclaim: ‘What kind of job is that for a nice Jewish boy?’ Like Landmann, Rosenberg and Shapiro impute this obsession with identity in Jewish humour to the ambiguous position Jews occupy in a fully modernized world. The modern Jew is marginal and moves between the extremes of assimilation to modernity and loyalty to the traditions and heritage of Jewry (cf. also 145, 147).

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Yet, self-deprecating humour is not necessarily the result of such an instability of identity. When a minority has acquired a measure of self-consciousness, self-deprecating humour may underscore its newly acquired identity and thereby strengthen its solidarity and cohesion. This can be observed in the humour of blacks in the US. In a rare sociological study of black and white reactions to racist jokes during the 1950s, Middleton discovered that blacks generally react more favourably than whites to anti-white jokes, and yet enjoy anti­ black jokes as much as whites (142, p. 181). This conclusion corresponds with that of an earlier study among college students which showed that blacks tell more anti-black jokes than whites tell anti-white jokes (cf. 174). These studies were undertaken in the days when assimilation was still the norm, and blacks were expected to behave like Uncle Toms, even in their humour. This changed radically during the 1960s and 1970s — black emancipation is no longer defined in terms of assimilation to the white majority. Black consciousness has developed, and whatever it may have achieved, the identity of the black minority has been welded during these decades. As a result, stereotyped jokes at the expense of blacks are no longer accepted by the contemporary black community, unless they circulate among them as some sort of gallows humour (cf. 133, 134). Such self-deprecating jokes should not be interpreted too hastily as expressions of self-hatred. They may, on the contrary, signal a strong sense of group identity, for the laughter they elicit is not a laughter with whites at the expense of blacks, but rather an in-group laughter which stands proof of ethnic pride and self-consciousness. Its the same kind of gallows humour — suggesting invincibility and a sense of superiority — that Reik observed in many of the Jews’ selfdeprecating jokes. Grotjahn wrote in this respect: ‘The Jewish joke constitutes victory by defeat. The persecuted Jew who makes himself the butt of the joke, deflects his dangerous hostility away from the persecutors onto himself. The result is not defeat or surrender but victory and greatness’ (68, p. 22). An intriguing aspect of ethnic jokes is their universality — they occur in very different countries but in general follow rather similar patterns and even have similar content. Jokes at the expense of an ethnic group usually make reference to: (1) the notorious stupidity of the ethnic group; (2) its stinginess; or (3) its being over-sexed or impotent. In a recent paper, Christie Davies argues forcefully that the universal popularity of these jokes ‘is to be explained in terms of

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the general characteristics of industrial societies rather than the particular circumstances of each separate society’ (136, p. 383). Western industrial societies dominate the world. In these societies, Davies continues, the social, geographical and moral boundaries have lost their clarity and distinctness. Ethnic jokes seem first to restore much-needed clarity and then to function as a control mechanism for those living within these various boundaries. This is why people who are, or seem to be, peripheral to the main population, or who are somehow viewed as being in an ambiguous position, are mocked and treated as obvious outsiders. In this way, boundaries between ‘us’ and ‘them’ are established. Davies argues that most ethnic jokes revolve around the axis of failure and success: the subjects of these jokes are usually stupid (knowledge) and stingy (morality), thereby underscoring the smartness and joyousness of those who tell the jokes. Davies could have added a third component — sexuality — because the subjects of ethnic jokes are usually either over-sexed or prudish, frigid or impotent. Davies also focuses on Eastern European societies which are under the totalitarian control of a strictly policed bureaucracy, with rigid and moral values. Here then ‘them’ is not an ethnic minority (although ethnic jokes do circulate in these countries), but the political elite and concomitant state bureaucracy. He distinguishes these two categories (Western industrial; Eastern European) from societies at war, which develop jokes in which cowardice takes the place of stupidity and stinginess. He summarizes his rather complex paper as follows: In answer to the question ‘What is the sociological basis o f the appeal o f ethnic jokes?’ we may answer: (1) The jokes delineate both (a) the social and geographical and (b) the moral boundaries o f a nation or ethnic group. By mocking peripheral and ambiguous groups, they reduce ambiguity and clarify boundaries or at least make ambiguity less frightening. (2) The jokes occur in opposed pairs and reflect the problems and anxieties caused by the conflicting norms and values inevitably found in large societies dominated by anomic, impersonal institutions such as the market place and bureaucracy. In peacetime jokes about ‘stupid’ and ‘stingy-crafty’ groups and in wartime jokes about ‘cowardly’ and ‘militaristic’ groups have three key aspects. (a) they reduce anxiety about the possibility o f individual failure vis-a-vis large, impersonal and perplexing institutions due to one’s failing to obtain a correct balance between conflicting norms and goals. (b) They provide guidance as to what the moral limits are, what the correct balance is and thus reduce anomie. (c) They provide a legitimation o f the individual’s situation in relation to both those who have failed and those who have been more successful whether in the market place or the bureaucracy, in war or in peace (136, p. 400).

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Humour, Laughter and Conflict The discussion of ethnic humour leads, of course, to the issue of conflict, in which humour and laughter appear to be very influential mechanisms. This can be observed micro-sociologicaliy in everyday interactions, as between married individuals who at times tease each other jocularly, and often disguise mutual criticism as jokes. In fact, one could paraphrase the well-known slogan and say: a family that jokes together, stays together. Similarly, on a macro-sociological level humour and laughter may function as catalysts in situations of social, cultural and political conflict. Prime examples of such situations are Quebec (francophone versus anglophone), Belgium (Flemish versus Walloons), Northern Ireland (Protestants versus Catholics), Spain (Basques versus Spaniards), and the US (blacks versus whites). The remarkable thing is that a relatively small number of jokes circulate in these very different situations of conflict. The content of these jokes, as we have seen in the previous section, usually revolves around cognitive (stupid-smart), moral (stingy-joyous) and sexual (frigid-over-sexed) qualities. These elements recur as cliched stereotypes in a limited set of jokes, following a few basic, rather predictable patterns. They are told about the Poles in the US, about the francophones or anglophones in Quebec, about the Armenians in the Soviet Union. In the words of Burma, this kind of humour ‘contains more or less well concealed malice’ (135, p. 710) and the jokes create a sense of solidarity and superiority among those who tell them and laugh at them. However, these jokes are usually rather ambiguous in conflict situations, leaving room for multiple interpretations. Sometimes both parties to a conflict may even tell the same joke, each of them laughing at a different aspect or component of it. For a while, the following macabre joke was told in Quebec by both francophones and anglophones, each believing the laughter was at the expense of the other: Francois was very drunk. On his way home, he entered the wrong house — an English funeral parlour. Shortly after, he was arrested on the charge o f necrophilic violation o f a corpse. In court the perplexed judge asked him to explain his strange behaviour. ‘It’s all very simple’, Francois said calmly, ‘I entered what I thought was my own house, I saw this beautiful lady in what I thought was my bed, and I accepted what I thought was a very blunt invitation’. ‘But’, stammered the judge, ‘didn’t you realize it was a corpse?’ ‘Not at all, your Honour, I thought she was English’.

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Reactions to this ambiguity can tell observers something about the intensity and quality of the socio-cultural and political conflict (cf. 137). If both parties laugh about the same joke, each believing the joke is on the other, it is a clear indication of the wide gap between them: they are so alienated from each other that the one no longer realizes what is going on with the other. Burma gives a striking example of such a ‘joke with two handles’ (50, p. 256f.): So marked is the influence o f one’s viewpoint that an occasional story is told by both Negroes and whites, each thinking it is a joke on the other party. One such example concerns the new Negro foreign language professor who attempts to vote in the Southern town in which his college is located. He must pass a literacy test. He is given a newspaper and asked what it says. He reads from it. He is given in succession Spanish, French, and German papers, from which he reads. Then he is given a Chinese paper and triumphantly asked what it says. Unable to read Chinese, he throws it down saying, ‘It says Negroes can’t vote i n . . . ’. (135, p. 712).

In terms of conflict and opposing ideologies, much humour does indeed have a rather opportunistic quality which is, however, not intentional but the inevitable result of humour’s basic ambiguity. Playing with established (institutionalized) meanings, as we saw in the first section is an ambiguous enterprise: one has to live in society in order to know the meanings, but in order to play with them one cannot be solidly part o f it. Self-consciousness, class-consciousness, a collective sense of identity, or whatever one wants to call it, is an important variable in the humorous dynamics of conflict. Prior to the emergence of such a consciousness, a group that occupies a minority position tends to accept joking stereotypes passively, because it lacks the collective will and strength to resist or counter them. But when selfconsciousness has grown among the members of a minority group, joking stereotypes are actively resisted, or even incorporated ironically into the minority’s own jokes and anecdotes (cf. 132). Self-consciousness establishes a sense of identity and relatively clear group boundaries. Strategies are then developed to prevent any passing across these boundaries. Once more, humour proves to be an influential and powerful strategy, functioning as a potent form of social control (cf. 177). An elegantly dressed black rides on a New York bus, while reading the Wall Street Journal. A shabbily dressed white stares at him with hatred and suddenly yells: ‘Nigger!’ The black businessman jumps to his feet and screams: ‘Where, where!?’

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(144, p. 120). Again, the joke is ambiguous: the black passenger is obviously scorned, but his success and the white man’s failure are equal parts of the punch line. Incidentally, Burma points out that in many jokes blacks are initially presented as little innocent men but in the end turn out to be superior to whites (135, p. 713). Hollywood has capitalized on this, for example in the motion pictures of Sydney Poitier. Or is this Uncle Tom again, in new clothes, admired by liberal whites? (cf. 141). There are, of course, many different conflicts in a society. Alongside the majority-minority conflict, we should mention the tensions between white- and blue-collar workers in a factory, between employers and employees, between staff and line in a bureaucratic organization, etc. Endemic in all these situations are tensions caused by differentiations of power, status and authority (stratification). Humour and laughter occupy important positions in stratified structures. We shall focus here on what has been branded upward and downward humour. Rose Coser (cf. 159, p. 86) and Pamela Bradney (cf. 156, p. 185) have discussed the downward humour of superiors in a hierarchical structure. People in power have a tendency to treat subordinates in a jovial and jocular manner. By this behaviour they try to exhibit a democratic attitude and to prevent the emergence of envy and resentment, but at the same time maintain their positions of power. Humour functions here as a kind of legitimating force, strengthening the authoritative quality of power. Legitimate power (or authority), as Max Weber taught, is power which convinces people, which people want to follow and obey. It is the ideal-typical opposite of brute force and naked violence through which power can also be achieved. Humour and laughter may embellish power with a human touch, take off its sharp edges, or mellow it (which is one of the reasons why contestants for power usually get very angry when one or another employs humour successfully and evokes laughter). Humour functions as a bridge between the powerful and the subordinate, as illusory as this link often is in reality. Downward humour can rarely be countered in kind. Thus, people tend to repeat it in their dealings with those placed under them. As a result, this brand of humour is, as Rose Coser said, asymmetrical. If someone from a lower echelon engages in upward humour, their behaviour is often viewed as insubordinate, as a potentially subversive activity (159, p. 86). Coser observed during meetings of the staff of a psychiatric institution that residents who took the

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initiative in joking had to take care to make themselves the prime target of their jokes (159, p. 87). It is also crucial in such situations to let it be known that the joking is viewed by the subordinate humorist as a brief excursion from routine deference, for the sake of diversion. Yet, upward humour is not totally absent in stratified structures, and one may perhaps conjecture that its occurrence will increase with the progress of democracy and its levelling effects. In pre­ modern societies — which were usually strictly stratified — upward humour was restricted to specific occasions and generally took place in a ritual setting. At regular intervals, periods of licence and ritual folly overturned the otherwise taboo and sacred hierarchies. Carnival (mardi gras) is still a faint survival of such a ritual (originally magical) revolt (cf. 113,207, pp. 25, 75, 178). In modern societies, upward humour is usually restricted to holiday situations — the annual company picnic, the coffee break, the excursion, etc. But even then, it requires a special technique: the humorist has to show manifestly that he is aware of his licence, and that he enjoys the permitted liberty. Back in the daily routines of the office again, he or she may remember their jocular freedom with pleasure, and thereby bear the renewed burdens of the job and the hierarchical inequality with a smile. Goffman’s observations about identity joking in closed institutions, like mental hospitals or jails, deserves our attention here. Intentionally or not, inmates and staff members may exchange roles and identities in a jocular manner: Inmates tell o f times they were mistaken for staff members and carried o ff the misidentification for a while, or o f times they mistook a staff member for an inmate; staff persons similarly recount times when they were mistaken for inmates. We find identity joking, when a member o f one group briefly acts like a member o f the other, or briefly treats a co-member as someone o f the other category for the avowed purpose o f amusement. (164)

Such jocular exchanges of identity have occurred throughout history in many different forms — from transvestism in ceremonial clowning to the swapping of roles by king and court jester. This suggests that identity joking goes beyond amusement: it is an exercise in the experience of identity, and a grounding of personal identity in social interaction. Through this kind of joking, identity acquires a socially objective quality and is thus strengthened. It also underscores power, as I tried to demonstrate in the case of the court

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jester whose jests stood at the service of the absolute monarch, even if they did poke fun at him (207, pp. 92-130). One last aspect of the relationship between humour and conflict remains to be discussed. Jokes and laughter may contribute to the sublimation of a conflict. The absence of an official censorship which curbs political jokes is not necessarily a token of a society’s democracy. The admittance or tolerance of politically critical humour may well be grounded in the awareness that humour is able to sublimate latent conflicts and thereby render them harmless. Goebbels, as we saw earlier, had no objections to humour critical of the Nazi regime, as it could function as an innocent outlet for hostile feelings. (This tolerance, as we saw earlier, can only be permitted for as long as one can rely on one’s power and strength.) The sublimation of conflict through humour and laughter is not, of course, its solution. As Tom Burns wrote: ‘The joke is the shortcut to consensus’ (157, p. 65), but the consensus that is achieved remains fragile and is in danger again the moment its concomitant laughter has ended. In other words, humour and laughter are unreliable in this respect as well.

