Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan 9781501731464

Table of contents :
Contents
Preface
Abbreviations
1. Japanese Security
2. Institutionalism, Realism, and Liberalism
3. Norms and the Japanese State
4. The Police and Internal Security
5. The Self-Defense Forces and External Security
6. The U.S.-Japan Relationship
7. Japan and Germany
8. Political Transformations, Past and Future
Notes
References
Index

Citation preview

Cultural Norms and National Security

A volume in the Series

Cornell Studies in Political Economy EDITED BY PETER]. KATZENSTEIN

A full list of titles in the series appears at the end of the book.

Cultural Norms and National Security PoLICE IN

AND

MILITARY

PosTWARjAPAN

PETERj. KATZENSTEIN

CORNELL UNIVERSITY PRESS Ithaca and London

Copyright© 1996 by Cornell University All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in a review, this book, or parts thereof, must not be reproduced in any form without permission in writing from the publisher. For information, address Cornell University Press, Sage House, 512 East State Street, Ithaca, New York 14850. First published 1996 by Cornell University Press First printing, Cornell Paperbacks, 1998 Printed in the United States of America Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Katzenstein, Peter]. Cultural norms and national security : Police and military in postwar Japan I Peter]. Katzenstein. p. em.- (Cornell studies in political economy) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-8014-3260-X (cloth : alk. paper) ISBN 0-8014-8332-8 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. National security-Japan. 2. Internal security-Japan. I. Title II. Series. UA845.K376 1996 96-6463 355' .033052-dc20 Cornell University Press strives to use environmentally responsible suppliers and materials to the fullest extent possible in the publishing of its books. Such materials include vegetable-based, low-VOC inks and acid-free papers that are recycled, totally chlorine-free, or partly composed of nonwood fibers. Cloth printing

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This book is a print-on-demand volume. It is manufactured using toner in place of ink. Type and images may be less sharp than the same material seen in traditionally printed Cornell University J.>ress editions.

For Nolnw and Yutaka

Contents

Preface Abbreviations 1. Japanese Security 2. Institutionalism, Realism, and Liberalism 3. Norms and the Japanese State 4. The Police and Internal Security 5. The Self-Defense Forces and External Security 6. The U.S.-Japan Relationship 7. Japan and Germany 8. Political Transformations, Past and Future Notes References Index

IX XV

1 17 33 59 99 131 153 191 211 255 297

vii

Preface

The central insight that drives this book's argument was an accidental byproduct of numerous research trips to Japan and Germany. Despite the homogenization of visual images that CNN projected onto 1V screens around the world, Japanese and German interpretations of the revolutionary changes transforming global politics have been strikingly different. The analytical tools of mainstream national security studies, such as the concept of the balance of power, did not prove particularly helpful in comprehending those differences. Moreover, I found it virtually impossible in the late 1 g8os and early 1 ggos to overlook the political significance of collective identities-which both the mainstream and many of its critics neglected in favor of the rational calculations of elites. This book departs in some ways from the two main paradigms that American specialists in international relations favor: realism and liberalism. Realism focuses on the distribution of capabilities in an anarchic system of states. Liberalism stresses the effects that rules have on the coordination of conflicting interests. These two analytical traditions have had long-standing disagreements, but this book's argument takes issue with core assumptions of both. It does so because I believe that the competing claims of different analytical perspectives must be evaluated critically. Norms are social facts whose effects are potentially as important in shaping politics as raw power or rational calculation. Norms typically inform how political actors define what they want to accomplish. Norms help coordinate political conflicts (regulative norms), and they shape political conflicts over identity (constitutive norms). To disregard norms and take the interests of actors as given is thus to short-circuit an imporlX

PREFACE

tant aspect of the politics and policy of national security. In brief, this book establishes that norms matter for national security policy. The resolution of specific conflicts in history gives some norms an aura of plausibility that can have a profound effect on politics. Yet individual choices matter, particularly when they become institutionalized. Japan's police and military adhered to violent practices in the first half of the twentieth century, and so their nonviolent conduct since 1945 deserves attention. This is true even though the Japanese police and military, unlike Mahatma Gandhi and his followers, do not eschew all forms of coercion. A book on Japanese national security appears to require a conjoining of two areas of expertise that, as a sometime student of European political economy, I lack. From the beginning of this project, however, I decided that I could rethink fundamentals best on the basis of empirical evidence that was new to me. Understandably, those who have devoted their lives to the analysis of Japan or of national security have at times been taken aback by my moving onto new terrain. Although he was very supportive of this project, one eminent Japan specialist, for example, remarked that my arguments must remain suspect since I do not even know which side is up in a Japanese newspaper. (Honesty compelled me to tell him that even if I did, I would not know whether to read from right to left or left to right.) In a similar vein, specialists in security studies have suggested to me that, in times of bewildering change, when even old-timers feel challenged, novices should keep quiet. Although I understand and, to some extent, sympathize with these reactions, I do not share them. In the scholarship on Japan and on national security issues there is room, I believe, for a newcomer. Scholarly traditions and preconceptions may be inadequate and need reexamination. Early on, for example, I became convinced that I had to broaden my vista to encompass internal security issues. This change in perspective is not mere faddishness. Instead, it returns the analysis of national security to a tradition interrupted by the militarization of politics through the exceptional circumstances of the Cold War. Relatedly, I found the obliteration of all cultural arguments in the analysis of Japan implausible. It was an understandable though unwarranted reaction, mostly from students of political economy, to a style of cultural analysis that had read all political conflicts out of Japan and had stressed Japanese uniqueness. Restrictive notions of both security and culture slight our understanding of Japan's national security. A large number of people have been extremely generous with their time in assisting me in this project. Most important, I thank the many Japanese police and military officials who gave generously of their time to answer questions that to them must often have sounded odd or selfevident. These officials could not be interviewed for direct attribution, X

Preface

so interviews are referred to only by number, date, and location. Interviews served two main purposes. They helped me check facts or arguments against the written record. And where the record was simply too spotty, interviews provided primary source material. Most important, they were the means by which I tried to think myself into the world as these officials experienced it. I also thank Japanese friends whose generosity was not diminished by the fact that I have shamelessly exploited their hospitality over the years: Kuniko and Takashi Inoguchi, Michio Muramatsu, Keiichi Tsunekawa, and Seizaburo Sato. Their assistance was essential for establishing contacts without which this project might not have gotten off the ground. Several Japan specialists have tutored me over many years. At Cornell University, and subsequently at long distance, T. J. Pempel has had much to do with my growing interest in Japan. I am also deeply indebted to my Cornell colleagues Robert Bullock, Takashi Shiraishi, and Robert Smith for taking the time to discuss my work and comment on it. Beyond Cornell, I am particularly grateful for the repeated, generous help I have received from Ellis Krauss, Michio Muramatsu, Richard Samuels, and Keiichi Tsunekawa. For their careful readings of key chapters of this manuscript and their many suggestions and criticisms that have helped me avoid numerous errors of commission and omission, correct faults in logic, and address weaknesses in presentation, I thank David Bayley, Charles Doran, Ronald Dore, John Dower, Albrecht Funk, James Goldgeier, Joanne Gowa, Ernst Haas, Michael Hechter, Ron Jepperson, Satoshi Kanazawa, Elizabeth Kier, Jonathan Kirshner, David Lake, Walter Mebane, Gil Merom, Jon Mercer, Ron Rogowski, Patricia Steinhoff, Takao Takahara, Daniel Thomas, and Janice Thompson. I am especially in debt to those who read the entire manuscript, some of them more than once, and who offered critical comments that have helped me greatly in clarifying my argument on key points: Robert Bullock, Kent Calder, Tom Christensen, Peter Gourevitch, Chalmers Johnson, Mary Katzenstein, Robert Keohane, Stephen Krasner, Ellis Krauss, Ikuo Kume, David Laitin, Mike Mochizuki, Michio Muramatsu, Gregory Noble, Nobuo Okawara, T. J. Pempel, Richard Samuels, Takashi Shiraishi, Robert Smith, YUtaka Tsujinaka, Keiichi Tsunekawa, and Frank Upham. I have learned much from reactions to various parts of the argument at lectures and seminars that I gave at the University of California (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and San Diego), the University of Chicago, Harvard University, M.I.T., the University of Minnesota, Princeton University, Stanford University, the University of Washington, and Yale University. I am also very grateful to Bronwyn Dylla and Kozo Kato for years of unfailing and outstanding help. They have searched Cornell's libraries and beyond for specific materials, checked footnotes and citations, and

xi

PREFACE

done all those chores professors should do themselves but often do noL Sandra Kisner's wizardry as a typist and her powers of concentration brought the footnotes and bibliography into final form under deadline pressure. This project has been supported generously by a fellowship from the German Marshall Fund of the United States (Grant no. 3-53597). The analysis of Germany's internal and external security policies spurred my interest in a Japanese comparison. Along some of the lines suggested in this book, I hope to deepen my understanding of German and European security issues in the years ahead. Meanwhile I am extremely grateful that the German Marshall Fund has provided me with sufficient slack to pursue, in a non-European setting, some of the security issues that also confront Germany and Europe after the Cold War. For seventeen years now I have had the enormous good fortune to have worked together with Roger Haydon. His shrewd advice during the evolution of this project, his uncanny sense of the psychological needs of an author, his sure judgment about the point when a manuscript is close to completion, his wonderful sense of humor, and the genius he demonstrates at the stroke (more precisely, innumerable strokes) of his pencil mark him as a rare artist of his crafL Roger made things look so effortless because he hid many more hours of hard work on this manuscript than I was entitled to. Without his help this would have been a much inferior book. I would also like to thank the other members of the superb staff at Cornell University Press. The quality of their work sets very high standards for the rest of the university community. A note on conventions: Japanese personal names are presented in Western (given name followed by family name) rather than Japanese form. Unsigned newspaper articles do not appear in the bibliography. The difference between Japanese- and English-language versions of the major daily newspapers is indicated by the presence or absence of Shimlmn in the title. In the case of the Japanese-language edition, normally the 13th edition is cited. Specialists will find more ext~nsive bibliographical references regarding Japan's internal and external security policy in, respectively, Katzenstein and Okawara ( 1993) and Katzenstein and Tsujinaka ( 1991 ) . Portions of chapter 7 have been published in "Regions in Competition: Comparative Advantages of America, Europe, and Asia," in Helga Haftendorn and Christian Tuschhoff, eds., America and Europe in an Era of Change (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), pp. 105-26; in "Coping with Terrorism: Norms and Internal Security in Germany and Japan," in Judith Goldstein and Robert 0. Keohane, eds., Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions and Political Change (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, XZl

Preface

1993), pp. 265-95; and in West Germany's Internal Security Policy: State and Violence in the r970s and r98os, Cornell University, Center for International Studies, Western Societies Program, Occasional Paper no. 28, 1990. They are used here with permission. From the outset it was clear to me that, for lack of the necessary language skills, I could carry out this project only in collaboration with Japanese scholars. I sought scholars interested in the substance of this project and flexible enough to agree on a common research strategy and publication format that made allowance for different individual and institutional needs. I was extremely fortunate that Nobuo Okawara and Yutaka Tsujinaka joined me in this venture. We agreed to research and write together monographs on the police (Katzenstein and Tsujinaka, 1991) and the military (Katzenstein and Okawara, 1993) that presented our main empirical findings in a loose, taxonomic framework from which, we agreed at the outset, we would draw, as each of us saw fit, in subsequent, singly authored works. We conducted virtually all the interviews jointly, and professors Okawara and Tsujinaka each spent a year at Cornell University where we did most of our library research and virtually all our joint writing. The historical parts of chapter 3 and the material presented in chapters 4-6 are sharply condensed versions of our joint work. But my intellectual debt to these two scholars is much greater than is reflected in these pages. They taught me a great deal about Japanese politics and the interpretation of evidence that I would have missed had I worked alone. I take full responsibility for what I have written here. But it is with a deep sense of gratitude and pleasure that I dedicate this book to these exceptional scholars and good friends. PETERj. KATZENSTEIN

Ithaca and Berlin

xiii

Abbreviations

ASDF ASEAN CIA CIST CR DPC EU FBI GNP GSDF JCP JDA JDIA JICA JMTC JOA

JRA

JSP LDP MIT! MOF MOFA MOHA MOJ MPD MSDF

Air Self-Defense Force Association of South-East Asian Nations Central Intelligence Agency Center for Information on Strategic Technology community relations Defense Production Committee European Union Federal Bureau of Investigation gross national product Ground Self-Defense Force Japan Communist Party Japan Defense Agency Japan Defense Industry Association Japan International Cooperation Agency Joint Military Technology Commission Japan Ordnance Association Japan Red Army Japan Socialist Party Liberal Democratic Party Ministry of International Trade and Industry Ministry of Finance Ministry of Foreign Affairs Ministry of Home Affairs Ministry of Justice Metropolitan [Tokyo] Police Department Maritime Self-Defense Force XV

ABBREVIATIONS

NATO NDPO NPA

NTI

sec

SCG SDC SDF UN UNAFEI

North Atlantic Treaty Organization National Defense Program Outline National Police Agency Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation Security Consultative Committee Security Consultative Group Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation Self-Defense Forces United Nations United Nations Asia and Far East Institute for the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders

xvz

Cultural Norms and National Security

CHAPTER ONE

japanese Security

Why a book about Japanese security? The answer is a simple but astonishing fact. Over the last few decades the Japanese police and military have been, by international standards, very reluctant to use violence. 1 Police statistics, though they are scattered and incomplete, support this claim. On average American law enforcement officers, in the line of duty, killed 375 felons each year between 1988 and 1992. Between 1985 and 1994 Japanese police officers killed a total of 6-less than one a year. 2 The United States deployed its military might several times in the 198os and early 1990s, in Grenada, Panama, and the Gulf. Japan, meanwhile, went through wrenching domestic debates over military participation in ON-sanctioned, multilateral peace-keeping operations-let alone UN peace-enforcement missions. The results of opinion polls are overwhelming: in 1991 70 percent of Japanese object to the use of military force to safeguard "international justice and order," whereas just about the same proportion of Americans (72 percent) favors such a use of military force.' Contemporary Japan thus eschews police and military violence. This choice is not unalterable, but neither is it transient. It has had important political consequences both at home and abroad. Over the postwar decades the police have dramatically improved their position in the Japanese polity, and through its national security policy the Japanese government has gradually changed Japan's position in the world by creating options that affect how it and other states behave. This book analyzes an important political question largely neglected in a tidal wave of publications on Japan. It illustrates that empirical research informed by "soft" cultural theories is not only possible but promI

CULTURAL NORMS AND NATIONAL SECURITY

ising for "hard-nosed" security issues that established theories do not explain adequately. It insists that "culture" is not a helpful analytical tool for empirical research; instead, it is more useful to analyze particular aspects of culture (here, social and legal norms). It develops various tests in the empirical chapters (3-7) to show that different kinds of norms matter in systematic ways for questions of security. Finally, in chapter 8, it suggests through a brief explanatory sketch that the process by which norms crystallize at critical historical junctures results from political conflict and change. I do not view culture as a child of deep continuities in history, as do those who interpret Japan as a "consensus culture" or a "peace-loving country." Rather than invoke history as the autonomous creator of particular aspects of culture, we should be able to point to political processes by which norms are contested and contingent, politically made and unmade in history. For example, the large number of bitter strikes that Japan experienced in the 1950s is a historical fact. The fact has been forgotten, because conditions changed and because it was in the interest of some organizations to create a new identity for Japan as a "consensus" political economy. Similarly, the historical record of the twentieth century belies the notion of Japan as a peace-loving country. Nevertheless, through a specific politics that this book seeks to understand, Japan has in recent decades maintained a collective identity first acquired in the 1950s, and that particular identity does deserve this description. I also reject the contrary and equally apolitical view of culture as the product of large historical discontinuities. Many liberals, especially in Japan, argue thatJapan's pacifism, its nuclear "allergy," is a natural outcome of the nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Relatedly, some realist explanations of national security argue that "history" can be reduced to the effects of large shifts in the international balance of power. In this view bipolarity after 1945 transformed Japan from aggressively militarist to pacifically mercantile. I believe such a view of the relation between history and culture is uninteresting as long as it fails to specifY the political mechanisms by which the purported transformation took place. 4 For it is not large historical discontinuities themselves, that leave their imprint on entire polities; it is memories of and beliefs about those events as interpreted and reinterpreted by political actors. The norms that have informed Japanese security policy for a whole generation did not emerge mystically from the fog of ancient history, nor did they appear suddenly, magically, an immaculate historical conception in 1945. Instead the 1950s saw intense political conflicts over what kind of country Japan should become. These conflicts proved so acrimonious, so widespread and politically costly, that Japanese elites in 2

japanese Security

the early 1g6os refocused the country's political agenda toward high economic growth. Equally important, those elites decided to live by the procedural norm of concurrent majority rule, which respects the veto power of intensely held minority views. This norm has since shaped Japan's collective identity and the interests informing Japanese security policy. 5 Norms are not static; they are contested and contingent. Why do they not change all the time in response to the push-and-pull of daily politics?6 The answer lies in history and in institutions. 7 Actors attribute far deeper meanings to the historical battles that define collective identities than to the transient conflicts of daily politics. Collective identities are not easily changed as any number of intransigeant disagreements vividly illustrates. Second, the taken-for-grantedness of institutionalized norms limits the range of choice at any given time. Law is such an institution. History and institutions thus give norms both importance and endurance. Nonviolent state behavior, I shall suggest, results from two distinctive aspects of Japan's security policy. First, the Japanese definition of security goes far beyond what American police or military officials would recognize. Japanese officials define internal and external security in comprehensive terms. They emphasize the social, economic, and political aspects of security rather than focus more narrowly on the explicitly coercive dimensions of state policy. Japan's security policy is thus part and parcel of its quest for social stability through economic growth. With the end of the Cold War, "comprehensive" conceptions of national security have become a growth stock. Japan was the intellectual venture capitalist who started this move, in the late 1970s and early 1g8os. It is less well known that, at the same time, the Japanese police also began to articulate an analogous concept, "comprehensive security policing." Their policy paper for the 1g8os argues that on issues of internal security the police should "adopt 'comprehensive preventive policing measures' broadly defined in cooperation with other administrative authorities and other organizations in order to gain a timely and wellinformed assessment of the possible causes of social disturbances. "8 The character of state institutions explains the comprehensive character of Japan's internal and external security policies. Second, Japan like other states must cope with often dramatic change as it seeks to protect state security. Like other states, it does so with varying degrees of success. We need to explain the variability with which the Japanese government adapts its security policy to social and political change. 9 The "flexible rigidities" that Ronald Dore analyzed in his work on Japan's industrial adaptation can be found as well in Japan's security policies. 10 On some issues-such as internal security, economic aspects

3

CULTURAL NORMS AND NATIONAL SECURITY

of Japan's external security, and gradual redefinition in the mission of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) across the 1 g8os-policy adjustment has been remarkably flexible. On other issues-the size of the defense budget, the deployment of the SDF overseas in international peace-keeping operations, technology transfer to the United States-policy has been remarkably rigid. A focus on norms can, I believe, help explain the pattern of variability and rigidity in Japan's security policy.n With its focus on the state and norms this book offers an institutional account of Japan's security policy. To do so requires two things. First, we must understand that the state is different sets of political relations; we cannot stipulate the state as a unitary actor. This book analyzes three sets of relations: within the state, between state and society (or polity), and between the polity and some features of the international environment. Second, we must stipulate, both at an abstract level and within the specific historical context of contemporary Japan, the norms that help shape security policy. At an abstract level we must recognize both norms that regulate behavior and norms that constitute identities, rather than focus only on the former. At the specific level, this book focuses especially on the relations between social and legal norms in contemporary Japan. Institutionalism offers an explanation, this book asserts, that is superior to two alternative formulations of rationalism, contemporary variants of realism and liberalism. 12 Students of national security typically subscribe to a realist perspective that focuses on the international balance of power and neglects domestic politics altogether or considers only the politics inside government bureaucracies. However, significant shifts in the international balance of power during the last three decades cannot be linked plausibly to the comprehensiveness of Japan's security policy. Realism thus does not illuminate central aspects of Japanese security policy. Important strands of contemporary liberalism, such as the new economics of institutions in the analysis of American politics, pay close attention to norms and rules in their models of domestic politics and policy.· But liberalism privileges norms that regulate behavior. It excludes norms that constitute the identity of actors and shape the standards of appropriate behavior which inform interests and policy. In so doing liberalism slights an important factor that can help us understand why Japanese security policy is flexible in some situations and inflexible in others. I do not deny that the international balance of power, under certain circumstances, may outweigh the effects of state institutions and norms. In acute international crises or in war, for example, material capabilities often have decisive effects on the security policy of states. By and large, 4

Japanese Security

though, these circumstances did not define the context in which the Japanese formulated security policy during the last half century. Similarly, I do not disregard the regulatory norms that are at the center of liberal analyses. But japanese security policy cannot be understood without paying due attention to constitutive norms. For the case at hand, in brief, the international balance of power is indeterminate and regulatory norms are insufficient to account for the distinctive aspects of Japanese security policy. Careful empirical research can reveal when the effects of institutionalized norms begin to wear thin, eventually leaving nothing but the Potemkin villages of politics. In Eastern Europe socialism, we know in hindsight, was a facade because masses were no longer willing to believe and die for it, and because leaders were no longer able to believe and kill for it. Japan in 1945-46 offers another example. The rapid disappearance of orthodox Emperor ideology, writes Carol Gluck, "suggests that the relation between experience and ideology had become so strained that the official ideology was relatively easy to abandon once the institutional apparatus that sustained it was dismantled. "13 To give a third example: Japanese politicians such as Ichiro Ozawa have, in the 1990s, staked their careers on the political intuition that what obstructs the path to Japan's "normalization" is a Potemkin village, not a strategic hamlet. As Chapter 8 suggests, the jury on Ozawa's hunch is still out.

WHY jAPANESE SECURITY?

The rise of Japan as a major Asian power, perhaps a technological superpower of the twenty-first century, was already recognized before the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union. And it was well known that by conventional measures Japan is a comparatively crimeless society and a peaceful, commercial power. Why analyze inconspicuous, and apparently inconsequential, Japanese traits at a time when Japan's economic and technological prowess, and the growing international trade and investment rivalries to which it contributes, command daily headlines? There are four answers to this question. They deal with Japan, the state, security studies, and history. In recent years our knowledge about japan has been based largely on studies dealing with its political economy. Japan's strong economic performance has spurred intense curiosity, as a visit to any bookstore testifies. Yet we know very little about the security policy of this new world power. Even though the United States spends about $30 billion annually on national intelligence, Japan was altogether neglected during the 1991 confirmation hearings of Robert Gates as head of the Central In-

5

CULTURAL NORMS AND NATIONAL SECURITY

telligence Agency (CIA). American intelligence now appears to be reduced to issues of industrial espionage. 14 We should do better. Japan defies American expectations not only with its distinct form of capitalism but with a state that appears to be inadequately prepared to defend its security. Yet it is by no means clear that Japan is the exception, the United States the rule. On questions of security the two states are opposite ends of a broad spectrum of political experience and experimentation. Since 1945 the United States has habitually sought to provide active leadership on the foreign policy crisis of the day, when necessary through unilateral, military action. Japan has not. Since international norms of state behavior are often shaped by leading international powers, it is important to understand how the Japanese construe security. A second answer involves our understanding of the state. The revival of state theory in American social science has been carried forward most actively"by students of political economy and the welfare state. Yet the core of the modem state lies, as Max Weber knew, not in economy and society but in the state's monopoly over legitimate means of coercion. Japanese police and military practice offers insight into state power in a society that only half a century ago feared its own police deeply and was waging aggressive war all over Asia. The third answer concerns the analysis of security issues. One reason for examining norms of internal security is to get a view that is unolr structed by international effects. We can then estimate how such norms also shape Japan's policy for external security. Furthermore, the end of the Cold War has made the defining and defending of state security more elusive. Contemporary militaries in many states are reassessing traditional security strategies in light of broader conceptions that integrate economic, social, ecological, and political aspects of security with more traditional military concerns. Japan's "comprehensive" security is instructive. Relatedly, the redefining of internal security policy in advanced industrial states was a burning issue for police forces only a couple of decades ago. During the first half of the twentieth century the police had focused on defending law, order, and property against the political forces of the Left which threatened social stability and capitalist legitimacy. The threat to the state was clearly cast in class terms, and the dominant image of the most serious internal challenge to state security was civil war. In the 1g6os the student movement and other social changes made those categories of analysis increasingly untenable, not only in Japan but across the industrial world. As threats to state security became more diffuse and unpredictable, the police had to rethink their mission, acquire new equipment, and retrain. In the 1ggos, with the end of the Cold War, many militaries face similar tasks.

6

japanese Security

The fourth answer concerns history. A historically informed social science can help us recognize broader patterns in the rush of daily events. Eras of dramatic change remind us of the importance of history in the shaping of norms and state institutions. Japan experienced traumatic defeat in the 1940s. In the 1950s political conflict raged between proponents of Japan's traditional, military-political identity and a new, economic-political one. Eventually, the Japanese chose economic competition over military aggression. But no lesson of history is learned automatically. Each lesson is an interpretation that is bitterly contested. For the interpretations we choose and the lessons we learn tell us who we are, what we want to become, how we should behave. That is, they become norms, and as norms they help shape future political choices. In Japan bitter conflicts helped define nonviolence as a standard for agents of the state.

FRAMING THE QUESTION: jAPAN's SECURITY POLICY IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

Comparison is an excellent antidote to the mistaken belief in Japan's uniqueness as well as to the misguided search for invariant laws of social and political life. For intellectual and political reasons I choose to compare japan with the United States and Germany. 15 These three countries are models of different types of capitalist democracies ("statist," "liberal," and "corporatist"). And each plays a central role in an important world region undergoing different types of integration: economic network integration in Asia, shallow market integration in North America, and deep institutional integration in Europe. 16 It is thus not far-fetched to look for systematic differences in the internal and external security policies of these three states. Like the United States and Germany, Japan confronts both internal and external challenges. And like the United States and Germany, Japan relies on police and military as the main organizations with which to defend the state. However, Japan has a distinctive way of coping with threats. Japanese officials view security as inseparable from the broader social and economic context in which the state operates. On questions of internal security a society that polices itself is the best guarantor for the state's security. Japan's external security, meanwhile, is seen to rest primarily on a stable economic and political relationship with the main world powers, foremost the United States. Japan's comprehensive definition of security has some important parallels to Germany's. 17 Germany, too, has adhered to a broad definition of security. The German police, however, dealt with threats to internal secu-

7

CULTURAL NORMS AND NATIONAL SECURITY

rity by seeking more encompassing laws and advanced technology. Located at the center of the Cold War, German govemments have defined their extemal security in political and military rather than economic terms. The close relation between Germany, the United States, and NATO on the one hand and between Germany, its European partner states, and the EU on the other was valued for political reasons. Only Westem integration, it was thought, could satisfY German national goals of reconstruction in peace and prosperity while leaving open the possibility of overcoming the political division of Europe and thus of Germany. Like Japan and Germany, the United States heeds social and legal issues on questions of intemal security; also it considers carefully the economic and political aspects of its extemal security. But in sharp contrast to the others, the United States is more likely to adopt policies that sanction organized counterintelligence and state violence both at home and abroad. Internal Security

Between 1945 and the early 1990s the defense of the intemal security of the United States against terrorist attacks and violent social protest was not a major issue. We should not belittle the strength of the anticommunist backlash and the public tolerance of racial discrimination in the 1950s and 196os. But a tradition of isolationism and specific aspects of a multiracial society differ significantly from a serious threat to the security of the American state. When the American state did react to apparent security threats, its response was often decentralized. 18 In sharp contrast to the state in Japan and Germany, it relied frequently on undercover police operations. The postwar FBI primarily focused intelligence operations on the Communist party and, with the spread of social unrest in the 1960s, also on New Left, Black, and Klan groups. The 1990s suggests further perceived threats to state security from intemational terrorism (the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center in New York) and radical militias (the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing). "Counterintelligence activities," writes Gary Marx, "drew on traditional techniques ... and were aided by the Cold War ethos and the presence of former military intelligence agents in police departrnents."19 Although the American Left was at its weakest for thirty years, the Reagan administration did not relax counterintelligence work against political dissidents. For reasons of intemational and domestic politics, in the words of Gilda Zwerman, "the strategies developed to apprehend, prosecute, and incapacitate these radicals as terrorists represent a restructuring and elaboration of domestic peacetime security operations and mark the

8

Japanese Security

emergence of a new U.S. domestic counterterrorist program."20 Meanwhile the internationalization of crime has led to a sharp increase in the international activities of U.S. law enforcement agencies. An unofficial State Department survey in 1994 found that 1,649 officers from various agencies were permanently assigned abroad. 21 The growth of terrorism in Germany was fed by the rise of oppositional social movements, particularly the New Left, with its focus on university reform and the Vietnam war in the latter half of the 196os. The fringes of this social movement generated some terrorist organizations. The Red Army Faction, for example, targeted prominent individuals in business and politics in a deliberate, if futile, attempt to mobilize the working class against the German state. These attacks prompted new techniques of police surveillance, and the German government broadened, legally and practically, the scope of its policy of internal security. Yet despite occasional successes, the German police made remarkably little headway in capturing successive generations of youngsters committed to acts of violence. This failure was all the more striking in light of the modernization of the German police force. It occurred despite the prolonged mobilization of the legal apparatus to protect the state, at the expense of some important civilliberties. 22 Between the late 1950s and early 1970s Japan experienced a wave of radical political action that dwarfed corresponding developments in Germany. Massive demonstrations against the renewal of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty in 1959-60, the antiwar movement of the 196os, and the mass mobilization in anticipation of the treaty's renewal in 1970 spawned unprecedented violence and terrorist attacks by different sects of Japan's New Left. The Japanese police were effective in isolating the hard core of the terrorists. They either captured terrorists, often without bloodshed, or pushed them abroad to North Korea and the Middle East. Since the mid-197os the Japanese police have had a much harder time in dealing with intermittent terrorist attacks as a 1995 nerve gas attack in the Tokyo subway illustrated. It has found itself in a protracted campaign against several violent social movements that engage in sporadic acts of domestic terrorism. Police strategy has made a virtue of patience. By undercutting the social base of support for terrorist organizations the police hope to consolidate the partial successes they have already enjoyed into a permanent pacification of Japanese society. 2~

External Security Attention to the economic and political dimensions, as well as a good measure of patience, also define Japan's external security policy. Military means for exercising control lost all legitimacy and efficacy after 1945·

9

CuLTURAL NoRMS AND NATIONAL SECURITY

The reliance on peaceful means of foreign policy, in particular such economic instruments of power as aid and foreign investment, has become the most important hallmark of Japan's security policy. In the late 1940s and early 1950s the Japanese government resisted American pressure to adopt a regional defense role in Asia. Instead, successive Japanese governments have drawn a sharp line between economics and security. Economic growth and technological innovation, not the acquisition of nuclear weapons, marked Japan's rise to the status of a major power. As Japan's role grew in U.S. defense plans for the Pacific, so links tightened between the Japanese and American militaries. The hotly debated issue ofJapan'sjoining international peacekeeping operations in the Gulf War, Cambodia, Mrica, and elsewhere illustrates how sensitive military issues remain, even though political experimentation is clearly on the rise with the changes in Japan's party system and the end of the Cold War. On economic matters, however, Japan did not play the role of follower. It achieved great savings in its use of imported energy, and its conquest of international markets, especially markets for products of increasing technological sophistication, was unrelenting. Aware of negative repercussions in America and Europe, the Japanese government and business community were adept in striking political bargains. To preserve gains they first limited exports and then, after 1986, moved increasingly to foreign investment in order to circumvent protectionism among major trade partners. In Germany, as in Japan, the road to international power did not lead to a rebuilding of national military capabilities and the deployment of forces. But unlike in Japan, political considerations typically outweighed economic ones. Germany's rearmament was a political gambit to regain sovereignty and reenter the community of states. To achieve that end Germany has been an assiduous champion of international integration on military, economic, and political matters. Indeed Germany has remained eager to abrogate national sovereignty on virtually all major issues affecting its external security, whether through NATO or the European Union (EU). On questions of military security Germany's armed forces have operated under NATO rather than national command. The agreement that brought about German unification in 1990 did not change this arrangement. It did, however, result in a 50 percent cut in the combined size of West and East German armed forces, thus assuring that united Germany remains a state with military capabilities that are modest compared to those of the United States and Russia as well as of France, Britain, and Italy. The willingness of German elites to participate in international peace-keeping operations under UN auspices is evidently increasing, but out-of-area deployment of NATO troops remains a sensitive political issue that divides the rival parties, the media, and the IO

Japanese Security

public at large. On economic issues Germany's international rise has also occurred in a multilateral, international framework; the EU is the central focus of Germany's economic expansion. The assertion of German power through the European Monetary System is one instance of Germany's defining the economic parameters of political choices in Western Europe. The Treaty of Maastricht and the plans for a European monetary union illustrate, conversely, the significant influence that Europe exerts on the unilateral exercise of German economic power. As the premier international power after 1945, the United States has pursued external security in a different fashion. The experience of Pearl Harbor was as deep as that of Hiroshima and Dresden. But the lesson was different. "Never again," in this instance, meant the United States should never again suffer a surprise attack. Throughout the Cold War a constant state of high readiness, an arsenal of the most modem and destructive weapons, and a willingness to contain militarily an enemy that was considered a dangerous global rival-all testified to an American resolve to rely on military force. Economic and political instruments of foreign policy clearly mattered, but they mattered in relation to objectives that were often understood primarily in military terms. States differ in how they define and pursue their security objectives. This truism is becoming more apparent as Japan's and Germany's security policies are now posing new challenges for the United States. Of the two, Jeffrey Garten suggests, "Germany is emerging as a far more wellrounded country, less of an economic giant thanJapan perhaps, but also less of a political dwarf."24 Germany's commitment to detente is deeply rooted and created in the 1970s and 198os an underlying tension with the United States regarding political elements as an integral part of NATO's J;>asic mission. The opening of the Berlin Wall, the Soviet retreat from E.;stem Europe, and the disintegration of the USSR have now broadened NATO objectives beyond military concerns. Analogously, Japan's economic competitiveness helped shape the 1992 U.S. presidential election campaign around the notion that the most effective foreign policy starts at home, with more investment in the American people and American infrastructure. In brief, Japan and Germany embrace conceptions of security more open to economic and political elements. Their rising power is likely to influence how other states in Europe and Asia, as well as the United States, will define their security in the future.

FRAMING THE ANSWER: JAPAN IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

This book steers between two contrasting and extreme positions. Advocates of a "positive political science" see Japan as a repository of data II

CULTURAL NORMS AND NATIONAL SECURITY

susceptible to standard economic tools of analysis of universal validity. Japanese specialists, by contrast, particularize Japan to such an extent that the country appears exotic and unique, not comparable to other capitalist democracies. The first position is a recent extension to Japan of a style of analysis developed to explain selected aspects of politics in the United States and abroad. The second is the traditional mainstream against which the first rebels. This book's analytical stance differs from both. 25 The search for a science of politics which follows the theoretical path taken by neoclassical and institutional economics is based on an extended economic analogy. Institutional rules shape the character of political competition. Political entrepreneurs seeking to prevail in political markets develop organizations and strategies that maximize their political revenues and private advantages under existing rules. Economic entrepreneurs want to maximize economic gain; political entrepreneurs want to get reelected. Thus the rules of Japanese bureaucratic, electoral and judicial politics generate politics and policies in ways universally applicable to all capitalist democracies. In this view institutions solve coordination problems and enhance efficiencies. 26 This perspective usefully illuminates some strands of democratic politics. But it is based on highly restrictive assumptions that take as fixed the preferences or identities of the political "players." Rationalism promises universal applicability, but so far it has offered useful insights into only a very limited slice of a complex American political reality, such as the House of Representatives of the U.S. Congress. Yet there are many arenas in American politics that this analytical perspective has failed to elucidate. The U.S. Senate, for example, does not lend itself to this style of analysis. At least, none of the major theoretical works in this tradition has chosen to examine Senate politics. One possibility is that House rules are more easily captured than senatorial norms in deductive models. A second possibility is that the two-year electoral cycles of the House drive politics more directly than does the staggered six-year electoral cycle in the Senate. To take a second example, scientific models of politics have had great difficulties capturing central aspects of U.S. social movements. One reason is that the electoral impetus is often not very strong. Much of social movement politics is not about the communication of fixed preferences. Rather, it is about the formation of preferences or identities and their effects on the process by which actors form their interests. We cannot afford to leave unanalyzed so central an aspect of politics. Equally unhelpful is the opposite stance. It particularizes the analysis of Japanese politics, resisting comparative analysis. Although this intellectual tradition is weakening, it retains a strong grip. Many Japanese, as I2

japanese Security

well as academic specialists on Japan, insist that Japan is different from the West-and "different" often means "unique." Karel Van Wolferen, for example, in a perceptive and widely noted book, insists on a sharp contrast between 'Japan" and "the West." What is unique aboutJapan, he suggests, is the absence of any one center of political accountability: a Kafkaesque "System" of power links semiautonomous groups sharing in the exercise of power. A complex of overlapping hierarchies has no peak. "No one is ultimately in charge."27 The System is neither monolithic nor pluralistic. Although it lacks a political center, it does have a "hard core, as it were, of institutions-numerous, closely packed, interconnected-that are tightly harnessed."28 Japan is a spider web without a spider at the center. In such a system there are no brakes, no compass. 29 Informed public debate, political accountability, and informed political choice are all but impossible. Japan's collusive political oligopoly may be advantageous for economic growth at home and economic expansion abroad, but it vitiates a liberal democratic politics and a responsible foreign policy. Van Wolferen's portrait of Japan has an uncanny resemblance to Ralf Dahrendorfs Germany in the mid-1g6os. Dahrendorf focused on various aspects of German society which did not match the requirements of the Western liberal tradition. With Britain rather than the United States as the implicit benchmark, Dahrendorf diagnosed illiberal tendencies of German society. His scathing criticism focused in particular on what he called a cartel of anxiety ruling German society from the top and lacking in self-confidence, social cohesion, and the courage for competition. This cartel, Dahrendorf argued, undermined liberal democracy in Germany. "Government must be referred to in the passive voice; to put it epigrammatically, 'Nobody governs Germany; Germany is governed.' "30 As in Japan, so in Germany arguments about historical exceptionalism (Sonderweg) appeal to unique differences that set Germany's path to modernity apart from that taken by exemplars of "the West." In the course of this critique of Germany Dahrendorf refers in passing to the obvious parallels between German and Dutch society, which he saw as a comparable source of stagnation and threat to liberal democracy.'1 Although it is by no means clear that Dahrendorf was right in his off-handed remark about the Netherlands, the idea is intriguing. Do the Netherlands share important political traits with Germany and Japantraits that set the democratic corporatism of small European states apart from the Anglo-American democracies? In the area of criminal justice, for example, accounts describing the Netherlands and Japan are strikingly similar. 32 As a Dutchman Van Wolferen may have missed a golden opportunity: his home country is, he insists, fundamentally different from Japan." Had he pointed to occasional similarities between

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Japan and the Netherlands, as well as the many significant differences that set the Netherlands apart from the United States, he could have discarded dichotomous styles of thought and the category of "the West."" In a world of many forms of capitalism, many types of democracy, and many kinds of states, "different" means "distinct" not "unique."35 Dahrendorf and Van Wolferen develop strikingly similar lines of argument while stressing German and Japanese uniqueness. 36 As the security policies of Japan and Germany mix similarities and differences, an analysis that stresses uniqueness does not help our understanding. Comparative analysis does. Arguments about the uniqueness of Japan or Germany should not stop us asking what we can learn from comparing the security policies of one with those of the other. Such analysis may help us see more clearly the truly distinctive aspects of Japan.

THE ARGUMENT IN BRIEF

The next two chapters develop the argument in general terms and specify it in its Japanese context. Chapter 2 articulates the norms-based perspective that informs this book and contrasts it with widely accepted explanations of Japan's external and internal security policy. Chapter 3 describes in more detail the general features of Japan's state and the institutionalization of social and legal norms in the media, the courts, and the bureaucracy. Then it applies, in a preliminary way, the analytical perspective that informs this book. It offers a norms-based explanation of the policies that the police and military pursued as "agents of violence" in prewar Japan. We move then to the more recent past, as the book's perspective is developed for postwar Japan's internal (chapter 4) and external (chapter 5) security policy. Together, these chapters document the effect of state institutions on the comprehensiveness of Japan's security policies. Broad social and economic aspects of security outweigh more narrowly conceived police and military considerations. Furthermore, these two chapters show that a flexible application of general legal norms creates conditions for policy flexibility when norms of collective identity are undisputed. This perception holds true both for the gradual expansion of police powers during the last three decades and for the pursuit of Japan's economic security in global markets. The pattern of policy adaptation is quite different when norms of collective identity are fundamentally contested-as on some important issues of military security. Under such conditions policy is marked by stalemate. In focusing on the U.S.-Japan relationship, chapter 6 examines the argument that the normative context matters more than the economic

japanese Security

or military content of policy. In striking contrast to the findings of Chapter 5, Japanese security policy has been more flexible in adjusting to the evolving U.S.-Japan relationship on military than on economic issues. Growing military cooperation resulted from a flexible application of Japan's defense plan and from changes in weapons technologies that broadened the notion of "self-defense." Norms of collective identity (a state seeking greater technological autonomy) as well as business interest in maximizing profits were central to the unrelenting resistance of Japan to any substantial change in technology transfer policy, including products and processes of direct interest to the U.S. military. In sum, the evidence suggests that the military or economic content of Japan's security policy does not help explain the balance between flexibility and rigidity. Norms and interests do. Chapter 7 compares the effects of state institutions and norms on Japanese and German security policy. Whatever commonalities these two trading states may share on economic issues, they have important and systematic differences in their security policies. Germany's internal security policies are driven by a Hobbesian fear of the fragility of domestic order, whereas Japan's internal security policy expresses a Grotian sense of community. Conversely, Germany's external security policy rests on a Grotian notion of belonging to an international community, whereas Japan's external security policy presumes a Hobbesian international system. These two clients of the United States have operated from similar international positions. Such significant differences cannot be explained by situational factors concerning differences in Japan's and Germany's placement in the international system. They can be explained, I believe, by state institutions and norms. The concluding chapter compares the police and the case of internal security with the military and the case of external security. It offers a historical sketch of the process by which police and military changed from violent to nonviolent agents of the state. Finally, I discuss the implications of this book's argument, in light of dramatic changes in Japan's party system and international environment, for the future of Japan's security policy. Japan lost the Pacific War and eschews violence. Other states, such as interwar Germany, also lost but did not eschew violence. Hence the intuitively appealing and implausibly anthropomorphic argument-losers in big wars mend their ways-is flawed. The institutional and normative bases of Japan's security policy are both more political and more subtle. They are more political because specific features of the Japanese state have discernible effects that embed violent elements of Japan's security policies in broader economic, social, and political factors. They are also more subtle. Japan's security policy turns in part on issues of collective

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CULTURAL NORMS AND NATIONAL SECURITY

identity defined, on questions of security, m terms of a high-growth economy and a nonmajoritarian polity. How and why the Japanese police and military have protected state security while eschewing violence is the subject matter of this book.

CHAPTER

Two

Institutionalism, Realism, and Liberalism

Most students of national security accord pride of place to material forces that define the balance of power between states. They have no patience for intangibles like culture. The analysis of norms connotes the naive idealism of international lawyers and do-gooders who do not understand the central fact that the world is a dangerous place. Cultural explanations may be acceptable as a last resort-but only if all other styles of analysis have failed. To connect political aspects of Japan to culture, norms, and identity is anomalous not only in security studies but in the writings on Japan's political economy. Virtually all of the best recent work has struggled hard to overcome the powerful intellectual tradition that stresses Japan's cultural uniqueness. This book's emphasis on the normative context of Japanese security policy thus cuts against the grain of most recent writings onJapan. 1 American and Japanese colleagues have been deeply puzzled by the approach I have taken. I vividly remember a weekly seminar in 1g88-8g on U.S.-Japan relations at a leading American university, well attended by exceptionally bright American and Japanese scholars and policy makers. Not a single presentation dealt with cultural issues. In fact, I do not recall a single instance when the term culture was invoked. Japan having joined the G-7 and the G-3, there was apparently nothing distinctive about the place. This struck me as exceedingly odd, considering how differently Americans and Japanese, around the same seminar table, participated in discussions. An analysis that considers norms, by definition collective social facts, need not insist on Japan's uniqueness, nor give way to the analysis of

CULTURAL NORMS AND NATIONAL SECURITY

subjective factors, nor rely on culture as an undifferentiated, residual category not amenable to empirical analysis. This book does not seek the roots of Japan's unique security policy, tautologically, in its unique culture. Instead, it highlights distinctive aspects of Japan's security policy and seeks to explain them in terms of norms that are, typically, institutionalized. By pointing to comparisons across policy domains and with other countries, I thus seek to open, not close, avenues for investigation.

NoRMS AND STATE SECURITY

Japan's police and military, and the security policies they pursue, are in some ways analogous to the proverbial dog that does not bark-in this case apparently for lack of bite. Since 1945, by comparative standards, Japan's police have had to cope with only a tiny number of criminals, and Japan's military fights no wars. But the security apparatus of the Japanese state is not necessarily weak. Mter all, unions that do not strike often do not do so because of strength not weakness; they simply do not need to rely on the weapon of last resort. The same might be said of a state's police and armed forces. Still, contemporary Japan is a peaceful trading state that obeys a central maxim: violence does not pay. Institutionalized norms have shaped Japan's security policy. They embody the qualities that define actor identities and the standards of conduct that actors seek to uphold. Thus institutionalized norms shape the interests that political actors pursue in a world of uncertain choices. In our normal lives we pay a great deal of attention to norms. Responsible parents, for example, if they have a chance, want to know something about the character (or norms) of their child's partner, not just about the size of his or her bank account. So it is with states. Compared to state institutions and norms, the growing thickness of Japan's wallet over the last four decades has had only very limited effects on its national security policy. Furthermore, although they act under similar international constraints, clients (such as Japan or Germany) of powerful states often behave differently because they adhere to different norms. Conversely, common norms shape Japanese policy similarly in different sectors, such as internal and external security. Different kinds of norms work differently. 2 Two kinds of norms matter to this book's argument. Regulatory norms define standards of appropriate behavior that shape interests and help coordinate the behavior of political actors. In contemporary Japan, for example, it is a social fact, shared by the police and military, that security policy should be pursued only by peaceful means. Constitutive norms express actor identities that also define interests and thus shape behavior. 3 For example, most Japa-

Institutionalism, &alism, Liberalism

nese share in a collective identity acquired and reinforced over several decades: Japan is a nonmajoritarian polity that respects intensely held views of strong minorities. Regulatory and constitutive norms are closely linked. What matters, therefore, is not only the compliance of political actors with social standards that shape their interests and behavior but the competence of actors to (re)interpret their identities and thus to (re)define their interests and behavior. Political interests are defined by both regulatory and constitutive norms. For example, the subordination of military to economic and political considerations in Japan's compreheqsive view of external security and the relative unimportance of organized state violence in the repertoire of Japanese police practices are regulatory norms that derive from the organizational structures of the Japanese state. Political interests are also shaped by a norm of collective identity, of Japan as a trading state that avoids majority decisions. Since the early 1g6os a vast majority of the Japanese public has embraced the pursuit of economic prosperity as central to Japan's collective identity. A large majority of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), and the Japanese government, has been unwilling to force against the wishes of the political opposition either a revision of Japan's Peace Constitution or new legislation governing police operations. It has thus affirmed a constitutive norm of procedural consultation, not simple majority rule, as relevant in defining standards of appropriate political behavior.' In contrast to ideas, norms make not only cognitive but also behavioral claims on individuals. 5 Chapter 3 makes more specific this abstract discussion of regulatory and constitutive norms. It shows how Japan's social and legal norms, institutionalized in the media, in the judicial system an,d in the bureaucracy, shape the interests and policy choices of government and corporate actors. Norms can affect behavior both indirectly and directly. Since norms are typically nested in one another, their effects are often indirect. 6 Norms have direct effects by defining collectively shared standards of appropriate behavior that validate social identities. They provide, in the language of Ann Swidler, a tool kit of world-views. They are prefabricated action channels that establish links between the values individuals hold and the problems they seek to solve. 7 Norms shape behavior by offering ways to organize action rather than specifying the ends of action. They create habits of interpretations and repertoires of practiae grounded in experience. 8 Styles of action thus are typically more persistent than the ends which individuals or groups seek to attain. In the words of Robert Smith, "certain elements, constructs, principles and styles seem to be enduring. At the very least, they seem to recur. ''9 What is true of domestic norms holds also for the international variety.

CULTURAL NORMS AND NATIONAL SECURITY

Agreement on norms in the international society of states is achieved either through parallel or converging national legislation or through international treaties. Treaties can directly specify norms that become binding after they have been translated into national legislation. Alternatively, they can articulate general principles that inform the setting of norms through national legislation. Furthermore, social norms at the global level provide states with standardized models of collective identity and authority, for example in regional and global ideologies of citizenship and human rights. States operate in an international environment awash with organizational and professional networks that both reflect and alter that environment. 10 However, the polity that is emerging at the international level does not have the density of institutionalized norms characteristic of national polities.11 The difference between international and domestic politics most relevant to this book thus lies not in the decentralization or centralization of power but in the number of people and the density of institutions involved in defining, interpreting, and reinterpreting different kinds of norms. In international society that task has traditionally been reserved to a few scores of scholars of international law. The same scholars also advise their national governments about the evolution of norms in the international society of states. Japan's internal security policy, described in greater detail in chapter 4, offers many examples of how norms work in domestic politics. Police defense of Japan's internal security is backed by social norms that affirm informal surveillance of citizens. The collective identity to be secured is conservative. Furthermore, legal norms are relatively undefined and embedded deeply in social norms that leave the police with broad discretionary powers. By the same token, and despite Japan's strict adherence to many provisions of international law, social consensus does not extend beyond the water's edge. For the Japanese government, international cooperation on questions of internal security is strictly interest-driven. External security shows a different configuration. The Japanese public simply does not question that the government should reduce the country's economic vulnerability, particularly its heavy reliance on imported raw materials. Similarly noncontroversial is the idea that Japan should strive for technological autonomy, both on its intrinsic merits and as a useful mechanism for reducing international dependence. This consensus on Japan's economic identity and the security it demands contrasts with bitter contests over what norms should inform Japan's military policy. A dovish public climate survives on these issues, despite a gradual acceptance of the necessity of national defense across the 1970s and tg8os. That social climate is reinforced by the legal provisions of Japan's Peace Constitution. 20

Institutionalism, Realism, Liberalism

In the domestic politics of Japan's security policy, in short, collective identities matter and social norms often inform the interpretation of legal norms. In the intemational society of states, in contrast, legal norms are primary. As a result it is comparatively difficult for Japan to move with confidence in such a society. Germany's highly legalistic domestic culture, based on universal claims of right and wrong, makes the polity feel at home in intemational society. Norms do not float freely in political space. They acquire particular importance when they crystallize, through institutionalization, as in the Japanese polity. Once institutionalized, norms do not simply express individually held preferences, values, or ideas. Institutionalized norms are collectively held and exist extemal to actors. They are part of an objective reality that often, though not always, commands some formal sanctioning mechanisms. 12 Institutionalization creates, across different segments of state and society, a degree of stability and uniformity which otherwise might be lacking. Three dimensions of state institutions matter: the organization of power inside the Japanese govemment; the relations between state and society; and Japan's transnational relations, especially with the United States. Empirical evidence suggests that the police and the SDF hold different positions in the Japanese state. Terrorism and violent social protest have triggered remarkably consistent political responses in Japan. The organizational structure of the Japanese police blends centralization and decentralization of political authority. Their mission is no longer informed, as it was in the 1930s and 1940s, by social repression aimed at the eradication of political dissent. Since 1945Japan's police force has been revamped. Although it remains largely centralized in seeking to protectJapan's intemal security, its mission has been broadened to respond to social needs while also serving the police interest of social surveillance. Japan's police blend traditional community service with modem police technologies. 'The police have not been molded in a vacuum," writes Walter Ames. "Rather, they fit Japanese society like a glove fits the hand, and the societal hand has determined the form of the glove. "13 When that hand forms a fist, as it does in some aspects of Japan's intemal security policy, so does the glove. The transnational links of the Japanese police, though they have grown since the 1g8os, are too weak significantly to affect these domestic arrangements. Short of domestic revolution, it is virtually impossible for an autonomous military establishment to reemerge. This remains true despite a strengthening of transnational links between the Japanese and the American militaries in the 1g8os which enhanced the role of the SDF in Japan. Within the govemment the military is fenced in by economic 2I

CULTURAL NORMS AND NATIONAL SECURITY

bureaucracies that severely circumscribe the access its professionals have to the centers of political power. Civilian control is firmly entrenched. The organization of state-society relations isolates the military from a public that, at best, musters grudging acceptance of the SDF. In Japan's defense economy, by way of contrast, government-business relations are close. The same is true of the economic sectors responsible for supplying the economy with vital raw materials. Since institutionalized norms are historical creations, the analytical perspective of this book thus falls squarely into the historical rather than the anthropological mode. 14 Japan's militarist norms, for example, were dramatically weakened by events of the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s. However, these events did not automatically or instantaneously alter public views of the emperor, the state, Article 9 of Japan's Peace Constitution, and the police law of 1954. They did so only as part of a prolonged political process. We can think of norms, following David Laitin, as focal "points of concern" 15 that reveal social agreement on what is worth arguing about. Throughout the postwar period, but especially in the 1950s, Japan's antimilitarist norms were politically contested, affirmed, and modified. This perspective helps us analyze norms empirically, even though they are, in the words of Gary Goertz, a "frustratingly intangible part" of the environment. 16 Norms cannot be reduced to individual action; yet they exist and have effects through both individual practice and social communication.17 For example, in Japan the point of concern in the domestic debate about national defense involved a dominant political establishment on the one hand and a civil-libertarian legal profession on the other. In the evolution of international norms, by contrast, Japan's passivity voided any substantive public debate either at home or abroad. In short, in the analysis of Japan's security policy it is important to focus on norms because they help us understand the interests of political actors. Institutionalized norms defining appropriate conduct, collective identities, and interests are closely related. Institutionalized norms and collective identities shape but do not determine policy and outcomes for two reasons: they are politically contested, and they are historically contingent.

REALISM, LIBERALISM, AND jAPANESE SECURITY

Realism and liberalism are two important perspectives informing the analysis of state security. Their analysis is not wrong but incomplete. 18 Realism focuses on the effects of material capabilities on security policy. Typically it is too general in the effects it stipulates for the security policy 22

Institutionalism, Realism, Liberalism

of specific states. Liberalism points to the importance of norms, what it calls preferences. But it focuses solely on regulatory norms and neglects altogether the constitutive norms that define actor identities and also shape actor interests. Realism

Realism is the most widely held analytical perspective in security studies. 19 Its arguments suffer from two crucial weaknesses. They are indeterminate in what they tell us about Japanese security policy. And they are too restrictive in treating Japan as a unified and rational state. International competition and emulation will lead to increasing homogenization of states in the international system, realist theory suggests-an unconvincing claim when applied to contemporary Japan. In recent decades changes in the international distribution of power have not led to significant changes in Japan's national security policy. 2° Furthermore, the realist argument is so general that different authors arrive at very different conclusions. Some argue that the structure of the international system creates small incentives for change in Japan's security policy; others argue the opposite. One can readily agree with the commonsense notion that international constraints set an outer boundary on what states can and cannot do, but it is impossible to translate this general argument into compelling insights about the security policy of specific states. The conventional wisdom among both American and Japanese experts focuses on the effect of the international system on Japan's security policy. The consequences of the end of the Cold War, according to this line of reasoning, are much more evident in Europe than in Asia. Whereas the Cold War in Europe defined the balance of power between East and West, in Asia the split was less evident. Furthermore, the Cold War in Asia began to abate in the 1970s, but it had not ended by the mid-1ggos. The collapse of communism and the disintegration of the Soviet Union thus created incentives for change in security policy much less compelling for Japan than for Germany. In focusing on the regional balance of power in Asia, we have to account for the incremental responses of Japan's security policy to the great changes that have occurred since the mid-1g8os. A second variant of realist explanation focuses on the balance of power in U.S.-Japan relations. It comes to a dramatically different conclusion: war between the United States and Japan is inevitable. George Friedman and Meredith LeBard assert that "the struggle between Japan and the United States, punctuated by truces, friendships, and brutality, will shape the Pacific for generations. It will be the endless game about 2]

CULTURAL NORMS AND NATIONAL SECURITY

which the philosophers have written, the game of nations-the war of all against all." 21 In this view geography is destiny. Both the United States and Japan are naval powers. The United States needs to control the sealanes because of its expansive notion of self-defense. Japan needs to control the sealanes because of its dependence on the import of strategic raw materials. Japanese vulnerability and American assertiveness will make a break between the two countries inevitable. Showdown is unavoidable since Japan cannot permanently subordinate itself to America's political demands. Meanwhile the United States, trapped by its empire and unable to revitalize its competitiveness, cannot forgo naval supremacy-its most important military asset to pressure Japan for economic concessions. (If it were a question of morality, fault would probably lie more with the United States than with Japan.) For this version of realism, therefore, dramatic changes in Japanese security policy are in the offing. 22 The conclusions of realist analysis point in opposite directions, for the international balance of power is indeterminate in its effect on Japan's policy. Since the mid-197os Japan has experienced substantial changes in its relative standing in the international system without great changes in its policy for national security. The weakening of the American position in East Asia since the mid-197os, the growth of a Soviet military presence in the late 1970s, the second Cold War in Europe in the early 198os, dramatic changes in Soviet defense and foreign policy after the mid-198os, the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991, and sharp increases in China's power have elicited no dramatic change in Japanese security policy. Rather than march in step with changes in the international balance of power, the interests of political actors are plastic. They can be conceived of in different ways, depending on the effects of institutionalized norms. In sum, there exists no observable relation between Japan's relative position and its security policy. This conclusion comes as no surprise to students of criminology who enrich the concept of structure with cultural content. David Bayley, for example, argues that "Americans tend to be structuralist in their thinking about crime ... but only very unobservant people could argue that Japanese order is not strongly affected by regimes of order enforced by community as well as governmental sanctions. "23 William Clifford concurs. The secret to Japan's approach to crime control lies "less in the structure than in the way in which the structure operates in practice. It is not in the form but in its interpretation, less the shape than the style and the meaning for people."24 In making a case for the importance of institutionalized norms, I build on these insights. In so doing I part company with an important strand of realist thought that views states as rational, unitary actors with fixed prefer-

Institutionalism, Realism, Liberalism

ences, such as survival_25 This is a deliberately chosen, limiting assumption. It may be reasonable in some extreme, wartime settings. But since war is a social institution, even in war the assumption is unwarranted. 26 Furthermore, internal security often illustrates fundamental clashes between state and individual security: many political actions designed to enhance state security put citizens at risk. This observation cuts against realism's core assumption that state security is a collective good uncontested in domestic politics. With scores of fragile states seeking to establish their legitimacy in the twentieth century, internal security is a vitally important issue with important international ramifications. But because realism views states as unitary actors, it leaves internal security to specialists in domestic politics. It thus relinquishes the analytical leverage that comparison across different domains of state security offers. Contra realism I believe that the distinctive aspects of Japan's security policy can be understood best by analyzing in one analytical framework its international and domestic aspects. Liberalism

Liberalism focuses on the normative context of political action. 27 This book's emphasis on norms is thus partly compatible with such explanations of security policy. Michael Hechter and Satoshi Kanazawa's powerful analysis of Japanese crime illustrates the point. They propose a theory that centers around norms, ''written laws and other mores" that help create "spontaneous local order. "2s In their view the group structure of Japanese society creates "control economies" much greater than those in other industrial societies. Group solidarity is enforced by the dependence of the individual on the group and the visibility of members of society. Hechter and Kanazawa use the scholarly literature on Japanese families, schools, and firms to show that dependence and visibility are much greater in Japan than in the United States. Had they included German institutions, they would have concluded that, in dependence and visibility, Germany falls in between, thus matching the order when the three societies are ranked in terms of crime. 29 In a similar vein Setsuo Miyazawa has shown how the organizational norms of the Japanese police, and a permissive legal context, have made the "calculative involvement" of the Japanese police more common than its "moral involvement."30 Visibility characterizes Japan's social order, according to Hechter and Kanazawa. This interpretation agrees with widely accepted facts about Japan. The enormous resources that the police allocate to the gathering of social intelligence, with the active support of the population, under-

25

CULTURAL NORMS AND NATIONAL SECURITY

line the importance of individual visibility. The importance of public as well as published opinion reinforces this pattem. The media are often used by the police to articulate social norms and to elicit individual compliance.31 Not uncommonly, for example, the names of suspects are revealed by the police and publicized by the media not only at the time of arrest but also when a suspect is sought, even for minor infractions such as signing a lease under a false name or giving a wrong address. 32 The courts acknowledge these social pressures: judges often reduce sentences because they recognize the weight of social sanctions that a defendant has already experienced. The virtue of liberalism is to illustrate how norms affect actor behavior. It brings together individual incentives and social facts in an actionoriented framework; and from this position liberal analyses of norms are typically unforgiving in their criticism of cultural explanations. Hechter and Kanazawa advance two criticisms. First, cultural analysis is too general. Confucian values, for example, do not offer a compelling explanation for Japan's low crime rates. Everywhere increases in industrialization and urbanization correlate with an increase in crime rates. If Confucianism were the main cause for Japan's social order, Korea and China should have even lower crime rates. 33 But they do not. Second, in contrast to individually held values, norms are collective propertiesthey exist by virtue of being held by different individuals and so constitute an objective reality that has important effects on behavior. By contrast, cultural analysis often assumes that action is determined by individually held values. 34 They may not seek the reason for Japan's comparatively low crime rate in institutional arrangements that create dependence and visibility, but traditional interpretations stressing the effects ofJapanese groups on the intemalization of values often dovetail with an institutional perspective. 35 One cultural analysis heavily informed by the group interpretation of Japanese politics comes to conclusions that are virtually identical to those of Hechter and Kanazawa. I. ]. Shain writes that "a large part of the explanation for Japan's success in holding down the incidence of serious crime lies with that society's ability to maintain effective smallgroup interaction despite its population's predominantly urban concentration .... In fact, each member of Japanese society is under a kind of group surveillance to make sure that he or she will measure up to required standards .... Literally, the individual in Japan is caught up in a web of expectations to conform and not to bring shame to his family, friends, and/ or associates at work. "'6 In practice, the two styles of analysis, norms-based and cultural, may not be far apart. Hechter and Kanazawa's aversion to cultural analysis is

Institutionalism, Realism, Liberalism

a reaction against a powerful tradition of scholarship that insists on Japan's uniqueness. Vulgar culturalism reduces the task of explaining Japanese policy choice to an insistence on the uniqueness of Japanese culture. In doing so it resembles vulgar rationalism (which infers the motives of actors from behaviorally revealed preferences). These contrasting explanations are identical in that they offer tautological explanations. They succeed in explaining everything and so explain nothing. 37 A liberal analysis of security policy will appear to some loosely rationalistic, to others loosely culturalist. These two terms are not contradictory.'8 Interest-driven and culture-driven styles of analysis often assume the ends of action: "rational," individualistic, arbitrary preferences or "irrational," consensual, cultural values. But this dichotomy is misplaced, and rationalist and cultural styles are compatible. Cultural analysis is greatly enriched if it is grounded in a theory of action. And rationalist analysis often depends on cultural styles of analysis. 39 Bringing these two styles of analysis together helps us take into account both the normative context in which interest formation takes place and the cost-sensitivity of collectively held norms. But this liberal argument neglects another type of norm that also has powerful political effects. Liberalism focuses solely on the efficiency effects that "thin" regulatory norms have on individual behavior. It overlooks "thick" constitutive norms that define the identities of actors. A framework stressing individual choice assumes that actors are autonomous from their environment. It considers their identity unproblematic.w This highly restrictive view of politics fails to recognize political identity as a social fact that is always present and often salient. 41 Depending on the situation, this identity may be either taken for granted or contested. I seek to capture the effects of both regulatory and constitutive norms. Collective identities can compel actors to make choices that are costly from the perspective of regulatory norms and that serve no apparent (rational) purpose. For example, Japan has not responded fully to external pressure for remilitarization from the United States nor conformed to the norms of the international state system. Interests derived from the identity norm of Japan as a nonmajoritarian polity in which dissenting minorities cannot be railroaded by elected majori'ties have, over the past three decades, trumped the norm of behaving like a "normal" state.' 2 In relations with other states, as Chapter 7 argues, collective identity matters much more in the definition of German than of Japanese interests. In an international crisis, the first question in Bonn and Berlin is "What do other European states and the United States think and want?" That is not the first question Japanese officials ask. Norms both constrain and enable actors. A political analysis of institu-

CULTURAL NORMS AND NATIONAL SECURITY

tionalized norms cannot be reduced to only one of these two dimensions. It must encompass both regulatory norms of collective authority and constitutive norms of collective identity.

STATE INSTITUTIONS AND

NoRMs

IN JAPAN

The interests that inform Japan's security policy are shaped by norms of appropriate behavior and identity institutionalized in the Japanese state. State Institutions

Japanese specialists disagree strongly on the nature of the Japanese state. Their disagreement is as intense, and politically perhaps as consequential, as was that of Soviet specialists between the 1950s and the 1g8os. A decade of charged political controversy between "apologists belonging to the Chrysanthemum Club" and "revisionist Japanbashers" has sharpened lines of argument about the nature of Japanese power! 3 The "apologists" find in Japan's state institutions confirmation of universal tendencies toward political and economic pluralism. Many groups compete for power in politics, many firms compete for profit in markets. Party factions and keiretsu groupings of firms are specifically Japanese features of politically universal forces. Japan is simply another state that is both democratic and capitalist, and there is no need to unlock any special Japanese secrets. Japan is subject to the same general laws and the same secular trends that apply to all capitalist democracies. Political power is dispersed and contested, and markets accommodate to the logic of domestic and international competition. The "revisionists" insist that Japan has developed a distinct form of capitalism. Japan's political system leaves some public- and private-sector elites to steer the economic and social evolution of the country.~ 39 The informal powers of the police are, however, vulnerable to unpredictable court rulings. In the late 1950s, for example, lower courts made important rulings that declared unconstitutional several local safety ordinances adopted between May 1958 and October 1959· But in July 1960, just after the big demonstration, the Supreme Court backed the police by reversing these rulings, one instance among many which, according to Karel van Wolferen, has gained the court a reputation "for overturning decisions against the government made by lower courts. "140 Such rulings are exceptional. 141 The Supreme Court has adhered to a stance of judicial passivity and evinces an attitude of barely concealed hostility toward progressive and radical political forces, especially in constitutional decisions and in rulings affecting public facilities such as airports.142 The director of the Supreme Court in 1978, Masao Okahara, typified this attitude. In his speeches he favored judicial self-restraint, repeatedly warning Japanese judges of the complex consequences of their decisions. 143 The Court's passivity did not rest on the views of individuals but typified the judicial politics of the Court's General Secretariat. Over time the secretariat has developed conferences with lower court judges to articulate general lines of policy. Review of lower court decisions is thus short-circuited by a political process that threatens dissident judges with reassignment. 144 Since the early 1970s, the courts have

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supported the informal exercise of police powers on questions of internal security. The courts also shield the police more directly from compulsory prosecution of the abuse of authority under Articles 262-269 of the new Code of Criminal Procedure. Between 1948 and 1977, of 1,785 charges brought against the police only 7 cases were prosecuted; four ended in convictions. "Not only is the small number of cases being prosecuted conspicuous," WTites Masayuki Murayama, "but so is the low conviction rate, especially in view of the fact that the average conviction rate of all Penal Code violations has been more than 95% inJapan." 145 Social Norms As the media and opinion surveys reveal, social norms also shape the interests and behavior of the police. Setsuo Miyazawa, for example, reports that he "observed great sensitivity to public relations in the police."146 The reaction of the security and riot police to widespread student unrest in the late 196os was patience in the face of provocation. The police delayed a crackdown on student radicals for almost two years, until 1969, when public opinion had swung toward the government. 147 Similarly, the government chose not to mobilize overwhelming force to end protracted and at times violent mass protests against the construction of Tokyo's Narita Airport. The protest movement of farmers and students clearly was anathema to those in power; but as an act of sincerity it commanded considerable respect, even approbation, among the Japanese public. 148 Ezra Vogel WTites that "when students occupy buildings, or the Red Army takes over villas, or Japanese terrorists hold international hostages, the Japanese police tend to be patient in order to avoid direct violent confrontations that might create or increase sympathy for potential martyrs. "149 Public opinion, reflected in the five major dailies, acts as a brake on police excesses and, more generally, executive power. The press pays much attention to the police and is often invoked in public debate as the ultimate arbiter. When the Supreme Court affirmed a lower court ruling favoring the police in a celebrated wire-tapping scandal of the 198os, the JCP issued a statement in which it claimed that "the party will appeal to public opinion until it can win indemnity from the state." 150 For the Japanese police the belief is axiomatic that success depends largely on a favorable public climate. Its public standing hit an all-time low around 1960. 151 The police worked hard to improve its image. A 1978 survey concluded that the police ranked first (31.9 percent) as protectors and ninth (2.8 percent) as violators of human rights. By 1983, the public rated the police most favorably among eight major in-

8o

The Police

stitutions, ahead of the press, business, and government. This high public standing is very likely due to its daily community activities, which combine service with surveillance. 152 Although the security police are cautious about what information they make available, the general and riot police go to great lengths to generate or maintain public support. The number of complaints lodged with the civilian review boards of the Ministry of Justice has declined steadily since 1948 and numbered about fifty in 1987. 153 Significantly, public support for the police did not differ by conservative or progressive political preferences. 154 Consistent policy pursued over forty years has brought stunning results. David Bayley concludes that "all accounts agree that people now come to the police largely because they want to and not because they feel they have to. Furthermore, even people who tend to have a skeptical attitude toward the police . . . admit that abuses of power by the police are minimal. "155 International Norms

Officials at the NPA and the MOHA, together with the staff of the Imperial Household Agency, belong to the most domestically oriented of Japan's major bureaucracies. It is one reason why Japan lacks a genuine internationalism on issues of international law. A second reason is the typically informal approach to legal norms in domestic affairs. Technically Japanese policy agrees with the evolving human rights foundation of the antiterrorist policy of the major Western democracies. Japan, for example, has strongly opposed Third World states that defend acts of terrorism as integral to national liberation struggles. In the aftermath of hijack.ings in the 1970s, the Japanese government enacted six laws targeting international terrorists, including members of the JRA, so that it could ratify five international treaties. The effect, however, was largely symbolic and had little bearing on the international work of the police. To date Japan has not been compelled to act on the international conventions it has signed and ratified. In the International Civil Aviation Organization and in the United Nations, Japan has never taken a leading role on terrorism. East Asia has failed to evolve regional organizations that might help Japan to articulate new international norms or reinforce established ones. 156 This passivity with respect to international norms is revealed on other issues. In the law of treaties, Japan insists on the cumbersome unanimity rule that prevents multilateral treaties from going into effect until the objections of all signatories have been accommodated. In the law of recognition Japan adheres to a schematic formalism. On questions of human rights Japan tends to lag behind international developments. 157

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This is not to argue that Japan lacks a conception of intemational norms. But the country has no easy way of translating the way legal and social norms interact in its·domestic politics into the intemational realm. "Intemational responsibility" means to the Japanese doing what others expect of a country whose intemational stature is rapidly growing. To transcend an interest-driven approach to intemational norms would require nothing less than a fundamental domestication of intemational society-the extension of Japan's social fabric abroad. Such changes are beginning to be observable throughout the Westem world in small ways (exchanging name cards among professionals) and in large ones (organization of work in the auto industry), but a substantial change along these lines would be a fundamental break in the history of the intemational system.

jAPAN's POLICY OF INTERNAL SECURITY

Japan's intemal security policy has domestic and intemational components. Challenged by mass protests at home, the police have perfected tactics of crowd control and selective intimidation that they first developed in the tg6os. This continuity is not mirrored in the intemational aspects of intemal security. Confronting a JRA that operates beyond national borders, Japan has shifted from substantial indifference toward intemational terrorism to hesitant contacts with foreign police forces and law enforcement agencies. Furthermore, in dealing with terrorists the norm has changed from being "soft" to being "hard" (although it still remains to be tested in a real crisis). At least on paper the Japanese govemment is now committed to reject terrorist blackmail even at the risk of human life. Domestic Policies and Internal Security

Intemal security policy was particularly contested in the late 1950s and early tg6os. Several attempts to strengthen police powers failed, despite a political offensive by conservative factions inside the LDP who wanted to retum to some political principles of the 1930s, as symbolized in proposals for a revision of japan's Peace Constitution and police laws. The police adopted informal procedures as an altemative. In decisions of tg6o and 1962 the Supreme Court backed the police on the constitutionality of the Public Safety Ordinance and on the 1954 revision of the Police Law. In both instances the Court encouraged the police to work without the backing of new laws or a revision of the constitution. The police moved quickly to take advantage of this opening.

The Police

One of the few senior police officials who in retirement turned publicly against the police, Tadamitsu Matsuhashi, admitted to a change in security policy in Fukuoka city. In the wake of the Court's 1962 decision Matsuhashi adopted a more expansive application of minor laws dealing with traffic violations, public building codes, and the regulation of mass demonstrations. 158 Discretion gave the police flexible ways to deal with political protesters, especially members of radical left-wing movements suspected of terrorism. Japan's prison system affords the police ample opportunities for isolating political radicals. Japan's pretrial detention system consists of 1,200 prisons run by the police, compared to the 150 under the jurisdiction of the MOJ. The police can keep suspects incarcerated for up to twentythree days. 159 Mter three, ten, and twenty days a judge must authorize continued detention for additional questioning-usually a routine formality. Methods of questioning are reminiscent of the 1930s; they aim primarily to break the will of the individual rather than infiltrate radical movements. Suspects are kept in police prisons primarily to extract confessions, under conditions that a 1984 report described as shocking. 160 The average length of stay of normal criminals is well below twenty-three days, but political radicals such as JRA member Maruoka have been held in police prisons for up to two months. 161 One legal technique the police use to detain political radicals is an arrest for lesser offenses. Using several articles in the Penal Code, some suspects reportedly have been arrested, detained, released, and rearrested several times over a period of months or more. 162 Arrested on minor offenses, suspects reportedly have been interrogated around the clock. 163 Mter an indictment has been handed down, the accused are held in the Tokyo detention center of the MOJ for the duration of the trial and all appeals. Conditions in this prison are better than in ordinary prisons: no work, permission to receive daily visits, availability of reading material, relatively unrestricted correspondence with the outside world. Communications with the defendant's lawyers are supervised tightly, however, and the defendant is put in solitary confinement. Judicial procedures thus permit the police and government to keep political radicals isolated for up to a decade before the final verdict. As Pat Steinhoff concludes, "in effect, the leaders of the most extreme protest groups have been treated within the letter of the law, but legal maneuvers have been contrived to keep them out of society for long enough to destroy the effectiveness of their leadership. The limits of acceptable dissent have been set primarily by bureaucrats trained in the law, who are clever enough to uphold it and still accomplish their aims. "164 Police procedures were refined once the JRA became the center of

CULTURAL NORMS AND NATIONAL SECURITY

Japanese terrorism in the early 1970s. Left-wing radicalism provoked intense police surveillance from the beginning. At the first JRA public meeting, uniformed police surrounded the building, "plainclothes police photographed the three hundred people who entered, and more police stood around the back of the hall watching. On stage, leaders of Sekigun (aJRA forerunner) made rousing speeches with black ski masks covering their faces so they could not be identified. Nobody got arrested that day because the gathering and the talks were perfectly legal. Yet the tone of the relationship had clearly been set." 165 Mter the left-wing groups began their attacks, Sekigun members were put under "roundthe-clock police surveillance, sometimes with two or three plainclothesmen surrounding one person whenever he stepped outside." 166 With no place to go in Japan and with Sekigun leaders ideologically inclined toward internationalism, terrorists saw great advantages in relocating to North Korea and the Middle East. 167 Since 1972 the JRA has operated abroad. As the leading scholar on the subject, Pat Steinhoff, writes: 'Japan's multinational corporation employees and its multinational revolutionary group, the Japanese Red Army, have similar social origins and a strikingly similar organizational style." 168 Throughout the 198os the Japanese Red Army continued to make front-page news. The NPA suspects JRA involvement in some hostage crises of the 1g8os, such as the Wakaoji case of November 1986, but it remains uncertain about the precise connections and operational moves of the JRA. 169 In November 1987 the Japanese police uncovered a domestic support group of the JRA, the Anti-War Domestic Front. A front document suggested that the JRA had moved into the second phase of a five-phase struggle that would bring it back to the homeland. 170 The struggle for Japan's internal security is likely to be protracted. Police flexibility has been strengthened by legal provisions that prohibit citizens from obstructing public officials in the performance of their duties. Charges brought by the police under this law are a good indicator of fluctuations in the general level of political activism. On average, half of all arrests based on the law occur in Tokyo. The proportion peaked at 70 percent in 1969. Compared to arrests in the 1g6o demonstrations, the number of arrests in 1969-71 was disproportionately large, suggesting that for political reasons the police were much more liberal in the application of this law. 171 Crime and court statistics illustrate a sharp increase in police powers of investigation since the early 197os. 172 Although an increasing reliance on search warrants suggests a growing role for the judiciary, in fact the issuing of warrants is no more than a bureaucratic formality. Furthermore, since the early 1970s judicial statistics show a steady decline in the proportion of those found innocent in court. Using a broad array of

The Police

data, former High Court judge Yasuo Watanabe concludes that the number of trumped-up charges has probably increased. 173 Before major public events the police routinely search houses, with or without warrants. 174 In preparation for the funeral of Emperor Showa the police entered, without a warrant, 6oo,ooo apartments during the week before the funeral-a fourfold increase over precautions taken at the Tokyo summit of 1986. A knock at the door, a polite request, a quick search of the apartment, and virtually universal compliance were normal. Even citizens who were hesitant or opposed afforded the police at least a quick scan of their typically small quarters when they opened the door. Although door-to-door questioning of residents is in violation of Article 35 of the Constitution, only a few lawsuits were filed in protest. 175 Essential for the flexible extension of police powers is the active support of the public. The community relations (CR) policy is a result. One police officer described the CR approach as "a dialogue that differs from the one-way communication of traditional public relations" between local residents and the police. "Its aim is the anticipation (of radicals' activity), the separation (of radicals from society), and the isolation (of radicals)." 176 The public's tolerance of and cooperation with the police remains a key instrument of internal security. In the 1g8os numerous occasions created serious security concerns. In many instances massive police checks, especially in Tokyo, work only with the active cooperation of the public. Roadblocks to protect the foreign dignitaries attending the funeral of the emperor, for example, were effective because the public heeded police pleas and left autos at home. Nor did the public object to the closing of many subway exits in central Tokyo so that a larger than usual crowd could, through a smaller than usual number of exits, pass by police officers inspecting their bags. 177 In the 1g8os the police tried informally to build crime prevention into the modernization of roads and the construction of apartment complexes. Particular localities can now be surveyed by means of TV monitors and the computerized "area information control" system. This system divides urban areas into squares of 250 meters; all relevant information is computerized for each square. A less sophisticated surveillance system was also put into effect in the 1g8os. A police blimp monitors developments in and around Tokyo during major public events, and all buildings over four stories high have identification numbers on their rooftops which are easily visible from the air. 178 Moreover, it is now standard operating procedure for the Tokyo police, in preparation for a major event, to search and seal thousands of manholes for explosives. The rationale for such a comprehensive approach was set out in a lecture that the commissioner general of the NPA, Hideo Yamada, delivered before the Foreign Correspondents Club of Japan in May 1986. 179

CULTURAL NORMS AND NATIONAL SECURITY

Yamada stressed two points. First, an effective campaign against political radicals requires the police to extend defense to the air as well as underground. Second, since the police have relatively limited legal powers, they operate by Japanese methods, that is, supported by and in cooperation with the public at large. With the waning of violent mass demonstrations after 1972, the police needed new reasons to build up the riot police. Justification came from international developments. Beginning with President Ford's visit in November 1974, the riot police have been busy preparing for the international events that, with increasing frequency, have been staged in Tokyo. Two police failures in 1975 turned a security police that operated behind the scenes to a highly visible force deployed massively at large public functions: the assassination attempt on Prime Minister Miki in June and the attack on the Crown Prince in July. 180 Japan hosted economic summit meetings in 1979 and 1986 and also welcomed U.S. President Reagan in 1983 and South Korean President Chun in 1984. Japan also celebrated the sixtieth anniversary of the Showa Emperor's reign in 1986, planned the Emperor's visit to Okinawa in 1987 as well as his funeral in 1989, staged the new Emperor's coronation in 1990, and organized security for the wedding of the Crown Prince in 1993. Police mobilization for such events has increased sharply. In the 196os a maximum of 5,ooo-1o,ooo policemen were mobilized by the MPD for events such as the Tokyo Olympics in 1964 and Soviet Vice-Prime Minister Mikoyan's visits in 1961 and 1964. At the occasion of President Ford's visit in 1974, however, the MPD mobilized 23,000 policemen on a daily basis. This number rose to 26,ooo at the Tokyo summit of 1979, and 30,000 at the 1986 summit and the Emperor's anniversary. It increased still further to 32,000 in 1989, at the time of the Emperor's funeral, 37,000 in 1990 at Emperor Akihito's enthronement, and 36,ooo for the G-7 summit meeting in 1993. 181 The police mobilize on a scale and with a thoroughness that reminds us of the importance of internal security. The 1984 visit of President Chun Doo Hwan, for example, inspired the police to stop cars, a month before the event, on Tokyo's crowded highways for practice searches. 182 In an effort to forestall terrorist attacks during the 1986 Tokyo Summit, an army of policemen protected conference halls and hotels and, for several days prior to the meetings, manned checkpoints throughout Japan. In preparation for Emperor Hirohito's funeral in February 1989, the police sealed thousands of manholes, constructed a steel wall around the inner courtyard of a park in which foreign dignitaries assembled, inspected subway tunnels, without warrants searched several hundred thousand apartments along the four-mile route of the funeral procession, banned domestic cargo flights several days before the funeral,

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The Police

and closed off so many roads and set up so many traffic checkpoints that car traffic in central Tokyo came to a standstill. 183 By the late 1g8os a policy of comprehensive security had become unmistakable. Commissioner Yamada's official notice of May 7, 1g86, following the second Tokyo Summit, stressed that the police had acquired comprehensive powers, substantially strengthening their surveillance of radicals and monitoring of particular localities without losing public support. The MPD and other prefectural police forces doubled the manpower they assigned to deal with radicals; the NPA reportedly pressed government agencies, using obscure bureaucratic regulations, to investigate buildings and homes in an extended search for radicals; and local police stations reportedly encouraged local assemblies to issue proclamations against political radicals. 184 Japan's policy of internal security is remarkably nonviolent. The police, as we have seen, attach great weight to public opinion and so avoid overt violence. Police restraint has been exemplified in many of the pitched battles that groups and social movements waged against the government's construction, operation, and enlargement of Narita Airport. Over nearly twenty years the movement articulated an enraged, alternative vision of politics, one fundamentally at odds with technocratic and administrative logic. Narita Airport was the largest construction project the Japanese government had ever undertaken. During the first phase of construction, which lasted until 1978, direct investment costs were 16o billion yen and indirect costs about 8oo billion yen. Two analysts note the human costs: "four policemen and two militants dead, thousands injured, and innumerable lives affected by court cases, legal proceedings, and other disruptions." 185 The low number of casualties, writes Robert Smith, offers "eloquent testimony that those who wield authority in postwar Japan have no sense it is the right of the state to take the lives of its citizens, however violent the form of their protest against its policies. " 186

One typical episode illustrates the protest around Narita that was quite common in the 1970s and 1g8os. In December 1g8g, 6,500 policemen dislodged about a dozen protesters, armed with firebombs and slingshots as well as bows and arrows, who opposed the expansion of Narita. The protesters occupied a shack and four steel towers built on a newly proposed runway. The police drenched the protesters with powerful water cannons. From cranes they lowered two huge steel cages, which deflected firebombs and stones hurled from the towers. They used a steel gondola, also suspended from a crane, from which five crouching policemen eventually leaped to take one of the towers. Mter a day of fighting the police had arrested three protesters. There were no injuries. 187 Similar incidents occurred in tggo.

CULTURAL NORMS AND NATIONAL SECURITY

The imperative was displayed most clearly in February 1972, when the police cornered five student radicals, responsible for a rash of deadly bombings, and one hostage in a villa in central Japan. Thus began an extraordinary ten-day drama: the siege of Asama-Sanso. The last ten hours of the siege were carried live by all major TV channels and watched by 95 percent of the viewing public. 188 Police orders were unambiguous: save the hostage, capture the terrorists alive, do not exchange hostages, maintain good relations with the media, do not incur police casualties. For ten days the police used a variety of methods to break the psychological resolve of the terrorists. On the tenth day, as the hope of saving the hostage dwindled, the police decided to take the building by storm. A huge, armor-plated crane broke down the walls, and policemen armed only with pistols-they were under strict orders not to use them-staged an assault in the early morning hours. Supported by ten armored cars, four water cannon-trucks, and 1,500 other policemen, they forced an entry into the building before noon. Once inside a policeman was soon shot and killed; only then was permission granted to use firearms in self-defense. Mter another six hours of fighting the radicals surrendered, and the hostage was released unharmed. Two policemen and one TV cameraman were killed, and twenty-three policemen were injured. Although confronted by radicals armed with several rifles and two thousand rounds of ammunition, during the entire drama the police fired only fifteen rounds from their pistols. It did use a wrecking crane, high pressure water hoses, twelve smoke bombs, and 1,400 canisters of tear gas. 189 Since another fourteen radicals were still at large, the police did not want to create a group of martyrs. Soon afterward one of the captured members of the group took the police to the grave of one of twelve members who had been tortured and killed in a brutal purge. 190 Such revelations signaled the end of the group's operations in Japan, as a horrified public turned against it. The police strategy of patient nonviolence had scored an impressive triumph. The restraint with which the Japanese riot police operates is, by international standards, also remarkable. The norm of avoiding bloodshed at almost all costs was an important reason why, at the beginning and at the end of the 196os, the police adamantly opposed politicians who demanded that the SDF be used as a back-up force to defend internal security against mass protests. At the height of what came to be known as the 990 days of mass protest-between October 8, 1967 and June 23, 1970-there occurred not a single death among protesters. The police made 15,000 arrests and suffered 12,000 injuries in more than 2,ooo encounters. 191 The riot police honed their tactics in the 196os. Brutal police intervention against demonstrators at Sunagawa in 1956 had elicited public

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criticism so intense that the police opposed mass demonstrations against the Security Treaty in 1g6o with a minimum of defensive equipment such as shields and vests. Preparations for the resumption of diplomatic relations with South Korea in 1965 embodied what the police had learned in 1g6o and became a trial run for dealing with the large-scale campus demonstrations and riots of the late 1g6os. 192 The police improved their equipment. Helmets with plastic face masks and long plastic shields became standard. Policemen were not armed with clubs, an offensive weapon that might undermine the image of a disciplined force put on the defensive by a hostile mob. But policemen trained to use shields as an offensive weapon, not only to push demonstrators back but to slam down on the ankles and toes of the front line of demonstrators. In addition the police strictly enforced a security ordinance requiring organizers to inform the authorities about planned demonstrations. It made maximum use of its power to arrest demonstrators, hoping to deter future involvement. It also succeeded in limiting ~he public space available for political demonstrations in the center of Tokyo. High-level personal contacts with the Japanese construction industry, for example, convinced one major company to store large amounts of building material on one site. The police also convinced the JSP leaders to hold rallies in Hibya Park, thus eliminating another site for mass demonstrations while at the same time spurring further conflict between the JSP and the JCP over the issue of mass protests. The police learned from tactical mistakes they had made in 1g6o. Police cars were refitted to secure them against rocks; strong searchlights were installed at the sites of major demonstrations; the food supply and sanitary facilities for the police were improved, but vendors were not permitted to sell food during demonstrations; injured policemen were rushed to the best hospitals whereas injured demonstrators had to wait their turn; photographers and journalists were provided with escorts and ample "photo opportunities," vantage points, that is, most favorable to the police; editors and commentators were invited to policesponsored lectures that provided background information and were intended to break the coalition between radicals and ordinary citizens. Six months before the anticipated peak of demonstrations in November 1965, the police started to train in earnest, and the normal system of personnel rotation was temporarily suspended. In short, the police made innumerable small adjustments in their "security production process." As it turned out, November 1965 passed without mass demonstrations. But when campus protest erupted on a large scale in 1967, the police were ready. Over the next twenty years there would be few changes in their tactics. The police were very clear about the goals and instruments of their security policy. The preface of the NPA interim report for the 1970s

CULTURAL NORMS AND NATIONAL SECURITY

states that "from now on, more than ever, we are planning to strengthen the bond between citizens and police. Although Japan's growing urbanization will be detrimental to this task, we are confident that we can forge an enduring link between citizen and police.'' 193 In general, Japan's internal security has experienced incremental adjustments over time. · The slogan that the police adopted in the wake of Japan's catastrophic defeat in 1945 still aptly summarizes their basic mission in the 1990s: "Respect human rights, keep alert, always be kind and popular. "194 By opting for a politically compelling path of "revision by interpretation" and relying on its considerable informal powers, the police have been able gradually to change their practices. Without conspicuous organizational changes or great political debates, and supported by the interplay of legal and social norms, police capacities have been enhanced. The consequence has been a substantial growth in the power to apply force without violence. International Policies and Internal Security

Unavoidably, Japan's internal security policy has been affected by developments in the international system over which the Japanese police have less control. Mter each of a series of spectacular hijacking operations in the mid-1970s, Japan's tendency to avoid violence left government and police open to blackmail. One change in policy, occasioned by the Bonn Summit of 1978, committed the Japanese government to stand firm in the face of terrorist blackmail-a change that had not been tested through the fall of 1995. 195 A second change was the government's hesitant but growing international involvement: in the coordination of antiterrorism and the participation of Japanese police in the Cambodian peace-keeping operation in 1993. The Japanese government eschewed violence at almost any cost and thus proved accommodating to terrorist blackmail in the 1970s. 196 Policy was defined by reaction to the very first hijacking of a Japan Air Lines flight, in 1970. Intent on avoiding loss oflife, the government, after days of arduous bargaining, acceded to the hijackers' demands. 197 This accommodating stance was much in evidence when Palestinian terrorists seized the Japanese ambassador in Kuwait in 1974, to effect the release of Japanese and Palestinian terrorists trapped on a ferry in Singapore harbor after a bungled attempt to set fire to an oil refinery. When a JRA team of terrorists hijacked a Japanese airplane to Dacca in 1977, Tokyo eventually acceded to the demands of the terrorists, justifYing the decision with the statement that "a single human life is weightier than the earth.'' 198 The government released six prisoners and provided a $6 million ransom as well as a supply of blank passports. 199

The Police

In these initial attacks the police completely misjudged the significance of the fact that some terrorists were Japanese. When the guerrillas, two of whom were Japanese, struck in Singapore on January 31, 1974, the Japanese government took the position that the incident concerned only the government of Singapore. Similarly, an attack on the diplomatic offices of the United States and Sweden in Kuala Lumpur in August 1975 reportedly caught Japanese officials completely by surprise. 200 By 1977-78 opposition to the government's accommodating stance had grown significantly. As early as 1974 top police officials let it be known in public that they thought the policy would only encourage further attacks. 201 In 1977 the minister of justice, Hajime Fukuda, strongly opposed the demands of the terrorists, refused to be involved in the release of jailed members of the JRA, and resigned with his deputy at the end of the crisis. 202 The international base of operation of the JRA ineluctably drew the Japanese toward a gradual internationalization of operations. Mter the 1977 Dacca hijacking the NPA and the MPD began stationing officers at major Japanese embassies to provide security and collect intelligence. In the evolution of Japan's policy of internal security, the 1978 Bonn declaration on terrorism was an important historical accident. No staff work had been done on the issue, and Prime Minister Fukuda found himself having to respond to an idea that emerged literally over lunch. The occasion demanded a show of international solidarity, a political opportunity that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs seized in order to reshape Japanese policy. 203 In accord with the Bonn resolution, a cabinet decree issued in September 1978 committed the Japanese government to stand firm in the face of terrorist blackmail. Implementation was, however, slow and tortuous. The Tokyo summit of 1986, held at a time of heightened threats from Libyan and Syrian terrorism, found the Japanese government only a hesitant supporter for the activist stance of the United States and several European countries. As host and chair, the Japanese government was forced to coordinate different national viewpoints and thus to support a policy that a narrow conception of its foreign policy interests might have rejected. 204 The 1987 Venice summit finally translated the broad principles of the Bonn declaration into concrete operational measures. 205 Difficulties of implementation were also evident on the domestic side. In September 1978 the Cabinet allocated resources to equip and train a special antiterrorist unit. 206 Staffed equally by police and SDF, the unit was to be deployed at selected diplomatic missions abroad. In fact no such unit was created. Instead, special antiterrorist squads train in each prefectural police force. These units can be deployed at short notice either singly or in combination. The police allocated the bulk of re-

CULTURAL NORMS AND NATIONAL SECURITY

sources to the formation of a small unit to protect Japan's thirty-four nuclear power plants. 207 Japan's allies welcomed the gradual shift in policy, but it received mixed reviews in Japan. Although the measures were modest, the press argued forcefully that the inviolability of innocent lives should not be equated with political weakness. In sum, after almost two decades, it remains unclear to what extent international pressures have moved the Japanese government to relinquish its nonviolent response to terrorism. The government and police have also used internationalization as an opportunity to strengthen internal security. It seems, for example, plausible to assume that in some instances the Japanese government deliberately undercut multilateral conventions it had formally supported. It may have used foreign aid to influence Syria to restrict the movement of the JRA when Emperor Hirohito was traveling abroad. The Emperor traveled in Europe in the fall of 1971 and in the United States in the fall of 1975; there is no conclusive proof, but sharp increases in Japanese aid to Syria in 1972 and 1975 were probably related. 208 Official briefings on Japanese aid policy in 1989-90 listed, as one of five reasons for continued aid to Syria, Japan's interest in having the Syrian government keep track of JRA operations carried out under the protection of the Syrian army, in Lebanon's Bekaa Valley. 209 The Japanese police have become an important source of information and technology for other police forces. The automated fingerprint identification system that it developed in the 198os, for example, made Japan an increasingly attractive partner for countries in Southeast Asia as well as in Central and Latin America! 10 Singapore has adopted the system as part of its citizen identification cards. 211 Occasionally Japan sends police officials to other countries, to offer specialized training in the use of what Japan values so much in its internal security policy: "comprehensive information and communication systems. "212 The Philippines has become an important partner in containing the activities of Japan's organized crime, the smuggling of firearms and drugs, organized trade in prostitution, and the JRA activity in Asia. Traditionally aid to foreign police was granted under the auspices of JICA in the name of "economic assistance." As part of its normal practice, JICA would "borrow" officials from other agencies and private corporations to help implement specific programs. Since 1988 the growing self-confidence of the NPA, a sharply increasing aid budget, and perhaps a diminishing public sensitivity to the overseas operation of Japanese policemen have led to change. In 1989 the NPA ran its own direct foreign aid program. 213 This international cooperation is organized by the NPA's antiterrorist division. An internal study group concluded that "anti-terrorist equipment should be deployed internationally because it

The Police

would not be effective if only Japan acted against terrorists." In line with this conclusion, Japan provides some equipment free of charge to Middle East states. 214 A symbol of this gradual internationalization was the convening, under the auspices of the NPA in June 1988, of the Ministerial Conference on Security Matters for the Asia-Pacific Region. It was the first such highlevel meeting that the NPA had organized since 1945. The meeting dealt with a broad array of law enforcement issues but focused specifically on pressing security questions of the 1988 Olympic Games in Seoul, South Korea. 215 With thirty-five Olympic teams training in Japan and 130 passing through, the Games posed great security risks! 16 Both countries activated their police cooperation in 1986, especially in immigration and surveillance. 217 For Japan the issue had acquired great urgency when it became clear in 1986-87 that the JRA was beginning to relocate back to Asia. At the time it appeared probable that the JRA, seeking to disrupt the Games, would prepare terrorist attacks either alone or in cooperation with North Korean agents. Japan encountered problems very quickly. When the time came for a final communique about strong security measures, several governments were unwilling publicly to choose between South and North Korea or to be seen backing the Japanese government against the JRA. Japan's international contacts on questions of internal security may be limited and problematic, but naturally they extend first to Asia. The same point is illustrated by the limited internationalization of Japanese practices. With funding, faculty, curriculum, case material, and participation heavily skewed toward Japan, UNAFEI has exported Japanese institutions and police practices, such as voluntary probation office-rs and Japan's system of police boxes, to some Asian states including Hong Kong, Singapore, and Malaysia!' 8 "Comprehensive security," including internal security, is a major preoccupation of ASEAN, providing a supportive environment for the operation of UNAFEI. The export of the koban system to Singapore deserves mention precisely because it has been so successful! 19 In the early 198os Singapore, struggling with sharp increases in urban crime, sent three study commissions to Japan to evaluate the koban system! 20 In February 1982 the Japanese police proposed a police box system in Singapore. Eight experimental boxes were introduced in the jurisdiction of the Toa Payoh police station. The experiment was so successful in reducing crime (reportedly by about 50 percent) that in 1984 Singapore introduced a fullscale koban system. Singapore's willingness to imitate Japan is noteworthy: for the first time since 1945 a Japanese security institution had become a model for another country. As this episode illustrates, Japan's longstanding isolation is beginning

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to break down. However, UNAFEI has not become a ready vehicle for exports to other Asian states. The reason is obvious. It was not clear whether Singapore's prime minister was interested in improving the efficiency of his police or attracted by the chance to establish "a Japanesetype surveillance system."221 Japan may be a model for containing crime at home, but the historical memory of Japanese atrocities tempers the willingness of Asian governments to emulate its police practices. Flexible adaptation to changing conditions is evident in how the Japanese police behaves in the international society of states. In the wake of the 1977 hijacking of a Japan Air Lines jet at Dacca, for example, the NPA, MOF, and MOJ began considering legislation to facilitate policy coordination with other countries. A draft bill prepared by 1980 proposed giving the police the power, enjoyed by most other forces around the world, to arrest rather than just observe suspected foreign felons sought by foreign police forces or Interpol. The measure would have strengthened the hand of the Japanese government in seeking the extradition of Japanese criminals, for example members of the JRA, who had fled abroad. 222 For a variety of reasons, including a strong hesitation to increase the formal powers of the NPA, the bill was not enacted. When the JRA issued a statement on January 7, 1989, calling for a fight against the Emperor system, however, the NPA wasted little time. It asked the General Secretariat of Interpol to stop issuing the less urgent blue international inquiry notices and instead requested the international red wanted notices as the single step preceding extradition requests.223 The Japanese government had become convinced that strict reciprocity was no longer the norm in the international coordination of antiterrorism policy. Even though Japanese law still prohibits arrests of foreign suspects listed on red notices, Japan's police started to ask other countries, with tougher domestic laws, to post red notices on fugitives from Japan, in particular members of the JRA. 224 Without changing J apanese law, the NPA has enlarged the scope of its international action. Changes in extradition and deportation practices have also enhanced police flexibility. 225 Between 1945 and 1985Japan responded to five formal and four de facto requests to extradite fugitives. In the same fortyyear span Japan made six formal and twenty-four de facto requests to other states. 226 The total of thirty-nine requests in forty years is about one a year. Although the numbers have increased significantly in recent years, 227 they remain minuscule by international standards. Like other states with a civil law tradition, Japan bases its practice on the principle of reciprocity rather than on extradition treaties. Since it has concluded only one extradition treaty, with the United States, it is free to adopt the growing state practice of deportation. About as many suspects were deported in the 198os as were extradited. Deportation hearings offer bu-

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reaucratic agencies flexibility in comparison to the complications of formal extradition. 228 In particular cases, however, the Japanese govemment will act on the basis of specific interests rather than legal modalities. In the late 198os, for example, it chose not to ask the United States to extradite or deport an alleged member of the JRA, Yu Kikumura. In a Japanese court Kikumura could have been charged only with minor violations of the passport law. In the United States the federal prosecutor in New Jersey charged Kikumura's possession of pipe bombs as nine separate crimes, resulting in a thirty-year jail sentence. 229 In the early 1990s Japan's participation in overseas operations involving either its military or its police was an extremely controversial issue in domestic politics. Mter much discussion the Diet passed legislation necessary to permit 75 civilian policemen to join the UN peace-keeping operation in Cambodia (discussed further in chapter 5). An SDF engineering battalion was stationed in one of the safest parts of the country in the South, but police officers were stationed in more dangerous locations throughout northwestem Cambodia. They were part of an intemational force of 3,6oo policemen from 32 countries, their mission to train the Cambodian police force. But with guerilla attacks increasing sharply, and against strong Japanese objections, in the spring of 1993 the UN command authorized civilian police officers to carry weapons for their self-defense. A Japanese police officer was killed and four others wounded in an ambush in May 1993, and the consequences were far-reaching. Although the specifics remain unclear, about twenty members of the Japanese contingent, either with or without permission from local UN commanders, left for Bangkok (where the injured had been flown) or Phnom Penh. Most retumed to their posts within a few days, but besides the four injured officers a further four were granted permission to leave for Japan for stress-related reasons. In the ensuing domestic debate, the Japanese govemment adamantly opposed a withdrawal of the police contingent. But after a nine-month stay, the Japanese force was the first to be withdrawn from Cambodia, in July 1993. 230 In the domain of intemal security policy Japan has only recently begun to intemationalize. In contrast to European states, Japan lacks significant instances of institutionalized and operational cooperation with the police of other states. 231 The Japanese police were initially as surprised by JRA attacks in Asia in the mid-198os as they had been in the early 1970s, when the JRA first appeared on the intemational scene. In the 198os Japanese intelligence was much stronger in Europe and the Middle East than in Indonesia or the Philippines. 232 It will take time for Japan's intemal security policy to be fully intemationalized. 95

CULTURAL NORMS AND NATIONAL SECURITY CoNCLUSION

Since it is not interested in either the internal aspects or the domestic politics of state security, realism offers no insight into the Japanese case. Liberalism does. It recognizes the importance of norms in how political actors define the interests that inform their policy choices. But the evidence does not help us decide whether liberalism's exclusive focus on "thin" regulatory norms and its neglect of "thick" constitutive norms is a minor inaccuracy or a major oversight. All of the norms that we identified as central to this case point in the same direction, toward a flexible policy. The anti-Left bias in the constitutive norm of collective identity was uncontested; social and legal norms were mutually reinforcing. Internationally Japan was passive, seeking to maximize tactical flexibility. Has the Japanese policy of internal security been effective? Statistics are of limited use in answering this question. As a percentage of the total number of arrests, security-related arrests declined from 1.60 percent in 1969, to 0.39 in 1975 and 0.17 in 1985. 233 But does this mean that the police have become more effective in coping with threats to internal security? Two answers are plausible. The police have become more effective and have arrested most of those who threaten state security. Alternatively, the Japanese police have become less effective, especially in view of the increase in terrorist and guerilla attacks after 1984. One answer may conceal divergent trends. The fight against the JRA was probably more successful than the fight against groups operating at home, in the Japanese underground. The police have great difficulty when they encounter groups that do not submit to self-policing-with serious implications for state security. One of the most serious international threats to Japanese security, the North Korean nuclear program, depends heavily on funds from Japan. About 150,000 of the million Koreans living in Japan are sympathizers of North Korea. Koreans run the highly profitable, legal pinball (pachinko) business, worth tens of billions of dollars each year. Under the auspices of Chosen Soren, a Korean organization friendly with North Korea, an estimated $o.6-r.8 billion is transferred annually to North Korea, sometimes under the watchful eye of the Japanese police. Tokyo resisted the imposition of harsh sanctions against North Korea in 1994 because it feared violent protests and perhaps acts of terrorism inside Japan. Occasional police raids, as in Kyoto in June 1994, when 300 riot policemen stormed a regional headquarters of Chosen Soren, reveal how poor police intelligence really is. 234 Similarly, the police knows very little about the militant cadres of prominent left-wing organizations such as chukaku. 235 In 1986, despite full mobilization of the police, political radicals staged an unsuccessful attack with homemade rockets on a palace residence in downtown Tog6

The Police

kyo. Fired from a distance of three kilometers, the rockets overshot the target. The police, however, had searched about so,ooo apartments and buildings within two kilometers of the conference site. The incident humiliated the police, which had arrested goo leftist activists with no clear cause, sealed off downtown Tokyo within two kilometers of the conference and lodging sites of foreign dignitaries, mobilized 3o,ooo policemen, and tried out $40 million worth of new equipment. 236 Patience is an essential part of Japan's policies of internal security. Fifteen years elapsed between the height of the anti-Narita movement and the final removal in tggo of the watchtowers that radicals had erected. The police have shown similar patience in dealing with prominent terrorists. The arrest of one of the leaders of the JRA, Osamu Maruoka, in November 1987 occurred fifteen years after the attack on TelAviv's Lod airport-first in a series of spectacularly cruel acts abroad in which Maruoka is suspected. 237 Other prominentJRA members were also arrested after many years either in Japan or while planning new attacks abroad: Yu Kikumura (in the United States, April tg88), Yasuhiro Shibata (in Japan, May tg88), and Hiroshi Sensui (in the Philippines, June tg88) .238 To Japanese ears "strategy" has unwelcome authoritarian connotations, painful reminders of the 1930s and 1940s. According to virtually all police officers, Japan's policy is not based on a sense of strategic mission; it has emerged instead in reaction to social developments. 239 The most important police-official-turned-politician, Masaharu Gotoda, argued that if "strategic thinking exists at all among former high-ranking police officials, it certainly is a mistake . . . . The police should adopt reactive tactics to achieve its purposes. Police tactics must be very different from military tactics; countermeasures are always the best option for the police."240 Patience combined with intelligent countermeasures can be a powerful weapon as long as its domestic legitimacy is not in doubt. The police, maintaining their system of social surveillance, miss few opportunities to reinforce their legitimacy and carefully cultivate a friendly image. In the mid-tggos the metal screens shielding the windows of riot police buses were removed, "to create a softer, less militaristic image"; officers were outfitted with new uniforms to give the police a "kinder, gentler look"; the NPA put a woman officer in charge of contacts with foreign police organizations seeking technical cooperation; and thirteen of Tokyo's police boxes are now staffed around the clock with officers trained to communicate in sign language. 241 The international scene has also shifted in Japan's favor. The Gulf War and the end of the Cold War have restricted the operational freedom of the JRA as the Syrian government has become increasingly pro-Western and East European governments have adopted Western policies. 242

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Japan's police response (or strategy) exhibits a discernible pattern during the last three decades, marked by flexibility, comprehensiveness, and nonviolence. A patient and long-term policy has sought to narrow the operational base and resources of the JRA, abroad and at home. The police have a similarly long-term approach to radical groups operating inside Japan. Since these groups lack new recruits and face declining support in urban areas, the police try to contain their operations rather than eliminate them altogether. 243 This policy of attrition waits for radicals to grow older. 244 Even when new and unexpected sources of terrorism arise, as they did with Aum Shinrikyo in 1995, the strategy appears to work. The Japanese police successfully practice what was only an aspiration for Latin American guerillas in the 196os: to swim like little fishes in the warm sea of the people.

CHAPTER FIVE

The Self-Defense Forces and External Security

Over the last three decades Japan's position in the intemational society of states has changed greatly. Superior economic growth and corollary measures of economic size-trade, investment, consumption of energy and raw materials, industrial production, financial assets, technological innovation-all point to an exceptionally rapid increase in power. Pessimists believe that Herman Kahn's 1970 prediction will finally prove correct: with the end of the Cold War Japan will evolve into a sup~rpower with nuclear weapons. 1 To support their worst fears they can point to Edwin Hoyt's grim description of the rise of militarism in Japan in the 1970s and 1g8os. 2 Less sensational analyses suggest that substantial change is inevitable. Jeffrey Bergner, for example, argues that 'Japan's budgetary capabilities will lead inevitably to a far larger Japanese military role. "3 Optimists believe that the foundations of an enduring Pacific Community have been laid. The U.S. Department of Defense, in its first comprehensive assessment after the end of the Cold War, suggested that the breakup of the Soviet Union had concealed a less visible victory, "the integration of Germany and Japan into a U.S.-led system of collective security and the creation of a democratic 'zone of peace. "'4 In this view Japan will continue to aspire to be the Switzerland of Asia, a competitive, noninterventionist trading state that heeds the universal interest of peace and profit. Neither vision is intellectually compelling. The case for the inevitability of a nuclear-armed, militarist Japan weighs too heavily what it considers inescapable pressures of the intemational balance of power; and it

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weighs too lightly the domestic factors shaping japanese policy. Similarly implausible is the notion that Japan will be the first state in history to wield huge economic and technological power without corresponding political influence and military might. This book's argument steers away from overly general predictions. It stresses how Japan is enlarging its national options. Institutionalized norms shape Japan's external security policy. The comprehensive character of policy is shaped by the transnational links of the SDF, by its restricted place in the Japanese state, and by its isolation from civil society on some issues and close ties with business on others. Social and legal norms define policy flexibility (on questions of economic security) and rigidity (on issues of military security).

THE STRUCTURE OF THE jAPANESE MILITARY

Japan's security institutions bias policy strongly against forceful articulation of military objectives; they favor a comprehensive definition of national security centering around its economic and political dimensions. In its purely domestic aspect, the military is subordinated to economics and politics. To this end the ministries of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), International Trade and Industry (MITI), and Finance (MOF) have penetrated the Defense Agency (JDA). State-society relations reinforce this pattern. Japan's SDF are relatively isolated from a skeptical public that is not supportive of military entanglements. Governmentbusiness relations on questions of weapons procurement and the import of raw materials are close, strengthening the economic aspects of security policy. Finally, the transnational links of Japan's state cut against the grain: they were the conduits of American pressure for an enlargement of Japan's defense efforts in the 1g8os.