5 CONCLUSION

This discussion of the functions of humour and laughter ought to end with a warning, lest we get caught amid a dreary functionalism. The humorist, we should never forget, is indeed frequently a homo homini lupus, but in many instances he is as much an innocent homo ludens. Laughter can be derisive and aggressive, but it can also be communicative and compassionate. Humour and laughter have their functionality in the fabric of social life, but they are just as often playfully useless and senseless. Every scientific analysis of humour and laughter risks neglecting this fundamental ambiguity. A sociological analysis, in particular, should take account of the fact that much humour and laughter is indeed tied to the social world and its conventions, yet transcends this world in playful merriment and joyfulness, liberating people from what ought to be thought, felt, said and done. In the most potent forms of humour people are what

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is called in Jewish humour Luftmenschen — freely floating, fantastic, utopian, irresponsible, crazy, yet very human. Humour’s opposites, seriousness (functionality) and mirth (playfulness), come together in its endemic relativity. The content of jokes is couched in relativity — their blood, for instance, is, as Schklovsky argued, never bloody — and everything humour touches is relativized by its very touch. Jokes, jests and pranks shake us awake, take us away from the routines of daily social life, and render all our legitimating ideologies and hopeful utopias powerless and helpless. This may be humour’s most important function: it often works as a de-ideologizing and disillusioning force. A socially accepted and traditional structure of meaning is exposed to a totally different structure of meaning, while the former is, as it were, looked at from the perspective of the latter. An army, for example, is a traditional system with its own set of norms and values, and a strict hierarchy of power and authority. Confronted with the world of a little but smart man who plays the system innocently, yet cunningly, this imposing institution loses much of its might and splendour. Hacek’s soldier Schweyk, put on the stage by Brecht in his play Schweyk im zweiten Weltkrieg (Schweyk in the Second World War) and transferred in time to the Second World War, was a cunning little man who enlisted in the army where he played his role as an anti-hero with disarming innocence. The incongruity rendered the army — with all its power and might — helpless, if not foolish. One is inclined to speak of non-violent resistance, but this is somewhat ponderous. Hacek’s little dog catcher, Schweyk, did not plan his innocent behaviour. He was ambiguous and enigmatic, hard to catch, a true Luftm ensch. Meanwhile, the incongruity of this funny man in this stern organization produces a very humorous effect. Humour carries an enigmatic quality: it is itself unrealistic and thereby able to demonstrate that reality as we know and live it could well be otherwise; that alternatives, as unreal and absurd as they may seem to be, are not unthinkable. Humour shares this with utopias, and it is up to the audience to decide, by a laughing response, whether a utopia is nothing but a joke. For instance, it might not be far-fetched to view the marxist utopia — of a society without private property, without a division of labour and thus without inequality, emerging after the Saturnalian overthrow of the capitalist system (‘world revolution’) by the proletariat — as a grand joke in which the unthinkable is finally being thought through to its consequences. It is thus a secularized version of the Judaeo-Christian eschaton, as

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well as a more dignified version of the fabulous Land of Cockaigne (cf. 113). However, history has shown that attempts to realize this utopia politically are doomed eventually to quench mirth and merriment in blood and tears. Unlike the blood in jokes, the blood in political revolutions is very wet and real.

Resume La Sociologie de I’humour et du rire

Contrairement a ce qui se passe en philosophic et en psychologie, la sociologie a prete jusqu’alors assez peu d e te n tio n a Phumour et au rire. Cela est d’autant plus etonnant qu’il s’agit de deux phenomenes eminemment sociaux. Dans le cadre de reference qu’utilise la sociologie de la connaissance, Phumour se definit comme Pacte de jouer avec des significations institutionalises (meanings). Dans Phumour, ce qui est considere comme evident et normal, est retourne, mis a Penvers, sens dessus dessous, etc. L’on cree pour ainsi dire une autre realite qui reflete la realite existante, ‘normale’. Par ailleurs, ce n ’est pas le desir du plaisantin d’etre drole qui decide du succes de Phumour; bien au contraire, ce sont les spectateurs ou auditeurs qui definissent le statut humoristique de la plaisanterie. L’instrument de cette definition n’est pas cependant le langage, mais le rire. Aussi le rire est defini ici comme le langage, comme le discours de Phumour. On ne considere pas pour autant le rire comme une simple reaction a une excitation humoristique, mais plutot comme un element constitutif de Pinteraction humoristique. Dans la vie sociale, Phumour et le rire remplissent diverses fonctions qui sont exposees dans le dernier chapitre. Leur role et leur signification dans la communication, dans la solidarity sociale, et dans le conflit social sont successivement passes en revue. Pour finir, nous critiquons comme trop partielle et simpliste P interpretation courante de Phumour, selon laquelle celui-ci ne serait qu’une soupape de securite pour des emotions refoulees ou l’expression d’une agression rentree. translated by Dr W. Th. M. F rijhoff

Annotated Bibliography

Some years ago, a former student of mine, Gerard Neger, composed an extensive bibliography of studies on humour and laughter in the social sciences. In addition, he annotated in Dutch those items we deemed sociologically relevant. This work was continued by Dr Willem van den Berg of the Catholic University at Nijmegen, who in 1977 completed a doctoral dissertation in the sociology of humour and laughter (cf. 111). In this way, a bibliography was composed containing over 1,000 items, several hundred of which were annotated in Dutch. From this elaborate bibliography I composed the limited selection that follows. I re-wrote the annotations in English, and selected those items which I considered especially relevant to the preceding Trend Report. However, I have also included items which fall outside this frame of reference but provide some insight into the present state of the art. I may mention here in particular the many experimental studies in the psychology of humour and laughter. But here too, I have tried to select items which may have some sociological relevance. All this goes to show that I am solely responsible for the final selection and content of this bibliography. I decided to divide the 225 selected items into two main parts: A. General Studies, and B. Monographs. The first part has been sub-divided into five categories, covering the main scientific disciplines involved. The second part consists of ten categories which cover the main substantive areas or subjects. This is not, of course, a strictly logical classification, but neither is it altogether arbitrary. After several abortive try-outs this appeared to me to be the best of all possible classifications.

A. General Studies I. Philosophy and General, Introductory Studies II. Sociology III. Psychology and Psychoanalysis IV. History and Literature V. Anthropology

from the SAGE Social Science Collections. All Rights Reserved.

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B. Monographs I. Religion and Morality II. Politics and Policy III. Nationality IV. Ethnicity V. Group Solidarity and Social Control VI. Science, Music and the Law VII. Mental Health VIII. Folly, Fools and Clowns IX. Children X. Cartoons, Comics, Satire and Caricature

A. General Studies I. Philosophy and General, Introductory Studies 1. BALDENSPERGER, F., ‘Les definitions de l’humour’ (The definitions of humour), in: F. Baldensperger, Etudes de VHistoire Litteraire (Studies of literary history), Paris, Librairie Hachette, 1907, pp. 176-222. A survey of various definitions of the concept of humour, from its origin in physiology (bodily fluid) to modern French, English and German connotations. 2. BEATTIE, J., ‘On laughter and ludicrous composition’, in J. Beattie, Essays, London, E. and C. Dilly; Edinburgh, W. Creech, 1778. An early critique of the Hobbesian interpretation of laughter as derision. The origin of laughter is the discovery of one or more incongruencies linked together into one or more combinations. 3. BERGE, B.D. (ed.), Introduction a retudescientifique du rire (Introduction to the scientific study of laughter), Paris, Flammarion, 1959. Selected papers on the scientific study of humour and laughter, several of which are listed in this bibliography. 4. BERGER, P.L., The Precarious Vision, Garden City, NY, Doubleday, 1961. A theological and sociological essay on social reality and relativity in which the hidden connection between comedy and tragedy is discussed on pp. 209-18. 5. BERGSON, H .,L erire. Essai sur la signification du comique, 1905 (Laughter. An essay on the meaning of the comic), Paris,

62

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

The Sociology o f Humour and Laughter Librairie F. Alcan, 1935. Laughter is social by nature. It is a response to humour (or the comic) which is defined as a mechanization and rigidification of life. Laughter is a correction of this mechanization. It keeps people under the pressure of social control. BERGSON, H., ‘A propos de la nature du comique’ (Note on the nature of the comic), in: Revue du M ois, 10 November 1919. Reply to one of the critics of Bergson’s theory (cf. 12) in which he explicates some of his ideas further. BRUNS, M., Ueber den Humor, seine Wege undsein Ziel (On humour, its paths and its aim), Minden, Westfalen, 1921. Humour is a worldview and an attitude towards life. It is a relativizing expression of existential wisdom, and an inner freedom which can only be acquired after many hard and bitter experiences. CARPENTER, R., ‘Laughter, a Glory in Sanity’, in: American Journal o f Psychology, 33, 1922, pp. 419-22. Laughter signals the triumph of the mind which proves to be aware of the misleading nature of humour. When we laugh about the errors of others, we do so because we have avoided them. CARRIT, E.F., ‘A Theory of the Ludicrous’, in: TheHubbert Journal, 21, 1922/23, pp. 552-64. Objects and events are only funny in relation to human values and norms. Laughter should not be identified with comedy which in fact expresses a sense of inadequacy and the failure to express emotions. CAZAMIAN, L. ‘Pourquoi nous ne pouvons definir l’humour’ (Why we cannot define humour), in: Revue Germanique, 1906, pp. 601-34. Humour cannot be defined in a single formula, but we can determine a few constant elements. In its content, humour always implies a sense of scepticism and relativism. In its form, humour often consists of a voluntary and conscious transposition of ideas and feelings from the normal and routine to the abnormal and unexpected. CHAPMAN, A.J. andH .C . FOOT(eds.), IPs a Funny Thing, Hum our, Oxford, Pergamon Press, 1977. Papers from the ‘Conference on Humour and Laughter’, July 1976, Cardiff, Wales, organized by the British Psychological Association. DELAGE, Y ., ‘Sur la nature de comique’, in: Revue du M ois, 20 April 1919, pp. 337-54. Critique of Bergson’s theory of humour and laughter (cf. 5). The comic is characterized by two

Bibliography

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14.

15.

16.

17.

18.

19.