Transnational Links The SDF draw their greatest political strength from outside Japan. Security arrangements with the United States have reinforced the military element in Japan's security policy. In the tg8os, Davis Bobrow reports, a leading Japanese international affairs analyst could calmly describe the Self-Defense Forces as "a piece of furniture that any modern house or nation has, a chair for the American visitor to sit on. . .. 'You must understand that we aren't serious about defense."'5 Transnational links to some extent loosen the political constraints that government and state-society relations impose on Japan's military. On questions of security several institutional links connect the two IOO

The Self-Defense Forces

countries: the Security Consultative Committee (SCC), the Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation (SDC), the Security Subcommittee (SSC), the Security Consultative Group (SCG), and the Japan-U.S. Joint Committee.6 The SCC and the Joint Committee date from the 1960 revision of the Security Treaty. Other fora were subsequently created to facilitate policy coordination across a broad range of security issues. These links offer a useful forum for official statements and replies rather than for resolving difficult issues. That job is left to informal contacts, by telephone and in face-to-face meetings at all levels of the bureaucracy, as well as to ad hoc and problem-focused bilateral consultations at the level of the administrative vice-minister or the bureau director. 7 Equally important, regular consultations create deadlines that force final decisions. 8 Transnational ties exist as well because the armed forces of the United States maintain a substantial presence in Japan. Despite the withdrawal of all American ground forces in 1957, the U.S. Air Force and Navy, as well as some Army logistical support still have about 39,000 military personnel stationed at 94 installations throughoutJapan. In the early 1990s the American base at Okinawa was home to the Third Marine Corps Division, the only amphibious force stationed in the Western Pacific. A squadron of Strategic Air Command tanker planes, whose mission is to refuel B-52 bombers stationed in Guam, was placed at Kadena Air Base in Okinawa. The U.S. Army Japan headquarters at Camp Zama and the Seventh Fleet headquarters at Yokosuka are both in the vicinity of Tokyo. The airbases at Misawa and Kadena are home to antisubmarine P-3C Orion airplanes. Since 1973 the U.S. aircraft carrier Midway and its successor, the Independence, have been granted access to Yokosuka. Two air wings of the 5th Air Force, equipped with F-15s and F-16s, were deployed to Misawa airbase in 1985, with the exception of Okinawa the first such deployment in Japan since 1971. These military bases coordinate U.S. military operations in the Pacific theater and act as staging areas for nuclear strikes. 9 Transnational links exist across different ministries and agencies. Generally, SDF coordination with the U.S. military increased greatly during the 1g8os. Although the SDF deals with the United States on narrow military issues such as training and equipment, weapon acquisition is handled by the Equipment Bureau of the JDA, in cooperation with MITI. MOFA has charge of broader questions of security policy. On the American side, the embassy handles broader political issues and leaves to the Department of Defense and U.S. Forces Japan strictly military matters and virtually all issues affecting civilian and military intelligence.'" Informal links between the two militaries are facilitated by their similar structures. For historical reasons, the three branches of Japan's IOI

CULTURAL NORMS AND NATIONAL SECURITY

SDF-Ground (GSDF), Maritime (MSDF), and Air (ASDF)-are modeled after the U.S. military. Indeed in their weapons, organization, and command structure the SDF are a "mini-size" American force. 11 In the 1950s the curricula of the three SDF staff colleges self-consciously imitated those of the American military. Today in its broad outlines the curriculum of SDF officers remains close to that of the U.S. military. 12 American military assistance has reinforced similar structures and close links. It has both promoted integration among the different branches of the SDF and linked the SDF more closely to the U.S. military. Compared to other military assistance programs, the Japanese was unique, for the SDF never lacked the human, technical, or financial resources necessary to build a modem fighting force. The burden-sharing formula built into the security relationship meant that from the very beginning U.S. military assistance was granted by its three armed services. 'This method of distribution," Edward Olsen writes, "induced the creation of a counterpart army, navy and airforce .... One can imagine the difficulties Washington would experience if Japan's armed forces were unitary in structure and not prepared to 'interface' with their U.S. counterparts. "13 SDF force structure and mission are an integral component of U.S. military strategy in the Pacific. Relations between the GSDF and the U.S. Anny are limited by the small number of army personnel stationed in Japan as well as intense public scrutiny. Still, the GSDF's primary mission is not just to defend Hokkaido against a limited invasion before a U.S. counterattack. Its adoption of a strategy of seashore defense gives it a larger role in control over the Straits of Japan, thus strengthening relations with the U.S. Navy. 14 The MSDF focuses on antisubmarine surveillance and protection of the seaways around the Japanese islands and so is part of the American naval presence in the Western Pacific. Japan's antisubmarine warfare copies that of the United States. Joint training, joint operation, and high levels of equipment interoperability between the United States and Japan point to very close relations. Moreover, the MSDF and the U.S. Navy can exercise together on the open sea, away from the watchful eyes of the Japanese public. Language is no barrier: since the early rg6os Japanese personnel have used English in their training. 15 In intensity and strategic significance, contacts between the ASDF and the U.S. Air Force fall in between. In the rg6os the ASDF kept closest relations with the U.S. military. When a Japan Air Lines passenger plane was hijacked in the early 1970s, a JAL official immediately telephoned not the ASDF but the U.S. Air Force. 16 The ASDF's air defense system copies that of the U.S., and its protection of Japan's airspace and surveillance in East Asia are auxiliary to the broader U.S. mission in Asia. I02

The Self-Defense Forces

Increasing transnational links between the three branches of the SDF and the U.S. military thus vary in strength. The links between the two navies are much stronger than those between the two airforces, which in tum are stronger than those linking the armies. 17 Growing cooperation with the U.S. armed forces also increases interservice cooperation. Seeking to prevent accidental Japanese attacks on U.S. aircraft and ships required the U.S. Navy to cooperate not only with the MSDF but also with the ASDF. American pressure thus forced a coordination between the MSDF and ASDF that had not existed before. 18 Joint international exercises have encouraged domestic exercises involving all three branches of the SDF. Once they occurred only sporadically, but since 1981 these exercises have occurred annually. 19 Transnational military links thus have had a discernible impact on the structure of the SDF. Transnational ties are reinforced by overseas training. The total number of SDF military personnel annually visiting the United States for training is about sixty. 20 Such visits are increasing because of the growing interoperability of weapon systems, which increases the need for overseas training. 21 Major SDF purchases of American equipment (the P-3C, the Airborne Warning and Control System [AWACS], the Patriot missile, the Aegis destroyer) will increase the flow of personnel across the Pacific until Japanese crews have been trained. 22 Growing defense links are illustrated by the rising number of joint operational exercises. 23 Between 1955 and the late 1970s they were restricted largely to joint exercises of the MSDF with the 7th Fleet; in addition joint exercises with the 5th Air Force took place in the early 196os when the ASDF assumed responsibilities for Japan's air defense. 24 But since 1980 Japan has participated in Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) naval exercises, which since 1971 have brought together naval forces from the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. In these multilateral exercises Japan communicates with other navies, but its participation is limited to joint training with the U.S. Navy. 25 Although it is minor, GSDF participation in joint operational exercises has also increased.26 The ASDF started a training program with the U.S. Air Force in November 1978, on the same day the SCC approved the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation. Data on joint exercises illustrate growing transnational links between Japan and the United States. In 1977 there were three exercises; in 1989, 24. Japan's state is not self-contained, and it has transnational links that are essential to its security policy. The U.S.-Japan relation is of cardinal importance in economic, political, and military terms. Yet the institutions of this relation are relatively weak, especially in comparison with the Atlantic Alliance (which is organized around an integrated command) .27 This absence of institutionalization is countered by a wide IOJ

CULTURAL NORMS AND NATIONAL SECURITY

range of informal, transnational ties as well as the depth of Japan's perceived vulnerabilities. High-level meetings between the U.S. president and the Japanese prime minister are an extremely important feature in the bilateral relations of the two countries. 28 Alliance management is not so much a matter of institutions as of informal coordination, which seeks to harmonize strong domestic political pressures within an evolving diplomatic relationship. These transnational links have pushed issues of military security higher up Japan's political agenda than domestic politics would have made likely. Political Organization of the Military

The JDA consists of the three military services (Ground, Maritime, and Air) as well as other offices. 29 The Joint Staff Council has one chairman, serving full-time, as well as the chiefs of staff of the three services, operating under civilian rule. Several ministries intervene in JDA affairs. They can do so easily because the JDA fills a significant number of its senior positions with officials temporarily assigned from other ministries. MOFA is a central actor for issues of security. Forged during the Occupation, MOFA has always had close relations with the U.S. government, and its main mission is to maintain a stable relationship with the United States. 30 On questions of military security MOFA has not had serious competition. The Defense Agency has remained subordinate, both politically and bureaucratically. Junior officials with "some background or strong interest" in security are assigned to MOFA's Security Division, which coordinates closely with the JDA. 31 According to MOFA, it is responsible for Japan's overall security policy; the JDA has the limited mission of defending Japan against physical attacks. Until recently the political management of military issues depended on the ministry's organization. MOFA has two types of bureaus, functional and geographic. Bureaus live by the rule of mutual noninterference. The ministry is thus characterized by what Haruhiro Fukui calls "subsystem dominance" and "ad hoc decision-making groups formed along bureau-division lines." 32 The implications for Japan's military security policy are significant. Until the early 1ggos MOFA's central unit for security policy, the Security Division, was part of the North American Affairs Bureau, a geographic bureau. Geographic bureaus are supposed to create and maintain good relations with "their" countries, and the North American Affairs Bureau was no exception. Its First and Second North America divisions were in charge of, respectively, the political and economic aspects of U.S.-Japan relations. The key MOFA unit on security policy was thus located in an organization that had considerable autonomy and accorded great importance to good relations with the I04

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United States. The dominance of the U.S.-Japan relationship thus was deeply embedded in the ministry's organization. Reorganization of MOFA may strengthen its ability to coordinate policy across issues, but it is unlikely to afford more autonomy to those inside the ministry who formulate military security policy." In Japan, writes Chalmers Johnson, the ministry "charged with trade administration occupies a position somewhat analogous to a ministry of defense in other nations."'4 MITI's organization differs markedly from that of MOFA. Rather than MOFA's bureau autonomy and the norm of noninterference, MITI has observed ministrywide, collegial decisionmaking.35 MITI is involved in military security issues in various ways. Foreign trade with implications for military security is under its jurisdiction. Operational control over the defense industry rests with its Aircraft and Ordnance Division. The director of JDA's Equipment Bureau invariably served earlier as director of Aircraft and Ordnance. 36 JDA procurement plans are submitted to MITI and MOF for review, and their approval is required for formalization (MITI's views are already reflected in JDA's draft plan) .'7 MITI also deals with the sensitive issue of increasing the flow of militarily relevant technology between Japan and the United States. 38 The late 1g8os witnessed MITI's growing involvement in security policy. In response to Toshiba's controversial sale of submarine technology to the Soviet Union, MITI substantially enlarged its Export Control Division. Its staff more than doubled, to about one hundred. This division reviews about one million applications each year. 39 In short, changes in both technology and politics are driving MITI toward a more active role in security policy. The finance Ministry is the third major ministry involved in security. Its dedication to the principle of fiscal prudence, its authority to prepare the budget, and its prestige have made it a brake on the unrestrained growth of the SDF and the defense industries. The MOF resisted a stronger Police Reserve under the Occupation; it blocked MITI's plans in the 1950s to build the defense sector as an export industry; and it restrained increases in the defense budget during the 1g8os-pressures from MOFA, JDA, LDP hawks, big business, and the U.S. government to the contrary notwithstanding. Indeed, Hideo Otake argues that the ministry has had the greatest civilian control over the SDF. 40 Three factors have shaped the MOF's thinking on defense. It feared that a military-industrial complex, once formed, might be impossible to dismantle. It suspected that the spending necessary to maintain such a complex might constrain the ministry's discretion in fiscal policy. Finally, the ministry's officials remembered all too well the pressures of the prewar military for large rpilitary spending. 41 IOJ

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In the ministry's view, John Endicott writes, the "balanced defense concept ... mainly says that any expenditures toward defense should be kept to an absolute minimum because defense does not contribute to capital accumulation for the Japanese nation." 42 An increase in defense expenditures must be justified by positive impact on the domestic economy.43 But the ministry's influence over national defense is not unlimited. It extends only to issues that involve substantial outlays of government funds. The ministry has been largely excluded from other questions of military significance, such as joint operational planning with the United States. 44 Policy is formulated and implemented largely by these three ministries as well as the JDA. On questions of economic security MITI, MOF, and MOFA are the core for Japanese policy. On questions of military security the central bureaucratic organizations are MOF, MOFA, and the JDA. Because of the prominence of legal issues in postwar defense, the Cabinet Legislation Bureau, an elite unit that oversees all legal aspects of government policy, has also played an important role. Specifically, the bureau has been primarily responsible for the government's evolving interpretation of Article 9 of the Constitution. 45 At times policy for military security and for economic security intersect. In the early 198os, for example, it was a matter of contention whether the United States should be exempted from Japan's ban on exporting arms and military technologies. MOFA and the JDA wanted to grant such an exception. They suggested that basing military exports on the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement of 1954 would sidestep problems with other countries. Unlike the United States, these countries did not have a defensive alliance with Japan. Focusing on possible repercussions in the Middle East, MITI opposed the change!6 More typical, however, is the separation of forces that shape economic and military security issues. Separation rests on the premise that military force to ensure economic security is not a viable political option. Informal interministerial coordination takes place routinely on the various issues of security policy, but distinctive institutional arrangements ensure that political and economic perspectives retain paramount importance in security policymaking!7 On some occasions prime ministers have been able to lead, even overriding important ministries. What has been institutionalized, however, are arenas of interministerial coordination such as the offices in the Cabinet Secretariat, which constrict prime ministerial leadership. The offices shape, albeit weakly, the policy process for security affairs without forcing it in a military direction. The JDA lacks institutional autonomy. Important ministries place their officials inside the agency, colonizing defense policymaking at its core. Officials sent on temporary assignment from other ministries constitute a significant part of the agency's personnel. 48 Of the JDA's eleven top

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bureaucratic posts, four are reserved for officials from other ministries. The NPA and the MOF have played an especially important role inside the JDA. They have placed officials frequently in the top posts: administrative vice-minister, chief of the secretariat, and bureau chief. Between the 1950s and the 1970s, nine of the twelve administrative viceministers of the JDA came from the NPA. Five first entered the JDA at the bureau chief level and went on to become the agency's top bureaucratic official. In the tg8os the balance of power shifted, and four of six administrative vice-ministers came from the MOF.'9 Lower echelons of the JDA exhibit the same pattern of outside penetration. Among 25 division chiefs, for example, at least four are always recruited from outside. Additional positions are staffed by officials from other ministries serving in the JDA for the first time in their careers. 50 Outside appointments are also made for some of the remaining 21 divisions. In its top- and middle-level appointments the JDA is deeply penetrated by officials from economic or political ministries. The flow of personnel between the JDA and the major ministries remains asymmetrical. JDA officials are usually dispatched to other ministries for educational purposes, that is, to experience nonmilitary areas and to broaden their horizons. They are expected neither to participate in important decisions nor to use their military expertise in their host ministries. 51 Inside the JDA uniformed SDF officers are clearly subordinate to civilians. The administrative hierarchy for military operations is under the control of the civilian administration, which in tum answers to the director of the JDA-consistently an elected official. 52 No SDF officer has ever been appointed at the division chief level or higher. 53 Japan's postwar elite endorses this arrangement wholeheartedly, for it retains a profound distrust of the professional military. 54 JDA directors have not counteracted the widespread bias against the military objectives. In the absence of effective parliamentary oversight, the civilian staff of the JDA exercises over the professional military what is sometimes termed "civilian control." Military professionals have chafed under this system but have not been able to undermine it. 55 The uniformed officers possess military expertise, however, and the principle of consensual decisionmaking suggests that it would be a mistake altogether to discount military influence in policymaking. 56 The SDF has not been disappointed in weapons procurement policies. 57 Moreover, uniformed officers can influence the policy process on security issues through their links with the U.S. military. Inherent in the JDA is a strong bias against a military interpretation of national security. The civilian bureaucracy of the JDA is closely linked to the prominence of a political and economic definition of security. This bias has been reinforced by a variety of deeply entrenched interminI07

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isterial arrangements. Japan's defense build-up in the 1g8os did not weaken broader political arrangements, either within the JDA or within the government.

Civil-Military Relations This conclusion is reinforced by the system of civil-military relations linking state and society.58 The SDF exists in relative isolation from the public, which by and large eschews military issues. Military interests are weakly represented inside the LDP, reflecting this characteristic feature of Japanese politics. Close relations between government and business, furthermore, accentuate the economic dimensions of security, both in weapons procurement and on the supply of raw materials. The military is remarkably insulated from the Japanese public. Unlike the police, in the eyes of the public the SDF lacks a convincing political rationale. The military is typically greeted with public indifference or thinly veiled hostility. The SDF energetically woos the public: its public information division employs about 50 in Tokyo and a total of 950 throughout Japan. 59 Public relation gimmicks, such as the opening of the Fuji GSDF base to tourists-a trip to the five lakes of Mount Fuji is part of the base tour-attract only 1,200 visitors a year. 60 Japan's powerful media no longer view the JDA and SDF with outright suspicion. Yet relations are far from comfortable. The oppositional role of important newspapers on defense policy is unquestioned, and Japanese dailies take a deep interest in national security.61 By most accounts, according to Richard Sneider, the major papers traditionally view themselves as the "surrogate of public opinion and more important than the Diet opposition parties in resisting any government tendencies to expand significantly the defense forces and budget. . . . "62 Although the major newspapers disagree more on defense than on many other issues, the press constrains the government to slow change in defense policy, whatever Japan's international situation. 63 Social support for the SDF rests on a small number of national veterans' associations and on more than a thousand local groups that have sprung up around SDF bases. Some are normal support groups: SDF veterans, parents of SDF members, groups seeking access to base facilities for sports events, groups wanting to promote the marriages of eligible daughters. Others are typically organized by local political elites and vie for the public funds that the JDA disburses to compensate for noise and other harmful side-effects of SDF operations. The Defense Facilities Administration Agency of the JDA spends about 5 percent of Japan's total defense budget on mandatory and discretionary compensation. 64 The whole system is a gigantic exercise in distriburoB

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tive politics through which the JDA generates some small, well-organized public support. SDF bases form a local welfare state that generates its own distinctive politics. 65 The peculiarity of the SDF's social base and the strength of Japan's economy explain why the SDF has great difficulties in filling its recruitment goals; the annual shortfall is 3o,ooo-4o,ooo men and is likely to grow as the Japanese population ages. If the economy generates adequate numbers of jobs, enlistment rates will decline sharply in the coming years. Furthermore, many recruits, especially in the GSDF, do not fit into the high-technology fighting force that the SDF is trying to promote.66 In 1989 the National Defense Academy could fill only 438 of its 500 spaces. The drop-out rate after the first year was 10 percent, and about one-third of graduates chose not to take military commissions. 67 Military pay and working conditions are often not competitive with those in the private sector. However, the effort to recruit women is just beginning, and the academy accepted women students for the first time in 1992.68 The insulation of the Japanese military was also evident in the "policy tribes" (zoku) of the LDP. Before the LDP lost power in 1993 these tribes were an important link between state and society in Japanese politics. LDP Diet members acquired expertise in particular policy areas, and they organized themselves in tribes specializing in particular areas of public policy. According to Kiyomasa Habara, members of the "defense tribe" fell into three subgroups: (l) those who developed an interest in defense while serving in the JDA as director or parliamentary vice-minister, (2) former civilian or uniformed officials in the JDA, and (3) those representing electoral districts that host military bases. 69 The defense tribe did not include any LDP leader. 70 The tribe"s relations with the defense industry were complicated. LDP Diet members were interested in the industry as a source of financial contributions. However, a series of scandals related to procurement and the low number of major new procurement programs lessened links with industry, and the defense tribe lacked the political support of organized social groups. 71 Party politicians were seldom interested in weapons procurement: "Few Dietmen, if any," Hideo Otake writes, "have an electoral district with a large armament industry." 72 Because of their pacifist stand, labor unions, with a few notable exceptions, refrained from pressuring the JDA on matters of procurement. 73 The defense zoku was not deeply involved in distributional politics and so may weather the realignment of Japan's party system somewhat better than will other tribes. 74 The defense economy is built around close links between business and government-links that reflect a far-reaching subordination of military to political and economic requirements. Where the civilian economy is

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complementary with the defense economy, as in Japan's advances in high technology, no structural barriers impede relations. 75 Japan's industry is geared to commercial products, and its major corporations eschew dependence on military production. Thinking in American rather than Japanese terms, Daniel Okimoto concludes that "if ever a major industrial state defied categorization as a military-industrial complex, it would have to be post-war Japan." 76 Most Japanese weapon producers do not depend heavily on military sales. With a few notable exceptions, dependence on weapons contracts is typically lower at bigger companies. 77 Yet the defense economy, understood not as a set of defense contractors producing for a government market but as a set of technological options pursued as a matter of conscious policy, has been a driving force in Japan's push toward new technologies. Its military significance is easily overlooked. Since 1945Japan has consistently chosen economic competitiveness over military prowess, seeking technological autonomy without risking its security arrangements with the United States. 78 Japan's defense economy should be evaluated not in terms of size but in terms of the technological options that civilian advances are creating. The aircraft industry is a case in point, as Richard Samuels, Michael Chinworth, and Michael Green have shown in detail. 79 In 1988 about one-third of the JDA procurement budget was spent on aircraft. The aerospace industry depends oveiWhelmingly on sales to the SDF, but it embodies the advances, especially at the level of components, that have made Japan a leading technological power at the end of the twentieth century. Aerospace differs from traditional industries such as shipbuilding, which look to the military to bolster sagging sales, especially in times of economic slowdown. The interconnectedness of business and government is key to a Japanese civilian-industrial complex. Even though they may not be significant weapon producers, writes Malcolm Mcintosh, virtually "all major manufacturing companies are involved in defence manufacturing."80 In the past, Japan licensed military technologies from the United States, and technological innovations were put to commercial use as quickly as possible. In the future the reverse process, from civilian to military technologies, may be accomplished with similar ease. According to recent sources, in some Japanese weapon plants defense and civilian production already run side-by-side, thereby accelerating the mutual diffusion of defense and civilian technologies. 81 While maintaining low barriers between civilian and military technologies, Japan has chosen limited domestic production under license rather than direct foreign purchase or self-sufficiency. 82 It leads the world in licensed production of major conventional weapon systems, and virtually all licenses originate in the United States. 83 Business and MITI thus view IIO

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the defense industry primarily in economic not military terms. The major corporations approach defense in terms of future growth and technological innovation, whereas MITI officials value it as an instrument for industrial policy. This convergence of perspectives has led some observers, such as Steven Vogel, to talk of an "emerging Japanese militaryindustrial complex. "84 The military element of this complex is not an objective but an instrument. Various institutions link business and government on issues affecting Japan's defense economy. The Japan Ordnance Association (JOA) was closely aligned with the GSDF and the JDA. The JOA was renamed, reorganized, and incorporated in September 1g88, becoming the Japan Defense Industry Association (JDIA). It continues to maintain close links to the GSDF. 85 MITI and the JDA both sponsored reorganization, believing that the old organization was too much a club of retired officers and too little a lobby for defense producers with an explicit role in policy. 86 Organizational channels at the peak level center on the Defense Production Committee (DPC) of the Federation of Economic Organizations (Keidanren) .87 The DPC is a voice for Japan's defense corporations. It advocates a long-term approach to the problems of the defense industry; it favors holding open production lines for major weapon systems produced domestically; and it speaks for the indigenous development of basic technologies, to be diffused to both the military and the civilian economy. 88 Finally, organizational links between business and government are reinforced by informal ties. Mter retirement, SDF officers, whose mandatory retirement ages ranged between 53 and 6o in the early 1ggos,89 and JDA officials often join the armaments industry, adding to its political clout. This pervasive practice (amakudari, the "descent from heaven") is accepted as perfectly normal. 90 As corporate interest in defense sales increased in the 1g8os, Steven Vogel writes, "military officers ... represent the most influential defense lobby of all. A defense contractor, it is said, should have at least one military 'old boy' for every 20 billion yen in annual defense sales.'"' 1 The structure of the defense economy stresses economic considerations and shows that the defense economy can help improve civilian competitiveness. Japan has neither a military-industrial complex nor a totally civilian corporate culture. The preeminence of its high-technology industries has made firms in the civilian sector directly relevant to the evolution of Japan's defense industry. Conversely, high-tech civilian firms are increasingly interested in new developments in weapons technology-potential competitors may develop commercial products through advances in defense technology. The Japanese government meanwhile wants to eliminate any vestige of Japan's technological backIII

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wardness. Although their motives differ, business and government thus cooperate closely. Japan's vulnerable position in a volatile world has left a deep imprint on the relationship between business and government regarding the import of raw materials. Over the last two decades the bureaucracy has to some extent relaxed its guidance over large exporters, but its relationship with importers of strategic raw materials such as oil remains very close. 92 As Richard Samuels and Shoko Tanaka have shown in their studies of energy policy, this relationship is not characterized by the political dictates of bureaucrats or the economic laws of market forces. Instead, it reflects the negotiated outcomes of the relationship between business and government. In the words of Richard Samuels, "state policy never served to transform the market ... it consistently served to ratify it. "93 As MITI has often only weak statutory authority, most of its policy measures are voluntary and depend on government incentives, financial and otherwise, to coax business along the path of reduced economic vulnerability. Administrative guidance was for Japan's energy corporations less important than the informal consultations that, according to Frank Upham, provided an opportunity to formulate policy that "was both within the limits set by MITI and consistent with industry consensus.''94 MITI's assorted powers, both formal and informal, over the licensing of technology, allocation of raw materials, and supervision of commercial operations established the basis for a close relationship between government and business. 95 Important court rulings also helped alter relations in the petroleum industry. On questions of energy policy, Japan has behaved, in Merrie Klapp's apt term, like a "sovereign entrepreneur" to enhance its economic security. 96 Civil-military relations, like the political organization of the military, thus create incentives favoring a comprehensive definition of security-a definition that the transnational links of the SDF to the U.S. military have been unable to dislodge.

THE NORMATIVE CONTEXT

On questions of national security Japanese norms of collective identity are split. Uncontested norms of economic security have favored policy flexibility; deeply contested norms of military security have encouraged policy rigidity. Because of strong political resistance to constitutional revision, the tension between social and legal norms has created a politics of constitutional interpretation. The government has tried to influence the evolution of social norms; the opposition has focused on existing legal norms. Their political bargaining began in the 1950s and defined I I2

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the political battle lines. The buildup of military strength and the government's shifting interpretations of the Constitution suggested to many a gradual move toward remilitarization. Despite the LDP's comfortable majority in the Diet, John Emmerson writes, on military issues "the voice of public opinion being louder in Japan than in most democracies, the Japanese leadership was never insensitive to the effect on the public of its decisions and actions. ''9 7 Specifically, the progressive camp went to court numerous times to challenge the government's interpretation of Article g, invoking a powerful procedural norm: Japan is a nonmajoritarian community. It thus raised the political costs for those seeking to make Japan a "normal" power with larger defense capability. On questions of national security Japan's social and legal norms are thus uncontested on economic security, deeply contested on military security. 98 Uncontested Norms of Economic Security

For over a century what James White calls Japan's "uniquely economic definition of security" has galvanized the Japanese people to collective action. 99 Its purpose was to "catch up and surpass the West" (oitsuki, oikose). Military industries were the spearhead of industrialization after the Meiji Restoration. Eventually the quest for economic security led a militarist regime to imperialism and war. Since 1945, however, the ideology of economic security has focused on the development of technology as the most plausible way to reduce Japan's dependence on imported raw materials and as a potent force to gain market share for commercial products. 100 The absence of debate about reducing economic vulnerability is not surprising. Mter the failure of military expansion Japanese policymakers welcomed the free trade of the Pax Americana as the only way to reduce their vulnerability. As Susan Pharr writes, Japan's foreign policy choices emerged from a shared conviction "among successive generations of policymakers faced by pressures inside and outside Japan who shared a perception that the world was a dangerous place. "101 Japan's dependence on foreign sources of raw materials is extreme. Since 85 percent of the land is not suitable for farming, Japan is not selfsupporting in food. Highly dependent on imports of wheat, soy beans, maize, and sorghum, Japan has the lowest level of food self-sufficiency in the industrial world. 102 Japan has few domestic sources of minerals, and in the case of bauxite, nickel ore, and uranium it is almost completely dependent on foreign supplies. Japan imports go percent of its iron ore, So percent of copper, and about so percent of its lead and zinc. It relies almost totally on imported petroleum, natural gas, and fossil fuels and has only limited capacities to tap domestic coal, geothermal, and hydroII]

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power. Japan currently imports about So percent of its total energy requirements. Statistics show that Japan is more dependent on imports of a broad array of raw materials, including crude petroleum, than any other major industrial state. Moreover, that dependence, because of high rates of economic growth, has increased greatly since 1g6o. 103 Perceptions of vulnerability dominate strategic planning documents. "In this view," writes Richard Samuels, "economics is national security for the Japanese .... It is only a slight exaggeration to say that the Japanese will accept higher factor costs for essentially the same reason that the United States will overpay for its defense systems. It makes each feel more secure." 104 The idea of Japan as a small island nation, easily held hostage in a hostile international environment, retains a powerful hold over Japanese thinking. This is not to deny what Samuels calls "the construction" of Japan's international resource dependency by interested groups. 105 Japanese elites do, at times, mobilize the idea to achieve specific objectives, appealing to the need to counter international vulnerability through collective effort, hard work, and willingness to pay higher prices. The consequence is an overarching concern with economic security, domestically institutionalized, which defies the expectations of conventional economic analysis. 106 Military aspects of national security are often debated in the language of economics rather than of military strategy. In the words of one Diet member, 'We could talk for hours about the level of spending and whether it should be higher or lower. Everyone would be willing to participate in the debate on those terms. But no other issues would ever be allowed to enter into the debate." 107 Others make the same point by referring to debate about appropriate levels of defense spending as "the strategy of econometrics." 108 Indeed, the government never offered a military rationale for its self-imposed spending limits. Reliance on an economic vocabulary for the discussion of national security has affected negotiations with the United States. Until the mid-1g7os the defense dialogue-including U.S. criticism andJapanese rejoinders-pivoted on "fiscal, economic, and statistical arguments, not on issues of military strategy, threat perceptions, or specific military missions." This preoccupation with the economics of security relations, Daniel Okimoto writes, was a "curious and striking feature of the U.S.-Japanese defense dialogue. "109 Political attention focused on marginal budget increases, just below or just above 1 percent of GNP, and so the government's effort to broaden and deepen its defense relationship with the United States was made easier. Even the United States has relied on economic language to express some basic positions. Talking about national security only in miliII4

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tary terms is not legitimate for the Japanese mainstream. The language of Japanese security policy is typically nonmilitary." 0 In the official language of the JDA, tanks are called "special vehicles," destroyers "escort ships," artillery "special department," and so forth.lll The aversion to military terminology is widely shared, and "economic security" first found its way into public discourse. "Military security" became an accepted term only in the late 1970s, and even then the preferred term was "comprehensive security." 112 In the 1g8os politics and economics were no longer "separate," and Japan was moving into the Western camp rather than following an "omnidirectional" foreign policy. At the same time, useful for those who wanted to keep defense spending under control, the concept of comprehensive security was a shield against growing American pressure to increase military spending. 113 The concept was congenial to politicians wary of confronting issues viewed with suspicion by Japanese voters. 114 In short, the doctrine of comprehensive security was the mechanism by which Japan redefined its posture in the international system. It revolves around the social stability and national autonomy that derive from a productive and technologically dynamic national economy. Contested Norms of Military Security

Many analysts credit public opinion with a substantial impact on security policy. In the 1950s and 1g6os this impact resulted from the combined weight of the parties in the Diet whose adamant opposition to Japan's militarist past enjoyed broad popular support; the vehement criticism that most of the mass media reserved for attempts to enhance the status of the military and to develop a more active defense policy; and the possibility of popular demonstrations. Some of the conservatives who held power in the 1950s, in particular Prime Minister Kishi, advanced their political agenda by advocating constitutional reform, a renegotiation of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, and, in a broader sense, a partial return to the substance of prewar politics. The 1970s and 1g8os have seen a reverse. The government has sought to mold the gradual change in a public opinion that grudgingly accepted the existence of the SDF and the need for a modest national defense. Without relinquishing its efforts to counter government policy, the opposition relied on litigation to contest the normative context in which Japan's national security policy is formulated. It did so even when legal action did not promise a reversal in policy. Litigation was itself a potent signal to the public that government policy lacked full legitimacy. Memory of the war and the military dimensions of security policy continue to divide the Japanese polity, but the procedural norm of Japan as 115

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a nonmajoritarian political community does not. Opponents of remilitarization thus have a potent weapon.

Social Norms. The preoccupation of the political elite with public opinion has resulted in innumerable opinion polls. On defense issues the results have been unambiguous. At the end of the I98os Davis Bobrow took stock of the voluminous literature on Japanese public opinion concerning international affairs. 115 Public attitudes, he concluded, favor a passive over an active stance, alignment with the United States over equidistance between the United States and the Soviet Union or its successor, political dependence over autonomy, and minimal over extensive military spending. Generational effects have been relatively small. Throughout the I98os the overwhelming majority was skeptical about dramatic departures from the status quo. 116 The public favored economic strength, peaceful diplomacy, and a low-key consensus approach; it did not feel seriously threatened by the Soviet Union or Russia; it did not think highly of the SDF; and it supported Article 9 of the Constitution. The military is viewed as marginal, and the public shows a marked lack of willingness to resort to armed defense: "Fewer than one in five respondents would resort to force to resist invasion."117 The public has opposed all attempts to shift power to the military, and the end of the Cold War did not lead to great changes in this opinion profile. Japan's antimilitarist social norms have been remarkably stable. Foreign opinion, especially in Asia, is also relevant for Japanese social norms. Political elites in neighboring states sometimes look atJapan with admiration, but suspicion and criticism flare up at regular intervals. The extension of Japan's naval defense perimeter to I ,ooo miles in the early I98os elicited only muted criticism. By contrast Japan's textbook controversy of July I982, which implied historical revisionism, led to outcry, for it suggested a government unrepentant about military aggression and atrocities in the I 940s. 118 Strong reactions to anything that smacks of Japanese militarism act as a social restraint on national security policy. Several episodes in the Ig8os and I990s illustrate the point: the protest over the prime minister's official visit to the Yasukuni Shrine (September/October I985), which encroached on strict separation of church and state; the dismissal of Education Minister Masayuki Fujio after remarks aboutJapan's annexation of Korea in I9IO (September I986); concern over the decision of the Nakasone government to remove the I percent ceiling (January I987); the protest by the Chinese government over a court decision on the ownership of a student dormitory in Kyoto claimed by Taiwan (February/May I987); the resignation of Vice Minister Kensuke Yanagiya after his undiplomatic remarks about Deng Xiaoping (June I987); the

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dismissal of Minister Seiryo Okuno after outspoken comments about prewar Japanese policy toward China (May 1988); the uproar when Justice Minister Seiroku Kajiyama compared the effects of foreign prostitutes on Tokyo to those of Mrican-Americans on American society (October 1990); and the resignation of Justice Minister Shigeto Nagano after he called the Japanese massacre in Nanking a "fabrication" (May 1994). 119 While mass publics in many Asian countries express growing trust, according to opinion surveys, they also favor Japan's continuing to play an economic not a military role in the region. 120 This evolution in social norms is not a spontaneous social process reacting to events in world politics. Both the SDF and the government target public opinion. The social consensus informing Japan's defense policy, for example, was the result of deliberate efforts by Prime Minister Sato (1964-72) and director-generals of the JDA such as Yasuhiro Nakasone (1970-71), Michita Sakata (1974-76), and Shin Kanemaru ( 1977-78). These men did not plot a revival of Japanese militarism, but they made deliberate attempts to shape domestic consensus. More clearly than any prime minister before or after, Yasuhiro Nakasone used his office in the 198os to reshape the public climate. He sought to influence normative conceptions of the state held by party officials, bureaucratic leaders, and the mass public. Nakasone aimed to break with Japan's role as a subordinate state and to build a greater selfconfidence-a Japan that acted as an equal with the United States as well as other nations. On the eve of assuming his post Nakasone said: "The first necessity is change in our thinking. Having caught up, we must now expect others to try to catch up with us. We must seek a new path for ourselves and open it up ourselves. "121 The prime minister was intent on breaking the military taboo embodied in k-ticle 9 of the Peace Constitution. As a young member of the Diet, he had sent a 7 ,ooo-word petition to General MacArthur asking for constitutional revision and an independent military. MacArthur is said to have glanced at the petition and thrown it in the wastebasket. 122 When he became head of the JDA in 1970, Nakasone sought to develop a more autonomous defense posture. 123 His entire career had prepared Prime Minister Nakasone to push for a new national consensus on defense.124 Yet for all his political boldness, the prime minister faced severe restraints. In his pronouncements Nakasone normally relied on the established political discourse: "Peace Constitution," "pose no threat to other countries," "the three nonnuclear principles," "exclusively defensive defense," and "never become a great military power." As Atsushi Odawara has pointed out, "these all express the brakes on military expansion. Nakasone is known both abroad and at home as a prime minister who

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has been enthusiastic about expanding defensive capabilities. Yet when speaking in public, even he cannot but do so within the framework of the Peace Constitution." 125 Despite his rhetorical caution Nakasone's political initiatives on defense were punished by the electorate. In December 1983 the LDP suffered one of its worst electoral setbacks since 1955. Many observers attributed that outcome to Nakasone's hawkishness. The prime minister changed his stance, and in the July 1986 elections, the LDP recouped its losses and won one of its greatest victories. Legal Norms. Japan's "linkage between internal constitutionalism and foreign policy," writes Lawrence Beer, "is admittedly unique among the world's democracies." 126 It is also unique that opposition to rearmament challenges the constitutionality of Japan's armed forces. The courts have given indirect support to the government's defense policy. Politically, what matters is not just the results of litigation. The fact that legal disputes remain unresolved sends a signal that the normative basis of security policy is still contested. In short, legal and social norms interact to help define Japan's military security policy. The Constitution renounces war as an instrument of policy. The famous Article 9 has imposed severe restraints on the conduct of security. policy. Its wording resembles closely the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, which renounced war as an instrument of statecraft: 127 Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling intemational disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.

Article 9 outlaws war and denies the state the right to belligerency. As Chalmers Johnson notes, "Most Japanese equate Article 9 of the Constitution with democracy itself; to alter one is to alter the other. "128 Attempts to revise the Constitution have failed repeatedly. In 1957 Prime Minister Kishi set up the Investigation Committee for the Constitution, but a report finally issued in 1967 failed to settle the controversial issue of constitutional revision. 129 Until the late 198os support for a possible revision to legalize full-scale rearmament gradually decreased. Between the early 196os and the late 198os, opponents of constitutional revision outnumbered supporters in most opinion polls, and by growing margins. 130 Progressives read Article 9 strictly and use the courts to challenge the evolution in government interpretation. The Supreme Court was thus

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The Self-Defense Forces

drawn into a political battle that went beyond the constitutionality of the SDF. In the eyes of the opposition, at stake was the principle of judicial review and the willingness of the Supreme Court to preserve the Constitution against a conservative govemment. Over the years critics have filed legal cases to challenge the constitutionality of the govemment's defense policy. 131 Opponents of the SDF did not succeed with this strategy, but they persisted. As John Haley argues, "so long as the issue continues to be litigated in well-publicized cases, a political consensus against the Self-Defense Forces may be forged or at least one favoring their legitimacy remains in doubt. "132 The legal basis for military action by the SDF remains tenuous. A state of emergency, for example, does not appear in any plans for full-scale mobilization. Even in times of crisis the SDF would have no legal base for unrestricted movement in Japan. As Edward Olsen says: "In theory, troops must get permission from property owners before they cross their property to fend off an invader. . . . Any defender who kills an invader under circumstances that are not clearly life-threatening could conceivably be charged with murder." 133 Who can sound alarms in the event of an air attack? Who should supervise civil defense measures? Such issues are not addressed by the existing SDF law. 134 Nor is it clear what could be done legally in a military emergency. The SDF lacks the right to courtmartial its members in times of war. 135 Defense officials have not been worried by this legal vacuum. Asked in the late 1970s by reporters what Japanese troops should do in an emergency, Defense Vice Minister Maruyama answered apocryphally, "Flee." 136 However, according to Thomas Berger, "in case the threat of hostilities emerged, JDA experts have little doubt that such laws could be speedily pushed through the Diet. "137 Constitutional politics continues in Japan in the absence of constitutional revision. Specific practices have evolved that give some of the legal restrictions imposed on the SDF a quasi-constitutional status. In the words of Ambassador Hisahiko Okazaki, "the govemment is obliged by opposition parties to express its opinion to the Diet that the particular weapon or activity involved would not be a violation of the Constitution. The arguments advanced by the govemment in such debates, and repeated in many sessions over a long period of time, with the passing of time tend to become highly salient political criteria that must be satisfied. "138 Several long-standing policies that restrain the growth of Japan's military result not from law but from "semiconstitutional" political understandings. A series of taboos curtail the growth of the military. Berger concludes that "in a sense these taboos can be viewed as a sort of tacit social contract between the conservative govemment and a broader spectrum of society that exchanges toleration of the armed forces for

CULTURAL NORMS AND NATIONAL SECURITY

promises to contain their growth and activities. "139 At bottom, the political tug of war over the normative context of Japan's security policy centers on the threat that extreme nationalism might pose to constitutional democracy. What is at stake is not the Constitution but the incremental steps that reinterpret it and thus alter the norms that shape security policy. "In Japan," Lawrence Beer writes, "people notice these little incidents, these little events that take place to which there is protest because of their symbolism ... the whole web of events and incidents and policies is quite important. It is a long, connected, and continuing postwar sequence that concerns them. "140 Originally Japan was prohibited from having a fighting force. Over time this interpretation shifted. The Police Reserve created in 1950 to defend internal security, after U.S. troops had moved to Korea, was justified by the government because it was not a fighting force. After 1954, building on the opening clause of the second paragraph of Article g, which might be interpreted as permitting the military deployment for defensive purposes, the government argued that the SDF "did not constitute the kind of war potential forbidden by Article g. "141 War and the threat of force were renounced as instruments for settling international conflicts-but not as means of self-defense. An alternative view held that since Japan did not renounce the right of self-defense, it could not renounce the appropriate military means. 142 Characteristic of Japanese politics in the 1950s and 1g6os was a deeply ingrained pacifism. In the 1970s and 1g8os, that pacificism weakened substantially, as seen in the erosion of the JSP's strength in the early 1ggos, both in the polls and in the Diet. The Constitution has been reinterpreted, in line with an evolving public consensus, to maintain the government's political legitimacy. For four decades the overwhelming majority of the Japanese public has accepted the SDF while at the same time refusing to amend Article g. 143 This reinterpretation is grounded in the tension between changing political circumstances and public fears of military experiments that ruined Japan two generations ago. It is controlled by the Cabinet Legislative Bureau, which reviews all policy in light of the government's constitutional interpretation. To date, normative constraints have made it impossible to revise Article g of the Constitution; to build or to possess nuclear weapons; to dispatch Japanese troops abroad as combatants, even as part of international peacekeeping forces; to sell weapons abroad; and to raise the JDA to ministerial status. These measures raise fears of a return to political conditions and practices of pre-1945. 144 By the early 1ggos the issue of constitutional revision was again actively debated, both in party politics and in the mass media, with Yomiuri Shimbun speaking for revision and Asahi Shimbun against. Debate gave no special license to the SDF: in December 1993 General Keisuke NaI20

The Self-Defense Forces

kanishi was forced to resign because he had publicly advocated a revision of the Constitution. Public opinion is so fluid as to bedevil pollsters. In one set of polls the proportion of those favoring constitutional revision more than doubled (from 23 to 50 percent) between 1986 and 1995; in another set, the proportion supporting revision declined between 1990 and 1993, from 40 to 6 percent. 145 The complex interplay between social and legal norms regarding national security is likely to persist, as indicated by a striking difference between public opinion and legal opinion on the issue. A 1981 poll indicated that 61 percent of the public favored the SDF at its present level of strength and 22 percent wanted to see it grow stronger. At the same time, by contrast, a survey of legal scholars showed 45 percent wanted to see the SDF abolished and another 15 percent wanted it weakened. Theodore McNelly concludes that "83 percent of the public favored preserving or increasing the SDF while 6o percent of legal experts favored abolition or reduction of the forces. The two polls also showed that while 17 percent of the public felt the SDF were unconstitutional 4 7 percent felt that they were not unconstitutional. By contrast, 71 percent of the legal experts believed that the forces were unconstitutional and only 27 percent found they were not unconstitutional. "146 A decade later this split between public and legal opinion had, if anything, widened. 147 In this situation the government has cultivated the practice of careful procedural consultation. 'The LDP," writes Joseph Keddell, "has emphasized consultation and compromise whether it was electorally strong or weak. This contrasts with the frequent snap decisions of the 1950s and 196os, which led to many disruptions of Diet proceedings, the most famous case being the 1960 Security Treaty crisis."148 In sum, the relationship between social and legal norms has been uncontested on economic security but deeply divided on military security.

jAPAN'S POLICY OF EXTERNAL SECURITY

Japan's security policy avoids violence. Its comprehensiveness is shaped by a state in which economic and political factors override transnational links. The normative context explains differences in its adaptability: on economic issues uncontested norms facilitate policy flexibility; on military issues, deeply contested norms lead to policy rigidity.

Economic Dimensions of Security On questions of both energy imports and technological dependence, Japan seeks to reduce its vulnerability. The oil crisis of 1973 was a dramatic event for most industrial countries. 149 The reaction in the United I2I

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States was to restore energy independence and self-reliance. In Japan, the government recognized that dependence on foreign supplies was inescapable. It sought not to eliminate dependence but to ensure stable supplies in an unstable world. In cooperation with business the government intensified policies it had adopted in the 196os: shifting the economy away from resource-intensive industries, gaining greater national control over the oil industry, restructuring foreign purchasing agreements, and stepping up overseas investment. But these efforts were modest; between 1946 and 1973 Japanese energy consumption, spurred by high growth, increased sevenfold, twice as fast as in other major industrialized countries. Mter 1973 energy policy became integrated with a recognition that the rise of high-tech industries was the most promising avenue for reducing dependence. Policy did not change after the second energy crisis of 1979. The government trusted the country's general economic adaptability and encouraged business to forge further links with oil-producing countries in the Third World. Japan's oil diplomacy became much more active after 1973. First and foremost, Japan tried to diversify its sources of supplies, to reduce dependence on the Middle East. 150 Southeast Asia, China, and Mexico became important suppliers for Japan in the 1970s. Japan also relied on its growing aid budget to cultivate good relations. In the Middle East, in particular, it tried to build good relations with stable Arab regimes. This bilateral approach was more important than multilateral energy policies (for example, the International Energy Agency) or coordination among major oil purchasers. Energy policy was intimately linked to evolving industrial policy. Energy research became the largest single item in MITI's budget, in 1987 receiving almost $1 billion, more than all other projects combined. 151 The oil shock of 1973 reinforced a stance already adopted: to develop energy-saving, high-tech industries. Markets for the products of such industries were expanding rapidly and could be serviced by a trained labor force and innovative management. Japan's industrial policy was not a reaction to 1973, but the oil shock made it more compelling. Over time, Japan succeeded in reducing its energy vulnerability to an astonishing degree. By 1990, the Economist concluded, 'japan, it seems, is no longer more vulnerable to higher oil prices than France or West Germany." 152 When Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, American and Japanese economists agreed that the economic disruptions would be much greater for the United States than for Japan. In the early 1990s, for commercial use, the United States needed 2.5 times more energy per capita than did Japan; the effect of a 10 percent increase in the price of oil was three times larger in the United States than in Japan; and each dollar increase on a barrel of oil would decrease Japan's balance-of-payI22

The Self-Defense Forces

ments surplus by $1.3 billion a year while increasing the U.S. balance-oftrade deficit by $2 .g billion. 153 The intimate links between defense policy and the changing character of military technology have important economic implications. For a variety of reasons security issues are becoming more submerged, hidden in market relations. Japan's leadership is attuned to this shift. Sporadic American calls for free trade to combat a growing "military protectionism" and the establishment of a "Defense GATT" 154 have had no impact. The growth of technonationalism has been more important. Technological sophistication is pushing the country inexorably to new political frontiers. The boundary between military and nonmilitary products and production processes has become less clear in the 1g8os. Cutting-edge technologies where Japan is strong-new materials, avionics, artificial intelligence, optical data storage-are distinguished by both "spin-on" and "spin-off'' processes between military and civilian applications. 155 They pose a serious challenge and a great opportunity to the Japanese who, in defense production, traditionally emphasize "the economic gains of military production at least as much as their military benefits. "156 Arms production is used to achieve maximum gains for the civilian economy. The braking system of Japan's bullet train was adapted from the F-104 fighter jet; the oil hydraulic technology of the F-86F was adapted to the needs of fire truck hoses. American gyroscope technology was adapted for use in bowling alleys, horse-racing starting gates, and seismographic equipment. Nissan Motors used parts of the F-86F engine to test shock resistance in automobiles as well as for resistance measurements of skyscrapers. Japanese manufacturers have now begun to tum the composite and ceramic materials that the Pentagon developed for armor plates, rocket nozzles, and structural parts of warplanes into commercially successful products: fishing rods, sailboat masts, and tennis racquets.157 Technology transfer also works in the opposite direction. Japan's rapid advances in commercial technologies have significant military implications. In semiconductors, for example, a 1987 study by the U.S. Defense Department reported that Japanese firms led American firms in 1 2 of 24 major areas of semiconductor technology, U.S. firms in only four. 158 Integrated circuits produced with gallium arsenide, for example, were originally developed in the civilian sector but now drive the development and production of Japan's phased-array radar for the FSX plane. Military orders, as in this case, can push Japan's technology lead in the civilian sector. 159 The 1990 DoD list of critical technologies has Japan leading the United States in five of twenty (semiconductor materials and microelectronic circuits, simulation and modeling, photonics, superconducI2J

CULTURAL NORMS AND NATIONAL SECURITY

tivity, and biotechnology); it judges Japan has reached parity in three others (parallel computing, high-energy density materials, and composite materials). Arthur Alexander concludes that "it is no exaggeration to say that the principal strength of Japan's defense industrial sector is its civilian industrial and technological competence-and the principal strength of civilian industry is in production."160 Japan's defense-related industrial policy does not differ significantly from the general principles informing its industrial policy. Japan should develop technologies as far and as fast as possible, and it should maintain the weapons it builds as efficiently as possible. 161 This policy involves high premiums now to enhance future autonomy. Coproduction programs with the United States rather than outright purchase, for example, have doubled the price for Japan of important weapon systems. According to Michael Chinworth, policy is often designed "to enhance domestic industrial capabilities and reduce dependency on the United States for future weapons programs.... Rather than looking for 'spinoffs' from defense production, the policy thrust is directed toward finding 'spin-ons."' 162 Security flows less from the acquisition of military hardware than from the development of advanced equipment that can be adapted to civilian or military purposes. Bureaucrats disagree on specific choices, butJapanese policymakers are committed to build weapons that enhance national technologies. The narrowness of Japan's present base of militarily relevant technologies makes self-sufficiency illusory even in the longer term. 163 But the general direction of technology-based procurement policy is unmistakable. 164 Military Dimensions of Security

On military questions Japan's policy adjustments have been slower and more difficult. 165 Transnational pressure from the United States for an enlarged defense role has clashed with the normative Japanese context for security policy, reinforcing the political restraints under which the military operates. The One Percent Ceiling. Japan's defense policy is probably known best for its commitment to keep defense spending below one percent of GNP. Like all political symbols this one is ambiguous. 166 The one percent policy did not follow a sudden conversion to pacifism after Japan had lost a long and bloody war. It resulted instead from high economic growth and conscious policy choices Japanese defense expenditures declined from just under 3 percent of GNP in 1954 to about o.8 percent by the late 1g6os. This decline resulted from Yoshida's foreign policy which favored economic reconstrucI24

The Self-Defense Forces

tion over security issues; from a deliberate policy after 1954 to eschew military production; and from the rapid growth of the Japanese economy. The one percent ceiling was announced as a formal commitment by the Miki Cabinet in 1976. It was a period of political weakness for the LDP at home and detente abroad, and the public mood favored reigning in military expenditures. 167 Relative to other budget lines, defense spending increased sharply in the 1980s, but fiscal constraints forced the government to announce in 1984 that it would have to delay Japan's defense buildup from 1988 to 1991. The one percent ceiling evidently prevailed over American pressure. Sooner or later, though, defense expenditure had to exceed the one percent limit, and in fiscal year 1987 the Nakasone government proposed a defense budget that amounted to 1.004 percent of GNP. 168 The Cabinet formally abolished the ceiling in January 1987. At the same time, it declared the total outlays authorized by the government for the period 1986-1990 (18.4 trillion yen) a new limit replacing the one percent ceiling. 169 As in 1976, the government sought to package increases with an official limit on defense expenditures. Japan's defense spending has since continued to hover a bit below the one percent mark. With the rate of increase in Japan's defense budget slowing from 6.1 percent in 1990 to 0.9 percent in 1994 it is likely that one percent will remain a de facto ceiling for defense expenditures for some years to come. 170 Limitations on defense spending since 1976 have reassured the Japanese public, and the opposition parties, that the government's restrained military policy would continue. These limitations furthermore convinced conservatives that macroeconomic considerations remained a vital aspect of Japan's security. Defense spending illustrates the rigidity of policy adaptation where the normative context of policy is deeply contested. Political restrictions, once uttered in the Diet, quickly consolidate into an official position that limits government options.

Sending the SDF Overseas. Policy rigidity also marks Japan's steadfast refusal to send SDF members abroad in combat roles, even as members of UN peacekeeping missions. 171 Mter Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, the United States suggested in August 1990, as it had in 1987, that Japan send minesweepers to the Gulf. The Japanese government refused, on the grounds that minesweepers might get drawn into hostilities. SDF ships were finally sent to the Gulf in April 1991...,.--after the end of the war. Categorical opposition to overseas deployment of the SDF may have lost some of its power in Japanese domestic politics. 172 It is unlikely, however, that Japan will extend its participation in multinational peacekeeping, even though many observers suggest that such a change in policy will be a necessary adjustment to the post-Cold War era. I2J

CULTURAL NORMS AND NATIONAL SECURITY

The United Nations Peace Cooperation Bill that Prime Minister Kaifu introduced in the Diet in October 1990 illuminated the political constraints under which the Japanese government operates. The UN Peace Cooperation Corps that the government proposed would have accepted volunteers from the SDF and the Maritime Safety Agency, which is part of the Ministry of Transportation. Its task included noncombatant functions such as the monitoring of ceasefires, administrative consultations with governments after the cessation of hostilities, the monitoring of elections, the provision of medical, transportation, and communication services, the rendering of assistance to refugees, and reconstruction. Under no circumstances could the corps engage in the "use of force" or the "threat of the use of force." Like a police force, members of the corps would carry only small arms to be used exclusively for self-protection. But the corps would have been permitted to' cooperate with nations acting to put UN resolutions into effect. In Diet deliberations it became clear that the government intended the corps to support multinational forces then deployed in the Gulf. Critics contended that cooperation with multinational forces, even if restricted to logistics and support, would constitute "use of force." Only 20 to 30 percent of the public backed the bill. 173 All opposition parties were against it, and fewer than half of the LDP's Lower House members supported it. 174 The bill died in November 1990 without coming to a vote in the Diet. In September 1991 the government submitted the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Cooperation Bill. The new bill took into account the low level of support for the 1990 version. It restricted itself to authorizing SDF participation in UN peacekeeping operations and humanitarian rescue operations. The 1980 Cabinet decision that interpreted Article 9 of the Constitution as prohibiting SDF deployment overseas on any mission involving the use of force remained a major obstacle for the government. The bureaucracy hotly debated whether the use of arms, in the face of organized attack, by dispatched SDF personnel would constitute legitimate self-defense or exemplifY a banned use of force. 175 The final version of the bill made overseas deployment of the SDF as part of a peacekeeping operation conditional on the combatants' agreement to a ceasefire, their acceptance of the deployment of a peacekeeping force, and the neutrality of that force. 176 Furthermore, the government announced that the SDF would not be placed under the operational command of the United Nations. SDF personnel would be permitted to use arms only for individual self-defense, not as part of any organized military action. 177 This legislation passed the Lower House in 1991 and was sent to the Upper House. The government's interpretation of Article 9 appears to have made

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The Self-Defense Forces

Japan's Constitution incompatible with UN norms on peacekeeping operations.178 Would it be feasible to maintain national command over SDF personnel deployed abroad on peacekeeping operations? Since placement of SDF personnel under UN command required a major change in govemment interpretation of Article 9, the question was a major point of contention in Diet debates. 179 The bill was amended in the Upper House, and it passed both houses in June 1992. The final version did not resolve the dilemma, but it froze any participation in peacekeeping operations that might involve a combat role for the SDF. Furthermore, the three-party coalition supporting the final bill informally agreed that the SDF would not participate in logistical operations such as the transporting of weapons. 180 SDF units sent abroad under the new law will, in the words of David Sanger, "stay far from the sound of gunfire."181 Six-hundred members of the SDF were deployed as part of UN peacekeeping operation in Cambodia in 1993. 182 The SDF was not assigned to the military component of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) but joined the engineering division and repaired roads and bridges. Unlike the 75 civilian police officers who were also part of Japan's contingent, the SDF were stationed in one of the safest areas of Cambodia. Eager to make the expedition a success, the govemment provided SDF troops with all amenities-reportedly causing envy and derision among other peacekeepers. A press corps as large as the entire SDF contingent covered every move. The operation was a political success, media coverage was favorable, and the troops were given a hero's welcome on their retum to Japan. SDF participation in UN peacekeeping operations is not Japan's only option. In the public's perception, the most valuable aspect of the SDF lies not in the protection they provide but in their emergency relief operations. The preference for the fight against nature provides a supportive public climate for Japan's participation in intemational relief efforts. After the 1985 earthquake in Mexico, Japan was severely criticized for its refusal to participate in intemational relief. Legislation adopted in 1987 provided for the sending of volunteer experts but explicitly excluded SDF personnel. When Bangladesh was hit by a typhoon in the summer of 1991, causing more than 1oo,ooo fatalities,Japan dispatched two helicopters and a rescue team of firemen. 183 Without much public debate Japanese civilians have participated in UN peacekeeping operations in Namibia (1989), Nicaragua (1990), Angola (1992), Mozambique (1993), and El Salvador and Mozambique (1994). 184 The nonmilitary aspects of these operations resonate with a Japanese public still doubtful about the legality and usefulness of the SDF's role in Cambodia. Takao Takahara notes that "such doubt was strengthened as news

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reports from Cambodia showed the engineer battalion 'in action' rebuilding roads and bridges. If the place is safe, some argued, why send SDF instead of construction workers?" 185 The Three Nonnuclear Principles. The Japanese public probably opposes nuclear weapons more strongly than the public in any other state. In 1987, 1,067 local communities, including seven prefectures and 400 cities, had declared themselves nuclear-free zones, compared to 180 in Britain and 154 in West Germany. 186 The three nonnuclear principles have been an integral part of Japan's national security. The principles, writes Tsuneo Akaha, "have been supported by a national consensus from which the government cannot deviate without risking a major political turmoil. "187 The Japanese fear of being drawn into an escalating Vietnam War, the great unease that China's nuclear test explosions created in Japan, and the prospect of the reversion of Okinawa without the removal of U.S. nuclear weapons prompted Prime Minister Sato in 1967 to spell out three principles as central to Japan's security policy. In his own words, the principles were "not to make such [nuclear] weapons, not to possess them, and not to bring them into Japan. "188 The specific occasion for this announcement was a Diet debate on Okinawa, but as Sato declared before the Diet in the following year, the three nonnuclear principles were only one of four pillars of Japan's nuclear policy. That policy also involved promotion of worldwide disarmament, reliance on U.S. nuclear deterrence, and peaceful use of nuclear energy. 189 Japan's nonnuclear policy was neither total nor unconnected to concrete political problems. Nonetheless, both the public and the Diet soon embraced the principles. When the Lower House finally voted on the reversion of Okinawa on November 24, 1971, it also adopted a formal resolution that expressed support for the three nonnuclear principles. The policy was reaffirmed when Japan decided in 1976 to ratifY the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and when, with some reluctance, it agreed to an indefinite extension of the treaty in 1995. 190 Japan's nonnuclear policy was put to a serious test in the early 1990s. International controversies surrounded its thirty-year effort to build-at the expense of several billion dollars-reprocessing plants and breeder reactors that promised energy security. The economic and political assumptions that supported this giant project-a uranium shortage instead of a glut and a sharp drop in price, international trust in Japan's peaceful intentions rather than mistrust, and ferocious international criticism-proved faulty. The first of eighteen biannual shipments of one or two tons (enough for 100-150 nuclear bombs) of reprocessed plutonium from France to Japan in November 1992 created a storm of

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international criticism. Fear of environmental disaster, including the hijacking of the ship by terrorist groups, was the language in which mistrust of Japan's possession of a large plutonium stockpile found expression. The government promised to reconsider, and in February 1994 it announced postponement of the program by 20-30 years. International and domestic public opinion (and Japanese utility companies unenthusiastic about footing the bill for energy self-sufficiency) forced the government into a humiliating turnabout. 191 Two of the nonnuclear principles thus have had a strong, restrictive effect on national security policy.

CoNCLUSION

Japan's policy of external security is largely shaped by factors that realist theory excludes from analysis. Realism focuses on rational, unified states that compete in an anarchic international system through balancing or bandwagoning strategies. It disregards the effects of institutionalized norms on the broad scope and variability of policy. In recognizing the role that regulatory norms play in politics, liberal theory takes a broader view. But its exclusive focus on thin, regulatory norms and its neglect of the thick norms of collective identity make liberal analysis overlook the striking difference between the economic and military dimensions of Japan's policy. Uncontested norms of economic security are rooted in shared conceptions of Japan as vulnerable; they encourage policy flexibility. Contested norms of military security do not; the litigation strategy of Japan's progressives, which appeals to a nonmajoritarian norm, increases resistance to policy change. For internal security we could not separate the causal influences of an uncontested collective identity and the reinforcing effects of social and legal norms. For external security they point in different directions. Since the Pacific War, Japan has eschewed most symbols of military status and power. Herman Kahn was mistaken when he projected in 1981, as he had in 1970, that Japan was likely to build nuclear weapons by the late 198os. 192 Only a small fringe of Japanese society currently views possession of nuclear weapons as a symbol of international stature to which Japan should aspire. Most Japanese view nuclear weapons and a strong military as generating not wealth and strength but immense risks. The pursuit of civilian high-tech products does not carry such risks, but it is making Japan a leading producer of components with direct military applications. A recently retired nationalist politician, Shintaro Ishihara, minces few words in discussing the Gulf War. "Computers were placed on most major weapons America used in the Gulf War, and the high-capacity semiconductors that constitute the brains of these com-

CULTURAL NORMS AND NATIONAL SECURITY

puters were mostly made in Japan. Of the semiconductors used in the modem weapons which are indispensable for the American strategy, 93 types are foreign-made. Only one is British. The remaining 92 are all produced in Japan."193 According to this view the status of the United States as a superpower is no longer secure, for it no longer rests on technological leadership in areas central to national security. Ishihara said openly what many Japanese and the U.S. Department of Defense acknowledge obliquely. 194 Studies conducted in the mid- and late 198os sought to measure U.S. dependency on foreign suppliers. The results were less graphic than Ishihara's statistics, but they point in the same direction. A 1987 Defense Department study found that 21 weapons systems relied on foreign semiconductors; in 7 cases the components were available only from Japan. 195 Arthur Alexander notes that overall dependence is small and growing and that Japanese producers are most heavily concentrated in the high-tech electronics products that Ishihara mentioned. 196 The 1988 Defense Science Board of the United States concluded similarly that ''we are, and will remain, dependent on foreign resources for critical components of our weapons systems. We cannot eliminate foreign dependency in this era of a globalized defense industry. We can and must eliminate the apparent loss of leadership in key defense technologies. "~ 97 Former Ambassador Edwin Reischauer remarked in 1970 "that there is a deep distrust of militarism in Japan, but a growing feeling that the country can't avoid the international responsibilities that require a strong military force." 198 Many similar assessments in the early 1990s overestimated Japan's willingness to accept an expanded role for its military. Institutionalized norms proved more important than the imperatives and incentives of the international system. Norms, not the system, show us why and how Japan's security policy adapts in a changing world.

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CHAPTER SIX

The U.S.-japan Relationship

Since the early 1950s some central aspects of Japan's security policy have remained unchanged. With the mid-1g7os, however, a new "realism" in foreign policy took center stage. Realism meant different things to different people. To the pacifist Left it constituted a serious threat to both the letter and the spirit of Japan's Peace Constitution. To the nationalist Right it meant the possibility of reasserting Japan's national role in world politics. Most important, the new realism spread in Japan's political center, between the waning pacifist Left and the minority appeal of the nationalist Right. "Political realists" concern themselves with the diplomatic implications of security policy and with the domestic persistence of pacifist sentiments. In contrast, "military realists" focus on the military balance in Asia and typically deduce a continued need for close political cooperation with the United States. They show less concern for public sensibilities about national defense. This much is readily acknowledged by virtually all specialists on Japanese security. But consensus conceals a puzzling feature of the U.S.-Japan relationship, Japan's most important link to the international system since 1945. The argument developed in chapter 5 suggests that we should expect Japanese policy to be more flexible in adjusting to economic than to military change in the U.S.-Japan relationship. However, the opposite is true. Transnational links do not explain this outcome. What matters instead is the normative context of policy.