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conditions: (1) there is an incongruency between cause and effect which is surprising, (2) the effect is unpleasant for the person subjected to it. In humour there is always a victim. Bergson responded to this essay (cf. 6). DISERENS, C.M., ‘Recent Theories of Laughter’, in: Psychological Bulletin, 23,1926, pp. 247-55. A comprehensive survey of the major traditional theories of laughter. Authors discussed include Baillie, Bergson, Bliss, Carpenter, Carrit, Delage and Eastman. EASTMAN, M., The Sense o f Humor, New York, Scribner, 1921. Part one of this influential study discusses humour and laughter as means of communication originating in play. Humour is a ‘shock absorber’ and relativizes the seriousness of daily life. Part two discusses various theories of humour and laughter. EASTMAN, M. Enjoyment o f Laughter, New York, Simon and Schuster, 1936. An oft-quoted study in which humour is narrowly related to playing. We laugh only when in a playful mood, and in humorous exploits even unpleasant things change into pleasantries. EASTMAN, M., ‘What We Laugh At — And Why’, Reader’s Digest, 42, April 1943, pp. 66-8. The joke has a universal technique: the audience is led to a specific goal, but by a sudden change is led astray and thereby tricked. Raised expectations vanish in limbo, accepted norms are placed upside down and reversed. GOULD, G ., Democritus, or the Future o f Laughter, London, Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner, 1929. Laughter emphasizes man’s mortality and relativity. It makes all people equal, and is in this sense democratic. Laughter transcends the boundaries of superiority and inferiority, respectability and ‘irrespectability’. ‘The very function of laughter is to keep us earthly, to remind the dainty of the coarse.’ HAYWORTH, D., ‘The Social Origin and Function of Laughter’, Psychological Review, 35, 1928, pp. 367-84. Laughter signals to the other members of the group that they can relax. Its phylogenetic origin lies prior to the development of language as a means of communication. It communicates after a threat or danger, that the situation is safe again. HEERING, H .J., Tragiek (Tragedy), The Hague, Boucher, 1961. An extensive discussion of humour’s seeming opposite,

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20.

21.

22.

23.

24.

25.

The Sociology o f Humour and Laughter tragedy. The ‘underground connection between humour and tragedy’ is discussed on pp. 82ff. HEYD, D., ‘The Place of Laughter in Hobbes’ Theory of Emotions’, Journal o f the History o f Ideas, 43:2, 1982* pp. 285-96. Hobbes discussed humour and laughter in the context of a general theory of emotions, in particular of the sense of glory. What he said about laughter was not very original, as it had already been said by Plato, Aristotle and Descartes. HOCHFELD, S., Der Witz (The joke), Potsdam/Leipzig, Verlag Von Bonness & Hochfeld, 1920. Most theories of humour focus on the irrelevant dimension of the comic. The joke is always dependent on the ambiguity of language, of words. It contains two meanings which have nothing in common, and are kept hidden until the punch line. The surprise of the joke lies in the second, hidden meaning. HUTCHESON, F., ‘Reflections upon Laughter’, in: Reflections upon Laughter and Remarks upon the Fable o f the Bees, 1750, New York, Garland Publishing, 1971. An early critique of the Hobbesian theory of laughter. It is not our sense of superiority which causes laughter. Its causes are manifold, but predominant is the juxtaposition of ideas which are contrary yet exhibit some resemblance: greatness-inferiority; dignity-courseness; sacred-profane; etc. Laughter elicits pleasure, banishes anxiety and sadness, relaxes tensions, reduces passions, corrects small vices, etc. JANENTZKY, C., ‘Ueber Tragik, Komik und Humor’ (On tragedy, comedy and humour), in: Jahrbuch des Freien Deutschen Hochstifts, 1936-40, Halle, Freies deutsches Hochstift, 1940, pp. 3-51. Humour is the connection between comedy and tragedy. The comic is not an objective phenomenon but an act of human imagination and definition. It is not discrepancy which is crucial, but free playing, chance, brain waves, etc. People define things, events, human beings as being ‘comic’ or ‘humorous’. JEANSON, F., Signification humaine du rire (The human meaning of laughter), Paris, Editios du Seuil, 1950. Most theories about laughter are inadequate because they start with a cause-effect reasoning and end up in determinism. Laughter is a matter of consciousness, exhibiting an intentionality which is experienced, not cognitively reflected upon. JENSEN, R., ‘Quid Rides’, Classical Journal, 16,1920-21, pp.

Bibliography

26.

27.

28.

29.

30.

31.

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207-19. Most theories of laughter neglect the impulsive jollity of humour. Laughter triggers the play instinct in adults which is still visibly present in children. KNOX, I., ‘Towards a Philosophy of Humour’, Journal o f Philosophy, 48, 1951, pp. 541-8. Humour is a form of liberation; the experience of delight about a chaos which has only a playful character. The lord of comedy is a lord of misrule. However, the misrule is not rebellion but play. Playful humour emphasizes and preserves existing values, but also criticizes them when they appear to be less valuable in practice. KOESTLER, A., ‘The Jester’, in: The A ct o f Creation, Part One (1964), New York, Macmillan, 1967, pp. 27-97. Laughter is a luxury reflex without a clear biological function. It results from a comic unmasking of our expectations. There is a pattern in humour: an event or situation is looked at from two different, incongruent frames of reference, which are brought together (bi-sociation), from which a contrast emerges. Humour, art and science are intrinsically related in the act of creation. KORNER, J., ‘Der Witz’ (The joke), Preussisches Jahrbuch, 239, 1935, pp. 128-49. The joke is a play on meanings, an ambiguous construction in which a sham meaning dominates and in which the true meaning is kept in the background. The discovery of the latter forces us to change our orientation. The joke conceals and reveals at once. Its essence is playing with words. Freud is criticized. LINSCHOTEN, J., ‘Over de Humor’ (On humor), Tijdschrift voorPhilosophie, 13:4,1951, pp. 603-66. Along, phenomeno­ logical essay on humour as a human capacity which presupposes versatility and intelligence. The essence of humour — which calls for smiles rather than laughter — is the discrepancy between idea and reality. LIPPS, T., Kom ik und Humor (The comic and humour), Hamburg/Leipzig, Verglag L. Voss, 1898. A very influential study in which the comic is defined in terms of the contrast between the great and the small, the meaningful and the meaningless. It has a playful character and a surplus of psychical energy. The nature of humour is characterized by the transcendence of the comic-ridiculous {Komik). MILNER, G.B., ‘Why Laugh?’, New Society, 25 December 1969, pp. 1008-10. Laughter is caused by a reversal of values

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and patterns of behaviour, or by the juxtaposition of things which have nothing in common. Two reversals are discussed: spoonerism and chiasm. 32. MONTAGU, A., ‘Why Man Laughs’, Thing, April 1960, pp. 30-2. Only human beings laugh and speak. Laughter developed together with language and can be seen as a quasi-language, it is a social expression of happiness. In the course of evolution it lost its derisive quality. Natural selection favoured human beings who were able to express pleasure through laughter. 33. PLESSNER, H., Lachen und Weinen (Laughter and crying), Bern, Francke Verlag, 1961. Laughter and crying are forms of human expression on the borderline between the consciousmeaningful and the unconscious-physical. Both reveal the condition of man as being which has and also is a body.

II. Sociology 34. CAMERON, W.B., ‘The Sociology of Humour’, in: Informal Sociology, New York, Random House, 1963, pp. 79-94. Humour is to be interpreted within social frames of reference: one situation is defined in terms of two different frames. Two broad categories can be distinguished: insider-humour (cf. jokes by Jews about Jews) and outsider-humour (cf. jokes by whites about blacks and vice versa). Jokes usually employ stereotypes, yet often break through moral conventions. 35. CHAPMAN, A .J., ‘Social Aspects of Humorous Laughter’, in: 11, pp. 155-85. Discusses some experiments on humour appreciation, and on the problem of how to quantify humorous expressions. The author expresses his interest in the social dimensions of humour which he tries to measure quantitatively. 36. DAVIS, M.S., ‘Sociology through Humour’, Symbolic Interaction, 2:1,1979-80, pp. 105-10. As an active and creative player in the social world, the human being tries to avoid incongruencies through humorous behaviour. 37. DUMAS, G., Le sourire (The smile), Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1948. A rare study of smiling in which the social nature of the smile is emphasized (cf. chapter 4). A smile can only be understood within a social context. It is an expression of joy, has to be learned, and differs in its

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meaning from culture to culture. 38. DUPREEL, E., ‘Le probleme sociologique du rire’ (The sociological problem of laughter), Revue Philosophique de la France et de VEtranger, 106, 1928, pp. 213-60. An early sociological treatise in which laughter of inclusion is distinguished from laughter of exclusion. Humour affirms the solidarity of the group which may cause the exclusion of others. The inequality of the sexes with respect to humour is also discussed briefly. 39. EMERSON, J.P ., ‘Negotiating the Serious Import of Hum or', Sociometry, 32, 1969, pp. 169-81. Joking is a useful channel for communication of taboo subjects. These subjects are, in a sense negotiated in an exchange. 40. ESCARPIT, R., L ’Hum our, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1960. Humour is viewed as playing with everyday, social, and taken-for-granted evidence. ‘Normal’ behaviour is inverted but the social order is not seriously impaired. Humour has a critical (irony) as well as constructive (liberation from tensions) effect. 41. GROSS, E., ‘Laughter and Symbolic Interaction', Symbolic Interaction, 2:1, 1980, pp. 111-2. A short note on laughter in terms of symbolic interactionism. 42. HERTZLER, J.O ., Laughter — A Socio-scientific Analysis, New York, Exposition Press, 1970. Laughter is eminently social. It is a pre-verbal means of communication because through it we send messages with specific meanings. Laughter is in a way a language of gestures which can only be understood within a shared social-cultural context of values, norms and meanings. Like language, humour tends to institutionalize. 43. MARTINEAU, W .H., ‘A Model of the Social Functions of Hum or', in: 66, pp. 101-25. Humour is part of every social system and can be analysed as one social process affecting the system. It functions as a ‘lubricant’ and ‘abrasive’ in social interaction. The paper gives a survey of the sociologically relevant literature and develops ‘a model of the social functions of humor’. 44. MEAD, G.H., Mind, Self and Society, 1934, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1959. In this classic book on social interactions, identity and institutions, Mead discusses humour and laughter on p. 206f. 45. RICHTER, H .P ., ‘Zur Soziologie des Humors’ (On the

68

46.

47.

48.

49.

The Sociology o f Humour and Laughter sociology of humour), Soziale Welt, 6:2/3, 1965, pp. 105-10. The humorist is an actor whose attitude is essentially emotional and non-rational. His behaviour deviates from rational, social roles and their related values. A rationally constructed world is altered into an irrational reality. The observer understands the reversal of values, appreciates it as humour, and reacts to it with laughter. STEBBINS, R.A., ‘Comic Relief in Everyday Life. Dramaturgic Observations on a Function of Humour’, Symbolic Interaction, 2:1, 1979, pp. 95-103. Particularly intellectually and/or socially creative individuals experience and create comic relief in everyday social life. They are able thus to solve problems in social interaction. VICTOROFF, D., ‘Etude sociologique’, in: 3, pp. 35-44. A sociological contribution to the scientific study of laughter, in which laughter is compared to language. Focuses on the group’s influence on laughter. Humour is always groupspecific. VICTOROFF, D., ‘Sociologie du rire et psychoanalyse’ (Sociology of laughter and psychoanalysis), Psyche, 72, 1952, pp. 665-74. Sociological and psychoanalytical interpretations do not exclude each other. The social nature of humour is highlighted by stereo-typed humour, i.e. stereotyped reactions to persons, institutions, values and symbols in society. ZIJDERVELD, A.C., Humor und Gesellschaft (Humour and society), Graz Wien, Styria Verlag, 1976. A socio-historical and comparative study of the nature and the social functions of humour and laughter. The main themes have been elaborated in 207 and in this Trend Report.

III. Psychology and Psychoanalysis 50. ALLPORT, F.H ., ‘Laughter’, in: Social Psychology, Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1924, pp. 252-8. Laughter is a response to a social stimulus whose nature is incongruent. A high expectation is reduced to nothingness, two opposed attitudes are switched, impulses are repressed and then released — laughter is the response to these incongruencies. It is a social process and someone who often laughs to himself is considered eccentric.

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51. BERGH, H. van den, Konstanten in de Komedie (Constant elements in comedy), Amsterdam, Mousault, 1972. Seven recurrent psychological mechanisms which cause people to laugh are: slating, liberation, signal of life, applause, reflex, happy expectation and relaxation. 52. BERGLER, E., Laughter and the Sense o f Humor, New York, Intercontinental Medical Book Co., 1956. A Freudian study of humour in which it is argued that laughter is not directed towards others but to our own super-ego. The latter showers us with reproaches to which we respond with jokes and laughter. This is why we often ridicule heroes and great men and women of our time in our jokes. 53. BERLYNE, D.E., ‘Laughter, Humor and Play’, in: G. Lindzey and E. Aronson (eds.), The Handbook o f Social Psychology, Reading, Mass., Addison-Wesley, 1969, vol. Ill, pp. 795-852. Wide survey of the main theories of humour and laughter which are divided into two broad categories: (1) philosophical-literary, (2) modern psychological theories. The second half of the article discusses theories and experiments on playing. 54. BERLYNE, D.E., ‘Humor and its Kin’, in: 66, pp. 43-60. Starting with existing theories and experiments of arousal, curiosity and investigative behaviour, the article tries to explain the pleasure experience of humour. It is related to and compared with play, art, music and curiosity in general. Humour is a ‘collative process’: it is not tied to a closed stimulus, but refers to the past and anticipates the future. 55. BLISS, S., ‘The Origin of Laughter’, American Journal o f Psychology, 26, 1915, pp. 236-46. Independently of Freud but at about the same time, the author argued that people are under a constant pressure to suppress their impulses, while they are at odds with social, ethical and religious codes of behaviour. Laughter results from a sudden liberation from these pressures. Humour appeals to our more primitive and natural wishes. 56. CARPENTER, W .R., ‘Experiments of the Comic’, American Journal o f Psychology, 36, 1925, pp. 309-10. The comic emerges from the sudden rejection of an error or untruth by an effort of judgement. The larger the error we discover and the larger the strain on our mind, the stronger the comic effect will be. The author believes this hypothesis can and should be

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tested in experimental research. 57. CHAPMAN, A.J. and H.C. Foot (eds.), Humour and Laughter. Theory, Research and Applications, London, Wiley 1976. A collection of psychological papers on humour and laughter. The first part covers various theories and empirical studies, while the second consists of papers on the use and functioning of humour in society, e.g. the social functions of humour in Trinidad, humour and communication, humour and psychotherapy, etc. 58. CHOISY, M., ‘L’Angoisse du rire’ (The fear of laughter), Psyche, 72,1952, pp. 641-56. Laughter is a defence mechanism against fear of the forbidden. We defend ourselves by laughter against fear of the father, the mother, the authorities, sex­ uality, aggression, death, etc. These are the recurrent themes in jokes, and our laughter is a healthy reaction which relativizes the absoluteness of fear. Other reactions to fear include art, neurosis and alcoholism. 59. DOOLEY, L., ‘The Relation of Humor to Masochism’, Psychoanalytic Review, 28, 1941, pp. 37-46. A Freudian comparison of humour and masochism. They have in common the interaction between ego and super-ego. Ego regresses to the infantile stage and surrenders to the super-ego which treats ego as a child. Humour is also a defence mechanism. It denies the seriousness or painfulness of a situation. 60. DORIS, J. and E. FIERMAN, ‘Humor and Anxiety’, Journal o f Abnormal and Social Psychology, 53:1, 1956, pp. 59-62. Experimental study of the relation between anxiety-score and reactions to humorous stimuli, conducted among 28 respond­ ents with high anxiety-score (HA) and 28 respondents with low anxiety-score (LA). HA respondents prefer aggressive cartoons less than LA respondents, yet this correlation depends on the social context: the difference of preference occurred only when a respondent was interviewed by a person of the opposite sex. Interviewed by persons of their own sex, HA and LA showed the same preference scores. 61. DUMAS, G., ‘Le rire’ (Laughter), in: Nouveau traite de psychologie, Paris, Alcan, 1933, vol. 3, pp. 240-73. Laughter can be approached from five different angles: (1) as an anatomic-physiological mechanism, (2) as an expression of pleasure, (3) as a reaction to the comic, (4) as a psycho-physical mechanism, (5) as a social phenomenon comparable to

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language. Laughter presupposes shared emotions, ideas and moral opinions, and it is communicative. EASTMAN, M., ‘Wit and Nonsense: Freud’s Mistake’, Yale Review, 26, September 1936, pp. 71-87. Critique of Freud’s theory according to which humour consists of liberated impulses which are sexual and aggressive by nature. Humour, on the other hand, is often an expression of our wish to flee from reality. In humour we admit that we are cowards. There is, of course, also innocent humour (cf. nonsense humour). Crucial to much humour is the playful teasing of others. FLUGEL, J.C ., ‘Humor and Laughter’, in: G. Lindzey and E. Aronson (eds.), The Handbook o f Social Psychology, Reading, Mass. Addison-Wesley, 1954, vol. 2, pp. 709-34. Comprehensive survey of the main theories of humour and laughter. Both are related to playing, and to the absence of biological needs. The social group and the cultural tradition are important conditions. Humour is often associated with anxieties, aggression, sexuality, sense of superiority, intellect, etc. Taboos are broken, making room for tolerance of repressed feelings, thereby releasing a surplus of energy which is used in laughter. FREUD, S., Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious, 1905, transl. by J. Strachey, London, Hogarth Press, 1960. Classic study in which it is argued that through jokes unconscious wishes are expressed in a socially acceptable manner. In this way the energy needed for repression is saved and discharged in laughter. The similarity between jokes and dreams is discussed in chapter 6. Three categories are distinguished: Witz, K om ik, H um or. FREUD, S., ‘Humour’, in: Collected Papers, vol. 5, transl. by J. Strachey, London, Hogarth Press, 1956. In humour, super­ ego treats ego in a parental manner in order to help it to face reality and avoid the pain of the reality principle. GOLDSTEIN, J.H . and P.E. McGHEE (eds.), The Psychology o f Hum our. Theoretical Perspectives and Empirical Issues, New York/London, Academic Press, 1972. Twelve papers dealing with theoretical and empirical subjects concerning the psychology of humour. The emphasis is upon quantitive research and verifiable theories. The appendix is an annotated bibliography of English publications from 1900-71. GOUSTARD, M., ‘Introduction a la bibliographic du rire et

72

68.

69.

70.

71.

72.

The Sociology o f Humour and Laughter psychologie comparee’, in: 3, pp. 83-118. Laughter is not merely a reaction to a humorous incident or object. It is our intention which renders an incident or object humorous. GROTJAHN, M., Beyond Laughter, New York, McGraw Hill, 1957. Influential, Freudian treatise in which the role of aggression in humour and laughter is heavily emphasized. GUIMAN, J. and R.F. PRIEST, ‘When is Aggression Funny?’, Journal o f Personality and Social Psychology, 12:1 1969, pp. 60-5. Whether aggression is viewed as funny or not depends on the social context: (1) aggressive acts by a person qualified as ‘good’ are more readily appreciated as ‘humorous’ than as hostile; (2) a victim who deserves aggressive treatment causes a humorous reaction sooner than someone who does not deserve inimical treatment. HEIM, A., ‘An Experiment on Humour’, British Journal o f Psychology, 27, 1936, pp. 148-61. Empirical study of possible regularities or tendencies in laughter. An attempt is made to classify humour by means of an experiment, and to indicate the major types of people correlating with this classification. It appears, as a result, that the experimental method is not very useful in the study of humour. Social elements may play an extraordinarily large role, but they were not taken into account in this study. KLINE, L.W., ‘The Psychology of Humor’, American Journal o f Psychology, 18, 1907, pp. 421-41. The regular, the uniform, the normal and taken-for-granted can never be the source of humour. The stimuli of laughter are, on the contrary, deviations from the regular and normal, and exaggerations of such deviations, Yet, the values of good and evil are not really affected, since humour is uninterested in worldly affairs. It has no practical interests but is an aim in itself. Located beyond good and evil, humour’s essence is freedom. KREITLER, H. and S. KREITLER, ‘Dependence of Laughter on Cognitive Strategies’, Merrill-Palmer Quarterly, 16, 1970, pp. 163-77. In most studies factors which stimulate laughter are not distinguished from the conditions which foster its working. The paper focuses upon the absurd as stimulus and cognitive strategies as a condition of laughter. Humour is not so much dependent on intelligence as on the total process of cognitive functioning, including habits of thought and learned abilities of problem solving.

Bibliography

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73. KRIS, E., ‘Ego Development and the Comic', 1938, in: Psychoanalytic Explorations in A rt, London 1953, chapter 8, pp. 204-16. The comic is not just a discharge of superfluous psychical energy (Freud), but also a regression to infantile experiences. In the comic, people throw off the shackles of logical thought and surrender to primary, infantile pleasures. Ego conquers anxiety and controls the surrounding world. 74. KRIS, E., ‘Laughter as an Expressive Process’, 1940, in: Psychoanalytic Explorations in A r t, London 1953, chapter 9, pp. 217-39. The study of laughter gives insight into the ego’s influence on expressive behaviour. Laughter is a social expression of aggression and regression, in which the control of the body by the ego is lifted. Laughter may slacken the functions of the ego. 75. LA-FAVE, L., ‘Humour Judgments as a Function of Reference Groups and Identification Classes’, in: 66, pp. 305-6. Humour and laughter are not synonymous, and many prominent theorists have written a theory of laughter rather than of humour. Jokes, experiments have shown, are appreciated by respondents when their reference group is treated favourably and their negative reference group unfavourably. Likewise, jokes are held ‘not funny’, when they ridicule the reference group and treat the negative reference group favourably. 76. LEVINE J., ‘Humour’, in: International Encyclopedia o f the Social Sciences, vol. 7, New York, Macmillan/Free Press, 1968. A survey of various theories of humour and laughter. Like the dream humour is a regression to infantile forms of thought and behaviour. The temporary suspension of logical and realistic thought has a rewarding effect. Humour liberates suppressed wishes. 77. McDOUGALL, W., ‘Why Do We Laugh?’, Scribners, 71, 1922, pp. 359-63. Laughter has physiological and psychological functions. It stimulates breathing and blood circulation, pushes the blood to the brain, etc. Laughter breaks through habits of thought and behaviour and enables relaxation. It prevents us from sympathizing emotionally with the pain and misfortunes of others. 78. MINDESS, H., Laughter and Liberation, Los Angeles, Nash Publications, 1971. Humour results in physical liberation. It also liberates us from conventions, morality, reason, etc. It is

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74

79.

80.

81.

82.

‘a frame of mind’ and leads us to ‘an escape from self-imposed prison’. Its conditions include mental flexibility, spontaneity, unconventional playfulness, wit and humility. PIDDINGTON, R., The Psychology o f Laughter, New York, Gamut Press, 1963. Comprehensive discussion of the psychology of laughter with a useful summary of the main classical and modern theories in the field. SKINNER, B.F., ‘Verbal Behavior’, in: J.J. ENCKE et al. (eds.), The Comic in Theory and Practice, New York, Free Press, 1960, pp. 92-9. The telling of jokes and funny anecdotes is analysed as verbal behaviour. TREADWELL, Y., ‘Bibliography of Empirical Studies of Wit and Humor’, Psychological Reports, 20, 1967, pp. 1079-83. Elaborate bibliography of empirical, mainly psychological studies of humour which have appeared in 1897-1966. WORTHEN, R. and W.E. O’CONNEL, ‘Social Interest and Hum or’, International Journal o f Social Psychiatry, 15,1969, pp. 179-88. An experiment among three groups of adult men in which the relationship between social interest (or humanistic identification) and humour appreciation is tested. High scores of individual independence and of other-centredness correlate positively with hostile or resigned jokes.

IV. History and Literature 83. AUDEN, W .H., ‘Notes on the Comic’, Thought, 27,1952, pp. 57-71. The comic is defined as ‘a contradiction in the relation of the individual or personal to the universal or impersonal which does not involve the spectator in suffering or pity’. Spoonerisms, puns, parodies, satires, etc. are discussed with references to literary works. 84. BRETON, A., Anthologie de Thumour noir (Anthology of black humour), Paris, Editions du Sagittaire, 1950. A compilation of black (or gallows) humour, taken from the writings of many,mainly French, authors. The volume includes a brief introduction by Breton. 85. ETIENNE, L ., L 9A rt de contrepet (The art of punning), Paris, Pauvert, 1957. Analysis of the art of punning in the French language. Rabelais is usually seen as the first master of contrepeterie.