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jAPAN'S SECURITY POLICIES AND THE U.S.-JAPAN SECURITY ARRANGEMENT In the 198os Japan gradually accepted a security role in East Asia, in effect a substantial modification of its postwar policy. It occurred in close cooperation with the United States. In contrast, policies governing Japan's export of technologies potentially relevant for military production remained intractable. In fact, military cooperation proved easier to achieve than the sharing of technologies. Broadening "Self'-Defense

The growing military links between japan and the United States in the 1980s were remarkable for Japan's policy flexibility. In 1976, for the first time since 1945,]apan organized its defense around an explicit strategic doctrine. The National Defense Program Outline (NDPO) sought to galvanize the public in support of military modernization. Prime Minister Miki introduced the NDPO as japan's long-term defense policy in October 1976. Based on threshold deterrence and the mobilization of a "standard defense force," the NDPO planned for deployment of a peacetime military large enough to repel minor aggression, qualitative development in defense capabilities, and an infrastructure permitting quick and effective mass mobilization if necessary. The NDPO had a double meaning: it set a ceiling to defense capability but it also stipulated a "standard defense force," which could be interpreted flexibly. 1 The ceiling responded to prevailing domestic politics. The Cabinet decided on November 5, 1976 to cap defense spending at one percent of GNP. It also relinquished a five-year buildup plan, adopting the NDPO instead and packaging it with the one-percent ceiling.2 The Miki Cabinet simultaneously laid the groundwork for a major expansion of Japan's military and adopted policy to limit future expansion of the SDF. The NDPO set quantitative limits on Japan's defense force, and the one-percent ceiling assured the public and opposition parties that the military would be kept under control. The NDPO aroused little domestic opposition, although the SDF viewed the "basic defense force" as belittling current threats. For the United States, Japan was a base for forward deployment of U.S. forces in Asia. Economic friction increased, but defense links tightened. The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation, issued in November 1978, dealt with three contingencies: deterrence of aggression against Japan, joint action in case of an armed attack on Japan, and Japan's assistance to the United States in unspecified situations that might affect Japanese security. 3 The guidelines gave operational meanIJ2

The U.S.-Japan Relationship

ing to U.S. and Japanese forces in Japan's defense. They spelled out a division of labor between the two militaries and provided for increasing cooperation. 4 Joint defense planning and exercises, intelligence exchanges, joint operational preparations, growing interoperability of military equipment, the promise of Japanese assistance under certain conditions to U.S. forces operating outside Japan-all pointed to growing links between the SDF and U.S. military in the tg8os and to significant changes in Japan's military posture. For many years the strategy of the GSDF had been shaped by a memorandum that Foreign Minister Ashida had drafted in 1947. In the face of a serious threat from the Soviet Union, and given the deterrent power of U.S. forces, the primary purpose of Japan's armed forces was domestic policing against Communist insurrection. 5 "As a consequence," writes Martin Weinstein, "it seemed perfectly reasonable to Prime Minister Yoshida and Foreign Minister Ashida to propose a mutual defense agreement with the United States, while asking the U.S. government to assume virtually the entire burden of Japan's external defense."6 Throughout the first two postwar decades the domestic mission of the SDF was reflected in its deployment. Of the thirteen GSDF divisions, only four were stationed in Hokkaido, the most likely point of attack by the Soviet Union. The other nine were deployed quite evenly throughout Japan, close to major metropolitan areas and industrial complexes. 7 The Vietnam War turned GSDF attention from mass disorders to include a protracted guerilla war, aided perhaps by Beijing or Moscow. A war of "national liberation," it was thought, might accompany a renewal of hostilities on the Korean peninsula. At the height of the Vietnam protest movement, in the fall of tg6g, the Japanese press reported that 7o,ooo members of the SDF could be mobilized for riot duty to contain massive demonstrations. 8 Throughout the 1g6os, however, government, police, and SDF remained aware of how politically explosive a military intervention in domestic politics would have been. The GSDF were a backup to the police, but controlling demonstrations remained a police task. 9 The best defense of internal security, in the planners' thinking, lay in the social stability that accompanies economic prosperity. In the 1950s and tg6os, the SDF gradually turned to the more traditional task of external defense. Mter the outbreak of the Korean War, General MacArthur authorized the National Police Reserve, a nucleus for the future SDF. It became a military force that was not strong enough either to muster an autonomous national defense or to participate, as the United States wished, in regional security. These restraints were not reflected in the 1954 law establishing the SDF. The SDF was authorized to maintain public order when necessary but also "to defend Japan against direct and indirect aggression. "10

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Deployment of the GSDF changed in the early rg8os. In an emergency eight divisions could be shifted to northern Japan: Half of the total firepower of the GSDF and much of its heavy equipment were concentrated in the defense of Hokkaido. Instead of preparing for partisan attacks and subversion in the Japanese interior, reserves began training in cold climates. Each division stationed in Hokkaido was reinforced by a tank company, to be equipped in the rggos with the new Mgo, a Japanese product said to be superior to the U.S. M I and the German Leopard. 11 In a second shift the GSDF and JDA adopted in I g86 a strategy of "seashore" or "forward" defense, implemented in Iggr-g6. Although apparently developed independently from the forward deployment of the Seventh Fleet under America's "maritime strategy," seashore defense of the home territories against amphibious attack extended GSDF control over the straits surrounding Japan. It poses a direct challenge to the Russian navy, which must break through the straits to gain access to the Pacific. Involving all three services, seashore defense points to a growing role for the GSDF in the maritime strategy of the United States in Asia. 12 Japan's seashore defense reveals the ambiguity inherent in high-tech weapons-surface-to-ship missiles now, multiple-launch rocket systems in the near future-giving the defensively deployed SDF a significant offensive capability. 13 The new strategic posture makes possible some reduction in the number and readiness of troops placed in northern Japan and will accelerate the move to lighter, more mobile units, equipped with sophisticated missiles. 14 The deployments of the rg8os completed a substantial change in policy. The GSDF was no longer a paramilitary force to contain internal subversion. Instead, it became a military force that, in the pursuit of selfdefense, is driven by technology and alliance politics to broaden its military mission beyond the shoreline. The MSDF's growing links to the U.S. Navy reflect similar pressures. The MSDF has a substantial antisubmarine capability; it engages in surveillance and intelligence; and it is prepared to assist the Americans in controlling the three strategic straits. Its military configuration is, however, imbalanced. It has too many destroyers and aircraft tracking submarines and supporting U.S. naval forces in the Pacific, too few (and unsophisticated) submarines independently to protect territorial waters and the sealanes. Demands for a more balanced force structure have been strongest in the MSDF. In the rg8os, in full accord with the United States, the MSDF extended sealane defense to I ,ooo miles and planned to mine or blockade the straits of Soya, Tsugaru, and Tsushima, to bottle up hostile fleets in times of war. In training exercises in the I g8os the MSDF operated as part of U.S.-Japanese battlegroups accompanying U.S. aircraft carriers. I]4

The U.S.-Japan Relationship

The MSDF was developing a capability that goes well beyond defensive assignments. 15 The extension of military responsibilities to 1,ooo miles beyond the home islands established Japan, in principle if not yet in practice, as a regional naval power in Asia. Friedman and LeBard term it "the first and most important step of the postwar period for Japan's foreign policy." 16 Sealane defense was not covered by the NDPO and so is a substantial change in SDF mission without an explicit change in defense policy. 17 It makes the Japanese government in fact a participant in regional "collective defense" measures, together with the United States and the Republic of Korea-and in violation, in the eyes of critics, of the Constitution. Japan's growing defense cooperation with the United States evidently weakens the policy constraints under which the SDF had operated before the 1g8os. The capability to project military power out to the 1,ooo-mile perimeter had further military consequences. It may eventually require either a midair refueling capability or the construction of small aircraft carriers. To date Japan's political leaders have not assented to this MSDF demand. Neighboring states would construe such a change as an offensive strategy in a time of declining political tension with Russia. 18 Hence Japan's "situation illustrates the difficulty of drawing limits around a defense-oriented force," Jeffrey Bergner says, stating that it is difficult to solve defense problems "without creating at the same time an offensive force that raises concerns among other nationals in the region. "19 The ASDF has not experienced substantial changes in strategy. Air surveillance of the three straits and the Sea of Japan is maintained in close cooperation with the U.S. Navy and Air Force. Indeed, the ASDF is so heavily skewed toward short-range interceptors-most of its 440 fighter aircraft fall into the category-that some observers speak of de facto integration of the Japanese ASDF in its American counterpart. 20 ASDF changes in the 1g8os also broadened the notion of "self-defense." For example, the ASDF deployed an air-defense screen across Japan to interdict long-range hostile bombers, fighter bombers, and tactical aircraft. Mter 1985 the Japanese government permitted deployment of two squadrons of U.S. F-16 fighters, capable of carrying nuclear weapons, at Misawa in northern Japan. These bombers can reach eastern Russia and thus are inherently "offensive."21 Japan's close integration with the U.S. military, its maritime strategy in the Pacific, and growing equipment interoperability go far beyond the professed aim of a military to counter small-scale invasions. Flexibility in military cooperation with the United States has favored the acquisition of weapons that blur the distinction between offensive and defensive. This policy enjoys strong support on both sides of the

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Pacific and has not encountered public opposition in Japan. Many Japanese defense specialists favor the policy, for they regard the acquisition of sophisticated weapons produced under foreign license as indispensable for an autonomous defense industry. 22 American defense contractors welcome additional sales. Until the end of the Cold War U.S. policymakers had wanted the Japanese government to increase its defense outlays and enhance capabilities. As a result Japan's traditional inward focus on "defensive defense" gave way to a more "offensive defense," a posture closely integrated with that of the United States. In the 1g8os each of the three services acquired weapon systems that blur the distinction between defense and offense. 23 In the 1ggos the GSDF's new strategy of seashore defense lends a compelling rationale for the purchase of MLRS and the deployment of sophisticated surface-to-ship missiles. (Such changes pose a serious threat to the Russian navy.) The MSDF's close cooperation with the U.S. Navy, especially in antisubmarine warfare, rests on an aircraft that increases the patrol range by a factor of ten, extending Japan's capacity to defend its sealanes. The four Aegis destroyers, half of what MSDF hopes eventually to deploy, are electronic centers to defend a taskforce of ships, including U.S. carriers, against missile and aircraft attack. For Japan's naval forces, heavily skewed toward ASW warfare, such a number of destroyers is excessive. 24 But as support for the air-defense systems of U.S. carriers, the quantity makes sense. With their long-range missiles, they also add to offensive capabilities. 25 The acquisition of such weapon systems ends any clear-cut distinction between offense and defense in Japan's security policy. The United States has long pressed Japan to equip its ASDF with fourteen American-built AWACS. The Japanese government had rejected these planes in the 1970s; American and Japanese concerns about the U.S. trade deficit helped force a change in policy in the late 1g8os. In the end Japan decided to acquire four planes, with the MOF vetoing additional purchases. 26 Japan thus acquires intelligence-gathering capacity that is inherently ambiguous; like the MLRS and Aegis destroyers, the AWACS are designed to identity enemy forces and attack them while they are still far away from home territories. Those who supported procurement believe that better intelligence is essential for the defense of Japan. 27 Airspace, like the surrounding seas needs to be defended "offensively. "28 Japanese politicians and defense specialists are quick to point to the absence of the offensive weapons barred by the Constitution (as currently interpreted by the government). The GSDF does not have amphibious assault troops; the MSDF has not deployed aircraft carriers; and the ASDF does not have long-range bombers or a capacity for mid-air IJ6

The U.S.-]apan Relationship

refueling. Yet Japan's offensive capabilities are evidently increasing. The increase is occurring in close consultation with the United States (the Aegis destroyers) or in reaction to American pressure (the AWACS planes). But it would acquire a totally different meaning should Japan's relationship with the United States change. If Japan's notion of selfdefense were to encompass regional security, it could be supported by the weapons that Japan acquired in the 198os and is purchasing in the 1990s. 29 In the 1990s many signs point to close military cooperation between the United States and Japan. In communications, for example, Japan's technological advances have led to closer integration with the United States-at the same time creating the capacity for greater autonomy in the future. In the 1960s and 1970s the SDF moved much more cautiously in this direction than had other government agencies, such as the NPA or large corporations. Since a defecting Soviet pilot landed a MiG-23 undetected on Hokkaido in 1976, Japan gradually sought to improve its communication, command, control, and intelligence (C 3 I). The effort built on extensive experience with earthquake-disaster management, which made Japan, in the words of Davis Bobrow, "develop survivable systems of communications, command and control. These measures are by and large regarded, even by many on the left of Japanese politics, as in a different category from rearmament."30 Traditionally Japan has had extensive intelligence exchange with the United States. Signal intelligence and satellite photographs apparently were swapped frequently. It is likely that the JDA receives either satellite photographs or satellite photograph-derived information concerning Russian military activity in the vicinity of Japan, as well as the deployment of troops and weapons. In the Intelligence Exchange Conference in the 1980s, the most extensive exchange occurred with respect to ocean surveillance. 31 In 1984 the SDF set up Central Command Headquarters with direct communications with the American commander-inchief in Japan. 32 The SDF is now finishing construction of the Integrated Defense Digital Network, a technologically advanced information grid for integrating defense capabilities all over Japan. By March 1997, an intelligence organization integrating the operations of the SDF with those of JDA civilians is scheduled to be in place. 33 The Gulf War drove home the same point in Japan: C 3 I capability is the quintessential requirement for victory in future conventional wars. Japan's technological leadership in the manufacturing of sensors and computer graphics will make it an important source of high-quality intelligence. It was Japanese not American intelligence officials who established in spring 1991 that North Korea was probably operating a noncivilian nuclear facility. An enhanced intelligence capability offers an

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additional way to strengthen security arrangements between the two countries, so both the U.S. and the Japanese governments support it. It also helps create new national options should circumstances change. In short, Japan has been moving toward a strategy of offshore land-, sea- and air-defense supported by an up-to-date communications, command, control and intelligence capability. This, writes Norman Levin, is a "significant departure from its long-standing orientation of, first, 'internal defense' and then 'defense at the water's edge.' "34 Theater missile defense (TMD), a scaled-down version of the SDI program, is now occupying Japanese and American policymakers. 35 It illustrates how advances in weapons technology broaden the conception of "self'-defense. It is far from certain how and to what extent the Japanese government will choose to participate, but the dynamics are well established. Once confined to a narrow conception of home territories, the SDF have extended their mission, as articulated in the joint communique signed after a meeting of Prime Minister Suzuki and President Reagan in May 1981, to defend sea and air spaces surrounding Japan. This larger conception of self-defense aims both to strengthen the U.S.-Japan military relation and to respond to an increasing concern for Asian regional security.36 Restrictions on the Transfer of Military Technology

Technology transfer has been fundamental to Japan's defense procurement policy. The United States now depends on some Japanese technology, with discernible effects in some defense-related areas. Traditionally, Japanese firms relied on American defense technology, which offered large technological benefits to domestic industry.' 7 But the growth of technological nationalism has made Japan's technology imports problematic. As Japan has made deep inroads into some strongholds of American industry, especially in high-tech areas, the U.S. Congress became increasingly hesitant to permit Japanese corporations to share in defense technologies in which the United States has invested heavily. Japan's strict control over the export of technologies has intensified the political problem. American policymakers press hard for technology flowback, but Japan has proved remarkably resistant to American pressure. The strict ban on the export of military products and technologies was not the automatic result of defeat in World War II. Building on bureaucratic regulations adopted in 1960 to curb the export of arms, Prime Minister Sato enunciated in 1967 the "Three Principles on Arms Exports," which banned arms exports to three groups of nations: Communist bloc countries, countries prohibited from receiving arms by UN res-

The U.S. -japan Relationship

olutions, and countries involved or likely to be involved in international conflicts. 38 Japanese business made this ban a political issue when it confronted a serious slump in profits after 1973. The pressure backfired. MITI backed a change in policy, but many parties were strongly opposed, and the government strengthened the ban. In 1976 Prime Minister Miki announced the ban was extended worldwide and affected export of all equipment necessary for arms production. In April 1978 MITI Minister Komoto affirmed before the Diet that the export of technologies relevant for weapons production was also prohibited. 39 A resolution passed by both Houses of the Diet in March 1981 reaffirmed the ban. Despite American pressure in the 198os, Japan did not increase the flow of militarily relevant technology back to the United States, even though in November 1983 it modified the ban as it affected the United States. 40 This change in policy was supposed to create a framework for future interoperability of Japanese and American weapons systems. The two countries also set up the Joint Military Technology Commission (JMTC), charged to review both U.S. requests and Japanese responses. The Japanese government specifically committed itself to facilitate the flow not only of military but also of dual-use technologies, in particular production technologies with military relevance such as gallium arsenide, opto-electronics, compound materials, ceramics, and heat-resistant materials. 41 However, the United States applied for only three technology transfers in the 198os. 42 This figure is paltry considering the 4o,ooo separate contracts that Japanese firms signed between 1951 and 1984 to acquire foreign, mostly American, technology; more than 100 military coproduction agreements in which Japanese manufacturers were using U.S. technologies in the 198os; and the 10:1 ratio favoring Japan in exchange of researchers in the second half of the 198os. 43 MITI has carefully monitored the export of dual-use technologies. Such export is, as noted in the 1983 agreement, officially free from government regulation, but in practice Japanese policy remains very restrictive.44 According to the government's general definition, weapons are "objects that are used by militaries and directly employed in battle. "45 Dual-use products and components are not necessarily covered by Japan's export ban; however, MITI has resorted to administrative guidance to block the export of technologies likely to be used for military purposes. It has also sought to prevent Japanese corporations operating in the United States from manufacturing or selling dual-use components for military use. Since the late 198os, in an effort to develop strict monitoring, Japan has led international efforts to govern the export of products and technologies essential to the building of weapons of mass destruction. In I]9

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April 1989 MITI created the Center for Information on Strategic Technology (CIST), its mission to improve the efficiency of export control. The center, sponsored by twenty-four leading industrial and trade associations, is run by retired MITI officials who act as president and executive managing president. An active MITI bureaucrat is "on loan" and works in the general coordination division. MITI hopes eventually to recruit 8oo member firms. For the time being it must cope with the skepticism of Japan's business community, which opposes government intrusion. 46 CIST is supposed to prevent Japan from finding itself in a situation similar to that of Germany, Switzerland, France and other suppliers of Iraq after the Gulf War of 1991. That war intensified Japanese interest in international agreements on ABC-relevant weapons technologies.' 7 In the nuclear suppliers group, in the Australia Group (dealing with biological and chemical weapons), in the Missile Technology Control negotiations, and in the internationalization of a bilateral U.S.-Japan arrangement controlling the export of supercomputers, the Japanese government has been a leading participant in creating international agreements. Japan's growing technological strength directly affects the U.S. military. During the Gulf War of 1991, for example, the United States needed quick access to supplies of Japanese high-tech components. The U.S. government asked Tokyo to persuade Japanese firms to give American forces in the Gulf priority for electronic products. According to one press report, it directly approached NEC, one of Japan's leading semiconductor producers. 48 Unconfirmed press reports also state that the Japanese government, using civilian ships, moved electronic parts, components, and perhaps products directly to the Gul£.49 In the words of a senior American official, it was "the first time that our growing dependence on certain critical components was spotlighted in a war setting .... We were lucky we were dealing with allies." 50 In crises Japanese policy can respond to American needs. But the Japanese have a deep-seated reluctance, which combines with corporate interests, to facilitate the flow of technology to the United States. Japan is the only major partner of the United States which does not have, or desire to have, reciprocal defense trade. If the defense contracts signed between 1986 and 1990 are implemented, annual defense trade between the United States and Japan will rise from $1.0 to $2.5 billion. The trade imbalance is likely to last. The United States outspends Japan in defense-related R&D by a factor of 15, in aerospace by a factor of 46. 5 ' Only where Japan can rely directly on civilian investments could it realistically pursue a military-strategic option. No significant coalition is forming, it seems, to press this case in the 1990s.

The U.S.-japan Relationship

Technology sharing and codevelopment with the United States thus remain plausible policies (as long as Japan can import U.S. technology without exporting its own). The pattern is illustrated by the hotly contested decision to codevelop the FSX aircraft. 52 Interested in technology transfer and the interoperability of equipment, the U.S. Department of Defense in particular favored the project. It guaranteed large contracts to the American defense industry. U.S. firms are expected to receive 3545 percent of development costs, paid by the Japanese government, and about 40 percent of the total work, as well as $5 billion realized through eventual sales of the plane to the SDF. Many members of Congress, however, saw the arrangement as giving technological secrets to Japanese manufacturers who were likely to use them to attack the aerospace industry, one of the last bastions of America's high-tech preeminence. The FSX battle is about technology transfer. The bargaining terms between Japan and the United States shifted over time. With technonationalism rising in both countries, Masashi Nishihara and David Potter argue, "the line between economics and defense has largely vanished. "53 A 1984 report of the Defense Science Board pointed to Japan's indigenous defense production and underscored the growing links between commercial and military technologies. Japanese policymakers now take as a given the importance not only of spin-offs, from weapons to civilian products, but also of spin-ons, from civilian technologies to weapon development. Negotiations over the FSX were contentious because of growing fears, especially in the U.S. Congress, of Japan as a high-tech competitor. Japanese officials argue similarly that civilian projects already under way could, if necessary, be linked to produce indigenous aircraft: the fighter design effort and T-2 Control Configured Vehicle testing program of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, the radar work of Mitsubishi Electric Company, the flight computer program of Fujitsu, the avionics research of Nippon Electric Company and Hitachi, and various composite material and stealth technology projects. 54 Technological self-sufficiency is clearly a long-term objective that enjoys broad support, but it is not a political program for the medium term. 55 The FSX episode is not the only recent reminder of the importance of technological autonomy. In 1991 it was discovered that Japan Aviation Electronics Industry had illegally shipped missile components to Iran. The U.S. State Department imposed an export embargo on the firm, threatening the supply of components and spare parts to the ASDF for which JAEI is the sole source. A prolonged embargo would have made it impossible for the SDF to operate at normal strength; the embargo shut down much of Japan's defense industry for over a month. 56 The episode strengthened the faction that favors greater technological self-sufficiency

CULTURAL NORMS AND NATIONAL SECURITY

in important weapons systems. But Japan's government is deeply split on how to attain that objective. In the FSX debate, for example,JDA's Technical R&D Institute and Air Staff Office and MITI's Aircraft and Ordnance Division favored domestic development; MITI's Trade Bureau, JDA's budget officials, the MOF, and MOFA were cautious or opposed. 57 The FSX controversy was public and overshadowed other unsuccessful attempts to deal with the problems of technology sharing. Neither the 1983 technology agreement between the Americans and the Japanese nor the participation of Japanese companies in the American Strategic Defense Initiative accelerated the flowback of Japanese technology to the United States. 58 Because of repeated failures to facilitate technology transfer, the 12th Meeting of the Japan-U.S. Systems and Technology Forum agreed in September 1990 on a few high-priority areas for technology flowback, among them rocket engines, infrared sensors, magnetic technology, ceramics, and advanced materials replacing steel. On the Japanese side the agreement involved a delicate political coalition; MOFA played the role of strong proponent, MITI that of reluctant ally. MITI has first-hand experience of dealing with private firms that are extremely reluctant to share proprietary technologies. Since the recipient will be the U.S. Department of Defense, Japanese firms fear detailed regulations and bad publicity in Japan. 59 Neither Japanese business nor MITI see their mission as sharing Japanese technology with U.S. producers. They aim rather to earn profits and create a more autonomous technology base for Japan's industries. The adjustment of security policy to facilitate the flow of militarily relevant technology from Japan to the United States has been fraught with difficulties. The United States has pressed hard for a change. Japan has, by and large, not responded to this pressure. Its quest for technological autonomy, even while it is pursuing defense cooperation with the United States, is deep and strong.

THE UNDERDETERMINING EFFECTS OF LINKS WITH THE UNITED STATES

Since 1945 Japan's place in the world has been defined largely in terms of its relation to the United States. Postwar diplomacy deliberately tied Japan more closely to the United States than to any other major country. Japan's exports are concentrated on the American market to a unique degree, and its security policy places Japan outside regional alliances and makes it largely dependent on bilateral relations with the United States. Contacts on the U.S.-Japan security relationship occur at

The U.S.-japan Relationship

all levels-bureaucratic, ministerial, and private. Nothing in the increasing transnational contacts between the two countries helps explain the policy flexibility on issues of military security and rigidity on questions of technology transfer. The Security Consultative Committee, dating back to 1960, has an American and Japanese membership deliberately unequal in rank. The committee attracted an extraordinary amount of attention from the press. Formal briefings were stilted, and leaks were so frequent that one admiral reportedly said that he would include nothing in his report to the committee which he would hesitate to see published in Time magazine.60 A second formal body, the U.S.-Japan Joint Committee, was set up by the Status of Forces Agreement (signed simultaneously with the Security Treaty in 1960). It meets every two weeks on issues involving American military sites in Japan. It is the most institutionalized of the consultative mechanisms between the two countries. The Joint Committee has about two dozen subcommittees, ad hoc working groups, and special panels. 61 A third group, the Security Subcommittee, deals with broad security issues of concem to the two countries. Since 1967, when the first meeting took place, it has met about once a year. Its membership is not formally fixed, but twenty-five high-ranking officials attend. 62 It is not clear how effective the subcommittee is in solving practical problems. 63 Special groups and commissions deal with specific problems. The Security Consultative Group was created in 1973 to help implement the Security Treaty and agreements related to it. The group's main concem was consolidation of understandings about U.S. bases in Okinawa, an important item after the islands reverted to Japan in 1972. After the Vietnam War the Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation intensified U.S.-Japanese consultations on cooperation under Articles 5 and 6 of the Security Treaty. 64 The subcommittee drafted the 1978 Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation. 65 Some transnational economic links that affect military security date back to the early 1950s. In 1954 the two govemments set up the Military Assistance Advisory Group-Japan, an important pipeline for rearmament. The Korean War underlined Japan's strategic importance as a forward base for the United States and made Japan a workshop for supplying American troops. Between 1950 and 1953 special procurement orders of the U.S. Department of Defense increased from $191 to $452 million. And in the 1950s the United States placed orders valued at $5.6 billion with Japanese industry, either for U.S. forces deployed in Asia or for those of its Asian allies. The Vietnam War led to a second boom. Procurement reached 63 percent of Japanese exports during the Korean

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War and 7-8 percent during the Vietnam War. 66 All told, between 1950 and 1983, theJDA received about $10 billion worth of advanced military supplies from the United States. 67 Technology transfer mattered from the very beginning, but only in the 198os did the two governments begin to encourage the reverse flow of military technology from Japan to the United States. 68 Aware of the importance of dual-use technologies and its growing dependence on Japanese producers, the U.S. Department of Defense eagerly joined the JDA in 1980 to set up the Systems and Technology Forum to facilitate cooperation in military R&D, production, and procurement. 69 The forum was directly undercut by Japan's prohibition on the export of military equipment, including military technologies. 70 Lengthy negotiations established the Joint Military Technology Commission in November 1983. It was staffed by State Department and DoD officials in the American embassy in Tokyo as well as Japanese officials from the JDA, MITI, and MOFA. 71 Detailed arrangements followed in December 1985 governing the transfer of military technologies. 72 In the 1990s U.S. government organizations, such as the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency and the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization, regularly send delegations to Tokyo on fact-finding missions. In August 1991 the DoD created, inside the Tokyo embassy, an office for researching and analyzing Japan's technology. 73 In September of the same year it started a training project for its middle-ranking civilian and military officials which includes time at Japan's research organizations and firms. 74 This survey of Japan's transnational ties with the United States yields no specific insights into why Japanese policy is more flexible on the military dimension of security policy than on the technological. This is not surprising. Transnational links act as conduits of political pressure, information, and contacts designed on the American side to enlarge Japan's military efforts. But these links, unlike institutionalized norms, do not by themselves shape Japan's national security policy.

NORMS OF ECONOMIC AND MILITARY SECURITY

Japan's uncontested norm of economic security and the economic interests of Japanese corporations explain the strong resistance to technology transfer. For Japan, technology is desirable for two reasons. It opens up the prospect for long-term economic growth, and it helps to reduce a vulnerability rooted in dependence on imported raw materials. As Richard Samuels argues persuasively, the norm of enhancing Japan's technological autonomy is strong and makes Japan eager to acquire foreign

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technologies to diffuse widely. Writing specifically about weapons procurement, Samuels argues that "on a project basis, indigenization has seemed not contested but inexorable. What once was purchased soon was licensed for coproduction. What had been coproduced then was codeveloped. Budgets and politics willing, what is now codeveloped will be indigenized."75 Japanese corporations are remarkably reluctant to transfer technology to neighboring states in Northeast and Southeast Asia. 76 The distinction between military and civilian technology is not essential in this drive for enhanced autonomy. What matters instead is that acquired knowhow is, according to David Friedman and Richard Samuels, "diffused aggressively throughout the Japanese economy as a matter of security ideology, national policy and private practice. "77 This consensus on the value of technological autonomy leads to a view of industry totally at odds with what one finds in the United States. In Japan, industries are valued for the knowledge they generate as much as for the products they make. This national consensus is so basic that it goes virtually unquestioned. 78 Michael Chinworth's study of business-government relations in the licensed production of the Patriot missile system identifies a remarkable unity of purpose between MITI and business on questions of defense technology. 79 Business and MITI do not aim to reestablish the military in a politically preeminent position. Both are determined to overcome Japan's technological lags in missile and aerospace technology. As in many other industrial sectors a commitment to the expansion of domestic capability overrides other considerations. In the late tg8os, for example, Japan's military aerospace industry armed Japan and, Richard Samuels and Benjamin Whipple write, served as a "bellwether for commercial aerospace and provides an important new market for the application of civilian high technology. "80 Recognizing persistent problems in technology transfer, Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney's visit to Tokyo in February tggo became an occasion to single out seven broad technology areas, rather than specific systems, of particular interest to the U.S. military. In September tggo Japan and the United States agreed on five technologies for joint study. With flow-back quickly becoming "a buzz word for the tggos, "81 several working groups were set up to broaden the flow of dual-use technologies from Japan to the United States."2 Agreement was eventually reached on two. But as Green and Samuels conclude, 'joint research and development of subsystems such as ducted rocket engines, eye-safe lasers, and phased array radar has led to negligible technology transfer to the U.S. side. The same is true for the much larger co-development of the FS-X fighter. "83

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Efforts of the Clinton administration do little to undermine that conclusion."• Defense Secretary William]. Perry's 'Technology-for-Technology" initiative of 1994 sought to linkJapan's participation in the SDI's successor, the theater-missile defense system, to U.S. access to Japan's commercially based dual-use technologies. For many Japanese policymakers, the American initiative was logical and promised military benefit in a time of shrinking defense budgets. It was also threatening, however, since it appeared to undercut the cherished aim of technological autonomy. Hence MITI and the JDA tamed the Perry initiative. They rehearsed their inability to deliver proprietary technology over which they had no control. Michael Green's assessment appears plausible: "as a practical matter, the potential for joint development of systems or subsystems between the United States and Japan is limited.''85 Norms of economic security and technological autonomy continue to shape the views of many Japanese economic bureaucrats. In dual-use technologies, moreover, private firms typically own the technology and are understandably reluctant to share it with U.S. competitors. 86 The anticipation of only minor sales holds Japanese firms back from licensing their technologies. 87 Finally, there remains the fear of hostile public reaction. In the mid-198os more than two-thirds of the Japanese public opposed the sale of military technologies to the United States. 88 Yet Japan cannot escape its relationship with the United States. Government officials view the world largely through the prism of the relationship, and so have been receptive to American pressures. In the late 1940s the Japanese government steadfastly rejected American plans for a regional defense perimeter in Asia, and so the 1951 Security Treaty did not provide for mutual consultations. 89 The United States was to defend Japan until Japan could defend itself-a promise made on American terms and in light of U.S. interests in the Far East. 90 The Japanese government became convinced that the treaty needed to be revised. Articles 5, 6, and 10 of the 1960 Treaty embody, in Martin Weinstein's words, the "formal, explicit guarantee and the mutuality sought by the Japanese government.'' They also tie the treaty to the United Nations. 91 The 1960 treaty provides for mutual action against an attack directed at either party. 92 U.S.-Japan security arrangements have given the Japanese government ample room to maneuver. During the Vietnam War, Japanese policy supported the American military fully. Okinawa handled about threequarters of the 400,000 tons of goods that American forces in Vietnam consumed each month. In 1966-67 about 100 military flights a month passed through Haneda airport. Kadena airbase averaged a takeoff or landing every three minutes around the clock, more than a million flights between 1965 and 1973. 93 The opposition in the Diet questioned

The U.S.-]apan Relationship

the basing of B-52 bombers on Okinawa. 94 Okinawa was not then covered by the treaty, however, and Japanese bases were not staging areas for combat, so both governments could sidestep the need for "consultation. ''"5 A 1966 report for the Military Preparedness Subcommittee of the U.S. Senate noted that "it would be difficult to fight the war in Southeast Asia without Yokosuka and Sasebo."96 Japan served as a de facto forward base of the U.S. military in Asia. 97 Article 6 of the Security Treaty was also interpreted flexibly in the aftermath of the Gulf War. Japan did not object that U.S. troops stationed in Japan were sent off to military engagements outside Asia. The meaning of "Far East," which U.S. troops in Japan are supposedly defending, apparently was never discussed."" U.S. forces stationed in Japan were also dispatched to the Indian Ocean and the Middle East at various times in the 1970s and 198os. 99 The regional security aspects of the treaty, controversial during the Vietnam War, have been redefined; the Security Treaty, it seems, has acquired a global scope. 100 In sharp contrast to its strict adherence to the first two nonnuclear principles, prohibiting possession and production, the Japanese government has handled the third so flexibly that many critics have charged outright opportunism. In the tradition of un yo, writes John Endicott, government policies "are subject to interpretation by public officials in the course of implementation or execution. This interpretation is then scrutinized by the body politic. If reaction is passive enough . . . the interpretation stands." 101 The process was essential in bridging an irreconcilable contradiction. The Japanese government adhered to nonnuclear norms while sheltering under the U.S. nuclear umbrella, which required support of the global and theater nuclear strategy of the Unitt;d States. The government's claim of no nuclear weapons in Japan has always sounded hollow. On the very day that former prime minister Sato received the Nobel Peace Price for his adoption of the nonnuclear policy, a retired U.S. Navy admiral, Gene LaRocque, ridiculed the notion that the navy would have its ships dispose of nuclear weapons before entering Japanese waters. 102 In 197 4 the New York Times reported a 1960 agreement permitting the introduction of nuclear weapons by ship or aircraft: "The Japanese had deliberately not retained a written text so as to be able to deny the agreement." 103 As early as the mid-1970s the Japanese public harbored widespread suspicion that the third principle (nonintroduction) was regularly violated. 104 Between 1964 and the early 198os nuclear-powered submarines paid 180 visits to Japan. 105 In the 1980s U.S. efforts to counter the Soviet naval build-up brought as many as 200 nuclear weapons into the Western Pacific, and presumably also into Japanese territorial waters. 106 1

47

CULTURAL NORMS AND NATIONAL SECURITY

Flexibility would not have been possible without a public willing to tolerate it. The Japanese public supports security arrangements in exchange for granting U.S. access to bases in Japan. The treaty has become accepted as furthering the long-term interests of Japan. Between 1969 and 1984 the proportion of those supporting the treaty increased from 41 to 69 percent, a remarkable change in a relatively short period of time. Trend data show that, in contrast to the 196os, the net approval rating of the treaty in opinion surveys increased greatly throughout the 1970s. 107 In his review of opinion polls, Davis Bobrow concludes that stronger relations with the United States have become the "dominant view ... dependence [on the United States] remains the single most supported position. "108 The polls supply no evidence that what is often referred to as a "special" relationship has any of the qualities of another "special" relationship, between Britain and the United States. 109 A significant part of the Japanese public views the relationship as a beneficial arrangement serving Japanese interests, administered flexibly, and maintained on a longterm basis. Without a sense of community, interest calculations can shift quickly, as they evidently did when three American servicemen raped a Japanese schoolgirl in September 1995. The incident started a political renegotiation of various aspects of the U.S. military bases in Japan. 110 The different episodes of Japanese security policy discussed in chapters 4-6 show that police and military have variable room to maneuver. The informalism characterizing how the Japanese police apply rules (unyo) is supported by a consensus of Japanese elites and the mass public. Military security similarly is shaped by domestic factors. However, rule by "constitutional interpretation" involves not an application of rules but a reinterpretation of norms as defined in the peace constitution. It places great obstacles in the path of those who want to make Japan a normal country, with a normal military force and normal levels of military spending; the government's room to maneuver has been much smaller for external than for internal security policy. 111 The two cases discussed in chapter 6 fall between policy rigidity and flexibility. The degree of normative consensus or contestation is not only left to the Japanese but involves also international legal and political obligations, for example, the Security Treaty and understandings on the sharing of technology. At issue is not just the application of rules or the contestation of norms, but a more complicated relation among norms, rules, and interest. In the sharing of technology the rigidity in Japanese policy is rooted in two factors: short-term corporate interests in profits on particular products and processes, and a domestically uncontested identity as a

The U.S.-japan Relationship

polity striving for technological preeminence. Changes in formal or informal international agreements have had relatively little influence. They introduce an element of normative contestation, however, and so a possibility for change that seems all but absent in internal security policy. Relative flexibility in the security arrangements between the United States and Japan is, from the Japanese perspective, a matter of long-term interest not of deeply contested collective identities. For this reason, policy flexibility in the face of American pressure in the 198os has been greater than in the case of the military aspects of Japan's security policy discussed in chapter 5· Specifically, the NDPO could accommodate American pressures to increase Japanese armament. The government gradually altered its basic defense posture without revising the NDP0. 112 Since the NDPO had defined the limits on the SDF in numerical-quantitative not technological-qualitative terms, it offered a ready escape hatch once a defense build-up became politically opportune. 113 The policy adopted in 1976 thus allowed for a substantial upgrading of frontline equipment. Furthermore, the relative share of frontline equipment in the overall defense budget increased from about 18 percent in 1976 to about 29 percent in 1985. 114 By 1984 the NDPO had been, to all intents and purposes, abandoned as the government conducted national security policy unconstrained by this general document. 115

CONCLUSION

In the 198os, T. ]. Pempel writes, Japan's most important ally, the United States, was "the occasion of more foreign policy, and foreign economic policy, controversies than all of Japan's potential enemies combined."n 6 Is there a discernible pattern in these controversies? Analysis in chapter 5 leads us to expect that in its relationship with the United States, Japanese policy should be flexible on economic issues and rigid on military ones. Yet the opposite is true. Why? Realist theory offers an explanation couched in terms of unitary, rational states that follow their interests in maximizing power. In this view, Japan has followed a shrewd security policy: free-riding on U.S. protection while investing in its own economy. This explanation runs into two problems. First, realists have difficulty accounting for the fact that Japan's military policy was so accommodating to American pressure in the 198os. It is not convincing to belittle Japan's arms build-up in the 198os as merely a smart, tactical concession to American pressure. By the mid-1990s, dollar for dollar, Japan had become the second or third largest military power in the world.

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CULTURAL NORMS AND NATIONAL SECURITY

Second, realists stipulate that political actors define their interests in terms of power. Since the United States was more powerful than Japan, the United States got what it wanted; Japan increased its defense outlays in the 1g8os. This explanation lacks an account of why American power prevailed on military build-up but failed on technology transfer. We cannot infer, tautologically, from the outcome that the U.S. government was not serious about technology transfer. Realist analysis measures general national capabilities and so stipulates general effects. It is indeterminate because it cannot discriminate among issues of military and economic security. Liberal analysis takes us a step further. It emphasizes not only power but norms as well. Yet it quickly runs into difficulties of its own. Mter 1983 the legal norms governing technology transfer between Japan and the United States were redefined to facilitate an increased flow of militarily relevant technology. Nevertheless, Japanese policy hardly moved. Why? The uncontested constitutive norm of enhancing economic security through technological autonomy was one of two reasons. The profit motive of Japanese business was a second. 117 The interests of political elites were affected by the normative context in which they were formulated, but business interests probably were not. 118 This observation reminds us that the norms-based analysis advanced here insists on the need to understand the interaction between regulatory and constitutive norms and interests. It does not insist that norms determine all the interests that inform policy choice. How do we explain Japan's willingness to accommodate to some U.S. pressures but not to others? A purported growth of collective identity between Japan and the United States is not compelling. Unlike those of Germany, discussed in chapter 7, Japan's transnational links with the United States do not touch on issues of collective identity. They stay in the realm of regulatory norms, of standards of appropriate behavior within a diplomatic relationship defined in terms of long-term interests. The line separating long-term interest from collective identity is fuzzy. Technological developments have pushed each branch of the SDF to embrace broader notions of "self'-defense. 119 But upgrading the weaponry of the SDF is also militarily and politically prudent. In this case the dividing line between identity and long-term interest is difficult to define. Nonetheless, the ability of the Japanese government to redefine its short-term interests within the relatively permissive norms of the U.S.Japan relationship was important in the 1g8os. Liberal analysis focusing on the importance of regulatory norms is thus useful in helping us find a partial answer to the question at hand. Finally, how can we explain Japan's strict adherence to the first two nonnuclear principles (production and possession) and its loose dealing IJO

The U.S.-japan Relationship

with the third (introduction). In terms of collective identity, Article 9 of Japan's Peace Constitution is much more salient than the Security Treaty. As Davis Bobrow argues, Japan's distinctive approach to security "lies not in the U.S. relationship, but in the autonomous factor of the militarily limiting 'peace' constitution." 120 Breach of the first two principles would have directly challenged the collective identity of Japan as a peaceful country. The American military neither denied nor confirmed the existence of nuclear weapons and redefined the meaning of "introduction"; breach of the third principle was politically less serious. Japan, of course, had control over the first two principles but less over the third, which depended primarily on the behavior of the United States. Japanese firms have never been reluctant to link up with foreign firms to acquire knowledge. Corporate strategies-joint production, foreign investment, cross-licensing, codevelopment-are strong indicators of the eagerness of Japan's business leaders to work in situations of mutual vulnerability. Access to the knowledge base of other societies and longterm relationships based on mutual vulnerabilities do not frighten Japan's policymakers. These are, in fact, the conditions under which government and business have survived for fifty years. Traditional notions of national self-reliance and national responses are from this perspective anachronistic. A willingness to cooperate based on long-term interest is acceptable. Japanese public officials expect to do better in such relationships than most foreign governments, improving their political leverage over time. In the U.S.-Japan relationship, Japan's security policy thus serves to provide for growing technological autonomy in a politically stable environment. 121 National security policy has become one of several instruments to ease Japan into a new, more international phase of its national evolution. In the process Japan is gradually creating new options. By 1984 the SDF had over fifty destroyers, twice as many as the U.S. Seventh Fleet. Japan had as many ASW aircraft as the entire Pacific Command of the U.S. armed forces. Japan's 400 fighter aircraft exceeded the combined total that the United States had stationed in Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the Philippines. 122 Japan's military options are not explicitly national. If it wanted a national military capability, Japan would have to acquire offensive systems it now shuns or, at a minimum, a broad range of stealth technologies. 123 Military issues cannot be separated, the Japanese agree, from political and economic considerations. But the high-tech weapons Japan is acquiring make it possible, unlikely as it appears now, to pursue a national option. This is true even of nuclear weapons. Although Japan's government insists that it will never deviate from its nonnuclear policy, it has, in the words of New York Times correspondent David Sanger, "already I5I

CULTURAL NORMS AND NATIONAL SECURITY

virtually become a nuclear power, possessing a deterrent without ever producing a weapon." 124 Closer defense cooperation with the United States in the 1g8os created a broader range of choice for Japan. Despite a deep-seated commitment to nonviolence, technonationalism does not force Japan to "give up the gun" now as it did in the sixteenth century. 125 In a decade of significant military buildup, the NDPO, the three nonnuclear principles, and the principles of defensive defense have officially remained intact. The national option now being created may never be exercised. But in Japan, as Takashi Inoguchi says, "change comes in the disguise of constancy. "126

IJ2

CHAPTER SEVEN

japan and Germany

In 1990 and 1991 German and Japanese officials confronted vexing problems. Should the German military send East German equipment to the Gulf while permitting its airforce to fly missions from Turkish airfields? Or should Germany reject the out-of-area engagement of NATO troops? Should Japan send unarmed soldiers to the Mideast, pay protection money, or do nothing? In a situation of rapid change, international structure and situation offered no obvious answers. Two decades earlier, as the Vietnam War provoked large-scale protests, the domestic environment of the German and Japanese states was changing rapidly, and officials had confronted difficult choices. Should large-scale protest be tolerate,d? Should it be crushed with massive police and paramilitary force? Should it be contained through a reorganization of national police forces? Was the upsurge of terrorism better combatted with new or traditional security policies? Answers to such questions, then and now, were not self-evident to policymakers. Structure and situation are not very helpful for understanding policy choice, especially in times of large-scale change, but institutionalized norms are. In this chapter I argue that different norms inform how Germany and Japan cope with their security problems. 1 In Germany the strengthening of state power through changes in legal norms betrays a deep-seated fear that terrorism challenges the core of the state. In effect, eradicating terrorism and minimizing violent protest overcome the specter of a "Hobbesian" state of nature. 2 Similarly, the issue of emergency powers in times of national crisis bedeviled German politics in the 1950s and 196os until it was finally resolved by a grand coalition of the two major parties. In Japan, on the other hand, the close interaction of so-

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cial and legal norms reveals a state living symbiotically within its society and not easily shaken to its foundation. Eliminating terrorism and containing violent protest were the tasks of a "Grotian" community. The pressure has been much lower than in Germany to address the issue of national emergency in legal terms. Conversely, Germany's active involvement in the evolution of international legal norms conveys a conception of belonging to an international "Grotian" community. Japan's lack of concern for the consequences of pushing terrorists abroad and its generally passive international stance is based on a "Hobbesian" view of the society of states. Japan and Germany have institutionalized norms differently, and the differences are significant. German federalism, alternating coalition governments, and the political and bureaucratic conflicts between ministries headed by politicians of different parties produce a state complex and decentralized in comparison to the simplicity of centralized Japan. The distance between state and society in Germany is much greater than the osmotic relation between formal and informal centers of authority in Japan's familial state. Finally, the German state is more closely linked to other states, especially in Europe, than is Japan with its neighbors in Asia. In brief, the institutionalization of directive, legal norms in Germany predisposes security policy toward an abstract universalism lacking in Japan. It prompts the government's high-tech approach to acquire social "intelligence" in order to reduce internal security threats. It also encourages active involvement in the international strengthening of global and regional norms. In Japan, by contrast, the institutionalization of a more permissive relation between social and legal norms has pushed security policy toward careful cultivation of police ties with society. It is more difficult for the Japanese government actively to help shape the evolution of international norms.

jAPAN, GERMANY, AND THE PROBLEM OF SECURITY

In Japan and Germany, changing social environments pose different security threats. On questions of internal security that social environment has been marked, since the mid-1g6os, by the rise of new social movements and new forms of organized protest, including terrorism. On questions of external security, the international society of states between the late 1940s and late 1g8os was defined by the Cold War. Internal Security

Japanese terrorism has been less frequent-between mid-1983 and mid-1g8g there were 144 incidents in japan, 315 in Germany-and less IJ4

Japan and Germany

serious-the number of deaths and injuries resulting from terrorist acts were only one-fourth of the German figure.' Germany has not been immune from international terrorism, but most terrorist incidents have been committed by domestic groups. The Red Anny Faction and the Revolutionary Cells on the Left and some neo-Nazi groups on the Right have targeted their attacks on prominent politicians and businessmen, U.S. military installations and personnel, and more recently foreigners. Between 1970 and 1979 there were 649 attacks by left-wing groups, which killed 31 people and injured 97; in addition, 163 persons were seized as hostages. Terrorist groups committed at least thirty bank robberies, which netted millions of deutschmarks. Between 1980 and 1985 the total number of terrorist acts increased to 1,6o 1. 4 There are no reliable data on the number of German terrorists. Media reports normally repeat vague government estimates of about 20 activists; 200 sympathizers who may help with money, cars, or apartments; and a supportive social milieu of 2,ooo to 2o,ooo, from which sympathizers and activists are recruited. Compared to official data on membership of radical organizations of the Left (63,000), Right (22,000), and among foreigners ( 11 7 ,ooo), these are small numbers. 5 Furthermore, terrorist acts pale compared to the total annual number, recorded in the early 198os, of estimated criminal acts ( 1o million), of recorded criminal acts (4 million), and of suspects investigated by the police (1.5 million). Less than half of the suspects are prosecuted, less than a third of those prosecuted are convicted; only a tiny portion of those convicted are sent to jail. 6 These aggregate figures suggest how seriously police and government have taken terrorism in Germany. Terrorist acts and violent demonstrations account for about 15,000 crimes against state securitythat is, about 0.33 percent of all recorded criminal acts-yet between 5 and 10 percent of all German police are assigned to the state security divisions of different police forces. These estimates exclude a force of about 25,000 which protects Germany's border and acts as a reserve in the case of large-scale public demonstrations. 7 Japan also experienced a spate of indigenous terrorism and violent social protest during the last three decades. But after a brief period in the late 196os and early 1970s, Japan's Red Anny moved abroad, to North Korea and the Middle East, which became a staging area for spectacular and brutal operations. At home, massive demonstrations against the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty in 1960, the antiwar movement in the late 196os, and the renewal of the Treaty in 1970 spawned social movements. Some of these movements, such as the one opposing construction of Narita airport on the outskirts of Tokyo, relied on violence primarily as a symbolic political instrument. 8 Other groups, such as chukaku, mobilized a small cadre of professional militants involved in bombing attacks and the launching of homemade missiles. Their targets typically

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were Japan's political and economic establishment, including the Emperor system, and in the 1995 nerve gas attack by Aum Shinr1kyo the state bureaucracy. Attacks have occurred in waves. Between 1969 and 1988 the Japanese police reported 236 bombing attacks and 531 guerilla actions. 9 The international scope of its actions may have earned the Japanese Red Army greater notoriety than its German namesake. But Japan, with almost double the West German population, probably experienced only half the numbers of terrorist incidents. 10 Estimates of the number of militant cadres vary greatly. Four of Japan's five radical groups and ten of about thirty affiliated sects are prone to violent or terrorist actions. Based on estimates provided by different branches of the Japanese police, the radical Left appears to have about 14,000 activists and 2o,ooo sympathizers. In large organizations such as chukaku the number of professional militant cadres lies in the hundreds. Other militant organizations are much smaller. The Red Army, for example, has about two dozen cadres abroad and a few hundred sympathizers inside Japan.n Despite these small numbers, the Japanese police mobilizes a disproportionate force to deal with radicals. The police penchant for secrecy is so great that only rough estimates are possible. Although the official number of security policemen is only about s,ooo (50 percent smaller than the corresponding German figure), the flexible deployment of personnel in Japanese bureaucracies makes it possible to allocate temporarily up to one quarter of the total police force of 240,000 to the defense of internal security. 12 External Security

The power shift from the United States to Asia, and specifically Japan, was a prominent trend in the 198os. It can be traced in many dimensions relevant to economic competitiveness and regional leadership. Most dramatic and probably most important is the reallocation of capital in global markets. The history of capitalism does not contain a comparable shift in so short a time. In the 198os the United States went from creditor of about $350 billion in 1980 to debtor of about $350 billion in 1990. This $700 billion turnaround was reflected in the growing global importance of Japanese banks. In the second half of the 198os most of the largest ten banks worldwide were Japanese, and Tokyo became the richest capital market in the world. Japan's technological dynamism may herald important political shifts in the coming decades. In the 1980s civilian technologies came to drive military technologies, an unforeseen development thatJapanese bureaucrats appreciated only when American defense officials insisted on access to some of Japan's civilian technologies. The "spin-on" from com-

japan and Germany

mercia! to military products is becoming important, and in important areas of high technology Japan's leading manufacturers are often ahead of American defense corporations. The Department of Defense has been aware of this development since the early 198os. Only a few voices anticipate that Japan will wish to exercise direct political power over the United States, 13 but the indirect use of commercial-military power is a different matter. As a prosperous and successful trading state, Japan has developed a deep confidence in the efficacy of markets. It thus took a different attitude to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait from that of the United States. Those concerned about Japan's dependence on Middle East oil questioned whether war would solve any underlying problems. Moreover, Japan built energy efficiencies into its economy after 1973, so that after an initial downturn in the global economy any increase in the price of oil will enhance rather than diminish its competitiveness. From Japan's perspective, Saddam Hussein had to sell Iraq's and Kuwait's oil eventually; Japan could afford almost any price and so preferred a diplomatic to a military solution. Even an Iraqi assault on Saudi Arabia would not have altered the economic logic of Japanese calculations. Protection of a friendly OPEC leader did not figure heavily in Japanese calculations, which conspicuously lacked the instincts that guided American diplomacy after August 2, 1990. When war became unavoidable, however, Japan joined Saudi Arabia and Germany as America's most generous financial supporter. In the foreseeable future there are two limits to Japan's power. First, the political imagination of policymakers is still constricted. They have failed to develop a clear-cut view of Japan's changing role in global politics. Criticisms levied against Japan in the wake of the Gulf War, and anticipation of changes consequent on the end of the Cold War, provided a strong impetus for Japan's political leadership to remedy that shortcoming. Still, political blueprints may not transform Japan's cautious, follow-the-leader approach to diplomacy. Second, both domestic and international politics constrain a dramatic rise in Japan's military power. Some shrill voices, magnified by American publishers with an instinct for selling books in Tokyo, talk of "the coming war with Japan. "14 Hardly anyone takes such talk seriously. The real change since the late 1970s has been a gradual military buildup that has created new options for national strategy. It is unlikely that Japan will develop in the near or medium term a large-scale program of intercontinental ballistic missiles, stealth technologies, and offensive, conventional military power. More likely Japan will operate within the political limits imposed on its exercise of military power after 1945. Japanese policymakers define national security in comprehensive terms, to include economic, social, and political issues, and so they are much more attuned to IJ7

CULTURAL NORMS AND NATIONAL SECURITY

finding an appropriate economic and political role than to developing national military options. From the perspective of Bonn and Berlin it is Moscow not Washington that offers the proper measuring rod to assess Germany's changing position in world politics. The disintegration of the Soviet Union, the decline of Russia, and the ascent of Germany found visible expressions in the opening of the Berlin Wall in 1989, German unification in 1990, and withdrawal of the last Russian soldier from German territory in 1994. 15 German unification within an integrating Europe and the Westem alliance is a culmination of foreign policy objectives articulated by Chancellor Adenauer in the early years of the Federal Republic. In economic terms also the difference between Germany and Russia is striking. In the winter of 1990-91 Germans organized a spontaneous, private economic assistance program to help stave off hunger in major Russian cities. This assistance supplemented extensive credits from the German government amounting to about $46 billion, or about 6o percent of the OECD total between September 1990 and March 1994. 16 Furthermore, Germany became the most ardent advocate for the Russian cause in international meetings. Typically the German government has tried to persuade the United States and Japan to help revitalize the Russian economy. The contrast between the economic crisis in Russia and that in East Germany underlines the difference between the two countries. Germany is so rich that in 1991-92 alone it mobilized more capital, measured in constant dollars, for the reconstruction of East Germany than the United States mobilized with the Marshall Plan for the reconstruction of Western Europe after World War II. The German economy turned inward to repair some of the material damages that forty years of socialism wrought in the East. Few observers doubt that it will emerge strengthened as one of the leading export economies in the global economy. The contrast between the successor states and Germany is striking in terms of the model they provide for other countries in Central and Eastem Europe. In 1945 the Soviet Union offered not only a political vision but had a transnational arm, the Comintem, to affect political developments in most European states. Forty years later the failure of the Soviet model was so conspicuous that in the foreseeable future no political leadership can aspire to power under a program dedicated to "socialism in one country." The dissolution of Comecon and the Warsaw Pact in 1991 symbolized the political exhaustion of the Soviet model. As a West European welfare state, on the other hand, Germany and its social market economy inspire political confidence in Central Europe as a form of capitalism worth emulating. Economic efficiency, private affluence, and good public services in a political economy fully integrated

japan and Germany

into a larger Europe, both economically and politically-these became targets of economic and political reform throughout Central and Eastem Europe. In the wake of the failed coup d'etat in Moscow, the European Community agreed to let governments in Central Europe join as associate members at an early date. This move expresses the absence of political alternatives in the East as well as the confidence that Central European governments place in the political models of the West. Germany's political role in world politics, like Japan's, will remain restricted in the coming years. The Gulf War and war in Croatia and Bosnia showed that Germany has no domestic consensus yet about its role in the world of military affairs. The mixture of political, economic, and military power, as well as the balance between national initiatives and international obligations, remains contested. Second, like Japan, Germany is unlikely to emerge as a major independent military power in the near future. Unification brought about a so percent cut in the combined military strength of West and East Germany. Moreover, the German army remains an integral part of NATO and thus under international supervision. Growth in Germany's nuclear military power under national auspices is highly unlikely. Only an integrated European defense policy might make Germany part of a European deterrent force. Rather than move back to the politics of 1912, European integration offers Germany participation in a regional politics that will help define its role in the next century.

jAPANESE AND GERMAN SECURITY PoLICIES

Although the institutions and instruments of state violence have been tamed since 1945, the power of the police and the armed forces has measurably increased. In both Japan and Germany attention has shifted away from the threat of civil war or massive social unrest and toward the intelligence necessary to prevent threats to the state. While focusing on this task the police has remained enmeshed in democratic regimes that have supervised the growing scope of their activities. Germany features a competitive party system at the national level, a division of territorial power in a strong federal system, and a judiciary that is both strong and interventionist. Japan has a strong central bureaucracy and a long-dominant political party, as well as significant relations between these institutions and the Japanese public (including the mass media). The growing power of the military over the last forty years has been harnessed in both cases to the United States without leading to a deep transformation of domestic politics. Japan's professional military would still confront oveiWhelming odds if it were to attempt to establish an IJ9

CULTURAL NORMS AND NATIONAL SECURITY

independent political base. Its growing strength in the 1g8os was tied to its intimate relationship with the U.S. military and the importance of U.S.-Japanese security arrangements. In Germany, by contrast, the military under civilian supervision gradually reestablished a position in domestic politics, in part because it has always been fully internationalized through its integration in NATO. Internal Security