Bibliography

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86. FORSTER, F., Studien zum Wesen von Komik, Tragik und Humor (Studies on the nature of the comic, tragedy and humour), Wein, Verlag Notring, 1968. Essays on the relationship between tragedy and comedy as intrinsically human phenomena. The focus is on the dramatic arts. 87. FRANCOIS, D., ‘Le Contrepet’, La Linguistique, 2:3, 1966, pp. 31-52. A linguistic and structural analysis of the pun in the French language. 88. HAZZLITT, W .C., Studies in Jocular Literature, London, E. Stock, 1890. Humour and wit are culturally determined and can be studied in the various traditions of art and literature. The book discusses riddles, epigrams, fables, fairy tales, repartee, etc. Biographies of jesters and late-medieval jest books are rich historical sources which give us insight into the culture of those days. 89. JONGEJAN, E., De H um or-‘Cultus’ der Romantiek in Nederland (The humour-‘cult’ of romanticism in the Netherlands), Zutphen, W .J. Thieme, 1933. In Romantic literature between 1770 and 1840 a real cult of humour developed. Humorous and funny effects were used in a forced manner, in literature as well as in life styles. The mockery of sentimentality was an essential component of this cult. 90. KRONENBERGER, L., The Thread o f Laughter. Chapters on English Stage Comedy from Jonson to Maugham, New York, Knopf, 1952; New York, Hill & Wang, 1970. Comprehensive survey of British comedy over a period of three hundred years. Comedies focus on human weaknesses, and demonstrate what we are in contrast to what we pretend to be. They have a social character because they focus on social institutions and collective modes of behaviour. Johnson, Shadwell, Sheridan, Wilde, Shaw, Maugham and others are analysed in detail. 91. PROMIES, W., Der Burger und derNarr, oder Das Risiko der Phantasie (The burgher and the fool, or the risk of imagination), Mtinchen, C. Hanser Verlag, 1966. A study of the attitudes of the bourgeoisie vis-a-vis fools and folly on the stage in Germany. The book covers the early Enlightenment, the rise of Rationalism, late-Rationalism and Romanticism. The fool’s imagination was attacked most — though unsuccessfully by bourgeois Rationalism which itself is permeated by irrationalism.

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92. ROBBINS, R.H. ‘The Warden’s Wordplay: Toward a Redefinition of the Spoonerism’, The Dalhousie Review, 46, 1966. pp. 457-65. Brief and lucid discussion of the unconscious wordplay that replaces words or syllables in a sentence. The spoonerism, as it is called, causes unexpected linguistic incongruencies. 93. SCHKLOVSKY, V.B., ‘Zur Theorie des Komischen’ (On the theory of the comic), Neues Forum, 4, October 1967, pp. 755-58. Linguistic analysis of humour in which it is argued that jokes do not relate to any social or psychical reality, but consist of purely formal juxtapositions of linguistic structures. ‘The blood in anecdotes is not bloody’. 94. SILLARD, P.A ., ‘Some Irish Bulls’, Catholic World, 135, September 1937, pp. 696-7. Brief analysis of unintended blunders in speech in which contrary meanings are tied together, causing odd sentence construction and weird semantic meanings. 95. THOMAS, K., ‘The Place of Laughter in Tudor and Stuart England’, Times Literary Supplement, 21 January 1977, pp. 77-81. Jokes indicate not only structural ambiguities in society, but also tensions and fears. Laughter is a source of social cohesion. In relatively small communities, ridicule is a means of preserving established values. Jest books, feasts of fools, and anti-religious and scatological humour under the Tudor and Stuart monarchies are discussed in the light of this interpretation. Y. Anthropology 96. CHRISTENSEN, J.B., ‘Utani: Joking, Sexual License and Social Obligations among the Luguru’, American Anthropolo­ gist, 65:6,1963, pp. 1314-27. Utani are the joking relationships of the Luguru in which jesting and sexual licence are not just allowed but even expected and compulsory. Radcliffe-Brown’s theory of conjunction and disjunction (cf. 100) is discussed and applied to obligations among the Luguru. 97. DOUGLAS, M., ‘Jokes’, in: Implicit Meanings. Essays in Anthropology, London Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975, pp. 90-114. Joking should be located within social contexts. It exceeds the boundaries of social control and is in this respect subversive. Unlike the ritual which is the expression of

Bibliography

98.

99.

100.

101.

11

consensus and hierarchic order, jokes disturb the status quo and its harmony. Yet, the joke also expresses consensus, has a cathartic function, and is in essence a group’s critique of its own functioning. DOUGLAS, M., ‘Do Dogs Laugh? A Cross-Cultural Approach to Body Symbolism’, in: Implicit Meanings. Essays in Anthropology, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975, pp. 83-9. Laughter is a physical form of communication and is a non-verbal expression of meanings. Laughter is the expression of a special situation and contributes to it. FLORNOY, B., ‘Le rire chez les Indiens d’Amerique’ (Laughter among the American Indians), in: 3, pp. 27-34. American Indians often laugh at the helplessness and errors of whites. Within their own societies there is always much laughter about children who imitate their parents or animals. Laughter is also elicited by stories about marital failures, strange customs in other Indian tribes, etc. Funny stories are told during feasts, and women tell each other funny stories about intimate details of their marital life. RADCLIFFE-BROWN, A.R. ‘On Joking Relationships’, 1940, in: Structure and Function in Primitive Society, New York, The Free Press, 1965, pp. 90-104. The classic essay on joking relationships in traditional African cultures. A joking relationship is defined as ‘a relation between two persons in which one is by custom permitted, and in some instances required, to tease or make fun of the other, who in turn is required to take no offence’. STEWARD, J.H ., ‘The Ceremonial Buffoon of the American Indian’, in: Papers o f the Michigan Academy o f Science, Arts and Letters, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1931, vol. 14, pp. 187-207. Informative survey of institutionalized and ceremonialized joking in American Indian cultures. Cere­ monial clowns violate sacred taboos and ridicule important ceremonies, traditional mores, matters of sexuality, strangers, etc.

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I. Religion and Morality 102. ALSTON, J.P. and L.A. PLATT, ‘Religious Humor: a Longitudinal Content Analysis of Cartoons’, Sociological Analysis, 30:4, 1969, pp. 217-22. Humour reflects socially accepted values and attitudes. It serves as a mechanism by which deviant or unacceptable behaviour is punished. The cartoonist tends to follow dominant values and attitudes because he is under the pressure of commercialism. Cartoons, therefore, reflect major changes of values and attitudes. The paper analyses changes in religious convictions. 103. BERGER, P.L., A Rumor o f Angels, Garden City, NJ, Doubleday Anchor, 1969. The essay discusses the rediscovery of the supernatural in modernity, and argues on pp. 86-90 that among other things, humour signifies a transcendental dimen­ sion of human existence: ‘The comic rejects the imprisonment of the human spirit in the world’. 104. FEHRLE, E., ‘Das Lachen im Glauben der Volker’ (Laughter in the beliefs of nations), Zeitschrift fu r Volkskunde, 40, vol. 2, 1930, pp. 1-5. Laughter occupies an important place in the myths and legends of many nations. It expresses vitality and is based on the notion that it breaks the spell of death, as well as the spell of malediction. Laughter is often viewed as a defence mechanism against evil forces (cf. laughter at burial rites). 105. GOOD, E.M ., Irony in the Old Testament, Philadelphia, Westminster Press, 1950. Irony is characterized by two elements: (1) what is meant is contrary to what is said; (2) its purpose is positive and contains a conception of truth. Irony should be differentiated from sarcasm, satire and parody. The book discusses the role of irony in the Old Testament. 106. HAUSDORFF, D., ‘Magazine Humor and Popular Morality, 1929-1934’, Journalism Quarterly, 41:4, 1964, pp. 504-16. Humour in magazines is a useful indicator of the public’s attitudes towards moral issues. Analysis of humour in eight magazines during the period 1929-34 indicates that the major issues were alcoholism, organized crime and organized religion. 107. KOLVE, V.A., ‘Religious Laughter’, in: The Play Called

Bibliography

19

Corpus Christi, Stanford, Cal., Stanford University Press, 1966, pp. 124-44. What were the functions of laughter in the Middle Ages, and how did it relate to religion? What about medieval laughter at the sacred? The paper gives a historical analysis of the feasts of fools, of the innocents, etc., and of the Corpus Christi play. 108. LEGMAN, G., Rationale o f the Dirty Joke. A n Analysis o f Sexual H um or, New York, Grove Press, 1968; London, Cape, 1968. This analysis of erotic humour (dirty jokes) is based on Freud’s theory of jokes (cf. 64, 65). The telling of obscene jokes is interpreted as a modified rape and the replacement of direct sexual relationships. Dirty jokes break taboos, and rationalize neurotically-charged situations. 109. LEGMAN, G., ‘Toward a Motif-Index of Erotic Hum or’, Journal o f American Folklore, 75, July 1962, pp. 227-48. As a preparation for the construction of a motif-index of erotic humour, the author presents a historical survey of erotic jokes as found in various literary genres.

II. Politics and Policy 110. BAUM, G., Hum or und Satire in der burgerlichen Aesthetik. Zur Kritik ihres apologetischen Charakters (Humour and satire in bourgeois aesthetics. Towards a critique of its apologetic nature), Berlin, Riitten und Loening, 1959. A marxist analysis of humour and satire as weapons in class conflict. Atonement is not in the nature of comedy and humour. The first chapter discusses the opposed conceptions of the comic in Hegel and Marx. I I I . BERG, W .A.L.M. van den, Van de Lach tot de Traan. Het Cabaret: Sociologisch Bekeken (From laughter to tears. A sociological look at ‘cabaret’), unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Nijmegen, 1977. A sociological study of a European brand of comedy called cabaret, in which social and political satire is performed on stage, usually by one person who performs sketches and sings songs. Four types of ‘cabaret’ have been identified by the author, who argues that these types reflect the psychological and political moods of various social groups in Dutch society. 112. COATES, J.F., ‘Wit and Humor: a Neglected Aid in Crowd

80

113.

114.

115.

116.

117.

118.

The Sociology o f Humour and Laughter and Mob Control’, Crime and Delinquency, 18, 1972, pp. 148-91. The use of humour may decrease tensions in crowds, unless these tensions have already reached boiling point. FERDINANDY, M. de, ‘Carnival and Revolution’, Atlas, February 1964, pp. 98-104. The Roman saturnalia and Euro­ pean carnival have much in common with political revolution. They are temporary periods of anarchy and licence in which destructive and repressed instincts emerge and take command. These periods are always followed by restoration. HANSER, R., ‘Wit as Weapon’, Saturday Review, 35, 8 November 1952, pp. 13-5. Political jokes are the last possible forms of resistance under a totalitarian system. The German word for them is Flusterwitze — whispering jokes. Many jokes circulating behind the Iron Curtain are adjusted versions of jokes against the Nazi regime. Old jokes frequently circulate for a long time in slightly adjusted versions. KIKKERT, J.G ., ‘Humor in Estland’ (Humour in Estonia), Internationale Spectator, 29:7, 1975, pp. 405-9. A discussion of anti-communist and anti-Russian jokes circulating in Estonia. They are directed against the Russian propaganda machine and the party apparatchiks. They function as an outlet for the frustrations of political repression, and can be interpreted as forms of passive resistance. LINDEMAN, H., ‘Humor in Politics and Society’, Impact o f Science on Society, 19:3, 1969, pp. 269-78. Humour prevents us from taking things too seriously. It relativizes and creates tolerance. It is a democratic value to be cherished, defended and promoted. OBRDLIK, A .J., ‘Gallows Humor. A Sociological Phenomenon’, American Journal o f Sociology, 47, 1942, pp. 709-16. Analysis of the various forms of humour prior to and during the German invasion of Czechoslovakia, based on personal observation. When the oppression was at its height bravado humour was replaced by sardonic jokes which the author calls ‘gallows humour’. Its functions are discussed. PRAAG H. van, Humor, het Geheime Wapen van de Demokratie (Humour, the secret weapon of democracy), Amsterdam, Arbeiderspers, 1967. Humour is an essential element of democracy. It relativizes, teaches us our weaknesses, and tells us to forgive the weaknesses of others. Humour testifies to our resilience in the face of superior power.

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Yet the pressure can not get too strong, or humour will fade away, as it does under very oppressive regimes. 119. PRIEST, R.F., ‘Election Jokes: The Effects of Reference Group Membership’, Psychological Reports, 18, 1966, pp. 600-2. Jokes about candidates and the effects of reference groups on their support are analysed and briefly reported. 120. PRIEST, R.F. and J. ABRAHAMS, ‘Candidate Preference and Hostile Humor in the 1968 Elections’, Psychological Reports, 26, 1970, pp. 779-83. Analysis of the role of humour in elections.