In Germany terrorism and protest reinforced a modernization and expansion of the police which were a key part of the Social Democratic reform program of the 1970s. A considerable growth in personnel and financial resources accompanied qualitative improvements and change in the basic mission of the police. The guiding image was no longer civil insurrection incited by East German infiltrators; the borderline separating normality and emergency became blurred. The police approach changed from reacting to social developments to trying to prevent threats in the first place. Improved methods of collecting, storing, and using information were seen as the best way to deal with terrorism, even though critics charged a serious loss in civil liberties. New forms of investigation have come to supplement traditional police work. In the 1970s the police developed "computer matching" (Rasterfahndung) as part of its antiterrorist campaign. The police scanned large amounts of data to identifY overlapping clusters of suspicious traits in target populations. For example, the police got access to the files of utility companies to identity customers who paid their bills in cash or through third parties. This group of potential suspects was narrowed down through data checks on residence registration, which is compulsory in Germany, automobile registration, and receipt of social security or childcare payments. The names that remained were terrorist suspects: they were young and single and unregistered, had no automobiles, and paid their utility bills in cash. If, in addition, the suspects lived in large apartment buildings with underground garages and unrestricted exits even during rushhour, they were put under surveillance. Police interest heightened if they had changed their locks as soon as they moved in, received little or no mail, insisted on having a telephone installed right away, paid their rent in cash in advance, and kept their curtains closed even during daytime. 17 Estimates of the numbers covered in some form by this surveillance system vary widely. Three million, or 5 percent of the West German adult population in the 1g8os, appears to be a reasonable estimate. 18 Computer surveillance systems for potential political criminals involved much smaller numbers. The Federal Criminal Police Office and most of the

r6o

japan and Gennany

states operated their own data systems. One such system, Apis, reportedly contained information on 33,000 individuals in the late tg8os. 19 "Preventive" and "intelligent" police work in the name of internal security was thus informed by abstract social categories that the police had defined, not concrete evidence that a suspect had been involved in specific illegal acts. The police complemented this home-grown, high-tech approach with international policy coordination to contain the threat of terrorism. A policy statement from the mid-tg8os articulates the position of the German government: liberal sharing of information to facilitate preventive searches of international terrorists by national police forces; far-reaching agreements on police cooperation across national borders; simplification of intergovernmental judicial assistance in general and of extradition in particular; and harmonization of national legislation on antiterrorist policy. The German government has been activist in multilateral arenas, such as the United Nations, economic summit meetings, Interpol and Europol, the Schengen Agreement among some members of the European Union, and the Working Group for Combatting Terrorism convened originally within the framework of European Political Cooperation. Multilateral arrangements facilitate the intense bilateral contacts that tie the German police to their counterparts in other European states. These contacts often involve the sharing of intelligence information and the furthering of professional cooperation, including an exchange program of police officers with France. More important, they facilitate operational cooperation at the local level, particularly in border areas, which has become quite extensive since Germany and France signed an administrative agreement in 1987. Japanese industry has projected a high-tech image during the last few decades, but the police have relied primarily on close relations with the public. The computer appeared to promise the German police the access to society that Japanese police always enjoyed through numerous links. Policy innovations, such as massive searches of apartment complexes and the creation or extension of police support organizations with a combined total of millions of individuals, provide the Japanese police with rich sources of information. The Japanese strategy looks less like the German shift from reactive to preventive policing than adaptation and extension of an extant surveillance system. The Japanese police were relatively slow to invest in modem technologies, and they deploy such technologies in a manner consonant with their pervasive presence in society. In the 1970s Japanese discussion of technology and communications issues affecting the police concentrated on traditional topics: the use of telephones by Japanese citizens and police reliance on patrol cars. The computerization of police work was

CuLTURAL NoRMS AND NATIONAL SECURITY

slow. 20 In the late 198os the NPA's computer system was used about 43 million times a year and stored information on 6-9 million individuals. 21 By international standards these figures are not high. A decade earlier and for a population half the size ofJapan's, the West German police were reportedly using a similar computer system 70 million times a year. 22 At best, computer technology in Japan supplements traditional police work. 23 Compared to Germany, Japan has been less activist internationally. The shift from an accommodating policy toward terrorist demands in the 1970s to an unyielding one in the 198os has not yet been tested. The Japanese government has thus been spared the agonizing choices that the JRA posed in the 1970s. In the 198os and 1990s the rhetoric of internationalism has increased on internal security as on most other important issues. Translating this general political commitment to international policy coordination into concrete initiatives has been excruciatingly difficult for the Japanese police. A case in point was the convening, under NPA auspices, of the Conference on Security Matters for the Asia-Pacific Region in June 1988. This first high-level meeting the NPA had called since 1945 represented a watershed for Japan's policy of internal security. At the conclusion, however, several Asian governments were unwilling to sign the final communique, underlining how difficult it is for Japan to play the role of international leader. In contrast to Europe, where a strong and rapidly growing body of international law is superseding national law, Asia has no indigenous legal framework to offer the multilateral forum that Japan is interested in creating. With its residue of Chinese, French, German, and American legal traditions Japan lives side-by-side with India and the Philippines, whose judicial and police systems are shaped by British and American legacies. Weak for reasons of geography, police cooperation is thus restricted to bilateral relations during specific crises. Confronted with explicit threats from the JRA and other extremist groups, Korea and Japan cooperated in joint security preparations for the Seoul Olympic Games of 1988. Moreover (except with the United States), Japan deals with extradition not on the basis of treaties but on the basis of reciprocity. During the last forty years, on average, Japan has dealt with one extradition request each year; the corresponding annual figure for Germany in the early 1980s was about 300. 24

External Security The United States and Russia have defined state security largely in military terms. For the United States the trauma of the surprise attack at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941 was perhaps even greater than the shock to the Soviet Union when German armies began Operation BarbaI62

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rossa onjune 22, 1941. The rise of the U.S. Air Force and the search for absolute protection-from the Flying Fortresses of the 1950s to President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative in the 198os-are the legacy of crucial historical experience. Through superior technology and nuclear deterrence, U.S. policy hoped to deter surprise attacks. Similarly, the buildup of the Red Army, with 5o,ooo tanks and millions of soldiers deployed to wage offensive war against Western Europe, can be understood only as part of the Soviet Union's experience during World War II. Mter suffering 20 million casualties in a war of great brutality, the Soviets believed that preparation for offensive war was the best way to minimize future risks. The Cold War was not simply born out of geostrategic realities after the defeat of Germany and Japan. It also embodied the historical lessons that these two states learned during the hot war that preceded it: state security could be defended only through preponderant military strength. Belying realist notions of what constitutes "normal" state behavior, the vanquished learned other lessons. Germany and Japan deemphasize military aspects of security at the expense of political and economic considerations. The military quest for regional hegemony had turned out disastrously for them, and another attempt in an era of nuclear deterrence was an invitation to suicide. Instead, both states emphasized what the Japanese eventually called "comprehensive security," a combination of political, economic, and military means for achieving security objectives that could no longer be sought by national military means. The prospect of any war, even a war fought by an international coalition with UN backing, creates confusion and dissent in these two states. During the Gulf War neither Japan nor Germany had the self-confidence with which the United States and Russia, but also China, Britain, and France, asserted military and political ~ower. The experience of the warfare state before 1945 was so disastrous, and that of the trading state after 1945 so successful, that military assertiveness cuts against the political grain in both countries. Japanese and German definitions of security interests reflect different balances among political, economic, and military objectives. Chancellor Adenauer's policy of rearmament and his entire Western policy was a political gambit. He used Germany's military potential as a bargaining chip to gain sovereignty and to attach the military capabilities of the entire NATO alliance to assure defense of the Federal Republic. The formation of the European Economic Community was a political backstop that Bonn supported wholeheartedly because it promised to cement Franco-German relations and thus peace in Europe. As conditions changed between the two superpowers and within Europe, West Germany became the leading proponent of the 1967 Harmel Report, which

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recommended that NATO remain a defensive military alliance with an integrated peacetime command. But the Harmel Report also stressed that NATO should become an instrument of detente policy. Until Secretary James Baker conceded, in a Berlin speech delivered in December 1989, that NATO's role was substantially political, the point had remained a source of muted conflict between the United States and Germany. However, the Harmel Report provided the basis for Chancellor Brandt's Eastern policy, which normalized political relations between West Germany, the Soviet Union, and the states of Eastern Europe. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe that ratified German unification in November 1990 is an institutional legacy of this political initiative. Economic considerations, though important, were secondary for German security. They were largely satisfied by the political integration of the Western community under American leadership. The Bretton Woods system, it turned out, was tailor-made for a German economy that was dependent on export markets in a way no previous, undivided Germany had been. Without the traditional breadbasket east of the Elbe and cut off by the Cold War from traditional markets in the East, German business and labor cooperated in a strategy of export-led growth. Trade did not follow the flag; it followed institutions the United States had created for a liberalizing international economy. The EC became an increasingly important market, and the Federal Republic became a consistently strong voice inside the EC for free trade. But political not economic considerations were driving German security policy. In Japan, economic considerations weighed more heavily until the 1970s. Economic growth would bring social stability and political democracy to a deeply divided country. Prime Minister Yoshida resisted the American effort to have Japan participate in regional defense. Stationed in the vicinity of major metropolitan areas, the SDF assumed an indirect policing role, primarily to deter domestic insurrection. A strict separation between economic and security issues in foreign policy also informed the policies of Yoshida's two most successful disciples. After a deeply divisive debate over renegotiation of the Mutual Security Treaty with the United States in 1960, Prime Minister Ikeda ( 1960-64) united the nation around his plan to double national income. Prime Minister Sato (1964-72) continued that growth policy and earned a Nobel Peace Prize for adopting the three nonnuclear principles in 1967. As late as the mid-197os Prime Minister Fukuda invoked Japan's omnidirectional, peaceful foreign policy. Only in the 198os did foreign policy acquire a security component that linkedJapan unambiguously as a junior partner in U.S. regional defense. The reconstruction of Japan created an economic dynamism that

japan and Germany

spilled over into striking success in export markets, first in the United States and later worldwide. The story of economic success marred by political, that is protectionist, backlash abroad, has been rehearsed frequently. Voluntary export restraints in textiles negotiated between the United States and Japan in the mid-1950s eventually were transformed into the Short-Term, Long-Term and Multi-Fiber agreements. They regulated international markets in textiles and garments from the early 196os on and were liberalized only in the Uruguay Round of tariff negotiations concluded in 1994- Voluntary export restraints in steel, negotiated in the late 196os, were replaced by the Trigger Price Mechanism in 1978 and soon thereafter by a restrictive, worldwide trade regime. The success of Japan's consumer electronics industry also led to a variety of trade restraints. The rise of the Japanese automobile industry caused the imposition of "voluntary" Japanese restrictions on auto exports after 1981; they were lifted after direct foreign investment made Japanese companies one of the "big three American producers" in the early 1990s. The semiconductor agreement of 1986, renewed in 1991, is another recent example of Japanese economic success and international political backlash. Japan's response to the political consequences of its international economic success has been remarkably consistent. Political bargaining about "voluntary" limitations has typically followed on the heels of economic success. Most of the time political agreements have been negotiated between Japanese and American officials. Japanese officials have made no sustained attempts to devise international solutions to the upheavals that Japan's export offensive has created. Instead, they have engaged in tough, pragmatic bargaining with trading partners. The pursuit of economic security gradually eroded the traditional most-fa"vored-nation norm, with its open-ended reciprocity over long periods of time, and the new and still contested "reciprocity" norm that makes international trade dependent on symmetrical market openings over shorter periods. For a variety of institutional reasons, Japan's markets are less open than those of its major competitors. The new, evolving norm thus is not in Japan's interest-or so we can infer from the fact that the Japanese government has now become an outspoken champion of the old, "liberal" rules in international markets. This is true even for markets in raw materials, such as oil, that are critical for Japan's industries. Japan's financial powers are now sufficiently large to secure the necessary raw materials through market transactions rather than state-tostate bargaining. Japan's economic success, in sum, has had a dramatic effect on its postwar role as a mercantilist trading state. Germany's more political and Japan's more economic definitions of security have, however, shared one feature. Both states have linked their

CULTURAL NORMS AND NATIONAL SECURITY

comprehensive definition of security to the military definition of security pursued by the United States. Germany in the 1950s and Japan in the 1g8os chose to build national military capabilities for political reasons. Germany wanted to regain standing in the Western community of nations and secure America's nuclear deterrent for its national defense. Japan was intent on cementing its relationship with the United States, frayed by recurrent economic tensions, as well as on helping meet the growing Soviet naval presence in the Pacific. Throughout the postwar years both Germany and Japan benefited greatly from America's nuclear umbrella, which permitted them to spend less on national defense. 25 The nuclear guarantee did pose the risk of being drawn into a conflict not relevant to local security, but in the judgment of successive governments the risk was small compared to the benefits of a close relationship with the United States. In other words, the nuclear guarantee, like the economic institutions of the Bretton Woods system, offered many benefits that Germany and Japan exploited to the best of their abilities.

STATE INSTITUTIONS

Japan and Germany formulate internal and external security policies in state institutions that differ in their effects. Three major differences stand out. First, once Bonn decided that communism (in the 1950s) and terrorism (in the 1970s) posed a real threat that required forceful action, its buildup of armed forces and police in the name of state security was both rapid and decisive. 26 In contrast, the privileged position that the Japanese police force has carved out for itself, its success in generating financial resources, its autonomy, and its extensive political connections have generated far-reaching changes in police practice within remarkably stable organizational parameters. Similarly, the buildup in Japan's military after the mid-1g7os occurred almost imperceptibly. Second, the contrast between social acceptance of the police and social isolation of the military is much greater in Japan than in Germany. Finally, Germany's police and military are well integrated into transnational structures that coordinate security policies across national borders; Japan's are not.

Internal Security It is characteristic of the decentralized German police after World War II that police matters were, until the 1970s, administered exclusively by the individual states. In 1972 the states and the federal government jointly streamlined Germany's police operations, especially on matters of r66

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security. Each of the states upgraded its Criminal Police Office and set up specially trained police squadrons and antiterrorist units. Each of the offices created a division of state security, which was fully integrated with the Federal Criminal Police Office in Wiesbaden. Increased specialization and flexibility were the arms of a more centralized police that had access to an information base gathered piecemeal. 27 Several legislative measures passed in the late 196os and early 1970s increased the capabilities of the federal govemment. The Office of the Federal Prosecutor was put in charge of initiating proceedings in suspected political crimes, including terrorism, thereby circumventing judicial decentralization. Special courts were set up to deal with questions of state security, reducing the opportunities defendants have to appeal a verdict. The federal govemment had enjoyed few direct police powers before the late 196os. A prolonged battle over emergency legislation was finally resolved in 1968. The new legislation sanctioned, under strict parliamentary supervision, the deployment of the armed forces in times of national emergency, to maintain domestic order against extemal aggression and intemal subversion. A constitutional amendment of 1972, and several laws passed in the early 1970s, greatly enlarged federal powers. The federal govemment assumed control of the Federal Border Patrol Police, and after the hostage tragedy that marred the Munich Olympic Games in 1972, it also set up an elite antiterrorist squad. Throughout the 1970s the federal govemment built up the Federal Criminal Police Office and the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, making them centers for police and intelligence organizations that strengthened the state's efforts to curtail terrorism. Finally, govemment and opposition overcame many of the decentralized features of Germany's federal system through use of the Standing Conference of Interior Ministers of the different states. In the 1970s the conference amounted, for all intents and purposes, to an all-party coalition on intemal security. Partisan differences increased in the 198os, but they concemed the choice of legal instruments to defend intemal security rather than specific police practices. Thus, a far-reaching centralization took place, especially in the 1970s, on all issues affecting state security. The Japanese police did not undergo a comparable change once terrorism and violent social protest became a serious political concem. Instead, the police continued to display an astonishing organizational stability as well as high adaptability in their practical work. They remained protected by a far-reaching secrecy that shielded operations even from close observers. Since 1954 the national govemment has been firmly in charge of intemal security, and the national police system is much more centralized than Germany's. The NPA possesses a great deal of independence but has direct control over only a very small police force. The

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Metropolitan Police Department (MPD), on the other hand, has developed into a powerful organization in charge of most operational work directed against the threat of terrorism. Like the NPA it is virtually unsupervised and has organized its work to avoid outside interference. The police have integrated security police forces operating under the auspices of the NPA, the MPD, and other prefectural police forces. And by rotating police officials to other ministries and agencies, they have established politically advantageous links throughout the political hierarchy. Growing centralization of the German police went hand in hand with the development of large, computerized information systems. The police sought through technological means to generate the information deemed essential for successful operation. The combination of existing and new sources of data encouraged experiments in computerized investigation. A growing distance between police and society, which centralization helped bring about, was coupled with an increasing reliance on computerized (indirect) forms of police surveillance. The Japanese police never embraced high technology as a solution to the problem of gaining adequate social intelligence. Instead they adhered to an institutional design that keeps them tied closely to society. The German police have close links to transnational organizations which affect internal security. Because of terrorist attacks on NATO installations in western Europe, particularly in Germany, NATO members maintain regular contacts concerning the security of military bases. They also consult on matters of policy, for example in NATO's Working Group on Terrorism. Contacts between the German police and the American FBI have been excellent over the years, and German officials for decades have exchanged intelligence in a special committee convened under the auspices of the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe; nonetheless, German officials have been unwavering in their opposition to a high NATO profile on antiterrorism. The mere appearance of military involvement in antiterrorism policy would have created a political firestorm in Germany. International police cooperation was acceptable as long as terrorism was politically defined as a domestic rather than a foreign policy issue. 28 Apart from Interpol, various semiofficial and official groups have emerged to encourage cooperation among national police forces: the Vienna Club, the Berne Club, the Berlin Club, the Cross Channel Conference, as well as the Standing Conference of the West European Ministers of Interior or Justice, and a working group on terrorism that initially was set up under the framework of the European Political Cooperation (EPC) that ties together the EU member states. The German government and German police officials regard a further integration of the policies of the interior and justice ministries (the so-called third pillar of the Maastricht Treaty) as a further step toward a new European legal order and internal security pol-

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icy; the United Kingdom and other EU members view the third pillar as strictly a system of intergovernmental cooperation. 29 In the 1970s European governments created an important mechanism of intergovernmental cooperation, TREVI (Terrorism, Radicalism, Extremism, Violence, International). A standing conference of the ministers of Interior and Justice of EU member states, TREVI is not part of the European Union, probably to avoid parliamentary oversight. The ministers meet, often on the same day, both under the auspices of TREVI and in the Council (of Ministers of Interior) of the EU. TREVI resulted from a largely Anglo-German initiative in 1975, at the height of a terrorist wave in Germany. TREVI and its various working groups provide not only for regular high-level contacts but also for institutionalized cooperation in practical police work against terrorism. 30 TREVI is known for efficient cooperation as well as for direct involvement of professional police officers in its working groups. Linked by its own secure communications system, TREVI facilitates police cooperation throughout Europe. The creation of a European police force, often referred to as Europol, within the context of the Maastricht Treaty and the Schengen Agreement is an additional step from intergovernmental to supranational police cooperation. Unlike police in other states, the German police do not merely implement decisions hammered out in TREVI. Instead, German police professionals prepare proposals that are given to civil servants for modification and in tum handed to politicians for ratification. Active and sustained participation in transnational structures is an important characteristic of the German police force's fight against terrorism. Although they grew during the 1g8os, transnational links were much less important in the operation of the Japanese police. In part this is just a matter of geographic isolation. Another island nation, the United Kingdom, registered 100 million border crossings in 1987; the Netherlands counted more than 200 million crossings, and Germany one billion.31 Japan had 10.8 million border crossings in 1g88, a sharp increase from 5.2 million in 1g8o, 1.7 million in 1970, and 0.3 million in 1960. 32 In relative terms the number of foreigners living in Japan was one sixth the number living in the Federal Republic in the late 197os. 33 The flow of messages between the Japanese police and law enforcement agencies abroad is also much smaller. Between 1977 and 1988 the total annual number of international messages about crimes increased from 4,500 to 7,8oo; in 1988 the NPA received more than three times as many messages from abroad (5,509) as it sent out (1,751). Only 366 of these were direct requests acted upon under provisions of the International Criminal Investigation Assistance Law. By contrast, Germany sends or receives each year more than 16o,ooo international messages concerning crime. 34 Internationalization has gradually affected Japan's law enforcement

CULTURAL NORMS AND NATIONAL SECURITY

agencies; each year a few officials are sent abroad as a matter of course. The number increased substantially in the tg8os. The NPA also stations officials, under the auspices of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, at Japanese embassies. Sponsorship of some international organizations such as UNAFEI, and participation in others such as Interpol, also express a growing internationalization of Japan's law enforcement. Compared to Germany's pervasive and long-standing international collaboration to combat cross-border crime such as terrorism, Japan's involvement in transnational police activities is extremely limited. External Security

When Germany began to rearm in 1955, it enshrined the principle of civilian control over the military. The armed forces were placed under the direct control of the executive branch. Under normal conditions the minister of defense, acting within guidelines laid down by the chancellor, bears responsibility for the armed forces including weapons procurement, manpower policy, training, and education. There is no General Staff; the most senior military officers, the inspectors of the army, air force, and navy, report directly to the minister of defense. The inspector general is not a supreme commander but the senior military adviser to the minister. The political and planning divisions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well as the Chancellor's Office and a cabinet committee, the Federal Security Council, are also involved in the formulation of external security policy. Reforms in the late tg6os and early 1970s increased the role of the armed forces in German politics, but they also reaffirmed the principle of civilian control. The Defense Ministry made little headway regarding major issues traditionally controlled by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, including political matters that are central to external security: NATO policy guidelines, arms control, and bilateral relations with important NATO partners. Much less important were the budget process and Parliament's weak involvement in defense policy. In Japan the military's isolation from and penetration by other ministries and agencies are much greater. In contrast to Germany, Japan does not have a defense ministry. The JDA ranks somewhat lower than regular ministries. Furthermore, security policy is formulated by powerful ministries such as MOF, MITI, and MOFA, which restrict the policy autonomy of the JDA and often relegate it to an implementing agency. Complex interministerial and interagency coordination constrains any JDA political initiative inside government. The subordinate role of the JDA is reinforced by staffing practices. Major ministries are assured important positions in the JDA and so inside control over the civilian bureaucracy that keeps Japan's professional military on a very short leash. I70

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The German armed forces are a professional military operating under civilian control. With the political elimination of the aristocracy after 1945, professional, technical, and managerial norms in the armed forces replaced the traditional honor code that had partially separated German army from civil society. The issue of military tradition remains sensitive even today: military symbols must be acceptable not only to the armed forces but to the public at large and to NATO partners. The armed forces have begun to reinstate some military traditions. Career officers are now sworn in while holding the edge of the flag at a ceremony often held at night and illuminated by torches. Traditional military marches are again being played in public. In the late 1950s and the early 1g8os the armed forces were the subject of intense public controversy, but for most of the postwar period the military has been accepted. That acceptance has grown over time. In some measure this has been true of japan as well, but japan's military faces much bigger barriers. Despite the attention it pays to public opinion, the media, and public relations, the military remains socially isolated. Support groups that have sprung up around military bases are intent on extracting resources from the defense budget rather than voicing patriotic support. Inside the LDP, the defense tribe lacked a coherent social or economic base to strengthen the position of the military. Public opinion has grudgingly accepted the necessity of a national military, but the social isolation of the military in Japan remains much greater than in Germany. The most distinctive feature of Germany's armed forces is their full integration into NATO. This transnational link was deliberately adopted in the 1950s, in part to contain the newly founded German army. By all accounts it has grown stronger over time. In fact, quick restoration of the military in the 1950s was possible only because of this transfer from a national to a transnational context. What emerged in Germany was not an army that could become, as in the Weimar Republic, "a state within a state." Rather, the German army became integral to an alliance system that encompassed the United States and Western Europe. In the international hierarchy of power and status, Germany ranked very low in the 1950s. Over time the American-German relation became a central feature of the NATO alliance. NATO embodies two principles: multinational cooperation that guarantees the sovereignty of member states, integrated military operations that do not. Institutional fora such as the North Atlantic Council, the Defense Planning Committee, the Military Committee, and the interaction between NATO ambassadors have fully integrated Germany in all aspects of the alliance-including the Nuclear Planning Group. NATO is an integrated force-in-being in peacetime rather than a traditional military alliance. I7I

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Throughout the postwar period this integrated military organization has had full operational control over all of Germany's armed forces. During the Cold War the most visible sign of Germany's dependence on the alliance was the presence of 4oo,ooo NATO troops and an additional 30o,ooo dependents on German territory. These troops had two purposes: defend Western Europe against the threat of a Soviet invasion, and protect Germany's allies from the Federal Republic. Virtually all of Germany's armed forces are under NATO command, even in peacetime. With the sole exception of military discipline, on virtually all questions concerning training, equipment, organization, and logistics as well as the leadership of troops NATO recommendations are binding on the German military. NATO's Supreme Allied Commander (Europe) has the right to inspect German troops, and in emergencies SACEUR assumes operational control over German military forces. German forces are responsive to the planning and war-fighting doctrine of the alliance; they train frequently in joint exercises with allied troops stationed in Germany. The German military has also been deeply enmeshed in various embryonic European defense arrangements, which constitute the "second pillar" of NATO: the Eurogroup in NATO, the European Political Cooperation after Maastricht called the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the West European Union, and increasing defense cooperation with France. It retains intense bilateral ties with the United States, which in the case of the air force has led to what Catherine Kelleher calls "planned similarity. "35 The strength of these transnational ties results in the absence of a clearly identifiable national profile on questions of national defense. "External actors and preferences," writes Kelleher, "penetrate German deliberations at every stage. "36 Although the transnational links of the Japanese military increased substantially after the mid-rg7os, they remain largely restricted to the bilateral relationship with the United States. Contacts have multiplied and become routine across all levels of the bureaucracy. Numerous links have been created between the Japanese and U.S. militaries, in part because of the continued U.S. military presence in Japan and in part because of growing cooperation between the two militaries. Yet bilateral relations, these changes to the contrary notwithstanding, are less a matter of institutions and more a matter of informal coordination. On this score the difference between Germany and Japan could not be greater. Institutionalized for decades, NATO and other European security arrangements have had a much deeper effect on the German military than evolving U.S.-Japanese security arrangements have had on the SDF. The Japanese military looks internationalized in comparison to the Japanese police, but its transnational links are considerably weaker than those of the German military.

japan and Germany NoRMATIVE CoNTEXTS

A widespread aversion to use of force has become an institutionalized norm in both Japan and Germany. Norms matter for an explanation of Japanese and German security policies. But they matter in different ways. In Germany, the Basic Law itself reveals a tension. First, the rule of law constitutes the state as the sum of laws duly passed by Parliament and individual rights secul'ely anchored in a natural rights tradition. Second, legal strictures imposed by state (i.e., executive) power do not constitute that state in a truly liberal, parliamentary fashion. 37 This ambiguity has been at the center of debate between the German political mainstream and critics championing a more vigorous defense of civil liberties. Occasional partisan disagreements in Germany, as elsewhere in Europe, have centered on the tradeoff between the need for effective protection against terrorism on the one hand and a concern for individual rights and parliamentary supervision on the other. Some German responses, such as the redrafting of Article 12ga of the Penal Code, which now includes motivation and intent rather than merely criminal behavior, are in such substantial disagreement with the legal doctrine of other European states that they are not covered in any bilateral and multilateral treaties. In a couple of cases the result has been considerable friction between Germany and its neighbors. In Japan, conflicts over domestic norms affecting internal security have been rare and more muted than in Germany. Occasionally, as in the late 1g6os and early 1970s, a conservative legal establishment favoring a passive judiciary has been confronted by a small group of reformminded lawyers and judges intent on protecting the civil liberties of political demonstrators. The Supreme Court has gone out of its way to avoid ruling on politically sensitive issues and has tried to muffie reformist lawyers. Japan experienced relatively little political conflict over the evolution of international norms; international terrorism was not a focal point of concern. A widely shared assumption holds the specific requirements of Japanese society and the situational logic of its legal norms do not connect easily with the more abstract Western norms codified in international public law. Comparison between Japan and Germany thus highlights how different norms can yield different political equilibria. Chapters 4 and 5 showed that in Japan the context informing security policy reflects a dynamic relationship between social and legal norms. Social norms make it difficult for Japanese decision makers to conceive of an international society of states knit together by abstract norms rather than enlightened self-interest. In Germany, the difference between legal and social norms is much less important, and on questions of state security, legal norms define social norms. The abstract character of legal norms I7J

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makes it easy for German decision makers to engage an international community of states, for that community gives expression to the abstract principles that inform many of Germany's domestic political practices. Internal Security

The norms characterizing Germany's domestic policy of internal security are centered around the idea of the lawful state (Rechtsstaat). This concept informs the self-understanding of police, elite civil servants, and politicians as they deal with questions of terrorism. The lawful state is an abstraction not based on any substantive rule of law. The state, not social norms or moral values, is the foundation for Germany's legal norms.l!B The police do not simply enforce the law; the police are the business of the state. The power of the state is legally controlled but, in the interest of defending state security, can also be legally imposed. Germany's Basic Law balances commitment to the primacy of individual rights with the provision that such rights can be limited by the principle of loyalty to the constitution. Organizations hostile to the constitutional order are explicitly prohibited (Article 9,2). 39 On questions of state security, and perhaps more broadly, the state legitimates itself. Germany's changing social norms are typically codified in legal language, and so constitutional amendments are passed with great frequency. Between 1949 and 1983, 49 articles of the Basic Law were altered, 33 were added, and 7 were deleted. By contrast, Japan's constitution has not been altered once since the end of World War 11.40 The German political elite responded to terrorist attacks with twenty amendments of the penal code passed between 1970 and 1989. 41 These legal changes strengthened state security against attacks from radicals, even at the cost of traditional civil liberties. Article 129a illustrates with particular clarity this shift in legal norms. It facilitates the protection of the state. Revised in 1976 and again in 1986, it grants state officials broad discretionary powers. It forbids the "support" or "advertisement" of terrorist organizations and, under certain conditions, permits the police to arrest individuals even in the absence of any suspicion of criminal activity. In fact, it subjects criminal intent rather than criminal behavior to criminal proceedings. According to Article 1 29a, mere suspicion of support for a criminal organization constitutes a criminal act and thus provides legal grounds for the issuing of a search or arrest warrant. This extension of the government's coercive power beyond criminal behavior, virtually unknown in other European countries has been an important element of German police practice. In short, the legal norms invoked against terrorism reveal a state intent on strengthening its own security as the sole source of norms. I74

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The abstract universalism that typifies Germany's domestic norms has been embodied historically in different forms. In the Holy Roman Empire of the German People, the ancient concept of universal sovereignty stood for an international community that encompassed various parts of Germany.'2 In the late nineteenth century, Germany's autocratic political tradition was explicitly embodied in the opening clause of the 1871 constitution of the Second Empire. Deliberately inverting language in the American Constitution and underlining the autonomous power of the state's executive branch, it starts: 'We the princes." After 1949 a democratic West German state, after prolonged political discussion of the "emergency laws," was designated guarantor of social order in times of crisis. Officials view the German state as part of an international community of states which seeks to protect itself against subversive attacks. Germany has participated with great energy in furthering the evolution of norms prohibiting terrorist activities and in several key episodes played a leading international role. Participation since 1949 was partly a concerted attempt to regain a measure of the legitimacy that the Nazis and their legal specialists of the New Order had squandered.'3 More important, this active role was shaped by the importance that German political leaders have attached to legal norms in domestic politics. Although Germany's involvement in UN norm definition has been more circumscribed than its work in various European fora, Bonn took the lead in formulating the 1977 UN Convention on Terrorism. The subject of terrorism was included on the agenda for the General Assembly at the request of Federal Republic, and a German chaired the group that drafted the convention. 44 The German government did not press ahead, hoping to overcome disagreements about the definition of terrorism that had divided the General Assembly, but it was eager to put its domestic antiterrorist policy on the broadest conceivable footing. Clarifying and universalizing the principles behind that policy was integral to its policy of internal security.'5 European fora combined the evolution of international norms with relative political homogeneity. In human rights, which includes norms affecting state reaction to terrorism, Western Europe has developed a strong regime. 46 Germany played the central role in developing the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism passed in 1977, arguably the most important international convention to establish international norms and procedures for combating terrorism. Based on a political initiative of the German minister of justice, the convention was drafted by the Council of Europe. 47 The Federal Republic was strongly committed to passage of the convention and ratified it without reservation in 1978, thereby seeking to

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set an example for other members of the Council of Europe. 48 Eventually all members, except Malta and Ireland, followed suit. Broadly speaking, the convention shifts attention away from the individual right to political asylum-characteristic of the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s-and toward the preoccupation with the threat of terrorism which marked the tg6os and 1970s. With some justification, one critic of the convention argues that it is an "international manifestation of the theory of the 'strong state' -that states hold in reserve strong and wide-ranging powers with which to suppress possible dissent. Germany particularly ... is generally associated with this view."49 Japanese legal norms are deeply embedded in social norms rather than constitutive of them. The difference is reflected in the size of the legal profession: with only half the population of Japan, West Germany in the tg8os had six times as many judges, five times as many lawyers, three times as many private attorneys, and a third more procurators. 50 The difference is not just a matter of quantity. None of Japan's radical organizations has been declared illegal since 1945. Because they cultivate close links with the public, the Japanese police have not actively sought some of the instruments of police power that the German police take for granted. Wiretapping, for example, is severely constrained by law, even though the prohibition may not be uniformly adhered to, as a tg86 scandal suggested. 5 1 Also, the use of undercover agents, except in some drug-related crimes, is suspect in Japan. On questions of internal security the opposition prevented the government from rewriting laws. In the 1970s and tg8os the Diet passed only a handful of laws or amendments dealing with internal security. The reason for this legal passivity lies in a political stalemate over the attempt to strengthen the legal and political position of the police. The stalemate dates back to the late 1950s, despite intermittent efforts by conservatives in the LDP to revive the issue. Confronted with this political reality, the police have adapted the national practice of bureaucratic informalism. Police informalism ( un yo) does not amount simply to arbitrary discretion. In permitting a flexible application of police powers, however, it gives a broad definition to the legal restraints under which the police operate. Leading police officials in the tg8os were explicit that the police strategy of "comprehensive security" deliberately makes use of police powers to conduct investigations under existing laws and ordinances. 52 German jurisprudence is informed by the inherent wrongfulness of conduct that is proscribed, as John Haley has shown in his analysis of German and Japanese antitrust law. 53 The apparent identity of legal and social norms which results is strikingly different from the dynamic interaction of norms in Japan. In all its actions the Japanese police, for example, cultivate the media and regularly take the pulse of the public. Pa-

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tience in the face of provocations, as in protests by student radicals of the late 196os, was dictated not by legal considerations but by the police assessment of public sentiment. This sensitivity has permitted the police to rise dramatically in the esteem and trust of the general public, occasional corruption scandals to the contrary notwithstanding. The public's goodwill is reinforced by the daily activity of police in community life as well as conscious police efforts to identifY public and police as on the same side in maintaining a civil society. In short, a supportive Japanese public gives the security and riot police great latitude in dealing with internal security on a daily basis. Japan is mostly in agreement with the human rights foundation of antiterrorist policy in the major Western democracies. But the social embeddedness of Japanese law has made it more difficult for Japan than for Germany to further the evolution of international legal norms prohibiting terrorism. Furthermore, Japan's social consensus has favored the notion of the country's uniqueness in the contemporary international system. The Western system of international law is based on a presumption of universally valid principles which does not reflect how norms work in Japan's domestic arrangements. At the end of January 1993, Japan had ratified only 7, the smallest number among UN members, of the 25 human rights treaties that the UN General Assembly had agreed on, whereas Germany had ratified 19, one of the highest numbers. 54 The extension of the abstract universalism of German law into a larger European space has no Japanese analogue. The process appears to have worked in reverse. When theJRA was operating abroad in the 1970s, the Japanese government enacted six domestic laws so that it could ratifY five treaties that it had already signed. In effect, international norms shaped the evolution of Japan's domestic legal norms on questions of internal security. However, these security laws had little bearing on the practical work of the police and the legal profession. In no international organization has Japan taken a leading role to further international norms of antiterrorist policy. Furthermore, the Japanese government has not yet had to demonstrate that it regards these conventions as binding. And unlike in Europe, regionalism in Asia has not developed organizations that might give Japan a forum in which to articulate antiterrorist norms. External Security

The normative consensus that informs Germany's political definition of security is expressed most succinctly by the term "security partnership." Ordinary language is a good indicator of a substantial change in German norms in the twentieth century. Before 1945 the concept "com-

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munity" was usually coupled with the adjective "national." References to international society took a variety of forms, most of which lacked communal connotations. Mter 1945 West Germans responded to the term "national community" with about the same enthusiasm as to the name Adolf. As democratic institutions and practices took hold, domestic affairs were thought of increasingly in terms of "civil society." But West Germany belonged to the Western Community, the Atlantic Community, and of course the European Community. Conceiving of the system of states in terms of security partnerships embedded in an international community builds on German experience with the "social partnership" that regularized conflict between business, unions, and other major interest groups. 55 The meaning of security partnership in the international context is frequently ambiguous. In the 1ggos it means for the left wing of the SPD and the Greens, the building of a European peace order focused on the needs and interests of Central Europe and the successor states to the Soviet Union; for the political center in all major parties, the acceleration of European integration linked both to continued strong ties with the United States and other OECD states and to strong connections to the new states of central and eastern Europe; and for some parts of the right wing of the CDU/CSU, an unwillingness to allow any erosion in the Atlantic Community. Common to all of these conceptions is the readiness to integrate Germany into international security partnerships. This view is strikingly evident in German acceptance of some tenets of nuclear deterrence, on which its defense has rested, and rejection of others. Throughout the Cold War, it was normatively acceptable that the purpose of nuclear power was to prevent war not to win it. A stable regime of mutually assured destruction, but not a nuclear war-fighting doctrine, comported with the German view that security interdependence was inescapable. Developments in American strategic doctrine that cut against this view were greeted with deep hostility and mass mobilization, as in the late 1950s and early 1g8os. The threat of mass killings from and on German territory in all likelihood greater than those committed by Nazi Germany-was unacceptable. And the threat of deliberate first use was acceptable only within a stable system of strategic deterrence. In this view, Germany's security dilemma pointed not to the principle of self-help but to interdependence. Hence, at the end of the Cold War, Germany more quickly than any other major state made dramatic policy initiatives on global environmental issues that illustrate another version of interdependence. External security policy has been informed, in domestic affairs, by norms expressed in the concepts of "moral leadership" and the "citizen in arms." These concepts were coined deliberately to forestall the reap-

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pearance of militarism. They were deliberately institutionalized to foster the growth of an army that actively supported democratic values. Reforms aimed at the exercise of authority within the armed forces and the relationship between the military and society. Although rearmament was hotly contested in the 1950s, on the issue of parliamentary control of the military, according to Donald Abenheim, "SPD advocates ... found willing partners for military reform in the CDU/CSU."56 There was virtual unanimity that an unconstrained military would invite total disaster. Moral leadership was designed to instill political responsibility in West German soldiers without endangering military preparedness. The modem soldier has become a professional with a distinctive competence, including courage, leadership qualities, and commitment, but no longer with a claim to uniqueness. The principles that guaranteed full integration of the military into civilian society and its subordination to a democratic govemment eventually were legally codified between 1954 and 1957. 'They signified," writes Abenheim, "a dramatic break with the Prussian-German military tradition. "57 They were institutionalized in the School of the Armed Forces for Moral Leadership, created in the 1950s, and in two military academies set up in the early 197os. For Japan the normative foundation of national security provoked sharp debate between left and right in the 1950s. The result was a standoff rather than a clear-cut political victory. Eventually, economic productivity convinced the public that it had a "good" constitution, a symbol of peace, prosperity, and stability. In the 1990s, debate about the constitution, and in particular Article 9, is heating up again. For a nationalist such as Shintaro Ishihara, the constitution is "a diaper put on by the Occupation," of which Japan must rid itself to get beyond the "democracy games" the Americans imposed. 58 Facing such strident rhetoric, progressives overlook their anti-American inclinations to join conservatives to defend the constitution and thus to protect Japan's postwar democracy. The renewal of this debate over revision and democracy, writes Carol Gluck, "is further evidence of the long postwar. As one German scholar commented in surprise, Germany operated for forty years under a constitution established under similar conditions without this sort of debate over origins and outcomes."59 Japan's approach to the intemational system is grounded in a notion of economic partnerships. What holds the world together is not common norms that tie different nations together in common endeavors. The world is govemed by interests. Intemational cooperation is made possible by the redefinition of short-term into long-term interests. This ability to redefine interests presupposes a willingness to extend the notion of self to incorporate relevant portions of the other, so that an

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interest-based relationship is ongoing. 60 As a result, Japanese govemment officials show a great deal of patience in dealing with what they often consider an unending string of unreasonable American demands. The Japanese govemment has paid an increasing share of the cost of American troops, but in 1974 West German chancellor Helmut Schmidt unilaterally ended West Germany's off-set payments for American troops. From a German perspective, Schmidt's action was logical under a system of flexible exchange rates. But from the perspective of Japan, it put short-term considerations ahead of the long-term benefits of an interestbased relationship. The Japanese approach differs from the marketbased American approach, which takes the identity of an actor as a given. It also differs from recent German and European experience, which increasingly calls into question the nature of the national self. Japan views many facets of intemationallife in terms of its economic security, broadly conceived. With respect to the United States, Japan has accepted a vulnerability in economic and security matters which exceeds that of Germany. With few exceptions, however, Japan has not had the experience of integrating with numerous regional countries in different intemational institutions-a politically defining experience for Germany in Europe. The normative context explains two aspects of Japan's and Germany's security policies. The complex relation between social and legal norms in Japan and the clear primacy of legal norms in Germany makes gradual change in policy a more plausible choice in Japan. Policy change is not simply a matter of the govemment's legal right but of its social empowerment. In Japan, the source of military and police power lies not only in the instruments provided by law and technology but also in social norms. At the same time the importance of these social norms in Japan weakens the appeal of, indeed the need to relate to, intemational norms which is so noticeable in Germany. Germany's political-military definition of security is pursued in an intemational community of states bound in security partnerships. Japan's political-economic definition of security is pursued in an intemational society of states motivated by the pursuit of long-term economic interests.

EMPIRICAL EXTENSIONS AND ANALYTICAL ALTERNATIVES

Institutionalized norms and security policies in Germany and Japan differ significantly. We can strengthen the argument of this chapter through empirical extension. Distinctions consistent with those made in this chapter exist in other policy domains touching on intemal security, such as the illegal trade in narcotics, and extemal security, for example

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foreign aid policy. We can reinforce the argument further by considering an unsatisfactory analytical alternative. Empirical Extensions Antidrug policy ranks as a high priority in Germany's and Japan's internal security. As in antiterrorism, a great difference exists between German policy that expresses the legal norms of a relatively autonomous state and Japanese policy that relies heavily on the social embeddedness of the state. Furthermore, in international affairs Germany has chosen an activist and cooperative approach to the containment of illegal drugs. Modeled after the American approach, Germany's antidrug policy is informed by the concept of "extended defense." The government's 1g88 antidrug report defines the concept clearly: "Of decisive importance for inhibiting the import of stimulants is the effort to build a line of defense in producer and transit countries. This requires close international cooperation. "61 In the 1g8os Germany stationed 3 7 police officers in 2 1 countries, primarily in the Third World. In the words of Ethan Nadelmann, in its proactive investigative techniques, "the German federal police agency has consciously emulated the DEA."62 In domestic politics Germany's antidrug police units have become "the most innovative and aggressive in Europe. "63 Backed by legislative changes, the German police uses undercover operations most extensively of all European police forces. 64 Furthermore, the networks of European police cooperation that operate in antiterrorism-such as TREVI and the Schengen Accord-also support Germany's active antidrug policy. Japan's antidrug policy, writes the NPA, rests on one main weapon: "To isolate not only drug dealers, but also the users from the rest of the population. ""5 In this as in all other areas of crime, David Bayley suggests, Japan's police have been effective. 'japanese experts attribute their enviable record to two factors: strict law enforcement and a climate of public opinion implacably hostile to drug use.''ffi Only when Japan's social structure was deeply disrupted, as in the first postwar decade, did the drug problem take on epidemic proportions. The restabilization of Japan and tough criminal penalties ended that epidemic and left Japan, despite some sharp increases in drug-related offenses in the 1970s and 1g8os, with a problem that is by American standards minuscule. 67 Since the public sees drugs as threatening not only the individual but society at large, it often reports drug users even when they are family members. The close involvement of the Japanese police with society reinforces self-monitoring, and the police remain confident that social barriers to drugs will hold up. Part of this confidence stems from the critically important role of yakuza-controlled distribution systems in JaI8I

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pan. In the 1ggos cocaine, for example, has not been a major problem for Japan because global narcotic cartels have no direct access to the Japanese market; meanwhile, for a variety of reasons, Japan's organized crime has had no interest in disturbing existing markets. 68 The police depend on yakuza operations, but with arrests for drug-related offenses decreasing sharply in 1g8g, the Japanese police exuded optimism. Close links with Japanese society, including organized crime, are essential to the police view of its mission. ''What we are thinking of," the NPA states, "is how to create an anti-drug society. "69 Japan has frequently professed its readiness to cooperate internationally although its domestic drug problem is not of grave concern. However, it never ratified the 1971 UN Convention on Narcotics and Psychotropic Substances. Despite criminalization of drug-related offenses, enforcement measures in Japan have remained lax by American standards. The Ministry of Justice blocked long-standing NPA demands for legal powers that are considered normal in the United States and, to some extent, in Germany: undercover operations, police surveillance, wiretaps and access to bank records. The limitations under which the Japanese police operate is a source of constant complaint among DEA representatives. Even the monitoring of money-laundering operations, regarded as an essential weapon against the drug-related activities of organized crime, has been stalled for years despite intense international pressure. Japan's participation in a "global partnership" in the war against drugs, signed by Prime Minister Kaifu and President George Bush in September 1g8g, was not motivated by any serious concern about drugs. It was instead a way to cement relations with Japan's most important trade partner and security guarantor at a time of mounting political frictions. As deployment of military forces abroad is prohibited by the Constitution, Japan has refused to participate in the eradication or interdiction of drugs abroad. Instead, Prime Minister Kaifu agreed in September 1989 to provide economic and technical assistance to encourage drug-exporting countries to diversify their economic base. A special Japanese assistance program to Colombia, for example, provided funds for a new sewage system for Bogota and the purchase of audiovisual equipment for the government's music archive. 70 Japan and Germany differ also in their foreign aid policies. Japan's economic approach to Third World aid has a long tradition that American pressure modified only slightly in the 1g8os. Since its inception German aid policy, on the other hand, has been motivated as much by politics as by economics. Japan's official aid is largely limited to economic purposes and, in line with its general foreign policy, has avoided a high diplomatic profile. 71

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The origin of Japanese aid in the 1950s was war reparations. To date a basically passive aid policy is enshrined in the "request principle." Third World countries, often assisted by some segment of Japanese business or by LDP powerbrokers, specify the amount and type of aid they want to get the policy process moving. Since the late 1950s Japan's aid has primarily served the objective of economic growth through export promotion. It moved in the 1970s from aid tied to Japanese exports to untied aid. Mter the oil crisis of 1973, however, aid was increasingly used to assure an uninterrupted flow of energy and other natural resources. In recognition of its rising stature and prompted by the second Cold War, in the 198os Japan extended aid to states bordering on areas of intense conflict, such as Thailand, Pakistan, and Turkey. It was part of a burden sharing in the Western alliance which took account of Japan's limited defense expenditures. But it did not alter Japan's basic approach to economic aid. The Japanese government disburses aid pragmatically and without a consistent set of policy objectives. Occasional declarations of principle by MOFA notwithstanding, aid giving is typically ad hoc because of the number of security interests in Japan's comprehensive policy. 72 Securing raw materials, enhancing global security and stability, improving living conditions in Third World countries, strengthening relations with Third World states-all of these are objectives that Japan's economic aid is designed to promote. In contrast, German foreign aid has been motivated primarily by political factors. It distinguishes clearly between economic and military-political aid. 7' At its origin in 1961 German aid policy was driven by the political attempt to alleviate upward pressure on the value of the Deutschmark in the fixed exchange rate system under Bretton Woods. In the initial years German aid was largely tied; in 1966, for example, about four-fifths of credits granted to developing countries flowed back to German firms as export orders. 74 Once Germany had adopted an aid policy, it used that policy for explicitly political purposes. In the 196os the Hallstein Doctrine threatened to cut off aid from any country that extended diplomatic recognition to the GDR. Economic aid was an instrument of unification policy. Leading aid recipients also benefited from limited arms sales (arms sales are absent from Japan's aid program). With abandonment of the Hallstein Doctrine in the late 196os, outright grants rather than loan assistance came to characterize German aid. By the early 1990s, on this score, Germany ranked first and Japan ranked last among the four largest donor countries. 75 In short, even though export interests mattered, general political and military considerations have been more important in Germany's aid policy.

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Analytical Alternatives There exists an analytical alternative to this book's focus on institutionalized norms. Adherents of parsimonious structural theories emphasize the similarity of Japan and Germany as client states of the United States since 1945· These states have targeted left-wing radicals and were left purposefully with incomplete (Japan) or internationalized (Germany) militaries. The Pax Americana has converted both countries from militarist to trading states that seek profit rather than glory and are geared toward conquering foreign markets not territory. 76 Such an explanation offers a reasonable starting point for a sustained comparison of Japan with Germany which uncovers significant differences in the security policies of the two states as well as in the domestic and international structures that constitute them and to which they react. Unlike structural analyses, which emphasize broad similarities, a situational explanation captures important differences between Japan and Germany on questions of national security. 77 I discuss such an explanation here in both its realist and liberal variants. It underlines differences in Japan's and Germany's situations as a plausible explanation of policy differences. Specifically, such an explanation points to factors that have exposed Germany to greater security threats than Japan. It links difference in the magnitude of threat to a more concerted and activist German security policy. A realist argument, for example, could point to the fact that national division gave terrorists a safe haven, and perhaps active support, in the GDR. Germany has long borders, and so it has been more vulnerable to cross-border flows of terrorists and drugs. Furthermore, Germany was at the faultline of the Cold War, exposed to a land-based military threat from a hostile superpower which was deterred, in part, by thousands of tactical nuclear weapons stored on German territory. Hundreds of thousands of foreign troops operated on German territory on both sides of the Iron Curtain. Finally, the German military was an integral part of NATO even in peacetime. None of these factors existed in Japan, an undivided island nation, far removed from the central faultlines of the Cold War, with only a small number of American soldiers and no nuclear weapons permanently located on its territory. Situational factors appear to offer a plausible alternative to the explanation developed here. On closer inspection, though, this realist version of a "situational" explanation disintegrates into a list of analytically heterogeneous factors encompassing geography, history, military technology and doctrine, and institutions. Realist theory does not offer an explicit logic by which to rank the relative importance of these factors. Furthermore, any singlefactor explanation has a scope more limited than this book's argument.

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It can make sense of Japan's internal or ofJapan's external security pol-

icy-but not of both. Indeed, several of the factors that situational explanations privilege are sufficiently specific to capture only a few elements of either internal or external security policy. In brief, a situational perspective either offers us a list not an explanation, or it covers a smaller slice of reality than the argument of this book. A focus on institutionalized norms covers questions of internal and external security, despite great differences in the two "situations." Since the early 1970s realists have insisted that Japan's return to the status of a "normal" international power, seeking military might, was just around the corner. Time after time, the policy choices of Japanese governments have proved specific realist predictions wrong. Realist analysis, in the case of Japan's security policy, has been forced to rely on two defenses, both of them unconvincing. First, while the international and Asian balance of power has shifted sharply since the early 1970s, the balance of threat has not. Protected by the American nuclear umbrella, Japanese officials have remained constant: they did not recognize any serious threat to national security and so continued free-riding on the American security guarantee. This line of argument raises several problems. Shifting the analysis from balance of power to balance of threat opens up vexing questions about the origins of threats. Threats exist because of variable identities that define commonality or difference, and such questions can be thought about more productively in a framework focusing on institutionalized norms than in the materialist frame of reference that informs realist theory. 78 Furthermore, I know of no realist analysis that has developed systematic evidence to support this claim. The reason is obvious. The statements and speeches of Japanese officials since the early 1970s do not support it. Japanese officials saw the defeat of the United States in Vietnam and its partial disengagement from Asia as having direct consequences for the threats to which Japan was exposed. Their threat perceptions were also affected by the Soviet buildup of naval forces in the late 1970s and by the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1ggo. For some realists interested in global threat perceptions, these developments in East Asia may not amount to much. Others may view Japanese officials, bent on free-riding, as masters at feigning concerns about international threats in public while in private "really" not worrying at all. The evidence presented in chapters 5 and 6 suggests that both claims are unpersuasive. Japanese officials have reacted less to changes in international threats than on the basis of interests shaped by institutionalized norms. As a second defense, realists can argue not about what happened dur-

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ing the last half-century but about what might have happened had the world looked different. In the absence of the American nuclear umbrella, would the Japanese government have followed realist preceptswhatever that might mean? In such a scenario, for example, realist analysis leads to the plausible expectation of substantial policy change, specifically a sharp increase in Japan's defense expenditures and, possibly, the need to develop national power projection capabilities and minimum deterrence in an anarchic international system. But it also leads to the equally plausible, though contradictory, expectation of no significant change in policy because increases in Japanese defense expenditures would be exceeded by those of neighboring states likely to form an antiJapanese alliance. Reasoning by counterfactuals is an uncomfortable move for an analytical perspective that insists on the primacy of materialist conditions and prides itself on offering a hard-nosed empirical analysis to help us act in the harsh real world. Since it explicitly argues for some immutable laws in history, realist theory cannot take refuge in an appeal to Japanese uniqueness. Evidently, fault lies not with the Japanese evidence but with realism's narrow analytical formulation and indeterminate predictions. Liberal theory offers another way to think about the "situational" explanation. It conceives of this explanation in terms of conditions that impose differential costs on Germany and Japan. By economic logic, differences in cost should elicit different responses. This reformulated explanation quickly runs into new problems. Some situational variables, such as geography, are constants; others, such as technology and doctrine, are variables. Which of the two types is more important? Without causal weights attached to each item on the list, we cannot answer that question. The liberal formulation has been worked through most carefully with respect to a small part of security policy: the magnitude of defense spending. Applied to Germany and Japan, the theory of collective action appears to offer a compelling argument why both countries could be expected to spend less than they would have in the absence of the U.S. security umbrella. Furthermore, an extension of economic reasoning (about relations between principals and agents) may also explain why Germany paid more than Japan did. Germany needed to overcome the lingering U.S. temptation to withdraw from Europe and so sought to entrap the United States through larger defense spending. Japan, by contrast, needed to restrain the United States, which was eager to enlist the SDF in a regional security role. It thus spent even less than might have been rational. Indeed, a rising threat from the Soviet navy and declining confidence in the U.S. security guarantee under President Jimmy Carter led to Japan's arms buildup (in absolute not relative

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terms) after 1976. These compelling arguments link changes in the relative cost structure of intemational situations to policy outcomes (here, defense spending). This line of reasoning faces serious criticism on two grounds. First, repeated, significant changes in the intemational balance of power have presented Japan and Germany with substantial changes in relative cost structures. Yet their defense spending and national security policies have not oscillated but changed only gradually. Institutional lag is one possible response, but it moves analysis away from economic logic to an argument about institutional norms. Economic reasoning focused on relative costs offers no insights into the stickiness of institutions, but a political analysis of norms does. Second, to conceive of intemational situations only in terms of relative costs assumes that the identity of the players is unproblematic. Identity derives, however, not from the players themselves but from the games they play. In Germany and Japan, collective identity has shaped the definition of interests and policy choice affecting levels of defense spending and security policy more generally. In Japan, the politics of the 1 percent ceiling was connected inextricably to clashing conceptions of collective identity. German defense spending has been shaped by the fact that policymakers have shared a sense of community in various intemational institutions, such as NATO. Liberals seeking to defend the situational argument could tum to counterfactual reasoning. How would Japanese security policy look if Japan were placed in the middle of Europe? It is American foreign policy after 1945 and the difference between European multilateralism and Asian bilateralism that account for difference in Japanese and German security policy. This argument has considerable merit. 79 One strength is that it eliminates the artificial distinction between intemational and domestic politics dear to many neoliberals. However, the argument focuses not on costs but on institutionalized norms, including norms of collective identity, that liberal analysis usually overlooks. Hence it strengthens rather than undermines this book's perspective. The data reported in chapters 4-6 showed decisionmakers responding not to shifts in opportunity costs abroad but, as Kent Calder has demonstrated with persuasive evidence, to the primacy of domestic power balances. 80 Arguments that focus on the costs of the intemational system are indeterminate. Chapter 8 argues instead that the institutionalized norms shaping the interests informing Japan's security policy emerged from intense domestic political conflicts in the 1950s. Put differently, even in defense spending, the narrow area that suits it most, a situational explanation that relies on economic logic has to "black-box" the domestic political process by which security policy is made. It is a less

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complete explanation than we need and, for students of politics, less interesting as well.

CoNCLUSION

Although both countries are profoundly suspicious of military issues and deeply afraid of military engagements, neither Japan nor Germany has been able to sidestep issues of state security altogether. They have been compelled to defend state security at home and abroad in ways that satisfy the requirements of their position in the international system, their domestic institutions, the transnational links they have forged, and the normative assumptions that shape their interests. It is common to insist that Japan and Germany are trading states that are fundamentally similar. 81 They were two great beneficiaries of the Cold War. Their political leaders learned similar lessons from their countries' defeats. At century's end Japan and Germany give contemporary expression to a commercial and peaceful vision of international politics. They defy expectations of the traditional "political-military" world and its territorial orientation. Jeffrey Garten stresses their fundamental similarities: 'Japan and Germany do have a lot in common ... these nations are nonmilitary economic powers-pacifist trading states."82 Japan and Germany were the two leading challengers to Anglo-Saxon domination in the first half of the twentieth century."' In the second half, they have played the role of leading supporters. Shielded by the United States, they are no longer tempted by military glory and territorial conquest. Instead, they have focused political attention on enhancing their competitiveness in international markets. The Gulf War of 1991 opened to both, more than to Britain or France, new opportunities to improve their international position through participation in multilateral military action. Yet Germany and Japan refused to participate, Britain and France did not. A realist explanation at the international level has difficulty accounting for this difference. Furthermore, neither the Japanese nor the German government was free-riding, as liberal analysis suggests. Both paid a high diplomatic price for refusing military support, and both bore a large share of the direct and indirect financial costs of the war. Japan contributed $13 billion, Germany $12. 84 Tens of thousands of antiwar demonstrators in the streets of Bonn and unseemly wrangling in the Diet remind us that changes in the cost structure of the international state system often do not tell us what is really important about the security policy of states. Institutionalized norms do. They elucidate how political actors define the interests that shape their choices on questions of state security.