III. Nationality 121. BEATTY, J., ‘Humor versus Taboo: the Sorrowful Story of the Cartoon’, Saturday Review, 40, 23 November 1957, pp. 11-5. In American cartoons, controversial issues — such as sexuality, political and religious preference, and death — are taboo. Cartoons avoid these issues for commercial reasons. They are usually politically conservative and rather illinformed, in sharp contrast to most British cartoons. 122. BERGER, A.A., ‘Authority in the Comics’, Trans-Action, December 1966, pp. 22-6. A comparative analysis of Italian and American cartoons suggests strong differences between the values of the two countries. In particular, the approach to and appreciation of authority is different: authority is more often deemed invalid in America and attitudes towards it are more hostile and rebellious than in Italy. ‘Comics accurately reflect values and are worthy of more serious attention’. 123. BLAIR, W., Native American Hum or, San Francisco, Chandler Publications, 1960. An historical analysis of typical American humour, expressing the country’s institutions, laws, folk ways, manners, characters, convictions, etc. Such national humour can be observed in the US from roughly 1830. Regional differences are taken into account (down-east humour, old-south humour, etc). 124. BLAIR, W., Horse Sense in American Humour from Benjamin Franklin to Ogden Nash, New York, Russell & Russell, 1942. A selection of humorous writings which express the typically American leaning towards common sense. In the introduction the author discusses the specific nature of

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American humour. 125. BLYTH, R.H ., Japanese Humor, vol. 24, Tokyo, Tourist Library, 1957. Japanese humour, like all national humour, is closely linked to the idiosyncracies of culture (cf. the smile as an expression of self-restraint). The book gives an historical survey, preceded by a comparative analysis of Japanese and European humour. 126. BOURKE, J., Englischer Humor (British humour), Gottingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1965. Small but thoughtful discussion of British humour and wit. Essential is the sudden emergence of a tension which is as suddenly conquered again. Wit is intellectual, and sometimes offensive, while humour is rarely intellectual and usually reconciling. Different types and categories of British humour are discussed. 127. CAZAMIAN, L., The Development o f English Hum or, Durham, Duke University press, 1952. The main focus is on humour in popular culture and literature during the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. 128. HAFERKORN, R., ‘Ueber das englische Understatement’ (On the British understatement), in: Britannica, Festschrift fu r Hermann Flasdieck, Heidelberg, Carl Winter Universitatsverlag, 1960, pp. 129-41. Understatement is the tendency to say less than is actually intended. It is the expression of a worldview, a way of thinking and living, typical of the upper and upper middle classes in England. It radiates a sense of superiority and control. 129. HEARN, L., ‘The Japanese Smile’, in: Glimpses o f Unfamiliar Japan, Boston/New York, Houghton-Mifflin, 1895, vol. 2, pp. 656-83. The Japanese smile is not an expression of jollity and pleasure but part of a cultivated etiquette. Even in situations of pain and sorrow, the smile seems to be obligatory. Loud laughter, sarcasm, irony and cruel jokes have no place in the Japanese code of behaviour. The smile signals the self-control which is fostered by Buddhist ethics. 130. KINNOSUKE, a., ‘What Makes Japan Laugh?’, Outlook, 146, 1927, pp. 49-51. Short discussion of the particular features of Japanese humour. The humour in southern Japan is reminiscent of the slapstick in American movies. 131. MERCIER, V., The Irish Comic Tradition, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1926. Historical and literary study of Irish

Bibliography

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humour, with chapters on macabre and grotesque humour, wit and word play, and satire and parody.

IV. Ethnicity 132. ARNEZ, N.L. and C.B. ANTHONY, ‘Contemporary Negro Humour as Social Satire’, Phylon, 29,1968, pp. 339-46. Three stages of Negro humour as social satire are distinguished: (1) the humour is in-group and helps to promote social cohesiveness: (2) the humour turns public, and outsiders use the black minority as the focus of their caricatures (cf. the black and happy buffoon); (3) the members of the black minority have become self-conscious and poke fun at themselves publicly (cf. Dick Gregory, Flip Wilson, Godfrey Cambridge, etc.). 133. BARRON, M.L. ‘A Content Analysis of Intergroup Hum or’, American SociologialReview, 15, February 1950, pp. 88-94. A content analysis of jokes about Jews (100), blacks (300) and Irish (274), taken from three different anthologies. The main stereotypes of each are listed and classified. 134. BOSKIN, J., ‘Good-bye, Mr. Bones’, The New York Times Magazine, 1 May 1966, pp. 31-92. A discussion of humour among American blacks in different periods. Two types are distinguished: external humour which fosters adjustment to the dominant white culture, and internal (in-group) humour which is anti-white and promotes black pride. Recent examples of blacks’ humour reflect a new sense of self-confidence, and of black consciousness. 135. BURMA, J.H ., ‘Humor as Technique in Race Conflict’, American Sociological Review, 1946, 11:6, pp. 710-5. Stereotyped humour about blacks in the US South functions to discredit the minority and to stress alleged white superiority. In reaction, blacks develop their own, anti-white humour. It is a technique used in times of conflict, aiming at the acquisition and maintenance of dominance. 136. DAVIES, C., ‘Ethnic Jokes, Moral Values and Social Boundaries’, British Journal o f Sociology, 33:3, September 1982, pp. 383-403. When a society grows complex and abstract, and social and cultural boundaries become vague and uncertain, jokes about minorities seem to draw some clearly

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distinguishable lines again. 137. GOLDMAN, M., ‘The Sociology of Negro Humor’, unpublished PhD dissertation, New School for Social Research, New York, 1960. Humour by and about blacks can only be understood sociologically by viewing it in the historical context of race relations in the US. Various functions of humour in the changing relations between the races in recent history are discussed. Humour is an instrument by which the tensions between the races can be measured. 138. GREENBERG, B.S. and S. KAHN, ‘Blacks in Playboy Cartoons’, Journalism Quarterly, 47, 1970, pp. 557-60. Short paper on the image of blacks in the cartoons of Playboy magazine. 139. HITSCHMANN, E., ‘Zur Psychologie des judischen Witzes’ (On the psychology of Jewish humour), Psychoanalytische Bewegung, vol. 2, 1930, pp. 580-6. A critique of Reik’s paper on Jewish jokes (cf. 143). Jewish self-derision is the result of the conflicts with which mainly young Jews have to live. They are squeezed between assimilation to the enlightened Western culture and loyalty to Jewish family traditions. By expressing their own imperfections in jokes, they are one step ahead of their opponents and critics. In the process, energy which they would have needed for repressing emotions is saved. Zionism is the arch-enemy of Jewish humour. 140. LANDMANN, S., Der judische Witz. Soziologie und Sammlung (The Jewish joke. Sociology and anthology), Freiburg, Switzerland, Walter Verlag, 1962. Socio-historical analysis and anthology of Jewish humour, in which the Jewish joke is viewed as a reaction to the pressures of the outside world, as well as a defence against the pressures from within embodied by the demands of tradition. When heroic battles and direct roads to victory appear impossible, people resort to jokes as a final weapon. 141. LOMAX, L.E., ‘The American Negro’s New Comedy Act’, Harpers Magazine, 222, June 1961, pp. 46-6. Whites and blacks laugh increasingly about the same jokes. The blacks’ humour becomes ‘interracial’, and class differences assume a more prominent role. The more blacks are integrated into society, the more laughter works to destroy racism. 142. MIDDLETON, R. ‘Negro and White Reactions to Racial Humor’, Sociometry, 22, 1959, pp. 175-83. Blacks react more

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147.

85

positively to anti-white jokes than do whites, but whites and blacks appreciate anti-black jokes equally. In groups with low authority scores, blacks react even more favourable to anti­ black jokes than do whites, but in groups with high authority scores no difference in reaction could be observed. REIK, T., ‘Zur Psychoanalyse des judischen Witzes’ (On the psychoanalysis of Jewish jokes), Imago, 15, 1929, pp. 63-88. Classic psychoanalytical essay on self-depreciation and self­ critique in Jewish humour. It is compared to melancholy. Both centre around a lost person who was loved and is now internalized through identification. Jewish jokes are directed against the non-Jewish reality which is internalized through identification. They are a hidden indictment of the non-Jewish world. RINDER, I.D., ‘A Note on Humor as an Index of Minority Group Morale’, Phylon, 26, 1965, pp. 117-21. The jokes of a minority are indicative of the self-images of its members and reflect their attitudes to the status they occupy in society as a whole. Two functions are dominant: (1) conflict with the outside world, and (2) control of deviation within the group. RINDER, I.D., ‘Minority Orientations’, Phylon, 26, 1965. pp. 5-17. Within minorities, the identification of group members with their group (centripetal) conflicts with identification with society as a whole (centrifugal). Hate of one’s own group develops gradually when an individual has broken his other ties, but has not yet been able to assimilate to society as a whole. ROSENBERG, B. and G. SHAPIRO, ‘Marginality and Jewish Humor’, Midstream, 4, 1958, pp. 70-80. In Jewish jokes, assimilation conflicts with the demands of Jewish tradition. Jewish humour testifies to the marginal and ambig­ uous position of Jews in modern society. The jokes offer an outlet for tensions and feelings of guilt arising from this marginality and ambiguity. SMITH, N.V.O. and W.E. VINACKE, ‘Reactions to Humorous Stimuli of Different Generations of Japanese, Chinese and Caucasions in Hawaii’, The Journal o f Social Psychology, 34, 1951, pp. 69-96. An experimental study of immigrant Japanese, Chinese and whites in Hawaii and of their younger generations. The focus is on possible differences between the older and the younger members of these groups.

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Three experiments demonstrated that responses to humour differ greatly among these three ethnic groups, but not between the older and younger generations within each group. This suggests that differences of ethnic background have not yet been erased in the process of assimilation. 148. WOLFF, H.A., C.E. SMITH and H.A. MURRAY, ‘The Psychology of Humor: A Study of Responses to Race Disparagement Jokes’, Journal o f Abnormal and Social Psychology, 28, 1934, pp. 341-65. Humour has a formula: there is incongruency in the sudden presentation of a new and amusing contrast to an expectation. The paper reports an experiment with ethnic humour. The less an ethnic minority is appreciated, the more people will laugh at disparaging jokes about it. 149. ZENNER, W., ‘Joking and Ethnic Stereotyping’, Anthropol­ ogical Quarterly, 43, 1970, pp. 93-113. An analysis of the dominant stereotypes in ethnic joking.

Y. Group Solidarity and Social Control 150. ARNDT, G.W., ‘Community Reactions to a Horrifying Event’, Bulletin o f the Menninger Clinic, 23 May 1959, pp. 106-11. Severely shocked emotions can be mastered through humour and laughter. Children are often the main channel for cruel, sick and sardonic jokes. They can tell the jokes because they are not yet aware of the taboo nature of their content. To adults these jokes are repugnant, yet their liberating effect is welcomed. 151. BATESON, G., ‘The Position of Humor in Human Communication’, In: Cybernetics, Transactions o f the Ninth Conference, held in New York, 20-1 March 1952, pp. 1-47. Humour is analysed in terms of communication theory. In telling a joke some facts are made explicit, while other information is held implicit and in the background. When the punch line is reached the latter is emphasized and brought forward, causing a paradox. The paradox is a prototypical paradigm of humour. 152. BAWDEN, H .H ., ‘The Comic as Illustrating the SummationIrradiation Theory of Pleasure-Pain’, Psychological Review, 17,5 September 1910, pp. 336-46. Laughter is the expression of

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relief after the accumulation of stimuli which either raise an expectation or cause an incongruency. Laughter eases the return to social equilibrium and to control over the situation. It fosters a sense of social responsibility in the individual. BERGE, B., ‘Propos sur le rire “ relationnel” ’ (Note on relational laughter), in: 3, pp. 119-22. In contrast to Hobbesian theory, the author emphasizes the relational nature of laughter. Laughter is not always derisive and at the expense of others. It is on the contrary, capable of fostering feelings of solidarity and of creating a sense of community. Laughter is essential to the socialization of the child. BLAU, P., The Dynamics o f Bureaucracy, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1955. The social functions of humour in a bureaucratic organization are briefly discussed on pp. 109-12. Joking is often a feature of competitive situations where it fosters group solidarity and reduces tensions. Humour often supplements the stereotyping of clients by bureaucrats. BOGARDUS, E.S., ‘Play Attitudes’, ‘Mirthful Attitudes’, in: Fundamentals o f Social Psychology, New York, Appleton, 1942, pp. 85-8, 88-95. Laughter is rarely aggressive but more often the expression of a ‘sunny disposition’ and the result of social contacts. It can have a corrective and integrating effect on the members of a group. BRADNEY, P., ‘The Joking Relationship in Industry’, Human Relations, 10, 1957, pp. 179-87. The anthropological notion of a ‘joking relationship’ (cf. 100) is applied to the world of Western industry. Joking relationships tend to emerge among workers when there is a possibility of open conflict which they want to avoid. Conjunction is paired to disjunction in these relationships. BURNS, T., ‘Friends, Enemies and Polite Fiction’, American Sociological Review, 18, 1953, pp. 654-62. Role conflicts are often solved by joking relationships. Jesting and irony occur in primary groups within larger, formal organizations, linking the formal and informal levels of role playing. COSER, R.L., ‘Some Social Functions of Laughter: A Study of Humor in a Hospital Setting’, Human Relations, 2, 1959, pp. 171-82. Humour and laughter express the collective experiences of the members of a group. In the formal setting of a hospital, the author observed humour and laughter at work. They served to avert fear, to rebel against authority, and to

88

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163.

164.

The Sociology o f Humour and Laughter liberate the individual from the stifling organization. Humour and laughter have socializing functions, and serve as outlets. COSER, R.L., ‘Laughter among Colleagues’, Psychiatry, 23, 1960, pp. 81-95. Laughing together presupposes a common definition of a situation. The paper discusses jesting and laughing during staff meetings in a psychiatric institution. Social distances diminish, and the adjustment of the individual to the formal organization is facilitated. The rigidity of the social structure is loosened without damaging it. Humour also functions as a controlled outlet for aggression. COSER, R.L., ‘Laughter in the W ard’, in: Life in the Ward, East Lansing, Michigan State University Press, 1962, pp. 84-9. Patients converse jocularly in reaction to the threatening aspects of ‘life in the ward’. Humour canalizes fears, anxieties and feelings of hostility. It creates consensus and a sense of solidarity. A dysfunction is, of course, that unsatisfactory situations remain unchanged. DOLLARD, J., Caste and Class in a Southern Town, New Haven, Conn., Yale University Press, 1937. In a society with a rigid, authoritarian social system, lower strata have to vent their frustrations and aggression in a circumspect manner. Joking is a device which is often used (p. 307). It brings relief but does not change the status quo. EMERSON, J.P ., ‘Social Functions of Humor in a Hospital Setting’, unpublished PhD dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1963. Social conflicts are caused by cultural and structural incongruencies and may lead to un­ certainty and loss of self-control on the part of involved individuals. Humour introduces these conflicts informally and neutralizes them. It is a socially accepted form of protest. FOX, R.C., Experiment Perilous. Physicians and Patients Facing the Unknown, Glencoe, 111., The Free Press, 1959. In this study of life in a city hospital in New England, the joking and laughing of patients and doctors is also discussed (pp. 76-84, 170-79). They are devices to counter anxieties, uncert­ ainties and frustrations — a cathartic function. Through humour new patients are introduced smoothly to the social milieu of the ward. GOFFMAN, E., Asylum s, Garden City, NJ, Doubleday Anchor, 1961. A classic study of life in a ‘total institution’. The relevance of joking and humour in general for the maintenance

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of the inmates’ self-identity (‘identity joking’) is discussed on p. 112. GOODCHILDS, J.D ., ‘Effects of Being Witty on Position in the Social Structure of a Small Group’, Sociometry, 22:3, 1959, pp. 261-72. An experimental study in which the influence of humorous behaviour on the position of the joking indivi­ dual in the group is analysed. Clownish behaviour produces popularity but has little influence on the group; sarcastic humour does not produce popularity but has more effect on the behaviour of the group. GOODCHILDS, J.D ., ‘On Being Witty: Causes, Correlates and Consequences’, in: 66, pp. 173-93. The focus is on the humorous performer rather than the audience. The author is particularly interested in the influence of humorous behaviour on the interaction processes in small groups. GOODCHILDS, J. D. and E.E. SMITH, ‘The Wit and his Group’, Human Relations, 7, 1964, pp. 23-31. Two experi­ mental studies of 72 and 108 adult males respectively provided information about (1) the personality and behaviour of the joker in a group and (2) the effects of humorous behaviour on the group. The joker has a positive self-image; his behaviour is relatively independent of the group’s norms; groups with a successful joker evaluate the experience positively; and they are better equipped to solve their problems. GOODRICH, A., J. HENRY and D.W. GOODRICH, ‘Laughter in Psychiatric Staff Conferences: A Sociopsychi­ atric Analysis’, American Journal o f Orthopsychiatry, 24, 1954, pp. 175-84. Analysis of 23 staff conferences in a psychiatric institution. Laughter promotes group solidarity, functions as an outlet for tensions, consolidates status positions, and diminishes anxieties. Cultural values concerning death and sexuality are corroborated by jokes. HANDELMAN, D. and B. KAPFERER, ‘Forms of Joking Activity: A Comparative Approach’, American Anthropolo­ gist, 74, 1972, pp. 484-517. A comparative analysis of joking behaviour in a sheltered workshop in Israel and in part of a lead and zinc mine in Zambia. Joking is governed by a set of rules called ‘joking frames’. Two major types are distinguished: ‘setting-specific’ and ‘category-routinized’ frames. The paper focuses on conditions which led to the establishment, main­ tenance and destruction of joking frames during interactions.

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170. HES, J. and J. LEVINE, ‘Kibbutz Humour’, Journal o f Nervous and Mental Diseases, 135, 1962, pp. 327-31. Humour is an expression of tension and a mechanism which fosters solidarity in the group. In the kibbutz, humour functioned as an outlet for daily tensions concerning authority, division of social responsibilities, attitudes of members of the kibbutz to art and culture, etc. 171. KAPLAN, H.B. and I.H. BOYD, ‘The Social Functions of Humor in an Open Psychiatric W ard’, Psychiatric Quarterly, 39,1965, pp. 502-15. The paper discusses three main functions: (1) humour fosters integration of the group, because it sanc­ tions deviations, expresses common emotions, and promotes ties of friendship and mutual succor; (2) it promotes adjustment to the environment; (3) it embodies social ap­ proval, mutual acceptance and support. 172. LUNDBERG, C.C., ‘Person-Focused Joking: Patterns and Function’, Human Organization, 28:1, 1969, pp. 22-8. An analysis of 13 joking situations in a formal organization. The question discussed is: who starts the joking to whom, about whom, in front of whom, and with what effect? The focus is on the rank of the participants, the relative status of the groups involved, the positive or negative feelings generated, and the group and individual responses to the joking. 173. MACDOUGALL, C.D., ‘Wit and Humor’, ‘Comic Strips’, Cartoons’, in: Understanding Public Opinion, New York, Macmillan, 1952, pp. 426-34,632-8,638-46. Laughter-creating humour promotes a we-experience in an audience. Because of this, the audience is more amenable to serious topics. Each group has its own brand of humour which is rarely funny to outsiders. US political life has a few comedians who can be compared to traditional court jesters. At the court of public opinion these jesters exert considerable influence on political affairs. 174. MIDDLETON, R. and J. MOLAND, ‘Humor in Negro and White Sub-culture. A Study of Jokes among University Students’, American Sociological Review, 24, 1959, pp. 61-9. A study of joking behaviour among students at two southern universities in the US. Differences in sex, race and frequency of joking are discussed. The most important function of joking is to strengthen feelings of solidarity and intimacy within the group. Too much emphasis has been placed on conflict and

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control functions in the literature on humour and laughter. 175. MILLER, F.C., ‘Humor in a Chippewa Tribal Council’, Ethnology, 6,1967, pp. 263-71. A report of observations made during sessions of a Chippewa tribal council. Humour and laughter have no control functions but foster communication. They also create a sense of relaxation. Jokes can convey things which could not be expressed otherwise. They thus strengthen human relations. 176. PILCHER, W.W., ‘Joking Behavior’, in: The Portland Longshoremen, New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, n.d. Another application of the notion of ‘joking relationships’ (cf. 100) to Western society, this time to the behaviour of longshoremen in Portland (USA). Three categories are distinguished: (1) blasphemy; (2) cursing and abuse; (3) obscene language. These joking relations tie people together, keep aggression under control, strengthen group solidarity and indicate the boundaries of the group. 177. STEPHENSON, R .M .,‘Conflict and Control Functions of Hum or’, American Journal o f Sociology, 56, 1951, pp. 569-74. The two main functions of humour are (1) conflict (humour as a weapon) and (2) control (humour regulates behaviour). Jokes express the dominant values of society and reduce status differences. 178. SYKES, A .J.M ., ‘Joking Relationships in an Industrial Setting’, American Anthropologist, 68, 1966, pp. 188-93. Applies the concept of joking relationships (cf. 100) to the informal, bantering behaviour of people in a Western printing office. Jocular relations were observed between young men and women who were potential partners. They avoided obscenities. However, uncontrolled and sometimes obscene joking behaviour occurred between individuals who were not potential partners, such as older married men and unmarried younger women. 179. WINECK, C., ‘Space Jokes as Indication of Attitudes toward Space’, Journal o f Social Issues, 17:2, 1961, pp. 43-9. A content analysis of 944 jokes about modern space exploration, collected in 1957-59. The jokes indicate anxiety, uncertainty and ambivalence about the subject, and seem to function as a kind of underground channel of communication. The attitudes and opinions expressed in these jokes contrast with data from opinion polls.

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VI. Science, Music and the Law 180. ESCARPIT, R., ‘Humorous Attitude and Scientific Inventivity’, Impact o f Science on Society, 19,1969, pp. 253-8. The essence of humour is a shift in the angle of view on reality. The humorist focuses on the absurdity of reality but in order not to be held crazy, he must be sure of his sanity and should possess a healthy sense of superiority. Eccentricity is the hallmark of humour. The similarities with the scientific attitude are striking. 181. FEHR, H ., Der Humor im Recht (Humour in the law), Bern, Haupt, 1946. An analysis of humorous incidents in, and humorous dimensions of, law and jurisprudence. 182. FELEKI, L., ‘Keeping Laughably up with Science’, Impact o f Science on Society, 19:3, 1969, pp. 279-90. Humour can function as an elixir in a world dominated by the sciences and technology — a mechanized world with which humour is at odds. Scientifically and technologically trained people control their world and leave nothing to the unexpected. Emotions such as pride, hate and selfishness will slowly wither away, and satire with them. We can expect the emergence of a mechanized kind of humour which is closely linked to science and technology. 183. KNESSL, L., ‘Humor in der neuen Musik’ (Humour in modern music), NeuesForum, 8,1961, pp. 72-4. A short paper on humorous effects in music, particularly contemporary music. 184. KOHN, A., ‘The Journal in which Scientists Laugh at Scienc Impact o f Science on Society, 19:3,1969, pp. 259-68. Despite the image of scientists as cold-blooded, impersonal people, they usually have a good sense of humour. Without it, science could in all probability not exist . One journal is devoted to the coalition of humour and science: ‘The Journal of Irreproducible Results’. It ridicules verbosity, obscurantism, pomposity, etc. in scientific publications and research programmes. 185. MULL, H.V.A., ‘A Study of Humor in Music’, American Journal o f Psychology, 62, 1949, pp. 560-66. A short paper on humorous effects in music. 186. PITLO, A., De Lach in het Recht (Laughter in the law), Haarlem, Tjeenk Willink, 1963. Laughter and the law are

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omnipresent in daily life, and have much in common. There is laughter at the law and lawyers, but there is also laughter in the law and in jurisprudence. The book gives an historical account of laughter and the law with many informative details.

VII. Mental Health 187. BRILL, A.A., ‘Wit: its Technique and Tensions’, in: Fundamental Conceptions o f Psychoanalysis, London, George Allen, 1922 pp. 113-38. The techniques of jokes are similar to those of dreams, but unlike dreams jokes are social and require an audience. Various techniques such as double pieanings, transference of meanings, automatism of thought, etc., are discussed and related to Freud’s theory. 188. BRILL, A.A., ‘The Mechanics of Wit and Humor in Normal and Psychopathic States’, Psychiatric Quarterly, 14,1940, pp. 731-49. Since Freud, few studies have dealt with the relations among humour, wit and psychopathology. Freud’s distinction between humour and wit, and their relations to the unconscious, are reiterated. 189. BRODY, M.W., ‘The Meaning of Laughter’, Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 19, 1950, pp. 192-201. Particularly among patients undergoing psychoanalysis, laughter signals, a defence. The origins of this laughter lie in the unconscious. It is the result of a liberation from psychic tensions — a liberation which is indirect, concealed and socially acceptable. Laughter conceals sadistic and masochistic emotions. 190. DAVISON, C. and H. KELMAN, ‘Pathological Laughing and Crying’, Archives o f Neurology and Psychiatry, 42:4. 1939, pp. 595-643. Pathological laughing and crying are involuntary attacks of emotional expression. They are caused by cerebral disturbances. Laughing and crying are closely related, and the one can change suddenly into the other. 191. GROTJAHN, M., ‘Laughter in Psychoanalysis’, in: Yearbook o f Psychonalysis, S. Lorand ed., vol. 6, 1950, pp. 228-33. In therapeutic sessions patients often tell jokes or funny stories which are indicative of their unconscious impulses. Their meaning is often aggressive. The psychoanalyst can use these jokes and anecdotes as a means to inform patients of things they do not wish to hear.