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japan and Germany

Both Japan and Germany are averse to the traditional trappings. of power which give state agents easy access to instruments of violence. This aversion has consequences for their domestic politics and for their international positions. To become the best number-two country in the world is a frequently professed aim of Japanese policymakers. One of Germany's major industrial corporations, Siemens, has lived for decades, and lived well, by the same credo ( der gute Zweite). Making allowance for Germany's position in an integrating Europe, this credo aptly summarizes Germany's international objectives. There are important differences in how Japan and Germany deal with their memories of the past and their aspirations for the future. These differences are reflected in norms that shape political interests differently. A Dutch journalist, Ian Bumma, argues that, metaphorically, Auschwitz and Hiroshima capture these differences. 85 Germans publicly debate their role as perpetrators of unspeakable crimes. By contrast, the Japanese remember their past as victims of a U.S. nuclear attack and eschew public debate on Japan's role in the Pacific War. Bumma's explanation of this difference is ambiguous. At times he invokes culture as an unexplained given, as he repeats Ruth Benedict's distinction between Asian shame cultures and Christian guilt cultures. More typically, he suggests that the difference lies in politics, between a German system that tends to encourage public debate of the past and a Japanese system that does not. Japan seeks to generalize to the international realm the norms and practices that characterize its domestic affairs. Japan's drive toward technological leadership in the twenty-first century fits this pattern, as Richard Samuels has argued. 86 So does its purchase of large amounts of plutonium from France. In this endeavor Japan suffers, as Robert Smith writes, from an "awful sense of isolation from the rest of the world. "87 Japan's domestic social arrangements do not travel well."" Without the dense social relations that characterize domestic society, international society for Japan is a world connected by networks of interests and reciprocal relations. Yet Japan does not merely follow what Davis Bobrow calls the usual "egocentric state-centered realpolitik principle.""" In Japan's domestic affairs, social relations assume a mutual dependence and vulnerability. Embracing dependence is a sure way to seek security in community rather than rely on the goodwill of others. 90 Unfortunately for Japan, conditions differ in an international society where many states are intent on minimizing their dependence on others. Japan's acceptance of the inescapability of dependence may meet an important precondition of building community at the international level. But it is not viewed this way by the elites of other states, especially the United States. For these elites, vulnerability leads to na-

CULTURAL NORMS AND NATIONAL SECURITY

tional weakness not international community. Japanese attempts to make others dependent-on its products, technological assistance, aid-are interpreted not as an effort to spread community but as a creation of strategic options to strengthen Japan's power unilaterally. Hobbesian and Grotian political conceptions, transferred from domestic to international settings, carry different meanings. On this score the contrast between Germany and Japan as two civilian powers is less striking than between Russia and the small European states. The small European states, with their Grotian approach in both domestic and international affairs, differ from Russia, which after Gorbachev exemplifies a largely Hobbesian approach to security issues. 91 Different states project diverse configurations of norms into the international realm, so Japan's view of the relationship between vulnerability and community is unlikely to gain acceptance. In the international society of states, the recognition of "normal" practice is shaped by realist and liberal presumptions that do not accommodate easily Japan's domestic experience. Germany may have it easier. It sees itself as indelibly linked to a deepening integration in a European and broader, Western community of states. In political terms, as this chapter suggests, what matters most politically are regulatory norms that redefine interests in Japan and constitutive norms that alter collective identities and interest in Germany. The corporate alliance that Daimler and Mitsubishi forged in 1990 is not the harbinger of a new Axis in world politics. Japan and Germany are neither new global powers nor new challengers to the United States. They are states with soft shells, carriers of many American interests and norms. Through a politics of norms and identity that shapes their interests, they seek to exercise regional control, each in its own way, both eschewing violence.

CHAPTER EIGHT

Political Transformations, Past and Future

The lack of fighting spirit and the subordinate role of the SDF drove one of Japan's most famous novelists and the leader of the paramilitary organization Tatenokai, Yukio Mishima, to a spectacular suicide on November 25, 1970. With a small group of supporters, Mishima locked up an SDF general and appealed to a jeering group of military cadets to help him stage a coup d'etat. In his last speech, Mishima emphasized that all chances for revising the Constitution had been lost on October 21, 1969, when police had contained the largest mass demonstration of the late 1960s and so obviated the need to mobilize the SDF. More than two decades later, in October 1992, with the party system of 1955 unraveling, a GSDF major published a blistering attack on the corruptionridden LDP, arguing for revolution or coup d'etat as the only way out of Japan's political crisis. In October 1993, a right-wing extremist, Shusuke Nomura, who had been loosely connected to Mishima, killed himself in a meeting with the president of Asahi Shimbun after declaring that, symbolically, he was also killing the newspaper with its corrupting influence on Japanese society. 1 These episodes did not have a discernible impact on the SDF, the police, or the Japanese polity. Internal security policy is encumbered by neither the logic of the international system nor the legal strictures of Japan's Peace Constitution. It offers compelling evidence for the proposition that the Japanese police eschews violence at almost all costs. In the spring of 1995, the gas attack in the Tokyo subway killed 12 and injured over 5,000, signaling a new and deadly form of terrorism. It kept Japan's public in a frenzied grip and the police scrambling for almost two months. The attack was the biggest security threat that Ja-

CULTURAL NORMS AND NATIONAL SECURITY

pan's police had faced in decades. For the first time since 1960, the SDF reportedly mobilized troops for an internal security operation. 2 In this crisis the police applied practices they had developed over decades. They operated, for example, with full support from a public that wanted reassurance and quick results. Although the public got neither, the police cultivated the press assiduously to maintain support. 3 Yoshio Kurabayashi, a court reporter for Nippon Television, said that "people don't want anything at all to interfere with the police. So we are not looking into any illegalities." In the view of Makoto En do, legal counsel to an Aum suspect, such subservience of the media signals that "the public has been mind-controlled. We have become a Fascist state."• The police exploited permissive legal norms, for example in the issuing of search warrants. They adhered to a painstakingly slow and methodical approach. They arrested scores of Aum leaders and cadres on minor charges and used interrogation in police prisons to generate further evidence. And they staged repeated, massive shows of force, with up to 6o,ooo policemen deployed in the streets. Two months after the attack the police arrested the leader of the sect, Shako Asahara, and subsequently moved to have Aum Shinrikyo dissolved.5 In brief, the police showed remarkable restraint in the face of extreme danger. They mobilized a great deal of force without engaging in overt violence. 6 This response offers a striking contrast to the U.S. government assault on a cult compound which killed about seventy members of a religious sect in Waco, Texas, in April 1993. Mter a 51-day standoff, the police used an armored vehicle to knock holes into various buildings and injected tear gas. A fire killed most of those inside, including 25 children. The FBI was criticized after the debacle for acting too hastily. Jeffrey Jamar, agent in charge, asked, "Where does impatience start? Is it the sixth week? The seventh week? The negotiations were going nowhere. We could spend six more months there, and nothing would change."7 Attorney General Janet Reno, widely praised for accepting responsibility for this massive failure, used military language to describe the fiasco. "Today was not meant to be D-Day. This was just a step forward in trying to bring about a peaceful resolution by constantly exerting further pressure to shrink the perimeter. "8 Violence may have created new violence. The 1995 bombing of a federal building in Oklahoma City killed 164, including 19 children, allegedly in retaliation for the killings at Waco. One difference between Japan and the United States is self-evident in international affairs and has domestic roots. On questions of state security, in the words of a former high-ranking official, Japanese police officers follow one command: thou shall not kill. 9

Political Transfurmations

PoLicE AND MILITARY CoMPARED With the end of the Cold War, state security is being redefined. Broader conceptions of economic, societal, and environmental security are acquiring currency among policymakers and scholars alike. 1°Furthermore, states must increasingly reckon with not only their own security but the security of groups and individuals. The danger of nuclear proliferation illustrates the continued relevance of traditional conceptions of security. Large flows of refugees point to new security threats. The possibility of an international grey market for plutonium, stocked from Russia's vast reserves, raises the specter of nuclear terrorism, which combines what academic specialists seek to separate: internal and external security, narrow and broad threats. Since the SDF are historically an offshoot from the police, in Japan internal and external security intermingle. This common historical origin is reflected in the SDF's continued aversion to the use of violence. Such an aversion is more typical of a police force than of an army. 11 It is the police which has prospered since the 1950s. In sharp contrast to the SDF, the police have been successful in protecting their power from the incursions of other bureaucrats. Before 1945, in times of national emergency, the Martial Law Ordinance empowered the army to act, and in the military police the army had an organizational base for intervening-a base it has lacked since 1945· The police have been more successful than the SDF in the fierce bureaucratic battles for financial resources. For the security police, these resources have been concentrated in the MPD, while the NPA has controlled all prefectural police forces. Between 1955 and 1988 the police force at the prefectural level increased by a factor of 1.6, some 88,ooo police officers, compared to an increase of 1.4 or 69,000 for the SDF. Budgetary data reveal a similar trend. The total police budget increased 3·9 fold between 1955 and 1988, whereas the SDF's budget increased 2.6 fold. 12 At its peak, in the early 198os, the Japanese police budget amounted to three-quartets of the defense budget; the corresponding figure for West Germany, after sharp spending increases on the police in the 1970s, was less than two-fifths. 13 Since 1945 the police have not acted in the shadow of a much larger army: the SDF outnumber Japan's police by a factor of only 1.5, but before World War II the ratio varied between 4 and 86. 14 Another measure of the size of Japan's security police is the "excess" of police personnel in Tokyo. Based on average police density in Tokyo and Osaka, Japan's two largest prefectures, Tokyo was "overpoliced" by 7,300 in 1961, 13,000 in 1972, and 16,ooo in 198o-even though it

I9J

CULTURAL NORMS AND NATIONAL SECURITY

had only average crime rates. 15 Overpolicing, a matter more of insurance than underconfidence, recognizes the added risk of political crimes. In the face of tangible threats from the IRA, the London police mobilized 6,ooo police officers for the wedding of Prince Charles, about one-fifth of the number of police in Tokyo during the wedding of Crown Prince Naruhito in June 1993. 16 The territorial density of the Japanese police, Setsuo Miyazawa writes, is such that "the country has been saturated by a larger number of officers than many other countries." 17 The SDF is considerably weaker and enjoys lower public standing, reinforced by its botched relief efforts after the Kobe earthquake. Although a major economic and technological power, Japan disposes of only modest military might. By conventional measures of military strength Japan ranks far behind its major industrial competitors. In 1985, its ground forces ranked 28th, its air force 23d, and its navy 11th in number of hulls and 7th in total tonnage. 18 A decade later there had been a modest change. In 1994, Japan's ground forces ranked 25th, its airforce 16th, and its navy 8th. 19 Relying on a more sophisticated formula that takes account of personnel strength, firepower, and training, the U.S. Department of Defense compared Japan in the late 198os with the member-states of NATO. It concluded that overall Japan ranked eighth, between Spain and Greece; ninth in ground forces, between Spain and the Netherlands; eighth in its airforce, between Turkey and Spain; and fourth in naval power, between France and Germany. However, the MSDF is less than one-tenth of the size of the U.S. Navy. 20 Japan's weapons procurement budgets increased at an annual rate of 11.5 percent between 1976 and 1990, but they have shrunk by $9 billion since 1991 (about 10 percent annually) .21 Weapons procurement in the peak year, 1990, was $6 billion and defense R&D expenditures about $0.5 billion, respectively 7 and 1.4 percent of the corresponding U.S. figures. 22 Disintegration of the Soviet Union and appreciation of the yen had made Japan's defense budget, measured in current dollars, second or third largest in the world by 1995. 23 But this statistic is misleading. In purchasing-parity terms, Japan's defense expenditures are considerably more modest. In 1989 they equaled those of Italy and came to only one half of the British figures-a country with an economy less than onethird the size. 24 In 1992, the intelligence budget of the United States ($29.32 billion) was go percent of the entire Japanese defense budget. 25 A rough estimate of the cost if Japan were to build a conventional military commensurate with its economic strength and population suggests annual expenditures of $150 to $200 billion for at least a decade (considerably more than the costs of German unification in the 1990s). 26 These are very large sums, even for Japan. They disappoint the expectations of Hatper's Magazine senior editor Michael Lind, who writes that "if

I94

Political Transfurmations

it chose to, Japan could become a high-tech military superpower overnight."27 Apart from institutional and normative constraints, there are formidable economic barriers as well. In brief, the build-up of the SDF in the 1g8os reinforced Japan's position as a regional military power in Asia. 28 It did not create the basis from which Japan can become a worldclass military power. The political position of the police and the military inside the state creates conditions favorable for a comprehensive definition of state security. The penetration of the military by other organizations is markedly greater than that of the police. Unlike the police, the military is not closely linked to Japanese society; but it draws strength from the dynamism of Japan's civilian technologies. Finally, transnational ties, especially with the United States, are much stronger on questions of external than of internal security. Japan has faced no serious threat to its internal security, favoring an autonomous policy stance, but relies on American guarantees for its external security. An astute observer of Japanese politics, Karel Van Wolferen, is thus mistaken when he writes that "in a political system where the various power groups refuse to give anyone a mandate for making binding decisions, institutions with the means of physical coercion-the police and the military-... are essentially in charge of themselves."29 Constraints on the military are much greater than those on the police. The interplay of social and legal norms also helps define the interests that inform Japanese security policy. In a 1991 opinion poll, the Japanese public valued "respect for law and order" most highly of all (92 percent), ahead of a variety of welfare and democratic values (So-go percent). To "have a strong defense" ranked at the bottom of the list (38 percent). 30 In internal security, evolving social norms have facilitated a gradual expansion of police power which has stretched existing legal norms. These social norms have impeded international policy coordination by underlining Japan's "uniqueness." On questions of external security, by contrast, the interplay of social with legal norms has favored policy flexibility under some conditions, rigidity under others. Chapter 5 suggested that on economic issues institutionalized norms point to flexibility whereas on military issues they encourage rigidity. Chapter 6 refined and tested the idea by showing that what mattered for the balance between flexibility and rigidity in U.S.-Japan security relations was not the content of policy but its normative context. The Japanese were remarkably flexible in coordinating military policy with the United States but rigid on the important issue of technology transfer. In other words, chapters 5 and 6 show that consensual norms on economic or military issues facilitate policy adjustment, contested norms do not.

CuLTURAL NoRMS AND NATIONAL SECURITY

Differences between the police and the military functions of the modern state are diminishing as diffuse threats in an uncertain environment have replaced the relative certainties of the Cold War. This development affects not only Japan but also the United States. If a new world order is the goal of American diplomacy, America's new role may be to act the part of an international policeman. In the words of General Colin Powell, former chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Guess who gets called when suddenly someone needs a cop?"31 However, outright military intervention makes Americans nervous; they do not want to settle disputes all over the world. But logistical and transportation capacities have made the United States Defense Department, in the words of Major General Thomas L. Wilkerson, the "nation's 911 force." The American military has become indispensable for dealing with natural disasters and humanitarian relief missions, in northern Iraq, Somalia, Rwanda, and Florida. 32 At the same time, American police work is changing, along lines that the Japanese police have developed. Models of community policing organized around "soft skills" and "cooperative relations with community" have sprung up over the last few years in South Seattle and Takoma Park, Baltimore and New York City. 33

THE PAST

How should we think about the origin of the institutionalized norms that have shaped Japanese security policy? In their pursuit of parsimony, realists and liberals favor simple and all-encompassing explanations rooted in two supposedly universal axioms. Realists see normal states as unavoidably linked in conflict in an anarchic international system; they look to history for evidence that confirms their expectation that Japan is again becoming a "normal" state. Liberals grant that conflict is endemic, but they expect that self-interested agents will normally adhere to norms regulating state behavior. Both realists and liberals rely on structural or situational explanations that make an elegant analytical move-a move at once beguiling and wrong-headed. They reduce major historical discontinuities, such as the Pacific War, to a structural or situational factor that resets the value of basic variables. In their view, war makes states. Applied to Japan, this argument appears eminently plausible. Japan was destroyed in the Pacific War, and Hiroshima and Nagasaki became powerful symbols of that destruction. The American Occupation reorganized Japanese politics, and for half a century thereafter American troops stationed in Japan and the U.S. nuclear umbrella protected Japan. Under the Pax Americana Japan grew rich, and so the discredited militarist tradition had no allure for the Japanese public. Japan defined

Political Transformations

security in economic and political terms and resisted all attempts to make military policy more important-exactly what one would expect. This argument has implications for the future. As long as the United States extends a security guarantee over Japan, there will be no pressures (for realists) or incentives (for liberals) to push the Japanese government to change security policy. Even after the Cold War, Japan can still have protection on the cheap. Meanwhile, U.S. insistence is eliciting marginal policy reforms, illustrated by Japan's leading role in the UN peace-keeping mission in Cambodia. The structure of the international system and the incentives in particular situations thus appear to explain Japan's security interests. The attraction of this argument is self-evident, for it seems to fit the German case as well as the Japanese one. It is parsimonious and covers similarly situated cases. Unfortunately, it is also wrong. The international balance of power and situational factors defining relative costs mattered less for Japan's security policies than did domestic political struggles and contested norms. In the 1950s, political and bureaucratic elites fought bitterly over what kind of country Japan was to become. Politicians purged after 1945, such as lchiro Hatayama and Nobusuke Kishi, pushed for rearmament. They were motivated both by the threat of communism at home and abroad and by the desire to reassert Japan's traditional identity against the United States, an overbearing new ally. On the political defensive, Prime Minister Yoshida's government proposed in 1953-54 a build-up of the military which, if fully implemented, would have produced a military roughly comparable to that of other medium-sized powers. 34 Under American Occupation, the Japanese government did not oppose being involved in the Korean War. Fear of adverse publicity, however, led it to conceal the full extent of Japan's involvement. Thousands of Japanese shipping and railway experts worked in Korea under American or UN command. Between October and December 1950,Japan deployed 46 minesweepers, manned by 1,200 men. Two boats were sunk, with one man killed and eight injured. Almost one-third of the support ships at Inchon were manned by Japanese crews. 35 According to Kenneth Szymkowiak and Patricia Steinhoff, the May Day clashes between leftwing demonstrators and police in 1950 and 1952 "established the ground rule that the civilian police would not fire on unarmed demonstrators regardless of provocation. "36 These historical facts make the arguments of realists and liberals about the assumed transformation of 1945 look like they are made of thin air. John Dower captures the political contestation and historical change more accurately when he concludes that bitter infighting among Japan's political elites subjected the constitution "to further tortured rem-

CULTURAL NORMS AND NATIONAL SECURITY

terpretation exacerbating political bipolarization (and temporarily conservative schism) and providing a symbolic focal point for subsequent political struggle .... Article 9 was blown up like a balloon, twisted like a pretzel, kneaded like plasticene .... Even while bending the law to its purposes, the Yoshida group remained acutely sensitive to its ultimate constraints. "37 Prime Minister Yoshida himself was deeply committed to a narrow economic definition of national interest-his primary reason for resisting Japan's rearmament. In 1952 he confided to a young aide (and the LDP's last prime minister of the early 1990s), Kiichi Miyazawa, that it "is indeed our Heaven-bestowed good fortune that the constitution bans arms. If the Americans complain, the constitution gives us a perfect justification. The politicians who want to amend it are fools."'" Neither the U.S. occupation authority nor Yoshida and his cabinet thought the constitution and Article 9 prevented Japan from participating as a fullfledged member of the United Nations. It was subsequent interpretation, initially for reasons of expediency, that created a minimalist interpretation of Article 9 and eventually a norm prohibiting SDF deployment abroad. This norm has shaped Japan's national security policy ever since, at times against the clear wishes of the government. 39 The Yoshida doctrine, writes Michael Green, "was in fact, not a 'doctrine' but a 'compromise' among the advocates of unarmed neutrality, unilateral rearmament, and disarmed economic (and technological) alliance with the United States-all of whom had to fit under the conservatives' ideological tent in order to achieve the political stability necessary for economic reconstruction." 40 In the early 1950s, antimilitarist norms did not determine Japanese interests and policies. Conflicts inside the bureaucracy, moreover, do not point to a powerful norm of antimilitarism after World War II. In the early 1950s, MITI seized full control of Japan's armaments industry, the bedrock of Japan's industrialization in the late nineteenth century. Mter the government had designated the industry as a major "national policy" industry in September 1952, MITI was set to promote its development vigorously.' 1 It encountered strong opposition from the precursor of the JDA. The Security Agency was committed to a strong national defense industry, and to this end advocated a policy of nationalization. MITI defeated the initiative. In MITI's view, nationalization jeopardized a proper balance between future support of the military and the civilian sectors of the economy-a balance that MITI officials thought essential for economic reconstruction. MITI's victory reflected a new constellation of power in the government, the result of a purge that eliminated a rentier class that threatened economic rationalization. 42 MITI's interest in armaments was economic not pacific. An arma-

Political Transfonnations

ments industry would not only earn foreign exchange but also offer technological spinoffs for civilian industries. The policy instruments that MITI officials planned to use were essentially the same as those subsequently used for civilian industries such as steel, automobiles, petrochemicals, and computers. In short, what Chalmers Johnson calls MITI's "economic general staff''43 was set to implement a commercial, exportoriented strategy to build up various sectors, including the military, through market mechanisms. MITI won the battle with the Security Agency but, after a bitter fight, lost the war with the fiscally conservative MOF. 44 Although MITI retained regulatory control, in 1952 and 1953 the MOF blocked MITI's proposal to grant preferential tax policies and government subsidies to defense contractors. In 1954, furthermore, the MOF vetoed use of the government's Fiscal Investment and Loan Program to build the defense industry with U.S. military aid. And it flatly rejected MITI's proposal to develop a jet engine that had few prospects for generating commercial sales. The cabinet backed the MOF against a coalition of MITI, MOFA, the Security Agency, and the DPC. Antimilitary norms were of secondary importance. What mattered was bureaucratic power politics. MITI adjusted quickly to its defeat at the hands of the MOF. It shifted focus to the expansion of other promising industries, such as shipbuilding and petrochemicals. 45 Until the late 1970s, the JDA showed little interest in developing an indigenous defense industry and was content with import dependence, especially on American arms suppliers. 46 As late as 1985 the Defense Production Committee of the Federation of Economic Organizations was complaining about the "absence of an arms industry policy. "47 Japan's public, like the country's elite, did not emerge from World War II with a new, readymade pacifist identity. It did not contract an "antinuclear allergy" in 1945, as analytic shortcuts to history assume. The U.S. occupation prohibited all reporting and remembrance of the annihilation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Indeed, the origin of Japan's antinuclear movement dates to 1954 and the irradiation of some fishermen by a U.S. nuclear test. 48 In the late 1950s, Japan's contested identity became the subject of mass politics. It mobilized millions of Japanese citizens, especially on the Left. Mter becoming prime minister in 1957, Nobusuke Kishi first pushed his conservative political agenda on domestic issues such as education, labor, and antimonopoly legislation. Subsequently, he moved to questions of security. In a climate of international crisis, the Kishi government announced in 1958 that it intended to strengthen the SDF (on August 28), renegotiate the United States-Japan Security Treaty (on September 11), and reform the police (on October 8). These initiatives

CULTURAL NORMS AND NATIONAL SECURITY

were widely interpreted as a concerted move to tum Japan back toward its traditional prewar identity. The Socialist opposition brought normal Diet business to a standstill and mobilized public demonstrations against the police bill. 49 The Kishi govemment relied on procedural irregularities to overcome Socialist obstruction in the Diet. It was condemned by the media, and four million citizens mobilized in strikes and rallies. Mter weeks of turmoil, Kishi agreed to withdraw the police bill on November 22. A broadly based coalition of opposition parties, left-wing radicals, and intellectuals succeeded with a strategy of mass mobilization that far exceeded even the worst fears of the govemment. At stake was Japan's collective identity-what kind of country Japan should become. Defense spending had declined in the second half of the 1950s, but Kishi's personality, background, and policies were potent symbols of the Japan of the 1930s. Massive demonstrations signaled widespread opposition. The govemment was forced to cancel a visit by President Dwight D. Eisenhower because it could not guarantee the president's physical security. The Diet adopted the renegotiated Security Treaty, but Kishi was forced to resign. Subsequent LDP govemments redefined Japan's identity in economic terms, ending a tumultuous period in Japanese history. Nineteen hundred forty-five did not magically transform Japan's approach to issues of security. Mter 1945, Japan faced dramatically different intemational incentives than it had before the Pacific War. In the 1950s, Japan was deeply divided over what approach to follow. The norms that have shaped Japan's security policy did not emerge fullblown from defeat in war and American occupation. They resulted, rather, from intense political conflicts inside Japan, both in elite and in mass politics. Throughout the 1950s these conflicts were pervasive as management once again took control over the shop floor. In the latter part of the decade, opposition to the revival of a conservative politics mobilized the population by the millions. Conflict was so wrenching that by 1g6o LDP factions that favored accommodation with the opposition prevailed. The LDP abandoned efforts to make Japan a normal country with a normal military and police. Instead Japan set off on a course of unrestrained economic growth at home and economic expansion in world markets. 50 Political elites and mass publics embraced an economic definition of collective identity and institutionalized regulatory norms, including legal flexibility and procedural consultation of political minorities, which has powerfully effected the definition of security interests ever since. Institutionalized norms forged in the 1950s shape relations of police and military with political parties, interest groups, the bureaucracy, the media, and the public, as well as foreign govemments. Japan's identity (or basic preferences) was 200

Political Transfrmnations

not instantaneously transformed by 1945. In elite politics, antimilitarist norms did not figure prominently in the fight over the defense industry. As Kent Calder writes, "during the 1950s both the defense debate and defense policy formation were relatively free of the distinctive limits and taboos which now so constrain Japanese security policy formation and implementation."51 And in terms of magnitude, "a 'defense allergy' of Japanese budgeting cannot explain why defense spending relative to both GNP and national budget was relatively high and stable during the 1950s, yet declining sharply thereafter."52 An argument that credits major historical discontinuities with instantaneous transformative effects is not only empirically wrong for Japan's security policy. It is also analytically limiting and politically implausible. The argument assumes that states or social groups have fixed collective identities (in the case ofJapan, militarist before 1945 and pacifist after). Typically realism and liberalism take as given the effects of collective identities on the definition of political interests. Alternatively, they assume that identities are magically transformed by cataclysmic events. In the case of Japan the central character appears on stage in the first act as a samurai and reappears in the third as a merchant. 53 Realists and liberals maintain that this shortcoming is inevitable: parsimony comes at a price. This appealingly modest disclaimer contradicts the initial, overblown claim. It holds, to repeat, that as long as Anlerican policy does not change, the logic of free-riding survives and there will be no change in Japanese policy. But the historical record of the 1950 suggests that the indeterminate and incomplete effects of international structure and situation on policy are not of decisive importance. Japanese conceptions of interest were and are shaped largely by domestic political processes. Theories that are silent on this point offer limited insights into the past and only very circumscribed analyses for the future. A view of history that gives excessive weight to historical discontinuities is also politically implausible. Like all students of politics, realists and liberals believe that during historical transformation, political choices matter. If they did not, they would neither read newspapers nor watch TV. History is made by people responding to their remembered, experienced, or imagined identities rather than to the effects that international distributions of capabilities or incentives of international situations have on the utility functions of agents. In times of profound change, neither structures nor situations send unambiguous signals to decisionmakers about how to define the security interests of states. Then, institutionalized norms are particularly important in the definition of political interests. The balance of power and the opportunity costs that mattered thus 20I

CULTURAL NORMS AND NATIONAL SECURITY

were domestic not intemational. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, the United States pressed the Yoshida govemment for a rearmament program much larger than it was prepared to enact. In 1954 the United States lined up behind MITI, MOFA, and the JDA in the fight that the MOF won. With the end of the Korean War, it is true, American policy began to shift, from treating Japan as its Asian arsenal to making Japan a market for U.S. defense contractors. But the barriers against a larger defense industry were rooted in domestic bureaucratic politics, not in American power or incentives created by American policy. Of course, historical periods that transform norms always remain connected to earlier periods. Transformative politics leave residues that infuse successive institutionalizations of norms. Excavating the different historical strata and establishing lineages that connect different periods give us a more accurate description of the institutionalized norms that shape interest and thus policy choice. The norm of Japan as a peaceful country would have had far less strength without earlier collective experiences. The progressive camp in Japanese politics had fought in the 1920s for reform of the land tenure system, and after 1945 it opposed U.S. imperialism and favored total demilitarization. Collective sentiments rooted in the experience of the 1920s and loss in the Pacific War thus offered a basis for mass mobilization in the 1950s-which helped institutionalize procedural consultation of the political minority. That norm hardly existed in the 1950s. The red purge of the late 1940s and early 1950s, bitter industrial conflicts throughout the 1950s, and the climactic conflict of 1958-6o over security issues all suggest an important parallel between the 1950s and the 1930s, even though the progressive camp became stronger after 1945· In the 1930s a legal ban on the Communist party and the trade unions, systematic containment of the Socialists who enjoyed little access to the mass media and had little legal redress, sharp discrimination against the Burakumin (a native minority group), and a reeducation campaign aimed at dissenting intellectuals-all constituted a concerted govemment effort to exclude discontented segments from what was extolled as an organic whole. In the 1930s, political minorities enjoyed no veto power. After the Meiji restoration, especially on security issues, it was the Emperor system not parliamentary politics that had conferred effective legitimacy and power on the police and military. Respect for minority views was part of the politics that the Meiji oligarchs pursued. Deriving their legitimacy from the throne, the armed forces and the police did not worry about the relationship between legal and social norms which is a central aspect of postwar Japan's security policy. The Pacific War replaced an emperor-centered politics legitimating state violence with a 202

Political Transformations

politics of legal and social norms contested by bureaucracy, courts, party politicians, and media. This political contestation may not meet AngloAmerican definitions of democracy, but it has been consequential. It has confirmed that Japan's police and military eschew violence. To insist on the effects of different episodes of transformative politics on the institutionalization of norms is one thing. To unravel the precise historical lineages that lead to Japan's reluctance to acquire "normal" police and military powers is another. For example, one consequence of the Pacific War has been to subordinate the military more fully than the police. As chapters 4 and 5 suggest, the reason was political. Backed by public opinion, elites believed that the Pacific War was rooted in the uncontrolled power of the military not the complicity of other Japanese institutions or the culpability of large segments of Japanese society. 54 Since this book has not attempted to render a historical account, it will disappoint the historian's expectations. Moreover, this brief analysis of historically nested norms will leave rationalists dissatisfied. In search of laws of history, they will want to know why the 1950s and not the 1g6os or 1970s were decisive. For rationalism, this is a vital issue. Rationalist approaches encounter a deeply troubling problem of indeterminacy in the game-theoretic solutions they spell out for games of conflict and coordination, and so they are turning to history and culture. But this vital intellectual issue for rationalism is not important for those who focus on the effects of institutionalized norms on policy. Their historical approach acknowledges what analytical perspectives that seek ahistorical generalizations neglect at their peril. Vexing issues of collective identity remain contestable and open to different political solutions in different crisis periods. As Carol Gluck notes, in chastizing some historians, "we do not recognize the loose changes that lie around the present ... when we write history, we tie all the changes of the past into a relentlessly linear narrative with hardly a loose end in sight. "55 Specialists in international relations are more at fault on this score than are historians. Realists and liberals tend to magnifY the causal effects of international structures or situations on interest and policy choice. When the walls come tumbling down, they rely on chutzpa to convince themselves, and us, that the signs were clear all along, that historical change follows a pattern best captured by tidy rationalist explanations. Some variants of cultural analysis suffer from the same affiiction. A high-ranking diplomat in MOFA, Kazuo Ogura, for example, weighs the effect of the 1940s on Japanese norms very heavily when he writes that "due to the defeat in World War II, and the collapse of a code of previously held ethics, the Japanese have shied away from projecting their beliefs and ideals internationally. Indeed, even now, almost 50 years after 203

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defeat, they still appear to be apprehensive of even expressing one. "56 Johan Galtung believes that those norms did not emerge from recent military defeat but were buried more deeply in history. For him, Japan is a country that embodies "a technology without a message." Japan cannot engage in cultural imperialism, Galtung argues, because its message is nonverbal, crystalized instead in its social structure. 57 Invoking history in its many guises thus can become a misleading shorthand in cultural argument. A historically informed social science must avoid two mistakes. It cannot permit itself to view political actors (as realism, liberalism, and some variants of cultural arguments do) as preprogrammed torpedoes with fixed identities. Neither can it be expansive in its view of actor identity (as are some variants of postmodernism that see identities as infinitely malleable) as pieces of driftwood. 58 History is not a variable to be neatly reduced to international structure or international situation; nor is it an infinite set of possibilities that actors can explore at their own will. A historically oriented social science makes contingent generalizations in periods when important parameters are reasonably stable. In the absence of a social-science version of chaos theory, it describes political conflicts and policy choices when they are unstable, hoping to capture how norms shape the definition of actor interests and thus the politics of state security.

THE FUTURE

Japan's security policy will continue to be shaped by the domestic rather than the international balance of power. The end of the Cold War and anticommunism have put massive domestic corruption center stage and as in Italy are affecting a reorganization of political parties.59 In 1993 the LDP relinquished power for the first time since 1955 and subsequently became a junior partner in a coalition government headed by a Socialist prime minister. The end of the Cold War is consequential for security policy, but international cataclysms affect policy through the interpretation that participants give them. 60 The end of uncontested LDP rule and the reorganization of the party system will be important for those interpretations. It is not clear where Japan will move: grand coalitions of loosely realigning factions, a twoparty system that rotates power between two right-of-center parties, a two-and-a-half party system in which one small party becomes the swing coalition partner, or coalitions among competing large and small parties. Similarly, it is unclear whether reorganization of the party system will involve the voting public; whether the perceived absence of dividing 204

Political Transformations

issues will create a growing pool of voters who can be mobilized sporadically for protest votes outside the political mainstream; or whether Japan will see the spread of a new type of social movement politics. In the transition from one party system to another, the power of the bureaucracy has increased markedly, making it politically more vulnerable. A new party system may have strong effects on the relative power of politicians and bureaucrats. It will take a few elections and several years before the new party system takes on a more defined shape. In the initial phase, change in the policies of the Socialist party (JSP) and its subsequent disbandment have significantly broadened the domestic political consensus about national security policy. Neither the constitutionality of the SDF nor participation in peace-keeping operations causes political disagreement anymore. 61 Of course, policy differences will continue to exist and be debated. Specifically, controversy divides a reformist, activist stance focusing on deregulation, administrative reform, a higher international profile for a "normal" Japan, and a greater willingness to acknowledge the past on the one hand from a conservative, passive stance with a lower international profile for a "civilian" Japan and less willingness to acknowledge the past on the other. 52 Ichiro Ozawa illustrates in his Blueprint for a New japan the first view and speaks for various factions and groups that in December 1994 formed a loose federation, the New Frontier Party. The second view is divided into two discernible groups. In his japan, a Small but Shining Country, Masayoshi Takemura captures a view of Japan as a civilian power that is willing to acknowledge the past; he speaks for the liberal wing of the rump LDP and what remains of the formerly socialist camp. Less willing to acknowledge the past, the leader of the LDP since September 1995, Ryutaro Hashimoto, remains committed to Japan's role as a civilian power. 63 These perspectives indicate faultlines of wider significance: a reformulation of legislation to permit Japanese participation in peace-keeping operations on more "normal," that is military, terms; and, more fundamentally, a revision of Article 9 of Japan's Peace Constitution, prompted by Japan's interest in a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. Short of a dramatic international crisis, neither issue is likely to become a matter of urgent public debate in the near future. 64 Instead, Japan's normal politics, balancing social and legal norms by constitutional (re)interpretation, is likely to prevail. Reorganization of the party system around two or three larger parties on the Right, controlling the levers of power, and two or three smaller parties on the Left will leave the door open to any number of potential coalitions. In such a system, principled opposition to any policy is likely to become marginalized, thereby weakening the norm of procedural 205

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consultation. This book's argument suggests that the contestations of norms and identities driving the reorganization of Japan's party system are likely to be important in determining future security policies too. Indeterminate realist and liberal analyses that focus on international structures or situations can lead to only limited insights. As domestic jockeying for power goes on, two basic views on Japan's security appear to be spreading: future policy will be determined either by global trading houses or by a resurrected military. Optimists insist that global markets, the Asian balance of power, the U.S.-Japan relationship, and the domestic political economy supply strong incentives to remain a noninterventionist trading state, pursuing peace and profit rather than national grandeur and power. Pessimists warn that harsh pressures in the international trade system and the growing uncertainties of a polycentric balance of power will reinforce Japan's mercantilist instincts, giving rise to a more aggressive stance. Both views are based on assumptions about how the pressures of international structure and the incentives of international situation shape policy. Optimists tend to view the new international system primarily as a global market, and they see Japan as a new kind of trading state. Pessimists typically insist on the inevitability of the security dilemma that all states face, and they point to mercantilist elements in Japan's domestic political structures which tend to undermine a liberal international economy. Both optimists and pessimists embrace assumptions-a benign international market place and a pacifist trading state, an unforgiving security dilemma and an aggressive mercantilist state-that predetermine their conclusions. 65 Optimists overlook important aspects of the Asian balance of power which make their strong claims problematic, and they discount political factors that make Japan different from a liberal trading state. Pessimists misidentify an extreme condition of international life as typical, and they overlook significant changes since 1945 that have affected the Japanese polity. Both optimists and pessimists focus on structural and situational determinants of policy, neglecting the causal effects that other factors, in particular institutionalized norms, have on the definition of actor interests and choice of policies. When Americans discuss the future, they rarely ask whether the norms defining how American power should be applied are held by the international community at large. For Japan this is not the case. There remains an uneasy sense that too often Japan remains a stranger in the international society of states. Unlike the United States, Japan lacks abroad what it has at home: an ideology of law and a vision of the good society that motivates political action. 66 Nor does it appear likely that Japan will remake political standards of behavior. A seat on the UN Security Council, for example, symbolizes 206

Political Transformations

membership in the club of great powers-a normal extension of Japan's rising international importance. Yet, unlike their German counterparts, the Japanese public is more skeptical and the government more cautious.67 This reserve is rooted in the norms that have shaped Japan's security policy since the 1950s, norms that make it difficult for Japan to conceive of itself as partaking in the traditional game of great power politics. Japan prefers to spread its influence abroad through markets. It seeks to diffuse the economic conditions and social practices that have made possible the rise of its dynamic and productive society. In the Japanese view, markets are not god-given but manmade: they need to be carefully cultivated and closely monitored. Japan hopes eventually to make the international society of states more recognizable to itself. Changes in the international division of labor illustrate the point. Toyotism is a new way to organize industrial production complexes not only within but also across borders. It creates mutual vulnerabilities and exercises structural control over parts of other nations' economies integrated in production chains that are centered on Japan. On security issues also, this is the way Japan is likely to project its power and influence abroad. Cognizant of the logic of deterrence, Japan's police are visible in massive numbers when the affairs of state require it. Yet this is not the way the Japanese police typically operate. They prefer societal self-policing to public intimidation. They seek to export to other states in Asia not international blueprints for regional integration but institutionalized norms as well as technological innovations that facilitate police work. The military lacks the power that Japan's corporations and police enjoy in their spheres, but the institutionalized norms that shape its operation do not lead to a dramatically different definition of interest or pattern of behavior when projected abroad. The reintegration of Vietnam and China into a dynamic Asian regionalism, for example, should be accomplished through a broad strategy of comprehensive security not through military balancing. 68 Japan's policy choices will help decide whether in Asia the creation of mutual vulnerabilities will help build a community, as it has in Japanese domestic politics, or develop a unilateral strategic option, as in Japan's foreign policy. 69 In the tggos, Asia looms much larger economically, politically, and culturally, than it did only a decade earlier. The Japanese are now aware that Asia is no longer poor and backward; that Hong Kong can be more exciting than Paris; that they can be more relaxed in Asia than in other parts of the world; that they communicate better with Asians than anyone else, for they are also Asians. Through a twist of history, "Asia" has acquired legitimacy in Japan's domestic politics. It draws support from two unlikely sources. Political 207

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forces connected to prewar, right-wing nationalism welcome Japan's move toward Asia as a retum to authentic roots. Political forces that derive from postwar, left-wing pacifism see in the move toward Asia a chance to submerge the drive to national power in cooperative regional security. 70 "Asia" thus touches on issues of collective identity that matter at least as much as do the intemational balance of power and intemational incentives. Asia is the site of the next great arms race, of potentially serious political instability and security threats. 71 Japan is surrounded by nondemocratic or recently democratic regimes that suffer from domestic instabilities. Several states, deeply distrustful of Japan, either possess or seek to acquire nuclear weapons and delivery systems that can reach Japan. Territorial disputes with Russia to the north and Japan's dependence on sealanes in the South China Sea occur in a region where in the very recent past states have relied on military means to secure territorial claims. If Japan is left unprotected by the United States, the defense option that institutionalized norms have prohibited could become a fallback option. But Japan is likely to try all other strategies first. The technologically driven expansion of "self'-defense in Japan's military services, discussed in chapter 6, has voided any clear distinction between defense and offense. Thus once Japan adopts an autonomous military strategy, it will almost certainly look "offensive" to others. On matters of national security, Japan is very unlikely to become the Switzerland of Asia. Asia is also a site of exploding markets and enormous profits. Economic growth, social modemization, and the spread of democracy are all tailored to the trade, investment, and aid policies through which Japan has reentered Asia over the past three decades-and in particular since the mid-1g8os. The institutionalized norms that have driven Japan toward comprehensive security are likely to continue even if the American presence should weaken. The United States has been an integral part of Asian politics and thus an essential part of Japan's move toward Asia. The security treaty could be embedded in different regional security arrangements, and intemational institutions such as Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation could offer a meeting ground for American insistence on enhanced transparency and policy coordination, on the one hand, and shrewdly calculated Japanese interests, on the other. Intemational institutions in Asia and beyond could benefit from an infusion of Japanese resources while continuing to reflect the imprint of the United States. Rather than pursue either the autonomous defense posture of a medium-sized power or assume the improbable role of a "military superpower," Japan could seek to embed its bilateral economic and security arrangements with the United States in organizations that encompass Asia more broadly. Asia 208

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would then become Japan's preferred venue for playing the role of a global civilian power. Such a course would extend American tutelage over Japan for a few more decades while making Japan an important interlocutor for the United States in Asia. It would serve the interests of many in Japan, in the United States, and in Asia, but it may not come to pass. For the scenario overlooks the powerful political effects that norms of collective identity have on the definition of interests. The racial definitions of "self' and "other" that John Dower has analyzed so eloquently for World War II may be less visible today. 72 Nevertheless, identity politics in U.S.Japanese as well as Japanese-Asian relations lurk just beneath the surface. Kazuo Ogura, for example, offers an analysis of the conflict between East and West. In uncharacteristically blunt language, Ogura speaks of the ignorance and prejudice that have blinded Western and especially American observers to the realities of Japanese politics. "To many Japanese, meanwhile, the American approach to Japan comes across as an attempt to create a spiritual colony of the United States onJapanese soil. The American approach seems somehow to refute the Japanese way of life and to violate the fundamentals of friendly relations between countries."73 For Ogura, furthermore, part of the essence of being Japanese is being unwilling to sacrifice human life for moral causes such as freedom and democracy. Such concepts give the Japanese "a vaguely unsettling sensation, as if we were wearing a new suit of Western clothes. The consequence is that it is very difficult for the Japanese to believe that fighting to the death for these concepts is their natural duty as Japanese." 74 The sense of violation of self that Ogura articulates can create currents strong enough to wash away stabilizing power balances, and they can inundate international institutions. On the historical record of the last four decades, however, this conclusion is too pessimistic. It belittles the accomplishments of the Japanese police and military. Conventional theories of international relations and traditional area studies do not help us fully appreciate these feats, for they tend either to neglect or to reif:Y norms. What is striking about Japan's security policy is the extent to which it has been shaped by institutionalized norms, which in turn it modifies. Japan's security policy is politically important and intellectually noteworthy because it focuses our attention on changes in the nature rather than the balance of power. Japan's state agents have found new political possibilities for defending security both at home and abroad-nonviolently.

Notes

1. jAPANESE SECURITY

1. This summary statement demands explication, especially as the concept of nonviolence is typically associated with Mahatma Gandhi and social movements resisting state violence. Because analytical categories established in national security studies do not recognize, let alone explain, central aspects of Japan's national security policy, I use the term deliberately to describe an important and novel political fact. Eschewing violence is different from avoiding coercion. As Steinhoff (1993), pp. 831, 835 and 842, and Foote (1993b), pp. 415,427, point out, the Japanese police, for example, uses coercive force and intimidation in numerous instances detailed in, among others, Katzenstein and Tsujinaka ( 1991) and Miyazawa ( 1992). But overt police violence of the kind that occurs frequently in the United States is a different matter. As chapter 4 demonstrates, the Japanese police goes to extraordinary lengths to avoid such violence even when operating under extreme conditions. For the military the contrast between Japan and the United States is self-evident. An international opinion survey indirectly supports the claim that the Japanese abhor violence. It shows public opinion in Japan, by international standards, strongly opposed to participation in UN-supervised peace-enforcement missions. Willingness to support such missions is much greater among the British (72%), American (59%), and German (57%) publics than the Japanese (36%). SeeDer Spiegel 14/1994, pp. 79, 81. The deployment and behavior of the SDF while participating in its first UN peace-keeping mission, in Cambodia, more directly support the claim that the SDF shuns violence. For a discussion of the cross-cultural meanings of concepts relating to peace and violence see Ishida, 1983, pp. 1 17-36. 2. U.S. Department of justice, Federal Bureau oflnvestigation, 1992, p. 22. I thank H. Richard Friman for access to unpublished Japanese data. The United States (21.93) leads Japan ( 1.73) by a very wide margin in the rate at which police officers are murdered (per 10o,ooo for the years 1970-77). See Zunno 2II

NOTES TO PAGES

1-4

and Lester, 1g82, pp. 7-8. Like the United States, Japan has the death penalty, however, executions are decreasing in Japan (from over goo in 1873 to about one a year now), while they are increasing in the United States. Between 1g88 and 1gg1, 17 death sentences were handed down inJapan, compared to 1,057 in the United States; and about one execution takes place annually in Japan, compared to an annual average of 16 in the United States from 1g88 to 1gg1. For Japanese data see Foote, 1gg2, p. 32g, and 1gg3a, pp. 36g-7o, 510, 514q, based on Dando, 1gg1, pp. 132-33, 252-53, 256-57. For U.S. data see U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1gg3, tables 6.114 and 6.11g. 3· Kyodo News International, 1gg1. New York Times, December 3, 1gg1: A16. 4· Furthermore, this particular realist claim is unwarranted. With the exception of Kenneth Waltz ( 1g7g), realists who stress the powerful effects of bipolarity typically smuggle hidden assumptions into their analysis when they seek to analyze the recurrence and the direction of balancing behavior. International structure alone does not provide us with compelling causal arguments about the direction of balancing. 5· Chapter 8 is silent on the issue of how strong a political force Japan's antimilitarism became at war's end in 1g45. However, the chapter does show that it was not the end of the war but political battles about the meaning of the war and the collective norms which emerged from these battles that shaped Japan's subsequent security policy. 6. Why does one set of events constitute a critical moment in history, freezing a specific set of norms, as was true of Japanese political battles in the 1g5os, while another set of events does not? This question is reasonable from the rationalist premise, which realism and liberalism share, but is not particularly pressing for the institutionalist account that subscribes to a contextual and historicist view of change. Realists, who see history as a repetition of sameness, as well as liberals, who search for focal points and stable equilibria, often approach history as a storehouse of facts which they sample at will. Institutionalism does not. It assumes that social science can make only contingent generalizations about historical periods when parameter values are reasonably stable. Hence it need not and should not answer a question that bedevils rationalism. 7· Students of rational choice, ethno-methodology, and rhetoric correctly remind us that, as long as the mechanisms at the micro-level are not well specified, this answer is not fully satisfactory. 8. Keisatsucho, 1g8ob, p. 87. g. The analysis makes no assumptions about whether policy flexibility or rigidity is inherently good or bad. That judgment depends on the substantive purposes of specific policies and their political context and remains contestable. In the case of Japanese foreign policy, what Henrik and Michele Schmiegelow (1ggo, p. 558) applaud as "strategic pragmatism," Seizaburo Sato (1g77, p. 38g) condemns as "an irresponsible immobilism." How much states adjust in different policy domains is an empirical issue, which one can hope to create some agreement about among observers, using evidence and analysis. 10. Dore, 1g86. This apparent contradiction also resonates with other writings on Japanese politics. See Stockwin eta!., 1g88, and Gluck, 1g85, p. 5· 11. In an excellent study Keddell ( 1gg3, pp. 6-7) focuses on the "incrementalism" of Japanese defense policy because he seeks to distinguish his argument 2I2

Notes to Pages 4-r3 from Calder's (1988) emphasis on discontinuous change in Japanese defense policy. But Keddell's study is selective in addressing only some aspects of defense policy related to general issues of military security, here discussed in chapter 5, as well as technology transfer, analyzed in chapter 6 (Keddell, 1993, pp. 6-7). His analysis excludes economic security and military cooperation, discussed, respectively, in chapters 5 and 6, which show an astonishing degree of policy flexibility. Hence even though Keddell's label of "incrementalism" differs from this book's label of policy "rigidity," his analysis partially confirms my argument. The definition of flexibility and rigidity varies here across different dimensions of security policy, not across countries or counterfactuals. This makes coding policies as either "flexible" or "rigid" less problematic than might first appear. 12. The choice of labels is, as always, problematic and may provoke dissent. No one likes to be tarred with a broad brush. Realism and liberalism are very general labels and hence may include variants that incorporate elements of this book's analysis into their formulations. Some realists, for example, eschew the parsimonious notion of the state as a unitary, rational actor. These scholars incorporate into their conception of the state broad views of the relevance of domestic and transnational politics for security policy. And a few liberals take seriously constitutive norms and the identity of actors. Generally speaking, however, I believe that the labels I have chosen accurately characterize the paradigmatic orientations of realism and liberalism. See also Katzenstein ( 1996a). 13. Gluck, 1985, pp. 284-85. 14· Schweizer, 1993· Whitney, 1995· 15. "Germany" refers in this book to the Federal Republic of West Germany before October 3, 1990, and united Germany after. 16. Katzenstein, 1997. 17. Whether one calls a state's security policy more or less comprehensive is a terminological issue with substantive political connotations. Japanese definitions of state security downplay the coercive elements central to Anlerican definitions. This issue is discussed in general terms by Ullman, 1983; Sandholtz eta!., 1992; Moran, 1993; Romm, 1993; Allison and Treverton, 1992; Schmitt, 1994· 18. Andrews, 1980. Keller, 1989. Fagelson, 1g8g. 19. Marx, 1988, p. 32. 20. Zwerman, 1989, pp. 31-32. 21. Johnston, 1995, p. A8. Nadelmann, 1993. 22. Katzenstein, 1990. 23. Katzenstein and Tsujinaka, 1991. 24. Garten, 1992, p. 19. 25. This is in no way original; many books on Japanese political economy, written by political scientists in the last two decades, adopt a similar approach. 26. For some applications to Japanese politics see Kernel!, 1991; Ramseyer and Rosenbluth, 1993; J. Kato, 1994; Hancock, 1993; Cowhey and McCubbins, 1995· 27. Van Wolferen, 1989, p. 5· 28. Van Wolferen, 1989, p. 159. 29. Van Wolferen, 1991. 30. Dahrendorf, 1969, p. 264. 31. Dahrendorf, 1969, p. 262. 32. Foote, 1992, pp. 384-85. 2IJ

NOTES TO PAGES 13-22 33· Van Wolferen, 1g8g, pp. 18, 81. 34· Katzenstein, 1985. 35· Van Wolferen (1g8g, pp. 18, 241-42) is aware of the force of this objection and thus insists that, amid all of the world's religious traditions, including Confucianism, Japan is unique in its indifference to transcendental truth or universal values. He is therefore forced to adopt the implausible view that while the Dutch had no influence over what to incorporate from the Americans and other Western powers, the Japanese were free to choose particular elements of Confucianism. Murakami's (1gg6) "polymorphic liberalism" offers a different way of thinking about "Eastern" and ''Western" philosophical traditions. 36. Positive evaluations of Japan and Germany, such as Vogel's (1979) and Calleo's (1978), are important counters to Van Wolferen's and Dahrendorfs critical assessments. Since, despite their great lucidity and elegance, they suffer from analogous analytical weaknesses, I do not discuss them here.

2. INSTITUTIONALISM, REALISM, AND LIBERALISM 1. For complementary analyses see Samuels, 1994, and Berger, 1992, 1993, and 1gg6. 2. Thomson, 1993· 3· For three very different, recent books dealing with Japanese conceptions of self and other see Roland, 1988; Rosenberger, 1992; Feinberg, 1993· 4· The empirical, causal, or conceptual nature of that link is a matter of unresolved theoretical controversy in contemporary social theory. 5· Hechter, 1992, pp. 215-16. Norms can contain causal beliefs about how the world works. However, unlike norms, causal beliefs, like other ideas, can be held without constraining behavior. See Goldstein and Keohane, 1993, for an exploration of the role of ideas in foreign policy. 6. Aggarwal, 1985; Tsebelis, 1ggo; Kowert and Legro, 1gg6. 7· Swidler, 1986. For a related though different position see also George, 1g6g. 8. Adler, 1987, pp. 11, 15. Reed, 1993, pp. 4 7-76. g. Smith, 1g8g, p. 722. 10. Meyer, 1987. Jepperson, Wendt, Katzenstein, 1gg6. Iriye, 1979 and 1ggo. 11. Thomas, Meyer, Ramirez, and Boli, 1987. 12. Hechter, igg2, p. 215. 13. Ames, 1981, p. 1. 14. Berger, 1992, pp. 13-14. More generally see Steinmo, Thelen, and Longstreth, 1992; Powell and DiMaggio, 1991; March and Olsen, 1989 and 1gg6; Cerny, 1ggo; Robertson, 1993; Weaver and Rockman, 1993; Orren and Skowronek, 1991. 15. Laitin, 1g88, p. 590. 16. Goertz, 1994, p. 224. 17. Only the behavioral aspect of practice is subject to direct observation. For treatments of this issue see Young, 1994; Kratochwil and Ruggie, 1g86; Adler, 1992. 18. For additional discussion of the implications of realist and liberal analysis in the case of Japanese security see also the discussion in chapter 7, pp. 184-88. 2I4

Notes to Pages 23-26

19. Whether realism is too general depends on the explanatory claims that it wishes to make. I refer here to a large literature on Japanese security policy that seeks to explain specific foreign policy choices rather than the effects of systemic constraints on general tendencies. Cumings ( 1993) offers the most sophisticated and compelling analysis along these lines, based on a mixture of realism and world systems analysis. But his argument about the "outer limits" of American control, which remain underspecified, suffers, like most realist analysis, from being both indeterminate and silent on domestic processes. These processes shape Japanese security policy in ways that, as this book argues, contradict the expectations we can derive from realist analysis. 20. Reformulating a realist balance of power theory in terms of balance of threat opens up a host of difficult questions that tend to undermine the parsimony of the realist perspective, as Walt's ( 1987) study illustrates. Barnett ( 1996) develops this argument. 21. Friedman and Lebard, 1991, p. 403. 22. Friedman and Lebard, 1991, pp. xiv, 16o-88, 255-56, 259, 269, 290, 300,324,400-401. 23. Bayley, 1991, p. 189. 24. Clifford, 1976, p. 6. See also Kiihne and Miyazawa, 1979, p. 91; Feldman, 1988, pp. 220-27. 25. D. Johnson, 1993; Waltz, 1979. 26. Keegan, 1993· Price and Tannenwald, 1996. 27. The argument is developed here only with respect to the domestic politics of Japan's internal security. It could easily be extended to include neoliberal regime theory in international relations, another rationalist, institutional argument. See Jepperson, Wendt, Katzenstein, 1996. 28. Hechter and Kanazawa, 1993, p. 458. For other works helpful in understanding this important article see Hechter, 1987; Friedman and Hechter, 1988; Heckathorn, 1990; Macy, 1993. 29. Compared to Germany, a relatively crime-free and orderly society by American standards, Japanese crime rates are lower by a factor of three (murder), four (burglary), six (rape), and thirty-one (robbery). These data differ slightly in different sources. Keizai Koho Center, 1990, p. 92. National Police Agency, 1987b, pp. 4-7, and 1989a, pp. 33-37. Takeyasu, 1986, p. 22. Advanced Course, 1989, p. 135· Miyazawa, 1990 and 1992, pp. 13-14. Bayley, 1991, pp. 5-10. Kristof, 1995c. Hechter and Kanazawa, 1993, p. 462. Hechter and Kanazawa qualify their argument in ways that probably affect some of their empirical claims without undercutting the central thrust of their analysis; see p. 469, n. 12; p. 476, n. 25; p. 479, n. 30; and p. 486, n. 39· They also rely on some indicators of questionable validity; see pp. 481-85, especially p. 482, n. 32. 30. Miyazawa, 1992, pp. 171-73, 191, 198. 31. Ames, 1981, pp. 72-74. Advanced Course, 1989, pp. 98-99. 32. One aspect of social control in Japan is the fear of perpetrators and victims alike that their names might be published in the papers. 33· Hechter and Kanazawa, 1993, p. 463. Reed, 1993, p. 36. 34· Hechter, 1992. 35· On the problem of overlap between a cultural analysis that focuses on the internalization of values and a sociological perspective that stresses collective norms see Coleman, 1990, pp. 286-99. 2I5

NOTES TO PAGES 26-30 36. Shain, 1984, pp. 226-27. See also Nakane, 1973. 37· On the problem of tautology in sociological analysis see Barry, 1978, pp. 90-91. 38. Campbell, 1988, p. 32.]. Kato, 1995. 39· Rationalism is turning to cultural analysis for two different reasons. First, it has come up short in dealing with the problem of multiple equilibria and indeterminate solutions. Norms conceived as focal points offer a way out of this dilemma. Second, incorporating cultural features helps rationalists transform games with incomplete information into technically perfected games with complete but imperfect information. SeeJ.Johnson, 1992, pp. 18-19, and Ferejohn, 1991. 40. A liberal account of norms also has difficulty dealing with immanent norms desired only for their own sake. In contrast to regulatory norms, constitutive and immanent norms emerge from relationships and need to be communicated to become part of an actor's preference structure. Constructivist approaches thus have an advantage over rationalist ones in making sense of constitutive and immanent norms. 41. Johnson and Keehn, 1994· David Laitin's (1994, 1995) work on language policy is very promising; it models how individuals coordinate their expectations of and behavior in a cultural institution that, over time, may affect individual and collective identities. 42. Liberals can of course argue that maintaining this identity norm is itself rational, in internal efficiencies (such as maintaining social harmony) or external efficiencies (such as saving on defense expenditures). Once a broad analytical perspective such as institutionalism recognizes collective identities as consequential, we are free to investigate both variable cost-sensitivities of norms and norm-sensitivities of costs. But this does not obviate the central point: liberalism's neglect of collective identities. 43· Samuels, 1992, pp. 27-29. Because political and epistemological issues intersect, the debate between these two positions is sharp. See Hancock ( 1994) and Clemons (1994) for two brief examples. 44· Johnson, 1982 and 1995· Prestowitz, 1988. Fallows, 1994· 45· Van Wolferen, 1989, 1990. 46. Ziirn, 1992, pp. 133-35. 47· Iriye, 1991. 48. Ruggie, 1993, p. 573· Institutionalism incorporates in its view of international structure both norms and capabilities, that is, ideational and materialist factors. It is thus well situated to deal with the imposition by dominant states of norms defined as collective social facts. Realism, in a similar process of analysis, addresses the imposition of the hegemon's values, and thus assumes that values either are the same as norms or become collectively held through political mechanisms that realist theory is not well equipped to analyze. For a notably sophisticated attempt to deal with this problem from a realist viewpoint see Nau 1990. 49· Ramseyer and Rosenbluth, 1993, p. 3· 50. March and Olsen, 1989, p. 48. 51. Oe, 1994· 52. Sanger, 1993a. 53· Buruma, 1994, p. 36. 2I6

Notes to Pages 30-36

54· Gluck, 1985. 55· Maruyama, 1963, pp. 1-24, 135-56. 56. Pyle, 1992, pp. 32-36, 56-65, 94-101. 57· Pyle, 1992, p. 36. 58. Economist, 1995. Smith, 1994. 59· Quoted in Pyle, 1992, p. 94· Nester, 1ggo, pp. 32g-8g. Harries and Harries, 1987, pp. 252-57. Muramatsu, 1987. The national role conception likely to be at the core of that new collective identity is Japan as a successful late developer and a cooperative partner in regional affairs. See Sampson and Walker, 1987, pp. 117-18. 6o. March and Olsen, 1g8g, pp. 50-51. 61. Rohlen, 1g8g, p. 11. 62. Rohlen, 1g8g, p. 16. 63. Rohlen, 1g8g, p. 35· 64. Apter and Sawa, 1984, pp. 4, 226-27. For related though less publicized cases see Rohlen, 1976, and Groth, 1g86. 65. These situations are analyzed in numerous case studies of the Japanese bureaucracy and (more recently and less plausibly) by the application of principal-agent theory to Japanese politics. The two approaches differ dramatically in their assessment of the relative power of bureaucrats and elected officials.

3·

NORMS AND THE JAPANESE STATE

1. Silberman, 1993. 2. Risse-Kappen, 1995· Nowell, 1994. Keohane and Nye, 1972. 3· Johnson, 1982. 4· For example, Yasusuke Murakami's (1982, 1987) "interest-oriented catchall hypothesis" describes a society increasingly dominated by political parties, and especially the LDP, as Japan enters the era of "new middle mass politics". See also Pempel's (1982, 1g8g, 1995) analysis ofJapan's "creative conservatism" and his ( 1ggoc) comparative investigation of systems of "one-party dominance"; Mochizuki's (1gg6) discussion of the LDP's "conservative hegemony"; and Gerald Curtis's ( 1g88) analysis of Japan's "party-centered politics" with its system of checks and balances-they all focus on the role of the LDP in Japan's evolving politics. 5· Yanaga, 1g68. Fukui, 1970 and 1977a, pp. 24-35. 6. Curtis, 1975. Fukui, 1977a. U.S. House of Representatives, 1982. Mochizuki, 1985. Reed, 1986. Pempel, 1987. Stockwin et a!., 1988. Krauss, 1g8g. Allinson, 1g8g. McKean, 1993. 7· Friedman, 1g88. 8. Abegglen, 1970. Kaplan, 1972. g. Patrick and Rosovsky, 1976. 10. Pempel, 1978, 1982, 1987, 1g8g, 1ggoc. J.R.G. 11. Samuels, 1987, pp. 35, 290. 12. Allinson and Sone, 1993. 13. Kumon, 1992. 14. Aoki, 1986, 1988, 1992. 15. Okimoto, 1g8g, pp. 152-60. 2I7

NOTES TO PAGES g6-40 16. Calder, 1g8g, p. gg2. I7. Takizaki, 1g88. Sanger, 1ggn. 18. Schweizer, 1ggg, p. 18. 1g. According to a classified CIA report from 1g87, 8o percent of all Japanese intelligence assets are targeted on the United States and Western Europe and concentrated primarily on acquiring information about technological developments. See Deacon, 1g82, p. 254, and Schweizer, 1ggg, p. 71. This is a drastic change from the large, security-oriented intelligence network that the Japanese government employed on a global scale in the 1ggos. See Deacon, Ig82, p. g. 20. Chapman, Drifte, and Gow, 1g82, p. 177. 21. Noble, 1ggo, pp. 2g-25. 22. Takizaki, 1g88, p. g. 2g. Katzenstein and Tsujinaka, 1gg5. Schoppa, 1ggg, 1gg4. 24. Vogel, 1gg6. 25. George, 1gg1, p. 5· 26. Sanger, 1gggb. 27. Yabunaka, 1gg1. Fukushima, 1gg2. Campbell, 1g8g. George, 1gg1, pp. 716. 28. Katzenstein and Tsujinaka, 1gg5, pp. g1-g5. 2g. Funabashi, 1g8g, p. 7· Stockwin et a!., 1g88. Sone and Kanazashi, 1g8g, pp. 2g2-g6. go. Dower, 1g88, p. 26. g1. Calder, 1g82. Fukai, 1gg2. Woodall, 1gg2. g2. Smith, 1gg2, p. 1g. gg. Kumon (1gg2, p. 125), for example, writes that in Japan "the mass media play the leading role in the process of consensus formation and inducement." g4. Pharr, 1gg6, manuscript p. 2. Calder, 1g88, p. 206. g5. Nihon Shimbun Kyokai (Japan Newspaper Association), 1gg2, pp. 72, 82, g4, 102-g. g6. Nester, 1g8g, p. 2g. Gale Directory, 1ggo. The top 100 weekly magazines in Japan have a combined annual circulation of one billion; about 2,ooo monthly magazines have an annual circulation of two billion. More than 55 million Japanese books were published in the mid-1g7os. In addition there are 11 ,ooo television stations and over 1,ooo radio stations. See Nester, 1g8g, p. 2g, and Okimoto, 1g78a, p. 465. g7. Kempski, 1gg2. g8. In arguably the most comprehensive study on the subject, Krauss (1gg6, manuscript p. gog) concludes that compared to citizens of other industrial societies, the Japanese are extremely attuned to public opinion. One should note, however, that in telecommunications and electronic networking, information density in Japan still lags several years behind that of the United States. Various government agencies are involved in pilot projects testing the establishment of community networks that far exceed any such experimentation in the United States. See Pollack, 1ggg, and Lytel, 1g8g. gg. Interview No. 11, Tokyo, January 1gg1. 40. Yamanaka eta!., 1g86, pp. g-11. 41. Prime Minister's Office, Public Affairs Section, 1ggo. 42. Inoguchi, 1gg1, p. 15g. 2I8

Notes to Pages 40-44

43· Hook, 1ggo, pp. 27-45. For a description of policy changes in the 1g8os and 1ggos see Smith, 1994. 44· The ministry, however, lacks the power to force editors to clarify that the SDF is constitutional. 45· Hook, 1990, p. 26. Government policy has become more liberal during the last decade. 46. McNelly, 1987, p. 8. 47· Hook, 1ggo, p. 27. 48. Krauss, 1987, p. 2. 49· Krauss, 1987, p. 2. 50. Krauss, 1987, pp. 7, 10-11. 51. Farley, 1gg6. Krauss, 1987, pp. 18-21. Kim, 1981. Lee, 1985, pp. 62-73. Kasza, 1g88. Thayer, 1975. Yamamoto, 1g8g. Van Wolferen, 1g8g, pp. 93-100, 231-34. Nester, 1g8g. Taketoshi, 1g8g. 52. Van Wolferen, 1g8g, p. 94· 53· Furthermore, the press clubs offer government officials fora in which they can informally gauge public sentiments. 54· Weisman, 1992. 55· Interview, Cambridge, Mass., February 22, 1992. 56. Szymkowiak and Steinhoff, 1995, p. 26g. 57· Gibney, 1g88, p. 261. s8. Yamamoto, 1g8g, PP· 374-75· 59· Westney, 1gg6. Lee, 1985, pp. 74-76. S. Kato, 1964, pp. 248-49. 6o. Nester, 1g8g, p. 37· 61. Kabashima and Broadbent, 1g86, p. 329. 62. Kabashima and Broadbent, 1g86, p. 349· 63. Saito, 1ggo, p. 93· 64. Immerman, 1992, p. 7. 65. Altman, 1992. 66. Dore, 1ggo, p. 440. 67. Galtung, 1974, pp. 35g-6o. 68. Campbell, 1g88, p. 33· 6g. Mainichi, November 11, 1ggo. 70. Kiihne and Miyazawa, 1979, p. 1g. 71. Bayley, 1976, pp. 65-66, and 1991, pp. 142-43. See also Parker, 1984, p. 87. 72. Upham, 1987. 73· Kawashima, 1963. Haley, 1978, 1982a, 1982b, 1991. 74· Upham, 1987, pp. 207-8. Foote, 1992. 75· Haley, 1982b, pp. 137, 139. 76. Henderson, 1965. Henderson, 1978, pp. 707, 716. Haley, 1978, p. 364 and 1984, pp. 15-16. Ramseyer, 1g88. West, 1g8g, p. 30. 77· Haley, 1982a, p. 281. 78. Kiihne, 1973, p. 1079. 79· Haley, 1978, p. 38g. 8o. Haley, 1992, pp. 58, 61. 81. Upham, 1987, p. 212. 82. Haley, 1978 and 1984, pp. 14-15. 83. Ramseyer and Rosenbluth, 1993, pp. 142-81. Since social norms do not enjoy existential priority over legal norms, the question whether one has causal

NOTES TO PAGES 44-47 priority over the other is not easily answered, as Ramseyer correctly points out. See Ramseyer, 1985, pp. 637-45, and 1988. 84. Foljanty:Jost, 1988, p. 85. 85. Ramseyer, 1985, p. 6os. 86. Haley, 1982b, pp. 126-28, 133. 87. Upham, 1987, p. 205. 88. Keehn, 1993, chapter 2. 8g. Keehn, 1993. Itoh, 1g8o. E. Kato, 1g8o. go. Abe, 1ggo. 91. Bolz, 1g8o. Abe, 1990, pp. 1086-87. Foote, 1988, p. 1011. 92. Ramseyer and Rosenbluth (1993, pp. 142-81) develop this point systematically but overemphasize the direct political influences controlling the Japanese judiciary. 93· Haley, 1984, pp. 2-7, 10, 15. 94· Upham, 1987, pp. 7-10. Takayanagi, 1963, pp. 15, 38. 95· Mter the Meiji Restoration, Japan introduced French and, in particular, German principles of law. Subsequently Japanese penal law closely followed German developments. Mter surrender to the United States at the end of the Pacific War, Japan grafted elements of American law onto both its indigenous and imported legal traditions. See Kitagawa, 1978, and Kuhne and Miyazawa, 1979, p. 17. Haley, 1991, pp. 67-82. H. Tanaka, 1976, pp. 163-253. g6. Kuhne and Miyazawa, 1979, pp. 17, 1o8-g. Upham, 1987, pp. 11-12. 97· Seizelet, 1992. Suganami, 1985. g8. Since this book's argument focuses on norms and state institutions, these remarks refer only to public international law. In private international law the rapid expansion of Japanese business abroad has led to substantial changes in traditional Japanese approaches. gg. Dore, 1986, p. 245· 100. This was the central point of a short course on Japan and international law that Ambassador Owada taught at the Harvard Law School in the winter of 1g88/8g. 101. Estimates of the number of civil suits filed per capita in Japan fall between 4 and 10 percent of corresponding figures in other developed countries. See Kim and Lawson, 1979, pp. 505-6. 102. Miyazawa, 1987, p. 222. Kawashima, 1963, 1967. Matsumura, 1988. Bayley, 1991, p. 129. 103. Haley, 1978, 1982a. 1991. Upham, 1987. The current debate addresses the precise meaning of "institutional structure," which is interpreted differently in sociological and economic theories of law. For a critique of the former by the latter see Ramseyer, 1988, and Hamilton and Sanders, 1992, pp. 186-202. 104. Ames, 1981, pp. 2-3. Kuhne and Miyazawa, 1979, pp. 106-g. 105. Haley, 1984, p. 19. 106. Ames, 1981, pp. 227-28. 107. Smith, 1985a, pp. 49, 7o-74; 1985b, p. 39· 108. Smith, 1985b, pp. 40-41. Murakami, 1985, p. 413. 109. Smith, 1985b, p. 41. Campbell, 1988, pp. g-10. Hamaguchi (1985) and Kumon (1982), among others, have put the social self at the center of "contextual" models of Japanese society. 110. Dore, 1986, pp. 1-7, 70-71, 8o-81; 1987, pp. 16-17, 16g-g2, 227; 1988. 220

Notes to Pages 48-52 Ill. Westney, 1987, pp. 35-36. Smith, l98sa, p. 39· T. Kato, 1994· pp. so53· 1 12. Westney, 1987, pp. 89-90. 113. Katzenstein and Tsujinaka, 1991, pp. 35-46. 114. Obinata, 1987, p. 118. Taikakai, 1970, vol. 2, p. 825. 115. Obinata, 1987, pp. 141-50. 116. Taikakai, 1970, vol. 2, pp. 749-52. 117. Steinhoff, 1991. Mitchell, 1976, 1992. Tipton, 1990. 118. Gluck, 1985, p. 279. l19. Obinata, 1987, pp. 206-9, 236-39. 120. According to government statistics, under the authority of the Peace Preservation Law, for example, the MOl arrested 64,070 people between 1928 and 1946, of whom only 6,061 were acquitted. However, the JCP estimates that hundreds of thousands of people were arrested, of whom 75,681 were acquitted. The JCP also claims that 179 people were tortured and murdered and 1,503 died in prison. In view of the open anti-Communism of the police and especially of its leaders, these figures cannot simply be dismissed. Taikakai, 1970, vol. 2, p. 874. Okudaira, 1977, pp. 114-17. Akahata, March 12, 1976. 121. Okudaira, 1977, pp. 134-55. Mitchell, 1976, pp. 127-47. Tipton, 1990. Van Wolferen, 1989, p. 184. Steinhoff, 1988b. 122. Westney, 1987, p. 47· 123. Obinata, 1987, pp. 42-45. 124. Bayley, 1985, p. 198. 125. Quoted in Van Wolferen, 1989, p. 183. 126. Titus, 1974, p. 4· 127. Sugai, 1957, p. 3· 128. Sugai, 1957, p. 3· Taikakai, 1970, vol. 2, pp. 708-14. 129. Homusho, 1990, pp. 314-15. 130. Arai, 1979, p. 20. 131. Sugai, 1957, p. 4· 132. For example, the Defamation Ordinance ( 1873), the Association Ordinance ( 188o), the Association and Party Law ( 1887), the Public Safety Ordinance (1887), the Preventive Control Ordinance (1892), the Publishing Business Ordinance and Law (1875, 1893), the Newspaper Ordinance and Law (1875, 1897), the Public Peace Police Law (1900), the Peace Preservation Law (1925), and many additional laws passed during the Pacific War. 133. Taikakai, 1970, vol. 2, p. 717. Okudaira, 1977, pp. 97-105. 134· Cities had an average of one policeman for every 500-1,500 residents; in the countryside that ratio was about one policeman for every 1,soo-3,000 residents. 135. Taikakai, 1970, vol. 2, pp. 604-9. Westney, 1987, pp. 78-82. Obinata, 1987,pp. 37-39, 86-9o. 136. Obinata, 1987, pp. 37-39, 195-96. 137. Taikakai, 1970, vol. 2, pp. 752-54. The Japanese army generated additional intelligence by sending military attaches to all Japanese embassies and setting up thirty intelligence bureaus abroad, mainly in China, Manchuria, and the Soviet Union. See Momose, 1990, pp. 291-94. 138. Momose, 1990, p. 312. Obinata, 1987, pp. 134, 137. Beasley, 1987, p. 1 45· 139· japan Times, February 3, 1989. 22I

NOTES TO PAGES S2-S6 140. Obinata, 1987, p. 118. Taikakai, 1970, vol. 2, p. 825. 141. Taikakai, 1970, vol. 2, pp. 6og-11, 730-32. Obinata, 1987, pp. 217-22. 142. Westney, 1987, p. 73· 143· Before 1945 the government issued the Martial Law Ordinance five times. At the request of the MPD and prefectural governors the military intervened ten times in domestic politics: three labor strikes, five instances of widespread social unrest, and two political riots. In other relatively small disturbances, the military police of its own accord mobilized the army. See Taikakai, 1970, vol. 2, pp. 770-72; Momose, 1990, pp. 278-79; Westney, 1987, p. 47· 144. Katzenstein and Okawara, 1993, pp. 11-20. For good summary overviews see the chapters on Japan in each of the three volumes of Millett and Murray, 1988. 145. Hackett, 1964, p. 344; 1965, p. 260. Hosoya, 1976, pp. 19-20. Maxon, 1957· pp. 21, 24· 146. Hosoya, 1971, p. 97· Maxon, 1957, p. 24. Shillony, 1981, p. 10. 147· Maxon, 1957• p. 34· q8. Crowley, 1g66b, pp. 24, So, 386. Harries and Harries, 1991, pp. 12829. 149· Duus, 1970, p. 201. Hackett, 1964, pp. 345-46. Hosoya, 1976, p. 29. Huntington, 1957, p. 131. Imai, 1957, p. 20. Yui, Fujiwara, and Yoshida, 1g8g, pp. 498-gg. 150. Hackett, 1964, p. 346. Imai, 1957, p. 4· 151. Beckmann, 1957, p. go. Crowley, 1g66a, p. 284. Hosoya, 1971, pp. 9495· Imai, 1973, p. 54· Krebs, 1991. 152. Smethurst, 1974, p. 335· 153. Smethurst, 1974, pp. 16-17, 19-20. 154. Storry, 1979, p. 131. 155. Smethurst, 197 4, p. 176. The Reserve Association was joined by the Greater Japan National Defense Women's Association. Created in 1932, the Women's Association by 1937 had a branch in every city, town, and village and functioned as the "women's arm" of the Reserve Association. Both were under the control of the army. At the local level, reservists were closely involved in the Defense Women's rifle training, drills, and maneuvers. See Smethurst, 1974, pp. xiv, xix, 16-17, 19-20, 23-26, 32-34, 39, 41-46. Fridell, 1970, p. 826. 156. Smethurst, 1974, pp. xiv, 25-26, 32, 34· 157. Smethurst, 1974, pp. 33, 39, 41-43. 158. Hosoya, 1976, p. 29. Huntington, 1957, p. 137. Storry, 1957, p. 3· 159. Fujiwara, 1957, p. 22. Harries and Harries, 1991, pp. 127-28. S. Kato, 1974, p. 221. Peattie, 1975, p. 6. 160. Duus, 1970, p. 205. 161. Yui, Fujiwara, and Yoshida, 1g8g, pp. 453-60. Crowley, 1g66a, pp. 27677· Crowley, 1g66b, p. 8. Hackett, 1965, p. 248. Ike, 1968, p. 1go. Maxon, 1957, p. 21. 162. Berger, 1974, p. 218. Crowley, 1g66b, pp. g, 111-12; 1974b, p. 274. Hosoya, 1976, p. 24. Jansen, 1968, pp. 182-83. Ogata, 1954, pp. xvi, 176. 163. Crowley, 1g66b, pp. 25-27; 1970, pp. 242-43; 1974a, p. 43· Iriye, 1965, pp. 15-18; 1971, p. 125. Kim, 1978, p. 47· 164. Johnson, 1993a. 165. Peattie, 1975, p. 203. 222

Notes to Pages 57-6r 166. Beasley, 1987, p. 224. Crowley, 1g66b, p. 10. Fujiwara, 1973, p. 18g. Imai, 1957, p. 5· Kim, 1978, p. 61. 167. Barnhart, 1987, pp. 18-1g, 39, 44, 270. Beasley, 1987, pp. 224, 225. Berger, 1974, p. 210. Crowley, 1970, pp. 252-53; 1974b, pp. 274, 292. Peattie, 1975, pp. 97-g8, 186-87. Pelz, 1974, pp. 171-73. More generally see Myers and Peattie, 1984; Duus, Myers, and Peattie, 1g8g; and Choucri, North, and Yamakage, 1992. 168. Hironaka, 1973, pp. 147-48. Hoshino, 1974, pp. 346-47. Sugai, 1957, pp. 11-12. Rinalducci, 1972, pp. 1-17.

4·

THE POLICE AND INTERNAL SECURITY

1. Katzenstein and Tsujinaka, 1991, pp. 7-8. Bayley, 1991, pp. 5-10. 2. Asahi Nenkan, 1971, p. 314. 3· Katzenstein and Tsujinaka, 1991, p. g and appendix. 4· Mainichi, November 26, 1ggo. 5· Japan Times, January 17, 1991, p. 2. Nihon Keizai Shimbun,January 17, 1991. 6. Interview Nos. 1, 11, 12, Tokyo, May q, 15, and 16, 1990. Interview No.7, Tokyo, January 16, 1991. Miyazawa, 1992, p. 30. Bayley, 1991, pp. 76-77. Besides the NPA and the MPD, other government ministries are involved in Japan's internal security policy, among them the Ministry of Justice, the Prosecutors Office, the PSIA, and, less central, the Defense Agency and the Self-Defense Forces (SDF). But none rivals the importance of the police. See Katzenstein and Tsujinaka, 1991, pp. 70-75. 7· Between 1962 and 1g88 the NPA share decreased from 0.76 to 0.54 percent in terms of personnel and from 18.2 percent (in 1955) to 7·4 percent (in 1988) in terms of financial allocation. In 1g88 more than 99 percent of the total police force and more than 93 percent of the total police budget were thus supplied by the prefectural governments. Katzenstein and Tsujinaka, 1991, pp. 50-51. Momose, 1990, p. 123. Keisatsucho, 1977b, 1g8ga. 8. Hoshino, 1974, p. 348. g. Over 15 percent of the personnel are assigned to three affiliated organizations, the Imperial Guard Headquarters, the National Research Institute, and the National Police Academy. 10. Somucho, 1988. 11. It seeks to integrate the scattered work on international terrorism and the JRA done in different divisions of the NPA. Its purpose is to stop the return or immigration of international terrorists; to locate and arrest terrorists living in Japan; and to eradicate organizations supportive of the JRA. But this recent division does not investigate terrorist organizations such as chukaku, which are based exclusively inside Japan. Kokusai Tero Mondai Kenkyukai, 1g8g, p. 56. 12. Mainichi, September 1, 1993. 13. Hironaka, 1973, p. 161. Interview No. 12, Tokyo, May 16, 1990. 14. Interview No. 3, Tokyo, May 14, 1990. 15. Kubo, 1984, pp. 93-102. 16. Katzenstein and Tsujinaka, 1991, p. 61. 17· Hironaka, 1973, pp. 185-87,309. Interview No. 17, Tokyo, May 17, 1990. Farrell, 1ggo, p. 181. Asahi,June 29, 1978. Yomiuri, 1986, p. 208. Hosaka, 1986, p. 18g. Mizutani, 1987, p. 11 7. 22]

NOTES TO PAGES 61-64 18. Asahi,June 29, 1978. Mizutani, 1987, p. 117.Jiyu Hosodan, 1986, p. 203. Katzenstein and Tsujinaka, 1991, pp. 61, 65. 19. Katzenstein and Tsujinaka, 1991, p. 63. 20. Kobayashi, 1986, p. 108. Maruoka, 1990, p. 64. 21. Kubo, 1984. 22. Interview No. 16, Tokyo, May 17, 1990. Yomiuri, 1986, pp. 192-93. This integration at the national level sharply contrasts with that of the criminal police, where competition between prefectural police forces is often intense. Furthermore, the criminal investigation and public security divisions of the police apparently do not coordinate their activities. Interview No. 10, Tokyo, May 15, 1990. Tawara, 1990, pp. 304-14. 23. Van Wolferen, 1989, pp. 359-60. Auer, 1973b, pp. 115-17. In 1994 former MPD superintendent Sadame Kamakura was appointed vice grand steward, the second highest position in the Imperial Household Agency, with likely promotion to the top position of grand steward. Mainichi, March 26, 1994. 24. Matsuhashi, 1984, p. 335· 25. Sentaku, 1986. Tahara 1986b, pp. 107-9. 26. Katzenstein and Okawara, 1993· p. 47· Angel, 1990, PP·' s6-57· Sentaku, 1986. 27. Japan Communist Party, 1988, p. 132. Richelson, 1988, pp. 254-55. Katzenstein and Tsujinaka, 1991, pp. 82-83. The NPA also benefited from the creation of a Standing Committee for Information Exchange, the only government committee in which substantial exchanges of sensitive intelligence information appear to occur, at least occasionally. Interview No. 15, Tokyo, May 17, 1990. 28. Katzenstein and Tsujinaka, 1991, p. 69. 29. Jiyu Hosodan, 1986, pp. 232-53. Tahara, 1986b, appendix. 30. Sato and Matsuzaki, 1986, p. 273· 31. Yomiuri, 1986, pp. 83-90. Inoguchi, 1989, pp. 108-9. Keehn, 1993. p. 209. 32. Yomiuri, November 25, 1984. Katzenstein and Tsujinaka, 1991, pp. 8889. 33· Clifford, 1976, pp. 97-109. 34· Ames, 1981, p. 228. 35· Bayley, 1991, pp. 11-30, and 1984. Ames, 1981, pp. 17-55. Parker, 1984, pp. 44-98. Clifford, 1976, pp. 79-80. Kuhne and Miyazawa, 1979, pp. 125-31. Mizumachi, 1982. Inami, 1987. Fukunaga, 1988, pp. 43-46, 68-69. 36. Katzenstein and Tsujinaka, 1991, pp. 88-89. 37· Murayama, 1980, pp. 42-44; 1989a, P· 19; and 1989b, p. sa. Furthermore, patrol officers value law enforcement activities more highly than other police work, partly because there they can meet the expectations of their superiors and reap professional rewards. See Murayama, 1980, pp. ss-s6, and 1989b, pp. 8-14; Miyazawa, 1992, p. 2 14. Changes in the performance evaluation of the patrol police officers, introduced in 1989, focused on downgrading this law enforcement orientation and strengthening other aspects of Japanese police work. 38. Miyazawa, 1992, pp. 241-42. Ames, 1981, pp. 38-40. Bayley, 1991, pp. 24-25,79-82. Parke~ 1984,PP· ss-s8. Fukunaga, 1g88, PP· 253-77· 39· Katzenstein and Tsujinaka, 1991, pp. 88-89. 40. Ames, 1981, p. 38. 224

Notes to Pages 64-67

41. Miyazawa, 1ggo, p. 40. Interview No.4, Kyoto, January 14, 1991. 42. For their promotions police officers are highly rewarded for providing such special information. Interview No. 12, Tokyo, January 18, 1991. Fukunaga, 1g88,pp. 240-41,272. 43· Ames, 1981 pp. 39-40. 44· Murayama, 1g8ga, p. 5· 45· Murayama, 1ggo, p. 179. 46. Murayama, 1g8ga, p. 12. Bayley, 1gg 1, p. 8o. 47· Fukunaga, 1g88, pp. 36-39. 48. DeVos, 1984, p. 239· Interview No. 5, Tokyo, May 1ggo. 49· Interview No. 5, Tokyo, May 14, 1ggo. Bayley, 1gg 1, pp. 88-g2. Keisatsucho, 1g88a, pp. 816-17. Parker, 1984, p. 173. Clifford, 1976, p. 101. The national federation of crime prevention associations consists of 4 7 prefectural associations, 1,260 regional associations (with each region corresponding roughly to the jurisdiction of a police station), and about 8,ooo municipal associations. National Police Agency, 1987b, p. 64. Advanced Course, 1g8g, p. 260. All Japan Crime Prevention Association, n.d., p. 20. Mizumachi, 1982, p. 155· In Tokyo in the 1970s and 1g8os the figure was constant: one checkpoint for every thirty households. Citizens Crime Commission, 1975, p. 30. Metropolitan Police Department Tokyo, 1g8g, p. 18. In his study of the police system in various regions of Japan, Walter Ames reports that about one house in fifty is designated as a "crime prevention checkpoint," a figure that agrees with the national average in the late 1g8os. The lowest ratio that Ames noted in his research was one in ninety-six. Ames, 1981, pp. 42, 49· National Police Agency, 1982, p. 44· Advanced Course, 1g8g, p. 260. 50. Thornton and Endo, 1992, pp. 158-sg. 51. Clifford, 1976, pp. 101-2. Ames, 1981, pp. 82-84. National Police Agency, 1g8ga, p. 64. 52. Miyazawa, 1991, pp. 242-46. 53· Murayama, 1g8o, pp. 16, 87-88. 54· Bayley, 1gg 1, pp. g 1-92. 55· Advanced Course, 1g8g, p. 271. National Police Agency, 198gb, p. 65. Parker, 1g84, p. 180. s6. Advanced Course, 1g8g, p. 275· Private firms handle only 1 percent of the crimes known to the police but work on 8 percent of all the cases that are cleared. See National Police Agency, 1g8ga, p. 65. Miyazawa thus concludes that "the private security industry provides the police with an enormous network of cooperating private persons which is better trained, organized and equipped than any neighborhood citizen group and is almost as large as the police force itself. ... The closer control of private security services by the police may simply mean the expansion of the police network of public surveillance and of potential employers of retired police officers." Miyazawa, 1991, pp. 250, 255· 57· Iishiba, 1ggo, p. 12. Tamura, 1g8g. Friman, 1991. Economist, 1ggo, p. 20. s8. Interview No.5· Tokyo, May 14, 1ggo. Aichiken-Boren, 1ggo, pp. s-6. 59· Foote, 1993c, pp. 724-25. Koseki, 1g88, pp. 235-36. I thank Gregory Noble for alerting me to this point. 6o. Weisman, 1991b. 61. E. Andrews, 1995. 62. Weisman, 1ggoa. 225

NOTES TO PAGES 67-70 63. Asahi, December 18, 1990. 64. The revised police manual for investigators in the organized crime section requires that police officers not dine with gangsters, not meet with yakuza members one-on-one, and report to their superiors both before and after meetings with members of organized crime. See Asahi, December 18, 1990. 65. Keehn, 1993, p. 206. 66. Heishman, 1990, pp. 24-25. Keehn, 1993, p. 207. 67. The system by which organized crime provides "stockholder men," through the system of sokaiya, was outlawed in the early 198os but is widely recognized as a normal part of corporate life. Organized crime, according to a NPA study, "collects" funds from perhaps as many as one-third of Japan's major corporations. See Keehn, 1993, p. 207. 68. See chapter 7 below. Iishiba, 1990, p. 104. Mizoguchi, 1986, p. 184. 69. Terzani, 1990a, 1990b. 70. Yomiuri, October 1 2, 1991. 71. Asahi, October 21, 1985. 72. Chiho Zaimu Kyokai, 1990. 73· National Police Agency, 1987a, p. 34· In addition, a select group of officers is sent to American universities for further study. Between 30 and 50 of the police officers of the NPA and the prefectural police forces combined are serving abroad at any given time. Interview Nos. 15 and 16, Tokyo, May 17, 1990. 74· Interview No.3· Tokyo, May 14, 1990. Interview No.9, Tokyo, January 17, 1991. 75· Interview No.6, Tokyo, January 16, 1991. 76. Interview No. 11, Tokyo, May 15, 1990. 77· National Police Agency, 1987a, p. 35· 78. National Police Agency, 1987a, p. 33· 79· Mainichi, May 10, 1989. Interview No. 1, Tokyo, June 20, 1991. 8o. Keisatsucho, 1987-1989. 81. At a time when an overseas deployment of the SDF was politically not feasible, the government decided on this move in the wake of the 1985 earthquake in Mexico, when Japan received sharp criticism from abroad because it had failed to provide direct emergency relief. Mainichi, March 30, 1988. 82. Kokusai Tero Mondai Kenkyukai, 1989. Yomiuri,June 29, 1989, Mainichi, June 29, 1989. Keisatsucho, 1979, 1982, 1985. New in the MOFA, the Division for the Prevention of Terrorism also targets the JRA and international terrorism. It emphasizes information retrieval and analysis to prepare the prime minister for summit meetings and to support the foreign minister at other international meetings. It also exchanges relevant information with the Japanese Overseas Enterprise Association. Interview No. 9· Tokyo, May 15, 1990. Nippon Zaigai Kigyokyokai, 1987. Finally, a new International Division, inside the Criminal Investigation Bureau of the MOJ, is in charge of international judicial cooperation and international treaties and agreements. Questions of international terrorism are evidently not unimportant; the first director of the new division was recruited from the Division of Public Security. Although there are no reliable data to evaluate the trend, the gradual internationalization of the Japanese police probably is slowly affecting the organizational structure and capacities of Japan's prefectural police, which does most of the practical police work. 83. Interview No. 2, Tokyo, December 8, 1988.

Notes to Pages 70-74

84. The 20-Year History, 1982, p. 13. 85. Clifford, 1982. UNAFEI has relied frequently on researchers from the National Research Institute of Police Science to be participants or lecturers in its seminars. The Institute of Police Science is also regularly visited by UNAFEI participants as part of their training programs. 86. National Police Agency, 1987a, pp. g6-37. Interview No. 1, Tokyo, June 20, 1991. 87. National Police Agency, 1987b, p. g6. 88. At that time two lower-ranking Japanese police officers served in the criminal affairs and communication sections. Interview No. 6, Tokyo, May 15, 1ggo. Anderson, 1g8g, p. 52. 8g. National Police Agency, 1987b, p. 6o. go. National Police Agency, 1987a, p. 39· 91. Discussions about an Asian bureau of Interpol have been inconclusive for more than a decade. Tokyo would be a natural host; however, Thailand has been Interpol's center for antidrug investigations since 1987, so a second Asian center seems unlikely. Interview No. 6, Tokyo, May 15, 1ggo. Anderson, 1g8g, p. 171. g2. Schweizer, 1993, p. 72. 93· Clifford, 1976, p. 97. 94· Sansoucy, 1995· 95· Aum apparently relied on a former member of the yakuza to head an "action squad" put in charge of kidnapping defectors, or intimidating and blackmailing other members. It is not clear if the assassination attempt on the head of the NPA was planned by Aum. The shots fired with a pistol from 25 yards required firearms skill apparently highly unusual in Japan. See Kristof, 1995b, 1995c. Reid, 1995· japan Times, April 14, 1995: 1. g6. Quoted in Radin, 1995. Kristof, 1995a and 1995c, p. A8. 97· Kajimoto, 1995. g8. Szymkowiak and Steinhoff, 1995, pp. 270-71, 273, 283. gg. Ames, 1981, pp. 122-24. Kaplan and Dubro, 1g86, pp. 83-87. 100. Quoted in Weiner, 1994, pp. 1, 14. This New York Times article details the available evidence; see also the follow-up article by Kazumoto, 1994. I tllank Walter LaFeber for providing a full copy of the document partly reproduced in the article as well as an unofficial English translation by Ono Kazumoto. 101. Quoted in Weiner, 1994, p. 14. 102. Johnson, 1g86a, pp. 12-14. Weiner, 1994, p. 14. Szymkowiak and Steinhoff, 1995, p. 272. 103. In March 1964 the NPA initiated its first sustained operation against organized crime. Three months later the Diet passed the Law on the Punishment of Violent Actions. Both moves aimed to constrain the activities of violent right-wing groups. See Hori, 1g8g, P· 58, and Szymkowiak and Steinhoff, 1995· pp. 272-73· 104. Advanced Course, 1g8g, p. 426. Takagi, 1g8g. 105. Calculated from Katzenstein and Tsujinaka, 1991, pp. 26-27, 31, 168. 1o6. Takagi, 1g8g, p. go 1. The police stopped publishing data in 1g8o, so the reported increase in Japan's radical right-wing groups probably represents splits within existing groups rather than changes in the total population. Thus the total number remains uncertain. For a general description, including quantitative evidence about the numbers of right-wing organizations and their members, 227

NOTES TO PAGES

74-78

as well as incidents and arrests, see Katzenstein and Tsujinaka, 1991, pp. 29-33. See also Szymkowiak and Steinhoff, 1995, pp. 278-79. 107. Szymkowiak and Steinhoff, 1995, pp. 285-86, 294· 108. Johnson, 1g86a, p. 11. 109. This assessment is supported by a cross-national ranking of corruption in different countries, released in 1995 by Transparency International. Japan ranks in the middle of the forty states for which data are available, behind most European states and ahead of most Asian ones. See Crosette, 1995. 110. Szymkowiak and Steinhoff, 1995, p. 274. 111. Interview No. 14, Tokyo, May 16, 1ggo. Kaplan and Dubro, 1986. Vogel, 1979, pp. 212-13. Kuhne and Miyazawa, 1979, pp. 63-69. Clifford, 1976, pp. 117-24. Miyazawa, 1992, pp.8g-g5. Parker, 1984, pp. 198-202. Ames, 1981, pp. 105-29. Bayley, 1991, pp. 168-6g. Van Wolferen, 1989, pp. 100-108. Woronoff, 1990, pp. 125-39. Stark, 1981. 112. Iishiba, 1ggo,p. 125. 113. This increase is probably related to the 1982 revision of the commercial law seeking to regulate the manipulation of stockholder meetings by organized crime. See Takagi, 1990, p. 648. 114. Terzani, 1ggoa, p. 109. 115. japan Times, May 17, 1988. 116. Kristof, 1995e. See also Stemgold, 1995. 117. Johnson, 1993b, p. 24. Taro, 1ggo. Sanger, 1993c. 118. Chandler and Kanabayashi, 1991. Stemgold, 1991a, 1991b 1992a, 1992b, 1994b. 119. Schlesinger and Kanabayashi, 1993, p. A1, A10. 120. Sanger 1992c, 1992d. Stemgold 1992c, 1992d. Chipello, 1992. For local case studies of these mechanisms see Stark, 1981, pp. 2, 36-40, 190-222. 121. Sanger, 1992c. 122. Stemgold, 1992e, section 3, p. 6. The pervasive links in the 1990s between organized crime and Japan's business and political elites have prompted the police to crack down on organized crime after the 1992 legislation. Gang warfare has increased, as well as violence against business leaders. Bussey, 1993. Mainichi, December 2, 1994, p. 7· Der Spiegel, 48/1994, pp. 164-66. 123. Quoted in C. Johnson, 1993b, p. 24. 124. C. Johnson, 1993c; see also 1986a. 125. Dower, 1992, p. 67. Weisman, 1991a. 1 26. Steinhoff, 1993, p. 849. 127. Suzuki, 1978, pp. 154-55. 128. Morris, 1959, p. 8. Morris, 1g6o, p. 162, n. 2. 1 29. Morris, 1959, p. 8. 130. Weinstein, 1971, pp. go-g1. Packard, 1966, pp. 101-5. 131. These attempts included the failure to enact the Political Violence Activity Prevention Law in 1961, the shelving of a bill to upgrade the Defense Agency to a ministry in 1965, and the lack of political response to a series of reports by the Research Council for Revision of the Constitution and the Ad-hoc Committee for Administrative Reform in 1964. The reports addressed centralizing the bureaucracy to support a strengthened prime minister. After these failed efforts, plans for further structural changes were abandoned. Even during the tenure of Prime Minister Sato (1964-72), supposedly a proponent of constitutional revi-

Notes to Pages 78-79

sion, no further attempts were undertaken. The status-quo policy continued throughout the 198os, illustrated by the failure to enact the National Secrecy Protection Law in 1984-85. This legislative passivity was reinforced by relations among the Supreme Court, the MOJ, and the Japanese Federation of Bar Associations. The police is often challenged by a legal profession that has a sizable wing critical of state authority. Lawyers have been a strong constituency for Japan's progressive parties, but they have also shown a keen interest, shared with the MOJ, in keeping their profession small and well paid. The Supreme Court itself has been reluctant to see its own strength augmented. Interview No. 20, Tokyo, May 19, 1990. S. Tanaka, 1987, p. 247· 132. Legislation passed in 1952 which sought to curb domestic subversion has been applied in only eight cases. Furthermore, only peripheral articles (Articles 38, 39, 40) were used. The central feature of the law, the prohibition of specific organizations and the regulation of their activities (Articles 5-9), has seldom been invoked. In 1952 it was used four times against JCP activists, all of whom were acquitted by 1967. A group of right-wing activists was arrested in 1961 and some were convicted in 1970, although not because of crimes violating this law. Between 1969 and 1971 the law was used to arrest several left-wing radicals. Mter prolonged court proceedings, three members of chukaku were finally convicted by the Supreme Court in 1990. Mainichi, September 29, 1990. 133. Tominomori, 1977, pp. 106-107. Goto et al., 1982, p. 183. Interview Nos. 15 and 17, Tokyo, May 17, 1990. Hori, 1983, p. 37· Yomiuri, 1986, p. 208. 134. Kawasaki, 1987, p. 251. Mainichi,June 7, 1986. 135· Shinmura, 1955, p. 219. 136. ''The formal legal system provides detectives with so many advantages that they rarely need to resort to obviously illegal tactics. . . . Japanese police officers not only fully utilize their enormous advantage over the suspect which is provided by the very enabling legal framework, but they also try to expand that advantage." Miyazawa, 1992, pp. 25, 96; see also pp. 100-101. Foote, 1993b. 137. Miyazawa, 1992, p. 17; see also pp. 103-18. Bayley, 1991, pp. 35-36. Miyazawa's work is important because he has put his findings in a comparative framework. The tensions exist not only for Japanese but also for Canadian and U.S. police officers. 138. Fujita, 1988. 139· Tahara, 1986b, p. 145· 140. Van Wolferen, 1989, p. 217. Oide and Fujiwara, 1987, pp. 391-92. 141. Generally speaking, the Supreme Court has avoided ruling on highly politicized issues and has followed a conservative and restrictive line in its decisions. The secretary general of the Supreme Court, Moriichi Kishi, warned judges in 1970 "not to participate in political organizations." Odanaka, 1973, p. 15. This injunction was interpreted by Haruo Nakamura, judge sitting on the bench of the Tokyo Advanced Court, to apply to membership in the Young Lawyers' Association, an organization dedicated to the protection of the Constitution. In May 1970 the chief justice of the Supreme Court, Kazuto Ishida, warned again that "extremist students, militarists, anarchists, and ardent communists are not suitable to perform the duties of judges" and insisted that "the execution of the power of the Constitution requires a very prudent cast of mind." Odanaka, 1973, p. 152. See also Hogaku Semina, 1971, p. 255· Van Wolferen, 1989, p. 218. Mter issuing these warnings, the Supreme Court formally refused to reassign

NOTES TO PAGES 79-83 several judges, and in the I970s several young lawyers were not permitted to become judges. Discrimination against judges who are members of the Lawyers' Association reportedly continued into the I98os. Odanaka, I973• p. ISO. Mainichi, March I I, I987. I42· Itoh, I989. 143· S. Tanaka, I987, p. 42. This attitude of the Supreme Court probably affected lower courts in three different ways: (I) it encouraged conservative rulings on questions of substance and procedure in cases involving New Left activists (Odanaka, I973• pp. 207-235); (2) it made it easier for the police to acquire warrants (Harano and Takada, I989); and (3) it facilitated the overturning of rulings against the police on constitutional grounds in lower courts and provided for an increase in court rulings favorable to questionable police behavior (Oide and Fujihara, I987). I44· Miyazawa, I988, pp. 74-75. I45· Murayama, I98o, p. 69. 146. Miyazawa, I992, p. 227. Bayley, I99I, pp. 63-64. Beer, I984. Whittemore, I961. I47· Steinhoff, I984, p. I9l. Farrell, I990, pp. I8I-84. 148. Smith, I985a, pp. 97-98, I3I-32. 149· Vogel, I979· p. 2I9. ISO. Mainichi, March IS, I989. ISI. Interview No. I7, Tokyo, May I7, I990. Asahi, June 28, I978. Kamishima, I989, pp. I36-37. I 52. S. Tanaka, I987, pp. 2I-23· During the last forty years the public's perception of the police has changed dramatically. Bayley, I984, pp. I90-93· This is undoubtedly due to a deliberate police policy of cultivating public opinion and not acting against public sentiments. Interview No. 9, Tokyo, January I7, I99L Hatakeyama, I984, p. 96. 153. Bayley, 1991, pp. 2-3. Smith (1985a, p. 125) gives the figure of 100 for the early I98os. Perhaps this number is so low because of a favorable public perception of the police or because of the public's awareness that complaints against the police's abuse of authority are rarely responded to. I54· Kabashima, I988, pp. 33-34. ISS· Bayley, I984, p. I92· I56. Donnelly, I986, p. 628. I57· Yomiuri,January 27, I989. Asahi Nenkan, I989, p. ll9. I58. Matsuhashi, I984, pp. 283-84. Hironaka has analyzed in detail the change in policy in the early I96os and has dubbed it the "no-need of legislation" strategy. Hironaka, I973• pp. 228-74. I59· Miyazawa, I992, pp. I9-2I, I43· I6o. Human Rights Watch ( I995· p. xi) starts the summary section of its report with a simple declaration: "Prisoners in Japan experience routine violations of human rights." See also Kuhne, I973, pp. 1083-84. Murayama, I98o, p. 89, n. 24. McCormack, I986. Igarashi, I986. Van Wolferen, I989, pp. I88-9o. Mainichi, September I7, I989. Yomiuri, May I8, I99L Blumenthal, I994· I6I. Interview No. II, Tokyo, January I8, I991. I62. Asano, I990. Maruoka, I990. Oono and Watanabe, I989. I63. Interview No. 9, January I7, I99l. I64. Steinhoff, I989b, p. I9o. 2]0

Notes to Pages 83-90 165. Steinhoff, 1g8ga, p. 727. 166. Steinhoff, n.d., p. g8. 167. Steinhoff, 1g8ga, pp. 729, 732. 168. Steinhoff, 1g88a, p. 2. 16g. Takagi 1988, p. 195. 170. Farrell, 1990. Interview No. 1, Tokyo, December, 1988. 171. Hironaka, 1973, pp. 339-41. 172. Katzenstein and Tsujinaka, 1991, p. 145. 173. Watanabe, 1g8g, pp. 422-23. 17 4· Hosaka, 1986, pp. 186-2og. Nishio, 1984, p. 162. Interview No. 15, May 17, 1ggo. 175. Such a tactic is not new. As early as 1971, in response to a wave of bombing attacks by left-wing radicals, the police adopted similar tactics. Targeting 40 people suspected of involvement in these attacks, as well as 200 members of radical organizations like the Red Army and other anarchist groups, the police organized two operations involving 2400 policemen searching 334,000 apartments and contacting 17,ooo realtors in early 1972. As a result, the police uncovered 50 hideouts, identified 250 radicals, and collected more than 2,000 pieces of evidence relevant to internal security. Takigawa, 1973, pp. 120, 215. Steinhoff, n.d., p. 228. 176. Takigawa, 1973, pp. 20, 63-65. 177. Interview No. 16, Tokyo, May 17, 1990. 178. Nishio, 1984, p. 162. Yamada, 1986. 179. Yamada, 1986, p. 337· 180. Suzuki, 1g8o, pp. 114-20. Tahara, 1g86a, pp. 321-22. Interview No. 17, Tokyo, May 17, 1990. 181. Indicating a sharp rise in the extent of police precautions, the total number of extra policemen-days increased from 16,ooo during President Ford's visit to 412,000 at the first summit in 1979, and to 81o,ooo at the second summit. See Asahi Nenkan, 1962, 1965, 1975, 1g8o, 1987; Keisatsucho, 1975, 1g8oa, 1987; Weisman, 1ggob; japan Times, June 29, 1993· 182. Van Wolferen, 1g8g, p. 199. 183. Sanger, 1g8ga, p. A7; 1g8gb. Nickerson, 1g8g, p. 8. 184. Mainichi, June 8, 1986. Yomiuri, June 11, October 20, 1986. Asahi, September 4, 1g8g. Yamada, 1986, p. 342. 185. Apter and Sawa, 1984, p. 202, and pp. 104-5, 112-14. 186. Smith, 1985a, p. 131. 187. Stemgold, 1g8g. 188. Steinhoff, n.d., p. 112. Ames, 1981, pp. 159-60. Bayley, 1976, pp. 16062. Kiihne and Miyazawa, 1979, pp. 121-22. Farrell, 1990, pp. 19-28. Keisatsucho, 1977b, p. 1154. Interview No. 15, Tokyo, May 17, 1990. 18g. Farrell, 1990, p. 27. Steinhoff, n.d., p. 112. Takigawa, 1973, pp. 164-79. 190. Steinhoff, n.d. Farrell, 1990, pp. 1-19. 191. Interview Nos. 15 and 17, Tokyo, May 17, 1ggo. 192. Interview Nos. 13 and 17, Tokyo, May 16 and 17, 1990. 193· Fukushima, 1972, p. 10. 194. Quoted in Steiner, 1965, p. go. 195· Interview No. 4, Tokyo, December 7, 1988. Interview Nos. 1 and 15, Tokyo, May 14 and 17, 1990. 1g6. Miller, 1986, pp. 409-10. 2JI

NOTES TO PAGES 90-94 197. Angel, 1990, pp. 40-41. 1g8. Quoted in Pyle, 1992, p. 6o. 199. Farrell, 1990, pp. 185-91. 200. The link between the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the prominent role of the JRA was, according to police officials in Tokyo, "more than we have ever expected." Nakamura, 1975. 201. Economist, 197 4· 202. Economist, 1977. Hielscher, 1977. These signs of disarray in the executive branch were reflected in the Diet. The Diet considered, but did not act on, legislation that proposed making it more difficult for the government to issue passports and easier to continue court proceedings against accused terrorists in the absence of defense councils, as long as that absence was dictated by a strategy of the accused to prolong the trial. Crome, 1978b. 203. Interview No. g, Tokyo, May 15, 1990. 204. Saito, 1ggo, p. 88. 205. Interview No. g, Tokyo, May 15, 1990. 206. Asahi Nenkan, 1979, p. 286. Suzuki, 1g8o, p. 131. 207. Crome, 1978a. 208. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1978, p. 222. 209. Interview No. 11, Tokyo,January 1991. 210. National Police Agency, 1987a, p. 28. 211. Interview No.5, Tokyo,June 28,1991. 212. National Police Agency, 1987a, p. 29. 213. Interview No. 4, Tokyo December 7, 1988. Interview No. 2, Tokyo, May 14, 1990. 214. Kokusai Tero Mondai Kenkyukai, 1g8g, p. 72. 215. Interview No. 1, Tokyo, December 6, 1988. Interview No.6, Tokyo, May 15, 1ggo. Nagamatsu, 1988. 216. Yomiuri, April 20, 1988. 217. Interview No. 15, Tokyo, May 17, 1990. National Police Agency, 1g8ga, pp. 125-26. 218. Interview No.3, Tokyo, December 7, 1988. 219. National Police Agency, 1987a, pp. 29-30. Bayley, 1984, pp. 193-94. DeVos, 1984, pp. 240-41. Asahi, November 30, 1982 andJanuary 3, March 22, August 29, October 17, 1983. Mainichi, March 18 and October 26, 1982. Yomiuri, February 21, 1990. 220. Bayley, 1984, p. 193. 221. DeVos, 1984, p. 241. Asahi, August 29, 1983. Kim Dae Jung (1994, p. 191), for one, refers to Singapore as "a near-totalitarian police state." 222. Mainichi,January g, 1g8o. 223. Farrell, 1990, p. 219. 224. National Police Agency 1g8ga, pp. 49, 127. Interviews No.6, Tokyo, May 15, 1990, and No. 1, Tokyo, June 20, 1991. japan Times, January 21, 1g8g. 225. Advanced Course, 1g8g, pp. 182-91. 226. Nishimura, n.d., pp. 4, ii-v. 227. Interview No. 18, Tokyo, May 18, 1990. Katzenstein, 1990, p. 59· 228. Interview No. 2, Tokyo, December 8, 1988. 2J2

Notes to Pages 95-98

229. Eventually an appeals court considered this sentence too harsh and remanded the case for resentencing. Kuby and Kunstler, 1990. Interview No. 18, Tokyo, May 18, 1990. 230. See Asahi, September 8, 1992, April 9 and 15, May 10, 14, 31, and November 27, 1993· Washington Post, May 7 and 8, 1993.]apan Times, July 9, 1993· New York Times, November 20, 1993· Shenon, 1993· Kono, 1993· 231. Interview Nos. 11, 14 and 20, Tokyo, May 15, 16 and 19, 1990. See also chapter 7 below. 232. Interview No. 11, Tokyo, May 15, 1990. 233· Excluding arrests for traffic crimes, the corresponding percentage figures were 4.20, 0.90, and 0.39· See Katzenstein and Tsujinaka, 1991, p. 168. 234· Sanger, 1993e, 1994d. Hamilton and Sapsford, 1994. Hamilton and Williams, 1994. 235· Interview Nos. 12 and 13, Tokyo, May 16, 1990. Parker, 1984, p. 131. 236. Schiller, 1986, p. 39· National Police Agency, 1987a, p. 121. Van Wolferen, 1989, pp. 199-200. Interviews No. 16, Tokyo, May 17, 1990, and No. 2 June 20, 1991. 237· Chira, 1987. 238. Farrell, 1990, pp. 200-204. These success stories can be easily disputed, as early successes have turned into a history of failure. Since moving abroad the JRA has been able to operate with impunity for many years, avoiding the reach of the Japanese government and police. The internationalization of crime has whittled away at the geographic isolation of Japan and is beginning to undermine national policies like strict gun control. Some of the suspects brought to trial after years of investigations have been found not guilty in court proceedings. And the capture of Yu Kikumura on the New Jersey tumpike can hardly be credited to the Japanese police. Furthermore, even in Japan, the capture of JRA members Osamu Maruoka and Yasuhiro Shibata illustrates the importance of luck rather than persistent police work. Interview No. 1, Tokyo, May 14, 1990. National Police Agency, 1989a, pp. 12 5-26. Maruoka, 1990, p. 116. 239· Interview No. 1, Tokyo, December 6, 1988. Interviews Nos. 1 and 17, Tokyo, May 14 and 17, 1990. 240. Quoted in Tahara, 1986b, p. 28. 241. Mainichi, May 3 and September 22, 1994· Yomiuri, August 30, 1994· Asahi, March 31, 1994. 242. Interview No.2, Tokyo, June 20, 1991. 243· Tachibana, 1975. The head of the NPA, Hideo Yamada, summarized: "The police in foreign countries have taken various measures to suppress acts of terrorism. For example, security patrols have been augmented both in numbers of men and in weaponry in the United States and Europe. Naturally, working conditions for these security officers have been improved, including pay. In addition army troops have been mobilized to guard international conferences. In Japan, however, the police are not allowed to take similar measures; so I am very proud that the Japanese police have been successful in maintaining order and security in this country. I hope they will use their wisdom 'native to the Japanese' in curbing violence in full cooperation with the people." Mainichi, April 21, 1988. 244· Interviews Nos. 1 and 15, Tokyo, May 14 and 17, 1990. 2

33

NOTES TO PAGES gg-104 5· THE SELF-DEFENSE FORCES AND EXTERNAL SECURITY 1. Kahn, 1g7o. 2. Hoyt, 1g85. 3· Bergner, 1gg1, p. 111. 4· Tyler, 1gg2, A14. 5· Quoted in Bobrow, 1g84, p. 37· 6. Katzenstein and Okawara, 1gg3, pp. 83-gg. Van de Velde, 1g88a, pp. 200206. 7· Interview No. g, Tokyo, June 13, 1gg1. Interview Nos. 20 and 23, Tokyo, December 18 and 1g, 1gg1. 8. Interview Nos. 2, 5, 6, 11, and 15, Tokyo, June 11, 12, 14, and 17, 1gg1. Interview No. 23, Tokyo, December 1g, 1gg1. g. Japan Defense Agency, 1gg4, pp. 56-57· Kristof, 1gg5d. Stemgold, 1gg4a. 10. Interview No. g, Tokyo, June 13, 1gg1. Interview No. 23, Tokyo, December 1g, 1gg1. 11. Emmerson, 1g71, p. 142. 12. Interview Nos. 5, 13, and 20, Tokyo, December g, 13, and 18, 1gg1. 13. Olsen, 1g85, p. 76. 14. Interview Nos. 2, 3, g, and 10, Tokyo,June 11 and 13, 1gg1. 15. Interview No. 11, Tokyo, December 12, 1gg1. 16. Emmerson, 1g71, p. 142. 17. Interview No. 13, Tokyo, December 13, 1gg1. 18. Interview No. 23, December 1g, 1gg1. 1g. Olsen, 1g85, p. g5. Interview Nos. 10 and 21, Tokyo, June 13 and 1g,

1ggL 20. Interview Nos. 4, 10, 12, and 15, Tokyo, June 11, 13, 14, and 17, 1gg1. Interview No. 5, Tokyo, December g, 1gg1. 21. Interview Nos. 3 and 5, December g, 1g91. Japan Defense Agency, 1ggo, P· 1 35· 22. In 1g87 about 400 members of the SDF were stationed in New Mexico for training with Nike and Hawk missiles, while another 58 were in Texas as part of the procurement of Patriot missiles. The strength of these transnational links with the U.S. military contrasts sharply with Japan's much weaker security ties with other countries. Every year, for example, SDF personnel are sent abroad for study, with the United States being by far the most important destination, taking about go percent of the 31g members of the SDF involved between 1g82 and 1g86. See Nakajo, 1g87, pp. 422-23. 23. Olsen, 1g85, p. g5. Drifte, 1g85b, p. 156. Van de Velde, 1g88a, pp. 2og15. 24. Interview Nos. 12 and 16, Tokyo, June 14 and 17, 1gg1. Matsuo, 1g87, p. 1g8. 25. These joint maneuvers overshadow the brief communication training exercises held with other navies during the sporadic goodwill port calls by MSDF ships in neighboring countries. Interview Nos. 11 and 23, Tokyo, December 12 and 1g, 1gg1. 26. Interview Nos. 8 and 12, Tokyo, December 11 and 12, 1gg1. 27. Interview Nos. g and 1g, Tokyo, June 13 and 18, 1gg1. 28. Interview Nos. 23 and 24, Kyoto and Tokyo, June 24 and 28, 1gg1. 2 34