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192. KANT, O., ‘Inappropriate Laughter and Silliness in Schizophrenia’, Journal o f Abnormal Psychology, 27, 1942, pp. 398-402. Starting from the hypothesis that every human expression has a meaning, the laughter of schizophrenics on inappropriate occasions should be viewed as the expression of certain experiences on the part of these patients. Loss of personal identity and the need to reduce tensions cause inappropriate laughter and silliness. Their meaning lies in the situation of the patients who realize its dangers and know that they can do nothing about it. The situation is truly bizarre and ridiculous to them. Eventually, however, this laughter can become autonomus and transcend these meanings. 193. KUBIE, L.J., ‘The Destructive Potential of Humor in Psychotherapy’, American Journal o f Psychiatry, 127, 1971, pp. 861-6. Jokes by the therapist during a session may work destructively on the patient, since they can frighten him or her and interrupt their feelings and thoughts. The patient may believe he or she is being attacked and therefore withdraw in defence. Only experienced therapists should employ humour, but they should do so with circumspection and only during the later stages of therapy. In such cases, humour on the part of the patient may also be helpful. It can enable him or her to understand their problems better. 194. LEVINE, J., ‘Humor and Mental Health’, in: A. DEUTSCH andH . FISHMAN (eds.), Encyclopedia o f Mental Health, vol. 3, 1963, pp. 786-99. A sense of humour indicates a stable character and is a sign of mental health. Humour can have a therapeutic value. 195. LEVINE, J., ‘Response to Humor’, Scientific American, 194, 1956, pp. 31-5. Humour is the temporary satisfaction of a hidden and forbidden wish and reduces fear and anxiety. Universal themes are sexuality and aggression. Experiment with t h e ‘mirth response test’. 196. SCHWEICH, M., ‘Reflexions sur le probleme du rire en psychopathologie’ (Reflections on the problem of laughter in psychopathology), in: 3, pp. 122-34. The explosive and improper laughter of schizophrenics is part of their way of experiencing reality. This laughter is not meaningless but expresses a split relationship to reality. In this sense it is a kind of a language.

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VIII. Folly, Fools and Clowns 197. CHARLES, L.H., T h e Clown’s Function’, Journal o f American Folklore, 58, 1945, pp. 25-34. A survey of data on ‘ceremonial clowns’ in 56 pre-modern, non-Western cultures, based on the cross-cultural survey of the Institute of Human Relations at Yale University. The clown makes conscious what has remained unconscious and hidden, namely the earthly, lascivious, profane and a-social elements of human existence. 198. FLETCHER, C., ‘Fool or Funny: the Role of the Comedian’, in: Beneath the Surface. A n Account o f Three Styles o f Sociological Research, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974, pp. 147-61. Humour demands a close tie to the audience, lest the entertaining comedian change into a laughable fool or clown whose humour and wit represent a superficial, commercial act. 199. KLAPP, O., ‘The Fool as a Social Type’, American Journal o f Sociology, 55, 1950, pp. 157-62. The fool has a social role with social functions. He represents values which the group rejects, and serves as an outlet for aggressive feelings. The fool is a symbol of this aggression. His behaviour is part of a control mechanism and fortifies the very norms which are violated by it. The fool serves as a negative example. 200. KONNEKER, B., Wesen und Wandlung der Narrenidee im Zeitalter des Humanismus (Essence and change of the idea of folly in the humanistic era), Wiesbaden, F. Steiner Verlag, 1966. A thorough analysis of the ideas of folly and fools in Brant, Murner and Erasmus. These are discussed in the context of the Renaissance and early rationalism in the 16th century. 201. POLLIO, H.F. and J. W. EDGERLY, ‘Comedians and Comic Style’, in: 57, pp. 215-42. The comedian or clown occupies an important place in social life. Being funny is a universal cultural phenomenon (cf. ceremonial clowns in non-Western, pre-modern cultures). The social functions of comedians are discussed in many theories, and it is obvious that an important part of laughter is nothing but the product of social interaction. 202. SWAIN, B., Fools and Folly during the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, New York, Columbia University Press, 1932. A comprehensive historical study of medieval and early modern folly, and ecclesiastical rejections of it. The feast of fools and

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fools’ societies in France are discussed in detail. 203. WEIDKUHN, P., ‘Fastnacht, Revolte, Revolution’ (Carnival, rebellion and revolution), Zeitschrift fu r Religions- und Geistesgeschichte, 21, 1969, pp. 289-306. Carnival is intrinsically related to rebellion and revolution. They all realize a reversal of values and create a temporary anarchy . The May 1968 rebellion in Paris had carnival features. 204. WELSFORD, E. The FooL His Social and Literary History, 1935, Gloucester, Mass., Peter Smith, 1966. A detailed study of the history of the fool as social role and literary figure. Very well documented chapters on the court fool in France and England, and on the stage clown and comedian. 205. WERTHEIM, W .F., East-West Parallels, Chicago, Quadrangle Books, 1965. A volume of essays in comparative sociology. One paper, ‘Society as a Composite of Conflicting Value Systems’ (pp. 23-39), discusses humour and jesters as counterpoint phenomena. 206. WILLEFORD, W., The Fool and his Scepter, Chicago Northwestern University Press, 1969. A psychoanalyticallyoriented study of fools and folly. It is in three parts: ‘The Fool and his Show’; ‘The Pattern of Folly’; and ‘The Fool and the Kingdom’; 207. ZIJDERVELD, A .C ., Reality in a Looking-Glass. Rationality through an Analysis o f Traditional Folly, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1982. A socio-historical study of the nature and functions of fools and folly in traditional, pre-modern cultures. There are chapters on popular fools and court fools in medieval and early-modern Europe, on ceremonial fools in non-Western cultures and on the strained relationship between folly and modernity.

IX. Children 208. BATES, L., ‘Development of Interpersonal Smiling Responses in the Pre-School Years’, Journal o f Genetic Psychology, 74, 1949, pp. 273-91. While growing up the child begins to laugh increasingly about things which people enjoy and define socially as funny. 209. BIRD, G., ‘An Objective Humor Test for Children’,

Bibliography

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211.

212.

213.

214.

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Psychological Bulletin, 22, 1925, pp. 137-8. A brief report on an experiment which demonstrates that children have a special sense of humour which correlates with their IQ. CAVANAGH, J.R ., ‘The Comics W ar’, Journal o f Crime, Law, Criminology, 40, 1949, pp. 28-35. Does the reading of comic books influence children negatively? Anti-social behaviour results from amassed aggression which cannot be expressed thus causing fear and anxiety. Comics may function as lightning conductors, since the child projects itself into the story and thereby works off its aggression. However, aggressive and bizarre stories can have a negative influence on ill-adjusted youth. ENDERS, A.C., ‘A Study of the Laughter of the Pre-School Child in the Merrill-Palmer Nursery School’, Papers o f the Michigan Academy o f Science, Arts and Letters, 8, 1928, pp. 341-56. Observation of children (two-four years), in groups and individually, who reacted to funny objects and photographs. Intelligence does not appear to influence the frequency of laughter, but age is crucial. The main causes of laughter are the movements and sounds of objects. FOOT, H.C. and A .J. CHAPMAN, ‘The Social Responsiveness of Young Children in Humorous Situations’, in: 57, pp. 187-212. There has been little research into the influence of the social situation on the responses of children to humorous stimuli. The focus is usually on the stimuli. Research carried out by the authors indicates that the social situation can alter the responsiveness of children to humour. HELMERS, H., Sprache und Humor des Kindes (Language and humour of the child), Stuttgart, Klett, 1971. Humour develops in children when they begin to speak. Language offers the child a stable order of norms and rules which is inverted and turned upside down in the comic. The child’s laughter indicates his affirmation of these rules and norms. Humour is thus a playing with language through which the child experiments with the rules and norms of that language. Without safety, or the sense of a spiritual order, humour could not emerge at all. (Cf. the ‘seriousness’ of puberty.) KENDERDINE, M., ‘Laughter in the Pre-School Child’, Child Development, 2, 1931, pp. 228-30. A brief report of an empirical study of laughter among pre-school children, conducted in February-June 1931. The children laughed most

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216.

217.

218.

The Sociology o f Humour and Laughter about their own movements and about socially unacceptable situations. The presence of other children was crucial for laughter, and children with a high IQ laughed more frequently than those with a low IQ. KIMMINS, C.W ., ‘The Sense of Humour in Children’, Strand Magazine, 63, 1922, pp. 52-6. An analysis of about 1,000 funny stories and jokes told by children aged seven-eighteen years. Central themes were superiority, the misfortunes of others, the stupidity of others, etc. Puns and surprising jokes were the favourites. However the appreciation of humour changed according to age. The sense of superiority, first towards younger children, and then towards adults, starts at roughly the age of eight years. KIMMINS, C.W ., ‘Visual Humour: Sights that Children Laugh A t’, Strand Magazine, 63, 1922, pp. 294-9. An analysis of the young child’s appreciation of everyday humour, based on about 1,000 funny incidents related by children. Until the age of seven years, children laugh mainly at visible events in which something surprising occurs — particular accidents and the misfortunes of others. LAING, A., ‘The Sense of Humour in Childhood and Adolescence’, British Journal o f Educational Psychology, 9, 1939, pp. 201ff. Brief report on an empirical study of differences in sense of humour, conducted among 200 children aged seven-ten years, 283 aged eleven-thirteen years, and 226 aged fourteen-eighteen years. The development of a sense of humour runs parallel to the intellectual and emotional development of the child. The youngest group laughed mainly at deviations from the normal and conventional, the middle group mostly at discomforts of others, and the oldest group displayed marked individual differences in sense of humour. PLAQUET, J., ‘Essai sur le rire chez l’enfant’ (Essay on the laughter of children), in: 3, pp. 141-4. The laughter of children is mainly an expression of happiness, and is closely related to playing. Like language, laughter offers a means of expression.

X. Cartoons, Comics, Satire and Caricature 219. HIGHET, G., The Anatom y o f Satire, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1962. A theoretical and historical

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analysis of satire in which three types are distinguished: (1) monologue; (2) parody; (3) story. Many examples from literary history (from Ancient Greece to contemporary America) are offered. JOHNSON, E., A Treatise on Satire, New York, Simon and Schuster, 1945. Critique is the essence of satire. It attacks conventions, habits and usages which are widely accepted without thinking. This is satire’s unmasking function. It lays bare the follies of our world-taken-for-granted. KOLAJA, J., ‘American Magazine Cartoons and Social Control’, Journalism Quarterly, 30, 1953, pp. 71-4. Content analysis of 600 cartoons from Ladies*Home Journal, Saturday Evening Post and Collier's. Humour often functions as social control by ridiculing deviant behaviour. Its conflict function lies mainly in ridiculing opponents, and again this strengthens the group’s morale. However, the cartoons investigated avoided controversial issues and thus lacked these two functions. They were characterized instead by an atmosphere of ‘the American middle-class weekend’. KRIS, E., ‘The Psychology of Caricature’, Psychoanalytic Explorations in A rt, London, Allen and Unwin, 1953, chapter 6, pp. 173-88. Caricatures, including cartoons, are graphical jokes. They are the result of a conflict between the direct gratification of instinctive needs and the repression of those needs by the super-ego. Caricatures have an aggressive nature, but try to unmask people in a socially acceptable manner. They are in part also the result of regression to a primitive stage ruled by effigy magic. KRIS, E., ‘The Principles of Caricature’, Psychoanalytic Explorations in A r t, London, Allen and Unwin, 1953, chapter 7, pp. 189-203. Portrait caricatures originated not earlier than the late 16th century. Political caricatures emerged in England only in the 18th century. This late genesis was caused by a change in the social position of artists who were no longer craftsmen, but creators of art as a projecton of inner life. However, the origin of the caricature goes beyond cultural history and should be sought in effigy magic. It still is a form of controlled magic. LUCIE-SMITH, E. (ed.), The Penguin Book o f Satirical Verse, Harmondsworth, Middlesex, Penguin Books, 1967. An anthology of English satirical literature. ‘The satirist’, it says in

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the Introduction, ‘speaks about power, and men of power’, Urban life is often the target of the satirist. 225. WINICK, C., ‘Teen-agers, Satire and M a d \ in: M. Truzzi (ed.), Sociology and Everyday L ife, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, Prentice-Hall, 1968, pp. 170-85. A discussion of American teenagers’ perception of their world in the late 1950s. The information is based on a content analysis of issues of Mad magazine and on interviews with regular readers. The magazine is described as ‘today [1962] the only satire magazine published in this country [USA] which has any considerable circulation’.