Notes to Pages ro4-7 29. The Joint Staff Council (JSC), the internal bureaus (consisting of the Secretariat of the JDA Director and bureaus in charge of defense policy, education and training, personnel, finance, and equipment), the Defense Facilities Administration Agency, and such organizations as the National Defense Academy, the Technical Research and Development Institute, and the Central Procurement Office. Japan Defense Agency, 1990, p. 309. See also Katzenstein and Okawara, 1993, PP· 21-56. 30. Van de Velde, 1988a, p. 322. 31. Van de Velde, 1988a, p. 306. Interview No. 13, Tokyo, June 14, 1991. 32. Fukui, 1977b, p. 16. 33· The creation of a General Foreign Policy Bureau may eventually modifY the political balance inside MOFA by weakening the North American Bureau and by increasing the capacity for policy coordination within the ministry. I thank Nobuo Okawara and Hideo Sato for clarifYing this point for me. 34· Johnson, 1977, p. 260. 35· Katzenstein and Okawara, 1993, pp. 28-29. 36. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, 1990, p. 103. 37· Kataoka and Myers, 1989, pp. 65-67. 38. Interview No. 14, Tokyo, June 15, 1991. See also the discussion in chapter 6. 39· This division is in regular contact with MOFA's Economic Affairs Bureau, specifically the Economic Security Office, which deals with COCOM and the Australia Group, as well as the General Foreign Policy Bureau. MITI also checks with the JDA, especially on exports relevant to the military. Interview No. 24, Tokyo, December 19, 1991. 40. Otake, 1980, pp. 16-18. 41. Otake, 1984, pp. 42-45, 52-53· 42. Endicott, 1982, p. 40. 43· U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, 1990, p. 103. 44· Otake, 1983, p. 142. MOF's control over the limits on defense spending is constrained by the budgetary norm of maintaining "balance" among various ministries. Under such a norm, a spending ministry stresses its "budget 'share,' or its growth rate in comparison with the budget as a whole." Campbell, 197'7, p. 32. 45· Koh, 1989, pp. 197-98. Kataoka, 1982, p. 257. 46. Gotoda, 1989, pp. 30-35. 47· Katzenstein and Okawara, 1993, pp. 39-56. 48. This phenomenon is not peculiar to the JDA. Agencies set up since 1945 have often been penetrated politically by older ministries. If the ministries involved agree, the rotation of officials among them can be easily accomplished and is not subject to approval by other government units. Keehn, 1990, p. 1034. 49· Two of them were first sent to the JDA at the bureau chief level. Hirose, 1989, appendix 1. Data on the key post of the director of the Defense Policy Bureau point to a similar change. See Katzenstein and Okawara, 1993, p. 48. The diminished presence of the NPA inside the JDA coincides with a shift in the SDF's mission from internal to external security. 50. Hirose, 1989, p. 89, appendix 3· 51. Interview Nos. 3 and 15, Tokyo, June 11 and 17, 1991. 52. Hirose, 1989, pp. 60-72. Kataoka and Myers, 1989, p. 72. Sase, 1991. 2]5

NOTES TO PAGES 107-9 53· Hirose, 1g8g, pp. 66, 70-71. 54· Otake, 1983, p. 192. 55· In the late 1970s the chairman of the JSC, General Hiroomi Kurisu, unsuccessfully advocated a reorganization of the JDA similar to that of the U.S. Department of Defense, in which civilian and military hierarchies both culminate in the office of the secretary of defense. See Kataoka and Myers, 1g8g, pp. 72, 74· 56. Okimoto, 1978a, p. 396. 57· Hirose, 1g8g, pp. 234-36. 58. Katzenstein and Okawara, 1993, pp. 56-83. 59· Interview No. 2, Tokyo, December g, 1991. 6o. Yomiuri Shimbun, December 28, 1ggo. It is thus hardly surprising that the SDF jumped at the chance of cooperating with a Japanese film producer in the production of Best Guy, a movie modeled on Hollywood's successful Top Gun. The movie was shot on location at the ASDF Chitose air-base, and the SDF cooperated in providing ample photo-opportunities in the form of fifty hours of air drills, saving the moviemakers millions of yen. See Kusaoi, 1ggo. 61. One comparative study found that Japanese dailies devoted more than three times as much space to disarmament topics as did the New York Times and the Times of London, in a group of international newspapers. See Okimoto, 1978a, p. 466. 62. Sneider, 1982, p. 58. 63. Van Wolferen, 1g8g, pp. g6-g7. 64. Boeicho, 1991a, p. 261. Boeicho, 1991b. 65. Interview No. 22, Tokyo, December 18, 1991. 66. Interview Nos. 2, 8, g, 10, and 12, Tokyo, June 11, 13, and 14, 1991. Interview No. 2, Tokyo, December g, 1991. 67. Interview No.8, Tokyo, June 13, 1991. 68. Asahi Shimbun, February 8, 1992. 6g. Habara, 1985, pp. 82-83. 70. Interview No. 2, Tokyo, June 11, 1991. 71. In his analysis of the policy process leading to the Fourth Defense Buildup Plan, Hideo Otake notes that the JDA was isolated and virtually left on its own in its negotiations with the MOF, in striking contrast to other policy areas where ministries were strongly supported by Diet members and interest groups in dealing with the powerful Finance Ministry. Otake, 1981, p. 491. Otake notes that "Dietmen never intervene specifically to sponsor a particular procurement projector to back a defense corporation, at least at the budget-making stage. Lobbying efforts are directed exclusively towards the total amount of the defense budget. This contrasts sharply with the 'Highway Construction Tribe' and the 'Education Tribe,' which lobby for their electoral districts or for their business sponsors, as well as for increases in the total budget." Otake, 1982, p. 17. Otake attributes this fact to the weak lobbying effort and small size of the defense industry. 72. Otake, 1982, p. 18. 73· Otake, 1981, p. 492. Defense policy is not altogether without a social base in Japanese domestic politics. The Democratic Socialist Party (DSP), for example, is supported by private-sector unions and small businesses. From a position of opposition it has shifted, since the mid-1g7os, to explicit support of Japan's

Notes to Pages

I09-I I

defense policy. The popularity of this party among defense industry workers may have contributed to its changing stance, but the DSP is the exception, not the rule. Generally speaking, national defense has no firm social base in Japan. 74· I thank Nobuo Okawara for clarifying this point for me. 75· Samuels, 1991, 1994· Green, 1995· Katzenstein and Okawara, 1993, pp. 65-78. 76. Okimoto, 1g81, p. 288. Auer, 1973b, pp. 217-45. According to different estimates Japan's defense industries accounted for less than 0.5 percent of total industrial output in the 1970s. During the defense build-up of the 1g8os this ratio increased only to about o.6 percent for the period since 1987. Green, 1995, p. 18. In the mid-1g8os only 2.0 percent of Japan's total manufacturing capacity was concentrated in the defense sector. Mcintosh, 1g86, p. 51. Only a little more than one-quarter of Japan's defense budget is spent on weapons procurement. This sum accounted for 0.36 of Japan's total industrial production in 1g8o and 0.54 percent in 1g8g. The corresponding American figure was 14 times larger, or 5 percent of total industrial production. Okimoto, 1g81, pp. 285-86. Vogel, 1g8g, p. 71. Japan Defense Agency, 1ggo, p. 319. Defense Production Committee, 1991, table 1. 77· Data for the 1970s show that, with one exception (Shinmeiwa Industry), defense contracts for all of Japan's top defense producers accounted for less than 10 percent of total corporate sales. In the United States, only one of the leading defense contractors (General Electric) relied on military products for less than 10 percent of its total sales. Hopper, 1975, pp. 142, 147. Okimoto, 1981, p. 286. Drifte, 1985a, pp. 18-1g. Owing to substantial and steady increases in the Japanese defense budget, by 1991 Japan's largest weapon producers, such as Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) and Kawasaki Heavy Industries (KHI), increased their defense sales to about 15 percent of total sales, still far below corresponding figures for American defense contractors. See Samuels, 1991, p. 57, and 1994, pp. 183-84, 316. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, 1ggo, p. 104, and 1991, p. 42. Vogel, 1g8g, p. 71. 78. Chinworth, 1992, p. 173. 79· Samuels, 1994, especially pp. 1g8-26g. Chinworth, 1992. Green, 1995. So. Mcintosh, 1986, p. 52. 81. Interview Nos. 1 and 1g, Tokyo, December g and 17, 1gg 1. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, 1ggo, pp. 64-65. 82. Okimoto, 1981, pp. 276-78. 83. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, 1991, pp. 5, 8. Overall, more than four-fifths of Japan's weapons are produced domestically. Okimoto, 1981, p. 282. Gros, 1g8g, p. 47· 84. Vogel, 1g8g, p. 71. 85. Vogel, 1g8g, pp. 74-76. Interview No. g, Tokyo, December 11, 1991. 86. Interview No. 11, Tokyo, June 14, 1991. 87. Hopper, 1975. Drifte, 1985a, p. 29. Chinworth, 1992, p. 25. 88. Interview No. g, Tokyo, December 11, 1991. 8g. Boeicho, 1991a, p. 286. go. Retiring members of the SDF are placed by the staff offices of the three services as well as by the SDF's Prefectural Liaison Offices and a JDA-affiliated national organization which has seven regional offices. See Harada, 1gg 1, p. 76. Interview No. 11, Tokyo, December 12, 1gg 1. 2]7

NOTES TO PAGES 111-18 91. Vogel, 1989, p. 76. 92. Vernon, 1983. 93· Samuels, 1987, p. 196. S. Tanaka, 1986, pp. 41-42, 113. 94· Upham, 1987, pp. 187-88. 95· Interview Nos. 6 and 17, Tokyo, June 12 and 17, 1992. McKean, 1993. 96. Klapp, 1987, pp. 174-90. 97· Emmerson, 1971, p. 114. 98. Katzenstein and Okawara, 1993, pp. 101-29. 99· White, 1993, p. 443· 100. Samuels, 1994, pp. 1-32. 101. Pharr, 1992, p. 3· 102. McMichael, 1991. 103. Sato, 1991, p. 79· Bobrow and Kudrle, 1987. 104. Samuels, 1989, p. 628. 105. Samuels, 1989, p. 628. 106. Samuels, 1989, p. 645. 107. Quoted in Pempel, 19goa, p. 11. 108. Cordesman, 1983. 109. Okimoto, 1982, p. 234· 110. Hook, 1990, pp. 26, 24-37. 111. Asahi Shimbun, September 26, 1991. 112. Umemoto, 1989, pp. 128-29. 113. Interviews Nos. 2 and 9, Tokyo, June 11 and 13, 1991. 114. Interview No. 9, Tokyo, June 13, 1991. 115. Bobrow, 1989. 116. Risse-Kappen, 1991, p. 495· 117. Bobrow, 1989, p. 597. 118. Interviews Nos. 10 and 14, Tokyo; December 12 and 13, 1991. Hook, 1990, pp. 25-34. 119. A. Watanabe, 1991, pp. 10-11. Sanger, 1990. Differences in the memories and historical interpretations of the war continue to divide Japan from other Asian states. See, for example, Smith, 1994; Sanger, 1994c. 120. Simon, 1986, pp. 48-49. 121. Quoted in Pyle, 1988, p. 84. 122. Pyle, 1988, p. 82. 123. Green, 1995, pp. 53-59· 124. Harries and Harries, 1987, pp. 252-57. 125. Odawara, 1985, p. 249. 126. Beer, 1989, p. 69. 127. The historical record suggests that Article 9 was not simply imposed by the American occupation or by General MacArthur personally. It appears also to reflect Japanese views in the highest government levels at the time. See Koseki, 1988,pp. 236-38;Aue~ 1993,pp. 70-74. 128. C. Johnson, 1992, p. 24. Lawrence Beer (1984, p. 8) concurs when he writes that "more than any other single written source of public principles, ideals, and law, the Constitution of Japan has become the touchstone of legitimacy in the country's legal and social culture." 129. Maki, 1980. 130. Bobrow, 1989, PP· 596, 598-99·

238

Notes to Pages

I

r9-23

131. See Katzenstein and Okawara, 1993, pp. 118-30; table A-1 and references. 132. Haley, 1988, p. 5· 133. Olsen, 1985, pp. 93-94. 134. Sassa, 1991, p. 61. 135. Interview No.8, Tokyo, December 11, 1982. Auer, 1973a, p. 50. 136. Quoted in Carpenter and Gibert, 1982, p. 264. 137. Berger, 1992, p. 489. 138. Okazaki, 1982, p. 470. 139. Berger, 1992, p. 345· 140. Beer, 1987, p. 12. 141. McNelly, 1975, p. 100. 142. In the words of Masahi Nishihara (1985, p. 135), "faced with strong pacifist demands to the effect that Article 9 prohibited any rearmament, the government claimed that Article 9 actually allowed Japan to exercise its right of self-defense. It was a new interpretation, based on a new emphasis placed on the first ten words of the second paragraph of the article. In other words the new interpretation was that Japan might have a force as long as it would use it not 'as means of settling international disputes' but simply as a means of self-defense. The new justification was also based on Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, which refers to the right of self-defense as an inherent right of any nation. Hence the euphemism known as the 'Self-Defense Force.'" 143. Eto, 1983, pp. 56-57· As chapter 8 discusses further, the situation has become more fluid in the 1990s. 144· Weinstein, 1971, p. 12 5· 145· Soeya, 1995, p. 15. Haas, 1995, n. 10. 146. McNelly, 1982, p. 357· 147. This gap did not narrow in the 1990s. While public support for the SDF consolidated, "So percent of the constitutional scholars in Japan adhere to the view that Article 9 prohibits the maintenance of any significant military force.'' Asahi Shimbun, November 18, 1991, reports a poll of constitutional lawyers which showed 78 percent insisting on the illegality of the SDF while public opinion during the 1980s increasingly accepted the SDF. See also Tuneoka et al., 1993, p. 140 and Takahara, n.d., p. 2. 148. Keddell, 1993, p. 15; see also pp. 16-17, 23, 187-89. 149. Fukami, 1988. Katzenstein and Okawara, 1993, pp. 141-48. 150. Cowhey, 1985, pp. 201-13. Quo, 1986. Caldwell, 1981a and 1981b. Bobrow and Kudrle, 1987, pp. 547-54· 151. Chandler and Brauchli, 1990, p. A{. 152. Economist, 1990, p. 61. 153. Chipello and Brauchli, 1990. 154. Burt, 1991. 155· Green, 1995. Pempel, 1990a, pp. 5-6. U.S. Congress, Office ofTechnology Assessment, 1988, 1989, 1990. Morse, 1987. Samuels, 1994. Friedman and Samuels, 1992. Borrus and Zysman, 1992, pp. 29-35. Vogel, 1992. 156. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, 1990, p. 61. Katzenstein and Okawara, 1993, pp. 148-55. 157. Pempel, 1990a, pp. 13-14, 21. Samuels, 1994, pp. 290-91. 158. Fong, 1990, p. 6. 2 39

NoTES TO PAGES 123-28 159. Chinworth, 1990b, p. 9· 160. Alexander, 1993, p. 51. 161. Interviews Nos. 1 and 21, Tokyo, December 9 and 18, 1991. 162. Chinworth, 1990a, p. 219. 163. Arthur Alexander's research, for example, compares Japan with Israel and Italy. It shows that 'Japan produces far fewer categories of military equipment than the other two countries, and for each category in which it participates, Japan produces fewer different types and models. Israel produced items in 2 1 of the 2 5 designated categories, and more tha,n 5 models on the average in each of the categories. Italy produced an average of 8 models in its 23 actively pursued categories. In contrast, Japan was engaged in only 12 categories, each with an average of 3 models. Moreover, many of these items were produced under license. Thus, in both breadth and depth, Japanese defense industry has much less experience than other countries that are less constrained by budget and policy in their military activities." Alexander, 1993, pp. 37-38. 164. Interview No.6, Tokyo, December 10, 1991. Green, 1995, pp. 125-52. 165. Katzenstein and Okawara, 1993, pp. 155-71. 166. According to NATO calculations of military expenditures, which include pensions and annuities, Japan's defense expenditures amount to about 1.5 percent of GNP. But for a variety of reasons, in Japan these annuities and pensions are included in the budget of the Ministry for Health and Welfare. 167. Keddell, 1993, PP· 49-57. 168. Berger, 1992, pp. 490-501.Johnson, 1986b, pp. 567-70. Keddell, 1993, pp. 125-60. 169. Asagumo Shimbun-sha, 1991, p. 25. 170. Research Institute for Peace and Security, 1994, pp. 131-32. 171. Keddell, 1993, pp. 31-40, 176-202. 172. Interviews Nos. 1, 4, 5, and 18, Tokyo,June 11, 12, and 18, 1991. Ogata, 1987. 173. A. Tanaka, 1990, p. 19. 174. Asahi Shimbun, November 9 and 10, 19go. 175. Interview No. 19, Tokyo, June 18, 1991. 176. Asahi Shimbun, September 19, 1991. 177. T. Tanaka, 1991, pp. 40-41. 178. As Pyle (1993, pp. 103-4) argues convincingly, this contradiction did not exist in the 1950s; it resulted instead from the government's evolving interpretations of Article 9· 179. Sasaki, 1991, p. 202. 180. Asahi Shimbun,June 16, 1992. 181. Sanger, 1992b, p. E4. 182. Japan Defense Agency, 1993, pp. 134-51. Shenon, 1993· 183. Interviews Nos. 1, 4, and 16, Tokyo, June 11 and 17, 1991. In 1991 the government submitted to the Diet a bill amending the disaster relief legislation of 1987 to permit sending SDF personnel abroad. The bill passed the Diet in June 1992 without much controversy. See Asahi Shimbun,June 16, 1992. 184. Takallara, forthcoming, p. 1. 185. Takahara, n.d., p. 10. Opinion polls indicated that the public preferred nonmilitary to military participation in peacekeeping operation by a margin of 3:1. Ibid., p. 10.

Notes to Pages I28-35 186. Drifte, 1ggo, p. 26. 187. Akaha, 1985, p. 75· 188. Quoted in Sigur, 1975, p. 187. 18g. Hook, 1988, p. 387. Wan, 1993, pp. 286-345. 1go. Okimoto, 1978a, 1978b. Stemgold, 1993· Schlesinger, 1993· 191. Sanger, 1994b. Chapter 6 discusses further the problematic third principle, which prohibits the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan. 192. Asahi, April 7, 1981. Kahn, 1970. 193. Ishihara and Eto, 1991, p. 123. 194. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, 1990, 1991. For a discussion of the same dilemma from the perspective of Japan see Green, 1995. 195. Schlesinger, 1991. 196. Alexander, 1992. 197. Quoted in Noble, 1ggo, p. 34· 198. Quoted in Mendel, 1970, p. 1049. 6. THE U.S.-JAPAN RELATIONSHIP 1. Kurokawa, 1985, p. 4· Green, 1995· pp. 73-77· Keddell, 1993· pp. 59-65. 2. Otake, 1983, pp. 133-37. 3· Takahara, 1992, p. 12. 4· Umemoto, 1985, pp. 53-54. Interview No. 14, Tokyo, December 13, 1991. 5· Weinstein, 1971, pp. 49, 106, 109, 112, 116-1g, and 1975, pp. 42, 44, 46. Morris, 1958, p. 19. 6. Weinstein, 1975, p. 57· 7· Weinstein, 1971, p. 121, and 1975, p. 52. Interview Nos. 6, 12 and 15, Tokyo, December 10, 12 and 14, 1991. 8. Havens, 1987, p. 18g. g. Interview No. 12, Tokyo, December 12, 1991. See also the discussion in chapter 4 above. 10. Weinstein, 1971, p. 108. 11. Nishihara, 1983/84, p. 187. Interview No.4, Tokyo, June 11, 1991. 12. Interview Nos. 12 and 23, Tokyo, December 12 and 19, 1991. Okazaki, Nishimura, and Sato, 1991, pp. 100-101. Smith, 1ggo, p. 21. 13. O'Connell, 1987, pp. 55-56, 65. Interviews Nos. 4, 7 and g, Tokyo, June 11 and 13, 1991. 14. Interviews Nos. 4, 8, g, 15, 21, and 22, Tokyo,June 11, 13, 17, and 19, 1991. 15. Interview No. 11, December 12, 1991. This level of operational cooperation goes far beyond any commitments Japan made in the NDPO or in the Guidelines, both of which mandate a strictly defensive posture for the SDF. Mochizuki, 1983/84, p. 161. Arkin and Chappell, 1985. 16. Friedman and LeBard, 1991, p. 266. 17. Nishihara, 1987, p. 186. Nishimura, 1991. 18. Interviews Nos. 8, 16, and 22, Tokyo, June 13, 17, and 19, 1991. Auer, 1988. 19. Bergner, 1991, p. 185. 20. Interviews Nos. g, 10, 12, 16, and 22, Tokyo, June 13, 14, 17, and 19, 1991. Interview No. 11, Tokyo, December 12, 1991.

NoTES TO PAGES 135-39 21. Similar problems exist with the stationing of 300 Green Berets at Okinawa in September 1983 and the deployment of SH-3H Sea King helicopters on the Yokosuka-based aircraft carrier Midway; these helicopters can carry nuclear depth charges for antisubmarine warfare. 22. Interview No.2, Tokyo,June 11, 1991. 23. Inoguchi, 1985, p. 28. 24. Interviews Nos. 16, 18 and 21, Tokyo, June 17, 18, and 19. Interview No. 11, Tokyo, December 12, 1991. 25. Interview No. 11, Tokyo, December 12, 1991. 26. How much of the planes' electronic gear will really be technologically advanced and not black-boxed to Japanese engineers remains unclear and is a possible source of friction. 27. Interview No. 23, Kyoto, June 24, 1991. 28. The replacement of the 210 F-104s by 223 F15:J Eagle fighters, each costing $65 million, serves the same purpose. 29. Interview Nos. 18 and 22, Tokyo, June 18 and 19, 1991. 30. Bobrow, 1984, p. 43· 31. The conference established regular links between the U.S. Commanderin-Chief, Pacific Fleet and the MSDF. Richelson, 1988, p. 266. 32. Harries and Harries, 1987, p. 249· 33· Sanger, 1992a. Because it feared losing control over intelligence to the civilians, the SDF in the early 1970s had blocked a proposal by then JDA chief Nakasone to integrate the intelligence operations of JDA civilians and the three branches of the SDF. Now, in contrast, an integration of intelligence gathering is viewed more favorably by a more self-confident SDF. Interview No. 21, Tokyo, June 19, 1991. 34· Levin, 1988, p. 17. 35· Green, 1995, pp. 136-39. Interview Nos. 1, 2, 5, and 10, Tokyo, December 5, 6, 8, and 14, 1994 36. Interview No. 21, Tokyo, June 19, 1991. 37· Chinworth, 1990a, p. 197. 38. Hummel, 1988 and 1991. Soderberg, 1986. 39· Hummel, 1988, p. 11. 40. Soderberg, 1986, pp. 126-56. Van de Velde, 1988a, pp. 331-69. Tow, 1983 and 1987. Kinoshita, 1989. Keddell, 1993, pp. 160-66. 41. George, 1988, p. 266. Interview No. 14, Tokyo, June 15, 1991. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, 1990, pp. 61-62. Rubinstein, 1987a, p. 46. 42. Only two technologies were transferred: the construction of naval vessels and the modification of U.S. naval vessels. Interview No. 14, Tokyo, June 17, 1991. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, 1990, p. 69. 43· Interview No. 11, Tokyo, June 14, 1991. Schlesinger and Pasztor, 1990. Samuels, 1991, p. 54· 44· Green and Samuels conclude in a report that "the implementation of the ban at the working level seems far more restrictive than is required de jure. Further, these restrictions seem contrary to the spirit of previous bilateral agreements. In 1983 the U.S. and Japan agreed on an exception to the ban in which military technology could be transferred to the U.S. side by the Japanese Government, and transfer of dual-use technology would not be blocked. There are nu-

Notes to Pages IJ9-43 merous indications ... that the transfer of dual-use technology is being blocked, however. The ambiguity of the ban and the 1983 exception has led MITI officials to take an overly cautious and conservative view of its implementation, particularly given the sensitivity of defense issues in Japan." Green and Samuels, 1994a, pp. 7-8. 45· Asagumo Shimbun-sha, 1991, p. 475· 46. Interview No. 24, Tokyo, December 19, 1991. Asahi Shimbun Keizai-bu, 1g8g, pp. 112, 115-117. 47· Interview No. 24, Tokyo, December 19, 1991. 48. Sentaku, 5/1994, P· 95· 49· Interview No. 6, December 1o, 1991. Had there been substantial domestic opposition, which there was not, a loophole existed under Article 12 of the U.S.Japan Status of Forces Agreement which permits supplying the United States with war-related equipment in times of need. The article exempts from the export ban American military forces stationed in Japan as long as ordered equipment is for use there. However, the Japanese government has no way to monitor whether the U.S. Department of Defense is using the material in Japan or is shipping it elsewhere, so weapons containing critically important components may have left, and continue to leave, Japan. Mainichi, February 6, 1982. Interview Nos. 3· 11, 14, and 17, Tokyo,June 11, 14, and 17,1991. 50. Eckhouse, 1991. Samuels, 1991, p. 63. However, one should not overestimate the current degree of dependence of American weapon producers on foreign suppliers solely on the basis of this case. See Silverberg, 1992. 51. Since the United States spends about twice as much as does Japan on R&D, the imbalance in defense and aerospace R&D in real dollar terms is about 30:1 and 92:1, respectively. See Vollmer, 1991, pp. 29, 31. 52. Green, 1995, pp. 86-124. Shear, 1994. Chinworth, 1992, pp. 132-61. Nishihara and Potter, 1990. Mastanduno, 1991, pp. 84-93. Noble, 1992. Spar, 1993· Alexander, 1993, pp. 31-35. Pollack, 1995. 53· Nishihara and Potter, 1990, p. 26. 54· Garby, 1g8g, p. g. Samuels, 1991, pp. 59-64. 55· U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, 1ggo, p. 67. Green, 1995, pp. 153-64. Interview No. 25, Tokyo, December 19, 1991. 56. Interview No. 23, Tokyo, December 19, 1991. Fujishima, 1992, pp. 21617. Green, 1995, p. 136. 57· Samuels and Whipple, 1g8g, p. 294· U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, 1990, p. 67. Interview Nos. 8 and 16, Tokyo, June 13 and 17, 1991. Around 1g86 MITI's Aircraft and Ordnance Division switched its position, to the dismay of the JDA. Asahi Shimbun Keizai-bu, 1g8g, pp. 237-40. 58. Interview No. 6, December 10, 1991. 59· U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, 1991, pp. 115-20. Chinworth, 1992, pp. 175-76. 6o. Emmerson, 1971, p. 140. 61. Japan Defense Agency, 1ggo, p. 294· Emmerson, 1971, pp. 140-41. Interview No. 20, Tokyo, December 18, 1991. Nakajo, 1987, pp. 432-35. 62. Interview No. g, Tokyo, June 13, 1991. Van de Velde, 1g88a, p. 206. 63. Interview Nos. 6 and g, Tokyo, June 12 and 13, 1992. 64. Ishiguro, 1987, p. 242. Van de Velde, 1g88a, pp. 165-72. 65. Between 1976 and 1978 it met eight times. In contrast, between 1979 and 2 43

1990 the SDC met only once. MOFA apparently continues to hope to make it a higher level policy forum. Interview No. 1, Tokyo, June 11, 1991. But close defense consultation continued after 1978. Major studies have dealt with joint defense planning, sea-lanes defense, the establishment of a Japan-U.S. Defense Coordination Center, the exchange of intelligence, common operational preparations, communications, and the assistance of Japanese defense facilities extended to U.S. forces in crises situations that would have an important impact on Japan. Akaha, n.d. pp. 132-33. Asagumo Shimbun-sha, 1991, pp. 283-84. Japan Defense Agency, 1ggo, pp. 176-77. Interview Nos. 1, 6, and g, Tokyo, June 11, 12, and 13, 1991. Van de Velde, 1g88a, pp. 200, 208-g. 66. Pharr, 1992, pp. 10, 20. 67. Drifte, 1985a, p. g. 68. Interview Nos. 6 and 20, Tokyo, June 12 and 19, 1991. 6g. It met twelve times between 1g8o and 1990. Under its auspices, technical review groups meet quite regularly to deal with questions affecting joint command, air defense, and the relations between each of the three services and their counterparts. 70. Interview No. 3, Tokyo, June 11, 1991. Interview No. 20, Tokyo, December 18, 1991. Rubinstein, 1987a, pp. 45-46. Kuranari and Mochizuki, 1983. Coming, 1g8g, pp. 278-86. 71. Rubinstein, 1987b. Soderberg, 1986, pp. 139-40. 72. Vogel, 1g8g, pp. 32-36. Okimoto, Rowen, and Dahl, 1987, pp. 42-46. However, the JMTC has not met frequently, and until the late 1g8os only a couple of technology transfers had actually occurred, both contrived more for establishing precedents for possible technology transfers than for any immediate military benefit for the United States. Vogel, 1g8g, p. 36. 73· Fujishima, 1992, pp. 213-14. Saikawa, 1ggo, p. 42. 74· Fujishima, 1992, pp. 214-15. 75· Samuels, 1994, p. 187. See also Chinworth, 1992, pp. 122-23, 168-76. Alexander, 1993, pp. 37-48. Green, 1995. 76. Hatch and Yamamura, 1995· 77· Friedman and Samuels, 1992, p. 4· 78. Friedman and Samuels, 1992, p. 55· 79· Chinworth, 1ggoa, pp. 197-gS, 228-32 and 1992. So. Samuels and Whipple, 1g8g, pp. 276, 305. 81. Interview No. 20, Tokyo, December 18, 1991. 82. Interview No.3, Tokyo, June 11, 1991. Interview No. 1, Tokyo, December g, 1991. 83. Green and Samuels, 1994a, p. 6. 84. Green, 1995, pp. 139-42. Green and Samuels, 1994a. Sentaku, 5/1994, pp. 94-97. Pollack, 1994. 85. Green, 1995, p. 134. 86. Interview No. 25, Tokyo, December 20, 1991. 87. Asahi Shimbun Keizai-bu, 1g8g, p. 76. Interview No. 11, Tokyo, June 14, 1991. 88. Mcintosh, 1986, p. 72. 8g. Ishimoto and Hirobe, 1987, pp. 117-21. go. Specifically, Article 1 gave the American military forces a very broad assignment. Their scope of action was not restricted to Japan; the terms of their 2

44

Notes to Pages I46-47 deployment were left solely to the discretion of the United States; and their status and operation was in no way tied to the United Nations. 91. Weinstein, 1971, p. 88. Aruga, 1989. 92. But this obligation extends only to Japanese and American forces stationed in Japan. Because it would have violated the prohibition of collective defense and security arrangements, as stipulated in Article 9 of Japan's Constitution, the treaty does not provide for military action to meet common dangers other than those directed against territories under Japanese administration. Addressing the purpose of stationing foreign military forces in Japan, Article 6 mentions Japanese security ahead of international peace and security in the Far East. 93· Havens, 1987, pp. 87-88, 159. 94· Richardson, 1977, pp. 257-58. 95· Prior consultation is not mandatory when logistical operations are being carried out from bases in Japan. Kim, 1972, p. 63. The Japanese government took the position that the U.S. forces stationed in Japan could, under Article 6 of the Security Treaty, operate in Vietnam, which is not a part of the Far East. Indeed, the foreign minister acknowledged that Japan was not neutral in the Vietnam War. Emmerson, 1971, p. 84. The government has argued that the treaty's relatively imprecise provisions for consultation represent a convergence of interests rather than, as the opposition maintains, a set of empty procedures leaving Japan without veto power. The government position is based on a joint U.S.-Japanese communique signed in 1960. Reliance on such "flexible" consultative mechanisms represents a Japanese concession in a treaty that in most other respects grants Japan, in American eyes, very favorable terms. But it is also well suited to the way legal and social norms interact in Japan. 96. Quoted in Havens, 1987, p. 87. 97· Emmerson, 1971, pp. 89-97. LaFeber, 1989, pp. 96-116. 98. Y Watanabe, 1991, pp. 244-45. 99· Nishihara, 1990, p. 4· 100. According to the government U.S. troops are legally free to leave Japan without the Japanese government's consent, because they start their "military operations" only when approaching the area of engagement, in this case the Mideast. This policy voids the necessity of the United States and Japanese governments having to reach explicit agreements on the objectives of particular troop movements and thus sidesteps the controversial issue of "prior consultations," provided by the Security Treaty, arguably the umbrella under which all of Japan's security policy is now conducted. Interview Nos. 15 and 22, Tokyo, December 14 and 18, 1992. 101. Endicott, 1975, p. 45· 102. Soderberg, 1986, p. 46. Van de Velde, 1988a, pp. 263-67. Olsen, 1985, p. 25· 103. Drifte, 1990, p. 25. 104. Van de Velde, 1988b, p. 23. The issue remained submerged until former U.S. ambassador Edwin Reischauer gave two interviews in spring 1981 in which he described long-standing arrangements that had permitted American warships carrying nuclear weapons to make port calls in Japan. For American policymakers, weapons "in transit" were not being "introduced into" Japan. "Introducing" for American policymakers meant offioading, stationing, or storing nuclear weapons on Japanese soil. For the Japanese government, perhaps because of how 2

45

NOTES TO PAGES 147-49 it answered questions from the opposition in the Diet, "introducing" included weapons in transit. In a second interview Reischauer insisted that American nuclear weapons policy toward Japan was an open secret and should not be a surprise to anyone, despite the traditional policy of the U.S. Navy neither to deny nor to confirm the existence of nuclear weapons on any of its ships. The uproar in Japan over Ambassador Reischauer's statements was very strong not because of what he had said, but because, as a relative insider, he had spoken at all, exposing that Japan's security relationship with the United States contradicted the third of its non-nuclear principles. Furthermore, Reischauer reopened painful discussions about whether nuclear-armed planes of the U.S. Air Force were flying in and out of Japan, and whether nuclear weapons were stored in Okinawa. Halloran, 1981. Stokes, tg8ta, tg8tb. Drifte, tggo, p. 25. Hook, tg88, pp. 387-88. Akaha, 1984, pp. 871-72 and 1985, p. 78. Van de Velde, tg88a, pp. 257-62, and tg88b, p. 23. Sayle, 1981. Other evidence suggests that Reischauer was speaking the truth. For example, in 1987 the JCP found in the U.S. Library of Congress a declassified telegram from tg66, signed by Secretary of State Dean Rusk, that substantially supported the 1974 New York Times story and Ambassador Reischauer's account. In the summer of 1987 the Kyodo News Agency reported the 1984 instruction by the commander-in-chief of the U.S. Pacific Forces to regional military commanders in several countries, including Japan, to devise plans to control nuclear accidents. See Drifte, tggo, pp. 25-26. 105. In the later phases of the Vietnam War, in 1972, with the United States resuming the bombing of North Vietnam and the Seventh Fleet mining North Vietnamese coastal waters, American nuclear-powered submarines visited Japanese ports as many as thirty times. With the American withdrawal from Southeast Asia, and in an era of detente, this number declined to about five to ten a year. By 1982 the visits had, however, increased to as many as 20. And in 1985 at least 32 nuclear submarines docked in Yokosuka and Sasebo. Akaha, 1984, pp. 87374; 1985, pp. 79-81. Drifte, tggo, p. 24. The stationing of the carrier Midway in Yokosuka and of the nuclear-powered Enterprise in Sasebo also has raised suspicions that some of the Enterprise attack-fighters may be equipped with nuclear weapons. Furthermore, the refurbished New jersey, equipped with 32 intermediate-range Tomahawk cruise missiles, has been granted visitation rights at Sasebo, as has the carrier Carl Vinson, which was reassigned from the Atlantic to the Pacific to augment America's nuclear capacity. 106. Akaha, 1984, p. 876. 107. Yamamura, tg8g, p. 2 2 2. Marshall, 1981, charts 5 and 11. Mendel, 1971-72, p. 525· 1o8. Bobrow, tg8g, pp. 586, 592. tog. Russett, 1963. Bobrow, (tg8g, pp. 592, 595) speaks of a "lack of robust confidence in the commonality of defense interests and the reliability of U.S. security commitments ... dependency [on the United States] continues to be less a matter of deep collective psychology and more an uneasy set of pragmatic stances." 110. Herald Tribune, October g, 1995, p. 2. 1 1 1. The economic security issues that chapter 5 discusses resemble the case of internal rather than external security. 112. Nishihara, 1983/84, p. 183. See also Mochizuki, 1983/84, pp. 156-57. Interview No. 23, Kyoto, June 24, 1991.

Notes to Pages r49-53 113. Most participants in the bureaucratic and political process that drafted the NDPO were aware of this aspect of the "ceiling." Interview Nos. 7, 10, 14, and 15, Tokyo, December 10, 12, 13, and 14, 1991. 114. Hirose, 1989, p. 211. 115. I am indebted to Richard Samuels for alerting me to this point. It appears unlikely that the 1994 report of the prime minister's Advisory Group on Defense Issues, once made operational for the SDF, will change this situation. Green ( 1995, p. 148) calls the report "clever but vague . . . . The question of capabilities versus development was at the core of the report's vagueness." Public perception of the Soviet Union as a threat had something to do with the public's acceptance of the U.S.-Japan security arrangements. See Marshall, 1981, charts 2 and 3; Bobrow, 1989, pp. 586-89. 116. Pempel, 1990b, p. 28. 117. In the coming years this may change. With a sharply shrinking weapons procurement budget and in the interest of keeping a minimum of national production Jines open, Japanese business corporations are beginning to push for a relaxation of the arms export ban, most likely through increased joint-weapons development and production with U.S. companies. See Hamilton, 1995· 118. Japanese business and government, for different reasons, currently resist increasing the flow of technology from Japan to the United States, so this analysis cannot untangle the relative power of government and business. However, a series of voluntary export restraint agreements, negotiated in different industrial sectors since the mid-195os, shows that government preference initially prevailed over the profit motive of business. In these two closely related issues tlle relative weights of government and business appear to be somewhat similar. Contemporary debates about Japan's political economy are briefly reviewed in chapters 2 and 3· 119. Blurring the distinction between offense and defense is not restricted to the SDF's new weapon systems. The riot police used its plastic shields offensively, by slamming them down on the toes of front-line demonstrators. The difference between defense and offense is not self-evident, technologically determined, or naturally given, as students of national security have often assumed in their writings on offense and defense as a cause of war. 120. Bobrow, 1989, p. 595· 121. Samuels and Whipple, 1989, pp. 305-8. Samuels 1994, pp. 198-269. 122. Keddell, 1990, pp. 169-70. 123. Interview No. 23, Kyoto, June 24, 1991. 124. Sanger, 1994a. Prime Minister Hata acknowledged as much in a subsequently retracted statement when he argued in tlle Diet in June 1994 that 'Japan has the capability to possess nuclear weapons, but has not made them." See Sanger, 1994e. 125. Perrin, 1979. 126. Inoguchi, 1985, p. 32.

7. JAPAN

AND GERMANY

1. For other analyses that also stress significant differences between contemporary Japan and Germany see Buruma, 1991, 1994; Berger, 1992, 1993, 1996; Schlant and Rimer, 1991; Leibfried, 1993; Kurth, 1991, pp. 219-22. 2 47

NOTES TO PAGES 153-62 2. The labels "Hobbesian" and "Grotian" are not perfect because Chinese, not Western, conceptions of law and international order shape Japan's approach. While a rough correspondence exists between Grotius and Mencius or Confucius, Chinese realists, or Legalists, do not have, even in Lord Shang, a representative whose arguments correspond fully with the intellectual position of Thomas Hobbes. Furthermore, the term "Legalists" has the wrong connotations for a Western audience. Hence I reluctantly choose Western labels to characterize Japanese experience. For helping me sort this out, I am indebted to Tom Christensen and lain Johnston and, for a lucid introduction and overview, to Chang Wejan's three lectures titled "The Origins of Chinese Legal Thought" delivered at the Cornell Law School on March 31, April 5, and April 7, 1994. 3· Katzenstein and Tsujinaka, 1991, appendix. 4· Horchem, 1980, p. 51. Kolinsky, 1988, pp. 61, 73· Because of the focus of chapter 4, this analysis covers only German policy directed against left-wing groups. In general, the Japanese police's conservative bias is also found in the German force, although in very different political forms. 5· Borgs-Maciejewski, 1988, pp. 44-45. 6. Wehner, 1980. Busch et al., 1985, pp. 260-69. 7· Brand, 1989, p. 142. Gassner, 1987, pp. 145-50. 8. Apter and Sawa, 1984. 9· Katzenstein and Tsujinaka, 1991, table 2. 10. This is not to argue that terrorism and social violence are less important politically in Japan than in Germany, since Japan's overall crime rate is very low by international standards. See Katzenstein and Tsujinaka, 1991, p. 5· 11. Katzenstein and Tsujinaka, 1991, pp. 12-16. 12. Katzenstein, 1990, pp. 12-13. Katzenstein and Tsujinaka, 1991, p. 39· 13. Ishihara and Eto, 1991. 14. Friedman and LeBard, 1991. 15. During the Cold War the Soviet Union's focus on the correlation of forces offered a specific version of a "comprehensive" security strategy. This fact is a useful reminder that "comprehensiveness" itself is not a recipe for success. The economic and political content that Japan and Germany gave to the concept, explained here largely in terms of institutionalized norms, is of central importance. 16. The German figure dwarfs those for Japan ($5 billion) and the United States ($18 billion). See Bureau of National Affairs, 1994. 17. Brand 1989, p. 69. Burgerrechte und Polizei, 1980. Flaherty, 1989, p. 73· 18. Katzenstein, 1990, p. 19. 19. Katzenstein, 1990, p. 19. 20. Clifford, 1976, p. 82. National Police Agency, 1989b, pp. 71-76. Rinalducci, 1972, p. xxviii. All prefectural police headquarters were eventually connected to the National Police Agency, first through a teletype network, later by computer. 21. A second system stored records on about 6o million drivers. Interview No. 4, Tokyo, May 1990. 2 2. Katzenstein, 1990, pp. 18-19. 23. Although the computer systems of each prefecture are linked in one centralized nationwide network, the more detailed data stored at the prefectural level are not fully accessible from the center. Interview Nos. 4, 10, 12, 19 Tokyo,

Notes to Pages I62-69 May 14-18, 1ggo. The MPD, however, apparently stores in a central computer system at least some of the data collected by the security police at local and prefectural levels. According to one long-time observer of the Japanese police, major corporations may have access to membership lists of left-wing organizations against which they screen job applicants. Interview No. 12, Tokyo, May 16, 1ggo. Other government agencies have their own computerized information systems not accessible to the NPA. The MOJ, for example, has a central data archive on all convictions, containing 10 million cases for the last two decades. It also stores, off-line in personal computers, data from the Prosecutors Office on individual cases. The Public Security Agency is in the early stages of developing its own data archives. These various sources of computerized information on individuals may become an additional useful instrument for Japan's policy of internal security. As of the early 1ggos, however, their importance and usefulness have been limited. Interview No. 2, Tokyo, December 8, 1988. Interview Nos. 4 and 18, Tokyo, May 14 and 18, 1ggo. 24. Katzenstein and Tsujinaka, 1991, p. 164. Katzenstein, 1990, p. 59· 25. Japan, however, spent much more on supporting American troops. Under the provision of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) the Japanese defense budget's share of tile costs of American troops stationed in Japan, increased between the early 1970s and the mid-1ggos from 30 to 100 percent. This figure was much higher per soldier than what was being paid by any NATO member. See Sutter, 1982, p. 14; Keddell, 1ggo, p. 170; Puckett, 1990, p. 1 1. In the early 1g8os, for example, Japan appropriated about $1 billion for the support of 48,ooo American troops while West Germany paid $1.3 billion toward the support of 240,000 American soldiers. Nishihara, 1983/84, p. 204. By 1990 Japan was paying about $2.4 billion, or 40 percent of the support costs of U.S. troops. Subsequently the percentage has increased further. In 1996 Japan pays 100 percent of the total costs, excluding the salaries of U.S. personnel, of the U.S. military presence in Japan. Stemgold, 1994a. Japanese funds cover construction, environmental abatement, land rental, local compensations, and welfare payments for local workers. 26. For tile purposes of tilis chapter's argument, Germany refers to tile Federal Republic of West Germany before October 3, 1990 and to unified Germany tilereafter. For practical purposes, tile norms tilat define Germany's security policy have been left largely intact despite unification, as have many of tile West German institutions tilat have spread eastward. It would take tilis discussion too far afield to describe and analyze tile contestation, specifically regarding social norms, now occurring between tilose living in what used to be called 'West" and "East" Germany. 27. Katzenstein, 1ggo. 28. Cullen, 1992. Walker, 1992. Den Boer, 1991. Ahnfelt and From, 1993. Anderson and den Boer, 1994. Fijnaut, 1993. Benyon, 1994. Funk, 1995. 29. Germany's preference can be explained as both institutional and rationalist. The German view of an institutionalized Europeanization of police cooperation simply extrapolates the legally mandated cooperation of quasi-independent states in Germany's federal police system. Furthermore, the Federal Criminal Office in Wiesbaden finds Europeanization appealing because it increases the federal police organization's power at the expense of the individual state police organizations. I thank Albrecht Funk for clarifying this point for me. 30. Katzenstein, 1990, pp. 23-27, 52-53. 2 49

NOTES TO PAGES 16g-81 31. Katzenstein, 1ggo, p. 4· Central Statistical Office, 1990, table 10.36. Birch, 1g8g, p. 11. 32. Somucho, 1g8g. 33· Kuhne and Miyazawa, 1979, p. 6g. 34· National Police Agency, 1987a, p. 35· National Police Agency, 1g8ga, pp. 49-50. Katzenstein, 1ggo, p. 22. 35· Kelleher, 1982, p. 292. 36. Kelleher, 1982, p. 283. 37· Busch et al., 1985, pp. 53-58. Funk et al., 1g8o, pp. 71-76. 38. Cowen, 1986, pp. 32-33· Finn, 1g8g, p. 346. 39· Weiss, 1976, pp. 63-64. Denninger, 1977. Hammans, 1987. 40. Seifert, 1983, p. 4· Seifert, 1977. 41. Katzenstein, 1ggo, pp. 32-33. 42. Dumont, 1986, p. 591. 43· Vagts, 1g8g. 44· Lagoni, 1977. Rosenstock, 1977. 45· The same impulse is noticeable in other international arenas such as the economic summits convened by the advanced industrial states since 1977. The subject of terrorism was raised for the first time at the Bonn summit in 1978, apparently without prior staff work, at a time when Chancellor Schmidt was preoccupied with threats of terrorism. But it was also clear that the political consensus that emerged at the Bonn summit did not really set any norm and had no legally binding force according to customary international law. 46. Donnelly, 1g86, pp. 620-24. 47· Friedlander, 1982. Freestone, 1981. Gal-Or, 1985. 48. Gal-Or, 1985, p. 256. 49· Freestone, 1981, p. 215. so. Haley, 1982a, p. 274. Henderson, 1965, pp. 195-96. Smith, 1g8sa, p. 43· Citizens Crime Commission, 1975, p. 33· Oki, 1984, p. 5· For thoughtful discussions of the meaning of this indicator in the American context see Clark, 1992, and Galanter, 1993· 51. Ogata, 1987. Ames, 1981, p. 145. Miyazawa, 1g8g. Van Wolferen, 1g8g, p. 199. 52. The normative context of Japan's internal security policy is not intelligible without reference to the power of public opinion, in contrast to the situation in Germany, where public opinion is less important. In their centrist leanings the Japanese are a step ahead even of the Germans. In response to the request, "choose any of the eleven types of people with whom you wouldn't like to be neighbors," 61 and 6o percent of the Japanese respondents answered "left radicals" and "right radicals," respectively, while German respondents answered 51 and 45 percent. See Nishihara, 1987, p. 75· 53· Haley, 1984, pp. 479-80. 54· Kawabe, 1994, pp. 183-85, as quoted inK. Kato, 1995, p. 1/33. 55· Katzenstein, 1987. s6. Abenheim, Ig88, p. 125· 57· Abenheim, 1988, p. 167. 58. Quoted in Gluck, 1992, p. g. 59· Quoted in Gluck, 1992, p. g 6o. Hamaguchi, 1985. 61. Thamm, 1g8g, p. 182. 2JO

Notes to Pages IBI-92 62. Nadelmann, 1987, p. 295· 63. Nadelmann, 1987, p. 26g. 64. Nadelmann, 1987, p. 288. 65. National Police Agency, 1ggo, p. 3· 66. Bayley, 1991, p. 119. 67. Friman, 1991, 1993, 1995· Yokoyama, 1988. Bayley, 1991, pp. 6-7, 11523. Miyazawa, 1992, pp. 91-95. Tamura, n.d. 68. Friman, 1993. 6g. National Police Agency, 1ggo, p. 5· 70. Friman, 1991, pp. 885-86, 888. 71. Arase, 1995. Wan, 1995. Ensign, 1992. Orr, 1ggo. K. Kato, 1995. Hasegawa, 197 5· Rix, 1g8o. Spindler, 1984. Wellons, 1987. 72. Yasutomo, 1986, p. 41. Japanese aid also lacks a general set of political objectives because of an inclusive and depoliticized policy process, ample resources, and the lack of an adequate staff. 73· Albrecht, 1g8o. Holbik and Myers, 1968. Kreile, 1978. Nitsch, 1982. K. Kato, 1995. Spindler, 1984. Wellons, 1987. 74· Holbik and Myers, 1968, p. 41. 75· Arase, 1995, p. 200. 76. Bergner, 1991, Maull, 1ggo/g1, 1994, and, to a lesser extent Garten, 1992, tend to stress in their analyses some of these similarities of Japan and Germany. 77· Some call it "structural," but this is an unfortunate misnomer. Neorealism is a structural explanation. Situational analysis lacks the theoretical sparseness of structural theories. 78. The point is developed generally in several essays in Katzenstein, 1gg6, and with reference to balance of threat theorizing specifically in Barnett, 1gg6. 79· I have developed this argument in Katzenstein, 1997. 8o. Calder, 1988, pp. 418-1g, 423-26. 81. Rosecrance, 1986. Maull, 1994· 82. Garten, 1992, pp. 17-18. 83. Frederick, 1g8g. 84. Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger, 1994, pp. 62, 66. 85. Buruma, 1994. Schlant and Rimer, 1991. 86. Samuels, 1994, pp. 45, 47-48, 250, 253, 262, 319-416. 87. Smith, 1985a, p. 112. 88. Gluck, 1995, p. 47· 8g. Bobrow, 1992, p. 1. go. Dore, 1ggo, p. 438. 91. I neglect here the United States and China because they are less easily classified. I thank Gregory Noble and a graduate student participant at a colloquium at Princeton University (December 6, 1993) for clarifying for me this extension of the argument. For related though different schemes see Maull, 1994, p. 5, and K. Inoguchi, 1994, p. 38.

8.

POLITICAL TRANSFORMATIONS, PAST AND FUTURE

1. Sanger, 1992d and 1993d. 2. Yoshida, 1995. 25I

NOTES TO PAGES 192-94 3· The media were told about the timing and location of the March 22 nationwide raids on Aum facilities on condition they not print the information until an agreed-upon time. japan Times, April 15, p. 3· Der Spiege~ 21/1995. 4· Watanabe, 1995· Sansoucy, 1995· 5· Reid, 1995. H. Kato, 1995.]apan Times, May 17, 1995. 6. Kristof, 1995c. 7· D.Johnson, 1993· 8. Verhovek, 1993, p. A2o. 9· The Chinese ambassador to Japan told a high-ranking Japanese police official that the Tiananmen Square massacre would never have happened if the Chinese government, following the Japanese example, had its own riot police skilled in firm, nonviolent crowd control. Interview No. 6, Tokyo, December 1991. 10. Walt, 1991. Kolodziej, 1992. Buzan, 1991. 11. Interview No.8, Tokyo, December 11, 1991. 12. Katzenstein and Tsujinaka, 1991, pp. 75-79· 13. Bayley, 1991, pp. 158, 171-72. Katzenstein and Tsujinaka, 1991, p. 77· Nihon Seisansei Honbu, 1989, p. 31. Busch et al., 1985, p. 78. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1981, p. 108. International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981, p. 26. 14· Katzenstein and Tsujinaka, 1991, table 1o. 15. Katzenstein and Tsujinaka, 1991, pp. 65-66 and table 8. Miyazawa, 1990, p. 37· 16. Bayley, 1991, p. 77· 17. Miyazawa, 1992, p. 5· According to Miyazawa's estimates, the workload of the Japanese police is considerably lighter than that of the American police. Miyazawa, 1991, p. 255, and 1992, pp. 13-15. 18. Hatsuse, 1986, pp. 88-89. 19. Data for the number of naval vessels are for 1993; number of aircraft refers only to those deployed by the airforce. International Institute of International Studies, 1994, and Jane's Fighting Ships, 1995· 20. Halloran, 1991, p. 8. Hatsuse, 1986, pp. 88-89. 21. See Alexander, 1993, p. v. Mecham, 1995, p. 42. 22. Alexander, 1993, p. v. 23. The effect of exchange rate variations on defense budgets was exceptionally strong in these two states in 1994-95. For 1995 official Russian defense spending amounted, according to one source (Erlanger, 1994) to only $15 billion compared to $47 billion for Japan. However, it is virtually impossible to get accurate estimates of Russian defense spending, expressed in dollars, that reflect differences in purchasing power and that are deflated by effective exchange rates. The International Institute for Strategic Studies, for example, estimates Russian defense expenditures at about $100 billion in 1995 (Siiddeutsche Zeitung, October 11, 1995, p. 8). Appreciation of the yen can also lead to very misleading inferences. In dollar terms the Japanese defense budget increased from $28.73 billion in 1990 to $39.71 billion in 1993 (Betts, 1993/94, p. 42). This 38 percent increase in times of decreasing international tension may suggest some worrisome implications for Japanese policy and Asian security. But since the $-yen exchange rate dropped from 144 in 1990 to 117 in 1993, yen-dominated figures point to only a 12 percent increase over these years. This would put Japanese 252

Notes to Pages r94-20r defense spending not ahead of but behind its neighbors. Indonesia (35%), PRC (21 %), Taiwan (20%), and South Korea (14%) although ahead of Australia (- 1 %) and the United States (- 11 %). 24. Levin, Lorell, and Alexander, 1993, pp. 40-41. This careful study argues that simple calculations of defense expenditures in current dollars greatly overestimate Japan's actual military effort and capabilities. This undercuts the most optimistic assessment of the military strength of the SDF, which judges the SDF as comparable in overall size and equipment to Britain's conventional capabilities. See Brown, 1993, p. 27. 25. New York Times, May 19, 1991: E5. Betts, 1993/94, p. 42. 26. Halloran, 1991, pp. 18-19. 27. Lind, 1995. See Levin, Lorell, and Alexander, 1993, pp. 110-ll, for a more circumspect, empirically grounded forecast suggesting that, at best, Japan will try to maintain in the 1990s some of the military gains it made in the 198os. 28. Levin, Lorell, and Alexander, 1993· 29. Van Wolferen, 1990. 30. Haas, 1995, table 5· 31. Quoted in Huntington, 1993, p. 82. 32. Schmitt, 1994. 33· Janofsky, 1995. U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, 1992. Boyce, 1992. Fairchild, 1991. 34· Calder, 1988, pp. 417-19, 430-31. Dower, 1988, pp. 369-470. 35· Auer, 1973a, p. 49 and 1973b, pp. 64-66. Olsen, 1985, pp. 75-76. 36. Szymkowiak and Steinhoff, 1995, p. 271. 37· Dower, 1988, pp. 433, 439· 38. Quoted in Pyle, 1993, p. 102. 39· Yoshida later regretted the policy of expedience he had followed in the 1950s. See Pyle, 1993, p. 104. See also Green and Samuels, 1994b, p. 15. 40. Green, 1995, p. 26. 41. Yanaga, 1968, pp. 254, 256. 42. C. Johnson, 1982, p. 42. 43· C. Johnson, 1982, p. 198. 44· Otake, 1984, pp. 31-32. Samuels, 1994, pp. 130-53. Alexander, 1993, pp. 19, 29-30, 36. 45· Otake, 1984, pp. 33, 40-41, 55-56. 46. Otake, 1983, pp. 216-17; 1984, p. 32. 4 7. Drifte, 1986, p. 26. 48. Dower, 1993, p. 26. 49· Packard, 1966. 50. Hein, 1993, pp. 112-15. Taira, 1993, p. 169. 51. Calder, 1988, p. 436. I disagree, however, with Calder when he continues the argument by writing that "virtually all of these emerged in the heat of political controversy during the 196os and 1970s as concessions from a vulnerable and internally divided Liberal Democratic party to its intransigent progressive opposition" (p. 436). The limits and taboos that were observed reflected in my argument the regulatory and constitutive norms that crystallized in the conflicts of the 1950s. The sharp contrast between the massive protests against the Security Treaty in 1960 and the much tamer resistance in 1970 illustrates this point. Political practices from the 196os to the 1990s did not initiate but reconfirmed 2

53

NoTES To PAGES 201-9 and modified what had been learned in the 1950s, as Keddell (1993, pp. 6-7) points out. The difference between this book's argument and Calder's is slight in terms of timing, but analytically the difference is substantial. Since Calder's analysis is isomorphic with realist and rationalist reasoning (pp. 418-20, 423-26) his treatment of norms and culture is unconvincing to me (pp. 418-20, 422, 428, 434-36, 438). 52. Calder, 1988, p. 436. 53· This analysis has neglected other changes that have also led to the diminution of conflicts over Japanese national security policy, including the withdrawal of 15o,ooo U.S troops between 1955 and 1g6o, the return of Okinawa and the resumption of diplomatic relations with China in the early 1970s, and the end of the Vietnam War in the mid-1g7os. See Dower, 1993, pp. 26-27. 54· Berger, 1993, p. 134· 55· Gluck, 1995, p. 35· 56. Ogura, 1991b and 1991a. 57· Galtung, 1974, pp. 356, 364. 58. The metaphor is Karl Deutsch's. Like Deutsch, I seek a middle ground between these two opposing analytical perspectives. Unlike Deutsch, I do not believe that a metaphor of "steering" captures how political actors respond to the problem of historical change in periods of transformation. 59· J. Kato, 1993. Tarrow, 1994. Cowell, 1993· 6o. Interviews Nos. 2, 3, 6, 7, and g, Tokyo, December 6, 7, 8, and 13, 1994. 61. Only the JCP and other splinter groups are still disagreeing with the government on these points. But politically this disagreement will not be of consequence in the foreseeable future. 62. An important exception to this generalization is the split between LDP and JSP on how to deal with Japanese history. See also Green and Samuels, 1994b, p. 10, and Utagawa, 1994, p. 4· 63. I thank Takashi Shiraishi for clarifying this point. See also Buruma, 1994. 64. Interview No. g, December 13, 1994. 65. Nye, 1995, and Johnson and Keehn, 1995, clearly articulate the security implications that derive from these two views. 66. For a coherent conservative statement of the Anlerican position see Huntington, 1993· 67. Lewis, 1993a, 1993b. Der Spiege/14/1994: 81. Japan Economic Research Institute, 1994· Kaiser, 1993. 68. Wiseman, 1992. Harding, 1994. Inoguchi, 1993. 69. Katzenstein and Shiraishi, 1997. 70. Interview Nos. 1, 2, 4, 5, and 8, Tokyo, December 5, 6, 7, 8, and 12, 1994. 71. Buzan and Segal, 1994. Betts, 1993/94. Friedberg, 1993/94. Klare, 1993· Mack and Ball, 1992. Ball, 1993/94. 72. Dower, 1986. 73· Ogura, 1991a, p. 50. 74· Ogura, 1991a, p. 49·

2

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